

SENATE

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1955

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Our Father God, in a day of tribulation Thou hast called us to dedicate our little lives to vast and vital causes.

In Thy providence it is ours to act our part in momentous days when it can be solemnly said:

"Once to every man and nation

Comes the moment to decide,

In the strife of truth with falsehood,
For the good or evil side."

We thank Thee that in such a day America is privileged to pledge her utmost that government by and for the people shall not be replaced by the shackles of tyrants, who disdain human dignity and whose ruling passion is to seize the reins of power for their own evil designs.

We humbly pray for the assurance that we are on Thy side. To this end keep our motives clean, our appraisals just, our conscience unbetraysed, as together, with fixed purpose of heart and in Thy might unafraid, we march to meet whatever awaits as in the name of the God of truth and freedom we set up our banner. Amen.

DESIGNATION OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The legislative clerk read the following letter:

UNITED STATES SENATE,

PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,

Washington, D. C., January 26, 1955.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. PRICE DANIEL, a Senator from the State of Texas, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

WALTER F. GEORGE,

President pro tempore.

Mr. DANIEL thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. CLEMENTS, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, January 24, 1955, was dispensed with.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its clerks, announced that the House had passed a joint resolution (H. J. Res. 159) authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and

territories in that area, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message also announced that the House had agreed to the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 3) favoring temporary permission for parking on square 723 of the Capitol Grounds.

EXECUTIVE REPORT OF A COMMITTEE SUBMITTED DURING ADJOURNMENT

Pursuant to the order of the Senate of January 24, 1955,

Mr. GEORGE, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, and the protocol thereto signed at Manila on September 8, 1954 (Ex. K, 83d Cong., 2d sess.), reported it favorably on January 25, 1955, and submitted a report (Ex. Rept. No. 1) thereon.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON] be excused from attendance on the sessions of the Senate for an indefinite period, because of illness.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CONVENTION WITH CANADA ON GREAT LAKES FISHERIES—REMOVAL OF INJUNCTION OF SECRECY

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair lays before the Senate Executive B, 84th Congress, 1st session, a convention on Great Lakes fisheries between the United States of America and Canada, signed at Washington on September 10, 1954. Without objection, the injunction of secrecy is removed from the convention, and the convention, together with the President's message, will be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the message from the President will be printed in the RECORD. The Chair hears no objection.

The message from the President is as follows:

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a convention on Great Lakes fisheries between the United States of America and Canada, signed at Washington on September 10, 1954.

Upon submission of the present convention to the Senate, I desire to withdraw from the consideration of the Senate the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention signed at Washington on April 2, 1946 and submitted to the Senate on April 22, 1946 (Senate Executive C, 79th Cong., 2d sess.).

I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report by the Secretary

of State with respect to the convention signed on September 10, 1954.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

The WHITE HOUSE,
January 26, 1955.

(Enclosures: (1) Report of the Secretary of State; (2) Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, signed at Washington September 10, 1954.)

BOARD OF VISITORS TO MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, as chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, I have appointed the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BUTLER] and the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN] as members of the Board of Visitors to the United States Merchant Marine Academy.

BOARD OF VISITORS TO COAST GUARD ACADEMY

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, as chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, I announce I have reappointed the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] and appointed the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. PURTELL] as members of the Board of Visitors to the United States Coast Guard Academy.

LIMITATION OF DEBATE DURING MORNING HOUR

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, under the rule, there will be a morning hour, and I ask unanimous consent that any statements made in connection with the presentation of petitions and memorials, the introduction of bills, and other routine business, be limited to 2 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

JOINT MEETING OF THE TWO HOUSES TOMORROW

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I desire to announce to the Members of the Senate that arrangements have been made for a joint meeting of the two Houses on Thursday, January 27, 1955, at 12:30 p. m., for the purpose of receiving the President of the Republic of Haiti, His Excellency Paul Magloire.

After a quorum call, which will be had about 12 o'clock noon tomorrow, the Senate will proceed in a body to the Hall of the House of Representatives.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

AUTHORIZATION FOR FEDERAL LAND BANKS TO PURCHASE CERTAIN REMAINING ASSETS OF FEDERAL FARM MORTGAGE CORPORATION

A letter from the Governor, Farm Credit Administration, Washington, D. C., transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend section 13 of the Federal Farm Loan

Act, as amended, to authorize the Federal land banks to purchase certain remaining assets of the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 5221 OF REVISED STATUTES RELATING TO VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION OF NATIONAL BANKS

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend section 5221 of the Revised Statutes, relating to voluntary liquidation of national banks (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

REPORT OF RUBBER PRODUCING FACILITIES DISPOSAL COMMISSION

A letter from the Chairman and members of the Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Commission, Washington, D. C., transmitting, pursuant to law, a report of that Commission, dated January 1955, together with a supplement thereto (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

REPORT OF FEDERAL FACILITIES CORPORATION ON GOVERNMENT-OWNED RUBBER PRODUCING FACILITIES

A letter from the Chairman, Rubber Producing Facilities Disposal Commission, Washington, D. C., transmitting, pursuant to law, Report No. 8, prepared by the Federal Facilities Corporation, with respect to its expenditures for repairs, replacements, additions, improvements, or maintenance of the Government-owned rubber producing facilities during the 5-month period for fiscal year 1955, ended November 30, 1954 (with accompanying report); to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1946, AS AMENDED

A letter from the Secretary of State, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

REPORT ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

A letter from the Secretary of State, transmitting, pursuant to law, the third report on the extent and disposition of United States contributions to international organizations, for the fiscal year 1954 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL PROPERTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED

A letter from the Administrator, General Services Administration, Washington, D. C., transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Government Operations.

AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ACT OF MARCH 12, 1914

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend section 1 of the act of March 12, 1914 (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

LEASING OF RESTRICTED INDIAN LANDS REQUIRING THE GRANT OF LONG-TERM LEASES

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize the leasing of restricted Indian lands for public, religious, educational, recreational, residential, business, and other purposes requiring the grant of long-term leases (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

TRANSMISSION OF CERTAIN GAMBLING INFORMATION IN INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE BY COMMUNICATION FACILITIES

A letter from the Attorney General of the United States, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to prohibit the transmission of certain gambling information in interstate and foreign commerce by communication facilities (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN PERSONS TRAINED IN ESPIONAGE, COUNTERESPIONAGE, OR SABOTAGE SERVICE OR TACTICS OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

A letter from the Attorney General of the United States, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to require the registration of certain persons who have knowledge of or have received instruction or assignment in the espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service or tactics of a foreign government or foreign political party, and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

RATES OF BASIC SALARIES OF CERTAIN EMPLOYEES IN THE POSTAL FIELD SERVICE

A letter from the Postmaster General, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to increase the rates of basic salary of postmasters, officers, supervisors, and employees in the postal field service, to eliminate certain salary inequities, and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

READJUSTMENT OF POSTAL RATES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION ON POSTAL RATES

A letter from the Postmaster General, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to readjust postal rates; establish a Commission on Postal Rates; and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

PETITIONS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore:

A resolution of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island; to the Committee on Finance:

"Resolution memorializing Congress to enact legislation increasing the personal income-tax exemptions

"Whereas it is estimated that approximately 80 percent of Rhode Island's industrial workers are engaged in either directly producing goods for the consumer market, or producing materials or parts for consumer goods; and

"Whereas Rhode Island's goods are sold in a national market, and therefore the prosperity of Rhode Island business and industry and high levels of earnings and employment depend on a sustained and rising level of consumer purchasing power throughout the Nation; and

"Whereas extensive unemployment has resulted from the fact that the Nation's productive capacity exceeds present levels of consumption; and

"Whereas it is essential to a more prosperous Rhode Island and a more prosperous Nation that national purchasing power be increased; and

"Whereas such an increase in purchasing power would be most effective and beneficial to the lower-income groups who must spend the highest proportion of their income: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island hereby memorializes the Congress of the United States to enact legislation increasing the personal income-tax exemptions; and be it further

Resolved, That attention of the Senators and Representatives from Rhode Island in the Congress of the United States is respectfully called to these facts and that each is requested to use his best efforts in this behalf; and be it further

Resolved, That the secretary of state be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to transmit to the respective Presiding Officers of both branches of Congress and to the Senators and Representatives from the State of Rhode Island in the Congress of the United States duly certified copies of this resolution."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Public Works:

"Assembly Joint Resolution 5

"Relative to memorializing the President and Congress to have the Mammoth Pass Road in California constructed as a national defense highway.

"Whereas the National Government is maintaining a naval ammunition depot at Hawthorne, Nev., for national defense; and

"Whereas the National Government has assisted in the construction of a national highway from the Mexican border to the Canadian line, known as United States Highway No. 395; and

"Whereas the United States Highway No. 395 connects with various other highways leading to other portions of California; and

"Whereas the central portions of California, namely San Joaquin and Santa Clara Valleys, are without direct defense for a great portion of each year because of snow on the high Sierra Mountains; and

"Whereas, the Mammoth Pass, which is within a few miles of United States Highway No. 395, is much lower and in more open country than the other passes and is not closed with snow for as long a time in the winter months as the other passes; and

"Whereas a portion of said proposed highway has been constructed by the Forestry Department, building from both sides of the mountain range, leaving a distance of approximately 28 miles to connect the United States Highway No. 395 and State Highway Route 125; and

"Whereas the construction of a highway over the said Mammoth Pass which could be kept open during the entire year through the use of modern machinery would be an important link in coast defense, inasmuch as the transportation of munitions from the naval ammunition dump at Hawthorne, Nev., to San Joaquin Valley and coast points would be greatly facilitated thereby; and

"Whereas the proposed highway will connect with United States Highway No. 99 from which several State highways lead across the Coast Range to the Santa Clara Valley on the west side of the said range, and connect with United States Highways Nos. 101 and 466; and

"Whereas the construction of the proposed highway would not only be of importance from the standpoint of national defense, but would be of inestimable advantage from an economic standpoint, in that it would:

"(a) Afford an opportunity for the development of a virgin territory with extensive natural lumber resources amounting to upwards of 2,800,000,000 board feet of a present commercial value and an additional 2 billion board feet of potential pulp timber and substantial deposits of iron, lead and, silver.

"(b) Attract a large number of visitors to view the priceless heritage of forests, mountains, game animals, birds and other scenic beauties of the region which would be open to tourist and other travel;

"(c) Provide a loop trip for those persons traveling from Southern California to the Owens River Valley by the eastern route; and

"(d) Assist in the full power and irrigation storage development of the upper San Joaquin River in order to meet the needs of the Central Valley Project; and

"Whereas, the building of the proposed highway would contribute in great measure to the future and increasing growth and prosperity of the San Joaquin Valley and of other portions of this State; now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Assembly and Senate of the State of California (jointly), That the President and the Congress of the United States be memorialized to take such steps as may be necessary to have the said Mammoth Pass Road constructed as a national defense highway, to commence at or near Casa Diablo in Mono County, on United States Highway No. 395, and continue over Mammoth Pass at the most feasible location and connect with State Highway Route 125 in Madera County, a distance of approximately 28 miles; and be it further

Resolved, That the Congress of the United States be memorialized to make a suitable appropriation to construct said highway as soon as possible; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be sent by the chief clerk of the assembly to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Secretary of War, and to each Senator and Representative from California and from Nevada in the Congress of the United States; and the Senators and Representatives from California and Nevada are hereby respectfully urged to request such action."

A petition signed by John J. Sommer and sundry other citizens of the State of California, relating to the establishment of a national pension of \$100 a month; to the Committee on Finance.

A petition signed by Mrs. Carolyn Fox Lawton and sundry other citizens of the States of Connecticut and New York, relating to the treaty-making power; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SALTONSTALL (for himself and Mr. KENNEDY):

Resolutions of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; to the Committee on Armed Services:

"Resolutions memorializing Congress to prevent the closing of the Murphy General Hospital in Waltham.

"Whereas the proposed closing of the Murphy General Hospital in Waltham would cause great inconvenience to disabled war veterans and would greatly lessen the hospital facilities available for such veterans: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives of the General Court of Massachusetts urgently requests that the Federal Government take such steps as may be necessary to prevent the closing of said hospital; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be sent by the secretary of the Commonwealth to the President of the United States, to the Secretary of the Army, and to each Member of the Massachusetts delegation in Congress.

"House of representatives, January 17, 1955.

"Adopted.

"LAWRENCE R. GROVE, Clerk.

"A true copy.

"Attest:

"EDWARD J. CRONIN,

"Secretary of the Commonwealth."

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate resolutions of the General Court of the Commonwealth, identical with the foregoing, which were referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. SALTONSTALL (for himself and Mr. KENNEDY):

Resolutions of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; to the Committee on the Judiciary:

"Resolutions memorializing Congress to amend the provisions relative to pardons contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act, commonly called the McCarran-Walter Act

"Whereas the Congress of the United States enacted into law the Immigration and Nationality Act on June 27, 1952, commonly called the McCarran-Walter Act, and identified as Public Law 414, 82d Congress, 2d session, chapter 477 (8 U. S. C., sec. 1101 et seq.); and

"Whereas this law provides only for the granting of a full and unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or by the governor of any of the several States to certain aliens convicted of certain crime or crimes to prevent deportation; and

"Whereas in many deserving cases undue hardship results by reason of the limitations placed upon the power of the governor pertaining to pardons provided for under this law: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Governor and Executive Council of Massachusetts hereby urges the Congress of the United States to amend the provisions of the said Immigration and Nationality Act so as to broaden its scope to prevent deportation of aliens in worthy cases where undue hardship would result to dependent persons, by allowing for the granting of conditional pardons by the President of the United States or by the governor of any of the several States to persons convicted of a crime or crimes to prevent deportation of an alien; and be it further

Resolved, That copies of these resolutions be transmitted forthwith by the Secretary of State to the President of the United States, to the presiding officer of each branch of Congress, and to each of the Members thereof from this Commonwealth.

"Adopted in council, January 19, 1955.

"A true copy. Attest:

"EDWARD J. CRONIN,

"Secretary of the Commonwealth."

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate resolutions of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts identical with the foregoing, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ELLENDER:

A resolution of the senate of the State of Louisiana; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry:

"Senate Resolution 5

"Whereas the Charolaise cattle smuggled into Louisiana originated from an area in Mexico in which foot and mouth disease had been prevalent and in which all livestock were exposed to and vaccinated against the disease; and

"Whereas the presence of these smuggled cattle in our State constitutes a threat to the livestock industry of the State and Nation as such exposed and vaccinated animals are considered potential carriers of foot-and-mouth disease for unknown periods of time; and

"Whereas the individuals involved in this case were refused permission for the legal entry of these cattle into the United States on two occasions because of the disease threat but chose to smuggle the cattle into this country, thus jeopardizing the entire livestock industry for their own personal gain; and

"Whereas the effectiveness of our livestock disease control laws that have protected the Nation's livestock from the exotic diseases that plague the world will be virtually

destroyed if the smuggled animals are allowed to remain in the United States under any circumstances; and

"Whereas the presence of these potential disease disseminators in Louisiana will seriously curtail the movement of our livestock through normal marketing channels as 16 States, in order to protect their own livestock industries, have threatened to embargo all cloven-footed animals originating from or passing through Louisiana: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate of the State of Louisiana, That the United States Treasury Department be requested to refuse all further requests for delays in the removal of these animals; and be it further

Resolved, That all the smuggled Charolaise cattle and their offspring be returned to Mexico immediately; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be forwarded to Members of the Louisiana congressional delegation, Hon. Ezra T. Benson, United States Secretary of Agriculture and Hon. George M. Humphrey, United States Secretary of Treasury.

"C. E. BARHAL,

"Lieutenant Governor and President of the Senate."

By Mr. ELLENDER:

A resolution of the House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry:

"House Resolution 4

"Whereas the Charolaise cattle smuggled into Louisiana originated from an area in Mexico in which foot-and-mouth disease had been prevalent and in which all livestock were exposed to and vaccinated against the disease; and

"Whereas the presence of these smuggled cattle in our State constitutes a threat to the livestock industry of the State and Nation, as such exposed and vaccinated animals are considered potential carriers of foot-and-mouth disease for unknown periods of time; and

"Whereas the individuals involved in this case were refused permission for the legal entry of these cattle into the United States on two occasions because of the disease threat but chose to smuggle the cattle into this country, thus jeopardizing the entire livestock industry for their own personal gain; and

"Whereas the effectiveness of our livestock disease-control laws that have protected the Nation's livestock from the exotic diseases that plague the world, will be virtually destroyed if the smuggled animals are allowed to remain in the United States under any circumstances; and

"Whereas the presence of these potential disease disseminators in Louisiana will seriously curtail the movement of our livestock through normal marketing channels as 16 States, in order to protect their own livestock industries, have threatened to embargo all cloven-footed animals originating from or passing through Louisiana: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, by the House of Representatives, State of Louisiana, That the United States Treasury Department be requested to refuse all further requests for delays in the removal of these animals; and be it further

Resolved, That all the smuggled Charolaise cattle and their offspring be returned to Mexico immediately; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be forwarded to members of the Louisiana congressional delegation, Hon. Ezra T. Benson, United States Secretary of Agriculture, and Hon. George M. Humphrey, United States Secretary of the Treasury.

"CLARENCE C. AYCOCK,

"Speaker of the House of Representatives.

"A true and correct copy, January 20, 1955.

"W. CLEGG COLE,

"Clerk, House of Representatives."

RESOLUTION OF AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATORS

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I was pleased to receive from Commissioner Melvin Larson, of the Wisconsin State Motor Vehicle Department, an important resolution which had been adopted by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators at a conference which they held in Los Angeles, Calif., on November 19, 1954.

The resolution raises the very important issue of a proposed special low postage rate for the mailing of motor vehicle license plates and certificates of title.

The resolution points out that there is at present a very unfortunate disuniformity in postage charges.

I present this important resolution and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD, and be thereafter appropriately referred.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Resolution 2

Whereas since the beginning of the practice of registering motor vehicles the United States mail has been one of the chief means of distributing license plates and certificates of title issued by the several States; and

Whereas the postage for such distribution has been paid by the States; and

Whereas motor vehicle registration has grown to such an extent in recent years that the postage for mailing license plates and certificates of title now imposes a tremendous financial burden on the States; and

Whereas all costs of administering motor vehicle registration laws are steadily increasing; and

Whereas it is impracticable to pass these increases on to the motoring public; and

Whereas 51 jurisdictions out of 65 States, Provinces, Territories, and districts have now adopted a standard-size license plate measuring 6 by 18 inches, and it is believed that all other jurisdictions which have not yet adopted such standard-size plate will do so in the near future; and

Whereas certain inequities now exist in the postal rates charged for sending license plates and certificates of title through the mail, an example of which is shown by the fact that in some States the postage on 1 license plate to a point within the first, second, or third zone is 8 cents, while the rate for 2 such plates is 23 cents; and

Whereas Congress has seen fit to permit newspapers, magazines, and other articles to be sent through the mails at special low rates: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, That Congress be requested to give consideration to the establishment of a special low postage rate for the mailing of motor vehicle license plates and certificates of title; be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be sent to the administrator in charge of motor-vehicle registration in each State and that each administrator furnish a copy to each Member of Congress from his State.

GREAT LAKES CONNECTING CHANNELS

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I was pleased to hear today from Col. F. H. Falkner, resident member, Corps of Engineers, here in Washington, that the

Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors had approved the regional report on deepening the Great Lakes connecting channels.

This marks an important step forward toward the completion of this great project which will cost around \$110 million, but which will repay itself manyfold to our Nation.

These channels are the subject of (S. 171) a bill to authorize the modification of the existing projects for the Great Lakes connecting channels above Lake Erie, which I introduced earlier this session.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Rivers and Harbors Board release recommending the deepening of the channels be printed at this point in the body of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and be thereafter appropriately referred.

There being no objection, the release was referred to the Committee on Public Works, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RIVER AND HARBOR BOARD RECOMMENDS DEEPENING OF GREAT LAKES CONNECTING CHANNELS

JANUARY 21, 1955.

The Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors at its meeting on January 20 held in Washington, D. C., concurred in general in the recommendations of the Detroit district engineer, United States engineer office, for the deepening of the Great Lakes connecting channels.

The Board's recommended plan of improvement provides for deepening and further improving the channels in St. Marys River, Straits of Mackinac, St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair, and Detroit River generally in accordance with the plans of the district engineer. The Board also recommended that the district engineer's plan be revised to include 1 foot of depth, in addition to that shown in the plan, in South Canal, upper St. Marys River. The recommended improvements would provide not less than a 27-foot depth throughout the connecting channels for 96 percent of the navigation season, applicable to St. Lawrence Seaway traffic. The recommended increased depths are based on the requirements of internal Great Lakes traffic but are so planned as to be fully comparable to depths planned for the St. Lawrence Seaway. The Board estimated the cost to the United States of these improvements at \$110,327,000.

The Board's recommendation also provided that a cutoff channel be constructed in Canada at Southeast Bend, St. Clair River, generally in accordance with the alternative plan of the district engineer for that section in lieu of further improvement along the existing alignment, if prior to initiation of construction in this reach accomplishment of the cutoff is found to be feasible; at an estimated additional cost to the United States of \$5,491,000.

The Board's report is being processed for submission to the Chief of Engineers. The proposed report of the Chief of Engineers thereon will be furnished to the Governors of the interested States and to interested Federal agencies for their views and comments. These comments will accompany the complete report to Congress with the recommendations of the Chief of Engineers.

After the report has been transmitted to Congress further action toward construction of any projects that may be recommended therein will depend upon the authorization of those projects by Congress and the subsequent appropriation of the necessary funds for the work proposed.

MINIMUM HOURLY WAGE—TELEGRAM

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, on Friday, January 21, on behalf of myself, the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], the senior Senator from West Virginia [Mr. KILGORE], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARA], the junior Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], and the junior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], I introduced the bill (S. 662) to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to establish a \$1.25 minimum hourly wage, and for other purposes. There has been a good deal of support forthcoming from groups and individuals in my State and elsewhere for such legislation.

It is certainly not news when groups and individuals representing labor give their strong support to legislation increasing the minimum wage and extending coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, when an organization representing business goes all out for such legislation, I believe that my colleagues in the Senate and other Americans throughout the country should take notice. Such support for S. 662 has come in the form of a wire from Mr. Rudolf Greeff, general manager of the Greater Clothing Contractors Association, Inc. I ask unanimous consent that at this point in my remarks there be printed the telegram which was sent to me on January 21 from Mr. Greeff.

There being no objection, the telegram was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 21, 1955.

HON. HERBERT H. LEHMAN,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

The Greater Clothing Contractors Association, Inc., of 100 Fifth Avenue, New York City, is a trade organization representing over 200 contracting shops in the men's clothing industry which in a city of New York employ approximately 40,000 workers. Our board of directors has unanimously adopted a resolution requesting that Congress support Governor Harriman's proposal to raise the national minimum wage to \$1.25 an hour. This must be adopted and put into law if we are to keep our factories and workers employed in the City of New York. Time is of the essence because we are losing ground steadily.

RUDOLF GREEFF,
General Manager, the Greater
Clothing Contractors Association, Inc.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. GEORGE, from the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, jointly:

S. J. Res. 28. Joint resolution authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories of that area; without amendment (Rept. No. 13).

By Mr. HUMPHREY, from the Committee on Government Operations:

S. 539. A bill to amend the act of July 10, 1953, which created the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations; with amendments (Rept. No. 15).

By Mr. HUMPHREY (for Mr. McCLELLAN), from the Committee on Government Operations:

S. 613. A bill to further amend the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended, so that such act will apply to reorganization plans transmitted to the Congress at any time before April 1, 1957; without amendment (Rept. No. 16).

By Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, without amendment:

S. Res. 13. Resolution to investigate certain problems relating to interstate and foreign commerce (Rept. No. 19); and

S. Res. 34. Resolution authorizing the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare to employ four additional temporary clerical assistants.

By Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, with an amendment:

S. Res. 25. Resolution authorizing the employment of an additional clerical assistant by the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

CONTINUANCE OF AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE EMPLOYEE WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. HILL, from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 40), which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

Resolved, That the authority of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare under Senate Resolution 225, 83d Congress, agreed to April 28, 1954, as amended (authorizing an investigation of employee welfare and pension plans and funds subject to collective bargaining) and the time for reporting the results of its study and investigation thereto is hereby extended through January 31, 1956.

Sec. 2. For the purpose of carrying out its duties under such resolution, the committee or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof is authorized to expend from the contingent fund of the Senate, upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, the sum of \$150,000 in addition to any sums heretofore authorized for such purpose.

ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT OF TEMPORARY ASSISTANTS BY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN], from the Committee on Government Operations, I report an original resolution to provide funds for the investigating subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, and ask that the resolution be referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The resolution will be received; and, under the rule, referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

The resolution (S. Res. 41) was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

Resolved, That in holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as authorized by subsection (g) (2) (B) of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, or any other duties imposed upon it, the Committee on Government Op-

erations, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized during the period beginning on February 1, 1955, and ending on January 31, 1956, to make such expenditures, and to employ upon a temporary basis such investigators, and such technical, clerical, and other assistants, as it deems advisable.

Sec. 2. The expenses of the committee under this resolution, which shall not exceed \$190,000 in addition to the amount authorized under Senate Resolution 189, 83d Congress, 2d session, agreed to February 2, 1954, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee or subcommittee, as the case may be.

REVISION AND PRINTING OF SENATE MANUAL—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 43), which was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That the Committee on Rules and Administration be, and it is hereby, directed to prepare a revised edition of the Senate Rules and Manual for the use of the 84th Congress, that said rules and manual shall be printed as a Senate document, and that 1,500 additional copies shall be printed and bound, of which 1,000 copies shall be for the Senate, 100 copies shall be for the use of the Committee on Rules and Administration, and the remaining 400 copies shall be bound in full morocco and tagged as to contents and delivered as may be directed by the committee.

MEMBERS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON PRINTING AND JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE LIBRARY—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 44), which was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That the following-named Members be, and they are hereby, elected members of the following joint committees of Congress:

Joint Committee on Printing: Mr. HAYDEN, of Arizona; Mr. GREEN, of Rhode Island; and Mr. JENNER, of Indiana.

Joint Committee of Congress on the Library: Mr. GREEN, of Rhode Island; Mr. MANSFIELD, of Montana; Mr. GORE, of Tennessee; Mr. BARRETT, of Wyoming; and Mr. MCCARTHY, of Wisconsin.

MARY ELIZABETH ELLIS

Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 45), which was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate hereby is authorized and directed to pay, from the contingent fund of the Senate, to Mary Elizabeth Ellis, widow of Joseph C. Ellis, an employee of the Senate at the time of his death, a sum equal to 12 months' compensation at the rate he was receiving by law at the time of his death, said sum to be considered inclusive of funeral expenses and all other allowances.

ZELMA SHEPARD

Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, reported an

original resolution (S. Res. 46), which was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate hereby is authorized and directed to pay, from the contingent fund of the Senate, to Zelma Shepard, widow of M. H. Shepard, an employee of the Senate at the time of his death, a sum equal to 6 months' compensation at the rate he was receiving by law at the time of his death, said sum to be considered inclusive of funeral expenses and all other allowances.

HILDA MILLER COON

Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 47), which was considered and agreed to, as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate hereby is authorized and directed to pay, from the contingent fund of the Senate, to Hilda Miller Coon, widow of Jesse D. Coon, an employee of the Senate at the time of his death, a sum equal to 2 months' compensation at the rate he was receiving by law at the time of his death, said sum to be considered inclusive of funeral expenses and all other allowances.

COMPENSATION FOR CERTAIN PERIOD OF EMPLOYEES OF FORMER SENATOR BOWRING—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. GREEN. Mr. President, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, I report an original resolution to pay compensation for a certain period to employees of former Senator Eva Bowring, and I submit a report (No. 18) thereon.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The report will be received, and the resolution will be placed on the calendar.

The resolution (S. Res. 48) was placed on the calendar, as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate is authorized and directed to pay, out of the contingent fund of the Senate, to the administrative and clerical assistants appointed by former Senator Eva Bowring, who were carried on the Senate payroll on November 7, 1954, salary for services in her office for the period November 8, 1954, through December 7, 1954, or for so much of that time through December 7, 1954, as they were not otherwise gainfully employed, at their respective rates of salary as of November 7, 1954.

EXTENSION OF TIMES FOR COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY TO CONDUCT STUDIES AND INVESTIGATIONS—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. GREEN. Mr. President, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, I report an original resolution to extend the times by which the Committee on the Judiciary may conduct studies and investigations, and I submit a report (No. 17) thereon.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The report will be received, and the resolution will be placed on the calendar.

The resolution (S. Res. 49) was placed on the calendar, as follows:

Resolved, That the times in which the Committee on the Judiciary may expend funds under authority of Senate Resolution 172, agreed to January 27, 1954; Senate Resolution 181, agreed to January 26, 1954; Senate Resolution 187, agreed to January 26, 1954; Senate Resolution 188, agreed to January 26, 1954; Senate Resolution 190, agreed to January 27, 1954; and Senate Resolution 227, agreed to April 28, 1954, are hereby extended through February 28, 1955.

COMPENSATION FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD TO EMPLOYEES OF FORMER SENATOR UPTON—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 50), which was ordered to be placed on the calendar, as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate is authorized and directed to pay, out of the contingent fund of the Senate, to the administrative and clerical assistants appointed by former Senator Robert W. Upton, who were carried on the Senate payroll on November 7, 1954, salary for services in his office for the period November 8, 1954, through December 7, 1954, or for so much of that time through December 7, 1954, as they were not otherwise gainfully employed, at their respective rates of salary as of November 7, 1954.

COMPENSATION FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD TO EMPLOYEES OF FORMER SENATOR BROWN—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 51), which was ordered to be placed on the calendar, as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate is authorized and directed to pay, out of the contingent fund of the Senate, to the administrative and clerical assistants appointed by former Senator Ernest S. Brown, who were carried on the Senate payroll on December 1, 1954, salary for services in his office for the period December 2, 1954, through December 31, 1954, or for so much of that time through December 31, 1954, as they were not otherwise gainfully employed, at their respective rates of salary as of December 1, 1954.

COMPENSATION FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD TO EMPLOYEES OF FORMER SENATOR BURKE—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 52), which was ordered to be placed on the calendar, as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate is authorized and directed to pay, out of the contingent fund of the Senate, to the administrative and clerical assistants appointed by former Senator Thomas A. Burke, who were carried on the Senate payroll on December 2, 1954, salary for services in his office for the period December 3, 1954, through January 1, 1955, or for so much of that time through January 1, 1955, as they were not otherwise gainfully employed, at their respective rates of salary as of December 2, 1954.

COMPENSATION FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD TO EMPLOYEES OF FORMER SENATOR CRIPPA—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 53), which was ordered to be placed on the calendar, as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate is authorized and directed to pay, out of the contingent fund of the Senate, to the administrative and clerical assistants appointed by former Senator Edward D. Crippa, who were carried on the Senate payroll on November 28, 1954, salary for services in his office for the period November 29, 1954, through December 28, 1954, or for so much of that time through December 28, 1954, as they were not otherwise gainfully employed, at their respective rates of salary as of November 28, 1954.

COMPENSATION FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD TO EMPLOYEES OF FORMER SENATOR LENNON—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, reported an original resolution (S. Res. 54), which was ordered to be placed on the calendar, as follows:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate is authorized and directed to pay, out of the contingent fund of the Senate, to the administrative and clerical assistants appointed by former Senator Alton Lennon, who were carried on the Senate payroll on November 28, 1954, salary for services in his office for the period November 29, 1954, through December 28, 1954, or for so much of that time through December 28, 1954, as they were not otherwise gainfully employed, at their respective rates of salary as of November 28, 1954.

INTERIM REPORT BY SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER (S. REPT. NO. 14)

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I submit an interim report by the Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter. This subcommittee, created by Senate Resolution 126, 83d Congress, 1st session, has been under my chairmanship for the past 2 years. The Committee on Foreign Relations last Friday authorized me to transmit this report to the Senate. It describes the activities which the subcommittee has carried on and indicates in a general way the main ideas we have received as the result of holding hearings at various places in the United States. Last week the Committee on Foreign Relations agreed to recommend that the Senate extend the life of the subcommittee for 1 more year so that it may make final recommendations helpful to the President in formulating the position of the United States Government in the event a United Nations Charter Review Conference is held next year. By the terms of the resolution, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. GEORGE, will serve as chairman of the subcommittee.

I should like to express my appreciation to the Honorable Guy Gillette, who conceived the study originally and who served with me during the 83d Congress. I also wish to thank other members of

the subcommittee who helped carry on this work, namely, Senators Ferguson, Knowland, Cooper, Holland, Sparkman, and Mansfield.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The report will be received and printed.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

As in executive session, The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. HILL, from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare:
Kenneth W. Momeyer, Jr., and sundry other candidates for appointment in the Regular Corps of the Public Health Service; and

Leverett Edwards, of Oklahoma, to be a member of the National Mediation Board.

By Mr. MAGNUSON, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

Philip Alexander Ray, of California, to be General Counsel of the Department of Commerce;

G. Joseph Minetti, of New York, to be a member of the Federal Maritime Board;

Kenneth H. Tuggle, of Kentucky, to be an Interstate Commerce Commissioner; and

John Robert O'Connor, Charles B. Williams, and sundry other persons for appointment in the United States Coast Guard.

By Mr. DANIEL, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

Everett Hutchinson, of Texas, to be an Interstate Commerce Commissioner; and

Ben H. Guill, of Texas, to be a member of the Federal Maritime Board.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED

Bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. THURMOND:

S. 701. A bill to release certain restrictions on certain real property heretofore granted to the city of Charleston, S. C., by the United States of America; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. SCHOEPEL:

S. 702. A bill for the relief of Tarik S. Kaynor; and

S. 703. A bill for the relief of the MacArthur Mining Co., Inc., in receivership; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. THYE:

S. 704. A bill to provide for the termination of Federal supervision over the property of Indians and Indian communities in the southern part of Minnesota, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

S. 705. A bill to provide that persons serving in the Armed Forces on January 31, 1955, may continue to accrue educational benefits under the Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. GEORGE:

S. 706. A bill for the relief of Margarete Lewis; and

S. 707. A bill for the relief of Christos Paul Zolotas; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DIRKSEN:

S. 708. A bill for the relief of Dr. James C. S. Lee, his wife, Dora Ting Wei, and their daughter, Vivian Lee; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 709. A bill to authorize the release of the personnel files of Federal officers and employees to congressional committees at the request of such officers and employees; and

S. 710. A bill to establish a postal rate-making procedure in the Post Office Department; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

S. 711. A bill to amend part II of the Interstate Commerce Act to provide for filing of equipment trust agreements and other documents evidencing or relating to the lease, mortgage, conditional sale, or bailment of trucks and trailers; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. DIRKSEN (for himself and Mr. DOUGLAS):

S. 712. A bill to amend section 7 (h) of the Natural Gas Act; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. SALTONSTALL (for Mr. KENNEDY):

S. 713. A bill for the relief of Romana Michelina Sereni;

S. 714. A bill for the relief of Alfio Ferrara; and

S. 715. A bill for the relief of Toy Lin Chen; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RUSSELL:

S. 716. A bill for the relief of Athanassios Theodore Stathopoulos; and

S. 717. A bill for the relief of Hedi Gertrude Spiecker; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MUNDT:

S. 718. A bill to provide for the return to the former owners of certain lands acquired in connection with the Fort Randall Dam project, the Oahe Dam project, the Gavins Point Dam project, of mineral, oil, or gas interests in such lands; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. MUNDT (for himself and Mr. CASE of South Dakota):

S. 719. A bill to increase, in the case of children who are attending school, from 18 to 21 years the age until which child's insurance benefits may be received under title II of the Social Security Act; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. LANGER:

S. 720. A bill for the relief of certain Pakistani aliens; and

S. 721. A bill to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment upon a certain claim of Stafford Ordnance Corp., a corporation, against the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BENNETT:

S. 722. A bill to authorize certain improvement of the Weber Basin, Utah, for flood control; to the Committee on Public Works. (See the remarks of Mr. BENNETT when he introduced the above bill, which appears under a separate heading.)

By Mr. BRICKER:

S. 723. A bill to amend the Interstate Commerce Act in order to provide civil liability for violations of such act by common carriers by motor vehicle and freight forwarders; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

(See the remarks of Mr. BRICKER when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. PURTELL:

S. 724. A bill to establish a Commission on Mental Health, and to provide for a study of the problems of mental illness and for the development of a national mental-health program; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

(See the remarks of Mr. PURTELL when he introduced the above bill, which appears under a separate heading.)

By Mr. NEELY:

S. 725. A bill for the relief of John Flanagan; to the Committee on Armed Services.

S. 726. A bill to amend paragraph 1513 of the Tariff Act of 1930 with respect to toy marbles; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 727 (by request). A bill to adjust the salaries of judges of the municipal court of appeals for the District of Columbia and the salaries of the judges of the municipal court

for the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

(See the remarks of Mr. NEELY when he introduced the last above-mentioned bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. KEFAUVER (for himself, Mr. LANGER, and Mr. HENNING):

S. 728. A bill to provide for assistance to and cooperation with States in strengthening and improving State and local programs for the control of juvenile delinquency; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

(See the remarks of Mr. KEFAUVER when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. KERR (for himself and Mr. MONRONEY):

S. 729. A bill relative to restrictions applicable to Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. KERR (for himself, Mr. MONRONEY, Mr. SCHOEPP, and Mr. CARLSON):

S. 730. A bill granting the consent of Congress to the States of Kansas and Oklahoma to negotiate and enter into a compact relating to their interests in, and the apportionment of, the waters of the Arkansas River and its tributaries as they affect such States; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. KERR (for himself, Mr. MONRONEY, Mr. MCCLELLAN, and Mr. FULBRIGHT):

S. 731. A bill granting the consent of Congress to the States of Arkansas and Oklahoma to negotiate and enter into a compact relating to their interests in, and the apportionment of, the waters of the Arkansas River and its tributaries as they affect such States; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. IVES (for himself and Mr. LEHMAN):

S. 732. A bill to promote public cooperation in the rehabilitation and preservation of the Nation's important historic properties in the New York City area, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. KILGORE:

S. 733. A bill to amend the Clayton Act by granting a right of action to the United States to recover damages under the antitrust laws;

S. 734. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, section 871, to provide penalties for threats against the President-elect and the Vice President; and

S. 735. A bill for the relief of Sarah Kaczniak; to the Committee on the Judiciary. (See the remarks of Mr. KILGORE when he introduced the first two above-mentioned bills, which appear under separate headings.)

By Mr. KILGORE (for himself and Mr. NEELY):

S. 736. A bill to provide a transcontinental superhighway with alternate sections; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. CARLSON:

S. 737. A bill to provide that the Secretary of the Interior shall investigate and report to the Congress as to the advisability of establishing Fort Wallace, in Wallace County, Kans., as a national monument; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. PAYNE (for himself and Mr. KENNEDY):

S. 738. A bill to provide for the amendment of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act (49 Stat. 2036), as amended; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. SMATHERS (by request):

S. 739. A bill for the relief of Avak Hagopian; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina:

S. 740. A bill to extend for an additional 5 years the authority to make, guarantee, and insure loans under title III of the Serv-

icemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, as amended; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. MAGNUSON:

S. 741. A bill to amend title XII of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, relating to war-risk insurance, in order to repeal the provision which would terminate authority to provide insurance under such title.

S. 742 (by request). A bill to improve the administration of the public airports in the Territory of Alaska; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

(See the remarks of Mr. MAGNUSON when he introduced the first above-mentioned bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. MAGNUSON (by request):

S. 743. A bill to authorize biennial inspection of the hulls and boilers of cargo vessels, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. YOUNG:

S. 744. A bill to authorize the expansion of post-office facilities at Williston, N. Dak.; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. YOUNG (for himself and Mr. LANGER):

S. 745. A bill to encourage durum wheat production through nonrecourse production loans; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

S. 746. A bill to provide for the return to the former owners of certain lands, including Indian tribal lands, acquired in connection with the Garrison Dam project of mineral interests in such lands; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. LONG:

S. 747. A bill to enable the States to provide for the increased financial needs of persons receiving assistance under the public assistance plans established pursuant to the Social Security Act; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 748. A bill to prohibit the United States from acquiring mineral interests in lands acquired by it except when necessary to serve the purpose for which such lands are acquired; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. LONG (for himself and Mr. ELLENDER):

S. 749. A bill to authorize construction of the Mississippi River-Gulf outlet; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. WILEY:

S. 750. A bill to require the registration of certain persons who have knowledge of or have received instruction or assignment in the espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service or tactics of a foreign government or foreign political party, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HUMPHREY (for himself and Mr. KENNEDY):

S. 751. A bill to provide assistance to communities, industries, business enterprises, and individuals to facilitate adjustments made necessary by the trade policy of the United States; to the Committee on Finance.

(See the remarks of Mr. HUMPHREY when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. EASTLAND (for himself and Mr. SCHOEPP):

S. 752. A bill to amend section 102 (a) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, so as to eliminate the requirement that privately owned stocks exported thereunder be replaced from Commodity Credit Corporation stocks; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

By Mrs. SMITH of Maine:

S. 753. A bill for the relief of George Roland Lavoie; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JACKSON:

S. 754. A bill for the relief of Mr. and Mrs. Fred A. Fletcher; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HOLLAND (for himself, Mr. SMATHERS, Mr. GEORGE, Mr. ELLENBER, Mr. LONG, Mr. MCCLELLAN, Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. ERVIN, Mr. SCOTT, and Mr. THURMOND):

S. J. Res. 29. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, relating to the qualification of electors; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(See the remarks of Mr. HOLLAND when he introduced the above joint resolution, which appears under a separate heading.)

By Mr. KEFAUVER (for himself, Mr. DANIEL, Mr. NEUBERGER, Mr. COTTON, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. DIRKSEN, Mr. ERVIN, Mr. HUMPHREY, and Mr. HILL):

S. J. Res. 30. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice President; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DANIEL (for himself, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. WILEY, Mr. DIRKSEN, Mr. KEFAUVER, Mr. MCCLELLAN, Mr. JENNER, Mr. IVES, Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. CHAVEZ, Mr. NEELY, Mr. MURRAY, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. HILL, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. NEUBERGER, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. BYRD, and Mr. GORE):

S. J. Res. 31. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice President; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(See the remarks of Mr. DANIEL when he introduced the above joint resolution, which appear under a separate heading.)

IMPROVEMENT OF WEBER BASIN, UTAH

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to authorize certain improvement of the Weber Basin, Utah, for flood control. I ask unanimous consent that a statement prepared by me, relating to the bill, be printed in the RECORD.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the statement will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 722) to authorize certain improvement of the Weber Basin, Utah, for flood control, introduced by Mr. BENNETT, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Public Works.

The statement presented by Mr. BENNETT is as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BENNETT

Even though the State of Utah faces a perpetual water shortage—in common with the rest of the country—we also face the unpredictable threat of floods.

The Corps of Engineers has approved a field report which recommends certain channel improvements on the Weber River between Morgan, Utah, and the mouth of the Ogden River. The corps characterizes these improvements as "essential parts of the flood control plan for the basin." The bill which I am introducing today would embody the corps' plan and would provide estimated average annual flood control benefits of \$226,000 for reduction in flood damages and \$16,000 for higher land use, a total benefit of \$242,000.

Such a bill is necessary to help prevent the annual loss to my State of hundreds of thousands of dollars as a result of spring floods. Ten such floods between 1890 and 1952 have ravaged this area, destroying homes, industrial buildings, transcontinent-

tal highways, railroad yards, schools and many acres of farm land that, paradoxically, have thirsted for water within just a few short months thereafter. Similar floods will roar out of our mountains again, Mr. President, unless we can authorize and build such economical improvements as are embodied in this bill.

The estimated cost to the Federal Government for construction of these improvements will be \$470,000, with another \$100,000 of non-Federal funds. Annual charges will total just \$40,000 of which \$15,800 would be paid by the Federal Government. When contrasted to the estimated annual benefit of \$242,000 and the benefit-cost ratio of 1.45, such investment by the Federal Government is more than warranted.

The flood control program on the Weber River has been developed by the Corps of Engineers in collaboration with the Bureau of Reclamation and with local cooperation, and I hope that the Congress will see fit to approve those phases of it as embodied in this legislation.

AMENDMENT OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT RELATING TO CIVIL LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS AND FREIGHT FORWARDERS

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to amend the Interstate Commerce Act in order to provide civil liability for violations of such act by common carriers by motor vehicle and freight forwarders.

The purpose of this bill is to write into part II of the Interstate Commerce Act a similar provision to that now contained in section 8 of part I and section 308 of part III.

These sections of law were enacted for the purpose of protecting persons who suffer damages resulting from violations of the law under parts I and III. Over the past few years shippers have been seriously injured as a result of violations of part II of the act; therefore, it appears desirable to write language into part II in order to provide civil liability for violations.

It seems eminently fair that the shipping public should be permitted to recover damages sustained as a result of violations of the law, and in this connection they are entitled to the establishment of an orderly system whereby recovery of such damages can be made under provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. This bill has been designed to accomplish that objective.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 723) to amend the Interstate Commerce Act in order to provide civil liability for violations of such act by common carriers by motor vehicle and freight forwarders, introduced by Mr. BRICKER, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH

Mr. PURTELL. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill designed to augment and accelerate our present efforts to solve the difficult, nationwide problems which have long persisted, and which continue to confront us, in our efforts to bring about

a more universal understanding of the nature of mental illness and greater improvement in our methods of care, treatment, and rehabilitation of the mentally ill.

I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to make a brief statement relating to the bill which I estimate will consume approximately 5 minutes and that the text of this bill (S. 724) immediately follow my remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the Senator from Connecticut may proceed.

The bill (S. 724) to establish a commission on mental health, and to provide for a study of the problems of mental illness and for the development of a national mental health program, introduced by Mr. PURTELL, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

Mr. PURTELL. First, Mr. President, I am convinced that this Nation must step up its efforts to deal more effectively with the general problem of mental illness. From time immemorial the populations of the world have experienced the problems, frustrations, and despair, which, widely attended by ignorance of the nature of mental diseases, have accompanied the incidence of mental illness. Yet we have made progress, so that today we have knowledge of many of the basic aspects of the problem, which, if more widely and properly applied, would help to reduce the number of patients presently in mental hospitals and to prevent the admission of countless others. At the same time, there are many aspects of the problem about which we lack sufficient knowledge to enable us to proceed with any degree of certainty.

To the extent that we can reduce the population in mental hospitals but do not do so, for lack of adequate programs or for other reasons, we are merely continuing to add to the taxpayers' burden, as well as failing to conserve our human resources. It is a fact, Mr. President, that 98 percent of all our mental patients are in State, county, city, or Federal tax-supported hospitals. We are spending over \$1 billion a year in public funds alone on costs incident to mental illness. It is also a fact that more than 700,000 patients, or 54 percent of all hospital patients of all kinds, on any given day, are in mental hospitals. I also invite attention to the fact that 38 percent of the 5 million men rejected before induction by selective service during World War II were rejected for neuropsychiatric disorders of one kind or another.

There is no doubt about the need for action, Mr. President. As a result of my experience as chairman of the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, during the 83d Congress, I have reached the conclusion that the problems incident to improving our attack on mental illness, through improved care, treatment, rehabilitation, and preventive measures rank among the most serious problems with which we are confronted in any

consideration for improving the Nation's health.

Accordingly, it is most gratifying that in his budget message last week President Eisenhower specifically singled out the field of mental health and made positive recommendations thereon. The President has recommended a budget increase of approximately \$4½ million for various mental health purposes.

The bill I have introduced would provide for the establishment of a Presidential Commission, made up of experts, to make a thorough inquiry into the whole question, and to develop and recommend to the President and Congress a comprehensive, long-range program of action for dealing with the problem. Such a program, Mr. President, is not to be envisaged as a Federal program, but as a national program, which would clearly seek to achieve progress through the joint efforts of all levels of government and of the numerous nongovernment organizations which are now working in this field. The step that is needed is to arrive at a benchmark, as it were, and to set goals, so that the combined efforts of all agencies may be brought together with common purpose and focused on common goals. Further, the Commission here proposed would not be merely another agency to make a study, and a report, to be filed away and perhaps forgotten. One of the fundamental problems confronting those who are trying to accomplish results in the mental health field is that of bringing about a wider understanding of the true nature of the problems of mental illness and keeping public attention focused on the problem long enough to bring about a lasting improvement in existing circumstances. Accordingly, it is proposed that this Presidential Commission continue in existence after completion of its inquiries in order to follow up, for a reasonable period of time, its review of progress toward solution of the problems of mental illness, and to assist and cooperate with other agencies in informing the public through educational programs in mental hygiene. I believe this sort of approach is absolutely necessary if we are going to do anything to step up our efforts in the field of mental health.

I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the bill (S. 724) was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TO ESTABLISH A COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, AND TO PROVIDE FOR A STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM

Be it enacted, etc., That there is hereby established a commission to be known as the "President's Commission on Mental Health" to be composed of a Chairman and seventeen other members appointed by the President. Members of the Commission shall be eminent representatives of the fields of psychiatry, mental hospital administration, medical education, physical medicine and rehabilitation, and allied mental health fields, and of representatives of the Council of State Governments. Such members shall be appointed for terms of three years except that any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed shall be ap-

pointed for the remainder of such term, and the terms of office of the members first taking office shall expire, as designated by the President at the time of appointment, six at the end of the first year, six at the end of the second year, and six at the end of the third year, after the date of enactment of this Act.

Sec. 2. (a) The Commission is authorized and directed to conduct a thorough inquiry into the problem of mental illness, including the status, progress, and problems incident to (1) the provision of hospital and related facilities necessary to the furnishing of care and treatment for the mentally ill, (2) the improvement of mental health services and treatment both in and outside mental hospitals, (3) the availability and training of psychiatrists and allied mental health personnel, and (4) the development of research into the causes, treatment, and prevention of mental illness.

(b) The Commission is further authorized and directed to develop and recommend a comprehensive national mental health program, including long-range plans for coping with both existing and anticipated problems incident to mental illness, as well as recommendations as to methods of financing the costs of such a program and the proper role of the local, State, and Federal Governments, and of nongovernment organizations and facilities in such a national program.

(c) The Commission shall transmit a report of its findings pursuant to the inquiry authorized under subsection (a), together with its recommendations under subsection (b), to the President and the Congress not later than thirty months following the enactment of this Act. In addition to such report and recommendations, the Commission may transmit from time to time such interim reports as it deems appropriate.

Sec. 3. Upon completion of its inquiry and transmittal of its recommendations in accordance with section 2, it shall be the duty of the Commission to conduct a continuing review and evaluation of the status, progress, and problems incident to the provision of care and treatment for the mentally ill, and to report annually to the President and the Congress the results of its review and evaluation, together with such recommendations as it deems desirable, and from the sums made available therefor for any fiscal year, the Commission is authorized to (1) develop, coordinate, and initiate broad public educational programs in mental hygiene, and (2) develop and participate with State and local mental health authorities and agencies and with nongovernmental mental health organizations, upon request, in the initiation of special demonstration projects, which, in the judgment of the Commission, hold promise of making substantial contributions to the solution of problems incident to the improvement of care and treatment for the mentally ill.

Sec. 4. (a) In connection with its inquiry under the provisions of section 2 (a) the Commission is authorized to sit and act at such times and in such places; to hold such public hearings; and to take such testimony, as it deems advisable.

(b) All executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Commission in its work and to furnish the Commission such information and assistance not inconsistent with law, as it may require in the performance of its functions and duties.

(c) Members of the Commission shall receive compensation at the rate of \$50 per diem while serving on business of the Commission, shall be reimbursed for actual and necessary travel expenses, and shall be entitled to an allowance of \$10 per diem in lieu of reimbursement for subsistence expenses, while so serving away from their places of residence.

(d) The Commission is authorized to appoint, without regard to the civil-service laws

and regulations, and to fix the compensation without regard to the Classification Act of 1949, as amended, of an executive secretary and such other employees as may be necessary to enable it to carry out its functions and duties.

(e) To enable the Commission to carry out its functions and duties, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956, the sum of \$1,000,000, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957, the sum of \$1,500,000, and for each fiscal year thereafter such sums as Congress may determine to be necessary for the purposes of this Act. The Commission is also authorized to accept (1) funds; (2) the services of voluntary and uncompensated personnel (and to provide transportation and subsistence as authorized by section 5 of the Act of August 2, 1946 (5 U. S. C. 73b-2), for persons performing such services); (3) equipment; and (4) facilities, donated for purposes of the Commission, and to use the same in accordance with such purposes.

Sec. 5. The Commission shall cease to exist ten years after the enactment of this Act.

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, will my colleague from Connecticut yield?

Mr. PURTELL. I am very happy to yield to my colleague.

Mr. BUSH. I wish to compliment the Senator upon his splendid address, and upon the bill which he has introduced dealing with this very important subject.

For a number of years I have been director of the Connecticut Society for Mental Health, and I am aware of the very serious problem which confronts us, a problem which exists throughout the United States.

I am very happy that my distinguished colleague has studied this situation so closely, and has introduced proposed legislation which I think will go a considerable distance toward solving this very serious national problem. I heartily compliment the Senator.

Mr. PURTELL. I thank my distinguished colleague.

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARIES OF JUDGES OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF APPEALS AND MUNICIPAL COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. NEELY. Mr. President, by request, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to adjust the salaries of judges of the municipal court of appeals for the District of Columbia and the salaries of the judges of the municipal court for the District of Columbia. I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a letter dated January 26, 1955, addressed to me by Charles B. Murray, president of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, relative to the subject matter of the bill.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the letter will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 727) to adjust the salaries of judges of the municipal court of appeals for the District of Columbia and the salaries of the judges of the municipal court for the District of Columbia, introduced by Mr. NEELY by request, was received, read twice by its

title, and referred to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

The letter presented by Mr. NEELY is as follows:

BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Washington, D. C., January 26, 1955.
Hon. MATTHEW M. NEELY,
Chairman of the Committee on the
District of Columbia, United States
Senate, Washington, D. C.

Sir: The Bar Association of the District of Columbia requests your assistance in the introduction and enactment of proper legislation to adjust the salaries of the judges of the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, to accompany S. 462.

S. 462 is proposed legislation for national Federal judicial salaries, among other things, and is being considered by the Committee on the Judiciary. It is predicated on the Segal Commission report. That report took into consideration all economic factors pertaining to the judiciary, including the judiciary of the District of Columbia, namely, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

We of the bar association feel that the historical differential between the salaries of judges of the United States court of appeals, the district court, the municipal court of appeals, and the municipal court should be maintained in the same ratio that has been established since the two latter courts were fully organized. The purpose of the proposed legislation, which is transmitted with this letter, is to preserve that ratio.

It is the feeling of the members of the bar association that the same reasons advanced by the Segal Commission report apply equally to the judges of the municipal court of appeals and the municipal court. Were it not for the mechanics of the District of Columbia organization and the organization of Congress, the legislation here proposed would undoubtedly have been included in the Segal report and legislation. The judges of the two courts who are affected by the legislation proposed are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and the two courts are in fact an integral part of the judicial system of the District of Columbia.

Respectfully,

CHARLES B. MURRAY,
President.

ASSISTANCE TO STATES IN THE CONTROL OF JUVENILE DELIN- QUENCY

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President on behalf of the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER] the Senator from Missouri [Mr. HENNINGS], and myself, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to provide for assistance to and cooperation with State efforts to control juvenile delinquency.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a brief explanatory statement and an analysis of the bill.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the explanatory statement and analysis will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 728) to provide for assistance to and cooperation with States in strengthening and improving State and local programs for the control of ju-

venile delinquency, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

The statement presented by Mr. KEFAUVER is as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR KEFAUVER

On behalf of myself, the Senator from Missouri [Mr. HENNINGS], and the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER], I am introducing a bill to provide for a broad and comprehensive attack on the problem of juvenile delinquency. The action which we are proposing is designed to assist States and localities to strengthen and extend their own programs to prevent youthful crime and to provide treatment to rehabilitate those children and youth who have already taken the first misstep on the road to a life of crime.

As members of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee To Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, we have, during the past year and a half, heard the testimony of countless witnesses from coast to coast and have heard hundreds of different recommendations as to what can and should be done to win this fight against juvenile delinquency. Out of all this testimony, certain facts are abundantly clear.

It is first of all clear that the problem is one that is growing in size and seriousness. The most recent figures indicate that in the last year alone the number of children in trouble with the police rose by a quarter of a million, from one million to one and one-quarter million. That figure in itself is shocking. But when one realizes that the types of youthful crimes committed are increasing in seriousness, that younger boys and girls are, in greater numbers, committing the more serious types of offenses, then it should be apparent to every thinking American citizen that the time to act is now.

A second fact that is equally clear is that the fight against juvenile delinquency cannot be fought from Washington. It must be fought in the localities where the delinquent child is found and where the delinquent acts are committed.

And the final fact made clear by our investigations is that even though the fight must be fought locally, the Federal Government can and should give assistance to the States in that fight. That assistance should not—it cannot—be such as to supplant the State's own efforts. But much can be done by the Federal Government not only through financial assistance but also through the gathering together and transmission of know-how, to aid the States in their fight to control and treat juvenile delinquency. At this crucial period in the fight the situation calls for nothing less than boldness, determination, and foresight.

This bill is designed to meet the problems on all levels of government. It establishes within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare an office for children and youth which will encompass the present Children's Bureau and provides for an added title of Assistant Secretary for Children and Youth. This greatly strengthens the program of the Federal Government in providing leadership in establishing programs for combating juvenile delinquency.

An advisory council on juvenile delinquency to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare is also established with membership from leading organizations dealing with the problems of delinquency in such fields as education, legal, social work, psychiatry, and police.

There are two provisions incorporated within the scope of this bill providing grants. One is to aid State governments in developing programs to combat delinquency and coordinate services of these governments, but it does not underwrite even a portion of the

present State and local programs. The other is a grant for training personnel limited to a period of 10 years. One of the greatest needs in the field of delinquency, as pointed out in our hearings, has been the extreme shortage of adequately trained personnel to meet the growing delinquency problem.

The analysis presented by Mr. KEFAUVER is as follows:

ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED DELINQUENT CHILDREN'S ACT OF 1955

TITLE I

Establishes an Office for Children and Youth in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. This should serve to concentrate work on the problems of children and youth at a departmental level which will command the attention that those problems should have. The Children's Bureau is made a part of this new Office and the Chief of the Children's Bureau is given the responsibility for administering the new Office with the added title of Assistant Secretary for Children and Youth. A new bureau is created in the Office—a Bureau on Juvenile Delinquency.

TITLE II

In an effort to achieve greater coordination of Federal programs dealing with delinquent children and to assure that in planning such programs consideration is given to the viewpoints of the national agencies in this field, this bill would establish a Federal Advisory Council on Juvenile Delinquency—advisory to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

TITLE III

This title provides—for a period of 7 years—for grants to States to assist them in achieving coordination of the many services involved in the control and treatment of juvenile delinquency, in determining where in these services need strengthening, in planning for priorities to strengthen these services, and in strengthening and improving those services. It is not intended that through this title the Federal Government would be underwriting even a portion of the present State and local programs. Rather this is intended as a means of boosting State and local efforts by putting a small amount of money where it will do the most good.

TITLE IV

This title would authorize grants for training personnel. The program is limited to 10 years. One of the greatest needs in the field of juvenile delinquency, as revealed by witness after witness before the subcommittee, is for more and better trained personnel. Present efforts in this area are scant. The bill is drafted so as to give the Secretary the greatest possible flexibility in the manner in which the desired objective—more trained personnel—is achieved.

TITLE V

Title V is a "seed money" or "risk capital" provision. It authorizes grants for special projects and is intended to permit the testing and development of new techniques for the control and treatment of juvenile delinquency. If administered with imagination and foresight, it holds great promise. This program, too, is limited to 7 years.

TITLE VI

This title contains general administrative provisions to be found in the standard grant-in-aid bill, with two exceptions. One is the provision permitting the Secretary for a period of 2 years directly to establish short-term courses for training personnel. This provision has been borrowed from the vocational rehabilitation amendments of 1954 (Public Law 565, 83d Cong.), since the problems faced by both fields seem to be identical. The second special provision is a "variable grant" provision for matching

State expenditures under title III, except for the first thirty thousand spent in the first 2 years.

RECOVERY OF DAMAGES UNDER ANTITRUST LAWS

Mr. KILGORE. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to amend the Clayton Act by granting a right of action to the United States to recover damages under the antitrust laws. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter from the Attorney General recommending the enactment of the proposed legislation.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the letter will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 733) to amend the Clayton Act by granting a right of action to the United States to recover damages under the antitrust laws, introduced by Mr. KILGORE, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

The letter presented by Mr. KILGORE is as follows:

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Washington, D. C., January 20, 1955.

The VICE PRESIDENT,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: The Department of Justice recommends amendment of the Clayton Act so as to grant to the United States a right of action to recover actual damages for violations of the antitrust laws. A draft of a bill designed to carry this recommendation into effect is enclosed for your consideration and appropriate action.

Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U. S. C. 15) provides that any person injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in the United States district courts and if he prevails shall recover an amount equal to three times the damages which were sustained by him.

In the case of *United States v. Cooper Corp.* (312 U. S. 600 (1941)), the United States Supreme Court held that the United States is not a person within the meaning of the statute or within the meaning of section 7 of the Sherman Act, which also authorizes treble-damage recovery for antitrust violations. The legislation here recommended would grant to the United States the right to recover actual damages sustained by it as a result of violations of the antitrust laws.

The United States is the largest single purchaser of goods in this country and may suffer substantial losses from antitrust violations. As shown in the Cooper case, the Government sustained extensive damages as the result of certain bids submitted on motor-vehicle tires and tubes. For the half year ending March 31, 1937, 18 companies submitted identical bids on 82 different sizes of tires and tubes. This identical bidding was repeated in the next half year, but with substantially higher prices than for the preceding period. When bids were submitted for the third half-year period the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department, upon the advice of the Attorney General, rejected the bids and invited new ones. The new bids were the same as those rejected. In the circumstances the Treasury Department negotiated a contract with another supplier for its full requirements.

In its next invitation to submit bids the Government required the bidders to warrant that the prices bid were not the result

of an agreement among them. Lower bids followed. A comparison of these bids with the earlier bids showed that the United States had been injured to the extent of \$351,158.21 during the 18-month period involved. A treble-damage action against the offending companies was instituted by the Government but was dismissed on the ground that the United States is not a person within the treble-damage provision of the statute.

The legislation recommended does not propose to authorize recovery by the Government of treble damages. The provision for the recovery of such damages by private litigants was enacted as an aid in the enforcement of the antitrust laws, constituting, as it does, a powerful additional deterrent to would-be violators. The Government, however, having primary responsibility for the enforcement of the antitrust laws, does not need a provision for the recovery of treble damages to stimulate its law-enforcement activities. Nevertheless, the taxpayers would seem to be entitled to recovery of actual losses sustained by the Government as the result of antitrust violations. Remaining provisions of the bill are technical amendments rendered necessary by the primary objective of the measure.

The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the submission of this recommendation.

Sincerely,

HERBERT BROWNELL, Jr.,
Attorney General.

AMENDMENT OF CODE RELATING TO PENALTIES FOR THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT-ELECT AND VICE PRESIDENT

Mr. KILGORE. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to amend title 18, United States Code, section 871, to provide penalties for threats against the President-elect and the Vice President. I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury recommending the proposed legislation be printed in the RECORD.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the letter will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 734) to amend title 18, United States Code, section 871, to provide penalties for threats against the President-elect and the Vice President, introduced by Mr. KILGORE, was received, read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

The letter presented by Mr. KILGORE is as follows:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 1955.

The PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE.

SIR: There is transmitted herewith a draft of a proposed bill "To amend title 18, United States Code, section 871, to provide penalties for threats against the President-elect and the Vice President".

Title 18, United States Code, section 871 makes it a Federal crime willfully and knowingly to make any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, whether such threat is deposited for conveyance in the mail, or is otherwise communicated. The proposed legislation would amend this statute to include, in addition to threats against the President, threats made against the President-elect and the Vice President of the United States.

The United States Secret Service, Treasury Department, is, by law, charged with the protection of the President-elect and Vice President, as well as the protection of the President and his family. It has been the experience of the Secret Service that the present law has been a great aid in the investigation of threats against the President, in that it permits prompt Federal action to be taken in the matter regardless of the manner in which the threats are communicated. Although it has been the past experience of the Secret Service that threats against Presidents-elect or Vice Presidents have been somewhat less numerous than those directed against our Presidents, there have been a sufficient number of cases involving threats against the President-elect and Vice President, investigation or prosecution of which have been hampered because of lack of an applicable Federal statute, to warrant the proposed amendment of title 18, United States Code, section 871. Accordingly, the Treasury Department recommends the enactment of the proposed legislation.

A comparative type showing changes which the proposed legislation would make in existing law is enclosed for convenient reference. The proposed legislation was submitted by the Department to the 83d Congress and introduced as S. 2602 and H. R. 5665. However, no further action was taken prior to adjournment.

It would be appreciated if you would lay the proposed bill before the Senate. A similar proposed bill has been transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

The Department has been advised by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this proposed legislation to the Congress.

Very truly yours,

H. CHAPMAN ROSE,
Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR CERTAIN LOANS UNDER TITLE III OF SERVICEMEN'S READJUSTMENT ACT OF 1944

Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to extend for an additional 5 years the authority to make, guarantee, and insure loans under title III of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, as amended. I ask unanimous consent that a brief statement, prepared by me, explaining why I think it necessary for Congress to act on this matter at this time be printed in the RECORD.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection the statement will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 740) to extend for an additional 5 years the authority to make, guarantee, and insure loans under title III of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, as amended, introduced by Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

The statement presented by Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina is as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHNSTON OF
SOUTH CAROLINA

While I am well aware of the fact that the provisions of existing law for GI loans and loans with which veterans may buy homes do not expire until July 15, 1957, and

for the Korean veterans at a subsequent date, I am also mindful of the fact that many veterans who would like to have availed themselves of the beneficial provisions of these laws have not been able thus far to do so. A goodly number have been and many still are confined in our hospitals in process of becoming rehabilitated. Many have been completing and are still receiving their education. Some are compelled to study on a part time basis. There are others who for economic reasons are just now finding themselves in a position to assume the responsibility of purchasing a home or establishing himself in business. To be able to buy a bare home without being able to furnish it adequately is a problem faced by many of our veterans. To accommodate this practical situation is the primary purpose of the proposed legislation.

The separate dates provided for in the extension of the several acts have for their purpose uniformity of time limitations for the benefits, as originally provided. Many of the veterans of the Korean war are still in school and will not graduate until several years from now, hence the extension of time for them and for others situated in similar circumstances is necessary if we are to meet the practical problems involved. I am sure it is the will of Congress that these problems, varied and complex as they are, deserve and will receive our heartiest consideration. The overriding purposes of all our veterans legislation has been to meet, as time passes and these problems arise, an equitable solution of them. Many of the difficulties could not be anticipated with any degree of certainty when these beneficial laws were first enacted.

PROVISION FOR EXTENSION OF CERTAIN WAR RISK, MARINE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to extend the authority of the Secretary of Commerce to provide war risk and certain marine and liability insurance for the protection of passengers and crew and vessels and cargoes, when endangered by war conditions or threat of war.

The present law—Public Law 763, 81st Congress—expires on September 7, 1955. In view of the unsettled state of world conditions this legislation should be kept on the statute books so that if conditions require it, the Government will be prepared to issue war-risk insurance when commercial marine insurance companies cannot or will not do so.

I may say, Mr. President, that I was the chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcommittee which held hearings on the original bill during the 81st Congress. When I reported that legislation to the floor it contained no expiration date. However, the minority calendar committee objected to such permanent authorization, hence an amendment was added placing a limit of 5 years on the Secretary's authority.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 741) to amend title XII of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, relating to war-risk insurance, in order to repeal the provision which would terminate authority to provide insurance under such title, introduced by Mr. MAGNUSON,

was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN PERSONS WHO HAVE RECEIVED INSTRUCTION OR ASSIGNMENT IN ESPIONAGE, COUNTERESPIONAGE OR SABOTAGE

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference, a bill to amend the Internal Security Act of 1950, relating to the registration of certain persons. I ask unanimous consent that a statement prepared by me on this subject, together with a letter from the Attorney General of the United States, be printed in the RECORD.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the statement and letter will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 750) to require the registration of certain persons who have knowledge of or have received instruction or assignment in the espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service or tactics of a foreign government or foreign political party, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. WILEY, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

The statement presented by Mr. WILEY is as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR WILEY

I am introducing today a bill recommended by the Department of Justice to repeal and revise certain sections of the Internal Security Act of 1950. These sections, although conceived with the best of intentions, are not, however, working out as originally planned.

The sections pertain to the registration of persons who have knowledge of or who have received instruction in espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage, service or tactics of a foreign government or a foreign political party.

The purpose of this new bill, like the purpose of the present sections in the Internal Security Act, is sound and fundamentally necessary.

The only question before us in the *modus vivendi*, how to attain a worthy purpose which by our experience is not being attained, imbedded under the present overall internal security statute and its foreign agent registration component.

I believe, and Attorney General Brownell and his associates believe, that we can achieve our goal by setting up a separate and distinct registration statute which will require registration of espionage-trained individuals, irrespective of any technical status or relationship as agent of a foreign principality.

I want to point out that on a great many previous occasions I have commented on the Senate floor regarding the danger of Communist espionage in our country.

In this air-atomic age, a single foreign intelligence agent—like a Richard Sorge, or a single treacherous American like the great numbers who were trained in espionage and related "skills" at the Lenin Institute and other Red schools of subversion—can do incalculable damage to our country.

THE SOVIET UNION—A SUPERSPY STATE

The Soviet Union is a breeding ground of spies. It is a superspy state. There, officials spy on one another, superiors on sub-

ordinates, subordinates on superiors, children on parents. It is only natural that this domestic spying spills over into preoccupation with engaging in foreign spying.

For that reason the Soviet Union has turned out wave after wave of crack spies, saboteurs, provocateurs from its training centers. It has graduated innumerable cadres skilled at everything from secret radio transmission—see my CONGRESSIONAL RECORD remarks of June 18, 1954—to assassination by poisoned bullets fired by an electrically operated gun resembling a cigarette case.

Soviet intelligence in particular has long been one of the master weapons in the international Soviet conspiracy.

Again and again, the West has learned to its sorrow that a Soviet spy network in the United States, or in Canada, or in Australia, or in Japan, or in West Germany, or in France, and elsewhere has penetrated what was mistakenly believed to be an impenetrable fortress of security.

We must, therefore, take vigorous action against these skilled foreign professional spies who infest the West, just as we must take action against their dupes and accomplices of American nationality.

Fortunately, our ever-alert Federal Bureau of Investigation is on the job, but let us at least give it and the Department as a whole a more effective registration tool than we now have available. We cannot expect miracles under the pending proposal, but at least it will be infinitely superior in effectiveness to the present provisions and it will become another improved weapon in our defensive arsenal.

I append hereto the text of the Attorney General's letter of January 26.

I introduce the bill and present the letter particularly in my capacity as ranking Republican of the Senate Judiciary Committee as well as ranking Republican of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The letter presented by Mr. WILEY is as follows:

JANUARY 26, 1955.

The VICE PRESIDENT,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. VICE PRESIDENT: The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended by section 20 (a) of the Internal Security Act of 1950, presently includes within the definition "agent of a foreign principal" persons who have knowledge of or who have received assignment in foreign espionage or sabotage systems. However, the remaining provisions of the act make it clear that the registration requirements are applicable only to those persons who are currently acting as agents. Hence, persons with past knowledge or training in the espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage service or tactics of a foreign government or political party are under no obligation to register if they are not acting as agents of foreign principals. The presence of this provision as an integral part of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which imposes the necessity of establishing an agency relationship or status before registration can be required, seriously impedes achieving the purposes and objective sought in the enactment of this legislation.

Furthermore, in administering the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the Department of Justice has attempted to make it clear that registration under the act in no way places any limitations on the activities which may be engaged in by an agent of a foreign principal and that there is no stigma attached to registration. The tenor and import of the statute are altered, however, by including within the definition of "agent of a foreign principal" persons who have received training or assignment in foreign espionage or sabotage systems.

For these reasons, it is recommended that the Foreign Agents Registration Act be

amended by deleting from it any reference to persons who have received training or assignment in foreign espionage or sabotage systems and to substitute therefor a separate and distinct registration statute which would require the registration of such persons irrespective of any technical agency status or relationship.

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a measure which would effectuate this recommendation. It will be observed that provision is made for the exemption of certain categories of persons from its registration requirements. These exemptions have been concurred in by the Departments of State and Defense.

The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the submission of this recommendation.

Sincerely,

HERBERT BROWNELL, Jr.
Attorney General.

ADJUSTMENTS TO THE NATIONAL TRADE POLICY

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, on behalf of the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] and myself, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to provide assistance to those individuals, companies, and communities suffering serious injury or threatened with serious injury due to increased imports resulting from the national trade policy. This bill is identical to one which the Senator from Massachusetts, who is absent from the Senate because of illness, introduced in the closing weeks of the 83d Congress—S. 3650. Representatives HARRISON WILLIAMS, of New Jersey, HAROLD DONOHUE, of Massachusetts, and others have introduced a similar bill in the House of Representatives in the 84th Congress.

Since the first introduction of this bill in June of last year, administration spokesmen have indicated agreement with the basic thesis of the junior Senator from Massachusetts that consideration must be given to the significant readjustment problems certain to follow from the adoption of any international trade policies which would result in a decrease in tariffs and a corresponding increase in imports directly competitive with the products of so many of our domestic industries.

This idea has recently been expressed publicly by Mr. Clarence B. Randall, the Chairman of the President's Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, and by Samuel W. Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs, in a recent speech before the National Foreign Trade Convention. Mr. Anderson discussed the need for assisting segments of our economy weakened by tariff decisions taken by our Government in the national interest and stated:

In my judgment, this idea has had insufficient debate and analysis. I am unwilling to accept the hypothesis that a Federal Government would be incapable of administering such an assistance program exclusively on the grounds of helping those unable to help themselves to readjust their affairs because of tariff action in the national interest.

I ask unanimous consent that at this point in my remarks certain excerpts

from the statement the junior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], made upon the introduction of this bill in the 83d Congress be inserted, along with a brief section-by-section analysis of the bill.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the excerpts and analysis will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 751) to provide assistance to communities, industries, business enterprises, and individuals to facilitate adjustments made necessary by the trade policy of the United States, introduced by Mr. HUMPHREY (for himself and Mr. KENNEDY), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Finance.

The excerpts and analysis presented by Mr. HUMPHREY are as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR KENNEDY

The difficulties caused by increased competition from imported products which face many businessmen, workers, and communities in this country, including those in the State of Massachusetts, present an increasingly serious problem which must be met by the United States Government. Inasmuch as any tariff, existing or prospective, is a direct result of national policy promulgated by the executive branch under authority delegated by Congress, it is only fitting that those individuals, companies, and communities who suffer serious financial loss or other injury as a result of that national policy be assisted by the Government in their own efforts to meet those problems.

The "escape clause" and "peril point" provisions in our tariff law, aimed at affording protection to domestic industries from foreign competition which is ruinous in nature, have serious shortcomings. Under an "escape clause" proceeding, even when an industry proves to the satisfaction of the Tariff Commission that imports have caused or threatened to cause serious injury, and the Commission has recommended to the President that the tariff be increased to prevent serious injury, the President is free to reject the Tariff Commission's recommendation (although he must provide Congress with an explanation of his action).

Under the "peril point" provision, the Commission, upon receipt from the President of a list of all products imported into the United States, which are being considered for possible tariff modifications, specifies for such products the tariff level below which, in the Commission's opinion, excessive imports would cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or competitively similar articles. But this again is merely a recommendation to the President, who is at liberty to reject the recommendation (again with an explanation of his reasons for doing so), and to negotiate a tariff lower than the "peril point" specified by the Commission. Thus in both instances a finding of serious economic injury can be ignored.

Since the "escape clause" principle was first promulgated by Executive order in 1947, it has become painfully clear that the proof of injury or threat of injury does not insure that relief will be forthcoming. Of 43 applications for relief under the escape clause provision upon which action has been completed to date, only 3 have been successful in traveling the tortuous route to relief: the fur-felt hat industry, the hatters fur industry, and the dried-frog industry. In the other 40 applications, 33 were rejected by the Tariff Commission, 5 were rejected by the President and 2 have been postponed by the President pending further study. Thus, al-

though the congressional intent that domestic industries are to be protected against ruinous competition from imports is written in crystal-clear language, no real relief has been forthcoming. Moreover, these discouraging results have had such a dampening effect on industries which are legitimately in need of relief from imports, that those companies are reluctant to go through the time-consuming, expensive procedures of the Tariff Commission to have their cases fairly adjudicated only to learn that—although they are entitled to relief under the criteria established by law—in the final instance such relief must be denied.

I am not suggesting that the President is guided by improper motives in rejecting the recommendations of the Tariff Commission that relief be granted to suffering industries in the form of tariff adjustments. Nor do I suggest that the decision is an easy one for the President. Concededly, it is extremely difficult to reconcile the conflicting national interest, which the President rightfully believes demands a high degree of international trade, with the legitimate needs of the domestic industries to be protected from imports which can be manufactured in foreign countries—with their lower living standards and labor costs—at substantially lower prices than in this country.

But it is our hope in presenting this bill to provide the President with a workable alternative to callous disregard of economic hardship, an alternative whereby the President would call into operation the facilities, programs, and resources of the Federal Government to provide special assistance to local industries, employees, and communities in making those economic readjustments made necessary by the President's decision. Where now the President can either accept or reject the recommendations of the Tariff Commission, this bill would authorize the President to invoke the provisions of the bill in the event he decides to (a) establish tariffs below the peril point or (b) refuse tariff modifications recommended as a result of an escape-clause proceeding. Let me make it perfectly clear that it is not our intention that this bill is to be a substitute for the present escape-clause or peril-point provisions. The President will continue to use his authority under the escape clause, as the national interest permits, to make "such adjustments in the rates of duty, impose such quotas, or make such other modifications as are found and reported by the Commission to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury to the respective domestic industry." The President could not use this as a substitute for following the peril-point recommendations of the Commission, in those cases where he would normally decide to follow them. The Trade Adjustment Act recommended by this bill would merely provide the President with an alternative in the event he determines, for reasons of overriding national interest, not to follow the recommendations of the Tariff Commission.

Upon the President's invocation of the provisions of the act those individuals, companies, or communities who regard themselves to be eligible for benefits under the act could apply to a new Trade Adjustment Board, which Board would determine the eligibility of applicants for relief under the act. The Board would issue certificates of eligibility entitling the holders to the assistance measures outlined in the act.

Very generally speaking, the following provisions of assistance are contained in the bill. For an individual who is unemployed as a result of the failure of the President to adhere to the recommendations of the Tariff Commission, the following forms of assistance would be available: (1) Supplemental unemployment compensation benefits in addition to those already available under existing unemployment compensation laws; (2) a lower

social-security retirement age, if he is of advanced age and unable to find further employment; (3) vocational reeducation and training programs; and, (4) in certain cases, financial assistance in his efforts to relocate to a different place in the United States, where appropriate employment is available.

For a company adversely affected, (1) technical information, advice, and consultation would be made available through established governmental agencies; (2) rapid amortization benefits would be made available to encourage modernization and diversification; (3) loans otherwise not commercially available would be made by the Small Business Administration to further aid modernization and diversification.

For communities found to be adversely affected as a result of the national trade policy, there would be available (1) the advice, technical information, and consultation necessary to establish a workable plan for adjusting to the situation created by the tariff action; (2) loans to such communities or industrial development corporations or similar agencies, for the purpose of implementing those adjustment proposals.

This bill is the result of several executive, congressional, and private studies during several years. The first recommendation of the Bell report on a trade and tariff policy in the national interest—signed by the representatives of major business, labor, and farm interests serving on the Mutual Security Public Advisory Board—states that where a decision in the national interest results in hardship to domestic industry, "the industry [must] be helped to make adjustments * * * extension of unemployment insurance, assistance in retraining workers, diversification of production, and conversion to other lines." Attention was given the basic ideas involved here by the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy appointed by the President to inquire into the problems of international trade policy (the Randall Commission). The Commission's study in this field is summarized in chapter 7 of the staff papers of the Commission. In addition, Mr. David J. McDonald, a member of the Randall Commission, formally submitted to the Commission a proposal, similar in many respects to that contained in the bill which we have introduced today.

It is true that most of the assistance measures contained in the bill are found elsewhere in Federal activities; but the bill consolidates in one act all such assistance measures, states clearly the national policy to aid in these hardship cases, and, most important, provides an administrative procedure which will facilitate the securing of adjustment assistance, and contains special provisions or extensions of existing programs not now available to those who are to be assisted by these measures. No super-bureaucracy is created. The Board created by this bill would perform carefully limited functions, and existing governmental facilities and activities would be utilized to the extent possible.

Let me also stress that this bill would not subsidize American industries merely to keep them in production; but would aid industries in their own efforts to adjust to changed conditions by modernization of plant and techniques and by diversification of products.

Although American industry has frequently been compelled to readjust to changed conditions resulting from industrial development, shifting customs and tastes, and general economic conditions, any adjustment made necessary by the tariff structure is unquestionably the direct result of national policy. Just as the Government felt compelled to assist the railroads at a time when national policy called for the development of a continental transportation system, just as the Government has felt compelled to assist in personal readjustments made necessary by the participation of our youth in military service, just as the Government met

its obligation to assist industry in adjusting to war production and again to return to civilian peacetime production, so there is an obligation on the part of the National Government to render assistance to those who are suffering as a result of the national trade policy, existing or prospective.

We must be realistic. Regardless of personal or sectional attitudes, it is clear that the trend is in the direction of lower tariff barriers and increased international trade. I might add that, even if there were no such trend and we were assured that the current tariff status would remain constant, there is great need for assistance to those who are injured by the existing tariff structure. Instead of merely talking about the need for American industries to adjust to imports, it is time we took some positive steps to assist them in their difficult transition.

In order that the Members of the Congress might better understand the purposes and provisions of this bill, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted into the RECORD at this point in my remarks a brief section-by-section analysis which I have prepared.

SUMMARY OF TRADE ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1955

Section 1 authorizes the act to be cited as "The Trade Adjustment Act of 1955."

Section 2 recognizes the necessity for an international trade program, indicates the practical shortcomings of the existing escape clause and peril point provisions, and recognizes the national obligation to render assistance to those industries, enterprises, communities, and individuals suffering as a result of increased imports encouraged by the international trade policy.

Section 3 authorizes the appointment of a special board made up of five officers and employees of the executive branch of the Government who shall serve without compensation in addition to their normal salaries as Government employees.

Section 4 authorizes the Board to conduct hearings, to secure information from the various agencies of the Government, to subpoena witnesses, and to establish appropriate rules and regulations.

Section 5 authorizes the President to invoke the provisions of this act in the event he fails to accept the recommendations of the Tariff Commission under the mechanisms of the escape clause proceeding or in the event he negotiates a tariff lower than that designated by the Tariff Commission as a peril point. After the President invokes the provisions of the act, the Board shall receive applications from communities, industrial development corporations, business enterprises, employees, or organizations representing employees for certificates of eligibility. The Board shall issue such certificates to those parties engaged in the production of articles identical to or competitive with the articles found to need tariff adjustment by the Tariff Commission. In determining eligibility, the Board is directed to consider the extent to which the employees and business enterprise or communities are affected by the injury suffered by the domestic industry. The Board is also directed to consider whether communities, business enterprises, and industrial development corporations have developed satisfactory programs for adjustment.

Section 6 authorizes application to appropriate Federal agencies for technical information, market research, or any other form of information and advice.

Section 7 amends the Small Business Act of 1953 to permit loans for economic adjustment purposes without the usual limitation on the amount which may be loaned. There is the requirement that the loans be not available commercially and that the program be an approved one and the same safeguards of the Small Business Act are made applicable.

Section 8 authorizes the Secretary of Labor to enter into agreement with the individual

States whereby supplementary unemployment compensation benefits may be paid by the State to unemployed individuals eligible for the benefits of this act. The States would be reimbursed by the Federal Government for the supplementary payments made by the individual States. The supplementary payments would be such as to make the total payment to the individual equal to 66⅔% of his average weekly earnings and the period for which this amount would be paid the individual would be 52 weeks. It is provided that all the standard unemployment compensation requirements shall be applicable.

Section 9 directs the Secretary of Labor to provide suitable vocational rehabilitation training for unemployed individuals. It directs the Secretary to utilize existing Federal Government facilities, and if necessary by agreement with public or private institutions to provide such additional training facilities as may be necessary. The Secretary is also authorized, under certain circumstances, to assist in the transportation of an unemployed individual and his dependents and household effects to a place in the United States outside of the employee's current labor area if no job opportunity exists within his own labor market area, if there is a job opportunity existing in the new location, if the individual desires to make such move in order to obtain such job, and if such action would be in the best interest of the United States.

Section 10 authorizes the Secretary of Labor to certify older workers to be unemployed as a result of the international trade policy of the United States, and the Social Security Act is amended so that such individuals may retire under the Social Security Act at age 60.

Section 11 would permit eligible business enterprises to take advantage of the accelerated amortization provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

Section 12 amends section 4 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 which is the "peril point" provision. As indicated above, the amendment authorizes the President to invoke the provisions of the act, and to notify the Congress in his message refusing the recommendations of the Tariff Commission to advise whether he has invoked the provisions of the act.

Section 13 amends section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, the "escape clause" provision. This authorizes the President to make the adjustments in tariffs recommended by the Tariff Commission, to invoke the provisions of the act, or to take no action in which case he shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of the Congress.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION RELATING TO ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution so as to abolish the electoral college and divide the electoral vote in proportion to the popular vote in each State.

The joint resolution is introduced on behalf of myself, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. JENNER], the Senator from New York [Mr. IVES], the Senators from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON and Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. WIL-

LIAMS], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], the Senators from Montana [Mr. MURRAY and Mr. MANSFIELD], the Senators from Alabama [Mr. HILL and Mr. SPARKMAN], and the Senator from Oregon [Mr. NEUBERGER].

I request that the resolution lie on the table for 2 days before being printed in order that additional cosponsors may add their names if so desired.

Representative FRANCIS E. WALTER, of Pennsylvania, and Representative CHAUNCEY W. REED, of Illinois, are introducing a similar resolution in the House today.

Without a doubt, the electoral college method of selecting the President is the most archaic and undemocratic feature of the United States Constitution. It was one of the few mistakes made by the Founding Fathers—a mistake because they thought the people could not be trusted to select the President and Vice President.

As originally intended, the States were to select well-informed public men as electors, and they were to meet and select a President and Vice President without reference to popular vote or any other method of expression from the people. The original form has been retained in the solemn words of the Constitution, although for more than a century it has had no practical use.

In fact, the electoral college system has never functioned as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution. For many years the electors have been mere figureheads casting their votes for the candidate who received the majority of the popular vote in their respective States. These votes could just as well be reported and counted without the intervention of "dummy" officers known as presidential electors.

All reason for the electoral college has long since disappeared, and the form should be removed from our Constitution before it rises to haunt us by flouting the will of the people in selecting a President. As long as the form remains in the Constitution, it is possible for electors to cast their independent votes contrary to the expressed will of their constituents, and this, in fact, has been done in more than one instance.

The practice which has been substituted for the constitutional form is just as evil and undemocratic. I refer to the custom which is generally understood and followed—that all electoral votes of each State will be cast for the candidate who receives a majority of the popular vote within that State. In effect, this disfranchises millions of American voters. Their votes for a candidate for President are not counted in the electoral vote unless their candidate receives a majority of the popular vote in their State.

For instance, if a candidate receives a 1-vote majority in the State of New York, he now receives 100 percent of the electoral votes of New York, and the candidate receiving only 1 less vote at the polls receives none of the New York electoral vote. Is it any wonder that overemphasis is given to political machines and minority groups which can make the slight difference in the pivotal States?

This proposed amendment would abolish the electoral college and provide for the division of the total electoral vote of each State in the exact ratio with the popular vote. This would mean that every person's vote would be counted as it was cast. It is the nearest possible approach to electing a President by direct popular vote of the people and at the same time retaining and preserving the present proportional strength of each State in the election of a President.

This joint resolution is worded exactly the same as the so-called Gossett-Lodge joint resolution, which was passed by the Senate February 1, 1950, by a vote of 64 to 27—CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, volume 96, part 1, page 1278. We have chosen this same language because it has been studied thoroughly and approved by the Judiciary Committees of both the House and Senate in previous sessions of Congress. Briefly, the proposed amendment would accomplish the following:

First. Abolish the fictitious electoral college.

Second. Abolish the office of presidential electors.

Third. Provide for direct voting for President and Vice President.

Fourth. Retain the electoral voting strength of each State as at present—one vote for each Member of Congress—but provide that such electoral vote be divided in exact ratio with the popular vote.

Fifth. Provide that the winning candidate must receive at least 40 percent of the electoral vote, failing in which the Congress would select the President from the candidates having the two highest numbers of electoral votes. This was the so-called Lucas amendment adopted in the Senate in 1950 in order to prevent splinter parties.

Mr. President, in due time it is my intention to speak at length concerning the evils of the present electoral college system and the benefits to be obtained from this proposed reform. For the present, I will simply summarize a few of the benefits, as follows:

First. We will cleanse our Constitution of an archaic provision which we have failed to obey or defend for more than a century.

Second. We will have democratic elections, with every person's vote counting for the candidate for whom it is cast.

Third. There will be less opportunity for fraud and pressure-group action.

Fourth. Sectionalism will be largely abated. A vote in every State will be just as important and count just as much as a vote in the present pivotal States. This is not the case now. With certain exceptions in 1952, the emphasis usually is on 8 or 10 pivotal States and the remaining States enjoy very little of the campaign and are usually ignored as source of presidential candidates.

It is my hope that during this year, with the approach of another presidential election, a serious effort will be made on both sides of the Capitol to submit the proposed reform to the States for their approval.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NEUBERGER in the chair). The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The joint resolution (S. J. Res. 31) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice President, introduced by Mr. DANIEL (for himself and other Senators), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

AMENDMENT OF RULE RELATING TO SPECIAL MEETINGS OF COMMITTEES

Mr. MUNDT submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 42), which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

Resolved, That the Standing Rules of the Senate are amended by adding at the end thereof the following new rule:

"RULE XLI

"SPECIAL MEETINGS OF COMMITTEES

"1. If the chairman of any standing, special, or select committee of the Senate, or of any subcommittee of any such committee, is requested by at least 3 members of the committee or subcommittee (or by 2 members, in the case of a 3-member committee or subcommittee) to call a special meeting thereof and fails or refuses after 3 days' consideration of the request to call such a special meeting within 7 calendar days from the date of the request, then upon the filing with the clerk of the committee or subcommittee of a written signed request by a majority of the members of the committee or subcommittee for a called special meeting thereof, the committee or subcommittee shall meet on the day and hour specified in such written signed request. It shall be the duty of the clerk of the committee or subcommittee to notify in the usual way all members of the committee or subcommittee of such called special meeting.

"2. In the temporary absence of the chairman of any standing, special, or select committee of the Senate, or of any subcommittee of any such committee, the member next in rank in the order named in the election or designation of such committee or subcommittee, and so on, as often as the case shall happen, shall act as chairman."

DEFENSE OF FORMOSA—AMENDMENTS

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I submit an amendment to House Joint Resolution 159, authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores and related positions and territories of that area. The resolution was passed yesterday by the House. I think this amendment is a very important one, and should be adopted by the Senate and by the House. The amendment simply provides that we shall discontinue any financial aid to any country (1) which allows its own materials to be shipped to Red China, or (2) allows its flagships to be used to transport goods to Red China.

If legislation of this type had been enacted 2 or 3 years ago, there would be no need today for House Joint Resolution 159. If the amendment is not adopted, we shall again find ourselves in the not too distant future in the tragic position of having American boys killed with materials which we are indirectly shipping to Red China.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment will be received, printed, and will lie on the table.

Mr. LANGER submitted an amendment, intended to be proposed by him, to the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 28) authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores and related positions and territories of that area, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

Mr. KEFAUVER (for himself, Mr. LEHMAN, and Mr. MORSE) submitted an amendment in the nature of a substitute, intended to be proposed by them to Senate Joint Resolution 28, supra, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

Mr. HUMPHREY (for himself and Mr. LEHMAN) submitted amendments intended to be proposed by them, jointly, to the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 28) authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores and related positions and territories of that area; which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION PLACED ON CALENDAR

The joint resolution (H. J. Res. 159) authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores and related positions and territories of that area, was read twice by its title, and placed on the calendar.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE RECORD

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

By Mr. KILGORE:

Statement prepared by Senator HENNINGS concerning President Eisenhower's message requesting a congressional resolution on the defense of Formosa and adjacent areas.

NOTICE OF FURTHER HEARING ON S. 462 AND S. 540, RELATING TO INCREASES IN SALARY OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, a special Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on yesterday, January 25, 1955, held hearings on S. 462 and S. 540, relating to judicial and congressional salary increases. Numerous witnesses were heard, including the Attorney General of the United States. In order that any other persons or organizations interested in this matter may be given an opportunity to testify or present a statement, the subcommittee is again meeting in open session on Friday, January 28, 1955, at 10 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building. I herewith present for insertion in the

RECORD a notice of the continuation of these hearings on Friday next.

There being no objection, the notice was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

On Friday, January 28, 1955, at 10 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, there will be a further hearing on S. 462, entitled "A bill to increase the salaries of justices and judges of United States courts, Members of Congress, and for other purposes," and S. 540, entitled "A bill to increase the salaries of judges of the United States courts, and to provide that Members of Congress shall receive salary comparable to that of judges of the United States district courts." This is a continuation of the hearings commenced on Tuesday, January 25, 1955. At the indicated time and place all persons interested in the proposed legislation may make such representations as may be pertinent. The subcommittee consists of the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER], chairman; the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. KILGORE]; the Senator from Texas [Mr. DANIEL]; the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS]; and the Senator from Idaho [Mr. WELKER].

NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON NOMINATION OF JOSEPH CAMPBELL TO BE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, at the request of the senior Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN], I wish to announce that the Committee on Government Operations will hold public hearings on the nomination of Joseph Campbell, to be Comptroller General of the United States, on February 2, at 10 o'clock a. m.

EULOGIES OF SENATORS WHO DIED DURING THE 83D CONGRESS

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the body of the RECORD eulogies which I have prepared on the life and public service of four Senators who died during the 83d Congress.

There being no objection, the eulogies were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EULOGY OF SENATOR HUGH BUTLER

Mr. President, one of the Senators who welcomed me to Congress in 1946 was a man whom I had come to know and admire as the Republican national committeeman from Nebraska, our departed colleague, Senator Hugh Butler.

My first committee assignment was to Interior and Insular Affairs, where I had the good fortune of serving with Senator Butler until his untimely death in 1954. Few men in the Congress have taken their committee chairmanships as seriously and served so fairly and impartially as this good man from Nebraska.

Senator Butler acquired his fine, charitable, Christian nature through a lifetime of service in religious and public-service organizations. Groups that he served with distinction and devotion, both as an official and a member, included Rotary International, the Omaha Board of Education, and advisory boards of the YMCA, Salvation Army, Community Chest, and the Omaha Chamber of Commerce. In addition, he served as moderator of the Nebraska congregational churches.

His ability to get along with people and to appeal to their better natures served him

well in his efforts in the Senate and its committees, and the sound achievements of the 83d Congress in the field of Interior and Insular Affairs stand largely as a monument to his ability as an organizer and to the personal esteem and friendship he had acquired among Members on both sides of the aisle.

His passing is a great loss to his family, his State, and to his many friends in Nebraska and to those of us who served with him in the Congress.

EULOGY OF SENATOR LESTER CALLAWAY HUNT

Mr. President, Senator Hunt had the distinction of being one of the few dentists ever elected to serve in the United States Senate. From the practice of dentistry in his hometown of Lander, Wyo., he first responded to a deep-seated urge for public service by becoming a candidate and being elected to the Wyoming House of Representatives in 1932. From that time to his untimely death in 1954, he was active in public affairs in the State of Wyoming and in the United States Senate, to which he was elected in 1948. He also was highly regarded in his profession, being a Fellow in the American College of Dentists.

Although Senator Hunt was in his first term in the Senate when death occurred, he was well known from the start to most of us from the Western States. He had served as secretary of state for Wyoming from 1934 to 1942, and as Governor of the Cowboy State from 1942 to 1948.

Because our respective States have a common boundary and similar economic problems, I had the pleasure of working with Senator Hunt on many problems of mutual interest. I was always favorably impressed with the competence and sincere devotion to duty displayed by Senator Hunt on those occasions, and I am gratified to recall that our relations here in Congress were always pleasant, even though the political aisle had technically separated us.

My last joint project with Senator Hunt was to provide active support to a bill that he had introduced to provide protection to our domestic coal industry. Because of his wide background in public affairs, he had a rich source of experience to draw upon, and he could always be counted on to be well informed and in support of measures contributing to the developing of the Mountain West.

His passing is deeply regretted by his many friends in the Senate, and his death is a heavy loss to the State of Wyoming.

EULOGY OF SENATOR BURNET RHETT MAYBANK

Mr. President, the past 2 years have been filled with many tragic moments for us Members of Congress as we received notice after notice of the passing of stalwart Members of the legislative Houses. Each of these men who died in the legislative service of his country was immediately missed by us in our labors, and the weight of that loss has increased with each passing day.

Those present at the hearing conducted in the caucus room on September 1, 1954, will remember the deep hush that fell over the room with the announcement of Senator Maybank's death. As we stood in silence, with our heads bowed in respect to our deceased colleague, I could not help reflecting how only days before we had exchanged cheerful greetings in the halls of the Capitol and the corridors of the Senate Office Building. Senator Maybank was a friendly, gracious man who made firm and fast friendships wherever he chanced to be, and his loss was a deeply personal one to those of us who had the good fortune to know him and to be associated with him so closely.

We here in the Senate learned to know and respect this man's exceptional ability

to inject a note of subtle humor when the occasion needed some relaxation, and to be sternly serious when the occasion demanded a steadfast adherence to fact and principle.

A veteran of World War I and a former Governor of the great State of South Carolina, he was a warm, personable man and a devoted public servant who will be missed by his family, his church, and his many friends throughout the Nation. I feel that my own life was enriched by the privilege of knowing and associating with Burnet Maybank.

EULOGY OF SENATOR PATRICK A. MCCARRAN

Mr. President, Senator Patrick A. McCarran served the State of Nevada in the United States Senate from 1933 until his untimely death in 1954. His loss was keenly felt here, where the veteran Senator from the Silver State was known and respected as one of the best informed and individually effective Members of the Congress and a great and powerful friend of the Mountain West.

I enjoyed congressional associations with Senator McCarran since my election in 1946. As a fellow member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I early came to regard the senior Senator from Nevada as a neighbor not only in a geographic sense, but also in his approach and convictions on many legislative and administrative problems. He was a man of strong convictions, and though we differed at times, it was never on personalities. In most of his dealings with other Senators, he chose to deal only with facts and issues, and he came to be widely respected by those with whom he differed.

The magnitude of legislative work turned out by this energetic and conscientious Senator was prodigious. Every session was replete with bills of his authorship and with reports from committees and subcommittees under his chairmanship. Any calendar of bills and of committees to which he was assigned bears liberal evidence of his phenomenal legislative activity.

In the passing of Senator McCarran, or "Pat," as he was called by everyone, not only the State of Nevada but the Nation has lost a true friend, a vigorous advocate, and a legislator distinguished for his ability and effectiveness. It is indeed rare that a small State produces a man of such great stature on the national scene.

Through his two decades of service in the Congress, Senator McCarran amassed a wealth of experience in the legislative processes and of knowledge of domestic and international affairs that has seldom been equalled in the history of American Constitutional Government. In these times of recurring international crises, his sound judgment and sage counsel was invaluable.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S SPECIAL MESSAGE ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I wish to make a few observations with respect to President Eisenhower's special message on foreign economic policy, which was communicated to the Congress last Monday, January 10, 1955. I believe it represents, in general, a constructive approach to a very complex problem which has many ramifications.

The President's emphasis upon the need for increasing "the opportunities for the fuller operation of the forces of free enterprise" in general are indeed welcome and desirable. In this regard, I am sure the President will find substantial support for his proposals that, first, stimulating the flow of capital abroad must be done in such a manner that "it

results in investment largely by individuals or private enterprise," and that, second, the technical assistance program should be concerned with "know-how rather than large funds."

However, there is another area of our foreign policy to which the President addressed himself which warrants special attention. That is the area of tariff legislation. I think my colleagues will agree with me that an American trade policy must embody those features that will work toward the enlargement of international trade, but in a manner consistent with maintaining a sound domestic economy. In this respect it appears to me that if realistic tariff legislation is enacted, it must necessarily, therefore, recognize the requirements of national defense, the customs and traditions of our people, and the protective legislation which safeguards wages, industry, and agriculture.

The President did indicate that all nations should mutually undertake the lowering of unjustified barriers to trade on "a mutual basis so that the benefits may be shared by all." But the "all" the President referred to must include those domestic industries such as wool, fuels, and nonferrous metals, which face disadvantageous competitive conditions with foreign imports. Not only must they be protected because they involve the economic welfare of a great section of this country, but because they are strategic and essential to our national defense and security.

There is, however, another aspect of tariff policy which is frequently overlooked in all the emotionalism and generalized discussion which frequently surrounds debate on this problem. That is the desirability and need of stability of tariff schedules. Witness after witness who testified at the hearings held last September by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Samuel C. Waugh, on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, spoke of this problem.

The central theme of their remarks indicated that the basic requirement for flourishing world trade is not so much a matter of lowering trade barriers generally, but a trade policy that embodies the attributes of predictability, continuity, and stability in tariff schedules. The environment in which trade can flourish, investment can realize a profit, and general world economic progress can continue, is one which is stable long enough to ensure that economic decisions can be made with a reasonable chance for success. Importers and exporters build markets on the basis then of stability in tariffs, quotas, and other barriers.

This problem, Mr. President, is ably discussed by Mr. Walter Lippmann in an article entitled "Economic Disarmament," which appeared in the New York Herald Tribune of January 13, 1955. Although I cannot agree with Mr. Lippmann on the question of "escape clause" legislation, I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the Record following my remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, with respect to escape-clause legislation, I should like to point out that the United States has invoked this clause on 4 occasions out of 55 requests for such action, since the Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951 became effective. These four occasions were with respect to:

First. Hatters' fur, 1952.

Second. Dried figs, 1952.

Third. Alsike clover seed, 1954.

Fourth. Watches, movements and parts, third investigation, 1954.

That certainly is not a very impressive list. The use of the escape clause by the United States, it is evident, has not made tariff rates unstable and subject to quick and arbitrary change, as Mr. Lippmann indicates is generally the case when escape-clause provisions are included in trade agreements and treaties.

EXHIBIT 1

TODAY AND TOMORROW

(By Walter Lippmann)

ECONOMIC DISARMAMENT

Reading the President's message on foreign economic policy, one is left with a general impression that American tariff rates are too high and that what he is asking for is authority to lower them a little bit by reciprocal agreements arrived at by international bargaining. I wonder whether this puts the real problem in its proper focus. Perhaps we can reach a clearer definition of that problem by saying that the main trouble today is not the level of the tariff rates. In the United States they are by and large not exorbitantly high any longer.

The real problem is economic warfare. All the governments have armed themselves with legal powers which they use to interfere with the international markets for goods. They use them offensively and they use them defensively to cut down, to cut off, to divert, to penalize, to subsidize buying and selling so that the pattern of transactions is different from what it would be under the free operation of supply and demand.

I think I am right in saying this, that the main trouble is not the level of the tariff rates established by the legislatures. If only the levels are known and are not subject to quick and arbitrary change, the trading community throughout the world can and will adapt itself to the rates. Provided the rate is stable, the question of whether it should be higher or lower is primarily a domestic issue. It is a domestic question whether industries should be protected for reasons of national defense or whether they should be exposed to international competition for reasons of efficiency and for the service of the consumer.

There is no inherent reason why the level of the tariff rates should be determined by reciprocal bargains. The real reason why we in the United States have used the reciprocal method for 20 years is that we have found it easier, as a matter of domestic American politics, to lower a tariff over the protests of a domestic producer if we could confront him with an American exporter who was going to gain access to a foreign market. Tariff reduction by reciprocal bargaining has been essentially a device for neutralizing one vested domestic interest by another.

The fact of the matter is that trade is, that trade has to be, reciprocal and no international agreements are needed to make it reciprocal. It is an optical illusion to believe the contrary. If we lower an American tariff rate and allow some foreign goods to be sold in the United States, the dollars earned by the foreign importers will in the end have to be used to buy goods produced

in America. The notion that the American markets can be flooded with foreign goods all coming one way cannot be true. For what on earth would the foreigner want to do with the dollars he earns? What good are American dollars to a foreigner unless he, or someone to whom he sells his dollars, spends them in the markets where dollars are the currency?

Almost anywhere in the world today, and for all I know perhaps also in the Communist world, an American can pay his bills with dollars. But why should an Italian taxicab driver or a French shopkeeper be glad to be paid in American dollars? Because he believes that he can always exchange the American dollars at a good rate for lire or francs. With whom can he exchange dollars? With someone who intends, or with someone who knows someone else who intends, to buy something in America that can be bought only with American dollars.

If the foreigners who earned American dollars by exporting goods to this country did not get those dollars spent in America, they would not be selling their imports to us. They would be giving them to us.

All of this is to say that, except as a matter of domestic practical American politics, tariff rates do not need to be fixed by reciprocal bargains. The real point of reciprocal bargaining power lies elsewhere. It lies in the field of what we might call the ending of economic warfare and the beginning of economic disarmament. Almost all countries, and we are well in the lead among them, are armed with economic weapons of offense and defense. These weapons include such devices as import quotas, which limit or even prohibit citizens from buying certain commodities, regardless of the price, the quality, the supply and demand. The weapons include exchange restrictions, export subsidies, preferential treatment for public contracts as in the Buy American Act, preferential rates as in the British Commonwealth, the peril-point gadget and the escape clause, which make almost all tariff rates unstable and subject to quick and arbitrary change.

The characteristic of these weapons of economic warfare is that they are not fixed rules and laws of trade but are operated by administrative decisions made, often under political pressure, by bureaucracies.

What we call the liberalization of trade might also, indeed might better, be called the objective of economic disarmament. The essential condition of economic peace is that trade among friendly nations should not be subject to the arbitrary acts of administrative and political officials, that trade should be subject to laws enacted deliberately and openly and after debate and not changeable except by equally careful deliberation.

DANGERS OF AIR POLLUTION

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, from time to time I have made brief comments respecting the problem of air pollution in the State of California, and particularly in the southern area of that State, and the great city of Los Angeles. Occasionally I have had printed in the RECORD comments from newspapers across the land to indicate that air pollution is not a local problem, nor, indeed, a problem for the people of California alone, but, rather, Mr. President, to indicate it has now become a national problem of considerable moment. I hope, therefore, that the 84th Congress will look with favor upon the efforts of communities in the various States to combat this menace, and will provide the means by enacting such legislation as may be necessary to enlist the power and the might of the Federal Government in assisting the American people

to solve a growing problem which threatens the health of the Nation.

Mr. President, I hold in my hand an article which appeared in the Los Angeles Examiner of Friday, January 21. In the article the Medical Society of Los Angeles announces that smog can kill. I commend the article to the reading of my brethren in the Senate because I believe the article brings forcibly and for the first time to the attention of the people the fact that today the pollutants of the air are sufficiently serious and hazardous that they can kill human beings. To my mind, that is one more reason why the Federal Government should enlist its services in respect to arriving expeditiously at a solution of the problem. Therefore, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article to which I have referred be printed in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MEDICOS ISSUE WARNING: "SMOG CAN KILL," DOCTORS SAY (By Magner White)

Smog can cause death. For the first time, the Los Angeles County Medical Association, through its 38-man council, was officially on record yesterday to that effect.

The council adopted nine motions, of which this was the first, all bearing on smog, as recommended by its smog committee, headed by Dr. Francis M. Pottenger, Jr., of Monrovia, the official bulletin disclosed.

"The viewpoint that air pollution can cause death is now official," Dr. Pottenger said yesterday. "It is based on medical literature on air pollution, including reports on the 1948 Donora, Pa., and the 1952 London and other air pollution disasters in which people died."

REAL QUESTION

The real question is, "Have such deaths occurred in Los Angeles? We have no positive proof, but the question has been brought up several times by physicians.

"Dr. John Barrows, former president of our association, was the first to sign a death certificate listing smog as a contributing factor in a death. More doctors have done this in the last 2 years."

Dr. Pottenger said it is yet unsettled how much smog, and what in smog, could kill a human being.

A meeting of all sections of the medical association with his committee has been set for next Monday night to develop an opinion survey on this, Dr. Pottenger said. Results of this survey will be published officially later in the association's monthly bulletin.

NINE POINTS

The request for this meeting was 1 of the 9 points in the smog committee's list of motions establishing the association's views on smog which was adopted by the council.

Others were:

1. That air pollution is a continuing dynamic problem in the Los Angeles area.
2. That biological (effects on living things) as well as chemical (density and duration of smog) indices "must be determined for the safety of human beings."
3. That the smog committee approves in principle establishment of chemical standards of air pollution (the point at which public warnings should be given) as proposed and begun by the board of supervisors.
4. That the smog committee feels that present chemical standards (based mostly on ability of workers in certain industries to withstand effects of gases) "do not alone safeguard the health of the public."

HOW MUCH?

5. That how much of each contaminant in smog human beings can withstand safely, either in sudden large amounts or over longer periods, singly, or in combination, must be determined.

6. That deans of the three medical schools and the California Institute of Technology be asked to report how they would determine these standards of toxicity (poisonousness) of air pollutants, and estimate how much it would cost to do this.

7. That the county supervisors be asked to obtain private, city, State, and Federal aid in financing research on these subjects, using facilities of all local institutions.

On Dr. Pottenger's smog committee, which drafted these propositions, are Drs. Kurt C. Shery, Torrance; James C. Doyle, Beverly Hills; Fordyce Johnson, and Clinton H. Thienes, Pasadena; Charles H. Pettet, Monrovia, and from Los Angeles: Fred E. Bradford, Madeleine Sallon, William K. Hewitt, Jr., J. Safe Ludwig, Walter E. Macpherson, Maurice Nugent, and Reginald H. Smart.

Mr. MARTIN of Pennsylvania. Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield to me for a brief comment?

Mr. KUCHEL. I yield.

Mr. MARTIN of Pennsylvania. I should like to add to the remarks of the distinguished junior Senator from California that in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania we have already had an instance of smog killing several persons.

In addition to what the distinguished Senator from California has mentioned, there is the matter of stream pollution, which relates not only to drinking water, but also to water used for commercial purposes.

The problem the distinguished Senator from California has mentioned is one which I believe should have the very serious attention of Congress.

Mr. KUCHEL. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania very much indeed. In his succinct comments, I think there is additional evidence that this problem is not a local one, but concerns all the States of the Union.

PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN SHIPPING, SHIPBUILDING, AND SHIP-REPAIR INDUSTRIES

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. President, in the interest of conserving time, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD a statement I have prepared, regarding the need for continued and vigorous attention to the problems of our shipping, shipbuilding, and ship-repair industries. In making this request, I especially emphasize to my colleagues the comments therein with respect to the funds which are recovered by the Government from the profits of subsidized shipping lines.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BUTLER

During the 1954 session of the Congress, a good beginning was made toward solution of some of the many problems that plague American shipping and its sister industry, shipbuilding and ship repairing.

Let there be any misunderstanding on this point, I believe the advances achieved in this respect were important. They will serve to prevent, or at least to defer, the impending collapse of these two strategic components of our peacetime economy and

our national security. However, I repeat and would emphasize strongly, that what has been done is only a beginning.

The 1954 enactments in the maritime field must be followed with legislation to establish a sound, long-range program for rehabilitating and maintaining the American Merchant Marine on the adequate basis envisioned in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. Unless this is done, we shall have accomplished only a transitory and fleeting result.

A recent issue of Nation's Business pictures in realistic fashion the current shipping situation and its unpleasant implications for the future, in an article captioned "Needed: 60 Ships a Year." As a direct result of the ship construction and emergency ship repair authorizations and appropriations passed in the final days of the 83d Congress, the horizon is somewhat brighter today than when this article was written. However, I believe it would be most appropriate to excerpt some of the factual statements and the conclusions of this splendid article for the reason that they are just as pertinent now as when written. For instance, the author lays down this premise as a starter:

"America's shipbuilders and operators are worried about the future of the Nation's merchant marine. Here's why: * * *

"In our pool of 1,028 active and 2,212 inactive vessels are many ships that were built just before or during World War II. They all will become obsolete between 1962 and 1967. Others, notably the war-born Liberties, always have been considered outmoded.

"Cargo offerings have been declining as a result of the end of the fighting in Korea and the recovery of foreign economies formerly dependent on American aid shipments."

Despite the remedies authorized by the 1954 legislation, however, the article continues:

"Still unsolved, however, is the problem of how to put the merchant fleet on a solid long-range footing. To do this, according to Under Secretary of Commerce Robert B. Murray, Jr., a peacetime nucleus of 36,000 shipyard workers should be continuously employed to meet planned mobilization needs. To maintain this force, Mr. Murray estimates, shipyards would have to build 60 ocean-going merchant vessels a year.

"Unlike many United States concerns, the ocean shipping industry is in constant, direct competition with foreign operators. Because most freight rates are fixed by international agreements among United States and foreign steamship companies (to maintain stable rates and prevent wild price slashing on the world market) the average shipper in foreign commerce would find little, if any, difference in the shipping price quoted by domestic and foreign lines.

"But the American shipowner who operates under these uniform rates has much higher cost of operation than his foreign competitor. Wages of United States seamen are more than twice as high as those paid by The Netherlands, second best-paying nation. It requires more capital to build a ship in United States yards than anywhere else—and American lines pay more for repairs, insurance, and food than operators under foreign flags.

"The Government officially recognized the squeeze on United States shipbuilders and operators with the passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. This measure provides subsidies for the construction and operation of ships serving trade routes which the Federal Maritime Board deems essential to our commerce and defense. In both cases, the Government pays the difference between certain American and foreign costs.

"But subsidies do not assure profits. They do not even guarantee against losses.

"To obtain an operating subsidy, a steamship line must demonstrate that it is meeting

substantial foreign competition on its route; that other United States-flag vessels do not serve the route adequately; that its sailings will be scheduled. Furthermore, it must submit to strict Government supervision of its accounts and operations and maintain its fleet by replacements as ships become obsolete.

"Subsidies are awarded on the basis of long-term contracts—usually 10 years—and are subject to recapture by the Government. If a line's profits during the contract period exceed 10 percent of the capital necessarily employed in the business, 50 percent of the excess must be returned to the Government until the recapture has equaled the entire amount of the subsidy paid.

"In the first 10 years of ship operating subsidy the United States spent \$67,222,996.87 and recaptured \$28,529,825.39. Thus, in its first decade, the program cost the taxpayers \$38 million. Between 1947 and June 30, 1953, subsidy expenditures totaled \$100,016,175.43. The amount to be recouped in this period has not yet been determined. The Maritime Administration has estimated that \$65,736,000 will be required for operating subsidies in 1954, and approximately \$69 million in 1955.

"Sixteen steamship lines currently are receiving subsidy aid. Their ships ply 28 essential trade routes."

Let me interject at this point my conviction that this question of maritime subsidies is the greatest obstacle American shipping has had to surmount in its efforts to win support in the Congress and throughout the country.

To those unfamiliar with the provisions of our basic shipping legislation, maritime subsidies have always represented, I daresay, so many millions of dollars tossed overboard and lost with the various subsidized shipping companies as the sole beneficiaries.

As explained above, however, this is not the case. Over the years a large percentage of these "subsidies" have been recovered directly from the profits of the companies involved, while the indirect recovery from corporation levies and personal income taxes has added greatly to that amount.

"Since 1952 United States flagships have been carrying a progressively smaller percentage of total American imports and exports.

"Latest figures available—covering 1953—show that our import-export trade was averaging 11,813,000 tons a month, with American flagships carrying 29.6 percent.

"Proponents of a strong United States merchant fleet cite this country's growing reliance on raw materials from abroad. The Committee of American Steamship Lines, trade association for the subsidized lines, stresses this theme in a recent study which reveals, among other things, that the jobs of about 1 million persons in Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan depend upon ocean transport of 15 raw materials vital to steel mill operation.

"Fifty-four passenger-carrying vessels are now operating under the United States flag. Thirty-seven are privately owned, 17 are property of the Government. Private owners maintain 758 United States-flag freighters, of which more than 100 are now inactive, and 433 tankers, of which 94 are in layup.

"Total private investment in dry cargo vessels and tankers has been estimated at \$1,830 billion. What this figure fails to show is the career investment of some 200,000 men and women whose livelihoods depend upon American ocean ships.

"The urgent requirements of defense underlie the efforts which such groups as the American Merchant Marine Institute are now making to improve our merchant fleet. Government officials have learned that they must equate our defense capabilities with a strong, readily available merchant fleet. World Wars I and II and the Korean con-

flikt demonstrated conclusively that merchant vessels are indispensable to the mass movement of military equipment and personnel and the raw materials needed for war production."

Nevertheless, some, in Congress and elsewhere, seem to be unalterably opposed to payment by Government of any aids to shipping. Forgetting, or perhaps unaware of, the fact that sizeable recoveries from subsidy funds have been and are being made, they take the position that the merchant marine is too great a drain upon Government. Some even go so far as to argue that we could, and should, save money by using foreign ships to carry our foreign trade. Here again they overlook or are unaware of the fact that, on practically all the established trade routes, conference agreements provide that foreign ship rates are the same as those of American-flag vessels, and that the ocean-shipping rates have a tendency to go sky high in emergencies, particularly when American-flag vessels are not available to us. We must not forget the bitter experience of the past when our Nation has sought to use foreign shipping in periods of emergency.

Further, no discussion of maritime subsidies could be considered complete, or conclusive, if it is limited strictly to the amounts paid out by the Government in ship construction and operating differential subsidies, and the portion of such funds recovered from profits of the subsidized lines.

To begin with, American shipping is as much a part of the defense structure of the country as are the fighting ships and auxiliaries of the Navy, the warplanes that operate from bases all over the world, and the land forces, the millions of fighting men, stationed in far-away bases, who must be kept supplied with food, armaments, medical requirements, and a thousand-and-one other products. Without the constant flow of supplies made possible by the vessels of the American merchant marine, and without the services of the thousands of trained officers and men of the merchant marine, this vast military establishment would be absolutely incapable of functioning, it would bog down quickly and completely.

The Nation is spending billions and billions of dollars to develop and maintain a military establishment capable of carrying on war anywhere throughout the world. Isn't it reasonable that we should spend some small percentage of those defense billions, to assure continued functioning of those military forces under the stress and strains of all-out-war? Even if the merchant marine cost the taxpayers hundreds of millions each year—which it never has—the services rendered by American shipping in World War II and the Korean hostilities would clearly demonstrate the wisdom of paying such a price to keep the merchant fleet in being, ready for any emergency calls.

On many counts it is possible to refute the argument that this Nation's shipping is an unbearable, and unjustifiable, deadweight on the taxpayers. Government participation in the maritime field makes it possible for the shipping lines to maintain vessels and shore facilities that furnish thousands of jobs, both directly and indirectly, throughout the country. The same holds true for the shipyards, to which construction differential payments are made.

These two industries pay, in the aggregate, vast amounts of taxes; likewise, their thousands of officials and employees, the latter mostly skilled, well-paid craftsmen, pay many additional millions in personal income taxes. Added to these are the tax payments from the many industries largely or solely dependent upon the continued functioning of American shipping, and their thousands of employees and officials.

The net result, I believe it can safely be said, is that, despite the terrific competition of low-wage foreign shipping, the American

merchant marine actually has been, if not self-supporting, at least so nearly so as to require only a negligible Government aid in the final analysis.

One of the larger subsidized shipping lines recently completed a study of its experience with Government subsidies. It is the first such statement that has come to my attention, and I am not in a position to state, therefore, whether the experience of this particular line is typical of the entire industry, or not. However, in line with the old adage that "the proof of the pudding is in the eating," I think the study deserves the serious consideration of Senators and citizens alike.

Here a word of praise might well be said for those former Members of the Congress who framed the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. They were extremely farsighted when they carefully designed the recapture provision of that act. It is a most unique provision. By virtue of it the Federal Government reserves the right, under specified conditions, to recapture up to the full amount of the operating subsidy paid during the effective recapture accounting period.

In effect, the recapture provision requires the Maritime Board to withhold the actual payment of subsidy accruals to the extent that the profit of the subsidized vessel operator exceeds 10 percent of his capital necessarily employed in the operation. The performance, under this section, of at least this one major subsidized operator would seem to prove a point and, to my mind, is worthy of special comment. The company in question is the owner and operator of one of the larger fleets of freight vessels under the American flag.

Its first subsidy contract was executed in 1937, from which time (excluding the war years, 1943 to 1946 inclusive) through 1953, it performed 2,969 round voyages with privately owned American-flag vessels on five trade routes declared by the Maritime Board to be essential.

As authorized in its contract, the company accrued operating-differential subsidy in the amount of \$49,800,000. Its profit for this operation permitted the Government to recapture a total of \$33,600,000. Thus, actual payments to the company by the Government in the form of operating subsidy were \$16,200,000.

During this same period from 1937 through 1953, this company paid \$18,800,000 in Federal income taxes. This was a net return to the Government from its operation of \$2,600,000, to say nothing of the Federal and State taxes paid by the company's employees or of the beneficial effect of the company's healthy operation upon our entire national economy.

In addition to the above-referred-to subsidized operation with its own vessels, the company also chartered from the Government quite a large fleet of Government surplus war-built ships, as authorized by the Ship Sales Act of 1946. This bare-boat charter operation, from May 1, 1946, through December 31, 1952, brought to the company an additional profit of \$6,400,000, which likewise was made subject to the recapture provisions of its subsidy contract. And the company paid a total charter hire to the Government of \$28,600,000 for the temporary use of these vessels.

Thus this operator, during the years following the enactment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 through the year 1953, has paid to the Government, in the form of subsidy recapture, Federal income taxes and charter hire, some \$31 million above and beyond the amount of subsidies received by it from the Government during this period.

It is freely admitted that the steamship business is cyclical, and that the subsidized lines, during certain depressed periods, cannot exist without full payment of subsidy under the parity principle. During the good years, however, the Government shares proportionately in the profits as and when they

accrue—a fact which I fear is all too little understood and appreciated.

It does seem to me that the results noted, covering the entire shipping subsidy period, do suggest that the word subsidy is at least challengeable as applied to participation by Government in the operation of this one steamship company.

SUPPORT FOR PROPOSAL FOR ANNUAL ADDRESS TO CONGRESS BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. President, in support of Senate Concurrent Resolution 4, which I submitted on January 21, 1955, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD two interesting articles which appeared recently in the Washington Evening Star.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Evening Star of January 25, 1955]

WHY NOT A HEARING FOR CHIEF JUSTICE? (By Miriam Ottenberg)

The parade of foreign dignitaries who have addressed Congress over the years is being cited by some of the legislators who want to hear an address by the Chief Justice.

The argument of these legislators: Congress listens to the aspirations and problems of officials of other lands. Shouldn't it give equal attention to the problems of the chief of one of the three branches of its own Government—particularly when these problems affect all the American people?

Since the days of Lafayette, scores of foreign emissaries have addressed one or both branches of Congress. There has also been a sprinkling of American generals and a few cabinet officers.

In one 4-month period in 1917, 9 different representatives of foreign countries addressed 1 or both Houses of Congress.

Between January and July of 1954, Congress assembled in joint meeting four times to hear foreign dignitaries.

Debates in Congress, a flowery predecessor of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, shows the Marquis de Lafayette addressed a joint session of Congress on December 10, 1824. The volume notes that the Speaker addressed the Nation's guest in an "eloquent strain, adorned by those graces of oratory for which he is distinguished." Lafayette's speech, according to this record, was delivered "in a tone in which energy of character and sensibility of feeling were most interestingly blended."

A half century later, a Chief Justice did address a joint session—by default. On December 18, 1874, His Majesty David Kalakaua, King of the Hawaiian Islands, appeared before a joint session but the first reigning sovereign to visit these shores was suffering from a severe cold. So Chief Justice Allen of the Hawaiian Islands read his address.

From then on, the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD is spotted with names familiar now only to students of foreign affairs. There was, for instance, Count Albert Apponyi, Hungarian Minister of Education, who addressed the House in 1911. And Reni Viviani, Vice Premier of France, who addressed the Senate on May 1, 1917, and came back to address the House 2 days later. And Baron Moncheur, chief of the political bureau of the Belgian Foreign Office, who addressed the Senate on June 22, 1917, and the House 5 days later. And Prof. Boris Bakhmetieff, Ambassador from the Republic of Russia, who addressed the House on June 23, 1917, and the Senate 3 days later. The legislators also paused that busy summer to hear addresses by a member of a Japanese war mission and by the head of the Serbian war mission, among others.

British Prime Ministers have been frequent Capitol Hill speakers. Ramsay MacDonald addressed the Senate in 1929. Winston Churchill addressed an informal joint session in the Senate chamber on December 26, 1941; addressed a joint meeting in the House chamber on May 19, 1943, and another joint meeting on January 17, 1952. Clement Attlee also addressed a joint meeting on November 13, 1945.

Among the countries whose spokesmen have appeared before one or both chambers, separately or in joint meeting, have been France, Hawaii, Hungary, Italy, Belgium, Russia, Japan, Serbia, Great Britain, Union of South Africa, Canada, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippine Islands, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Ecuador, India, Chile, Pakistan, Australia, Turkey, Ethiopia, China, Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Liberia, Paraguay, Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico, Cuba, and South Korea.

Congress has paused in its business of legislating to hear Americans, too, though less frequently. Cordell Hull, as Secretary of State, addressed a joint meeting of Congress in 1943. Gen. Julius Franklin Howell, as acting commander in chief of the United States Confederate Veterans, addressed the House in 1944.

As supreme allied commander, General Eisenhower addressed a joint meeting in 1945. So did Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz. Gen. Douglas MacArthur made his long-awaited appearance before a joint meeting of Congress in 1951. And Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway addressed a joint meeting in 1952.

Last year, the House and Senate held joint meetings to hear President Celal Bayar of Turkey in January, Governor General Vincent Massey of Canada and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in May and President Syngman Rhee of South Korea in July.

There have been kings and queens, prime ministers and premiers, cabinet officers and generals. Some legislators feel it is now time to hear from another distinguished visitor to the halls of Congress—the Chief Justice of the United States.

[From the Washington Evening Star of January 20, 1955]

STOREY, EX-PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES BAR, BACKS CHIEF JUSTICE REPORT—JUDICIAL BRANCH NEEDS CONGRESS SPOKESMAN, DALLAS LAWYER SAYS

A former president of the American Bar Association and widely known southern lawyer today endorsed the proposal for an annual address to Congress by the Chief Justice in the interest of prompt and efficient justice.

Robert G. Storey of Dallas, Tex., made this statement to the Star:

"The judicial department of our Government should have a spokesman, just as the executive branch has a spokesman and the legislative branch has spokesmen.

"In my observations as president of the American Bar Association and as a long-time member of the bar, the judges get together at meetings and make recommendations, but they really have no spokesman. No public attention is given to their needs."

NEEDS WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD

"It is entirely proper and fitting that the Chief Justice make a statement to the Congress once a year, reviewing the accomplishments of the judiciary and outlining its needs. Certainly, the Chief Justice is the head of the judicial system and I do not see why he should not be its spokesman.

"I feel that the Congress and the people would support the reasonable needs of the judiciary if they knew the facts. These facts have not been properly disseminated. I think there is a great lack of information on the part of the public and even the Congress of the actual condition of the judiciary. The case loads are far beyond the capacity of the courts in many areas. The facts properly brought to the attention of the Congress

and the public would result in help for the judiciary.

"There is another reason for the Chief Justice to address the Congress. In this world-wide struggle between the Communist way of life and the free world, one of the basic issues is the type of judicial system which will survive—whether one as independent as ours from any outside influence will decide on questions of life, liberty and property or one dominated by the Kremlin."

SAFEGUARD OF LIBERTY

"I don't believe our people as a whole understand the safeguards and guaranties we receive through our independent judiciary system. Our contracts are sacred and enforced. Under the Communist regime, contracts are not sacred. Our independent judiciary system is one of the greatest safeguards of liberty not only for us but for other free nations.

"Long delays in the disposition of cases will affect the standing and integrity of the judicial system and hence tend to weaken it. We should do all we can to assure that justice will be prompt as well as efficient."

AIR CARGO LOGISTICS AND THE FAIRCHILD FLYING BOXCAR

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. President, the Fairchild flying boxcar, truly an aviation workhorse, is one of the special products developed by Maryland hands. Located at Hagerstown, Md., the Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. has for a great many years turned out military troop and cargo transports. More than 1,200 of these planes have been produced since VE-day in 1945.

Recently the flying boxcar was made the key item in a planned and scheduled air cargo service operated by the United States Air Force in Europe, under the command of Lt. Gen. William H. Tunner. The development of a regular airlift through careful planning has been receiving increasing attention, and has been the means of providing an astounding increase in combat effectiveness for military planes and crews stationed in various areas of the world. By efficiently utilizing pilots and crews in their required routine training, freight transportation between military bases on a scheduled basis has been effected without additional cost to the Government.

Mr. President, in December 1954 there appeared in the Pegasus, a monthly publication of the Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., an article on the subject of the importance of air cargo logistics, the excellence of which prompts me to ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CRACKING THE AOCF BARRIER

In an operation lacking the high drama of the Berlin Airlift or the combat urgency of Korea, but with even greater import for the future, Lt. Gen. William H. Tunner has directed the fashioning of an air logistics service that has increased the combat effectiveness of the USAF in Europe by an astounding percentage—astounding but highly classified. And the job has been done with great and measurable savings to the United States.

General Tunner took over command of USAFE—United States Air Forces in Europe—in July 1953. It was a command that had made very major strides in the buildup of air strength on the continent. The Ram-

stein Complex [Pegasus, November 1953] had been built into business and as the buildup of the Air Force in the United States continued, new units would flow into the command. The slow and frustrating construction of NATO bases in France was a harassing problem and still needs must be nurse-maided into effectiveness. As General Tunner took over the details of his command he found the maintenance and supply of his USAF units, and that of the MIDAP commands, tied to traditional ground transport. A few C-47's borrowed and begged from administrative units were being flown on scattered emergency supply missions. By November of 1953 he had established by air logistics service, and its planes that month flew 1,000 tons of cargo.

As of November 1 this year, 12 months after the establishment of the Air Logistics Service as the keystone in a program to increase the combat availability of American aircraft on the continent, approximately 3,600 tons a month are being carried on scheduled cargo flights flown over trunk and feeder routes by Fairchild C-119 flying boxcars. Cargo carried in the 12-month period has gone as high as 4,000 tons in a month. Of these 3,600 tons, 84 percent are critical, high-cost items required to keep fighter aircraft ready to fly—and ready to fight. The remaining 16 percent consists of filler items put aboard to utilize the capacity of the flying boxcars and, at the same time, save this additional cost of ground transport of the items.

About the only way in which an estimate of what this means can be given, without at the same time giving away order of battle information to the Russians, is that \$345 million would represent the essential cost of the number of additional wings needed to maintain the higher level of combat readiness now being attained over that available when the program started. At the same time, it is estimated that \$500,000 a year is being saved on ground transportation costs alone, not taking into consideration the losses ascribable to damage and pilferage, both of which had been major items of expense in the European logistics system. An additional saving will come with the development of a new pallet and loading system devised in the European theater and now being service-tested. This, it is now estimated, will save 90 percent of loading time when it has been put into general service in the 200-plus C-119's assigned to the USAFE.

The additional cost of flying these 3,600 tons a month? Nothing. The flying boxcars in the Air Logistics Service are programed for 32 flight hours per month. Previously, the programed hours had been entirely utilized in routine training or Army cooperation missions. Today, the Army requirements are being met, while 50 percent of the total capability of the 3 C-119 wings—the veteran 60th and 317th and the more recently arrived 465th—is devoted to the scheduled service. This service in itself is viewed as primary training along the lines of troop carrier realities developed during the Korean war. A rotational squadron, the 776th of the 456th Wing normally based at Charleston, S. C., also contributes planes, crews, and experience to the Air Logistics Service. The 60th Wing is based at the huge Rhein-Main base outside Frankfurt, Germany. The 317th is based at Neubiberg, near Munich, and the 465th is in France at Toul-Rosiere, northeast of Paris. The 776th squadron is operating from Rhein-Main.

As Leroy Whitman, editor of the unofficial but authoritative Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, describes the increased combat effectiveness rate directly attributable to the new air logistics system: "The increased strength stems from the vast understanding and experience in airlift on the part of USAFE's commander, Lt. Gen. William H. Tunner, USAF."

But even beyond this basic fact lies an unusual but quickly transmitted enthusiasm built up in the echelons of operations, transportation, supply, packaging, and material-handling units which is reflected in new procedures, new devices, new methods, and new outlooks encouraged by General Tunner, and by Maj. Gen. Mark B. Bradley, Jr., vice commander of USAFE. This enthusiasm has led to slicing of redtape and paperwork, to speeding of the gears at major depots, to the radical new pallet and loading system which has been hand fashioned in its evolution to service-test form by technicians both American and German. People all along the line who had ideas churning through their minds were encouraged to express them and the top-level interest in development of the Air Logistics Service is reflected in the building of an airlift system that resembles only in fundamental concept the great airlifts of the past in Burma, Berlin, and Korea.

Burma was a total airlift, carried out to convey all materiel and many supplies required for the maintenance of a limited force; it had to be organized and flown without regard for cost. Berlin was a one-point airlift, geared to deliver staples required to feed and warm a city under siege; it required a high degree of traffic control and turnaround techniques. Korea was a combat airlift, with heavy accent at times on airdrop in a land with few airports; it was largely one of support of operations of ground units.

USAFE's Air Logistics Service is not a total airlift. It serves many bases scattered from England to Turkey and North Africa. It is designed to improve day-to-day efficiency of an air force—to increase the size of the air force-in-being by cutting maintenance time to an irreducible minimum. To accomplish this, USAFE utilizes many of the techniques of these earlier airlifts, but, at the same time, introduces the elements of economics and air-route scheduling over both trunk and feeder lines. Additionally, it does not wholly absorb the aircraft units used, utilizing only part of their capability.

The Air Logistics Service is controlled by the 322d Air Division (combat cargo), at 12th Air Force headquarters in Ramstein, Germany. The 322d has responsibility for carriage of personnel, cargo, and mail; for supply of aircraft for airborne operations both of the United States Army and NATO allies; aeromedical evacuation and special missions. In addition to the 3 wings and 1 squadron of Fairchild C-119 flying boxcars, the 322d has been assigned C-47 aircraft, requisitioned from administrative service in tactical units, for its passenger service on the continent. These operate under the 716th Special Air Mission Squadron at Rhein-Main and the 7206th Air Base Squadron, at Athens, Greece.

Working with the 322d is the Air Secretariat of US EUCOM Joint Military Transportation Board at USAFE headquarters, which includes members from Air Force and the Army. This board receives requirements and allocates space to units requesting air logistic support.

USAFE headquarters is now situated at Lindsey Air Base, a former German Army establishment on the outskirts of Wiesbaden, Germany. Until this year, USAFE headquarters was scattered through 33 rented buildings in downtown Wiesbaden, and the consolidation is saving \$500,000 a year in rentals alone.

The Lindsey establishment was refinished by the German Government to meet the needs of USAFE, and with the move to the new kaserne the command headquarters and the Wiesbaden area command were consolidated. Although termed an air base, the only landing field at the headquarters is a small area for helicopters.

A few figures dramatize the magnitude of the USAFE operation in Europe and the importance of the new airlift concept to the

carrying out of the American mission on the continent. USAFE represents a \$3½ billion investment on the part of the United States in aircraft, equipment, and supplies, and real estate facilities. It is manned by 115,483 persons with an annual payroll of \$285,340,867. It is spending more than \$200 million a year in construction at the present time, with total expenditures on the Continent of more than \$375 million, exclusive of United States pay.

The Air Logistics Service operates over routes totaling 16,000 miles. The flying boxcars cover more than 260,000 miles a month on the trunk and feeder routes, operating 58 flights a week in regular service and utilizing up to 18 C-119's a day.

Trunk routes are those between the huge depots at Burtonwood, England; Chateauroux, France, and Erding, near Munich in Germany via Rhein-Main; another trunk operates from Chateauroux to Bordeaux, France, and across Spain to Nouasseur, near Casablanca in French Morocco; another from Nouasseur to Wheelus Field at Tripoli.

The feeder runs are those among the base complex in southern Germany and northern France, serving six bases at the present time, 6 days a week.

The feeder runs are from Erding through Rhein-Main and Landstuhl to Chateauroux; and from Toul through Laon to Chateauroux, returning to Toul through Chaumont; from Rhein-Main through the Hahn and Biburg bases to Chateauroux. Greece and Turkey are served by an additional trunk MDAP route operation, with five flights weekly being flown between Erding or Chateauroux through Athens to Ekisehir in Turkey. Still other flights, when necessary, serve these countries from Wheelus Field, where cargo for these countries brought from the United States is dropped by the Military Air Transport Service on its service to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

Denmark is serviced by one flight each week, but will take over its own supply flight; as its C-47 fleet becomes fully operational.

Italy and Belgium also have been worked into the program, operating at least one flight a week into the depot at Chateauroux with their MDAP C-119 flying boxcars.

In addition to the regularly scheduled 58 flights per week, there also exists what is known as the lift of opportunity, by which an effort is made to locate and load cargo on an airplane going on a mission of some other type if the load will not affect the carrying out of the mission assigned.

Served by this airlift, in addition to the important interdepot operation, are 6 USAF fighter-bomber wings, 2 USAF pilotless bomb squadrons, 8 USAF fighter-interceptor squadrons, and 3 USAF C-119 wings themselves, the big strategic bases of north Africa, the MDAP units of the NATO countries, and the Army aviation units in Germany. These latter pick up their supplies from the nearest Air Force base served by the Air Logistics Service.

Before the Air Logistics Service began its operations, the mechanics of requisitioning and receiving routine items from base to depot to base required an average of 45 days. A goal of 23 days was set for the total materiel pipeline—air and ground—system, and at one time during the year this target almost was met. It has recently crept up to 28 days, and, needless to say for the benefit of those who know General Tunner, is being worked upon—rather strenuously, continuously and with almost religious fervor.

Priority items were taking 16 days before ALS. A goal of 6 days was set; the chart lines crossed that point several months ago and are now down to 3½ days.

In Turkey, it had been taking an average of 150 days to obtain parts and supplies. This has been cut to between 15 and 20 days,

a matter which is also getting considerable attention to determine why it is even that long a time.

When it is considered that an estimated \$1,400,000 inventory is carried for every day of Air Force supply in the European theater, it is obvious that elements other than combat effectiveness are involved, as vital as is the combat posture in a situation in which victory or defeat could be decided in a matter of hours.

The reduction in supply time is not solely a matter of air delivery. It involves innovations in procedures, in paperwork, packaging, and attitudes.

For example, requisitions today are prepared at the bases on a basis of priority lists, separated into priority and routine envelopes, and hand delivered to the crew of the ALS airplane going through, and delivered at the depot directly to the voucher section—bypassing the Adjutant General step—for processing. At the depot a further analysis is given the requisitions, and, even though the item may be ordered as routine, it will be air-shipped if it comes in the high-cost category. This is not necessarily an item on which the cost of purchase alone is high, but rather one in which a number of elements enter: expense of packaging, expense of acquisition, expense of warehousing, expense of exposure to damage and loss, expense of ground transportation, etc.

There is a further analysis of aircraft loads as the requisitions by bases are assembled. First are the priority items, then the high-cost items, and, finally, the filler items to make up the prescribed load, set up by the 322d, which must be carried on each scheduled run. There is then analysis to determine if extra sections will be required to meet commitments. The 3½-day figure for receipt of priority items is proof enough that the system has been thoroughly shaken down.

The C-119 flying boxcars are given a form of combat loading, with the ultimate aim of cutting ground time to a minimum.

Being given service tests in the Air Logistics Service is a new form of pallet-loading, which, it is hoped by its originators, will reduce loading time by 90 percent and permit a leveling out of labor peaks and valleys in the depots. While pallets are not particularly novel, the USAFE system meets that description. It has been evolved by trial and error to a point at which it now appears that it will be a major development in cargo handling.

The heart of the system is a combination of light tracks and wheeled pallets which permit ready movement of the pallets in a warehouse, aboard trucks and onto aircraft. On the aircraft, they are automatically positioned and held in position by the tracks, which are so arranged that they can be connected to existing tie-down structure, disconnected and folded completely out of the way, or removed completely from the plane if necessary for other missions. It is estimated that the track can be installed or removed in 5 minutes, and when folded, in 2 to 3 minutes, in each instance by 1 man. They fold into an area 2 inches wide and 9 inches high.

The pallets are built with lightweight steel bracing and aluminum, in 2 sizes, 40 by 48 inches and 60 by 84 inches. They weigh approximately 40 pounds, as compared with the 80 pounds of the normal wooden pallet. The entire system weighs in at about 900 pounds.

The development will be tested on the feeder run between Rhein-Main and Chateauroux, at first on 4 C-119 aircraft and eventually on 25 of the flying boxcars.

Unusually high load factors have been maintained by the Air Logistics Service through close control in the operations section of the 322d Air Division. On the trunk lines, a load factor of 75 percent has been

attained. Feeder lines are exceeding 65 percent, for an overall efficiency of more than 90 percent. The feeder load factor is compromised by the fact that return loads from air bases served on the feeder system are only about 30 percent. It has been estimated, for a basis of comparison, that commercial freight carriers have been operating with an average load factor of less than 60 percent.

The average load carried by the C-119's in the Air Logistics Service is 11,000 pounds, ranging up to 14,000 pounds on some runs.

Thus far, the Air Logistics Service operates primarily for the Air Force. Small quantities for the limited naval forces in Europe also are carried. Supplies and materiel for the Army are handled through a liaison officer at Chateauroux, and Army supplies are beginning to move through the system as a result of USAFE studies of applications of the system to the Army. Foreseen is a possibility of effective and expanding use for the same type of supplies now hauled for the Air Force. This would cover tank engines and similar equipment, which would permit reduction of time out of service for maintenance and at the same time permit removal of war-risk items to safer areas. This has been done by the USAFE with the depot at Erding, for a long time the principal supply center in Europe but within minutes by air of the Russian zone. War risk items have been transferred to the establishments at Chateauroux and Burtonwood. Erding now being used largely for MDAP items and routine supplies.

USAFE estimates that the tonnage being carried will increase over the next several years as additional units arrive from the States to fill NATO bases being built in France.

THE TALENT IRRIGATION AND POWER PROJECT IN JACKSON COUNTY, OREG.

Mr. NEUBERGER. Mr. President, the failure to include in the 1956 budget any funds for starting construction of the Talent irrigation project constitutes a betrayal of the people of southern Oregon.

During the political campaign of last fall celebrations were staged by the Republican Party heralding the Talent project. The unmistakable impression was given to the voters of Jackson County that the great undertaking was on the threshold of being brought to fruition.

Yet, having used this important project, which has the support of Oregonians of all political persuasions, as a campaign device to drum up Republican votes, the administration has now evidently abandoned interest in the project, as demonstrated by the fact that no funds have been included in the budget for construction of either irrigation works or the powerplant.

Both my distinguished senior colleague from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] and I have urged the Interior Department to provide funds in the budget for the Talent project. At this point, Mr. President, I should like to make available for the RECORD the letter which I addressed to the Secretary of the Interior on January 11, 1955, less than a week after I took the oath of office as a Senator, making a formal request for recognition of the urgent need to begin the Talent project.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JANUARY 11, 1955.

HON. DOUGLAS MCKAY,
Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This is a formal request to urge that you include funds for the Talent irrigation project in the budget of the Bureau of Reclamation for the coming fiscal year.

In my opinion, the minimum which should be recommended is \$350,000 for restoring the canal systems of the Medford and Rogue River Valley Irrigation Districts. I also believe that at least \$2,500,000 should be recommended for the start of construction on the physical engineering works themselves.

It is imperative, I think, that the resources of Oregon be developed in an orderly manner, in the public interest, in order to care for the large population influx which migrated into our State between 1940 and 1953. These people can earn a living at productive work only if we use our resources wisely and well. I feel certain that the Talent irrigation and power project constitutes such use of our resources.

Because the total cost of the project is \$22 million, it is obvious that even a recommendation of nearly \$3 million in the coming fiscal year budget will still leave a considerable amount of time before the project can be completed.

I hope that you and your associates in the administration can see fit to recommend in the budget the funds necessary to get the Talent project well started.

With good wishes, I am,

Respectfully yours,

RICHARD L. NEUBERGER,
United States Senator.

Mr. NEUBERGER. During the 1954 campaign my wife, who campaigned vigorously throughout the State, and I warned the people of southern Oregon that the administration might drop all real interest in the Talent project, after having used it as a campaign come-on. We pointed out that an authorization without construction funds was like a man telling his girl friend to go down to Tiffany's jewelry store to buy the best necklace in the house, but never opening his checkbook to pay the bill.

My opponent told the people of southern Oregon that it was merely run of the mill work from here on, so far as the Talent project was concerned. The Governor of Oregon said at a big political rally:

I know that you people will prove to Congress and the President that the Talent project was well considered and a worthwhile project, not only for Jackson County but for the State of Oregon and being good for Oregon, is good for the United States.

The Governor spoke as if the Talent project already were completed; but the cold, hard fact is that the 1956 budget does not provide one penny to finance concrete, excavation, girders, generators or ground clearing on the Talent project.

For political purposes the people of Jackson County were sold a mirage.

I should like to say here and now, for the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] and myself, that we will spare no effort to try to redeem the broken promises which the administration made to the people of southern Oregon last year.

The budget should contain \$2,500,000 for the start of engineering and construction on the physical engineering works themselves. The whole project will cost approximately \$23 million so even this is only a modest beginning.

Plans for the Talent division of the Rogue River Basin call for development of storage facilities to irrigate 17,890 acres of land in Bear Creek Valley, and the construction of a 16,000-kilowatt hydroelectric plant. The Talent division includes 9,250 irrigable acres in the Talent irrigation district which require supplemental water, and also 8,640 irrigable acres of dry lands.

The area critically needs a reliable and permanent supply of water, which can come only with adequate storage. The Talent project will provide this storage.

Oregon is one of the 2 or 3 fastest growing States in the Nation. It needs sound and steady development of its natural resources. Its people should not be subjected to so-called political authorizations of projects, which then are cavalierly abandoned, once the campaign at the polls is over. Either a project is sound or it is not. Why authorize it with bands and fanfare and political speeches, if there is no genuine intention to provide the funds with which the authorization can be turned into steel and concrete and rushing water in canals?

Mr. President, I ask to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks a dispatch by Mr. A. Robert Smith in the Medford (Oreg.) Mail-Tribune of January 9, 1955, describing the elimination of the Talent project from the budget; a story in the same paper of January 17, 1955, detailing my letter to Secretary McKay requesting funds for the Talent project; and a report by the Commissioner of Reclamation, dated March 17, 1954, setting forth some of the details of the Talent project in Jackson County, Oreg.

There being no objection, the matters referred to were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TALENT PROJECT OUT OF FEDERAL BUDGET, CORRESPONDENT SAYS—ELECTION RESULTS SAID REASON FOR REMOVAL

(By A. Robert Smith)

WASHINGTON.—The Eisenhower administration has passed over Oregon in preparing the new Federal budget in the field of new reclamation projects for 1955, while approving new starts on added irrigation acreages in neighboring Washington, Idaho, and California.

Oregon was left out because of the outcome of the recent election, in which the voters of the State refused to return Republican Senator Guy Cordon and thereby gave Democrats control of the Senate, according to a highly placed administration official.

The Oregon project which the Bureau of Reclamation and Oregon Members of Congress have been seeking to get started in 1955 is the Talent division of the Rogue River project, a \$20,500,000 irrigation proposal near Medford authorized by Congress last summer.

REPORTED TURNED DOWN

But reportedly the project was turned down by the Budget Bureau, which has the last word on how to allocate the President's annual budget requests—that is, which projects go in and which get chopped off. Official word on the matter will not be out

until President Eisenhower sends his detailed budget message to Congress January 17.

Only three new reclamation projects are reportedly contained in the new budget—Santa Maria, near Santa Barbara, Calif.; Michaud Flats near American Falls Dam on the Snake River, Idaho; and Foster Creek near Chief Joseph Dam on the Columbia River, Wash.

A high administration official said Senator Cordon had tried before leaving office this past week to get the Budget Bureau to unloosen funds for the Rogue River project.

"WHY HELP CORDON?"

"But the boys in the Bureau feel, 'Why should they help Cordon? He was defeated.' And that's all they need to cut a project out of the budget."

Reminded that Secretary of Interior Douglas McKay is still in office and favors the project, the official declared: "But the Budget Bureau has seen the Oregon election returns, and they know McKay came out on the short end."

In short, it was pointed out the few projects gaining approval were doled out to States that stood by GOP candidates. The California project is a pet of Senator THOMAS KUCHEL, a Republican reelected in November; the Idaho project is a favorite of Senator HENRY DWORSHAK, a victorious Republican in 1954; and the Washington project goes to Representative WALT HORAN, Republican, and Senator WARREN G. MAGNUSON, a Democrat who will be the top man from the Northwest on the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee in this Congress.

ELLSWORTH SOUGHT APPROVAL

Representative HARRIS ELLSWORTH, Republican, of Oregon, said he vigorously argued for Rogue River project funds but had no word on whether they had been approved or disapproved.

From Democratic circles, it became clear that Senator WAYNE MORSE and Senator RICHARD L. NEUBERGER will try to add funds to the budget during its review by Congress, and that the slighted Oregon project would be one they would push. The long-haul strategy of Democrats so long as they control Congress and the GOP controls the executive departments, it is expected, will be something like this:

Although Eisenhower does not ask Congress for funds to start many new projects, the Democrats will move to jack up his budgets by adding funds for such resource development. They will initially appropriate the minimum amount of money needed in each State to get construction work started, which would be calculated to force the administration in subsequent years to request additional funds to complete the projects without politically risky and uneconomic interruptions.

NEUBERGER CALLS ON MCKAY TO ADD FUNDS FOR TALENT PROJECT

Oregon Senator RICHARD NEUBERGER has called on Interior Secretary Douglas McKay to include at least \$2,850,000 in the budget of the Bureau of Reclamation to be used for the Talent irrigation project.

CANAL RESTORATION

In a letter written to McKay, a copy of which was furnished to the Mail Tribune, NEUBERGER stated: "In my opinion the maximum which should be recommended is \$350,000 for restoring the canal systems of the Medford and Rogue River Valley Irrigation Districts. I also believe that at least \$2,500,000 should be recommended for the start of construction on the physical engineering works themselves.

"It is imperative, I think, that the resources of Oregon be developed in an orderly manner, in the public interest, in order to care for the large population influx which

migrated into our State between 1940 and 1953. These people can earn a living at productive work only if we use our resources wisely and well. I feel certain that the Talent irrigation and power project constitutes such use of our resources."

TOTAL COST \$22 MILLION

"Because the total cost of the project is \$22 million, it is obvious that even a recommendation of nearly \$3 million in the coming fiscal-year budget will still leave a considerable amount of time before the project can finally be completed.

"I hope that you and your associates in the administration can see fit to recommend in the budget the funds necessary to get the Talent project well started."

PROPOSED REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF RECLAMATION

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
Washington, D. C., March 17, 1954.

The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

SIR: This is my proposed report on the Talent division, Rogue River Basin project, Oregon. It is based on and includes the accompanying report of the regional director, Boise, Idaho.

The Talent division is located in Jackson County of southwestern Oregon. Project lands lie along the Bear Creek, a tributary to the Rogue River, in the general vicinity of the city of Ashland and the towns of Talent and Phoenix. This multipurpose development is primarily for irrigation but also produces hydroelectric power, flood control, and incidental fish and wildlife, and recreation benefits.

There is substantial need in the project area for supplemental water for presently irrigated lands and the development of new irrigated lands from the water supply that the proposed development would make available. This is a locality with a large percentage of small farms with off-farm income playing an important role in the economy. A full water supply would furnish additional income to farmers on the small tracts and would provide for optimum use of the available water resource which, as a result of population increase, is important to the economy of the region.

Lands developed along Bear Creek for agricultural, industrial, commercial, and residential purposes are subject to flooding almost every winter. This flood damage would be substantially reduced as a result of enlarging the existing Emigrant Reservoir as part of the proposed plan. Hydroelectric power and energy that would be made available would provide a modest but valuable addition to help serve the anticipated power requirements of the area. The inhabitants have recognized the value of this development to their general welfare and there is concerted local agreement for early construction. The construction of this division would be economically justified in that the estimated annual benefits exceed the estimated annual costs by the ratio of 1.3 to 1.

The plan provides for an adequate water supply for 17,890 acres of irrigable land of which 9,250 would receive a supplemental supply and 8,640 would be newly irrigated lands and receive a full supply. In addition, the plan would develop 10,000 kilowatts of nominal prime power by integration of the proposed division powerplant with the Columbia River power system. Studies are now under way to increase this capacity to 16,000 kilowatts and a supplemental report on this will be made available in the near future.

The division plan is primarily an extension to the works of the Talent irrigation district. Existing facilities of this district would be used to as great an extent as possible and enlarged as required. Emigrant Reservoir would be increased in size from 8,300 to

45,000 acre-feet capacity, as would the lengths and capacities of the existing major canals and laterals. Hyatt Prairie Reservoir would be utilized at its present size. Major new water-collection facilities would consist of Howard Prairie Dam and Reservoir, 60,500 acre-feet capacity, a system of collection canals for diverting and conveying water from the Little Butte Creek watershed into Howard Prairie Reservoir, and the Howard Prairie delivery canal and tunnel for conveying the reservoir water and other flows of Beaver and Jenny Creeks, of the upper Klamath River watershed, across the Cascade Divide into Bear Creek. This canal and tunnel would also convey Hyatt Prairie Reservoir water. In dropping from the Cascade Divide to the enlarged Emigrant Reservoir, where it would be reregulated, the water would pass through the proposed Green Springs powerplant.

The proposed plan will require transbasin diversion of water to be successful. Studies indicate that the required supply is available and there would be no apparent conflict with existing rights. The State engineer of Oregon has expressed his approval of the proposed use of water as set forth in this report.

The estimated cost of the development based on January 1953 prices is \$19,894,000. Annual operation, maintenance and replacement costs would amount to \$150,500, of which \$85,900 is allocated to irrigation and \$64,600 allocated to power.

The allocations of the \$19,894,000 to irrigation, power and flood control are respectively \$12,971,000, \$6,286,000, and \$637,000. The latter amount is nonreimbursable in accordance with law. It is estimated that the amount allocated to power including interest during construction could be repaid from net power revenues in 49 years with interest at 2½ percent. For the water users to pay out the irrigation allocation, 70 years would be required with the aid of net power revenues after the 49th year. It is estimated that the irrigators, in addition to paying annual operation, maintenance, and replacement costs and a bonded debt with interest due on existing works, would be able to repay in the 70-year period approximately \$7,870,000 of the capital costs allocated to irrigation. Aid to irrigation from net power revenues would amount to about \$5,101,000.

During an interim period, it is proposed to defer development of 2,680 irrigable acres under the Phoenix Canal in the division and to use the water (9,000 acre-feet) on the Medford and Rogue River Valley irrigation districts to supplement their present inadequate supplies until an alternative source of supply can be developed. No new construction would be required to accomplish this temporary arrangement, inasmuch as the water would be released into Bear Creek for use by the district through existing facilities. The charges for the 9,000 acre-feet of water would be on the same basis as if the 2,680 acres of division land were included and would maintain feasibility of the plan.

Present plans include but a very small amount (\$10,000) for fish and wildlife facilities. Studies will continue on fish and wildlife resources affected by this development and any reasonable expenditures found necessary by the Secretary for this purpose will, in final analysis, be considered nonreimbursable in accordance with existing law.

The National Park Service concludes that recreational development in the Talent division would not be of national significance. The regional director, therefore, in the absence of commitment by local interests for repayment of recreation costs and in accordance with Bureau of the Budget Circular A-47 omits recreational facilities from the plan of development recommended. However, it is believed that construction of minimum basic recreation facilities necessary to provide access, sanitation, and safety for immediate public use and for protection of the area should be undertaken as part of

the project costs on a nonreimbursable basis. Accordingly, the regional director's report is hereby amended in this respect.

Except as modified with regard to fish and wildlife costs and recreational facilities, I concur in and adopt the recommendations of the regional director as set forth in paragraph 41 of his report.

I recommend that you approve and adopt this report as your proposed report on the Talent division and that you authorize me in your behalf to transmit copies to the States of Oregon and California and to the Secretary of the Army, in accordance with requirements of the Flood Control Act of 1944 (58 Stat. 887), to the State of Oregon for the views and recommendations of the head of the agency exercising administration over the wildlife resources of that State, in accordance with provisions of the act of August 14, 1946 (60 Stat. 1080), and to the other interested Federal agencies for their comments.

Respectfully,

W. A. DEKHEIMER,
Commissioner.

Approved and adopted: April 1, 1954.

DOUGLAS MCKAY,
Secretary of the Interior.

PROTECTION AGAINST STORM DAMAGE

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, hurricanes Carol and Edna struck Connecticut and other Northeastern States with devastating force during 1954. Fifty-eight lives were lost; thousands of families in coastal areas suffered distress and hardship; property damages were inflicted in staggering amounts.

In an effort to find a constructive solution to the very serious problems of shorefront protection, beach erosion, and tidal flooding created by these terrible storms which have occurred with increasing frequency in recent years, I introduced on January 14 a bill authorizing a survey of the affected areas. The bill, S. 414, would require the Army engineers to determine possible means of preventing damages to property and loss of human lives by hurricane winds and tides.

The distinguished senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN] and his distinguished colleague [Mr. PASTORE], subsequently introduced a somewhat similar bill, although more limited in scope. I refer to S. 524. I should like at this time to express my gratitude for the kind remarks made by the senior Senator from Rhode Island in reference to my bill, and to assure him and his junior colleague that I stand ready to cooperate with them, and with all other Senators interested in constructive action toward meeting this problem.

It is my hope that these bills will be scheduled for early hearing by the Senate Committee on Public Works. I have requested the chairman, the distinguished senior Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ] to schedule hearings at the earliest practicable date.

Mr. President, many difficult problems have been created by the increasing frequency and severity of hurricane damage in the Northeast. The determination of the extent of Federal participation in meeting them will not be an easy task. But they are problems which need solution, and the leadership of the Congress is essential in exploring all possible

avenues of proper assistance to the States, communities, and people who have borne the brunt of these disasters.

I ask unanimous consent that an exchange of correspondence between the Governor of Connecticut, Hon. Abraham Ribicoff, and myself on this matter be printed at the conclusion of these remarks.

There being no objection, the correspondence was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
EXECUTIVE CHAMBERS,
Hartford, January 19, 1955.

HON. PRESCOTT BUSH,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: I know that you are vitally interested in the problems of shorefront protection and beach erosion as it affects the State of Connecticut. The serious effects of tidal floods and beach erosion will take the cooperation of the Federal Government, the State, the towns, and the individual property owners.

I have received a letter from Governor Roberts, of Rhode Island, who informs me that the Rhode Island delegation intends to ask for a study by the Army engineers concerning the problems which affect the navigable waters of Narragansett Bay and waters along the southern shores of New England. Furthermore, that Senator GREEN will invite congressional representatives from the three southern New England States to meet for discussion of an act the Rhode Island delegation is introducing in Congress.

In reading the proposed Rhode Island act, it would appear to me that it might be preferable to widen the scope of the survey to cover beach erosion and shorefront protection in general as well as problems of damage due to hurricane tidal floods.

I have written Governor Roberts that I am sure that the Connecticut delegation would be pleased to cooperate with other congressional representatives from adjoining States in joint action for the mutual benefit of southern New England.

It is my intention, at some future date, to call a conference to which will be invited our United States Senators, the Congressmen whose districts adjoin the Connecticut shoreline, and local officials. Before setting such date, I will clear with you to find a day mutually convenient.

If you have any suggestions, I would be pleased to receive them.

Thanking you in advance for your cooperation, I am

Sincerely,

ABE RIBICOFF,
Governor.

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,
January 22, 1955.

HON. ABRAHAM RIBICOFF,
Governor of Connecticut,
State Capitol, Hartford, Conn.

DEAR GOVERNOR: Thank you for your letter of January 19. I am delighted that we share interest in the problems of shorefront protection and beach erosion vitally affecting Connecticut. In an effort to contribute toward a solution of these problems, I introduced in the Senate on January 14 a bill to authorize a survey of the New England, New York, and New Jersey coastal and tidal areas for the purpose of determining possible means of preventing damages to property and loss of human lives due to hurricane winds and tides. A copy is enclosed.

The bill was drafted after consultation with the Chief of Army Engineers and contains language broad enough to cover the very serious problems of beach erosion and

shore protection in general as well as those arising from tidal flooding.

I had not been aware, at the time the bill was introduced, that Senator GREEN was working on similar legislation. His bill, in which Senator PASTORE joined as a sponsor, was introduced on January 18. I agree that the Rhode Island bill appears to be too limited in scope, and feel that by restricting the proposed survey to southern New England it narrows the support we might expect from other States in the Northeast.

As you know, bills of this nature are referred to the Committee on Public Works, of which I am a member. It is my intention to request that hearings be held at the earliest practicable date. When hearings are scheduled, I think it would be advantageous if you, as Governor of our State, could appear in person or by representative to join me in presenting Connecticut's views.

In the meantime, a conference of Connecticut Members of Congress with shoreline and local officials, such as you suggest, seems a very desirable step, and you can count on my cooperation. I will also be glad to discuss the problem with Senator GREEN when we can arrange a mutually convenient time.

Your interest in this problem, which has been a matter of deep concern to me since I entered the Senate, is fully appreciated. I am confident that by working together we will be able to make progress toward its solution.

With best wishes, I am,
Sincerely yours,

PRESCOTT BUSH,
United States Senator.

Mr. PURTELL subsequently said: Mr. President, earlier in today's session my colleague, the senior Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BUSH] introduced correspondence between him and the Governor of Connecticut relative to a bill providing for a study to be made relative to preventive measures guarding against hurricane damage along the New England, New York, and New Jersey coasts. I wish to associate myself with the remarks of my colleague, and I ask unanimous consent to have printed at the end of the remarks of my colleague correspondence which I have had with Hon. Abraham Ribicoff, Governor of Connecticut.

There being no objection, the correspondence was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JANUARY 24, 1955.

HON. ABRAHAM RIBICOFF,
Governor, State of Connecticut,
Executive Chambers,
Hartford, Conn.

DEAR ABE: Thank you for your letter of January 19, with respect to the communication which you received from Governor Roberts of Rhode Island, informing you of the study which the Rhode Island delegation is asking the Army engineers to conduct concerning the problems affecting the navigable waters of Narragansett Bay and waters along the southern shores of New England. This general area is one which has given me some concern for quite a period, and early last fall I first took up the matter with the office of Army engineers and had drafted for introduction in the Congress a bill which would, "authorize and direct the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, to conduct a detailed study of the coastal areas of the New England States and of New York State for the purpose of determining the feasibility of protective works in such areas against hurricanes and other heavy storms."

However, I found that Senator BUSH had likewise prepared a bill which would serve the same general purposes and, inasmuch as

he is a Member of the Senate Public Works Committee, to which committee any request having to deal with public works would be referred, I deferred to him. A copy of his proposal is attached.

As I stated above my interest in this matter continues, and I shall be most pleased to cooperate with you and the other members of the Connecticut delegation as well as the representatives of neighboring States. While one cannot control the elements, I think we would be remiss in our duties if we did not look into the engineering and economic feasibility of hurricane protective works.

I shall be pleased to hear from you as to your plans for a conference and you may be sure I shall try to adapt my calendar to yours.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

BILL
WILLIAM A. PURTELL,
United States Senator.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
EXECUTIVE CHAMBERS,
Hartford, January 19, 1955.

HON. WILLIAM A. PURTELL,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR BILL: I know that you are vitally interested in the problems of shore-front protection and beach erosion as it affects the State of Connecticut. The serious effects of tidal floods and beach erosion will take the cooperation of the Federal Government, the State, the towns, and the individual property owners.

I have received a letter from Governor Roberts, of Rhode Island, who informs me that the Rhode Island delegation intends to ask for a study by the Army engineers concerning the problems which affect the navigable waters of Narragansett Bay and waters along the southern shores of New England; furthermore, that Senator GREEN will invite congressional representatives from the three southern New England States to meet for discussion of an act the Rhode Island delegation is introducing in Congress.

In reading the proposed Rhode Island act, it would appear to me that it might be preferable to widen the scope of the survey to cover beach erosion and shore-front protection in general, as well as problems of damage due to hurricane tidal floods.

I have written Governor Roberts that I am sure that the Connecticut delegation would be pleased to cooperate with other congressional Representatives from adjoining States in joint action for the mutual benefit of southern New England.

It is my intention, at some future date, to call a conference to which will be invited our United States Senators, the Congressmen whose districts adjoin the Connecticut shoreline, and local officials. Before setting such date I will clear with you to find a day mutually convenient.

If you have any suggestions, I would be pleased to receive them.

Thanking you in advance for your cooperation, I am

Sincerely,

ABE, Governor.

RELIEF OF TAKASHI SUGIURA

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, a few days ago I introduced Senate bill 328, for the relief of Takashi Sugiura, a picture moulder in the Smithsonian Institution.

I ask unanimous consent that the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN] be permitted to be a cosponsor of the bill.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point the text of a letter written by the Director of the Smithsonian Institution to the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], together with an attached memorandum.

There being no objection, the letter and the memorandum were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION,
FREER GALLERY OF ART,
Washington, D. C., January 24, 1955.

HON. THEODORE F. GREEN,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR GREEN: You no doubt recall meeting our Japanese picture mounter, Mr. Takashi Sugiura. Senator SALTONSTALL has introduced a bill in the Senate for the relief of our man's wife and children. The number of the bill is S. 328, and the enclosed paper will explain the situation. I do hope that you will find it possible to support this bill, which is very important to us.

Sincerely yours,

A. G. WENLEY, Director.

LEGISLATION INTRODUCED CONCERNING JAPANESE PICTURE MOUNTER, FREER GALLERY OF ART

Early in 1953 we brought to this country on a first priority immigration visa Mr. Takashi Sugiura, of Tokyo, Japan, to work as an oriental picture mounter in the Freer Gallery of Art. Our understanding with him was that, if both parties liked the arrangement we would bring over his wife and family at the end of a year. Now we find that, although he petitioned for the admission of Mrs. Sugiura and her three children, Motoko, Atsushi, and Kumi Sugiura, and they were placed on the waiting list on October 15, 1953, they are on the No. 3 priority list and there is no hope of getting them over here in the near future in that classification.

This matter is extremely urgent to us because, should we lose Mr. Sugiura, it would be almost impossible to get someone to take his place here. We could get no technician like him in this country, and it is difficult even in Japan to find a really good man. We therefore asked Mr. Fouche of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to draw up a bill for the relief of Mrs. Chii Sugiura, Motoko Sugiura, Atsushi Sugiura, and Kumi Sugiura. This has been introduced in both the Senate and the House of Representatives as S. 328 on January 11 and H. R. 933 on January 5 of this year. These bills were introduced by Senator SALTONSTALL and Representative CANNON, respectively, and are identical. These two bills are worded as follows:

"Be it enacted, etc., That, in the administration of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Mrs. Chii Sugiura and her three children, Motoko Sugiura, Atsushi Sugiura, and Kumi Sugiura, shall be deemed eligible for the issuance of immigration visas pursuant to section 203 (a) (1) (B) of that act notwithstanding that they are not accompanying Takashi Sugiura to the United States: Provided, That they are otherwise admissible to the United States and that applications for such visas are made within 6 months after the date of the enactment of this act."

We feel rather pressed, for it is urgent to the safety and preservation of our great collection of more than 2,000 paintings that Mr. Sugiura remain with us. It is now almost 1 year and 9 months since he has been in this country, and as yet we have been unable to fulfill the agreement that we made in good faith with him. This has placed a physical and financial burden on Mr. Sugiura, for not only has he been separated from his family, but he has also had to maintain two households. He has recently expressed

his determination to return to Japan in the near future if nothing can be done to reunite him with his family in the United States.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO BAN THE POLL TAX

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, in the last three Congresses a group of southern Senators, of which I have the privilege to be one, has introduced in each Congress a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the effect of which would be to ban the imposition of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in elections in which a President, a Vice President, Members of the United States Senate, or Members of the House of Representatives are being elected.

This has been an extremely serious effort on behalf of this group of Senators. At this time we wish to call attention to the fact that we are again introducing the same joint resolution which was introduced previously. I am honored to be joined in this effort by my colleague, the junior Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], the two Senators from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER and Mr. LONG], the two Senators from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN and Mr. FULBRIGHT], the two Senators from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN and Mr. SCOTT], and the junior Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND]. In addition, at least a half dozen other Senators from Southern States will support the joint resolution, if it is brought to the floor of the Senate.

Mr. President, it is quite apparent that this matter has been allowed to become largely a political issue, and that no party and no Judiciary Committee up to this time has been willing to report such a proposed amendment to the Senate, where it could receive careful consideration by the entire body.

I must say that the distinguished Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER], former chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, was kind enough to conduct hearings on the subject last year. The hearings were completed and the printed hearings were made available. Therefore, it should not take long for the present Judiciary Committee, under the able leadership of the distinguished Senator from West Virginia [Mr. KILGORE], to complete the consideration of the subject and to report to the Senate an appropriate joint resolution.

For myself and on behalf of the other Senators whom I have named I now introduce a joint resolution proposing the constitutional amendment, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection the joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred. Without objection the text of the joint resolution will be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The joint resolution (S. J. Res. 29) to provide for a constitutional amendment to the Constitution of the United States, introduced by Mr. HOLLAND for himself and other Senators, was read

twice by its title, referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Resolved, etc., That the following article is hereby proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:

"ARTICLE —

"SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax or to meet any property qualification.

"SEC. 2. Nothing in this article shall be construed to invalidate any provision of law denying the right to vote to paupers or persons supported at public expense or by charitable institutions.

"SEC. 3. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Florida yield for a question?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am delighted to yield to the distinguished Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I wish to state to the Senator from Florida that I am pleased by his introduction of the joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment with respect to poll taxes. It is my intention very shortly to introduce a bill which will try to accomplish the purpose of the joint resolution which the Senator from Florida has introduced. The bill would accomplish that result by legislative enactment.

I may say, further, that if we should be unable in the Senate and in the House to proceed with success toward the enactment of a statute, which can be held to be constitutional, to eliminate the requirement of a poll tax, I would deem it wise and prudent to undertake an appropriate program looking toward the desired result by way of a constitutional amendment, and to call for prompt action on the proposed amendment by the States.

I believe the time has arrived for us to take some action that will be meaningful and effective. I wish the Senator from Florida to know that, because we always try to treat each other with a sense of integrity and fair play. Therefore I shall try to continue to further the proposal which it is my intention to introduce with the assistance of my colleagues as cosponsors. However, I wish also to say in good faith that if those efforts are not effective and successful, I believe it will be the duty of those of us who believe that the poll-tax requirement should be eliminated to support an effort to bring the desired result about through a constitutional amendment.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the Senator from Minnesota. By way of response I should like to say that many of us disagree entirely with his belief that it would be efficacious or constitutional to bring about the desired result by a Federal statute. I believe such an approach would lead only to a snarl on the floor

of the Senate, which would get us nowhere at all.

I hope the Senator from Minnesota and other Senators will consider seriously supporting our proposal for a constitutional amendment. The senior Senator from Florida and many other Senators from the South have strongly supported such a State constitutional amendment, or statutory action, or both, in their own States, which have resulted in the elimination of the poll tax. For example, I see on the floor today several Senators who in their own States, either as members of their legislatures or as Governors—and some of them in both capacities—from time to time have accomplished that result.

We believe that with the limitations that are proposed in the joint resolution, the constitutional amendment could be submitted quickly to the States and that probably it could be adopted even more quickly than any other amendment has been heretofore adopted.

We have indicated to the members of the Committee on the Judiciary that we would be perfectly willing to have a 2-year limitation or any other reasonable limitation placed upon the measure, because we are confident of its prompt adoption by most of the several States, if they are given an opportunity to act on it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. HOLLAND. I gladly yield to the distinguished Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I wish to express the hope that the Committee on the Judiciary will proceed along the lines of the request of the Senator from Florida, and hold hearings on the joint resolution. I should like to say further that, while one always has his own personal convictions as to the best manner in which to approach a very difficult problem, which in this case relates to the election laws of the various States and the right of franchise, I believe the important thing is to get something done.

I believe the Senator from Florida will find that the junior Senator from Minnesota, instead of trying to be an obstructionist in any way, will try to be a supporter of prompt and effective consideration of the joint resolution. At the same time, with all the vigor I have and with the powers of persuasion I have, I shall try to gain majority support for a legislative proposal.

Mr. KILGORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Florida yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I am delighted to yield to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, if I am permitted to do so.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator from Florida has expired. The Senate is still operating under the 2-minute order.

Mr. HOLLAND. I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed additional time so that I may yield for a question to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator from West Virginia may proceed.

Mr. KILGORE. Mr. President, the Senator from Florida is undoubtedly aware of the fact that in days gone by I have advocated that the best way in which to handle the poll-tax situation was by a constitutional amendment.

Mr. HOLLAND. I recall that with pleasure.

Mr. KILGORE. The effect of a constitutional amendment would be much more far-reaching than would the effect of a bill. For that reason I am glad the Senator from Florida has introduced his joint resolution, and it is my hope that we will get efficacious action on the matter in committee, so that it may be reported to the Senate as soon as possible.

Mr. HOLLAND. I am very much encouraged by the remarks of the Senator from West Virginia.

APPOINTMENT OF GEN. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR TO THE RANK OF GENERAL OF THE ARMIES

Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. Mr. President, on January 21, a joint resolution (S. J. Res. 26) was introduced on the floor of the Senate. This resolution authorizes the appointment of Gen. Douglas MacArthur to the rank of General of the Armies. Today, on the 75th birthday of this distinguished American, I should like to speak on behalf of this resolution.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur has marched through history with the alert, giant strides of a man who knows where he is going. This colorful son of a colorful father was born 75 years ago today on an Army post in Arkansas. He was born into the Army. He gave it his life.

The early record of Douglas MacArthur promised the great future he later achieved. He graduated from West Point as the No. 1 man in his class. He achieved the incredible record of 98.14 percent in all his studies. It was no surprise that he was selected as the man most likely to succeed.

His record in the Rainbow Division of World War I was one of courage combined with astute military judgment. When he was appointed Chief of Staff of the United States Army by President Hoover he was only 50 years old. He was the youngest man ever to hold that high position.

The highlight of his career came in the Second World War. Few of us will forget his brilliant and inspired defense of the Philippines. The news was tragically bad from all fronts. The Dutch East Indies and Singapore fell like dominoes before the rush of the Japanese. But General MacArthur conducted a defense of Bataan that was both brilliant and valuable. The Japanese planning for the conquest of the Philippines was thrown completely off schedule. The free world watched and took heart. Handicapped by small forces and by meager resources, he held on to give us the precious time we needed so vitally. Even in adversity this was one of his finest hours.

When victory finally came it was due in no small part to the magnificent leadership of Douglas MacArthur. But he was not yet free of responsibility. After a spectacularly successful period of Japanese reconstruction, MacArthur

again assumed the role of military leader with the invasion of South Korea. Again his judgment and vigor led us successfully through a trying time. The brilliance of the master craftsman appeared with the attack on Inchon. The Nation had again called on Douglas MacArthur and again he had responded.

A brilliant military tactician, a sound statesman, a warm human being—this is Gen. Douglas MacArthur. To raise his rank to General of the Armies would be a fitting tribute to a truly great man.

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Iowa yield?

Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. I yield.

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. President, I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate the distinguished Senator from Iowa on his remarks concerning that great American, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, and to join with the Senator in the sentiments which he has expressed upon the occasion of the 75th birthday of that very distinguished citizen of our country.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, I join with my colleagues in paying tribute and in saying "Happy birthday" to that great professional military tactician who is today celebrating his 75th birthday anniversary in the city of Los Angeles, Calif.

I remind the Senate that last week I introduced a joint resolution, which was cosponsored by the junior Senator from Texas [Mr. DANIEL], the junior Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MARTIN], the senior Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT], the senior Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], and other Senators, which would accord to General MacArthur the distinguished honor of being General of the Armies of the United States. I should like to invite all my colleagues to join in the sponsorship of that resolution.

It has been impossible to call this matter to the attention of the Committee on Armed Services because that committee has been holding hearings on Formosan problems.

I should like to give way to any of my senior colleagues who favor the resolution, and who, because of their superior knowledge of the great work of General MacArthur, might desire to be the author of the resolution which I have heretofore introduced. So again I say to General MacArthur, on behalf of the people of Idaho—yes, on behalf of the people of this Nation—"Happy birthday," and many, many more of them. I thank the Senators for their interest in the matter.

PROTECTION OF THE SECURITY OF FORMOSA

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. President, from the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, which held a joint meeting, I report favorably Senate Joint Resolution 28, authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States to protect the security of Formosa, and for other purposes. I request unanimous consent to file the joint report of the two committees on the resolution sometime during today.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, may I inquire of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations if it is the purpose, to his knowledge, to bring up this matter for consideration immediately, or if the Senate will have a few days in which to study the joint resolution?

Mr. GEORGE. It is not my purpose to move the immediate consideration of the joint resolution, but I expect to move tomorrow morning to proceed with its discussion.

Mr. LONG. Are we to understand that debate on the measure in the Senate is to be undertaken without Senators having had more than simply tomorrow morning in which to study the report of the committees?

Mr. GEORGE. The report of the committees will be filed sometime during this afternoon—as early as possible, I may say to the Senator—and I hope that the Senate will be ready to proceed with the consideration of the joint resolution tomorrow.

Mr. LONG. Can the distinguished Senator from Georgia inform the Senate how much time Senators will have in which to study the report of the committees before the Senate takes up the matter?

Mr. GEORGE. I cannot say. I shall move the consideration of the joint resolution tomorrow, immediately upon the convening of the Senate.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The report, when filed, will be received and placed on the calendar.

In that connection, House Joint Resolution 159, a similar joint resolution, also will be placed on the calendar.

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. President, I may say to the distinguished Senator from Louisiana that I have been advised that a joint meeting of the two Houses will be held tomorrow, and that it is likely that the Senate will be convened at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning. Therefore, I shall make the announcement that the joint resolution will not be called up until after the Senate has reconvened, following the joint meeting with the House.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I desire to confirm what the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia has said with reference to the plans for tomorrow. It is my intention to move that at the conclusion of its business today the Senate adjourn until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning. As the distinguished Senator from Georgia has said, he will not move to take up the joint resolution tomorrow until after the joint meeting of the two Houses of Congress, which will be held in the Hall of the House of Representatives.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I offer an amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 28 and ask that it be printed and lie on the table.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment will be received, printed, and lie on the table.

THE FIGHT AGAINST THE CHICAGO WATER STEAL

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in

the RECORD a statement which I have caused to be prepared relating to the fight against what is known as the Chicago water steal, and also a letter from the municipal port director of the city of Milwaukee.

There being no objection, the statement and letter were ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

WE MUST CONTINUE TO FIGHT AGAINST THE CHICAGO WATER STEAL

For many years it has been my privilege to battle against what is generally known as the Chicago water steal; namely, the efforts by the Chicago Sanitary District to sabotage a United States Supreme Court decision limiting to 1,500 cubic feet a second diversion of water from Lake Michigan through the Chicago Sanitary Canal.

Side by side with me in this effort have been most senatorial and congressional delegations from the Great Lakes States, the Great Lakes Harbors Association, the Lake Carriers Association, and the governments of States bordering the lake. Simultaneously, the United States State Department has vigorously supported our position; namely, that any change in the Supreme Court's decision of 1930 should be effected through judicial process rather than political process; that is, by going back to the Supreme Court for review of the matter rather than by attempting to torpedo this court decision by a political action.

Our good friends to the north in Canada have repeatedly protested through diplomatic channels Chicago's attempts to abstract water from an international basin for the benefit of a single community in one nation.

And so, as Senior Senator from Wisconsin, and as ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I shall continue to oppose with all the force at my command the Chicago water steal. I shall continue to insist that studies which are now being made of the water levels on the Great Lakes by the Corps of Engineers be continued, and that no adjustment of the allowable water diversion be made until the Engineers' reports have been made and very carefully considered.

I am deeply interested in protecting the common interests of the Great Lakes area. That includes, of course, shore property owners along the lakes. But I point out that these property owners would in no way be helped by the Chicago water steal, which is actually contrary to their interests and to the interests of the lakes as a whole.

I append a splendid and hard-hitting memorandum, which was prepared by the distinguished municipal port director of Milwaukee, the Honorable Harry C. Brockel, for the mayor of Milwaukee, the Honorable Frank P. Zeldler. This memorandum discusses the background of this issue clearly, and in a very straightforward fashion.

CITY OF MILWAUKEE,
BOARD OF HARBOR COMMISSIONERS,
Milwaukee, Wis., January 21, 1955.

HON. FRANK P. ZEIDLER,
Mayor, City of Milwaukee,
City Hall.

DEAR MR. MAYOR: As requested, we are glad to send you herewith a memorandum concerning the legal background of the Chicago water diversion controversy, which apparently will be revived again in this session of Congress, despite Presidential veto last August of H. R. 3300 which, if enacted, would have authorized an additional 1,000 cubic second-feet of diversion from Lake Michigan through the Chicago Sanitary Canal.

The water diversion controversy arose from the circumstance that between the years 1892 and 1900, the city of Chicago and its suburbs carried out a plan to dispose of

the sewage of the Chicago metropolitan area by cutting a canal across the low continental divide about 10 miles west of Lake Michigan and discharging the sewage of the entire metropolitan area into the Mississippi watershed by way of the Chicago Sanitary Canal, Des Plaines and Illinois Rivers.

This action precipitated 40 years of controversy and litigation. Ultimately, the other States of the Great Lakes Basin all the way from New York to Minnesota brought an original action in the United States Supreme Court to enjoin Chicago from the continued abstraction of waters from the Great Lakes Basin. The United States Supreme Court appointed Charles Evans Hughes as special master. After years of hearings and investigation, the Supreme Court in 1930 issued a decree based upon the findings of Special Master Hughes, who later became Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the Chicago water diversion had caused a lowering of 6 inches in the levels of the Great Lakes. It held that the lowering of lake levels by approximately 6 inches caused "a substantial and injurious effect upon the carrying capacity of vessels, and deprived navigation and commercial interests of facilities which otherwise they would have enjoyed in commerce on the Great Lakes." The Court also held that the 6-inch lowering of the Great Lakes had caused substantial injury in connection with fishing and hunting grounds, beaches, summer resorts, and public parks.

The Court in its decree of 1930 ordered a gradual reduction in water diversion from the amounts then being taken and ordered Chicago to provide other means of disposing of the sewage of the sanitary district.

Since 1930 Chicago has slowly and reluctantly progressed the building of sewage treatment plants, and it is understood that substantially all of Chicago's sewage is now fully or partially treated.

The Supreme Court ordered that by 1937 diversion from Lake Michigan be reduced to 1,500 cubic feet per second, plus domestic pumpage. The diversion of 1,500 cubic feet per second was considered adequate to provide water circulation in the Sanitary Canal and to maintain navigation levels. No sooner had the diversion reached the level fixed by the Supreme Court in 1937 than Chicago initiated the first of its many attempts to evade the Supreme Court decree. In practically every session of Congress since 1937 bills have been introduced providing for diversion in quantities much greater than allowed by the Supreme Court decree. Numerous other efforts were made by Chicago to circumvent the decree. For example, in 1942 the Chicago Sanitary District attempted to secure from Donald Nelson, War Production Administrator, an order increasing the diversion on the grounds that increased flow of water through the canal would permit increased generation of power at Lockport for war-production purposes. Thanks to vigilant action by Milwaukee public officials and the Great Lakes Harbors Association, this specious plea was denied.

Very shortly thereafter Chicago attempted to hoodwink the United States Public Health Service into issuing an order for increased diversion. Chicago claimed that a great pool of pollution existed in Lake Michigan, in the vicinity of its water intakes, which could be siphoned off by increased velocity of flow from Lake Michigan into the Sanitary Canal. At the same time that the sanitary district claimed that its water supply was in peril Mayor Kelly was campaigning for office and loudly proclaiming that Chicago had "the finest water supply in the world." Dr. E. R. Krumbiegel, Milwaukee health commissioner, was an effective witness in refuting this fallacious claim before the United States Public Health Service and before congressional committees.

Having been frustrated before the War Production Board, the United States Public Health Service, and congressional committees, Chicago then attempted to secure an Executive order from the late President Roosevelt authorizing increased diversion. A barrage of protest came from the Great Lakes region as a result of which the President declined to issue the order.

Chicago thereafter petitioned the Supreme Court to reopen the case on the grounds that Chicago's water supply and public health were in jeopardy. A special master was appointed by the Supreme Court, who conducted lengthy investigations and took much testimony. The special master found the Chicago claims unfounded and the Court declined to modify the decree.

Officials of the sanitary district have gone so far as to claim that increased diversion of lake water is needed for the development of atomic power at the Argonne Laboratory. Neither the State of Illinois nor the Chicago Sanitary District is in any way concerned with the development of atomic power at the Argonne Laboratory. No suggestion has ever been made by the Atomic Energy Commission that increased diversion is necessary for the operation of this atomic plant.

A variety of specious reasons have been advanced by the State of Illinois and the Chicago Sanitary District. These are not the real motives for increased diversion. The real motive is obscured in the sensational claims of the sanitary district. Increased diversion is desired because of the additional income to be derived from the development of hydroelectric power at Lockport, Ill., where the sanitary district maintains an electric powerplant and to decrease the operating expenses of the sanitary district, which becomes possible if untreated or partially treated sewage can be diluted with additional lake water. In the report of Special Master Lemann to the United States Supreme Court in March 1941 it was pointed out that the additional electricity which could be developed by a diversion of 10,000 c. f. s. is worth \$1,500 a day to the sanitary district, or \$550,000 a year.

The sanitary district has thoroughly confused the entire issue by repeated shifts of position and numerous phoney claims. Among the purposes mentioned by Illinois for requiring increased diversion of Lake Michigan water are navigation, public health, recreation, community use, agriculture, and atomic power. Every one of these claims has been thoroughly disproved. Only two conclusions can be drawn—either the securing of increased diversion has become an obsession and a fixed political objective in the Chicago area, or the sanitary district wants the water for power generation at Lockport to increase the funds available to it from sale of power.

The Great Lakes Harbors Association, the port cities of the Great Lakes, the Lake Carriers' Association, and the governments of the States bordering the Great Lakes have been united in opposition to the demands of Chicago that the waters of Lake Michigan be exploited for the political or financial benefits of the Chicago Sanitary District. The Canadian Government has repeatedly protested through diplomatic channels the attempts to abstract water from an international basin for the benefit of a single community.

For the past 40 years the Milwaukee city government has been a powerful force for the protection of community and regional interests in this matter. Milwaukee should not be diverted from its position by abusive statements emanating from Chicago, which have little or no basis in fact. The allegation that pollution in the Chicago area emanates from Milwaukee is utterly ridiculous. While the writer is no authority in the field of sewage disposal, it is my understanding that it would be physically and

financially impossible to build sewage facilities of a capacity adequate to treat sudden deluges of storm water when torrential rains fall. Under these conditions, there is inevitably some mixing of storm and sanitary sewage and a flow develops beyond the capacity of our treatment plant. However, it is my understanding that quantities of sewage bypassed under these conditions are small in volume, short in duration, and so diluted as not to present a health hazard.

Chicago is obviously attempting to weaken the united front of Great Lakes interests against water diversion by endeavoring to make it appear that this is a Chicago-Milwaukee squabble. Nothing could be further from the truth, and Milwaukee's valuable and historic leadership for the protection of its interests and the interests of the entire lake region should not be diminished by these unworthy and unfounded allegations.

It has been the position of many interests on the Great Lakes that if Chicago has a legitimate basis for adjustment of the 1930 decree, it should be back to the Supreme Court and make its petition, which will become the subject of reasonable and thorough investigation. In a word, this important issue, affecting a great watershed, 2 nations, and 8 States, should be decided by the judicial processes and not by political methods.

With another temporary rise in lake levels, it can be anticipated that another hue and cry will emanate from Chicago, for more water. The Chicago Sanitary District and Chicago newspapers have done a clever propaganda job in persuading and alarming owners of shore property in Wisconsin and Michigan that increased diversion of water to the sanitary canal will solve the high water problem on Lake Michigan. The maximum correction which would result in high water in Lake Michigan as a result of H. R. 3300 would be 1 inch in 3 years. One inch of water would obviously not settle the erosion problem when the lakes rise to levels of 3 feet above normal, as they did in 1951 and 1952. On the other hand, removal of 1 inch of water from Lake Michigan as a result of the Chicago water diversion would, at the low lake level cycles, have a disastrous effect upon lake shipping. If the bulk freighter fleet on the Great Lakes has its safe draft reduced by only 1 inch, the annual loss in carrying capacity is approximately 2 million tons of cargo per season for American vessels only, excluding Canadian and ocean shipping. In the contest between erosion and navigation, the Chicago water diversion offers small comfort as an erosion preventative, but presents a very real threat to navigation and shipping on the Great Lakes.

Milwaukee, other port cities, and maritime interests of the Great Lakes region are now pressing for Federal deepening of the Great Lakes connecting channels in preparation for the St. Lawrence Seaway project. It would be most inconsistent to press for such a costly improvement and at the same time consent to other measures which would result in lowering lake levels.

We recommend that Milwaukee continue to support legislation providing for long-range study of water levels of the Great Lakes with a view to the building of control works. Such a study by the Corps of Engineers is now in progress. Its findings should be awaited before lake levels are further tampered with. In the meantime, the writer believes that it would be sound public policy to insist that Congress refrain from adjusting the allowable water diversion until lake level engineering studies are completed. The groups opposing the Chicago water diversion are now in a very powerful position, having the support of a presidential veto which will serve as a deterrent to congressional committees and to both Houses of Congress against hasty enactment of legislation such

as H. R. 3300 which slipped through the Senate in the confusion of the closing hours.

Respectfully,

H. C. BROCKEL,
Municipal Port Director.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NEUBERGER in the chair). Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

AMENDMENT OF WHEAT MARKETING QUOTA PROVISIONS

Mr. LONG obtained the floor.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Louisiana yield for a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. LONG. I shall yield to the distinguished acting majority leader, with the reservation that I do not lose my right to the floor, and by that I mean that if the measure the Senator intends to take up should result in relatively lengthy debate, I shall insist on my right to proceed in the regular order.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may reserve that right in yielding to the acting majority leader.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Senate bill 145, amending the wheat marketing quota provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 145) to amend the wheat marketing quota provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, which had been reported from the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry with amendments on page 2, line 2, after the word "counties", to insert "which (1) are", and in line 3, after the word "and", to strike out "which" and insert "(2)", so as to make the bill read:

Be it enacted, etc., That subsection (e) of section 334 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended (7 U. S. C. 1334 (e)), is amended, beginning with the 1955 crop of wheat, to read as follows:

"(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the Secretary shall increase the farm marketing quotas and acreage allotments for the 1955 crop of wheat for farms located in counties in the States of Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota designated by the Secretary as counties which (1) are capable of producing class II durum wheat and (2) have produced such wheat for commercial food products during 1 or more of the 10 years 1945 through 1954: *Provided*, That the increase in the wheat acreage allotment for any farm shall not exceed the difference between the acreage of cropland on the farm suitable for the production of wheat and the wheat acreage allotment, if any, determined without regard to this subsection, and the increase in allotment shall be conditioned upon the production therein of class II durum wheat. The increase in wheat acreage allotments authorized by this subsection shall be in addition to the national, State, and county wheat acreage allotments, and the acreage of class II durum wheat thereon shall not be considered in establishing future State, county, and farm acreage allotments."

The amendments were agreed to.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I should like to make a very brief explanation of the bill.

The bill would permit a small increase in the production of durum wheat for a 1-year period. Durum wheat is used in making macaroni and spaghetti. Because of a severe new type of rust damage, the total production of durum wheat has declined from an average of about 35 million bushels to about 5,600,000 bushels this year. Additional acreage is badly needed. The bill is approved by the Department of Agriculture, farm organizations, the Grange, the macaroni industry, the milling industry, and by the committee.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, as a part of my remarks, the committee report explaining the bill, and a tabulation showing durum wheat production for the past 10 years.

There being no objection, the report (No. 9) and tabulation were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, to whom was referred the bill (S. 145) to amend the wheat marketing quota provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, having considered the same, report thereon with a recommendation that it do pass with amendments.

Public Law 290, 83d Congress, added section 334 (e) to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, to provide for increased acreage allotments in 1954 and 1955 for durum wheat producers. However, it is restricted to producers who devote a normal share of their original allotment to durum and who have produced durum in 1 or more of the preceding 3 years. S. 145 would remove these restrictions for 1955; since experience in 1954 shows that durum producers, who have sustained serious losses due to damage from stem rust "race 15b," will not risk planting a large part of their original allotment to durum in order to obtain the additional durum allotment. The critical shortage of durum and the need for this legislation is more fully described in the attached letter from the Under Secretary of Agriculture.

The committee amendments are designed to make it perfectly clear that the additional allotments are to be restricted to "counties" which have produced such wheat, rather than "farms" which have produced such wheat.

DEPARTMENTAL VIEWS

JANUARY 20, 1955.

The honorable the PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE,
United States Senate.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Enclosed for consideration by the Senate is a draft of a proposed amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended. We believe it to be of such importance as to require immediate and favorable consideration. It is designed to increase the production of class II durum wheat, the supply of which is extremely short.

It is essential that the bill be given immediate consideration and enacted as soon after the convening of the Congress as possible. If the amendment is to be effective, farmers must be informed of its provisions prior to seeding time, which begins soon after the 1st of March. It is only after enactment of the proposed amendment that we can prepare and promulgate an effective program that will induce farmers to seed increased acreages of durum wheat.

Durum wheat, class II, has a usage substantially different from that for any other class of wheat because it is the source of semolina, from which satisfactory quality

macaroni products are manufactured. It is a spring wheat and is grown in the States of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Minnesota. The supply situation with respect to durum wheat is critical, due to damage from stem rust "race 15b." In 1952 the production of durum wheat totaled 22 million bushels, which was only 60 percent of the 10-year 1942-51 average production of 37.4 million bushels. In 1953 the crop was 13.9 million bushels and the estimate for the 1954 crop is only 5.5 million bushels. The normal requirement for domestic use, exports, and carryover is about 35 million bushels per year.

These three successive crop failures have endangered the entire durum wheat industry both on the production and milling sides. The macaroni industry members report it is faced with a shrinking market due almost entirely to the production of an inferior product resulting from the use of classes of wheat not well suited for such products.

An effort was made by the Congress in 1953 to relieve the situation by enacting section 4 of Public Law 290 (68 Stat. 4). Under this statute the 1954 acreage allotments and marketing quotas for wheat producers who had grown durum wheat during 1 or more of the preceding 3 years were increased to permit the growing of increased acreages of durum wheat, class II. Our investigation indicates that the program, under these provisions, has not and will not be effective because (1) the seeding of other spring wheat is limited to the pro rata share of the regular wheat allotment attributable to such spring wheat as a condition of qualifying for the additional allotment for durum wheat, and (2) eligibility for the additional allotment to produce durum is dependent upon the producers having grown durum wheat, class II, in 1 or more of the preceding 3 years. Producers feel that the growing of durum wheat against the hazards of stem rust "race 15b" is too great to expect them to gamble on seeding a substantial part of their farm wheat acreage allotments to such class of wheat.

Under the proposed bill, farmers would be permitted in areas capable of producing durum wheat, class II, from which acceptable semolina may be produced for the production of satisfactory macaroni products, to grow such class of wheat over and above the regular farm wheat acreage allotments without regard to the class of wheat seeded within the allotments. The acreage permitted to be grown would be limited only by the total acreage of cropland on the farm well suited for the production of wheat. Farmers operating in the areas to be selected would be eligible for the increased allotments for durum wheat production regardless of whether they had previously produced such wheat. The increase in allotments under the bill would not be considered in determining future State, county, and farm wheat acreage allotments.

Although considerable increase in the acreage seeded to durum wheat could be expected if the proposed bill is enacted, it is not likely that the production of durum wheat will reach normal levels until adequate supplies of rust-resistant varieties of durum wheat seed are available. Four such varieties of durum wheat, class II, have been developed and further experimentation is being conducted by the North Dakota Agricultural College and Experiment Station. This station is also conducting a seed-reproduction program for such varieties. It is not expected, however, that ample seed of these varieties will become available before 1957.

The proposed bill would apply to the 1955 crop only. Although the problem may continue for 2 to 3 years, it is felt that the situation should be reexamined before continuing this type of legislation beyond 1955.

The proposal would result in a slight increase in administrative costs, which can be absorbed within existing funds.

Representatives of this Department will be available to assist in any way in the consideration by the Congress of the bill.

A similar letter is being sent to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

We are advised by the Bureau of the Budget that from the standpoint of the program of the President, there is no objection to the submission of this bill.

Sincerely yours,

TRUE D. MORSE.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with subsection (4) of rule XXIX of the Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED

SEC. 334. * * *

(e) [Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, if after investigation the Secretary determines with respect to any class or subclass of wheat that a substantial difference exists in the usage or marketing outlets therefor and that the supply of such wheat for the 1953-54 and 1954-55 marketing years with respect to the 1954 crop, and for the 1954-55 and 1955-56 marketing years with respect to the 1955 crop, will be substantially short of indicated market demands and carryover requirements for such wheat for such marketing years, the Secretary shall increase the marketing quotas and acreage allotments for such crop of wheat for farms which produced such wheat in one or more of the preceding 3 years to the extent necessary to make available a supply of such wheat adequate to meet such demands and carryover requirements. The increases in farm marketing quotas and acreage allotments shall be made on the basis of the acreage seeded to such class or subclass of wheat during the period of years considered in establishing farm marketing quotas and acreage allotments for wheat. The additional acreage required by this subsection shall be in addition to the national acreage allotment, and shall not be used to increase the acreage allotment applicable to other wheat produced on farms for which such additional acreage has been allotted, nor shall such acreage be considered in establishing future State, county, and farm acreage allotments.] *Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the Secretary shall increase the farm marketing quotas and acreage allotments for the 1955 crop of wheat for farms located in counties in the States of Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota designated by the Secretary as counties which (1) are capable of producing class II durum wheat and (2) have produced such wheat for commercial food products during 1 or more of the 10 years 1945 through 1954: Provided, That the increase in the wheat acreage allotment for any farm shall not exceed the difference between the acreage of cropland on the farm suitable for the production of wheat and the wheat acreage allotment, if any, determined without regard to this subsection, and the increase in allotment shall be conditioned upon the production thereon of class II durum wheat. The increase in wheat acreage allotments authorized by this subsection shall be in addition to the National, State, and county wheat acreage allotments, and the acreage of class II durum wheat thereon shall not be considered in establishing future State, county, and farm acreage allotments.*

Durum production for the past 10 years

	National	North Dakota
1945.....	32,800,000	29,900,000
1946.....	35,800,000	32,400,000
1947.....	44,300,000	40,500,000
1948.....	45,100,000	40,500,000
1949.....	39,100,000	34,300,000
1950.....	37,200,000	32,400,000
1951.....	34,800,000	28,600,000
1952.....	22,500,000	20,000,000
1953.....	13,000,000	12,100,000
1954.....	5,600,000	5,000,000

NOTE.—United States figures are for the States including Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Figures include red durum, which is generally less than a million bushels per year.

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. YOUNG. I yield to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. DANIEL. Do I understand correctly that the bill provides for the increased allotment for a period of only 1 year?

Mr. YOUNG. One year.

Mr. DANIEL. The bill does not propose to restrict the planting of that crop in any other area, and will have no effect whatever except for a period of 1 year. Is that correct?

Mr. YOUNG. Yes.

Mr. DANIEL. I may say to the Senator from North Dakota that I have received inquiries concerning the bill, and certain objections were raised, which I think the Senator from North Dakota has met by the elimination of certain language from his bill.

Mr. YOUNG. I should like to add that the bill would permit the production of durum wheat on undiverted acres in any county in the United States which had a previous history of raising durum wheat. If the county had produced any durum wheat in the past 10 years, the farmers in that area would be permitted to produce additional durum wheat.

Mr. DANIEL. For 1 year?

Mr. YOUNG. For 1 year.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF ARMED FORCES TO PROTECT SECURITY OF FORMOSA

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I have been seriously worried about the request for the passage by Congress of a joint resolution authorizing the President to conduct military operations for the defense of Formosa, the Pescadores, and other islands along the China coast. Let me say that as one Member of this body I very much appreciate the fact that the President has undertaken to request of the Congress our advice and consent to military actions that might well lead to world war III. It is an extremely grave decision that Congress is called upon to make. Its gravity should not be underrated, nor should it be arrived at without thoughtful consideration.

Yesterday the House voted 409 to 3 in favor of the resolution, only 1 day after its introduction, without having the

benefit of a single day's hearings. The argument that prevailed on the floor of the House was that we should back the President. I do not agree that that is the basis upon which we should decide this issue. It seems to me that it is our duty to give the President and the Nation the benefit of our best advice after we have fully informed ourselves on the subject.

I do not have the advantage of presently being a member of either the Senate Committee on Armed Services or the Committee on Foreign Relations. Those committees have been conducting hearings for 2 days, and able members of those committees have been developing the problems involved in the commitment which we are asked to make.

It is well that the entire public of the United States should go into this matter with their eyes open. Up to this point, as a former member of the Committee on Armed Services, and as one who served on that committee when President Truman ordered the 7th Fleet to defend the strait between Formosa and the mainland, I have never interpreted that obligation as extending to the small islands within easy artillery range of the Chinese mainland held by the Communists.

I would not attempt to compare my judgment with that of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, as a veteran of three amphibious landings, I have some practical understanding of the difficulties of an amphibious landing. I say to my colleagues that there is all the difference in the world between committing our fleet to the defense of a strait more than 75 miles wide, defending islands more than 50 miles beyond the horizon, so far as the Communists are concerned, and holding islands a mere stone's throw from the Chinese mainland. To me it is inconceivable that it would be at all difficult for the greatest naval power on the earth to defeat an amphibious landing attempted by a force, totally lacking in modern seapower, against a well-armed island manned by 500,000 troops. Yet, I can envision eventualities that could lead to an all-out war if the President were to take full advantage of the invitation in the resolution as presently worded.

If I understand the situation correctly, it is the feeling of the responsible military authorities of this country that our forces should undertake to attack the Chinese mainland prior to the time that our opponent could launch any amphibious invasion. The mere concentration of Communist Chinese troops at any point along more than 200 miles of shoreland could serve as justification for heavy bombardment of Red Chinese ports. This is far more than our Nation has thus far committed itself to do.

When President Truman committed this Nation to resist aggression, it resulted in severe criticism, as the hardships of such a course became apparent. We owe it to the people of the United States to explore fully and to understand fully the extent of the commitments we are asked to make and the possibilities to which they may lead.

If this resolution is to be regarded as a decision to ask for a showdown with China, and Russia as well, then we should face it as such. We should realize that to become involved in a war with Russia under such circumstances would mean that the many allies, numbering more than 400 million persons committed to our side in the event of Communist aggression, would have no obligation to come to our aid. It would be strictly the type of go-it-alone policy that has previously been advocated by some of our military commanders in the Pacific.

It would be with the utmost regret that I should feel forced to vote against the resolution requested by the President. Nevertheless, I believe in my conscience that I owe it to those whom I have the honor in part to represent to vote my own convictions in this matter after learning the facts, rather than to approve without study the judgment of the President or Admiral Radford.

I am extremely concerned about that fact that we have not made available to the American people the information that has been developed in hearings on this joint resolution. Mr. President, at this point let me say it is my understanding that we shall have no printed hearings on this matter when it comes before this body for consideration. If keeping the public somewhat in the dark is necessary to prevent our enemies from knowing our intentions, then at least Senators should avail themselves of the facts and of our intentions prior to the vote. It is for that reason that I wish to request that we not be in such a wild rush to pass the joint resolution before all Members have had the opportunity to apprise themselves fully as to the effect of their vote.

This joint resolution need not be rushed through today or tomorrow. After all, we have the capabilities of defeating any enemy Communist effort to capture Formosa and the Pescadores. The entire world knows of our intention to do so.

Having seen our great fleet in action, I have not the slightest doubt that it could prevent any major organized landing on Formosa. It could do this without bombing China prior to the initiation of such a landing, if there is the slightest determination or will to fight on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek's troops on Formosa, and I am confident that such a determination exists.

Yet if we pass the joint resolution in its present form, it would be urged by the friends of Chiang Kai-shek that it would be appeasement for our President to permit the Chinese Communists to capture any one of many islands held by the Chinese Nationalists along the China coast. For myself, I fully believe that Chiang Kai-shek and his friends have no more certain purpose than to have the United States fully involved in all-out war with Red China, even if this should mean war with Russia.

Once Congress has given this matter the green light, it would be difficult for the President to resist the urging to extend our protection even closer to the

Chinese mainland, in holding tiny islands that are of little value to the defense of our essential interests. Every person who urged that we should hold back would be accused of being an appeaser. When troops are concentrated opposite small islands along the China coast, the hue and cry would be raised across the land that our forces should bombard the mainland of China.

I do not regard it as a bad thing that we have many able fighting men who believe that war with the Communist powers is inevitable. After all, a good fighter will never be fully prepared unless he believes he is going to fight. However, we should be careful that those of us trusted with the policy decisions do not permit our judgment to be colored too much by those forceful men of action who become impatient with those who attempt to make their action unnecessary.

It is also fair that we give the American people an opportunity to be heard in the making of this decision. So far they have hardly heard it discussed. Although I am not one to decide my vote in such a matter by popular sentiment, I believe it only fair to our people that the question of carrying warfare to the China mainland and the possibility of Chinese counteraction, together with the steps that might be expected from China's powerful ally, Russia, in support of the Chinese Communists, should be made clear. Thus far the American people have not been informed of the implications of this joint resolution. They do not realize that our commitments are being extended far beyond anything any of us have realized prior to this time.

Let us be true to our responsibilities by so carefully studying this joint resolution that we give the President our best advice. Let us arrive at a joint resolution which we can support with the assurance that it offers the best possibility for world peace.

IN OPPOSITION TO PREVENTIVE WAR

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, in the course of my life I have delivered many speeches; but I have never delivered a more difficult one, or one which carries a greater obligation and responsibility to my conscience and to what I consider to be my patriotic duty, than the speech I am about to make on the floor of the United States Senate.

During the course of this speech I shall not yield, Mr. President, because I wish to have appear in the RECORD a statement of continuity, setting forth the reasons for the vote I cast this morning in the joint meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services in opposition to the resolution authorizing the President in advance to exercise extraordinary powers in the Pacific.

Up to this minute I have refused to give to any member of the press any statement of those reasons, because I think I owe it to my constituents and to my country to set them forth in the first instance on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. President, as a Senator, there is no question in my mind as to the probable consequences, insofar as I am concerned, of the course of action I am following in this issue. However, I may say I have committed political suicide many times, and probably once more will not make any great difference, even though it may be the final act of its kind in my case. But I have always meant it, Mr. President, when I have said I would never hesitate to sacrifice myself politically for any principle which I believed to be one of right. I shall always try to keep faith with the dictates of my conscience. In my judgment, the implications of this issue called for the vote against the resolution in its present form which I cast this morning in the joint meeting of the two committees, and for the reasons I am about to enunciate.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I will not yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon declines to yield.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield for a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. MORSE. I pause, Mr. President—in order to protect my rights to the floor—to inquire whether the Senator from Louisiana wishes me to yield, in order to permit him to submit something which has nothing to do with the Senator from Oregon or the subject matter of the speech I am about to make, but has something to do with the business of the Senate, over and above this matter, and can be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I should like to suggest the absence of a quorum, if the Senator from Oregon will yield for that purpose, inasmuch as I believe—although I do not know what the Senator from Oregon has in mind—that the speech he is about to make is a rather important one, and I am sure other Senators would like to hear it.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I appreciate the courtesy implied in the Senator's suggestion, but I decline to yield for that purpose.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon declines to yield.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I do not think there is any doubt about the fact that the purpose and subject of this speech is very well known throughout the Senate. Furthermore, I am not speaking to the Senate alone; I am speaking to the American people, on an issue which I believe to be of as vital importance to their security as any issue which has come before the Congress since the outbreak of the Korean war.

PRESIDENT HAS EMERGENCY DEFENSE POWER

Mr. President, I desire to have it distinctly understood that it is my judgment that as a matter of constitutional law the President of the United States, as Commander in Chief, has the emergency power at any time to proceed to take whatever defensive action in his wise discretion is necessary to protect the security of the United States. From the standpoint of authorizing the President

to exercise that power, the joint resolution pending before the Senate is absolutely unnecessary.

I can understand why a President of the United States, for psychological reasons and in view of the present world situation—and I think as we read the President's message, it becomes very clear that that was one of the motivations of the message—might wish to take up this matter with the Congress, in advance of any exercise of discretion on his part. I wish the President had not done so, Mr. President, not because I have any hesitation in meeting the issues involved, but because he places upon each Member of the Senate, in my judgment, the responsibility of carrying out an independent senatorial duty in regard to the proposals, and the implications of those proposals, found both in the message and in the joint resolution. That makes it necessary, in my judgment, for a full discussion and for the maximum disclosure possible of the serious dangers inherent in the resolution consonant with the obligations of each Member of the Senate to keep secret certain high military secrets of the Government which were discussed in the executive joint meetings of the committees.

SECURITY MAKES DEBATE DIFFICULT, BUT PUBLIC MUST HAVE FACTS

That is very difficult to do, Mr. President, because if the American people are to receive the information they are entitled to receive on this issue, it becomes necessary, in my judgment, to discuss some of the implications and possible eventualities of the course of action suggested in the joint resolution. Such a course of debate is necessary even though some of the information might be considered by some to be of some value to potential enemies. I don't think anything will be said in this debate that will disclose any information that will be helpful to our enemies. However, Mr. President, such a risk must be run under the constitutional processes of our system of political freedom if the Congress is to fulfill its responsibilities to the people of this Nation.

So as we proceed in this debate, it seems to me that we must walk a pretty tight wire as between our obligations to the Commander in Chief on the one hand and our obligations to a free citizenry on the other. But the President raised the issue; I did not. When the President raised the issue and placed upon me as a Senator the responsibility to fulfill what I consider to be my solemn obligations to the people of my State, I became duty bound to discuss the implications of this issue as I honestly believe them to be. Let me make it very clear, however, at the outset of this speech that I do so without the slightest intent of disclosing on the floor of the Senate any information which could possibly be used against the best interests of my Nation.

In decades gone by in the history of the United States Senate, other men have stood in a position somewhat similar to mine at this moment. Other men have stood on the floor of the Senate when great issues of war and peace were involved, and have not represented a majority point of view in the Senate.

It is rather paradoxical for me to find myself in a somewhat similar position today, because in most of the past historical instances I have usually found myself, as a citizen, opposed to the point of view held by those minorities of Senators. I have always respected, however, their sense of duty and their obligation to their constituents to stand here and say what they thought ought to be said in the interest of protecting the welfare of their country. In that spirit I shall discuss the issue of war and peace today.

I have said that in my judgment the President of the United States, as Commander in Chief, has the emergency power which he needs to take whatever defensive course of action is necessary to protect the vital interests of the American people and the United States Government in the Pacific, if the overt acts of an enemy make it necessary for the President immediately to take such action without coming to the Congress of the United States for approval.

The inherent Commander in Chief powers granted to the President of the United States by the Constitution have never been defined by the United States Supreme Court, and in my judgment, they never will be defined in any strait-jacket manner, because they defy definition. They defy definition because changing conditions from year to year and from decade to decade make it essential, from the standpoint of national survival, that the President of the United States exercise broad emergency powers as Commander in Chief to protect the security of the Nation in an hour of crisis.

**POSITION ON PRESIDENT'S EMERGENCY POWERS
NOT NEW**

This is not the first time I have enunciated that principle on the floor of the Senate. I have done so during the past 10 years on several occasions. The last time I discussed this point—and I shall be rather brief about it today—was at the time of the Steel case, when the President of the United States, in exercising what he claimed to be his constitutional powers under the facts of the situation then existing, ordered a token seizure of the steel mills. I stood on the floor of the Senate and said then—and I repeat it today—that if the facts were as the President believed them to be, then he had the power to seize the steel mills.

There is not a line in the United States Supreme Court decision in the Steel case, which was written in 6 parts, in 6 special concurring opinions, which denies that premise. What the majority decision in the Steel case found was that the facts in the case did not support the exercise of the power which the President exercised, and therefore, on the basis of the facts which the Court found existed, the power he exercised was an unconstitutional exercise of power. It is surprising that so many lawyers who have criticized me for my position on the Steel case apparently have never taken the time to read the 6 special concurring majority opinions in the case.

I thought the President properly exercised a constitutional power on the basis of the facts of the case, because of the controlling factor set forth in the testi-

mony of the then Secretary of Defense, Mr. Lovett, when he said to the Labor Committee of the Senate—I paraphrase him, but accurately—"If those steel furnaces go cold, we shall pay for it in the loss of life of American boys in uniform."

I said in substance, "If that fact holds up, if it be true that the Korean situation is such that there will be a loss, by reason of these furnaces going cold, of ammunition needed by our military forces, then the President of the United States has the duty to exercise his power as Commander in Chief and raise the American flag in a token seizure over the steel mills, and operate them under the flag, without a single managerial officer being taken from behind his desk, so that there may be continuity of production in the interest of the successful prosecution of the Korean war."

That is why I said on the floor of the Senate—and I paraphrase my speech—that I did not think any of us would live long enough to see the United States Supreme Court deny that power to the President; but I was wrong. I was wrong on a finding of fact so far as the Supreme Court was concerned, because the Supreme Court disagreed with a finding of fact which I made as a Senator when I came to judge what decision I should render in regard to the seizure of the steel plants.

It will be recalled that, as the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD shows, the moment the Supreme Court decision was handed down, I walked onto the floor of the Senate and said in effect, "The Court has spoken. Its decision is law, and we must proceed now to see to it that the rights of management are protected in accordance with the Court's findings of fact and law."

**PRESIDENT'S EMERGENCY POWER SUBJECT TO
CONGRESSIONAL CHECK**

The RECORD will also show that when I supported the President's seizure, I pointed out that, although a President has the right to act as President Truman did in the premises, the Congress has the duty to pass judgment upon the act, and proceed either to affirm, modify, or repudiate the President's course of action. If I say nothing else in this speech on the question of constitutional power—and although this is an abstract point, and I recognize that it may be considered by many as academic and professorial—I desire to make plain that the constitutional principle I am talking about now is of vital importance in connection with the course of action we may follow with respect to the resolution dealing with the Formosan area.

Therefore, I wish to stress the point that under its constitutional checking power the Congress has jurisdiction and authority to modify a course of action followed by a President in the exercise of his emergency powers. I emphasize that, Mr. President, because I am surprised to find that some of my colleagues and many citizens seem to think that when the Commander in Chief exercises an emergency power the Congress of the United States is handcuffed and has no authority to act in the premises.

To the contrary, Mr. President, under our system of checks and balances the

Executive power is subject to a legislative check; and if a President of the United States, for example, should order troops somewhere in the world where the Congress thought troops should not be sent, the Congress would have the right to pass a resolution checking the President's action.

A study of the history of Congress during the past decades seems to indicate a growing acceptance, it appears to me, or a growing contention, that there is nothing Congress can do when a President exercises emergency power. I deny that premise. When we are called upon to deal with such an issue as that which now confronts us, I say that Congress has the duty of taking affirmative checking action if it believes the President of the United States is exceeding his emergency power, or if the facts in a particular situation do not justify the exercise of his inherent constitutional powers as Commander in Chief.

Therefore, Mr. President, on the very day the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD shows that I supported President Truman in the steel seizure case, I introduced in the Senate a bill proposing to regularize the seizure, making perfectly clear the limitations of such seizure, and protecting the interests of management, so that the argument could not be supported that the seizure would override the rights of management.

The RECORD shows that I said I thought there were really three types of strikes involved in the steel case. I said one strike was the threatened strike of the workers. Then there was the threatened lockout by the employers which amounted to a strike on the part of management. Lastly there was the strike by the Congress of the United States in not going forward with its constitutional duty of exercising a check upon the President of the United States in the exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief. I argued that Congress had a clear duty to pass some legislation on the steel seizure case.

I have given that little review of my position on the question of emergency power of a President because my position has ever been consistent with respect to it, and it is consistent today.

In my judgment, the President of the United States has the authority to carry out the defensive purposes of the resolution which has been submitted to Congress. I think it is a significant and historic message which the President of the United States has sent to Congress in support of the resolution and of the exercise of his emergency powers.

I shall always support the President of my country when he exercises those powers in his capacity as Commander in Chief, unless a clear showing can be made that the President is following a course of action contrary to the security and welfare of the Nation, in which event a restrictive check should be put upon him by the Congress.

I do not expect, Mr. President, that any such situation will ever develop under Dwight Eisenhower.

Knowing full well that misunderstanding will arise and that in some quarters, the deliberate misrepresentation will be made of my position on this

issue, let me make the RECORD perfectly clear by saying, although I oppose the President of the United States on a great many domestic issues, I have gone down the line with Dwight Eisenhower on all the major issues of foreign policy which have come before the Senate, and I intend to continue to do so in connection with those matters which fall clearly within the field of my legislative responsibility. I doubt if President Eisenhower in the future, any more than in the past, will propose legislation in the field of foreign policy that I shall not support in the main. I shall disagree undoubtedly on some details and support from time to time some amendments to his legislative proposals in the field of foreign policy but I doubt if we will ever be so far apart that I cannot support his main objectives in foreign policy legislation.

RESOLUTION IN PRESENT FORM A BLANK CHECK

However, Mr. President, what confronts us now is not legislation. This is a proposal that, in advance, we give a blank check of approval to the President of the United States to do any and all the things permitted to be done under all the implications of the resolution: We are being asked in effect to underwrite by our approval not only all the words of the resolution, but all the meanings of the resolution to be found between the lines, which are not written physically into the resolution. Those meanings must be read into the resolution from the testimony of Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In my judgment, that is not appropriate under our system of checks and balances. The Executive has the duty of carrying out executive functions. The Congress is required to exercise its constitutional checks upon the decisions and the actions of the President of the United States.

I wish to say, Mr. President—and the arguments I have heard in support of the resolution prove how sound I am in my judgment—that one of the effects of the resolution will be to seal the lips of the elected representatives of the American people with respect to the course of action the President may take under the resolution.

If the President were to follow a course of action which Congress might think was not in the best interest of the Nation, we would hear it said to us: "You voted for the resolution to give the President the authority and the sanction to carry out that course of action; did you not? Why are you now criticizing him?"

The fact is, what the President is asking for is a predated authorization of anything he may do under the resolution. Perhaps there is a great deal of merit in what one distinguished Member of the Senate said to some of us when we discussed the subject: "It may be a predated declaration of war." It might very well be that.

One of the reasons for my voting in committee against reporting the resolution favorably—and there are many other reasons—was that in my judgment, under our constitutional processes, the

resolution should never have been introduced in the first instance. The President should have proceeded to exercise the power he has, without asking Congress for a predated authorization for any particular course of action. In my judgment the Members of Congress will be put in a rather embarrassing position, if subsequently they find themselves not in support of a particular course of action the President may be following.

THE NEED FOR NATIONAL UNITY AND THE NEED FOR NATIONAL DISCUSSION

In these early remarks I wish to make it very clear that no Member of the Senate is more appreciative than I am of the fact that in this hour we need the maximum amount of unity and support of the President of the United States and of the Government of the United States. For me, possessing, as I do, the conviction that we should have the maximum of unity in this hour, Mr. President, it is not pleasant, and it is not easy to stand on the floor of the Senate and set forth objections to a resolution, when I know very well that the very objections themselves are bound to create in some quarters some disunity. But the responsibility for that is not mine; it is the President's. When, at the request of the President this resolution comes to the floor of the Senate, it then becomes the duty of each Member of the Senate who does not think that what it proposes is in the best interest of the United States to make clear the reasons for his objections.

WILL SUPPORT FINAL ACTION OF CONGRESS

But—and mark this—when the Senate acts, whatever its action may be, there is not a Member of the Senate who will stand behind the action more firmly than will the Senator from Oregon. That has always been my position. When the court speaks—and this is the court of last jurisdiction and last resort on this issue—that is the decision, so far as I am concerned. Then I shall abide by it. When the debate is over and the Senate of the United States takes its action—and I think we all know very well what the majority action will be; it will be in favor of the resolution—then I shall support the action, because it will then become a clear public duty to do so, since the Congress is the court of last resort in these premises.

FREE DEBATE REQUIRED

But there is always hope, Mr. President. If the time should ever come when the Members of the Senate of the United States abandoned hope that a majority of this body would follow what they considered the right course on some occasion, then service here would really be unbearable. I still have hope that the Senate will at least propose some modifications of this resolution which will remove some of the dangers which I consider to be in it now. The more serious the threat of war, the greater is the responsibility of the President and the Congress in this particular situation calmly and conscientiously to act only after the most mature deliberation.

Therefore, Mr. President, I wish to associate myself with the remarks previously made this afternoon on the floor by the Senator from Louisiana [Mr.

LONG]. I think the premises he laid down are sound. Proper consideration of this resolution necessarily calls for full and frank discussion of varying points of view in this body.

It has been necessary for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee on Armed Services to hold closed-door hearings on the joint resolution introduced at the request of the President. It is assumed that no information available to the President and the Defense Department has been withheld from the joint sessions of those two committees; but, unfortunately, the hearings cannot be made public. I understand, however, and this I stress, Mr. President, that the report of what occurred in those secret hearings can be read by each Member of the Senate in the committee rooms of the two committees. The hearings will be kept under lock and key and guard, but Members of the Senate are privileged to read the record. I urge Members of the Senate to do so.

I say to my colleagues in the Senate, Mr. President, "Disagree as you may with me on any or all the points I make in this speech, you cannot understand my position unless you know the contents of the record of the hearings which we have held in the past 2 days. If you know the contents of the record of the hearings, then, and then only, will you understand one of the major reasons for my opposition to the resolution, to wit, it establishes a precedent in the history of American foreign policy, it marks a departure from our principles and practices."

PRESENT RESOLUTION THREATENS UNITED STATES RECORD OF NONAGGRESSION

A study of the history of American foreign relations will disclose that the most persuasive foreign policy weapon we have ever had, and the most precious foreign policy ideal a free people has ever had, has been the ideal of the free Government of the United States never to commit an act of war, never to commit an act of aggression, and never go to war, until war is made upon us.

Senators may differ with my conclusions, but my conviction is mine, Mr. President, and no one can take it from me. My conscience is mine, and no one can take it from me. My conscience and my convictions shout in my ears a warning that in the course of action proposed now the United States, for the first time in all its history, is moving itself into such a position that the judgment of millions of people will be that we are, at least so far as the resolution in its present form itself is concerned, going so far as to threaten an act of aggression before an act of war has been committed upon us.

I happen to believe it is important—
Mr. BUTLER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I shall not yield at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LONG in the chair). The Senator from Oregon declines to yield.

Mr. MORSE. I happen to believe, Mr. President, that in this hour of crisis we had better think of American boys and girls 50 years from today or 100 years

or 200 years from today, because in future international councils of the world they will be judged by what we do in making a record on this issue. We shall weaken our position, Mr. President, one of the strongest positions we have had over decades in the field of foreign relations, if we make any exception to the historic principle that we are a nation of peace, and that the proof of it is found in our actions. The proof of it is that there cannot be pointed out in our history an act of war on the part of the United States prior to an act of war being committed against us.

I know one of the arguments or rationalizations being used by some in justifying following the course of action to which this resolution may lead is that we have to run the calculated risks of war.

THE CALCULATED RISKS OF PEACE

In answer to that, Mr. President, I plead with my Government and with my people also to show a sufficient determination to run the calculated risks of peace. The calculated risks of peace, applied specifically to this factual situation, in my opinion, mean that we must face the calculated risk of the Red Chinese massing forces in China, without striking them unless they actually commit an act of war.

I am greatly disturbed about the extent to which in so many quarters in America, it has become accepted that legal principles of international law no longer are important. The argument is by way of rationalization, I respectfully submit; it is an appeal to fear and not to reason. We cannot stop and pay respect to the principles of international law, goes the argument, because the issue now is an issue of survival. Therefore, it is contended we must run the calculated risks of war, and we must make it very clear to the Communist segment of the world that if they mass air power and troop power on the mainland of China, or naval power in the harbors of China, we are giving them notice by this joint resolution—that we are authorizing the exercise of a value judgment by someone to determine whether we should not strike first.

RESOLUTION IN PRESENT FORM CONTAINS THREAT OF PREVENTIVE MILITARY ACTION

In my opinion, Mr. President, the threat of such an aggressive course of action does violence to the long history of America's international record of non-aggression and peace. Even the threat is bad enough. But another reason I am against the resolution is that, in my judgment, the odds will be against peace if the resolution should be passed in its present form. I do not say that the joint resolution will make war a certainty, but I say that the passage of the joint resolution will step up considerably the possibilities and probabilities of war on the mainland of China.

PROPOSAL IRRECONCILABLE WITH CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES

Here, again, we deal with a matter of conscience, which a Senator is entitled to have the record show when it is such a driving force as it is to me in the formation of my conviction. I cannot reconcile with my religious princi-

ples what I consider to be some issues and questions of morality involved in this proposal. I cannot reconcile them with what I think is the Christian motivating force behind the whole history of American foreign policy, because that policy, in my judgment, can best be defined or described, if a short definition is wanted, by three words: Promotion of peace. That has been the moral principle of American foreign policy, and I cannot reconcile this joint resolution with that principle, because, as I view it, the joint resolution greatly endangers the prospect of peace and steps up the probabilities of a new war.

What is my duty if I see it that way? My duty is to fight as hard as I can in this debate for the protection of the blood of millions of my fellow citizens, because I am certain that if we get into a war on the mainland of China, it will cost us vast reservoirs of American blood, to the number, not of thousands, but of several million Americans.

Furthermore, Mr. President, I have listened, as other Senators have listened, to the arguments about what will happen to us if an enemy should start dropping atomic bombs upon us, thereby involving the danger of the annihilation of whole areas of the United States. I know of that danger. It is a very real danger. Does that danger justify what I consider to be a repudiation of the historic policy of our country, not to commit an act of war upon another nation until an act of war shall have been committed upon us?

I say it is a matter of conscience. I like to think that the words "In God we trust" constitute more than a motto. I like to think that those words express a spiritual way of life for the American people. As I listen to some of the arguments made by the preventive-war group in America, I come to the conclusion that no longer do they fully appreciate the meaning of that motto. Is it something simply to pass lightly between our lips? Or do we have the faith that there is a great Deity who, after all, directs the course of mankind, and before whose throne we shall be adjudged?

I am not in the slightest moved by all the scarecrow and fear arguments relating to the atomic age, when it comes to considering the question whether we shall keep faith with or shall now repudiate a great international policy principle of our Nation from its beginning, namely, that we are a nation of peace, and that we do not make war upon others until war has been made upon us. I have greater faith in a living God than to accept the argument that the threat of possible war justifies our committing an act of war out of fear that we may be attacked. I cannot reconcile such an act with God's law.

It seems to me that great spiritual truths and principles should be lived not only by individuals, but also by a group of individuals who have formed themselves into a political society called a nation. How frequently do we hear it said on the platforms of America, in the discussions of the people of America, from the pulpits of America, and from the offices of the politicians of America that we are a Christian nation? Do we mean it? If we mean it, Mr. President,

then here is one Christian whose Christian convictions compel him to say on the floor of the Senate today that he thinks it is immoral to propose that we tell any nation, no matter how much we may fear it and despise it, that "We threaten you with aggression if you follow some course of action on your mainland which we fear may result in your making an attack on us." I say it is immoral. I say it cannot be reconciled with Christian principles. I say it cannot be reconciled with our claim over the decades that we are a peaceable nation.

Other men as Christian as I am, as spiritually devoted to the right as I want to be and try to be, hold a view on this question directly the opposite of mine; and I respect their sincerity, patriotism, and integrity. What I am confessing now on the floor of the Senate is my earnest feeling in regard to this matter because I happen to believe that it is of such serious import to the future of my country that I must say whatever I think needs to be said by way of warning the American people as to the dangerous course of action that is being marked out for them by implication and by the express provisions of the resolution as well.

I have discussed a hypothetical situation in terms of spiritual and moral generalizations. I now wish to discuss the problem from the standpoint of the question of sovereignty in the field of international law.

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

I say most respectfully that one who listens to the discussion of the resolution by some persons might think that all we had to do was to take an eraser and erase and wipe from international law codes that have existed during the history of mankind the doctrine of national sovereignty. That doctrine cannot be erased. It is indelibly written in the chronicles of history for all time. While a nation can violate it, the doctrine cannot be erased.

I respectfully say that one of the implications of the resolution in its present form is that it will lead to the violation of the sacred doctrine of sovereignty, if civil law can be considered sacred, if man-made law can be said to be sacred.

I know one should not entertain feelings of hate, and yet we are human. I hate communism. I despise the Communists. Yet I know that even if one entertains against Communist nations and communism the feelings of hatred that the Senator from Oregon holds, and yet talks about the sovereign rights of a Communist nation, I know what that person lets himself in for. But I shall take the abuse and misunderstanding of my position if it comes, because I am not talking about these nations as nations except in respect to the law and the doctrine of sovereignty. Let us not forget that even dictatorships have rights of sovereignty. Fascist dictatorships, Communist dictatorships, Socialist dictatorships—yes, dictatorships of any hue—have rights of sovereignty, as do democracies.

As I cross-examined the Secretary of State in executive session, and as I cross-examined the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the doctrine

of sovereignty—and I speak respectfully—I came to the conclusion that they were willing to put the doctrine of sovereignty in refrigeration for the time being, and proceed with a foreign policy course of action as though the doctrine were nonexistent. But the doctrine does exist. The American boys and girls, to whom I referred a few moments ago, are going to be judged, 50 or 100 or 200 years from now, by the people of other nations of the world, on the issue whether or not we, claiming to respect the sovereign rights of another nation, violated those sovereign rights, or threatened to violate them, under the implications and meaning of the resolution.

Let us consider those sovereign rights. On the map in the back of the Chamber is shown the mainland of China. Does anyone wish to deny that it has sovereign rights? Does the fact that we know it to be a mortal enemy of ours and that we know the Communist segment of the world, if it ever felt strong enough to annihilate us, would endeavor to do so, does such recognition on our part destroy the sovereignty of the Communist nation or the Government which controls the mainland of China? Of course not.

We hope, and I trust others in the Senate pray with the frequency that I pray for the fulfillment of the hope, that the day will soon come when great international problems, such as the one now before the Senate of the United States, will be settled in international judicial tribunals, where the rules of reason will prevail, rather than by military force and atomic weapons threatening the destruction of most of civilization.

The time when reason and justice will prevail in international disputes may be far in the future, but when the day comes when I shall cease to be a Member of the Senate of the United States, I shall be very proud to think that my greatest contribution may be judged, if I shall have made any contribution, worthy of historical note, to be the Morse resolution of 1945, whereby we committed ourselves to the compulsory jurisdiction of a world court in a controversy with any nation that likewise accepts that jurisdiction for settling an international dispute. I hold that up as an ideal in international relations. I hold it up as a goal yet to be reached, but a goal we had better work toward, or there will never be permanent peace on earth. We are not marching toward a goal of international justice, in which a dispute such as the one now before the Senate will be determined by rules of evidence, the weight of the evidence, and the merits of the respective positions of the parties in issue, by threatening to ignore the rights of sovereignty, even of a dictatorship nation.

So I go back to the hypothetical situation. As can be seen on the map, 8 or 10 miles from the mainland, or from the Amoy Harbor, is the island of Quemoy. Suppose as a sovereign nation, Red China, builds a jet airplane field, or another kind of military installation, and Red China masses military forces on that installation. Our military officials, as is their duty, report to the Commander in Chief, as the result of

that course of action by that dictatorship, that all does not go well. So we say to that dictatorship, "Disband those military forces or we strike." Can anyone regard that kind of action as respect for the sovereign rights of another nation? I cannot do so, nor can I square it with what I think history shows to have been the record of the United States in regard to respecting the sovereign rights of other nations. It has never been our policy to threaten aggression or commit acts of aggression.

Mr. President, all the children of a Divine Being have some common human frailties, including impetuosity, emotional attributes, impulsiveness, and a tendency to resort to self-help whenever they think they have received from an opponent a great thrust at their personal dignity. That goes for individuals; but history shows it goes for nations, too. And I say it, Mr. President, in expressing a fear of mine that when we are dealing with a nation such as Red China, we are dealing with a nation which has little regard for human values and human life, a nation to whose leaders, in my judgment, human values mean nothing. I think its leaders are so warped and twisted in their political philosophy that they will follow a course of action—if we give them a good excuse for it—of seducing us into a war on the mainland of China, and thereby poisoning our reputation for nonaggression. So, Mr. President, I think it is a great mistake to encompass in a joint resolution, either by word or by implication or by testimony in executive sessions supporting the joint resolution, any proposal which would lead to violation of the sovereign rights of any nation. However, this joint resolution would do that, in the case of the hypothetical I have cited, because the moment we were to strike a blow, carrying out the threat of aggression that is implicit in the joint resolution in its present form, we would have committed an act of war against the mainland of China. Then we would be in it; and if we go into it, Mr. President, we are going into it to win. We must do so. And if we go into such a war, we are not going to end it in a day or in a year, or in ten years. That is so because all the modern weapons, all the atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs will not subjugate the mainland of China. We can pockmark it with all the weapons of atomic destruction, and even though each pockmark on the topography of the mainland of China may extend 20 miles across; we could not subjugate China by atomic action. Mr. President, in the last analysis we could not subjugate China by any means except manpower; and that would mean American manpower, with foot soldiers—American foot soldiers.

Therefore, Mr. President, when I am discussing my fear as to the potentialities of the joint resolution, I am raising my voice today on the floor of the Senate in the interest of what I believe to be the security of millions of American boys who will be called into the military as well as civilians at home. Should a conflict come it will go on long after the bombing is over. We then

would be confronted with the job of occupying the vast land mass of China, which no nation to date has ever subjugated, and which I am not sure even some trigger-happy military advisers of our own Nation believe even we could conquer. Years of guerrilla warfare would go along with our occupation of China. It is a great mistake to run the risk of a war that would necessarily send foot soldiers to China.

Mr. President, another word on the question of sovereignty; and then I shall discuss the dangers of the kind of a full-scale war the possibility of which I believe this resolution increases.

GOING IT ALONE

We have no reason to believe that Red China will act alone; we have no reason to believe that Red Russia will pay no heed or will give no consideration to her treaty commitments to Red China. We certainly have the right to believe that Red Russia, like Red China, would like to get us into a position where we would stand alone, or comparatively alone, in a contest with Red China. No one can give a guarantee, as of this hour—and I do not think it will be possible to give such a guarantee for some time in the future, if ever—that we will not stand alone if we become involved, as the result of the threat of aggression which is implied in the joint resolution, in a war on the mainland of China.

RESOLUTION SHOULD BE LIMITED TO FORMOSA AND THE PESCADORES

I believe it is fairly well recognized in our country that the people and many of the leaders of countries who are our allies are very much divided on the military course of action which should be followed in Asia by the United States and our allies. I think there is general recognition that we have the right and, as I happen to believe, the duty of protecting America's vital interests in the Pacific, by seeing to it that the Pescadores and Formosa are protected. I want it thoroughly understood that I will vote for an amendment to the joint resolution, which has become known as the Humphrey amendment, the legal implications of which I shall discuss on a different day, because that calls for a detailed discussion of means of perfecting the joint resolution. I shall vote, as I did in committee this morning, for such an amendment because it draws the line of demarcation which I believe should be drawn in the Straits of Formosa, and serves clear notice, not only on the Communist segment of the world, but also on our allies, that we have no defense policy in this area whatsoever except to protect the Pescadores and Formosa.

I have supported the proposition that that is what we should do. I have supported it from the very beginning of the Formosa issue. Also from the beginning, Mr. President, I have taken the position, and I repeat it today, that the responsibility of protecting Formosa should be placed under the jurisdiction of the United Nations. I completely support the President as to the United Nations reference in both his message and, I think, the meaning, in part, of the joint resolution itself, namely, that the United Nations should be encouraged by

us to take early action over the issue of jurisdictional control of this very hot issue in the Straits of Formosa.

Why do I take that position, Mr. President? I take it because I think we have rights—they are not permanent rights, but I think they are rights which would be recognized in any international court of law—to exercise jurisdiction by way of protecting Formosa and the Pescadores from becoming a threat to the peace in the Pacific. Our rights grow out of World War II and the Japanese treaty.

UNITED STATES RESPONSIBILITY AND RIGHTS
CONCERNING FORMOSA

Further I take that position because of this history, which I briefly state: For a long, long time, of course, Formosa was recognized as Chinese territory. Then there came the Japanese occupation. Then there came the Cairo agreement. The Cairo agreement was participated in by Prime Minister Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, representing their respective countries. They entered into an agreement that Formosa should be returned to China as a territorial settlement of World War II. On what theory? On the theory of dividing the spoils of war? No American or Britisher would ever impute such an unconscionable motive to those two great world statesmen. In my judgment, we cannot study the history of the Cairo agreement, we cannot study what it says and what was said about it at the time of the agreement, and reach any other conclusion than that the Cairo agreement rested upon the sovereign rights of China to Formosa. Those rights are not changed because there has been a change of government in China. The change of government in China in no way changes the sovereign rights of China to Formosa. Those are vested, sovereign rights. They were violated by Japan. They were trespassed upon by Japan, and the Cairo agreement recognized them anew.

Someone may ask, "If that is true, why do we not withdraw from Formosa?" In the process of settling a war, when an area is such that it threatens the peace of the segment of the world in which it is located, it does not follow that a nation which has sovereign interests in the territory is entitled to an automatic reestablishment of physical control of the area because the consequences of a war are not over even with the signing of a peace treaty. There still rests upon the participants in the war, and particularly the victors in the war, if their intentions are peaceful, the duty to follow a course of action which will advance and preserve the cause of peace.

So after the Cairo agreement, with the problem of settling the whole Pacific situation in connection with the Japanese Peace Treaty, which was subsequent thereto, we were confronted with the question of exercising some protective jurisdiction over Formosa so that it would not become a threat to the vital interests of peace in the Pacific—and the vital interests of peace in the Pacific happened to be also the vital interests of the United States.

That is why, in years gone by, I have stood on the floor of the Senate and defended what amounted to a de facto pro-

tectorate by the United States over Formosa. But I think the obligation is not yet completely fulfilled. I think we have the right and duty to maintain—and to announce to the world the purpose of maintaining—a protectorate over Formosa, until the United Nations assumes that responsibility. I think it ought to do so, and the sooner the better.

RESOLUTION SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED TO
EMPHASIZE U. N. ROLE

There can be no denying the fact that the loss of Formosa at the present time to the Red Chinese would not be in the interest of world peace. It would break the chain of America's defense from the Aleutians down through Australia and New Zealand. But because it is so vital to the preservation of peace in the Pacific I believe we ought to urge, in stronger language, and more specific language than is contained either in the message or the resolution, that the United Nations take early jurisdictions over Formosa, as I have suggested in the past, and suggest again today. I call it a trusteeship. I care not what it is called. It is the accomplishment in which I am interested—a jurisdiction which will place on the United Nations, to which we are a party, the responsibility for maintaining peace in that area of the Pacific so far as Formosa is concerned.

STATUS OF OTHER ISLANDS DIFFERENT FROM
STATUS OF FORMOSA

But let us take the other islands—Tachen, Matsu and Quemoy. For decades they have always been within the sovereign jurisdiction of China. Their allegiance to China or Chinese sovereignty is not questioned. They are recognized as Chinese territory. It so happens that as the Nationalist Chinese forces retreated from the mainland of China they occupied those islands. It makes no difference whether they are occupied by National Chinese or Red Chinese, so far as their sovereignty lineage is concerned. It is Chinese. Now they are involved in a civil war, which is the next major point I wish to stress in this argument.

Under the doctrine of sovereignty, those islands are clearly Chinese territory. They have never been under our control. We have never exercised any jurisdiction over them. They were not involved in the Cairo agreement in the respect to the point I am now discussing. They are unquestionably Chinese territory even though they are now the subject of a civil war.

I cannot see any other conclusion than that if we become involved in those islands, we knowingly and intentionally and willfully, as a nation, involve ourselves in a Chinese civil war. That will be the propaganda of the Communists all over China.

CONGRESS MUST CONSIDER ASIAN OPINION

That causes me to say at this point that we must pay some attention to what the millions of people in other parts of Asia think about these matters of sovereignty and the involvement of a western power in Chinese civil wars, or the civil wars of any Asiatic people. I am fearful of some of the consequences of this resolution because, as we look at

the map and recognize the sovereign rights of these islands, I do not see how we can escape the fact that they are the subjects of a civil war. Certainly Quemoy, the Matsus, and the Tachens, which have figured so prominently in the discussions, both in public and in our committee in private, are Chinese territories. If we try to maintain Nationalist Chinese forces on those islands with American support, we are involving this Nation in a civil war of China.

The question may be asked: "But why does not that argument apply to Formosa?"

It does not apply to Formosa for the reason that Formosa was occupied by Japan during a period of war, and because it became involved as one of the settlement problems of World War II itself. Furthermore, we took jurisdiction over Formosa, as one of the victorious allies, and in that way we had authority under international law to take action with respect to its protection until peace in the Pacific could be assured. The finality of that action has not yet been reached. I wish to stress that point. There are still many questions of international law which will have to be adjudicated in connection with Formosa, and it will take many years before any finality is reached in respect to the disposal of Formosa.

Our rights in Formosa are not rights of fee simple, I may say, but rights of protection, which we as a nation have in maintaining peace in the Pacific. They grow out of World War II. That argument does not apply to the other islands. We have the right to protect Formosa as a postwar problem as long as its status involves or threatens our vital interests in the Pacific. It is important to get the United Nations to relieve us of a unilateral course of action in respect to Formosa, but until it does we have a clear duty in the interest of world peace to protect Formosa. The world cannot overlook the fact that we owe territorial obligations to Formosa because we took it from the Japanese and controlled it after World War II. Its return to China had not been implemented when it became a threat to our vital interests and to peace in the Pacific.

Mr. President, I fear it will be contended all over Asia that it is one thing for us to defend and protect Formosa, but another thing for us to become involved in supporting a participant in a Chinese civil war in connection with its attempt to hold coastal Chinese islands.

That leads me to make a few comments on one of those participants. I make these comments on the Nationalist Chinese participant by saying, first, that no matter what I may think the shortcomings of the Nationalist regime may be, the Chinese Nationalists are so much less objectionable than the Red Chinese and their program that I am not at all hesitant about our protecting the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa and on the Pescadores. I am not hesitant about it, because that area was involved in the Cairo agreement. It was involved in the settlement following the war, and we still have responsibility in connection

with that settlement. Of course, we have the clear responsibility of maintaining peace and protecting our vital interests in that area. Therefore I support the defense of Formosa.

NATIONALIST CHINA COULD LEAD UNITED STATES INTO WAR ON CHINESE MAINLAND

One of my fears is that if we shall adopt the language of the resolution, including what it covers and what it implies, we will place the American people and the interests of the American people in the Pacific in the hands of the Nationalist Chinese, in that, if they followed a course of action on the coastal islands with our coverage and logistic support which would result in war, we would be in it with the Nationalist Chinese.

Of course, we must speak in terms of possibilities and hypotheses in dealing with the question of Formosa. Therefore, let us assume that the Nationalist Chinese in the Tachens or in the Matsus or in the Quemoy area should follow a course of action which would result in major military operations, and that we would support them—and I believe that under the resolution we would be expected to support them, do we not thereby run a grave risk of being drawn into a war on the mainland of China? I think we would. Suppose the Nationalist Chinese so maneuvered in their military operations in the coastal island areas that it would look very much as though we were being attacked by the Red Chinese. In that event we would be drawn into a war on the mainland of China by the Nationalist Chinese.

As I said, Mr. President, many people do not entertain that fear. I do. I am very much afraid of the consequences of giving the Nationalist Chinese any support in connection with their military operations on the coastal islands. I am very much afraid that it would be very easy for the Nationalist Chinese, under the operations that would ensue from implementing the resolution, to follow a course of action in the Tachens or in the Matsus or in the Quemoy area which would have the effect of dragging us into a war with Red China.

I have an additional fear. I believe that is exactly what the Nationalist Chinese would like to have us do. I happen to share the point of view, which has been expressed by other Senators also, that the Nationalist Chinese believe their only hope of survival in the long run is to get the United States involved in an all-out war on the mainland of China, which would result, they hope, in the final subjugation of the Communist regime and in the restoration of the Nationalist Chinese on the mainland of China.

I do not believe I can say more than that, because I do not feel I can say more on the floor of the Senate by way of documenting that fear without violating what I believe to be security matters.

However, I make the assertion about my fears of the Nationalist Chinese because it explains one of the reasons for my vote this morning against the resolution. I shall not be a party to a reso-

lution which, in my judgment, places what I believe to be an awful power, or the opportunity to exercise an awful power, in the hands of the Nationalist Chinese, with the danger of involving the people of my country in a third world war. I do not believe there is any necessity for running that risk in order to protect and defend Formosa.

The argument is made, of course, that we cannot draw a line in the Straits of Formosa, because if we draw a line, we serve notice on the Red Chinese that we will not defend the Tachens, the Matsus, and Quemoy. However, I say if we do not draw a line, there is a very great danger that we will not only defend the Formosan area but we will also fight on the mainland of China. I shall not vote to sacrifice the life of a single American boy on Quemoy or on the Matsus or on the Tachens in the defense of a participant in a Chinese civil war, as the Nationalist Chinese are.

Can we defend Formosa without threatening to bomb any concentration of military force on the mainland of China? Can we defend Formosa unless we threaten and carry out the threat that we will commit an act of war upon a sovereign nation before that sovereign nation commits an act of war upon us? I should certainly hate to think we could not. I hope I am within the proprieties when I say I have not heard any high American official, civil or military, say we could not. They do say that we run a greater risk, militarily speaking, if we follow that course of action. There is, of course, a greater risk if we wait for the enemy to get its forces concentrated and then let it start to use that concentration. But that is what I, in this speech, have called the calculated risk of peace in contrast with the calculated risk of war, which latter I think is speeded up and greatly increased by the resolution in its present form. I think we had better hold firm to our historic policy, to which there has been no exception of which I know, never to commit an act of war until an act of war has been first committed against us.

THE RESOLUTION IN ITS PRESENT FORM THREATENS PREVENTIVE WAR

On the last point, Mr. President—and I speak respectfully when I make this argument—I think the implication of the joint resolution is that we are going to strike on the mainland of China, when those in charge of our military operations have reached the conclusion that the enemy is about to attack us. This amounts, in fact, to authorizing by this resolution a preventive war. That is another reason why in committee I voted against the resolution this morning.

I have always been opposed to the preventive-war philosophy. I have always felt that the talk of a preventive war does not promote peace, and I have felt, Mr. President, that no matter in what language it may be couched, any proposal for a preventive war means not a little war, not a police action, but a total war.

So, Mr. President, I am opposed to the resolution in its present form because, to all intents and purposes, I consider it to amount to a quasi-legalization of a

preventive war. That is not a legally accurate term, but it is descriptive in outlining my point of view.

I think we should continue to assert that we will not be a party to a preventive war, because a preventive war is based upon acts of aggression, and we cannot reconcile a preventive war with America's historic policy of peace which I have outlined.

Much talk is reported in the press, Mr. President, and on the radio, about the near unanimity of the House of Representatives in voting for the resolution. It has been discussed only in terms of protecting Formosa from attack. But there has been a secret debate both inside and outside the committee rooms on the alarming implications of the broad scope of the resolution. That secret debate has been conducted by small groups of Senators, Congressmen, among themselves and with members of the press. The public has had little opportunity to learn and consider the extent of the military action that might result from the approval of the resolution as presented by the President.

The President in his message said:

In unfriendly hands Formosa and the Pescadores would seriously dislocate the existing, even if unstable, balance of moral, economic and military forces upon which the peace of the Pacific depends. It would create a breach in the island chain of the western Pacific that constitutes for the United States and other free nations, the geographical backbone of their security structure in that ocean. In addition, this breach would interrupt North-South communications between other important elements of that barrier, and damage the economic life of countries friendly to us.

There are some who dispute the military value of Formosa, but I recognize that it has great military value. It has great military value, as I said earlier in this speech, in protecting our defense line from the Aleutians and down the island chain to Australia and New Zealand. But I do not share the point of view, and I am satisfied that many military officials do not share it, that all would be lost in the Pacific if we lost Formosa; that we would be driven back to the California shore if we lost Formosa; that the Philippines, Japan, Okinawa, Australia, and New Zealand would fall. I do not think there is any basis for such military conclusion. It would be much more difficult to defend our vital interests in the Pacific if we lost Formosa. Any war would be much more costly in precious lives and materiel, if we lost Formosa. But I do not believe that the calculated risk of losing Formosa justifies the United States at this time in violating our historic policy of avoiding the commission of an act of war. I have more confidence in the military than to think they cannot hold Formosa—unless we authorize a preventive war. I wish to reemphasize that no one in the hearings—and I think I am free to say this much—testified that we could not hold Formosa even if we did not strike first on the mainland of China in case we thought the situation was such that there was a real danger that a strike was about to be made against us.

HOW FAR SHOULD WE GO?

Assuming the importance of Formosa to Japan, the Philippines, South Asia, Australia, New Zealand and other areas, how much territory should be defended under this resolution? The President and Secretary Dulles urge protection of Formosa and the Pescadores because of the importance their defense to free nations in the Pacific. The resolution in its present form provides for "protection of related possessions and territories." Of course, it is that part of the resolution to which the Humphrey amendment goes; and I shall support on the floor of the Senate, as I did in committee, the Humphrey amendment to eliminate the quoted language.

The Humphrey amendment would have the effect of drawing the line of jurisdiction through the Straits of Formosa, and it would eliminate any obligation or responsibility for defending the coastal islands to which I have already referred, about the sovereignty over which there is no dispute. It is Chinese sovereignty, and whatever government controls China will be the government which eventually will control those islands.

It is very interesting that this subject matter was discussed very brilliantly, in my opinion, in an article written by Stewart Alsop, which appeared in this morning's Washington Post and Times-Herald.

I shall not take the time to read all the article, if I may have unanimous consent to have it printed at this point in my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXHIBIT 1
MATTER OF FACT
(By Stewart Alsop)
IT COULD MEAN WAR

The extraordinary gravity of the decision which President Eisenhower has now taken is not yet fully appreciated in Congress or the country. The decision is, essentially, to bomb the Chinese mainland if this is deemed necessary for the defense of the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

Bombing the Chinese mainland means, of course, war with China. It could mean war with China's ally, Russia.

The Presidential decision to risk a major war in the defense of these two islands represents a great victory for Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Last October, Radford first proposed that the 7th Fleet should bomb the Chinese mainland, if necessary, to hold Quemoy. That time, Radford suffered a defeat when President Eisenhower ruled against it.

Thereafter, Radford went to the Far East. He returned a couple of weeks ago, surer than ever that he was right. He immediately went to work to convince Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who had taken a middle position in the October dispute. Radford is a very persuasive man, and Dulles at length fell in with the substance of his views.

It was thus Dulles, rather than Radford, who went to the President to persuade him to reverse his October ruling. In the end, the President decided on a curious compromise—the Tachens would be evacuated, while war would be risked if necessary to defend Quemoy, the most important Nationalist island, and probably Matsu. This time, the Joint Chiefs other than Radford were informed of this Presidential decision after it had already been taken.

Events, of course, helped Radford. Evacuation of all the offshore islands was a possible alternative, but Chiang Kai-shek bitterly resisted this idea. The alternative prospect of letting island after island fall bloodily to the Communists, while the Seventh Fleet stood idly by, seemed more and more unappetizing as time went on.

At the same time, it became more and more obvious that these islands, virtually within spitting distance of the mainland, could not possibly be defended unless bases and supply lines on the mainland were attacked.

Both the President and Dulles undoubtedly hoped that the American decision to intervene if necessary might bring "stability" to the area, in the form of a deal with the Communists to accept an agreed dividing line in the straits of Formosa between the two Chinas. In fact, the Presidential decision was presented to the British on this basis.

Now both the Communists and Chiang have furiously rejected any "two-China" deal, and the hope that it can be made is dying. Simultaneously, the fear that the Chinese Communists, far from being deterred, will accept the American challenge, and invade Quemoy or Matsu, is growing.

Moreover, although the basic decision to attack the mainland if necessary to defend the islands has been made, two vital questions remain unanswered. The first is: Do we use nuclear weapons? Many policymakers, reportedly including Secretary Dulles, say that the use of atomic weapons against China would have fatal political consequences. But there are cogent arguments for using the decisive weapons if the Chinese mainland is to be attacked at all.

The second question is: What do we do if the Communists succeed in taking Quemoy, say, despite our intervention? They may well be capable of doing so. American officers who watched the invasion of Ykiangshan through powerful glasses reported that it was a remarkably efficient little operation. If Quemoy is taken despite American bombing of the mainland, this would be a genuinely disastrous blow to American prestige in Asia. Yet current estimates are that it would require a major amphibious operation, involving at least three crack American divisions, to retake the island if it fell.

But although such vital questions remain unanswered, the great central decision has been made. The decision to bomb the Chinese mainland if necessary may well be—it probably is—the right decision. But the dangers it involves, including the danger of war, should be faced up to boldly, rather than being buried in ambiguities. And if these dangers are faced up to boldly, surely it will appear that this is hardly the right time to begin reducing our investment in defense.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I call attention to an observation or two by Stewart Alsop, for whose knowledge of Asiatic problems I have an exceedingly high respect, and in which I have great confidence. He says in the article:

The extraordinary gravity of the decision which President Eisenhower has now taken is not yet fully appreciated in Congress or the country. The decision is, essentially, to bomb the Chinese mainland, if this is deemed necessary for the defense of the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

I express, here and now, complete agreement with that observation by Stewart Alsop. I think the American people should recognize that that decision has been made and should take it into account as they come to pass judgment upon what is involved in the course

of action upon which we are asked to embark under the joint resolution.

Alsop goes on to say:

Bombing the Chinese mainland means, of course, war with China. It could mean war with China's ally, Russia.

I completely agree with that conclusion. Again, I think that I am within the bounds of propriety—I trust I am—when I say that I heard no official, civil or military, deny that a strike by our forces against the mainland of China would be an act of war. We would be in a war. If we attacked before a strike was committed against us, we would go down in history with the black page written against us that we were the aggressors. I do not want future generations of Americans to be subjected to that judgment of history.

Alsop continues as follows:

The Presidential decision to risk a major war in the defense of these two islands represents a great victory for Adm. Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Last October, Radford first proposed that the Seventh Fleet should bomb the Chinese mainland, if necessary to hold Quemoy.

Before I go a step further, Mr. President, I wish to modify my request for insertion of Alsop's article in the RECORD, and to reserve the right to strike out any part of the article which may, to the slightest degree, be subject to the interpretation that it violates rule XIX. I do not think it does, but before I release it to be printed in the RECORD, I wish to check it very carefully.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the article goes on to say:

That time, Radford suffered a defeat, when President Eisenhower ruled against it.

Thereafter, Radford went to the Far East. He returned a couple of weeks ago, surer than ever that he was right. He immediately went to work to convince Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who had taken a middle position in the October dispute. Radford is a very persuasive man, and Dulles at length fell in with the substance of his views.

I digress to say that there is no doubt that Admiral Radford is not only a very persuasive man, but an exceedingly able man, a very forthright man, and a highly intelligent and courageous man.

One cannot listen to him testify, as I have listened to him, and as other members of the committee have listened to him, for the past 2 days, without knowing that he possesses those great qualifications. I happen to be one, however, who believes that he is very wrong in some of the approaches he makes to American-Asiatic relations. I happen to be one who believes that he does not fully appreciate the very great probability that if we become involved in a strike against the mainland of China, we are going to have to put foot soldiers onto the mainland of China. I feel certain that it is within the proprieties to say that Admiral Radford would not deny that to strike against the mainland of China might lead to that result. He does not guarantee that it would not. He

does not share, to the degree that some of us do, the fear that it would be inevitable.

That leads us to a very vital military, strategic problem of the hour. Are we in a position of military defense at the present time, so that if what the resolution called for should lead to a war on the mainland of China, we have the forces in being, either air power or manpower, for the successful prosecution of such a war, without unnecessary and terrific losses to the United States? I happen to be one who believes we are not in that defense posture. I happen to be one who thinks that every Senator owes a duty to himself and to his constituency to read every word of the transcript of the record of the past 2 days, and to reach his own conclusions as to whether, at the present time, we are in the defense position we ought to be in, so as to be able successfully to prosecute, with the minimum possible loss, a war on the mainland of China.

I repeat what I said earlier this afternoon: We shall have to do that with men, in the last analysis, because we are not going to conquer China except with manpower, after we get through bombing out her "guts"—and we can do that, and will do it, and should do it, if we should become involved in a war.

But I am concerned that we shall have a clear, clean record of involvement; and I am concerned that we should have a defense posture so strong at the time we become involved, if we shall become involved, that our involvement will result in minimum losses of American life, both on the battlefields and here at home—and I happen to believe that many civilian lives will be lost at home, as well as the lives of men in uniform.

Also proceeds in his article, which I shall not take the time to read to the Senate, to discuss the attitude of the Nationalist Chinese and the clear implications of the adoption of the resolution. I find myself in agreement with his statement of those implications. I urge my colleagues in the Senate to read the article, along with the official transcript of the record of the executive sessions of the committee.

Mr. President, I now refer to an article by Walter Lippmann, which was published in the Washington Post and Times-Herald of last Monday, the 24th. I ask unanimous consent that, following my speech, I may submit for the RECORD whatever edited portions of the Lippmann article I wish to present for inclusion at this point in my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXHIBIT 2

TODAY AND TOMORROW
(By Walter Lippmann)

REAPPRAISAL IN FORMOSA STRAIT

In their press conferences on Tuesday and Wednesday of last week, Mr. Dulles first, and then the President, made known the decision not to defend the Tachens and the other offshore islands which are held by Chiang's Nationalist forces. This marked the turning of a page.

Until then our military commitments in this area had as a matter of policy been left undefined and uncertain. Our policy was to keep everybody guessing. Thus, under the proposed security pact with the Nationalist

government, our military commitments are quite specifically limited (article VI) to Taiwan (the Chinese name for Formosa) and the Pescadores. The treaty promises nothing beyond that, nothing, that is to say, about the offshore islands. But notes exchanged by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Yeh, the Nationalist foreign minister, which go with the proposed pact, do say that the United States could by joint agreement act in the other territory, which means the Tachens and the offshore islands. We were not bound to act there. But we had left ourselves the option of acting if we chose.

Some time ago the Peiping government began to test our intentions in this unclarified situation. They took to shelling and bombing offshore islands, and finally by an amphibious operation they conquered one of them last week. It was at this point that the administration abandoned its policy of deliberate uncertainty, and made known the decision not to intervene in the defense of the offshore islands.

This might be described as a sound decision taken under embarrassing conditions that should have been foreseen and avoided. The policy until last week was a bluff that was called, and we have retreated in the face of Red Chinese military action. Since for good reasons we had never meant to fight for the offshore islands, it was a serious error to give the impression that we might fight for them.

Moreover, the President gave a very poor reason for our decision to draw a line between the Formosa-Pescadores territory which we will defend and the offshore islands which we will not defend. He said that the Tachens and the small islands are not "a vital element, as we see it, in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores." This takes it for granted that we have a unilateral right to intervene in foreign territory for strategic reasons—that the controlling principle of our policy is not law but strategy. This, to give it its true name, is militarism.

We do not need to resort to militarism to protect our interests in this area. There is a radical difference in law between the two sets of islands. Throughout the 20th century Formosa and the Pescadores belonged not to China but to Japan. They were captured from Japan by the United States, not by China. Under the Japanese surrender terms of 1945, which were formally ratified by the 1952 Treaty of Peace (chap. II, art. 2b) "Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores." But now let us note this. Though Japan has renounced the title, no one else has acquired it.

In the President's message of January 10, 1952, submitting the Japanese Peace Treaty to the Senate, he put into the RECORD the official statement of Mr. Dulles to the San Francisco Conference. In that statement Mr. Dulles said that "some Allied Powers suggested that article 2 should not merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam, but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of the ex-Japanese territories. This, admittedly would have been neater. But it would have raised questions as to which there are now no agreed answers. * * * Clearly, the wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned, leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international solvents other than this treaty."

None of this applies to the offshore islands. They have always been Chinese. We have a right to be present in Formosa and the Pescadores under the terms of the Japanese surrender and of the Japanese Peace Treaty. We have a right to see that their ultimate disposition is not settled by force but in accord with the interests of the people of Formosa and of the interests of the powers concerned in the Pacific. Our presence for these purposes is not intervention in the Chinese civil war. It is not intervention be-

cause Formosa and the Pescadores are not really Chinese territory.

But were we to intervene in the offshore islands, we would be acting on Chinese territory in a Chinese civil war. For these reasons our actual decision not to intervene in the offshore islands would not only look better but would in fact be better if it were based not on the strategical opinions of the White House and the Pentagon but on the law and the right about Formosa and the Pescadores.

Our right to defend Formosa rests on the fact that it is territory ceded by Japan about which the ultimate disposition has not been settled by any treaty. Even though both Chinese governments claim Formosa as Chinese, even though we promised in 1943 at Cairo to restore it to the Republic of China, Formosa is not now, it is not yet, Chinese territory. Because of that, our presence in Formosa is not intervention in the Chinese civil war.

On these grounds we have obligations and rights in the disposition of Formosa, regardless of whether we think Chiang or Mao is the head of the legitimate government of China. Our position in Formosa does not depend upon Chiang. For Chiang has never acquired a legitimate title to Formosa. Our position is the consequence of an international war, and on that ground we can make a case before the opinion of mankind to invoke their collaboration in reaching an international solution.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the Lippmann article, I submit, is a very persuasive document in support of the Humphrey amendment. Listen to what Lippmann says; speaking of the conference between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Nationalists:

Until then our military commitments in this area had as a matter of policy been left undefined and uncertain. Our policy was to keep everybody guessing. Thus under the proposed security pact with the Nationalist government our military commitments are quite specifically limited (Article VI) to "Taiwan (the Chinese name for Formosa) and the Pescadores." The treaty promises nothing beyond that, nothing, that is to say, about the offshore islands. But notes exchanged by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Yeh, the Nationalist Foreign Minister, which go with the proposed pact, do say that the United States could by joint agreement act in the other territory—which means the Tachens and the offshore islands. We were not bound to act there. But we had left ourselves the option of acting if we chose.

Sometime ago the Peiping Government began to test our intentions in this unclarified situation. They took to shelling and bombing offshore islands, and finally by an amphibious operation they conquered one of them last week. It was at this point that the administration abandoned its policy of deliberate uncertainty, and made known the decision not to intervene in the defense of the offshore islands.

This might be described as a sound decision taken under embarrassing conditions that should have been foreseen and avoided. The policy until last week was a bluff that was called, and we have retreated in the face of Red Chinese military action. Since for good reasons we had never meant to fight for the offshore islands, it was a serious error to give the impression that we might fight for them.

Moreover, the President gave a very poor reason for our decision to draw a line between the Formosa-Pescadores territory which we will defend and the offshore islands which we will not defend. He said that the Tachens and the small islands are not "a vital element, as we see it, in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores." This takes it for granted that we have a

unilateral right to intervene in foreign territory for strategic reasons—that the controlling principle of our policy is not law but strategy. This, to give it its true name, is militarism.

Mr. President, I too have a very high regard for this great student of international relations, Walter Lippmann, who writes so penetratingly and with great scholarship. I think this particular column, entitled "Reappraisal in Formosa Strait," and his most recent column, describing the line of demarcation, which really is covered by the Humphrey amendment, represent a point of view to which Members of the Senate should give great weight before they vote for a resolution so broad in the territory it covers as is the resolution now before the Senate.

Mr. President, I have already received permission to have this commentary, when edited, printed in the RECORD.

I think Alsop and Lippmann have performed a great service for the American people by pointing out in their columns the dangers that are likely to flow if—and it is an assumption—it develops that a decision is made to strike on the mainland of China before a strike is committed against us.

Mr. MORSE subsequently said: Mr. President, I wish to make a brief statement in regard to a second Walter Lippmann article which I did not include, as I had intended to do, when I discussed the first Walter Lippmann article today. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the Official Reporter be authorized to insert in the body of the RECORD, at the point where in my speech this afternoon I was discussing the Walter Lippmann article entitled "Reappraisal in Formosa Strait," and quoted therefrom the entire article, as well as the second Lippmann article which I had intended to discuss briefly, which is entitled "The Definition of Formosa."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Oregon? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

EXHIBIT 3

TODAY AND TOMORROW
(By Walter Lippmann)

THE DEFINITION OF FORMOSA

The realities of the Formosa question are overlaid with so much propaganda, bluff, and face-saving that it is hard to find one's way around in it. The best clew to a clarified definition of the problem—I am not saying a solution of the problem—is to recognize that there are in fact two lines which mark the limits of what we call "Formosa."

The one line is known to the experts working on the problem as the "jurisdictional line." It is the line laid down in the Japanese surrender terms, the Japanese peace treaty, the proposed mutual security pact with Chiang's government and in the President's message. The line covers Formosa and the Pescadores but not the offshore islands. The other line includes the offshore islands. Though it is sometimes called "the strategic line," that is a misleading name for a line of which some of the islands at least, such as the Tachens now, Quemoy in September, have been declared of no decisive strategic importance. This second line is in fact the western boundary of the legal territory of China that Chiang's Nationalist Government still holds. It is the

line where the Nationalist retreat from the mainland ended.

The difference between these two lines, which involve the possession of the offshore islands, is probably the critical issue in the present phase of maneuver and possible negotiation about Formosa. The offshore islands—but not Formosa and the Pescadores—are Chinese territory for which the Chinese civil war is still being fought. They are the last remaining Chinese territories which Chiang actually governs.

That gives these offshore islands considerable symbolic importance. A clean-cut decision by the United States to stand on the jurisdictional line of the treaties would protect Formosa, it would cut off the implied commitment of the United States to support Chiang in a campaign of restoration.

For Peking this would mean acceptance of the fact that they are the de facto government of Chinese territories. It would not recognize that they have title to Formosa. Nobody would have title to Formosa. The Allied Powers who have made the peace treaty with Japan would remain the custodians of the title to Formosa and the Pescadores.

It is evident that if there is to be a ceasefire, there must be a line of demarcation, and that the most reasonable line is the jurisdictional line. East of that line Peking does not have any legal title; armed action would therefore be international aggression. West of the line we have no legal claims, and intervention would be intervention in a civil war. The acceptance by us of the jurisdictional line would put an end conclusively to the notion of a United States intention to intervene. It would, moreover, fix conclusively not only the defense but the custodial character of our presence in Formosa.

There are differences of opinion as to the strategic value of these offshore islands. They would seem in the main to have a nuisance value in that they enable the Nationalists to interfere in some degree with coastal shipping. That may well be one of the reasons why Peking has been showing so much interest in them.

From the point of view of the defense of Formosa, their importance cannot be very great. Last week the President wrote off the Tachens and last September he wrote off Quemoy. It is indeed a question whether these islands, some of them within less than 5 miles of the mainland, are not strategic liabilities if it came to actual fighting. I have heard one eminent soldier, not American but active in our cause, say that an insistence upon defending these offshore islands would be like trying to defend the doormat of a house inhabited by your enemies.

The real significance of these offshore islands is not strategic but legal and political. In forming our policy we cannot expect to find that every consideration is on one side rather than the other. What we shall find is, I believe, that the preponderant weight of the consideration is in favor of our standing on the jurisdictional line.

The objection to doing that is that it means the final abandonment of our support of the Nationalist campaign of restoration, and that this will destroy the morale of the Chinese on Formosa. There can be little doubt that the Formosa Chinese and their supporters in other lands will feel that they have been deprived of the hope of a restoration. But is it not the fact that insofar as they have thought the United States would go to war for a restoration, they have been living on false hopes? I think their sincerest friends in Washington would tell them that American opinion favors the defense of Formosa, but is opposed to a commitment or to taking any risks of war about going back to the mainland.

As against the political disadvantage of the discouragement of non-Communist Chi-

nese, there are probably big advantages on the other side. An American policy based on the jurisdictional line will almost certainly insure the support of our active allies in the Far East. It enables the powers which recognize Mao Tse-tung to recognize also the defense of Formosa. It would probably do much to win respect for our Formosa position among the uncommitted nations of Asia and it would provide a sound legal and political foundation for an eventual attempt by the United Nations to bring about a ceasefire in the Far East.

I use the word eventual because in a matter of such immense complexity, it is not possible to proceed by big and spectacular steps. The world is an elephant crossing a precarious bridge and it must test its footing. It is sometimes possible to obtain assent, to obtain a willingness not to object, without obtaining an express agreement. But in order to progress at all, no matter how slowly and tortuously, it is necessary that we be clear in our minds about where we do and where we do not stand, where we are not going and where we are going.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I should like to have the RECORD show, at that point in my speech this afternoon, the following brief comments on the Walter Lippmann article dealing with the subject of the definition of Formosa.

In this very fine article Walter Lippmann discussed the problem of the definition of Formosa, and he used the following language:

The one line is known to the experts working on the problem as the "jurisdictional line." It is the line laid down in the Japanese surrender terms, the Japanese peace treaty, the proposed mutual security pact with Chiang's government and in the President's message. The line covers Formosa and the Pescadores but not the offshore islands. Though it is sometimes called "the strategic line," that is a misleading name for a line of which some of the islands at least, such as the Tachens now, and Quemoy in September, have been declared of no decisive strategic importance.

Mr. President, I think the entire column is a very excellent one, and bears on the entire question of the Humphrey amendment, as to whether we owe a clear duty now, in determining our final policy on this issue, to make clear that we are not going to become involved in any conflict over the Matsu Islands and the Quemoy Islands and the other islands along the Chinese coast, which I do not think anyone can question are Chinese territory and fall within the sovereign rights of China.

The President and Secretary Dulles urge protection of Formosa and the Pescadores because of their importance to the defense of the free nations in the Pacific. The resolution in its present form provides for "protection of * * * related positions and territories."

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HUMPHREY AMENDMENT

The resolution is so broad as to authorize preventive military action against Communist military build-ups which may threaten "such related positions and territories."

In his message the President said:

I do not suggest that the United States enlarge its defensive obligations beyond Formosa and the Pescadores as provided by the treaty now awaiting ratification. But unhappily, the danger of armed attack directed against that area compels us to take into account closely related localities and

actions which, under current conditions, might determine the failure or the success of such an attack. The authority that may be accorded by the Congress would be used only in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or "definite preliminaries" to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores. (Quotation marks added.)

I say, most respectfully, that calls for an authorization to take preventive action. When we authorize preventive action, I say we close the books on all the past foreign policy of the United States in respect to our becoming involved in war, and we start a new chapter, whereby we serve notice—and I say we do it in a rather threatening manner, and it will be so interpreted—that we may engage, in accordance with our judgment and discretion, in preventive action.

Mr. President, there is a very delicate point which I think must be considered in the debate, namely, as to who is going to make that decision. Of course, the responsibility for making the decision is the President's, and I am satisfied that President Dwight Eisenhower will review very carefully any recommendation concerning a decision he might make relative to taking military action in the Pacific. But he, too, is human, and he must necessarily rely heavily, it seems to me, upon the recommendations and the urgings of those who are entrusted with military operations in that area of the world.

With no personal reflection whatsoever, but because I have a difference in point of view as to what ought to be our approach to Pacific problems, I think that in all probability the first decision at least, and it will probably be the prevailing decision, will be made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford; and I am satisfied that he is strong for preventive action, and that preventive action will get us, I believe unnecessarily, into the third world war.

Much is being said about the statement issued by the Chinese Red premier's insulting statement, a vicious statement, a typically Communist statement, and I think also it was a blustering and a bluffing statement—but who can be sure?—that the Chinese Communists are going to drive us out of this area of the world, including Formosa. That statement makes us angry, and would make any red-blooded American angry. Of course, our first reaction would be, "Oh, you think you will? Well, we will show you." That is a very normal human reaction. But the Communists have made many such blustering and bluffing statements; and I believe that if we make clear that we are going to defend Formosa, if we serve firm notice that we are going to hold Formosa, and call upon the United Nations to assume jurisdiction over it, and demonstrate, to this dictator of Red China, as we are perfectly able to demonstrate, without preventive action, that any time he starts a strike against Formosa, he will be at war with us, the strike will not start.

Why do I say that? Because I think he knows that we can destroy his military forces, and, for that matter, those

of Red Russia. I think the Kremlin, as well as the Red Chinese, know we can do it, if we have to. We can do it with much less loss and more quickly if we have allies. We are not likely to have many allies if we now adopt a preventive war policy in Asia.

But I refuse to believe that we have to put ourselves in the position before the eyes of the world of threatening an aggression in order to protect Formosa or in order to make clear to the Red dictator in China that we mean business. That is why I say, Mr. President, we must run the calculated risk of peace in order that we shall not in any way besmirch the great record of peace which is the record of American foreign policy from the beginning of our Nation.

We hear the argument that, "Of course, we do not have to wait until the first bomb is dropped if we know large numbers of Russian jet planes are coming over Alaska and Canada on their way to drop bombs on the United States." Mr. President, of course, we do not have to wait, because those planes commit an act of war against us the moment they start over our territory or the moment they leave Siberia. No one will have any doubt as to what the purpose of that kind of a trip is, and then the war is on. But in this discussion we are talking, insofar as my hypothetical is concerned, about the situation before an act of war has been committed by a sovereign state against us. I say that we can defend Formosa without providing, by means of this joint resolution, an authorization for preventive action.

Therefore, Mr. President, it is my argument that the joint resolution could involve potential unilateral United States military action in two areas beyond Formosa and the Pescadores, namely, the Quemoy and Matsu island groups, which are within 10 miles of the Chinese mainland.

United States military action on, or in the skies over, or in the water surrounding the island groups in sight of the mainland, or action on the mainland could constitute acts of war. Such acts of war might, under the joint resolution as it is now drawn, be undertaken before any overt Communist military action.

In either of these cases, in view of the questionable right of the United States to protect the Quemoy and Matsu island groups, the United States would find itself at war with Communist China; and I believe we would be in that situation without very many allies. Under the Chinese-Soviet Defense Pact, Russia could enter the war without the NATO countries being under obligation to join with us. Our European bases almost certainly would not be available to us under such a circumstance.

The United States position already does not have the sympathy of the Asian and Pacific countries. Our efforts to bolster anti-Communist forces in Asia which are not now receiving sufficient attention—would get even less.

With the United States embroiled in a war with Communist China, the invitation to Communist attempts to subvert Western European nations would be clear.

It is said that the joint resolution is defensive only. Unfortunately, that is not the case, in my opinion. The language of the joint resolution and the President's message make clear that it would be taken as authority to prevent militarily "situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores."

Mr. President, I cannot speak for the thoughts in the minds of men in foreign capitals. The information we have received thus far is very scant. But today the ticker shows that Herbert Evatt, head of the Labor Party in Australia—the opposition party to the party now in control there—made the statement that the Formosan situation should be put before the United Nations at the earliest possible moment. That is a part of my argument. I think it should, too, Mr. President. I think the joint resolution should be very much strengthened in connection with the United Nations' obligations to act; and I think the Kefauver substitute—which I shall not discuss today, other than to make this passing reference to it—is much to be preferred in respect to its provisions relative to the United Nations. So I shall support the Kefauver substitute as an alternative to the joint resolution now before the Senate.

PROBLEM OF TACHEN EVACUATION

However, Mr. President, I wish to point out that when we start talking about preventive actions involving "definite preliminaries" to an attack by our potential enemy, such action or the use of ships or planes of the 7th Fleet to evacuate some 20,000 Nationalist troops from the Tachens might very well create a situation which would lead to war. To be frank about it, Mr. President, I think the Tachens situation is the most difficult problem for me to handle in connection with my argument. However, I am going to face it. I believe we have a moral obligation—and perhaps a legal obligation, too—to give protection to the Nationalist Chinese who must be evacuated from the Tachens. It seems to me it is pregnant with the possibilities of war, in that there can be created incidents which might unavoidably lead us into war. To use one example, let us suppose we are giving cover to a Nationalist Chinese ship which is taking Nationalist Chinese soldiers off the Tachens; and let us suppose we are giving that coverage because—to state only one of many reasons, and this one is a reason of humanity—we think it is unconscionable to leave those soldiers to a Red-Chinese blood bath, which is what we would do if we did not provide a cover to evacuate them, if the Nationalist Chinese decide upon evacuation. Of course, if they do not so decide, then I think our responsibility to the people on those islands comes to an automatic end. But, Mr. President, if the decision to evacuate is made, we then have, in my opinion, a humanitarian and a moral obligation to give them coverage, in order that they may leave safely. So let us suppose that in that operation the Red Chinese were to sink the troopship to which we were giving cover, and let us suppose that our aircraft were then

in hot pursuit—as I think they should be, under the circumstances—in following an attacking Red Chinese airplane over the mainland of China. That could lead to an incident of war, although I do not think it necessarily would, as a consequence. But, I also think that from the standpoint of international law, the Red Chinese plane in making such an attack would know that in attacking that cover, it was in the first instance making a war strike against us. Of course, that is a different thing from our making a strike in the first instance against the mainland of China in the Quemoy area.

EVACUATION SHOULD BE UNDER AUSPICES OF U. N.

Mr. President, I shall not take the time to go into the further legal distinctions regarding this matter; but I think the broad distinction becomes perfectly clear.

However, I would hope—although I doubt that the time element would permit it, but I wish it could and would—that the evacuation, even though the military force being used for coverage would be ours, would be conducted under the auspices and the jurisdiction and authority of the United Nations. Then, Mr. President, an attack by the Red Chinese would have to be considered as an attack not only on the United States, but also on the United Nations, for which, under those circumstances, we would be acting as the enforcement officer of a program of evacuation.

LIMITING THE RESOLUTION

Mr. President, we must consider whether the joint resolution goes too far. Should it not be limited literally to defensive actions and to the territory of Formosa and the Pescadores? I think so. One of the reasons why I voted against the resolution in committee is that I believe it goes too far. The Humphrey amendment sought to remedy this defect.

THE DESIRE FOR U. N. CONSIDERATION

Many people of the United States, and many people throughout the world, believe that this current threat to world peace should be submitted to the United Nations. We can and should secure Formosa and the Pescadores until the United Nations can act. We should do no more without the most searching consideration.

We must firmly resist Communist aggression. We must also avoid any action which would provide the Chinese Communists with a pretext for aggression, a pretext whose validity in the eyes of Asians would be different from what it is in our eyes.

That leads me—and I am almost through—to comment on the fact that it does us no good to say, "They are going to lie about it anyway." As was said recently, one can turn on the short-wave radio anywhere in Asia and hear almost a constant Red Chinese propaganda bombardment, consisting of vicious misrepresentations of United States policies in Asia. I know that to be true. All I am saying is: Let us not follow a course of action which, in the judgment of history, would afford any foundation for

the propaganda which Communists may wage against us.

While I am on that point, let me say that we cannot ignore public opinion abroad or at home. Now that the President has requested the Congress to pass this resolution, I think there is no way of avoiding a considerable amount of international discussion of the implications of the resolution.

I am very much worried about what the final judgment of world public opinion will be. Early indications are that in Asia such public opinion involves a great many reservations about the course of action which is being proposed by the resolution. In our own country there can be no question about it. Already, as Senators, we are receiving a considerable number of communications. I do not know how they run in other offices, but in my office the communications are overwhelmingly against the adoption of the proposed resolution in its present form.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, at the conclusion of my remarks, a cross-section of the communications received in my office. I assure Senators that they in no way violate rule XIX.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the communications may be printed, as requested.

(See exhibit 4.)

CONCLUSION

Mr. MORSE. In concluding, Mr. President, for the reasons I have expressed today, and for others which I intend to set forth in greater documentation detail in subsequent speeches, I wish to say that I shall vote against the resolution unless, in the course of the debate, argument is advanced which shows that I am wrong in my present thinking and conclusion on the subject or it is amended by the Humphrey and Kefauver amendments. I have never hesitated to change my opinion on the floor of the Senate in the course of debate when I became convinced that I was mistaken. I shall not hesitate to do so in this instance; but after listening for the past 2 days to the arguments advanced by the top civilian and military officials in the field of military and foreign policy, I have come to the deep conviction that it would be a great mistake for the United States to follow the course of action contemplated or made possible by this resolution.

So, I say that, as was pointed out by witnesses, we must, of course, take the calculated risks of war. But we must also take the calculated risks of peace. I say that we cannot in good conscience flirt with a defensive war. In my judgment this resolution would legalize the position of the proponents of a preventive war, which has been advocated in this country for the past several years.

EXHIBIT 4

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 26, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Please speak out against hasty action which may plunge America into catastrophic world war.

ALLEN A. SMITH.

HANOVER, N. H., January 25, 1955.
The Honorable WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: This appeal is addressed to you because I believe that you have a clearer and more independent mind than most of the other Senators, and, in addition, the ability to see ahead.

It seems to me that Mr. Dulles, for it is he who is apparently propounding the theory of telling China just where to stop, is operating from a wishful thinking starting point. He wants China not to want a major war, but has he any basis for an actual belief, backed up by facts, that China, with Russian promises behind her, is not ready to risk one? Since victory today may well consist in China's keeping us busy in the Orient, with Russia, acting suddenly as an ally, striking our cities with atomic bombs from another direction; can't that possibility encourage, rather than discourage, China from risking such a large-scale, total-push war at the present time?

Furthermore, we actually do not know what fears and emotions are now stirred up in the Chinese people, distorting their thought processes. We should know that they have a deep-seated historical hatred of the West as exploiters of the East—which distrust the Communists have had more success in allaying than the British or we have had. I myself am not at all sure that China isn't as ready now as she ever will be for an all-out war. The decisive question for us at present might well be: Can we afford to tip the scales with a Formosa ultimatum and land in an atomic squeeze between Russia and China?

War has changed; and only the country that can strike first and hardest can call the tune. Are we in that position? I think not. Our great danger is arrogance in our political thinking. It could be our undoing.

Thanking you for any consideration you may give these beliefs,

Very sincerely yours,

ALICE POLLARD,
Mrs. Joseph G. Pollard.

DETROIT, MICH., January 25, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: Might I suggest, Senator, a possible solution to the political Formosa situation?

Place Formosa under U. N. trusteeship and then leave the Formosans vote and decide whether they desire to remain under Chiang Kai-shek, join mainland China, return to the jurisdiction of Japan, or establish themselves as an independent country.

The Formosans are not Chinese. The Chinese conquered them in the 16th century. Japan conquered them in 1895, and Franklin D. Roosevelt returned them to China without plebiscite. My recollection is that in 1946 Chiang sent an army to Formosa and killed 50,000 of them in their revolt.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES F. DAPPER.

SKOKIE, ILL., January 24, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR: Now you should speak out against holding Formosa. You have always voted with the people. The people don't want militarists taking us into a futile and a rough war.

Sincerely,

F. H. MARSHALL.

—
GLOUCESTER, VA.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I see with great alarm that the President is asking for the power to commit warlike acts and even to make war at his own discretion.

Do not, I beg, allow any man such power! I notice, if we don't look out, that we will be standing up to Red China all alone and

Russia can pick up what's left, win, lose or draw! I don't see any allies rushing to join us.

Are we going to slaughter our young men again for some orientals living half around the world? And why is our destiny and that of Chiang so bound up together? Trade? Trade against blood?

A Pacific war brings prosperity to California as some people know. But it is paid for in blood and tears.

Evidently we are not committed to protect Formosa as I understand that the Senate has never ratified this pact and I hope they never will!

Turn the whole business over to the U. N. They are for this sort of thing. Bring back the Seventh Fleet and let the U. N. take over.

Sincerely,

Mrs. H. B. HOLCOMBE.

EUGENE, OREG., January 23, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Isn't there some way the explosive Formosa situation can be turned over to the U. N. and thereby increase the worldwide respect for this Nation and the possibility of further progress toward peace?

We have made a good beginning in sending our food to hungry populations even if their government happens to be our enemy. This mature and Christian action should have all the encouragement you can give it. As I understand the psychology of starvation, meeting the basic physical needs of hungry people is the best—perhaps the only—defense against their falling prey to totalitarian forms of rule.

Now, if ever, we need a show of faith in the future. Our acts, as a nation must be in the direction of a community of all nations for there can be no hope for peace outside of that eventuality.

I hope you will make every effort to see that the Formosan situation is neutralized and that restraint becoming a mature people is exercised in the power struggle now going on.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD E. L. BARTON.

YPSILANTI, MICH., January 25, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.:

We know, don't we, that the Soviets want us to exhaust ourselves in peripheral wars. Why then do we fall into the trap of Formosa, the least significant area in which we could possibly engage our strength. Will we win the battle of Formosa, drag on in a war with a China as duped as we are, and be unable to parry the thrust of a completely unexhausted Russia? This is not statesmanship but idiocy.

ANN JONES.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

In heaven's name, please deny President's request for authority to intervene in Chinese civil war. We can see no logical, sane, or moral basis for such an act that could lead to an atomic world war. The U. N. is the only alternative to the frightful implications of President's request.

Dr. and Mrs. Z. GROSS.

SEATTLE, WASH., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Depending on you to lead and opposing granting Eisenhower war powers. Using United States forces, atomic weapons, attacking prognosticated attackers "before they leave home," are stupidly and absurd measures for attaining goal professed—peace.

There are other alternatives to our futile Asian policy than war.

Mr. and Mrs. RICHARD A. PETERSON.

SANTA CLARA, CALIF.,
January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

As one who 10 years ago attended the organizational sessions of the United Nations, I urge you to seek some method for utilizing the machinery established there for a settlement in the Formosa Straits short of armed unilateral action.

GRACE McDONALD.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.,
January 25, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Unalterably opposed to the turn to preventive war indicated in reversal of previous China policy. As Nation magazine puts it, recent treaty "is a document giving away an island which doesn't belong to us to a man who has no right to it." Now we encourage Chiang Kai-shek to new provocations by suggesting blank check commitments. Chiang is hated by his own people because his government is a cruel, treacherous, and corrupt dictatorship. Urge you do everything possible to stop administration from lighting matches around this powder keg.

RICHARD LYNDEN.

RALEIGH, N. C.,
January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.:

All sections of America but especially we of the South have reason to recall how amazingly few outstanding national leaders stood out with wisdom and courage against the tragic drift toward war in the 1850's and 1860. I hope history will not repeat itself in this respect and that you will seriously consider whether we may not invite the world's worst war if we bypass the United Nations or act without the sincere approval both of our professed allies and of the great neutral nations. There will be almost equal danger in a general world war or in a war in which the United States and China might almost destroy each other, leaving Russia itself unharmed.

CLARENCE POE,
Editor and Board Chairman,
The Progressive Farmer Magazine.

MADISON, N. J.,
January 25, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Urge you vote against resolution authorizing use of armed force in Asia and work for peace in Asia and Europe through United Nations.

ALICE HUSSEY BALASSA.

STATTON, OREG., January 22, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: It is with anticipated pleasure that I await the results of the 84th Congress under the leadership of the Democrats. From your newsletter I can readily see that you have set high and commendable goals to strive for.

The Hells Canyon bill is one that I hope will be looked upon with favor by Congress because it is vital and essential to the development of industry in the Northwest.

My hope is that you will favor any aid in the way of equipment and supplies to Nationalist China, as of late the policy of our Government seems to be one of appeasement to Red China, who has murdered many

American citizens. No; I do not favor a blockade of Red China at present, but I feel quite strongly that we should not tie the hands of the Nationalists. After all, Russia is constantly supplying Red China. News dispatches indicate that Red China is using Russian-built equipment. I have heard news commentators say that Nationalist China would be able to successfully invade the mainland if we would supply them with the necessary equipment, much of which we have in mothballs where it is doing no one any good but going to waste. This I believe is an important item to be considered.

Yours truly,

NESTOR VAN HANDEL.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 26, 1955.
Chiang desperately needs our surplus fighting planes. Let's send them.

Yours hopefully,

VERA J. ELLIS.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 24, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Sincerely hope you will back the President's request on the defense of Formosa.

P. J. LAWLESS.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 24, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.:

HONORABLE SIR: We do want peace but not at the price of appeasement. Patriotic Chinese Nationalists are being murdered by gangsters. They do not have means to defend themselves. Chiang does not ask for manpower, only for defense equipment. How come we can send fighter planes to Latin America and deny this so much greater need? In the name of suffering humanity, let us send Chiang's government what they need, and at once. Our stupidity gave away the mainland. Can we never learn? Please, please act quickly.

Yours hopefully,

VERA J. ELLIS.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 26, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, D. C.:

Resist hysterical stampede. Allow time for people to register opinion. Evacuate Formosa. Save world from inevitable destruction.

LEO GALLAGHER.

ACOMA, WASH., January 25, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

A synthetic war atmosphere has been built up by the Pentagon, the armament interests, and the China lobby, and it is apparently very thick around Washington. What would we say if Cuba were Communist and the Kremlin decided to maintain that island as part of a Kremlin defense line? That is not one bit more absurd than our policy in Asia, and mark my word, our system of free enterprise is going to collapse along with democracy if we follow the egg-head leadership now insisting on American evacuation of Chinese forces thrown off the mainland as result of revolution. Heaven knows our country needs men of courage and commonsense as never before.

REX ROUBUSH.

SOUTH PASADENA, CALIF., January 24, 1955.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Now that the President has spoken for broader power to deal with the China situation, and having heard you on a broadcast say that this should never have been handled unilaterally—that I fully agree. We have the United Nations and

that's where the problem belongs. It's a world problem, and if it calls for boys to die, then I say let all the nations take part. We should not sacrifice our young American manhood any further on foreign soil, unless others are willing to do likewise; and I don't mean a token force, either.

As you well know, "Chang" was surrounded on the mainland by a bunch of grafters and crooks; if he hadn't have been, why was it that whole armies of his deserted and went over to the Commies? They didn't trust him or his advisers. I don't think he is any better than the Commies. It's six on one hand and half a dozen on the other. That's why I say, my dear Senator, one American boy's life isn't worth giving for the motley scum, so won't you please do everything in your power to keep us from becoming involved, alone, on an all-out war in China?

Now, I am of middle age. I have no young boys to go, but I have some very dear friends who do, and I feel very close to these kids, and there are millions of other kids whom I don't know but for whom I am writing this letter. May God direct you, for I know you have the courage to fight for what you think is right. I have followed you too long in the Senate for that; you are a great American, and you are one of the best Senators to sit in that august body.

With my best wishes for your success in all your undertaking,

Yours truly,

M. F. YASBOROUGH.

CLEVELAND, OHIO, January 23, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: You are about the only person on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that it seems worth writing to, although you aren't from my State. In today's Plain Dealer was a big splash about "Warships moving" out of Manila, etc. Then a dispatch out of Washington, D. C., saying the President was going to draw a line between Formosa and the mainland and hold it against Communist aggression—and ask Congress to back him.

I realize that after World War I, we withdrew into our "shell" and let the rest of the world "stew in its own juice". I didn't agree with that kind of diplomacy but I think it is just as wrong morally or bad for the country diplomatically if we go too far the other way.

Just what does this Chiang Kai-shek have or represent that we feel we must back him and stay in his corner?

This Plain Dealer article spoke of the Tachens being an outpost guarding the approaches to Formosa. Then later we were told the islands were 250 miles away to the north—twice as far away as the actual mainland, China.

Why do we insist on holding Formosa, just to give a home for Chiang—our boy? And keep the pot boiling over there? Do you think that Red China could find a better issue to unite their people, to build up militarily over the years than this is? Then we talk about peace—when are we going to be realistic for the long pull ahead? Let's eliminate tensions, not aggravate them—if we desire peace.

Yours truly,

C. ROMNEY.

MADISON, WIS., January 25, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

No further aid to Formosa. Fear atomic bomb war.

LELIA BASCOM.

LONG BEACH, CALIF., January 25, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Oppose any attack on China mainland or coastal waters. Find cease fire outlet for peace.

Mr. and Mrs. ALFRED DAWSON.

SACRAMENTO, CALIF., January 25, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

You're only person who can defeat or arrest this sudden recommendation for war with China. If Nationalist China wants cease fire and our protection; yes. Fight her war now.

Respectfully submitted.

OLGA BURROUGHS.

PELLA, IOWA, January 22, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I am writing to you because, I believe, you would rather serve the best interests of the American people than the war party in Congress which tries to get us involved in an Asian war.

America would oppose any foreign power occupying islands along her coast. We wouldn't want China in Puerto Rico, Cuba, or Alaska would we? By the same token let's get out of Formosa and let the Chinese settle their own war.

Wendell Wilkie a long time ago told us that the jig was up for the white man exploiting the colored races. Apparently, we need a war, possibly an atomic war to learn that lesson.

A vote for the Asian alliance or defense means that you support the Chinese lobby and the American privileged few as against the people of the United States.

Please vote against any Asian alliance.

Yours respectfully,

PETER VAN ZANTE, M. D.

SAN RAFAEL, CALIF., January 25, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Do not feel American people have any vital interest in Formosa nor preservation Chiang's government worth single American life. Hope you will oppose pending resolution.

A. P. SAXTON.

CLAREMONT, CALIF., January 25, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Under no circumstances allow attack on continental China. Danger of total war too great. Far better lose face and Formosa by refusing President's request than lose civilization. The meek shall inherit the earth. Urge cease-fire through United Nations.

C. S. JOHNSON.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 24, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Beg you to vigorously oppose use of our forces to evacuate islands outside line we will defend.

WILLIAM H. DAVIS.

CINCINNATI, OHIO, January 25, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We're inviting war by our actions on Formosa in defending the corrupt and anti-democratic Chiang regime. In Cincinnati you spoke of keeping faith with conscience. We urge you keep faith by speaking out against this suicidal policy and do all you can to get a peaceful solution.

Mr. and Mrs. BERMAN.

BURLINGAME, CALIF., January 25, 1955.

United States Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Please don't sell people of the United States out by a vote for our defense of Formosa or other far distant Chinese islands. Suggest to you, our President, and your colleagues a 6-month cooling-off period. We cannot win an aggressive war with the awakened teeming millions of Asia. Don't vote to wipe out the white race. Vote for peace. Yours for a free United States.

J. MONTGOMERY REYNOLDS.

BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF., January 22, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

HONORABLE SIR: Since the President inclines to the military, such as Admiral Radford's setting of foreign policy in the Far East, must the Senate, likewise, bow to this military usurpation of policymaking? Cannot such rash, dictatorial promoters of hot war be called to account before the Foreign Affairs Committee and the American public in conformity with our longstanding, American constitutional subservience of the military to civilian policymaking authority?

I am against conceding to the President any power to take the "tough, insane" steps towards involving America in the eventual holocaust of hot war anywhere, especially towards supporting the figment of a corrupt Chinese Nationalist Government on Formosa or Tachen Island with American guns and lives.

Respectfully,

SAMUEL J. SPERLING, M. D.

ST. LOUIS, MO., January 24, 1955.

The EDITOR, POST-DISPATCH,
St. Louis, Mo.

DEAR SIR: I was glad to read this statement by Senator MORSE in the Post-Dispatch of January 23:

"Southeast Asia should be brought under the United Nations jurisdiction as rapidly as possible, and * * * American unilateral action, particularly in the Formosa straits, should come to an end. I think of it as a great mistake for the United States to take upon itself the full responsibility of policing the Formosa area."

Bravo to Senator MORSE! One of the saddest ramifications is that this kind of opinion has not been more openly and more confidently expressed in recent years.

Sincerely,

JOY C. GUZÉ.

MY DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I don't know whether this letter will be printed or not but my object is to get your words in the much-read Letters to the Editor column since I found them on one of the back pages.

I hope you will follow Senator FLANDERS' example and speak fearlessly for peace and the United Nations.

Sincerely,

Mrs. JOY C. GUZÉ.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Urge your influence for rational approach Formosa crisis. Peace too precious to jeopardize by calculated-risk policy administration.

VIRGINIA MALBIN.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 25, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: Senator WARREN MAGNUSON is right. This step can well lead to war

and the end of civilization. It should be handled through the United Nations.

Sincerely,

WARREN LOYAL IRWIN.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 25, 1955.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,

United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

Nation looks to you for leadership in opposing on Formosa program. Vast majority oppose new war moves in Asia, but they need spokesman. Strong Senate minority would give encouragement to peace forces here and abroad. Whole problem should be referred to United Nations.

ARTHUR H. BONE.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Urge that you firmly oppose United States military defense of Formosa. The people are not with Eisenhower on this suicidal giveaway of American lives any more than they are for the giveaway of public resources. The problems are similar; the villains identical. Fight for us on this front, too.

JOAN BAKER.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Dulles policy now bearing its disastrous fruit. Warlike measures and risks cannot be construed as implementing peace. Urge your counsel against: (1) Rash threats of war; (2) consequent damage of our prestige in Asia and worldwide; (3) unfair methods of administration to stampede Congress and Nation.

M. RUSSO.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 25, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We are very disturbed by recent statements and actions of our President and Secretary of State in regard to the Formosa question.

It seems to me like a cleverly devised scheme to wrest from Congress the power to declare war.

It was also stated that they would have to take action without the consent of the United Nations. This is another clever scheme to scrap the United Nations.

May we count on your vote against this resolution?

Yours very truly,

W. L. FOWLKS.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 25, 1955.

The Honorable WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: It seems to me that a unilateral United States decision, not only to defend Formosa but also to take whatever steps necessary, including preventative action, might leave us in a shooting war without any allies. I think that the United States should have put up a resolution in the United Nations, in a sense, giving U. N. protection to Formosa. Then if a Chinese Communist invasion came, we would have other armed forces standing by our side.

Now that the President has sent this message to Congress, and it appears obvious that the implementing resolution will pass, I think it is important that an amendment be made on the floor instructing the United States delegation to the U. N. to press for parallel United Nations action. If the United Nations is to mean anything, we should bring our problems to the U. N. first

and take our unilateral action only if the U. N. fails to act.

Sincerely,

DON S. WILLNER,
Attorney at Law.

THE DALLES, OREG., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

Unthinkable you will vote for possible war to save Formosa for discredited, corrupt Chiang.

Mr. and Mrs. FRANK R. STOVALL.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

DEAR SIR: We sincerely hope that when the matter comes up in the Senate of aiding Formosa—to the extent of bombing the Chinese mainland in advance of aggression—that you will vigorously oppose it.

We hope that you will examine your conscience and see that such a move could only lead to a disastrous war, and we do not want another war.

Sincerely,

MRS. LOIS NEWMAN.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Urge every effort be made to keep us out of China war. Hope you will speak out for calm approach to crisis.

Mr. and Mrs. ARTHUR LIND.

MONMOUTH, OREG., January 24, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We are absolutely opposed to a defensive war in China, such as Eisenhower seems to be suggesting, or any other kind of a war.

We feel that war is outmoded in international affairs and that we should not only initiate negotiations in cases of disagreement, but be prepared to initiate a new series if they break down.

Sincerely yours,

CLARENCE and MILDRED BURCK.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 22, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.:

Good work on using the United Nations for the Formosa problem. Keep it up.

Sincerely,

LESLIE C. DAVIS.
CLARA J. DAVIS.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 25, 1955.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Please vote against any move by our Armed Forces which might involve United States in Far East war.

Sincerely,

PATRICIA ZAHUMENSKY.

FLORENCE, OREG., January 26, 1955.

The Honorable WAYNE L. MORSE,
United States Senator,
Washington, D. C.:

I am against defending Formosa. Believe it will precipitate a full-scale war.

Dr. THOMAS M. HUNT.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Considering danger of atomic holocaust, strongly urge you oppose Formosa resolution. Let United States not bypass U. N. Road to peace is not via ultimatum and war threats.

Dr. and Mrs. M. MALBIN.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 26, 1955.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We strongly urge that you vote against the Eisenhower resolution for United States defense of Formosa. United States has no jurisdiction over Chinese civil problems and we urge that such problems be referred to the U. N. in the interest of world peace.

MOLLY CAVENAUGH.
LOIS CARTOZIAN.
RUTH NEWMAN.
JOAN BAKER.

ST. ALBAN'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH,
Tillamook, Oreg., January 22, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Foreign Affairs Committee,
Washington, D. C.:

HONORABLE SIR: Evidence indicates that peaceful coexistence between the eastern and the western alliances can be achieved through the following adaptation of the providential principle of geopolitical hegemonic equity, which will most likely prove acceptable to both East and West:

Providence has composed the world in the form of world islands consisting of continents (and subcontinents) and their adjacent islands and peninsulas. Today, each world island is awakening to its capability of becoming self-sufficient (in all essential resources), prosperous and independent, largely through internal unification. All areas within a world island are economically (that is, in natural resources and productivity) interdependent. Consequently, every world island today is driven (often without full awareness) by a strong natural urge to achieve effectual political unity as the only means to economic integration and consequent prosperity and security; two of the main purposes of government are those of insuring the security and the prosperity of the area governed.

In other words, each continental world island is by nature endowed with its own Monroe Doctrine. This should be easy for the nations to see and agree upon in principle. However, in practice present boundaries would presumably remain; and every maladjusted area which by its present sovereignty, alliance, hostility, and geographical situation menaces the security of the world island of which it is part, would be bound and benefited by treaties of peace, limited armament and economic aid, guaranteed by all concerned, thereby demonstrating mutual good faith (and note that political destiny is generally determined in large measure by apparent economic advantage). Such is the long-sought-after *modus vivendi*, the condition for peaceful coexistence, the formula for peace—geopolitical hegemonic equity.

If this peace formula is not adopted, war between Russo-Chinese Eurasia and the United States alone may occur, perhaps reducing both powers to exhaustion or atomic rubble and leaving the other nations, until then under jeopardy and relatively helpless, to compete for world dominance.

Of course, this is my personal message to you. (And, of course, you are welcome to read it to Congress if you should so desire.)

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

The Reverend J. J. HANCOCK.

Vicar.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I had not intended to speak this afternoon, but the remarks of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] are so far reaching in their implications that I feel in the interest of national security the RECORD must not be allowed to go unchallenged at this point.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, will the Senator yield so that I may suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield for that purpose provided I do not lose my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HRUSKA. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THURMOND in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, as I stated at the outset, I had not intended to speak today on the subject of Senate Joint Resolution 28, which has been reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, sitting jointly.

However, after listening to the speech of the senior Senator from Oregon, the implications and deductions he apparently drew from some testimony given before the committees are so far reaching in their nature that I believe great damage can be done to the national security position of the United States and, indeed, to the security of the 7th Fleet and our other Armed Forces in the far Pacific. Therefore, insofar as something may be said to clarify the Record in that regard, I believe it needs to be said here and now, and very properly.

The President of the United States, in his message to Congress of Monday, specifically said:

Our purpose is peace. That cause will be served, if, with our help, we demonstrate our unity and our determination. In all that we do, we shall remain faithful to our obligations as a member of the United Nations, to be ready to settle our international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.

I repeat that the President's message, the joint resolution which has been reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services today by a vote of 26 to 2, and the companion joint resolution, which was passed by the House by a vote of 410 to 3, serve the purpose of peace. That is the sole purpose involved.

Of course, men may honestly differ in their interpretation of testimony, but in my judgment there is not a scintilla of evidence before the committees, sitting jointly, which could lead any reasonable person to believe that the purpose of the resolution is to engage in a preventive war, or that its purpose is aggression against the Chinese Communist regime or any other regime on the face of the earth.

The whole text and tenor of the joint resolution and the President's message is to stabilize a difficult situation in the Pacific.

During the last administration it was the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and during this administration it is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, that it was not and is not in the national interest of our own security or in the interest of peace in a free world to permit the island of Formosa to pass into unfriendly hands. Should that island and its adjacent group of islands, the Pescadores, pass into unfriendly hands, it would drive a wedge into the heart of our defense position, which runs from Japan to Korea in the north, through our great airbase on Okinawa, through Formosa to the Philippines, to its anchor in Australia and New Zealand. The breaching of the line would turn the flank of Okinawa in the north, and it would turn the flank of the Philippines in the south.

In addition to that, it would cut the sealanes into southeast Asia, upon which depends the economic life of Korea and Japan, two of our allies, with whom we have mutual-security pacts, and would thus bring about the economic and political collapse of peoples with whom we are associated.

Therefore, there has been no difference of opinion or in judgment between the last administration and the present administration with respect to the importance to the vital interests of this country of maintaining the chain of defense to which I have referred.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I would prefer not to yield until I have completed my statement. At the conclusion of my remarks, I shall be glad to yield.

In view of the statements of the senior Senator from Oregon, I hope Members of the Senate, in the exercise of their responsibilities as Senators, will go to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations and ask to read in the committee room the classified documents of the hearings. I make that request because if those records are read in their entirety, no deduction of the kind made by the senior Senator from Oregon can possibly be drawn.

Why do I say that in my considered judgment this has been a great disservice to our country? I say it because on the floor of the Senate, not by a columnist, who did not sit in the hearings, not by a newspaperman, who may have received his information second hand or third hand—accurate as newspapermen may try to be—but by a Member of the Senate, who has just recently been assigned to one of the two great committees concerned with this subject, there has been made a statement today which, if allowed to go unchallenged, might cause the men in the Kremlin or in Peiping to believe that a decision to engage in a preventive war or an act of aggression had been made by the Government and the people of the United States.

If the Communists in Red China and Russia felt that was the case, they might decide to strike before that event could occur, and we might jeopardize the men of the 7th Fleet, we might jeopardize our position at Okinawa, and might jeopardize our entire position in the far Pacific. It is for that reason, Mr. President, that I have felt the deep necessity of rising on the floor today to try to straighten out the record.

Mr. President, already the wire services are carrying comments on this subject. To be sure, the comments were made before the speech, but I can think how Pravda and Tass will blazon forth tomorrow.

What Pravda was saying before the speech was made is indicated by the following on the ticker tape:

Moscow.—The Soviet newspaper Pravda charged today President Eisenhower's message to Congress on Formosa was "brazen intervention" in Red China's internal affairs and an attempt to prepare an invasion of the mainland.

The official Communist Party newspaper printed its sharpest attack on American policy on Formosa in an article about Mr. Eisenhower's message to Congress Monday. The article was written by V. Borovoski.

"On 24th January," Pravda said, "President Eisenhower sent a special message to Congress demanding powers to use American Armed Forces for insuring the so-called security of Formosa and the Pescadores; in other words, for open armed intervention in the domestic affairs of China."

"Both Houses of Congress are rushing through the consideration of this message. In question is the preparation of direct aggression by the United States Armed Forces against the continental territory of China," the newspaper said.

It added that President Eisenhower's "demand for freedom of action in the area of the Taiwan (Formosa) Strait fully discloses the real meaning and purpose of the reports emanating from the United States that American diplomacy is allegedly seeking a cease-fire in the Taiwan Strait."

"Washington wants such a cease-fire" as would prevent the Chinese people from liberating Taiwan and the other islands belonging to them which have been seized by the Chiang Kai-shek clique," Pravda said.

"At the same time Washington itself is making preparations on the pretext of helping Chiang Kai-shek to intervene directly in the hostilities and extend aggression against China."

The article reviewed recent American military actions and plans in the Formosa area, as reported in the American press.

"To all this the Chinese people reply calmly and firmly that they are resolved to liberate Taiwan, which is their territory, and no threats or provocations can prevent the triumph of their just cause," Pravda said.

It said, "The ruling circles of countries allied to the U. S. A. hasten to take a more cautious attitude, stressing that (President) Eisenhower's move is American in nature."

Mr. President, with all the sincerity which I possess, I say I know of no living American who is more devoted to the cause of peace in the world and to the cause of preventing the holocaust of war, and more familiar with the devastation of war and with what war costs in men and material, than is the President of the United States. Time and time again in the face of great provocation of things which in the long course of history would have been considered acts of war, such as the shooting down of American planes in areas where they had every right to be, the illegal holding of men in uniform of our country in violation of the Korean armistice terms, which are certainly acts of war, he has demonstrated his peaceful inclinations. In order to prevent the provoking of hostilities, he has—and I say this as one who has been sometimes critical of things which have been done or which have not

been done—leaned over backward to preserve peace with honor, which is far different from peace at any price.

Mr. President, I again plead with every Member of the Senate to look at the record, to read the record, to go to the committee room this afternoon, or to go there tonight and read it. They have no business which is more important to them than to read the entire record even if they have to cancel every engagement they have made. If that were done, they could not fairly draw the deduction that this resolution was either intended or meant to provide for preventive war, or provide for aggression against the Chinese Communist regime, or against any other nation on the face of the earth.

It is not only the high responsibility of the Senate of the United States, but, according to my view, the high responsibility of the American press, that that fact be made clear to the people of this Nation and to the people of the world, before great damage is done to the security of the United States.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I shall be glad to yield when I have completed my statement. The Senator from Oregon asked that he be not interrupted during the course of his remarks. There were several times when I would have liked to interrupt him. I think it would have been helpful if we could have carried on a colloquy during his remarks. But he preferred it the other way, and I think he was entirely within his rights.

We are dealing with a serious problem, one which could, to be sure, ultimately lead to peace or to war, but there is a considerable body of opinion on the part of those who are just as much devoted to the cause of peace, just as much interested in the American people, just as much interested in the children and grandchildren of America and the heritage we shall pass on to them as are any other classes of our citizens, who feel that the alternative of doing nothing or of passing an emasculated resolution will more quickly and more directly lead to war than will the action proposed by the President of the United States in order to stabilize the situation in the Pacific.

Mr. President, I believe the time has come when, as responsible men, and Members of this great legislative body, and as citizens of the United States, whether we serve here or elsewhere, we must face up to the fact that the Far East today hangs in the balance. There is responsible judgment in the highest councils of our Nation that if nothing is done, if the Chinese Communists are permitted to go unchallenged from island to island down the coastal island chain, ultimately and inevitably they will launch a massive attack, as is stated not only in the Pravda article and by Chou En-lai, but is repeated time and time again.

If it be true that the last administration believed as does the present administration, that it is not in our national interest to permit this great chain of islands to pass into Communist hands, and that the loss of Formosa can be detrimental to the holding of our position

in the Pacific, then we must decide what reasonable and prudent steps should be taken to see that that shall not happen.

If we do nothing, the nations which hang in the balance will say, as they have said heretofore, that the United States of America, as the Chinese put it, is a "paper tiger"; that when we hear one slight roar out of Mao Tse-tung or Chou En-lai, we back down from our position; we dare not uphold our friends in the Pacific; we dare not uphold our own positions in the Pacific; and we will lose the remaining free nations in Asia today. That is the condition which the people of our country, the Congress, and the Government must face up to.

I have said that the President of the United States is devoted to the cause of peace. Every Member of the Senate, everyone in the galleries, everyone throughout the country, knows that to be a fact. There is no person who is more devoted to religious principles than is the President of the United States.

This joint resolution has not come before Congress in any quick, un-thought-out way. It has come only because the President of the United States, having the greatest responsibilities which any nation ever has placed upon any human being in all time, and living in a sort of solitary loneliness, if I may say so, in sleep, work, and in recreation, cannot escape his final responsibility as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

The President cannot go on a brief vacation or fulfill a social engagement without having always in the back of his mind that thought that he may at any moment get a message saying that our Armed Forces have been attacked in some area of the world. What a tremendous responsibility for any person to be called upon to bear. The American people have made the office of the Presidency the most burdensome and man-killing job the world has ever known.

Do Senators think that the President lightly prepared his message to Congress suggesting the joint resolution? Everyone knows that that did not happen. The joint resolution comes before Congress not only with the recommendation of the President of the United States, but also of the Secretary of State, who is an experienced diplomat. It comes before Congress with the endorsement of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the belief that the outlines presented by the President are in keeping with our vital security interests in the Pacific.

The joint resolution has been endorsed by the unanimous vote of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It has passed the House of Representatives, I repeat, by a vote of 410 to 3. It has been reported to the Senate by a vote in committee of 26 to 2, with 2 amendments having been offered and having been rejected by a vote of 20 to 8.

Certainly those persons also are concerned about the honor of the United States.

I would not stand here today and make the statements I have made—and I believe my statements would be borne out by other Members who sat in the committee—if I interpreted this measure

as did the Senator from Oregon, as having any semblance of being a joint resolution calling for preventive war or aggression.

I submit that the evidence is clear and unmistakable that the President believes that the situation in the Pacific can be stabilized if with the judgment and consent of the sovereign government of the Republic of China on Formosa the Nationalist Chinese can simply redeploy certain of their forces which are located on certain of the islands referred to as the Tachen group and perhaps other islands in that general area. Redeploy them to do what? To defend more effectively the bastion of Formosa which, as a national policy, we have said must not pass into Communist hands.

Why cannot the Government of the Republic of China, which was our ally in two world wars, and which offered to come to our support in the Korean war, but was turned down, themselves defend this group of islands some 200 miles north? Simply because they do not have the air power to provide effective cover. The Chinese Communists have superiority in the air. They can interfere with the resupply and reequipment of the Nationalist Chinese. Unless the Nationalist Chinese were either supported directly by us or we could give them cover support for redeployment, it would mean a Dunkerque in that area of the world, and would result in the loss of a substantial number of Chinese Nationalist troops who could better be used for the support and defense of the island of Formosa.

There have been suggestions of better ways of accomplishing the desired result. I suppose a resolution has never come before the Senate which could not be fly-specked, or in which a word could not be changed here or there. But the pending joint resolution has been given deep consideration by the President, by the National Security Council, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by the Secretary of State, having in mind our obligations under the United Nations Charter, our obligations to our allies in Europe, and our obligations to our allies in the Pacific, as well; for, I repeat, we have a mutual defense pact with the Republic of Korea, with Japan, with the Philippines—and also historic ties with the Philippines—and with the Anzus powers, including Australia and New Zealand. There is before the Senate a treaty, not yet acted upon, dealing with southeast Asia, the so-called Manila pact. There will be pending before long a similar mutual defense pact with the Republic of China on Formosa, which is the only gap in that long area of defensive chains.

There have been some who have suggested that the joint resolution should be changed. Changed how? One of the suggestions was that the reference to certain other areas now in friendly hands should be eliminated. Presumably it was thought on the part of the proponents of that amendment that to do so would further limit the action of the United States. The proponents of the amendment had a perfect right to submit their proposal. I am not complaining about

that. Men may honestly differ. No one is infallible. But the proposal was that there should be such a limitation, which would mean, quite frankly, that regardless of what might occur, the United States should not, even if in the judgment of the President it was wise to do so and, of course, no one suggests that one iota of his powers as Commander in Chief, whatever they may be under the Constitution, can be either added to or subtracted from by whatever Congress might provide in a resolution—use our forces on the offshore islands other than Formosa and the Pescadores. So the amendment is a restrictive proposal.

If the intent and the purpose of such an amendment be as I have suggested, what would it accomplish? It would be a green light to the Chinese Communists to proceed to take those islands. We would be saying to them, "You can feel absolutely certain that, with impunity, you send your invading forces, your paratroopers, troops from amphibious craft into that line of islands, regardless of their relationship to the safety of Formosa. Come and get them, and get them now."

There is a school of thought that believes that the proponents of the amendment are mistaken; that actually what the amendment would accomplish would be to impose, in a way, restrictions upon the President, because now he is limited in that particular field, so far as the resolution is concerned, to other areas in friendly hands, which means that only on those islands or areas in friendly hands, which in his judgment, and that of the Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are believed to be essential to the protection of Formosa, could our Armed Forces be used. They could not be used under the resolution, on the mainland of China, or even on the islands presently held by other than friendly hands.

But let us look at this picture in its entirety. What is the proposal again? If the Government of the Republic of China believes that it would serve the mutual defense interests to redeploy its forces, we shall do what? We shall be in a position, if the President and his advisers deem it wise, to furnish cover and facilities for deployment of those forces, and save another Dunkerque. We would not be committing an act of aggression. We would merely be trying to stabilize peace in the Pacific. There can be no question about that. There would not be a shot fired by either an American plane or an American ship unless fired upon.

Can anyone suppose that, if the American Air Force or the American Navy were giving cover for that type of humanitarian effort in an effort to evacuate persons from certain islands, if it was determined to do that, and if the Communists sent a wave of MIG planes to attack the carriers which were furnishing the planes to give such protection, and attempted to sink our carriers, our forces would take it and do nothing? Is it desired to draw a line, or to provide a sanctuary, with the understanding that when American planes reached within 3 miles of the Chinese coast, they

could go no further, but would have to return to their carriers, wait to be refueled, re-armed, and re-equipped, so that the enemy planes could come again in another wave and attempt to sink the carriers of the 7th Fleet, and other American forces that might happen to be there? I cannot believe that any person who has thought the problem through would want to tie the President's hands to that extent.

I repeat, this is a resolution of peace. It is a resolution of stability. The President of the United States has invited the United Nations to give consideration to the problem in the Pacific. I have stated it, and I repeat that there is not one iota of desire or intent, in the President's message, in the resolution, in the action of the House of Representatives, in the action of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services in the Senate, that the resolution be passed for the purposes of either making possible a preventive war or aggression against the Chinese Communist regime, or any other regime.

I only hope and pray that the misinterpretation or the misconstruction which may have been placed on the resolution has not already done great damage to our national security, and the security of the men in the 7th Fleet who are manning the outposts in the Pacific, for the situation is just that serious. Problems and wars have resulted from less than such statements. There is a big difference between having a columnist or newspaperman make certain statements and having a statement made on the floor of the Senate which may be interpreted as an official American Government policy. Again I say that men may honestly differ, but at least I have given my views as a spokesman for the administration and the President's party in this matter which is not a partisan matter because the resolution was reported in the House by Representative JAMES P. RICHARDS, of South Carolina, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and in the Senate by the able and distinguished chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], and the distinguished and able chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the junior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL].

Mr. President, I wish to point out that on April 29, 1954, during the Geneva conference, Mr. Chou En-lai gave a formula for peace in the Pacific which I think we should bear in mind. I read from Mr. C. L. Sulzberger's article on the first page of the New York Times of April 29, 1954, with the dateline Geneva, April 28.

In part, the article reads:

In his first speech before the Geneva conference and in the Western World, Peiping's Premier and Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, assumed a role for his country of sharp belligerence. His words were angry, even if they were read in a quiet, indeed monotonous, high-pitched voice.

Mr. Chou asserted that the United States had occupied Formosa in June 1950 and that this was Chinese territory.

Every Member of the Senate knows there is no occupation of Formosa by

the United States. We have a relatively small military mission there. The island does contain 9½ million free Chinese, and an armed force of more than 350,000 non-Communist Chinese. The population is larger than that of 30 nations who are members of the United Nations and are sitting in the General Assembly. So it is no small, inconsequential island. It is larger than Denmark, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Ireland. It is the approximate size, in population, of Australia. So let us put the island in its proper perspective.

Let me continue to read from the article of Mr. Sulzberger:

He proposed that "all foreign military bases in Asia be removed."

Listen to this, Members of the Senate of the United States. He has laid down his formula. He has said:

If you want to follow this formula, you can get stability, for a brief time, in the Pacific.

Mark my words and listen to the statement that Chou En-lai spoke at the Geneva Conference:

He proposed "that all foreign military bases in Asia be removed, foreign armed forces stationed in Asian countries be withdrawn."

He stated, in effect, "Be prepared to withdraw from Japan, from Korea, from Okinawa, and your military mission from Formosa, from the Philippines, from southeast Asia, and you can have a temporary settlement in the Pacific."

Mr. Chou went on to say:

The remilitarization of Japan be prevented, and all economic blockades and restrictions be abolished.

Later a spokesman from the Chinese Communist delegation clarified this implied demand in alleging that the United States had "more than several hundred military bases in Japan."

The formula has been laid out. It was laid out there at the Geneva Conference. It has been repeated time and time again.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a part of the remarks of Mr. Chou which was published in the New York Times of April 29, 1954, and a part of the text which appears on page 4, be printed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the statement and text were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

In his first speech before the Geneva conference and in the Western World, Peiping's Premier and Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, assumed a role for his country of sharp belligerence. His words were angry even if they were read in a quiet, indeed monotonous, high-pitched voice.

Mr. Chou asserted that the United States had occupied Formosa in June 1950 and that this was Chinese territory.

He proposed that "all foreign military bases in Asia be removed, foreign armed forces stationed in Asian countries be withdrawn, the remilitarization of Japan be prevented, and all economic blockades and restrictions be abolished."

Later a spokesman from the Chinese Communist delegation clarified this implied demand in alleging that the United States had "more than several hundred military bases in Japan."

STATEMENT BY MR. CHOU

This is the first time that the foreign ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Republic of France, the People's Republic of China, and other countries concerned have met together, at the same table, to examine and solve the most pressing problems of Asia. Our task is intricate. However, the convening of this conference signifies in itself the growing possibility of settling international disputes by the peaceful means of negotiations. The delegation of the People's Republic of China hopes that all the delegates to this conference will make due efforts to fulfill this task.

The government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people consistently work for peace and against war. We have never committed and will never commit aggression against other countries; but we most emphatically shall not tolerate aggression against us by any country. We respect the right of all the nations to choose and preserve their own way of life and their own state system without interference from outside. At the same time we insist that other nations treat us in the same way. We believe if all the nations of the world observe these principles and are motivated by the mutual desire for cooperation, the peaceful coexistence of the countries with different social systems will be secured.

The People's Republic of China has already been recognized by more than 20 countries with an aggregate population of over 1,000 million. However, certain states—the U. S. A., first and foremost—still refuse to recognize the People's Republic of China and endeavor to ignore the right of the Chinese people to choose their own state system. Refusing to reconcile themselves to the defeat suffered by them in China, they are dreaming to impose upon the Chinese people the power of the Kuomintang remnant clique (the Nationalist China government on Formosa), a clique long ago thrown out by the 500 million Chinese people.

Up to now, at various international conferences they are still planting the henchmen of the Kuomintang clique to pose as representatives of the Chinese people. The People's Republic of China has been subjected to illegal discrimination with respect to its international status and rights. The peaceful development and security of China are being constantly threatened. The existence of this state of affairs and its further continuation hinder the peaceful settlement of the urgent international questions especially those of Asia, and aggravate uneasiness and tension in international relations. It is clear that this state of affairs should not prevail any longer. This conference should lay foundations for the change of this situation.

NORTH KOREAN PLAN BACKED

The delegation of the People's Republic of China fully supports the three-point proposals put forward by Foreign Minister Nam Il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in respect to the restoration of the national unity of Korea and the holding of free, all-Korean elections.

The Korean people, after their liberation from the enslavement under Japanese imperialism, have consistently aspired for the realization of Korea's independence and unity. The unification of Korea should be achieved through the holding of the all-Korean general elections under conditions precluding any foreign intervention and pressure from any terrorist group, thus enabling all the Korean people to freely express their will under peaceful conditions.

Some people do not like this only correct solution, that is, the holding of general elections in Korea to form an all-Korean Government and reunite Korea in a united, in-

dependent, and democratic state. The Syngman Rhee government does not like it, according to yesterday's speech made by the delegate of the Republic of Korea. He obviously ignores the national interests of the Korean people, trying to make it appear that without foreign interference in the internal affairs of Korea, the Korean people could not solve their democratic problems, the holding of free all-Korean democratic elections included.

This view was most vividly expressed by the delegate of the Republic of Korea when he spoke of the foreign troops in Korea. He openly called for the staying of American troops in Korea. This fact alone shows how much such claims that the South Korean regime expresses the interests of the people of Korea are worth. But the Chinese people are interested not only in this aspect of the problem, but more so in the fact that the presence of the American troops in Korea directly affects the preservation of peace in Korea and the security of the People's Republic of China.

The peaceful unification of Korea is a matter for the Korean people themselves. Therefore, for the purpose of holding nationwide free elections in Korea without foreign interference, all foreign troops must first of all be withdrawn from Korea.

From the first day of the negotiations on the cessation of hostilities in Korea, we have formally put forward the proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. Now as the armistice in Korea has already been achieved, there is even less excuse for any foreign troops to remain in Korea.

The peaceful unification of Korea has a great bearing on the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East. The successful carrying out of the peaceful unification of Korea depends on the will of the respective states concerned with the maintenance of peace in the Far East to take measures for insuring the free and peaceful development of Korea without allowing foreign interference in the internal affairs of Korea.

From what has been said, we consider that the proposals made by Foreign Minister Nam Il, head of the delegation of the democratic People's Republic of Korea, are entirely fair and reasonable. We hope that all the participants in this conference will seriously consider those proposals which could form a basis for achieving an agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem.

Since the outbreak of the war in Korea, a territory belonging to China—Taiwan [Formosa]—has been occupied by the United States of America. This question is not yet settled. As is generally known, Taiwan is part of China's territory, and its occupation by anybody can in no case be tolerated. The United States occupation of Taiwan is an act seriously violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China. At the present time Taiwan is turned into a base of the United States of America for conducting subversive activities and further aggression against the People's Republic of China. Japanese militarism which had committed aggression against nations in Asia for a long time is now being revived at an accelerated pace. This state of affairs is menacing with increasing seriousness the peace and security of the Far East and Asia.

The Government of the People's Republic of China considers that the countries of Asia should consult among themselves with a view to seeking common measures to safeguard peace and security in Asia, by assuming obligation mutually and respectively.

CONCERNED ABOUT PEACE

The people of China, as all the peoples of Asia, are concerned not only about peace in Asia but also about peace in Europe and other parts of the world. The policy of reviving German militarism and splitting Europe into mutually hostile military blocs now menaces the peace and security in Europe

and at the same time affects the situation outside Europe, aggravating tension and uneasiness in Asia. That is why we consider that in order to safeguard world peace it is necessary, through negotiation, first and foremost between the great powers, to put an end to the rearmament of Western Germany and to insure security in Europe on the basis of joint efforts of all the European states, as proposed by the Soviet Union.

We also consider that the interests of peace demand the termination of armaments race, the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons of mass extermination.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, the peoples of the whole world, especially the peoples of Asia, are following the progress of our conference with great concern. They all expect the conference to achieve positive results. Unfortunately, some Asian states which express concern about peace in Asia, such as India, Indonesia, Burma, etc., are unable to participate in our conference, which in no way can be considered as a positive aspect of this conference.

Allow me to express the hope that the delegates to this conference, guided by the interests of consolidating peace and security in Asia and in the whole world, will make joint efforts to find ways and means for solving the present urgent problems listed on the agenda of this conference.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks a statement which was made by Premier Chou En-lai, and which is dated "Tokyo, Tuesday."

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TOKYO, Tuesday.—Text of a statement by Chinese Communist Premier Chou as broadcast by the Peiping radio:

"The Government of the Peoples Republic of China has repeatedly and in solemn terms declared to the world: The Chinese people are determined to liberate their own territory of Taiwan (Formosa). Since the recent successful liberation of Yikiangshan by the Chinese people, the United States Government has, on the one hand, stepped up its military operations to make war provocations, and has, on the other hand, been engineering a conspiracy for a so-called cease-fire through the United Nations, to intervene in the Chinese people's liberation of Taiwan.

"Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory. The liberation of Taiwan is a matter of China's sovereignty and internal affairs. No outside interference is allowed. Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter also explicitly stipulates: 'Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in the matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the members to submit such matter to settlement under the present charter.'

"Therefore, neither the United Nations nor any foreign country has the right to intervene in the Chinese people's liberation of Taiwan. The Government of the People's Republic of China absolutely cannot agree to a so-called cease-fire with the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique repudiated by the Chinese people.

"It should be pointed out that the Chinese people's exercise of their own sovereign rights in liberating China's mainland and many coastal islands has never caused tension in the Far East. The present tension in the Taiwan area can only be attributed to the fact that the United States Government has occupied Taiwan, shielded the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique, and incessantly directed subversive activities and war threats against the People's Republic of China.

"The so-called mutual security treaty concluded between the United States Government and the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique has further heightened this tension and is seriously threatening peace in the Far East.

"It is very obvious that the source of this tension is the United States and not China. This tension will be eliminated as a matter of course, if the United States stops its intervention in China's internal affairs and withdraws all its Armed Forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

"The so-called cease-fire between the People's Republic of China and the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique, which the United States Government and its followers are trying to engineer, is in actuality intervention in China's internal affairs and alienation of China's territory. They are using war threats and brandishing atomic weapons in an attempt to force the Chinese people into tolerating the occupation of Taiwan by the United States, giving recognition to the United States-Chiang Kai-shek Mutual Security Treaty and permitting the use of Taiwan by the United States as a military base for preparing a new war. The Chinese people absolutely cannot tolerate this. They firmly oppose it.

"To safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, to safeguard the security of China and peace in the Far East, the Chinese people must liberate Taiwan, and the United States must stop intervening in China's internal affairs and withdraw all its Armed Forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait."

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I now read from the statement:

The Government of the People's Republic of China has repeatedly and in solemn terms declared to the world: The Chinese people are determined to liberate their own territory of Taiwan (Formosa). Since the recent successful liberation of Yikiangshan by the Chinese people, the United States Government has, on the one hand, stepped up its military operations to make war provocations, and has, on the other hand, been engineering a conspiracy for a so-called cease-fire through the United Nations, to intervene in the Chinese people's liberation of Taiwan.

Does he want a peaceful settlement? Is that statement by him an indication that he respects international law and order? Is it an indication that he is ready for membership in the United Nations, which presumably was created to help establish an international system of law and order and to assist in preserving the peace of the world for ourselves and our children? Even on that basis, does this statement of his indicate a peaceful intent on his part?

I continue to read:

Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory. The liberation of Taiwan is a matter of China's sovereignty and internal affairs. No outside interference is allowed. Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United Nations Charter also explicitly stipulates: "Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in the matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matter to settlement under the present charter."

At that point I might say, parenthetically, that the Government of the Republic of China is recognized by most of the nations of the world. It is still a member of the United Nations organization. What forces we have there for training purposes have been there by invitation of the legal, recognized Govern-

ment of the Republic of China, one which sits on the Security Council of the United Nations—just as we have sent missions into Greece, to help put down the Communist rebellion there; and just as we have sent missions into Turkey, to help the Turks resist Communist aggression from without.

I continue to read:

Therefore, neither the United Nations nor any foreign country has the right to intervene in the Chinese people's liberation of Taiwan. The Government of the People's Republic of China absolutely cannot agree to a so-called cease-fire with the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique repudiated by the Chinese people.

It should be pointed out that the Chinese people's exercise of their own sovereign rights to liberating China's mainland and many coastal islands has never caused tension in the Far East. The present tension of the Taiwan area can only be attributed to the fact that the United States Government has occupied Taiwan, shielded the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique, and incessantly directed subversive activities and war threats against the People's Republic of China.

The so-called Mutual Security Treaty concluded between the United States Government and the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique has further heightened this tension and is seriously threatening peace in the Far East.

It is very obvious that the source of this tension is the United States, and not China. This tension will be eliminated as a matter of course—

Listen to this, Mr. President—

If the United States stops its intervention in China's internal affairs and withdraws all its Armed Forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

I might say parenthetically at this point that I wonder whether my distinguished friend and colleague from the State of Oregon really believes that Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung and the other members of the hierarchy of the Communist regime in China will be a bit interested in the legalistic question as to whether there is a difference between Taiwan and the Pescadores, on the one hand, and Quemoy and the Matsu Islands and, indeed, even the Tachen groups, on the other. After all, they are all a part of China. Taiwan and the Pescadores were promised to the Republic of China by the Cairo agreement. They were promised to be returned to the Republic of China, and that is to whom they have been returned. The legalistic title may not be settled, but certainly the possession is in the hands of the Republic of China. There will be no shooting in that area of the world, in my judgment, unless the United States, in trying to stabilize, in the interests of world peace, the area there is fired upon; and in that case I do not believe the American people would expect our forces there to act as sitting ducks.

I continue to read:

The so-called cease-fire between the People's Republic of China and the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique, which the United States Government and its followers are trying to engineer, is in actuality intervention in China's internal affairs and alienation of China's territory.

In his message, Mr. President, the President of the United States himself suggested that we would be glad if the

United Nations would use its good offices to obtain a cease fire. But what was done before the ink of the message had hardly had time to dry? In view of the difference in time between the Far East and here, it was probably almost before the message was off the presses in America that Chou En-lai even repudiated a cease fire engineered by the United Nations, as being an intervention in the Chinese war; and I suppose that in that event he would consider the event itself an act of aggression.

I read further:

They are using war threats and brandishing atomic weapons in an attempt to force the Chinese people into tolerating the occupation of Taiwan by the United States, giving recognition to the United States-Chiang Kai-shek Mutual Security Treaty and permitting the use of Taiwan by the United States as a military base for preparing a new war. The Chinese people absolutely cannot tolerate this; they firmly oppose it.

To safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, to safeguard the security of China and peace in the Far East, the Chinese people must liberate Taiwan, and the United States must stop intervening in China's internal affairs and withdraw all its Armed Forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

Mr. President, that statement by Chou En-lai is entirely consistent with the statement he made at Geneva, when he said there can be peace in the Pacific, but the United States must get out of the Pacific and must withdraw to the Pacific coast States of Oregon, Washington, and California. He said that perhaps they would permit the United States to keep Alaska and Hawaii, but that the United States must get out of that area of the Pacific. He asked the other nations to denounce the mutual-security pacts they have at the present time with the United States. Then said Chou En-lai, at Geneva, "Then we shall have Asia for the Asians."

But, Mr. President, the free people of Asia know that is merely Communist semantics, and that it means that Asia will then be for the Communists. Thus there will be full realization of the prediction made 30 years ago by Lenin, when he said, "The road to Paris is through Peking"—meaning that if the Communists can get control of China, they will ultimately have control of all of Asia, with its 1½ billion people and its vast strategic resources; and once the Communists have consolidated their power in Asia, including the manpower and resources of Asia, they will then be prepared to turn with overwhelming power against the West. In that event, neither Paris nor Berlin nor Madrid nor Rome nor London would be likely to stand up against that overwhelming mass of power.

Under those circumstances, with Asia and Europe behind the Iron Curtain, although we might resist as an isolated island of freedom, the result would be sort of a continental Dien Bien Phu, and we would not be able to preserve either the economic or the political systems which have caused this Nation to grow from a small colony of 3 million on the Atlantic seaboard to a great Nation of

165 million, the most productive, agriculturally and industrially, the world has ever known, with the highest standard of living for our people; and a Nation which time and time again, at great sacrifice to itself, has poured forth its resources, in order to help maintain a free world of free men.

Now we have reached the point where we can either back up the President of the United States, and can take a position which is sound in international law, a position which will command the decent respect of the people of Asia, who are not playing "footsie" with the Communists. We will never entirely satisfy them until we completely abdicate, and agree to every demand of the Chinese Communists; and even then they will not be satisfied.

So we now have that choice. We can either draw the line and make it clear that this is in the interest of peace, and make it clear that there is not an aggressive act in the mind of the President or the Government of the United States; or we can back down, in the face of these threats, and can see all in Asia go down the drain, at the vital risk of the security of the United States, as was testified by the responsible members of our Government.

Is this situation one in which the Communists have followed a rather consistent policy? It is. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks an editorial published in the Daily Worker for Tuesday, January 25, 1955. The Daily Worker is the spokesman of the Communist Party in this country. The title of the editorial is "For Peace in Asia." It is highly critical of the recommendations of the President of the United States, and suggests that we had better get out of Taiwan if we want peace in the Pacific.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Daily Worker of January 25, 1955]

FOR PEACE IN ASIA

The American people know peace in Asia is vital to the peace of our own country.

That is why they insisted on a truce in Korea. That is why they blocked the demands of the Knowland-Radford-McCarthy crowd for intervention in Indochina.

And that is why they are so concerned now to see an end of fighting in the Formosa Straits.

Does the message which President Eisenhower sent to Congress Monday help bring peace, or does it threaten peace?

The Cairo Declaration, signed on December 1, 1943, by the United States and the other great powers, declared that all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

The Chinese islands which Japan stole from China and was forced to return, the Eisenhower administration now proposes to steal in the name of its puppet Chiang Kai-shek.

That is the sum and substance of the President's message which treats the Cairo Declaration as a scrap of paper. That is how the billion people of Asia rightly see it. No hypocritical talk by Eisenhower of peace can cover up its meaning as a threat to peace. No approval by Congress can make it lawful.

Crisis in the Far East? Yes, but it would disappear overnight if our Navy were where

it belonged. Chiang Kai-shek himself couldn't last a week on Formosa (Taiwan) without American guns—the Chinese people of Formosa themselves would throw him into the China Sea as he was thrown off the mainland.

Even the proposal to use the 7th Fleet to evacuate Chiang's mercenaries from the Tachen Islands, is highhanded intervention. The administration is trying here to prevent a defeat for Chiang from turning into a rout, and is thereby inviting an incident which could involve the United States directly in the shooting.

Every time the international atmosphere cools down a bit, the Knowland "warhaws" and the Eisenhower administration try to make it boil again. Dag Hammarskjöld's trip to China was greeted by millions of Americans as a sign of the easing of tensions. But that is just what the Cadillac Cabinet in Washington can't stand.

The administration does not dare ask even the U. N. to approve this outrageous action. The American people should not support it either, since it is a threat in the first place to the people of our country. Congress should reject Eisenhower's request for war powers. There is only one way to avoid crises and bloodshed in the Pacific, that is through talks for a peaceful settlement of all differences, based on a recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 600-million-strong People's Republic of China and of its rights to its legal seat in the U. N.

This is what all Americans who want to preserve peace and restore our own country's dignity in the eyes of the world, should tell the President and their Congressmen.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I have already spoken longer than I intended to speak. However, I felt that it was important that the RECORD be cleared, at least, insofar as I, as one Member, might clear it.

I wish to make only passing reference to the statement by the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse] regarding a so-called United Nations trusteeship over Formosa. That suggestion, or a similar suggestion, was made some time ago, officially, by some of the Communist powers, and by India. India is a great nation in population. I regard Mr. Nehru as a very sincere man. I think he hopes he can maintain a sort of balance between the East and the West. He certainly is rather severe on his domestic Communists, although at the United Nations, and in his diplomatic action, he is neutral on the side of the Communist world. Some time ago he suggested the possibility of a trusteeship over Formosa, and at one time over Korea.

How do the people of those two sovereign nations look upon such a suggestion? Mr. President, a trusteeship by the United Nations with respect to either Korea or Formosa would be looked upon by the sovereign people of those two nations as nothing but multiple colonialism. Colonialism in Asia is dead. The people on our side want no part of it. The people who are neutral want no part of it. Even the people who are on the Communist side want no part of it. They are gradually learning the bitter lesson that one type of colonialism has been supplanted by the greatest godless tyranny the world has ever known. So they would reject such a proposal.

I ask the Senator from Oregon, What United Nations mouse would bell the cat

with respect to Formosa? Formosa has a population of 9½ million. I have already said that that is a larger population than that of some 30 members of the United Nations who sit in the General Assembly. When the war in Korea broke out and the United Nations called upon its members to come to the aid of the little victim of aggression in Korea—and it will be remembered that the Communists charged that that, too, was a civil war—how many responded? Of 60 members of the United Nations only 16 besides the United States responded, and all 16 of them together supplied only 45,000 troops. The United States alone supplied more than 450,000, and we rotated more than 1 million men through Korea. The little Republic of Korea, which was the victim of aggression, supplied 650,000 troops, and today has the largest standing army in that area of the world. Indeed, it is the fifth largest standing army in the world. They are our allies and our friends. They gave a good account of themselves, but the two of us together, the Republic of Korea and the United States—supplied 95 percent of the manpower and 95 percent of the resources.

How do Senators think those people would react to a trusteeship? How do Senators think the people on Formosa would react to a trusteeship? Inasmuch as all the members of the United Nations together supplied only 45,000 troops in the Korean war, which was the first test of whether or not we could preserve a system of international law and order, are they going to disarm the government and the army of the Nationalist Government on the island of Formosa with 45,000 troops? I think not. It is not a practical suggestion, and in my judgment it will not be accepted, and should not be accepted by any decent, self-respecting sovereign people in that area of the world. Are they expected, then, in order to prevent the liquidation of their families, to place their lives in the hands of an organization which could be paralyzed by a Soviet veto, an organization which, when the chips were down, supplied only 45,000 men? Do Senators expect them to disarm 350,000 of their own troops and place their lives and future at the tender mercy of an organization which would be subject to a Soviet veto? I think not. So let us at least keep this discussion on a practical plane, and realize that we have some obligations to those people.

If it were not a fact that the President of the United States, the Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this proposal is in the vital interest of our country, there might be a question involved. But the purpose of this action is not to help the Republic of China as such—although it would help it, of course—any more than our agreement with Japan and the Philippines was solely for the purpose of helping them.

This action is proposed because we do not think it is in the vital interests of this Nation to permit that island chain to go down the drain, and to move back toward the Pacific Coast States, one of which is, in part, represented by the dis-

tinguished Senator from Oregon, and another of which I represent, in part. That would not be in our interest or the interest of the free world.

So, Mr. President, I hope that at least I have been able to afford some clarification on this question. It is the desire and intent of the President and of the Government that the proposed course of action shall be an act of peace and of stabilization in the Pacific. It will be nothing more than that unless the Chinese Communists themselves make it war.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I congratulate the able minority leader on his fine presentation of the essence of this issue. He will recall that beginning in 1949, I believe, he and I visited the Far East a number of times. Our visits were not limited to Formosa, and they were not concerned solely with that issue. They related to Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Indochina, Australia, New Zealand, and the entire Southeast Asia area, including Thailand, Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia. The present message of the President of the United States relates to that entire area and its relation to the other areas of the world.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I agree with the Senator.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Will the Senator also bear me out when I suggest that those of us who have been there in person and have studied the areas and talked with the leaders of those countries may perhaps be better qualified to express a global view on this question than those who have not been there? I express the thought that every member of the Foreign Relations Committee and every member of the Armed Services Committee should be familiar with that area before criticizing the President of the United States for what seems to us to be obviously a step which he feels he must take at this time, with the full collaboration of the Secretary of State and the members of his administration in the interests of the security of the United States.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THURMOND in the chair). Does the Senator from California yield to the Senator from Minnesota?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, I wish to place myself on record as concurring in the remarks of the distinguished minority leader [Mr. KNOWLAND]. He has well stated the issue. I was in the committee room the first day of the hearing on this resolution, when the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, appeared before the committee. At that time I endeavored to acquaint myself with the entire question, as best I could. I was in the Far East a year ago. I believe the President has taken the only sane, sound, and proper course of action in laying before this legislative body, representing the people of the respective States, a resolution which would give him the assurance that we, as

a legislative body, stand behind him, in the event that his action may in any sense involve this great Nation in a military role in the Far East.

The Senator from California has stated the case ably, and I wish to commend him for doing so. He has expressed better than I could possibly have expressed my conviction and opinion on this very grave question.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I thank the distinguished Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I wish to add a few words to those expressed by the senior Senator from California this afternoon, in support of the resolution, which was reported jointly by the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services.

I do so because I join him in wishing to leave no false impression either with the Senate, with the people of our country, or with the peoples of other countries as to the feeling of many of us who have considered and discussed the subject, not only today, but over many years.

Let us never forget the primary purpose of this resolution. Let us keep ever before our eyes the primary purpose of the President. That primary purpose in each case is to maintain the security of our country, with the least possible bloodshed by American boys. We wish to do everything we can to keep peace in the world, to maintain our security in the United States, and to cause as little harm as is possible to those of our boys who must fight for us.

Let us never lose sight of that primary purpose. Let us never forget that that is the primary obligation of the President, as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces and as head of our diplomatic and policy-making establishment, responsible for our foreign relations.

The senior Senator from California has emphasized the fact that the President's only motive is to keep the peace.

I have attended almost every meeting at which this vital subject has been discussed, at which the President has led the discussion. Certainly, as one who has listened to him, I have always heard him state most fervently that his one motive was to keep peace in the world and to obtain a better and more durable peace than exists in the world at the present time. Certainly his intention is not to initiate an act of war.

I have served on the military committees of the Senate since I have been a Member of this body, first on the Naval Affairs Committee, and then on the Committee on Armed Services, over a period of more than 10 years. During that time the committees on which I have served have authorized new aircraft carriers. They have authorized new types of weapons. They have increased the manpower of the Armed Forces, and have considered measures increasing the pay of the members of the Armed Forces.

Those of us who have served on those committees have taken all manner of steps designed to improve the defense of our country, to enable our country to obtain maximum security, and to strengthen the morale and efficiency of our armed services.

We have done that over the past 10 years.

The purpose of the resolution which we shall consider tomorrow, and which was reported jointly by these two committees, after considering it for 2 days, is to make certain that the peace is kept. Its purpose is to insure that the military forces which we have built up, and which we want to make ever more efficient, will be able to act to maintain and protect our security with the least possible bloodshed by those of our boys who would be the first to fight in our behalf.

In all the briefings of the military committees on which I have served, it has been made perfectly clear, as it has been made perfectly clear to the people of the United States by the Secretary of State and by the President and by others, that our first line of defense runs from the Aleutians in the north, through Japan and Okinawa to Formosa and the Philippines, down as far as Australia and New Zealand.

As the senior Senator from California has pointed out, if Formosa is taken out of that line of defense and allowed to fall into unfriendly hands, the airline between Okinawa and the Philippines and the sealanes between Japan and Australia could be cut off. In that way our military forces which we have established and strengthened on Okinawa and Formosa and in the Philippines could be seriously interfered with.

Therefore, as the President has stated, Formosa is important to our security. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that it remain in friendly hands. The purpose of this resolution is to support the President's effort to do just that—keep Formosa in friendly hands.

Since 1950, the 7th Fleet has been patrolling the sealanes off Formosa in an effort to maintain the defensive attitude of Formosa and to keep it from being invaded from the mainland, which is only a little more than 100 miles away.

In the resolution which the President has requested he asks to be given authority to defend Formosa, the Pescadores, and certain other islands which are in friendly hands, in order to make sure that no enemy will land on Formosa.

I am not disclosing any security information when I say that if we permit hostile Communist troops to board junks in certain island harbors, it will be much easier for the enemy to approach Formosa than otherwise. It would create a grave danger for our boys who may have to defend the area between Formosa and the mainland. If those islands with those harbors are protected and kept in friendly hands, the possibility that junks could use those harbors for the purpose of invasion becomes more remote.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would rather not yield, because I do not desire my trend of my thought to be interrupted.

The purpose of the resolution, as I say, and the purpose of the vote of the committees in jointly reporting the resolution, is to maintain our security with the least possible bloodshed of American boys. Let us never forget that fact.

That is the thought I try to keep everlastingly before me in considering this subject. The distinguished senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], in the course of his remarks, to which I listened attentively, and which the senior Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND] answered so ably, makes four points, as I understand. The first point is that the constitutional authority of the President permits him to act without any action on the part of Congress.

The second point is that the resolution initiates an act of aggression.

Third, the senior Senator from Oregon states, the passage of the resolution may involve the question of usurping the sovereignty of another nation.

Finally, he brings up the question of the United Nations, and the question of making more use of the United Nations.

So far as the constitutional power of the President is concerned, let me say that if immediate action on his part is required, the President certainly can be relied upon to act. If there is involved a situation which will continue for several weeks or months, even 6 months or a year, as may prove to be the case when it comes to the protection of the Formosan Strait, then certainly he has the privilege of asking the Congress to join with him in assuming responsibility.

As I see it, that is what he is doing in this instance. Congress must appropriate the funds. Congress must build up the manpower of the Nation. Congress becomes intimately involved in any act of this kind. It is not an act of aggression, but an act that will maintain the security of our country with the least possible danger to American boys.

Is this an act of aggression? As the senior Senator from Oregon was speaking, I tried to think of a very simple situation that comes up in everyday life. We know that Chou En-lai has made the most violent statements about Formosa and about our so-called interference with Formosa. When a man is calling us all kinds of names, and is raising his fists, and we know he is a strong man, what are we going to do? Shall we wait until he strikes the first blow? If we wait for the first blow, we may never be able to strike back.

In the world of sport, which we all love, let us consider football, which I used to play badly. A player, let us assume, is about to throw a forward pass. Is the opposing team going to let him throw the forward pass without any effort to defend its goal line, or is it going to stop him? We see that situation in every game of football we watch.

Whatever we may do, when we see the massing of junks or of planes and note what Chou En-lai has said about our acts in Formosa, are we going to stand with our hands at our sides, or are we going to maintain our security with the least possible bloodshed on the part of our Armed Forces?

That, as I see it, is the important question. There is no question of sovereignty of nations involved. We are not going to attack any nation unless our own security is in danger. If our own security is in danger, we must be

guided by circumstances as to what will best preserve our security with the least possible loss of the blood of American boys.

Finally, Mr. President, I should like to say something about the United Nations. There is no one who desires to see the United Nations succeed more than I do. I was for the League of Nations in 1920. I voted for the United Nations when that question came before this body in 1945 and 1946. I wanted the United Nations to succeed. But if we load that organization with tasks that it clearly cannot accomplish, it will lose its prestige and its opportunity for doing future good. If we ask the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire now, we are placing a burden on that organization which it will be very difficult for it to bear.

We are even now asking the United Nations to help us to get back some of our prisoners of war. I hope it will succeed. If it does not, we must do something about it. The United Nations can accomplish it only by persuasion, and it cannot be very forceful at this time in attempting to influence men like Chou En-lai.

So the President, in sending his message to the Congress, asks us to join with him in carrying out the great responsibility which is his in the first instance. He is asking us to help him carry it, because he thinks it will offer the best opportunity for maintaining peace in the world and maintaining our security with the least possible loss of blood. Let us not forget that fact for a single minute when we vote on this question tomorrow or the following day.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield for a question?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.

Mr. LONG. I should like the Senator to clear up 1 or 2 points with which I am much concerned. The Senator is a member of the Armed Services Committee, and served as chairman of that committee last year. He is familiar with many of these problems. The Senator made the statement that he was in favor of maintaining our security with the least possible loss of lives.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is correct.

Mr. LONG. I should like to ask the Senator which would tend toward the least possible cost in lives, the holding of an island 75 miles away from the shores of an enemy power, when we have the most powerful navy in the world to defend the straits, or the holding of an island right at the entrance of an enemy harbor.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The holding of an island at the entrance of an enemy harbor is primarily to be done by the Chinese troops who are on the island today. The furnishing of air cover, our ability to support the troops by airpower, and perhaps from the sea, will provide an additional source of power to those islands and will keep the harbors free.

Mr. LONG. The question I had in mind was, Which would tend to cost us the greatest loss of life, and which would be the most difficult—to hold an island lying against the shoreline at the mouth of an enemy harbor, or to hold an island 75 miles away?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I think what we want to do, clearly, is to prevent an invasion of Formosa. If we allow ships to be collected in those harbors to invade Formosa, it makes it much more difficult for us, and it makes it possible for them to land a greater number of troops successfully.

Mr. LONG. The Senator agrees with me, does he not, that Communist China has very few fighting ships, particularly very few modern ones?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I agree with the Senator; but it has many, many thousands of junks. It has not much regard for human life; and if a large number of junks start out at night, it is very difficult—

Mr. LONG. The Senator is not concerned about the firepower of a Chinese junk, is he?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. No; but I am concerned about the number of junks which can do damage at night.

Mr. LONG. I know of no seaworthy craft that could not be picked up by radar. Certainly, we could defend at night as well as in the daytime.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I wish to make it clear to my colleague that I do not think any naval officer will testify that every junk can be stopped.

Mr. LONG. Of course, the Senator agrees with me that there are at least 500,000 well-trained troops on Formosa.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Less than that, but there is a substantial number. The Senator from California mentioned 350,000. I should think he is correct in that figure.

Mr. LONG. We have spent large amounts of money in connection with those troops, and they are well equipped and well trained.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Yes; and we hope they are being better equipped and trained as time goes on.

Mr. LONG. In order to have our ships in a position to support islands such as Quemoy it would be necessary to bring the ships within range of Communist land-based guns, would it not?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would not agree with the Senator's statement in that regard.

Mr. LONG. The Senator would agree that those ships would be in much more hazard, would he not?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would agree that they would be closer to the shore, but if the harbors are kept clear, the danger of troops landing in Formosa is that much less.

Mr. LONG. Is there any doubt in the Senator's mind whether Formosa can be held without attacking Communist harbors prior to the time the fleet puts to sea?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would hope that that question can be answered "Yes." I know I cannot answer the question. In other words, I would not agree with the Senator from Louisiana on that point. Do I make myself clear?

Mr. LONG. Yes. Would the Senator agree with me that this resolution accepts in advance the President's judgment as to whether it is desirable and necessary to bomb the Chinese mainland prior to the time a Chinese fleet with a

Chinese troop concentration could be put to sea?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would say that the resolution, if passed, would recognize the principle that the Commander in Chief can use his best discretion, his best experience, and his best knowledge in handling the situation for the security of Formosa and the Pescadores and with the least loss of life of American citizens.

Mr. LONG. Does not the resolution, by its terms, state specifically that the President should take such action as in his judgment would hold those islands which he believes should be in friendly hands?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Those are the islands which are in friendly hands today.

Mr. LONG. Therefore, this resolution does accept in advance the judgment of the President as to whether we should bombard or bomb the Chinese mainland?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I think that what it does is to place reliance upon the judgment of the Commander in Chief; and this particular Commander in Chief has given his whole life to a comprehensive understanding of military problems.

Mr. LONG. The resolution relies upon his judgment, but it accepts his judgment in advance, in that it instructs him to take such action if, in his judgment, he deems it to be proper.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. If he did not come to Congress, but exercised the constitutional authority he has for the direction of our Armed Forces in an emergency, then Congress would have to rely upon his judgment anyway.

Mr. LONG. The point I have in mind is that, once again, the President, not being in the field, would necessarily be forced to accept the judgment of the commander in the field as to whether or not it was necessary and desirable, all facts considered, to undertake to bombard the Chinese mainland.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. He could accept the recommendation of the commander in the field, and then exercise final judgment himself, as has been stated in the press. That authority he has used in one or two instances already.

Mr. LONG. Would not the Senator agree with me that even without this resolution, if the President felt that it was essential and necessary to undertake to attack the Chinese mainland prior to the time our own units were attacked, in that event this Nation would expect the President to take such action?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. If the act of aggression by Chou En-lai were made evident by the concentrations of planes and ships, then the President would, in his discretion, have to do what I have tried to indicate I would do in the circumstances, namely, defend and protect this country by taking appropriate action at that time.

Mr. LONG. Whether or not Congress would support such action would then depend upon the facts of the particular case. Would not that be correct?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Whatever occasion arose, naturally, Congress would have to determine what action, if any, was necessary afterward. My under-

standing is that no action would be necessary, except, of course, action on appropriations.

Mr. LONG. In view of that fact, why should it be necessary for Congress to approve in this case the basis upon which the President should undertake to attack the Chinese mainland, without our knowing what the facts are?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I disagree with the Senator's premise. I do not agree that the President necessarily would direct an attack upon the Chinese mainland. I should hope that it would not be necessary. But the President has appropriate constitutional powers. This situation is not going to end overnight. It will continue for a week or 10 days, 6 weeks or 2 months, or perhaps 10 months. Therefore, the President has asked us to join with him, and to have the American people join with him, in undertaking to carry out his responsibility for the security of the country.

Mr. LONG. Will the Senator from Massachusetts explain why Congress should approve in advance a decision to attack the Chinese mainland, without our knowing what the facts might be whenever that should occur?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator from Louisiana continues to refer to an attack on the Chinese mainland. I should hope that it would not be necessary to attack the Chinese mainland. I hope that by the policy we are now considering we will prevent any effort on the part of the Chinese Communists to build up and activate their forces.

Mr. LONG. I believe the Senator from Massachusetts has already agreed with me that the joint resolution would approve of the President using his judgment in undertaking to attack the Chinese mainland, if he thought it necessary to do so.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I do not think the placing of ground troops on the Chinese mainland is at all contemplated. So far as I can foresee in the future, there will be no use for ground troops on any of the islands or, in any event, on the mainland.

Mr. LONG. We are speaking of air bombing and naval fire.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Naval fire and air bombing, at the most.

Mr. LONG. The point I make is, Why approve such action in advance, without knowing the facts upon which action might be based at a particular time?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Because it affords us the greatest opportunity for security with the least possible bloodshed. By letting Chou En-lai know that we are going to stand our ground and are not going to hold back helplessly, we hope that we will prevent any attack. That is the basis for our action, as I see it.

Mr. LONG. How can we be sure in our judgment that the Chinese Reds are actually going to be able to attack Formosa?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. It is a risk. Of course any positive policy is a risk these days. This is the least possible risk to our security.

Mr. LONG. Would not that be a case of our firing the first shot, in that sense?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I cannot say it would not; I would hope not.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I yield.
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I congratulate the Senator from Massachusetts upon his very clear statement, which is entirely extemporaneous. There is one thing at this time about which I wish to question him, since he is a very distinguished and experienced lawyer.

We have heard a great deal, pro and con, from Members about the question of sovereignty. I submit to the Senator that there is involved no question of sovereignty, in the international sense of the word, in our relationship with the Red forces in China. There is a de facto ability on the part of the Reds in China to exercise force. But sovereignty among nations, as we know it, is a technical situation, in which the recognition of de jure rights is accorded by the nations of the world, and such recognition is generally considered to be binding upon the nations which accord it.

The United States has never recognized the sovereignty, the political integrity, or the right of the Government of Red China to speak for the Chinese people. We have, on the contrary, continued our recognition, official and otherwise, of the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Republic of China as now exercised by the Nationalist Government, which presently has its seat in Formosa.

Does the Senator from Massachusetts agree, therefore, that the question of sovereignty probably does not apply to the claimed authority of the Red organization in China?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator from Iowa has expressed the situation much better than I could express it. I agree with him entirely, and I repeat one point I tried to make earlier. I do not ask Senators to agree with me, but it is my feeling that that question would not arise unless our own security were imperiled. If our own security were imperiled, then it would be necessary for the United States Government to take whatever steps were necessary at the time to save the lives of American boys, and not to have our grandchildren or great-grandchildren raise questions at some later time.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. In connection with the defense of Quemoy and the Matsus, which are I believe, the other series of islands in the vicinity of Fuchow, is there any question in the Senator's mind that the Chinese Nationalists themselves have ample troops on those islands to defend the islands, and that at present there is no particular indication that they will need additional manpower on those islands, provided they receive adequate logistical support, and that they can defend themselves for an indefinite period against the announced intended attacks on the part of the Red forces of China?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. That is the information which has been supplied to us. The Senator has correctly stated the situation.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Therefore, the defense of those islands by Chinese

Nationalist troops themselves would be, in fact, a defensive action, which would postpone or eliminate the threat of action by the Reds against Formosa, a threat which might, indeed, call for the shedding of American blood.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator is correct.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. In other words, if the bastions are now being protected by Nationalist Chinese troops in sufficient numbers, and can probably continue to be protected by Chinese troops in sufficient numbers, provided they receive logistical support, it puts the danger of shedding American blood just that much further away from Formosa and the Pescadores; and therefore, it would be to our interest, in my view, that the islands which would guard the entrances to the harbors where staging operations could be undertaken by the Reds should be as far away from Formosa as possible, and there is already Chinese Nationalist manpower in position to do that job in the foreseeable future.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator from Iowa has expressed the situation well and clearly. His view is in accordance with the evidence which has been given to us. I believe that is the only purpose the President had in mind in requesting the passage of a joint resolution by Congress at this time.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I thank the Senator. Before I conclude my questions, and without desiring to take any further time from the Senator from California, I wish to say that I think the Senator from California has given one of the most masterful extemporaneous expositions and analyses of this situation, or of any other situation, that I have heard since I have been on the floor of the Senate. I wish to congratulate him for the vigor, clarity, and force with which he has set forth the position of the United States and of President Eisenhower in the effort to preserve the peace of the world, to do everything we can to that end, and to prevent what would otherwise be the certainty of American involvement at some time in the not too distant future, if we do not act now to put out the incipient fire which otherwise might take hold and burn up our whole free civilization.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I wish first to agree with the last statement made by the Senator from Iowa. I now yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Does not the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts think there would be more benefit if some of the so-called neutral nations who have been playing "footsie" with the Chinese Communists, both in the United Nations and elsewhere, during the whole Korean struggle, instead of proposing a trusteeship for Formosa, where the people have had free elections, would suggest free elections in Communist China, in order to let the people of Communist China determine by vote, rather than by force of arms, whether they wanted to be a free China or a Commu-

nist China? If that were done, and if the same amount of effort were to be exerted for such a proposal, we might find that there might be two Chinas. We might find that the Communist-dominated areas of Manchuria and north China, which now are so closely allied to the Soviet Union that they are almost a part of it, might decide to be Communist China; but south of the Yangtze River, we might find that if the people had an opportunity to express themselves, they would have a free China.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. There is much evidence on which to base a belief that there are many persons in the south of China who would like to be under a different regime, and under a free China regime, as the Senator from California has suggested.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, I rise for the purpose of sending to the desk a proposed substitute, which I presented in the committee this morning, which I intend to offer on behalf of myself and a number of other Senators at the appropriate time, when the resolution is under consideration. I ask that the amendment be printed for the information of the Senate, and lie on the table.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment will be printed and will lie on the table.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, I wish to speak very briefly in explanation of the substitute which I propose to offer at the appropriate time. Later I shall discuss it in more detail.

The question before the Senate presents a very grave issue, which is very likely to result in a war with Communist China, and perhaps a general war. Therefore, I am glad that the Senate is going to take ample time to debate and consider the question.

I am glad the distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] has made a full explanation of his point of view, with much of which I agree. I wish to compliment him for his address. He has spoken with great sincerity and with much conviction.

Likewise, the distinguished Senator from California has clearly and forcefully stated his point of view. I do not agree with the criticism made by the Senator from California of the Senator from Oregon that the Senator from Oregon was not justified in talking about the possibility of a preventive war. I hope all Senators will read the RECORD, but I wish to say that if there was any doubt about the matter, the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], in his colloquy with the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER], has clearly brought out that possibility as a part of the result which might follow if the joint resolution were enacted.

The Senator from Massachusetts always understates matters. He is a thoughtful and a conservative gentleman. However, not more than 10 minutes ago the Senator from Massachusetts said that the purpose of the resolution was to make it possible, if it looked as if the Communists were "going to throw a pass," for our forces to strike the first lick. I do not know a better

definition of preventive war than such a statement.

In the Senator's remarks it was brought out that it would be up to us to decide whether a staging, or concentration, or collection of ships, or shipping, and whatnot, in our judgment, and in the judgment of the political leaders of the islands off the coast of China, would be such a situation as would require, under the resolution, an invasion of the mainland of China, or the dropping of bombs on the mainland of China. So that aspect is perfectly clear. Everyone who reads the RECORD will realize the possibility which is embodied in the resolution of bombings, and of carrying of war to the mainland of China. So I think that the Senate should carefully consider the resolution, because it seems to me probably to be a war resolution.

Mr. President, I think war may come out of the present situation, whether any resolution is passed or not. Our citizens ought to understand that we are considering a question which may lead us into war very soon. The Senate should endeavor to get the resolution in such shape that it will result in the least possible chance of war, and still maintain our honor.

In the second place, if such an unhappy day must come when we go to war, I think we must insure our being in a favorable position in the eyes of the world, in seeking international justice and standing for justifiable rights, so that we will not be all alone, if such a horrible catastrophe should befall us. In other words, we must try to have public opinion, world public opinion, on our side. We must have allies.

I fully agree with the Senator from California that this is a time when we would all like to back up the President, and when we should have national unity. We do want national unity.

I say to the Senator from California that if the terms of the resolution were limited to the defense, by all the forces we have, if necessary, of Formosa and the Pescadores, which the resolution has been advertised to the people of the Nation as encompassing, I do not think there would be one vote against the resolution in the United States Senate. I do not know of any Senator present who would not favor using all of our military forces, pending a fair and equitable final disposition of the island of Formosa, in a defense of that vital island, and the protection of the obligation that we took upon ourselves when our military forces occupied Formosa after the war with Japan. So if it is unity the minority leader is seeking, all that is necessary is to see to it that we are kept from getting involved with Chiang on these little coastal islands.

If what is desired is the protection of the Pescadores and Formosa, there can be absolute unity, in my opinion, as registered by the vote of every Member of the United States Senate.

But, Mr. President, when it comes to the question of the coastal islands, that is another thing, for they are in a different category, as compared with Formosa. The coastal islands have always been Chinese territory. Formosa was ceded to Japan, I believe, in 1895. We

have a moral and a legal obligation to protect Formosa; that is our obligation under the treaty of peace, and in view of our having occupied Formosa, after our forces captured it during the last war. Come what may, no vote in the Senate should be interpreted by anyone as meaning that any Member of the Senate is not willing to vote to have the United States use all its forces for the protection of the Pescadores and Formosa.

Mr. President, I feel very sincerely that agreement to use our forces to defend Quemoy and Matsu and the coastal islands will greatly increase the risk of our becoming involved in a general war. There is no doubt that military people are also of that opinion. Senators who read the record will see that is true.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield for a question?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. LONG. I believe the Senator from Tennessee feels the same as some of the others of us do, although perhaps we are in the minority. At any rate, some of us feel reluctant to approve the principle of having our Nation strike the first blow because we think the enemy will strike us if we do not. However, it seems that that is a strong possibility, in view of the use in the joint resolution of the language—

Resolved, etc., That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Yes; there is no doubt that that would result in breaching our policy of opposition to fighting preventive war, our policy of opposition to striking the first blow. That is what the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] said a few minutes ago. There is no question about it.

Mr. LONG. Once those harbors were used in an effort to make a landing in an attack against Formosa, if we saw other concentrations of those who were attempting to make such a landing, it would then seem appropriate that those concentrations might be attacked while they were still in the harbors. But to attack them before an effort was actually made to launch an invasion would be to assume that those forces were going to launch such an invasion, whereas an error might be made in making that assumption.

Mr. KEFAUVER. It has been said we would not use our own troops. Of course, it has been said for a long time that Chiang Kai-shek would need only our materials, and would not need our troops, for assistance. But I cannot see how we can even use our air cover or our naval cover, for that would involve shooting down their planes; and, as we know, that would lead to war.

The Senator from California said that such a limitation as has been proposed

would be an open invitation to the Communists to take the islands. Of course, no one here wants to interfere with anything Chiang Kai-shek wants to do, for that is his business. If he wants to continue to fight for those islands, as he has been fighting for them, that is his business. We did not put him on those islands, and I do not think it is up to us to help him defend them. That is a matter between himself and the Chinese Communists. If he wants to fight, he has a great deal of our material which he can use. But we are not going to use the Armed Forces of the United States for the purpose of trying to keep Chiang Kai-shek on those islands, so he can mount an invasion of the mainland of China. That is the issue here.

What happens if we are in those islands? We know that in that case we run a grave risk or grave danger, militarily, of getting into war; and we also shall have this difficulty: We shall place our future and what will happen in the future in the hands of a man who passionately wants to get back on the mainland of China, and who apparently would give anything in the world in order to get us involved in a war with Communist China, so he could get back on the mainland of China, by using our troops and our military power. The decisions thus made by his people would involve us. If we are going to take over these coastal islands, I say we should call the signals. His motive is not the same as ours. Our motive is peace. His motive is the re-invasion of the continent of Asia.

I am sure all of us remember seeing, about the first of the year, an item about an Associated Press and, I believe, a United Press press conference at which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek said he expected a general war to break out within a few weeks; and he said that after having had a 4-hour conference with Admiral Radford. I have the news clipping around somewhere, and I am certain that all Senators remember that incident.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield for a question.

Mr. KNOWLAND. The Senator from Tennessee has referred to a statement made by the Senator from Massachusetts. Of course, the Senator from Massachusetts left the Chamber briefly, and thereafter was engaged in conversation. I do not wish the record to stand, as I understand it has been made to stand, as showing that the Senator from Massachusetts had either suggested or admitted or advocated that either this policy or this joint resolution was intended to or would be used to bring about or to authorize a preventive war. The Senator from Massachusetts is on the floor at this time, and of course can himself clarify the matter. However, as I understood his remarks—

Mr. KEFAUVER. The Senator from Massachusetts was here when I made the statement.

Mr. KNOWLAND. He was in and out of the Chamber.

As I understand the situation, and I think the record regarding it is perfectly clear, the Senator from Massachu-

sets said that if the United States or if the President, in his desire for peace, and the President has made that very clear in his message to the Senate and in the joint resolution, had furnished cover and support for the evacuation of the Tachens, if that is determined upon by the Nationalist Chinese forces that are there, and if our planes were subject to attack by Chinese Communist planes, and if the Chinese Communist planes committed the first open and overt act, and thus if they themselves determined whether there would be war or would not be war, if they had committed that act of aggression, and if thereafter we found they were building up in the harbors of Foochow or Amoy a vast invasion fleet, we were not going to let our forces be sitting ducks.

I think that is an entirely different premise, as compared to the one the Senator from Tennessee has tried to write into the remarks of the Senator from Massachusetts, namely, that this would lead to a preventive war.

Mr. KEFAUVER. No; I entirely disagree with the Senator from California; that is not what the Senator from Massachusetts said. He said, in effect, that if you see a fellow about to throw a forward pass, you jump in, first, to break it up.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes; but after the football game has started.

Mr. KEFAUVER. No; he did not say anything about waiting until after the football game had started.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield to me?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I shall yield in a moment.

Mr. President, I think the record is quite clear, namely, that if we see a concentration of shipping or if we see an airport being built in that area, under the terms of the joint resolution as it is now written, we would be leaving the action to be taken to the judgment of military men who might be trigger-happy, to begin with, whereas we do not know how their decision might be influenced by their frame of mind; or we would be leaving it to the responsibility of Chiang Kai-shek and his people, and we might be leaving it to their decision; and they might decide that in the case of a small activity, in one place or another, it might be a concentration leading to an invasion, and therefore we should bomb it.

I say that is too great a risk for us to take, considering how awful a war would be.

Now I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I wish to say that I was out of the Chamber for a few minutes, having been called to the telephone.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I thought the Senator from Massachusetts was present when I referred to his statement.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I was told of the statement the Senator from Tennessee made. At that time I was in the lobby.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I am sorry.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I say that I agree with President Eisenhower when he says he would never fight a preventive

war. He has made that statement, and I certainly am in support of it. I certainly agree that he would never, in and of himself, as Commander in Chief, recommend or commit an act of aggression. But I say that if it is perfectly obvious that an act of war or an act of aggression is going to be committed, and has been started, either by attacks on our airplanes, when our planes are flying as air cover, or by having planes attack ships we were trying to cover in order to enable them to support an evacuation in a peaceful way, or if there were to be such as an assembling of ships in one of the harbors after such threats have been made and after such acts have been initiated, then we should expect to take action in self-defense.

As the Senator from California, who has played football perhaps, more recently than I, knows, one cannot throw a forward pass until after the game has started. I am confident the Senator from Tennessee feels the same way about it. The situation is similar to that in which a man makes a very hostile remark and puts up his fists, indicating that he is about to hit another man. Is he to let that fist come within an inch of him before hitting back, or must one stand with his arms at his side and let the other man hit him first?

Mr. KEFAUVER. If a man were in his own yard and held up his fist, I would wait until he came out to the street before hitting him. What the Senator is saying is that we should go into his yard and take him on.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Oh, no.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I am sorry if I have misunderstood the Senator. His remarks will speak for themselves in the RECORD. I think he has made some qualification, however.

I think it is unfortunate that much, if not most, of the testimony must be confidential and secret. However, I believe one point should be made clear to the American people, and that is that the resolution contemplates bombing shipping concentrations, staging areas, air fields, and any other activity on the mainland which, in the opinion of some Army officer in the area, or perhaps some of Chiang Kai-shek's men who may be acting as advisers, may remotely, or otherwise, in some way be used, not against the Pescadores and Formosa, but the islands which are now in friendly hands. It is clear that that is the situation.

Mr. WELKER and Mr. KNOWLAND addressed the Chair.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I want to see the United States do everything it can to defend Formosa; and we will do so. But it is desired to bomb a ship which someone might think was going to Quemoy, or a train going to Quemoy which might have some supplies, or to bomb a staging area.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, that is not the testimony, if the Senator will yield.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield for a question.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Does not the Senator know that that is not the testimony at all? It was not stated in any of the hearings that a local commander on the

spot would have the responsibility or the power to commit an act such as the Senator describes, which would be an act of aggression. That is not the intent of the resolution, and there is nothing in it which indicates that the local commander would have authority to make the decision.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I accept that modification. That is correct. The President would make the decision. He is spoken of, of course, as the Chief Executive. But I submit—and I think the Senator will agree—that actually decisions must be made by commanders in the field under general orders. I do not think anyone would contemplate that, in connection with bombing a staging area or some other target, the local commanders would actually get in touch with the President and await his reply. He would send his orders down through military channels.

I did not mean that actually the decision would be made by some subordinate officer; but the gathering of the facts upon which the decision would be made, and the recommendations, which are always very influential in such cases, would certainly be done by the commanders and officers in the field, perhaps even after consultation with Chiang Kai-shek's officers.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Does the Senator believe that if Admiral Pride, for example, the commander of the Seventh Fleet, were affording covering facilities for the evacuation, and his planes and ships were brought under attack, whether or not the responsible officer had communicated with Washington, he would then be limited to flying 3 miles from the China coast, while the Chinese Communist planes went in for another bomb load to come out and attack United States carriers or planes?

Mr. KEFAUVER. No.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Does the Senator believe that a responsible officer like Admiral Pride, who is entrusted with great responsibility in an important mission, should have his hands tied in circumstances in which we might be attacked, and in which war might be made upon United States forces?

Mr. KEFAUVER. Of course, that involves the executive power of the President. The issue which we are discussing is that in one clause of the resolution, a situation which might apply to Formosa and the Pescadores is made to apply also to the offshore islands. That is the issue. It has been said that we want to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. There is no argument on that point. There is absolute unity. It is the coastal islands that are getting us into all this difficulty.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. LONG. This Nation having committed itself to support the Chinese Nationalists and help them to hold the coastal islands along the Chinese coast, does it not stand to reason that, when it sends its ships within range of the

coastal guns of the Chinese Communists, they are going to fire on our ships?

Mr. KEFAUVER. Of course, they will fire on our ships.

Mr. LONG. If we send our ships in to evacuate Chinese Nationalist troops in positions where they are under fire from land-based Communist guns, is there any reason to believe that those guns will stop shooting merely because our ships come up?

Mr. KEFAUVER. No. I think we must realize that our ships and planes are going to be hit and our men killed.

Mr. LONG. Is there any doubt in the Senator's mind that once the shooting starts, our side will be shooting, too?

Mr. KEFAUVER. There is no doubt in my mind about it. These things spread very rapidly.

Mr. LONG. In short order the fur will fly.

Mr. KEFAUVER. In short order the fur will fly. The unfortunate thing is that when the fur starts flying, we shall be left in a situation in which we are there alone, or with Chiang Kai-shek. If the fur must fly, I want it to be on a high legal basis. I want us to be in a position in which the free nations of the world will have to join with us.

We can do that so long as we confine ourselves to Formosa, where we have a legal obligation to be, and where other nations have just as much interest as we have. All the nations which joined with us in the war against Japan are just as much interested as we are. Britain is interested in Hong Kong. France has concessions. The Netherlands, Australia, and all the other nations have interests. But if the fur started to fly, we would be in the fight by ourselves, on our own, without any help. I am afraid, from our friends and allies. I think that would be very unfortunate.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. WELKER. A few moments ago I heard my distinguished friend and colleague from Tennessee discuss the point that, should the resolution be passed, we would, in effect, be giving control over American boys to some war-mad man who had dedicated his life to recapturing the mainland of China.

Does the Senator want the American people to feel that the Commander in Chief of our forces, the Chief Executive of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, would ask the Congress to pass a resolution calling upon American mothers and fathers to turn over to his command their children, in order that they might go to a foreign land, namely, Formosa, and be shot down at the whim of some alien commander not under the direct control of the President of the United States? Does the Senator want that message spread over America?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I will say to the Senator that I did not intentionally say what the Senator gives me credit for having said. Whatever may be the case, I have the greatest confidence in the President of the United States. I know the President of the United States does not want to get us into war. I know he wants peace. I have no doubt in the world that the preamble to the joint res-

olution which sets forth that the resolution is for peaceful purposes, is all that is in his mind. There can be no question about it. His whole life and all his acts throughout his life have demonstrated that. I believe that is true in large part of our high military officers and of the civilians in the Defense Department. However, I submit to the distinguished Senator that we must face the realities of what the resolution would do.

After all, in spite of our confidence in the President, all of us have our own responsibilities to the people who send us here. I have such a responsibility to my people.

I quote from the resolution:

This authority to include the securing and protection of such positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands,

That can mean one and only one thing, namely, that Congress specifically authorizes—it may be considered as a suggestion—the placing of our troops on the island of Quemoy, the Matsu Islands, and the other islands that remain in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek.

I believe the reference to those islands must be eliminated from the resolution, because they are in a different situation. They must be eliminated, because I do not understand how we can operate in those islands without getting into a shooting war. There is shooting going on there.

If the substitute amendment I have offered is adopted, or if the Humphrey amendment is agreed to, and if then the President, after exhausting all other efforts, believes it to be absolutely necessary to take some action in connection with those islands, he would have the constitutional right to do so.

At least the implication in the resolution before us is that we take that burden and responsibility upon ourselves.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator from Tennessee has stated that if we limit the pending resolution in the form suggested by the Senator from Minnesota, and if then the President believes he must go beyond it, he will have the constitutional power to go beyond it. Assuming that the distinguished Senator from Tennessee were in the White House, would he, after Congress—

Mr. KEFAUVER. Let me say that that is a violent assumption in the first place. I would much sooner assume that the Senator from Massachusetts were in the White House.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I am citing a hypothetical case. Suppose the Senator were in the White House as President, and Congress had stricken from the resolution the authority he had requested in the regard mentioned by the Senator from Tennessee, would the Senator from Tennessee, as President, then go forward assuming even greater responsibility, without again coming before Congress, although it might then be too late?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I will tell the Senator what I believe a reasonable man would think about it. He would feel that the sense of Congress was that we

should not get into war over coastal islands; that we would be glad to have Chiang Kai-shek defend them—and he has a great deal of our material—but we would not want to take the risk—and I think it is almost bound to happen—of getting into a general war over some islands of which Chiang Kai-shek is in possession and which he has great difficulty holding, by sending our airplanes and troops and ships into the islands, where they would be bound to get hit.

When they get hit, we will be in an all-out, general war.

I believe everyone would understand that it was the intention of Congress that Chiang Kai-shek should retain the islands, but that we would not want to get mixed up with him in a war.

In holding Formosa and the Pescadores, with the greatest Navy and Air Force in the world—at least, the greatest Navy—and with about 148 miles between the mainland and Formosa and the Pescadores, it might be a little more difficult to hold those islands without the harbors or ports on the coastal islands, but I think the greater difficulty would be more than offset by the lesser chance of getting us into a war.

If we found that something had to be done with respect to some island, because of the attempted invasion of Formosa, then I think the President would have the constitutional right to do it. However, that would not be a suggestion or an invitation by Congress to do it in the first place.

Mr. President, I have talked too long already. The substitute I offered for the joint resolution has these objections.

First. It avoids reference to the unratified defense treaty and other language which recognizes Formosa and the Pescadores as a part of China.

Second. It avoids the assumption that the present Communist attacks or threatened attacks on the offshore islands are in aid and preparation for armed attacks on Formosa. This is not necessarily true. At least the Congress is not in a position so to aver and thereby to sanction in advance armed retaliation for any armed attack on the offshore islands. We must guard against becoming involved in a large-scale war; not in defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, but in defense of the offshore islands.

Third. It defines and explains United States' responsibility for the peace and security of Formosa as a result of World War II and describes a basis for action by the President in fulfillment of that responsibility pending U. N. action.

Fourth. It makes clear that the purpose of the United States in committing itself to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores is to keep these areas from being involved in the Chinese conflict.

Fifth. It makes clear that we welcome U. N. intervention and respect our obligations under the charter.

Sixth. The revised language making clear the preexisting responsibility of the United States as a consequence of the war against Japan, for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, makes it possible for the Congress to recognize and affirm the authority of the President to act, rather than to purport to au-

thorize the President to act, in a field which is the primary if not exclusive responsibility of the President.

Seventh. Reference in the administration proposal securing related positions and territories as necessary to the defense of Formosa is unwise. This reference implies that the offshore islands are necessary to the defense of Formosa. As already stated, this is not necessarily true; to say so gravely increases the risks of war. If it be true it is a military judgment for which the President and not the Congress, must take the responsibility. If the President decides that intervention in case of attack against an offshore island is necessary for the defense of Formosa, he can so declare and act accordingly. The inclusion of specific language suggests that the Congress thinks such intervention may be necessary and in light of the imminent danger of war from such intervention, Congress should not so suggest. Many things may happen before Red China can prepare an all-out attack against Formosa. But hasty intervention to protect the offshore islands may precipitate war much more quickly than is generally realized, and when we are ill prepared psychologically as well as militarily for it. Moreover we may in time gain free world support for the defense of Formosa but not for defense of the offshore islands. Serving due notice that we will defend Formosa may deter or at least postpone war. Serving due notice that we will defend the offshore islands is more likely to precipitate than to deter or long defer war. If we are bluffing about the offshore islands, we will lose much more face than need be when our bluff is called, as it is likely to be.

If war comes, not from the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores which can be divorced from the Chinese conflict, but from the defense of the offshore islands like Quemoy and Matsu which cannot be divorced from the Chinese conflict, we may be without friends and allies in the free world. The defense of the offshore islands necessarily involving us in China's conflicts is in its nature calculated to precipitate war with China rather than to forestall armed attack on Formosa. We cannot convince the world that the Communist attacks on the offshore islands are primarily designed in preparation for armed attacks on Formosa. The offshore islands are in truth more necessary to the defense of the mainland than they are to the defense of Formosa. Quemoy and Matsu are nearly as difficult to separate from the mainland as Staten Island is from the United States. They are as close to the mainland as Alexandria is to the 14th Street Bridge in Washington.

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, we have before us for consideration Senate Joint Resolution 28 authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores and related possessions and territories of that area.

In the passage of this resolution we are facing the most portentous situation since the decision made by President Truman to resist the invasion of South

Korea. The dangers of that action which the resolution supports do not arise from any decision to protect the security of Formosa and the Pescadores. The doubt, the uncertainty, the ambiguity relate to the protecting of "related possessions and territories of that area."

It is the clear assumption that this joint resolution authorizes the defense of the Quemoy and Matsu Islands though those are not named in the resolution. In the public press of this country, in the comment from abroad, this assumption is made and the assumption is supported by the briefings we have had during the past few days.

The dangers of this situation can be expressed in a very few words. If the island of Quemoy, for instance, is to be defended by our armed strength, the commitment is a grave one. Should Communist China make a massive attack upon it, our defense must be correspondingly massive. It surely would be the case in that event that not 11 airmen but 1,100 of our boys and eventually perhaps 11,000 of them would find themselves in Communist prisons. A determined attack by the Communists cannot be kept within narrow limits. It is they who will determine the scope.

The situation is more dangerous than this. We have had intimations from the highest quarters that it would be militarily advisable to prevent the massing of troops and equipment gathered for the purpose of making an assault on the islands. Put in plain English, this is preventive war. And it is seriously proposed as a possible action pursuant to the purposes of this resolution.

We have already lost military face in Asia. We lost this in the summer of 1951 when General Van Fleet had the Communist armies retreating in disorder, out of ammunition and abandoning their equipment. He was told not to pursue them. Militarily we then and there lost face. There is no hope of recovering it by any action contemplated in this present connection.

Had we advanced to the narrow waist of Korea, we could have bargained for peace terms from strength and the whole Asian situation would have been infinitely better than it is today. We could indeed have gained not merely military face but moral face as well, for the opportunity was open to us to propose peace terms which were right for all the people involved in the Korean situation. We could have proposed the unification of that unhappy country, the protection of the interests of Communist China by the establishment of a neutral zone along the Yalu and confided the administration of that neutrality to Asiatic powers, thus giving them a stake and a responsibility in the peace of the Asian continent. We lost military face and threw away the opportunity for moral face.

This happened during the Truman administration. It was still possible at the beginning of this administration to have saved the situation morally and more consideration was given to that possibility than in the months before. Eventually, however, the present administration abandoned the position of moral and spiritual strength and banked its hopes

of a peaceful settlement on the weary months of wrangling at Panmunjon.

There is, therefore, no hope of regaining our military reputation through the passage of this resolution and every expectation of losing what moral strength our position in Asia still holds for us. The proposal is a dubious one indeed.

All this may be said while at the same time we recognize that our President and the Secretary of State, by leaving open the questions posed by the situation in the Quemoy and Matsu Islands, nevertheless can employ it as an asset in negotiations of the most difficult, delicate, and dangerous sort, looking ultimately to some sort of arrangement for ending the hostilities between Communist and Nationalist China. It must be admitted that this is a possibility, but it is a possibility which the President and the Secretary of State must carry out alone. It is not fair to ask the Congress with its limited knowledge of the situation to share that responsibility. The Congress must not offer to share it. For that reason I shall vote for the treaty guaranteeing the independence of Formosa and the Pescadores, but without prejudice to negotiations, I shall vote against this resolution.

Mrs. SMITH of Maine. Mr. President, we are about to take very grave action that concerns the vital security of every family and every home in our country. The risk in the action is tremendous. But I think that we have no other choice than to give the President, by an overwhelming vote, the power he requests. To do otherwise would be disastrous. It is unthinkable that we would not vote to affirm the power the President requests in this crisis—and make no mistake about it, it is a crisis.

The situation is such that we do not have the luxury of freedom of choice in this matter. There is no choice. The circumstances do not permit us the liberty to differ with the President on this resolution. For if we did, and the resolution were defeated, we would give the impression to the rest of the world that we did not have the will to resist Communist aggression.

Yet, the fact that we do not have a free decision in this matter, the fact that we must overwhelmingly give to the President by resolution the very power which I am convinced he already possesses constitutionally, the fact that there is such great unanimity in Congress on this issue, and the fact that the American people overwhelmingly demand a firm stand against the Communists—all these facts do not relieve us of the responsibility of debating and determining, as far as is humanly possible, what this resolution entails.

The conduct of foreign relations and the formulation of foreign policy traditionally and constitutionally have been the authority of the executive branch of our Republic—the constitutional prerogative of the President and the State Department—except for the provisions for ratification by the United States Senate. But let us recognize, particularly in relation to the matter now before us, that such ratification power and participation by the Senate in the formulation of foreign policy is an "after

the fact" power and participation—or perhaps more accurately stated, an "after the decision by the President" power and participation.

The resolution before us presents an unusual situation in at least two respects. First, the resolution calls upon the Senate for a "before the fact" participation in foreign policy formulation, for partnership with the President in a field heretofore reserved for the President. It is not actually a sharing of the authority in foreign policy formulation with the President, simply because under the circumstances we have no free choice in the matter.

What it is, is actually a sharing of the responsibility for the grave decision with the President. That is a responsibility that I am quite willing to accept, even though it is not accompanied by authority. As Representatives of the people, however reluctant we may be to have this awesome responsibility thrust upon us by the President, and regardless of the traditional separation of powers under the Constitution, we have no choice but to accept what the President has thrust upon us.

But in doing so let us be honest about this matter. The first and basic point of honesty to ourselves and our people is the inescapable fact that, with all the paramount considerations of international ramifications in this proposal, at least some of it stems from a consideration of domestic politics.

To put it as frankly and honestly as I know how, the request of President Eisenhower for passage of this unprecedented resolution has the strong recent historical background of the decision of President Truman to involve our country in the Korean war without consulting Congress.

We all know the criticism leveled at him because of that.

This resolution, when passed, will foreclose against any such similar criticism of President Eisenhower, because he will have put Democrats, as well as Republicans, in the same position with him. He will have placed them in the position of having shared the decision with him.

A second point of distinction in this unprecedented resolution is the manner in which it has thrust upon the House of Representatives participation in the formulation of foreign policy. While the Senate has an "after the decision" ratifying power, the House does not even have that power under the Constitution. So in this resolution the House has been presented with a doubly unusual situation.

The nearest similarity that I can think of with respect to participation by the House of Representatives on foreign policy—and I speak with the experience of 9 years' service in the House, most of which was during the war—is the voting by the House, as well as by the Senate, on a declaration of war.

So I ask in all sincerity and seriousness—I ask with the greatest emphasis on remaining calm—I ask in what I consider to be a deep responsibility to the people of our country—"Is this resolution a reserve declaration of war?" Does it amount to giving to the President, in

advance, a ratification by both the House and Senate of a future declaration of war by the President?

I do not know. I do not think the people of America know. I think that they are entitled to know, because I think they are entitled to know as far as possible what this resolution is getting them into. If the answer is "Yes," then I am confident that the American people have such confidence in President Eisenhower that they are willing to give such great power to him in advance.

This leads me to the very core of what troubles me the most about this resolution: the question of what it actually is as contrasted with what it seems to be to the American people. There should be no difference. It should be what it seems to be.

It is my impression that to a majority of the American people it seems to be an ultimatum to the Red Chinese that we will take so much and no more; that we have drawn a line which we have warned the Red Chinese not to cross; that if they do cross that line there will be war. Grave and awesome as that is, I think the American people have come to the conclusion that we must do that—that the Reds have given us no other choice; that we have reached the point where we can tolerate no more; that we have put the Reds on notice not to expect any appeasement, retreat, or withdrawal on our part in the future.

Yes; I think that is what the resolution seems to be to the American people. But is it actually what it so seems to be to the American public?

Certainly that does not seem to be the case with many of the sophisticates in international relations, for there is a widespread interpretation and prediction in Washington, in London, and in other capitals of the world that the resolution is a beginning of a partial withdrawal of the United States from this area of Chinese conflict; that it is the first step toward a goal of two-pronged neutralization: First, to insure the security of Formosa and ultimately to make it a United Nations trusteeship under Chiang Kai-shek; second, to give notice to the Chinese Reds that the United States not only will not help Chiang in any attempt to invade the mainland and regain control of China from the Reds, but that the United States will go further and prevent Chiang from making such an attempt.

This interpretation and prediction, which is being made freely in Washington, London, and other capitals of the world, further forecasts an ultimate and accelerated admission of Red China to the United Nations and the recognition of Red China by the United States.

Who are right in their impression—the American public or the sophisticates in international relations? This is a question to which I believe the American people are entitled to an answer in the debate and discussion of this resolution.

It is a question which I believe the President of the United States and the Congress of the United States have a clear duty to answer to the American people—to tell the American people as much as can be told. The American people must not be misled by what the

resolution seems to be if that is not in fact what the resolution actually is.

One of the inherent dangers in a matter of this kind is the tendency of oversimplification. For example, one simple and popular way in which the resolution has been characterized is that it "draws a line and tells the Reds that if they step over that line they face war."

It is not just that simple. It is not that easy of determination. It is not merely a matter of whether the Reds go 1 inch over that line.

For example, suppose that our intelligence forces determine that the Reds have massed forces on the coast of the mainland of China in the first step of an assault on Formosa. Do we wait until those forces have crossed 1 inch over the drawn line? Or do we strike those forces on the mainland before they get that far, since we know they are going to cross the drawn line?

Suppose that the answer is "No," then what do we do if the Red planes take to the air off the coast of the mainland and head for Formosa and the assault ships start cruising in the waters, headed for the assault on Formosa? Do we make a defensive strike at these planes and ships so obviously headed for an assault on Formosa? Do we make a defensive strike in the area between the coast of the mainland and the island of Formosa?

No; it is not as simple as this catchy concept of drawing a line.

The least that we can do for the American people is to give them all the facts we can—to tell them the risks, the problems, what can and cannot be foreseen—to tell them as much as possible about what we are getting into in passing this resolution—to be completely honest with them regardless of partisan considerations—to say that we are drawing a line on Formosa as we drew a line in Korea and a line in Berlin—to say whether the resolution is actually a reinvoking of the Truman policy of neutralizing Formosa and the civil war between the Chinese Reds and the Chinese Nationalists—a reinvocation by President Eisenhower of a Taft-revised Truman policy—in that President Eisenhower has done what the great Senator Robert A. Taft criticized President Truman for not doing—taking the decision of intervention to Congress before final action.

To summarize my position on this matter, Mr. President, I close by saying this:

First. I am going to vote for this resolution because I think we must take a firm stand; and because I think Congress and the President should stand united on this issue, I hope the resolution is passed by a unanimous vote.

Second. I am going to vote for this resolution even though I do not consider it necessary from a constitutional standpoint, for I believe the President already has all the necessary power without this resolution. I am going to vote for it because the President feels that it will strengthen his hand in dealing with the situation.

Third. But before this debate is over, I hope that the President and Congress will have taken the American people into their full confidence and will have told them as much as possible; that the ques-

tions I raise will have been answered as much as possible—the questions of:

(a) Is this a reserve declaration of war?

(b) Is it the ultimatum to the Red Chinese that it seems to be to the American people?

(c) Or is it a radical change in our foreign policy—a change that will commit this country to preventing Chiang from invading the mainland of China?

(d) Is it the first in a series of steps designed to end ultimately in admission of Red China to the United Nations and to recognition of Red China by the United States?

(e) Is the concept of "drawing a line" as simple as many Americans might think it to be?

(f) Do we have the necessary military strength to back up our firm talk—enough strength to still make the proposed cuts in the military forces?

PROGRAM FOR TOMORROW

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I should like to restate the program for the Senate tomorrow. The Senate will meet at 11 o'clock a. m., and complete its morning business before proceeding in a body to the Hall of the House of Representatives for a joint meeting of the two Houses to hear the President of Haiti. After the joint meeting, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 28.

Mr. President, earlier in the day a number of the Members of the Senate were advised that the Senate would not remain in session after 6 o'clock p. m. There are present two Senators who have short statements they wish to make. I should like to inquire if there are any other Senators on this side of the aisle who have statements they care to make.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Minnesota to offer such proposals as he may desire to present, if I may yield with the understanding that I do not lose the floor.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I send to the desk two amendments to the pending resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 28, and ask that they be printed and lie on the table, and be brought up for consideration tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments will be printed, and will lie on the table.

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF ARMED FORCES TO PROTECT SECURITY OF FORMOSA

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I have asked the Senator from Massachusetts to tarry for a moment, because I wish to make a very brief comment on some observations he made concerning some arguments presented by me earlier in the afternoon.

I am sure the Senator from Massachusetts never intends to put words in my mouth; but I respectfully suggest that the record of his remarks will contain a misstatement, which he attributes to me, of my position on the emergency powers of the President. I wish to make

very clear to him that my position on the powers of the President as Commander in Chief is that he has the right, whenever the facts justify, to take the actions necessary to protect the security, safety, and vital interests of the United States, until such time as Congress can act in the premises. Therefore—and I think this is where the Senator from Massachusetts misunderstood or misinterpreted my position—I pointed out there is no necessity for the joint resolution insofar as concerns the right of the President to exercise his power as Commander in Chief to protect the security of the Nation, for that power already exists. The joint resolution goes beyond that. That is why I said I thought it was a mistake for the President to request the passage of the joint resolution. The joint resolution seeks to obtain a blanket authority or authorization from the Congress of the United States to approve in advance a course of action the President may sometime in the future deem it wise for him to follow. That course of action, I respectfully submit, might be one which would involve the President's ordering the military to commit an act which would amount to an act of war on a sovereign power. I respectfully submit that under the Constitution of the United States, the President does not have that power; and, because, under the Constitution, the Congress has the power to check the Executive, Congress would have the power—if the President exercised that kind of authority, which would exceed his emergency and Commander in Chief powers—to revoke his action.

Let me put it in another way: Under the Constitution of the United States, no President has the right to commit an act of war against a sovereign power. That power vests in the Congress of the United States, and nowhere else.

One of the weaknesses of the joint resolution, in my judgment, is that, in effect, a situation may arise in connection with which we may find that we have predated an act of war by the President of the United States against a sovereign power.

Next let me say the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Iowa engaged in a very interesting colloquy on the doctrine of sovereignty. Of course, Red China does not exist in an international vacuum. Red China exists in a world in which our most powerful allies have recognized her; and, as to those allies, they have recognized her as a sovereign nation. What is her relationship to us? It is that of a de facto government which controls the mainland of China. She does it by her reprehensible, police-state methods, whereby the Chinese people either go along or are liquidated; or, as I said on the Ed Murrow television show, last night, a great many of them have found that one of her devices of liquidation, particularly in the Indian corridor, is to make them work on dams, highways, and various other public projects on from 500 to 700 calories of food a day, until finally their starving carcasses drop dead.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield to me?

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I decline to yield at this time.

So, Mr. President, Red China liquidates them in that way. No one can question that she rules and controls the mainland of China by these reprehensible methods; but she is in de facto control there, and we know her to be a de facto government.

The Senator from Massachusetts cannot cite a single instance in history in which a de facto government is without sovereign rights, when it comes to making war upon such a de facto government.

I wish to say that the United States has no right to commit an act of war upon a de facto government without violating the long history of our country, which shows that we have never committed acts of war by way of aggression. That is my position; and everything I have said this afternoon on the doctrine of sovereignty, I reiterate after hearing the Senator from Massachusetts.

Now, Mr. President, let me say something more about preventive war. I am sure the Senator from Massachusetts is going to let the record stand exactly as he made it when he presented his point of view as to the effect of the joint resolution, and I am perfectly willing to let the record speak for itself.

I believe the Senator from Tennessee is completely correct when he points out that the record of the hearings—if the Senate will read it—leaves no doubt about the fact that the joint resolution encompasses the possibility of conducting preventive action on the mainland of China.

Let me now refer to the argument of analogy used by the Senator from Massachusetts. Of course, such arguments are always of dubious value, and very often they get the arguer into difficulty. I refer to the argument about what one would do if a man were to raise a fist against him. Let me tell my colleagues that the law of self-defense does not mean that it can be applied to such a case of before an assault has started. Raising one's fist does not constitute an assault—particularly, to use the analogy employed by the Senator from Massachusetts, if the person raising it is in his own backyard.

If Senators wish to contend with me on the basis of argument of analogy used by the Senator from Massachusetts, I reply that, even though I hate Communists, as I do, with every fiber and cell of my body, nevertheless, the fact remains that Red China exists as a de facto government in relation to us, and as a recognized government in relation to our major allies. As a de facto government, she has the sovereign right on her own mainland to maneuver her military forces as she sees fit; and our right of self-defense does not start, Mr. President—unless we want to take on the historic responsibility of waging war against Red China—until China starts an assault. The legal principle is similar to the case of an assault and battery case. One's right of self-defense does not exist until one is assaulted; and if one proceeds to beat up the other fellow before he begins the assault, the one who proceeds to beat him up cannot invoke

the right of self-defense. Every lawyer in this body knows that to be so.

Therefore, I wish to say that I do not think we can escape the fact that under the record which has been made in connection with the joint resolution, the President goes beyond the proposal of merely exercising his existing emergency power on the basis of present facts. This joint resolution implies clearly that we would be authorizing, in advance, preventive action. That would do such violence to the historic policy of my country that I will not be a party to it.

I close by saying to my good friend from Maine [Mrs. SMITH], for whom I have the highest respect, that I do not accept the thesis laid down in her speech, that we do not have freedom of choice in this matter. We not only have freedom of choice, Mr. President, but we have the clear sworn duty, under the oath which we took when we walked up to the Vice President's desk at the time we entered this body, to exercise freedom of choice. No President of the United States can, under any possible exercise of power, take away from a Member of the Senate the duty to exercise freedom of choice.

One of the most unsound arguments I have heard in connection with this subject—an argument which we heard in committee, and an argument which was repeated by the Senator from Maine this afternoon—is that, in the interest of national security, we have no choice but to go along with the President of the United States. That is an argument which might have a place in the forum—to the extent any forum exists—of a dictatorship country, but not in free America. We have the clear constitutional obligation, when we take our oath of office upon entering service in this body, to exercise a freedom of choice in the Senate. If we think the President is making a mistake, we owe a serious patriotic obligation to the man in the White House to express to him our honest differences of opinion with him as to the implications, the effects, and the possible results of this resolution.

I know of no better way of creating great disunity among the people of the United States than for us, the lawmakers, ever to bend our knees to the idea that we have no choice but to go along with the President in the name of national unity. We have a duty in this debate—and it will be a historic debate—to demonstrate to the free nations of the world and the police states of the world what constitutional processes under this Government really mean, what a system of checks and balances, which guarantees us protection from a personal government, really means.

Whenever the argument is made to me that I have no choice but to go along with the President of the United States because he sent a resolution to Congress and announced to the world his program, that argument means that I should accede to a personal government. That I will never do.

I wished to make these points before the session closes tonight, because I think it is only fair to the people of my State. It is fair to me. It is fair to my col-

leagues. It is fair to the minority leader [Mr. KNOWLAND], whose sincerity is not the slightest bit less than my sincerity in the premises. Nor is the sincerity of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] or any other Senator in this body less than mine. I understand the position taken by the Senator from California. I simply do not agree with his conclusions.

Of all the things he said, I think the only thing I wish to take the time to comment on tonight is the statement he made with respect to a trusteeship. It is the strangest interpretation of what a United Nations trusteeship is to suggest that it is a multilateral colonialism.

The trusteeship I am talking about is the same kind of trusteeship I urged in 1945, when, on the floor of the Senate, I suggested that the United Nations exercise jurisdiction over Korea, giving immediate life and meaning to the self-determination principle of the San Francisco Charter—until when? Until such time as conditions could be stabilized in Korea and the Korean people could enjoy the freedom of self-government. Would that we had done it, because we followed a different course of action some months later, when we joined with Russia in the partition of Korea along the 38th parallel.

The principle of giving life, meaning, and substance to the self-determination principle is what caused me last spring to urge a United Nations trusteeship over Indochina. In my judgment, had we tried to bring that about, and had we been successful in our effort, we would have thrown the Russian propaganda forces for a complete loss in Indochina, because it would have been a clear demonstration that we were standing for the freedom of all Indochina, not merely a part of it.

I am pleading for a United Nations trusteeship as quickly as we can get it. I do not know whether we can be successful. I have my doubts as to whether we could be successful. But let the record of history show that we tried.

Let me say to the Senator from California that when I am pleading for a United Nations trusteeship I am not proposing that on Formosa the Nationalist Chinese be weakened one iota. I am not proposing that they be disarmed to the extent of a single rifle. I am simply proposing that the United Nations, by a trusteeship order, announce to the world that Formosa has come under the protectorate of the United Nations, and not the United States alone, and that an attack on Formosa under that trusteeship would be an attack on the United Nations. Let us call Russia's bluff on that point.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I shall be glad to yield in a moment.

Let us call Russia's bluff, in the light of all the phony, false peace propaganda she is sending around the world. Let us see if she means it when she implies that she wants peace in the South Pacific. One of the best tests as to whether or not she means it is whether or not she would join with other nations of the United Nations in a plan for a trusteeship-protectorate over Formosa.

That is the position I have taken, in urging in the Senate in years gone by that we take advantage of every opportunity to build up the system of international relations which the great Senator Vandenberg of Michigan used to proclaim so effectively from his desk on the other side of the aisle, when he was a Member of this body. In those historic speeches he pleaded for support for a system of international justice through law. If one rereads those speeches, as I did during the past summer, he will see that time and again he pointed out that the hope of permanent and lasting peace in the world will never be attained until we use international judicial processes to accomplish it.

I think Russia will not go along for a long time, but I want to keep her in such a position that we can show the rest of the world that when she has an opportunity to support a system of international justice through law, she will not go along. That is why I have urged on more than one occasion that we call her bluff, that we show up the falsity of her hand, so to speak, by asking her to take a dispute to the World Court. We shall not get her before the World Court as of the present. When do I think we will start getting her there? We shall start getting her there whenever we become successful in keeping the free nations of the United Nations united shoulder to shoulder.

Another great lesson Vandenberg taught us was that one of the devices of Russia would be to drive wedges of discontent, discord, and difference of opinion among our allies, and keep us split as allies. Then the old Communist technique of divide and conquer would have a better chance of prevailing.

I urge that we work out a satisfactory form of United Nations trusteeship or mandate or protectorate over Formosa. I am not one for labels. I do not care what it is called, if the substance is there. I am in favor of any program that will place the United Nations in a protectorate position over Formosa and will protect the Nationalist Chinese.

Let me tell the Senator from California—and I believe he knows I have stood with him on some phases of this issue many times in the last few years on the floor of the Senate—that he can count on me always to support a program which will not subject the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa to a Red Communist blood bath. We must never do that.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I should like to say to the Senator it is hardly conceivable in any proposal of a U. N. trusteeship that I have heard discussed that it would not have as a part of it some type of what might be called a U. N. neutral nations' commission. We tried that system in Korea. The so-called neutral nations in the Soviet bloc have used their power to move their representatives around South Korea for espionage purposes. However, the representatives of the neutral nations of Sweden and

Switzerland in North Korea are limited to the ports of entry.

I should think that the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa would have to have their heads examined if they ever permitted a similar neutral nations' commission to roam around the fortifications and beach defenses and gun emplacements on Formosa, when the information that such representatives obtained would go to the Security Council of the United Nations, which every 6 or 7 months is headed by a representative of the Soviet Union, and to the Military Applications Commission, of which every 3 or 4 months a Soviet representative shows up as chairman.

From public admissions of representatives of the Soviet Union during the Korean war we know that at the U. N. they not only gave moral support to the aggression in Korea, against the authority of the U. N., but that they supplied the arms and equipment and Mig planes and tanks and ammunition, and practically every other type of equipment, and defied the U. N. to do anything about it.

Under those circumstances, how could any responsible Nationalist Chinese official on Formosa, with any sense of responsibility, sit back and rest the defense of 9½ million people, to whom he has a great responsibility, upon the U. N., which did not produce the force to resist aggression in Korea, particularly when we know that there would be leakages through the Soviet world and its allies back to Communist China, which would endanger the defense of Formosa?

Therefore I think it is a very practical problem that we must face.

Mr. MORSE. I think the Senator from California is quite right in saying it is a practical problem. He knows me well enough to be certain that I would never underwrite that kind of trusteeship.

I never speak about another man's motives, but on the basis of our colloquy I would infer that the Senator from California thinks it is impossible to develop a trusteeship for Formosa which would be satisfactory and practical.

I say, let us try. By trying we would not in any way weaken the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa, because they would still be under our protection until we were convinced that the U. N. protectorate would protect their interests and until the people on Formosa were convinced that it would protect their interests.

I am not for 1 second advocating the weakening of the protection of the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa. I am saying, however, that we ought to carry this propaganda fight to the Russians, and to that end we should evince a willingness to propose and advocate a United Nations protectorate over Formosa which would avoid the kind of impractical problem the Senator from California and I wish to avoid, and which would advance a system of international justice through law.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Why, under the same circumstances, and with a good

deal of justification, should we not say—and I am saying this in all seriousness—that the United Nations is interested in the peace of the world. Therefore, let us arrange a supervised U. N. election on the mainland of China, as well as on the island of Formosa, so as to give the people of both areas an opportunity to express their views as to what kind of government they would like to have?

Why must we always pick out our friends, one of the free nations of the world, particularly when the Senator has so ably pointed out the ruthless type of tyranny which exists in Communist China, and never be allowed to make a suggestion or proposal that the same question be submitted to the people of China, who are unfortunate enough to be on the mainland, as to whether they wish to live under that type of dictatorship? We could make a little propaganda out of that suggestion going behind the Chinese equivalent of the Iron Curtain, whether it be a bamboo curtain or other kind of curtain.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Oregon advocates doing everything we can possibly do to explore any possibility of developing the kind of protectorate in Formosa that will protect the Nationalist Chinese, and at the same time remove us from what I believe to be the singular position of maintaining a jurisdiction over Formosa at the present time which is not to our best interest.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I shall take only another minute or two to say that there is a great deal of talk about two Chinas cropping up. It is always Formosa that is stressed.

If there is to be a discussion or any proposal made for a trusteeship with respect to the island of Formosa, where the free Chinese are in possession, I believe that any government, whether it be the Indian Government or the British Government or any other government, has an equal responsibility to suggest the same thing to the Chinese Communists. Let them submit the issue to their people under a UN trusteeship or under a U. N. supervised election.

We suggested such a course in Korea, but it was turned down. Therefore, why apply the force, so to speak, to the Republic of China on the Island of Formosa, but not make a similar suggestion with respect to the Chinese mainland?

The second point I should like to bring out is that perhaps the analogy which has been drawn by the Senator from Oregon and by my distinguished colleague from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] was a little wrong with relation to this situation.

The Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Oregon during the colloquy spoke of the man in the backyard who shakes his fist at his neighbor. I quite agree that under those circumstances the neighbor would not be justified in going over and knocking off the other man's block, so to speak, even though he had shown an unfriendly attitude.

The Senator from Oregon is the former dean of a law school and an able lawyer, while I am not a lawyer, but a news-

paperman. Let me suggest a little closer analogy. Suppose in the Senator's neighborhood there was a person who had killed his brother and perhaps one of his sons, and had recently kidnaped three of his children, and then had publicly and privately stated that at the first opportunity he would shoot the Senator from Oregon; and suppose that when the Senator from Oregon went out into his yard, within view of his neighbor who had killed his brother and son and kidnaped three of his children, and his neighbor pulled out a Colt .45 and started to load it, as well as a sawed-off shotgun, and then proceeded to point it at the Senator from Oregon. I ask the Senator whether under those circumstances he would not be justified in at least assuming that his neighbor was going to kill him at the earliest opportunity.

Mr. MORSE. I say goodnatureedly that I would not run over to my neighbor's yard.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I know that the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] is about to make a request of me, as acting majority leader, for some time. I wish to serve notice on him that if I yield to him I yield for a very definite purpose, and that I do not wish him to be as extravagant with time as was the Member of the Senate to whom I yielded 5 minutes.

I inquire of the Senator from Minnesota as to the amount of time he may require.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I may say to my good friend from Kentucky that my request for time will be for less than the 5 minutes under the normal clock arrangements which are customary in the Senate of the United States.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I yield, with the understanding that I shall not lose the floor; but let me urge the Senator to confine his remarks to as many minutes less than 5 as may be possible.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I merely want to announce that the amendment which I introduced, relating to Senate Joint Resolution 28 as it is found on page 2, is cosponsored by the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] and the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], and I ask unanimous consent that we may hold it open for others who have indicated to me that they want to join in cosponsoring the amendment. However, they were not present when I offered it, and I did not feel at liberty to add their names.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota understands that it would not be printed.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I did not so understand, Mr. President. Then I shall leave it as it is.

I should like to make this observation in reference to the amendment, so that my colleagues may know its purpose as they read the RECORD tomorrow morning.

What it does is to strike out the language on page 2, after line 11, insert a period after the word "attack" and strike out the remainder of the sentence down through line 11.

The language which would remain would be:

That the President of the United States be, and hereby is, authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack.

It is that language which will authorize the President to do what he says he wishes to do, namely, to safeguard and protect the vital interests of the United States by the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

I would merely cite, Mr. President, what I read recently in the dispatches in the Senate lobby from the Associated Press and the United Press, to the effect that a foreign minister of the chief ally of the United States of America, that ally being Great Britain, and that Foreign Minister being Anthony Eden, in reply to questions this afternoon, in the House of Commons, stated that he considered the offshore islands which have been referred to so frequently in these debates, particularly Quemoy, to be within the territorial jurisdiction of the Communist government of China. He considered that the island of Formosa is in a separate category, in view of its relationship to World War II and the disposition of that island since that time, and, therefore, its defense and security is obviously the legitimate interest of the nations of the world.

I merely make this observation because, while the Secretary of State has informed many of us that the relationships between our chief ally, Great Britain, and the United States are sound and in accord, it is perfectly obvious that there is a great difference of opinion as to the right of a nation such as ours to interfere in what is considered to be a domestic matter, a civil war, and the right and the obligation of our country to take a stand in defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, which by their peculiar relationship following World War II are outside the jurisdiction of the Communist government of China.

I further add, Mr. President, that when I listened to the comment today that the resolution which is before the Senate is submitted for us to consider before the decision is made, I felt that I should sharply dissent from that attitude and that observation. The truth is, as the Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] who made that general observation stated, herself, that we have no choice. The President has already announced what he has constitutional power to do, and he placed before us his desire, his objective, and his purpose by formal resolution. So that the resolution is not one which we are permitted to design; it is one which we are permitted to accept or reject; and to reject it would be to undermine the President's authority completely and totally.

I regret to say that we find ourselves in that particular position. I feel that my amendment, however, will do much to clarify the intent and purpose which have been stated again and again as to our objective in defending Formosa and

the Pescadores and which may very well save us from a debacle second to none if we accept such tenuous and uncertain language as is found in the resolution relating to island territories and possessions if held in unfriendly hands.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in adjournment until 11 o'clock a. m. tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 45 minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, January 27, 1955, at 11 o'clock a. m.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1955

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

Rev. Paul R. Abbott, Church of the Advent, Episcopal, Brownsville, Tex., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, our only governor and king, who hast brought us from many places to serve this country, who hast committed to us, through Thy people, the solemn trust of government, we confess that we are creatures of weakness, that we are often tempted to do the evil we would not, that we are divided and torn between many loyalties, sometimes taking the easy way to avoid criticism and seeking the easy honor of popularity.

Yet Thou hast made us as Thine own children and hast said in Thy holy word that our creation was very good. Thou hast planted us each in a special portion of this land where we have grown into many allegiances to family and friends. Thou hast even sent Thy blessed son to die for us and redeem us.

Therefore, O Lord, we make bold to ask Thy special grace that, despite our weaknesses, and despite our divided commitments, we may, in the deliberations of this body be inspired by Thy wisdom, especially needful in these troublous times; to the end that we may truly serve all the people of this country, seeking the honor and welfare of the state and, above all, the good hope of Thy kingdom where perfect justice, charity, and peace shall reign.

We beseech Thee, O Lord, to bless the labors of this House of Representatives and make its Members good servants both of Thee and Thy people.

Through Jesus Christ, the great giver of law, we pray. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING CEREMONY TOMORROW

The SPEAKER. The Chair desires to make a statement. After consultation with the majority and the minority leaders of the House and remembering the terrific jam we had upon this floor on previous occasions, with the consent and approval of the floor leaders, the Chair announces that on tomorrow during the

ceremony the door immediately opposite the Speaker will be open and the doors on the Speaker's left and right and none other. No one will be allowed upon the floor of the House who does not have the privilege of the floor of the House.

MANDATORY RADIO CONTACT BY SHIPS AT SEA

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, frequently, on board ship and other places where shipping people gather, I have often discussed with them the problem of whether or not the law requires a ship to report by radio once a day.

In a recent editorial, the New York Times revived this discussion, arising from the loss of the freighter *Mormackite* which capsized in the Atlantic last October with the loss of 37 seamen. It was several days before the few survivors were discovered because, for a week or more, no search had even been started.

In some cases of ship loss at sea there are no survivors and none knows just when the ship went down, or in what area. So it is that I raise once more the question of mandatory radio contact and I agree with the words of the New York Times, as follows:

As far as we know there is no valid argument against such a rule, and not to have it is simply to ignore an ordinary safety precaution that would be neither difficult nor costly.

It is for that reason, Mr. Speaker, that I introduce my bill today, to require certain ships to report by radio their positions every 24 hours.

CONTINUATION OF EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS TO PERSONS SERVING IN THE ARMED FORCES

Mr. O'NEILL, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following privileged resolution (H. Res. 111, Rept. No. 9), which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed:

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 587) to provide that persons serving in the Armed Forces on January 31, 1955, may continue to accrue educational benefits under the Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, and for other purposes. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill, and shall continue not to exceed 1 hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, the bill shall be considered as having been read for amendment. No amendment shall be in order to said bill except amendments offered by direction of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, but said amendments shall not be subject to amendment. At the conclusion of such consideration, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and

the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion, except one motion to recommit.

THE DEBATE ON HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 159

Mr. OLIVER P. BOLTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BENTLEY] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. BENTLEY. Mr. Speaker, I regretted to note yesterday, during the debate of House Joint Resolution 159, the gentleman from California took advantage of the opportunity to accuse President Eisenhower of duplicity in the message to the Congress of January 24 regarding the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. I resent this attack upon our President and will endeavor to state the facts in their correct sense.

The gentleman referred to the President's message of February 2, 1953, which revoked the earlier order given by former President Truman in June 1950 that the 7th Fleet was instructed to prevent Formosa from being used as a base of operations against the Chinese mainland. The gentleman terms this statement as "brazen partisan politics" and apparently is under the impression that the President's message of January 24 represents a retreat from this position. He goes even further in stating that President Eisenhower knew that he was speaking an untruth when he made this statement approximately 2 years ago.

I confess myself completely unable to follow the gentleman's logic. In June of 1950, at the time of the Communist invasion of South Korea, former President Truman ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent attack upon Formosa and also to prevent any operations on the part of the Chinese Nationalists against the Communist-held mainland. It is a well-known fact this permitted the Communists to abandon their troop concentrations opposite Formosa and to move them into Manchuria and then into Korea the following November. For 2½ years, therefore, the Communists had no concern for the protection of their long and exposed coastal line from attacks from Formosa. This was, to say the least, an unnecessary advantage to give to a country with whom we were at war for all intents and purposes. President Eisenhower was right in correcting this mistake in his message of February 1953 and in ordering the 7th Fleet to be used solely for the defense of Formosa and not also as a defense of the Chinese Communists. There is certainly no duplicity in his recent message, which continues that protection of Formosa, and there is no inconsistency in the two messages. Finally, former President Truman did order the 7th Fleet to protect the Communist Chinese mainland against attacks from Formosa. This is an incontestable fact, a true statement,