

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. AANDAHL:

H. R. 3561. A bill for the relief of Mary Osadchy; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CELLER:

H. R. 3562. A bill for the relief of sundry former students of the Air Reserve Officer's Training Corps; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LEONARD W. HALL:

H. R. 3563. A bill for the relief of Wah Chang Corp.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HEFFERNAN:

H. R. 3564. A bill for the relief of Reuben Krakovsky; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3565. A bill for the relief of Ernest Sbaaschnik, Sr.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KENNEDY:

H. R. 3566. A bill for the relief of certain Latvians; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3567. A bill for the relief of Vera Oumancoff; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MACK of Washington:

H. R. 3568. A bill for the relief of Mary Delores Walters; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. PASSMAN:

H. R. 3569. A bill for the relief of Louis Campbell Boyd; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. POULSON:

H. R. 3570. A bill for the relief of Gregorio Mario Bernardini; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. TOWE:

H. R. 3571. A bill for the relief of Rosalia Olga Deutsch and Leslie Deutsch; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. YORTY:

H. R. 3572. A bill for the relief of Ying Chee Jung; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. COX:

H. J. Res. 222. Joint resolution authorizing the President to issue posthumously to the late William S. Cox a commission as third lieutenant, United States Navy; and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

189. Mr. CORBETT presented a resolution of the Council of the Borough of Sharpshburgh, Pa., opposing the proposal of the Secretary of the Treasury that income from municipal bonds be subject to Federal income taxes, which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FRIDAY, APRIL 6, 1951

The House met at 11 o'clock a. m.

Rev. H. Marshall Smith, Trinity Baptist Church, Kerrville, Tex., offered the following prayer:

Our Father, which art in heaven, we praise this morning to thank Thee for all life and our manifold blessings.

We come to Thee for leadership in the midst of a world in confusion; conscious of human failure, we turn to Thee, as did our forefathers, seeking divine wisdom in so far-reaching decisions.

We pray for Thy presence with our military forces, for all who direct these forces; for all who carry on in the daily walk; for these who serve in our legislative and executive offices.

Forgive us, O Lord, for every failure, for our selfishness, and give us the fullness of Thy love, in Jesus' name. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate, by Mr. Woodruff, its enrolling clerk, announced that the Senate had passed a concurrent resolution of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. Con. Res. 18. Concurrent resolution approving the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defense efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

The message also announced that the Vice President has appointed Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina and Mr. LANGER members of the joint select committee on the part of the Senate, as provided for in the act of August 5, 1939, entitled "An act to provide for the disposition of certain records of the United States Government," for the disposition of executive papers referred to in the report of the Archivist of the United States numbered 51-17.

SUSPENDING CERTAIN IMPORT TAXES ON COPPER

Mr. MILLS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the bill (H. R. 3336) to suspend certain import taxes on copper.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arkansas?

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, and I do not believe I am going to object, because I think our domestic mining corporations are fully protected under this bill as well as enabling the people to get copper for the war effort.

Mr. BENNETT of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. I yield.

Mr. BENNETT of Michigan. Will the gentleman from Arkansas explain the purpose of the legislation at this time?

FACTS IN SUPPORT OF ENACTMENT OF H. R. 3336

Mr. MILLS. Mr. Speaker, H. R. 3336 would suspend the import tax on copper during the period beginning April 1, 1951, and ending February 15, 1953, unless, during this period, the price of copper should fall below 24 cents per pound. The present price of copper, which has been in effect since October 2, 1950, is 24½ cents per pound.

The bill is essential, the same as previous legislation suspending the import tax on copper imposed by section 3425 of the Internal Revenue Code, except that a safeguard for domestic producers of copper has been inserted in this bill. Under the proviso included in H. R. 3336, when for any one calendar month during the

period of the suspension of the import tax the average market price of copper for that month has fallen below 24 cents per pound delivered Connecticut Valley, the Tariff Commission is required to give notice to the President within 15 days after the end of such month. Within 20 days thereafter, the President would be required to revoke the suspension of the import tax and the President's revocation would be effective immediately.

COPPER SUPPLY CRITICAL

According to informal estimates of the Department of Interior, domestic mine production for the calendar year 1951 is 950,000 tons, or 43,000 tons above domestic mine production for 1950. The increase in estimate for domestic production for calendar year 1951 is based upon the rate of production in the last quarter of 1950, and does not take into account any stoppages that may arise from accidents, labor shortages, or other factors.

Imports of copper for the calendar year 1951 are estimated at 743,000 tons by the Department of Interior, or 53,000 tons above the total imports for the calendar year 1950.

Despite the current increase in the rate of domestic production and of imports of copper, stocks of copper above ground are already at a very critical level. Refined copper at refining plants had declined from a level of 61,000 tons at the end of 1949 to 19,000 tons at the end of 1950, which, as far as is known, is the lowest level ever recorded.

DEMAND FOR COPPER

According to information obtained informally from the National Production Authority, the estimated demand for copper for the current year is as follows:

	Tons
Military requirements	300,000
Stockpile	127,000
Exports	65,000
All other requirements	1,500,000

Estimated total demand... 1,992,000

The effect of order M-12, issued by the National Production Authority, is to reduce this demand by approximately 300,000 tons to 1,692,000 tons. Even so the supply of copper available to meet this demand, as estimated by the National Production Authority, is slightly less than 1,500,000 tons—somewhat below the estimate of the Department of Interior.

It is readily apparent, therefore, that for the foreseeable future the demand for copper is substantially in excess of the available supply from all sources. The elimination of the import tax on copper, it is believed, will insure for use in this country a larger share of the world production. Moreover, the continuation of the import tax on copper complicates the problem of price control of articles manufactured from copper, inasmuch as it is now necessary to have two maximum-price ceilings for such products, depending upon whether the source of the copper is domestic or foreign. Suspension of the import tax would make possible a one-price system of controls on articles made of copper.

The following letters have been received from the interested executive departments in support of legislation to suspend the import tax on copper:

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,
Washington, January 23, 1951.

HON. R. L. DOUGHTON,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This letter is in further reply to your request of January 8, 1951, for our comments concerning House Joint Resolution 37, a joint resolution to suspend certain import taxes on copper.

This Department urges the enactment of the subject measure for the following reasons:

1. The United States is, and for some time will probably continue to be, a large importer of copper since domestic production does not meet all of our requirements. Even before the present emergency situation arose we were able to produce in this country only about two-thirds of the copper needed by American industry. Increased requirements for military needs, an accelerated stockpile program, and a minimum export program to meet our foreign policy will reduce that proportion appreciably. Maximum imports of copper are vital to the fulfillment of our domestic military and industrial needs for the foreseeable future.

Domestic production probably cannot be increased significantly within the next 2 or 3 years, even with prices higher than they are at present. Failure to suspend the import duty has resulted in an increased price for foreign copper which is reflected in increased prices for copper products.

Where the needs for large amounts of foreign copper are so apparent, it is essential to encourage the flow of imports by a waiver of the import tax. Because of this tremendous need, a suspension of the import duty will not result in injury to the domestic copper industry.

2. Chile remains our largest source of supply of imported copper. The suspension of the excise tax cannot help but be reflected favorably in our relations with that country.

May we take this opportunity to recommend that the proposal be amended by changing the effective date from January 1, 1951, to March 1, 1951, since a retroactive suspension date might raise difficult administrative problems in industry.

We have been advised by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this report, and that enactment of this measure would be in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS W. S. DAVIS,
Acting Secretary of Commerce.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 30, 1951.

The Honorable R. L. DOUGHTON,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives.

MY DEAR MR. DOUGHTON: Reference is made to your letter of January 8, 1951, transmitting for the views and recommendations of the Department of State a copy of House Joint Resolution 37, a joint resolution to suspend certain import taxes on copper.

The Department supports the enactment of legislation to suspend the excise tax on imported copper for two principal reasons. At present, domestic production of copper does not meet domestic requirements. The National Production Authority has issued an order severely restricting the use of copper in the United States during the first quarter and continued restriction will probably be necessary beyond this period. It is estimated that domestic mine production during 1951 will only satisfy about 55 percent of our total requirements for copper, exclu-

sive of stockpiling. In view of the present prices, low inventories, and prospective demand for copper, we are convinced that during the term of the proposed legislation the import tax is not required to insure the prosperity of the domestic copper-mining industry. The tax has also resulted in increased costs of raw material to domestic processors and is reflected in higher prices charged domestic consumers.

The Department also favors the suspension of the tax on copper because of the deleterious effect that the tax has had on our relations with Chile. The present Government of Chile is outstanding in its friendship for the United States and in the cooperative stand it has taken on the international political issues of concern to us. It is firm in its opposition to communism.

Copper is a commodity strategic to the United States. We need imports of copper in peacetime but they are absolutely essential during a war. For example, our imports of copper from Chile totaled 285,218 tons in 1949 or 21 percent of our total supply. Imports from all sources were 545,898 tons and 40 percent of our supply. It is, therefore, in our interest to maintain and develop sources of copper in friendly foreign countries as well as at home.

The Department has been informed by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this report since enactment of this legislation would be in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely yours,

JACK K. MCFALL,
Assistant Secretary
(For the Secretary of State).

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, D. C., February 5, 1951.

HON. R. L. DOUGHTON,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives.

MY DEAR MR. DOUGHTON: Under date of January 8, you requested the views and recommendations of the Department of the Interior on House Joint Resolution 37, a joint resolution to suspend certain import taxes on copper.

This Department is in favor of a suspension of the import taxes on copper, and therefore recommends the enactment of House Joint Resolution 37. However, we believe that the suspension should continue for a longer period than June 30, 1952, as now specified in the joint resolution. It would also seem desirable to adjust the effective date of the suspension so as to permit a reasonable advance notice to the industries concerned.

The present demand for copper is so great that domestic producers are supplying only about 65 percent of the requirements, and imports must be relied upon for the remaining amount of about 35 percent. In view of this unusual current demand and the very great estimated requirements for the future, this Department does not believe that the suspension of copper import taxes for any reasonable period could injure the domestic-mining industry. A fixed suspension for a period of at least 2 years would provide a better inducement for the development of foreign production to fill the urgent deficiencies in domestic supply, both current and future, than would the period of 18 months from January 1, 1950, stated in the joint resolution. Moreover, we believe that the most equitable and practical method of placing the suspension in effect would be to provide for its commencement on a date approximately 20 to 50 days after the enactment of the authorizing legislation.

In the light of these considerations it is recommended that House Joint Resolution 37 be amended substantially as follows: At

lines 11 and 12 strike out the words "the period beginning January 1, 1951, and ending with the close of June 30, 1952," and insert in lieu thereof the words "a period of 2 years beginning on the effective date of this act. This act shall take effect on the first day of the calendar month next succeeding the twentieth day after the date of its approval."

The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the submission of this report, since enactment of the proposed legislation would be in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely yours,

OSCAR L. CHAPMAN,
Secretary of the Interior.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET,
Washington, D. C., January 26, 1951.
HON. ROBERT L. DOUGHTON,
Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee, New House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. DOUGHTON: This is in answer to Mr. Davis' letter of January 8, 1951, inviting the Bureau of the Budget to comment on House Joint Resolution 37, to suspend certain import taxes on copper.

On the basis of available information it is clear that total requirements for copper to meet our mobilization, stockpiling, and essential civilian needs will be in considerable excess of the supply of copper which can be produced promptly from sources within the United States. In view of this fact the removal of the import tax on copper in order to facilitate importation of this strategic material, for a 1½-year period as proposed in this bill or for a 2-year period as suggested by some of the interested Government agencies, is most desirable. In recognition of the need for this material to implement our defense objectives the President, in his Economic Report transmitted to the Congress on January 12, 1951, recommended that the import tax on copper should again be waived.

In light of the foregoing, you are advised that enactment of House Joint Resolution 37 would be in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely yours,

F. J. LAWTON,
Director.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D. C., February 2, 1951.
HON. ROBERT L. DOUGHTON,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your recent request for the views of the Department of Defense with respect to House Joint Resolution 37, to suspend certain import taxes on copper.

The Department of Defense recommends enactment of House Joint Resolution 37 and, in addition, recommends that the joint resolution be amended to provide that the suspension of the tax be effective for a period of 2 years from the date of its enactment.

Copper is in general short supply the world over. Serious difficulties are being experienced in building up the stockpile. As the rearmament program increases in tempo, additional conservation measures will have to be undertaken. Serious consideration is now being given to international allocation schemes of this and other materials in short supply. Under such conditions for the indefinite future, import restrictions have little significance, except as an added handicap to access to foreign supplies.

The Bureau of the Budget has advised that passage of House Joint Resolution 37 is in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely,

MARX LEVA.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 25, 1951.

HON. R. L. DOUGHTON,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Further reference is made to the request of your committee for the views of the Treasury Department on House Joint Resolution 37, to suspend certain import taxes on copper.

The proposed legislation would extend for a period beginning January 1, 1951, and ending June 30, 1952, the suspension of import taxes imposed by section 3425 of the Internal Revenue Code on articles other than copper sulfate and other than composition metal provided for in paragraph 1657 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, which is suitable both in its composition and shape, without further refining or alloying, for processing into castings, not including as castings ingots or similar cast forms.

This Department anticipates no unusual administrative difficulties under the proposed legislation and, therefore, would have no objection to its enactment.

Unmanufactured copper: United States production, deliveries, stocks, imports, and exports; monthly averages for 1947-49, the first 3 quarters of 1950, and statistics for October 1950¹

[Short tons copper content]

Item	1947 year	1948 year	1949					1950				
			First quarter	Second quarter	Third quarter	Fourth quarter	Year	First quarter	Second quarter	Third quarter	October	
Production:												
Mine output ²	70,630	68,805	61,553	67,075	56,866	61,639	61,783	71,614	74,245	76,489	77,912	
Secondary ³	41,948	41,181	39,333	31,333	23,666	32,333	32,500	28,795	30,095	32,590	35,189	
Total.....	112,578	109,986	100,866	98,408	80,532	93,972	94,233	100,409	104,340	109,079	113,101	
Foreign trade:												
Imports for consumption: ⁴												
Refined.....	12,523	20,845	28,766	25,060	20,949	17,317	23,023	23,630	35,071	23,003	29,002	
Other ⁵	25,212	19,657	28,288	22,446	18,079	28,678	24,373	30,505	27,014	9,479	35,492	
Total.....	37,735	40,502	57,054	47,506	39,028	45,995	47,396	54,135	62,085	32,572	62,494	
Exports ⁶	12,457	12,278	13,591	12,156	9,151	13,873	12,192	15,583	12,687	10,182	10,376	
Production plus imports minus exports.....	137,856	138,210	144,329	133,858	110,409	126,094	129,437	138,961	153,738	131,469	165,219	
Deliveries and stocks, refined copper:												
Deliveries by refiners.....	115,305	112,037	101,605	51,451	79,723	111,333	86,051	115,812	113,871	109,198	121,806	
Refiners' stocks.....	77,244	76,325	81,115	123,953	207,788	139,925	138,195	79,666	52,792	52,989	56,945	

¹ All figures preliminary.
² Estimated recoverable content of ores and concentrates.
³ Represents copper in all forms from old scrap.
⁴ All imports entered free of duty for the period shown.
⁵ Represents copper in ore, concentrates, matte, blister, and scrap copper.
⁶ Represents copper in ore, concentrates, matte, blister, refined, and scrap copper.

Source: Production, U. S. Bureau of Mines; deliveries and stocks of refined, Copper Institute; foreign trade, U. S. Department of Commerce.

TABLE 2.—Copper: Changes in United States published prices of electrolytic copper, delivered Connecticut Valley, from Nov. 8, 1946 (last day OPA maximum price on copper was in effect) to Jan. 12, 1951

DATE OF CHANGE AND NEW PRICE		[Cents per pound]
1946:	Nov. 8 (OPA ceiling).....	14.37½
	Nov. 12.....	17.50
	Nov. 20.....	18.50
	Nov. 23.....	19.50
1947:	Jan. 28.....	20.00
	Mar. 3.....	20.50
	Mar. 8.....	21.50
	May 12.....	22.75
	June 6.....	21.50
1948:	July 29.....	22.50
	Aug. 10.....	23.50
1949:	Mar. 29.....	23.37½
	Apr. 14.....	21.50
	Apr. 21.....	20.00
	May 2.....	18.50
	May 9.....	18.00
	May 25.....	17.62½
	June 8.....	17.00
	June 13.....	16.50
	June 17.....	16.00

1949—Continued	
July 7.....	17.00
July 11.....	17.62½
Nov. 4.....	18.50
1950:	
Apr. 18.....	19.50
May 18.....	20.50
June 6.....	22.50
July 1.....	22.50
Oct. 2 to date (Jan. 13, 1951)...	24.50

¹ This price applied to domestic copper only. The price of foreign copper on July 10 and Oct. 2 to date was 24.5 cents and 26.5 cents per pound, respectively.

Source: American Metal Market.

¹ The proposed measures would suspend the import-excite tax on the copper content of copper-bearing articles, including ores and concentrates, copper matte, blister copper, refined copper, and copper-containing alloys (brass, bronze, ball metal, nickel, nickel silver, and phosphor copper), but excluding copper sulfate and composition metal. Public Law 42, 80th Cong., suspended the tax on the same articles as well as the tax on composition metal, and Public Law 33, 81st Cong., which extended the suspension, excluded composition metal and copper sulfate from free entry, as do the proposed measures.

1950, so that enactment of either of the proposed measures would restore, rather than continue, the suspension of this import-excite tax.

Public Law 42, Eightieth Congress, suspended this tax from April 30, 1947, through March 31, 1949, and Public Law 33, Eighty-first Congress, enacted March 31, 1949, extended the suspension through June 30, 1950. Although the suspension of the tax did not become effective until 1947, most of the large imports which entered during the war period were for the account of the Government and were entered free. By Public Law 869, Eighty-first Congress, approved September 30, 1950, the import-excite tax on the copper content of copper-bearing scrap metal was suspended through June 30, 1951.

The import-excite tax imposed on the copper content of copper-bearing articles was 4 cents per pound, as originally provided for under the Revenue Act of 1932 (now sec. 3425 of the Internal Revenue Code). In the general agreement on tariffs and trade (Geneva agreement) the United States reduced this tax by 50 percent, effective March 16, 1949. Thus, with the termination of the suspension on July 1, 1950, the import-excite tax on copper is 2 cents per pound.

Table 1 summarizes available current statistics on domestic production of copper, deliveries of refined copper by domestic refiners (part of which is copper refined from imported crude copper), refiners' stocks, and foreign trade. It also shows the total for domestic production plus imports, minus exports, which is a rough measure of demand. Another measure of demand (not computed in the table) is afforded by the total deliveries by refineries plus the imports of refined copper, minus the total exports (which consist mainly of refined copper). Deliveries by refiners are more sensitive to short-term changes in demand than is domestic production.

Table 2 gives changes in the price of electrolytic copper, delivered Connecticut Valley, since OPA controls terminated.

Generally, since the close of the war, the demand for copper has materially exceeded the domestic production, and large imports have entered. There was, however, a period during 1949 when the supply for a time exceeded the demand. In the second quarter of that year deliveries to consumers by refiners (not including deliveries for the Government stockpile), which had averaged about 102,000 tons monthly during the first quarter, averaged only 51,000 tons, and stocks in the hands of the refiners increased

sharply. The domestic prices of electrolytic copper (Connecticut Valley) declined from 23.37½ cents per pound in April to 16.0 cents in June. The situation changed again in the third quarter, deliveries by refiners increasing materially, although the stocks held by refiners continued to increase by reason of a shift in the holding of stocks from consumers of copper to the refiners. In this quarter the price rose from 16 to 17.62½ cents per pounds (the higher figure first quoted on July 11). In the last quarter of 1949 the general demand situation strengthened and deliveries by refiners averaged 111,000 tons per month. In consequence refiners' stocks were greatly reduced, although they still were much larger than the monthly average for 1948. The domestic price of electrolytic copper rose to 18.5 cents per pound (quoted on November 4, 1949), at which level it continued to April 18, 1950, when the price was increased to 19.5 cents. On May 18, 1950, the price advanced to 20.5 cents and on June 6, 1950, to 22.5 cents. On July 1, 1950, with the termination of suspension of the import-excite tax, a dual price system became effective; consumers paid 22.5 cents per pound for domestic copper and this price plus the tax of 2 cents per pound, or 24.5 cents per pound, for foreign copper. On October 2, 1950, the United States price of domestic copper advanced to 24.5 cents per pound and of foreign copper to 26.5 cents (including tax).

In 1950 domestic mine production increased steadily. In the third quarter domestic mines produced an average of 76,500 short tons of copper per month, an increase of about 25 percent over the monthly average for 1949. Deliveries of refined copper were 121,806 tons in October 1950 and were consistently much higher in the first three quarters of the year than in the comparable period of 1949. Stocks in the hands of refiners have continued at low levels and were 56,945 tons on October 31, 1950, as compared with 116,000 tons on December 31, 1949.

Average monthly imports in the first and second quarters of 1950 were 54,135 tons and 62,085 tons, respectively. In the third quarter they declined sharply owing to labor troubles in Chile. However, with Chilean production resumed imports in October were 62,494 tons, exceeding slightly the high monthly average imports for the second quarter.

The Committee on Ways and Means, which unanimously reported this bill, considers the proviso for termination of the suspension, should the price of copper fall below 24 cents, to be adequate protection to our domestic producers of copper, and so far as I know there has been no protest raised by domestic producers of copper to the bill, H. R. 3336.

Mr. BENNETT of Michigan. Why is it necessary, then? The point I make is this: As I understand the situation there is no proof either before the Committee on Ways and Means or any other agency of government that suspending this tariff will get us any more copper.

Mr. MILLS. There is a distinct possibility that the suspension will help to insure maintenance of our supply of copper from Chile.

Let me say to the gentleman that Chile is now selling part of their copper production to countries other than the United States. If the copper tax is not suspended this would be an added incentive for Chile to sell elsewhere more of the copper that is now coming to the United States.

Mr. BENNETT of Michigan. Of course the reason is that the world price of copper today is 30 cents a pound, and

the Chilean copper producers are only getting the market price in this country of 24½ cents a pound, plus the tariff, which is 2 cents per pound. If the tariff is taken off, there will still be no incentive for the Chilean producers or any other producers to send copper here at 24½ or 26½ cents a pound when they can get 30 cents a pound in the world market. Why should they sell copper in this country for 6 cents per pound cheaper than they can get elsewhere?

Another thing, copper scrap in this country is 32 cents a pound.

Copper fabricators who are yelling the loudest about suspending the tariff are paying 32 cents per pound and better for first-class copper scrap in this country today. Taking the tariff off will not help these fabricators in any respect, but it will penalize a large segment of the domestic copper-mining industry by taking away a protection to which they are rightfully entitled. American workmen cannot compete with the slave wages paid the copper miners in foreign countries, and even though the price of copper is within reasonable limits today there is no assurance that we will not have a repetition at some future date of the precipitous fall in the price of copper such as occurred in the summer of 1949, when thousands of American copper miners were thrown out of employment.

Why should copper be singled out for the discriminatory treatment, Mr. Speaker? Copper does not stand in any different position with respect to supply than a thousand other commodities which have adequate tariff protection.

It may be in line with Mr. Acheson's foreign-policy program, but it is one of the most unfair and unjustifiable pieces of legislation that has ever been brought before the House of Representatives. I shall not object to the present consideration of the bill, Mr. Speaker, because I know there are sufficient votes to pass it. But I do want to emphatically express my own opposition to it because I think it is a very serious mistake.

I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, this means the raw material out of which copper is produced?

Mr. MILLS. That is correct. It is the raw copper that comes from Chile.

Mr. RANKIN. The truth of the business is that we are not only going to have to get our raw copper from South America, but the Aluminum Company of America, the greatest aluminum producing concern in the world, is now getting 95 percent of its bauxite from South America. Iron ore in the Mesabi range is playing out, and they are going to have to get iron ore from Venezuela. So, as a matter of fact, we are going to have to do a great deal of trading with South America if this country is going to remain on its present production and distribution basis. Therefore, construction

of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Inland Waterway, the missing link in our defense program, should be speeded up with all possible haste.

It will provide what will amount to a slack-water route from the Gulf to the Great Lakes, and to all points on the Tennessee and Ohio Rivers, as well as the ones on the upper Mississippi and the Missouri. This route will never be frozen up, but will be open for transportation the year round.

It is the only possible way for the Aluminum Company of America to get cheap transportation for her bauxite coming in from South America.

The steel interest in this area, whether in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago, Cleveland, or St. Louis, all other plants in that area, will have to get their iron ore from Venezuela in the years to come. Unless this great project is constructed to provide cheap transportation for this iron ore into that area, at all times of the year, those plants are going to have to move to the Gulf coast, or to some places in Central or South America, just as surely as the sun rises. This project means more to our national defense than any other one of its kind ever proposed, for the simple reason that it will provide this cheap slack-water route for bringing in this bauxite, copper, and iron ore for the production of war materials.

It will also cut the water distance between our atomic bomb plant at Oak Ridge and the Gulf of Mexico by 800 miles, and will cut the water distance between the new atomic bomb plant at Paducah, Ky., and the Gulf at Mobile by more than 300 miles. At the same time, it will reduce the cost of transportation between these points to the irreducible minimum, and will save the swift current of the Mississippi for the downstream traffic.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arkansas?

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the import tax imposed under section 3425 of the Internal Revenue Code shall not apply with respect to articles (other than copper sulfate and other than composition metal provided for in paragraph 1657 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, which is suitable both in its composition and shape, without further refining or alloying, for processing into castings, not including as castings ingots or similar cast forms) entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption during the period beginning April 1, 1951, and ending with the close of February 15, 1953: Provided, That when, for any one calendar month during such period, the average market price of electrolytic copper for that month, in standard shapes and sizes, delivered Connecticut Valley, has been below 24 cents per pound, the Tariff Commission, within 15 days after the conclusion of such calendar month, shall so advise the President, and the President shall, by proclamation, not later than 20 days after he has been so advised by the Tariff Commission, revoke such suspension of the import tax imposed under section 3425 of the Internal Revenue Code.

In determining the average market price of electrolytic copper for each calendar month, the Tariff Commission is hereby authorized and directed to base its findings upon sources commonly resorted to by the buyers of cop-

per in the usual channels of commerce, including, but not limited to, quotations of the market price for electrolytic copper, in standard shapes and sizes, delivered Connecticut Valley, reported by the Engineering and Mining Journal's "Metal and Mineral Markets."

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. REED of New York. Mr. Speaker, I understood there was a committee amendment to the bill.

Mr. MILLS. In line 20, on page 2, the word "Mineral" should be "Minerals." But I did not think it was of sufficient importance to offer an amendment to the bill.

Mr. McCORMACK. I understand what is intended is "Minerals"?

Mr. MILLS. Yes. It refers to a publication and it should be "Metal and Minerals Markets." The bill refers to the journal as "Metal and Mineral Markets," but it does not appear to be of sufficient significance to justify an amendment.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members who may desire to do so may have permission to revise and extend their remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arkansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. WILLIAMS of New York. Mr. Speaker, as the representative of the Thirty-fifth District of New York State, which includes the city of Rome, known as the Copper City, I strongly approve the passage of this bill, H. R. 3336, intended to provide temporary relief for one of the most serious situations confronting the copper consuming industries of this country.

Speaking in behalf of these copper consuming manufacturers in my district, and for their employees, it would seem to me that it is only common sense to immediately do away with the present import tax on copper. Our requirements for the metal for essential uses increases with each day, while the supply now available in this country is far short of demand. To augment our supply we must extend our purchases to foreign markets. This means that the United States must bid against all other countries for this vital metal and that the continuation of the \$40-per-ton import tax is actually a barrier to its free flow to this country, at a time when it is so urgently needed.

Copper is needed not only for weapons of defense but to construct, deliver and power the tools needed immediately to produce these weapons.

Many fabricators have had to lay off thousands of workers because of lack of copper at a time when rising prices have impaired the living conditions of these people. Letters from my constituents testify to this fact.

The purposes of this bill are reasonable and logical. It will, to some extent, relieve the serious situation faced by employers and employees.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy that the House has approved this measure.

Mr. BARING. Mr. Speaker, I have not changed my position in regard to the suspension of the import tax on copper. I believe that a tax is necessary to insure the protection of our domestic copper industry against the cheap labor which produces foreign metal. We are undergoing strained, extenuating world circumstances at the present time, and most of the western copper producers realize that we must have an abundance of copper to meet the emergency. Therefore, they have agreed to H. R. 3336 as a compromise measure. This bill states that when, for any one calendar month, the price of copper drops below 24 cents a pound, the Tariff Commission within 15 days after the conclusion of such calendar month shall advise the President, and the President shall by proclamation not less than 20 days after he has been so advised by the Tariff Commission, revoke such suspension of the import tax imposed under section 3425 of the Internal Revenue Code.

This compromise seems to protect our domestic sources at a time when the metal is badly needed, and will reimpose a tariff if the price drops below 24 cents a pound. In accordance with advice from the copper people of my State, I am not registering an objection to the measure. Otherwise I would have bitterly opposed any suspension of the copper tariff, for it has always been my contention that we protect the domestic industry first, last, and always. In order to do this, a tariff is necessary at all times.

Mr. SADLAK. Mr. Speaker, when the House Ways and Means Committee approved H. R. 3336, to suspend the current copper import duty from April 1951 to February 15, 1953, I was greatly pleased as were the many copper-using industries in my district, the State of Connecticut.

The increasing demands of the military and stockpile programs have created a tight supply situation in copper, and as a consequence, many copper factories have been forced to drastically reduce their operating schedules resulting in mass layoffs of their employees.

I now hope that the passage of H. R. 3336 will mean that an adequate supply of copper will be made available to this industry, thereby enabling manufacturers and workers to produce without disruption the maximum quantity of copper materials so vital to our national defense program.

UNITED STATES v. PATTERSON

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication from the Clerk of the House:

APRIL 5, 1951.

The honorable the SPEAKER,
House of Representatives.

SIR: From the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, I have received three subpoenas duces tecum, directed to me as Clerk of the House of Representatives, to appear before said court as a witness in the case of the *United States v. William L. Patterson* (Criminal No. 1787-50), and to bring with me certain and sundry papers therein described in the files of the House of Representatives.

Your attention and that of the House is respectfully invited to a resolution of the

House adopted in the Forty-sixth Congress, first session (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, p. 680), upon the recommendation of the Committee on the Judiciary, as follows:

"Resolved, That no officer or employee of the House of Representatives has the right, either voluntarily or in obedience to a subpoena duces tecum, to produce any document, paper, or book belonging to the files of the House before any court or officer, nor to furnish any copy of any testimony given or paper filed in any investigation before the House or any of its committees, or of any paper belonging to the files of the House, except such as may be authorized by statute to be copied, and such as the House itself may have made public, to be taken without the consent of the House first obtained."

And to a resolution adopted by the House in the Forty-ninth Congress, first session (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, p. 1295), from which the following is quoted:

"Resolved, That by the privilege of this House no evidence of a documentary character under the control and in possession of the House of Representatives can, by the mandate or process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from such control or possession but by its permission.

"That when it appears by the order of a court or of the judge thereof, or of any legal officer charged with the administration of the orders of such court or judge, that documentary evidence in the possession and under the control of the House is needful for use in any court of justice or before any judge or such legal officer for the promotion of justice, this House will take such order thereon as will promote the ends of justice consistently with the privileges and rights of this House."

These resolutions result from the issuance of subpoena duces tecum upon the Clerk of the House to produce certain original papers in the files of the House.

Permission to remove from their place or from the custody of the Clerk, any papers, was denied by the House but court afforded facilities to make certain copies of the papers to be secured from the House. This seems to be the uniform procedure in the case of a subpoena duces tecum served upon the Clerk of the House of Representatives to produce original papers from the files of the House.

The subpoenas in question are herewith attached, and the matter is presented for such action as the House in its wisdom may see fit to take.

Very respectfully yours,

RALPH R. ROBERTS,

Clerk of the House of Representatives.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will read the subpoena.

The Clerk read as follows:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. WILLIAM L. PATTERSON, CRIMINAL NO. 1787-50

TO HON. RALPH R. ROBERTS,
Clerk of House of Representatives,
House Office Building:

You are hereby commanded to appear in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia at United States District Courthouse in the city of Washington, D. C., on the 5th day of April 1951, at 10 o'clock a. m., to testify in the case of *United States v. William L. Patterson* and bring with you documents and other materials in the possession of the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities as set forth on the attached schedule.

This subpoena is issued upon application of the defendant.

HARRY M. HULL, Clerk.

[SEAL] By MICHAEL JAMES SULLIVAN,
Deputy Clerk.

Dated April 4, 1951.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the schedule suggested above will be printed in the RECORD.

There was no objection.

(The matter referred to follows:)

(1) The original or carbon copy of the minutes of the hearings before said committee, held on August 3 and 4, 1950, involving the Civil Rights Congress as they were originally received from the stenographer or reporter who took the same; (2) copies of said minutes, if any, as same were amended or revised, subsequent to the receipt from the stenographer of the original of said minutes; (3) copies of all bank records, photostatic or otherwise, of the Civil Rights Congress obtained by the committee, particularly from the Amalgamated Bank of New York, New York City; (4) all other data, reports, on, of or pertaining to the Civil Rights Congress, which were considered by the above-mentioned committee, or any member of its staff, in connection with the subpoena issued to the Civil Rights Congress and to William L. Patterson, its national executive secretary, in connection with the hearings of said committee on the Civil Rights Congress on August 3 and 4, 1950; (5) all minutes of the aforesaid committee whether of executive session or otherwise, at which action was considered or taken relative to the subpoena issued to the Civil Rights Congress or William L. Patterson, its national executive secretary, to appear before the committee on August 3 and 4, 1950, or at which the committee considered or acted on the citation for contempt against the said William L. Patterson for alleged refusal to produce documents of the Civil Rights Congress subpoenaed by the committee; (6) records of the committee indicating the name or names of the stenographers or reporters who took the minutes of the hearings of said committee on August 3 and 4, 1950; (7) any correspondence between the committee, any of its members, its clerk, or any other member of its staff, with and from the Civil Rights Congress or William L. Patterson pertaining to the appearance of the said William L. Patterson before said committee on August 3 and 4, 1950, and pertaining to requests or demands by said committee and pertaining to the refusal to produce said records on requesting delivery of records of the Civil Rights Congress, concerning which the said William L. Patterson testified on August 3 and 4, 1950, at hearings before the committee; and (8) statement or statements filed with the committee by William L. Patterson on August 3 and 4, 1950, in connection with his testimony before the committee on said date.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will read the other two subpoenas.

The Clerk read as follows:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—THE UNITED STATES v. WILLIAM L. PATTERSON, CRIMINAL NO. 1787-50

The President of the United States to Clerk, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., and bring with you subpoena of Lobbying Committee to William L. Patterson issued August 3, 1950.

For Mr. Roberts or Mr. McGill: You are hereby commanded to attend the said court forthwith at 9:00 o'clock a. m., to testify on behalf of the United States; and not depart the court without leave of the court or district attorney.

Witness, the Honorable Bolitha J. Laws, chief judge of said court, this 5th day of April A. D. 1951.

[SEAL]

HARRY M. HULL,

Clerk.

By C. H. MILSTEAD,

Deputy Clerk.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—THE UNITED STATES v. WILLIAM L. PATTERSON, CRIMINAL NO. 1787-50

The President of the United States to Clerk, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C., and bring with you subpoena of Lobbying Committee to Civil Rights Congress issued July 21, 1950.

For Mr. Roberts or Mr. McGill: You are hereby commanded to attend the said court forthwith at 9:00 o'clock a. m., to testify on behalf of the United States; and not depart the court without leave of the court or district attorney.

Witness, the Honorable Bolitha J. Laws, chief judge of said court, this 5th day of April A. D. 1951.

[SEAL]

HARRY M. HULL,

Clerk.

By C. H. MILSTEAD,

Deputy Clerk.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged resolution (H. Res. 179) and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read as follows:

Whereas in the case of the *United States v. William L. Patterson* (No. 1787-50, criminal docket), pending in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, subpoenas duces tecum were issued by the chief justice of said court and addressed to Ralph R. Roberts, Clerk of the House of Representatives, directing him to appear as a witness before the said court, and to bring with him certain and sundry papers in the possession and under the control of the House of Representatives: Therefore be it

Resolved, That by the privileges of this House no evidence of a documentary character under the control and in the possession of the House of Representatives can, by the mandate of process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from such control or possession but by its permission; be it further

Resolved, That when it appears by the order of the court or of the judge thereof, or of any legal officer charged with the administration of the orders of such court or judge, that documentary evidence in the possession and under the control of the House is needful for use in any court of justice or before any judge or such legal officer, for the promotion of justice, this House will take such order thereon as will promote the ends of justice consistently with the privileges and rights of this House; be it further

Resolved, That Ralph R. Roberts, Clerk of the House, be authorized to appear at the place and before the court named in the subpoenas duces tecum before-mentioned, but shall not take with him any papers or documents on file in his office or under his control or in his possession as Clerk of the House; be it further

Resolved, That when said court determines upon the materiality and the relevancy of the papers and documents called for in the subpoenas duces tecum, then the said court, through any of its officers or agents, have full permission to attend with all proper parties to the proceeding and then always at any place under the orders and control of this House and take copies of any documents or papers and the Clerk is authorized to supply certified copies of such documents and papers in possession or control of said Clerk that the court has found to be material and relevant, except minutes and transcripts of executive sessions, and any evidence of witnesses in respect thereto which the court or other proper officer thereof shall desire, so as, however, the possession of said documents and papers by the said Clerk shall not be disturbed, or the same shall not be removed from their place of file or custody under said Clerk; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be transmitted to the said court as a respectful answer to the subpoenas afore-mentioned.

Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALTER. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. HOEVEN. As I understood the reading of the subpoena, it required the attendance of the Clerk on April 5, which was yesterday. Is this not sort of an ex post facto proceeding here?

Mr. WALTER. The matter has been continued until such time as the House acts on the resolution and indicates its willingness to permit the Clerk to produce whatever documents the Court determines are material and relevant to the matter on trial.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

UNITED STATES v. KAMP

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication from the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

APRIL 5, 1951.

The honorable the SPEAKER,
House of Representatives.

SIR: From the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, I have received a subpoena duces tecum directed to me as Clerk of the House of Representatives, to appear before said court on the ninth day of April, 1951, at 9:45 o'clock a. m. as a witness in the case of the *United States v. Joseph P. Kamp* (Criminal No. 1788-50), and to bring with me certain and sundry papers therein described in the files of the House of Representatives.

Your attention and that of the House is respectfully invited to a resolution of the House adopted in the Forty-sixth Congress, first session (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, p. 680), upon the recommendation of the Committee on the Judiciary, as follows:

Resolved, That no officer or employee of the House of Representatives has the right, either voluntarily or in obedience to a subpoena duces tecum, to produce any document, paper, or book belonging to the files of the House before any court or officer, nor to furnish any copy of any testimony given or paper filed in any investigation before the House or any of its committees, or of any paper belonging to the files of the House, except such as may be authorized by statute to be copied and such as the House itself may have made public, to be taken without the consent of the House first obtained."

And to a resolution adopted by the House in the Forty-ninth Congress, first session (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, p. 1295), from which the following is quoted.

Resolved, That by the privilege of this House no evidence of a documentary character under the control and in possession of the House of Representatives can, by the mandate or process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from such control or possession but by its permission.

"That when it appears by the order of a court or of the judge thereof, or of any legal officer charged with the administration of the orders of such court or judge, that documentary evidence in the possession and under the control of the House is needful for use in any court of justice or before any judge or such legal officer for the promotion of justice, this House will take such order thereon as will promote the ends of justice consistently with the privileges and rights of this House."

These resolutions result from the issuance of subpoena duces tecum upon the Clerk of the House to produce certain original papers in the files of the House.

Permission to remove from their place or from the custody of the Clerk, any papers, was denied by the House but court afforded facilities to make certain copies of the papers to be secured from the House. This seems to be the uniform procedure in the case of a subpoena duces tecum served upon the Clerk of the House of Representatives to produce original papers from the files of the House.

The subpoena in question is herewith attached, and the matter is presented for such action as the House in its wisdom may see fit to take.

Very respectfully yours,

RALPH R. ROBERTS,

Clerk of the House of Representatives.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will read the subpoena.

The Clerk read as follows:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. JOSEPH P. KAMP, CRIMINAL NO. 1788-50

To RALPH R. ROBERTS,

Clerk, United States House of Representatives, Capitol Building, Washington, D. C.

You are hereby commanded to appear in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia at District Courthouse in the city of Washington, D. C., on the 9th day of April 1951, at 9:45 o'clock a. m., to testify in the case of *United States v. Joseph P. Kamp*, Criminal No. 1788-50, and bring with you:

1. Transcript of proceedings of June 6, 1950, before the Select Committee on Lobbying Activities of the United States House of Representatives.

2. Transcript of proceedings of said select committee relating to defendant Joseph P. Kamp, or to the issuance of committee subpoenas, or to both subjects, held on June 14, 1950.

This subpoena is issued upon application of the defendant.

Dated: April 3, 1951.

HARRY M. HULL, Clerk.

By HELEN M. MCINTOSH,
Deputy Clerk.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged resolution (H. Res. 180) and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

Whereas in the case of the *United States v. Joseph P. Kamp* (No. 1788-50, criminal docket), pending in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, subpoena duces tecum was issued by the chief justice of said court and addressed to Ralph R. Roberts, Clerk of the House of Representatives, directing him to appear as a witness before the said court on the 9th day of April 1951, at 9:45 o'clock antemeridian, and to bring with him certain and sundry papers in the possession and under the control of the House of Representatives: Therefore be it

Resolved, That by the privileges of this House no evidence of a documentary character under the control and in the possession of the House of Representatives can, by the mandate of process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from such control or possession but by its permission; be it further

Resolved, That when it appears by the order of the court or of the judge thereof, or of any legal officer charged with the administration of the orders of such court or judge, that documentary evidence in the possession and under the control of the

House is needful for use in any court of justice or before any judge or such legal officer, for the promotion of justice, this House will take such order thereon as will promote the ends of justice consistently with the privileges and rights of this House; be it further

Resolved, That Ralph R. Roberts, Clerk of the House, be authorized to appear at the place and before the court named in the subpoena duces tecum before-mentioned, but shall not take with him any papers or documents on file in his office or under his control or in his possession as Clerk of the House; be it further

Resolved, That when said court determines upon the materiality and the relevancy of the papers and documents called for in the subpoena duces tecum then the said court through any of its officers or agents have full permission to attend with all proper parties to the proceeding and then always at any place under the orders and control of this House and take copies of any documents or papers and the Clerk is authorized to supply certified copies of such documents and papers in possession or control of said Clerk that the court has found to be material and relevant, except minutes and transcripts of executive sessions, and any evidence of witnesses in respect thereto which the court or other proper officer thereof shall desire, so as, however, the possession of said documents and papers by the said Clerk shall not be disturbed, or the same shall not be removed from their place of file or custody under said Clerk; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be transmitted to the said court as a respectful answer to the subpoena afore-mentioned.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

RESIGNATION FROM COMMITTEE

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following resignation from committee:

The Honorable SAM RAYBURN,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Capitol.

MY DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I hereby resign as a member of the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs in order to accept membership on the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Sincerely yours,

HARLEY O. STAGGERS.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the resignation is accepted.

There was no objection.

APPOINTMENT TO COMMITTEE

Mr. DOUGHTON. Mr. Speaker, I offer a resolution (H. Res. 181) and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

Resolved, That HARLEY O. STAGGERS, of West Virginia, be, and he is hereby, elected a member of the standing committee of the House of Representatives on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

ADJOURNMENT OVER AND PROGRAM FOR NEXT WEEK

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet on Monday next.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I do this for the purpose of securing information as to the program for next week.

Mr. McCORMACK. Monday is District day, which I do not like to dispense with in order to give the committee an opportunity to call up its bills. The daylight-savings bill, if favorable action is taken, would have to be taken up on or before April 29. There are two bills on the calendar: H. R. 2612, the daylight-saving-time bill, and H. R. 3297, a bill authorizing the appointment of the Director of Civilian Defense. The third supplemental appropriation bill of 1951 is also set for Monday. It is quite probable that the consideration of those bills, or at least two of them, will take a considerable part of Monday's session, if not the whole session.

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. We will be fortunate if we do not go into Tuesday.

Mr. McCORMACK. I think it would be unfortunate if we go into Tuesday. Let us hope that that situation will not prevail, because I think the 5-minute rule on the manpower bill will start on Tuesday.

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. You are going to finish the deficiency bill before you go on to the manpower bill?

Mr. McCORMACK. Yes, of course. I am proceeding on the assumption that there will be the usual fine cooperation and that we will dispose of these matters on Monday, but if not, of course, we can continue them until later.

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. We are always willing to cooperate to expedite the business of the House, but we also have to face facts.

Mr. McCORMACK. I have always found that we have the cooperation of the gentleman in matters concerning the operation of the House, just as we cooperated with my friend when he was the Speaker.

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. Certainly; I agree with that.

Mr. McCORMACK. After the disposition of those bills, the manpower bill will be taken up for consideration under the 5-minute rule, and it will continue until it is finished. If it is completed before Friday, then of course the program for Friday will be undetermined.

April 14 is Pan American Day, and each year on that day we have speeches. However, April 14 being Saturday, the probabilities are that the observance of that day will be advanced to either Thursday or Friday, probably Thursday. While I cannot definitely announce what day it will be, I should like to put the Members on notice that the strong probability is that it will be Thursday, but in any event not later than Friday.

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. I do not suppose that would intervene before the completion of the consideration of the manpower bill?

Mr. McCORMACK. No. The consideration of the manpower bill will proceed with that understanding.

There is one further observation I should like to make. From now on we will have legislation constantly coming up. While I as majority leader like to please every Member as far as is humanly possible, the same as the gentleman from Massachusetts and the gentleman from Indiana did a few years ago, it presents many difficulties as the bills start rolling out of committee, and considerable embarrassment. I hope Members will keep that in mind, so that speaking engagements or official trips in the middle of the week will not be carried out. It will be just impossible to arrange a program from now on if Members are to have speaking engagements on Monday nights or Tuesday nights, and so forth. I hope the Members will keep that in mind.

We always try to cooperate on Monday because on Monday we can legislate and if there are any roll calls we can agree that they shall be taken up on Tuesday, so that there will be no loss of time. However, outside of Monday and Saturday, I hope Members will keep that in mind. I particularly hope that members of committees or subcommittees that are going to travel, if there are any, will keep in mind that from now on we will have a steady program.

Of course, we have to realize that time passes and July will come soon. There is a hope and ambition in relation to that. I am only expressing my personal opinion, but I would regret very much if the Members of the House were not given a vacation. We are entitled to a vacation, although very few of us have one when we are away from here. We are compelled to take one around the latter part of September or in October, and then come back again in November.

I have hopes, but I cannot guarantee that some other plan will be arrived at, but still that is all a matter of getting the essential part of our legislative business through in time. I might also say for the benefit of the membership that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARTIN] and I have agreed—of course subject to the unanimous consent of the House, which has never been denied—that if there are any roll calls on Monday, I shall ask unanimous consent that they go over until Tuesday.

Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. In which event we may meet at 11 o'clock on Tuesday, is that correct?

Mr. McCORMACK. Yes, there is a strong possibility that if there are any roll calls on Monday which will go over to Tuesday I will ask the indulgence of the House to meet at 11 o'clock on Tuesday.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCORMACK]?

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object—

The SPEAKER. The Chair would like to have this question determined now. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Yes, if I cannot find out about committee meetings, then I object.

The SPEAKER. Objection is heard.

SPECIAL ORDER GRANTED

Mr. KENNEDY asked and was given permission to address the House for 15 minutes on Monday, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered.

THE CHERRY TREES SURROUNDED BY OHIO DRIVE

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio? There was no objection.

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Speaker, for the next few days Washington and the famous cherry blossoms will be at the height of their beauty and glory.

No doubt Washington is the most beautiful city in the world and at this time it is the most important city in the world. Likewise, at this time the cherry blossoms are Washington's most beautiful attraction.

The people of the great State of Ohio and the Members of Congress from Ohio have a special interest in the cherry blossoms because the cherry trees are located in a section which is surrounded by beautiful Ohio Drive and Buckeye Road.

To see the cherry blossoms one must travel Ohio Drive which starts from Constitution Avenue near the Lincoln Memorial and runs down the Potomac 3½ miles to Hains Point, then 3 miles back along Washington harbor to Fourteenth Street.

On behalf of the Ohio Congressmen and the people of the great State of Ohio, I most cordially invite you and the tens of thousands of visitors who will come to Washington in the next few days to take a ride on beautiful Ohio Drive and see Washington's most beautiful scenery.

Mr. Speaker, I am also glad to say that Miss Virginia E. Bender, the daughter of our colleague, Hon. GEORGE BENDER, has been selected as Ohio's princess and will represent Ohio in the Cherry Blossom Festival which will be held this week in Washington.

1951 AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (S. 1) to provide for the common defense and security of the United States and to permit the more effective utilization of manpower resources of the United States by authorizing universal military training and service, and for other purposes.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill S. 1, with Mr. COOPER in the Chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT].

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the gentleman from Missouri if he will permit me to yield time to the gen-

tleman from North Carolina [Mr. DURHAM] to address the Committee now?

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I can never deny my friend from North Carolina anything.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 hour to the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. DURHAM].

Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the kind remarks of my good friend, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT].

For the last few days we have debated an issue which has been presented to the Congress for the sixth time since I have been here. There is no such thing as a painless draft act. It deals with human beings. It places the responsibility of service to their country upon human beings. It simply cannot be carried out without causing some disorder in the economic set-up of our citizens. It inconveniences many people. But the matter of giving service to our country is a matter that we can all be proud of. There are 224 men in this body who have seen service in the different branches of the service of this country.

It is common knowledge that individuals usually respond to whatever their duty becomes when the facts are presented to them as they exist. For some 150 years or more this country has had no long sustained military policy. In my opinion, this committee has spent more time on this draft bill than any other draft bill that has been presented to the House in the history of the country. We did it for that reason. We were trying to work out for this country, for the preservation of our freedoms and the protection of them from a military standpoint, a program on a long-time basis.

There is very little difference of opinion in regard to the present draft act. We have listened for the last few days to the arguments, pro and con, on the controversial issues in this bill. There has probably been some English conversation used here that has been used by the propaganda machines of the Soviet nation to try to convince the other nations of the world that we are trying to enforce upon the world an imperialistic design of government. The Soviet nation has used every means to try to destroy the confidence of other nations of the world in this country, by saying that we have imperialist design in our minds.

There have been several speeches made on this floor indicating a fear that we might become a military nation because of the adoption of one of the provisions in the title of this act before the Congress. I do not at all share that opinion and have said so on many occasions.

I think if you will look at the structure of our Government you will readily arrive at the conclusion that it simply cannot happen in this country unless we have a different way of electing our Commander in Chief, who is a civilian, unless we destroy the two bodies of the Congress; and, in my opinion, that will never happen in this country. Also, we have at the head of the Defense Department civilian control. Not only that, but today there are more than 20,000,000 veterans in this country who have seen

service at one time or another; and, as I said before, 234 Members of this House have served in the Armed Forces; so at any time they could comprise a majority if there were any desire or if there were anything to this claim and this argument that this country could become a military government. We could take over and control it if such an ideology were ever implanted in the minds of those who serve here today in this body. It simply just does not exist in the American mind, and never will, in my opinion.

It is always easy to criticize, of course, someone or somebody; and to criticize the Department of Defense at a time like this is, in my opinion, very serious. I do not mean by that that they should not at all times be subject to the control of the civilian government, which they are, but to condemn them when they have a responsibility of carrying out and protecting you and me and every American citizen gives only to the communistic countries propaganda for their own use.

I believe this country today, the American people, have made up their minds as to the job before us. For me there is but one policy—that is the American policy. That, once adopted, and what it means down through the years, is the important thing to me; whether you be Republican, Democrat, or something else, to me there is but one policy—Americanism. To be an American today is the desire of every human being, probably, outside the continental limits of the United States. Those who have traveled know that to be a fact. To defend that policy it is necessary to provide means and methods, and the responsibility falls upon the Armed Forces of this country.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield very briefly?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield, briefly.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. The gentleman will admit, will he not, that the objectives of all of us are the same and that we differ only as to the means and methods?

Mr. DURHAM. That is exactly what I was going to say, that the only difference is in the means and method and the approach to the solution of this problem.

We are faced today, regardless of the opinion of some, with a deadly atheistic ideology that is not going to be contained within its own borders, as has already been demonstrated by its actions since World War II. In my opinion it will continue regardless of the present personnel that directs that deadly atheistic type of ideology; whether they died or whether they live, America is going to be faced with the responsibility that faces it at the present time of trying to keep free people free so that the peace-loving peoples can express themselves, so that they can worship God as they desire, speak what they think, read what they care to.

Mr. Chairman, the Defense Establishment of this country is a fact-finding body. It is necessary for it to process information. It is the responsibility of this body to finally process it to a stage of action so that it will become effective,

and also to provide the force and the necessary means to carry it into action. Why should that establishment be criticized when it offers to the committee or it offers to the Congress information necessary for us to carry out and design and process legislation for the defense of our country?

No businessman would think of conducting his business without some type of analysis of the situation that exists in regard to his business. If he did otherwise he would not be successful. So it becomes necessary and incumbent upon the Armed Forces of this country to analyze throughout the world what we are supposed to defend and what we expect to defend.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. JOHNSON. Is this not something analogous to the situation we have frequently in a lawsuit? You have a judge who presides. There are technical problems which present themselves in the case. Therefore, experts are called in. I have been engaged in those kind of lawsuits where mining engineers and hydraulic engineers are called in to help the court to evaluate the facts and understand the problems; but finally either the judge or jury decides the case. In the situation which the gentleman is discussing so ably today a committee listens to the evidence, it understands it and then the members use their judgment and apply their common sense, finally offering a policy which we hope the Congress will approve.

Mr. DURHAM. That is exactly what the Committee on Armed Services and the old Committee on Military Affairs have done here over the past 12 years in formulating draft acts and other legislation.

On yesterday I notified my good friend and colleague, the gentleman from North Carolina, that I expected to discuss for a few minutes the measure which he expects to present to this House next week, just exactly what the Barden bill does and what it does not do for the defense of this country in the present emergency. As he said here on the floor of the House in discussing it day before yesterday, he took the bill as we reported with the exception of three changes. He changed the service date from 26 to 24 months; he changed the age limit from 18½ to 19; and he struck out the UMT provision. The figures that were presented to us show definitely and very plainly—and figures are factual, they necessarily have to be—that it cost \$10,000 or thereabouts to keep a man in service for a period of 12 months. So, it is just mathematically true, regardless of the argument, when you put a man in service for a short period of time, he becomes an expensive soldier. Although a period of 3 months sounds to be reasonably small, with a force of 4,000,000 it would cost us many millions of dollars more, and I am sure the gentleman from North Carolina wants to be as conservative as I do in the spending of funds. The change in the age limit from 18½ to 19 was arrived at after the committee had gone over all the figures that

we could possibly secure, all of the pool of men that we could possibly scrape from any place in the barrel, with about, at the present time, more than 600,000 or close to that number of reserves already called out for active duty, many of them up to the age of 40 years, many of them with 3, 4, and 5 years of service. In my opinion it is mandatory on this Congress that we relieve those men as soon as possible. To do that it is going to be necessary to go to 18½. Six months' delay would mean about two more years for the reservists in this country, regardless of what each individual thinks about it. It just works out that way. The gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. BARDEN], who is one of my closest friends and always has been, served on a great football team at the University of North Carolina, which is my home, Chapel Hill. He served on one of the finest teams in this country and won national recognition and when anybody went around his side of the line, they usually found out he was there. He admitted he was no military expert, to which I agree, but has offered a bill on military matters which, if adopted, the defense establishment would have to operate under. I believe his proposal to be unsound and for that reason I oppose it.

He admitted that he was an experienced legislator, which he is, and I will add to that that he is not only experienced but he is able. So it is with a little bit of reluctance that I would challenge what I believe to be his best judgment, as I know he is as honest as I am about matters of this kind.

He comes from the Albemarle section of North Carolina, where white men first placed their feet in this country. For more than 150 years before the Revolutionary War those people there fought tyranny. They fought Blackbeard, they fought the pirates, centuries before the Revolutionary War. So his part of the country is just as patriotic as any other part. It is with some hesitation that I disagree with him.

For more than 30 years now this country has discussed back and forth this subject of universal military training. It has been before practically every body in this country. It has been discussed by not only the American Legion but clubs, church circles, and other groups in this country. It has been discussed thoroughly, in my opinion. So this claim or challenge or charge that the Committee on Armed Services placed this provision in this bill simply because they wanted to tie it onto the draft bill, and felt that they would not get it otherwise, is not well founded.

Personally, I think it is time this country was making up its mind what its military policy on a long-range basis should be. It is my definite opinion, based on service myself in the First World War and the experience I have gained as a member of the Committee on Armed Services for the past 12 years or more, that if we expect to continue our traditional military policy, placing a large measure of dependence upon preparedness for defense on our Reserve units and the National Guard and on other organized units, we must make it possible for them to be able to achieve

the degree of preparedness that modern warfare requires.

I am honestly convinced that we cannot do this unless we have some system of military service and training such as our committee has brought to you in the measure now under consideration.

We had less than 600,000 troops when the Korean operation began, so we can readily see that if it had not been for the organized Reserves in this country we would again have found ourselves in the desperate situation in which we have always found ourselves before.

This also offers a far-reaching military program. As has been demonstrated here in figures by the chairman and many others, and I am not going to go into them in detail, the bulk of the reserves ordered up here are mostly veterans, many of them married, and many others with high positions of responsibility in business or industry who could ill afford to lose their jobs or leave them. The universal military training program, if and when adopted, or some such plan that is set up after the drafting of men has ceased, will induct around 500,000 or more for a 6-month basic training course yearly, so we can readily see that we can create a pool in the 6-year period required by this act by having in Reserve status 3,000,000 or more men.

I think that is necessary because if you get the number of reserves like we held after the last war and like we held after the First World War, we simply do not carry out a Reserve program which is efficient and which is in being when an emergency happens. Whatever conditions might exist in the future, we would not have to disrupt the men as we have been doing during this emergency, by taking men with families and those men 40 years old or more. This would immediately give us a ready force of men after a short refresher course or period of training to fill the ranks of our divisions and other units. Heretofore our Reserve units have suffered because of a lack of interest primarily due to the lack of equipment, training facilities, and supervision by our Armed Forces. If the guard and Reserve units could always be brought up to 75 percent or 80 percent of the trained strength, which they would be under universal military training, then those units could be called up and put into service in a short time. We are all aware of the trouble we have had in the past. It is my considered judgment that the lack of such a system has carried us through the dreadful experience of rushing understrength units into action in nearly every emergency we have faced in this Nation for the past 30 years or more. Universal military training and service is not only the most effective and democratic way to meet our military needs, it is also the most economic way. It makes it possible to shift a substantial part of the responsibilities for national defense from our forces in being to a reserve of trained civilian manpower. The annual cost of maintaining a man as I have said before in the Military Establishment is \$10,000. The annual cost of maintaining a man in a state of readiness in Reserve is \$524, and in the Na-

tional Guard it costs \$623. That is a considerable difference. It is true that the National Guard and Reserve Corps are not strictly comparable to the situation of maintaining a man in the standing Army, because it is impossible to evaluate the support the Reserve components draw from the Regular Military Establishment in terms of overhead, training facilities, hospitalization, and other factors.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the difference in the cost of keeping a million men under arms, or keeping the same number in the Reserve, runs to several billion dollars a year. The cost of training men in a separate universal-military-training program would be about \$2,900 for a 6-month training program. This would give him the basic military skills which would enable him to provide effective service in the Reserve in any emergency. It is also important to recognize the great waste which is attendant on the present system of quickly expanding or contracting our military forces with each shift in the international tide today.

Universal-military-training service would assure an orderly flow of trainees into our posts, camps, and stations on a regular basis. It would not be necessary to open and close the stations with all the costs that accompany each shift. In the current expansion of the Army it has been necessary to reactivate many camps, and if I may especially call the attention of the gentleman to this, camps which were shut down only a short time ago. A few examples will show how costly this process of reactivation is.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield.

Mr. HINSHAW. On yesterday the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], made the statement that he intended to submit a certain amendment to his committee on next Monday. I wonder if the gentleman is prepared, or if the chairman of the committee is prepared, to present that amendment in the form he intends to submit it so that we might all consider it before the bill is read for amendment.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield.

Mr. VINSON. I will state to the gentleman from California [Mr. HINSHAW] that sometime during the debate today I will present the amendment to the House and have it printed in the RECORD.

Mr. HINSHAW. That is exactly what we need in order that we may know how to act when the bill is read for amendment.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield.

Mr. GROSS. May I ask the chairman of the Armed Services Committee if he has any more amendments in the nature of all-day suckers that he is going to offer?

Mr. VINSON. I will say to the distinguished gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GROSS] I have not finished reading his

statement made yesterday. After reading it, probably it may be necessary to make some corrections in the conclusions that the gentleman uttered on the floor.

Mr. GROSS. I will say further to the gentleman that I think he ought to offer an amendment that will prohibit the taking of Reserves back into service within 24 hours after they are let out. I hope that might be done in justice to this heartwarming story that we have read about the Reserves.

Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Chairman, there is another matter that I think is important in regard to the adoption of some type of universal military training.

There has been a great deal of criticism directed against the new program for the deferment of college students. It has been felt by many that the deferment will be so broad as to create an aristocracy of brains and wealth, made up of youths who will escape military service at the expense of the rest of the Nation's youth.

This criticism underlines one of the essential differences between Selective Service and universal military training. In Selective Service, the emphasis is on deferments and exemptions; in universal military training, the emphasis is on having all young men assume a common and equal obligation for the defense of their country. Exemption from this obligation is confined to those who are prevented by mental or physical disability from rendering any useful contribution to the military establishment, no matter how far standards of acceptability are lowered.

It is possible to apply this democratic principle of universal obligation under universal military training without impairing the industrial, technical, or educational preeminence of our country. The same is not true under Selective Service to anything like the same degree. Here is why: Selective Service represents a device for calling men into the Armed Forces for extended periods of active duty. They must face the prospect of being away from their civilian pursuits for roughly 2 years. Moreover, the lack of any adequate reserve program makes it necessary to cut across a broad age range to secure enough men to defend the country. An indiscriminate withdrawal of men under such circumstances could have a most destructive effect on the Nation's economic and cultural life, particularly if the present emergency lasts for many years.

Who in this body says it will not last that long? The argument today that we must not adopt a long-range program simply does not reason out to good sound judgment, in my opinion, because we have faced an emergency since 1939 and are not out of it today. Suppose we have to draft men for another 20 years, and who can say we will not?

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield.

Mr. HINSHAW. I wonder if I understand this bill correctly in that these programs do not run concurrently, but end-to-end in other words; is that correct? Or do they run concurrently?

Mr. DURHAM. That is true; they do not run concurrently. It goes into effect only when the drafting of men stops.

Mr. HINSHAW. That is my understanding, and I think it must be the opinion of many Members here that these programs will run concurrently.

Mr. DURHAM. You simply could not run the two concurrently, because at the present time you have a complete draft.

Mr. HINSHAW. That is correct; and as I understand whatever UMT program might be subsequently adopted by the House could not take effect until the draft for the armed service was finished; is that correct?

Mr. DURHAM. That is correct.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield.

Mr. BROOKS. The gentleman is making an excellent speech. I should like to add just one thought or observation. Under the bill the UMT provision, of course, is separate from the rest of the program. The UMT program would be handled under a civilian board, whereas the draft law is under the military.

Mr. DURHAM. That is correct.

Mr. BROOKS. And a different set-up would prevail.

Mr. HINSHAW. But that was not my point; my point was that the two do not run concurrently, but end-to-end.

Mr. DURHAM. That is right.

Mr. ELSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield.

Mr. ELSTON. I think we might add to what the gentleman has said in answer to the inquiry of the gentleman from California that while it would not be feasible to put the universal military training program into effect until the emergency is over, nevertheless, under the bill it could be done. The President, for example, could defer from military service all those between 18½ and 19 years of age and permit the training program to begin. It could begin even before the emergency was over.

Mr. DURHAM. I hardly see how it could possibly be done unless, of course, we come to a position in this emergency where we do not require the present pool of men, which is about 800,000, who become 18½ each year and it will require this figure. If you reach a point which did not require all in the pool, then the President could put UMT in operation under this bill.

Mr. ELSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield.

Mr. ELSTON. I agree that that would be true, and it would be very difficult to put it into effect as long as men are needed for service; but it could technically be done before the emergency is over if perchance the President came to the conclusion that there were enough men in the pool between the ages of 19 and 26, by using those between the ages of 18½ and 19.

Mr. DURHAM. Yes; he could do that, but you would not have enough men unless you dropped down below the 18½-year age limit to get your personnel.

Mr. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield.

Mr. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL. I appreciate the gentleman's clearing up something which has been bothering me for a number of days since the debate started on this bill. The gentleman from California just said that the UMT program would not run concurrently with the draft program. The point I am making, however, is whether after the draft is dropped and the UMT is started you will not have an army operating for about one-quarter of what it costs the Government today. In other words you will be doing away with the GI benefits, with the emoluments, and the good pay which the soldiers now enjoy. You will be substituting a UMT program for the great majority of the young men in military service.

Mr. DURHAM. The 6-year period of Reserve duty, after 6 months training, will provide approximately 3,000,000 men, which is a good force in being, in my opinion. Of course, if you face an all-out emergency, that is different, but for ordinary peacetime conditions that is a reasonable number.

Mr. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL. My contention is if we have an armed force we have to pay for it. We cannot let go those emoluments, those GI benefits that Congress has fought so hard to give the young men in the armed services.

Mr. DURHAM. Of course, I do not think this country can stand a \$70,000,000,000-a-year program for the Armed Forces for many, many years. That is what disturbs me. It disturbs me because of the fact it simply is not reasonable to think that our economic system can stand it. What I am thinking about, what I want to do, and what I desire to do is to get some type of plan that will have a force in effect that we can use when we have to use it without being so expensive to the American taxpayers.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. In reference to the subject of cost that the gentleman referred to a while ago stating it is costing many millions of dollars to reactivate camps all over the country.

Mr. DURHAM. That is necessary.

Mr. GROSS. What happened to the more than \$40,000,000,000 that were appropriated for housekeeping expenses or allegedly spent on housekeeping expenses in four fiscal years?

Mr. DURHAM. What years is the gentleman talking about?

Mr. GROSS. After the last World War, after World War II.

Mr. DURHAM. These are camps that became necessary because of the expansion of the armed soldiers that were moved out entirely and had to go back in there and take over because we had to have some training facilities. If we had a force in effect like provided in this military training plan these facilities would have been kept. Of course, I do not know what plan we will adopt, but I assume we will adopt a plan that car-

ries basic military training. We should adopt that.

Mr. GROSS. Is it not true that the buildings and other facilities in these camps were allowed to deteriorate?

Mr. DURHAM. Yes; they were built out of pine lumber primarily.

Mr. GROSS. Yet we appropriated billions of dollars for them.

Mr. DURHAM. The gentleman does not expect an old pine barracks to last 40 years, does he?

Mr. GROSS. It has not been 40 years since the end of World War II.

Mr. DURHAM. It has been about 10 years.

Mr. GROSS. It has been about 5 or 6 years.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. JOHNSON. The Congress should know that practically all of the housing facilities at the time we got into the war or immediately thereafter were temporary propositions.

Mr. DURHAM. That is correct.

Mr. GROSS. Why should not those buildings have been kept up? Did you not take them in after Korea broke? Have you not had soldiers themselves putting in window glass, putting windows, and painting buildings?

Mr. DURHAM. Everybody disbanded and went home after the last war.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. I was a member of the subcommittee that visited the Sampson Air Base this last week end. We found there that in a matter of 3 or 4 years the main beams of the buildings had completely rotted and it will require a vast sum of money to rebuild them. It is simply the elements taking hold of the timber and destroying it.

Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Chairman, it is, therefore, both understandable and necessary that selective service be concerned with the maintenance of a balance between those who are called into the Armed Forces and those who are needed to keep the home front from collapsing. It is equally understandable that this differentiation would provoke bitter resentment among those who are called upon to leave their families and risk their lives while others stay at home to push forward their regular careers.

The existence of universal military training will infuse such vitality into the National Guard and the Organized Reserves that it will not be necessary to draft men for prolonged service, except when an acute threat hangs over the country. A man can be called up for 4 to 6 months of training without the necessity for the elaborate system of industrial, agricultural, technical, and educational deferment that exists under selective service.

Army training to all young men in the year between 18 and 19 represents the best answer to the problem of national defense. It assures that the burden is equitably distributed over all our young

men. At the same time it guarantees maximum strength for our country in its industrial, technical, and educational aspects. It is the American road to survival in the explosive world situation we may have to face for the rest of our lives.

Mr. Chairman, I have tried to outline to the committee some of the reasons why I am supporting UMT and why I hope this committee will vote down the substitute to be offered by my good friend from North Carolina, not that I do not consider his judgment and his belief that he is approaching this on a sound basis, but I do believe that this committee has worked out for this Congress and for the Armed Forces, for the protection of freedom, the best manpower bill that we can possibly present to you. The chairman, in my opinion, has offered and is going to offer a good amendment which will give this body and the other body the right and the opportunity to amend and work out a long-range program of service in this country.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HINSHAW. By virtue of the fact that the bill amends existing law and hence is not an original bill, except in the report by the committee, where the language of the committee bill we have on the floor is properly placed in substitution for language in existing law, a great deal of misapprehension has arisen among a number of people in the country who merely read the bill itself and do not have the benefit of the Ramseyer rule report. Now, one of the things which I believe I understand perfectly but which I think is misunderstood by many of the people is the fact that this bill is confined solely to the young manhood of the country and in nowise affects the young womanhood of the country. Is that correct?

Mr. DURHAM. Correct.

Mr. HINSHAW. That is one of the misapprehensions of fact that has existed in several places in the country. The other one is, and arising from the same cause, I believe, that the Senate bill as amended by the House, or as the Senate bill was presented to the House, would permit the drafting of labor. I understand the terminology of the original act and the present bill. It is my belief that it in nowise whatever does provide for the drafting of labor; is that correct?

Mr. DURHAM. Certainly our bill does not.

Mr. HINSHAW. That is my understanding of it.

Mr. DURHAM. That is correct.

Mr. HINSHAW. Regardless of what the Senate bill may have provided,

Mr. DURHAM. Yes.

Mr. HINSHAW. I am glad the gentleman made those statements categorically, because the other side has been presented. Where it has come from, I do not know.

Mr. BROWN of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. BROWN of Georgia. I want to congratulate the gentleman on his splendid explanation of this bill. I regard the gentleman now addressing the Chamber one of the most outstanding men in Congress.

Mr. DURHAM. I thank the gentleman very much.

Mr. BROWN of Georgia. I would like to ask the gentleman what he thinks about the recent order issued by General Hershey wherein he makes a distinction between college students because some happen to make a little better mark than the others. I have not seen a single Member of Congress or anybody else who approves that order. I certainly hope before this bill is completed next week someone will offer an amendment, and that it will be adopted, to do away with that order.

Mr. DURHAM. I think the gentleman has justification for his concern.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield.

Mr. COLE of New York. Is it not a fact that Mr. Hershey explained this proposal to the committee, that the committee drafted the bill to make it possible for this plan to be inaugurated, that the report itself, which has been before this Committee all week, explains what the plan has, and that the plan had the complete endorsement of the committee at the time it was considered?

Mr. DURHAM. At the time it was considered; I think the gentleman is correct.

Mr. BROOKS. If the gentleman will yield, may I ask if it is not a fact that the committee altered the Senate bill so as to make possible that particular plan, and made a change actually in the stipulations of the bill?

Mr. DURHAM. That is true.

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. May I call the gentleman's attention to the fact that while the distinguished gentleman from California was making a statement before our committee I made this statement, which appears on pages 507 and 508 of the hearings:

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make this observation, that I think it is highly important also to defer as many men as we possibly can with brains and who are going ahead with their education. At the same time, we cannot defer everyone. And the fact that these men are deferred does not necessarily mean—I mean the fact that some of them are not deferred—you have to have an age limit somewhere. It does not necessarily mean that they are not going to ultimately complete their education. I know of numerous instances where boys were taken, when they completed high school, into the service and who spent as many as 2 and 3 years or longer in service, but who had the determination to come back and complete their education.

Now, many of them made better students than they would have made because they were impressed with the seriousness of the proposition when they were about to lose the thing. It was dear to them. While I think it is regrettable that we cannot defer all of them—and we are trying to make it up to them, trying to take them as late as possible

by fixing the age limit at 18½ and then giving all of this broad leeway here to General Hershey and the President to defer those that are making good in an educational way. But we have to get some men into the armed services, and we cannot just take all of these men who are not able to go to college and not take any of them who might be able to go. While I agree with what the gentleman says in large measure, I cannot see how we can absolutely fix this thing where nobody will be hurt and yet at the same time build up our armed services.

I do want to ask the gentleman if he does not think that what we had in mind largely was that they should be handled in a common-sense way on that?

Mr. DURHAM. I do not believe we expected this thing to be issued as it appeared in the press.

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. That is right.

Mr. DURHAM. The Senate, as you recall, just blocked out 75,000 students, who would have been selected probably by some agency downtown. I would vote against the bill instead of voting for such a provision as that, because if we remain in this emergency 10 years you would have an entirely selective system of education.

It is a difficult problem to work out, I will admit. It is one of the most difficult problems. I have 11 colleges in my four counties, and it is one of the most difficult problems that faces us because we all realize it is going to be necessary to try to keep your scientific and your technical personnel in the colleges of this country. It just must be done. Somehow it has got to be done.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield.

Mr. HINSHAW. During the course of the testimony which I was privileged to hear before the gentleman's committee, and I appreciate that very much, General Byers made two statements, which I think are of great importance. With the gentleman's permission I would like to read those two statements, which are not very long—if I may.

Mr. DURHAM. The gentleman may read them.

Mr. HINSHAW. The statement is as follows:

We feel we are responsible to furnish to the youth of the Nation the best possible trained officers that we may get them, and we feel we should be very derelict in our duty if we did not plan to take 4-year college men to lead these boys, rather than use the emergency of taking those that happen to come into officer candidate school.

Then he says further:

The officers'-candidate-school graduate was a very, very sound, small-unit leader. He had been thoroughly trained in all elements of detail and performed small-unit leadership in an outstanding degree but his utility beyond that was in direct proportion to the education which he had had before he started the OCS.

Mr. DURHAM. There are, of course, 210,000 in the ROTC at the present time in the colleges of the country, which is quite a large number of potential officers and the services desire to enlarge the program which I think is sound.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. I yield.

Mr. RICHARDS. I join the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Brown] in complimenting the gentleman from North Carolina on the great work he has done in this field. I have great confidence in his opinion. I would like to ask the gentleman a question, and I promise I will not take up much of his time. The question is along another line. Existing law provides as follows: Under the provisions of applicable laws and regulations, any persons between the ages of 19 and 26 shall be offered an opportunity to enlist in the Regular Army for the purpose of service equal to that prescribed in subsection (b) of this section.

The period of service prescribed in subsection (b) is 21 months. The gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. BARDEN], for whom I also have great respect, called to the attention of the House the many instances where the military had shown disregard of the mandate of Congress. I have investigated and find that the Army is not carrying out the clear mandate of Congress in the matter of accepting enlistments in the Army of men in the draft brackets. The minimum period of acceptance, generally speaking, is 3 years. There have been a few Reservists accepted for less than 3 years, but very few. There are many boys in this country who want the privilege of volunteering, want to go ahead and do their part, serve their 21 months or 24 or 26 months. They want to be volunteers without being penalized for it. They want the law passed by the Congress to be observed by the military. The military, generally speaking, does not accept them for less than 3 years. Will the gentleman explain that?

Mr. DURHAM. I do not know whether I can explain it; of course it is a regulation which has been adopted, based on the best opinion, for the services of the different branches of the Army and Navy. At the present time you must realize this of course, that the Army is facing difficulty in getting men. The Air Force is a branch of the service that the boys like to get into, and the Navy is another one that the boys like to get into. Both of those branches of the service have had plenty of volunteers. But when you have to get down into the ditch, and have to do the walking, and the drudgery that has to be done as a foot soldier, the man is going to try to get into another branch of the service. They can change the regulations and they can change the period of service to 3 years or 4 years or whatever they want to under present law.

Mr. RICHARDS. That is the very point I wish to make. The Army needs these men. They are going into the Marine Corps and the Navy, and while the Congress of the United States has said, in the last act that we passed, that if those boys want to enlist for the same period for which they would be drafted, they would be given that opportunity, that is not being done.

Mr. DURHAM. The gentleman feels just like I do. Certainly I do not think we want to stop all volunteering. You cannot say to the Air Force, "Here, you are not going to take any more men," and you cannot say to the Navy, "You are not going to take any more volun-

teers." I would not agree to that. To me that would be very destructive. That is what we are faced with. It is just like having a good football team in South Carolina, and a sour one in North Carolina. The boy wants to go to South Carolina because they have a good football team.

Mr. RICHARDS. There is no competition at all in this respect. To join the Marine Corps they have to sign up for 4 years, I believe.

Mr. DURHAM. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDS. But this law would help to get men into the Army. It says men shall be accepted for enlistment for a period of 21 months. The Army has refused to let them enlist.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield at this point—you will find at page 30 of the bill S. 1 the provision under subsection (2) that the man can within the ages of 18 and 26 be accepted for that particular obligation.

Mr. DURHAM. We took all the reserves and all the reserves at the present time are in for 21 months.

Mr. RICHARDS. That does not meet the proposition at all. It is a separate section of the bill. That section says that they will be given an opportunity to volunteer for induction. That is entirely different. But existing law says, "shall be offered an opportunity to enlist in the Regular Army for the same period that they would have been called." The same provision should be in this bill and it should be observed by the military.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from North Carolina has expired.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I would like somebody to answer my question.

Mr. SHORT. I would like to say to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RICHARDS] there is no answer to your argument and your logic. I think it is rather manifest that the military has deliberately circumvented the clear intent of Congress.

Mr. RICHARDS. It seems so.

Mr. SHORT. That is the reason I do not want us to fall under military control in this Congress. The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RICHARDS] is to be congratulated for having pointed this out. It is only one of many instances in which they have circumvented the clear intent of Congress.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 13 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GAVIN], and I think the chairman of the committee has promised him 12 minutes also.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GAVIN] is recognized.

Mr. RICHARDS. Will the gentleman yield for just a moment?

Mr. GAVIN. For just a moment.

Mr. RICHARDS. The gentleman is a very able member of this committee. Will he admit that the Department of Defense has absolutely refused to adhere to the directive of Congress in regard to allowing men to enlist for the same period that they would be drafted?

Mr. GAVIN. I was not listening to the gentleman's discussion, and the

chairman of the committee could probably better answer that particular question.

Mr. VINSON. I was going to suggest that the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] could give the explanation of that, as he is fairly familiar with it.

Mr. COLE of New York. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GAVIN. I yield.

Mr. COLE of New York. It is true that the Army has refused to accept enlistments for a 21-month period, but the reason they have refused is because the Congress in the past has, by legislation, extended the enlistment period of those now in the service for a period of a year. So, if they accepted enlistments for 21 months, and subsequently the Congress has exercised its authority and extended the enlistments for a year, the result would be that those men would have been acting for a longer period of service than under the draft.

Mr. RICHARDS. I agree that men in all categories face the chance that Congress will extend their period of enlistment.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is taking too much of my time. I decline to yield further. I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

Mr. GAVIN. Will the gentleman from Georgia kindly yield me that 15 minutes now?

Mr. VINSON. I yield the gentleman 15 minutes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, I have listened intently for the last 3 days to this debate on the reorganization of selective service and universal military training. A great deal of the time has been used to attack and criticize the military, the brass, rather than to discuss the issues which are before the House. In my opinion, more propaganda has been developed for the Communists than has happened around here for the last 5 years. It is easy to criticize our military leaders, but a few years back when they were leading the American forces to great victories we heard great tributes paid to them from the floor of this House. It would appear now from what you hear, that if this legislation is passed an effort will be made by the military to take over the civil functions of our Government, Prussianize and militarize the youth of this great Nation of ours. That is simply ridiculous; nothing is further from the truth.

I want to call your attention to the fact that General Eisenhower—who is the upper brass, and who received the greatest ovation any American ever received from the Members of this House a few years ago right in this House—he represents the military; General Eisenhower represents the upper brass, and he is the exemplification of all that represents everything that is military in this Nation, however, today Members on both sides of the aisle are greatly concerned that he will not be their presidential candidate. By that I mean both sides,

Republicans and Democrats, would be glad to take this top brass as their candidate for President in 1952, and let no one tell you otherwise. Both sides are afraid that they are not going to have him for their candidate; both sides are worried now as to how to make overtures to get the upper or the top-level brass for their candidate. If he were their candidate, Republican or Democratic, a great many of you would draw a great sigh of relief and satisfaction that you had a good man, and let no one tell you otherwise. So all this talk about what the brass would do to this great Nation of ours is far from the truth, and we should confine ourselves to the issue before the House and not these attacks as to what the military would or would not do under this proposed legislation.

What I desire to talk here about today is the troops-for-Europe question. It has been discussed here momentarily but little or no attention has been paid to it. I am of the opinion that this issue of supplying troops for the defense of Western Europe will be raised in connection with the pending legislation. I desire to offer for your consideration a few brief comments thereon.

This is a complex and a difficult problem which has engaged the efforts and the attention of the American public for an extended period. While I do not claim to be an expert on the matter, I have made a close personal study of the issues involved over the past several years. During and since World War II I have given this matter close study. I have had the good fortune during the past 3 or 4 years of making several visits to the European Continent. My views and conclusions with respect to the conditions existing there have been previously made known to the House, and I shall simply invite your attention at this time to my remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS of January 22 and February 26 of this year.

As you all know, American troops reached the continent of Europe during World War II in September of 1943, when elements of General Eisenhower's North African Command landed at Salerno. The operation was a difficult one, and the Germans were much better prepared for our forces than had been anticipated. As a result the outcome was for some days in question and the casualties of our American youth were terrific in their effort to fight their way in. However, we obtained and secured a foothold on the continent of Europe from which we were able to exert substantial pressure against the German military machine. Our major landing was, of course, in Normandy in June 1944 after we had amassed one of the largest land, air, and sea forces ever seen. Again, the cost not only in matériel and supplies but in American youth was very, very heavy.

I would simply remind you at this time that our present position in Western Europe was not easily gained and we should, in my opinion, consider most carefully what we shall do before we abandon it. We fought our way in, we are dug in and we should stay in. We pulled out of Italy in 1948 and we then had a difficult time for fear the Communists would take over. We had 50,000

troops in Korea a little over a year and a half ago, but we pulled them out. So Joe Stalin says: "For the glory of the Soviet Union he moves in."

So what? It has cost us now 55 or 60,000 casualties to fight our way back to regain that which we held because somebody was not thinking right when we pulled out. Now we are in Europe, we are dug in and have a foothold, and we should stay in.

After the termination of hostilities in Europe and Japan, there was, as you know, tremendous pressure brought to bring the boys home. Public sentiment, reacting after almost 4 years of war, demanded speedy demobilization without securing results commensurate with our sacrifices and military achievements and without any thought as to the future position of this country in world affairs. I regret that there was not more prudence and fortitude demonstrated in meeting the popular clamor at that time. As a result we demobilized our Army, our Navy, our Air Corps, and largely destroyed our military machine within a year after we had achieved such costly and hard-won victories.

Two years after the end of hostilities in World War II, the beautiful dream of permanent peace and friendly relations with the Soviet Union and its Communist satellites began to fade away. We slowly woke up to the fact that we had been fooled, trapped, and betrayed and that the glib assurances and facile promises of the Russian rulers were worth exactly nothing. The Communist assault upon Greece, the threats against Turkey and the unjustified closing of our corridor into Berlin all showed us the stern realities we had too long neglected; however, we once again sought a painless solution and we took the easy way out.

We were told on eminent authority from the floor of this House to pump some \$22,000,000,000 into the economy of Western Europe so that the Continent would be revived economically, made secure for democratic government, and constitute a military stronghold against possible Communist movement or aggression. Some of this money, certainly in its initial phase, was well spent in relieving malnutrition if not actual famine, due to the drought in Europe in 1947, and restoring the productive capacity of the mills, transport systems, and factories destroyed by war. However, much of it has been relatively of little use, and, as I have stated before, any real recovery or rebuilding of Western Europe must come from the people of that Continent, not as the result of our generosity, no matter how much we spend. We were told, possibly in all sincerity, that if we simply furnished goods and materials at the expense of the American taxpayers, Europe would become not only prosperous but would reform its archaic institutions so that those countries would have a genuine democratic basis. Of course, most of these results have not been attained and we should have known at the time that they would not be. For example, after 3 years of talk, land reform in Italy has been barely started. Taxes in that country are still collected chiefly from business activities or consumption, and

very few wealthy people in Italy make any commensurate returns of income taxes, while the American taxpayer is paying through the nose to carry this tremendous load, and while in Italy they make but the slightest attempt to impose and collect taxes, that, is from the wealthy people of the country. The rich get richer and the poor get poorer.

France emerged from World War II in better condition physically than after World War I, but with strong socialist movements which succeeded in nationalizing their banks, their insurance companies, their public utilities, and certain automobile companies, in addition to the railroads and the telephone system which had previously constituted a chronic burden on the French national budget. These socialized industries have simply followed the same pattern of overexpanded payrolls, inadequate initiative, and constitute a greater drain on the limited and poorly collected tax revenues of that country. In Britain we have subsidized socialism to the nth degree. We put about \$5,000,000,000 into Britain in the last 4 or 5 years. American money, supplies, materials, and food have made it possible for the intellectual theorists to carry out their doctrinaire scheme of nationalizing and socializing not only the coal mines but the entire rail and highway transport system and now even the iron and steel industry. I feel that our continuing and misguided generosity in this respect has simply prolonged the agony and increased the hardships of the British people by continuing an inept, unworkable arrangement, which would have otherwise fallen of its own weight. When it became apparent that the vast expenditure of funds under the Marshall plan for priming of the European pump would have only a limited effect, we were presented with the idea of a North Atlantic Pact. Whether you like it or not, you are in the North Atlantic Pact.

Now, to make my position clear, I voted against the British loan for \$3,750,000,000. I voted against UNRRA. I voted for ECA on one occasion in 1947, but I voted against ECA ever since. I voted against the reciprocal trade treaties, the Export-Import Bank, and I voted against appropriations for the MDAP. So, no one can say that I have been friendly toward the give-away spending programs in Europe, but now our backs are up against the wall. What have we done with this pump priming and this MDAP? We pumped \$22,000,000,000 into Europe. We have made it a going concern. We have rehabilitated the coal and the steel industries in the Ruhr and the Saar Valleys. It is now the second greatest industrial area in the world. It has tremendous industrial potentialities.

The nations of Europe are rehabilitated. Now what do we want to do? We want to pull out and let Stalin & Co. move in piecemeal, pick these countries off one at a time and, in a year or so from now, solidify his gains. Then, whether you like it or not, you will have trouble. So while we are in we should stay in. It would, in my opinion, be a drastic mistake to pull out. There are

certain advantages in a scheme such as the North Atlantic Pact, but the whole assumption and purpose of this plan was to have the United States underwrite the defenses of Western Europe. We bought this plan, too, and set up in London one of the largest and most complicated headquarters which I have ever seen. The branch offices in Paris and Rome are likewise sizable. Under this organization and the military assistance program which has implemented it, we have been trying to purchase the security of the Western World by furnishing technical assistance, materials, and considerable quantity of arms. However, up to now, the results have been rather disappointing. As I reported on my trip from Europe in December 1950, there is no effective military force which can prevent the Soviet Army from marching to the English Channel and to the Pyrenees as rapidly as they can travel. Our forces in Germany, while individually capable, are insufficient and too greatly dispersed. Our forces in Austria are handicapped for defense by the terrain and lines of communication, and there is throughout a lack of adequate tactical air support, and technical troops such as engineers.

Anyone who looks at the problem which faces General Eisenhower will conclude, I believe, on the basis of simple arithmetic that the defense of Western Europe against possible Soviet aggression will require not less than 35 and possibly 50 trained and well-equipped divisions. Likewise, a simple examination of the facts will show that there are nowhere nearly that number of troops presently available.

The French have made some effort and, in my opinion, could make a great many more efforts toward the building up of an army of at least 20 divisions. The Italians have planned for an army of 12 divisions, but they are short of equipment, and it will be quite some time before their effective strength is anywhere like that amount.

The story elsewhere in Europe is the same. So far as I know, there are only two strong anti-Communist forces in Europe at the present time. One of these is the Yugoslav Army, which is fully occupied in defending that country against the surrounding Russian satellites and possibly a direct Russian assault. The other is in Spain. Aside from these, the best prospects, indeed, the only prospect I can see for building up an effective Western European defense in the near future lies in rearming the people of Western Germany.

I am glad to note that at long last the administration has decided to act under the authority granted in Public Law 697 of the Eighty-first Congress by recruiting some 2,500 displaced persons from nations now behind the iron curtain. However, that is only a drop in the bucket. Our real source of manpower lies in Western Germany. Unless we exploit it, our efforts will, in my opinion, come to naught.

The matter of rearming Western Germany and utilizing the potential military strength of Spain is not a new topic for me, and I shall not repeat what I have heretofore said in favor of both of

those proposals. In my opinion, they are not only desirable but absolutely essential if we are to have an effective force in Europe. I am unable to understand why our State Department has not exerted a greater effort and made more progress along these lines. While I have no great confidence in their efforts, and never have, and maybe never will, after I observed their operation on three or four trips to Europe, it may be that with the settlement of the outstanding economic issues between France and Germany and the much belated recognition of Spain, some substantial progress can be made.

At this time, as I have said, we are confronted not with a theory but a condition and a number of very hard facts. We must either strengthen our defense in Europe on the prospect that under General Eisenhower's leadership the nations here will make a real effort to develop their defensive capabilities and that our State Department will permit and encourage the participation of Spain and Western Germany, or we must get out of Europe and stay out.

As I said, I have been against all the giveaway programs. I have been fighting the one-worlders, the do-gooders, the intellectuals, and the "giveaways." So my record is clear. But my observation now is that in the situation that we are now in I am willing to go the last mile with General Eisenhower because the General has told us he would look the situation over and in 6 months or a year, if cooperation were not offered by the countries participating in the Atlantic Pact, he would come back and tell us. If the countries at that time will not cooperate, after we put in a certain number of divisions, then I say we ought to get out and stay out and let them go it alone.

But now that we have fought our way in and we are dug in, let us not turn over a great rehabilitated Europe to the Soviets to exploit and give us trouble later on.

We ought to give help to Turkey. We ought to give help to Yugoslavia. We ought to give further help to Greece. We ought to give help to Spain. They are all anti-Communist, and they are the only ones that will fight.

There are some of those who contend that we could, from the North American Continent, defend our Nation and defeat Soviet Russia. I wish I could share their view, but I am unable to do so. One of the great prizes for which the Soviets with their patience and long-range cunning are striving is the industrial area of northern France, Belgium, and the Ruhr. If they gain these resources and that assemblage of industrial plants and technical skill, we shall be faced with a very formidable foe indeed.

As I stated in February, if these territories are occupied, the people of those countries will cooperate. You will cooperate any time when you have a bayonet in your back. Those who fail to do so will either occupy a mass grave or be deported to some slave-labor camp in Siberia.

Quite aside from our moral obligations and our sympathies and any humanitarian feelings we may have, we simply

cannot afford to let the Russians take over the industrial areas of Western Europe. There are others who have contended, with somewhat more basis, that Western Europe can be defended without the utilization of American Ground Forces. A plausible case can be made out that by sea power and air power alone, we can render sufficient assistance to Western European nations; and that they will themselves supply the ground armies. This, certainly, would be desirable and after a time it should become possible. But right now it is not feasible. I know of no competent military authority who believes that at this time sea power and air power alone can protect that vital area. As for ground forces, as I have said before, there are not yet sufficient numbers. In short, unless we retain and strengthen our existing forces there, the defense of Western Europe will be seriously weakened, and the moral effect upon our potential allies will, in my opinion, be very serious if not disastrous.

There is an obvious popular appeal in furnishing only air power and sea power. It is a clean, fairly comfortable type of warfare, in which the casualties are far lower, and for which we would probably not have to draft nearly so many American boys.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GAVIN] has expired.

Mr. GAVIN. May I have an additional 5 minutes, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. SHORT. I am sorry, I do not have the time to spare.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman five additional minutes.

Mr. GAVIN. I thank the gentleman.

Unfortunately, however, I cannot believe, especially in the light of our Korean experiences, that air power and sea power alone can be decisive, any more than I would want to send American troops into combat without adequate air support.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GAVIN. I yield.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. Does the gentleman know that air power has not been used in the way it was intended to be used in Korea, by going behind the Manchurian line and cutting off the sources of supply?

Mr. GAVIN. Yes; I fully realize it has not been and that is exactly what we do not want to happen again. We do not want to handicap General Eisenhower. We do not want to put him in a strait-jacket. We do not want to handcuff him and shackle him and put him in the same position.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. If the gentleman is saying that our war in Korea has not been fought by utilizing every weapon that we had, I entirely agree.

Mr. GAVIN. Certainly. I realize it has not been fought with every weapon; however, for your information, it might be interesting to you to know that we did try to build a great defense program back in 1948, but the administration cut us back from \$17,000,000,000 to \$14,000,000,000. Then the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, cut it back more. He cut

back the 70-group Air Force to 48, mothballed the fleet, canceled the carrier, skeletonized the Marine Corps, cut back the ground forces, and then when we did go into Korea we had our boys going over there to fight tanks with carbines.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. That is what I am talking about. We have not been able to use our Air Force to the maximum effect.

Mr. GAVIN. Certainly; I agree with the gentleman from Mississippi; and certainly we do not want to shackle General Eisenhower in Europe.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GAVIN. Not at this time. Please permit me to continue.

If we learned any military lesson from our campaigns in Europe and the Pacific during World War II, it is that success in battle depends upon well-trained units and the closest possible coordination of all arms and services at the decisive point. And, as I just stated, even though in a technical sense, air power and sea power might do this task, the effect upon Western Europe of withdrawing our Army would be more serious than I care to contemplate. The popular will to resist communism would be weakened, if not destroyed and the Russians and their satellites would take over the remaining countries there, one by one, just as they took over Czechoslovakia in 1948, and endeavored to take over Italy and France.

My conclusion is that from a military point of view, we must augment and strengthen our defenses in Western Europe at this time. We must recognize, of course, that there are limitations to our capacities, and we should face the prospect, as I hope the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council have, that we may find after a time that we can no longer carry the load we have assumed. Certainly the burden on the American taxpayer is heavy, and I regret exceedingly that we must maintain such a large standing army at such terrific cost. Further, in my opinion, these efforts will come to naught unless in the interval, our State Department will use the time thus gained in order to obtain and organize effective allied armies in Spain and Germany.

Therefore, it is my belief that at this time the Congress should take the following action: (a) authorize by law, a definite strength for the size of our Armed Forces; (b) permit the dispatch of troops and units, within such strength of the types required, to Europe, without placing General Eisenhower in a strait-jacket—in other words, allow reasonable flexibility in meeting problems as they arise; and (c) place a definite time limit on this program, so that we will have an opportunity to reexamine it after reasonable period has elapsed, say a year and a half.

I have no more assurance than you that this program will work; but I feel that it is our best, indeed our only hope, for protecting our security and striving to avert large-scale war under present conditions. I therefore urge you, without regard to your opinions as to past transactions, or any overoptimistic estimates of the future, to support the pro-

gram of strengthening our military position, and increasing our troop strength in Europe. We must, within the limits of our resources and economy, and without destroying our economy through inflation and bankruptcy, build up a strong, well-balanced force, organized and disposed in the best manner possible to meet the threats to our security. Military strength alone cannot solve our problems in the absence of real statecraft and wise diplomacy; but I hope that this House—with the understanding and support of the American people—will provide the essential means for our national security.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE].

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I have purposely waited until the last day of general debate and until after other Members of the committee and of the House have had an opportunity to express themselves on this legislation which is of so great importance to the welfare of the country and such an impact upon the lives of many of its citizens before undertaking to give expression to my own thoughts on the subject.

From the arguments which have been made to date, it is apparent that the major objection and criticism of the proposal comes from the minority Members of the House. As a Member of the minority my convictions on this problem are so deep that I feel I must express them, even though I may stand alone in the position which I have taken.

The security of our country and the welfare of millions of its youth cannot be hammered upon the anvil of political partisanship. By this I do not mean to imply nor create the inference that partisanship has dominated the thoughts and deliberations of any Member of the House but it is obvious from many of the expressions which have been voiced in this debate that a genuine and widespread lack of confidence in the administration, both political and military, prompts many to approach this problem with grave misgivings. Frankly, I, too, share these misgivings, but the only alternative is to deny to the military authority to continue the draft for service and refuse to take the initial steps necessary for a long-range defense program through a system of universal military training, with the consequence that our national security may be placed in grave peril.

Admittedly, we are faced with a choice of two evils: the granting of this unprecedented authority to an administration whose competence, both political and military, is seriously questioned, or to withhold the authority with the obvious likelihood that our national security may be placed in jeopardy and the terrific price again be required to be paid in dollars and lives which past experience has shown to be inevitable.

The choice is not an easy one; either course is fraught with grave consequences but between two evils, I choose the former with great reluctance. The choice is made with some degree of confidence, based perhaps upon hope, that times may change the complexion of the administration and the military. The

foreseeable future offers no reasonable expectation that times will remove the need for a strong Military Establishment to protect this country.

It is quite apparent from the discussion on the bill so far this week that the major criticism has been centered in that portion of the proposal with respect to establishing a program for universal military training. There seems to be little, if any, disagreement with the need for extension of the draft for service. Consequently, my further remarks will be devoted to a discussion of some of the objections that have been raised.

It is quite understandable that a discussion of a proposal such as this should generate a degree of feeling and expression of emotional outburst. Although a pattern for universal military training has been recommended for three decades by many of our most outstanding and earnest citizens who are concerned about the costs of our national defense and the effectiveness of the Military Establishment, this is the first time that such a legislative proposal has been considered by the House. The proposal itself is contrary to all of our historic traditions. It is contrary to our concepts of the American way of life. It involves disruption of all American homes. It involves interference with the lives of individual young men. It provides for regimentation under military auspices and training of a military nature. It entails substantial costs in money. It carries the seeds of a military autocracy. All of these are repugnant to the American thought. Therefore, it is entirely natural that the feeling of the Members should be one of resistance to embarking upon a program such as this for the first time in history, especially when coupled with the thought that it is to be administered by an administration which lacks the confidence of the people.

This reluctance I feel, however, generates basically from the emotions of the heart rather than from the dictates of the mind. It is not necessary for a person to be in a high position or in the inner councils of Government for him to realize that the world is in a desperate situation. With hundreds of thousands of men engaged in conflict in Korea, the peace and stability of the world is threatened in many places throughout the world, all of them stemming from the ambitious designs of a ruthless godless handful of dictators whose power is great and whose cunning is sinister. So long as this threat remains it is imperative that this country preserve its national security in the most effective means. This can best be accomplished by the expansion of its own defenses and, at the same time, giving assistance and leadership to the other countries of the world who likewise are threatened with the same danger. Only the blind and unreasoning person would deny this fact. Therefore, it is quite natural that there should be emotional expressions when our mind prompts us to do something which our heart and instinct tells us is wrong or undesirable. I am sure the public and posterity will forgive us.

There are those who say that we should defer consideration of a permanent

training program until after the need for service has ended and the world picture has clarified materially. It is the same old argument as has been voiced in years past. The arguments voiced this week are the same as those we heard a decade ago when this country again was faced with ruthless aggression by lawless, irresponsible, and godless persons. It has voiced many, many times in the past; it is the argument of not trying to repair your leaky roof while it is raining, and always when the sun shines refusing to make repairs because temporarily there is no need for it. In my opinion there is no time which is more appropriate to give consideration to such a program than right now when we in Congress and the public generally are feeling the realities of war, the full impact of mobilization, of disrupted homes, of manifold economic dislocations and of high taxes and of high debt.

What are the alternatives? We all admit that the country cannot bear the terrific financial burden of a large standing army, as a permanent policy. Most of us recognize that in the future it is unlikely that there will be time for us to prepare and equip our citizens for the Nation's defense as has occurred in the past. Scientific progress has wiped out the walls of protection previously given to us by the oceans around us and the air space overhead. We cannot be sure what, if any, allies we may have in case hostilities are begun by this gang of brigands who are bereft of reason and recognize only the power of force. The time is no more appropriate than right now for us to give thoughtful consideration to a permanent program which will provide the country with a degree of defense which our economy can well support without serious interference with the normal pursuits of life. This bill does not establish the program of training itself, it simply sets in motion certain machinery for the development of a program subsequently to be approved by this or successor Congresses, entirely in keeping with the wish and will of the people at all times. The program may be changed at any time by the Congress. Control of the nature of the program and its continuance remains constantly within the hands of Congress and there is no dominating voice or veto coming from either the military or the Chief Executive.

Argument has been made that this bill should be divided into separate titles, one dealing with the draft for service and the one dealing with draft for training. I, too, feel that it was a mistake at the beginning to have the two phases of this problem, both of which are common to our national defense, to be interwoven in such a fashion as to make it difficult for the Congress to understand or to give expression to its views on the two issues involved. This objection, however, is one which relates to the form of legislative contents, rather than the substance of the legislation itself. It is a criticism of the mechanics of legislative processes rather than the contents of the legislation. As the bill is now written, it is entirely possible for the issues to be drawn by appropriate amendment by which the Members can

voice their position for or against the program for military training. Consequently, now that the legislative process has progressed to this point, with the two matters interwoven in the fashion in which they are, I feel it would be a serious mistake for us, at this late date, to try to completely revise the bill so that two matters can be treated separately and distinctly. The opportunity for expression and for decision on the major points of issue can be resolved without splitting the bill into its several titles. In taking this position I recognize that I am not entirely consistent with previous attitudes on the subject; however, I am more interested in obtaining affirmative action on these two proposals than I am in the legislative niceties of statutory draftsmanship.

Complaint is also made that the bill contains no numerical ceiling on the over-all size of our Military Establishment. With this complaint, I concur completely. Historically, the Congress has insisted on controlling the size of our Military Establishment by imposition of statutory ceilings on the number of people within the components of the various military services, except during actual wartime operations. Whether this ceiling should be fixed at 3,200,000, 3,500,000, or 4,000,000 is of no great consequence but it is of the utmost importance that some ceiling, within those numbers, be imposed and by the imposition of them, the Congress is in a position to control the size of our Military Establishment and indirectly control their deployment, which leads me to another major objection voiced to the bill.

Argument has been made that there is no limitation upon the area or the places where troops might be used and that, therefore, the Congress has lost control of our national defense and failed in its constitutional responsibility. Even though this country has engaged in a formal pact with certain countries of northern Europe with respect to our common defense, there remains strong resistance to the implementation of this commitment by the sending of troops abroad.

First let me emphasize that it is my firm conviction that the control of our Military Establishment should always remain with the Congress. Any responsible Commander in Chief should welcome the opportunity of sharing his responsibility with the Congress in making decisions of such grave consequence as sending military forces abroad into foreign areas. It was a mistake of the gravest sort for the President to have taken the position that it was within his right to send troops to Europe to implement the North Atlantic Treaty without consultation with or approval by the Congress. However, the proposal to place statutory limitations upon the use of our Armed Forces carries with it consequences of such grave implications, that I fear that great harm might be done by it. Unforeseen situations develop with such suddenness and rapidity in these modern times that it is conceivable any rigid limitation on the geographical use of troops would impair the Nation's security. No one, except a

dozen men in Moscow, knows what the future holds. Can we afford to take a chance by tying the hands of our military? I think not but it seems to me that control by and responsibility of the Congress is reasonably safeguarded through the imposition of a numerical ceiling on the over-all strength of our Military Establishment, and, too, we must remember that the Congress always, through the power of limitations upon appropriation bills, retains the control of our Military Establishment.

Therefore, strong as I am of the viewpoint that the people, through Congress, must always keep a dominant hand upon the size and use of our Military Establishment, as between writing into this legislation a restriction against the use of troops in any particular area abroad which runs the danger of seriously undermining our national security, or of relying upon a numerical ceiling and the appropriation authority of Congress to regulate the problem, I think the course of wisdom prompts choice of the latter.

Another factor must also be considered in connection with this matter. What psychological effect will such a restriction have upon our present allies and the other members of the North Atlantic Pact? Already we hear reverberations from foreign capitals regarding the Senate action a couple of days ago in its treatment of this same problem. Such a course will be completely misunderstood abroad—it will give discouragement to our friends and encouragement to our enemies.

Now the final major objection to the proposal is that the program for military training contains no termination date. To my mind that is one of the advantages of the program and one of the strongest arguments in its favor. It is to be a permanent program, designed to develop a large reservoir of civilians who, at one time during their lives, have had some minimum of military experience by way of basic military training. I can think of nothing which would be more of a guaranty against this country becoming militaristic than that each of its citizens have had some military experience and some short period of their life spent under military control.

The real danger of a system of permanent universal military training as I see it, and the major argument against it, from my viewpoint, is that by adopting it and once it is in force and operation it might cause the country to acquire a sense of false security in the belief that since all of its citizens have had military training, therefore, it need not look to the other phases of a military establishment which are so essential to an adequate military defense, such as a standing army of adequate size, modern implements of war and equipment, airplanes and guns and tanks, and so forth. However, that is a problem for the future to deal with and is not of immediate concern.

But the reason why, in my view, the training program should have no termination date but rather should be permanent is so that every American youth can plan his life in such fashion that this period of training can be worked

in a period most suitable to fit his program of life. With a termination date in the training program then it would be the tendency for each individual to defer fulfilling his obligation or making plans to meet it in the hope and perhaps expectation that some future Congress would fail to extend the law. The public interest is amply and completely safeguarded at all times under the terms of this bill with respect to the continuance of a training program. If at any time a majority of the Members of the Congress representing the will of the people feel that the need for a training program no longer applies, they can suspend all further inductions into the training program by simply passing a concurrent resolution which does not require the approval of the Commander in Chief or President.

Mr. Chairman, it is not a happy decision that prompts me to support this legislation. Instinctively I rebel against the regimentation of the military, against the thought of universal conscription either in wartime or in peacetime. What idealism I still retain after years of public service prompts me still to shun a move such as this but the realities of the modern world, the actualities of recent history, and the evidence of hostile or imperialistic action on the part of the Kremlin, prompt me to support it.

As between choosing conscription for national defense, of giving every citizen some degree of training, or following the only other course through which our national defense can be maintained, that of having a large standing army of professionals at a vast and terrific financial cost and of maintaining a Reserve force of substantial size, I prefer the former: a small well-trained professional Military Establishment and a tremendous reservoir of trained civilians.

Mr. Chairman, there may be some who hesitate and equivocate on this proposal, there may be some who counsel delay, there may be those who voice fear and apprehension for the effect that this program will have upon our moral and civic life, but as for me, I am ready to act, I am ready to decide now and for those actions and those decisions I am ready to answer to my country, to my conscience, to my posterity, and to my God.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 40 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED].

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. Mr. Chairman, I wish it had been the opportunity and privilege of every Member of the House to listen to the learned discussion which has taken place during this debate thus far on both sides of the aisle. I also wish it had been their privilege to be present to have just heard the remarks of my distinguished colleague from New York, a member of our committee, who I believe is admired and whose views are respected by every Member of the House.

I have listened to the statements made here today and the debates that have taken place in the last few days; I listened to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GAVIN] and his very fine remarks, the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE], and after listening to them and to the remarks of our distin-

guished colleague from California [Mr. JOHNSON], and possibly others from the other side of the aisle, I have arrived at the conclusion that this bill is going to receive considerable support from both sides of the aisle, and that this is a bill which I believe, when it finally comes out of the House, will not only represent the views of the majority of the Members of this House on both sides of the aisle, but also will represent the views of a majority of the American people.

As has been said during these debates, a Member of the House has to be close to his people. He is naturally close to his people. Sometimes we have to advocate measures, in order to satisfy our conscience, which a majority of our constituents might not at that particular time endorse. But, ordinarily, realizing the fact that we are their representatives, we try to represent their views—the views of a majority of them—as far as we can conscientiously do so.

When this bill came before our committee I wondered about the advisability of reducing the draft age below 19. If you will pardon a personal reference, there have been other personal references made during these debates, so please pardon me for making a personal reference.

I had three sons in the last World War. One of them was taken into the Army immediately after he graduated from high school, and served as a GI in Europe in the Third Armored Division of the First Army. He was wounded twice in Germany. My eldest son served in the Navy in foreign service, both in the Pacific and Atlantic areas, for several years. My second eldest son was in the Army and served in the Pacific, on Saipan, for a considerable period of time. So I realize the heartaches of the parents of America when they consider the thought of their 18-year-old boys being taken away from home and sent into combat areas at such a tender age. I consulted with our distinguished chairman about that matter, and considered it, and I probably never would have persuaded myself to vote to reduce the age below 19 if I had not been convinced by what my distinguished chairman said and by what General Marshall and others said when they testified before our committee that we had to do that if we intended to make the pool large enough so that some of these deserving reservists, many of whom had reached an age beyond which the present draft or this bill and who were in service, some with a family back home who had put in years of service in the last war, could come home. It was obvious that it was necessary for us to reduce the age limit if they were to be brought home within a reasonable time, so I agreed to support the bill reducing the age to 18½. But I want to say that I agree thoroughly with what has been said many times on this floor, to the effect that the average 18-year-old boy has not the discretion that a man on the front lines should have. It is heart-rending for me to think of the number that we have at that age and younger today. We did, however, place in this bill a provision that no 18-year-old boy could be sent into a combat area outside the territorial

limits of the United States or its Territories or possessions, and I think that when we did so we placed a very important provision in the bill.

I know that when you talk to many of the generals they say there is not much difference between boys of 17, 18, 19, and 20, and that some of them at 18 are just as mature as others at 20; yet we know a boy who is not quite mature when he reaches 18 is certainly a little more so when he reaches 19, and that on the average boys of 19 and 20 are more mature than those of 18.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. TEAGUE. Would the gentleman state to the Committee that the Defense Department proved beyond doubt that they had to have our 18-year-olds?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I could not say that to the gentleman from Texas; I could not say that they proved beyond doubt. I say after listening to General Marshall and others who testified before our committee, and after conferring with our chairman and other members of the committee who have been in Congress much longer than I, that I decided it was necessary as far as my own vote was concerned.

I would like to state one reason why we have reduced these standards for induction. I called on Selective Service headquarters to give me as nearly as they could the percentage of young men subject to the draft who had been rejected for all reasons. They did submit to me a list of the various States and the percentage of rejections for the months from the 1st of July through October of 1950. You would be astounded at some of the figures.

In one great State of the Union the percentage of rejections was 60.7 percent of all examined for mental reasons alone, and that included many boys in high school, as brought out by our colleague the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. DURHAM]. In my section of the country, the southern area, the average for 12 States was 34.9 of rejection for mental reasons alone. The physical rejections were very small—around 5 or 6 percent. In areas all over the United States the percentage of rejections for mental reasons alone ran to approximately 20 percent—I believe it was 18.7 percent to be exact. That is all in the record of the hearings. Those figures were introduced by me in the hearings. So we concluded that in order to make this pool sufficiently large these standards of induction should be reduced to where they were back in January of 1945.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. I want to congratulate my distinguished friend for putting those facts before the committee. That is, in my opinion, the reason why the selective service part of this bill certainly must be passed. May I also ask the gentleman, who is a member of the Armed Services Committee, whether he would not think it proper that we amend the bill now before the House to

provide that the pool of eligible registrants between the ages of 19 and 26 shall be exhausted before we start drafting the 18½-year-old boys?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I will say to the gentleman from Mississippi that I think his suggestion is a very worthy one to be considered, worthy of the serious and deliberate consideration of the Members of this House, but I want to say also that we should consider on the other side of the picture the way we have this bill written a man does not have to speculate as to when that other pool is going to be exhausted. He does not have to sit back and wonder: Well, how long will it be before I am going to be called in. "Should I continue to pursue what I am doing now or what should I do?" Under the way we have it written, he knows when he becomes 18½ years of age, unless he is deferred, that he is going to be called into the service of his country. He does not have to speculate.

Mr. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL. The gentleman is right in his contention that many are being rejected because of their failure to pass the mental examination. But, can the gentleman explain to me the paradox of rejecting these thousands of young men on the one hand because they are not able to pass the examination, yet on the other hand deferring 75,000 men a year because they happen to be intellectuals.

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. Well, I will say this to my colleague that we do not have any provision in our bill to defer 75,000. That is in the Senate bill.

Mr. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL. The gentleman will admit, though, that it has been proposed again and again by competent authorities.

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. Yes.

Mr. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL. Intellectual authorities.

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. Yes.

Mr. NICHOLSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. NICHOLSON. I hesitate to ask the gentleman this question because he has been very fair, calm, and collected in his discussion of this matter. I cannot understand why the system whereby the people were drafted in 1917 and went to war and built up manpower enough to beat the world is not just as good now.

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. Well, I respect the views of my colleague from Massachusetts very highly.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HINSLAW. I was very much interested in the gentleman's statement concerning deferment for mental causes. I have heard from people in some parts of the United States that today some of these young men, smart alecks, if you please, have discovered that if they commit a misdemeanor they

could be deferred, so they have committed misdemeanors for that purpose.

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. Well, I do not know about that.

Now I have some other things that I want to discuss. In our investigation and hearings which, as has already been stated, lasted over a period of months, we also found that in the high schools of this country—and we are all anxious for our boys to receive a high-school education; we think they are certainly entitled to that—over 120,000 graduated last year after they became 19 years of age, and we did not think it was right to take a man out of high school in March or April or May when he was going to graduate shortly thereafter. That is why we placed the provision in the bill that a man in high school in his senior year, who was pursuing his course satisfactorily, should not be drafted before his 20th birthday or his graduation, whichever should come first. We tried not to discriminate against anyone in this bill. We did defer all the members of ROTC senior units, and we did have a provision in here that would defer a man to the present academic year before he was to go, if he was called, and we had another broad provision in here under which it was announced a day or two ago that a method was going to be devised whereby a mental test would be given and then in addition to that men in their freshman year, in the first half of their class and in the first two-thirds in the sophomore year and three-fourths in the junior year might be deferred.

There is a great university in my home town, the University of Alabama. I naturally have the interest of that institution at heart. I have the education of the youth of this country at heart and in mind. I know we need to preserve all the brains and technical skill we can. At the same time, as I said a few moments ago when I asked the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. DURHAM] to yield, and read from these hearings, the thought occurred to me that we might be giving them too much leeway, that there was no limit to the deferments they might make.

After listening to General Hershey, for whose views I have a good deal of respect, I wondered how that provision would be put into effect and whether we would ultimately, without intending to do so, while trying to preserve the brains and skill of this country, yet make too much of a discrimination between the man who is able to go to college and the one who is not; because when I look at this proposition of service to our country, I do not think that just a temporary interruption in a man's education always means that he will not come back and finish.

If you will pardon another personal reference, may I say that three of my boys were in the service for a period of years. Each came back and completed his education. Two are practicing law in Tuscaloosa now. The other took a master's degree out in California but is now back in the Navy, and has been serving in Korea and Japan.

So while it might interfere with a man's education, we do not want to dis-

criminate too much, because when a man has the determination to get an education in these days he can do it. How many of you know men who worked their way through college? I am looking at one of my colleagues right here, from Alabama, who deserves all the credit in the world. If a man wants hard enough to get an education, he usually finds the way to do it, even though it is delayed.

As far as the universal military training part of this bill is concerned, he would lose only 6 months. Five hundred thousand men will be taken away from their education for a period of 6 months' training, and then placed in the Reserves. Any man who will let 6 months of basic training interfere with his college education just does not want an education.

Mr. AYRES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. AYRES. I congratulate the gentleman on his three fine sons, and also on his son who went into the service at 18. I believe the gentleman has presented a very convincing argument, that perhaps the boys of 18 are too young to be drafted. My question is this: If they are too young at 18 to be drafted, why should we permit them to enlist and be turned over to the military under their sole jurisdiction?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. Does the gentleman mean, Why should they be permitted to enlist at 18 or under?

Mr. AYRES. That is right.

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. One of our greatest States in this Union is known as the Volunteer State. When you find a man who is adventurous enough and feels that he is mature enough to enlist, we have always given him that privilege. But I cannot see as a matter of logic from that, that we should say, "When you boys become 18, we are going to force you to go into the service whether you want to or not."

Mr. KILDAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. KILDAY. We know that many 18-year-old volunteers have made excellent soldiers. The Marine Corps particularly would testify to that. As the gentleman says, some 18-year-old boys are mature and some are not. The boy who volunteers is the mature 18-year-old. If he is not, he has no desire to volunteer and his parents will not let him. But when you put out the dragnet you get the mature and the immature at the same time.

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I agree with the gentleman.

So in regard to the educational matter I have been bothered more by that in connection with this bill than anything else in the bill. My distinguished colleague from Texas has offered an amendment which, if adopted by the House, would leave it to the local boards, as I understand it, to fix the matter of deferments just like they are handling it now. I suggest to the Members of the House that the proposed amendment is certainly worthy of their serious consideration.

Another amendment, if we do not adopt that one, which I think could be seriously considered by the House, would be, in addition to the ROTC units that we are deferring, and in addition to the statutory period of deferment to the end of the academic year, to place a top limit on the number, say from 300,000 to 400,000, who in addition could be deferred, and put some limit on them beyond which they could not go. That is simply a matter for the Members of the House to consider.

To get down to the UMT part of this program. We are all in favor—or practically all of us—in favor of continuing the draft. We may not all agree it is necessary to go below 19. Some of us may think we ought to go to 18. But we all realize the seriousness of the situation today. Therefore, there is not too much discussion or debate here about continuing the draft. I want to say to my friends on both sides of the aisle that regardless of what you advocate here today I know you are sincere in what you believe. You may be right. None of us knows when he is right or when he is wrong. But I believe you certainly are sincere. I say to the gentleman from Missouri I regard him very highly, as he knows. I know he is sincere in everything that he has told the House. I know how he loves freedom and how he loves liberty. I know what is in his heart. I admire him and respect him. But I say to you gentlemen that we are now in probably as serious a time as we have ever been in. Universal military training is something I have always believed in. I have always believed we should have it in some form. I myself am not afraid of this country being Prussianized. I believe we had over four and one-half million men in the armed services in the First World War and probably over 13,000,000 men in the Second World War. I do not see any danger now of this country becoming militarized or Prussianized. I do not believe the people feel that way about it. But I do believe that the people of America today are more concerned about our lack of preparedness and our failure to prepare, than they are about us becoming militarized or Prussianized.

Certainly if you are really for universal military training with the concessions that have been made here, as our distinguished chairman stated yesterday that this plan to be brought back by the Commission could be amended on the floor of the House, and could be rejected or accepted, you will find that acceptable. So we on the committee have never contemplated that any Commission which was later appointed could just write any kind of a plan they wanted to and come up here and jam it down the throats of the Congress. We never had that in mind at all. To show you we were thinking about the importance of the civilian in America, we have a provision in the bill that this Commission must be composed of three civilians and one member from the Reserve and one from the Regular Establishment. I believe that a provision is written in the bill which provides that the chairman must be a civilian.

So we had that in mind and we always thought that regardless of the provision of this concession which was made here yesterday about being permitted to make amendments on the floor of the House, that we would have some distinguished members of that Commission to help us in submitting a proper plan.

What would you say, for example, if the former distinguished Senator from New York, Mr. Wadsworth, would happen to become a member of that Commission? It has never been our idea that we would just have some mediocre men on that Commission. Of course, we have no way of knowing just who would be appointed to the Commission, but we always had in mind that they would come back to the committee with a plan. From time to time they would be consulting with various members of our committee, and particularly our chairman, about that plan. You know they would be getting his advice and suggestions, and the advice and suggestions of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. KILDAY], the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. BROOKS], and the gentleman on the minority, and when this plan came back to the Armed Services Committee it would have their views already in it, to some extent. Then, when we got through talking about it, before we ever brought it to the House, we would have a conference with them and talk it over. Then, when that measure finally comes to the floor of the House, it will represent the combined views of the members of the Commission and of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I yield.

Mr. TEAGUE. Does the gentleman believe you will ever have a better Commission than you have already had, and does the gentleman believe you will have any better information than you have now? Does not the committee have sufficient information right now to go ahead and write a universal military training bill?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I will say to my distinguished colleague from Texas [Mr. TEAGUE] that we know if we write a bill now it is not going into effect now. If the plan goes into effect 2 years from now, it might be well for us to consider and deliberate about the plan for the next 2 years. It would be well for the Commission to consider it quite a while and for us to consider it quite a while.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I yield.

Mr. JOHNSON. Can the gentleman think of any more important job that a man could be appointed to do than to figure out a sound, long-range military policy for the United States, to secure its citizens and its institutions? It is obvious that we can command the best talent in the United States for this job. The President, I hope, will select such men. They will be available to him.

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I cannot. I say to the members of the committee we have to face this matter of universal military training sooner or later, and we might as well face it today. Sometimes

we might be a little better off if there was some reason for acting than if we try to act on it after we get back into a period of complacency. The able gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT], in presenting this matter before the committee the other day made the statement that we had demobilized too rapidly after the last World War. I agree. But why? Because we had all gone back into a spirit of complacency; because every time Russia makes a threat against us we get serious and say we are going to do something about it. When the troops start losing ground in Korea, and I pause to call attention to the fact that I read yesterday our casualties last week were over 1,400 over there, but when these things happen we say we have to do something about it. Then the next thing you know, Russia starts talking about peace and makes some flimsy, friendly gesture, and we get right back into the same spirit of complacency that we did when we demobilized too quickly after the last World War.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I yield.

Mr. HAYS of Arkansas. The gentleman has made a good point. It seems to me that the danger of Prussian elements in a universal military-training program need not be feared in America. It is inherent in our national point of view. I do not want to take too much of the gentleman's time, but I simply wish to concur in his general proposition regarding the distinction between the Prussian type of military training and the kind that undoubtedly would be evolved in this country where our tradition is contrary to the Prussian point of view. In other words, it was not the fact that training was universal which made Prussianism the odious thing that it was. It was rather the philosophy of a national leadership devoted to dictatorial power which produced terrible results. The democratic ideal in America will be embraced in a universal type of training if we hold on to the basic ideals of this country. And if we should lose those ideals nothing would save us anyway.

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I appreciate the contribution of the gentleman from Arkansas. I cannot yield further at this time, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say in conclusion that we have heard lots here today and throughout this debate about what happened in past years, the mistakes of the past, and all that; and I admit that there have been many mistakes, but let us remind ourselves that here we are in April 1951 facing the future and it is our responsibility to prepare our country for what we face.

We have got to get behind something and somebody; we have got to unite on some plan; we have got to have a fixed plan that cannot change from day to day. I tell you right now that we should have confidence in our present military leadership, in General Eisenhower, General Bradley, and these men who successfully led us through the last war. If we have not, in whom can we have confidence? We are not going to have

any others. If we destroy the confidence of the people in them we destroy their confidence in the men who have got to lead us through the next war if we have one. It is illogical to do that.

When General Eisenhower came over here I had met him once when we went over to the Pentagon a year or two ago, I sat at table with him and had lunch. But I never knew the man really until he addressed the Members of both Houses of Congress and then came before our committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee and submitted to questioning for a number of hours, then that night talked to the American people. I listened to him again, I just had not had enough of what he had said and I listened to him again when he talked to the American people over the radio. I want to tell you that that man inspired a feeling of absolute confidence in me and I felt that he was one man who could successfully lead us should we be forced into another war.

He accepted the responsibility which he has today not because he wants it, for he has had all the honors any man could possibly want; he accepted it merely as an act of patriotism to try to keep us in or restore us to peace. It is just too bad if we cannot get together under his leadership.

The day after he got through here I picked up a paper and read either an editorial or article which said that General Eisenhower in what he was doing was simply the tool of Dean Acheson. I laid the paper down; I felt discouraged; I just felt that now, what America needs is a real leader and she has one in General Eisenhower, and can we not all get together on any one thing?

He says that the way he outlined is the way to preserve peace, and I believe with the experience that he has had we should follow his suggestions of leadership. Talk about a military dictatorship and people being afraid of it and afraid of being Prussianized, why, as one gentleman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, said here today, there is not any man in America more popular with the people of America than General Eisenhower right now. I agree with what he said about that. What the people are afraid of is that we are going to continue to stay unprepared.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I yield.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Not being critical at all, may I ask the gentleman if he thinks that General Eisenhower or someone else determines whether we shall take part in war?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I do not think anybody has a determination of whether we take part in a war; I think it largely depends upon what Russia does.

Much has been said about UMT. I do not care exactly what plan of UMT you work out, I believe we must have some meritorious plan of UMT to secure the future. If we are for UMT let us support the bill, let us go on record as being for UMT or being against it.

Now, as to what the local posts of the Legion and veterans think about this matter, let me say this: There has been

some talk about it being supported by only those higher up in the Legion. Here is a letter from Chilton County Post, No. 6, of Clanton, Ala., not written lately but back in March, asking me to support this measure in full, requesting that I support it as a one-package proposition. Here is a telegram from George Huddleston, Jr., department commander of the American Legion at Birmingham, Ala., supporting it. My son is commander of the Farley W. Moody Post at Tuscaloosa, Ala. I know they are for it. Here is a letter from the auxiliary ladies of the Farley W. Moody Post, No. 34, of Tuscaloosa, Ala., requesting that I support the universal military training bill now on the calendar.

I have others here, including the telegram from the national commander. As far as I am concerned, I believe the people of Alabama as well as elsewhere hate to see their sons drafted, but I want to tell you one thing right now and that is that I believe the majority of the people of Alabama, the people of my district, are in favor of some plan of universal military training. I do not believe they want their sons to go into combat when they are not properly trained.

Now, we talk about expenditures. General Marshall told our committee, as has already been stated, that if we establish this UMT system, within a period of 2 years after it is established he has hopes of reducing our standing Army below what it is even now, although we might be somewhat in peril at the time, but if things got no worse, because then we would have a trained reserve ready to take the place of the standing Army. So it is bound to save money, as our distinguished chairman and others have told you. If you want economy, it seems to me you should be for this bill, if you want preparedness you should be for it, if you want our youth to have a chance to survive in any combat which may come, you should be for it. They ought to have combat training which is provided in this bill, that is the basic training provided in this bill, because any man can become a combat soldier whether he is at the front or not. The front lines will not mean too much in another war. The man in a cobbler shop a thousand miles from the front or hundreds of miles from the front may be an infantry man in the next minute in the event of a paratroop landing. So they all need training.

I want to tell you that this great committee, led by my distinguished chairman, has done a good job. The gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON] may be something in the nature of a Sherman tank when he comes up here to put through legislation, as I believe was stated, but whenever he tries to put through legislation here in the House it is not because he is trying to hoodwink or fool anybody, it is because he believes it is for the best interests of his Nation.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. Would it not be much more feasible, in view of the many arguments the gentleman has made, not to

draft 18-year-olds at this particular time because we cannot have a UMT and a drafting of 18-year-olds both, but rather, increase the draft age perhaps to 27, start your UMT program with the 18-year-olds, as they move into college or as they proceed through high school, or as they work into the National Guards or otherwise?

Mr. DEGRAFFENRIED. I have not given that question enough consideration to really be able to answer it. At the present time I think we have about as good a bill as can be worked out.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has expired.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. DONDERO].

Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Chairman, we are now considering Senate bill No. 1. The title of the bill is to provide for the common defense by extending the draft law with certain modifications.

The second subject in the bill is to establish for the first time in the history of the United States compulsory military training, referred to in the bill as universal military training. Its correct designation should be compulsory. In its present form, I shall vote against the bill. The gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. BARDEN] has introduced H. R. 3364. This bill deletes compulsory military training, provides for induction at age 19, the same as in existing law. It provides for a maximum service of 24 months instead of the 26 months provided in the measure now before us. I intend to vote for the Barden bill.

I am not opposed to extension of the draft and sincerely believe that in the present world condition it is necessary that we do this in the interest of national security and defense.

Wartime conscription is one thing; peacetime compulsory military training is quite another. One is a wartime necessity; the other is far from being a necessity.

To establish universal or compulsory military training in America is to import an Old World disease. It involves the regimentation of our young men. Such a policy would serve in the end to militarize our economy, against the wishes of the people.

In the long run, it would lead to military domination, to the Prussianizing of our Government. That is something the proponents have been trying to accomplish for 28 years.

I do not believe our Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a policy-making body, have evolved into a Prussian-style general staff. Neither do I believe that the responsible members of that body are seeking or even desire to control our Government and our economy.

I do believe that compulsory military training would open the way. It would present the opportunity. It would, I believe, be the seed from which might spring the growth of American militarism; a growth which would strangle our free enterprise system, our free political institutions, and, finally, our essential liberties.

It seems that recent statements on this floor, to the effect that already the

military is planning to take over in wartime all important functions of our Federal Government, were based upon a single document. It was a handbook, outlining prewar policies of the German general staff, and was circulated among high ranking officers in the Pentagon.

This book, I am told, revealed how the German general staff planned to take over in wartime all administrative, judicial, and legislative functions of government and dominate absolutely all economic activities of the German people.

I do not think that the men who lead our Armed Forces took this outline of German general staff policies seriously. They must have known all about those policies long before the book was circulated. All of our high ranking officers are students of the art and theory of war.

However, the fact remains that this book was required reading among our military leaders. It demonstrates the magnitude of the temptations which even the ablest and most patriotic of those men in the Pentagon would face, should compulsory military training create a favorable field here, for Prussianized thinking.

In view of these facts, this bill, together with selective service law improvements, looks entirely too much like an effort to cram compulsory military training down our throats, by forcing us to accept it as an integral part of necessary wartime conscription.

Legislation to strengthen the draft law, and legislation for compulsory military training, if we must give the latter any consideration at all, should be handled in two separate bills.

Compulsory military training presents a definite threat to our free institutions and our personal liberties. Until 1940, the year before World War II, this country never accepted peacetime conscription. We did so then because it was plainly evident that a World War was only a few months away. At that time, compulsory military training was not even seriously considered.

Neither Congress nor the people liked either of them. I do not think they like them now.

It is my conviction that the people of the United States know, by reason of their common sense, that extension of the draft, from time to time as needed, can serve all the requirements of national defense. They know that the draft can serve these requirements, even in the event of all-out war.

Furthermore, it is my conviction that the people of the United States actively abhor universal military training, because they know history has shown that compulsory military training has never won a war for any country.

Those countries where compulsory military training was in effect, have been forced to depend for victory upon nations which had rejected military training as repugnant to free men.

Conscription and compulsory military training are ideas which have their roots in the quarreling nations of Europe, and not in America. While we have accepted conscription solely as a wartime necessity, we have always regarded compulsory military training, and its attendant evils of regimentation

and possible militarism, as hateful and contrary to our traditions.

The advantages of this policy are manifest in the military record of our Republic since the day of its birth. These advantages are manifest in the rise of the United States to world prominence and power unparalleled throughout the history of the earth.

I should not neglect to say that these advantages are apparent in our record thus far in the Korean war.

In spite of all the political difficulties put in the way of our far-eastern high command, almost unaided except by half-trained South Korean troops, they have prevailed against an enemy far greater in numbers. There is reason to think they will continue to do so.

It may be said that our traditional hatred of peacetime conscription and compulsory military training grows out of the fact that many of our ancestors came from Europe to America to escape long years of military training. My own father was sent to this country from Italy, in 1854, when he was only 15 years old, to escape compulsory military training.

My grandparents sent him to this country because they knew that compulsory military training would keep him in army camps for seven of the best years of his young manhood. Even in those days, many Europeans hated and feared the consequences of the very things now proposed for America in this bill.

In conclusion, I think I should point out that those of us who are conservative enough to oppose this proposal may be attacked by so-called liberals. We may even be called reactionaries.

But let me say to you that opposition to this proposal marks us, not as reactionaries, but as conservatives in the sense that we seek to conserve the freedom of our young men from regimentation and to preserve our free institutions and the essential liberties of the people.

Let us strengthen our selective service law, sufficiently to fulfill all of our military needs, but let us reject any and all proposals for compulsory military training, which would open the gate to the very evils against which we are mobilizing today.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as she may desire to the gentlewoman from Ohio [Mrs. BOLTON].

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, the very distinguished Committee on Armed Services has presented to this body a bill which has two distinct and separate aims: First, the drafting of young men for active service in the Armed Forces in such numbers as the Defense Establishment deems necessary to meet the contingencies of this very grave moment in the world's history; second, to establish a formula under which there shall be what is termed universal military training.

I have the highest respect for the eminent gentlemen who make up this powerful and important committee and for the distinguished gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON] who has long been its chairman. I am sure that each of them has nothing but the highest sense of obli-

gation to the people of this great country and that each is making every effort to secure legislation which acts in the best interest of the United States.

I would call attention, however, to the fact that there is a wide and vigorous difference of opinion among the members of the committee over this bill—differences not of a political nature, but of deeply considered judgment. I do not recall any such cleavage except in the matter of the President's request for House agreement in the appointment of a military man to the office of the Secretary of Defense. When the majority of this House last fall took the responsibility for setting aside a law passed in 1947 after the most careful consideration of and with unanimous agreement to the basic principle enunciated by the wise men who established our unique form of government—that in these United States control of military power should be in civilian hands—this country was laid open to a course of action, the second step of which is being presented to us in Senate bill 1: Control by this same military of the education of our youth.

Do the people of this country want this step to be taken or do they believe, as I do, that there is a better way—an American way—to set up even at this late date a method of military instruction under civilian control that originally was considered one of the essentials of freedom?

Mr. Chairman, there is no one in this House who desires a true and constructive peace more sincerely than the Representative from the great Twenty-second District of Ohio. My constituents have suffered tragically, not only from both World Wars but also from the Korean battles. They desire peace as never before. They insist that war begets more war and that we must find the sure road to peace. They recognize that it is the United States which must lead the world out of the darkness and chaos of war into a climate in which peace may be born and grow to full maturity.

Wars do build wars—of that there is no doubt—but until the fanaticism, the greed, the selfishness of nations can be held in check, until these have been curbed sufficiently to permit peace measures to replace them, there seems to be no other method possible save that of material, visible strength.

But that should not mean the abandonment of fundamental principles indigenous to our unique national structure.

Do not misunderstand me.

I do not come before this House asking for disarmament, but I do come before you to insist, so far as it is in my power, that our methods of procedure and the formula set, give this great country a strength that will be recognized throughout the world as invincible and be in keeping with our true belief and faith in the principle of freedom under God.

To me it is not in keeping with the tradition of the Committee on the Armed Services to submit to this House a bill that confuses issues and methods as does S. 1. On the very face of it is the implication that the Congress' emotions can

be so played upon as to bring about results which could not be accomplished were the membership not thrown off balance.

Every Member of this House knows that emotion and considered thinking do not go hand in hand. Anger another deeply, and most will lose control, saying and doing things they will regret all of their lives. Pour the miasma of fear over the people until their breath is shortened, their sight impaired, and where is their sanity of judgment?

It has long been the method of the party in power to create an atmosphere of fear which beclouds the vision and saps the courage of many men and women. The cry of "wolf, wolf" has long been heard in the land—so long that we no longer have confidence left in those in whom we should be able to trust implicitly. There is great possibility of fatal tragedy in this, for any thoughtful person knows that the world stands upon the edge of a burning caldron into which a sudden misstep could plunge mankind. What the United States does at this time may be the deciding factor in the future of our world. Such steps as we take should not be taken in confusion of mind under emotions largely resulting from fear.

Whatever we do, if we are to build the strength we, as a Nation, must have to lead the battle against darkness, must be clearly understood by the people and decided by them. This measure as proposed is not clear nor is it forthright, proposing as it does to achieve the enactment into law of a procedure whose far-reaching implications are beclouded and certainly are not understood.

I reiterate what I have already said: that action taken under stress of emotion cannot be sound, a false move on the part of the United States, not out beyond our borders but right here in the very center of government, may tip the scales toward defeat of the principles for whose protection and development this Nation was born. When emotion runs high among the people, it is the duty of government to so clarify every action to be taken that thinking can be freed and sane judgment can be attained.

This, Mr. Chairman, this legislation as presented to this great body does not do. Indeed, it would seem to have the unwritten purpose of making confusion rather confounded. As the representative of nearly a million people, I must protest this method. I must do all that lies in my power to insist that the administration be not permitted to use double talk. It is failing the people of this country whose representatives we are.

My confidence in Americans is very great. I believe that they can be depended upon to act with sanity and judgment, once they know all the facts. It angers me deeply to have those in high places treat them and treat us as if they—and we—were children, to be cajoled or frightened into obedience.

Yes, the world is an armed camp with spurts of war now here, now there. It is no more than common sense to build a practical and material strength that will preserve our free way of life and make it possible for us to be successful

champions of freedom. Is this, therefore, a moment for us to take a second step away from the basic principles of civilian control of our Armed Forces and our educational processes and so weaken the very sound basis of our national structure?

Once upon a time there were minutemen—there was a militia. Every man had his gun and knew how to use it. Every boy was taught the skill required, either by his father or his uncle or someone in the village who knew how to teach him.

You cannot tell me that the citizens of this country are any less ready to learn the necessary skills and to see that their sons, too, know them.

This is no longer a simple process, this knowing how to use the weapons of self-protection and the defense of freedom. It takes more complex methods of procedure, just as the whole mechanics of living have become complex beyond belief. But surely that does not mean that every man cannot find free ways to accomplish these purposes. I believe that a way can be, must be found to develop in every youth growing into manhood, a deep love of his country and understanding of his responsibility to her institutions, to her future; to take his part in her life, in her strength, in her progress. I do not believe our search for a way to do this is helped by this legislation as introduced.

Let me remind you that the terms used are in themselves deceptive and disturbing, "universal military training." What is universal about it? Where is there any recognition of the fact that for every soldier at the front today there must be at least eight trained men behind it in a line, a part of which, at least, is right here in Washington? Where is there provision for the men who do not qualify for that front-line job? Is there any reason why men with flat feet or broken ear drums, with a leg gone, but with minds that work—often overtime—why these and others should not be trained in skills with which to serve, with which to man those millions of positions behind the men of the line? If it is to be universal training where is the title covering these?

A IV-F is not a pariah, Mr. Chairman. If we are to fortify the road to peace, if we are to be ready for all contingencies, we would need all of our manpower, and we would need to have every man know his own strength and how to use it for the best interests of his country.

But I see nothing in this bill, Mr. Chairman, that would insure us such training. I believe that those things pertaining to what is inaccurately called universal military training should be separated from the bill and an eventual bill be brought to the House which would face issues squarely in words every American will understand. I have no doubt of the action our citizens would want once they face the reality of America's need of them and the world's need of America's strong leadership in the difficult but no less imperative battle to retain freedom on the face of the earth.

Feeling as I do, that our responsibility as citizens and as the representatives of the citizens of this still free country

is to clarify issues and give to the people that upon which they can form sane and sound judgment. I am particularly glad that the debate of these days has given to those in authority, a clearer concept of the method that must be used as Americans' will to express themselves in the real interests of Americans.

The announcement by the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee that he now proposes to bring in an amendment which will keep the principles of universal military training, but will do no more than set up a commission to bring in a detailed blueprint of the what and how as envisaged by the administration, for both Houses to pass upon, increases one's belief and confidence in the democratic processes as we understand them. I am convinced that the people of this country are already facing up to the cold realization of life, and that they are taking hold of whatever sound methods are put before them, supporting them with a renewed loyalty and a greater patriotism than has been theirs in many a long day.

The draft title of the bill undoubtedly will be amended in various particulars next week. It has been my opinion that changes might be made at this time which would make it mandatory for the Selective Service Board and its branch boards to consider the many elements that must be maintained if the country is to weather what will at best be hard sledding.

Up to this time there has been little evidence that Selective Service has any broad national picture or that there is true cooperation with the many vital nonmilitary services. To give you an example: The farmers of Ohio, the growers of vegetables under glass and other such, have had their trained men literally snatched from them by draft boards whose sole viewpoint appears to be industrial and urban. One of my own constituents, when he was refused deferment for a highly skilled greenhouse man, was told: "We don't need your vegetables, we have more in storage now than we need." Have we? Perhaps now—but what of 6 months or a year from now? Greenhouse men take a lot of training just as do dairy farmers.

That the armed services have no common plan for recalling reservists units has been a source of many grave injustices and much bitterness. Neither of these are conducive to high morale or a cohesive service. This, of course, is not part of the legislation before us. I speak of it merely to emphasize the need of a more thorough Nation-wide plan fully understood and supported by the people to use our not-so-great manpower to the very best possible advantage and in such wise that the spirit of every serviceman and civilian worker will be fused into an invincible though intangible strength—to defend this country and to uphold freedom in the world.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. BYRNES].

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, too often, when we debate controversial and far-reaching legislation, such as the bill before us, we are

apt to ignore the basic principles which have always motivated us as a Nation. We become enmeshed in the technicalities, we are swayed by the pull-and-tug of conflicting interests and emotions, and we lose sight of the very principles which have served as our guideposts since the day this Nation began.

Let us not, as we make the momentous decisions involved in this legislation, forget the basic principles governing our approach to the Military Establishment which have guided us since the days of George Washington.

Those principles can be briefly stated. They reject the idea of a huge standing Military Establishment in time of peace, with its tremendous cost and its dangers of military domination, and they contemplate a comparatively small standing force, large enough to meet the immediate threats to our national security, backed up by a large, well-trained citizen Reserve or militia, ready to spring into instant action when danger approaches. As expressed in War Department Circular No. 347 on August 25, 1944, our policy calls for a professional peace establishment—no larger than necessary to meet normal peacetime requirements—to be reinforced in time of emergency by organized units drawn from a citizen Army Reserve, effectively organized for this purpose in time of peace.

Mr. Chairman, our action on this bill will decide whether we are to continue to follow the principle of a small standing force backed by Reserve units, or whether we are to embark upon the principle of a huge standing force—a policy which has led to the eventual ruination of every nation which has adopted it.

If we here reject the provisions of this bill calling for the establishment of a universal military training program, then I say, Mr. Chairman, that we have rejected the principle of a citizen army and that we have embarked on the road to a permanent, huge standing force which will wreck our economy and lead eventually to the domination of our country by the military men who control that force.

Why do I say this?

If we reject universal military training the only known method of insuring a strong, well-trained Reserve force, then we have only two alternatives. We can decide to take the risk of inadequate preparedness, and we would be blind, indeed, if we failed to recognize in the world around us a danger which calls for the utmost in preparedness, or we can protect our lives and liberties by authorizing and appropriating funds for a huge standing force. Without the strong citizen Reserve that UMT will eventually provide, we must do one or the other: take the risk of inadequate preparedness and, in the process, encourage the aggressor or establish a standing force large enough to meet any eventuality, and such a force, Mr. Chairman, will not require 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 men, but it will require a force in being at all times into the foreseeable future approaching World War II strength.

For these reasons, I am struck by the inconsistency of some of the amendments which are proposed to this legislation. I refer particularly to those which would strike out the UMT provisions of this legislation and those which would limit the size of our Military Establishment.

If we strike out the UMT program, Mr. Chairman, we cannot, if we have the security of this Nation at heart, put any effective limitation on the size of our standing forces. If we strike out UMT, we will have killed, for all practical purposes, our Reserve establishment. It will wither and die on the vine for lack of manpower. With a weak and ineffective Reserve establishment, with our entire reliance placed upon our standing forces, who would dare tamper with our national security by imposing drastic restrictions upon the size of that force? Without a soundly conceived Reserve establishment, 10,000,000 men in the standing forces would not be too much for minimum security.

I do not want to leave the impression that we will not require a relatively large standing force during the uneasy period which lies ahead. Our lack of well-trained Reserves, caused by both the lack of a universal military training program, which is the fault of Congress, and the lack of a sound Reserve program, which is the fault of the Pentagon, will require a much larger force than would be necessary if we had both a working UMT program and a sound Reserve program in operation. When these things have been accomplished, and I am hopeful that Congress and the Pentagon will both move swiftly toward that end, we can then think about the reduction of our standing force. In that connection, I think it is the responsibility of Congress, if it provides the means to bring about strong Reserve forces, to set limits upon the size of our Military Establishment. Until we have those Reserve forces, however, I believe we must recognize the need for a larger standing force than would otherwise be necessary.

As part of my remarks, I will include correspondence which I have had recently with the Secretary of Defense concerning the principles which underly our Military Establishment. I hope that the members will find time to read them. The Secretary, briefly, reaffirms the principles which I have stressed. You will note, Mr. Chairman, that the Secretary states that universal military training "is the only practical way to hold down the size of our force on active duty, keep the cost of our defense program within reasonable limits and insure the strengthening of our democratic traditions against any danger of military domination."

MARCH 14, 1951.

The Honorable GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: My correspondence reflects much confusion in the mind of the average citizen over the kind of Military Establishment which will be required during the uneasy period which lies ahead. Recent congressional debates, I believe, demonstrate the depth of that confusion.

The need for a strong national defense organization is generally taken for granted,

but there is a great fear on the part of many that a very large Military Establishment will cause serious economic difficulties, particularly if the present situation prevails for some time to come. I believe you yourself have warned against a possible letdown in civilian morale if we build such an establishment and have no immediate use for it.

Much of this confusion, I am convinced, stems from a lack of understanding of the basic principles upon which our armed establishment rests and, in many cases, from an ignorance of the very existence of such principles. In the present situation, for instance, many people believe that an increase in our armed potential must necessarily result in the creation of a large standing army, draining away our substance and lessening the capacity of the Nation to produce. Faced with the dilemma of how we are to survive if we do not build up large forces and how we are to preserve our society if we do, many are led to rationalize themselves into the belief that the need for large, trained forces does not exist, or that we must risk postponing their creation until the crisis is upon us. They forget, or do not know, that there is a third method—a method which many of us have assumed is the basic principle guiding our military policy today.

I refer to the "general principles of national military policy to govern preparation of postwar plans" laid down by you when you were Army Chief of Staff in War Department Circular 347 on August 25, 1944. This circular rejects the principle of a large standing army and accepts "the conception of a professional peace establishment (no larger than necessary to meet normal peacetime requirements) to be reinforced in time of emergency by organized units drawn from a citizen army reserve, effectively organized for this purpose in time of peace."

In spite of the fact that the Army has failed to develop a sound reserve program in the postwar years, it has been my assumption that this principle still governs our planning and that we are relying upon this concept to provide trained forces quickly, should war strike, without having them constantly under arms during what may be a long period of tension. Naturally, our standing force—the professional peacetime establishment—must be increased in view of the world situation, but I have assumed that we cannot increase it to a size large enough to meet any contingency and, therefore, our major reliance must be placed upon a citizen army. If such an army is well-organized, well-trained, and ready to spring into action in case of war, I believe you will agree it represents almost as effective a deterrent to the aggressor as a large standing army. In addition, it would not constitute such a drain upon the economy.

My purpose in writing, therefore, is twofold. First, to clarify my own thinking, I inquire whether the principles set down in the above-mentioned circular still govern our military planning. If they do not, I would sincerely appreciate learning what principles now form the basis for national policy in this connection.

Secondly, in either event, I strongly urge you to call to the attention of the American people, at the earliest possible time, the existence of basic principles governing military planning during this period, spelling out those principles carefully so that all may understand. It is difficult for ordinary citizens, and perhaps soldiers do not appreciate this, to distinguish between the various components which make up our Armed Forces and to fit them into their logical place in an over-all scheme of things. I have no doubt that the American people, if they are given the opportunity to understand the basic reasoning behind our military policy will find it much easier to support the sacrifices necessary to give that policy full mean-

ing. It seems to me that a general clarification of this whole matter, Mr. Secretary, would be invaluable at this time.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN W. BYRNES,
Representative in Congress.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, March 19, 1951.

HON. JOHN W. BYRNES,
House of Representatives.

MY DEAR MR. BYRNES: The thoughts you set forth in your excellent letter of March 14 are fundamental precepts in the planning of our Military Establishment. The Department of Defense is completely committed to the thesis that our force of troops on active duty should be held to the smallest number consistent with our security and that this force should be reinforced in time of acute danger by the calling to duty of well-organized and well-trained National Guard and Organized Reserve units.

The policy enunciated in War Department Circular No. 347 on August 25, 1944, has always represented the military policy of our country. It is still our policy. However, it has become tragically apparent that we can never hope to have a trustworthy citizens' reserve of adequate dimensions unless some provision can be made for a regular flow of trained young men into these civilian units. It has been the lack of such a dependable flow of trained manpower that has prevented us from going as far as we would have desired toward transferring responsibility for our national safety away from our forces in being to the National Guard and Reserve.

In order that we may give more effective expression to our historic policy of shunning a large professional Military Establishment without exposing our Nation to possible annihilation at the hands of an aggressor, the Department of Defense is currently urging the Congress to enact a permanent program of universal military training and service. This is designed to do the very things you stress in your letter as important to a soundly conceived national-defense program.

It will enable us to build up the expanded force we need to meet the immediate threat to our security. At the same time it will infuse real vitality into our Reserve components so we can count on them to take the field swiftly and effectively whenever the need arises. With such a program, we will be assured of the greatest protection for our country at the smallest cost in men and money.

The Senate has already passed the universal military training and service bill by a vote of 78 to 5. I hope the House will approve a bill that makes the same enduring contribution to security as the Senate. I am convinced such a measure represents the only practical way to hold down the size of our force on active duty, keep the cost of our defense program within reasonable limits and insure the strengthening of our democratic traditions against any danger of military domination.

In the course of the hearings on the bill, all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the civilian officers of the Department of Defense have sought to give the clearest possible picture of the philosophy underlying our advocacy of universal military training and service. I recognize that there is still great confusion on many basic points, and you may be assured that I shall continue to do everything in my power to explain exactly what it is we hope to accomplish through this approach to national security.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 40 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. SHAFER].

Mr. SHAFER. Mr. Chairman, I rarely take the floor of the House. Today, I think, is the first occasion I have asked for time in several weeks. I am going to use a number of quotations in my talk, all of which are well documented and will appear in the RECORD.

Mr. Chairman, human memory can become exceedingly short in the heat and fury of battle—even in the heat and fury of a parliamentary battle of ideas and policies such as we are engaged in here this week.

Memory is especially short, under the stress and confusion of controversy, when it comes to recalling the background and origins of the conflict.

Yet sometimes it is extremely important to make the deliberate effort to remember. Sometimes that remembering helps define and clarify the very issues at stake.

With that purpose of defining and clarifying the issues, I want to quote a brief statement to you. I ask you to listen closely to these words—and now I am quoting:

The realities of the situation are that if such legislation (that is, universal training legislation) were enacted tomorrow it could not possibly be put into effect at once. In view of the demands made on our military forces by the Korean aggression, it is clear that we could not possibly make available the installations and trained military manpower to put a universal training program into operation at this time or in the immediately foreseeable future. Accordingly, it does not seem to me immediately necessary for the Congress to enact universal training legislation.

That is the end of the quotation.

This line of reasoning is not new to the Members of this House. It has been offered during this debate by those who see no reason for hurrying or being hurried into a decision of this importance. I doubt, however, whether this position has been as well or as briefly stated by anyone on this floor. It states the case concisely: There is no immediate necessity for enacting UMT because UMT cannot be put into operation "at this time or in the immediately foreseeable future."

But it is not primarily the clarity or the common sense logic of this statement which prompts me to place such emphasis upon it.

The significance of the statement I have just quoted is that these are the words of the President of the United States. They were contained in a letter—in duplicate letters, to be exact—under date of August 29 of last year. These letters were addressed to the chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees (House hearings, p. 132).

In consequence of these letters—and that was their clear intent—work on UMT legislation was abruptly halted in both committees.

In the Senate committee, that work was then at an advanced stage. A bill, endorsed by the American Legion, was ready for final action. We have the word of Chairman JOHNSON that—

It was then in its fourth revision; all controversial matters had been ironed out satisfactorily. (Senate hearings, p. 24.)

Later, Senator JOHNSON said, relative to the President's letter:

We had a bill ready and ready to report it, and at the request of the Commander in Chief we withheld action. (Senate hearings, p. 213.)

The bill was not so far along in the House committee. But early this year, in commenting on the President's letter to the committee, the distinguished chairman said:

That simply means this: In going down to this age of 18, with world conditions as acute as they are and as uncertain as they are, probably everyone who is drafted, of whatever age for many, many days and possibly several years in the future probably will be called right into the service and there won't be much opportunity of any set-up of the universal military training. (House hearings, p. 132.)

Now there is another statement I would like to call to your attention.

When the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee reconvened on January 10 of this year to resume consideration of draft and manpower legislation, Chairman JOHNSON reviewed this bit of past history. Then he added this most significant statement:

Now the over-all picture has changed so that I think it is obvious that we have more important things to do than debate stand-by legislation for the future. (Senate hearings, p. 24.)

His very next sentence appears to explain what he meant by "more important things to do." He said:

Our present national emergency makes it imperative that we look to a program sufficiently realistic to meet this country's immediate needs.

Let me sum up the situation as it stood when the two congressional committees convened after the start of the new Congress. With the worsened situation in Korea; with the President's earlier announcement of plans to send more troops to Europe, and with every indication that substantially more manpower must be mobilized for active military service, there was certainly nothing to change the position on UMT taken by the President in his letter of August 29. And there obviously were "more important things to do than debate stand-by legislation for the future."

How does it happen, then, that we find ourselves where we are this afternoon—embroiled in just such a debate on stand-by legislation for the future? How does it come to pass that we find UMT legislation now on the must list? How does it happen that this controversial issue has been tied to a piece of necessary legislation—the draft-extension bill—with a mandatory deadline of July 9? Above all, how does it happen that the UMT provisions now before us, and the UMT provisions already adopted by the other body, are not those of the original Legion-sponsored UMT bill so near approval in the Senate Armed Services Committee last August and reintroduced in both Houses this session? How does it happen the current bills are substantially different?

These questions are important because the answer is important. That answer not only tells why we are in the situation and confusion we are in here today, but

it clarifies and sharpens up the real issues now before the House.

First. Because one man has claimed full responsibility, and has claimed it in the almost defiant statement to the House committee—"I am not admitting it; I am telling you; I did it"—I shall name that man. And because he is a military man, first, last and always, even though he holds a supposedly civilian post, I am going to phrase my answer to the questions I have raised in military analogy.

Perhaps both he—and the American people—will understand the import of that language.

We are today embroiled in this issue, under pressure of an arbitrary dead line, under pressure of administration demands and warnings, for just one reason.

That reason is that Gen. George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense, has decided that now is the strategically proper D-day for establishing a firm beachhead in the United States for his brand—and the Pentagon's brand—of permanent universal military and national service.

General Marshall acknowledged—under sharp questioning by the Member from Texas [Mr. KILDAY]—that the Marshall bill combined and intermingled the two things, draft extension and UMT—so that "it is practically impossible to separate" them—House hearings, page 24.

He acknowledged before both committees that he was joining the two items under the stress of the present emergency, because of a fear—and I am quoting—"that we will once again throw aside all our military power whenever our sense of urgency subsides"—Senate hearings, page 25. He made it plain that he doubted whether UMT would be adopted if postponed. Here are his very words:

I am strongly of the opinion that if you ever divorce this phase (that is, UMT) from the bill we are sunk again. (House hearings, p. 25.)

Then he went on to say this—and mark these words well:

I do not want us to delay to get this into law. I want to get going. (House hearings, p. 25.)

There you have it.

General Marshall wants the beachhead established now—under the covering barrage of necessary emergency draft-extension legislation.

There, Members of Congress, are the marching orders.

Second. The situation even has its humorous aspects. It is obvious from the record that the general took members of his own army, both in the Pentagon and in the Congress, completely by surprise.

When General Marshall announced the new approach—the beachhead strategy—to the Senate committee on January 10, Senator MORSE, who was by no means adverse to the strategy, expressed his surprise. Senator MORSE said, addressing the general and the committee:

Unless there is something wrong with my ears, I recall distinctly in recent days, in answer to questions that I put to members

of the Military Establishment before our committee, they testified that they did not favor going ahead with it (UMT) at the present time. * * * I think the chairman will share my view.

General Marshall assured him that now, at least, there was nothing wrong with his ears:

You heard correctly. * * * Here is a proposal that combines the present emergency with the future enduring program. (Senate hearings, p. 28.)

And it certainly appears that the general caught his own Defense Department flat-footed. As a result, a lot of midnight oil was burned in the Pentagon, getting the new law ready for the Congress to rubber stamp.

When Secretary Marshall appeared, Monday, January 10, before the Senate committee, he did not have the bill ready. He said it would be in form later in the week—Senate hearings, page 27.

The following Monday, in answer to a query, Assistant Secretary Rosenberg said:

We will have the bill surely this week. (Senate hearings, pp. 153-154.)

The next day Chairman JOHNSON very sharply rebuked the Defense Department for the delay, commenting, caustically:

We have something else to do besides practice. * * * They—

Meaning the Defense Department—

have had since last September to get the bill ready.

Secretary Rosenberg explained, apologetically:

We are working on the bill, drafting all night tonight. (Senate hearings, p. 215.)

Later, on January 23, when General Marshall was before the House committee, the Member from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS] called his attention to the omission of a very important provision from the bill relating to the National Guard. General Marshall said it was an oversight and added:

I do not know how it happened. But they were working on these papers up to 2 or 3 in the morning, and that probably is the explanation. (House hearings, p. 17.)

I spoke of this situation as having its humorous side. But it ceases to be funny with what I am going to mention next.

Secretary Rosenberg told the Senate committee, apologetically, that "the shortness of time has not permitted us to consult with as many people as we wanted to"—Senate hearings, page 44. Spokesmen of the vitally affected Reserve Officers' and National Guard Associations testified later that they had not been consulted by anybody in the preparation of the bill—Senate hearings, page 728.

The National Guard spokesman charged that the law had even been violated, since the matter had not been considered by War Department committees which included National Guard officers, as required by statute—Senate hearings, pages 714-715.

What a farce all of this makes of the solemn assurance given the Senate committee earlier by Mrs. Rosenberg, and

repeated in substance to the House committee. She told the Senate committee:

I should like to say to you * * * that we are fully aware and particularly sensitive and conscious of the very grave responsibility we take when we recommend that this country change its whole concept of military service, national service for all its citizens. (Senate hearings, p. 41.)

Third. In devising and executing this surprise beachhead maneuver, General Marshall made use of a tactic which became familiar to all of us in the Pacific during the last war. He used the by-passing technique.

You will recall, when the President of the United States announced there was no hurry about enacting UMT, that there was legislation before the Armed Services Committees of both Houses. You will recall that it was well advanced in the Senate committee. And you will recall that this bill, strongly supported by the American Legion, was reintroduced in the present Congress as S. 1.

That bill was before the Senate committee when General Marshall appeared on January 10 and announced his beachhead strategy. Did General Marshall make any mention of this bill, of the past labors on the bill—so much as even to criticize or condemn it? Oh, no. He simply bypassed it completely. He left it to wither on the vine. For the original Senate bill 1 there was not even the courtesy of a military funeral and the sounding of taps.

The shift was adroitly executed—General Marshall, you will recall won fame in the First World War for moving an entire army to a new position under the very eyes of the enemy without being detected. This new shift was made with equal expertness.

Twenty days later, Senator MALONE, a coauthor of the original Senate bill 1, appeared before the committee and reported:

The country is entirely confused about the Marshall-Rosenberg substitute while still retaining the title Senate bill 1. My recent mail indicates the people believe that the substitute upon which the hearings have been held is the original Russell-Malone American Legion or veterans' bill. (Senate hearings, p. 1172.)

I may add that today, more than 2 months later, my own mail indicates this impression still exists. Incidentally, Senator MALONE denounced the substitute as a monstrosity.

There was an earlier witness before the Senate committee who recognized the quick switch. That was National Commander Erle Cocke, Jr., of the American Legion. He told the Senate committee, in no uncertain terms, on January 19:

We want to make it clear that the plan before you is not universal military training of the type so long advocated by the American Legion, and supported by the people. (Senate hearings, p. 702.)

To be sure, after the Senate committee made a few changes the top brass of the American Legion decided to enlist in the Pentagon's "Operation UMT Beachhead." That is their privilege, of course. But I think they may wake up to find that they are very junior members of an axis they will wish they had never joined. I

may add that I am not too frightened by a so-called pressure group which caves in so easily to the Pentagon pressure group.

Let us not miss the tremendous importance of the program which General Marshall is seeking to substitute for the dead-on-the-vine, original S. 1. The Marshall proposal calls for a mandatory obligation of military training and military service and thereafter membership in a Reserve component of the Regular armed services for a total of 6 years, for every able-bodied American youth. That is in the bill now before this House. The bill adopted by the Senate calls for a total obligation of 8 years.

But that doesn't put the finger on the most fundamental change. The plan, and specifically the Reserve component provision, means that the program will set up a centralized, federalized, Pentagon control, on a permanent basis, over the bulk of the Nation's military manpower.

That is the complete opposite of a citizen-army Reserve plan, with local units, locally trained, under local officers. It threatens the whole system of the State-organized and State-controlled National Guard. It means, also, that in future emergencies men would be called up directly by the Defense Department and not through a local draft board set-up. That is a Prussian-type UMT.

And get this: The Pentagon has asked for up to 6 months to perfect and announce an improved Reserve program. They have asked for that interlude even though Mrs. Rosenberg told the Senate committee:

It would be useless for us to ask you to give us a universal military service and training program unless at the same time we would come up to you with an improved Reserve program. (Senate hearings, p. 50.)

This request amounts to saying: Give us our beachhead now and later on we will tell you what life is going to be like in the occupied area.

Fourth. I know the argument that will be advanced—and has been advanced during this debate.

We were told, only yesterday, and I believe that my good friend from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS] said it—that this bill before the House is not the Marshall-Rosenberg plan. And we were told, too, that approval of this bill does not authorize UMT; that the UMT plan must come back to the Congress for final decision. Now, I note, they have added even a postscript to that. They now promise us there will be opportunity to amend the plan when it does come back.

Now I do not discount the work that has been done by the House committee. I do not deny that our esteemed chairman, good soldier that he is in trying to carry out the policies from above, has sought and secured some improvements in order to make a bad bill less bad. All credit to him.

But I point out two facts.

Once you have approved UMT as part of a draft-extension bill—regardless of details—which you promise to let Congress fill in later—they have won the beachhead.

Let me remind you that the other body has already adopted, in its virtual entirety, the Marshall-Rosenberg program. This legislation will go to conference. There is no way of knowing what House-devised defenses may crumble there.

No, my friends, you do not defend a beachhead by retreating inland to imagined defenses.

You win or lose on the beaches themselves. This is the battleground and now is the battle—not at some other place and time.

Fifth. Now I want to say a very hard thing, but a thing the record forces me to say.

Like every campaign, General Marshall's "Operation UMT Beachhead" has its expendables.

Mr. Chairman, I charge—from the record—that the Pentagon demanded the draft of 18-year-olds with the sole, exclusive, and deliberate purpose of getting going now with a permanent system of peacetime conscription.

I am perfectly aware of what Mrs. Rosenberg told—and failed to tell—the House committee on January 25. The esteemed chairman said to her:

Well, the question is naturally going to arise if you go down to the 18-year-old group. What are you going down there for? Are you going down there to strengthen the military force to meet the world crisis as it confronts us today, or are you going down there partly for the purpose of inaugurating and starting a program of universal military service or training?

Mrs. Rosenberg answered:

We are going down for two reasons. One, that all our heads of the services and General Bradley have said that they are some of the finest soldiers and are needed to make our Army as combatworthy as possible; and secondly, we are suggesting going down because we have need of men and we have the choice of offering that we take fathers or husbands or veterans or all of them. (House hearings, p. 73.)

There was not a word here to indicate whether they wanted the 18-year-olds so they could gain the UMT beachhead.

But now turn back, please, 10 days, to January 15. Listen to the earlier testimony of Mrs. Rosenberg before the Senate committee—and she was repeating what she had said 3 days prior:

Again we are not asking you to give us the 18-year-old universal military training because we are going to run short in this pool. We might, but our strong argument is that if we do not have them, we have to maintain a force as large as this or larger during the entire period of tensions which, as General Marshall said, may be 10 years.

We say if you do it the other way, if you give us enough young men who will have training and can be put in the Reserve force, we hope that as tensions lessen, the Regular force, the force in being, will be reduced.

Later that day, Chairman JOHNSON undertook to sum up Mrs. Rosenberg's argument. He said:

You told us that you do not ask to go down in the 18-year-old crop just to supply the 3,500,000 force in being. That is not your real reason for doing it. * * * As I gather it, you do not rest your case for 18-year-olds on the necessity of taking them because you can't get a 3,500,000 force from any other source, because you can.

I am still quoting Senator JOHNSON's summation:

But if you do not take the 18-year-olds, your UMT program goes out the window, because you do not have people to train them and you have got to phase them in with the Regular service in order to have a UMT program. * * * Is that correct?"

Mrs. Rosenberg replied with obvious enthusiasm:

That is the best presentation that the Department of Defense has made yet for its case. That is exactly it, Senator. (Senate hearings p. 187-188.)

That is certainly plain enough, Mr. Chairman.

That certainly identifies the expendables in operation UMT beachhead.

Sixth. No general ever planned to capture a beachhead merely to win or hold the beachhead. That is only the first objective.

Mr. Chairman, I want to warn this House that this UMT proposal is only the beginning of the system of conscription and regimentation which the administration and the military have in mind for the American people.

I wish the present administration would be even a fraction as explicit and forthright in stating their military goals and objectives in Korea as they are in stating the war aims of operation UMT beachhead.

They have made it clear that they want a large-scale standing army for an indefinite future.

They want it to be replaced, if and when it is replaced, with a Pentagon-controlled Reserve set-up—details furnished in 6 months or later.

They want—it is all in the record of the Senate and House hearings—Government-controlled selection of college students, a plan of Federal scholarships, and a plan of free medical rehabilitation through the United States Public Health Service or Veterans' Administration—Senate hearings, pages 51-53, 56, 158-159, 465, 497; House hearings, page 349.

But that is not all.

Let me read what Mrs. Rosenberg told the Senate committee:

It is his—the President's—concept, and that of the Department of Defense, that this must be a universal program and that every man physically and mentally and morally capable of performing a service, either in the military or outside, must perform that service. (Senate hearings, p. 51.)

Mrs. Rosenberg made it plain that she was talking about those men who would be left after drafting all those capable of only limited-duty military service. She estimated that the number of 18-year-olds in this category would be from 100,000 to 150,000 annually.

Mrs. Rosenberg continued:

We, however, want to make sure, and that is not the Department of Defense's program, but I know those are the President's instructions, that when a program is submitted to you * * * it will not be a made-work program but one of real usefulness in the national effort. (Senate hearings, p. 51.)

And still later, Mrs. Rosenberg reiterated:

The President will have a program. (Senate hearings, p. 148.)

Details are still awaited. The House committee was told nothing about this.

Subsequently, Labor Secretary Tobin was asked if he agreed with the program for nonmilitary service for 18-year-olds asked for by the Department of Defense. Secretary Tobin answered:

It would be a very difficult program to administer, and I would want to have an opportunity to see a specific plan before me before I would want to commit myself. (Senate hearings, p. 340.)

There was no doubt in the mind of another witness who was an enthusiastic supporter of really universal service, that this is a Pentagon project. Dr. Karl T. Compton said:

I believe that the plans now proposed by the Department of Defense are aimed in that direction.

That is, universal national service—Senate hearings, page 426.

There was no doubt either about the long-range objective in the mind of another witness, who did not like the prospect at all.

James B. Carey, secretary-treasurer of the CIO, told the Senate committee:

We believe that a change in the title to "Universal Military Training and Service" will leave the door open to the drafting of individuals not qualified for military duty to perform functions normally carried on by civilians.

And Mr. Carey added:

To this we are unalterably opposed. (Senate hearings, p. 1051.)

Seventh. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I want to say a word about the barrage which is currently being laid down to cover the advance to General Marshall's beachhead objective.

It is a barrage of promise and threat, of confused and conflicting propaganda, but why should they care if it is conflicting so long as it's confusing?

The Defense Department is alternately trying to sell its UMT plan to the Congress on the argument that it will make possible a reduction of the standing Army in the near future and trying to stampede the Congress into accepting the whole program without question because of real or fancied imminent peril.

They cannot have it both ways.

There cannot be any real build-up of the Reserves through UMT until it is possible to halt the draft for service and switch to the draft for training only.

More than 2 months ago, Chairman VINSON and Mrs. Rosenberg agreed on the statement that—

You may not be able to reach the training phase for a great, great many years. (House hearings, p. 110.)

Yet the House committee report says it may be possible to end the draft and reduce the standing Army in the near future—report, page 14—and the distinguished chairman last week was quoted as saying that it might be within 18 months.

Yet in his testimony, General Marshall said, as recently as March 1, we must prepare for the probability that it will be necessary to go above the 3½-

million figure in the standing army—House hearings, page 438.

General Bradley said that—

After 5 or 10 years * * * you might be able to reduce those that are on full time active duty below 3½ million. (Senate hearings, p. 666.)

Does that sound like the near future? And then Wednesday we were given a warning which should preclude all thought of early application of UMT. Our esteemed Speaker told the Congress and the Nation:

* * * it is my firm belief that we are in greater danger of an expanded war today than we have been at any time since the close of the World War in 1945. * * * I think that we stand in the face of terrible danger and maybe the beginning of world war III. (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, April 4, 1951, p. 3311.)

I pray God that the Speaker may be wrong. I know how sincerely he hopes that he is wrong. But surely if this is the possibility, there is no prospect in the foreseeable future for reducing the forces-in-being—which no one would want done under such circumstances. And there would be no prospect of switching to the training phase of UMT—for which there would be no possible need.

Certainly the Speaker's statement lends new and ominous import to the words of Senator JOHNSON that "we have more important things to do than debate stand-by legislation for the future."

In the light of what the Speaker has said, I say to General Marshall: If you, General Marshall, share the Speaker's grave anxiety over the immediate situation, then, in the name of national unity and for the sake of putting first things first, withdraw your demand for stand-by UMT legislation as part of the draft-extension bill—involving as that demand does, a deeply divisive issue, and involving as it does detailed work and planning by the Pentagon and Congress which have no immediate urgency or relevancy.

And I extend the same proposition to General Marshall's Commander in Chief. I urge the President of the United States to write another letter. I urge him to say—and I believe he can say it with vastly more cause than when he said it on August 29 of last year—I urge him to say in that letter: "It does not seem to me immediately necessary for the Congress to enact universal training legislation."

I say, respectfully and earnestly to the President of the United States, that this is the course of practical realism. This is the course of hard-headed wisdom. This is the course of patriotism which would do much to unite a free people to meet whatever challenge may be before us.

And if that letter is not forthcoming, then, for the same reasons, let the Congress say it. Let the Congress by its vote say to the President and to the Pentagon: "It does not seem to us immediately necessary to enact universal training legislation."

And then let us, and the President, and the American people, turn with courage

and unity to the more important duties at hand.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHAFER. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. VORYS. I was told by a member of the 21-member Committee on Reserves that they would report by the end of March to the gentleman's committee. Is that true, or is that out the window? What is the present situation?

Mr. SHAFER. I do not know whether it is true or not. All I am doing is quoting the record or using their own words.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentlewoman from Illinois [Mrs. CHURCH].

Mrs. CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, I approach this subject with the trepidation which it deserves. For 3 days I have been a daily attendant and a conscientious listener to these debates. May I say I never expect to hear on the floor of the House a finer or more carefully reasonable speech than that given by the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE]. The fact that I do not agree with him in no sense lessens my admiration for the cogency of his sincerity for the height of his idealism. I am delighted also to follow the gentleman from Michigan who has given us facts which we did not know. I would like to inform the committee—if I may be forgiven the personal allusion—that I know the experience of sending boys into the service. In my adult life I have had my family participating in two wars. I have been caught abroad in two wars. I think, whether we call it that or not, that we are now actually in one of the most disastrous wars this Nation has ever faced, in Korea. For that reason there is no length to which I would not go to furnish this country adequate defense of men and money.

I would like to go on record permanently as saying that. However, I have distinct fears about this bill. I am convinced that the American people who are being asked to give their sons, and who may be asked to give their daughters, have a right to have their representatives vote separately on the two provisions of this bill. I shall support with all my heart the extension of the draft. I ask, however, a studied consideration of the universal military training provisions of this bill. In fact, I would hope that they might be removed from the bill and considered separately. I will tell you why. I take distinct exception to the idea that there is any necessary reason for including such provision in this bill since the chairman of the committee himself has said that the plan could not go into active operation for 24 months. If that is true, we have adequate time to study again the problem; to bring it up for late consideration before the House; and to let the people express themselves through us on the provisions of such a plan.

We are now actually in a war, with emergency draft bills adequately covering our present situation. Furthermore, I object to the form of this bill. I think that it is another step away from truly representative government. I have

great faith in the Committee on Armed Services. I have such faith in the chairman that he, the other day, almost persuaded me that this bill was perfectly harmless. However, I believe perhaps that I have more faith in them than they seem to be showing in themselves; I am perfectly convinced that there is no reason for a committee so ably chaired, and manned with such experienced and conscientious men, to rely upon any commission to bring in provisions to be embodied in a universal military training bill. You have been told today that any plan, as brought in under the proposed provision by the Commission, can be amended. The chairman said yesterday that an amendment to make this possible would probably be offered and passed here next week. However—and this is definitely stated in the bill—as now provided the plan suggested by the Commission and reported to the House must be accepted or rejected in full. I would remind you that such was the intention of the committee when the bill was written and reported to the House. I would remind you, as did the gentleman from Michigan, that if the House so amends this provision, the amendment can later be lost through conference. And we will then find ourselves, we the Representatives, a thinking, experienced, conscientious body of men and women elected to represent the American people, in the position of having to take or reject without change the plans presented to us by the Commission.

Mr. Chairman, my time is short. My plea is only with reference to that feature of the bill. I would urge the Armed Services Committee, if it feels that it cannot adequately bring in a universal military training plan through its own efforts, to seek the advice perhaps of an advisory commission, if it must have one. But let the committee bring in a definite plan made by itself from the proposals of that committee, which plan can be considered on its merits with a full expression of opinion from all of those at home whom we represent.

Have you stopped to think of it this way? We are here, not only through our own ambitions or desires. We are here merely because the people back home in each case thought that we were smart enough and honest enough and idealistic enough to express their viewpoint.

We are turning more and more away from our responsibilities as legislators. I would remind you, I do not think that the American people expect their Congress to turn over the processes of thinking, of planning, of deciding questions such as the UMT, to any agency or to any commission. This UMT program would go into the life of every individual American. There is no phase of our activity, no phase of our thinking, no phase of our living that it would not touch. On such questions the American people have a right to express themselves through us. On such questions we have a duty to vote specifically. I would say just this to you: We exist here, this whole Government, traditionally and rightly, only by consent of the governed. I would warn you that if we give up that

right, if we refuse to take our privilege and our responsibility to draw our own plans, there should be no hope for any one of us.

We have had experience in this country with an effort to enforce laws which did not have full public support. If you are going to have full public support for an epoch-changing program, you must have behind you the will and the conviction of the American people. I would urge the Armed Services Committee to accept the responsibility, not to bring us in a piecemeal plan whereby we decide today we will take UMT without knowing or being able to tell the people back home what we have voted for; but to wait and to bring in a full plan which can be presented, a plan which could win our support if it were necessary, but a plan on which we could go back to our people and say, "You decided through us, through your constitutional authority expressed in us." Then I believe that there would be some reason for us to go out to a weary world and sell a story of what truly representative government can be. What would it mean to all of us to have a full force abroad but to lose at home not only our freedom but that sense of constitutional government in which every man and every woman can walk with human dignity, as individuals, with the right to express themselves through this Congress? I would beg the Representatives in this House: Do not in any sense abdicate your authority. It is also your responsibility. Insist upon having submitted to you in full the plans which may change the lives of every one in this generation and in the generations to come.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois [Mrs. CHURCH] has expired.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I now yield to one of the ablest members of our committee, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. ELSTON] 40 minutes.

Mr. ELSTON. Mr. Chairman, I shall not endeavor to discuss at this time all of the provisions of this bill. I voted in committee to report the measure to the House, but did so with definite reservations. Like many other members of the House, I favor the selective service features of the proposed legislation, but feel that this subject should be separated from the universal military training provisions. Moreover, it is my considered judgment that the active duty strength of the Armed Forces should be fixed by Congress in this bill. The original measure considered by our committee contained a limitation of 4,000,000 persons at any time. On final consideration, however, and by a divided vote, this limitation was deleted. I believe it is the duty of Congress to limit our active military strength by definite authorizing legislation, and not bring about such limitation under the specious theory that this can be done through appropriations. Whether the number should be 4,000,000 persons or some other number is for us to determine when appropriate amendments are offered. Since we are proceeding at the present time on the basis of need for 3,462,000 men, I shall support an amendment to fix a limitation of 3½ million persons, or 4,000,000 if that

amendment is rejected. Should the need arise at any time to increase the limit, Congress can act and Congress would act. To leave it to the military authorities would not only be dangerous for economic and other reasons, but such action would constitute an unwarranted delegation of authority. A limitation would be the best way in which to prevent a waste of manpower by the Armed Forces.

In the Committee on Armed Services an effort was made to prohibit the sending of troops to Western Europe without the approval of Congress. This amendment was defeated in committee and will be reconsidered before this committee.

This is a question of far-reaching importance and it is my purpose to support any amendment which will permit Congress to retain the power and authority to say when and how many American boys shall be sent to Western Europe for service with the armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty nations. It is the constitutional duty of Congress to determine this question, and it is an obligation which cannot and should not be delegated to the President. I have no sympathy with the plea that the requiring of congressional approval will hamstring General Eisenhower in the performance of his duties. It could just as effectively be argued that General Eisenhower is being hampered by the necessity of coming to Congress for appropriations to support the American Armed Forces under his command.

I have not reached the place where I am willing to place the judgment of any President above that of the duly elected Members of Congress, even if we had the constitutional right to delegate our authority to pass upon this vital question. We shall have our opportunity to write our position into law by an appropriate amendment to this bill. It is far from sufficient to merely express an opinion on the subject by way of a resolution. Too often the will of Congress is ignored even when it is expressed in law. A mere expression of opinion would be meaningless. With no limitation on the size of our Armed Forces, and unrestricted authority on the part of the President to send American troops anywhere in the world, we will be taking a long step toward the military dictatorship the framers of our Constitution feared when it created this Republic.

While the pending bill fixes a definite termination date as to its selective service features, you will note that the universal military training part of the measure is permanent. The National Security Training Corps is created as soon as the President appoints a National Security Training Commission. No further action by Congress would be needed to make universal military training a permanent institution of our Government. There will be no further congressional review until and unless a measure is introduced and considered to repeal the law. I need not tell you that if universal military training is set up at this time there is no certainty that it could be repealed short of a two-thirds vote of both Houses, which would be required in the event of a Presidential veto. I listened with great interest to

the remarks of our distinguished chairman at the beginning of this debate on the subject of adopting and terminating universal military training. But I submit the procedure is not as simple as he indicated. At the moment there is no universal military training program before us. There is nothing in this bill which definitely advises Congress about even the major phases of universal military training. Those details, we are told, must be left to a commission to be appointed by the President. Bear in mind we do not wait until a program is submitted by the Commission before we adopt universal military training. We adopt it now, and the Universal Military Training Corps comes into being as soon as the Commission is appointed by the President. The Commission may be appointed at any time after the passage of the bill.

Under the language of the pending bill Congress would leave it to the Commission to devise the program and to submit it to Congress. If the amendment which our distinguished chairman now proposes to offer should not be adopted, our only course thereafter would be to accept or to reject the plan exactly as submitted. We would have no authority to change the crossing of a "t" or the dotting of an "i" in the plan. If any legislative bill comes before us in the regular way we have an opportunity to amend it in committee or on the floor. On the other hand, if this bill is not amended, the plan of the Commission would have to be accepted exactly as the Commission wrote it or be rejected in its entirety. In other words, the Commission would do the legislating and Congress would either rubber-stamp the Commission's view in their entirety or reject them completely. In this connection let us not forget that the original plan or future plans might not be submitted to the Congress which considered this bill, but to a future Congress. That Congress will have nothing to say about the matter except to approve or disapprove the plan of a Federal bureau. Surely this is not the way to legislate, and it is not the way intended when the Congress of the United States was created by the founding fathers.

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELSTON. I yield to the gentleman from Arkansas.

Mr. TACKETT. Yesterday I asked someone who was speaking on the bill, I believe the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BENTSEN], about the authority of the House to amend the bill after the Commission reported it. He advised me that the chairman of the committee had stated to the House that not only the Armed Services Committee but also the House would have the authority to amend the bill when it is submitted by the Commission for approval or rejection by the House. What does the gentleman say about that?

Mr. ELSTON. I am coming to that, and I shall be glad to answer the question.

While the amendment which the chairman indicates he will offer may go a long way toward correcting an incred-

ible situation, I am not certain of its legal soundness. If the plan takes the form of a legislative bill, subject to Presidential approval or veto, it would, of course, have the force of law. On the other hand, mere congressional approval by way of a concurrent resolution would not make the plan the law of the land.

I submit it is dangerous to attempt to legislate by mere resolution. The Supreme Court of the United States has not as yet determined that it is unconstitutional to legislate through the process of concurrent resolution for the simple reason the question has not been presented to that Court. Certainly we cannot take from the President of the United States his constitutional right to approve or veto legislation passed by Congress. A concurrent resolution would seek to do that very thing. The purpose of a concurrent resolution as you know is to fix the time of final adjournment, provide for a joint session to receive the President's message, and like matters which do not constitute legislation. If the amendment which is to be submitted by our chairman provides that Congress may approve of the plan of the Commission or that we may amend or reject the plan by concurrent resolution, I submit the amendment would violate the Constitution, since it would deny to the President his clear constitutional right to either approve legislation or to veto it. The proposed amendment of the chairman contemplates that the entire plan which is to be submitted by the Commission is to be considered first by the Committee on Armed Services where it will be subject to amendment. Thereafter the plan will be brought to the floor of the House for further amendment, if desired. Thereafter Congress will, by concurrent resolution, adopt the plan or reject it. The President will have nothing to say about it.

While I differ with President Truman on perhaps as many things as any Member of this body, I do not want to be in the position of voting to deny to him or to any other President any right clearly guaranteed by the Constitution. While I have said this question has not been passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was considered by a United States circuit court of appeals. I refer to the case of F. H. E. Oil Co. against Commissioner of Internal Revenue decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fifth District on August 21, 1945 and reported in 150 Federal Reporter, page 857. This case reviewed the decision of the Tax Court of the United States for the District of Texas. The syllabus of the case, which constitutes the law, reads as follows:

A resolution adopted by House of Representatives and agreed to by the Senate, but not approved by the President or passed over his veto, was not an act of Congress and did not make or change the law, but, as an expression of an opinion on a point of law, it would be entitled to respectful consideration by the courts.

I do not think we are so much concerned about whether a plan to completely set up a program of universal military training will be given respectful consideration or not. We are concerned with whether or not our concurrent reso-

lution will have the force of law. I submit that under this decision it will not have the force of law. The amendment which the chairman proposes to offer provides that the plan of the National Security Training Commission may be adopted, rejected, or amended by concurrent resolution.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELSTON. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. BROOKS. I have been listening very carefully to the gentleman's logic. I wondered in my own mind whether or not the gentleman would apply that same logic to the resolution in the Senate of sending troops to Europe.

Mr. ELSTON. I think it is conceded that the resolution adopted by the Senate does not have the force of law. We can give it force of law by adopting a similar amendment in this bill, and I feel it should be done. That would be the proper way in which to do it.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELSTON. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. VORYS. The gentleman as a distinguished and able lawyer has pointed out that this particular requirement or gimmick that we have had in various bills about legislating through a concurrent resolution has not been passed upon by the Supreme Court. Does not the gentleman agree with me that not only the Supreme Court but the Congress is also sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution and that we have the duty, if a provision is unconstitutional, not to adopt it?

Mr. ELSTON. The gentleman is absolutely right. We have taken an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. If it is our considered judgment that anything in any measure violates the Constitution we cannot in good conscience support it.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELSTON. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HINSHAW. The gentleman has made a most excellent point, one that I personally had not had an opportunity to consider. He has quoted the law. It would seem to me that whatever amendment the gentleman from Georgia presents would have to take that into consideration, otherwise his amendment would have no force and effect in law. I wonder if the gentleman has any idea as to just what sort of amendment the gentleman from Georgia intends to offer? Has it been submitted to him for his consideration?

Mr. ELSTON. No; it has not, but I am advised that it contemplates adopting or changing the plan of the Commission by concurrent resolution. If, on the other hand, a bill is introduced containing the provisions of the plan, and the Committee on Armed Services and the House and the Senate fully debate it, after which the bill goes to the President for approval or veto the proper procedure would have been followed.

Mr. HINSHAW. It seems to me if the gentleman is correct, and I think he probably is, that the only thing the

committee can then do is provide that a commission shall make a report, period; and then from that point a new bill would be introduced. Is that not correct?

Mr. ELSTON. Yes. The only thing I feel the Commission should do, if we need a commission at all, is to make recommendations to the Congress, leaving it to Congress to enact the law. That is the proper procedure to follow.

Mr. HINSHAW. I appreciate the gentleman's remarks.

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELSTON. I yield to the gentleman from Arkansas.

Mr. TACKETT. I asked a question a moment ago and I am interested in knowing the answer, because I do not want any legislation to be authorized by a commission without the consent of Congress and without our having an opportunity to look at it after they get through with it. Does the gentleman understand that the amendment that will be offered by the chairman of this committee, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], will authorize Congress to amend and change or modify any legislative proposal that is submitted to the Congress by the Commission?

Mr. ELSTON. Yes, that is true, but I understand that when the House and Senate pass on any plan of the Commission it is by concurrent resolution and not as we would proceed if we were considering a legislative bill.

Mr. TACKETT. The gentleman's objection is that the President, if he signs this bill, will be authorizing legislation to be brought about by way of the Commission?

Mr. ELSTON. Not only would the President be authorizing it but Congress also would be authorizing it. If we pass this bill, with the proposed amendment of the chairman included, we will be authorizing the Commission to legislate. That is a power which I feel we cannot delegate.

Mr. TACKETT. If I understand this bill correctly with regard to the universal military training phase, it would just be authorizing the Commission to propose some legislation for Congress either to adopt or reject; is that not true?

Mr. ELSTON. It would authorize the Commission to submit a plan which we must accept or reject without change, unless of course the proposed amendment of the chairman is adopted. That amendment would permit Congress to amend the plan. I would have no objection to the Commission making recommendations to the Congress, if, after such recommendations are made, legislation is introduced and considered in the usual way. I object to merely rubber-stamping that which is turned over to it by the Commission.

Mr. TACKETT. If I understand correctly, the amendment to be offered by the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON] would not place us in the position of rubber-stamping the legislation, but we would be allowed to write the legislation after it has been suggested by the Commission; is that not true?

Mr. ELSTON. We could make whatever changes we desire. However, the

complaint I make is that in the final analysis, after we have made the changes, the amended plan must be adopted by the House by concurrent resolution. The President, of course, will have no authority to approve or veto the resolution. That, I say, is taking from the President a constitutional right as firm as the right of Congress to legislate.

Mr. TACKETT. As long as no rights are taken away from this Congress, which is closer to and more representative of the people, we do not particularly give a hoot whether the President approves the legislation by one method or the other, do we? I would not vote to delegate authority to a commission to determine such legislation. But it would hurt nothing to provide an advisory committee.

Mr. ELSTON. I think so, because the Constitution provides that the proper way to legislate is for both Houses of Congress to pass legislation, after which the President shall have an opportunity to approve it or to veto it.

Mr. KILDAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELSTON. I yield.

Mr. KILDAY. My idea of a plan of military training, and I think this was the idea in the committee, is that the Commission would say a certain portion of the time served in training would be devoted to classroom work, drill maneuvers, and what not. That, of course, is not a matter of law. It is only a matter of the manner in which the time is to be utilized. I think the gentleman would agree with me the concurrent resolution would not be concerned with that, because it is not to become a matter of law, but only a matter of the application of the plan under which they are to be trained. Should the Commission bring in something which was a matter of legislation, do you not think it would then be necessary to go through the legislative process to take from that plan those things which require legislation, and that they would have to go through that legislative process? The plan is only: How are you going to utilize their time; how are you going to protect their morals; and how are you going to provide for their welfare, and all that sort of thing. If there should be anything in the plan of a legislative nature, it would have to come out, and it would not be approved by concurrent resolution, but would have to go through the regular legislative process.

Mr. ELSTON. May I ask the gentleman from Texas where any suggestions would be coming from if they did not come from the plan, because certainly there is not one single word in this entire bill which does more than merely set up a universal military training program.

Mr. KILDAY. But suppose the Commission should come in and recommend that rather than \$30 a month, as we provide in this bill, the pay should be \$40 a month. Of course that would have to go through the legislative process, would it not?

Mr. ELSTON. Certainly.

Mr. KILDAY. That would not be included in the plan.

Mr. ELSTON. Certainly it should not.

Mr. KILDAY. The questions of drill and morals and welfare, and things of that kind included in the plan which is approved by the concurrent resolution, do not become law but only the manner in which the training should be carried on.

Mr. ELSTON. I think the gentleman is begging the question. Everything the Commission proposes does not have to be brought to the Congress. What I am contending is that anything which is of a legislative nature at all should be brought to the House with a recommendation. Thereafter we should pass on the recommendations in the form of a legislative bill rather than a concurrent resolution.

Mr. KILDAY. I believe the gentleman will agree with me that when we discussed this matter in committee we were concerned that the system might be used to promote some social-welfare program. We mentioned training in ceramics, and things of that kind. We wanted to make sure that it was to be military training, and not a socializing program. That was one of the main things which motivated us in requiring that the plan be submitted to the Congress, so that we could keep it in line as a military program and nothing else.

Mr. ELSTON. I am not objecting to submitting the plan. I am not objecting to submitting recommendations. I think it would be the duty of the Commission, if it is created, to do that, but I am saying before the plan becomes effective, if it contains legislative matter, it should be considered in a legislative bill.

Mr. VINSON. Of course, everyone in the House agrees to that, I might say to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. ELSTON. That is not the way I understand the gentleman's resolution.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELSTON. I yield.

Mr. HINSHAW. If I understand the gentleman correctly, and understand his point, if we adopt the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Georgia, we would then have committed ourselves to a definite period of, say, 6 months of training and 6 years in the Reserves, and the only thing we would then do is approve or disapprove or make recommendations for change concerning what the Commission will establish as the method of carrying it out; is that correct?

Mr. ELSTON. Of course, the gentleman appreciates that universal military training is a tremendous subject. The bill which was reported out of the Committee on Armed Services in the Eightieth Congress was, I believe, 63 pages long. It contained all sorts of provisions with respect to benefits and everything that would and should be considered in that kind of a program. There is nothing in this bill setting those things up. Obviously it is expected that all those matters will be presented to us by the Commission. Then we will either adopt the plan of the Commission, modify it, or reject it by a concurrent resolution.

Mr. HINSHAW. I would like to know just what the force and effect of the

amendment to be offered by the gentleman from Georgia would be. I do not quite understand it. If what the gentleman says is so, I do not think it would have any force and effect.

Mr. ELSTON. In my opinion it would have no force or effect in law, and if a plan for UMT is adopted by concurrent resolution we may find some day the entire procedure has been declared to be unconstitutional.

Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELSTON. I am glad to yield to my friend from North Carolina.

Mr. DURHAM. Today we do not write out definite plans in words as to what the Army and Navy and Air Force do in their training program or their welfare program or benefits to the personnel. Why would this be any different?

Mr. ELSTON. I hope the gentleman understood me. I do not contend that the Commission should present to the Congress every minor detail in the whole program. But this bill provides that the plan for universal military training shall be submitted to Congress by the Commission. The gentleman, who is one of the very able members of our committee, knows that when we considered the UMT program in the Eightieth Congress, which was reported by our committee unanimously, it was a huge bill. It contained all kinds of provisions; the same provisions that should be in any legislation setting up so important a program as universal military training. Under this bill all of these things will be presented to us by the Commission in the form of a plan. I know of no other legislation that is going to be introduced on the subject. If we pass this bill we must stand aside and wait for the Commission to act. We must wait for their plan. Until the amendment suggested by our distinguished chairman was announced, we could not even amend the plan that was to be submitted to us by the Commission.

Mr. DURHAM. I thought the point which was disturbing the gentleman was that it would not have the force of law.

Mr. ELSTON. It would not, if it is to be approved by a concurrent resolution. The point I am making is that a concurrent resolution does not have the force of law.

Mr. DURHAM. Of course, I do not believe it would be possible to submit a plan in its entirety that would not require some legislative act.

Mr. ELSTON. Does the gentleman contend that the bill we are considering provides for anything of that kind? The bill provides that the Commission shall submit a plan to the Congress, and the Congress shall either approve or reject it.

Mr. DURHAM. If I understand what the chairman is going to offer as an amendment, he will submit an amendment based on the fact that the House can amend or the Senate can amend.

Mr. ELSTON. That is right, but ultimately we approve of the plan, amended or not, by a concurrent resolution.

Mr. DURHAM. We can write anything in it that we want to.

Mr. ELSTON. But it would not have the force of law if it was in a concurrent resolution.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELSTON. I am glad to yield to my chairman.

Mr. VINSON. It would have jurisdiction to incorporate things in a legislative program that are not set out in a concurrent resolution.

Mr. ELSTON. Of course, the Congress has a right to repeal the entire act if it cares to do so.

Mr. VINSON. Exactly.

Mr. ELSTON. But let me ask the gentleman, for whom I have the highest regard, if his proposed amendment does not provide that the plan which will eventually be adopted, whether we amend it or not, is to be approved by Congress by a concurrent resolution?

Mr. VINSON. May I take the time to read it, and I would like to put it in the Record at this point, if the gentleman will permit.

Mr. ELSTON. Very well.

Mr. VINSON. What I propose to offer for the consideration of the Committee on Monday is an amendment to this effect:

On page 37, strike out lines 3 and 4 and substitute in lieu thereof the following:

"(7) The Commission shall, not later than 6 months following its appointment, submit to the Congress an initial plan or plans for—"

On page 38, strike out lines 1 through 20, inclusive, and substitute in lieu thereof the following:

"(1) The plan provided for in paragraph (7) of this subsection shall have been transmitted to the Congress and shall have been approved by the adoption of a concurrent resolution of the Congress incorporating such plan with or without amendments. Upon receipt by the Congress the plan shall be referred to the Committees on Armed Services which committees shall, not later than the expiration of the first period of 45 calendar days of continuous sessions of the Congress, following the date on which the plan provided for in paragraph (7) of this subsection is transmitted to the Congress, report a resolution to their respective Houses incorporating the plan with or without amendments and its recommendations thereon, and such resolution shall be privileged and may be called up by any Member of either House but shall be subject to amendment as if it were not so privileged."

On page 39, strike out lines 2 through 7, inclusive, and substitute in lieu thereof the following:

"(9) Following the adoption of a plan submitted by the Commission pursuant to paragraph (8), the Congress may, in accordance with the procedure established under paragraph (8) modify or change such plan, or the Commission may, if changes to the plan are deemed desirable by the Commission, submit such changes to the Congress in accordance with the procedure prescribed in paragraph (8), and such changes shall be acted upon as prescribed in paragraph (8)."

Mr. ELSTON. As I indicated the amendment does provide that the plan shall be adopted by concurrent resolution.

Let us keep in mind that compulsory military training is in itself a tremendous subject. It would be something new in the history of this Nation and, as I see it, should not be embarked upon until legislation is introduced in the regular way, adequate hearings are held, and the subject fully debated on the floor of the House. The incidental questions in-

involved, all of them of great importance, are large in number. As an example of the magnitude of the subject, I would call your attention to the fact that the universal military training bill which was unanimously reported to the House during the Eightieth Congress by the Committee on Armed Services, contained more than 60 pages.

Among other questions, the Congress might want to consider the cost which it is conceded will amount to billions of dollars a year. I appreciate, of course, that it will be claimed that where national defense is involved we cannot count the cost. I believe it has been demonstrated that that is the attitude of Congress. However, since universal military training cannot, or at least should not become operative until after the present war emergency is over, such an argument is not supported by logic or reason. If an effort should be made to put universal military training into operation before the present emergency is over, it would seriously interfere with our defense effort rather than help it. The more immediate the threat to our national security, the more necessary it is that peacetime training programs be deferred. If the threat is immediate and serious—and under existing conditions it is not safe to proceed on any other theory—our manpower and our dollars must be used as fully as feasible in preparation for the impending conflict or to prevent its execution, rather than upon any purely peacetime training program.

Whether you are for or against universal military training is beside the point. Ordinary procedure should require the entire program to be subject to congressional review. This can be accomplished only by the fixing of a termination date. Since the bill does not fix a time when inductions into the program shall cease, I propose to offer an amendment to make this part of the bill conform to the selective-service phase. Selective service is definitely terminated on July 1, 1954, thus requiring a complete congressional review of the whole program before that time. On the other hand, universal military training will continue on a permanent basis unless the program is terminated or suspended for a stated time by concurrent resolution. It has been conceded in this debate that the only hope for universal military training is to tie it in with selective-service extension. That in itself should call for congressional review not later than 3 years after the passage of this bill. A provision for the termination of universal military training by concurrent resolution is far from being even a poor substitute for a provision which would require a complete congressional review the same as is required if selective service is to be extended.

If a concurrent resolution may be used to terminate universal military training, it may be used to terminate any law. It may be employed to amend any law. That I do not believe is the function of a concurrent resolution. If laws may be terminated or amended by concurrent resolution, I repeat, what becomes of the constitutional provision requiring action on the part of both the President and

Congress? What becomes of the President's right to veto, and the necessity for a two-thirds vote of both Houses to override a veto?

However much we may disagree with the President, I submit it is neither our province, nor should it be our desire, to seek to deny to him any authority guaranteed by the Constitution itself. A concurrent resolution, according to section 1037, VII of Cannon's Procedure in the House of Representatives "is without force and effect beyond the confines of the Capitol." Yet section 18 (c) of the pending bill would provide, by concurrent resolution, for the termination or suspension for a stated period of time of all inductions into the Armed Forces or the National Security Training Corps. Obviously the procedure defined in this section is designed to prevent the same complete congressional review of the universal military training program as is provided for selective service, as outlined in section 17 (d). That section definitely terminates selective service on July 1, 1954, unless Congress, after a review of the program before that date decides it should be continued.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELSTON. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. BROOKS. I wish to ask the gentleman in reference to the reorganization program. It is generally conceded now that program can be set up by law through agreement by Congress with the Executive, and plans shall be submitted to the Congress. If not acted on, they shall have the force of law.

Mr. ELSTON. Yes.

Mr. BROOKS. Analyzing that, if the Congress and the executive department agree to a plan whereby the universal military training program may be submitted, not to a commission or to a board or to a department of Government, but to the Congress itself, you might say acting as a commission, and it adopts that plan affirmatively, why would that not be a similar case?

Mr. ELSTON. The gentleman refers to plans under the reorganization bill sent to us by the President. Of course, that is not a precedent at all because the plans which are sent to us by the President under the Reorganization Act are initiated by the President himself. He had had his opportunity to pass on the plan. We simply give his plan our approval or disapproval.

Mr. BROOKS. We can set up a commission and agree that the Commission adopt a plan and submit it back to us. If we fail to act it is law.

Mr. ELSTON. I am sure that would be an unwarranted delegation of power. Moreover, under such procedure, the President would not have had his opportunity to exercise his constitutional right to approve or to veto it.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELSTON. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HINSHAW. I presume from what the gentleman says that if the President were directed to submit a plan to the Congress, the Congress could by concurrent resolution approve or disapprove it?

Mr. ELSTON. I doubt that, since that would not be similar to the procedure under the Reorganization Act. Under the Reorganization Act, which was passed by Congress and signed by the President, the submission of plans of reorganization of executive departments is authorized.

This method of attempting to legislate by concurrent resolution is not new. During the Roosevelt administrations it was employed many times. During the Truman administration it has been employed many times, but two wrongs do not make a right. Since the Supreme Court of the United States has never passed on the question, the fact that Congress has been doing something which may be unconstitutional does not make it constitutional. You cannot make an unconstitutional act constitutional by practice or custom.

Mr. HINSHAW. Suppose that the Commission submits a plan and the Congress decides to change the plan and by concurrent resolution approves the changed plan, then the President does not like the thing and pays no attention to the concurrent resolution. He can then proceed on his own authority to put any plan into effect he wants to?

Mr. ELSTON. The President could properly take the position that the plan which was adopted by a concurrent resolution is not the law of the land, but he, of course, could not put a plan of his own into effect that was not authorized by law.

Mr. HINSHAW. You put in the law here there should be 6 months of military training and 6 years in the Reserves. That is sufficient law, I think, to enable the President to institute any plan he wants to.

Mr. ELSTON. The President might take the position that that is sufficient as to that particular phase of the law.

Mr. KILDAY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELSTON. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. KILDAY. Does the gentleman not agree with me on the concurrent-resolution feature that it would depend on whether it is a condition precedent or a condition subsequent? In other words, in answer to the gentleman from California, fearing the President might be able to put it into effect because the concurrent resolution was not effective, if it was a condition precedent he could not do it. The point is that a concurrent resolution terminating has always been sustained, not by the courts but here in the Congress, on the ground that it is a condition subsequent, beyond which the law shall not proceed.

Mr. ELSTON. I have every reason to believe that we would respect our concurrent resolution, but it still would not have the force of law.

For the reasons I have stated, Mr. Chairman, it would appear that while this bill contains many desirable and highly essential features, it at the same time has its objectionable side. The objections may be and should be corrected by proper amendments so that we may present a united front on the only part of the bill that is needed at this time in our national defense effort.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GRAHAM].

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman who has preceded me, the Member from Ohio [Mr. ELSTON], has in reality covered much of the ground that I intended to discuss. However, there is one phase that has not yet been touched upon, and on that particular phase I wish to devote my efforts.

By way of preface may we take a historical review for a moment? We are considering four clauses of article I of section 8 of the Constitution of the United States. Now let us go back for a minute and see what was in the minds of the founding fathers.

When that Convention met in the city of Philadelphia in 1787 there had been in existence for over 100 years the English bill of rights, and in that bill of rights it was distinctly set forth that "the raising or keeping of a standing army within the Kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against the law." Now, when these men gathered there that day in May they had that clearly in their minds, and in addition to that there were four precedents that were governing them: One had been the immortal Declaration of Independence in which issue had been taken with the King for his keeping peace armies. The other was the Virginia bill of rights; the other the Massachusetts bill of rights; and the other the Declaration of Policies of the Continental Congress—all criticizing the creation and the placing of standing armies in times of peace. Therefore, when they entered into this particular discussion they had keenly in their minds the danger of a standing army, and for 162 years we have come down through the ages without any compulsory military requirement other than the standing Army authorized by the Congress for adequate protection, together with the militia of the several States.

Now the four sections I want to direct your attention to in article I of the Constitution are these:

Section 8, clause 11:

Congress shall have power to declare war, grant letters marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water.

There is your first delegation of power to make rules.

Clause 12:

Congress shall have power to raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than 2 years.

Here was to be control of any standing armies, and they could not exist longer than 2 years; this through the power of the purse.

Clause 13:

Congress shall have the power to provide and maintain a Navy.

But here is the all-important one with which we are dealing today, clause 14:

Congress shall have the power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

You now see the express constitutional mandate that the power to make rules was in the hands of the Congress alone.

Now then, what do we get from that? Can we delegate that power? That is the all-important question here. And, can we abjectly assign that to some commission? There is no question, as this bill is presently drawn and has now passed the Senate, that the power that shall go to the Commission shall remain, unless the amendment to be offered by the distinguished gentleman from Georgia prevails. If not, you are going to conference, if this bill carries, and there the conferees must reconcile the differences between the two bills. Keep that in mind on your parliamentary situation as it will exist when this measure passes the House.

I maintain that the making of the plan and the program to be carried out in pursuance of that plan is the sole and exclusive duty of Congress; and that this responsibility cannot be shifted to any commission.

This is the point I want to make, and I am quoting now from the case of *United States v. Williams* (302 U. S. 46) decided in 1937:

The power of Congress (under this clause for regulating the land and naval forces) to determine how armies shall be raised, whether by voluntary enlistment or forced drafts, the age at which the soldier shall be received, and the period for which he shall be taken, the compensation he shall be allowed, and the service to which he shall be assigned is plenary and exclusive.

In other words, that power is in the Congress, never to be delegated to any commission, group, or outside influence. It must be kept in the Congress of the United States. It is full, complete, absolute, and exclusive.

Now we come to the next step, the set-up of the committees here in the Congress. For the particular purpose of enacting legislation in pursuance of that authority heretofore given us, we have our various committees. Among them is this able Committee on Armed Services, headed by that very outstanding man, the distinguished gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON]. The whole composition of the committee is of the highest order. For months they have heard the testimony of expert witnesses from all over the United States, testifying whether or not we shall depart from this established custom of 160 years. They have now brought—with one exception, in my judgment—to this Congress what they think is their considered judgment and the best thing to do under present world conditions.

Next we come to what the Supreme Court said on the question of the delegation of power on the part of the Congress. Back in 1933 this Congress passed what is known as the National Industrial Recovery Act, the constitutionality of which was tested in what is popularly known as the "Chicken case," or the Schechter case. The decision by the Supreme Court in that case is one of the most informative and one of the most illuminating decisions that have ever been handed down on the question of the delegation of congressional power. I want to read a part of it to you now on the question of delegation of power.

Remember what the act did. It authorized the President to approve or pre-

scribe codes of fair competition for various industries in order to effectuate the policy of Congress. That is what we are dealing with now, the policy of Congress. It then declares the policy in comprehensive terms to be the rehabilitation of industry and the conservation of national resources. Here we are dealing with flesh and blood, the youth, the coming manhood of America, not in terms of economic, industrial, and financial matters, but the living lifeblood of America, the future citizenry of America.

The Supreme Court said:

This is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

The Court further said that Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade and industry.

There is the whole thing in a nutshell, the mandate in the Constitution of the United States that the Congress shall make the rules, that that power shall not be delegated, and the decision of the Supreme Court that Congress cannot abdicate or delegate that power to any board or commission, because it has also been held that even the rulings of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have the binding force and effect of law. This is what is said on that—

In pursuance of the authority Congress set up by act of March 2, 1799, established rules for the government of the Navy, which were repealed in 1800, in 1862, during the period of the Civil War, Congress recognized the regulations theretofore issued by the Secretary of the Navy subject to alteration with approval by the President.

Do you get that clause, "subject to alteration with approval by the President"?

Referring to these regulations issued under this authority, the Supreme Court states in *ex parte Reed* (100 U. S. 13, 22 (1879)):

Such regulations have the force of law.

Later, quoting again from a famous opinion by the Supreme Court, *Gratiot v. the United States*, reported in Howard, volume 4, pages 80-117, the Court, speaking of army regulations, which is what we are dealing with here, stated:

This Court has too repeatedly said that they have the force of law to make it proper to discuss that point anew.

So whatever power we give to this Commission, if it reports back to the Congress, it has reported what is the law, and we have delegated away our authority.

Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GRAHAM. I yield.

Mr. COX. I learned long ago that the gentleman is not only a very profound lawyer, but a sound thinker. On the question of the delegation of power as contained in the UMT provision of the bill, does not the gentleman's view already prevail, considering the fact that the author of the bill has stated he will offer an amendment providing that no

plan proposed by the Commission shall become effective in the absence of congressional approval, in other words, requiring affirmative action on the part of the Congress?

Mr. VINSON. And may I say in response to that, if it becomes necessary by what is sent up here by the Commission to require legislation, or if it requires a concurrent resolution it will be laid before the House.

Mr. GRAHAM. I am sure it will.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania has expired.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Mississippi, a veteran [Mr. WILLIAMS].

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, let me thank my good friend, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services for allotting me this time. Three days ago when I walked into this Chamber I was very much opposed to the legislation, particularly the UMT phase of it. Insofar as I am able to determine, there is no opposition to the selective-service phase of this legislation. The question, the real issue in this bill, has been whether we are going to set up a commission whose duty it will be to write a universal military training bill to be submitted to the Congress and the manner in which it will be considered. The bill as originally written comes to us, as I understand, delegates legislative authority to this commission to be appointed by the President. It delegates legislative authority, and retains veto powers in the hands of the Congress.

I want to thank the distinguished gentleman who preceded me for talking on the constitutionality of such an undertaking. I think he is absolutely correct in stating that nowhere in the Constitution or in any interpretation of the Constitution can we find the power given to the Congress to delegate the legislative authority given it under the Constitution.

Back in Mississippi several years ago we had an old backwoods politician, a very good friend of mine. He hailed from the great metropolis of Hot Coffee, Miss. That is just a few miles out of Puckett. He was a great political philosopher. Some of his friends prevailed on him to run for public office. He was a little more honest than the average politician because when they asked him what his platform was going to be he told them, "I will be just as honest as the times will permit."

When I came here 3 days ago and began to listen to the debate on this bill, and after I had read the bill which was presented by the committee, in my own mind I thought possibly the committee had adopted that same philosophy. But I do want to say in all fairness to the committee and to its great chairman, that I have never seen a controversial piece of legislation considered as fairly and as honestly as this bill has been presented. I say this because the chairman has recognized that he was about to commit a sin against the Constitution by giving legislative authority to an appointed commission.

Now he has drafted an amendment to this legislation which he intends to present as a committee amendment next week when the bill is open for amendment, that will retain the legislative powers to set up a UMT program in the hands of this Congress.

If that amendment is adopted, I intend to support this legislation, despite the other misgivings I have had in the past about it.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. I yield.

Mr. VORYS. As I understand this new plan, as amended by the Chairman's amendment, we will still have delegated to the commission one legislative function; that is, to introduce a bill.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. The gentleman knows that nobody can introduce a bill in the House except a Member of the House.

Mr. VORYS. This plan is to be introduced the same as a bill, according to the way the gentleman has described it.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. I yield.

Mr. VINSON. It may be sent up to the committee by the Commission, but it will receive the same treatment that this original bill which was sent up by the Pentagon received. It will be put on the table and the committee will write its own bill.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. Under the original bill as presented by the committee, as I understand, the Commission shall submit a plan, and if it is not vetoed by this Congress within a certain length of time it becomes law. Now that is delegating legislative authority to a commission. But as I understand the chairman's amendment, when the Commission presents this plan to the Armed Services Committee, they have to report out a bill, whether it is the Commission's bill or an entirely different bill, within 45 days. If they do not, any Member of the House can call up that particular plan for consideration, and the House can vote it up or down; but if the House does not take any action on it, it dies.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. I will be delighted to yield.

Mr. JOHNSON. I want to compliment the gentleman on his forthright stand. There is no man in this House of Representatives who has a better right to talk on these problems than the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WILLIAMS]. He gave something of himself. Many of us served here but few of us sacrificed anything like he sacrificed.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. The gentleman flatters me. I appreciate his statement, particularly in view of his splendid record as a pilot in World War I.

I might also say that I have such a high regard for the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee and for the members of that committee that I am not willing for them to delegate their own responsibilities to some commission; nor am I willing to concede

now that the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives is incapable of writing a universal military training bill.

I remember 2 or 3 years ago, when they brought this retirement legislation before the House. If I recall correctly, it contained over 500 pages. Now, if the Armed Services Committee can write a successful 500-page retirement bill—and it apparently has been successful—then there is no reason why they could not write a good universal military training bill.

But if the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON] is accepted next week, the legislation will be the responsibility of the committee, in which I have the utmost confidence.

Now, regardless of whether universal military training becomes law or not, as provided in this legislation, I question the degree of security that we will have merely by setting up a standing army of three or four million men.

I think we are overlooking the one major factor in our national defense. We are overlooking the building of an air force second to none. I am sorry to say that I heard the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania, my good friend Mr. GAVIN, earlier today apparently attempt to minimize the military potential of the Air Force. He cited instances that had happened in Korea to back him up. Apparently he had not seen the figures given by General Headquarters showing what the air force has already done in Korea. Tied as their hands are by refusal to permit them to cross the Manchurian border and bomb the sources of supply which are furnishing weapons to kill our American boys, the United States Air Force up until March of this year had been given credit for 81 percent of all the enemy trucks destroyed. The United States Air Force destroyed 75 percent of all enemy tanks that have been destroyed in the Korean war. The United States Air Force destroyed 72 percent of the enemy artillery, three-quarters of it; and the United States Air Force, though it is not primarily an antipersonnel weapon, has accounted for 47 percent, or one-half of all of the enemy soldiers that have been killed. The United States Air Force to date has done more than half of the effective fighting which has been done in Korea despite the fact that they have not been given permission to operate in the manner in which it can operate most effectively, which is cutting off enemy supplies at their source.

It has been said also that a man must be a radical, or dreamer, to contend that an air force, properly equipped and properly manned, under good conditions, can win a war by itself. No, possibly not; but what happened in Japan? The United States Air Force bombed Japan to her knees. Japan surrendered without an American soldier's having put a foot on her soil. The United States bombed Germany into submission, and destroyed her power to make war before an American soldier put foot on German soil.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. Gladly.

Mr. GAVIN. I just want to point out to my very distinguished friend, whom I compliment for his very fine statement, that it was no attempt on my part to minimize the glorious record of the Air Force in their fights in Korea. I was trying to point out the need for all three branches of the service, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and that each of them should be built up to a sound strength to meet the needs and demands that may be made upon us anywhere, any time, any place on earth.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. I thank the gentleman for clearing that point up. I agree with him thoroughly, and I apologize for misinterpreting his earlier remarks.

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. I yield.

Mr. BERRY. Does the gentleman know that 3 weeks ago the military released 40 percent of the stockpile of aluminum for civilian use and that today the factories are buying back aluminum through the regular sources for civilian purposes? Forty percent of the stockpile of aluminum has been released for civilian use within the last 3 weeks, and yet the striking power of the B-36's rests upon aluminum. Does the gentleman know that?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. I had not known that, but I think it is well that the House should know it.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. I yield.

Mr. HINSHAW. In view of the gentleman's statement I should like to point out that the lead time in the manufacture of a good many items that go into an airplane is as long as 2 years. That includes such things as jet engines and their parts, and instruments. It is not feasible nor is it worth while to construct the frame of an airplane until the parts necessary to make it fly are available, hence the aluminum which may now be available in surplus to some extent, and probably therefore has been released.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. I yield.

Mr. GAVIN. When I made my statement about the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force I intended to include also the Marine Corps because of their wonderful record.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. I am glad the gentleman has corrected his oversight.

I may state, Mr. Chairman, that I am not alone in my thinking when I say that air power is our No. 1 effective weapon. I have some distinguished company. General Spaatz says:

I believe that war with Russia, if we have it, will be decided by air power supported by surface forces, and not by surface forces supported by air power.

That is also my theory of modern warfare. Certainly we need surface

forces, but let us recognize the obvious—that the most destructive attacking force that we have today is in the air.

Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. COX. I want to thank the gentleman for the compliment he paid my lifelong friend, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, and the compliment he paid the committee. I have been a Member of this House for many years, and in all my experience here I have never seen the broad differences that existed between two well-balanced groups so completely annihilated as they have been in this general debate. The chairman of the committee and his aides in support of the bill have made magnificent arguments. Under the leadership of the brilliant Missourian [Mr. SHORT], the opposition has made a wonderful advance. We find ourselves now almost in complete agreement on a bill that there was doubt as to which way the vote would go 4 days ago.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my bringing the Air Force into this talk is to try to reason with the House for a few moments on the way we can best build our national defense in order to make America secure. We can have as large a standing Army as we are economically capable of having, yet not have an effective defense. No nation has ever been able to cross Russia on land and capture it, and it is pure fallacy to contend that we could do it now.

General George in his testimony before a committee of the other body on the subject of sending American troops to Europe told them this:

One thing to me seems to stand forth. I do not care how big an army Russia has, she can't walk that army across the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean, or across the Arctic ice-cap and attack this country.

I do not care how big an army we have, we cannot defeat Russia. Napoleon tried it, and he lost; Hitler tried it, and he lost—he had his whole hearthland right on the very borders of Russia. The biggest army that Russia has can't stop our Air Force from hitting Russian bases. The biggest army and biggest navy we have can't stop the Russian air force from hitting our vulnerable and vital spots. I want to bring that out simply because there is only one thing that can defend this Nation, and that is air power, and the only thing that can create a body knock-out blow against Russia also is air power.

Whether we adopt UMT, whether we extend the draft, is of little consequence, in my opinion, so far as bolstering our national defenses to the point of invincibility is concerned. These alone will not make us secure. We must not fail in our obligation to the American people to protect and defend them with the most effective weapon of war, which is an air force second to none.

We must recognize the fact that our Air Force is now the backbone, if you please, of our military machine. All of the rest of the branches, the Marines, the Navy, and the Army, must, if we are to effectively defend this country, act in support of that striking Air Force.

General Vandenberg said before the same committee of the other body:

With an adequate air force, properly manned, with sufficient personnel, installations, bases, the war potential in my opinion of any nation in the world could be destroyed by that air force.

That may sound far-fetched, but it is fact.

I would not discredit the ability or the honest intentions of our distinguished and eminent military men who have appeared before the various Armed Services Committees of both Houses in support of the ancient theories of fighting ground warfare, and who feel that our security is in the hands of the infantry. That is all that those gentlemen know in the line of the military. That is the way they have been trained. Generals Vandenberg, George, and Spaatz attended the same schools that the infantry generals did. They, too, know ground warfare. All who go through West Point learn the fundamentals of troop deployment and overland strategy. But the Air Force generals are also trained in air warfare as well as ground warfare. These men know what an air force can do whereas these ground generals have not had occasion to realize the full potential of a strong air force.

Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. GAVIN. It must also be recognized that the ground forces have to move in to make the bases available for the Air Force. The ground forces have to move in with the services of supply, they have to move in with the food, they have to move in with the equipment. They are certainly an important branch for supporting the movement of the Air Force.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. The gentleman is absolutely correct.

Mr. GAVIN. We should appreciate the necessity for having ground forces to give them that coordinated support in any air force attack.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. The gentleman is eminently correct. But let me remind you that the ground forces cannot move into enemy territory until we have mastery of the air, until air power has softened the enemy to the point where the ground forces are able to move in.

Mr. GAVIN. But after we have mastery in the air, the ground forces have to move in and go through the cold and the heat and the filth and the fatigue of modernized warfare to take over that particular area.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. That is true. But in war we are dealing in the currency of human lives. That ground force can possibly move in if it is superior in numbers and weapons, and has no air opposition. But if we send the air force in first we are going to economize in human lives.

Mr. GAVIN. It is a team working together.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DOYLE].

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Chairman, being a member of the Committee on Armed Services and having heard the testimony and evidence produced before that committee during the several weeks we studied this important subject of selective-service extension and UMT, and also again this session being a member of the Subcommittee on Reserve Components of the Military Establishment, also having been present on this House floor during all the present debate these 4 days, I believe I can add to, clarify, and emphasize a few material points and ultimate conclusions in support of this bill as it comes from the Committee on Armed Services. I make my remarks having in mind that my distinguished chairman has announced a clear and constructive amendment. That amendment is clearly so reasonable and sound no voice has been raised against it.

As no Member has raised his or her voice during this debate against the proposed extension of the Selective Service Act of 1948 as proposed in this bill, it is clear to me that the people of this great Nation generally recognize the necessity for its extension and this House knows the extension is necessary. Therefore I will treat briefly with the UMT division of this bill, only.

It has been stated in the committee report that the avowed purposes of this UMT proposal are, first, to enable the armed services to immediately raise and maintain an armed force of sufficient size as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet our minimum security requirements and, second, to establish a universal military-training program.

Now, as to the first objective which has been stated. The necessity for raising an armed force of sufficient size to meet our minimum national defense security requirements is so self-evident and so much the paramount issue and the responsibility of this Congress that I only need to mention it, and you unanimously agree with me. The Constitution charges us with this continuing responsibility. It is as clear as crystal. No Members desire to shirk it, I feel sure. Our security is at stake. But whether or not we in Congress and the American people should let the Joint Chiefs of Staff of our Military Establishment determine from their expert training and experience, what the minimum requirements for our national security should be; then they recommend them to us and we take their advice, is the subject at issue, brought forth in the recent 4 days' debate on this bill.

Some of the opponents of universal military training apparently believe they know more about, or at least as much of, what is needed to meet our minimum military security requirements, as do our combined and total Military Establishment, as represented to Congress by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am not only disturbed, I am shocked, to hear so many opposing this bill say so much of what cannot help but be, and will naturally be, construed by aggressive Communists, Stalin, and his cohorts, as less than lack of faith in the ability of our American military. Aggressive communism delights to hear our top military criticized and referred to with undignified words

and with careless, thoughtless language—not giving any proof with our criticism.

Such criticism, to the extent that it appears unjust and unfounded, is weakening to our sinews and results in causing natural fears and anguish in the minds of the American people. The American people need the assurance of sound, competent military leadership, rather than any carping, unwarranted innuendos and insinuations against those on whom we must depend.

In this connection, I yield to no man the having of a more fixed purpose than I do, that our beloved Nation shall not become militarized or fall under the control of the military. I have always felt that way. Constitutionally and on all other grounds, from the office of the Commander in Chief to the Halls of Congress, ours has been and is and must be maintained in fact, as a civilian economy and a civilian-controlled military through the actions of Congress on appropriations and otherwise. We must remain a Republic of free men, living daily the democratic way of life. There is no need of civilian control passing to the military. It is inconsistent with our whole history.

It has not been my knowledge nor experience in the 5 years, almost, that I have been here now, that the rank and file of our Military Establishment leadership has been or now is less able in their profession, or less patriotic or less devoted to duty and the best interests of our great Nation, than are we Representatives in Congress, who have been chosen from the many millions to patriotically represent the American people legislatively on a high ethical, moral, and nonpartisan plane in matters of national defense and national security as concerned in this bill. I recall the Biblical story of some having notes in their eyes. Let us be eminently fair in our remarks.

Finally, as to the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the minimum requirements for national defense and security, I want them to know that as far as I am concerned, I consider them continuously charged with that responsibility, legally, morally, and on all points. I look to them to be well-qualified and equipped to fully, adequately, safely, and vigilantly determine our minimum military and defense requirements at all times, and then to recommend and advise Congress promptly what those minimum requirements may be for our national defense against aggression. I see no other way provided whereby we in the Congress can most safely and sanely proceed to render our legislative responsibilities; even though we must always continue to control the numerical strength and expenditures of the Military Establishment by our appropriation control and legislative processes.

Our Joint Chiefs of Staff have informed us of the need of immediately raising an armed force of 3,462,000 men. They advise this is the minimum sufficient; they advise us of the necessity of maintaining this size force to meet our minimum security requirements probably during the next several years.

As one Member of Congress, I would not want the responsibility of refusing to provide the minimum military recommended by our Joint Chiefs of Staff in the event of a global war or even under present global conditions. I know I am not sufficiently informed to know as much as they do. We must depend upon them for their military opinions and advice. I would rather err in favor of having a million men too many, for a short period, than 1,000 men too few at all in time of necessity. Aggressive communism knows only the power of might as a deterrent to her world conquest pronouncements. America never has had, and does not now have, and never will have, with God's help, any desire or determination to conquer a territory or to conquer a people. We must always keep the heart of America on that level—no conquest of territory and no conquest of people. We must build a world of good-will relationships through righteous treatment of people.

But America has an immediate and continuing responsibility not only to the United States of America, but to the freedom-loving and freedom-seeking peoples all over the world. And our own security is in jeopardy. Distance and space have been shrunk; the time element and distance have been practically erased; communication delays and transportation bottlenecks have been eliminated. We in America have been catapulted into a world neighborhood which is by hour and by day becoming more dependent and interdependent on the daily behavior and conduct of the nations constituting this world neighborhood. We are a neighbor in this world neighborhood and cannot change our residence, street, or location.

Having previously discussed the first stated and avowed purpose of this bill, as found on page 9 of the committee report, let us now briefly discuss the second objective which is, to wit, "that it will establish a universal training program."

At this point I wish to inform my colleagues I will digress from my written notes to speak ad lib. First I wish to refer to the Towe bill, and wish to remind you that in the Eightieth Congress it almost passed a universal military bill. It passed the Armed Services Committee unanimously. I read the bill H. R. 4278, Report No. 1107, introduced July 18, 1947. I found the concluding statement by the Committee on Armed Services saying this:

The committee concludes that a flexible well-administered program of UMT as provided in H. R. 4278 is a vital necessity to the United State at this time.

This bill by the Republican-controlled Armed Services Committee also created a UMT Commission.

I find no objection, so far as I am concerned, to the Congress referring for study and survey and report to a committee controlled by a civilian majority, such as this Commission will be under this bill. Three of the five must be civilians. I find no objection to referring to such a commission approved by the Senate of responsible citizens for study, survey, and report back to the Congress well considered plans and pro-

grams for a UMT program. I think it is wise that we set up such a commission that will have a year or two, or even longer if you please, to study that important subject and report back to the Congress. When the reported plan can be amended, adopted, or entirely rejected. So far as I am concerned, as a member of the Committee on Armed Services, at this stage of my information I do not feel qualified, to be frank with you, to report now a UMT bill to this House in detail so far as my judgment and knowledge is concerned, and draw up a program of universal military training of which I would ask your approval. I do not feel I have the knowledge. I would need much study and advice. I fully know I would have to have the expert advice and opinion of men who know far more and of men who are admittedly best advised on those problems. We need educators and others to help us. I think it is very important that Members of Congress get the best advice they can and have it coming from an experienced group of men specifically delegated for that purpose under this bill for 1 or 2 or 3 years to study the problem and then report back to Congress. We can take it or leave it; we can take the good and leave out what we wish. We can then more intelligently legislate. We are surely not ready to do it now.

I might say, Mr. Chairman, I am glad to have given up my place on the speaking schedule to some of my other colleagues so that they could get away earlier in the day, as they had pressing official business in committee work. So I have shortened my remarks.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOYLE. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. BROOKS. The gentleman from California is a member of the subcommittee on reserves. Earlier in the day the gentleman from Michigan brought up the question of when the Reserve program would be given to the Congress.

The question was asked as to the specific time and readiness of the Defense Department to give that program to the committee. Since the gentleman is a member of that Reserve subcommittee, I think the RECORD ought to show, in his time, that the Defense Department is prepared and has been for several weeks prepared to come before the subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee with a Reserve program, and as soon as our legislative schedule permits, we hope to be able to have representatives of that Department give us the Reserve program in detail. I have consulted with the able gentleman from California on that point.

Mr. DOYLE. I thank the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee for that observation. He very ably heads this important subcommittee, and I enjoy working under his leadership. I do wish to now mention a couple of subjects and ideas that I mentioned in Armed Services Committee, and I do it with a great deal of feeling that they are important to consider under this universal military-training proposal. I

think this House should be reminded of the fact that if and when this UMT program is set up, it is set up for the youth of our Nation between 18½ and 19 years of age, the "tender" young men of our Nation, so-called, the youngest in our military call. On pages 36 and 37 of the committee hearings there is quoted there a discussion between myself and General Marshall. Then, later in the report, a discussion between myself and Mrs. Rosenberg and General Hershey, dealing with the matter of the morals and welfare of these young men in the UMT.

I wish to say as one Member of Congress I shall expect the Commission, when it is set up, and if no Commission is set up, I expect any bill passed by this Congress to contain adequate provisions to protect, as far as they can be, the morals and the welfare of the young men who go into this national training corps. I think it is high time that we in this Congress declare ourselves that we are not afraid to speak clearly and firmly on the proposition that the conditions and circumstances surrounding the training of boys and young men must be to the uttermost for their protection and their strength; rather than for their weakness and the destruction of their character and their morals. Such protection against commercialized vice of all kinds is a must.

Another thing, about 5 years ago I spoke over a considerable radio hook-up in New York City, and at that time I extemporaneously said something like this: "It is time America gets on her knees and stays there." I have said it frequently since that time. I think that is true. I know it is true. To do so keeps a person or a people humble enough to deserve prosperity. I wish at this point in our discussion, because I do not believe it has been sufficiently emphasized in this debate, to say that military strength alone will not give us world peace. Military might alone will not do the job. Adequate military strength is absolutely necessary at this time, to prevent Russian communistic aggression, but the greatest force, if you please, the greatest force that we have in this Nation, is the morality, honesty, integrity, and clean living and righteousness, and all the other intangible elements and factors that enter into American life and make the hearts and souls of men, as the strength of 10. As far as I am concerned, I know that these moral and spiritual powers have more permanent power than even powder and bullets. We need to get on our knees and keep our powder dry, also. I want to urge that as we think of making our Nation stronger in a military way, stronger than ever before, that we place paramount in our objectives the proposition that our main national objective in becoming strong in a military way, is not to conquer people and territory but to be strong enough to compel world peace. This is not inconsistent. It is factual. That, if you please, is my paramount justification for voting for this bill for UMT. It gives us a reserve source of military training which will make it unnecessary to keep a back-breaking sized Regular Army over a term of years. It

will give us the strength to keep off a war of communistic aggression, I hope.

If you ask us what letters or communications I have had for or against UMT from my congressional district, I will say that not more than 25 residents of my congressional district have written me opposing it, while I have had many times that number of approvals. And just a few minutes ago I was handed this telegram:

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 6, 1951.

HON. CLYDE DOYLE,

House of Representatives,

Washington, D. C.:

The following national organizations urge your support of Senate bill 1 as amended by House Armed Services Committee including UMT and extension of draft in one bill.

National Guard Association of the United States, by Maj. Gen. Ellard A. Walsh, President; Reserve Officers Association, by E. A. Evans, Executive Director; Military Order of the World Wars, by Milton G. Baker, Commander in Chief; Adjutant General Association of the United States, by Maj. Gen. W. H. Harrison, Jr., President; Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, by Charles C. Ralls, Commander in Chief; the American Legion, by Miles D. Kennedy, National Legislative Director; Disabled American Veterans, by Boniface R. Malle, National Commander; AMVETS, by Harold Russell, National Commander.

I think the American people feel we in Congress will vote our honest-to-God conscientious convictions upon all the known facts.

It is a chance for world peace sooner through present strength and might. But we must keep our objective—a just world peace.

I had a son—some of you have said he was a distinguished son because he gave his life for our country in the uniform of the Air Force as a first lieutenant. I had always been opposed to the conscription of the young men of our Nation until one time in his lifetime, when home for a few days' vacation from the Aleutian Islands where he was stationed, he said this to me, he said: "Dad, be sure, if you ever have anything to do with it, that the young men of our Nation before they go to college, if possible, have more military training. Give them more training, dad, than I had before I had to go into combat." And so you can understand, you men who know, how I feel. The thing that convinced me outside of the volume of evidence that came before our committee and convinced us, outside of the justification that I know these men made before our committee, the evidence and the telling to the committee, to justify this UMT commission at this time, was the appeal of my own son based on his experience in the United States Air Force when he said to me: "Dad, give the American boys, if you ever get a chance, more basic training than I, myself, had before I went into combat in the Aleutian zone."

So I wish to urge you, Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, to realize that we are not going to abdicate anything from Congress; we are going to keep control of the UMT plan; we can end it if we want to. I do not anticipate or look toward abdicating any legislative responsibility on my part. If that commission

comes back to us and makes recommendations which need the legislation of Congress, we will enact the legislation. The commission cannot and need not legislate. Congress will continue to legislate if necessary. I do not conceive of that commission's usurping the power of Congress or taking over unto itself the pronouncement or the enforcement of rules that have the effect of law. This bill does not intend or allow that. I am not afraid of that at all because I know and you know that if the commission comes back to us with a plan and a program which we approve, then that program or plan, after we amend it or otherwise treat it, if it needs the power of legislation, Congress is the only power to legislate.

I have not again repeated the figures of either men or dollars involved. Members have already done so—several of them. You have the financial saving of many millions which will result before you. You have heard of the necessity of this UMT plan to gain a permanent reserve. You know Congress can end the program or change it at will. You know it will not start until or unless Congress has first and previously approved the plan and passed the necessary legislative enactments and provided the money. You know it is even possible the world will settle down to settle up in time so the UMT will never be necessary. God grant it may be so. But, meantime, let us not procrastinate and do less than our fullest duty to ourselves and to our freedom-loving friends and allies for peace on earth.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, bill S. 1 which we are now considering has as its objective the common defense and security of the United States and for other purposes. The effort for national security is an old one. For many years organization for group security has been the objective of even primitive forms of social organization. This security has taken on many different forms and for offensive as well as defensive purposes. We like to think and we profess that all policies in the field of military preparedness are for defensive purposes and yet we have seen throughout history that these defensive measures for security eventually justify the claim for aggressive action. It has long been a popular concept that the best defense is an offense. Napoleon, Bismarck and many other leaders used that concept to start a war.

History also shows that foreign policy as the official conduct of relations of our sovereignty to others grew up side by side with the professional soldier and the professional army. The military as an institution from the outset of civilization has been a pertinent tool of foreign policy. The Military Establishment provides the latent force that makes diplomacy effective. It likewise is that arm of government which has always been a heavy burden upon taxpayers.

Since all expenditures for the military and for foreign-policy operations must be paid for by the people, the population as a whole is beginning to realize that

the most of its Government's foreign policy has a direct bearing upon their lives for they foot the bill.

No President or Secretary of State or the Chief of Staff will admit that his policy is aggressive and calculated to bring war. So here today we hear the same arguments that have been used since 1939—that whatever we do is always designed for peaceful purposes. Yet we look in vain for evidence of peace anywhere in the world.

The necessity of deceiving the people, especially in matters of foreign policy, says Mr. Felix Morley in an article on foreign policy to be issued very soon, is indeed an accepted principle of statesmanship. Machiavelli, writing *The Prince* in 1513, devoted all of one chapter under the title "In What Way Princes Must Keep Faith." The conclusion of this great political scientist was that a chief of state must always "seem to be all mercy, faith, integrity, humanity, and religion." However, he continues, those that have been best able to imitate the fox have succeeded best. But it is necessary, he goes on to say, to be able to disguise this character well and to be a great feigner and dissembler; and men are so simple and so ready to obey present masters that those who deceive will always find those who allow themselves to be deceived. It is hard to believe when Machiavelli made that statement in 1513 that it would have such a close application to the arguments that we have listened to in this debate. Machiavelli also said when foreign policy is unsuccessful the tempo of deception must be increased and the blame for failure must, if possible, be focused on a situation for which it is claimed the chief of state is not responsible.

Alliances such as the North Atlantic Pact, as a device of foreign policy, are as old as recorded history. Though unfamiliar to most Americans because until recently it was our policy to have nothing to do with entangling alliances, today we find ourselves stripping our economy and imposing great financial burdens upon our people. All of this in an effort to bolster questionable alliances to the detriment of our way of life.

As we review history and remember great civilizations which relied upon the use of force to maintain their position, there is but one conclusion. It has failed to bring peace or security. The use of force has led rather to the disintegration and destruction of those empires. This is the road we are traveling today. There will be neither peace nor security if we continue to march down the road which is proposed in the pending legislation. Peace through force is a fiction; it is contrary to the judgment of history, as I read it.

Mr. Chairman, there will never be a lasting peace while we continue to rely upon guns and bombs. This is the program we are asked to approve today. I repeat, that peace and security will elude us if we use bombs, bacteria, pacts, promises or advance commitments. Since 1915 the role of commitments in American policy have obviously insured the enlargement of limited wars to general wars. Yet they have always been advertised as vindications of international morality. So as we look at the

question before us, we are forced to the conclusion that the methods we now seek to use can result in but one condition, namely the ultimate destruction of the United States of America as we know it. In 1917 we joined with other nations in the use of force for peace. We failed. It was the same in 1941. What reasons are there to expect a different result now?

Mr. Chairman, we need to do some thinking in new directions if we are to pass a peaceful world on to those who follow us. It can never be, I repeat, achieved by the use of alliances and military force. War is an evil; good cannot be secured by evil means. War is a cancerous growth of minor conflicts which would remain small as issues between the nations concerned but which grow into larger conflicts of war as a consequence of amassing forces by means of involuntary servitude.

Mr. Chairman, the decision of whether or not to use force in self-defense is a matter of strategy to be determined by us but I remind you that Christ's method met the force of great military and political power 2,000 years ago and its defensive strength was impressive. Has not the Prince of Peace demonstrated the secret of both peace and defense for which we ourselves have not been able to see the reason. Why it works so well may defy some of our instincts and surpass our full understanding.

Mr. Chairman, we are at war and I shall vote to amend the Selective Service Act if the age for induction is fixed at 19 years. I see no justification for this country furnishing the great bulk of fighting men for countries all over the world when the draft age in those countries is higher than here. I would remind you that we are furnishing 90 percent of the men in Korea and as usual we are also providing the money and the material.

It is my opinion that universal military training should not be in this bill. I do not think it is a military training bill at all. It is bait to secure support for the pending measure. This House should consider a separate bill which incorporates the principle of universal military training. I do think the people want the question settled soon but this is not the place to do it. I shall vote against it in its present form.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BATES].

Mr. BATES of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, if we are living in a world today of lessening tension I am not aware of it. If there is anything that appears to be guaranteed to the people of the world these days it is stabilized tension. If we are not faced with a condition of all-out war, it appears we are faced with a long period of stress. The most prominent men of our country have prophesied that this period of stress will probably last for some 20 years. We cannot afford during that period to spend some thirty-five to fifty billions of dollars a year in military expenses, because should we do that we would lose the war economically. If we do not get involved in all-out war we must have a program that is within the capacity of our economy to stand and one that will be adequate to

cope with any emergency that may present itself. We cannot move up and down like a thermometer and suddenly expose our unprepared youths to meet an emergency situation. This can only result in the reckless expenditure of lives and money. Time after time we have had Congressmen appear in the well of this House and complain about the short period that existed between the time a man was called into the service and when he died in Korea. We cannot be expeditious with the lives of men. The men of this country are entitled to the best plans that the best brains of this country can devise.

Today the youth of America have had no opportunity to plan their lives. There is to them no real security. Consider the inactive reservist who has been called back for the second time within a decade, men who said they were willing to serve their country in the event of an all-out war, but who have been snatched once again from their home life. Why? Only because there were not adequately trained men available to take their places. As long as we pursue a haphazard system, repeated injustices will follow. We listened to the remarks of the gentleman from California [Mr. DOYLE] and the advice that his son passed on to him. Because there was a boy who had had experience in war. He knew what training meant.

It is up to us to prepare the men of this country, to give them the training that they need. Strength will direct our destiny until such time as the Ten Commandments of God are imbedded and felt in the hearts of men, but until that time comes we must have recourse to strength, unlike prior to World War II, when our allies represented strength, today we find them practically destitute economically and having been ravaged by war, have perhaps lost the will to fight. The vitality of force and factory that was available to us during the days of the League of Nations is not available to us under the United Nations. Youthful and vigorous America finds itself facing new conditions. We have greater responsibilities and challenges in a smaller and a more explosive world.

We have heard speaker after speaker here tell us that other countries are not taking their boys at 18½ and keeping them in service for 26 months. If the people of this country have a suspicion of the aid we might expect to receive from our so-called friends overseas, it is all the more reason why in this country we must protect ourselves. It is not our friends I am primarily concerned about, it is our potential enemies and what they may do that really concerns me.

The universal military program is designed to permit a smaller standing Military Establishment with a broad Reserve base. With the knowledge and assurance that we have trained reserves that can augment our standing Armed Forces, we can decrease the size of our standing force, and take a calculated risk to meet any emergency. This bill does not commit any Member to any definite plan. If you are interested in some particular plan you will have an opportunity to discuss it before the committee. You can amend it on the floor and in its final analysis you can accept or reject the

plan. I know there are probably a hundred plans in the minds of various Members of Congress. I have one and probably each of you sitting here at this moment has a plan. But if we can devise a plan that will cut down on the standing Army and lower the cost to the taxpayers and still have military security, and if we can also give some certainty to the plans of our youth, and if we can give more bargaining power to our diplomats, and if we can create a reservoir of men to meet an emergency and to make an enemy think twice before he attacks, Mr. Chairman, I am in favor of such a plan.

I propose to support the bill when it comes to final vote when it contains certain amendments which will be offered.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 12 minutes to the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. BAILEY].

Mr. BAILEY. Mr. Chairman, it is not my desire to add to the dissension and general confusion that has developed in the prolonged debate on this legislation. I have requested this time in order that I might plead the cause of more than 100,000 injured and otherwise disabled ex-servicemen who, in our zeal to prepare America for another war, we may make the "forgotten men" of World Wars I and II.

I shall, Mr. Chairman, during the course of my discussion, ask to include in the RECORD a mass of detailed information to prove that the medical, dental, and nursing staffs of our Veterans' hospitals are being raided by the armed services to such an extent that before the close of the current year, more than half of our veterans' hospitals will be closed to these helpless men who so richly deserve every service and assistance our Government can possibly render.

I am fully aware of the dire emergency that faces our Nation. I realize the need for prompt and courageous action in setting up our defenses. We must, of course, put first things first; but there should be a triple-A priority for those men who, in 1917 and again in 1941, rendered such gallant service to America.

Today we have in operation throughout the Nation 142 veterans' hospitals. On January 15 of this year, these hospitals were short 379 doctors. Hardly a single one of them had a full medical staff. On this same date, there were six new hospitals completed, prior to January 1, 1951, that could not open their doors because there were no doctors available. These new installations were located in Albany, N. Y., at Erie, Pa., at Seattle, Wash., and at Beckley and Clarksburg in West Virginia. One hundred and five doctors were needed to staff them. The one located in my district, at Clarksburg, has in the past few days opened its doors; but only 56 patients have been admitted because there are not enough doctors.

To add to this already deplorable situation, there are 21 other new hospitals now in the course of construction that will be completed in this calendar year of 1951. They will require 355 doctors and there is not a single doctor in sight. One cannot escape the economy angle involved—or rather, the lack of economy. The six units already completed and the

21 units nearing completion will cost in excess of \$300,000,000. Can we justify such a huge expenditure with no return in the way of service to the thousands of servicemen now pleading for admission to these hospitals?

What I have just told you is not even half the story. This already bad situation is further aggravated by the action of the armed services in recent months in calling for active service Reserve medical men and other doctors who are subject to service under the provisions of an act by the Eighty-first Congress that provides for drafting doctors between the ages of 25 years and 50 years.

As of the 1st day of April, this year, a total of 418 of these reservists and other doctors have been separated from the staffs of the 142 operating hospitals. A total of 136 of these are specialists particularly trained for the care of servicemen. There are 79 other doctors who have been called on whom the Veterans' Administration has asked for deferments. Few, if any of these, will be deferred, and they are subject to call at a later date.

The total score is a shortage of—

(a) Present installations.....	379
New installations.....	460
	839
(b) Armed service calls (separated) ..	418
Armed service calls (pending)	79
Total.....	1,436

The situation in the dental and nursing staffs is also acute. Four hundred

and thirty-six nurses have already been separated and 57 others have been ordered to report for active duty. In the case of dentists, the smaller hospitals are the hardest hit. Many have but one or two on the staff which has been wiped out by the summary and arbitrary action of the Armed Forces.

I would like to submit and put in the record these statistics that I have here. (The documents referred to are as follows:)

VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION,
OFFICE OF CHIEF MEDICAL DIRECTOR,
DEPARTMENT OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY,
Washington, D. C., January 18, 1951.
HON. CLEVELAND M. BAILEY,
House of Representatives,
Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR MR. BAILEY: The attached material is forwarded in accordance with our telephone conversation of yesterday.

If any further information is desired, please do not hesitate to call on us.
Very truly yours,

ARDEN FREER, M. D.,
Acting Chief Medical Director.

Number of full-time physicians needed for existing installations (from par. 4, p. 2, of letter to Mr. Kraable, Jan. 9, 1951)	379
Number of full-time physicians needed for hospitals which have construction completed, but not open for admission of patients (from enclosure A)	105
Number of full-time physicians needed for hospitals which will have construction completed during the calendar year 1951 (from enclosure B)	355
Total	839

[Enclosure A]

Veterans' Administration hospitals with construction completed but not open for admission of patients

	Date construction completed	Estimated date for admission of patients	Number of beds	Type of beds	Number of physicians needed
Omaha, Nebr.....	October 1950..	February 1951..	486	General medical.....	22
Beckley, W. Va.....	do.....	do.....	200	do.....	10
Clarksburg, W. Va.....	do.....	do.....	200	do.....	10
Erie, Pa.....	January 1951..	March 1951.....	208	do.....	10
Seattle, Wash.....	do.....	do.....	325	do.....	16
Albany, N. Y.....	do.....	April 1951.....	1,005	do.....	37
Total.....			2,424		105

[Enclosure B]

Veterans' Administration hospitals which will complete construction during calendar year 1951

Location	Estimated date of completion of construction	Number of beds	Type of beds	Number of physicians needed
Seattle, Wash.....	January 1951..	325	General medical.....	17
Miles City, Mont.....	March 1951.....	100	do.....	5
Indianapolis, Ind.....	do.....	494	do.....	(1)
Phoenix, Ariz.....	April 1951.....	192	do.....	(1)
Bonham, Tex.....	May 1951.....	50	do.....	4
		288	Domiciliary.....	
Denver, Colo.....	do.....	494	General medical.....	(2)
Kansas City, Mo.....	do.....	498	do.....	25
Madison, Wis.....	June 1951.....	486	do.....	25
Louisville, Ky.....	July 1951.....	494	do.....	(1)
Iowa City, Iowa.....	August 1951.....	489	do.....	25
East Orange, N. J.....	September 1951.....	945	do.....	34
Philadelphia, Pa.....	do.....	496	do.....	25
Cincinnati, Ohio.....	October 1951.....	496	do.....	25
Salt Lake City, Utah.....	do.....	546	Neuropsychiatric.....	20
Baltimore, Md.....	November 1951.....	295	Tuberculosis.....	17
Birmingham, Ala.....	do.....	487	General medical.....	24
Durham, N. C.....	do.....	491	do.....	25
New Orleans, La.....	do.....	493	do.....	(1)
Boston, Mass.....	December 1951.....	955	do.....	34
St. Louis, Mo.....	do.....	486	do.....	25
Syracuse, N. Y.....	do.....	496	do.....	25
Total.....		10,106		355

¹ Transfer from old hospital.
² Transfer from Fort Logan.

Status of medical military personnel as of Jan. 11, 1951

DOCTORS	
Total number of—	
Doctors separated to enter armed services:	
Doctors	119
Residents	194
Total	313
Requests for delays submitted to armed services:	
Doctors	281
Residents	106
Total	387
Requests for delays awaiting action by armed services:	
Doctors	78
Residents	27
Total	105
Delays granted by armed services:	
Doctors	43
Residents	19
Total	62
Delays granted by armed services:	
Doctors	47
Residents	37
Total	84
Requests returned by armed services without action (physically disqualified; to be resubmitted upon receipt of extended active-duty orders; not to be called at this time, etc.):	
Doctors	113
Residents	23
Total	136
DENTISTS	
Total number of—	
Dentists separated to enter armed services	38
Requests for delays submitted to armed services	102
Requests for delays awaiting action by armed services	22
Delays granted by armed services	19
Delays denied by armed services	19
Requests returned by armed services without action (physically disqualified; to be resubmitted upon receipt of extended active-duty orders; not to be called at this time, etc.)	42
NURSES	
Total number of—	
Nurses separated to enter armed services	270
Requests for delays submitted to armed services	209
Requests for delays awaiting action by armed services	60
Delays granted by armed services	27
Delays denied by armed services	109
Requests returned by armed services without action (physically disqualified; to be resubmitted upon receipt of extended active-duty orders; not to be called at this time, etc.)	13
Doctors separated to enter armed services by specialty as of Jan. 11, 1951	
Internal medicine	49
Neuropsychiatry	17
General surgery	14
Orthopedic surgery	4
Neuro surgery	1
Plastic surgery	1
Anesthesiology	1
Urology	1
Otolaryngology	2

Doctors separated to enter armed services by specialty as of Jan. 11, 1951—Continued

Eye, ear, nose, and throat	5
Ophthalmology	3
Tuberculosis	7
Pathology	2
Radiology	4
Cardiology	1
Dermatology	1
Obstetrics	1
Physical medicine	1
Gastroenterology	2
Tumor research	1
Total	119

Source: Prepared by Medical Manpower Unit, Jan. 15, 1951.

JANUARY 9, 1950.

Mr. T. O. KRAABEL,
National Director, the American Legion,
National Rehabilitation Commission,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. KRAABEL: This is in reply to your letter of November 27, 1950, concerning the comments of Mr. Grant Morgan, your national field representative, following his visit to the VA Center, Sioux Falls, S. Dak., August 7 through August 11.

My staff and I have been aware of, and concerned regarding the lack of doctors in the specialties of psychiatry and otolaryngology at this center and have given Sioux Falls high priority for the procurement of these specialists.

We are most fortunate insofar as the psychiatric situation at the center is concerned, as on November 7 one of the psychiatrists at Lincoln, Nebr., requested transfer to Sioux Falls. With this exception, in spite of all recruitment efforts, both in and out of the Veterans' Administration, no psychiatrist up until this time has been at all interested in an assignment to Sioux Falls. It is expected that this physician will be transferred the latter part of January, unless, of course, the Armed Forces should take him.

The possibility of recruiting a qualified psychiatrist for replacement at Lincoln, Nebr., is practically nil. As far as the State of South Dakota is concerned, the Veterans' Administration has in its employment 40 percent of all psychiatrists listed by the American Psychiatric Association as practicing their specialty in this State.

In regard to the possibility of assigning an otolaryngologist to the center, I can only paint a dim picture. Earlier this year, before the Korean incident when recruitment was still a possibility, my staff interviewed several candidates, but they were definitely not interested in coming with the Veterans' Administration for assignment in South Dakota. However, we will continue our efforts to find an otolaryngologist willing to accept this assignment, either from physicians presently with the Veterans' Administration or by recruitment. It is out of the question to try to transfer a physician unless he is agreeable to the transfer. If we try to force the transfer, he will resign and be lost to the Veterans' Administration. There are such lucrative opportunities for qualified specialists in civilian practice that doctors are resigning rather than accept an assignment to which they are not agreeable.

I am very glad you brought to my attention the situation at Sioux Falls, S. Dak., as I am more concerned than anyone else over this lack of physician personnel, which is rapidly becoming evident in more and more of our hospitals. Your letter concerning the center at Sioux Falls gives me an opportunity to acquaint you with this grave situation which faces the whole Veterans' Administration.

As you are aware, we have for the past 2 years maintained the highest type of medical care to veterans, in spite of the handicaps of budgetary and ceiling limitations

under which the Veterans' Administration is operating.

Our present situation is this: As of November 1, 1950, we had 290 fewer full-time physicians and 130 fewer part-time physicians on duty in the Veterans' Administration than were on duty as of February 1, 1950, in addition to a loss of 162 residents. The opening and staffing of 21 new hospitals during this period made the situation doubly acute. Due to shortages in critical categories we are beginning to spread our medical care in specific specialties dangerously thin.

This decrease of 290 full-time physicians does not seem as great as compared to the total number of physicians in the Veterans' Administration, but when transposed into terms of patient care, it is a major item. If we apply the ratio of one physician to 30 patients, then the care of 290 times 30 equals 8,700 patients being affected by this loss. The total number of vacancies for physicians was reported by the field stations to be 379 as of December 7, 1950.

It is my expressed policy, to which I am irrevocably committed, to maintain the highest quality of medical care for veteran patients. If I am faced with alternative of continuing our present standard of medical care for fewer patients and poor medical care for a greater number of patients, I choose the former. In considering anything less I would be derelict in my duty and responsibility to veteran patients.

If the Armed Forces continue to call Veterans' Administration physicians at the same rate as in the recent past, we will be in dire need of physicians at our existing hospitals, and the staffing of certain new hospitals to be activated in the remainder of the fiscal year 1951 may prove to be a practical impossibility.

As you may be aware, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not yet set up any system of permanent deferment for physicians. The best we can do is obtain a temporary delay in orders, which in the long run will catch up with us.

My staff and I are devoting a major part of our time to developing some effective method of easing this crisis, but in view of the present situation I have found no over-all relief or remedy possible within the authority of the Veterans' Administration. If the Veterans' Administration were placed on a parity with the Armed Forces for procurement of physicians, this would do much to stabilize our personnel situation.

Very truly yours,
PAUL B. MAGNUSON,
Chief Medical Director.

Mr. BAILEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to quote the last paragraph of a letter from Dr. Paul B. Magnuson, former head of the Medical Services Division of the Veterans' Administration. Dr. Magnuson says:

My Staff and I are devoting a major part of our time to developing some effective method of easing this crisis, but in view of the present situation I have found no over-all relief or remedy possible within the authority of the Veterans' Administration. If the Veterans' Administration were placed on a parity with the Armed Forces for procurement of physicians, this would do much to stabilize our personnel situation.

I want to propose to my colleagues that we remedy this situation by inserting a short, simple amendment to this pending legislation. The amendment should be inserted on page 33, after line 8 and would read as follows:

Said paragraph (1) is further amended by adding at the end thereof a new sentence as follows: "No physician or dentist who is engaged in full-time employment as such at

any hospital operated by the Veterans' Administration shall be inducted under the provisions of this subsection after he has attained the thirtieth anniversary of the date of his birth."

I had thought of asking for deferment of doctors between the ages of 25 and 50 years. I recall the Government paid for the education of several thousand doctors during and after World War II. Many of these young men are under 30 years of age and should discharge their obligation to the Government.

I shall go into this matter in greater detail when this legislation reaches the amendment stage. In the meanwhile, it is my sincere hope that you will join me in helping these men when the opportunity is at hand and the need is so great.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BAILEY. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. I have brought some of the same information to the House already, the part regarding the number of doctors and nurses that have been seized by the armer services for duty. I have introduced a bill which would give the doctors and the nurses military status. That was necessary in World War II. We were not getting the doctors and nurses then. It was done, and the situation was eased. If they do that, Veterans' Administration doctors can be kept in the VA or in some cases there could be a transfer of doctors from one service to another, and the Veterans' Administration and the care of veterans would be better. The appalling thing to me, as it is to the gentleman, is that our men are injured in the service and then the benefits they should have are not secured to them. Also the Veterans' Administration does not fight as it should fight to give the men the benefits to which they are entitled under the law.

Mr. BAILEY. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for her comments. I know of her great interest in the veterans of this country.

In conclusion, may I state that this Congress would be remiss in its duty if it does not at this time take advantage of an opportunity to handle the situation that will close, as I said before, half the veterans' hospitals of the United States before the first of January 1952.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. The gentleman has made a very fine and very necessary contribution.

Mr. BAILEY. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from South Dakota [Mr. BERRY].

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Chairman, I have been on this floor every minute throughout the entire debate on this question of preparedness through manpower conscription, and certainly the only purpose of this legislation before us today is preparedness—yet no one has as yet touched upon the point of what to me is the material question involved in this draft and training issue.

It seems to me that in order to understand what preparation we need for war, we must first consider the basic, under-

lying reason of why we are heading for war, why we are in the shameful international condition that we are in today. In our thinking let us build our foundation first and ask ourselves why did we get into this mess? Then consider how we are going to get out of it.

First, I want it understood that I am not an isolationist—I propose to defend every free country, every God-fearing country, against the ravages of a godless communism.

Next, I want it understood that I hold no grudge against the military. I think they are doing the only kind of a job they can do under the outmoded kind of training they have had. I do not think they are any worse than any other American organization or Government department which is not responsive to the people. Every department of Government has great difficulty in getting away from the "horse and buggy" days of the past.

But, I want to say at the outset that I am convinced that the principal reason we got into this mess today was because of the inability of our military leadership to depart from the outmoded military textbooks of the past. In their preparation for World War II their only conception of waging such war was surface warfare—fighting man for man, gun for gun, tank for tank, and carcass for carcass.

There is not a person sitting in this room who has not said to himself a thousand times, "How could they do it? How could men with the capacity and the vision of Roosevelt and Churchill sign the agreements that they signed at Yalta and Tehran, or their successors at Potsdam?" How could they do it?

I have read everything that I could read. I have talked with some of those in high places. I have heard those of the top official brackets. I have attended committee hearings. The answer that I submit to you this afternoon for your thought and consideration is the only logical thinking and conclusion that I can come to. I want you to think this through with me. But in doing so, let us be fair, let us be tolerant to the place where it hurts, let us lay aside partisan politics and ask ourselves this simple question of how could great men, international thinkers, world leaders, give the Russian bear one-third of free Europe and the only friend we ever had in Asia, China, and its possession that we had previously agreed to return to her, Manchuria?

How could they do it?

Oh, yes, I know, I, too, have thought that it was the influence of Alger Hiss and the Remingtons and the other pinks in the State Department and high Government departments, and yet, upon serious reflection, I could not conceive of how those men, even with their inside influence, could do the entire job. They might have been able to sell the book to Roosevelt, but by what magic power could they cast the same spell over Churchill?

There is no question but that Alger Hiss took advantage of the existing hysterical situation to further his nefarious and traitorous ends, but the fundamental reason why our leaders were

willing at Yalta and Tehran to trade half of what we had to win by World War II was fear, was panic, was hysteria.

They knew of no way of winning that war against Germany except with ground forces in surface warfare. They knew that this Nation and her democratic allies could not match German troops man for man. They could not believe that air power could do any more than serve as mobile guns, and rather than to see our men slaughtered in a man-to-man struggle in surface warfare in a bloody mile-for-mile battle to recapture lost ground, they were willing to trade the free people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and what not into eternal slavery in exchange for the Russian masses who would move in from the east to help make the kill.

There is no question but that the black hand of the traitorous Hiss was writing the doom of all free people everywhere, that he took advantage of his position and the hysteria of the day to further his nefarious ends at Tehran, but the underlying cause of the shameful trade of friendly China and Manchuria was the fear and hysteria of our military leaders, Marshall and King and our other military experts could not conceive of being able to bring Japan to her knees without the use of ground forces for a bloody invasion to wade in to make the kill. And, because they could not, they were panicky, they were hysterical, and they were willing to trade another friendly nation into dark and doomed slavery in exchange for the Russian masses to move in to help make the invasion.

In spite of the fact that strategic bombing and strategic bombing alone, cut the economic and war potential heart out of Japan and caused her surrender with an army of six million well equipped men still in the field without the need of one single Russian soldier, our military leaders refuse today to admit that their strategy was wrong, they refuse to admit even today that Japan was defeated from the skies.

Let me read to you the words of Secretary Marshall delivered on June 21, 1943, when he said:

Your adversary may be hammered to his knees by bombing, but he will recover unless the knockout blow is delivered by the Army.

As proof that his thinking has not changed, less than a month ago speaking at Columbia University, said:

The experience of battle * * * points to the continued and decisive role of ground forces.

General Bradley wrote only last year that he is convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that—

We shall once more be forced to gain the inevitable victory over our dead bodies—those of our soldiers on the ground.

All of General Collins' statements revolve around his certainty that "the doughboy is the final answer."

No, my friends, let us be fair, let us be tolerant, let us admit that Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam were the result of fear, panic, and hysteria brought about by an outmoded conception of warfare in our military leadership.

Yes, our leadership and their military advisers were hysterical as they sank into the slime of their own ideology of surface warfare, and, as they sank, they were grasping for a straw at Yalta, they were grasping for a straw at Tehran, they were grasping at Potsdam, and my friends, they are panicky today, and because they have no more free people to trade into slavery, they are grasping for another straw, our 18-year-old kids. And well, they might, because if they still refuse to come down to 1951 in their thinking, they will have to draft into their surface forces every man, woman, and child in these United States to be able to meet Russia on the ground man for man.

No, this is not a question of whether 18-year-olds make the best soldiers. It is not a question of morals of these kids. It is not a question of whether we need 3,462,000 or 3,462,001 men, whatever the figure is, it is a question of national policy, and national policy alone.

It is a question of whether we, as the elected Representatives of the people, are going to serve notice today upon the military that they throw away the old textbooks of Napoleon and his Maginot line successors and come down to 1951 in their methods of warfare.

A vote for this 18½-year-old draft is a vote to ratify Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam, because it is the same underlying principle that is facing us today. A vote against it is a vote to serve notice on the military that this is 1951 and that we demand that they modernize their war machine.

I agree that we have to have an army. I agree that we have to have a navy. I agree that our youth should be trained in the fundamentals of war for their own and their country's protection, but the time has come when our Air Force has got to be our striking force, has got to be our deterring force against the ravages of Communist aggression.

There is not one single person in this room who has the slightest doubt in his mind today but that if we had 3,000 B-36's loaded with bombs and ready to blacken the sky of any nation who dared put one foot across any border in aggression that there would be no Koreans, or Indochinas, or Irans, or an invasion of Europe.

Yes; we need fighters and strafers, but if we had that air superiority, if we had those long-range bombers to hit at the heart of Russia or any of her satellites and simply serve notice on her, "You send one division of men across any border anywhere in aggression, and we will blast you into all eternity," there would be no World War III. You may be as sure of that as you are that 3,500,000 American soldiers will not deter 30,000,000 well-trained Russian soldiers.

Even Secretary of State Dean Acheson 2 weeks ago Thursday night when he was "briefing" the freshmen Members of Congress on the Russian situation made the statement that Russia will not strike this spring because she is afraid of our air superiority. When I asked him if he did not believe unquestionable air superiority would continue to contain Russia,

he said, "Yes," and then he stopped short and said:

That is for a time, until they build up their defense, and then we have got to depend upon our ground forces.

Yes, in spite of that knowledge, in spite of that fact, the military still refuses to throw our resources into the manufacture of B-36's. In spite of the fact that Russia is being contained today because of our puny fleet of striking bombers, the military refuses to throw our economy into the manufacture of 50 or 100 times as many as we have today. Believe this or not, in spite of the fact that aluminum is the one essential metal needed in the manufacture of B-36's, 2 weeks ago the military released 40 percent of the aluminum stockpile to civilian use, and believe it or not, South Dakota has purchased enough aluminum on the open market to manufacture two license plates for every car in the State for 1952. And you tell me we are honestly preparing to defend the peace?

Yes, they are up here on the Hill asking us to draft skilled American boys, potential pilots, potential mechanics, potential navigators, to throw into the muck and the slime of surface warfare in Korea or Europe, or wherever the Commander in Chief may decide to send them next. At the same time, their Secretary of State tells us that it is our puny striking force of long-range bombers that is deterring Russia today. At the same time, the Pentagon tells us they are making every effort to defend this Nation, and yet by their own act, the one essential metal that is necessary to build up that containing force, is released to civilian use to add to the glutted market of refrigerators, chrome on new cars, and yes, let us not forget, two license plates for every automobile.

Today our Nation is standing at the crossroads. Our freedom, our way of life, our homes, the future of our children and their religion hangs in the balance. The decision rests upon you as the Representatives of the American people.

Let us vote an extension of the 19-year-old draft. Let us serve notice on the Pentagon that when they get their house in order, we will provide for the military training of our youth in a bill which does by direction what this bureaucratic monstrosity claims to do by indirection. This Congress is not feeble-minded. This Congress has some of the most able men in the Nation on its roster. Then why do we have to delegate our duty and authority to five men to perform? It is time the legislative branch of the Government started to legislate.

Let this Congress put an end to this bickering in the military. Instead of being so worried about grabbing our boys out of high school, let us conscript every ounce of metal necessary to immediately construct 3,000 B-36's and the fighters and strafers necessary to protect them in the air, and let this Congress once again speak for the people of the United States, speak for the free people everywhere, and let its voice be heard in the saving of civilization.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Ford].

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I take this time principally to inquire of the chairman, or the gentleman handling the bill on either the majority or minority side, for information concerning the recent directive of the President concerning the deferment of young men who are able to go to college. As we all know, the President on Sunday, or last week, issued an order which permits or which directs the selective-service boards throughout the country to defer men who are going to college. It so happens in my home county the two draft boards, or a substantial number of the members have felt this directive is discriminatory. There have been resignations from the two draft boards because the draft boards feel that the President's order is discriminatory and in effect would set up a poor man's army. I would like to read into the Record a telegram sent to me from Draft Board No. 43 in Grand Rapids. I quote:

Congressman GERALD FORD:

We are indignant over the inconsistency and the embarrassment that will be ours on the college and university student deferment proposal outlined in Operations Bulletin No. 28 just received from national selective-service headquarters.

It is felt that the procedure outlined would show discrimination to those who can afford college against those who cannot afford this higher education or who prefer some vocation equally beneficial to our country. Branding those economically unable to afford college or those least intelligent as the only ones eligible for the defense of our country was construed as an insult to those whom we are inducting into service.

HENRY S. KAMINSKI,

Chairman.

FRANCIS T. RUSSELL,
ROBERT J. YONKMAN,
LEWIS M. DE KORNE,

Members, Local Board No. 43, Selective Service System.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have some clarification of an amendment which I understand is to be offered next week by the gentleman from Texas in reference to this problem. Can the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Brooks] amplify what I have seen in the newspapers in reference to that amendment?

Mr. BROOKS. I am not familiar with the amendment to be offered by the gentleman from Texas next week. As I saw it in the press, I assume it would be offered to the Committee on Armed Services when the other amendments were taken up on Monday.

Mr. FORD. I wonder whether the gentleman from Texas can enlighten us. I think it is very important, not only so far as these two draft boards are concerned, but I think it is important on a Nation-wide basis. The men on that particular draft board and those on draft board No. 43, I know take their responsibilities very seriously. They are high-type individuals and it would be tragic if they should resign during this emergency period over the question of a policy which I am sure the House and the other body might revise very shortly.

Mr. KILDAY. The amendment to which he refers was mentioned by me the day before yesterday when I spoke on the bill. I read it as part of my remarks, and it is printed in the Record at page 3310 of April 4, together with a

brief statement of my objections to the Executive order. The amendment in effect repeals the Executive order and therefore would leave the matter of students and education as it now is under the act of 1948, and as it was under the act of 1940.

In other words, the effect would be that the local boards would continue to determine who should be deferred for the purpose of education, and the examination now called for would be eliminated.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield.

Mr. COLE of New York. Is the gentleman advised as to whether the draft boards to which he refers have granted deferments to college students within their jurisdiction?

Mr. FORD. It is my understanding that they have pursued a policy of granting deferments for those who are in college and who have requested permission to finish their present semester or college term. I do not know whether or not they have gone beyond that particular policy.

Mr. COLE of New York. Of course, the result of the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Texas, which would revert to the present practice of allowing local boards to deal with college deferments, inevitably results in discrimination with respect to dealing with college students in one community as contrasted with the way college students are deferred in another community. It is for the purpose of avoiding that discrimination that this plan announced by General Hershey has been devised, through which a formula of granting college deferments will be standardized and will be granted to all college students, irrespective of where they live. Speaking for myself, there will be one who will resist the proposal of the gentleman from Texas, because I feel that the plan proposed by General Hershey, which has been before the committee and which the committee endorsed in reporting this bill, and the plan is set forth in the committee report, is a fair method of dealing with this very difficult problem. I am not greatly impressed with this argument that the plan of General Hershey will result in a poor man's army. I have yet to find any boy who wants to go to college badly who is prevented from going because he has not got the money to do it. That is an argument, I think, without any foundation, that it will result in deferring the rich boys over the poor boys, because it will not at all.

Mr. FORD. I might say to the gentleman that I think we should weigh very strongly the point of view of those who are actually operating a selective-service board. They have had practical, down-to-earth experience of handling deferments of many thousands of individuals.

Mr. COLE of New York. Why should that be any more true with respect to college deferments than with respect to agricultural, industrial, or any of the other deferments which are written into the law?

Mr. FORD. It seems to me you have to give some discretion to the local

boards. The order of General Hershey, as announced by the executive branch of the Government, makes an arbitrary, across-the-board determination for all draft boards, taking away the essential discretion at the local level. For that reason I personally think the amendment to be offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. KILDAY] is highly desirable.

Mr. KILDAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield.

Mr. KILDAY. I think the major objection is that an agency of the Federal Government is permitted to choose those who shall go to or continue in college. I am basically and fundamentally opposed to permitting the Federal Government to choose the people who shall be educated in this country.

Mr. COLE of New York. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield.

Mr. COLE of New York. I agree completely with the gentleman from Texas [Mr. KILDAY] in his position of opposition to authorizing any Government agency to select who shall go to college, but the Hershey plan does not do that at all. It simply prescribes the pattern of determination. It does not select the individuals themselves.

Mr. KILDAY. But it does provide the examination; it gives the examination, and it grades the papers, and all that sort of thing. So that it results in the Federal Government determining who shall go to or continue in college.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield.

Mr. BROOKS. Of course I am very much concerned with reference to the proposed changes. I am informed, however, that the new directive actually reduces rather than increases the number of deferments. While that is not the final test, whether or not we will increase or decrease them, I think we should have a very orderly plan. I think we should have a plan that will fit into the operation of the schools and colleges throughout the country so as to do them as little damage as possible. Furthermore, I recognize that it is only a 3-year proposal, as I understand, and at the end of that limited period, of course, deferments will cease.

Mr. FORD. That is under the directive by the executive branch?

Mr. BROOKS. Under the statute we have a limit imposed upon the operation of any such plan. Of course, it is merely deferment, it is not a final exemption.

Mr. FORD. It is possible that in the interim the international situation may be such that those who have been deferred for that interim period will not thereafter have to serve in the Armed Forces.

Mr. BROOKS. We fervently hope that that is the case; and if that is the case we certainly would not want to put out of business thousands of schools and colleges throughout the country through the unwise operation of any deferment policy.

Mr. FORD. In closing I would like to say that I am certainly sympathetic

with the position in which these local draft boards find themselves. I only hope that they will defer their resignations where they have not already done so, and in the meantime I hope that we shall be able to include in the legislation the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, there are three or four other Members who have asked for time, but I do not see them on the floor at the moment. Since the hour is late I imagine they are as exhausted as most of us are.

There are no further requests for time on this side.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I have several requests for time. I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY].

Mr. MCCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, in my opinion the subject matter which we are debating this week is the most important of any which we may be called upon to consider during this term of Congress. This very debate is the debate which should be characterized as the "great debate." We are not proposing a hair cut for the Nation, nor the treatment of a common cold. The proposal today is an operation affecting the vitals of human life. It is a departure from a firmly founded and long-standing American tradition. We are here considering a proposal, which if it becomes law, will penetrate every fiber of the social structure of the United States, which will affect every family in the Nation and which will take in control the youth of this Nation.

This is a frightening prospect. Yet it is one which we must face. It will not profit us, or the Nation, to turn our face away from the reality of the evil which faces us; to underestimate its power, and to fail to make adequate preparations to meet and overcome this evil. The question before us is not the pleasant one of proposing means by which the horizons of freedom will be extended further. It is not a question of securing greater freedom and liberty for an already free people, but rather one of securing the freedom which we possess, and/or of attempting to make secure that freedom which we possess, and which we value.

Mr. Chairman, I stand ready to make the unpleasant decisions which may be necessary in order to secure that freedom. At this time of decision, we must remember the important truth expressed by V. H. Gardiner. We must remember that—

We are but the transient trustees of the heritage of all for which the past has lived, charged with administering it for a little while, but surcharged with responsibility of administering today our trust for the future, of our successors and of the world, in such manner that they will not look back upon us as false trustees, who took our present ease instead of performing our perhaps more painful duty as a sound link in the chain of generations.

First. The case that has been made for the Selective Service Act has been well presented.

Second. The members of the Armed Services Committee, who have presented this bill, have spoken well of the need

for a general training program, a program which will meet our national needs, in time of cold war, in time of uncertain and precarious peace.

They have told us that we need such a program to insure the continued safety of this country. They have told us that we need such a program in order to give some measure of certainty to parents and to young men as to how much of their lives is to be given in service to country, and when. They have told us we need a program which will give some assurance to men who are in the military service, or who have already served, that they will not be left alone to defend this country, and that other men who may be called upon to defend this country and the cause of freedom, will not be called upon to enter upon this task short-handed and inadequately trained. They have told us that we need a program which will prove to the world that the United States intends to carry out its responsibility in the cause of justice and freedom.

They have told us of this great need.

Individual members of the committee have told us of the great knowledge, wisdom, and virtues of the other members of the committee, and of the committee as a whole.

The have told us of their great labors as a committee. For 65 days they have dwelt on the mountain top.

But, after all this, I looked to the proposals in the bill. What is proposed? A commission to study the problem and write the law.

A commission, another commission. The executive branch of the Government now operates through commissions. The judicial branch has yielded in many fields to the commission, and the legislative branch too.

Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to delegating legislative responsibility to a commission when the question is one of reorganization, when the principal point at issue is probably that of who shall control the files. But, here before us today, is a proposition of another order. I believe that the committee should have brought before us a specific plan and program drawn by the committee. They have chosen not to do so. They propose a commission. I will accept this proposal, but under the condition that that commission will be required to report its proposals to the Armed Services Committee, which will then have the power to modify them, and which will, itself, have the responsibility to report the plan, as amended, to the House of Representatives for final disposition.

Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion that this action should be completed in this first session of the Eighty-second Congress.

Mr. BUSBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. BUSBEY. I could not help but take recognition of the statement of the gentleman that we were in between peace and war. Does the gentleman believe the fact we are losing thousands and thousands of American boys in Korea indicates we are not at war?

Mr. McCARTHY. I said we were between all-out war and peace. I said we were in what has been called a cold war.

Mr. BUSBEY. Would the gentleman agree we are at war but the President has not made a declaration or asked Congress to make a declaration of war, which in my opinion he ought to do?

Mr. McCARTHY. It is obvious it has not been declared; it is obvious we are shooting and losing men. I know the American people know that and I hope the Members of Congress know it. The technical point whether war has been declared does not have any particular bearing on our action on this legislation.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. PHILBIN].

(Mr. PHILBIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and include tables and excerpts.)

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, I am very thankful to you, to the distinguished gentleman from Georgia, the great American who heads our committee, for yielding me time to present my views on the pending measure.

I entertain such high admiration and such deep affection for the gentleman that it is not at all pleasant for me to have to disagree with him so sharply on this major and perhaps crucial legislation.

However, I have very deep convictions on these issues, which I feel conscience bound and duty bound to express and vote.

Let me make it clear at the outset that I do not question in any way the present need of a strong and invincible and powerful national defense. I have long been conscious of the menace of Soviet aggression and the shadow which it has cast over the free world and I sincerely and heartily approve of the objective of facing up to that threat with all the material and physical resources which this great, powerful Nation can command.

I am in complete agreement with the program of marshaling and mobilizing our great resources, both human and material, so that we may be prepared to meet every possible eventuality affecting our security, our freedom, and our well-being as a great democratic Nation.

I am not questioning the strictly selective-service parts of this bill. I am willing to vote for the extension of the present draft, because I believe it is necessary for us to build up our Army and our other Armed Forces consistently with emergency conditions which now face us.

If it appears, as has been intimated on this floor by very responsible leaders, that we are facing all-out war, then I am prepared to vote for all-out mobilization and I will vote, not only to draft boys into the Army, but I will vote to draft wealth, industry, and agriculture and every other part of the American economic machine that may be necessary to win that war and save the Nation.

But I must confess that, while I have studied these matters very carefully and have surveyed international developments very scrupulously, I am unable to

whip myself into the frenzy of apprehension and hysteria which I have seen manifested in some quarters.

So far as I can view it, we are about the only democratic nation where responsible leaders are exhibiting such extreme hysteria. None of the nations located closest to the source of this great threat—the Soviet Union—seem to be greatly disturbed about their particular situation. None of them are raising large armies. None of them are passing sweeping and drastic draft and manpower bills like this one. These data have been presented to the House and I will not repeat them at this time. But it is very interesting and pertinent to note that the large majority of Atlantic Pact nations are at present drafting only boys over 19 years of age, and some of them do not draft boys until they are 20 or 21 years of age.

We are all aware of the outstanding record and great service of General Eisenhower, and I think that he is greatly respected by every Member of the House. Despite his able and energetic efforts, it must be admitted that the number of military effectives which he has pledged by member nations up to this time for the defense of Europe, is hardly what one would call an enthusiastic response.

As of February 15, 1951, the size and strength of present armed forces of the member nations of the Atlantic Pact and the plans for future increases thereof, which I am inserting as part of my remarks, do not indicate that any of the members has been moved by the hysteria and sense of urgency, which have prevailed during some of our own deliberations.

We are a great Nation. But certainly we cannot be expected to carry all the burden of fighting against potential common enemies throughout the entire world. There are over 250,000,000 people in the democratic nations, outside of the iron curtain in Europe, and it is logical, proper, and just for us to expect that these peoples, these nations, will assume full responsibility and make all necessary sacrifices that may be required to defend their own soil and wholeheartedly join with us to stave off Communist aggression.

It should be clear to every one of them that the military resources marshalled up to this time in Europe are wholly inadequate, if war comes, to stop hostile military aggression. We must be reminded that in case of such aggression, the Red army would have the assistance of its satellite states and Communist fifth columns of size, significance, and power in almost every single country involved, where, according to our best information, Trojan horses of Communist conspiracy stand patiently by, ready at a given signal, to unload the enemies of democracy.

On the point of possible resistance to this threat, let me cite briefly from Gen. Pierre Billotte, one-time head French military adviser to the United Nations, who certainly ought to know the situation, and I quote:

To put up resistance with any real hope of success, the least Europe would require is 100 divisions, extremely mobile, equipped

with the most powerful antitank weapons and supported by ultra-modern air power—at least 10,000 tactical and 2,000 strategic planes. * * * Reduced to financial terms, no less than \$100,000,000 investment, spread over several decades, is indicated.

Mr. Chairman, this is just the kind of a trap into which the Soviet is seeking to lead us, to tie us up for several decades, if necessary; even some of our own leaders say that it would be 20 or 30 years, piling untold expense, regimentation, burdens, and sacrifices upon the American economic system and the American people, which would finally wear down our morale, smash us financially and economically, and bring us to a state of collapse.

Now there is one answer to this situation from the American standpoint and it does not lie in transforming our own great Nation into totalitarian patterns and binding the strong arms of our people with the obnoxious and unnecessary restraints of supermilitarism. It does not lie in a piecemeal, scattered, ineffectual program for the alleged benefit of foreign countries. In the first place, any arms, military strength, naval components or air power which we provide under any program in defense of democracy and America should, insofar as possible and practicable, be kept under the control and direction of our own military leadership. Otherwise, in some conceivable circumstances, our own weapons may be turned against us. As we deem the occasion demands it, in this world which has been torn asunder by the blandishments and threats and conspiracies of communism, let us strengthen first the Armed Forces of our own Nation. Let us at this time strengthen our own air power and bring into being—which I hope we are preparing to do because certainly that is the intent of our people—a fleet of supertranscontinental and intercontinental strategic bombers and other suitable modernized aircraft, capable of carrying atomic bombs and other effective explosives to the very heartland of the enemy.

We should greatly speed up the building of our radar screen as this committee, I am proud to say, has been seeking to do.

We should hasten and expedite our guided missile program.

We should assemble a great fleet of modernized tanks.

We should take more of our great naval forces out of moth balls and put them into action at the fastest possible rate.

We should build, strengthen and equip a reorganized army—an army based on modern concepts of warfare, equipped with every modern device and weapon.

We should revitalize and build the National Guard and the Reserves, which have been, to such an amazing extent, neglected and demoralized since the war.

We should utilize the weapons and techniques in which our great free creative and productive system gives us such a great superiority.

If we do these things, we will be giving the most effective possible answer—the answer of freemen, not slaves—to the threats of Russian aggression and the defense of the United States and the

other democracies, should it become necessary.

There is little chance of any significant land invasion of the United States at this particular time and such operations would not only take long, careful preparation but would be attended with greatest difficulties and obstacles. We must recognize, however, that in the event of war, we would undoubtedly suffer some serious and crippling attacks from the air. We must be in such a position, should attacks come, that we will be able to meet the aggressors with an adequate radar screen on land, sea and in the air, and also with a flood of tactical aircraft and antiaircraft fire on land and sea and be ready to deal with problems of public safety and public medical care in damaged areas.

We must be ready also to deploy our air strength and our valuable sea power that we can immediately and without any delay from several strategically located points within the range of our heavy bombers visit swift and terrible retaliation upon the enemy that dares attack us. If we are to believe our military authorities, we are equipped to visit terrible retaliation from the air against the attacker nation.

We have many things on our side. We not only have hundreds of atomic bombs made and ready to go, but we have an incomparable know-how, the scientific genius, the industrial capacity, the skilled workers, the capable leadership to make enough atomic bombs and other destructive weapons to bring ruin and devastation to any potential enemy. And believe me the Soviet Union recognizes that fact.

We should move with all possible speed to set up hemispheric defenses, not only along the coastline of the United States, but jointly with our neighbors to the north and to the south and in Alaska.

I am not one of those who believes that war is imminent. I do not speak in the spirit of a jingoist or warmonger, nor am I an appeaser, nor do I presume military expertise. I have vigorously protested against appeasement of the Soviets on very many occasions, even while World War II was going on, because I saw the great danger and the menace to our free institutions that was looming in the person of the great Frankenstein which this Nation and other democracies helped to set up to challenge the most precious values of civilized man.

I am intensely profoundly interested in peace and, even now when a wave of defeatism and resignation to war has spread over much of the Nation or at least has affected many people, I am as anxious to strive for and to work for peace as eagerly and as militantly as some seem to be striving for war. I am glad to know that the leadership of this Nation has inaugurated fresh measures even at this advanced stage on the road toward hostilities to effect a world-wide disarmament program and to look forward to some international arrangement to utilize atomic energy for the benefit and advancement of humanity rather than for its destruction.

But I recognize that it takes two to make such a bargain. It takes at least

two to sit around the peace table at a time like this and they must sit around it with the genuine feeling and spirit of peace in their hearts. Long ago, long before the Soviets acquired their present strength and at times when we ourselves were formidable militarily, I urged that we call peace conferences to make the peace and to unite the nations of the world against war. But it is better late than never and in the name of Christian civilization and humanity, even now the goal of peace and peaceful settlement of the present situation should be kept in mind and earnest, untiring efforts made to reach it.

I may say—and I think we are practically all agreed upon this—that we must be prepared against every possible eventuality and we must take into account every possible military contingency. If we obey our ordinary instincts of self-preservation, in a world torn with strife, persecution, and brutality, in a world plagued with Communist infiltration, threats, and intimidations, we cannot gamble as we have heretofore, we cannot delay until another Pearl Harbor shakes us out of our lethargy, because this time, the visitation of war will come like a bolt from the blue. It will come without warning. It will come on a broad front, not only in Europe, but in Asia, where bloody war in which we are engaged, is already raging. It will come with the crushing power of the Soviets and their satellites, accompanied by internal troubles, dissension, revolution, and rebellion in various countries, generated by Godless Communism, such as this Nation and this world has never before witnessed.

Unless we are fully prepared and ready for it, we will be completely overwhelmed even before we have time to get into action. Then in truth the lamp of liberty will go out and the darkness of slavery will have come upon us.

Now is the time for firm, high courage, courage in our strength as free men and women, courage to carry on boldly and unflinchingly as Americans have always carried on in emergencies and in time of danger and crisis. It is a time to strengthen our free institutions and not to weaken them by forms of indenture and peonage and other forms of ruthless tyrannical dominion over the individual.

Our aim is high. Our cause is just and if we but seek it in a humble, honest spirit, we will find the guidance and the help of the Almighty and we will not only be safe and secure from our enemy but we will be able to preserve our liberties and build a lasting and enduring peace upon this earth based upon justice, tolerance and love of our fellow man.

I am very sorry that the bitter controversial UMT proposal has been injected into this bill. It merely diverts us from considering the really vital questions of our national defense and preparedness. There is nothing new, strange or startling about UMT. It is as old as the hills. It has been employed by every tyrant who ever lived from Caesar to Hitler and from Charlemagne to Stalin. Here in this country they call it the Plattsburg plan because it had such an aristocratic origin. It has been considered several times by the Congress

and in every instance repudiated and put aside in response to overwhelming public sentiment. In an ordinary time, there is not a man in the Chamber who believes it would have a chance of passing this House.

History is strewn with the wreckage of great nations which put their faith in supermilitarism. Now I am not criticizing the military. I greatly admire our military leaders and I recognize above all the great debt which we owe them. But this is a civilian government dominated by the people and directed by their representatives. Military men have their place and it is a very important place, but they must always be subject to the direction and control of the civilian arm of this Government and they must always be subordinate to the representatives of the people, in matters of policy unrelated to military strategy and tactics. Essentially and basically, UMT is a Prussian-slave system of militarization which has signally failed every country that has tried it. At different times and in some cases more than once in history, France, Russia, Germany, and Italy have gone down to defeat under this tyrannical, conscript pattern before the forces of free nations.

France, which has had universal military training for over 160 years, has been overrun by its enemies four times during that period. As recently, as June 1940, as you all recall, the French Army, consisting of 5,000,000 men who had received years of military training, was disastrously defeated in a few days by far fewer numbers of technically trained Germans. Germany, which had UMT for more than 100 years, has suffered complete military defeat and disaster twice within the past generation. UMT did not bring victory to Japan, nor prevent the invasion of Russia, which but for the assistance of our own Nation, would have been most certainly overrun and conquered by Hitler. All the nations of Europe, with their millions upon millions of conscripts, with years of universal military training, could not check the ruthless march of Hitler. It remained for our American soldiers, without UMT, I repeat, and our American Air Force, to blast and defeat the powerful Nazi horde.

UMT is a most alarming development in American life because it would strike a telling blow at our great educational system and our traditional family life. It is based on the assumption that military leaders are better qualified to bring up and train our young men than their parents, than their spiritual advisers in the churches of America, and than the teachers in their schools.

UMT is contrary to American free tradition, antagonistic to the spirit of the American people. Americans are born free and the youth of America, in this and future generations, are entitled to our incomparable heritage of freedom. UMT is just the opening wedge for much wider regimentation by Federal bureaucrats of our educational, religious, and social structure. It will unquestionably result in dangerous and un-American encroachment upon the freedom of the individual. First, our young boys will be impressed and indentured, and then it is entirely possible, in fact some re-

sponsible people are already demanding, that our young girls will follow suit. Next, after that we will revive the idea of universal service, the drafting of all able-bodied people between the ages of 18 and 65, such as was proposed and brought into this House during the last war.

Many of you will remember that bill. It finally wound up as a draft of all those between 18 and 45 and would permit a Federal bureaucrat to send our citizens away from their homes to work in any part of the country. I had the privilege, at that time, of voting against that bill. But it passed this House and was sent over to the other body, where an aroused public opinion soon consigned it to the well-known and well-deserved pigeon-hole. Such a measure has strong support in many places even now.

UMT presents the greatest of challenges to free sectarian education of young men. If carried to its logical conclusion, it will greatly hamper, if not destroy, the training of youths in religious schools of all denominations and substitute instead training in Army camps under the decrees and plans of some Federal bureaucrat. Let no one here get the impression that UMT is a substitute for a general draft in the event of an all-out war because in that case, as in our previous wars, it would be necessary to mobilize all our strength and manpower.

This Prussianized system would disrupt and jeopardize all privately endowed education in the United States and it would unquestionably result in widespread Federal control over our schools, colleges, and institutions of learning. By making schools and colleges financially dependent upon the Government, UMT may well lead to nationalization of education. No real, reliable cost estimates are at hand. In fact, that question has been very carefully avoided for the most part. A few years ago, the UMT national committee estimated that it would cost something in the neighborhood of \$2,000,000,000 a year. At the same time, Hanson Baldwin, eminent New York Times military authority, estimated that it would cost from three to five billion dollars a year. Since that time, costs have gone up and it could well cost twice that amount or \$10,000,000,000 a year for the cost of running the program alone.

But do you suppose for a moment that these boys, who have been dragged away from their homes into Army camps at the age of 18, are going to be satisfied with a pay of \$30 a month. In modern America, that is nothing but peonage and no one can make anything else out of it. You will have demands for equalized pay for the trainees, you will have demands for the full GI benefits, compensation, insurance, health benefits, and other fringe benefits, which Congress will find it very difficult to reject. Before we get through with this program, its cost could be so staggering as to greatly handicap the financial needs of the entire national defense. So far as I am concerned, if the Congress is going to spend such huge amounts of money, I would rather see it spent for strategic bombers or other necessary equipment that would have some real value to us in

an emergency, and, believe me, we are going to have no difficulty whatever in getting very smart, capable young American boys to handle our aircraft and to man our Navy and Army.

Let me point out also that from a moral and social standpoint, UMT will have devastating results upon our youth and everyone in this House knows it. It will promote the development of bad habits, always occasioned by the associations and environmental attractions of Army life for extreme youth. It will encourage premature marriages and breed unimagined social problems for which the Government will finally have to pay a huge price.

In my humble opinion, the great nation like our own which takes its boys away from their homes, away from their churches, away from their schools and colleges, and makes them part of a great militaristic caste system, with all its known and demonstrated evils, under the pretext that it is necessary for the national security, cannot avoid the gravest of consequences to its political freedom, the integrity of its family life, and the impairment of its educational system. The preservation of individuality, morally, spiritually, politically, and in every other sense, has been one of the chief contributing factors to the greatness of America. Our strength lies in our freedom. Experience has clearly demonstrated to us that Americans can live, work, and fight better when they are free. To shackle young America into a Prussianized militarism bred of hysteria and propaganda is to ignore the chief source of our great power as a nation.

It is surely unnecessary for us to adopt a pattern of totalitarian government in order to defend ourselves against the Marxist superstate. If democracy fails to meet these issues clearly and courageously, the door will be wide open for the development of a regimented American state.

I was glad to note that the great chairman of this committee is considering amendments that will soften up this bill. But that is not enough for the American people. There is one sound, sensible solution, and that is to strike UMT completely from the bill, raise the draft age to 19, and then proceed to clear the way for the building of a powerful, invincible national defense predicated on modern concepts, and not based upon the outmoded and discredited militaristic systems which have brought nothing but defeat and disaster throughout all history to the nations which employed them.

Our purpose should be not to disrupt the lives of young Americans except where it is absolutely necessary for the defense of the Nation. We can and should institute voluntary training programs in the schools, colleges, and factories for young men and launch a program of summer training in universities and colleges, trade and technical schools, coordinated with training programs at military installations where our young men can receive military training without causing them to abandon their career. The great Marine Corps has made exceptional progress in shaping a satisfactory program, which is known as

"platoon leaders' class," and it can well be copied by other branches of the service. These are matters which should be carefully studied by the committee and legislated upon by the Congress, and not by some outside commission.

It is utterly unthinkable to me that this Congress should at any time delegate its lawmaking powers to any commission, and I am constrained, for the reasons I have set forth, to vote against UMT and the 18-year-old draft.

TROOPS TO EUROPE

As I understand it, the administration contends that the President has general power, as well as authority under the Atlantic Pact, to send troops abroad without the approval of Congress.

The Constitution specifically vests Congress with sole power to declare war, and this connotes the plenary power to wage war with all the force necessary to make it effective.

While the President has no power under the Constitution to initiate or declare war against a foreign state, he has power to recognize the existence of a state of war and to resist force by force. Where the President acts in an emergency to involve the Nation in war, or the danger of war, it is certainly contemplated by the Constitution that he should seek approval or ratification of his acts by Congress. If this were not true, this Nation would be just another dictatorship and its Executive head could not only engage in war, but invoke every measure, including the draft and assignment of armed forces and troops, to fight such a war of his own will. Clearly this is not the case.

The President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and as such is authorized to direct the movement of land, naval, and air forces placed by law at his command and employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual. But it must be remembered and emphasized that Congress has sole power to raise and support armies and to maintain and provide the Navy and the Air Corps and every other military component. The Congress makes the laws relative to war. The President enforces them. Neither should intrude upon the authority of the other. The power of the President acting as Commander in Chief must be exercised according to law. In this democracy, the military is subordinate to the civilian authority and must be kept so.

The above-stated principles are not figments of the imagination but specific provisions of the Constitution and judicial interpretations thereof. Therefore, I am of the view that the question of sending troops to Europe should be presented to and determined by the Congress.

Apart from constitutional power, there is another side of this question: Is it advisable to send additional troops to Europe in substantial numbers until the nations of Europe have clearly and unmistakably demonstrated their firm purpose, expressed in action, that they intend to defend themselves against aggression. There are more than 250,000,000 people in free Europe, powerful industrial resources and very sizable military manpower. Yet up to this moment, General Eisenhower's efforts to

raise military divisions under the Atlantic Pact for the defense of Europe could hardly be termed successful.

Would we not be foolhardy, indeed, if, until Europe moves very decisively and substantially to defend itself, we were to pour in substantial numbers of American boys and large quantities of American arms? Do not European nations have primary obligation to defend themselves?

I think we must follow the prudent course of building and conserving our strength for possible all-out war. Clearly, Europe is afraid of being turned into an atomic battleground. She is war-weary and intimidated, and wracked by social ills and unworkable social panaceas. In our own interest, and in keeping with our own ideals of democracy and freedom, not to speak of our obligation to our honored dead and all these who recently made such bitter sacrifices in the name of human liberation, we cannot ignore Europe's plight. For many reasons, not the least of which is our own security, we certainly cannot stand by while she is overrun.

If it is necessary, as it seems to be, to lift her morale and strengthen her courage, let us state frankly and unequivocally that unwarranted aggression by the Soviets against western civilization means war. Such an attitude on our part coupled with overwhelming air power, a strong remobilized Navy and a powerful Army, all implemented with atomic weapons, guided missiles and other modern war matériel, backed up by the vast incomparable productive power of America, will make any nation think twice before committing an aggression that would require us to protect our security and defend our spiritual ideals and our free civilization. Above all, let us be prepared for every possible contingency.

Let us not feel that war is inevitable or imminent. Intelligent, courageous action may well keep the peace. But that action must be based upon overwhelming strength of arms and a firm resolution not to dissipate or misuse our strength. And it must be taken with calm, prudent, if sober, judgment, free from vagrant emotions of the hour.

I hope that the President will submit the question of sending troops to Europe to the Congress. In this way, the representatives of the American people will be able to pass upon the merits and demerits of this proposal and the decision reached, whatever it is, will make for a policy that will have behind it the support of the country.

Casualties in Korea

United States, as of Mar. 23:	
Killed.....	8,511
Wounded.....	37,918
Missing.....	10,691
Total.....	57,120
Turkey (of which 298 are killed).....	1,169
Britain.....	892
French.....	396
Australia.....	265
Netherlands.....	112
Thailand.....	108
Philippines.....	55
Greece.....	89
Canada.....	68

UN figures are estimates only. Information from UN Secretariat.

Troop strengths in Korea

United States:	
Army.....	250,000
Navy (including Marines).....	90,000
Air Force (unestimated groups).....	-----
Source: General Bradley, Feb. 26.	
UN, as of March 1:	
Korea.....	60,000-90,000
Commonwealth and United Kingdom.....	13,000
Philippines.....	1,000
Turkey.....	5,000
Thailand.....	1,000
Netherlands.....	600
Greece.....	800
France.....	600
Canada.....	10,000
Australia.....	1,000
Sweden.....	200
Total.....	33,200

In addition, there are unestimated naval and air contingents from some of these countries.

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, Washington, D. C., April 3, 1951.

To: The Honorable P. J. PHILBIN.
From: Dr. Albert C. F. Westphal, Chief, Foreign Affairs Section.
Subject: Draft ages in the various Atlantic pact nations, also size, respective present standing armies.

The following is in answer to your request of April 2, 1951, regarding the draft ages in the various Atlantic Pact nations, also the size, respective present standing armies:

Country	Ground forces	Navy and air	Total
Belgium.....	91,000	11,000	102,000
Luxembourg.....	2,000	-----	2,000
Denmark.....	23,000	6,000	29,000
France.....	600,000	122,000	722,000
Italy.....	245,000	62,000	307,000
Netherlands.....	78,000	36,000	114,000
Norway.....	15,000	10,000	25,000
Portugal.....	64,000	9,000	73,000
United Kingdom.....	380,000	349,000	729,000
Canada.....	34,000	27,000	61,000

Source: Basic Information on Implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty. Committee print, 82d Cong., 1st sess., Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, February 15, 1951; p. 1.

Type and period of military service in foreign countries

Country	Type of service (conscription or volunteer)	Minimum age of service
Belgium.....	Conscript.....	20
Canada.....	Volunteer.....	18
Denmark.....	Conscript.....	19
France.....	do.....	19
Italy.....	do.....	21
Netherlands.....	do.....	18
Norway.....	do.....	19
Portugal.....	do.....	20
United Kingdom.....	do.....	18

Source: Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951. Hearings before the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. U. S. Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess. January and February 1951.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. WOLVERTON].

Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman, the importance of the legislation now under consideration, relating to the present and future security of our country, requires that we give it the careful and studious attention its importance demands.

The debate which has now proceeded for 3 days and will continue, according to present plans, for many more before

the final vote is taken has been characterized by sincerity. There has been an almost total absence of partisanship. The arguments for and against the legislation in its present form have been based upon facts, figures, testimony, and statements of military and other personages well qualified to speak and express opinions on this legislation and its provisions.

I have listened carefully to the debate as it has progressed. I have learned much from the discussion. As a result of what I have heard and the individual study and consideration I have given the matter, I am convinced that the wisest course for us to pursue would be to separate the two divisions or parts of the bill so that each subject may be treated on its individual merits.

Title I of the bill provides for an extension of the selective-service program with certain changes in the provisions of the present law. Without discussing at this time the suggested changes, and, leaving that until the bill is read for amendment, it is my opinion that no doubt exists as to the necessity for a continuation of selective service. It is unfortunate that such a necessity does exist. We won the war but we do not have peace. Uncertainty and fear exists. Failure of some of our allies of World War II to recognize, now that the war is over, the principles of freedom for which we fought has brought throughout the world a condition that requires the free nations of the world to strengthen their military forces. As the leading exponent of freedom in all the world we must do our part with particular reference to our own security. Unpleasant though it may be to be faced with the continued necessity of providing men for military forces, yet, in the face of present conditions we cannot do otherwise. Hence, it is my opinion that the selective-service feature of the bill, or one similar in most respects, will have the unanimous support of the House. This is as it should be.

When, however, we consider title II of the bill, a different situation exists. This part of the bill sets up a program or plan for universal military training. It is no definite plan. The formulating of such a program is left to a commission of five members to be appointed by the President. It is provided that it shall make a report to Congress, and, Congress can then only vote up or down the plan without the right to amend or change in any particular. Nothing could be more unsatisfactory. I am certain that those individuals and organizations that have expressed a favorable opinion of universal military training would not favor such a plan. It would mean an abdication of congressional rights and responsibilities. No such plan can be justified no matter how favorable one may be to a universal military training program. In this controversial matter the question as to whether there shall be a system of military training, as well as the type and form it shall take, must and should be decided by the Congress.

Furthermore, this is not the time, nor is this bill the proper place for universal military legislation.

The present bill to extend and continue the selective service is before us

because of the present emergency in Korea and elsewhere. It is immediately necessary. It is admitted by the sponsors of the universal military training feature of the bill that such a program could not and would not be put into effect until the termination of the present emergency. And, as to this our highest military authorities have said that it might be one, two, three, or more years before it could be done. One of our highest authorities has even fixed 10 years as the possible date before it could be put into effect. Therefore, there is no immediate reason for its adoption at this time. We should wait until this emergency is over and then decide what, if any, program for universal training is then necessary. It should be judged in the light of the situation then existing. It is my opinion therefore that the present emergency legislation for extension of the selective service should not be encumbered with a controversial matter that cannot be put to use, even if adopted, until some time in the distant future.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. MARTIN].

Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I have thoroughly appreciated the opportunity to hear the outstanding debate on S. 1, which is now before us for consideration. It is a privilege, indeed, to join in the discussion in the closing minutes of this debate and I appreciate very much the time granted me.

Throughout my entire lifetime I have tried to study preparedness fairly and thoroughly and I have tried to analyze America's position in the family of nations as well as analyze the factors important in our defense of America.

Some 30 years ago I taught military science and tactics at the University of Iowa. In that capacity I had occasion to lecture to student groups on matters of military history and military policy. We studied the factors important to preparedness and we tried to determine the most important sinews of war but above all we studied the prevention of war through strength.

I will today outline briefly the historic American and Russian rivalry and enumerate the sinews of war, discuss briefly our manpower situation and the importance of military training in our preparedness program, and close with a brief statement of my views regarding the prevention of war.

BACKGROUND FOR WAR—HISTORIC AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN RIVALRY

Alexis de Tocqueville, of France, in 1831, visited the United States to inquire into what was then hailed as the great experiment in constitutional liberty. Coming to North America shortly after the pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine, de Tocqueville was acquainted with the major currents of national developments in Europe which, in view of subsequent events, he described with remarkable precision.

Writing about 1835 in his *Democracy in America*, he summarized his views with unusual clarity:

There are, at the present time, two great nations in the world which seem to tend toward the same end, although they started from different points: I allude to the Rus-

sians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and whilst the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly assumed a most prominent place amongst the nations; and the world learned their existence and their greatness at almost the same time.

All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits, and only to be charged with the maintenance of their power; but these are still in the act of growth; all the others are stopped, or continue to advance with extreme difficulty; these are proceeding with ease and with celerity along a path to which the human eye can assign no term. The American struggles against the natural obstacles which oppose him; the adversaries of the Russian are men; the former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its weapons and its arts; the conquests of the one are therefore gained by the ploughshare; those of the other by the sword.

The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the citizens; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm; the principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter servitude. Their starting point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

Just before the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853 between France and England on the one hand and Russia on the other, Lord Palmerston, British Foreign Minister for many years and Prime Minister for nearly 10 years, spoke of the czarism and its methods as follows:

The policy and practice of the Russian Government has always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other governments would allow it, but always to stop and retire when it was met with decided resistance. In furtherance of this policy, the Russian Government has always had two strings to its bow, moderate language and disinterested professions at Petersburg and London; active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations.

During his famous Asiatic cruise Commodore Perry not only visited the Japanese Empire and other islands of that region but also the mainland of eastern Asia. He was thus able to interpret realistically the movements he discerned.

Commodore Perry presented a paper before the American Geographical and Statistical Society, at a meeting held March 6, 1856, in New York City, from which I quote as follows:

It requires no sage to predict events as strongly foreshadowed to us all; still westward will the course of empire take its way. But the last act in the drama is yet to be unfolded, and notwithstanding the reasoning of political empires—westward, northward, and southward—to me it seems that the people of America will, in some form or other, extend their dominion and their power until they shall have brought within their mighty embrace multitudes of the islands of the great Pacific, and placed the Saxon race upon the eastern shores of Asia; and I think, too, that eastward and southward will her great rival of future aggrandizement (Russia) stretch forth her power to the coast of China and Siam, and thus the Saxon and the Cossack will meet once more, in strife or in friendship, on another field. Will it be in friendship? I fear not. The antagonistic exponents of freedom and absolutism must thus meet at last, and then will be fought that mighty battle on which the world will look with breathless interest, for on its issue will depend the freedom or the

slavery of the world—despotism or rational liberty must be the fate of civilized man. I think I see in the distance the giants that are growing up for that fierce and final encounter; in the progress of events that battle must sooner or later inevitably be fought.

Let us examine America's position today in the hope that we can disagree with Commodore Perry's prediction.

The United States can avoid becoming involved in a third world war if we build our own defenses strong enough to discourage other nations from attacking us. But if we build our strength to full preparedness and use it as aggressors against other nations, we will most certainly fulfill Commodore Perry's prediction. We need an appraisal of our Nation's role in the family of nations. No nation has yet permanently benefited by world-wide conquest and subjugation of other nations. Surely the United States cannot consider its role that of forcing all other nations of this earth to adopt our prescribed forms of government and to govern themselves as we dictate.

It is most hazardous also to permit our defenses to become so impotent as to tempt aggressor foreign nations to attack us because of our weakness. We were dangerously close to that level of unpreparedness when the Korean war started last June. America dangerously had assumed that the appropriation of dollars for defense assured us of strength in our defenses, and America awakened with a rude jolt, indeed, last June. We have made good progress in rebuilding our defenses during the past year, but we should not be so naive as to assume that our adversary—Russia—has not appraised our strength and our weakness in every factor bearing upon the adequacy of our strength.

THE SINEWS OF WAR

It is my belief that the defense of any nation, or the sinews of war of that nation, can be classified under five general headings:

- (a) Strategic and critical materials.
- (b) Industrial production and inventive genius.
- (c) Economic strength and manpower.
- (d) Military preparedness.
- (e) Fiscal strength.

In this debate on the proposed Universal Military Training and Service Act now before us special attention should be given to the matter of guarding America's small manpower in industry, agriculture, and in our Armed Forces, with special emphasis upon the latter. This is made necessary by the fact that our total population equals approximately only 6 percent of the world population, together with the fact that the logistics of world war III will be weighed heavily against us if that war is to be fought far from our own land. And Heaven forbid its being fought here at home.

America must launch a successful broad-based reserve military training program to the end that there will not again be permitted to occur the abrupt and disastrous let-down in our preparedness whenever the Korean war might end or if it is permitted to drag along in stalemate.

Some time after World War I ended, Germany rebuilt her armed might faster

than the Allies, and immediately at the end of World War II Russia launched a tremendous drive for preparedness while we declined in our own preparedness and concentrated our energies almost exclusively in the rebuilding of our civilian economy. I will not take the time now to outline the steps taken by Russia in contrast to our own but I do urge you to read the writings of Robert Magidoff, who was expelled from Russia April 15, 1948, and who has written good first-hand reports on Russian industry which have appeared in American publications; also, the comparison of the armies of the world that appeared in the Encyclopedia Britannica Yearbook for 1948 starting at page 73, which summary was prepared by Gen. E. S. Seibert, of our own General Staff. You do not need to have access to classified information to draw an accurate picture of the contrast between Russian preparedness and American unpreparedness between 1945 and 1950. The handwriting was plainly written on the wall in those years and Russia is capable of analyzing the sinews of war whether or not we in America choose to close our eyes to our own weaknesses that Russia may discover and accurately appraise notwithstanding.

The draft for military service must continue as long as we are at war, and Congress will also very properly establish the size of the standing Armed Forces to the extent needed to protect our country over the years ahead. But we should not attempt to build the armed services beyond the point that will threaten our own fiscal stability. We cannot in this debate expect to set the exact peacetime limits of the standing Armed Forces, but we can make provision for a successful broad-based reserve military training program that will enable our Nation to mobilize and place combat troops in the field more quickly in event a world war should strike us after the draft for military service has been discontinued.

During the past 35 years I have been a firm believer in universal military training under civilian control, but to date I have never had an opportunity to register my support of universal military training in any vote here in Congress in my time.

I am tremendously interested in giving our young men the opportunity to learn how to defend themselves and our Nation without taking them into the armed services by the draft in peacetime. The powers of the President under our Constitution as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces are far too great for Congress lightly to transfer the power to raise or create the Armed Forces in that way. In my opinion, Congress must jealously guard its constitutional power and obligation by placing an expiration date in any legislation establishing the draft for military service, and Congress should also guard against crippling our defense self-sufficiency. This can best be done by building a training program under civilian control to make available the greatest possible number of basically trained men who can fit quickly into any mobilization effort. A standing armed force of 2,000,000 men together with the National Guard and the ROTC program

as it has functioned cannot furnish us with enough basically trained men to protect our country adequately in the early days of another world war. Universal military training is not the sole factor of adequate preparedness but it is a highly important factor that can be helpful through cutting down the length of time needed for basic training and team training before newly recruited men should be committed to combat. With our small percentage of the world's population and the increased tempo of modern warfare, basic training of all men for defense is more important today than at any time in history, if we are to guard our manpower as we should guard it, if we are to strike our adversary quickly and effectively, and if we are to give our young men a fair chance to defend themselves in the first disastrous days of any future world war. On the effectiveness of our punch in those first days may rest the fate not only of the men committed quickly to combat but the success or failure of our Nation in that world war and the fate of our Nation for all time to come.

PREVENTION OF WAR

One of civilized man's greatest problems is the prevention of war. Both individuals and nations have within them enough of the spirit of Cain to make necessary the most careful self-control, both against imperialistic impulses at home and against aggression from without.

No one nation today has such a monopoly of any one of the five sinews of war as to enable that nation to rely solely on that one factor. Strategic and critical materials are divided largely between Russia, Britain, and America. America has outstanding leadership in industrial production and inventive genius. America has developed her economic strength ahead of other nations but this factor is somewhat offset by America's comparatively small land area, population, and manpower. At the end of World War II America held undisputed leadership in military preparedness and military strength but 5 years of repose in America and determined effort by Russia had almost produced disastrous results at the outbreak of the Korean war. During those 5 years Russia devoted from 25 to 30 percent of her entire industrial production to preparedness and Russia maintained large armed forces together with tremendous training programs, in contrast to America's devotion of 6 to 8 percent of her industrial production to preparedness and the characteristic return to small armed forces with no reserve training program worthy of the name. America on the other hand set something of an all-time record for rapid and successful reestablishment of the civilian economy. Industrial production and inventive genius rapidly have built up our standard of living to the point that Stalin has used the iron curtain more tightly than ever to conceal information of our success from the Russian people.

This achievement, however, carried with it a very dangerous impact upon our available reserves of raw materials. Private industry not only used up 95 percent

of RFC stocks of strategic and critical materials and all other supplies of these materials they could get from all sources, but private industry failed to preserve stockpiles of its own of the most strategic and most critical items and now faces unparalleled competition in the world market for the basic materials needed to maintain our industrial production at its capacity. Throughout the past 5 years the Government stockpile program has coasted along with the Munitions Board unwilling to compete with private industry in requiring needed reserves of strategic and critical materials during the period of postwar rehabilitation. Their miserable failure to safeguard America's security in strategic and critical materials is best proven by their record of increasing our Government stockpiles from 15 percent in 1946 to only 30 percent in 4½ years. Even so, hungry industrialists, have already launched a vigorous attack on the program of building these meager Government stockpiles to the size needed for the safeguarding of our Nation in event of another world war.

On the fiscal front, Stalin no doubt has more than once expected a crash in the financial structure of America. I am not qualified to predict with certainty whether Stalin's hopes on that line may be fulfilled but I do know that our Federal Government cannot long proceed with its profligate and wasteful spending as usual for nondefense, and even for defense itself, without resorting to confiscatory taxation on the one hand or to impossible deficit financing on the other. Most certainly America's strength today does not lie in sound fiscal planning but I am not in position to draw comparisons between America and Russia on that front because I have no authentic information on Russia's fiscal situation.

In summary, the one factor in which we are best prepared to hold our position of strength in the family of nations is in the field of industrial production and inventive genius. Altogether, on the other four points I can see no clear-cut guaranty of either peace or war in the years ahead, but I can predict that unless America builds adequate stockpiles of strategic and critical materials, skillfully guards her small manpower, launches a successful broad-based Reserve military training program, and reduces Federal spending enough to remove the threat of confiscatory taxation, deficit financing, and fiscal collapse, we can expect an attack by Russia based upon our weakness in one or more of these four factors.

On the other hand, if we build our strength successfully and skillfully in these four fields and preserve our industrial power of production and our inventive genius, we can build this Nation to such strength that no nation will dare strike us. If in our great strength we then refrain from the role of the aggressor and in true Christian spirit do not undertake to force other nations to live and govern themselves as we dictate, we can build a lasting peace out of the rubble of this war-torn world.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. PRIEST) having assumed the chair, Mr. COOPER, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (S. 1) to provide for the common defense and security of the United States and to permit the more effective utilization of manpower resources of the United States by authorizing universal military training and service, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have five legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the bill under consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

ADJOURNMENT OVER

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet on Monday next.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

Mr. HAND (at the request of Mr. SHORT) was given permission to address the House on Monday next for 45 minutes following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered.

Mr. JAVITS (at the request of Mr. SHORT) was given permission to address the House on Monday next for 15 minutes, following any special orders heretofore entered.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION BILL, 1951

Mr. CANNON, from the Committee on Appropriations, reported the bill (H. R. 3587) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 298) which was read a first and second time, and with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed.

Mr. TABER reserved all points of order on the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. VELDE] is recognized for 30 minutes.

EMPLOYEE LOYALTY PROGRAM

Mr. VELDE. Mr. Speaker, we, as Members of Congress, know entirely too little of the operations of Government agencies. Each year these agencies come before Congress for money to operate and each year Congress appropriates the money. But little do we know if the money is spent for the purpose for which it was appropriated. If we ask for an accounting, we are given a curt refusal. Let me give you an example:

On March 21, 1947, President Truman signed and caused to be issued Executive

Order 9835, entitled "Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an Employee Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch of the Government." Under this order the loyalty program was placed under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and the Civil Service Commission, in turn, placed the Loyalty Review Board under the chairmanship of Mr. Seth W. Richardson.

Mr. BUSBEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VELDE. I yield.

Mr. BUSBEY. I compliment the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. VELDE] for bringing up this loyalty review board and the entire question of loyalty. The incident to which he refers of the three men in the Department of Labor is just scratching the bottom of the bucket here in one little department. If we went through the various departments we would find many instances where these department loyalty boards have declared people ineligible and then the Loyalty Review Board, that is the Seth Richardson Loyalty Review Board, declaring them eligible just like they did in the Remington case. I say that with the exception of one department, and that is the Department of State. The pitiful thing about that is that as many people as they have down there who are certainly questionable as to their loyalty, they have never found one in the Department of State, which is an indictment of the loyalty board of the State Department. All that would have to be done is for the President of the United States to make one little change in his directive and it would correct the whole thing, and untie the hands of the Loyalty Review Board so that they could get these disloyal people out of the Government. Because the President has not done that, I say the President is directly responsible for the condition which exists.

Mr. VELDE. I think the gentleman is absolutely right. I commend him on the procedure of his particular subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Department of Labor. I think the Committee on Appropriations is one vehicle which can be used to combat communism in the executive departments of Government. I think the gentleman is absolutely right when he says that we, the Members of Congress and the members of the Committee on Appropriations, should not recommend appropriations for any of the executive departments until they are absolutely satisfied that they have cleared themselves of all disloyal employees. Again I say the gentleman is right in asking the questions that he has asked of members of the Department of Labor when they come before his distinguished subcommittee. And I think the other subcommittees handling the other departments in the executive branch of the Government could certainly gain a great deal by following the same procedure which is used in the gentleman's committee.

Each year since Congress has been asked to, and has willingly appropriated money for the operation of the loyalty program and the maintenance of Richardson and his staff. I have no idea

as to how many millions of dollars Congress has appropriated to the Civil Service Commission for the operation of this loyalty program, but I do know that when Congress inquires as to how the Civil Service Commission is succeeding in ridding the Government of disloyal and subversive employees, we are politely but firmly denied access to any records.

To me there is only one reason for such refusal. President Truman, the Civil Service Commission, and the Loyalty Review Board do not want the Congress to know how utterly and completely the loyalty program has failed and how many millions of dollars have been dumped down another "operation rat-hole." But the truth cannot be hidden forever. Gradually some of the ineffectiveness of the Civil Service Commission and its Loyalty Review Board has come to light.

The case of William W. Remington should forever shame the Loyalty Review Board. How many more cases like that of Remington lie hidden in the files of the Civil Service Commission we may never know, but as I said before, the truth cannot be hidden forever. An indictment that there are other "Remington" cases concealed in the files of the Loyalty Review Board will be found in the recent testimony of the Chairman of the Loyalty Board of the Department of Labor before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. This witness related three instances wherein his Board found the Department of Labor employees to be ineligible for Government employment under the provisions, rules, and standards of the President's loyalty program, only to have the Loyalty Review Board, chaired by Seth W. Richardson, reverse the findings and compel the Department of Labor to restore employees they deemed to be disloyal.

The fact that regional loyalty boards and agency loyalty boards find some Government employees disloyal under the standards laid down by the Presidential directive, only to have their findings upset by the Richardson review board, causes one to wonder as to the type of persons selected by the Civil Service Commission for membership on the loyalty review board, a board which is, in effect, the court of last resort on the question of loyalty of Government employees.

The answer, I think, will be found in an article in the March issue of the National Republic. At this point I would like to insert the entire article, which, incidentally, appears to be the first of a series.

Thus we learn from outside sources the record of those persons selected by the Civil Service Commission to administer the loyalty program. However, we, the Congress, the ones who appropriate the funds for the operation and maintenance of such a program, are denied by Executive fiat, any information or records we may wish to review.

[From the National Republic]
THE BATTLE OVER LOYALTY
(By Walter S. Steele)

The battle between Congress and President Truman over the issue of Communists and sympathizers in our Government still brews. Beginning back in 1935, Congressman Hamilton Fish, who had served as chairman of the first House committee created to investigate subversive activities within our country, launched a campaign exposing Communists and frontiers in the New Deal administration. Due to the fact that the Congressman was a Republican and in the minority in an Executive-whipped Congress, he aroused little interest as far as the administration was concerned. However, the continuous attacks by Mr. Fish and the sensational exposures by Dr. William Wirt, gradually awakened the American people, and in 1938 Congress, having recovered from New Deal control, moved by the growing concern of the public, stifened its back and voted the Dies Committee into existence.

With the creation of the new congressional committee to investigate and expose communistic and other subversive influences wherever found, real fireworks began, as far as the Reds in the Government were concerned. By October 1939, the committee, with the help of outsiders, had succeeded in collecting sufficient evidence to enable it to publicly brand as Red-fronters some 500 or more top New Deal office-holders, centered principally in the Works Progress Administration, Security and Exchange Commission, Social Security Board, Agriculture Department, Library of Congress, Rural Electrification Administration, Department of Commerce, Veterans' Administration, State Department, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Maritime Labor Board, United States Tariff Commission, Post Office Department, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Power Commission, National Labor Relations Board and the Railroad Retirement Board.

The double-fisted exposure shook the American public from its apathy, and repercussions were felt high up in New Deal circles, to such an extent, in fact, that a smear campaign was immediately organized in an effort to undermine the committee and cast reflections upon the integrity of its members. Threats of reprisal were made against committee members and its major witnesses who were furnishing the documentary evidence relative to the Red plot. As the smear campaign, waged by the New Deal, grew in bitterness and intensity, so also grew the committee's determination to expand its drive to expose and drive out of governmental posts the Reds, their frontiers and their dupes. Every committee exposé stung the New Dealers to the quick, and so confused did they become they overplayed their hands, revealing their true colors. The committee accordingly triumphed with the public. The exposure of Reds in the Government, in the leadership of labor unions, and in educational and youth circles, began to draw more than counter-fire, as the smear campaign of the New Deal backfired and began to wear thin.

With his resignation from Congress, the chairmanship of the House Committee Investigating Un-American Activities passed from the fiery Mr. Dies through several hands, finally to Republicans who had gained control over the House. Throughout the chairmanship of Parnell Thomas the committee continued to uncover and expose the Red plot in our Government, as well as in other fields. It was during this period that the Red espionage rings in the Government were uncovered. Finally the chairmanship of the committee was turned over to Congressman Wood, of Georgia, who has maintained the high standards of efficiency set by his predecessors, although much of the militancy of

the committee has been shorn within the past year.

The committee brought to light the secret Red cells operating in governmental circles, cells feeding an enemy government with secret defense and foreign policy documents from our official files, and cells influencing our governmental policies. It made public the extent to which our Armed Forces were penetrated. It revealed the Red infiltration in our secret atomic laboratories, and the manner in which Communist sources secreted maps, diagrams and specifications of some of the very weapons which would later prove to be the balance between our possible victory or defeat in a show-down with world Communist forces. Finally public reaction to these exposures became so bitter that President Truman, in an attempt to placate the American people, issued an Executive order creating the Loyalty Review Board, the announced purpose of which was to rid the Government of all persons of questionable loyalty. This action, fortunately, did not deter the congressional committee from continuing its Red hunt and exposure of those who had penetrated our Government ranks. Federal juries joined the drive.

Not only did the House committee step up its investigations, but the Senate also took up the man hunt. To Senator McCARTHY goes considerable credit for further extending this search, although others contributed immeasurably. Their disclosures culminated in the passage, over the President's veto, of the McCarran Act under which the President was ordered to create a second Loyalty Commission, one subject to Congress, and bound by law to oust the disloyal from our Government, providing severe penalties to those failing to take such action. This Commission, although its members have been named, has so far failed to function because of lack of Senate confirmation.

Recently President Truman, in an effort to forestall further congressional action, created a third Board, presumably for the purpose of defending the civil rights of individuals accused of subversive connections. The new Board received little acclaim from the general public and aroused the immediate indignation of most Members of Congress, many of whom interpreted the move as one to sabotage the McCarran Act.

This article will deal chiefly with the original Board, still in existence, officially known as the Loyalty Review Board, which was created not by Congress but by Executive order on March 21, 1947. The Board is composed of individuals appointed by Mr. Truman, not subject to congressional ratification. The national Board operates in Washington, D. C., and maintains 14 regional boards located in various sections of the country. The members have all been selected by the Civil Service Commission and approved by the White House and are out of the reach of Congress. Seth Richardson, law partner of Joe Davies of Mission to Moscow fame, is Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board. On the national Board there are 17 other individuals. Each regional board has a chairman and vice chairman, and is composed of 5 or more members. Before this Board came the Remington, Hiss, and other such cases involving disloyalty on the part of Government employees, but not until congressional and senatorial committees uncovered evidence from outside sources were such individuals dropped from Government posts or were frightened out of office. In several instances grand juries issued indictments, rendering verdicts finding the defendants guilty of perjury, contempt, or violation of security laws. Investigations and questioning on the part of the FBI led to the voluntary resignations of many others involved in the Red plots.

The June 14, 1950, issue of the New York Times contained an item having possibly

little meaning to the majority of its readers. It bore information, however, which should become the basis of a congressional inquiry into the method and manner of the carrying out of some of the duties imposed upon the Civil Service Commission by Executive order relative to ridding the Government service of persons of questionable loyalty. The item stated in part:

"Ernest Angell, New York lawyer, has been elected chairman of the board of directors of the American Civil Liberties Union, the organization announced yesterday. * * *

"Mr. Angell is a member of the law firm of Spence, Hotchkiss, Parker, and Duryee. In 1936-1938 he was regional administrator of the Securities and Exchange Commission. He is chairman of the Second Regional Loyalty Board of the Federal Government. * * *

A little more than 3 months later the Washington Evening Star, on September 27, 1950, carried a news item headlined: "Civil Liberties Union offers to help fight anti-Red law in court." Here is the disgusting spectacle of an individual appointed by the Civil Service Commission to enforce a Presidential order to purge the Government of employees of questionable loyalty who at the same time was heading and directing an organization that was volunteering services to oppose an act of Congress intended to curb the activities of disloyal people. The two positions held by Mr. Angell could not possibly be more incompatible.

This incident raises the question as to how and why Mr. Angell and several others were appointed to positions of trust and responsibility on the President's so-called Loyalty Review Board. It is not intended to convey the idea that Mr. Angell or any other member of the Board is a Communist or is disloyal to the Government of the United States. It is contended, however, that persons selected for such an important assignment should be absolutely clear of past or present radical affiliations or associations, and should at least be impartial. The same rule should apply to the members of the immediate family of such individuals selected. Mr. Angell or no other person can serve two masters. If Mr. Angell was more interested in the purposes and program of the American Civil Liberties Union, the director of which several years ago, said: "Communism is the goal," he should not have been appointed to the Loyalty Review Board.

The appointment of individuals to positions on the Loyalty Review Board is provided for in part III of paragraph 1 of the President's Executive Order, No. 9835, signed, March 21, 1947: "There shall be established in the Civil Service Commission a Loyalty Review Board of not less than three impartial persons, the members of which shall be officers or employees of the Commission."

Additional light is thrown on the subject by the testimony of a Civil Service Commissioner before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations of January 14, 1948. The Commissioner said:

"The Executive order provided that that Board should be made up of not fewer than three employees of the Civil Service Commission. The Commission was given the responsibility of appointing that Board. It realized immediately that that Board was right at the very heart of this whole program, and that the program could succeed or fail on the basis of the kind of a Board that we actually appointed."

It would appear, then, that the Civil Service Commission was aware from the very start that the success or failure of the loyalty program depended entirely upon the kind of persons the Commission appointed. However, not a single person who could be considered an expert or one well qualified on subversive activities has been appointed

to the Board by the Commission. This point was made in Congress by a Member of the House of Representatives in testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on August 5, 1948, when he said:

"It is not surprising to me that this Loyalty Review Board has done nothing, because if you look over the 23 names originally appointed to this Board, you will readily come to the conclusion that not a single one of them is qualified to pass on cases of loyalty or security." (Hearings, July 21 to September 9, 1948, pp. 637 and 638.)

Taking a look into several individual cases, it is noted, in addition to Mr. Angell, one Wilbur LaRoe has been a member of the Loyalty Review Board since its inception. On page 1692 of appendix IX of the Report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities the name Mr. Wilbur LaRoe appears as a sponsor of the Washington Committee for Aid to China, an affiliate of the China Aid Council of the American League for Peace and Democracy, the latter a direct Communist front movement. The Washington Evening Star of February 8, 1946, refers to Wilbur LaRoe as a sponsor of the American Committee for Spanish Freedom. A letterhead of the same organization, dated January 25, 1946, also reflects a Wilbur LaRoe as one of its sponsors. Both the American League for Peace and Democracy and the American Committee for Spanish Freedom have been cited by the Attorney General as organizations, coming within those proscribed by the President's Executive order. This information was a matter of record at the time Mr. LaRoe was appointed by the Commission and was no doubt known to the Commission. Yet in apparent defiance of the record, LaRoe was appointed to the Loyalty Review Board and continues to be a member. Could it be expected that he would dare hold that a person is of questionable loyalty because of affiliation with an organization sponsored by him? Hardly.

It will be recalled at this point that not only did the Loyalty Board exist while Alger Hiss, Judy Coplon, William Remington, and others were in the Government, who have since been indicted and convicted, but in most instances the Board had these and other individuals before them and evidently found them to be of unquestionable loyalty. Proof that such must be so is the recent case of William Remington, who held down a number of posts in the Government, the last of which was with the Commerce Department, dealing with matters on the Far East. Remington was recently tried and convicted of lying about his Communist connections.

One of the witnesses brought in to defend Remington was Dr. Arthur W. MacMahon, who, according to official records from the Board, is still a member of the Loyalty Review Board.

According to the United Press, February 6, 1951, Dr. MacMahon, admitted as a witness under cross-examination the day before, that he had sponsored Remington for a Government post in 1940, and supported him against charges of disloyalty in 1946, when the question of Remington's communistic background was before the Loyalty Review Board. He said, while he did not sit on the panel in the particular case, that he submitted an affidavit in behalf of Remington to the members of that panel. Remington was cleared shortly thereafter by the Board and months later indicted by a Federal grand jury and convicted early in February 1951. Here is an instance of a Board member not only endorsing a person of questionable loyalty for a Government post, but influencing the Board when it was reviewing Remington's record.

There is also the case of Earl G. Harrison, another appointee of the Civil Service Com-

mission to the Loyalty Review Board. Mr. Harrison was the recipient of an annual award of the American Committee for Protection of Foreign-Born in 1943 as "the person whose contributions are deemed most meritorious in promoting the progress of foreign-born in America" (Washington Times-Herald, April 17, 1943). The Attorney General has also listed this organization as a Communist organization within the meaning of the President's loyalty program. Mr. Harrison joined the American Civil Liberties Union, Angell's outfit, in denouncing the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and he served on the board of the ACLU from 1948 on. He sponsored the annual conventions of the American Committee for Protection of Foreign-Born and has addressed its gatherings. Such recognition as that conferred by the latter organization on Mr. Harrison seems to have meant to someone in authority in the Civil Service Commission that Harrison was eminently qualified to be a member of the Loyalty Review Board.

The name of Charles E. Merriam, another member of the Board, was listed as a member of the book committee of the American Society for Cultural Relations With Russia, according to a report of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. The society was one of several created for the express purpose of selling Soviet Russia to the people of the United States, the present-day counterpart being the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. The Civil Service Commission apparently felt that affiliation with the society had no bearing on a person's qualifications for membership on the Loyalty Board.

On March 13, 1948, President Truman issued the following memorandum to all officers and employees of the executive branch of the Government:

DIRECTIVE OF MARCH 13, 1948

(Confidential status of employees loyalty records)

Memorandum to all officers and employees in the executive branch of the Government:

The efficient and just administration of the employee loyalty program, under Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, requires that reports, records, and files relative to the program be preserved in strict confidence. This is necessary in the interest of our national security and welfare, to preserve the confidential character and sources of information furnished, and to protect Government personnel against the dissemination of unfounded or disproved allegations. It is necessary also in order to insure the fair and just disposition of loyalty cases.

For these reasons, and in accordance with the long-established policy that reports rendered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other investigative agencies of the executive branch are to be regarded as confidential, all reports, records and files relative to the loyalty of employees or prospective employees (including reports of such investigative agencies), shall be maintained in confidence, and shall not be transmitted or disclosed, except as required in the efficient conduct of business.

Any subpoena or demand or request for information, reports, or files of the nature described, received from sources other than those persons in the executive branch of the Government who are entitled thereto by reason of their official duties, shall be respectfully declined, on the basis of this directive, and the subpoena or demand or other request shall be referred to the Office of the President for such response as the

President may determine to be in the public interest in the particular case.

There shall be no relaxation of the provisions of this directive except with my express authority.

This directive shall be published in the Federal Register.

HARRY S. TRUMAN,

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 13, 1948.

This was followed by another directive on August 5, 1948, which was nothing more or less than a slap in the face to the Members of Congress. This directive reads:

[For immediate release]

AUGUST 5, 1948.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

1. In responding to a written request from a congressional committee for information relating to the employment of individuals, the department or agency may forward to the committee all unclassified routine papers (such as Civil Service Form 57, records of promotion, efficiency ratings, letters of recommendations, etc.).

2. No information of any sort relating to the employee's loyalty, and no investigative data of any type, whether relating to loyalty or other aspects of the individual's record, shall be included in the material submitted to a congressional committee. If there is doubt as to whether a certain document or group of documents shall be supplied, the matter should be referred to the White House.

I honestly urge both Houses of Congress to deny the Civil Service Commission any funds for the continuance of this so-called employee loyalty program and until such time as the Civil Service Commission and its Loyalty Review Board modifies its standard or yardstick to a reasonable doubt and to such a time as the Civil Service Commission and its Loyalty Review Board agrees to review and consider the cases of all Government employees heretofore granted clearance and until such time as the Civil Service Commission and its Loyalty Review Board opens wide to congressional committees all their records on loyalty matters.

(Mr. VELDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and include an article.)

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION REFERRED

A concurrent resolution of the Senate of the following title was taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. Con. Res. 18. Concurrent resolution approving the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defense efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty nations to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

Mr. KARSTEN of Missouri asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a recent editorial from the St. Louis Star-Times.

Mr. WALTER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a letter received by the chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities, together with the official statement of the Motion Picture Industry Council.

Mr. THOMPSON of Texas asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a letter from the

Commandant of the Marine Corps to his general officers.

Mr. MORANO asked and was given permission to extend his remarks.

Mr. POTTER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial.

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include additional matter.

Mr. VAN ZANDT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include additional matter.

Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a letter.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts asked and was given permission to extend her remarks and include an article by Mr. Walter Lippmann from the Washington Post.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to revise and extend the remarks he expects to make in Committee of the Whole this afternoon and include certain letters.

Mr. JACKSON of California asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial.

Mr. McDONOUGH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks.

Mr. YORTY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include additional matter.

Mr. SCHWABE (at the request of Mr. SHORT) was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances and include letters.

Mr. COLMER (at the request of Mr. DOYLE) was given permission to extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. CANNON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a letter.

Mr. BRAY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 5 o'clock and 36 minutes p. m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until Monday, April 9, 1951, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

366. A letter from the Postmaster General, transmitting a draft of a proposed bill entitled "A bill to extend the benefits of the Social Security Act to certain employees in the postal service, and for other purposes"; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

367. A letter from the Chairman, United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, transmitting the Fifth Semi-annual Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange for the period July 1, 1950 through December 31, 1950, pursuant to section 603 of Public Law 402, Eightieth Congress (H. Doc. No. 103); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed.

368. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a draft of a proposed bill entitled "A bill to repeal certain laws relating to timber and stone on the public domain"; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

369. A letter from the Secretary of the Army, transmitting a letter from the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, dated January 24, 1951, submitting a report, together with accompanying papers on a review of reports on the Caloosahatchee River, Fla., from Fort Myers to the Gulf of Mexico, requested by a resolution of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, House of Representatives, adopted on April 30, 1935; to the Committee on Public Works.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. DAWSON: Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Second Intermediate Report of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, an inquiry concerning procedures for distributing national service life insurance dividend checks to persons in the Armed Forces (Rept. No. 295). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. CANNON: Committee on Appropriations. H. R. 3587. A bill making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, and for other purposes; without amendment (Rept. No. 298). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 3330. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Anna L. De Angelis; without amendment (Rept. No. 296). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 3495. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Cora B. Jones; without amendment (Rept. No. 297). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 3 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BOGGS of Delaware:

H. R. 3573. A bill to authorize the attendance of the United States Marine Band at the celebration of the three hundredth anniversary of the settling of New Castle, Del., to be held in New Castle, Del., on June 16, 1951; to the committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. GRANGER:

H. R. 3574. A bill to amend section 117 (j) of the Internal Revenue Code with respect to the income tax treatment of sales of livestock; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. STAGGERS:

H. R. 3575. A bill to create a Department of Peace; to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

By Mr. WALTER:

H. R. 3576. A bill to amend the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ABERNETHY (by request):

H. R. 3577. A bill to amend the District of Columbia Teachers' Leave Act of 1949; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. BUSBEY:

H. R. 3578. A bill to provide for a national cemetery in the metropolitan area of Chi-

cago, in the State of Illinois; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. FALLON:

H. R. 3579. A bill to provide for the issuance of a special postage stamp in commemoration of the one hundredth anniversary of the ice cream industry in the United States; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. HAGEN:

H. R. 3580. A bill to amend section 3A of the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended to grant certain benefits to such officers as other Federal employees, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H. R. 3581. A bill to establish the Federal Agency for Handicapped, to define its duties, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

H. R. 3582. A bill to amend the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended, with respect to the effective date of annuities of Members and elected officers of the Senate and House of Representatives; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H. R. 3583. A bill to amend section 3A of the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended to grant certain benefits to such officers as other Federal employees, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. REECE of Tennessee:

H. R. 3584. A bill authorizing the Tennessee Valley Authority to construct a bridge across the Powell River arm of Norris Lake; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. DAWSON:

H. R. 3585. A bill to authorize and direct the Administrator of General Services to transfer to the Department of the Navy certain property located at Decatur, Ill.; to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

By Mr. DAVIS of Georgia:

H. R. 3586. A bill to provide for the more effective prevention, detection, and punishment of crime in the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. CANNON:

H. R. 3587. A bill making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Appropriations.

By Mr. BARING:

H. R. 3588. A bill to establish the Office of Federal Minerals Coordinator; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. BRYSON:

H. R. 3589. A bill to amend title 17 of the United States Code entitled "Copyrights" with respect to recording and performing rights in literary works; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DOUGHTON:

H. R. 3590. A bill relating to the income-tax treatment of gain realized on an involuntary conversion of property; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. KEE:

H. J. Res. 223. Joint resolution to give the Department of Commerce the authority to extend certain charters of vessels to citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. STANLEY:

H. Res. 182. Resolution relating to clerk hire for Members of the House of Representatives; to the Committee on House Administration.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 3 of rule XXII, memorials were presented and referred as follows:

By Mr. BARING: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of Nevada; to the Committee on Agriculture.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. DAWSON:

H. R. 3591. A bill for the relief of H. Lamar Aldrich and others; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3592. A bill for the relief of Paul Tse, James Tse, and Bennie Tse; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DENNY:

H. R. 3593. A bill for the relief of John George Fient-Geigy; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HART:

H. R. 3594. A bill for the relief of Harvey L. Cobb; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JACKSON of California:

H. R. 3595. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Ada Svejkovsky; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3596. A bill for the relief of Genelle E. Ehrlich and Paul Willard Ehrlich, Jr., to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3597. A bill for the relief of John A. Hogg and Mrs. Leona Pearl Hogg; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KEATING (by request):

H. R. 3598. A bill for the relief of Lydia Daisy Jessie Greene; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROOSEVELT:

H. R. 3599. A bill for the relief of Christina Finkelperl; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SITTNER:

H. R. 3600. A bill for the relief of Dr. Alexander Symeonidis; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

190. By Mr. CHIPERFIELD: Resolution of Illinois Petroleum Marketers Association, Springfield, Ill., re opposition to any increase in the Federal gasoline tax; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

191. By Mr. HOLMES: Memorial of State of Washington House of Representatives, House Joint Memorial No. 1, urging that adequate funds be furnished for use of International Joint Commission for study of problems of Columbia River and its tributaries, and particularly the Similkameen River; to the Committee of Public Works.

SENATE

MONDAY, APRIL 9, 1951

(Legislative day of Monday, March 26, 1951)

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

Rev. Walter L. Beckwith, secretary, Peninsula Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, Smyrna, Del., offered the following prayer:

Our Father, we thank Thee that the evidence of Thy presence in our past encourages us to come boldly to the Throne of Grace.

Have mercy upon us in these hours of great need. Save us from ourselves, lest in our selfishness we betray Thee and those who trust us.

Save us from a false sense of security, lest we find in our seeking after power and position that we have broken our industry, enslaved our people, and sacrificed our youth only to find that we have missed the time of our visitation and that Thou who art the source of all power hast been forgotten.

Awaken and revive us that we may have the constant sense of Thy presence.

We ask in the name of Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. McFARLAND, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, April 5, 1951, was dispensed with.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators be permitted to present petitions and memorials, submit reports, introduce bills and resolutions, and transact other routine business without debate before we proceed under the unanimous-consent agreement.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE LATE SENATOR VIRGIL M. CHAPMAN OF KENTUCKY—RESOLUTION OF CURRY BRECKENRIDGE UNIT, NO. 8, AMERICAN LEGION AUXILIARY, LEXINGTON, KY.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a resolution adopted by Curry Breckenridge Unit, No. 8, American Legion Auxiliary, of Lexington, Ky., which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION RE THE LATE HONORABLE VIRGIL CHAPMAN

Whereas Almighty God, in His infinite wisdom, has deemed it best to remove from our midst the late Honorable Virgil Chapman, United States Senator from the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and member of the Armed Forces Committee; and

Whereas because of his untiring efforts in so faithfully fulfilling his obligations as such and in whatever other capacities he was called upon to serve; and

Whereas because also of his devotion and loyalty to his native State and likewise to the United States and the excellent record attained thereby, covering his many years of service; Therefore be it

Resolved, That the members of the Curry Breckenridge Unit, No. 8, American Legion Auxiliary, of Lexington, Ky., in this, the first meeting held since the great loss of our beloved Senator and friend, do extend and express by way of this resolution, the sincere sympathy of the members of said Auxiliary unit to the following: The President of the United States, the Vice President of the United States, the United States Senate, and the members of the Armed Forces Committee; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be sent to the widow of the late Honorable Virgil Chapman.

Respectfully submitted.

LUCILLE G. WILSON,
Legislative Chairman.

MRS. LEWIS F. GIFFORD,
ELIZABETH F. ROGERS,
Committee Members.

This resolution was unanimously passed March 20, 1951.

FLORA L. DENNISON,
President.
ELIZABETH F. ROGERS,
Recording Secretary.