

249. By Mr. BURTON: Petition protesting against French occupation of Rhine zone; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

250. By Mr. BYRNS of Tennessee: Papers to accompany House bill 4005, granting a pension to Percy H. Allen; to the Committee on Pensions.

251. By Mr. CRAMTON: Petitions of Mrs. George Millus, secretary Woman's Home Missionary Society, Elkton, Mich., and Mrs. E. A. Johnson, secretary Huron County Sunday School Association, Port Hope, Mich., urging an amendment to prohibit child labor; to the Committee on Labor.

252. By Mr. DOYLE: Petition of city council of the city of Chicago, Ill., petitioning Congress to amend the Volstead Act to permit the sale of light wine and beer; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

253. Also, petition of the city council of the city of Chicago, protesting against the passage of any legislation affecting the sovereign rights of the States of this Union; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

254. By Mr. DRIVER: Petition of the Wynne Chamber of Commerce, Wynne, Ark., in regard to transportation act; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

255. By Mr. FULLER: Petition of the city council of the city of Chicago, favoring modification of the Volstead Act to permit the manufacture and sale of light wines and beers; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

256. Also, petition of the Chicago Association of Credit Men, favoring the plan of the Secretary of the Treasury for reduction of Federal taxation; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

257. Also, petition of the Ottawa (Ill.) Chamber of Commerce, opposing any amendment or change of the transportation act during the present session of Congress; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

258. Also, petition of the Military Order of the World War and various other organizations, favoring retirement of emergency Army officers disabled in the service; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

259. By Mr. KAHN: Petition of Dolores Parlor, No. 208, Native Sons of the Golden West, San Francisco, Calif., urging the enactment of laws excluding from entry into the United States all persons ineligible for citizenship; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

260. By Mr. MACGREGOR: Petition of Maurice A. Wall Chapter of the Disabled Veterans of the World War, protesting any reduction in training maintenance pay; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

261. Also, petition of Buffalo Chamber of Commerce, Buffalo, N. Y., approving the tax-reduction plan of Secretary Mellon; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

262. Also, petition of city council of the city of Chicago, to so amend the Volstead Act that light wines and beer will be permitted; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

263. Also, petition of city council of the city of Chicago, Ill., protesting against any legislation affecting the sovereign rights of the States of the Union; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

264. Also, petition of Typothetae of Buffalo, an association of employing printers, approving the tax-reduction plan of Secretary Mellon; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

265. By Mr. RAKER: Petition of Louis A. Elmore, Berkeley, Calif., in re legislation relative to salaries of railway postal clerks; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

266. Also, petition of National Council of Traveling Salesmen's Associations, New York City, in re Pullman surcharge; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

267. Also, petition of citizens of New York and various national organizations, indorsing legislation relative to retirement of emergency Army officers; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

268. Also, petitions of the B. F. Keith circuit of theaters, New York City, in re income tax; National Association of Upholstered Furniture Manufacturers, Chicago, Ill., in re income tax and soldiers' bonus; California Corrugated Culvert Co., West Berkeley, Calif., in re income tax; and Citizens Trust & Savings Bank, Los Angeles, Calif., in re income tax and soldiers' bonus; Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, in re income tax; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

269. Also, petitions of C. L. Best Tractor Co., San Leandro, Calif., in re income tax and soldiers' bonus; Moreland Motor Truck Co., Los Angeles, Calif., in re income tax and soldiers' bonus; National Association of Real Estate Boards, Chicago, Ill., in re income tax; the Little River Redwood Co., Cannell, Calif., in re income tax; and Western Pipe & Steel Co. of California, San Francisco, Calif., in re income tax; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

270. Also, petition of Max Baer, Placerville, Calif., in re cut-price advertising; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

271. Also, petition of Joseph E. Stansfield, first lieutenant, Coast Artillery, and Harold R. McKinnon, first lieutenant, One hundred and forty-fourth Field Artillery, at United States Veterans' Hospital No. 24, Palo Alto, Calif., in re retirement of disabled emergency Army officers; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

272. By Mr. SABATH: Petition of the city council of the city of Chicago, Ill., urging Federal control of radio communication; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

273. By Mr. SNELL: Petition protesting against any legislation prohibiting the manufacture and sale of the pistol and revolver and ammunition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

274. Also, petition of Mr. A. H. Scudder (representing candy manufacturers in the United States), to reduce excise tax of 3 per cent on candy manufacturers; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

## SENATE.

TUESDAY, December 18, 1923.

The Chaplain, Rev. J. J. Muir, D. D., offered the following prayer:

O God, our Father, every day gives to us an increased impression of Thine infinite care over us and how Thou dost want us to fulfill our obligations in the sight of Him who thus keeps us day by day and enables us to perform high and holy duties. We beg of Thee that we may understand much more clearly how to interpret Thy ways and walk in paths agreeable to Thy good pleasure, so that now and always there may be enjoyed the consciousness that we please Thee. Through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

The reading clerk proceeded to read the Journal of yesterday's proceedings, when, on request of Mr. LODGE and by unanimous consent, the further reading was dispensed with and the Journal was approved.

GEORGE A. SANDERSON, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE.

Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I ask the permission of the Senate to have passed two formal resolutions of notification which I omitted to present yesterday.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The resolutions will be read for information:

The resolution (S. Res. 85) was read, considered by unanimous consent, and agreed to, as follows:

*Resolved*, That the President of the United States be notified of the election of George A. Sanderson, of Illinois, as Secretary of the Senate.

The resolution (S. Res. 86) was read, considered by unanimous consent, and agreed to, as follows:

*Resolved*, That the House of Representatives be notified of the election of George A. Sanderson, of Illinois, as Secretary of the Senate.

### HOLIDAY RECESS.

Mr. WARREN. From the Committee on Appropriations I report back favorably without amendment House Concurrent Resolution No. 7, and I ask for its present consideration.

The concurrent resolution was read, considered by unanimous consent, and agreed to, as follows:

*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring therein)*, That when the two Houses adjourn on Thursday, December 20, 1923, they stand adjourned until 12 o'clock meridian Thursday, January 3, 1924.

### INTEREST UNDER TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a report of the Alien Property Custodian in response to Senate Resolution 49 (agreed to December 12, 1923, submitted by Mr. WATSON), giving information as to certain accrued interest under the trading with the enemy act, which was referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed.

### SALARIES OF FARM LOAN BOARD.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a report of the Federal Farm Loan Board, made in compliance with Senate Resolution 22 (agreed to December 10, 1923, submitted by Mr. BORAH), transmitting information relative to salaries, positions, and expenses of said board, of the Federal farm-loan bank, and Federal Farm Loan Bureau, which was referred to

the Committee on Banking and Currency and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,  
FEDERAL FARM LOAN BUREAU,  
Washington, D. C., December 17, 1923.

The PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE,  
United States Senate.

SIR: In compliance with Senate Resolution 22, the Senate is advised—

FIRST.

Inquiries 1 and 2 do not indicate whether the information is desired as to the Federal land banks, the Federal intermediate credit banks, or the Federal Farm Loan Bureau, all of which are under the supervision of the Farm Loan Board.

Inasmuch as the expenses of these organizations are paid from different sources, namely, each Federal land bank paying its own expenses, each Federal intermediate credit bank paying its own expenses and contributing pro rata to so much of the expense of the Federal Farm Loan Bureau as arises from the operation of the intermediate credit banks, while the general expenses of the Federal Farm Loan Bureau are paid by the Federal and joint-stock land banks, it has seemed to us proper to segregate these and answer as to each separately.

The Federal farm loan act specifically confers upon the Farm Loan Board authority to employ persons in the Farm Loan Bureau and fix their compensation. This power, however, never has been exercised except in connection with the initial organization, which was provided for by Congress in a lump-sum appropriation. Since June 30, 1920, all salaries for the personnel of the Farm Loan Bureau have been provided for by congressional appropriation in advance, and no position has been created by the Farm Loan Board which has not been previously so provided for. The appropriations for the fiscal years ending, respectively, June 30, 1923, and June 30, 1924, carried a lump sum for the positions of "examiners of securities" with a provision that the salary of any such examiner should not exceed \$3,000 per annum. In that division two increases have been granted since March 4, 1923, namely:

- Thomas E. Leavey, increased on May 16, 1923, from \$1,500 to \$1,800.
- Harold E. Benson, increased December 1, 1923, from \$1,800 to \$2,400.

THIRD.

It is assumed that the third inquiry relates only to the official personnel of the Federal land banks and official salaries paid by such banks. No new official positions have been created in such banks the expense of which is paid by the Federal land banks, except in the Federal Land Bank of Spokane the office of vice president has been made active at a salary of \$5,000 per annum, one-half of which is paid by the Federal land bank and one-half by the intermediate credit bank; also in the Federal Land Bank of Omaha the chief appraiser has been elected a vice president, retaining the same duties as before and performing the duties of the president in the absence of that officer, and his salary has been increased from \$4,500 to \$5,000 per annum. No other official salaries to be paid by the Federal land banks have been increased since March 1, 1923.

FOURTH.

Answering question 4, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, there were expended for salaries and expenses of the Federal Farm Loan Bureau \$209,350. The appropriation for the current fiscal year is \$332,920. This is exclusive of the additional personnel made necessary by the intermediate credit banks, which is discussed in another paragraph. In the appropriation for the current year will be found an item of \$35,000 for salaries and expenses of reviewing appraisers, which positions were provided by Congress and did not exist in 1920. There also will be found an item of \$84,000 for salaries and expenses of examiners of national farm loan associations, for which the appropriation in 1920 was \$15,000. With the difference in these items deducted, it will be seen that the appropriation for the current year is only \$19,570 in excess of the amount expended in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920.

The salaries and expenses of the Federal land banks for the year ending November 30, 1920, were as follows:

Bank.	Salaries.	Expenses.	Total.
Springfield.....	\$50,101.29	\$25,225.15	\$75,326.44
Baltimore.....	52,171.99	25,959.87	78,131.86
Columbia.....	58,553.12	23,004.26	81,557.38
Louisville.....	64,510.28	24,173.49	88,683.77
New Orleans.....	69,628.67	25,202.27	94,830.94
St. Louis.....	76,491.49	43,782.55	120,274.04
St. Paul.....	80,997.64	38,750.64	119,748.28
Omaha.....	64,525.72	24,632.47	89,158.19
Wichita.....	69,451.35	26,323.50	95,774.85
Houston.....	93,658.44	29,894.63	123,553.07
Berkeley.....	62,737.75	13,338.79	76,076.54
Spokane.....	71,803.46	24,415.25	96,218.71
Total.....	\$14,631.20	\$24,672.87	\$1,139,304.07

The salaries and expenses for the banks for the 12-month period ending November 30, 1923, were as follows:

Bank.	Salaries.	Expenses.	Total.
Springfield.....	\$110,918.98	\$87,749.69	\$198,668.67
Baltimore.....	156,253.85	91,949.48	248,203.33
Columbia.....	143,628.42	84,605.03	228,233.50
Louisville.....	164,335.96	77,852.43	242,188.39
New Orleans.....	170,690.59	77,723.89	248,414.48
St. Louis.....	146,252.82	95,825.78	242,078.60
St. Paul.....	171,204.01	130,203.47	301,407.48
Omaha.....	121,058.85	70,108.45	191,167.30
Wichita.....	151,837.62	83,480.58	235,318.20
Houston.....	167,141.86	103,660.25	270,802.11
Berkeley.....	130,196.19	56,157.72	186,353.91
Spokane.....	161,021.51	71,669.46	232,690.97
Total.....	1,794,600.66	1,030,992.23	2,825,592.94

In this connection it should be borne in mind that during the year 1920 the active operations of the Federal Farm Loan Bureau and the Federal land banks were at a comparative standstill by reason of litigation involving the constitutionality of the farm loan act and that no applications were taken for loans in the Federal land banks during that year after February 6.

FIFTH.

On October 31, 1920, the Federal land banks had outstanding loans totaling \$349,597,495.50, and on October 31, 1923, there were outstanding loans totaling \$775,311,855.98.

In order that the relation of expenses of the Farm Loan Bureau and the several Federal land banks to the business transacted may more clearly appear, there is attached Exhibit A, showing the number and amount of loans closed by each of the Federal land banks during each of the years of their operation, brought down to October 31 of the current year.

Exhibit B shows the annual salaries and expenses of the several Federal land banks covering the same periods.

Exhibit C shows the number of persons employed in the Federal Farm Loan Bureau and in each of the Federal land banks on November 30 of each year since the organization of the system. In the statement of employees of the Farm Loan Bureau on November 30 of the present year are included 12 employed on account of and at the expense of the Federal intermediate credit banks; also 4 additional national farm-loan association examiners, 2 additional members of the Farm Loan Board, and 2 private secretaries, which were provided for by the last Congress.

During the years 1921 and 1922 the work of the Farm Loan Bureau was largely increased by the organization of 40 joint-stock land banks, which institutions from October 31, 1920, to October 31, 1923, made loans totaling \$325,663,461. This work in the bureau fell largely on the securities, statistical, accounting, and examining divisions.

FEDERAL INTERMEDIATE CREDIT BANKS.

The organization of these institutions was provided for by the agricultural credits act approved March 4, 1923, which act authorized the Farm Loan Board to assess against the several intermediate credit banks the expense of such additional personnel of the Farm Loan Bureau as the creation and operation of such banks should make necessary. Under this provision there have been created in the bureau the following positions, with salaries stated in connection:

Administrative assistant.....	\$7,500
Bank examiner.....	4,200
Auditor.....	2,740
Executive clerk.....	2,240
Messenger.....	1,080
One clerk at \$1,840.....	1,840
One clerk at \$1,440.....	1,440
Three clerks at \$1,240.....	3,720
One clerk at \$1,200.....	1,200
One clerk at \$1,140.....	1,140

The agricultural credits act provided that the officers and directors of the several Federal land banks should be ex officio officers and directors of the Federal intermediate credit banks. The salary of \$1,000 per annum for the president of each of the banks and \$1,500 per annum each for the secretary and treasurer, to be paid by the intermediate credit banks, has been authorized in recognition of the additional duties and responsibilities, making the salaries paid these officers by the two institutions: President, \$10,000 per annum, and secretary and treasurer, each \$7,500 per annum. In addition to this there have been created in the intermediate credit banks official positions enumerated below at salaries stated in connection:

Springfield: Manager.....	\$6,000
Baltimore: Manager.....	4,500
Columbia: Manager.....	4,000
Louisville: Manager.....	6,000
New Orleans: Manager.....	3,600
St. Louis: Vice president and manager.....	7,500

St. Paul:	
Vice president .....	\$4,200
Cashier .....	3,600
Omaha: Manager .....	6,000
Wichita: Vice president .....	7,500
Houston:	
Manager .....	6,500
Assistant manager .....	3,600
Berkeley: Vice president and manager .....	7,500
Spokane:	
Manager .....	5,000
Vice president (salary, \$5,000; one-half paid by Federal land bank) .....	2,500

In all but one of the banks the two institutions occupy the same building, and in several of them the salaries and expenses of the intermediate credit banks were in the first instance charged to the salary and expense accounts of the Federal land banks. These accounts have been or are being readjusted so as to reimburse the land banks for any expenditures on these accounts and preserve an absolute segregation of the operating departments of the two institutions.

In addition to the positions hereinbefore enumerated, the several Federal land banks and intermediate credit banks, by action of their boards of directors, have united in the employment of a general counsel and fiscal agent, resident in Washington, at a fixed annual compensation of \$25,000, payable monthly, and provide the office personnel of such general counsel and fiscal agent, consisting of an assistant at \$2,500 per annum, secretary at \$2,240 per annum, and an office boy and messenger at \$75 per month. The circumstances of such employment and the scope of the duties of the general counsel and fiscal agent can best be expressed by the resolution of the board of directors of the Federal Land Bank of Springfield in connection with such employment, which resolution is substantially the same as that passed by each of the other Federal land banks and by each of the Federal intermediate credit banks, and is as follows:

"Whereas it was the unanimous judgment of the presidents of the 12 Federal intermediate credit banks assembled in conference in the city of Washington, D. C., on June 12, 1923, that the Federal land banks and the Federal intermediate credit banks unite in the employment of a general counsel, to be located in the city of Washington, and in the employment of a financial adviser and agent, whose duties shall be to study financial conditions and methods as affecting the sale of Federal farm loan bonds and the debentures of the intermediate credit banks and advise with the several banks in relation thereto, and to make, from time to time, subject to the approval of the banks and the Farm Loan Board, arrangements for the sale, refunding, and retirement of such securities, and to perform such other services incident to the foregoing as the banks may from time to time require; and

"Whereas the presidents of the several banks at the conference aforesaid made tentative arrangement (subject to the approval of the boards of directors of the several banks) with Charles E. Lobdell to act as such general counsel and financial agent for the fixed compensation of \$25,000 per annum and traveling expenses, the banks to provide offices in the city of Washington and office employees, such salary and expense to be apportioned amongst the 24 banks on such basis as the presidents may from time to time deem equitable: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That such arrangement is hereby ratified and approved, and the president of this bank be authorized to commit the bank thereto, and that the proper officers are hereby authorized to make payment of such portion of the salary and expenses as may from time to time be apportioned to this bank."

In view of the fact that the employment by the banks of a general counsel and fiscal agent is in this way brought to the attention of Congress in advance of the submission of our annual report to Congress, in which the subject would have been fully presented, we ask leave in this connection to submit the following statement:

On June 12 the presidents of the 12 Federal land banks, in regular conference assembled in the city of Washington, initiated negotiations with Mr. Lobdell to enter the service of the 12 Federal land banks and

12 Federal intermediate credit banks in the capacity of general counsel and fiscal agent. In view of the authority conferred by the agricultural credits act of 1923, the bank presidents, acting as a bond sales committee, had unquestionable authority to negotiate and consummate such an arrangement without the approval of the Farm Loan Board or of the boards of directors of the several banks. Such an arrangement, however, met the full approval of the business judgment of each member of the board, which was promptly expressed. The arrangement was unanimously approved by the board of directors in each bank and became effective in July.

The 12 Federal land banks comprise the largest cooperative marketing organization in the world, their annual output of farm loan bonds for the years 1921, 1922, and 1923 averaging \$200,000,000. These have been sold in periodical offerings ranging in amount from \$40,000,000 to \$75,000,000. The average expense of this marketing has been 1 per cent, as compared to an average of 1½ per cent paid by the joint-stock land banks, which offer like bonds individually.

To determine the proper time, rate, and price of an offering of these securities requires experience, close observation, and sound judgment. A misjudgment of so small a fraction as one-fourth of 1 per cent on the smallest offering made in the last three years would make a difference of \$100,000 to the banks, and the market price has within that period varied as much as 1 per cent in a single month.

The Federal intermediate credit banks, which have marketed \$30,000,000 of debentures this year, and may reasonably anticipate increasing operations, will probably shortly take rank next to the Federal land banks in the size of their cooperative marketing operations, and the marketing of their securities involves the same observation, experience, and judgment as is involved in the marketing of farm loan bonds, although they find a different market and are altogether upon a different basis.

The officers and directors of the several land banks believed, and the Farm Loan Board fully concurred in that view, that Mr. Lobdell by reason of his intimate knowledge of the farm loan system, acquaintance with the methods pursued in the sale of farm loan bonds, and general training was the best qualified person that could be obtained to assume these responsibilities, and that in view of the services to be rendered the compensation, while large as compared to Government salaries, was very reasonable measured by the standard of the salaries paid by other farmers' cooperative marketing organizations for competent sales agents or paid in other commercial channels for like services, and that the annual compensation involved would not be unreasonable for the services of general counsel alone when compared with the salaries paid to counsel for large groups of cooperative marketing organizations or other commercial organizations of like importance.

The expenses of the general counsel and fiscal agency are borne jointly by the Federal land and intermediate credit banks, apportioned with reference to the service rendered each upon such basis as the presidents from time to time in conference assembled may determine.

This arrangement has been in effect less than six months, but the board has no hesitancy in saying that the services of Mr. Lobdell to the Federal intermediate credit banks in connection with their organization and establishment of policy and in the marketing of \$30,000,000 of their debentures without sales expense other than approximately \$7,500 in advertising has not only been of very great value but has actually saved, as against any other method of sale, an amount exceeding the total expense of his office for an entire year.

The fiscal agency from time to time buys and sells farm loan bonds, and this feature of the work of the agency will undoubtedly make annually for the Federal land banks a sum in excess of any contribution they may be called on to make for the maintenance of the fiscal agency, and it is the belief of the managers of the banks that it will ultimately lead to an even more advantageous bond selling arrangement.

Respectfully submitted.

FEDERAL FARM LOAN BOARD,  
R. A. COOPER,  
Farm Loan Commissioner and Executive Officer.

EXHIBIT A.  
Loans closed by Federal land banks during each year from organization of system to October 31, 1923.  
[Organization to Dec. 31.]

Bank.	1917		1918		1919		1920	
	Loans.	Amount.	Loans.	Amount.	Loans.	Amount.	Loans.	Amount.
Springfield.....	453	\$1,126,305	1,652	\$4,554,740	1,928	\$5,868,600	746	\$2,018,400
Baltimore.....	728	1,853,600	1,781	4,275,850	2,159	5,829,950	920	2,810,483
Columbia.....	578	1,170,520	3,530	6,625,330	3,232	8,234,645	1,503	4,385,670
Louisville.....	967	2,303,800	3,081	7,807,200	3,106	11,206,700	1,711	6,435,500
New Orleans.....	2,050	2,246,485	6,803	9,110,430	4,765	9,200,615	2,215	5,251,675
St. Louis.....	898	1,649,515	4,584	9,179,975	4,620	12,393,520	2,129	7,866,865
St. Paul.....	3,362	7,023,300	6,391	15,532,100	4,517	17,279,500	2,444	9,820,500
Omaha.....	701	2,240,190	3,326	14,655,450	3,427	21,045,850	1,774	10,984,800
Wichita.....	3,552	7,641,300	4,279	8,716,800	2,703	8,975,500	1,713	6,809,400
Houston.....	829	2,117,990	4,995	13,084,656	5,844	18,445,390	2,128	7,168,160
Berkeley.....	839	2,533,900	2,302	7,039,700	1,847	6,139,700	831	2,934,900
Spokane.....	3,197	7,205,310	7,004	17,326,405	5,101	14,738,705	2,150	6,869,615
Total.....	18,154	39,112,115	49,728	117,908,636	43,249	139,365,745	20,264	72,855,968

EXHIBIT A—Continued.

Loans closed by Federal land banks during each year from organization of system to October 31, 1923.  
[Organization to Dec. 31.]

Bank.	1921		1922		1923 (10 months).		Total.	
	Loans.	Amount.	Loans.	Amount.	Loans.	Amount.	Loans.	Amount.
Springfield.....	932	\$3,071,600	2,204	\$7,034,000	1,987	\$6,697,040	9,902	\$30,370,685
Baltimore.....	1,248	3,782,401	4,476	12,032,399	3,789	10,303,701	15,101	40,891,384
Columbia.....	3,874	10,655,600	7,834	17,409,650	3,490	6,865,274	24,041	55,346,689
Louisville.....	2,462	10,147,900	7,220	24,383,800	5,171	16,132,100	23,718	78,417,000
New Orleans.....	3,208	7,268,500	11,830	22,203,650	8,527	17,391,700	39,398	72,679,055
St. Louis.....	2,735	7,849,700	6,419	17,207,700	2,989	7,803,500	24,374	63,950,875
St. Paul.....	1,618	8,169,100	6,168	26,300,200	5,706	23,920,600	30,205	107,945,300
Omaha.....	1,926	9,538,200	4,276	19,451,600	3,164	19,147,100	18,594	97,034,190
Wichita.....	2,329	7,671,100	6,018	19,815,000	4,053	14,302,400	24,647	73,431,500
Houston.....	3,134	9,878,025	7,895	23,672,700	6,806	18,354,200	31,631	92,720,991
Berkeley.....	1,082	3,803,700	3,147	11,386,100	1,973	7,066,400	12,021	40,904,400
Spokane.....	2,605	9,194,150	6,508	23,338,050	3,897	13,636,650	30,462	92,308,885
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>27,153</b>	<b>91,029,976</b>	<b>73,995</b>	<b>224,134,849</b>	<b>51,552</b>	<b>161,623,665</b>	<b>284,095</b>	<b>846,030,964</b>

EXHIBIT B.

Salaries and expenses paid by Federal land banks during each year from organization to November 30, 1923.

SALARIES.

Bank.	Organiza- tion to Nov. 30, 1918.	12 months ending Nov. 30, 1919.	12 months ending Nov. 30, 1920.	12 month ending Nov. 30, 1921.	12 months ending Nov. 30, 1922.	12 months ending Nov. 30, 1923.	Total.
Springfield.....	\$99,783.42	\$61,497.00	\$50,101.29	\$60,155.35	\$88,481.88	\$110,918.98	\$470,937.92
Baltimore.....	107,545.75	70,058.51	52,171.99	58,701.22	107,306.81	156,253.85	552,038.13
Columbia.....	127,328.62	68,999.81	58,553.12	82,554.06	135,588.32	143,628.42	616,652.35
Louisville.....	115,571.56	84,106.09	64,510.28	70,623.89	142,269.74	164,335.96	641,417.52
New Orleans.....	123,500.37	76,467.50	69,628.67	76,470.17	140,269.12	170,690.59	657,026.42
St. Louis.....	127,338.56	95,949.39	76,491.49	81,928.22	129,233.12	146,252.82	657,193.60
St. Paul.....	194,756.10	109,054.14	80,997.64	80,459.59	153,558.09	171,264.01	790,089.57
Omaha.....	125,090.42	82,929.08	64,525.72	64,917.49	108,363.34	121,058.85	566,884.90
Wichita.....	149,595.83	75,642.10	69,451.35	88,901.61	132,149.23	151,837.62	667,577.74
Houston.....	152,111.99	138,423.00	93,658.44	86,955.06	139,075.23	167,141.86	777,365.58
Berkeley.....	124,258.63	74,178.37	62,737.75	65,842.01	116,907.06	130,196.19	574,120.01
Spokane.....	146,632.40	92,149.77	71,803.46	78,754.74	133,683.15	161,021.51	684,045.03
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>1,593,513.65</b>	<b>1,029,454.76</b>	<b>814,631.20</b>	<b>896,263.41</b>	<b>1,526,885.09</b>	<b>1,794,600.66</b>	<b>7,655,348.77</b>

EXPENSES.

Springfield.....	\$71,067.25	\$33,809.77	\$25,225.15	\$40,154.56	\$63,514.90	\$87,749.69	\$321,521.32
Baltimore.....	42,343.73	43,190.20	25,959.87	25,622.39	63,140.47	91,949.48	292,206.14
Columbia.....	46,880.30	24,682.30	23,004.26	41,424.79	78,281.23	84,605.08	298,887.96
Louisville.....	37,516.73	30,418.47	24,173.49	38,551.91	61,400.12	77,852.43	269,913.15
New Orleans.....	65,466.66	29,898.94	25,202.27	28,016.52	54,391.81	77,723.89	278,700.09
St. Louis.....	70,639.95	52,460.21	43,782.55	59,062.64	96,760.37	95,825.78	419,128.50
St. Paul.....	106,967.91	46,061.61	38,750.64	46,942.64	53,841.64	130,209.47	422,833.91
Omaha.....	64,061.85	42,453.33	34,632.47	30,973.01	59,069.68	70,108.45	297,328.79
Wichita.....	96,215.01	31,983.42	26,323.50	49,793.90	84,510.07	83,480.58	372,308.45
Houston.....	50,231.62	48,005.59	29,864.63	44,321.48	77,972.94	103,660.25	354,056.51
Berkeley.....	53,401.94	42,422.39	13,338.79	22,204.50	46,985.65	56,157.72	234,510.99
Spokane.....	55,387.81	31,545.99	24,415.25	32,879.81	49,603.22	71,669.46	265,531.54
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>758,217.76</b>	<b>456,964.22</b>	<b>324,672.87</b>	<b>466,548.15</b>	<b>789,502.10</b>	<b>1,030,992.28</b>	<b>3,820,897.38</b>

SALARIES AND EXPENSES.

Springfield.....	\$170,850.67	\$95,306.77	\$75,326.44	\$100,309.91	\$151,996.78	\$198,668.67	\$792,459.24
Baltimore.....	149,889.48	113,248.71	78,131.86	84,323.61	170,447.28	248,203.33	844,244.27
Columbia.....	174,218.92	93,682.11	81,557.38	123,978.85	213,869.55	228,233.50	915,540.31
Louisville.....	153,088.29	114,524.56	88,683.77	109,175.80	203,669.86	242,188.39	911,330.67
New Orleans.....	186,967.03	106,366.44	94,830.94	104,486.69	194,660.93	248,414.48	935,726.51
St. Louis.....	197,975.51	148,409.60	120,274.04	141,590.86	225,993.49	242,078.60	1,076,322.10
St. Paul.....	301,754.01	155,145.75	119,748.28	127,402.23	207,399.73	301,473.48	1,212,923.48
Omaha.....	189,152.27	125,382.41	89,158.19	101,890.50	167,463.02	191,167.30	864,213.69
Wichita.....	245,810.84	107,627.52	95,774.85	138,695.51	216,659.30	235,318.20	1,039,886.22
Houston.....	202,343.61	186,428.59	123,523.07	131,276.54	217,048.17	270,802.11	1,131,422.09
Berkeley.....	177,660.57	116,600.76	76,076.54	88,046.51	163,892.71	186,353.91	808,631.00
Spokane.....	202,020.21	123,695.76	96,218.71	111,634.55	183,286.37	232,690.97	949,546.57
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>2,351,731.41</b>	<b>1,486,418.98</b>	<b>1,139,304.07</b>	<b>1,362,811.56</b>	<b>2,316,387.19</b>	<b>2,825,592.94</b>	<b>11,482,246.15</b>

EXHIBIT C.

Number of employees of the Federal land banks, Federal intermediate credit banks, and Federal Farm Loan Bureau on November 30 of each year from 1918 to 1923.

	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	Nov. 30, 1923, in- termedi- ate credit banks.
Springfield.....	27	25	14	27	43	48	2
Baltimore.....	29	28	14	23	34	43	3
Columbia.....	27	31	13	44	51	50	2
Louisville.....	31	34	14	43	63	67	1
New Orleans.....	31	38	24	43	70	72	4
St. Louis.....	33	35	27	45	57	64	3
St. Paul.....	46	39	23	35	69	67	6
Omaha.....	30	31	17	34	36	49	5

EXHIBIT C—Continued.

Number of employees of the Federal land banks, Federal intermediate credit banks, and Federal Farm Loan Bureau on November 30 of each year from 1918 to 1923—Continued.

	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	Nov. 30, 1923, in- termedi- ate credit banks.
Wichita.....	25	23	17	43	55	61	5
Houston.....	55	54	22	39	58	58	5
Berkeley.....	26	26	18	29	39	46	6
Spokane.....	41	38	25	44	55	77	4
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>404</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>449</b>	<b>630</b>	<b>702</b>	<b>46</b>
Farm Loan Bureau.....	53	72	55	61	73	95	

## PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS.

Mr. HARRIS presented the following resolution of the Legislature of Georgia, which was referred to the Committee on Commerce:

Whereas there was organized in Brunswick, Ga., on May 15, 1923, the Altamaha River System Association, formed from representatives of some 30 or more middle and southeastern Georgia counties, the purpose of which association was the permanent improvement of the Altamaha, Oconee, and Ocmulgee River systems, both for purposes of navigation, drainage, and general commercial development; and

Whereas said association is now actively at work in creating sentiment in favor of the development of this magnificent river system, the total mileage of which exceeds that of any south of the Ohio or east of the Mississippi Rivers, and following which development incalculable benefit can be derived by the State of Georgia at large, and particular benefit to that portion of the State immediately contiguous to those streams; and

Whereas an area of more than 14,301 square miles, or practically one-fourth of the State, and a population of 686,662 persons, or more than one-fourth of the State, will be directly and indirectly benefited by the contemplated improvements in this system of rivers; and

Whereas millions of dollars are now being expended by the Federal Government in the reclamation of arid western lands for agricultural purposes; and

Whereas the contemplated improvements before mentioned will serve not only to provide navigation but will to a certain extent provide drainage of uninhabitable areas, thus rendering them fit for agricultural use, as well as improving the sanitation of such areas: Therefore be it

*Resolved by the General Assembly of Georgia*, That this body is in hearty sympathy with the efforts of this group of Georgia's citizens and recommends that the United States Government, through its River and Harbor Committee of Congress, take cognizance of the claims of Georgia in the development of these waterways for the purposes contemplated by the organization before mentioned.

STATE OF GEORGIA,  
OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF STATE.

I, S. G. McLendon, secretary of state of the State of Georgia, do hereby certify that the one page of typewritten matter hereto attached is a true copy of "A resolution recommending that the United States Government take cognizance of the claims of Georgia in the development of the Altamaha, Oconee, and Ocmulgee Rivers," read and adopted August 4, 1923, as the same appears of file in this office.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of my office at the capitol in the city of Atlanta this 31st day of August in the year of our Lord 1923 and the independence of the United States of America the one hundred and forty-eighth.

[SEAL]

S. G. McLENDON,  
Secretary of State.

Mr. CAPPER presented memorials of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union of Lyons, Marion, Independence, Ransom, Haviland, Dodge City, Natoma, Topeka, and Coldwater, and of the Kansas Woman's Club, of Lyons, all in the State of Kansas, remonstrating against the adoption of a proposed amendment to the Constitution granting equal rights to women, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

## FUNERAL EXPENSES OF THE LATE SENATOR NELSON.

Mr. KEYES, from the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate, to which was referred Senate Resolution 63, submitted by Mr. SHIPSTEAD on the 12th instant, reported it without amendment, and it was considered by unanimous consent and agreed to, as follows:

*Resolved*, That the Secretary of the Senate be, and he hereby is, authorized and directed to pay from the contingent fund of the Senate the actual and necessary expenses incurred by the committee appointed by the Vice President in arranging for and attending the funeral of the Hon. Knute Nelson, late a Senator from the State of Minnesota, upon vouchers to be approved by the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate.

## FUNERAL EXPENSES OF THE LATE SENATOR NICHOLSON.

Mr. KEYES, from the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate, to which was referred Senate Resolution 62, submitted by Mr. PHIPPS on the 12th instant, reported it without amendment, and it was considered by unanimous consent and agreed to, as follows:

*Resolved*, That the Secretary of the Senate be, and hereby is, authorized and directed to pay from the contingent fund of the Senate the actual and necessary expenses incurred by the committee appointed by the Vice President in arranging for and attending the funeral of the

Hon. Samuel D. Nicholson, late a Senator from the State of Colorado, upon vouchers to be approved by the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate.

## ADDITIONAL SENATE PAGES.

Mr. KEYES, from the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate, to which was referred Senate Resolution 30, submitted by Mr. LONCE on the 10th instant, reported it favorably without amendment, and it was read, as follows:

*Resolved*, That the Sergeant at Arms be, and he hereby is, authorized and directed to employ during the present session of Congress five additional pages for the Senate Chamber, to be paid out of the contingent fund of the Senate, at the rate of \$2.50 per day each.

Mr. JONES of Washington. I think the resolution ought to go over a day.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. On objection the resolution will go over one day.

## HEARINGS BEFORE COMMITTEE ON PRIVILEGES AND ELECTIONS.

Mr. KEYES, from the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate, to which was referred Senate Resolution 70, submitted by Mr. SPENCER on the 15th instant, reported it favorably without amendment, and it was read, as follows:

*Resolved*, That the Committee on Privileges and Elections, or any subcommittee thereof, be, and hereby is, authorized during the Sixty-eighth Congress to send for persons, books, and papers, to administer oaths, and to employ a stenographer at a cost not exceeding 25 cents per hundred words, to report such hearings as may be had in connection with any subject which may be before said committee, the expenses thereof to be paid out of the contingent fund of the Senate; and that the committee, or any subcommittee thereof, may sit during the sessions or recesses of the Senate.

Mr. ROBINSON. I understand that is the usual resolution passed with reference to other committees yesterday.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The resolution, the Chair is informed, is in the form in which it has been passed for other committees. Is there objection to the present consideration of the resolution?

The resolution was considered by unanimous consent and agreed to.

## HEARINGS BEFORE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS.

Mr. KEYES, from the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate, to which was referred Senate Resolution No. 68, submitted by Mr. HALE on the 15th instant, reported it without amendment, and it was considered by unanimous consent and agreed to, as follows:

*Resolved*, That the Committee on Naval Affairs, or any subcommittee thereof, be, and hereby is, authorized during the Sixty-eighth Congress to send for persons, books, and papers, to administer oaths, and to employ a stenographer at a cost not to exceed 25 cents per 100 words to report such hearings as may be had in connection with any subject which may be before said committee, the expenses thereof to be paid out of the contingent fund of the Senate; and that the committee, or any subcommittee thereof, may sit during the sessions or recesses of the Senate.

## BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION INTRODUCED.

Bills and a joint resolution were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. EDGE:

A bill (S. 1492) to reduce the number of commissioners of the United States Shipping Board, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce.

By Mr. WATSON:

A bill (S. 1493) for the appropriation of accrued interest of money deposited in the Treasury under the terms of the trading with the enemy act to be used in the purchase of wheat and fats for the starving people of Germany; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. WALSH of Montana:

A bill (S. 1494) granting a pension to James Farrell (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Pensions.

A bill (S. 1495) for the relief of David Schlenker; to the Committee on Public Lands and Surveys.

By Mr. GEORGE:

A bill (S. 1496) to amend section 216 of the revenue act of 1921; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. COPELAND:

A bill (S. 1497) to admit wives of American citizens to the United States without reference to date of marriage, condition of quota, or any other provision of the immigration laws; to the Committee on Immigration.

By Mr. CAPPER:

A bill (S. 1498) to extend the provisions of section 127-A of the national defense act, as amended; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. HARRIS:

A bill (S. 1499) to promote the safety of passengers and employees upon railroads by prohibiting the use of wooden cars under certain circumstances; and

A bill (S. 1500) to promote the safety of passengers and employees upon railroads by compelling common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to use steel passenger cars under certain conditions; to the Committee on Interstate Commerce.

A bill (S. 1501) authorizing the Department of Commerce to collect and publish additional cotton statistics and information; to the Committee on Commerce.

A bill (S. 1502) for the relief of the widow and minor children of Ed Estes, deceased; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. ASHURST:

A bill (S. 1503) granting a pension to Thomas N. East; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. KING:

A bill (S. 1504) to provide for the extermination of insects and pests in the Kaibab National Forest; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

By Mr. HALE:

A bill (S. 1505) for the relief of Herbert G. Black, owner of the schooner *Oakwoods*, and Clark Coal Co., owner of the cargo of coal on board said schooner; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. UNDERWOOD:

A bill (S. 1506) for the relief of Capt. Edward T. Hartmann, United States Army, and others; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. McKINLEY:

A bill (S. 1507) granting a pension to William D. Harrington; and

A bill (S. 1508) granting an increase of pension to Mary S. Fuller; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. JONES of Washington:

A bill (S. 1509) for the relief of George Turner; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A bill (S. 1510) to authorize the Greater Wenatchee Irrigation District, a municipal corporation organized under the laws of the State of Washington, to construct a bridge and approaches thereto across the Columbia River at a point in or near section 15, in township 20 north, of range 23 east; to the Committee on Commerce.

By Mr. ELKINS:

A bill (S. 1511) granting a pension to George W. Johnson; to the Committee on Pensions.

A bill (S. 1512) for the relief of Joseph C. Holley; to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads.

By Mr. BURSUM:

A bill (S. 1513) granting a pension to Anna Katharine Leahy;

A bill (S. 1514) granting an increase of pension to James W. Turknett;

A bill (S. 1515) granting an increase of pension to Mary McCook;

A bill (S. 1516) granting an increase of pension to Richard F. Clark;

A bill (S. 1517) granting a pension to Helen Sherry;

A bill (S. 1518) granting an increase of pension to Therron B. Leftwich;

A bill (S. 1519) granting an increase of pension to Stephen Easton; and

A bill (S. 1520) granting an increase of pension to Eli Newson; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. DILL:

A joint resolution (S. J. Res. 48) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States for war referendum; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

LIEUT. HENRY N. FALLON (RETIRED).

Mr. WALSH of Massachusetts. A few days ago I introduced a bill (S. 946) for the relief of the family of Lieut. Henry N. Fallon (retired), which was referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs. It should have been referred to the Committee on Claims. It was with that committee last year and reported favorably. I ask that it be referred to the Committee on Claims.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the Committee on Naval Affairs will be discharged from the further consideration of the bill, and it will be referred to the Committee on Claims.

#### HEARINGS BEFORE MINES AND MINING COMMITTEE.

Mr. ODDIE submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 87), which was referred to the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate:

*Resolved*, That the Committee on Mines and Mining, or any subcommittee thereof, be, and hereby is, authorized during the Sixty-eighth Congress to send for persons, books, and papers, to administer oaths, and to employ a stenographer at a cost not exceeding 25 cents per 100 words to report such hearings as may be had in connection with any subject which may be before said committee, the expenses thereof to be paid out of the contingent fund of the Senate; and that the committee, or any subcommittee thereof, may sit during the sessions or recesses of the Senate.

#### HEARINGS BEFORE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE.

Mr. LODGE submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 88), which was referred to the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate:

*Resolved*, That the Committee on Foreign Relations, or any subcommittee thereof, be, and hereby is, authorized, during the Sixty-eighth Congress, to send for persons, books, and papers, to administer oaths, and to employ a stenographer at a cost not exceeding 25 cents per 100 words to report such hearings as may be had in connection with any subject which may be before said committee, the expenses thereof to be paid out of the contingent fund of the Senate; and that the committee, or any subcommittee thereof, may sit during the sessions or recesses of the Senate.

#### HEARINGS BEFORE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY.

Mr. McLEAN submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 89), which was referred to the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate:

*Resolved*, That the Committee on Banking and Currency, or any subcommittee thereof, be, and hereby is, authorized during the Sixty-eighth Congress to send for persons, books, and papers, to administer oaths, and to employ a stenographer at a cost not to exceed 25 cents per 100 words to report such hearings as may be had in connection with any subject that may be pending before said committee, the expenses thereof to be paid out of the contingent fund of the Senate; and that the committee, or any subcommittee thereof, may sit during the sessions or recesses of the Senate.

#### ASSISTANT IN SENATE DOCUMENT ROOM.

Mr. LENROOT submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 90), which was referred to the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate:

*Resolved*, That the Secretary of the Senate be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to appoint an assistant in the Senate document room at a compensation of \$1,500 per annum, to be paid out of the contingent fund of the Senate until the end of the Sixty-eighth Congress.

BELLE DICKINSON.

Mr. PEPPER submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 91), which was referred to the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate:

*Resolved*, That the Secretary of the Senate be, and he hereby is, authorized and directed to pay to Belle Dickinson, widow of Milton L. Dickinson, late a private of the Capitol police, a sum equal to six months' compensation at the rate he was receiving by law at the time of his death; said sum to be considered as including funeral expenses and all other allowances.

#### COMMITTEE SERVICE.

On motion of Mr. ROBINSON, and by unanimous consent, Mr. REED of Missouri (at his own request) was relieved from further service on the Committee on Privileges and Elections.

On motion of Mr. ROBINSON, and by unanimous consent Mr. SMITH was assigned to service on the Committee on Privileges and Elections.

#### TREATY WITH TURKEY.

Mr. KING. Mr. President, we have been informed that a treaty has been entered into between Turkey and the United States, which is to be submitted to the Senate for its action in the constitutional way. It is not my purpose at this time to discuss the treaty or express the grounds of my opposition to its ratification.

I offered a resolution, which has been referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, which, *inter alia*, declares it to be the

sense of the Senate that the United States shall not resume diplomatic relations with Turkey until the Turkish Government shall have withdrawn its military forces from the territory allocated to Armenia in the treaty of Sevres, and delimited by the President of the United States, in conformity with such treaty, and also shall have removed all impediments to the peaceful settlement of the Armenians within said territory, and shall have consented to the setting up of an independent Armenian State.

This is not the time, nor is it my purpose in rising, to discuss the Lausanne treaty, or the resolution to which I referred, but merely to ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the RECORD an editorial appearing in the Atlanta Constitution, under date of December 16, 1923, in which the question referred to is ably discussed. This newspaper, as Senators know, is one of the ablest published in the United States, and its editorials are worthy of consideration at the hands of Congress.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### RELATIONS WITH TURKS.

Senator KING, Democrat, of Utah, has introduced a resolution opposing the proposed resumption of diplomatic relations with Turkey "until the rights of Armenia have been adequately protected."

The Senator is right, and for the same reason the Senate should refuse to ratify the treaty negotiated between the United States and Turkey at Lausanne in August last.

By this treaty the United States not only surrenders her legitimate and essential rights in Turkey, but nullifies the late President Harding's pledge to Armenia.

At the conference table the American delegates, supported by the Turks, sought to secure, under the formula of "the open door," recognition for the so-called Chester concession, parts of which were held by England and France to infringe upon the prior rights of their nationals, and succeeded only in leaving out of the allied-Turkish treaty any definite provision concerning this matter.

The chief concern of the Turks in this entire transaction was to secure a larger loan from America, using the Chester concession as an inducement to American capital.

The fact is, we refused to associate ourselves with the Allies or to act with vigor in regard to Armenia, our principal display of energy being the assertion of certain commercial rights which struck Europe as showing that the open-door policy can be made to cover a wonderfully wide field.

It now appears that the Chester concession was of most doubtful value—having already passed entirely from American hands—and yet the obtaining of it caused a sacrifice of American rights and interests and the abandonment of Armenia.

Not only are the Kemalists the grateful beneficiaries of the crimes of their predecessors, but they are now openly engaged in completing the extirpation of the Christians. These facts certainly do not show that the Kemal government, which is not a "republic," as called, but a dictatorship, is inclined to respect either the usages of international law or observe the terms even of the treaty which this Senate is now called upon to ratify.

The Lausanne treaty promotes neither peace nor justice. It sanctions the expulsion from their homes of the entire original populations, and confirms the enslavement of hundreds of thousands of Christian men and women—Greeks and Armenians.

So far as the European nations are concerned the treaty is merely a truce, and so regarded strictly from a military viewpoint.

So far as this country is concerned there is no necessity for a treaty of expediency.

The honor of this Government is not in ratifying the treaty but in refusing its ratification.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MOSES in the chair). Morning business being closed, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which is the election by roll-call ballot of the chairman of the Committee on Interstate Commerce.

Mr. OWEN. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.

#### SECRET DIPLOMACY OF EUROPE.

Mr. OWEN. Mr. President, the interest of the American people is affected in many ways by the present instability in Europe. Until the nations are stable they can not repay the loans due the United States, and we can not reduce taxes as we should be able to do. The European demand for American goods, the ability to pay for such products, the internal effect on the prices of agricultural products and manufactures all depend on European stability, as well as the equally important matter of world peace and international good will.

If American ideals were accepted by the statesmen of Europe—the ideals of international understanding and good will, of international justice and helpfulness—the European nations could disarm, balance their budgets, stabilize their currency, go into maximum production, and into an era of prosperity and peace.

Under those conditions America could afford to make loans to Europe sufficient to assist them meet such objects.

Europe is still suffering somewhat from the old ideals which formerly dominated their respective foreign policies in which commercial imperialism sought by bayonets and intrigue to expand the power and prestige of each nation.

Previous to 1914 Russia, France, Great Britain, and Germany conspicuously were seeking to expand their control or hegemony over large areas of the earth's surface in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere, occupied by the unenlightened and ignorant peoples of the earth, as well as in Europe.

Great Britain, through its foreign office, its military and naval power, during many generations had established under such a policy great colonies throughout the world until its rule governed 440,000,000 people.

Russia occupied and ruled under a like policy about one-sixth of the entire surface of the land of the world and had under its Government 150,000,000 people speaking many languages and dialects.

France, with its colonies, controlled 90,000,000, and had its colonial claims in Asia, Africa, South America, and the islands of the sea. At one time France controlled the lands now occupied by the United States west of the Mississippi River, including Louisiana, and claimed eastern Canada. When we were in the great Civil War the French Government took part in sending and backing Emperor Maximilian in Mexico, and was compelled by the United States to withdraw by show of military force.

Belgium has its Congo, Holland its Java, and Germany had secured portions of Asia, large colonies in Africa, and various islands of the sea.

These ancient Governments controlled their foreign relations through a very compact, powerful, and, to all intents and purposes, imperial government. Old Russia was an absolute monarchy, with a foreign office pursuing what they called a "historic mission," having ever in view the acquisition of larger territory, greater power, trading with the great powers and coercing the smaller powers, planning to get parts of Manchuria and China and Persia, laying covetous eyes on Sweden and Finland, determined on controlling the Dardanelles, desiring to annex portions of Germany, and expand its power in the Balkans.

The foreign office of France in like manner was a very old and venerable institution, with employees who had spent their lives in the service and who had the ambition and fixed purpose to increase the power, financial and commercial, territorial and political, of "France"—that is, the Government of France—throughout the world.

Under the constitution of 1875, the President of France has a right to make a secret treaty on his *sole authority* without the advice or consent of the French Senate or the French Parliament.

Joseph Barthelemy, French professor of political science, in *Democracy and Foreign Policy*, 1917, page 102, makes the following statement of the principles of the French constitution of 1875:

The constitution of 1875 was the result of a transaction brought about, among other things, by the force of conditions between a monarchist majority unable to establish a monarchy and a republican minority. Under all of the fundamental problems of constitutional right it adopted a transactional solution; that is what it did notably in that which concerned the direction of foreign affairs. Here upon this point is a résumé of the arrangements which should not be forgotten to consider together with the general rules of the parliamentary régime.

First, in principle, the President of the Republic *alone* represents the nation in foreign affairs; it is *to him* are accredited the ambassadors of foreign powers; it is *in his name* in which the ambassadors of France speak; *he* conducts the negotiations; it is *by his signature* that he binds the country in international treaties of which he is the juridical author.

On page 105:

The principle expressly set forth by article 8 of the law of the 16th of July, 1875, is that the President of the Republic *negotiates and ratifies treaties upon his sole authority*.

On page 109:

Almost all of the great international acts which have marked the turning point of our foreign policies during the half century, almost all those which have exercised a decisive influence on the destinies of

France, are the work of the Government alone and have been ratified by the President of the Republic upon his sole authority. It is in effect that article 8 of the law of the 16th of July, 1875, does not submit to parliamentary approval the most important perhaps of all the treaties, the great political treaties and the treaties of alliance.

It was under this authority that the secret treaty between Russia and France of 1892 contemplating military operations against Germany was executed and withheld from the French Parliament. It was under this authority that the secret treaties of 1916-17 to divide German and Austrian territory between France and Russia were entered into.

Great Britain's foreign affairs are directed in like fashion by the British foreign office, No. 10 Downing Street, without being directed by or disclosed to the British Parliament.

Sir Edward Grey, in his agreements with the Governments of France and Russia contemplating military and naval cooperation between Russia, France, and Great Britain along the lines worked out by the military and naval staffs of Great Britain, France, and Russia, was able to do so in absolute secrecy. He did not submit these records to parliament until after the war had been entered into by Great Britain. Six times the British Parliament was advised there were no commitments made. (Exhibits 11 and 12—How Diplomats Make War, Neilson; Entente Diplomacy and the World; Un Livre Noir, etc.).

It is of supreme international importance that the world should understand the structure of these foreign offices and what they did in bringing about the World War. How they subsidized and controlled the press, how they formed public opinion through such means, and taught the people to fear and hate each other and build up armies to the limit of their taxing capacity.

Until these methods are thoroughly understood by the world and corrected, the American ideals of international understanding and international good will is impossible of accomplishment.

Until these methods are understood, the great mass of the people who pay taxes and die on the battle field will never be able to realize that their hatred of each other is completely artificial and a result of the ambition and pride of their leaders in charge of foreign affairs. It is necessary to stop the malignant criticism of one people by another people through the press and by public men if war is to end.

#### THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR WAR.

Many men now think of Germany as composed of bad people of criminal intent who wickedly and with malice premeditated the innocent, unsuspecting good people of Belgium and France. The people of Germany and of France are equally good.

Of the present population of Germany charged with the payment of reparations, about 20 per cent in 1914 were unborn babes; about 80 per cent of the German people living in 1914 were women and children without knowledge and without political power and absolutely innocent of any wrongful purpose. There is no adequate moral basis upon which they can be charged with the responsibility of the war.

About 10 per cent of the population of Germany were men capable of bearing arms, about 5 per cent capable of some slight service, and about 10 per cent engaged in other services as noncombatants, and these groups are intermingled.

The 10 per cent fit for service had no option whatever about answering the call of mobilization. If any German had dared to do so, such a rebel under the military dynasty of Germany then in control would have faced a drum-head court-martial, a firing squad, an ignominious death, and an odious memory as a coward and a traitor to his country.

The same thing is perfectly true with regard to the men of France, of Russia, of Great Britain, of Belgium, as the case might be.

The people themselves were not responsible for war. If they had been responsible they have certainly paid a terrible penalty, for 8,538,315 of these men were killed or died from wounds, over 21,000,000 of them were wounded, over 7,000,000 were missing, most of whom died without record. The unrecorded women and children who died number many millions more.

If the German and Austrian people were responsible for the war they have been punished; 2,972,000 of them were killed, 7,186,000 were wounded, 3,252,000 were missing.

The total number of killed, wounded, and missing in the war was 37,494,000 men and probably half as many women and children died from war and exposure and famine.

The cost of this was over two hundred and eight thousand million dollars (\$208,000,000,000) at a low estimate. (Exhibits 22, 23, 24.)

The people of these countries did not will their own death and destruction. This war was brought on by a few men in charge of government, responsible for government, pursuing policies which probably for the most part they thought wise and necessary to advance what they vainly imagined to be the "glory" and "honor" of their own respective nations. It is futile to denounce the leaders who brought this great war on, but it is essential to the future of mankind to understand what happened and how it happened, to prevent again the crucifixion of the world by secret diplomacy.

There are certain noble and splendid qualities which were common to the Russians, the Germans, the French, the British, the Italians, the Belgians, and others. They were all splendidly brave, magnificently loyal and patriotic of heart. They followed their leaders believing that they were defending the best interests of their country.

When detached America went into the war it did so with a clearer vision. We were not fighting the German people as such. We were fighting a military despotism which ruled the German people and had persistently made war on us. We were fighting for liberty and justice as we understood it. We had not a single doubt that the German rulers were exclusively responsible for the war. We had seen them refuse in The Hague conferences to agree to the principle of arbitration and of disarmament. We heard much of their wonderful army, of their annual maneuvers, of their officers drinking the silent toast to "Der Tag." We heard about their invading unprepared and unsuspecting Belgium and France and Russia. We heard of their poison gas and their atrocities in battle.

And now, Mr. President, there has come out of hiding a great mass of evidence previously unknown, previously unsuspected, to which we shall be compelled to give attention and which disclose that the German leaders, bad as they were, were not exclusively responsible for the World War. They were certainly responsible for having seized Alsace-Lorraine in 1870 and imposed an indemnity of a billion dollars on France which left a terrible grievance in the heart of patriotic French people, which was revenged in the World War. And while during 41 years of the life of the German Empire it did not make war on its neighbors, it continually advocated the doctrine of might. The German leaders taught the value of military preparedness to the utmost limit of their capacity, and they are jointly responsible with the other nations of Europe for the evil consequences which have resulted from this false doctrine and a structure of government irresponsible to the people.

America has believed, on the contrary, in the homely but wise doctrine of Abraham Lincoln, who believed in a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, and who grandly said:

Let us have the faith to believe that right makes might.

Mr. President, the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs, who trusted alone to the sword, and the Romanoffs, who relied alone on brute power, have been punished and we need not reproach them. Nicholas and his family are all dead. The Austrian Emperor and his successor are dead. The Hohenzollerns were compelled to leave Germany and relinquish all power.

With the destruction of the Russian dynasty the secret archives of the Russian foreign office were exposed and printed by the Revolutionary Government. A portion of them have been translated into French under the title "Un Livre Noir," and the former secretary of the Russian Embassy at London, B. De Siebert, has also published 858 secret documents disclosing the policy of the Russian Government and of France and Great Britain in relation to this war and in relation to the world, under the title, "Entente Diplomacy and the World," by De Siebert. It is a "Matrix of the History of Europe 1909-1914," which every student of government should read until he knows the inner secrets of entente diplomacy.

In like manner the secret archives of Germany have been disclosed to view, and of Belgium, and some of the English records have come to light.

These revelations of European diplomacy and of the European methods of conducting foreign affairs should be understood by the American people. Perhaps when the world understands what these records disclose it may become possible for "the common people, who pay the taxes and who die upon the battle field," to exercise a larger influence with their Government leaders and bring about a larger recognition of the importance of international understanding, international good will, international peace and prosperity.

#### SOME SECRETS OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY.

The records to which I have called the attention of the Senate appear to demonstrate that the German militaristic rulers did not will the war, tried to avoid the war, and only went into war because of their conviction that the



persistent mobilizations of Russia and France meant a determination on war and were secretly intended as a declaration of war by Russia and France against Germany. The records show that the Russian and French leaders were determined on war, and intended the mobilizations as the beginning of a war which had for many years been deliberately prepared and worked out by the complete plans of campaign through annual military conferences.

In 1892 Russia and France entered into the following treaty:

EXHIBIT I.  
APPENDIX C.

THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE OF 1892.

The French issued after the war, when they first disclosed the terms of this agreement, a special Yellow Book upon this subject. The essential terms of it can be found in the pamphlet of March, 1919, No. 136, of the American Association for International Conciliation. The body of the engagements is as follows:

DRAFT OF MILITARY CONVENTION.

"France and Russia, animated by a common desire to preserve the peace, and having no other end in mind than to ward off the necessities of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against either of them, have agreed upon the following provisions:

"1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all its available forces to fight Germany.

"2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of one of the powers which are a party to it, should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first indication of the event, and without a previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize all their forces immediately and simultaneously, and shall transport them as near to their frontiers as possible.

"3. The available forces which must be employed against Germany shall be: For France, 1,300,000 men; for Russia, from 700,000 to 800,000 men.

"These forces shall begin complete action with the greatest dispatch, so that Germany will have to fight at the same time in the east and in the west.

"4. The staffs of the armies of the two countries shall constantly plan in concert in order to prepare for and facilitate the execution of the measures set forth above.

"They shall communicate to each other, in time of peace, all the information regarding the armies of the Triple Alliance which is in, or shall come into, their possession.

"The ways and means of corresponding in time of war shall be studied and arranged in advance.

"5. France and Russia shall not conclude a separate peace.

"6. The present convention shall have the same duration as the Triple Alliance.

"7. All the clauses enumerated above shall be kept absolutely secret."

An exchange of letters of transmission and of unimportant comment upon this document by General de Boisdeffre, the army representative who conducted the affair for the French in St. Petersburg.

Two letters from Montebello, French ambassador, to Casimir Perier, President, at Paris, and one by Mouravieff, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Delcasse, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A reply by Delcasse.

All these intermediate documents are summed up in the report of Delcasse himself to Loubet, President of the French Republic, on the 12th of August, 1899, when Delcasse has to report what he considers, after a visit to St. Petersburg, a strengthening of this alliance, so that it will outlive even the dissolution of the Triple Alliance, against which the original arrangement was supposed to be a justifiable protection. The following is Delcasse's report in full:

[Delcasse, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Loubet, President of the French Republic.]

PARIS, August 12, 1899.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT: Your excellency knows with what idea in mind I went to St. Petersburg. Our arrangements with Russia are of two kinds—a general diplomatic agreement, expressed in the letters of August 9, 21, 1891, and August 15, 27, 1891, signed by Giers, Mohrenheim, and Ribot, and which stipulated that the two Governments will consider in concert any question capable of putting the peace of Europe in jeopardy; and a military convention of December 23, 1893, to January, 1894, which concerns an aggressive act on the part of one of the powers of the Triple Alliance, and whose duration is limited to the duration of the Triple Alliance.

But what would happen if the Triple Alliance should dissolve otherwise than by the volition of all its members; if, for example, Emperor Francis Joseph, who seems at times the only bond between rival and even enemy races, should suddenly disappear; if Austria were threatened by a dismemberment, which perhaps is, after all, desirable, which perhaps might be countenanced, and which, in any

case, one might become anxious to turn to account? What could be more capable of compromising the general peace and of upsetting the balance between the European forces? And what situation, furthermore, would more deserve to find France and Russia not only united in a common plan but ready even for its execution?

Now, it is just at the precise moment when the military convention should work that it would cease to exist; born of the Triple Alliance, it would vanish with it. That is a deficiency which has troubled me constantly since I became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and it has been my firm resolve to neglect no opportunity to overcome it. I have found in your lofty and prudent patriotism a powerful support. Sure of receiving from Emperor Nicholas a friendly welcome, I decided to return to Count Mouravieff, whose views have always been in perfect accord with mine, the visit which he paid me in Paris last October. Arriving in St. Petersburg Friday evening, the 4th of August, I was invited to breakfast with their majesties on Sunday at Peterhof. After breakfast the emperor took me into his study. First he was good enough to tell me what esteem and approval my conduct during the last Franco-English crisis had aroused in him. We ran over the different problems which had arisen during the course of the year and reviewed the general world situation. Then, approaching the relations between France and Russia, I revealed to the emperor my belief and apprehension that the alliance would be disarmed in case one of those very events should arise in view of which it was formed: "Since our agreement of August, 1891, execute all important questions, does not Your Majesty think that the military convention of 1894, which is the instrument for making that agreement effective, should have the same duration—that is to say, as long as the general and permanent interests of our two nations remain solidary; and do you not think also that the work of Emperor Alexander III and of President Carnot will surely receive the confirmation of Your Majesty and of the new President of the French Republic?"

The emperor assured me that such was his feeling; that he was anxious to continue essentially in the path indicated by his father and to draw closer the bonds forged for the common good of France and Russia. At that moment I took the liberty of submitting to the emperor the draft of a declaration which I had drawn up that morning. In it the arrangement of 1891 is solemnly confirmed, but the scope is singularly extended; while in 1891 the two Governments expressed anxiety only for the maintenance of the general peace, my plan provides that they should concern themselves just as much with "the maintenance of the balance between the European forces."

In short, by attaching the military convention to the diplomatic arrangement this plan assures to it the same duration.

The emperor seemed to think that I had expressed his idea exactly. He called Count Mouravieff, to whom, at his majesty's request, I read the declaration. An understanding already existed between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and myself on the fundamental basis of the plan. It was decided that the new arrangement, of which the contents and the very existence should remain absolutely secret, should be established undeniably in the form of letters which Count Mouravieff and I would exchange. That was done Wednesday morning, the day I left St. Petersburg.

DELCASSE.

In pursuance of this treaty the military staffs of France and Russia entered into a military conference, August 31, 1911, printed by Foreign Affairs, in London, September, 1922, under the title, "The Great Fraud," is as follows:

EXHIBIT II.

THE GREAT FRAUD—HOW THE RUSSIANS AND FRENCH PREPARED FOR WAR.

I. (IN 1911.)

In our article last month, "The Poison that Destroys," dealing with the alleged allied unpreparedness for the war, we wrote: "The legend of French and allied unpreparedness was exclusively for British consumption." The document published below reveals the French and Russian generals discussing their war plans over a table in the palace of the Russian Czar—exactly three years before the war began. It shows how these poor unprepared States, the victims of German aggression—France and Russia—were even then discussing a military offensive against the Central Powers which should be camouflaged diplomatically as a "defensive" war. We see them reckoning up the immense forces—1,300,000 (minimum) French and 800,000 (minimum) Russians—which would be available for overwhelming Germany; how she must be attacked simultaneously on the east and west. We see that they knew perfectly well that Germany would seek to avoid the pincers by striking rapidly at France, using the "Belgian corridor," as Lord Loreburn calls it, into France. We observe the assurance of the French chief of staff that (even then) the French Army could concentrate as rapidly as the German and was in a position "to take the offensive against Germany, with the help of the British Army on its left flank."

Turn from that picture to the statements made to us by ministers and their henchmen from a hundred platforms when the war broke out three years later; France and Imperial Russia dreaming of naught but peace; Europe suddenly startled out of her repose by the Kaiser's predatory legions. "We were all caught unprepared" (Mr. Lloyd-George).

Then glance—when you read about the French offensive "with the help of the British Army on its left flank"—at Mr. Asquith's speeches in the House of Commons: "There is no secret arrangement of any sort which has not been disclosed and fully disclosed to the public \* \* \*" (November, 1911), and again, "As has been stated \* \* \* there are no secret engagements with any foreign Government that entail upon us any obligations to render military or naval assistance to any other power" (December, 1911).

And estimate the extent of the deception practiced upon the British nation. (Ed. Foreign Affairs.)

This was the seventh Franco-Russian military conference.

MINUTES OF THE MEETINGS OF THE FRENCH AND RUSSIAN CHIEFS OF STAFF AT KRASNOE-SELO, AUGUST 18 (31), 1911.

In accordance with paragraph 1 of article 4 of the military convention of August 17, 1892, the heads of staffs of the Russian and French armies met in conference at Krasnoe-Selo August 18 (31), 1911. The French military *attaché* was present as secretary. The various points of the convention (this refers to the Franco-Russian military convention which, since 1892, had been the basis of Franco-Russian relationship. It was kept secret until 1920) were successively examined by the conferring parties, and gave rise to the following exchange of views:

Preamble.

The two chiefs of staff declare, by common accord, that the words "defensive war" must not be interpreted in the sense of a war which would be conducted defensively. They affirm, on the contrary, the absolute necessity for the Russian and French armies to adopt a vigorous offensive, and as far as possible a simultaneous one, in conformity with the text of article 3 of the convention, whose terms provide that "the forces of the two contracting powers shall come into full action with all speed. (The "defensive" war was strictly for diplomatic purposes it will be observed.) (Les forces des deux puissances contractantes s'engagent à fond et en toute diligence.)

ARTICLE 1.

Same observations as in the conference of 1910, reading as follows:

"The two chiefs of staff, confirming the viewpoint of preceding conferences, are entirely in accord on the point that the defeat of the German armies remains, whatever the circumstances may be, the first and principal object of the allied armies."

ARTICLE 2.

Same observations as in the conference of 1910, reading as follows:

"The conferring parties express once more their common accord, arrived at in the conference of April 8 (21), 1906 (par. 2 of Chap. I), that the mobilization of the German Army compels Russia and France to mobilize immediately and simultaneously all their forces upon the first news of the event and without a preliminary understanding being necessary; but that in case of a partial or even general mobilization of Austria or Italy alone this (preliminary) understanding appears indispensable to them. They therefore agree to invite their respective Governments to be good enough to settle this point, which has already attracted the attention of their predecessors."

ARTICLE 3.

Sharing the opinion of their predecessors, the conferring parties, in common accord, think that Germany will direct a greater portion of her forces against France and will only leave a minimum of troops against Russia.

General Dubail points out that new arguments for this view are to be found in the recent improvements undertaken by the Germans in their network of western railways—open lines, sheds, landing places—and by the fortifications erected on the French frontier.

The French chief of staff thereupon submits the following considerations:

"From what is known of the German mobilization and concentration, one may conclude that the first great encounters will probably take place in Lorraine, Luxemburg, and Belgium (so vanishes the legend of the shocked surprise with which the allied Governments learned of the German invasion of Belgium) from the fifteenth to the eighteenth day."

At that moment the strength of the French Army will be greater than the 1,300,000 men provided for by article 3 of the convention.

It is believed that the Germans will conduct hostilities with the greatest possible energy, in order to impose from the first day their will upon the enemy and to obtain the decision (initiative (?)) or at least to reduce the French to the defensive. In the event of success they would thus be in a position to turn the greater portion of their forces against the Russians.

The French chief of staff has reasons to believe that in the actual circumstances (August, 1911) if Germany provoked war neither Austria nor Italy would immediately follow her.

General Gilinsky agrees that Italy would not, but thinks, on the other hand, that Austria will be compelled to come in with the Germans (*prendre fait et cause pour*), if only out of gratitude for the support given by the latter to Austria in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

General Dubail, continuing his exposition, indicates on general lines the French mobilization and concentration.

He shows that the French Army concentrates as rapidly as the German Army, and that as from the twelfth day it is in a position to take the offensive against Germany, with the help of the British Army on its left flank. (In accordance with the secret arrangement between the British and French general staffs, begun in January, 1906, by the joint decision of Lord Grey and Lord Haldane, but concealed from the nation and even from the Cabinet (except Mr. Asquith and—so Lord Grey and Lord Haldane have affirmed—the Prime Minister).)

France is therefore ready to march in the sense strictly indicated by article 3 of the military convention of 1892. However, in order to be assured of success, it is necessary that she should receive the simultaneous and effective assistance of the Russian Army.

In a word, it is essential that Germany shall be attacked at the same time on the west and on the east. (Just about the time this conference was held Colonel Repington, military correspondent of *The Times*, was saying in that journal: "The possibility of a war on two fronts is the nightmare of German strategists, and, considering the pace at which Russia has been building up her field armies since 1905, the nightmare is not likely to be soon conjured away.")

In view of the profound differences which exist in the geographical, economic, political, and military situation of the allied nations, the difficulty has always been to provide for this simultaneous action which responds to an ideal not actually realizable.

As from 1900, the Russian general staff, in conformity with this point of view, undertook to attack on the eighteenth day with the first *échelon* (body of troops), sufficient to engage victoriously five or six German Army corps supported by a certain number of reserve divisions, (Poor unprepared Russia!)

In 1908, responding to the same considerations, it envisaged the means adopted in order to give the Germans, from the very beginning of war, the greatest possible anxiety on their eastern flank. (*Idem.*)

It seems that the new disposition of Russian troops in peace time involves certain difficulties from the point of view of prompt intervention at the very commencement of the campaign.

Indeed, in 1910 the passing of the frontier was indicated as taking place only toward the twentieth day.

The French staff can only confirm once more the opinion put forward upon several occasions in the course of the preceding conferences.

As far as it is concerned, the Russian armies should pursue the object of compelling Germany to maintain the greatest possible number of forces on her eastern frontier.

This object, which was the very basis of the military convention of 1892, can only be attained by the offensive.

The effect of this offensive will be the more certain inasmuch as it will take place sooner, will be carried out with greater strength, and will take a more dangerous direction for the enemy.

In these circumstances, and it being admitted by common accord by the conferring parties that the Germans will direct the principal mass of their forces against France, the French chief of staff expresses the desire that the disposition (of the Russian armies) should, as far as possible, allow of taking the offensive with the first *échelon* (body of troops) as from the eighteenth day. Perhaps even this delay might be reduced, thanks to the recent improvements introduced into the Russian mobilization and concentration.

General Dubail closes his exposition by remarking that he is not unaware of the various motives which have compelled Russia to revise the disposition of her troops upon her territory in time of peace. He renders a sincere homage to the efforts made during the last three years by Russia to reinforce her military power, and he is happy to note the improvement produced, as a whole, in the friendly and allied army by the latest modifications introduced into the mobilization.

General Gilinsky thereupon develops the Russian point of view.

He, first of all, emphatically affirms the will of the Imperial Government to fulfill scrupulously the obligations imposed upon it by the convention.

General Dubail hastens to declare that he fully appreciates the loyalty of this declaration at a moment when difficulties are arising in connection with Moroccan affairs and when it is not possible to estimate what the true intentions of Germany may be.

General Gilinsky adds that in view of the actual threats of a conflict the duty of the Russian headquarters staff is to enlighten in a precise manner the French headquarters staff on the actual condition of the Russian Army.

The latter is pursuing its reorganization following the campaign in Manchuria (Russo-Japanese War), but this transformation only really

began in 1908—that is to say, four years ago. A great number of improvements are by way of being carried out, but, even using the greatest diligence, the Russian Army will only be complete in heavy artillery in 1913, in light artillery in 1914, and in new infantry munitions in 1916. Moreover, equipment is lacking for the larger portions of the reserve regiments. General Gilinsky gives detailed indications on these points, supported by figures.

*He adds that, when the Russian Army will have completed its re-organization, it will put into line forces very superior to the 800,000 men provided for by the convention.*

But it is necessary to remark that Austria has made great progress from the military point of view. Her mobilization is now as rapid as that of the Russian Army, and its concentration takes place nearer the frontier. In contradistinction with the situation prevailing up till now, the Russian headquarters staff is constrained to admit that Austria would be in a position to take the offensive before the Russian troops destined to face her.

*In these circumstances Russia does not appear to be in a condition to sustain, for two years at least (that is to say, not before 1913. By the spring of 1914, Russia's military chiefs publicly announced their readiness through the organ of the Russian war minister), a war against Germany with a certainty of success. She would certainly be in a position to ward off blows, but perhaps less able to give decisive blows.*

Nevertheless, whatever may be the drawbacks specified above in the preparation of the Russian Army for war, the friendly and allied headquarters staff declares it is ready to satisfy in the greatest measure possible the desires expressed by the French headquarters staff.

General Gilinsky notably declares that the mobilized troops of the active army will have completed their concentration on the frontier on the fifteenth day, with the exception of the last trains and convoys, and that efforts will be made to take the offensive from that day, without waiting for the above, which will only be complete on the twentieth day.

General Gilinsky estimated that the measures taken by the Russian headquarters staff will compel the Germans to leave at least five or six army corps on their eastern frontier, in accordance with the French headquarters staff's demand. He also gives detailed indications of the mobilization and concentration of the Russian Army (effectives, dates of preparation, general disposition, and concentration).

General Dubail thanks General Gilinsky for the sincerity of his explanations on the actual state of preparation of the Russian Army, and declares himself fully satisfied with an offensive which will begin immediately after the fifteenth day, and which would be of a nature calculated to retain at least five or six German army corps on the frontiers of eastern Prussia.

#### ARTICLE 4.

The chiefs of staff reproduce without alteration the six first paragraphs of the observations concerning article 4 in the conference of 1910, reading as follows:

The conferring parties agree, by common accord, on the following points:

"(1) Conferences between the two chiefs of staff will be periodical and, in principle, annual.

"(2) Moreover, meetings will take place each time that one of the headquarters staffs has expressed a desire therefor.

"(3) *The minutes of the conferences will be submitted to the approval of the Government of each country, and a visé of the minister of war and of the prime minister will be attached thereto, so that the chiefs of staffs of the allied armies may refer to this document in the realization of desirable improvements.*

"(4) A more continuous and complete form will thus be given for the exchange of information between the headquarters staffs."

In particular, before each conference, an agenda will be drawn up of the points which it is proposed to examine.

*The chiefs of staffs particularly insist that the minutes of the conferences shall be submitted to the two Governments for ratification.*

As regards routes and means of correspondence in war time, the conferring parties are agreed that wireless telegraphy must take the first place.

The line, Paris-Bobrousk, is working in a satisfactory way at both ends. It is, however, desirable that the station of Bobrousk should be furnished with stronger apparatus in order to successfully oppose a systematic mixing up (*brouillage*) (i. e., of the messages).

The station of Sebastopol is not working regularly. The Russian headquarters staff declares that it is to be handed over entirely to the navy, to which it belongs and which absorbs it almost without interruption for its own service, and to establish on the borders of the Black Sea, in some place other than Sebastopol, another station which will belong solely to the army.

The code in peace time has been functioning since 1910. General Dubail states that the code in war time will be probably ready in a month.

The conferring parties are agreed that at the beginning of next October the technical members of the Franco-Russian Commission should assemble again in order to study on the spot the measures of detail to be taken, so that the four stations, Bobrousk, Paris, Black Sea, and Bizerta, should be in a position to carry out the services. The commission of technicians will hold its meetings at Bobrousk, then in the Crimea, and afterwards at Paris and Bizerta.

The other means provided and organized for corresponding in war time are as follows:

(1) Messengers plying between Belgium and Denmark. It is now proposed that this communication shall be carried out *via* England and Denmark.

(2) Telegraphy *via* the United States and the Pacific Ocean, or by the Mediterranean and Turkey.

The idea of a direct cable between France and Russia has been abandoned, as has also the service of carrier pigeons.

#### ARTICLE 5.

Same observations as in the conference of 1910, reading as follows: *"The conferring parties are agreed that article 5 compels the contracting parties not only not to make peace but also not to cease operations in order to conclude an armistice individually."*

#### ARTICLE 6.

Remains abrogated.

In conformity with the diplomatic arrangement of the month of August, 1899, which was referred to in Chapter I of the conference of July (June (?) 2 to June 19, 1900, the convention will last as long as the diplomatic arrangements actually in existence, and of which they form the complement.

#### ARTICLE 7.

No observations.

(Signed)

J. GILINSKY,

*The Chief of the General Headquarters Staff  
of the Russian Army.*

DUBAIL,

*The Chief of Staff of the French Army.*

(Visé)

MESSIMY

(spelled Messimi, presumably in error),

*The Minister of War.*

Similar conferences will be found in Un Livre Noir, pages 425 to 437, inclusive, on July 13, 1912, and August, 1913, as follows.

Foreign Affairs prints an English translation of the 1912 conference with its comments, as follows:

(The eighth Franco-Russian military conference.)

#### EXHIBIT III.

THE GREAT FRAUD—HOW THE RUSSIANS AND FRENCH PREPARED FOR WAR.

#### (II. THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF JULY, 1912.)

We reproduced last month the full text of the minutes (the original texts are in French) of the meetings of the French and Russian chiefs of staff at Krasnoe-Selo in August, 1911. We have now before us the minutes of a similar conference held in Paris in July, 1912. The preamble of this conference and a good deal of the contents are similar to the wording of the 1911 minutes. We therefore indicate the similarity where it exists and do not reproduce the same text, referring our readers to the September issue of Foreign Affairs, pages 57-59. These documents show the absurdity of the contention that France and Imperial Russia were not preparing for war and that they were taken by surprise by a German "conspiracy." Next month we shall publish the minutes of the conference between the two staffs in 1913. (Ed. Foreign Affairs.)

MINUTES OF THE MEETINGS OF THE FRENCH AND RUSSIAN CHIEFS OF STAFF AT PARIS IN JULY, 1912.

(At the head of the minutes the words "Eighth Conference"—Huitième Conférence—are inscribed.)

"In accordance with Paragraph I of article 4 of the military convention of August 17, 1892, his excellency General Gilinsky, chief of staff of the Russian Army, and General Joffre, chief of the general staff of the French Army, met in conference at Paris July 1 (13), 1912.

"The following were also present: General de Curières de Castelnau, first subchief of the staff of the army; Colonel Matton, military attaché to the French Embassy in Russia; Colonel Count Ignatieff, military attaché to the Russian Embassy in Paris. The latter officers were present in the capacity of secretaries.

"The following points in the convention were successively examined by the conferring parties and gave rise to the following exchange of views":

#### PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION.

"In the first place the conferring parties decide that every time they find themselves in accord to accept without change one or more new paragraphs (*aliénas*) in the minutes of the preceding conference, the

text will be reproduced integrally in the present minutes. A special reference will be inscribed in the margin of the texts which are thus reproduced. This proceeding will have the advantage of dispensing, as far as possible, with a reference back to the text of the preceding minutes."

## PREAMBLE.

"Accepted without comment by the conferring parties." (Same observations as in the 1911 conference. See p. 57, September issue of Foreign Affairs.)

## ARTICLE I.

"Accepted without comment by the conferring parties." (Same observations as in the 1911 conference. See p. 57, September issue of Foreign Affairs.)

## ARTICLE II.

"Same comments as in the conferences of 1910 and 1911." (See art. 2, 1911 conference, p. 57, September issue of Foreign Affairs.) The last sentence in the minutes of the 1912 conference differs and reads as follows:

"This interpretation of the convention has been approved by the Governments of Russia and France in accordance with the signature of the two Governments to the minutes of the conference of August, 1911."

## ARTICLE III.

First paragraph identical with the first paragraph of the 1911 conference (see September Foreign Affairs, p. 57). Article III of the 1912 conference then goes on as follows:

"General Joffre points out that new arguments in support of this point of view are to be found in the improvements which the Germans are continually making in their network of western railways (open lines, sheds, landing places), and by the measures recently taken in the neighborhood of the French frontier, notably in the Eiffel region. The French chief of staff insists upon the capital point that it is in the interest of the Germans to operate successively and separately against France first, and then against Russia. The plan of the Allies must be, on the contrary, to endeavor to attack simultaneously on both sides at once with the maximum of combined effort.

"With this end in view, and basing itself upon the present situation in Italy, which is at war with the Turks, and on the relation of that power with France and Russia, the French staff has established its plan of concentration on the following bases:

"A strict minimum of troops, composed more especially of units of reserve, is left on the frontier of the Alps to defend the passes foot by foot. The whole mass of the French forces is concentrated from the beginning on the German frontier. The total will greatly exceed the 1,300,000 men provided for by article 3 of the convention of 1892. [The Franco-Russian Military Convention, which was the spinal marrow of the Franco-Russian Alliance.]

"Moreover, the French staff is making such new improvements in the network of the various railway companies as will allow, shortly, one or two days' advance on concentration, and within one year from now an advance (in time) upon the German concentration. Eleven millions of francs are at the present moment being devoted to this work."

"General Joffre exhibits, in support of his explanations, a map on which is set out the French dispositions for concentration.

"General Gilinsky is fully in accord in principle with the chief of the staff of the French Army on the necessity of concordant and timely efforts to direct the bulk of the two allied armies against Germany. He also agrees with the opinion expressed on the subject of the Italian Army, whose action under present circumstances does not seem to be very pressing, at least at the opening of hostilities.

"On the other hand, Austria has greatly developed her military power; she has improved her railways, with an obvious offensive intention, and Russia can not afford a check on the Austrian side. The moral effect would be disastrous. She must therefore devote her forces to face that power at the same time as Germany.

"On the other hand, Sweden had appeared, up to the present, to adopt an expectant attitude, in order to find herself at an opportune moment on the favorable side of the scales. That is not the situation to-day. Instigated and led on by Germany, she would probably join the latter against Russia. This consideration would compel Russia to leave in Finland and around St. Petersburg more considerable effectives than was precedently indicated. Finally, the construction of railways in Asia Minor would enable the Turks to accelerate their mobilization and their concentration. This may lead in the future to the necessity of maintaining larger forces on that side. In any event, the Russian general staff is still resolved to concentrate against Germany a group of forces containing the figure of 800,000 men at least, and is decided to make the offensive action of her armies felt after the fifteenth day of mobilization.

"General Joffre observes that the defeat of Germany will immediately dissipate all the fears which might be inspired by the attitude of Sweden and Turkey.

"It is therefore the annihilation of the German forces which must be pursued at all costs. With this object, the delays of mobilization

and concentration of the armies must be reduced to a minimum. The development of railways obviously constitutes one of the essential factors to that end. On that subject, General Joffre remarks that the railway lines utilized by the Russian troops to be transported toward the western portion of the Empire are not all double lines. The concentration of the forces would thus be inevitably delayed. On the other hand, it would be seriously accelerated if the single lines, or sections of single lines, were doubled, and even if certain portions were quadrupled, as has already been carried out by the French staff on the national railways. These improvements, he thinks, could be usefully applied (a) by doubling the lines St. Petersburg-Taps-Walk-Riga-Mouraviewo-Kochedary; (b) to the sections Briansk-Gomel, Louninetz-Jabinka, of the Orel line to Warsaw by Brest-Litovsk; (c) a quadrupling of the sections Jabinka-Brest-Litovsk, which will allow the two lines [this may not be an accurate translation. The word used is "courant." It may apply to the railways, or it may refer to advancing bodies of troops.—Ed. Foreign Affairs] coming, one from Moscow and the other from Orel, to join at Brest-Litovsk; (d) the quadrupling of the sections Siedlets-Warsaw, which would bring to this latter town the two lines [this may not be an accurate translation. The word used is "courant." It may apply to the railways, or it may refer to advancing bodies of troops.—Ed. Foreign Affairs] coming from St. Petersburg, on the one side, and from Bologne on the other. Finally, the Russian alignment (*voie russe*) should be used for the lines which are directed from Warsaw, respectively, on Cracow and Thorn.

"General Gilinsky agrees with General Joffre in attributing the highest strategic importance to the development of railways. He points out that in Russia railways can be divided into two categories—one belonging to the Crown, the other belonging to private companies. Improvements are taking place on the former and others are projected. They will be realized in accordance with the resources available. Nevertheless, it does not seem useful to double the line St. Petersburg-Riga-Kochedary, whose eccentric (i. e., *curve*) position, and the neighborhood of the enemy frontiers, make its utilization difficult. In the second category of private railways the State can not exercise a direct and coercive influence. The State has acquired the lines with abnormal (*anormales*) gauges which go from Warsaw toward Thorn and Cracow with the intention of transforming them into normal gauges. The continuity of transport will thus be insured without delay from the heart of the Empire to the western frontier. Finally, General Gilinsky recalls the general reasons which intervene to delay the Russian concentration. Whilst in France the railways are always ready, in Russia they have to be mobilized at the same time as the army.

"General Gilinsky develops on its main lines the preparatory measures of concentration and of groupment of the Russian armies directed against Germany.

"General Joffre is in accord with General Gilinsky on the necessity of frankly directing toward the south the center of gravity of these armies, and to dispose the bulk of the forces in conditions which will enable them, either to take the offensive in the direction of Allenstein if the enemy is present in force in eastern Prussia or attempts to debouch on Warsaw, or to maneuver by the left bank of the Vistula to march on Berlin if the enemy has carried out his concentration in the region Thorn-Posen, or if he attempts to leave that base to march on Warsaw or Ivangorod."

## ARTICLE IV.

"The chiefs of staff reproduce without alteration the six first paragraphs and observations in article 4 at the conference of 1910, reading as follows:"

"Same as in article 4 of the conference of 1911 (see September issue of Foreign Affairs, p. 58), with the exception of the following paragraph:

"The chiefs of staff particularly insist that the minutes of the conferences shall be submitted to the two Governments for ratification." (This paragraph disappears from the 1912 conference.)

The text thereupon continues as follows:

"The means and measures for corresponding in time of war will be perfected and completed according to the wishes formulated in the course of the 1911 conference. At the present moment four posts of the T. S. F. (wireless) allow communication in peace time along the lines Paris-Bobruisk, Bizerta-Sebastopol. Code dictionaries for peace time and for war time have been drawn up and deposited in the Russian and French Ministries of War. Instructions have been drawn up to fix the hours for the working of the stations, to determine the indications and signals for reconnaissance, the service codes, and the duties of the section chiefs. The communications which are being daily exchanged at the present time prove that this system of correspondence is thoroughly regular and satisfactory. Nevertheless, in order to improve it still further, the Russian general staff intends to allow the navy the sole use of the station of Sebastopol and to create for the army a special station near Nikolaleff. The commission, which has already been concerned with correspondence by wireless, must satisfy itself that the present French station at Bizerta will suffice to

communicate with the two Russian stations in the Crimea, or if it will be necessary to create a new special station for France. Transmission of dispatches by messengers between France and Russia has been recently reorganized through the diligence of the French staff. The correspondence is sent through Scandinavian countries up to the point where code communications can be used in all security. From that point the dispatches are carried to Russia by special officers already appointed. To insure still better communication between France and Russia it might be advisable to study the possibility of utilizing the wireless station already established in Norway. This question will give rise to communications later between the French and Russian general staffs."

## ARTICLE V.

Same as in 1911 conference. (See September issue of Foreign Affairs, p. 59.)

## ARTICLE VI.

Same as in 1911 conference. (See September issue of Foreign Affairs, p. 59.)

## ARTICLE VII.

Same as in 1911 conference. (See September issue of Foreign Affairs, p. 59.)

(Signed) J. GILINSKY,  
The Chief of Staff of the Russian Army.  
J. JOFFRE,  
The Chief of Staff of the French Army.  
A. MILLERAND,  
The Minister of War.

## EXHIBIT IV.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,  
Legislative Reference Service.

(Translation.)

(Un Livre Nois, Diplomatie d'avantguerre. Paris, 1923, vol. 2, pp. 431-437.)

## NINTH CONFERENCE (AUGUST, 1913).

In accordance with the provisions of section 1 of article 4 of the military convention of August 17, 1892, His Excellency General Gilinsky, chief of the general staff of the Russian Army, and General Joffre, chief of the general staff of the French Army, met in conference at St. Petersburg and at Krasnoe-Selo at different times during the month of August, 1913.

Others present were General de Laguiche, military attaché of the French Embassy in Russia; Colonel Count Ignatief, military attaché of the Russian Embassy in Paris; Colonel Berthelot, commander of the Ninety-fourth Infantry Regiment, *aide major général désigné* of the French Army.

The various points of the agreement were successively considered by the conferees and the following views exchanged:

## PRELIMINARY REMARK.

First of all the conferees decide that whenever they agree to accept without change one or more paragraphs of the procès-verbal of the preceding conference the text of it shall be reproduced in its entirety in the present procès-verbal.

A special note will be inscribed on the margin of the texts thus reproduced.

This method of procedure dispenses with the necessity for referring back to the text of the preceding report as much as possible.

Preamble (accepted without comment by the conferees): The two chiefs of general staff agree that the words "defensive war" should not be interpreted in the sense of "war to be conducted defensively." They assert, on the contrary, the absolute necessity for the Russian and French Armies to make a vigorous offensive and as far as possible simultaneously, in compliance with the text of article 3 of the agreement, according to which "the forces of the two contracting powers shall all come into action with the least delay."

FIRST ARTICLE. Same remarks as in the conferences of 1910 and the following ones, which read as follows:

"The two chiefs of general staff, confirming the point of view of the previous conferences, agree fully on this point, that the defeat of the German armies remains under all circumstances the first and principal aim of the allied armies."

Completed as follows:

"And this even more so than formerly on account of the considerable growth of the relative military power of Germany in the Triple Alliance."

ART. 2. Same remarks as in the conferences of 1910, 1911, and 1912. However, the Russian and French Governments having approved the interpretation of the two chiefs of general staff by signing the procès-verbaux of the conferences of August and July, 1912, these remarks should read as follows:

"As recognized by the Russian and French Governments in 1911 and 1912, German mobilization will compel Russia and France to mobilize all their forces immediately and simultaneously as soon as it becomes known without the need of a previous agreement. *The same will apply*

*to every act of war of the German Army against either of the allied powers. But in case of partial or even general mobilization of Austria or Italy alone, such agreement is required."*

The sentence underlined was added to provide for the possibility of a sudden attack with forces under cover preceding mobilization, for the purpose of gaining an important strategic point.

ART. 3. Sharing the opinion of their predecessors, the conferees agree that Germany will direct the greatest part of its forces against France and will only leave minimum of forces against Russia.

The principal result of the enforcement of the German military law of 1913 will be to hasten the mobilization of the German Army. This army can then have more time than in the past to operate against France before turning against Russia.

The plan of the Allies should then be to try to attack both sides simultaneously, exerting the maximum of combined efforts.

General Joffre declares that France will engage on its northeast frontier almost all her forces, the number of which will exceed that provided for in the text of the convention by more than 200,000 men; that the concentration of the fighting elements on this frontier will be completed, for the most part, on the tenth day of mobilization, and that the offensive operations of this group of forces will commence from the morning of the eleventh day.

General Gilinsky declares that Russia will engage against Germany a group of forces consisting of at least 800,000 men and the concentration of the fighting element on the Russian-German frontier will be completed, for the most part, on the fifteenth day of mobilization, and that the offensive operations of that group of forces will commence immediately after the fifteenth day. By the end of 1914, the end of the concentration will be advanced about two days.

The conferees outline briefly the arrangements made for the concentration and grouping of the French and Russian Armies directed against Germany.

They agree upon the need of directing the offensive against the heart of the enemy country; upon the advisability of concentrating the forces in such a way as to be able to either combat the forces of the enemy concentrated in eastern Prussia or to march to Berlin by starting operations in the south of that Province if the German forces are concentrated on the left bank of the Vistula.

Although aware of the need for Russia to maintain large forces against Austria and Sweden, General Joffre thinks that the defeat of Germany will greatly facilitate the operations which the Russian Army shall direct against the other enemy powers. Annihilation of the German forces, therefore, must be pushed at any cost, and this from the start. For this purpose delays in mobilization and concentration of the allied armies should be reduced to a minimum.

To this end the development of the railroad system is an essential factor; General Gilinsky states that the construction work recommended in the preceding conference has been carried out as follows:

The sections Briansk-Gomel and Louninetz-Jabinka of the line from Orel to Varsovia have been double tracked.

The section Jabinka-Brest-Litovsk has been quadruple tracked.

As to the quadrupling of Siedletz-Varsovia the difficulties of its execution are too great, and a better result will be obtained by constructing a new line with double tracks starting from Riazan and Toula and ending at Varsovia.

General Joffre agrees on this point.

An examination of the railroad map leads the two chiefs of general staff to conclude that a marked increase in the rapidity of concentration would be obtained by constructing certain railroad lines connecting eastern Russia with the region of Varsovia, such as:

1. Doubling the line Batraki-Pensa-Riajsk-Bogoiavlensk-Soukhinitchi-Smolensk.

2. Doubling the line Rovno-Sarny Louninietz-Baranovitchi.

3. Doubling the line Lozovaia-Poltava-Kiev-Sarny-Kovel, constructing the line Grichino-Kovel.

Offensive operations will also be facilitated by adopting the standard gauge on the Russian railroads on the left bank of the Vistula, as well as by increasing the means of crossing the river in the region of Varsovia.

Lastly, it seems that in order to obtain the service required of the railroads the rolling stock (cars and especially locomotives of great power) should be greatly increased.

With respect to the conduct of operations it is quite necessary for the allied armies to obtain a decisive success as quickly as possible. A check of the French armies at the beginning of the war would permit Germany to transfer to its eastern frontier a part of the forces which would have fought at first against France. If, on the contrary, the French armies quickly obtain a success against the German forces facing them, this success will facilitate to that extent the operations of the Russian armies, since the forces brought by Germany to her western frontier will be unable to be transferred to the east.

It is therefore essential that the French armies should have a marked numerical superiority over the German forces of the west. These conditions will be easily realized if Germany is obliged to protect herself with larger forces on her eastern frontier.

General Joffre states that, in this connection, it would be advantageous for both armies to have the Russian forces so grouped in the government of Varsovia, even in peace time, that they constitute a direct menace to Germany.

General Gilinsky states that the new plan of reorganization of the Russian Army provides for the establishment of an army corps in the region of Varsovia.

ART. 4. The chiefs of general staff reproduce without change the first three paragraphs of the observations concerning article 4 in the conference of 1912, which read as follows:

"1. The two chiefs of general staff shall hold periodic and, in principle, annual conferences.

"2. Furthermore, a conference shall be held whenever a general staff shall deem one necessary."

Paragraph 3 could be simplified as follows:

"3. The procès-verbal of the conference shall be submitted for approval to the Government of each country so that the chiefs of general staff of the allied armies may rely on this document for the realization of desirable improvements."

Paragraph 4 shall read as follows:

"4. The exchange of information between the allied armies, being of utmost value, will continue regularly and frequently."

Before each conference the points which it is proposed to consider shall be mutually made known.

The ways and means of correspondence in time of war have been perfected according to the wishes expressed in the course of the conference of 1911 and 1912.

The wireless stations of Paris-Bobrouisk and of Bizerta-Sebastopol are functioning well. The station at Bizerta has been reinforced by France; a powerful station is being constructed in Russia near the Black Sea, so that communications may be as easy by day as by night.

Following the attempts at communicating between the Eiffel Tower and the Russian naval station at Sveaborg, it is desirable to see the latter station reinforced.

Telegraphic communications can be exchanged between the French and Russian chiefs of general staff by British cables and with the aid of Great Britain.

The conventions with London have just been concluded, all arrangements have been made, and operations can start.

Cablegrams pass by way of America, Australia, and Zanzibar or by way of South Africa and Zanzibar to reach Odessa.

Communications by emissaries are organized by the French chief of general staff for the transmission of dispatches from France to Russia. It would be advisable for the Russian chief of general staff to organize communications by emissaries on the same plan.

ART. 5. The Russian and French Governments having accepted the interpretation given since 1910 to article 5, said interpretation could read as follows:

"The Russian and French Governments have respectively recognized that article 5 obliges the contracting parties not to stop operations or conclude an armistice separately."

ART. 6. (Accepted without remarks by the conferees.)

Article 6 is repealed as heretofore.

In conformity with the diplomatic agreement of August, 1899, mentioned in chapter 1 of the conference of July 2, 1900, the convention will last as long as the diplomatic agreements now in force which it supplements.

(Translated by Lottie M. Manross, December 13, 1923.)

In 1916 France and Russia entered into a secret treaty to divide German and Austrian territory between Russia and France, as follows:

#### EXHIBIT V.

#### APPENDIX D.

*Secret agreement of 1916-17 between France and Russia for the disposition of German and Austrian territory.*

#### I.

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (M. Sazonoff) to the Russian ambassador at Paris. February 24 (March 9), 1916:

(No. 948.)

PETROGRAD.

Please refer to my telegram No. 6063 of 1915. At the forthcoming conference you may be guided by the following general principles:

"The political agreements concluded between the Allies during the war must remain intact, and are not subject to revision. They include the agreement with France and England on Constantinople, the Straits, Syria, and Asia Minor, and also the London treaty with Italy. All suggestions for the future delimitation of central Europe are at present premature, but in general one must bear in mind that we are prepared to allow France and England complete freedom in drawing up the western frontiers of Germany, in the expectation that the Allies on their part would allow us equal freedom in drawing up our frontiers with Germany and Austria.

"It is particularly necessary to insist on the exclusion of the Polish question from the subject of international discussion and on the elimination of all attempts to place the future of Poland under the guarantee and the control of the powers.

"With regard to the Scandinavian States, it is necessary to endeavor to keep back Sweden from any action hostile to us and at the same time to examine betimes measures for attracting Norway on our side in case it should prove impossible to prevent a war with Sweden.

"Rumania has already been offered all the political advantages which could induce her to take up arms, and therefore it would be perfectly futile to search for new baits in this respect.

"The question of pushing out the Germans from the Chinese market is of very great importance, but its solution is impossible without the participation of Japan. It is preferable to examine it at the economic conference, where the representatives of Japan will be present. This does not exclude the desirability of a preliminary exchange of views on the subject between Russia and England by diplomatic means."

SAZONOFF.

#### II.

Confidential telegram from M. Pokrovsky, M. Sazonoff's second successor as Foreign Minister, to the Russian ambassador at Paris, January 30 (February 12), 1917:

(No. 502.)

PETROGRAD.

Copy to London confidentially. At an audience with the most high, M. Doumergue submitted to the Emperor the desire of France to secure for herself at the end of the present war the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and a special position in the valley of the River Saar as well as to attain the political separation from Germany of her trans-Rhenish districts and their organization on a separate basis, in order that in future the River Rhine might form a permanent strategical frontier against a Germanic invasion. Doumergue expressed the hope that the Imperial Government would not refuse immediately to draw up its assent to those suggestions in a formal manner.

His Imperial Majesty was pleased to agree to this in principle, in consequence of which I requested Doumergue, after communicating with his Government, to let me have the draft of an agreement, which would then be given a formal sanction by an exchange of notes between the French ambassador and myself.

Proceeding thus to meet the wishes of our ally, I nevertheless consider it my duty to recall the standpoint put forward by the Imperial Government in the telegram of February 24, 1916, No. 348, to the effect that "while allowing France and England complete liberty in delimiting the western frontiers of Germany we expect that the Allies on their part will give us equal liberty in delimiting our frontiers with Germany and Austria-Hungary."

Hence the impending exchange of notes on the question raised by Doumergue will justify us in asking the French Government simultaneously to confirm its assent to allowing Russia freedom of action in drawing up her future frontiers in the west. Exact data on the question will be supplied by us in due course to the French cabinet.

In addition we deem it necessary to stipulate for the assent of France to the removal at the termination of the war of the disqualifications resting on the Aland Islands. Please explain the above to Briand and wire the results.

POKROVSKY.

#### III.

A telegram from the Russian ambassador in Paris to M. Pokrovsky, January 31 (February 13), 1917:

(No. 88.)

Copy to London. Referring to your telegram No. 507, confidentially, I immediately communicated in writing its contents to Briand, who told me that he would not fall to give me an official reply of the French Government, but that he could at once declare, on his own behalf, that the satisfaction of the wishes contained in your telegram will meet with no difficulties.

IZVOLSKI.

#### IV.

On February 1 (14), 1917, the Russian Foreign Minister addressed the following note to the French ambassador at Petrograd:

"In your note of to-day's date your excellency was good enough to inform the Imperial Government that the Government of the Republic was contemplating the inclusion in the terms of peace to be offered to Germany the following demands and guaranties of a territorial nature:

"1. Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France.

"2. The frontiers are to be extended at least up to the limits of the former principality of Lorraine, and are to be drawn up at the discretion of the French Government so as to provide for the strategic needs and for the inclusion in French territory of the entire iron district of Lorraine and of the entire coal district of the Saar Valley.

"3. The rest of the territories situated on the left bank of the Rhine, which now form part of the German Empire, are to be entirely

separated from Germany and freed from all political and economic dependence upon her.

"4. The territories of the left bank of the Rhine outside French territory are to be constituted an autonomous and neutral State, and are to be occupied by French troops until such time as the enemy States have completely satisfied all the conditions and guaranties indicated in the treaty of peace.

"Your excellency stated that the Government of the Republic would be happy to be able to rely upon the support of the Imperial Government for the carrying out of its plans. *By order of His Imperial Majesty, my most august master, I have the honor, in the name of the Russian Government, to inform your excellency by the present note that the Government of the Republic may rely upon the support of the Imperial Government for the carrying out of its plans as set out above.*"

V.

Finally, on February 26 (March 11), 1917, the Russian ambassador at Paris sent the following telegram to M. Pekrovsky:

(No. 168.)

See my reply to telegram No. 167, No. 2. The Government of the French Republic, anxious to confirm the importance of the treaties concluded with the Russian Government in 1915, for the settlement on the termination of the war of the question of Constantinople and the Straits in accordance with Russia's aspirations, anxious, on the other hand, to secure for its ally in military and industrial respects all the guaranties desirable for the safety and the economic development of the Empire, recognize *Russia's complete liberty in establishing her western frontiers.*

IZVOLSKI.

Bausman says:

On the very next day (March 12) the Russian Revolution took place, and on March 15 the Czar abdicated.

THE PRESENT POSITION (BAUSMAN).

Apparently the design of driving Germany back to the left bank of the Rhine has now been abandoned by the French Government, although there has been no official statement to this effect.

Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons, on December 19, 1917, said of this plan:

"We have never expressed our approval of it, nor do I believe it presents the policy of successive French Governments who have held office during the war. Never did we desire and never did we encourage the idea that a bit of Germany should be cut off from the parent State and erected into some kind of \* \* \* independent Government on the left bank of the Rhine. His Majesty's Government were never aware that was seriously entertained by any French statesman."

It must be noted in this connection that by the declaration of September 5, 1914, the Allies undertook to make peace in common. Any arrangement between France and Russia therefore equally affects Great Britain.

In the light of these treaties and these military conferences, I call attention to chapter 12 of Entente Diplomacy and the World, giving the dispatches showing the Entente preparations for war (Exhibit 6), and the Falsification of the Russian Orange Book (Exhibit 7).

In 1906 Sir Edward Grey, on behalf of the British Government, entered into an agreement with France which in 1912 he reduced to writing, as follows:

EXHIBITS VIII AND IX.

(Letter Sir Edward Grey to French Ambassador Cambon, November 22, 1912.)

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: From time to time in recent years the French and British military and naval experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets, respectively, at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that if either Government have grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common.

If these measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

[The last vital paragraph was not read to Parliament by Grey, although afterwards published in the White Book.] (How Diplomats Make War, 303.)

The French ambassador, Cambon, immediately replied in the following letter:

FRENCH EMBASSY,  
London, November 23, 1912.

DEAR SIR EDWARD: You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, November 22, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that on either side these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point; and I am authorized to state that in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an attack from a third power or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common. If those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, etc.,

PAUL CAMBON.

(How Diplomats Make War, 279.)

In 1914 Sir Edward Grey delivered copies of these letters exchanged between him and the French ambassador to the Russian ambassador as a basis for an entente between Great Britain and Russia (see ch. 12, Entente Diplomacy and the World, p. 709), under which a plan of naval cooperation between Great Britain, Russia, and France was worked out.

When the German rulers ordered a German mobilization, 5 p. m., Saturday afternoon, August 1, it was followed immediately by the marching of regiments through London equipped for war the following morning, Sunday, August 2, 1914. (How Diplomats Make War, Neilson, p. 295.)

French troops invaded German soil Sunday, August 2, 1914. (Reflections of the World War, p. 145.)

On Saturday, the 1st day of August, the German border was crossed in four places by Russian patrols. (Preparation and Conduct of the World War, Von Kuhl, pp. 79-80.)

Germany declared a state of war existing with Russia, because of Russian acts, on August 1, 1914, 7.10 p. m.; with France, August 3, 1914; Belgium, August 4, 1914. (Scott Documents on World War, p. 1377.)

France declared war against Germany on August 3, 1914; Great Britain against Germany, August 4, 1914; Russia against Germany, August 7, 1914. The evidence appears to show that it was the Russian policy to invade Germany without a declaration of war and to make its mobilization complete under the camouflage of peaceful negotiations. (Von Kuhl, pp. 70-80.)

In the Russian Czar's orders for mobilization, 30th of September, 1912, Chancellor Von Bethmann-Hollweg quotes the following language:

It is the Emperor's order that the notification of the mobilization should be equivalent to the notification of a state of war with Germany.

In other words, the Russian mobilization order was to be regarded as a secret declaration of war.

Hollweg further states that the Russian instruction for the troops on the German front was:

As soon as concentration is completed we shall proceed to advance against the armed forces of Germany with the object of carrying the war on to their own territory. (Reflection on the World War, p. 132.)

This was strictly in line with the Franco-Russian treaty of 1892 and the military conferences of 1911, 1912, and 1913.

It will be observed that under the Franco-Russian secret treaty of 1892, section 1, it was provided that in case of war Russia should employ all its available forces to fight Germany and that the military and naval staffs, in the military conference above quoted, expressly contemplated that the German

Army should be obliged to attack France through Belgium, and stipulated:

The French Army could concentrate as rapidly as the German Army, and that as from the twelfth day it is in a position to take the offensive against Germany with the help of the British Army on its left flank.

And thus clearly outlines the cooperation agreed upon between Russia, France, and Great Britain.

The conference states:

It is essential that Germany shall be attacked at the same time on the east and on the west.

But the most important light is thrown upon the matter by the preamble in the minutes of the meetings of the French and Russian chiefs of staffs, as follows:

#### PREAMBLE.

The two chiefs of staff declare, by common accord, that the words "defensive war" must not be interpreted in the sense of a war which would be conducted defensively. They affirm, on the contrary, the absolute necessity for the Russian and French armies to adopt a vigorous offensive, and, as far as possible, a simultaneous one, in conformity with the text of article 3 of the convention, whose terms provide that *the forces of the two contracting powers shall come into full action with all speed!*

The Franco-Russian treaty, 1892, provided "In case the forces of the Triple Alliance or of one of the powers which are a party to it [for example, Austria] should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first indication of the event and without a previous agreement being necessary shall mobilize all their forces immediately and simultaneously and shall transport them as near to their frontiers as possible. \* \* \* These forces shall begin complete action with the greatest dispatch, so that Germany will have to fight at the same time in the east and in the west."

Therefore when Austria partially mobilized in ignorance of the terms of this secret Franco-Russian treaty of 1892, Russia and France were under a secret contract to immediately mobilize and attack Germany with all their forces. This was a secret declaration of war on Germany as of the date of the Austrian mobilization, July 28, 1914.

The Russian and French mobilizations, which were begun under the treaty of 1892, must be interpreted in the light of that treaty and the annual military conferences from 1903 to 1913 of the general staffs of the Russian and French Armies.

#### RUSSIAN PREPARATIONS.

The manner in which the Russian military and railway preparations and mobilization had been worked out is set forth in the work of Von Eggeling, *The Russian Mobilization and the Outbreak of the War*, and by Gen. H. von Kuhl in his work, *The German General Staff in Preparation and Conduct of the World War*, an abstract of which is submitted (Exhibit X).

All the military authorities in Europe knew and recognized, as a matter of military strategy, that in a war between Germany, Russia, and France, the German troops would be compelled to enter France through Belgium, as the French frontier otherwise was absolutely impregnable because of the gigantic forts and prepared military defenses.

Further the military strategists were all agreed that Germany's only chance to win in such a military struggle was by speed and efficiency, conquering France first, and then meeting Russia.

Germany claimed that while Belgium had never collaborated with Germany to preserve Belgium's neutrality against France and Great Britain, Belgium had a positive understanding with Great Britain and France as to cooperation in a war of France and Great Britain with Germany. See Belgian documents in facsimile in German White Book (pp. 837 to 860, *Diplomatic Documents Relating to Outbreak of the European War*. Scott).

The secret documents exhibited in *Entente Diplomacy and the World*, 858 in number, demonstrate beyond the shadow of a doubt that it was the fixed policy of the Russian Government to control the Dardanelles and expand its power in the Balkan States where there were millions of Slavs in Serbia and in Austria, and that this could only be done by means of a general European war. It was therefore necessary for the carrying out of the Russian policy to bring about a general European war and at the same time to put the moral responsibility of such a war on others. These secret documents show that it was the design of the Russian Government to do this, and that the means of accomplishing this end lay through the Slavs of Serbia and their intrigues with the so-called "unliberated Slavs of Austria."

The Serbian intrigues through a period of years were financed by Russia and the Austrian Government was so seriously disturbed by these intrigues that they were compelled at huge expense and great internal inconvenience to mobilize in 1912, and again in 1913, and again in 1914, when the Crown Prince of Austria and his consort were murdered by a Serb believed to have been instigated by a malignant press campaign carried on in Serbia and alleged to have been directly arranged by the Pan Slav "Black Hand," fostered by the Russian minister at Belgrade.

In Professor Sloan's work, *The Balkans*, page 193, May, 1914, he says:

At Belgrade the trade of politics has been on a level unknown elsewhere, unless it be at Constantinople. The overthrow of one king and the setting up of another was a matter of money, and it was the Russian ambassador who provided the funds. The whole conspiracy has been traced to its source; there is not a step for which the documentary evidence can not be produced.

Nitti, in his book *Peaceless Europe*, pages 12, 83, 84, 87, says:

Russia alone promoted and kept alive the agitation in Serbia and of the Slavs in Austria. It was on account of Russia that the Serbian Government was a perpetual cause of disturbance, a perpetual threat to Austria-Hungary. The Russian policy in Serbia was really criminal.

In 1908 the Czar had assured Paschitch, the Serbian minister, that the Bosnia-Herzegovinian question would be decided by war alone, for which meantime they could preserve a calm attitude with military preparations. (Bogitsevitch quoted in *Diplomatic Revelations*, p. 101.)

In the German White Book, 1919, Part II, page 53, is an account of a visit of the Serbian Prime Minister to the Czar of Russia, February 2, 1914, and his report that he requested of the Czar 120,000 rifles and munitions, and so forth; that the Czar said that Russia was doing as much as it could to arm. He asked how many soldiers Serbia could muster. The minister answered a half million well-clothed, well-armed soldiers. The Czar replied:

That is satisfactory; it is no small matter and one can accomplish much by means of it.

Under the treaty of 1892 France had financed Russia to the extent of about \$7,000,000,000 to enable Russia to build up a gigantic army and to build military railways to the German frontier. (Lex Talionis.)

The assassination of the Crown Prince (June 28, 1914) caused the Austrian Government to demand immediate satisfaction of the Serbian Government on July 23.

On July 24 Serbia mobilized, but accepted the Austrian demands, except one or two affecting the question of sovereignty, which they proposed to arbitrate. Austria ordered a partial mobilization against Serbia. The same day the Russian Government authorized a mobilization, and the Russian Minister of War, Sukhomlinoff, made it a general mobilization and afterwards made the Czar believe it was a partial mobilization, which the Czar made a general mobilization on July 30. The army of Belgium was mobilized as of this day, July 24. The British fleet was completely mobilized and ready for war as of July 24. The French Government took preliminary steps, canceling leaves of absence, and so forth.

René Viviani, president of the council, August 4, 1914, in the French Chamber of Deputies, in commenting on the Austrian notice to Serbia of July 23 and subsequent events, said:

As these events unfolded themselves, the Government, watchful and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the measures of precaution which the situation required—the general mobilization of our forces on land and sea was ordered.

Under the secret 1892 treaty the Austrian mobilization required the immediate mobilization of all the Russian and French forces and the speediest possible simultaneous attack on Germany east and west.

William II was in Scandinavia on a summer cruise, returning on Sunday, July 26. Upon his return he directed the German chancellor to urge on Austria the acceptance of the Serbian reply and the acceptance of a method of adjustment acceptable to the Entente powers. Austria yielded to this demand, declared that the demand on Serbia was not intended as an ultimatum, that Austria was willing to have the matter adjusted by an international conference, that it had no designs on Serbian territory, that it had only made a partial mobilization against Serbia, and that it only sought its own internal peace against Serbian intrigue.

The secret Russian records show that the Russian Government was determined on war, that the French Government was



determined on war, that the French Government refused to attempt to moderate the attitude of Russia, and that the British Government refused to attempt to exercise a moderating influence with the Russian Government, and that the Russian Government rejected in advance any attempt to exercise a moderating influence with the Russian Government.

These secret documents show that it was a part of the policy of the French and Russian Governments to put the odium of the World War upon the German Government.

The German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, states that:

The German Minister of War thought it a mistake to declare war on Russia, not because he considered that war could be avoided after Russia had mobilized, but because he feared that the political effect would be prejudicial.

But that the chief of the general staff favored declaring war:

Because our hope of success against the enormous superiority in numbers was dependent on the extreme rapidity of our movements.

And this opinion prevailed. (Reflections of the World War, 138.)

Because Germany declared war on Russia and mobilized at 5 p. m., Saturday, August 1, 1914, public opinion throughout the world has largely accepted the view that the German leaders were responsible for the war. This has been emphasized and made more effective by propaganda and by the excitement and hostility of war.

After August 1, 1914, Russia and the various powers issued Orange Books, White Books, Yellow Books, etc., each of which was intended to prove an alibi and show that each of the several Governments was innocent of the responsibility for the pending gigantic catastrophe.

The Russian Foreign Office issued an Orange Book to show the innocence of the Russian Government. Out of 60 dispatches in the Foreign Office for the few days preceding the World War, it appears that 50 of them were falsified by omissions, deletion, or insertion. (Exhibit 7.)

This document shows by its forgeries in suppressing the vital dispatches a fixed policy to exculpate the Russian and French statesmen and make it possible to cast the odium of the war on the German statesmen.

G. P. Gooch appears to be justified (Falsification of the Russian Orange Book) in stating:

It is now established by documentary proof:

1. That from the commencement of the quarrel onwards France made the Russian point of view her own.

2. That in complete contrast to Germany's effort in Vienna she categorically refused to exert herself in a moderating influence in Petersburg, but, on the contrary, strengthened the Russian will to war by giving repeated assurances of unconditional support.

3. That she had decided upon war and had informed Petersburg to that effect before a decision regarding war or peace had been apparently come to there. (Telegram No. 216 from Paris.)

4. That France only refrained from declaring war against Germany, because, having regard to public opinion in France and England, it was considered to be better that Germany should appear the aggressor. (Telegrams Nos. 218, 222, 225, 226.)

Any evidence from Russian or French sources favorable to the German Government obviously is entitled to great weight, while self-serving evidence of the Russian statesmen must be taken with reserve.

#### THE ORANGE BOOK AS CORRECTED FROM UN LIVRE NOIR.

Telegram 184 (Falsification of the Russian Orange Book, p. 21), the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonoff, on July 24, states:

*Germany ardently desired the localization of the conflict, as the interference of any other power on the ground of existing treaties must have incalculable consequences. \* \* \* Ex-Minister Pléhon had an interview with the Austrian ambassador to-day, from which he also gained the impression that Austria-Hungary did not intend her step to be regarded as an unconditional ultimatum.*

Telegram 186, from the Russian representative at Paris to Sazonoff, Petrograd, on July 25, said that the action of the German ambassador—

has to some extent reassured the foreign ministry as being an indication that *Germany does not seek for war in any case. \* \* \**

That the German ambassador had pointed out—

*That the Austrian note has not the character of an ultimatum; \* \* \* that the German step had only for its object the localization of the Austro-Serbian conflict; \* \* \* that the absence of the President of the Republic and of the Minister President (Viviani) prevents the Foreign Office for the moment from expressing its opinion definitely regarding present events.*

POINCARÉ AND VIVIANI WERE EN ROUTE FROM ST. PETERSBURG TO PARIS.

Telegram 187, July 26, from the Russian representative at Paris to Sazonoff, Petrograd, states that the German ambassador had advised the French Minister for Foreign Affairs:

*Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial gains and does not threaten the integrity of Serbia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and to maintain order.*

Telegram 188, July 26, from the Paris Russian representative to Sazonoff says that Berthelot, the director of the political department of France, inclines to the opinion—

*That Germany and Austria do not desire war in any case.*

Telegram 1521, July 27, Sazonoff, Russian foreign minister, to Izvolski, Russian ambassador in Paris:

*If there is a question of exercising a moderating influence in Petersburg, we reject it in advance, as we have adopted a standpoint from the outset which we can in no way alter. \* \* \**

Telegram 194, Izvolski wired that Poincaré will return to Paris on Wednesday, July 29 (five days after Belgium mobilization, four days after Russian general mobilization had begun, and on the next night, July 30, the French Minister of War told the Russian military attaché the French Government was determined on war, telegram 216).

Telegram 195, July 27, the German ambassador is shown urging a new proposal for the intervention of France and Germany between Russia and Austria, which was not accepted. Izvolski says in this regard:

*I was surprised at the correct understanding of the situation manifested by the acting minister and his assistant and to see how firm and tranquil they were in their determination to extend to us their fullest support and to avoid the slightest appearance of any lack of unity between us.*

Telegram 197, July 27, Izvolski to Sazonoff:

M. Cambon (French ambassador in Berlin) telegraphs from Berlin that in reply to his question as to what attitude Germany would adopt toward a partial mobilization by Russia, Jagow (German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) replied that a mobilization of that kind would not result in German mobilization, but that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would immediately reply by attacking Russia.

Telegram 1539, July 28, Sazonoff to Izvolski:

In consequence of Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia, we shall announce tomorrow a mobilization of the Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan military districts. In bringing this to the notice of the German Government repeat that Russia has no aggressive intentions against Germany. Meanwhile our ambassador in Vienna is not being recalled.

Sukhomlinoff had already issued a general mobilization order of the Russian Army. He "lied to the Czar" as to its being a general mobilization (Eggerling), said it was partial, and pretended that he had stopped the mobilization, although he did not do so. The Czar, however, July 30, authorized the general mobilization. (Let France Explain, p. 201.)

Telegram 198, July 28, Izvolski to Sazonoff:

*I deem it my duty to make clear that, as results from my conversation yesterday at the Quai d'Orsay, the acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs did not for a moment admit the possibility of exercising a moderating influence in Petersburg. \* \* \* As a result of his conversation with Baron Schon, the minister declined to accept the German proposal."*

Germany was exercising strenuously a moderating influence on Vienna in favor of peace.

Telegram 201, July 28, Izvolski to Sazonoff, states that the German ambassador had again visited the French Foreign Minister and told him that:

*Germany ardently desired to work with France for the maintenance of peace. \* \* \* That Germany was ready to cooperate with the other powers for the maintenance of peace.*

Telegram 1544, Sazonoff to Izvolski, July 29:

The German ambassador informed me on behalf of the Imperial Chancellor that Germany had not ceased and will not cease to exercise a moderating influence in Vienna, and would continue to do so despite the declaration of war. Up to this morning no news has been received of the crossing of Austrian troops on to Serbian territory.

Telegram 1551, July 29, Sazonoff to Izvolski:

The German ambassador has communicated to me to-day the decision of his Government to mobilize if Russia does not stop her military preparation. \* \* \* As we can not accede to Germany's wish, nothing remains for us but to hasten our own warlike propa-

rations and to reckon with the probable inevitability of war. Inform the French Government of this, and at the same time thank it for its declaration made in its name by the French ambassador that we can fully rely upon the support of our ally France. Under present circumstances this declaration is especially valuable for us. It is very desirable that England also without loss of time should associate herself with France and Russia, as it is only thus that she can succeed in preventing a dangerous alteration in the European balance. London telegraphed to in like terms.

Of course, England could not stand for the control of western Europe by the military machine of Germany. Sazonoff knew this and could count on British help. The association of Great Britain with Russia and France would guarantee the safety of attack by Russia on Germany.

Telegram 304, July 29, Sazonoff to Izvolski:

I urgently request you to communicate to the French Foreign Minister the following telegram from the French ambassador in Petersburg: The German ambassador has just informed Sazonoff that if Russia does not stop her military preparations the German Army will be ordered to mobilize. \* \* \*

Telegram 202, July 29, Izvolski to Sazonoff:

Bienvenu-Martin, the acting Foreign Minister, told me that this morning the German ambassador made a communication to him, employing practically the following expressions: Germany is continuing her endeavors in Vienna to cause Austria to agree to a friendly exchange of opinions which should indicate the object and the extent of the steps undertaken by her and concerning which Germany has not so far been exactly informed. The declaration of war will not stand in the way of this exchange of opinions. Germany hopes to receive during the course of these negotiations explanations which will satisfy Russia. Finally, Baron Schon again protested against the assertion that Germany was encouraging Austria to be unyielding.

Telegram 203, July 29, Izvolski to Sazonoff:

\* \* \* Germany \* \* \* declares that as we have received the assurance that Austria seeks no territorial gains, the maintenance of peace entirely depends on Russia because it turns upon the necessity for localizing the Austro-Serbian affair; that is, the punishment of Serbia for her former policy and the giving of guarantees for the future. \* \* \*

He states:

That France and England positively could not exercise any moderating influence in Russia. \* \* \*

Telegram 204, July 29, Wednesday, Izvolski to Sazonoff:

The firm attitude taken up by the French press continues. It passes severe judgment upon the Austrian attack and upon Germany's manifest share of blame for it, and unhesitatingly declares that this touches us, and that we can not remain unsympathetic. As regards solidarity with us, this question is not once discussed, but is taken as a matter of course. Every journalist expresses himself in this sense, including such prominent personages belonging to the most diverse parties as Pichon, Clemenceau, and even Jaures, and also Herve, the father of antimilitarism.

The press reflected the French Government's wishes. (Telegram 216.)

Telegram 206, July 29, Izvolski to Sazonoff:

When the President returned to Paris, he was received at the railway station and in the streets with sympathetic demonstrations from the assembled crowd. Margerie (political director in the French Foreign Office) told me that the President, from his conversations during his journey with prefects and politicians, had become convinced of the firm, energetic, and at the same time calm state of public opinion, which plainly formed a correct estimate of the true significance of events. The same attitude reigned among a large section of the Radical Socialists. The Government attaches no importance to the antimilitary demonstrations of the revolutionary party, and intends to take energetic measures against it. Our military attaché reports in detail regarding the preparatory military measures. Feeling runs high in military circles and in the chief command. I report regarding the press in a special telegram.

Telegram 207, July 29, Izvolski to Sazonoff shows further efforts on the part of Germany to get an adjustment and states:

Finally Baron Schon complained of France's military preparations, and said that in this case Germany would be compelled to adopt similar precautions. Viviani, on his part, declared that France honestly desired peace, but at the same time was firmly determined to act in full agreement with her allies, and Baron Schon could convince himself that this decision was finding the liveliest support in the country. This evening Viviani has forbidden a projected anticwar meeting of the revolutionary party.

It was the night of the next day that the French Minister of War told the military attaché that the French Government was determined on war.

Telegram 1554, Sazonoff to Izvolski, states that if Austria would admit that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed the character of a European question and would declare a readiness to eliminate from her ultimatum those points which violate the sovereign right of Serbia, Russia undertakes to suspend her military preparations.

These preparations had been going on for at least five days. The Russian policy was to use diplomatic negotiations to conceal the war measures, and the Russian policy fixed in 1912 was to cross the German border without a declaration of war. (Von Kuhl, p. 79, 80.)

Telegram 1555, July 30, Sazonoff wires Izvolski:

Until we receive a thoroughly satisfactory reply from Austria through the German Government, we shall continue our military preparations. This is communicated to you very confidentially.

The word "thoroughly" is interesting.

That very night, at 1 a. m., Izvolski telegraphed to Sazonoff, telegram 216:

From military attaché to War Minister, 1 a. m.

The French War Minister informed me in earnest, hearty tones (sincerité enthousiastique) that the Government is firmly decided upon war, and requested me to confirm the hope of the French general staff that all our efforts will be directed against Germany, and that Austria will be treated as a quantité négligeable.

This attitude was strictly in line with the Franco-Russian secret treaty of 1892 and the military plans worked out by the French and Russian general staffs in annual conferences and frequent intercommunications.

So that the French Government gave Austria no time to make "a thoroughly satisfactory" reply to Russia or any other kind of reply.

On August 1, telegram 1601, Sazonoff wired Izvolski:

At midnight the German ambassador informed me on behalf of his Government that if within 12 hours—that is, before midday on Saturday—we do not begin to demobilize, not only as against Germany, but also as against Austria, the German Government will be compelled to order mobilization. To my query as to whether this was equivalent to a declaration of war, the ambassador replied that it was not, but added that we were very near to war.

On Saturday, August 1, 5 p. m., Germany issued a general order of mobilization; at 7.10 p. m. the German ambassador notified Sazonoff Germany accepted the war challenge of Russia. The negotiation with Austria and Germany for the preservation of peace appears to have been used as a camouflage for a predetermined war.

Telegram 208, July 30, from Izvolski to Sazonoff assured him:

The French Government is ready to fulfill all its obligations as an ally. It is of opinion, however, that at the present moment, when negotiations are still in progress between the less interested powers, it would be to the purpose that Russia, so far as the measures of a defensive and precautionary nature which it has deemed necessary to adopt will permit, should not take any direct steps which would serve Germany as a pretext for ordering the general or partial mobilization of her forces.

The term "defensive" had already been defined by the French and Russian staffs, with the approval of the French and Russian Governments as "offensive" in their annual conferences.

The significance of this suppressed telegram is revealed in combination with telegram 1551 of July 29 and suppressed telegrams 209 and 210 and 216 from Paris on July 30.

The French Government (July 30) having determined on war does not wish Germany to mobilize yet, but to gradually discover a situation so dangerous Germany shall declare war as a military necessity.

Telegram 1551, on July 29, from Sazonoff to Izvolski, stated:

Nothing remains for us but to hasten our own warlike preparations and to reckon with the probable inevitability of war. Inform the French Government of this and at the same time thank it for its declaration \* \* \* that we can fully rely upon the support of our ally, France.

This was two days before the German Government demanded that the Russian mobilization should stop under a penalty of German mobilization and three days before the German Emperor, by the German ambassador at Petersburg, accepted a state of war as forced on the German Government. It was not

a German declaration of war. It was a German acceptance of a state of war.

Telegram 209, of July 30, Izvolski to Sazonoff, states that the French ambassador in London:

Was instructed to confer with Grey as to the fixing of the combined attitude of France and England concerning which these two powers, in consequence of the general understanding existing between them, have to deliberate whenever a period of political tension arises.

The time "to deliberate" had nearly arrived.

This proposed conference was based on the notes exchanged between Cambon and Grey on the 22d and 23d of November, 1912 (Exhibits 8 and 9, How Diplomats Make War), and the war plans of the military and naval staffs of Great Britain, France, and Russia, already completely matured.

Telegram 210, of July 30, from Izvolski to Sazonoff, referring to the French War Minister, said that the French War Minister had said to the Russian military attaché:

\* \* \* that we could declare that in the higher interests of peace we are ready temporarily to delay our preparations for mobilization, since this would not prevent us from continuing our preparations and indeed from intensifying them, but we should have to refrain from the possible greater movements of troops.

These suppressed telegrams indicate that both in Petersburg and in Paris the negotiations for the maintenance of peace were "a ruse de guerre" and being used as a screen for a war already fully determined on both in Paris and in Petersburg.

Telegram 216 of July 31, Izvolski to Sazonoff, expressed a fixed war determination (1 a. m. of July 31 was the night of Thursday, July 30):

From military attaché to War Minister. 1 a. m.

The French War Minister informed me in earnest, hearty tones (sincerité enthousiastique) that the Government is firmly decided upon war, and requested me to confirm the hope of the French general staff that all our efforts will be directed against Germany, and that Austria will be treated as a quantité négligeable.

This was equal to a secret declaration of war on Germany, in view of the Franco-Russian treaty and military plans agreed on.

It was 23 hours before the German Government demanded a cessation of the Russian mobilization and two days before Germany declared a state of war existing.

On the same day, July 31, telegram 215 from Izvolski to Sazonoff discloses that Baron Schon asked Viviani what attitude France would adopt in the event of an armed collision between Russia and Germany. Viviani declined to answer. Baron Schon requested arrangements for passports.

On August 1 the German ambassador again visited Viviani, and the latter expressed his "astonishment" to Baron Schon at his action yesterday, "which was not justified by the relations between France and Germany," although, as above, the French Government had already decided upon war and advised Russia to attack Germany with all its forces—and Viviani knew it as Premier.

Izvolski to Sazonoff, August 1, telegram 219, states that the German ambassador had visited Viviani for the second time. That Viviani informed him that the President of the Republic, Poincaré, had signed a decree ordering French mobilization. (It may be remembered that the order of Belgian mobilization was issued July 31 also, although the army had been mobilized on and before July 24.) Viviani expressed his astonishment that Germany should have adopted such a measure as demanding that Russia demobilize under penalty of a German mobilization—

when a friendly exchange of views was in progress between Russia, Austria, and the other powers.

Here is the refinement of high-class diplomacy where two nations have fully prepared themselves for war, are determined on war against a neighbor, and the Premier of France assures the ambassador of Germany that a friendly exchange of views between the powers forbids Germany to prepare for defense. And the same day, August 1, Izvolski wires Sazonoff:

Poincaré declared to me in the most categorical manner that both he himself and the whole cabinet are firmly determined fully to carry out the obligations laid upon us by the terms of our alliance.

The French general mobilization and an immediate offensive on Germany was required by the secret Russian agreement of 1892.

Izvolski, Russian ambassador, wires Sazonoff the same day, August 1, 1914, telegram 223, as follows:

Poincaré told me that during the last few days the Austrian ambassador had energetically assured him and Viviani that Austria

had declared to us (Russia) her readiness not only to respect the territorial integrity of Serbia but also her sovereign rights, but that we (Russia) had intentionally concealed those assurances. To my remark that this was a complete lie, Poincaré replied that similar statements had been made in London by Austria, where they might create a very dangerous impression, and therefore ought to be denied there as well.

That Austria did make these representations is shown by telegram 195; by a verbal declaration of Count Pourtales, French ambassador in St. Petersburg; and by Sazonoff's answer contained in the first two sentences from St. Petersburg of telegram 1554 and by many other records.

The attitude of Italy is shown by telegram 220 of August 1, from Izvolski to Sazonoff, as follows:

Margerite told me that according to information from a very secret source Italy apparently intends, in reliance upon the manner in which the conflict has arisen, to remain neutral at first, and then to come to one decision or another in accordance with the course of events.

The Entente had already weakened Italy's attachment to Germany by concessions in Africa and elsewhere.

The chief of the German general staff, Von Moltke's memorandum of 1912, showed that the Germans did not count upon Italy. (Exhibit 11.) That Germany could not compete on the ocean with Britain or on land with Russia; that Germany had but little hope in a war with Russia and France.

Austria accepted the proposed mediation as between herself and Serbia as two sovereign Governments (Austrian Red Book III, p. 65), but it availed nothing.

Petrograd knew of Austria's acceptance of mediation which was disclosed to Grey in London on the 1st of August. (British White Book, 133.)

Sazonoff, former Russian minister of foreign affairs seven years later, November 15, 1921 in *La Revue de France*, tells that the Czar received a telegram from the Kaiser begging the Czar, notwithstanding the declaration of war, to keep the troops from the German frontier, and that the German Emperor was nearly frantic.

Baron Rosen in "Forty Years of Diplomatic Life," Saturday Evening Post, August 21, 1920, page 85, gives it as his opinion that the Russian mobilization necessarily led to war. He places the guilt upon all three Russian heads, Sazonoff, Sukhomlinoff, and Jaunuschkevitch. He states that at dinner with Sukhomlinoff, then Minister of War, when he received a telegram that Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia (July 25), he heard the War Minister exclaim—

"CETTE FOIS NOUS MARCHERONS!"

that is, "This time we shall march." (Ibid., July 24, 1920, 132.) (This meant under the treaty, 1892, and military and naval conventions with France Russia would attack Germany.)

Baron Rosen states that the intelligentsia and military party of Russia were for war. (Ibid., August 21, 1920.) (They controlled the Government.)

Baron Rosen further tells that Sazonoff and Jaunuschkevitch stopped the dispatch of the Czar's aid to Berlin and secured on Thursday, July 30, a re-order of the general mobilization. (Ibid., August 21, 1920.)

It was in this condition of affairs, with Russia having an army of over 2,000,000 men on the East, who had been practicing mobilization since spring and actually had been in process of mobilizing at least since the 25th of July (Czar's telegram), that the German Government demanded the mobilization stopped under the alleged necessity of regarding it as a declaration of war by Russia.

It was well understood by the military strategists of France and Russia and of Europe that Germany's only chance in such a war as this was by lightning speed and efficiency, striking France through Belgium. (See French and Russian military conferences.) The dispatches show that Germany tried to secure French neutrality and failed, tried to obtain British neutrality and failed, tried to induce Belgium to submit to an unopposed passage and failed. (Morel, Truth and the War. How Diplomats Make War, Neilson.) (Diplomatic Documents, World War, Scott.)

SOME EVIDENCE FROM BERLIN.

It was the policy of Germany to support Austria in rebuking Serbia, as far as could be done through diplomacy, but even if the diplomatic effort should fail, Germany did not intend to be drawn into a war.

On Sunday, the 26th of July, the Kaiser returned from his Scandinavian cruise. On Monday a rapid fire of telegrams took place from Berlin to Vienna, under the instruction of the

Kaiser, demanding a peaceful adjustment, Berlin assuming that the purpose of the Entente was not necessarily hostile or determined on war, and that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement was really sincere, put great pressure on the Austrian Government, as appears, through the following telegrams:

[From the German Chancellor to the German ambassador, Vienna, July 27.]

We can not reject the rôle of mediator and must place the English proposal before the Vienna cabinet for consideration. Request Count Berchtold's opinion on the British proposal, as well as on Sazonoff's wish to negotiate directly with Vienna. (Die Deutschen Dokumente, No. 396.)

On July 28 he sent this dispatch:

The refusal of every exchange of views with Petrograd would be a serious mistake if it provokes Russia precisely to armed interference, which Austria is primarily interested in avoiding. We are ready, to be sure, to fulfill our obligations as an ally, but *must refuse to allow ourselves to be drawn by Vienna into a world conflagration frivolously and in disregard of our advice.* Please say this to Count Berchtold *at once with all emphasis and with great seriousness.* (Ibid. No. 396.)

On July 29 he sent this dispatch:

I regard the attitude of the Austrian Government and its unparalleled procedure toward the various Governments with increasing astonishment \* \* \*. It leaves us wholly in the dark as to its program \* \* \*. I must conclude that the Austrian Government is harboring plans which it sees fit to conceal from us in order to assure herself in all events of German support and avoid the refusal which might result from a frank statement. (Ibid. No. 396, p. 361.)

He sent five warning telegrams on the 29th and 30th to Vienna. (Ibid.)

The Kaiser had informed Foreign Minister Jagow on seeing the Serbian reply accepting the Austrian conditions and agreeing to mediation that—

Now, no cause for war any longer exists.

On July 30 the German Chancellor sent the following telegram:

If Austria refuses all negotiations, we are face to face with a conflagration in which England will be against us. Rumania and Italy, according to all indications, will not be for us, and we shall stand *two against four powers.* Through England's opposition the main blow will fall on Germany. Austria's political prestige, the military honor of her army, as well as her just claims against Serbia, can be adequately satisfied by her occupation of Belgrade or other places. Through her humiliation of Serbia she will make her position in the Balkans, as well as in her relation to Russia, strong again. Under these circumstances, *we must urgently and emphatically press upon the consideration of the Vienna cabinet the adoption of mediation in accordance with the above honorable conditions.* The responsibility for the consequences which would otherwise follow would be for Austria and for us an uncommonly heavy one. (German White Book, p. 395.)

In Oman's Outbreak of the War, pages 61, 68, 69, 77, 79, 88, and 89, will be found the exchange of telegrams between William II and Nicholas, as follows:

JULY 28—10.45 P. M.

I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The unscrupulous agitation which had been going on for years in Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Serbians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless you will agree with me that both of us, you as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by you and your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, *I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia.* I hope confidently that you will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise. Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin.

(Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 61.)

WILHELM.

PETERHOF PALACE, July 29—1 p. m.

I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask you earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country, and in Russia the indignation, which I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that very soon *I shall be unable to*

*resist the pressure exercised upon me, and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war.* To prevent such a calamity as a European war would be, I urge you in the name of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far.

NICHOLAS.

(Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 61.)

JULY 29—6.30 P. M.

I have received your telegram and I share your desire for the conservation of peace. However, I can not—as I told you in my first telegram—consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an "ignominious war." Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Serbia, as long as they are merely on paper, are entirely unreliable. According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian War without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between your Government and Vienna, an understanding which, as I have already telegraphed you, *my Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid, and would undermine my position as mediator, which, upon your appeal to my friendship and aid, I willingly accepted.*

WILHELM.

(Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 68.)

It was the very next night that the French Minister of War said the French Government was determined on war. (Telegram 216.)

PETERHOF PALACE, July 29.

Thanks for your telegram, which is conciliatory, while the official message presented by your ambassador to my Foreign Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to explain the difference. It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to The Hague Conference. I trust in your wisdom and friendship.

NICHOLAS.

(Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 69.)

JULY 30—1 A. M.

My ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization. *I have told you the same in my last telegram.* Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Serbia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to your advice and that of your Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator, with which you have intrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon your express desire, is threatened, if not made impossible. *The entire weight of decision now rests upon your shoulders; you have to bear the responsibility of war or peace.*

WILHELM.

(Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 77.)

This was the day the Czar reordered Russian mobilization and the French minister advised Russia "the French Government was determined on war."

PETERHOF, July 30—1.20 p. m.

I thank you from my heart for your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatischeff (Russian honorary aid to the Kaiser) with instructions. *The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defense against the preparations of Austria.* I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner your position as mediator, which I appraise very highly. We need your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.

NICHOLAS.

(German White Book, 1915, 23-A.)

Then Nicholas reorders Russian mobilization.

JULY 31, 1914.

I thank you cordially for your mediation, which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. *It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations, which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization.* It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

NICHOLAS.

(Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 88.)

Under the 1892 treaty a partial Austrian mobilization required Russia and France to attack Germany. The Austrian-Serbian negotiations could end when Nicholas said the word and Russia was ready to enter Germany.

JULY 31—2 P. M.

Upon your appeal to my friendship and your request for my aid, I have engaged in mediation between your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place your troops were being mobilized against my ally, Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to you, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this I have continued it, and I now receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defense. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia, which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for you and your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by you if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary.

WILHELM.

(Oman's Outbreak of the War, p. 89.)

No reply. Wilhelm, at midnight Friday, gave notice the German Army would mobilize if by noon Saturday Russian mobilization did not stop. At 5 p. m. Saturday, August 1, German mobilization was issued. At 7.10 p. m. German ambassador at Petrograd advised the Russian Government that Germany accepted the Russian challenge and the state of war forced on Germany.

It will be observed in this exchange of telegrams that Nicholas was under a pressure he feared he should be unable to resist. On the very day that the Kaiser advised him that he would have to bear the responsibility of war or peace if he ordered a general mobilization, he re-ordered the mobilization which had been begun by his own statement on July 25, and on July 31, having the day before ordered the general mobilization, he advises the Kaiser it was impossible to discontinue the military preparations, and he gives his solemn word that the Russian troops will undertake no provocative action, although they cross the German border in four places the next day. (Kuhl 79-80.)

The German leaders, getting daily reports from Paris, London, Brussels, and Petersburg, accepted what they had become convinced was now absolutely unavoidable, and on Saturday, 5 p. m., August 1, ordered a general mobilization.

(Note presented by the German ambassador at St. Petersburg on August 1, at 7.10 p. m.)

The Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator between the cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilization of her forces both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by any military proceedings on the part of Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary to answer) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honor, on the instructions of my Government, to inform Your Excellency as follows:

His Majesty the Emperor, my august sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge and considers himself at war with Russia.

FOURTALES.

The words in parentheses occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that by mistake they were both inserted in the note.

RELATIVE ENTENTE AND GERMAN PREPARATIONS.

General Von Moltke, in the summary above referred to, says that Germany would be obliged in the event of war—

to take the field against France with an inferiority in infantry (though still with a slight superiority in artillery), and will further be attacked in the rear by Russia.

And he says:

In view of the enormous sums Russia is spending on the reorganization of her army she will be stronger with every year that passes. It is just as impossible for Germany to try to compete with Russia as a land power as it is for her to attempt to catch up with England as a sea power.

In chapter 10 (Let France Explain) Bausman points out the preparedness of the Entente Allies—Russia, France, and England—and that in 1914 the expenditures of Russia, France, and England for war purposes made a total of \$1,337,259,735, while Germany and Austria expended in 1914 \$420,133,850, so that the Entente Allies expended \$917,000,000 more in 1914 than Germany and Austria, and this does not include Belgium or Italy.

The number of men available for immediate action of Russia, France, England, and Italy was 2,663,003. The total for Germany and Austria was 1,176,741.

General Buat's figures give the German active army 870,000 men, the French active army 910,000 men. General Joffre in Franco-Russian conferences of 1913 said he would have 200,000 more men than agreed to.

Of course, Great Britain, France, and Russia controlled the sea through the giant navy of Great Britain, and therefore Germany was cut off from supplies throughout the world, while the Entente Allies had the whole world to draw from.

When the war ended Germany with approximately 67,000,000 people was facing nearly the whole world, or over 1,400,000,000 people against the German Government.

Chancellor Hollweg states that—

The supposition that Germany let loose war out of mere lust of world power is so silly that a historian would only take it seriously in the entire absence of any other explanation at all. \* \* \* Such an assumption ascribes to us the sort of folly that is only attributed to an opponent in the heat of political controversy. (Hollweg, 163.)

He says:

The controversy as to which party gave the first impulse to a program of general armament and to a perversion of the policy of alliances will probably never be fought to a finish. Immeasurable mutual distrust, imperialistic ideals, and a patriotism restricted to material national instincts respectively worked each other up without its ever being possible to say that any particular nation had contributed most to the general tendency of the world. (Ibid. 169.)

Hollweg points out that Russia mobilized because it desired war. It refused to suspend mobilization.

In spite of the fact that Vienna was ready to enter into direct conversation with Petersburg on the Serbian issue.

In spite of the fact that Vienna had accepted the Grey mediation.

In spite of the fact that Vienna had given assurances as to the integrity of Serbia.

In spite of the fact that Vienna was prepared not to go beyond such a temporary occupation of a part of Serbian territory as England itself had considered acceptable.

Finally, in spite of the fact that Austria had only mobilized against Serbia and that Germany had not yet mobilized at all.

Former Chancellor Hollweg then says:

Consequently, when the telegraph brought us news of the mobilization on the morning of the 31st of July, we could not be other than convinced that Russia desired war under all conditions.

It appears that neither Germany nor Austria knew the terms of the treaty of 1892 requiring Russia and France to attack Germany if Austria mobilized.

SOME BELGIAN EVIDENCE.

In the reports from the Belgian ministers and chargés d'affaires at Berlin, London, and Paris to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Brussels, printed by E. S. Mittler & Sons, Berlin, will be found 200 pages of evidence going to show the attitude of Quai d'Orsay, of London, and of Berlin to the general effect that the Berlin Government was very desirous of maintaining peace, that the French Government became increasingly disposed to war as the war powers of Russia and France were expanded and the Entente with Great Britain became dependable.

For example, the Belgian minister at Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium says, page 184:

Everyone in England and France considers the Entente Cordiale to be a defensive and offensive alliance against Germany. \* \* \* It is the Entente Cordiale which has reawakened in France an idea

of ravanche, which up to then had slumbered. It is also the Entente Cordiale which is responsible for the state of uneasiness and unrest prevailing in Europe for the last seven years. \* \* \* For the present it must therefore be considered as approved that the plan of assisting France in a war against Germany by landing an army of 150,000 English troops was discussed in London. There is nothing in this calculated to surprise us. It is the continuation of the singular proposals made some years ago by Colonel Barnardston to General Ducarne.

The Belgian minister, Guillaume, at Paris to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, January 16, 1914, says:

I already had the honor of informing you that it is MM. Poincaré Delcasse, Millerand, and their friends who have inaugurated and pursued the nationalistic, militaristic, and chauvinistic policy, the renaissance of which we witnessed. Such a policy constitutes a danger for Europe—and also for Belgium. I see in it the greatest peril threatening to-day the peace of Europe. \* \* \* The attitude adopted by Barthou has provoked a recrudescence of militarism in Germany. (Ibid. p. 169.)

The Belgian minister at Berlin in a long letter on February 20, 1914, quotes the French ambassador at Berlin, as follows:

The majority of the Germans and of the French undoubtedly wish to live in peace. But in both countries there is a powerful minority dreaming solely of battles, of wars of conquest, or ravanche. Herein lies the danger; it is like a powder barrel which any rash act may set on fire. (Ibid. p. 173.)

On May 8, 1914, the Belgian minister, Guillaume, at Paris to the Belgian foreign office quotes an "experienced and highly placed diplomat" as stating:

If a serious incident should arise one of these days between France and Germany, the statesmen of the two countries will have to arrive at a peaceful solution of the matter within three days or else there will be war.

One of the most dangerous elements of the present situation is the return of France to the three-years' service; the latter has been inconsiderately imposed by the military party, and the country is unable to stand it. Before two years have elapsed France will be placed before the alternative either of abrogating the three-years' act or of going to war. \* \* \* The press in both countries is blameworthy. The campaign pursued in Germany against the Foreign Legion is exceedingly clumsy, and the tone of the French newspapers is invariably acrimonious and aggressive. (Ibid. p. 181.)

On June 9, 1914, Guillaume wires the Belgian Foreign Office from Paris as follows:

During the last few days the press campaign in favor of the principle of the three-years' service has been extremely violent. All sorts of means have been adopted with a view to influencing public opinion. The newspapers have not hesitated to compromise even General Joffre. We have also seen the French ambassador in St. Petersburg take—contrary to all precedents—an initiative which may prove dangerous for the future of France. Is it true that the St. Petersburg cabinet pledged France to adopt the three-years' service and that the former is to-day bringing all its influence to bear in order to prevent the abrogation of the law in question? \* \* \* We must therefore ask ourselves if the attitude of the St. Petersburg cabinet is based on the conviction that events are imminent which will permit of Russia making use of the instrument placed by her in the hand of her ally. (Ibid. p. 182.)

("Events are imminent" means "war is near.")

The Belgian minister, Beyens, at Berlin, June 12, 1914, in a dispatch to the Belgian Foreign Office, says:

Another criticism which can be leveled against the champions of the three years' service in France is that of perpetually dragging Russia into the discussion—Russia whose political aims remain a mystery, who utilizes the dual alliance solely for her own benefit and who likewise, although she is no ways threatened by Germany, increases her armaments in alarming proportion. (Ibid. p. 186.)

#### SOME EVIDENCE FROM LONDON.

In great detail and with innumerable quotations, Francis Neilson, a member of the English Parliament, in his work, *How Diplomats Make War*, substantially confirms from English records what has been disclosed in the telegrams above quoted; that is, that there was in effect an understanding between Russia, France, and Great Britain with the military and naval details all worked out by repeated conferences of their general staffs and the understanding that Great Britain would cooperate with France in the event of a war with Germany. For example:

In London, on Saturday, August 1, Lord Lansdowne, Sir Edward Carson, and Mr. Bonar Law hastened to the center of the diplomatic world. (How Diplomats Make War, p. 293.) Germany had issued

orders for the general mobilization of her army and navy; the next day, the Sabbath, to be the first day. Through the long Sabbath all over the Kingdom thousands of feet tramped channelwards, regiment after regiment with full kit wound through London streets as the bells from tower and steeple called the folk to prayer. Ministers went to a cabinet meeting there and yielded up to the French ambassador some token of British friendship.

The German mobilization was ordered 5 p. m. Saturday. The English regiments were on the march Sunday morning armed for war.

On August 1 Sir Edward Grey told the German ambassador that Great Britain would not engage to remain neutral, that—*we must keep our hands free.* (How Diplomats Make War, 290.)

The fact was Grey was not really free but fully committed, both by the real intent of the agreement with France, but far more by the interests of Great Britain, and Great Britain instantly carried out the commitment under the agreements with France and with Russia.

Telegram 148 from the British Foreign Office, August 2, 1914:

After the cabinet meeting this morning, I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:

"I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coast or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

So that the Entente was in fact effective, after all, on the certain contingency of action by the German fleet, and Parliament was committed by its own Government's acts. This action was equal to agreeing to attack Germany as an ally of France. The interests of Great Britain, however, made it necessary when a war actually came between France and Germany that Great Britain should fight the military rulers of the German people who would have been dangerous to British interests if they had conquered France and dominated western Europe (whether they were responsible for the war or not).

Mr. Neilson points out (p. 265):

News had reached Berlin that Belgium had issued as early as July 24 a mobilization circular, and an undated instruction to Belgian ambassadors which contained the information they were to give to the chancellors as to her "strengthened peace footing."

The Belgian circular of July 24 (day Austria made demand on Serbia) announced that the Belgian Army had already been mobilized and forts near Germany put in order for war.

In the circular of the Belgian Foreign Office to its ambassadors, dated July 24, was the inclosure heretofore referred to, without date, but necessarily either of that date or of an earlier date, which states:

All necessary steps to insure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian Army has been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defense of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of defense.

There is no manner of doubt what the Grey-Cambon letters meant. The complete plan of naval and military strategy was worked out between the French and British naval and army officers, and on Sunday morning, the very next morning, the time Germany ordered her mobilization Saturday afternoon, and accepted the state of war intended by Russia and contemplated by the mobilization and the Czar's secret order to the staff, British regiments were marching through London to the front fully equipped for war. (How Diplomats Make War, p. 295.)

A number of the members of the British cabinet resigned when they discovered this secret diplomacy, including Lord Morley and the famous patriot, John Burns.

The French Government immediately offered Belgium military support (ibid., 310), and the following dispatch from the French ambassador at Brussels to the French Government explains the relations between France and Belgium. The telegram follows:

The chief of the cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the French military attaché to prepare at once for the cooperation and contact of French troops with the Belgian Army pending the results of the appeal to the guaranteeing powers now being made. Orders have therefore been given to Belgian provincial governors not to regard movements of French troops as a violation of the frontier.

The British troops took their place on the left wing of the French under the plans long since worked out.

The mobilization of the Belgian army was completed at least the day before the general mobilization of the Russian Army begun under Sukhomlinoff's order, July 25, about which "he lied" to the Russian Czar (see Sukhomlinoff's trial) when he represented to the Russian Czar that it was a partial mobilization, but which was reordereed as a general mobilization by the Russian Czar on July 30.

In the trial of Sukhomlinoff, Minister of War, at St. Petersburg, by the revolutionary government of Russia, Bausman says:

Sukhomlinoff confessed that after the Czar had received these telegrams from the Kaiser the Czar called the Minister of War up by telephone and told him to stop the mobilization. At that time the Czar thought the mobilization was only partial. It was really already general, a procedure for which the direct authority of the Czar was necessary and had not been given. Sukhomlinoff confessed that in making the mobilization general he had concealed this from the Czar; nay, more, that he did not reveal it to him in the conversation by telephone. He next admitted that he promised the Czar to stop the further mobilization and not to issue a general mobilization. He hung up the telephone with a false promise to the Czar, and, he says, went on with the mobilization. His fellow rogue, Jaunuschkevitch, floundering in his testimony and confronted at all times with contradictions, left the stand in the same disgusting and humiliating condition. (Bausman, 200; also Oman's Outbreak of the War, 68.)

If the democracies or peoples of the world continue to permit secret diplomacy with its ambitious intrigue, militarism, commercial imperialism, this World War will not be the last.

The greatest of the English papers, the London Times, correctly states the true position with regard to this matter of British participation in the Triple Entente, as follows (How Diplomats Make War, 336):

[From the London Times, March 15, 1915.]

There are still some Englishmen and Englishwomen who greatly err as to the reasons that have forced England to draw the sword. They know that it was Germany's flagrant violation of Belgian neutrality which filled the cup of her indignation and made her people insist on war (sic). They do not reflect that our honor and our interest must have compelled us to join France and Russia even if Germany had scrupulously respected the rights of her small neighbors, and had sought to hack her way into France through the eastern fortresses.

Great Britain was led into the war on the theory that British interests required cooperation with France and Russia, for which Sir Edward Grey had laid the ground by years of naval and military conferences in which every detail of a war on Germany had been carefully outlined.

In Entente Diplomacy and the World, Documents 847 and 850 (Exhibit VII), will be found the British-Russian Entente plans.

These dispatches demonstrate beyond a possibility of doubt that there were secret conventions thoroughly worked out and planned between Russia, France, and Great Britain as to how war should be made on Germany, involving Great Britain sending empty ships into the Baltic Sea for Russia's use against Germany just before the war of 1914 was declared; (Doc. 850) that England should be prepared to fetter the German fleet in the North Sea; arrangements in the Mediterranean were to be made, and especial authority to the Russian ships to use French and English ports to establish a complete working plan between the navies and the armies of the three countries—Great Britain, Russia, and France. The limit of discussion makes it inexpedient to quote these innumerable documents. It should be sufficient to call the attention of the Senate to these documents and of their convincing character.

The Russian ambassador, London, June 25, 1914, telegraphs to Sazonoff (Doc. 855, p. 730, ibid.):

Grey told me to-day that he was greatly alarmed by the false rumors which were circulating in the German press concerning the contents of the alleged naval convention between England and Russia. \* \* \* Grey assured the German ambassador \* \* \* that between England, on the one hand, and France and Russia there existed neither an alliance nor a convention \* \* \* that their negotiations had never assumed a character directed against Germany nor had they any reference to the so-called "encircling policy."

On the face of the Cambon-Grey letters was an express disclaimer of either Government being bound by them, but the actual intent and true, common interest against the German Imperial Government is quite clear.

The English honor and interest were both involved. It certainly appears that France, Russia, and Great Britain did have secret conventions; the conventions were directed against Ger-

many, worked out in detail then in process of execution and they were in pursuance of "the encircling policy," and were carried out on the battle fields and at sea within 60 days.

Three days later Russo-Serbian intrigues led to the murder of Archduke Ferdinand, and the grand drama, with stage fully set, opened to the astonishment and grief of the poor, little common people who die and pay taxes.

The secret entente agreements with France and Russia were repeatedly denied by the British Foreign Office in Parliament by its representatives asserting that there was no commitment of the British Government to support the French Government in case of a war with Germany.

On March 10 of the following year, 1913, Mr. Asquith, replying to a question in the Commons from Lord Hugh Cecil, denied that England was under an—

obligation arising owing to an assurance given by the ministry in the course of diplomatic negotiations to send a very large armed force out of this country to operate in Europe.

On March 24 he made similar denials in reply to questions from Sir W. Byles and Mr. King.

On April 14 Mr. Runciman, in a speech at Birkenhead, denied "in the most categorical way" the existence of a secret understanding with any foreign power.

On May 3 the Secretary for the Colonies, Mr. Harcourt, declared that he "could conceive no circumstances in which continental operations would not be a crime against the people of this country."

On June 28 the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Acland, declared publicly that—

in no European question were we concerned to interfere with a big army.

On July 1 Lord Loreburn, Lord Chancellor from 1906 to 1912, said—

that any British Government would be so guilty toward our country as to take up arms in a foreign quarrel is more than I can believe.

On April 28, 1914, and again on June 11, Sir Edward Grey confirmed in the House of Commons Mr. Asquith's assertion, made March 11 and 24, 1913, of British freedom from engagements with continental powers. (See Neilson, How Diplomats Make War; Morel, Truth and the War, etc.)

These disclosures justify America in receiving the assurances of European diplomats with some reserve.

Lloyd-George five months before the war said:—

The German Army is vital not merely to the existence of the German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation itself, surrounded as Germany is by other nations, each of which possesses arms about as powerful as her own. (Daily Chronicle, January 1, 1914.)

The French Army was much more powerful than the German (conferences above quoted).

The semiofficial paper, Birshewija Wjedomasti, of Petrograd, on June 13, 1914, before the Serajevo tragedy, stated:

Russia is ready and hopes that France is ready. (Bourse Gazette.)

This article appears to have been inspired by Sukhomlinoff, Minister of War. This paper goes on to state that the Russian Army is now 2,320,000 men. (Bausman, 31.)

This paper (supra) further said:

We have projected and begun to build a whole network of strategic railways to concentrate the army as quickly as possible. (Bausman, Appendix G.)

#### THE EUROPEAN PRESS.

The press of Russia, France, Germany, and Serbia in 1914 was a press largely controlled by subsidies.

The journals were not supported by advertisements as in America. They relied upon subsidies from governments, politicians, and from commercial and financial interests.

Through this agency the people of Germany, France, and Russia were taught to hate each other. The death of the Crown Prince of Austria was attributed by the Government of Austria to the Serbian press propaganda financed by the Russian Government through the Russian minister at Belgrade with the connivance of the Serbian Government. In Livre Noir, which discloses the secret archives of the Russian Foreign Office, are many dispatches showing the manner in which the Russian Government subsidized and directed the press.

On page 208, Livre Noir, for example, in telegram 591, December 18, 1913, Izvolksi, the Russian ambassador at Paris, speaking of the Paris press, says:

The papers which are devoted to us, as Le Matin, rely on me for instructions, and if we do not give them directions they might perhaps engage themselves with a false view.

On page 213 (ibid.) Izvolski says:

It is particularly important here, at such a moment, to control the press. Otherwise it may engage itself with a false view; besides it is more than sure that it is continually moved by financial circles who have in view only their own special interests.

On page 271 of *Livre Noir* Izvolski writes:

Endeavoring to maintain the attitudes which are desirable for us with the press of the Government and political world, I am doing my utmost at the same time to influence the press. With this in view, thanks to the measures taken in time, considerable results have been obtained. As you know, I do not intervene directly in the distribution of the subsidies, but this distribution in which the French ministers take part, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance, is, it appears, efficacious and obtains its ends. From my side I exert every day to influence personally the most important journals of Paris, such as *Temps*, *Journal des Debats*, *L'Echo de Paris*.

The manner in which the press responds to such stimulation has heretofore been shown in the dispatches which I have quoted, showing that they were instrumentalities in moving the French people to war and in moving the Russian people to war.

From these disclosures it will appear how extremely significant to the German rulers was the attitude of the French press in Paris in July, 1914, where they were denouncing Germany and Austria and demanding the support of Russia, and it is worth while to recall the declaration of the *Nouvelle Revue* that France was determined on war, and of the *Petrograd* press that Russia was determined on war, and that France and Russia were prepared.

In the American press a few weeks ago was an item announcing that the French Government requested 8,000,000 francs to be used with the press without disclosing the details.

I have just received by mail as a Senator of the United States a book of 112 pages of press clippings strenuously supporting the French policy in the Ruhr. It is obviously paid propaganda. The first article declares, among other things, in regard to the World War:

What Germany could not do in battle she is doing by evasion and maneuver. She has broken the unity of the Allies and has made of Armistice Day a hollow mockery. America, and history must so write it, was the first to falter. Last in the field, we were the first to leave.

This unfair imputation was printed in an American newspaper and purports to be written by an American editor.

The fact is, America, and history must so write it, won the war, and only left when the military dynasties had been destroyed in battle.

When the Allies were sending delegation after delegation imploring our help, telling us that the British and Belgian troops had their backs to the wall, and that the French troops were bled white, America sent 2,000,000 of the ablest and bravest men on earth to the battle line and drove the Germans back, and the American President by diplomacy presented terms the German people accepted as a basis of armistice. See the dispatch of June 3, 1918, of General Foch, Lloyd-George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, beseeching our assistance immediately (Exhibit 13) and urgently declaring that without American help the war was lost and victory impossible.

Until the great mass of European people understand how they are ruled and led into war by a few leaders there can be little hope of permanent peace in the world. If a few diplomats having access to the national purse are permitted by propaganda, through a subsidized press, to teach the people to hate each other, permanent peace is impossible.

The peoples ought to be taught to understand each other, to respect each other and promote friendly commercial relations with each other.

There is no possible reason why the farmers and laborers of France should be led to kill the farmers and laborers of Germany, and there is no just cause why the mechanics, clerks, and domestics of Germany should be taught to hate and kill the mechanics, clerks, and domestics of France. They are all alike entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But their peace depends on the intelligence, power, and initiative of the people themselves expressed through their proper parliaments elected by the suffrage of the people. This is a matter that the people of Europe themselves must work out. They can not be advised from America. Possibly the seeds we sow in feeding their famishing may finally lead their statesmen to realize that the American ideals of international understanding and good will is the better policy.

The Belgian minister at Berlin, Baron Beyens, speaks about the French inflammatory discourses which place Belgium in

so dangerous a position and which interfere with those trying to preserve the peace between France and Germany.

Baron Guillaume, the Belgian ambassador at Paris, wrote his home office, May 8, that Frenchmen were proclaiming a certain victory over Germany. (*Dip. Rev.*, p. 288.)

The Russian ambassador at Berlin advises his Government March 12, 1914, that Germany "is trying to appear not afraid."

Izvolski, the Russian ambassador at Paris, on September 12, 1912, reports a conversation with Poincaré assuring him of the French loyalty to Russia, as follows:

If a conflict with Austria should involve Germany's armed intervention, France will at once recognize it as a *casus foederis* and will not lose a minute in fulfilling her pledges to Russia. (*Pravda*, 1919; Bausman, 34.)

On December 23, 1920, Lloyd-George expresses the opinion—That no one at the head of affairs quite meant war. It was something into which they glided, or rather staggered and stumbled.

This view is very charitable but comes a little late.

It is worth while to remember that Germany had over 4,500 miles of frontier to protect and no natural boundaries to protect her on the east or the west or the south and that their authorities naturally were apprehensive.

Frederick Bausman, former member of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, in *Let France Explain*, thoroughly documented (London, George Allen & Unwin), believes that the Government of France under Poincaré was also to blame for the world catastrophe, and he lays down the following propositions:

First. That the alliance of France and Russia was unnecessary to the safety of France and was hostile to the peace of Europe by its inviting into western Europe an overwhelming mass led by irresponsible men who aimed at extending there an irresponsible government and a shameful despotism.

Second. That France deliberately and continually armed Russia and encouraged her aggressiveness against Germany; that French policy was continuously directed to creating a favorable opportunity for war upon Germany to regain her lost Provinces, disintegrate Germany as she had kept her disintegrated in previous centuries, and resume her old place at the head of European affairs.

Third. That the German armaments were, beyond all question, made necessary by the enormous and wholly unnecessary increases in Russian armaments.

Fourth. That the Serbians were among the most ruthless people in Europe; that Russia had no regard for Serbia other than to extend her own empire into the Balkans; and that Russia desired to break up, through Serbia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a result that would have left Germany helpless against Russia later.

Fifth. That the war sprang out of Russian ambition in the Balkans and in nothing vital to the French whatsoever, and that France could have stopped Russia at the outset by telling her that she would not support her Balkan ambitions, because Russia would not have gone into the war unless supported by France, which country immediately advised her that she would support her.

Sixth. That Germany did everything possible to avert the war after discovering that Russia actually would go to war and France support Russian ambitions in the Balkans, the chancellor imperatively and repeatedly requesting Austria to acquiesce, and the Kaiser personally imploring the Czar to stop, and that England, though embarrassed by previous relations with the French and Russians, also exerted herself to prevent war, but that the French Government did nothing whatever to restrain Russia.

Seventh. That the Russians, finding themselves certain of French support and possibly of English support, too, pushed, at first by stealth and then openly, a general mobilization; that they brought 2,000,000 of well-equipped troops toward the German frontier and refused, after reasonable notice from Germany, to stop the mobilization; that France and Russia knew that they could ultimately drive England into the war, because England could not risk the conquest of France by Germany under any circumstances, and that Italy would not aid Germany at all.

Eighth. That Russia wanted a war, that France knew that Russia wanted a war, and that the Government of Poincaré did all that was possible to lash up the people of France against Germany before the war because his Government believed that the combined forces of France and Russia, especially if aided by England, were invincible.

Ninth. That the French and Russians, neither of them surprised but on the contrary long prepared, went into the war



at the height of their overwhelming strength, the French Army being alone equal to that of Germany and the fully equipped part of the Russian much larger.

Tenth. That if the war had ended successfully for Russia, the best part of central Europe would have been absorbed by her; that France during the war actually made a secret treaty to that effect; that the Germans were compelled to resist with enormous loss the spread of the Slavs into western Europe and have contributed to its protection; and that the English, compelled by sheer military necessity to save France from defeat, have suffered incalculably in life, trade, and wealth.

And says:

A single telegram from the French Government to the Russian would have prevented this war, a simple telegram warning Russia that France would not support her in a conflict concerning the Balkans when Russia herself was not attacked by the Central Powers, neither of which had even mobilized against her. Germany had not mobilized at all. One such message, I repeat, would have saved civilization its catastrophe, for the Russian Government at the outset had stated that it would not venture into this war unless "secure of the support of France." (Let France Explain, p. 36.) (British White Paper 17.)

In order to comprehend what took place in Europe, one should remember that the Governments of Europe are in the hands of a comparatively few men.

The record shows, of course, that the Czarist Russian Government was a military dynasty, controlled by the Czar, grand dukes, and their military satellites. The French Government, the record shows, entered into a secret written treaty with this military monarchy whose views of government were diametrically opposed to the supposed principles of the Republic of France.

The British Foreign Office entered into a secret agreement with France and Russia without the knowledge of Parliament, and thus stimulated and made aggressive the militarism of the French leaders, and all the more made aggressive the leaders of Russia whose objects were entirely at variance with those of the British people or of the French people. The French leaders had some reason to fear the possible aggression of the German military dynasty and by making an alliance with Russia and England were able to make the German military authorities afraid to attack France, but the policy fatally encouraged Russia to attack Germany. Russia had a far more important and different purpose to serve. The Russian Government had long had a determined policy to control the Dardanelles, to have free access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. It was impossible for Russia to get this advantage except as the result of a general European war, and the way to provoke a general European war was precisely the means employed by Russia with its intrigues in Serbia, where the Slavs of Serbia were stimulated and financed to carry on secret intrigues against the Austrian Government through the Slav population of Austria. It was only necessary to compel Austria to partially mobilize, whereupon the Franco-Russian agreement to attack Germany came into effect automatically, and France and Germany must instantly mobilize and attack Germany at the same time on the east and on the west with all their forces.

These Serbian intrigues compelled Austria to mobilize in 1912. (Russia not quite ready.)

Again compelled Austria to mobilize in 1913. (Russia not quite ready.)

In 1914, when they led to the murder of the Crown Prince of Austria and his consort, the court at Vienna in extreme anger delivered a 48-hour demand for satisfaction and mobilized against Serbia.

A pretext for the Russian mobilization had been created by Russia and instantly Sazonoff said, "This time we shall march."

This was the precise situation which the Russian clique, led by Sazonoff and Sukhomlinoff, seems to have desired to accomplish and the war was on.

#### FRENCH EVIDENCE.

Colonel Boucher, of the French general staff, issued in 1910 to 1913 three books—one France Victorious in To-morrow's Wars, one the Offensive Against Germany, and another Germany in Peril.

In the latter he says:

Germany is menaced on all frontiers, and situated that she can not feel secure of her future against all her adversaries, without finding some way to eliminate us . . . menaced on the north by England, on the west by France, on the east by Russia, and to-day equally on the south . . . in danger of panslavism. She must raise her forces to the supreme degree.

General Buat, of the French general staff, showed that the mobile forces of France were an active army of 910,000 men with reserves of 1,325,000.

One can say then that without taking any account of the Belgian Army or of the four British divisions, France alone was at the beginning, at least, equal, if not superior, to her formidable adversary in the number of the principal units. (L'Armée Allemande, pp. 1-9.)

The French ambassador at St. Petersburg, Paleologue, in the early part of 1914 was warned by Viviani that war would soon break out (Revue des deux Mondes, January, 1921); but Viviani, in his opening speech to the French Parliament after the German declaration of war, complained of its being "unexpected."

Lord French tells us that the preparations with France were on a complete and mutual understanding ("1914," p. 8) and that England was to put 160,000 men at a point near Belgium on 12 days' notice.

Benckendorff, the Russian ambassador to London, said:

When I recall Cambon's conversations with me, the words exchanged and add the attitude of Poincaré, the thought comes to me as a conviction that of all the powers France is the only one which not to say that it wishes war would yet look upon it without great regret. (German White Book, pt. 2, p. 75.)

Many notable French men have issued protests and accusations against Poincaré, such as De Martial, Henri Barbusse, Anatole France, Ernest Renaud, etc.

Renaud, a distinguished historical writer, engaged Poincaré in an argument and said:

The Entente wanted the war as much as William II, and you, Mr. President, and your group of friends wanted it more than all. (Bausman, p. 29.)

Sukhomlinoff, Russian Foreign Minister, August, 1912, after one of Poincaré's visits sent a circular to his Russian diplomats saying:

When the critical moment in international relations arrives, it will be most desirable to have at the head of the allied governments, if not Poincaré himself, at least a personality who has the same energetic character and who has as little fear of responsibility as the present French Prime Minister. (Entente Diplomacy, pp. 652-655.)

In Poincaré a-t-il Voulu la Guerre the warlike course of the French Government is attributed to Poincaré from his coming into office in 1912. The work of Pevet, Les Responsables de la Guerre, places the responsibility on Poincaré. (Bausman.)

Poincaré assured the extra session of the French Parliament August 4, 1914, that France—

was prepared and our enemy will meet on their path our valiant troops. (French Yellow Book, p. 158.)

The attitude of the French war party may be appreciated from the quotation of Mr. Buxton, in the foreign office debate of July, 1912, taken from the Nouvelle Revue, one of the most prominent of Paris reviews:

We intend to have war. After 40 years of a heavily armed peace we can at least utter this opinion without the serious readers of a French revue shaking in their shoes. . . . France is ready to strike, and to conquer, as she was not ready 40 years ago, and she will not be in 4 or 5 years to come, owing to the annual divergent numbers of the birth rate in each country. . . . We, the attacking party, will have arranged with England that their fleet . . . will have followed . . . the remains of the whole German Navy into the German waters. (How Diplomats Make War, p. 206.)

M. Poincaré has not escaped the criticism of representatives of the people of France in the French Chamber of Deputies. On July 5, 1922, while M. Poincaré was presiding over the Chamber of Deputies as its President, M. Vaillant-Couturier (p. 2337-2338, Journal Official) declared "upon his conscience as an old soldier" that he was convinced of the responsibility of Raymond Poincaré for the World War because of his policy in the Balkans and his unwarrantable support of Russian ambitions and Russian policies. He declared that the war was desired by a group of important rank in the Court of Russia and that Poincaré did not do what he could have done to deter the war, that Poincaré's culpability would be exposed by the records and he accused him on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies to have been responsible for building up in France by Russian propaganda public opinion among the French people favorable to the Russian intervention in Balkan affairs.

That he had contributed to the war by allowing chances for peace to pass.

M. Vaillant-Couturier in the course of a long speech said:

We accuse him of having been the man about whom was crystallized the desire for revenge on the part of the most turbulent of French nationalists. We accuse him of having been that which Jaurès hoped he would not be, the president of reaction or of war.

We accuse him of having let pass certain omissions of texts in the publication of the diplomatic archives \* \* \*

We accuse him of having thrown France into a war which the Russian mobilization provoked. We accuse him of having compromised between 1912 and 1914 the destinies of France, whatever might have been the wishes of Germany at that time \* \* \*

and stated that the "stillborn treaty of the peace of Versailles," which "they all condemn more or less," stood between a peaceable future and the French people, and said:

For us M. Poincaré represents all that nationalism has been able to produce of a funereal character before, during, and after the war. To-day his policy leads us to isolation, to failure, and to new wars.

On January 15, 1914, Izvolski, in a "very confidential" letter (Livre Noir, 230) says:

If the incident continues to develop, the question might put itself within the scope of the alliance. In a conversation with me, M. Poincaré expressed himself exactly the same, by repeating to me several times, "It is well understood that we shall sustain you."

I respectfully call the attention of the Senate to the secret telegrams from Izvolski, in Livre Noir, pages 14, 19, 20, in which Izvolski, on January 29, 1913, over a year before the World War, says:

I have just had a long conversation with Poincaré, who has declared to me in his capacity as President of the Republic he will have abundant possibility of directly influencing the foreign policy of France \* \* \*. According to him it is of the highest importance for the French Government to be able in advance to take part in directing public opinion as to a war which could arise in the matter of the Balkans. \* \* \*

And on January 30, 1913, page 19:

The energy, the decision, and the entire character of M. Poincaré appear as the guaranty of that which in his capacity as President of the Republic he will not content himself—as, for example, M. Fallières—with a rôle purely passive and, if it might be so expressed, decorative, but that he would influence by every means and at all times the French policy in the domain of foreign affairs. \* \* \* That is why during the next seven years we can be completely assured against the appearance at the head of the French Government and diplomacy of such persons as Caillaux, Cruppi, Nonis, etc. \* \* \* M. Poincaré continues to come every day to the ministry, and M. Jonnert makes no reply, expresses no opinion without he has knowledge of it and consents to it. \* \* \*

And page 20:

The French Government is firmly decided to fulfill toward us its obligation as an ally, and it admits with full knowledge and with all the cold blood necessary that the final result of the actual complications can be for it the necessity of the participation of France in a general war. The moment when France should draw the sword is exactly determined by the Franco-Russian military convention and under the understanding the French ministry entertain not the slightest doubt nor the slightest hesitation. \* \* \*

Also the French Government does not wish to deprive Russia of its liberty of action, nor to put in doubt the moral obligations which rest upon it in that which concerns the Balkan States. Consequently Russia can count not only on the support in arms of France in the case foreseen by the Franco-Russian convention but upon the most energetic and effective diplomatic assistance (of France) in all the enterprises of the Russian Government in favor of said States (the Balkans).

Poincaré undertook his own defense by writing a book "Les Origines de la Guerre" (Cassie) in 1921, in English 1922, an analysis of which appears in Let France Explain, Chapter XIV. He wholly omits the Russian mobilization and does not contradict the Belgian minister's charge against him as bringing on the war. He omits the vital record of the falsification of the Russian Orange Book, but admits—

(a) That the Kaiser made repeated efforts to come to a good understanding with France (p. 25).

(b) That Delcasse made a revision, which he misquotes, of the Franco-Russian treaty (p. 56).

(c) That France had always in mind the recovery of the lost Provinces (p. 25).

(d) That the Franco-Russian treaty was never disclosed before the war and that Viviani, with a copy in his pocket, refrained from reading it to the Parliament.

(e) That the pacific Georges Louis was recalled from St. Petersburg because the Russians wanted a different sort, etc. (Let France Explain, p. 229.)

Poincaré's defense will be found in the Living Age, Saturday, August 26, 1922, page 503, in which he says that Sazonoff was a "pacifist," that—

the thought of crushing Serbia dominated the whole policy of Austria and Germany.

That when he and Viviani (July 29, 1914)—

reached Paris we were received by a startled and troubled nation that, far from wishing war, was overwhelmed with solicitude for the safety of France, although firmly resolved upon any sacrifices to defend the fatherland.

It will be observed that Poincaré returned to Paris on July 29, and that it was on the night of the next day—July 30—that the French minister of war told the military attaché of the Russian Embassy with "enthusiastic sincerity" that the Government is firmly decided upon war and requested the Russian Embassy to confirm the hope of the French general staff that all the Russian efforts should be directed against Germany. (Telegram 216.)

Poincaré states that with the consent of the ministry he wrote a letter to King George on July 31, 1914, informing the King that France would do all in her power to maintain peace. This letter to King George is not consistent with telegram 216, nor with the secret military treaty and the secret conferences of the Russian and French general staffs of 1911, of 1912, of 1913, to mobilize and attack Germany in the event of an Austrian mobilization, but was extremely serviceable in convincing British public opinion of the peaceful attitude of the French Government and of the guilt of the German Government in willing the war.

Poincaré insisted on having Grey announce the Entente avowedly as a means of preventing Germany from declaring war. Grey was unwilling, probably because it would have stimulated Russia to war if every element of doubt of British support were removed.

Grey did not wish war, but had no option but to support France if it came.

On the night of July 29, the British ambassador at Berlin wired Sir Edward Grey that the German Chancellor had told him (the British ambassador in Berlin) that—

As far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy was that *Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be.* (How Diplomats Make War, 263.)

So that it is clear that the German Government expected Great Britain to support France in the event of war. The fact that Great Britain would support France fully justified the Russian war party and the French war party in their determination on war.

Moreover, Sir Edward Grey told the French ambassador at London, Cambon (British White Paper, 87), that he meant to tell the German ambassador that day, Wednesday, July 29, that he must not be misled from the friendly tone of their conversation that Britain would stand aside, so that both Germany and France knew that Britain would not stand aside.

On Friday, July 31, the British ambassador to Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen, wired Sir Edward Grey that *the German Chancellor said he had done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, but he could not leave his country defenseless—*

while time was being utilized by other powers; and if, as he learns is the case, *military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it will be impossible for him to remain quiet.* (Ibid. 281.)

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to the British ambassador at St. Petersburg that *he did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend military preparations unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia.* (Ibid. 282.)

In other words, he did not exercise an effective moderating influence on St. Petersburg; he justified their military preparations.

The whole story is set forth quite fully by Neilson, a member of the British Parliament, in chapter 12 of How Diplomats Make War. The chapter is entitled "A game of chess."

Without doubt patriotism in the form of intense nationalism moved most of the European leaders, who thought in terms of military strategy alone.

It is futile to reproach individuals in the foreign office of Petersburg, of Paris, of London, of Vienna, or Berlin. These

men were produced by their environment in an atmosphere of secret diplomacy, believing in the power of might first, last, and all the time, but nevertheless also believing it necessary to subsidize the press and direct public opinion so as to have the support as far as possible of their own nationals.

A profound distrust was everywhere evident between the leaders of the different nations.

These foreign offices were controlled by a consuming desire for further political power over other people and over other territory. Their whole diplomacy in foreign relations largely consisted of trading with each other, giving and taking "compensations." The prime moving force was commercialized imperialism.

The Entente Allies should have conquered Germany and Austria within a few months considering the enormous preponderance of power in favor of the Entente Allies. It should have been a profitable war in the matter of colonial possessions, annexations, and indemnities; but its prolongation for four years was very unexpected and costly. The collapse of the Russian armies, probably due largely to the hate of the Russian people of the Romanoff Government, proved a blessing in disguise to the whole world, including the French, British, and Russian people.

The overthrow of the German military government will probably prove a blessing to the world, especially to the German people, notwithstanding the severe suffering which has temporarily taken place since the armistice.

In due time no doubt the British, French, and Belgian people will correct the defects in the Government of their own foreign offices, and the extent to which commercialized government has gone in the past will probably be abated in the future.

If the principles of the League of Nations shall become the rule governing the relation of nations to each other, the evils of the past will be entirely abated and international understanding, good will, and cooperation will become the rule of international intercourse.

In the light of the disclosures which are made of the secret diplomacy of Europe, it is clear that a profound national humiliation was put upon the German people by article 231 of the treaty of Versailles in violation of the evidence now known to the world. Article 231 is as follows:

ART. 231. The allied and associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the allied and associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

This article makes the German Republic, representing a free people, accept the responsibility of having imposed upon the Allies the World War by the aggression of the Imperial German Government of 1914, which was the master of the subject German people.

The German people feel a profound bitterness over this article and its consequences, and it will be well for the world to consider whether a reconciliation between the peoples of Germany, France, and Great Britain is possible so long as the German people are unjustly charged with this great wrong.

In the Memoirs of Izvolski is narrated a personal attempt of William II, in 1905, to establish permanent peace between Russia, Germany, and France in the so-called Treaty of Bjorkoe, as follows:

Their Imperial Majesties, the Emperor of all the Russias, of the one part, and the Emperor of Germany, of the other part, with the object of assuring the peace of Europe, have agreed upon the following points of the treaty hereinafter related, with reference to a defensive alliance:

"ARTICLE I. If any European State shall attack either of the two Empires, the allied party engages to aid his contractor with all his forces on land and on sea.

"ART. II. The high contracting parties agree not to conclude a separate peace with any enemy whatsoever.

"ART. III. The present treaty shall be in force from the moment of the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan and may only be canceled by a year's previous notice.

"ART. IV. When this treaty goes into effect, Russia will take the necessary steps to make its terms known to France and invite her to subscribe to it as an ally."

NICHOLAS.  
WILLIAM.

The hostility of France to this treaty caused its cancellation.

The records to which I have above referred show in many ways the efforts of the German Government to effect a rapprochement with France and with Great Britain, all of which were unavailing.

One of the most learned men in Europe, E. D. Morel, a member of the British Parliament, has written several works explaining this unfortunate condition of European diplomacy, such as *Truth and the War*, *Diplomacy Revealed*, *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy*, in which these processes are explained in great detail and fully confirm what the records to which I have above referred exhibit; and the underlying policy of the diplomacy of the foreign office of the European nations is set forth by Leonard Wolf in a little work called "Economic Imperialism," showing the substantial fact that governments had been employed for money making purposes in the exploitation of the ignorant and unenlightened races; that under this policy all of Africa had been divided up and other parts of the world seized for similar purposes, to make rich the industrialists of the nation which annexes and controls such territories.

The covenant of the League of Nations is bringing before the world a new conception of international relationship in which international justice, understanding, and good will is being made increasingly possible.

America is now concerned in judging from the past the probabilities of stability in Europe. Unless Europe shall have stable government, America can not afford to extend any large credits to Europe which it might be desirable to do to help the people of France and the people of Germany to again get back into full production.

We all desire truly to see the French protected. I favored the treaty guaranteeing France protection and fully supported France during the war, but the Ruhr invasion is indefensible from any standpoint.

#### AMERICA JUSTIFIED IN ENTERING THE WAR.

America was justified in entering the war regardless of who was responsible for willing the war and putting it in motion. America was not informed with regard to the secret intrigues of Europe, nor of its commercialized imperialistic aims. America declared a state of war with Germany because the military rulers of Germany committed one act of war after another on America in violation of accepted international law, and America did not lay down the sword until that Government was annihilated and the Hohenzollerns driven from power. It cost America forty-two billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of men and a huge future tax of pensions. Happily for the freedom of mankind the war resulted in the destruction of the three great military dynasties—of the Hohenzollerns of Germany, the Hapsburgs of Austria, and the Romanoffs of Russia—and has promoted the cause of democracy and the freedom of mankind.

But the record which I have disclosed, Mr. President, that the British Foreign Office did not dare to disclose to the British people in their Parliament the truth of the secret intrigue with the French and Russian Governments, thereby giving the highest testimony to America that British public opinion, like American public opinion, will not consciously support international intrigue. It is for American statesmen to consider now how far these secret forces are in control of the British and French Governments, and the extent to which they are in control must be read in the light of the actions of these Governments, not merely by their words or official public communications.

The purposes of America in fighting this war were expressed with great force in the address of the President of the United States, January 8, 1918, and subsequent explanatory addresses in which he voiced the declared purposes of the Entente Allies and conditions on which they were willing to make peace, and which they, after nine days' discussion at the Trianon, Versailles, formally accepted November 4, 1918. They then and there pledged themselves to these conditions as the basis upon which the German Republic directed its military commanders to sign the terms of an armistice and practically surrendered. The German Republic accepted the terms and directed their military commanders to accept the terms of the armistice.

The pledges made to the German Republic through the President of the United States by the Allies was in effect—

- (a) The end of secret diplomacy.
- (b) The removal of economic barriers and equality of trade.
- (c) Impartial adjustment of colonial claims.
- (d) Association of nations in a League of Nations, having in mind the protection of every nation, of its territorial integrity, and political independence.
- (e) A just and stable peace; that Germany should—
  - accept a place of equality among the peoples of the earth . . . .
  - instead of a place of mastery.
- (f) The right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety of all nations.

(g) The destruction of any arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world.

(h) The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that governs the individual citizens of all modern States in their relations with one another.

(i) The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just.

(j) No special or separate interest of any single nation, or any group of nations, can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.

(k) No leagues or alliances or special covenants or understandings within the general or common family of the League of Nations.

(l) No special, selfish economic combinations within the league.

(m) All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

(n) No punitive damages, no annexations, no indemnities, but an honorable and a just peace.

The German Republic accepted and instructed its military officials. Then the Entente military command imposed the military terms on the German generals, as shown in Exhibit 14.

The manner in which the British, French, and Belgian Governments carried out these pledges is set forth in the treaty of Versailles and analyzed with great care by Warren Hills in *Lex Tallonis* and by J. Maynard Keynes in *Economic Consequences of the Peace*.

They show the Entente statesmen entirely violated the pledges made, and the United States has been put by them in the false position of having betrayed the German people with false promises to induce their surrender. The United States should not be content to rest under this unjust imputation without proper protest. The English people are becoming impatient with these conditions.

The terrible anxiety of France, Great Britain, and Italy, which led them to fully accept American terms, is shown by Exhibit 13, in which Foch, Clemenceau, Lloyd-George, and Orlando implored American aid June 3, 1918, as necessary to avoid entente defeat.

#### EXHIBIT XIII.

(Action taken at conference June 1 and 2, 1918.)

The Prime Ministers of France, Italy, and Great Britain, now meeting at Versailles, desire to send the following message to the President of the United States:

"We desire to express our warmest thanks to President Wilson for the remarkable promptness with which American aid in excess of what at one time seemed practicable has been rendered to the Allies during the past month to meet a great emergency. The crisis, however, still continues. General Foch has presented to us a statement of the utmost gravity, which points out that the numerical superiority of the enemy in France, where 162 allied divisions now oppose 200 German divisions, is very heavy, and that, as there is no possibility of the British and French increasing the number of their divisions (on the contrary they are put to extreme straits to keep them up), *there is a great danger of the war being lost unless the numerical inferiority of the Allies can be remedied as rapidly as possible by the advent of American troops.* He therefore urges with the utmost insistence that the maximum possible number of infantry and machine gunners, in which respect the shortage of men on the side of the Allies is most marked, should continue to be shipped from America in the months of June and July to avert the immediate danger of an allied defeat in the present campaign owing to the allied reserves being exhausted before those of the enemy. In addition to this, and looking to the future, he represents that *it is impossible to foresee ultimate victory in the war unless America is able to provide such an army as will enable the Allies to establish ultimate superiority.* He places the total American force required for this at no less than 100 divisions and urges the continuous raising of fresh American levies, which, in his opinion, should not be less than 300,000 a month, with a view to establishing a total American force of 100 divisions at as early a date as this can possibly be done.

"We are satisfied that General Foch, who is conducting the present campaign with consummate ability and on whose military judgment we continue to place the most absolute reliance, is *not overestimating the needs of the case, and we feel confident that the Government of the United States will do everything that can be done, both to meet the needs of the immediate situation and to proceed with the continuous raising of fresh levies calculated to provide as soon as possible the numerical superiority which the commander in chief of the allied*

armies regards as essential to ultimate victory." (From *The Great Events of the War*, published by the National Alumni, 1920, Vol. VI, p. 187.)

And the Allies solemnly declared to the Germans, November 4, 1918—

Their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress on January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses.

Under these terms the Allies—

Understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.

On November 11, 1918, the President of the United States, in speaking of the military autocracies of Europe, declared that—

The great nations which associated themselves have now definitely united in a common purpose to set up such a peace as will satisfy the longing of the whole world for disinterested justice. \* \* \* Their representatives in the supreme war council at Versailles have by unanimous resolution assured the peoples of the Central Empires that everything that is possible in the circumstances will be done to supply them with food and relieve the distress that is in so many places threatening their very lives. \* \* \* Hunger does not breed reform, but it breeds madness and all the ugly distempers that make an orderly life impossible.

The Government of Great Britain, immediately after the disarmament of the Germans, the taking of their warships, and of their mercantile marine, established by an Order in Council a blockade *not only not supplying the food the German people required, but cutting off the food they might have secured for themselves, even cutting off fish supply from the Baltic Sea* and using the pressure of famine to coerce the German Republic to accept the terms of the treaty of Versailles. The Entente Allies established a reparation commission, controlled by France, Belgium, Italy, and Great Britain, who fixed the reparations regardless of the promises made the German people by the allied governments on November 4, 1918.

The Entente Allies in writing the treaty of Versailles *took all the German colonies, took away from German territory a large part of East and West Prussia, of Poland and Silesia, and the entire left bank of the Rhine was occupied from Switzerland to Holland, 50 kilometers on the right bank were held subject to military control, the coal fields of the Saar Valley were taken by France.*

Moresnet, Eupen, and Malmedy were given to Belgium, Schleswig added to Denmark, the German Republic not permitted to enter the league, and all overtures from the German Government treated with indifference or contempt.

French officials took an active part in the political disintegration of the German Republic by promoting a movement for an independent Rhine State, an independent Bavaria, an independent Saxony, seized the industrial heart of Germany in the Ruhr, and made such strenuous demands upon the German Government for instant reparations that that Government is now absolutely bankrupt, unemployment breaking down the industrial life of the German people and threatening them with famine. German statisticians estimate that less than 5 per cent of the German coal has been left the German Government's control; that Germany has lost 14 per cent of its area, 10 per cent of its population, 70 per cent of its zinc and iron ore, 20 per cent of the potato land, 18 per cent of the wheat and rye land, and the cost of the occupation from 1918 to 1922 is put at four and one-half billion dollars or more than sixteen times as much as the cost of German occupation of France in 1870-1873.

The reparations bill which is estimated by Andre Tardieu in December, 1918, after the armistice, at nine billions, is now fixed at thirty-three billions by the employees of the proposed beneficiaries, and credits are refused which the Germans estimate at approximately twenty-five billions. The details of these claims and counterclaims I submit as Exhibits 15 and 16.

#### THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR WILLING THE WORLD WAR.

The moral responsibility for willing the World War has been definitely fixed upon Germany by article 231, as follows:

ART. 231. The allied and associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the allies and associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

This necessarily means the aggression of the German Government of August 1, 1914, under William II, a military autocracy, controlling without their consent the German people with a rod of iron.

The German people of August 1, 1914, can not be held responsible for the decision of William II. They were a subject people, 80 per cent of them were women and children without political capacity, about 10 per cent were men engaged in production and distribution, about 10 per cent were called to arms by an order of mobilization which could not be disobeyed under penalty of immediate death. Something over 10 per cent of these Germans took up arms under penalty of death; 1,773,780 were killed, 4,216,056 were wounded, 1,152,800 were prisoners or missing, a total of 7,142,558. Hardly a man escaped.

But the penalties of the moral responsibility of willing the war is being visited on the German people of to-day, 20 per cent of whom were unborn babes August 1, 1914, 50 per cent were then infants, 16 per cent were then women, leaving about 14 per cent of men now living who were then either combatants or noncombatants.

If William II was exclusively and entirely responsible for this war, the Entente Allies have allowed him to go in peace with his property, and they are imposing the penalties of this wrong upon people who can not be charged with the moral responsibility of the war and in violation of the conditions of the armistice.

But, it will be said, who then shall be responsible for reparations?

The reparations agreed to—that is, compensation for damages done the civilian population of the Entente Allies by the German troops on land and sea and air—was accepted by the German Republic, representing the German people, and this reparation they are legally and morally bound by, but it should be established in honor and justice by disinterested judges and experts, not by the beneficiaries or representatives moved by the old principles of European diplomacy that led directly to this war.

If the old principles of commercialized imperialism moving in profound secrecy is to fix the policy of international relationship, we have no just reason to hope for the restoration of peace and prosperity in Europe.

The conditions laid down for the armistice by the President of the United States, accepted by the Allies, and then accepted by the German Republic, can not be flagrantly dishonored with impunity. Such evil seeds sown will bring a harvest of hate and future wars. It is not yet entirely too late to correct this great wrong to the German people.

The fundamental condition of peace is good faith, absolute justice arrived at by just processes.

Then international understanding and good will becomes possible. Then we can hope for the actual reduction of armaments to the limit of domestic requirements for police and good order.

Then we can hope to see the budgets balanced.

Then we can hope to see European currencies stabilized, put on a gold basis, and people given a currency medium with which they can make contracts safely.

Then European bonds could be sold throughout the world to the fullest extent of their legitimate needs. Then the safety of France will be assured, as all the world desires.

Then America will be justified in cooperating with the new world conducted along the lines of international justice, international good will, and sincere international commercial and financial cooperation.

Mr. President, the great masses of the people in France deserve the warmest admiration. They are a great people, very brave, very loyal, very intelligent, industrious, and thrifty; their language, their architecture, their sculpture, their paintings, their productions are unsurpassed in beauty. I am convinced that these people in their hearts desire to live at peace with the world, to live their own lives, raise their children, and enjoy social intercourse with each other, and that they would commend international policies which would lead to this result.

And when this has been said, the same thing can be said with equal truth and with equal force of the German people, of the Italian people, and of the British people.

Mr. President, I have discharged an irksome, painful duty. Senators will find the complete record referred to in the bibliography which I present and will find quotations so abundantly made that there remains no reason why any Senator should not be perfectly informed with regard to what has taken place and what caused the World War. It was caused at last by fear of each other, by ambition, by pride of a few men in a few chanceries who were doubtless doing what they believed to be for the welfare and "glory" of their own country, but whose error of judgment has crucified the world. We do not wish a repetition of it.

During the World War I favored the French in every possible way with money, credit, supplies, ships, and men. I was one of those who favored a treaty to guarantee the French people against future German aggression, and I favor now whatever is necessary to protect the French people against the future aggression of Germany, but I do not favor the breach of agreement of the armistice conditions on which the peace of France and the lives of Frenchmen were saved on the battle field by the cessation of battle through the armistice contract of November 4, 1918.

The preservation of the white civilization of Europe demands that the statesmen of the world realize the importance of pursuing processes which will really and in truth establish international understanding, good will, and cooperation.

Open diplomacy and the orderly rule of the people by the peaceful processes of democratic or republican government is the true remedy.

It is probably the only remedy, and the people alone can make it effective in each of the several nations. America can set a good example. The success financially and commercially of this doctrine in America should encourage the people of other countries as they advance in the practice of democratic government.

Let us still pray with our immortal Lincoln that government of the people, by the people, and for the people shall not perish from the earth.

#### APPENDICES.

##### EXHIBITS TO SPEECH OF MR. OWEN, UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA.

[Exhibits not quoted in speech are added here.]

- Exhibit 1.—Franco-Russian treaty, 1892.
- Exhibit 2.—Franco-Russian military conference, 1911.
- Exhibit 3.—Franco-Russian military conferences, 1912.
- Exhibit 4.—Franco-Russian military conferences, 1913.
- Exhibit 5.—Franco-Russian treaty, 1916-17.
- Exhibit 6.—Chapter XII. Entente Diplomacy and the World War (secret Russian documents).
- Exhibit 7.—Falsification—Russian Orange Book of 1914.
- Exhibit 8.—Letter, Grey to Cambon, November 22, 1912.
- Exhibit 9.—Letter, Cambon to Grey, November 23, 1912. Franco-British entente memo.
- Exhibit 10.—Russian military preparations (Bausman).
- Exhibit 11.—Von Moltke summary (Bausman).
- Exhibit 12.—German demand on Belgium for passage.
- Exhibit 13.—Dispatch, General Foch, Lloyd-George, Clemenceau, Orlando, June 3, 1918, praying for speedy American support.
- Exhibit 14.—Armistice terms imposed by Foch November 14, 1918.
- Exhibit 15.—What Germany has paid—comparative statements.
- Exhibit 16.—How much has Germany paid—Keynes.
- Exhibit 17.—Killed and wounded in World War.
- Exhibit 18.—United States killed and wounded in World War.
- Exhibit 19.—Costs of World War.
- Exhibit 20.—Books quoted.
- Exhibit 21.—Abstract of armistice conditions of November 4, 1918.

#### EXHIBIT VI.

##### *Entente Diplomacy and the World War—De Siebert.*

##### FURTHER ENTENTE PREPARATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN WAR. (February-July, 1914.)

(837. The Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Sazonoff. Letter, January 31-February 13, 1914.)

In my telegram No. 19 I called the attention of your excellency to the communication of the Russian telegraph agency in Berlin, that Secretary of State von Jagow had declared in the Budget Commission that Anglo-German relations were steadily improving. In the same telegram, the declaration of the German naval minister with reference to the mutual relations between the English and the German Navies, was mentioned.

As you are aware, Tirpitz remarked that the relation of the English to the German fleet, 16:10, as proposed by Churchill, was entirely acceptable to Germany. As to the idea of an "exempt year," this proposal could not be accepted. Jagow declares that the cabinet of St. James has for the present advanced no such propositions. I asked my English colleague how the constantly recurring assurances of the statesmen here to the effect that an improvement had occurred in Anglo-German relations were to be explained, for this, involuntarily, provoked the thought that constant negotiations were taking place between London and Berlin which might finally lead to a rapprochement between both countries.

Goschen's reply was as usual, namely, that all assurances had absolutely no value and that the exchange of opinions between Berlin and London was limited to mutual economic and railway interests in

Africa. [Quite a remote locality and one quarter in which Russia had no "historic mission" or "diplomatic desires."]

As to Churchill's proposal to establish a relation of 16:10, my English colleague affirmed my assumption that the Canadian dreadnoughts are excluded from this proportion, something to which Germany could scarcely agree. As to the proposal to build no warships for a whole year, the explanations of the secretary of state, as Goschen told me, are not in accordance with facts, for he, Goschen, has been instructed by London to sound Jagow, who had, however, given him an evasive answer. The English ambassador is, however, of the opinion, as he told me in strict confidence, that this idea was unreliable and all the less acceptable to Germany since all the workmen of the German shipbuilding yards would in such a case be thrown out of employment, whereas the English workmen could easily be taken over by the private shipbuilding yards in order to build the numerous small ships which the English fleet constantly requires. Apart from this, the British ambassador added, it would not suffice to suspend shipbuilding in England and Germany—all other great powers would also have to do the same.

My French colleague [Jules Cambon], whose opinion Goschen had asked regarding the "cæmpt year," replied that he could in no case approve of this idea, since all the savings which Germany would make in consequence of the interruption of shipbuilding would be devoted to the strengthening of the land army; and, in case of future conflicts, this would be directed chiefly against France. [Rather an impossible situation—an impasse. Thus the much advertised disarmament proposals came to naught, as reasonable people expected.]

Cambon is very much worried by these constant rumors of an improvement in Anglo-German relations, since he agrees that there is a possibility of rapprochement between these two countries in the future.

Although I do not fully share these fears, I can not free myself entirely from the thought that Germany and England, once they have begun to regulate their economic interests in Africa, will in time proceed to more important negotiations, which might finally lead to a certain agreement also in political questions. From here I am able to observe the efforts of the German Government to please the British; but, of course, I lack the possibility of judging what impression these efforts make upon leading circles in England. [They made very little impression.]

(838. The same to the same. Confidential report, February 27–March 12, 1914.)

\* \* \* According to wholly confidential reports reaching me, the growing military strength of Russia is causing ever more serious anxiety at Berlin. In the opinion of German Government circles, the new heavy siege artillery in Russia will be finished by 1916, and from that moment Russia will step into the lists as a most formidable foe with whom Germany will have to cross arms.

No wonder that in view of such considerations the Germans are straining every nerve to be ready for war with us, and no wonder that they try to intimidate us, so as to avert the suspicion that Germany is afraid of Russia. Nevertheless it is my conviction that between all the lines printed about Russo-German relations in the German newspapers of late one may always read fear of Russia. [Refers to the cry of the Germans: Die russische Gefahr—the Russian peril.] In conclusion, let me express the hope that they are not in error about this at Berlin, and that we are actually taking all measures for strengthening our military power, which must compel Germany to hesitate before no measures so as to bring her preparedness for war to the highest pitch. [Swerebeff, knowing that this would bring on the catastrophe in either a military or an economic way, the expression is axiomatic of the policy of the Entente.]

(839. The same to the same. Confidential letter, March 27–April 9, 1914.)

The unfriendly attitude toward Russia, which became noticeable ever since the beginning of the Liman von Sanders episode last winter, has much improved of late. The press has ceased its daily attacks upon Russia, although no opportunity is missed of publishing this or that fact unfavorable to Russia, mostly free inventions or serious distortions. This attitude of the German press does not let the excitement die down. This comparative quiet, however, so I hear constantly from a reliable source, is only apparent, and public opinion in Germany is still as aroused as ever against Russia, wherein the military men and the Prussian Junkers make no secret of their warlike mood. This excitement and warlike feeling is due manifestly to Germany's fear of the increase of our military and economic power. They think that this is the most favorable moment for a conflict between Germany and her eastern neighbor, since our military preparations are by no means complete. [Depending entirely on the ability of the French banks to make loans to Russia.] That such a conflict must come sooner or later is apparently not doubted here.

In South Germany this hostility toward Russia is even more manifest, probably due to the influence of Austria. Our compatriots who come through here have frequently reported this feeling to me. Of course, I can not test this personally; perhaps their tales are much

exaggerated, but they must contain some kernel of truth; all the more so, since even the German Government, as I reported in my letter of February 27–March 12, is much disturbed by the measures taken in Russia toward the increase of our army and of our military preparedness. At least, such is my conviction. There is no doubt, furthermore, that the renewal of our commercial treaty in 1917, which may prove less favorable to Germany, is preying upon the mind of the Berlin cabinet, which, probably, would prefer to have the existing treaty remain in force as long as possible.

Nevertheless I am of the opinion, in which I am confirmed by the secret informations mentioned above, that the Berlin cabinet does not share the views of the bellicose elements of Germany, which profess to desire an immediate armed conflict with Russia. The German Government prefers to try all peaceful means toward reconciliation before taking any decisive step. Among these means one of the most important is the commercial treaty, so they are preparing here for the incidental negotiations with special energy along the lines of a carefully drafted plan.

(840. Sazonoff to the Russian ambassador at London. Telegram. January 30–February 12, 1914. No. 252.)

Copy to Paris.

Of late we have frequently been able to convince ourselves that we lack an organ which would unite the views and the common action of the powers, an organ such as the ambassadorial conference in London last year. The correspondence resulting from this lack leads to delays which have an injurious effect on the progress of affairs. As the London cabinet does not desire again to convene last year's conference, we shall not further insist upon it, but Grey perhaps will not object to the proposal that at least the three powers of the Entente should through their representatives in London establish the community of their views. For while the powers of the opposite group are acting we are merely deliberating [at least a slight exaggeration], and our coherence, weak enough in itself, thereby loses still more of its force. I beg you to speak to Grey in this sense as soon as your French colleague receives instructions as to this matter.

(841. The Russian ambassador at London to Sazonoff. Telegram, February 5–18, 1914. No. 39.)

Your telegram No. 252 received.

Cambon received the necessary instructions yesterday, and I informed Grey to-day of your proposal. I told him that, considering the want of an adequate organ, such as last year's ambassadorial conference, you thought it necessary to arrange for an exchange of views on the pending questions, in order to arrive in this way at a preliminary agreement between the three Entente powers. In this way the delays caused by telegraphic correspondence would be avoided and the influence and weight of the decisions of the three powers would be enhanced.

I instanced the case of Albania, whither the Prince of Wied was to proceed, before various important questions had been solved. Grey replied that in the case mentioned by me the Triple Alliance had the advantage of being able to act, while the Triple Entente could only defend itself against encroachments. However, Grey raised no objection to your proposal, and told me that he was pleased to accept it, and suggested that I should meet him to-morrow, Thursday. He has already informed Cambon of this, who has made a similar statement to him this morning.

(842. Sazonoff to the Russian ambassador at Paris. Confidential letter, March 20–April 2, 1914. No. 23.)

In your letter of March 5–18 you mentioned the question of a closer union between Russia and England and expressed the wish to ascertain my views upon this subject [Izvolski's inquiry was probably the result of French reaction to Sazonoff's regret that there was "lack" of an organ facilitating intercourse of the Entente], the more so since there was a possibility that this question would be touched upon by the leaders of French and English foreign policy during the impending visit of King George to Paris. I therefore consider it my duty to inform you that a further reinforcement and development of the so-called Triple Entente and, if possible, its transformation into a new triple alliance appears to me to be a demand of the present hour. Whilst thoroughly insuring the international position of France, Russia, and England, an alliance of this nature would, because of its lack of any thought of conquest on the part of the powers mentioned, threaten no one, but signify the best guaranty for the preservation of the peace of Europe. [Would have done that by stabilizing international relations. At the same time Sazonoff's solicitude for the peace of Europe could not be taken seriously; it had its *arrière pensée*.]

Certain steps have already been undertaken by France and England with regard to working out a plan for the most uniform action possible and for a more precise definition of mutual obligations. Obviously, we too must work in the same direction, whereby a number of incidental questions might be joined to a whole series of subjects which are ripe for discussion—subjects which impinge heavily upon Russian and English interests in numerous fields.

As you are aware, the inner situation of England is at present such that it wholly absorbs the attention of the Royal Government and of the public. [Disturbances in Ireland and labor questions.] Under these circumstances the soil for international agreements, concerning which the English, in accordance with their nature, are so sensitive, is most unfavorable, and we must, therefore, nolens volens, pursue this object with the greatest caution.

In spite of this, I share your opinion that it would not prove inexpedient if Poincaré and Doumergue [French Minister of Foreign Affairs], on the occasion of the meeting with King George and his minister (Sir Edward Grey), would in confidence indicate to them that a closer agreement between Russia and England would also be hailed in France as an auspicious event, which would prove equally desirable to all three partners in the Triple Entente. The establishing of the conditions upon which a political convention of this sort might be concluded would naturally have to be the subject of direct negotiations between St. Petersburg and London; but it is possible that the French Government would consider it useful to propose to Grey to communicate to us in common the contents of the political convention which you speak of as having been concluded between England and France. [The British Government has consistently denied that there was a political convention or treaty.] This might then serve as a basis for working out a similar convention between Russia and England.

(843. The Russian ambassador at Paris to Sazonoff. Letter, March 27—April 9, 1914.)

After the receipt of your letter of March 20—April 2, No. 23, I made use of the first opportunity once more to engage Doumergue in conversation in regard to the question of a closer understanding between Russia and England. Doumergue confirmed to me in the most decisive manner his intention of speaking to Grey, during the impending meeting, to the effect that an agreement of this nature was highly desirable. He believes that it will prove very easy to bring forth convincing arguments in favor of this thought, because it is most obvious that, inasmuch as France has special military and naval understandings with Russia and England, this system must be coordinated and complemented by corresponding understandings between Russia and England. Doumergue believes that the Russo-English agreement would have to be in the form of a naval convention, and that this would render necessary technical consultations between the three staffs of admiralty. [Russian, French, and British.]

With regard to the political compact between England and France, which is to be communicated to us after consultation with Grey, Doumergue assured me that France and England were not bound by positive political obligations, but that, should the course of events lead to common action on the part of both powers, they would adhere to the technical arrangements worked out by the general staffs. [Quite the worst form of "alliance" there is, because it conveys no warning to the adversary and leaves the *casus foederis* determinable by circumstances the political opponent can not define to himself, as he can easily do in case of "defensive" alliances.] Doumergue added that he did not remember whether the foregoing was expressed in a definite formula, but he promised to look up the documents in the archives of the ministry, and to bear in mind the wishes which we have expressed.

Up to the present I have not had the possibility of renewing my conversation with Poincaré upon this subject; he is still at Eze. But I shall make an effort to see him at once after his return and to discuss with him the contents of your letter.

(844. The Russian ambassador at London to Sazonoff. Letter, April 29—May 12, 1914.)

Sir Edward Grey requested me to call upon him, and, upon receiving me, told me that since his return from Paris he had had no other opportunity of seeing me save in the presence of the French ambassador, which had not permitted him to describe to me in a veritable manner how profound had been the impression which he had received on his visit. He told me that he did not think he was merely giving his own personal impressions, but also those of the King and of all those who had taken part in the visit.

Grey told me that these impressions had exceeded his expectations by far, and that he could not sufficiently congratulate himself upon the reception by the President of the Republic and by Doumergue, with whom a perfect understanding had been achieved regarding all current questions and the general political situation. [It so happened that just then there was no "crisis" of any sort in Europe; shortly afterwards Poincaré went to Russia.] That, in addition to this, the reception accorded Their Majesties on all occasions and wherever they appeared bore the stamp of sincere sympathy. From this the British Government had drawn the conclusion that the fundamental idea of the Entente had taken root as deeply in France as in England, and that in consequence of this it rested upon a particularly firm and enduring basis.

On this occasion Grey spoke with a warmth which is not usual with him and which proved that he made his deductions from firmly grounded judgment. The intention by which he was governed in asking me to come and see him, in order to make such a communication to me, is entirely clear. He wished to announce to me the beginning of a

phase of a still closer rapprochement to France. This intention became still more obvious to me upon his remarking to me without any preliminaries, that I was doubtlessly informed about the conversation which he had had with Doumergue on the subject of Russia. He told me that it had been impossible for him in Paris, being at a distance from his colleagues, to do more than express his personal assent to the plan, according to which the Governments of England and France were to inform the Russian Government of all military conventions existing between England and France. [The Russian Government had desired that on former occasions, without success, however.]

He was able to inform me to-day that he had spoken of this to the Prime Minister immediately upon his return to London; the latter shared his opinion and had no objections to make against the plan proposed. The whole affair was, however, essentially of such importance that it could not be decided upon without the assent of the cabinet-council.

Grey told me that, to his great regret, it had not been possible for him to convene the cabinet for this purpose during this first week; the Ulster question and the budget demanded the entire attention of the ministers.

I said only a few words in reply. I thanked Sir Edward Grey for his communication and told him that I knew how to appreciate its significance to its full extent. [Benckendorff realized that a naval or military convention with Great Britain, or both of these, would have far-reaching effects upon the international situation. Besides, the making of such agreements would have been a most satisfactory culmination of his own efforts. We find, then, that this sane man loses his balance a little in gladsome anticipation of the promised state of affairs whenever he writes of it.] I summed up the situation to the effect that if the two governments should communicate to us their military conventions [going a step further, Benckendorff wanted not only a naval but also a military convention], the Russian Government would reserve the privilege of making a corresponding proposal upon an analogous basis to the British Government. I told him that I assumed he knew the views your excellency entertained regarding the necessity of a still closer union between the Triple Entente, according to which even an alliance after the pattern of the three other powers was not excluded.

Sir Edward replied that he did not consider an alliance as possible. I returned that I personally also conceded the difficulties of such an alliance. He added:

"As you see, we have no alliance to-day even with France." [French and Russian statesmen had failed to realize that British imperialism was too large an institution to be tied down by definite agreements; that, indeed, there were too many hostile points of contact between Great Britain, France, and Russia to make an alliance of definite terms possible, as in Persia, China, Turkey, the Balkans, and North Africa. A definite alliance between Russia and France was possible because of their common aversion to Germany, an almost total absence of colliding colonial interests, and the necessity of Russia to find capital and of France to find profitable investments. None of these factors were evident in Anglo-Russian relations.]

(845. The same to the same. Letter, May 8—16, 1914.)

The French ambassador informs me that Grey last evening gave him to understand that he had submitted to the ministerial council the answer which he had given M. Doumergue in Paris in his own name after the French minister had made clear to him the expediency of informing the Russian Government of the correspondence which had taken place between the French and the English Governments, in order that the St. Petersburg cabinet might begin negotiations to conclude an agreement on the same basis regarding the eventual cooperation of the Russian and English Navies. Sir Edward had remarked, in addition, that the ministerial council had approved of this answer. He (Grey) reserved the right of informing me of this; but as the proposal had originated with Doumergue he considered it necessary first to inform him of the decision of the British cabinet.

According to Sir Edward's view, the course of the proceedings might be as follows:

After authorization by his Government, Cambon would inform me of the exchange of notes, whilst at the same time Sir Edward, on his part, would communicate the same to me in order that I may inform the Russian Government. Just as the agreements entered into with France provide, in the event of a *casus belli*, first of all for the cooperation of the armies, so, according to Sir Edward Grey, the nature of things demands that the eventual agreements with Russia should relate to the navy. The negotiations would, in consequence, have to be carried on between the Russian and English staffs of admiralty. The negotiations with France took place at the time in London, and the French military and naval attachés in London traveled to Paris in order to obtain the instructions which occasion rendered necessary. Finally, Prince Louis of Battenberg went to Paris quite unofficially in order to coordinate the agreements. [First Lord of the Admiralty, but by no means a naval expert, so that the coordination in question was probably of a political character.]

Cambon was of the opinion that after the correspondence had been communicated it would be necessary to determine the further proceed-

ings. He told me that, according to the opinion of Sir Edward Grey, the negotiations might be conducted precisely as in the case of France, i. e., that our naval attaché in London would be empowered to enter into negotiations with the British admiralty staff, after he had been given instructions in St. Petersburg, for even repeated journeys on the part of the naval attaché would in no wise arouse public attention, whereas the arrival of more prominent Russian naval officers in London would surely become known and might lead to undesirable comments (and thus inform the members of the Triple Alliance).

(846. The same to the same. Letter, May 5-18, 1914.)

Upon my return to London from Paris Cambon informed me that Grey had confirmed to him what he had told Poincaré and Doumergue in his own name. Grey added, that since his return the cabinet had met daily, because of the difficulties in Ireland and the budget, so that he had not yet found it possible to take up with his colleagues the important questions of the day, which referred to foreign affairs and the Paris conversations. He had been obliged to postpone these questions for 8 or 10 days. Grey, however, had reported to Asquith on his journey. Without binding the cabinet to the present, Asquith had answered that he saw no insurmountable difficulties against carrying out the plan proposed in Paris. Since then Asquith has repeated this to Cambon himself. The latter has been able to establish the fact that the Prime Minister is very favorably disposed to plans of that kind. These refer, consequently, to eventual military conventions between Russia and England analogous to those which exist between France and England. The latter would be communicated to us in confidence, whereupon the Russian Government would have to make analogous proposals to the British Government, which, according to the nature of things, would refer more to the navy than to the army.

It is not to be assumed that all members of the cabinet will give their sanction to this beforehand and without opposition. [Feeling that so long delayed a convention with Russia had a definite object in view. The sounding of Grey by Benckendorff had been a continuous performance, so that an emergency would be detected behind Grey's willingness to approach Russia closer in a military sense.] Nevertheless, the firm determination of the real leaders of the Cabinet will carry the day, as I do not doubt in the least, and then the real negotiations may begin.

After the results which have just been described will have been achieved we, as I believe, will have attained the main object in view, namely, to substitute for the hitherto far too theoretical and peaceable basic idea of the Entente something more tangible. My sojourn in Paris and the spectacle which I there witnessed have anew substantiated my opinion, that an alliance or any other form of public agreement is impossible, and that, even if the British Government should permit itself to agree to this, the results would be quite different from those expected. The reception which was accorded the King and the Queen was no doubt an extraordinarily hearty one, much heartier, I was told there, than was the case with former English visits. If, in spite of this, the impossibility of concluding a formal alliance between England and France has been recognized, then this will in a still greater degree be the case between Russia and England. [Naturally, Great Britain's reasons for not making a definite alliance with France were identical to those that argued against a definite alliance with Russia. The British Government was at least true with itself. Its world politics—as those of any other Empire—were such that it became necessary to play all States against one another, in which none were really friends while all were potential enemies.]

I doubt whether a more powerful guaranty for common military operations could be found in the event of war [all too true] than this spirit of the Entente, as it reveals itself at present, reinforced by the existent military conventions.

If we review the various phases of the Entente it can not be denied that England has never hesitated in threatening moments to place herself on the side of France; the same holds good for Russia on every occasion on which English and Russian interests were simultaneously affected, and this, despite the difficulty of reconciling the policies of both countries in questions that arise day after day, and despite those reasons, which it would lead too far to discuss here, but which explain clearly why the entente between Russia and England has not taken root so deeply as that between France and England. [These policies and reasons are outlined in the footnotes explaining why Great Britain was averse to "alliances."]

The reason for this is to be sought in the fact that even a most careful but public alliance would meet with strong and undisguised opposition in England, and that not only on the part of the Liberal Party, and that a great part of the political effect intended would be frustrated by it. I believe that under such circumstances an alliance would not be worth much. It would merely, in a very slight degree, increase the guaranties which are offered to France and Russia by England, and it would, on the other hand, offer a far more fertile soil for agitation in favor of Germany, something upon which Germany places more weight than ever. [Somewhat far-fetched. What an alliance would have done is: Germany would have known just what to expect, and it is precisely this which Grey wanted to avoid as is shown by the documents.]

*To recapitulate in brief, I would like to say that even those Englishmen who are firmly convinced that sooner or later a conflict with Germany will prove inevitable would be frightened by the idea of binding England by means of decisive treaties of alliance which would impose obligations upon her, the conditions and consequences of which can not as yet be foreseen.*

(847. The same to the same. Letter, May 10-23, 1914.)

Sir Edward yesterday requested that Cambon and I call upon him. As my French colleague had already informed me, the Secretary of State confirmed to me the fact that the English Ministerial Council had approved of the answer which he had given to Doumergue in Paris in his own name [to wit, without the consent of the cabinet council], after the French minister had spoken of the relations between Russia and England and had indicated how useful, under certain contingencies, previous military conventions between the Governments would prove.

*The first step to be considered was to communicate to the Russian Government, on the part of France and England, the two confidential and secret documents, which had been exchanged between the French and British Governments in the year 1912.*

Sir Edward laid special stress upon the point, that the text of these documents showed that no alliance was concluded between the two powers. They fulfilled the purpose rather of putting the substance of the military agreements in the proper light, agreements which had been entered into between the army and navy authorities for the eventuality that it should become necessary for the British and French naval and land forces to cooperate actively. [The eventuality differs from the regular *casus foederis* of defensive alliances in so far as it makes cooperation of the armed forces contingent upon the mutual selective consent of the subscribing Governments, instead of fixing the point and conditions of "operativeness" of the alliance in a definite and precise manner.]

Sir Edward emphasized the fact that, without some such previous agreement, an immediate cooperation, even with the best of wills and in spite of the close political entente between both Governments, would encounter serious technical difficulties. [Hardly the case. The British Government would have either accepted or rejected an alliance. No technical difficulties were involved. It was all a matter of whether or not an alliance or a convention was desired and desirable. From an alliance retreat was impossible without perjury; a convention left it to the British Government to recognize the "necessity" for participation. One can not escape being struck by the fact that Russia and France in thus bowing to the whim of the British Government must have valued their ententes with Great Britain far beyond the limits ordinarily set by "national honor" and sovereignty. Grey was willing to go so far and no farther, and the French and Russian Governments accepted his views without so much as offering a good argument for what they really did want—treaties of alliance with Great Britain.]

He added that England had no objections to an agreement in the same spirit as expressed in the correspondence between Cambon and himself being entered into and concluded between the Russian and the English staffs of Admiralty. In a convention of this kind he saw the same practical advantages which result from the convention with France. He told us that he was thinking of a naval convention, because this, in view of the circumstances, was the most suitable, and because he was, moreover, disposed to believe that this would also be in accordance with the wishes of the Imperial Government.

Hereupon, Sir Edward Grey gave me a copy of the document which he had handed to the French ambassador on November 22, 1912, and Cambon on his part gave me, on the authority of his Government, a copy of the reply which he had directed to Sir Edward Grey on the following day.

In response to my question, Sir Edward declared that the most expedient thing to do would be to authorize our naval attaché in London to place himself in communication with the British staff of Admiralty. The First Lord of Admiralty, as well as the British ministers, were instructed as to our plans. The British staff of Admiralty is in possession of the conventions regarding the navy which were worked out in common by France and England. As to the remaining agreements, France, who was allied with us, might use them as she deemed necessary.

In thanking Sir Edward for his friendly sentiments, I confined myself to remarking that I would at once transmit the copies of both documents to your excellency and report to you exactly what he had told me when handing the copy.

(848. Letter from Sir Edward Grey to M. Paul Cambon, the French ambassador at London. Nov. 22, 1912.)

*From time to time, during the course of the last few years [we seem to deal here with an inconsistency. The correspondence between Cambon and Grey is dated November 22 and 23, 1912, but says that "from time to time, during the course of the last few years, the experts of the French and British military and naval authorities have con-*

<sup>1</sup>This text differs slightly from the version of the letter in the British Blue Book, due, no doubt, to subsequent editing of the Blue Book text.



sisted with one another"—in other words, the convention was in existence, and very broad in scope, as will be shown further on. Since the period of this activity by French and British military and naval agents was anterior to the exchange of the letters between Grey and Cambon, it is reasonable to assume that the Franco-Russian convention contained in its proper text certain stipulations and conditions as to the question of effectiveness of the understanding. The Russians were never informed of this, and, in their case, a writ of nonresponsibility, for the benefit of the British, was exacted as the very beginning of the negotiations. In the light of these facts, the value of the Grey-Cambon letters is no great one, being simply a screen for the actual understanding that made such military and naval cooperation with France possible [the experts of the French and English military and naval authorities have consulted with one another. It was constantly agreed that such discussions were not to restrict the freedom of decision of the two Governments as to whether the one was to support the other with arms or not. We assumed in this that such consultations by experts represented no agreement, and could not be regarded as one, whereby the one Government or the other would be pledged to intercede in an eventuality which had not yet taken place and which might never take place. Thus, for instance, the present division of the fleets of France and England is not based upon an obligation to operate in common in the event of war.]

"You have in the meantime pointed out that if the one Government or the other should have weighty reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power, it would be necessary to know if it might, in such a case, count upon the armed assistance of the other. I am entirely of the opinion that if the one Government or the other should have weighty reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power, or any other threatened disturbance of peace, this Government ought at once to come to an understanding with the other as to whether both Governments are to proceed in common in order to ward off the attack and to preserve peace, and to consider what measures are to be mutually taken. If these measures comprise a military action, then the plans of the general staffs are to be considered at once, and it would be the duty of the Governments to decide as to how far these were to be followed."

(849. Letter from M. Paul Cambon, the French ambassador at London, to Sir Edward Grey, Nov. 23, 1912.)

You reminded me, through your letter of yesterday, the 22d of November, that from time to time during the course of the last few years the experts of the military and naval authorities of France and England have consulted with one another, that it was constantly agreed that these discussions were not to restrict the freedom of any Government in deciding in the future whether it wished to grant the other armed assistance or not, that these consultations between the experts formed no obligation on either side, and were not to be regarded as any which would compel the two Governments to intervene in certain eventualities, and that you have in the meantime pointed out that if one or the other Government should have weighty reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power it would be important to know whether it might count upon the armed assistance of the other.

Your letter gives the answer to this point and I am empowered to state that in the event of one of the two Governments having weighty grounds for fearing an attack by a third power or a disturbance of general peace, the Government in question ought at once to decide in conjunction with the other, whether a procedure in common by the two Governments would be feasible to prevent the attack or to preserve peace. In this case the two Governments would discuss the measures which were to be taken conjointly. Should these measures make a military action necessary, the two Governments would at once consider the plans of their general staffs, and a decision would be made as to how far these plans were to be followed.

(850. Sazonoff to the Russian ambassador at London. Confidential letter, May 15-28, 1914. No. 47.)

The readiness of the British Government to begin, without delay [the British Government was in no hurry, according to Prince Louis of Battenberg, which is to be explained largely by the fact that the Russian fleet being a negligible quantity just then, Great Britain assumed most of the liabilities], negotiations regarding the conclusion of an agreement between Russia and England, which would concern joint operations of our naval forces in the event of a common military action, has been received on our part with a feeling of the greatest satisfaction. Quite apart from the fact that such an agreement is desirable from a special military standpoint we attach great importance to it in a general political sense.

In the conclusion of such an agreement we see an important step toward bringing England into closer union with the Franco-Russian alliance and an effective means of reinforcing the recognition of the common interests of England and Russia which, we are convinced, will favorably influence all the questions which affect British and Russian interests. I have called the attention of our Ministry of the Navy, in particular of our naval agent in London, most specially to the great

political significance of the impending negotiations which the latter will have to carry on with the English staff of Admiralty. [According to Grey, they were not to have "great political significance," and there was no mention in the Cambon letters of "active cooperation of their naval fighting forces," which term, however, Sazonoff may have considered as merely circumscribed. Be this as it may, Sazonoff evinces an eagerness hardly compatible with the dignity of the Imperial Russian Government.] The proposal made by the British Government respecting the form in which the convention is to be concluded is recognized by us as in every way suited to the purpose [showing that the Russian Government was not very particular as to quality], and Captain Volkoff has been instructed to enter into negotiations with the British Government. The principles which are to be considered during the impending negotiations have been the object of a consultation which took place on May 13-26 in the office of the chief of the staff of Admiralty.

For your personal information, I append a copy of the resolutions passed at this conference.

"On May 13-26, 1914, a consultation took place in the office of the chief of naval staff for the purpose of an exchange of opinions respecting the impending negotiations as to a convention between Russia and England, which concerns the active cooperations of their naval fighting forces should warlike operations, agreed upon by Russia and England, take place with the participation of France. After it had been primarily remarked how desirable such a convention would be from a specific naval standpoint and, above all, with regard to general political considerations, the members of the conference, after a comprehensive examination of the question, came to the following decisions:

"It was first of all recognized that our naval convention with England, like the Franco-Russian naval convention, would have to bear in mind actions of our navy in conjunction with the English Navy which, while constituting actions agreed upon, would nevertheless be separate.

"As to the strategic aims, which, from our standpoint, are to become operative in the event of a war between the powers of the Triple Entente and the powers of the Triple Alliance [a very dangerous and undiplomatic admission], one must distinguish: on the one hand, between the operations in the region of the Baltic and the North Sea; on the other hand, the Mediterranean. In both we must seek to obtain compensation from England for diverting a part of the German fleet upon ourselves. [The Russians wanted "compensation" even when they were the beneficiaries.]

"In the northern theater of war our interests demand that England should fetter as great a portion of the German fleet as possible in the North Sea. By this means the vast preponderance of the German fleet over our own would be equalized and perhaps permit, in the most favorable circumstances, a landing in Pomerania being made. Should it be possible to undertake this operation, its execution would be rendered extraordinarily difficult owing to the lack of transport vessels in the Baltic. The British Government might, therefore, assist us considerably by rendering it possible that a certain number of merchant vessels should be sent to our Baltic ports before the beginning of warlike operations so that the lack of transport vessels might be made good in this way. [This should remove all doubt as against whom the convention was directed. The *casus foederis* may have been absent, but the objective at least was plainly identified.]

"The situation in the Mediterranean also concerns our interests most essentially, since in the event of the Austro-Italian forces in this sea having the upper hand, an attack by the Austrian fleet in the Black Sea would be possible, which would mean a serious blow to us. It is, therefore, from our point of view, extremely important that a safe preponderance of the fighting forces of the Entente over the Austro-Italian fleet in the Mediterranean be established. Since the Austro-Italian naval forces are superior to the French, it is desirable that England, by stationing the requisite number of vessels in the Mediterranean, secure the preponderance of the Entente powers, at least so long as the development of our own fleet does not permit us to assume this duty. It would also be desirable that England's consent to our ships using the English ports in the eastern Mediterranean as bases be secured, similar to what is granted to us by the French naval convention, which permits us to make use of the French ports in the western Mediterranean.

"Should the question of the Straits [the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles] be discussed in connection with the situation in the Mediterranean, then political questions were not to be touched upon; but only temporary operations in the Straits, as one of our strategic measures in the event of war, were to be borne in mind.

"In addition, the conference recognized that it was desirable that all details of the relations between the Russian and the British Navies in the projected naval convention between ourselves and England should be established. For this purpose it will be necessary to come to an understanding as to signals and special ciphers, wireless messages, and the relations between the British and the Russian naval staffs.

"It is moreover necessary that information regarding the navies of other powers, as well as one's own navy, and in particular with regard to technical details, instruments, and inventions, be exchanged between the two naval departments.

<sup>1</sup> See first footnote to preceding document.

"In the opinion of the conference, it would also be necessary to arrange for a periodic exchange of opinion between the heads of the Russian and the English admiralty staffs according to the example of the Franco-Russian naval convention." [A rather accurate transcript of the above document passed into the hands of the German Government. The denials of the British and Russian Governments did not, and naturally could not, remove the deep impression made by the terms of the above communication. Despite that, Emperor William went on a trip into Scandinavian waters even after the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand.]

(851. The Russian naval agent in London to the chief of the Russian staff of admiralty. Secret report, May 24-June 6, 1914. No. 182.)

I have the honor of reporting to your excellency regarding the purchase of the dreadnought [both Russia and Turkey were in the market for these ships, the population of the latter having raised the necessary funds by population subscription] belonging to Chile, as well as the prospective conditional agreement with England.

Before my departure from St. Petersburg it appeared to be certain that the Government of Chile had finally agreed to the sale and that this might hence be concluded in the near future.

After my return here and after a conversation with the firm of Armstrong I have the following results to report: Although the naval council in Chile has approved of the sale of the two dreadnoughts, the Government has not found it possible to confirm this decision, even though no final negative answer has been given on its part. *This change of front is to be attributed entirely to the Chilean minister here.*

*The latter once remarked, even before the beginning of our negotiations, that he considered it possible to sell the ships only to England. Since Armstrong is aware of this, he believes that the only means of securing us at least one ship is to have our ambassador request Grey to indicate to the Chilean minister that England would be pleased with this sale. It is still doubtful whether Grey will determine upon such a step. Should this be the case, we might count upon being able to purchase at least one vessel, if not both. After Grey has returned to London I shall submit these considerations to our ambassador and request his support.*

As to the prospective naval convention with England, I have been able to establish the following after my conversation with the Prince of Battenberg [Louis, who had coordinated the Franco-British agreements]:

*The British Government is in no haste, and it is the French Government which insists upon expediting this matter.* [There was no need for haste so far as the British were concerned. The Russian fleet was a wholly negligible quantity and landing troops in Pomerania a quite impossible plan so long as the Entente fleet was not in control of the Baltic.] *The prince intends to travel to Russia with his wife during the coming August, and he is authorized to discuss this question with the Naval Minister and with you.* Before his departure he will ask me to see him with regard to an exchange of opinion, in order to prepare himself for the further negotiations which are then to take place in St. Petersburg. His Highness is quite in agreement with these negotiations.

(852. The Russian ambassador at London to Sazonoff. Letter, May 29-June 11, 1914.)

I notified Grey yesterday that Captain Volkoff had returned from St. Petersburg and had been instructed to enter into negotiations with the Admiralty. *Grey replied that he would at once acquaint the First Lord of the Admiralty of this. On this occasion Grey remarked that certain indiscretions had regrettably been committed in this matter and that first German and then other newspapers had occupied themselves with this question. He regretted this, the more since he will be obliged to reply to a question relative to this which will be put to him in the Commons.*

*I replied that I, on my part, extremely regretted these indiscretions, which repeated themselves all too frequently; I was convinced that your excellency shared this point of view, and I told him that the *Novoe Vremia* had published a dementi. [Showing what the value of governmental denials—denials—is.] Grey was not aware of this, and was very well satisfied. [The virtuous Sir Edward.] He asked me to send him the text. He then told me in general outlines the answer which he thought of returning in Parliament, and which would cover our negotiations, as well as those which had taken place with France. [Indicating to what extent the British Parliament enjoyed the confidence of Grey and the Government.] I replied that it seemed expedient to me to treat the matter from this point of view.*

(853. The same to the same. Telegram May 30-June 12, 1914. No. 149.)

Grey told me that he highly appreciated your frank and friendly declarations regarding the Turkish Navy. *Had the British Government believed that the development of the Turkish Navy signified a danger for Russia, the British officers would not have been permitted to enter Turkish service.* [This document shows diplomacy in its dull moments.] *Since this permission, however, has only been granted to enable the Turkish Navy to defend the independence of Turkey every*

*deviation from this aim would meet with the disapproval of the Government. Grey added that a refusal would have resulted in the Turkish Government turning to Germany, which would have been contrary to the interests both of Russia and England.* [Not a sound argument, since Great Britain and Russia succeeded in making the German military mission in Turkey almost entirely impossible. The presence in Turkey of the British naval mission was the only reason why the Turkish Government was permitted to retain the services of Liman von Sanders Pasha, so that there was no danger at all that the development of the Ottoman fleet would have been left to the Germans. There were times when Sir Edward Grey had a poor opinion of the intelligence of the Russians, and this was one of them. The astute Benckendorff had fallen under the sway of the "closer relations" promoted by the proposed naval convention and once more lost his splendid perception and fine judgment.] *As to the ordering and the sale of ships in England, the Government had no legal means at its disposal to oppose these. Nevertheless, the British ambassador in Constantinople has been instructed to make representations to the Sublime Porte, and the British officers in Constantinople are to express themselves in the same sense, though more indirectly.*

These declarations have, however, brought about the result, that without any previous notification of the British Government, and without any cooperation with the naval mission, direct contracts have been signed between the Turkish Government and English shipbuilding yards which lie quite beyond the influence of the Government. Grey is of your opinion, that complications with Greece are to be feared if Turkey should increase her armaments; he trusts, however, that prudence will keep the upper hand in Constantinople. *Should the crisis grow acute the Government at London is prepared to come to an understanding with us without delay and to confer as to the attitude which is to be adopted.* [Turkey was augmenting her naval forces, because Greece was negotiating, through a Fred J. Gauntlett, for the purchase of the United States battleships *Idaho* and *Mississippi*, which the United States Congress knocked down at the bargain-counter figure of exactly \$12,535,276.98.]

(854. The Russian ambassador at London to Sazonoff. Telegram May 31-June 13, 1914. No. 150.)

Your telegram No. 1137 received. I have repeatedly discussed this question with the Foreign Office during the last few days. *The difficulty lies in the fact that the Chilean minister is opposed not only to a sale to Russia, but to any sale whatsoever. Grey told me the day before yesterday that he would make use of a favorable opportunity to prevail as much as possible on the minister.*

(855. The same to the same. Telegram June 12-25, 1914. No. 167.)

*Grey told me to-day that he was greatly alarmed by the false rumors which were circulating in the German press concerning the contents of the alleged naval convention between England and Russia in connection with the question of the Straits; he had deemed it necessary to speak of this in confidence to Lichnowsky, who is going to Kiel, where he is to see the Emperor. Grey assured the German ambassador that the question of the Straits had not been discussed between England and Russia for five years. [Hardly true.] He assured him that between England on the one hand and France and Russia there existed neither an alliance nor a convention. ["And Brutus is an honorable man."] He, nevertheless, told him that he did not wish in any way to conceal from him that the intimacy between the three Governments had grown so great during these last years that they had on all occasions come to an understanding upon all questions just as though they were allies. On the other hand he affirmed that during the course of these years such negotiations had never assumed a character directed against Germany. [A falsehood.] Nor had they any reference to the so-called "encircling policy." [In this connection the answer given by Sir Edward Grey to the questions put to him in the House of Commons by Mr. King, member of Parliament, and by Sir W. Byles, member of Parliament, in June, 1914, deserves to be cited:*

"3. Mr. King asked whether any naval agreement has been recently entered into between Russia and Great Britain, and whether any negotiations, with a view to a naval agreement, have recently taken place or are now pending between Russia and Great Britain.

"5. Sir William Byles asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make any statement with regard to an alleged new naval agreement between Great Britain and Russia; how far such agreement would affect our relations with Germany, and will he lay papers."

Sir E. Grey:

"The honorable member for North Somerset asked a similar question last year with regard to military forces, and the honorable member for North Salford asked a similar question also on the same day, as he has again done to-day. The Prime Minister then replied that if war arose between European powers there were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. That answer covers both the questions on the paper. It remains as true to-day as it was a year ago. No negotia-

tions have since been concluded with any power that would make the statement less true. No such negotiations are in progress, and none are likely to be entered upon, so far as I can judge. But if any agreement were to be concluded that made it necessary to withdraw or modify the Prime Minister's statement of last year, which I have quoted, it ought, in my opinion, to be, and I suppose that it would be, laid before Parliament."

Another falsehood—flavored with a grain of truth.

(856. Sazonoff to the Russian ambassador at London. Confidential letter, June 12-25, 1914.)

Immediately before the departure of our courier I hasten to inform you that I had another long conversation yesterday with the British ambassador, whose attention I called to the serious danger of a cooling of our relations to England on account of the Persian question. I assumed that the perturbation and excitement which had been noticeable of late in England were most likely to be traced back to the fact that fears as to the position of England in India were once more becoming manifest. Sir George Buchanan conceded that my assumption was for the greater part correct. In consequence, I once more repeated to him all the arguments which prove how unfounded all such fears are, and I even hinted that, should it be desired, we could give to the British Government and to public opinion there reassuring declarations in regard to this in the most decisive form.

I have for the present contented myself with these hints; yet it seems to me quite possible that later on, in connection with our further negotiations, we might propose to England to give her a guarantee of her Indian possessions as effective as that given her by Japan in 1902.

At the present time it appears to me necessary to conclude the proposed naval conference as quickly as possible. [A rather interesting statement in the light of the "open secret" making the rounds in Europe at that time, that in the course of that summer the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria was to be put out of the way because of his alleged anti-Slav tendencies, as he was three days after the writing of this letter. There had never been much antipathy against Austria-Hungary in England, and Sazonoff needed some assurance that he would have the support of the British Government when the work of the Crown Prince Alexander and the Serbian Narodna Odbrana should have produced the next Balkan crisis.] It is important not to postpone the conclusion of this agreement, and His Majesty was graciously pleased to express himself in this sense to the British ambassador in my presence. To close, I will mention that Sir George Buchanan was received yesterday in special audience by the Czar in order to hand him an autograph letter from King George. This letter is couched in very friendly terms, and expresses the hope of His Majesty that the relations between Russia and England might not be troubled on account of the Persian question.

(857. The Russian ambassador at London to Sazonoff. Letter, June 19-July 2, 1914.)

I have received your very confidential letter of June 12-25. The answer which was given to you by Sir George Buchanan in reply to your statement that in England there was a revival of the old fears as to India is undoubtedly correct; it must, however, be supplemented by a few additional words.

Inasmuch as the security of India is a consequence of the political entente between Russia and England, it follows that public opinion in England, as well as the British Government, in full confidence as to our intentions, have no fears so long as this entente exists. Should this entente come to an end, there would be a revival of the fear in question. We have to deal therefore with an hypothesis, which, however, arises only if the entente appears to be threatened by the events in Persia. It seems to me important to lay stress upon this difference, for the fears of the English do not go further than I have just indicated.

This does not, however, preclude the possibility of finding, in connection with certain modifications of our present agreements, a formula which would give expression to the security of India in a still more direct manner; this would merely make our entente still closer.

The conversations which I have had with Grey during the last few days prove this in a manner which is as clear as it is convincing. I shall do all that lies in my power to expedite the negotiations between Captain Volkoff and the British Admiralty. I see no indication that the British Government hesitates, in any way, to carry out the plan agreed upon in Paris. I believe, on the contrary, that this question has assumed a still greater importance in the eyes of the British Government; it sees in this a practical necessity and a natural result of the entente. If the matter has dragged up to the present, this is to be attributed to the circumstance, of which I was, moreover, informed from the very beginning, that the Government wishes to instruct Prince Louis of Battenberg to bring the negotiations in St. Petersburg to a close. The exact date of this quite private visit, concerning which nothing is to penetrate into the public, has not yet been fixed. Naturally, the date of this visit depends only in a slight degree upon Prince Louis himself.

One circumstance, which at first glance is of merely subordinate importance, but which is in reality much more important than one is disposed to assume, has up to the present adversely influenced the preparatory negotiations of Captain Volkoff. I allude to the indiscretions which have been committed. It is true that these, having very likely been committed in Paris, cause no particular surprise. Notwithstanding, it must be remarked that nothing has ever become known as to the Anglo-French convention. [The existence of which Grey denied in Parliament.]

There seems to be no doubt that this time the alarm in Berlin has been very great. (Resulting from the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive.) Perhaps Sir Edward Grey desires that this should be somewhat allayed before he enters upon further negotiations. It is, indeed, true that he would find it difficult to issue a dementi, and to go on negotiating at the same time—a rôle which he would be obliged to play toward Germany, as well as toward a considerable portion of his own party, and the English press.

It is evident that your conversation with the British ambassador will exercise a good influence.

(858. The same to the same. Confidential letter, July 3-16, 1914.)

I have but very little that is of interest to report to you to-day.

Grey told me yesterday that he had received no further disquieting news from Vienna and Berlin during the last few days. Nevertheless, he did not seem to be very reassured. He considers the outbreak of national passions as very dangerous, the more so since there are but very few elements which would be able to restrain them. He says that we can no longer count upon Germany being the peacemaker under all circumstances. Nicolson is less uneasy. His standpoint is based upon the idea that Emperor Francis Josef could desire warlike complications this year less even than during the preceding year now that the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, who was to be the leader of the party of action, was no longer there. I have no doubt that Grey has used very plain language in Berlin and Vienna.

The military advance on Germany while Germany was prevented from mobilizing by diplomatic negotiations appears from the dispatches published in The Falsification of the Russian Orange Book. (Exhibit VII.)

(Explanation of the different types employed. Roman print: Text of the official Russian Orange Book to which no exception can be taken after comparison with the original telegraphic texts of the documents. *Italic print*: Falsifications and omissions in the official Russian Orange Book as proved by the same documents.)

#### EXHIBIT VII.

##### DOCUMENTS.

(From the chargé d'affaires in France to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.)

(Tel. No. 184.)

PARIS, 11/24 July.

The copy of the note handed in at Belgrade was officially communicated to the French Government by the Austrian ambassador to-day, with the addition of detailed reasons for it, which have already appeared in the newspapers. Later the German ambassador saw the minister (Bievenue-Martin, French Minister of Justice, representing the Foreign Minister during the latter's visit to Petersburg) and read to him a communication setting forth the Austrian arguments and stating that if Serbia refused compliance or adopted a defiant attitude Austria would be obliged to exert pressure and, if necessary, take military measures. At the end it was stated that in the German view this was a matter that should be directly settled by Austria and Serbia themselves, and that it was to the interest of the powers in general to leave the affair to the powers concerned. Germany ardently desired the localization of the conflict, as the interference of any other power on the ground of existing treaties must have incalculable consequences. Berthelot, the director of the political section, who was present at the interview, asked the ambassador whether Austria's action was to be regarded as an ultimatum or only as a summons, or, in other words, whether warlike action would inevitably follow if Serbia did not acquiesce unconditionally in Austria's demands. The ambassador evaded replying by stating that he had no instructions on that point, but it could be gathered from his tone that hope was not lost that the affair would be settled by negotiation between Austria and Serbia. As Berthelot also told me, ex-Minister Pichon had an interview with the Austrian ambassador to-day, from which he also gained the impression that Austria-Hungary did not intend her step to be regarded as an unconditional ultimatum.

SEVASTOPULO.

(The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the chargé d'affaires in France.)

(Tel. No. 1488.)

ST. PETERSBURG, 11/24 July.

The communication made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the powers on the day following the handing of the ultimatum to Belgrade leaves the powers only a short period in which to undertake anything for setting aside the complications that have arisen.

In order to obviate the incalculable consequences, fateful for all the powers alike, which could result from the mode of action adopted by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it appears to us indispensable to prolong the time granted to Serbia. Austro-Hungary, which has declared her readiness to communicate to the powers the results of the investigation on which her accusations are grounded, ought also to afford them the possibility of forming a judgment concerning the matter. In the event of the powers being convinced of the justification for certain Austrian demands they would be in a position to convey corresponding advice to the Serbian Government. A refusal to extend the term of the ultimatum would deprive the step taken by Austro-Hungary of all effect as regards the other powers and would be contrary to all international custom.

We instruct Kudasheff [Russian chargé d'affaires in Vienna] to speak to this effect, and hope that the Government to which you are accredited will declare its concurrence in our views and immediately instruct its representative in Vienna to take action accordingly. London, Rome, Berlin, Belgrade, and Bucharest informed.

SAZONOFF.

(The chargé d'affaires in France to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.)  
(Tel. No. 186.)

PARIS, 12/25 July.

With reference to my telegram No. 184.

The declarations made by the German ambassador yesterday are reproduced to-day, although perhaps not in their exact form, by the *Echo de Paris*, with comments, in which the threatening character of this step is emphasized. The ambassador, much concerned at this indiscretion, saw Berthelot this morning and insisted that his words by no means bore the threatening character attributed to them. He declared that Austria had handed her note to Serbia without any previous discussion of it with Berlin, but that Germany approved of Austria's point of view, and that naturally if, as he expressed it, "the arrow was once let fly," Germany could only be guided by her duty as an ally. *The fact that Baron Schön has deemed it necessary to take this new step has to some extent reassured the Foreign Ministry as being an indication that Germany does not seek for war in any case. In consequence the Agence Havas is publishing a communication from the Germany Embassy in the sense of Baron Schön's statement of to-day, in which it is pointed out that the Austrian note has not the character of an ultimatum, but only means that an answer is demanded within a given period. The announcement further states that the German step only had for its object the localization of the Austro-Serbian conflict. The revelations of the Echo de Paris caused a panic of the Bourse to-day. The absence of the President of the Republic and of the Minister President (Viviani) prevents the Foreign Office for the moment from expressing its opinion definitely regarding present events. Public opinion and the press, without distinction of parties, are extremely excited by these events; even Jaurès strongly condemns Austria's action, which threatens to let loose a general war.*

SEVASTOPULO.

(Foreign Minister to the ambassador in France.)

(Tel. No. 1508.)

ST. PETERSBURG, 12/26 July.

I am telegraphing to Vienna as follows:

"To-day I had a long and very friendly conversation with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador. After I had examined with him the ten demands addressed to Serbia, I remarked that, apart from the anything but dexterous form in which they were drawn up, some of them were absolutely impossible of fulfillment, even if the Serbian Government should declare its readiness to accept them. For example, points 1 and 2 could not be carried out without an alteration of the Serbian laws regarding the press and assembly, to which the approval of the Skupstchina could scarcely be obtained; on the other hand, the fulfillment of points 4 and 5 might have extremely dangerous results and even call forth terrorist attempts against members of the royal house and against Pashitch, which could scarcely be Austria's intention. As to the other points, it appeared to me that, subject to certain alterations of details, it would not be difficult to find a basis for an understanding if the accusations they contained could be supported by adequate proof.

"In the interests of the maintenance of peace, which, according to Szapary's words, Austria desired as sincerely as the other powers, it was essential to put an end as soon as possible to the present state of tension. To this end it seemed to me very desirable that the Austro-Hungarian ambassador should be empowered to enter into a private exchange of views with me for the purpose of making a mutual redraft of some of the articles in the Austrian note of the 10th (23d) of July. In this way it would probably prove possible to find a formula acceptable to Serbia, and at the same time affording Austria satisfaction regarding her most important demands. Speak in the sense of this telegram in a cautious and friendly manner with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin and London informed.

"SAZONOFF."

(The chargé d'affaires in France to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.)  
(Tel. No. 187.)

PARIS, 12/26 July.

To-day the German ambassador again visited the substitute Minister for Foreign Affairs (Bienvenu-Martin) and made to him the following statement: "Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial gains and does not threaten the integrity of Serbia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and to maintain order (*faire la police*.) [The words in italic reveal aptly the Austro-German idea of how to handle the conflict with Serbia, but which, however, Russia has never accepted.] In consequence of this it depends upon Russia to obviate war. Germany feels herself at one with France in the earnest desire to preserve peace, and trusts that France will use her influence in Petersburg in a moderating sense." The minister observed that Germany for her part might do the same in Vienna, especially after the proof Serbia had given of her desire to be conciliatory. The ambassador replied that that seemed to him impossible, as Germany was determined not to interfere in the Austro-Serbian quarrel. The minister then asked whether the four powers, England, Germany, Italy, and France, could not take steps in Petersburg and Vienna, as it was in effect a case of a quarrel between Russia and Austria. The ambassador appealed to his lack of instructions on this point. Finally, the minister decided to accept the German proposal as the Minister President was absent. *Unfortunately, Berthelot was not present at this conversation.* [This sentence was omitted in the Orange Book because it would have weakened Berthelot's view as expressed in the following telegram from Paris, No. 188 of July 26, to the effect that Germany was seeking to intimidate France.]

SEVASTOPULO.

(The chargé d'affaires in France to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.)  
(Tel. No. 188.)

PARIS, 12/26 July.

Continuation of my Tel. No. 187.

Berthelot, the director of the political department, declared that in his personal opinion the successive German démarches in Paris were intended to intimidate France [compare note to the telegram from Paris, No. 187, of July 26] and to secure her intervention in Petersburg. *Taking all the facts together, and in view of the whole attitude of Germany and Austria-Hungary, he inclines to the opinion that these powers are striving after a brilliant diplomatic victory, but do not desire war in any case, although if it comes to extremes they will not shrink from it. He considers emphatic and energetic action by England and Berlin useful.*

SEVASTOPULO.

(The chargé d'affaires in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 189.)

PARIS, 12/26 July.

The director of the political department informed me that the Austrian ambassador, as he informed him of the contents of Serbia's reply to the ultimatum, did not conceal his astonishment that Giesl [the Austro-Hungarian minister in Belgrade] had not been satisfied with it. Serbia's complaisance must, in the opinion of the director of the political department, have a very favorable effect.

SEVASTOPULO.

(The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the ambassador in France.)

(Tel. No. 1521.)

ST. PETERSBURG, 12/27 July.

With reference to Sevastopulo's telegram No. 187 and mine No. 1508. Instructed by his Government, the English ambassador asked me whether Russia is agreeable that England should take the initiative and summon the representatives of France, Germany, and Italy to a conference in London in order that the four powers may discuss the finding of a way out of the present situation.

I replied to the ambassador that, although my negotiations with the Austrian ambassador had begun favorably [Vienna regarded a redrafting with Russian help of the ultimatum which she had already handed to Serbia as inadmissible, but was ready to negotiate with Petersburg regarding it. This readiness of Austria-Hungary, which is so plainly recognizable in the further course of events, and which was attributable to Germany's advice, is to be seen from telegram No. 1592 from Petersburg, which was suppressed], I had received no reply to my proposal regarding a combined redrafting of the note. I was therefore ready to accept this or any other English proposal calculated to effect a peaceful settlement if our direct negotiations with the Vienna cabinet lead to no result. *It was, nevertheless, necessary for me to duly set aside a misunderstanding which had crept into the reply to the substitute Minister for Foreign Affairs (Bienvenu-Martin) to the German ambassador. If there is a question of exercising a moderating influence in Petersburg, we reject it in advance* [Sazonoff measures with two sorts of measures, as he and his allies constantly urged that Germany should exercise a moderating influence of this sort in Vienna. Compare the suppressed telegram No. 201 of July 28 from

Paris and No. 203 of July 29], as we have adopted a standpoint from the outset which we can in no way alter, as we have already shown ourselves favorable to all of Austria's acceptable demands.

The ambassadors in England, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy informed.

SAZONOFF.

(The Foreign Minister to the ambassador in France.)

(Tel. No. 1524.)

ST. PETERSBURG, 14/27 July.

Referring to my telegram No. 1521.

I have made myself acquainted with the reply which the Serbian Government handed to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our expectations by its moderation and the readiness (expressed) to give Austria the fullest satisfaction. Unless the Vienna cabinet is seeking for a pretext for an expedition [in the Orange Book the word "expedition" is replaced by the word "war." The change effected by this one word makes clear the difference between the Russian and the Austrian view of the dispute] against Serbia, we do not understand of what Austria's further demands could consist. Berlin, Rome, Vienna, London, Constantinople informed.

SAZONOFF.

(The chargé d'affaires in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 190.)

(In the Orange Book the whole of this telegram is falsified, and reads there: "The German ambassador discussed the situation anew and in detail to-day with the director of the political department. The ambassador strongly insisted upon excluding any sort of possibility of mediation or of a conference.")

PARIS, 14/27 July.

Referring to my Tel. No. 187.

The conversation referred to in this telegram took place at 5 o'clock. At 7 o'clock the German ambassador came to the ministry for the second time and discussed the situation in detail with Berthelot to try and find a way out. He insisted upon ruling out all possibility of mediation or of a conference, but expressed the view that perhaps England could give advice to Vienna. He did not, however, make it clear whether this idea originated with his Government or whether it was his own. Finally he expressed the wish that a short communication regarding the Franco-German negotiations should be published which should have as its object the maintenance of peace, and this has been done to-day.

London informed.

SEVASTOPULO.

(The chargé d'affaires in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 191.)

PARIS, 14/27 July.

The French ambassador in Switzerland insists upon the desirability of filling the post of Russian military attaché in Switzerland as soon as possible.

SEVASTOPULO.

(The ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 192.)

PARIS, 14/27 July.

Your telegram No. 1508 shows that you did not yet know the Serbian Government's reply. The telegram sent to me from Belgrade bearing this news was 20 hours on the way. The pressing telegram of the French Foreign Minister sent to Vienna at 11 a. m. the day before yesterday with the order to maintain our standpoint was only delivered at 6 o'clock. Here there is no doubt as to an intentional delay on the Austrian lines.

IZVOLSKI.

(The ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 193.)

PARIS, 14/27 July.

Having just returned I have taken over the conduct of the embassy.

IZVOLSKI.

(The ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 194.)

PARIS, 14/27 July.

The President of the Republic has given up his visit to Copenhagen and Christiania and returns here on Wednesday.

IZVOLSKI.

(The ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 195.)

PARIS, 14/27 July.

Immediately after my return to Paris I had a discussion with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in presence of Berthelot and Abel Ferry. [The undersecretary of state in the French Foreign Office. Left out because of the suppression of the second half of this telegram.] They confirmed for me the details of the steps taken by the German ambassador and communicated to you by Sevastopulo in his telegrams.

This morning Baron Schön confirmed his statement of yesterday in writing, as follows: "(1) Austria has informed Russia that she seeks no territorial gains and does not threaten the integrity of Serbia. [Although the omission of this word does not alter the general sense, it apparently deprives the Austrian assurances of all point.] Her sole object is to preserve her own tranquillity. (2) It therefore rests with Russia to obviate war. (3) Germany and France, being absolutely at one in the ardent desire not to disturb the peace, should influence Russia in a moderating sense." In this connection Baron Schön very particularly underlined the statement as to the solidarity of Germany and France. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was persuaded that the object of the above-mentioned action on the part of Germany was undoubtedly to promote disunion between Russia and France, to induce the French Government to make representations in Petersburg, and in this way to isolate our ally, and in the event of war to divert the responsibility from Germany, who, to all appearance, would have done all she could to maintain peace and to place this responsibility upon Russia and France. To-day at 2 o'clock, prior to the taking by the Austrian ambassador of the step described in my telegram No. 196, the German ambassador visited Abel Ferry and, in the name of his Government, made a new proposal for the "intervention of France and Germany between Russia and Austria." Abel Ferry replied that he would bring this proposal to the knowledge of the acting Foreign Minister, and only observed that it would be more to the point to leave intervention to the four powers, and to that Baron Schön personally agreed. The Acting Foreign Minister told me that he did not quite understand this new step of Baron Schön's; that he mistrusted it, and merely intended to tell him in the morning that he would receive a reply from the Foreign Minister when he returned to Paris on Wednesday. For the rest, I was surprised at the correct understanding of the situation manifested by the acting minister and his assistant and to see how firm and tranquil they were in their determination to extend to us their fullest support and to avoid the slightest appearance of any lack of unity between us. [The second half of this telegram was suppressed in the Orange Book because it proved the repellent and in no way justified mistrustful attitude of France, which precluded in advance the possibility of success attending the steps taken in Paris and Germany.]

IZVOLSKI.

(The ambassador in France to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.)

(Tel. No. 196.)

PARIS, 14/27 July.

Instructed by his Government, the Austrian ambassador here informed the Acting Foreign Minister that Serbia's reply was considered unsatisfactory in Vienna, and that to-morrow, Tuesday, Austria would take "energetic steps" to compel Serbia to give her the necessary guaranties. In reply to the minister's query as to what these steps would consist of, the ambassador said that he had not been precisely informed on that point, but that it might be a case either of an ultimatum, of a declaration of war, or of a crossing of the Serbian frontier. [In the Orange Book the end of the telegram is as follows: "But it might be a case of a crossing of the Serbian frontier, of an ultimatum, or even of a declaration of war." Therefore subsequently the last eventuality is represented as a particularly severe means of exerting pressure.]

IZVOLSKI.

(The ambassador in France to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.)

(Tel. No. 197.)

PARIS, 14/27 July.

[This telegram was suppressed in the Orange Book because it constituted unpleasant proof that Germany's attitude was not unconditionally warlike.]

Jules Cambon (French ambassador in Berlin) telegraphs from Berlin that in reply to his question as to what attitude Germany would adopt toward a partial mobilization by Russia, Jagow (German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) replied that a mobilization of that kind would not result in German mobilization, but that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would immediately reply by attacking Russia.

IZVOLSKI.

(The Foreign Minister to the ambassador in France.)

(Tel. No. 1528.)

ST. PETERSBURG, 15/28 July.

I am telegraphing to London as follows:

From my conversations with the German ambassador I gain the impression [in the Orange Book the words "more and more" have been subsequently added] that Germany has previously become a party to Austria-Hungary's unyielding attitude. [That is to say, that Germany shared Austria's opinion as to the symptomatic significance of the Serajevo murder as a danger to the monarchy.] The Berlin cabinet, which could have arrested the development of the entire crisis, appears to exercise no sort of influence upon its ally. The ambassador here regards the Serbian reply as unsatisfactory.

This attitude of Germany's appears to me extremely disquieting, and I am of opinion that England more than any other power is in the position to undertake in Berlin the necessary steps to exert corresponding influence. *Without doubt* the key to the situation is in Berlin. [By means of a very clever rearrangement these words, instead of being placed at the end and in connection with the steps recommended to be taken by England in Berlin, are put into the *first* sentence, which then reads: "My private talks with Pourtalés constantly strengthen my impression that the key to the situation is in Berlin, and that Germany is in sympathy with Austria's irreconcilable attitude." This was to create the impression that the true cause for Austria's unyielding attitude was to be found in Berlin.]

SAZONOFF.

(The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the ambassador in France.)  
(Tel. No. 1538.)

ST. PETERSBURG, 15/28 July.

I am telegraphing to London with respect to my telegram No. 1521. With regard to a declaration of war against Serbia, my direct negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador are apparently purposeless. [The Orange Book reads: "In view of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, it is necessary that England," etc. There is here an intentional double falsification. On the one hand no hostilities had then taken place (compare also the first italicized sentence in the telegram from Petersburg No. 1544 of July 29), and on the other hand it is therefore Petersburg and not Vienna which first rejected the idea of direct negotiations between the two cabinets.] It is necessary that England should initiate mediatory action with all possible speed, and that Austria's military action against Serbia should be suspended without any delay, otherwise mediation only serves as a pretext to greatly postpone the solution of the question and afford Austria time to completely smash Serbia. [The Orange Book states further: "and to assume a commanding position in the Balkans." This addition has for its purpose to represent subsequently as a question of European equilibrium the Austro-Serbian conflict, which, in the view of most of the great powers, was capable of localization.]

SAZONOFF.

(The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the ambassador in France.)  
(Tel. No. 1539.)

ST. PETERSBURG, 15/28 July.

I am telegraphing to Berlin—  
In consequence of Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia, we shall announce to-morrow a mobilization of the Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kasan military districts. [The whole telegram is suppressed in the Orange Book because it indisputably shows that the Serbian and Russian mobilizations were far more extensive than the military measures previously effected by Austria-Hungary against Serbia alone, and that therefore Russia could in no way feel that she was threatened by Austria.] In bringing this to the notice of the German Government repeat that Russia has no aggressive intentions against Germany. Meanwhile our ambassador in Vienna is not being recalled. London, Vienna, and Rome informed.

SAZONOFF.

(The Foreign Minister to the ambassador in France.)  
(Tel. No. 1540.)

ST. PETERSBURG, 15/28 July.

You can communicate the contents of my telegram, No. 1539, to the Government to which you are accredited. London, Vienna, and Rome informed.

SAZONOFF.

(The ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)  
(Tel. No. 198.)

PARIS, 15/28 July.

Your telegram, No. 1521, received. I deem it my duty to make clear that, as results from my conversation yesterday at the Quai d'Orsay, the Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs did not for a moment admit the possibility of exercising a moderating influence in Petersburg [here again two sorts of measures are employed. Compare note to telegram from Petersburg, No. 1521, of July 27, and the concluding remarks in the suppressed telegram from Paris, No. 20, of July 28], but only retorted to the German ambassador that it was not Russia but Austria who threatened peace, and that in any case if it was a question of exerting a moderating influence, this must be done not only in Petersburg but before all in Vienna. As a result of his conversation with Baron Schön, the minister declined to accept the German proposal.

IZVOLSKI.

(The ambassador in Paris to the Foreign Minister.)  
(Tel. No. 201.)

(This entirely suppressed telegram is exceedingly valuable in regard to forming a judgment concerning Germany's attitude during the crisis. With regard to the impossibility of the exertion by Germany of too

strong a pressure in Vienna, compare note to the telegram, No. 1521, of July 27, from Petersburg, and the suppressed telegram, No. 198, of July 28, from Paris.)

PARIS, 15/28 July.

The German ambassador again visited the Acting Foreign Minister to-day and declared that although he had no communication or proposal of an official nature to make, he nevertheless wished to talk with him regarding the situation and the means of avoiding steps which would be incapable of being recalled. He added that Germany ardently desired to work with France for the maintenance of peace. In reply to the minister's observation that England had put forward a project for mediation which France and Italy had already accepted, Baron Schön replied that Germany was ready to identify herself with this action, provided that it did not take the unacceptable form for Austria of a tribunal of arbitration or of a conference. The minister replied that if Austria only raised objection to the form the same object could be attained by other means, and that it would be very easy for the German Government to insist that Austria should afford the powers time in which to find a conciliatory exit from the impasse. Baron Schön replied that he had no instructions on this point, but knew that Germany was not in a position to exert pressure on Austria. In this connection the ambassador complained of the French press, which unjustly accused Germany of instigating Austria. According to what he said, it is true that Germany approves of Austria's action, but that she had not been informed in advance of the contents of the Austrian note. The German Government could not interfere too brusquely with Austria, who must obtain guaranties as regards Serbia. Finally the ambassador again affirmed that Germany was ready to cooperate with the other powers for the maintenance of peace.

IZVOLSKI.

(The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the ambassador in France.)  
(Tel. No. 1544.)

ST. PETERSBURG, 16/29 July.

With reference to my telegram No. 1521, I am telegraphing to Berlin. The German ambassador informed me on behalf of the Imperial Chancellor that Germany had not ceased and will not cease to exercise a moderating influence in Vienna and would continue to do so despite the declaration of war. Up to this morning no news has been received of the crossing of Austrian troops onto Serbian territory. [Compare note to telegram No. 1538, of July 28.]

I requested the ambassador to convey my sincere thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly character of his communication. I acquainted him with the military measures that Russia has taken, informing him that these are in no way directed against Germany, neither constitute aggressive measures with regard to Austria. The steps taken by us are to be explained by the mobilization of a large part of the Austrian Army.

To the ambassador's proposal to continue direct negotiations with Vienna I replied that we were ready to do so if Germany's advice found an ear in Vienna. At the same time I declared that Russia is prepared to accept the proposal of a conference of the four powers, with which Germany does not appear quite sympathetic. The best method of utilizing all means to a friendly solution appeared to us to be parallel negotiations of the four powers, England, France, Italy, and Germany, and our simultaneous direct conversations with the Vienna cabinet, as had been resorted to in the moments of greatest tension during the crisis of last year.

In face of the Serbian concessions it appeared to us to be not difficult to come to an understanding regarding the uncertainty still existing with respect to other points if Austria showed good will and the powers [in the Orange Book "Germany" is substituted for "the powers." Thus here again there is the attempt to throw the whole responsibility upon Germany similarly as in the displacement called attention to in the note to telegram No. 1528 of July 28] used their influence in a pacifying sense.

London, Nisch, Vienna, Rome, Bucharest, and Constantinople informed.

SAZONOFF.

(The Foreign Minister to the ambassador in France.)  
(Tel. No. 1547.)

PETERSBURG, 16/29 July.

I beg you to communicate the contents of my telegram No. 1544 to the Government to which you are accredited. I am also telegraphing a similar message to London and Nisch. [The communication of this telegram to the Serbian Government certainly did not tend to move it to a change of course.]

SAZONOFF.

(The Foreign Minister to the ambassador in France.)  
(Tel. No. 1548.)

PETERSBURG, 16/29 July.

With reference to my telegram No. 1544. At the time of my last conversation with the German ambassador I had not received telegram No. 105 [telegram No. 105 is as follows:

"Vienna, 15/28 July. I have just spoken in a *very* friendly manner with Berchtold. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador can be given full power to effect a private exchange of views with you regarding a combined redrafting of some of the articles in the Austrian note. I declared that such a solution of the question was desirable for Austria herself, as it would improve her relations with Russia and would offer substantial guaranties for the future relations of the monarchy with Serbia. I directed Berchtold's attention in this connection to the danger to the peace of Europe which would result from an armed conflict between Austria and Serbia. The Foreign Minister replied that he was fully conscious of the seriousness of the situation and of the advantages to be derived from a free exchange of opinions with us, but that the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had only decided *very* unwillingly to take harsh measures against Serbia, could not at present give way and enter into a discussion of the text of its note. *The crisis had become so acute and public opinion in the country was so excited that the Government, even if it so desired, could not undertake such a step, the more so because Serbia's reply proved the insincerity of her promises regarding the future. The Foreign Minister was evidently greatly disturbed by the news of Montenegro's mobilization and expressed his astonishment at this measure, which, in his opinion, there was nothing to justify. I have gained the impression from this conversation that the Austro-Hungarian Government has at present decided to deal Serbia a blow in order to enhance its influence in the Balkans and at home, and that it counts upon Germany's support and the love of peace of the other powers in order to localize the conflict.*" Similar telegrams to Berlin, Paris, London, and Nisch. Schebeko.] from our ambassador in Austria, from which it appears that the Vienna cabinet refuses to enter into a change of views with us. [In opposition to this assertion it must be emphasized that Austria nevertheless strove for the localization of her conflict with Serbia, and that her refusal to undertake with Russia a redrafting of the text of the note to Serbia, as asserted by Sazonoff, did not extend to the question of direct negotiations with the Petersburg cabinet. Compare note to telegram No. 1521 of July 27 and the suppressed telegram No. 1592.] In consequence of this we leave completely to England the initiative as regards the steps she may deem to be useful.

Vienna, Rome, Berlin, Nisch, Constantinople, and Bucharest informed.

SAZONOFF.

(The Foreign Minister to the ambassador in France.)

(Tel. No. 1551.)

PETERSBURG, 16/29 July.

The German ambassador has communicated to me to-day the decision of his Government to mobilize if Russia does not stop her military preparations. We began these only because of the mobilization already begun by Austria of *eight* army corps, and because she was evidently not ready to accept any method for a friendly solution of her conflict with Serbia.

As we can not accede to Germany's wish, nothing remains for us but to hasten our own warlike preparations and to reckon with the probable inevitability of war. Inform the French Government of this, and at the same time thank it for its declaration made in its name by the French ambassador that we can fully rely upon the support of our ally France. Under present circumstances this declaration is especially valuable for us. *It is very desirable that England also without loss of time should associate herself with France and Russia, as it is only thus that she can succeed in preventing a dangerous alteration in the European balance.* [The extraordinary range of the whole of this communication of Sazonoff's is illuminated by Izvolski's answer. See the suppressed telegrams from Paris Nos. 208, 209, and 210 of July 30.]

London telegraphed to in like terms.

SAZONOFF.

(The Foreign Minister to the ambassador in France.)

(Tel. No. 304.)

PETERSBURG, 16/29 July.

I urgently request you to communicate to the French Foreign Minister the following telegram from the French ambassador in Petersburg: The German ambassador has just informed Sazonoff that if Russia does not stop her military preparations the German army will be ordered to mobilize. Sazonoff replied that the Russian preparations were occasioned by (1) Austria's unyielding attitude; (2) the fact that eight Austrian army corps had already been mobilized; (3) the tone in which Count Pourtalés made his communication has caused the Russian Government to order to-night the mobilization of the 13 army corps destined to act against Austria. [Compare note to the suppressed telegram No. 1539, of July 28. In that telegram Sazonoff states the reason for the Russian mobilization to be not the tone of the German ambassador's communication but Austria's declaration of war against Serbia.]

SAZONOFF.

(The ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 202.)

PARIS, 16/29 July.

*Bienvenu-Martin, the Acting Foreign Minister, told me that this morning the German ambassador made a communication to him, employing practically the following expressions: "Germany is continuing her endeavors in Vienna to cause Austria to agree to a friendly-exchange of opinions which should indicate the object and the extent of the steps undertaken by her and concerning which Germany has not so far been exactly informed. The declaration of war will not stand in the way of this exchange of opinions. Germany hopes to receive during the course of these negotiations explanations which will satisfy Russia." Finally, Baron Schön again protested against the assertion that Germany was encouraging Austria to be unyielding.*

IZVOLSKI.

(The ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 203.)

PARIS, 16/29 July.

Apropos of the arrival of the President of the Republic the Foreign Minister has prepared a short exposé of the situation in approximately the following words: Austria, which fears internal disintegration, utilized the murder of the archduke as a pretext for demanding guaranties which might eventuate in the occupation of Serbia's military communications, and therefore of Serbian territory. Germany is supporting Austria, and declares that *as we have received the assurance that Austria seeks no territorial gains* [a tendentious omission intended to cut away the grounds of the German argument and to justify the employment further on of the expression "sophism." It is the same tendency as has been called attention to in the note to telegram No. 195 from Paris of July 27] the maintenance of peace entirely depends on Russia because it turns upon the necessity for localizing the Austro-Serbian affair; that is, the punishment of Serbia for her former policy and the giving of guaranties for the future.

Germany deduces from this that pressure in a moderating sense must be exercised in Petersburg. This sophistry is rejected both in Paris and in London. In Paris Baron Schön sought in vain to move France to bring influence to bear on Russia in unity with Germany in the interests of peace. The same endeavor was made in London. In both capitals the reply was that pressure must be exerted in Vienna for the excessive demands of Austria, her refusal to discuss the limited reservations made by Serbia, and her declaration of war threatened to bring about a general war. France and England *positively* [this word was probably suppressed in the Orange Book because public opinion would scarcely have shared this view, the more so as Germany had been constantly called upon to exert a moderating influence in Vienna. Compare note to telegram No. 1521 of July 27 and note to the suppressed telegram No. 201 of July 28] could not exercise any moderating influence in Russia, which had hitherto manifested the greatest moderation, in that she had above all things advised Serbia to accept all the conditions in the Austrian note that it was possible to accept. To-day Germany alone seems to object to the idea of influencing Russia, and inclines toward exercising mediatory action in Petersburg and Vienna, but at the same time both Germany and Austria seek to prolong the present situation. Austria openly pursues dilatory negotiations in Petersburg. Simultaneously she adopts active measures, and if these are tolerated her claims will correspondingly increase. It is very desirable that Russia should give her full support to Sir E. Grey's mediatory project. Otherwise, under the pretext of obtaining "guaranties," Austria can bring about an actual change in the territorial status quo in eastern Europe.

IZVOLSKI.

(The ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 204.)

PARIS, 16/29 July.

*The firm attitude taken up by the French press continues. It passes severe judgment upon the Austrian attack and upon Germany's manifest share of blame for it, and unhesitatingly declares that this touches us, and that we can not remain unsympathetic. As regards solidarity with us, this question is not once discussed but is taken as a matter of course. Every journalist expresses himself in this sense, including such prominent personages belonging to the most diverse parties as Pichon, Clémenceau, and even Jaurès, and also Hervé, the father of antimilitarism. [When it is remembered that Jaurès was shortly afterwards murdered, the little word "even" used in this suppressed telegram gains an almost ominous sound.]*

IZVOLSKI.

(The ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 206.)

PARIS, 16/29 July.

*When the President returned to Paris he was received at the railway station and in the streets with sympathetic demonstrations from the assembled crowd. Margerie (political director in the French Foreign*

Office) told me that the President from his conversations during his journey with prejects and politicians, had become convinced of the firm, energetic, and at the same time calm state of public opinion, which plainly formed a correct estimate of the true significance of events. [The true significance of events therefore lay for the French nation much deeper than the apparent cause, viz, the Austro-Serbian conflict.] The same attitude reigned among a large section of the radical socialists. The Government attaches no importance to the antimilitary demonstrations of the revolutionary party and intends to take energetic measures against it. Our military attaché reports in detail regarding the preparatory military measures. Feeling runs high in military circles and in the chief command. I report regarding the press in a special telegram.

IZVOLSKI.

(The ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)  
(Tel. No. 207.)

PARIS, 16/29 July.

Viviani has just confirmed to me the firm determination of the French Government to act in agreement with us. This decision is supported by the widest circles and by all parties, including the radical socialists, who have handed him a resolution giving expression to the absolute confidence and the patriotic feeling of their group. Viviani telegraphed urgently to London, immediately after his return to Paris, to the effect that in consequence of the breaking off of direct negotiations between Petersburg and Vienna it is indispensable that the London cabinet should repeat as quickly as possible its proposal for mediation by the powers in some form or another. Viviani received the German ambassador in my presence to-day, who repeated his assurances as to Germany's peaceful intentions. In reply to Viviani's remark that if Germany desires peace she should hasten to associate herself with England's proposals for mediation, Baron Schön said that Austria shrank from the use of the word "conference" or "arbitration." Viviani remarked that it was not a question of words and that it would not be difficult to devise some other form of mediation. Baron Schön is of opinion that in order to assure success for the negotiations between the powers it is necessary to ascertain what Austria intends to demand from Serbia. Viviani replied that it would be very easy for the Berlin cabinet to interrogate Austria on that point, but that meanwhile the Serbian note in reply would be the subject of examination. Finally Baron Schön complained of France's military preparations and said that in this case Germany would be compelled to adopt similar precautions. [The suppression of this sentence marks the propaganda that had already commenced with the object of placing on Germany the responsibility for the outbreak of war. Telegrams Nos. 210, 214, 215, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 225, 226 from Paris and Nos. 1554, 1637, and 304 (Paléologue's) from Petersburg have the same effect.] Viviani on his part declared that France honestly desired peace but at the same time was firmly determined to act in full agreement with her allies [in the Orange Book the words *and friends* are added here. This was done later for the sake of England; nevertheless the original form of the Russian telegrams from Paris indicates that as a matter of fact French policy rested from the outset on the English alliance] and Baron Schön could convince himself that this decision was finding the liveliest support in the country. This evening Viviani has forbidden a projected antiwar meeting of the revolutionary party.

IZVOLSKI.

(The Foreign Minister to the ambassador in France.)  
(Tel. No. 1554.)

PETERSBURG, 17/30 July.

With reference to my telegram No. 1521, I am telegraphing to Berlin as follows:

(1) The German ambassador, who has just visited me, asked if we could be satisfied with Austria's promise not to violate the integrity of Serbia. I replied that this assurance did not suffice. At the urgent request of the ambassador that I should state the conditions on which we were still ready to suspend our military preparations, I dictated to him for urgent dispatch to Berlin the communication reproduced below in (2). I request you to telegraph at once what attitude the German Government adopts toward this new proof of our readiness to do what is possible toward a friendly solution of the question, as we can not allow negotiations of this nature merely to afford Austria and Germany a gain of time. [The Orange Book adds the words here: "in which to make their military preparations." Compare with this the note to telegram No. 207 of July 29.]

(2) "If Austria admits that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a European question and declares her readiness to eliminate from her ultimatum those points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to suspend her military preparations." [This formula of Sazonoff's signifies nothing less than a demand that Austria should take back her ultimatum to Serbia, a condition which was naturally unacceptable for Vienna.]

London and Vienna informed.

SAZONOFF.

(The Foreign Minister to the French ambassador.)

(Tel. No. 1555.)

PETERSBURG, 17/30 July.

Very urgent. I refer to my telegram No. 1554.

Until we receive a thoroughly satisfactory reply from Austria through the German Government, we shall continue our military preparations. This is communicated to you very confidentially. [Comment is superfluous. In connection with the following telegram that was suppressed in the Orange Book this declaration is important as regards fixing the commencement of the Russian general mobilization.]

SAZONOFF.

(The ambassador in Paris to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 208.)

PARIS, 17/30 July.

Your telegram No. 1551 received.

I received it during the night, and immediately, i. e., at 3 a. m., communicated it to the Foreign Minister. At my instance our military attaché likewise communicated it to the Minister for War. Poincaré, Viviani, and the War Minister Messimy immediately held a discussion at the Élysée, as a result of which a telegram was sent to the French ambassador in Petersburg in approximately the following sense. The telegram begins with an allusion to the text of the instructions furnished to him from the battleship "France," and then states: "The French Government is ready to fulfill all its obligations as an ally. It is of opinion, however, that at the present moment, when negotiations are still in progress between the less interested powers, it would be to the purpose that Russia, so far as the measures of a defensive and precautionary nature which it has deemed necessary to adopt will permit, should not take any direct steps which would serve Germany as a pretext for ordering the general or partial mobilization of her forces." [The whole significance of this suppressed telegram is revealed in combination with telegram No. 1551 from Petersburg of July 29, and with the two following and likewise suppressed telegrams, Nos. 209 and 210, from Paris on July 30.]

IZVOLSKI.

(The ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 209.)

PARIS, 17/30 July.

Continuation of my telegram No. 208.

The contents of the telegram to the French ambassador in Petersburg were immediately transmitted to London, whereby Paul Cambon was instructed to confer with Grey as to the fixing of the combined attitude of France and England concerning which these two powers, in consequence of the general understanding existing between them, have to deliberate whenever a period of political tension arises. [Cambon's query is made on the grounds of the notes exchanged between Cambon and Grey on the 22d and 23d November, 1912, which constituted the foundation of the politico-military agreement between England and France.]

IZVOLSKI.

(The ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 210.)

PARIS, 17/30 July.

Continuation of my telegram No. 209.

Margerie, with whom I have just spoken, said that the French Government does not wish to interfere in our military preparations, but regards it as highly desirable that these, having regard to the negotiations for the maintenance of peace that are still continuing, should be as little public and challenging in character as possible. The War Minister has developed the same idea to our military attaché, and said that we could declare that in the higher interests of peace we are ready temporarily to delay our preparations for mobilization, since this would not prevent us from continuing our preparations, and indeed from intensifying them, but we should have to refrain from the possible greater movements of troops. A ministerial council is to take place at 6.30 under the presidency of Poincaré, immediately after which I will see Viviani. [This suppressed telegram is irrefutable proof that both in Petersburg and in France the further negotiations for the maintenance of peace, including Grey's proposals and Germany's endeavors in Vienna, only served as a screen for the military preparations which were being secretly made in Russia and in France.]

IZVOLSKI.

(The ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 212.)

PARIS, 17/30 July.

The ministerial council, presided over by Poincaré, has approved of the telegram sent to the French ambassador in Petersburg the previous night and mentioned in my telegram No. 208.

IZVOLSKI.



(The Foreign Minister to ambassador in France.)

(Tel. No. 1583.)

PETERSBURG, 18/31 July.

No. 1. With respect to my telegram No. 1554.

The English ambassador communicated to me in the name of his Government the wish of the London cabinet to make some change in the draft which I proposed to the German ambassador yesterday. I replied that I accepted the English proposal, and send you the altered draft in No. 2.

SAZONOFF.

(Foreign Minister to ambassador in France.)

(Tel. No. 1582.)

PETERSBURG, 18/31 July.

No. 2. If Austria agrees to stop the advance of her army on Serbian territory and admits that the Austro-Serbian conflict has become a question of general interest for Europe, and therefore concedes that the great powers may examine into what satisfaction Serbia can afford the Austro-Hungarian Government without detriment to her rights as a sovereign state and to her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude. [That Sazonoff did not take his own proposal seriously is clearly evidenced by the following: The telegram containing Sazonoff's draft was dispatched from Petersburg at 10.10 on the evening of July 31. But by the last sentence of the Paris telegram No. 215 of July 31, which is entirely suppressed in the Orange Book, it is plain that the French Ambassador Paléologue telegraphed already on the morning of July 31 to his Government: "Full mobilization of the Russian Army authorized." It can surely no longer be disputed that the Russian Government had thereby irrevocably decided upon war. The Sazonoff draft also confirms the view expressed in the note to telegram No. 210 that all further negotiations by Russia and France merely served as a cover for their feverishly conducted secret military preparations.]

Berlin, Vienna, London, Rome informed.

SAZONOFF.

(Foreign Minister to ambassador in France.)

(Tel. No. 1592.)

PETERSBURG, 18/31 July.

The Austrian ambassador visited me and informed me that his Government is prepared to enter into an exchange of views regarding the contents of the ultimatum handed to Serbia. I expressed my satisfaction, and remarked to the ambassador that it would be preferable to conduct the negotiations in London, all the great powers participating. We hope that the English Government will take over the direction of these discussions, whereby it will earn the thanks of all Europe. In order that these negotiations shall proceed favorably, it is very important that Austria should suspend her military operations on Serbian territory.

Similar telegrams to London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. [Compare notes to telegrams Nos. 209 and 210. Regarding the willingness of Austria to engage in direct negotiations with Russia, compare note to telegram No. 1548 of July 29. With regard to Sazonoff's demand that Austria should suspend military operations on Serbian soil, compare telegram No. 210 of July 30.]

SAZONOFF.

(Ambassador in France to Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 214.)

PARIS, 18/31 July.

The French ambassador in Berlin telegraphs that Jagow requested him to come to him, and said that, to her great regret, Germany, having regard to "the general mobilization of the Russian Army," was obliged to adopt for her own security the military measures known as "Danger of war," and which of themselves entail other measures, such as, for example, the closing of the frontier and the ordering of a state of siege, etc. Germany begs Russia to demobilize, otherwise she, too, will mobilize. The ministerial council immediately held, with Poincaré presiding, decided to adopt, with respect to the five army corps adjacent to the frontier, the most complete preparatory measures, without, however, giving to them the character of mobilization. [With regard to these five frontier corps, it must be noted that on the very next day, i. e., on August 1 (see Paris telegram No. 127, also suppressed) the Russian military attaché in Paris was able to report to his Government that they were "fully prepared for war."] In communicating this to me, Margerie added that France would reply to the mobilization of the German Army by immediately mobilizing all her forces. It is noteworthy that in the Havas message received here from Berlin there is also mention of the "general mobilization of the Russian Army," which borders upon the idea that Germany seeks prematurely on one ground or another to bring about analogous measures on the part of France. [In this concluding sentence Germany is evidently accused of having attempted by means of false news regarding the Russian mobilization to bring about French measures

of mobilization on July 31 in order to put upon France the responsibility for the outbreak of the war. In presence of this suspicion one thinks involuntarily of the proverb, "Qui s'excuse s'accuse," for on the one hand the French mobilization was already far advanced, while on the other the German news was in accordance with the facts. See concluding sentence of Paris telegram No. 215 of July 31.]

IZVOLSKI.

(Ambassador in France to Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 215.)

PARIS, 18/31 July.

At 5.30 p. m. the German ambassador came to Viviani and declared in the name of his Government that, having regard to the "general mobilization of the Russian Army and Navy," Germany is obliged to adopt measures in accordance with the expression "Danger of war." At the same time Germany has demanded that Russia shall demobilize. Russia is given a 12 hours' delay, after which, in the event of her refusal, Germany will also mobilize. Baron Schön added that he was instructed to ask what attitude France would adopt in the event of an armed collision between Russia and Germany. Viviani listened to the ambassador's communication, but declined to give him any answer. Thereupon Baron Schön said that he would come to him at 1 o'clock to-morrow for his answer, and begged him in anticipation to make the necessary arrangements for his departure. At present a special ministerial council is sitting under the presidency of the President of the Republic. Margerie, who has just communicated these details to me, stated that probably Viviani will not reply to the ambassador to-morrow, as he sees a trick in Germany's procedure, which is intended to place on France the responsibility for the declaration of war. Margerie added that a telegram had just been received from the French ambassador in Petersburg, dated this morning, confirming the general mobilization of the Russian Army, to which he added no explanation.

IZVOLSKI.

(Ambassador in France to the Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 216.)

PARIS, 18/31 July.

From military attaché to War Minister. 1 a. m.

The French War Minister informed me in earnest, hearty tones that the Government is firmly decided upon war, and requested me to confirm the hope of the French general staff that all our efforts will be directed against Germany, and that Austria will be treated as a quantité négligeable. [With regard to the great importance of the French ambassador's report as to the general Russian mobilization see notes to telegrams No. 1582 and 214. The propaganda referred to in note to telegram No. 207 is now in full swing, with the object of putting the blame on Germany. But in order to fully understand the mendacity of Viviani's attitude with regard to the German ambassador, to whom he gave no answer on July 31 to his direct question, and would give no answer on the following day, the suppressed telegram No. 216 from Paris of July 31 must be taken into account.]

IZVOLSKI.

(Foreign Minister to ambassador in France.)

(Tel. No. 1601.)

PETERSBURG, 19 July/1 Aug.

At midnight the German ambassador informed me on behalf of his Government that if within 12 hours—that is, before midday on Saturday—we do not begin to demobilize, not only as against Germany but also as against Austria, the German Government will be compelled to order mobilization. To my query as to whether this was equivalent to a declaration of war, the ambassador replied that it was not, but added that we were very near to war.

Berlin, London, Vienna, Rome informed.

SAZONOFF.

(Foreign Minister to ambassador in France.)

(Tel. No. —.)

PETERSBURG, 19 July/1 Aug.

Germany has declared war against us.

SAZONOFF.

(Ambassador in France to Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 217.)

PARIS, 19 July/1 Aug.

The military attaché requests me to inform you as follows: Grouping of German forces on 19th July (1st August). The six frontier corps, 14, 15, 16, 21, 8 and 2d Bavarian, reinforced by parts of 7, 11 and perhaps 18 on the German-Luxembourg-Belfort front. Increased movements of troops in progress. Distribution of horses completed. An attack from Metz or from the Saarburg-Bruges district may soon be expected. In France the five frontier corps are in complete readiness for war. [Compare note to telegram No. 214.]

IZVOLSKI.

(Ambassador in France to Foreign Minister.)  
(Tel. No. 218.)

PARIS, 19 July/1 Aug.

The Austrian ambassador was twice with Viviani yesterday evening, and informed him that Austria not only has no intention of violating the territorial integrity of Serbia, but is also ready to negotiate with the other powers regarding her conflict with Serbia in all its bearings. To-day the German ambassador visited Viviani before the time appointed yesterday, and the latter expressed his astonishment at his action yesterday, which was not justified by the relations existing between France and Germany. [Viviani's "astonishment" must have been wholly feigned. Compare the suppressed telegrams, Nos. 210, 215, 216, of July 30 and 31.] To the ambassador's declaration that, in consequence of the evident mobilization, not only as against Austria, but also as against Germany, of the Russian land and sea forces, Germany was compelled to adopt energetic measures, Viviani replied that according to information here Russia had not mobilized her sea forces. At this the ambassador was visibly surprised. As the result of a long conversation, Baron Schön did not repeat his demand for a reply as to France's intentions and his threat of departure, but asked Viviani to see him again at 6 this evening. Although the German ambassador's attitude was modified to-day, the French Government is much disturbed by Germany's special military measures along the French frontier, being persuaded that under cover of the so-called state of danger of war an actual mobilization is in progress, which may place the French Army in a disadvantageous position. On the other hand, for political reasons in respect of Italy, but more especially of England, it is very important for France that her mobilization should not precede the German, but should form an answer to the latter. This question is at present being discussed by the ministerial council at the Élysée, and it is very probable that general mobilization will be decided upon.

IZVOLSKI.

(Ambassador in France to Foreign Minister.)  
(Tel. No. 219.)

PARIS, 19 July/1 Aug.

After receiving the telegram of the French ambassador in Petersburg, in which he announced the communication made to him by the German ambassador regarding Germany's decision, the President of the Republic signed the decree ordering mobilization. The summons to the reserves is being beaten in the streets. The German ambassador has just visited Viviani for the second time, but imparted to him nothing new, but declared his inability to decipher the telegrams that had been received. Viviani informed him of the signing of the mobilization decree, and expressed his astonishment that Germany should have adopted such a measure at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was in progress between Russia, Austria, and the other powers. [How completely the true sense is altered by this statement of Viviani's is made plain by, among other sources, the Paris telegrams, Nos. 210, 216, and 222.] He added that mobilization does not as yet mean war, and that just as the Russian ambassador was remaining in Vienna and the Austrian ambassador in Petersburg there was absolutely no ground for Baron Schön's departure, and indeed the baron had not repeated his threat to go. [Instead of all this, the Orange Book states merely: "The German ambassador in Paris can remain." Having regard to telegrams Nos. 216 and 218, it can scarcely be maintained that "absolutely no grounds exist for Baron Schön's departure." Viviani's whole attitude is undoubtedly founded upon the propaganda already referred to.]

IZVOLSKI.

(Ambassador in France to Foreign Minister.)  
(Tel. No. 220.)

PARIS, 19 July/1 August.

Margerie told me that according to information from a very secret source Italy apparently intends, in reliance upon the manner in which the conflict has arisen, to remain neutral at first and then to come to one decision or another in accordance with the course of events.

IZVOLSKI.

(Ambassador in France to Foreign Minister.)  
(Tel. No. 221.)

PARIS, 19 July/1 August.

From the military attaché: General mobilization was announced at 3.40 p. m. The War Minister has expressed the wish: (1) To move Serbia to take the offensive more promptly. (2) To receive news daily regarding the German army corps opposed to us. (3) To be informed as to the date of the commencement of our offensive against Germany and to be kept au fait of events. For the French the most desirable direction of our blow continues to be Posen-Warsaw. According to information from Denmark the First, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Army Corps, Sixth Reserve Guards Corps, and the Second Corps are detailed to act against us.

IZVOLSKI.

(Ambassador in France to Foreign Minister.)  
(Tel. No. 222.)

PARIS, 19 July/1 August.

I received your telegram regarding Germany's declaration of war against us at 11 o'clock. I immediately communicated it in person to the President of the Republic, who immediately summoned a ministerial council. Poincaré declared to me in the most categorical manner that both he himself and the whole cabinet are firmly determined fully to carry out the obligations laid upon us by the terms of our alliance. There arose, however, in connection therewith a series of complicated questions of a political and strategic nature. In the first place, according to the French constitution, a parliamentary decision is necessary regarding a declaration of war, and at least two days are required for the assembling of Parliament. Although Poincaré has no doubt as to its decision he would prefer to avoid a public debate regarding the application of the treaty of alliance. On these grounds, and for reasons which chiefly concern England (see telegram No. 20), it would be better if the declaration of war were made, not by France, but by Germany. It must further be borne in mind that to-day is only the first day of the French mobilization, and that therefore it would be more advantageous for both the Allies if France were only to begin military operations after mobilization was more advanced. For the rest Poincaré is persuaded that Germany will not wait for a declaration of war by France, but will attack her without delay without permitting her to complete her mobilization. Immediately after the discussion of all these questions by the ministerial council Poincaré will summon me and inform me as to the results.

IZVOLSKI.

(Ambassador in France to Foreign Minister.)  
(Tel. No. 223.)

PARIS, 19 July/1 August.

Poincaré told me that during the last few days the Austrian ambassador had energetically assured him and Viviani that Austria had declared to us her readiness not only to respect the territorial integrity of Serbia but also her sovereign rights, but that we had intentionally concealed those assurances. To my remark that this was a complete lie [the Orange Book reads: "I oppose it (the lie!) with a categorical denial." With regard to the Austrian statements, compare the written statements of Baron Schön in Paris under (1) in telegram No. 195 from Paris; the verbal declarations of Count Pourtalés in Petersburg, and also Sazonoff's answer contained in the first two sentences of the Petersburg telegram No. 1554], Poincaré replied that similar statements had been made in London by Austria, where they might create a very dangerous impression, and therefore ought to be denied there as well. [In the Orange Book the suppressed end portion of the telegram is given as follows: "I denied this categorically." It is for the reader to decide whether this dementi only refers to the Austrian assurances regarding Serbia's sovereign rights or also to her territorial integrity as well. That the latter was in effect actually guaranteed by Austria is indisputably shown by the note to telegram No. 223 above, while Serbia's sovereign rights, which were touched by the punitive measures necessitated by the Serajevo murder, would have formed the subject at that time of the direct negotiations between Austria and Russia, to engage in which the former had declared her readiness. Compare note to telegram No. 1548. IzvolSKI's assertion is therefore unsustainable, and this accounts for the falsification in the Orange Book.]

IZVOLSKI.

(Ambassador in France to Foreign Minister.)  
(Tel. No. 224.)

PARIS, 19 July/1 August.

A telegram has been received from the French minister at Bucharest which displays great anxiety regarding the intentions of Rumania, who is said to be inclined neither to absolute neutrality nor to participation in common negotiations with Austria. The President of the Republic said to me that influence must be brought to bear on Rumania without loss of time by promising her Transylvania. In Poincaré's opinion, attempts must also be made to draw Italy over to our side by promising her Valona and freedom of action in Albania.

IZVOLSKI.

(Ambassador in France to Foreign Minister.)  
(Tel. No. 225.)

PARIS, 19 July/1 August—3 a. m.

I have just come from the President of the Republic, who said that the council of ministers again confirmed the decision unreservedly to fulfil France's obligations as an ally. The council recognized that in the interests of both the Allies it would be better for France to complete her mobilization, for which purpose 10 days would be required, before hostilities are commenced. At the end of that period Parliament will be summoned to meet. Poincaré continues to fear that Germany will attack France at once in order to render completion of the mobilization difficult. The above statements must be preserved absolutely secret.

IZVOLSKI.

(Foreign Minister to ambassador in France.)

(Tel. No. 1627.)

PETERSBURG, 20 July/2 Aug.

Germany is openly endeavoring to turn the responsibility for the rupture on to us. Our *general* [with regard to the suppression of the allusion to the "general" character of the Russian mobilization, compare note to Paris telegram No. 197 of July 27] mobilization was necessitated by the immense responsibility which we should have incurred if we had not taken all the precautionary measures in good time, and Austria had limited herself to protracted negotiations while at the same time bombarding Belgrade. [In the Orange Book there is the following addition to the sentence: "and carried out her complete mobilization." This subsequent insertion in the Orange Book reveals the evident falsification in the telegram from Vienna regarding the alleged general Austrian mobilization on July 28. Compare telegram No. 1554. For the rest the hypothetical action attributed to Austria exactly corresponds with the attitude of Russia and Austria themselves. Compare telegram No. 210 of July 30.] The Czar had given his word to the German Kaiser not to take any provocative action so long as the negotiations with Austria continued. After this guaranty and all the proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany had no right to doubt our assurance that we would joyfully accept any way out that was compatible with Serbia's dignity and independence. Any other issue would have been quite incompatible with our own dignity and would naturally have shattered European equilibrium, as it would have brought about the hegemony of Germany. This European character of the conflict, which was of world-wide significance, was infinitely more important than its occasion. [In the Orange Book there is the following addition: "As Germany decided to declare war on us at a time when negotiations between the powers were still in suspense, she took upon herself a heavy responsibility." In this addition is made quite clear the tendentious misrepresentation of the true contents, to which attention has already been called in the note to telegram No. 207 for the purpose of transferring the blame for the war to Germany. Compare the bearing of France and Russia toward the negotiations between the powers now represented as so promising and telegram No. 210 of July 30.]

SAZONOFF.

(Ambassador in France to Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 225.)

[This telegram, evidently inadvertently, has been given the same number as the last sent on the previous day.]

PARIS, 20 July/2 Aug.

To-day, Sunday, is to be regarded as the first day of mobilization.

IZVOLSKI.

(Ambassador in France to Foreign Minister.)

(Tel. No. 225.)

PARIS, 20 July/2 Aug.

Small German detachments have crossed the French frontier and some minor collisions have already occurred on French territory. This enables the French Government to declare to Parliament, which is summoned to meet on Tuesday, that France has been attacked, and so to avoid a formal declaration of war. News has been received to-day that German troops have entered Luxembourg territory, thereby violating the neutrality of the Duchy, which is guaranteed by England and Italy, among others, signed by the treaty in 1867. This circumstance is considered very advantageous for France, as it will infallibly call forth a protest from England and cause her to manifest greater energy. There is also news that German troops are said to be advancing toward Arlon, which indicates an intention of violating Belgian neutrality also. This will touch England even more nearly. Viviani telegraphed to London immediately directing the French ambassador to call Grey's attention to this.

IZVOLSKI.

To make effective the duty of France to mobilize and immediately attack Germany simultaneously with Russia under the terms of the treaty of 1892 it was only necessary to make Austria mobilize, above quoted, and this was accomplished through the Slavs of Serbia.

That the German authorities were not entirely unsuspecting of the will to war by the French and Russian leaders is shown by the sealed instruction sent under seal of July 26 to the German ambassador at Brussels not to be opened until authorized by telegram. The authority was given August 2, after the French and Russian troops had crossed the German line. This communication from the German Government was handed to M. Devignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 7 o'clock p. m. August 2, 1914.

## EXHIBIT X.

## APPENDIX G (BAUSMAN).

Russian increases: Reorganization was begun in 1910, with as much secrecy as possible (Eggeling, 9). The losses of the Japanese war were

replaced in 1911. In 1914 the military expenditures were 2,600,000,000 marks (Kuhl, 60). The universal service law required four years with the colors. The German staff reckoned in 1913 on a Russian total of 38 reserve divisions; the force would be—

	Reservists.
For active formations	748,000
For reserve formations	876,000
For replacement	205,000
For communication formations	40,000
	1,869,000
In both categories of reserve or a surplus of	2,292,000
	423,000

(Von Kuhl, 61-62.)

This was in 1913. For the following year increases were planned and in part carried out. Excluding Siberian and Turkestan troops, the strength of the Russian army was 30 army corps, comprising 35½ cavalry, or Cossack, divisions, 35 reserve divisions, and 40 national defense divisions.

The peace strength in the summer of 1914 was 1,581,000 officers and men; the war strength 3,461,750 (Kuhl, 104, 105).

The ultimate aim became that of creating an army which could take the offensive against Germany. All Russian Army questions after 1910 were viewed by the press in Russia from this angle. (Eggeling, 9.)

The military railways: These were created to permit the immediate transport of troops from Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kazan to the German and Austrian frontiers. In peace times the forces were divided along the new lines to be rushed to the front. (Kuhl, 76.) France made a loan for these lines—one thousand million francs. The Siberian Railway was also double-tracked to bring up the forces from there. In 1912 two great private roads (from Sosnowice to Warsaw and from Alexandrovo to Warsaw) were purchased by the Government. The Polish railway officials were supplanted by Russians in 1912 (ib.).

## RUSSIAN MILITARY MENACES IN 1914 BEFORE THE SERBIAN TROUBLE.

In 1911 the French chief of staff, Dubail, attended the Russian maneuvers, and the next year the Russian chief, Shilinski, attended the French. France demanded Russian military increases in exchange for her seventeen thousand million francs. (Kuhl, 72.) This was charged by the Russian journal *Rjetsch*, on July 19, 1914. (ib., 70.) The Grand Duke Nicholas desiring war in 1912, Sukhomlinoff answered that they were not yet ready, whereupon the former renewed his pressure on preparations. (Eggeling, 49-50.) Nicholas planned a military demonstration for 1913, but was stopped by remonstrances that two years would yet be necessary. (Eggeling, 16.)

In 1913 the German general staff believed that the Russian field forces of the first line could be ready on the fifth day of mobilization, and of the second line on the eighth. (Kuhl, 82.) The spring of 1914 witnessed the enormous preparations, the Duma sanctioning increases equal to the entire peace strength of the Austrian and Hungarian armies. (Eggeling, 18.) Continual test mobilizations were occurring, supplies were imported, coal reserves increased, and rolling stock added. Grain export was stopped. (ib., 16-17; Kuhl, 66-67.)

Peace reviews and strengthening of fortresses: These were very common. In the autumn of 1913 General Joffre headed a mission to St. Petersburg to examine her military efficiency, and departing remarked, "The Russian Army is at this moment the mightiest in the world" (Eggeling, 12-22). The troops around Vilna and Warsaw were presumed to concentrate against Germany, the Kiev forces against Austria. Sukhomlinoff announced himself ready in 1914. (ib., 22.)

Final movements after Serajevo: Von Eggeling goes into great detail of the eventful last week. He discusses the revelations also of the Sukhomlinoff's trial. As to actual movement to the German frontier, Kuhl says that the plan carried out was that of 1912 (which was captured during the war) of crossing the German borders without declaration of war. "Our measures must in this connection be concealed by apparent diplomatic negotiations." On the very 1st day of August, that of Germany's declaration of war, "the border was crossed in four places by enemy patrols." (Kuhl, 79-80.)

## APPENDIX I (BAUSMAN).

Since the first edition of this work there has been issued a startling exposure entitled "*The Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book*." (London, Allen and Unwin, 1923.) The work appeared shortly before in German, with notes by Freiherr von Romberg. The London edition contains a foreword by the learned Professor Gooch.

The "books," of various colors, issued immediately after the outbreak of hostilities by the different governments, were at first supposed to be complete. Later it was discovered that they were made up of selected matter, and that all the truth was not revealed. That any of the dispatches, though, would be deliberately tampered with before publication was never suspected, so during eight or nine years the public had believed that what the various governments did publish was genuine. The book just referred to has dispelled that illusion in so far as concerns Russia. In the Russian Orange Book not only were

whole telegrams omitted but passages were left out and passages altered. As Professor Gooch says:

"Readers will form their own impression as to the changes, but there will be general agreement that the original Orange Book was a dishonest piece of work."

An omitted dispatch is No. 1521, from Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister at Petrograd, to Izvolski, his ambassador at Paris. Its date is July 27, four days before the admission of the Russian mobilization and five days before the German declaration of war upon Russia because she would not stop that mobilization. Sazonoff actually says:

"If there is a question of exercising a moderating influence on St. Petersburg we reject it in advance."

On July 30, in telegram No. 207, Izvolski advises Sazonoff that Schon, German ambassador at Paris, "complains of the French military preparations," and that Schon said that in that event Germany "would be compelled to adopt similar precautions." He relates that Viviani replied that France wanted peace, but was "determined to act with her allies." Viviani had that evening forbidden, he says, a projected antiwar demonstration in Paris. These passages were suppressed.

We come now to the 31st. At 1 o'clock in the morning, Izvolski, in his No. 216, advises Sazonoff as follows (entirely omitted from the Russian Orange Book):

"The French war minister informed me in earnest tones that the Government is firmly resolved on war and requests us to confirm the hopes of the French general staff that all our efforts will be directed against Germany and that Austria will be treated as a negligible quantity."

The reader will note that this was sent before the Russlaus had formally announced their mobilization and before Germany had declared war. It became plain that France was willing to jump into the fray even without waiting for German action, that she was simply studying the moral effect of a first action upon her part and not hesitating as to war. Here is what Izvolski says in his No. 218 to Sazonoff on August 1, the day upon which the German ultimatum to Russia to stop her mobilization expired:

"For political reasons, in respect to Italy and especially England, it is very important for France that her mobilization should not precede the German but should form an answer to it."

In his No. 222 (suppressed) Izvolski further advises Sazonoff on the same 1st day of August, after hearing that Germany on the expiration of her telegram to Russia had declared war. He states that he has received a telegram announcing Germany's declaration of war against Russia and had seen Poincaré, who had immediately summoned a ministerial council regarding French action. "It would be better," Izvolski says, "if the declaration of war were made not by France but by Germany." He then states that, to-day being the first French day of mobilization, it "would be more advantageous for both the allies if France were only to begin military operations after her mobilization was more advanced."

The reader will see the confirmation in all this of two things contended in the first edition of the present book: That the hanging back from the frontier by France was part of her general plan of waiting until the Russians were ready to move in conjunction with her; second, that she was firmly resolved on war and was simply studying the appropriate time in which to launch war, and that it had even been considered that France should declare the war on Germany without waiting either to be attacked or to have a war declared upon her.

#### EXHIBIT XI.

##### APPENDIX A (BAUSMAN).

###### *Von Moltke's summary of December, 1912.*

In December, 1912, Von Moltke made a long "memorandum" of the military situation to the War Ministry. It is too long for complete quotation here, but can be found in the book by Ludendorff called *Problems of the General Staff*, Volume I, at page 57. He reviews the certainty that England will be against Germany, with France and Russia, but Italy "has no vital interest in a conflict between Austria and Russia. While Germany and Austria will be fighting for their existence, Italy will hardly be threatened."

He had had an interview a few days since with a representative of the Italian general staff, who says that, "no matter what the pretext," Italy will not contribute her third army, which had been counted upon.

He then adds three appendices, of which I give the two pertinent ones, as follows:

"Under I of the appendix are the forces which Germany can put into the field in the west in a war with the Triple Entente, in battalions, squadrons, and batteries, which can be opposed to the forces at the disposal of France and England. The tables show an inferiority on the side of Germany of 124 battalions; if Belgium be added to the number of our enemies, the figure is 192 battalions. The Italian Army is left out of account, as it will not participate. On the other hand, the French Alpine army, which will be immobilized by the Italians, is also left out of the calculation. If the Italian third army were brought to Germany, the two allies would have a slight superiority. But it is

immaterial to us whether Italy assembles 2 or 12 army corps behind her Alpine frontier. It would be an extraordinary operation to force that frontier. Until it is opened, the whole Italian Army will be standing idle, rifle in hand, without being able to fire a shot. Germany must gain the decision alone and unaided. While in 1870 she had a superiority in infantry of 106 battalions over France, as well as an immense preponderance of artillery, and fought this one opponent with her rear secured, she has now to take the field against France with a great inferiority in infantry (though still with a slight superiority in artillery), and will further be attacked in the rear by Russia. The superiority of our artillery rests at the moment on our more marked development of high-angle fire (field howitzers) and our heavy artillery of the field army. Moreover, we are ahead of the French with the provision of field kitchens and tents, as well as our infantry rifle. But it is only a question of money for France to catch up with us in these respects. In time she will be able to get level with us and even overtake us. On the other hand, she can not overtake us as regards the number of men fit for service, who are at our disposal as long as we manage to secure them for the army.

"Part II of the appendix shows that in the east Russia enjoys a very great numerical superiority. A comparison of the forces which Germany, Austria, and Rumania combined can put into the field against Russia reveals a Russian superiority of 1,374 battalions, 319 squadrons, and 82 batteries. At the present moment Russia is still very much behindhand with the reorganization, equipment, and arming of her forces, so that for the time being the Triple Alliance need not be afraid of an armed conflict even with her in spite of her numerical superiority. But when we look forward into the future we must keep present in our minds the fact that in view of the enormous sums Russia is spending on the reorganization of her army, she will be stronger with every year that passes. It is just as impossible for Germany to try and compete with Russia as a land power as it is for her to attempt to catch up with England as a sea power. But it is just as incumbent upon her to leave no stone unturned to employ all the resources which are still at her disposal on a large scale in order to maintain that position vis-à-vis our neighbors which we enjoyed before they brought their armed forces up to the present level and began to think of increasing them.

"The military situation in our frontier Provinces requires special attention. We have to expect, certainly in the east and possibly in the west also, an attack immediately on the proclamation of mobilization. If such an attack were not beaten off by the destruction of railways, bridges, and tunnels, our mobilization, the arming of the fortresses, and our deployment would be seriously interfered with. It is of the very greatest importance that our troops in these regions should be reinforced and our fortresses be put into an advanced state of defense.

"I believe I have established the necessity of increasing our military forces and improving our home defenses in what I have said above. The political situation will make these measures an inexorable necessity. Of course, the satisfaction by the nation of the demands made here and dealt with in greater detail in Part II of the memorandum will involve great personal and pecuniary sacrifices. But in any case these sacrifices will be far less than those we should have to face in case of a lost war.

"We must also point out that our neighbors have made and are now making similar sacrifices in order to strengthen their military forces.

"France makes much greater personal demands on her population than we do on ours. During the first Morocco crises she spent 300,000,000 marks on the strengthening of her eastern fortresses.

"This year Russia demanded and obtained from her national assembly 1,300,000,000 marks.

"In the last three years England has spent large sums to give effect to the Haldane reforms.

"Switzerland has introduced a new army organization at a heavy cost.

"Belgium is now carrying through a new defense bill, by which her army will be brought up to a mobilization strength of 300,000 men. She has laid out enormous sums to modernize the fortifications of Antwerp.

"Under the pressure of the political crisis Austria has been compelled to demand very large credits for that reorganization of her army which is long overdue.

"Germany, too, must be prepared to make sacrifices. The program for the provision of the most urgent requirements which is drawn up in Part II must be carried through with the greatest energy, so that in the future Germany, trusting to her own strength, can give the political leaders of the nation a support which is solid enough to meet all emergencies."

It demanded a peaceful passage through Belgium, proposing to pay for damages and respect Belgian sovereignty and territory when war ended, and claimed to know that Belgian neutrality had already been violated by France. (Exhibit XII.)

## EXHIBIT XII.

BRUSSEL, August 2, 1914.

## IMPERIAL GERMAN LEGATION IN BELGIUM.

(Highly confidential.)

The German Government has received reliable information according to which the French forces intend to march on the Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France of marching on Germany through Belgian territory. The Imperial Government can not avoid the fear that Belgium, in spite of its best will, will be in no position to repulse such a largely developed French march without aid. In this fact there is sufficient certainty of a threat directed against Germany.

It is an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to forestall this attack of the enemy.

The German Government would feel keen regret if Belgium should regard as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of the enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to violate Belgian territory.

In order to dissipate any misunderstanding, the German Government declares as follows:

1. Germany does not contemplate any act of hostility against Belgium. If Belgium consents in the war about to commence to take up an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German Government on its part undertakes, on the declaration of peace, to guarantee the Kingdom and its possessions in their whole extent.
2. Germany undertakes under the conditions laid down to evacuate Belgian territory as soon as peace is concluded.
3. If Belgium preserves a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in agreement with the authorities of the Belgian Government, to buy against cash all that is required by her troops, and to give indemnity for the damages caused in Belgium.
4. If Belgium behaves in a hostile manner toward the German troops, and in particular raises difficulties against their advance by the opposition of the fortifications of the Meuse or by destroying roads, railways, tunnels, or other engineering works, Germany will be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this case Germany will take no engagements toward Belgium, but she will leave the later settlement of relations of the two States toward one another to the decision of arms. The German Government has a justified hope that this contingency will not arise and that the Belgian Government will know how to take suitable measures to hinder its taking place. In this case the friendly relations which unite the two neighboring States will become closer and more lasting.

On August 3 Belgium refused and the German troops thereafter treated Belgium as an enemy ally of France.

## EXHIBIT XIV.

## THE GERMAN ACCEPTANCE OF ARMISTICE TERMS.

1. Cessation of operations by land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice.
2. Immediate evacuation of invaded countries: Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, so ordered as to be completed within 14 days from the signature of the armistice. German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will become prisoners of war. Occupation by the allied and United States forces jointly will keep pace with evacuation in these areas. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance with a note annexed to the stated terms.
3. Repatriation, beginning at once and to be completed within 15 days, of all inhabitants of the countries above mentioned, including hostages and persons under trial or convicted.
4. Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following equipment: Five thousand guns (2,500 heavy, 2,500 field), 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 minenwerfers, 1,700 airplanes. The above to be delivered in situ to the Allies and the United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the annexed note.
5. Evacuation by the German armies of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. These countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local troops of occupation under the control of the allied and United States armies of occupation. The occupation of these territories will be carried out by allied and United States garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine, Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne, together with bridgeheads at these points in 30-kilometer radius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions.

A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right of the Rhine between the stream and a line drawn parallel to it 40 kilometers (26 miles) to the east from the frontier of Holland to the parallel of Gernsheim and as far as practicable a distance of 30 kilometers (20 miles) from the east of stream from this parallel upon Swiss frontier. Evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine lands shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of 16 days, in all 31 days after the signature of the armistice. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated according to the note annexed.

6. In all territory evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacuation of inhabitants; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants. No destruction of any kind to be committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered, as well as military stores of food, munitions, equipment not removed during the periods fixed for evacuation. Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left in situ. Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel shall not be moved. Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroad, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired. No person shall be prosecuted for offenses of participation in war measures prior to the signing of the armistice.

7. All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain. Five thousand locomotives, 150,000 wagons, and 5,000 motor lorries in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the associated powers within the period fixed for the evacuation of Belgium and Luxemburg. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within 36 days, together with all pre-war personnel and material. Further material necessary for the working of railways in the country on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left in situ. All stores of coal and material for the upkeep of permanent ways, signals, and repair shops left entire in situ and kept in an efficient state by Germany during the whole period of armistice. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. All civil and military personnel at present employed on such means of communication and transporting, including waterways, shall remain.

8. The German command shall be responsible for revealing within 48 hours all mines or delay-acting fuses disposed on territory evacuated by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction. The German command shall also reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or polluting of springs, wells, etc.) under penalty of reprisals.

9. The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allies and the United States Armies in all occupied territory, "subject to regulation of accounts with those whom it may concern." The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhineland (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

10. An immediate repatriation without reciprocity, according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all allied and United States prisoners of war. The allied powers and the United States shall be able to dispose of these prisoners as they wish. This condition annuls the previous conventions on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war, including the one of July, 1918, in course of ratification. However, the repatriation of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and in Switzerland shall continue as before. The repatriation of German prisoners of war shall be regulated at the conclusion of the preliminaries of peace.

11. Sick and wounded who can not be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by German personnel who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

12. All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Rumania, Turkey, or Austria-Hungary shall immediately withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914. German troops now in Russian territory shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as soon as the Allies, taking into account the internal situation of those territories, shall decide that the time for this has come.

13. Evacuation by German troops to begin at once, and all German instructors, prisoners, and civilian as well as military agents now on the territory of Russia (as defined before 1914), to be recalled.

14. German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other undertakings, with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Rumania and Russia (as defined on August 1, 1914).

15. Renunciation of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

16. The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier either through Danzig or by the Vistula in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories and for the purpose of maintaining order.

17. Evacuation by all German forces operating in East Africa within a period to be fixed by the Allies.

18. Repatriation without reciprocity within maximum period of one month, in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of all civilians interned or deported who may be citizens of other allied or associated States than those mentioned in clause 3, paragraph 19.

19. The following financial conditions are required: Reparation for damage done. While such armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery or repatriation of the cash deposit, in the National Bank of Belgium, and in general immediate return of all documents, specie, stock, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries. Restitution of the Russian and Rumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that power. This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until the signature of peace.

20. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships. Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and merchant marines of the allied and associated powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

21. All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the allied and associated powers in German hands to be returned without reciprocity.

22. Surrender to the Allies and the United States of America of all German submarines now existing (including all submarine cruisers and mine-laying submarines), with their complete armament and equipment, in ports which will be specified by the Allies and the United States of America. Those which can not take the sea shall be disarmed of the material and personnel and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. All the conditions of the article shall be carried into effect within 14 days. Submarines ready for sea shall be prepared to leave German ports immediately upon orders by wireless, and the remainder at the earliest possible moment.

23. The following German surface warships which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States of America shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America and placed under the surveillance of the Allies and the United States of America, only caretakers being left on board, namely:

Six battle cruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers, including 2 mine layers, 50 destroyers of the most modern type. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. All vessels of the auxiliary fleet (trawlers, motor vessels, etc.) are to be disarmed. Vessels designated for internment shall be ready to leave German ports within seven days upon directions by wireless, and the military armament of all vessels of the auxiliary fleet shall be put on shore.

24. The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep all mine fields, and obstructions laid by Germany outside German territorial waters, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

25. Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the naval and mercantile marine of the allied and associated powers. To secure this, the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy all German forts, fortifications, batteries, and defense works of all kinds in all the entrances from the Cattegat into the Baltic, and to sweep up all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters without any question of neutrality being raised and the positions of all such mines and obstructions are to be indicated.

26. The existing blockade conditions set up by the allied and associated powers are to remain unchanged and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture. The Allies and the United States shall give consideration to the provisioning of Germany during the armistice to the extent recognized as necessary.

27. All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States.

28. In evacuating the Belgian coasts and ports, Germany shall abandon all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, cranes, and all other harbor materials, all materials for inland navigation, all aircraft, and all materials and stores, all arms and armaments, and all stores and apparatus of all kinds.

29. All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany, all Russian war vessels of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant vessels seized are to be released; all warlike and other materials of all kinds seized in those parts are to be returned, and German materials, as specified in clause 28, are to be abandoned.

30. All merchant vessels in German hands belonging to the allied and associated powers are to be restored in ports to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

31. No destruction of ships or materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender, or restoration.

32. The German Government will notify neutral governments of the world, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the allied and associated countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for specific concessions, such as the export of shipbuilding materials or not, are immediately canceled.

33. No transfers of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag are to take place after signature of the armistice.

34. The duration of the armistice is to be 30 days, with option to extend. During this period, on failure of execution of any of the above clauses, the armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties on 48 hours' previous notice. It is understood that the execution of articles 3 and 18 shall not warrant the denunciation of the

armistice on the ground of insufficient execution within a period fixed, except in the case of bad faith in carrying them into execution. In order to assume the execution of this convention under the best conditions, the principle of a permanent international armistice commission is admitted. This commission shall act under authority of the allied military and naval commanders in chief.

35. This armistice to be accepted or refused by Germany within 72 hours of notification.

(See Exhibit 21: Conditions of armistice.)

#### EXHIBIT XV.

##### WHAT GERMANY HAS PAID.

It is impossible to determine precisely what Germany has paid in execution of the treaty of Versailles, because the amount to be credited for various items, such as the Saar mines, the merchant marine, etc., remains unsettled. We therefore present herewith a German statement, which may be regarded as a maximum account, and a Reparation Commission statement, which may be taken as a minimum. The former includes all payments to December 31, 1922; the latter includes only payments to August 31, 1922. The Germans include German property liquidated abroad, which does not come within the purview of the Reparation Commission; their figures on Saar coal and other State property ceded are several times as large as the "provisional figures" given by the Reparation Commission, which are recognized as too low; the Germans reckon the coal delivered at the world market price, the commission at the low German market price; other cost reckonings vary, and the commission takes no account of the items listed by the Germans under V. A thousand gold marks is about \$250.

##### The German statement.

#### I. DELIVERIES FROM MATERIALS ON HAND AND CESSION OF PROPERTY WITHIN THE REICH AND ABROAD.

	Gold marks (in thousands).
1. Property of the Reich and of the States (exclusive of Eupen-Malmedy, Alsace-Lorraine, and the colonies).....	5,507,616
Add: Property of the Reich and of the States in Eupen-Malmedy.....	150,000
2. Saar mines.....	1,017,570
3. Private and public cables.....	79,410
4. Nonmilitary property left in the territory evacuated by the German troops on the western front.....	1,897,150
5. Railroad and pontoon bridges over the Rhine (part belonging to Baden).....	9,611
6. Shares of the Morocco State Bank and value of the stocks and bonds delivered in accordance with article 260 of the peace treaty.....	392,643
7. German property liquidated abroad.....	11,740,000
8. Germany's claims on her former allies ceded in accordance with the peace treaty.....	8,600,000
Total.....	20,394,000

#### II. PAYMENTS AND DELIVERIES FROM NATIONAL CAPITAL AND CURRENT PRODUCTION.

9. Railroad material delivered in accordance with the armistice terms, including reserve parts, motor trucks, all locomotives, rolling stock, and other railroad equipment in the ceded territories (inclusive of Upper Silesia, exclusive of Memel district, Denmark, and Eupen-Malmedy).....	2,238,433
10. Ocean-going vessels (inclusive of vessels in American waters and ships on which an embargo had been placed) and fishing boats, ships of inland waterways, harbor equipment, and river boats.....	6,020,391
11. Coal without by-products (world market price).....	2,333,600
12. Deliveries for reconstruction in accordance with the armistice terms (for instance, coal by-products, animals, pharmaceutical products, machinery, tools, woods, University of Louvain, paintings, etc.).....	520,578
Total.....	11,113,000

#### III. CASH PAYMENTS.

13. Payments in foreign exchange.....	1,580,000
14. Sale of destroyed and damaged war material (scrap), estimate.....	200,000
15. Rhineland customs and other revenue from the economic sanctions of 1921.....	69,337
16. Yield from the English recovery act.....	126,295
17. Miscellaneous (war expenditures of Alsace-Lorraine, Franco-German pension agreement, guaranties to the guaranty committee, etc.).....	104,368
Total.....	2,140,000

## IV. OTHER PAYMENTS AND DELIVERIES.

	Gold marks (in thousands).
18. Clearing.....	603,000
19. Internal costs of occupation including mark advances (the external costs of occupation—i. e., the expenses, borne in the first instance by the powers occupying German territory, and met without mark advances— are paid by Germany by deliveries in kind. These costs amounted to 3.4 billion gold marks on Apr. 30, 1922).....	861,000
20. Cost of the Reparation Commission and the other inter- allied commissions.....	90,000
21. Restitutions and substitutions (i. e., deliveries of mater- ial restituted or substituted) of machines, tools, ships, and animals—estimate.....	400,000
22. Navy delivered to the Allies exclusive of those vessels interned in Scapa Flow, but inclusive of the marine equipment in Tsingtau ceded to Japan—articles 184, 185, and 188 of treaty.....	1,417,000
Total.....	3,371,000

## V. EXPENDITURES AND LOSSES WITHIN GERMANY.

23. Military disarmament (exclusive of sales of scrap), estimate—i. e., army, navy, or air material undam- aged or destroyed, delivered to the Reparation Com- mission, sold whole or broken up to the highest bid- der, mostly in Germany, the proceeds of which were credited to the Allies. The yield from the sales of scrap were credited to capital account ( <i>vide supra</i> 14).....	6,250,000
24. Industrial disarmament—estimate.....	2,700,000
25. Nonmilitary material left by the German troops in the evacuated territory on the eastern front—estimate.....	1,050,000
26. Miscellaneous (costs of plebiscites, determining fron- tiers, care of refugees, etc.)—estimate.....	482,000
Total.....	10,482,000

## VI. SUMMARY.

Deliveries from materials on hand.....	29,394,000
Payments and deliveries from national capital and cur- rent production.....	11,113,000
Cash payments.....	2,140,000
Other payments and deliveries.....	3,371,000
Expenditures and losses within Germany.....	10,482,000
Total.....	56,500,000

If to this total the value of Alsace-Lorraine, of the German colonies, and of the purely military material in the various evacuated territories be added, the figure representing Germany's total payments and deliveries runs well above 100,000,000,000 gold marks.

## THE ALLIED SUMMARY.

The reparation commission accounts are not complete, nor are they yet available in any simple form. The following summaries, taken from the *Federal Reserve Bulletin* for February, 1923, are the clearest available:

## I. PAYMENTS TO AUGUST 31, 1922.

	Gold marks (in thousands).
On pre-May 1, 1921, army costs and coal advances, ac- count.....	2,621,650
On capital debt account.....	2,504,342
On post-May 1, 1921, army costs account.....	268,190
On schedule of payments account:	
On installments due to Aug. 15, 1922.....	1,952,923
On installments falling due Oct. 15, 1922.....	38,023
Total.....	7,385,128

Of this total 21 per cent, or 1,562,244 thousand gold marks, was paid in gold or in foreign currency; 45 per cent, or 3,318,542 thousand gold marks, was paid in kind; and 34 per cent, or 2,504,342 thousand gold marks, was paid in State property in the ceded territories.

## II. PAYMENTS IN KIND.

	Gold marks (in thousands).
Under armistice convention:	
Abandoned war material.....	317,804
Rolling stock (127,039 cars, 4,553 locomotives).....	826,653
Motor trucks.....	17,509
Fixed railway material.....	2,461
Agricultural material.....	22,709
Louvain Library.....	1,451
Proceeds of reparation recovery act.....	114,744
Under Annex III:	
Ships (2,593,057 gross tons).....	706,129
Inland watercraft and installations.....	24,836

## Under Annex IV:

	Gold marks (in thousands).
Reconstruction material.....	19,810
Livestock (99,300 horses, 175,439 cattle, 218,076 sheep, 21,664 goats, 245,688 poultry).....	157,073
Miscellaneous under Annexes II and IV.....	110,268

## Under Annex V:

Coal, coke, and lignite (actual tonnage 41,019,432 metric tons; converted tonnage, 45,760,053 metric tons).....	776,618
Coal, credit in suspense.....	30,970
By-products of coal.....	22,855

## Under Annex VI:

Dyestuffs (17,363,990 kilograms).....	46,937
Pharmaceutical products (753,775 kilograms).....	12,813

## Under Annex VII:

Submarine cables.....	49,000
Miscellaneous.....	236

## Sales by Reparation Commission:

Coal, coke, and lignite to Luxemburg (2,525,314 metric tons; 3,406,387 in converted tonnage).....	50,074
Dyestuffs to United States Textile Alliance (2,341,497 kilograms).....	4,564
Dyestuffs to German buyers (626,805 kilograms).....	3,026
Total.....	3,318,542

## III. DISTRIBUTION OF RECEIPTS.

Countries.	In thousand gold marks.			
United States <sup>1</sup> .....	59,491			59,491
British Empire <sup>2</sup> .....	955,161	141,922	538	1,097,621
France <sup>3</sup> .....	1,322,709	101,013	2,042	1,425,764
Italy.....	39,106	157,723		196,829
Japan.....		8,978	59,000	67,978
Belgium.....	254,640	1,208,202	635	1,463,477
Others.....		136,627	6,031	142,658
Total.....	2,631,107	1,754,465	68,246	4,453,818

<sup>1</sup>1,007,283 thousand gold marks still unpaid.

<sup>2</sup>60,159 thousand gold marks still unpaid.

<sup>3</sup>155,635 thousand gold marks still unpaid.

	Gold marks (in thousands).
Cession to France—Saar (provisional figure).....	300,000
Cession to Poland (provisional figure).....	1,730,582
Cession to Danzig (provisional figure).....	305,514
Other items in suspense and undistributed assets:	
Pre-May 1, 1921.....	563,289
Post-May 1, 1921.....	44,350
Total.....	7,397,553

An anonymous writer in the *Federal Reserve Bulletin* comments on these figures, pointing out that 39 per cent of the total paid has been absorbed by the expense of the occupation and the advances for food for the Ruhr miners made under the Spa agreement. He adds that if the total cost of the armies of occupation had been paid it would have absorbed 56 per cent of the more than 7,000,000,000 gold marks paid. Since only 65 per cent of this total was paid out of current production (the remaining 35 per cent being paid from cessions of State property effected without use of the occupying armies) it follows that the expenses of the armies and commissions maintained by the Allies in Germany have absorbed more than 86 per cent of the heavy payments exacted from Germany!

## GERMANY'S OFFERS.

So many loose statements have been made about "German failure to make proposals to the Allies" that we give the following summary of such proposals:

1. May 29, 1919. Note of the German peace delegation at Versailles offered 20,000,000,000 gold marks by May 1, 1926, and 80,000,000,000 in noninterest-bearing annual payments.
2. July 12, 1920. General proposal for final settlement presented at Spa. (Included repetition of offer of German labor for reconstruction of the devastated districts.)
3. March 1, 1921. Doctor Simon's proposal of payment of a total capital value of 50,000,000,000 gold marks, with interest at 5 per cent.
4. April 24, 1921. German note to the American Government proposing same total, to be amortized in accordance with an index figure of German prosperity.
5. January 28, 1922. Plans for fiscal reforms and payments, submitted to Reparation Commission.
6. May 28, 1922. Further proposals submitted to Reparation Commission.

7. November, 1922. Further proposals submitted to Reparation Commission during its visit to Berlin.

8. January, 1923. Proposals by Karl Bergmann, not officially submitted because Poincaré granted him no audience.

9. May 2, 1923. Cuno proposals.

#### EXHIBIT XVI.

##### WHAT GERMANY HAS PAID—KEYNES.

With the German Government's formal announcement of its bankruptcy and the total cessation of all payments, including deliveries in kind, the first phase of reparations during which Germany continuously paid large sums—probably up to the full limit of her capacity—has come to an end. It may be that no more will ever be paid. This is therefore an appropriate moment for reviewing and estimating her past performance.

The mind of the public has been extremely confused by the variety of estimates which have been current, varying from German official claims that she has already paid more than £2,200,000,000 to press headlines that she has paid nothing at all.

Apart from differences of opinion as to the estimation of particular items, there are two sets of figures which have been distinguished, namely, the total financial burden thrown on Germany by the peace treaty and the portion of this which counts under the terms of the treaty toward the discharge of reparations. Certain sacrifices imposed on Germany are excluded altogether from the items counting toward reparations, although they cost Germany just as dear as items which are not excluded, while the method prescribed by the treaty for calculating for the purposes of the reparation account the value of certain other items undoubtedly yields a lower figure than their real cost to Germany. Thus the cost to Germany of what she has paid and delivered is much greater than the sum credited to her in the books of the Reparation Commission.

Now if we are considering what progress Germany has made toward meeting her treaty liabilities, the latter figure alone is relevant, but if we are seeking the measure of effort needed to carry her burdens or the punishment imposed on her it is the former figure which matters.

Let us begin with the sums credited to her in the books of the Reparation Commission, which are indisputable and which represent the lowest estimate of her effort on any computation. These fall into three categories: Cash, £95,000,000 gold; deliveries in kind, £189,000,000; State property in ceded territories, £127,000,000; total, £411,000,000. Of these sums £19,600,000 was returned to Germany in the form of coal advances (under the Spa agreement). On the other hand, currency worth about £35,000,000 and goods and services worth at least a further £35,000,000 have been furnished to the armies of occupation and the commissions of control. Furthermore, the Reparation Commission has still to estimate and credit the value of State property in the ceded area of Upper Silesia, estimated by Germany, I think, at about £50,000,000. If we make adjustments for these various items, the total sum will be £511,000,000.

Let us allow next for the items reckoned in the reparation account below their real value. The largest and most indisputable of these is coal and coke. If the value of these deliveries had been calculated at their world market price instead of by the formula prescribed by the treaty, it is estimated that £70,000,000 additional (or thereabouts) would have been credited. There are also several other important items in which there is a wide difference between the value placed on them by the German Government and that assessed by the Reparation Commission as follows: The Saar mines, German valuation, £50,000,000, Reparation Commission valuation, £20,000,000; the mercantile marine, German valuation, £290,000,000, Reparation Commission, £35,000,000; ceded State property (not including Upper Silesia), German valuation, £275,000,000, Reparation Commission, £127,000,000; armistice deliveries, German valuation, £175,000,000, Reparation Commission, £59,000,000; total German valuation, £790,000,000, Reparation Commission valuation, £241,000,000.

Thus the German valuation is more than three times that of the Reparation Commission. Part of this discrepancy can be explained, without imputing bad faith to either party, by the difference in the principles of valuation adopted. The German Government naturally considers what the property is worth to the Germans, and the Reparation Commission equally considers what it is worth to the Allies, which may be all the difference between a going concern and a bankrupt stock. It might be quite consistent with the terms of the treaty to value some of the most essential parts of Germany's industrial equipment as scrap iron, but this would not be a correct measure of the burden thrown upon Germany. Indeed, its tendency to impoverish whatever it touches and to convert organized equipment into rubbish is one of the characteristics—we can almost say one of the objects—of the treaty of Versailles. Two items are, however, since they relate to known and definite objects, particularly striking—the Saar mines and the mercantile marine. The difference between the valuation per ton of output placed by the Reparation Commission on the Saar mines and that claimed by France for the destruction of her own mines, and the difference between the valuation per shipping ton placed on the

German mercantile marine and that claimed for the destruction of allied shipping are so wide as to seem obnoxious to justice. It should be added that the discrepancy in the shipping valuation partly depends upon whether the boom values current at the date of delivery are taken or slump values current at the date of valuation. It is instructive because it well illustrates the outrageous character of the reparation business to note that the valuation placed on the whole German mercantile marine is sufficient to pay interest on Germany's reparation liability as assessed by the same authority for a period of less than six weeks, while the surrender of the Saar mines pays the perpetually accruing interest bill for less than one month.

Since the German valuation has been built up item by item and offered for criticism and cross-examination, we may fairly assume, after allowing for all possible exaggerations, that a measure of the burden thrown on Germany by the deliveries is not less than half the figure claimed—that is to say, £395,000,000—as against £241,000,000 credited under the terms of the treaty. No one, I think, could put the cost to Germany as distinct from the value to the Allies (which in some cases is less than nothing) at a lower figure than this.

Our table is then as follows: Credits with the Reparation Commission (less Spa coal advances), £391,000,000; cash and goods supplied to the armies of occupation, £70,000,000; ceded property in Upper Silesia, £50,000,000; addition for the world market price of coal, £70,000,000; addition for the real value to Germany of various surrenders, £154,000,000; total, £735,000,000. I think this can be regarded as a conservative estimate of the burden thrown on Germany under these heads.

We now come to certain items which under the terms of the treaty do not count at all toward the reparation, but are none the less a charge on Germany. The most important are the following: (1) Sums owed to Germany by her former allies; (2) German colonies and State property there situated; (3) State property in Alsace-Lorraine; (4) "restitutions" in replacement of specific allied property removed by Germany from the invaded territory; (5) German ships seized in enemy ports; (6) German private property seized and liquidated abroad; (7) payments by Germany in discharge of private debts.

The face value of the first item is £85,000,000, but while it represents real loss to Germany its market value undoubtedly is nil. I know of no reliable estimate of items 2, 3, 4, and 5. On the basis of partial data I put these items, but without much confidence as to the accuracy of the figure, somewhere around £100,000,000 altogether.

Items 6 and 7 are of different character. The proceeds have been applied to the discharge of German private debts and to this extent they represent not a net loss but the liquidation of liabilities. The net burden has been thrown on Germany only to the extent that the assets have not been applied to the discharge of the liabilities of her own nationals—under the treaty any surplus can be applied to discharge the private debts of Germany's former allies—or have been sequestered and in part not applied (as in the United States), or have been sold at a price less than their value to their German owners as a going concern. Nevertheless, apart from this net burden, the fact that this amount of capital, previously lent to Germany, has been called in, thus diminishing her working capital abroad and her liquid reserves against emergencies, has clearly diminished her capacity to make foreign payments during the period since the armistice almost as much as though it were a net loss.

The figures are very large. The German Government's estimate of the value of the property liquidated abroad is £585,000,000—Tardieu has estimated it a little higher, namely, at £650,000,000—and the amount of cash payments under the clearing-house system is £30,000,000. The estimate of the value of the property liquidated appears too high if it is intended to represent its present value, but is probably not too high as a measure of its pre-war value.

To sum up, I am of the opinion that the financial cost to Germany of her efforts to meet her treaty liabilities and her obligation to surrender under the treaty between the date of the armistice and the date of the occupation of the Ruhr has exceeded a billion pounds, and if we include the sums she has had to find in this period to discharge private debts, the figure reaches £1,300,000,000. In order to reach an independent estimate, I made this calculation before opening the valuable volume, Germany's Capacity to Pay, by Moulton and McGuire, lately published by the Institute of Economics of Washington, D. C. The corresponding estimate of these writers is £1,290,000,000 up to September 30, 1922, which almost agrees with my figure, allowing for the fact that I carry my calculations up to a later date. There are, however, some differences between us regarding one or two items, which make up the total. In addition to this, Germany's pre-war investments in Russia, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary, and her war loans to her allies have been rendered valueless by the course of events, and there has, of course, been an enormous loss of "good will" in her business connections and organization.

Allowing for the change in the value of money and for the relative wealth and population of France in 1871 and Germany in 1919, the figure of £1,000,000,000 pounds represents a real burden on Germany per head more than double that thrown on France by her payment



of £200,000,000 after the Franco-German War. If we remember that Germany had fought the most exhausting war in history for four years and had lost in one way and another the bulk of her foreign assets, whereas France had her previous resources of foreign investments and the like almost intact, it is clear that the German effort to pay has represented enormously more than the equivalent of the French indemnity, as indeed we can easily judge after the event, by the comparative effects on the wealth and prosperity of the German people in 1923 and the French people in 1873.

In the face of these facts, the broad outlines of which are not open to dispute, it is an outrageous thing that certain sections of the press should be filled with charges that Germany has paid next to nothing, that she has evaded her liabilities, and that by bluff and chicanery she has cheated her creditors. These statements and suggestions are untrue.

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES.

LONDON (by cable).

EXHIBIT XVII. Military casualties, World War, estimated. (Casualties, by number.)

Table with 7 columns: Countries, Total mobilized forces, Killed and died, Wound casualties, Prisoners and missing, Total casualties, Total casualties in per cent of total mobilized. Rows include Allies (Russia, France, British Empire, Italy, United States, Japan, Rumania, Serbia, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Montenegro) and Central Powers (Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria).

1 Includes deaths from all causes. 2 Includes marines serving with the Army. 3 Official figures. 4 Includes "died of wounds" (14,500).

EXHIBIT XVIII.

Battle deaths, United States Army, World War, revised to May 1, 1922. (Total battle deaths.)

Table with 9 columns: Commissioned (Killed in action, Died of wounds, Total), Enlisted (Killed in action, Died of wounds, Total), Aggregate (Killed in action, Died of wounds, Total). Rows include Divisions, Other units, and a list of Divisions (2d, 1st, 3d, 32d, 4th, 28th, 42d, 26th, 5th, 77th, 27th, 30th, 79th, 78th, 90th, 89th, 91st, 82d, 35th, 80th, 29th).

1 Includes 2,372 Marine Corps personnel, but does not include Navy personnel.

EXHIBIT XVIII—Continued. Battle deaths, United States Army, World War—Continued.

Table with 9 columns: Commissioned (Killed in action, Died of wounds, Total), Enlisted (Killed in action, Died of wounds, Total), Aggregate (Killed in action, Died of wounds, Total). Rows include a list of Divisions (37th, 33d, 36th, 98d, 7th, 81st, 85th, 41st, 92d, 83d, 6th, 40th, 86th, 39th, 76th, 84th, 88th, 31st, 8th, 87th, 34th, 38th) and a Total row.

1 Includes 2,372 Marine Corps personnel, but does not include Navy personnel.

EXHIBIT XIX.

Cost of World War to principal belligerents, estimated.

The gross expenditures include intergovernment loans totaling \$22,072,214,125, which, if subtracted to avoid duplication, make net expenditures of \$186,233,637,097.

[Source of information: War Costs and Their Financing.]

Table with 3 columns: Country, Cost, Per cent of total. Rows include Great Britain, United States, France, Russia in Europe, Italy, Canada, Rumania, Australia, Belgium, India, Serbia, New Zealand, South African Union, Greece, Crown colonies and dependencies, Japan, Other Entente Allies, Total, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, Total, Grand total.

EXHIBIT XX.

- Bayerische dokumente zum kriegsausbruch und zum Versailler schuld-spruch. Dr. P. Dirr.
Official German Documents Relating to the World War. Volume I.
Official German Documents Relating to the World War. Volume II.
Pre-war Diplomacy. 1919. E. D. Morel.
The Secret Treaties. F. Seymour Coombs.
Let France Explain. Bausman; Allen & Unwin, London.
Lex Tallonis. Hills; Fleet, McGinley Co., Baltimore.
A Revision of the Treaty. J. M. Keynes; Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York.
Reflections of the World War. Bethmann-Holweg; Thornton, Butterworth, London.
Germany's Capacity to Pay. Moulton and McGuire; McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York.
Entente Diplomacy and the World. de Siebert; Knickerbocker Press, New York.
Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy. E. D. Morel; National Labor Press, Manchester.
The Falsification of the Russian Orange Book. Baron von Romberg; George Allen & Unwin, London.

- The Falsification of the Russian Orange Book. Baron von Romberg; B. W. Huebsch, New York.
- Recollections of a Foreign Minister. Izvolski; Doubleday, Page & Co., New York.
- History of the World War. Francis A. March; John C. Winston Co., Philadelphia.
- Un Livre Noir (Russian Archives), 2 volumes. Rene Marchand; Librairie du Travail, Paris.
- Les Responsabilités de la Guerre. De Martial.
- Sur la Question des Responsabilités. De Montgelas.
- Considerations sur les Responsabilités de la Guerre. Dupin.
- Poincaré a-t-il Voulu la Guerre. de Toury.
- Comment c'est Déclanchée la Guerre Mondiale. Kautsky.
- Diplomatic Genesis of War. E. D. Morel.
- Les Responsables de la Guerre. A. Pevet.
- German Documents Relative to the Origin of the War, 4 volumes. C. Jordan.
- Austrian Documents, Diplomatic Action Looking to War, 3 volumes. Official publication.
- Diplomacy Revealed. E. D. Morel.
- Secret Documents of the Archives of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Emile Laloy.
- Diplomatic Documents, History of the Policy of the Entente Before the War. de Siebert.
- The Myth of a Guilty Nation. Nock; B. W. Huebsch, New York.
- Economic Imperialism. Leonard Wolf; Harcourt, Brace & Howe, New York.
- The Causes of International War. G. L. Dickinson; Harcourt, Brace & Howe, New York.
- Truth and the War. E. D. Morel.
- How Diplomats Make War. Francis Neilson; B. W. Huebsch, New York.
- Belgium and the European Crisis. Official reports; E. S. Mitler & Sons, Berlin.
- The Living Age. August, September, October, 1922.
- Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of European War, etc., 2 volumes. Scott, Jos. W.

## EXHIBIT XXI.

## CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE FIXED BY THE ALLIES AND ACCEPTED BY GERMAN REPUBLIC.

The President of the United States, in his speech of January 8, 1918, proposed the conditions upon which world peace might be assured. They included certain 14 points, as follows:

1. Open covenants openly arrived at, and open diplomacy.
2. Freedom of navigation upon the seas.
3. Removal of economic barriers; equality of trade.
4. Reduction of armaments guaranteed.
5. Impartial adjustment of colonial claims.
6. Evacuation of Russian territory; a free Russia.
7. Evacuation and restoration of Belgium with unlimited sovereignty.
8. Evacuation of French territory; restoration of Alsace-Lorraine.
9. Readjustment of Italian boundaries along lines of nationality.
10. Autonomy for peoples of Austria-Hungary.
11. Evacuation and restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro; Serbia accorded access to sea; relations in Balkan States determined upon historical lines of allegiance and nationality, with international guaranties of territorial integrity.
12. Turkish sovereignty maintained, but subject nationalities to be free and autonomous, with Dardanelles opened under international guaranties.
13. Independent Poland guaranteed; access to sea.
14. Association of nations in a league of all nations.

Among statements of principles presented by President Wilson to be accepted are the following:

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open, and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind.

We wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace, such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program removes.

We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement of distinction or of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her, either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade, if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world, the new world in which we live, instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealing with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial dominion.

We have spoken now surely in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle is made a part of its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything they possess.

On July 4, 1918, the President of the United States declared the issue of the war to be one between democracy and autocracy and that the settlement must be final, and made the following declarations:

1. The destruction of any arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it can not be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

2. The settlement of every question, whether of territory or sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation of people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

3. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern States in their relations with one another, to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundations of a mutual respect for right.

4. The establishment of an organization for peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit, and by which every international readjustment that can not be amicably agreed upon by the people directly concerned shall be sanctioned.

In his Labor Day message of September 1 President Wilson said:

It is a war to make the nations and peoples of the world secure against every such power as the German autocracy represents. It is a war of emancipation. Not until it is won can men everywhere live free from constant fear or breathe freely while they go about their daily tasks and know that governments are their servants and not their masters.

On September 27 President Wilson, in opening the Liberty loan drive, declared the following five principles:

1. The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

2. No special or separate interest of any single nation, or any group of nations, can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.

3. There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants or understandings within the general or common family of the League of Nations.

4. There can be no special selfish economic combinations within the league, and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

5. All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world. It is further stated that the United States will enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations.

It was known to the German Government that President Wilson spoke as the representative of the allied and associated powers, and on October 4, 1918, Prince Maximilian, of Baden, in notes transmitted to President Wilson by wireless, offered to make peace on the basis of President Wilson's address of January 8, 1918, and his later pronouncements, and to conclude an armistice, and said:

The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take a hand in the restoration of peace, acquaint all

belligerent states with this request, and invite them to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of opening negotiations. It accepts the program set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27, as a basis for peace negotiations. With a view to avoiding further bloodshed the German Government requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land, on water, and in the air.

The President replied desiring to know if the German Government spoke for the German people and demanded a withdrawal of German troops from allied territory as an evidence of good faith.

The Germans replied October 12, accepting in unqualified manner the President's proposals in the following language:

The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of January 8 and in his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of these terms. The German Government believes that the Governments of the powers associated with the Government of the United States also take the position taken by President Wilson in his address. The German Government, in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government, for the purpose of bringing about an armistice, declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacuation. The German Government suggests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed commission for making the necessary arrangements concerning the evacuation. The present German Government, which has undertaken the responsibility for this step toward peace, has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The chancellor, supported in all his actions by the will of the majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people.

On October 14 the President replied demanding the absolute overthrow of the Kaiser and the house of Hohenzollern and the cessation of illegal and inhumane practices.

The Germans replied on October 20, agreeing to the annihilation of the Kaiser's power and all the conditions, but protesting the reproach of illegal and inhumane actions which they vigorously disclaimed, as follows:

The German Government protests against the reproach of illegal and inhumane actions made against the German land and sea forces and thereby against the German people. For the covering of a retreat destructions will always be necessary, and they are carried out in so far as is permitted by international law. The German troops are under the most strict instruction to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their ability. Where transgressions occur in spite of these instructions the guilty are being punished. The German Government further denies that the German navy in sinking ships has ever purposely destroyed lifeboats with their passengers. The German Government proposes, with regard to all those charges, that the facts be cleared up by neutral commissions.

The Germans advised the President that a new government had been adopted in Germany "in complete accordance with the representation of the people based on equal, universal, direct franchise."

On October 23, 1918, the President of the United States replied to the effect that having received such assurances from the German Government he felt he could not decline to take up with the associated Governments the question of an armistice; that the armistice must leave the associated powers in a position to enforce any arrangements that might be entered into, and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible; that if such an armistice was suggested by the military advisers of the associated nations the acceptance of its terms by Germany would afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeded.

The German Government on October 27 replied accepting the terms, and said:

The German Government has taken cognizance of the answer of the President of the United States. The President is aware of the far-reaching changes that have been carried out, and are being carried out, in the German constitutional structure, and that peace negotiations are being conducted by a people's government, in whose hands rests, both actually and constitutionally, the power to make the deciding conclusions. The military powers are also subject to it. The German Government now awaits proposals for an armistice which shall be the first step toward a just peace, as the President has described it in his proclamation.

On October 28 Emperor William issued the following decree indorsing the constitutional amendments promulgated by the Reichstag:

*Prepared for by a series of Government acts, a new order comes into force which transfers the fundamental rights of the Kaiser's person to the people. Thus comes to a close a period which stands in honor before the eyes of future generations. Despite all struggle between invested authority and aspiring forces, it has rendered possible to our people that tremendous development which imperishably revealed itself in the wonderful achievements of this war.*

The notes between the Government of the United States and the German Government in their complete continuity, setting forth the proposed bases of peace, were immediately transmitted by the President of the United States to the supreme war council, and Germany was so notified in his note of October 28. Clemenceau turned these notes over to Foch, who summoned Petain, Haig, and Pershing to read the correspondence to them and ask their advice. On the 26th Foch handed the military terms of the armistice to Clemenceau at the Trianon Palace Hotel, the meeting place of the supreme war council in Versailles.

The representatives of the Entente Governments immediately convened there to consider the terms laid before them and to come to a conclusion as to their acceptance or rejection; to decide whether an armistice should be granted and peace made upon the basis offered, or the offer of an armistice refused and surrender demanded. They reached a final conclusion on November 4, accepting the basis on which the Germans agreed to surrender as fixed by President Wilson, having occupied a period of nine days in deliberating upon the entire contract.

The representatives of the Entente Governments at the Trianon Palace Hotel in the above conference were Mr. Balfour; Prime Minister Lloyd-George, the Foreign Minister; the Secretary of State for War; the First Lord of the Admiralty; the high commissioner to the United States, Lord Reading; the chief of the general staff, Field Marshal Haig; the first sea lord, Admiral Wemyss; and Mr. Bonar Law, all of whom represented Great Britain.

The French Government was represented in like fashion by Clemenceau, by Foreign Minister Pichon, and most of the members of the French Government.

The United States was represented by General Bliss, Colonel House, Admiral Benson, etc.

The Italian leaders were there.

In all, 24 delegates actively participated and reached the following conclusion, to wit:

The allied governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress in January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses.

They must point out, however, that clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allies feel that no doubt ought to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.

#### CHAIRMAN OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE.

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MOSES in the chair). The Secretary will call the roll.

The reading clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Adams	Curtis	Gooding	Lenroot
Ashurst	Dale	Greene	Lodge
Ball	Dial	Hale	McKellar
Bayard	Dill	Harrell	McKinley
Borah	Edge	Harris	McLean
Brandegee	Edwards	Harrison	McNary
Brookhart	Elkins	Heflin	Mayfield
Broussard	Ernst	Howell	Moses
Bruce	Fernald	Johnson, Calif.	Neely
Bursum	Ferris	Johnson, Minn.	Norbeck
Cameron	Fess	Jones, N. Mex.	Norris
Capper	Fletcher	Jones, Wash.	Oddie
Caraway	Frazier	Kendrick	Overman
Copeland	George	Keyes	Owen
Couzens	Gerry	King	Pepper
Cummins	Glass	Ladd	Phipps

Pittman	Shipstead	Stanley	Walsh, Mont.
Ralston	Shortridge	Stephens	Warren
Ransdell	Simmons	Sterling	Watson
Reed, Mo.	Smith	Swanson	Weller
Reed, Pa.	Smoot	Underwood	Wheeler
Robinson	Spencer	Wadsworth	Willis
Sheppard	Stanfield	Walsh, Mass.	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ninety-one Senators having answered to their names, a quorum is present. The pending question is the election by roll-call ballot of a chairman of the Committee on Interstate Commerce. The Secretary will call the roll.

The reading clerk proceeded to call the roll.  
 Mr. KENDRICK (when his name was called). I have a pair with the Senator from Illinois [Mr. McCORMICK]. I transfer that pair to the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. SHIELDS], and vote for Mr. SMITH. I ask that this announcement may stand for the day.

Mr. FLETCHER (when Mr. TRAMMELL'S name was called). My colleague is unavoidably absent. He is paired with the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. COLT]. If my colleague were present, he would vote for Mr. SMITH. I desire this announcement to stand for the day.

The roll call was concluded.  
 Mr. McKELLAR. I wish to announce the unavoidable absence of my colleague the senior Senator from Tennessee [Mr. SHIELDS] on account of illness. If he were present, he would vote for Senator SMITH. I will let this announcement stand for the day.

The ballot resulted—for Mr. CUMMINS 37, for Mr. SMITH 39, for Mr. COUZENS 14, as follows:

FOR MR. CUMMINS—37.			
Ball	Ernst	McLean	Stanfield
Brandegee	Fernald	McNary	Sterling
Bruce	Fess	Moses	Wadsworth
Bursum	Greene	Oddie	Warren
Cameron	Hale	Pepper	Watson
Couzens	Harreld	Phipps	Weller
Curtis	Keyes	Reed, Pa.	Willis
Dale	Lenroot	Shortridge	
Edge	Lodge	Smoot	
Elkins	McKinley	Spencer	

FOR MR. SMITH—39.			
Adams	Fletcher	McKellar	Sheppard
Ashurst	George	Mayfield	Simmons
Bayard	Gerry	Neely	Stanley
Broussard	Glass	Overman	Stephens
Caraway	Harris	Owen	Swanson
Copeland	Harrison	Pittman	Underwood
Dial	Heflin	Ralston	Walsh, Mass.
Dill	Jones, N. Mex.	Ransdell	Walsh, Mont.
Edwards	Kendrick	Reed, Mo.	Wheeler
Ferris	King	Robinson	

FOR MR. COUZENS—14.			
Borah	Frazier	Johnson, Minn.	Norris
Brookhart	Gooding	Jones, Wash.	Shipstead
Capper	Howell	Ladd	
Cummins	Johnson, Calif.	Norbeck	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The whole number of Senators voting was 90; necessary for a choice, 46. Fourteen Senators have named Mr. COUZENS; 37 Senators have named Mr. CUMMINS; and 39 Senators have named Mr. SMITH. There is no choice. Another ballot will be taken, and the Secretary will call the roll.

The reading clerk called the roll, and the ballot resulted—for Mr. CUMMINS 37, for Mr. SMITH 39, for Mr. COUZENS 14, as follows:

FOR MR. CUMMINS—37.			
Ball	Ernst	McLean	Stanfield
Brandegee	Fernald	McNary	Sterling
Bruce	Fess	Moses	Wadsworth
Bursum	Greene	Oddie	Warren
Cameron	Hale	Pepper	Watson
Couzens	Harreld	Phipps	Weller
Curtis	Keyes	Reed, Pa.	Willis
Dale	Lenroot	Shortridge	
Edge	Lodge	Smoot	
Elkins	McKinley	Spencer	

FOR MR. SMITH—39.			
Adams	Fletcher	McKellar	Sheppard
Ashurst	George	Mayfield	Simmons
Bayard	Gerry	Neely	Stanley
Broussard	Glass	Overman	Stephens
Caraway	Harris	Owen	Swanson
Copeland	Harrison	Pittman	Underwood
Dial	Heflin	Ralston	Walsh, Mass.
Dill	Jones, N. Mex.	Ransdell	Walsh, Mont.
Edwards	Kendrick	Reed, Mo.	Wheeler
Ferris	King	Robinson	

FOR MR. COUZENS—14.			
Borah	Frazier	Johnson, Minn.	Norris
Brookhart	Gooding	Jones, Wash.	Shipstead
Capper	Howell	Ladd	
Cummins	Johnson, Calif.	Norbeck	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The whole number of Senators voting is 90; necessary for a choice, 46. Fourteen Senators have named Senator COUZENS; 37 Senators have named

Senator CUMMINS; 39 Senators have named Senator SMITH. There is no choice. Another ballot will be taken, and the Secretary will call the roll.

The reading clerk called the roll, and the ballot resulted—for Mr. CUMMINS 37, for Mr. SMITH 39, for Mr. COUZENS 14, as follows:

FOR MR. CUMMINS—37.			
Ball	Ernst	McLean	Stanfield
Brandegee	Fernald	McNary	Sterling
Bruce	Fess	Moses	Wadsworth
Bursum	Greene	Oddie	Warren
Cameron	Hale	Pepper	Watson
Couzens	Harreld	Phipps	Weller
Curtis	Keyes	Reed, Pa.	Willis
Dale	Lenroot	Shortridge	
Edge	Lodge	Smoot	
Elkins	McKinley	Spencer	

FOR MR. SMITH—39.			
Adams	Fletcher	McKellar	Sheppard
Ashurst	George	Mayfield	Simmons
Bayard	Gerry	Neely	Stanley
Broussard	Glass	Overman	Stephens
Caraway	Harris	Owen	Swanson
Copeland	Harrison	Pittman	Underwood
Dial	Heflin	Ralston	Walsh, Mass.
Dill	Jones, N. Mex.	Ransdell	Walsh, Mont.
Edwards	Kendrick	Reed, Mo.	Wheeler
Ferris	King	Robinson	

FOR MR. COUZENS—14.			
Borah	Frazier	Johnson, Minn.	Norris
Brookhart	Gooding	Jones, Wash.	Shipstead
Capper	Howell	Ladd	
Cummins	Johnson, Calif.	Norbeck	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The whole number of Senators voting is 90; necessary for a choice, 46. Fourteen Senators have named Mr. COUZENS; 37 Senators have named Mr. CUMMINS; 39 Senators have named Mr. SMITH. There is no choice. Another ballot will be taken. The Secretary will call the roll.

The roll call having been concluded, the ballot resulted—for Mr. CUMMINS 37, for Mr. SMITH 39, for Mr. COUZENS 13, for Mr. FESS 1, as follows:

FOR MR. CUMMINS—37.			
Ball	Ernst	McLean	Stanfield
Brandegee	Fernald	McNary	Sterling
Bruce	Fess	Moses	Wadsworth
Bursum	Greene	Oddie	Warren
Cameron	Hale	Pepper	Watson
Couzens	Harreld	Phipps	Weller
Curtis	Keyes	Reed, Pa.	Willis
Dale	Lenroot	Shortridge	
Edge	Lodge	Smoot	
Elkins	McKinley	Spencer	

FOR MR. SMITH—39.			
Adams	Fletcher	McKellar	Sheppard
Ashurst	George	Mayfield	Simmons
Bayard	Gerry	Neely	Stanley
Broussard	Glass	Overman	Stephens
Caraway	Harris	Owen	Swanson
Copeland	Harrison	Pittman	Underwood
Dial	Heflin	Ralston	Walsh, Mass.
Dill	Jones, N. Mex.	Ransdell	Walsh, Mont.
Edwards	Kendrick	Reed, Mo.	Wheeler
Ferris	King	Robinson	

FOR MR. COUZENS—13.			
Brookhart	Gooding	Jones, Wash.	Shipstead
Capper	Howell	Ladd	
Cummins	Johnson, Calif.	Norbeck	
Frazier	Johnson, Minn.	Norris	

FOR MR. FESS—1.			
Borah			

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The whole number of Senators voting is 90; necessary for a choice, 46. One Senator has named Mr. FESS; 13 Senators have named Mr. COUZENS; 37 Senators have named Mr. CUMMINS; 39 Senators have named Mr. SMITH. There is no choice. Another ballot will be taken, and the Secretary will call the roll.

The reading clerk called the roll, and the ballot resulted—for Mr. CUMMINS 35, for Mr. SMITH 39, for Mr. COUZENS 13, for Mr. FESS 2, for Mr. McLEAN 1, as follows:

FOR MR. CUMMINS—35.			
Ball	Ernst	McKinley	Smoot
Brandegee	Fernald	McLean	Spencer
Bruce	Fess	McNary	Stanfield
Bursum	Greene	Moses	Sterling
Cameron	Hale	Oddie	Wadsworth
Couzens	Harreld	Pepper	Warren
Curtis	Keyes	Phipps	Watson
Dale	Lenroot	Reed, Pa.	Weller
Elkins	Lodge	Shortridge	

FOR MR. SMITH—39.			
Adams	Edwards	Heflin	Owen
Ashurst	Ferris	Jones, N. Mex.	Pittman
Bayard	Fletcher	Kendrick	Ralston
Broussard	George	King	Ransdell
Caraway	Gerry	McKellar	Reed, Mo.
Copeland	Glass	Mayfield	Robinson
Dial	Harris	Neely	Sheppard
Dill	Harrison	Overman	Simmons

Stanley	Swanson	Walsh, Mass.	Wheeler
Stephens	Underwood	Walsh, Mont.	
FOR MR. COUZENS—13.			
Brookhart	Gooding	Jones, Wash.	Shipstead
Capper	Howell	Ladd	
Cummins	Johnson, Calif.	Norbeck	
Frazier	Johnson, Minn.	Norris	
FOR MR. FESS—2.			
	Borah	Willis	
FOR MR. McLEAN—1.			
		Edge	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The total number of Senators voting is 90; necessary for a choice, 46. One Senator has named Senator McLEAN; 2 Senators have named Senator FESS; 13 Senators have named Senator COUZENS; 35 Senators have named Senator CUMMINS; 39 Senators have named Senator SMITH. There is no choice. Another ballot will be taken, and the Secretary will call the roll.

The reading clerk called the roll, and the ballot resulted—for Mr. CUMMINS 36, for Mr. SMITH 39, for Mr. COUZENS 11, for Mr. FESS 2, for Mr. McLEAN 1, as follows:

FOR MR. CUMMINS—36.			
Ball	Elkins	Lodge	Shortridge
Brandegee	Ernst	McKinley	Smoot
Bruce	Fernald	McLean	Spencer
Bursum	Fess	McNary	Stanfield
Cameron	Greene	Moses	Sterling
Couzens	Hale	Oddie	Wadsworth
Curtis	Harreld	Pepper	Warren
Dale	Keyes	Phipps	Watson
Edge	Lenroot	Reed, Pa.	Weller

FOR MR. SMITH—39.			
Adams	Fletcher	McKellar	Sheppard
Ashurst	George	Mayfield	Simmons
Bayard	Gerry	Neely	Stanley
Broussard	Glass	Overman	Stephens
Caraway	Harris	Owen	Swanson
Copeland	Harrison	Pittman	Underwood
Dial	Heflin	Ralston	Walsh, Mass.
Dill	Jones, N. Mex.	Ransdell	Walsh, Mont.
Edwards	Kendrick	Reed, Mo.	Wheeler
Ferris	King	Robinson	

FOR MR. COUZENS—11.			
Brookhart	Gooding	Johnson, Minn.	Norbeck
Capper	Howell	Jones, Wash.	Shipstead
Frazier	Johnson, Calif.	Ladd	

FOR MR. FESS—2.			
	Borah	Willis	
FOR MR. McLEAN—1.			
		Cummins	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The whole number of Senators voting is 89; necessary for a choice, 45. One Senator has named Senator McLEAN; 2 Senators have named Senator FESS; 11 Senators have named Senator COUZENS; 36 Senators have named Senator CUMMINS; 39 Senators have named Senator SMITH. There is no choice. Another ballot will be taken, and the Secretary will call the roll.

The reading clerk called the roll, and the ballot resulted—for Mr. CUMMINS 35, for Mr. SMITH 39, for Mr. COUZENS 11, for Mr. FESS 2, as follows:

FOR MR. CUMMINS—35.			
Ball	Elkins	Lodge	Shortridge
Brandegee	Ernst	McKinley	Smoot
Bruce	Fernald	McLean	Spencer
Bursum	Fess	McNary	Sterling
Cameron	Greene	Moses	Wadsworth
Couzens	Hale	Oddie	Warren
Curtis	Harreld	Pepper	Watson
Dale	Keyes	Phipps	Weller
Edge	Lenroot	Reed, Pa.	

FOR MR. SMITH—39.			
Adams	Fletcher	McKellar	Sheppard
Ashurst	Frazier	Mayfield	Simmons
Bayard	George	Neely	Stanley
Broussard	Gerry	Overman	Stephens
Caraway	Glass	Owen	Swanson
Copeland	Harris	Pittman	Underwood
Dial	Harrison	Ralston	Walsh, Mass.
Dill	Heflin	Ransdell	Walsh, Mont.
Edwards	Jones, N. Mex.	Reed, Mo.	Wheeler
Ferris	Kendrick	Robinson	

FOR MR. COUZENS—11.			
Brookhart	Howell	Jones, Wash.	Norris
Capper	Johnson, Calif.	Ladd	Shipstead
Gooding	Johnson, Minn.	Norbeck	

FOR MR. FESS—2.			
	Borah	Willis	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The whole number of Senators voting is 87; necessary for a choice 44. Two Senators have named Senator FESS; 11 Senators have named Senator COUZENS; 35 Senators have named Senator CUMMINS; 39 Senators have named Senator SMITH, and there is no choice. Another ballot will be taken, and the Secretary will call the roll.

The reading clerk called the roll, and the ballot resulted—for Mr. CUMMINS 36, for Mr. SMITH 42, for Mr. COUZENS 11, for Mr. FESS 1, as follows:

FOR MR. CUMMINS—36.			
Ball	Elkins	Lodge	Shortridge
Brandegee	Ernst	McKinley	Smoot
Bruce	Fernald	McLean	Spencer
Bursum	Fess	McNary	Stanfield
Cameron	Greene	Moses	Sterling
Couzens	Hale	Oddie	Wadsworth
Curtis	Harreld	Pepper	Warren
Dale	Keyes	Phipps	Watson
Edge	Lenroot	Reed, Pa.	Weller

FOR MR. SMITH—42.			
Adams	Frazier	McKellar	Shipstead
Ashurst	George	Mayfield	Simmons
Bayard	Gerry	Neely	Stanley
Broussard	Glass	Overman	Stephens
Caraway	Harris	Owen	Swanson
Copeland	Harrison	Pittman	Underwood
Dial	Heflin	Ralston	Walsh, Mass.
Dill	Johnson, Minn.	Ransdell	Walsh, Mont.
Edwards	Jones, N. Mex.	Reed, Mo.	Wheeler
Ferris	Kendrick	Robinson	
Fletcher	King	Sheppard	

FOR MR. COUZENS—11.			
Borah	Cummins	Johnson, Calif.	Norbeck
Brookhart	Gooding	Jones, Wash.	Norris
Capper	Howell	Ladd	

FOR MR. FESS—1.			
		Willis	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The whole number of Senators voting is 90; necessary for a choice, 46. One Senator has named Senator FESS; 11 Senators have named Senator COUZENS; 36 Senators have named Senator CUMMINS; 42 Senators have named Senator SMITH. There is no choice. Another ballot will be taken. The Secretary will call the roll.

The reading clerk called the roll, and the ballot resulted—for Mr. CUMMINS 37, for Mr. SMITH 42, for Mr. COUZENS 11, as follows:

FOR MR. CUMMINS—37.			
Ball	Ernst	McLean	Stanfield
Brandegee	Fernald	McNary	Sterling
Bruce	Fess	Moses	Wadsworth
Bursum	Greene	Oddie	Warren
Cameron	Hale	Pepper	Watson
Couzens	Harreld	Phipps	Weller
Curtis	Keyes	Reed, Pa.	Willis
Dale	Lenroot	Shortridge	
Edge	Lodge	Smoot	
Elkins	McKinley	Spencer	

FOR MR. SMITH—42.			
Adams	Frazier	McKellar	Shipstead
Ashurst	George	Mayfield	Simmons
Bayard	Gerry	Neely	Stanley
Broussard	Glass	Overman	Stephens
Caraway	Harris	Owen	Swanson
Copeland	Harrison	Pittman	Underwood
Dial	Heflin	Ralston	Walsh, Mass.
Dill	Johnson, Minn.	Ransdell	Walsh, Mont.
Edwards	Jones, N. Mex.	Reed, Mo.	Wheeler
Ferris	Kendrick	Robinson	
Fletcher	King	Sheppard	

FOR MR. COUZENS—11.			
Borah	Cummins	Johnson, Calif.	Norbeck
Brookhart	Gooding	Jones, Wash.	Norris
Capper	Howell	Ladd	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The whole number of Senators voting is 90; necessary for a choice, 46. Eleven Senators have named Senator COUZENS; 37 Senators have named Senator CUMMINS; 42 Senators have named Senator SMITH. There is no choice. Another ballot will be taken.

EXECUTIVE SESSION.

Mr. LODGE. I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business. After 10 minutes spent in executive session the doors were reopened, and (at 3 o'clock and 40 minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned until to-morrow, Wednesday, December 19, 1923, at 12 o'clock meridian.

EXTENDING ARBITRATION CONVENTION WITH FRANCE.

In executive session this day, the following agreement was ratified, and on motion of Mr. LODGE the injunction of secrecy was removed therefrom:

To the Senate:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification, I transmit herewith an agreement signed between the United States and France on July 19, 1923, extend-

ing for another period of five years the arbitration convention concluded between the two Governments on February 10, 1908.

For the information of the Senate, I transmit also copies of notes exchanged at the time of the signature of the agreement between the Secretary of State and the French ambassador.

CALVIN COOLIDGE.

Accompaniments: Agreement, as above; notes exchanged between Secretary of State and French ambassador, as above.

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 12, 1923.

The PRESIDENT:

The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to its transmission to the Senate to receive the advice and consent of that body to ratification, if his judgment approve thereof, an agreement between the United States and France extending for another period of five years the arbitration convention concluded between them on February 10, 1908.

At the time of the signature of the agreement, notes were exchanged between the Secretary of State and the French ambassador confirming an understanding between the two Governments that in the event that the Senate gives its assent to the proposal made to the Senate by the President on February 24, 1923, that it consent, under certain stated conditions, to the adherence by the United States to the protocol of December 16, 1920, under which the Permanent Court of International Justice has been created at The Hague, the Government of the French Republic will not be averse to considering a modification of the convention of arbitration renewed by the agreement, or the making of a separate agreement, providing for the reference of disputes mentioned in the convention to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Copies of these notes are inclosed for the information of the Senate.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES E. HUGHES.

Inclosures: Agreement, as above; notes exchanged between Secretary of State and French ambassador, as above.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, December 11, 1923.

[Copy.]

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic, desiring to extend for another five years the period during which the arbitration convention concluded between them on February 10, 1908, and extended by the agreements concluded between the two Governments on February 13, 1913, and February 27, 1918, shall remain in force, have respectively authorized the undersigned, to wit: Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State of the United States, and J. J. Jusserand, ambassador of the French Republic to the United States, to conclude the following agreement:

ARTICLE I.

The convention of arbitration of February 10, 1908, between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French Republic, the duration of which by Article III thereof was fixed at a period of five years from the date of ratification, which period, by the agreement of February 13, 1913, between the two Governments was extended for five years from February 27, 1913, and was further extended by the agreement of February 27, 1918, between the two Governments, for a period of five years from February 27, 1918, is hereby extended and continued in force for the further period of five years from February 27, 1923.

ARTICLE II.

The present agreement shall be ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by the President of the French Republic, in accordance with the constitutional laws of France, and it shall become effective upon the date of the exchange of ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible.

Done in duplicate in the English and French languages, at Washington, this 19th day of July, 1923.

(Signed)

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES.

JUSSERAND.

[Copy.]

JULY 19, 1923.

His Excellency Mr. J. J. JUSSERAND,

Ambassador of France.

EXCELLENCY: In connection with the signing to-day of an agreement for the renewal of the convention of arbitration concluded between the United States and France, February 10,

1908, and renewed from time to time, I have the honor, in pursuance of our informal conversations, to state the following understanding which I shall be glad to have you confirm on behalf of your Government.

On February 24 last the President proposed to the Senate that it consent under certain stated conditions to the adherence by the United States to the protocol of December 16, 1920, under which the Permanent Court of International Justice has been created at The Hague. As the Senate does not convene in its regular session until December next, action upon this proposal will necessarily be delayed. In the event that the Senate gives its assent to the proposal, I understand that the Government of the French Republic will not be averse to considering a modification of the convention of arbitration which we are renewing, or the making of a separate agreement under which the disputes mentioned in the convention could be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

CHARLES E. HUGHES.

[Translation.]

EMBASSY OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

TO THE UNITED STATES,

Washington, July 19, 1923.

His Excellency the Hon. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES,

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Mr. SECRETARY OF STATE: Your excellency was pleased, by your note dated this day, to suggest in connection with the renewal of the arbitration convention signed by France and the United States on February 10, 1908, and periodically renewed since, that the agreement of the two Governments on the point specified as follows in your said note be placed on record.

Your excellency's communication reads as follows:

"On February 24 last the President proposed to the Senate that it consent under certain stated conditions to the adherence by the United States to the protocol of December 16, 1920, under which the Permanent Court of International Justice has been created at The Hague. As the Senate does not convene in its regular session until December next, action upon this proposal will necessarily be delayed. In the event that the Senate gives its assent to the proposal, I understand that the Government of the French Republic will not be averse to considering a modification of the convention of arbitration which we are renewing, or the making of a separate agreement under which the disputes mentioned in the convention could be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice."

I have the honor to inform your excellency that my Government, whose instructions have come to hand, entirely agrees with your excellency in this matter.

Be pleased to accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances, etc.

JUSSERAND.

EXTENDING ARBITRATION CONVENTION WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

In executive session this day, the following agreement was ratified, and on motion of Mr. Lodge the injunction of secrecy was removed therefrom:

To the Senate:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification, I transmit herewith an agreement signed between the United States and Great Britain on June 23, 1923, extending for another period of five years the arbitration convention concluded between the two Governments on April 4, 1908.

For the information of the Senate, I transmit also copies of notes exchanged at the time of the signature of the agreement between the Secretary of State and the ambassador of Great Britain.

CALVIN COOLIDGE.

Accompaniments: Agreement, as above; copies of notes exchanged between Secretary of State and ambassador of Great Britain, as above.

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 12, 1923.

The PRESIDENT:

The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to its transmission to the Senate, if his judgment approve thereof, to receive the advice and consent of that body to its ratification, an agreement concluded between the United States and Great Britain on June 23, 1923, extending for a further period of five years the arbitra-

tion convention concluded between the two Governments on April 4, 1908.

At the time of the signature of the agreement, notes were exchanged between the Secretary of State and the ambassador of Great Britain, confirming an understanding between the two Governments that in the event that the Senate gives its assent to the proposal made to the Senate by the President on February 24, 1923, that it consent, under certain stated conditions, to the adherence by the United States to the protocol of December 16, 1920, under which the Permanent Court of International Justice has been created at The Hague, the Government of Great Britain will not be averse to considering a modification of the convention of arbitration renewed by the agreement or the making of a separate agreement providing for the reference of disputes mentioned in the convention to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Copies of these notes are inclosed for the information of the Senate.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES E. HUGHES.

Accompaniments: Agreement, as above; notes exchanged between Secretary of State and ambassador of Great Britain, as above.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, December 11, 1923.

The President of the United States of America and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, being desirous of extending for another five years the period during which the arbitration convention concluded between them on April 4, 1908, extended by the agreement concluded between the two Governments on May 31, 1913, and further extended by the agreement concluded between the two Governments on June 3, 1918, shall remain in force, have respectively authorized the undersigned, to wit: Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State of the United States, and Sir Auckland Geddes, G. C. M. G., K. C. B., His Britannic Majesty's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the United States, to conclude the following articles:

ARTICLE I.

The convention of arbitration of April 4, 1908, between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the duration of which by Article IV thereof was fixed at a period of five years from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the said convention on June 4, 1908, which period by the agreement of May 31, 1913, between the two Governments was extended for five years from June 4, 1913, and was extended by the agreement between them of June 3, 1918, for the further period of five years from June 4, 1918, is hereby extended and continued in force for the further period of five years from June 4, 1923.

ARTICLE II.

The present agreement shall be ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by His Britannic Majesty, and it shall become effective upon the date of the exchange of ratifications which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible.

Done in duplicate this 23d day of June, 1923.

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES,  
A. GEDDES.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

June 23, 1923.

The right honorable

SIR AUCKLAND GEDDES, G. C. M. G., K. C. B.,  
Ambassador of Great Britain.

EXCELLENCY: In connection with the signing to-day of an agreement for the renewal of the convention of arbitration concluded between the United States and Great Britain, April 4, 1908, and renewed from time to time, I have the honor, in pursuance of our informal conversations, to state the following understanding which I shall be glad to have you confirm on behalf of your Government:

On February 24 last the President proposed to the Senate that it consent under certain stated conditions to the adhesion by the United States to the protocol of December 16, 1920, under which the Permanent Court of International Justice has been created at The Hague. As the Senate does not convene in

its regular session until December next, action upon this proposal will necessarily be delayed. In the event that the Senate gives its assent to the proposal, I understand that the British Government will not be averse to considering a modification of the convention of arbitration which we are renewing, or the making of a separate agreement, providing for the reference of disputes mentioned in the convention to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

CHARLES E. HUGHES.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

Washington, D. C., June 23, 1923.

The honorable CHARLES E. HUGHES,

Secretary of State of the United States,

Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day's date in which you were so good as to inform me, in connection with the renewal of the arbitration convention of April 4, 1908, between Great Britain and the United States, that the President of the United States had proposed to the Senate the adherence of the United States, under certain conditions, to the protocol of December 16, 1920, creating the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and that, if the Senate assents to this proposal, you understand that His Britannic Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider the conclusion of an agreement, providing for the reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice of disputes mentioned in the convention.

Under instructions from His Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, I have the honor to confirm your understanding of His Majesty's Government's attitude on this point and to state that if the Senate approve the President's proposal His Majesty's Government will be prepared to consider with the United States Government the conclusion of an agreement for the reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice of disputes mentioned in the arbitration convention.

I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration,

Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

A. GEDDES.

EXTENDING ARBITRATION CONVENTION WITH JAPAN.

In executive session this day, the following agreement was ratified, and on motion of Mr. LODGE the injunction of secrecy was removed therefrom:

To the Senate:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification, I transmit herewith an agreement signed between the United States and Japan on August 23, 1923, extending to another period of five years the arbitration convention concluded between the two Governments on May 5, 1908.

For the information of the Senate I transmit also copies of notes exchanged at the time of the signature of the agreement between the Secretary of State and the Japanese ambassador.

CALVIN COOLIDGE.

Accompaniments: Agreement, as above; notes exchanged between Secretary of State and the Japanese ambassador as above.

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 12, 1923.

THE PRESIDENT:

The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to its transmission to the Senate to receive the advice and consent of that body to ratification, if his judgment approve thereof, an agreement between the United States and Japan, extending for another period of five years the arbitration convention concluded between them on May 5, 1908.

At the time of the signature of the agreement notes were exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Japanese ambassador confirming an understanding between the two Governments that in the event that the Senate gives its assent to the proposal made to the Senate by the President on February 24, 1923, that it consent, under certain stated conditions, to the adherence by the United States to the protocol of December 16, 1920, under which the Permanent Court of International Justice has been created at The Hague, the Government of Japan will not be averse to considering a modification of the convention of

arbitration renewed by the agreement or the making of a separate agreement, providing for the reference of disputes mentioned in the convention to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Copies of these notes are inclosed for the information of the Senate.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES E. HUGHES.

Accompaniments: Agreement signed August 23, 1923; copies of notes exchanged between Secretary of State and Japanese ambassador as above.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, December 11, 1923.

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, desiring to extend for another five years the period during which the arbitration convention concluded between them on May 5, 1908, and extended by the agreement concluded between the two Governments on June 28, 1913, and further extended by the agreement concluded between the two Governments on August 23, 1918, shall remain in force, have respectively authorized the undersigned, to wit, Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State of the United States, and His Excellency Masanao Hanihara, His Majesty's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary at Washington, to conclude the following agreement:

ARTICLE I.

The convention of arbitration of May 5, 1908, between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the duration of which by Article III thereof was fixed at a period of five years from the date of the exchange of ratification, which period, by the agreement of June 28, 1913, between the two Governments, was extended for five years from August 24, 1913, and was extended by the agreement between them of August 23, 1918, for the further period of five years from August 24, 1918, is hereby extended and continued in force for the further period of five years from August 24, 1923.

ARTICLE II.

The present agreement shall be ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and it shall become effective upon the date of the exchange of ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible.

Done in duplicate in the English language at Washington this 23d day of August, 1923, corresponding to the 23d day of the eighth month of the twelfth year of Taisho.

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES,  
M. HANIHARA.

[Copy.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
August 23, 1923.

His Excellency Mr. MASANA O HANIHARA,  
Japanese Ambassador.

EXCELLENCY: In connection with the signing to-day of an agreement for the renewal of the convention of arbitration concluded between the United States and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, May 5, 1908, and renewed from time to time, I have the honor, in pursuance of our informal conversations, to state the following understanding, which I shall be glad to have you confirm on behalf of your Government.

On February 24 last the President proposed to the Senate that it consent under certain stated conditions to the adhesion by the United States to the protocol of December 16, 1920, under which the Permanent Court of International Justice has been created at The Hague. As the Senate does not convene in its regular session until December next, action upon this proposal will necessarily be delayed. In the event that the Senate gives its assent to the proposal, I understand that the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan will not be averse to considering a modification of the convention of arbitration which we are renewing, or the making of a separate agreement, providing for the reference of disputes mentioned in the convention to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

CHARLES E. HUGHES.

[Copy.]

JAPANESE EMBASSY,  
Washington, August 23, 1923.

HON. CHARLES E. HUGHES,  
Secretary of State.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day's date communicating to me your understanding reached in our informal conversations in connection with the renewal of the convention of arbitration concluded between Japan and the United States May 5, 1908, and extended in its operation until August 24 of this year.

I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under instructions from my Government, your understanding as set forth in the following terms:

"On February 24 last the President proposed to the Senate that it consent under certain stated conditions to the adhesion by the United States to the protocol of December 16, 1920, under which the Permanent Court of International Justice has been created at The Hague. As the Senate does not convene in its regular session until December next, action upon this proposal will necessarily be delayed. In the event that the Senate gives its assent to the proposal, I understand that the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan will not be averse to considering a modification of the convention of arbitration which we are renewing, or the making of a separate agreement, providing for the reference of disputes mentioned in the convention to the Permanent Court of International Justice."

Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

M. HANIHARA.

EXTENDING ARBITRATION CONVENTION WITH  
NORWAY.

In executive session this day, the following agreement was ratified, and on motion of Mr. LODGE the injunction of secrecy was removed therefrom:

To the Senate:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification, I transmit herewith an agreement signed between the United States and Norway on November 26, 1923, extending for another period of five years the arbitration convention concluded between the two Governments on April 4, 1908.

For the information of the Senate, I transmit also copies of notes exchanged at the time of the signature of the agreement between the Secretary of State and the Norwegian Minister.

CALVIN COOLIDGE.

Inclosures: Agreement as above; notes exchanged between Secretary of State and Norwegian minister, as above.

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 12, 1923.

The PRESIDENT:

The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to its transmission to the Senate to receive the advice and consent of that body to ratification, if his judgment approve thereof, an agreement between the United States and Norway extending for another period of five years the arbitration convention concluded between them on April 5, 1908.

At the time of the signature of the agreement, notes were exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Norwegian minister confirming an understanding between the two Governments that in the event that the Senate gives its assent to the proposal made to the Senate by the President on February 24, 1923, that it consent, under certain stated conditions, to the adherence by the United States to the protocol of December 16, 1920, under which the Permanent Court of International Justice has been created at The Hague, the Government of Norway will not be averse to considering a modification of the convention of arbitration renewed by the agreement, or the making of a separate agreement, providing for the reference of disputes mentioned in the convention to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Copies of these notes are inclosed for the information of the Senate.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES E. HUGHES.

Inclosures: Agreement as above; notes exchanged between Secretary of State and Norwegian minister, as above.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, December 11, 1923.



LÉGATION DE NORVÈGE AUX ETATS-UNIS,  
Washington, D. C., November 26, 1923.

His Excellency Hon. CHARLES E. HUGHES,  
Secretary of State, etc., etc., etc.

SIR: With reference to the note which your excellency has been good enough to address me to-day in connection with the signing of an agreement for the renewal of the convention of arbitration concluded between Norway and the United States April 4, 1908, and renewed from time to time, I have the honor to state that I have been authorized to confirm, and I hereby do confirm that, in the event that the Senate gives its assent to the proposal made to it by the President of the United States that it consent under certain stated conditions to the adherence by the United States to the protocol of December 16, 1920, under which the Permanent Court of International Justice has been created at The Hague, the Government of Norway will not be averse to considering a modification of the convention of arbitration which we are renewing, or the making of a separate agreement, providing for the reference of disputes mentioned in the convention to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Accept, sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) HELMER H. BRYN.

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, desiring to extend for another five years the period during which the arbitration convention concluded between them on April 4, 1908, and extended by the agreement concluded between the two Governments on June 16, 1913, and further extended by the agreement concluded between the two Governments on March 30, 1918, shall remain in force, have respectively authorized the undersigned, to wit: Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and Mr. Helmer H. Bryn, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Norway in the United States, to conclude the following agreement:

ARTICLE I.

The convention of arbitration of April 4, 1908, between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, the duration of which by Article IV thereof was fixed at a period of five years from the date of the exchange of ratifications, which period, by the agreement of June 16, 1913, between the two Governments was extended for five years from June 24, 1913, and was extended by the agreement between them of March 30, 1918, for the further period of five years from June 24, 1918, is hereby extended and continued in force for the further period of five years from June 24, 1923.

ARTICLE II.

The present agreement shall be ratified by the President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by His Majesty the King of Norway, and it shall become effective upon the date of the exchange of ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible.

Done in duplicate in the English and Norwegian languages at Washington this 26th day of November, 1923.

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES,  
HELMER H. BRYN.

EXTENDING THE ARBITRATION CONVENTION WITH  
PORTUGAL.

In executive session this day, the following agreement was ratified, and on motion of Mr. Lodge the injunction of secrecy was removed therefrom:

To the Senate:

I transmit, with a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification, an agreement concluded between the United States and Portugal on August 23, 1923, extending for a further period of five years the arbitration convention concluded between the two Governments on May 5, 1908.

For the information of the Senate, I transmit also copies of notes exchanged at the time of the signature of the agreement between the Secretary of State and the minister of Portugal.

CALVIN COOLIDGE.

Inclures: Agreement, as above; notes exchanged between Secretary of State and minister of Portugal, as above.

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 12, 1923.

The PRESIDENT:

The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to its transmission to the Senate, if his judgment approve thereof, to receive the advice and consent of that body to its ratification, an agreement concluded between the United States and Portugal on August 23, 1923, extending for a further period of five years the arbitration convention concluded between the two Governments on May 5, 1908.

At the time of the signature of the agreement, notes were exchanged between the Secretary of State and minister of Portugal confirming an understanding between the two Governments that in the event that the Senate gives its assent to the proposal made to the Senate by the President on February 24, 1923, that it consent, under certain stated conditions, to the adherence by the United States to the protocol of December 16, 1920, under which the Permanent Court of International Justice has been created at The Hague, the Government of Portugal will not be averse to considering a modification of the convention of arbitration renewed by the agreement, or the making of a separate agreement, providing for the reference of disputes mentioned in the convention to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Copies of these notes are enclosed for the information of the Senate.

Respectfully submitted.

CHARLES E. HUGHES.

Inclures: Agreement, as above; notes exchanged between Secretary of State and minister of Portugal, as above.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
Washington, December 11, 1923.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
September 5, 1923.

VISCOUNT D'ALTE,  
Minister of Portugal.

SIR: In connection with the signing to-day of an agreement for the renewal of the convention of arbitration concluded between the United States and Portugal, April 6, 1908, and renewed from time to time, I have the honor, in pursuance of the note of July 26, 1923, of the Secretary of State, and your note of August 8, 1923, to state the following understanding, which I shall be glad to have you confirm on behalf of your Government:

On February 24 last the President proposed to the Senate that it consent, under certain stated conditions, to the adherence by the United States to the protocol of December 16, 1920, under which the Permanent Court of International Justice has been created at The Hague. As the Senate does not convene in its regular session until December next, action upon this proposal will necessarily be delayed. In the event that the Senate gives its assent to the proposal, I understand that the Government of the Portuguese Republic will not be averse to considering a modification of the convention of arbitration which we are renewing, or the making of a separate agreement, under which the disputes mentioned in the convention could be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

WILLIAM PHILLIPS,  
Acting Secretary of State.

[Translation.]

LEGACAO DE PORTUGAL NOS ESTADOS UNIDOS,  
Washington, September 5, 1923.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: Under instructions from His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Portuguese Republic I have the honor to confirm your understanding of the attitude of the Government of the Republic with reference to the point mentioned in your note of this date and to state that should the Senate of the United States approve the President's proposal the Government of the Portuguese Republic will be prepared to consider with the United States Government the conclusion of an agreement for the reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice of disputes mentioned in the arbitration convention between the two countries.

Accept, sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ALTE.

His Excellency WILLIAM PHILLIPS,  
Acting Secretary of State of the United States of America.

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Portuguese Republic being desirous of ex-

tending for another five years the period during which the arbitration convention concluded between them on April 6, 1908, and extended by the agreements concluded between the two Governments on June 28, 1913, and September 14, 1920, shall remain in force, have authorized the undersigned to conclude the following agreement:

## ARTICLE I.

The convention of arbitration of April 6, 1908, between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Portugal, the duration of which by Article III of the said convention was fixed at a period of five years from the date of the exchange of ratifications thereof, which period by the agreement of June 28, 1913, between the two Governments was extended for five years from November 14, 1913, and was further extended for a period of five years from November 14, 1918, by the agreement concluded by the two Governments on September 14, 1920, is hereby renewed and continued in force for a further period of five years from November 14, 1923.

## ARTICLE II.

The present agreement shall be ratified by the Government of the United States of America and by the Government of the Portuguese Republic in accordance with their respective constitutional methods, and it shall become effective upon the date of the exchange of ratifications, which shall take place at Washington as soon as possible.

Done in duplicate in the English and Portuguese languages at Washington this 5th day of September, 1923.

WILLIAM PHILLIPS,  
ALTE.

## CONFIRMATIONS.

*Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate December 18, 1923.*

## DIRECTOR OF THE MINT.

Robert J. Grant to be Director of the Mint.

## SUPERINTENDENT OF THE MINT.

Frank E. Shepard to be superintendent of the mint at Denver, Colo.

## DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF STANDARDS.

George K. Burgess to be Director of the Bureau of Standards.

## COLLECTORS OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

Mabel G. Reinecke to be collector of internal revenue for the first district of Illinois.

Charles W. Anderson to be collector of internal revenue for the third district of New York.

## PROMOTIONS IN THE ARMY.

Walter Henry Gordon to be major general.

John Murray Jenkins to be brigadier general, Cavalry.

Thomas Horace Slavens to be brigadier general, Infantry.

Charles Jacobs Symmonds to be brigadier general, Cavalry.

LaRoy Sunderland Upton to be brigadier general, Infantry.

Colden L'Hommedieu Ruggles to be assistant to the Chief of Ordnance with rank of brigadier general.

John Warren Joyes to be assistant to the Chief of Ordnance with rank of brigadier general.

Fred Hayes Gallup to be major, Field Artillery.

Kenneth Hubert Bailey to be first lieutenant, Medical Officers' Reserve Corps.

## CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

*To be second lieutenants.*

Francis Rarick Johnson.	John Rutherford Noyes.
Royal Bertrand Lord.	Lyle Rosenberg.
Kenner Fisher Hertford.	William Randolph Winslow.
Steven Livesay Conner.	William Newton Leaf.
Miles Reber.	David Morris Dunne, jr.
Charles West Stewart, jr.	Frank McAdams Albrecht.
William Francis Merwin Longwell.	

## SIGNAL CORPS.

*To be second lieutenants.*

Glenn Hunter Palmer.	Sylvester John Keane.
Isidore Sass.	Waldemar Fritz Breidster.
William Jackson Morton, jr.	David Barbour Barton.
Howard William Serig.	

## CAVALRY.

*To be second lieutenants.*

Donald Henry Galloway.	Donald Alexander Beck.
Daniel DeBardleben.	Walter Burnside.
William Shepard Biddle, 3d.	Ben L. Wells.

Winston Jennings Eaddy.  
Kevin O'Shea.  
Carl Douglas Silverthorne.  
Raymond Chesley McCormick.  
Frank Hinton Bunnell.

Charles Vinson Bromley, jr.  
Wilfrid Henry Hardy.  
Leslie Martin Greener.  
Joseph Smith.  
Clinton John Harrold.  
Eugene Lynch Harrison.

## FIELD ARTILLERY.

*To be second lieutenants.*

Robert Farnsworth Hallock.	Charles Woodford Cowles.
Herbert Davidson.	Leslie Page Holcomb.
Stuart Alfred Beckley.	Philip Harrison Enslow.
Harold David Kehm.	Kenneth Shearer Sweany.
Bernard Gjelsteen.	Warren Cole Stout.
Herbert Bronson Enderton.	Paul Russell Covey.
John Battle Horton.	Bernard Aye Tormey.
Joseph Leander Hardin.	Valentine Roy Smith.
Carter Bowie Magruder.	Joseph Anthony Cella.
William Joseph D'Espinoza.	John Ellsworth Adkins, jr.
Patrick Weston Timberlake.	Robert Chaffee Oliver.
David Larr.	Francis Arthur Garrecht, jr.
Allen Lloyd Keyes.	Frank Dorn.
Harry McKenzie Roper.	Bruce Rowan King.
James Henry Workman.	Paschal Hoover Ringsdorf.
William Remsburg Grove, jr.	Stuart Lee Cowles.
Wade Lavern Kerr.	Briscoe Allen Trousdale, jr.
Dan Chandler.	Francis Townsend Dodd.
Michael Buckley, jr.	George Stanley Smith.
Rex Eugene Chandler.	Harvey Keene Palmer, jr.
Sheffield Edwards.	Paul Downing Michelet.
John Joseph Binns.	John Guy Wilson.
Ulysses John Lincoln Peoples, jr.	George Franklin Williams.
Rochester Flower McEldowney.	Paul Phillip Hanson.
	David Sherman Babcock.

## COAST ARTILLERY.

*To be second lieutenants.*

Theodore Morrison Clarence Osborne.	Howard John Vandersluis.
Ralph Arnold Tudor.	Franklin Kress Gurley.
Mark Hampton Galusha.	Louis Eugene Imhof.
Lawrence Sprague Barroll.	Russell Emerson Bates.
Edgar Hoffman Price.	William Augustus Davis
George Francis Heaney, jr.	Thomas.
Saverio Hardy Savini.	James Boyce Carroll.
John Harvey Farrow.	Donald McLean.
Douglass Gordon Pamplin.	Howard Edward Crane
George Edward Waldo.	Breitung.
Lloyd Shepard.	Edward Elford Lutwack.
John Roper Burnett.	James Sifly Jefferies.
Edgar Lee Love.	Robert Herman Krueger.
Raymond Stone, jr.	Donald Cameron Tredennick.

## INFANTRY.

*To be second lieutenants.*

William Elgie Carraway.	James Eugene Bernard McInerney.
John Mark Pesek.	Allen Welty Smith.
Joseph Caldwell King.	Nathaniel Lancaster, jr.
Woodson Lewis, jr.	Charles Oscar Moody.
Frank Edwin Wilder.	Charles Edward Woodruff, jr.
Wilbur Ray Pierce.	Hartwell Rodney Cragin.
Benjamin Franklin Caffey.	George Pierce Howell, jr.
Philip Roy Dwyer.	Warren Alfred Robinson.
Damon Mott Gunn.	Herbert Robert Campbell.
Charles Metz Seebach.	Roswell Hitchcock Harriman.
Henry James Pitt Harding.	George Conrad Mergens.
John Humphrey Evans.	Horton Vail White.
Douglas Ewart Christie.	James Edward Bowen, jr.
George Lewis Dewey.	Austin Curtis Cunkle, jr.
James Frederick Torrence, jr.	Charles Carlton Cavender.
Everett Clement Meriwether.	William Campbell Lucas.
Louis William Haskell.	Wendell Gunner Johnson.
Eugene Ware Ridings.	Paul Kenneth Porch.
William Ernst Winter.	Lyman O'Dell Williams.
Alexander Davidson Reid.	Temple Graves Holland.
John William Harmony.	Paul Cyril Serff.
Elwyn Donald Post.	Lawrence Leroy Skinner.
Louis Wagner Marshall.	Edward Forstall Adams.
James Alan Evans.	Vincent Paul O'Reilly.
Ralph Christian Bing.	Thomas Sherman Timberman.
Earl Shuman Gruver.	Cyril Quentin Marron.
Dudley Carl Roth.	Louis John Storek.
Joseph Ingham Greene.	James Jewett Carnes.
Abner Judson McGehee, jr.	Joseph Winfield Boone.
Cecil Ward Nist.	

Garrett Bartlett Drummond.  
Harry Lang Scheetz.  
Hugh Chauncey Johnson.  
Charles Calvin Higgins.  
George Craig Stewart.  
Louis Peter Leone.  
Robert Leroy Dulaney.  
James Clarke Carter.  
Robert McKee Smith.  
Richard Edmondson Russell.  
Lawrence Varsi Castner.  
Henry Granville Fisher.

Hal Clark Granberry.  
Edwin Britain Howard.  
Frederick Edward Phillips.  
John Paul Evans.  
William Harold Schaffer.  
Sidney Lee Douthit.  
Allen Dwight Raymond, jr.  
James Cyril Short.  
Walter Cornelius White.  
Lynn Edwin Brady.  
James Robert Lindsay, jr.  
Roy Madison Foster.

## AIR SERVICE.

*To be second lieutenants.*

Hugh Wagner Downing.  
Kenyon Moore Hegardt.  
John Wesley Warren.  
James Warner Fletcher.  
John Albert Chambers.  
Thomas Magnor Conroy.  
Alfred Louis Johnson.  
Will Walter White.  
Clyde Kenneth Rich.  
Paul Wakefield Wolf.  
Laurence Carbee Craigie.  
Charles Wesley Gettys.  
Charles White Lawrence.  
Benjamin Stern.  
Wallace Evan Whitson.  
Russel J. Minty.  
Birney Kellogg Morse.  
Stewart Leon Thompson.  
James Francis Joseph Early.  
Morris Kelly Voedisch.  
Richard Briggs Evans.  
Alden Rudyard Crawford.  
George Gareld Rusk.  
Thomas Merritt Lowe.  
David Myron Schlatter.  
Alejandro Garcia y Da Jose to be second lieutenant, Philippine Scouts.  
Santiago Guevara y Garcia to be second lieutenant, Philippine Scouts.  
Wayne Latta Barker to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.  
Carl Brown McDaniel to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Carlisle Brown Irwin to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Lee Carl Vance to be second lieutenant, Cavalry.  
Russell Vivian Perry to be second lieutenant, Quartermaster Corps.  
Thomas Davison Drake to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Edgar Marvin Fogelsonger to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Scales Clary to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Robert Coleman Ashley to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Granville Victor Morse to be second lieutenant, Cavalry.  
Herbert Spencer Jordan to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Dresden James Cragun to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Edward Harvey Clouser to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Herbert Kenneth Baisley to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Alexander Joseph Hogg, jr., to be second lieutenant, Quartermaster Corps.  
Carl Eugene Anderson to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
James Lloyd Kerr to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Thomas Robinson to be second lieutenant, Cavalry.  
John Kraybill Nissley to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
William Rush Blakely to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
William Douglass Paschall to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Frederick Mott Thompson to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Charles Goodwin Percy to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Thomas Rives Potts to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Roy Paris Turner to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Alonzo Valed Thorpe to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Voris Hamilton Connor to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Arthur Bordeaux Nicholson to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.  
Henry Kamsler Shane to be second lieutenant, Corps of Engineers.  
Girvella Leighton Field to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.  
Staten Eugene Rall to be second lieutenant, Infantry.

Howard Orville Douglass to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.  
Franklin Mervyn Seward to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Harold Everett Walker to be second lieutenant, Cavalry.  
Don Emerson Carleton to be second lieutenant, Cavalry.  
Kenneth Lafayette Johnson to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Eugene Haworth Vernon to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Eyrle Gray Johnson to be second lieutenant, Cavalry.  
Paul Green Kendall to be second lieutenant, Cavalry.  
Melville Irwin Murray to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Ralph Waldo Russell to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.  
Archibald Yarborough Smith to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Herbert William Anderson to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.  
DeWitt Ballard to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
James Lendsey McKinnon to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Emory Clayton Cushing to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Willis Glenn Cronk to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Richard Tyler Willson to be second lieutenant, Cavalry.  
Leslie Lee Hittle to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Oscar Arthur Proehl to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Carl Archibald Stevenson to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Leslie Furness Young to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Leslie Wright Stanley to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Emmett Hill Emanuel to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Eugene Désiré Regad to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Donald Taylor Beeler to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Charles Creswell Blakeney to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
John Valentine Grombach to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Everett Lewis Young to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
William Mason Hoke to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Willard Fromm Millice to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Elvin Hamilton Burger to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
James Freeland McGraw to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Richard Searl Marr to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Frank Finley Taylor, jr., to be second lieutenant, Quartermaster Corps.  
Leonard James Greeley to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Kingsley Sherman Andersson to be second lieutenant, Corps of Engineers.  
William Frishe Dean to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Felix Nicholson Parsons to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Ben Early Cordell to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Daries Joshua Oyster to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Victor Park Noyes to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Lloyd Elmo Hunting to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
George Philips Privett to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.  
Gordon Tarbell Walte to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Richard Howell Dean to be second lieutenant, Signal Corps.  
Carl Adam Kugel to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
William Lindsay McPherson to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.  
William Vincent Gray to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Rowland Kieburz to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Daniel Peter Norman to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
John Mitchell England to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Floyd Cornelius Devenbeck to be second lieutenant, Ordnance Department.  
William Black Forse, to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
William Brown Short to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.  
John Wallace Homewood to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
John James Mahoney to be second lieutenant, Cavalry.  
James Vestie Collier to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Edwin Kennedy Wright to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Clint Leroy Taylor to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Richard Herbert Torovsky to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Oscar Philip Hebert to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Raymond Morrallee Arthur to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.  
Thomas Thrower Mayo to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Carroll Norton Pearce to be second lieutenant, Infantry.  
Philip Mapes Shockley to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Clement Aloysius McCalley to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Ernest Tuttle Owen to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
Glen Trice Lampton to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Walter Francis McGinty to be second lieutenant, Air Service.

Howard Miller Fey to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Robert Boyd Williams to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
James Fuller McKinley to be colonel, Adjutant General's Department.

James Luke Frink to be major, Quartermaster Corps.  
Ray Maxey Hare to be captain, Quartermaster Corps.  
Thaddeus Clarence Knight to be captain, Quartermaster Corps.

Frank August Helleman to be captain, Corps of Engineers.  
Walter Putney Boatwright to be major, Ordnance Department.

Archie Stanton Buyers to be major, Ordnance Department.  
Vennard Wilson to be captain, Ordnance Department.  
Lewis Morrell Van Gieson to be first lieutenant, Ordnance Department.

Charles Roderick Mize to be first lieutenant, Ordnance Department.

James Wentworth Freeman to be first lieutenant, Ordnance Department.

## SIGNAL CORPS.

Goodwin Compton to be lieutenant colonel.  
Albert Louis Rhoades to be lieutenant colonel.  
Stewart Woods Stanley to be major.

*To be captains.*

Howard Standish Thomas.	Wilton Burton Persons.
James Arthur Code, jr.	John Henry Gardner, jr.
Stephen Hunting Sherrill.	Joe Jene Miller.
Robert Newton Kunz.	Evan Dhu Cameron, jr.
John Arthur Pierce.	Frederick Wilhelm Hoorn.
Charles Torrance McAleer.	James Tolmie Watson, jr.
George Washington Gering.	Lawrence Locke Clayton.
Jerry Vrchlicky Matejka.	

*To be first lieutenants.*

Arthur Emil Mickelsen.	Allen Louis Stowell.
Marion Van Voorst.	Albert Henry Johnson.

## CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE.

*To be majors.*

Charles Edward Terry Lull.	Fred Seydel.
Charles Russell Alley.	Haig Shekerjian.
James Wilbur Lyon.	John Absalom Baird.
John Blackwell Maynard.	Leigh Francis Joseph Zerbee.
Isaac Edwin Titus.	William Ashley Cophorne.

Victor Parks, jr., to be captain, Chemical Warfare Service.

## CAVALRY.

Henry Lee Kinnison, jr., to be first lieutenant, Cavalry.  
David Franklin Stone to be second lieutenant, Cavalry.

## FIELD ARTILLERY.

John Robert Thomas, jr., to be lieutenant colonel.

*To be majors.*

George Allen Taylor.	John Albert Hoag.
Ralph Talbot, jr.	Frank Bonne Jordan.
Alexander Camman Sullivan.	

*To be captains.*

Orville Monroe Moore.	Everett Busch.
Charles Sabin Ferrin.	George Eddy Cook.
John Allen Stewart.	John Albion Chase.
William James Schaal, jr.	Arthur Musser Sheets.
Robert Van Kleeck Harris, jr.	Erle Dorr Ferguson.
William Evan Lewis.	Martin Clinton Walton, jr.
Daniel Warwick Colhoun.	Edmond Hugh Brown.
William Henry Colbern.	Leon Ewart Savage.
Harold Taylor Brotherton.	John Russell Young.

*To be first lieutenants.*

George Bittmann Barth.	Arthur Penick Moore.
Winfield Scott Roberson.	Kenneth Howe Sanford.
Lee Vyvian Harris.	Gerard Swarthout.
Thomas Martin Tiernan.	George McKnight Williamson, jr.
William Lawrence Kay, jr.	

*To be second lieutenants.*

Francis Borgla Kane.	Michael Vincent Healey.
William Stevens Lawton.	Richard André Peterson.
Fred James Woods.	Lew Myers Morton.

## INFANTRY.

George Carson Lawrason to be major.  
Frederick Clifford Rogers to be major.  
Justice William Martin to be first lieutenant.

*To be second lieutenants.*

Kenneth Francis Pughe.	Alfred Lawrence Price.
Harry Herman Haas.	Thomas Edward Lewis.
George Edward Mitchell, jr.	

## COAST ARTILLERY CORPS.

*To be captains.*

Joseph Jerome McConville.	Ernest Ransome Percy.
Joshua Dever Powers.	Mario Cordero.
James David Brown.	Benjamin Haw Lowry.

*To be first lieutenants.*

John Marks Moore.	Herbert Blend Kraft.
William John McCarthy.	

James Kirk to be major, Air Service.  
Raymond Shener Jett to be first lieutenant, Air Service.  
Joseph Popenjoy Bailey to be first lieutenant, Air Service.  
Edward Harold Coe to be second lieutenant, Corps of Engineers.

McDonald Donegan Weinert to be second lieutenant, Corps of Engineers.

George Work Marvin to be second lieutenant, Corps of Engineers.

David Charles George Schlenker to be first lieutenant, Signal Corps.

Amory Vivion Eliot to be first lieutenant, Signal Corps.  
Hayden Purcell Roberts to be second lieutenant, Signal Corps.

John Charles Macdonald to be first lieutenant, Cavalry.  
William Peyton Campbell to be second lieutenant, Cavalry.

George William Bailey, jr., to be second lieutenant, Cavalry.  
Vernon Edwin Prichard to be captain, Field Artillery.

Albert Edgar Billing to be first lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
William Cadwalader Price, jr., to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.

Earl Albert Hutchings to be second lieutenant, Field Artillery.

Vincent Coyle McAlevy to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.

Charles Ream Jackson to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.

Richard Brown Thornton to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.

Albert Sidney Howell, jr., to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.

Charles Linton Williams to be second lieutenant, Air Service.  
Lawrence Joseph Carr to be second lieutenant, Air Service.

William Carleton Hanna to be captain, Coast Artillery Corps.  
Philip Howard Raymond to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.

Charles Rocheid Forest to be first lieutenant, Field Artillery.  
William Hugh Burns to be second lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.

Harry Selby Purnell to be lieutenant colonel, Medical Corps.  
James Rhea McDowell to be captain, Medical Corps.

Benjamin Tillman Sharpton to be captain, Medical Corps.  
Barton Willard Johnson to be captain, Medical Corps.

John Charles Burr to be captain, Dental Corps.  
Walter Robert Pick to be lieutenant colonel, Veterinary Corps.

Andrew Edmund Donovan to be lieutenant colonel, Veterinary Corps.

Burt English to be lieutenant colonel, Veterinary Corps.  
Burton Alpheus Seeley to be major, Veterinary Corps.

George William Brower to be captain, Veterinary Corps.  
Thomas Alfred Breen to be captain, Veterinary Corps.

Frank Marion Lee to be first lieutenant, Veterinary Corps.

## MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS.

*To be first lieutenants.*

Frank Steiner.	George Porter Chase.
Jesse Harper Mael.	Alfred Thompson Houck.
Frank Arthur Crawford.	

## TO BE CHAPLAIN WITH RANK OF CAPTAIN.

Philip Francis Coholan.	John Francis Monahan.
Harry Dubois Southard.	Samuel Barcus Knowles.
Mariano Vassallo.	Luther Deck Miller.
Benjamin Joseph Tarskey.	William Donoghue Cleary.

Edward Erie Lane.  
Edmund Charles Sliney.  
Harlan Judson Ballentine.  
Hal Coleman Head.  
Walter John Donoghue.

Oscar Whitefield Reynolds.  
Samuel Otto Wright.  
John MacWilliams.  
Reuben Earl Boyd.  
Roy Hartford Parker.

Eustaquio Sabio Baclig to be first lieutenant, Philippine Scouts.

Jose Emilio Olivares to be second lieutenant, Philippine Scouts.

INFANTRY.

*To be captains.*

Clarence Harvey Bragg. DeWitt Clinton Smith, jr.  
Paul Rutherford Knight. John Curtis Newton.  
Edward Arthur Dolph to be first lieutenant, Coast Artillery Corps.

Joseph Kittredge Baker to be first lieutenant, Cavalry.  
Charles William Leng, jr., to be first lieutenant, Cavalry.  
Frederick Pearson to be first lieutenant, Infantry.  
Charles Frederick Colson to be first lieutenant, Infantry.  
Donald Frederic Carroll to be first lieutenant, Infantry.  
Bernard Wellington Slifer to be first lieutenant, Coast Artillery.

Willard Ames Holbrook, jr., to be first lieutenant, Cavalry.  
Auston Monroe Wilson, jr., to be first lieutenant, Coast Artillery.

Samuel Powell Walker, jr., to be first lieutenant, Cavalry.  
Robert Alwin Schow to be first lieutenant, Infantry.  
John Harrison Stokes, jr., to be first lieutenant, Infantry.  
Grayson Villard Heidt to be colonel, Quartermaster Corps.  
James Cooper Rhea to be colonel, Cavalry.  
James Hanson to be colonel, Infantry.

Walter Herbert Neill to be lieutenant colonel, Quartermaster Corps.

Edmund Anthony Buchanan to be lieutenant colonel, Cavalry.  
Benjamin Delahauf Foullois to be lieutenant colonel, Air Service.

Lawrence DuVal Cabell to be colonel, Quartermaster Corps.  
Clyffard Game to be colonel, Quartermaster Corps.  
George Washington Stuart to be colonel, Infantry.  
Robert Cherry Foy to be colonel, Field Artillery.

Thomas Edward Hambleton to be brigadier general, Adjutant General's Department, Officers' Reserve Corps.

James Sumner Jones to be brigadier general, Adjutant General's Department, Officers' Reserve Corps.

Ora Elmer Hunt to be brigadier general, Inspector General's Department, Officers' Reserve Corps.

Samuel McRoberts to be brigadier general, Ordnance, Officers' Reserve Corps.

John Ross Delafeld to be brigadier general, Ordnance Department, Officers' Reserve Corps.

Edward Orton, jr., to be brigadier general, Quartermaster's Department, Officers' Reserve Corps.

James Johnson Borree to be brigadier general, Officers' Reserve Corps.

Quincy Adams Gillmore to be brigadier general, Officers' Reserve Corps.

Richard King Hale to be brigadier general, Officers' Reserve Corps.

Jay Johnson Morrow to be brigadier general, Engineer Officers' Reserve Corps.

OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS.

*To be brigadier generals.*

Frank Ellis Bamford. Samuel Gardner Waller.  
Mortimer Drake Bryant. Robert E. Wood.  
Harold Montfort Bush. William Chamberlaine.  
George Rathbone Dyer.  
William Pegram Wilson to be major, Ordnance Department.  
John Edwin Ray to be first lieutenant, Field Artillery.

POSTMASTERS.

ARIZONA.

Leonard D. Redfield, Benson.  
John R. Livingston, Chloride.  
John A. Williams, Hayden.  
Luther Caldwell, Holbrook.  
Harry E. Jenkins, Cooley.  
Elfreda M. McIntyre, Gila Bend.  
J. Lee Conrad, Scottsdale.  
Eliel T. Miner, Humboldt.  
James E. Kintner, Grand Canyon.

COLORADO.

Eldon J. Fisher, Alamosa.  
Charles C. Hurst, Antonita.  
Ralph W. Bidwell, Briggsdale.  
Herbert D. McCaslin, Byers.  
Lillie W. Tomkins, Buena Vista.  
Paul P. Huston, Calhan.  
George Baker, Delagua.  
Charles L. Rudel, Fleming.  
Newell R. Usher, Florence.  
Alexander G. Johnson, Fort Lupton.  
Lawrence H. Dewey, Fruita.  
Lula D. Trimble, Georgetown.  
Mary E. Kendall, Kiowa.  
Emma B. Champie, Kersey.  
Elizabeth Amy, Kirk.  
Cecil M. Mount, La Jara.  
Royden G. Girling, Lazear.  
Lillian D. Watson, Louisville.  
Dallas E. Daniels, Manassa.  
James M. Brown, Mancos.  
William A. Sawyer, Mount Morrison.  
Ellsworth A. Weller, New Castle.  
Anna Richards, Ouray.  
Edward F. Green, Tungsten.  
Mary J. Fuller, Two Buttes.  
Ralph H. Weekly, Yuma.

KANSAS.

Frederick H. Dodd, Altoona.  
Charles N. Hunt, Arkansas City.  
William P. Ham, Atchison.  
Ella M. Greason, Atwood.  
Maurice W. Markham, Baldwin City.  
Samuel Barber, Barnard.  
Ernest E. Shannon, Barnes.  
John G. Hyde, Beloit.  
Jessie M. Arbogast, Belpre.  
Horace C. Lathrop, Blue Rapids.  
Arthur B. Fowler, Brookville.  
James R. Galyon, Burden.  
Linnihan M. Kelleher, Burlingame.  
Harry B. Gailey, Cambridge.  
Claude W. Simpson, Cawker City.  
Martin W. Sanderson, Cedar Vale.  
Lloyd T. Erickson, Cleburne.  
William C. Coates, Clyde.  
Orville G. Hannum, Corning.  
Elwood M. Jones, Council Grove.  
Edward L. Kier, Courtland.  
Harvey E. Yenser, Delphos.  
Alfred N. Parrish, Dunlap.  
Lorraine A. Lyon, Edgerton.  
Grace E. Campbell, Elmdale.  
Harry A. Osborn, Emporia.  
Carl E. Myers, Enterprise.  
William L. Oliver, Erie.  
Edward W. Melville, Eudora.  
George G. Wood, Eureka.  
Rebecca C. Minneman, Fairview.  
Charles D. Pritchard, Fall River.  
Hiram L. Hyde, Geneseo.  
Charles S. Goodrich, Goff.  
Edward M. Brown, Greensburg.  
Simon W. Jones, Hanover.  
Bessie M. Achenbach, Hardtner.  
Luella Meredith, Hill City.  
Ferdinand Scharping, Hillsboro.  
William T. Beck, Holton.  
Marjorie Van Meter, Johnson.  
Alvey P. Spessard, Junction City.  
Kirby L. Griffith, Kanopolis.  
Elmer E. Brewster, Leavenworth.  
Anna J. Miller, Lebanon.  
Clayton R. Abbott, Lincoln.  
Neeley F. Troy, Little River.  
Eben Carlsson, McPherson.  
Joseph C. Wolf, Macksville.  
John O. Rodgers, Mankato.  
Daisy F. Greene, Menlo.  
Clarence E. Wilson, Mildred.  
John B. Schwab, Morrowville.  
John D. Eisenhower, Navarre.  
Josiah Foltz, Newton.

Rhoda Champagne, Oketo.  
 Clarence Haughawont, Onaga.  
 Herman F. Kiesow, Osage City.  
 Walter S. Clark, Ottawa.  
 Cyrus W. Ricketts, Paola.  
 William M. McDannald, Peru.  
 Leslie Fitts, Reading.  
 Itella Maupin, St. John.  
 Albert E. Kerns, St. Marys.  
 Ralph G. Johnson, Seneca.  
 Guy E. Woodhouse, jr., Sharon Springs.  
 Samuel M. Simmons, Spring Hill.  
 Chester A. Freeman, Tonganoxie.  
 Russel R. Bechtelheimer, Ulysses.  
 Viola E. Stauffer, Valley Center.  
 Orloff F. Falls, Valley Falls.  
 Carroll B. Kelly, Wakeeney.  
 Mary O. Detwiler, Wamego.  
 Connie Collins, Washington.  
 Charles E. Painter, Waverly.  
 Claude J. Wood, Wetmore.  
 William L. Holmes, White City.  
 David R. Price, Williamsburg.  
 Althea C. Curry, Winchester.  
 John F. Allen, Yates Center.  
 Zella M. Johnston, Zenda.

## MAINE.

Everett E. Sinnett, Bailey Island.  
 William F. Holden, Bangor.  
 William C. Libbey, Belfast.  
 Everett E. Brown, Brooks.  
 Dwight A. Bisbee, Canton.  
 George W. Jordan, Cumberland Center.  
 Fred A. Pitts, Damariscotta.  
 Everett M. Vannah, East Boothbay.  
 Sarah J. Jordan, Ellsworth Falls.  
 Eugene L. Jewell, Fairfield.  
 Harry B. Brown, Farmington.  
 John E. Sargent, Fryeburg.  
 Wade P. Clifton, Greenville Junction.  
 Stephen H. Ward, Kennebunk Port.  
 George D. Vose, Kingfield.  
 Charles E. Perry, Kittery Point.  
 Walter B. Stone, Lovell.  
 Marry G. Kennison, Madison.  
 Rose McLaughlin, Mapleton.  
 Albert C. Bradbury, Newport.  
 Bernice E. Morse, North Jay.  
 Edith B. Holden, Oakfield.  
 Dwight P. Macartney, Oakland.  
 Homer M. Orr, Oldtown.  
 Louise R. Harding, Orono.  
 Alice C. Havener, Searsport.  
 Earle R. Clifford, South Paris.  
 Ernest C. Butterfield, Springfield.  
 George W. Tracy, Stockholm.  
 George H. Hopkins, Stockton Springs.  
 Clarence T. Carl, Waterboro.  
 Edward C. Bridges, York Village.

## MASSACHUSETTS.

Charles W. Hastings, Agawam.  
 Samuel L. Porter, Amesbury.  
 Frederick H. Green, Ashburnham.  
 Harry F. Bingham, Ashby.  
 John D. Quigley, Ashland.  
 Ruth M. Davis, Auburn.  
 Albert L. Porter, Avon.  
 Daniel M. O'Leary, Baldwinville.  
 John J. Downey, Blackstone.  
 Lewis R. Holden, Bondsville.  
 Lawrence T. Briggs, Brockton.  
 Maynard N. Wetherell, Chartley.  
 William H. Lilley, Chicopee.  
 William Davidson, Chicopee Falls.  
 Fred A. Campbell, Dedham.  
 George W. Jones, Falmouth.  
 George H. Staples, Franklin.  
 Gilbert W. O'Neil, Gloucester.  
 Charles H. Slocomb, Greenfield.  
 Leroy E. Johnson, Groton.  
 Harry L. Howard, Hatfield.  
 Albert F. Newell, Holden.  
 William F. Keller, Holliston.  
 George A. Coolidge, Hudson.

Leon C. W. Foote, Lee.  
 Ernest H. Wilcox, Manchester.  
 Turner R. Bailey, Medfield.  
 Bernard Campbell, Millville.  
 Karl F. Koch, Montague City.  
 Charles D. Streeter, Mount Hermon.  
 Harold Winslow, New Bedford.  
 George W. Orcutt, North Abington.  
 James T. Potter, North Adams.  
 Alice K. Briggs, North Easton.  
 Edith H. Johnson, North Middleboro.  
 Frederic W. Brown, North Scituate.  
 Wilfred J. Tancrell, North Uxbridge.  
 Charles W. Adams, Onset.  
 Alonzo W. Jones, Orleans.  
 John Hamilton, Otter River.  
 Palmer J. Lord, Petersham.  
 Margaret E. Rourke, Prides Crossing.  
 Aloysius B. Kennedy, Rochdale.  
 Mark A. Putnam, Rutland.  
 William E. Chaffin, Scituate.  
 Edward L. Chapin, Southbridge.  
 Wesley G. Rose, South Deerfield.  
 Maurice Williams, South Easton.  
 John H. Preston, South Hadley.  
 Susan F. Twiss, Three Rivers.  
 Alfred N. Andrews, Topfield.  
 Frederick C. Haigis, Turners Falls.  
 Otis J. A. Dionne, Walpole.  
 Blanche E. Robinson, Wareham.  
 Thomas E. Hynes, Wayland.  
 Alexander Wylie, Webster.  
 George D. Roe, Westfield.  
 Henry O. Bailey, West Newbury.  
 Mary A. Fallon, West Stockbridge.  
 Edmund F. Peck, West Wareham.  
 W. C. Arthur Hebert, West Warren.  
 Harry W. Metcalf, Wrentham.

## NEVADA.

James L. Denton, Caliente.  
 Henry J. Marriott, Ely.  
 Anna S. Michal, Round Mountain.

## NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Wallace E. Mayo, Cascade.  
 Harry L. D. Severance, Claremont.  
 Charles E. Ayers, Farmington.  
 May F. Sumner, Goffstown.  
 Edward E. Cossette, Gonic.  
 Maurice H. Randall, Haverhill.  
 Jesse C. Parker, Hillsboro.  
 William H. Drew, Intervale.  
 Harriet O. Harriman, Jackson.  
 Charles L. Bemis, Marlboro.  
 Arthur J. Gould, New London.  
 Harold B. Pinkham, New Market.  
 Harry D. Eastman, North Conway.  
 Charles F. Southard, North Haverhill.  
 Stella E. Coburn, North Rochester.  
 George P. Furbush, Rochester.  
 Charles E. Winn, Somersworth.  
 Byron J. L. Eaton, Seabrook.  
 Eleazer F. Baker, Suncook.  
 Arthur O. Albrecht, West Ossipee.

## NEW MEXICO.

Emmet Wirt, Dulce.  
 Flossie Fraser, Gibson.  
 John L. Augustine, Lordsburg.  
 Malaquias Baca, Mosquero.  
 Marie J. O'Bryan, Santa Fe.  
 Louise N. Martin, Socorro.  
 John H. Vaughan, State College.

## OKLAHOMA.

Mrs. Roy M. Muse, Elmore City.  
 Marshall G. Norvell, Marietta.  
 William H. Maxey, Randlett.  
 Otto G. Bound, Ryan.  
 Harrison Brown, Watonga.  
 Myrta V. Ballenger, Woodward.

## SOUTH DAKOTA.

John D. Evans, Alpena.  
 Frank I. Neal, Aurora.

John V. Drips, Belvidere.  
 Benjamin D. Kidman, Bigstone City.  
 Willard O. Dalley, Bison.  
 Leroy A. Gage, Bryant.  
 Arthur D. Flagg, Buffalo.  
 Leonard J. Walker, Carthage.  
 William W. Sour, Castlewood.  
 Frank B. Sherwood, Cottonwood.  
 Charles S. Kingsbury, Dallas.  
 Clyde J. Bowell, Edgemont.  
 Winfred E. Whittemore, Estelline.  
 Alma J. McCormack, Faith.  
 Lee E. Buck, Flandreau.  
 Hattie L. Meyer, Florence.  
 Alton E. Lewis, Henry.  
 Clyde L. Buttrick, Isabel.  
 William F. D. Ackermann, Kaylor.  
 Linville Miles, Langford.  
 Henry Rohrer, Madison.  
 John G. Wordeman, Martin.  
 John M. Williams, Miller.  
 Albert Koehne, Oldham.  
 Clarence M. Matter, Orient.  
 Fred S. Williams, Pierre.  
 Oliver C. Ross, Pine Ridge.  
 Robert G. Andis, Presho.  
 John Larson, Pukwana.  
 John W. Rydell, Rosholt.  
 Fred J. Seais, Spearfish.  
 Edward J. Groat, Thunder Hawk.  
 Gust M. Eggen, Vienna.  
 Victor M. Dalthorp, Volga.  
 Edward A. Wearne, Webster.  
 Guy M. King, Wessington.  
 Volney T. Warner, Woonsocket.  
 John W. Woods, Worthing.  
 Emil O. Vondracek, Yale.

## UTAH.

Peter Allan, Blanding.  
 Henry H. Lunt, Cedar City.  
 Elsie Tallestrup, Clearcreek.  
 James C. Hill, Elsinore.  
 Will C. Barton, Garfield.  
 Ezra P. Jensen, Garland.  
 Leo N. Gledhill, Gunnison.  
 Maranda Smith, Heber.  
 Harold A. Wood, Holden.  
 Goldie F. Stevenson, Lynndyl.  
 Alta A. Dayton, Magna.  
 Henry C. Jacobs, Mount Pleasant.  
 George G. Roseyear, Park City.  
 Mary Cooper, Pleasant Grove.  
 Frances C. England, Scofield.  
 Thomas H. Latimer, jr., Springville.  
 Norman G. Allan, Wellsville.

## WEST VIRGINIA.

Cecil H. Martindale, Ansted.  
 Rosa P. Oxley, Athens.  
 Henry A. Russell, Berkeley Springs.  
 Dorsey J. Lake, Bridgeport.  
 Edgar I. Hatfield, Cairo.  
 Nina E. Nettles, Camden on Gauley.  
 John M. Garrett, Dunbar.  
 Stark A. Willhide, Durlins.  
 John H. Middleton, Elk Garden.  
 Thomas W. Stalnaker, Elkins.  
 James S. Phipps, Fayetteville.  
 Oscar Sipple, Fort Gay.  
 Wilbur Dolly, Franklin.  
 Everett B. Wray, Glen White.  
 Bailey G. Stump, Grantsville.  
 Perry C. Thomas, Helen.  
 John F. Lusk, Itmann.  
 Millard F. Forgey, Kingston.  
 Elmer E. Radabaugh, Masontown.  
 Earl Pepper, Morgantown.  
 William R. Moore, Mount Hope.  
 John A. Diehl, Mullens.  
 Joe Van Zandt, Newburg.  
 Lloyd V. McIntire, New Martinsville.  
 Wesley L. Lawson, Nitro.  
 George McDonald, Parkersburg.

Lawrence Lipscomb, Parsons.  
 Jessie L. Henery, Pine Grove.  
 Leonard C. Griffith, Power.  
 Waitmon T. W. Morgan, Rainelle.  
 Frank T. Corder, Raleigh.  
 Emerson E. Deitz, Richwood.  
 Isaac C. Staats, Ripley.  
 George H. Spencer, Rivesville.  
 Justus Stalnaker, Sutton.  
 Preston R. Payne, Switchback.  
 Lawrence B. Kenniburg, Thomas.  
 Abner N. Harris, Thorpe.  
 William G. Damron, War.  
 Willis H. Marshall, Wheeling.

## SENATE.

WEDNESDAY, December 19, 1923.

The Chaplain, Rev. J. J. Muir, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Our Father, we certainly ought to be a happy people for Thou dost crown our days with Thy goodness, and Thou dost give us evidence continually that Thou art watching over us. Deliver us from all pessimism. May we see the world brighter and more hopeful than in former days, and where shadows may have fallen may we know of a surety that behind the dim unknown standeth God within the shadow keeping watch above His own. We humbly ask in Jesus' name. Amen.

The reading clerk proceeded to read the Journal of yesterday's proceedings when, on request of Mr. LODGE and by unanimous consent, the further reading was dispensed with and the Journal was approved.

## MONTHLY REPORTS OF CONDITIONS OF RAILROAD EQUIPMENT.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a report of the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, submitted in compliance with Senate Resolution 438, agreed to February 26, 1923, showing for the month of November, 1923, the condition of railroad equipment and related data, which was referred to the Committee on Interstate Commerce.

## ATTORNEYS EMPLOYED BY THE SHIPPING BOARD.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair lays before the Senate a report from the United States Shipping Board and will ask the Secretary to read the letter accompanying it.

The reading clerk read as follows:

UNITED STATES SHIPPING BOARD,  
 Washington, December 18, 1923.

The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE,  
 Washington, D. C.

SIR: There is transmitted herewith, in accordance with resolution adopted by the Senate on January 16, 1923, and Senate Resolution No. 37, a list of attorneys employed by the United States Shipping Board and by or for the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation or their agents.

The information required under Senate resolution of January 16, 1923, was of such an extensive nature that the report could not be completed prior to the adjournment of Congress on March 4, 1923.

I have taken the liberty of including in the report all attorneys employed by the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation or their agents down to August 21, 1923, and will be glad to furnish the committee with information regarding any attorneys who have been either employed or discharged since that date. This date was used, as I find it was the date on which the final work on the resolution of the Senate of January 16, 1923, was completed.

We are continuing our search to find if any other attorneys may have been employed through the agency of any of the managing operators or agents. It is not believed that there have been any others, but search will be continued to make sure of this fact.

Respectfully,

EDWARD P. FARLEY, *Chairman.*

Mr. MOSES. I ask unanimous consent that the report be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from New Hampshire asks that the report be printed in the RECORD. Is there objection?

Mr. KING. It is an important report, and I think it ought to go to the Committee on Commerce that that committee may determine whether it shall be printed as a public document. However, if it is printed in the RECORD that will be