

Congressional Record.

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION.

SENATE.

FRIDAY, March 31, 1916.

(*Legislative day of Thursday, March 30, 1916.*)

The Senate reassembled at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

NATIONAL DEFENSE.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 12766) to increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The Secretary called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Beckham	Hollis	O'Gorman	Stone
Brandegee	Johnson, S. Dak.	Overman	Sutherland
Burleigh	Kenyon	Page	Swanson
Catron	Kern	Pomerene	Taggart
Chamberlain	Lane	Shafroth	Thomas
Clapp	Lippitt	Sheppard	Tillman
Colt	McCumber	Sherman	Underwood
Culberson	McLean	Simmons	Vardaman
Cummins	Martin, Va.	Smith, Ga.	Wadsworth
Curtis	Martine, N. J.	Smith, Md.	Warren
Gallinger	Myers	Smith, Mich.	Weeks
Gronna	Nelson	Smith, S. C.	Williams
Hardwick	Norris	Sterling	Works

Mr. HOLLIS. I desire to announce that the senior Senator from Maine [Mr. JOHNSON] is necessarily absent. This announcement may stand for the day.

Mr. KERN. I wish to announce the unavoidable absence of the senior Senator from Florida [Mr. FLETCHER]. He is paired with the Senator from Idaho [Mr. BRADY]. This announcement may stand for the day.

I desire also to announce the unavoidable absence of the Senator from Arizona [Mr. SMITH] on account of illness. This announcement may stand for the day.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Fifty-two Senators have answered to the roll call. There is a quorum present. The pending amendment is the amendment offered by the Senator from Iowa [Mr. CUMMINS].

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I understood the Senator from Iowa [Mr. CUMMINS] had the floor, but he stated to me a little while ago that he is going to yield to the Senator from Colorado [Mr. THOMAS], who gave notice that he would speak to-day on this subject.

Mr. CUMMINS. While the amendment I have offered is pending the Senator from Colorado has given notice of an address this morning, and I will be very glad, as far as I am concerned, to take the floor after he has finished.

Mr. THOMAS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. NELSON. Will the Senator from Colorado yield to me for a moment?

Mr. THOMAS. Certainly.

Mr. NELSON. I have an amendment to offer to the pending bill, and I should like to present it and have it printed and lie on the table.

The VICE PRESIDENT. It will be so ordered.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, the bill reported by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and which is now the unfinished business is designed, as far as the committee was able to do so, to meet present requirements and establish a method of progressive increase of the Army. Its companion bill will be that offered by the Committee on Naval Affairs and designed to accomplish a similar end as to that branch of the service.

This bill has been framed with much care and after full information from all points of view. To the distinguished chairman of the committee belongs the chief credit for framing the measure as it has been presented and for a patient investigation of all those details which are essential to any well-prepared scheme of Army organization.

It is not a perfect measure; but, as far as it is possible for human foresight to safeguard the present and care for the future, with a due regard to the general public requirements, we believe it to be as near to what the Congress should do as is possible under all the circumstances.

Some of its provisions do not appeal to me and some others are not so desirable as companion propositions appearing in the House bill. Time may demonstrate that it has many deficiencies not now observable, but these fortunately can be corrected by additional legislation as the demands of the future may require. We are confident that it is free from the reproach of partisanship and that it is the composite result of an earnest desire upon the part of all members of the committee, without regard to politics or party affiliation, to give to the Senate a bill which it can accept with some confidence that it will be practical and successful in operation.

And, indeed, Mr. President, though its imperfections may be many, I am sure that it will monopolize the resources of the department for its development for some time to come, and that through the process of development experiences will be gained and deficiencies discovered which, as I have stated, can and will be remedied by future legislation.

The bill, Mr. President, will not satisfy the extremists in either direction, and particularly those who demand a very large Army and an equipment little, if any, below those of military nations. Cecil said many years ago that "to have too much forethought is the part of a wretch; to have too little is the part of a fool."

I have little sympathy, Mr. President, with the views of extremists upon the subject of preparedness in either direction. At the same time I respect their convictions, and, with the exception of some of the militarists, for their sincerity.

The fact, however, that it does not meet the expectations of these representatives of part of the public sentiment of the country will doubtless result in a challenge of the efficiency of the bill, and therefore it must be justified by its sponsors. Hence the reasons assigned for a larger establishment than this bill provides requires some discussion, for if they are sound, if there is a menace of danger to the country in the immediate future as real as many declare and as some believe, then, of course, this Nation should go upon a war footing as soon as possible and the proposed measure either be amended, very largely transformed in fact, or rejected altogether. For modern wars, Mr. President, are those of nations and not of armies. In the great conflict now raging across the seas every resource of every nation has been marshalled into action, and the fighting and firing line are coterminous in some instances with the boundaries of empires; in others they stretch so far that flanking movements are impossible without violating the territory of neutral nations.

I do not hesitate to say, therefore, Mr. President, that if we are face to face with a probable invasion, if our condition is such as not only to prevent but as to invite the hostile incursions of some first-class power or powers, the conclusion which has been pressed upon public attention so frequently and so much that preparedness to the last degree is an essential element of our future preservation becomes an unanswerable proposition. But I contend, Mr. President, and I shall attempt to show that while there is necessity for extending the national defenses, strengthening our forces on land and on sea, nevertheless the reasons for it can not be found in the menace of a threatened invasion.

It is contended that we are the wealthiest, most helpless, most envied, and most disliked of nations. Of our opulence there can be no question, and opulence is always attended by the envy of those who do not share it, whether it be the opulent individual or the opulent nation. That we are the most helpless is at least admitted to be a debatable question, and that we are the most disliked of nations can be demonstrated to be false.

I agree, Mr. President, that the advantage which we have taken, and very naturally, of the needs of the nations at war, the exacting contracts which have been extorted from them, the

enormous transfer of wealth from them to ourselves, the occasional lapses in performance, particularly with regard to the quality of the goods furnished, have very naturally aroused a feeling of dislike which would be reciprocal if the case were reversed, and there is no doubt that much dissatisfaction has been engendered, which may have ripened or will ripen into resentment consequent upon commercial conditions which the war has created between our own and some of the warring nations and which have been to the immeasurable advantage of America.

It is said that we have incurred the animosity and tempted the cupidity of other nations against whom we must arm thoroughly and speedily lest we be lost; that our armament on land and on sea, if we would be immune from attack, must be second to that of no other first-class power. As one authority has expressed it, "To do less than this were worse than not to arm at all." I repeat that if these premises are true the conclusion is unavoidable.

But, Mr. President, the war scare is no new thing. It has existed and has appeared intermittently for many years; it will continue to manifest itself so long as men are engaged in private occupations, the prosperity of which is dependent in whole or in part upon war conditions.

Surely the public can not have forgotten the charge of Dr. Liebknecht, made in the German Reichstag in 1912, of a worldwide munitions trust, in which were involved not only the capitalists of all the civilized nations, not only distinguished civilians in these several countries but members of the military and naval organizations and clergymen as well, all of whom, through their identification as shareholders with this great combination, were interested in furnishing arms and munitions of war to whatsoever nation might be induced to purchase. It can not have forgotten that the investigation of these charges disclosed their truth; that the Krupps admitted an annual expenditure of some \$200,000 in disseminating war rumors and operating upon the fears of hostile peoples for the promotion of contracts for guns and ammunition.

I remember very well, Mr. President, how the exposé shocked this country. Beginning with Germany, it involved all the first-class powers of the world, and among other things disclosed the fact that the so-called Harvey Co., an American corporation, was the connecting link which bound great American concerns like the Bethlehem Co. with those of Great Britain, of France, and of Germany.

Nor can we overlook the fact that Japan is an ancient specter, rising bellicose and defiant on the western horizon with the regularity of the seasons and threatening the invasion of America about 30 days before the meeting of every Congress—a specter, Mr. President, which, as is suggested to me, anticipated the consideration by the Military and Naval Committees of their respective subjects regularly and habitually clothed in the crimson raiment of blood and of rapine, and appeasable only by the propitiatory offering of battleships and ammunition. It may be that these apparitions had, and still have, some foundation, but what I wish to impress upon the attention of the Senate is that, true or false, these warnings of unseen but palpable dangers, the expression of their imminence, and their magnitude are not the offspring of the great war in Europe. That has merely shifted them in a different direction and given them renewed force. It has changed the point of attack, and the threatened invasion has been shifted from the Orient to the Atlantic.

Mr. President, the effect of the sudden outbreak of this great conflict upon the reasoning faculties has been most apparent. The war came with all the shock of a world-wide, unexpected catastrophe. Perhaps we might have known—doubtless many of us foresaw—that the constant and continually expanding military and naval equipments of the countries involved would inevitably lead to the existing debacle; but, generally speaking, mankind had reached the comforting conclusion that great wars were things of the past; that the enormous national liabilities, the control of the finances of the world by comparatively few men, the softening, elevating, and refining influences of our modern civilization made any future great conflict impossible. These delusions, Mr. President, dissipated in an instant, disorganized for the time being the rational faculties of mankind and shattered their capacity for an intelligent consideration of the "change of front of the universe."

In a recent article in the Saturday Evening Post entitled "War's madness," Will Irwin says:

The great wars of the past have been fought in unanalytical ages. The historians and diarists have recorded battles, diplomatic maneuvers, the thoughts of statesmen and generals. No one, so far as I know, has speculated very much on the state of the public consciousness, and no one, before Armageddon broke out, seems to have understood that the mind of war is an abnormal mind, that he who touches

it becomes infected with a madness. It has always been so, I suppose; but it is doubly so now, when war on an unprecedented scale has affected a set of nations highly civilized and possessing, therefore, highly organized nerves.

From the very beginning of the war Europe was abnormal, although the abnormality had then a different form from the present madness. No one in those early days seemed ever to smile; and this was equally true of the French, the Germans, the British, and the Belgians. Laughter I heard, but it was metallic laughter. The sound which a London theatrical audience made after a comedian sprang a joke was quite different in quality from the hearty laughter of ordinary times. You perceived it, too, in the people on the streets. A London crowd is always somber enough; but never before did it look like this. People walked stooping, their eyes on the ground. When they raised their faces you saw that their brows were curiously knit. That is the symptom which one notices most commonly in a madhouse. No lunatic's brow ever seems quite in repose. Such was the composite face of London in August and September, 1914.

It was the face, too, of Brussels, as I found when I arrived there, just before the Germans came. Brussels, of course, was anxious and very much afraid. In spite of newspaper yarns about the heroic defense of Liege, the Belgians really expected just what has happened. But anxiety could not exactly account for the strange expressions, for the oddity of the gestures and movements among the people on the streets. They talked and acted by jerks.

These emotional conditions, Mr. President, are kaleidoscopic; they attack the imagination and reasoning powers first from one and then from another angle. Among other things, they breed credulity. Men are prone to believe whatever they hear if asserted with conviction.

Thus, Mr. Irwin calls attention to the fact that shortly after the outbreak of the war—

Europe was a study in the growth of rumor. Bizarre reports, great and small, ran from mouth to mouth. There was the famous story of the Russian forces in England, which was told so circumstantially that even the correspondents of neutral nations, comparatively calm in this soul tempest, came to believe it.

And I am reminded by this reflection, Mr. President, of an incident that occurred shortly after the declaration of war against Spain by the United States in 1898. I happened at the time to be in the city of Chicago when a rumor came over the wires that the Spanish fleet was in the lines of European and Atlantic travel under orders to sink or to intercept all vessels bearing the American flag. I saw a mob around one of the telegraph offices with white faces and pallid lips, clamoring for news from the great American trans-Atlantic liners bearing friends and relatives to and from America. Every individual in the throng was panic-stricken by the rumor, which was accepted without question as to its accuracy. The public mind was off its balance; hysteria had for the time dethroned common sense; excitement and apprehension were uppermost. Next morning the rumor was dissipated, but the state of the public mind consequent upon the declaration of war was receptive to every rumor, however unreasonable, with which it might be confronted. So the rumors of the Russian invasion of Germany through Great Britain, like the rumors of the Spanish fleet of 1898, mythical and absurd though they were, for the time being were facts as real, as absolute, and important as any which have actually transpired since then.

These mental maladies, Mr. President, are contagious. They inevitably spread to neutrals and arouse the fears and the apprehensions of their people. They also, unfortunately, arouse their cupidity, and this, the greatest of all wars, has for the time excluded dispassionate consideration of all other topics. Our capacity for calm and sober judgment of men and of events has been disturbed by our emotions; our vision has been clouded by the dust and smoke of the conflict; abnormal and horrible conditions have aroused national sympathies, antipathies, and apprehensions. Our indignation has been inflamed by atrocities in Belgium, in Servia, in Armenia, and in eastern Prussia, and we shudder at the thought of their possible repetition in America.

Nations, like individuals, Mr. President, are governed more largely by their fears and their prejudices at all times than by their reason. I think that may be stated almost as an axiom, which can appeal for its truth to the history of civilization. Hence we have been prone to imagine perils impending, but which for our hysteria would unquestionably excite our derision.

War, too, has developed latent race tendencies in our composite citizenship. These have been aroused, and, to some extent, new political alignments have been consequently made. We have been appalled by the brutality of modern warfare, and particularly by the discovery that our civilization, after all, is but a thin veneer; that we are barbarians all; that our knowledge, slowly accumulated by the generations, seems in its last analysis to aggravate our brutality and extend our power to destroy.

I pause here, Mr. President, to say that, in my judgment, the most valuable lesson which America has derived from the great European war is the consciousness of the fact that there is in this country no unity of American citizenship, no oneness of

purpose, no distinctively national policy. On the other hand, we seem to be a polyglot combination of races, which have not been fused in the melting pot, which finds expression each along its own lines of nationality, which have not yet grasped the value or the significance of free institutions or the necessity of maintaining the Government, that its institutions may endure.

We now perceive that our constant pursuit of things material, our strife for wealth and luxury, have taken the flush from patriotic impulse, has dulled the edge of our devotion to the Nation, has made us indifferent to the precious institutions of which it is the custodian, has caused us to forget the terrible cost at which they were acquired. It remains for us to take advantage of that lesson, Mr. President, by cultivating a oneness of sentiment, an equality of citizenship, the establishment and administration of justice in all its aspects, to the end that true Americanism may become the enduring element, binding us all to the defense, as we are bound in the destiny, of the great Republic.

Mr. President, that sort of preparation is indispensable to the success of all others, for without the national feeling, that oneness of purpose, that love of country, that exaltation of American institutions above every other earthly consideration, all the armies and all the navies, the panoply of war, "the captains and the shouting," will be unavailing if the crisis of the Nation's existence, which, God forbid, should ever confront our people.

War, Mr. President, has also profoundly affected us economically, socially, politically, and morally. It has doubtless subjected us to dangers, but at the same time it has offered us marvelous opportunities. These, of course, I can only mention and enumerate in passing. It has given us new markets, stimulated production, shifted the financial center of the world. It has been a graphic verification of the truth of Mr. Seward's celebrated dictum in 1861, "There is no customer like a great nation engaged in offensive warfare."

The war has also doubtless necessitated departure by belligerents from the lines of international law in their treatment of neutrals. These departures have brought us at times into diplomatic difficulties with nations that are leading in the conflict, some of which are still existent, but all of which, I trust, will be disposed of without resorting to the close of diplomatic relations or to acts of retaliation.

Advantages caused by war demands have created new lines of production and new captains of industry. These have seized opportunities and have prospered abnormally, not only through the needs and agony of nations by the manufacture of equipment necessary for their purposes, but also through the manipulation of the stock market. Their suddenly acquired gains and their methods of acquirement doubtless makes it difficult for some of them "to sleep o' nights." In the language of Shakespeare they "Weep to have what they so fear to lose"; and perhaps, actuated by a possible sense of danger, they are earnest in their loud and constant clamors for preparation.

Mr. President, those who thrive by war are naturally desirous of continuing war conditions. I think it was Demetrius the silversmith who protested against assaults upon the temple. He was an image maker, and by that means he made his livelihood. The public state of mind resulting from war, the reasoning faculties obscured, the emotions aroused, and the imagination ready to depict or to entertain any and every assertion of existing danger, became fertile soil for the seed of the war-rumor propaganda. Mankind was ripe for suggestions and self-interest was swift to make them.

One prominent newspaper a few days ago asked the question, in arguing for an expanded military organization: "Who would have supposed possible such a war as this? Is our invasion the more impossible?" The answers to such questions, Mr. President, are easily made by an excited and apprehensive audience. Very naturally it accepts the suggestion which such inquiries involves, and recognizes the necessity, because believing the rumor, of providing against the imagined danger by clamoring for most immediate and extensive "preparation."

Mr. President, there is yet another motive which prompts the declaration that our exposed and defenseless condition invites, and may suffer, immediate incursions from other countries. I refer now to those who are interested in the continuation of existing internal conditions and who shrink from all change either as chauvinistic or as injurious. It is well known that this country, at and before the outbreak of the war, was absorbed in the consideration of matters of grave domestic concern. They had reference to abuses which were the outgrowth of commercial and economic conditions and which found expression in discontent, which manifested itself sometimes in very dangerous outbreaks and collisions in election contests, in legislation, and at all times in active agitation of a more or less

effective character. Now, the demand for immediate preparedness, if made insistent, necessarily crowds out all other affairs of public concern, and therefore it is to the interest of those who believe in the good old doctrine of *laissez faire* to substitute the cry for preparedness, for a great naval and military establishment, and to base that cry upon the charge that we are in imminent and immediate danger of invasion, since it is impossible, in the inflamed condition of the public mind, thus aroused and thus appealed to, to consider any other than the immediate question. Therefore, reforms, no matter how badly needed nor how insistent, will be either shelved, postponed, or forgotten.

It is an old saying that when the whole family goes to the circus there is the opportunity of the porch climber; and when the whole Nation has its attention fixed upon the threatened danger, not only of invasion but of extinction, every legislative reform, every social change, however needed, is necessarily postponed to the consideration of the immediate danger, and when postponed the chances are that it may be permanently forgotten in the consequent absorption of the public mind. Plans and policies for internal regulation of economic and social affairs become then no longer prominent, and may reforms which are crystallized into law halt in their operation.

I have noticed that one of the immediate consequences of the war in this country has been the establishment of two great combinations, second in magnitude only to the United States Steel Corporation, one being the Midvale and the other, if I recollect correctly, the Cambria, although I am not positive as to the exact name of the latter. And, Mr. President, their formation, which would have been the signal for excited and determined opposition prior to August, 1914, has not created a solitary ripple of excitement or of more than passing notice anywhere. The time is ripe for these combinations. They have sheltered themselves behind the bulwarks of a supposed necessity for immediate preparation for national defense, and the good work will doubtless continue, as does the process of wealth consolidation, which seems also to proceed unhindered; indeed, that which is used to divert public attention from these things becomes an asset easily coined into gold while we are preparing to meet an enemy of the imagination.

Then, too, Mr. President, increased public expenditures which preparedness necessitates may also force a return to the good old tariff conditions. Extensive preparation means very largely increased public expenditures. People dislike direct taxation or any taxation of which they are cognizant. They submit to indirect taxation easily because it is unobservable, and those infant prodigies which have been disciplined by the enactment of the Underwood bill doubtless look upon this war as a providential occurrence, which, properly handled and wisely conducted, may force the hand of a reluctant Congress to return to the good old days of the Payne-Aldrich tariff, and, as the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. GORE] suggests, justify the war from that standpoint. I commend this phase of the so-called menace of an invasion particularly to the consideration of my friends on this side of the Chamber.

Then we are told, to use the expression of one of the great New York papers, that New York and Boston and Philadelphia and Chicago are drunk with money. The proceeds resulting not alone from the increased demand for manufactures and foodstuffs, but from the values given to shares and bonds representing the institutions thus engaged, has brought to this country countless millions of dollars, gorging the avenues of trade, and becoming to some degree a positive burden in the economic channels of the country. What better outlet for them than a bond issue, with the people of the United States and their wealth as the basis of the security? These gentlemen are in a position not only to furnish us with everything necessary for preparedness, but also to lend us the money, if so be we shrink from taxing the people directly, at a comfortable rate of interest, and thus have the Nation as the old darky arranged his coon trap—so as to catch the people of the country "a comin' and a gwine."

I have heard many suggestions of bond issues here, and from public men at that, in connection with general and loose discussion of the means to be resorted to for the purpose of securing a needed added revenue. I have noticed that some of the financial papers, first hinting, have afterwards openly advocated that method of financing our new schemes of preparation. For my part, Mr. President, I hope the Congress will not consider them at all. There is no need in this day, with all the wealth that has been accumulated in this country, for mortgaging posterity by the issuance of a single dollar of added indebtedness; and I think it is well that that fact should be made as clear as possible, to the end that this element underlying the propaganda for extensive and unlimited preparation may understand the

situation. As far as I am concerned, I believe, as far as we can do so, in placing the expense consequent upon our necessary military and naval expansion upon the wealth of the country, and particularly upon the war industries, if I may so term them, of the Atlantic States.

What is it that is said to be so attractive to these mercenary countries of the Old World, armed to the teeth, and looking with dripping chops upon the splendid spoils offered to them upon our defenseless shores? What is it but the accumulated wealth, aggregating billions of dollars, and unequally distributed among the people living along the northeastern part of this defenseless shore? Shall your sons and mine be enlisted and take their place in the ranks, equipped with munitions of war to defend this country, and to defend, of course, that wealth, and at the same time be made to pay for it? We who bear the burden of the day, the heat, and the conflict of actual warfare, are offering the supreme test of loyalty and of citizenship. Therefore let those whose accumulations are to be protected, and the amount of which constitutes the tempting lure to the other nations of the world, meet the financial obligations which we must assume so largely on their account.

These various conditions, Mr. President, somewhat crudely stated, have given the old Army and Navy propaganda an added impetus. Japan has been succeeded by Europe as the "accelerator of public opinion," if I may use the expression of a somewhat celebrated New York politician. The propaganda began with the firing of the first gun at Liege, since which time the press, the pamphlet, the moving picture, the perambulating orator, the convention, the church, and the professions have all been enlisted for the crusade. The administration and the Congress have been denounced in unmeasured terms for their supineness, their indifference, and, above all, for their lack of patriotism in failing to recognize and to provide against the danger. If any effort that could have been made has not been resorted to to stampede the Nation, I am at a loss to know what it is. The movement has been organized; it has been well conducted; it is certainly managed with rare executive ability; and while unquestionably it comprises a considerable portion of the patriotism of the country, at bottom, Mr. President, cupidity and avarice and greed are the basis of the propaganda. Its expense has been enormous, but that has not proven at all embarrassing. From these sources and interests have come wars and rumors of war; our helpless military and naval condition have been exploited; our enormous wealth, the ambitious designs of other powers, their hostility toward us, and their contempt for us. With a few honorable exceptions, the entire press of the country has voiced these conditions for months, accentuated with growing frequency, by abuse of the President and denunciations of the Congress for their supineness and indifference to an obvious national peril.

Mr. President, if we are one-tenth as helpless as some of these gentlemen and some of these organizations have declared us to be, true patriotism would have suggested that they keep silent about it instead of advertising our great wealth, our inability to defend it, our sloth, and our opulence to these covetous nations across the sea. As it is, no nation, however insignificant; no invasion, however ridiculous; no menace, however absurd, has been suggested that has not found lodgment somewhere. Apprehension has given way to fear and fear to hysteria, that the future is pregnant with hidden but real dangers to our national peace and integrity. How clearly a moment's reflection reveals the fact that the real menace is to our National Treasury; that the contemplated assault is directed by these national scandal mongers upon the national resources.

Mr. President, this militarist propaganda, which combines a medium portion of patriotism with a very large portion of self, is a commercial enterprise. The enormous profits of the makers and venders of war supplies will probably cease with the war itself, unless a new market for their wares can be provided. The best and perhaps the only available new customer is the Government of the United States. If it can be seduced or frightened or stampeded into a policy of unlimited naval and military equipment, the new business will continue, even though the war should end to-morrow.

Mr. President, I do not want to be unfair in this discussion. I am quite aware that cupidity, the desire for gain, the ambition for material progress and benefit through the medium of so-called preparedness, is not confined to the munitions makers. It is an inherent American propensity, and where it is not inherent has been cultivated everywhere. "We all do it." I think I am within bounds when I say from two to three thousand bills have been introduced and are now pending in the two Houses of Congress at the instance of individuals or of localities, based upon the theory of needed preparedness, and having for their purpose and object the securing of appropriations to

be expended in those localities, but which, but for the propaganda, never would have been dreamed of. I mention this fact in no spirit of carping criticism. The average citizen can not be blamed for imitating a common example nor for demanding a share in a proposed scheme of nation-wide expenditure. When gain and glory go hand in hand, patriotism waxes not in the crowded marts of commerce only, but in the highways and byways everywhere.

I want to read an extract from a letter which I received some days ago as illustrative of the fact that the material side of the extended and unlimited propaganda is not confined to the Atlantic seaboard. This letter is from the West, although not from my State. It begins with two quotations—one biblical, the other historical:

"The Philistines be upon thee."

"Nero fiddled while Rome burned."

This is a third and final reminder that while Congress sleeps the enemy may be advancing. What will we do when every munitions plant on the seaboard is in his hands and none in the interior? The Almighty has stored in the hills around—

I have omitted the place—

every element essential to the manufacture of war material and the patriotic citizens of the town are anxious to donate a site for a Government plant. Is Americanism dead and the public servant hypnotized?

This is my last appeal. Please tell the President that the alternative is a munitions plant at _____, and other advantageous places west of the Alleghenies, or Roosevelt for President. He must make his choice.

DEMOCRAT.

[Laughter.]

The author of this epistle is neither less sincere nor more ridiculous than the presidents of defense societies nor the frantic advocates of a Navy greater than England's or an Army equal to that of Germany.

Mr. President, our Navy has been decried, our Army has been ridiculed, and our administration denounced by the advocates of this propaganda. Eminent men have convened in this very city and charged the President of the United States with indifference, with neglect of duty, and with cowardice. Congress and members of the Cabinet have been overwhelmed with similar epithets and denunciations. Aye, men heretofore in charge of great departments, in which millions have been expended under their own supervision, have befooled their own nest in denouncing their departments as deficient in organization and entirely unequipped for the exigencies of the hour. Our defenseless coast and our unprotected areas east of the Alleghenies, where the bulk of the Nation's wealth is centered, has been mapped and platted, and gentlemen have discoursed eloquently over its many vulnerable points of attack and the awful consequences of its invasion by a comparatively small army of veteran soldiers, and while manufacturers at the same time are increasing their equipment, extending their plants, enlarging their business in this exposed area of the country, all indifferent to the fact that the "Philistines are upon them."

Mr. President, the Army and Navy officers wherever they have spoken at all, with two or three exceptions, have joined their voices with those who warn and those who prophesy. Far be it from me to say anything derogatory of the officers of the American Army and Navy. They are a splendid body of men. They have no superiors. They are, generally speaking, the soul of honor—men of high purpose and lofty ambition, ready to aid their country wherever they can, not only in the assumption of official responsibility but in giving the benefit of their experience to the Nation.

I do not, therefore, Mr. President, in referring to the association of these gentlemen with the preparedness program, intend to do more than to call attention to what may be called a national trait, a democratic trait, if you please, which characterizes officers of the Army and Navy of the Republic and due largely, if not entirely, to our form of government and its institutions. I am reminded that Lord Salisbury once declared that the average officer, if consulted, would insist upon fortifying Mars against the moon. I do not go quite as far as that although the experience of that great statesman doubtless justified his comment. I think the tendency of an American or a French officer, however, would be in that direction.

Mr. President, one of the greatest books in the English language, and too little read in these days, is De Tocqueville's Democracy in America, written a great many years ago. I shall ask permission to insert at the end of my remarks his twenty-second chapter entitled "Why democratic nations are naturally desirous of peace and democratic armies of war." I shall read only a brief extract from this chapter on page 282 to illustrate what I mean:

In democratic armies the desire of advancement is almost universal; it is ardent, tenacious, perpetual; it is strengthened by all other desires, and only extinguished with life itself. But it is easy to see that of all armies in the world those in which advancement must be slowest in time of peace are the armies of democratic countries. As the num-

ber of commissions is naturally limited, while the number of competitors is almost unlimited, and as the strict law of equality is over all alike, none can make rapid progress—many can make no progress at all. Thus the desire of advancement is greater, and the opportunities of advancement fewer, there than elsewhere. All the ambitious spirits of a democratic army are consequently ardently desirous of war, because war makes vacancies, and warrants the violation of that law of seniority, which is the sole privilege natural to democracy.

We thus arrive at this singular consequence, that of all armies those most ardently desirous of war are democratic armies, and of all nations those most fond of peace are democratic nations; and, what makes these facts still more extraordinary, is that these contrary effects are produced at the same time by the principle of equality.

It is to be expected, therefore, that the occasion of occasions for this tendency to manifest itself is that which contemplates an expansion of our military and naval systems. The motive behind it is commendable. It is wholly free from the taint of avarice and of greed, but it must nevertheless be taken *cum grano salis*, since it is not entirely disinterested.

It is the best part of the play, but not beyond fair criticism.

Now, Mr. President, what is and has been this danger, and what nation is it that threatens our peace? This is the concrete question which confronts us in view of the propaganda to whose origin I have referred. If I understand it, we are said to be in peril of invasion by some one or more of the great powers now engaged in war, whose resentment we have incurred, or whose cupidity we may have aroused, and that either or all of them can easily land upon our defenseless coasts an enormous veteran army, which, because of our defenseless condition, will overwhelm the country, levy tribute upon its wealth and dictate its own terms of peace, thus humiliating if not subjugating the Nation, because of its supine and slothful indifference to the obvious peril. What evidence do the alarmists furnish to support their warning?

Mr. Henry A. Wise Wood, who is prominently connected with the Aero Club of America, recently related, and I quote from a clipping from one of the circulars of that association, that—

In the archives at Washington there is a document which sets forth the celerity with which these very seas may suddenly be used for an attack upon us. According to its contents, which give the numbers of men, each of several nations could land upon our shores within a given period of time, it lay within the power of one of these nations to set down *upon our Atlantic coast, in 46 days, over 750,000 men, with artillery, sufficient ammunition, and supplies to last them for three months. And on our Pacific coast, it was stated, in 61 days there could be landed approximately 350,000 men, with supplies and weapons.*

The italics are mine.

This necessarily implies, Mr. President, that somewhere in the national archives is a plan or document prepared elsewhere which our Government had been fortunate enough to intercept and which both discloses this perilous situation and the probability of its execution. I shall presently show that this is merely a résumé in the author's own language of a calculation of the Army War College as the partial basis of a proper military policy. But Mr. Wood continues:

It would require at least five years to get and train men to meet this contingency. Therefore the plans to increase the Army to 300,000, and to provide for training that part of the citizenry which is willing to train while being employed daily in peaceful pursuits, can not be considered as anything more than a conservative precaution. Nor can the plan to spend \$17,500,000 for aeronautics—\$7,500,000 for the Navy \$5,000,000 for the Army, and \$5,000,000 for the militia—be considered excessive.

It may be uncharitable to suggest that the proposed appropriation for aeronautics had much to do with the alarming announcement preceding it, although there can be no doubt about it. Be that as it may, I feel free to offer the comforting assurance that I shall vote for a generous appropriation for that arm of the service, without regard to the sensational situation so prophetically outlined in Mr. Wood's statement, and so vividly portrayed in "The Battle Cry of Peace."

Not Mr. Wood only, but Col. Roosevelt has given his sanction to this paper invasion by referring to it in some one of his multitudinous contributions to the press upon the general subject.

Mr. President, there is no question but that a great many good people in this country, millions of them, have been impressed by these absurdities and really believe them. They are entitled, I think, to definite information with regard not to their existence, for they are mythical, but to their probability, either presently or in the more remote future.

What is the nation which entertains these designs upon America? We certainly have no reason to fear Italy, or Austria, or Russia, or France. The senior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. McCUMBER], in a very able address upon this general subject, with his usual exhaustive ability, demonstrated the absurdity, a few days ago, of the existence of any possible apprehension from those countries. Is it England or Germany? Mr. Roosevelt, in another of his articles, has assured us that we need not fear England, because she is not a military nation.

Germany alone, Mr. President, is left, and every man, if he will admit it, who believes or who thinks of invasion pictures in his imagination the advancing helmets of the German legions. The only nation which possessed 750,000 veteran troops when the "document in the archives" was written was Germany. The only nation whose colonial ambitions might conflict with American policies was Germany. The only nation whose marine equipment and whose military equipment unite and which could therefore secure the needed transportation for such a horde, with its equipment, is Germany. So when war with some country across the sea or the invasion of America by some country across the sea is mentioned, Germany is the one nation which the mind has in view, whether expressed or not.

Of course, Mr. President, I must not be understood as assuming that there is any basis for such an apprehension or that the existence of such a danger is even remote beyond the fact that its status justifies the inference. I merely express what seems to be the inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the attitude which the militarists, so-called, necessarily assume when warning our people of their peril.

But if we admit, for the sake of argument, that these apprehensions are well founded, what sensible, sober-minded man or woman can, upon a moment's reflection, feel that such an invasion is either possible or probable?

I do not overlook the assurance, Mr. President, that the warring nations will be more formidable when peace has been declared than they are now; that the danger will then be more insistent and exigent than ever; that the hundreds of thousands of battle-scarred veterans who have won their spurs on sea and land, the survivors of the greatest war in the world's history, will be the most compact and magnificent fighting forces ever known. This is undoubtedly true, but these forces will be divided then as now; and, without regard to efficiency or truculence, only the improbable amalgamation of the armies of Europe could make them a source of serious apprehension to America. And we may be sure that the animosities of the present will be accentuated when peace shall have come and the nations brooding over the conflict and its destructions come to realize the extent of their calamity.

Moreover, Mr. President, these unhappy countries are weary of conflict, bankrupted in their finances and facing a future so gloomy, so forbidding, and so pathetic, whatever the issue, that further strife will be abhorrent. To say that any nation, the greatest or the least of them or all of them together, in view of these conditions, would immediately, after the close of the present hostilities, provoke a rupture with the United States and attempt to transport a great army 3,000 miles across the sea to wage an offensive war against a nation of 100,000,000 of population, possessed of limitless resources, with all the possible consequences involved, is to picture a possibility so utterly baseless as to be absurd; yet the portent finds currency among many good and thoughtful people all over the country, who will live to laugh at their apprehensions and marvel at their easy but complete deception.

Mr. President, a hostile force can reach us, if at all, only from across the sea. I think that is self-evident. It can not come from any other direction or in any other manner unless the science of aeronautics should advance so rapidly as to enable it to come in transports through the air; and if that be so, then all the preparation in the world we may make by land and on the sea would be of practically little value, lest our artillery shall have been so developed as to enable us to destroy it. I venture the assertion that no such force as would be required for our conquest could come or could disembark successfully, even had there been no great war, with all its casualties and destruction.

What nation possesses both the ships and the hosts required? I am speaking now of possibilities at the end of the war, since we are surely immune from invasion until then. England is not a military nation. She has the vessels; she has not the men in arms; and even the fact otherwise, inasmuch as she has a thousand miles of seacoast of her own to the north of us, with a frontier of 3,000 miles between Canada and ourselves, we might sow the waters with bombs and sea mines and plow the depths with submarines from our northeastern coast extremity to Galveston, and yet, so far as England is concerned, she could carry out her hostile purposes as though we had done none of these things, unless our fleet were sufficiently strong to destroy her armada. She could land her troops upon her own coasts and then attack us across the border. We may therefore leave Great Britain out of our calculations. What of the other nations?

Now, Mr. President, I come to the estimates of the Army College with regard to this subject. But before doing this I will refer briefly to the testimony of Gen. Wood and one of his

aides before the committee, which I think is appropriate in this connection. Gen. Wood calls attention to the fact that 98 ships were able to convoy and land 120,000 men at Gallipoli, his contention being that this historic fact, this military accomplishment, was conclusive of the ability of any of these nations to land even a larger force without difficulty upon our shores if undefended. Gen. Wood, however, stated some of the transports used by the British Army were capable of carrying from ten to twelve thousand men, which gave her an enormous advantage, and which explained the small number of vessels required for the transportation of such a large number of men with their equipment. No other nation possesses transports of such huge capacity.

I recall that it required 35 transports to carry 35,000 men from Canada to Great Britain, and I think that was without their complement of munitions and equipment. This proposition would require ten times that number of vessels for 350,000 men, and perhaps half as many more for the needed impedimenta. With regard to the Gallipoli incident, it must be noted that this convoy was assembled at Alexandria, and very close to the point of disembarkation. The length of time required for the transportation of the troops from Great Britain to the point of assembly will not be known until the war is over. It was, of course, much longer in point of time with the allies in full command of the seas. There was an occasional submarine perhaps; but England and her allies were in absolute command, subject to that one possible disturbing influence, between the point of embarking and the point of disembarkation.

Col. Glenn's attention was called to the same subject. I asked and he answered the following questions:

Senator THOMAS. Colonel, if my figures are correct on a basis of 98 transports to 128,000 men, it would take 311 transports for 400,000 men?

Col. GLENN. Yes, sir.

Senator THOMAS. An armada of that size would encounter some pretty severe and dangerous experiences, would it not? It might be enveloped in fog or meet with storms?

Col. GLENN. Yes, sir; it would have to take its chances on all those things; yes.

Senator THOMAS. Probably resulting in disaster?

Col. GLENN. I do not think so, sir.

Senator THOMAS. With a number of ships like that?

Col. GLENN. I do not think so, sir.

Senator THOMAS. And particularly if it had a large convoy with it?

Col. GLENN. It might, of course. You have to take your chances on that sort of thing; but I do not believe that it would.

Senator THOMAS. Assuming that you had to make a landing with your troops, after reaching the shore somewhere outside of a harbor or along the shore, how far out would it be safe to anchor your transports from the shore in order to debark the troops?

Col. GLENN. It depends entirely on the conditions. Yet, at the harbor of Salem, Mass., I think they would run them right in to the docks. We certainly can not reach them with any guns we have.

Senator THOMAS. Landing at some other place where there is no harbor—

Col. GLENN. I do not catch the point, sir. They would not hesitate to make a landing from several miles out, if it were necessary, sir. They would use their launches.

Senator THOMAS. With small transports like those used by the British Army it would be necessary, would it not, for them to stand off quite a distance from shore, especially if the wind were blowing shoreward?

Col. GLENN. That all depends upon the local conditions of the harbor.

Senator THOMAS. I am eliminating a harbor in these questions, sir.

Col. GLENN. You mean, sir, an open roadstead?

Senator THOMAS. Yes; I am eliminating harbor conditions.

Col. GLENN. I do not quite catch your point. You mean, how far out it would be necessary for them to go—

Senator THOMAS. I must assume that if a landing is attempted where there is no harbor, that those large transports will not be able to come right up to the shore, but that they will have to debark their troops and ammunitions with lighters. About how far out would these 311 ships have to stand in order to safely do that, and how far away from each other?

Col. GLENN. They, of course, would have to have swinging room for their anchor chains when they did that; but I think that the question of just where they would anchor would depend on the depth of water.

Senator THOMAS. Precisely.

Col. GLENN. And it would also depend upon what their facilities were for discharging. With the Navy present and the facilities that should be provided, it makes no serious difference whether it is a mile or whether it is 5 miles; it takes just simply a little bit longer to handle it.

The significance of the extract just read lies in the assumption—the constant assumption by the witness—of the ability of the enemy to disembark within some harbor. My questions had reference to disembarkation upon the assumption that harbor protection would make it the equivalent of such disembarkation as took place at Gallipoli; a very different and a far more perilous situation. While we are told that this is simple and feasible, no expert will discuss it under examination if he can avoid it.

Now, I come to the "Statement of a proper military policy for the United States," by the Army War College, with regard to the subject; and, Mr. President, I believe its close analysis demonstrates, without extended comment, the improbability—nay, the impossibility—of a possible landing of an armed force

upon any part of our shores. I read from pages 10 and 11, the subsection entitled "Preparedness of the world powers for over-sea expeditions":

Control of the sea having been once gained by our adversary or adversaries, there is nothing to prevent them from dispatching an over-sea expedition against us.

Of course not; but there is the assumption by the experts at the outset of a condition that our Navy makes impossible, as I think I can demonstrate in a few moments. The statement proceeds:

In order to form an idea of the mobile force we should have ready to resist it, an estimate must first be made of the approximate number of troops that other nations might reasonably be expected to transport and of the time required to land them on our coasts.

The number of thoroughly trained and organized troops an enemy can bring in the first and succeeding expeditions under such an assumption is a function of—

(a) The size of the enemy's army; and

(b) The number, size, and speed of the vessels of the enemy's merchant marine that can be used as transports.

Should our enemy be a nation in arms—that is, one in which all or nearly all of the male inhabitants of suitable physique are given a minimum of two years' training with the colors in time of peace (and this is true of all world powers except ourselves and England), it is evident that the size of the first expedition and succeeding expeditions would be limited only by the number of vessels in the transport fleets.

Note the exception of England, the one nation thoroughly provided with sufficient transport facilities.

Then follows a detailed statement of transport and military strength of the nations. This is already in the RECORD, and it is not necessary for me to reinsert it. The Senator from Oregon [Mr. CHAMBERLAIN] inserted it on the day before yesterday; but I will merely say that the total strength of the armies of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and Russia, and also the tonnage available of ships with a capacity of over 3,000 tons and 2,000 tons and 1,000 tons are given, the number which could be transported on a first expedition, and the number which could be transported on a second expedition, the German Army, of over 750,000 men, being given about 47 days—within 1 day of the time mentioned by Mr. Wood in the clipping to which I have called attention—and Japan some 41 days, about the same time as that stated by Mr. Wood. These are my reasons for declaring that this estimate is that mysterious, that marvelous, that damning document reposing somewhere in the archives of the War Department.

The allowance made in this estimate is 3 tons per man and 8 tons per animal for ships over 5,000 tons and 4 tons per man and 10 tons per animal for vessels under 5,000 tons, which allowance has been used in estimating the capacity of vessels, except where the regulations of other countries prescribe a different allowance.

They also include rations, water, forage, and so forth, for the voyage and a margin for three months' reserve supplies. The tonnage allowance covers men, animals, and all accessories, and is sufficient to provide for vehicles, including guns, and is "that prescribed in our field service regulations."

Mr. President, I do not know when those field service regulations were formulated, but I do know that the impedimenta which must accompany an army, if equipped for modern warfare, as armies now engaged in war are equipped, make this allowance entirely too small, and that, instead of one ship to a thousand men, the tonnage required would be at least 50 per cent greater than this estimate. It would tax to the extreme the energies, the capacity, and the possibilities of the merchant marine of every nation in the world, with the single exception of Great Britain, who, as I have stated, if she desires to invade us, can do so without regard to our efforts at coast protection.

This report is theoretical; it must be theoretical; and if it has slumbered in the archives of the War Department so long, then it certainly must have been made at a time when military and naval conditions were entirely different from what they are at present. The development of the artillery arm by this war, to say nothing of others equally important, would more than double the capacity allowed by this estimate for impedimenta.

Mr. President, let us assume that a nation—I do not care which, but some one of the powerful military nations of the Old World—should design the investment of this country, what would be the effect upon its commerce in commandeering a sufficient number of vessels for the purpose? What time would be required to gather the stores and munitions essential for such an expedition and to load them when gathered? In what port could the armada be assembled? And if in several, where would the several fleets assemble? When one considers the increased paraphernalia of a modern army, aeroplanes, lorries, camp kitchens, hospital supplies, gasoline, provisions, horses, mules, ammunitions, modern siege guns, hand grenades, trench tools, telephones, wire, aeroplane attachments, engineering equipment, and all the other varied mechanical combinations essential to modern warfare, and then say that in 46 days or

in 46 weeks a sufficiently formidable expedition could be assembled to invade and swoop upon this country without more than a moment's warning, so to speak, is more than absurd; it is ridiculous. The experience of the British at Gallipoli is, for the purposes we are now considering, no experience at all. And I venture the assertion that the Army College, should it revise its report, will be forced to the same conclusion.

I have here, Mr. President, an article from the Kansas City Journal, which is entitled "What preparedness means," which I ask to insert at this point in my remarks without reading. It throws an illuminating light upon the controversy. I will merely state that, amongst other things, it declares that a million men, marching four abreast, would extend over a line 400 miles long, practically from Kansas City to the Colorado border. Then a statement is made of the various items of equipment which must accompany such an army. I shall not burden the Senate by reading it, but ask that it be printed in the Record as a part of my remarks.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, permission is granted.

The article referred to is as follows:

[From the Kansas City Journal.]

WHAT "PREPAREDNESS" MEANS.

Probably no word has ever dropped more frequently or more glibly from the tongues of the American people and with so little understanding of its real meaning as the word "preparedness." People know, of course, that preparedness means being ready with an army and navy for resistance if the United States is invaded by an enemy, but the immense amount of preliminary work that must be accomplished before a state of actual preparedness is reached, and how it is done, are details to which the average citizen has given little thought. It is customary to imagine that mere soldiers in the bulk constitute a machine for defense, and that with an army of a million men there need be no worry about incidents.

Assuming that 1,000,000 men stood ready to take up arms for the defense of the Nation against a first-class power, what would they need immediately before they could take part in a single battle? Just to feed them would require 4,000,000 pounds of solid food and 3,000,000 pints of coffee daily. To equip this army would require 750,000 rifles, 2,000 field guns, 200,000 horses to haul these guns, 165,000,000 rounds of cartridges, and hundreds of other things that are not at present available.

That the citizen soldier may have some adequate idea of the tremendous amount of preparation that must be accomplished before preparedness is a fact two Army officers have drawn up a schedule of war from the inside. This is not a manual of training, but a treatise in plain language and a guide by which the layman may inform himself in general way concerning military rudiments, so that if he is ever called upon to defend his country he may understand better the general nature of things military. In this connection many popular fallacies are pointed out, such as the alleged geographical security of the United States; the idea that Americans are born soldiers; that European nations will be too exhausted to be feared after the war; that lack of money abroad will prevent a war; that, prepared or unprepared, the United States can "lick" any nation on earth, and that money and material resources are synonymous with military strength.

What does an army of a million mean? One million men marching four abreast would extend over a line 400 miles long, practically from Kansas City to the Colorado border. Some of the things that these million men must be provided with before they can fight are:

Seven hundred and fifty thousand rifles and bayonets for them to fight with.

Two hundred and sixty-five thousand pistols, little brothers of the rifle. Eight thousand machine guns, the military scythe.

Two thousand one hundred field guns to batter down attack.

One hundred and sixty-five million cartridges to carry them into their first fight and as many more for each succeeding fight.

Two million five hundred thousand shells and shrapnel for our field guns for every hour they are in action.

One hundred and ninety-six thousand horses to carry them and pull their carriages.

One hundred and twenty-seven thousand mules to haul their supplies and pack their guns.

Eight thousand wagons to transport their supplies and ammunition.

One million cartridge belts for their ammunition.

One million first-aid packets to bind up their wounds.

One million canteens.

Each of them must have a uniform and equipment:

One million shelter halves to protect them from the weather.

One million ponchos to keep them dry.

Two million blankets to keep them warm.

Two million pairs of shoes.

Two million uniform coats, breeches, leggings, suits of underwear.

One million hats.

Two million shirts.

Four million pairs of socks.

One million haversacks to carry their equipment.

Finally they must eat:

One million pounds of meat each day.

One million pounds of bread each day.

Two million pounds of vegetables each day.

Three million pints of coffee or tea each day.

All this must be purchased, transported, prepared, and cooked each day, and to eat it they must have:

One million cups.

One million plates.

One million knives.

One million forks.

One million spoons.

To provide for proper care, training, and led into battle they should have 25,000 trained officers.

The calling into service of 1,000,000 men would mean the organization, equipping, and training of 10 armies the size of the complete Regular Army of the present time. If 1,000,000 men should apply at the recruiting offices, it would require the uninterrupted effort of 1,000

recruiting parties, working day and night for more than 10 days, to enroll and enlist them. It would require a week to move them to the camp, provided all the suitable railroad equipment of the country were given over to this work alone.

One thousand men would have to work day and night for 10 days to erect the tents for them, and when completed this camp would amount to a city of more than 125,000 tents, covering an area of more than 8,000 acres, an area equal to the size of St. Joseph.

MR. THOMAS. Now, Mr. President, by way of contrast to the assertions of our many vocal warriors and of course I do not thus refer to our War College nor to the officers whose statements I have referred, I call attention for a moment to what seems to me to be the best-considered article upon the subject of oversea invasion, considered from the nautical standpoint, which I have been able to discover. It was contributed to the Contemporary Review of February, 1909, and is signed "Master Mariner." It was inspired by a report to the British Parliament that an invading force of 150,000 men could be conveyed in 200,000 tons of shipping from Germany to Great Britain, the British Government at that time having under consideration the general subject of a possible invasion of England by the German Empire. This gentleman made that report the subject of the article to which I am calling attention.

He first directs his criticism to the fact that the force would have to be "accompanied by 14,000 horses and a full proportion of guns and wheeled transports, amounting to hundreds of large and small vehicles." He says:

Now, it is one thing to calculate tonnage for infantry alone, but quite another to allow for the other branches and impedimenta of an army fully equipped for service in the field.

Of course, I am only reading extracts—

Another very misleading generalization put forward—

Says this writer—

was contained in the statement—perfectly true in itself—that 200,000 tons of shipping are normally to be found lying in German ports, from which it was inferred that there would be little or no difficulty in commandeering sufficient and suitable sea transport for immediate use by the invading army at any moment. But what does this 200,000 tons represent? It represents the aggregate tonnage of a heterogeneous collection of shipping averaging at least 150 vessels of different sizes and speeds, from Atlantic liners to coasting tramps, or perhaps even steam barges, in which the actual numbers and individual vessels vary, with arrivals and departures, not only every day but every tide. Now, it must be borne in mind that the distribution among different transports of the units of an expeditionary force which intends to land on an enemy's coast in the expectancy of opposition at any moment is mainly governed by the requirements of the disembarkation, for it is obviously a matter of the greatest importance that the force should be landed in such a manner that it can be tactically formed for meeting the enemy with as little delay as possible when once on terra firma, or it may be surprised in a state of unprepared confusion. To insure this it is essential not to split up brigades, battalions, or batteries among different ships more than can be helped, and, in cases where splitting up is imperative, the different vessels carrying separate portions of the same organization or unit must be allotted neighboring berths in the disembarkation anchorage plan—of which more hereafter—or utter confusion will ensue.

He then refers to the expeditionary force of 15,000 men sent by the Americans to Cuba in 1898 as an "instinctive example." He concedes that that was badly managed and worse regulated, and consequently it is not very illuminating. He then refers to the matter of secrecy, which, I think, is to be one of the elements of the prophesied invasion—that it would be upon us almost before we knew it. He says:

A great deal has been said about the powers the German authorities possess of keeping matters secret, but a sudden and wholesale embargo on the national shipping in their ports would occasion so much surprise and even excitement among the neutral shipping lying at the same jetties that every outgoing neutral vessel would carry the news to her destination, often only a few hours' steaming from the German coast. If they were prevented from sailing to stop this, the mere fact of the nonarrival of the usual numbers of expected coasters at various ports would tell its own tale, repeated at once to London.

That is to say, secrecy would be absolutely impossible in connection with such a proposed expedition. Let me say right here that the speed of any fleet must necessarily be regulated by its slowest unit. A fleet of 300 or 400 vessels would necessarily include some which were much slower than others, and, unless they were to be abandoned and allowed to make their way on their own speed and practically without protection, in which event the entire expedition would be imperiled, the faster vessels must accommodate themselves to the slower, and, by a process of mutual progress, reach the point of destination at the same time. Hence, to say that under such conditions a swift expedition, even after it has been assembled, is a possibility is to reckon without a due consideration of that important factor.

If, however, for the sake of argument, we assume that the ships have been commanded, and the troops, guns, and horses of a large force embarked on a rough general plan, after more or less unavoidable delay, the next question inviting attention is that of getting the vessels clear of the harbors into open water, and here we enter the domain of purely nautical discussion, where only seamen can speak with authority. Now no seaman in the world would undertake to empty this huge and motley crowd of shipping out of the basins and pilot it down the long and tortuous estuaries of the German coast.

Of course I must assume that some of the physical conditions which are here involved might not exist with regard to the supposititious expedition which forms the basis of this demand for universal preparedness—

to open sea in less than two, or perhaps even three, high tides, and even then in the general hustle the grounding of a large steamer in a narrow part of the channel might delay the whole exodus for hours.

When all were clear of pilotage waters, however, and fairly in the open, fresh difficulties would arise. The unwieldy armada must either cross independently in a "go as you please" fashion or make the voyage in company. If they crossed independently, the first vessels would anchor off our coasts a full 24 hours before the last and give notice of what was following, thus destroying still further that element of surprise which would be essential to success. It is plain, therefore, that they must keep together somehow, although they could only do so as an unordered mob of ships. It would be just as impossible to form, dispose, and maneuver 200 vessels of different sizes that had never moved together before, and whose masters were destitute of all practice in maneuvering in company, as it would be to put 500 men, taken at random from the streets and placed on a parade ground, through intricate battalion movements forthwith. This mob of ships would probably cover at least 20 miles from van to rear and throw smoke visible for another 10 to 50, according to the state of the atmosphere. They would have to cross lines of trade frequented by neutral shipping and pass through fishing grounds, and could not possibly evade observation unless in a fog, and if a fog set in, their state of danger and confusion would be appalling.

Of course that is obvious. A huge armada proceeding in company, and convoyed by perhaps as many more vessels, overtaken by a thick fog, when dependence would be placed entirely upon sound signals, and these entirely unreliable under such atmospheric conditions—why, Mr. President, we can imagine, from the appalling accident on the New York Central Railroad day before yesterday, as the consequence of a thick fog on land, what the frightful possibilities of disaster would be to such a fleet under such circumstances.

Their speed would be that of the slowest vessel, and her speed itself would be below its own average unless the weather were exceptionally calm, for the wind would be from the westward and therefore against them. It must not be forgotten that landing on an open coast is only possible with the wind blowing offshore—that is to say, a westerly wind as regards our east coast—and unless that were the case the expedition would never start. The speed of the fleet, as a whole, would not therefore exceed 6 or 7 knots.

Without reading further as to that particular subject, Mr. President, I may say that the conclusion of this writer is that such an expedition from the near-by country of Germany to Great Britain would exhaust three weeks at the lowest, and in the event of any casualty the time would be correspondingly extended.

But he proceeds:

But the passage across would not be the least of the nautical difficulties to be faced. If German seamanship proved equal to all these obstacles, a yet further test would await it in the task of anchoring this cumbersome host of shipping in an ordered and rearranged disposition, such as is essential for disembarking a force in the face of an enemy.

He also says:

When a fleet of transports sails for a hostile coast, a detailed plan of anchorage berths has to be prepared beforehand by the admiral commanding the escorting squadron, and issued to each master of a transport before sailing, in order that he may know exactly where he is required to place his ship on arrival. *This necessitates, of course, a previous knowledge of the exact point of disembarkation and the features of the coast line.*

The italics are mine.

Then he discusses the length of the line necessary for a systematic and safe disembarkation.

When a fleet of 150 to 200 vessels has to be considered such a method of proceeding is out of the question, and the transports would have to pick up their berths independently on arrival as best they could. Two hundred vessels in a single line would cover about 50 miles of coast from wing to wing. In three parallel lines they would cover about 16 miles.

If 300 vessels would be essential for the transportation of 250,000 men with a competent equipment to the coast of the United States, they would, of course, require a third more of coast-line distance, which would be somewhere between 70 and 75 miles for a single line; and three lines are about the maximum number of lines that would be practicable for speedy disembarkation. If four or more lines were used, the outer ships would be so far from the beach that very great delay in landing their troops would ensue. Every half mile farther out means an extra mile from the ships to the beach and back, and when a boat made 10 trips in 24 hours she would cover 10 more miles in that period—a loss of time perhaps quite four hours for every such extra half mile.

I read another extract:

If, in order to avoid this delay, the transports anchored at hazard on arrival, the confusion on the beach would be stupendous.

* * * * *

Fair weather must be assumed throughout as a matter of course.

What possibilities are involved should a storm at sea overtake such a fleet? Fogs are ominous things; a raging storm in a sea thickly peopled with crowded ships would sow death and destruction everywhere, and it would be a miracle if upon a voyage of 3,000 miles no storm would be encountered.

Mr. President, in view of these difficulties, so graphically portrayed by a man evidently a thorough master of the business of transportation at sea, what becomes of this nightmare of a possible over-seas invasion of our defenseless coasts even were the ships collected and the men embarked? I am surprised that some of the obvious difficulties have not long ago suggested themselves to the deliberate judgment of thinking people. But I have observed nothing of the sort.

Let us ask, however, where this expedition, if it comes, would be landed? What would be the point of disembarkation? Of course, if any capacious harbor were available it is obvious that such harbor would be the point. But assuming that there is some sort of defense—and I think the assumption is borne out by existing conditions—that some defensive preparation in and around the different available harbors of the Atlantic coast, then the disembarkation must overcome such defenses or be made along the open shore. "Master Mariner" declares that this requires a number of things in combination—fair weather, a breeze off the shore, and not less than 20 to 25 miles of available frontage, with 3 columns of ships at the farthest, for a relatively speedy and successful disembarkation. Can such a feat be accomplished? If so, we deserve defeat.

I contend that we have at least the nucleus of both Navy and Army. We certainly have paid well for both. Our construction of a navy began with the administration of President Arthur. Its strength in 1909, according to President Roosevelt, was ample. I wish to read an extract from Mr. Roosevelt's last literary production, "Fear God, and Take Your Own Part," page 226. That sounds like an utterance of the Kaiser. Mr. Roosevelt there says:

In February, 1909—

Only seven years ago—

when the battle fleet returned from its voyage around the world, the United States was in point of military—that is, primarily naval—efficiency in such shape that there was no people that would have ventured to attempt to wrong us, and under such circumstances we could afford to keep the Philippines and to continue the work that we were doing. Since then we have relatively to other powers sunk incalculably from a military standpoint; we are infinitely less fitted than we were to defend ourselves.

Of course it may perhaps be assumed that since Mr. Roosevelt ceased to be actively engaged in the affairs of the Nation everything has deteriorated, and particularly the military and the naval arms. If that were true, it were pity; and if it is true it is the most cogent reason why the party to whose embraces he is so anxious to return should receive him with open arms, and strive to make him President of the United States once more.

But, Mr. President, is it true that since 1909 our Navy has deteriorated? I know the libel is made and reiterated and unfortunately believed to some extent throughout the country. Unfortunately, too, some naval authorities have given the weight of their opinions to that assertion. And yet, Mr. President, if it is true, then it must be true also either that we have lost or abandoned a considerable portion of our fleet, or that they have been placed out of commission, or that our strength in men has so deteriorated that our warships are useless because our complement of marines have not been or can not be secured.

I hold in my hand a copy of Pearson's Magazine for February, which contains an article entitled "Proof that big navy increase is not needed now," and I will read one or two extracts there published from the testimony regarding our naval strength in December, 1914, by Admirals Fletcher and Badger before the House Committee on Naval Affairs. At that time the late lamented Representative Witherspoon was a member of the House committee and in the full possession of all his wonderful faculties. He has since passed into the great beyond. His death was little short of a public calamity. I think he knew more about naval conditions the world over, including our own, of course, than any other man in public life. He was diligent, earnest, capable, practical, and useful, and as a member of the House Committee on Naval Affairs he was of indispensable value to the people of the United States. He took occasion to closely question these gentlemen regarding our strength at sea. The report is not easily available, the issue having been practically exhausted.

Mr. McCUMBER. On what date?

Mr. THOMAS. This was in December of 1914. The report is of comparatively recent date. Admiral Fletcher, I think, has recently been somewhat conspicuous in giving testimony reflecting upon the strength and personnel of the Navy. On

page 548 of the report occurs the following examination, the subject being the comparative strength of the American and other navies:

Mr. WITHERSPOON. How many battleships has England got? Admiral FLETCHER. According to this table here [indicating] England has 20 dreadnaughts built.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. The total number? How many has she in all? Admiral FLETCHER. This table puts it at 60.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. That is, 60 battleships?

Admiral FLETCHER. Sixty battleships.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I did not ask you about that statement. I have seen that old statement before. I do not care anything about that statement. The Navy Yearbook puts down the number of English battleships completed, building, and authorized at 72. Now, your idea is that if those 72 ships were pitted against ours we would not be able to resist them. Is that it?

Admiral FLETCHER. We could resist them, but we would probably be defeated.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. That is what I mean. We could not resist them successfully?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; all else being equal.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. It has been told this committee by high authority in the Navy Department, among others Admiral Vreeland, that if we had a war with England on account of its relations with other nations in Europe it could not afford to send more than half its ships against us. Do you believe that is so?

The admiral was not disposed to answer that question directly. He said:

That is a question of policy and of political conditions in Europe upon which I would not pretend to pass judgment.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Then your statement that we could not resist England would be on the assumption that she could send her entire fleet or more than half of it against us?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; she would control the sea if she could keep there a more powerful fleet than ours.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Or not afraid of war with the rest of the world, not afraid to take all the ships away from her own coast, and to send all of them, or a large majority of them, against us? Your statement is based on that?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir: it is based on actual superiority.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Well, on the assumption that what other naval experts have told us is correct—that she could not send more than 50 per cent of her 72 against us—you would not say then that we would not be able to resist them successfully, would you?

The admiral replied:

I would not like to pass judgment on a supposititious case of that kind.

And yet that "supposititious case" was based upon other competent naval testimony, common-sense testimony, that neither England nor any other European nation would deprive her coast and her people of the protection of her entire navy in the event of a war with America. It is not only not supposititious but it represents an obvious condition of naval warfare.

But Mr. Witherspoon was persistent:

Now, according to the Navy Year Book, Germany has battleships built, building, and authorized, 39.

I may say, in passing, that we then had 40.

Would you say that, if she could send all those ships against us, we would not be able to resist them?

Admiral FLETCHER. I should say that we ought to, if we have the greater force.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes; we ought to. Certainly we ought; and we could?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; the greater force should win.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes; we could.

Admiral FLETCHER. I think so.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Now, it has been stated to us that if Germany were at war with us she could not afford, either, to send more than one-half her ships against us.

Admiral FLETCHER. That I do not know.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I am not asking you whether you do or do not. Assuming that she could send only half her 39, would you not say that we could successfully resist that number?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir; I would say so if all our force is available to meet her.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I would, too. Now, take France. This Navy Yearbook says that France has a grand total of battleships, built, building, and authorized, of 29—11 less than we have. Would you not say that if she sent all hers against us that we would be able successfully to resist them?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; our force available being the greater.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. And if she sent only one-half of them we would not have much of a fight, would we?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; we ought not to.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. That is the way I look at it. Here is Japan, which, according to the Navy Yearbook, has only 19 battleships, or 21 less than we have got. If Japan should send all of her 19 against us, do you not think we would be able successfully to resist them?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, I should say, if all of our force were free to meet them at the time.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. And if she did not send but half of them, there would not be much of a scrap, would there?

Admiral FLETCHER. Probably not.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Now, here is Russia, that the Navy Yearbook says has a grand total of battleships, built, building, and authorized, of 15. If she should send all of them against us, would you not say that we could successfully resist them?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. And if she sent half of them, there would not be any fight at all, would there?

Admiral FLETCHER. Not much.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Here is Italy, that has a grand total, according to the Navy Yearbook, of 17 battleships. We could successfully resist them, whether she sent all of them or a part of them, could we not?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; I think so.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Now, Austria-Hungary, according to the Navy Yearbook, has a grand total of battleships, built, building, and authorized, of 10. We could successfully resist them, could we not?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think so.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Then what nation is there we are not prepared successfully to resist? There is not one on earth, is there, Admiral—not a single one?

Admiral FLETCHER. Well, Judge, I think there is.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Well, which one? I have gone through the big ones. Tell me which one.

Admiral FLETCHER. I should say that England has a navy so much more powerful than that of any other nation in the world that she could easily keep control of the seas.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. England. Well, what other one, then?

Admiral FLETCHER. I do not think we need greatly fear any other single nation.

But Mr. Witherspoon pressed his question:

Then there is no other country except England that, in your judgment, we could not successfully defend ourselves against?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that is correct; yes, sir.

And yet, though England concededly entertains no designs of conquest against us, though we can, according to this high authority, successfully defend ourselves against any other country, men who should know better, men high in the confidence of the Nation, persistently and constantly slander and belittle our Navy, abuse and villify its Secretary, and proclaim from the housetop our utter helplessness should any country declare war against us and embark a hostile force to attack us. This is not patriotism; it is gross commercialism, coining fear into appropriations and apprehension into dividends.

Mr. President, that testimony has not appeared anywhere in any of the recent discussions upon this subject. None of the great newspapers, designed to instruct the people and acquaint them with public affairs, has even referred to it; and yet it is available to all of them.

Then Judge Witherspoon asked the witness if England had any battleships as large as some of ours. Of course, this was before the appearance of the *Queen Elizabeth*.

Admiral FLETCHER. England has many ships which are very nearly of the same power of our own ships of same date of building.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Let us see about that, now. I do not believe she has, though you know more about it than I do. In this Navy Yearbook, which gives a list of the English battleships, I find that the last five dreadnaughts that England built or is building are named the *Royal Sovereign*, *Royal Oak*, *Remilles*, *Revolution*, and *Revenge*, each of which has a tonnage of 26,000.

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. And we have two ships—the *Pennsylvania* and the *No. 39*—which have a tonnage of 31,400, and then we have authorized three more that are to have a tonnage, as I understand, of 31,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Thirty-two thousand.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Thirty-two thousand tons. In other words, the tonnage of the *Pennsylvania* and *No. 39* is 5,400 tons greater than that of the last five English dreadnaughts that are building, and the last three dreadnaughts that we are building have a tonnage of 6,000 tons greater than the last five English ships. Do you tell me that these English ships are equal to ours?

Admiral FLETCHER. No; I did not say that.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Do not you regard them as inferior to ours?

Admiral FLETCHER. Yes; as near as we can estimate.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I do, too. And the armament of these five ships is eight 15-inch guns, while the armament of the five American ships I have referred to is twelve 14-inch guns. Which is the more powerful armament—eight 15-inch guns or twelve 14-inch guns?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think the twelve 14-inch guns more powerful, but I am not sure this opinion is concurred in by all authorities.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Then, understanding your testimony, after reviewing it, do you want us to understand that England is the only nation on earth that has a navy that we could not successfully resist?

Admiral FLETCHER. I think that is the fair conclusion; yes, sir; at the present time.

Here is a short extract from the testimony of Admiral Badger.

Mr. WARREN. What is the date of that?

Mr. THOMAS. December 14.

Mr. HUSTING. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ROBINSON in the chair). Does the Senator from Colorado yield to the Senator from Wisconsin?

Mr. THOMAS. I yield.

Mr. HUSTING. I should like to ask the Senator whether the question of speed was taken into consideration as well as the efficiency of our battleships?

Mr. THOMAS. The Senator will have to draw his own conclusion from what I read. There was nothing said on the subject of speed in these extracts. The practical efficiency of our fleet was the subject considered during the course of the witness's examination.

Mr. HUSTING. I merely wish to say that in some article I read very recently it is claimed that the highest speed of American battleships is less than the slowest speed of a first-class battleship of either England or Germany.

Mr. THOMAS. One is apt to hear anything in regard to our Navy now if it is of a derogatory nature. In the popular acceptance of the preparedness propaganda it ought all to go into the scrap heap; we have nothing. What I am reading is something of record, falling from the lips of gentlemen high in our Navy, reluctantly conceding that less than 18 months ago we

had a very respectable Navy and one second only to Great Britain.

Mr. HUSTING. I was merely asking for my own personal information. I wish to state to the Senator that in one of the recent fights, in which the *Bluecher* was sunk, the speed of that boat, I think, was given at 24 knots.

Mr. THOMAS. That was a battle cruiser.

Mr. HUSTING. Yes.

Mr. THOMAS. A battle cruiser, as the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. GALLINGER] suggests to me, has much more speed than a modern battleship.

Mr. HUSTING. I understood it was claimed there that the lowest speed, as the figures were given, was greater than the highest speed of our vessels, and I merely asked the Senator whether those figures were correctly given or not. It was stated that the slowest boat in that fleet was faster than any boat we have in our Navy.

Mr. THOMAS. I have not much doubt that the slowest cruiser of that particular fleet was faster than any battleship we have or that Great Britain or Germany has. I was not referring to the speed, and my recollection is that no battleship was engaged in that battle. As the Senator from New Hampshire suggests to me, no battleship has yet been engaged in any naval conflict since the outbreak of the war.

Mr. HUSTING. The claim is made that the slowest boat fighting in that battle was faster than any boat we have in the American Navy.

Mr. THOMAS. It may be. I will not pretend to pass on that subject. I freely admit that there are deficiencies in our Navy. Among them is the absence of battle cruisers and transports, which, as the Senator from New Hampshire suggests, we ought to provide for, and which I doubt not we will provide for.

The testimony of Admiral Badger is short and is negative, but valuable. He says:

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Well, I wanted to get your views about that, because I do not like to hear Americans running around and talking about the German Navy being superior to ours. I know it is not so.

Admiral BADGER. You have not heard me say that.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. No; and I am glad that is so. I hope you never will say it, because there is not any truth in it.

Mr. President, the disparagements of our existing Navy are not confined to naval officers. If the statements of some high in authority are to be accepted, but which I question, we have fallen from what was second to what is now fourth place. If this is so, the change has occurred since December, 1914. I am unable to credit the possibility except upon the theory that some of our boats have been retired or that our naval force has fallen off, and, as far as I have been able to follow the testimony before the Committee on Naval Affairs, neither of these things can be said to have occurred. I affirm that the American Navy is competent and is prepared to confront any hostile expeditionary force that may threaten us, and that its development should proceed normally and wholly free from the hysterical and unpatriotic disparagements which self-seeking leagues and associations are circulating about it.

Now, a word as to our coast defenses. The charge has been reiterated that any respectable fleet with hostile designs, under present conditions, could invade our coast, which is practically defenseless, and capture or destroy our large cities, levy tribute upon their citizens, ravish their women, and inflict the greatest calamity upon the Nation that it has ever encountered; and this because we have failed to make due provision for their protection by a proper system of coast defense. Gen. Weaver is at the head of our coast defenses and has been for a great many years. He is a very competent, a very capable, and a thoroughly experienced officer. I asked him and he answered the following questions before our committee upon that subject:

Senator THOMAS. I would like to ask you before you leave us how our coast defenses, as constructed at the present time, compare with the coast defenses of other nations?

Gen. WEAVER. I think there is no question, Senator, that our coast defenses are superior to those of any other nation, so far as the material is concerned. There is no question about it whatever. The only element, in my opinion, that makes them inadequate now is the shortage of personnel.

Senator THOMAS. You have got the guns, but not the men behind them?

Gen. WEAVER. That is the point, exactly.

Senator THOMAS. Well, I think you ought to have them.

Gen. WEAVER. I will say this, so that I may not be misunderstood: The evolution of gunfire on board warships has developed a type of ordnance that was not contemplated when our fortifications and our guns were mounted, and therefore it is possible at the present time for an enemy's ships to come up and take position beyond the range of our guns and fire at us without our being able to reach them in reply.

Senator THOMAS. You mean changes in trajectory?

Gen. WEAVER. I am going to come to that; so as to make it clear. There are certain places, like the Rockaway Beach and at San Francisco, where it is necessary for us to provide additional fortifications to defend cities. In order to meet the attack of this new naval ordnance against the forts themselves we have a number of surplus 12-inch guns which were intended to replace those guns which are

now mounted in our fortifications; but with the advance of ordnance it is desirable now to substitute a larger caliber and a more powerful gun. Since, however, these 12-inch guns are in existence, it is proposed to take them and to mount them on carriages that will admit of firing them under high angles of elevation, giving a range that is superior to that of any range that can be brought against us. While the projectile is only 12 inches in diameter, and therefore not as large as that of the projectiles of the 15-inch guns mounted on ships of the *Queen Elizabeth* type, still our range will be greater, and with our superior range-finding equipment ashore our fire will be more accurate, and we can contend with advantage against any naval fire that may come against us.

There is the language of the chief of our coast fortifications.

Mr. SHAFROTH. Will the Senator state when that testimony was given?

Mr. THOMAS. It was given the first of the present month or the latter part of February, before the Committee on Military Affairs.

Mr. President, it is true that the equipment in men for our coast defenses is and has been deficient, but with a proper complement of men to man our coast fortifications, there is no more danger of hostile incursions resulting in the wreckage and plunder of any of our great coast cities than there is of a similar catastrophe through an assault by the Swiss fleet upon the fortifications of the city of Denver.

Mr. PHELAN. Will the Senator permit me?

Mr. THOMAS. With pleasure.

Mr. PHELAN. Does the Senator assume that an enemy would seek out the fortified places upon our coasts or make a landing where there was no preparedness against attack?

Mr. THOMAS. I am sorry that the Senator did not do me the honor to attend during the course of my previous remarks upon that subject; and inasmuch as I have spoken now longer than I intended and still have a few things to say, I shall have to refer the Senator to the record of my speech.

Mr. PHELAN. I shall take great pleasure in reading the report of it.

Mr. THOMAS. I may say to the Senator, however, if there is any place that is not either fortified or protected with sea mines or susceptible of swift protection with sea mines and submarines that is entitled to the name of a harbor, I do not know where it is. If the Senator thinks it is possible for any large expeditions to disembark anywhere except at a harbor—an assumption which is freely made these days—I feel reasonably sure that if he will do me the honor to read what I have said on the subject, he will at least be partially reassured.

Mr. McCUMBER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Colorado yield to the Senator from North Dakota?

Mr. THOMAS. I yield.

Mr. McCUMBER. The Senator might carry his conclusions a little further than he has done so far. Suppose the shells from one of these battleships should strike one of our defense fortresses, could it have much more effect than merely dislodging the guns?

Mr. THOMAS. Upon the assumption of the correctness of Gen. Weaver's statement—and I think it is entitled to absolute credence—it is inconceivable that it would have a greater effect than that.

Mr. McCUMBER. Suppose that one of the projectiles from our land batteries should strike a warship, what chance would it have of existing after being struck fully and fairly?

Mr. THOMAS. Up to this time the experience of the past has demonstrated that a battleship is more dangerous to its own crew than to the crew of the enemy ships. In other words, more lives have been lost by internal battleship explosions and other accidents than by the destructive forces of an enemy; and there can be no question, owing to the character of the construction, that such a catastrophe as the Senator suggests would result in the annihilation of the ship.

Mr. McCUMBER. Then is it not almost certain that no commander of a battleship would ever engage his ship in a duel of that character?

Mr. THOMAS. Well, if he did he would have to be extraordinarily successful in order to escape a court-martial.

Mr. President, it is a well-known fact that in the accumulation of sea mines and facilities for strewing them, as well as in the matter of submarine construction, we have been making great progress since this war began, and doubtless we shall make much greater progress. I think a commander who would approach within the range of sea mines and possible submarines would be more hazardous and more foolhardy than would be the commander who would make such an attack as the Senator from North Dakota suggested.

Mr. President, our Army is admittedly small. Such has been the policy of our people from the inception of the Government. It is effective, in my judgment, to the extent that in the wisdom of Congress it has been permitted to expand. What we have on

land and on sea has, however, cost the people of this country during the last 15 years more than \$3,500,000,000. Our naval expenditures during that period of time have exceeded those of any other nation in the world, with the single exception of Great Britain.

I have a table showing the naval appropriations of the principal powers from 1900 to 1914 which I will ask leave to insert at this time in connection with my remarks without reading.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, that will be done.

The table referred to is as follows:

Naval appropriations of the principal powers from 1900 to 1914, inclusive.

Fiscal year.	Great Britain, Apr. 1-Mar. 31.	United States, July 1-June 30.	Germany, April to March.	France, January to December.
1900-1901	\$145,792,850	\$61,721,695	\$37,173,074	\$72,683,183
1901-2	150,569,190	68,438,301	46,315,803	67,079,011
1902-3	150,679,328	82,977,641	48,818,700	59,217,553
1903-4	173,548,053	104,126,192	50,544,003	59,740,222
1904-5	179,138,049	116,655,826	49,110,300	60,178,623
1905-6	161,117,947	109,725,059	54,918,000	61,565,779
1906-7	152,054,342	98,392,144	58,344,300	59,514,293
1907-8	151,880,617	117,333,474	69,133,500	60,685,813
1908-9	156,401,161	120,421,409	80,737,626	62,194,916
1909-10	181,936,341	122,247,363	95,047,820	64,899,589
1910-11	202,056,258	111,791,980	103,302,773	74,102,433
1911-12	211,596,295	133,559,071	107,178,489	80,371,102
1912-13	224,443,296	129,787,233	109,989,096	81,692,832
1913-14	237,530,459	136,858,301	112,091,125	90,164,623
1914-15	260,714,275	141,872,786	113,993,329	123,828,872

Fiscal year.	Russia, January-December.	Italy, July 1-June 30.	Japan, April-March.	Total.
1900-1	\$42,101,212	\$23,820,206	\$21,373,954	\$423,140,250
1901-2	45,488,462	23,875,532	23,522,400	433,639,620
1902-3	50,769,465	23,522,400	17,654,528	489,053,046
1903-4	60,018,895	23,522,400	17,553,279	489,053,046
1904-5	58,076,543	24,300,000	10,018,024	497,477,385
1905-6	60,228,444	24,494,400	11,378,202	483,427,831
1906-7	60,703,557	25,865,663	30,072,061	485,846,363
1907-8	43,012,166	27,516,451	35,124,346	504,706,370
1908-9	49,682,482	30,453,697	39,347,332	539,228,793
1909-10	58,059,043	31,812,885	35,005,719	589,008,759
1910-11	46,520,465	40,595,204	36,889,158	615,253,277
1911-12	56,680,915	40,780,987	42,944,329	673,111,187
1912-13	82,019,633	41,893,420	46,510,216	716,335,726
1913-14	117,508,657	49,550,147	48,105,152	791,808,463
1914-15	128,954,733	56,920,440	69,111,653	895,396,083

Mr. THOMAS. I am not prepared to admit that all this money has been squandered. Some of those who so contend libel preceding administrations. Of course, their zeal for fat contracts makes that an easy albeit a most disreputable task. That there have been expenditures which were not warranted by a strictly scientific military and naval program no one can doubt. On the other hand, I take pride as an American in asserting that to the extent to which the law has authorized a military organization ours is as good as any other in the world, and to the extent to which we have provided for naval construction we have produced a Navy which, with the exception of deficiencies in transports and battle cruisers, is equal to-day, if not superior, to every navy that is afloat, with the single exception, of course, of that of Great Britain.

We should not forget, Mr. President, that during the past 25 years about 71 cents of every dollar that has come into the Treasury of the United States has been expended upon wars fought and wars expected. This is \$71 out of every \$100 of revenue. Of course, I include payments for pensions and interest on the public debt in the statement.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Colorado yield to the Senator from Oregon?

Mr. THOMAS. Certainly.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I think it might be well for the Senator to state in this connection that a large proportion of that money has been spent simply because we had not an Army. Take the very large pension appropriation that is made every year. If there had been a proper military policy in vogue at the time the Civil War broke out, that pension appropriation would have been very much diminished, because the 90-day men, and even those serving a shorter enlistment, receive the same pension as men who practically served during the war.

Mr. THOMAS. I have no doubt that is true. I am not criticizing the expenditure; I am merely stating what I understand to be the fact.

Mr. NORRIS. In connection with what the Senator from Oregon has said, I should like to ask the Senator from Colo-

rado if preparation for preparedness had taken place prior to the Civil War would it not have been true that there would have been preparedness on both sides, so that it would not have made any difference? There would have been as much preparedness on one side as the other.

Mr. THOMAS. I can not say as to that. I have not the time either to analyze or to criticize these expenditures. The subject was first called to national attention by Representative Tawney, who at the time was chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations. It was to me a startling fact, and I have heard it reemphasized by competent authorities a number of times since. I use it in this connection for the purpose of calling attention to the fact that we have paid well for what we have gotten, and that we are now about to embark upon a policy where these expenditures will be increased. So I would not be at all surprised if hereafter 80 or 85 cents of every dollar will be used for military or naval purposes. And if we yield to the clamor of militarism our martial establishments will exhaust our total revenues, however large.

Mr. WARREN. Mr. President—

Mr. THOMAS. I yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. WARREN. The statement made by the Senator from Colorado that 71 per cent has been expended for military and naval purposes has been made before, or rather it has been stated at 70 per cent. As the Senator has stated it, and the first time I ever heard it, it was stated by a former Representative from the Northwest, at that time the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations. I questioned that statement then, and I looked over the estimates and expenses. I am prepared to say that investigation will not prove that that percentage is correct or nearly so.

Among other things, at that time the pension list was very large. Among other things figured in were the salaries of the great number of officers engaged in river and harbor improvements, going on to improve the rivers and lakes and deepen the channels at cities and other points. That was all charged in this computation. Of course we require deep water in certain places for warships, but no one claims that all that is chargeable to military expenditure, because it is for the commerce of the country. There were included a very great number of items and expenses through or by so-called Army appropriations. That was entirely and altogether apart from Army or war support.

There were many other things added, and the alleged percentage, I will state to the Senator, was claimed to be as he has stated. It was questioned by me and by a great many others who have given it some attention. It falls far short of 71 per cent.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President—

Mr. THOMAS. I yield.

Mr. NORRIS. In this same connection, I should like to say to the Senator that when that statement was made by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the House, I myself had a computation made by the clerk of the Committee on Appropriations and the item suggested by the Senator from Wyoming was not included. Nothing was included for rivers and harbors. As I remember it now, and I am speaking only from memory, I think that the percentage was 68. It included fortifications; it included the Navy; it included everything, I think, that could be properly chargeable to the past wars or to future preparation for war, but nothing like river and harbor improvements were included.

Mr. WARREN. The Senator does not doubt my statement?

Mr. NORRIS. I have not doubted what the Senator said.

Mr. WARREN. The Senator stated that he made it but 68 per cent. The statement I figured on, of Mr. Tawney's, was 70 per cent. I say, in making that, they did include such items as I mentioned. They may not have been included in the statement of the Senator.

Mr. NORRIS. I have not denied that. I simply wanted to interject here what I believe to be the real statement upon which a proper percentage could be based. I did not want the impression to go out that in the right kind of an estimate river and harbor improvements were included. I do not know anything about what the Senator from Wyoming included. I know what I used in the computation I made, and I know what the result was.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I should like to say in this connection that the leader of the majority party of the other House, Mr. KIRCHIN, recently issued a statement in which he estimated our expenditures for military purposes—past, present, and prospective—at 60 per cent of our entire revenue. The proportion in Germany, I think, was 55 per cent; in Japan, 45 per cent; in France, 35 per cent; and in Great Britain, 37 per cent, as I recall it, the ratio of this country being larger than

that of any other country, military or nonmilitary, in the entire world. These estimates were based on expenditures prior to the outbreak of the present war.

Mr. THOMAS. The percentage which I gave may not have been precisely that announced by Mr. Tawney; the entire statement may not stand the test of investigation, but to my mind it is a remarkable fact that a statement coming from such a high source so many years ago, if untrue, should not have been exposed, or at least publicly challenged, long ago. I mention it in connection with the subject of the items of expenses which any new departure upon military and naval lines will necessarily require, and also because these things are apt to grow by what they feed on. In fact, the proposition of large preparedness—militarism, if I may so speak—is very much more extensive now than it was when the subject began to receive the serious consideration of the public.

Mr. WARREN. There has been a large portion of the expense of the National Government in military affairs, and probably always will be with all nations. In fact, most of the expenses of government in this country are carried on by the several States, and there is not so much left for the United States Government except the matter of fortifications and military defenses. In the last decade or two we have had to put in all the fortifications that we have, either new or rebuilt. The Senator will remember that we laid out the work expected to the extent of \$100,000,000 succeeding the war, and yet twice as much more has been necessary in constructing fortifications where none existed before or where imperfect ones only existed. It was the same with the Navy. We had no Navy of consequence for many years, so that the expenditures have been larger of later years along that line.

Then came the Spanish War and the increase of our forces. Then came the buildings, the difference between housing 25,000 men and 100,000 men. So the expenditures have been larger of late years than they proportionately would be over a long period, and they may have been larger than they will be in the future. That they have been larger than they will be in the future I doubt, because from the remarks made by the Senator, which he so well put, we will feel it necessary to increase our fortifications perhaps and to increase our mobile Army, and perhaps increase our Navy; but, as I said before, we must remember that that is bound to be the main expense of the United States Government as a Government.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I must again say that I am neither criticizing nor complaining of the fact, if it be a fact, which I have been stating. I am trying to point a moral, if not to adorn a tale, to emphasize the fact that these expenditures are apt to permanently increase by the increasing demand for first one and then another enlargement of our military or our naval equipment. I think this is illustrated very well by a comment of the New York World upon the proposed establishment of a small army in the Canal Zone. The editorial is entitled "Round and round," and it was prompted by the assertion that an army of 25,000 men was needed for the purpose of protecting our fortifications there against a land attack. I read the editorial. It is very short:

ROUND AND ROUND.

The building of the Panama Canal by the United States was advocated on the ground that it would double the strength of the Navy.

The canal was only about half built when the experts found that it must be heavily fortified to protect the Navy in protecting it.

The canal has now been fortified with what Gen. Edwards, military governor of the Canal Zone, calls the biggest guns and finest gun emplacements in the world. But these might be seized by an enemy operating from the land side, and therefore need the protection of an army of 25,000 men on the spot all the time.

Where is this chain of successive and "essential" dependences to reach an end? If the canal must have a strong Navy to protect it, and if the strong Navy must have big canal fortifications to protect the Navy in protecting the canal, and if the big fortifications must have a sizable Army to protect the fortifications in protecting the Navy in protecting the canal, who or what is to protect the sizable Army in protecting the fortifications in protecting the Navy in protecting the canal?

There is a "round robin" of expenditures which, if we once begin a policy of military and naval equipment based upon fear and apprehension, will exhaust our revenues much more than the 71 per cent to which I directed the attention of the Senate.

Mr. WARREN. I do not wish to delay the remarks of the Senator, but I think he will agree with me that quite a large percentage of the so-called military expense is that which ought not to be properly charged to actual military expense, for instance, the Panama Canal. The Senator may remember what proportion was charged to the War Department in respect to the canal. There was the cleaning up of Habana, the work of putting in an expensive road system in Cuba and Alaska, and putting in the telegraph system there. All of it has been put in by the Army, and such work is being done practically all over

the country. Where officers are in charge of that work it is charged to the Military Establishment.

Let me at this point submit a partial list of many things charged up as military, which, as a matter of fact, are in nowise expenses properly chargeable to military:

Sanitary work at Habana, Cuba—doing away with yellow fever.

Payment of annuities to an enlisted man, and the widows of certain medical officers who sacrificed themselves to the yellow-fever experiments.

Sanitary work in Panama Republic outside of Canal Zone. Work of medical officers with American National Red Cross. Furnishing of subsistence, clothing, tentage, blankets, and so forth, from quartermaster supplies of Army to sufferers and refugees from various earthquakes, floods, and fires.

Raising the *Maine*. (While this followed and was incident to war, the work and expense were incurred not only for sentimental reasons, but for the safety of commerce in Habana Harbor.)

Furnishing of transportation, subsistence, and medical supplies of Army for relief of destitute American citizens in Mexico, including transportation to their homes in the United States.

Extensive reclamation work in China, by officer of Corps of Engineers, Army, for the prevention of floods and resultant famines in China.

Employment of officers, employees, vessels, and supplies of Military and Naval Establishments for relief, protection, and transportation of American citizens in Europe during the existing political disturbance there.

Care and maintenance of lepers and special patients in Guam and Culion, P. I.

Instructing the youth of the country at various universities and colleges, and instructing students at the two United States academies in nonmilitary subjects.

Assisting in the civil government of the Philippines.

Employment as Indian agents and superintendents.

Employment on California Debris Commission, and various other nonmilitary commissions.

Employment in rivers and harbors work.

Employment in construction of Panama Canal.

Investigating proposed sites for Government reclamation projects.

Employment as engineer commissioner of District of Columbia.

Building military and post roads, bridges, and trails in Alaska. Building telegraph and telephone lines in Alaska, for commercial purposes, which have earned hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Employment of engineer officer for service in connection with the location and construction of the Alaskan Railroad.

Building and maintaining roads, bridges, and so forth, in the parks of the District of Columbia, for the use and pleasure of the people.

Employment as superintendent of public buildings and grounds in and around Washington.

Employment of Army engineers in connection with maintenance and improvement of roads, bridges, culverts, and so forth, in various national parks both in and out of the District of Columbia.

Preservation and purchase of specimens for the Army Medical Museum and Library, used for educational purposes by civilian physicians and others.

Building of Washington Monument.

Building of Cabin John Bridge.

Reclamation and development of Anacostia River and flats, under supervision of Chief of Engineers of the Army.

Maintenance and care of national cemeteries, containing bodies of many persons (widows and others) who performed no military service for the country; and furnishing headstones for unmarked graves of civilians in military post cemeteries.

Participation of officers and men of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps in various international and other expositions of commercial nature.

Mr. SHAFROTH. I should like to ask the Senator from Wyoming a question.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Colorado yield to his colleague?

Mr. THOMAS. Certainly.

Mr. SHAFROTH. The Senator from Wyoming has been upon the Committee on Military Affairs for many years, and I should like to have his estimate as to the proportion of expenditures for preparation for war and for past wars as compared with the total expenditures of the Government.

Mr. WARREN. Well, in my opinion, the miscellaneous matters are really not properly chargeable to war expenditures,

and they would reduce the percentage which the Senator has stated from 12 to 15 per cent or more.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Let me answer the Senator.

Mr. SHAFROTH. So that it would be 55 per cent.

Mr. WARREN. I think it would be possibly 50 per cent. I think it will be more than that in the future if we provide a sufficient Army. We might as well meet these questions fairly and squarely.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, in answer to the Senator, I will say that I have before me a copy of the statement that has been prepared by the clerk of the Appropriations Committee, showing the appropriations for the fiscal years from 1875 to 1916, inclusive, for each of the services, for each of the departments—and I assume that he has correctly prepared it—showing that, as a basis, I will say to the Senator, that in round numbers the appropriations for 1916 were \$421,000,000 for the Army and Navy for fortifications and for pensions, and \$164,000,000 of that sum, in round numbers, was for pensions, leaving \$257,000,000 that was properly expendable for the Army out of a total appropriation of \$991,000,000, in round numbers. This tabulated statement gives the appropriations for all of these years. So, if this be true, the proportion is very much less. It is not 50 per cent.

Mr. WARREN. Undoubtedly that is true, and I am allowing for pensions and all that may be charged, though some of them are really not properly chargeable.

Mr. SHAFROTH. I ask the Senator whether that nine hundred and some odd million dollars of total revenues includes the postal receipts?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. This is just an itemized statement of appropriations; it does not give the items of receipts.

Mr. SHAFROTH. Does it include appropriations for the Postal Service?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. It includes everything. It includes the Agricultural Department, the Army, the Diplomatic and Consular Service, the District of Columbia, fortifications, the Indian Service, the legislative appropriations, the Military Academy, the Navy, pensions, including deficiencies, the Post Office Department, rivers and harbors, and sundry civil appropriations.

Mr. SHAFROTH. The Post Office Department, supposing it to be self-supporting, is usually not put in as a governmental expenditure.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Colorado yield to the Senator from Utah?

Mr. THOMAS. I yield.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Mr. President, it seems to me that all of these comparisons of the proportion of our revenue which is spent for military purposes are, to a certain extent at least, very misleading. The Senator from Oklahoma a moment ago stated that we were spending a very much larger proportion of our revenue for military purposes than was England or Japan or France.

Mr. GALLINGER. Or Germany.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. I speak of those three. I do not need to remind the Senator from Colorado of it, because he recognizes that those Governments are altogether different from ours. They have, unless for purely local purposes, but a single budget. Out of their revenues all of the general expenses of government must be met, while in the United States we have a dual form of government. If we were to institute a fair comparison, we should ascertain what proportion of all the public revenues of the National Government and of the State governments are spent for military preparation. If we should do that, we would find that the proportion of our expenditures for military purposes would fall far below what is expended in these other countries.

The Federal Government has limited functions. Most of the affairs of government are carried on by the States. Schools are maintained, roads are built and kept in operation, and the hundred and one functions of domestic government are carried on by the individual States instead of by the General Government, while in the case of England, in the case of France, and in the case of Japan there is a single treasury from which the general expenditures must be made.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I still decline to be beguiled into a criticism or a discussion or an analysis of the statement which I made, the authority for which I have given. I am aware that the subject is one of importance, but I simply mentioned it, almost in passing from one subject to another, and because I thought, and still think, that it has some bearing upon the relation of expenditures to our proposed new military and naval organizations.

I regard the matter of expenditure as second in importance to no other feature of our program. It is true that the distinguished ex-President of the United States dismisses the subject with the flippant remark that it is of only secondary consideration; but we have to raise the money and therefore it is well to understand that the proposed extension, although insignificant in the eyes of the average militarist, will impose upon the taxpaying people of this country an additional expense of not less than \$150,000,000 to \$250,000,000 a year to begin with; and those of us who are responsible, as representing the administration, for the raising of this revenue must necessarily consider it in conjunction with the question of necessity as contrasted with the question of the expediency of our action upon these mighty subjects of present importance.

Mr. President, I believe I have established the proposition that the menace of a foreign invasion, the existence of an impending peril of tremendous dimensions just across the eastern horizon and threatening us with devastation, compared with which that of the Goths and Vandals of other times was as nothing, simply exists as an asset in the skillful hands of those whose purposes are more largely material than patriotic. But there are reasons, perfectly cogent ones, why this country should rearrange and strengthen its military and naval organizations.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Colorado yield to the Senator from New Hampshire?

Mr. THOMAS. I yield.

Mr. GALLINGER. In that connection, I will ask the Senator from Colorado if he has read the statement of Gen. Miles made before the Military Committee only a few days ago?

Mr. THOMAS. I heard it.

Mr. GALLINGER. In that statement Gen. Miles scouts the idea of any nation in the world being able to invade our coasts and to defeat our armies on American soil.

I will say, before I proceed further, that I propose to follow the Committee on Military Affairs, so far as I can, in the bill that they have with such great care prepared. I am neither an alarmist nor a pacifist. I think we ought to have adequate preparedness, so called; but if Gen. Miles is at all correct in his testimony we need not be unduly alarmed over the possibility of our coasts being invaded by a hostile fleet or a hostile army.

If the Senator from Colorado will permit me, I should like to read just a few words from what Gen. Miles said.

Mr. THOMAS. I have no objection to the Senator doing so.

Mr. GALLINGER. Gen. Miles was asked by the Senator from Florida [Mr. FLETCHER]:

GEN. MILES ON THE DANGER OF INVASION.

Senator FLETCHER. General, perhaps you would not want to express any opinion about it, but, frankly, it seemed to me rather far-fetched and absurd that it was a feasible thing for an army to be transported across the ocean and landed on Rockaway Beach, or Block Island, in such way that it could take that portion of the country and then come on down and string a 400-mile line from Chesapeake Bay to Lake Ontario. That is one of the important dangers, apparently, in the minds of some people. I would like to get your views about that, if you care to express them.

Gen. MILES. I dislike to give my views on that, as I consider it an unreasonable and impossible proposition. * * * The placing of an army on American soil is the last thing any European Government would attempt; it could never be reembarked. It would dissolve like snow beneath the midday sun. Whenever it has been attempted it has resulted in disaster.

Senator FLETCHER. It would be impossible for the enemy's ships to carry coal enough to bring them over here and take them back, would it not?

Gen. MILES. If the enemy could not be destroyed by the patriotism and valor of the American people before they could send their ships back and get another load, then I would want to live in some other country.

And a note on this slip which I hold—I admit it has been issued by an antimilitary organization—is very impressive to me. It says:

At the outbreak of the war it took Great Britain, with full control of the seas, 33 days to transport 30,000 men, without equipment, across the Atlantic from Quebec to Southampton.

As I said before, Mr. President, I am for preparedness; but I do not share the apprehensions that I think were in the mind of the Senator from California when he asked the question a little while ago as to whether or not we could repel an army if it should come across the ocean and attack our forts and our seacoasts. I apprehend that, while such an army was coming here, if it took Great Britain 33 days to send 30,000 men across the ocean to reinforce the British Army in the European war, we would be pretty well prepared to meet an army before it invaded our territory. We would have our submarines, if we are wise enough to build some; we would have our mines; we would have our battleships; we would have made all our preparations to give them a warm welcome as they approached our coast. I think probably we would be able to protect ourselves from an invasion of that kind.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Colorado yield to the Senator from Connecticut?

Mr. THOMAS. I am becoming somewhat weary, and I had no intention when I took the floor this morning of occupying it for so long a time. I have comparatively little more to say, and while I always welcome interruptions I want to get through sometime. However, I yield to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I simply wish to say with reference to the statement just read by the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. GALLINGER] that I have seen it stated in print, which is of equal authority with the print which the Senator read from, that the reason it took Great Britain 33 days to move those troops to which he referred was that the troops were not ready to move before that time, and not because the authorities were embarrassed about facilities for moving them.

Mr. THOMAS. Another reason was that the ships were not ready, as they never are ready in emergencies such as are assumed to confront us at the present time.

Mr. President, I believe that we should have a good Army and a good Navy, including coast defenses. I believe that we should utilize the present occasion to begin, I will not say a new, but a more extended and well-reasoned policy with regard to these great subjects. The reasons why we should do so seem to me to be obvious. But one of them may be said to be the outgrowth of the great war in Europe.

These reasons appeal to me as being, first, that we are a great commercial Nation; that commerce we propose to expand until it again reaches every quarter of the globe. Commerce breeds differences—that of one nation can increase only at the expense of another. I think that in its final analysis the prime cause of the existing conflict will find its roots in commercial sources and commercial conflicts. With the expansion and extension of our commerce we must have a Navy sufficiently powerful to protect the rights of our citizens and establish justice for every interest which pertains to America and Americans.

We are, moreover, through the announcement of the Monroe doctrine, the guardian of the Western Hemisphere, and that guardianship, Mr. President, has been extended in many directions, some of which never could have been foreseen by those who enunciated that doctrine. It has been necessary for us to take control of the financial affairs of some of the weaker powers upon this continent, to assume some influence in their general policies everywhere, and, as time advances, these obligations will doubtless increase and conditions will present themselves which will make it necessary either that we recede from or insist upon a more active recognition of this doctrine; indeed, I think it is safe to say that, but for the outbreak of the war, that contingency would have arisen before now. The public possesses the information which leads me to make that statement and I need not enlarge upon it.

Moreover, we have insular possessions which must be safeguarded. Those outlying possessions would be the first to feel the effect of foreign conflict or foreign aggression. In order to reach them, and reach them speedily if necessary, we must have a navy powerful in its structure and in its equipment, and a land force sufficiently formidable to accompany, for purposes of defense, any naval excursion made necessary for the protection of any of our insular possessions.

Moreover, Mr. President, overpopulated nations must find an outlet somewhere. Some of the nations of the earth are to-day overcrowded, with no sign of a diminution of the ever-increasing number of their inhabitants. They necessarily burst their bonds in obedience to an inexorable law of natural expansion, and if these outlets are directed toward the Western Hemisphere they must be either prevented or controlled by the Government of the United States.

Mr. President, there is no question that every nation in the world is to a greater or less degree involved in the conflict now raging in Europe and Asia. Neutrality is in some respects an abstract term. So great a conflict as this, with its ramifications extended in every direction, necessarily comes in contact with, if, indeed, it does not frequently overlap, the rights and interests of neutral nations. Ours is the only great power not directly involved in the conflict, and it may be that in a week, in a day, possibly in an hour, some crisis may overtake us which may make it absolutely necessary to go beyond the point where we can find safety with honor in maintaining peaceful international relations. God grant that such a time as that and such a crisis may never come; but that nation is indeed indifferent which, in view of the experiences of the last 14 months, does not perceive the possibilities which make preparation to a certain degree an inevitable and predominant duty.

So, Mr. President, while the propaganda of universal preparation may well be regarded as a call to the trough instead of a

call to the trenches, the sober, reflective judgment of the people of this country overwhelmingly approves of the intention of the Sixty-fourth Congress, without regard to party or to personal differences as to details, to meet and recognize and perform this duty, and perform it with such expedition as its importance justifies.

I regret, Mr. President, that the many so-called defense societies, journals, associations, and other institutions which have been holding meetings, listening to frenzied speeches, and passing resolutions denouncing and instructing us, proclaiming our dire needs and more dire helplessness, have none of them suggested a method of raising the revenue needed for their purposes. We have been told that our Atlantic and Pacific coasts were exposed and defenseless; we have been told that we needed a Navy equal to that of the greatest navy afloat, and that our Army should be swelled to millions of active, militant soldiers; and yet, so far as I can remember, not one of these associations or leagues, not one of these conventions, has given the slightest consideration to the financial side of the problem, or if they have they have kept their views to themselves, leaving us to flounder along as best we may. This is a part of the problem also, Mr. President, which this Congress must determine and, unfortunately, must rely upon its own views as to details because of the absence of any outside suggestions.

Economy should be practiced by the Nation, but, unfortunately, I see no signs of it on either side of this or the other Chamber. If there is any tendency toward the reduction of expenditures in any direction, I should be very glad if some Senator would interrupt me and point it out. If there has been any diminution in the appropriations either for necessary objects or for matters which might well be left to a more propitious time, I have been unable to perceive it. Mr. President, this lack of economic forethought is due not so much, in my judgment, to the good intent of Senators and Representatives as it is to the insistent demands of their several constituencies. The man who preaches and attempts to practice economy in public life is disliked by his associates, but it is equally true that if he attempts to put his purposes into effective operation he must look for repudiation by those whom he represents.

The amount of added revenue which we are obliged, therefore, to raise must be taken in connection with the certain fact that there will be no corresponding reduction of public expenditures; in other words, we are going right ahead, every department of Government in full blast, and every possible appropriation to be made just as heretofore. The raising of millions of dollars necessary to meet these urgent additional needs which can not be postponed or disregarded will, I regret to say, be accompanied by no reductions in the public expenditures.

For one, Mr. President, I am prepared to take my share of the responsibility. I stated at the outset that I had no sympathy with the extremists, however conscientious and sincere, upon this question, whether it be in the direction of military preparedness or no preparedness at all. I love peace, Mr. President, as dearly as any man on earth. In my earlier years I had some bitter experiences with war, and I know full well its horrors and its consequences; but I am not vain enough, Mr. President, to believe that human nature will ever so change that "wars and rumors of wars" will cease to ebb and flow with the tides of civilization. We can only strive to make our wars, if wars there are to be, just and unavoidable ones. Let us avoid them, if this is consistent with duty and with honor, with the maintenance of our national self-respect and our obligations to mankind. Such wars are frightful and horrible to contemplate. But, Mr. President, such wars have their compensation in the spiritual values which spread from them like a benediction. Who can estimate the far-reaching, the priceless spiritual values of the War between the States to this Nation? It is beyond all estimate. It has consecrated the North and the South to the destiny of a single people; it shines through eyes that are filled with tears of suffering and of sacrifice, and clusters around battle flags scarred and grimed with conflict; it rises from the grave of every soldier and lifts us into an atmosphere redolent with the aroma of nationalism. Its memories are as sacred as they are precious. It is worth all that it cost our people, and will ever give courage to those who may falter in their guardianship of justice and of liberty. Our Nation is dedicated to the rights of man, to the arts of peace, and to the regeneration of the world. Our example should be commensurate with our ideals; but, Mr. President, until all the nations shall reach this high plane of lofty purpose peace may fly on frightened wings to other lands and we may become involved in war's deadly circuit. We must therefore shape our policies and make our preparations as the experiences of the past demand,

not for conquest, nor yet for glory, but that our loins may be girded for whatever ordeal the future may provide for us.

I shall support this bill, Mr. President, in the main. I feel sure it will have in its favor the preponderance of public sentiment and that in its practical operation it will give general satisfaction.

APPENDIX.

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA.

[By Alexis de Tocqueville.]

(Vol. 2, chap. 22.)

WHY DEMOCRATIC NATIONS ARE NATURALLY DESIROUS OF PEACE AND DEMOCRATIC ARMIES OF WAR.

The same interests, the same fears, the same passions which deter democratic nations from revolutions deter them also from war; the spirit of military glory and the spirit of revolution are weakened at the same time and by the same causes. The ever-increasing numbers of men of property—lovers of peace, the growth of personal wealth which war so rapidly consumes, the mildness of manners, the gentleness of heart, those tendencies to pity which are engendered by the equality of conditions, that coolness of understanding which renders men comparatively insensible to the violent and poetical excitement of arms, all these causes concur to quench the military spirit. I think it may be admitted as a general and constant rule that amongst civilized nations the warlike passions will become more rare and less intense in proportion as social conditions shall be more equal. War is nevertheless an occurrence to which all nations are subject, democratic nations as well as others. Whatever taste they may have for peace they must hold themselves in readiness to repel aggression, or, in other words, they must have an army.

Fortune, which has conferred so many peculiar benefits upon the inhabitants of the United States, has placed them in the midst of a wilderness where they have, so to speak, no neighbors; a few thousand soldiers are sufficient for their wants; but this is peculiar to America, not to democracy. The equality of conditions and the manners, as well as the institutions resulting from it, do not exempt a democratic people from the necessity of standing armies; and their armies always exercise a powerful influence over their fate. It is therefore of singular importance to inquire what are the natural propensities of the men of whom these armies are composed.

Amongst aristocratic nations, especially amongst those in which birth is the only source of rank, the same inequality exists in the army as in the nation; the officer is noble, the soldier is a serf; the one is naturally called upon to command, the other to obey. In aristocratic armies the private soldier's ambition is therefore circumscribed within very narrow limits. Nor has the ambition of the officer an unlimited range. An aristocratic body not only forms a part of the scale of ranks in the nation, but it contains a scale of ranks within itself; the members of whom it is composed are placed one above another in a particular and unvarying manner. Thus one man is born to the command of a regiment, another to that of a company; when once they have reached the utmost object of their hopes they stop of their own accord and remain contented with their lot. There is, besides, a strong cause, which in aristocracies weakens the officer's desire of promotion. Amongst aristocratic nations an officer, independently of his rank in the army, also occupies an elevated rank in society; the former is almost always in his eyes only an appendage to the latter. A nobleman who embraces the profession of arms follows it less from motives of ambition than from a sense of the duties imposed on him by his birth. He enters the army in order to find an honorable employment for the idle years of his youth, and to be able to bring back to his home and his peers some honorable recollections of military life, but his principal object is not to obtain by that profession either property, distinction, or power, for he possesses these advantages in his own right and enjoys them without leaving his home.

In democratic armies all the soldiers may become officers, which makes the desire of promotion general and immeasurably extends the bounds of military ambition. The officer, on his part, sees nothing which naturally and necessarily stops him at one grade more than at another, and each grade has immense importance in his eyes, because his rank in society almost always depends on his rank in the army. Amongst democratic nations it often happens that an officer has no property but his pay and no distinction but that of military honors; consequently as often as his duties change his fortune changes and he becomes, as it were, a new man. What was only an appendage to his position in aristocratic armies has thus become the main point, the basis of his whole condition. Under the old French monarchy officers were always called by their titles of nobility; they are now always called by the title of their military rank. This little change in the forms of language suffices to show that a great revolution has taken place in the constitution of society and in that of the army. In democratic armies the desire of advancement is almost universal; it is ardent, tenacious, perpetual; it is strengthened by all other desires, and only extinguished with life itself. But it is easy to see that of all armies in the world those in which advancement must be slowest in time of peace are the armies of democratic countries. As the number of commissions is naturally limited, whilst the number of competitors is almost unlimited, and as the strict law of equality is over all alike, none can make rapid progress—many can make no progress at all. Thus the desire of advancement is greater and the opportunities of advancement fewer there than elsewhere. All the ambitious spirits of a democratic army are consequently ardently desirous of war, because war makes vacancies and warrants the violation of that law of seniority which is the sole privilege natural to democracy.

We thus arrive at this singular consequence: That of all armies, those most ardently desirous of war are democratic armies, and of all nations, those most fond of peace are democratic nations; and what makes these facts still more extraordinary is that these contrary effects are produced at the same time by the principle of equality.

All the members of the community, being alike, constantly harbor the wish and discover the possibility of changing their condition and improving their welfare; this makes them fond of peace, which is favorable to industry and allows every man to pursue his own little undertakings to their completion. On the other hand, this same equality makes soldiers dream of fields of battle by increasing the value of military honors in the eyes of those who follow the profession of arms and by rendering those honors accessible to all. In either case the inquietude of the heart is the same, the taste for enjoyment is insatiable,

the ambition of success as great; the means of gratifying it are alone different.

These opposite tendencies of the nations and the army expose democratic communities to great dangers. When a military spirit forsakes a people, the profession of arms immediately ceases to be held in honor, and military men fall to the lowest rank of the public servants; they are little esteemed, and no longer understood. The reverse of what takes place in aristocratic ages then occurs; the men who enter the army are no longer those of the highest but of the lowest rank. Military ambition is only indulged in when no other is possible. Hence arises a circle of cause and consequence from which it is difficult to escape; the best part of the nation shuns the military profession because that profession is not honored, and the profession is not honored because the best part of the nation has ceased to follow it. It is, then, no matter of surprise that democratic armies are often restless, ill-tempered, and dissatisfied with their lot, although their physical condition is commonly far better and their discipline less strict than in other countries. The soldier feels that he occupies an inferior position, and his wounded pride either stimulates his taste for hostilities, which would render his services necessary, or gives him a turn for revolutions, during which he may hope to win by force of arms the political influence and personal importance now denied him. The composition of democratic armies makes this last-mentioned danger much to be feared. In democratic communities almost every man has some property to preserve; but democratic armies are generally led by men without property, most of whom have little to lose in civil broils. The bulk of the nation is naturally much more afraid of revolutions than in the ages of aristocracy, but the leaders of the army much less so.

Moreover, as amongst democratic nations (to repeat what I have just remarked) the wealthiest, the best educated, and the most able men seldom adopt the military profession; the army, taken collectively, eventually forms a small nation by itself, where the mind is less enlarged and habits are more rude than in the nation at large. Now, this small, uncivilized nation has arms in its possession, and alone knows how to use them; for, indeed, the pacific temper of the community increases the danger to which a democratic people is exposed from the military and turbulent spirit of the army. Nothing is so dangerous as an army amidst an unwarlike nation; the excessive love of the whole community for quiet continually puts its constitution at the mercy of the soldiery.

It may therefore be asserted, generally speaking, that if democratic nations are naturally prone to peace from their interests and their propensities, they are constantly drawn to war and revolutions by their armies. Military revolutions, which are scarcely ever to be apprehended in aristocracies, are always to be dreaded amongst democratic nations. These perils must be reckoned amongst the most formidable which beset their future fate, and the attention of statesmen should be sedulously applied to find a remedy for the evil.

When a nation perceives that it is inwardly affected by the restless ambition of its army the first thought which occurs is to give this inconvenient ambition an object by going to war. I speak no ill of war; war almost always enlarges the mind of a people and raises their character. In some cases it is the only check to the excessive growth of certain propensities which naturally spring out of the equality of conditions, and it must be considered as a necessary corrective to certain invertebrate diseases to which democratic communities are liable. War has great advantages, but we must not flatter ourselves that it can diminish the danger I have just pointed out. That peril is only suspended by it, to return more fiercely when the war is over, for armies are much more impatient of peace after having tasted military exploits. War could only be a remedy for a people which should always be athirst for military glory. I foresee that all the military rulers who may rise up in great democratic nations will find it easier to conquer with their armies than to make their armies live at peace after conquest. There are two things which a democratic people will always find very difficult—to begin a war and to end it.

Again, if war has some peculiar advantages for democratic nations, on the other hand it exposes them to certain dangers which aristocracies have no cause to dread to an equal extent. I shall only point out two of these. Although war gratifies the army, it embarrasses and often exasperates that countless multitude of men whose minor passions every day require peace in order to be satisfied. Thus there is some risk of its causing under another form the disturbance it is intended to prevent. No protracted war can fail to endanger the freedom of a democratic country. Not, indeed, that after every victory it is to be apprehended that the victorious generals will possess themselves by force of the supreme power, after the manner of Sylla and Cesar; the danger is of another kind. War does not always give over democratic communities to military government, but it must invariably and immeasurably increase the powers of civil government; it must almost compulsorily concentrate the direction of all men and the management of all things in the hands of the administration. If it lead not to despotism by sudden violence, it prepares men for it more gently by their habits. All those who seek to destroy the liberties of a democratic nation ought to know that war is the surest and the shortest means to accomplish it. This is the first axiom of the science.

One remedy, which appears to be obvious when the ambition of soldiers and officers becomes the subject of alarm, is to augment the number of commissions to be distributed by increasing the Army. This affords temporary relief, but it plunges the country into deeper difficulties at some future period. To increase the Army may produce a lasting effect in an aristocratic community, because military ambition is there confined to one class of men, and the ambition of each individual stops, as it were, at a certain limit; so that it may be possible to satisfy all who feel its influence. But nothing is gained by increasing the Army amongst a democratic people, because the number of aspirants always rises in exactly the same ratio as the Army itself. Those whose claims have been satisfied by the creation of new commissions are instantly succeeded by a fresh multitude beyond all power of satisfaction; and even those who were but now satisfied soon begin to crave more advancement; for the same excitement prevails in the ranks of the Army as in the civil classes of democratic society, and what men want is not to reach a certain grade, but to have constant promotion. Though these wants may not be very vast, they are perpetually recurring. Thus a democratic nation, by augmenting its army, only allays for a time the ambition of the military profession, which soon becomes even more formidable, because the number of those who feel it is increased. I am of opinion that a restless and turbulent spirit is an evil inherent in the very constitution of democratic armies and beyond hope of cure. The legislators of democracies must not expect to devise any military organization capable by its influence of calming and restraining the military

profession; their efforts would exhaust their powers before the object is attained.

The remedy for the vices of the Army is not to be found in the Army itself, but in the country. Democratic nations are naturally afraid of disturbance and of despotism; the object is to turn these natural instincts into well-digested, deliberate, and lasting tastes. When men have at last learned to make a peaceful and profitable use of freedom, and have felt its blessings—when they have conceived a manly love of order and have freely submitted themselves to discipline—these same men, if they follow the profession of arms, bring into it, unconsciously and almost against their will, these same habits and manners. The general spirit of the nation being infused into the spirit peculiar to the army, tempers the opinions and desires engendered by military life, or represses them by the mighty force of public opinion. Teach but the citizens to be educated, orderly, firm, and free, the soldiers will be disciplined and obedient. Any law which, in repressing the turbulent spirit of the army, should tend to diminish the spirit of freedom in the nation, and to overshadow the notion of law and right would defeat its object; it would do much more to favor, than to defeat, the establishment of military tyranny.

After all, and in spite of all precautions, a large army amidst a democratic people will always be a source of great danger; the most effectual means of diminishing that danger would be to reduce the army, but this is a remedy which all nations have it not in their power to use.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, yesterday the Senate adopted an order authorizing the printing in parallel columns of House bill 12766 and Senate bill 4840, concerning the national defense. The printing clerk advises me now that it is found impossible to print these bills in parallel columns, for the reason that one section of the House bill, for instance, may be involved in a half dozen sections of the Senate bill and vice versa. It would involve an expense of several hundred dollars, and would not assist the Senate at all if we simply printed the bills in parallel columns, without paralleling the subject matter of each bill, and that is the impossible thing to do. Therefore, unless the Senate objects, I should like to ask that the vote by which the order was made be reconsidered.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the vote is reconsidered, and the order is rescinded.

Mr. CUMMINS. Mr. President, before the pending measure reaches a final vote I hope to have an opportunity to discuss the general subject of preparedness for both war and peace; but at the present moment I intend to direct my observations to the bill itself, with special reference to the amendment which I have offered and which is now pending. It is probable that during the progress of the bill I will offer a number of amendments; but I assure the chairman of the committee who has the bill in charge and all Senators that these amendments will not be presented in a hostile spirit. They will be for the purpose of harmonizing and strengthening the bill, rather than for the purpose of disarranging or weakening it.

The bill reported by the committee divides the armed, organized, active land forces of the United States into three parts or divisions: First, the Regular Army, so called; second, the Volunteer Army, so called—I say "so called," because the word "volunteer" is entirely inappropriate in its use in connection with that particular division, for the entire armed strength of the United States is a volunteer armed strength; third, the National Guard, or, as it might be termed, the Organized Militia of the United States.

I have always been in sympathy with the traditional policy of the American people, which, as I understand it, has been opposed to a large standing army; but I do not find that the force here proposed is in any way inconsistent with the policy to which I have referred when the situation with which we are confronted is taken into account. I intend to favor the increase of the Regular Army to the point provided for in the bill, first, because our relations toward Mexico are in such a state that I think we ought, having that danger in view, to increase the Regular Army as greatly as is here proposed; second, because the increase of something like 80,000 men is to be made in five years, a very limited addition in any one year; and, third—although this is not technically a reason, possibly—because I fear that the entire increase provided for in the Regular Army will not be realized. I fear that it will be impossible to enlist the men necessary for the proposed increase.

Service in the Regular Army is not attractive to the young men of the country. The compensation is small, and the duties are such as naturally repel the ordinary American citizen. It is only in times of great danger, when the spirit of patriotism is invoked, and the determination to preserve the country from threatened peril is paramount, that we will be able to enlist or maintain an Army of any considerable extent.

The second division, the Volunteers—while I do not intend to discuss the merits of the proposition fully at this time—in my judgment ought to be entirely eliminated from the measure. It is not only impracticable in operation; it will not only, as I look at it, fail to provide an additional force, but it will be a very serious obstacle in the way of recruiting the National Guard, which I look upon as the real source of strength, so far

as training and discipline are concerned, and will divide the energies of the country and of Congress in the maintenance of these two bodies of men, both of which have for their chief purpose the education and the training of young men in the military science. In my judgment, this section of the bill encounters all the difficulties from the constitutional standpoint that are urged against the National Guard. I shall present my views upon that subject more fully at another time; but in order that Senators may have the matter in mind, let me remind those who are here that the Constitution plainly contemplates two great resources of military strength, so far as land forces are concerned: First, the Regular or the Standing Army, the Army of the United States, supposed to be in service during the entire period of enlistment, whatever that may be; second, the militia, which, as I said the other day, is as purely a Federal force and as entirely under the power and jurisdiction of Congress as is the Regular Army in all respects save one, and it is this—that while the Organized Militia is not in the active service in time of war or imminent war, its officers are to be appointed or selected by the several States.

It is my opinion that section 56 of the bill, the section that refers to the so-called Volunteer Army, simply creates another organized body of the militia, and that the provision of the Constitution which reserves to the States the authority to appoint officers will be just as applicable to the so-called Volunteers in times of peace as it is applicable to the Organized Militia, known as the National Guard.

With that I pass to the immediate subject of my amendment. I do not profess to great expertness in the military science, but my general reading and observation have led me to the conclusion that in the national defense the land force is quite as important as the naval force. Indeed, if I were compelled to rank the importance of these two arms or branches of our military strength, I would give precedence to the land force. I understand perfectly that the office of the Navy is to prevent landing upon our shores, to protect our commerce, and the like; but, after all, one engagement may entirely destroy the naval force as a protection to the people of the country. One engagement may so dissipate or disintegrate the Navy that it will thereafter become practically useless in defending our land against invasion.

Do not understand me even to suggest that our Navy should be weak or inconclusive. I am entirely in favor of an adequate naval force; but I repeat that for the protection of the United States against invasion we must depend more largely upon the strength and efficiency of the land force than of the sea force. No foreign power will ever attempt an invasion if it knows that it will be met upon the shore with an army of adequate strength and of adequate equipment, for there would be no motive whatsoever for the invasion if it were reasonably sure that the invading force would be forced back into the sea.

I am therefore particularly interested, and I think every Senator is, in so organizing our land forces that all the world may know that, even though our naval fleet is swept away, nevertheless no hostile foot can ever be planted upon American soil.

The bill, Mr. President, inaugurates a new era. It is an entirely new era so far as the Organized Militia is concerned; that is, so far as the National Guard—for I shall hereafter speak of it as the National Guard—is concerned. It establishes new relations between the General Government and the guard. It creates a new atmosphere which surrounds the whole armed strength of the United States; and it is my desire to see the guard brought into as close connection with the War Department at Washington as it is possible to bring it. If we are to depend—and we must depend—upon these forces, that are in the service in time of peace only to be trained and educated and disciplined in military affairs, there must be between such force and the supreme commander in the War Department that relation and feeling of confidence and closeness that will make all of them understand that they are moving and working for a single object.

I hope that the jealousy and aloofness heretofore existing between the Regular Army and the National Guard may be overcome, and that each will regard the other as a body of faithful, patriotic soldiers, each attempting in its own way and within its own field to further the great purpose for which our armed strength is created.

The National Guard will be from now henceforth, if this bill is passed, a Federal instrumentality. Most people have been in the habit of thinking of the guard or the Organized Militia as a State organization, as a State militia, as State troops, to be called into the Federal service only in times of great peril when it is necessary to make additions to the power of the Regular Army. There is nothing in our Government, there is

nothing in our Constitution, upon which any such belief or sentiment can be founded.

The militia are not State troops only. The truth is that there is no State in the Union that can organize and equip and arm a militia without the consent of Congress, and that consent has been given in times past; but Congress never has assumed to exercise all the power that is given to it in the Constitution with regard to the Organized Militia. This bill, for the first time in the history of our country, puts the National Guard in its proper relation to the General Government, and makes every officer of the National Guard as subject to the orders of the President as is any officer of the Regular Army.

Many people have seemed to believe that when the President of the United States desired to call upon the militia of the country it was necessary for him to make a requisition upon the governor of the State in which the particular militiamen or body of militia happened to be. It is not so. The President of the United States has the power, or we can give him the power, to issue all the orders that may be necessary to completely govern the militia or the National Guard directly to the officers commanding the guard, and there must be as complete and as full obedience to orders of that sort as though they had been directed to officers of the so-called regular force.

The word "regular" has crept into the literature of this general subject without any authority whatever. We have used it without very much discrimination to define that body of men who were continuously in the service of the Federal Government; but the forces provided for in the bill before us, and who are designated as parts of the Regular Army, are in fact no more parts of the Regular Army than are the officers and the men of the Organized Militia or National Guard.

The Constitution, which confers upon Congress the power to legislate upon this subject, does not suggest that one force is "regular" and the other "irregular." As I recall, there is no such word employed in the Constitution with reference to military matters; and I hope in the very beginning, as we go forward with this bill, that the somewhat vague and prejudicial impression many men have had that the Regular Army was a Federal instrumentality and the National Guard purely a State instrumentality, will disappear, because one, like the other, is subject to the laws of Congress and to the orders of the President of the United States.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, will the Senator permit me to ask him a question?

Mr. CUMMINS. Certainly.

Mr. NELSON. I should like to hear the Senator, in connection with his remarks, interpret this provision of section 2, Article II, of the Constitution:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States.

That contemplates that the States may have a militia, and that the President has no command over them until they are called into the actual service of the United States. I should like to hear the Senator interpret that provision of the Constitution.

Mr. CUMMINS. Mr. President, I do not think so. In order to interpret it, I will begin at the origin of this power as given to both Congress and the President in the Constitution.

In Article I, section 8, there will be found the authority respecting the armed strength of the country; that is to say, the authority to provide for the national defense. I read—

Mr. NELSON. From what section does the Senator read?

Mr. CUMMINS. I am reading now from section 8 of Article I. We all know that it is preceded by the words "The Congress shall have power."

To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.

To provide and maintain a Navy.

To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

It has been generally supposed that the parts of the Constitution I have just read relate to what I have called the Regular Army so far as the land force is concerned. I continue:

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

I have heard it doubted, oftentimes, whether the clause I have just read gave Congress the authority to empower the President to send the militia beyond the confines of the country. That question was long ago definitely settled by the Supreme Court of the United States, but I shall not pause to read the opinion. It is to the effect that the President, in order to repel invasion, may send the militia, which has been organized under the authority of Congress beyond the limits

of the United States, because oftentimes the most effective way of repelling invasion is to invade, thus prevent the invasion which is anticipated or feared.

Mr. HARDWICK. Mr. President, will the Senator pardon me for just a moment?

Mr. CUMMINS. I yield to the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. HARDWICK. The decision to which the Senator refers does not go to the effect, however, of holding that the militia can be sent off for a long foreign campaign, if I remember it correctly.

Mr. CUMMINS. No; it does not go to the extent of holding that if the United States were to enter upon a war of aggression, and desired to occupy a foreign country in order to conquer it, the militia could be dispatched upon an errand of that kind.

Mr. HARDWICK. No.

Mr. CUMMINS. It is limited to the precise case I have already suggested.

Mr. HARDWICK. Yes. If the Senator will pardon me, I want to suggest that the illustration I have in mind, remembering that case, is this: If the President saw troops massed against us across the Canadian border or the Mexican border, he might send the militia across to strike first at those troops, but the case does not go any further in principle than that.

Mr. CUMMINS. It is also true that when the President of the United States, under the authority of Congress, determines that a particular fact or situation exists which authorizes the use of the militia, his determination can not be questioned anywhere or by anybody.

Mr. STERLING. Mr. President, I will ask the Senator from Iowa if he will give us the volume and page of the case to which he refers?

Mr. CUMMINS. The title of the case is Martin versus Mott, Twelfth Wheaton, 19. There is also the case of Houston versus Moore, Fifth Wheaton, 1.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Before the Senator passes from that, will he not make this qualification of his statement as to the discretion of the President? Suppose the President should deliberately undertake to send the National Guard across the sea into Asia to take part in the war there, would it not be so clearly violative of the Constitution that he would be subject to impeachment?

Mr. CUMMINS. I am not prepared to deny the proposition just suggested by the Senator from Georgia. I can conceive that the action of the President might be so arbitrary and so clearly colorable that it might be inquired into. But so far as I am concerned, this limitation commands the National Guard to me rather than otherwise. I do not believe we ought to organize the armed strength for the purpose of conquering any country in the world. I do not believe that we ought to impose upon the people of this country the burden that is necessarily entailed in the maintenance of military strength in order to do more than to repel invasion and to resist attack. If we ever reach a time when the American spirit desires to subject other countries to our power, that desires to enlarge the territory of the United States by conquest, the Constitution, from which I am quoting, will already have disappeared as a living force among the American people. I hope that no part of our military strength, whether it be denominated as the Regular Army or denominated as militia, will ever be employed for any such purpose.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Will the Senator allow me to say that in calling attention to this limitation with reference to the National Guard I did not at all mean to indicate that I thought it was an objection. I think it is a desirable limitation.

Mr. CUMMINS. I am sure of that.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. I hope there never will be an effort to send them abroad for any such purpose.

Mr. CUMMINS. I am sure the sentiment of the Senator from Georgia is in exact accord with my own.

Mr. NEWLANDS. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Iowa yield to the Senator from Nevada?

Mr. CUMMINS. I yield.

Mr. NEWLANDS. I wish to ask the Senator from Iowa how the militia could be used in case it is necessary in the maintenance of the Monroe doctrine to defend the soil of some Central American or South American Republic against foreign invasion?

Mr. CUMMINS. Mr. President, I am not very much concerned about the Monroe doctrine in building up our land force. It may be that some time we will be so unfortunate as to be compelled to take a large army to a distant country in order to sustain the Monroe doctrine. I am praying that no such contingency will ever occur, and if it does unhappily come I am

quite willing to depend upon the 250,000 men and officers who are provided for in the earlier parts of the bill.

Mr. NEWLANDS. I suppose the Senator also assumes that the militia can not be used for any such purpose and he realizes, of course, that one of the chief—

Mr. CUMMINS. I do not say so. I do not want to drift into a discussion of what the Monroe doctrine is or a discussion of the principle upon which it is founded, but if I understand it the Monroe doctrine is based upon self-interest. It is a doctrine which restrains foreign powers from occupying with their sovereignty the Western Hemisphere because we believe their presence in the Western Hemisphere with the governmental views they entertain would constitute a peril to the United States, and it is quite likely that that is the equivalent of a threatened invasion.

I quote the next paragraph of the Constitution upon this point:

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia—

There is no suggestion there that it is a State force alone—and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States.

Mr. NELSON. Does not that mean that the Federal Government has no control unless they employ them directly in the service of the United States.

Mr. CUMMINS. Not at all. The militia generally is composed of all the people of the United States. What is the militia? The unorganized militia under this bill is declared to be all men or boys from 16 to 60 possibly, or 65, and that is simply an interpretation put upon the word "militia." The unorganized militia of the United States is composed of every man, and I suppose, in the future, of every woman who is capable of bearing arms and defending the liberties and the integrity of the country. There is no description of militia in its general sense short of the one I have just suggested.

And for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

In the same article and in section 10 we find this provision:

No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage or keep troops or ships of war in time of peace.

What are troops? I assume that troops, as distinguished from men, are men organized, armed, and equipped for the purpose of carrying on warfare.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Iowa yield to the Senator from Utah?

Mr. CUMMINS. I do.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. The Senator from Iowa is always very accurate in his investigation and in his interpretation of the Constitution; but I ask the Senator whether he does not think that the word "troops" there means something entirely different and distinct from the word "militia"—whether the word "troops" does not mean a standing army as distinguished from the militia?

Mr. CUMMINS. I do not think so, although that is, of course, a mere matter of judgment. The word "militia" includes all the men of the United States who are capable of carrying on war. The word "troops" is distinguishable from the word "militia" in this, that it signifies organized men, armed men, trained men, who are capable of moving under the orders of superior officers. That is the interpretation I put upon it.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. The State keeps the militia.

Mr. CUMMINS. No State keeps such militia without the consent of Congress.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. I am not so sure about that.

Mr. CUMMINS. At least I—

Mr. SUTHERLAND. The Senator is presenting a phase of the matter that I confess I have not had occasion to think about. However, it occurs to me that what is meant by the provision to which the Senator has just referred is that the State shall not keep troops in the sense that it shall not maintain a standing army, but that the State may maintain militia as distinguished from troops.

Mr. CUMMINS. Does the Senator think the State may maintain an army for nine months in the year?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. It may maintain the militia all the time, in the sense that it is a force upon which the State may call. The State may execute its own laws by calling upon the militia.

Mr. CUMMINS. When the militia is unorganized?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. It creates the militia and appoints the officers of the militia, and in that sense it keeps the militia.

Mr. CUMMINS. When the militia is organized, what does it become then?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. It is still the militia.

Mr. CUMMINS. They may organize the militia and keep them throughout the year, but they could not keep troops during the whole year?

Mr. SUTHERLAND. That is my interpretation of it. I think that is precisely what it means.

Mr. CUMMINS. It does not seem to me that distinction can be accepted.

Mr. CURTIS. I think the latter part of section 10 explains that the State militia are considered as troops, because it says:

No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.

Mr. CUMMINS. Undoubtedly.

Mr. CURTIS. So the State may maintain troops.

Mr. CUMMINS. Congress can authorize a State to have troops and use them. I have no doubt about that at all. It can maintain troops without the consent of Congress when it constitutionally engages in war—that is, when invaded. Of course this is very largely an academic question, for I hope there is no Senator here who desires to destroy the National Guard entirely, although that would seem to be the view of some of its opponents.

The next suggestion with regard to the militia found in the Constitution is the one quoted by the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. NELSON], and I read it:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several States.

The militia have a habitation, of course, and it is not inaccurate to speak of the militia of the States even though it were not intended to mean that the States have exclusive power over the militia.

But the second suggestion in response to that of the Senator from Minnesota is this: When are they called into the actual service of the United States? Whenever the United States attempts to organize them and train them and discipline them in order that they may be efficient in war they are in the actual service of the United States. There is no difference in law between the period of preparation and the period of performance. Otherwise how can you reconcile these two provisions of the Constitution? In one it is said Congress shall have the power to organize, to equip, to discipline, to arm the militia, whether in time of war or in time of peace, and they are employed, as I think, under Article I, section 8, of the Constitution whenever they are preparing themselves for the work to which they may be ultimately called.

Mr. NELSON. Will the Senator allow me right there to interrupt him?

Mr. CUMMINS. Certainly.

Mr. NELSON. I want to call the Senator's attention to the specific language of the paragraph of the Constitution which he has quoted in part. It is paragraph 16 of Article I:

To provide—

That is, Congress may do this—

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia—

That is, to lay down and prescribe the rules—and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States.

Congress has no power or the President has no power to govern them unless they are directly employed in the service of the United States. And then it adds:

Reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

That is, Congress could lay down the rules and regulations for the training of the militia, but it is with the States to appoint the officers and to carry on the practical training before they are called into the service of the United States.

Mr. CUMMINS. Mr. President, there is a part of what the Senator from Minnesota has just said that can be accepted, but there is a part that is not justified by the language he has read. I have already discussed it to some extent, and I have reached a conclusion, and I have no doubt whatsoever that the power reserved—

Mr. NELSON. Perhaps I ought not to have interrupted the Senator, and I will not interrupt him if it does not suit him.

Mr. CUMMINS. I have not suggested that the Senator from Minnesota shall not interrupt me. I will be very glad to have him interrupt me at any time. I have, however, considered that section or article of the Constitution as fully as I can, and I will not attempt to add to what I have already stated with respect to it.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Before the Senator passes to another subject—I said in the colloquy a moment ago that I thought the

term "troops" referred to a standing army and not to the militia. Since then I have obtained the volume of the Century Dictionary dealing with the word "militia," and I invite the Senator's attention to this definition among others:

3. In the United States, all able-bodied men over 18 and less than 45 years of age amenable to military service. Divided into organized militia, or the National Guard and "reserve militia."

Then follows a quotation from Lincoln, in which he says:

It has been necessary to call into service, not only volunteers, but also portions of militia of the States by draft.

Then follows a quotation from Fiske's American Political Ideas, page 98, where it is said:

The Regular Army is supported and controlled by the Federal Government, but each State maintains its own militia, which it is bound to use in case of internal disturbance before calling upon the Central Government for aid. In time of war, however, these militias come under the control of the Central Government.

Now, this is the part to which I invite the Senator's attention:

4. A body of men enrolled and drilled according to military law as an armed force, but not as regular soldiers, and called out in emergency for actual service and periodically for drill and exercise.

Then follows something else which it is not necessary to read. So that the author of this dictionary seems to regard the militia not as regular soldiers but as a body of citizens armed for emergencies and not regular soldiers, and I think that that is the sense in which the word "troops" is used in the Constitution.

Mr. CUMMINS. I see nothing whatever in the definition just read that is inconsistent with anything I have said. I understand perfectly that the militia is that portion or part of our organized strength that is not in continuous service and is called into active service or continuous service only in the event of war or the imminence of war. I have no doubt whatsoever about that. But it does not at all impinge upon my argument or my conclusion to assert that the power to call the militia is in the Congress of the United States, and that the power to organize it and discipline it and train it under officers appointed by the State is also in Congress. By that I do not mean to say that the States may not lawfully organize the militia, because Congress has given the authority to organize it, and it is not necessary even to say that the States could not organize the militia without the consent of Congress. All that I am attempting to establish is the power and authority of the General Government over the Organized Militia known as the National Guard, and when that is established the whole contention, in so far as I am concerned, is proven.

I have entered upon it only because there is a disposition, or has been a disposition, to belittle the National Guard as an essential part of our national armament. I believe it is the agency and the only practicable agency for the training of the young men of this country so that in the event of war we can command a sufficient and efficient Army, and it is with that in view that I have offered the amendment which is now pending and which I now call to the attention of the Senate.

It will be remembered that we have in the Regular Army a General Staff. This bill perpetuates the General Staff. Whether it makes any changes in its personnel I do not know, nor is it material. The provision is found in section 6, and I will read but a little of it:

SEC. 6. The General Staff Corps: The General Staff Corps shall consist of 1 Chief of Staff, detailed in time of peace from major generals of the line, who shall while so serving have the rank, pay, and allowances prescribed for a lieutenant general, and shall take rank and precedence over all other officers on the active list of the Army; 3 assistants to the Chief of Staff, brigadier generals, detailed in time of peace from the brigadier generals of the line, 1 of whom shall be the president of the Army War College and 1 of whom shall be Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs; 10 colonels; 12 lieutenant colonels; 32 majors; and 34 captains—

In all, 92 officers of the Regular Army. These officers constitute the General Staff. Their functions are purely advisory. Neither the staff nor any of its members as such staff officers have any authority whatsoever. It is a board created in order to exchange views, to discuss military affairs, to look into the future, to apprehend military needs, to provide in a broad way for the national defense. It is, I think, an invaluable arm of the service. I think its existence has vindicated the wisdom of the men who not long ago organized it, and I have no criticism upon it or quarrel with what it is appointed to do.

The amendment which I have offered is as follows:

The President shall detail five officers of the National Guard of not less than 10 years' service, who shall constitute an additional section of the General Staff to be known as the National Guard section. Such officers shall be detailed as follows: One for a term of one year, one for a term of two years, one for a term of three years, and two for a term of four years, and after the expiration of each detail the successor shall be detailed for a period of four years—

I will say, in passing, that is the period of the detail of the officers from the Regular Army—unless such detailed officers shall be sooner relieved. In the event of a vacancy in this section the detail shall be for the unexpired term. No

officer having served in this section of the General Staff shall be again detailed for such service within two years after the service has ceased. National Guard officers so serving shall receive the pay and allowances of officers of similar grade in the Regular Army.

My amendment is intended to bring into close cooperation and consultation the officers of the Regular Army and the officers of the National Guard. It is to secure the harmony and good feeling that must exist between these two arms of the service if all the purposes of this bill are to be realized.

It will be remembered that the National Guard under this bill is to consist of practically 117,000 men and officers for the first year. That is the actual strength at this time. It is to be increased during succeeding periods until it reaches the actual strength of substantially 265,000 men and officers. That is the peace strength. When it is recruited to the point of 265,000 it will constitute the most reliable, the most effective, and I think the most patriotic reserve force for the defense of the Union that can possibly be organized. It is composed and will be composed mainly of young men of high ambitions, deeply attached to the institutions of the country, anxious and willing to take on the training and receive the instruction necessary to make them efficient soldiers and capable of defending their country in time of need.

Is it possible that a force of 265,000 such men preparing themselves to discharge the highest duties a citizen can owe his Government ought not to be represented upon the General Staff? Is it possible that there is a Senator here who will deny that privilege to this body of men? No matter what you pay them, they will have served their country in preparation with actual loss to themselves. Are you willing to deny such a body of men, through their officers, participation in the military councils of the Nation? When the moment of danger comes they are the men who will spring to the country's defense, and they are the men upon whom we must rely for immediate and efficient organization.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. I was called out for a moment. Is the Senator now discussing his amendment which looks toward placing the officers of the National Guard at the head of the bureau here that directs the National Guard?

Mr. CUMMINS. No; I am discussing the amendment now which proposes to create an additional section, known as the National Guard section of the General Staff, to be composed of five officers of the National Guard. I have described in a general way what the General Staff is and the office which it performs, and I am attempting now to show how wise it will be to attach to the General Staff of the Regular Army five representatives of the National Guard.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Will the five so attached to the General Staff have any control over the National Guard Bureau in the War Department, which heretofore has been presided over and controlled exclusively by Regular Army officers, who are not familiar with the work of the National Guard and really are not so capable of sympathizing with and directing it as if there were some officers of the National Guard in that bureau?

Mr. CUMMINS. The amendment now under consideration will not change the present organization in the War Department known as the Division of Militia Affairs. I have another amendment, which I shall offer later, possibly, which puts at the head of the Militia Division in the War Department an officer of the National Guard, but that is not the question now under consideration.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. I asked of the Senator from Iowa the question I did, because I read his amendment last night, and I did not think it reached that division. It seems to me that we ought to reach that division also with the presence of an officer of the National Guard.

Mr. CUMMINS. Mr. President, I am trying to take one step at a time. No matter whether those who believe in the National Guard are successful in putting an officer of the National Guard in charge of the Militia Division or not, there should be little difference of opinion with regard to the propriety of having the guard represented in the General Staff. The members of the General Staff, as such, have no duties to perform, except advisory and consulting duties. It is a committee of the whole upon the state of the Union, so far as military affairs are concerned.

This particular amendment places five representatives of the guard upon the General Staff, in order that they may meet with them, exchange views with them, explain to them, if you please, the necessities or wants of the National Guard, and who can, by their personal association, destroy, as I hope, the unreasoning, unfounded hostility which some of the officers of the Regular Army have manifested toward the National Guard.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Can the Senator from Iowa tell us what number of officers there are now in the General Staff?

Mr. CUMMINS. I do not know how many there are now.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. But under this bill how many are provided for?

Mr. CUMMINS. The bill provides a General Staff composed of 92 officers of the Regular Army.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. And the Senator proposes by his amendment to add five officers of the National Guard?

Mr. CUMMINS. I ask a representation of five officers from the National Guard. Those officers could not under any possible circumstances overcome the judgment or the conclusions of the General Staff. They would constitute so slight a proportion that the only influence they could exert would be through the persuasiveness of their reasons for the course advised. If, as some people have fancied, the National Guard were to attempt to take possession of the General Staff and were to attempt to administer the military affairs of the country, every Senator would object; but why the military councils of the Nation should not welcome the presence of these few officers of the guard, who come directly from a body which, when the terms of this bill are fully realized, will number 265,000 young men, who are giving their time, devoting their energies, and making sometimes almost infinite sacrifices in order that they may be ready when the time of emergency or danger approaches, I can not conceive.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Mr. President, will there not be as many more also of the National Guard reserve under the terms of this bill?

Mr. CUMMINS. Gradually there will be many more. In the course of years the National Guard reserve, it is to be hoped, will largely outnumber those who are actively enrolled and under immediate training, and whose duty it is to go to camp, to maneuver, to drill, and the like.

Mr. President, I have occupied a great deal more time than I had intended to do upon this amendment. My only excuse is that we drifted away into a constitutional argument, with respect to the status of the National Guard under the laws of the country. While I do not deplore or regret the argument, I hope Senators will understand that it is not in anywise involved in the amendment which I have offered. If the views of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. NELSON] or the views of the Senator from Utah [Mr. SUTHERLAND] are sound, the amendment that I have offered is just as essential, it is just as necessary, it is just as wise, and will be just as effective as though the views which I have held and attempted to state shall be found to be true.

I hope, with all my heart, that the men and the officers of the National Guard, who have for so many years manifested in the most conclusive way their interest in the military strength of the country and their willingness to do all that they can do to provide for the national defense, will hereafter be represented upon the General Staff.

Mr. BRANDEGEE obtained the floor.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. President, I merely wish to ask a question of the Senator from Iowa before he resumes his seat.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I yield to the Senator from Illinois for that purpose.

Mr. SHERMAN. It will take me but a few moments to do so. Before the Senator concludes his remarks I should like to have him add his views upon this statement in the report from the War College under date of September, 1915. It is found on page 22, near the foot of the page of this document, in the following language:

Due to constitutional limitations, Congress has not the power to fix and require such an amount of training for the Organized Militia. No force can be considered a portion of our first line whose control and training is so little subject to Federal authority in peace.

I wish to ask, in connection with that statement, the Senator's interpretation of the sixteenth clause of the powers of Congress, as defined in the Constitution, which has been referred to here. Among other powers it refers to the appointment of officers of the militia by the States and "the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." Will the Senator state what he believes "discipline" as there used to include? Does it not include requiring some length of training in the State militia so as to give adequate military strength to that organization?

Mr. CUMMINS. Obviously, Mr. President, it involves the power of Congress to prescribe the time the training shall continue. If that be not true, this whole bill is founded upon a false view of the Constitution. It has given the President the power to prescribe the period of training and the character of the training. It must be carried on under the eyes of an officer of the Regular Army. There is not a movement of the National Guard, from the moment of organization, when both officers and men are not under the control of the General Government. I can not imagine anything connected with the National Guard

that will not come within the term of "organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia." If anyone can imagine what more could be done with a military organization I shall be very much interested to hear it.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, may I add just one word, with the permission of the Senator from Connecticut, which I think will interest the Senator from Illinois?

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I yield to the Senator from Kansas.

Mr. CURTIS. I wish to read an extract from a document prepared by the military council of the State of Missouri in reference to the power of the Federal Government over the militia under the Constitution. I read as follows:

Save and except the appointment of officers reserved to the States, but one power remains in the States, and that is to train the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. What does this mean? It means that while the State shall superintend the actual drill and instruction of the National Guard, such instruction must be according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; that is to say, the method of drill and instruction and the observance of all things which go to make up military discipline must be according to Federal standards.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, I did not catch the name of the document from which the Senator from Kansas has been reading.

Mr. CURTIS. I have read from an article prepared by the military council of the State of Missouri.

Mr. WARREN. Mr. President, I ask permission to have read at the desk a telegram from the seat of war in Mexico.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. I shall be very glad to yield to the Senator for that purpose.

The VICE PRESIDENT. In the absence of objection, the Secretary will read as requested.

The Secretary read as follows:

[Statement for the press.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 31, 1916.

Following telegram received to-day:

"SAN GERONIMO, March 30.

"Dodd struck Villa's command, consisting of 500, 6 o'clock March 29 at Guerrero. Villa is suffering from a broken leg and lame hip; was not present. Number of Villa's dead known to be 30; probably others carried away dead. Dodd captured two machine guns, large number of horses, saddles, and arms. Our casualties, 4 enlisted men wounded. None serious. Attack was surprise, the Villa troops being driven in a 10-mile running fight and retreated to mountains northwest of railroad, where they separated into small bands. Large number Carranzista prisoners, who were being held for execution, were liberated during the fight. In order to reach Guerrero Dodd marched 55 miles in 17 hours and carried on fight for 5 hours. * * * Elilio Hernandez, who commanded Villa's troops, was killed in fight. With Villa permanently disabled, Lopez wounded, and Hernandez dead, the blow administered is a serious one to Villa's band.

"PERSHING."

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Mr. President, I think one of the most important features of this bill is the attempt to federalize properly the so-called National Guard, which I assume to be the Organized Militia of the several States. That feature is covered by section 112 of the bill, which I will not read in full, but which I will ask to have printed in full in connection with my remarks. I will read that portion which commences at the bottom of page 191 and provides:

The National Guard * * * may be ordered into the service of the United States by the President to serve for a period of three years within or without the continental limits of the United States, unless sooner discharged by the President.

The section entire is as follows:

Sec. 112. When Congress shall have authorized the use of the armed land forces of the United States requiring the use of troops in excess of those of the Regular Army, the officers and enlisted men of the National Guard, who have signed an enlistment or agreement to render military service to the United States and have received and accepted compensation for training for such service under the provisions of this act, and who have passed the required physical examination at the time of their enlistment, may be ordered into the service of the United States by the President to serve for a period of three years within or without the continental limits of the United States, unless sooner discharged by the President. Officers and enlisted men in the service of the United States, under the terms of this section, shall have the same pay and allowances as officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army.

Mr. President, I very much fear that Congress is exceeding its power under the Constitution in enacting that provision. It is not entirely a new subject. In 1840 the then Secretary of War, Mr. Poinsett, submitted to Congress a program, one section of which provided:

Sec. 17. That the President of the United States be authorized to call forth and assemble such numbers of the active force of the militia, at such places within their respective districts, and at such times, not exceeding twice, nor — days, in the same year, as he may deem necessary; and during such period, including the time when going to and returning from the place of rendezvous, they shall be deemed in the service of the United States, and be subject to such regulations as the President may think proper to adopt for their instruction, discipline, and improvement in military knowledge.

Secretary of War Poinsett submitted his provision to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and in due course it

went to the House Committee on Militia. On March 6, 1840, the chairman of that committee made reply thereto, inviting the Secretary's attention to several points in his proposed reorganization of the militia which presented a "contrariety of opinions to the Committee on Militia," and stating that at their request he was writing to suggest the difficulties and to ascertain a more complete exposition of his views, and further remarking thereon as follows:

By the seventeenth provision, the power of the President to call forth and assemble such numbers of the active force of the militia as he may deem necessary, and subject them to such regulations as he may think proper to adopt for their instruction, discipline, and improvement in military knowledge, is an organization supposed to be incompatible with the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, that "provides for calling forth the militia and reserves to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."

Under date of April 8, 1840, Secretary Poinsett, with reference to the foregoing contention, replied as follows—

Mr. President, as I am very hoarse this afternoon, I do not want to read any more than is absolutely necessary, and so I will ask the Secretary to read the reply of Secretary Poinsett.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will read as requested.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Will the Senator from Connecticut kindly indicate what the matter referred to is?

Mr. BRANDEGEE. It is the report of the Secretary of War, Mr. Poinsett, in 1840, upon a very similar proposition to federalize the State militia or the National Guard.

The Secretary read as follows:

With regard to the seventeenth article, the same difficulty which presented itself to the committee occurred to me when considering this subject, viz: That provision of the Constitution which restricts the power of Congress over the militia to organizing, arming, and disciplining them, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. Although the word "disciplining" is susceptible of a different interpretation from that given to it here, yet the subsequent reservation to the States of the power to train the militia according to the system of discipline adopted by Congress would seem to define its meaning; and as we can not be too scrupulous in our interpretation of the Constitution, I propose that in the event of its becoming necessary to resort to drafts in order to fill the ranks of the active class of militia, to apply to the States to place by law their contingents at the disposition of the General Government for a period not more than 30 days of every year for the purpose of their being trained in conjunction with regular troops and by veteran officers. It is not probable that this cooperation will be withheld by any State when the advantages are presented to it of possessing a body of well-organized, well-armed, and well-disciplined militia, without any expense either to the States or to the citizens thereof, and when they are made aware that it is the intention of the Government to assemble such militia at convenient points within each State and in the vicinity of depots of arms, which it is proposed to establish as a part of the system. [Italics supplied.]

Mr. BRANDEGEE. In other words, Secretary Poinsett conceded the force of the constitutional objection raised by the chairman and changed his plan so as to rely, not upon the authority of the Congress to call the militia into the service of the United States for training, but upon a draft by the State in pursuance of State law, effective only to bring the militia of a given State to a rendezvous within that State.

The Hay provision is even broader than the Poinsett provision. Its effect is to authorize the President to call the militia of a given State into the service of the United States for the purpose of training, not only to encampments within the State but at joint encampments with the Regular Army, which will in the general case be without the State.

Mr. President, it will thus be seen that this proposition has been considered previously by Congress and abandoned on the theory that they had no constitutional authority to federalize the militia, subject to the order of the President, to make it a part of the Regular Army and to send it out of the country.

The Senator from Iowa has alluded to the case in Fifth Wheaton, and now I wish to allude to the case of Peter J. Dunne against The People, reported in Ninety-fourth Illinois, State Reports, being a decision of the supreme court of that State. It is a very instructive case, and answers a good many of the questions about which we are more or less confused, I think, judging from the running colloquy which has developed on this subject. After reading two or three paragraphs of the syllabus, I will ask permission to print in the RECORD, where it may be studied at the leisure of Senators, such portions of the case as I have marked—not the entire case—as it deals with some other points.

The syllabus says:

The power in Congress to provide for organizing, arming, equipping, and disciplining the militia is not exclusive. It is merely an affirmative power, and not incompatible with the existence of a like power in the States; and hence the States have concurrent power of legislation not inconsistent with that of Congress. It is only repugnant and interfering State legislation that must give way to the paramount laws of Congress constitutionally enacted.

3. The Federal Constitution does not confer on Congress unlimited power over the militia of the several States, but it is restricted to specific objects enumerated, and for all other purposes the militia of the States remains subject to State legislation. The power of a State over its militia is not derived from the Constitution of the United States. It is a power the States had before the adoption of that instrument, and its exercise by the States not being prohibited by it, it still remains with the States, subject only to the paramount authority of acts of Congress enacted in pursuance of the Constitution.

6. By any fair construction of the Constitution of the United States, a law to organize the militia of a State for its own purposes, not inconsistent with the laws of Congress on that subject, is valid. In right of its sovereignty a State may employ its militia to preserve order within its borders, where the ordinary local officers are unable, on account of the magnitude of the disturbance, or any sudden uprising to accomplish the result.

7. The organization of the active militia of the State is not in violation of that clause of the Federal Constitution which withdraws from the States the right to keep troops in time of peace. Such a militia is not embraced in the term "troops," as used in the Constitution. The State militia is simply a domestic force, distinguished from regular troops, and is only liable to be called into service when the exigencies of the State make it necessary.

I now ask that the portion of the case I have marked be printed in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. In the absence of objection, permission to print the matter referred to in the RECORD is given. The matter referred to is as follows:

PETER J. DUNNE V. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

1. Juror—Exemption of active militia: The provision of the act of May 28, 1879, entitled "An act to provide for the organization of the State militia," etc., which exempts an active member of a company of the State militia from serving upon juries, is a valid and constitutional law.

2. State militia—State and Federal power—and herein of their concurrent powers: The power in Congress to provide for organizing, arming, equipping, and disciplining the militia is not exclusive. It is merely an affirmative power and not incompatible with the existence of a like power in the States; and hence the States have concurrent power of legislation not inconsistent with that of Congress. It is only repugnant and interfering State legislation that must give way to the paramount laws of Congress constitutionally enacted.

3. The Federal Constitution does not confer on Congress unlimited power over the militia of the several States, but it is restricted to specific objects enumerated, and for all other purposes the militia of the States remains subject to State legislation. The power of a State over its militia is not derived from the Constitution of the United States. It is a power the States had before the adoption of that instrument; and its exercise by the States not being prohibited by it, it still remains with the States, subject only to the paramount authority of acts of Congress enacted in pursuance of the Constitution.

4. The reservation to the States of the power of appointing the officers of the militia and authority to train the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress does not place any restriction upon the States in respect of its power of concurrent legislation concerning its militia. The exception from a given power can not be considered as an enumeration of all the powers which belong to the States over the militia.

5. There is no question of the power of a State to organize such portion of its militia as may be deemed necessary in the execution of its laws and to aid in maintaining domestic tranquillity within its borders. The power given to the chief executive of the State to call out the militia to execute the laws, etc., by implication recognizes the right to organize a State militia.

6. By any fair construction of the Constitution of the United States, a law to organize the militia of a State for its own purposes, not inconsistent with the laws of Congress on that subject, is valid. In right of its sovereignty a State may employ its militia to preserve order within its borders, where the ordinary local officers are unable, on account of the magnitude of the disturbance or any sudden uprising to accomplish the result.

7. The organization of the active militia of the State is not in violation of that clause of the Federal Constitution which withdraws from the States the right to keep troops in time of peace. Such a militia is not embraced in the term "troops," as used in the Constitution. The State militia is simply a domestic force, as distinguished from Regular troops, and is only liable to be called into service when the exigencies of the State make it necessary.

8. It is a matter dependent on the wisdom of Congress whether it will provide for arming and disciplining the entire body of the militia of the United States. The citizen is not entitled, under any law, State or Federal, to demand, as a matter of right, that arms shall be placed in his hands.

9. It is for the legislature to determine of what number the active militia of the State shall consist, depending on the exigency that makes such organization necessary.

10. Same—Validity of act of 1879—Under the constitution of 1870, and in respect to Federal laws: The act of the general assembly of May 28, 1879, providing for the organization of a State militia, etc., is not in conflict with any provision of the present constitution of this State.

11. Nor is that act repugnant to the national law relating to the militia, either in its spirit, intent, or effect. In defining what persons shall constitute the State militia, it is in strict accordance with the act of Congress of 1792.

12. The provision in the State militia law making it the duty of the governor, as commander in chief, by proclamation, to require the enrollment of the entire militia of the State, or such portion thereof as shall be necessary, in the opinion of the President of the United States, and to appoint enrolling officers, and to make all necessary orders to aid in the organization of the militia, is not in contravention of any of the provisions of the act of Congress of 1792, or any other act of Congress in relation to the organization of the militia, but is rather in aid of such laws.

13. The organization of a State militia, when not in actual service, but for the purpose of training under the act of Congress, into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies, shall be done as the State legislature may direct. When called into the national service, it is made the duty of the executive to organize the militia as the act of Congress directs.

14. The adoption of the discipline, exercises, and equipment required in the Regular Army of the United States, in the State system, will not render the law invalid.

15. The fact that the men composing the active militia of the State are required to take an oath to obey the "orders of the commander in chief, and such other officers as may be placed over them," is no just ground of objection to the law. The obedience to the orders of the governor is when they are in the service of the State, and not in the actual service of the United States.

16. The provision of the militia code of the State which provides that no military company shall leave the State with arms and equipments without the consent of the commander in chief was intended to apply to the militia when not in the actual service of the United States, and is a valid law.

17. The provision of the militia law making it unlawful for any body of men other than the regularly Organized Volunteer Militia of this State and of troops of the United States, with an exception in favor of students in educational institutions where military science is taught, to associate themselves together as a military company or organization, or to drill or parade with arms, in any city or town of this State, without the license of the governor, is not inconsistent with any paramount law of the United States, and is a binding law.

18. Same—The act not defeated if some provisions are invalid: If the militia law, in some minor matters of detail in the organization of the active militia, or in some of its regulations, should not be found in harmony with the acts of Congress, that would not invalidate the whole act. The most that can be said is that they should yield to the paramount laws of the United States.

19. If the general provisions in sections 4, 5, and 6 of article 11 of the militia act were repugnant to the laws of the United States respecting the militia, they might be eliminated from the statute without affecting in the slightest degree the efficient organization of the active militia; but they are not inconsistent with or repugnant to any acts of Congress on the subject.

20. Nonessential differences in the regulations as to the militia not in the actual service of the United States, contained in a State law, from those in acts of Congress, will not render the former invalid.

21. Police power of the State—Generally: In matters pertaining to the internal peace and well-being of the State, its police powers are plenary and inalienable. It is a power coextensive with self-protection. Everything necessary for the protection, safety, and best interests of the people of the State may be done under this power. Persons and property may be subjected to all reasonable restraints and burdens for the common good.

22. Where mere property interests are involved, this power, like other powers of government, is subject to constitutional limitations; but when the internal peace and health of the people are concerned, the only limitations imposed are that such "regulations must have reference to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." What will endanger the public security must, as a general rule, be left to the wisdom of the legislative department.

23. Same—Prohibiting parade, etc., of armed bodies of men: It is a matter within the regulation and subject to the police power of the State to determine whether bodies of men, with military organizations or otherwise, under no discipline or command by the United States or of this State, shall be permitted to parade with arms in populous communities and in public places.

Writ of error to the criminal court of Cook County; the Hon. William H. Barnum, judge, presiding.

Mr. Charles A. Gregory, for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. Lyman Trumbull, Mr. Harry Reubens, and Mr. Wolford N. Low, for the defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Scott delivered the opinion of the court:

Peter J. Dunne, having been summoned to serve as a juror in the criminal court of Cook County at the September term, 1879, it was made to appear he was a citizen of Illinois, 22 years of age, and that he was an enlisted, active member of the "Illinois National Guard," in Company G, First Regiment, a military company organized and existing under a statute of this State, approved May 28, 1879, and in force July 1, of the same year, entitled "An act to provide for the organization of the State militia, and entitled the 'Military Code of Illinois,'" and because of the facts appearing he claimed, under the provisions of the act, which so expressly declares, he was exempt from jury duty, but the court deemed the cause assigned insufficient in law to excuse the juror from service, and notwithstanding the decision of the court he refused to serve in the capacity of a juror, and on account of his contumacy he was fined in the sum of \$50.

Acting on the suggestion of counsel, that it is the desire of both parties to obtain the opinion of this court as to the validity of the act of the general assembly "to provide for the organization of the State militia," approved May 28, 1879, all preliminary considerations as to the manner in which the case comes before the court, and the invalidity of the act under the constitution of the State, will be waived with a view to proceed directly to the question whether the act, or such parts of it as provide for the organization of the active militia of the State, known as the Illinois National Guard, is void by reason of its repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States, and to the laws passed in pursuance thereof. It may be remarked, although no point is made that the act in question contravenes any provision of our State constitution, it seems to be in entire harmony with that instrument. Article 12, section 1, constitution of 1870, is, "The militia of the State of Illinois shall consist of all able-bodied male persons resident in the State between the ages of 18 and 45, except such persons as now are or hereafter may be exempted by the laws of the United States or of this State." And section 2 of the same article is, "The general assembly, in providing for the organization, equipment, and discipline of the militia, shall conform as nearly as practicable to the regulations for the government of the armies of the United States." On examination it will be seen the act of the general assembly under consideration conforms exactly with these constitutional requirements, as will be made to appear more fully in the sequel of this discussion.

If, therefore, this act of the legislature is void, it must be for one of two reasons assigned, (1) because of its repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States (2) because it is inconsistent with and repugnant to the acts of Congress on the same subject, passed in pursuance of authority conferred by the Federal Constitution. The importance of the questions involved has induced the most careful consideration, but it will be our purpose to avoid all unnecessary discussion and state our views as briefly as practicable.

The first proposition submitted against the validity of the act known as the military code, is that the power of organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, being confined by the Constitution of the United States to Congress, when Congress has acted upon the subject and

passed a law to carry into effect the constitutional provision, such action excludes the power of legislation by the State on the same subject. This is not, in our judgment, an accurate—certainly not a full—expression of the law. Two things must be assumed to maintain this proposition: 1, that the constitutional provision in respect to the militia is of that character it can only be exercised by Congress, and that any State legislation would of necessity be inconsistent with Federal legislation under that article of the Constitution; 2, that the Constitution itself places a restriction, either directly or by implication, upon all State legislation in respect to the militia. Neither assumption is warranted by any fair construction of the Constitution of the United States, nor by contemporaneous explanations by writers whose authority is to be respected, or by any subsequent judicial determinations with which we are familiar.

Article 1, section 8, division 15, confers power on Congress "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." Neither this clause nor any other of the Constitution inhibits in express terms State legislation in regard to the militia. Our understanding is, it is a matter upon which there may be concurrent legislation by the States and Congress. No doubt it is true that some powers granted to Congress are exclusive and exclude by implication all State legislation in regard to the subject of such powers. It is not true, however, that all powers granted to Congress are exclusive, unless where concurrent authority is reserved to the States. Examples of concurrent authority readily suggest themselves. Congress has power, under the Constitution, "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises," but it has never been supposed that grant of power was a restriction upon the States "to lay and collect taxes" for State purposes. Such a construction would destroy all State governments by taking from them the means of maintaining order or protecting life or property within their jurisdictions. Other examples might be mentioned, but this is sufficient for our present purpose.

It might be well in this connection to call to mind that "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." The power of State governments to legislate concerning the militia existed and was exercised before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, and as its exercise was not prohibited by that instrument, it is understood to remain with the States, subject only to the paramount authority of acts of Congress enacted in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States. The section of the Constitution cited does not confer on Congress unlimited power over the militia of the States. It is restricted to specific objects enumerated, and for all other purposes the militia remain as before the formation of the Constitution, subject to State authorities. Nor is there any warrant for the proposition that the authority a State may exercise over its own militia is derived from the Constitution of the United States. The States always assumed to control their militia, and, except so far as they have conferred upon the National Government exclusive or concurrent authority, the States retain the residue of authority over the militia they previously had and exercised. And no reason exists why a State may not control its own militia within constitutional limitations. Its exercise by the States is simply a means of self-protection.

The States are forbidden to keep "troops" in time of peace; and of what avail is the militia to maintain order and to enforce the laws in the States unless it is organized? "A well-regulated militia" is declared to be "necessary to the security of a free State." The militia is the dormant force upon which both the National and State Governments rely "to execute the laws, * * * suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." It would seem to be indispensable there should be concurrent control over the militia in both governments within the limitations imposed by the Constitution. Accordingly it is laid down by text writers and courts that the power given to Congress to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia is not exclusive. It is defined to be merely an affirmative power, and not incompatible with the existence of a like power in the States; and hence the conclusion is the power of concurrent legislation over the militia exists in the several States with the National Government.

The case of *Houston v. Moore* (5 Wheat. 1) is an authority for this construction of the Constitution. The question before the court in that case, as concisely stated by Kent in his *Commentaries*, in discussing the power of Congress over the militia, was whether "it was competent for a court-martial, deriving its jurisdiction under State authority, to try and punish militiamen, drafted, detached, and called for by the President into the service of the United States, who refused and neglected to obey the call"; or, as stated by Story, J., the only question cognizable by the court on the record before them arose on the refusal of the "State court of common pleas to instruct the jury that the first, second, and third paragraphs of the 21st section of the statute of Pennsylvania of the 28th of March, 1814, as far as they related to the militia called into the service of the United States under the laws of Congress, and who failed to obey the orders of the President of the United States, are contrary to the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress made in pursuance thereof, and are therefore null and void. The court instructed the jury that those paragraphs were not contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United States, and were therefore not null and void." Notwithstanding there was a law of Congress that provided for the organization of courts-martial for the trial of militia drafted, detached, called forth into the service of the United States, to be conducted as courts-martial for the trial of delinquents in the Army, the court decided that the militia, when called into the service of the United States, were not to be considered in that service or in the character of national militia until they were mustered at the place of rendezvous; and until then the State retained a right, concurrent with the Government of the United States, to punish their delinquency. The statute that formed the ground of controversy in the State court enacted that noncommissioned officers and privates in the militia who should neglect or refuse to serve when called into the actual service of the United States in pursuance of an order or requisition of the President should be liable to certain penalties, defined in the act of Congress of 1795. The judges concurring in the decision of the court did not concur in all the reasoning by which the conclusion was reached, and they seem to have coincided only in the decision the State law was valid. Washington, J., delivered the principal opinion. Johnson, J., gave a concurring opinion, and Story, J., delivered a dissenting opinion, in which another member of the court concurred.

Although neither opinion had the sanction of a majority of the courts as to all it contains, yet on many subjects discussed the judges all agreed, and as the several opinions contain the views of these eminent legalists on these important questions they are entitled to the highest consideration. After stating his conclusion that the offense of disobedience to the President's call upon the militia is not exclusively cognizable before courts-martial of the United States, Washington, J., adds: "It follows, then, as I conceive, that jurisdiction over this offense remains to be concurrently exercised by the National and State courts-martial, since it is authorized by the laws of the State and not prohibited by those of the United States." There being no repugnance in the State law with the law of Congress, in his opinion, the conclusion he reached, after an extended examination of the case, was the State court-martial had a concurrent jurisdiction with the tribunal pointed out by the act of Congress to try a militiaman who had disobeyed the call of the President and to enforce the laws of Congress against such delinquent.

Johnson, J., conceded fully that concurrent power of legislation over the militia existed in the States with the National Government. Story, J., in the opinion he gave, was even more pronounced in the expression of similar views, and, in speaking of the power granted to Congress by the Constitution to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union and to organize, arm, and discipline the same, said: "It is almost too plain for argument that the power here granted to Congress over the militia is of a limited nature and confined to the objects specified in these clauses, and that in all other respects and for all other purposes the militia are subject to the control and government of the State authorities." All the judges concurred, as we understand their opinions, in the proposition that when Congress has once acted within the limits of the power granted in the Constitution its laws for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia are supreme, and all interfering regulations adopted by the States are thenceforth suspended, and for the same reasons all repugnant legislation is unconstitutional. That principle applies only where Congress has assumed control of the militia under granted powers, and does not militate against the construction uniformly given to the Constitution by Kent and other writers, "That a State may organize and discipline its own militia in the absence of or subordinate to the regulations of Congress." It is only repugnant and interfering State legislation that must give way to the paramount laws of Congress constitutionally enacted. The cases that support this doctrine are numerous and of the highest authority. (Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; Sturgis v. Crownfield, 4 id. 122; Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507; Houston v. Moore, 3 Ser. and Rawle, 170; Opinion of the Justices, 14 Gray, 614; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. R. 542; Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1; Caldee v. Bull, 3 Dallas, 386; 1 Kent's Com., 265, 389.) No case has been cited that holds a contrary doctrine except Golden v. Prince (3 Wash. C. C. R., 313), and what was said by the same judge in Houston v. Moore, *supra*. We are not aware that the opposite views expressed by Judge Washington in either of those cases have ever been followed by any court. In Houston v. Moore, Johnson, J., expressly controverts the proposition "that within the scope Congress may legislate the States may not legislate," and speaks of it as an exploded doctrine.

Now do we think the reservation of the power "to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority to train the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress," as suggested by counsel, puts any restriction upon the States in respect to the concurrent legislation concerning the militia. Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of that clause of the Constitution, says: "That reservation constitutes an exception merely from the power given to Congress to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and is a limitation upon the authority which would otherwise have devolved upon it as to the appointment of officers." Obviously that is all that clause of the Constitution does mean, and we adopt as our own view what that able jurist added: "The exception from a given power can not upon any fair reasoning be considered as an enumeration of all the powers which belong to the States over the militia."

But the principal argument is made on the other branch of the case, viz., that the act of the general assembly "to provide for the organization of the State militia" is repugnant to the laws of Congress on the same subject constitutionally enacted, and is for that reason null and void. Wherein the "spirit, intent, and effect of the Illinois statute is in conflict with the provisions of the act of Congress," as insisted on the argument, is not apparent. Neither in the title of the act nor in any of its provisions does it appear the object of the State law is in conflict with the National law. The first section declares "that all able-bodied male citizens of this State between the ages of 18 and 45 years, except such as are expressly exempted by the laws of the United States, or are State or county officers, or on account of their profession or employment are exempted by the commander in chief, shall be subject to military duty and designated as the 'Illinois State Militia.'" That is in exact conformity with the act of Congress of 1792, and what more could the legislature do? The contention of counsel is that an act of the State legislature to organize the militia, if in conformity with the act of Congress on that subject, "is inoperative and amounts to nothing," and if it differs from the act of Congress it is "equally inoperative and void." Assuming that to be a correct proposition—and if it is confined to the organization and arming of the militia called to enter the active service of the United States it is the law—then the act of the legislature is as comprehensive as it could constitutionally be made, so far as it purports to declare who shall constitute the whole body of the militia under the act of Congress.

The second section is a declaration of legislative intention on the part of the State to cooperate with the General Government in the matter of enrolling and organizing the entire militia of the State when it shall become necessary "to execute the laws, suppress insurrection, or repel invasions or quell riots, or when a requisition shall be made by the President of the United States for troops," and should be read in the light of facts historically known to all. For many years after the adoption of the Federal Constitution State laws provided for enrolling and training of the militia in conformity with the act of Congress. It was usual to have annual, and in some States more frequent, days for drilling and training, and persons liable to military duty were compelled to attend under penalties; but for a third of a century or more there has been very little effort, if any, made to organize and train the entire body of the militia, and all State laws designed to effectuate that purpose have either been repealed or suffered to fall into disuse. It has become the settled conviction in the public mind that militia training, as it was practiced in the States, was of no practical utility. Besides that, it would be a most gigantic and expensive undertaking to enroll and supply the entire militia of the United States with arms and ammunition, as provided in the act of 1792. The annual appropriation

of the sum named in that act for that purpose is insignificant as compared with the amount it would necessarily cost. As the laws now are, it is improbable the entire militia of the States will ever be enrolled or summoned for discipline under the act of Congress, unless some great impending danger shall make it necessary. When such an exigency does occur, this statute makes it the duty of the governor, as commander in chief, by proclamation, to require the enrollment of the entire militia of the State, or such portion thereof as shall be necessary, in the opinion of the President, and to appoint enrolling officers and to make all orders necessary to aid in the organization of the militia. Such a law is not in contravention of the act of 1792 or with any other act of Congress in relation to the organization of the militia, but is rather in aid of all such laws.

The remaining sections of the act, with the exception of those contained in article 11, relate to organization, arming, drilling, and maintaining the "active militia" of the State. The designation "Illinois National Guard," applied to the active militia, is a matter of no consequence, and the act will be construed as though it did not contain those words. That a State may organize such portions of its militia as may be deemed necessary in the execution of its laws and to aid in maintaining domestic tranquillity within its borders is a proposition so nearly self-evident that it need not be elaborated at any great length. "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State," the States, by an amendment to the Constitution, have imposed a restriction that Congress shall not infringe the right of the "people to keep and bear arms." The chief executive officer of the State is given power by the constitution to call out the militia "to execute the laws, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion." This would be a mere barren grant of power unless the State had power to organize its own militia for its own purposes. Unorganized, the militia would be of no practical aid to the executive in maintaining order and in protecting life and property within the limits of the State. These are duties that devolve on the State, and unless these rights are secured to the citizen, of what worth is the State government? Failing in this respect it would fail in its chief purpose. But what reason is there why a State may not organize its own militia for its own purposes? As we have seen, the State has the power of concurrent legislation with the National Government over the militia, when not in the actual service of the United States, within limits quite accurately defined in law as well as in the decisions of courts, both State and Federal. Certainly Congress has not exclusive jurisdiction over the militia not actually employed in its service. Congress may provide for "organizing, arming, and disciplining" the militia, but the appointment of officers and the authority to train the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress is reserved to the States. There can, therefore, be no efficient organization of the militia when not called into the service of the Union, without the cooperative aid of the States. Congress may not deem it necessary to exercise all the authority with which it is clothed by the Constitution over the militia. Historically we know there has been no efficient organization of the militia in this State within the last 30 or 40 years.

Mr. Story, in the opinion he gave in Houston v. Moore, said: "It would certainly seem reasonable that in the absence of all interfering provisions by Congress on the subject, the States should have the authority to organize, arm, and discipline their own militia. The general authority retained by them over the militia would seem to draw after it these necessary incidents." These were but an expression of his individual views, but anything written by that eminent jurist on this subject is entitled to great consideration, and as his views are an accurate expression of our understanding of the meaning of the Constitution in this respect, we adopt them as our own.

Judge Washington, in the opinion he gave in Houston v. Moore, conceded that if Congress did not exercise the power of providing for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia it was competent for the States to do it.

Gibson, J., in the opinion he delivered in Houston v. Moore (3 Ser. and Rawle, 192*) said: "It can not be questioned but that the Federal and State Governments have concurrent authority over the militia when not in actual service of the United States. Congress has power to organize and arm—a State may do the same. The Government of the Union may draw out the militia in any of the exigencies mentioned in the Constitution. A State may employ its own militia for its own purposes."

In the opinion of the justices (14 Gray, 614), after announcing their conclusion that the commonwealth could not constitutionally provide for the enrollment in the militia of any person other than those enumerated in the act of Congress of 1792, they said: "We do not intend by the foregoing opinion to exclude the existence of a power in the State to provide by law for arming and equipping other bodies of men for special service of keeping guard and making defense under special exigencies or otherwise, in any case not coming within the prohibition of that clause of the Constitution (art. 1, sec 10) which withdraws from the State the power to keep troops." But, aside from all authority, on any fair construction of the Constitution, a law to organize the militia of the State for its own purposes, not inconsistent with any law of Congress on that subject, is valid. In right of its sovereignty a State may employ its militia to preserve order within its borders when the ordinary local officers are unable, on account of the magnitude of the disturbance, or of any sudden uprising, to accomplish the result. Our conclusion, therefore, is the general assembly might enact the law in question, and that its general scope and effect are not in antagonism with any act of Congress on the same subject. Although, in minor matters of detail in the organization of the active militia of the State, some regulations might be found not in harmony with the act of Congress, the utmost that could be said would be that they would give way to the paramount laws of the United States.

That being the case we might here close the discussion, for if the law in relation to the militia in the main is a constitutional enactment, it would be sufficient warrant for the conduct of defendant, notwithstanding some minor regulations might be invalid because in conflict with the laws of the United States.

But, as we have been urged by both parties to do so, we will briefly state our views on some of the most important provisions and regulations found in the State law which, it is insisted, are in conflict with acts of Congress, and for that reason render the whole act inoperative and void. We will be assisted to a clearer understanding of the remaining questions to be discussed, by keeping in mind a few propositions which are so plain as to admit of no controversy:

1. The repugnancies alleged to exist in the Military Code of the State with the acts of Congress, are all to be found in those sections of the statute which relate to the organization of the active militia when organized for State purposes, and not to those sections which

relate to the entire body of the militia, nor to the militia when called into the service of the United States.

2. The acts of Congress prescribe essentially different regulations for the organization of the militia when called into actual service, and for the organization for training under State authority. Many of the latter seem to be only directory, while the former all appear to be mandatory.

3. When not in actual service the act of 1792 provides "the militia of each State shall be arranged into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies, as the legislatures of the States may direct."

4. Nonessential differences in the regulations as to militia not in actual service of the Union, contained in a State law, with acts of Congress, will not render the former invalid.

It is no valid objection to this act of the legislature that it does not require the entire militia of the State to be enrolled as "active militia." Counsel do not wish to be understood as claiming that no militia law is valid unless it provides that each and every male inhabitant of the specified age should at all times be armed and equipped and engaged in drilling and maneuvering. But the argument made is, that the performance of military service in times of peace can not be legally confined to a select corps consisting of a limited number of volunteers to the exclusion of all other able-bodied male residents of the State. The argument admits of several conclusive answers that may be shortly stated: (1) It is a matter dependent on the wisdom of Congress whether it will provide for arming and disciplining the entire body of the militia of the United States; (2) the citizen is not entitled under any law, State or Federal, to demand as a matter of right that arms shall be placed in his hands; and (3) it is with the legislative judgment of what number the active militia of the State shall consist, depending on the exigency that makes such organization necessary.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Mr. President, to my mind that case, if it is authority—and I think it is—decides distinctly that what we call loosely "the National Guard" is a State militia, officered by the States and trained by the States, subject to the declaration by Congress of the kind of discipline that is to be applied in the process of training. But the training and the officering are reserved distinctly to the States. This bill, if I comprehend it, attempts to put the State militia under the control of the President of the United States and turns over to the General Government the training of those troops.

Of course, I am aware that this subject is going to be debated at great length, and I do not care to enter upon any extended discussion of it at this time, but I did want to put that case in the RECORD.

I have here three very able articles on this subject, written by ex-Secretary of War Stimson, which I would like to have printed in the RECORD in connection with my remarks, provided they have not already been printed. I am not sure but that they may have been printed in the House proceedings. The printer will know; and if they have been, of course I do not ask to have them inserted again.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

The matter referred to is as follows:

H. L. STIMSON ANALYZES THE ARMY BILLS—THE ADDITIONS TO OUR LAND FORCES NOW BEING CONSIDERED BY THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE.

[By Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War in President Taft's Cabinet.]
(First article.)

MARCH 15, 1916.

To the EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

You have courteously asked me for an expression of my views in regard to the military bills now pending before Congress. I am glad to comply, although any such expression must necessarily deal only with the salient points of a very complicated mass of proposed legislation.

At no time since the beginning of the Government has there been such fundamental and general overhauling among thinking people throughout the world of the postulates of military system and policy. The great European war has driven home to us even in America the fact that the last half century has completely revolutionized national methods of making war. As a consequence, the foundations of our own policy have been submitted to a scrutiny and criticism which they probably have not received before, even in the stress of our own wars.

Unfortunately, the effect of this has been manifested in Congress later and less thoroughly than among the people of our Atlantic seaboard, and thus, though the pending bills show the beneficial results of the agitation, it has not been sufficient to save us from some fundamental errors.

AS TO THE REGULAR ARMY.

So far as the Regular Army is concerned, the agitation for preparedness has had, on the whole, gratifying results. Mr. HAY, of the House, who originally proposed to add no new regimental units in the Army but merely to raise the number of enlisted men in the existing regiments, has now reported a bill which contains increases substantially corresponding with Secretary Garrison's recommendations. Mr. CHAMBERLAIN, from the Senate, goes much further, and reports a bill which presents substantially the increase recommended by the General Staff. If the House bill becomes a law, we shall have 10 new regiments of Infantry and 6 new regiments of Field Artillery, besides 15 new companies of Engineers and 52 new companies of Coast Artillery. If the Senate bill becomes law, we shall have 34 new regiments of Infantry, 10 new regiments of Cavalry, and 15 new regiments of Field Artillery, besides 92 additional companies of Coast Artillery and 6 entirely new regiments of Engineers. Mr. HAY's bill would give us, within the continental United States, 3 Infantry divisions and 1 Cavalry division, besides an additional Cavalry brigade. This is the same number of tactical organizations which we have at present, but our present divisions are partly skeletonized and lack the requisite number of regiments to make them complete. Mr. HAY's additions would complete them.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN's bill would give us within the United States 4 Infantry divisions and 2 Cavalry divisions. A fair argument can

be made for each of these propositions. Having in mind merely the military needs of the country, preference should be given without hesitation to the larger proposal. The Regular Army under both plans is to be our first line of defense, and in our rapidly growing country a mobile force inside the United States of 4 divisions of Infantry and 2 divisions of Cavalry, or from 100,000 to 140,000 men, according as the units are at peace or war strength, is certainly none too large for that purpose.

The reasons which are cited against the larger and in favor of the smaller proposal are, first, the supposed impossibility of recruiting under our voluntary system the additional men necessary for Senator CHAMBERLAIN's proposal, and, second, the fact that we have not in existence sufficient accommodations in our posts for such a number and that the cost of building such accommodations would be very great. The Senate bill proposes to meet the first of these difficulties by changing our faulty enlistment law so as to permit men to be furloughed into the reserve after two years' service or even after one year, in the case of such men as are reported as proficient and sufficiently trained by their company commanders. Our present law requires a maximum of four years and a minimum of three years with the colors before they can be so furloughed. Experiments have been made with provisional companies, troops, and batteries of the Regular Army which have indicated that not only can the men be sufficiently trained within the shorter period but that there can be developed in this way a much greater interest and stimulus among both the men and their officers. Most of our progressive officers believe that under such a system of reward for proficiency and good conduct the Regular Army might be made to appeal to a class of men which it does not now reach and that enlistments would be very greatly increased if these better men felt that by applying themselves diligently they could get the requisite training and an honorable discharge after a year's service. I have long been of that opinion myself, and I believe that this is one of the strong points in favor of the Senate bill.

So far as the difficulties of housing the Army are concerned I am inclined to think that this could be made a blessing in disguise. It would make it necessary for us to devise a system of housing large masses of troops in cantonments instead of supporting them at many small and expensive posts. We faced just such a problem when we mobilized a division on the Mexican border at Galveston in 1913, and we solved it with fair satisfaction and with comparatively little expense. Although placed in a very uncomfortable situation, owing to the military exigencies of the mobilization, the men and officers built their own cantonments, and the bulk of them have remained on the border ever since.

If we had to face the problem of housing an additional division or two of troops it would necessarily force us to house them in a more practical and less expensive way than at present. And it would result, in my opinion, in the new units being kept together instead of scattered. This would be an incalculable advantage from the military standpoints of training, discipline, and usefulness.

RESERVE OFFICERS.

One of the great needs which have been made clear by the public discussion of military matters of the last year has been our shortage of officers and the necessity of establishing a system of reserve officers upon which the President can call in case of war, both to take junior positions in the Regular Army and to help officer the volunteer or citizen army upon which the Nation must rely in any serious emergency. Both the Senate and the House bills have provisions for establishing such a reserve officers' corps, but each follows a different method. The Senate bill provides for the organization of courses at our universities and colleges and other educational institutions at which students may receive either elective or compulsory instruction in military training under officers of the Army detailed as professors of military science and tactics.

It then provides for reserve officers' training camps where such students can receive further training out of doors, and finally provides for temporary commissions as second lieutenants in the Regular Army, by which such reserve officers can be given practical instruction at that best of all schools—the Regular Army—for a period not exceeding six months.

The House bill, on the other hand, provides for the establishment of 30 cadet companies to be attached to the various branches of the Army, in each of which from 50 to 100 cadets between the ages of 20 and 27 years, and recruited from officers of the National Guard and graduates of educational institutions to which regular officers are detailed to give instruction, can receive a year's training, after which they at once become members of the officers' reserve corps.

While it is perhaps a fair matter of argument as to the merits of either system, I am personally inclined to the belief that more satisfactory results will be obtained through the Senate program. It seems to me that it will appeal to a more broad and better educated class of men and that it will permit more intensive as well as more flexible training. A member of a cadet company who is trained for a year straight in such a company must necessarily spend a large part of that year in garrison or posts where much of the duty to be performed is mechanical and a matter of routine. While it is important that every officer should be thoroughly grounded in such duties it is also true that with the class of men which we should hope to get as reserve officers the time spent in such routine and garrison duty need not be nearly so long as is necessary to train recruits of a less intelligent class. It is much more important that we should get for our reserve officers a class of men who not only have the capacity for the higher branches of study which are now so necessary in modern warfare, but who have spent a requisite amount of time on such matters rather than on mere garrison drill.

Finally, the chance of serving for six months as an officer in the Regular Army, which is provided by the Senate bill, will give a training in responsibility to a serious and ambitious man which service in a cadet company could not possibly do.

The foregoing, I think, are the most salient provisions of the bill, so far as they concern the Regular Army. There are other features in each bill which are of great importance, but for the most part they are not matters of general interest. The Senate bill provides for a tactical organization by brigades and divisions. It increases the number of the General Staff and provides for additional general officers of the line. These are all good provisions. On the other hand, the numbers which it prescribes for certain units, particularly in the case of machine-gun companies and troops, are much below those indicated as necessary by the experience of the European war, and in this respect the Senate bill is inferior to the House bill. On the other hand, the House bill in providing for admission to the Regular Army of new officers of the grade of second lieutenants gives a preference to officers of the National Guard over enlisted men of the Regular Army

and members of the Officers' Reserve Corps. This is a reversal of the present law, and I do not believe it is just to the enlisted men in the Army. Under the House bill enlisted men are also required to take examinations for commissions, while no such requirement seems to be exacted of officers of the National Guard. As a rule, candidates for a commission who have served an enlistment in the Regular Army are better grounded in the rudiments of the training necessary for a junior officer than are officers of the National Guard. As the bill now stands it would be quite possible for a man to obtain an election as an officer of a National Guard organization and then to enter the Army practically without examination, taking precedence over specially qualified enlisted candidates and over members of the Officers' Reserve Corps. I think this is unsound, and would tend to break down the provisions for officers' training, which the bill in other portions seeks to establish.

The House bill also contains some provisions, particularly in section 8, which will tend to narrow and restrict the wise system of detail in the staff departments, and would thus tend to a reversion to the system of permanent departmental staffs which existed before the Spanish War, and which was terminated by the reforms of Secretary Root.

Taken as a whole, therefore, the general treatment of the Regular Army and its problems by both bills is an improvement over existing legislation and would tend to give us a larger and better Regular Army than we could have expected a little while ago. Provisions of the Senate bill follow much more closely the recommendations and views of our military advisers, the General Staff, and that bill, while far from perfect, is consequently more free from imperfections than the other.

HENRY L. STIMSON.

THE PROPOSALS TO "FEDERALIZE" THE MILITIA—WHEREIN THE BILLS BEFORE THE SENATE AND HOUSE FAIL TO PROVIDE THE MEASURE OF DEFENSE NEEDED.

[By Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War in President Taft's Cabinet.]
(Second article.)

NEW YORK, March 17, 1916.

To the EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

In my previous letter I discussed the provisions of the bills pending before Congress relating to the Regular Army. What I regard as the most serious and dangerous provisions in the proposed legislation are found in the remaining portions of the bills which relate to our citizen soldiery. This is also the most important part of the program of national defense. The function of the Regular Army in the scheme of national defense is narrow. It is the nucleus and pattern with the aid of which we are to train our citizen soldiers, and it is to serve as the meager first line to delay and hold off an invasion while the citizen forces are mobilizing. The ultimate safety of the country has always depended and must in future depend upon the efforts of men who are not professionals, but citizens leaving civil pursuits to serve their country in time of war.

Our Federal Constitution provides clearly for two classes of soldiery—the one national and the other local; the one organized and controlled exclusively by the National Government, the other primarily a force which belongs to the separate States, although it is subject to national use under certain conditions. The power to raise national forces is broad enough to include all kinds of soldiery, both professional and citizen. Under it we support our Regular Army and under it, in nearly all our wars, we have raised forces of citizen soldiers, either as volunteers or under the draft. Gen. Upton, our foremost military writer, speaks of this constitutional authority as "unqualified" and as giving "every war power that the most despotic ruler could ask."

On the other hand, the authority given by the Constitution over the local forces or militia of the several States is narrow and restricted. They can only be called into the service of the General Government for three purposes, namely, "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." Congress has power only to enact the general statutes providing for their organization, arms, and discipline, while to the States is intrusted the administration of such statutes, and to the States is reserved expressly the power of appointing the officers and training the men. While the President is the Commander in Chief of our national forces at all times under the Constitution, he commands the militia only when "called into the actual service of the United States."

This distinction between local and national forces goes back to the very beginning of the Government, and as the country has grown larger the necessity for the distinction has grown more acute. There have always been men in the country who, while they could and would serve for home defense, nevertheless found it a great hardship, owing to their business or domestic ties, to undertake to serve anywhere and under all conditions. On the other hand, there always have been other men, usually younger, to whom the distinction was of no such importance. I think it is safe to say that to-day, when the New York militia are confronted with the possibility of being sent 2,000 miles away to the Rio Grande, this old question presents itself to the various men of those organizations in quite as sharp colors as it did in the Revolution, when the militia of New England were reluctant to serve in New York, and Washington was writing to Joseph Reed of the "desire of retiring into a chimney corner" which had "seized the troops of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts."

The very training of our militia has taken on a character suited for home-defense troops with domestic ties rather than for national troops. We drill them at night, once a week, in the armory instead of sending them out into the field for several months of consecutive, intensive training, and have thus adopted a way which is the least effective method of teaching a man to be a soldier.

Now the European war has suddenly brought us face to face with the fact that we must have a national force of citizen soldiery, trained in time of peace to stand behind the Regular Army in time of war, whenever and wherever it may be needed. We have suddenly learned that the progress of military science makes it impossible for us any longer to wait until the outbreak of war before we begin to train and discipline such a citizen army. At the same time the experience of our young men in the students' and business men's camps has shown that there are thousands of Americans outside of the militia ready to make the sacrifice necessary for such preparation, and that, under the conditions of intensive training in the field and under the guidance of regular officers, they can make greater progress in learning how to be soldiers in even one month than they can in three years of weekly armory drills in the militia.

Under these circumstances, the natural and constitutional method to follow would clearly seem to be to establish a force of national volunteers under the national power of the Constitution, leaving it free for such units of the National Guard as may desire to do so to transfer themselves from the militia to this new force, while the others,

composed, perhaps, of a different class of men, retain their old status of militia and play their old part as a home defense.

There ought to be no real antagonism between these two classes of citizen soldiery, and I do not believe there would be. Each would have a separate and an honorable part to play in the scheme of national defense, and each could do it without either straining the Constitution or disrupting the occupations of their respective members. The men who were young and foot free would naturally go into the national soldiery; the men who were older and more tied down would remain in the militia.

Instead, however, of taking this apparently simple and natural course, both the Senate and House bills contain elaborate provisions aimed to "federalize" the militia.

By this it is proposed that we shall still retain them as militia, and yet will try to increase the power of the Federal Government over them, so that we can use them as first-line national forces.

In their attempt to do this it is inevitable that the authors have inserted many provisions whose constitutionality—to put it most mildly—is very doubtful. The whole effort is an attempt to give the Central Government an authority over the militia which it has not been hitherto believed to have.

But for the purpose of this discussion I shall not argue any of these doubtful questions, but shall only endeavor to point out that under the restrictions of the Constitution, which are admitted and clear, such an attempt will be a failure in its results from military standpoint. It will not provide the measure of national defense which, in this year of grace 1916, we are all aiming to get.

The two perfectly clear limitations which the Constitution puts upon the use of these State troops by the Central Government are, first, that they can only be used by the Federal Government for the three purposes above mentioned, and, second, that they are under the direct command and control of the President only in time of war, after they have been called into the service of the United States; that in other times they are under the command of the governors of the separate States. These two limitations—divided control and limited use—are violative of the first principles of military efficiency as applied to a national army. We do not have to speculate about this or to argue from the experience of other nations. We have tried it ourselves in our own history under the same Constitution and with the same divided control over our militia, with results so disastrous that it seems inconceivable that we should want to make such a system the keystone of our arch of national defense. We tried to fight the War of 1812 in a large part with militia, and it was the most disastrous war in our history. On April 10, 1812, Congress authorized the President to call upon the governors of the States for 80,000 militia. The War of 1812 against England was unpopular in New England—just as a war here against any one of the European nations would be unpopular in certain parts of the country. The governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to furnish their quota or to obey the President's call. They were backed up in this by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, which held that the State authorities and not the President were to judge whether the exigency requiring the services of these militia existed. A quarter of a century later the Supreme Court of the United States decided this question contrary to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, but that was a matter of cold comfort when an enemy was threatening and the troops were needed. The same practical difficulty would exist to-day in case the authorities of any State refused. What is needed under such circumstances is not a lawsuit or a writ of mandamus, but the undisputed authority of a single commander in chief to order the men to obey on the pain of death, and no such power exists in the President of the United States over militia troops which are not yet in his service.

In September, 1814, a British force invaded New York and began an attack on Plattsburg. The American commander, Gen. Macomb, called upon the governor of Vermont to send troops to his assistance from across the lake. This governor, Martin Chittenden, was an opponent of the war. He declined to comply. The Vermont Militia were anxious to go to the help of their compatriots, but could get no order to do so. In the language of the historian Ingersoll:

"An officer of the militia, Gen. Newell, tendered his brigade to the governor to repair to Plattsburg or anywhere else to oppose the enemy, to which the governor's cold-blooded answer was that he had no authority to order the militia to leave the State. On the 6th day of September, the cannonade then begun was distinctly audible at Burlington and at Gov. Chittenden's residence at Jericho. But housed and recreant there, the chief magistrate still held off, when the people on their own spontaneous motion in numbers crossed the lake and following the cannonade hurried to Plattsburg, without distinction of party to tender their services for their country."

Unfortunately the militia were not always as patriotic as these men of Vermont. On October 13, 1812, Gen. Van Rensselaer had assembled a force, consisting of about 900 Regulars and 2,270 Militia on the New York side of the Niagara River for the purpose of attacking a British fort across the river on Queenstown Heights. Early in the morning he sent over the Regulars and a few of the militia to surprise the British. The attack was completely successful, and the Americans took possession of the fort. Later in the day the British commander assembled reinforcements and began an attempt to retake it from the Americans. Gen. Van Rensselaer then sought to bring over the rest of his force to the rescue of the sorely beset advance guard. But, in the language of Gen. Upton:

"The rest of the militia on our side of the river, although ordered and implored by their commander, absolutely refused to cross over, under the plea that, according to the Constitution of the United States, they could only be called out to resist an invasion."

During the rest of that day these men stayed on the bank on the American side and watched their comrades driven out of the fort, down to the river's bank, until they were killed or captured to the last man. Gen. Van Rensselaer, in his report of the action, said:

"I can only add that the victory was really won, but lost for the want of a small reinforcement; one-third part of the idle men might have saved all."

In precisely the same way during the same year a body of Ohio Militia refused Gen. Hull's order to cross the boundary at Detroit, "alleging as a reason that they were not obliged to serve outside of the United States." Still another force of militia under Gen. Dearborn refused to cross the line at Plattsburg for the same reason, and still another force acted in the same way under Gen. Smyth.

It is idle to say that such things could not happen to us to-day. These incidents were not the result of chance; they were the fruits of faulty methods. American soldiers in 1812 were no less brave and patriotic than they are to-day. The American people to-day contain within them many more discordant elements than they did a century

ago, and the governors of our States in the twentieth century will be quite as quick to listen to local political considerations as those New England governors were during the War of 1812. Indeed, it was less than two years ago when the governor of South Carolina disbanded his entire militia force in order to block the attempts of the National Government to restore discipline out of chaos in those South Carolina militia. It is as true to-day as when Washington was writing from Valley Forge that the safety of this country as a Nation can only be maintained by national forces under undivided national control.

In my next letter I shall endeavor to discuss in more detail how the provisions of the pending bills have failed to meet this national requirement.

HENRY L. STIMSON.

THE WAY TO A REAL ARMY OF CITIZENS—ONE SECTION OF THE SENATE BILL OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY NOT FOUND IN THE "FEDERALIZATION" OF THE MILITIA.

[By Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War in President Taft's Cabinet.]
(Third and last article.)

NEW YORK, March 20, 1916.

To the EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

In my last letter I discussed the attempt of the House and Senate bills to "federalize" the militia from the standpoint of our military experience in the War of 1812. I pointed out that the experience of that war conclusively demonstrated the weakness of the system of divided control and of limited use under which our militia is placed by the Federal Constitution. I tried to point out how such a force under such divided control inevitably broke down in time of war.

This defect of divided control can be demonstrated to be as fatal to the development of the numbers and efficiency of a national force in time of peace as the experience of 1812 showed it to be fatal to the fighting ability of such a force in time of war. The underlying proposition of both the bills proposed in the Senate and the House is that the Federal Government shall purchase the authority over these State troops which the Constitution has failed to give it as an original right. The authors of these bills apparently recognize, as indeed they must, that the power of the President to command the militia is limited by the second section of article 2 of the Constitution to those times when they are "called into actual service of the United States," and that by article 1, section 8, there is reserved to the States the "authority" to "train the militia" in time of peace as well as to appoint the officers. The bills, therefore, provide a system of payments from the Federal Treasury. It is then argued that although the President can not compel obedience to his orders to the State troops in time of peace by force, he can, by withholding these appropriations from the Federal Treasury, purchase their obedience and discipline.

This would be considered a singular doctrine amongst the students of military science in other countries. And yet, singular as it is, there are already in existence precedents in our own experience which will demonstrate its foredoomed failure here with almost mathematical certainty.

We judge our success in the development of a national force of volunteers by their readiness to enlist and their resulting numbers on the one side and by their efficiency and discipline on the other. Our own experience with the method of Federal payments to the militia has already demonstrated that it is a failure in both of these directions.

In 1903, under the Dick law, we instituted the policy of making payments to the National Guard for the purpose of recruiting up its numbers and improving its discipline. These appropriations covered not only arms, ammunition, and supplies, but pay, subsistence, transportation for the men during their maneuvers in the field, and also aid to the various State encampments as well as to the joint maneuvers. Beginning with appropriations aggregating about two and one-half millions a year they were steadily increased until we are now paying six millions a year to the militia. Simultaneously the numbers of the Guard have diminished in comparison with the population of the country. Money has failed to give us numbers. In 1903 the National Guard consisted of 116,542 officers and men. In 1915 it consisted of 129,398 officers and men. The population of the country by the census of 1900 was less than 76,000,000. In 1915 it is reported as over 100,000,000.

In respect to efficiency and discipline I take the following from the official reports: In 1915, 564 officers and 19,382 men were absent from the annual inspection. During the year 1914 the average number of men absent from each weekly drill of instruction was 63,201, or nearly 50 per cent of the entire strength of the Organized Militia. The amended Dick law required the attendance on the part of the men of the militia at 24 drills during the year. Thirty-seven per cent of the militia failed to attend this absurdly low minimum requirement in 1914. At the last Federal inspection the instruction of 330 companies, or equivalent units, was rated as poor, and 932 companies were below the standard of efficiency. In 1914 only 34.8 per cent of the National Guard qualified as second-class marksmen or better. In other words, only about one-third of our Organized Militia could shoot well enough to be rated as indifferent marksmen or attain the lowest standard recognized in our military shooting.

Again, the standard of care and the responsibility which the National Guard has shown in respect to the Federal arms, uniforms, and equipment which have been issued to it under the Dick law has been so low that there is now a total shortage of \$1,352,761 of such property issued to it, as to which the Federal authorities are unable to get either a report of the property or a proper accountability as to its disposition. Four years ago, in 1912, drastic steps were initiated by the Secretary of War to reduce such shortages. Under the system of divided control it has been found practically impossible to accomplish this. In the case of many States the shortages are so great that if they were charged against the Federal appropriations coming to such States there would be nothing left for rifle practice or camps of instruction or any other training for several years to come. This would mean that to apply the discipline of this method of purchasing efficiency would result in depriving the States of some of the vital elements of training which they can not afford to lose. In other words, the system proposed by these bills for extending the authority of the Central Government over the militia by Federal payments has been tried and has failed. It has failed in respect to numbers, in respect to marksmanship, in respect to discipline, and in respect to equipment.

It would, of course, be unfair not to remember that there are some militia organizations to whom these criticisms do not apply. Our best militia regiments have attained a degree of soldierly efficiency and patriotic devotion to duty which, in view of the handicaps of system under which they labored, is in the highest degree commendable. It is

particularly gratifying that the State of New York in this respect stands at the top. But when a system is proposed for the development of a national force, it should be judged by its results throughout the Nation. It must be judged not by the exceptions but by the average, and judged by the average this system is a failure.

This failure lies at the root of the system proposed in the two bills. There is no use in enacting, as the bills do, that the militia must keep up to certain standards when there is no way provided of making it keep up to such standards except a way that is a proved failure. It is absurd to provide that hereafter the President may direct the militia to recruit its companies up to maximum war strength when hitherto, under the same system, he has been unable to keep it up even to a minimum strength. Thus the report for 1915 showed that the infantry of the militia of the country was 21,571 men below the minimum enlisted strength required by law. If the President has been unable to purchase compliance with this low standard in the past, how can he be expected to purchase compliance with a higher standard in the future?

It is true that the present bills propose to remedy this evil by increasing the Federal payments. But such a remedy does not touch the real evil. It still leaves the Federal Commander in Chief in the position of a benevolent adviser with no power to command. The administration of his plans is in the hands of people over whom he has no control. The Federal Government can advise, can make general regulations, can scold and threaten to withhold the pay, but the vital functions of administration, of giving the orders and seeing that they are obeyed, is in the hands of the State governors and their subordinates. Dollars spent without the direct power to see to their application are dollars wasted.

So far as the numbers of the militia are concerned, there is an additional reason why they can not be kept up; a reason which the proposed bills not only do not remove but, on the contrary, perpetuate. The main reason which keeps down enlistments in our National Guard is the liability of the militia to strike duty and the consequent antagonism which has grown up on the part of our laboring men against this form of military service. It is this hostility on the part of the men upon whom the Nation should most rely for its national defense which keeps down the numbers of our State militia. So long as it remains State militia and remains liable to this kind of police duty, it will be difficult if not impossible to keep its numbers full. The present bills expressly continue that liability. The House bill contains a provision in section 26 "that nothing contained in this act shall be construed as limiting the rights of the States and Territories to the use of the National Guard within their respective borders in time of peace."

This is the real reason why in Great Britain, where the territorial army is really a national army and not local police, five young Englishmen enlist where only one young American enlists in our National Guard, and why in Canada six young Canadians enlist in the national guard where one young American enlists in ours. So long as we persist in this faulty system, so long as we try to make the same man do duty as a national soldier and at the same time as a State policeman, we shall fail, even with the aid of individual pay, to bring our enlistments up.

On the other hand, the introduction of such a system of individual pay unconnected with any field duty will introduce a most serious evil into our body politic. Under the new bills, the National Guard officer and soldier will receive individual pay not directly connected with outdoor service or with the specific performance of any military duty. He will be on the annual pay roll of the Federal Treasury, subject only to certain conditions which may not be rigidly enforced. This will thrust the National Guard into politics. It means the creation of another vested interest in the pork barrel. Some of the provisions of these bills seem almost purposely designed toward the accentuation of such an interest. In the House bill is a provision which forbids any militia organization to be disbanded without the consent of Congress. In other words, no matter how low the standard of discipline may sink in such a regiment or company, its commander in chief, the governor, can not discipline it by mustering it out without the consent not of the President or the Secretary of War but of Congress. If the Congressman from that district has a number of loyal supporters in that regiment on the pay roll of the Federal Treasury, the consent of Congress will be hard to obtain. No provision could be more skillfully adapted to turn what is ostensibly a system of military pay into a system of congressional patronage.

In 1912 a minority of the same House committee which now recommends this legislation filed a minority report in which, unless I am mistaken, Mr. Hax himself concurred, which uttered this solemn warning on the dangers of such legislation. After stating that it was "a measure that is pregnant with greater possibilities of evil in a financial way, and that gives less assurance of compensating advantages of any kind than any measure that has ever been enacted by Congress with regard to the State militia," the report went on to say:

"The minority making this report is convinced that the legislation proposed by the pending bill is not only unwise, but that it is dangerous in the extreme. Rather than enter upon a legislative course that will inevitably entail upon the General Government an enormous expense, which may be found in dire emergency to have been wasted, a course that will surely lead to the creation of a great military force that will become so powerful politically that Congress will be no more able to resist its demands than it has been to resist the demands of the far less compactly organized and manageable army of pension applicants and their friends, this minority would favor a reasonable increase of the Regular Army, leaving the States to maintain their own troops in their own way and at their own expense without any aid whatever from the United States." (Rept. 1117, Pt. II, 62d Cong., 3d sess.)

For the reasons which I have given in this and my preceding letter, I fear that the attempt to build up under the militia provisions of our Constitution a national Army as an immediate line of defense behind the Regular Army will meet with failure; that under it in time of peace there can not be developed the numbers or the efficiency necessary for such a purpose, and that in time of war the same dangers will be encountered which made our experiment in 1812 so disastrous.

There has been, however, reported in the Senate bill as section 58 a provision which, if enacted, would open the door toward the creation of a truly national army of citizens. We have already in existence, enacted in 1914, a statute which permits the President in time of war to raise an army of Federal volunteers wholly under the discipline and control of the Federal Government. The operation of this statute is limited to time of war. It has now been abundantly shown by the discussion of the past year that it is too late to wait until the opening of war to raise such a force of volunteers. The requirements of modern war would make such a course disastrous to any nation which tried it. Therefore, in section 58, the Senate bill proposes to permit the President to organize and train such a force in time of peace. Under the

section there is wisely left to the President a certain amount of discretion in respect to the term of enlistment, the period of training, and of service with the colors and with the reserve, which will permit not only experiments to be made to determine which methods will be best suited to our needs, but will permit different methods to be used according to the requirements of the different parts of the country and the varying needs of an urban or rural population. If this section becomes law I believe that we could successfully lay the foundations of a really national reserve. We could feel our way so as to do no injustice to existing institutions or faithful and effective militia organizations. And yet we should be upon the right military and constitutional road. Coupled with the provisions which are also fortunately in both bills providing for the development and encouragement of our present system of military training camps for students and business men there would be laid the foundations for gradually building up an intelligent and effective system of citizen soldiery—a force which could absorb such units and men of our present militia as desire that kind of service and leave other units and other men to be developed along the line of home defense. Along that road, I believe, lies the wisest solution of our present problem.

HENRY L. STIMSON.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Mr. President, of the three distinct classes of troops provided in this bill, I hope we will adopt the first and the third, striking out the provision in section 56 for the second. I do not believe that 30-day-a-year trained men will amount to any efficient force or be any substantial contribution to the armed forces of our country; and I think it would be far better to spend what money is spent to develop the Regular Army and the National Guard.

Now, Mr. President, I wish to say just a word about the National Guard. I have had occasion to call out the National Guard and see them called out in my own State, and for the length of training and service they have had I know they make splendid soldiers. I believe that with some eliminations from the provisions of this bill applicable to the National Guard, and some additions, they can be greatly strengthened as an effective force.

One of the provisions to which I call attention—and there are others upon the same line, though perhaps not quite as shocking—is the provision in section 71 which requires that each member of the National Guard shall sign an agreement that—

In the event the President of the United States shall order the National Guard into active service because of actual or threatened war within three years from the date of enlistment I agree to serve as a member of the National Guard in the service of the United States within or without the continental limits of the United States for the period of three years.

Then, again, a little later on, is the provision that all of this act, so far as compensation to the National Guard is concerned, depends upon the signing of the agreement to serve without the continental limits of the United States. I do not believe the Constitution contemplated their serving without the limits of the United States except to repel an invasion by temporarily invading some other country to prevent the invasion of our own country, and I do not believe that a member of the National Guard should be required to sign the proposed agreement. I do not think I could give my consent to vote for a measure which required such an obligation from a member of the National Guard. I think it is an effort to force the National Guard into a contract to do that which the Constitution does not permit Congress to require from a member of the National Guard.

I trust we may make amendments along the line of the amendment suggested by the Senator from Iowa [Mr. Cummins], which will permit some of the officers of the National Guard to serve upon the General Staff or in the War College; and I think there ought to be one or more officers of the National Guard in the particular division of the War Department which has charge of the National Guard. I think their work and the difficulties which surround their work should be better understood by the division of army headquarters which controls and directs their work. I think a more sympathetic support from that division to the National Guard would strengthen and help them, and broaden those in charge in the War Department.

Mr. President, if we do rely upon the first provision—the Regular Army and the National Guard—what will this bill give us? This bill contemplates the increase of the Regular Army to 175,000 or 180,000 men with the colors with a possible 250,000; and under its provisions in a few years we ought to have 400,000 reservists who have been trained until they are thorough soldiers. The bill wisely provides that the General Staff may have all the time at least a paper organization of the reservists. It provides a plan by which the General Staff will know who are still reservists and where they are. It keeps the reservists in shape where they can be quickly called into active service; and it will give, in a few years, a force of 400,000 men who have had training as soldiers, who can be called at once to the colors in case they are required.

I think these provisions of the bill are such that those who have done the work upon it ought to receive from us our fullest

appreciation. If they limit the force to 180,000—and I do not know what the pleasure of the Senate will be upon that subject—it would still develop in a few years a reserve of 400,000 men; and that reserve consists, under the plan of this bill, of men who have been trained to efficient work as soldiers. Although they receive only \$24 a year, the expense to the Government being very small, it still gives, if we need them, a splendid body of trained men who in almost no time—in 30 days—could be called to the colors and quickly organized, as the bill provides that their nominal organization, though they are not with the colors, is to be continued all the time.

Mr. President, I especially desire this evening to call attention to one amendment that I have offered to that part of the bill which applies to the Regular Army. It is the provision which brought laughter or smiles from some Senators when it was read on yesterday, but which I intensely favor and from the work of which I have great faith that much good will come. It is the amendment providing that so much time as can be taken without interfering with their military training shall be given to study and to instruction for the private soldiers while they are with the colors, with a view of fitting them for civil life. It provides that vocational instruction shall be given to the private soldiers in agriculture and in mechanical arts. It provides that the Secretary of War shall provide rules and regulations for the conduct of this instruction.

Is it feasible? Surely no one will question the value of such instruction if it is feasible and practicable.

I shall have the privilege a little later during this session of bringing to your attention our vocational education bill, which has been worked out by the commission appointed by the President 18 months ago under a joint resolution of Congress, and I trust the bill will be approved by the Senate and also by the House. I think it will be.

There is no question of greater importance for our national life than the better preparation of our young men for the work in which they will engage. The power of the German Empire to-day lies in the vocational instruction which has been given to its men. The thoughtful business man engaged in commerce, the thoughtful business man engaged in manufacturing enterprises, to-day approves the modification of our system of education and calls for more time to be given to pedagogical instruction of the young, specializing them for particular lines of work.

It has been recently pointed out by a large gathering of our most thoughtful business men that part-time studies for those under 19 who go into work of any kind are essential for their development for life; and I am gratified to say that especially in the State of Wisconsin there is the fullest recognition of the fact that part-time instruction on vocational lines, particularly for those who before the age of 20 engage in occupations looking toward support, is absolutely essential if we are to develop our young men, and our young women also, to their fullest capacity, not only for the welfare of individuals but as a great economic problem involving our entire country, and as a great problem of better developing the citizenry of our country.

Mr. VARDAMAN. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Georgia yield to the Senator from Mississippi?

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Certainly.

Mr. VARDAMAN. I should like to ask the Senator if his amendment provides for compulsory teaching?

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. It does.

Mr. VARDAMAN. It will require the soldier to take some branch of study?

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Yes; it will be a part of his work. It will be compulsory.

I want to say to the Senate that a few days ago a young officer gave me a most interesting account of the work done upon this line in the fort where he was stationed two or three years ago. The value of the work it is hardly necessary for me to argue, if it can be conducted in such a way as not to interfere with their military training, and really better prepare them to return to civil life. This young officer told me that at a fort at which he was stationed he and a number of other young officers determined to do something for the private soldiers, and they asked for volunteers to take a course in instruction of a certain number of hours each day, and about one-third of the privates volunteered. They thereupon worked out a line of studies which they could give in the fort. They had electrical works in the fort. They could give them instruction in electricity. They had a boiler plant in the fort. They felt that they could give them instruction in boiler handling and in steam operation. They had a shoe shop, they had a harness shop, they had a small machine shop, they had a bakery. Out of these possibilities just around them in the fort

they classified certain lines of vocational instruction, and invited the men to make their selections, and then these young officers trained them three or four hours a day, part of the time in vocational work, part of the time in general educational work; and the officer assured me that the development of those men was really remarkable. Only a short time ago, he said, he received a letter from one of them in Chicago, a private soldier who had no vocational training prior to that time, recalling to his mind that he took the bakery instruction, and stating that he was in Chicago running a bakery of his own and making from \$150 to \$200 a month.

Mr. President, I desire to ask that at the close of my remarks there may be printed in the RECORD an article by Mr. Charles Johnson Post on "How a big army could be made a social asset—vocational training in many trades needful in defensive preparation would fit men for civil career." In this article he points out that after the private soldier had been with the colors a sufficient length of time to be proficient, his detail could be made, in many instances, to plants or workshops belonging to the Government.

I ask that this article may be printed at the end of my remarks.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. But it might be suggested that nothing could be done for agriculture.

Mr. CLAPP. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Georgia yield to the Senator from Minnesota?

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Certainly.

Mr. CLAPP. If the Senator will pardon an interruption, I have this thought to suggest: I most earnestly hope the Senator's amendment will prevail. As a Republic, we have to bear a certain burden with reference to war; and, bearing that as a necessity, we ought to get whatever resultant good can be gotten out of that necessity.

If the Senator will pardon me for just a moment further, I have always been a strong believer in the National Guard, not so much with the view of its use in a war, which I hope we never will have, but I have believed it would be a good investment for this country to appropriate more for the National Guard, supplementing the school life and the business training of the young man with camp life, discipline, and the traditions of military achievement. Now, we can supplement that by supplementing the military training of the regular soldier with a certain amount of training for civil life; and I, for one, am most heartily in accord with the Senator's amendment.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I hold in my hand an article by Gen. Wood, one of the brainiest and strongest of the men who have been connected for some time past with the Regular Army of this country, in which he cordially indorses the view that vocational instruction can be given to the privates while they are with the colors; that the time can be taken by the officers to give them instruction that will greatly contribute to their value as citizens when they return to private life. I ask that this article by Gen. Wood may be incorporated at this point in my remarks.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

The matter referred to is as follows:

VOATIONAL TRAINING IN ARMY O. K'D BY GEN. WOOD—NOTED COMMANDER SAYS PLAN PROPOSED BY CHARLES JOHNSON POST IS SOUND IN THEORY, PERFECTLY PRACTICAL IN APPLICATION, AND IS WORTH MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AS SERVING THE DOUBLE PURPOSE OF MILITARY EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, TO BE ATTAINED SIMULTANEOUSLY.

[By Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood.]

The plan of army industrial and vocational training that has been worked out by Mr. Charles Johnson Post, and has appeared in the pages of this paper, has many excellent points from the military point of view. This plan also is more complete in its development than any plan in Army preparedness along vocational lines that I have so far seen.

It has been transmitted to the War College for study and report upon it. Mr. Post approaches the problem of army service from the angle of a volunteer army, while I personally believe that some form of universal training is absolutely essential; yet I believe that certain of the features of vocational training along the lines that he has developed should be added to it.

His plan as a whole contemplates two things: (1) Efficiency as a soldier in military duties, and (2) the attainment of such efficiency under conditions that also prepare him for his return to the civil, industrial life. This would give a twofold efficiency to the country—a military efficiency and an economic efficiency. Men would return to civil life not only better but also more useful members of society. Such a system avoids any economic waste in a standing army.

What this country needs in the way of an army is not an army of men who remain in it permanently, except officers and noncommissioned officers; it should be in the nature of a great military training organization, constantly giving back to society men of military efficiency against the days of emergency. This is one feature of this plan that is taken care of. Under it the actual period of military training is a variable factor, though the standard of efficiency for all is the same; for, as Mr.

Post provides, no man can avail himself of the vocational apprenticeship until he has first become an efficient, first-class soldier. There is no confusion between these two periods, and it is necessary that they should be kept as distinct periods, even under the term of the single enlistment.

In brief, Mr. Post's plan proposes to give an opportunity to considerable portions of men under training as soldiers to secure, during the course of that training, an increase in their wage-earning capacity so that they are sent back to society and civil life not only ready as a soldier, but prepared for a higher degree of economic citizenship. This is a good idea if it can be put into operation without unduly extending the period of military service.

One of the great problems we have in this country is considerably due to the fact that great portions of our population develop in racial areas, reading a dialect press and controlled in the intervening years by dialect interests. Some sort of a community of service must be established in order to develop a proper and necessary appreciation of the duties and obligations of American citizenship—for equality of opportunity means an equality of obligations. I believe that the best method is by some sort of systematized military training of a universal character wherein Mr. Van Rensselaerbit will rub shoulders in the ranks with Mr. Podunski; under such service how long would it be before there is established a fellowship—an appreciation of what a democracy is and means, and of what American citizenship opens up? These large racial areas come from countries of racial oppression.

We must have some plan. And I believe that military training is invaluable for the purpose. I am anxious to see some form of the Australian or Swiss military systems adopted here. A man gets in military training control of his body—knowledge of health for himself and of preventable diseases that is of benefit to himself, his family, and to posterity; he gets discipline—a knowledge of the relationship of himself to social and economic forces; he learns to coordinate himself with society and to take his place and part effectively; he learns duty, obligation, and efficiency in many channels of American citizenship. If, then, we add to the purely military and civic features of army training a system whereby he is enabled to acquire a vocation—a trade or a profession—we have added that much to the industrial efficiency of our society, and, as I have said, made the Army a source of economic gain of great value. The Army and the Military Establishment would be as efficient a social instrument in times of peace as it would be of protection in international emergency.

That the basic principle of the system Mr. Post proposes is sound in theory and perfectly practicable in application, subject to certain modifications in matters of detail, appears to me obvious, and equally so that it should be developed along with any army reorganization and extension whether on the volunteer basis of enlistment or upon a basis of some form of universal military training. The plan he proposes is worth most serious study and consideration.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Senators, this view receives the support of many of the very best officers in the Army. I claim for it no novelty. I in no sense claim that it is an invention of mine. I am presenting to you the suggestions of others. No one appreciates more than I do the importance of preparing the young men of this country for the struggle of life, for usefulness in life, for effective force in life. But while I might believe it practical to give such instruction and such benefits to privates in the Regular Army, I would not be so sure that it could be done had I not the confident opinion of those highest in the Army, and those who in the Army have made from their military service the greatest success, that it is practicable.

Do you know that the Coast Artillery put this practice into effect the 1st of January, 1915? I send to the desk and ask that the Secretary may read the order of the Chief of Staff to the Coast Artillery on this subject, passed in January a year ago.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the Secretary will read as requested.

The Secretary read as follows:

During the indoor season, the Artillery instruction period will be one and one-half hours. The remaining two hours of the daily instruction period will be devoted to courses in vocational instruction under the initiative, direction, and control of coast-defense commanders. As many separate vocational courses will be inaugurated and conducted as may be possible, utilizing commissioned officers as supervisors of such courses, and the Artillery noncommissioned staff officers, enlisted specialists, and rated men as instructors. Attendance upon these courses will be optional with the enlisted men. Those enlisted men not engaged in these courses will be assigned to police or other work about the post during the instruction period. Among the courses that may be given are those in telephony, care and operation of combustion and steam engines, surveying, wire and radio telegraphy, firing and care of boilers, electric wiring, typewriting, bookkeeping, and stenography. These subjects are to be considered as merely suggestive, and it is not intended to exclude other vocational subjects which may suggest themselves to coast-defense commanders. In so far as practical the installed Coast Artillery matériel may be utilized in connection with this instruction.

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Georgia yield to the Senator from Colorado?

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Certainly.

Mr. THOMAS. May I ask the Senator if he does not think the proposition he is now stating would also operate as an inducement for enlistment?

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Unquestionably. Mr. President, if you will democratize the Army, if you will break the caste that exists in the Army, if you will make the private a man and an American citizen just as much as the officer, and if you will enlist the officers in the development of the men, in the development of their mental and moral strength, in the training of the men for civil as well as military life, you can make the position of the private in the Army a very different one from what it

has been in the past, and you can make the button worn by the private as a member of the national reserve a badge of honor wherever he goes, second only to the uniform of the West Point graduate.

Mr. WORKS. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Georgia yield to the Senator from California?

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. I do.

Mr. WORKS. I am very much interested in what the Senator is saying about democratizing the Army; but does he think he will secure the cooperation of the officers in the Army to any great extent in an effort of that kind?

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. To a very great extent; yes.

Mr. WORKS. I am very glad to hear the Senator say so.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. I did not know until to-day that the Coast Artillery had adopted that rule. An officer of the Coast Artillery came over to me with the report of the successful work that has been done in the past 12 months under that order, showing what great progress the men have made under their tuition in vocational lines in 12 months. Then I asked him how it happened that the work had been done. "Why," said he, "an order was passed the first of last year requesting it of the officers, and making it a matter of volition with the men"; and a large part of the men, he said, volunteered to take the training.

I have here a report on their work, which shows, Mr. President and Senators, that they succeeded in establishing courses for bakers, carpenters, blacksmiths, painters, firemen, engineers, telephone and telegraph operators, radiotelegraph operators, plasterers, plumbers, stenographers, and typewriters. I desire, without stopping to read it, that it be printed in connection with what I have just said.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection it is so ordered.

The matter referred to is as follows:

OPPORTUNITIES FOR EDUCATION IN THE COAST ARTILLERY CORPS.

The Coast Artillery Corps gives a young man an exceptional opportunity to learn some trade outside of the purely military business, and to improve his general education very materially. While vocational training has been optional with the enlisted men, a great many have taken an interest in this work, and have left the service with a knowledge of some vocation outside of the military profession. Among the courses which have been held are courses for bakers, carpenters, blacksmiths, painters, firemen, engineers, telephone and telegraph operators, radiotelegraph operators, plasterers, plumbers, stenographers, and typewriters. In many instances enlisted men have become quite proficient in the courses which they have pursued.

In addition to the subjects enumerated above, many enlisted men have taken a special interest in the electrical installations connected with coast fortifications. The Coast Artillery enlisted men operate the power plants in which electric power is generated for use in the fortifications, and thus become familiar with electrical machinery of all kinds. They also learn to operate steam-power plants, fire boilers, run gasoline engines, and operate searchlights. In connection with submarine mine work, they learn considerable about boats and their operation.

For men who take an exceptional interest in their work there is maintained at Fort Monroe, Va., a school for enlisted men. At this school they are trained for the duties of master electricians, electrician sergeants, engineers, firemen, master gunners, radiotelegraphers, and sergeants major. The last-mentioned grade includes a course in stenography and typewriting. The electrician sergeants take care of the lines of communication at the posts, they keep all telephones in good condition, they install wiring, and assist generally in any work pertaining to the electrical installation. The engineers have charge of the power plants and make all ordinary repairs on the boilers and the machinery in the plants. The firemen have charge of the firing and operation of boilers. The master gunners are charged with the preparation of charts, maps, drawings, range tables, etc., in a coast-defense command. Radio sergeants are used to communicate with vessels and for other signal work. These courses are open to men who are ambitious and who take an interest in their work. Every enlisted man who serves a tour in the Coast Artillery Corps, and who is ambitious to learn, has numerous opportunities to better himself in both theoretical and practical subjects.

Radio operators are always in demand by commercial firms, as are the electricians, engineers, and firemen, who have learned their vocations while enlisted men of the Coast Artillery Corps.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. I to-day learned first of this work in the Coast Artillery, and I ask Senators who smiled yesterday when the amendment that I offered was read whether they can not now smile with approving praise at this splendid work that has been voluntarily done by these men in the Coast Artillery.

I do not desire at this time to discuss the amendment further; it will formally come up for consideration later on; but I wished to put this much in the RECORD and say this much at the present time to the Senate that it may be the subject of thought, that Senators may overcome the first view that such work would be impossible, and that they may prepare themselves for becoming accustomed to it by a knowledge of the fact that it has been done and has worked well. If Senators will only give the subject thought, they will be ready to accept it as a part of the bill.

APPENDIX.

HOW A BIG ARMY COULD BE MADE A SOCIAL ASSET—VOCATIONAL TRAINING IN MANY TRADES NEEDFUL IN DEFENSIVE PREPARATION WOULD FIT MEN FOR CIVIL CAREERS.

[The *Globe* prints below a synopsis of a comprehensive plan for raising and maintaining an army adequate to our needs, which has been submitted to the War College at Leavenworth for study and report upon it. Its author possesses technical fitness and experience. He has seen fighting service in the field in the War with Spain, he was a commissioned officer in both Infantry and Coast Artillery in the guard of this State, and, together with four other officers, organized the first class in military field engineering which, at its own expense, engaged a Regular Army officer as an instructor—this was in the days when there was no widespread fervor of preparedness—and is the author of the textbook on "Horse Packing" for military and frontier use. The plan has the double advantage that it would not cripple our industrial resources during either the raising or the maintenance of a competent army, but, on the contrary, would prepare us for greater industrial development while preparing us effectively to resist military invasion. Sacrificing no part of the proficiency in arms which our men of military age should possess, it would at the same time provide them with proficiency in the useful arts.]

[By Charles Johnson Post.]

This country needs an army. It needs it just as any subdivision of society needs a police force.

Such army must be efficient; it must bear a relation to the probabilities of its service; it must be an army not merely for the sake of an army; it must be an army proportioned to our needs and to its social usefulness, and the feudal elements in it of social and economic waste must be reduced to a minimum.

In other words, the army of our future must not be merely an increase in the size, in the raw bulk, of that feudal instrument with feudal principles that has so far been retained; it must be a part of our social system—an instrument of social use and value in place of the heavy burden borne by society against the plunge of war.

The ideal system of army defense existed in those simpler times or exists to-day in those communities less complex than those with which we are generally familiar. In every frontier the ordinary struggle of survival was easily interchangeable with the necessities of camp and field. The hunting, the open life, and the necessities of primitive existence were a constant training of youth along lines that made him the finest fighting material in the world. History is full of examples. The march of progress advances both the complexities of society and the arts of war, and the old interchangeable relationship is supplanted. Let this old relationship be reestablished; take from the Army the singleness of its rarely used function; let it be in times of peace an instrument of social use, of economic training as well as of military training, and there is no more danger in it of militarism than there was in the days when men wore coonskin caps and shot Indians or turkeys on the day before Thanksgiving with equal skill. The dangers from militarism lie in the feudal survivals in our Army system and not in the fact that men are taught to handle firearms or drill in masses.

PRE-EXTRA TRAINING DEMORALIZING.

With certain special and technical exceptions our Army—or, for that matter, any army—taking young men at the formative period of their manhood, gives them nothing that is of value in meeting the problems of life and livelihood that confront them on their return to civil society. On the present feudal basis our army training is, in its economic and social aspects, wasteful and demoralizing.

But take the feudalism out of the Army; make it efficiently constructive in the time of peace as it is efficiently destructive in time of war; establish it along lines wherein young men may acquire the industrial equipment for industrial civil life that is ahead of them—give them these things as well as the requirements of military proficiency—and the country will have an army of defense, in which there lies no more menace of militarism than exists in so many vocational schools or technical colleges.

It is along the lines of these principles that the following plan is based.

Here is a plan for raising and maintaining an army adequate to our needs which neither in the raising nor in the maintenance of it would cripple our industrial resources, but, on the contrary, would in both respects prepare us for greater industrial development as well as to resist armed attack. The practicability of the plan seems to be obvious from a lay point of view. Its value from a military point of view is under consideration by the War College at Leavenworth.

Experiments in military training by the War Department have shown that a recruit can be turned into a soldier in less than a year of training. The present enlistment period is three years—two years of wasteful reiteration.

Let the recruit join the Army for a term that will give him three years' apprenticeship at the trade of his choice; this period would be a fixed quantity. Preliminary to this he would serve through various degrees of military training until he has acquired standing as a private of the first class. He could not enter upon his vocational apprenticeship until he was certified as a first-class private.

TRAINING IN GOVERNMENT SHOPS.

This vocational training would be in the Government shops, in which the implements and munitions of war would be, in the largest measure, constructed. The Army should be self-sustaining through its own manufactures in its own shops, but none of the articles so made should be sold at any time in competition with private manufacture. We think of Government Army shops as merely engaged in turning out guns. This is not so; in the Army upkeep there is and would be every activity drawn upon that is called into play in civil society. In gun making there is the finest kind of training for mechanics; range finders and the instruments of precision call for the higher mechanical skill in the naturally talented; garrisons must be kept up in their plant—masonry, carpentry, plumbing—while the Quartermaster's Department, with its transportation equipment alone, is an enormous field for the acquiring of trades used in civil society. The list is limitless.

The adoption by the Government of these functions would serve a double purpose; it would furnish the opportunity for a widespread industrial training that would react directly in the economic advantages of this country, with a population of highly skilled men constantly created, and it would eliminate the commercial interest that thrives best on war scares and war. The iniquitous Krupp scandals are too recent to permit us to overlook the warning they conveyed and to take preventive measures lest we, too, be Kruppized. Moreover, war and

all pertaining to it are matters of so great national and individual sacrifice that it is intolerable that any class of Army contractors should alone be protected in the profits that to all the rest of us spell destitution and death.

During this period of vocational training the young man would keep with him his uniform and equipment in a locker of his shop and be responsible for the condition thereof—much the same as in Switzerland. In the event of war he could be mobilized by changing from his shop clothes to his uniform—a matter of 15 minutes or less.

During the first year of such vocational apprenticeship there would be two months' field service with the colors.

During the second year there would be six weeks' field service with the colors.

And during the third and final year of apprenticeship he would serve one month of field service. This would crystallize the military training of his first and preliminary military service.

There would be a certain percentage of these young men—just as there are now—to whom the military life would appeal. These would, in place of the trade apprenticeship, pass into a special military school that would train them up to the degree required of the highest grade of noncommissioned officer—a sergeant. From this school they would then pass back into the regular, permanent Military or Army Establishment. A man would pass back with the rank of a private and the capacity of a sergeant, subsequent promotion depending upon his capacity in that branch. From this permanent section would be drawn the drill instructors and the minor officers of the whole Military Establishment. A sergeant under our present system is in command of a section—three squads of 24 men, including 3 corporals. Allowing for staff details and the general contingencies of an enlarged organization, there would be in this permanent section an army of sergeants, each capable of taking command of 16 volunteers. In other words, the Army could be enlarged 16 times and have a full equipment of noncommissioned and commissioned officers, for noncommissioned officers in the permanent section would become officers in war time.

And this takes no count of those men, first-class privates and trade apprentices, who are trained as soldiers ready to step fully armed into the ranks.

SHOULD BE FEDERAL UNIVERSITY.

There is one other phase of the matter that needs attention. Into the Army would come men of the capacity of professional men and with the ambition to achieve such rank. The trade school would limit their usefulness not only to society but to the Army Establishment. There would also be men of the capacity of officers. At the present we regard the latter capacity as the only one to be encouraged, so we have West Point. But if it is sound in principle to educate American citizens for a certain governmental department it is equally sound to train them for other needed governmental service.

West Point should be more than a local academy on the Hudson. It should be a great Federal university open to all who can pass the necessary requirements. There should be military training sufficient to qualify a man for a commission for all who entered—an obligatory course. For those training for officers in the Regular (permanent) Establishment it should be most extensive. Every department under each Cabinet officer has need of men with college training and technical degrees, and it is here that the graduates should be drafted for a certain period. There can not be too much education among a people nor can too many people have too much of it. This plan would abolish those stories of men struggling through college on peanuts and popcorn as a steady four years' diet. But that loss would be only of a mass of pathetic anecdotes and in no way reflected in the economic ability that would be represented in this country.

Let us be concrete and offer an illustration in figures:

Assume an army of 100,000 apprentices a year—not a high number, as is well known to any who are familiar with the craving in the working classes that their boys shall have a trade—and a permanent establishment of 50,000 Regulars. For the first year this means only 150,000 men.

The second year—with the next class of apprentices—it means 250,000 men.

The third year 350,000. And the fourth year and every year thereafter 450,000 men ready in 15 minutes after the bugle blows.

PRESENT SOCIAL WASTE WIPE OUT.

And this is not counting the possibilities that lie in expanding the very highly trained military specialists comprising the 50,000 of the permanent establishment. Expand them by sixteen times—every private in it a sergeant—and there are 800,000 men in a fully officered additional army. And these additional soldiers would be from the graduated apprentices, who should be held to respond to military service, in case of need, for a certain period after acquiring their trade in the Government shops.

Under a plan like this there would be no great mass of soldiers in an army who served no function in time of peace. The social waste of the present feudalistic army system would be gone. In place of the great Army budget there would be virtually an educational budget to be passed by Congress. The military training would be incidental to acquiring a civil career; there would be no more menace of militarism than there is in a public school or a college that requires service in return for an education. There would be no menace of militarism, for the Army would be a social instrument of service in which the service it performed in the civil functions of our economic and social life would overshadow the militaristic.

It would be, as it should be, a highly efficient posse comitatus, ready for indefinite expansion in time of need, in place of a feudalism; and it would relate itself usefully to the complexities of modern civilization in the functions of peace.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. President, I desire to express just a few sentiments with respect to the amendment offered by the Senator from Iowa [Mr. CUMMINS], and at the same time to assure the Senate Committee on Military Affairs that in supporting the amendment of the Senator from Iowa I am not intending to express any opposition or hostility to the bill itself which has been reported to the Senate by the Military Affairs Committee, a bill which, in my judgment, is the best piece of military legislation that has ever been presented to the Congress of the United States. I do believe, however, that there are one or two points in the measure which may be strengthened and which by being strengthened will add to the efficiency of the armed force of the country.

The amendment of the Senator from Iowa, as Senators have heard, seeks to add that officers of the National Guard shall be detailed by the President for a fixed term of years to serve with the General Staff of the Army. I shall not make a plea to the Senate that this detail of five National Guard officers should be made by the President on the ground that the National Guard morally is entitled to this consideration, although I believe it is entitled to consideration on that ground, but on the ground of increasing the military efficiency and value of the General Staff itself.

It must be remembered in considering this matter as to the National Guard and the Regular Army, constituted as they will be if the bill passes as a force jointly responsible for the defense of the country, that different problems affect them, different conditions confront them. The General Staff, as I understand it, is expected in time of peace to study out in advance all the contingencies which may arise in time of war, all problems of supplying troops in the event that they are called into active service, all the problems of transporting troops to points of mobilization, and of supplying them when they have reached the point of mobilization. The General Staff, I understand, will be an aid to the War College in laying out in advance a campaign and methods of defense in the event of certain kinds of attack being made upon the country, so that should war or emergency exist and confront the country suddenly the management of the Army might proceed intelligently and promptly to meet the situation.

The problems concerning the mobilization and supply of the National Guard are necessarily somewhat different from the problems confronting the mobilization and supply of the regular forces. The Regular Army, as we know, lives in barracks at Army posts scattered over the country—in my judgment too many of them. In any event the Regular Army is always permanently stationed at Army posts and the men live in barracks, and they are constantly under the immediate control and direction of the officers. The mobilization of the Regular Army at a given point on either coast is a thing which any Regular Army officer can very easily and efficiently and promptly work out by a plan adopted in advance.

But I think it can be stated that it is not so easy for a Regular Army officer to work out the problem of mobilizing the National Guard or of supplying it while it is in transit or while it is collected for the time being, as at its home station, for the National Guard is scattered all over the country and the men do not live in barracks. They live at their homes, and the problem of getting them to their armories is one which National Guard officers have studied for years and years. I know the problem has been worked out in the State of New York to the extent that it is now contemplated that should the New York Guard be called into service to meet an emergency, all the organizations in the State could be packed up and ready to go on the trains wherever they are expected to go within 12 hours.

The problem of getting those men from their homes to the armories is essentially a different problem from that involved in mobilizing Regular troops. The same may be said in securing them the proper amount of supplies in the event they are so mobilized. I have believed for some time—and particularly do I believe it now, when it is apparent that the National Guard is to be considered at least as an important part of the Federal force—that those particular difficulties and problems of mobilizing and supplying the National Guard in case of an outbreak of war should be taken into consideration by the General Staff here at Washington, and I think that can be done with far greater promptness and efficiency if a few officers of the National Guard who are particularly able and capable of studying this thing from their own standpoint—the standpoint of the peculiar difficulties of the National Guard with which they are familiar—are called into consultation.

That, to my mind, is, from the military standpoint, the argument back of the amendment offered by the Senator from Iowa. It is to establish cooperation between the two forces. It is not to hinder the Regular Army officer; it is not to challenge his control; it is not to defy his authority; it is not to attempt to undermine his influence in the management of Army forces of the United States. It is to help him at a point where the National Guard officer is peculiarly qualified to help him. I do not believe that any Regular Army officer who has studied the peculiar difficulties confronting National Guard mobilization would refuse to have that kind of help. I do know of one case, at least, where the War Department authorities requested that kind of help and have acknowledged that it was of the greatest assistance.

I think it was but two years ago, when the Mexican situation was looking somewhat cloudy, that the War Department began making inquiries of the officers of the various State guards as

to what they could do in the event of trouble on the Mexican border in the way of turning out troops, because it is well understood that the Regular Army at its present size is helpless to carry on a thorough intervention in Mexico, and reliance must be had at this day and hour, as was the case two years ago, upon the National Guard to reenforce and assist the Regular Army in any such operation as they might be called upon to undertake. At that time, two years ago, an officer of the National Guard was requested to come to Washington to help the officers here in the War Department to work out plans of mobilizing the men of the guard of New York, and that officer spent some time here. I have heard from many sources, and most of them exceedingly reliable, that he pointed out more things to Regular Army officers with respect to peculiar difficulties and peculiar problems confronting the mobilization and supply of National Guard troops than they had ever thought of; and that is not surprising, for they had never attempted to do any such thing, whereas this particular officer had studied this problem for months, and, in fact, for years. I have had it on the highest authority that his assistance at that time was very highly appreciated by Regular Army officers.

I do believe that if we are to have a force of two hundred and sixty-odd thousand troops under the term and caption of National Guards, to be a part of the Federal force, to act with the Regular Army in case of necessity, it will accrue to the efficiency of both those elements, Regulars and National Guardsmen, if officers of the National Guard are permitted by authority of Congress, expressed in a statute, to come to Washington and stay here for a term of five years and consult and confer with the men with whom they will have to cooperate in time of war.

Mr. President, I hope that the amendment will prevail.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I purpose to detain the Senate for only a very few moments. In all that the Senator from Georgia [Mr. SMITH] has said about vocational training for the benefit of the soldiers of the Army I heartily concur, but I could not concur in that part of his remarks which would eliminate the Volunteer Army from the bill and rely only upon the militia. I will in the briefest possible manner point out to the Senate how as to numbers the National Guard that we could depend upon is, as one might say, a man of straw. We are wholly at the mercy of the several States. Let me read again this paragraph of the Constitution:

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of officers, and the authority of training the militia.

That authority of appointing the officers and training the militia is given exclusively to the States. There can be no militia force organized in any of the States unless officers are appointed. The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of *Houston against Moore*, Fifth Wheaton, page 36, while passing upon this paragraph of the Constitution, remarked:

Indeed, extensive as their power over the militia is, the United States are obviously intended to be made in some measure dependent upon the States for the aid of this species of force. For, if the States—

Now, listen to this—

For, if the States will not officer or train their men there is no power given to Congress to supply the deficiency.

So when you come to the question of determining how much the Army will be increased by what is termed the National Guard provision of the bill, you are utterly at the mercy of the several States, and no one can determine in advance how big our force will be. Some States may provide for the organization of two or three regiments of infantry, a battery of artillery, and a company of cavalry. Some may not; and if they fail, how can you compel them to do it? There is no power in Congress. You can not organize the militia into companies or battalions without appointing officers, and if the different States make no provision for doing that, where is the number of your National Guard? One State may provide for a National Guard of a thousand men, another State may provide for a National Guard of 10,000 men, and another State may provide for a National Guard of 5,000 men, but whatever the number is, Congress can not control it. It is a matter under the control of the respective States.

So I say, Mr. President, you can not settle the numbers of the National Guard by this legislation. It is entirely at the mercy of the several States. The bill assumes that all the States will organize a militia on a given basis, but there is nothing in the Constitution and nothing in the law by which we can compel the States. Suppose the governor of any State in the Union refuses to appoint officers and to organize and train regiments, what then? Where is your National Guard? Where is your State militia? I am not hostile to the State militia, but we

are left in an entire sea of uncertainty as to the number we can count on.

What about the Volunteer Army? That is enlisted. We know the numbers of that. The men we enlist in the Volunteer Army are soldiers of the United States. We know their number, because we know the number we enlist, and they are subject to Federal control. The volume of that branch of the service we can determine and fix, but it is not so, Mr. President, with the National Guard.

During the days of the Civil War, while we had many so-called militia regiments in the several States, as a matter of fact the regiments, bodily as such, did not go into the service. In a few isolated cases the regiments were mustered in, but in most cases the men were mustered in as individual volunteers, and our great Army during the Civil War was not composed of militia regiments or militia companies; it was composed of volunteers, such as are contemplated under this proposed law.

This is not a new thing, Mr. President. During the Spanish-American War we had a Federal Volunteer Army. It differed from the volunteer State regiments in this, that the officers of that Federal volunteer force were appointed by the President of the United States, and, as a rule, they were officers who had had training and experience in the Regular Army. They got commissions in those volunteer regiments and they proved themselves to be very efficient. Some of those regiments were recruited in the far South, and they made most excellent soldiers.

As I have said, while I have no opposition to the National Guard as such, and while it is well enough to make use of them so far as we may, in view of the fact that in so using them we are at the mercy of the States, I believe it is unsafe to entirely rely upon them, and that, by all means, we ought to have a volunteer army of the United States of America. The Volunteers are as much soldiers in one sense as are the men in the Regular Army. The only difference is as to the manner and the time of their service. As I pointed out to the Senator from Iowa [Mr. CUMMINS] while he was on the floor, the militia of the several States are not under the control of the Federal Government until actually called into the service of the United States. The Constitution, Mr. President, is quite plain on that point, and I quote from it as follows:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States.

The mere fact that the militia companies are organized in the different States and that they are drilled by officers appointed by the Government, and are trained by them according to Army regulations, does not make them a part of the military force of the United States. They are not in the service of the United States until they are actually called into that service and mustered in as soldiers of the United States. So long as they remain pure and simple militia regiments, a part of the National Guard, and nothing else, they are not soldiers of the United States Army in the proper sense of the term; they are simply nothing else than State militia. It is only when the President, in the exercise of his constitutional authority, calls those troops into the service of the United States that they become a part of the military force of the United States.

Mr. GALLINGER. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Minnesota yield to the Senator from New Hampshire?

Mr. NELSON. I yield.

Mr. GALLINGER. I notice that the Senator from Iowa [Mr. CUMMINS] took a different view of this provision of the Constitution, as I recall. I want to ask the Senator from Minnesota exactly what is the status of these soldiers after the exigency for which they are called out has passed? They are called into the service of the United States; they become soldiers of the United States; do they remain soldiers of the United States after that?

Mr. NELSON. Not at all.

Mr. GALLINGER. Do they go back to their respective States?

Mr. NELSON. They go back and become a part of the State militia, subject to the rules and the laws of the State, and the State may discharge them. The State controls the mustering in of the forces. The State may never muster in a single battalion or a single company, because of the failure to appoint officers.

Mr. GALLINGER. I think the Senator from Minnesota is right on that point; but what was troubling me was, if these men are called out in the event of a war of greater or less importance and the necessity for their service ceases, how are they sent back to their respective States—by proclamation that they are not needed any longer?

Mr. NELSON. No definite rule has been laid down, so far as I am aware, as to that. I suppose they could be discharged

from the service of the United States, and would then go back to their respective States.

Mr. GALLINGER. That is the point on which I wanted to get the Senator's opinion.

Mr. NELSON. Whilst I agree with the Senator from Georgia [Mr. SMITH] in one of his contentions, I disagree with him in respect to another. I believe under the Constitution we have no power to use the militia outside of the boundaries of the United States except in such an instance as that to which I will refer. The language of the Constitution on the subject is perfectly plain. It is that—

The Congress shall have power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

Under that provision of the Constitution manifestly we should have no right to take that force out of the country. The only exception is in such a case as the Senator from Georgia suggested. Suppose we sent a force down to the Mexican border to repel invasion, and if for the purpose of repelling that invasion and as an incident to it that force should cross the border and go into foreign territory, I do not think that that would violate the spirit of the Constitution; but if we should attempt to transport our State militia over to one of the South American countries or over to Europe or to Canada in an offensive war, I believe it would be utterly beyond our power under the Constitution.

Mr. PAGE. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Minnesota yield to the Senator from Vermont?

Mr. NELSON. I yield.

Mr. PAGE. I should like to ask the Senator from Minnesota if, in his opinion, there is any doubt that the patriotic purposes of every State and the governor of every State would not be a sufficient guaranty that the officers of the militia would be duly appointed for all the National Guard regiments?

Mr. NELSON. Does the Senator from Vermont mean to their full quota?

Mr. PAGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. NELSON. To the full number contemplated by this bill?

Mr. PAGE. Yes; and for the drilling of those regiments?

Mr. NELSON. I have my doubts about that. The States would undoubtedly appoint some officers; they would undoubtedly organize some regiments to form a little skeleton of the National Guard; but I doubt whether any of the States would come up to the maximum contemplated by the bill.

Mr. PAGE. I have an idea, Mr. President, that they would.

Mr. NELSON. Let me ask the Senator how many members of the National Guard there are in Vermont?

Mr. PAGE. We have only one regiment; but I have no doubt that, if we were called upon, the patriotic impulses of Vermont would be sufficient to guarantee that everything that could be asked for by the Federal Government would be done, and be promptly and willingly done.

Mr. NELSON. Well, I doubt it, Mr. President. I remember what has occurred in the past. I believe the citizens of Minnesota are as patriotic and are as willing to fight for this country as are any other men in this Union. We had two or three regiments in the Spanish War of State volunteers; we were ready to furnish any additional number that might be required; and yet during all of the time since then we have only had two or three skeleton regiments. They meet once a year in an encampment and have a jolly good time. I once had an opportunity to inspect them when I was governor of the State of Minnesota. It was a very interesting and clever performance, but it never struck me, as an old soldier who had served during the Civil War, that there was much real soldiering about such State encampments.

I remember one encampment very well, which occurs to me now, and so I will refer to it. I went down to Lake City as governor of Minnesota to inspect the National Guard of our State. They furnished me, from a livery stable at Lake City, with an old plug of a horse to ride. I think the boys had "set it up on me," as they say. I discovered, however, what was up before the exercises commenced. I put big spurs on and spurred that old horse to such an extent that he got so excited he could hardly stand still. One of my staff, when I came riding back in the woods on that old horse, was nearly scared to death for fear the horse would kill me; but I avoided that catastrophe and succeeded in inspecting the guard in a proper manner on that old plug of a horse, but the whole thing was like a circus to me. [Laughter.]

Mr. CUMMINS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield to me?

Mr. NELSON. I yield to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. CUMMINS. I wish merely to ask the Senator how long ago it was that the distinguished Senator was governor of Minnesota?

Mr. NELSON. It was in 1893, 1894, and part of 1895.

Mr. CUMMINS. Does not the Senator realize that the National Guard has radically changed since that time?

Mr. NELSON. Oh, it has improved somewhat.

Mr. CUMMINS. Since that time the National Guard has improved its training, its discipline, and its purposes.

Mr. NELSON. All things improve, Mr. President.

Now that I have given one picture of the National Guard, I must say, on the other hand, that I have seen the National Guard give some very fine exhibitions. I recall, especially the Pennsylvania troops that I saw on the occasion of the inaugural ceremonies some years ago. I see my good and genial friend from New Jersey [Mr. MARTINE] in front of me. I do not recall having seen any of the New Jersey troops on that occasion, but I saw several regiments of the Pennsylvania Militia, which I very much admired. They had something of the gait and something of the swing which the old soldiers had in the days of the Civil War.

Mr. MARTINE of New Jersey. Mr. President, let me say that I fear the Senator's failure to see the New Jersey troops was because of a lack of proper vision. I am not willing to stand here and not pay a tribute to the troops of that State. It can not be said that at the inaugural ceremonies or at any other time the New Jersey troops have failed, either in presenting a proper appearance or in giving indications of splendid discipline.

Mr. NELSON. I simply meant to say that I did not observe the New Jersey troops on the occasion I had in mind.

Mr. GALLINGER. Perhaps they were not properly labeled.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, while I am on my feet I can not help adding a few words more.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Mr. President, just a moment, if the Senator will allow me. As Senators are telling of the National Guard of their respective States, I want to say to the Senator that we have in Georgia something over 3,000 men enlisted in the National Guard, and I think the companies of that organization on drill make as fine an appearance as any troops I ever saw. They outclass regular soldiers in competitive drills, and are really in such splendid shape that they could almost be called into active service at any time. The service in which they are engaged is the pride of those young men. They have competitive company drills at fairs all over the State, and the people have great pride in their militia.

Mr. NELSON. While we are on the subject, Mr. President, of the National Guard, having given one side of the picture, I desire to give another experience I had while governor. A very serious strike occurred in the iron mines on Lake Superior, back of Duluth. The men of two of the mines left their work in order to go to another mining camp in an effort to induce others to join the strike. The sheriff of St. Louis County said he was unable to handle the situation and asked me to send the militia to help him. At that time the general of the militia was a very pompous, dignified man, who, while the strike was pending, came to my office almost every day and wanted to go with the militia to the district where the disturbance prevailed. I knew that if he went to the strike district there would be shooting. My adjutant general was an old German who had served in the Civil War. His name was Muhlberg, and a fine old fellow he was. I called him up, and I said, "Gen. Muhlberg, take a militia company, go to Duluth, and stop the disturbance, but do not have any shooting if you can help it." He replied, "Never mind, Governor, I will go up there, and I will fix them without shooting." He went there and maintained the peace. He marched troops up there and camped them, made a little speech to the strikers, and they went back to their quarters. I am satisfied if the brigadier general of the militia at the time had gone to the mines there would have been bloodshed.

Mr. President, if I may be pardoned for these wandering remarks, I want to say a word in behalf of the Army in general. I am surprised to note in very many quarters a prejudice against a so-called standing army and against soldiers in general. The fact is seemingly overlooked that the majority of the men in the Army are of our own flesh and blood, citizens of the United States, and they do not lose the attributes of citizenship or the American spirit because they join the ranks of the Army. Our own history and the history of the South demonstrate that the old soldiers are not a danger to the Republic in any form.

The historian Macaulay tells us that when the Stuarts returned to power in England after the death of Oliver Cromwell and his son, and it became necessary to disband the great army of Puritans who had marched under Oliver Cromwell, the Stuarts were afraid that those old army veterans when disbanded would be a disturbing and vicious element in the body politic and prove a menace to society. The historian, however, tells us that these expectations were never realized. He said that if you went into any community in England after those

veterans were discharged and found a thrifty and prosperous blacksmith or a thrifty and prosperous carpenter or a thrifty, prosperous, and energetic tailor, if you scratched his head a little you would generally find that he was one of Oliver's old soldiers. Instead of those men being a menace to the country they were a blessing to it; their training in the army had made them good citizens. Exactly the same thing occurred at the end of our great Civil War. When that war was over the veterans in the Confederate Army retired to the walks of civil life and became the leaders and the best citizens in their respective communities. So with the veterans of the North, the veterans of the Grand Army of the Republic. When they returned to civil life they became industrious, prosperous, thrifty citizens of the United States. Neither the old Confederates nor the old Union veterans who retired to civil life after that long and dreary war proved themselves to be bad citizens or to be a menace to the public interest; and I am surprised, Mr. President, to think there are any men in this country who are hostile to a fair-sized standing army.

We are a rich and a wealthy country. We ought to be well equipped both in peace and in war—well equipped in peace in order to prevent war—and I hope that before we enact the pending proposed legislation we will secure a somewhat ampler force than is provided even in the Senate bill.

It is very strange—I dislike to go into the domain of politics, but I can not help doing so—that 18 months ago our good President was opposed to preparedness; he did not think it was necessary; but within six months he has come around and is now strongly in favor of it.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Does not the Senator think something has happened in 18 months?

Mr. NELSON. Yes; something has happened in 18 months, as the Senator from Mississippi suggests.

Mr. WILLIAMS. And not alone in the mind of the President, but in the history of the world.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I do not intend exactly to criticize the President, because we do not all see the light of truth at an equally early period. I think the President 18 months ago did not apprehend that the war in Europe would be on such a stupendous scale or would continue so long.

Mr. MARTINE of New Jersey. He was not alone in that thought.

Mr. NELSON. Oh, no; I am conscious of that fact; but the events which have occurred within the last 12 months have led the President to change his mind; and I congratulate him on the position he has now taken.

He and some of his advisers prepared a plan. The only criticism of that plan which I have to make is that it was a homeopathic plan. His idea of preparedness was a good one; but he did not carry it far enough; it was on too narrow a scale. To my mind, the plan proposed by Secretary Garrison was by all odds the best and wisest plan.

Now, coming to this bill, I am not only in favor of the Regular Army—and a little larger Regular Army, if we can have it, than is provided for in the pending bill—but I am in favor of a volunteer army, and I am not opposed to the militia. Let us take it just as it is, with all of its virtues and all of its infirmities, but let us have a real reserve force in the shape of a volunteer army, upon which we can depend—such an army, Mr. President, as we had in the days of the Civil War.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE.

A message from the House of Representatives, by J. C. South, its Chief Clerk, announced that the House had passed a bill (H. R. 10384) to regulate the immigration of aliens to, and the residence of aliens in, the United States, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message also announced that the House insists upon its amendments to the bill (S. 4399) granting pensions and increase of pensions to certain soldiers and sailors of the Civil War and certain widows and dependent relatives of such soldiers and sailors, disagreed to by the Senate, agrees to the conference asked for by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and had appointed Mr. SHERWOOD, Mr. RUSSELL of Missouri, and Mr. LANGLEY managers at the conference on the part of the House.

The message further announced that the House insists upon its amendments to the bill (S. 3984) granting pensions and increase of pensions to certain soldiers and sailors of the Civil War and certain widows and dependent relatives of such soldiers and sailors, disagreed to by the Senate, agrees to the conference asked for by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and had appointed Mr. SHERWOOD, Mr. RUSSELL of Missouri, and Mr. LANGLEY managers at the conference on the part of the House.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS.

Mr. GALLINGER presented memorials of 16 citizens of Center Barnstead, N. H., remonstrating against the enactment of legislation for compulsory Sunday observance in the District of Columbia, which were ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented a petition of the Woman's Club of Center Harbor, N. H., praying for an investigation into conditions surrounding the marketing of dairy products, which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

He also presented a petition of the German Alliance, of Manchester, N. H., praying for the removal of restrictions on the shipment of milk to Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Poland, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

He also presented a petition of the Berger Manufacturing Co., of Boston, Mass., praying for liberal appropriations for the maintenance of the Bureau of Standards, which was referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

He also presented a petition of the Department of Louisiana and Mississippi, Grand Army of the Republic, praying for the retirement of Volunteer officers of the Civil War, which was ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. PHELAN presented a petition of the Woman's Council of Sacramento, Cal., praying for an investigation into conditions surrounding the marketing of dairy products, which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

He also presented a memorial of the congregation of the Adventist Church, of Mountain View, Cal., remonstrating against the enactment of legislation for compulsory Sunday observance in the District of Columbia, which was ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented a petition of Local Union No. 338, Cigarmakers' International Union of America, of Eureka, Cal., praying for the enactment of legislation to further restrict immigration, which was referred to the Committee on Immigration.

Mr. BURLEIGH presented a petition of sundry citizens of Greenville, Me., praying for national prohibition, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. WADSWORTH presented memorials of sundry citizens of Saranac Lake and Lincklaen, in the State of New York, remonstrating against the enactment of legislation for compulsory Sunday observance in the District of Columbia, which were ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented petitions of sundry citizens of Wayland, Parishville, and Middletown, all in the State of New York, praying for national prohibition, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES.

Mr. PHELAN, from the Committee on Public Lands, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 406) to authorize exploration for and disposition of coal, phosphate, oil, gas, potassium, or sodium, reported it with an amendment, and submitted a report (No. 319) thereon.

Mr. NELSON, from the Committee on Commerce, to which was referred the bill (S. 4426) to regulate the salaries of keepers of lighthouses, reported it with amendments, and submitted a report (No. 320) thereon.

BILLS INTRODUCED.

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. CULBERSON:

A bill (S. 5339) to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to regulate commerce," approved February 4, 1887, as heretofore amended; to the Committee on Interstate Commerce.

By Mr. WILLIAMS:

A bill (S. 5340) to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to readjudicate the cases of Mattie W. Jackson, widow, and others, against The United States, and Mattie E. Hughes against The United States; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. TAGGART:

A bill (S. 5341) granting an increase of pension to Charles Leffler (with accompanying papers);

A bill (S. 5342) granting an increase of pension to Michael Galligan (with accompanying papers); and

A bill (S. 5343) granting a pension to Anna Stanley (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. SMITH of Maryland:

A bill (S. 5344) for the regulation of the practice of podiatry in the District of Columbia, and for the protection of the people from empiricism in relation thereto; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. OLIVIER (for Mr. PENROSE):

A bill (S. 5345) granting a pension to William R. Miller; to the Committee on Pensions.

NATIONAL DEFENSE.

Mr. WORKS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (H. R. 12766) to increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

Mr. LEE of Maryland submitted amendments intended to be proposed by him to the bill (H. R. 12766) to increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

Mr. SMITH of South Carolina submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (H. R. 12766) to increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

THE JUDICIAL CODE.

Mr. OLIVER (for Mr. PENROSE) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 1412) further to codify, revise, and amend the laws relating to the judiciary, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and ordered to be printed.

MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

Mr. TILLMAN. On yesterday I submitted a resolution (No. 156) providing for the printing of 1,000 additional copies of Senate Document No. 494, Sixty-second Congress, second session, third impression, entitled "Military Policy of the United States," by Bvt. Maj. Gen. Emory Upton, United States Army. I find that there is a later impression, being the fourth one of this document, and I ask that the order of yesterday be rescinded and that there be printed as a Senate document 1,000 additional copies of the fourth impression.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED.

H. R. 10384. An act to regulate the immigration of aliens to, and the residence of aliens in, the United States was read twice by its title and referred to the Committee on Immigration.

EXECUTIVE SESSION.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of executive business.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business. After five minutes spent in executive session the doors were reopened, and (at 5 o'clock and 45 minutes p. m., Friday, March 31, 1916) the Senate took a recess until to-morrow, Saturday, April 1, 1916, at 12 o'clock meridian.

CONFIRMATIONS.

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate March 31 (legislative day of March 30), 1916.

POSTMASTERS.

CONNECTICUT.

John G. St. Ruth, Windsor.

MINNESOTA.

Fred Gay, Moose Lake.

MISSOURI.

J. S. Divelbiss, Braymer.

NEW JERSEY.

William Gerard, Rockaway.

OHIO.

Fred D. Baker, Sunbury.

William E. Haas, Delaware.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

FRIDAY, March 31, 1916.

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Henry N. Couden, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Infinite Spirit, through whose eternal energy and all-embracing love we live and move and have our being, open Thou our eyes to the beauty of holiness and ever lead us in the way of truth; impart unto us wisdom and strengthen us for every duty, that we may be the instruments in Thy hands for the promotion of Thy kingdom, that peace and good will may possess every heart; and Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

PENSIONS.

Mr. RUSSELL of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the House insist upon its amendments to the bill (S. 3984) granting pensions and increase of pensions to certain

soldiers and sailors of the Civil War and certain widows and dependent relatives of such soldiers and sailors, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Missouri asks unanimous consent that the House insist on its amendments to S. 3984, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate. Is there objection?

There was no objection; and the Speaker appointed as conferees on the part of the House Mr. SHERWOOD, Mr. RUSSELL of Missouri, and Mr. Langley.

Mr. RUSSELL of Missouri. I ask for the same order with reference to S. 4399, granting pensions and increase of pensions to certain soldiers and sailors of the Civil War and certain widows and dependent relatives of such soldiers and sailors.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the same order will be made as on the preceding bill, and with the same conferees.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to Mr. SLAYDEN until the 8th of April, inclusive, on account of business.

WITHDRAWAL OF PAPERS.

By unanimous consent, leave was granted to Mr. BAILEY to withdraw from the files of the House, without leaving copies, the papers in the case of Mrs. Sara Gates (H. R. 18404, 63d Cong.), no adverse report having been made thereon.

OLEOMARGARINE.

Mr. HAUGEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for a reprint of House bill 13825, and that the spelling of the word "oleomargarine" and the title of the bill be corrected; also, that in lines 19 and 20, page 14, the words, "that causes it to look like" be stricken out and the words "in imitation or semblance of" be inserted in lieu thereof.

Mr. Speaker, I make this request in order to correct what appear to be some typographical errors in the bill.

Mr. FITZGERALD. That is not a reprint.

Mr. MANN. The way to do is to introduce another bill. We can not have two prints of a bill in two different forms.

The SPEAKER. The best thing for the gentleman to do is to reintroduce the bill as he wants it to appear.

EVENING SESSION ON TUESDAY NEXT.

Mr. STEPHENS of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that on Tuesday next at 5 o'clock the House take a recess until 8 o'clock, the evening session to continue for not more than three hours, for the consideration of bills on the Private Calendar.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. STEPHENS] asks unanimous consent that on Tuesday next at 5 o'clock the House stand in recess until 8 o'clock, the evening session to be for the purpose of considering bills on the Private Calendar and not to extend beyond 11 o'clock.

Mr. MANN. Unobjection bills?

Mr. STEPHENS of Mississippi. Yes; unobjection bills, to be considered in the House as in Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. And no other business to be transacted at that night session. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

RIVERS AND HARBORS.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the river and harbor bill, H. R. 12193; and pending that I would like to see if we can make some arrangement for time for general debate. I will ask the gentleman from Washington [Mr. HUMPHREY] what time he suggests? I myself suggest five hours.

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. I have had requests on this side for 4 hours and 15 minutes, and very insistent requests.

Mr. SPARKMAN. We have had requests on this side for nearly as much, but I am sure we can cut it down to two hours and a half.

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. I have gone over the requests that have been made, and I think we ought to have four hours on this side. I have another request right now.

Mr. SPARKMAN. How would this suggestion meet the views of the gentleman from Washington, that we consume the balance of the day in general debate and consider the bill under the five-minute rule to-morrow?

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. No, I would not do that, because I do not know how much of this day we are going to have for discussion. There may not be very much of it left by the time we get through.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I should think we might stay here until 7 o'clock, if necessary, or even 8 o'clock. So far as I am per-

sonally concerned, I would be willing to have a night session.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Why not have a night session for general debate?

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. I would not be willing to have a night session. As long as we have before us the program that has been outlined we may as well take our time, because we will never get through anyway. There is no use in trying to hurry the impossible. I think some gentlemen on that side of the aisle ought to have the courage to go and tell the President the facts about this.

Mr. MANN. I suggest to the gentleman that he make it seven hours, three and a half hours on a side.

Mr. KITCHIN. Why could we not agree to run on until 5 o'clock and then recess until 8 o'clock and finish the general debate to-night?

Mr. MANN. Everybody knows there will be nobody here to-night.

Mr. KITCHIN. How would this do, then: Suppose we consume the balance of this day in general debate, and meet at 11 o'clock to-morrow, and have an hour's general debate to-morrow, and at 12 o'clock begin under the five-minute rule?

Mr. MANN. I am perfectly willing to begin at 11 o'clock to-morrow, as far as I am concerned, but I think we ought to have the seven hours' debate.

The SPEAKER. Has anybody any suggestion to make? The time is running.

Mr. FITZGERALD. Tempus fugit!

Mr. MANN. You had better make it seven hours' debate, with the suggestion that we meet at 11 o'clock to-morrow.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Suppose we run until 6 this evening and then meet to-morrow and finish up the seven hours?

Mr. MANN. As far as I am concerned I have no objection to running until 6 o'clock, but nobody can guarantee that between 5 and 6 o'clock some one will not raise the point of no quorum. There will be very few Members here.

Mr. SPARKMAN. We can have a gentleman's agreement that we will stay until 6 o'clock.

Mr. MANN. The gentleman himself has control of that matter. We can make no agreement as to how long it will run.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am trying to make a satisfactory agreement. I know how these things go, and I want to make it satisfactory, if I can.

Mr. MANN. Let the gentleman make a request for seven hours' debate and meet at 11 o'clock to-morrow.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that there be seven hours of general debate, one half to be controlled by myself and the other half by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. HUMPHREY], and that we meet at 11 o'clock to-morrow.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Florida moves that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the river and harbor bill, and pending that he asks unanimous consent that general debate be limited to seven hours, one half to be controlled by himself and the other half by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. HUMPHREY], and that the House meet to-morrow at 11 o'clock. Is there objection?

Mr. LONDON. Mr. Speaker, may I ask the gentleman from Florida whether I will be yielded 10 minutes by each side?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I will yield the gentleman 10 minutes.

Mr. LONDON. Will the gentleman from Washington yield 10 minutes to me?

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I do not like to deny the gentleman from New York, but I do not think the gentleman has a right to talk every time a bill comes up before the House.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I object.

The SPEAKER. What does the gentleman from Illinois object to?

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I object to the request of the gentleman from Florida for seven hours time if this is to be a part of the program.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. CHIPERFIELD] objects.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Speaker, at the suggestion of the gentleman from Illinois, our minority leader, I withdraw the objection.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois withdraws his objection. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Florida

to go into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the river and harbor bill.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of no quorum.

Mr. FITZGERALD. The House is dividing.

The SPEAKER. The Chair will count. [After counting.] the Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify the absentees, and the Clerk will call the roll.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 238, nays 95, answered "present" 3, not voting 97, as follows:

YEAS—238.

Abercrombie	Dooling	Key, Ohio	Roberts, Mass.
Adair	Doughton	Kincheloe	Rouse
Adamson	Eagle	Kinkaid	Rubey
Alexander	Estopinal	Kitchin	Rucker
Allen	Evaas	Konop	Russell, Mo.
Almon	Farley	Lafean	Sanford
Ashbrook	Farr	La Follette	Schall
Aswell	Ferris	Lazaro	Scott, Mich.
Austin	Fields	Lee	Sears
Ayres	Finley	Lesher	Shackelford
Bailey	Fitzgerald	Lever	Shallenberger
Barkley	Flood	Lieb	Sherley
Barnhart	Flynn	Linthicum	Sherwood
Beakes	Fordney	Littlepage	Sims
Bell	Foster	Lloyd	Sinnott
Black	Freeman	Loback	Sisson
Blackmon	Fuller	London	Slayden
Booho	Gandy	Longworth	Small
Borland	Gard	McAndrews	Smith, Idaho
Britt	Garner	McArthur	Smith, Minn.
Browning	Glynn	McCracken	Smith, N. Y.
Brumbaugh	Godwin, N. C.	McDermott	Smith, Tex.
Buchanan, Ill.	Godwin, Ark.	McKellar	Snell
Buchanan, Tex.	Gould	McLemore	Sparkman
Burgess	Gray, Ala.	Magee	Steagall
Butler	Greene, Mass.	Martin	Stedman
Byrnes, S. C.	Gregg	Matthews	Steele, Iowa
Byrns, Tenn.	Griffin	Mays	Stephens, Cal.
Caldwell	Hadley	Miller, Minn.	Stephens, Miss.
Callaway	Hamilton, Mich.	Miller, Pa.	Stephens, Nebr.
Candler, Miss.	Hamlin	Montague	Stephens, Tex.
Cantrill	Harrison	Moon	Stone
Capstick	Hastings	Moore, Pa.	Stout
Caraway	Hawley	Morgan, La.	Summers
Carlton	Hay	Moss, Ind.	Switzer
Carter, Okla.	Hayden	Mott	Taggart
Casey	Heflin	Murray	Tague
Charles	Helm	Neely	Talbott
Church	Hensley	Nicholls, S. C.	Tavenner
Cline	Hicks	Nolan	Taylor, Ark.
Coady	Hinds	Oakey	Thomas
Collier	Holland	Oglesby	Tillman
Connally	Hollingsworth	Oliver	Tinkham
Conry	Hood	O'Shaunessy	Treadway
Cooper, Wis.	Houston	Overmyer	Tripple
Costello	Howard	Padgett	Van Dyke
Cox	Huddleston	Park	Venable
Cramton	Hughes	Parker, N. Y.	Vinson
Crisp	Hulbert	Phelan	Watson, Pa.
Crosser	Hull, Iowa	Platt	Watson, Va.
Cullop	Hull, Tenn.	Pou	Webb
Curry	Humphreys, Miss.	Powers	Whaley
Davenport	Husted	Pratt	Wilson, Fla.
Davis, Tex.	Igoe	Quin	Wilson, La.
Decker	Jacoway	Ragsdale	Winslow
Dempsey	Johnson, Ky.	Rainey	Wise
Dickinson	Kearns	Raker	Young, N. Dak.
Dies	Kelley	Randal	
Dill	Kent	Rayburn	
Dixon	Kettner	Reilly	

NAYS—95.

Anderson	Focht	King	Russell, Ohio
Britten	Frear	Langley	Sells
Browne	Gardner	Lehbach	Sloan
Burke	Garland	Lenroot	Smith, Mich.
Campbell	Gillet	Lindbergh	Stafford
Cannon	Good	McClinic	Sterling
Carew	Gordon	McKinley	Sullivan
Carter, Mass.	Gray, Ind.	McLaughlin	Sweet
Chiperfield	Green, Iowa	Madden	Taylor, Colo.
Cooper, Ohio	Greene, Vt.	Mann	Thompson
Cooper, W. Va.	Hamilton, N. Y.	Mapes	Tilson
Crago	Haagen	Mondell	Timberlake
Dale, Vt.	Hayes	Moore, Ind.	Towner
Danforth	Heaton	Morgan, Okla.	Walsh
Denison	Helgesen	Nelson	Ward
Dillon	Helvering	Nichols, Mich.	Wasow
Doolittle	Hernandez	Norton	Wheeler
Dowell	Hill	Paige, Mass.	Williams, T. S.
Dunn	Hopwood	Parker, N. J.	Williams, Ohio
Ellsworth	Howell	Ramsayer	Wilson, Ill.
Elston	James	Reavis	Wood, Ind.
Emerson	Johnson, S. Dak.	Ricketts	Woods, Iowa
Esch	Kahn	Rogers	
Fess	Keating	Rowe	

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—3.

Glass Guernsey Humphrey, Wash.

NOT VOTING—97.

Aiken	Chandler, N. Y.	Dewalt	Fairchild
Anthony	Clark, Fla.	Doremus	Foss
Bacharach	Coleman	Driscoll	Gallagher
Barchfeld	Copley	Drukker	Gallivan
Beales	Dale, N. Y.	Dupré	Garrett
Bennet	Dallinger	Dyer	Graham
Bruckner	Darrow	Eagan	Gray, N. J.
Burnett	Davis, Minn.	Edmonds	Griest
Cary	Dent	Edwards	Hamil

Hardy	Loud	Page, N. C.	Slemp
Hart	McCulloch	Patten	Snyder
Haskell	McFadden	Peters	Steele, Pa.
Henry	McGillicuddy	Porter	Stiness
Hillard	McKenzie	Price	Sutherland
Hutchinson	Maher	Rauch	Swift
Johnson, Wash.	Meeker	Riordan	Vare
Jones	Miller, Del.	Roberts, Nev.	Volstead
Keister	Mooney	Rodenberg	Walker
Kennedy, Iowa	Morin	Watkins	Williams, W. E.
Kennedy, R. I.	Morrison	Sabath	Wingo
Kless, Pa.	Moss, W. Va.	Saunders	Young, Tex.
Kreider	Mudd	Scott, Pa.	
Lewis	North	Scully	
Liebel	Oldfield	Shouse	
Loft	Olney	Siegel	

So the motion was agreed to.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

For the session:

Mr. DEWALT with Mr. McFADDEN.

Until further notice:

Mr. McGILLICUDDY with Mr. GUERNSEY.

Mr. DENT with Mr. HULL of Iowa.

Mr. EDWARDS with Mr. KIESS of Pennsylvania.

Mr. GALLIVAN with Mr. JOHNSON of Washington.

Mr. WALKER with Mr. DARROW.

Mr. PATTEN with Mr. FAIRCHILD.

Mr. WINGO with Mr. CARY.

Mr. WM. ELZA WILLIAMS with Mr. GRIEST.

Mr. GALLAGHER with Mr. SNYDER.

Mr. LIEBEL with Mr. ROWLAND.

Mr. AIKEN with Mr. BACHARACH.

Mr. BRUCKNER with Mr. BENNET.

Mr. DALE of New York with Mr. MOONEY.

Mr. DRISCOLL with Mr. COLEMAN.

Mr. EAGAN with Mr. COPELY.

Mr. GARRETT with Mr. DALLINGER.

Mr. GLASS with Mr. SEEMP.

Mr. HAMILL with Mr. DRUKKER.

Mr. HARDY with Mr. EDMONDS.

Mr. HART with Mr. FOSS.

Mr. HENRY with Mr. LOUD.

Mr. MORRISON with Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington.

Mr. SABATH with Mr. NORTH (ending two weeks after March 30, 1916).

Mr. HILLIARD with Mr. GRAY of New Jersey.

Mr. JONES with Mr. HUTCHINSON.

Mr. DUPRÉ with Mr. KENNEDY of Iowa.

Mr. MAHER with Mr. KREIDER.

Mr. OLDFIELD with Mr. McCULLOCH.

Mr. OLNEY with Mr. MCKENZIE.

Mr. PAGE of North Carolina with Mr. MEEKER.

Mr. PRICE with Mr. MILLER of Delaware.

Mr. RAUCH with Mr. MORIN.

Mr. RIORDAN with Mr. MUDD.

Mr. SAUNDERS with Mr. PETERS.

Mr. SCULLY with Mr. RODENBERG.

Mr. SHOUSE with Mr. SCOTT of Pennsylvania.

Mr. STEELE of Pennsylvania with Mr. SUTHERLAND.

Mr. WATKINS with Mr. SWIFT.

Mr. BURNETT with Mr. SIEGEL.

Mr. LEWIS with Mr. ANTHONY.

Mr. LOFT with Mr. ROBERTS of Nevada.

Mr. CLARK of Florida with Mr. GRAHAM.

On the vote:

Mr. DOREMUS (for motion) with Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island (against).

Mr. YOUNG of Texas (for motion) with Mr. STINESS (against). Mr. GUERNSEY. Mr. Speaker, I voted "no," but, as I am paired, I desire to withdraw that vote and answer "present."

The name of Mr. GUERNSEY was called, and he answered, "Present."

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am paired with the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. MORRISON]. I voted "yea" and I desire to vote "present."

The name of Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington was called, and he answered, "Present."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill H. R. 12193, the rivers and harbors appropriation bill, with Mr. SHERLEY in the chair.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to dispense with the first reading of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, the bill totals in cash and authorizations \$39,608,410, the latter, however, only amounting

to \$1,710,000. This aggregate is made up exclusively, with one exception, of items for maintenance, prosecution of work on unfinished projects heretofore adopted, and surveys and contingencies. The exception is that part of the project for the improvement of East River, N. Y., set forth in House Document No. 188, Sixty-third Congress, first session, which provides for a channel 85 feet deep from New York Harbor to the Brooklyn Navy Yard.

The committee, as was the case no doubt with everyone else favorable to river and harbor legislation, deeply regretted the necessity for again leaving new projects out of the bill. The reasons for this were: Treasury conditions growing out of the European war, the necessity for making ample provisions for national preparedness, and the large number of adopted and uncompleted projects demanding attention.

The estimates submitted by the War Department for this bill amount to \$44,376,710—\$4,585,950 for maintenance, examinations, surveys, and contingencies; the balance, or \$39,790,760, for works of improvement. By going over the estimates, however, and considering carefully every item, we were enabled to make a net reduction of \$4,768,300, and that, too, in the judgment of the committee, without endangering or stinting the work on any project.

The total reduction was much greater than the net saving, amounting to \$7,498,300; but, in addition to the item for the improvement of a part of the East River, it was found necessary, on account of damage to several completed works by storms that visited a number of the Gulf ports last summer, to increase the appropriation for several of the harbors and channels in that section, mainly on the coast of Texas. In addition to these increases, others were found necessary in different parts of the country, but in each case the increase was made after and upon the advice of the engineers. Among these is a \$300,000 item for the Delaware River, which, however, is not an actual increase over the estimates, as this apparent increase forms a part of the \$600,000 authorization recommended by the chief in his annual report.

Another item is that for the further improvement of Pollock Rip, Nantucket Sound, Mass., appropriating \$150,000, but for which there was no original estimate. This work had been going on for some time, and when the estimates were made last June the advisability of an appropriation in this bill was not then apparent, but a later report, called for by resolution of the committee, showed the necessity for the amount we have given. This channel is the northerly passage off the shoals on the eastern entrance of Nantucket Sound connecting the deep water of the sound with that of the ocean and is traversed by an extensive coastwise traffic. It is stated that an average of nearly 50 vessels per day goes through this channel and that the commerce amounts to something like 20,000,000 tons annually. In its present shape it presents unusual dangers of collision, besides it is very difficult of navigation. The committee thought the work was sufficiently urgent to justify increasing the amount estimated to that extent.

Another item of increase is that of \$250,000 for Trinity River, Tex. The canalization of a part of this river has been going on since 1902, under a project calling for the construction of 37 locks and dams with incidental dredging and other open-channel work at an estimated cost for a 6-foot navigation of \$4,650,000. The main work of canalization, however, has been done on section 1, covering a stretch of the river of about 50 miles below Dallas, Tex. Only two of the locks and dams, 3 and 5, estimated to cost \$300,000 each, remain to be completed. But owing partly to the fact that an instrumental survey was pending for the purpose of determining, among other things, the number of locks and dams actually necessary below section 1, no estimate was furnished except one of \$50,000 for open-channel work. The report of the Chief of Engineers, however, suggested that while it would be better in case Congress should desire to go ahead with the work on locks and dams 3 and 5 to furnish the entire amount of \$600,000, he stated that if it should be decided to make provision for only a year's work, \$150,000 for each lock and dam should be appropriated. After the making of this report, however, the people of Dallas, who are very desirous that the work should go on without delay, offered to contribute \$100,000 toward the same, being one-sixth of the amount of the estimated cost of the two locks.

But the committee, feeling that it would answer the purposes as well to arrange for only one year's work, concluded to appropriate \$250,000 on condition that local interests furnish \$50,000 more, the whole making an aggregate of \$300,000, it being understood that in a subsequent bill the balance of the \$300,000 could be furnished in like proportions by Congress and by local interests. It is proper to say that the people of Dallas have already contributed somewhat liberally to that

improvement, having heretofore furnished \$60,000 for the construction of locks and dams in this first section and, in addition, the necessary lands for the same. The first section is not embraced in the provision for a reexamination of the river, and the importance of finishing the work in this section is based upon the belief that it will add very materially to the length of the period each year during which navigation may be carried on, and thus greatly increase the use of the river to the people at and near Dallas and throughout the river valley.

A much larger sum was offered by local interests in case the entire project should be adopted in this bill, but that was impractical, owing partly to the fact that the reexamination has not been completed, but I am informed that the offer will hold good until the survey is before Congress and that body has had time to act upon it. I wish to say further that the offer of local assistance evinced a confidence in the worth of the proposed improvement that appealed very strongly to the committee, for if those on the ground and supposedly to be benefited by the improvement are willing to aid so materially in the work it is evident that they believe it will be valuable and that they are in earnest in their desire to use the river.

One of the largest items in the bill is one of \$6,000,000 for the further improvement of the Mississippi River from Head of Passes to the mouth of the Ohio River. This money is to be expended, as the paragraph will show, under the direction of the Secretary of War and in accordance with plans, specifications, and recommendations of the Mississippi River Commission, as approved by the Chief of Engineers, for the general improvement of the river, for the building of levees between Head of Passes and Cape Girardeau, Mo., and for surveys in such manner as in their opinion shall best improve navigation and promote the interests of commerce at all stages of the river.

This work has now been going on actively by the Government in conjunction with levee districts and the States bordering on the Mississippi since about 1879, when the Mississippi River Commission was created, during which time and down to June 30, 1915, the Government expended \$32,320,178.07 for levee building alone, and for revetment and other works of improvement \$44,737,968.93. The States and levee districts have, however, expended a much larger sum for that purpose, the amount being \$81,093,644. This would show that the Government has been paying apparently 40 per cent of the amount of levee construction. Of course this should measure the value of that class of work to navigation, as the money has been furnished on that theory. There is no way to determine this accurately, and in making the allotments the Chief of Engineers has very likely taken a liberal view of the matter, as Congress and the people of the country probably intend he should. There is no doubt, however, but that the levees contribute to some considerable extent toward the stability and integrity of the bed of the river, and in that way benefit commerce and navigation. It is estimated that the amount still needed to complete the levee line is about \$45,000,000, which, according to the proportion heretofore furnished by the Government, would leave about \$18,000,000 to be furnished by the Federal Government.

Attention, however, should be called to a further provision in connection with the item of \$6,000,000 just mentioned, practically extending the jurisdiction of the Mississippi River Commission over levee building from the mouth of the Ohio to Rock Island, Ill.; hence if that provision remains in the bill a part of whatever funds are appropriated will be used on that stretch of the river. The amount of construction between the mouth of the Ohio and Rock Island, I believe, has never been accurately determined, but it is supposed that only a small sum, relatively speaking, will be required for that work.

There are 271 items of appropriation in the bill—180 for maintenance and 91 for works of improvement. The sum necessary to complete unfinished projects heretofore adopted, according to the original estimates, is about \$230,000,000. But owing to the abandonment of portions of several projects and the completion of others within the limits of the estimated cost, the entire sum may not be needed; in fact, it may be reduced eventually as much as \$10,000,000; but even then there will remain \$220,000,000 to be appropriated. It may, hence, be seen that it will require several more bills, unless larger amounts are furnished in those yet to come, before the entire sum needed to finish these works is finally appropriated. But the smaller projects are being rapidly finished, and in two or three years more there will only be left of the older and larger ones, such as the Mississippi River and its principal tributaries, the Ohio and Missouri, requiring now about \$150,000,000 to complete. But as the work on these is expected to cover relatively long periods, and only to require money to continue the work from year to year, the appropriations for old projects should not, after the passage of one or two more river and harbor bills, reach the

figures in the present measure. I would like also to emphasize the fact that after deducting the \$150,000,000 required for the Mississippi River and its two main tributaries from the \$220,000,000, the probable net sum to finish old projects, only about \$70,000,000 are left to complete all those outside of the three just mentioned, which could easily be covered by two such measures as this.

By reference to the bill it will be noted that there is a considerable falling off in surveys as compared with the number in the bill of 1915, there being 180 in that while there are only 84 in this. This reduction at least suggests that the demand for waterway improvement is being rapidly met and that as soon as the large amounts necessary to complete the projects now underway are furnished subsequent bills should show a marked decrease in the number of projects adopted and, consequently, of the amounts appropriated.

It will also be noted that a few waterways for which appropriations are made, either for maintenance or for continuing improvement, accommodate relatively a very small freight tonnage. This is perhaps traceable in some instances to the fact that the projects have not been completed so as to furnish the facilities intended, or, if completed, a sufficient time has not elapsed to permit of their full utilization. In other cases the small tonnage may be traced to a depression in business or to local causes of a temporary character. But there are not many of such works—only about 27 in number—with amounts appropriated in this bill ranging from \$1,000 to \$209,000 and aggregating \$855,100; the waterways, however, only accommodating a commerce amounting to 223,651 tons, though this commerce is valued at \$11,841,296.

All of these waterways, especially the rivers and intracoastal canals, traverse sections of country rich in agricultural, mineral, forestry, or other industrial possibilities, and it is believed they will eventually and at no distant day become useful arteries of commerce. To my mind it is inconceivable they should not do so or that they will not eventually pay to the people of the country at least a fair return upon their cost by furnishing means for cheaper and more convenient transportation. For these reasons the committee has thought best to continue work on them, at least for the coming year, in the hope that increased benefits will follow. I for one believe it would be foolish to abandon them until they have had a fair trial. Then, and after a reasonable time, if adequate results do not follow, further work upon such as are found unsatisfactory may be discontinued.

Now, three minority reports have been filed—one by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. HUMPHREY]; another by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. TREADWAY]; and still a third by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FEAR]. The first was based upon a single ground, the inclusion in the bill of the item for the opening of that portion of East River, N. Y., from deep water in New York Bay to the Brooklyn or New York Navy Yard, so as to give a 35-foot depth where only 30 feet, perhaps a little less, exists now, and that through a narrow, tortuous, and more or less dangerous channel, the purpose being to furnish a depth of water such that the largest naval vessels can at all times reach the yard. As just stated, the committee decided not to insert new projects in the present measure, but later, and before the preparation of the bill was finished, we received a communication from the President urging, in the interest of national preparedness, an appropriation for the improvement of the East River at the point mentioned. The letter is upon such as are found unsatisfactory may be discontinued.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, February 11, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. SPARKMAN: The President directs me to say to you that he is strongly of the opinion that the pending river and harbor bill should carry an appropriation for the immediate improvement of the East River adjacent to the Brooklyn Navy Yard. He fully appreciates the fact that this would be contrary to the rule of the committee not to recommend appropriations for new projects at this time, but he feels that the importance of the matter in its relation to the question of national preparedness fully justifies an exception to the rule.

The President understands that Secretary Daniels has fully explained this matter to the committee.

Sincerely yours,

J. P. TUMULTY,
Secretary to the President.

In addition to this request of the President, we had before us representatives both of the Navy and War Departments, Admiral Benson and Capt. Knapp appearing for the former, and Col. Black, of the Engineer Corps, for the latter. In this hearing it appeared that the navy yard, the largest and most commodious in the country, capable of receiving and docking ships with a draft of 32 feet 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches, can only be reached by a channel 30 feet in depth at mean low water. Furthermore, it is the only navy yard on the Atlantic equipped with facilities for building battleships. It was further suggested that a ship which can easily go through the channel now might be so disabled in battle or otherwise as to require a much greater depth than

necessary in her normal condition, and that without the increased depth she might be rendered inactive and useless at a critical period in our national affairs. Now, when to these considerations are added the request of the President, the one who stands at the head of our Military and Naval Establishment, who, by reason of his position, is, or should be, at all times familiar with our foreign relations, and who, under the Constitution, directs our diplomatic activities, it seems to me that an exceptional case is presented and that the needed improvements should be made without delay. I may add that while this emergency work only costs \$700,000, the whole East River project, covering the entire river, calls for work to cost about \$13,000,000. This work in its entirety should, in the interest of commerce, be adopted in the near future, but the committee did not think it advisable to undertake any more in this bill than is absolutely necessary to furnish an adequate channel to the navy yard.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Does the appropriation made in this bill for reaching the navy yard apply only to that particular channel project, or is it the beginning of a movement up the East River?

Mr. SPARKMAN. It applies only to this particular project, but is a part of the East River project, a very small part, however; about one-twentieth.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. And it pertains only to the approaches to the navy yard?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Only to the approaches.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. This being the only new project that comes in this bill, were there other worthy projects that might be regarded as this was, a war-project necessity, brought to the attention of the committee?

Mr. SPARKMAN. There were other projects brought to the attention of the committee, but the committee did not consider them as urgent as this.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. This is the only one on which the President made an urgent request of the committee?

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is correct.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. And it is confined to the approaches of the navy yard for the purpose of getting vessels in and out?

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is true.

The minority report also says that many other items of equal or greater merit were voted down in the committee. Perhaps there were such viewed from the standpoint of commercial importance, but none that was on a par with the New York item from the viewpoint of national preparedness. If there were such, they were not presented to the committee, nor was its attention call to them by anyone.

The only other item that presents conditions at all similar is the navy yard at Charleston, S. C., the difference between it and the yard at New York being one of degree in the matter of importance. While the Charleston yard has a dry dock that can accommodate vessels drawing more than 30 feet, unlike the Brooklyn Navy Yard it has no shipbuilding plant, its equipment being only for repairs. I believe, however, that a shipbuilding slip is soon to be located there, but when completed it will only accommodate, so I am advised, tugs and possibly torpedo boats.

Like the New York Navy Yard, however, the channel leading to the Charleston yard is of less depth than are the slips or dry docks. While the latter can accommodate vessels of 30 feet draft, the former only has an available depth of 26 feet.

Mr. TREADWAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Certainly.

Mr. TREADWAY. The gentleman refers to the Charleston (S. C.) Dry Dock as being the only one where large ships could be constructed?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I said where battleships could be constructed.

Mr. TREADWAY. May I not ask if Boston has not both a dry dock in course of construction and a navy yard already equipped?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I understand the Government has a navy yard there, with a dry dock, but I understand, further, that it can accommodate vessels of only 8,000 tons.

Mr. TREADWAY. May I further interrupt the gentleman to ask as to the probable capacity, or expected capacity, of the dry dock at Boston now under construction?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I understand there is a dry dock to be constructed there by the State—it may be in process of construction—that will accommodate very large vessels. I am not advised as to the size of the vessels it is designed to accommodate, but I understand it is to be a very large dry dock.

Mr. TREADWAY. Is it not in evidence that it will accommodate the largest vessels either constructed or in expectation of construction?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I could not state as to that.

Mr. TREADWAY. I will be glad to inform the committee later in respect to that.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I wish to say here that they have ample water at Boston to reach the Government navy yard there; that any vessel that the dry dock can accommodate can easily reach the yard.

Mr. WHALEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Certainly.

Mr. WHALEY. Did not the President communicate with the gentleman respecting the Charleston project?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. WHALEY. Did not the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral Benson also write letters urging the adoption of the project?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I will say to the gentleman that the President did have a conversation with me, in which he suggested that I take into consideration this navy yard, together with the advisability of deepening the approaches thereto, and suggested that if, after considering it, the committee thought that it presented an urgent case he would be pleased to have us take care of it in this bill.

Mr. WHALEY. Did he not also ask the gentleman to consult the naval officers about it?

Mr. SPARKMAN. He did.

Mr. WHALEY. And the gentleman received a letter from the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral Benson?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I did at least get a letter from Admiral Benson about it. I may have received one from the Secretary.

Mr. WHALEY. He sent me a copy of the one he sent to the gentleman.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Then, I undoubtedly received it.

Mr. HULBERT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman whether the dry dock which it is intended to construct at Boston referred to by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. TREADWAY], is to be built by the Federal Government or the State government?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I understand there is one to be constructed there by the State government, and perhaps that is the one to which the gentleman refers. There is also a navy yard with a dry dock owned by the Government there.

Mr. HULBERT. But over the dry dock to which the gentleman from Massachusetts referred the Secretary of the Navy or the Federal authorities would not exercise any jurisdiction. That would be dependent entirely upon whatever courtesy might be extended to them by the State of Massachusetts.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes; but I would say to the gentleman that if the State should construct a shipbuilding plant there for large vessels, the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, as would Congress, I think, feel inclined to aid in such channel improvement as would furnish ample water to the dock.

Mr. HULBERT. On the theory that it was for commercial purposes?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Oh, yes; largely on that theory, though not entirely.

Mr. TREADWAY. Mr. Chairman, would I be intruding on the gentleman if at this point I should answer directly the question the gentleman from New York [Mr. HULBERT] has just submitted relative to Federal control over the navy yard or dry-dock?

Mr. SPARKMAN. The gentleman may proceed if it is only a short statement he wishes to make.

Mr. TREADWAY. Just a word. I desire, Mr. Chairman, through the courtesy of the gentleman speaking, to quote from the report of the Secretary of the Navy submitted to Congress December 15, 1915, in which he says:

This monumental work involving an expenditure by the State of Massachusetts of well over \$3,000,000 will afford naval and dry-dock facilities in this important harbor superior in extent and size to that available at any other American port.

And I call the attention of the gentleman from New York especially to this clause—

and by arrangement give the United States Government control and paramount use of the dock in time of war.

I thank the chairman of the Rivers and Harbors Committee for his courtesy.

Mr. SPARKMAN. With reference to the Government Navy Yard at Boston I wish to say that it can accommodate vessels drawing 29.6 feet.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Is that the Government dock or the State dock?

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is the Government dock.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. The State dock is 1,200 feet long, much longer than the other.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes; the State dry dock is to have a much greater capacity.

The minority report submitted by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. TREADWAY], while lacking in clearness as to what is meant by good and bad projects, is quite definite in other respects. For instance, it is clear beyond peradventure, that the bill is not such as he would have framed if he had prepared it all by himself, without being hampered or troubled with the views and voting power of the other 20 members of the committee, and that unless it is changed in this House to suit him it will not have his support. That is to be regretted for several reasons. In the first place, I, for one, would be glad to have him in accord with us. I would like to know that one with the standing the gentleman has attained in this House, even during the short time he has been here, who has shown such an interest in river and harbor matters and such an intelligent grasp of the subject as the gentleman has shown, is with us.

In the next place, we would indeed be pleased to have him vote for the bill whether it is amended to suit him or not. But such things will occasionally happen in and out of legislative bodies, and especially is that true in one like this where the principles of representative government are recognized and where there are 434 other members to be consulted. Nevertheless, it is the gentleman's privilege to give expression to his own views and to vote against the bill if his judgment so dictates. But even though the gentleman leaves us in the dark as to the items which he would condemn and as to some other objections he has to the bill, I may, I think, without doing him any injustice, summarize his views as follows:

That we are appropriating more money than the conditions of the Treasury will justify; that the amount appropriated is greater than necessary to take care of the projects under way; that too much is appropriated for some unnamed projects; that appropriations are made for projects without merit; that the committee has followed the usual procedure in making up the bill; and last, but not least, that we are appropriating money for very shallow streams on which boats can with difficulty run now. Well, it is too bad that the gentleman should find fault with the bill on that account. Why, Mr. Chairman, that is the very purpose of this class of legislation. That is why we have river and harbor bills. If harbors or rivers or even the creeks were deep enough to meet the demands of commerce we would not have to improve them. That is why in earlier days we appropriated money for the Connecticut, Merrimac, Malden, Taunton, and other rivers partly or wholly in the gentleman's own State, some of them in their original condition quite as shallow as those unnamed streams which the gentleman likely had in mind when he was framing his report. That also was the reason for the improvement of the St. Marys River at the falls, which, in its original condition, could float nothing except logs and very small craft, but which now, by reason of the improvement made, carries more than 50,000,000 tons of commerce annually. The same may be said of hundreds of other waterways originally of little value but now of great use to the country. No; Mr. Chairman, it is not the shallowness of the stream that should alone influence us, but the relative cost and advantages to come from the improvement as well.

That we are appropriating too much I deny, if we are going to do the work at all. Our purpose was to furnish no more and no less than is necessary to prosecute the work on each project until another bill can be framed and passed, and that is what I hope and believe we have accomplished. To have done more would have been foolish extravagance; to have done less would have been criminal negligence.

I know something of the way this bill was framed, and I can truthfully say that no river and harbor bill during the past 20 years has received greater care in its preparation than has this measure. Not a recommendation by the engineers but was carefully considered in all its details. This the gentleman knows if he gave the care and attention to the bill and its preparation that each Member should bestow upon such matters, and which the gentleman did bestow on the preparation of this bill, as he was present, I believe, at every important meeting of the committee.

I have called attention to the fact that there are on the books \$230,000,000 of old projects; that is, projects heretofore adopted and yet to complete. A little later, if I have time, I will, in view of past and present efforts to inject sectionalism into the consideration of this and the last two river and harbor bills, call attention to the dates these projects were adopted. For the present I will only say we have them on the books, and if they are to be completed the work should go on with a reasonable degree of speed until they are finished; otherwise great waste

will be the result. And I want to say further that one object in excluding new projects from this bill was that we might deal more liberally with those we have on hand and push them to completion as rapidly as possible.

Of course the gentleman no doubt thinks that some of them, which, however, he has not mentioned, ought not to receive appropriations at all. It may be that there are some on the books which, in the light of subsequent events, might at the time of adoption have waited and given place to others more urgent. Still, I believe them all meritorious and, when finished, that they will be of great benefit to the commerce of the country, both local and general. The work upon them is well advanced, many nearing completion, and it would be the height of folly to stop their improvement now. That is my own opinion, but when they are reached under the five-minute rule anyone may move to strike them out. Then the House can do as it pleases with them.

Even now, however, I would like to ask the critics of river and harbor legislation, and who may wish to eliminate certain projects from this bill, where they will draw the line between the good and the bad, what would be their standard of excellence, and upon what will they base such standard? Will they base it upon a certain proportion of cost to tonnage, or of cost to freight value, or both? If upon the proportion of cost to commerce, will they consider present commerce alone, or both present and future? If the latter, then a wide field is opened up and many things are to be taken into account, such as the possibilities of agricultural and industrial development, and the furnishing of additional and cheaper means of transportation as a result of a proposed work.

Then again, what will be the proportion of cost to tonnage and value? Should it be 1 to 2, 1 to 5, 1 to 50, or what would we fix as the proportion? I only mention this to show the difficulties in the way of anyone when he essayes the task of selecting projects to be improved from those which should not be.

The truth is that no fixed standard can be erected. Each tub must stand upon its own bottom; each project upon its own merits. The Committee on Rivers and Harbors and the House heretofore have acted upon that plan and in doing so have tried to be just and fair. They may have made mistakes now and then, but not many. Indeed my opinion is that mistakes have been less frequent in river and harbor bills than in any other class of legislation.

Mr. FREAR. May I ask the gentleman a question?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. FREAR. I desire to ask if the suggestion the gentleman makes is not answered quite fully by Col. Townsend, who in the case of the Mississippi and the other rivers of the Mississippi Valley urges that we leave 58 river projects in *status quo* and make completed experiments in two cases, and then when those are successfully completed we are to wait and find whether they will carry any appreciable freight.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I will say to my friend that Col. Townsend neither follows nor suggests any rule, but would do what he proposes arbitrarily.

Mr. FREAR. May I interrupt further to ask, if the chairman pleases, if there is no means by which we can drop any of these projects when once begun?

Mr. SPARKMAN. This House can do it whenever it likes, either with or without the committee's recommendation; but when it acts it must do so arbitrarily, as I know of no fixed standard by which it can be done. I want to say most emphatically that this committee invites the closest scrutiny of any and every item in this bill. If there is anything in it that ought not, in the opinion of the majority of this House, to be there, let it be stricken out. That is what we are here for.

Mr. SLOAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Certainly.

Mr. SLOAN. I desire to make a suggestion to the Chair, that this executive session, apparently, going on down in the pit may be interesting to those who are participating, but really the committee would like to hear what is going on.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the gentleman come nearer the throne and not remain in the outskirts. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I will.

Mr. STAFFORD. Will the gentleman advise the committee whether in any instance the committee has refused to appropriate for any project which is of a questionable character, so far as future tonnage is concerned?

Mr. SPARKMAN. In this particular bill?

Mr. STAFFORD. As far as the present bill is concerned.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Oh, we cut several; two or three on that ground, but the most of them because the money recommended was not needed.

Mr. STAFFORD. Does not the gentleman believe that it is a good business principle for the Government to follow that when it launches into a project which, after appropriation and development, is shown to the committee is no longer worthy of exploitation, that it should be abandoned?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Most assuredly.

Mr. STAFFORD. There are many such projects?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I do not think so.

Mr. STAFFORD. I understood, if the gentleman will permit me further, that he stated that as a usual thing the policy followed by the committee was that when once the Government launched into a project it should not be abandoned until fully completed and determined whether it was worthy of indorsement. To that policy the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. TREADWAY] as a business proposition takes issue in his report by what I believe is good business policy, namely, to abandon the work when once shown not to be worthy of support by reason of the commerce that might develop in the future.

Mr. SPARKMAN. The gentleman has not expressed my views with entire correctness. I believe that whether a project has been adopted or not it should not receive an appropriation if it is not going to be of sufficient benefit to commerce to justify the appropriation. The difficulty is to determine that question. But if, in the opinion of the committee, when the matter is under consideration there, or of the House when here, it is not worthy, it ought to be left out.

Mr. STAFFORD. At that time?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes; at that time.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Is there any way of determining the future commerce to which the gentleman refers until the channel is constructed?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I know of no way by which this can be done accurately. We can only guess.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Is there any way of determining the tonnage of a railroad until the railroad is completed and operated?

Mr. SPARKMAN. No; and I will say that I have known railroads that had been constructed for years before they began to pay.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. And there must be some expenditure before we can determine the question?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. I think that answers the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. STAFFORD].

Mr. HULBERT. I would like to ask the chairman of the committee if there was not a provision in the last bill calling upon the Chief of Engineers to investigate and report whether there were such projects then in the course of construction that were not worthy of further improvement, and if the investigation pursuant to that act is not now in progress?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes; and the engineers are investigating and reporting as fast as they can.

Mr. HULBERT. And have not such projects as have been reported unworthy by the Chief of Engineers been omitted from consideration in this bill?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I would not say that.

Mr. FREAR. May I interrupt just once more?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Let me answer the question a little more fully. We had two under consideration when preparing this bill upon which reports had been made recommending their complete or partial abandonment. One was at Sandy Bay, Mass., and known as the Sandy Bay harbor of refuge; the other was the Arkansas River. The Sandy Bay proposition came before us and was referred back to the board for further consideration, the committee not being satisfied with certain features of the report. The board only recommended a partial abandonment of the Arkansas River project, and after looking into it we found that the Government had within the last two years constructed two very expensive dredge boats for the purpose of making a test of the efficiency of the plan under which work was being done on that river. These dredges had only been recently constructed, and, after consideration, the committee did not think it wise to withhold an appropriation at this time, but that we should keep these boats in operation at least during the next fiscal year and until a thorough or a better test has been made.

Mr. FREAR. May I interrupt?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. FREAR. Referring directly to the appropriation for the Arkansas River, which, as I recollect, carries over \$300,000, does it not?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I think it is \$200,000.

Mr. FREAR. Does not the gentleman think it is a rather expensive experiment to spend \$200,000 in order to keep two dredge boats busy, when the Army engineers, after an expenditure of \$3,000,000 on that river, have determined and recom-

mended that the project should be abandoned? In the face of that recommendation the committee indorsed it. And in answer to the suggestion of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MOORE] as to the importance of completing a project in every case before determination can be had of its usefulness, is it not a fact that the past expenditure of \$20,000,000 on a project that only carried 19,377 tons last year of actual commerce is evidence of a questionable policy? This bill appropriates \$1,500,000 more for that particular project. Have we not given it a fair test after 20 or 30 years?

Mr. SPARKMAN. To what project does the gentleman refer?

Mr. FREAR. To the project of the gentleman at my right, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BORLAND], for the Missouri River.

Mr. BORLAND. The gentleman is mistaken; the project was reported favorably.

Mr. FREAR. This was in reply to the suggestion as to completing a project before you can get the commerce.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I would not like to be led off into a discussion of that project just now. When we reach the five-minute rule I am willing, in so far as I can give the matter direction, to accord gentlemen such time as may be reasonable in which to discuss that and all others the merits of which are questioned.

But to return to the minority report of the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. Chairman, I am not impressed with the criticism that we have pursued the usual methods in framing this bill. The gentleman has not suggested a better plan; and until one is found what should we do but follow the one we have? Besides, what are the usual methods? Why, those, with modifications from time to time, we have been pursuing for nearly a century. These are, first, a survey ordered by Congress, which is made by the district engineer, whose report is reviewed by the division engineer, by the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, and finally by the Chief of Engineers, whose decision is final. It thus passes under the scrutiny of at least nine engineers, none of whom, except perhaps the district officer, is below the rank of colonel, the chief being a brigadier general.

If all, or even the Chief of Engineers, reports adversely, nothing further is done; but if instead the report is favorable, then the final survey and estimate are made, the report upon which is in turn reviewed by the same officials. Both reports are then sent to Congress in one document. If the finding is unfavorable, nothing more is usually done; but if favorable, then the Committee on Rivers and Harbors considers it, giving it the closest scrutiny, and may or may not recommend it to the House for adoption. And in this connection I may say that we have before us many projects favorably reported calling for millions of dollars to complete, but which, on account of the fact that we have not considered them urgent or worthy, have not adopted them and are not likely to do so.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Certainly.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN. The gentleman says if the report is unfavorable, the recommendation is that no action be taken. It, of course, rests with Congress, does it not?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I said, as a rule nothing further is done with it.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN. Does the gentleman mean to say that a committee of this House ties itself up absolutely to follow the report of the engineers?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I was referring to the practice of the River and Harbor Committee, which we have been following for the last 10 or 15 years. Under that practice we do not consider a project that has been turned down by the engineers.

Mr. McLAUGHLIN. You follow them absolutely and do not use your own judgment and discretion at all? Is that the idea?

Mr. SPARKMAN. The gentleman is very nearly correct. We have to have some rule and draw a line somewhere between the good and the bad, and that rule has usually worked well. The House can always correct us when we make a mistake; but the House up to date has followed the committee pretty closely in that particular. Now, all know the course pursued after a bill appropriating for a project or projects reaches this body. I will not go into details, only saying that the items in no appropriation bill, coming from any committee, receive any closer scrutiny than do the items entering into the various river and harbor bills from the time the surveys are ordered to the point where they finally reach the President for his signature, nor is there any around which greater safeguards against mistakes are thrown than those measures.

Mr. Chairman, these are the usual methods, the whole constituting a system founded upon experience and having the ap-

proval of the ablest and the best minds of the country, a system which has been in existence for three-quarters of a century and under which the navigable capacity of more than 25,000 miles of inland waterways and upward of 300 harbors—ocean, gulf, and lake, have been increased from primitive and unsatisfactory conditions until, with few exceptions, they are keeping pace with the demands of a rapidly growing commerce, a commerce amounting to more than 870,000,000 tons annually, and valued, it has been estimated, at more than \$22,000,000,000.

These great results have been attained at a cost of only \$800,000,000, and the work accomplished has gone on until at least three-quarters of that necessary to place all our rivers and harbors in first-class condition has been completed or is now under way. I hence submit that, after all these great results have been achieved, we should not lightly discard the system that has brought them to us.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Certainly.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I will ask the gentleman to repeat the figures of expenditures for rivers and harbors, as he has them there, from the beginning on up.

Mr. SPARKMAN. About \$800,000,000.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. About \$800,000,000 for the work of improving rivers and harbors for the purposes of commerce in the United States?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Will the gentleman allow me to interject into his remarks right there this very interesting comparison of figures, that during the 40 years up to 1907, while a less amount than he has mentioned was expended for the commercial development of rivers and harbors within the United States, we had spent \$8,900,000,000 for the Army and Navy and the pensions of the country, showing that the great plod horse that bears up the interests of the country is the least encouraged agency for material advancement that now occupies the public mind?

Mr. SPARKMAN. The gentleman is correct in that, and I thank him for the interruption.

Now, some gentlemen here and elsewhere are accustomed to point to the treatment of the waterways of Europe, mainly those of Germany, Belgium, and France, as examples worthy of imitation or as furnishing standards of comparison by which it is sought to place our waterways and our treatment of them at a disadvantage, the argument being that we, under our system, have been woefully extravagant, while under theirs the improvements have been made with the minimum of economy resulting in the maximum of efficiency.

Well, let us see. The 25,226 miles of our inland waterways have cost for improvement and maintenance since the beginning of the Government \$514,982,612 for the rivers, or \$19,807 per mile, while the inland waterways of Prussia have cost, for original work and maintenance, \$56,400 per mile. Those of Belgium, \$102,397 per mile. Those of France, \$63,065, per mile. At the same rate of expenditure as that in Prussia the cost here, instead of \$19,807, would have been \$1,479,136 per mile. At the same rate as in France, the cost here would have been \$1,653,942, while at the same cost as in Belgium it would have been \$2,685,000 per mile.

Mr. FREAR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman pardon an interruption there?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. FREAR. By way of illustration, is it not true that the gentleman has included nearly a thousand miles of the upper Missouri River on which there is not a single steamboat to-day?

Mr. SPARKMAN. It embraces all the navigable portions of that river.

Mr. FREAR. And it is not used for navigation to-day?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Oh, yes; the statistics show that it has some commerce. Just what the amount is I do not recall just now.

Mr. FREAR. It is only slight.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. It has had some commerce on it during the period in which this \$800,000,000 was expended?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. And that commerce has diminished or departed since that time?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes; but we are in hopes it will come back again. I believe it will.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Certainly.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. Just to get an explanation. The gentleman says that prior to the time the \$800,000,000 was expended the commerce was greater. I understand the \$800,000,000 of expenditure was made since the beginning of the Government. What does the gentleman mean?

Mr. FREAR. Those expenditures were \$850,000,000, instead of \$800,000,000, and they have been made since 1875, have they not? And prior to that time the commerce on the Missouri River was greater by far than it is now.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. The \$800,000,000, as I understood it, was expended going clear back to the organization of the Government.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is right.

Mr. FREAR. The Engineers' reports show that \$850,000,000 was appropriated.

Mr. SPARKMAN. We are talking about the expenditures. Eight hundred and fifty million dollars may have been appropriated, but there have been only about \$800,000,000 expended.

Mr. BARCHFELD. Mr. Chairman, will my friend yield there?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. BARCHFELD. The gentleman refers to that happy day before our Government proceeded to improve rivers and harbors by appropriations. I suppose he refers to the day of the aborigine, when the Indian pursued his happy way in his lovely canoe. That is the commerce that the gentleman from Wisconsin would like to see to-day. [Laughter.]

Mr. FREAR. Pardon me; may I answer there? That is hardly a fair reply, it would seem. Many years ago, before the time of which the gentleman speaks, 1875, there was commerce upon the upper Missouri River, and boats were running there. It had actual navigation. To-day practically none. There is but one boat running, according to the statement furnished to the committee, from Sioux City to Kansas City.

Mr. BORLAND. Between Sioux City and Omaha.

Mr. FREAR. Yes; between Sioux City and Omaha, after all the expenditure, which has been very large, as the chairman well said. I am in favor, I will say in answer to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, of legitimate waterway improvement where it brings results.

Mr. BARCHFELD. Just there, will the gentleman permit me another interrogatory?

Mr. FREAR. With the consent of the Chairman I will, if I can reply.

Mr. BARCHFELD. Does not the gentleman think that when the mighty Missouri is improved there will be a restoration of that commerce which that section of the country so badly needs? I want to say that there is to-day a legitimate commerce between Kansas City and St. Louis.

Mr. BURGESS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield, and to whom?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I will yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FREAR].

Mr. FREAR. I desire to answer the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BARCHFELD], and say this: According to the Deakyne report, from Kansas City to the mouth of the river there was a saving of \$10,000 made in freights in 1914 by use of that waterway, irrespective of whether the boats were carrying it at a profit or not. For that saving of \$10,000 during 1914 in freight rates, he estimates it will cost the Government \$1,100,000 every year for interest and annual maintenance. That is according to his report, is it not?

Mr. BORLAND. Now, let me answer the gentleman in a word.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes; I would like to have the gentleman do that, but I wish to proceed with my statement, and, when through, will be glad to answer any questions gentlemen may wish to ask.

Mr. BORLAND. If the gentleman will look back over the history of the Missouri River at the time he speaks of, just prior to and after the Civil War, he will find that the boats were wrecked every few years; and we could restore commerce on the Missouri River to-day on the same terms as existed then if we had no railroad competition, because a boat then had to charge enormous freight rates, sufficient to enable it almost to make its cost in a single season. At that rate you could put commerce on any river, anywhere, at any time, but to-day you must have an improved channel in order to put commerce on it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. The gentleman's statement is, I think, correct.

Mr. EAGLE. If the gentleman will allow me, I think an accurate statement of the figures may be illuminative of the controversy that has arisen between the gentlemen down in the

pit just now. It so happens that since 1875 the exact amount of the appropriations made for rivers and harbors during the 40 years up to June 30 last is \$680,552,501.01, according to the report of the Chief of Engineers. The excess above that was spent at a time prior to 1875.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Is the gentleman dealing with expenditures or appropriations?

Mr. EAGLE. Both.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. I have the figures here, and they come from the Appropriation Committee, and the amount for 40 years from 1875 up to and including 1914 is just what the gentleman from Texas [Mr. EAGLE] states—six hundred and eighty million and odd dollars.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. I should like to ask one question.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Certainly.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. I notice in the speech of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FREAR] made on January 13 that he made the following statement:

Mr. Speaker, we have paid out of the Government Treasury over \$850,000,000 for waterways.

Now, has \$850,000,000 been paid out of the Treasury in actual money?

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is not my understanding, and I have gone over the matter very closely. I think the error of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FREAR] arose from the fact that he was considering appropriations rather than expenditures.

Mr. FREAR. Unquestionably. Almost anyone would understand that by reading the speech as a whole. That was the intention.

Mr. SPARKMAN. But the gentleman called me to task a while ago and insisted that I was wrong when I used the word "expenditures."

Mr. FREAR. I did not get the distinction the gentleman made at the time.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I think if the gentleman will look over his speech he will find that he did not make that distinction.

Mr. FREAR. No; I presume that was an error in expression. The chairman says the amount is \$800,000,000, but it is impossible to say what the exact expenditure has been since the last report.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. Will the gentleman allow me to make one comment right there?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Certainly.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. I do not think a gentleman should be obliged to read 40 or 50 pages of a speech to find out what it means, when a gentleman says that more than \$850,000,000 has been paid out of the Treasury. [Applause.]

Mr. FREAR. Mr. Chairman, pardon me just one moment in reply.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. I was entirely misled by that statement of the gentleman.

Mr. FREAR. The gentleman makes a criticism upon his colleague from his own State. Ordinarily I do not resent that, but I will say that the gentleman followed me so closely throughout the last session that he ought to have known what the facts were from an independent investigation.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I do not care to yield any further at this time.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. I want to say just one word more.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, I guess I will have to yield to my general friend from Wisconsin.

Mr. FREAR. Which one?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Both are general, but I refer to the one who is now speaking, for the time being.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. The gentleman, on the second page of his speech, says:

We have paid out of the Government Treasury over \$850,000,000 for our waterways.

Now, will the gentleman allow me to interject right there this one short statement: Germany is about the size of Texas. It is composed of a number of States, and, of course, as the gentleman knows, includes Prussia, which has the largest appropriation. That State, less than the size of Texas, has expended about \$500,000,000 on its rivers and harbors. Is not that so?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Somewhere in that neighborhood; yes.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. And France, which is not as large as Germany, has paid out about \$450,000,000 on its rivers and harbors.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Something like that.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. Neither one of them being as large as one State in this great Republic of 48 States.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not care to yield any further just now, because I must finish my statement.

Mr. HARDY. I wish the gentleman would yield to me for a suggestion right in this line.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Florida yield?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. Is it not a fact that a great many rivers amply able to carry commerce have had their commerce destroyed by the competitive methods adopted by the railroads, which we call cutthroat rates, reducing rates from water competitive points until the railroads have absorbed the commerce that naturally and justly ought to be carried on the rivers themselves?

Mr. SPARKMAN. According to the reports which we regard as reliable, I should say that is correct.

Now, Mr. Chairman—

Mr. DAVIS of Texas. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I hope the gentleman will let me go on a little further, then I will yield.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman declines to yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I will yield to the gentleman presently. Returning to the question of the comparison which I was making between the waterways of Europe and the waterways of this country, I wish to say the fact is that not only the average but the actual cost of waterway improvement in France, Prussia, and Belgium has been greater than the cost of the same class of improvements in this country. Moreover, there have been about 2,500 miles of waterways, including canals, costing millions of dollars, abandoned in France out of the 10,372 miles constructed and improved from first to last, and about 2,550 miles in Germany out of the 8,750 miles originally constructed there, while of our twenty-five thousand and odd miles of waterways practically none that have been under improvement by the Federal Government have been abandoned, though some State canals, unwisely and improvidently constructed, have gone out of use; but the Government of the United States is keeping up practically all the waterways that it has ever had under improvement, and I think it should with few exceptions continue to do so, at least for a reasonable time.

Certainly, Mr. Chairman, we should not condemn a system that has worked so well without suggesting a better to take its place. This the gentleman from Massachusetts does not undertake to do.

That, too, was the course pursued by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FREAR] for a time, but after many reminders that he was suggesting nothing for the system he would destroy he has come forward with a substitute plan for the one we have. He proposes a commission of five members to be appointed by the President, not more than three of whom shall belong to any one political party, and who are to hold their offices for seven years. These commissioners he would clothe with all but plenary powers over waterway improvements in the interest of navigation, water-power development, and reclamation.

The chief if not the only power left to Congress under his plan is to furnish the money for the activities of the commission, which is to be done, not through the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, as one might suppose, but through the Committee on Appropriations of the House.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the commission plan for dealing with our rivers and harbors is advisable, the bill submitted is greatly defective in many of its details, but I shall not stop to consider them. The serious objection to that and all similar plans is that it takes from Congress and the Representatives of the people the right to select the projects to be adopted and the work to be done, and turns it over to a board of commissioners to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice of the Senate, without giving the House an opportunity of saying who these commissioners shall be. I do not believe the time has yet come for that, and I doubt if it will come in the very near future.

The present system, I know, has evils as well as virtues, but its evils and its virtues are those of our system of government, which is representative in substance and in form. By reason of that feature it may be cumbersome and, at times, a little more costly than an autocratic government, though that is to be doubted. It might be that the Czar of Russia, with autocratic powers, could have a piece of work done more to his liking and at less cost than can Congress, though even that may be questioned. Every power on continental Europe is more centralized and less responsive to the people than is ours, and all of them have greater advantages, if advantages they are, in the sweep and power of a single will; and yet what true American would exchange our system of government for theirs?

The gentleman cites us to these countries and their methods of dealing with their waterways as models of excellence—something for us to pattern after—and yet I have shown that these waterways, mile for mile, have cost much more than ours. But admitting in some matters of administration the desired end is reached at less cost there than here, we still have our representative form of Government, resting upon the will of the people, and which, in the long run, costs less than those of Europe. Does anyone suppose for a moment that if the question of peace or war had been submitted to the people of Europe's warring nations before war was declared, the conflict raging there, costing perhaps in the end forty or fifty billions of dollars and millions of human lives, would have been started? Better, far better, a representative form of government, with its disadvantages, if any; with its slightly increased cost of administration, if it does really cost more, than one with such tremendous powers for evil.

As I have said, my estimate is that the work of improving our harbors and rivers, including intracoastal waterways, but excluding canals, is about 75 per cent completed. My familiarity with the ports and inland waterways of the country justifies, I think, that conclusion. But I want to say something about the work already done, especially the projects adopted during the past 20 years.

Mr. Chairman, I regret to note a tendency, even though it be by a very few, to inject sectionalism into our river and harbor legislation. I refer more particularly to statements made by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. TREADWAY] and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FREAR] the one in discussing the bill of last year, the other in a speech delivered a few weeks ago. My colleague on the committee [Mr. TREADWAY] after criticizing several items in the bill of 1915, entirely in the Southern States, and claiming that the committee, which he suggested was organized in the interest of the South, had discriminated in favor of that section, submitted as proof a list of items purporting to give the States lying in the North and those in the South, together with the items in the bill, for projects in each of these States.

Having furnished the statement, he asked, In what way can this situation be explained other than that the control of this House and the greater portion of its vote is favorable to the southern interests? No such deduction as that could have been properly drawn from this statement if even the apportionment of the items by him in the list had been properly made, because I know that neither sectionalism nor politics had anything whatever to do with the framing of the bill. But the apportionment was not properly made.

The total for the North, as contained in this statement, was \$15,185,730, while that credited to the South—or, perhaps, I should say "charged," as the gentleman seemed to state it in the shape of a charge—was \$16,182,150, but to get this large amount he included in the southern list the entire Mississippi River from St. Paul to the Head of Passes, at a cost of \$6,700,000, and the Missouri River from Fort Benton, in Montana, to the mouth, at a cost of \$1,365,000, entirely oblivious of the fact that each of the navigated portions of these rivers had to traverse 7 to 10 States of the Union, and should not have been charged to any section of the country.

Now, the gentleman's own party, in its platforms, has declared the Mississippi to be a national stream, and the same could, with equal propriety, have been done with the Missouri, and for like reasons. Eliminating, then, \$8,000,000 in that bill for these two streams from the \$16,000,000 would leave only about \$8,000,000 for the southern group of States and \$15,000,000 for the northern.

But, Mr. Chairman, I am almost ashamed to make reference to this matter, because the discussion of a great subject like this should be pitched on a higher plane than sectionalism or partisanship; and I am happy to say that during the 21 years I have been in this House, whether under Democratic or Republican control, I have never seen sectionalism displayed in the slightest degree in the framing of legislation looking to the improvement of our rivers and harbors.

In this connection I may as well call attention to some of the criticisms against this and the bills of 1914 and 1915. One hearing or reading these criticisms would believe that the committee and the House, as at present organized, are responsible for all the projects against which complaint is made or has been made during the past two years. But the facts are that, of the entire amount of \$39,608,410 carried in this bill, only \$7,359,260 are for works of improvement on projects adopted since the present chairman has had the honor of presiding over the deliberations of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, while of the \$230,000,000 of unfinished projects upon which

work is now being prosecuted only \$27,563,420 are for projects adopted during that time.

Now, I am not criticizing previous committees of Congress responsible for this larger, much larger, aggregate. They not only did the best they could with the lights before them, but performed, in my judgment, a great work for the country. Yet, while indulging in the pastime of throwing stones at the present committee, do not forget to locate the greater responsibility, if responsibility it is, for the large appropriations in the annual bills or for the character of the projects for which these appropriations are being made. The committee as at present organized is endeavoring in good faith and as best it may to carry on the work cut out for it by its predecessors.

As I said, I am not condemning the policy inaugurated in the bill of 1896 and followed by the committee and Congress in subsequent bills, but which received its most emphatic indorsement in the bills of 1907 and 1910, for the policy was that of the people back of it, and the liberal interpretation given it was but an effort to carry out their will. And, after all, Mr. Chairman, it is the people who initiate projects and it is they who inaugurate policies, and theirs is the responsibility if mistakes occur, but they have been, in my opinion, relatively few in number in so far as river and harbor legislation is concerned.

I have heretofore referred to certain projects which are favorite subjects of criticism. A few of these are in the northern group of States, while the majority are in the southern. But wherever located their adoption was intended to serve a good purpose, and it is my belief the most of these projects will.

True, the commerce accommodated by some of the waterways for which appropriations are made in this bill is not great, but I am confident such conditions are only temporary. The cost of an improvement and the present commerce of a waterway are not the only criteria for our action in the adoption or rejection of a project. Future commerce, the industrial development of a community, the cheapening of transportation, and the increased facilities for the distribution of the products of the country to the consumers at home and abroad are to be considered. Indeed, they are of more importance than present commerce, for such works are supposed to be permanent, and when we improve a stream we do so for the future much more than for the present.

Now, Mr. Chairman, as I have already remarked, it is a matter of regret that it was thought inexpedient not to include new projects in this measure. But it is to be hoped that the bill due at the next session of this Congress may contain all such as are worthy and urgent. I for one shall favor them, and it is the present purpose of the committee to begin hearings on new projects immediately after the House has disposed of this measure, with a view to having the bill practically prepared in so far as new projects are concerned before Congress convenes next December.

While there are many of these that ought to be started at an early day, I want to say to those immediately interested in new projects that from the date when this bill is likely to become a law at the end of the present session, not more than seven or eight months will elapse before the next bill will be due—not a long time to wait, especially when we remember that under the practice existing prior to the adoption of the annual bill feature three years often elapsed between river and harbor bills of any kind, whether containing old or new projects.

Now, this bill, or one substantially like this, should become a law before the end of the fiscal year, otherwise great loss to the Government will occur. I notice the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FREAR] would arbitrarily cut the bill down to \$15,000,000, while the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. TREADWAY] would postpone the whole matter indefinitely. Both of these recommendations evince a regrettable lack of information on the subject, especially by those clothed with the duty of legislating for our navigable waterways. Why, Mr. Chairman, it has been estimated by those competent to judge that the delay in passing the river and harbor bill of 1914 for a period of about four months, or one-third of a year, caused a direct and definite loss of about \$400,000—to be exact, \$395,554.23—and what might be called an indirect loss of nearly \$500,000 more.

Now, this does not include the loss to the people from the continuation for a longer period of time of unfavorable waterway conditions which the work is intended to remedy, but the direct loss would be sufficient to make the early passage of the bill very desirable. Work of that nature is going on all over the country; plants have been assembled at many places which are being used by the Government; at others work is being done from year to year under contract with parties who, having assembled plants, would also have to tie them up and disband

their forces, making the contract price higher when work by them is again desired.

The Government has on hand to-day an aggregate of dredging plants consisting of 153 dredges, with a complement of auxiliary plants numbering more than a thousand vessels of various kinds, the whole costing originally upward of \$15,000,000, with a present value of more than \$12,000,000. In addition the Government has in its employ to operate these plants, and to carry on works of improvement, more than 1,700 officers and upward of 14,000 men, the most of whom would be thrown out of employment were this bill to fail of passage. Outside the Government plants the department rents more than a hundred boats of various kinds at a cost of approximately \$175,000 per year, all of which would likely have to disband if an adequate amount of money to keep them going is not furnished.

I have presented all this is to give the House an idea of the nature and extent of the preparedness of the Government for the work it is now doing in river and harbor development, and what it would mean to stop this great work even for a few months. But that does not tell the whole story, for it is only a part of the loss the people would sustain. The country is developing rapidly along every line of human activity. Earth and air, forest and stream, are all being invaded by man in his efforts to cheapen the cost of living and add to the comfort and happiness of the people. The output of farm and garden, of factory and mine, is increasing rapidly, all demanding cheaper and more commodious means of transportation and distribution. The railroads, though we have the finest system in the world, can not do all this work; so the people must look, and are looking, to their harbors and navigable streams to supplement the railroads in their efforts to carry our products to the consumer at home and abroad. The people are primarily responsible for the efforts we are making to deepen their harbors and improve their inland waterways. Their wishes should be heeded and the demands of commerce for ample transportation facilities given without unnecessary delay.

Now, Mr. Chairman, after a thorough study and investigation of all projects for which appropriations were or have been recommended for this bill, an investigation covering nearly three months, we have presented this measure. It may not, indeed it is not, perfect, but we have done the best we can, and I trust the bill will meet the approval of this House. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, how much time have I consumed?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has consumed 1 hour and 10 minutes.

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I yield 45 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. LONGWORTH].

Mr. LONGWORTH. Mr. Chairman, the question I propose to discuss to-day is of such great and far-reaching importance that I feel justified in occupying more time than I usually do upon a matter not directly concerned with a bill actually before the House. Moreover, I feel justified in asking the close attention of every Member present, because the question is a new—one, new, at least, in some of its details—to a large proportion of the membership of this House.

A singularly interesting feature of this question is that it has two distinct sides, a business side and a military side. It is upon the latter phase that I shall spend most of my time, both because it has never been considered to any real extent by Congress, and because the business side was very fully and completely presented in a very able speech by the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. HILL] in this House on the 14th of last February. I think I can not do better at this time than to invite your attention and the attention of the country to that speech and to the hearings held by the Ways and Means Committee earlier in the year; for to my mind, no individual piece of legislation of greater importance and more far-reaching consequences is before this Congress than House bill No. 702, introduced by the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. HILL], the object of which is, and the effect of which will be, if passed, to establish and maintain in this country the manufacture of dyestuffs. My object now in addressing this House is to urge with all the force at my command that this bill or some similar bill be taken up and passed as speedily as possible.

There is no partisanship in my appeal. It is addressed equally to each side of this House, as much to Democrats as to

Republicans, as much to those who in general oppose the use of the tariff-making power of Congress to establish and maintain an American industry as to those who defend it. A situation confronts us which rises high above partisan politics, a situation before which considerations of purely political expediency ought to vanish into thin air. For myself, as a Republican—and as most of you know a pretty militant one—let me say that I would scorn to seek partisan advantage from any claim of inconsistency that might be urged against Democrats who vote for this legislation. There are times when consistency ought to yield to the force of circumstances. If not, consistency means nothing more than obstinacy.

That such times are upon us no thinking man can doubt. In time of peace we find ourselves practically without a prime necessity in the life of every American citizen. More important still, we are sternly admonished that in time of war we would be practically without or, at least, greatly deficient in an absolute necessity of modern warfare and national defense.

I appeal, then, not merely to your judgment as statesmen but to your patriotism as American citizens, for I assert that bound up in this legislation is not only the prosperity but the safety of the Nation. I realize that this is a pretty strong statement, but permit me to say that I shall make no statement upon this subject which I am not able to back up by ample and competent authority.

Why do I say that not only the prosperity but even the safety of the Nation are bound up in this legislation? It is because the dye industry and the industry of making the modern high explosives go hand in hand. Like the Siamese twins, one could not exist if the other could not. Dyes and explosives are equally products of coal tar. Up to a certain point their process of manufacture is identical. From then on the making of the finished product is a question only of detail. It can be done in the same plant, with the same machinery, and by the same men. In other words, any factory which can make colors, without adding to its buildings, practically without changing its equipment and using the same working force, can equally well manufacture the modern high explosives. For this statement there is abundant authority from the leading chemists of the country, which I shall print fully in the RECORD.

I quote from the statement of Dr. Bernhard C. Hesse, one of the leading chemists of this country and chairman of the New York section of the American Chemical Society, who drafted the report upon which the Hill bill is based:

DR. HESSE. There is an angle from which you can look at this proposition, and that is the angle of the contribution of this industry to our national equipment. I am not talking preparedness but national equipment. Whether we are in position to-day to manufacture from the materials produced within our own borders—from materials we will always have access to—a sufficient amount of materials with which to defend ourselves, I do not know; but the information I get is that we are now rapidly approaching a position or condition where we are independent of any foreign country, except Chile, for any materials that we may want for defense in the way of explosives. However, if the explosives people are not ready to assume that responsibility, if we did have a complete self-contained coal-tar dye industry in this country—and by that I mean an industry that will produce its crude, intermediates, and its finished dye—we would have an equipment—and by that I mean actual physical plant—we would have an equipment which could, with comparatively little delay, be converted into a device to manufacture explosives, and we would have the nucleus of a trained body of men—workmen, if you please—foremen and superintendents, who could, with very little added time, learn how to make these explosives properly, and they then begin to act as a nucleus for an accretion or growth of the men necessary to do the work.

The following is the statement of Dr. J. Merritt Matthews, a chemist of the highest reputation, and also a member of the same committee:

DR. MATTHEWS. The raw materials entering into the manufacture of dyestuffs are practically the same raw materials that enter into the manufacture of these high explosives. That is to say, substances like benzol, toluol, and naphthalene form the basis of coal-tar dyes. They also form the basis of these modern high explosives, such as picric acid, trinitrotoluol, and nitronaphthalene. Also, explosive are chiefly the nitrated products. Their manufacture requires very large supplies of nitric acid and strong sulphuric acid. We have the same requirements in the manufacture of dyestuffs; large quantities of nitric acid are required, and large quantities of strong sulphuric acid. Also, I might add other chemicals, such as caustic soda, chlorine, and similar substances. That is, there is a parallel line running through this whole thing, linking at many points of contact the dyestuffs and the explosives.

A factory, for instance, which is capable of turning out dyestuffs can, with very small effort, be changed over to the manufacture of these explosives. The materials are the same, and the processes of manufacture are more or less identical. Furthermore, in the raw materials, if there is no demand in times of peace for benzol, toluol, and naphthalene, if there is no commercial outlet for them for productions of a peaceful nature, such as dyestuffs, it is natural to suppose—and we have seen it—that their recovery will be neglected. Nobody is going to recover benzol, toluol, and naphthalene simply with the idea that if he stores them up there will some day come a war. He must have an immediate commercial outlet for peaceful products, and the only peaceful product that gives him that outlet is dyestuffs.

I want to refer also to a further statement by Dr. Hesse on this subject, contained in a letter written by him on February 18:

The finished explosives are nitration products; nitration products are intermediates of coal-tar dyes; the finished explosives are of a higher degree of nitration than the nitration intermediates of the dye industry; the kind and quality of materials to make finished explosives are the same as for nitrated dye intermediates; the difference in manufacture is almost wholly a difference in proportions of the materials used; the apparatus used is the same, difference in size or capacity of individual pieces of apparatus is about the only difference; the difference in operation is not more than one of temperature and duration of time.

Upon this point I quote from a letter written upon the 19th of February by Dr. W. Beckers, the president of one of the two dye works of any importance now existing in this country:

Regarding the relationship between the dye industry and high-explosives industry, I beg to say that for the explosives the same raw materials—that is, benzol and toluol—are used, together with nitric acid and sulphuric acid, as for dyestuffs. The apparatus for making explosives—that is, the nitrating and sulphonating machinery—is similar to that used here in the manufacture of intermediate products for dyestuffs, so that as long as we have a dyestuff industry this country will keep on producing benzol and toluol, as well as the highly concentrated nitric and sulphuric acids, and in case of war these products can be used for the making of ammunition. While dyestuffs, as well as the intermediates for the manufacturing of same, are not explosive, by a change of the process one can obtain explosives out of the same raw materials and in the same apparatus, so you will see that there is a very close relation between the two.

If we should not get the Hill bill passed and the dyestuff industry should not be established, we will lose positively in this country the benzol and toluol distilling industry, as there would not be any sale for their products in time of peace. Then, if war should come, and the United States should need explosives to be made in this country, these industries would have to take the matter up again, and it would take a year or a year and a half to obtain the necessary raw materials in this country, just the same as it took this country during the present war to build the necessary plants for the raw materials for the explosives made now for the warring countries in Europe.

It also might interest you to know that the experience a dyestuff manufacturer has in the manufacture of intermediates for dyestuffs would be sufficient to enable him to start making explosives without any further experimenting.

Stripped of all technical language, the proposition comes down to this: If we had in this country an industry which in time of peace could supply the American market with all the dyes it needed, we would at the same time have an industry which in time of war could supply the Government with all the high explosives it might need, and that immediately. Without a competent dye industry it is a question whether we could in any event supply ourselves with the explosives necessary for a war of any magnitude—to successfully repel, for instance, an invasion from any first-class power. It is possible that to-day there is being manufactured in this country, mostly for export, a sufficient quantity of the material for high explosives to supply the Government in some ordinary emergency; but you must remember that it is a purely artificial industry, one which has sprung up in response to the foreign demand of the allies for explosives due to the European war, and one which will cease almost entirely and at once when the war is over.

Moreover, it has taken a long time—a year and a half, at the least—for this industry to become established. New plants had to be built and new equipment installed, all of which will go into the scrap heap when peace is declared. It is out of the question to build explosive works and have them lying idle in time of peace. The plants would deteriorate rapidly and the cost of keeping a factory in readiness during time of peace would be so enormous that it would be absolutely impracticable.

There is one very important point that ought to be considered in this connection—whether it would be practicable to manufacture high explosives in advance and store them away for an emergency. On this point the preponderance of authority is all one way, and to this effect: That it would be entirely impracticable, not only because the substances are apt to deteriorate but because most of them are highly dangerous. Dr. J. Merritt Matthews, a chemist of national reputation, summed this up in one sentence during the hearings before the Ways and Means Committee. Speaking of these high explosives, he said:

They will not only degenerate, but are liable to explosion from one cause or another, and consequently there is no great incentive for a man to manufacture large quantities of picric acid, for instance, and keep it on hand. They can be kept for a certain length of time, but the consensus of opinion is that they are rather dangerous things to have lying around.

The following colloquy took place during the hearings before the Ways and Means Committee, which it seems to me very well covers this question:

Mr. CONRY. Will the gentleman permit a question there? Is it possible to create these chemical ingredients to which you have referred and which make up a constituent part of the explosives and store them away without a process of degeneration?

Dr. MATTHEWS. You mean, can explosives be manufactured in advance?

Mr. CONRY. Yes.

Dr. MATTHEWS. To a certain extent, they can.

Mr. CONRY. Will they not degenerate?

Dr. MATTHEWS. The chances are they will; they will not only degenerate, but they are liable to explosion from one cause or another, and consequently there is no great incentive for a man to manufacture large quantities of picric acid, for instance, and keep it on hand.

Mr. CONRY. And in view of the fact that this degeneration does take place he can not manufacture those in sufficient quantities to prepare for a future contingency like a war?

Dr. MATTHEWS. Not to store them up. They can be kept for a certain length of time, but the consensus of opinion is that they are rather dangerous things to have lying around.

Mr. CONRY. Then, if the question of national equipment enters into the manufacture as a material consideration, the establishment which produces the products will have to be of such a character as to be able when the contingency arises to produce a sufficient quantity of explosives and the acids out of which explosives are manufactured to meet the demands as they arise?

Dr. MATTHEWS. You mean the peace demands?

Mr. CONRY. The demands of war.

Dr. MATTHEWS. Yes. But the dyestuff factory can, without very great change in its equipment and routine, make picric acid and trinitrotoluol and in a very short time turn from the manufacture of various dyes to the manufacture of those products. In fact, it is a much simpler proposition than it is to make dyestuffs.

Mr. CONRY. So that in your view of the situation, from the standpoint of the trade, the national equipment for a future war would be simply a secondary consideration?

Dr. MATTHEWS. A secondary consideration to have a manufacture of explosives?

Mr. CONRY. Yes.

Dr. MATTHEWS. I should think it would be a first consideration.

Mr. CONRY. I mean from the standpoint of the trade. The primary consideration is the manufacture for commercial purposes?

Dr. MATTHEWS. Yes.

Mr. McGILLCUDDY. Do you know, Doctor, whether the dyestuff factories in Germany have shifted over to the manufacture of explosives in this war?

Dr. MATTHEWS. Of course, I have no positive or intimate knowledge of that, but it is reasonable to suppose from the circumstances surrounding those manufacturers that they have turned their attention from the manufacture of dyes to the manufacture of those explosives.

Mr. HILL. I have special information which I will file with the committee exactly on that point, that the German dyestuff manufacturers have been engaged since the beginning of the war almost exclusively in making explosives.

Mr. LONGWORTH. The gentleman questioning the witness before you asked how long it would take for those commercial organizations, assuming that the war was over, to return to the manufacture of dyestuffs with their present organization. Do you believe, from your knowledge of the efficiency of the German chemical industry, that it would take very long?

Dr. MATTHEWS. I think it would take a very short time.

Mr. LONGWORTH. That is to say, practically the moment the war was over they would almost immediately resume the manufacture of dyestuffs and export them into this market?

Dr. MATTHEWS. I should think so. I can see no reason for thinking otherwise.

Mr. LONGWORTH. When you say "a short time" you mean a matter of a few months?

Dr. MATTHEWS. A few months, or even less than that. The processes of making these explosives really do not interfere with the technic, the organization, or the apparatus, to any great extent, of manufacturing dyestuffs.

During Dr. Schoellkopf's testimony the following colloquy occurred:

Mr. LONGWORTH. The statement was made here yesterday that Germany—it being assumed that practically their entire chemical industry is engaged in making explosives—could within 60 days after the war stopped resume the manufacture of dyestuffs on the old scale. Do you think that was an exaggeration?

Mr. SCHOELLKOPF. I think they could resume the manufacture of dyestuffs in a shorter time than that. I am convinced of that.

Mr. HILL. What about the keeping qualities of modern high explosives? Can they be stored and kept in readiness for future use for any particular length of time without deteriorating?

Mr. SCHOELLKOPF. I have no definite knowledge on that point. I feel this way about it: That it would not be possible to store up any quantity of explosives which would be sufficient to run a modern war for any length of time. It would be too dangerous. The quantity of explosives necessary for a good-sized battle would be sufficient to blow up a whole county.

The question, therefore, resolves itself down to this proposition: Is it not the part of wisdom and foresight to establish and encourage an industry which can be used in time of peace for the manufacture of products for which there is a steady and universal home demand, and then convert its factories into explosive factories in time of war? It seems to me that the best answer to that question is the experience of Germany since the war began.

Mr. FESS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LONGWORTH. With pleasure.

Mr. FESS. Is it possible to convert the institution or the industrial plant used as a dyestuff manufacturing plant into an explosive factory?

Mr. LONGWORTH. I will reply to the gentleman by saying that it is not necessary even to convert it, for the explosives can be made in precisely the same plant, with the same equipment, with the same force.

Mr. FESS. And how long would it take to do this?

Mr. LONGWORTH. It can be done immediately. One gentleman before the committee when asked that question respecting his dyestuff plant—and there are only two of them in this

country—said that he could supply the Government with modern explosives of the best quality within 10 days.

Mr. FESS. Has the gentleman looked into this question as to how long it takes to establish an explosive plant, if we had no dyestuff establishment already established?

Mr. LONGWORTH. I said that it would take about a year and a half, at least, to get up to our present point of efficiency in the manufacture of high explosives, and that I do not think would be anywhere near what would be necessary for a serious war.

Mr. LEVER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LONGWORTH. Yes.

Mr. LEVER. Would not the plant to which the gentleman refers also be usable in the manufacture of fertilizer?

Mr. LONGWORTH. Hardly; because fertilizers are made out of phosphates, and those are not used directly in the manufacture of dyes.

Mr. LEVER. Oh, yes.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Not necessarily.

Mr. LEVER. Nitrogen is.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Nitrogen is used in the manufacture of high explosives; but I am coming to that a little later.

Mr. SWITZER. Will the gentleman inform us whether there is any likelihood that the Ways and Means Committee will report out a bill that would tend to relieve the present dyestuff situation and encourage that industry?

Mr. LONGWORTH. It is for the purpose of inducing the committee to do so that I am making this appeal.

A good many years ago Germany discovered that the chemical industry—and particularly the dyestuff industry—lent itself most readily to the manufacture of high explosives. The German Government therefore started out to encourage and foster this industry in every way possible, and it soon became one of the most profitable industries in the land. But the German Government was not satisfied merely that this industry should yield enormous profits. It deliberately aimed to extend it to such proportions that it might be, in time of need, converted into an explosive industry to take care under any circumstances of any demand that a great war might create. The demand for dyes at home was not sufficient for this purpose, and it was necessary, therefore, to build up an immense foreign trade. For this purpose every possible concession was granted, as, for instance, in freight rates for export; and the Government even went to the extent of remitting taxes in order that the industry might reach the highest possible stage of development. Cooperation was had between the great German universities and the dyestuff industry so that the best education and talent could be made available. Scientific research was encouraged, and the Government went to the extent even of granting special pensions to those who had devoted a certain number of years to research work in chemistry.

The inevitable consequence of this governmental activity was that almost from the beginning and for many years the German dye industry has dominated the world. Was human foresight ever more brilliantly justified than that of the German nation when war broke out? Note what happened: A general order was issued that the production of dyes should cease and that the factories should at once turn all their energies to the manufacture of high explosives. Following the plan preconceived years before, every tank and every kettle was arranged so that explosives could at once be turned out, and it was known almost to a pound what the production of each factory would be. In every one of these factories was an abundance of crude material, such as every large business concern must keep on hand, and almost every ounce of it was capable of being made into some kind of explosive.

At this point was made manifest another instance of Germany's wonderful efficiency and foresight. She had within her own borders every material necessary for the production of high explosives save one, namely, nitrogen. Now nitrogen compounds are the basis of all modern high explosives, and in time of war they must be had in unlimited quantities. Up to a few years ago Chile saltpeter was used as the basis of all nitrogen compounds, and this can be obtained only from Chile. German statesmen had realized that if any nation with which she might ever be at war should obtain control of the sea Germany would be cut off from the Chilean supply of nitrogen and hence, under then existing conditions, practically helpless. And so science set out to evolve some other method of producing nitrogen, and a process was evolved of obtaining it out of the air. It was discovered that to make nitrogen out of the air a cheap electrical energy is essential. On looking over the field German scientists had found that the cheapest source of electrical energy came from waterfalls in Norway, and accordingly large industries were established there to make nitrogen products, and these

products were sent to Germany. But even then all future difficulties were not provided for. Germany still faced the question of losing the use of this water power in Norway if some other nation obtained control of the sea, and that was just what happened when England bottled up the German Navy. But in the meantime another method of obtaining the cheap electrical energy necessary for producing nitrogen out of the air had been evolved. Six large plants were established on the Rhine in districts where coal was coked. Now, in the process of coking coal a certain gas is developed which ordinarily went to waste, but under this new process this gas was used in internal explosion engines, and these engines were attached to enormous generators for the production of the necessary electrical energy. Thus in one operation Germany obtained not only her benzol and toluol but her nitric acid as well, which in combination make the modern high explosives.

Now, speaking to the question of the gentleman from South Carolina, I desire to say that while water power is a very good way to produce electrical energy necessary for the obtaining of nitrogen from the air, it is not the only way. Germany herself has proved that nitrogen can be extracted from the air equally well by the use of gas produced in the coking of coal, and therefore it is unnecessary that this Government would have to have an enormous water power in order to produce nitrogen. It may be produced that way, but as a matter of fact nitrogen can be extracted from the air in any large chemical establishment where the coking of coal goes on.

Mr. FESS. Will the gentleman yield there?

Mr. LONGWORTH. Yes; with pleasure.

Mr. FESS. Has the gentleman any estimate of the waste in our present method of coking coal?

Mr. LONGWORTH. I believe it has been something like 75 per cent. I think the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. HILL] showed that in the ordinary beehive oven at least 75 per cent went into waste.

Mr. FESS. Could that waste be utilized?

Mr. LONGWORTH. That could be utilized in explosion engines, which are attached to generators, in the same way water power produces and stores electrical energy in generators. The whole question is such a new one that it has not yet been determined what is the best and cheapest method, I assume. In this country though we surely have an advantage over Germany, because we have a great deal of water power distributed all over the country and also a large number of coal mines and coke ovens.

Mr. LEVER. I was about to ask the gentleman if he was describing what is known as the "arc process" of extracting nitrogen from the air by this coking of coal?

Mr. LONGWORTH. I can not answer the gentleman's question specifically.

Mr. LEVER. I am inclined to think it is not. I think the process he is describing now is a recent discovery in Germany.

Mr. LONGWORTH. A recent discovery in Germany, since the war began, or at least put in operation since the war began.

Mr. LEVER. It is the newest process of the Government?

Mr. LONGWORTH. It is the newest process of the Government, and the fact is that Germany is to-day producing absolutely unlimited quantities of explosives and producing at the same time unlimited quantities of nitrogen out of the air.

Mr. LEVER. I believe, personally, that it would be unwise for this Government to commit itself to any definite process of extracting nitrogen from the air until we know what the best processes are.

Mr. LONGWORTH. I agree absolutely with the gentleman, and I think the experience of Germany conclusively proves that it would be folly on our part now to go into a great Government enterprise for extracting nitrogen out of the air because there happens to be at any particular place a very large development or possible future development of water power.

Mr. SWITZER. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. LONGWORTH. I will yield.

Mr. SWITZER. Could the gentleman say which is the cheaper method?

Mr. LONGWORTH. I can not say, because this development is of so recent origin that I presume it has never been estimated.

Mr. HULBERT. Has it been brought out in the hearings before the Ways and Means Committee as to how many such plants there are that are capable of developing nitrogen and what the approximate quantity would be?

Mr. LONGWORTH. I think there are unlimited facilities in this country, both by water power and through the process of coking coal.

Mr. HULBERT. I am speaking of those cases where at present the facilities exist.

Mr. LONGWORTH. I think facilities exist practically in every State of the Union where there is any coal or water power.

Mr. MADDEN. I understood the gentleman to say there were only two plants in existence in the United States.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Only two plants of any size that are making dyes. There is a substantial difference.

Mr. HULBERT. There are a large number of plants in existence at this time making coke, where it would be possible, with very few additional facilities, to produce nitrogen?

Mr. LONGWORTH. That is my belief, because that is what Germany is doing.

Mr. HOPWOOD. I would like to state that in my district, in southwestern Pennsylvania, there are 38,000 coke ovens of the beehive type, where all of this is going to waste, and where all of it could be utilized for the purpose the gentleman is speaking of.

Mr. LONGWORTH. I believe it could be made an almost universal industry throughout the country.

Now, gentlemen, where would Germany be to-day if she had not planned for just what happened?

I say to you, gentlemen, that history affords no more brilliant example than this of that foresight and efficiency which make a nation commercially great in time of peace and formidable in time of war. Where would Germany be to-day if she had not planned for just what happened? I repeat: Shut off from Chile, she would have been without an essential ingredient to make explosives. Without the greatest chemical industry in the world she would have been powerless to produce the explosives necessary for her military operations—and that even if she could have imported her nitrogen. To-day, so far as this very bedrock of military efficiency is concerned, she has an absolutely unlimited supply, and other things being equal, could fight forever.

Not long ago the greatest living inventor—Thomas A. Edison—speaking of war, remarked:

There has got to be a great deal more, and it is going to be more destructive every year. I do not look for electricity to play such an important part in this newer slaughter. It is going to be a struggle of explosives. That will be the all-important element.

In the light of recent events no truer prophecy could have been made. Germany saw it years ago. She fully realized that the production, continuous and without limit, of high explosives was the very bedrock of preparedness. She realized that under conditions sure to come the chemist would displace the armorer as the underlying genius of modern warfare. She realized, in short, the plain fact that under modern conditions a nation without a great chemical industry might, about as well be without an army or a navy. [Applause.]

Shall we remain blind to the plain facts? Shall we continue to ignore a situation which any man may read? What Germany has done in building up her chemical industry America can do. It remains only for our national legislators to see the light and to act accordingly. We have the crude material for making both dyes and explosives in limitless quantities. We lack only the machinery for converting them into the finished article. In one respect we even have a decided advantage over Germany. We have countless water-power sites, where, if necessary, nitrogen out of the air could be developed more cheaply than anywhere else in the world. Fortunately, too, this water power is in the center of the country, far away from either the Atlantic or the Pacific seaboard. The same is true of our resources for generating our electrical power from the by-products of coal. Even if we were cut off from Chile we could thus obtain nitrogen from the air more easily than Germany. To-day almost all of our factories producing the materials for high explosives are grouped on the Atlantic seaboard. From a strategic standpoint this is essentially wrong. If unhappily an invading force landed in this country, it is perfectly obvious that these plants would be the first object of seizure.

In the light of the lesson we have learned, or ought to have learned, from this lamentable war—a lesson which should burn itself into our minds more deeply every day—is it not absolute folly to neglect the golden opportunity, an opportunity which, if we fail to seize, may never come again, an opportunity which comes to a nation perhaps but once in a century, an opportunity not only to make ourselves free from the industrial domination of any other nation in time of peace but to make ourselves secure forever so far as the very foundation of military efficiency is concerned in time of war? [Applause.]

What was the situation with regard to the dye industry before the war broke out? It was about this: Germany had us and the world generally by the throat. Our manufacturers were producing only about 15 per cent of the finished dyes used in the

American market. Germany supplied the rest. There were in this country only two dye plants of any magnitude. They were producing only about 15 colors, while Germany was producing 1,800. Even this paltry industry existed practically only on sufferance. If any American manufacturer was so bold as to attempt to produce a new color he was warned at once that this would not be permitted, and if he did not yield, the screws were put on him, and the way of it was this: If he attempted to put some new product on the market a similar product made in Germany was at once offered in the American market at 50 per cent or less of his actual cost of production. Under these circumstances he had to stop producing this color or go broke. Instances of this sort of competition were many. I will give one by way of illustration:

During the hearings before the Ways and Means Committee, Dr. Schoelkopf, one of the two large American dye manufacturers, was testifying, and I asked him this question: "Dr. Schoelkopf, before the war did you have any personal experience with what has been called here unfair methods of competition used by the German dye industry?" He replied: "We did have." I then asked him to describe what these methods were, and Dr. Schoelkopf replied: "One very serious instance was in connection with a certain black we were producing. When we started to manufacture it we put it in for about 35 cents a pound. A little later foreign manufacturers began to sell it here for 14 cents a pound. It was being sold in Germany for about 22 cents a pound. That was the regular price. They were bringing it here, paying 30 per cent duty on it, and selling it for 14 cents a pound."

Of course it is evident that no American manufacturer can live against that sort of competition. Beside it the methods in their palmiest days of some of our so-called trusts and monopolies pale into insignificance.

What happened after the war began? Just what might have been reasonably expected when the source from whence come the dyes that the American people use was, so to speak, dried up. We had persistently refused to make any provision for such a situation. We had continued to rely upon another nation than our own to furnish us with practically all our dyes, and now we were called upon to pay the price. As I said before, Germany at the outbreak of the war had turned all her dye factories over to the manufacture of high explosives. We had no dye industry in this country worthy of the name. Very soon most dyes could not be procured for love or money, and the price of the few that remained went skyward. Instances are recorded, some of which I will publish with my remarks, of advances in the prices of dyes in this country not only in hundreds but in thousands per cent. We had testimony before the Ways and Means Committee, from a manufacturer of women's and children's hats, that a dye absolutely necessary to his business, which, under ordinary circumstances cost about \$1,700, he had been glad to procure for more than \$52,000, and he has lately written me that this same amount would cost him to-day more than \$120,000.

NEW YORK, February 23, 1916.

Mr. NICHOLAS LONGWORTH,
Room 319, House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR CONGRESSMAN: I have just read the copy of Congressman HILL's speech before Congress on the dyestuff bill, H. R. 702, and on page 11 I read that yourself and Mr. HILL discussed the writer's statement before the Ways and Means Committee regarding our recent dye-stuff purchases in China.

In order to have the matter entirely correct in your mind, I would say that you will find, on page 119 of the printed hearing before the Ways and Means Committee on the dyestuff bill that the writer answered your question as to exorbitant cost of dyestuffs, stating that my company had just paid \$5.75 a pound for aniline black (made by Badische, in Germany), which we had purchased from China.

These identical goods in normal times would have cost us 20 cents per pound, or a total of \$1,748, whereas we are now compelled to pay more than \$52,000.

Since that time we have made another purchase of same goods from Shanghai, paying \$7.50 per pound instead of \$5.75, and on February 14 last we were quoted \$12 a pound for exactly the same material from China.

This latest quotation means an advance of 6,000 per cent over the normal before-the-war figure of 20 cents per pound.

Yours, very truly,

R. H. COMEY CO.,
GEO. W. WILKIE,
For the Company.

I append below a communication from the Treasury Department showing the effect of the present dye famine upon a most important branch of the Government service:

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, March 9, 1916.

Sir: Owing to conditions arising out of the European war, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, which prepares all Government notes and other securities, national-bank notes and Federal reserve notes, postage and revenue stamps, and currency of the Philippine government, has found it impossible to purchase colors for inks in sufficient quantities in the United States to carry on its work. It has been compelled for over a year to use cheap and unsatisfactory substitutes for some

of the colors, and as time has gone on even these substitutes have become more and more difficult to purchase, and it seems to be only a question of a short time until the supply of them will be exhausted. At present the Bureau of Engraving and Printing has only two weeks' supply of reds and blues, which are the most important colors used by it.

Some time ago an order for 145,000 pounds of blues and reds was placed in Germany, and through the assistance of the State Department permission was granted for the exportation of these colors. The first of several consignments has just reached this country. Under the tariff act some, if not all, of these colors are dutiable, and it seems to me it is proper at this time and under these conditions for Congress by joint resolution to authorize the importation of all of these colors free. It is impossible to buy these colors here. The prices that are now paid for them in Germany are higher than the prices before the war plus the duty. The duty will be approximately \$12,000, and it will be necessary to go to Congress for a deficiency appropriation if this duty is paid. There can be no question of this importation injuring in any manner any American industry.

I therefore have the honor to request that a joint resolution authorizing the admission free of duty of approximately 145,000 pounds of dry colors, valued at \$40,000 to \$50,000 (the exact amount not being determinable at this time owing to the fluctuations of exchange), from Germany for the use of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, the same having been ordered December 10, 1915, and shipment being made to and in the name of the Secretary of the Treasury, said colors to be exclusively for the use of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, may be passed by Congress. As part of these colors has already been shipped and some of them are now in this country, I request that immediate action on this resolution may be taken, if possible.

I inclose herewith a suggested form of resolution.

Respectfully,

BYRON R. NEWTON,
Acting Secretary.

HON. CHAMP CLARK,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Below is a homely illustration of the effect of the dye famine on the everyday life of the average American citizen:

IMPORTANT NOTICE.

Careful investigation made by the Laundrymen's National Association of America, both among the selling agents of dyestuffs and the manufacturers of wash goods, shows that there is a shortage of permanent dyestuffs almost amounting to a famine, and that industries depending upon fast colors are in many cases closed down.

That the better quality of shirtings now being worn are perhaps in most cases fast colors, but that this condition can not possibly continue for any great length of time.

That the wash goods in which the colors are most questionable at the present time are: Red tablecloths and napkins and towels with red borders; blacks in cotton ginghams, which are apt to wash lighter and in some cases "crock" when the damp goods are folded. Black stockings will probably "bleed" and turn lighter. Light goods with blue, red, or black trimmings are apt to cause trouble.

Some makers of wash goods are already notifying their patrons that they can not guarantee the permanency of colors.

Under these circumstances, and for the further reasons that there is no known method whereby fugitive colors can be washed so that they will not run, and no way of knowing whether colors will run or not, except by washing, we beg to notify our patrons that while we use every care in the handling of colored goods, we can not be responsible when these goods fade, as some of them surely will.

In view of the situation we strongly urge our customers to use as much white goods as possible until such time as the permanent dyes will again be available.

DICKS LAUNDRY CO.,
Greensboro, N. C.

Under such conditions does it not strike gentlemen who represent the cotton States that the price of cotton is seriously menaced? With the decline in the demand for cotton goods, with the diminished output of all, and the probable closing down of many cotton factories, will anyone contend that this decreased demand will not be reflected in the price the cotton farmer gets for his product?

To show that the women of the country have become awakened to the situation I quote a dispatch which appeared in the Cincinnati Enquirer, one of the leading newspapers of the country, not long ago.

[Special dispatch to the Enquirer.]

WASHINGTON, February 27.

A call went out to-night to 100,000 women to wear simple colors as much as possible during the spring and summer months to aid American dye makers and manufacturers. The call was sent out by Mrs. James M. Thompson, daughter of Speaker CHAMP CLARK, chairman of the executive committee of the Woman's National Made in the United States of America League, to the members of the league.

It is with peculiar pleasure that I cite as witness on the side of the case I advocate the highly intelligent and charming daughter of the distinguished statesman who presides over this House [applause], and I welcome the ground thus afforded to appeal to you, my Democratic colleagues, to support this bill on behalf of the women of the United States. You can not, I am convinced, turn a deaf ear to this appeal of your wives and daughters and sweethearts. You will not, I feel assured, condemn them to wear, as soon they will have to, hats and clothes only of dull, insipid gray. [Laughter.]

What possible objection can there be to the passage of legislation which will relieve this situation? Only two objections, so far as I know, have been hinted at. One is that the increase in the duties on intermediates and dyes provided in this bill might raise the cost to the consumer, and the other is that this possible increase might be seized upon by textile

manufacturers as a reason for later demanding higher duties upon their products.

The first objection can be disposed of in a very few words. In normal times the cost of dyeing a suit of clothes was variously estimated by manufacturers in their testimony before the Ways and Means Committee at from 1 to 4 cents for an entire suit. At the highest estimate this bill increases the duty somewhere about 35 per cent. Therefore, if the entire duty were added to the price that the consumer would be called upon to pay, it would amount to somewhere about two-thirds of a cent for an entire suit of clothes. The thing is so infinitesimal that it is not worth talking about, and in the face of increases in the price of dyes since this war began, running up to 10,000 per cent, it becomes merely ridiculous.

Now, as to the question whether the large textile and other manufacturers will base later on upon these slightly increased duties an appeal for higher tariff rates on their manufactures. It is true that a number of them did sign a protest at the time of the making of the Payne tariff law against an increased duty on dyes; but these very same men are united in favor of this bill as consumers, and I would be much surprised if they ever resort to their former argument.

But if by chance they should, I pledge myself here and now that if I shall be in some future Congress where a new tariff bill is to be written, and if I shall be in a position where my attitude on such questions may carry any weight, I will resist to the uttermost any effort on the part of textile or other manufacturers who use dyes to obtain higher duties on their products because of the passage of this bill. [Applause.]

Addressing myself particularly to my Democratic friends, I am aware that you are opposed as a general thing to the use of the tariff-making power of Congress to create and maintain American industries. This is not though, I venture to believe, because the Democracy as a party is opposed to the encouragement of American industry, but only because you hold, as I believe wrongly, that American industry can be encouraged in other ways and can permanently exist without reasonably protective duties.

But even so, suppose a condition exists by which an industry, necessary not only to the happiness and prosperity of the American people, but to the safety of the Nation, can only be created and maintained, as concededly in this case, by the use of the tariff-making power: Are you not justified in here making an exception to your general rule? Permit me to commend to you the attitude of a prominent Democrat, Prof. Charles H. Herty, president of the American Chemical Society, of Chapel Hill, N. C. Addressing the Democratic members of the Ways and Means Committee, he said:

Let me say to you, gentlemen on the left side of the House, as a fellow Democrat, that I wrestled with this question a long time before I could bring my mind to the point of advocating a protective tariff, as it was naturally against the convictions which I had acquired earlier in life in a Democratic atmosphere. But I was finally driven to it from whatever line I tried to solve this problem and I am convinced that if we are to have such an industry in this country we must have protection for it in the way of a tariff.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield to the gentleman five minutes more.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Can the gentleman yield to me 10 minutes? I have been interrupted to some extent.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Speaker, I can not. I have already parceled out all my time.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Will the gentleman from Washington [Mr. HUMPHREY] give me five minutes?

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. I will yield to the gentleman five minutes and take it out of the time of some one else.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. LONGWORTH. There is one way, and one way only, to permanently establish in this country an industry which in time of peace can supply American citizens with the dyes and chemicals absolutely necessary to their happiness and well-being, and, even more important still, an industry which, if unhappily this Nation should be at war, can furnish to the Government a limitless supply of the high explosives without which we would be entirely impotent to defend ourselves. By a unanimous report a committee of the ablest chemists in this country, a committee composed of men of all shades of political opinion, have officially declared that the Hill bill, substantially as it stands, is the way to accomplish this. It is not the easiest way necessarily; it is the only way. The moment it is passed we are definitely assured that millions of capital will be at once invested in building up an industry which in a very short time will be able to supply the entire demand of the American market for dyes in time of peace. Furthermore, we are assured by the highest authority that when this industry shall have reached these

proportions it will be equally competent to supply the demand of the American Government for high explosives in time of war.

In the words of a great Democratic President, it is a condition and not a theory that confronts us. We can not avoid admitting the wrong. How then can we, with the remedy at hand, avoid applying it?

The Almighty has blessed this country as He has blessed no other country under the sun. He has endowed us with all the resources necessary to the life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness of our hundred million people and all the additional millions that are to follow. We have but to gather them. True, there are a very few things like tea and coffee and some tropical fruits for which we are dependent upon other countries, but these are lands lying under the Equator and upon them our sturdy competitors in our own and in the world's markets are equally dependent. But outside of these few tropical products there is absolutely nothing in the way of either luxuries or necessities in the daily life of the American Nation which can not, under wise legislation, be produced as well in this country as in any other. Under these circumstances, is it not the height of folly to rely permanently upon some other nation to furnish us with objects of imperative necessity?

It has been said that the Lord has under His protection especially three classes of persons—children, inebriates, and the people of the United States. While in the last analysis this statement is not altogether flattering to us as a people, we must concede that it has elements of truth. If we have one great fault, probably it is this, that we place too much reliance upon Providence and too little on ourselves.

History shows that it usually takes some great disaster to awaken us from our ordinary attitude of more or less snug self-complacency. That disaster is here. The European war has taught us—or ought to have taught us—two lessons by which, if we shall fail to profit, we shall not deserve the continued beneficence of Providence. It has taught us not only that we are not prepared industrially but that we are not prepared defensively. To me it seems so obvious as hardly to call for assertion that the very foundation of military efficiency in modern warfare, whether offensive or defensive, whether by land or sea, is the modern high explosive. No matter how large our Army, no matter how powerful our Navy, no matter how effective our fortifications, if we have not in unlimited quantities the explosives for use in our guns we are equally impotent in attack or defense.

If I have not failed utterly in contributing anything of value in my discussion of these all-important questions, I have shown at least these two facts: First, that this Nation is not equipped to furnish in time of need the explosives necessary for our national defense; and, second, that if we had a chemical industry capable of satisfying the entire demand of the American market for dyes we would then have an industry which, in time need, could turn out daily and almost immediately all the explosives necessary for our national defense. Permit me to reiterate that you can not manufacture explosives to-day and store them up for use in the distant future. You must have the machinery necessary to turn them out day by day, just as Germany is doing. Without that machinery we are merely court ing national humiliation, and that, possibly, before many years roll by.

No matter where your sympathies may be in the European war, whether you like Germany or hate her, no man can refuse to admire her marvelous military efficiency. No man can refuse to admire the foresight of her statesmen in preparing years ago for exactly what has happened. No man can afford to ignore the obvious fact that the basis of her preparedness has consisted in her ability to turn out, under any and all contingencies, absolutely unlimited quantities of high explosives. The continuous thunder of her guns about Verdun has depended not so much upon the men that fired them as upon the scientists and workmen in her chemical factories on the Rhine. [Applause.] Were these factories nonexistent, had they been less completely built up, the thunder of her guns would have ceased long ere this. She would have been a beaten nation.

We shall be reckless and foolhardy indeed if we decline to profit by the lesson that Germany has taught us. For myself, I am in favor of every measure looking toward adequate national preparedness that is before Congress. I am ready, and indeed eager, to go further than I believe this Congress intends to go, and I am ready to vote not only for the appropriations but for the revenue measures necessary to pay the price. But I tell you, my colleagues on both sides of this House, that no matter how far you may go in increasing the Army and the Navy, no matter how far you may go in strengthening our fortifications, you will not have approached adequate preparation for the national defense

unless at the same time you shall have provided for the continuous and unlimited production of high explosives. [Applause.]

In one respect the proposition I advocate stands upon a different footing from any other preparedness measure. The building of battleships costs money; the increase in the personnel and the equipment of the Army, the enlargement of our fortifications, will cost money. It is this increased cost, which must be paid by additional taxation of some sort, to which gentlemen opposed to any preparedness program object; but to establish and maintain an industry which can in time of need supply an unlimited quantity of high explosives will not cost the taxpayers of this country a single cent. Not only will it cost nothing, but it will prove a great national asset, for it will provide employment for thousands of American citizens, return substantial profit to American capital, and at once reduce the present absurd cost of dyes, and with that the materials in which these dyes are used.

But, to my mind, the question of adequate national defense rises high above a matter of dollars and cents. I would favor this particular proposition if, instead of being a great national asset, instead of costing nothing, it would cost millions. I am willing, and not only willing but eager, to vote for millions to strengthen the military arm of the Government. More than that, I am ready as a legislator to vote for measures to provide for the additional necessary revenue, and I am ready as a taxpayer to diminish my income to the extent necessary to pay the cost. [Applause.]

The world to-day is in tumult. To the south of us a volcano is in eruption which has already cost the property and lives of countless American citizens. We are sending a part of the American Army into the very crater—with what result, who can tell? Europe is in conflagration; and I think it would be a reckless man indeed who would arrogate to himself the power to prophesy what may come out of the bedlam let loose throughout the civilized world. Times are upon us when we are called to deal not with probabilities but with possibilities. The last war in which we were engaged, the War with Spain, was not probable a few weeks before it was in full blast, but it was possible. To-day war is not probable, if you please, but who will deny that it is possible; not alone with Mexico but with one or more of the most powerful of the nations? It will cost money to get ready, but it will cost infinitely more if we are attacked when we are unready. Because we have to pay some advance money down, shall we refuse to insure now against a casualty—presently improbable, if you please, but which if it does come may menace not only our honor as a Nation but our very existence as a Republic?

This is no time to count the cost. This is no time to haggle about dollars and cents. Let us, without regard to party lines, mindful only of our duty as the direct representatives of the American people, so legislate as to be well assured, come what may, that we shall hand down to posterity the Nation bequeathed to us by our fathers with its resources unimpaired and its honor unsullied. [Applause.]

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. McARTHUR].

Mr. McARTHUR. Mr. Chairman, unless all signs fail, this Congress, within a short time, will commit the people of the United States to an unwise, unstatesmanlike, and unpatriotic act. I refer to the pending bill providing for independence for the Philippine Islands. This bill has passed the Senate and is now on the House calendar, and it is currently reported that arrangements are being made to force it through the House at an early date. The Clarke amendment to the original Hitchcock bill provides for withdrawal of American sovereignty from the islands four years after the President's approval of the pending measure, although the President may at that time prolong our sovereignty by proclamation until the end of the Congress then in existence.

Thus will end in shameful abandonment one of the noblest works which an enlightened nation ever undertook on behalf of an inferior people whom it had rescued from ignorance and tyranny. The United States acquired the Philippine Islands by the fortunes of war and drove out the Spaniards as a matter of military necessity, thereby assuming a great national responsibility. We did not annex the islands because of any desire for national aggrandizement or conquest, but because we realized that the people were totally unfit to govern themselves, and if left to work out their own salvation would soon have fallen under the régime of the astute and selfish mestizo politicians—the only Filipinos now clamoring for independence—and the blood-thirsty tribesmen of Mindanao. We annexed the islands with the declared purpose of making the good of the

people our sole guide and the progress which we have made is sufficient proof of the rectitude of our intentions. The arduous task of uplifting the natives of the islands from ignorance and savagery was entered upon by a party of Americans with a zeal which commanded the respect and admiration of the civilized world and great progress was made in material development—in educating the people and in placing government within their hands. This work, begun by William McKinley and continued by Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, stands forth as one of the splendid chapters of our national history and bears evidence of an altruism that speaks untold praise for our country. [Applause.] When historians of the future shall have spoken a dispassionate and final verdict upon the deeds and achievements of the first decade of our occupancy of the Philippine Islands, no more inspiring chapter of our national history will be found. [Applause.]

A party of political partisans, headed by William Jennings Bryan, who sees no good in any policy advocated by the Republican Party, have from the outset obstructed our great work in the Philippines by branding it as imperialism. They have made common cause with the mestizo politicians, who clamor for the opportunity to exploit the people in the name of independence. The present administration has already practically turned over the government of the islands to the mestizos, and by so doing has driven out many trained and experienced Americans, who had made splendid records in their several positions.

The first question that naturally suggests itself to our mind is: Are the people of the Philippine Islands capable of self-government? It is true we have lifted them from ignorance and savagery and have been schooling them in the ways of peace and industry, but it can not be successfully contended that these people are now capable of self-government and able to protect themselves against conquest by any nation that may see fit to attack them. While many offices are filled by Filipinos in a satisfactory manner at the present time, it must be remembered that the actual governmental responsibility for the islands rests upon the American people, and it is fair to assume that when our sovereignty is removed these small officeholders will aspire to higher places, and the jealousies and ambitions of the various factional leaders will soon breed a political revolution. The natives of the islands are entirely unfit to use the franchise peacefully and intelligently—an absolute essential to self-government. They have no adequate conception of liberty, equality, and constitutional rights, and are wholly unfit to conduct a republican form of government. The prolonged agitation for independence has kept the Filipinos stirred up and dissatisfied and has concentrated their attention upon political conditions rather than upon economic affairs, an influence that has worked great injury.

As there are more than 3,000 islands in the Philippine group, and as tribal and sectional feeling runs high, it is impossible to establish any system of government that would draw these heterogeneous and incongruous people into a national self-governing entity.

The Moros—the inhabitants of the island of Mindanao—number half a million people, with as many more tribesmen who are classified as "head hunters," have for generations been hereditary enemies of the Filipinos. The Moros have been Mohammedans for centuries, while the Filipinos believe in the Christian religion. They distrust the Filipinos, and have only refrained from annihilating them because of the continued presence of Spanish armies and later the troops of our own Army. It is well understood that the Moros and the Igorrotes are not in sympathy with the idea of Philippine independence, and it is fair to assume that they will make trouble as soon as the American flag is lowered from the islands.

Mr. TOWNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McARTHUR. Yes.

Mr. TOWNER. In that connection is it not true that they have repeatedly said they would never submit to the domination of the Filipinos?

Mr. McARTHUR. I think that is absolutely correct, and I shall touch upon that point a little later.

Philippine independence means revolution—such as we now witness in Mexico—and revolution would mean intervention by the United States or some other power. Our obligations to the Filipinos and other natives of the islands and to our own people who have gone there to reside would not permit us to stand by and witness bloodshed, rapine, murder, and destruction of homes and property. A revolution would necessitate intervention, if not by us then by Japan or some other world power. Indeed, it has been suggested that Japan already has a covetous eye on the islands, and will seize them on the slightest pretext after our sovereignty is withdrawn. Thus it is fair to assume that the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands—the Filipinos, the

Moros, the Igorrotes, and other tribes and peoples—are altogether incapable of effecting a strong national sovereignty and of undertaking the exercise of functions of self-government. They may be capable of so doing at the end of 25 or 50 years, but they are incapable at the present time, and to turn this race over to their own chaos would be to invite revolution and seizure, with its attendant international complications. A political party that would commit the American people to a shameful surrender of this character undertakes a grave responsibility.

The next question that suggests itself is, Do the people of the Philippine Islands want self-government? To begin with, the laboring classes, who comprise the greater part of the population, are entirely satisfied with existing conditions under American rule. Most of them have no conception of independence. These are the tillers of soil and the men who labor on the sugar plantations and other agricultural properties. They are contented with assured wages and just treatment. They know that by appealing to American officials they can obtain advice and secure justice. All they ask is to be let alone.

Another class of native people who are content with the American administration are the Moros. They do not hesitate to declare that they will not tolerate Filipino domination. Since the American occupation, these people have come to realize that they are infinitely better off under American rule than ever before in their history. They distrust the Filipinos, however, and will never submit to their domination.

Mr. FESS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McARTHUR. I will.

Mr. FESS. I understand the gentleman makes a distinction between independence and self-government. Mexico has independence, but what about self-government?

Mr. McARTHUR. I do make a distinction between independence and self-government. I believe the Jones bill, considered by the Committee on Insular Affairs of this House, gives the Filipinos self-government under which they would prosper, but the Hitchcock bill with the Clarke amendment, which means abandonment and scuttle, is not what the Filipino people want, or what the people of the United States want. [Applause.]

Mr. MADDEN. And is it not the opinion of the gentleman that there would be a wide difference between independence and liberty?

Mr. McARTHUR. Absolutely.

Mr. MADDEN. You might grant them independence, but it would by no means give them liberty.

Mr. McARTHUR. The Clarke amendment will not give them liberty over there, but revolution.

Mr. MADDEN. The gentleman believes that when independence is granted it should be at a time when independence will be likely to carry liberty with it. [Applause.]

Mr. McARTHUR. That is my belief. The Filipinos enjoy liberty now—much more than they would enjoy under the rule of the mestizo politicians. They enjoy more rights and liberties than many of the so-called Republics of the world. They have more liberty than did the people of the Territories of the United States before their admission to the Union. When these people show that they are capable of self-government, it will be time to consider the question of independence, but in the meantime we must protect them and insure them in their rights of life, liberty, and property under our flag.

Mr. O'SHAUNESSY. If the gentleman will allow me, since the passage of the Clarke amendment, I have been curious to know how much of a Filipino student the Senator has been. Has he ever been in the Philippine Islands?

Mr. McARTHUR. I can not answer the gentleman's question.

Mr. REAVIS. Is there anything in his amendment that would indicate that he had ever been in the islands?

Mr. McARTHUR. There is nothing to indicate that he has a true conception of what the people in the Philippine Islands want.

In this connection it is interesting to note the International News Service reports from Manila, under date of March 28. These reports indicate that the plans of the present administration, with reference to the pending bill, have caused great excitement in the islands and have created conditions almost resembling a panic among the more intelligent and substantial native residents, who see in such action nothing but political chaos and commercial ruin. Numerous signed petitions are pouring into Manila from the southern Provinces, earnestly protesting against the whole measure and urging a postponement of independence for at least 20 years.

The only advocates of Philippine independence among the native people are the politicians, whose designs have been encouraged by the present administration. This class is in a decided minority, but is sufficiently organized to exert a marked influence, especially when aided and abetted by the representatives of the present administration. Under the operation of an independent government the opportunity for political activity would be most inviting to the mestizo, and it is safe to predict that he would not long delay the exploitation of the masses of the people to his own political advantage.

The commercial value of the Philippine Islands to the people of the United States is apparent when one stops to consider that they are using annually upward of \$27,000,000 worth of our products; but I must pass from the consideration of this interesting phase of the general question in order to discuss more important features which are directly concerned with our national honor and responsibility.

During the years of American occupancy of the Philippines our Government has invited settlement and investment on the part of our people. Many Americans have gone to Manila and elsewhere on the Islands and established homes. Others have invested their earnings and their capital. On top of this, \$17,250,000 worth of Philippine bonds have been sold in the United States above par and have been widely distributed among savings banks and other depositories of the people's money. When the pending bill shall have become a law these investments will not be worth 10 cents on the dollar, and Americans who are now residing in the islands will either leave or submit to the blackmail and tyranny of the mestizos. No American capital would have been invested in the islands had there been any notion of the passage of such legislation as that before us.

If the liberty of an oppressed people were at stake, if some great principle of government or some right of humanity were in the balance, there might be some justification for confiscatory legislation, for human rights should prevail over property rights; but when no great crisis is at hand, when none but the politicians of the islands are crying for independence, why pass a law that will mean financial ruin to large numbers of American citizens? There is no adequate provision in the Clarke amendment for ascertaining the damage that the pending bill will inflict upon American enterprise and industry. The vague suggestion that the President may negotiate with the Philippine government on the subject is illusory and meaningless.

The treaty of Paris was between the United States and Spain, but it also indirectly obligated us to all powers of the world with which we have treaty relations. We agreed, among other things, to protect the property rights of the people of the islands, regardless of their nationality. We agreed that they should be secured in the free exercise of their religion. Does any thoughtful person imagine that the rights of foreigners will be protected under the rule of the mestizo? Does anyone imagine that the Christian Filipinos will be free in the exercise of their religion when the knives of the "head-hunters" are again whetted for blood? In view of the solemn terms of our treaty, can the party in power now justify its policy of scuttle? Are we not under lasting obligations to the Philippines, to Spain, to our own people, and to the world to carry out, both in letter and in spirit, the express and implied terms of the treaty? Are we not bound by our supreme obligations to humanity itself to continue our policy of enlightenment, progress, and education toward a people born in ignorance and darkness and to endow them further with the blessings of liberty and happiness? [Applause.]

The Spanish-American War sounded the death knell to secluded statehood and proclaimed to the world that this Nation was its brother's keeper and would no longer view with toleration the oppression of a weaker race. That war has passed into history and this is the record: A war for humanity, justified by direct outrage, resulting in national responsibility in the sight of God. The hills of San Juan and the plains of Malabon, crimson with the blood of the best young manhood of our Republic, should remind us of our solemn duty to the world and of our responsibility to God. We have placed ourselves on record for truth and justice—truth for eternity; justice for man, not men. Mighty nations of antiquity stood for less and are slumbering in their own colossal ruins. Can we at this juncture of the world's affairs, with the fate of nations trembling in the balance, with the eyes of mankind turned toward our shores and our republican institutions, afford to proclaim to the world that we have abandoned the responsibility which we so courageously assumed and that we have failed to keep the faith? It is inconceivable that a great nation should so sin against its duty, against its historic traditions, against its conceptions of honor and service, as to write upon its statute books an act which the world will

view in astonishment and which will cause future generations to blush with shame. [Applause.]

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FREAR].

Mr. FREAR. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. FREAR. Mr. Chairman, the chairman of the Rivers and Harbors Committee said to me a few moments ago that he was glad I took part in the discussion because it lends enlightenment to the proceedings, and also brings out some information. I am very glad if I am able to add to any information on this occasion. It is a very important question, and a very important bill we have here. A few minutes ago the chairman of the committee and others present questioned the assertion made in my speech because I used the term "\$850,000,000 expenditure" from the Treasury instead of "appropriation." No man in the House can say exactly what is expended to-day, a week ago, or a month ago. The only thing we keep in mind is the appropriation, and we have appropriated \$850,000,000 as stated. And because I use the term "expenditure" instead of the term "appropriation" it does not seem a fair criticism. Those who pursue my speech for the purpose of getting some subject for criticism I invite to take hold of this question in the same spirit in which I desire to discuss it, for the purpose of doing what is right and avoiding needless waste. The discussion in regard to 1875 was that the rivers at that time had not been improved, and not a fair comparison with European rivers. I still insist that is so, and I do not think anyone can reasonably draw any further deduction.

Mr. MAPES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FREAR. No; I can not yield at this time.

Mr. MAPES. I would like to insert a question for information.

Mr. FREAR. I will be glad to yield to any gentleman under the five-minute discussion at all times.

Mr. MAPES. The question I desire to ask relates to the particular point which the gentleman is now discussing.

Mr. FREAR. Very well; go ahead.

Mr. MAPES. I was curious to know over what period of time the appropriations mentioned were made by the countries of Europe—Germany and France.

Mr. FREAR. I could not give the gentleman the information here, although I have in my report given some information on the appropriations there.

Mr. MAPES. Not on the time.

Mr. FREAR. No; just the total appropriations as shown by the Government itself.

Mr. Chairman, when this bill is reached, under the five-minute rule I expect to offer some amendments proposing to strike out some especially bad items and to reduce extravagant appropriations in a number of instances. At this time I desire to briefly state reasons why, in my judgment, the bill should be defeated.

Last week, by a vote of 224 to 179, the House struck section 82 out of the military bill. The section concealed a \$24,000,000 appropriation for the Alabama Power Co.'s Muscle Shoals project. Practically the same proposition was stricken out of the 1915 river and harbor bill last year, and it may bob up again, because it is being strenuously urged upon different committees at both ends of the Capitol. That \$24,000,000 temporary saving to the Federal Treasury could not have been effectively reached, excepting for the fight made against last session's two river and harbor bills. Coming with a unanimous report of the Military Committee, the Alabama company's water-power project had official indorsement, but notwithstanding that approval it was driven from the bill. If no other result is achieved this session, the "fixation-of-nitrogen" proposition with its many millions subsidy for a private power company has again been defeated, and that in itself justifies the fight against waterway waste.

Over \$42,000,000 was saved to the Federal Treasury by the defeat of two vicious river and harbor bills last session. The bill before us carrying \$39,600,000 is worse than the 1915 bill which we defeated. It is a bold attempt to continue the same wasteful policy and illustrates the pardonable weakness of those who defend the present system. The cause is not far to find—that policy can not be defended.

Under the provisions of the wasteful 1916 river and harbor bill before us, in order to get \$200,000 for Diamond Reef in New York Harbor we give \$1,750,000 for the trafficless Missouri River \$20,000,000 project.

Mr. HULBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FREAR. I can not yield. I have not the time.

Mr. HULBERT. I would like to have the gentleman state the facts; that is all. The amount provided for Diamond Reef is \$700,000.

Mr. FREAR. There was a \$500,000 authorization proposed, of course; but if it was a million dollars, and we are going to throw away one million and a half on the Missouri River, there is no justification. I am leaving it for the gentleman to determine for himself.

In order to get \$100,000 for Boston Harbor or \$140,000 for Buffalo, contained in the bill, we must give \$944,000 for an insignificant actual traffic on the Tennessee River and \$710,000 for the Cumberland River joke, which was three times rejected by Army engineers. In order to get \$75,000 for Los Angeles and \$15,000 for San Francisco, the bill carries \$2,765,000 for the Delaware River. The Delaware has active, vigilant, aggressive forces behind its demands. From the former head of the War Department, Army engineers, and numerous other local influences, pressure comes for over two and three-quarters millions which goes into the Delaware this year, notwithstanding the largest vessels in the Navy can reach the Philadelphia yard. Approaches to navy yards at Boston, New York, and Charleston are in bad shape, but League Island gets more than all other navy yards combined, and, according to naval officers, needs it least of all.

Again, the notorious Trinity River gets \$300,000 in this bill, although it has no commerce and needs artesian wells to furnish moisture. The equally famous Brazos gets \$390,000 in this bill, yet only 1,080 tons of actual commerce was floated in 1913. Texas is a large State and has many Congressmen, so over \$2,300,000 is given to Texas. Its projects, with rare exceptions, are of little commercial value.

In order to get sufficient influence to navigate this bill past snags in another part of the Capitol nearly \$800,000 is given to the traffickless Red, Arkansas, and Ouachita Rivers, in Arkansas. These three streams combined can not boast of 50,000 tons of actual commerce nor average 50 miles' haul, whereas New York Harbor, which receives about the same amount under the bill, has a commerce reaching over 100,000,000 tons annually, or several thousand times as great as the Red, Ouachita, and Arkansas combined.

To get \$43,000 for the Superior-Duluth Harbor, that carried 46,000,000 tons of freight in 1913, it becomes necessary to give \$6,000,000 for the lower Mississippi. Salaries, clerical, office, traveling, and miscellaneous expenses of the Mississippi River Commission come high, but we are asked to give unquestioningly. The traffic on the lower Mississippi, excluding soft coal, is now estimated at only 200,000 tons annually. The Superior-Duluth traffic costs the Government about \$1 per 1,000 tons under this bill. The Mississippi River traffic costs \$30 per ton, and in 1916 the Mississippi item reaches practically the entire amount appropriated by the Government for the Superior-Duluth Harbor since 1896. Thus far the Mississippi has received about \$150,000,000 from the Federal Treasury and has lost 90 per cent of its commerce, while we were squandering all these millions.

Cleveland gets \$65,000 in this bill for a harbor that handles over 16,000,000 tons of waterway freight annually, while the Ohio River gets \$5,500,000 in this bill for a commerce that is rapidly dwindling. Fifty million dollars has been dumped into that stream for an insignificant commerce, apart from soft coal, that likewise is less in quantity than before the so-called improvement was begun.

Scores of questionable streams and estuaries, including the Coosa, Alabama, Warrior, Cape Fear, and Cold Spring Harbor, are well provided for. The never-to-be-forgotten and indefensible Norfolk-Beaufort Canal farce also carries \$1,000,000 in this bill.

That is the character of the \$39,600,000 waterway bill now before us.

Investigation and rejection by this House is urged on items that are so drunk with public funds they fall down from their own gluttony. Over half of the \$39,600,000 contained in the bill ought to be stricken out and reduced appropriations made all along the line. Properly distributed, \$15,000,000 would meet all necessities, and probably that amount could be reduced if the interests of a war-tax-ridden people are to be considered.

In House Report 254, part 2, this session, I have set forth definite objections to this bill and recent waterway expenditures which deserve careful consideration.

During the past 40 years we have appropriated \$850,000,000 for waterways.

WHERE THE MONEY GOES.

In order to present the destination of waterway appropriations in concrete form, it may be stated that two substitute bills reaching \$20,000,000 and \$30,000,000 were passed during the

Sixty-third Congress in lieu of two bills aggregating \$92,000,000 which were defeated.

The \$50,000,000 was by law turned over to Army engineers for allotment, and out of 240 projects given specific amounts there was awarded to an even dozen waterway projects out of that fund, and proposed in the bill before us, the following enormous amounts:

Engineers' allotment, 1914 and 1915, of \$47,586,000, and 1916 bill.

Rivers.	1914, twenty million.	1915, thirty million.	Total Sixty- fourth Congress.	1916, proposed bill, \$39,608,410.
Mississippi.....	\$5,250,000	\$5,815,000	\$11,065,000	\$8,320,000
Missouri.....	950,000	1,100,000	2,050,000	1,750,000
Ohio ¹	1,160,000	3,915,000	5,684,000	5,500,000
Tennessee.....	223,000	501,000	724,000	944,000
Cumberland.....	210,000	378,000	588,000	710,000
Ouachita.....	300,000	136,000	436,000	429,000
Aransas Pass.....	470,000	180,000	650,000	100,000
Sabine Pass.....	240,000	100,000	340,000	593,000
Brazos.....	230,000	240,000	470,000	390,000
Black Warrior.....	168,000	48,000	816,000	-----
Cape Fear.....	185,000	328,000	508,000	218,500
Beaufort Canal.....		400,000	400,000	1,000,000
Total.....	10,595,000	13,136,000	23,731,000	20,131,000

¹The Ohio River was also given \$3,200,000 in the 1915 sundry civil bill.

Of two hundred and twenty-odd projects given the remaining 50 per cent from the 1914 and 1915 allotments about one-half were trafficless rivers which have a combined actual commerce less than the waterway tonnage of Buffalo or Boston or Cleveland or Philadelphia, or several other lake and ocean harbors. The 12 rivers that received \$23,731,000 in 1914 and 1915, or 50 per cent of the total during the Sixty-third Congress, are well recognized by the committee in the 1916 bill with an aggregate of \$20,030,500 out of \$39,635,410 contained in the bill after deducting \$250,000 for surveys.

The 1916 bill from which the minority dissents gives these same 12 river projects nearly as much as was allotted for the two years 1914 and 1915. More striking, one-half of the entire proposed 1916 appropriation goes to these 12 river projects. Deducting \$20,030,500 for them as above provided and \$250,000 for new surveys leaves \$19,327,910, which is divided among the remaining 270 items. Of these last items, approximately 170 are canals, bayous, and rivers all of which do not handle as much actual commerce as any one of several harbors that can be named.

Over \$250,000,000 has been spent on the 12 river and canal projects by the Government in an effort to resuscitate a lost commerce. Deducting floatable timber and sand that was floated a half century ago, before these extravagant expenditures occurred and in larger quantities than to-day and which does not require expensive waterways, several of these projects are reported to have floated in 1913 approximately as follows:

Upper Mississippi (average upper Mississippi haul less than 50 miles, or less than 30,000 tons average continuous haul).....	Tons.
	170,000
Lower Mississippi.....	200,000
Ohio (95 per cent coal) under Tennessee (includes on Tennessee 78,000 tons coal hauled 16 miles).....	2,000,000
Tombigee and Warrior (includes on Warrior for 32,000 tons coal, distance not stated), average.....	200,000
Beaufort Canal.....	56,000
Cumberland.....	65,000
Missouri.....	53,000
Hennepin Canal.....	24,000
Muscle Shoals Canal.....	11,850
Red River.....	5,887
	1,694

Aside from soft coal, as near as can be estimated, the average haul was from 30 to 100 miles on the various rivers.

During 1914, 1915, and 1916 nearly one-half of the entire amount given to all waterways will be for these 10 river and canal projects. The balance is divided among about 270 or more projects, of which 20 genuine waterways disclosed 1913 traffic as follows:

10 ocean harbors.	Tons.	10 lake harbors.	Tons.
New York (estimated).....	100,000,000	Superior-Duluth.....	46,875,000
Philadelphia.....	26,267,335	Chicago-Calumet.....	13,275,000
Boston (estimated).....	20,000,000	Milwaukee.....	8,647,000
Baltimore.....	14,781,942	Ashland.....	5,623,309
Norfolk.....	17,349,942	Ashtabula.....	15,713,375
Savannah.....	3,154,089	Cleveland.....	16,483,083
New Orleans.....	6,442,932	Buffalo.....	18,920,554
Galveston.....	4,445,088	Erie.....	3,340,071
San Francisco.....	9,353,530	Marquette.....	1,852,229
Portland, Oreg.....	7,923,902	Soo Canal.....	75,714,344

Approximately 200,000,000 tons of waterway commerce was handled at the 10 ocean ports, and, allowing for duplications, one-half that amount at the 10 lake ports. Presumably the commerce was carried on the average 200 to 500 miles, counting ocean and lake traffic, but, like some other waterway statistics, no definite figures are available.

The significance of the comparisons will not be overlooked. Ten ocean ports handled fifty times the actual commerce carried on 10 river projects that annually receive about half of the average waterway bill, and these same rivers floated only about 4 per cent of the commerce counted at 10 lake ports.

The cost to the Government for furnishing a waterway for inland commerce, per ton, is not definitely settled as to method of computation and only approximate results can be reached, because the amount properly chargeable to investment interest is variously estimated, although annual maintenance is sure and certain. Excluding floatable timber and sand usually hauled short distances, the following estimates have been made on the several rivers and canals noted:

	Per ton.
Ohio River (excluding coal, \$40 per ton)-----	\$3.00
Ohio-----	8.00
Warrior and Tombigbee-----	12.00
Upper Mississippi-----	12.00
Lower Mississippi-----	35.00
Arkansas-----	20.00
Hennepin-----	36.75
Missouri-----	40.00
Muscle Shoals (Tennessee)-----	40.00
Aransas Pass Canal-----	80.00
Brazos-----	80.00
Red-----	100.00
Muscle Shoals (proposed)-----	150.00
Big Sandy, Ky-----	350.00

As the relatively small commerce consists largely of cheap, heavy freight, like coal, fertilizer, rock, ore, and a small amount of merchandise, and the haul is for short distances on the average, the significance of Senator Burton's advice will not be lost when he said the Government could save money on its inland waterways by buying the freight and burning it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FREAR. Will the gentleman give me more time? I will be very glad to yield to him if I can get the time.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I desire to ask the gentleman what is meant by floatable timber?

Mr. FREAR. That which can be floated in 2 or 3 feet of water, and does not need an 8 or 10 foot channel, as is repeatedly urged upon the committee. We will reach that in the five-minute discussion when instances will be presented.

WATERWAYS COST PER MILE.

Students of transportation in determining the economic value of railways or waterways first ascertain the cost per mile of the system. It is interesting to note that in round numbers the following estimate of expenditures per mile by the Government on these three waterways have been made:

	Per-mile.
Lower Mississippi, 1,000 miles, at-----	\$100,000
Ohio River to Missouri River, 200 miles, at-----	86,000
Upper Mississippi, 600 miles, at-----	40,000
Ohio River, 1,000 miles, at-----	60,000
Lower Missouri, 400 miles, at-----	40,000

Government and State canal investments are proportionately wasteful.

	Per-mile.
Hennepin, 60 miles, at-----	\$126,000
Muscle shoals, 26 miles, at-----	175,000
Muscle shoals, proposed, 26 miles, at-----	560,000
Chesapeake & Delaware Canal, proposed, 13 miles, at-----	1,530,000

The above river and canal projects are from waterways that float an insignificant commerce compared with the investment. Can any condemnation of our wasteful purposeless waterway policy compare with a brief statement of expenditures past, present, and prospective?

EXPERT TESTIMONY ON USELESS CANALS.

Waterways and Commerce, the leading waterway journal of the country, says in its March, 1916, issue:

The Erie Canal, costing the State of New York alone to-day \$150,000,000 plus \$90,000,000 expended in the past, or \$240,000,000 in all, has a 12-foot draft. * * * Why spend enormous sums of money on building useless canals? When the Welland Canal is in operation all of our lake traffic will go by way of Montreal because the 25-foot Canadian ships can not use the 7 or 8 or 12 foot American waterway.

What a startling commentary on enormous waste when \$150,000,000 is being thrown away on a deserted canal. Twelve-foot channels are valueless and lake canals to be of use must accommodate lake vessels. Where is the limit to waterway waste? The 1916 bill carries \$1,250,000 for the Hudson River 12-foot project to connect with the canal. If the canal proves useless, the new \$7,530,000 river project will be equally useless.

What further facts need be added to indicate our entire waterway lack of system, the indefensible character of a \$39,-

608,410 proposal which enriches dredgers, contractors, and other private interests at the expense of a patient, overburdened people?

EMINENT WATERWAY AUTHORITIES AGREE.

Students of the subject and eminent authorities believe that European waterways, with one or two notable exceptions, are vastly disappointing in commercial returns for expenditures made upon them. This opinion may be open to controversy, depending upon the viewpoint of Government activities and basis of estimating profitable expenditures. However, it is difficult to understand why any unbiased mind will fail to admit the existence of enormous waste in our inland river and canal waterway development compared with tangible returns.

Apart from the effervescence of waterway convention enthusiasts, what can withstand the conclusions of eminent authorities on the subject, from several of whom I briefly quote:

WE CAN NOT TURN THE CLOCK BACK.

We have found from our study that everywhere in Europe no less than in the United States there has occurred with the development of the railways a rapid decline in the amount of traffic carried on inland waterways. * * * To attempt now to return to the antiquated system of transportation of a half century ago * * * is to attempt to turn backward the clock of time. (Prof. Moulton in Waterways against Railways.)

EXPENSIVE RIVER EXPERIMENTS VALUELESS.

Our river traffic has rapidly declined. European Governments prevent railways from maintaining direct competition and foreign barge-men are content with a few cents a day for their service. Conditions here are far more difficult to overcome, and a return to practical inland river transportation is possible only with radically changed conditions not effected by expensive river improvements. (Ex-Waterway Commissioner Reid.)

WATERWAY GUESSWORK A FAILURE.

If we are to avoid in the future the painful necessity of continued explanations of why waterway transportation is a failure, it is necessary for us to begin now to supersede guesswork and generalized assumptions by impartial and comprehensive analysis and by providing in advance for those physical and financial cooperative relations between waterway and railway that are absolutely essential to real success in water transportation. (Walter L. Fisher, Journal Political Economy, July, 1915.)

STOP WASTE ON 58 RIVERS NOW.

Specifically the writer would not abandon any navigable stream in the Mississippi Valley that has been partially improved, but would leave 58 of them in their status quo, confining operations to snagging and maintenance of existing works. * * * If facilities afforded by the Government are utilized (greater improvement of the Ohio and lower Mississippi) the upper Mississippi and the Missouri should then receive attention. (Col. C. McD. Townsend, chairman Mississippi River Commission.)

PLENTY OF WATER, BUT NO TRAFFIC.

To-day the Mississippi from St. Louis to its mouth affords a channel which is the best to be found in any stream in the world. * * * and see its emptiness. An 8-foot channel is all that the most efficient service requires. The Government works unremittingly to develop waterways only to see the water-borne traffic grow less as the years go by. (J. H. Bernhard, Asso. M. Am. Soc. C. E., proceedings A. S. of C. E., Aug., 1915.)

Discussing the Missouri River project ex-Senator Burton, a man who has accomplished more for American waterways than anyone else and is acknowledged to be our greatest waterway expert, said of such projects less than a year ago:

PURE, BALD, UNMITIGATED WASTE.

You may spend \$20,000,000—yes, \$30,000,000—on this project, and in spite of that enormous amount the traffic will diminish, because you are facing a condition that no policy of river improvement can reverse—the loss of that class of river traffic and the utilization of other agencies for the carrying of freight. I wish it were not so. * * * but I am tired of rainbow chasing, and that is what this is. It is much worse than rainbow chasing. It is pure, bald, unmitigated waste.

IMPARTIAL OPINIONS.

No reputable waterway authority, so far as known, has controverted these unprejudiced opinions of thorough students of the subject and recognized experts. Officials of interested waterway lobbies have suggested that railways may seek to warp the judgment of men who protest against "bald, unmitigated waste" of public funds on useless rainbow-chasing projects.

House resolution No. 98 was introduced January 19, 1916, to inquire into any activities of railways, and also into well-known activities of certain waterway lobbies. It is significant that the resolution has received no support from those who assail the purposes of men now trying to stop enormous waterway waste. An investigation would speedily determine the motives of those who support or oppose the present system of waterway expenditures.

In this connection it may be of interest to quote briefly a word of advice from a secretary of the Rivers and Harbors Congress, who in his address, according to the 1911 official waterway proceedings of that waterway lobby, said as follows:

A CONGRESSMAN MUST GET ALL HE CAN "FOR US."

I want to repeat and to emphasize that in supporting the National Rivers and Harbors Congress you are supporting your own cause. Another thing, be big and broad enough to demand that the improvements which are well under way, whether or not they happen to be

your own particular projects, shall be put under the continuing-contract system and taken off the appropriation map. The sooner that is done the sooner your own will receive its just recognition. The continuing-contract system is the only wise and businesslike method and one that we all have talked and written much about, but if there has been any wise and businesslike method of improving a single river in this country I am not advised of its name or where it is located. Mark you, it is not my intention to criticize either Congress or Congressmen for lack of business methods, for I truly believe that the average man who comes to Washington as a Congressman is just as good a business man as the average man he has left at home. It is not his fault, as I see it, but our fault, and I use the word "our" in a nation-wide sense. We send him here to legislate for the Nation, theoretically, but actually to get all he can for us, and if he does not get our share and then some, we do our best to replace him with some other man who will take better care of our particular congressional district.

I have given his entire statement because the present secretary of that same organization has publicly declared the last four lines quoted in the minority report state "a half truth." I do not desire to misstate any proposition and Ellison's pernicious advice speaks for itself. The more we get, the worse it sounds, and it fitly represents sentiments preached at the average waterway lobby jollification.

Distinguished from this principle of legislative conduct are the words of a man whose rugged character, great ability, and high purposes marked Robert Toombs as a legislator of different type. He said on February 27, 1857:

Whenever the system shall be firmly established that the States are to enter into a miserable scramble for the most money for their local appropriations, and that Senator is to be regarded the ablest representative of his State who can get for it the largest slice of the Treasury, from that day public honor and property are gone and all the States are disgraced and degraded.

What holds this bill together? Why does not the present administration condemn the "miserable-scramble" proposition as it is termed by Senator Toombs?

Why not reach down and save \$20,000,000 for "preparedness"?

Why is not this a good time to practice an economy that has been preached in party platforms? Why are we confronted with a river and harbor bill before the regular defense bills are passed, and why are we engaged in securing the "largest slice of the Treasury" for our constituents according to the expressive words of the same high authority?

This should not be a partisan question. I believe it ought to be kept out of politics, but the only way to keep it out is for those who desire economy and honest legislation to combine and defeat this bill.

OBJECTIONABLE ITEMS SHOULD BE EXPOSED.

Mr. Chairman, I prefer to refrain from unnecessary discussion of this bill. I desire others to show up its iniquities, and will be glad to withhold criticisms on any project if other Members will give the facts to the House, but I am not inclined to remain silent over vicious items and thereafter have defenders of the bill urge it as above reproach because of that silence. My disinclination to trespass on the time of the House has been evidenced, for I have purposelessly refrained from debating other questions and have not wasted time in useless discussion since the session began.

Last session we sat for 13 hours continuously in one day and held long sessions on several other days before the 1915 bill was finally jammed through the House to its final defeat. I hope every Member who believes in stopping wasteful expenditures under the cloak of "navigation" will take part in pointing out defects in this bill and help to secure fair and open discussion. Only by that means can we hope to gain permanent and beneficial waterway legislation.

Mr. Chairman, it has been suggested that a committee member ought to present his objections specifically before the committee and not to the House. I do not think that objection will be seriously urged, but if so, I am frank to say that few members of the committee are competent to discuss a majority of the 270 or more items contained in the bill, and the average member finds it difficult to keep informed on one-quarter of the items.

I have no apologies to make for lack of definite knowledge on items not specifically objected to at the time they were passed upon by the committee. The present system expects every Member to be primarily interested in his own particular project. Beyond that he may or may not find time or inclination to concern himself. If need be I am ready to discuss that part of the system which practically throws the burden upon the shoulders of the chairman and expects him to stand sponsor for and defend the bill. However, such discussion will not be profitable nor strengthen the character of this measure.

TWO PROPOSITIONS ARE OFFERED.

Two propositions for your consideration have been offered in my minority report, one a substitute bill with restrictions as to allotments which places \$15,000,000 in the hands of Army en-

gineers for distribution. I am frank to say the record made by Army engineers in previous allotments has been indefensible. That is a grievous fault of the present system, but no other method can be devised here for carrying on necessary projects with a reasonable appropriation.

It may be opposed by those who have persuaded the committee to make liberal allotments for their particular projects, such as the Delaware River, the Mississippi, the Ohio, the Missouri, the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and others. In like manner it will be opposed by those who realize that even with their accustomed liberality Army engineers will hesitate to fritter away much money on wasteful projects contained in this bill.

These engineers have proven to be broken reeds on which to cling, but until we change the system and make them, in fact, responsible subordinates, there seems no better plan to offer. If adopted, it will bring a saving of nearly \$25,000,000, and when the fund is properly administered no legitimate waterway need suffer.

Another proposal is offered in my report. In order to avoid the blundering, illogical method now in vogue that recognizes neither scientific, commercial, nor business principles, a tentative bill is offered in the back of my minority report to this bill. If imperfect, it nevertheless is a step toward intelligent business methods.

I have been unable to get action by the committee on that measure. Necessarily, a bill that would put the committee out of business, as my bill proposes to do, will not be acceptable to the committee. However, the interests of actual waterways of the country, the necessity of avoiding scandalous waste, the spectacle of a depleted Treasury waiting the assault of an old-fashioned, wasteful bill; the willingness of its defenders to ignore needs of the Army and Navy and other governmental appropriations, in order to get local aid from the Federal Treasury; all these arguments ought to bring about a defeat of the river and harbor bill and substitution of a better system. Let us keep in mind the weakness of this present bill and the occasion for that weakness, and then proceed to permanently improve conditions and work toward a national budget system, as proposed. I do not question the personal high character of any Member when I say we are bound tight to a bad system.

Mr. Chairman, riotous waste in river appropriations has been fully disclosed during recent sessions. Remarks in the RECORD of January 13 give testimony piled on testimony, tending to show that the present system is antiquated, vicious, and ought to be abandoned. In the minority report on this bill, part 2, abundant proof is offered that as a moral and business proposition this bill ought to be defeated.

THIS BILL SHOULD BE DEFEATED.

Not one project in five would get past the House if proposed in a separate bill. Not one project in five would have been presented to the House originally if equal contribution had been required from the locality especially interested. By brushing aside contributions and combining 300 projects scattered over the country, but now all comfortably resting in one barrel, the bill stands or falls in its entirety. Not one project can be defeated.

I have not enlarged upon the fundamentally evil features of the present system, nor have I time nor inclination to do so. It is improper to waste public funds, even in times of peace, in order to secure some local aid from the Treasury. If public office is a public trust for the benefit of the public, we have much to answer for, even in times of governmental opulence; but what shall we say of ourselves, and what will the country say of us, when we now face a great Treasury deficit with which to meet a national-defense program. What will it say upon finding we have again passed the same old bill that for years has confronted us? What apology have we to offer for lavish expenditures and waste at this time?

Will we prefer extravagance to public economy? Will we demand what Senator Toombs terms "our slice from the Treasury," before we pass public-defense measures? Last session we defeated both river and harbor bills, but we have before us a measure worse, if anything, than the last one we defeated.

Let us not deceive ourselves with any mistaken belief that House bill 12193 can be passed by Congress without bringing censure that will not down. If we would meet the present emergency patriotically, we must not be content to talk of love of country and profess pride in an intelligent democracy, the hope of our fathers. Such sentiments go with high ideals. The kind of patriotism the country demands to-day is that which rings true, and is not of lip service alone; which puts aside selfish interests to join hands for the common good and places national honor and national interests above local or personal greed, by whatever name it may be called.

If we meet the issue patriotically and defeat the wasteful measure, no man need ever apologize over his action. Our duty has never been more clearly defined than it is to-day on this bill.

Then there is the Erie Canal, on which \$150,000,000 has been spent by New York State. An unprejudiced waterway journal, among the first in this country, *Waterways and Commerce*, says that it is practically money thrown away. I have referred to it in my report, taken from that paper. The same has been stated by gentlemen from New York, who seemed to be conversant with the facts, and it simply goes to show we are spending money without ascertaining what results we are to get from the expenditure or what commerce results will be obtained.

Mr. MADDEN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FREAR. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. MADDEN. Has the gentleman thought out what effect the expenditure of \$150,000,000 on the Mississippi will ultimately be?

Mr. FREAR. I can not go into that at this time, as I have so many matters to which I desire to refer. I will be glad to enter into that under the five-minute discussion. In my report I have presented the judgment of Dr. Moulton, who has studied and traveled abroad, and who is a very excellent authority on the subject of waterways. He has traveled throughout Europe and this country and he sustains the present inland waterway waste in substance. The same is true of Waterway Commissioner Reid, of Wisconsin, a man who has given study to waterways in Europe and in this country, and the same is true of Walfer L. Fisher, who has traveled throughout Europe and made a study of inland waterways. The same is practically true of Col. Townsend, who says we ought to stop work on 58 of the streams—in his speech made in Washington recently—and asks us to pick out one or two projects and ascertain whether any commerce will flow from the expenditure we are making. The same thing is true of Mr. Bernhard, when he says of the Mississippi River, to-day we have a far better channel than is found on the Rhine River, notwithstanding the commerce reaches something like 40,000,000 tons on the Rhine compared to 200,000 tons annually on the Mississippi River. Of course, Germany, as we know, has Government control of the railways as well as the waterways. Senator Burton, who is an authority, has agreed substantially, both by voice and act, in the wasteful methods now pursued. Criticism has been made that some of these projects were reported while he was chairman of the committee. Mistakes may have been made in judgment. That being so, when the error is disclosed we should cease wasting money. The gentlemen whom I have quoted, who are good authorities—I have heard of no higher recognized in the country—not one takes the position of the committee, that once you have started you must continue an appropriation, irrespective of what the result may be.

Mr. Chairman, how much time have I remaining?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has five minutes.

Mr. FREAR. Mr. Chairman, I did not know I would get through this in time, and I now shall be glad to yield.

Mr. SMALL. In the gentleman's report filed, top of page 5, are certain improvements, together with the tonnage carried in 1913. I suppose the gentleman meant 1914?

Mr. FREAR. No; 1913, as a rule, because those estimates were made before the 1915 report was received.

Mr. SMALL. I would like to ask the gentleman the source from which he obtained the tonnage?

Mr. FREAR. From the Engineer's reports—the 1913 report, according to my recollection, unless otherwise stated—and I deducted the floatable timber or other freight as stated, which was carried.

Mr. SMALL. I am not asking about deductions.

Mr. FREAR. I speak of that and make that qualification in my report.

Mr. SMALL. What is the source from which the gentleman has made the deduction to which he refers?

Mr. FREAR. From the itemized statements that appear in the Engineer's reports, second volume, in each case.

Mr. SMALL. Then all the information has been taken from the engineer's reports?

Mr. FREAR. I think so, in every case; possibly I took something from the remarks of the Senator from Ohio when he addressed himself to that subject. I do not remember.

Mr. SMALL. From the 1913 reports?

Mr. FREAR. From the 1913 reports, as a rule, unless it specifies 1914.

Mr. SMALL. Why did not the gentleman take the 1914 report?

Mr. FREAR. Because the 1915 report was not in my hands at the time the estimate was made.

Mr. SMALL. These are for the calendar year 1913?

Mr. FREAR. They are for the years given by the Engineer's reports.

I desire to answer the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BORLAND] or anyone else who may care to question me. I could not do so before. I am sorry to say that it takes more time than at my disposal to answer these matters as fully as I would like to answer them.

Mr. HULBERT. Will the gentleman yield for one question?

Mr. FREAR. I yield.

Mr. HULBERT. When the gentleman stated that the people from New York had voted for other provisions in the committee in order to secure the inclusion of one item of \$200,000 for the improvement of the East River, did the gentleman take into consideration the other items included in the bill, of benefit to the harbor of New York?

Mr. FREAR. No. I said that in order to get the appropriation for his harbor the gentleman is obliged to accept the bill that contains these other items.

Mr. BORLAND. I wanted to ask the gentleman whether he is not aware that the total amount he has charged against the Missouri River represents the amount that was spent by the Missouri River Commission prior to 1902?

Mr. FREAR. It includes—

Mr. BORLAND. As well as the amount of the present projects?

Mr. FREAR. I so understand.

Mr. BORLAND. Does not the gentleman realize the amount spent by the Missouri River Commission between 1880 and 1902 was spent under a system of isolated local appropriation, and was practically lost, and therefore the only project before the House relating to the Missouri River is the present existing project upon which only \$6,000,000 have been spent?

Mr. FREAR. I will answer the gentleman by saying that I concede that was practically lost. I believe that practically all the money that is now going into the Missouri River according to the report of Col. Townsend and Col. Deakyn is lost. And the only actual gain reported coming to the Missouri River is 500,000 acres now being reclaimed at the present time.

Mr. PARKER of New York. In your report, on page 18, you criticize the digging of the Erie Canal and the present barge canal in the State of New York as useless.

Mr. FREAR. I gave the statement and authority on which based.

Mr. PARKER of New York. This last fall there was submitted a referendum bond issue of \$37,000,000 to the people of the State of New York, which was passed. Do you recognize the people of the State of New York as authority?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin has expired.

Mr. PARKER of New York. Will the gentleman yield for one more question?

Mr. FREAR. I can not yield. My time has expired.

Mr. EAGLE. Mr. Chairman: It is my purpose, by the invitation of the chairman of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, to discuss the history and policy of waterway improvements throughout the country and, by your indulgence, also to discuss in greater particularity the projects within my own district in the State of Texas—notably the Houston Ship Channel and the Brazos River; but the remarkable tone assumed and statements and insinuations made against the entire membership of the Congress and its policy of waterway improvements by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FREAR] who has just taken his seat seem to me urgent to compel a digression in order briefly to reply to him.

Mr. Chairman, it is said that there was once a good old Quaker who said to his wife, "All persons are insane but thee and me, and thou art a little queer." And so the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FREAR] practically asserts that this Congress is an aggregation of incompetents, an assemblage of "pork-barrel grafters," and that the only truly wise, learned, disinterested, patriotic statesman in all the land hails from Hudson, Wis., on the classic banks of the upper reaches of the noble St. Croix.

Mr. Chairman: If the gentleman from Wisconsin entertains the low estimate of the House of Representatives which, as a new and presumptuous Member, he has expressed in his rambling remarks concerning it and the motives which govern its conduct, he might well resign his seat in disgust and refuse to serve here with so contemptible a congress of dishonorable public men.

He said one moment ago, as plainly as the English language can convey an impression that the great Rivers and Harbors Committee—at whose head the respected gentleman and learned statesman from Florida [Mr. SPARKMAN] presides with distinction, upon which my honorable and beloved colleague from Texas [Mr. BURGESS] serves with wisdom and fidelity as ranking member, and upon which are loyally associated with them

men of character and integrity from 21 States of this Union—have made up a bill upon the basis of bribing different State delegations to vote for the whole bill because their several State items were embodied in it, and that this Congress is so base as to be subject to such dishonor.

Mr. Chairman: I have heard about the sort of bird that befools its own nest. I have read with contempt in the "yellow journals" and the muckraking magazines, which are a disgrace to American civilization—those ghouls of human character which slander and belittle every noble and unselfish effort of human life in its public activities—such statements as these, but I have been able to attribute with charity their vile slanders of public men as much to ignorance as to mendacity; but this is the first time I have seen the American Congress put in disgrace by one of its own Members by an accusation that the membership itself, in order severally for their districts and collectively for their States to obtain appropriations necessary to provide adequate facilities for water-borne commerce, were subject to the degrading charge of being thus bribed into voting for a "pork-barrel bill" which would be a dishonest loot of the Public Treasury.

His performance is unworthy of a place in these proceedings. [Applause.]

There are some more things I want later to say concerning the gentleman from Wisconsin and his State of Wisconsin, and concerning that other great "anti-pork-barrel" statesman whom he praises as the greatest waterway expert in the United States, Mr. Theodore E. Burton, who served in this House as chairman of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors for 10 years and who during that time carried to his State of Ohio a one twenty-second portion of the entire annual rivers and harbors appropriations and to his own city of Cleveland about 50 per cent of that amount, and who, later, in the Senate, when he became a presidential possibility, or imagined himself as such, chose to reverse his attitude of a lifetime on waterway appropriations and improvements by twice filibustering to death rivers and harbors bills which were reasonable, just and necessary, in order that he might appear before a certain portion of the admiring public as a matchless "watchdog of the Treasury." [Applause and laughter.]

If I have time I shall also show the House and the country what appropriations in times past the State of Wisconsin has received, until every harbor, inlet, river, bay, creek, and mud pond capable of accommodating a mud turtle was duly improved, before she sent here the noble statesman, Mr. FREAR, to question the integrity of Congress and to belittle statesmen who are with conspicuous devotion and painstaking care faithfully doing their duty by the entire country. [Laughter and applause.]

The Father of his Country, Gen. George Washington, inaugurated our waterway policy by calling a convention for the purpose, in 1787, to improve the navigation facilities of the Potomac River. He represented Virginia at that convention; then the State of Maryland was induced to send delegates; then Delaware and Pennsylvania, and later all of the thirteen original States. That policy is very worthy of its very respectable beginning and its lineage, and it has since been pursued, sometimes by private subscription but generally by public appropriations, as an enormous blessing to the commerce and prosperity of the entire country. Gen. Washington who presided over the constitutional convention, James Madison who did more than any other man to write the Constitution of the United States, and Alexander Hamilton who did as much as any other man except James Madison in writing it and more perhaps than any other man to secure its adoption, believed and stated that the Constitution gives the Congress the power to appropriate money for the improvement of rivers and harbors. Congress has always acted on that theory.

But a new school of statesmanship has arisen in the last few years, made up of men limited in their vision of national needs, who assert that such public expenditures are reckless and wasteful extravagance, wholly forgetting that the entire bulk of our exports is water borne and that navigation of our rivers, lakes, and harbors is an absolute necessity of that commerce. Captious criticism of each item in each bill may prove to a few gentlemen an entertaining diversion and does delay the bill to passage, but it little satisfies the country which knows that its prosperity depends upon commerce and its rapid and economical movement.

It has always been the theory upon which Congress has acted that the object and justification of appropriating money out of the Federal Treasury for rivers and harbors was to induce, increase, and accommodate commerce. In my judgment, there are two additional objects which appropriations for rivers and harbors indirectly accomplish, which are of almost equally great importance, and ought to be taken into consideration by Congress in providing for commerce on our waterways. One of

them is to reduce the exorbitant charges laid against commerce for the transportation of freight, and the other is to prevent the overflow of rivers upon farms and towns and the consequent destruction of life and the wrecking of property of hundreds of millions value each year.

I shall digress from what I had in mind to say by making an illustration of the Mississippi River. It has been determined by the study of soil and climatic conditions and a consideration of the requisite amount of fertility to support an individual life, that, but for the overflows of the Mississippi River and its tributaries, 500,000,000 human beings can be supported in that basin alone. There are less than 100,000,000 inhabitants of the United States at the present time. During the course of a few centuries, when our population shall have increased to several hundred millions, students when considering the conditions of the country then, with reference to its population and the necessities of its entire areas being conserved for the blessings of mankind and for an opportunity for the full development of its matchless civilization, will read with wonder how men in the year 1916 ever doubted the expediency and the plain duty by adequate appropriations to keep the Mississippi within its banks, so that life, property, wealth, civilization, and happiness may be secure in its fertile valleys on each bank for a thousand miles as it moves on its majestic way southward toward the sea. [Applause.]

The flood waters of 31 States contribute to form the Mississippi River that empties at New Orleans into the Gulf of Mexico. And yet at most times in the year, as we all know, the Mississippi stays within its alluvial banks; but at other times, when the high waters even of the State of Pennsylvania, and, lower down, of the States of West Virginia and Kentucky to the south, and Indiana, Illinois and Ohio to the north, add their flux of water to the vast stream, it absolutely inundates and devastates for hundreds of miles on both sides.

The Congress, instead of accepting the advice of men who want to build political reputations for themselves at home by advocating here a pusillanimous doctrine that would make themselves heroes as "watchdogs of the Treasury," ought, upon the other hand, to make one continuing contract for the full amount necessary to make that noble river what it ought to be—the carrier of vast commerce at cheap rates—and to make the Mississippi Valley one of the grand garden spots of the world and the home of one of the most prosperous and glorious civilizations that man has known since the beginning of time. [Applause.]

The money that has been spent in improving navigation on the Mississippi River has resulted in a saving to the producers and shippers in its valleys on both sides of that river, from its upper reaches to the Gulf, of far more than the total about \$150,000,000 that has been spent for the improvement of navigation on that river.

As an illustration of an incidental object and benefit of improving navigation primarily for purposes of commerce upon the rivers and lakes of the country, take the case of the Mississippi at Memphis, Tenn. The gentleman from Wisconsin has stated that, despite the sums expended upon the Mississippi, commerce has largely left that river and is using the railroads which parallel the river. Even granting his premise, his conclusion does not hold true, for the incidental benefit to the public of cheapening transportation by the competing lines of railroads remains permanently as a blessing. From Memphis it is some 500 miles to the Gulf at New Orleans. The freight on the railroad is 75 cents per bale of cotton. But from Waco, Tex., the same distance from the Gulf at Freeport, the charge by rail for the same service is \$2.25 per bale.

If the Brazos River improvements from Waco to the Gulf were completed, as the Mississippi River improvements from Memphis to the Gulf are completed, the freight charge on a bale of cotton from Waco to the Gulf would be 75 cents instead of \$2.25 as at present. Those two cities are about the same distance from a Gulf port, over exactly the same character of country. Why should the producers and shippers in the Brazos River Valley be penalized for all time to come in freight charges on their cotton and other products seeking an outlet to the sea, when the completion of the present Brazos River project will free them from such extortion? It is entirely safe to assume, and it is so clear as to be self-evident, that if snags and sand bars yet existed in the bed of the Mississippi River from Memphis to New Orleans, so that water transportation would be impossible, the railroads which run alongside the Mississippi would be charging the producers \$2.25 per bale freight instead of 75 cents per bale as at present. Water competition produces freight miracles. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, there are four items that have absorbed the bulk of the national revenues during the last 40 years. During those 40 years the Army has received \$1,973,825,531.68,

the Navy has received \$2,120,214,833.29, pensions have received \$4,568,251,057.52, while rivers and harbors have received only \$680,552,501.01. That is, the average per year during the last 40 years has been about \$49,000,000 for the Army, about \$53,000,000 for the Navy, about \$114,000,000 for pensions, and about \$17,000,000 for rivers and harbors. Or, to state it in another way, for every \$1 appropriated for rivers and harbors, by which our national commerce everywhere may move, by which the annual increment of wealth to this Nation may be doubled and trebled and quadrupled over what it would be except for our rivers and harbors, about \$3 have been spent for the Army; for every \$1 spent for rivers and harbors \$3 have been spent for a Navy; and for every \$1 spent for rivers and harbors, about \$7 have been spent for pensions. In all, the Congress has appropriated about \$13 each year during the past 40 years for these nonproductive purposes for each dollar that has been appropriated for rivers and harbors without which the Government would not have received the other \$13 with which to pay those other items. [Applause.] This has been true notwithstanding the fact that all of our exports are water borne, and that the net profits on our exports, made possible by our lake, river and harbor improvements, over what they would be without such improved facilities, are probably enough in a single year to pay the entire bill of waterway improvements for the last 40 years; and, as stated, the entire amount of such foreign commerce is made possible only because of the river, lake and harbor improvements throughout the country.

And yet, at places throughout the country, and in portions of the public press—notably that portion of it influenced by those railroads that seek to monopolize all of the carrying trade along their lines—and by a few Members of Congress who appear to be anxious to make reputations at home as economists here, who rant and prate and belittle and question the political integrity of all Representatives who contend for appropriations for the waterway projects in their several districts to which such projects are fairly entitled by virtue of present and prospective tonnage and the normal movements of trade and commerce, the good faith as well as the wisdom of Congress is constantly called in question, and ignominy is heaped upon the heads of the people's faithful Representatives. For one I am heartily tired of such narrow vision, such poor logic and such brazen effrontery. [Applause.]

As I have sat here for three years in succession and heard a certain gentleman speak hour after hour, as long as he could secure time upon his own side, and exhaust the five-minute rule and move to strike out everything from the last word to the tenth word and the eighteenth word, until he drove Congress into the cloakroom in sheer desperation [laughter] there was at least some amusement in contemplating the spectacle of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FEAR], three years in congressional service, setting up his opinion on engineering problems against the expert opinions of the engineers of the War Department who are the honor men of West Point, the men of the highest technical knowledge in the United States and perhaps the equal of any in the world, engineers with life positions, with their reputation at stake, with a technical knowledge of engineering problems such as none of us could acquire if we began now and worked until the end of our days, and with a process of legislation directing them in reporting a project which makes it almost inevitable that they do not err. Great respect should be paid to the standing of any waterway project finally taken on and appropriated for by Congress, when the process is fairly considered by which it is taken on. First, a bill is introduced providing for a survey. Second, the Rivers and Harbors Committee, if it thinks a *prima facie* case is made, inserts in the next appropriation bill an item authorizing a survey. Third, the Chief of Engineers then directs the district engineer to make a preliminary examination and report, showing prospective cost, benefit and feasibility. Fourth, this examination being made, the report thereof goes from the district engineer to the colonel of the division, then with his condemnation or approval to the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors for its examination, and then to the Chief of Engineers. Fifth, if the project have enough merit to pass these several tests and criticisms, it is then referred back for exhaustive examination and complete report thereon, then again to the board when complete and exhaustive hearings are held as to cost, as to present and prospective tonnage, and as to the necessities of commerce and all relevant issues. Upon the full facts thus revealed the Board of Engineers prepares its final report. Sixth, thereupon the Rivers and Harbors Committee of the House of Representatives sometimes—as in the case of the Brazos River in Texas—visit and inspect the proposed project. Seventh, as the result of such systematic, painstaking and exhaustive study, surveys and examinations, it is thereafter appro-

priated for until completed. It is greatly to be doubted if the expenditure of public money in any other department of Government is so thoroughly considered and minutely scrutinized as in the appropriations for waterways. Then to have some gentleman persistently belittle those who have investigated the facts, and who know the splendid people who work for waterway improvements and their exalted motives, who know of the enormous commerce that will move, and who know of the excessive freight charges collected from producers and shippers every year at the hands of those who have a monopoly upon transportation, is enough to justify language in reply that might not be parliamentary. [Applause.]

Some illustrations may be briefly made of the effect of waterways improvements upon commerce and development—each of which suffered in their incipiency from the same character of criticism now directed against present appropriations. Many years ago when De Witt Clinton was governor of the State of New York, he conceived the Erie Canal. He was ridiculed and failed of reelection because the short-sighted citizens failed to catch his splendid vision of a greater New York. He was what muckrakers would nowadays call a "pork-barrel" statesman. But later, when the people came to understand it, they reinstated him in office, and he carried through that noble work, and all men now agree that the thing that established the supremacy and the preeminence of New York over Philadelphia and other Atlantic cities was the Erie Canal, opening the vast commerce of the Northwest over the lakes and rivers through the Erie Canal and emptying its wealth into the lap of New York City. [Applause.]

On this floor, in almost the identical spot where I stand, J. Proctor Knott, of Kentucky, built his fame, as enduring as man's appreciation of genius and oratory, upon his famous speech on Duluth. At that time, Duluth was a mere name on the map of the far frontier, and had an item in the river and harbor bill. It was struck at by Mr. Knott with real wit and humor instead of the stereotyped variety that we repeatedly hear concerning the Trinity River having an artesian well bored in its bed in order to get water into it. I hear that brilliant sarcasm every time the House considers a waterways bill. And yet Duluth has become a splendid city and its great port bears annually an enormous commerce, to the blessing of the people of all that vast northwestern country.

Now I will give you another concrete illustration. Take the great port of Galveston. When I was a young man, I acted as clerk for Col. Walter Gresham, a venerable and respected citizen of Galveston, who even yet looks after Galveston's port interests with conspicuous ability, Gov. H. Bradford Prince of New Mexico and others in the draft of a resolution calling upon Congress to make Galveston a port for the accommodation of the overseas commerce of the trans-Mississippi country. Later, in 1891, at the meeting of the Trans-Mississippi Commercial Congress, at Denver—where I first had the pleasure and the honor that has lasted all these years of forming the friendship of the beloved Speaker of this House [applause], where he was also a delegate—a resolution was adopted which was transmitted to each Member of Congress asking for an appropriation sufficient to make the port of Galveston a complete success. The records of the sessions of Congress which followed show that the Galveston item was vigorously condemned as "pork" in the interest of the West and particularly of Texas.

As late as 1898 Texas with her 400 miles of coast line was compelled, in order to have the complete project for the port of Galveston finally adopted by Congress, to unite on Galveston to the utter exclusion of all other Texas rivers and harbors projects. In 1891 there were 9 feet of water over the Galveston inner bar and 12 feet over the outer bar; now there are 119,000 acres in the harbor, roads and port of Galveston having 30 feet of water. In 1891, there was only \$636,000 in value of commerce imported into the port of Galveston, and that by lighter over the bar, while during the year 1914—only 23 years later—there was \$12,000,000 in value of her imports. [Applause.] During 1891, the total value of exports from Galveston was \$10,000,000, whereas in the year 1914 the value of exports from Galveston had climbed to the enormous total of \$256,000,000. [Applause.] It is now the second port of the United States in point of exports, the matchless port of New York standing first. More than 4,000,000 bales of cotton left the port of Galveston during the year 1915, and 50,000,000 bushels of wheat coming from Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma and the vast central West left the port of Galveston.

And yet that splendid result has been accomplished by the expenditure of less than \$11,500,000 for the harbor and less than \$2,000,000 for the channel—in all, less than \$13,500,000 for the development of the great port of Galveston—second in the United States in importance, at least as to exports, and cer-

tainly second only in affording the Nation an annual trade balance with the world, and which has already, even in its infancy, enabled the farmers and shippers of Texas and the great Southwest to save many times over the total amount it has cost. [Applause.]

HOUSTON SHIP CHANNEL.

I would like now to tell the House something about my home port, Houston. I think it will gratify the House to know what the splendid citizens have done down there, and what they are going to do, what they have done themselves and what the Congress helped them to do, at a place on a waterway 50 miles inland from the port of Galveston. For half a century it was a dream of the citizens of Houston that it become a deep-water port. As early as 1871 the Congress appropriated a pittance and authorized an investigation. Further appropriations were made in 1877, in 1881, in 1892 and in 1899—as the needs of commerce and the use of that waterway required; but on June 25, 1910, Congress passed a bill appropriating \$1,250,000 conditioned upon the raising of a like amount by the city of Houston as she had proposed to do. Even before the Houston Ship Channel was completed, tonnage of the amounts now stated for the years named of the value following moved over the channel:

Year.	Short tons.	Value.
1905.	104,937	\$12,544,323
1906.	132,103	15,933,003
1907.	452,463	24,486,732
1908.	602,731	28,318,621
1909.	1,214,904	36,097,553
1910.	1,371,653	39,155,357
1911.	1,354,897	34,721,533
1912.	1,305,050	35,938,800
1913.	1,860,452	38,738,464

And yet, at the last session of Congress, when we were asking for an item of maintenance only, opponents of waterway improvements and candidates for publicity as exalted types of political morality assured the House this this tonnage of this enormous value was sand and shell! The courageous people of the city of Houston and the county of Harris, at that time knowing that about \$2,000,000 had already been expended by private enterprise and Government appropriations, and that no deep water existed at Houston sufficient to accommodate ocean-borne commerce, raised \$1,250,000 and in effect tendered it to Congress conditioned upon an appropriation for a like sum, so as to make the \$2,500,000 necessary to complete the Houston Ship Channel. Congress accepted that proposition, because all good men admire a proud, courageous and self-confident people. [Applause.] The Houston Ship Channel was finished during the summer of 1915, and now it has a uniform depth of 25 feet of water all the way from the Gulf of Mexico to the turning basin in the city of Houston. The navigation district, meaning the city of Houston and the county of Harris, has expended about \$1,000,000 of its own money in acquiring land and digging a commodious turning basin. It has raised \$3,000,000 with which it has built and is building free wharfage, docks, terminals and warehouses, in order to have at least one spot on earth where monopoly shall not have a foothold. [Applause.] There were two barges built to keep that channel open, costing \$200,000 each, and Houston matched dollars with Congress—Houston paying for one and the United States paying for the other. [Applause.] The Houston Ship Channel was completed during the summer of 1915, and within four months after it was completed 40,000 tons of freight—enough to load 40 trains of 50 cars each, or 1 train 16 miles long—went over the wharves at the port of Houston. The tonnage is developing rapidly. Lines of steamships, laden to the guards incoming and outgoing, ply between Houston and New York regularly, between Houston and Havana, and between Houston and Mexican ports.

Already great industrial plants line its shores—vast cotton warehouses and compresses, fertilizer works, packing plants, oil refineries and various other industries which require deep water for the conduct of their large business—noble forecasts of Houston's greatness; and the mind thrills with the noble vision of the Houston of the future, when the enterprise of our people shall have had time to develop its vast possibilities. Houston is 500 miles nearer than New York to the Panama Canal; already 17 railroads come to Houston "to meet the sea"; already she is the richest, largest and most splendid city in the vast State of Texas where 5,000,000 people dwell with pride in her past, with joy in her present and with firm assurance of her limitless future; [applause] and when, as is inevitable, the Gulf of Mexico shall have become the Mediterranean of our Western Hemisphere, Houston will be its chief city and port, sitting as an uncrowned queen upon its shore and extending her blessings

to all the world. [Applause.] The bill now under consideration provides two items for the Houston Ship Channel—one for its annual maintenance and another for an investigation and report upon the necessity, feasibility and cost of deepening that channel. We have faith that Houston is destined to be the Manchester of America and the citizens of Houston are not going to wait for a later generation to do that splendid work [applause].

During the year 1915, 1,070,700 tons of freight passed over the channel, worth \$32,143,500, notwithstanding that the European war smashed southern prosperity and demoralized shipping. It is apparently developing during the first year since its completion at least \$50,000,000 in value of tonnage moved. Two million bales of cotton moved from Houston over that channel alone in the last year. [Applause.] That is not all: 183,000 tons of lumber and shingles worth \$3,760,000, 23,000 tons of hardware and machinery worth \$2,300,000, 37,000 tons of groceries valued at \$2,000,000, and 42,000 tons of rice valued at \$1,680,000, and much miscellaneous freight, besides 2,000,000 bales of cotton, moved over the Houston Ship Channel into and out of the port of Houston last year. The people of Houston achieved this splendid result by a total expenditure of less than \$5,000,000, and the people of Texas have already saved, by virtue of the Houston Ship Channel, more than enough in freight rates to make up the whole cost of the entire enterprise.

BRAZOS RIVER.

Another Texas project, which must run the gamut at each session of Congress and overcome the jeers of the uninformed and the supercilious but which is one of the very best projects taken on and appropriated for by Congress, is the Brazos River from the Gulf of Mexico at Freeport to Waco—a distance of 425 miles. Gentlemen complain that there is little tonnage at present moved on the Brazos and offer that as a reason why the project should be abandoned after \$1,700,000 have been expended upon the project. They seem to forget that not a pound of freight could move through even the Panama Canal until it was completed; but the probability that tonnage would move through the Panama Canal caused several hundred million dollars to be expended upon that project. No man lives in comfort in his house until it has been finished. As to the port called formerly Velasco and more recently Freeport, it may prove useful for the House to know that private capital constructed it by the expenditure of more than \$1,000,000 and then turned the enterprise over to the United States without cost to it. Upon the banks of the Brazos River and only 3 or 4 miles above where it empties into the Gulf, there has been recently discovered and developed, at an outlay of millions of money, the greatest sulphur mine in all the world. It is estimated to contain a total of 17,000,000 tons of sulphur worth about \$20 a ton. At this hour a bin of sulphur 99 per cent pure and worth \$1,000,000 lies on top of the ground at Freeport on the banks of the Brazos River, and only the surface of the vast wealth deposited there has been touched. Great ships of the sea come from all over the world through the port of Velasco, or Freeport, to take that sulphur away, and thus to add to the comfort of the world and the commerce and wealth of Texas and the United States. And yet I have heard each session for the last three years some gentlemen belittle the Brazos River and the port of Freeport as being unworthy of national recognition. [Applause.]

The Brazos River project was not taken on for political reasons—because, at that time, Mr. Burton, a Republican, was chairman of the Rivers and Harbors Committee in the House, the Congress was overwhelmingly Republican, and Texas was overwhelmingly of the Democratic Party; but the Brazos River project was undertaken only because sound and compelling logic demanded it be done. Nor was the project taken on hastily or without due consideration. There have been three official and several unofficial surveys of that stream and reports accompanying. As early as 1874 Maj. C. W. Howell, in 1889 Maj. C. J. Allen, and in 1894 Maj. A. M. Miller made official examinations and reports. All of those reports agree that the improvement of the Brazos River for commerce is feasible, requiring only money to carry the enterprise to success, and that the tonnage exists to use the river when improved. In 1900 the able engineer, Col. C. S. Riché—an ornament to his profession and his Nation—made his official report concerning the Brazos after thorough examination, in which he said, among other things:

For all the foregoing reasons, therefore, I have the honor to report that, in my opinion, the Brazos River from its mouth to the city of Waco is worthy of improvement for a light-craft navigation, even if the cost of the work should be as great as \$6,000,000.

His superior officer, Col. H. M. Roberts, concurred in the report of Col. Riché, and added:

I think the survey should be made, as, from all the data I have seen, I am forced to concur with Col. Riché in the opinion that the Brazos

River from its mouth to the city of Waco is worthy of improvement for a light-draft navigation, even if the cost of the work should be as great as \$6,000,000.

This same Col. Roberts, who later became Chief of Engineers, again officially reported in its favor, in 1901. Later, Maj. Jadwin officially reported:

The Brazos River is the best river in the State of Texas. There is sufficient water, if properly conserved, to provide navigation even beyond Waco.

These reports were approved by the Chief and Board of Engineers, and the Secretary of War, Hon. William H. Taft, approved the report and transmitted it to Congress. Thereupon, the Rivers and Harbors Committee, with its chairman, Hon. Theodore E. Burton in person at its head, then visited Waco and inspected the Brazos River and unanimously approved the project for its improvement notwithstanding it should entail a total expenditure of \$6,000,000; and thereafter Congress appropriated for it, the work has steadily progressed, and about \$1,700,000 have already been expended upon it. And then later, in 1915, when he was a Senator, this same Mr. Burton filibustered to death an item for the Brazos River upon the ground that the river is not worthy of improvement and that the appropriation is "pork." [Laughter and applause.]

It is 425 miles by river from the Gulf to Waco. The Brazos River traverses for a thousand miles a region more fertile than the valley of the Nile. The vast and fertile area over which freight rates will be affected by making the Brazos navigable from the Gulf to Waco amounts to probably 32,000 square miles—an area larger than such large States as South Carolina, West Virginia or probably Indiana, and contains one-third of the population of 5,000,000 people in Texas, and produces one-third of her annual great cotton crop. From the Gulf to old Washington, a distance of 254 miles from its mouth, the reports of the engineers agree that 6 feet of water for eight months in the year could be secured by removing the snags and bars and the construction of training walls and spur dykes; but that from old Washington to Waco such uniform depth could be secured only by a system of locks and dams. The first part of this work has been done, and some of the locks and dams have been completed, others are in process of completion and some few others are yet to be built. To illustrate the character of country and its state of development through which the Brazos flows from Waco to the Gulf, I cite the House to the production in bales of cotton in each of these counties in the year 1914: McLennan, 99,622; Falls, 70,767; Milam, 64,323; Robertson, 42,438; Brazos, 22,147; Grimes, 22,657; Burleson, 25,891; Austin, 25,449; Washington, 34,200; Waller, 10,203; Fort Bend, 19,923; Brazoria, 5,043; a total of 442,663 bales, worth \$60 to \$75 per bale. The second tier counties in that same year produced: Bastrop, 33,913; Bosque, 26,254; Coryell, 29,767; Colorado, 16,853; Fayette, 40,667; Hill, 94,127; Lee, 12,488; Leon, 16,893; Limestone, 70,794; Madison, 11,072; Matagorda, 3,682; Montgomery, 8,937; Wharton, 15,665; Williamson, 112,791; a total of 503,903 bales; a grand total for those first and second tier of counties on the Brazos River, only from Waco to the Gulf, of 946,566 bales. And yet gentlemen argue that the Congress should provide no facilities for the improvement of the Brazos River on whose banks such wealth and commerce are provided by that thrifty and splendid people. [Applause.]

As an incidental benefit flowing from the improvement of the Brazos River for the purpose of commerce, I will mention not only the inevitable reduction in freight rates in competition with water rates, but the other enormous benefit of preventing overflows from floods. There are probably more than 750,000 acres of rich alluvial soil on both banks of the Brazos from Waco to the Gulf subject to overflow, which will be largely or altogether redeemed from that annual calamity by the completion of the Brazos River project. Those lands are of nominal value now, but will be worth \$100 per acre then; and that will increase population and add vastly to the wealth, production and commerce of the country. It would be no less than inexcusable and almost criminal folly to abandon the Brazos River project; but its completion as speedily and economically as possible will give hope and courage to a splendid citizenship, insure immense tonnage to move at living rates, cause new centers and enterprises to spring up along that stream, add largely to the wealth and population, and bring unending blessings to that territory, to our whole country and to the world. [Applause.]

But I have promised the House that, before I concluded, I would furnish a statement, not alone of appropriations received by the great State of Ohio and the thriving city of Cleveland for rivers and harbors improvement during the 10 years Mr. Burton presided as chairman over the Rivers and Harbors Committee of

the House, but also by the State of Wisconsin, and I shall discharge that promise. In passing, it may be proper to remark that the same chairman, Mr. Burton, once caused to be passed a \$55,000,000 rivers and harbors bill through the House under suspension of the rules—before, in the Senate, he had arisen to filibuster to death smaller but similar bills as reckless waste of public funds. [Laughter.]

Hon. Theodore E. Burton was for 13 years a Member and for 10 years chairman of the Rivers and Harbors Committee of the House of Representatives. His service as a Member of the House terminated March 3, 1909, when he entered the Senate. He was, therefore, chairman of the Rivers and Harbors Committee of the House for five Congresses, viz., Fifty-sixth, Fifty-seventh, Fifty-eighth, Fifty-ninth, and Sixtieth Congresses, and was a member of the committee during a part of the Fifty-fourth and all of the Fifty-fifth Congresses. His official career as chairman began in December 1899 and terminated March 3, 1909.

During these 10 years the appropriations and authorizations were as follows:

Year.	Appropriations.	Authorizations.	Total.
1900	\$560,000		\$560,000
1902	26,771,442	38,586,160	65,357,692
1904	3,000,000		3,000,000
1905	18,181,875	17,184,657	35,366,532
1907	37,108,083	49,954,349	87,062,432
Total	85,621,397	105,725,166	191,346,654

Following are the appropriations and authorizations by Congress made to the several rivers and harbors of the States of Ohio and Wisconsin during the years in which Mr. Burton was chairman of the River and Harbor Committee.

Act approved June 12, 1902 (Stat. L., vol. 32, pp. 32 et seq.):

For Ohio.	Appropriations.	Authorizations.
HARBORS.		
Conneaut	\$200,000	\$250,000
Ashtabula	200,000
Fairport	200,000
Cleveland	625,000	2,300,000
Black River	6,000
Huron	40,000
Sandusky	125,000
Port Clinton	5,000
Toledo	15,000
Muskingum (river)	10,300
Total	1,426,300	2,550,000
RIVERS.		
Ohio, Locks 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6	275,000	300,000
Lock 37	100,000	950,000
Lock 8	50,000	250,000
Lock 11	50,000	250,000
Lock at Marietta	25,000
Open channel	400,000
Total	900,000	1,750,000

Omitting the Ohio River, the total appropriations for rivers and harbors were \$1,426,300
Authorizations 2,550,000

Total for Ohio 3,976,300

Or about one-sixteenth of the amount appropriated for the whole country in this act.

It is not fair to charge all of the Ohio River appropriation to the State of Ohio. Mr. Burton, however, was very generous to this river.

Appropriations \$900,000
Authorizations 1,750,000

Total 2,650,000

This river primarily benefits Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky, Illinois and Indiana. The river touches Ohio soil for a longer distance than it touches Illinois and Indiana combined. It touches West Virginia and Kentucky for a distance about equal to that of Ohio, Illinois and Indiana combined, and is formed in Pennsylvania. The Government improvement extends over a length but little short of 1,000 miles, upon which the Government expended up to June 30, 1913—

On open-channel work \$7,206,621
And on locks and dams 21,134,888
With an unappropriated authorization of 7,376,000

Making a total of 35,717,409

The present project contemplates 54 locks and dams, worked up during Mr. Burton's chairmanship, but actually adopted in 1910 after he had gone to the Senate. The estimate in 1906 was \$63,731,488 in addition to the appropriations already made. The State of Ohio is directly benefited by a contact touch of 500 miles; Illinois and Indiana combined 500 miles; Kentucky and West Virginia 1,000 miles. In other words, the direct benefit to Ohio is far more than one-fourth of the distance, but in this estimate I shall charge Ohio with one-fourth of the appropriation for 1902, or \$662,500 which added to the \$3,976,000 appropriated, of a purely Ohio nature, makes a grand total for Ohio of about \$4,638,500, or about one-fourteenth of the entire appropriations of the act.

Act approved March 3, 1905, Statutes at Large, volume 33, pages 117 et seq.:

Harbor.	Appropriations.	Authorization.
Port Clinton	\$2,000
Toledo	20,000
Sandusky	125,000	\$480,000
Huron	68,500
Vermilion	15,000
Lorain	85,000
Cleveland	200,000
Fairport	130,000
Ashtabula	20,000
Conneaut	60,000
Muskingum (river)	118,000
Total	843,500	480,000

Or a total of \$1,323,500 for Ohio.

The Ohio River received, \$355,000.

One-fourth of this, or \$88,750, added to the above gives a grand total for Ohio in this act of \$1,412,250.

Act of March 2, 1907, Revised Statutes, volume 34, pages 1073 et seq.:

Harbors.	Appropriations.	Authorization.
Port Clinton	\$3,000
Sandusky	125,000
Huron	16,000
Vermilion	15,000
Lorain	30,000
Cleveland	223,000	\$900,000
Fairport	100,000
Ashtabula	20,000
Conneaut	20,000
Muskingum (River)	48,000
Total	600,000	900,000

Or a total of \$1,500,000.

Ohio River.	Appropriations.	Authorizations.
Dam No. 8	\$250,845	\$500,000
Dam No. 11	198,343	500,000
Dam Nos. 13 and 18	174,078	400,000
Dam No. 26	100,000	965,000
Dam No. 19	200,000	100,000
Dam No. 37, at Louisville	271,000
Dam at Great Miami	20,000
Open channel	450,000
Total	1,664,266	2,465,000

Grand total \$4,129,266

One-fourth 1,032,318
Which added to 1,500,000

Makes for Ohio in 1907 2,532,318

Act of March 3, 1909, Statutes at Large, volume 35, page 815: This act made a lump sum appropriation of \$8,185,750 in cash and an authorization for the Ohio River of \$100,000.

Out of this lump sum Ohio got the following allotments:

Toledo Harbor	\$45,000
Port Clinton	2,500
Vermilion Harbor	2,000
Fairport Harbor	5,000
Total	54,500

And the Ohio River got \$150,000 which, with the \$100,000 in the bill, made \$250,000. Charging Ohio with one-fourth of this, or \$62,500, the State got a total in this act of \$117,000.

Recapitulation.

Acts of—	The State got—	Cleveland got—
June 12, 1902.....	\$4,638,500	\$2,925,000
Mar. 3, 1905.....	1,412,250	200,000
Mar. 2, 1907.....	2,532,318	1,123,000
Mar. 3, 1909.....	117,000
Total.....	8,700,066	4,248,000

Ohio received during Mr. Burton's chairmanship one twenty-second of all that was given to all the States, and Cleveland, his home city, received very nearly one-half of what was appropriated for Ohio.

HOW WISCONSIN FARED.

Act of June 12, 1902:

Harbor.	Appropriations.	Authorization.
Racine	\$20,000
Kenosha	5,000
Milwaukee	232,000
Ahnapee	10,000
Port Washington	6,000
Oronto	3,000
Sheboygan	90,000
Manitowoc	45,000
Two Rivers	20,000
Kewaunee	11,000
Green Bay	105,600
Sturgeon Bay	44,000	\$178,000
Ashland	40,000
Port Wing	25,000
Superior	200,000
Fox River	70,000
St. Croix River	2,000
Total	928,600	178,000

Or \$1,106,600 in all.

Act of March 3, 1905:

Harbor.	Appropriations.	Authorization.
Kenosha	\$5,000
Racine	30,000
Milwaukee	250,000	\$218,000
Sheboygan	18,000
Manitowoc	110,000
Two Rivers	6,600
Kewaunee	3,000
Sturgeon Bay	50,000
Green Bay	10,000
Ashland	60,000
Port Wing	19,992
Fox River	35,000
St. Croix River	4,000
Total	601,592	218,000

Or \$819,592 in all.

Act of March 2, 1907:

Harbor.	Appropriations.	Authorizations.
Kenosha	\$22,000
Racine	50,000
Milwaukee	200,000	\$392,000
Sheboygan	40,000
Manitowoc	100,000	276,000
Two Rivers	90,000
Kewaunee	5,000
Algoma	43,000	100,000
Sturgeon Bay	20,000
Green Bay	5,000
Ashland	60,000
Port Wing	2,000
Fox River	35,000
St. Croix River	4,000
Total	706,000	768,000

Or \$1,474,000 in all.

Act of March 3, 1909, made appropriations as follows:

Menominee Harbor	\$4,000
Green Bay Harbor	12,000
Kewaunee Harbor	5,000
Sheboygan Harbor	5,000
Port Washington Harbor	4,000
Racine Harbor	5,000
Kenosha Harbor	10,000
Fox River	20,000
Total	65,000

Or a total, in 10 years of \$3,465,192.

The Mississippi River from St. Paul to the mouth of the Missouri received \$3,000,000 in all. This river in this stretch touches Wisconsin approximately one-half the distance from St. Paul to the mouth of the Missouri River, and Wisconsin should be charged approximately one-fourth of this appropriation, or \$750,000, which added to the amount directly charged to her makes a total of \$4,215,192.

And, when all of the harbors, lakes and rivers in those splendid States are improved to completion for purposes of their great commerce, these enlightened and disinterested statesmen are loudest in denunciation of worthy and approved projects in other sections of our common country which contributed willingly their full share to the prosperity and happiness of Ohio and Wisconsin.

True statesmanship is not narrow; true patriotism is not circumscribed by sectional limitations. This is one mighty Nation with a destiny based on fraternity. Those policies and sentiments which injure some portions injure the whole; and those policies and sentiments which bless the whole aid and ennoble all sections of our beloved country.

Irrespective of section or faction or party or local interest, it is ennobling to serve well in our day, and thus to help guide this mighty Nation in its onward march toward that noble destiny of freedom, prosperity, and happiness which has always been the vision and the dream of patriots. [Long continued applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I yield two minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MANN].

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I ask the Clerk to read in my time the matter which I send to the Clerk's desk.

The Clerk read as follows:

[Statement for the press.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 31, 1916.

Following telegram received to-day:

"SAN GERONIMO, March 30.

"Dodd struck Villa's command, consisting of 500, 6 o'clock, March 29, at Guerrero. Villa, who is suffering from a broken leg and lame hip, was not present. Number of Villa's dead known to be 30, probably others carried away dead. Dodd captured two machine guns, large number of horses, saddles, and arms. Our casualties, four enlisted men wounded. None serious. Attack was surprise, the Villa troops being driven in a 10-mile running fight and retreated to mountains northwest of railroad, where they separated into small bands. Large number of Carranzista prisoners, who were being held for execution, were liberated during the fight. In order to reach Guerrero Dodd marched 58 miles in 17 hours and carried on fight for 5 hours. * * * Eliso Hernandez, who commanded Villa's troop, was killed in fight. With Villa permanently disabled, Lopez wounded, and Hernandez dead, the blow administered is a serious one to Villa's band.

"PERSHING."

[Loud applause.]

Mr. TREADWAY. Mr. Chairman, I am so thoroughly interested in endeavoring to secure at this time the adoption of the project for deepening Boston Harbor that I desire to use most of my time under general debate to call the attention of the House to the merits of the Boston project. In view of the fact that the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, early in its deliberations, decided not to include new projects in the present bill, no move was made by the friends of Boston Harbor for a hearing or an opportunity to present its claims. We accepted this action on the part of the committee in good faith and with as good grace as we could in view of our great interest in its adoption.

We have a standing before the House now from the fact that the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, after hearings were closed and the bill practically made up, included in the bill the East River project, found on page 4, lines 23 to 25, and page 5, lines 1 to 12, inclusive. The East River project comes before the House in a very peculiar, I might say unprecedented, manner. The vote of the committee in reference to new projects placed the East River item in exactly the same position as the Boston item. In other words, both projects had been favorably reported upon by the Board of Engineers, but were excluded from consideration by the general vote. Were it not that the East River project finally got into the bill, I should not, at this time, be asking for consideration for Boston Harbor.

I wish to state my thorough disapproval of the manner in which the inclusion of this item was secured. The previous action of the committee was overruled on a strictly partisan basis as a result of the request of the President to insert the East River project. The facts are that the Democratic Members from New York, under the lead of the Member from New York on the committee [Mr. HULBERT], assisted by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, Mr. FITZGERALD, a man whose ability to foresee political advantage is well recognized, placed the matter before the President in such a way

that he, under the guise of preparedness, could well cater to the Democratic politicians of New York and Brooklyn. The letter Secretary Tumulty sent to Mr. SPARKMAN was inspired by the letters of Mr. HULBERT and Mr. FITZGERALD, the latter stating that—

The Representatives from New York would be placed in an impossible position if they supported revenue measures which largely increased the burdens of their constituents, while failing to obtain legislation deemed essential for the security of the metropolis of the Nation.

The gentleman from New York [Mr. FITZGERALD] has an extremely pleasing style of expression, but the real thought back of it all is "the support of their constituents," which means votes for both Congressmen and for President.

The only emergency existing is, before another river and harbor bill is prepared there is to be a national election. The hearing does not contain any evidence whatsoever going to show that this appropriation need be made at the present time. The facts are an appropriation of \$200,000 was made last year to remove Coenties Reef. Work has begun on that and will be continued for nearly a year. The distance between Governors Island and the Battery is so narrow that it is not practical, according to Col. Black's own testimony, to work on Coenties Reef and Diamond Rock at the same time, as the channel would be blocked for navigation. All that it would be possible to do before the completion of Coenties Reef project would be to make borings in preparation for future work. It can readily be seen that this feature does not constitute an emergency.

I am heartily in favor of any improvement in New York Harbor that will be beneficial either to preparedness or to the commerce entering that port. New York is the greatest commercial center in this country and is entitled to every possible consideration commensurate with the interest of others that Congress can afford to give it.

It is on such projects as New York that Government money is wisely expended. I should be in favor of adopting in the very near future, if not at the present time, the entire project recommended for New York, which included the removal of the serious obstruction to navigation at Hell Gate and the entrance into Long Island Sound. Money properly expended on such projects as these benefits the entire country and can in no sense be regarded as open to the criticism being heard against river and harbor work.

New York lacks facilities for the enormous commerce of the port; it lacks sufficient opportunity for entrance; all large vessels must now enter at one end. The day is not far distant when vessels coming from the north at least can enter through Long Island Sound, by the removal of Hell Gate, and secure dockage in upper New York with much more convenience than they can to-day go around and enter by Ambrose Channel. The amount required to bring about this great improvement seems large, but I submit that it is small in comparison to the national benefit that would result both to commerce and to defense.

It will thus be seen that my opposition to the New York project is not one of opposition to its intrinsic merits, but, rather, to the method under which it comes before the House in the present bill. Political partiality has been shown this project by the administration. I appeal to the House to show by its action that we are sincere in our intention of bettering our national defense. Personally I would forego every possible river and harbor appropriation called for in this bill which did not have to do with national defense and vote to substitute such items as combine the commercial interest with national defense. New York Harbor is one of these; Boston Harbor is another, and they should stand or fall together. The fact that one has a positive presidential endorsement does not detract from the merits of the other. If the Boston project is adopted I will gladly vote for the New York item and other such items that can come into the bill on their own merits in behalf of national defense.

There are two courses open to this House. Either exclude the New York item from the bill or include the items for other harbors needing improvement exactly as much as New York on the ground of preparedness. One of these harbors is situated in the State I have in part the honor to represent, the port of Boston. At the proper time I intend to offer an amendment for the adoption of the project deepening Boston Harbor recommended by the Board of Engineers in their report to the Secretary of War dated April 25, 1914, Document No. 931, Sixty-third Congress, second session.

This amendment will ask for an appropriation of \$400,000, with an additional authorization of \$1,145,000, which is the amount of the item recommended by Gen. Kingman, then Chief of Engineers, revising the district officer's report, which called for \$3,845,000. The project was divided into two sections; one in the inner harbor, extending from Presidents Road to the navy

yard, and the other in the outer harbor, from Presidents Road to the ocean. It is this latter section of the project for which we will ask for an appropriation.

I have such an abundance of material at hand in favor of the Boston item that I can but briefly refer to it at this time and will incorporate in my remarks resolutions adopted by the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, letters from the Boston Chamber of Commerce, from the directors of the port of Boston, and the president of the Massachusetts Real Estate Exchange:

BOSTON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
Boston, March 2, 1916.

HON. ALLEN T. TREADWAY,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR CONGRESSMAN TREADWAY: We are very glad to know that you are planning to ask for an amendment to the river and harbor bill when it is reported in the House to include an appropriation for deepening the channels in Boston Harbor. We certainly agree with you that if an appropriation is to be made in the case of New York Harbor on the ground of preparedness and in order that there may be an adequate depth of water for vessels to reach the Brooklyn Navy Yard, Boston is fully justified in claiming recognition for the same reason.

The Charlestown Navy Yard, as you are well aware, is one of the most important in the country. As pointed out by the Board of Engineers in their report to the Secretary of War (Doc. No. 931), "the strategic conditions are such that in the event of a war with almost any European power of importance a naval battle may be expected off the New England coast. In such an event, however the battle might result, there would probably be a number of crippled ships of the first class coming into the yard for repairs, and some of these, on account of their condition, drawing more than their normal draft."

The Secretary of the Navy, in a letter to the Secretary of War, dated October 6, 1912, stated that there was urgent naval need for a 40-foot channel up to the Charlestown Navy Yard. As pointed out by these experts, it is extremely doubtful if the present depth of water in the channel approaches to the harbor would be adequate for naval emergencies.

There is a movement on foot at the present time to make the Charlestown Navy Yard available as a Government shipbuilding plant, and it appears not unlikely that it may be used in the near future for the construction and repair of battleships, so that its importance as a naval base would be greatly enhanced, and the need for adequate channel depth would thereby become of great importance to the Government. At the present time Boston has one of the largest shipbuilding plants in the country, the Fore River Shipbuilding Co., engaged in the construction of both naval and commercial vessels. The U. S. S. *Nevada*, one of the largest ships in the Navy, was recently completed at this plant, and in the rapid development in naval construction it is not unlikely that larger ships will be laid down in the not distant future. Reasonable preparedness for national defense, we believe, should certainly include provision for improved channels at the principal ports which are likely to be used by the Navy Department in time of war, and as it usually takes years to complete the deepening of a channel, which would seem urgent that the present Congress should make provision for future requirements.

Commercially the importance of the port of Boston is such as to demand recognition by the Federal Government. In that branch of foreign trade from which the United States Government derives a revenue, namely, the import trade, Boston exceeds all other ports by a wide margin, with the exception of New York. A comparison of the imports of merchandise by customs districts for the year ending November 30, 1915, shows that the total value of imports for the following districts is as follows:

For the Massachusetts district (for which Boston is the principal port)-----	\$159,917,216
For the New Orleans district (next in value to Massachusetts on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts)-----	79,925,716
For the Philadelphia district-----	67,913,141
For the Baltimore district-----	22,716,759
For the Galveston district-----	8,537,348

Of all the customs districts in the country Massachusetts was one of the few which showed an increase in imports for 1915 over 1914.

It is interesting to note the growth of import traffic at Boston over a series of years.

<i>Imports of merchandise at Boston at intervals of 5 years since 1900.</i>	
1900	\$68,630,557
1905	106,072,780
1910	121,448,107
1915 (year ending Nov. 30)	159,917,216

<i>Total amount of imports and exports during the same years.</i>	
1900	\$192,488,718
1905	199,869,674
1910	190,930,966
1915 (year ending Nov. 30)	278,916,363

The port of Boston is 190 miles nearer Europe than any of the large ports in the United States. Outside of New York, this is the only port frequented by the great passenger liners carrying first-class passengers.

<i>Trans-Atlantic passengers handled in and out of eastern United States ports for the year ending June 30, 1915.</i>	
Boston	114,000
Philadelphia	87,000
Baltimore	38,000

Boston has exceptional attractions as a port for large combination passenger and freight steamers of the type requiring the greatest depth of water. Arrivals of foreign steamships at the port of Boston for 1915 were 1,434, with a gross tonnage of 2,270,059. Many of these ships have a draft in excess of 30 feet, and the present 35-foot channel is inadequate for the ships which, previous to the present European war, frequented this port. The channel depth of 35 feet is sufficient to take care of ships drawing up to 30 feet, but is not considered adequate for ships drawing more than 30 feet. The Cunard Steamship Line at Boston claims that the present channel depth does not permit of their ships sailing at fixed hours, as they are required to accommodate themselves to the tides. The company states that the formation of the channel in Boston Harbor is largely rock, a condition that does not exist at other

ports, so that in the event of a steamer going aground she is liable to be seriously damaged.

The State is now about to award a contract for the construction at Boston of a dry dock large enough to take care of any ship yet built or proposed at a cost of approximately \$3,000,000. The proposed site is adjacent to, and leading directly from, the main ship channel. The existence of this much-needed facility on the Atlantic seaboard is likely to attract to this port in case of accident the largest ships afloat. The ships having a draft in excess of 30 feet, particularly in a crippled condition, would have considerable difficulty in operating in the channel at its present depth, except at high water. If this facility is to be of value to the larger liners, it is essential that the channel should be deepened. The fact that the State has expended, and is still expending, large sums of money to provide improved docking and terminal facilities suitable for larger ships, should elicit the hearty cooperation of the Federal Government.

I presume that the directors of the port of Boston have furnished you with the full details with reference to the work which is being constructed under their supervision, and for that reason it will be unnecessary for me to cover that matter.

You can be assured that the business men of Boston and the State and local authorities are in hearty accord with you in the matter of the proposed deepening of the harbor channels. I sincerely hope that you will be able to prevail upon Congress to make the necessary appropriation for the work. I know that you will not hesitate to call upon us for any assistance you may require in promoting this important project for Boston.

Very truly yours,

JAMES A. MCKIBBEN, *Secretary.*

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
DIRECTORS OF THE PORT OF BOSTON,
Boston, February 24, 1916.

HON. ALLEN T. TREADWAY,
House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR CONGRESSMAN TREADWAY: I beg to acknowledge your communication of February 21 relative to the rivers and harbors bill now pending in Congress, and in compliance with your request beg to supply the following pertinent information or remarks:

The foreign commerce of the port of Boston for 1915 was \$290,516,803, a gain of \$57,047,284, or 24.4 per cent over 1914; imports for the year amounting to \$171,353,793 and exports \$119,163,010. These figures do not include Canadian in-transit trade or merchandise going through Boston to other interior customs districts for appraisal and duties, which should swell the total by at least \$50,000,000 more.

Twelve thousand and forty-nine ships of 15,155,568 tonnage entered the port of Boston during the past year.

Comparative figures of the tonnage of shipping entering the ports of the world in 1913—a normal year—show that Boston, when its foreign and domestic tonnage is considered, is the fifth port of the world, following New York, London, Hamburg, and Rotterdam, and outranking such ports as Antwerp and Liverpool. The figures are taken from the report of the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce for that year, so far as continental European and other ports are concerned, and from the Port of London Authority for figures pertaining to British ports. (See p. 3 of the Port of Boston, United States of America, copy of which is enclosed.)

In normal times the port of Boston has 56 steamship lines to and from all parts of the world, 40 in the foreign trade and 16 coastwise. (See pp. 8 and 9 of The Port of Boston, United States of America.)

New England manufactures one-seventh of the manufactured goods made in the United States, the value of the product, according to the United States Census of 1910, having been \$2,670,065,000. (See p. 6 of The Port of Boston, United States of America.)

The United States has expended on Boston Harbor and its tributary rivers, etc., from 1825 to 1915, a period of 90 years, the sum of \$12,668,474.99, an average of \$140,760.83 per year.

The State of Massachusetts has expended and actually entered into contract to expend on Boston Harbor and its tributary rivers, etc., from 1870 to 1915, a period of 45 years, the sum of \$15,477,360.62, of which amount all but \$2,784,152.94 has actually been expended, making an average of \$343,719.03 per year by the State. In other words, while the Federal Government has spent approximately \$12,500,000 on Boston Harbor in 90 years, the State of Massachusetts has spent 24 per cent more in half the time (45 years)—\$15,500,000, an average per year of \$343,719.03 against that of the Federal Government of \$140,760.83, the State's average per year being 144 per cent greater than that of the United States.

Ten million dollars customs duties and \$4,400,000 income tax was collected in the Massachusetts district last year, a total contribution of \$14,400,000 to the total expenses of the Federal Government and for use in just such projects as rivers and harbors work. The customs duties collected by the Federal Government at the port of Boston for the past eight years reaches a total of \$172,887,022.70, an average of \$21,610,877.83 per year.

These figures show that Massachusetts does not ask that the Federal Government lavish its funds on Boston Harbor, but merely asks cooperation in a work of which she is doing the greater share herself.

The largest passenger and freight pier in the world was completed at Boston just over a year ago (November, 1914), 1,200 feet long and 400 feet wide, with 40 feet of water dredged alongside and leading to the main ship channel at low-water mark.

This terminal can accommodate any vessel afloat or projected, and with its construction and assignment of its berths for use the Hamburg-American and White Star Lines agreed in written contracts to put on their largest steamers, of greater draft and carrying capacity than the port had known heretofore.

The present 35-foot channel was started in 1902 and substantially completed in 1914, a matter of 12 years, showing that an initial appropriation for a new or improved channel does not necessarily mean that it is such a project as can be built in a single year.

It took 12 years to build the present 35-foot channel, and undoubtedly would take as long to deepen it to 40 feet at low-water mark.

That the commerce and industry of the country demand such improvements is our experience in the case of the 35-foot channel, the growth of steamships, commerce, and shipping during the 12-year progress of that project showing that "between 1902 and 1914—the commencement and completion of the 35-foot channel—the steamships using this port (Boston) increased in carrying capacity from 4,500 to 6,000 tons dead-weight capacity to 8,000 to 12,000 tons dead-weight capacity, and drawing from 29 to 33 feet fully loaded; the foreign commerce from \$168,000,000, in round numbers, to \$235,000,000, in round numbers; and the tonnage of shipping, foreign and coastwise, from 9,906,748 net tons to 15,285,992 net tons." (See p. 95, Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, for 1915.)

A 40-foot channel started in 1916 would not be completed, judging from past experience at this port, until 1928 or 1930, and it is fair to assume that commerce and shipping will also increase proportionately in size and volume as it has in the past, so that the new 40-foot channel even then will hardly be adequate to accommodate the business which will use it. In other words, a 40-foot channel for Boston is a necessity, not a luxury.

The State of Massachusetts is building on the flats belonging to the Commonwealth in Boston Harbor the largest dry dock on the Western Hemisphere, located just off the main ship channel. It will be 1,200 feet long, 125 feet wide, and able to accommodate any vessel afloat or projected.

Five hundred thousand dollars has been expended to date to prepare the site for the dry dock. A \$1,800,000 contract was awarded by the Commonwealth last fall for the actual construction of the dock, work on which was immediately commenced and is now rapidly progressing. Contract plans and specifications for pumping machinery, steel gate, and other appurtenances to finish this dry dock, amounting to \$1,000,000 more, are being prepared.

The dry dock will be completed in about three years, and its immediate proximity and availability to the Boston Navy Yard, the Fore River shipyards, at Quincy, and to the Rockland trial courses for naval vessels make it most advisable for strategic purposes that the United States Government provide Boston with a 40-foot channel, so that the largest battleships and boats of the present and future may be able to reach this dry dock when completed for its utilization in case of accident or emergency, military or commercial.

It would be a sad commentary to build the largest dry dock in the country here at Boston and then have the Federal Government fail to provide the necessary channel to allow the big vessels of the present and future to approach and use it.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is patriotically going ahead in the improvement of Boston Harbor, and it is up to the Federal Government to assist in every possible way, for the benefits are mutual.

The additional fact that Boston Harbor has a ledge or rock bottom and a 10-foot tide is also added reason, as a matter of present safe navigation for greater depth, and the further fact that as a gateway it serves the whole country demands that cooperation of the Federal Government be forthcoming.

The State of Massachusetts is assuming a public work and service to the entire country in developing the port of Boston, and it is the duty of the Federal Government to aid and cooperate in this public development by every means in its power.

Massachusetts does not ask a lavish expenditure of Federal Government funds on Boston Harbor. It asks for cooperation in serving the commerce of the country and nothing more. The records of its own expenditures surely prove its right to ask for that assistance.

I trust the foregoing will be of value and that you will call on us whenever we can be of service.

Very truly yours,

EDW. F. MCSWEENEY, Chairman.

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
DIRECTORS OF THE PORT OF BOSTON,
Boston, March 6, 1916.

Hon. ALLEN T. TREADWAY,

House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN TREADWAY: I beg to acknowledge your letter of February 25 asking for more detail on the issue of a 40-foot channel for Boston Harbor in its relation to national preparedness.

Europe is northeast of North America instead of due east, thus bringing Boston 200 miles nearer thereto than New York, 400 miles nearer than Philadelphia, 500 miles nearer than Baltimore, 1,700 miles nearer than New Orleans, and 1,900 miles nearer than Galveston. (See p. IV of The Port of Boston, U. S. A.)

Many of the important munition, firearm, and armament plants, as well as other adjustable industries that can and are being utilized for manufacturing implements of warfare, are located in New England. (See p. 265 of The World Almanac, 1916.)

It is the woolen, worsted, cotton, and boot and shoe manufacturing center of the country.

It contains extensive meat-packing plants and grain elevators of millions of bushels capacity.

It had \$1,571,917,283.53 deposits in its savings banks in 1915. (See p. 325 of The World Almanac, 1916.)

The exchanges of the Boston Clearing House last year reached a total of \$7,481,341,000. (See p. 333 of The World Almanac, 1916.)

The first movement to expect of an enemy will naturally be against just such a district as New England.

The first clash will of necessity be a naval one. Boston Harbor is fairly well defended by Coast Artillery, but there are many vulnerable landing points along the coast to the north and to the south. Only an efficient naval force of this country can keep it clear. Once New England is taken, New York is endangered from the rear attack thus made possible.

Upon the port of Boston will depend the repair and refitting of naval vessels "coming (as the Secretary of the Navy says) from the initial clash of battle, with all its resulting disruption, and which might be enabled by near and convenient dockyard facilities to rapidly refit and repair and then return to action and overwhelm the enemy's similarly damaged fleet which had ventured to make an attack on our seacoast. The importance of such dry docks can not be overestimated." (See extract of Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1915 appended hereto.)

The navy yard at Boston is less than an hour from the open sea. The \$3,000,000 dry dock being built by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts at Boston is still nearer.

New York is several hours from the upper harbor to Sandy Hook.

Boston is the only port along the Atlantic coast building a dry dock large enough to accommodate the big ships of the future. Hence, the port of Boston should be given first consideration in any scheme of naval preparedness. (See extract of Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1915 appended hereto.)

The New York dry dock is merely prospective.

At Boston over \$500,000 has been paid out in preparing the site, and on October 15 last a \$1,800,000 contract was further awarded by the Commonwealth for the construction of the dry dock proper. Work was begun the very next day, and has been progressing rapidly ever since.

Contract plans and specifications for its equipment with steel gate, pumping machinery, and other appurtenances, at an estimated amount of \$1,000,000 more, are now under preparation and will be opened for bids in a comparatively short time.

This provides for a total expenditure of about \$3,300,000 on the Boston dry dock by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. It is expected to be completed in three years.

The proposed 40-foot project to the navy yard at New York is based on military or naval preparedness, with New York doing nothing itself in the shape of cooperation or local assistance in the matter.

New York now has a 40-foot channel. Boston's is 35 feet deep at mean low water.

Time is the essence of preparedness.

Massachusetts has taken time by the forelock. The United States Government has done nothing in this all-important matter of preparedness but discuss it. On the other hand, Massachusetts has gone into action, and, with its \$3,000,000 dry dock under construction at the port of Boston, both points and makes ready the way for Federal cooperation.

The United States Army Engineer in 1914 recommended the 40-foot project for Boston Harbor, at an estimated cost of \$3,845,000, complete, which, over an estimated term of 12 years, as in the case of the present 35-foot channel at Boston, would average about \$325,000 per year.

The division engineer at New York approved the same.

The Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors cut the estimate more than 100 per cent, to \$1,545,000, and recommended that that amount be appropriated by Congress.

The Chief of Engineers, United States Army, requested that this amount be allowed and that the project be authorized.

With the reports and recommendations of the Navy and War Departments both favorable, Congress should give full faith and credit to the matter of a 40-foot channel for Boston Harbor, which is a necessity—not a luxury.

A large vessel under way draws at least 3 feet more than when lying at anchor or when tied to her berth, for it then sets lower in the water and, in addition to this allowance, is entitled to at least 3 or 4 feet more as a matter of safe navigation, particularly in a harbor with a ledge rock bottom like Boston.

This means that 6 or 7 feet must be added to the given draft of a vessel to find out how much water she really needs to make her navigation into or out of port possible.

Take the dreadnaught *Pennsylvania*, the newest battleship launched, and now undergoing its tests on the Rockland trial course just outside of Boston, which will draw 34 to 35 feet when fully loaded, armed, and equipped.

With 6 or 7 feet more allowance when under way, as a matter of safe navigation, she would require about 41 or 42 feet of water at least, and to-day could not get into or out of Boston Harbor except at high tide.

Such a ship, under these circumstances, might thus find it necessary to wait a very important 11 or 12 hours to get into or out of port to save herself or the fleet.

In case of injury, it is easily possible for a ship to settle 5 feet farther in the water, thus adding still more to its draft and bringing it to a minimum of 46 or 47 feet.

With the present 35-foot channel at Boston, it would be impossible for such a ship, under conditions now existing, to reach the new dry dock at Boston, which alone on the Atlantic seaboard, when built, will be able to accommodate the largest ships afloat.

A ship like the *Pennsylvania* is to cost \$7,260,000 for hull and machinery alone; it is estimated that her armament and equipment will bring her full value up to \$12,000,000.

There are four other such ships of similar value now under construction, and many more of different classes and varied costs in commission and contracted for.

A dry dock at Boston might on occasion easily save to the National Government the value of such a ship.

A 40-foot channel at Boston may also save to the National Government the value of such a ship many times over by allowing her to reach such a dry dock as is now under construction.

For these reasons it appears that a 40-foot channel for Boston Harbor should be immediately authorized by Congress.

Very truly yours,

EDW. F. MCSWEENEY, Chairman.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
BOARD OF HARBOR AND LAND COMMISSIONERS,
Boston, February 21, 1916.

The harbor and land commissioners of Massachusetts respectfully petition the National House of Representatives for the inclusion in the pending river and harbor bill of an appropriation for the improvement project in Boston Harbor recommended by the Board of Engineers in Document No. 931.

The port of Boston is not only one of the greatest commercial ports of this country but it is also one of the greatest ports of the world. It contains at Charlestown one of our largest navy yards and one of our best naval dry docks. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is now engaged in building a great commercial and naval dry dock, 1,200 feet long, at an estimated cost of over \$3,000,000, and with approaches and accessories the cost will probably be over \$4,000,000. The United States is not requested to pay a dollar of this cost, although it might reasonably be asked to pay one-half, as the preference will be given to naval vessels.

The Boston project should be included in the pending bill, because the fact that it is the nearest great American port and harbor to Europe and the first point of naval offense and defense on the Atlantic coast, and therefore should be as speedily as possible fully developed and equipped.

For the board.

WM. S. McNARY, Chairman.

MASSACHUSETTS REAL ESTATE EXCHANGE,
Boston, Mass., February 17, 1916.

Hon. ALLEN T. TREADWAY,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR CONGRESSMAN TREADWAY: It was most gratifying to read in the newspapers your announcement of a determination to carry to the floor of the House your efforts to secure justice for Boston Harbor in the appropriation bill, and I hasten to let you know that Massachusetts is behind you.

I was not at all surprised at the action of the committee in deciding to exclude from the appropriation bill the project for Boston's 40-foot channel.

It was altogether to be expected, and we shall get nowhere unless we take a stand in support of the Congressman who has the courage of his convictions, and knows what ought to be done for Boston.

In the light of the facts, it is utterly ridiculous that Boston should be treated after the fashion in which the House Committee on Rivers and Harbors contemplates. Massachusetts has spent millions of dollars in improving the port of Boston, and we are now expending more millions in building a great dry dock. Massachusetts has always proclaimed her willingness to meet with Massachusetts money dollar for dollar any appropriation by the Federal Government.

As a matter of fact, Massachusetts has done far more than that. And yet, here we are, the nearest great port to Europe, the second port in this country in the matter of imports and revenues to the Federal Government, sidetracked by Congress in favor of projects with not one tithe of the merit of Boston's claims.

We can not conceive of the frame of mind of a congressional body, committed as this Congress is to a policy of preparedness, which will permit to remain neglected a port of the importance of Boston and exposed to attack as is Boston.

Yours, sincerely,

JOHN J. MARTIN.

The basis of the claim in behalf of this appropriation is a letter from the Acting Secretary of the Navy to the honorable Secretary of War, dated October 16, 1912, which I will also insert:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 16, 1912.

From: Acting Secretary of the Navy.

To: The honorable the Secretary of War.

Subject: Dredging of channels to the principal navy yards.

1. I have the honor to quote for your consideration the following recommendation of the General Board, which has been approved by this department:

"The General Board recommends that channels leading to all the first-class docking, repair, and supply yards be dredged to a depth of 40 feet at mean low water and to a least width of 750 feet, and greater if practicable."

2. Careful consideration of this problem leads this department to believe that steps should be taken at once to dredge the channels to our principal navy yards and stations in order to accommodate ships that will undoubtedly be constructed in the near future. The battleship *Pennsylvania*, now being designed, practically reaches the limit of dimensions that can be assigned without an increase in draft; and the condition will become acute when battle cruisers already projected are authorized. Supplementing this is the possibility that battleships of our present fleet may have an increased draft due to injury in battle or otherwise.

3. In view of the above, I have the honor earnestly to request the consideration of your department upon the advisability of asking Congress for appropriation for dredging the channels to our first-class yards, including those at New York, Norfolk, Philadelphia, Boston, Puget Sound, and Pearl Harbor. If this meets with your approval, this department will endeavor to cooperate in every possible way toward securing the necessary appropriation for dredging the channels to these yards until an ultimate depth of 40 feet and least width of 750 feet has been attained.

BEEKMAN WINTHROP.

This letter calls for appropriation for dredging the channels to all first-class yards, including those at New York, Norfolk, Philadelphia, Boston, Puget Sound, and Pearl Harbor, to an ultimate depth of 40 feet.

I call attention to the fact that this recommendation was made nearly two years before the European war broke out, when this country considered itself secure in anticipation of continued peace throughout the world, and before the American people had become aroused to the degree of preparedness we find on every hand to-day. If this recommendation represented the view of the two great departments at that period, how much more applicable it is to the conditions as they exist to-day. The direct application to Boston Harbor is thoroughly covered in the report of the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Daniels, submitted to Congress December 15, 1915, which I also insert as a part of my remarks:

[Extract of report of the Secretary of the Navy submitted to Congress Dec. 15, 1915.]

The necessity for sufficient dry docks large enough to receive the largest superdreadnaughts is obvious. In times of peace they are needed for the overhaul periods and repairs. In time of war they may turn the tide. It is easily conceivable that a \$20,000,000 dreadnaught of the future might be an entire loss if there were not at hand, close to the scene of the damage or disaster, a dry dock to which that vessel could be sent for repair and refitting. More important still, a large fleet of such vessels coming from the initial clash of battle with all its resulting disruption, might be enabled, by near and convenient dockyard facilities, to rapidly refit and repair and then return to action and overwhelm the enemy's similarly damaged fleet, which had ventured to make an attack on our seacoast. The importance of such dry docks can not be overestimated.

He then continues:

The contract made by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on the 15th day of October, 1915, insures the construction of a dry dock at Boston capable of taking the largest merchant or naval ships afloat, which will add to the all too few dry-dock facilities on the Atlantic. Naval experts were detailed to aid by their advice and experience in this large enterprise, which means so much to the Navy as well as the commerce of New England. It will be the greatest graving dock in the world. When completed it will readily dock the largest war vessels built or contemplated to be built for the future, sufficient in size to receive commercial vessels considerably larger than the giants in the trans-Atlantic Ocean trade.

This monumental work, involving an expenditure by the State of Massachusetts of well over \$3,000,000, while being constructed primarily for the commercial purposes of the port of Boston, will afford

the Navy of dry-dock facilities in this most important harbor superior in extent and size to that available at any other American port, and by arrangement give the United States Government prior and paramount use of the dock in time of war.

The city of New York has had under consideration the construction of a dry dock as a municipal enterprise in its port, of somewhat similar dimensions to those of the dry dock now being built at Boston, and has made, under the direction of the commissioner of docks, preliminary plans and studies for this enterprise. An officer of the Corps of Civil Engineers of the Navy has been assisting and advising the city in the enterprise.

Officers of the naval Civil Engineer Corps also assisted and advised the governor of Massachusetts and the directors of the port of Boston in the studies and negotiations which resulted in the starting of the Boston work. With the increase of merchant ships of large tonnage, dry docks of the character building in Boston must be multiplied.

I wish, however, to call the especial attention of the House to one extract from the Secretary's report to Congress, referring to the possible dry dock. He writes as follows:

It will be the greatest graving dock in the world. When completed it will readily dock the largest war vessels built or contemplated to be built for the future, sufficient in size to receive commercial vessels considerably larger than the giants in the trans-Atlantic Ocean trade.

This monumental work, involving an expenditure by the State of Massachusetts of well over \$3,000,000, while being constructed primarily for the commercial purposes of the port of Boston, will afford the Navy of dry-dock facilities in this most important harbor superior in extent and size to that available at any other American port, and by arrangement give the United States Government prior and paramount use of the dock in time of war.

We ask for no better indorsement of our project than the Secretary himself has given. He states what the facilities will be for the use of that dry dock. It is perfectly apparent that he expects there will be sufficient water in the harbor for our greatest ships to reach the dry dock.

This report represents the careful survey of naval conditions and his personal opinion in his official communication to Congress. It is not the result of personal pressure from any source whatsoever, but the voluntary expression of the Secretary's judgment. I submit to the House its value is much greater coming in this way than when persistent and influential Members individually secure special prepared statements. What do these words mean? Are they written simply to fill space or do they mean that the Secretary actually considered that dry dock as of great value to the Government for the purpose of docking the largest war vessel built or contemplated to be built in the future? Does he mean that these facilities which "are superior in extent and size to those available at any other American port" are simply to be ornamental and a monument of the liberality of the State of Massachusetts toward the Federal Government or are to be a most useful adjunct to the Nation's preparedness? The question is, of course, absurd, and the answer too apparent to need expression.

In this connection I desire to quote from the report of the district engineer, found on page 24, Document No. 931, Sixty-third Congress, second session:

The navy yard located at Charlestown is one of the most important in the country. The strategic conditions are such that in the event of a war with almost any European power of importance a naval battle may be expected off the New England coast. In such an event, however the battle might result, there would probably be a number of crippled ships of the first class coming into the yard for repairs, and some of these, on account of their condition, drawing more than their normal draft.

We therefore have in Boston Harbor two most essential features for the scheme of preparedness. We have the Charlestown Navy Yard, where the repairs and construction work can be carried on, and we have in process of construction the largest dry dock in the Western Hemisphere.

I wish to call attention at this time to the contribution the State of Massachusetts itself has made toward the development of Boston Harbor. From 1870 to 1915 the State has expended, or entered into contracts to expend, the sum of \$15,477,360. It has actually expended all but \$2,784,000 of this amount. The State has expended in 45 years \$3,000,000 more than the Federal Government has expended in 90 years on this harbor. All we ask is Federal cooperation, the State itself having more than met dollar for dollar of Federal appropriation.

The Federal project now completed was commenced in 1902, covering a period of 12 years. I submit that we can not begin the deepening recommended by the department a day too soon, as the dry dock is under contract to be completed within two years. Over \$500,000 was expended in preparing a site. A contract for \$1,800,000 was awarded on October 15, 1915. Work has progressed rapidly ever since. Within a comparatively short time contracts will be let for the equipment with steel gate, pumping machinery, and other appurtenances at an estimated cost of about \$1,000,000. This dry dock, to be first at the call of the United States Navy, will cost the State of Massachusetts \$3,300,000, and will be ready for use in less than three years from the time it was started last October.

This work of the State of Massachusetts is being carried on by a State board known as the "Directors of the port of Boston." Their authority was established by an act of the legislature in 1911, which carried with it an appropriation of \$9,000,000. I may be pardoned for saying that it was with some feeling of personal satisfaction that, as president of the Massachusetts senate, I signed this bill upon its passage previous to its submission to our then governor, Eugene N. Foss, a brother of our distinguished and highly esteemed colleague from Illinois.

Every statement contained in the letters and resolutions I ask to have printed as part of my remarks are absolutely applicable as arguments for the adoption of this project, and before the amendment is acted upon which I propose to offer I ask the Members of the House to give careful consideration to the statements they contain.

Boston is 190 miles nearer Europe than New York, and correspondingly nearer to ports farther south. It is a most natural assumption that in case of war with a European nation, our Navy would have its first conflict off the New England coast on the trans-Atlantic route. As loyal Americans we would hope that our fighting forces would be as successful as our vessels were at the Battle of Santiago, but it would be foolhardy of us to rely upon this result. The facilities at Boston, both at the navy yard and dry dock, are within one hour of the open sea, and they might be the means of saving one or more of our most expensive ships.

I have said nothing of the commercial needs of this appropriation, as my argument to-day is not based on that feature. Boston has 40 steamship lines in the foreign trade, and 16 lines in the coastwise trade, to and from all ports of the world, practically all of them regular lines with fixed or determined sailings. These sailings in the foreign trade amounted during 1914 to 1,098 vessels, and in the coastwise trade to 2,542 vessels, or by ports between Boston and foreign ports 1,148, and coastwise 2,769.

It has three railroad lines connecting with all sections of the United States and Canada. It is the second largest international port in North or South America and is the fifth largest in the world, being surpassed only by New York, London, Hamburg, and Rotterdam. Boston has the greatest passenger and freight pier in the world, 1,200 feet long and 400 feet wide, providing over one-half mile of berthing space at which five large ocean-going steamships can be docked at one time. Boston is the center and distributing point in New England, which produces one-seventh of the manufactured goods made in the United States. These statistics are taken from a pamphlet published by the directors of the port of Boston in 1915. Under the five-minute rule, when the amendment I shall offer is before the House, I shall hope to speak further, briefly, of the reasons why we should at this time adopt the project for Boston Harbor, which has the approval of the Board of Engineers, and is so earnestly advocated by the eminent citizens to whom I have referred.

I wish at this time to thank the distinguished chairman of our committee for the courtesy which he showed me in his remarks this morning. Realizing as he does that we frequently differ about the committee table, he nevertheless was kind enough to express a personal regard toward me and which I am more than glad to reciprocate toward him. It has been a great privilege and pleasure for me during my brief service in Congress to feel that I was serving on a committee having a chairman so eminently fair, always so kind, and every ready to assist any member of the committee whether favorable or unfavorable to the personal attitude which he might be taking. [Applause.] Congress is honored by the service of such a man as Chairman Sparkman. [Applause.] I for one hope that many years are still before him as a distinguished Representative from the State of Florida, to serve not only its interests but those of the Nation as well. [Applause.]

I will now turn very briefly in my remaining time to some general features which have already been referred to. It is not necessary to go into details in reference to the report submitted by the gentleman from Wisconsin. He has spoken for himself and certainly needs no assistance from me.

I would add that I do not agree with the bill he submits. It seems to me that the fault in the present system is not so much with the engineers as with us and our predecessors. The engineers are the servants of Congress, and when Congress votes appropriations the engineers conceive it to be their duty to carry out those votes as instructions. This is one of the principal objections to the so-called lump-sum method of appropriations made in the last two river and harbor bills. Any project having been once adopted by Congress is regarded by the

engineers as worthy of an allotment, as the engineers rightly regard Congress as the body having the authority of passing upon the actual merits of the project. The possible addition of civilians to the Board of Engineers might leaven the loaf, but the first step toward revision of river-and-harbor work is a realization on our part that money injudiciously appropriated in the past should not be used as a reason for future appropriations for the same project. There is not a man on this floor to-day but what in using his individual judgment and good sense would realize that the money expended on this class of items to date has been wasted, and a continuation of the same appropriation means an additional waste.

The river and harbor bill for 1916 carries an appropriation of cash and authorizations of \$39,608,410. It is understood that this is the first rivers and harbors bill, certainly the first in many years, wherein any minority reports have been filed. Possibly we may be making up for a little lost time, in that this year there are three separate reports filed by minority members. One of these reports is signed by six members of the committee; another by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FEAR]; another by myself; and the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. KENNEDY] agrees to this one. I purpose to deal briefly with the reports of the chairman and the three minority reports.

The chairman states that the one item for a new project was placed in the bill at the request of the President. We entirely agree with his statement that this was the method wherein the East River project was included in this bill. He further states that the reductions from the engineers' estimates made in the draft of the bill was through careful investigation and review by the committee, assisted by the Corps of Engineers. It is fair to state in this connection that estimates made up for the committee's use by the engineers are very apt to be extremely liberal, and they frequently recommend reductions in the items not actually needing the money they themselves have asked for but a few months previously.

The chairman states that meritorious new projects are excluded from the bill owing to the probable increase in appropriations for national defense and "Treasury conditions growing out of the European war." With the first suggestion I heartily agree, but we can find a very much better explanation of the depleted Treasury than the European war. This excuse is covering a multitude of sins, both of omission and commission, on the part of the Democratic majority, and it will be but a short time before these fallacies will be so thoroughly shown up before the American people and the real reason explained to them for the depleted Treasury, namely, Democratic extravagance and the failure of the Democratic tariff law, that the lease of life of the Democrats as a majority in this House is now reduced to less than one year.

When it is so clearly demonstrated, as the statistics of the Democrats themselves do, that the value of imports is greater than under the Republican tariff, but that the receipts to the Government are very much less, and that the cost of the necessities of life has in no particular been reduced, the good sense of the American people will cause them to reach but one conclusion, namely, that the Democratic Party, as the party in control of the affairs of the Government, is a very successful failure. How successful this failure has been in the minds of the people will be clearly demonstrated in the results of the election next fall.

The liberality of the people on the Trinity River at Dallas is thoroughly appreciated, but the extravagance of the committee in allowing a \$50,000 bait to cause us to appropriate now \$250,000, and expect to appropriate that much more, can not be justified.

I greatly enjoyed the splendid address of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. EAGLE], which he has just delivered, and congratulate him upon his eloquence. He spoke of "drifting." I am confident that he is the only gentleman in Congress who can "drift" in the amount of water in the Brazos River, which he so gloriously defended.

I am not in favor of including in this bill the item to which the chairman next refers, namely, \$6,000,000 for the Mississippi River. The friends of the Mississippi River have caused a new committee to be established in this House, and the burden of carrying an appropriation for that river should at the present time be borne by the Flood Committee. We have masqueraded long enough under the guise of providing for navigation and appropriating money for the construction of levees and flood control on the Mississippi.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TREADWAY. I have but a minute more and I would like to use it.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. The gentleman understands that under the rules of the House the Flood Committee has no power to appropriate?

Mr. TREADWAY. Certainly; but the Appropriation Committee can take care of its needs.

If we are to give credence to an item in yesterday's Washington Post, from which I quote, this new committee will bear out the old adage, "A new broom sweeps clean." Within a few weeks after its appointment it announces the perfection of plans which Congress will be urged to adopt. I will quote:

The plan calls for Federal Government expenditure of \$45,000,000 in five years. It provides that States benefited must aid in the work and pay part of the cost. Mr. HUMPHREYS estimated the States would have to spend approximately \$20,000,000. Work on the Mississippi River, under the bill, would be continued under the present Mississippi River Commission.

Under these circumstances we can well afford to take the Mississippi River item from the present bill.

The last paragraph of the chairman's report is an encouraging symptom. We have too long been carrying items in the bill based on conditions no longer existing. They should be sifted out and dropped from this as well as future bills. He has given a very pleasing description of what has grown to be a household word in reference to numerous appropriations. He does not use the word the public considers as applicable, but in writing the paragraph surely had in mind the thought of "pork."

We never had a better time nor a better reason for withdrawing support from unmeritorious projects. The time is ripe, because the people are aroused and demand either the elimination of items of this character or the defeat of river and harbor legislation. We will never have a better reason because every dollar that can be secured for the National Treasury can be wisely and beneficially expended for national defense. The people demand the removal of "pork" from the rivers and harbors bill just as loudly, if not as effectively, as they demand the expenditure of large sums for the subject now uppermost in the minds of over 100,000,000 of people in our country. [Applause.]

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. FREEMAN]. [Applause.]

Mr. FREEMAN. Mr. Chairman, the improvement of all commerce-bearing rivers and harbors to their full navigable capacity as rapidly as Treasury conditions will permit has been and is, I understand, the policy of Congress.

I wish in the course of this general debate to place in the RECORD certain facts that you may have an opportunity to give them careful consideration, so that when the proper time comes I may offer an amendment, which, in the exercise of your sound discretion, you may support or oppose, as you deem best.

Thirty years ago New London Harbor was described in the annual reports of the Chief of Engineers as one of the best in the United States and as accessible for all classes of vessels at all seasons of the year. Since that time there has been a great increase in the length and draft of commercial vessels.

There is now a demand for piers of a thousand feet in length by vessels requiring over 30 feet of water at mean low tide. The State of Connecticut recognized this demand and appreciated the natural advantages of New London Harbor, with the result that in 1911 the State made an appropriation of \$1,000,000 for public steamship piers and terminals at New London, as shown in the following bill, approved July 25, 1911. I will place in the RECORD the full text of the bill:

Joint resolution No. 216 of Connecticut State Senate, concerning steamship terminals at New London.

Resolved by this assembly, That the commissioners of rivers, harbors, and bridges, hereinafter called the commissioners, shall have power, on behalf of the State, to acquire, own, construct, maintain, and operate docks, wharves, piers, quays, and dikes, canals, slips, and basins, or any other appropriate harbor facilities, sheds, warehouses of all kinds, vaults, railroad tracks, yards, terminals, and equipment, and all other lands and water-transportation facilities in the city of New London and the towns of Waterford and Groton necessary to expedite the interchange of rail and water traffic; and for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this resolution the governor and the mayor of the city of New London shall be ex officio members of the commission of rivers, harbors, and bridges.

Sec. 2. Said commissioners may, in behalf of the State, acquire, by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise, the title of private or public owners, if any there be (the United States Government being excepted, unless agreement be made with the proper Federal authorities), to land lying beneath the public waters of that part of the Atlantic Ocean known as New London Harbor and of the Thames River, and to any lands penetrating into, abutting on, or situated in such waters and riparian or other rights, if any there be, of such owners to, over, or under such public waters the submerged lands under, and any artificial or made lands in said waters. In case said commissioners can not agree with the owner or owners of property, franchises, or rights taken under the provisions of this resolution as to the amount of compensation or damages to be paid therefor, they may, through the attorney general, condemn the same in the name and on behalf of the State. The attorney general may, after 10 days written notice to the adverse party, apply to the superior court in the county in which the real estate or

other property so taken or injured is situated, and thereupon said superior court shall appoint three disinterested freeholders as a committee to fix or assess the amount of such compensation or damage; and said committee shall give notice to the parties of the time and place of its meeting, at which time and place said committee shall proceed to hear the parties and inquire into the value of the property to be taken or the extent of the damages; and said committee shall assess just compensation or damages to the person whose real estate or other property has been taken or injured, which assessment shall be in writing under the hands of said committee and shall be returned to the clerk of the superior court, who shall record it. Said real estate or other property which is the subject of such assessment may be taken and used by said commissioners when the compensation or damage assessed shall have been paid to the person entitled thereto or deposited to his use with the treasurer of the county wherein said property is situated. If any person required by this section to be notified shall be unknown, or a nonresident, or absent from the State, or non compos mentis, or a minor, such notice of the proceedings intended by said commissioners to be instituted shall be given as shall be prescribed by a judge of the superior court, and such judge may grant any order of notice as in cases demanding equitable relief.

Sec. 3. Said commissioners shall also have power to acquire or condemn, as provided in section 2, any construction or other contract, any property, real, personal, or mixed, and all property rights, easements, and privileges, including all wharves, docks, piers, slips, and other harbor structures and facilities, improvements, or utilities constructed or operated in connection therewith, which said commissioners are authorized to acquire, own, construct, maintain, or operate under the provisions of this resolution, and which are owned by persons, firms, or private corporations, and all rights, terms, easements, and privileges pertaining thereto, and including also property, property rights, easements, and privileges now or hereafter devoted to public recreation or park or other public uses.

Sec. 4. Said commissioners shall have power on behalf of the State to fix and regulate rate and charges for the use of all such facilities, improvements, lands, and utilities, or any of them, to any person, firm, town, or municipal or private corporation for the purpose of using and operating the same for a period, except as to vacant land, of 10 years, and as to vacant land upon such terms and conditions as shall be fixed by said commissioners.

Sec. 5. Before said commissioners shall commence any of the docks, canals, channels, basins, or improvements authorized by this resolution they shall secure from the Secretary of War or other authorized officer for the Federal Government all necessary permits, licenses, or authority for the construction of said docks, canals, basins, channels, or improvements, and said commissioners may convey to the United States the fee simple title to the land over which said canals, basins, or channels may be or have been constructed, and may enter into agreements with authorized representatives of the Federal Government relative to sharing in or the apportionment between said Federal Government and said commissioners of the cost of constructing said canals, basins, channels, or other harbor facilities hereby authorized.

Sec. 6. Except as herein otherwise provided, all property acquired under the provisions of this resolution, and all income derived therefrom, shall belong to the State.

Sec. 7. The comptroller is hereby authorized, as funds may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this resolution, to draw his orders, from time to time, on the treasurer to an amount not exceeding, in the aggregate, \$1,000,000.

Sec. 8. Said commissioners shall keep books and accounts of all transactions pertaining to constructing, maintaining, and operating the improvements and utilities authorized under the provisions of this resolution, including the cost of all land acquired for rights of way and all legal, clerical, engineering, and other necessary expenses, including a per diem charge of \$10 for each day actually spent by the commissioners upon said work, in connection with such acquisition, improvement, maintenance, and operation, which books and accounts shall be open to the inspection of the auditors of public accounts; also all contracts, agreements, and leases pertaining to or made under the powers granted by this resolution.

Sec. 9. Said commissioners shall not carry into effect the provisions of the preceding sections until, after proper investigation, they shall have found that said improvements will, in their judgment, be for the commercial advantage of the State.

Approved, July 25, 1911.

This act shows, first of all, that nothing was to be done until the commissioners should be satisfied that the expenditure of this money would be for the commercial advantage of the State of Connecticut; and, secondly, that agreements were clearly contemplated with the Federal Government relative to the sharing in and apportionment between said Federal Government and said commissioners of the cost of constructing channels and other harbor facilities.

Therefore they awaited action by the Federal Government, and accordingly nothing was done until Congress convened the following December, when, on December 14, the Hon. Edwin W. Higgins introduced the following bill:

Be it enacted, etc., That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized and directed to cause examinations and surveys to provide a uniform depth in the harbor at New London, Conn., of 45 feet, and make such surveys, examinations, and reports as will insure the full cooperation of the United States with the State of Connecticut in the improvement of the New London (Conn.) Harbor and its approaches.

On July 25, 1912, this bill passed the House and became a law. In accordance with this law the matter was referred to the district engineer officer. On November 22, 1912, this officer made the following report, of which I quote sections 7 and 8:

In view of the appropriation of the State for the creation of improved transfer and terminal facilities, of the natural advantages of the harbor, and of its existing rail connections, I am of the opinion that New London Harbor is worthy of improvement by the United States, with a view to securing increased depth of channel, and recommend that a survey be authorized to determine the extent and cost of such improvement.

Sec. 8. I am informed by the State rivers, harbors, and bridges commission that they are not prepared at the present time, pending the result of the surveys in progress, to take up the question of the

cooperation on the part of the State of Connecticut in the improvement of the harbor and its approaches. I am led to believe, however, that this cooperation will consist in connecting the entrance channel with the docks provided by the commission.

And I now add, for the purpose of showing that the question of cooperation on the part of the State was the chief concern of the Government, the following indorsements:

OFFICE OF DIVISION ENGINEER, NORTHEAST DIVISION,
New York, November 25, 1912.

To the CHIEF OF ENGINEERS:

Concurring in the recommendations of the district engineer, a survey is necessary to furnish information on which to base a recommendation as to further improvement. The nature of such recommendation should depend on the projects of the State of Connecticut and the cost of additional work by the United States which would be justifiable.

W. M. BLACK,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers.

BOARD OF ENGINEERS FOR RIVERS AND HARBORS,
December 5, 1912.

To the CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY:

For reasons stated herein the board concurs with the district officer and the division engineer in recommending a survey in order to determine the extent and advisability of the improvement and the amount and character of cooperation that may be expected.

For the board.

WM. T. ROSELL,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Senior Member of the Board.

Mr. MADDEN. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. FREEMAN. I can not yield just now; I have only a moment left.

Up to this time the State commissioners had not incurred a single obligation, and they had \$1,000,000 still in their possession.

During the summer of 1913 the district engineer officer made the survey called for and reported as follows:

SURVEY OF NEW LONDON HARBOR, CONN.

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
New London, Conn., December 10, 1913.

From: The district engineer officer.

To: The Chief of Engineers, United States Army (through the division engineer).

Subject: Report of survey of New London Harbor, Conn.

1. In compliance with the provisions of the rivers and harbors act of July 25, 1912, and with departmental letter of December 12, 1912, I submit the following report on the survey of New London Harbor, Conn., with a view to securing increased depth of channel and for report upon the question of cooperation on the part of the State of Connecticut in the improvement of said harbor and its approaches.

2. The survey was made during the past summer. It embraced a complete hydrographical survey of the harbor and a topographical survey of the shores. The nature of the bottom, along the line of the proposed channel, was investigated by forcing down by hand a suitably pointed pipe. A map of the harbor, in three sheets, is submitted with this report.

3. The improvement of New London Harbor now desired is an entrance channel of size sufficient to accommodate ocean-going steamships, the natural depth available, 26 feet at mean low water, not being sufficient for vessels of that class. The harbor is, in many respects admirably adapted to development as an ocean port. It is approached by deep water over a route that does not offer any grave dangers to navigation, its waters are sheltered, and it is rarely, if ever, closed by ice. The small tidal range is advantageous from the standpoint of terminal construction and operation. The harbor bottom is of soft material, and the cost of securing an entrance channel of sufficient dimensions for the present purposes, and of enlarging it to meet future needs, will be very small in comparison with that necessary for the development of other harbors of the United States. The railroad connections with tributary territory are ample. Its disadvantages lie in its limited area of natural deep water and in the topography of its shores. While the hills bordering the harbor are of no great elevation, the amount of lowland easily and cheaply adaptable for mercantile and manufacturing enterprises is somewhat limited.

4. The present commerce of the harbor is practically entirely coastwise. It amounted to 907,990 short tons, valued at \$107,688,345.90 during the calendar year of 1912. The proposed improvement will not appreciably benefit the greater part of this commerce, as the existing depths are ample for vessels engaged therein. A small portion of the amount, amounting to certainly not over 15 per cent, but probably less, is received in New York Harbor from over-sea ports, and thence shipped to New London for consumption and railroad distribution. It is possible that this portion might be shipped direct to New London were the harbor an ocean port.

5. The commerce to be benefited by the proposed improvement is, except for the small amount just mentioned, entirely prospective. Its volume will depend upon a number of factors, among which the activity of the mercantile interests who may identify themselves with the port is perhaps the most important. The attached letter from the rivers, harbors, and bridges commission of the State sets forth the view of those interested in the commercial possibilities of the harbor.

6. In anticipation of such commerce the State of Connecticut has purchased lands, prepared the designs, and is about to enter into the first contract for the construction of a pier and terminal in the harbor, at the location shown on the accompanying map. The pier is to be of most modern construction, is to be 1,000 feet long, and the slips alongside will be excavated to 35 feet at mean low water. It is to be provided with cargo-handling facilities, and there are to be constructed in conjunction therewith terminal railroad yards and warehouses. The appropriation made by the State for the purpose is \$1,000,000, and it appears likely that the actual cost will approach that figure. The expenditure of this large sum by the State for this purpose was not without opposition, and during the past session of the legislature a somewhat vigorously supported but unsuccessful proposal was made to withdraw the appropriation.

7. It is believed that the commerce anticipated will be carried in vessels not exceeding 30 feet in draft. A channel depth of 33 feet at

mean low water has, therefore, been selected as that appropriate to the expected needs. As the harbor admits of a straight channel a width of 600 feet is believed to be ample. The alignment follows the east side, leaving undisturbed the anchorage area now largely used by coastwise vessels which have occasion to seek refuge in the harbor.

8. The estimated cost of the proposed channel is as follows:

Dredging, 2,487,000 cubic yards, at 12 cents	\$298,440
Administration, inspection, and contingencies	31,560
Total	330,000

The estimate includes 745,000 cubic yards as allowance for over-depth dredging of 2 feet.

9. The channel excavated under the existing project for the improvement of the harbor front of New London, excavated in similar material, shows little deterioration in the eight years which have elapsed since its completion. While the outer portion of the proposed channel is exposed to the cross currents of Long Island Sound, the bottom appears stable, and it is believed that the cost of maintenance will be small. The estimated cost of maintenance is, therefore, placed at \$2,000 per annum.

10. The cooperation proposed by the State of Connecticut in the improvement of the harbor and its approaches, as set forth in the attached letter, to which reference has previously been made, consists in the construction of the pier and terminal and in the dredging necessary to connect this pier with the channel. It appears that the State authorities have never contemplated any contribution toward the cost of improving the main channel of the harbor as a part of this cooperation.

In view of the relatively small cost of the improvement of this channel and of the long-established policy of the General Government in the improvement of waters for the use of commerce, it is believed that the State should not be called upon to contribute toward the cost of such improvement and that no cooperation other than that proposed should be required.

11. While the commerce which is expected to follow the proposed improvement can not be forecast with certainty, yet it is highly improbable that such a large and well-appointed terminal as that which the State proposes to provide will go unused, and a considerable commerce may be expected to follow the improvement. In view of the natural advantages of the harbor and the relatively small cost of improvement, I am of the opinion that New London Harbor is worthy of improvement by the General Government to the extent of providing a channel 33 feet deep at mean low water from the natural deep water in the upper harbor to Long Island Sound, at a cost of \$330,000 for original and an amount estimated at \$2,000 per annum for maintenance. The work should be prosecuted at such a rate as to secure its completion in two years. If the project is adopted by Congress, the amount of \$170,000 should be provided as an initial appropriation and a continuing contract authorized to include the remaining amount of \$160,000.

12. In compliance with the provisions of the act I further report that the cooperation by the State of Connecticut in the improvement of New London Harbor and its approaches should consist in the construction of a pier and terminal of the character proposed by the rivers, harbors, and bridges commission of the State and in the excavation of the channel to connect this pier with the main channel, and I recommend that the entering into contracts covering the essential portions of this work by the proper agencies of the State of Connecticut should be a condition precedent to the expenditure of the funds that may be appropriated by Congress for the excavation of the main channel.

G. B. PILLSBURY,
Major, Corps of Engineers.

[First indorsement.]

THE DIVISION ENGINEER, NORTHEAST DIVISION,
New York City, December 13, 1913.

To the CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY:

Forwarded, concurring in the views and recommendations of the district engineer officer.

FREDERIC V. ABROT,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers.

[Third indorsement.]

BOARD OF ENGINEERS FOR RIVERS AND HARBORS,
December 30, 1913.

To the CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY:

1. This report of New London Harbor is called for with a view to securing increased depth of channel and for report upon the question of cooperation on the part of the State of Connecticut in the improvement of said harbor and its approaches. New London Harbor comprises the lower 3 miles of the Thames River. It has a main channel of approach with a depth of 26 feet or more. The existing project provides for a ship channel 400 feet or more in width, 23 feet deep, and about 6,000 feet long in the main harbor, skirting the water front of the city, and for a depth of 15 feet in Shaws Cove. This project has been completed, the amount expended to June 30, 1913, being \$153,230.55.

2. The present commerce of the harbor is practically all coastwise and amounts to about 900,000 tons, having a value of about \$107,000,000. It consists principally of steamboat freight, coal, and lumber. Some foreign commerce is carried on, it being reported that 3 foreign vessels entered and 15 cleared from the port, and 2 American vessels entered from and 4 cleared for foreign ports.

3. The district officer states that the harbor is in many respects admirably adapted for development as an ocean port. It is approached by easily navigated deep water, is in a sheltered position, has a small tidal range, which is advantageous from a standpoint of terminal construction and operation, is rarely, if ever, closed by ice, and is used extensively as harbor of refuge. The improvement now desired is an entrance channel of sufficient size to accommodate ocean-going steamships. The natural depth of 26 feet now available is not deemed sufficient for vessels of that class.

4. It is stated that in anticipation of a foreign commerce the State of Connecticut has purchased lands and is about to enter upon the construction of a commodious and modern pier 1,000 feet long, with suitable connections, and to excavate to a depth of 35 feet at mean low water slips alongside and connecting with the main channel, this work to be done under a State appropriation of \$1,000,000. The furnishing of this modern terminal and its connection with the main entrance channel is the cooperation offered by the State in the development of this port. The district officer states that the commerce will be carried

in vessels not exceeding 30 feet in draft, and for their accommodation he proposes a channel depth of 33 feet at mean low water and a width of 600 feet. The estimated cost of securing such a channel is \$330,000 and \$2,000 annually for maintenance.

5. While the commerce expected to follow the improvement now desired is prospective, the district officer believes that it is highly probable that such a large and well-appointed terminal as that proposed by the State will result in a considerable development of commerce, and he reports the locality worthy of improvement to the extent outlined above, contingent, however, upon contracts covering the essential portions of the work proposed by the State of Connecticut being entered into as a condition precedent to the expenditure by the United States of funds upon the proposed project. In this view the division engineer concurs.

6. As stated by the district officer, this harbor is well adapted for development as an ocean port, possessing a number of advantages enumerated above. It has at present a large and growing commerce, and the expenditures for navigation facilities by the United States have been comparatively small. With the terminal proposed by the State, connected with adequate railroad facilities, it would seem reasonable to believe that a commerce of considerable size may develop, and it is believed that the United States would be justified in providing the entrance channel if it is assured that the plans of the State will be carried out.

7. The board therefore concurs with the district officer and the division engineer in reporting that in its opinion it is advisable for the United States to undertake the further improvement of New London Harbor by the construction of a channel 33 feet deep at mean low water and 600 feet wide, as proposed by the district officer, at an estimated cost of \$330,000 for first construction and \$2,000 annually for maintenance, the work to be begun only after assurance satisfactory to the Secretary of War has been given that the State will carry out its project practically as now proposed and described herein. The first appropriation should be \$170,000 and the second \$160,000, so as to complete the work in two years.

8. In compliance with law, the board reports that, except as contemplated by the above recommendations, there are no questions of terminal facilities, water power, or other subjects so related to the project proposed that they may be coordinated therewith to lessen the cost and compensate the Government for expenditures made in the interest of navigation.

For the board.

W. M. BLACK,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Senior Member of the Board.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, January 16, 1914.

From: The Chief of Engineers, United States Army.
To: The Secretary of War.
Subject: Preliminary examination and survey of the New London Harbor, Conn.

1. There are submitted herewith, for transmission to Congress, reports dated November 22, 1912, and December 10, 1913, with maps, by Maj. G. B. Pillsbury, Corps of Engineers, on preliminary examination and survey, respectively, authorized by the following item contained in the river and harbor act approved July 25, 1912:

"New London Harbor, Conn., with a view to securing increased depth of channel and for report upon the question of cooperation on the part of the State of Connecticut in the improvement of said harbor and its approaches."

2. The existing project for the improvement of New London Harbor provides for a ship channel 400 feet or more in width, 23 feet deep, and about 6,000 feet long in the main harbor, skirting the water front of the city, and for a depth of 15 feet in Shaws Cove. The district officer reports that the least depth in the main channel is 26 feet at mean low water. The commerce of this locality is large and important, but, being mainly coastwise, has not in the past required great depth. In anticipation of the development of a substantial foreign commerce, it appears that the State of Connecticut has purchased lands, prepared designs, and is about to enter into the first contract for the construction of a pier and terminal in the harbor, at a cost of about \$1,000,000. The pier is to be 1,000 feet long and of most modern construction, and the slips alongside will be excavated to a depth of 35 feet at mean low water. The district officer is of the opinion that these facilities will be taken advantage of by commerce, and to afford the necessary means of approach he believes that it is advisable for the United States to provide a straight channel 600 feet wide and 33 feet deep at mean low water, located as shown on the accompanying maps, at an estimated cost of \$330,000. He recommends, however, that the entering into contracts by the proper agencies of the State of Connecticut, covering the essential portions of the proposed terminal construction, be made a condition precedent to the expenditure of funds by the General Government for the channel improvement. The division engineer concurs with the views of the district officer.

3. These reports have been referred, as required by law, to the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, and attention is invited to its accompanying report, dated December 30, 1913, concurring with the views of the district officer and the division engineer.

4. After due consideration of the above-mentioned reports, I concur with the views of the district officer, the division engineer, and the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, and therefore report that the further improvement by the United States of New London Harbor, Conn., is deemed advisable so far as to provide a channel 33 feet deep at mean low water and 600 feet wide, at an estimated first cost of \$330,000 and \$2,000 annually for maintenance, the work to be begun only after assurance, satisfactory to the Secretary of War, has been given that the State will carry out its project of terminal development practically as now proposed and described in the report of the district officer. The first appropriation should be \$170,000 and the second \$160,000, so as to complete the work in two years.

E. B. BURR,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Acting Chief of Engineers.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, January 17, 1914.

THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith a letter from the Acting Chief of Engineers, dated 16th instant, together with copies of reports from Maj. G. B. Pillsbury, Corps of Engineers, dated November 22,

1912, and December 10, 1913, with maps, on preliminary examination and survey, respectively, of New London Harbor, Conn., made by him in compliance with the provisions of the river and harbor act approved July 25, 1912.

Very respectfully,

LINDLEY M. GARRISON,
Secretary of War.

Mr. TILSON. Will my colleague yield?

Mr. FREEMAN. I ought not to do so, but I will.

Mr. TILSON. Will you put into the RECORD the part that Connecticut has done?

Mr. FREEMAN. I may get it in the RECORD in order that the House may consider it before this amendment is offered.

There is, of course, considerable repetition in these reports, but I call attention to each one of them because I want every one here to know that from the district engineer, to the division engineer, to the Board of Engineers, to the Chief of Engineers, to the Secretary of War, and into the hands of the Speaker of the House for reference to the committee, there is an implied promise of cooperation if the proposed plans of the State are carried out as a condition precedent. These various reports make up House Document 613. In addition to all this, the Rivers and Harbors Committee of the House favorably reported in the bill of 1914 this item, with this condition:

Improving harbor at New London, Conn., in accordance with the report submitted in House Document No. 613, Sixty-third Congress, second session, and subject to the conditions set forth in said document, \$170,000.

And the bill with this item and this condition passed the House.

The Connecticut State commission was headed by Gov. Simeon E. Baldwin and was composed of the best civil engineers and keenest business men of Connecticut.

They realized that the best way to do a thing was to do it; that the proper way to fulfill a condition precedent was to fulfill it. They started in to assure the Secretary of War of their good faith by the purchase and condemnation of real estate, by the awarding of contracts for the construction of a pier 1,000 feet long with modern, up-to-date equipment, by awarding a contract for the excavating of the slips and of a new channel of 35 feet depth out to meet a Government channel of only 26 feet depth. You reply that they should have awaited the action of the Senate. Perhaps; in view of subsequent events. But I submit their action in no way reflects upon their sound judgment or their business sagacity. After a long and careful investigation they were thoroughly convinced that it was a good business commercial proposition for the benefit of the whole State. They knew that the declared policy of Congress had been to develop our harbors to their full navigable capacity as rapidly as Treasury conditions would permit. They knew that there were annual rivers and harbors bills for twenty, thirty, and forty millions, and they knew that, owing to the natural advantages of the harbor, it required only an initial appropriation of \$170,000, with a total of \$330,000, and they had the strongest possible assurances from the Government officials. The Senate committee reported the New London item favorably, but an amendment struck out all the items in the bill and substituted the lump sum of \$20,000,000, to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of War and the supervision of the Chief of Engineers. Nevertheless the committee, with faith in the implied promise of the Government officials and with confidence in the judgment of Congress, proceeded with the work. To be sure, they had to. They were already involved to the extent of several hundred thousand dollars in awarded contracts, and they continued the work awaiting the third session of the Sixty-third Congress. The committee in that session ruled that no new projects would be considered. The same amendment that I shall hereafter offer was presented, and after considerable debate, in which there was from all Members much praise and commendation of the project, it was voted down because it was then considered not to be within a strict construction of the rule regarding new projects.

Even the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Florida, then said:

I am not going to say anything about the merits of this proposition. We passed upon it last winter, when we were dealing with new projects. When we were preparing the bill of 1914 this matter was presented to us. We went over it and regarded it then as a good project, as one that should receive the favorable consideration of our committee and of the Congress. We passed the 1914 bill with this in it, subject to the conditions imposed.

And again, in reply to the gentleman from New York [Mr. CONRY], who asked:

Does not the gentleman think that under all the circumstances of this case there is an implied obligation on the part of the Government to make this improvement?

The gentleman from Florida said:

I am not sure, but I could answer that either way and tell the truth. It depends altogether on the way a man looks at it, whether he thinks it an obligation or not.

And when the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. REILLY] said:

The gentleman spoke about a question that he could answer either way. If an authorized agent of the Government, charged with certain work, should recommend that before the Government does this particular work the State of Connecticut shall do a certain thing, and the State of Connecticut goes ahead and does that thing, is there not an implied obligation on the part of the National Government?

To which the gentleman from Florida replied:

I do not go that far with this particular project, though it is commendable in them to undertake that. They have anticipated the action of Congress. They assumed that Congress would act favorably, and I think they were justified in that assumption, for whenever we reach new projects I, for one, shall favor this particular project.

And again, a moment later when he was reminded that the State of Connecticut would lose the interest on \$1,000,000, he said:

I do not believe the failure to adopt this project is going to keep the State of Connecticut from doing whatever work it can do there, and I do not think the failure of Congress to adopt the project at this time, provided we do adopt it in the next bill and have a bill at the next session of Congress, is going to delay the State of Connecticut one minute.

This is the next session of Congress; we are about to adopt a bill; this bill contains at least one new project. I have a telegram showing the exact progress of the work to date in New London:

NEW LONDON, CONN., March 27, 1916.

Hon. R. P. FREEMAN,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.:

Yours received. State pier contract total \$1,000,000; nearly \$800,000 contracted for and expended to date. Work practically finished except for asphalt floor and superstructure on pier and railroad terminal track layout back of pier. Probable date of completion, early next fall. Thirty-five feet of water on both sides of pier. United States engineers have already recommended 33-foot channel, but Congress has taken no action, although the State has already dredged its part of the 33-foot channel which runs from the pier to the proposed Government channel. This entire State project can not develop its greatest value until the Government completes the work as projected.

F. V. CHAPPELL,
Chairman Committee Rivers, Harbors, and Bridges.

At the proper time I shall offer an amendment appropriating \$170,000 for New London Harbor. Its adoption will obviate all questions of good faith and implied obligations. Considering the amount required and the commerce affected I believe there is no project in the bill of great merit, and I trust it will receive the favorable consideration of the committee.

[Mr. HARDY addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BORLAND].

Mr. BORLAND. Mr. Chairman, in the few minutes assigned to me I had intended to answer some of the statements and calculations of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FREAR], who has been the most persistent opponent of river improvement; but I found that his estimates and calculations had been so thoroughly discredited by the questions interjected into his own speech that I concluded that work had been pretty thoroughly done. His estimates of the amount expended upon the Missouri River are so far out of the way that it would not be difficult to disprove them; but it will be more profitable to us, in the few minutes that I have to speak to you, to investigate some of the problems which are now being solved on the Missouri River, and successfully solved, looking to the future of river navigation in this country.

In the first place, I want to say that I believe, from experience, observation, and study, that the solution of river improvement in this country is vital to the commercial development of the whole interior section of our country. We must solve successfully the problem of river improvement in order to put this country upon a basis of natural competition with the great manufacturing and producing countries of the world. [Applause.] If we are to compete with Germany, Belgium, France, England, and the other great producing countries in the world markets, we must have transportation from the producing regions of our country to the seaboard and to the foreign market. [Applause.] That great problem is before us for solution, and no hit or miss, superficial criticism will suppress that problem until it is properly solved.

I wish every Member of this House could get and would have before him House Document 463, just issued by the Public Printer. It is the report of the hearings of the Board of Army Engineers at Kansas City last October upon the Kansas City Missouri River project. It contains all the facts up to date on the subject of successful river navigation. In it you will find pictures of the successful barge fleet on the Missouri River. I want to say to you that that barge fleet is scarcely three years old.

In 1910, when we first got our appropriation for the improvement of the banks of the Missouri River, there was nothing on the Misosuri River available for river transportation, except

the old frail Texas deck, inflammable boat of ante bellum days. We put a German technical engineer into the field because we had promised Congress that if it gave use the improvement of the Missouri River we would restore river navigation upon a successful and commercial basis. Mr. Von Pagenhardt reviewed every form of river craft in the country, and he evolved the steel hull barges that are now used on our river. We now have a fleet of 3 towboats and 12 steel-hull barges. These steel-hull barges run from 1,400 tons down to 300 tons. The power boat does not lose any time. It drops the empty barge at the wharf, picks up a loaded barge and goes on down the stream. The gentleman says that prior to 1875 there was navigation on the upper Missouri River. He does not know a thing about river transportation. If he did, he would know that those old boats that ran in those days into a country that had no railroad service charged rates which would pay the cost of a boat in a single season, and the boat often lasted only a single season. The average life of those boats was only three years. Under those conditions you could not transport freight to-day to save your life. I know, because I was born on the Missouri River and saw those boats when I was a boy. You could not run such boats under commercial conditions to-day. Could we use those old boats that the gentleman has in mind, which carried a deckload on a frail and inflammable wooden structure; that had to be loaded and unloaded by hand? Not at all. We must have a modern steel craft and a modern wharf. In this report you will find pictures of the modern wharf at Kansas City, with the electric conveyors by which the goods out of the hull of the steel barge are transferred to the cars. Why, your negro stevedore, whistling and singing at his work, has disappeared with Mark Twain's last account of him. He has gone and is known only to poetry and song.

We have to move freight for 30 cents a ton or less or we can not move it at all. Talk about \$1.50 or \$2 a day for negro labor, and casual or uncertain at that, is out of the question.

Now, take another question. We have to be able to absorb the switching charges and the marine insurance in order to haul freight on a river. That is not all. After we got the boats the railroads refused to interchange business with us and we had to force them. We came to Congress and got the act of August, 1912, passed amending the interstate-commerce law, which says that if a railroad reduces its charges to meet water competition it can not afterwards raise the charges without showing changes other than water competition. Thus we have taken away from the railroads the greatest weapon they had to drive the boat out of business.

Not only that, but Congress put into the law a provision that the railroads must give through rates and through routes with water carriers. What has been the result? The Missouri River Transportation Co. is the only one that ever made a successful fight under that law. It wanted a share of the business, but the railroads would not interchange business with it because the boats would charge 80 per cent of the route, while the railroads were charging 100 per cent, and the 20 per cent difference between Kansas and St. Louis would have gone into the pockets of the mill owners and the farmers of the West. So the roads resisted the demand of the boat line for through tariff, and we took the case to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the commission decided that we were entitled to a through rate and through route. Now we are shipping flour, grain, and mill stuff to the seaboard at a saving of 20 per cent on a 400-mile river route. [Applause.] Every dollar of that saved goes into the pockets of the producer of the West.

Here is another point that I want to touch on. Gentlemen talk about freight rates. For the freight rate between Chicago and New York, 812 miles, by rail is 18 cents on wheat. By rail and lake it is 14 cents; by lake and canal 8 cents. Between Minneapolis and Chicago, which is only 420 miles, the rate is 10 cents for wheat. Kansas City to Chicago, 451 miles, the rate is 12 cents for wheat. Now, mark you, they will haul wheat in competition with lake and rail or lake and canal route for 18 cents a hundred 812 miles, while from Newton, Kans., 644 miles to Chicago, they charge 24½ cents for the same wheat. From Smith Center, Kans., 617 miles to Chicago, they charge 25 cents for the same wheat. The rail route is higher between Chicago and New York than the water rate—18 cents by rail, 8½ cents by water; but the rail rate of 18 cents is kept down by the water rate, because they charge 25 cents from Smith Center to Chicago for the same wheat.

Now, gentlemen, it will cost \$50,000 a mile to put 400 miles of the Missouri River in perfect condition to carry freight, and if put in that condition it will haul as much as 100 single-track railroads. It will cost to-day \$55,000 a mile to build one single-track railroad from Kansas City to St. Louis. It will cost \$5,000 a mile more to build one single-track railroad from Kansas City

to St. Louis than it would cost to improve the entire Missouri River.

They say the railroads are in bad shape anyway. The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FEAR] referred to the cost of the waterways improvement in this country. Does he know how much we are paying for the improvement of the railroads? Does he assume that the shipper does not pay the cost of the increased rail facilities? Let him look at the Five Per Cent case that went before the Interstate Commerce Commission, where the railroads got an increase of 5 cents on freight rates. What did they prove in the 5-cent increase case? They proved that the Baltimore & Ohio system cost \$129,000 a mile; that the Pennsylvania system cost \$113,000 a mile, while this waterway system will cost \$50,000 a mile at the highest estimate and have a higher carrying power than any railroad, no matter where it is.

What are these railroads doing? I will tell you. The honest, capable, well-managed railroads in the West are making money, and the looted railroads are showing a loss. Listen to what the Interstate Commerce Commission told me the day before yesterday. The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul, a good railroad, made \$12,108,000 in 1915. The Missouri Pacific lost \$1,318,000 in the same territory. That is the difference between railroad management, and the public pays the bill of bad railroad management and the looting of railroad companies. The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, a fine railroad, made \$19,000,000; the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe cleared \$24,000,000; the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific lost \$745,000; the Wabash lost \$2,057,000, while the Chicago & Alton went down \$1,690,000. Yet the public is asked to pay 5 per cent increase on freight rates in order to pay for that kind of railroad management!

The waterway is a destroyer of monopoly; it is a destroyer of looted railroads. It is the only thing that the public can and will control, and which it can make live up to its promises to the public. Every railroad now is reaching out to seize the terminals. We in Kansas City have seized the water front and built our municipal terminal, and every boat that comes up the Missouri River is free to land at the municipal terminal by obeying the municipal regulations. The whole waterway movement is a destroyer of monopoly.

We have now gotten to the point where we are forcing railroads to meet the cut rate between Kansas City and St. Louis, and they come to you gentlemen and say, "These men have been building up a business there under the sanction of Congress, they have invested money in boat lines, capitalized by the public and the shippers, and now is the time to stop these fellows by throwing a monkey wrench in the machinery, refusing them their appropriations for one year. If we can knock them out for a single year the railroads will get back every shipper that has gone to the boat line in the last five years. Just one year is all we ask you to kill the river and harbor bill for, and by that time we will have the whip cracking over the head of every shipper in the Southwest, and he will come back to the railroads as the only safe way to get his goods to market, and he will know what happens to men who invest their capital in attempting to establish a public enterprise in opposition to the monopolies of this country." You are asked now to kill the river transportation; you are asked to put a penalty upon the men who have invested their money, their time, and capital in building up the interior navigation of the country. You are asked to say that these men shall not have the same opportunities that the railroads have had to build up a paying business. The great trans-Pacific railroads, every railroad in my part of the country, was capitalized and paid for by subsidies and grants from the public, and not one of them paid in the first nine years of its operation, not one.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri has expired.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. LONDON].

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman desire me to yield him five minutes now?

Mr. LONDON. Yes.

Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington. Very well; I yield five minutes to the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. LONDON. Mr. Chairman, the Commission on Industrial Relations has concluded its labors. This House some time ago adopted a resolution authorizing the publication of 100,000 copies of the report. No provision was made for the publication of the testimony.

There is a universal demand for copies of the report.

Students of society, social workers, editors, men and women interested in the labor problem, are anxious to obtain access

to the report and to the testimony in the hope of finding a source of information and suggestions for future constructive action. In spite of it all, there is a sneer in certain quarters when the Commission on Industrial Relations is mentioned.

A studied effort is being made to discredit its work. It is urged that the work of the commission has no value, because the report is not unanimous. That there are, in fact, several reports, and that the lack of agreement among the members of the commission is in itself sufficient to destroy the probative value of its findings as well as the conclusiveness of its recommendations. The report could not have been unanimous, because there is no unanimity, because there can be no harmony in modern society. Naive people perhaps believed that if a group of employers, employees, and professors would get together around a table and "talk it over," the causes of industrial dissatisfaction would be ascertained and that a brotherly way would be found of allaying it. But the actualities of life disappointed these good people. It turned out that not only could not the members of the commission agree on conclusions and recommendations but that each group interpreted the facts that had been presented in accordance with its class bias and class understanding of things. The representatives of capital on the commission could not under any circumstances get themselves to indorse the view that the principal cause of unrest was the fact that the wealth of the Nation had been concentrated into the hands of a small number, and that this was the cause of the restlessness of the many.

It would have been just as reasonable to assume that a commission consisting of a Republican, a Democrat, and a Socialist would agree on a program of political action. These parties represent distinct class or group interests, and the program of each necessarily corresponds with the needs of the group it represents.

One recalls the significant statement made by one of the fathers of this Republic during the Constitutional Convention to the effect that two persons born of different nations but belonging to the same class of society will more easily understand each other than two persons of the same nation but belonging to different classes of society.

It is in the very fact that the report is not unanimous that I find the greatest significance.

The commission came into being as the result of a general demand that the cause of industrial unrest be investigated. For a long time there had been talk that violence was being resorted to in industrial disputes both by labor and capital.

Then came the climax. For many years a bitter struggle had been raging between the National Erectors' Association (employers) and the International Association of Bridge and Structural Iron Workers (employees). The erectors' association was one of the most powerful bodies of employers in the country. The contest assumed a violent character, with its finale in the McNamara case at Los Angeles, at which labor men confessed to having been guilty of a number of acts of violence against property committed in the course of union activity.

A shout went up from the enemies of organized labor all over the country that a change of labor's leadership was imperative; that labor had been proven guilty of violence; that it had been defying all law, and that its activity had been criminal. It looked as if a reign of reaction of which the working people were to be the victims was about to set in.

There were, however, silent forces in American life which made such a result impossible.

The Socialist movement had succeeded in awakening the minds of the thinking men and women of the country to the need of a study of society and of its problems. To the thinker a series of acts of violence committed by a union appeared to be something more than a mere mistake of a union leader. The student of society asked himself the question, "How did it come that a union organized primarily for the improvement of the condition of the workers was compelled to resort to violence? And how did it happen that millions of men, without knowing the merits of the case, took sides and determined in advance of the trial the guilt or the innocence of the accused as their sympathies lay with labor or against labor?"

Immediately after the conviction of these labor leaders a symposium of opinion was gathered in a journal called "The Survey." This question was propounded to the contributors of opinions: "What constructive suggestion can we make now to study or to allay the industrial unrest of which the McNamara case was such a serious manifestation?"

In an opinion which I contributed I said in part:

What a good thing it would be, now that two labor leaders have confessed, for capital to come forward and confess; and how horrifying its confession would be, and how shocking would be the revelation of crimes of omission and commission, of the crushing of the weak and the helpless; of the bribing of voter, legislator, and judge; of the sub-

sidizing of a venal press; of thousands upon thousands crippled, mutilated, and murdered through negligence and indifference, through avarice and greed! But capital will not confess. Capital stands for "law and order."

The American people must awake to the fact that a bitter, merciless class war divides society. It is a war between those who have and those who have not, between property and its interests on one hand and life and its interests on the other. It is a war with all war's fury, with all its injustice, with all its crime-breeding hatreds.

Where are the seers and prophets of America? Where are the teachers and guides? Where are her intellectual and moral forces? Can the contending classes be compelled to adopt civilized methods of warfare?

A petition signed by a number of prominent men and women asking for the appointment of a commission on industrial relations to examine and investigate into the causes of industrial dissatisfaction was presented to the President. We have before us the report of the commission.

Here are some of the essential facts that the commission has disclosed:

In spite of the fact that this country is so young, that its population is 100,000,000, while Europe has 450,000,000, in spite of great strides in the application of science to industry, in spite of the fact that the total wealth of the United States has more than doubled during the last 20 years, that the wealth per capita has tremendously increased, there is in these United States a distressing and almost incomprehensible amount of poverty.

Occupational diseases, low wages, excessive hours of toil, insanitary conditions, improper and adulterated food are sapping the vitality of the industrial workers.

One-fifth of the women workers employed in factories, stores, and laundries earn less than \$4 per week and half earn less than \$6 per week. At least one-third, and possibly one-half, of the families of wage earners employed in manufacturing and mining earn less than is required for a comfortable or a decent living; that between one-third and one-fourth of the male workers earn less than \$10 per week.

In the principal industries the workers are unemployed, on the average, one-fifth of the year.

Only one-third of all children in the United States complete the grammar-school course, and this in a Republic whose very existence depends upon an intelligent electorate.

The personal relation between employer and employee has disappeared. Thus, in transportation, approximately 100 per cent of the wage earners are employed by corporations; in mining, 90 per cent; in manufacturing, 75 per cent. The man, the employer, has ceased to be responsible to his fellow man, the worker.

New and ingenious methods of exploitation, calculated to extract the last ounce of energy from the living machine, were being devised, with total disregard for the permanent well-being of the man. The relationship has become one between the man and the cost sheet. It is the worker, throbbing with life, against the soulless corporation. A man is hired for a week, for a day, for an hour, by the piece, and no one cares what becomes of him when he is separated from his job.

With the increase of a propertyless and incomeless industrial proletariat, there is an alarming increase of the number of farmless farmers. Out of every 100 farms in the United States 37 per cent are operated by tenants. Here is what the commission has to say about the tenant farmers in one of our largest States:

Badly housed, ill nourished, uneducated, and hopeless, these tenants continue year after year to eke out a bare living, moving frequently from one farm to another in the hope that something will turn up.

The tenant farmer in the Southwest is not much better off. This is how his condition is described by Basil M. Manly, who wrote the main report of the commission:

The prevailing system of tenancy in the Southwest is share tenancy, under which the tenant furnishes his own seeds, tools, and teams, and pays to the landlord one-third of the grain and one-fourth of the cotton. There is, however, a constant tendency to increase the landlord's share through the payment either of cash bonuses or of a higher percentage of the product. Under this system tenants as a class earn only a bare living through the work of themselves and of their entire families.

Few of the tenants ever succeed in laying by a surplus. On the contrary, their experiences are so discouraging that they seldom remain on the same farm for more than a year, and they move from one farm to the next in the constant hope of being able to better their condition. Without the labor of the entire family the tenant farmer is helpless. As a result not only his wife is prematurely broken down, but the children remain uneducated and without the hope of any condition better than that of their parents. The tenants having no interest in the results beyond the crops of a single year, the soil is being rapidly exhausted, and the conditions therefore tend to become steadily worse. Even at present a very large proportion of the tenants' families are insufficiently clothed, badly housed, and underfed. Practically all of the white tenants are native born. As a result of these conditions, however, they are deteriorating rapidly, each generation being less efficient and more hopeless than the one preceding.

As to the agricultural laborer, his state approaches that of a slave.

Absentee landlordism is on the increase.

More than four-fifths of the large land holdings are being kept out of use; land unoccupied and held for speculative purposes is being withheld from men who could earn their livelihood as freemen by tilling the soil.

A financial and industrial oligarchy wields a power of which no potentate has ever dared dream. Two per cent of the people own 60 per cent of the wealth of the nation and 65 per cent of the people own only 5 per cent of the Nation's wealth; 6 financial groups employ 28 per cent of all industrial workers. It is within the power of the few to give or refuse the means of life to the many.

The commission registers a growing distrust for the law among the masses. It shows how laws for the elimination of child labor, for the protection of women against exploitation, for the compensation of workers injured in industrial accidents, for the promotion of safety in factory and mine, for the emancipation of the seaman, were fought at every step by capital and its minions in the legislatures and in the courts, and that—after wholesome and necessary laws are passed they are in large part nullified by the courts, either upon technicalities of a character which would not be held to invalidate legislation favorable to the interests of manufacturers, merchants, bankers, and other property owners, or thrown out on the broad ground of unconstitutionality, through strained or illogical construction of constitutional provisions.

That the supposed guarantees by the Constitution of the rights of citizens to trial by jury, security from unwarranted arrest, freedom of speech, free assembly, writ of habeas corpus, the bearing of arms, and similar elementary rights were found to be of no avail in many jurisdictions when invoked by labor.

It may be worth while to give an extract from the testimony of Prof. Henry R. Seager, of Columbia University, on the attitude of the courts toward the workers:

I don't see how any fair-minded person can question but what our judges have shown a decided bias in favor of the employers. I would not be inclined to ascribe this so much to a class bias, although I think this is a factor, as to the antecedent training of judges. Under our legal system the principal task of the lawyer is to protect property rights, and the property rights have come to be concentrated more and more into the hands of corporations, so that the successful lawyer to-day, in the great majority of cases, is the corporation lawyer. His business is to protect the rights of employers and corporations. It is from the ranks of successful lawyers, for the most part, that our judges are selected, and from that results inevitably a certain angle on the part of a majority of our judges.

Not only has the growing power of corporate capital exercised a baneful influence upon the course of legislation, but by assuming the right to maintain private guards, private police, and private arsenals capital has usurped a power which belongs to the State, to the people in their collective capacity. Strike-breaking agencies, consisting of the very scum of the earth, are being clothed with authority of the law, and in many an industrial dispute have gangs of hoodlums in the pay of capital, fortified by a sheriff's badge or turned into improvised militiamen, stained the sacred flag of the Republic with the blood of helpless strikers. Each such corporation is a little feudal state in itself.

The story of the Colorado strike reads like a story of the days of piracy, except that the industrial pirate lacks the charm of chivalry and bravery which surrounded the pirate of old.

Organized capital has diffused its poison in the realm of thought. Not satisfied with the possession of the lion's share of the Nation's wealth, it has made a bold attempt to control the very world of ideas. Under the guise of promoting science capital has been endowing colleges and universities and has been establishing funds for pensioning professors. One can not expect to find independent thought in a dependent professor.

By generous contributions to private charity the princes of the purse are teaching the people to look to them for relief when the hour of need comes, and under present conditions it comes often. In the words of the commission:

The domination of the men in whose hands the final control of a large part of American industry rests is not limited to their employees, but is being rapidly extended to control the education and "social service" of the Nation.

These are some of the findings of the commission. No wonder there is hesitancy in some quarters to spread these findings before the people. No wonder there is anxiety to discredit in advance the work of the commission. It has established the truth of the prophecy made by James Madison during the Constitutional Convention of 1787 that—

In future times a great majority of the people will be not only without landed but any other sort of property.

I shall not undertake at this time to discuss the recommendations of the commission and of its members.

The commission has proven the contention of the Socialist that political democracy and industrial absolutism can not go hand in hand.

Our progress lies in the direction of extending the principles of democracy to industry.

The report as well as the testimony should be made accessible to the great masses.

Let the American people know the facts.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. PARK). The gentleman from New York asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. Will the gentleman permit an interruption?

Mr. LONDON. Yes.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. To leave the gentleman's speech as he has just left it, would convey the impression to the reader that the House had not approved the resolution providing for the printing of the report. The House has passed it.

Mr. LONDON. You provided for a limited number of copies.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. It is held up in the Senate.

Mr. LONDON. One hundred thousand copies will not, by any means, be sufficient. I myself have received requests for almost a thousand copies. It is perhaps true that the most intelligent people write to me.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. But 100,000 copies is better than none.

Mr. LONDON. Yes.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. But the impression would have been, if the gentleman had not changed it, that he wanted the House to hurry up with its distribution of this report, as if the House had been careless in the premises.

Mr. LONDON. The House passed a resolution for the printing of 100,000 copies.

Mr. COOPER of Wisconsin. And you want a much larger number.

Mr. BORLAND. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. HARRISON). Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. CRISP].

Mr. CRISP. Mr. Chairman, I desire to ask leave to extend my remarks by having printed in the RECORD some resolutions adopted by a patriotic society in my home city, urging preparedness.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the Chair, Mr. HARRISON, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that the committee had had under consideration the bill H. R. 12193, the river and harbor appropriation bill, and had come to no resolution thereon.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Speaker, is it understood that when the House adjourns to-day it adjourns to meet to-morrow at 11 o'clock a. m.?

The SPEAKER. That was agreed to this morning.

JOINT RESOLUTION AND ENROLLED BILLS PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS APPROVAL.

Mr. LAZARO, from the Committee on Enrolled Bills, reported that this day they had presented to the President of the United States for his approval the following joint resolution and bills:

H. J. Res. 68. Joint resolution to cede to the State of Maryland temporary jurisdiction over certain lands in the Fort McHenry Military Reservation;

H. R. 10037. An act granting pensions and increase of pensions to certain soldiers and sailors of the Civil War and certain widows and dependent children of soldiers and sailors of said war; and

H. R. 11078. An act granting pensions and increase of pensions to certain soldiers and sailors of the Civil War and certain widows and dependent children of soldiers and sailors of said war.

ADJOURNMENT.

Mr. KITCHIN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 5 o'clock and 43 minutes p. m.) the House, under its previous order, adjourned until to-morrow, Saturday, April 1, 1916, at 11 o'clock a. m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1. A letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, submitting a clause of legislation heretofore suggested, extending the limitations as to the number of delivered sheets of customs stamps and of checks, drafts, and miscellaneous work to be executed by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, and urging immediate action by Congress (H. Doc. No. 969); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

2. A letter from the Secretary of War, transmitting with a letter from the Chief of Engineers, reports on preliminary examination and survey of Housatonic River, Conn. (H. Doc. No. 970); to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors and ordered to be printed, with illustrations.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several calendars therein named, as follows:

Mr. McCracken, from the Committee on Irrigation of Arid Lands, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 12305) to promote the reclamation of arid lands, reported the same with amendments, accompanied by a report (No. 458), which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. NORTON, from the Committee on Indian Affairs, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 11720) to provide for per capita payments to be made to Indians of the Fort Berthold Reservation, N. Dak., reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 459), which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

CHANGE OF REFERENCE.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXII, committees were discharged from the consideration of the following bills, which were referred as follows:

A bill (H. R. 8263) granting a pension to Francis A. Grennen; Committee on Invalid Pensions discharged, and referred to Committee on Pensions.

A bill (H. R. 13953) to pension soldiers' widows who were married after 1890 act was passed; Committee on Pensions discharged, and referred to Committee on Invalid Pensions.

PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. HAYDEN: A bill (H. R. 14029) to provide for the establishment of bonded warehouses where imported grains and seeds may be stored and cleaned for exportation; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. GALLIVAN: A bill (H. R. 14030) to erect a monument at Gainesville, Tex.; to the Committee on the Library.

By Mr. RAKER: A bill (H. R. 14031) to amend the act entitled "An act to prohibit the importation and use of opium for other than medicinal purposes," approved February 9, 1909, as amended by an act approved January 17, 1914; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BURGESS: A bill (H. R. 14032) to provide for the erection of a public building in the city of Alvin, Tex.; to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. CARTER of Massachusetts: Memorial of the Massachusetts Legislature, favoring action by Congress toward securing the moral support of the United States for the oppressed Jews in Europe; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, memorial by the Massachusetts Legislature, relative to the conditions of destitution in Poland and to the entry of food therein; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ADAIR: A bill (H. R. 14033) granting an increase of pension to John H. Lewis; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. ASHBROOK: A bill (H. R. 14034) granting a pension to Lodenia Edwards; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. CLARK of Missouri: A bill (H. R. 14035) granting a pension to Jackson St. John; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. DOWELL: A bill (H. R. 14036) granting an increase of pension to Oscar W. Lowery; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14037) granting an increase of pension to James W. Pace; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. FESS: A bill (H. R. 14038) granting an increase of pension to Joseph W. Smith; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14039) granting an increase of pension to John G. Dalie; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. FITZGERALD: A bill (H. R. 14040) for the relief of Henry Metz; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. HASKELL: A bill (H. R. 14041) granting an increase of pension to Edward Dubey; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HAYES: A bill (H. R. 14042) for the relief of Joel Henry Mansfield; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

By Mr. IGOE: A bill (H. R. 14043) granting a pension to Julia M. Anderson and minor child, Wilbert T. Anderson; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. KAHN: A bill (H. R. 14044) granting a pension to David Mann; to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14045) granting an increase of pension to Louis Gottlieb; to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14046) for the relief of Mrs. Francesca G. Montell; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. KEY of Ohio: A bill (H. R. 14047) granting an increase of pension to Jacob H. Wolf; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14048) granting an increase of pension to George Lloyd; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. LAFEAN: A bill (H. R. 14049) granting an increase of pension to Henry Schaeffer; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. LENROOT: A bill (H. R. 14050) for the relief of Philip S. Everest; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. LESHER: A bill (H. R. 14051) granting a pension to John M. Koons; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. LITTLEPAGE: A bill (H. R. 14052) to reimburse Tennie A. Anderson, postmaster at Maplewood, Fayette County, W. Va., for money, money orders, and postage stamps stolen; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. LONGWORTH: A bill (H. R. 14053) granting a pension to Omar Boggs; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. MATTHEWS: A bill (H. R. 14054) granting an increase of pension to Spencer H. Lighthill; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. O'SHAUNESSY: A bill (H. R. 14055) granting an increase of pension to Sarah E. McCann; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. PADGETT: A bill (H. R. 14056) granting an increase of pension to Julia E. Jones; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. PARK: A bill (H. R. 14057) granting a pension to Daniel H. Gerald; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. RAKER: A bill (H. R. 14058) granting a pension to Mary A. Blair; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. RUSSELL of Missouri: A bill (H. R. 14059) granting an increase of pension to Sarah J. Clary; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SCHALL: A bill (H. R. 14060) granting an increase of pension to Edward F. Ziebarth; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. THOMAS: A bill (H. R. 14061) granting an increase of pension to James W. Barton; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 14062) granting an increase of pension to Thomas H. Boyd; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By Mr. ASHBROOK: Memorial of Woman's Relief Corps. of London, Uhrichsville, Yellow Springs, and Chagrin Falls, all in the State of Ohio, favoring House bill 11707, the widows' pension bill; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, memorial of Radnor (Ohio) Grange, No. 1917, against the proposal to revolutionize our present mail service; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of G. W. James and 6 others, of Mount Vernon, Ohio, against House bill 652, Sunday-observance bill for the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Also, memorial of Hebron (Ohio) Grange, No. 2038, against Madden rider to Post Office appropriation bill; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. BAILEY: Petitions of sundry citizens and church organizations of the State of Pennsylvania, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also petition of Millard Closson, C. L. Wright, Clarence May, J. F. Mugridge, George E. Burkitt, William T. Hale, J. B. Custer, Joseph Stroud, C. B. Gilpatrick, Charles R. Clark, Joseph Chidders, Oliver Makin, John Chappell, George W. Mulren, Albert N. Fink, Cloyd Gochmour, Cyrus Ling, Edwin Walls, John Closson, C. H. Bottscher, Ray Miller, Foster Custer, Albert Fry, Howard C. Fry, and Albert N. Fink, all of South Fork, Pa., against bills denying the use of the mails to certain publications; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. DALE of New York: Petition of H. M. Bickford Co., of New York, relative to appropriation for construction of Norfolk-Beaufort Inlet waterway; to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors.

By Mr. DENISON: Petition of First Baptist Church, of Sisser, Ill., for national woman's suffrage; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of First Baptist Church of Sesser, Ill., against laws abridging free speech and free press; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of First Baptist Church of Sesser, Ill., favoring Burnett immigration bill; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, petition of First Baptist Church of Sesser, Ill., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DILLON: Petitions of sundry citizens of Mitchell, S. Dak., favoring resolution for investigation of dairy products; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. ELSTON: Petition of E. R. Oti and other citizens of Alameda County, Cal., protesting against the passage of House bills 491 and 6468; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of L. H. Anderson and other citizens of Alameda County, Cal., protesting against the passage of House bill 652; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Also, petition of Karl W. Adler and 70 other citizens of Oakland, Cal., for passage of the Emerson resolution; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. FESS: Petition of members of the Lewis Relief Corps, of Xenia, Ohio, asking Congress to pass the Ashbrook bill; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. FITZGERALD: Memorial of board of directors of the Knights of Columbus Institute, stating that they join with the Sons of the American Revolution and other patriotic bodies to show their belief in preparedness by displaying the American flag on April 19, 1916; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. FULLER: Petition of Uriah Painter and 56 other Civil War veterans, favoring additional pensions for ex-soldiers of the Civil War who were prisoners of war; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GALLIVAN: Memorial of Eastern States Industrial and Agricultural Exposition, relative to appropriation for boys and girls' exhibit in National Dairy Show exhibit; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. GUERNSEY: Petition of sundry citizens of Amity and Cary, Me., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HAMILTON of Michigan: Petitions of residents of Benton Harbor, Decatur, Wayland, Cass County, and Three Rivers, all in the State of Michigan, favoring the Susan B. Anthony amendment; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH: Memorial of Henry S. Wells and 58 ex-Union soldiers who were prisoners of war, asking for pension for time held as prisoners, at rate of \$2 per day; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HOPWOOD: Petitions of sundry citizens and church organizations of Pennsylvania, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KAHN: Papers to accompany House bill 14045, for relief of Louis Gottlieb; to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, papers to accompany House bill 7160, for relief of John Blueford; to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, papers to accompany House bill 13498, for relief of Susan E. Cline; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. KELLEY: Memorial of 50 citizens of Cohoctah and 53 citizens of Pontiac, Birmingham, and Royal Oak, all in the State of Michigan, favoring Susan B. Anthony amendment to the Constitution; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of 14 citizens of Leslie, Mich., against passage of bills to amend the postal laws; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island: Petition of Dr. Arthur T. Jones, of Providence, R. I., favoring preserving and strengthening the Medical Reserve Corps of the United States Army; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. LESHNER: Petitions of Woman's Christian Temperance Union of 277 people of Berwick; Woman's Christian Temperance Union of 506 people of Orangeville; Lutheran Sunday School of 956 people of Milton; 100 people of Milton; United Brethren Church of Milton; Methodist Episcopal Church of Milton; 60 men of Milton; Woman's Christian Temperance Union of 245 people of Milton; 504 people of Milton; and Methodist Episcopal Church of 500 people of Milton, all in the State of Pennsylvania, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LEWIS: Memorial of 457 members of labor unions and citizens of Rio Grande, P. R., asking for an investigation of conditions of the island; to the Committee on the Territories.

By Mr. LOUD: Petition of S. M. Pourie, secretary, Bangor Grange, No. 1089, Bay City, Mich., opposing the Madden rider in the Post Office appropriation bill; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. MCKINLEY: Petitions of sundry business men of the State of Illinois, favoring tax on mail-order houses; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MAPES: Petitions of citizens of Grandville, Holland, Cedar Springs, and Sparta, Mich., favoring passage of the Susan B. Anthony amendment, enfranchising the women of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MORGAN of Oklahoma: Petition from the First Baptist Church Sunday School, Cherokee, Okla., asking for the speedy passage of the Webb-Smith national prohibition resolution, House joint resolutions 84 and 85; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition from the Sunday School of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Byron, Alfalfa County, Okla., earnestly petitioning for the speedy passage of the Webb-Smith national prohibition resolution, House joint resolutions 84 and 85; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition signed by 13 citizens of Cherokee, Okla., asking for the speedy passage of the Webb-Smith national prohibition resolution, House joint resolutions 84 and 85; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. PRATT: Petition of Julian A. Morris, Edward H. Perkins, and 29 other citizens of Wayland, N. Y., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RAKER: Petitions of 8 firms of Orland and Red Bluff; 12 firms of Yreka; 13 firms of Redding; 3 merchants of Plymouth; 9 firms of Dunsmaur; 10 firms of Corning; Campini & Garibaldi, of Drytown; 12 firms of Grass Valley; 4 firms of Amador City; 12 firms of Nevada City; 12 firms of East Auburn; 8 firms of Lincoln; 6 firms of Sisson; 4 firms of Weed; and 11 firms of Red Bluff, all in the State of California, favoring House bills 270 and 712; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. ROGERS: Petition of citizens of Lowell, Mass., opposing House bills 491 and 6468; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. ROWE: Petition of the United States Steel Corporation of New York, against House bill 9411, the tag bill, relative to number painted on motor boats; to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

Also, petitions of Real Estate Board of New York and New York Building Managers' Association, favoring appointment of commission to make investigation of the coal situation; to the Committee on Rules.

Also, memorial of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, relative to national defense; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of Abraham Goldfaden Lodge, No. 505, I. O. B. A., against passage of the Burnett immigration bill; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, petition of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, favoring House bill 8668, to establish a national park service; to the Committee on the Public Lands.

By Mr. SHOUSE: Petition of sundry citizens of Larned, Kans., protesting against passage of House bills 6468 and 491 and similar legislation; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. STINESS: Papers to accompany House bill 13964, granting an increase of pension to Emeline L. Bennett; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, petition of Master Printers' Association of Rhode Island, favoring House bill 11621, providing for mailing of catalogues, circulars, etc., at the pound rate of 8 cents; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of Providence Branch, No. 35, National Association of Bureau of Animal Industry Employees, favoring the Lobeck bill for the classification of the employees of the Bureau of Animal Industry; to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, petition of William B. Kimball and others, of Providence, R. I., protesting against House bills 491 and 6468, to amend the postal laws; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of Dr. Arthur T. Jones, of Providence, R. I., advocating the strengthening of the Medical Reserve Corps of the Army; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of Rhode Island Equal Suffrage Association, favoring Susan B. Anthony Federal amendment for woman suffrage; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of Brown Bros. Co., of Providence, R. I., against the passage of Senate bill 3598; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. SUTHERLAND: Memorial of 500 citizens of Clarksburg, W. Va., favoring Federal motion picture commission for censorship of motion-picture films; to the Committee on Education.

By Mr. TILSON: Petition of Pastors' Union of New Haven, Conn., urging Congress to prohibit sale of liquor in the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Also, petition of Pastors' Union of New Haven, Conn., urging Congress to establish a Federal motion picture commission; to the Committee on Education.

By Mr. WARD: Petition signed by Mrs. Alice E. Stevens, Tillson; Mrs. Helen A. Palmer, Gardiner, James B. Palmer, Plattekill; Elliot F. Soule, Jr., Plattekill; J. E. Jenkins, Plattekill; and Joseph Millett, Tillson, all in the State of New York, representing the several churches, in reference to national constitutional prohibition amendment; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SENATE.

SATURDAY, April 1, 1916.

(Legislative day of Thursday, March 30, 1916.)

The Senate reassembled at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

DEATH OF SENATOR SHIVELY.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair lays before the Senate a note of thanks from Mrs. Shively addressed to the Senate of the United States, which will be read.

The Secretary read the note, as follows:

To the Senate of the United States:

Mrs. Shively and the members of her family desire to express their deep appreciation of your sympathy and extend to you their most grateful thanks for a beautiful floral wreath.

PUBLIC BUILDING AT PARIS, TEX.

Mr. CULBERSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to report back from the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds, favorably with amendments, the bill (S. 5270) for a public building or buildings at Paris, Tex., and I submit a report (No. 321) thereon. I desire its present consideration.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. If it does not lead to any discussion, I shall not make any objection.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, proceeded to consider the bill.

The bill was reported from the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds with amendments, in line 4, to strike out the words "appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated" and to insert "authorized to be expended by the Secretary of the Treasury," in line 6 to strike out the words "or buildings," and in line 8, after "Paris," to insert "Texas," so as to make the bill read:

Be it enacted, etc., That the sum of \$200,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, be, and the same is hereby, authorized to be expended by the Secretary of the Treasury, for the purpose of supplying the necessary building for the Federal court, post office, and other Government offices at Paris, Tex.

The amendments were agreed to.

The bill was reported to the Senate as amended, and the amendments were concurred in.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

On motion of Mr. CULBERSON, the title was amended so as to read: "A bill for a public building at Paris, Tex."

RECLAMATION PROJECTS.

Mr. WORKS. Will the Senator from Oregon yield to me just a moment to offer a resolution of inquiry?