

From Exclusion to Inclusion

1941–1992

Around 9:00 in the morning on April 21, 1945, Daniel K. Inouye, a 20-year-old army lieutenant from Honolulu, Hawaii, was shot in the stomach on the side of a mountain in northwestern Italy. The German bullet went clean out his back and missed his spine by a fraction of an inch. “It felt like someone punched me,” he remembered years later. “But the pain was almost non-existent. A little ache, that’s all and since the bleeding was not much I said well, I’ll keep on going.”¹

Later that morning, Inouye, a pre-med student who had been getting ready for church when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was hit again. This time a rifle grenade nearly blew off his entire right arm. After picking up his tommy gun with his left hand, he continued to charge up the hill, firing at German soldiers as he went. Eventually shot in the leg, Inouye waited until his men seized control of the mountain before being evacuated.² The war in Europe ended 17 days later.

Inouye lived in military hospitals for the next two years to rebuild his strength and learn to do everyday tasks with one arm. The war forced him to adapt, and over the next two decades, the country he nearly died for began to adapt to the war’s consequences as well.

For the most marginalized people—women and minorities, especially—World War II had profound implications for what it meant to be American. The sacrifices they made overseas and on the home front challenged the country to confront its legacy of political exclusion: What role would they have in this new world order?

Japanese-American citizens were rounded up and incarcerated in internment camps during World War II. Photographer Dorothea Lange captured this image of a child, wearing a tag as identification, as he waits for a bus to a relocation center in 1942.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration





This map details the location of U.S. combat and service ships in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, the day it was attacked by the Japanese.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration



In his painting *Attacked Pearl Harbor* [sic] (circa 1947), Henry Sugimoto captures the stunned and anxious reactions of Japanese-American citizens after hearing about the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Sugimoto and his family were removed to internment camps during World War II.

Image courtesy of the Japanese American National Museum, Gift of Madeleine Sugimoto and Naomi Tagawa

For Inouye, the war had something of a twisted logic. “Dec. 7 was the worst date in history for Americans of Japanese ancestry,” he told the *Boston Globe* in 1967. “And yet—maybe this is a horrible thing to say—Dec. 7 was one of the greatest breaks we ever had. The hatred erupted and gave us a chance to counteract it.”³

Of course, not everyone saw the Pearl Harbor attacks as an opportunity for positive change. In their aftermath, the federal government, afraid that immigrants or their family members with Japanese ancestry had helped orchestrate the attacks from U.S. soil, uprooted more than 120,000 Japanese Americans living along the West Coast and placed them in internment camps out of “military necessity.” For these people, the war was a period of remarkable emotional and psychological trauma. Beginning in the 19th century, Congress and the courts prevented Japanese immigrants from becoming citizens and from participating in the political process. After 1924 Congress made them ineligible for admission into the United States entirely, and the federal government considered them a direct threat to the nation. The native-born children of Japanese immigrants were U.S. citizens, yet they were imprisoned by their own government, including four who years later would serve in the U.S. House of Representatives. Because their community lacked a voice at almost every level of government, mainland Japanese Americans’ political exclusion was quickly compounded by their physical exclusion with internment.

From Hawaii to Capitol Hill, the effects of the war ricocheted across the legislative process over the next 50 years. At first, wartime alliances altered the political math Congress used to determine immigration policy. In 1943 Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act but still kept Asian immigration at a minimum for another two decades. Then the sacrifices and courage of Japanese-American GIs during the war questioned stereotypes at home. Finally, the war against communism encouraged legislators to adopt new visa programs as existing policy became inconsistent with post-war foreign policy needs. In the 1960s, federal lawmakers overturned a century of exclusion and opened citizenship to thousands of Asian immigrants from a host of different countries.

The process did not have a clean narrative arc stretching neatly from exclusion to citizenship. Congress did not swear in its first voting Asian Pacific American (APA) Member, Dalip Singh (Judge) Saund of California, until January 1957, more than a decade after the war. But through fits and starts, exclusion gave way to citizenship, which provided a path to political agency. The decades of discrimination against Asian Americans that culminated in the forced imprisonment of the Japanese-American community during the war left deep and lasting scars. But by the end of the 20th century, APAs in Congress wielded significant political power and forced the country to confront the haunting legacy of internment and prejudice.

This section profiles the 14 APA Members first elected to Congress between 1956 and 1992.⁴ Five served as U.S. Representatives, two as Senators, and three held seats in both chambers. Unlike the first section of this book in which every APA Member profiled was a statutory representative, only four of the Members in this section served as Delegates. The first part of this essay provides the general historical context of the war and the experiences of Asian-American

communities during this era. The middle section describes the new paths to citizenship and the process of turning that status into political power. Lastly, the discussion turns to the kinds of issues APA Members dealt with during their time in Congress.

This essay groups together the stories of Guam and American Samoa for two reasons. First, both territories became part of America's insular orbit following the Spanish-American War at the turn of the 20th century and both figured prominently in the Pacific theater during World War II. Second, because they were under U.S. jurisdiction at the time, the experiences of the islands' peoples differed significantly from those of immigrants coming from Japan, China, and other independent nations.

WORLD WAR II

Daniel Inouye had just finished brushing his teeth and was dressing in his Sunday best when he looked outside into the bright, early-morning sun on December 7, 1941. He was listening to the radio and buttoning his shirt when a panicked voice cut into the day's programming. "This is no test!" the radio announcer screamed. "Pearl Harbor is being bombed by the Japanese! I repeat: this is not a test or a maneuver! Japanese planes are attacking Oahu!"⁵

Inouye and his father ran outside as dark smoke filled the sky. Japanese warplanes flew overhead. The phone rang. On the other end was the local Red Cross chapter, looking for Inouye. "How soon can you be here, Dan?" the chapter's secretary asked. "I'm on my way," he replied.⁶

Grabbing his bike, the 17-year-old Inouye sprinted for the aid station near Pearl Harbor. As he sped toward the smoke, Inouye noticed his neighbors filling the streets. One of them, an elderly Japanese man, asked him if Germany had attacked, unable to process the reality that his ancestral home had just bombed his adopted one. "In the marrow of my bones," Inouye remembered almost 30 years later, "I knew there was only deep trouble ahead. And then, pedaling along, it came to me at last that I would face that trouble, too, for my eyes were



Seventeen-year-old Daniel K. Inouye was deeply affected by the bombing of Pearl Harbor. He volunteered as a private in the U.S. Army in 1943 and retired as a captain in 1947.

Image courtesy of the Daniel K. Inouye Institute



Smoke billows from the wreckage of the USS *Arizona* on December 7, 1941, in Pearl Harbor.

Image courtesy of the Library of Congress

Enemy Alien:

*A foreign resident in a country with which
his or her country is at war.*



From left to right: U.S. Army Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and Rear Admiral Milo Draemel meet at headquarters in Pearl Harbor shortly after the attack on December 7, 1941.

Image courtesy of the Naval History and Heritage Command

shaped just like those of that poor old man in the street, and my people were only a generation removed from the land that had spawned those bombers, the land that sent them to rain destruction on America.”⁷

Inouye was at the aid station for less than an hour when the next round of bombers swooped into Pearl Harbor. Armed with a stretcher, he and a few others raced to the impact zone and began ferrying out the dead and injured. It was five days before he went home.⁸

During World War II, tens of millions of Americans, nearly 11 percent of the entire population, received some sort of military training. Of those, almost 75 percent wound up overseas, engaged in the European and Pacific theaters. By one estimate, 33,000 *nisei* (the American-born children of Japanese immigrants) served in the armed forces during World War II. For these tens of thousands of Japanese-American troops, however, serving their country was not always a protected right. They fought for a chance to fight for America.⁹

Daniel Inouye was too young to enlist in 1941. But his age was not the only thing that prevented him from signing up. Following the attacks on Pearl Harbor, the federal government reclassified nearly every *nisei* on mainland America and in Hawaii, including almost every *nisei* already in uniform, as an enemy alien unfit to join or serve in the armed forces.¹⁰

Martial Law

On that fateful day, Hawaii began a complete transformation, one that threatened to upend generations of Japanese Hawaiians’ participation in the life of the islands. U.S. officials declared martial law on the afternoon of December 7, and the military assumed all local judicial authority, regulated employment contracts, froze jobs and wages, instituted a curfew, censored the mails, monitored all telephone calls, and had the entire population fingerprinted. Newspapers and magazines, particularly Japanese-language publications, faced new licensing and strict censorship. Authorities implemented food and gasoline rationing and required that all firearms be surrendered. The U.S. Office of Alien Property Custodian seized businesses and properties and froze bank deposits and assets at all Japanese banks.¹¹

Still, the treatment of persons of Japanese descent proceeded along two very different paths in Hawaii and on the mainland. In Hawaii, the new military governor, U.S. Army General Delos C. Emmons, ignored orders from Washington to evacuate and intern Japanese Hawaiians.¹² Military intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) told Emmons that they had no evidence of any Japanese disloyalty or sabotage. He soon concluded that any effort to intern Japanese Hawaiians, the largest ethnic group on the islands, would be an immense undertaking and would drain the resources needed to bolster the islands’ defenses.¹³

In early 1942, General Emmons came under great pressure to relocate and intern Japanese Hawaiians. That pressure intensified following the publication of the Roberts Commission report on Pearl Harbor, directed by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, which falsely suggested that Japanese Hawaiians had provided vital military and naval information to the Japanese consulate that contributed to the Pearl Harbor disaster. Emmons successfully resisted such



During the Battle of Midway, the U.S. Navy decisively turned the tide of the naval war in the Pacific with a devastating attack on the Japanese navy. This photograph shows the *Mikuma*, a Japanese heavy cruiser, after U.S. planes bombed the ship on June 6, 1942.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

drastic actions, however, because powerful white landowners and territorial newspapers backed him. Hawaiian Delegate Samuel Wilder King supported only the arrest of spies.¹⁴

Crucially, too, Hawaiian businessmen rejected internment. “There are 160,000 of these people who want to live here because they like the country and like the American way of life,” wrote the president of the Honolulu chamber of commerce. “The citizens of Japanese blood would fight as loyally for America as any other citizen.” But most important of all, the Japanese Hawaiians were the lynchpin of the local economy.¹⁵

Emmons ended up interning fewer than 1,500 people (about two-thirds of whom were Japanese immigrants and one-third U.S. citizens) whom he considered serious security threats. This came to about 1 percent of the islands’ Japanese and Japanese-American population. Pressure for internment eased after the U.S. victory off Midway Island in June 1942 put the Japanese navy on the defensive and tamped down concerns about an invasion of Hawaii.¹⁶ Still, martial law remained in place until President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) lifted it in October 1944 after it became clear that Allied forces had turned the tide against Japan.

“Go for Broke”

While wholesale internment on the islands never came to fruition, life for Japanese Hawaiians remained far different from what it had been before the bombings. In the years leading up to the war, *nisei* served in the military across Hawaii. About 1,500 men had been drafted between September 1940 and December 1941, and on the morning of December 7, for instance, 2,000 Hawaiian *nisei* helped defend the islands when the bombings began, including future U.S. Senator Spark M. Matsunaga of Hawaii, who led a company of troops on nearby Molokai. By nightfall, thousands more *nisei* from the Hawaii territorial guard and the University of Hawaii’s reserve officers’ training corps helped guard vital points throughout the islands.¹⁷



Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott Jr., right, salutes after fastening the Presidential Unit Citation streamer to the flag of Company L, Third Battalion, of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, on September 4, 1945. More than 10,000 Japanese-Hawaiian men tried to enlist in the 442nd, an all-*nisei* combat unit that received hard-won commendations.

Image courtesy of the U.S. Army Center of Military History



Daniel K. Inouye, photographed in his U.S. Army uniform on January 1, 1947, fought as a member of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. On June 21, 2000, Inouye received the Congressional Medal of Honor for heroism in battle during World War II.

Image courtesy of the Daniel K. Inouye Institute



The 100th Infantry Battalion was an all-*nisei* unit of the U.S. Army. Two privates in the 100th, Takeshi Omuro and Kentoku Nakasone, load a machine gun in 1943.

Image courtesy of the U.S. Army Center of Military History

But anti-Japanese hysteria quickly took over, and it was not long before the military stripped *nisei* troops of their weapons and assigned them to menial tasks under armed guard. Less than two months later, on January 21, 1942, the military dismissed all 317 *nisei* from the territorial guard. Six months after that, following the Battle of Midway, the army removed Matsunaga from command and sent him and other *nisei* soldiers to a base in Wisconsin. “Oh, my heavens, that was a sad day,” Matsunaga later remembered in an interview with the *Washington Post*. “Just imagine serving there for almost a year and having proven my loyalty.... Boy, I still feel emotional about it when I talk about it.”¹⁸

Pressuring the government for a chance to join the fight, Matsunaga’s *nisei* troops petitioned President Roosevelt directly, and with the support of U.S. military officers in Hawaii, the federal government eventually created an all-*nisei* army division, the 100th Infantry Battalion, formed largely out of the young men stationed in Wisconsin.¹⁹

Not long after, federal officials endorsed the idea of creating an all-*nisei* combat unit, and in January 1943, the War Department put out a call for 1,500 volunteers to form the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Remarkably, even as the federal government interned Japanese Americans on the mainland, more than 10,000 Japanese Hawaiians, roughly 40 percent of all eligible *nisei* men in Hawaii, tried to enlist. The army ended up taking 2,600 volunteers, including Daniel K. Inouye, who was midway through his freshman year at the University of Hawaii.²⁰

The 442nd adopted “Go for Broke” as its motto, borrowing the gambling term for when someone bets it all. “It was no idly chosen phrase,” observed the *New York Times* in June 1943. “The Japanese-Americans realize they have perhaps more at stake in this war than the average soldier.” At a time when their own government was forcing them to prove their loyalty, the *nisei* troops, the *Times* wrote, “have known from the beginning they would be under close public scrutiny.”²¹

The 100th left for North Africa in September 1943 but soon transferred to central Italy, where it faced heavy combat. It eventually became known as the “Purple Heart Battalion” because of its high casualty rate—300 killed, 650 wounded—including Matsunaga, who suffered major injuries to his leg while crossing a mine field.²²

In the spring of 1944, Inouye and the 442nd shipped out for central Italy and met up with the 100th that June. The two forces went on to see combat in Italy and France, and earned thousands of individual commendations and the nickname the “Army’s Most Decorated Unit.” Their costliest campaign took place in Bruyères, France, when the 442nd was sent to save a Texas battalion trapped behind German lines. In one week, the unit suffered 800 casualties. The casualty rate was so high over the course of the conflict that more than 15,000 *nisei* troops would serve in the unit.²³

The harrowing and decorated service of Japanese-American GIs during the war and the fact that they had helped take down the Axis powers helped to transform the old order back home. “Hawaii seemed at a turning point in history, gathering breath as it made ready to push off in directions never before imagined. One could almost feel the ferment of impending change,” Inouye later wrote in his memoirs. “The 442nd was very much a part of what was

happening.” But it was not just because of the accolades and honors they won in combat. “It was more subtle,” he said. “We had gone off to war as the sons and grandsons of immigrants, heirs of an alien culture and very much expected—and I suppose, expecting—to resume our unobtrusive minority status if and when we returned. But the army had given us a taste of full citizenship, and an appetite for more of the same. We were the ‘can-do’ outfit and we were heady with a sense of ourselves.”²⁴

Internment

Nearly 6,000 miles away from the bloody combat in the French and Italian countryside, Norman Y. Mineta of California, a future 11-term Member of the House, experienced a far different war.

Mineta grew up in San Jose, California, and had just turned 10 when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941. The same day Inouye and his father ran outside to see black smoke billowing above the naval base in Hawaii, Mineta saw his own immigrant father cry for the first time, unsure of how to process news of the destruction and the uncertain consequences to come.²⁵

Despite the attacks having occurred in Hawaii, the bombings had vast and devastating reverberations on the mainland. Inouye, like many Hawaiians of Japanese descent, lived under strict martial law, but he was allowed to stay in Honolulu, help at the Red Cross, finish high school, and enroll in college. For Mineta and the 120,000 Japanese Americans living in California, Oregon, and Washington State, however, the rhythms of everyday life were quickly disrupted by the federal government.

“I don’t know what’s going to happen to your mother and me,” Mineta remembers his dad telling him and his siblings. “But just remember: All of you are U.S. citizens and this is your home. There is nothing anyone can do to take this away from you.”²⁶




After the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the U.S. government forcibly evacuated Japanese immigrants and their families from their homes. The owner of the Wanto Co. grocery store in Oakland, California, protested the removal by posting this large sign over the closed store that proclaimed “I am an American.”

Image courtesy of the Library of Congress



Residents of Japanese ancestry gather on April 6, 1942, at the Wartime Civil Control Administration in San Francisco. Having left their homes, they piled possessions in the street and waited to be sent to internment camps.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration



President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942. The order led to the detainment of persons of Japanese descent, both foreign-born and American citizens, in internment camps in six western states and Arkansas.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration



Japanese Americans from California and Washington State were sent to War Relocation Authority camps, including Heart Mountain in northern Wyoming. Here, a man walks down one of the camp's roads in 1942 as the mountain rises behind the rows of barracks.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

On February 19, 1942, however, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, which authorized military officials in the western states to forcibly remove Japanese immigrants and their families to temporary holding facilities to protect “against espionage and against sabotage.”²⁷ Mineta, dressed in his Cub Scout uniform, and his family were forced to abandon their home, placed on a train, and sent hundreds of miles south to an assembly area at the Santa Anita racetrack outside Los Angeles. The compound was ringed with barbed wire and bright searchlights and staffed with armed military personnel. Mineta and his family stayed in makeshift barracks at the track while the unluckiest evacuees bunked in the horse stables. After four months, the Minetas were placed on another train and sent to an internment camp in Heart Mountain, Wyoming, in a valley just east of Yellowstone National Park. There they found more barbed wire and more machine guns.²⁸

The policy of internment became the pivotal event in 20th-century Asian-American history. As thousands of American sailors lay dead or injured, federal officials and many other Americans turned the *issei* (first-generation Japanese immigrants) and *nisei* into enemies of the state. While the U.S. military learned to live with Japanese Hawaiians, whose large numbers helped to ensure the smooth running of the islands’ economy, it treated Japanese Americans on the mainland very differently. It suspended Japanese Americans’ civil rights wholesale and forced this smaller population from their homes and livelihoods. Internment set back progress in the Japanese-American community for at least a generation.

Within a day or so after the attacks, the FBI arrested 1,500 Japanese immigrants throughout Hawaii and the western states. Armed with lists of “enemy” aliens that had been compiled by the Office of Naval Intelligence and a host of other groups, the FBI swiftly silenced much of the community’s leadership. When federal officials turned them over to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the *issei* were imprisoned in camps scattered across the northern Midwest. By December 8, 1941, the United States had closed its borders to “all persons of Japanese ancestry, whether citizen or alien,” and frozen the bank accounts of many Japanese Americans. Within two days, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover reported that he had “practically all” suspected enemy aliens in custody.²⁹

The FBI’s efficiency failed to calm the fear rippling across the West Coast and the federal government that Pearl Harbor had been an inside job. “We have thousands of Japanese here,” the *Los Angeles Times* reminded its readers. The West Coast was now “a zone of danger” where “alert, keen-eyed civilians” now had to cope with “spies” and “saboteurs.” The cartoonist Theodor Geisel, known popularly as Dr. Seuss, stoked that fear when he drew hordes of mainland Japanese armed with explosives. A presidential commission to investigate the Japanese attacks reaffirmed the suspicion that Japanese spies living in America helped plan Pearl Harbor.³⁰

In March 1942, FDR issued Executive Order 9102, which created a new agency, the War Relocation Authority (WRA), to carry out the removal.³¹ Within weeks, the U.S. Army’s Western Defense Command (WDC) had instituted curfews throughout the western states and ordered Japanese Americans to abide by the military’s authority.³²

In the spring of 1942, the government sent all Japanese Americans, regardless of citizenship, living on the West Coast to 17 hastily created assembly centers. Evacuees, whom the WRA called the “incarcerated people,” could bring only what they could carry and had little ability to dispose of their other possessions or property. From there they were transported to WRA camps.³³ [Table 2]

FDR’s first choice to run the WRA was Milton S. Eisenhower, the younger brother of future President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Milton had accepted the job reluctantly, writing in April 1942, “I feel most deeply that when the war is over and we consider calmly this unprecedented migration of 120,000 people, we as Americans are going to regret the unavoidable injustices that may have been done.” One western governor cautioned him, “If you bring the Japanese into my state, I promise you they will be hanging from every tree.” Milton Eisenhower resigned two and a half months later.³⁴

The capacities of the WRA camps varied from 7,500 to 18,000 inmates. Built by the Army Corps of Engineers, the housing blocks were laid out in a grid pattern and surrounded by barbed-wire fences and guard towers. Each block contained 14 barracks made of wood and tar paper, 20 feet by 120 feet, divided into “apartments” of varying sizes. Unmarried adults had the smallest rooms. The largest rooms were reserved for families of six or more individuals. The apartments had no running water, no electricity initially, and no kitchen facilities.³⁵ One internee recalled finding “a pot-bellied stove, a single electric light hanging from the ceiling, an Army cot for each person and a blanket for the bed.”³⁶ Other buildings housed a central mess hall, communal bathrooms, school, and medical facilities. The bathrooms, one for each gender, had sinks, showers, and toilets, but lacked any measure of privacy.³⁷

“We did not know where we were,” one internee recalled. “No houses were in sight, no trees or anything green—only scrubby sagebrush and an occasional low cactus, and mostly dry, baked earth.”³⁸

Most adult internees worked for meager government salaries. They raised crops, cleaned the communal areas, cooked, provided clerical assistance, and transported goods. Unskilled laborers took home \$12 per month, skilled



President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Milton S. Eisenhower as the first director of the War Relocation Authority in 1942. Eisenhower, however, did not support the policy of removal and internment and resigned less than three months later.

Image courtesy of the Library of Congress



At the Tanforan temporary detention facility in San Bruno, California, a woman looks out through the doorway of a barracks built specifically to house a family. Photographer Dorothea Lange captured this scene at the War Relocation Authority camp in 1942.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

Table 2: The War Relocation Authority Camps, 1942–1946

Name and Location	Opened	Closed
Poston, in Yuma County, AZ	8 May 1942	28 November 1945
Tule Lake, in Modoc County, CA	27 May 1942	20 March 1946
Manzanar, in Inyo County, CA	1 June 1942	21 November 1945
Gila River, in Pinal County, AZ	20 July 1942	10 November 1945
Minidoka, in Jerome County, ID	10 August 1942	28 October 1945
Heart Mountain, in Park County, WY	12 August 1942	10 November 1945
Granada, in Prowers County, CO	27 August 1942	15 October 1945
Topaz, in Millard County, UT	11 September 1942	31 October 1945
Rohwer, in Desha County, AR	18 September 1942	30 November 1945
Jerome, in Drew & Chicot Counties, AR	6 October 1942	30 June 1944

U.S. Army, Western Defense Command, *Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast 1942* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1943): 256; Brian Niiya, ed., *Encyclopedia of Japanese American History* (New York: Checkmark Books, 2001): 174–175, 179, 190, 231–232, 266–267, 276, 337, 350–351, 390, 394–395.



Internees of Tule Lake camp in California plant celery. War Relocation Authority internees raised crops, cleaned, and performed other tasks for small salaries.

Image courtesy of the Library of Congress



Internees wait outside the Japanese American Citizens League in Centerville, California, before boarding buses headed to the Tanforan Assembly Center on May 9, 1942.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

Kibei:

A Japanese term that identifies nisei children who were born in the United States, educated in Japan, and returned to the United States.

workers earned \$16, and professionals made \$19. The Works Progress Administration also arranged for internees to work outside the camps. In the beginning, inmates helped during local harvests for a day or two. Later, the government authorized longer furloughs in midwestern cities to free up labor for defense work. Other Japanese Americans had indefinite leave to set up permanent resettlements outside the defense area as long as the internee could support him- or herself and reported any changes in address.³⁹

On the whole, however, the demand on their time in the camps was light. Handicrafts helped pass the time. Internees built furniture out of spare lumber and set up bonsai gardens outside their apartments. The National Japanese American Student Relocation Council helped college-aged internees enroll in certain midwestern colleges and universities. In other cases, institutions of higher education simply barred the *nisei*.⁴⁰

Parents and elders tried to create as normal an atmosphere as possible for young internees. “In camp we started getting organized because we knew we’d be there for a long time,” Mineta later remembered. “There were schools, theaters with candy counters; movies were a dime. So the life was probably typical of what it might have been in any community anywhere, except you had barbed wire, armed guards, the sentries and the search lights.”⁴¹

Such conditions eventually bred generational and cultural transformations. Before the camps, male *issei* heads of family held a significant amount of power. In the camps that status eroded. The Justice Department housed many of the patriarchs in separate facilities, forcing some out of communal activities because of their age or language abilities. Others suffered from depression. As a result, women and children performed much of the labor. They sat on organizations that communicated with the administrators and went out beyond the camps on work-release programs. The WRA banned Japanese-language instruction and outlawed Shinto ceremonies while the camp schools, taught by white teachers, stressed American patriotism. Rather than eating as a family unit, children and teenagers sat with their peer groups in the mess halls. Indeed, most social activities, from movies to sports, separated the young from their elders.⁴²

Life in the camps and the stresses of being wrenched away from home also revealed divisions among the internees. Each camp had two extremes. Among the *issei*, who never had the chance to become U.S. citizens, pride in Japan and its culture remained strong. The *kibei*, their U.S.-born children who had been educated in Japan and had come back to the States, shared their parents’ resentment that internment destroyed what they had built in America. At the other extreme were the hyperpatriotic *nisei* who belonged to the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL). They had cooperated with federal authorities before the war, identifying people in the Japanese-American community they saw as dangerous. The JACL claimed to speak for all *nisei* and saw relocation as an opportunity to prove their loyalty by cooperating with the program. The League opposed legal efforts to challenge internment and tried to stifle dissent or resistance within the camps.⁴³

When the War Department began organizing the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, the WRA tried to identify inmates who would be willing to fight for the same government that imprisoned their families. But in order

to qualify for military service, the *nisei* had to prove their loyalty by answering a lengthy questionnaire.⁴⁴

The loyalty survey took questions from the normal draft registration, but, for Japanese immigrants who had been prevented by law from ever becoming U.S. citizens, the survey came as another insult. One question in particular, question 28, asked respondents if they maintained allegiance to the Japanese emperor. For noncitizens, the loyalty questionnaire essentially asked them to become stateless, not Japanese, but not fully American either.⁴⁵

Much of the Japanese-American community had gone to the camps reluctantly, but quietly. For some, it was a way to assist the war effort and prove their loyalty. But over time, opposition within the camps took several forms. Internees criticized the loyalty survey and protested conditions in the camps. Some incidents turned violent. Eventually, the internees challenged the very legality of internment. Perhaps predictably, relatively few of them volunteered for military service. Unlike the high volunteer rates of Japanese Hawaiians who were not subject to imprisonment, by early 1944, only 1,200 mainland *nisei* had signed up.⁴⁶

The WRA, under its wartime head Dillon Myer, struggled with meager resources to make the camps tolerable. The more enlightened administrations, such as the one running the Minidoka camp, worked with the internees to improve living conditions. Other camp officials saw their responsibilities as protecting the country from potential danger. Unsurprisingly, where camps treated inmates with contempt, resistance to internment grew. At Wyoming's Heart Mountain camp, inmates formed the Fair Play Committee and refused to participate in the draft until the government recognized *nisei* citizenship. Most were tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison until President Harry S. Truman issued a mass pardon for *nisei* draft objectors in December 1947. Though Heart Mountain was located far outside the military evacuation zone, camp administrators clamped down on dissent, going so far as to ask the U.S. Office of Alien Property Custodian to shut down the *Rocky Shimpo*, a Japanese-American newspaper published by a small *nisei* community in Denver, Colorado, hundreds of miles away.⁴⁷

Violent outbreaks recurred at a handful of camps. In December 1942, at the Manzanar War Relocation Center, two internees were killed and another 10 were wounded when military police fired tear gas and live ammunition into a crowd of internees who had gathered to protest conditions in the camp. Administrators deported protest leaders to a Justice Department facility and moved 65 internees to another camp as the army tightened security. In April 1943, at the Topaz War Relocation Center, an elderly internee, James Hatsuki Wakasa, was shot to death by a watchtower sentry who claimed that Wakasa had tried to crawl through the fence. Though an initial army inquiry indicated a cover-up (Wakasa had been shot in the chest), a court-martial acquitted the sentry of murder. Later that year, at the Tule Lake Segregation Center, the army declared martial law after internees protested deadly working conditions and the WRA's decision to pay outside farm laborers higher wages than internees. Inmates went on a brief hunger strike as 300 other prisoners were sent to a separate Justice Department facility. The protest slowly dwindled away.⁴⁸



A member of the Nishi family sits in a barracks, furnished with scrap materials and items purchased by mail order, at Minidoka Camp in Idaho in 1942. Minidoka Camp administration officials worked with internees to improve living conditions.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration



A *nisei* community in Denver, Colorado, began publishing the *Rocky Shimpo* newspaper during World War II. Hundreds of miles away, administrators of the Heart Mountain relocation camp asked the U.S. Office of Alien Property Custodian to shut down the newspaper in a bid to silence dissent.

Image courtesy of the Library of Congress

Gordon Hirabayashi's draft card lists his name, address, birthplace, and other personal details. "I am a conscientious objector," Hirabayashi wrote neatly in blue ink in the left margin.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration


I am a conscientious objector

SERIAL NUMBER 3936	1. NAME (Print) Gordon Kiyashi Hirabayashi		ORDER NUMBER 265
2. ADDRESS (Print) 1417-East 42nd Seattle King Wash.			
3. TELEPHONE Milrose 0909	4. AGE IN YEARS 22	5. PLACE OF BIRTH Seattle Wash.	6. COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP U.S.A.
7. NAME OF PERSON WHO WILL ALWAYS KNOW YOUR ADDRESS Mrs. Shinzago Hirabayashi Mother			
8. ADDRESS OF THAT PERSON R.F.D. #2 Box 126 Auburn King Wash.			
9. EMPLOYER'S NAME Student			
10. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR BUSINESS University Washington			
I AFFIRM THAT I HAVE VERIFIED ABOVE ANSWERS AND THAT THEY ARE TRUE.			
REGISTRATION CARD D. S. S. FORM 1		Gordon K. Hirabayashi	

Because many of the internees were American citizens, legal challenges to internment soon appeared before federal judges, and four cases made it to the U.S. Supreme Court.⁴⁹ The Supreme Court decided the first two cases, *Hirabayashi v. United States* and *Yasui v. United States*, in June 1943 (Gordon Hirabayashi of Seattle, Washington, and Minoru Yasui of Portland, Oregon, had separately challenged the WDC curfew). But the Justices unanimously sided with the government and stated that the curfew order fell within the “power to wage war successfully,” even if that meant singling out a group of people because of their ancestry.⁵⁰ One Justice initially dissented and compared the experience of Japanese Americans to Jews in Europe under Nazi Germany, but his opinion was later edited to support the court’s consensus that the internment program went “to the very brink” of constitutional authority.⁵¹

The Supreme Court also ruled on additional cases in late 1944, long after the perceived threat of a Japanese military invasion had passed. In *Korematsu v. United States*, Fred Korematsu of San Francisco challenged the constitutionality of the exclusion and detention orders. Writing the *Korematsu* opinion for the Court (the final tally was a 6 to 3 majority), Justice Hugo Black argued that, because it was impossible to distinguish between loyal and disloyal Japanese Americans, the military had cause to imprison “all citizens of Japanese ancestry.” As before, “military urgency” outweighed questions of race and ethnicity in his reasoning. Justices Owen Roberts, Frank Murphy, and Robert Jackson forcefully dissented. Murphy, who questioned the lack of due process, also sneered at the military’s professed urgency and noted it took months to implement the full policy. The entire exclusion program, he argued, was a “legalization of racism.” For Justice Jackson, *Korematsu* set a risky precedent and validated “the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens.”⁵²

In *Ex parte Endo*, also decided in December 1944, Mitsuye Endo of Sacramento, California, a *nisei*, applied for a writ of habeas corpus from detention at Tule Lake. In this instance, a unanimous court granted Endo her



The Western Defense Command posted exclusion orders at First and Front Streets in San Francisco to notify passersby about the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry. “All Japanese persons, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated ... by 12:00 o’clock noon Tuesday, April 7, 1942.”

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

freedom. Justices Roberts and Murphy found the court's majority opinion too facile, and each filed a concurrence denying the constitutionality of internment. "For the Government to suggest under these circumstances," Murphy concluded, "that the presence of Japanese blood in a loyal American citizen might be enough to warrant her exclusion from a place where she would otherwise have a right to go is a position I cannot sanction."⁵³

By the fall of 1944, the Roosevelt administration and the WRA had begun phasing out the camp system and freeing prisoners it deemed "loyal," that is, those who had answered affirmatively to the loyalty questionnaire. When America declared victory over Japan in August 1945, however, the camps still held 44,000 detainees.⁵⁴

The War's Mixed Legacy

Although the war seemed to disproportionately affect Japanese immigrants and their American-born children, it had equally far-reaching effects on other Asian and Pacific Islander Americans. As it did for women and African Americans, the war encouraged Asian immigrants of many nationalities to fill new roles, all the while gaining the moral authority to challenge discrimination on the home front.

But the war's effects were far from uniformly positive. It was a mixed legacy that shaped personal lives and political aspirations for decades. It affected each Asian community in different and unique ways.

Japan's surprise attacks on the United States at Pearl Harbor, for instance, swiftly transformed China and India into U.S. allies, and the domestic atmosphere for immigrants from these countries improved. For Pacific Islanders who initially lived under American protection in the Philippines and Guam, however, the war brought years of brutal Japanese occupation with bloody and devastating consequences. Though no voting APA Representatives served in Congress at the time (nor would they for more than a decade after the war), these upheavals shaped the experiences of the group of APAs who came to Congress in the post-war decades.

IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES


For much of the 1930s, Americans had taken on an increasingly positive view of China. Henry Luce's *Time* and *Life* magazines published full-page charts to "educate" Americans on how to distinguish Chinese friends from "Jap" enemies. And in 1942, a Gallup poll listed the Chinese as "hardworking, honest, brave, religious, intelligent, and practical" and the Japanese as "treacherous, sly, cruel, and warlike."⁵⁵ The gradual shift away from the 19th century's virulent anti-Chinese policies quickened after Pearl Harbor, as lawmakers redirected their efforts toward Japan. "All at once we discovered the saintly qualities of the Chinese people," said Missouri Representative William Elmer in 1943. "If it had not been for December 7th, I do not know if we would have ever found out how good they were."⁵⁶

The armed forces and defense industries began hiring Chinese Americans, and young Chinese men eagerly volunteered or participated in the military draft. Meanwhile, the number of Chinese Americans in professional and technical jobs



World War II left a mixed legacy for Asian Pacific Americans. As anti-Japanese sentiment rose, this Filipino grocer used his ethnic heritage as an advertisement for his business in San Lorenzo, California, in 1942. The Philippines was a U.S. territory at the time.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration



In 1943 Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act to buttress America's wartime alliance with China. But long-standing quotas still kept Asian immigration at a minimum for another two decades.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

increased threefold between 1940 and 1950, with a concentration on engineers and technicians. Chinese-American women, like many women in the United States during the war, also experienced booming rates of employment.⁵⁷

In 1943 nine bills were introduced in Congress to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Act, which was first passed in 1882. FDR urged legislators to overturn the ban to further the war effort. The repeal law erased all six versions of the exclusionary acts and brought Chinese immigration under the quota system in a largely symbolic gesture (China's annual quota was only about 100 people). Importantly, it also opened up the naturalization process to Chinese Americans who were not native-born.⁵⁸

Legislation that granted asylum to war refugees and that also incrementally overturned long-standing immigration policies had a profound impact on APAs. Until the 1990s, only a handful of Asian and Pacific Americans served in Congress, far too few to drive the country's legislative agenda, which more often responded to the exigencies of the Cold War and America's decades-long rivalry with the Soviet Union. But changes culminating in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 had far-reaching consequences for a variety of Asian communities in America as well as the diversity of Asian-American representation in Congress.

Starting in the 1940s, the Cold War began influencing immigration legislation in ways large and small. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948, for instance, started as an effort to assist European war refugees and quickly turned into a way to help Chinese immigrants who became stuck in America after China's communist revolution in 1949. With President Harry S. Truman's State Department taking the lead, federal officials stretched the application of the law and allowed Chinese immigrants to remain in the country rather than face persecution if they were required to return home.⁵⁹

As the anxieties of the Cold War began dictating foreign policy, U.S. politicians saw an opportunity to combat communism abroad by passing more welcoming immigration policies at home. The sterling war record of *nisei* soldiers had helped erase fears about their loyalty and that of their parents. And during the 81st Congress (1949–1951), Minnesota Representative Walter Judd introduced a bill incorporating Asian immigrants into the national origins quota system and opening naturalized citizenship opportunities to all permanent Asian residents in the United States.⁶⁰ Judd's measure would also have created something called the Asia-Pacific Triangle, an area of the globe from which immigration to the United States would, with few exceptions, be limited to 100 annual visas per country. It also prohibited Asian immigrants from entering the United States via other Western Hemisphere nations.⁶¹

A version of Judd's bill eventually passed both the House and Senate, but the conference committee added a clause aimed at likely communist sympathizers and those who belonged to or would later join subversive organizations. Because of that change, President Truman vetoed the bill and called the new section "vague and ill-defined."⁶²

Dismayed by the triumph of the communist regime in China, Congress acted in the early 1950s to do more than simply slip Asian refugees into legislative solutions intended for Europeans. In 1953 Congress for the first time passed

legislation that included a section explicitly providing for Asian expatriates. The Refugee Relief Act was an umbrella bill that circumvented the national origins quota system and provided entry for more than 200,000 refugees who had been displaced by communist insurgencies around the world. Representative Judd, who had served as a medical missionary in China, took the lead in adding visa provisions for Chinese refugees and for people of Asian descent. Subsequent amendments increased the number of Chinese visas and expanded the program to Africa and the Middle East.⁶³

At the height of America's communist paranoia in the 1950s, legislative efforts to thwart suspected communist sleeper cells cast unsettling domestic shadows for Asian Americans, especially as Congress considered the Internal Security Act of 1950. Led by the Senate Judiciary Committee and the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and sparked in large part by America's war with communists in North Korea, Congress severely circumscribed the movement of suspected communists living in the United States. In a flashback to 1941, Congress built part of the 1950 Internal Security Act on the framework of Japanese-American internment, which empowered the federal government to detain communists in emergency situations.⁶⁴

Later in the decade, Chinese immigrants again were caught up in Cold War concerns. Throughout much of the 1950s, the FBI considered Chinese immigrants a major security threat primarily because it feared they were using forged immigration documents purchased on the black market in Communist China. In an effort to identify communist agents among Chinese immigrants, the INS initiated a confession program in which any Chinese immigrant entering the United States with fraudulent papers could still apply for a visa so long as they were related to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident. In return, the immigrant would have to identify everyone who had helped him or her enter the country illegally. Unsurprisingly, the program produced few confessions.⁶⁵

The procedure, however, showed enough promise that the Immigration Act Amendments of 1957 codified the confession program into law. When he signed the legislation, President Eisenhower, who had urged Congress to show leniency to immigrants who had lied in order to escape the Iron Curtain, admitted ruefully that the bill could have been much better.⁶⁶ The confession program largely escaped controversy during its rapid passage, but few Chinese Americans ever participated.⁶⁷

Over the next decade, the refugee crisis continued unabated and, by 1960, had become one of the United Nations' signature issues. Congress, for the most part, kept its attention on the situation in Europe. During debate over the Fair Share refugee bill, for instance, Hawaii Senator Hiram L. Fong introduced an amendment that added visas for 4,500 Chinese refugees, which, he said, would hopefully overturn the common misconception that Asians were "not as good as the people of Europe." Although the Senate added the amendment, the House deleted it from the final version.⁶⁸

Direct legislative solutions were not the only option for Asian asylum seekers. At the time, the U.S. Attorney General's parole power enabled him to temporarily open America's borders in emergency situations. Congress could then pass legislation to allow these refugees to apply for permanent residency



Hiram L. Fong was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1959 following the admission of Hawaii as a state.

Image courtesy of the U.S. Senate Historical Office

status. In 1962, for instance, President John F. Kennedy (JFK) used his parole authority to admit 15,000 Chinese refugees who had settled in temporary camps in Hong Kong.⁶⁹

During World War II, many U.S. soldiers and sailors serving overseas married locals and fathered children, but America's stringent immigration laws prevented most from bringing their new families home after the war. To deal with these wartime complications, Congress passed a series of laws allowing foreign spouses and children of armed services personnel to enter the United States under a nonquota basis. The War Brides Act in 1945, officially known as the Alien Spouses of Members of the Armed Forces Act, applied only to the spouses of white and black soldiers. Less than a year later Congress passed legislation allowing the fiancées of U.S. personnel to bypass the quota system. Chinese war brides, many of whom had married U.S. soldiers of Chinese descent, won this right soon after.⁷⁰ The number of Asian war brides, in part, helped to break down some of the general hostility toward Asian immigration.⁷¹

Overturning Exclusion, Limiting Immigration

The war had far-reaching consequences for other Asian communities that wanted access to America's naturalization process as well. When Dalip Saund first came to the United States from northern India in 1919, he had planned to stay for only a few years, pursue his education, and return home. The immigration official at Ellis Island who stamped his passport shook his hand and told him, "You are now a free man in a free country," but that turned out to be only partly true. Saund moved to California, where anti-Asian policies had created an entire community of second-class citizens. At the University of California, Saund, who later revealed that he had been "cruelly discriminated against many a time because of the place of my birth," socialized only with other Indian immigrants. "Prejudice against Asiatic people in California was very intense in the early twenties and I felt keen discrimination in many ways. Outside of the university atmosphere," he wrote in his memoirs, "it was made quite evident that people from Asia—Japanese, Chinese, and Hindus—were not wanted."⁷² Among other policies, the state's alien land laws prevented Saund and other Asian immigrants, including Norman Mineta's parents, from owning land. When Saund moved to Southern California to begin farming, a friend of Saund's in Los Angeles put the leases in his own name to circumvent the land laws.⁷³

By midcentury, Saund had carved out what he considered to be a good life in the States. "I was making America my home," he later wrote. He "had married an American girl," and together they had three children. He had a successful farming business and had an active social life. But he could not escape the reality that state and federal laws excluded him from political engagement. "I was dedicated to what is called the American way of life and yet when I looked in front of me I saw that the bars of citizenship were shut tight against me."⁷⁴

In response, Saund helped create the India Association of America in the early 1940s, a group that worked toward winning naturalization rights and, in effect, overturning the alien land laws. The association raised both money and awareness, and it was not long before he received help from national lawmakers.⁷⁵ Both Presidents FDR and Truman had recommended extending



Dalip Singh (Judge) Saund came to the United States from India in 1919. Spurred to political engagement by anti-Asian discrimination, he became the first voting Member of Asian descent in the United States Congress in 1957.

Image courtesy of the Library of Congress

Asian Indians the opportunity to become naturalized citizens and including them in the national origins quota system. To that end, Representative Emanuel Celler of New York introduced H.R. 3517 on June 20, 1945. Coming just weeks after V-E Day, it garnered widespread bipartisan support as a way to counter Japan's anti-American propaganda.⁷⁶ The Senate later added a clause granting immigration and naturalization rights to people from the Philippines, which was about to gain its independence from the United States. The bill became law on July 2, 1946.⁷⁷

Saund became a U.S. citizen on December 16, 1949. A little more than seven years later, he took the oath of office as the first full-fledged voting Member of Asian descent in the history of the U.S. Congress.

It was around midcentury that public opinion on alien land laws also started to shift, and it was not long before the federal courts began reversing their earlier decisions. On April 17, 1952, in *Sei Fujii v. California*, the California supreme court declared the land laws unconstitutional and added that they violated the United Nations Charter. California voters finally erased the policy in a public referendum in November 1956. Washington State removed the last alien land law on the West Coast 10 years later.⁷⁸

By the early 1950s, attitudes toward the Japanese had also undergone a sweeping transformation. Communist regimes in North Korea and China quickly replaced the conquered Japanese as the main U.S. adversary in the Pacific. Instead, U.S.-occupied Japan became a significant ally in the Cold War and an important forward position for U.S. Armed Forces. Under these circumstances, the last vestige of Asian exclusion in U.S. immigration law finally fell: the inability of the *issei* to become naturalized citizens.

When the 82nd Congress (1951–1953) began in January 1951, the two chairmen of Congress's immigration subcommittees laid out a comprehensive overhaul. Pennsylvania Representative Francis E. Walter and Nevada Senator Patrick (Pat) McCarran, both of whom were fervent anti-communists and isolationists, drafted H.R. 5678, an omnibus immigration bill that built on the Immigration Act of 1924. Hoping to make immigration law a part of the country's Cold War arsenal, they added new features to more easily exclude and deport immigrants they considered to be subversive.⁷⁹

Building on Walter Judd's 1949 immigration bill, Senator McCarran embedded the Asia-Pacific Triangle provision into the new bill. The triangle clause set a limit of 100 visas per country, but enabled all Asian immigrants to apply for naturalization. Judd's triangle provision became something of a sideshow to the larger congressional debate on how best to fight communism. But, crucially, the JACL, the major *nisei* civic association in the country, backed the citizenship provision. Their lobbyists in Washington, Etsu and Mike Masaoka, made their way through the congressional office buildings and argued that McCarran–Walter would honor the parents of those *nisei* soldiers who fought and died for the country in Europe.⁸⁰

Although the bill opened up citizenship to thousands of Japanese immigrants, the final version's limited quotas and anti-communism provisions troubled President Truman, who vetoed it on June 25, 1952. The next day, however, the House overrode the veto, 278 to 112. The Senate followed suit on June 27, 57 to 26, and enacted the McCarran–Walter Immigration and Nationality Act into law.⁸¹



Senator Patrick McCarran of Nevada was a fervent isolationist, and the namesake of the McCarran–Walter Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which excluded and deported immigrants deemed subversive.

Image courtesy of the Library of Congress



Representative Daniel K. Inouye of Hawaii meets with President John F. Kennedy in the Oval Office on April 10, 1962. Inouye lost his right arm during his World War II service with the 442nd Regimental Combat Team.

Photograph by Robert Knudsen; image courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library/National Archives and Records Administration

In 1965 Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act, making it simpler for immigrants to come to America. The law encouraged Asian immigration and eliminated national quotas. In the years that followed, immigrants from China, India, Japan, and the Philippines reshaped America's demographics.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

Since 1965

McCarran–Walter failed as a comprehensive solution to U.S. immigration policy largely because of its reliance on the controversial national origins quota system developed in the 1920s.⁸²

Moreover, international conflicts and changing foreign policies also continued to influence the flow of people from abroad. America's failure to contain communist expansion in Southeast Asia created a tide of political refugees that the United States felt obligated to protect, many of whom had been U.S. allies in the defense of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Moreover, the thaw in U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China during the 1970s encouraged more open and welcoming policies.

In 1965 Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act, also known as the Hart–Celler Act, making it simpler for immigrants to come to America. It unleashed a host of unintended consequences—chief among them, it opened the doors to large migrations from Asian nations. As such, it serves as a watershed moment in this story.

In the summer of 1963, President Kennedy proposed legislation to phase out the national origins quota system, eliminate the Asia-Pacific Triangle, and institute new entry criteria based on an immigrant's career path and family status. He sent these recommendations to Congress along with requests for the creation of a new advisory immigration board and emergency refugee authority.⁸³ In the aftermath of JFK's assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) renewed the campaign for immigration reform.⁸⁴

As Congress took up reform in 1964, both the House and Senate immigration subcommittees heard testimony against the quotas. Secretary of

Eighty-ninth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday, the fourth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five

An Act

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 201 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (66 Stat. 175; 8 U.S.C. 1151) be amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 201. (a) Exclusive of special immigrants defined in section 101(a) (27), and of the immediate relatives of United States citizens specified in subsection (b) of this section, the number of aliens who may be issued immigrant visas or who may otherwise acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence, or who may, pursuant to section 203(a) (7) enter conditionally, (i) shall not in any of the first three quarters of any fiscal year exceed a total of 45,000 and (ii) shall not in any fiscal year exceed a total of 170,000.

"(b) The 'immediate relatives' referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall mean the children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States: *Provided*, That in the case of parents, such citizen must be at least twenty-one years of age. The immediate relatives specified in this subsection who are otherwise qualified for admission as immigrants shall be admitted as such, without regard to the numerical limitations in this Act.

"(c) During the period from July 1, 1965, through June 30, 1968,



President Lyndon B. Johnson signs the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 on Liberty Island in New York City. The witnesses at the signing include Senator Daniel K. Inouye of Hawaii.

Photograph by Yoichi Okamoto; image courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library/National Archives and Records Administration

State Dean Rusk observed that the quota system discriminated against whole groups of people and provided communist countries with a weapon in Cold War propaganda. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy called the immigration process “a standing affront.” “Everywhere else in our national life, we have eliminated discrimination based on national origins,” he said. “Yet, this system is still the foundation of our immigration law.”⁸⁵

Policy experts did not forecast a huge rise in immigration if national origins quotas were eliminated: 94,000 Asian immigrants could be expected during the first five years (19,000 per year). At that rate, Asian emigration would trend slightly higher than emigration from Europe. The Attorney General expected another 5,000 total would come after removing the Asia-Pacific Triangle.⁸⁶

The bill stalled in the House that year, but LBJ’s sweeping victory in the 1964 presidential elections created large Democratic majorities on Capitol Hill and set the stage for another attempt at immigration reform in the 89th Congress (1965–1967). The President urged Congress to scrap the national origins quota system and called it “incompatible with our basic American tradition.” Instead, reform proponents sought to replace it with a system that attracted skilled immigrants and those with family already in the States. The same day Johnson submitted his message, companion immigration bills were introduced in the House by Judiciary Chairman Celler and in the Senate by Philip Hart of Michigan.⁸⁷

After the Judiciary Committee cleared Celler’s bill, the House spent very little time debating the possible impact on APA immigration. But just before the House voted on the bill, Celler addressed the issue. “With the end of discrimination due to place of birth, there will be shifts in countries other than those of northern and western Europe,” the chairman observed. “Immigrants from Asia and Africa will have to compete and qualify in order to get in, quantitatively and qualitatively, which, itself will hold the numbers down.” Celler predicted that immigration from Asia would remain low because few

people would be able to take advantage of the provision allowing families to reunify in the States.⁸⁸ The measure passed, 318 to 25.⁸⁹

The bill's path through the Senate followed a similar course. Despite some lobbying resistance from the JACL, which argued that the decision to prioritize family relations would limit Asian immigration, the Senate passed it in September 1964.⁹⁰ Once again the general debate paid little attention to possible consequences other than generalized fears that America was "throwing the doors open and equally inviting people from the Orient, from the islands of the Pacific, from the subcontinent of Asia, from the Near East, from all of Africa, all of Europe, and all of the Western Hemisphere on exactly the same basis," according to Democrat Spessard Holland of Florida.⁹¹

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 eliminated the national origins quota system, set a ceiling of 290,000 annual visas (120,000 from the Western Hemisphere; 170,000 from the Eastern Hemisphere), and limited yearly emigration from any one country to 20,000. Crucially, it lifted the cap on entries for family reunification. In celebration, Johnson held the signing ceremony outdoors on October 3, 1965, at the foot of the Statue of Liberty.⁹²

The Hart–Celler immigration bill quickly became a classic case of unanticipated consequences. Much of the debate had been over allowing more southern and eastern Europeans into the country and over the first entrance caps placed on emigration from the Western Hemisphere. Not even the JACL predicted the large impact the law's changes would have in encouraging Asian immigration.

Total immigration grew to more than 450,000 annual entries, with only one in five coming from Europe. Much of the increase in Asian migration to the United States came through the family reunification clause, leading some Chinese Americans to call Hart–Celler the "Brothers and Sisters Act." Ultimately, immigration officials simply miscalculated how few people it took to create an extensive network of relatives.⁹³ The bill's provision opening visas for skilled and professional workers also drove a substantial part of the new immigration.⁹⁴ Although the new law affected each community in America differently, the rising immigration rates from China, India, Japan, and the Philippines, in particular, helped reshape America's social landscape.

EXPANDING REPRESENTATION: PACIFIC TERRITORIES

Efforts to define the relationship between the United States and its overseas territories that had occupied so much of the story before World War II continued after the conflict, though on a new trajectory. In 1946 the United States followed through on a decades-long promise to give the Philippines complete independence. Hawaii, due in part to its Delegates' strong campaigns for statehood, was little more than a decade away from incorporation into the Union as the 50th state in 1959.

But territorial questions spread beyond these longtime bulwarks of America's presence in the Pacific. In fact, America's Pacific empire at the opening of the 20th century also included the 210-square-mile island of Guam and the multiple islands that make up American Samoa. Placed under American military control, both Guam and American Samoa were vital fueling stations in strategic Pacific locations.

After the United Nations issued a decolonization mandate in 1945, the United States gradually handed over the island governments to the people. In 1947 the Truman administration approved the trusteeship agreement for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands that required the United States to “make ample provision for the political, economic, social, and educational development” of certain Pacific territories (Northern Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands) after the war. Nearly a year later, Congress established the Joint Committee on the Trust Territories of the Pacific to oversee the mandate.⁹⁵


Yet, like much of American policy toward the territories, self-determination came piecemeal. The U.S. military maintained a strategic interest in Guam throughout the Cold War, and Guamanians became U.S. citizens in 1950. American Samoa, on the other hand, lost much of its importance as a refueling station as technology improved the range of America’s warships. Samoans were also wary of U.S. citizenship and fiercely protected their cultural and political systems.

Regardless of their differences, for Pacific Islanders living under the U.S. flag, gaining access to America’s lawmaking process proved to be especially difficult.

American Samoa and Guam to World War II

The United States’ relationship with Samoa began out of military necessity. In 1872 the United States cut a deal to build a coaling station at Pago Pago, a vital deepwater harbor, in return for helping Samoa negotiate international disputes. Following the U.S. victory in the Spanish-American War, the Convention of 1900 permanently divided Samoa between Germany and the United States.⁹⁶ Guam, which had been captured by the USS *Charleston* during the war, fell within America’s jurisdiction.

Congress placed Guam and American Samoa under the control of a rotating cast of U.S. military officers, but the experiences of the two territories differed substantially. In 1900 and again in 1904, American Samoa’s political leaders—



This Promulgation of Laws Regulation from 1900 details the issuance of laws and ordinances governing the islands of Tutuila and Manu’a in American Samoa. Following the U.S. victory in the Spanish-American War, the Convention of 1900 permanently divided Samoa between Germany and the United States, and the U.S. Navy was responsible for the administration of American Samoa until 1951.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration



As governor of Guam, U.S. Navy Captain Roy Smith formed the Guam congress in 1917.

Image courtesy of the Library of Congress



U.S. Naval and Marine Corps officers salute as the U.S. flag is raised during the liberation of Guam in 1944.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

the heads of extended families in Samoan society—agreed to turn over the islands to the United States in the “Instrument of Cession.” Their agreement both legitimized American annexation and solidified the *matais* (familial chiefs) as the primary source of local power.⁹⁷

In Guam, on the other hand, island leaders frequently depended on the individual governors to cede local control. In 1917 the governor of Guam, U.S. Navy Captain Roy Smith, formed the Guam congress, an advisory body of Chamorros (Guamanian natives) and statesiders appointed entirely by Smith. Fourteen years later, the then governor, U.S. Navy Captain Willis Bradley, created the second Guam congress, an elected, bicameral legislative body with the same advisory mandate.⁹⁸

On the mainland, however, there was little federal impulse in either the U.S. Navy or the State Department to provide self-determination for either territory.⁹⁹

Post–World War II Guam

In December 1941, Japanese forces invaded Guam, beginning a brutal, three-year occupation. Chamorros were often beaten or executed for small offenses.¹⁰⁰ Delegate Ben Garrido Blaz, who worked in the island’s labor camps during the war, recalled having friends simply disappear while he suffered from “the hunger and deprivation of concentration camps.”¹⁰¹ American forces recaptured the island in the summer of 1944, but the effects lingered for the next 50 years. Antonio Borja Won Pat, Guam’s first Delegate to Congress, said his experience during World War II largely shaped his congressional career. He said his strong stance as a defense hawk on the House Armed Services Committee came from his “first-hand [experience with] the enslaving hands of a military conqueror.”¹⁰²

In large part, the end of the conflict changed U.S. attitudes toward the islands. Guam, for instance, remained under naval rule, but the Navy granted the territorial government “interim” legislative powers in 1947. Won Pat, then the president of the local chamber of commerce, applauded the decision, but told the *Chicago Tribune* in November 1946 that Guam needed “a self-supporting economy before it can be ready for American citizenship.”¹⁰³

The war also significantly changed the island. The U.S. military occupied two-thirds of Guam’s land, and the island’s white population had increased 420 percent during the 1940s. Though still a minority, whites filled nearly half the high-paying jobs, which set up a clash between Guamanians and federal administrators.¹⁰⁴ By 1949, Won Pat had effectively changed his mind about naval control when, as speaker of the territorial assembly, he led a walkout protesting an ongoing power struggle with the then governor, Rear Admiral Charles Pownall.¹⁰⁵

In September 1949, President Truman transferred control over Guam from the U.S. Navy to the Department of the Interior, and a few months later, on February 19, 1950, Congressman James Peterson of Florida introduced H.R. 7273 that provided for the Guam Organic Act. The bill moved smoothly through Congress and passed with little debate before Truman signed it into law in August. The legislation granted Guamanians citizenship and established a unicameral legislature and an independent judiciary. The governor, appointed by the Interior Department, was given veto power. Guamanians paid federal

income taxes, but the territorial government retained the funds to use at home. In 1968 Guam began directly electing its own governor and lieutenant governor.¹⁰⁶

Post-war American Samoa and Self-Determination

Unlike Guam, American Samoa stayed under U.S. control for the duration of the Second World War. On June 29, 1951, the Truman administration transferred American Samoa from the U.S. Navy to the Department of the Interior via Executive Order 10264. Though Congress considered conferring citizenship on American Samoans as early as 1933, there was no immediate push for an organic act like that in Guam.¹⁰⁷

Samoans were protective of their family- and community-based political system and wary of America's involvement. "We're very tribal about our ways," Delegate Eni F. H. Faleomavaega once put it rather succinctly. To date, American Samoans are not U.S. citizens. They are the only people still designated U.S. nationals, a status defined by the Nationality Act of 1940 as those who are not citizens under the U.S. Constitution, but who "owe permanent allegiance to the United States." "I guess our forefathers were very hesitant about getting citizenship, for fear that their lands or their culture will be taken away once they become U.S. citizens," Faleomavaega conjectured.¹⁰⁸

In 1954, at the behest of the Interior Department, federal officials and island leaders organized a constitutional committee to outline a new civil government in American Samoa. They unveiled a draft constitution six years later, and 68 delegates selected by village and district councils approved the document unanimously.¹⁰⁹

The Samoan constitution essentially codified the existing political structure: a governor who held full veto power appointed by the Interior Department and a bicameral *fono* (territorial congress). One chamber was made up of the traditional *matais*. Elected representatives from geographical districts comprised the other chamber.¹¹⁰ Later revisions in 1969 limited the governor's power and expanded the number of *matais* in the *fono*. Samoans began electing their governor and lieutenant governor in 1977.¹¹¹

Congressional Representation

Guam began requesting nonvoting representation in the U.S. Congress as early as 1954, but after 14 years of inaction on the Hill, the territorial legislature created an office to lobby Congress on its behalf. It was an elected position first held by Won Pat, but since it wasn't federally sponsored, it functioned more like a private lobbying firm than a legislative office.¹¹²

On June 1, 1971, Phillip Burton of California, who served on the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, introduced H.R. 8787, which provided for Delegates to Congress representing Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The bill, he said, kept "with the modern trend of democratic governments" in the territories. He believed the needs of the two territories went beyond the jurisdiction of his single committee and with Delegates of their own the territories would have a direct line to Congress. Following a brief debate, the bill granted the new Delegates floor and committee privileges on par with those of the statutory representatives from the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.¹¹³



President Harry S. Truman signs the Guam Organic Act of 1950. From left to right: Wyoming Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney, Carlos Taitano, Harold Seidman, Francis Matthews, New Mexico Senator Clinton P. Anderson, Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman, and Nebraska Senator Hugh Butler.

Image courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Library/
National Archives and Records Administration



U.S. Navy scouting pilots discuss plans for patrol flights in the South Pacific during the early 1940s.

Image courtesy of the National Archives
and Records Administration

Patsy Takemoto Mink of Hawaii (seated first from right in the second row) and Phillip Burton of California (seated fourth from right in the second row) served on the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Pictured here with committee staff, Burton introduced legislation to grant Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands Delegates in the U.S. Congress.

Collection of the U.S. House of Representatives



The Senate passed the bill without amendment by voice vote on March 28. President Richard M. Nixon signed the bill on April 10, 1972, and the following November Guamanians elected Won Pat as their first Delegate.

Like Guam had done two years earlier, American Samoa sent an unofficial “Delegate at Large” to Washington to act as an elected lobbyist for the islands in 1970.¹¹⁴ On August 2, 1978, Representative Burton introduced H.R. 13702 to provide for a Delegate from American Samoa with the same privileges as other territorial lawmakers. The legislation sailed through Congress and its success surprised even Faleomavaega, who was a congressional staffer at the time.¹¹⁵ “You wouldn’t believe, it was difficult for me even, how do you justify having a congressional delegate from this little, dinky territory, at that time with only about 36 to 40 thousand people,” Faleomavaega asked, adding that Burton’s belief that every territory “should have representation” was key to its success. President Jimmy Carter signed the bill on October 31, 1978. The first American Samoan Delegate, Fofó I. F. Sunia, was elected in 1980.¹¹⁶

The stories of how Guamanians and American Samoans came to be represented in Washington in the 1970s were but two points on a long, arcing dialogue that began in the 1890s about how overseas territories would be administered by or incorporated into the nation. For Guam and American Samoa, especially, the post–World War II period was one of rapid change. Both came out from under military rule and were granted a measure of autonomy as well as representation in Congress. Their new Delegates joined a small cohort of APAs in Congress, pushed for their islands’ interests, developed key congressional allies, and participated in the legislative process to a degree earlier statutory representatives had not.

APA MEMBERS ON CAPITOL HILL: LEGISLATIVE INTERESTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

When considering the legislative agendas and the accomplishments of the Asian and Pacific Islander Americans in Congress during this era, it is important to remember that only 14 APA individuals first won election to the House or Senate in the period from Pearl Harbor to the end of the Cold War in the early

1990s. The most who served in any one Congress in the course of this long span was eight, first in the 97th Congress (1981–1983) and again in the 100th and 101st Congresses (1987–1991). This group proved to be small enough that APA Members did not even form an issues caucus until two decades after women and African Americans had done so in the 1970s.

In many respects, the composition of this group of legislators reflected long-standing immigration patterns. Until the 1970s, Japanese Americans remained the largest APA immigrant community in the United States and half of the 14 APAs who entered Congress were ethnic Japanese. Among them, Hawaii's Patsy Takemoto Mink became the first woman of color to serve in Congress in early 1965. In the first 60 years of Asian Pacific Americans in Congress, all served in the House. When Hawaii entered the Union as a state in 1959, Hiram Fong became not only the first Asian-American Senator, but also the first Chinese American to serve in Congress.

Geographically, these Members hailed from only a handful of areas: six from Hawaii, four from California, and two each from Guam and American Samoa. Still, this represented a change in the power of these individual Members. With the election of Dalip Saund of California in 1956, the era of APAs serving exclusively as statutory representatives, as either Delegates or Resident Commissioners, drew to a close. Of the first 18 APAs who served in Congress through 1945, all were statutory representatives with circumscribed powers. From 1941 to 1991, 10 of the 14 APAs elected to Congress held full voting and membership privileges as Representatives or Senators with no restrictions on their ability to participate in committee, hold leadership posts, or vote on final legislation. The handful who served as Territorial Delegates still were unable to vote on final legislation, though, over time, they enjoyed more privileges in terms of their participation on committees.

It was during this era that, for the first time, APAs served on a broad range of congressional committees that reflected a full spectrum of legislative interests. In 1981 Daniel K. Akaka became the first Asian American to serve on the House Appropriations Committee. California's Robert T. Matsui became the first to serve on several key panels: Interstate and Foreign Commerce (forerunner to Energy and Commerce) in 1979; Judiciary in 1979; and Ways and Means in 1981. Spark Matsunaga broke ground on the House Rules Committee in the 90th Congress (1967–1969). Guamanian Delegate Won Pat became the first to serve on the Armed Services Committee beginning in 1975. In the Senate, Fong became the first to serve on the Judiciary Committee (1961) and the Appropriations Committee (1969), while Inouye joined the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1963.

In more than a century of service in Congress, only a small handful of APAs have ever led committees. It is perhaps unsurprising that Inouye, who served longer than any other APA (a combined 53 years in the House and Senate), led the way in this regard. During his long Senate tenure, Inouye chaired three standing committees (Indian Affairs; Commerce, Science, and Transportation; and Appropriations) as well as two very prominent select committees (the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, better known as the Iran-



Hawaiian politicians meet with President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966. From left, Representative Spark M. Matsunaga, Representative Patsy Takemoto Mink, President Johnson, former Delegate and then Governor John Burns, and Senator Daniel K. Inouye.

Photograph by Yoichi Okamoto; image courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library/National Archives and Records Administration



President Lyndon B. Johnson and Hawaii Representative Patsy Takemoto Mink wave before setting off on a flight from Honolulu to Los Angeles after attending the Honolulu Conference on the Vietnam War in 1966.

Photograph by Robert Knudsen; image courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library/National Archives and Records Administration



Norman Y. Mineta of California was the first, and to date the only, Asian Pacific American to chair a committee in the U.S. House of Representatives. He oversaw the Committee on Public Works and Transportation in the 103rd Congress (1993–1995).

Image courtesy of the Library of Congress



Spark M. Matsunaga of Hawaii held a leadership role in the Senate, serving as the Democrats' Chief Deputy Whip from the 95th through 100th Congresses (1977–1989).

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Nikkei:

A Japanese term used to identify any person of Japanese descent who emigrated abroad or is the descendant of such individuals.

Diaspora:

The migration of an ethnic group from their home country or region to different parts of the world.

Contra Committee). Akaka led two standing Senate committees (Veterans' Affairs and Indian Affairs). Mineta remains the only APA to ever chair a House committee. He wielded the Public Works and Transportation gavel in the 103rd Congress (1993–1995).

As with committee leadership positions, only a few individuals have moved into party leadership posts. Representative Mink became the first APA to hold a nominal leadership spot when she served for a term as secretary of the House Democratic Caucus in the 94th Congress (1975–1977)—a post traditionally reserved for women Members. In the following Congress, Senator Inouye won election as secretary of the Senate Democratic Conference and remained in that post through the 100th Congress (1987–1989) until his failed run for Majority Leader. He later served as president pro tempore of the Senate, third in line in presidential succession and the member of the majority party with the longest continuous service. In addition to Inouye, Matsunaga also held a position within the Senate Democratic leadership, serving as the appointed Chief Deputy Whip from the 95th through the 100th Congresses (1977–1989).

Remarkably, two of the most powerful APA congressmen—Inouye and Mineta—formed lifelong friendships with other future powerful legislators during the most trying times of their lives, long before any of them served on the Hill. Senator Robert Dole of Kansas had been shot in northern Italy only days before Inouye suffered his own nearly fatal wound. By sheer happenstance, Dole and Inouye both recovered at the Percy Jones Army Hospital in Michigan, where future Senator Philip Hart of Michigan also recuperated from his wartime injuries. While interned at the Heart Mountain camp, a short drive outside of Cody, Wyoming, Mineta, for his part, formed a lasting friendship with future Senator Alan Simpson of Wyoming. Mineta and Simpson first met when their respective Boy Scout troops gathered at the camp for a jamboree, even sharing a tent together. Years later, Inouye, Dole, Mineta, and Simpson would lean on those old friendships during important debates on issues like redress and immigration.¹¹⁷

The legislative interests of the APAs of this era largely reflected the unique trajectories of the immigrant or Pacific Islander groups to which they belonged. For the Guamanian and Samoan Delegates, efforts to secure a measure of self-determination and federal appropriations were balanced with a respect for maintaining indigenous culture. Hawaiians aimed to achieve the long-sought goal of statehood. In fighting for redress for World War II internment, Members of Congress who were *nikkei* (those who belonged to the Japanese diaspora, emigrants, or their descendants who reside outside Japan) also raised public awareness of the history of Asian Americans in the 20th century.

Self-Determination

Neither of the Guamanian Delegates in this period, Won Pat nor Blaz, chaired a congressional committee or had a vote on final legislation on the House Floor, but both men worked to give Guam control over its future. Their efforts, however, were frequently thwarted by both mainland opposition and political infighting back home. “Evolution necessary to change a sleepy tropical island into a thriving American community of more than 100,000 persons has been slow and gradual but consistent and steady,” Won Pat once told his colleagues.¹¹⁸

In 1976 Won Pat and Delegate Ron de Lugo of the U.S. Virgin Islands steered H.R. 9491 to passage, a measure that established constitutional conventions in Guam and the Virgin Islands despite opposition from the Department of the Interior. The proposed constitution for Guam won approval from both President Carter and Congress in 1978 only to stall after the territory's government changed hands. Guam's new Republican administration delayed the ratification vote, during which time support for the constitution crumbled amid claims it continued the status quo under the Organic Act. During a public referendum on August 4, 1979, ratification failed spectacularly.¹¹⁹

Won Pat was never able to revive the constitution or any serious discussions on status before his departure from Congress in 1985. His successor, Republican Ben Blaz, introduced the Guam Commonwealth Act in 1988, this time with the full backing of Guam's voters and a local bipartisan Commission on Self-Determination. The bill, however, never made it out of committee.¹²⁰

Commission on Guam War Claims

Even though more than 30 years had passed since the end of World War II, both Won Pat and Blaz confronted issues held over from the conflict. In 1945 Congress passed the Guam Meritorious Claims Act that authorized the Navy Secretary to settle cases of damaged property after the Japanese and American occupations left much of the island in ruins. The Navy dragged its feet, however, and a decade into the claims process the Defense Department ruled that Guamanians had not been U.S. citizens during the war and were therefore ineligible for compensation. The Micronesian Claims Act of 1971 did little to solve the problem and only provoked more criticism. The issue was effectively dropped during the 101st Congress (1989–1991).¹²¹



In retaking the island of Guam from the Japanese, U.S. forces destroyed the Piti Navy Yard, shown here in 1944.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

The military presence on Guam continued to be a contentious issue well into the 1990s. In an effort to limit military holdings on the islands, Blaz introduced the Guam Excess Lands Act in 1992 which would have transferred 3,000 acres from the Defense Department to Guam in an effort to settle the land claims, but the bill was not acted on.¹²²

Cultural Protection and Attention in Washington

In Congress, Pacific Delegates often found themselves having to explain and protect the unique customs of their islands. “Guam is still an unknown quantity,” an aide to Won Pat noted in 1978, “so we are engaged in a constant job of education.”¹²³ In some cases, the Delegates had to clarify even basic points. In early 2002, for example, a House colleague mistakenly introduced Delegate Faleomavaega as “the gentleman from Somalia.”¹²⁴

For Delegates from the Pacific territories, even the simplest legislative acts could be challenging. All 13 of American Samoa Delegate Fofó Sunia’s bills, for instance, never made it past the subcommittee level. “Even if I had only one bill passed that would be a great record,” Won Pat reminded his constituents while running for a third term. Personal connections, he said, could help grease the wheels—“You need friends in Congress.”¹²⁵

But there were also even larger partisan issues to work around. When Faleomavaega was just a House staffer working for the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Representative Burton taught him an important lesson: Do not make territorial issues “controversial,” he said, and ensure they have bipartisan support. “Because the territories are so small, don’t get into the arena of the big issues because you will be eaten alive.”¹²⁶

Geography also played a role. Unlike the U.S. Virgin Islands or Puerto Rico, whose constituencies lived much closer to the mainland, the Pacific territories were relatively isolated. “Our only disadvantage out here,” Won Pat bemoaned to the *Pacific Daily News*, “is that we are just too damn far from the United States.”¹²⁷ For the Delegates, simply staying in contact with their constituents was difficult. At first, the House would only pay for Won Pat to go home four times a year, but he eventually had his travel and telephone budgets expanded in the 95th Congress (1977–1979). A similar allowance was also approved for the Samoan Delegate. Flights from Hawaii to American Samoa were often limited, however, so when Faleomavaega served as a Delegate a decade later, he tried to go home once a month for at least a week.¹²⁸

Hawaiian Statehood

Along with the decision to grant Guam and American Samoa Delegates in the House, one of the most consequential developments in the history of APAs in Congress during the second half of the 20th century was the successful campaign by Hawaii for statehood. First as a territory and then as a state, Hawaii has sent more APAs to the House and Senate than anywhere else—15 individuals since Delegate Robert W. Wilcox, the first APA to serve on Capitol Hill. Of the six APA Senators in history, five hailed from Hawaii.¹²⁹

Ever since the government annexed the Hawaiian Islands during the late 19th



Robert W. Wilcox was the first Asian Pacific American to represent Hawaii as a Delegate to Congress, from 1900 to 1903.

Collection of the U.S. House of Representatives

century, statehood seemed to loom just out of reach. By fits and starts, however, statehood supporters gradually won concessions and, by the late 1950s, the campaign for Hawaiian statehood faced a familiar hurdle: the confluence of race and politics.¹³⁰

At the time, both Hawaii and Alaska were working toward statehood. Traditionally, Alaska's voters elected Democrats while Hawaiians generally elected Republicans. The assumption in Washington was that these electoral patterns would persist. In the Senate, party divisions were so close that the majority usually held only a one- or two-seat advantage. Admitting either Hawaii or Alaska to the Union separately threatened to tip the scale in either direction. Because of the razor-thin margins, a coalition of conservative Republicans and southern Democrats effectively ruled the Senate, capable of blocking either civil rights legislation or statehood for multiracial Hawaii with equal effectiveness.¹³¹

By midcentury, the statehood movement in Hawaii seemed well on its way to achieving its goal. It had a majority coalition of white settlers, commonly called *haoles*, and pro-statehood Japanese Hawaiians that outnumbered the anti-statehood block of Native Hawaiians.¹³² Congress's earlier fears that statehood would sweep an untold number of communist agents into the national fabric had been neutralized by previous immigration laws.¹³³ Finally, Hawaii's longtime Delegate in the House, Republican Joseph Farrington, had worked tirelessly to coordinate the statehood campaign in Washington.

When Farrington died in 1954, however, things started to unravel. Although his widow, Republican Elizabeth Farrington, took his seat and resumed the statehood campaign, she struggled against a political realignment back home that was swelling the ranks of the Democratic Party. Complicating the issue, some Democrats in Washington insisted on coupling Alaskan and Hawaiian statehood to maintain party parity in the Senate, but the House Rules Committee Chairman, Howard Smith of Virginia, a dyed-in-the-wool conservative southern Democrat, refused to consider the joint proposal.¹³⁴

During the 85th and 86th Congresses (1957–1961), the fate of Hawaiian statehood largely lay in the hands of two Texans, House Speaker Sam Rayburn and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson, who both thought they saw a parliamentary opening. If they could convince the authorizing committees to make Hawaiian and Alaskan statehood privileged measures, then congressional leaders could still bring the bills to the floor for a vote despite opposition in the House Rules Committee or by southern Democratic opponents.¹³⁵

In April 1956, in a key turning point, Alaskan voters approved a referendum to adopt a proposed state constitution. When Alaskan officials later presented their charter to Congress, the House and Senate were freed from having to pass an enabling act and could immediately start debating the terms of statehood. With Alaska in the pipeline, Johnson informed Hawaii's new Delegate, Democrat John Burns, that his territory would have to wait until the next year for its chance for statehood. Afraid that if Hawaii became a state and elected two GOP Senators he would lose his majority, Johnson instructed Burns to stall attempts to bring up Hawaiian statehood in 1958.¹³⁶

The plan by Rayburn and Johnson to bring Alaska's statehood bill to the



A campaign handbill urges voters to support Elizabeth Farrington in 1955. Farrington succeeded her late husband, Joseph Rider Farrington, as a Delegate from Hawaii in the 83rd and 84th Congresses.

Collection of the U.S. House of Representatives

This 1959 cartoon by Jim Berryman—“What Did Alaska Have That I Don’t Mister?”—highlights the long-intertwined push for statehood by Alaska and Hawaii. Alaska became a state first in January 1959, and Hawaii followed suit in August 1959.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration



On March 18, 1959, Henry McPhee, associate special counsel to the President, looked on as President Dwight D. Eisenhower signs the bill making Hawaii the 50th state.

Photograph by the National Park Service; image courtesy of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library & Museum/National Archives and Records Administration

floor as a privileged measure worked as expected. After overruling objections and defeating a motion to send it back to committee, the House passed it in late May and the Senate cleared it in late June. President Eisenhower signed it into law on July 7, 1958. Keeping his end of the bargain, Delegate Burns discouraged the chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, Leo O’Brien, from bringing up Hawaii’s accompanying statehood bill.¹³⁷

Throughout July, congressional Democrats contained the political damage to Burns for putting off the Hawaii bill while House Majority Leader John McCormack of Massachusetts stated publicly that Hawaiian statehood would be debated in the next Congress. When the new territorial governor, William Quinn, and a delegation of Hawaiians lobbied Congress to consider an enabling bill before adjournment, Johnson promptly shut them down. Later offering his reassurance, Johnson said, “Due to the wise counsel of Delegate Burns and others who have put their country ahead of politics, Hawaii has the best chance for admission at the next session as it has ever had.”¹³⁸


When the Hawaiian statehood bill failed to come up in 1958, voices from across the country, from President Eisenhower to the editorial board of the *New York Times* and especially Republicans in Hawaii, lashed out at Congress. Despite the delay on Capitol Hill, Delegate Burns won re-election that year, adding to substantial Democratic gains nationwide. The bill to begin the statehood process for Hawaii was introduced in both houses of Congress in January 1959. Less than 90 days later Eisenhower signed it into law.¹³⁹

The inhabitants of Hawaii voted for the statehood plebiscite by a 17 to 1 margin on June 27, 1959. Two months later, on August 21, President Eisenhower proclaimed Hawaii the 50th state of the Union.¹⁴⁰ With statehood, the U.S. Senate received its first APA Member, Hiram Fong, and the House its first Japanese American, Daniel Inouye.

LONG ROAD TO REDRESS

Comprehensive legislation apologizing for internment and compensating its victims had to wait for more than a generation after World War II until a phalanx of influential *nikkei* Members of Congress drew attention to the issue. The effort involved pushing back against Cold War–era legislative initiatives that again gave the U.S. government worrisome detention powers while raising awareness about Asian-American experiences and their contributions to U.S. society. This remained a particularly Japanese-American burden, but the community sought to make this a fully American issue—one that required constant education and vigilance. Whether the issue was repealing dangerous laws or providing monetary compensation to detainees, Congress remained a central stage in the redress debates.

When the Roosevelt administration began its internment policy during World War II, thousands of Japanese-American families had little time to arrange their affairs and pack the few things permitted them in the camps. The evacuation was hurried and chaotic. Bank accounts were frozen. Businesses were shuttered. Homes, automobiles, furniture, land, clothes, utensils—all the trappings of everyday life—were abandoned. The cost was staggering. The economic losses to thousands of U.S. citizens and the congressional decision to codify the *nikkei* evacuation and internment into law cast a long and dark shadow over the APA experience for decades afterward.



This election certificate formalized Daniel K. Inouye's election to Congress in 1959 as Hawaii's first U.S. Representative. Inouye also was the first Japanese American elected to the House.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

This San Francisco restaurant closed after the federal government mandated the evacuation of Japanese-American citizens during World War II. A sign in the window promises that the restaurant will soon open under new management.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration



Japanese Americans line up outside a Civil Control station in San Francisco in 1942 to await processing and evacuation.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration



In 1952 California Representative George P. Miller introduced legislation that restored benefits to *nisei* federal employees who had been evacuated during World War II.

George Paul Miller, Victor Lallier, 1965, Collection of the U.S. House of Representatives

Loyalty

The first stirrings of ameliorative action began even as the war drew to a close, though not in the form of monetary reparations. During internment, some *nisei* men held in the more repressive camps renounced their U.S. citizenship. Some did so out of protest, but others feared the government would deport their immigrant parents (who, by federal law, had been prevented from becoming U.S. citizens) back to Japan after the war and, by giving up their citizenship, the *nisei* could return to Japan to care for them. Uncertain as to the legal precedent in order to renounce one's citizenship, the federal government looked for a way to manage such "disloyal" internees.¹⁴¹ Working with Congress, the Justice Department crafted a first-of-its-kind policy enabling native-born Americans to renounce their U.S. citizenship. At the time, no such mechanism existed. But the proposed measure allowed the government to retain control over "disloyal" prisoners who voluntarily gave up their citizenship before deporting them to Japan. It became law in July 1944 as an amendment to the Nationality Act of 1940.¹⁴²

Even as Japanese-American detainees were being released from other camps, the WRA turned Tule Lake into a high-security segregation center to hold the roughly 5,500 *nisei* who had either failed the loyalty questionnaire or who sought to go to Japan.¹⁴³ More than 1,300 of these "Native American Aliens" were deported. By the end of the war, however, virtually all renunciants and deportees fought to have their citizenship restored despite opposition from the Justice Department. Wayne Collins, a civil liberties lawyer, defended many *nisei*, arguing that they had given up their citizenship under duress or coercion. Some blamed the military and the WRA, but the greatest pressure to renounce came from other militant detainees. By 1959, all renunciants who had applied, both those looking to return from Japan and those in the United States under threat of deportation, had regained their citizenship.¹⁴⁴

Slowly and incrementally, wartime restrictions also were rolled back. In 1945, four years after the federal government seized the banks, financial records, and assets of Japanese Americans using the Trading with the Enemy Act, Congress voted to unfreeze their money and set aside as much as \$10 million in refunds. But because the Office of Alien Property Custodian offered low exchange rates and erected additional hurdles, less than half of the 7,500 Japanese-American depositors redeemed their certificates. More than two decades passed before the U.S. Supreme Court in *Honda v. Clark* forced the custodian to meet all outstanding claims in full.¹⁴⁵

In 1952 Congress tackled another lingering injustice from the war when it restored seniority benefits to all *nisei* federal employees who had been evacuated. Introduced by Representative George P. Miller of California, the bill expanded a previous law that restored seniority benefits to *nisei* postal workers.¹⁴⁶

Addressing the far larger injustice of uprooting and incarcerating an entire ethnic group, however, remained an unresolved issue for decades. After the war, former Japanese-American inmates from seven WRA internment camps met in Salt Lake City, Utah, to outline a policy seeking compensation. The delegates settled on reparations: direct payments from the federal government for losses incurred during the forced evacuation.¹⁴⁷

When Republicans took over both chambers in the 80th Congress (1947–1949), the political atmosphere on the Hill warmed to reparations, but hurdles remained. Calculating the cost and verifying property-loss claims proved to be challenging because few records had been kept. Despite some initial help from the WRA, the whole situation was “complicated ... by difficulties in communication with absent owners and local prejudice,” the Interior Secretary said in a letter to House Speaker Joe Martin of Massachusetts.¹⁴⁸

Congressional deliberations also trod carefully around the evacuation’s legality. In 1947 the House Judiciary Committee admitted that no one sent to the camps had been guilty of sabotaging America, but the committee nevertheless justified internment as a “military necessity.”¹⁴⁹ Even still, the House clearly viewed the evacuees as victims of government overreach. The internees were loyal Americans, the committee wrote and “to redress them would be simple justice.” To not do so, the committee believed, would feed into the global communist propaganda criticizing America’s civil rights record.¹⁵⁰

In a message to Congress in February 1948, President Truman reminded the country that more than 100,000 Japanese Americans had been removed from their homes “solely because of their racial origin.”¹⁵¹ Five months later, on July 2, 1948, Truman signed the Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act into law, but it had limited impact. The legislation covered only “real or personal property” damaged or lost during the evacuation or during internment. Left unaddressed were the unknown costs associated with the stigma of incarceration, the psychological damage, lost earnings, injury or death, and resettlement. The Justice Department struggled to process the 26,000 claims totaling \$148 million. In the end, the government awarded just \$37 million. In order to keep up with the claims, Congress amended and extended the act, settling the last claim in 1965.¹⁵²

While addressing old injustices, APA advocates in Congress kept a close eye on new legislative efforts that threatened to undermine their constituents’ rights. In the late 1960s, the House Un-American Activities Committee lobbied to use the Emergency Detention Act—Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950—



A Japanese-American child arrives at Lone Pine, California, by train in 1942. He continued on to the Manzanar relocation camp by bus.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

Sansei:

A Japanese term that identifies the second generation of Japanese Americans who were born in the United States.

President Gerald R. Ford, surrounded by Asian Pacific American Members of Congress, including Daniel K. Inouye of Hawaii, Patsy Takemoto Mink of Hawaii, Norman Y. Mineta of California, Spark M. Matsunaga of Hawaii, and Hiram L. Fong of Hawaii, signs a proclamation formally terminating Executive Order 9066 and ending the relocation program.

Image courtesy of the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library/National Archives and Records Administration

to clamp down on urban riots and student protests. Title II gave the government broad authority to detain suspected communists and other subversives, and the threat of arbitrary arrests, violations of free speech, racism, and internment unsettled many Americans, among them the Japanese-American community that still held painful memories of wartime incarceration.¹⁵³

In response, Hawaii's Senator Inouye submitted a bill to repeal the Emergency Detention Act in the 91st Congress (1969–1971); Representative Matsunaga cosponsored another measure in the House. During debate, Inouye argued that the government's arrest powers terrified those "who are by birth or choice not 'in tune' or 'in line' with the rest of the country."¹⁵⁴ In the following Congress, Matsunaga and Chet Holifield of California sponsored legislation to completely repeal Title II, overriding weaker attempts to simply revise it. Matsunaga used his position on the Rules Committee to prioritize his bill (H.R. 234), casting Title II as a hangover from a darker era, out of place in a changing America. "This is an attempt to erase ... the last vestige of any authority to incarcerate people because they are related to people who are at war with us," Speaker Carl Albert said plainly. H.R. 234 overwhelmingly passed the House, 356 to 49.¹⁵⁵ The Senate passed the bill by voice vote. On September 25, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon signed the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act into law.¹⁵⁶

Remembrance

In the aftermath of internment, a long, stunned silence came over those in the Japanese-American community directly affected by the program. After years of carving out a life in the United States, the trauma of losing a business or a home, of being shipped off to remote camps, of being labeled an enemy, weighed heavily among the *issei* and *nisei*. Historian Roger Daniels, then a professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, once told the story of having *sansei* (the American-born grandchildren of *issei*) students in class who insisted they had been born in Los Angeles in 1943. Given the circumstances, Daniels knew they could have been born only in one of the camps and that their parents never told them about the experience.¹⁵⁷






By the 1970s, many of the older camp inmates had died or become infirm and leadership had passed to the *nisei*. The younger generation began to process the trauma, drawing inspiration from both the civil rights movement and peace protests. They organized the first visit to Manzanar in late 1969, which sparked annual pilgrimages to other camp sites.¹⁵⁸

These grassroots efforts helped nudge the nation in its bicentennial year toward reconsidering this troubling aspect of its past. In 1976, on the 34th anniversary of FDR's Executive Order 9066, President Gerald R. Ford signed Proclamation 4417, "An American Promise," which formally ended the relocation program that had remained on the books years after its directives had been abandoned.¹⁵⁹ "We now know what we should have known then—not only was that evacuation wrong but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans," Ford said. "On the battlefield and at home the names of Japanese-Americans have been and continue to be written in America's history for the sacrifices and the contributions they have made to the well-being and to the security of this, our common Nation."¹⁶⁰ The symbolic and often overlooked proclamation served as one of the earliest official statements denouncing the evacuation and internment program.

Ford's statement endorsed remembrance, that by commemorating the event, the sites, and the people, the country could avoid such an unworthy act in the future. This process played out over several decades. By 1980 at least two of the war relocation camps were listed on the National Register of Historic Places: Manzanar in California and Minidoka in Utah. In the 1990s, the effort to raise awareness about the history of internment gained momentum. During the 102nd Congress (1991–1993), the Manzanar War Relocation Center was designated a national historic site. In 1992 the Rohwer Relocation Center Memorial Cemetery gained designation as a national historic landmark while Congress authorized a National Japanese American Memorial to be built with

In 1943 photographer Ansel Adams took this image of the Manzanar War Relocation Center in California. Public Law 102-248, approved during the 102nd Congress (1991–1993), designated Manzanar as a National Historic Site in 1992.

Image courtesy of the Library of Congress



In 1976 President Gerald R. Ford issued this proclamation, "An American Promise," formally ending the relocation program that began 34 years earlier with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066. The executive order had remained on the books years after its directives had been abandoned.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

President William J. (Bill) Clinton signs the Asian/Pacific American Heritage Awareness Month Proclamation in 1993, accompanied by, from left to right: Senator Daniel K. Akaka of Hawaii, Representative Norman Y. Mineta of California, Representative Patsy Takemoto Mink of Hawaii, Representative Robert T. Matsui of California, Representative Jay C. Kim of California, Delegate Eni F. H. Faleomavaega of American Samoa, and Delegate Robert A. Underwood of Guam.

Image courtesy of the William J. Clinton Library/National Archives and Records Administration



private funds in Washington, DC. “The lessons learned,” Senator Inouye said about the memorial that opened in 2001, “must remain as a grave reminder of what we must not allow to happen again to any group.”¹⁶¹

Reacting to a National Park Service report about the condition of the internment camps in the West, President William J. (Bill) Clinton directed Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt to provide recommendations for the preservation of these sites.¹⁶² Just days before he left office, President Clinton issued Proclamation 7395 to establish the Minidoka Internment National Monument in Utah.¹⁶³ Meanwhile, Congress passed legislation in the 1990s and early 2000s that added the Granada War Relocation Center to the National Register, appropriated funds for a visitor center at Manzanar, and authorized the study of a memorial on Bainbridge Island, where the first *nikkei* were evacuated in 1942. Toward the end of 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law legislation authorizing \$38 million toward the preservation of Japanese-American confinement sites.¹⁶⁴

These and other efforts helped Americans to contextualize the experiences of the *issei* and the *nisei* during World War II. These efforts also promised to bring the stories of internment to a substantially broader audience.

By the late 1970s, momentum had also started for the commemorative annual recognition of Asian-American heritage. Representative Mineta and New York Representative Frank Horton cosponsored a resolution to set aside one week every year to celebrate the diverse heritage of APAs. Supported by a national coalition of civic groups, including the Organization of Chinese Americans and the JACL, the bill passed the full House in July 1978, 360 to 6, and the Senate passed it two months later.¹⁶⁵ President Carter declared that the first annual Asian Pacific American Heritage Week would take place in May 1979.¹⁶⁶ Congress later expanded the commemoration period and passed H.R. 3802 on May 3, 1990.¹⁶⁷ When he signed the act into law, President George H. W. Bush proclaimed the month of May as the annual Asian Pacific American Heritage Month.¹⁶⁸



By the late 1970s, Asian Pacific American Representatives and Senators, including Spark M. Matsunaga of Hawaii, shown serving on the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee, pushed for recognition of Asian-American heritage.

Image courtesy of the U.S. Senate Historical Office

Redress

Efforts at remembrance reinforced the belief that the federal government should act substantively on the legacy of internment before the older generation of Japanese Americans passed from the scene. At the JACL national convention in 1970, a Manzanar pilgrimage organizer, Edison Uno, introduced a resolution calling for reparations to the victims or heirs of “the worst mistakes of World War II.” Although the National Council for Japanese American Redress (NCJAR), an offshoot of the JACL, adopted the resolution, it did not follow through.¹⁶⁹ The idea took root, nonetheless. On June 28, 1974, Representative George E. Danielson of California introduced a bill to establish a relocation benefits commission to help victims of the internment camps get financial relief.¹⁷⁰

Spurred to act as more and more *issei* victims died without seeing government action, the JACL adopted a resolution calling for \$25,000 reparation payments to victims of the evacuation or their heirs and established the National Committee for Redress (NCR), headed by John Tateishi. Not everyone agreed, however. The keynote speaker of the 1978 JACL national meeting, Senator Samuel Ichiye (Sam) Hayakawa of California, later dismissed the proposal as “ridiculous.” Hayakawa added, “For the JACL to ask for the restitution is merely the rekindling of resentment and racism that no longer exists.”¹⁷¹

In early February 1979, the JACL president, Clifford Uyeda, along with Tateishi and his NCJAR colleagues arranged to meet with the four Democratic *nikkei* Members of Congress: California Representatives Matsui and Mineta and Hawaiian Senators Inouye and Matsunaga. Inouye and Matsunaga had served in the 442nd Regimental Combat Team and the 100th Infantry Battalion, respectively; Mineta and Matsui had been inmates at Heart Mountain and Tule Lake concentration camps, respectively.¹⁷²

Neither Tateishi nor the JACL leadership had consulted the Congressmen about their redress proposal and simply assumed they would have their support. Inouye provided them with a hard lesson in congressional relations. “I said I think it is premature,” Inouye recalled. “I don’t think it will fly.” The shock was palpable. “They were hoping that all of us would come in flags waving and say let’s make the charge up the hill,” he added. “I think for a moment they were ready to take away my membership card.”¹⁷³ From the Congressmen’s perspective, the proposal threatened to become a divisive issue. As Mineta’s legislative director pointed out, the *nikkei* legislators had “spent their whole lives trying to be seen not as Japanese Americans, but as just plain old Americans.” Instead, Inouye asked the NCR to think about a blue-ribbon commission to study the wartime relocation and internment of Japanese Americans.¹⁷⁴

By and large, the JACL supported Inouye’s commission, but the activists remained keenly aware that this decision would delay any action on redress even as the *issei* generation continued to disappear. On August 2, 1979, Senator Inouye introduced S. 1647, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) Act. When Republican Senate Minority Whip Ted Stevens of Alaska approached Inouye about adding Aleutian and Pribilof Islanders, who had also been evacuated, to the commission bill, Inouye, a longtime friend of Stevens, gladly made the addition. This ensured the support of Alaska’s delegation and protected the bill from accusations that it benefited



In 1978, when the Japanese American Citizens League proposed reparation payments to Japanese Americans interned during World War II, California Senator Samuel Ichiye (Sam) Hayakawa rejected the idea as “ridiculous.”

Image courtesy of the U.S. Senate Historical Office




Members of the National Committee for Redress meet with Senators and Representatives in 1979. Standing (left to right): John Tateishi, Ron Ikejiri, Clifford Uyeda, Ron Mamiya, and Karl Nobuyuki. Seated (left to right): California Representatives Norman Y. Mineta and Robert T. Matsui and Hawaiian Senators Daniel K. Inouye and Spark M. Matsunaga.

Image courtesy of the Japanese American National Museum, Gift of Norman Y. Mineta, 96.370



With the support of Representative Norman Y. Mineta of California, House Majority Leader Jim Wright of Texas introduced a bill in 1979 that created the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians.

James Claude Wright, Jr., Marshall Bouldin III, 1991, Collection of the U.S. House of Representatives



Formed in 1979, the National Council for Japanese American Redress sought financial compensation for Japanese Americans incarcerated during World War II. This fundraising card proclaims: “We went obediently then. We have remained largely silent since. But no more!”

Image courtesy of Shosuke Sasaki, Densho Digital Repository

special interests. On the whole, the bill’s language focused on fact-finding: How was Executive Order 9066 implemented? What was its impact on U.S. citizens and resident aliens? How did the military decide on evacuation and relocation? By emphasizing this approach, Inouye and Matsunaga convinced Hayakawa to cosponsor the bill to maintain a bipartisan and unified *nikkei* front.¹⁷⁵

In the House, Mineta, who had spent part of his childhood in the Heart Mountain internment camp, could not bring himself to introduce the companion bill, H.R. 5499. It was too personal. But he remembered that Majority Leader Jim Wright of Texas had once told him how outraged he was when the Supreme Court justified the camps and, when asked, the Texan readily introduced the bill with 147 cosponsors on September 28, 1979.¹⁷⁶

In the Senate, Inouye managed the bill. The Governmental Affairs Committee held hearings on the legislation on March 18, 1980, and featured supportive testimony from the JACL, *nikkei* Congressmen, and from Clarence M. Mitchell of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. On the other hand, the NCJAR opposed it for being too timid, instead preferring a bill that would have directly required monetary reparations and an apology. In the end, the committee reported Inouye’s commission bill favorably, and on May 22, it passed the full Senate by voice vote.¹⁷⁷

Two weeks later, the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations held hearings on Inouye’s bill (S. 1647), on the Wright–Mineta bill (H.R. 5499), and on a third bill that proposed paying out reparations directly (H.R. 5977). Fortunately for the commission’s supporters, the subcommittee was chaired by Representative Danielson, who had sponsored the first Japanese-American compensation bill back in 1974. Danielson and the ranking minority member, Robert McClory of Illinois, supported the Wright–Mineta bill and amended it to include the Aleuts and Pribilof Islanders within the scope of the commission’s investigation. The full Judiciary Committee approved the bill and reported it to the House, which then passed H.R. 5499, 279 to 109. The Senate then agreed to replace the language of Inouye’s bill with the text of the Wright–Mineta bill.¹⁷⁸ On July 31, 1980, in a ceremony in the Cabinet Room, President Jimmy Carter signed the CWRIC Act into law.¹⁷⁹

The act creating the CWRIC provided for seven commissioners: three to be named by President Carter, two by Senate president pro tempore Warren G. Magnuson of Washington, and two by House Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill of Massachusetts.¹⁸⁰ Four Democrats and three Republicans initially served on the commission that was co-chaired by Joan Z. Bernstein, a former counsel for the Health and Human Services Department, and Representative Dan Lungren of California.¹⁸¹

Much of the CWRIC’s work involved locating and gathering official documents, memoirs, and personal papers that revealed the federal decision-making processes to implement internment. But the commissioners also wanted to hear and question surviving policymakers and detainees alike. Twenty days of hearings were scheduled around the country in 11 locations between July and December 1981. More than 750 witnesses testified. Both Matsui and Mineta testified about their families’ experiences during the evacuation and relocation

as well as their time in the camps. The CWRIC also heard from federal officials like John J. McCloy at the War Department, Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen of the WDC, and Abe Fortas of the Interior Department, who had contributed to the decision to go ahead with internment.¹⁸²

Initially, the early testimony held outside Washington, DC, came mostly from *sansei*, who reported how little they had learned about internment from their parents and grandparents. But over time, an increasing number of *issei* and *nisei* witnesses appeared, often telling their stories for the first time. “For over thirty-five years I have been the stereotype Japanese American,” Alice Tanabe Nehira told the commission. “I’ve kept quiet, hoping in due time we will be justly compensated and recognized for our years of patient effort. By my passive attitude, I can reflect on my past years to conclude that it doesn’t pay to remain silent.”¹⁸³ During hearings in Los Angeles, *Time* magazine reported “the audience listened with hushed respect to stories almost too painful to remember, but too important to forget.”¹⁸⁴

As the commission worked on its report throughout 1982, Senator Hayakawa, who taught at an Illinois college during the war, took to the Senate Floor on the 41st anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attacks to adamantly oppose reparations and noted that his “flesh crawls with shame and embarrassment” at the thought. He reminded Japanese Americans of their successful integration into American society, their relative level of wealth and educational achievement, and he warned that, in an era of budget constraints and widespread public concern about Japanese economic gains versus the United States, such a program would invite a “backlash.”¹⁸⁵

The CWRIC issued its report, *Personal Justice Denied*, on February 24, 1983.¹⁸⁶ It presented a narrative about the *nisei* and *issei* that began before the Pearl Harbor attacks and followed their experiences through the end of internment, and it included comparative analyses with the situation in the military and in Hawaii and described the Aleuts’ experience. A summary paragraph distilled the commission’s basic conclusions:

The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions which followed from it—detention, ending detention and ending exclusion—were not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad historical causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. Widespread ignorance of Japanese Americans contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave injustice was done to Americans and resident aliens of a Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II.¹⁸⁷

The public responded favorably to the findings, and there were few objections to the report. The commissioners supported their conclusion unanimously but offered no recommendations and didn’t comment on reparations. “It’s appropriate that the commission did not deal with the issue of redress,” Matsui




President Jimmy Carter signs the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act into law on July 31, 1980. Standing directly behind President Carter, left to right, are Hawaii Senator Daniel K. Inouye, California Representative Norman Y. Mineta, and Hawaii Senator Spark M. Matsunaga.

Image courtesy of the Jimmy Carter Library/National Archives and Records Administration



The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians holds a hearing in 1981 about the treatment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Initially, young Japanese Americans spoke about how little their grandparents said about internment. Eventually, *issei* and *nisei* witnesses testified before the commission, many telling their stories for the first time.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration



The report *Personal Justice Denied* collected the findings of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians in 1983.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

said, “because I think the attention of the American public should be on what happened, and the individual tragedies that occurred during [the war].”¹⁸⁸

Senator Inouye’s blue-ribbon panel had accomplished more than anyone dared to imagine. After suffering silently for 50 years, mainland *issei* and *nisei* finally felt free to speak up. Stories they had buried deep inside came spilling out to the surprise of their children and their community. Simply being able to talk about their experiences and having someone confirm that they had undergone a major injustice often meant more than a government check ever could.¹⁸⁹

Four months after the report came out, the commission published its recommendations on June 16, 1983. The commission unanimously proposed having the federal government apologize “for the acts of exclusion, removal, and detention.” It also called for presidential pardons for anyone convicted of curfew and exclusion violations. It asked Congress to direct federal agencies to review “with liberality” all *nikkei* applications for restitution associated with the internment, and it recommended a special foundation created and funded by law for the research and public education of “the causes and circumstances of” internment. All but one of the commissioners further recommended a congressional appropriation of \$1.5 billion to pay all surviving evacuees and detainees \$20,000 each in reparations.¹⁹⁰

Most *nikkei* Congressmen cheered the result. Senator Matsunaga announced he would do everything he could to push Congress to fund the recommendations. In the House, Mineta vowed “to develop a plan to implement these long overdue recommendations.” Matsui welcomed the recommendations but warned against “false and misleading expectations” about seeing the payments anytime soon. Hayakawa, who had since retired from the Senate, dissented. While he approved of a “national apology for the old injustice,” Hayakawa believed “the successes Japanese Americans have enjoyed in business, education, the professions and in politics have amply demonstrated the esteem in which they are held by their fellow Americans.” He concluded, “All this is redress enough.”¹⁹¹

Congress, however, offered a tepid response to the CWRIC recommendations in the 98th Congress (1983–1985). Redress bills were introduced in both the House (H.R. 3387) and Senate (S. 1520) in mid-1983, but neither went anywhere.¹⁹² While Congress generally seemed to support the commission’s findings, opponents rejected redress payments as unfair to American taxpayers by making them liable for the transgressions of an earlier generation.¹⁹³

In a fitting bit of commemoration, House Democratic leadership saved the designation H.R. 442 for the redress bill at the opening of the 99th Congress (1985–1987), referencing the wartime heroics of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team.¹⁹⁴ Mineta was the first person to testify on H.R. 442, and he spoke powerfully on how internment affected his family. “I was a U.S. citizen at birth,” he reminded a House Judiciary subcommittee. “I had all of the rights promised to all the citizens in the Constitution, and I was 10 ½ years old. There was no reason, absolutely none, to fear me. Was I supposedly a saboteur? A spy? A secret agent? No one has ever explained to me what threat I posed or even could have been seen to pose.”¹⁹⁵ But Mineta was not alone in his long-simmering doubt or his lifetime of confusion, and when he spoke in terms of “us,” “we,” and “our”

during his time before the subcommittee, he spoke on behalf of everyone who spent time in the camps. “Mr. Chairman,” he said, wrapping up, “there is no statute of limitations on our shame, our damaged honor, or our violated rights, and it has fallen on this subcommittee to set us free.” Despite his impassioned testimony, the legislation failed to gain traction.¹⁹⁶

In the 100th Congress, with Texas Representative Jim Wright now Speaker and with an additional APA Member of the House, Representative Patricia Saiki of Hawaii, redress had its best chance in years.¹⁹⁷ As taken up by the House, the redress bill did three things: It authorized \$1.2 billion out of which every surviving member of the camps would be paid \$20,000; it advised the Justice Department to clear the convictions of anyone who had resisted imprisonment; and it set aside \$50 million to educate the public about the injustices committed by the U.S. government.¹⁹⁸ Representative Don Young of Alaska introduced the Aleut redress bill (H.R. 1631) in March 1987, and Senator Matsunaga introduced a companion redress bill (S. 1009) the next month. When Matsunaga rose to introduce his bill, he declared, “Perhaps the most traumatic experience, the one thing that has haunted Americans of Japanese ancestry for 45 years, was the stigma of being cast as disloyal to their own beloved country, the United States of America.”¹⁹⁹

Throughout the 100th Congress, Matsunaga worked with the American Civil Liberties Union to lobby each Member on the need for reparations. He and Inouye also both testified before the House committees considering the legislation.²⁰⁰

Although the Ronald Reagan administration opposed redress, the House quickly moved the bill through the Judiciary Committee, which cleared the measure as Mineta and Matsui looked on. Mineta, working with the Democratic leadership, arranged to have H.R. 442 arrive on the House Floor on September 17, the bicentennial of the signing of the U.S. Constitution.²⁰¹ “Great nations demonstrate their greatness by admitting and redressing the wrongs they commit,” Mineta told a rapt audience in the House Chamber.²⁰² In an emotional floor speech, Matsui retold his family’s heart-wrenching story of being uprooted from their home. “How could I, as a 6-month-old child born in this country, be declared by my own Government to be an enemy alien?” he asked.²⁰³ One amendment was made to the bill when Representative Lungren asked to have “failure of political leadership” added to the list of causes of the internment.²⁰⁴

As before, not everyone believed redress was necessary. Redress supporters, said William Frenzel of Minnesota, were “asking us to purge ourselves of someone else’s guilt with another generation’s money.” But opponents were unable to sway the majority, and after the debate, the House passed the redress bill, 243 to 141. As a former internee, Mineta was technically included in the legislation, but he voted “present” to avoid the appearance of any conflict of interest.²⁰⁵

In the Senate, Matsunaga’s bill had a slightly more complicated run in which two failed amendments would have stripped funding for or made it virtually impossible to fund redress payments.²⁰⁶ A third amendment proposed by Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina demanded the Japanese government compensate the families of those killed in the attacks on Pearl Harbor before



In his testimony about H.R. 442, the redress bill, Representative Norman Y. Mineta of California questioned why he, as a 10 year old, was sent to an internment camp. Like Mineta, this unidentified grandfather and grandson were sent to a camp for the duration of the war.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration



Patricia Saiki represented Hawaii in the 100th and 101st Congresses (1987–1991). She added her support to the struggle for redress payments to Japanese Americans.

Collection of the U.S. House of Representatives



The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 became law on August 10, 1988, and implemented the recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. The first letters of apology and redress payments were presented to the oldest surviving detainees in a public ceremony on October 1, 1990.

Image courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration

President Ronald Reagan signs the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, providing reparations to Japanese Americans. Reagan is flanked by (left to right) Senator Spark M. Matsunaga of Hawaii, Representative Norman Y. Mineta of California, Representative Patricia Saiki of Hawaii, Senator Pete Wilson of California, Representative Don Young of Alaska, Representative Robert T. Matsui of California, Representative William Lowery of California, and Harry Kajiura, President of the Japanese American Citizens League.

Image courtesy of the Ronald Reagan Library/National Archives and Records Administration

any reparations be made to Japanese Americans. Helms's proposal infuriated Matsunaga, who rushed to highlight its false logic by pointing out that it tied American citizens to the attacks, an accusation the bill was specifically written to redress. When Helms refused to relent and demanded a vote, his amendment failed, 91 to 4.

Following debate in the Senate, Matsunaga brought up H.R. 442, and asked that the text following the enacting clause be replaced with the substance of his bill (S. 1009). The bill, which spread reparation payments over five years, passed on April 20, 1988, by a vote of 69 to 27, a veto-proof majority.²⁰⁷

After the House and Senate agreed to the conference report that summer, President Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 into law on August 10.²⁰⁸ "Indeed, scores of Japanese Americans volunteered for our Armed Forces—many stepping forward in the internment camps themselves," the President said. "The 442nd Regimental Combat Team, made up entirely of Japanese Americans, served with immense distinction to defend this nation, their nation. Yet, back at home, the soldiers' families were being denied the very freedom for which so many of the soldiers themselves were laying down their lives."²⁰⁹


The Civil Liberties Act only authorized the redress payments to the surviving detainees. The President still had to fit the cost into the federal budget, and Congress had to approve the necessary appropriations. When both President Reagan and his successor, George H. W. Bush, asked for less money than expected, the House Appropriations subcommittee overseeing the legislation responded by recommending large sums for the redress program. Under the threat of a presidential veto, however, House leaders removed the funding before bringing the supplemental budget before the House. "The money was there and ready to go before it was stripped by a veto threat from the same team that made redress a campaign issue last year," Representative Matsui said bitterly. "When an election was on the line, they couldn't say enough about their support for reparations.



Now that 200 survivors are dying each month without the benefit of seeing their dreams completed, they want to block the funding.” The only funding that Congress agreed to that year was a small amount for administrative costs.²¹⁰

Having missed the deadline for the 1989 fiscal year, Congress turned its attention to the budget for 1990. When House and Senate budget negotiators reconciled their targets in the spring, \$150 million had been slated for redress payments. As before, appropriating money for redress proved to be far more challenging. H.R. 2991 included only \$20 million for redress, and during a markup before the full Appropriations Committee, Representative Julian Dixon of California protested the reduction. “This isn’t a new program,” he complained. “This is a debt.” Several efforts to add to the payment appropriations failed until Representative Steny Hoyer of Maryland suggested moving \$30 million from the U.S. Census Bureau based in his district toward redress. That broke the impasse in committee, but the final House bill set aside just \$50 million for redress, 10 percent of the initial authorization.²¹¹

When a Senate Appropriations subcommittee approved H.R. 2991, it removed every last cent for redress payments. Senator Ernest Hollings of South Carolina said the committee “couldn’t find” the money. One camp survivor attending the Senate markup, Rudy Tokiwa, was appalled. “How long do they expect us to wait?” he asked. “They’re just waiting for every one of us to die off.” At that point, Inouye stepped in. Taking Hollings aside, the Hawaii Senator suggested turning redress into a federal entitlement program with annual funding of about \$500 million. The payments would be done in a timely




A September 4, 1991, Office of Redress Administration letter informs the recipient of an upcoming redress payment.

Image courtesy of Marjorie Matsushita Sperling, Densho Digital Repository



A woman embraces Representative Norman Y. Mineta of California at a redress check ceremony in 1990.

Image courtesy of the Japanese American National Museum, Gift of Norman Y. Mineta, 96.370



Embodying the transition of Asian Pacific Americans from exclusion to citizenship during the 20th century, Dalip Singh (Judge) Saund published the campaign booklet "What America Means to Me" during his congressional campaign of 1956.

Collection of the U.S. House of Representatives, Gift of Dr. Eric Saund

manner, and the entitlement would be insulated from annual funding fights. The Senate committee agreed to the change, and the full Senate approved H.R. 2991 on September 29, 1989, 74 to 22.²¹²

The resulting conference committee agreed to the redress entitlement swap. In the House, Representative Mineta led supporters of the effort. Congress could not prevent elderly internees from dying, he said. "But Congress can make the effort to disburse the redress compensation as quickly as possible." One voice of support came from Representative Newt Gingrich of Georgia, who said that redress was "trying to make sure that those who are now elderly, who once suffered a grievous harm, are given a chance to have their government and the country they love repay that harm before they pass on." The House approved the conference report, 323 to 81, followed by the entitlement waiver, 249 to 166. After the House and Senate cleared the final version that fall, President Bush signed H.R. 2991 into law on November 21, 1989. The first letters of apology and the first redress payments were presented to the oldest surviving detainees in a public ceremony on October 1, 1990. Two years later, Congress amended the Civil Liberties Act in order to provide redress payments to an additional 20,000 camp survivors.²¹³

CONCLUSION

Remembrance and redress underscored the profound impact that World War II had on the story of Asian Americans. The echoes of that conflict reverberated for decades afterward. In many ways, the story of seeking and eventually winning redress followed the general contours of the APA experience from the mid- to late-20th century. The decision to evacuate and then imprison 120,000 men, women, and children of Japanese ancestry during World War II capped a century of exclusionary race-based policy that either barred Asian immigrants or denied those already settled in the United States such basic rights as owning property or enjoying opportunities to participate in American society. Only after these exclusionary policies were peeled away one by one did the nation come to terms with the legacies of discrimination and face the historic injustice of internment.

The trajectory of Asian and Pacific Islander Americans during this period moved from exclusion to citizenship. Judge Saund embodied this transition. Though he had been in America since the 1920s, he would not earn his citizenship until the late 1940s. But this opened up possibilities for his political participation that culminated when he won a seat in the U.S. House in 1956. While wartime exigencies caused great hardships for Japanese Americans, they also opened up new possibilities for Asian Indian Americans, such as Saund, and Chinese Americans. Over several decades, immigration prohibitions were relaxed. In its new role as a global power—in part, seeking to appeal to foreign constituencies during the Soviet-American rivalry of the Cold War—the United States created a representational framework for its Pacific territories. On the domestic front, as a small but influential group of APA legislators entered Congress, they were vigilant against dangerous internal security policies that threatened unconstitutional detention, such as Title II of the Internal Security Act that Representative Matsunaga and Senator Inouye helped to repeal.



Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta, a former Representative from California, and Senator Daniel K. Inouye of Hawaii visit Pearl Harbor in 2004. Mineta, a former internee in the Heart Mountain Camp, and Inouye, a soldier in the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, used their personal experiences as inspiration for political and social change.

Image courtesy of the U.S. Navy

Sometimes change occurs as an unintended consequence of reform, as with the Hart–Celler Immigration Act of 1965 that swung the doors wide open to Asian immigration through family reunification and refugee resettlement policies. More often, efforts at reform percolate through the legislative process slowly, as the case of internment redress illustrates.

But whether gradual or swift, carefully constructed or purposefully undefined, the legislative process turns on representation in Congress and the ability of policy advocates to cultivate key allies. In this sense, the history recounted in this chapter is also the story of the growing political clout of Asian Pacific Americans, especially in Hawaii, California, and America’s Pacific territories.

At the beginning of this story, Daniel Inouye, a wounded World War II veteran who fought valiantly with an all-Japanese-American unit, struggled to recuperate from devastating war injuries. Meanwhile, a young boy named Norman Mineta, who, with his family, was uprooted from his home in San Jose and sent to an internment camp in the moonscape terrain of remote Wyoming, tried to find a semblance of normalcy while adjusting to his new surroundings. Remarkably, these very different life experiences and political paths had converged by the early 1990s when Representative Mineta and Senator Inouye served as two of the most senior and influential Members in their respective chambers.

Their stories embodied those of their APA contemporaries on Capitol Hill and portended even greater changes that would come in the following decades.

NOTES

- 1 Quotation from Senator Daniel K. Inouye, oral history interview by Major Debora R. Cox, 26 April 2000, U.S. Army Medical Department, Office of Medical History: 5. See also Daniel K. Inouye with Lawrence Elliott, *Journey to Washington* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969): 149–154; Willard Edwards, “Nisei Hero Inouye Brings Battlefield Courage to Senate,” 17 February 1963, *Chicago Tribune*: 11; Caryl Rivers, “A Career of Many Lifetimes,” 15 January 1967, *Boston Sunday Globe*: A32; Bill Yenne, *Rising Sons: The Japanese American GIs Who Fought for the United States in World War II* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2007): 215–217.
- 2 Inouye with Elliott, *Journey to Washington*: 149–154; Yenne, *Rising Sons*: 215–217.

- 3 Rivers, "A Career of Many Lifetimes."
- 4 This figure does not include the final Philippine Resident Commissioner, Carlos Peña Romulo, who was appointed to that position by the Philippine government-in-exile in August 1944. Because his career was so brief and fits better within the context of Philippine-U.S. relations, which is broadly covered in Part 1, "Exclusion and Empire, 1898–1946," his profile appears in that section of the book.
- 5 Inouye with Elliott, *Journey to Washington*: 53.
- 6 Ibid., 54–55.
- 7 Ibid., 56.
- 8 Ibid., 55, 57–61.
- 9 David M. Kennedy, *Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999): 747; Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans*, rev. ed. (Boston, MA: Back Bay Books, 1998): xiv.
- 10 Yenne, *Rising Sons*: 34–39.
- 11 John S. Whitehead, *Completing the Union: Alaska, Hawai'i, and the Battle for Statehood* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004): 72; Roger Bell, *Last Among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984): 77; H. Brett Melendy, *Hawaii: America's Sugar Territory, 1898–1959* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999): 233, 237.
- 12 Tom Coffman, *The Island Edge of America: A Political History of Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003): 79.
- 13 Gary Y. Okihiro, *Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865–1945* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1991): 205; Melendy, *Hawaii*: 237.
- 14 Sucheng Chan, *Asian Americans: An Interpretive History* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1991): 124–125; Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 383.
- 15 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 382–383.
- 16 Ibid., 382; Whitehead, *Completing the Union*: 78; Melendy, *Hawaii*: 234.
- 17 Whitehead, *Completing the Union*: 84; Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 384.
- 18 Chan, *Asian Americans*: 125; Gavan Daws, *Shoals of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1968): 348; quotation in Carla Hall, "The Senator & His Space Refrain," 13 August 1986, *Washington Post*: C1.
- 19 Hall, "The Senator & His Space Refrain"; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 134; Whitehead, *Completing the Union*: 84–87.
- 20 Whitehead, *Completing the Union*: 86; Bell, *Last Among Equals*: 82; Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 385.
- 21 "Japanese Excel in U.S. Combat Unit," 6 June 1943, *New York Times*: 33.
- 22 Chan, *Asian Americans*: 134; Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 400.
- 23 Melendy, *Hawaii*: 238; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 134–135; Yenne, *Rising Sons*: 2.
- 24 Inouye with Elliott, *Journey to Washington*: 201–202.
- 25 Johanna Neuman, "Profile: Norm Mineta; What Moves Him?," 25 April 2005, *Los Angeles Times*: B2.
- 26 Ken Ringle, "The Patriot: Norman Mineta Was Interned by His Country, but Still He Loved It. Then He Changed It," 21 August 2000, *Washington Post*: C1.
- 27 "Executive Order 9066," National Archives and Records Administration, accessed 6 October 2017, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/5730250>.
- 28 Ringle, "The Patriot"; Berkley Hudson, "'The Hurt is Still There,' Reparations Evoke Painful Recollections," 25 August 1998, *Los Angeles Times*: 10; Michael E. Myers, "As Japanese-Americans, He and His Family Were Interned During War," 22 May 1988, *Los Angeles Times*: 2.
- 29 Roger Daniels, *Asian America: Chinese and Japanese in the United States since 1850* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988): 202, 205–206; Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 386.

- 30 Daniels, *Asian America*: 199–200; Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 380; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 124–125.
- 31 Roger Daniels, *The Japanese American Cases: The Rule of Law in Time of War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2013): 23–24.
- 32 Roger Daniels, *Prisoners without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993).
- 33 Daniels, *Asian America*: 231, 225.
- 34 Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, *Milton S. Eisenhower: Educational Statesman* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Daniels, *Asian America*: 226–227. In his letter, Eisenhower estimated that 4 in 5 *nisei* were loyal with 50 percent of *isei* “passively loyal.”
- 35 Chan, *Asian Americans*: 127; Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 395; Daniels, *Asian America*: 231–232.
- 36 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 395; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 127.
- 37 Chan, *Asian Americans*: 128.
- 38 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 395.
- 39 Ibid., 396; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 128.
- 40 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 395; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 128.
- 41 Betty Cuniberti, “Internment: Personal Voices, Powerful Choices,” 4 October 1987, *Los Angeles Times*: 1. See also Irvin Molotsky, “Washington Talk: Friendships, The Heat of War Welds a Bond That Endures Across Aisles and Years,” 26 April 1988, *New York Times*: A22; Frank Davies, “Mineta, Ex-Senator Forged Ties at Internment Camp,” 2 May 2008, *San Jose Mercury News*: n.p.
- 42 Chan, *Asian Americans*: 128; Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 396.
- 43 Chan, *Asian Americans*: 129; Daniels, *Asian America*: 221–222.
- 44 While the initial call to fill the ranks of the segregated battalion would be filled by transfers and volunteers, the draft-registration information eased processing of new recruits. Daniels, *Asian America*: 251n97.
- 45 The wording of the WRA form for question 27 was “Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?” And the wording for question 28 was “Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attacks by foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor or any other foreign power or organization?” Daniels, *Asian America*: 261; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 130; Erika Lee, *The Making of Asian America: A History* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015): 239.
- 46 Daniels, *Asian America*: 220; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 133.
- 47 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 398; Lee, *The Making of Asian America*: 243; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 134.
- 48 Chan, *Asian Americans*: 129–130, 132–133; Daniels, *Asian America*: 228–230.
- 49 Peter Irons, *Justice at War: The Story of the Japanese American Internment Cases* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Daniels, *Japanese American Cases*.
- 50 Paul Finkelman, “*Hirabayashi v. United States*,” in *The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States*, 2nd ed., ed. Kermit L. Hall (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005): 430–431.
- 51 Finkelman, “*Hirabayashi v. United States*.”
- 52 Paul Finkelman, “*Korematsu v. United States*,” in *The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court*, 2nd ed., ed. Kermit L. Hall (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005): 561–562. The *Korematsu* decision has never been overturned. See Adam Liptak, “A Discredited Supreme Court Ruling That Still, Technically, Stands,” 27 January 2014, *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/us/time-for-supreme-court-to-overrule-korematsu-verdict.html> (accessed 24 August 2016).
- 53 Irons, *Justice at War*: 343; Daniels, *Japanese American Cases*: 77–78.

- 54 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 404–505; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 139.
- 55 Lee, *The Making of Asian America*: 253–254; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 121.
- 56 Lee, *The Making of Asian America*: 254.
- 57 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 373–374; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 121–122.
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- 59 Displaced Persons Act, Public Law 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948); Stathis, *Landmark Legislation*: 231; Roger Daniels, *Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1990): 329–330; David M. Reimers, *Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992): 22; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 141; Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 417.
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- 61 Reimers, *Still the Golden Door*: 16–17.
- 62 “Naturalization of Asians,” *CQ Almanac*, 1950, 6th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1951): 240–42, <http://library.cqpress.com>; U.S. Senate, *Presidential Vetoes, 1789–1976* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978): 388.
- 63 Refugee Relief Act, Public Law 83-203, 67 Stat. 400 (1953); Daniels, *Coming to America*: 336; Stathis, *Landmark Legislation*: 240–241; Reimers, *Still the Golden Door*: 24; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 141.
- 64 Internal Security Act of 1950, Public Law 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950); Michael J. Ybarra, *Washington Gone Crazy: Senator Pat McCarran and the Great American Communist Hunt* (Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2004): 508, 510; Mitchell T. Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream: How Japanese Americans Obtained Redress* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999): 65.
- 65 Daniels, *Asian America*: 307–308; Lee, *The Making of Asian America*: 276. For more on illegal Chinese immigration during the Cold War, see Mae M. Ngai, “Legacies of Exclusion: Illegal Chinese Immigration during the Cold War Years,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 18, no. 1 (1998): 3–35. And for more general information on the history of illegal immigration, see Mae M. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
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- 73 Saund, *Congressman from India*: 63.
- 74 Ibid., 71.
- 75 Ibid., 72–75.
- 76 “Naturalization of Natives of India,” *CQ Almanac*, 1945, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1946): 710–711, <http://library.cqpress.com>; Reimers, *Still the Golden Door*: 15.
- 77 *Congressional Record*, House, 78th Cong., 2nd sess. (14 June 1946): 6933; *Congressional Record*, House, 78th Cong., 2nd sess. (25 June 1946): 7458; *Congressional Record*, House, 78th Cong., 2nd sess. (27 June 1946): 7775; Saund, *Congressman from India*: 75; “Indian Bill Praised,” 29 June 1946, *New York Times*: 3; Hing, *Making and Remaking Asian America*: 36–37; Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 417; Public Law 79-483, 60 Stat. 416 (1946).
- 78 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 412–413; Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 55, 249n11.
- 79 Daniels, *Asian America*: 305; Tichenor, *Dividing Lines*: 189–190; Stathis, *Landmark Legislation*: 238.
- 80 Reimers, *Still the Golden Door*: 20; Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 413.
- 81 U.S. Senate, *Presidential Vetoes*: 393.
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- 84 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” 8 January 1964, in *American Presidency Project*, ed. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26787> (accessed 12 March 2016); Lyndon B. Johnson, “Statement by the President in Response to a Report on Immigration,” 17 January 1964, in *American Presidency Project*, ed. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25994> (accessed 12 March 2016).
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- 86 Reimers, *Still the Golden Door*: 74.
- 87 Ibid., 66; “National Quotas for Immigration to End,” *CQ Almanac*, 1965, 21st ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1966): 459–482, <http://library.cqpress.com>. See, for example, James L. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1968): 481; Lyndon B. Johnson, “Special Message to the Congress on Immigration,” 13 January 1965, in *American Presidency Project*, ed. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26830> (accessed 12 March 2016).
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- 95 *Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Pacific Islands*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 378 (3 July 1947); Public Law 80-204, 61 Stat. 397 (1947); Garrison Nelson, *Committees in the U.S. Congress, 1947 to 1992*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1994): 963. It appears that committee members reported materials through their standing committees. The joint committee disbanded on December 31, 1948.
- 96 Arnold H. Leibowitz, "American Samoa: Decline of a Culture," *California Western International Law Journal* 10, no. 2 (Spring 1980): 227–229; Sean Morrison, "Foreign in a Domestic Sense: American Samoa and the Last U.S. Nationals," *Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 75.
- 97 Arnold H. Leibowitz, *Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989): 414; Morrison, "Foreign in a Domestic Sense": 76–77.
- 98 Robert F. Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall: A History of Guam*, rev. ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011): 130, 140; Leibowitz, *Defining Status*: 323, 417. Chamorro is the common term used to describe Guam natives before World War II. After the war, Chamorro and Guamanian are considered interchangeable terms. See Gina E. Taitano, "Adoption of 'Guamanian,'" *Guampedia*, accessed 13 October 2015, <http://www.guampedia.com/adoption-of-guamanian/>.
- 99 One exception is Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland, who introduced a bill (S. 1450), which died in the 75th Congress (1937–1939), conferring citizenship to Chamorros on Guam. Navy Secretary Claude Swanson was blunt: "These people have not yet reached a state of development commensurate with the personal independence, obligations, and responsibility of United States citizenship," he told a Senate Committee in 1937. The letter from Swanson to Senator Tydings is printed in the Hearings before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, *Citizenship for Residents of Guam*, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (9 April 1937): 2.
- 100 Leibowitz, *Defining Status*: 323–324.
- 101 *Congressional Record*, House, 99th Cong., 2nd sess. (26 November 1991): 35435.
- 102 *Congressional Record*, House, 96th Cong., 2nd sess. (5 March 1980): 4831.
- 103 Pedro C. Sanchez, *Guam: The History of Our Island* (Agana, Guam: Sanchez Publishing House, 1987): 297; Lloyd Norman, "Navy Must Long Rule Guam, Says Island Leader," 10 November 1946, *Chicago Tribune*: 36.
- 104 Leibowitz, *Defining Status*: 325; James Perez Viernes, "Civil Rights and Citizenship (1898–1950)," *Guampedia*, accessed 13 October 2015, <http://www.guampedia.com/chamorro-drive-for-civil-rights/>.
- 105 Doloris Coulter, "Guam Rebels at New Navy 'Rule,'" 3 April 1949, *Washington Post*: B3.
- 106 Organic Act of Guam, Public Law 81-630, 64 Stat. 384 (1950); Stathis, *Landmark Legislation*: 235; Guam Elective Governor Act, Public Law 90-497, 82 Stat. 842 (1968).
- 107 There is one instance of a proposed Organic Act for American Samoa. After the *matai* protested a host of U.S. policies and threatened to destabilize the military's authority, Congress authorized the creation of a commission to investigate the governance of American Samoa in 1930. The commission recommended that Samoans be granted American citizenship with a tripartite government but the legislation died in the House in 1933. See Leibowitz, *Defining Status*: 416–417.
- 108 Eni F. H. Faleomavaega, oral history interview by the U.S. Capitol Historical Society, 11 April 2011, accessed 13 July 2015, http://www.uschs.org/oral-histories/uschs_faleomavaega.htm (site discontinued); Nationality Act of 1940, Public Law 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940); Morrison, "Foreign in a Domestic Sense": 84, 84n79.
- 109 Leibowitz, *Defining Status*: 420.
- 110 Leibowitz, "American Samoa: Decline of a Culture": 251; Morrison, "Foreign in a Domestic Sense": 80.
- 111 For a full picture of the development of the local legislature, see Fofó I. F. Sunia, *The Story of the Legislature of American Samoa* (New Zealand: GP Printers, 1988); Leibowitz, "American Samoa: Decline of a Culture": 255–256.

- 112 Leibowitz, *Defining Status*: 339–340.
- 113 House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, *Providing for a Delegate to the House of Representatives for the Unincorporated Territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands*, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. 270 (1971): 2, 4; “Guam, Virgin Islands Delegates,” *CQ Almanac*, 1972, 28th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1973): ch. 6, 245; *Congressional Record*, House, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (18 January 1972): 26; Public Law 92-271, 86 Stat. 118 (1972).
- 114 Paramount Chief A. U. Fuimaono first held the position, and Faleomavaega worked on his staff.
- 115 Hearing before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on National Parks and Insular Affairs, *Delegate from American Samoa to the U.S. Congress*, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. (8 August 1978): 1.
- 116 Faleomavaega, oral history interview; Public Law 95-556, 92 Stat. 2078 (1978).
- 117 See Richard Ben Cramer, *What It Takes: The Way to the White House* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993): 95–111, 131–136; Ed O’Keefe, “Bob Dole Pays Respects to Daniel Inouye in Capitol Rotunda,” 20 December 2012, *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/wp/2012/12/20/bob-dole-pays-respects-to-daniel-inouye-in-capitol-rotunda> (accessed 24 August 2016); David M. Shribman, “The Daniel Inouye Generation: Wounded in War, He Just Kept Serving His Country,” 19 December 2012, *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*: B7; Robert D. McFadden, “Daniel Inouye, Hawaii’s Quiet Voice of Conscience in Senate, Is Dead at 88,” 18 December 2012, *New York Times*: A33; Frank Davies, “Mineta, Ex-Senator Forged Ties at Internment Camp,” 2 May 2008, *San Jose Mercury News*: n.p.
- 118 *Congressional Record*, House, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (9 September 1975): 28034.
- 119 Leibowitz, *Defining Status*: 336–338. Quotation from Rogers, *Destiny’s Landfall*: 242.
- 120 Blaz introduced H.R. 4100, 100th Cong. (1988).
- 121 Guam Meritorious Claims Act, Public Law 79-224, 59 Stat. 582 (1945); Bernard Punzalan, “Guam World War II War Claims: A Legislative History,” *Guampedia*, accessed 9 March 2016, <http://www.guampedia.com/guam-world-war-ii-war-claims-legislative-history/>. Under the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the United States excused reparations from Japan and transferred war claims in Guam to its courts. See Stathis, *Landmark Legislation*: 238.
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- 125 Leanne McLaughlin, “Record is Admirable: Won Pat,” 3 September 1976, *Pacific Daily News* (Guam): 24.
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- 128 Faleomavaega, oral history interview.
- 129 See Appendix B, Asian Pacific Islander Representatives, Senators, Delegates, and Resident Commissioners by State and Territory, 1900–2017.
- 130 See the general discussions in Bell, *Last Among Equals*, and Whitehead, *Completing the Union*.
- 131 Bell, *Last Among Equals*: 243, 253–254.
- 132 *Ibid.*, 257–258.
- 133 Whitehead, *Completing the Union*: 307; Melendy, *Hawaii*: 277.
- 134 Office of the Historian, U.S. House of Representatives, “Mary Elizabeth Pruett Farrington,” *Women in Congress*, <http://history.house.gov/People/Detail/13007?ret=True>.
- 135 Bell, *Last Among Equals*: 237, 273.
- 136 *Ibid.*, 238, 244, 246; Whitehead, *Completing the Union*: 311.

- 137 Bell, *Last Among Equals*: 247–249.
- 138 Whitehead, *Completing the Union*: 312; quotation in Bell, *Last Among Equals*: 250.
- 139 Whitehead, *Completing the Union*: 314–316; Stathis, *Landmark Legislation*: 252.
- 140 Daws, *Shoal of Time*: 391; Whitehead, *Completing the Union*: 319, 322–323.
- 141 Daniels, *Asian America*: 265–266.
- 142 Chan, *Asian Americans*: 139; Public Law 78-405, 58 Stat. 677 (1944).
- 143 Lee, *The Making of Asian America*: 239–240.
- 144 Ibid., 239–241; Daniels, *Japanese American Cases*: 122–124; Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 54–55.
- 145 Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 60–61.
- 146 Ibid., 55, 250n13.
- 147 Ibid., 52.
- 148 Daniels, *Asian America*: 296–297.
- 149 House Committee on the Judiciary, *Authorizing the Attorney General to Adjudicate Certain Claims Resulting from Evacuation of Certain Persons of Japanese Ancestry Under Military Orders*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. 732 (27 June 1947); Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (hereinafter CWRIC), *Personal Justice Denied*, Part 1 (December 1982): 50, <https://www.archives.gov/research/japanese-americans/justice-denied> (accessed 9 January 2017); Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 54; Daniels, *Asian America*: 296.
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- 163 William J. Clinton, “Proclamation 7395—Establishment of the Minidoka Internment

- National Monument,” 17 January 2001, in *American Presidency Project*, ed. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=62518> (accessed 31 March 2016).
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- 172 Daniels, *Japanese American Cases*: 148; Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 86.
- 173 Daniels, *Japanese American Cases*: 148; quotation in Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 86.
- 174 Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 86; see also Daniels, *Japanese American Cases*: 148.
- 175 Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 91–92; Daniels, *Asian America*: 334–335.
- 176 Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 92. Backed by JACL members who thought the commission option was too timid, Seattle Congressman Michael E. Lowry introduced a competing redress bill that provided for a formal apology and reparations payments. Because none of the *nikkei* Congressmen supported it, the Judiciary Committee never considered it. See Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 92–93; Daniels, *Japanese American Cases*: 149.
- 177 Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 93–94.
- 178 *Ibid.*, 95; *Congressional Record*, House, 96th Cong., 2nd sess. (21 July 1980): 18875–18876.
- 179 Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 96; Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act, Public Law 96-317, 94 Stat. 964 (1980). See also Jimmy Carter, “Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act Remarks on Signing S. 1647 Into Law,” 31 July 1980, in *American Presidency Project*, ed. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=44855> (accessed 9 March 2016).
- 180 Senator Milton R. Young of South Dakota served as president pro tempore on December 5, 1980. See “President Pro Tempore,” U.S. Senate Historical Office, accessed 24 March 2016, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/President_Pro_Tempore.htm#5.
- 181 Daniels, *Japanese American Cases*: 150; Daniels, *Asian America*: 335–336. The other members were former Massachusetts Senator Edward W. Brooke; former Justice Arthur J. Goldberg; former Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Arthur S. Fleming; Judge William J. Marutani; and former Washington Senator Hugh B. Mitchell. In early 1981, Reverend Ishmael V. Gromoff, an Aleut, and former Massachusetts Representative Father Robert F. Drinan were added to the commission.

- 182 Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 99–100; CWRIC, *Personal Justice Denied*, Part 1: 1; Daniels, *Japanese American Cases*: 153.
- 183 Lee, *The Making of Asian America*: 312; quotation in Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 485.
- 184 Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 110.
- 185 *Congressional Record*, Senate, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (7 December 1982): 29209–29213, quotation on p. 29213.
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- 187 *Ibid.*, 18.
- 188 Daniels, *Japanese American Cases*: 4; Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 111.
- 189 Daniels, *Asian America*: 339.
- 190 CWRIC, *Personal Justice Denied*, Part 2: *Recommendations*, <https://www.archives.gov/research/japanese-americans/justice-denied> (accessed 25 March 2016); Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 112.
- 191 Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 113.
- 192 *Ibid.*, 139, 142. For the testimony of Mineta and Matsui, see Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations, *Japanese-American and Aleutian Wartime Relocation*, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., (20–21, 27 June 1984 and 12 September 1984): 24.
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- 194 Both Senators Inouye and Matsunaga served in the 442nd. Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 153–156.
- 195 Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations, *Civil Liberties Act of 1985 and the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands Restitution Act*, Part I, 99th Cong., 2nd sess. (28 April 1986): 34.
- 196 *Ibid.*, 36; Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 156.
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- 198 “House Votes to Make Amends for Internment,” *CQ Almanac*, 1987, 43rd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1988): 278, <http://library.cqpress.com>; “Internees Gain Reparations,” *CQ Almanac*, 1988, 44th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1989): 80–81, <http://library.cqpress.com>; Bill McAllister, “Amends Sought for 1940s Internment,” 12 September 1987, *Washington Post*: A1; Mick Rood, no title, 16 September 1987, States News Service; Jill Lawrence, no title, 17 September 1987, Associated Press; Nathaniel Nash, “House Votes Payments to Japanese Internees,” 18 September 1987, *New York Times*: A15; Jill Lawrence, “Mineta Tearfully Recalls 1942 Internment as House Votes Cash Compensation,” 18 September 1987, Associated Press.
- 199 Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 167, 170. The Aleut redress bill was reported out of the Judiciary Committee in October. “House Votes to Make Amends for Internment”; Halloran, *Sparky*: 210–220.
- 200 Halloran, *Sparky*: 210–220.
- 201 Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 167–169; “House Votes to Make Amends for Internment.”
- 202 “House Votes to Make Amends for Internment.”
- 203 *Congressional Record*, House, 100th Cong., 1st sess. (17 September 1987): 24304.
- 204 “House Votes to Make Amends for Internment.”
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- 206 Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 171, 181; “Internees Gain Reparations”; Halloran, *Sparky*: 226.

- 207 *Congressional Record*, Senate, 100th Cong., 2nd sess. (20 April 1988): 7619–7643; “Internees Gain Reparations”; Halloran, *Sparky*: 233–234.
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- 209 Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*: 485–486; Ronald Reagan, “Remarks on Signing the Bill Providing Restitution for the Wartime Internment of Japanese-American Civilians,” 10 August 1988, in *American Presidency Project*, ed. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36240> (accessed 24 March 2016).
- 210 “House Votes to Make Amends for Internment”; quotation in Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 201–203.
- 211 Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 201, 203–204; “Commerce, Justice, State Cleared for President,” in *CQ Almanac, 1989*, 45th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1990): 721–728, <http://library.cqpress.com>.
- 212 “Commerce, Justice, State Cleared for President”; Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 206, 208.
- 213 “Commerce, Justice, State Cleared for President”; Maki et al., *Achieving the Impossible Dream*: 209–210; Chan, *Asian Americans*: 174; Daniels, *Japanese American Cases*: 163.

Party Divisions in the House of Representatives

85th–102nd Congresses (1957–1993)*




Source: Office of the Historian, U.S. House of Representatives, "Party Divisions," <http://history.house.gov>.

*Party division totals are based on Election Day results.

Party Divisions in the Senate

85th–102nd Congresses (1957–1993)*




Sources: U.S. Senate Historical Office; *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774–Present*, <http://bioguide.congress.gov>.

*Party division totals are based on Election Day results.


Asian and Pacific Islander American Members by Office

First Elected 1956–1991



Asian and Pacific Islander American Members by State and Territory

First Elected 1956–1991



Sources: Appendix A: Asian and Pacific Islander American Representatives, Senators, Delegates, and Resident Commissioners by Congress, 1900–2017; Office of the Historian, U.S. House of Representatives; U.S. Senate Historical Office.

Congressional Service

For Asian and Pacific Islander Americans in Congress First Elected 1956–1991

