

# U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ: ADMINISTRATION VIEWS

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## HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 3:46 p.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Secretary, I hate to tell you this, but while you were socializing with these cameramen we are watching, the staff removed the film from all those cameras. There was a negative reaction to that!

Anyway, we are all set. The Committee will come to order. We thank you, Secretary, for your patience. This has been another typical day on the Hill. And it is of great pleasure to welcome you once more to our Committee.

We have heard from a very distinguished panel of experts this morning on the subject of Iraq, and, of course, we look forward to your testimony.

The United States is once again confronted with the specter of Saddam Hussein armed with an arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear weapons. This is a sobering prospect, but we should not focus our attention solely on his instruments of destruction. Indeed, we must recognize that the threat lies in Saddam himself.

The record could not be more stark. In 1980, he attacked Iran and initiated a decade of warfare that killed and wounded over 1 million people, a conflict that included his use of chemical weapons on Iranian troops, and in 1990, he invaded Kuwait and imposed a brutal occupation upon that country, laying waste to everything within reach when his forces were finally driven out. He has indiscriminately used chemical weapons on unarmed civilians in his own country and has slaughtered any who have opposed him.

Given this record, there can be no doubt that once armed with weapons of even greater destructive power, he will have little reluctance to use them. The threat to U.S. interests is obvious, but we are not the only target. The entire world should understand the danger that Saddam poses to everyone and should welcome any opportunity to end it before he is ready to strike.

Despite the extensive criticism that has been directed at the Administration, I believe that the President and you, Mr. Secretary, have gone to extraordinary lengths to enlist the cooperation of the world community, including that of our allies and the United Na-

tions. The response, however, has been a disappointing one. You will forgive me if I say that many of our critics apparently refuse to recognize the danger for what it is, or have decided that this is a problem that they can leave to the U.S. while they limit their contribution to commenting safely from the sidelines. We can see this attitude once again in the eager reaction to Saddam's latest promise of cooperation, which has, at least initially, accomplished its purpose of undermining the fragile beginnings of a consensus that at long last something must be done.

But we would be fools indeed if we believed that Saddam can be trusted. He has cynically broken all of his previous promises of cooperation, and there is no reason to believe that his latest statement is anything more than an attempt to delay and divide us. He will only use the time the world grants him to further his plans and preparations.

To those who advocate a more trusting approach, I need only remind them that Britain and France once waited hopefully while Germany armed itself, with results that were catastrophic to all. This is a stark reality.

But we are confronted with an even greater danger than Saddam himself. Despite clear and repeated warnings, it appears that much of the world does not understand that we have entered a wholly new and increasingly perilous era. Through repeated usage, the term "weapons of mass destruction" has become almost banal, but the unimaginable destructive power these weapons represent requires our constant focus and a determination to do what we must to defend ourselves.

The problem is not merely that a murderous tyrant such as Saddam may be in possession of these weapons. In the aftermath of September 11th, we must accept that he has been joined by many others of an even more fanatical purpose. Terrorists willing to commit suicide in order to kill large numbers of innocents cannot be stopped by the familiar conventions of deterrence. Their possession of weapons of mass destruction must be equated with a certainty that these will be used against us.

To assume that these terrorists and others will remain unarmed by Saddam is an assumption with a deadly potential. A first strike could well be the last strike. We should not guess the world into annihilation. Given the leadership role of the United States in the world and the recognition that only we can defend our own interests, we do not have the luxury of pretending not to see the danger confronting us. All our choices are difficult ones, but the only real option is to act.

I now yield to Mr. Lantos for his opening statement, and I will beg the indulgence of the Committee to forego their opening statements so we can get to the Secretary's important testimony. Their statements will be made a part of the record, without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hyde follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure to welcome you once again to our Committee. We have heard from a very distinguished panel of experts this morning on the subject of Iraq, and we look forward to your testimony.

The United States is once again confronted with the specter of Saddam Hussein armed with an arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons. This is a sobering prospect, but we should not focus our attention solely on his instruments of destruction. Instead, we must recognize that the threat lies in Saddam himself. The record could not be more stark. In 1980, he attacked Iran and initiated a decade of warfare that killed and wounded over one million people, a conflict that included his use of chemical weapons on Iranian troops. In 1990, he invaded Kuwait and imposed a brutal occupation upon that country, laying waste to everything within reach when his forces were finally driven out. He has indiscriminately used chemical weapons on unarmed civilians in his own country and has slaughtered any who have opposed him. Given this record, there can be no doubt that, once armed with weapons of even greater destructive power, he will have little reluctance to use them.

The threat to U.S. interests is obvious, but we are not the only target. The entire world should understand the danger that Saddam poses to everyone and should welcome any opportunity to end it before he is ready to strike. Despite the extensive criticism that has been directed at the Administration, I believe that the President and you, Mr. Secretary, have gone to extraordinary lengths to enlist the cooperation of the world community, including that of our allies and the United Nations.

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To those who advocate a more trusting approach, I need only remind them that Britain and France once waited hopefully while Germany armed itself, with results that were catastrophic to all.

This is a stark reality, but we are confronted with an even greater danger than Saddam himself. Despite clear and repeated warnings, it appears that much of the world does not understand that we have entered a wholly new and increasingly perilous era.

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To assume that these terrorists and others will remain unarmed by Saddam is an assumption with a deadly potential. A first strike could well be the last strike.

We should not guess the world into annihilation.

Given the leadership role of the United States in the world and the recognition that only we can defend our own interests, we do not have the luxury of pretending not to see the danger confronting us. All of our choices are difficult ones, but our only real option is to act.

Chairman HYDE. And now Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me associate myself with all of your remarks.

Mr. Secretary, we are delighted and honored to have you. You have performed magnificently in our national interest, and I think I can speak for all Democrats and all Republicans on this panel to say we are deeply in your debt. You have done an outstanding job. I really found out how outstanding a job you did when my wife told

me last Sunday as we were watching you, this is Colin Powell's finest hour. Her judgment is impeccable.

Mr. Chairman, the President gave a speech last June in which he put forth a doctrine of preemption. I support his approach. In the security environment of today where technology overrides borders, where weapons of frightening destructive power can pass easily and unseen between rogue states and terrorists, it is only common sense that a doctrine of preemption be one tool in our policy arsenal. We cannot wait for madmen to strike first. Their blow might be more than we should bear.

But it would be wrong, Mr. Chairman, to think that preemption is a new concept on the world scene. Wise leaders have always been alert to threats and taken timely action. To cite perhaps the most appropriate and crucial example, in 1981, Israel bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, incurring the fury of much of the world, but then the deep gratitude of all thinking people less than a decade later. Had it not been for Israel's action that fateful day, it would have been a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein who would have occupied Kuwait in 1990, and we may well have chosen a different strategy than we did. Had Saddam possessed nuclear arms in 1990, he might very well today control not only the oil fields of Iraq and Kuwait, but also those of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Thanks to the doctrine of preemption, that did not occur.

The Administration is asking us to support their right to wage war on Saddam Hussein if he cannot be brought into compliance with all U.N. resolutions. Mr. Chairman, the case for removing Saddam is powerful. Already illegally wielding chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein must be stopped before he develops nuclear arms and the capacity to deliver them, and he must be stopped before he shares his chemical and biological weapons with terrorists, if he has not already done so. There is very little time to lose.

Some argue that we need not resort to military action because Saddam can be contained as the Soviet Union was. But who would bet their lives on it? With the stakes so high, we must prepare for all eventualities, not merely for the possible or even for the probable.

Saddam is a dictator who took over one of the wealthiest countries in the world and utterly destroyed its economy through his reckless actions. As we all know, he started two major wars, tried to wipe an entire country off the map, attacked Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran unprovoked, tried to assassinate the former President of the United States, gassed his own people as well as Iranians, and committed innumerable abominations in what the great Iraqi intellectual Kanan Makiya called a republic of fear.

When he was given a reprieve after the Gulf War, survival in exchange for the destruction of his weapons of mass destruction, he egregiously violated the terms of his parole. How difficult is it to believe that a dictator with this type of a resume would use nuclear weapons? Are we to sit on our hands while Saddam develops nuclear arms? Could we ever forgive ourselves if he used them? If he did use these horrible weapons against our interests, could we say

we were surprised? That we would never have imagined such a thing?

If we do nothing, we will almost certainly stand humiliated before history. We are in a race against time. We must rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein before he commits his next outrage.

Mr. Chairman, if there will be an Iraq campaign, it must not end with Saddam's fall. The biggest benefit in a post-Saddam Middle East would be the emergence in time of a democratic Iraq that could become the democratic jewel of the Arab world. This would require a long-term effort on our part and on the part of our friends, but its success would revolutionize the region far more than just repaying our investment. A democratic Iraq would be antiextremist. It would be devoted to building its society rather than destroying others. It would isolate terrorist supporters like Syria and Iran, and the myth that democracy is incompatible with Arab society would be shattered. Indeed, the demonstrated effect of Iraqi democracy would resonate throughout the authoritarian-dominated Middle East.

By assisting Iraqi democratization, the United States would not only have demonstrated its opposition to a lawless Iraqi regime, but its commitment to the Iraqi people, and, as in our finest hours, we will have joined our resolve to defend ourselves to our highest democratic ideals.

Mr. Chairman, war is a terrible thing. I know it well. I was closer to it for a longer period of time than most Members of Congress. Sometimes, as in the Second World War, there is no other way to do what is best for humanity. Mr. Chairman, if no peaceful way can be found to rid the world of the plague of Saddam Hussein, I believe this may be one of those times. Thank you.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

They say when you are introducing someone who has many accomplishments and is so well-known, the less you say, the better. And if I were introducing you at a dinner, I would say, ladies and gentlemen, the Secretary of State. But in any event, it is a great pleasure to welcome you, and we would like to hear from you now.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COLIN L. POWELL,  
SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Secretary POWELL. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure to be back before the Committee, and I welcome this opportunity to present the Administration's position with respect to our situation regarding Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Lantos, and other Members of the Committee, you and I have been discussing Iraq for many years. In fact, many of the Committee Members go back to the days before the Gulf War when I came up and testified on so many occasions about what we were doing in our buildup of Desert Shield. We all remember vividly that in 1990, Saddam Hussein's forces, as both of you have noted, invaded Kuwait, brutalized that population, and at that time rejected the international community's ultimatum to withdraw.

The United States built a worldwide coalition. We got the whole international community involved at that time with the clear political purpose of liberating Kuwait. The military instrument of that

coalition led by America had an equally clear military objective that flowed directly from the political purpose, and that was to eject the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait. The United Nations Security Council endorsed this purpose and objective, and the international community responded with unprecedented political backing, financial support, and military forces. As a result, we not only accomplished our mission in the Gulf War, the way in which we did it was a model of American leadership and a model of international cooperation.

When the war ended, the Security Council of the United Nations agreed to take measures to ensure that Iraq did not threaten any of its neighbors again. Saddam Hussein, as you both have noted and all will note, was a man who after all had sent his armies against Iran in 1980 and then against Kuwait in 1990, who had fired ballistic missiles at neighboring countries, and had used chemical weapons in the war with Iran and even against his own people. The United States and the international community at that time were strongly determined to prevent any future aggression.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 fixed the terms of the cease-fire in the Gulf, and the fundamental purpose of this resolution and many more that followed was restoration of regional peace and security by way of a series of stringent demands on Iraq, particularly its disarmament with respect to weapons of mass destruction and possession of ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometers.

Desert Storm dramatically reduced Iraq's more conventional military capability, while at the same time it did not leave Iraq so prostrate that it could not defend itself against Iran. It just had finished a war with Iran, and we did not want to give Iran an opportunity to start that war up again from a position of superiority.

The focus of 687 was on weapons of mass destruction, and the resolutions that followed focused on that and other problems with Iraq that I will touch on in a moment.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, you know the rest of the story. You heard President Bush relate it at the United Nations 7 days ago. Iraq has defied the United Nations and refused to comply completely with any of the United Nations Security Council resolutions that were passed. Moreover, since December 1998, when the United Nations inspection teams left Iraq because of the regime's flagrant defiance of the U.N., the Iraqi regime, Saddam Hussein, has been free to pursue weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile the world has changed dramatically.

Since September 11th, 2001, the world is a different place, a more dangerous place than the place that existed before September 11th or a few years ago when the inspectors were last in. As a consequence of the terrorist attacks on that day and of the war on terrorism that those attacks made necessary, a new reality was born. The world had to recognize that the potential connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction moved terrorism to a new level of threat, a threat that could not be deterred, as has been noted, a threat that we could not allow to grow because of this connection between states developing weapons of mass destruction and terrorist organizations willing to use them without any compunction and in an undeterrable fashion. In fact, that nexus became the

overriding security concern of our Nation. It still is and will continue to be so for years to come.

We now see that a proven menace like Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction could empower a few terrorists to threaten millions of innocent people. President Bush is fully determined to deal with this threat. This Administration is determined to defeat it. I believe the American people would have us do no less.

President Bush is also aware of the need to engage the international community, just as an earlier President Bush did some 12 years ago. He understands perfectly how powerful a strong and unified international community can be, as we have seen so well demonstrated in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere, a war on terrorism that is each day producing new successes, one step, one arrest, one apprehension at a time.

The need to engage the international community is why the President took his message on the grave and gathering danger of Iraq to the United Nations last week. Moreover, it is the United Nations that is an offended party, not Iraq, as some people might claim, and not just the United States. It is the international community that should be offended. It is a combination of United Nations resolutions that have been systemically and brutally ignored and violated for these past 12 years. It was the United Nations inspectors who found it impossible to do their job and had to leave the work unfinished.

The President's challenge to the United Nations General Assembly was a direct one, and it was a very simple one: If you would remain relevant, you must act. You must not look away from this challenge.

The President's speech was powerful. I was there, I listened to it, I knew what he was going to say, and I could see the energy in the room as he delivered it. It energized the United Nations General Assembly, and it energized the debate taking place at this 57th meeting of the General Assembly. It changed the political landscape on which this issue was being discussed. It made it clear that Iraq is the problem. Iraq is the one that is in material breach of the demands placed on it by this multilateral organization, the United Nations.

The President made clear that what was expected of Iraq was to repair this breach if it could. He made it clear that the issue, however, was more than just disarming Iraq by eliminating its weapons of mass destruction and by constraining its mid- and long-range missile capability. The U.N. resolutions also spoke of terrorism, human rights, the return of prisoners, the return of property, and the proper use of the oil for food programs. And the indictment that the President laid out didn't need much discussion or debate. Everybody sitting in that chamber last Thursday knew that Iraq stood guilty of the charges. It convicted itself by its action over these past 12 years. There can be no question that Iraq is in material breach of its obligations.

Over the past weekend while I worked the aftermath of the President's speech, I saw the pressure build on Iraq, as the Arab League, the Secretary General, and so many other nations pressed Iraq on the need to take action. It stood guilty, and nobody could

deny the guilt. And then 4 days ago, on Monday, Iraq responded not with a serious offer, but with a familiar tactical ploy to try to get out of the box, to try to get out of the corner once more. The Iraqi Foreign Minister said Iraq would let the inspectors in, quote, without conditions. And this morning in a speech at the United Nations, he challenged President Bush's September 12th speech. He even called for a discussion of the issue of inspection teams in accordance, quote, with international law, he said.

He is already walking back. He is already stepping away from the "without conditions" statement that they made on Monday. But he is not deceiving anybody. It is a ploy we have seen before. We have seen it on many occasions, and on each occasion, once inspectors began to operate, Iraq continued to do everything to frustrate their work.

Mr. Chairman, I will call your and the Members' attention to the written statement that I have submitted, and I ask that it be put in the record, where I record a dozen examples of Iraq's defiance of the U.N. mandate. Cited in that longer statement is everything from intimidation at gunpoint to holding up inspectors while all the incriminating evidence was removed from the site to be inspected. It is a litany of defiance, unscrupulous behavior, and every sort of attempt at noncompliance, and by no means have I listed everything, only a sampling.

The Iraqi regime is infamous for its ploys, its stalling tactics, its demands on inspectors, sometimes at the point of a gun, and its general and consistent defiance of the mandate of the United Nations Security Council. There is absolutely no reason to expect that Iraq has changed, that this latest effort of theirs to welcome inspectors without conditions is not just another ploy. Let us be absolutely clear about the reason for their announcement on Monday and what their Foreign Minister said today. They did not suddenly see the error of their ways. They did not suddenly want to clear up the problems of the past 12 years. They were responding to the heat and the pressure generated by the international community after President Bush's speech.

The United States has made it clear to our Security Council colleagues that we will not fall for this ploy. This is not the time to welcome what they said and become giddy as some have done. This is the time to apply even more pressure. We must not relent. We must not believe that inspectors going in under the same conditions that caused their withdrawal 4 years ago is in any way acceptable or will bring us to a solution to this problem. These 4 years have been more than enough for Iraq to procure, develop, and hide proscribed items well beyond the reach of the kinds of inspections that were subject to Saddam's cheat-and-retreat approach from 1991 to 1998.

If inspectors do go back in because the U.N. feels that it is appropriate for them to do so, they must go back in under a new regime with new rules, and without any conditions and without any opportunity for Iraq to frustrate their efforts.

It is up now to the United Nations Security Council to decide what action is required of Iraq to deal with this material breach of the United Nations mandate. If part of the solution that the Security Council comes to involves an inspection regime, it must be

a regime that goes in with the authority of a new resolution that removes the weaknesses of the present regime, and which will not tolerate any Iraqi disobedience. It cannot be a resolution that will be negotiated with Iraq. The resolution must be strong enough and comprehensive enough that it produces disarmament and not just inspections.

Many United Nation members, including some on the Security Council, want to take Iraq at its word and send inspectors back in without any new resolution or new authority. It is a recipe for failure, and we will not support that. The debate we have begun to have within the Council is on the need for and the wording of a resolution. Our position is clear. We must face the facts and find Iraq in material breach. Then we must specify the actions we demand of Iraq, which President Bush has already laid out in his speech last week. And then here is the key element. Here is what will make it different from what we did in the past, and this must be an essential element of any road going forward, any plan to go forward from the Security Council: We must determine what consequences this time will flow from Iraq's failure to take action.

That is what makes this different. This time, unlike any time over the previous 12 years of Iraqi defiance, there must be hard consequences. This time Iraq must comply with the U.N. mandate, or there will be decisive action to compel its compliance.

We will listen to other points of view and will try to reach agreement within the Council. There will be a difficult debate. We will also preserve at all times the President of the United States' authority and ability to defend our Nation and our interests as he sees fit. Do it with our friends, do it with the United Nations, or do it alone, but the President has made it clear that this is a problem that must be solved and will be solved.

Some have suggested that there is a conflict in this approach, that U.S. interests should be our total concern. But, Mr. Chairman, both of these issues, both multilateral and unilateral, are important. We are a member of the United Nations Security Council. We are a member of the United Nations. It is a multilateral institution whose resolutions have been violated. But the United States, as a separate matter, believes that its interests are threatened even if the United Nations does not continue to come to that conclusion.

We are trying to solve this problem through the United Nations and in a multilateral way. The President took the case to the U.N. because it is the body that should deal with such matters as Iraq. It was created to deal with such matters. And President Bush is hoping that the U.N. will act in a decisive way. But, at the same time, as he has made clear, and my other colleagues in the Administration have made clear, and I make clear today, if the United Nations is not able to act and act decisively, then I think that will be a terrible indictment of the U.N., and the United States will have to make its own decision as to whether the danger posed by Iraq is such that we have to act in order to defend our country and to defend our interests.

Mr. Chairman, our diplomatic efforts at the United Nations would be helped by a strong, strong congressional resolution authorizing President Bush to take action. The President should be authorized to use all means he determines appropriate, including

military force, to enforce the United Nations Security Council's resolutions Iraq is defying, to defend the United States and its interests against the threat Iraq poses, and to restore international peace and security to the region.

I know that the Administration has provided language to the Congress. I ask that the Congress consider it carefully and quickly, and I ask for immediate action on such a resolution to show the world that the United States is united in this effort. To help the United Nations understand the seriousness of this issue, it would be important for all of us to speak as a nation, as a country, and to give this powerful signal to our diplomatic efforts in the United Nations.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues in the Intelligence Community and my colleague, Secretary Rumsfeld, are giving the Congress additional information with respect to military ideas and options and with respect to the intelligence supporting the conclusions we have come to, so I will not take any time to do that here today. But I am prepared to answer any questions in these areas that you think I might be competent and qualified to answer.

But let me say this about the Iraq threat before I stop and allow the greater part of our time available for your important questions to be answered: We can have debates and discussions or disagreements about the size and nature of the Iraqi stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, and we can discuss whether they are or are not violating the range constraints on the missiles that they have, but no one can doubt the record of Iraqi violations of United Nations security resolutions. That is not debatable. It is a fact. It is a stated fact. And no one can doubt Iraq's intention to continue to try to get these weapons of mass destruction unless they are stopped, and that is also not debatable. And I hope that will help to shape our debate and our discussions and the important decisions that we may have to make as a Nation. These two realities, their intention and their continued violations over time, are indisputable.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will stop and look forward to the questions from the Committee. And once again, I ask that my full statement be put in the record.

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Powell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE,  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you to testify on the Administration's position with regard to Iraq.

Congressman Hyde, Congressman Lantos, you and I have been discussing Iraq for a long time. In fact, many of the committee members go back with me to the days of the Gulf War.

In 1990, Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait, brutalized the population, and rejected the international community's ultimatum to withdraw.

The U.S. built a world-wide coalition with the clear political purpose of liberating Kuwait. The military instrument of that coalition, led by America, had an equally clear military objective that flowed directly from the political purpose: eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait.

The United Nations Security Council endorsed this purpose and objective, and the international community responded with unprecedented political backing, financial support, and military forces. As a result, we not only accomplished our mission in

the Gulf War, the way we did it was a model of American leadership and international cooperation.

When the war ended, the UN Security Council agreed to take measures to ensure Iraq did not threaten any of its neighbors again. Saddam Hussein was a man after all who had sent his armies against Iran in 1980 and then against Kuwait in 1990, who had fired ballistic missiles at neighboring countries, and who had used chemical weapons in the war with Iran and even against his own people. The United States and the international community were strongly determined to prevent any future aggression.

UN Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 fixed the terms of the ceasefire in the Gulf. The fundamental purpose of this resolution and many more that followed was restoration of regional peace and security by way of a series of stringent demands on Iraq, particularly its disarmament with respect to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometers. Desert Storm had dramatically reduced Iraq's more conventional military capability while at the same time not leaving Iraq so prostrate it could not defend itself against Iran.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, you know the rest of the story. You heard the President relate it at the United Nations seven days ago today. Iraq has defied the United Nations and refused to comply completely with any of the UN Security Council Resolutions. Moreover, since December 1998 when the UN's inspection teams left Iraq because of the regime's flagrant defiance of the UN, the Iraqi regime has been free to pursue weapons of mass destruction.

Meanwhile, the world has changed dramatically.

Since September 11, 2001, the world is a different place. As a consequence of the terrorist attacks on that day and of the war on terrorism that those attacks made necessary, a new reality was born: the world had to recognize that the potential connection between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction moved terrorism to a new level of threat. In fact, that nexus became the overriding security concern of our nation. It still is. It will continue to be for some years to come.

We now see that a proven menace like Saddam Hussein, in possession of weapons of mass destruction, could empower a few terrorists to threaten millions of innocent people.

President Bush is fully determined to deal with this threat. His Administration is determined to defeat it. I believe the American people would have us do no less.

President Bush is also aware of the need to engage the international community. He understands how powerful a strong and unified international community can be, as we have seen so well-demonstrated in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The need to engage the international community is why the President took his message on the grave and gathering danger of Iraq to the United Nations last week. Moreover, it is the United Nations that is the offended party, not Iraq, as some might claim.

It was United Nations resolutions that were systematically and brutally ignored and violated for these past 12 years. It was United Nations inspectors who found it impossible to do their job and had to leave the work unfinished.

The President's challenge to the United Nations General Assembly was a direct and simple one: If you would remain relevant, you must act.

The President's speech was powerful and energized the UN General Assembly debate. It changed the political landscape on which this issue was being discussed. *Iraq* is the problem. *Iraq* is in material breach of the demands placed upon it by the United Nations.

President Bush made clear in his speech what Iraq must do to repair this breach:

Iraq must immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material;

Iraq must end all support for terrorism and act to suppress it, as all states are required to do by UN Security Council resolutions;

Iraq must cease persecution of its civilian population, including Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, and others, again as required by UN Security Council resolutions;

Iraq must release or account for all Gulf War personnel whose fate is still unknown. It must return the remains of any who are deceased, return stolen property, accept liability for losses resulting from the invasion of Kuwait, and it must cooperate fully with international efforts to resolve these issues, once again as required by Security Council resolutions;

And Iraq must immediately end all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program. It must accept UN administration of funds from that program, to ensure that the money is used fairly and promptly for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

Over the past weekend I watched the pressure build on Iraq as the Arab League, the Secretary General and others pressed Iraq on the need to take action.

Four days ago, on Monday, Iraq responded with a familiar, tactical ploy. The Iraqi Foreign Minister said Iraq would let the inspectors in without conditions. But he is not deceiving anyone. It is a ploy we have seen before, on many occasions. And on each occasion, once inspectors began to operate Iraq continued to do everything to frustrate their work.

In May 1991, for example, just after suspension of hostilities in the Gulf War, Iraq accepted the unrestricted freedom of entry and exit without delay or hindrance for UN inspectors and their property, supplies, and equipment.

In June 1991—a short month later—Iraqis fired warning shots at the inspectors to keep them away from suspicious vehicles.

Three months later, in September, the Iraqis confiscated a set of documents from the inspectors. When the inspectors refused to comply with an Iraqi demand to give up a second set of documents, the Iraqis surrounded them and for four days refused to let them leave the inspection site. Finally, when the UN threatened enforcement action, the inspectors were allowed to leave.

In February 1992 Iraq refused to comply with a UN inspection team's decision to destroy certain facilities used in proscribed programs and in April of that year Iraq demanded a halt to the inspectors' aerial flights.

Later, in July of that year, Iraq refused the inspectors access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture. The inspectors had reliable information that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities. They finally gained access only after members of the Council threatened enforcement action.

In January 1993, Iraq refused to allow the UN inspection teams to use their own aircraft to fly into Iraq.

In June and July of 1993, Iraq refused to allow the UN inspectors to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two missile engine test stands.

In March 1996, Iraqi security forces refused UN inspection teams access to five sites designated for inspection. The teams entered the sites after delays of up to 17 hours—which of course permitted the Iraqis to remove any incriminating evidence.

In November 1996, Iraq blocked UN inspectors from removing remnants of missile engines for in-depth analysis outside Iraq.

In June 1997, Iraqi escorts on board a UN inspector team helicopter attempted physically to prevent the UN pilot from flying the helicopter in the direction of its intended destination.

In that month also, Iraq again blocked UN inspection teams from entering designated sites for inspection.

In September 1997, an Iraqi officer attacked a UN inspector on board a UN helicopter while the inspector was attempting to take photographs of unauthorized movement of Iraqi vehicles inside a site designated for inspection.

Also in September, while seeking access to a site declared by Iraq to be "sensitive," UN inspectors witnessed and videotaped Iraqi guards moving files, burning documents, and dumping ash-filled waste cans into a nearby river.

Mr. Chairman, I have left out much and could go on—all the way to the departure of the UN inspection teams from Iraq in December 1998 because they could no longer do their job. And I could talk about Operation Desert Fox, the military action that resulted.

But I believe you get the point.

The Iraqi regime is infamous for its ploys, its stalling tactics, its demands on inspectors—sometimes at the point of a gun, and its general and consistent defiance of the mandate of the UN Security Council.

There is absolutely no reason at all to expect that Iraq has changed, that this latest effort to welcome inspectors without conditions is not another ploy.

Let's be clear about the reason for their announcement. The Iraqis did not suddenly see the error of their past ways. They were responding to the heat and pressure generated by the international community after President Bush's speech.

The United States has made it clear to our Security Council colleagues that we will not fall for this ploy. This is the time to apply more pressure, not to relent. We must not believe that inspectors going in on the same conditions that caused their withdrawal four years ago is in any way acceptable. These four years have been more than enough time for Iraq to procure, develop, and hide proscribed items well beyond the reach of the kinds of inspectors that were subject to Saddam's cheat and retreat approach from 1991 to 1998.

The United States has determined that Iraq's obstruction of UN Security Council resolutions and its gross violation of its obligations cannot continue. In his speech to the General Assembly, the President challenged the Security Council to live up to its responsibilities. The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, said the same thing. We, our closest allies, and our friends around the world are prepared to do our part to enforce Security Council resolutions and render harmless the Iraqi threat. We are discussing now the best way to proceed with the other members of the Security Council and with close friends. We are trying to find a solution.

If part of the solution involves an inspection regime, it must be a regime that goes in with the authority of a new resolution that removes the weaknesses of the present regime and which will not tolerate any Iraqi disobedience. It cannot be a resolution that will be negotiated with Iraq. The resolution must be strong enough and comprehensive enough that it produces disarmament, not just inspections.

Many UN members, including some on the Security Council, want to take Iraq at its word and send inspectors back in without any new resolution or new authority. This is a recipe for failure.

The debate we have begun to have within the Council is on the need for and the wording of a resolution. Our position is clear. We must face the facts and find Iraq in material breach. Then, we must specify the actions we demand of Iraq—which President Bush has already shown us. And we must determine what consequences will flow from Iraq's failure to take action.

That is what makes this time different. This time, unlike any time over the previous 12 years of Iraqi defiance, there must be hard consequences. This time, Iraq must comply with the UN mandate or there will be decisive action to compel compliance.

We will listen to other points of view and try to reach agreement within the Council. It will be a difficult debate. We will also preserve the President's ability to defend our nation and our interests.

Some have suggested that there is a conflict in this approach, that U.S. interests should be our total concern.

But Mr. Chairman, both of these issues are important. We are a member of the UN Security Council. We are a member of the UN. It is a multilateral institution whose resolutions have been violated. But the United States, as a separate matter, believes that its interest is threatened. We are trying to solve this problem through the United Nations and in a multilateral way. The President took the case to the UN because it is the body that should deal with such matters as Iraq. It was created to deal with such matters. And President Bush is hoping that the UN will act and act in a decisive way.

But at the same time, if the UN is not able to act and act decisively—and I think that would be a terrible indictment of the UN—then the United States will have to make its own decision as to whether the danger posed by Iraq is such that we have to act in order to defend our country and our interests.

And Mr. Chairman, our diplomatic efforts at the United Nations would be helped by a strong Congressional resolution authorizing President Bush to take action.

The President should be authorized to use all means he determines appropriate, including military force, to enforce the UN Security Council resolutions Iraq is defying, and to defend the United States and its interests against the threat Iraq poses, and to restore international peace and security to the region.

I ask for your immediate action on such a resolution to show the world that we are united in this effort.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues in the intelligence community and in the Department of Defense are giving the Congress what it will need with respect to intelligence on Iraq and on military contingency planning. So I won't speak to those areas.

But let me say this about the Iraqi threat before I stop and allow the greater part of this time for your important questions.

We can have debates about the size and nature of the Iraqi stockpile of WMD and of mid- and long-range missiles. But no one can doubt the record of Iraqi violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions, one after another, and for twelve long years.

And no one can doubt that the Iraqi dictator's intentions have not changed. He wants weapons of mass destruction as clearly as he wants to remain in power.

These two realities stare us in the face and cannot—must not—be avoided.

Thank you and I'll stop there and take your questions.

Chairman HYDE. And I just want to say to the Secretary, we as a Committee will move swiftly to consider a resolution. We will mark it up in our Committee so we can have our wishes expressed

in the resolution. We are working with the White House with the text of the draft that they have submitted. We understand the urgency, and we will act accordingly.

I am now pleased to recognize my Democratic counterpart, who has made bipartisanship a real genuine word. Thank you.

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me echo your words. This Committee will take up the resolution at the earliest possible time.

And let me just remind all of us that it was just about a year ago, Mr. Secretary, that my good friend Henry Hyde and I spent 9 hours in our respective manager's chairs taking up the resolution with respect to our determination to fight global terrorism. That resolution passed almost unanimously. I am confident that this resolution will pass overwhelmingly, because the American people under Congress will speak with one voice on this issue.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to relinquish my questioning time to other Members of the Committee, because we usually never get to the more Junior Members. As much as I would like to ask many questions, let me just conclude by saying your statement was extraordinarily powerful. There isn't a single sentence in this with which I would disagree. I want to commend you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

Chairman HYDE. Speaking of Junior Members, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LANTOS. Had I known that, Mr. Chairman, I would have—

Mr. GILMAN. That is the nicest comment I have heard all day, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, welcome. It is always good seeing you before our Committee. You have been doing an outstanding job, and we all laud you for that. And I want to thank our Chairman for his leadership in these important areas.

We had this morning a very important, distinguished panel before us regarding the issues and the dynamics that the Administration must take into account when pursuing policy toward Iraq. As 9/11 taught us, Saddam's means of deploying weapons of mass destruction are by no means limited to conventional means. He has continued sponsorship of terrorist groups of global reach, providing him additional mechanisms with which to deliver them. As long as Saddam's regime continues, policies aimed at acquiring nuclear weapons and increasing his storehouse of chemical, biological, and possibly radiological weapons, the Iraqi regime will continue to pose a serious threat not only to our Nation, but to our allies in the global community.

The only sure way to render Saddam's regime incapable of presenting a threat to our Nation, Iraqi's neighbors and our allies in the region, and the people of Iraq itself, is through a swift and prompt removal of the regime itself, and we hope you can convince the U.N. to move expeditiously. That is why I support the President's proposed joint resolution authorizing the use of armed forces against Iraq without conditions, and I hope our Committee will act appropriately.

Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary, despite the fact that Saddam Hussein has given us a letter of "unconditional" authority to enter

Iraq, I assume there will be further conditions, as you have already pointed out. Let us assume the U.N. moves in its usual manner, with delay and debate. When is the appropriate time that we move despite the U.N.'s activity?

Secretary POWELL. I can't answer that today, Mr. Gilman. I have been spending an enormous amount of time, as you would expect, talking to the different members of the Security Council, and as soon as I leave here, I will be meeting with an important member, the Foreign Minister of Russia, who will be my guest this evening and will be here tomorrow with the Minister of Defense of Russia. And I will get a good sense of where we are by early next week, as all of the Security Council members react to the President's speech, react to what was said Monday by the Iraqis and what was said today by the Iraqis, and start to get a sense of the possibility of getting a resolution or resolutions from the Security Council that would satisfy our purposes.

But as the President has said, and as I have said, we will only be patient for weeks and not months as we go about this work. I hope we will get a resolution that will have the indictment, the actions that they need to take—and we will determine what actions they need to take—and then I hope we will be able to get consequences that will flow from lack of action. But if we don't get that, then the President will consult with the Congress, I am sure, talk to the American people, and we will be standing by as a Cabinet to give him the advice he needs to make a decision as to what the United States might have to do by itself or with the help of friends.

One thing that happened last week as a result of the President's speech is a lot of our friends—and I don't want to go into specific names of countries right now—but a lot of our friends and a lot of Nations that were sitting there undecided or needing to hear more about this saw the President's speech as an opportunity for the international community to act. They have indicated to us that they would now watch what happens within the Council, and if the Council acts, fine, they would be able to work with us; but if the Council doesn't act, we have made the effort to get the Council to act, and they may be willing to join with us in whatever we might feel is necessary to do.

Mr. GILMAN. That is encouraging.

One more question.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. GILMAN. I don't see the red light.

Chairman HYDE. All right. You have 35 seconds.

Mr. GILMAN. Just one more question. What is your view of a plan by the Carnegie Endowment supporting coercive inspections?

Secretary POWELL. It is a very interesting plan. I have read the report. We are looking at the report and studying it. There are some parts of the report that we do not find acceptable, and that is, in order for this to work, we would have to foreswear any action against Iraq, and that is not something we can do.

The problem I have with the report—and I will be spending more time on it—is that it once again sets it up so that we need coercion to go perform these inspections. That is not what we are looking for. Iraq is either serious, trying to make a change in their behav-

ior—and I don't know that they will or they won't, but I would bet against it if I were a betting man—and, therefore, you shouldn't need coercive methods.

What we are looking at is if the U.N. decides to send inspection teams back in under a new mandate, any time, any place, anywhere, with no hindrances tolerated, and Iraq tries to frustrate that, the teams come out. We don't play games at palaces. We don't stand around debating or arguing anything with them. They are not serious. What we are trying to find from the Iraqi side is a serious expression of their desire to get out of the breach they are in. We didn't hear it today. We didn't hear it Monday. And so that is a reservation I have about coercive inspections, but we are looking at it.

Chairman HYDE. The Chair announces that the order in which you will be called is the order in which you arrived for this meeting as recorded by the Clerk of the Committee.

So if you are distressed that you are not being called timely, take it up with the Clerk.

Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for coming, Mr. Secretary. I intend to support the resolution authorizing all necessary means to achieve the goal of disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, even if ultimately that includes the need to change regimes. And my assumption is that the reason that the Administration has had a policy of regime change is its belief that based on Iraq's past behavior, the only way to achieve the goal of the disarmament of the weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them is through regime change. There could be some tightening up of the resolution. We could go through that. There is time to deal with all of that. I intend to vote for it.

But if it comes to that, if the efforts to determine whether or not Iraq will change its behavior and allow the kind of information and follow-up destruction of weapons and disarmament does not go as we could hope and that the decision is made by the President to use force, there are many concerns, of course. One concern is the post-Saddam strategy for the international community generally and for the United States specifically. And for the U.S. specifically, the rhetoric in the last campaign and of some people now in leadership positions in this Administration regarding earlier policies concerning nation building make people worry that the commitment, the financial resources, the continued presence of coalition forces, the patience to create the multi-ethnic democratic institutions will not be there, and that we will not be in there for the long haul. The opportunity that was spoken of by Mr. Lantos so eloquently, of transforming that part of the world in a way that shows us to have become the liberators of the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein and to demonstrate that this is not us against the Arab world, will have been missed.

Another concern particularly, is about what Iran's role will be in the wake of this. Will the forces for Shi'ite and Kurdish separatism take over? Will heirs to Saddam's tyrannical behavior in the area take over?

I am wondering what assurances you might be able to give us about this Administration's will to deal with the very complicated

but critically important post-Saddam decisions that are being made and the planning for that.

Secretary POWELL. Of course, the President has not decided on a military option, but we do a lot of contingency planning within the Administration, and every question you just touched on, every point you just made, has been under consideration. We understand the implications of such a change of regime action and have made a commitment—to ourselves, anyway—as we start down this road that we would have obligations to see it through.

We would hope that if it came to that, there would be a sea change in the region; rather than it being seen as an assault, it would be seen as a liberation and it would be seen as the beginning of a new era in that part of the world, as Mr. Lantos has spoken of. We are working our way through the issues that have been raised by such contingency, and it is another reason why we went to the international community last week. If we ever get to that point, we want the international community in there, because it will take the international community to help stabilize the situation and create the kind of region that we talked about earlier.

There are some advantages that exist in this particular situation, in that Iraq is not a poor country, it has just squandered its wealth. It will have access to \$20 billion a year of oil revenues, as it does now, except it won't be going to weapons of mass destruction or suppressing the population.

It has an educated population, and it has social structure that could be worked with. Yes, there are three significantly different ethnic groups: The Shi'as, the Sunnis and the Kurds, but there are also things that hold them together as a single nation which we would also be committed to.

The shorter answer, Mr. Berman, is, yes, all of these things are being considered, and we recognize that we would have an obligation to stay for a while.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Leach of Iowa.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I think all Americans realize there is enormous risk in action and enormous risk in inaction, so we are all trying to put the pieces together in terms of judgment. Philosophically I would just begin with a bit of advice, and that is not to emphasize the preemption doctrine although it is an element of all of this. This is principally an element of law enforcement, and the law enforcement relates not just to U.N. resolutions and Security Council resolutions, but principally violations of the Biological Weapons Convention and the NPT. And if the U.N. is to be relevant, it is to uphold the law and the law is very clear-cut.

The second point I would make is that I think all of us are very concerned, as the prior speaker mentioned, with the so-called end game. But I at least am personally even more concerned about the beginning game. The reason that there are violations of the Biological Weapons Convention is that they have biological agents, and so the question becomes will they be used? And if they are used, will this not become one of the most extraordinary events in the history of man?

In that regard, the obvious issue is how do we try to determine and do everything we can to see that they are not used. And one

of the great messages that I think is very important to emphasize in terms of words is that leaders can be mendacious, but people and countries are not evil and that we ought to emphasize to the Iraqi people that we are on their side. However, if any individual in Iraq participates in usage or unleashing of a weapon of mass destruction, they will be held accountable as war criminals, and that is the only way they can be looked at.

And so my question to you, sir, is what kinds of efforts have we been making to reach out to the Iraqi people to underscore this nature of modern war? That usage potential of a weapon of mass destruction is a defenseless circumstance, and particularly in the first hours or days of engagement is a trauma that appears to me to be of absolutely stunning significance.

Secretary POWELL. We have considered this question carefully, and in any campaign that may be engaged in, there would be a strategic information component to it that makes just that point: That this is not conflict against the Iraqi people, but a despotic, dictatorial, tyrannical regime, that it would be wise for any citizen of this country not to any longer support that dictator, and particularly for the armed forces of this country to recognize the consequences of resisting or especially using these kinds of weapons in a criminal manner inconsistent with international law and the obligations of that country.

These are messages that we will be getting out, if we start down into such a campaign, and there will be time to convey such messages and we are starting to convey them now. Not that we are beginning such a campaign, but just to make sure it is understood.

I understand the seriousness of this issue. I faced this question once before in 1990. And there is another component to educating the population, and that is making sure they understand the deterrent capacity of the Armed Forces of the United States if such weapons were to be used. I believe to some extent that might have deterred their use 12 years ago when Desert Storm was being fought.

At that time we were also making sure in every way we could that we went after those sites and locations where such materials, such weapons might be located, and one of my great concerns at that time as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was how to do that, and to make sure that in attacking such places we were not releasing that which we were trying to destroy, and I think at that time we were successful.

But use of biological weapons would be one of the more terrible things that we have seen in history, and it would be a terrible thing to have occur at that time. But to let the presence of such weapons or the use of such weapons at the beginning of such a campaign deter us from entering into such a campaign would also be a big mistake, because they would just continue to be developed and become a bigger threat at some future time.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Ackerman of New York.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Good to see you again. As you might know, when the President spoke at the United Nations, Mr. Gilman and I were also on the Floor, not because you needed any help, but because we thought you might appreciate some support from your New York

"home boys," and we brought Mr. Issa along as well and made him an honorary New Yorker.

I just want to say that your observation that the room was electric even on the part of those who do not always agree with us was absolutely the right observation. I think people have a tremendous renewed respect for the United States and what we are trying to do, and also for our reasons. There are still some who do not understand it fully.

That being said, I have two basic questions. The first one is what would be the Administration's course of action if, within the Security Council, some of the permanent representatives, France, Russia, China, would insist on proceeding with inspections under the current existing U.N. regime?

Secretary POWELL. We would oppose it. We would oppose it.

Mr. ACKERMAN. But they could veto any resolution.

Secretary POWELL. It is not clear that it would require another resolution. We might have to find other ways to oppose it because there are existing resolutions now.

Mr. ACKERMAN. What you are saying here and in the President's resolution, in the proposed language that we have seen today, it is proposing basically nothing new that we have been talking about, except acknowledging that the existing U.N. resolutions are, indeed, surviving, the vote that was taken, never having been rescinded and the problem continues, as I understand.

Secretary POWELL. There is standing authority for the inspection team, but there are weaknesses in that authority which make the current regime unacceptable. We need a new resolution to clean that up and to put new conditions on the Iraqis so that there is no wiggling out. And if somebody tried to move the team in now, we would find ways to thwart that. In fact we have been in conversations with the Secretary General, I have spoken to him and been in contact with Dr. Blix, the head of the UNMOVIC, the inspection team. Dr. Blix and the Secretary General have made it clear that they recognize that there is a debate taking place in the Security Council, and they are trying to see whether the Security Council chooses to give UNMOVIC new or different authority.

Mr. ACKERMAN. My second question is to the concern that Mr. Berman raised, which was to the point of our commitment after invasion, after disarmament. After Saddam, what, and our commitment to that?

The question is basically what effect the military action in Iraq would have on our overall war on terrorism. The primary focus of the war on terrorism right now is in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, terrorism is on the increase there and the President there narrowly escaped an assassination attempt and the indications are that al-Qaeda is preparing for new attacks. In addition to the reconstruction and humanitarian assistance that we have given, the stuff that we have not given seems to render that whole situation as inadequate. And your own State Department's recent report on meeting the immediate security needs in Afghanistan seems to back-track from the commitments that we made for expanding the international security force over there.

How can we rebuild a safe and secure Afghanistan as we have committed and for which we have had so much support from the

international community—and that commitment was pretty, pretty hard to get and hard to make in some cases. We asked a lot of those countries that came along with us or agreed with us—it is not just for them a roll in the hay, and yet they still ask the question, will you love us in the morning? And our actions seem to fly in the face of that and it looks like we are moving away. Can we sustain these two actions of pacifying both Afghanistan and Iraq? Can we do this on two fronts at the same time?

There are people questioning the commitment to resources, to both of these because on the first one our commitment seems to be a lot softer than it was going in, and I think that would be highly problematic if we did not follow through on that and do everything that we can. We were able to do it after World War II. If we are going to do it, this is a big commitment.

Secretary POWELL. In terms of a military commitment, I will yield to Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. I believe they analyzed this and believe as a military matter it is within the capacity that exists in the armed forces of the United States.

With respect to your point that we are backing off or not being as aggressive as we were in the beginning, I have to take issue with that. We have put \$450 million, way over our initial commitment, into Afghanistan. We have accomplished a great deal. A national army is slowly being built. A government is being made to function. It is still a fragile situation, but a lot has been accomplished in just the period of 9 months starting from absolutely nothing.

President Bush made another commitment last week of \$180 million, 80 from us and 50 from both the Japanese and the Saudi Arabians, for highway reconstruction. A million people have come back into the country from refugee camps. There is still a security problem. It is still fragile. That is why we are keeping Operation Enduring Freedom going. But have we cleaned them all out? No. Are there pockets of insecurity in the country? Yes.

One of the most pressing concerns, and I think Don Rumsfeld would say the same, and also Generals Franks and Myers, is in the southeast part of the country along the Pakistan border, and we are working on this. Our first priority right now is to see how to take over the current ISAF mission when the Turkish finish their tour at end of the year. The question of expanding ISAF is constantly under discussion. We have not made a commitment to expand it yet. We have been talking about it, and my colleagues in the Pentagon and my associates in the State Department will be discussing it further early next week.

But let's not see ISAF as a solution for all the problems. ISAF is essentially a force that goes into an area, sits, and provides a useful presence, but it is not the answer. And in the report that you made reference to, my associate who wrote that report, Ambassador Johnson, was making the point that there will not be enough troops to flood every corner of Afghanistan with an ISAF. If you take Kabul, we have 5,000 ISAF troops there. We have the most competent protective people one can imagine protecting President Karzai, and someone was still able to get close enough to take a shot at him. We were lucky that he was not killed.

It remains a fragile situation. There are people trying to destroy this emerging democracy, and America is committed, working with our allies to stay the course in Afghanistan.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, welcome to the Committee. Again, as always, your testimony was outstanding, and I just remind everyone that a few years ago someone got close enough to President Reagan to almost take his life. So it is very hard to protect a head of state.

One real basic question, and I think all of us who watched the President at the United Nations were very proud and felt that he laid out the case in a masterful way, clear, compelling, not ambiguous. It has undoubtedly led to an enormous sea change in attitudes in the U.N. itself. Throughout history the credible threat of force by any country, in our case the United States, brings us to a critical point. I think that the international community understands that Iraq poses serious threat to the region and to the United States and Saddam Hussein shows no abatement in his efforts to procure weapons of mass destruction, but perhaps they want to put it aside and not face it.

Saying that, I do believe, as I know every Member of this Congress believes, war should be an option of last resort—after all of the diplomatic and other means are exploited. We now have a joint resolution before us, and I wonder if you would comment on what might happen if it were to receive a lukewarm response or perhaps might not even pass to the diplomatic efforts at this crucial stage.

Secretary POWELL. I think it would be very unfortunate if it got a lukewarm response, or if for the next several weeks Members eviscerated it or watered it down so that we were not playing a certain trumpet in the United States. It would undercut my efforts.

After the President gave his speech last Thursday, Mr. Smith, the phone lines to Baghdad lit up. Lots of people were calling and saying, "They are serious. It is show time."

We put enormous pressure on this situation, on the entire international community, and on Saddam Hussein. I knew at some point they would make a movement, I knew they would invite the inspectors back in at some point. I did not think it would happen 3 days later. That was a little bit of a surprise. Although I knew it was going to happen the day before it happened, it was a little bit of surprise. But it reflected pressure, and for us not to continue that pressure by the threat of force, by the consequences for failure to act on the part of the Iraqi regime, I think would be very unfortunate. A lukewarm, weak, eviscerated resolution coming out the Congress would not serve my diplomatic purposes.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, welcome. I always say that your eloquence is second to none. The substance of your remarks is certainly very welcomed by the Members of this Committee.

Mr. Secretary, I am certain you are well aware that this issue is perhaps more serious, more profound than anything that we could ever discuss in our constitutional frame of government. War, when our Nation and its national leaders must decide whether there is a justifiable reason to send our sons and daughters into

harm's way to sacrifice ultimately their lives to defend our Nation from its enemies.

You, Mr. Secretary, can appreciate more the filth and the stench there is in war from your own experience in Vietnam. War does not discriminate between Republicans and Democrats. America's finest men and women in the prime of their lives are going to be coming back in body bags, with families and loved ones to experience the sorrow and sadness.

I resent anyone here in this body to insinuate or imply that those of us on this side of the aisle as Democrats are a bunch of nilly-willies and are afraid to fight a war. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Mr. Secretary, if and when we do fight this war, will our President's use of military force be so certain that this war we will fight will be nothing less than but to win?

Secretary POWELL. Yes.

Mr. FALEOMAVEGA. I sure appreciate that answer. I would like to call you the Reluctant Warrior, if I may.

Secretary POWELL. I do not shrink from the title.

Mr. FALEOMAVEGA. Mr. Secretary, some 58,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen never returned from Vietnam. You and I both experienced that sad situation in Vietnam, including some 300,000 of our U.S. military personnel wounded and maimed for the rest of their lives and some 2 million Vietnamese who lost their lives in that awful war.

Will there be from the Administration a promise that we will never hear another Secretary of Defense years later confessing that we were wrong to be in Iraq, just like former Secretary of Defense McNamara making his confession that we were wrong to be in Vietnam?

Secretary POWELL. Congressman, we have had the most intense discussions about this issue within the Cabinet, and nobody wants war as a first resort. The President went to the U.N. last week on a mission of purpose, not to issue a declaration of war. But sometimes war comes. I have been known as the Reluctant Warrior. It does not bother me in the least. I fought 2 years in Vietnam. I commanded units on the DMZ and on the Iron Curtain. I have sent men and women into battle with the certain knowledge that some would die on the night that I sent them in. So war should always be the last resort. But the threat of war has to be there. And when a decision is made to fight a war, it is also well known that I believe strongly in doing it decisively and doing it in a way that achieves a political purpose so that no life is wasted in the prosecution of that war.

Mr. FALEOMAVEGA. Mr. Secretary, when we do win the war, perhaps it might be too presumptuous on my part, but there seems to be a real serious concern about the destabilization of countries like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria, let alone the millions of refugees that are going to be created in the havoc of war coming out of Iraq. Am I too presumptuous to think that this might not happen in the aftermath of a war effort against Saddam Hussein and his regime? Are we prepared to answer and to meet the results that may be produced as a result of the war?

Secretary POWELL. We obviously are thinking through all of these issues, Congressman, and making sure that we have made appropriate plans. In my own mind, these sort of destabilizing activities might occur before the buildup to the conflict rather than after. There is no regime in that part of the world, there is no government that I deal with—and I deal with them all, I can safely say—there is no nation over there that would not like to see a different leader in Baghdad. They differ as to how to bring it about. They differ as to how serious a threat it is to them. But there is no one who would feel terribly saddened if Saddam Hussein were not in Baghdad. And once he is not in Baghdad, I think we have an entirely new strategic situation upon which we can build.

But will there be a lot of concerns and some instability in the regions and some troubles we will have to deal with in the period before decisive action? The answer to that is yes.

Mr. FALOMAVEGA. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. I thank the gentleman from American Samoa. The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Earlier today Tom Lantos made a point which Michael Ledeen also makes in his book, *War Against the Terror Masters*. His point was Iraq would have developed a nuclear weapons program, they would have a bomb by now had it not been for the pinpoint bombing of the reactor in 1981, which one could argue was an exercise in the right of preventive self-defense, especially in light of the chemical attacks on Iranians and on Kurds.

And it would seem that had Iraq had that weapon during the time of the Gulf War, your work would have been much more challenging. I think one of the reasons we are focused here today on Iraq is because of the recognition from defectors who have told us what they are developing. So if they do not see reason and if they do not let the inspectors back in, then we are confronted with a question of how to develop Iraqi democratic opposition. And I wanted to bring up some of the points that are argued that just as with the Taliban in Afghanistan, where we were able to find elements that were ready to rally against the Taliban, so it is with the Iraqi people we have seen—we have seen how their resistance could be used in an effective way.

The Iraqi National Congress (INC) has carried out numerous attacks against the regime. Those could not have been carried out without quite a bit of popular support. If we were to take the no-fly zone in the north and change that into a no-trespassing zone and let the Iraqi National Congress install itself, ensconce itself there and recognize that as a legitimate government in the country and make it a haven for Saddam's enemies and make it a staging ground for a democratic revolution, and if we were to create a similar zone in the south using our air power, given the historical resistance we have seen in the south, we might see the ability to put together a sustainable opposition.

Now if it comes to having to make that decision, then we should be doing what we can now to build the Iraqi National Congress. I wanted to ask you about that, because to me, just as in Afghanistan, there has to be support for the people who have resisted Sad-

dam over the years and we have to build strong institutions that will rally the people when the time comes.

Secretary POWELL. As you know, Mr. Royce, in recent weeks we have been intensifying the level of discussion and having meetings with members of the opposition, the INC and others. We understand that as we think about such a campaign, and if it becomes reality, we will need to create something new consisting of both those from outside as well as those from inside in order to put something there that will have stability. So we are intensifying the level of work that we are conducting with the opposition.

We had conferences in the State Department recently, and my colleagues in the Defense Department were also doing quite a bit of work on this. Your idea of how one might conduct such a campaign using the northern and southern no-fly zones are ideas that have occurred to others in the planning process. All of this is being taken into consideration. I would like to stop there.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your very thorough comments. As we all know, this is a time when very grave decisions will have to be made. In this morning's testimony—and I would like to hear your comments regarding them—one of the panelists seemed to feel that if the U.N. inspectors went in and found nothing, he concluded that therefore Saddam Hussein did a good job of hiding them and that we should simply go in anyway, and I wonder if that is the opinion of the Administration.

Secondly, there was an estimate by another panelist that the military strength of Iraq is much weaker than it was in 1991, and that it would almost—he said not quite a cake walk but it would be something that could be handled very easily. I would like to know what your opinion on that is, especially in light of regime change. I guess if a regime change would conclude, that you will eliminate the leadership of Iraq. I certainly support someone other than Saddam Hussein leading Iraq, that is for sure. I don't think any of us quarrel with that.

However, what do you think in your estimation would be the reaction of the Iraqis if regime change means, I guess, elimination? That would be somewhat different than the invasion of Kuwait when they were repelled by our forces very well, but not in a battle to the end. Regime change, I guess, means the end of those people that are currently in control?

Secretary POWELL. On the first question, if it is possible to get an inspection regime of the kind we have in mind—and we have some fairly stringent demands that we would put before the Security Council—and they went in and did a thorough job and they were not hindered in any way—the Iraqis were cooperating with them—that would raise our level of understanding and confidence that they have eliminated most of what could be found visibly.

We will never be able to find everything if the Iraqis are still intent on hiding something. Any refrigerator truck could be a biological factory. Tunnels, other places of hiding. Things could be hidden in plain view that are capable of producing chemical weapons or biological weapons. Nuclear weapons are a little more difficult. They could be sequestered away. The real thing is are they serious. So the inspection regime would not be just an examination of what

they have and getting what they have and destroying it, but also a test of their seriousness. I think what we would have to do is, as the inspectors are reporting and telling us what they found and what they are doing, we would have to make a judgment as to whether we should have confidence in that or whether we should reserve the right and the ability to conduct regime change.

Saddam is weaker than in 1991, significantly weaker in terms of his conventional capability. I will yield to my colleagues in the Intelligence and Defense Community, but I would guess he is somewhere between 35 and 40 percent, conventionally, of his original 1991 strength. But I would rather they give the answer. I do not dabble in their business anymore.

And so, as a former general—I know what current generals tend to think and how they do their planning—you never plan a campaign thinking it is going to be a cake walk. If you have the force, use it, and put in what you think is needed for the task that is ahead of you. But I will let the Pentagon determine what that answer is.

In answer to an earlier question, with respect to regime change, we would make it clear from the very beginning of this to the Iraqi people that we are viewing this as a liberation, that this despotic regime which has sat on their dreams and their aspirations and their desires, which has subjugated its minorities and suppressed the Shi'a in the south, persecuted the Kurds in the north, gassed its own people, is now gone. There will be some who are so wrapped up in that dictatorial regime, in that tyrannical system, who have benefited from that tyranny, who will not be happy that it is gone. But I suspect that most people, once they realize that a better day is coming—that the United States is not coming to impose, not coming to replace the dictatorial regime with anything but something that is representative of the people of Iraq—can be bought over rather quickly to a new form of government in which they will be participants in creating as opposed to having it imposed on them.

A government of Iraqis governing Iraqis in a democratic fashion seems to me would not be a hard case to make. There is a better use of their oil wealth, and they will be better off being part of the international community rather than being the pariah of the international community. So I think attitudes can be changed quickly.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. King.

Mr. KING. Secretary Powell, I want to join my colleagues in commending you for the testimony that you have provided here today, for the outstanding job that you have done as Secretary of State, particularly over the past several weeks in marshalling international opinion behind the United States, and also for your testimony today and your public appearances in galvanizing the American people behind the effort.

I will fully support the resolution when it comes to a vote. I will be proud to support it. You and the President are laying the groundwork in the way that it has to be done, because if there is any vote that a Member of Congress should take seriously it is putting a young American's life at risk. I do not think any of us take that in any way except the most serious manner.

I would like to ask my questions as a follow-up to what Mr. Faleomavaega said regarding the impact that this—if it does become a military exchange and the United States does win, as we certainly expect it to—the long-term impact that it will have on the moderate Arab states in the region, and also if you can tell us what our contingencies are if Israel should be attacked by Iraq once an engagement begins.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Brown.

Secretary POWELL. Do I get to answer the gentleman from New York?

Mr. KING. Mr. Secretary, they are always coming between New Yorkers.

Secretary POWELL. The Chairman runs a nice, speedy hearing. Everybody gets their questions in; they just do not get any answers.

Mr. KING. I hope it is not a commentary on the quality of my questions.

Chairman HYDE. I am sorry, Mr. Secretary. I was distracted by administrative details up here. Please proceed.

Secretary POWELL. There will be difficulties in the region during any such campaign of the kind we are talking about here today. But I think that in the aftermath, if it is done well, if it is done right, and if people view it as a liberation and not an invasion, things can be managed. It is really going to be in the transition period, in the buildup.

With respect to Israel, this is also something that we are thinking about, and you can be sure we will be in the closest consultation with our Israeli friends and colleagues. Both Vice President Cheney and I have experience dealing with this question and this problem, and I think we would know how to deal with it again.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Ohio.

Secretary POWELL. I was not objecting, Mr. Chairman. I just—

Chairman HYDE. I think I know a pause when I see one. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you for joining us today. I am very concerned about the direction that the Administration is taking our Nation. The go-it-alone attitude in Kyoto to the ABM, to the International Criminal Court, perhaps a unilateral mission in Iraq, that troubles me.

I believe as you do that Saddam Hussein poses a threat to peace unless he readmits U.N. inspectors unconditionally to root out weapons of mass destruction. I supported House Joint Resolution 75, which warned Saddam Hussein that he must comply with the U.N., but I firmly believe we must exhaust every option to achieve our goals by diplomatic means before we even consider military action.

Scott Ritter, the former senior U.N. weapons inspector, stated that Iraq currently has no weapons of mass destruction and is not a threat to the outside world because it lacks the fissile material to develop highly enriched uranium.

I have two questions. First, what efforts are we making to ensure Iraq does not acquire nuclear material, we and others in the world community? And second, were Saddam to submit to inspections and

be fully disarmed of weapons of mass destruction, would the Administration without the support of a significant number of our allies initiate military action to effect regime change based on Saddam's noncompliance with other conditions?

Secretary POWELL. First, with respect to the point about unilateralism, I spent a great deal of my time in the multilateral world, and as you can cite a couple like the ICC and Kyoto where we were not in the international consensus, I can go to a lot of issues where we are in the international consensus. And the very fact that the President went to the United Nations last Thursday and presented the case, I think, shows the respect we have for the opinion of others, the respect we have for the United Nations. We took the problem to the United Nations. It is Iraq that is acting in a unilateral way in that regard.

But I do not want to belabor that. Scott Ritter, if he is right and if Saddam Hussein is telling the truth, then the answer is quite simple: Invite everybody in, inspectors, politicians, congressional delegations, give us all the documents that they have been hiding all of these years, do not frustrate anyone, let everyone come in and examine it. If that is the case, fine. But the intelligence is clear, the evidence is clear that they haven't stopped trying to find the materials necessary to develop weapons of mass destruction. The intelligence is clear. It is obvious. And notwithstanding Scott Ritter's claims that there is nothing there, we can show you intelligence in classified settings, or even in unclassified settings, that show that his intentions have not changed; he is continuing to pursue this kind of technology. When we find things that might be heading in his direction, we take action to try to stop it by talking with the countries from which those materials are coming.

With respect to fissile material, we are hard at work with those nations that are potential sources of fissile material to bring it under control and dispose of it. With one country recently, we were able to get a great deal of material back under control and sent back to its origin where it will be stored safely. We are hard at work on that.

With respect to the United Nations or what the President might decide to do if there was an effective inspection, I don't think I can comment on that right now until we actually see that happen. The reason we came to the position that regime change was appropriate—and it is a position that has been the American Government position since 1998 as a result of legislation passed by Congress and as a result of a decision made by President Clinton—it was because for years, and especially in 1997 and 1998, we saw a Saddam Hussein who was simply stiffing the United Nations, stiffing the international community. And the judgment was made, the correct judgment, a conclusion to which this Administration also came after we commenced, that regime change seemed to be the only thing that would solve this problem.

And even after you satisfy all the concerns about weapons of mass destruction, if you were able to do so as the President noted last week and as I touched on but did not linger over in my statement, there are other conditions within the U.N. resolutions with respect to human rights, with respect to accounting for missing persons, including an American pilot, and return of property, and

with respect to proper use of the Oil for Food Program. All of that is something that the Iraqi regime must be held to account for.

I cannot say to you now what the situation might look like some time in the future when the inspectors have gone in, and what judgment the Security Council or the President might have to make at that time as to whether or not a different course of action is required.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Houghton.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's good to see you, Mr. Secretary. Let me just ask you a couple of questions. It seems to me that what you are saying—I may be wrong here—that the United States is going to do what it wants anyway. In other words, inspection is something we want, but inspection isn't a goal because it is disarmament and it is regime change, and those are two things that I wonder whether the United Nations is going to grapple with.

Then another question—and I was not in here for part of the other discussion and if the question is duplicative please forgive me—I wonder about our allies. We were not sort of a unilateral type of country; we have never done that in the past. We have always tried to bring other people around, so it is not a divisive but a coagulating of forces.

And then my last question is one of cost. I don't know, maybe that was brought up before, and if it was, forget that, but if I remember correctly Japan picked up a great deal of the cost of Desert Storm, and we have an economy which is sort of shaky. So when you take a look at the cost of the war and of nation rebuilding and other ancillary things, you just do not want to have a situation which ruins the economy, which is the basis of it all.

Maybe you would like to comment.

Secretary POWELL. On the last question I cannot give you an estimate of cost, and nobody really can give you a good estimate because it is not clear what might be required yet. But yes, there will be a cost associated with it. But since I cannot estimate what that cost is, I cannot give you what the impact is on the economy.

You are quite right, in Desert Storm, we were able to mobilize the international community, and for the most part the cost was quite manageable.

With respect to allies, we always prefer to work with allies. We have been part of great alliances, NATO, many other alliances. We have gone into combat a number of times with friends by our side. Afghanistan is an example. Kosovo is an example. Kuwait is an example. But sometimes you have to act unilaterally, and sometimes without benefit of international consultation or support, and very often in a preemptive way, and we have talked about all of these issues here today.

Let me wrap it up with a single example people forget. The 20th of December 1989, 2 months after I became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we went into Panama, and we did not ask the OAS or the United Nations. We brought 13,000 troops out of their barracks in Panama, and I dropped another 14,000 troops by air. In a 24-hour period, we took out a regime, a regime that was killing American citizens. Four days after they killed an American citizen, we took them out, and a day later we put in a new President, a

President who had been elected by the Panamanian people and was not being allowed to accept the office.

So preemption, no consultation, no support of anyone. Why? Because American interests were at risk; American citizens were at risk. And President Bush, at that time George Herbert Walker Bush, felt it was necessary to act with the recommendation from this Chairman and then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney at that time, to protect American citizens. We completed the mission and turned the country back over to the Panamanian people, and not only took our forces out, but completed the elimination of American military presence in Panama under the terms of the Panama Canal Treaty.

So sometimes it is necessary to act in that fashion because you have to protect your interests, you have to protect your citizens, and you either have no choice or you have no time to do it in a multilateral fashion. But as the President demonstrated last week, he wanted to take this problem to the international community. That is exactly what he did. The international community did respond.

And to come to the first part of your question, what we would expect the international community to do is to support the indictment that the President laid out. I don't think there is any disagreement about the violations of the Iraqi regime.

Secondly, determine what action Iraq has to take to deal with that breach. The President laid out what Iraq should do in his speech. But it won't work unless there is the third element, and that element consists of what the international community or the United States is prepared to do in order to keep the pressure on Iraq. And not just pressure, but the reality of something happening if they do not change their ways, if they do not respond to these demands.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlewoman from Georgia, Ms. McKinney.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I want you to know that my respect for you is unbounded. I would also like to say thank you for the recognition and acknowledgment that you gave to the people of African descent in Latin America and particularly the Afro-Colombians. I note with some sadness today the coup attempt and the accompanying violence that took place in Cote d'Ivoire. Sadly, I fear that this has more to do with the unexploited oil reserves that makes Cote d'Ivoire a candidate for political intrigue, destabilization and what I would call the underbelly of globalization and our unquenchable thirst for oil.

I note that several news articles inform us that the Bush Administration had a plan for regime change in Iraq drawn up long ago by Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, General Myers and General Franks. Further, we are informed that U.S. troops would be used to guard oil fields around the Shi'a port of Basra. We are also told in other news articles that former CIA Director Woolsey is already divvying up Iraq's huge oil reserves for U.S. corporations and stands ready to punish the oil companies of those countries who do not support our plan for regime change.

Also, we are told about the as yet unannounced Office of Global Communications, that it will be given \$200 million to convince the American people of the need to oust Saddam Hussein.

I have read the White House discussion draft of the joint resolution, and it authorizes the President to use force in order to enforce U.N. Security Council resolutions. Given the number of important U.N. Security Council resolutions that are ignored and unenforced, how can we put our young men and women in harm's way when this President refuses to even pay them? This President signed an Executive order waiving the high deployment overtime pay of our young men and women, those same young men and women who will be asked to put their lives on the line, and perhaps even die.

Secondly, we did not use U.S. troops and we did not even threaten to use force when a million Rwandans were killed in 100 days. We did not use force when the people of Afghanistan were left to the horrors of the Taliban. We did not use force when 12-year-old little girls were raped and the hands of little boys were chopped off in Sierra Leone. We did not use force from August 2, 1998, when Uganda and Rwanda invaded the Democratic Republic of Congo. Three million people have been killed, and we did not use force.

For how many years has there been war in Sudan? Millions of people have been killed, and we did not use force.

In the mid-1970s, when East Timor was invaded by Indonesia and one-third of the East Timorese population was murdered, we did not use force, we gave the green light.

Mr. Secretary, I know that your job is a difficult one and you have carried yourself with such high stature and convention. We are being asked to give sanction to a war.

Could you just comment on what I have said?

Secretary POWELL. You said a great deal, Congresswoman McKinney, and if time permitted, I would like to go down most of these items. Time does not permit. I will not talk about any contingency plans, and I am not sure what the reference to Jim Woolsey is.

With respect to Cote d'Ivoire, we are concerned about the disturbances that are taking place over the last 2 days, and hopefully things are settling down. You wrapped in the issue of oil there. We are an oil consuming Nation, and we deal with nations that are able to give us oil. But I am troubled by some of the recent reports in the press that suggest that is all we are interested in—African oil. One today in the Washington Post is especially troubling to me.

I have spent most of my time in Africa talking about economic development, talking about HIV/AIDS, talking about poverty, talking about AGOA and talking about, as I did week before last in Gabon, with President Bongo, setting aside 10 percent of the country for national forests and to protect our environment. To have the whole thing focus on oil is a bit troubling. But we are an oil consuming Nation. As soon as everyone in this room sells their SUVs or cars, we will not be. But as long as we are, we should work in a way with countries that have that natural resource so that they can use that natural resource not just to fuel our appetite, but to generate wealth that will help their people come up out of poverty if used properly.

With respect to U.N. resolutions, we believe all should be obeyed, and we try to have them implemented. But not all of them are violated so flagrantly and consistently as Iraq has violated the resolutions placed upon it. And it is not just a violation that will cause a disturbance. It is a violation that is allowing them to pursue the most dastardly weapons imaginable—nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons—which they have shown every inclination in the past to use if they have them. Those violations do require, I think, the kind of action that we have asked the Security Council to contemplate, and the kind of action that the President is asking the Congress to support should it become necessary.

Overtime pay for young personnel—I am not sure if you were referring to uniformed personnel or not, I am not familiar with that issue. But with respect to some of the other issues you have touched on, we have been actively engaged in the Sudan. I met with the Sudanese Foreign Minister, and we do have some progress toward peace in that troubled part of the world. We are increasing our diplomatic presence. We sent in one of your former colleagues from the Congress, Senator Danforth, and he did a terrific job. And we are working hard. We are working hard in East Timor to support that new democracy. Uganda, Rwanda, we have had success. President Bush met with Presidents Kabila and Kagame and with President Mbeki last week to give a push to solving the problems in the DRC. I cannot say what happened or account for decisions that were made before our watch in the mid-'90s, but we are working each one of these accounts because we strongly believe that we have got to get these regional conflicts solved in Africa and other parts of the world so we can focus on what President Bush said is his real agenda, economic development. Trade, not aid. Helping nations.

We have come to this body and asked for a \$5 billion increase in our aid accounts beginning 3 years from now. Why? So that we can invest in these nations that are coming out of regional conflicts or getting themselves on a path to democracy, a 50 percent increase in amounts available for aid. No Administration has done that in the last 30 years.

So I think we have a good record to tell on most of these issues that you have raised. But in the case of Iraq, we have a real and present danger of a regime that is trying to develop the worst weapons imaginable and has shown the proclivity, the intention, and the likelihood of using such weapons or, even more troubling, these weapons being slipped out to terrorists who absolutely are undeterable and will use them against us.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Nick Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Mr. Secretary, I would assume that if the Security Council passes a resolution, if it is a tough resolution it still is not going to call for a regime change and will leave, it seems to me, a real conflict. And maybe my question would be, if we use military force going into Iraq, what would you consider the top priority? Finding all of the weapons of mass destruction and destroying them and the potential or the immediate potential to produce more? Or regime change?

Secretary POWELL. The principal objective would be disarmament, and regime change has always been linked to disar-

mament. But regime change would also be linked to those other resolution elements such as human rights violations, terrorism, misuse of the Oil for Food Program, and not accounting for prisoners. That is why regime change has been a policy of the United States Government through two Administrations and by an act of Congress.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. But is it fair to assume that a U.N. resolution is not going to call for a regime change?

Secretary POWELL. It is fair to assume that you would not see a resolution coming out that would explicitly call for a regime change. It would also not prohibit regime change. I think the most one could expect out of the U.N., since regime change is not a policy of the United Nations, is that in the face of continued Iraqi violations and failure to respond, the U.N. might authorize member states so inclined to take all necessary means, or to take appropriate action, without describing or specifying what that appropriate objection should be, or what specific objectives might be.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Part of the problem is that, even though we find these weapons and destroy them and even though we bring our intelligence community and technology into discovering what's there, it is going to be impossible to discover everything. You still end up with the problem that if you have Saddam there, he can reestablish his weapons after 5 years or 10 years. There is still that threat without regime change. How do you deal with that?

Secretary POWELL. That is the reason that the President has focused on regime change and why it has been U.S. policy.

But I don't want to prejudge what the President might do in light of changed circumstances or in light of success on the part of the U.N. in imposing its will on Iraq. But it certainly remains the policy of the United States government that regime change would be a solution to the challenge in the problems we face now.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. If we were to go in with military force, would you and the Administration develop some kind of an exit strategy in terms of how long are we going to stay there or how long are we going to try to reform that government?

Secretary POWELL. In the contingency planning that has been undertaken, we are certainly looking at the duration of any such mission, with the goal of turning it over to international elements or back to the people as quickly as possible. Nobody wants to go and stay for any extended length of time.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. My last comment or question is, despite the President's excellent outstanding presentation at the U.N., many of my constituents still feel that they don't have enough information to feel justified in supporting military attacks on Iraq.

Secretary POWELL. Well, I hope this hearing will help, and I hope the testimony being provided by my colleagues in the Administration, Director Tenet and Secretary Rumsfeld, will convey to the American people the seriousness of this issue and why we have to go before the Security Council and ask them to act; and why, if they do not act, the President may have to act. And I hope that as this argument is made over time—and the debate really now has started—we are no longer just having dueling editorials and dueling articles and dueling leaks. The President has made the

case clearly before the Nation, before the United Nations, before the world, and I think these hearings are very helpful in explaining it and educating the American people and the population of the world.

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KING [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, there has not been a regime change here in the Committee. I am just filling in for Mr. Hyde.

Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I am glad to see the old regime continues.

Saddam has killed hundreds of thousands of his people, gassed his own people, risked his own life several times, all in an effort to expand his power. If he had nuclear weapons, he could smuggle one into the United States. After all, a nuclear weapon is about the size of a person. Hide it in an apartment somewhere, lead a blindfolded American physicist to the undisclosed apartment, and let America know that he had the capacity to destroy Chicago or Los Angeles.

I think at that point it is unlikely that you would find a majority of this House authorizing American forces to defend Kuwaiti sovereignty or anything else that might cost us an American city, and so it is unacceptable that we go back to sleep and let this man develop nuclear weapons.

The do-nothing policy shouldn't be completely derided, because that is the policy the two Administrations embraced until September 11th of 2001. Iraq didn't change on September 11th; America changed. We woke up, and we decided that risks we used to sleep through and wait to mature, we had to deal with.

So if the do-nothing policy isn't seriously before us, there are really two policies before us. One is what I call the Richard Perle "invade now" approach. This has a legalistic version which is really the same thing, and it says: Iraq must immediately comply with all U.N. resolutions, including the one to stop oppressing its own people, or we invade pretty soon. And I don't think Saddam is going to morph into Mother Teresa in a week or two. So if we insist upon enforcing by force all U.N. resolutions, including the ones that call for human rights, in Iraq, that is the "invade now" approach.

The other is an approach for a robust inspection regime with enforcement, which means if there is the slightest interference with inspectors, you bring in Richard Perle.

Those are the two approaches. Neither one of them is perfect or simple.

In our Committee and in other forums, the problems of inspectors have been talked about—and Richard Perle did a pretty good job of that this morning—but I would point out that with a regime change, in 10 years from now you could have another Baathist regime in Iraq or an Assyrian regime or an Ayatollah-led regime.

In his dying days, Saddam might spirit away his nuclear secrets just as the Nazis loaded up a submarine with their nuclear secrets in their dying days and sent that submarine unsuccessfully to the Japanese imperialists. And the effect of an invasion on the Arab streets is not known.

What concerns me, Mr. Secretary, is that when you are at the United Nations, you are really going to two different organizations

and asking for authorization. You are up in New York, and you are down here. When you are at the United Nations, the most you can hope for is a truly robust inspection regime, and I hope you get it. Here, the White House just released a resolution that goes far beyond anything you could plausibly expect or even dream the United Nations Security Council would do.

It is a blank check. It says we can go with the Perle approach or the Powell approach. Congress doesn't have an opinion on it; you guys decide. We are going to go home and wave in parades.

It simply disturbs me that you would ask Congress to abdicate any responsibility for choosing between these two approaches, and I would prefer if you would submit a resolution or discuss—I mean, we can draft resolutions here. But discuss, do you want—which side of this debate are you on? Do you want a resolution directing the use of force against Iraq in the next week regardless? Or do you want a resolution that embraces the robust inspection with all the bells, whistles, enforcements, immediacies, and expectation that if there is the slightest—if there is a 5-minute delay, then you are authorized to invade? Or do you have a view of the U.S. Constitution that says Congress is just supposed to be a rubber stamp, sign the blank check, and you guys fill in the world Perle or the word Powell on the dollar sign line and take the check to the bank?

Secretary POWELL. I think the President certainly does not have a view of the U.S. Constitution that Congress is a rubber stamp. I know I certainly don't, and I don't think any of my colleagues in the Administration do. I think that the President views Congress as a partner. That is why he met with the leadership 2 weeks ago and engaged the leadership at the beginning of September; and that is why, in response to that discussion with the leadership, he said at the end of that meeting, he will consult with the Congress and ask you for approval of authority.

Now he has sent language to the Congress reflecting what he would believe is appropriate for the Congress to do, but he understands fully that this is merely the beginning of a discussion that has to take place, for the most part, within the Congress. And I think, therefore, he has provided his recommendation, and we now wait to see how Congress chooses to dispose of that recommendation or act on that recommendation.

The President will obviously, when the resolution emerges, engage with Congress on it, watch the debate as Congress debates whatever resolution it chooses to debate, and he will respect what the Congress says when Congress has acted on it. He will take it into account.

He also recognizes that he has his own authority as President of the United States, but he understands the important role that Congress plays. That is why he has brought this issue to the Congress.

Remember, at the time, sir, the people were saying, well, there is a legal opinion that says he doesn't have to even come to the Congress. But he understood what was the right thing to do, and he did the right thing.

Mr. SHERMAN. Would there be any harm if we passed a resolution—

Chairman HYDE [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Kerns.

Mr. KERNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for spending your time, and I know you have been here for quite a while.

The questions that I have heard back in Indiana, back home, across the country—fellow Members of Congress, I just returned from the Middle East—is to the timing with regard to the war on terrorism. What is your opinion, the impact of the war on terrorism, how this will impact the cooperation of those countries, particularly in the Middle East, that are trying to help to the extent that they can? And do you see that this could jeopardize/enhance that cooperation and our efforts on the overall war on terrorism?

Secretary POWELL. I think it is manageable, sir. The President's speech helped a great deal last week when he demonstrated to the nations in the region that he was looking to the Security Council to examine this and see what the proper course of action in the multilateral forum was. Almost immediately, we got positive reactions from a number of the nations in the Middle East. Many of them also immediately went to the Iraqis and said, boy, this is deadly serious, and it is time to stop the games.

So I think the nations in the Middle East know that we are trying to work within the international community to deal with this problem and are appreciative of that effort, because they are appreciative of that initiative on the part of the President. It helps us in our overall campaign against terrorism.

Will there still be some difficulties as we move forward? Yes. But I think the President went a long way in dealing with the concerns you just raised.

Mr. KERNS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I yield back to the Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here, Mr. Secretary.

I want to start by being very honest with you about the level of frustration I have at the sequence of events here. You are the first and only representative of the Administration to come before this Committee and to begin to talk about Iraq either in a classified or unclassified, private or public hearing. I am being told this Committee may be asked to vote as early as next week on this resolution. I do not think the Administration is helping its cause by coming so late and just starting today. I think this Committee—not the Members of this Committee, the American public through the Committee deserves a lot more information before we are asked to act.

My frustration is heightened by what I regard as the implication in the public comments of the Administration that Members of Congress are receiving new information, information the public does not have. That gives me a great deal of frustration.

The way I regard the Administration's position right now, Mr. Secretary, is not that there is new information which has created a more imminent or substantial risk on the part of Saddam Hussein, but that the standard has changed since September 11th, and that the new standard, as the President so well articulated in front of the United Nations, is a grave and gathering danger. And I don't know what that means.

I have a couple of questions. My first pertains to my concern that this debate seems to be conducted without any regard whatsoever to the risks that this country faces as a result of al-Qaeda. And in my State of Florida and others, it certainly seems to be a very imminent and substantial risk. In the absence of information that suggests to me that Saddam Hussein is an imminent and substantial risk, aren't we jeopardizing our commitment to the war on terrorism by dealing with the Saddam Hussein situation at the same time as opposed to dealing with it later?

Secretary POWELL. I don't think there is a difference between the approach we are taking to Saddam Hussein and the weapons of mass destruction he is developing, which might become terrorist weapons, as being not part of the campaign against terror. It really got pulled into that. The nexus became what happened on September 11th. We saw what the possibilities are with this kind of weaponry in the hands of terrorism.

With respect to—and I don't think us dealing with Saddam Hussein means we can't deal with al-Qaeda. At the same time we are having this debate, we are rolling up cells. We have had quite a bit of success in recent days picking up people in Pakistan and elsewhere and starting to connect more and more of the dots.

So the campaign against al-Qaeda has not suffered. In fact, it has really turned into a phase of law enforcement, intelligence exchange, and financial transaction tracking. That campaign will continue, and we are showing a real success day by day with apprehensions and arrests.

This Administration just didn't discover this problem a few weeks ago. We have been talking about it since the very beginning of the Administration. I might have to go back through my confirmation hearing and my first hearing before this Committee, but I think we have been talking about Iraq as a problem from the very beginning.

One of the first meetings I had as Secretary of State was with my staff to discuss what to do about the fact that the whole sanctions regime on Iraq was collapsing. The members of the Security Council were just moving away from the whole sanctions regime.

I spent a whole year pulling that sanctions regime back together, getting all the permanent members knitted back together on the Goods Review List and smart sanctions, as it is called. That took a lot of work, and it showed the commitment of the Administration to do something about this.

During that same period of time, we were studying the intelligence, we were seeing what the inspectors had said and where they had left it off in 1998. I think it is of no surprise to this Committee or to the Congress or to the American people that President Bush has been speaking about this problem from the very beginning of his Administration. Now we have reached a point in the aftermath of 9/11 that it is not a problem we can just continue talking about. We really have to act on this problem.

Mr. DAVIS. But, Mr. Secretary, I think what is a surprise, that we have gone from what you describe to now the brink of a war against this country, and I think that Congress and the American public is entitled to a clear explanation as to what has changed. Is it the information, is it the evidence—some of which we may not

be able to talk about publicly, some of it which we might—or is it the standard?

Secretary POWELL. I think I can make a case that all of those elements play a role in creating a sense of urgency at this time. The fact that we have seen terrorists trying to learn about biological weapons and chemical weapons and nuclear weapons and radiation bombs—I mean, the information that has come out on al-Qaeda and we have found in Afghanistan, it may not be smoking gun information, but it certainly says we have got to go after this kind of technology, this kind of mass weapon technology wherever we find it. We find it in Iraq in the hands of an individual who has demonstrated he is willing to use it, and I think that brought a heightened sense of urgency to it. We have found no change in the intention of Saddam Hussein over these years to abandon this.

You have been reading stories about these aluminum tubes. There may be a debate, some say in the newspaper today, about whether they are for centrifuges or for something else. The fact of the matter is that he is going after this kind of technology. So his intention has not changed.

So I think all of these things have come together. We have been in office for 21½, 22 months now. We have been talking about this problem for this long. The President was determined that he wasn't going to just talk about it for his whole period in office, but to start to act on it, and he is now bringing the case to the American people.

We have had a large number of meetings over the last year and a half about the no-fly zone, the fact that we are attacked in the no-fly zone almost every day. And even in the last 4 days since the Iraqis said, come on, everything is fine, no conditions, they are still firing at our airplanes, and we have had six incidents of this occurring so far this week.

So the President has made it clear that we just can't look away from this problem. Doing nothing is no longer an option. All of these elements have come together, and he has presented the case to the American people; I'm trying to help the Congress understand it better today, as are all of my colleagues in the Administration. And we know that it is a weighty decision that we are putting before you.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Secretary, the choice doesn't have to be between war and nothing, does it?

Secretary POWELL. The President didn't declare the war. The President has taken the case to the Security Council. He didn't ask them to declare war. He said, here is a problem. Here is a problem that you have been turning away from for all these years, and you cannot turn away any longer in light of the terrorist threat the world faces. Therefore, it is time for you to put down binding demands on this regime and put down actions that they must take to get out of these breaches. The President listed them.

But to list these actions and to say you have got to do this, but if you don't do it there are no consequences and we will just come back next year at the 58th General Assembly session and talk about it all over again—the President believes strongly, and I think many of our friends believe strongly, certainly Prime Minister Blair has spoken out strongly about this—is no longer an option. Even

those nations that are not prepared to go as far as we are right now have acknowledged the problem, and they are trying to get the Iraqis to do something before these consequences flow. But there must be consequences that will flow, or you cannot expect Saddam Hussein and the Iraqis to do anything but what they have been doing for the last 11 years.

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman's time has expired.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and welcome, Mr. Secretary.

I am the last one on this side, I guess, but hopefully not the least of the group. But I do take a different position, and I have spoken out on this, and I am sure others are aware of this.

I am strongly opposed to this war. I see no purpose in it. I get thousands of letters on this, and even Mr. Smith a few minutes ago said when he talks to his people back home they can't understand what we are doing. A lot of people still believe in this country that for us to initiate a war is hardly good sense in solving problems.

You know, a lot of people in this country believe in negotiation and containment. And even I—I was called up in the military during the Cuban crisis. Missiles were 90 miles off our shore, and we didn't have to go to war over this, and we settled this. And here we are, we have a country that you even admit is greatly weakened from where it was before, and they are 6,000 miles away. They are half the size of Texas, they have a gross domestic product (GDP) that is 20 percent less than that of Idaho, and we are willing to make this commitment to war.

There are just a lot of people are really still concerned about this. And the concern I think shouldn't be fluffed off, because I think they are very serious, and they have good reasons to be concerned. They are concerned about, you know, a massive expansion of the war. Some people even say, who knows, this could end up in World War III when we think about what the Muslim Arab world thinks about us, and this could lead to something unheard of. And this is historic—because look at what happened in Vietnam. Nobody planned that. The costs can be out of control, and we could end up with somebody worse in Iraq.

So there are a lot of reasons why we ought to be careful with what we do.

Even if we were able to handle the Soviets, I just can't see why we have to be so determined that we have this all-out fight.

My question has to do with anticipation of this uprising, which didn't occur after the Bay of Pigs, of course, didn't occur after the Persian Gulf War, that we are going to liberate these people?

A good example of this—and this is minor, I realize this, but this was not anticipated. This was in the *Wall Street Journal* 2 days ago, and this has to do with a headlines that says: Tough Bush Protest on Human Rights Backfires in Egypt.

I have no problem with what the President said, you know, about complaining about Ibrahim being put in prison. But the surprise was that the human rights groups in Egypt are standing up to the government and attacking us. And they very subtly said—this was their answer: Any foreign interference in our internal politics is an insult. Now, who else spoke out against that? The wife of the man

who was in prison, implying that we ought to stay out of this, that we are making the problems worse.

So my suggestion here is, do we really know, and what are the unanticipated consequences that can occur? Twenty Arab nations voted to condemn our plans to invade and to initiate this war. So what kind of assurances can we give the American people for all these individuals who are so anxious to go to war that there will be, you know, at least a reception over there when there is no indication that there is support among the Arab nations and no European Nation is for it?

It would be very interesting to see what happens in Germany this weekend, because it will be a pro-American or anti-American vote, and we may well lose it. And Tony Blair may well lose it, too.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Paul.

Nobody is looking for a war if it can be avoided. The President didn't go up to the U.N. to declare war. He went up to the U.N. to declare a problem.

The Cuban missile crisis lasted a few weeks. This has lasted for 12 years. President Kennedy didn't negotiate out of the Cuban missile crisis simply because he and Krushchev got along well. Krushchev didn't have the cards, and President Kennedy had the power and had made it clear that he was not going to tolerate this and he would take action. It was not just "stop your ships from coming," but "if you don't stop those ships from coming, turn around and get this stuff off the island of Cuba"——

Mr. PAUL. May I interrupt?

Secretary POWELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. PAUL. I just want to add that we took our missiles out of Turkey at that particular time as part of the negotiations.

Secretary POWELL. That was part of the negotiation, and the negotiation finally solved it. But that negotiation would not have been successful, the action that Krushchev took would not have been taken, if he wasn't sure that you were being called up, not just for a jaunt in the swamps of Florida. But you were being called up at that time, Mr. Paul, and I was being activated and pulled out of my unit in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and getting ready to be sent to Florida as well, because President Kennedy was deadly serious and Krushchev knew it.

Now, in order to make the pill go down a little easier, we subsequently made the deal with the missiles in Turkey. But there was no doubt about American determination and the American purpose at that point. And I would submit that it wasn't just negotiations unbacked by force that did it, that we had the force to prevail and Krushchev did not. And he turned around, and he also lost his position in due course because he had played in a game he shouldn't have been playing in.

I understand the concerns you raise, Congressman Paul. We know that much work has to be done in the Arab world, and I am hard at work doing that. I also know that the United States is looked to as the arbiter in the world on so many issues, so many crises. The one thing we do that sometimes gets us in trouble in places is that we do speak out for human rights, and we do speak out even when people may not want us to speak out, even when people may object to us, quote, interfering in their internal affairs.

But we do it because we believe there are universal standards of human rights and justice. It has been a hallmark of American foreign policy for many, many years, and I think it has to continue to be a hallmark of American foreign policy if we are going to remain the Nation we are and the inspiration to the rest of the world.

It is always easier for me to go visit a leader and not talk about human rights. Nobody wants me to talk about human rights when I come visit them or when they come see me, but they hear it because it is part of our foreign policy. We would not be true to our Nation and our foreign policy if we did not. Over time, our message tends to penetrate, and our message tends to inspire people to want a different kind of regime and a better life where such things can be spoken about.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Secretary, we have been told that you have to leave at 6 o'clock.

Secretary POWELL. I really do, sir.

Chairman HYDE. And that leaves one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight of our Democratic brethren.

Secretary POWELL. We can do it. I don't want to be rude, so we can go a few minutes longer, and I will be brief with my answers. I promise.

Chairman HYDE. In exchange for brief questions. Is that alright?

Secretary POWELL. In exchange for brief questions. Yes, sir.

Chairman HYDE. Then Mr. Engel is next.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Powell and I are both from the Bronx, and I don't think brevity is a part of our upbringing.

But let me just say, first of all——

Secretary POWELL. Did you get a report about my travels in the Bronx the other day?

Mr. ENGEL. I did. I actually did. And everybody was very thrilled. They actually said you responded much better now than when you were a child, but I could have expected that.

Thank you for all the work that you do. I had a bunch of questions. I am going to throw them out, and you can be as brief as you like about it.

On September 11th, the *New York Times* reported—let me read this briefly:

“Senior intelligence officials acknowledge today that the government had not compiled enough data of cross-agency assessment of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capacities. Intelligence officials responding to repeated complaints said today that they were working on the authoritative document. The last such thorough assessment on Iraq's clandestine weapons was produced about 2 years ago, and the Administration hasn't prepared what is called the National Intelligence Estimate, which in essence is the cross-agency analysis of a major intelligence question informed by nations' intelligence services.”

I am not asking you to disclose any classified information, but can you tell us whether we have or will perform this NIE?

Secretary POWELL. I can't speak to the particular article. For the 22 months I have been at this, I have been getting a constant stream of intelligence information, not only from the CIA but from my own intelligence agency INR, in the State Department that talked about all of these. And on a regular basis I tasked my director of intelligence to go get me the latest that he could on an inter-agency basis on conventional weapons, radiological, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in Iraq. I have had a steady stream of information, even though it might not have been in the form of an NIE.

Mr. ENGEL. I am just going to jump around quickly. We had a hearing here yesterday on Syria. Many of us believe that Syria and Iran have an even worse track record of terrorism than does Iraq, and Syria continues to occupy Lebanon. I hope that in our focus on Iraq that we are not going to forget those other states who support terrorism.

I want to add to that. Last time, you remember, I supported Operation Desert Storm back in 1991 and I expect to vote for a joint resolution next week or whenever it is. We put great restrictions on our ally Israel not to retaliate when Saddam Hussein sent missiles over to Israel. We don't know what he may do or what he may not do, but I just want to say that I would hope that no such restraint—we would hope that this wouldn't have to happen, but I would hope that we would not pressure Israel or any nation not to respond and defend their own security this time around.

Secretary POWELL. We would certainly be in constant touch with the Israeli government on this matter.

In the case of the Gulf War, I believe the decision the Israeli government made at that time was the correct one.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

I was just want to associate myself, Mr. Secretary, with the remarks of the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Davis. People in my district have a profound concern. There appears to be a sense of urgency, and I think you responded to him by saying there has been talk about it. But I think there is a sense among the American people that this has come out of the sky on them. We are talking war when it really hasn't been on the radar screen, so to speak.

We have known for years about Saddam Hussein. I think you served on the National Security Council when we supported Hussein in the war against Iran. We were aware that he was using chemical weapons then, that he gassed the Kurds, I think it was in 1988, that we had an Embassy there, that we, in fact, took him off the terrorist list. But I don't see any new hard evidence to indicate that we should be rushing into this.

I heard today for the first time that we are going to be voting on the resolution next week, maybe the week after. I am uneasy, Mr. Secretary, and I know I am speaking for an awful lot of people. I know I come from Massachusetts, I know we are different, but I have got to tell you, it is a profound concern. A thousand people showed up at a forum I held on Iraq, when they should have been on the beach on Cape Cod on a beautiful Sunday, and they were truly, truly concerned.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I think it goes without saying I have tremendous respect for your service to our country. But I was here when you made your statement. I read through it again. I saw all of the comments relating to what Iraq has done in the past and what it has failed to do in terms of the United Nations resolutions, but what I failed to see is, what is it that makes this the imminent threat to the national security of the United States?

You know, you make reference to the terrorist attacks and that September 11th changed the world. Of course, we at least believe it changed the world. Over in Europe, I think they only think it changed America. But, you know, the question I see is, who did we go after, after September 11th? We didn't go after Iraq. We went after al-Qaeda and bin Laden. And so we identified what was the threat to the United States, and a year later we were pursuing that element of terrorism against our country.

Now, you recite, as the Administration has recited, everything that has happened in the past. You recite the violations that have taken place. Those took place when the President took office, they took place before the President took office, they continue to take place today. Yet, without, of course, discussing those briefings, I have not seen yet what is the clear and present, imminent danger to the United States? What is the casus belli here that we are in fact pursuing?

If you could respond to that.

And, further, why didn't we go in August against Saddam instead of against al-Qaeda if he is such a threat to us? I don't think this is a good guy by any stretch of the imagination. He is a bad actor. He is a menace to the world. But the question is the timing and the reason and the urgency that has suddenly developed in terms of saying we must act now, and we will do it unilaterally even if we can't get multilateral support.

Lastly, what is our game plan? You know, all we tell the world is that regime change is our ultimate goal. Not just weapons of mass destruction, but regime change. Now if you tell Saddam that regime change is your ultimate goal, then he is more likely, I would think, to use whatever weaponry he has. When we succeed at that regime change, what is our game plan for a post-Saddam Iraq? What are our responsibilities there? How much is that going to cost? What is our long-term commitment? What is our game plan? Let us know this before we start this military action, and also, what is our exit strategy in that regard?

Secretary POWELL. I think there perhaps should have been a sense of urgency long before this time, because he never gave up his sense of urgency in trying to develop these weapons of mass destruction. President Bush came in and I think for the last 20-odd months of his Administration has been conveying the seriousness of this issue. Now the pieces are coming together when he believes it is time for the international community to act.

There is no one single piece of intelligence information that says let us act this month, today, rather than last month. But it also says, why wait for a year from now so that we can see that these weapons have been developed further? And with this new nexus of

terrorism, with the possibility that this kind of weaponry can get in the hands of the other, what is the point of delaying?

So I don't know that it has suddenly descended upon us as a real and present danger so much as that it is a danger that has been there all along. It is real and it is growing, and why not this time? Why wait? Why did we wait previously?

Mr. MENENDEZ. Why not against other regimes that have the same—

Secretary POWELL. I don't think there is any other regime that is quite as dangerous as this particular regime and has demonstrated the willingness to use the kinds of weapons they are developing.

Mr. MENENDEZ. How about post-Saddam?

Secretary POWELL. Post-Saddam we have talked about, but a case can be made, and I think it is a powerful case, that nobody is all that anxious to stand by Saddam when he is on his way out. Certainly none of the allies that I know of and I speak to on a regular basis anywhere in the world are supporters of Saddam Hussein and would not like to see him gone. So I think there is an opportunity to portray this not as an oppressive invasion, but really a way of changing a regime so that the people would be liberated.

Mr. MENENDEZ. My question is, what is our game plan?

Secretary POWELL. Well, we obviously have this under serious consideration, all aspects of this campaign, should it come to a campaign. And our game plan would be, if this were to occur, we would work with the international community to put in place a government, a leadership, drawing from people outside right now in opposition, as well as those inside, who would put in place a government that is representative of its people and is no longer a threat to its neighbor. It will take time, it will take effort, it will take energy, it will take money, and it will take staying power.

Chairman HYDE. The next gentleman is Mr. Meeks. But if Mr. Meeks will withhold for a moment—I usually give my time to the Members because we always run out of time, and everybody gets a little testy when they don't get called. But I want to say something at this point, and so I am going to yield to myself for a moment.

I will tell you what is different for me—not for anybody else, but for me. I was in World War II, and I remember the kamikaze pilots, and I thought they were a strange breed. Very patriotic, but a little weird to dive into an aircraft carrier and incinerate yourself.

The suicide bombing that is going on in Israel and in the Palestinian conflict, the fact that there is so much hate, the World Trade Center bombings, where people with joy incinerate 3,000 people, there is a lot of hate there. I had no idea the depth of hatred in the world against freedom, against us. And we cannot watch the development of these biological weapons which could poison the water in New York like that, no big deal. That stuff could be smuggled in with a diplomatic pouch and could be devastating—devastating.

So, it is a new ball game. It isn't like in the old days when General Putnam lined up his troops and said, don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes.

There is a lot of hate combined with a lot of death that can be dealt with very quickly and very easily. And, therefore, as I said, the first punch could be the last punch. We can't stand idly by and let that happen.

Iraq isn't the only country that hates us and that will disseminate and distribute these weapons to people who will be happy to use them and go to heaven as they burn up in the flames. But this is a different situation today than that was, and what brought it home to me was September 11th and the World Trade Centers and in the bombings in Palestine and Israel. It is a new world. I think our leaders, our Government has the duty to protect us, and I think that is what they are trying to do, and they need our help, not our hindrance.

Anyway, Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to associate myself with every word that Mr. Menendez indicated, every word, because I think that is absolutely the key and the problem not understanding that I am having myself and in my constituency.

Secondly, in what the Chairman just indicated, I think just the opposite. Yes, the whole world is different since September the 11th. But what it has shown me since September 11th, that, yeah, when they came in, these kamikazes and the guys that are blowing themselves up, they are a different breed. You know, some of the stuff that they can use to damage and threaten us, they don't even have to sneak it in. They can get it right here. When we look at the anthrax scare, that wasn't brought in from someplace else. That was created here. So they don't have to smuggle it in to get it here. The danger is already here.

To me, what 9/11 showed me is that we do need a better relationship outside of this world. And what it also showed me is that we can have it. Because when I look at what has happened post 9/11, I remember the debate in this Congress. They questioned whether or not we should be friendly or use Pakistan as an ally. And I remember coming before this Committee, saying we should give them the opportunity to prove that they want to be an ally; and if they don't prove it, then we should do something about it.

I look at what has happened there and in Malaysia and Singapore and Indonesia, almost all Muslim countries primarily, and that they are helping expose the people who are threatening us right now so that we are not in danger. Then I talk to some of those individuals from their government and some from our own State Department, and they say, well, the appearance is that it is us against the Islamic nations, and some of the information that we are now getting could possibly stop or not be as frequent as it is as a result of this. Therefore, in my estimation, this put us in greater danger here in the United States.

Believe me, if you could show me or tell me—that is the information I am trying to look for, whether it is classified or unclassified—that this Nation is in imminent danger, I am the first to say let us go strike first. If there is something that has happened within the last 5 months or 6 months or something that we need to do right now, then I will be the first to say let us go and let us strike right now. Let us not wait.

But if not, then why not take the time, the opportunity to have our new friends and allies and our old friends and allies work together? We are voting this resolution next week, and if this does not happen, then we can all do this together, as opposed to us doing something on a unilateral basis, which then I think will further anger the world and further put Americans in jeopardy and having more people around the world hating us in America.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.

The resolution that the President is asking for, and the draft of which he provided, is not a resolution that is a declaration of war to go to war tomorrow. It is an expression of support for what he might have to do if the actions that we are trying to take in the multilateral organization, the United Nations Security Council, are not successful. He has taken the case to our friends and allies. I have spent an enormous amount of time on it. I am getting ready to do it again in a few minutes.

So we understand the seriousness of this issue. It is not a rush, but, at the same time, it is useful for the world to see the United States united behind the proposition that something has to be done about this. I am sure that the Chairman is arranging whatever intelligence briefings or other information that the Committee might need to have a better understanding of the nature of the threat.

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Hello, Mr. Secretary; and thank you for your very clear testimony. It is always very good to see you and really to listen to your straight talk.

I, too, want to thank you for your service and for the extremely important role that you are playing during this very difficult period.

I have two questions that I would like to ask you very briefly.

First of all, we did receive, of course, the White House discussion draft of the resolution. And in the draft—as you indicated earlier—one of the provisions which says that Congress has already expressed support for regime change. Again, this was expressed through Public Law 105-338, under I believe the Clinton Administration. Also, again serving as one of the bases for this resolution in this draft discussion you cite the resolution last year that was passed, Public Law 107-40, as part of the rationale and basis for moving forward with the use of force.

I didn't support either one of them because I didn't want to get to where I think we are going. But many Members who I talked to indicated to me that when they voted for either one of those, they did not read this or understand that to mean that the use of force was being authorized for a regime change, that this is not what was entailed in that; and I am quite surprised to see both of those resolutions here, the one of 9/14 and also the previous one.

My second question is this. If Iraq had not responded with an affirmative on the return of weapons inspectors with, as you call it, their tactical ploy—that is, I believe, how you described it—what would have been the United States' response and how would our strategy differ now and how would this resolution before us read had they just not responded or said no inspections, case closed? What would our position be at this point?

Secretary POWELL. I don't know that it would have been any different. The President, when he met with the leadership two Wednesdays ago, I guess it was now, if my memory serves me correctly, said that he would be consulting with Congress and that he would be taking the case to the international community. He has done both things. And if Iraq had not said anything this past Monday—which I think is your question—we would still be on the same track. I would be doing the same thing today if they hadn't spoken on Monday, trying to generate support within the Security Council for a clear statement of the indictment against Iraq for material breach, what actions they should take as the President laid them out in his speech, and a statement of consequences for inaction.

Their effort on Monday to derail that strategy won't succeed, because we are going to continue to try to get that resolution from the Security Council.

With respect to the two public laws you made reference to, I don't have them in front of me to see their full language. But I don't think they were intended to be an all necessary means kind of authority in either of those two public laws. I think this pulling forward from the past Congress's previous expressions on this issue leads us to this resolution language which is presented to the Congress for its consideration, which would give the President appropriate means to deal with the situation as he sees it necessary.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Schiff.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your not only being here but staying here long enough for the rest of us to have a chance to ask you a couple questions.

I want to begin by noting my agreement with some of the non-debatable points that you made at the outset. That is, that Saddam Hussein has violated and continues to violate U.N. resolutions, that he continues to develop weapons of mass destruction; and although you didn't posit it as a non-debatable point, I also concur with your statement that the present circumstances are unsustainable. Indeed, when several of us in the delegation went to Incirlik and talked with the wing commander there and discussed how every day and practically every hour American pilots are shot at by Iraq in their enforcement of U.N. resolutions, it became even more apparent how unsustainable the present course is.

You also made a point, though, that the intelligence is clear about a lot of what Saddam Hussein is doing; and I do want to express and note disappointment that some of my other colleagues have alluded to with the information that has been shared with Members of Congress. I have attended the classified and non-classified briefings; and many, many of us feel that there was much more information that we should be receiving. Indeed, often the information we receive on CNN is of greater value and of greater insight than what we have in classified briefings. So I would encourage you to pass that message back, that the Administration has to do a better job with sharing information with the Congress.

I also encourage the Administration to do a better job with sharing information with the American people.

We have talked about the Cuban missile crisis. And one image that stays fresh in all of our minds is that of the photographs of the missile buildup in Cuba. Given the advances in our techno-

logical sophistication since the early 1960s, it would be, I think, important for the Administration to help make the case to the American people to show graphically some of the evidence that it possesses.

Finally, I wanted to ask you, in line with some of what you have heard, about the imminency. Because there is a perception, not only among many of the Members, but among many of the American people that there is something rash and sudden about this. The breaches of U.N. resolutions have been going on for a decade. The lack of inspections have been going on for several years. The September 11th attacks did change this country and the world. But when we think about it, too, the September 11th attacks were not attacks using chemical or biological weapons. They were, in fact, using commercial airliners. And in that sense, the threat from Iraq didn't change in the nature of that attack.

I wonder if you could share both what the best, most recent and most irrefutable evidence of Saddam Hussein's development of weapons is. Also, what is the best-case scenario? What would you like to see happen? Not in a dream world where he morphs into Mother Teresa, as one of the Members mentioned, but what is it that is a plausible and best-case scenario for what the U.N. would do and what we could compel Iraq to do, short of invasion? And in the event of invasion, should the American people be prepared for young American men and women being exposed to chemical and biological weapons and dying from their exposure?

Secretary POWELL. On the third question, that is always a risk about warfare. That is a risk that I had to deal with at the time of Desert Storm. We went into Desert Storm fully expecting chemical weapons to be used immediately and recognizing that there was a risk of biological warfare. I did not expect nuclear engagement because we were reasonably sure they did not have a nuclear weapon at that time, but they might have, but we didn't think they really did. So it is something that is a part of modern warfare, and we train our troops to deal with it. But it is still a horrible thing to contemplate.

With respect to the most recent evidence, I don't know that there is a single smoking most-recent gun, although people have been reading stories about the aluminum tubes that shows a continued intention on the part of Saddam Hussein to do it. But there are many other things that may be going on that we don't know about, and we do know the intention still remains. So it is not just what we know, it is what we don't know that may be going on, because there is someone determined to try to develop this kind of capability that we have to keep our eyes on.

I will convey your message back to my colleagues in the Administration, especially those in the intelligence community, that there is a desire to see more information. But they will not come up here with something that says this makes yesterday quite different from today and what we have to do today as a result of this knowledge. But there will always be the danger of waiting for something that gives us a sense of urgency and, unless that comes along, we won't act. But we might wake up one day and find something has happened, and we will regret the fact that we hadn't acted.

And it is not just a sense of urgency that should impel us to act. It is a sense of what this whole regime has been up to for all these years, the violations of all these years. It is as good a time to act now as any, especially in light of the kind of comments the Chairman made a little while ago about the change in the world.

Now people say, well, it is not a chemical or biological weapon that was smuggled into the country. It was a weapon that was developed here. It was a plane full of fuel that made one devastating bomb—four of them. One didn't get to its target and crashed in the field in Pennsylvania, killing a large number of people. But the next time it might be a biological weapon that doesn't kill 3,000 but kills 100,000. It has that potential. And if we have the ability to find out where this kind of technology might be being developed and where it could originate from, it seems to me we have an obligation to try to do something about it.

With respect to what would be an outcome short of war, that outcome has been before the Iraqi regime for years, and that is to come totally clean. There was no regime change policy before 1998. The policy was, come clean. You say you don't have any. Prove it. You say you don't have any. Let people come in and go all over the country without interruption, without interference, without being sidetracked, and demonstrate it.

What the inspectors found for 7 years, and what we know has been the case since, is that they were just getting on the trail. Iraq has been doing everything to keep them off the trail, and they constantly found more leads to follow.

Why did the Iraqis stop them in 1998? Why did they have to frustrate them to the point where they had to leave? Because they were being successful, they were finding out information, they were finding out leads.

What we haven't been able to do for the last 4 years is to have that kind of intrusion within the country that will allow us to find out what might have been going on in the absence of inspectors. We can do a lot with intelligence, but it is not as good as on the ground, looking on the ground, interrogation of people, defectors coming in and then giving information that inspectors can then go use.

So it seems to me that a first step—not our only step, and not the final step—would be a regime where the inspectors go in and are completely free and are not inhibited in any way. What this would also suggest is whether or not there has been a change in Iraqi attitudes, and whether they have given up the intention to develop these weapons. That would also be something that would be very significant to discover.

But, you know, we are where we are, and I think this is the time to take action and not try to find a way of not taking action because it is a difficult action to take. I think this is the time and place.

Chairman HYDE. The gentlelady from California and our final interrogator.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the Secretary for the time and I thank him for his serious and true commitment to try to think through what needs to be done.

However, let me just say straight out for the record, I would not vote for the resolution as it has been sent down to us today that says the President is authorized to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, and it goes on.

Let me pose some questions, and you can answer them in your closing.

Would coercive inspections as presented by the Carnegie Endowment be something that would be considered if the final resolve in the resolution says that the President would use all means? Would coercive inspection be one?

Number two, why are we so hated? That is the question that has been asked ever since 9/11. What do we do to incur the hatred of people?

And the next thing is, I am still very concerned about Afghanistan. I am hearing that there has been a resurgence of the Taliban. I don't think we have completed that job—and I did hear you say about an hour ago that we can do two things at one time. So do you anticipate that an invasion of Iraq will have any significant impact on the security situation and on our ability to win peace in Afghanistan? And what must we do? What more must we do to win the peace in Afghanistan, and have we learned any lessons that can be used in Iraq?

And then, how would it impact our relationships with Pakistan, where significant segments of the population are still sympathetic to al-Qaeda, if we are preemptive?

The last one I just want to make is that in the newspaper yesterday, the *Wall Street Journal*, it says that Bush's economic aide says the cost of a war on Iraq may top a hundred billion dollars. At a time when we have some domestic issues that have been pushed off the table and put on the shelf, we are contemplating force; and I still don't understand the urgency of this.

I am going to end by saying that, as a representative of 600,000 people, and I am on what they call the left coast—that is California—I haven't heard yet what I can tell my voters that would then get them to support a preemptive attack on Iraq.

So if you could address some of those points, I would appreciate it; and I am sorry for taking so long.

Secretary POWELL. On coercive inspections, the Carnegie idea, we are studying it. I have read the report. As I mentioned earlier, we are studying it. I have two problems with it.

One, it says the only way it will work is if you give up the idea of using force. I think if you give up the idea of using force, you are playing into the hands of the Iraqis.

The second problem I have with the coercive inspections is that it is almost a non sequitur. If it is supposed to be an inspection where they are cooperating with you, you shouldn't need to fight your way in or shoot your way in. As an old infantry officer, I have a little bit of concern about my being a young company commander in charge of 100 troops in the middle of Mesopotamia all by myself trying to shoot my way into a presidential palace or to force my way into a presidential palace. I haven't squared all those circles in my mind as to whether this concept would work. But we are studying it, and we are in touch with the Carnegie Center.

What do we do to incur hatred? Some people resent us. Some people don't like our system. Some people believe we are supporting the wrong side in the Israel-Palestinian dispute, even though I spent most of my time trying to support both sides to see if we could find a solution to move forward. But there is a great deal of resentment to our success. There is a great deal of resentment to the fact that we stand by our value system. And we are designing programs to try to deal with this.

I point out to a lot of audiences who say we are anti-Muslim or anti-Islam, we have fought three wars in the last 12 years. What did we do in Kuwait? We rescued a Muslim country. What did we do in Kosovo? We rescued a Muslim country. What did we do in Afghanistan? We rescued a Muslim country. And in all instances we didn't stay. We didn't take their oil. We didn't try to capture them. We tried to help them. We tried to put them back in a more stable footing. And we have got to get this case out better.

In Afghanistan—you know, people are concerned about Afghanistan. It is a fragile situation. But, my heavens, you should see, or stop and reflect—I know you do see, but reflect at how far we have come. We have come a long way in the last 9 months, and we have done a tremendous job. And President Karzai and his associates have done a tremendous job. But we haven't solved every problem in Afghanistan. We have not gotten rid of every al-Qaeda element that is there. But we are going to stay there until we do and put that country on a stable footing.

And we can do it and also deal with other contingencies in the world. Our whole force structure is designed to deal with more than one problem at a time.

As to the impact on Pakistan. We stay in the closest contact with President Musharraf. He also is under attack by these terrorist elements. So to the extent that we are going after terrorism, so is he; and he has been playing an important role in our campaign, as evidenced by the arrests that were made just within the past few days on conspirators who were part of the 9/11 terrorist attack against us.

With respect to the *Wall Street Journal*, I just can't comment on what number was provided with respect to how much—what it would cost. I don't know the assumptions. I am familiar with the article. I just can't comment on it. And I don't believe the White House has bought into that number, because it is a number—I don't know what the basis or the assumptions they used to determine what the cost of such a thing would be.

With respect to the urgency of it all, I think I have talked to that in my previous two answers.

Is there a smoking gun that requires something to be done today? No. But has there been a problem that has been developing over many years we just cannot ignore any longer? To paraphrase my colleague, Don Rumsfeld likes to say, do we wait for the gun to go off and then decide we should do something too late?

I believe this is the time to deal with this problem and not push it off for another Congress or another President.

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Secretary, you have been more than generous with your time. You have made a great contribution to this subject, and we are proud of you, and we thank you.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HYDE. The Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:36 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]



## A P P E N D I X

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### MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN  
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. Chairman,

I wish to thank Secretary Powell for appearing before the International Relations Committee today to discuss the Administration's policy toward Iraq and the growing threats posed by Saddam Hussein.

As a Member of the House International Relations Committee, I am well aware of the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein to the United States, Israel, Turkey and our other allies in the Middle East. For decades, Saddam has demonstrated contempt for the international community, disregard for United Nations Security Council Resolutions, hostility toward the United States, intent to develop weapons of mass destruction and an unbridled willingness to use them. He has used chemical weapons against his own people in Northern Iraq, in addition to Iranian soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). Given his despicable track record of aggression, there is no reason to believe that Saddam Hussein would not use biological, chemical or nuclear warfare in the future—particularly against America, Israel or Kuwait.

Following the implementation of UN sanctions against Iraq in 1991, Saddam Hussein has consistently blocked UN weapons inspectors in violation of UN Security Resolutions and international law. He has illegally smuggled oil in exchange for cash, retained substantial chemical and biological weapons outlawed by the sanctions regime and continues to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction. Recently, it has been reported that Saddam Hussein has sought to purchase and smuggle thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes used in the production of nuclear weapons. This development—in addition to recent meetings between Hussein and nuclear scientists—clearly indicates a renewed Iraqi interest in acquiring a nuclear arsenal that could be used against its enemies in Saddam's self-declared "campaign against the West."

Saddam Hussein has consistently allied himself with organizations and state sponsors of terror that pose a severe threat to the United States. During these most difficult times, there is a risk that Iraq would share its weaponry, technology and intelligence with our enemies—a development that threatens to compromise the security of the United States and, ultimately, our success in the war against terror.

The United States cannot afford to turn a blind eye to the growing threats posed by the current Iraqi regime. Forcing Saddam from power could pave the way for a new government that would better respect human rights and serve as a model of democratization in the Arab world, enhance the stability of the Middle East, increase the prospects for peace in the region and send a strong message that the United States will take all steps necessary to ensure its security interests and defense.

While I strongly support regime change in Iraq, I believe essential prerequisites must be met before America proceeds with military action. The Administration must consult with Congress and seek a congressional resolution that authorizes the use of force. This resolution should include a blue-print for a post-Saddam regime and provide for the allocation of military, financial and humanitarian assistance to Iraq that will demonstrate to the world America's commitment to the Iraqi people and the future of the region. Additionally, the Bush Administration must explain the short-term objective and long-term strategy for this operation to the American people, drawing from past mistakes—such as our experiences in Vietnam—to ensure that the public understands the time commitment and financial burden of any incursion prior to the initiation of a military attack. Finally, the Administration must

consult with world leaders—including our allies in the Middle East and Europe—and the UN Security Council to build a network of international support before taking action against Iraq.

Perhaps the most important considerations that must be addressed by the Administration—prior to the initiation of an incursion in Iraq—are the complexities surrounding the opening of another “front” in the war against terror. We must draw lessons from our experience in Afghanistan, where the recent assassination attempt on President Karzi, bombings in Kabul and regrouping of Al Qaeda operatives all indicate that the American-led efforts to destroy Bin Laden’s network have not thoroughly eliminated its operational capability. If we are to initiate a regime change in Iraq similar to that in Afghanistan, it is essential that America and our allies allocate the necessary military resources and make a long-term commitment to ensure a future of stability and security in the Middle East. Further, we must not allow an American-led incursion in Iraq to divert our attention from the ongoing campaign against Al Qaeda. Recent events—including Al Qaeda’s initiation of terrorist attacks in Tunisia and Pakistan, relocation into Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iran and funneling of money through Sudan and Iran—all indicate that the United States has not yet completed its mission of eradicating this pervasive threat.

Secretary Powell, for all of the aforementioned reasons, I am convinced that it is in the best interest of both the United States and the international community to remove Saddam Hussein from power, eliminate his stockpile of weapons of mass destruction and create an atmosphere conducive to security and democratization in Iraq. Additionally, it is in the best interest of the Iraqi people to promote regime change because it could free them from an oppressive, dictatorial leadership and bring them closer to a future of prosperity, tolerance, justice and peace.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BRIAN D. KERNS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN  
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank Secretary of State Colin Powell for coming before this Committee to answer our questions regarding our increased involvement in Iraq.

It is important that we do everything necessary to pursue those who may harm this great nation. The September 11 attacks have taught us the importance of being as proactive as possible. Since the attacks we have waged war in Afghanistan, frozen the assets of terrorists, and beefed up our homeland security.

Mr. Secretary, you are before us today to make the case for our invasion of Iraq. It has been reported in the news that Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction and has violated numerous U.N. resolutions. The President has gone before the international community to make the case for invading Iraq and removing the despot, Saddam Hussein. The American people, however, still have questions regarding Iraq and pursuing Saddam Hussein. As always, we want to make certain that we take the appropriate steps to secure the safety of the American people and our soldiers who will be required to fight this war. It is also important to take into consideration the impact this may have on the international community and, in particular, the Middle East. Mr. Secretary, I welcome your thoughts on this matter of great national importance.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHELLEY BERKLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN  
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. Welcome Secretary Powell, I look forward to hearing your testimony.

In his address to the UN last week, President Bush correctly noted that, “We created a UN Security Council so that, unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes.”

Mr. Chairman, we have deliberated enough over the past twelve years—and the UN’s 16 resolutions with respect to Iraq have been ignored for far too long.

Mr. Secretary, the Administration’s decision to seek UN and Congressional support for its Iraq policy is an important 1st step in dealing with the clear and present danger that Iraq poses to the international community—and I applaud your willingness to be here today.

My view with respect to Iraq is unequivocal. It is an evil and repressive state whose leader has demonstrated a remarkable and almost unparalleled disrespect for both the rule of law and the most basic human rights.

It is time to address Iraq’s egregious and unacceptable behavior. And, it is time that the United States confront the horrific reality that Saddam continues to de-

velop and stockpile large quantities of weapons of mass destruction—and may be only a short time away from developing a nuclear weapon.

Mr. Secretary, the facts speak for themselves: In 1980, Saddam Hussein attacked Iran—a war that lasted eight years and cost 1 million lives. In 1990, Saddam attacked Kuwait—and continues to defy his commitments as part of a cease-fire he agreed to.

Even more alarming, Saddam Hussein has shown his willingness to use chemical weapons—against Iran when his military experimented with finding the most efficient ways to spread nerve, blister, and mustard gas on the battlefield. And, he has used chemical weapons against his own people. Nobody who has seen the gruesome video footage of his troops gassing entire villages in Iraq can doubt that this man is evil.

Despite countless good-faith attempts to bring Iraq into the community of civilized nations, Saddam continues to thumb his nose at the UN, the United States and our allies, and the very notion of the rule of law and the sanctity of basic human freedoms.

As Iraq continues to make progress toward the development of more advanced chemical and biological weapons and the means to deliver them, it is essential that we deal with this rogue state before it decides to again strike its neighbors, or even more chilling, supply terrorist groups with these weapons of mass destruction.

This issue could not be more timely, in light of our country's current debate about how best to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists.

- September 11 has taught us that the world is not safe and that there are those who would attack us if given the chance.
- Saddam's own past has taught us that he wouldn't hesitate to attack us if given the chance.

President Bush was right when he told the UN last week that, "The history, the logic and the facts lead to one conclusion: Saddam Hussein's regime is a grave and gathering danger . . . [and] to suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence. To assume this regime's good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a reckless gamble." Mr. Secretary, this is a gamble we must not take for chance.

