

AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE: A SECURITY BUILDING BLOCK

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THURSDAY, JULY 12, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:20 a.m., in Room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. ROYCE. I will call this meeting to order at this time.

This hearing on the African Crisis Response Initiative as a security building block is the issue before us, and so let me just make a few comments and then turn to the Ranking Member for his comments.

It was 4 years ago that this Subcommittee held a hearing on what was then the new African Crisis Response Initiative. ACRI, as it is known, utilizes U.S. military personnel and private contractors to train various African militaries in peacekeeping and in humanitarian operations.

This program's goal is to create national units of African troops able to operate jointly and effectively in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations throughout what is commonly believed to be the world's most conflict ridden continent. Absent stability, our countries, our initiatives toward Africa will be for naught if we don't succeed in this.

Four years into this training and with a new Administration in place, it is important that we take another measure of ACRI. While not without its shortcomings, ACRI has yielded positive results. Peacekeeping deployments by ACRI countries including Kenya, Ghana, Mali, Benin, and Senegal have contributed troops in efforts to stop dangerous and horrific conflicts in Guinea-Bissau and the Democratic Republic of Congo. While stability is the goal, deployments are the essential means. ACRI equipment has also been used by Malawi in providing humanitarian relief to Mozambique in the wake of devastating floods there last year.

African countries increasingly view conflict beyond their borders as their problem, too, as they should. That is why, after a somewhat tentative beginning, African countries are coming to embrace ACRI as a means of allowing them to act on their interest in stability. Besides bolstering African peacekeeping capabilities, there are several tangible benefits of the military-to-military contact brought about by ACRI.

The U.S. military can and does promote the professionalism of African militaries, including their understanding of the role that the military plays in a democratic society. In fact, the defense minister of Ghana recently said that, through ACRI, his troops received an orientation toward democratic traditions and a better appreciation of the democratic way of life. Given Africa's history of coups, this is a considerable benefit.

A shortcoming of ACRI, though, is that it is limited to training in Chapter 6 peacekeeping operations. The conflict in Sierra Leone led the Clinton Administration, belatedly, to initiate Operation Focus Relief, or OFR, which gave lethal training to seven Nigerian, Senegalese and Ghanaian battalions to serve in Sierra Leone. The Nigerian troops who are in Sierra Leone are doing a commendable job. OFR-type training is focused on more aggressive tactics, and these tactics are very imperative to getting the job done in Sierra Leone. Faced with limb-chopping rebels, this is frankly necessary.

OFR is the type of training needed for other African conflicts. We should help African peacekeepers prepare for hostile and downright ugly environments.

ACRI has continuously evolved and more retooling is in order. Some critics have expected ACRI to be a magic bullet, establishing unrealistic expectations. Developing effective conflict resolution mechanisms is no easy task; we should realize that. If anything, our efforts in Africa have been too modest.

We should be patient, viewing this type of military training on the continent as a long-term effort; 4 years is but a blip in time. Doing nothing, ending promising efforts that have had positive results and which have earned the support and goodwill of several African governments would be shortchanging our considerable and growing interests on the African continent. This would be an inexplicable pullback.

Mistakes may be made, but we need to stay engaged to keep the African continent from slipping into chaos.

We have heard reports suggesting that the Administration is moving away from American training of African troops. These accounts seem to persist, despite Secretary of State Colin Powell's endorsement of such training during his recent trip to the continent. I believe that there are many in Congress who hope these reports are well off the mark.

Today, the Subcommittee is seeking clarification of the Administration's plans for ACRI and for OFR. We look forward to following up this hearing and working with the Administration on these important efforts in the months ahead.

And at this time I am going to turn to our Ranking Member, Mr. Don Payne of New Jersey, for any opening statement he might want to make.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief, so we can move forward. I would certainly like to thank you for calling this very important and timely meeting.

As you know, the ACRI program has evolved over the past 5 years or so. As we may remember, it was initially called the Africa Crisis Response Force, ACRF; and that title did not go over too well, and so the "force" was changed to "initiative." but the goal remains the same.

I had the opportunity to travel with President Clinton on his first trip to Africa, the six-country, 12-day visit; and at that time, at our final stop in Senegal, one of our itinerary items was to visit an ACRI training, and we had the opportunity to go to a Senegalese base, and we saw—and Congressman Royce was there with us. We saw training of Senegalese troops being trained by U.S. Military trainers, and we were very impressed at that time with the progress that was being made.

We had a hearing back in 1997 about ACRI, and at that time, I think the Committee, in general, was supportive. I certainly lent my support to the continued funding. You know, we have funding in several pockets of foreign military financing—the voluntary peacekeeping operations, economic support line—and also we have the special project dealing primarily with the Nigerians and some Senegalese, Operation Focus Relief, similar in its response to attempt to have a force to try to ward off the type of genocide that we have seen in the past, particularly in Rwanda.

I would hope that we can get some clear answers. I think that since the U.S. Has made it a policy issue of not sending U.S. Troops into harm's way unless it is a very, very unique situation—and I don't see Africa ever getting up to that level of the bar—I think then the next best thing would be that we ought to be able to train troops to be proficient in attempting to avoid the types of problems that we saw in the past.

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne. We are joined here by Congressman Houghton of New York, Congressman Tancredo of Colorado, and Congressman Jeff Flake of Arizona.

I am going to encourage my colleagues to make this vote. I will continue to preside until I can make the vote as well; and that way we can roll through this general vote.

At this time, let me introduce Mr. Bellamy. We very much appreciate his taking the time to come to testify before us today. He joined the Foreign Service in 1977 and was appointed Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs last month. He is serving as Acting Assistant Secretary during Assistant Secretary Walter Kansteiner's travels in Africa.

Mr. Bellamy's previous assignments include serving as political officer, chief political officer, in Zimbabwe. And we want to thank him for being with us.

We look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BELLAMY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you the achievements of the African Crisis Response Initiative, the status of the program and this Administration's objectives for constructively dealing with the critical issues of deadly conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.

None of the Administration's priorities in Africa can be realized in the presence of deadly conflict. We must help to stop the wars in Africa. In the midst of our other work in Africa, we must pay

close attention to the security dimension. We must have programs that enhance African security structures, designed to bring greater stability to the continent. And, at present, one of the U.S. Government-to-government programs to obtain this objective in Africa is ACRI.

ACRI, now entering its fifth year of activity, arose from lessons we learned earlier in the 1990's and from concern that Burundi could implode with similar disastrous consequences to those in Rwanda. The lessons are that Africans are willing to deploy their troops to perform peacekeeping, but Africans are resource limited with regard to equipment and training preparation. ACRI was, therefore, designed to enhance the capacity of selected African countries to respond quickly and effectively to peacekeeping and complex humanitarian relief contingencies on the continent. ACRI provides a common program of instruction and interoperable communications equipment to improve multinational peacekeeping operations.

The decision to deploy ACRI-trained troops is made by the individual governments in response to a request and a mandate issued by an international political body, such as the United Nations, or a subregional organization, such as ECOWAS or SADC.

From July 1997 to the present, ACRI has conducted battalion initial training in Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya. The ACRI program provides the host military training on the full range of U.N. Chapter 6 peacekeeping tasks from convoy escorts, logistics, protection of refugees and internally displaced persons to negotiations and command and control. Respect for human rights is reinforced as a fundamental concept throughout the program.

The program also integrates nongovernmental and international relief organizations into the training and creates linkages for continued association with other African peacekeeping contingents.

Finally, ACRI provides an in-depth HIV/AIDS awareness module in each training event.

The ACRI program has constantly evolved, based on training outcomes, changing participant needs and experience and peace operation requirements. For example, representatives of international relief organizations, such as ICRC, now participate in training events.

ACRI's substantial command and control evolution produced the first, and still only, U.S. Training program in peace support operations for an international brigade-level staff. This operational command and control contingent directs subordinate battalions to perform competently in a multinational, multi-unit context. ACRI complements and supports French, British, Belgian and other allied peacekeeping training efforts and welcomes their participation in multinational field training exercises. Selected ACRI-trained contingents also participate in multinational field training exercises while ACRI-trained officers attend British- and, prospectively, French-sponsored peacekeeping schools. ACRI welcomes observers for all training events, and it is evidence of the intense interest in this program that ACRI training events have often received extensive and positive press coverage both in Africa and elsewhere.

Today and in the recent past, ACRI partners have been contributing to conflict resolution efforts in Africa. Ghana and Mali sent battalion-strength contingents to Sierra Leone as part of the ECOWAS peacekeeping force. Ghanaian military observers are deployed to support MONUC, the U.N. military operation in Congo, and UNMEE, the U.N. military operation in the Horn. A Ghanaian-trained brigadier, ACRI-trained brigadier, is the OAU representative to the Ethiopia-Eritrea MCC U.N. military operation.

Benin sent a troop contingent to Guinea-Bissau. Senegalese peacekeepers were engaged under the U.N. mission in the Central Africa Republic. Malawi utilized ACRI-provided equipment for their helicopter operations in flood-ravaged Mozambique and provides observers to peacekeeping efforts in the Congo and Kosovo.

ACRI's future is under interagency review. The enhanced capacity for peacekeeping and complex humanitarian response that ACRI partnership provides is very much in line with this Administration's overarching goals in Africa. ACRI has developed significant support among you and your colleagues in the Congress, while also garnering respect in Africa. ACRI reinforces the strong U.S. commitment to African militaries that serve at the direction of an elected civilian government and that operate without violating human rights.

There are, however, ways for enhancing capacity for the full range of peace support operations requirements as they exist in Africa. And while the ACRI program provides basic support skills and trains partner militaries on how to respond, via force protection, ACRI does not cover the offensive combat aspects of Chapter 7 peace enforcement, nor does ACRI provide lethal equipment to African militaries.

The purpose of the current review is to explore options for building upon the base ACRI has established and determining how best to assist Africans in their efforts to develop effective capacities. The Administration remains committed to continuing the kind of political-military engagement in Africa's—with Africa's militaries that ACRI has established.

Finally, we want to work with Congress in assisting Africans to stop wars on their continent. We need to identify the means and obtain the resources to train African contingents and to support them during deployed peace support operations. We intend to continue to develop enhanced African capacity not only in African militaries, but also in African civil structures dealing with security matters, such as the secretariats in the subregional organizations.

Peacekeeping capacity enhancement is not inexpensive. But it can be addressed in a proactive manner over an extended period as the ACRI program has accomplished during the past 4 years. Peacekeeping operations, and especially peace enforcement operations, are, on the other hand, usually very expensive; and we believe that costs can be limited by virtue of enhanced African capacity and early response. In addition, diplomatic and political efforts in tandem with support for African-led conflict mitigation can also be effective in addressing causes and potential resolution of deadly conflict.

We look forward to working with Congress on how best to achieve these goals.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bellamy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you very much for this opportunity to discuss with you the achievements of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), the status of the program, and this Administration's objectives for constructively dealing with the critical issue of deadly conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.

Assistant Secretary Kansteiner has noted that none of the Administration's policies in Africa can be realized in the presence of deadly conflict. We must help stop the wars in Africa. In the midst of our other work in Africa, we must pay close attention to the security dimension. We must have programs that enhance African security structures designed to bring greater stability to the continent. At present, one of the U.S. government-to-government programs to attain this objective in Africa is ACRI.

ACRI, now entering its fifth year of activity, arose from lessons we learned earlier in the 1990s and from concern that Burundi could implode with similar disastrous consequences to those in Rwanda. The lessons are that Africans are willing to deploy their troops to perform peacekeeping, but Africans are resource-limited with regard to equipment and training preparation. ACRI was therefore designed to enhance the capacity of selected African countries to respond quickly and effectively to peacekeeping and complex humanitarian relief contingencies on the continent. ACRI provides a common program of instruction and interoperable communications equipment to enhance and improve multinational peace operations. The decision to deploy ACRI-trained troops is made by the individual governments in response to a request and mandate issued by an international political body, such as the United Nations, or a subregional organization such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

From July 1997 to present, ACRI has conducted battalion initial training in Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya. The ACRI program provides the host military training on the full range of UN Chapter VI peacekeeping tasks, from convoy escort, logistics, and protection of refugees and internally displaced persons, to negotiations and command and control. Respect for human rights is reinforced as a fundamental concept throughout the training program. The program also integrates non-governmental and international relief organizations into the training and creates the linkages for continued association with other African peacekeeping contingents. ACRI provides an in-depth HIV/AIDS awareness module in each training event.

The ACRI program has constantly evolved, based on training outcomes, changing participant needs and experience, and peace operations requirements. For example, representatives of international relief organizations, such as ICRC, now participate in training events. ACRI's substantial command and control evolution produced the first (and still only) U.S. training program in peace support operations for an international brigade-level staff. This operational command and control contingent directs subordinate battalions to perform competently in a multinational, multi-unit context. In addition to its command and control aspect, brigade-level training is designed to incorporate civilian representatives of African subregional organizations.

ACRI complements and supports French, British, Belgian and other allied peacekeeping training efforts and welcomes their participation in ACRI training events. Selected ACRI-trained contingents also participate in multinational field training exercises, while ACRI-trained officers attend British and, prospectively, French-sponsored peacekeeping schools. ACRI welcomes observers for all training events; and it is evidence of the intense interest in this program that ACRI training events have often received extensive and positive press coverage, both in Africa and elsewhere.

Today and in the recent past, ACRI partners have been contributing to conflict resolution efforts in Africa. Ghana and Mali sent battalion-strength contingents to Sierra Leone as part of the ECOWAS peacekeeping force; Ghanaian military observers are deployed to support MONUC (in Congo) and UNMEE (in the Horn) missions and a Ghanaian ACRI-trained brigadier is the OAU representative to the Ethiopia-Eritrea MCC. Benin sent a troop contingent to Guinea-Bissau; Senegalese peacekeepers were engaged under the UN mission in the Central Africa Republic. Malawi utilized ACRI-provided equipment for their helicopter operations in flood-ravaged Mozambique and provides observers to peacekeeping efforts in DROC and Kosovo.

ACRI's future is under interagency review. The enhanced capacity for peacekeeping and complex humanitarian response that ACRI partnership provides is very much in line with this Administration's overarching goals in Africa. ACRI has developed significant support among you and your colleagues in the Congress, while also garnering respect in Africa. ACRI also reinforces the strong U.S. commitment to African militaries that serve at the direction of an elected civilian government and that operate in a professional manner without violating human rights. There may be, however, ways for enhancing capacity for the full range of peace support operations requirements as they exist in Africa. While the ACRI program provides base peace support skills and trains partner militaries how to respond, via force protection, in an escalating military situation, ACRI does not cover the offensive combat aspects of Chapter VII peace enforcement, nor does ACRI provide lethal equipment. The purpose of the current review is to explore options for building upon the base ACRI has established and determine how best to assist Africans in their efforts to develop an effective capacity. The Administration remains committed to continuing the kind of political-military engagement with Africa's militaries that ACRI has established. As important as are other programs such as IMET, they do not produce the scale of relationships and connections that ACRI does through its longer-term activities. We see this outcome as an important benefit ACRI offers, particularly associated with civil-military relations, even beyond the military training provided by the program.

Finally, we want to work with the Congress in assisting Africans to stop wars on their continent. We need to identify the means and obtain the resources to train African contingents and to support them during deployed peace support operations. We intend to continue developing enhanced African capacity, both in African militaries, but also in African civil structures dealing with security matters, such as the secretariats in subregional organizations. Peacekeeping capacity enhancement is not inexpensive, but can be addressed in a proactive manner over an extended period, as the ACRI program has accomplished during the past four years. Peacekeeping operations, and especially peace enforcement operations, are on the other hand usually very expensive. We believe that costs can be limited by virtue of enhanced African capacity and early response. In addition, diplomatic and political efforts, in tandem with support for African-led conflict mitigation, can also be effective in addressing the causes and potential resolution of deadly conflict. We look forward to working with Congress on how best to achieve these goals.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Bellamy, thank you very much. Let me ask you a few questions.

You mention in your testimony that you are sure the Administration wishes to build upon the base that ACRI has established. And I have also heard the Administration speak of ACRI as a long-term program.

One of the concerns I have is the Administration's fiscal year 2002 congressional budget justification. When you read through that—and perhaps it is because it hasn't been thought through, it suggests that next year will be the last year of ACRI. That's my reading of the text. And so I just wanted a commitment that the Administration does consider ACRI to be a long-term program.

I would hope the review you mentioned would result in a commitment to ACRI activities, at least at the level of engagement that we are currently making. I would hope that the Administration would seek, since it is undergoing a review, congressional input for that review. I consider this hearing part of that input, as I mentioned in my statement, and we will be following up this hearing with additional contacts with you.

But I will close my observations and question by saying that, as you know, Sierra Leone is an issue of considerable interest to all the Members of this Subcommittee and to many of the Members of the House. I welcome continued consultations with you and with others in the Administration on this subject.

The important thing is getting the job done in Sierra Leone, which fortunately right now our OFR-type activities there are

doing. It is not checking the bureaucratic boxes. This, as with many things in Africa, will require a long-term commitment on our part. Our training of Nigerian troops for Sierra Leone, which has really been effective, has been done outside of ACRI.

Would we consider evolving ACRI into an OFR-like Chapter 7 training? I will just ask you for observations on that.

Mr. BELLAMY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me assure you that we welcome and indeed seek congressional input as we move forward with this review process. I am going to borrow some of the phrases that you used in your opening statement, if I may, because they put it better than I could perhaps.

You mentioned that ACRI has been a success story, and it is time to take another measure, take another look at ACRI. You mentioned that perhaps we ought to be thinking about preparing African militaries for more robust peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. A little retooling is in order, I think you said. And those sentiments sum up exactly what is at—the basis for our interagency review.

Would we, you asked, consider evolving the ACRI program into something more along the lines of Operation Focus Relief? Does it make sense to add a lethal training component, a preparation for a more difficult peacekeeping environment? And the answer to that may well be yes. And, in fact, it is precisely that question which has motivated this Administration review of where we want to take ACRI in the future.

Mr. ROYCE. I see.

Mr. Bellamy, I am going to run to catch this vote, and I am going to turn it over to Mr. Payne at this time. Thank you.

Mr. PAYNE. [Presiding.] Thank you very much. I missed your testimony. First of all, could you—I—you may have done it in your opening remarks. But could you tell us the countries that are actively participating in this, and about the size of their units.

Mr. BELLAMY. I believe—I may, for the exact numbers, ask one of my colleagues to correct me if I stray. But the countries that have—are currently active in the ACRI program are Senegal, Mali, Benin, let's see—Benin, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and—which one have I missed? Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Benin, Kenya. Okay, six nations, and I believe we have trained up—to this point I think the total number of African soldiers trained in ACRI is about 8,000.

Mr. PAYNE. I understand there are some other countries that were being considered initially, but because of situations in their countries—

Mr. BELLAMY. Right.

Mr. PAYNE. Which ones are those? And actually, if the problems are abated, what would be your opinion about them entering the program?

Mr. BELLAMY. Several of the programs that were—several of the countries that were initially considered for participation in ACRI became ineligible for one reason or another. Cote d'Ivoire, where we actually had the beginning of a program under way, experienced a military coup and was disqualified under section 508. In Uganda, Uganda's entry into the war in Congo in August 1998 effectively disqualified them from participation on policy grounds. In the case of Ethiopia, where preparations had been made for the beginning

of an ACRI program, the onset of the war, the Eritrean-Ethiopian war resulted in our needing to cancel plans for Ethiopian participation.

Will we consider expanding the list of participant countries in ACRI or in a successor program to ACRI? And the answer is certainly yes. One of the measures we want to undertake is consultations with a number of African countries about their needs and expectations and willingness to participate in peacekeeping missions. One of the mistakes that was originally made, I think as you mentioned, Congressman, in the original ACRF program was the failure to consult early on with African countries. We want to avoid that mistake the second time around as we evolve this program.

So, yes, we are looking to engage new African—new members in ACRI or the successor program.

Mr. PAYNE. All right. Initially, also, I think South Africa had actually opposition. It was unclear whether they opposed it or didn't really oppose it. What is South Africa's position on ACRI at this time?

Mr. BELLAMY. My understanding, Congressman, is that South Africa is—I would have to say not yet, or not a—would not be a willing participant in ACRI or ACRI-type programs, and I think there are several reasons for that.

One is that like every other institution in South Africa, the South African military is going through difficult and, at times, painful post-apartheid transition. And I think the South Africans themselves have to make some decisions about what kind of a peacekeeping role they want their military to play in Africa. They haven't come to those conclusions.

They, the South Africans, are also sensitive about being—and I think this is understandable—sensitive about throwing their weight around in the region and being seen sometimes to be too far out in front of some of their neighbors and SADC.

South Africans, I think, ideally, would like SADC as an organization to come to some decision about participation in ACRI. Unfortunately, SADC itself, internally, also has a number of unresolved issues about the role it wants to play as a regional organization in peacekeeping.

Finally, I think there probably is an element of resistance in at least some quarters in the South African Government to participating in a program that is perceived to have been designed and directed elsewhere, in this case by the United States.

So I think for a variety of factors there is a reticence there. But that certainly doesn't permit the U.S. from continuing to engage South Africa in many other ways. And there is clearly a useful role that South Africa can play in supporting African capacities, even if they are not members of ACRI.

Mr. PAYNE. You mentioned the regional organizations. Now the SADC region, the southern countries, Mr. Mugabe had SADC as an organization, I suppose bringing Namibia and Angola and Zimbabwe into the conflict—I guess, Burundi and Rwanda, Uganda.

The way that SADC runs its military arm, so to speak, as opposed to ECOWAS where it was primarily, I suppose, depending mainly on Nigeria—do you know the mechanisms in both of these

groups and whether, either as a regional organization, once the Zimbabwe—once the Great Lakes region problem has been resolved, if that might be a vehicle to work through those organizations?

Mr. BELLAMY. We very much want to explore ways to work with the—particularly, the two regional organizations you mention, Congressman, to develop their—to develop a security relationship with the regional organizations. Of the two, clearly ECOWAS, the West African organization, has more experience and is further advanced in terms of putting together regional peacekeeping operations. And I will add parenthetically that in the coming year we are going to be exploring with ECOWAS ways in which we can deepen our cooperation and offer more assistance to them as they try to develop those multinational capacities.

In the case of SADC, the process whereby SADC would assume peacekeeping roles and develop the internal mechanisms that allow it to play a security role is far less advanced. Part of the reason for that is probably that the SADC body, internal body, charged with security issues and security cooperation is, I believe chaired by President Mugabe of Zimbabwe. That clearly makes it difficult for the United States and, I think, a number of other potential donors to have a security relationship with SADC in the same way that we have had security relationship participation with ECOWAS.

But that is an issue that SADC and the SADC members must, and I am sure will, resolve—resolve themselves. But we do look forward to expanding our cooperation with SADC in this area in the future. I think SADC itself is going to have to come to a number of internal decisions in order to put itself in a position to do that.

Mr. PAYNE. Now, I didn't hear Nigeria's name on the list of six countries that you mentioned. Is Nigeria part of the ACRI, or is it felt that they are advanced enough that they don't need technical assistance?

Mr. BELLAMY. When ACRI was launched in 1997, we were not willing to invite the Abacha government in Nigeria to participate in the program. That, I am sure, all would agree was the correct policy decision at the time.

The Nigerian reaction was, by the—the Abacha government was somewhat embittered and Nigeria was a very vocal critic throughout Africa of the ACRI program.

With the political changes in Nigeria, we have moved, I think very quickly to develop a military-to-military relationship. Nigeria is, I think it fair to say, the flagship participant in the Operation Focus Relief training program. Nigeria, bilaterally, is the largest single recipient of U.S. Security assistance and is the—probably the country with the largest single focus in terms of bilateral—bilateral military programs and capacity building on our part. So, although Nigeria is not formally a member of ACRI, we have a developing and already—I think, a pro-? business relationship with Nigeria, and I feel certain that as we evolve ACRI, perhaps giving it new tasks and seeking new members, Nigeria will very much be a part of our considerations.

Mr. PAYNE. The European view of ACRI, could you, and I know that the Administration touched base with European countries be-

fore it started the program. But could you tell me the general feeling in Europe and maybe, in particular, the countries that are still more active, like France.

Mr. BELLAMY. I recall serving in Paris in the mid-1990's, when the ACRF, later ACRI, concept was first proposed. And there was a tremendous amount, I recall, of French skepticism with regard to this program. By May 1997, we had reached an understanding, both with the British and the French on the nature of our—of the ACRI program. And were able to sign a memorandum, an informal memorandum, whereby all three governments recognized and applauded the separate efforts that we were making in terms of building African capacity.

I think today the relationship is a good and comfortable one with these two governments and also with Belgium. The Belgians have, in fact, provided trainers and participated actively and with excellent results in some of our ACRI programs. We have had British and, on one occasion, French observers in our ACRI training programs. I think the level of contact and the comfort level that we have with our European allies on this program is vastly improved over the situation in the mid-1990's.

Mr. PAYNE. At one time France kept a pretty large number of its troops in—on African soil. What is their position now? Have they been reduced? From what I understand, that may have been the case. And does the French Foreign Legion become involved in any issues of this nature?

Mr. BELLAMY. I don't have with me the precise number of French troops stationed in Africa. I would guess that it is probably between 5- and 6,000 and that those numbers are down somewhat, but not dramatically, over the numbers in the early 1990's.

It, we believe—I think that the French Government has indicated on a number of occasions that its policy in Africa has evolved over the past decade and those French forces are there usually to—in response to bilateral security treaties and to arrangements with African governments. But they are not there, for the most part, to intervene in internal disputes or to participate—to become involved in the internal affairs of the countries in which they are stationed. And I think certainly, as we look back over the past 2 or 3 years, I don't think we would find any examples of the French forces in Africa becoming involved in ways that might have been considered more routine 15 or 20 years ago.

Mr. PAYNE. Now, just getting to where we are now, I understand that there has been a shift. When this program began it was within the State Department, and I believe it is being recommended for the Department of Defense. What is the change and why was it felt that it would be better served in the other agency?

Mr. BELLAMY. I am glad you asked that question, Congressman, and I want to be very clear on this particular point.

No decision has been made to transfer the ACRI program to the Department of Defense. There has been a—and there is an ongoing discussion; as part of this review within the Administration, a number of ideas have been floated and discussed. One of those ideas is to transfer the ACRI program to the Department of Defense. Evolving the program by perhaps adding more Chapter 7 capacity to the program, but even under that concept, I believe the

policy and programmatic direction of the program and the funding of the program would remain in the State Department.

But let me again stress that no decision has been made to move the program to DOD. That's one option that is under evaluation, among others.

Mr. PAYNE. Do you see any additional funding? Perhaps funding ought to come from DOD and let the State Department run it. You know, they round numbers out in hundreds of millions now—a few hundred millions here, a few hundred million there. Do you see any prospect of increased funding for this program?

Just—there is the second bell, and I am going to have to leave; and I appreciate the prerogative of having all this time.

One, let me just make an estimate. I have a feeling that this program will have less of an interest in the new Administration.

Secondly, I think that there is a fundamental discussion going on in our Defense Department now about the whole necessity of ground troops anyway. I envision a defense, an Army, less defense or with unmanned things; and a scary kind of Star Wars, and we are protected by lasers. So I see a fundamental change as it relates to defense in general, but I feel that because of budget cuts that are going to have to come down the pike, that a program in Africa in general, will—which has been marginalized in the first place, I think, will—and I hope I am wrong—have less of a priority, less funding, less importance; and I just wonder if you could give me your opinion on where this program is going.

Thanks.

Mr. BELLAMY. Let me assure you, Congressman, that this Administration is committed to maintaining ACRI or ACRI-type programs, at least at the level of the previous year and, hopefully, at a greater level than we funded it in 200—2001. It is a priority of this Administration to develop those capacities in Africa. We regard ACRI as largely a success story over its 5-year life span. It has projected a 5-year life span. We have every intention of evolving the program, building on what we have learned and evolving this program according to the changing needs in Africa and the willingness of African partners to participate. So I am, in fact, I recognize that in the future—in a constrained budget environment in the future hard choices need to be made. But as far as the Administration is concerned, this program and this priority is every bit as important today as it was last year.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. [Presiding.] We will go to Mr. Flake of Arizona.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you.

Mr. Bellamy, it is great to hear from you. And I just wanted to ask a couple of questions with regard to this program and the context of what we see occurring in Africa now.

Specifically, there was a meeting of the Organization of the African Community, which is being dissolved, I understand, now to become the African union. That's the intent.

But what was of note during that time, reading the press report, it said African ministers rallied behind Zimbabwe over its controversial land reform program on Sunday. The ministers proposed that South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Cameroon, Kenya, and Zambia make up a committee to support Zimbabwe in future talks with the

European Union and other parties on land reform. It is the feeling there that Zimbabwe is being criticized too much for the lawlessness that is going on there, and I think we would characterize it that way. I think the State Department has.

How can we effectively implement a program like this with countries who refuse to criticize the lawlessness that is going on in Zimbabwe like this? And it seems that not many of the countries in Africa right now are willing to stand up and say that this is lawlessness. How can we implement a program while we are training troops and hope that they will support the rule of law when we see this going on?

Mr. BELLAMY. Let me first of all say that the matter of Zimbabwe is of great concern to this Administration. Secretary Powell, during his recent visit to Africa, was very direct and very public on this point during the recent visit of President Mbeki of South Africa, both the Secretary and the President raised our concerns about the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has moved to the top of our list of priorities in terms of African political crises that need urgent attention.

Part of the attention that we will be giving Zimbabwe is to engage African states, and particularly those closest to Zimbabwe and most directly affected themselves by the crisis in Zimbabwe, and to impress upon them the need to join us in insisting that the fundamental issue in Zimbabwe is lawlessness, is rule of law, and is the need for free and fair elections in which Zimbabweans can genuinely choose their political leadership.

And I think a—our best response to the petition that you mention is to vigorously engage, but quietly engage a number of African governments along these lines. I am perhaps less concerned about public statements that might be made by African governments than by what they are saying privately; and particularly in their private conversations with the Zimbabwean Government, I have to be honest that we don't have—we would like to see a number of African governments be more forthright and more direct in their private conversations with President Mugabe as well.

Mr. FLAKE. Well, I spent—lived in southern Africa for about 3 years. And 6 months of that time in Zimbabwe, so it just breaks my heart to see what is going on there. And it is driving away tourists.

They have an economy largely based on tourism now. It is really killing that country off. What else can we do at this point?

If there is a bill in the Senate on Zimbabwe, what should we in the House be doing to—I know this isn't directly related to what we are discussing here, but will ultimately impact what we are discussing here. What can we do here in the House with the limited leverage that we have? We have no bilateral aid to Zimbabwe. What leverage do we have?

Mr. BELLAMY. I think the most important thing that we can do now, Congressman, with regard to Zimbabwe, is to work with other concerned states, African neighbors and also the Europeans, donor states, to do everything we can to ensure that the upcoming presidential election in Zimbabwe is open, free, and fair.

And that is an effort that we have it start soon; we can't wait until a week or 2 weeks before the actual vote. It needs to start

now so that an atmosphere and a climate of openness can be created to allow these elections to take place. And I think if Zimbabweans are given the opportunity freely to go to the polls, they will resolve their own problems.

But the most important single thing I believe the international community can do is to organize itself to provide monitors, provide the preelection support that is necessary for that ballot to take place. Although you are correct that we have very limited assistance programs in Zimbabwe, we do provide substantial amounts of aid to nongovernmental organizations and to other organizations there that are working to uphold the rule of law, foster respect for human rights, and create better conditions in the country. And I think it is important that we continue that assistance and, as necessary, increase it.

Mr. FLAKE. Back to this program in particular. Some of the complaints from those who trained forces there are that we are—we limit our options in just training them in peacekeeping. Are there efforts—and I am sorry I missed some of the testimony when I was out to vote—perhaps, to train them with combat skills, perhaps more useful? How much flexibility should we be given?

Mr. BELLAMY. Yes. That—well, that is the crucial question, I think, and it is precisely that question that is at the heart of this review of ACRI that I mentioned.

And a question we have asked ourselves is, we believe we need to evolve the ACRI program. We have achieved a great deal with it; we have learned a great deal. It may well be time to add that what might be called a “Chapter 7 component” to the training we provide African militaries. The question then becomes which participants, under what circumstances, how do you actually organize and design such a program? But let me assure you that that particular element of giving African militaries more robust capabilities is very much what we—what this review is about.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Flake.

I think on the question of Zimbabwe, I agree with you Mr. Bellamy. The key question is getting to fair and free elections there, and I think, had we had fair and free elections in the last cycle, the indications from the polling are that Morgan Tsvangirai and the Movement for Democratic Change won the parliamentary election.

We had an opportunity in the past to lead a CODEL to Zimbabwe. We were to be election observers. When we were slated to leave, we were contacted by the Zimbabwean Government, as were other election observer teams in the West, and asked not to go. We now know why.

To the extent that we can focus on assuring that the next election is fair and free, I think that that will do much to bring about progressive change toward democratic principles in Zimbabwe.

Let me also make the observation that ACRI includes training in the proper role of a military and a democracy, and as I mentioned in my statement, that seems to be paying off. I was going to ask you about what materials are used to teach this lesson, but I was also going to impart some information, and that is, when the junta that controlled Nigeria passed the baton to General Abubakar, he

asked if we would be a party to his attempt to bring democratic change to Nigeria. Don Payne, myself, and General Colin Powell went over on a mission as an observer team for that election.

When the General was here in the United States, one of the Members of our Committee asked him, what led you, General Abubakar, to give up control of the junta and to try to engineer this constitution for your country and to step back and remove yourself from politics and turn the country into an elected government?

He said, "The training that I received in Fort Benning, Georgia, about the military being subservient to a constitution and to the people and to democracy. I always wondered if I would have the opportunity some day to bring that to Nigeria."

So this type of training program is important, both in terms of stability, but also, I think, in terms of what it gives the military in its education about democratic principles. What materials are used in that process to teach democratic principles in the military?

Mr. BELLAMY. I couldn't agree more with the thrust of your comment, Mr. Chairman.

It sounds as if General Abubakar was a graduate of our IMET training program, possibly; and I don't—I am not sure that I can give you a specific answer as to the exact materials that are used in the ACRI program in terms of civilian-military relationships, respect for the rule of law, respect for human rights. That—those lessons are part of the curriculum. And I'll try to get you a more specific answer, if I may, Mr. Chairman, on exactly where they fit into the curriculum.

But this—the larger issue of professionalizing militaries and ensuring a correct relationship between civilian and military is a part of almost every military-to-military interaction we have with Africa. It is part of the IMET program. It is part of many of our bilateral programs.

We have a major effort under way right now in Nigeria to help the Nigerian military to carry out the reforms it has set for itself and to achieve the professional goals that it wants to achieve and to consolidate its place as subordinate to civilian authority. So this is very much a part of virtually every military interaction we have. And I'll try to.

Mr. ROYCE. That would be fine. I just would like to get the details because I think it will assist me in talking with my colleagues.

The authorization for ACRI, in other words, the African Conflict Resolution Act in 1994, has run out for a year now. Would the Administration welcome a similar authorization?

Are there plans for Operation Focus Relief beyond this year when the current training goals are to be met?

I know that State and DOD are working out the details on ACRI. I just again would like to express, on behalf of my colleagues, our desire in Congress to be a part of this very important decision-making process, and so, I am sure you will impart that information.

Mr. BELLAMY. Yes, I certainly will. We welcome your input and your participation, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.

Mr. BELLAMY. In answer to your question on authorization and continuation of OFR, I believe our budget request for ACRI for 2002 was a little bit less than it had been in the previous years.

That simply reflected the fact that at the time we were putting numbers together with programs, we felt that the ACRI program would be in the process of evolving. We didn't quite know where it would evolve.

We felt that 15 million would be adequate to deal with it. But we also were quite aware that we are asking for a larger sum overall on our peacekeeping budget, and if we needed to find ways to plus up or support ACRI or its successor, we thought that adequate funds would be available to do that.

In terms of OFR, will we continue with OFR? Again, at the time we put our estimates together, we did not anticipate that events in Sierra Leone would have taken the positive turn that they have over the past 3 months, and we fully anticipated that a continuing training of West African battalions for service in Sierra Leone was certainly going to be one requirement.

We are not so sure now. However, we are certain that there are a number of related peacekeeping and peace enforcement capacity building opportunities, particularly in West Africa. And so, in one fashion or another, we intend to build on the OFR program and carry those lessons forward.

Mr. ROYCE. I believe that one of the real enthusiasts for OFR training of Nigerian soldiers and Ghanaian soldiers in Sierra Leone is Dr. Cooksey of Louisiana. Now, Dr. Cooksey has been over to Sierra Leone. He has seen the rough, up close. He has, as a doctor, operated on many of the victims of conflicts, such as this one. And he has shared with me, and we have been in numerous meetings, I will mention, where he has stressed the importance of the United States being engaged in terms of helping African countries, training African combat troops to have the type of success that the Nigerians are having on the ground right now and the Ghanaians in turning back the revolutionary united fronts and their despicable acts.

And so I am going to turn to Congressman Cooksey for his questions at this time.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, you know, in my experience over there, particularly last year in Sierra Leone, as well as when I was in the East, working in Kenya, and then I was in Mozambique toward the end of that civil war about 10 years ago. When you talk to the man and woman on the street, the people in the village there say the number one need is not food and clothing and foreign aid, it is security; and I feel very strong about that.

You know, I was in the military during the Vietnam War, and we have to have a military, but we have got to have security over there; and I think we need to do whatever we can to help those people with security.

I was impressed with what MPR is doing when I was over in Nigeria and Senegal and Ghana, and those are the three countries, as you know, that are providing the military. And when I talked to our MPR personnel that are over there, they feel like the troops are being trained in the right direction and can be, in effect, the peacekeeping force.

Do you think that they are making progress? Do you think they will be able to be effective?

Mr. BELLAMY. Yes, Congressman. We do think they are making progress and that they will be effective in Sierra Leone. We have up to now deployed the—Nigeria, I should say, has deployed two battalions trained under the OFR program. And all of the reports that we have received from the U.N. and from other observers on the ground is that these troops are performing very well and that they—with the skills that they have acquired, they are a marked improvement over the units that they replaced.

During our recent visit to Nigeria I heard a very senior Nigerian official remark that the OFR program was the best thing that had ever happened to the Nigerian military. That may be a bit of hyperbole, but it certainly reflected the enthusiasm of the very senior officials of the Nigerian Government.

We are in the process now of training a battalion from Senegal and a battalion from Ghana. In a couple of months' time we will start training the three remaining battalions from Nigeria. All of the reports that we have from the training currently underway are positive, that the report is going well, the interaction of the united forces and the Ghanaian and Sengalese forces is very positive, and the responses we are getting are positive.

So we feel that we made the right choice. We put a program together that wasn't perhaps as well funded as it ought to have been, as we would have liked, and we have learned a great deal in trying to run this program but we think we have achieved good results; and in part as the situation in Sierra Leone turns around, we think that will be further confirmation of that.

Mr. COOKSEY. You know when you go over and you see children, I mean truly abused the way these children have their arms and extremities cut off—I met a young man that is about the age of one of my daughters, and he had lost his leg. And I said, why? And he said, I am married and I have children but they thought I was part of the government.

Anyway, I came back and I was so desperate to find a solution that I was willing to put our military in there, and I think that should have been an option; but this is still a good choice, I mean the proper choice, to have West Africans helping out over there. It has been my understanding that a lot of the U.N. peacekeeping forces that go in there are sent in from places like Kenya, and I was in and out of Kenya for 6 years, but these people are being sent in there to make money for their governments. They are not competent soldiers. They have their armored personnel carriers taken away from them, their weapons taken away from them, and their underwear taken away from them. And I just think we need people in there that can do the right thing, and I feel that these governments can do it.

I was very impressed with the President of Ghana, the new President of Ghana. And Obasanjo, the new President of Nigeria, I think he is going to keep the soldiers in the barracks. I mean, I was in the military, but the military has been a lot of the problem in Africa, the old military from the seventies and the eighties, and hopefully that will be squared away.

Do you think the warlords are really there because they are trying to do the right things politically in, say, Sierra Leone or the Congo, or do you think they are using war as an extension of poli-

tics, or you think the warlords are there because they are interested in the enormous mineral wealth that they have in diamonds, gold and so forth in these countries? What is the real motivation for people like the former leadership of the RUF and, I assume, the current leadership of the RUF?

Mr. BELLAMY. Congressman, I think there may have been some leaders of the RUF or perhaps are some leaders of the RUF who have a political agenda. I am not sure it is a well developed, well thought out, particularly credible political agenda. But I think that many of those who are fighting and many of these so called warlords are doing so because it is a way of life, not because it responds to some sort of a political agenda.

I have to say that we are encouraged by the trends we have seen over the past couple of months and particularly the disarmament that is occurring, the extension of U.N. Authority and a Sierra Leone government authority into wider and wider areas of Sierra Leone, the fact that disarmament and demobilization has started in the diamond-producing areas as well.

We have to be extremely wary about this. We have seen this before. We have been victimized by premature opposition in Sierra Leone before. But nevertheless, the disarming and demobilizing that is occurring suggests to me the shallowness of whatever political program might have existed out there with the RUF.

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, my other follow-up question in response to your answer: Does there really exist any kind of will and capability to crack down and truly disarm these entities, or are they going to do the limited soft Chapter 6 type peacekeeping training? That is the question that must be answered and should be answered.

And in defense of the RUF, and it is not easy to defend anything the RUF has done, we met with some members of the Lome Commission, three of them, and one of them was a member of the RUF. And one way I negotiate with people that I consider to be bad guys is that I try to be bigger and uglier and badder than they are. My mother is an English teacher, she wouldn't have approved of me using that word, but anyway I tried to put this guy on the defensive. He is a French teacher in Sierra Leone; and I said, how do you justify cutting off the hands and extremities of these children? He said, I didn't do it. I got to talking to him, and a later follow-up question, I asked the three of them, have you lost any members of your family? And the RUF member had. He was a well-educated, articulate guy. He said yes, I lost a daughter. And his daughter was probably about the age of one of my daughters, and my daughters are all in their twenties now, and he got to me with that answer.

The point is, there are bad guys on all sides of the issue over there. Charles Taylor is terrible, and you can quote me on that. He needs to drop dead. Qaddafi needs to drop dead. There are some bad guys on both sides of these issues over there.

But getting back to my original question, does there exist anywhere the kind of will and capability to truly disarm these entities or are you going to do this limited soft Chapter VI peacekeeping training?

Mr. BELLAMY. I think the U.N., the international community generally has learned some painful lessons in Sierra Leone; and

one of the lessons learned was that the last time, in 2000, this was done in the wrong way. As I understand it, the disarmament that is taking place now involves the immediate destruction of weapons. Unlike in the first go-around, these weapons are being destroyed almost as soon as they are collected. They are not being sent someplace and stockpiled.

The U.N. Is present now in Sierra Leone in much greater force and with better command and control mechanisms than it was a year ago. The troops that it has are better trained and better equipped for the mission than they were a year ago, in part due to our OFR training efforts and to the fact that more of our OFR troops are going to be coming on line this year. Plus we simply have the experience of last year.

Part of the reason these hapless forces were disarmed and held hostage was simply that they were not at all prepared for the mission that awaited them. They had been briefed and trained and sent in to do something completely different; and once they found themselves there confronted by a very formidable and dangerous foe, cut off without adequate command and control and without clear guidance on what they could and could not do, they did fall prey.

I think we are beyond that now, and I think we are in a much better posture in Sierra Leone today than we were a year ago.

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, that is my last question.

My good friend Don Payne has come in, and he has done more to I think understand and provide better leadership than anyone else in the Democrat party, and we don't have anyone comparable in the Republican party. So I am glad to have Don in here.

Ed Royce keeps it alive, and he understands the issues. Ed is tougher than any of the rest of us, and I have seen him negotiate with some of the bad guys.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, we thank you.

I want to thank you, Mr. Bellamy, for making the trip down here today. I want to tell you again that I look forward to being in consultation with you over the next few weeks. And I believe Mr. Payne wants to make one more parting suggestion.

Mr. PAYNE. Yes. Just on the Sierra Leone problem, I think that it was unfortunate that the troops were sent without having a robust enough group to confront the RUF, especially since it was in the Diamond Mine region, and I think that was a mistake. I don't believe that troops trained by U.S. Or U.N. Are poor troops. I think that anytime you are outmanned as they were, I believe it was only about 50 or 60 troops that went into the RUF area, that is what the mistake was. It was logistically—and it could have been any group of—it could have been the best-trained Soviet troops or whatever, U.S. Troops. If you are totally outmanned, 20, 30 to one, whatever it was, in territory that you shouldn't—unchartered territory, then that is what is going to happen. I don't think that that is how the troops always will be.

The other thing is that I do believe that we have to be concerned about mercenaries from South Africa which are being hired in the Congo. You had Ukrainian troops that were brought in by Mobutu during his last days. You have the Sandline group from Great Britain with some former Green Berets in there. I think that, as Con-

gressman Cooksey pointed out, there are bad guys on all of these sides; and the governance in Sierra Leone, ever since independence, has been poor. It has been Freetown and the rest of the country be damned, and so you have conditions that create organized groups like the RUF and others.

So I think that in the new government I believe that they will have to look at the total country and have rural programs, not only to deal with the center city of Freetown, and that has been one of the problems from the beginning.

Finally, I was very opposed to President Clinton and his opposition to land mine reform, being opposed to his lack of opposition to banning land mines. I think that was wrong. And I was a very strong supporter of President Clinton.

Having said that, though, I think that it was totally the wrong decision at the U.N. Last week for the U.S. To oppose a moratorium on weapons, small weapons. I think it is wrong, if we are going to try to end these wars around the world, we cannot continue to be the world's biggest supplier of arms and then criticize those folks who use them. And we know in Sierra Leone they didn't necessarily use weapons that we export as much as in other places, but we can't have it both ways. We can't try to have stability in the world and still be the largest supplier of weapons around the world. It is wrong, and the policy should be change, and I am disappointed as an American that we have a policy that says we will not stop the proliferation of small arms to warlords and to rogue governments and all the rest. It is as wrong as Clinton's opposition to the land mines.

Mr. COOKSEY. Could I—

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.

Mr. COOKSEY [continuing]. Comment on that, Mr. Chairman, on his comment?

Mr. ROYCE. Okay. Mr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. Very briefly. I want to echo what he said. I was not ever a major supporter of Clinton. We were separated by an imaginary line between Louisiana and Arkansas, I won't go into that, but I am a supporter of Congressman Payne's position about land mines.

When I was in Mozambique toward the end of that civil war, took care of a woman who stepped on a land mine—and I have pictures if anyone wants to see them. Anybody in the military that will look at that picture of that lady—and if I had her in my own operating room I could not have restored her sight. She had already lost her limbs—any person that could see what the land mine did to her and still is in support of land mines is wrong on that issue. So Don is right on that issue for sure; and, Congressman Payne, I agree.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Cooksey. Thank you, Congressman Payne. Thank you, Mr. Bellamy.

We will now go to our next panel, and as our next panelists come forward I will remind them that we have your written testimony. We have reviewed your written testimony, so we are going to ask you to keep your statements to 5 minutes and then we will go to questions and that will allow us to conclude on time.

Our first witness on our second panel will be General Mamadou Mansour Seck. He is in his ninth year as Senegal's Ambassador to the United States. Those of you who know him are aware that he has worked very closely with the Department of State and Department of Defense in the design phase of the African Crisis Response Initiative and the African Center for Strategic Studies.

From 1988 to 1993, Ambassador Seck was the Senegalese equivalent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and I will mention that Senegal has never had a coup in its history. I will also mention that under General Seck's leadership Senegal contributed troops to Desert Shield and to Desert Storm, and in 1992 and in 1993 Ambassador Seck led Senegal's contingent to ECOMOG in Liberia. It is indeed our honor to have his excellency Ambassador Seck with us today.

Mr. ROYCE. Sir, if you would like to open.

**STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY MAMADOU MANSOUR SECK,
AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY,
REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL**

Ambassador SECK. Good morning, sir. Chairman Royce, we know each other for a long time, during the long process of the AGOA bill. This is the second time you honor me by inviting me in 1 month. Last month was about HIV/AIDS and the success stories of my country Senegal. Today we have to speak about the issue of ACRI, African Crisis Response Initiative, which is initially false.

When I remember 5 years ago, my good friend Ambassador McCallie came to my office. We discussed about the conception and the formula of the ACRI, and my conception was that I agree on the idea and the goal because Africa needs really an African military body by sub-region, for example, to prevent and resolve any kind of conflicts. It was a kind of precondition to our development.

Last Thursday, 28th of June, President Bush met with President Wade from Senegal, President Konare from Mali and President Kufuor from Ghana, and they came to the same conclusion. In the communique they said that the U.S. Will work with the region to build a mechanism to prevent and, when necessary, contain and end conflicts.

Of course, training, equipment, weaponry are keys to any success. It happens that Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana especially had already a broad experience in peacekeeping during the last four decades. We went to the Middle East, to the Congo in the 1960's, Egypt, Lebanon, Congo/Zaire twice, Chad, Liberia—ECOMOG. I remember having the pleasure to be invited by Saddam Hussein in 1988 and 1989 because during that national day he was praising the Senegalese contingent of observers. If you remember 8 years—during 8 years there was a war between Iran and Iraq, and Senegal provided after the cease-fire some observers on the border between the two.

So when these contingents from Nigeria, for example, with a British-style army, Senegalese with a French-style army are together, how to coordinate, how to harmonize different contingents if their equipment, their training, their weapons and their language are not interoperable to have a military vocabulary, this is

the central question that I think we must solve, and I think the ACRI is really doing a wonderful job.

From our part in Senegal, we have a professional army in a democratic country. We train our military also to understand and use English language instead of our French language, official language.

I will sum up the characteristics of our armed forces before discussing the U.S. Cooperation through the ACRI, the ACSS and the Operation Focus Relief.

Our army is coming from the French Army after our independence in the 1960's, and all our officers are educated in military academies mostly, training for the army, Ecole Dallaire where I was trained, and Ecole Navale, all here in Colorado Springs where we bring people from the Air Force, West Point and Annapolis. This means that when the country is democratic we don't think about having a coup d'état because it is too complicated for a military brain. So we don't have the time to take the power.

And there is a separation of power of branches in our country. You are not the head of the military because you are the nephew or the son of the President but because of your own merit on the ground. That is very important.

Senegal, because of its professionalism, provided a lot of troops, more than 15,000, during the last four decades for peacekeeping. We went to the Congo, to Katanga. We went to the Middle East, Egypt and all those countries. We went to Chad. Of course, we went to Liberia; and we were a part of Desert Storm where we lost almost a hundred soldiers.

So I think that the military—what we should do with ACRI, I don't think we need the military from the U.S., the GIs to come and do the job for us. We have to be responsible of our military operations, provided our friends like the U.S. Could provide equipment and training but even the intelligence operation. That is very important. So I think that the ACRI is doing a wonderful job.

The purpose to work in partnership with Africa, Europe and the United Nations and other friendly countries to promote regional stability in Africa through engagement using carefully harmonized U.S. Programs and initiatives, that is a national security document in 1999. The same document said it is in the U.S. Interest to support and promote collective capability among the Africa States.

The objectives are training a minimum of 12,000 peacekeepers; build effective command and control; provide commonality and interoperability; enhance international, regional and subregional peacekeeping capacity in Africa; training in HIV/AIDS awareness;

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have that kind of exercise and the ECOMOG represented. Also some of the European allies like France were among them.

But I think also that the ACSS, African Center for Strategic Studies, is helping in the spirit of how the senior officers and senior civilians in the same democratic country can work together and not fear each other or don't understand each other. But I think also that we need to say that we have sometimes the impression of a double standard. What was spent in Kosovo was more than \$20 billion, but when we talk about Africa we are talking about a hundred million. But that doesn't mean that we do not recognize what a wonderful job that the Americans are doing to help us.

In conclusion, we can be convinced that by helping the African to be ready to prevent the upcoming crisis, the U.S. Could decrease the need to play the role of a firefighter for the continental conflict. This is very important.

I remember President Roosevelt saying after World War II, we have learned that we cannot live alone at peace. We have learned that our own well-being is dependent on the well-being of other nations far away. We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community. I think that this is a role that the U.S. Should really play with us.

Thank you very much. I am open to your questions, especially will be interested to answer about the Chapter VII where we have the ACRI is not covering the weaponry, for example, because it is not possible to make any peacekeeping or peace enforcement without weaponry. We have to be always superior and disciplined and expertise in case that you have a battle. You don't have to make a war, but you have to prepare a peacekeeping operation like in a war. You have to be superior to any eventual enemy. That is very, very, very important. You have also to have your self-control and to play the role to be a soldier and sometimes a diplomat at the same time. That is not very easy.

Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. I hope we have learned those words from President Roosevelt, and I think the Generals have learned those words from Napoleon. So I thank you very much for your observations there.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Seck follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY MAMADOU MANSOUR SECK, AMBASSADOR
EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY, REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL

Mr. Chairman:

I thank you for inviting me to testify before the Subcommittee on Africa to debate the stabilization of our continent, Africa. Of course, in this endeavor the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) plays a central role.

Five years ago Ambassador McCallie came to my office to discuss the best formula to organize the ACRI. My conception was that Africa badly needed a well organized African military body in each sub-region to prevent or resolve any kind of conflicts. This was a precondition to our development. On Thursday, June 28, 2001, the White House came to the same conclusion, as President Bush met with President Wade from Senegal, President Konare from Mali, and President Kufuor of Ghana. The United States will work with the region to build mechanisms to prevent, contain, and when necessary end conflict.

Of course training, equipment and weaponry are keys to any chance for success. It happens that Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana already have a broad experience of peace-keeping since the 1960's in the Middle East (Egypt & Lebanon) and in Congo/Zaire, Tchad and Liberia (ECOMOG). Yet, how can they be pooled together and discuss how to coordinate and harmonize different contingencies if their equipment,

training, weapons, and language are not interoperable? That is the central question to answer. Senegal's participation includes a professional army in a democratic country. We have trained our military to understand and use English even though our official language is French. I will sum up the characteristics of our armed forces before discussing the role of the United States cooperation through the ACRI, ACSS and Operation Focus Relief.

I. AN ARMY OF LIMITED SIZE AND ITS GOALS

Senegal is bordered by the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Mali and the Cape Verde. The size of Senegal is roughly the size of South Dakota, 76,000 square miles. After our independence from France in 1960, Senegal started to organize its armed forces. The army (infantry, paratroopers, commandos, and engineers), the air force and the navy, were created for the defense of the nation.

The goal was the preservation of our sovereignty and our freedom from external threat. It was determined to limit the armed services to the absolute minimum required for the defense of the democratic nation. Traditionally, the manpower of the national conventional armed forces totals roughly one hundredth of the national population. For example, before the end of the Cold War, France had a population of about 50 million inhabitants and an army of 500,000.

The United States has a population of over 250 million and an armed forces of 2 million. In communist countries, this ratio had historically been two to three times higher. The percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) used for the defense during the Cold War represented 4% on the average for the Western countries, but more than 10% for the communist countries. However, in Senegal, we had a far less percentage of our population engaged directly in armed forces. Instead of the expected 100,000 armed forces personnel for a population of 10 million, we have only 16,000. In addition, our armed forces expenditure represents merely 2% of our GNP. We have invested in good training, professionalism and quality rather than quantity.

II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL (LAW 6322—AS OF 3/23/63 AND THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF ITS PEOPLE)

Under Senegalese law, the President stands as guarantor of the national independence and the integrity of our territory. He is responsible for the national defense as well. As you may know, a comprehensive national defense does not rely only on its military, but on all aspects of the national interest and security. The President defines the national strategy, and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense implement its policies according to the means and the goals.

1. The law of Senegal says "The Republic of Senegal is secular (non-religious) democratic and social. It guarantees the equality of all citizens before the law without any distinction of origin, race, sex, or religion."
2. The national sovereignty belongs to the Senegalese people who exercise it by their representatives elected to the National Assembly. "No section, nor individual citizen can attribute the sovereignty to himself or herself." All Senegalese nationals above the age of 18, no matter their gender, with civil and political rights, can vote according to law.
3. The Republic of Senegal is a multiparty democracy. The political parties are part of the democratic expression of the will of the people of Senegal expressed through the vote. Political parties must respect the principles of national sovereignty and democracy.
4. The major institutions of the Republic are:
 - The President of the Government (Executive Branch)
 - The National Assembly (Legislative Branch)
 - The Supreme Court (Judicial Branch)
5. The human being is sacred. The nation has the obligation to respect and protect each person. The freedom of the human being is inviolable. The defense of freedom is an absolute right.
6. All human beings are equal before the law. Men and women are equal in their rights.
7. Everybody has the right to express and freely publicize his opinion by speech, writing and imagery.
8. The residence is inviolable without a warrant.
9. The President of the Republic is Commander in Chief of the armed forces. He presides over the National Security Council and names all higher ranking officers.

10. When the Institutions of the Republic, the Independence of the nation, the integrity of the national territory or the implementation of the international commitments (engagement) are threatened in a serious and/or urgent manner, or if the normal functioning of the public power is interrupted, the President, after informing the National Assembly, can take any measure to re-establish the normal functioning of the public power and guarantee the safety of the Nation. The National Assembly then meets and can amend these measures during the vote for their ratification.
11. Only the National Assembly can enact the law. The law determines the fundamental principles of our National Defense.
12. A declaration of war is authorized by the National Assembly.
13. No ceding and annexation of territory is valid without the consent of the interested

Defenders of Democracy

As you can see from my recitation of the constitutional and legal framework upon which the defense of the Republic of Senegal and the conduct of its armed forces is built, the National Security and the role of the armed forces is defined as the preservation and defense of the rights of the people of the Republic of Senegal, exercised through the democratic institutions of the State. The Army of Senegal is a defender of our democracy. There has also never been a *We "Coup d'Etat"* since our independence in 1960.

III. A ROLE FOR THE ARMY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Now that the Cold War is over, Senegal like the United States is reviewing the role and mission of its armed forces. We face the question of what role the armed forces are going to play. How do we continue to more effectively use our relatively modest expenditure for national defense? I believe that with the end of the Cold War comes an opportunity for our well-trained armed forces to make important contributions in nation building, but also to the stabilization of the region and the continent.

Participation in economic and social development

Senegal is composed of six main ethnic groups: the Wolofs, the Toucouleurs, the Fulanis or Peulhs, the Sereres, the Diolas, and the Mandigos. The armed forces have always been a privileged "melting pot" where the young men from all walks of life and all origins, experience a training of "being together" in harmony.

The current armed forces budget consists 30% of its devotion to the building of the country's infrastructure. Included in the efforts are the construction of roads and bridges but the engineering corps, the protection of the national fishery industry, and the provision of emergency medical assistance, including evacuations from rural areas.

Peacekeeping

Without a long lasting peace and stability our nations cannot develop. That is why a professional army, not only to practice its freedom and sovereignty, but also to participate in the stability of the region and the continent (see the list of peace-keeping operations).

For the last forty years Senegal has sent more than 17,000 men in 46 peace-keeping operations worldwide. While sent out, more than 200 men lost their lives. For instance, we lost 96 men in Operation Desert Storm. Senegal was also the first country in the Sub-Saharan Africa to be a part of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

In Liberia, ECOMOG, with its 12,000 men was led by Nigeria, among them 1,500 Senegalese and 900 Ghanians. The example was quite unique in Africa, where for the first time, a regional force tried to restore peace by its own means and troops, with the help of our friends, especially the United States.

IV. WHAT COULD THE MILITARY ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN AFRICA BE?

America is already helping the continent in providing the funding for humanitarian operations in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and elsewhere.

The African Center for Strategic Studies, provides an education for senior African officials to learn about smooth relations between the military and the civilian in a democratic society. Through the ACRI, the United States is training some countries like Senegal and Uganda, to resolve or prevent regional conflicts.

The ACRI is a \$20 million dollar a year, plus \$90 million from the OPS Focus Relief, this initiative was launched in 1996 and coordinated by the State Department.

The purpose being to work in partnership with Africa, Europe, the United Nations, and other friendly countries "to promote regional stability in Africa through engagement using carefully harmonized U.S. programs and initiatives." (National Security Strategy 1999) Also from the NSS's documents is the quote saying, "It is in the U.S. interest to support and promote collective capability among the Africa states."

Objectives

- Train a minimum of 12,000 peacekeepers
- Build effective command and control
- Provide commonality and interoperability
- Enhance international, regional, and sub-regional peacekeeping capacity in Africa
- Training in HIV/AIDS awareness
- Peacekeeper computer based training
- Cooperation with European Allies: France (Recamp), UK (Staff College), Belgium

V. ACRI PROGRAM IN SENEGAL

Since May, 1999, a battalion is being trained in five phases of which four have been completed. The training phases go according to the following:

- First phase trained 40 persons
- Second phase trained 200 persons
- Third phase trained 45 persons
- Fourth phase trained 600 persons

The training program is conducted every six months.

During September and October of 2000, a formation of an African Brigade for peacekeeping took place. The group met in Dakar where over 400 persons were trained. Currently in progress is the training of our battalion earmarked for UN Mission in Sierra-Leone. From July 9–28, 2001, 650 men will encounter a multinational exercise and it will be held in two parts. The first part is a political/military seminar, which will see the participation of Senegal, Malawai, France, ECOMOG, and OAU. The second part will be conducted at the Brigade Staff level.

These generous U.S. activities could be completed by:

- Helping to build professional armies in a democratic society
- Providing the equipment, weapons and the training without any U.S. participation in the actual operations
- Sharing information and intelligence to prevent any security threat
- Avoiding the perception of double standards i.e. Kosovo/Sierra Leone—15–20 billion to Kosovo; 110 million to Sierra Leone
- Helping to organize regional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement training maneuvers and improving the interoperability of the units
- Using its diplomatic influence to mediate in case of conflict

In conclusion we can be convinced that by helping the Africans to be ready to prevent the upcoming crisis, the United States could decrease the need to play the role of a firefighter for the continental conflicts. The United States has provided 10 million dollars for crisis prevention to the OAU and 100 million for civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Our security, our stability nad the development of our economy, are the conditions of our progress.

The regional integration like ECOWAS in West Africa and the SADC in Southern Africa, have markets of over 200 million consumers, and need the United States' technical assistance to reform and harmonize their national economies. The recent enactment of the AGOA bill is going in the right direction. The Cologne debt relief initiative for the HIPC countries also moves in a optimistic direction.

After World War II President Roosevelt said, "We have learned that we cannot live alone at peace. We have learned that our own well-being is dependent on the well-being of other nations far away. We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community."

This, we believe, is the role the United States should play fully with its friends. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. I will now go to go to Dr. Michael Hanlon, and then we will go back to questions.

Dr. O'Hanlon is a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies division of the Brookings Institution. His experience is in arms treaties, civil warfare, military technology, peacekeeping operations and U.S. defense strategy. He is a former adjunct professor to Columbia University and Georgetown University. He was a Peace Corps volunteer in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Doctor, we are glad you are with us. If you would hold your testimony to 5 minutes please, we would appreciate it.

**STATEMENT OF MICHAEL O'HANLON, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW,
FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION**

Mr. O'HANLON. It is a great honor to appear before the Committee and to be here with Ambassador Seck.

I will be very brief. I wanted to associate myself with your eloquent comments earlier and the Ambassador's about the need for robust capabilities in Africa. What I have tried to do in my work at Brookings, and this builds on some work I also did earlier with Congressman Solarz, was to try to sketch out the broad scale of the problem.

If we want to have a goal in mind for how many troops with what sorts of capabilities we would ultimately like to have, given the prevalence of civil conflict around the world and in Africa in particular, what is a realistic goal, how do we put this 15 to \$20 million ACRI program and the \$90 million Operation Focus Relief program in context compared to what I think our goals should be? I go through some of the detailed reasoning in my written remarks; and, as you say, I can just summarize here to say that, in the end, I believe we need roughly a tenfold expansion of the capabilities of our current programs.

Just to summarize again, the way I get to that estimate, if you look, for example, at the number of wars in Africa in the 1990's and consider those we did respond to in some way versus those we did not respond to, I think there were at least twice as many we should have seriously considered a role in or an earlier role in than we did.

If you look today in Africa at the kinds of missions that might be considered, obviously we can't use an ACRI kind of program in each and every civil war—probably not appropriate in Algeria, probably not appropriate in the earlier war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and perhaps too difficult in Angola.

However, the fact that we have a peace treaty that is potentially going to come into effect in Congo or at least a cease-fire and we are talking about only sending 3,000 people internationally from all countries to try to maintain that peace, but in Kosovo and Bosnia, as the Ambassador has said, the scale of effort is in the tens of thousands for much smaller countries suggests to me we need to think much more ambitiously.

In the short term, we can't necessarily do this overnight, and I will be certainly delighted if the Bush Administration increases ACRI by even 10 or \$15 million, but ultimately I think this should be a program that is a couple hundred million dollars a year, if not more than that, and that envisions handling training and equipping for several tens of thousands of African troops on the whole. I think the scale of the problem is such that that should be our

goal, and I am happy to answer questions about how I get to that sort of number in the Q and A.

Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Hanlon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL O'HANLON, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN
POLICY STUDIES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

SAVING LIVES WITH FORCE: AN AGENDA FOR EXPANDING THE ACRI

Civil conflicts around the world remain numerous and deadly. At least several hundred thousand people lose their lives each year due to the direct effects of war as well as war-related famine and disease. This number has not markedly increased since the end of the Cold War, but nor has it declined. As of early 2001, major wars with very high casualty rates continued in Angola and Congo; serious if somewhat less deadly conflicts continued in Burundi, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Algeria, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Indonesia, Colombia, and elsewhere.

These wars have an obvious and tragic toll in lost human lives—with most of the dead being innocent noncombatants. They have other costs as well. They provide terrorist groups with havens, as in Afghanistan, and with motivating causes, as in much of the Middle East. They do much to keep large segments of Africa and certain other parts of the world mired in misery and economic stagnation. And they undercut the U.S. argument that democracies truly protect and promote human rights. In a world essentially run and dominated by the industrial democracies, their apparent indifference to many such conflicts weakens their moral authority and their international legitimacy as global leaders.

What can be done to reduce the prevalence and severity of such wars? Traditional peacekeeping in places such as Kashmir, Cyprus, and the Sinai has a role. So does a more comprehensive type of approach—involving not only peacekeeping but election monitoring, demilitarization, and state building—which has been applied in places such as Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti, and the Balkans. Despite many assertions to the contrary, most or all of these missions have been at least partial successes in the sense that intervention made conditions better than they would otherwise have likely been.

However, missions in Angola and Rwanda were outright and major failures, in the sense that bloodshed intensified after the deployments of U.N. troops. Moreover, the world's non-interventions in places such as Sudan and Liberia mean that the international community deserves no more than a low passing grade for its humanitarian military efforts of the first post-Cold War decade. The international community can and must do better. And the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) can play a meaningful role in helping it do so. That would be especially true if it were expanded to cover more countries and troops, and if it moved beyond exclusive focus on non-lethal Chapter VI peacekeeping operations to help prepare African militaries for Chapter VII forcible interventions and difficult peace operations as well.

Some doubt the need for military solutions to civil conflicts, preferring to focus on neutral peacekeeping, preventive action, economic aid, and other softer tools of policy. These all have important roles, to be sure. But they are insufficient by themselves. In some cases, wars are already underway, making it impractical to carry out preventive action or to provide much development assistance. In other cases, peacetime political and economic conditions are so poor that aid is wasted, misdirected, or ineffectual. Neutral peacekeeping does not always work either. Many advocate "separating militias" and "disarming combatants" as the way to reduce deadly conflict. In many if not most cases, however, militias and combatants will not wish to be separated or disarmed—and would not assent to such operations if asked. Their weapons provide routes to power and wealth, and they often have no interest in giving them up or in disengaging from combat operations.

If the global community needs more capacity for humanitarian intervention, should that job be given to the United Nations? Some would say yes. For example, it is commonly argued that a small U.N. standing force could make a meaningful difference in reducing civil conflict around the world. Proponents often cite a goal of 5,000 troops, motivated in large part by the claim of Canadian General Romeo Dallaire that such a capability, if added to his small U.N. force in Rwanda in 1994, could have stopped the genocide there. However, Rwanda is a small country that is not representative of many places where civil conflict breaks out. Second, although there is little doubt that General Dallaire would have used 5,000 more troops bravely and with some effectiveness, it appears a low estimate even for

Rwanda. Third, had such forces run into trouble, the international community would have needed to bail them out. Fourth, in the event of two or more simultaneous conflicts requiring rapid attention, such a force would clearly be far too small.

Rather than thinking in terms of a 5,000-person U.N. force, the international community should develop capacity to deploy at least 100,000 troops abroad, above and beyond those forces already capable of doing so today. Standing up a dedicated U.N. force of this size would be very expensive, not to mention politically contentious. Fortunately, it is not necessary to do so. National armies around the world are already available, with many of their costs paid by their home governments. Building on this existing capability rather than creating a new one from scratch is almost surely a more efficient way to spend resources.

What is needed to realize this agenda? In the case of western allies, Washington simply needs to provide political encouragement—and to accept a greater global security role for the European Union, Japan, and other countries. In the case of poorer countries, notably many in Africa, the United States and its friends and allies should provide aid and technical assistance to national military establishments. Specifically, in the case of the United States, it should expand the ACRI to include more training and more equipment—and preparations for operations that could involve the lethal use of force. In other words, ACRI should grow to resemble Operation Focus Relief—the training for muscular intervention provided primarily to Nigerian forces at present—and should not be limited to a small training program for relatively safe operations.

THE SCOPE OF THE GLOBAL PROBLEM

Precise estimates of how many wars may erupt in the future, and of how many troops it would take to quell them, are of course impossible. But recent history can provide a rough and useful guide. The weight of evidence suggests that it could be desirable to double the world's capacity for humanitarian interventions and difficult peace operations. For that to be possible, various countries will need to improve their military capabilities. The United States can and should do more—but its other global military responsibilities preclude major expansions of its role in humanitarian missions. Other states need to assume the primary responsibility for expanding global capacities in this realm.

It is not appropriate to use force to settle every conflict in the world. Some conflicts might even be exacerbated by external involvement. Some might be so intractable as not to justify the investment in effort, dollars, and the blood of international peacekeepers that would be required to stop them. Others are not severe enough to warrant forcible intervention; while they might merit international diplomatic attention, and possibly the deployment of peacekeepers if ceasefires can be established, they cannot justify deployment of many thousands of troops in a muscular mission.

But the international community can generally do something about the world's worst wars. That is not always the case, but it is true for most civil conflicts of the present and recent past.

No quantitative or scientific guideline for intervention can ever be reliable; every case must be assessed on its own terms, and in light of its own politics. But one useful rule of thumb may be to consider forcible humanitarian intervention whenever the rate of killing in a country or region becomes extremely high—regardless of the specific cause of the death toll, be it mass slaughter, genocide, or war-related famine. As former Congressman Steve Solarz and I pointed out several years ago, only a few conflicts in the world typically cause per capita death tolls several times greater than the annual U.S. murder rate of roughly 1,000 people per every 10 million. Even though one cannot make decisions on intervention based primarily on such quantitative metrics, the international community should in most cases seriously consider intervention when it witnesses extremely lethal conflicts.

Given the highly political and case-specific nature of military interventions, only a case-by-case analysis can resolve the question of when and how to intervene. To gauge the likely future need for such operations, it is useful to consider the recent past, since it provides a list of specific conflicts for consideration. Consider the period of the mid-1990s. There were about eight extremely lethal conflicts between 1992 and 1997: Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, and Angola, as well as Bosnia and Chechnya. These cases accounted for more than 75 percent of all war-related deaths in the world over that time period. The international community did intervene in a substantial way in Somalia and Bosnia. It also ultimately devoted some belated and limited effort to address the consequences of the 1994 war in Rwanda, helping refugees who fled to then-Zaire. What about the other cases?

Should the international community have intervened to stop the killing and the dying in those wars?

There will be times when using force to stop genocide or other mass killing is not appropriate. Intervening to stop Russia from killing tens of thousands of innocent Chechens, for instance, would have risked a major-power war between nuclear-weapon states with the potential to kill far more people than the intervention could have saved. Invading North Korea to bring food to its starving people when famine was at its worst several years ago would probably have precipitated all-out war on the peninsula.

In Rwanda, by contrast, the sheer scale of the killing—nearly one million dead in several months' time in 1994—meant that almost any timely intervention would have been better than standing aside, and could have saved a significant percentage of the total victims. The international community should have quickly sent at least 10,000 troops to defeat the genocidal Hutu militias that targeted Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Whether those forces then stayed on for years to help the country rebuild, or took the radical step of partitioning Rwanda, would in this urgent case have been a secondary concern.

In Sudan, the international community should also have intervened in the early 1990s. In fact, the case for doing so may become compelling again. The most natural solution to end the fighting and associated famine would be to partition the country into two parts: a predominantly Muslim north and a predominantly Christian south. That would not please those who are only satisfied by the promotion of multiethnic democracies, but it could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives quickly, and at a modest blood cost to the United States.

In Liberia, the death toll during the early 1990s was much smaller than in Rwanda or Sudan. Nonetheless, the world should have intervened to stop the killing and help establish a coalition government and a professional military. Ethnic hatreds were less severe, and the violence more arbitrary and wanton, than in many other wars. Under those conditions, chances were good that the bloodshed could have been quickly stopped. Liberia's modest geographic size is an additional factor that would have lent viability to a possible intervention.

In short, in my view the international community should have intervened in Rwanda, Sudan, and probably Liberia over the illustrative five-year period in question. In addition, it was right to get involved in Somalia and Bosnia (as well as Kosovo), even if the international community did so belatedly and with only modest success. In other words, actual interventions were about half as numerous as would have been ideal. Part of the reason for this mediocre track record was lack of political will; part of the reason was lack of military capacity among those states that might have had the political will.

How many military personnel would have been enough? It is difficult to say, absent a detailed study of each country's geography and military balances. But several rules of thumb allow rough estimates. First, past experiences with counterinsurgency suggest that in difficult missions an intervening force may need several troops—and possibly even 10 or more—for every 1,000 members of a country's civilian population. In a country of roughly 10 million, that would translate into 50,000 or more troops.

Second, based on both military doctrine as well as political symbolism, intervening forces should generally be comparable in number to the largest likely internal foe they might face. With comparable numbers, as well as superior skills, mobility, and firepower, they would be well placed to dominate the ensuing battles. In most of the above conflicts, that would not have required more than 50,000 troops, but numbers could clearly reach into the several tens of thousands even by this second metric.

All told, an international community that averaged deploying some 50,000 peacekeepers around the world on official U.N. missions in the 1990s, and another 50,000 on average in the Balkans in the second half of the decade, could have needed twice as many troops for a more ambitious effort to mitigate the most lethal effects of civil violence during that time period. In other words, the typical deployment level of roughly 100,000 troops could have totaled 200,000, in rough numbers.

A survey of conflicts that have been underway in the 2000–2001 time frame produces a similar rough estimate. The international community continues to deploy some 50,000 troops in the Balkans. Elsewhere, its U.N. peacekeeping missions have become much smaller than in the early to mid 1990s, though the Sierra Leone operation has kept numbers in the vicinity of 20,000 to 30,000. But a major possible mission in Congo has not been seriously contemplated, the international community instead choosing to hope that a minimal observer mission rather than a muscular peace enforcement operation will suffice there. A serious mission in Congo could easily require 100,000 troops itself, using the force-sizing criteria noted above and mak-

ing reference as well to the sheer enormity and challenging topography of that country. Possible operations in Angola and Sudan, to say nothing of a more effective mission in Sierra Leone, could push the total up further. Counting ongoing missions as well as hypothetical ones, total deployed troop numbers could again quite easily reach 200,000.

THE CURRENT GLOBAL "SUPPLY" OF PROJECTABLE MILITARY FORCE

At present, unless the United States were to provide the bulk of the capabilities, the international community does not have the capacity to sustain 200,000 forces in the field over an extended period of time. Given normal troop rotation patterns, at least 500,000 troops would be needed to sustain up to 200,000 in the field over an extended period. As the table below shows, the international community falls far short of that goal.

To project military power, armed forces usually require three elements, above and beyond troops and combat equipment: strategic lift to move equipment, organic logistics assets that allow units to operate in foreign and possibly undeveloped regions, and military personnel who can be legally deployed under their existing national laws.

Sometimes a country can deploy forces abroad without meeting all three requirements. A country need not have long-range lift if its troops are deploying to a nearby location, if it has enough time to arrange transportation commercially, or if another country can transport its troops. Deploying forces may not need extensive logistics support if they are able to live off the local economy and get by with light equipment. And a given country may be able to deploy conscripts abroad, depending on its specific legal restrictions. But generally speaking, a military that might deploy abroad needs to meet these criteria.

Estimated Global Supply of Projectable Military Force

Defense Country	Total Active Spending (Bil.US\$)	Ground Strength (in thousands)	Ground Forces Deployable and Sustainable in 1-3 Months (estimate)	Percent of Total Quickly Deployable
United States	283	640	400	60
U.K.	37	120	20	15
France	38	190	15	8
Germany	31	220	10	5
Italy	22	175	5	3
Canada	7.5	21	5	25
Netherlands	7	25	1	4
Other NATO	43.5	980	20	2
Other Europe	13.5	296	3	1
Australia	8	24	5	20
Japan	41	150	2	1
South Korea	12	585	5	1
India	14	1,100	10	1
Pakistan	4	550	2	0.3
Bangladesh	1	120	0.3	0.3
Sri Lanka	1	95	1	1
Malaysia	3	80	2	3
Singapore	5	50	2	4
Russia	56	355	35	10
China	40	1,705	20	1
African Neutrals	7	350	10	3
Argentina, Brazil, Chile	24	300	12	4
Non-US TOTAL		7490	190	3

AN AGENDA FOR IMPROVING INTERVENTION CAPACITY—AND THE NEED FOR AN EXPANDED ACRI

To summarize, surveying the world's conflicts, both those now underway and those of the recent past, it would be desirable that the international community be

able to deploy up to 200,000 troops for military missions to quell them or at least to mitigate the human tragedy they cause. If up to 200,000 might be deployed at a time, a pool of at least 500,000 would be desirable, to provide a rotation base. A significant number, but not the dominant number, should come from the United States. Most forces should come from other countries. African countries, in particular, should be able to provide at least 100,000 of those troops, given the prevalence of conflict on their continent and their acute interest in controlling it.

African militaries are not generally well-suited to classic power projection operations. Focusing on those countries that are not themselves presently engaged in severe conflicts—those referred to as neutrals in the above table—they possess an ability to deploy and sustain no more than some 10,000 forces in aggregate. They could deploy more than that for relatively simple missions conducted with little equipment in large cities. But for missions designed to control large swaths of land, and missions that might entail combat and require the use of substantial numbers of military vehicles, African militaries are quite limited at present. And ACRI in its present form, despite its worthwhile contributions, is doing little to change that basic fact.

What would it cost to expand Africa's collective capacity for power projection to about 100,000 troops? One way to estimate the cost is to use, as a guide, a country with a very capable military but a limited defense budget. Such a country can provide a good model for frugal but effective military planning.

Consider then the budget of South Korea. That country has, over the past couple of decades, averaged spending some \$10 billion to \$12 billion on its military, with about \$3 billion to \$4 billion typically going to procurement. With that budget, it fields half a million active-duty ground forces, most of them light infantry but with substantial numbers of armored and mechanized formations as well. In other words, South Korea's forces are probably a good model for what one would want to create in the way of global intervention capacity, in terms of quality and character. Assuming that South Korea's equipment inventories were built up over essentially a twenty-year period, given the normal lifetimes of most weaponry, and that some of its purchases clearly go to its air force and navy, its 450,000 ground troops might operate \$45 billion worth of equipment in rough numbers. That translates into \$10 billion of equipment per 100,000 troops.

Suppose that African states together sought to field 8 to 10 divisions, with about 100,000 associated personnel, suited for intervention abroad. The associated cost might then be \$10 billion to \$20 billion, depending on the quality of equipment procured. Poor countries, principally in Africa, might receive such equipment as aid; less poor developing countries might receive rebates or subsidies. In all, the donor community might need to spend \$5 billion to \$10 billion to make such an arrangement work. The U.S. share might be \$2 billion to \$4 billion, assuming that Europe would provide an equal amount and that countries such as Japan would contribute significant assistance as well. If provided during a five-year initiative, annual aid would be \$400 million to \$800 million for this purpose—more than ten times current spending for the Africa Crisis Response Initiative, but several times less than current U.S. military aid to the Middle East, for sake of comparison.

The virtue of providing this equipment to foreign militaries is that military manpower would not need to be increased or funded. Some funds for needs such as training, ammunition, and equipment maintenance might have to be provided on an annual basis. Scaling from the U.S. defense budget, it is possible that annual operating costs could be one-tenth the value of the capital stock of the equipment provided, necessitating an additional annual contribution of a couple hundred million dollars or so, for a total U.S. cost of roughly half a billion to a billion dollars a year.

Clearly, however, smaller efforts could be highly useful. As a practical matter, any such ambitious agenda would have to begin with smaller steps (please see my New York Times oped below for a suggestion). But ACRI should have a much broader mandate, and should be ramped up to cost at least ten times what it does today. As the world's political leader, and as a country dedicated to human rights, the United States cannot in good conscience do less.

APPENDIX—NEW YORK TIMES OPED

HOW TO KEEP PEACE IN AFRICA WITHOUT SENDING TROOPS

The New York Times, January 8, 2001—Michael E. O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies

During the presidential campaign, George W. Bush opposed using American military power to stop tragedies like the 1994 Rwanda genocide. He

viewed such interventions as strategic luxuries that the United States simply could not afford.

The United States certainly cannot be the world's policeman. But with nearly a half-million people dying each year in civil conflicts around the world, a president cannot suggest indifference to the world's worst atrocities simply because they do not affect America's core interests.

Fortunately, there are ways to prevent atrocities in distant parts of the world without turning to the American military. The solution is to help other countries improve their ability to use force to save lives.

In some regions, like Europe, the United States needs to provide only a little encouragement. European countries currently spend two-thirds of what the United States spends on defense, but focus excessively on protecting their own territories.

To deploy significant numbers of troops beyond the NATO region, European countries must purchase ships and airplanes, as well as trucks and other equipment that allow them to operate a long way from home. The Clinton administration has sometimes discouraged Europeans from this task, because of an overwrought worry that NATO could be weakened if the European Union becomes militarily stronger. Mr. Bush should cheer them on.

But the real opportunity, as well as the real problem, is in Africa. Although conditions have improved in places like Rwanda, Sudan and Somalia, terrible wars continue in Angola, Congo and Sierra Leone. A number of African countries, led by Nigeria, have tried to send troops to quell some of these conflicts; after all, it is in their best interest to do so. But they often lack the basic means to get the job done.

This is where the United States can help. We can provide equipment, training and general financial support so that African troops can carry out more of the missions that we prefer to avoid.

To its credit, the Clinton administration, after its shameful non-intervention during the Rwanda genocide, moved in this direction. It created the Africa Crisis Response Initiative to help militaries in the region prepare for difficult operations. The program has been a success, but it receives only \$20 million a year and has trained just 6,500 troops. The program has given African troops only non-lethal equipment like communications gear. These troops also need trucks, light armored vehicles and other equipment that can be used to uphold—or impose—peace.

The Bush administration should expand this program dramatically. A serious peace operation could require anywhere from 10,000 to 50,000 troops. That means that the current program should reach at least 10 times as many soldiers as it does today. And the program needs better equipment if African troops are to effectively counter opponents like the brutal rebels of the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone.

The price tag for these efforts would be considerable, but not when compared to what it costs to send American forces abroad. Expanding the training program might cost \$200 million a year. Buying enough equipment could cost \$5 billion over several years. If the United States split the cost with its allies, we would spend about \$500 million a year—much less than we typically spend when American troops carry out peace operations.

This proposal could elicit a positive bipartisan reaction on Capitol Hill, even though it requires an increase in foreign aid. To begin, the program could help relieve peacekeeping demands on American troops. In addition, since the African response program is run by the State Department, Colin Powell would presumably direct it. His military experience, together with his personal reputation, could reassure members of Congress who might otherwise be wary of supporting international peacekeeping efforts.

To be sure, there may be peace operations in which the American military must play a role. For instance, Mr. Bush would be mistaken to believe that American forces can be quickly withdrawn from Kosovo, where conditions remain tense and where NATO allies rightly expect American leadership and participation.

Nor would this program be a panacea for all civil conflict. There would still be a need for debt relief and traditional foreign aid, since they reduce the likelihood of civil conflict in the first place.

But if America leads a major effort to train and equip the militaries of other carefully chosen countries for peace operations, violence and human suffering in regions like Africa can be reduced.

Mr. ROYCE. I appreciate that observation, and it goes to Ambassador Seck's point that although ACRI helps avoid perceptions about the double standard, there is certainly an imbalance in terms of the resources committed to that double standard. You are suggesting that we should more equitably raise that level of commitment.

The old military adage that you quoted about being best trained, Ambassador, in terms of being best trained and having the best equipment in order to meet the enemy in the field certainly applies to a conflict with an organization like the RUF that we found was very well armed and very adversarial and confrontational, and to that end I would welcome your observations on Chapter VII training. Could you speak to the importance of troops having the right level of military equipment and the right level of combat training?

Ambassador SECK. Yes. My conception in the preparation of any kind of peacekeeping, peace enforcement is this. We prepare these kind of operations like preparing a battle or a fight. That means what? You have to know the environment. You have to know who is your eventual enemy. You have to know if the infrastructure allows you to come from one point to another.

I remember when in 1991 I came here to see my good friend Colin Powell, we were in the same position, but we didn't agree completely because he didn't want to help. But I said I would like more, and I even asked if we can borrow the weaponry and give it back when we finish the job because President Bush, Sr., insisted that he wanted the Senegalese to go to Liberia after Desert Storm, you know.

So in this country when you see the map of the country, you see that there is no infrastructure. If you want to go to the Lofa country from Monrovia, for example, you have six or five maybe rivers to cross. You need not only four-wheel drive but also sometimes helicopters to come from one point to another you know but also the weaponry. You have some of the troops in Africa. They have AK-47s. We are not sure that we have always same the calibers for the ammo. You can have interoperability having the same kind of frequency, the same kind of modulation of frequency when you use the same weapon to talk to each other.

Some are speaking French only. I remember, for example, the Ghanaians, they had a very small contingent, but they were really—they work to a very small place because they could not interact with others. The Senegalese for the last three decades were training our people, our officers to speak English or to have report in English because English is the international language, you know.

So this is very important, to prepare like a war. You are not coming for a war, but in case you need it, you have to show your expertise, your discipline, your self-discipline. Because sometimes you have somebody irritating you but it is not at the point that you are threatening your life. So you have to keep your self-control.

That happened, for example, in one of our troops in Lebanon where in the 1970's where the jeep of those people was stolen by a Palestinian. They saw the guy coming and stealing it. They could even kill him. It was very easy. But they kept really their sangfroid, like we say in French, not to kill him. But that doesn't hap-

pen all the time. You need discipline. This is why really the weaponry and preparing people is really important for us.

Mr. ROYCE. You need something else, too, and that is intelligence, and you spoke to that issue. I witnessed ACRI training in your country. I think your point that this is a missing component is a good one. What should we be doing to improve intelligence gathering? I think it is very important. It is difficult dealing with an underground organization like the RUF where intelligence suddenly becomes very important to be able to track. It allows you to know who is the enemy and where the enemy is.

Can I have your observations on intelligence gathering?

Ambassador SECK. Yes. You know, the paradox is that sometimes you Americans know more on what is happening on the continent than we know because we don't have satellites, but also, for example, the networking of the diplomacy. Because you have diplomats everywhere. You can tell what happens on the border, for example.

In the case of ECOMOG, we have many representatives coming from Burkina Faso or Ivory Coast and crossing the border. If we can have those kinds of information in regions and use it, you know, how to prevent. But the quantity, how many threats, those kinds of things. But also with your satellites you have to know or how many troops, when they are organized, when you have more than 100 people or 1,000 of them. You know where they are and timely tell us what is happening so we can prepare our operations accordingly.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Seck.

I will go to Mr. Flake for his questions and then to Mr. Cooksey and then to Mr. Payne. Mr. Flake.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you. Just a question with regard to the use of troops.

With a country like Senegal with good democratic institutions, it seems kind of a supplement because you already have traditions and discipline, whatnot. What about other countries? What is your view on countries without such institutions in place? Do we through this program help develop those kind of institutions in the case given here, or more often are we just providing military expertise which is then sometimes used in ways that we wouldn't certainly approve of? At what point—who is the training most useful for, those countries with strong democratic institutions or those without them?

Ambassador SECK. Yes. I think that it would be wrong to be too selective, but you have three kind of countries—countries like Senegal where they have very solid democracy, countries where there is no democracy at all, and then the gray area between the two. I think the countries in the gray area should be given the opportunity to be part of it in the conception in, for example, the staff, when the staff is coming to Senegal, for example, without the troops, to have that kind of training, to know how to react, for example, for a contingent of one battalion, contingent of one brigade, one division. That is always a good asset for them to do that.

I think that also giving the example of the democratic country and everybody knows that when you have good government the World Bank is working with you, the U.S. is working with you, the French or those kinds. Giving an example is also something very

good I think. But I understand sometimes that some countries are not democratic, but when they are in the gray area I think a staff participation, just for the conception and for the thinking, brainstorming, those kind of things, give them to reflect, I think will help I think.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you. Well, this democratic institution says I have to go vote now. So thank you.

Mr. COOKSEY. Do you feel comfortable with the progress your military has made toward being part of this peacekeeping force? Do you feel comfortable with the progress that your military has made? Do you think they can be effective in being an effective peacekeeping force in West Africa?

Ambassador SECK. Yes, Congressman. But I think what is missing, we have to maybe improve the harmonization, as I said, of the equipment. If somebody is, for example, speaking Portuguese they have to have access to English, military English report vocabulary, for example. I think in this case the U.S. Could help. Because I remember that maybe 30 years ago the English lab in my staff, in the staff was provided by the American embassy, for example, but the fact also that we trained education in new schools and military academy, that could help a lot.

I think that we Senegalese we don't lack training, but our problem is how to harmonize with other troops. For example, one of the problems we had in Liberia was the commanding officer is from Nigeria. He was about 45 years old, but my commander with 1,500 soldiers, a colonel, but he was in the Army for almost 25 years, with a lot more experience in peacekeeping and everything. So there is a problem of homogeneity, also even the conception. But we came to merger each experience in the conception. Before any kind of operation, we urged the leader of each contingent to come to the conception, to the staff, with the map; and everything we did already together, the brainstorming; and once we finish, we distribute the task to the continent of Senegal, continent of Nigeria and those kind of things.

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, I understand that problem. I understand that in some of these U.N. Peacekeeping forces there would be a group of peacekeepers maybe marginally trained, but one group have one set of communications equipment, using one set of frequencies and another nation would have something else, they couldn't even communicate with each other by radio. I understand that is a problem, and we are willing I think in this country to put the communications equipment in, the hardware, the weapons systems to first enforce the peace and then keep the peace. But I want to make sure that those—the infrastructure, the communications commitment and the weapons system—are used to enforce peace and keep peace, and I don't want to see some old military guys like you and me come in and take over the country and become a dictator and continue to rape and pillage the country.

I was in Senegal and had a wonderful visit. I was impressed with your government. I was particularly impressed with the guy that led us in from the airport. He rode his motorcycle with no hands and he gave directions and cleared the streets. You probably know who he is.

But I think your government is doing a lot of the right things, but we don't want to put hardware in there and have it misused.

The main thing, I just want to see the killing stopped, and I don't care what we have to do to stop the killing. If it involves, you know, hijacking someone that is a dictator and putting him away, that is justified, too. But I don't want to see the people that die as a result of these dictators like Qaddafi and Charles Taylor are the weakest members of society—the children, the women, the elderly. Somebody has got to stand up for them. And if somebody is a no-good dictator like Charles Taylor, well, you know, those people are basically cowards and they are exporting tyranny and they are doing it because they are greedy. So whatever needs to be done I will support doing, but we want to see that our materials are used properly.

Ambassador SECK. Yes, Congressman. I think that is why I understand the selectivity. That is why there are three categories of countries—democratic, the gray area of countries and the nondemocratic, the one that you mentioned earlier. And since I am a diplomat I cannot comment about my not good friend but the guy that I know very well, Mr. Charles Taylor.

But also on this very important—education is very important. I remember one of the various sayings that a general, that is Mr. Royce, who say that you ask to General Abubakar in Nigeria, how did you get back to give the power and being just a civilian? He said, my education. That is very important, very important.

I say that all my officers—all our officers were trained in our school, in France, in Morocco and the U.S. Those people, they don't have the mentality of having a coup or being a kind of dictator or those kind, but many of those officers used to be maybe NCOs in the French and the UK before independence, and after they were the same officers, they became colonel overnight, these are not real military guys. So I think what you can do to help also is provide those kind of seats in new schools to really educate these people, I don't say without limit, but this is the preconditions because that is a problem of mentality and you can help in that. I think it very important.

Mr. O'HANLON. Can I add one point, Congressman?

As we all know—I think you are right, but, as you all know, there will be abuses, of course, if we expand these programs as I think you and I would like to see them. I think one of the great tests is going to be for people who support these programs to give a perspective. And you have seen these war zones. I was in former Zaire when it was at peace, but it was still terrible, and people are going—the press are always going to focus on the one or two or three atrocities, things that go wrong.

If we do expand the level of aid, if we do expand this program in scale and size as I think we should, I think there will be problems. But we have to accept that, that at some level these abuses are the lesser of two evils compared to unchecked war. I am in full expectation that will be the case, but I think it is a risk we have to run. We try to avoid it by working with the right countries.

Mr. COOKSEY. You mean by putting in the equipment to give them the military tools to enforce the peace, is that what you mean?

Mr. O'HANLON. I am talking about going to Chapter VII sorts of training, the focus relief effort in a much broader scale and envisioning much larger missions in some places like Congo where the current scale of effort being contemplated I think is far too little.

We need more forces. Some of them are not going to be perfect. They are going to commit some abuses. We see that kind of thing. We all watch the one marine who commits a rape on Okinawa gets the attention, and the 19,000 who don't are not noted for their service. So it is just going to be an inevitable consequence, but I think it is a risk we have to run. Because, as you know better than most, the scale of these atrocities is so severe that relatively few abuses by ACRI or OFR troops is something we have to live with I think if they happen.

Mr. PAYNE. What we are going to do, we have got about a half a second left to vote. But Mr. Royce will be back here probably in about 2 minutes, and he has a parting question he would like to ask you. So if you would just wait for a moment or two, he should be right back. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. ROYCE. In conclusion, Dr. O'Hanlon, we want to thank you for making the trip down here to testify; and always Your Excellency, Ambassador Seck, we thank you very much for your input. Thank all of you for coming out today for the hearing.

This meeting stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

