

THE FUTURE OF NATO AND ENLARGEMENT

HEARING

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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:15 p.m. in Room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly presiding.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The Europe Subcommittee meets today for the first of several hearings we have planned to review the future of NATO and the issue of enlargement. At the end of this process we hope to consider legislation which will affirm our support for NATO, endorse enlargement, and possibly even endorse specific candidate countries for NATO membership.

In just 7 months, the leadership of NATO will meet in Prague to, among other things, make a decision on the enlargement of the alliance. As we all know, there are 10 applicant countries who have decided that NATO is certainly relevant to them and an organization they wish to be a member of. But NATO membership for them is more than joining a military alliance. For them, it will be a validation of their return to being democratic, European, and pro-western states.

But even as we discuss who should be invited into NATO, we should take a moment to discuss exactly what type of alliance we will be inviting the new members to join and what we believe the role of this alliance will be in the future.

Certainly, NATO must maintain its political purpose and military coherence. In this context, I disagree with those who believe that in this post-Cold War and post-September 11th era NATO may no longer be relevant for the overall security of the United States. NATO is, indeed, relevant to the U.S. NATO remains the foundation of American policy in Europe. NATO has proven to be a strong and viable alliance, preserving the collective security of Europe for over 53 years.

Back in 1949 when the Senate debated the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, there was certain concern about what Article V would commit the U.S. to do in Europe. It is ironic that the first time in 53 years Article V was invoked, as it was on September 12th, it was invoked by our allies in defense of the U.S.

NATO was relevant in ending the brutal conflicts in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Today, our NATO allies provide 80 percent of the military forces remaining in those countries, and NATO, working with the European Union, was instrumental in helping resolve the problem in Macedonia before things got out of hand.

Since 9/11, NATO's relevance has been clear with respect to the campaign against global terrorism and the war in Afghanistan. Currently, 14 of our allies from NATO are operating side by side with U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, as many of them have been since the first days of the conflict. Today's newspaper headlines the role British troops are now playing there. In addition, the peace-keeping force in Afghanistan is almost entirely European, and Turkey, which will soon take a lead role in the Afghan peace-keeping mission, will use NATO's planning assets at S.H.A.P.E. to guide their operation.

I also disagree with those who believe that unless NATO is willing to undergo major restructuring to become a global, rapid-reaction force in the war against terrorism, it can no longer be relevant. Global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction should be challenges worthy of NATO concern. NATO must seriously address these issues between now and Prague, but these should not be seen as the only issues which define NATO for the future.

Finally, an essential aspect of NATO is the welcoming of new members into the alliance. I believe enlarging NATO does contribute to the overall security of the United States because membership in NATO does enhance overall European stability and security. We are encouraged by the number of applicants for NATO membership and their dedication and enthusiasm to achieve that goal.

So today we ask our witnesses: Is NATO relevant? Has NATO's traditional role as a collective defense organization come to an end? Does NATO need a major restructuring of its organization and mission? Why should the alliance expand? On the whole, can the current applicant countries contribute to the strength of NATO? Does the MAP process by which NATO will admit new members clearly outline the criteria NATO should demand new members to meet?

[The prepared statement of Chairman Gallegly follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THE HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

The Europe Subcommittee meets today for the first of several hearings we have planned to review the future of NATO and the issue of enlargement.

At the end of this process, we hope to consider legislation which will reaffirm our support for NATO, endorse enlargement and possibly even endorse specific candidate countries for NATO membership.

In just seven months, the leadership of NATO will meet in Prague to, among other things, make a decision on enlargement of the alliance. As we all know, there are ten applicant countries who have decided that NATO is certainly relevant to them and an organization of which they wish to be a member. But, NATO membership for them is more than joining a military alliance. For them, it will be a validation of their return to being democratic, European and pro-western states.

But even as we discuss who should be invited into NATO, we should take a moment to discuss exactly what type of alliance we will be inviting new members to join and what we believe the role of this alliance will be in the future.

Clearly, NATO must maintain its political purpose and military coherence.

In this context, I disagree with those who believe that in this post, post-Cold War and post-September 11 era, NATO may no longer be relevant to the overall security of the United States.

NATO is indeed relevant to the U.S.

NATO remains the foundation of American policy in Europe. NATO has proven to be a strong and viable alliance preserving the collective security of Europe for over 53 years.

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Global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction should be challenges worthy of NATO concern. NATO must seriously address these issues between now and Prague. But these should not be seen as the only issues which define NATO for the future.

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So, today we ask our witnesses:

- Is NATO relevant?
- Has NATO's traditional role as a collective defense organization come to an end?
- Does NATO need a major restructuring of its organization and mission?
- Why should the alliance expand?
- On the whole, can the current applicant countries contribute to the strength of NATO?
- Does the MAP process by which NATO will admit new members clearly outline the criteria NATO should demand new members meet?

I look forward to our hearing today and the Subcommittee's continued work in support of NATO.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I look forward to the hearing today and the Subcommittee's continued work in support of NATO. As you can hear, the bells have just gone off. It is my understanding that there will be two votes, possibly three, which means that we could conceivably be there as long as a half hour. I will personally get back as quickly as I can, and hopefully I will bring some of my colleagues with me because I think this meeting is far too important not to have as many people participate as possible. So with your indulgence, I will run over and do my duty on the floor and return.

[Whereupon, at 1:23 p.m., a recess was taken.]

Mr. GALLEGLY. I will call the hearing back to order. Our first witness today is General William E. Odom. General, welcome.

**STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM E. ODOM,
U.S. ARMY [RET.], DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
AND SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE**

Mr. ODOM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure and an honor to appear before you today to talk about the subject of NATO enlargement. I was asked to present a strategic overview of the context in which we are making this decision this coming fall, and I have, in my written testimony, done that, trying to point out the historical perspective and the historical legacies we face, how far we should go, the Russia factor, and whither NATO, the missions, et cetera.

Rather than go over that in detail, I will pick a few highlights and emphasize the points I think are worth discussing further here.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection, we will have your entire statement made a part of the record of the hearing.

Mr. ODOM. Thank you, sir. To me, the most important aspect of a historical perspective is to realize that the end of the Cold War is very much like the end of World War II. At that time, the late-1940s, we had a band of weak European states in the Baltics to the Mediterranean, more connected by wars and ethnic conflicts than by cooperative relations, mutually suspicious and uncertain about how to proceed in postwar reconstruction. The initial purpose of the alliance, people tend to forget, was not keeping the Russians out. It was to keep old enemies in Western Europe from drifting back toward war while proceeding with economic recovery. The Soviet military threat, keeping it out, really becomes an issue a year later, 1950.

So I think it is good to remember that our reasons for founding the alliance were to deal with that set of problems. If we come forward to today, the parallels are striking. Again, we see a band of states from the Baltics to the Mediterranean in economic distress, mistrustful of their neighbors because of nationalism and ethnic tensions, and uncertain about how to proceed. Their problems, however, I think, are different in several ways from the ones West Europe faced in the 1940s. There are many similar, but rather than destruction in war suffered by Western Europe, they confront a different kind of destruction, namely, the devastating legacies from Communist party rule, from command economic systems, from Soviet political hegemony, and in addition, their own traditional ethnic tensions.

I will just make a point or two about each of those legacies. Communist party rule produced a dictatorial party with cadres who were highly trained in Marxism-Leninism as good party operachti. Now, most of those old elites in one way or another are still participating in the governments, the bureaucracies, the militaries and the intelligence services of the candidate countries and the three new countries that are already in. They do not bring the kind of skills you really need for running a modern democracy with a market economy. Many of them have proved able to change, to catch up, and to do quite well in these kinds of positions, but many of them have not, particularly at the second and third levels in the bureaucracies; and, therefore, they present somewhat of a problem of obstruction.

Now, if you compare that with Western Europe in the 1940s and fifties, the Nazi elites and the fascists were not allowed to participate this way. They were moved out. So this problem in Eastern Europe is somewhat different, and I think it is a little more difficult to overcome than the problems in Western Europe.

The command economies left two things that I think are critical and different. First, instead of destroyed factories they have left factories that reflect misguided investments from command decision making, which means these factories cannot compete in modern market competition. They also have the institutional legacies of Communist rule. During World War II, Western Europe did not lose its legal institutions and most of its governing and economic institutions. But in Eastern Europe the Communists destroyed them. Thus, they have to be rebuilt today. Property rights, civil law, commercial law, contract law—these sorts of things have not existed in the Communist period in the way that they will have to exist if these countries are going to succeed with the kind of transition they have in mind. Therefore, I think in many ways the challenges here are bigger than after 1945.

Soviet political hegemony has left a few effects; I think one is worth mentioning. A few of the former party military intelligence officials, now well placed within some of these post-Communist regimes, still have their personal connections with Russian intelligence counterparts. Not only does this allow Russia the potential to make trouble in these countries, but it also permits cooperative criminal activities. And we have seen a few cases of this. I do not think the West European countries faced this kind of problem that we are seeing now.

Finally, ethnic tensions and nationalism are not attributable, of course, to Soviet influence. These problems are most conspicuous in the breakup of Yugoslavia. To presume, as critics of NATO enlargement have done, that only Yugoslavia is afflicted by these is a dangerous illusion. In Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia provides a preview of what will inexorably occur there over the next several years without NATO enlargement. Hungarian minorities in Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Poles in Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, and a number of others are potential crisis issues. The Czech government recently invoked the Benes decrees over the Sudeten Germans, souring their relations with Berlin, temporarily, we hope. These are examples of the kinds of things that can occur there.

Why have most of these sleeping dogs not barked thus far or not barked louder? Because the prospect of NATO membership is something their leaders do not want to spoil. Without that hope, some of their leaders would feel free to exploit these issues for their own personal political advantage within their countries. They are refraining because they have aspirations to get into NATO. Anyone who objects to enlargement, therefore, it seems to me, is obliged to explain how we will deal with a plethora of these problems if we do not enlarge and create a framework in which they can be moderated, brought under control, and solved peacefully.

Now, to the question of how much enlargement, how far to go, I would like to direct my remarks primarily toward the Baltic states and the Balkan states. Surprisingly to me, and I am very

supportive of their inclusion, there has been a lot of support for Baltic states coming into the alliance. I endorse that.

I would just mention that one argument against their admission is that they are not militarily defensible. I think that is technically wrong in light of the enormous increase in the lethality of U.S. ground and air forces over the past 20, 30 years and the parallel decline and deterioration in Russian forces. I think a defense on the ground of Estonia is entirely feasible.

Another point I would make: Berlin was not defensible during the Cold War. The issue is the strategic context of Europe. If the Russians decided to invade Estonia, they would be risking war with Europe and the United States. If they are willing to do that, they are probably going to do it without bothering to invade Estonia first. So if we can deter them overall, which I do not really think is a big question right now, particularly in light of the cooperative attitudes in Russia, this issue ought not to be taken very seriously as an objection.

Bulgaria and Romania can arguably be given a higher priority than the Baltics, not because they are better prepared. Far from it. They face large internal difficulties. Romania, surprisingly, has done more to get ready for NATO membership after its disappointment in 1998 than most observers expected. The key reason for including both countries now is stability in the Balkans. Bosnia and Kosovo were interior to the external borders of Yugoslavia. Therefore, civil wars there did not risk spilling over outside Yugoslav borders. Were a civil war to break out in Macedonia, it seems almost inevitable that Bulgaria will be drawn in, the Greeks, the Albanians, and, of course, the Serbians would probably come in. This could generate a general war in the Balkans.

We have no adequate framework to contain such a conflict right now. Bringing Romania and Bulgaria into the alliance gives us the foundation for a Balkan security framework. And, therefore, I think that is a very compelling argument for admitting these two countries.

While I favor the admission of at least seven members, those are the comments that I wanted to make on specific cases. A brief word on the Russia factor. Russia is now conciliatory toward enlargement, and for very good reasons. Stability and economic prosperity in the states of Eastern Europe are very much in Russia's interest. Civil war and poverty are not. Russia lacks the military power to prevent the former and the economic power to provide the latter. Only the U.S.-led NATO countries have the power to do both.

Several Russian politicians have obviously come to recognize this, especially President Putin, who seems determined to integrate Russia's economy into the West. We should make that as easy for him as we can. Of course, I think the main obstacles to the integration are not objections of the West but his own internal transformation. But again, I think the Russians do show a sense of understanding that it is in their interest for this to happen.

On the missions, I have mentioned a number of things in my written testimony that I will not go over, but I do want to raise the question of whether or not NATO has run out of missions. I hear the assertion occasionally made that its old missions are no longer relevant; and, therefore, we need a big debate and discus-

sion within the alliance to reach a consensus about a new mission. This is a very bad idea that needs to be put down every time it surfaces. The damage that such a discussion could do is hard to exaggerate.

I am old enough to remember these debates going back to the 1950s and the 1960s. We have had them again and again. They never reach much of a consensus, and NATO has gotten on in spite of them. I think we should learn from experience that that is not really the way to handle the problem. No new consensus would emerge, and the alliance would be seriously weakened now.

And second point, a debate is not needed. The alliance's oldest mission, using hegemonic U.S. presence in Europe to keep the peace among its members, or effectively providing a supra-national political-military authority, a surrogate for it, remains as important today as it was in 1949. I tried to emphasize that in my reference to the historical legacies.

Third, dealing with the Soviet military threat put us on a course in Europe of big military exercises. These exercises drove the slow, tedious negotiations among the members for standards of interoperability. Those were not created overnight, and they had to be constantly upgraded as the technology and the quality of the forces changed. Since the end of the Cold War, big exercises like REFORGER have ceased. While there are multilateral exercises on the tactical level, there are none at the higher levels. Therefore, the national level staffs and the larger units in European forces are not being dragged out and trained in this kind of context with U.S. forces.

NATO is the only place in the world where we train for multinational coalition warfare. If we did not have this training vehicle, we would be trying to invent it. The biggest danger that I see to NATO today is that the U.S. has ceased conducting these exercises, and we are not driving this process. Without such training, the so-called technology gap between the United States and Europe will grow, and it is only partially a technology gap. It is also a training and procedures gap. U.S. neglect of this mission is the major threat to the alliance today.

So I think the United States has it very much in its own hands as to whether it wants to revitalize this alliance and go ahead, and I think things like the European Union CSDP will not be the big issue they have been if the U.S. were to move in this regard. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Odom follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM E. ODOM, U.S. ARMY [RET.], DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES AND SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you to discuss the wisdom of NATO enlargement. You have asked me to present an overview of the strategic context in which the next round of enlargement is being considered this year.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Let me begin by offering some historical perspective. Europe's security needs today are similar to those of the period right after World War II. The end of the Cold War, like the end of that war, left a band of weak European states from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean, more connected by wars and ethnic conflicts than

by cooperative relations, mutually suspicious, and uncertain about how to pursue postwar reconstruction. The debates in Europe about creating NATO at that time ignored the Soviet military threat while focusing more on economic reconstruction and fear of Germany. Even the United States saw the Soviet threat as more political than military until the outbreak of the war in Korea in 1950. The initial purpose of the alliance, therefore, was not to “keep the Russians out,” but “to keep old enemies in Western Europe from drifting back toward war” while proceeding with economic recovery.

Reconstruction in Western Europe, therefore, succeeded dramatically because traditional enemies—France and Germany—cooperated in the European Coal and Steel Community which was soon eclipsed by the European Economic Commission, based on the 1957 Treaty of Rome. This story is well known, but we tend to forget that it was only possible because the United States took a hegemonic role in the North Atlantic Alliance and maintained large military forces in Europe. This effectively made NATO a surrogate for a supranational political-military authority that could keep the peace, something modern Europe has never been able to do. Although the ensuing five decades have produced the European Union, this organization is a long way from being able to assume the governing role that NATO has played.

CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Today’s parallels to 1949 are striking when we consider Eastern Europe. Again, we see a band of states from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean in economic distress, mistrustful of their neighbors because of nationalism and ethnic tensions, and uncertain about how to proceed. Their problems, however, differ somewhat from those faced by Western Europe in the 1940s and 50s. Rather than the destruction in war suffered by Western Europe, they confront a different kind of destruction, namely, the devastating legacies from Communist party rule, command economic systems, and Soviet hegemony. Let me describe each briefly.

—*Communist party rule.* The Soviet regime-type had as its core a single dictatorial party tightly embracing the secret police and military officer corps. The post-communist leaders in these states mostly come from these old organizations, which socialized them in ways that are inimical to Liberal democracy and market economies. Some are able to change sufficiently to play a positive role in the new political and economic systems, but many are not. The problem was different in Western Europe where the Nazi and fascist elites were deposed and destroyed. No Nazi Party was left to compete in elections. The old communist elites have not suffered the same fate; they survive in large numbers and lead successor communist parties and communist-like parties, actually winning office in a case or two. I am not suggesting that the communists are likely to re-establish durable communist regimes throughout the region (although Belarus and Moldova have such regimes, Bulgaria had one for a couple of years). They have neither the public support nor the organizational discipline necessary, but because they play a significant role in the politics of these countries, they obstruct and slowdown progress in effective reform.

—*Command economic systems.* The old economic system in all of these countries squandered capital in unprofitable investments for four decades, making most of their industries unviable in a market economy. Perhaps more troublesome are the institutional legacies of command economies. Western Europe did not lose its old legal and economic institutions, but in Eastern Europe the communists destroyed them, such as they were; thus they must be rebuilt today. This is a much bigger challenge than anything faced in Western Europe after 1945.

—*Soviet hegemony.* The effects of Soviet control over these countries were many, but the residue of a few of them is especially worrisome. A few former party, military, and intelligence officials, now well-placed within the post-communist regimes, still have personal connections with their old Russian counterparts. Not only does this allow Russian intelligence officers to make political trouble in these countries, but it also permits cooperative criminal activities with Russian intelligence and criminal circles. Western European communist parties after WW II, of course, caused some, but not all, of the same problems we see today in Eastern Europe.

—*Nationalism and ethnic tensions.* Not something attributable to Soviet influence, these problems are most conspicuous in the breakup of Yugoslavia. To presume, as critics of NATO enlargement have done, that only Yugoslavia is afflicted by them is a dangerous illusion.

The history of Europe from the Protestant Reformation right up through WW II is a record of religious, ethnic, and nationalist strife. England’s border with Scotland saw continuous war from 900 to 1746 with two brief pauses. No border in the Balkans can match that record!

It is frequently said that peace is now permanent in Western Europe, but such a claim may be premature. European leaders would have laid the foundations for future wars in 1990 had not the United States overruled them. Lady Margaret Thatcher and President Francois Mitterand struggled to prevent the reunification of Germany. Suppose they had succeeded. Germany probably would have reunited anyway, quitting NATO and expelling US troops, being furious at Britain and France, and more beholden to Moscow than Washington. That might also have allowed the Warsaw Pact to survive. British and French handling of the Bosnian crisis in the early 1990s actually contributed to the spread of civil war in Yugoslavia. Unlike in the case of German reunification, the United States did not become involved and overrule until much too late.

In Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia provides a picture of what will inexorably occur there over the next several years without NATO enlargement. The Hungarian minorities in Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia, Poles in Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine, the Roma in several countries, Turks in Bulgaria, and Albanians in Macedonia are other potential sources for ethnic strife and wars throughout the region. The Czech government recently used the old Sudeten German issue to sour its relations with Berlin. And Russia's province of Kaliningrad, part of old East Prussia, is a potential source of many problems.

Why have most of these "sleeping dogs" not barked, or not barked louder? Because prospective NATO members do not want to spoil their prospects for admittance. Without that hope, some of their leaders would feel free to exploit these issues for domestic political purposes.

Anyone who objects to enlarging NATO, therefore, should be obliged to explain how we are to deal with the plethora of problems that these four legacies have bequeathed Eastern Europe if admitting new members is ruled out. Still, we must face the question, how much enlargement go and how fast?

HOW MUCH TO ENLARGE AND WHY NOW?

The answer to how much is at least five countries, although seven would be better. Thereafter, a long interval should precede any additional enlargement. The answer to "why now" varies.

The Baltic states have been very successful in their political and economic transition programs. Latvia, having the largest Russian minority, faces more difficulties but has made impressive progress. Bringing them into NATO will help sustain what is being accomplished in these countries. Some observers insist that the Baltic countries are militarily indefensible. This judgment is wrong on two counts, technical and strategic. On the first count, given the great lethality of US and NATO forces against the greatly deteriorated Russian military, a local defense is highly feasible in Estonia, the most exposed of the three countries. On the second count, Berlin was indefensible during the Cold War, but the strategic context prevented a Soviet attack on it. The same holds for the Baltic states today. If Russia invaded them, it would risk general war with Europe and the United States. The strategic question, therefore, is the defensibility of Europe, not the Baltic states. Thus the indefensibility objection is a red herring, not to be taken seriously.

Romania and Bulgaria can arguably be given a higher priority than the Baltic states, not because they are better prepared. Far from it. They face large internal difficulties. Romania, surprisingly, has done more to get ready for NATO membership after its disappointment in 1998 than most observers expected. The key reason for including both countries now is stability in the Balkans.

Bosnia and Kosovo are terrible problems, but compared to civil war in Macedonia, they could look small. It most likely would lead to the country's breakup, which could bring Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia, and Greece into a conflict there. In other words, a general Balkans war could arise from it unless NATO creates a framework for maintaining security in the entire Balkans. Making Romania and Bulgaria NATO members is the most obvious way to begin, because it puts NATO astride all countries there rather than entangled on one side or the other. This probably explains why Turkey and Greece are uncharacteristically cooperating to support Romanian and Bulgarian admission.

Slovenia and Slovakia might as well be included if these other five countries are. Slovenia is well-prepared, but Slovakia needs to make greater progress.

THE RUSSIA FACTOR

After the dire warnings about Russian reactions to the first round of NATO enlargement failed to materialize, new ones should not disturb us this time. Russia is now conciliatory toward enlargement, and for very good reasons.

Stability and economic prosperity in the states of Eastern Europe are very much in Russia's interest. Civil war and poverty are not. Russia lacks the military power to prevent the latter and the economic power to provide the former. Only a US-led NATO has both. Several Russian political and economic leaders have come to recognize this, especially Putin, who seems determined to integrate Russia's economy into the West.

Then why not include Russia in NATO? First, its policies in the CIS and Chechnya are incompatible with NATO membership. Second, it is too big and its problems too intractable for Putin to achieve broad Russian integration with Western economies any time soon. Third, inside NATO Russia would periodically play a spoiling and blocking role that could fatally weaken the alliance. Fourth, the seven states now seeking membership want security against Russia. Russian membership, some of them have warned, would be dangerous for them. We should not underestimate their fears as an important subjective political factor.

All of these reasons argue strongly against upgrading Russia's link to NATO beyond the 1999 "founding act." Until Moscow uses this connection constructively for several years, it would be unwise to allow it greater access to NATO deliberations and policy discussions.

WHITHER NATO?

Serious questions need to be raised about where NATO is headed with enlargement. Will it lose its vitality? Is it being diluted so that it amounts to little more than OSCE? Does it really have a mission today? Is NATO being displaced by the EU's moves to take over responsibility for Europe's security?

Dilution is a danger if more than the seven candidates now being considered are admitted. That must wait until the present prospective members are successfully integrated into NATO. Experience already gained from the three new members shows that it takes time. For example, the Czech Republic is creating serious problems, especially with the increasing signs of unpunished criminal activities by high-level government officials. No doubt, some of the candidates for admission this year will prove troublesome once they become members. Still, dealing with these problems is a major reason for enlargement. If the Czech Republic were outside of NATO, our leverage for solutions would be less.

At some point, however, troublesome new members could prove more than NATO can handle. For that reason, *the alliance ought to consider amending the treaty to establish rules and procedures for expelling members that have become a danger to NATO from within.*

The analogy with OSCE is instructive, not against expansion, however, but as a strong reason for not including Russia or increasing its status in Brussels.

NATO's mission is a very serious matter, dangerously neglected, especially by the United States. It is really a question of "missions" plural. Some are new, and some are old. Here is a tentative list:

1. *Providing a substitute for a European supra-national political-military authority.* This implicit mission remains valid today and for the indefinite future. We need to be more conscious of it without *talking more* about it. The Europeans know its importance but do not like to admit it. If the European Union achieved a political federation with an effective central government, it might well displace NATO, something the United States cannot oppose, not least because Washington was the original sponsor of European integration. The danger today, however, is that we could forget this mission while the Europeans create unjustified illusions about EU defense capabilities. The combined misunderstandings could precipitate a premature US withdrawal from Europe, catalyzing the slow but sure process of growing tensions and instability in Europe. A number of lesser and more specific missions can help avoid such a disaster. The following three are examples.

2. *Transforming the political and economic institutions of countries in the Balkans.* A new mission, it has been described as a case of previously taboo "out of area operations." The United States has been reluctant to undertake it, classifying it as "peacekeeping," which it is not. Rather it involves what the United States did during its occupation of Germany between 1945 and 1955. "Peacekeeping" was developed by the United Nations with very specific and limited activities, which cannot create the new institutions needed in the Balkans. Only military occupation and governance can. To evade this mission is to risk NATO's future.

3. *Training for coalition warfare.* The coalition that fought the Gulf War against Iraq was greatly facilitated by NATO interoperability standards and practices. No other organization but NATO provides the development and maintenance of interoperability essential for effective multi-lateral coalition warfare. If we did not have

NATO to provide this service, we would have to invent it. In a word, NATO needs no direct enemy to justify its existence. This training mission alone is enough.

The greatest threat to NATO's future has been US neglect of this mission since the end of the Cold War. It requires a yearly set of large-scale exercises involving multi-national operations. And those in turn demand a series of smaller scale national level training endeavors to prepare for them. Large-scale NATO "combined" exercises have virtually ceased. The militaries of the new NATO members, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, therefore, have had neither the chance nor the demand to become involved in such training at more than a very low-level. Their national defense staffs are not forced to become operationally involved on more than very limited small unit operations. Thus they can drift along with little change from their old communist military practices.

One of the reasons for the huge gap in military capabilities between the United States and Europe is the lack of a regular and demanding combined exercise program. If, for example, the United States began an annual exercise, projecting three to six heavy Army brigades to Europe, almost entirely by airlift (C-17s can carry M-1 tanks), to participate with NATO forces, that would draw them into demanding operations, showing up their "gaps" and needs for modernization. Their defense ministries could not easily ignore them.

The Cold War REFORGER exercises accomplished this with the Central Front scenarios, but the United States had weapons and equipment already deployed in Europe (POMCUS stocks), making the lift requirements relatively small. Today, such exercises should involve lifting ALL of the weapons and equipment in very short time periods. A score of fast RO/RO ships and a fleet of 300 C-17s could put two US heavy divisions in Europe in two weeks.

On alternate years, heavy brigades of European forces should be projected on the same high-speed basis for exercises in the United States and Canada. If the United States offered the lift and invited European militaries to "play" in this game, their military commanders would likely jump at the opportunity. The professional enhancements offered and the chance to show their own governments what their real shortfalls are in capabilities for operating with US forces would be powerful incentives to European officers. The new NATO member states would scramble to be the first to participate.

Two major gains could result from such training. First, it would show up the EU's "common security and defense policy" for what it is—little more than a piece of paper. And it would do so without any public comments from US officials, comments that infuriate European leaders without changing their behavior.

Second, the technological gap between US and European forces would likely narrow. Moreover, it does not exist in some areas, something that exercises would force the US defense department to acknowledge. And it would be especially helpful for military reforms in NATO's new member states.

4. *Out-of-area operations.* The precedent for NATO conducting out-of-area operations has been set in the Balkans, but it remains contentious. In my own view, pushing NATO to become a vehicle for global war on terrorism is neither good for NATO nor for success in that war. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's term, "coalitions of the willing," is a better approach. In a few cases, a NATO political consensus for an out-of-area campaign will be possible, but not every time the United States demands it. The interoperability standards and practices learned in NATO, however, can be exploited by coalitions of a few NATO members who do share a consensus on fighting outside of Europe.

CONCLUSION

Let me end by applauding this committee's efforts to put the case for NATO enlargement—pros and cons—before the American public. Admitting new members is not a step to take lightly. Moreover, if the United States continues to let the alliance drift without leadership and direction, and if it spends more time condemning the EU's military planning than improving NATO's military activities, enlarging NATO will yield few of the results and possibly contribute to the alliance's decline.

I strongly favor enlargement this year not only because it serves a broad range of interests, including those of Russia, Europe, and the United States, but also because it should force the United States to wake up to most of these long neglected tasks.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, General Odom. Our next witness is the director of foreign and defense studies and Senior Fellow at American Enterprise Institute and probably better

known to most of us as former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Welcome, Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

**STATEMENT OF JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, FORMER U.S.
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. This is a subject of great interest to me and has been for quite a long time. I think it is important for the United States and also for Europe and for peace in the world in a general way.

I believe your questions, which you posed at the beginning, are important: Is NATO still relevant? Will it be useful if we enlarge it? There are some other questions, too, of course. Can NATO adapt without being absorbed? Can it maintain its identity in a rapidly changing Europe and a rapidly changing world? Can it assist in the training that is so important and the development of interoperability, which General Odom has just referred to? There is a question about the proposed new members. Will they fit? Is there enough cultural homogeneity? Is there enough military and political homogeneity? Is the mission of NATO still relevant enough that it even makes sense to talk about its continued expansion? The biggest question of all, I suppose, is if the enlarging of NATO will further reinforce peace in Europe and in the whole region.

I have been particularly interested in the discussion so far about its impact on relations between Greece and Turkey. I have been interested in that for obvious reasons, since there have been problems, special problems, through the years in relations between those countries. And as I understand it, the governments of both Greece and Turkey are today assuring all interested parties that they expect that NATO will reinforce peace and good relations between those countries.

I have heard discussion, as I am sure you have, about Slovakia very particularly and about whether Slovakia is ready for membership in NATO. Of course, we have heard that question raised about a good many of the countries that are now being proposed as new members for NATO. Last week, the former Czech Ambassador here in the United States, Alexander Vondra, was just reminding us all that the Czech Republic is a very strong supporter of Slovak membership. Ambassador Vondra feels that it would be important for them and would reinforce everybody's democratic institutions.

I have heard discussions among my friends who have long been concerned about peace and democracy and the development of free markets and free institutions in Southeastern Europe and who have worked on these problems. Of course, many people have been concerned about the reinforcement of democratic institutions and strong economic institutions in Southeastern Europe. Everyone that I talk to or listen to today is arguing that the proposed enlargement and the inclusion of the 10 candidate members, the Vilnius group, so called, would reinforce democratic institutions in Southeastern Europe, strengthen democracy, strengthen rule of law, strengthen their moves toward integration, and generally make for a more stable and democratic region.

All of them, it seems to me, either are now or soon will be, I predict, candidates for membership in the EU, and I think this is something to bear in mind when we think about NATO enlarge-

ment—not that it is definitively important but that it is certainly relevant because as these countries become members of the EU, if they also become members of NATO, each of those is a significant step toward further integration of Europe. Many people think that the integration of Europe is an important development. I think it is an important development. It is just one more assurance that Europe will never again be a battlefield, which it has repeatedly been, and is one more reinforcement of the elimination of causes of strife and conflict. I think it is a relevant step actually toward the integration of Russia, as Russia becomes progressively interested in integration with Europe and with the former Communist states in the then-Russian Empire, which has dissolved with almost unbelievable speed.

I think that problems in Eastern Europe are real today, and the obstacles to democratic institutions and strong economic institutions are real, and I have no doubt that there are real obstacles to their orderly integration into NATO or that there will be real problems in their integration into the EU. I will just limit my remarks to NATO. I do not think that the problems constitute overwhelming obstacles. It is very important, in thinking about whether a country will fit in NATO or will fit into the democratic alliance or an organization of any kind, to remember all of the nondemocratic states, whom I believe have found membership useful to the construction of democratic institutions. Such infamous nondemocracies, if I may remind us, without in any way insulting any of the democracies in Europe today. Germany had had a Nazi government not too long before it became a member of NATO, and Italy had had a fascist government not too long before it became a member of NATO, and Spain, of course, became a member of NATO relatively soon after it had been a quasi-fascist state, and Portugal, Greece, and Turkey had been dictatorships.

And I believed, as I supported the enlargement of NATO at each stage, including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic more recently, that the association with NATO, particularly of the military establishments in those formerly nondemocratic states would have a reinforcing and very positive impact on the military institutions of new democracies. General Odom would know more about this than I, but perhaps military men can learn more readily from other military men than from civilian professors or such. I think there is some evidence to support that case in any case.

I also believe that the integration in NATO of the candidate states of Eastern Europe will speed their general economic well-being and their political well-being. Why? Just because of association, continuing and more and more intensive association, with other democratic, economically sound states. It will reinforce practices of civil law and the habits associated with order and civil law in those states. I believe, beyond that, that the integration of all of these states in NATO will provide a stronger foundation for democracy in those states and for sound economies in those states because it relates them in more dimensions for more purposes. It can strengthen all of the dramatic changes which have occurred in each of them in the post-Cold War period.

While I believe that it is often difficult for peoples and nations to change and institutions to change, we also have dramatic experi-

ence with the transformation of many countries in the post-World War II period and in the post-Cold War period, and our experience, in my judgment, reinforces the potential for transformation, and, indeed, what has already happened in these countries reinforces their potential for rapid adaptation to new opportunities, new possibilities, and new associations.

So I, quite frankly, hope that the Congress will accept these candidate members to NATO. I feel quite certain that they will make good members of NATO. Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Madam Ambassador. Our next witness is the Director, Center on the United States and France, and Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute, Dr. Philip Gordon. Dr. Gordon?

STATEMENT OF PHILIP H. GORDON, SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to testify here today. I submitted remarks on a broad range of challenges to NATO, but what I would like to do here, if I may, is just summarize on three points, which is what those challenges are, why NATO remains important, and how we can go about preserving the utility of the alliance.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection your entire statement will be made a part of the record of the hearing.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you very much. Let me begin on the challenges because I think that is why we are all here. The challenges are enormous, and I actually think that the greatest challenge to NATO today is not, in fact, enlargement but a more fundamental question, which is what NATO is for, not how it is made up, but what it is for. I think that question is before us more than anything because of the fact that NATO no longer seems central to the central security issues of the day, not least the war in Afghanistan that we have just seen fought.

For 50 years, NATO was the institution that addressed the United States' most fundamental security issue in Europe, and then even after the Cold War for the past 10 years it was still the institution that dealt with our primary security issue, at least the one we were most involved in, in the Balkans. Now neither of those are true, and when the big, central military challenge came up before us, the war on terrorism and the war in Afghanistan, NATO did not seem relevant, and I think that raises serious questions in a lot of people's minds about what the alliance is for. Moreover, in the war in Afghanistan it was not only the case that NATO was not used but that the United States gave a very strong impression that it did not want to use it for such contingencies, and we were faced with this very bizarre and, I think, quite unpredictable situation in which we had European allies actually offering to propose more troops and forces than we were willing to accommodate. And that left them, some of our key allies, wondering whether we would ever be interested in using NATO again.

Let me be clear. I think in the Afghanistan case there were good military reasons not to use NATO: the need for tactical surprise, operational security. Most of the allies did not have the right equipment and could not have been used. But nonetheless what

seemed to be an American attitude of drawing on our perceived lessons of Kosovo that we did not want to have to consult among 19 countries, and we wanted to do this without the encumbrance of the alliance has raised in a lot of people's minds the question of whether NATO can be used again.

A second big challenge is the technological one. Experts were talking about a capabilities gap long before September 11 in the war on terrorism, but I think recent events have made this problem even greater than it was before. The war in Afghanistan showed how far ahead of its allies the United States is in the way it could integrate new technologies—sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, smart-bomb satellites, jammers, and all the rest—where Europe was well behind, and decisions and developments since then have made this problem worse, not least in the fact that the United States has proposed, at least, to increase its military budget in 1 year by some \$48 billion, which is much more than any single European country spends on defense in the year, period. Our increase would be more than even the larger spenders in Europe, France and Britain, spend at all, which will only increase this capabilities gap.

Third, reinforcing this view of concern about what NATO might be used for is the EU dynamic. We do not have time to get in here and now all of the reasons behind this impetus behind the European defense and security policy, but the point is that Europeans are getting on with their own security policies, setting up their own institutions, and partly driven by the notion that the United States may not be interested in using NATO and incorporating allies, are likely to keep doing that.

Then there is the Balkans, where we are faced not with the challenge of failure but in some ways the challenge of success. The crisis in the Balkans is what kept NATO relevant and valid for the past 10 years. If you remember 10 or 12 years ago, there were lots of hearings like this where people were asking whether NATO was still relevant. It was not clear that it was, but when NATO became absolutely necessary to bring peace to the Balkans after the disasters of the early nineties, it was clear that NATO was relevant, and I think it bought the alliance another decade, and now we are back to that question, well, if it is not for keeping the peace in Central Europe or Germany, if it is not for the Balkans, what is it for?

And then finally there is the challenge of enlargement in relations with Russia. For reasons I will give in a minute, I am a strong supporter of both a wide enlargement and closer Russia NATO ties, but I think it is just fair to note that many believe that a wider NATO and a new relationship with Russia will dilute the alliance and make it even less likely to be used.

I mentioned all that because I think we need to be frank and put all of that on the table because there are a lot of people who are asking the question whether NATO will be used again, and I actually believe that the Prague summit in November, whereas a year ago we might have said if there is a wide enlargement, it will be deemed a success, and NATO will have had a great triumph, a lot of people now are taking that almost as a given and want to see what NATO is going to decide to do to remain relevant and not just to enlarge.

So what should we do? Do we throw up our hands and say there are great challenges out there, not certain how NATO can be used, and just enlarge the alliance and give up? I think not. I think not for many of the reasons that the Chairman explained in his opening statement about why NATO remains still valid and relevant. It remains the primary vehicle for American engagement in European security, which until further notice is still necessary.

I think the enlargement process has helped play a critical role in unifying the continent that was divided for 50 years. I think the incentives of getting into NATO have clearly proven strong in bringing about political, economic, and military reform in the candidate countries. NATO brought peace to the Balkans as no other organization could have done, and it still has tens of thousands of troops there keeping the peace. The Partnership for Peace has been essential for relations with countries even in Central Asia, some of whom proved necessary during the war in Afghanistan. And then finally, but far from least, NATO's role in ensuring interoperability among allies so that they can cooperate militarily even when NATO, per se, is not involved, as was the case in the 1990-91 Gulf War, as was the case in Afghanistan. And I think it is worth reminding ourselves that at present there are now more troops from NATO allies in Afghanistan than there are American troops, and the fact that they can work together in a peace-keeping operation and even perform combat missions together, as some of them have been in recent weeks, would simply not be possible without the interoperability that comes in part from membership in NATO.

So if NATO is worth preserving, and yet there are challenges out there, how do we use Prague and the runup to Prague and the aftermath of Prague to make sure it stays relevant? Let me just put a few thoughts on the table on those issues.

First, on enlargement, I think it is important that a wide enlargement take place at Prague. I have already explained that I think this incentive of membership has been powerful in pushing along the reform process in the candidate countries. I do not think we can forever tell them, well, keep trying, keep trying; you will eventually get in. Critics of NATO enlargement have long argued that either it would cost too much or it would offend the Russians too much and cause a crisis with Russia or it would excessively dilute the alliance. And I think our past experience is that none of those things proved true. It did not cost too much, and I do not think it will cost too much to continue. Relations with Russia are now far better than they were in the period before enlargement, and President Putin has basically acquiesced to this idea. And the dilution argument, I think, misses the point. NATO was never an alliance of equals in which all members had the same voice. It always depended on U.S. leadership, and it just seems to me strange to argue that somehow with 19 members NATO is a lean, efficient, decision-making machine, but with 24 or 26 somehow it is too unwieldy to work. The key will be American leadership, and I think if we continue to lead the alliance, it can remain effective.

I would add the thought, though, that we might need to consider a mechanism to suspend the membership of those who no longer meet their obligations, either military or political. That has been considered in the past. It never proved actually necessary, or it was

never implemented in the past, but as the number of members rises, and I think to help us confront this problem, at some point, too, the process is great at getting candidates to reform before they get in, but once they get in they get a free pass. I think we might need to think about some sort of suspension mechanism to make sure that all allies continue to meet their obligations even once they are in.

NATO-Russia. I think we have an important opportunity with Russia. Even before September 11th I think President Putin showed he had made a strategic choice for the West. I think September 11th reinforced that choice. It is worth noting that Putin has acquiesced to all sorts of things that people never thought he would accept, NATO enlargement possibly even to Russia's borders. He supported our war in Afghanistan, U.S. bases in Central Asia, the end of the ABM Treaty. While I think the idea of Russian membership in NATO is premature, it is not premature at all for a new relationship with Russia that would allow for greater cooperation between NATO and Russia, whether that be in the areas of peace keeping, missile defense, reform of the military sector, or actual military missions.

It is true that Russia had the opportunity to cooperate these fronts even in the past after the founding act, and they did not avail themselves with it. But in the context of Putin reaching out and looking for a new relationship with NATO, I think we have a real chance to lock that in, and if a new forum would help lock that in, I think it should be supported.

European defense policy; a brief word on that and then the war on terrorism, and I will conclude. On the European defense policy, we need at Prague and before it to continue to work to finalize the deal to keep this ESDP closely related to NATO. Many Americans are concerned about the whole European defense process, but I think given American attitudes about not wanting to use NATO for certain things, the growing capabilities gap, and the idea of the U.S. wanting to get out of the Balkans, I do not see how we can criticize the Europeans for wanting to set up some alternative. What we can do is work very hard to ensure that that European process is closely coordinated with NATO's so that if we do agree to fight together, as we often have in the past, and as I suspect we often will in the future, Europeans can do so more effectively, and if Europeans have to act without us, for example, in the Balkans, that they can do so more effectively.

In the near term, that means closing the deal that we have been working on for a number of years on asset sharing between the European Union and NATO, which has been a long struggle and is currently being held up by one NATO member, Greece, which is not satisfied with the deal. We need to work very hard to make sure that that deal gets completed.

Finally, on the war on terrorism, which is what I began with by saying that NATO no longer seemed central to this, I think we need to have high aspirations but not excessive. NATO will never be the central organization for the coordination of the war on terrorism. Much of this takes place between the U.S. and the EU in areas of law enforcement, financial controls, and so on. But we can do more in NATO. I think NATO can play a greater role in areas

like counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil defense, and consequence management. I think it can play a role in missile defense coordination, possibly even including Russia. I think it can play a role in coordinating special forces among allies. I think the command structure can be further reformed so that it is more appropriate for use in projecting military forces abroad. And then finally, we should use the Prague summit to reinforce the political solidarity among allies and the notion that NATO, which the alliance already acknowledged in 1991 and 1999, does have a role in global security problems as well. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILIP H. GORDON, SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE

I am delighted to provide testimony to this subcommittee on the important subject of NATO and its future. The ongoing war on terrorism, an expected enlargement at the November 2002 Prague summit to 5–7 new members, the European Union's own emerging security and defense policy, and a new NATO-Russia relationship all raise fundamental questions about the roles NATO can play and how it should serve American interests. It is thus right that members of Congress begin to think about these issues well before the Prague summit, so that they can help shape American policy toward the most successful Alliance in history. NATO will probably never again be the central security institution it was during the Cold War, but it remains a vital tool for the defense of important American interests. Let me try to explain how recent developments challenge the Alliance, and how I think we should use the Prague summit to enhance its future effectiveness.

Less than 24 hours after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, America's allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came together to invoke the Alliance's article 5 defense guarantee—this “attack on one” was to be considered an “attack on all.” When it came time to implement that guarantee, however—in the form of the American-led military campaign in Afghanistan, NATO was not used. The Americans decided not to ask for a NATO operation for both military and political reasons—only the United States had the right sort of equipment to project military forces half-way around the world, and Washington did not want political interference of 18 allies in the campaign.

In the wake of these decisions, some observers have begun to wonder whether NATO has any enduring role at all. And there are, in fact, serious reasons to be concerned about the future of the Alliance if leaders on both sides of the Atlantic do not take the steps necessary to adapt it to changing circumstances. The Afghanistan campaign revealed significant gaps between the war-fighting capabilities of the United States and its allies, and reinforced the perception in some quarters in Washington that it is easier to conduct operations alone than with allies who have little to offer militarily and who might hamper efficient decision-making. Moreover, the U.S. decision in the wake of the terrorist attacks to increase its defense budget by some \$48 billion for 2003—an increase larger than any single European country's entire defense budget—will only make this capabilities gap worse. To the extent that the war on terrorism leads the United States to undertake military operations in other distant theaters, and to the extent that the Europeans are unwilling or unable to come along, NATO's centrality will be further diminished.

Yet to conclude that NATO no longer has any important roles to play because it was not used for a mission that it was not designed for would be perverse and mistaken. The Alliance remains the primary vehicle for keeping the United States engaged in European security affairs. Through its enlargement process, it is playing a critical role in unifying a continent that had been divided for almost 50 years. NATO brought peace to the Balkans, and continues to deploy tens of thousands of troops to the Balkans, without which could easily revert to the horrible conflicts of the 1990s. Through its Partnership for Peace, the Alliance has reached out to and promoted military cooperation with partners in Central Asia, some of which ended up making essential contributions to the campaign in Afghanistan. NATO also continues to perform the important function of promoting military interoperability among the allies, so that they can cooperate militarily among each other even when NATO per se is not involved—as they did during the 1990–91 Gulf War and in parts of the operation in and around Afghanistan. As the international community considers ways to stabilize Afghanistan in the wake of the war, NATO planning and

command and control capabilities may well prove to be the best option for the maintenance of a long-term, Western-led security force. In short, while the war on terrorism suggests that NATO is no longer the central geopolitical institution it was during the Cold War, it would be premature and extremely short-sighted to conclude its mission is over and that it has no future role to play.

Instead of giving up on NATO, the North American and European allies should use the Prague summit to continue to adapt the Alliance to the most important security challenges of the day. Just as previous developments—such as the end of the Cold War or the conflicts in the Balkans—have obliged the Alliance to adapt, September 11 and the conflict that has followed it will require NATO leaders to think boldly and creatively about how to keep the Alliance relevant.

How should NATO adapt at Prague? First, Alliance leaders should make clear that new threats such as international terrorism are a central concern to NATO member states and their populations. Already in its 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO leaders recognized that “Alliance security must also take account of the global context” and that “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage.”¹ NATO made essentially the same point in the 1999 Strategic Concept, this time moving “acts of terrorism” to the top of the list of “other risks.”² This is not to say that any act of terrorism or threat to energy supplies can or should be treated as an Article 5 contingency for which all Allies are obliged to contribute troops. It does mean, however, that all allies recognize that their common interests and values can be threatened by global developments, a point made dramatically clear by the attacks on Washington and New York. Even if invocations of Article 5 will no longer necessarily mean a formal NATO operation under NATO command, the concept that “an armed attack” from abroad must trigger solidarity among the member states is an important development that must be maintained and reinforced.

Second, NATO members—and particularly the European allies—must accelerate the process of adapting their military capabilities for new missions in light of the new campaign. At NATO’s April 1999 summit, the Allies adopted a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) designed to improve allied forces’ deployability, mobility, sustainability, survivability and effectiveness.³ The DCI process identified some 58 areas in which Allies were asked to make concrete improvements in their forces to fill specific gaps in Allied capabilities. But the DCI process never really had political visibility and few of its goals have been fulfilled. At Prague, European NATO members should consider whittling down this long list to some 3–5 most critical categories—perhaps Precision Guided Munitions, airlift, secure communications, and in-air refueling—and making real commitments to fulfilling their goals. Not only do the Europeans need to make serious improvements in capabilities if they want to join effectively with the United States in the anti-terrorism campaign, but the EU process needs to be fully integrated with NATO’s. Otherwise the current problems with interoperability will only get worse. Europeans have had legitimate complaints about not being fully involved in the first stages of the military operations in Afghanistan, but such involvement will only become more difficult in the future if American and European military capabilities continue to diverge.

Third, NATO should continue the process of enlargement, as a means of developing strong allies capable of contributing to common goals and of consolidating the integration of Central and Eastern Europe. Barring the unexpected, it now seems clear that the Alliance will take in 5–7 new members at Prague: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and possibly Bulgaria and Romania as well. Some observers argue that taking in such a large number of new allies will dilute the Alliance and render it unusable in the future. The truth, however, is that there is not a fundamental difference between an Alliance at 19 and an Alliance at 24 or 26—NATO was never an alliance of equals and always depended on American leadership in the past as it will in the future. To ensure future effectiveness, NATO leaders might want to consider mechanisms that would allow for the temporary suspension of an Ally whose democratic credentials were in question. But it would be a mistake to fail to act on the principle that the Alliance has enunciated for years, that the

¹See *The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept*, North Atlantic Council in Rome, November 7–8, 1991 (Brussels: NATO), para. 12.

²See *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999, Press Communiqué NAC-S(99)65 (Brussels: NATO), para. 24.

³See Washington Summit Communiqué, Press Communiqué NAC-S(99)64, Brussels, April 24, 1999, para. 11.

NATO door is open to those European democracies who are committed to contributing to the Alliance's common values and security interests.

Fourth, the Prague summit should be used to promote greater cooperation between NATO and Russia. Significant progress is already being made in this regard, as seen in Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent acquiescence toward enlargement and his agreement with NATO Secretary General George Robertson to set up a new forum to expand NATO-Russia cooperation. In another sharp break with the recent past, Moscow has also agreed to get NATO's help in restructuring its armed forces, long resisted by Russia's conservative defense establishment, but where NATO has much to offer. NATO should seek to build on this new momentum and propose much more far-reaching cooperation that could transform Russia's relationship with the West—the proposed NATO-Russia Council “at twenty” is a good start and should be formalized at Prague. NATO-Russia cooperation could include exchanges of information on civil defense cooperation (where both sides would have much to learn from each other), cooperation and training among NATO member and Russian special forces, Russian involvement in collaborative armaments programs, and other NATO-Russia joint military exercises. In the wake of the tragedies of September 11, the prospect that Russia could feel that it is part of the West—rather than threatened by it—is an opportunity that should not be missed.

Finally, NATO needs to develop its capacity to deal with the specific issue of terrorism, a process long resisted by European allies who worried about given the Alliance too great a “global” or “political” role. In fact, there are great limitations on the role NATO can and should play in this area—issues of law enforcement, immigration, financial control, and domestic intelligence are all well beyond NATO's areas of competence and should be handled in other channels, notably those between the United States and the EU (which have in fact been strengthened since September 11). Still, NATO allies can and should share information about nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missile programs; develop civil defense and consequence management planning; develop theater missile defenses; and better coordinate various member-state special forces, whose role in the anti-terrorism campaign will be critical. The Alliance should also consider a new Force Projection Command, that would be specifically responsible for planning out of area operations. During the Cold War, few could have imagined the need for American and European special forces to travel half way around the world and execute coordinated attacks, but that is now a very real requirement. While NATO was not used for the military response to an attack on the United States, it is unfortunately not difficult to imagine a major terrorist attack on a European city for which a NATO response would be appropriate.

Even with all the right reforms, NATO will probably not again become the central defense organization that it was during the Cold War, or even during the Balkan wars of the 1990s. But that does not mean that it does not remain an essential tool with which the United States and its most important allies can coordinate their militaries, promote the unification of Europe, maintain peace in the Balkans, and quite possibly fight major military operations anywhere in the world. The Prague summit should be used to revitalize and adapt a still-essential organization, not to accept its demise.

Philip H. Gordon is a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and a former Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Dr. Gordon. Our next witness is a political scientist with the RAND Corporation, Dr. Thomas A. Szayna. Dr. Szayna, welcome.

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS S. SZAYNA, POLITICAL SCIENTIST,
RAND**

Mr. SZAYNA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting me to testify on the military preparedness and readiness of the candidate countries to join NATO. I submitted a longer statement. I request that it be entered into the record.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection it will be made a part of the permanent record in its entirety.

Mr. SZAYNA. In my statement today I focus on assessing the preparations that the MAP countries—by MAP I am referring to the Membership Action Plan—are making to attain standards that

would allow them to function effectively within NATO and on assessing their likely military contributions to NATO. First, I will outline some of the goals that NATO has set for the candidates; two, I will discuss some of the constraints that limit the ability of the MAP countries to meet these goals; third, I will go briefly over the contributions that the MAP states are bound to make to NATO; and fourth, I will discuss some recommendations for an optimal U.S. approach to shape the militaries of the candidate states. I want to stress that the testimony is focused on the military aspects of enlargement rather than the political rationale behind it, as the other panel members already have spoken at great length about it.

So, first, what goals has NATO set for the candidates? NATO launched MAP in April 1999 to keep the door to further enlargement open. MAP consists of individually tailored programs of activities and exchanges to help those countries prepare for membership. It contains five chapters: one, political and economic; two, defense and military issues; resource issues; security issues, and by "security" I mean security of information; and legal issues. Each MAP country prepares a detailed annual plan as part of MAP, with activities that are designed to further alliance compatibility in all five chapters.

I should note that it is important that the alliance has always emphasized that none of the goals in MAP should be considered as a list of criteria for membership. That said, if a candidate state cannot fulfill the criteria in MAP, then that state is not likely to contribute much to NATO or be able to participate fully in NATO's activities.

When it comes to the first chapter, other than possibly Macedonia and Albania, the candidates have made progress in meeting most of the goals. Bulgaria and Romania still need to consolidate that progress. There is some potential for backsliding in Slovakia if the populist forces associated with the pre-1998 government come back to power. The legal chapter is not controversial, and none of the candidates would have problems with it prior to accession. The security chapter may be more problematic, although the problems would be on the implementation side as opposed to any controversies regarding its usefulness.

The most challenging aspects that the candidates face are in the military realm. The candidates are expected to provide forces and capabilities for NATO missions, to participate in NATO's military structure, agencies, and planning, and to pursue interoperability. Achieving the above, of course, entails having the political capacity and will to be active NATO members and to devote enough resources to those efforts.

That brings me to the issue of constraints that the MAP candidates face. The fundamental constraint on the ability of the MAP states to achieve their military objectives is the lack of resources available to them relative to many of the current NATO states. In itself, this stems from the small size and the relative lack of affluence of the candidates. These problems have affected all of the MAP states and their armed forces to varying extents. The willingness of the candidates to invest resources in defense has varied. Although all of the candidates have plans in place to increase defense spending to 2 percent of GDP, which is the benchmark within

NATO, and some of them are at that level already, whether the candidates will stick to this level is open to question after accession. But the defense burden-sharing issues aside, there remains the fundamental point of low resources in an absolute sense. These are small countries.

Now what contributions can the candidates make? As a basic assessment, none of the MAP states can offer any forces or capabilities that would be unique to the alliance, although they can augment NATO's forces in some areas. Neither in quality nor quantity will the MAP states make a substantive difference in NATO's military potential. That said, some of the light forces of the MAP countries are suitable for peace-keeping operations, and almost all of the MAP states have had contingents participate in NATO's peace operations in the Balkans. Support elements within the MAP forces, especially engineers, MPs, medical, and so on, can make an especially useful contribution to NATO's peace operations. Several MAP countries also have special forces and mountain infantry units, and those will be of some utility to NATO in certain combat operations. In addition, some of the rapid-reaction forces that are being formed by all the MAP states would be of interest to NATO.

None of the MAP states is currently in a position to contribute significantly any naval or air forces to NATO. Probably the most important contribution that the MAP states can make is their ability to provide air space and bases and quality infrastructure to NATO's operations, and this is especially important in the post-September 11th security environment. That event has especially elevated the importance of Bulgaria and Romania because of the sea bases and air bases in those countries.

The resource and human constraints in the MAP states limit their ability to participate effectively in the alliance, stemming from their small size. Even the small NATO states currently need to train about 200 people to staff the various NATO agencies and to be an effective NATO member. That is going to be hard for those countries to achieve. I wish to stress that it is important to keep in mind that the standard of reference is very high. NATO militaries are among the best, the most sophisticated in the world. In any event, with wise investments and good planning, all of the MAP states can make a real contribution in the long term to NATO.

Now, the final section: What should be done to make these candidates net contributors? Whether a MAP state is invited to join NATO this year or not, there is a long-term U.S. interest in assisting these militaries in being able to participate in NATO operations. Interactions and guidance that are part of MAP, combined with the desire of the MAP states to join NATO, have meant that incentives were in place for the MAP states to devote a fair share of resources to defense, to make some hard choices in defense planning, and to make their defense-planning programs compatible with those of NATO. Both NATO and the candidates have gained as a result.

The MAP states can contribute relatively more to NATO if, instead of building up their forces across the board, they would keep in mind the law of comparative advantage and build on existing strengths, emphasizing their ground forces, and focus on the pros-

pect of missions that their armed forces might undertake. With a well-thought-out plan of development and modernization, the armed forces of the MAP states eventually could make a meaningful, if small, contribution to the alliance. MAP has helped to guide them in that direction. However, if the incentives of potential membership were to disappear, then country choices are likely to yield a less efficient use of resources. The problems of MAP countries on the military side are real, but those should not necessarily stop the alliance from enlarging.

A potential way to keep the incentive system in place and still achieve the political goals of enlargement is to invite the candidates but delay the actual membership, accession, if you will, until the existing MAP goals are completely fulfilled. I stress “existing MAP goals,” not any new goals. In this sense, membership would be contingent on the MAP state being able to function in the alliance and to make a military contribution to NATO. Otherwise, near-term accession to the alliance may require additional assistance from the current NATO members so as to help make the candidate countries’ membership substantive as opposed to nominal. From a long-term perspective, this approach has merit, and it will provide a constructive framework for maximizing the military contributions of the candidates while providing the near-term security umbrella that the MAP states seek and to prevent disruptions to the alliance.

With that, I conclude my testimony. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Szayna follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS S. SZAYNA, POLITICAL SCIENTIST, RAND

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for inviting me to testify on the military preparations and readiness of the candidate countries to join NATO.¹ In June 2001, NATO heads of state agreed to invite at least one country to join the alliance at its summit meeting in November 2002 in Prague. Officials from many countries in and near Europe have expressed their goal to join NATO, but the set of realistic candidates from which the invitees will be chosen in November 2002 is comprised of the nine countries currently in NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP).²

In today’s statement, I focus on assessing the preparations the MAP countries are making to attain standards that would allow them to function effectively within NATO and on assessing their likely military contributions to the alliance. First, I outline the goals that NATO has set for the candidates. Second, I discuss some of the constraints that limit the ability of the MAP states to reach these goals. Third, I briefly go over the basic contributions to the alliance that the candidates can make. Fourth, I discuss some recommendations for an optimal U.S. approach to shaping the militaries of the candidate countries. I want to stress that the testimony is focused on the military aspects of enlargement rather than the political rationale behind it.

¹This statement is based on a variety of sources, including research conducted by the author during the last five years on the reform of the armed forces of the European post-communist countries as part of RAND’s Project Air Force, RAND’s federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for the United States Air Force. The specific project that this testimony builds on was sponsored by the Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Headquarters, United States Air Force. That said, however, the opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research.

²The nine countries include the following: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.

WHAT GOALS HAS NATO SET FOR THE CANDIDATES?

NATO launched MAP in April 1999, with the aim of keeping the alliance's door open to future members. MAP consists of individually tailored programs of activities and exchanges to help the aspirant countries prepare for possible membership. MAP contains five "chapters:" (1) political and economic issues; (2) defense/military issues; (3) resource issues; (4) security issues; and (5) legal issues. Each MAP country prepares a detailed annual plan as part of MAP, with activities designed to further alliance compatibility in all five chapters. The MAP mechanism complemented an existing program of cooperation between the candidate states and NATO under the auspices of NATO's Partnership for Peace (or PfP) Planning and Review Process (or PARP). In its current form, PARP resembles the alliance's Defense Planning Questionnaire (the DPQ) and consists of a series of goals for interoperability and for forces and capabilities. Additional bilateral mechanisms of cooperation between the candidates and the major NATO countries serve to provide further guidance.

Although a variety of mechanisms to improve the compatibility of the candidate forces with NATO is in place, the alliance has always emphasized that none of the goals in MAP or any other programs of cooperation should be considered as a list of criteria for membership. As NATO has stressed, invitations to join the alliance will be based strictly on a consensus alliance decision that bringing the given state into the alliance will contribute to security in Europe. In other words, strategic motivations, rather than any specific criteria, military or not, will guide NATO choices. In this sense, whether the candidate states attain MAP and PARP goals is useful, but it does not determine whether an invitation will be issued. It is important to remember that preparations and even readiness for membership say nothing about the strategic wisdom of inviting a given state to be a member. The above notwithstanding, if a candidate state cannot fulfill the criteria in MAP and PARP, then that state is not likely to contribute much to NATO or be able to participate fully in the alliance's activities.

Within the outlines of the five MAP chapter headings, candidates are expected to take action on dozens of specific areas to achieve agreement with alliance norms and customs. Other than Macedonia and Albania, the candidates have made progress in meeting the stipulations of the political and economic chapter of MAP. Bulgaria and Romania still need to consolidate that progress. There is the potential for backsliding in Slovakia, if the populists who governed prior to 1998 come back to power. The legal chapter is uncontroversial, and none of the candidates would have problems with it prior to accession. The security chapter may be more difficult to implement, although it also should be uncontroversial. The actual determinants about which countries will need to enact special procedures for safeguarding sensitive information may come after the issuing of invitations.

The most challenging aspects that the candidates face are in the military realm. The candidates are expected to: (1) provide forces and capabilities for NATO missions; (2) participate in NATO's military structure, agencies, and planning; and (3) pursue standardization and interoperability. Achieving the above entails having the political capacity and will to be active NATO members and devoting enough resources to these efforts (which, in itself, entails having the appropriate defense resource planning mechanisms in place).

WHAT CONSTRAINTS DO THE CANDIDATES FACE?

A fundamental constraint on the ability of the MAP states to achieve the military objectives is the lack of resources available to them relative to most of the current NATO members. In itself, this stems from the small size and relative lack of affluence of the candidate states. With one exception (Romania), most of the MAP states have populations of less than 8 million and, of these, other than Bulgaria and Slovakia, all have populations smaller than 4 million. The MAP countries can be categorized here into three groups along the lines of affluence (measured by GDP per capita) and, thus, potential to devote resources to NATO integration. Albania and Macedonia fall substantially below the levels of affluence of the least affluent NATO member, Turkey. Bulgaria and Romania are close to the Turkish level of affluence. Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia are at a higher level of affluence than Turkey and either close to, or at the level of, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.

The starting point for the transformations of the MAP states' defense establishments differs and continues to influence their adaptation to NATO. Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia inherited a large military establishment from the communist era. The other MAP states basically had to start from scratch, having little in terms of

equipment and organization.³ As such, their problems have been different. Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia have faced problems of military reform similar to those faced by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, namely, cutting back force size and force structure and gradually making equipment compatible with that within NATO. The problem here has been how to slim down and adapt the legacy forces. The other MAP countries have had the opposite problem of how to build up a NATO-compatible military establishment. Different levels of resource availability and varying degrees of effectiveness in defense planning have led to different levels of success in this group.

Touching on the resource chapter of MAP, the willingness of the candidates to invest resources in defense has varied, although all the MAP states have plans in place to increase their defense spending to close to 2.0 percent of the GDP (with some of them at that level already). Whether the candidates will stick to those plans once they are members is debatable. The defense burden-sharing issues aside, there remains the fundamental point of low resources in an absolute sense. The combined current level of annual defense expenditures by all nine MAP states is approximately \$2 billion (which is two-thirds of what current less affluent or small NATO allies like Poland or Denmark, respectively, spend annually).

WHAT CONTRIBUTIONS CAN THE CANDIDATES MAKE TO NATO?

As a basic assessment, none of the MAP states can offer any forces and capabilities that would be unique to the alliance, although they can augment NATO's forces in some areas. Neither in quality nor quantity will the MAP states, collectively or individually, make a substantive difference in NATO's military potential. Their accession to NATO in the near-term would make the problem of interoperability and compatibility among the alliance's forces more acute, since it will enlarge the group of NATO countries within NATO that cannot meet the high levels of combat potential of the United States and a few other major allies.

The ground forces of the MAP countries can fulfill NATO's mission of providing a (limited) deterrent and an initial defense of their borders. However, only small portions of these ground forces can participate effectively in NATO's power-projection missions. The vast majority of the ground forces of the MAP militaries have obsolete equipment, training and readiness that falls short of general alliance norms, and deployment capabilities that are unsuitable outside their countries. Only Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania possess heavy forces, and these suffer from the same problems common to the rest of the armed forces. That said, some of the light forces of the MAP countries are suitable for peacekeeping operations, and almost all the MAP countries have had contingents participate in NATO's peace operations in the Balkans. The support elements in the MAP forces (engineer, medical, military police) can make an especially useful contribution to NATO's peace operations. Several MAP countries also have special forces (commando/ranger) units and certain types of forces, such as mountain infantry (Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria), that could be an asset in some NATO combat operations. In addition, portions of the rapid-reaction forces being set up in all the MAP states also have utility to NATO, subject to constraints stemming from equipment, logistical issues, and lack of organic transport.

In terms of air forces, the MAP countries can provide for surveillance of their own airspace. However, other than Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia, they have little or no means of protecting their airspace. None of the MAP countries can contribute air force contingents for NATO power-projection missions. The naval forces of MAP countries (except for the land-locked Slovakia and Macedonia, all the MAP states have small navies) are oriented toward coast defense. Problems of obsolete equipment, low training, and readiness have affected the air and naval forces to a greater extent than the ground forces.

Probably the most important contribution that the MAP states can make to NATO is their ability to provide airspace and quality infrastructure for supporting NATO deployment and training. The post-September 11th security environment has elevated the importance of the sea and air bases in Bulgaria and Romania.

The resource and human constraints in MAP states limit their ability to participate effectively in NATO's military structure, agencies, and planning. Assuming that every NATO candidate country will need to appoint approximately 200 officers and defense civilians (who are fluent in English) annually to the variety of NATO headquarters and agencies, none of the MAP states can fulfill that goal in the near future without repercussions for the functioning of their ministries of defense. The

³ Albania is a hybrid case, in that it inherited large forces from the communist era but then allowed them to fall into disarray.

Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, despite having much greater resources than any MAP country, have had difficulties fulfilling their NATO staffing requirements. The MAP states will face much more severe problems.

In terms of attaining compatibility with NATO forces, the important question here is the extent of interoperability required and the time frame available in which to work out at least temporary solutions. Focusing on selective units (primarily rapid-reaction and/or specialized troops), continued investments in interoperability—along with making some tough choices—will allow for some of the best units of the forces of MAP states to be integrated in certain NATO operations. Anything beyond that is a long-term goal.

If the above picture seems overly negative, it is important to keep in mind that the standard of reference is very high. NATO militaries are among the best and most technologically advanced in the world. In any event, with wise investments and good planning that stresses the comparative advantages of the militaries of the MAP states, the candidates can become net contributors to NATO in the long-term. In the near-term, because of the human and resource constraints, the MAP states would have difficulties in functioning effectively in the alliance.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO MAKE THE CANDIDATES NET CONTRIBUTORS?

Whether a MAP state is invited to join NATO this year or not, there is a long-term U.S. interest in assisting these militaries in being able to participate in NATO operations. The interactions and guidance that are part of MAP and PARP, combined with the desire of the MAP states to join NATO, have meant that incentives were in place for the MAP states to devote a fair share of resources to defense, to make some hard choices in defense planning, and to make their defense planning programs compatible with those of NATO. Both NATO and the candidates have gained as a result. However, those incentives will largely disappear upon accession to NATO.

The MAP states can contribute relatively more to NATO if, instead of building up their forces across the board, they would keep in mind the law of comparative advantage, build on existing strengths, and focus on the prospective missions their armed forces might undertake. With a well thought-out plan of development and modernization, and increased operations and maintenance spending, the armed forces of the MAP states eventually could make a meaningful, albeit small (i.e., proportional to their size), contribution to the alliance. MAP has helped to guide them in that direction. However, if the incentives of potential membership were to disappear, then country choices are likely to yield a less efficient use of resources, driven by any number of factors, ranging from prestige to incompletely developed defense planning and procurement processes.

A potential way to keep the incentive system in place and still achieve the political goals of inviting the MAP states to join the alliance is to delay actual membership until the existing MAP goals are completely fulfilled. In this sense, membership would be contingent on the MAP state being able to function in the alliance and make a military contribution to NATO. Otherwise, near-term accession to the alliance may require additional assistance from the current NATO members to make the candidate countries' membership substantive as opposed to nominal and/or adjustments in NATO's expectations from individual members. From a long-term perspective, the approach has merit in that it will provide a constructive framework for maximizing the military contributions of the candidates while providing the near-term security "umbrella" that the MAP states desire and preventing disruptions to the functioning of the alliance.

With that, I conclude my testimony. I welcome any questions you may have.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Dr. Szayna. Before we go to questions, I would like to recognize the presence of representatives from several of the candidate countries. We have with us today the Ambassador from Bulgaria, Ambassador Poptodorova—close enough?—thank you—the Ambassador from Lithuania, Ambassador Usackas; the Ambassador from Romania, Ambassador Ducaru, and we do have representatives, I believe, from Latvia and Croatia here as well. Welcome. Do we have someone that I missed? Estonia. The Baltics are well represented, and from Slovakia and Slovenia. Everyone that is a candidate is here today being well represented. It is wonderful to have good staff, isn't it? Thank you very much, and I appreciate your presence here today.

I would just like to open with a brief question, and in the consideration of time since we got a slow start, I will defer to my colleagues. For the United States, candidate countries for NATO membership must face, I believe, two critical tests: First, can we be assured that each new country is fundamentally committed to democracy and political stability; and two, will the candidate countries strengthen the alliance? Do all of you believe that some or all of the candidate countries can meet those two criteria? Does anyone want to jump in? Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. I thought I had addressed that question, or at least I intended to. I believe that all of the candidate countries today are fundamentally committed to democratic institutions. I think that not all of them have fully achieved mature democratic institutions, but those who have not are working on it and I believe definitively will soon.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Does anyone differ? Dr. Gordon?

Mr. GORDON. I do not differ. I would just add one point. I do actually think they all are at present committed to the values and interests that we need them to be, but the question is how you ensure that over time. We have so much focus on whether someone wins an election before the summit will that matter. The key is sustaining this, and that is why I mentioned in my testimony the idea of possible suspension because, as in the past, we have had members who at certain times are committed to the common values, and then you had an election or a coup or whatever—Greece, Turkey, Portugal—and they were not any longer. So it seems to me obviously they have to be committed before they get in, but we need some mechanism to make sure they remain so.

Mr. GALLEGLY. General Odom, and then we will have Dr. Szayna.

Mr. ODOM. In my written testimony I included the point that Dr. Gordon made about revising the treaty to have rules to expel members. That may be very difficult to achieve, but I think it is well worth bringing up, and I brought it up, too, in my formal testimony, and I want to endorse that. A second point about contributions, if you use a broad definition of contributions, I think the answer is yes. Sometimes geographic position is a contribution. Sometimes blocking things is a contribution. Sometimes providing troops is a contribution. So I think the answer to that is yes.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Dr. Szayna?

Mr. SZAYNA. I concur on the first point with my fellow panelists. On the second point I would like to add that there are many ways to strengthen the alliance. Some countries do so with military forces, some just by geography and the bases they offer, and others just in an overall sense of contributing to the unifying of the continent. I think all of the MAP states bring in aspects of these contributions to the alliance.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you. One quick question for General Odom. General Odom, do you believe that there is a credible risk that further NATO enlargement weakens the alliance's military effectiveness, and do you have any suggestions?

Mr. ODOM. I do not think it needs to weaken NATO's military effectiveness. I think NATO's military effectiveness has declined because the U.S. has not put the emphasis on exercises, force com-

mitments, et cetera, over the past decade that, in retrospect, it is clear we should have. So I do not see the dilution as a problem unless we go so far as to admit Russia now. Then it would be hard to say why NATO would be all that different from OSCE. But as long as enlargement is within the number of countries we are talking about here, and the number I mentioned that I would feel very comfortable with is seven, at least at this round, dilution should not be a problem. The more serious problem that is raised there is better solved by the U.S. deciding that it is really going to take advantage of this multilateral military training environment and use it for that.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, General Odom. I now defer to my colleague and good friend, the Ranking Member, Mr. Hilliard.

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, before I start the question I have a statement I would like to have entered into the record.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection it will be made a part of the record of the hearing.

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, in pursuing the line of questioning you had, I am just wondering whether enlargement will strengthen NATO, and let me tell you why, or will it change NATO as we know of it now, and whether the change would be for the good. The reason why I am asking that is because we already have a large number of multination organizations, and I have seen organizations that become a part of it. Because of the type of diversity that they bring, it causes changes in the way it operates. For example, if all of the countries are admitted, does that mean, and I think, Dr. Gordon, you had already answered the question, does it mean that we need new rules in terms of discipline, in terms of suspension in case things happen as they do when you have a large membership? So the real question: Does enlargement strengthen NATO, or will it change it, and will the change be for the good? And, Dr. Gordon, since you have already approached that matter, would you start off?

Mr. GORDON. Sure. Let me say a couple of things about it. On the strengthening of NATO, I think Tom Szayna said this well. In terms of military capabilities, they cannot bring a lot, but they can help strengthen NATO in significant ways. We should also not overlook the way that NATO is strengthened when new members come in. To the extent that it ensures peace and stability in those nations, we are building ourselves better partners for the future.

The issue you address, though, about weakening NATO with members that either will not stick to the interests and values or have nothing to contribute, I already said I do think NATO needs to think about mechanisms of suspension. I remind us that although they are not written into the treaty, as General Odom has suggested, NATO has considered these things in the past when other countries were on the verge of or had gone over to—the colonels in Greece or a military coup in Turkey or the Italians on the verge of Communists in the government. So this is not new terrain for NATO, even though it has never had to implement it. The European Union faced this a couple of years ago, you remember, when the Austrian government involved a neo-fascist in the government,

and the EU was pretty close to doing the same thing. So I think we need to tackle it in that way with a mechanism.

But beyond the mechanism, the reason I do not think it dilutes NATO is NATO has never been blocked by one little member objecting to something that NATO wanted to do. When we worry about with all of these little countries that NATO can be held up from doing something because this small country is going to oppose it, it just has not worked that way. When the United States has chosen to lead, sure, sometimes it has to lean on allies, and it is a difficult diplomatic process, but I do not fear that somehow we are going to be on the verge of a major NATO operation in the Middle East or the Balkans or in Europe, and somehow we are going to all be frustrated and unable to act because one member blocks it. It just does not work that way.

Mr. ODOM. I would add a point about what you mean by strengthening. I agree with what Dr. Gordon has said, and I think you can look at strengthening in a different dimension. I would put the question more specifically. Does it strengthen us in dealing with the security problems we face today? And I think in the case of the Balkans the answer is unambiguously yes. Neither the Clinton Administration nor this Administration have come up with a very satisfactory all-Balkan security framework that promises to contain things and really bring them under control. Things do not seem too volatile there, but I think if you look closely at Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, it would not support as optimistic a view as I have heard suggested today. In the case of the Balkans admission of Bulgaria and Romania would strengthen NATO. You can probably make similar cases for the Baltic states.

Mr. HILLIARD. Ms. Kirkpatrick?

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Yes. I feel actually that my views have been very well expressed by my colleagues at this table on this question which you have raised, which is an important question.

Mr. HILLIARD. Dr. Szayna?

Mr. SZAYNA. The only thing I would add is that NATO has enlarged many times previously. Each time there were questions asked as to what did the new members bring and would they fit in. There is a socialization and adjustment period, of course, always. However, in looking back at the history of NATO, I think every round of enlargement has to be assessed as a success. We have done it right previously. I am not sure there is any problem with this round. This is a bigger round than any previous one. However, we are approaching it with a clear perspective, knowing what the problems are and knowing what to expect.

Is the change for the good? I see it more as an issue of adjusting to the current security environment. Because the current security environment is quite different from what we have had in the 1990s and certainly in the Cold War, there is a need for some major adjustments, perhaps for emphasizing the political aspects of NATO for coalition building. In this sense, I have no doubts that wide enlargement would strengthen NATO.

Mr. HILLIARD. In terms of democratic institutions, we realize that some countries are stronger in that area than some of the others, but all of you without exception to any particular country would agree that you would agree to the enlargement or the par-

ticipation of all those who seek to become a member. If there is an exception, would you let me know?

Mr. ODOM. Let me address that this way. Some of these countries have made enough progress so I would be willing to bet they will succeed in developing what I would characterize as "liberal" democratic rather than just democratic institutions. Democracy is about voting. Liberalism is about rights and laws and constitutions. Constitutional orders, I think, will take root and become stable in a few of these. That is much more questionable in others. Some of them will make some progress, regress, make progress again. It will be a difficult and a tedious process. But given the alternatives and the security disorders that could occur if we do not bring them in, I would prefer to risk trying to usher them through those difficulties.

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Ambassador Kirkpatrick?

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. I would just add that I stated in my testimony that a number of NATO members had, let us just say, brief experience with democratic institutions and democratic government at the time that they became democratic members of NATO, and I mentioned Germany and Italy and Spain and Portugal and Greece and Turkey and so forth—but I also note that there have not been any significant problems with the viability of democratic institutions in those countries. I truly believe that NATO membership strengthens democracy and, moreover, democratic military establishments as well, rather than threatens them, in fact.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much.

Mr. HILLIARD. I think both of them wanted to answer also.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I am sorry. Dr. Gordon?

Mr. GORDON. I will just be very brief, but to be technical, I believe Mr. Hilliard's question was whether we supported the membership of all those who wanted to be members, and I am not sure anybody said that. There are 10 countries who have formally expressed their interest in being members, and speaking personally I think that Albania and Macedonia I would not be prepared to support in this round. Croatia has not been part of the MAP process, so I think it is probably not ready in other senses. And even on the other seven, which I think probably should be invited in in this round, things that might happen between now and the summit could lead us to question that. So I just wanted to be clear that I, at least, was not saying, yes, blanket all of those who want to get in should get in.

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Dr. Szayna?

Mr. SZAYNA. Well, Phil actually expressed most of what I wanted to say, but one thing to add is that I do not think among the various NGOs that monitor democratic developments and human rights there is any controversy that Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, or Latvia fail to meet any of the usual criteria for democratic states. Bulgaria and Romania are very close to those levels also, although the progress there has been more recent. As I mentioned in my testimony, there is still some need to consolidate these recent developments. I do agree that Macedonia and Albania are not quite yet at the level that is the norm within NATO.

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Before I defer to my Chairman Emeritus, at the request of our Ranking Member, Tom Lantos, I ask unanimous consent to submit for the record a statement by the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation. Without objection that will be made a part of the record, and at this point I would defer to the gentleman from New York, the Chairman Emeritus of the full International Relations Committee, Mr. Gilman.

[The information referred to follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LÁSZLÓ HÁMOS, PRESIDENT, HUNGARIAN HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION

NATO ENLARGEMENT: THOROUGH EXAMINATION NEEDED
WILL ROMANIA AND SLOVAKIA FULFILL EXPECTATIONS?

Mr. Chairman, the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation (HHRF) was formed 26 years ago to articulate the human rights concerns of 1.6 million Hungarian-Americans. The purpose of the organization is to promote the cultural, linguistic and religious rights of Hungarian minorities living in countries surrounding Hungary.

We appreciate the opportunity of this hearing to convey our position on selecting Slovakia and Romania for NATO membership at this time.

After 1989, HHRF was an early and vocal proponent of NATO enlargement to include those countries in Central and Eastern Europe which met the criteria of institutionalized human rights reforms, including full protection of the rights of national minorities. During the first round of expansion, the breadth and depth of domestic reforms achieved by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in establishing functioning, sustained democracies was the primary focus. Now, during the next round of admissions, closer examination of and attention to the domestic realm is again warranted as NATO faces the specter of admitting ten countries concurrently in what would be an irrevocable move. It is important that the United States not make a superficial and premature decision.

It is HHRF's firm opinion that it is in the interest of NATO, Romania and Slovakia, and the sizeable Hungarians minorities in these two countries for Romania and Slovakia to be fully integrated into the trans-Atlantic alliance. Admission, however, should occur only based upon performance and compliance with the culture of democracy, a sustained, demonstrated commitment to the common values which NATO members share. Ambassador Nicholas Burns, U.S. envoy to NATO, recently described "two tests" for the enlargement of NATO (*Financial Times*, April 3, 2002): "Will the new members strengthen the alliance rather than weaken it? And can we be assured each new member is fundamentally committed to democracy and will achieve political stability?"

Unfortunately, 12 years after the fall of communism, numerous serious human and minority rights abuses—a linchpin of true democracy—remain in these countries to be rectified. The following brief overview represents ongoing, significant inadequacies in redressing the legacy of communism as regards the 600,000 and 2 million-strong Hungarian communities in Slovakia and Romania. We understand that the challenge facing these two countries is enormous due to a lack of progress for the past 12 years in the specific, critical issues we enumerate below. However, an unparalleled opportunity exists now for Slovakia and Romania to provide the evidence in living up to their promises and demonstrate their commitment to democratic ideals. The ball is in their court.

Romania

1. Continued Violation of the Sanctity of Private Property: Failure to Return Church and Communal Properties Illegally Confiscated Under Communist Rule

The four historic Hungarian religious denominations (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Lutheran and Unitarian) have extensive documentation of at least 2,091 church properties illegally confiscated from them between 1945–1989 under communism. None of these properties—save six—have been returned to their rightful owners. 11 years after the fall of communism a Law on Restitution of Private Property was adopted on January 17, 2001 and is touted by the Rumanian government as having "settled" the restitution issue. But in fact, this law explicitly excluded communal and church properties on the promise that these would be covered under a separate law. Today, there is still no such law. While neighboring countries long ago ad-

dressed and resolved this matter, the decade-long delay by Rumania constitutes an ongoing, major blow to religious freedom, civil society and the Hungarian minority's ability to maintain community and church life.

The inviolability of private property is a fundamental pillar of democracy and indispensable element of a functioning market economy. But this principle is not entrenched in Rumania and the government is recalcitrant on the issue: the Rumanian constitution's provision that "*private property shall be equally respected by law irrespective of its owner*" (Article 41/2) is ignored; repeated Council of Europe and European Union documents calling on Rumania since 1993 to settle this issue on the principle of restitution in integrum are snubbed; although the relevant international instruments have been ratified by Rumania, they are immaterial. Even the United States' Special Envoy on Property Restitution Issues, Stuart Eisenstat, couldn't make headway on this issue. It is also become patently clear that even the numerous government decrees passed since 1996 as temporary, good-will measures to return select, high-profile buildings until a comprehensive law could be enacted were hollow promises, propagandistic in nature to obtain credibility for Rumania abroad and lacking the requisite intention and means for their implementation. While the *six* properties mentioned above were returned to their rightful owners in this manner; the constitutional court, local councils, judicial system and even the government's very own Ministry of Culture stymie, hinder, and oppose restitution of the other properties identified in these decrees. On what grounds then is the latest deadline of April 30 agreed to by the ruling PSD to submit the above-mentioned necessary legislation to Parliament to be expected?

2. Failure to Restore the Independent Hungarian State University in Cluj

Native-language education is the single most important factor in securing a national minority's identity and survival. Immediately after the 1989 Romanian revolution, the governing National Salvation Front explicitly pledged to restore the independent Hungarian-language Bolyai state university, which the former dictator abolished in 1959 by forcibly merging it with the Romanian Babes University. In the past decade, successive Romanian governments have dishonored the pledge through extra-legal measures (unlawfully ignoring a 1995 petition signed by a half-million citizens), diversion (offering a German-Hungarian university never seriously intended), deceit (claiming that the supposed "multi-cultural" character of the rump institution somehow compensates for the real article) and even threatening to disallow a *privately*-funded initiative (through proposals to deny accreditation unless "sufficient" Rumanian-language instruction is offered).

Today, after so much obfuscation, the government still has not issued the necessary instructions to allow two Hungarian-language divisions (Humanities and Natural Sciences/Mathematics) at the Babes-Bolyai University, and additional departments instructing in Hungarian in other divisions of the institution. Nor is there adequate Hungarian-language instruction at other, key state institutions such as the Gheorghe Dima Music Academy in Cluj, the University of Agricultural Sciences in Cluj, the Tirgu Mures Technical University and the Oradea University. These expansions are another commitment that the ruling PSD promised the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Rumania in Article 7 of their Agreement for the year 2002. Babes-Bolyai President Andrei Marga has promised to take the issue before the university's senate *should* the needed government directive materialize—which hasn't—but the body can still veto the initiative, as it has done in the past.

3. Official Harassment of Csángó Hungarians

The right to identity and native-language education is not secure in Rumania. In fact, you can be harassed for asserting these as is the case with the Csángós, a culturally distinct, centuries-old ethnic Hungarian community numbering more than 100,000 who live in the northeastern part of Rumania. The Csángós very existence is continually denied by the authorities, coupled with the falsification of census data, and forceful action is taken when they attempt to assert their aspirations through legitimate means.

Although the legal mechanism for their native-language instruction exists in the Law on Education and the Council of Europe's Framework Convention on National Minorities, local and national-level authorities refuse to implement these in the case of the Csángós. For example, on November 14, 2001, the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers adopted a resolution supporting the Parliamentary Assembly's Recommendation 1521 (2001) on Csángós Minority Culture, among others, urging the Rumanian government to ensure their native-language education. Nevertheless, *on the very same day*, Deputy School-Inspector of Bacau/Bákó County Livia Liliana Sibisteanu threatened with fines and house searches those Csángó families in Cleja/Klészse who offered native language classes held *in their own homes*. Five days later,

inspectors of the local Institute of Public Health visited the houses in question, banning the holding of classes.

4. Continued Imprisonment and Harassment of Ethnic Hungarians

The continued selective prosecution and conviction of ethnic Hungarians for resistance to the Ceausescu regime in December 1989 present compelling evidence of a strong anti-Hungarian bias in the judicial system. Of the six police fatalities that occurred in the two Hungarian majority inhabited counties of Harghita and Covasna—three ethnic Rumanian and three ethnic Hungarian—prosecution occurred *only* in the ethnic Rumanian cases. 12 years after the overthrow of the Ceausescu dictatorship, as recently as July 2001, an ethnic Hungarian from Targu Secuiesc/Kézdivásárhely, Antal Reiner, was imprisoned.

A total of six ethnic Hungarians were singled out for the lynching of the local representative of dictatorial rule, Aurel Agache, a particularly brutal police major who, on December 22, 1989, armed with his service revolver, tried to prevent the mob from entering the local Communist Party headquarters in the town. The Council of Europe's Opinion 176 of 1993 specifically called on the Rumanian authorities to "*reconsider in positive manner the issue of releasing those persons imprisoned on political or ethnic grounds.*" Yet, these six defendants were sentenced to several years in 1999, a full six years after the recommendation, four of them in absentia, while Reiner and Dezso Héjja (who was granted a presidential pardon this March) were imprisoned. The government could introduce a law in the Parliament which would exonerate these individuals, but until now has not shown a willingness to do so.

5. Shortcomings in the Implementation of the Law on Public Administration

Implementation of the Law on Public Administration, adopted May 23, 2001, is frequently obstructed at the local level. The law mandates the use of the native language in localities where the given minority population exceeds 20 percent and includes the display of bilingual government institution, street- and place name signs in these settlements. Outside of compactly Hungarian-inhabited areas though, this law is blatantly ignored despite the will of the people. Moreover, those in a position to intervene on the part of the central government do not do so.

The most egregious examples occur in Cluj County. The ultra-nationalist Mayor of Cluj/Kolozsvár (22 percent ethnic Hungarian), Gheorghe Funar, has repeatedly declared that the signs will not be displayed as long as he occupies his post, thereby overriding the local council's decisions. Similarly, mayors of several localities in Cluj County: Cornets/Magyarszarvaskend (59 percent ethnic Hungarian), Luncani/Aranyosgerend (35 percent), Bontida/Bonchida (22 percent) refuse to display bilingual inscriptions. The central government's representative, County Prefect Vasile Soporan, obligated with upholding the law according to Rumanian law, has so far failed to take action in any of these cases, nor has the Minister for Public Administration intervened.

Slovakia

1. Benes Decrees Discriminate Against Ethnic Hungarians

Post-communist property restitution is a tough, painful, though unavoidable issue that Slovakia has still not faced in order to become a truly functioning democracy. The 1945 Benes Decrees—as a precursor to the infamous modern-day practice of ethnic cleansing—sought to create an ethnically pure nation-state, among others, by summarily revoking the citizenship of all ethnic Hungarians, confiscating all of their properties, closing their centuries-old schools and ordering their en masse expulsion. But, the discriminatory legal impact of the Benes Decrees remains in effect *today*. Even though, upon its July 1993 accession to the Council of Europe, Slovakia obligated itself to overcome this legacy, it has failed to do so. Today, ethnic Hungarian Slovak citizens are denied rightful claim to property restitution to which ethnic Slovaks are. Thousands of acres of land confiscated from ethnic Hungarians and given to ethnic Slovaks under the decrees still remain in the latter's possession. The assets of all Hungarian community organizations confiscated between 1945 and 1948 have yet to be returned to their rightful owners. The 100,000-member Hungarian Reformed Church, which had the majority of its buildings and schools confiscated, still has no legal recourse. Nor is there any expressed intention to redress these legal inequities. Most recently, Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda exclaimed "*I take the liberty to declare with certainty that the Benes Decrees need not be abolished and will not be abolished*" (OMRI-Slovak Digest, March 11, 2002). Can NATO embrace an aspirant country which refuses to overcome this anachronism?

2. *Ethnic Hungarians Gerrymandered and Denied Representation*

The adoption of the laws on redistricting and regional election in July and December, 2001, precluded a Hungarian majority in any of the eight new territorial units and therefore prevented the election of a single ethnic Hungarian chairman to head up any of these units. Through a combination of gerrymandering, a two-round election system, and fierce propaganda for Slovaks to vote for "Slovaks" (criticized by European Parliamentary Rapporteur Wiersma to no avail), Hungarians, who were previously relatively well-represented at the local level, now suffer serious *under-representation* on precisely those local issues (education, culture, public administration) of greatest importance to the cohesiveness of a minority. On July 4, 2001, in an about face, all members of the governing coalition—save the Hungarian Coalition Party (HCP)—allied themselves with the opposition Meciar-led Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the ultra-nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS). As a result, the Slovak Parliament actually voted in favor of the existing Meciar-era eight district system in force since 1996! The implicit anti-Hungarian bias of these measures, coupled with certain provisions in, and omissions from the laws, cast serious doubt on the Slovak leadership's commitment to the principles of devolution, regionalism, and promotion of a democratic and civic society and seriously questions whether in fact public administration reform occurred at all. But the Slovak leadership considers this issue to be behind it and has not indicated any willingness to amend the laws.

3. *Hungarian-Language Higher Education Imperiled*

The state of Hungarian-language higher education has reached crisis proportions in Slovakia: Today, nearly half as many ethnic Hungarians graduate from institutions of higher education (3.6 percent) than ethnic Slovaks (7.5 percent) at the national level. The number of ethnic Hungarian graduates from Konstantin University—where enrollment by minority students has dropped by a whopping three-fifths in the past five years—does not replace retiring teachers. Yet, for more than a year, the senate and accreditation committee of the university have failed to take up the issue of implementing a January 2001 government recommendation to create an independent Hungarian-language division of six departments within the institution for which monies have already been allocated. The purpose of the college would be to provide adequate training of ethnic Hungarian teachers for the 600,000 strong community as no such independent facility exists in the country. Upon joining the government coalition, the Hungarian Coalition Party *relinquished* its goal to establish of an independent Hungarian-language *university*, which would be necessary to reverse the declining trend in native-language education, in favor of pledges by the government to create the division at Konstantin University and narrow the gap between ethnic Hungarian and Slovak graduates. The government has failed on both counts.

4. *Continued Legal Inconsistencies between the Law on the Use of Minority Languages and International Norms*

The Minority Language Law needs to be amended to bring it into full compliance with the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages, which Slovakia ratified in June 2001, the last country with a Hungarian minority to do so. The Hungarian Coalition Party voted against the Minority Language Law adopted in July 1999 because of its serious shortcomings. Yet, a law whose ostensible intention is to benefit minorities can actually be passed in Slovakia over and above the objection of the largest minority, representing ten percent of the population. There is no indication on the part of the Slovak government that it intends to reverse the discrimination contained in the law.

5. *Failure to Adopt a Law on National Minorities*

Legislation has not even been drafted, let alone adopted which would establish an institutional system to promote and preserve national and ethnic minority culture. All other countries in East Central Europe with Hungarian minorities have adopted, or in the case of Yugoslavia, at least drafted such a law. In addition, funding for minority culture has not been institutionalized and is subject to annual haggling during budgetary debates.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for taking up this very timely issue of the future of NATO and its enlargement and for our expertise who are here represented by these panelists. To all of the panelists, do you believe that the aspirants to NATO membership can make any substantial contribution

to our effort with regard to international terrorism? To any of our panelists who would like to address that. General Odom?

Mr. ODOM. I think it already has, and, as the Chairman's opening remarks indicated, Article 5 was invoked by NATO for the first time in support of our reaction against this attack. As I said in my own testimony, I do not think that trying to turn NATO into a counterterrorist organization makes any sense. Having very strong and capable military forces developed in that alliance will mean that they will be available in coalitions that are willing to go do the kinds of things we want to do in these operations. I think we are going to have an increasingly difficult time keeping people in various parts of the world agreed on what the counter-terrorism war is about, and I would not want to harness the future of NATO to the imponderables of that development.

My answer is, in sum, yes, it will make contributions. Can it become the primary counterterrorism organization in the world? I doubt it.

Mr. GILMAN. Let me ask the panelists, what are the most important challenges in the next enlargement round?

Mr. ODOM. I would repeat just briefly what I said in my testimony. The real challenge to the alliance right now is internal housekeeping, and that means bringing back the large, multinational exercises so that we overcome some of this technology and military gap between Europe and the U.S. It has been debated only as a matter of whether they spend enough. If they spent more, that might help. I have heard examples of modernization in the case of European militaries which we have not even recognized by the U.S. Defense Department. In some cases they are further along than we realize because we do not have an aggressive, following on kind of exercise program that we had in the day of REFORGER. Each year we sent a number of divisions to Europe to fall in on prepositioned equipment.

Now, as I have suggested in my testimony, I think we need to have big exercises each year in which two, three, four, five, six heavy brigades of U.S. forces are moved over there in a very short amount of time. Then it would be a good idea to turn that exercise around, run it back this way, and bring European forces to North America for an exercise. And I believe they would like that. It would help bring up their standards. The number of purposes we might find for using such force projection in the future may surprise us. So that would be my answer to your question.

Mr. GILMAN. Over time will the candidate states be able to pull their resources and develop joint capabilities to contribute to a collective defense? Yes, Mr. Szayna.

Mr. SZAYNA. Let me maybe answer the other question first. I was going to address that, too.

Mr. GILMAN. Sure. Go ahead.

Mr. SZAYNA. I think that the biggest challenges in this round of enlargement is that we ensure that new members do not fail as members of the alliance. As I mentioned in my statement, these are all very small states with limited potential, with limited human resources to function effectively within NATO. Either through an incentive structure or through a speeded-up process of helping to train personnel for them, we need to make sure that when they

join they are not treated as second-rate members because that in the long run would spell the failure of the whole process of enlargement, distinguishing between the new members and the old members of NATO.

Mr. GILMAN. And following up with your comments, are the aspirant countries fully aware of their obligations that come with NATO membership? Do they believe that nine prospective member states are able to share their fair share of the alliance defense burden?

Mr. SZAYNA. All of the states that are in MAP have plans in place to reach a 2.0 percent level of GDP in terms of their expenditures on defense. Some of them are at that level already or above it. The big question mark, of course, is whether they will continue to stay at that level after accession. What I suggested is that we separate perhaps the issue of invitation from actual accession so as to ensure that in the next 2 or 3 years those levels are locked in, and they do commit to that level.

Mr. GILMAN. Are the aspirant countries prepared now to meet those? Are they capable of meeting their fair share?

Mr. SZAYNA. Well, I think the definition of "fair share" as we have defined it within NATO is 2 percent of GDP. If you take that as a benchmark, then they are committed, at least in the near term, to achieving those limits.

Mr. GILMAN. Beyond their commitment, are they capable of meeting those benchmarks?

Mr. SZAYNA. That depends on the political will, and I see, at least right now, that will is in place. But that will is in itself a function of the incentive structure. Once the incentive structure disappears with accession, if they are separated from the invitation, meeting the commitment may be an issue, as we have seen with current members of NATO.

Mr. GILMAN. Dr. Gordon, did you want to respond?

Mr. GORDON. Yes, because I think it is a good set of questions. Somehow we need to balance. There is this phenomenon in NATO and other organizations that you have more leverage over people who want to get in than over those who are actually already in, and the incentives are greater before they are in than after they are in, and we have seen that in NATO, too. Somehow we have to balance, though, that mechanism with the need also not to keep telling countries to do certain things and they will get in and then not taking them in. There is a question of how long we could keep saying do more, do more, do more, and then put it off. I think we would pay a price for that as well. In my own view, we balance that right this time, and it is time to bring most of them in.

Mr. GILMAN. General Odom?

Mr. ODOM. You asked if they carry their fair share of the military burden, and the answer was the commitment is 2 percent, and you wanted to be precise about that. I would look at carrying their fair share in a different light. The transitions that these countries face in reforming their militaries are not enhanced by a large military budget. It is much easier to transform a very small military, then expand it later. In fact, the military transitions may be better helped if the military budgets are actually cut in some of these countries.

One of the major problems they have is reducing the officer strength in order to get the operations and maintenance budget down and to bring in a new generation of officers. So having a 2-percent budget level could be counterproductive in this regard. To me, what really makes sense as a definition of carrying their burden is how effective they are in carrying through these military transitions, which I do not think in the initial phase involves spending a lot of money for personnel or new equipment until they have made those basic changes.

Mr. GILMAN. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, did you want to comment on this issue?

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. No. I agree with what General Odom just said.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. I want to thank our panelists. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been called to a markup in the Judiciary Committee. Before I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt, I would like to personally thank the witnesses for your attendance today. I want to acknowledge and thank the representatives from the candidate countries for their interest and their commitment to the process, and with that I will turn the chair over to an individual who has been the greatest resource on NATO to this Committee of anyone that I know, our good friend from the State of Nebraska, Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER [presiding]. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt, is recognized.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. I think the responses from the panel have informed us substantially, but I want to get back to the concept of relevance, which I think is a fundamental question in terms of NATO. And I wonder if because our focus today in the hearing is NATO and its future whether we do that question justice in terms of an ample answer. All of your comments, your observations, your testimony is interspersed with suggestions or recommendations of advancing political and economic reform through the vehicle of NATO.

Now, there are other multilateral mechanisms that I presume should accomplish exactly those goals. And is there overlap between the principles and the criteria established, for example, to accede to the European Union? What is the role of OSCE? What is the role of CSDP? It is as if we are talking today about relevance without expanding the context of these various modalities to give us a better understanding of the relevance of NATO. I would invite any comment. General Odom?

Mr. ODOM. Yes. Obviously, the point you have made about expanding and understanding its overall relevance is critical and terribly important to understand. I think, at least in my own testimony and what I have heard others here say, the old mission that NATO was originally founded to carry out did not involve big military commitments. President Truman promised Senator Vandenberg in 1948–1949 that if he would support ratification, he would not keep U.S. forces in Europe. The real concern was Communist party takeovers, animosity between Germany, France, and Britain, those sorts of things. It was the outbreak of the Korean War that made it more centrally a military alliance.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But it has evolved—

Mr. ODOM. It has evolved.

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Into a security/military modality.

Mr. ODOM. Absolutely. But at the same time it went ahead managing those old problems. And what it is doing in Eastern Europe today is handling the same kinds of problems in Central and Eastern Europe as it handled in Western Europe.

Mr. DELAHUNT. At its inception, during the early stages of the——

Mr. ODOM. Yes, but right on through. Let me give you an example of why I think it is still relevant in Western Europe. If you remember 1990, France and Britain tried to prevent the reunification of Germany. Suppose they had had their way. Germany would be outside of NATO, reunified. Probably we would still have the Warsaw Pact. Look at what a mess we would have. The U.S. made sure that did not happen.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I understand that, General.

Mr. ODOM. All right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me just pursue that for a moment. But do we today, with a more mature stage in terms of European democracies, do we have other modalities, mechanisms, multilateral institutions to serve the needs that we all acknowledge exist?

Mr. ODOM. Well, I am just going to go quickly to CSDP and OSCE and the points you raised. It has been my observation in a few travels there that the process of entering the EU is having a very positive impact on the internal developments of economic institutions of the members, a much more detailed and precise and perhaps in the near term more rapid effect than NATO has had in the past, and that is a good thing. I do not think that displaces NATO. I think that complements NATO in a very effective way.

As far as CSDP is concerned and the European Defense Initiative, or whatever they call it, if the Europeans can build a military capability and a Federal system that could command and control it effectively, then the U.S. would have to applaud and say we can abrogate the military responsibilities there. After all, we are the ones who initiated this idea. It was not the Europeans. We were calling for this in the 1950s, complaining that they were not moving more rapidly.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I have always found that to be ironic, and yet today the debate in this institution, I think, is conflicted in the sense of, boy, why are they doing it? Is this the demise of NATO? There is some concern about that.

Mr. ODOM. Absolutely. Let me say what I would suggest is a way to unravel that muddle. There is a danger here, and the danger is not that they will do it. The danger is that they will say they have done it, sign a piece of paper and believe the paper actually provides the military capabilities. We will take them seriously and drop out of the alliance. Then they will say, oh, my goodness, we really did not mean that.

Now, if the Europeans had a high degree of confidence that their security could be managed by a common security and defense policy, you would not have the support you have for the U.S. to be there today. And I do not hear any members in Western Europe calling for us to leave. So there is a bit of double-talk on both sides.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I understand that. Another point I would raise, though, is, and I concur. I think it has to be real and tangible as opposed to illusory.

Mr. ODOM. But it is not here and now, and it will not be here in the next 5 years.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. But at the same time I think you made the point, General, that our increase this year of some \$48 billion exceeds the total defense budget of Great Britain, France, and other democracies. I am going to point is, are we playing the role of—I do not want to use the term—

Mr. ODOM. Are we allowing them to free ride?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes. Some might use the term “sucker,” you know.

Mr. ODOM. I will not answer that. If you want a technical, economic answer, I would refer you to Marcus Olson’s *The Logic of Collective Action*, exploring pursuit of a public good. Free riding is logical and rational for people if they can get away with it, but even when one individual decides to pay the public good price, it is profitable to the person who pays it. So even if they free ride, and they do not free ride nearly as much as we have always accused them of doing, we still make money.

If you look back over the last 50 years, have we gotten richer by their free riding or poorer? I think we have gotten a lot richer. If this is free riding, I want more of it.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Could I just ask for your indulgence, Mr. Bereuter? Dr. Gordon was—

Mr. ODOM [continuing]. Disagreeing.

Mr. GORDON. No, not at all. The first part of what you were addressing Mr. Odom on is this idea of why does NATO have to do this in terms of the enlargement before we got to ESDP. Why do we have to do this? Aren’t there other organizations that can perform this role? The short answer is yes, but that does not mean NATO does not also need to play.

In an ideal world one might have imagined at the beginning of the nineties the EU says, you guys can all join the EU. This will be the mechanism for enhancing stability and democracy and all of that. But, one, the EU was not ready to do that, and by the mid-nineties NATO decided that this vacuum needed to be filled, and you could not just tell these countries to stay out of the organizations forever; and, two, even once the EU finally got around to starting to do that, and now it finally will by 2004, these countries want to be in NATO. For whatever reason, they have decided that getting into NATO consecrates their belonging to the West and embeds them in this political security community with us, and in that sense, because they have decided it is true, I think it is true, and so NATO has a positive role to play in achieving that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I understand this is not a static, but it is an ongoing evolution, and I think that we find ourselves somewhat confused. We listened to the President, his remark about enlargement, et cetera, and yet we really do not want to hassle ourselves with consultation when it comes to what we consider our own national interest, Afghanistan being the best example that comes to mind.

Mr. GORDON. If I may add on the ESDP thing, I think we are also sometimes confused on the free-riding and burden-sharing

issue in the sense that we want to have it both ways like lots of people do, but we complain that they do not spend enough and they do not do enough but seem tempted to draw the conclusion from that that we should just go alone and not involve them. It is true they spend a lot less than we do, but as I mentioned in my testimony, if the European members of NATO are spending \$170 billion, let us hope that they are getting something for that. They can do better, and they can be more efficient, but they do. And then we rely on them. We are relying on them for 80 percent of the forces in the Balkans, and now we are relying on them for the majority of the forces in Afghanistan. So we would be cutting off our nose to spite our face to say, you know, you guys do not spend enough, so from here on in we are doing it alone.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I agree with you, Doctor. I guess what I am saying is as these various modalities evolve over time, such as the EU, such as the OSCE, such as the CSDP, I think we have got to understand that we will always require adjustments on our part. I would think, for example, in some future crisis that if there was a legitimate European security organization that was tangible and real that we did not participate in, that it would be easier, given communications, to consult with that particular organization as opposed to a series of sitting down and participating in consultations involving 19 nations. Ambassador Kirkpatrick?

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. At the beginning of the war, the hostilities—rapidly a war—in the Balkans, Mr. Jacques Poos, who was then the President of the EC, announced this was the year of Europe and that this was a problem for Europe to deal with, not the United States. Quite specifically, there is no role here for Americans, he said. And this is when we had President George Bush, Sr., and he was quite ready to just sit back and have the Europeans take that role.

As you know, it went very badly. It went very badly above all for the people of the Balkans and most especially for the Bosnians and the Croats at that stage, which was a long stage. But it was only after the situation had become really quite bad that the United States did, in fact, begin to play a role. It was a limited role, and we did not put troops on the ground, you may recall, for a very long time, but we did, however, progressively contribute by way of our air power, and things got better. The larger the role our air power played, the better—the more improvements were made at the time.

I think that that experience, which was very clear, left a good many Americans and maybe some Europeans reinforced in their view that to deal effectively with military, strictly military, problems, in Europe it was still necessary, or at least highly desirable and probably necessary, to have an American presence. I think that this is a very widespread view.

I think most Americans would be very happy if this were not the case, and I think we should say to all the new potential members of NATO that we look forward to the day that European member states of NATO do, in fact, take over all of the military functions of NATO, and it will leave us with quite enough to do in the rest of the world. That is my view.

Mr. ODOM. Could I make one point about OSCE? This organization, I thought, had potential which was not taken advantage of. If you are trying to explain what that organization is like and what it does, the best analogy I can come up with is the U.N. General Assembly. It is a great debating society, but it cannot act because it requires unanimity, and it does not have a hegemon who can line everybody up and make them vote a particular way. That was the problem with the League of Nations. The United Nations is not that way because it has a security council. If OSCE had had a security committee with the few major powers in it, it might have become an effective security institution.

That is one point I would make. The second point I would make is that even with its present cumbersome, almost impossible decision process, if Russia had consistently played a constructive role, OSCE might look like a very effective organization. I think this is worth underscoring because it tells you what the dangers are of a premature NATO membership for Russia and what could happen if you have too close a relationship in the new arrangements that are being considered. It seems to me OSCE can be seen as an interesting barometer of the degree of constructive international behavior we see from Moscow.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Delahunt, briefly one more. We have got a briefing that some may want to go to.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I can read that on CNN, read about it tomorrow.

General Odom, to pursue what we are talking about in terms of NATO, its evolution, do any of you see OSCE, for example, evolving and maturing into an institution that meets the security needs at some point down the line, 5, 10, 15 years?

Mr. ODOM. I do not see that in 15 years because I think that what it would require to make that work would be a solidly rooted, constitutional breakthrough in Russia. That eventually may happen, but I do not see that in the 5- or 10-year period. Fifteen years is pretty far out into the future, but in the short term I do not think it is even remotely possible.

Let me say that I know it concerns some of the leaders of the member countries that we talk about bringing Russia closer to NATO. I heard one prime minister make the point very directly to a small group, saying, I really want to join NATO, but why should I join NATO if Russia is going to be in it? If you ask the aspirant members, I think they will give you a better sense of the politics of this part of the world and a sounder sense for us to make our decisions on. So I do not see it in the near term as much of a solution.

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Gordon, I think you wanted to respond to that.

Mr. GORDON. Just that I think that OSCE and NATO have very different roles and should have very different roles. OSCE sets norms. It can send missions to countries to observe human rights and minorities issues. It does those things very well. It is particularly legitimate in doing those things because everybody is a member, and let us keep it that way. The OSCE does not have an integrated military command, does not have military forces, does not do peace keeping. I think that is right. There is a division of labor,

and OSCE does what it does, and NATO needs to preserve its military effectiveness to do what it does.

Mr. BEREUTER. I would like to begin my comments here by giving a belated welcome to this distinguished panel. I was involved in a markup of the FDIC reform legislation, but there is no subject in foreign policy that I am more interested and involved in than NATO issues, and so I was particularly looking forward to this hearing. I had a chance to see Dr. Gordon's paper in advance. The other things I have tried to pick up from listening to the staff here, my own and Committee staff.

I would like to just make one comment about something that was said earlier with respect to ESDI. It is true that the United States for a long period of time has formally supported a European pillar and, in fact, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly since the late-1980s was supportive. But, of course, we had always been expecting it would be within NATO. In fact, that was specifically identified as recently as the 50th anniversary of the NATO organization with the Washington summit. And then Prime Minister Blair threw us a curve at the San Milo meeting with his French counterpart, and we found that suddenly it was to be within the European Union. While that is their decision, I think we have had a responsibility to be constructive critics. I think it is also inevitable that there is going to be, despite the best efforts, some resources that are not used as well to meet the DCI, for example.

But those are observations, and I really wanted to focus on just two or three things and, therefore, conclude this hearing in a reasonable time. The first relates to Russia, and I know that some of you have addressed that in your comments, perhaps all of you. Just as a place to start, I am going to read from some comments from Dr. Gordon's paper and see if we have some agreement or disagreement on enlargement with respect to what he says about Russia.

First of all, he references the new forum that Lloyd Robinson is proposing to set up and which seems to have interested the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, and perhaps is responsible for some acquiescence in his concern about expansion. I would like to know what you think about that new forum as best as we can understand it and very vaguely described at this point.

But then here is what Dr. Gordon says:

"The NATO-Russia Council at twenty is a good start and should be formalized at Prague. NATO-Russia cooperation could include exchanges of information on civil defense cooperation, cooperation and training among NATO members and Russian special forces, Russian involvement in collaborative armament programs, and other NATO-Russia joint military exercises."

I suspect that is not meant by Dr. Gordon to be exhaustive. But I would like your comments on these suggested areas where we might have some cooperation and involvement between Russia and NATO and anything you might want to say about the new forum, as described by Lloyd Robinson. We know Dr. Gordon's view to some extent. He can enlarge upon it, but I would like the reaction of the other three as to what do you think of the things that he

has listed? Do any of you have any disagreements with those areas of proposed cooperation or suggested cooperation? General Odom?

Mr. ODOM. I would not rule out that kind of cooperation in the distant future. There was nothing to prevent that cooperation today or in the past. It has been Russia's choice. A new arrangement with NATO I do not think would change the realities that make it difficult to have cooperative relations on that front today. I do not know the details of this new council. What I can read about them seems to change from day to day, so I have difficulty having a firm view on it.

In general, I do not think we need any improved relationship. The founding act, it struck me, gave Russia a very adequate access to NATO activities if it wants to be an observer.

Mr. BEREUTER. But as you know, they really have not taken advantage of it.

Mr. ODOM. They have not what?

Mr. BEREUTER. They have not taken advantage of that.

Mr. ODOM. That is another reason I do not see why a council will make it any better. In other words, if they are not willing to take the seat that has been offered to them, why will they take another seat? It makes one suspect that what they want is a seat in which they can be an obstacle rather than a constructive player, and I do not see any reason to increase their capabilities to do that, and there are fora in which they can be constructive. So this idea of paying off the Russians for what objectively is in Russia's interest I do not find very appealing.

As I said in my own testimony, there were dire projections of what would happen if we expanded NATO against Russia's will in the past, and they have not come to pass. Instead, Putin is very conciliatory, and I think he is conciliatory for good, constructive, objective reasons. It is very much in Russia's interest to have peace and stability and prosperity in this region between Western Europe and Russia, and Russia cannot provide any of those things. Only NATO, led by the U.S., can do that, along with the EU and others.

Therefore, objectively, it is very much in his interest that we do this, and it increases the prospects for him having success in what I take is a genuine commitment on his part to integrate his economy into the West. I think Putin will have difficulties because of internal problems of Russia, but we should certainly keep the door open, and I do not think we will make it any easier for him by giving him a seat where some members of his government who do not share his integration policies toward the West will use it to be obstructionist rather than constructive.

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Szayna or Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Dr. Szayna first.

Mr. SZAYNA. It is my view that the long-term goal—I mean long term—beyond 15 years, 20 years and so on—for NATO to play in the security in the Northern Hemisphere is to try to integrate Russia into what we call the West. It is not going to be an easy process. It is dependent to a large extent on the willingness of the Russians and their ability to cooperate with NATO. However, to the extent that we can try to bring in the Russians, both in the war on terrorism as well as in the larger cooperative security schemes in Europe, into the organization, then NATO is useful as long as we

make sure that we know what NATO is for, and it retains its fundamental ability to protect its members.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, do you want to comment on the Russia-NATO relationship?

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. I listened to Lord Robertson when he was here discuss this issue as well as others and, as always, I find him an impressive man and his arguments impressive. I felt, however, that there is no way that we can know about what would be the likely consequences or the difficulties—the advantages or difficulties—of having Russia more closely tied to NATO unless or until we try it. We in a sense tried it in the Balkans and found it troublesome to have Russia playing a military role in the military operations in the Balkans. It was not helpful.

I think, therefore, the only way we can really arrive at sensible views about the likely consequences of such activities of this changing relationship is to try it but not to try it in a way that there is no turning back, only to try it as we did in the Balkans in a limited kind of way so that we can see what the consequences might be and what the difficulties are, what the rewards are, what kind of peace partners they make, and we will find out. They have done rather better with us in East Asia than many of us expected, at least than I expected that they would, in fact.

So we can try it, and we can see, and I think it would be very important for us to be prudent in our approach to it.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. And, of course, they evolved, and they did better with respect to K-4 than in Bosnia. Dr. Gordon, I think you wanted to comment.

Mr. GORDON. I do not disagree that much with General Odom, but I made very clear in my own testimony that the Russians had this opportunity before. The permanent joint council, as you said yourself, Mr. Chairman, the permanent joint council provided for all of this as a possibility, even the possibility of joint action, and Yeltsin, the Russians chose not to avail themselves with it. So it is a fair question, well, why give it to them again? And I think the answer is over the past year, as again I mentioned, the Russians have acquiesced to NATO enlargement, acquiesced to the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, let us put bases in Central Asia, supported us in the war on terrorism, all very much against Russian domestic public opinion. Putin has made a strategic choice for the West, and he has been with us on all of these big questions.

So he comes to us, and he says he needs a different configuration at NATO so that we can possibly cooperate better at NATO. I do not want to be micromanaging Russian domestic politics, but it seems to me that while preserving NATO's ability to decide as NATO, and there are no vetoes in this, if we can do that, as Ambassador Kirkpatrick said, we need to be prudent, but why not give it a chance?

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. The second of my three questions relates to the enlargement round. I have been interested and actually pleased with the evolution of thinking of not only this country but in most of the other 18 NATO countries, most, not all, that a larger number of members should be brought in, and it seems to me the question is typically framed now five or seven, and I think there are four that are broadly approved of at this point. We will watch,

of course, until Prague, but that would include the Baltic states and Slovenia, the latter having missed the first round, and objectively they should have been included, in my judgment and in the judgment of the Congress as formally expressed. And Slovakia, it is really a matter, I think most agree, of whether Mr. Majar is returned to the prime ministership or not, and if he is, then I think it is not likely that Slovakia unfortunately would be allowed to join.

So this comes down to Romania and Bulgaria in most people's thinking. Given how they are evolving in all of those areas formally and informally on which supposedly judgments will be made, if they continue on this track through Rakovich and Prague, what are your opinions about whether or not Romania and Bulgaria should be offered, and I do not lump them together—there is quite a difference in their patterns, but each of those two, what would you like to say about that subject if they evolved in the progress that they are making at this point? Democratic institutions, transparency in budgeting, civilian control of military, interoperability—all of those issues, for example. Dr. Szayna?

Mr. SZAYNA. As I mentioned in my statement, this is something maybe I should elaborate on further, Romania and Bulgaria have an increased importance for the United States because of the war on terrorism. I think their progress over the last 2 or 3 years deserves to be supported, their progress internally, that is, in terms of transformation. They certainly were helpful during the war over Kosovo. There are lots of reasons to encourage current governments in power in those countries.

That said, the consolidation of democracy in those countries is still a process, very much a process. I want to go back to the point I made about trying to separate invitation from accession because invitation will provide the encouragement and the security that these countries seek. But making accession dependent on the fulfillment of the MAP goals (which are political, democratic, economic), and perhaps allowing those countries to accede only when they meet fully the existing criteria—which may be simply a year later, if that, than the other countries—may be a way out of this problem.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Szayna. Who else would like to comment on Romania and Bulgaria specifically? Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you. I would like to say that it is my impression that both Romania and Bulgaria have made some significant progress in both their political and economic spheres and have been helpful in their military on military matters. They were helpful to us, quite specifically, and I have been impressed. Every time there has been an opportunity, it seems to me, a clear opportunity for them to be helpful, they have been helpful. I have been impressed by the support for Romania and Bulgaria membership that has been offered by both Turkey and Greece, both of whom have made strong statements about their conviction that it would strengthen the possibilities for peace in that area.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. General Odom?

Mr. ODOM. I would like to reinforce what I said in my written testimony. There is a danger of spreading violence in the Balkans. Macedonia is in no sense a country that is fully stabilized, and this

could lead to an all-Balkans war. We have no security framework to deal with the Balkans as a whole. Bringing Bulgaria and Romania in will provide the basis for that. We will then have our arms around the whole of that region. We may not use that framework very well, but we would certainly have the building blocks on which to make it effective.

I am also impressed that Greece and Turkey are cooperating in supporting the admissions of both, and I suspect that the points that I am making about the security of the Balkans go a long way in explaining that uncharacteristic cooperation. So while I would not be bullish on the speed with which either of those countries will become effective market economies with good constitutional governments, I do not think it is out of the question that they can do it, and it is an investment worth making, a risk worth taking.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, General. Dr. Gordon, do you wish to comment?

Third, finally, we have seen quite a few people that follow NATO begin to suggest that what is evolving if we expand in a dramatic fashion for seven or five is that we are moving away from an organization that is primarily a mutual defense pact, arguably the most successful ever, toward a general security organization that also has military capability, a security organization versus a mutual defense pact. What is meant by that, in your judgment, and what are your thoughts about it, any of you? Dr. Gordon?

Mr. GORDON. I think we moved away from that a long time ago. Indeed, as some of us has stressed during the discussion, NATO was always more than just an Article 5 mutual defense pact, and it performed those other roles of political integration, security, community, cooperation among the members. It always was. Article 2 of the treaty talks about economic cooperation, Article 4 about consultation on a range of issues.

You cannot separate these things neatly into NATO used to be common defense, and now we have lost that, and it is trying to be something else. We can preserve the common defense, and I do not see any reason why it would no longer be a common-defense issue. When we were attacked, we chose, and it was appropriate, that the United States respond without using NATO's military structures. I think if a European country were attacked by catastrophic terrorism, we might well see NATO be a defense pact again or attacked in some other way.

Mr. BEREUTER. And do you think there is any inherent reason to suggest that a greater focus on the range of security items means that NATO would be any less successful or effective as a mutual defense pact?

Mr. GORDON. I do not see any reason to think that. And again, we expanded the mission in the Balkans in ways that people had not foreseen before. One of NATO's great strengths has been its willingness to adapt, and I do not see any reason why if we start doing new things, we are not as serious as we used to be about the old things.

Mr. BEREUTER. All right. Thank you. Who else? Dr. Szayna?

Mr. SZAYNA. Just one comment on what Phil said on the question of how will the alliance function with, let us say, up to 26 members. There is a process of socialization that members go through

when they join the alliance. They learn how to discuss various issues in the alliance. There are countries, such as Iceland or Luxembourg, that play a relatively minor role in some of the debates just because they bring little to the table, and they understand that. They still play a role, but it is something which is more in line with what they bring to the table.

I do not think that some of the new members, if they are invited, such as Latvia or Slovenia, will act all that differently from those members. I think the deeper issue is commonality of basic interests among members. I do not think that is a threat here. I think, given the enlargement of the EU and the essential unity of views on fundamentals within the alliance, I do not think the function of the alliance is at risk.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. General Odom, I saw your hand.

Mr. ODOM. I would like to correct what I think is a misunderstanding in the way that a position you described is put. The NATO has been a successful alliance because we have had a strong military core. It has always been at work doing the kinds of things we are expecting it to do in Eastern Europe, substituting as a supra-national, political, military authority for Europe. NATO did that in Western Europe, and as I mentioned earlier in my testimony here, the initial purpose for the alliance was to keep our allies from fighting one another, not what was going on outside the alliance; that came later.

Now, it seems to me that the weakness, if you look back at the fifties when we were developing this military core, the U.S. alone was causing it to happen. Not much in Europe was happening that drove this. We were constantly prodding our allies, constantly dragging them into more kinds of military operations and things, and we built this up over a period of time.

What has happened now, and what I see as a serious danger to the alliance, is that we have stopped doing that with the end of the Cold War. As I made a proposal at the end of my written testimony about the kinds of exercises that could do this, I think that is the real danger. These other missions; I think it is impossible for us to have much success in them unless we keep this military core stable.

I am just reminded of a quote from Machiavelli when he said that the foundations that all states share are good laws and strong armies. Since there are no good laws without good armies, I shall set aside discussion of laws and proceed to speak of armies. And I think that is the story of NATO's success, and we have stopped talking about armies in Europe, and that is the danger.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, do you have anything you would like to say on this subject?

Ms. KIRKPATRICK. No. I very much agree with what General Odom just said.

Mr. BEREUTER. I would like to see if Mr. Hilliard has any concluding remarks or questions, and then we will go finally to our colleague from Massachusetts. Mr. Hilliard, do you have any concluding remarks or questions you would like to make?

Mr. HILLIARD. I would just like to thank the panel for its participation and for your thoughtful and thorough answers to the ques-

tions, and it has certainly enlightened me, and I thank you very much.

Mr. BEREUTER. The gentleman from Massachusetts? I only regret I was not here for the whole hearing. I would have benefitted from it. I thank you so much for sharing your information, your thoughts with us, and answering our questions. We appreciate it very much. The Subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:03 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

