

THE BUCHAREST SUMMIT AND THE WAY FORWARD FOR NATO

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 23, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:07 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert Wexler (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. WEXLER. I would like to bring the Europe Subcommittee to order.

Mr. Gallegly, the ranking Republican member, may or may not be here. He has some other business. Hopefully if he comes I will go right to him and give him an opportunity to make his opening statement.

I would just like to make some opening remarks and turn it over to Mr. Wilson, if he would wish to do the same, and then go to our two respected witnesses. I want to thank both Assistant Secretary Dan Fried and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs Dan Fata for appearing before us.

Today's hearing comes on the heels of NATO's Bucharest Summit where the alliance addressed many of the most pressing security challenges facing the United States, Canada and our European allies. As a strong supporter of NATO, I was heartened to see that our allies joined together in the summit declaration reaffirming their support for enlargement and agreeing to further strengthen the collective capability of the alliance to meet the existing and emerging 21st century threats.

Despite the language contained in the declaration, I remain concerned that our differences between us and some of our NATO allies, particularly on the issues of Ukraine and Georgia's relationships with NATO, the Bush administration's missile defense plan, energy security and NATO's relations with Russia, as well as the alliance's mission in Afghanistan, have yet to be determined and ironed out.

From my perspective, one of the highlights of the summit was NATO's invitation to Croatia and Albania to begin accession talks. To that end, I want to congratulate the Albanian and Croatian Governments, which have demonstrated their strong commitment to transatlantic security.

On a somewhat negative note, it was my hope that the negotiations would have led to a mutually acceptable official name for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM, prior to Bucha-

rest. Unfortunately this did not occur, and I strongly support the decision of NATO members to hold off on sending an invitation to FYROM until a mutually acceptable resolution to the name issue is reached between Greece and FYROM.

As a strong supporter of the Membership Action Plan for both Ukraine and Georgia, I also cannot hide my deep disappointment that a MAP was not given to Kiev and Tblisi in Bucharest. While I very much appreciate the President's show of support for both nations, including a visit to Ukraine prior to the summit, I find it extraordinary—actually unprecedented—that President Bush's all out push for a MAP for Georgia and Ukraine was rejected and a consensus position was not worked out prior to the summit.

In the lead up to NATO's foreign minister meeting in December later this year, it is essential that the United States follow through on the Bucharest Summit declaration, which states unequivocally that Georgia and Ukraine will become NATO members and that the alliance supports these countries' applications for MAP. I congratulate Ambassador Fried and others who worked very hard in this regard.

There is no greater test for transatlantic alliance, for the alliance itself, than ISAF operations in Afghanistan, which were deemed the alliance's top priority at Bucharest. NATO and all of the nations contributing to ISAF took an important forward step in laying out ISAF's strategic vision.

Some of the most important guiding principles of the ISAF plan include a firm and shared long-term commitment in Afghanistan, a comprehensive approach to NATO and U.N. efforts that will bring together civilian and military efforts and increased engagement and cooperation with Pakistan.

One of the biggest difficulties the alliance has faced in Afghanistan has been the lack of sufficient NATO force to provide security. This shortcoming has crippled economic and political gains, placing the mission in jeopardy at times.

In that vein I want to applaud President Sarkozy for his decision at Bucharest to deploy an additional battalion of French troops to eastern Afghanistan, as well as the Governments of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Poland and the Czech Republic, which have also committed additional forces. Even so, I remain deeply concerned that there are still not enough forces on the ground to halt the growing power of the Taliban and provide the necessary security for the Afghan people.

Mr. Fried and Mr. Fata, it is clear that the alliance has much work to do over the next year in the lead up to the 60th anniversary of NATO to resolve the differences between the member states. However, as a strong supporter of the transatlantic alliance I remain convinced that new and old threats to both sides of the Atlantic can be best addressed if we collectively share this responsibility, and to that end NATO remains indispensable.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

The Europe Subcommittee will come to order. I want thank Assistant Secretary Dan Fried and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs Dan Fata for appearing before us. Today's hearing comes on the heels of

NATO's Bucharest Summit where the alliance addressed some of the most pressing security challenges facing the United States, Canada and our European allies.

As a strong supporter of NATO, I was heartened to see that our allies joined together in the Summit Declaration reaffirming their support for enlargement and agreeing to further strengthen the collective capability of the alliance to meet the "existing and emerging 21st century threats." Despite the language contained in the declaration, I remain concerned that differences still exist between the US and some of our NATO allies—particularly on Ukraine and Georgia's relationship with NATO, the Bush Administration's Missile Defense plan, Energy Security and NATO's relations with Russia as well as the alliance's mission in Afghanistan.

From my perspective, one of the highlights of the Summit was NATO's invitation to Croatia and Albania to begin accession talks. To that end, I want to congratulate the Albanian and Croatian governments who have demonstrated their strong commitment to transatlantic security.

On a negative note—it was my hope that the negotiations would have led to a mutually-acceptable official name for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) prior to Bucharest. Unfortunately this did not occur and I strongly support the decision of NATO members to hold off on sending an invitation to FYROM until a mutually acceptable resolution to the name issue is reached between Greece and FYROM.

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In the lead up to NATO's Foreign Minister meeting in December 2008, it is essential the United States follow through on the Bucharest Summit declaration, which states unequivocally that "Georgia and Ukraine will become NATO members" and that the Alliance "supports these countries applications for MAP."

There is no greater test for the transatlantic alliance than ISAF operations in Afghanistan, which were deemed the Alliance's top priority at Bucharest. NATO and all of the nations contributing to ISAF took an important step forward in laying out ISAF's Strategic Vision. Some of the most important guiding principles of the ISAF plan include a firm and shared long term-commitment in Afghanistan, a comprehensive approach to NATO and UN efforts that will bring together civilian and military efforts, and increased engagement and cooperation with Pakistan.

One of the biggest difficulties the Alliance has faced in Afghanistan has been the lack of sufficient NATO forces to provide security—this shortcoming has crippled economic and political gains placing the mission in jeopardy. In that vein, I want to applaud President Sarkozy for his decision at Bucharest to deploy an additional battalion of French troops to Eastern Afghanistan as well as the governments of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Poland and Czech Republic who have also committed additional forces. Even so, I remain deeply concerned that there are still not enough forces on the ground to halt the growing power of the Taliban and provide the necessary security for the Afghan people.

Mr. Fried and Mr. Fata, it is clear that the Alliance has much work to do over the next year in the lead up to the 60th Anniversary of NATO—to resolve the differences between members. However as a strong supporter of the transatlantic alliance, I remained convinced that new and old threats to both sides of the Atlantic can best be addressed if we collectively share this responsibility; and, to that end, NATO remains indispensable.

Mr. WEXLER. I now turn to Mr. Wilson for his opening remarks as he wishes, and then I will introduce our witnesses.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairman Wexler, for holding this hearing. Thank you to our witnesses for their testimonies here today.

This hearing is focused on the NATO alliance and the recent summit in Bucharest. There were several key decisions made at the summit, including the invitations to Albania and Croatia to potentially become member states.

It is particularly interesting to me, Albania. I can remember when I was in college that I would listen to shortwave Radio To-

ronto, and I did because of the bizarre nature. The only Maoist totalitarian state in Europe, and I felt so bad for the people of Albania, but now through the Partnership for Peace program the South Carolina Army National Guard that I served with, we have had a strong relationship for a number of years with Free Albania.

Additionally, I am grateful for the military support of French President Nicholas Sarkozy as he pledged to provide troops in Afghanistan. As co-chair of the Bulgaria Caucus, I am grateful for Bulgarian troops who are serving that I have met with in Kabul. I hope to see continued support for NATO members for promoting security in Afghanistan.

Al-Qaeda is truly a global threat, and they have already perpetrated attacks on our NATO allies. Any safe haven for terrorists is a threat to the civilized world everywhere. It is important that we continue to take a renewed look at NATO and what role it is playing and should play in the future in regards to Afghanistan, the larger global war on terrorism and future conflicts.

I want to thank the members of the State Department for being with us today. Your expertise and judgment are invaluable to this discussion. NATO membership is predicated upon our collective belief on the strength and justice of democratic government and our willingness to stand with one another in defense of those freedoms we cherish.

This alliance has a long and proud history, and I am confident that whatever the differences between the member states we as an organization can come together and solve the many security issues that face our nations.

Again I want to thank Chairman Wexler and my fellow committee members for this opportunity. I look forward to the testimony from today's witnesses.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much.

Our first witness is Ambassador Daniel Fried, who is currently serving in two positions as the Acting Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the Department of State.

Prior to his current position, Ambassador Fried served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council. His long and distinguished career has included service in the former Soviet Union and as a senior advisor on European policy for multiple administrations. In addition, he served as U.S. Ambassador to Poland from November 1997 through May 2000.

He has been kind enough to come here again, which is one of several times that he has been so gracious to provide both knowledge and testimony to our subcommittee.

Our second witness is Daniel Fata, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy. Mr. Fata formulates and implements United States defense policy for 48 nations in Europe and Eurasia, as well as for NATO, the EU and the OSCE.

During his tenure, Mr. Fata's efforts have focused on improving bilateral relations with key European allies, as well as on issues involving NATO, Afghanistan, Russia, missile defense and Kosovo. Mr. Fata assumed his duties on September 7, 2005, and has served

as a key advisor to both Secretaries of Defense Rumsfeld and Gates.

Mr. Fata also has been very gracious to accept our invitation today, as he has in the past, and at this point I would like to turn to Ambassador Fried.

Thank you both, gentlemen, for being here.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador FRIED. Chairman Wexler, Congressman Wilson, thank you for the opportunity to discuss NATO's Bucharest Summit and the way forward for the world's most successful alliance.

NATO is an alliance of values that provided the foundation for freedom's victory in the Cold War. While its core mission remains the same—defense of its members—NATO today also defends the transatlantic community against new threats and challenges that can be global in scope.

The Bucharest Summit was one of the most productive and certainly the least scripted summit in my memory. At Bucharest allies strengthened their commitment to operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo; invited two new members and opened the way for future members, including Georgia and Ukraine; endorsed strengthened partnerships across the globe; initiated new defense capabilities, in particular missile defense; and reaffirmed their goal of productive relations with Russia while taking decisions on their own terms.

Afghanistan remains, as you said, Chairman Wexler, NATO's most important operation, and NATO highlighted this issue as never before. U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Afghan President Karzai, representatives from the EU, Japan, Australia, the World Bank joined NATO leaders and 14 other non NATO partners that comprise ISAF. They issued a vision statement, a long-term commitment to support the Afghan Government and people.

NATO also welcomed the appointment of the new U.N. Special Representative for Afghanistan, Ambassador Kai Eide of Norway, whose mission is to bring greater coherence to international civilian efforts and to improve coordination with NATO and the Afghan Government.

Many allies backed up this commitment with deeds. As you have said, Chairman Wexler and Congressman Wilson, President Sarkozy announced the deployment of a French combat battalion to Eastern Afghanistan to further United States, Polish, Georgian, Czech and other contributions. This brings the total of new troops and trainers in 2008 to 6,000. With these, NATO has 47,000 troops in Afghanistan. Twenty-eight thousand of these are non-U.S. forces, contributed by all 26 allies plus 14 non NATO contributors.

To be sure, challenges remain in Afghanistan. Violence is up, particularly in the south where the vast bulk of opium poppies are grown. NATO allies and the United States are still learning how to do counterinsurgency right, and ISAF can and should do more to help the Afghans implement an effective counternarcotics strategy.

But it is also important to note progress. More than 65 percent of the population in Afghanistan now has access to health care, and

there are over 2,500 miles of paved roads, as opposed to less than 100 miles in 2001. Nearly 6 million children are now in school. Twenty-five percent of them are girls. The current government was voted into power by 8 million Afghan voters.

While many, including many Europeans, remain skeptical about the Afghanistan mission, the NATO summit demonstrated that Afghanistan matters to Europe as well as to the United States, NATO is part of a wider international effort and that our collective efforts are producing results despite the challenges we face.

NATO plays a vital role in Kosovo with nearly 16,000 troops, 91 percent of which are contributed by non-United States allies and nine non NATO contributors. The Bucharest allies reaffirmed their commitment to KFOR's mission of maintaining security and stability in Kosovo, including protection of minorities and religious sites. NATO will continue to play a key role in the establishment of a new multiethnic Kosovo security force and a Kosovo Government civilian agency to oversee it.

NATO faced a major test in Kosovo in March when a small group of Serb extremists took over a courthouse complex in Mitrovica. UNMIK, with KFOR's support, retook the facility. KFOR's actions here and throughout Kosovo in support of the U.N. and other international organizations have been prompt and effective.

We must maintain our resolve in the face of future provocations. It is particularly important that the U.N. and EU continue to play their roles and that the UNMIK presence in Kosovo gradually transition to an EU led rule of law mission.

It is also important to note what has not occurred in Kosovo. So far, no massive intercommunal violence, no new refugees and no trouble at patrimonial sites. We are not past the point of dangerous threats to stability in Kosovo. We have made a good start.

NATO's training mission in Iraq, in place since 2004, has trained over 10,000 Iraqi Government security personnel and coordinated over \$170 million in military equipment transfers. In Bucharest, in response to Prime Minister Maliki's request, allies agreed to broaden this initiative to include more training, defense reform and institution building.

NATO is continuing to enlarge, and this is one of the most successful United States-led initiatives in post Cold War Europe. At Bucharest, NATO invited Albania and Croatia to join the alliance and agreed that Macedonia will receive an invitation as soon as the dispute with Greece over its name is resolved.

The United States was disappointed that Macedonia was not invited to join NATO, and we will continue to support U.N. negotiator Matt Nimetz in his efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution to the name dispute.

In one of the most interesting and complicated and I can add exciting discussions of the summit, leaders agreed to striking language which reads: NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agree today that these countries will become members of NATO.

While both these countries have much work to do, this momentous decision means that their membership in the alliance is a question of when, not whether. Foreign ministers will review and

can decide on the MAP requests at their December meeting this year.

Allies also invited Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro to begin an intensified dialogue and at the same time conveyed their desire to develop a closer relationship with Serbia when Serbia is ready.

After 9/11, NATO recognized the need to reach out to new partners on the basis of shared security interests and democratic values. Today Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and now Singapore are making valuable contributions to NATO's operations, especially in Afghanistan.

At Bucharest, allies committed to new capabilities to meet new and different challenges, updating the NATO response force, boosting the effectiveness of allies' special operations forces and enhancing NATO's airlift capability with a consortium for C-17s and work to increase availability of helicopters, particularly in Afghanistan.

NATO endorsed a cyber defense policy to help protect sensitive infrastructure and assist any ally whose cyber infrastructure is under threat. Members of Congress played a key role in focusing attention on this issue following the cyber attacks against Estonia.

On energy security, allies agreed to provide civil expertise and disaster relief for energy-related incidents and maritime surveillance to help protect critical energy infrastructure.

In a major achievement, NATO recognized that ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat, missile defense forms part of a broader response to counter this threat and that the U.S. proposed missile defense system will make a substantial contribution to protecting alliance territories and populations.

NATO will develop options for the protection of all allied territories and populations and reiterated its desire to work with Russia on missile defense, including the potential for linking the United States, NATO and Russian missile defense systems.

NATO continues to cooperate with Russia, and allies have made clear that Russia has nothing to fear from NATO enlargement. Russia's offer of land transit for NATO's nonmilitary supplies to Afghanistan shows that broader cooperation is possible.

While NATO cooperation has not lived up to our expectations, we remain committed to overcoming the zero sum Cold War mentality of the past. Russian President Putin's participation in the NATO-Russia Council highlighted that NATO can seek to work together with Russia while taking its own decisions for the benefit of NATO and Euro-Atlantic security as a whole. Our challenge in the coming years will be to narrow these differences with Russia and work together to address emerging security threats, even as certain areas of disagreement remain.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Wilson, 15 years ago NATO was an alliance which had never actually engaged in operations, though it was prepared to do so. Today NATO is becoming the transatlantic community's security arm for the 21st century and is transforming its defense capabilities commensurate with its new mission.

In the months ahead, I look forward to continuing this work with you. Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fried follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Wexler, Ranking Member Gallegly, Members of the Committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Bucharest Summit—the largest in its history—and the way forward for the world's most successful political-military alliance.

NATO is not just a military alliance; it is an alliance of values that provided the foundation for freedom's victory in the Cold War. While its core mission remains the same—the defense of its members—NATO is achieving this in new ways. It is evolving into a 21st century role, enlarging the area in Europe where freedom is secure, defending this transatlantic community against new threats and challenges that are often global in scope, and building partnerships around the globe with like-minded countries who want to work together with NATO to face these challenges. The Bucharest Summit further advanced NATO's transformation in each of these areas.

I will speak today about the Summit outcomes and what these mean for the development of NATO's operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, its transformation to address global security challenges, and its membership and relationships with countries and organizations.

The Bucharest Summit was one of the most productive and certainly the most open summit that I can remember. It was certainly the least scripted. Indeed, the Summit Declaration decisions concerning Georgia and Ukraine were only reached by leaders in informal sessions at the Summit itself.

The Bucharest Summit advanced U.S. objectives in a number of areas:

- Allies strengthened their commitment to *operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Iraq*, furthering NATO's transformation from a static Cold War instrument that never fired a shot in anger to an active, expeditionary force capable of projecting power out of area where needed.
- Allies *invited two new members* to join them and set out a *vision of future membership for others, including an invitation for Macedonia as soon as the name issue is resolved*.
- Allies *endorsed the need for strengthened partnerships across the globe* with individual countries as well as with other international institutions, increasing NATO's ability to cooperate across the full spectrum of civil-military measures to address security challenges wherever they might arise.
- Allies endorsed the *need for new defense capabilities* to meet emerging security challenges of the future, in particular missile defense, but also cyber and energy security.
- Despite some differences with Russia, including over Kosovo, Russia's suspension of its implementation of the CFE Treaty, Missile Defense, and enlargement, Allies *took decisions about NATO's agenda on their own terms* while reaffirming their continuing interest in using the NATO-Russia Council to develop a productive relationship with Russia based on cooperation in areas of common interest.

NATO'S KEY OPERATIONS

Afghanistan

Afghanistan remains NATO's most important operation and Bucharest was the site of significant progress on a number of fronts.

At Bucharest, NATO brought together contributors as never before. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and President Karzai and representatives from the EU, Japan, Australia, and the World Bank joined NATO leaders and another 14 other non-NATO partners.

But it was not the meeting that mattered so much as the long-term commitment that the assembled NATO Allies and ISAF partners made—to support the Afghan government and people in building an enduring, stable, secure, prosperous and democratic Afghan state, free from the threat of terrorism—through their endorsement of an ISAF strategic vision statement. The vision that these leaders set out not only charts a way forward in Afghanistan, it also demonstrates that NATO, a transatlantic organization, is part of a wider global community committed to tackling the security challenges of our time.

The ISAF leaders' statement outlines a comprehensive strategy calling for coordinated efforts in the areas of security, economic development, and good governance. Civil-military coordination can and should be better, and NATO welcomed the ap-

pointment of the new UN Special Representative, Ambassador Kai Eide—a former Ambassador to NATO and envoy in Kosovo—as an experienced diplomat whose mission includes bringing greater coherence to international civilian efforts, and greater coordination with NATO and the government of Afghanistan.

Through new force contributions, many Allies backed up these words of commitment with deeds. President Sarkozy announced that France will send a new combat battalion to Eastern Afghanistan, freeing U.S. troops to do more to help Allies in the South. In addition to the French contribution, the temporary addition of 3,500 U.S. Marines, as well as further Georgian, Czech and other new contributions by Allies and partners, brings the total to about 6,000 new forces for Afghanistan since the beginning of 2008.

Some Allies, like the Poles, deserve special recognition for increased contributions over the past year. Poland has twice sent in more troops to eastern Afghanistan—first in Fall 2006 when it added 1,000, and then again this winter with a pledge for 400 more troops and an equipment pledge of eight helicopters, addressing a critical shortfall for the NATO operations.

Despite these contributions, however, we still need Allies to do more to provide the combat troops, helicopters, and trainers crucial to the ISAF mission. Achieving success will require surmounting real challenges—operationally on the ground in Afghanistan as well as politically in Europe.

We must be sober about the situation: levels of violence are up, particularly in the South where the vast bulk of opium poppies is grown. We know that counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts must be intertwined. Because the narcotics trade helps fuel the insurgency and fosters corruption, we cannot succeed in one unless we succeed in the other. ISAF can and should do more, especially in the area of interdiction, to help the Afghans implement an effective counternarcotics strategy.

While we face the challenges with open eyes, it is also important to recognize that progress has been made. In 2001, under the Taliban, only 900,000 children had access to education and it was illegal for girls to attend school. Only eight percent of the population was able to receive healthcare. Commerce was inhibited by the lack of paved roads. The Taliban imposed a destructive and repressive regime on the people of Afghanistan, while terrorists were allowed to continue spreading their extremism across the country and internationally.

But, as President Karzai noted in his speech at Bucharest, Afghanistan is far better off than in 2001. More than 65 percent of the population has access to healthcare, and there are over 2,500 miles of paved roads, up from just over 30 miles in 2001. Today nearly six million children are in school and more than 25 percent of that number is girls. The current government was elected by eight million Afghan voters, on the basis of a constitution approved through an open process, a Loya Jirga, establishing democratic institutions in Afghanistan for the very first time.

Many Europeans are skeptical about the Afghanistan mission—people either believe it does not matter to them, that success is out of reach, or that humanitarian assistance alone should be enough. But the Bucharest Summit helped illustrate that events in Afghanistan do indeed matter to Europe and North America, that NATO is part of a wider international community determined to succeed in Afghanistan, and that our collective efforts to support the Afghan government and people are producing results, despite the serious challenges we face.

Kosovo

NATO's mission in Kosovo (KFOR) is critical—not just for NATO but for the UN and the European Union. NATO has played a vital role in Kosovo's security since it led the successful military campaign in 1999 to stop and reverse the ethnic cleansing, and then put in place the KFOR peacekeeping force under UNSCR 1244.

Kosovo is now independent, but NATO will continue its mission there, and at Bucharest NATO renewed its commitment to doing its job: maintaining security and stability, and in so doing, contributing to freedom of movement and protection of minorities and religious sites. NATO made clear that it will continue to play a key role in the establishment of a new, multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force and a Kosovo government civilian agency to oversee it.

It is important to recognize that KFOR cannot succeed in these tasks alone. Other international organizations, in concert with local governing structures, must continue to be engaged and act responsibly.

The challenges we have seen recently in Kosovo primarily involve Serb-instigated violence by a small number of radicals, supported in at least some instances by authorities—or some authority—in Belgrade. In the first instance, at present, it is the role of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN po-

lice to control the borders to Kosovo and provide for law and order throughout Kosovo, but KFOR is there to provide general security and back up the UN as needed.

NATO faced a major test for three days in March, when a small group of Serb extremists took over a courthouse complex in Mitrovica. Rightly understanding that mob violence can not be allowed to succeed, UNMIK, with KFOR's extensive support, successfully retook the facility. KFOR troops—French soldiers mainly—managed this situation with great professionalism under fire, and KFOR's actions here and throughout Kosovo in support of the UN and other international organizations, have been prompt, correct, and effective. Both sustained injuries—UNMIK had 42 wounded and one fatality, a Ukrainian police officer; KFOR had 22 soldiers wounded.

We must maintain our collective resolve in the face of future provocations and attempts by outside actors to instigate violence. It is particularly important that the UN and EU continue to play a strong, stabilizing role in Kosovo, and that the UNMIK presence gradually transition to an EU-led rule of law mission.

Finally, when we think about Kosovo, it is also important to note what has not occurred following Kosovo's declaration of independence. There has *not* been the massive inter-communal violence that we had all feared. There have been no refugees, no internally displaced persons, and no trouble at patrimonial sites. We are not yet past the point of dangerous threats to stability in Kosovo, especially in the North, but we are on the right track and making progress day by day. If we are steady in the face of pressure and provocations, time will be on our side, and on the side of the Kosovo government which has taken seriously its responsibilities following independence.

Iraq

NATO's Training Mission in Iraq, where NATO provides leadership training to Iraqi Security Forces to help establish a more secure environment, has achieved valuable results since it was initiated in 2004. To date, NATO has provided civil and military staff training, police training, and officer and non-commissioned officer leadership training to over 10,000 Iraqi government security personnel.

At Bucharest, Allies noted their agreement to a structured cooperation framework to develop NATO's long-term relationship with Iraq, as well as their decision, in response to Prime Minister Maliki's requests, to broaden the activities of the NATO Training Mission, to include Navy and Air Force leadership training, police training, border security, defense reform, and defense institution building.

NATO ENLARGEMENT AND OPEN DOOR POLICY

Adriatic Charter Countries

At Bucharest, membership invitations were issued to Albania and Croatia, and Allies reiterated that the door to NATO membership remains open. Allies also determined that Macedonia meets NATO's performance-based standards and will receive an invitation as soon as the dispute with Greece over its name is resolved. As President Bush noted, "America's position is clear: Macedonia should take its place in NATO as soon as possible."

Bringing Albania and Croatia into NATO's fold will advance security and stability in the Balkans. In just over one decade, Croatia has moved from war to peace, and both countries have strengthened their democracy and achieved internal stability. Both are already valuable contributors to NATO's missions and will now continue as NATO Allies.

The United States was frankly disappointed that the Republic of Macedonia was not invited. We will continue to support UN-negotiator Matt Nimetz to help Macedonia and Greece find a mutually acceptable solution to the name dispute as quickly as possible. The United States is working with Greece, other Allies and with Macedonia to support this process.

In Zagreb, immediately after the NATO Summit, President Bush met with the leaders of all three nations, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, to celebrate the invitations already issued, reiterate our commitment to Macedonia's future NATO membership, and offer our help to Macedonia to resolve the name issue as soon as possible.

Georgia and Ukraine

In one of the most interesting and complicated discussions of the Summit, leaders also declared unequivocally that Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO. The declaration language reads: "NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agree today that these countries will become members of NATO."

In saying this, NATO made a momentous strategic decision that avoids drawing a line in Europe. It is true that Georgia and Ukraine have a lot of work to do. They know this and they acknowledge that they are not ready for NATO membership today. These countries have the responsibility to meet NATO's standards. But NATO's decision means that their membership in the Alliance is a question of when, not whether.

Thus, leaders made the major political decision. What was not agreed was the technical step—an offer to help these countries in their reform efforts through participation in NATO's Membership Action Plan. Allies made clear, however, that this is the next step in their relationship with NATO, and leaders explicitly stated that NATO's Foreign Ministers, who meet in December 2008, are authorized to take decisions about MAP participation.

Over the next months, we will continue to work closely with these aspirants and with our Allies with the objective of reaching consensus on the timing of their admission to the Membership Action Plan.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia

Allies also invited Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro to begin an Intensified Dialogue relating to their membership aspirations and, at the same time, conveyed their desire to develop a closer relationship with Serbia when Serbia is ready. NATO's cooperation with these countries will further increase stability in the western Balkans.

NATO's enlargement has been one of the most successful U.S.-led initiatives in the post-Cold War era, and it remains a driving force for aspirant nations to undertake difficult reforms. The United States will continue to provide leadership in enlarging the Alliance. NATO enlargement has been a bipartisan effort from its beginning—and the work of the last three Presidents. In his address to the Croatian people just after the Bucharest Summit, President Bush said, "Today the people of Europe are closer than ever before to a dream shared by millions: A Europe that is whole, a Europe that is at peace, and a Europe that is free."

PARTNERSHIP

As a larger NATO tackles 21st century security challenges that know no geographic limits, NATO is increasingly working with partners who share this desire to meet today's security challenges.

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, NATO was an Alliance of 16 members and no partners. Today, NATO has 26 members—with 2 new invitees, prospective membership for others, and over 20 partners in Europe and Eurasia, seven in the Mediterranean, four in the Persian Gulf, and others from around the world.

Through the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace after the Cold War, NATO provided the political and practical cooperation necessary to help newly free nations of Europe consolidate their regained sovereignty and integrate into the transatlantic community.

NATO matched the Partnership for Peace with the establishment of the Mediterranean Dialogue, and, in the aftermath of 9/11, NATO realized the need to reach out to new partners around the world on the basis of shared security interests and democratic values. This included establishing the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to reach out to nations of the Persian Gulf. In addition, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and now Singapore are making valuable contributions to NATO operations, especially in Afghanistan.

At Bucharest, Allies endorsed the need for NATO to strengthen its relationships with partners across the globe and reaffirmed that we remain open to developing relationships with additional countries.

ENHANCING CAPABILITIES, INCLUDING MISSILE DEFENSE

At Bucharest, Allies endorsed NATO's development of the capabilities necessary to meet the challenges of a new century. These include updating the NATO Response Force to make it more usable and deployable if the need arises, boosting the effectiveness of Allies' special operations forces through increased coordination and training, and enhancing NATO's airlift capability—through a consortium of Allies and partners procuring C-17s and through work to increase the number of deployable helicopters available for theater airlift, particularly in Afghanistan.

To defend against new threats on technology and energy, NATO also adopted a cyber defense policy that enhances its ability to protect its sensitive infrastructure, allows Allies to pool experience and capabilities, and permits NATO to come to the assistance of an Ally whose cyber infrastructure is under threat. Members of Congress played a key role in focusing attention on this issue following the cyber at-

tacks against Estonia. Looking ahead, NATO will develop a single cyber authority for Allies to consult on cyber defense issues and exercise its new policy in NATO Crisis Management Exercises.

NATO's engagement to improve energy security will now enable Allies to share energy related information and intelligence, assist with civil expertise and disaster relief in the event of an energy-related incident, and support the protection of critical energy infrastructure via maritime surveillance. NATO will also advance regional cooperation by promoting political dialogue on energy security among its partners.

In a major step forward, NATO also endorsed the protection of Alliance territory and populations against missile threats. Allies recognized that ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat, that missile defense forms part of a broader response to counter this threat, and that the U.S.-proposed system will make a substantial contribution to protecting Alliance territories and populations.

NATO tasked further work to develop options for the protection of all Alliance territory and populations, and reiterated its desire to work together with Russia on missile defense, including the potential for a joint architecture including elements of United States, NATO and Russian missile defense systems. Given the history of this issue, including the skepticism with which Allies initially approached missile defense, this was a considerable achievement.

NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

NATO continues to seek to work together with Russia to address common interests such as nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics with respect to Afghanistan. While our cooperation has not lived up to the expectations we had when the NATO-Russia Council was created in 2002, we remain no less committed to overcoming the zero-sum, Cold War mentality of the past and focusing on genuine security cooperation on issues of mutual concern. Russia's offer of land transit for NATO's non-military supplies to Afghanistan shows that cooperation is possible.

At Bucharest, Russia's concerns focused on NATO enlargement. The Russians have expressed their opposition to NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine in strong terms, both publicly and in private meetings. But Russia has nothing to fear from NATO enlargement. Its concerns are, in our view, vestiges of the past, rooted in notions of and perhaps ambitions about balance of power and spheres of influence, rather than 21st century concepts of fostering human development through free, prosperous, secure societies. In our view, democratic and peaceful countries on Russia's borders are a threat to no one, and make good neighbors for Russia, and for us all. In fact, thanks in part to NATO enlargement, Russia's western frontiers have never been so secure and benign.

On some issues, such as Kosovo and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), we continue to have serious differences with Russia. On CFE, NATO has endorsed the U.S. parallel actions proposal to end the deadlock over CFE. We regret Russia's unilateral suspension of its obligations under this binding treaty, and we want to maintain the viability of the CFE security regime. To that end, we are seeking to achieve ratification of the Adapted Treaty by all States Parties as well as Russia's fulfillment of remaining Istanbul commitments related to withdrawal of its forces from Moldova and Georgia.

Russian President Putin's participation in this Summit highlighted that NATO can seek to work together with Russia, while taking its own decisions for the benefit of NATO and Euro-Atlantic security as a whole. Our challenge in coming years will be to narrow these differences, and work together to address emerging security threats, even as certain areas of disagreement will undoubtedly remain.

CONCLUSION

NATO faces genuine challenges. It always has. And while the Bucharest Summit successfully addressed some challenges, many more remain. But the strength and enduring character of the Alliance comes from our ability to face these challenges together. As Winston Churchill said, "the only thing worse than fighting with Allies is fighting without them."

Fifteen years ago, NATO was an alliance which had never actually engaged in operations anywhere, though it was prepared to do so. Today, NATO is both a larger alliance and an alliance taking action to meet security challenges around the world. While NATO's mission remains the same—the defense of its members—how it fulfills this mission is evolving. Today NATO is becoming the transatlantic community's security arm for the 21st century, and is transforming its defense capabilities commensurate with its mission.

NATO's 60th Anniversary in April 2009 will be an historic milestone celebrated with a Summit on the Franco-German border in Strasbourg and Kehl. As part of this 60th Anniversary Summit, we look forward to the fulfillment of President Sarkozy's vision of a France fully reintegrated into NATO's military structure.

NATO has served as the security umbrella under which centuries-old rivalries within Europe were settled. Its very creation provided an essential precondition for the European Union, a united Europe, to take shape, and it continues to be the anchor for our vision of a Europe that is whole, free and at peace.

Mr. Chairman, Representative Gallegly, and other Members of the Committee, in the months ahead, we look forward to continuing this work with you.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

Mr. Fata?

STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL P. FATA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. FATA. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Wilson, thank you for inviting me to testify on behalf of the Defense Department on the Bucharest Summit and the way ahead for NATO.

In the months ahead, the Defense Department will be working to move NATO forward in the four main areas addressed by the heads of state and government at Bucharest: Afghanistan, missile defense, defense capabilities and enlargement.

NATO's fundamental purpose remains collective defense. However, the missions that flow from this responsibility are being transformed as a result of NATO assuming authority for the International Security and Assistance Force, ISAF, in Afghanistan beginning in 2003. At Bucharest it was clear that the number one issue for NATO today is the success of our efforts in ISAF, which is NATO's first major operation beyond the geographic confines of North America and Europe.

At Bucharest, allies agreed that Euro-Atlantic and broader international security is tied to Afghan's stability and security. ISAF now includes approximately 50,000 troops from 40 nations, including over 19,000 from the United States.

The Bucharest Summit came at a critical time for the alliance's transformation to be a global provider of security. At the NATO summit in Riga in November 2006, allies pledged to ensure that ISAF would have the forces, resources and flexibility needed to ensure the mission's continued success.

Between Riga and Bucharest, allies contributed 7,100 additional forces to ISAF. However, that is still well short of what the commander of ISAF, U.S. Army General Dan McNeill, believes is required to win the fight. The shortfalls, the force or troop shortfalls, are compounded by the fact that some allies continue to place caveats on their forces, restricting the commander's flexibility in employing the forces at his disposal. Some allies are also reluctant to employ counterinsurgency tactics because of concerns about blurring the lines between civilian and military responsibilities.

At Bucharest, Secretary Gates stressed that while NATO is a military organization it is also undertaking civilian activities in connection with security assistance operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans and elsewhere. While working, when possible, in cooperation with other organizations such as the European Union or the

United Nations, NATO needs to be capable of performing a full range of security and civilian tasks.

Let me just add that the Secretary also made the point that there should no longer be any kind of competition between the EU and NATO and that both organizations should have the capabilities to do military and civilian activities.

Part of the problem in force generation for ISAF—and let me just say again 7,100 additional troops have been added since the Riga Summit in November 2006—has been flagging public and parliamentary support in allied nations for the ISAF missions.

To help allies shore up domestic political support, the United States pushed for an ISAF public strategic vision document, something to explain how allied security is directly linked to the stability in Afghanistan and to lay out a vision to guide ISAF's role in Afghanistan over the next 5 years. The vision document was agreed by the heads of states and government from allied and other troop contributing nations at Bucharest.

Moving to missile defense, ballistic missile defense was one of the President's top issues going into the Bucharest Summit, and we are very pleased that the alliance agreed to a strong statement of support not only for the planned United States missile defense assets in Europe, but for additional missile defenses that would defend all allies against the growing ballistic missile threat.

For the past year the United States has been working intensely with allies to explain our plan to field missile defense interceptors in Poland and a missile defense radar in the Czech Republic. These assets will provide coverage to many, but not all, allies from long-range ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East.

While explaining the benefits of these assets, we have also encouraged NATO to think about ways to provide coverage to those allies who would remain vulnerable to shorter range ballistic missiles.

At Bucharest, allies endorsed the United States extension of our ballistic missile defense system and acknowledged the work being done by the United States and by the NATO-Russia Council to address Russia's concerns about missile defense. Missile defenses in Europe, whether they are United States or allied assets, pose no threat to Russia's strategic deterrent. The United States has proposed wide-ranging transparency and confidence building measures that are intended to address Russia's concerns, and we remain hopeful that Russia will accept these measures.

NATO still has much work to do, specifically with respect to completing the Bucharest tasking to develop options on a comprehensive missile defense architecture in time for the 2009 60th anniversary summit. As we have done in the past, the U.S. is prepared to support and contribute to these efforts in the hopes that all allies will one day be able to enjoy the benefits of a missile defense system.

In addition, allied heads of state and government agreed to explore ways to link the United States missile defense capability with NATO missile defense efforts, encouraged Russia to take advantage of United States missile defense cooperation proposals and are ready to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russia missile defense systems.

NATO defense ministers agreed to pursue the seven recommendations for improving allied defense capabilities that Secretary of Defense Gates proposed at Bucharest. They are included verbatim in my written statement, but I would like to describe in general terms how his recommendations will shape the way forward for NATO in the coming months.

Based on the agreements made by heads of state and government at Bucharest to provide the forces needed for ongoing operations, we will be pressing allies to provide needed forces and capabilities to NATO commanders, particularly in Afghanistan. A U.K. and French initiative to establish a trust fund to assist nations in upgrading helicopters and training air crews is a step in the right direction.

We will also direct the North Atlantic Council to examine ways to use NATO common funding to better support operations and establish a common logistics base for helicopters. Both of these efforts, if successful, could improve the allies' ability to support ongoing operations.

There are longer term problems with inadequate levels of defense spending on the part of most allies and inefficient use of available defense funds. Secretary Gates has asked allies whose defense spending is less than 2 percent of their GDP to commit to increasing defense spending by .2 percent of GDP over 5 years.

While such increases may be difficult to achieve within European cabinets that may have other funding priorities, defense ministers do have a great deal of influence as to how these available defense funds are spent. Many allies could use their available funds more efficiently by shifting investment out of nondeployable capabilities and into transportation and support capabilities to make forces more usable. Secretary Gates has also asked allies to raise their target for deployable forces from 40 to 50 percent.

Although these actions address capability shortfalls over the longer term, we intend to press for national commitments, including the participation of finance ministers into NAC discussions, North Atlantic Council discussions, over the next few months.

Significant inefficiency is caused by the inability of many of the smaller nations in Europe to achieve economies of scale in their defense expenditures. Some allies and partners are already participating in creative multinational arrangements to use available defense funds more efficiently and address capability shortfalls that they would not have been able to address unilaterally.

One of the best examples is the strategic airlift consortium in which nations joined into a C-17 program that will be used by NATO, EU and nations to satisfy their airlift requirements. Allies are also moving forward on the alliance ground surveillance system, AGS. Secretary Gates has urged participants to agree to sign the memorandum of understanding for the AGS and the C-17 consortium as soon as possible.

In the interest of time I will skip my comments on enlargement and just conclude by saying, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to present the Defense Department's view of the Bucharest Summit and the way ahead. From the Pentagon's perspective, we believe the summit was a tremendous success. Those were actually

words that Secretary Gates spoke to the media or gave the media directly after the summit.

There is a good deal of defense-related work that needs to be done before the 2009 summit. Working with State and with Congress, we will make sure the alliance at 60 will be prepared and capable to undertake the 21st century challenges.

Thank you, sir. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fata follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL P. FATA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee: thank you for inviting me to testify about Defense Department objectives and plans following the April 2-4, 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest.

In the months ahead, we will be working to move NATO forward in the four main areas addressed by Heads of State and Government at Bucharest: Afghanistan, Missile Defense in Europe, Defense Capabilities, and Enlargement.

There is no doubt that the number one issue for NATO today is the success of our International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. At Bucharest, Allies agreed that Euro-Atlantic and broader international security is tied to Afghanistan's stability and democratic future.

Allies also agreed that ballistic missile proliferation is an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory, and populations; that missile defenses form part of a broader response to counter the threat; that the planned deployment of U.S. missile defense assets in Europe will substantially contribute to Allied protection against that threat; and that the Alliance should develop options for a "comprehensive missile defense architecture."

NATO defense ministers agreed to pursue all of Secretary Gates' recommendations for improving defense capabilities, including those related to multinational arrangements such as the C-17 consortium and the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance system (AGS), using NATO common funding to help fill military requirements for ongoing operations, and commitments to increase defense spending and deployability targets.

Although the UNITED STATES was disappointed that Allies could not reach a consensus on offering Membership Action Plans to Ukraine and Georgia, Allies agreed for the first time that "these countries will become members of NATO." The UNITED STATES supported NATO membership invitations for all three Adriatic Charter countries: Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia; and we are pleased that accession talks have begun for Croatia and Albania. Allies agreed that Macedonia is also ready for membership, pending resolution of its name dispute with Greece. We are hopeful that Macedonia's negotiations with Greece under UN auspices will resolve outstanding issues so that accession talks can proceed as soon as possible.

AFGHANISTAN

NATO's fundamental purpose remains collective defense. The missions that flow from this responsibility are adapting to meet 21st century challenges. Nowhere is that transformation more apparent than in Afghanistan, where NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since 2003. This major operation is the first NATO mission beyond the geographic confines of North America and Europe. ISAF now includes approximately 47,000 troops from 40 nations including more than 19,000 from the UNITED STATES. The Bucharest Summit came at a critical time for the Alliance's transformation as a larger alliance working with global partners to counter threats around the world. At the NATO Summit in Riga in November 2006, Allies pledged to ensure that ISAF would have the forces, resources, and flexibility needed to ensure the mission's continued success. Between Riga and Bucharest, Allies contributed 7,100 additional forces to ISAF. However that is still well short of what the Commander of ISAF, U.S. Army General McNeill, believes is required to win the fight. The shortfalls are compounded by the fact that some Allies continue to keep "caveats" on their forces, restricting the commander's flexibility in employing the forces at his disposal. Some Allies are also reluctant to employ counter-insurgency tactics because of concerns about blurring the lines between "civilian" and "military" responsibilities. At Bucharest, Secretary Gates stressed that although NATO is a military organization, it also is undertaking civilian activities in connection with security assistance operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and elsewhere. While working in cooperation with

other organizations, such as the European Union and United Nations, NATO needs to be capable of performing a full range of security and civilian tasks.

Part of the problem stems from flagging public and parliamentary support in Allied nations for the ISAF mission. To help Allies shore up domestic political support, the UNITED STATES pushed for a public "Strategic Vision" for ISAF to explain how Allied security is directly linked to stability in Afghanistan and to lay out a vision to guide ISAF's role in Afghanistan over the next five years. This Strategic Vision was endorsed by the Heads of State and Government from Allied and other ISAF troop contributing nations at Bucharest.

In the Strategic Vision, Allies and partners agreed that Afghanistan is the Alliance's key priority. The Strategic Vision incorporates four guiding principles:

- 1) a firm and shared long-term commitment;
- 2) support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility;
- 3) a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and
- 4) increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Pakistan.

What is required now is for Allied capitals to use this Strategic Vision as the basis for generating national support for the NATO mission in Afghanistan.

At Bucharest, France announced that it will send an additional battalion to eastern Afghanistan. This will permit the UNITED STATES to assign more troops to the South where Canadian, UK, Dutch and others have been engaged in challenging combat operations against resurgent Taliban forces. Also at Bucharest, Russia offered land transit for NATO's non-military or non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan.

A key component of ISAF's operation is training and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA). Three years ago there was no ANA to speak of, but today the ANA stands at approximately 55,000 and is engaged in or leading major operations alongside ISAF forces. ISAF partners have fielded or pledged approximately 50 Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to help build a more effective Afghan National Army. However, this still falls short of the 71 OMLTs required by March 2009. Thirteen ISAF nations have donated equipment to the ANA through NATO and a trust fund has been established to cover transportation and installation costs for the donated equipment.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Ballistic Missile Defense was one of the President's top issues going into the Bucharest Summit, and we are very pleased that the Alliance agreed to a strong statement of support, not only for the planned U.S. missile defense assets in Europe, but for additional missile defenses that would defend all Allies against the growing ballistic missile threat.

The Bush Administration believes strongly that ballistic missile proliferation poses a threat not only to the UNITED STATES, but to our European Allies as well. This is why we moved from a "national" missile defense policy under previous Administrations to a broader-based approach. The idea was to ensure that missile defenses are capable of protecting the UNITED STATES *and* its Allies to ensure that the security of the UNITED STATES and its Allies remains indivisible and that adversaries are not able to use the threat of ballistic missile attack to drive a wedge between us.

For the past eight years, the UNITED STATES has been working with Allies to explain our plan to field missile defense interceptors in Poland and a missile defense radar in the Czech Republic. These assets will provide coverage to many, but not all Allies from long-range ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East. While explaining the benefits of these assets, we have also encouraged NATO to think about ways to provide coverage to those Allies who would remain vulnerable to shorter-range ballistic missiles.

Given this, we were very pleased that at the Bucharest Summit, all 26 Allies agreed to the following points in the final Summit Declaration:

- Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory, and populations; including a growing threat from intermediate range and long-range ballistic missiles;
- Missile defenses form part of a broader response to counter this threat; NATO welcomes the fact that European-based U.S. assets will protect most Allies against long-range ballistic missiles and supports territorial missile defense as one means of safeguarding Alliance territory and population centers against the risk associated with ballistic missile proliferation;

- Planned U.S. missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic will provide a “substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles;” and
- The Alliance should develop options for a “comprehensive missile defense architecture” that provides coverage for those Allies not covered by the U.S. system. The Alliance will develop options to safeguard those Allies who remain vulnerable to short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles for consideration at the 2009 summit.

In addition to these critical points, Allies also acknowledged at Bucharest the work being done by the UNITED STATES and by the NATO-Russia Council to address Russia’s concerns about missile defense. Missile defenses in Europe, whether they are U.S. or Allied assets, pose no threat to Russia’s strategic deterrent. The UNITED STATES has proposed wide-ranging transparency and confidence building measures that are intended to address Russia’s concerns, and we remain hopeful that Russia will accept these measures.

NATO still has much work to do, specifically with respect to completing the Bucharest tasking to develop options for a comprehensive missile defense architecture. As we have done in the past, the UNITED STATES is prepared to support and contribute to these efforts in the hope that all Allies will one day be able to enjoy the benefits of missile defense.

In addition, Allied Heads of State and Government agreed to explore ways to link the U.S. missile defense capability with NATO missile defense efforts, encouraged Russia to take advantage of U.S. missile defense cooperation proposals, and are ready to explore the potential for linking UNITED STATES, NATO, and Russian missile defense systems.

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Secretary Gates proposed and NATO Defense Ministers at Bucharest agreed to pursue seven recommendations for improving NATO defense capabilities:

- Examine and fully pursue multinational arrangements to address capability shortfalls.
- Participating nations in the C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) program need to sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as soon as possible so the first C-17 can be operational by the end of 2008.
- Applaud the UK initiative to establish a trust fund to assist nations in upgrading helicopters and training air crews, and direct the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to examine ways to use common funding to better support operations and establish a common logistic base.
- Participating nations in the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) program should agree to the final cost shares and sign the MOU so that AGS is operational by 2012.
- Encourage nations spending considerably less than two percent of GDP on defense that cannot achieve that level, to commit to increasing defense spending by 0.2 percent of GDP within five years.
- Prioritize the provision of forces to fill the remaining holes in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSORs) for ongoing operations.
- Commit to increase NATO forces’ deployability target from 40 to 50 percent.

There have, for many years, been persistent problems with inadequate levels of defense spending on the part of most Allies and inefficient use of available defense funds. Although even a modest increase such as that proposed by Secretary Gates may be difficult to achieve within many European cabinets that may have other funding priorities, Defense Ministers do have a great deal of influence over how available defense funds are spent. Many Allies could use their available funds more efficiently by shifting investment out of non-deployable capabilities and into transportation and support capabilities to make forces more usable.

Significant inefficiency is caused by the inability of many of the smaller nations in Europe to achieve economies of scale in their defense expenditures. Some Allies and Partners are already participating in creative multinational arrangements to use available defense funds more efficiently and address capability shortfalls that they would not have been able to address unilaterally. One of the best examples of this is the Strategic Airlift Capability Program, in which a consortium of nations is procuring shares in C-17s that will be used to satisfy NATO, EU, and national strategic airlift requirements. The consortium has currently committed to acquiring

three C-17s, but there is no reason that other airframes, such as the A400M, could not be added to the pool in the future.

ENLARGEMENT

The UNITED STATES supported NATO membership invitations for all three Adriatic Charter countries—Croatia, Albania and Macedonia at the Bucharest Summit. Each country has made significant progress over the past eight years and each is now a force for stability in the Balkan region and beyond. Their forces serve with us in Afghanistan and other global peacekeeping operations, and they continue to play important roles on Kosovo. In short, they already have shown a clear commitment to bearing the responsibilities of NATO membership. Just as importantly, each of them shares our values of democracy, human rights, and freedom.

These countries have worked hard to earn a NATO invitation and, like all the other recent new NATO members, they will strengthen the Alliance. Eventually bringing all three, not just two, of these countries into NATO will permanently extend NATO's zone of peace and stability into the Western Balkans. It will also set a positive example for other countries in the region.

Accession talks will be conducted in April to May 2008 with the aim of finalizing Accession Protocols in time for signature by NATO member countries by the end of July 2008. Allies agreed at Bucharest to complete the ratification process "without delay." As accession talks begin, we will continue to engage Albania and Croatia to encourage them to complete remaining reforms to achieve NATO membership.

Croatia has a proven track record of political and economic maturity and it is also an important Partner on the battlefield. Today, it is a net exporter of stability. It is an active Partner in the Adriatic Charter with Albania and Macedonia, provides military and police forces to eleven United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations worldwide, and is also a strong contributor to ongoing NATO operations. It has a contingent of approximately two hundred troops in ISAF that is scheduled to grow to over three hundred by the end of this year. Additionally, it already is a strong supporter of NATO exercises. Last year's amphibious exercise held in Croatia was the largest ever held in a non-member state.

Albania is also a net provider of security and stability throughout the region. It currently provides troop contributions to both Iraq and Afghanistan and supports the peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. In fact, it is one of the greatest per-capita contributors to NATO and Coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, its strong support and leadership on Kosovo has been significant. It consistently has called on all parties to negotiate and to avoid resorting to violence. Just as importantly, it has made steady progress on combating corruption, with arrests of high-level government officials among others, substantial progress on judicial reform, and progress on laws to increase transparency and efficiency within the court system.

Macedonia also is with us in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its soldiers are fighting alongside ours, keeping the peace and defending freedom. This is the best evidence that Macedonia, like Croatia and Albania, is ready to be a full NATO member. Macedonia has already successfully completed nine MAP cycles and MAP reviews. Consequently, we were greatly disappointed that Macedonia did not receive an invitation to join NATO because of the dispute with Greece over its name.

When Macedonia and Greece arrive at a solution to the name issue, Macedonia will take its place within NATO. At Bucharest, the Administration and NATO Allies agree that Macedonia is ready for membership based on NATO's performance-based standards.

NATO enlargement continues to play a vital role in supporting the cause of freedom in Europe by promoting democratic values and giving countries a road map for military and political reforms. Ukraine and Georgia's aspirations to join the Alliance are closely connected to these same values as they seek to solidify their democratic reforms and join the Euro-Atlantic family of democracies. We believe strongly that Georgia and Ukraine both deserve to participate in a Membership Action Plan (MAP). This was the message the President and the Secretary of Defense took to Bucharest and will be the message we continue to send to Allies in the coming weeks and months.

MAP provides an opportunity for countries to continue their efforts towards defense and civil society reform by providing stringent goals to be completed before membership can be considered. As we all know, MAP is not membership, and Georgia and Ukraine have some time to go before membership is even a possibility. Yet MAP can provide vital tools for Ukraine and Georgia to continue to pursue democratic reform and consolidate their robust reform agendas.

The President strongly urged Allies to approve Ukraine's and Georgia's requests for a MAP. Although Alliance Heads of State and Government reaffirmed the principle that NATO's doors remain open to European democracies and that both Georgia and Ukraine "will become members of NATO," we were disappointed that a few Allies were not ready to approve MAP for Ukraine and Georgia at Bucharest. All Allies agreed that no nation outside of NATO should be able to block an aspirant's progress toward membership.

Alliance members will now begin a period of intensive high-level engagement with both Ukraine and Georgia to address questions pertaining to their MAP applications of some Allies. The Department of Defense will continue to work with our USG colleagues and with those in the Alliance who continue to have reservations about extending MAP to ensure that Ukraine and Georgia get the support they need to continue reforms and progress toward NATO membership. Foreign Ministers will further assess the MAP requests at their meeting in December and have been empowered by Allied leaders to approve the requests.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Given prior UNITED STATES and Allied contacts with Russia on the CFE Treaty, there were no expectations that President Putin would arrive at the Summit with a new position. We have been waiting for a response to the so-called "parallel actions package," which includes proposals designed to break the impasse over ratification of the CFE Adapted Treaty and Russia's fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments to withdraw Russian forces in Georgia and Moldova, that are there without the consent of the host countries. Russian suspension of its implementation of the current CFE Treaty last December only complicated negotiating efforts. Shortly before the Bucharest Summit, the North Atlantic Council issued the first public description of the package's main elements and strongly endorsed the package as the basis for moving forward.

In Bucharest, President Putin repeated complaints that NATO States had not ratified the Treaty and that the Baltic states had not joined the Treaty regime, something that could legally only occur under the Adapted Treaty. Putin's remarks showed that Russia's problems with the Treaty regime also extend to the updated or Adapted CFE Treaty, which Russia has already ratified. Putin repeated demands for elimination of flank restrictions for Russia, without which Russia could theoretically mass its entire force on its northern or southern periphery. At the same time, Russia demands that NATO and other states in the flank zone accept strict limits on their forces and outside reinforcements.

No Ally has suggested that NATO members withdraw from the Treaty. The Defense Department will continue to work closely with the State Department to support efforts to work with our Allies and Russia on a negotiated solution. At the same time, NATO has stated that the current situation where Allies are implementing Treaty requirements, such as data exchanges, while Russia is not, cannot continue indefinitely. The timing and content of next steps will be a matter for multilateral discussion in NATO. During suspension, Moscow has also indicated that it would exercise restraint in deploying additional combat forces near its borders. We see no imminent threat to European security. But CFE has provided important predictability and transparency, and, if we lose the Treaty regime, we may also lose some of the sense of security that Europe has recently experienced.

OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS

The largest NATO presence in the Balkans is the Kosovo Force or KFOR. Since establishing the mission in 1999, several thousand service members from NATO and non-NATO countries have served in Kosovo, helping to maintain a safe and secure environment for all the people living there.

Kosovo's declaration of independence on February 17th ended one chapter and began another. We must deal with short-term challenges to security and longer-term challenges of Kosovo's development. Emotions continue to run high and unfortunately, last month, a few Serb extremists attacked international police and military forces, killing one and injuring more than 60. However, KFOR did a superb job in limiting the violence and defusing the situation. Kosovo's independence brings Europe closer to the goal of being whole, free and at peace. In the future, we look forward to NATO helping establish a small, lightly equipped Kosovo Security Force and its civilian oversight ministry as well as dissolving the Kosovo Protection Corps.

The UNITED STATES pledged to keep about 1,500 U.S. service members in KFOR through the transition period from the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to the EU-led International Civilian Office. Our forces, mostly National Guard personnel, are doing a fantastic job in Kosovo.

Serbia strongly opposes Kosovo's independence. We understand that, and we continue to reach out to Serbia diplomatically during what has been a painful period for them. We support maintaining the NATO Liaison Office in Belgrade and hope that Serbia will continue to take advantage of the opportunities it offers.

With NATO's offer of membership to Albania and the commitment to invite Macedonia as soon as the name issue is resolved, the NATO Headquarters in Tirana and Skopje have accomplished the majority of their tasks. NATO will continue to help these countries implement the defense reform programs they undertook several years ago.

The work of NATO Headquarters Sarajevo helped Bosnia-Herzegovina reach a point where the Alliance decided to begin an Intensified Dialogue on the full range of political, military, financial, and security issues relating to its aspiration to membership.

NATO WAY AHEAD

Our vision of NATO's future is one in which NATO remains the premier transatlantic security institution with collective defense as its core function, while continuing to embrace new challenges and reach out to new partners. At the dawning of the new millennium there was an extraordinary amount of uncertainty and discussion about the future challenges to the Euro-Atlantic area and appropriate future roles and missions for NATO. Some who viewed NATO as a purely military alliance believed that NATO was no longer relevant. Others recognized that NATO still had a useful role to play, but thought that role should be limited to the collective defense of the territory of its members. There were some who perceived the European Union efforts to develop a security and defense policy (ESDP) to be in direct competition with NATO for resources and political support.

Today, NATO's assumption of new security tasks and new partnerships, especially its operations in Afghanistan, is transforming the Alliance at the political level as well as the military level. The views of European political leaders have converged on the realization that "Euro-Atlantic and wider international security is closely tied to Afghanistan's future as a peaceful, democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism." They now also share a realization that a full range of policy instruments, both military and civilian, must be coordinated to achieve many of our security aims including a stable and peaceful Afghanistan that will not endanger its neighbors, the Euro-Atlantic area, and the wider international community. They must now convey these realizations to their constituents, many of whom do not appreciate the importance of NATO's operations in Afghanistan as central to countering the global threat of terrorism and Islamic extremism.

The experience of our real world operations has shown us that we cannot afford to allow institutional rivalry to impede cooperation between NATO and the EU. At the Bucharest Summit, French President Sarkozy indicated a desire to achieve closer cooperation between NATO and the European Union. Secretary of Defense Gates indicated that he thinks the time is right to try to bring the two organizations into closer cooperation, while recognizing that they each need a mix of military and non-military instruments. President Sarkozy announced that France and Germany will host the 60th Anniversary NATO Summit in Strasbourg, France and Kehl, Germany in April 2009, and he gave positive indications that France might announce its reintegration into the NATO military structure at the 2009 Summit. The full reintegration of France into Alliance military structures and better cooperation between NATO and the European Union in which each has access to needed capabilities, both military and civilian, will be a focus of our efforts over the next year.

CONCLUSION AND DOD PLANS FOR FOLLOW-UP

In conclusion, with the exception of the disappointment on Macedonia, we think that Bucharest was a success for the UNITED STATES by accomplishing the following:

- Allies' official acknowledgement of a NATO role in operations outside of the Euro-Atlantic area by agreeing that Euro-Atlantic security is tied to Afghanistan's stability and future;
- a firm and shared *long-term* commitment by Allies to a comprehensive approach, bringing together civilian and military efforts to prevent Islamic extremists from regaining control of Afghanistan;
- approval by Allies of the extension of the ballistic missile defense system to Europe;
- invitations to Albania and Croatia to join the Alliance;

- agreement by NATO defense ministers to pursue Secretary Gates' seven-point plan to improve defense capabilities and agreement to provide forces and capabilities needed for ongoing operations; and
- acknowledgment by Allies that Ukraine and Georgia will join NATO—it is a matter of when, not if, and foreign ministers will address the issue before the end of the year.

The Department of Defense intends to follow up on these successes over the next year by:

- encouraging Allies to use the Strategic Vision approved at Bucharest to improve political support to more fully support ongoing ISAF operations;
- engaging with French counterparts to reinforce France's increased commitment to ISAF, its possible reintegration into the NATO military structure, and exploring possible improvements in the defense and security relations between NATO and the EU; and
- working with Allied counterparts to improve defense capabilities by:
 - implementing the U.S. ballistic missile defense sites in Europe and continuing to work with Allies to develop a comprehensive missile defense architecture;
 - highlighting ongoing multinational arrangements to address capability shortfalls efficiently by completing arrangements necessary for an initial operational capability for the C-17 consortium by year end and for AGS by 2012; and
 - achieving Allied agreement to Secretary Gates' targets for increases in defense spending within the next five years for Allies spending less than two percent of their GDP on defense and increased deployability targets.
- Continuing to work with the State Department and Allies to initiate accession talks with Macedonia immediately after the name issue is resolved and to approve Membership Action Plans for Ukraine and Georgia as soon as possible.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to present the Defense Department's view of the Bucharest Summit and the way ahead for NATO. I would be honored to answer any questions you or the Committee may have. Thank you.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you to both gentlemen.

I want to welcome Mr. Sires of New Jersey, Mr. Inglis of South Carolina, Mr. Tanner of Tennessee to the committee meeting. My understanding is that Mr. Sires and Mr. Inglis do not wish to make any opening statements.

Mr. Tanner, do you wish to?

Mr. TANNER. No.

Mr. WEXLER. Okay. Then we will move forward with the questioning.

I would like to start if I could with two questions, the first with respect to the Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia and tie it into the most recent actions by Russia, which would seem in a very direct way to undermine the territorial integrity of Georgia and try to combine what was and was not done at the Bucharest Summit with the actions by the Russians subsequent to the summit with respect to Georgia.

When I was in Ukraine earlier in the year, we had this extraordinary, of course, development that the President, Prime Minister and Speaker of the Parliament signed a letter in a uniform position asking for a Membership Action Plan.

I believe public opinion in Ukraine is not yet favorable with respect to NATO membership, but that entry into a Membership Action Plan was viewed as a very positive development and compared to some other countries, previously, where public opinion was not yet mature to a point where NATO acceptance was widely held, during the process of the Membership Action Plan the governments

were able to show their people why NATO membership was a positive development for the nation.

I would be disingenuous if I did not acknowledge the wholehearted effort by the administration from the President on down in achieving the Membership Action Plan for both Ukraine and Georgia. At the same time, of course, the Membership Action Plan was not provided.

What was provided was a fairly extraordinary statement that in essence said that Ukraine and Georgia would become members of NATO, so in essence what happened was NATO refused to provide an application, which is the Membership Action Plan, but they provided acceptance of the application, which seems to be a bit illogical at least for those of us that were not present at the summit.

So I guess I would like to ask, one, how did that confluence of effects occur, and, two, with respect to those nations that were most reluctant to extend the Membership Action Plan, such as Germany, what is their reaction now if their reluctance was based on their concern with aggravating President Putin in Russia, now that subsequent to the summit and Ukraine and Georgia not being given the MAP application Russia goes in and violates the territorial integrity of Georgia?

With that, Ambassador Fried and Mr. Fata, if you would, please?

Ambassador FRIED. Those are good questions, and you have introduced issues that we are working on now and will be working on for the balance of this administration.

You are correct that NATO leaders came to a strong and extraordinary conclusion when they agreed that these countries, Ukraine and Georgia, will become members of NATO. This was a statement that is so clear and unadorned it could only have been produced by leaders discussing it among themselves, as opposed to bureaucrats. In fact, it represented a discussion and a consensus by leaders during the NATO summit itself following an extraordinary series of discussions among the leaders and senior officials.

That statement means that the alliance far from drawing a line down Europe with Ukraine and Georgia on the other side from NATO made a decision that there will be no line and that Ukraine and Georgia have a future in the alliance. That followed a very vigorous debate about the timing of the Membership Action Plan.

The other governments, the German Government should speak for itself, but it became clear during the discussion at the summit that the German chancellor was not interested at all in drawing a line in Europe, but did want to make sure that Ukraine and Georgia were ready.

We had differences about their readiness. You know that the United States Government favored a Membership Action Plan right then and there, but what NATO did was important, and we are going to be working on the basis of the leaders' decision at Bucharest.

Now, you asked a question about Russian pressure on Georgia, both political pressure, the Russian decision to in principle open up branches of its government ministries in Abkhazia, the breakaway Georgian territory, and I believe you are also referring to Sunday's shoot down by a MiG-29 of an unarmed Georgian reconnaissance drone over Abkhazia.

We are very concerned by what this means. Our support for Georgia's territorial integrity, its sovereignty and its independence is unequivocal and strong, and Secretary Rice reiterated this to the Georgian foreign minister today, not 3 hours ago.

We want to work with our European partners and with Russia in a peaceful solution to the problem of the Abkhazia breakaway territories and the Abkhazia breakaway territory in South Ossetia, current and ongoing tensions between Georgia and Russia, and we hope that Russia will act in conformance with its declared policy of respecting Georgia's territorial integrity and a peaceful solution to these conflicts.

I can't give you a direct answer to your question about the impact of NATO's lack of a decision on MAP. I can't demonstrate a causality between that and Russian pressure. There was Russian pressure before this decision. I can't prove the negative that it wouldn't have happened had the decision come out in another way.

But it is important that Europe and the United States work together to send clear messages of support for Georgia and clear messages to Russia that it needs to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its neighbors.

I will add also in this context that the record shows that NATO enlargement has in fact been good not only for European security as a whole, but, frankly, in our opinion good for Russia because the region of Europe to Russia's west has never been so benign, so peaceful and so secure in all of European history, and this is a result of NATO enlargement and EU enlargement.

I don't expect Russia to thank the United States for supporting NATO enlargement, but I do tell my Russian friends that they ought to recognize this. They have a different view.

Mr. FATA. Sir, if I may? I was actually in Georgia at the end of last week, Thursday and Friday, and with respect to Bucharest there were three feelings. There was excitement over the language that they would become members and welcomed into Europe's home, along with excitement for just how strong the United States came out in support. The Congress, the administration, we are supporting Georgia.

There was frustration over Germany and a couple other allies, using your language, sir, that put it out there they could become members, but then there wasn't the Membership Action Plan. Frustration in particular over some of the comments that were made by the chancellor.

And then there was concern about the activities being undertaken they believed certainly by Russia with the idea of opening representative offices in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and what that meant for December when the foreign ministers will review the MAP applications.

What the Georgians told us would go a long way in helping to deal with the frustration that both the Georgian Government and the Georgian public was feeling were strong statements of solidarity by the United States, the European Union and allied capitals condemning Russian actions with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That would go a long way to ease the frustration or to show that Europe is with Georgia.

I put myself in their shoes and I said, "Look, if I were writing talking points for how to go forward on a Membership Action Plan between now and December, I would want to make sure that I wrote in there that it is Georgia's responsibility to make the case to the Europeans why MAP isn't membership, why unresolved territorial disputes has never been a condition for extending MAP.

"While you have welcomed us into Europe's home by saying we will become members, but now you have stopped short, we are doing everything we can to realize that NATO has an open door. We will be restrained. We will be mature. We will be practical in our relations with Russia. We are not looking to preempt or to act in a provocative way and that we don't hold a grudge against Europe."

Again, if I was writing the Georgian talking points and I made the point to them that if there is a Europe backlash in Georgia that will only hurt Georgia's chances for getting MAP in December. I think they took those comments on board. Again going back, they were excited. There was a bit of frustration and a bit of concern.

I haven't been to Ukraine since Bucharest so I can't speak for that, but that is sort of the Georgia perspective from on the ground.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

I am going to ask one quick question regarding Afghanistan and then go to Mr. Wilson.

Anthony Cordesman, who I think both of you gentlemen are familiar with from the CSIS, drafted a synopsis of NATO's Afghanistan policy following the summit. He stated that we need to be cautious about the definition of success by NATO's approach or with respect to NATO's approach in Afghanistan, and he stated what is being described as progress seems far closer to buying time at best and a slow slide toward failure at worst.

He goes on to state that NATO is making slow increases in force levels to meet a requirement for a long-term presence and that every year NATO has had insufficient forces in Afghanistan. Do you agree or disagree with Mr. Cordesman's assessment?

Ambassador FRIED. Agree with some of it, disagree with the main thrust of his argument.

I agree that NATO did not have, especially in the beginning, an adequate appreciation of the magnitude of the challenge, nor had we worked out the right counterinsurgency tactics. It seems to me that over the past year-and-a-half, especially since the Riga Summit, we have gotten a lot smarter.

Is there any lesson learned other than the hard way? I don't know, but in any event NATO has learned lessons the hard way. We are much better, particularly the U.S. forces in the east, at counterinsurgency, and those lessons are filtering out to other forces who are learning them and getting better at what needs to be done. It would be a fair question to ask well, why now? Why not 4 years ago? But better now than 4 years hence.

The slogan of Riga was only a slogan when we started using it, which was comprehensive approach, meaning civil and military at the same time. Now we are putting this into practice. It means something on the ground, and where we do it right we see results.

So I don't think it is simply a question of buying time in a slow slide to chaos, to paraphrase Cordesman. I would say that it is a

question of how fast we can learn the lessons and how steep our ramp up will be and whether that is adequate.

I am far more comfortable than I was 1½ years ago. Partial answer, but that outlines it in the main.

Mr. FATA. What I would just say briefly, sir, and Dan and I have spent a lot of time talking to our allies. Allies understand the mission has changed from when they signed on to the harder part of the mission, what we call Stage 3 and Stage 4, in the summer of 2006 when NATO now assumed command for the south and then the east.

They understand the mission has changed, but it has taken some time to understand what that mission change means and how you engage in it, what it takes, how many it takes, what kind of enablers it takes. We see allies since November 2006, since a few months since NATO took command for the whole country. We have seen allies nearly double the amount of forces on the ground.

They realize in their own inventories they don't have enough helicopters, the up-armored vehicles and all that that is required. They are finding ways to get that, as opposed to saying we are not going to do the mission. They are finding ways to get the mission done.

No ally has left. I think Switzerland had two people on the ground. I think they are the only country to have pulled out of Afghanistan. No major ally—no fighting ally, no NATO ally—has left the mission. In fact, we have seen more partners come on the ground since Riga in November 2006.

I think there are still some growing pains that we need to go through. Let me go back to my opening comments. NATO has never done anything this far, this challenging before. It is not the 20th century. It is a new way of fighting. The initiatives that were launched throughout the decade are getting us there, but they don't change overnight.

As long as allied defense spending remains low and the bulk of the allies are below the NATO agreed minimum of 2 percent it is going to be difficult to generate those kinds of capabilities necessary. I think we are making inroads.

This Afghan strategic vision document which laid out why we went, what we have achieved, what needs to be done over the next 3 to 5 years will be a big public and parliamentary rallying tool, but I wouldn't throw the baby out with the bath water.

Progress is being made. Sometimes and in some areas slower than what we would like, but overall progress is being made. The training of the Afghans is increasing. They are becoming more and more of a fighting force.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson?

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador and Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.

Secretary Fata, NATO has just been a phenomenal success, a victory in the Cold War. Twenty years ago it would be unimaginable that countries that were members of the Warsaw Pact would now be strong members of NATO.

As I mentioned, my interest in Bulgaria. I am very proud that their National Assembly 2 years ago voted for the first time in

their 1,225 year history to invite a foreign military presence, being American bases, to be located in Bulgaria. Can you tell us what the status is on those bases and also in Romania?

Mr. FATA. Sir, I believe we have completed all the implementing agreements. There are about a dozen different legal and other technical arrangements that need to be worked out with the United States and Bulgarian sides and the United States and Romanian sides. We have completed all—I believe we have completed all—of the agreements with Bulgaria.

On Romania there was still one outstanding legal document that we needed to close our chapter that we needed to close. We are hoping to have an exercise there this summer and then begin construction of the facilities soon after that, so all in all things are in good shape.

Both governments continue to welcome the U.S. presence. Both populations continue to welcome the U.S. presence. It will be a rotational presence. It is not a full-time presence. It will be rotational. It is of a battalion size. It is not going to be year-round.

There may be moments where we don't have folks, given the operational tempo of our forces, but it is a good move. It is a welcome move. It is something that will continue and that isn't recognized often.

It is transformational for the Bulgarian and Romanian forces to be able to partner exercise with ours, but with the unknown piece or piece we don't hit enough on. This is transformational for us, for our own forces. They get to learn different tactics and techniques that we wouldn't normally be exposed to, and, like we learned in the Cold War going back to your comments, it creates a bond with the people.

When there are U.S. soldiers there it creates a bond with those, and it just reinforces the strength of the allied partnership.

Mr. WILSON. And the strategic location of it adjacent to the Middle East is just amazing to me what wonderful partners they can be.

A concern that all of us have is in Pakistan the border areas, the ungoverned tribal areas. There were discussions at Bucharest largely led by the Netherlands for assistance to Pakistan. What is the status on EU-NATO working more closely with the Government of Pakistan?

Mr. FATA. Dan, do you want to?

Ambassador FRIED. We are working. The biggest development in our relations is a function of the election they had, which produced a legitimate new civilian government and resulted in a defeat for the extreme Islamist parties, particularly in the northwest region.

This gives us a new opening. We were all wrestling with the problem of relations with Pakistan when it looked like they were in a political crisis with no way out. This means that our military relationship with Pakistan, which is critical because of the antiterrorism component, can be embedded in a larger outreach to Pakistan more generally.

Now, this is a real opening, and many in the Congress have been urging us to do this. Now the opportunity is with us so I can report to you that the administration is actively working on ways to broaden this relationship, and we are developing ideas and options.

The security component is critical, and the relations between ISAF and the Pakistanis are important. I think Yacta Hocstetter has been active in Islamabad. He has been there several times, but there is a larger and more hopeful context.

Six months ago we would be having a different kind of conversation with narrowing perspectives. It looked much grimmer. Now the problems are there, but the political context is improved so we are trying to take advantage of it, so a broader answer.

Mr. WILSON. And a final question. In regard to Albania and Croatia, what steps do they have to take to fully become a member? Are there any requirements?

Ambassador FRIED. Well, the principal requirement from an American perspective is that the Senate will have to give its advice and consent.

NATO is making formal invitations. There will be an accession. There is a NATO process of accession which should be complete this summer, I think July. Accession protocols have to be signed, and then after that the ratification process will occur.

Now, based on past standards this usually takes 1 year or a bit more. It would be great if we could get it done by the April 2009 summit, but it is working and I have to tell you to be in Zagreb with the leaders of Croatia, Albania and also Macedonia and see how far these countries have come from the 1990s was a heartening example of what happens when a policy works out, and a bipartisan policy I should add. The last three Presidents have led the way. Sometimes things work out.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Sires?

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this meeting.

Mr. Secretary, I just have a question. Due to the ongoing—how can I say—struggle between FYROM and Greece regarding the name Macedonia, where are we today?

Mr. FATA. We are in the middle of negotiations led by U.N. envoy Matt Nimetz to try to find a solution to the name issue. The U.S., at the request of both governments, has supported the Nimetz process. I have been to Scopia myself and been in meetings with leaders of both countries. The U.S. can support the Nimetz process of finding a way forward.

It is heartening that even after the Bucharest Summit both governments in Scopia and Athens have committed themselves to try to work with Nimetz and find a solution, so this is not a passive process. It is very active. It is ongoing. Matt Nimetz has been to the region since Bucharest.

We are talking to these governments all the time, so we hope to keep pushing ahead. What we don't want is for both governments to just settle back and think that this can go on for years. That is not a good situation.

Happily, NATO leaders did decide that an invitation to Macedonia will be extended as soon as there is a solution to the name issue. Macedonia was given I can't call it a provisional invitation, but the decision was this is the only issue outstanding. Get this done, and we don't have to wait for another summit.

Mr. SIRES. Did we underestimate how strongly the Athens Government felt about the naming?

Ambassador FRIED. Oh, I would say the U.S. Government was very well aware of the strong feelings. I worked on this issue and have been familiar with it since the mid 1990s.

There was an opportunity we thought before. In fact, the Greek Government asked us to become involved before the Bucharest Summit and we did. We didn't get there. There is no point casting blame. The point is now to try to find a solution acceptable to both sides.

Mr. SIRES. Did we recognize the name of New Macedonia or something like that that I read someplace, or did we accept it? We haven't accepted anything?

Ambassador FRIED. No. Right before the NATO summit, about a week before, Matt Nimetz, the U.N. negotiator—he is an American, but he doesn't work for the American Government—came up with a proposal. It didn't use the word new. There was another formula.

The Macedonian Government accepted it. The Greek Government didn't, but both sides have now said and told us that they know they need to move on and find a solution. Rather than sit pat and be angry they want to find a solution, and we are very supportive in working with both sides.

Mr. SIRES. On my visit to Greece and meeting with the Athens Government they felt so strongly. I was, quite frankly, surprised at how strongly they felt about the name issue.

Ambassador FRIED. Issues of identity in that part of the world are very strongly felt on all sides. You know, it is easy for Americans to say well, it is just a name. What does it matter? It does matter to the people in the region.

Mr. SIRES. I didn't say that, by the way.

Ambassador FRIED. We have to respect that.

Mr. SIRES. I didn't say that, but I was there. What is in a name? I never said that.

Ambassador FRIED. No, you didn't. Some people do. Not you, sir.

Mr. SIRES. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. WEXLER. There is a lot of support here on this panel and in the Congress for the position of the Greek Government.

With that, Mr. Bilirakis?

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. I appreciate that. You know what my position is.

Mr. Fata, it has been reported that Ukraine is expected to have up to eight additional army subunits certified in compliance with NATO standards in 2008. This is in conjunction with four existing subunits certified last year. It demonstrates that Ukraine is capable of meeting NATO's operational capability standards. Meanwhile, Ukraine has been very active participating in NATO operations.

In terms of military readiness, how does Ukraine match up against existing relatively new NATO members like the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia?

Mr. FATA. Sir, what I would say with respect to that question is that, one, we continue to be very encouraged by Ukraine's willingness, its ability to partner and engage with NATO in its operations.

It is the only non NATO country to be involved in every single one of NATO's operations. It has a presence, whether it be naval or whether it be on the ground, in every single one of NATO's operations.

Ukraine, because of its Soviet legacy and the materiel and the weapons that were left over, brings to it a tremendous amount of capability. It has what most allies don't have a lot of, and those are helicopters, as well as strategic airframes. It is able to lift and move its equipment and its people to essentially anywhere where they need to go.

It has the helicopters. I am not saying they are the best helicopters, but these helicopters work. They support Ukraine's operations to the point that allies have a leasing arrangement. It is called SALIS, the Strategic Air Lift. It stands for a temporary leasing agreement, SALIS, S-A-L-I-S, where allies lease or rent Ukrainian airframes to help haul some of their equipment, so the Ukraine is a very capable non NATO partner.

It has a bit of a way to go in terms of meeting NATO standards writ large. It does not have an NCO corps. That needs to be developed. The United States has been working with the Ukrainians 4 years. We have an annual meeting that I chair at my level walking through it used to be a 12-month plan of how we are going to help the Ukrainians develop themselves. I in my job have expanded it out to a 5-year plan so that we are able to look longer than just what our current FMF cycle is, if you will.

Building an NCO corps, helping with English language training, professionalizing the force, dealing with how logistics and other things are procured. In Ukraine it is getting to the point where they need to start buying newer stuff. A lot of the stuff has been left over, so helping them really to develop a modern military.

They are quite capable. They are an able partner. I look forward to working with Ukraine over the next few years to get them closer to meeting all of NATO's standards.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. How about can you maybe elaborate on Georgia?

Mr. FATA. With respect to their capabilities or——

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Yes. Military in general, their admission into NATO.

Mr. FATA. On Georgia——

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Yes, on Georgia.

Mr. FATA [continuing]. What I would say is for there we continue to be impressed, absolutely impressed by Georgian capabilities.

NATO has over a 70-percent approval rating in Georgia. Ukraine is about 30 percent, but in Georgia there is wide acceptance across the country that NATO is Georgia's future, that NATO is Georgia's friend.

Georgia is on the ground with us, with the United States, in Iraq. It is with NATO in Afghanistan. They had a contingent in Kosovo that they are going to withdraw in order to increase force presence in Afghanistan. Very capable forces. They have four brigades. Three of the brigades have been or are being trained, advanced training by us. They use modern weapons, modern western weapons.

They understood the importance of English language training right from the get-go. They knew that was the coin of the realm.

They knew that was the key to interoperability. They are very well respected by NATO allies for what the Georgians are able to do on the ground, how disciplined they are.

Again, if you look at Georgia are they ready for membership yet? No. They, too, are not there. Membership means more than just a military. There is a wider span that has to be undertaken. There are still some additional reforms that need to be undertaken with the Georgians.

Again, I lead those discussions for our building in working through that, but continue to be impressed by just the quality of the Georgian force and the commitment by the Georgian Government.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. All right. Thank you, Mr. Fata.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Tanner?

Mr. TANNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you calling this hearing in the capital of the former British Colonies, the United States of America. What is in a name?

Mr. WEXLER. Right.

Mr. TANNER. Ambassador Fried, you said something that reminded me. My predecessor used to say I appreciate this more than you know, and I always wanted to say well, just exactly how much do you think I know? You said you were more comfortable than you were 1½ years ago, and I was going to ask how comfortable were you 1½ years ago.

But seriously, I have a question that comes up in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly with increasing frequency, and that is the growing uneasiness by the parliamentarians in Canada, the Dutch, Brits and so on about the lack of burden sharing in Afghanistan as it relates to the military effort particularly in the south and east.

As a corollary to that, could you relate to us if the question of caveats with regard to the military action there came up and, if so, how were they addressed?

Then I have my last question. I think Afghanistan probably as much as any other military/civilian effort we are doing points out the fact that military action alone is only a fraction of the answer, and what we have been doing in NATO PA is trying to urge those allies who maybe cannot for some reason, public opinion or otherwise because of the controversial nature in Europe and here too about Iraq—I am trying to separate Iraq from Afghanistan for a moment.

That if they for some reason cannot support the military effort to the extent that we would like it seems to me they certainly can support the PRT effort to build a civil society, which is the other part of the answer in this evolving threat that we face in this century.

May I ask either or both of you to comment on that?

Ambassador FRIED. Congressman, let me go through these questions, all of them quickly, and then Dan Fata may have things to add.

I don't want to duck the question of my comfort level 1½ years ago, but I will say that 1½ years ago when we came up with this notion of a comprehensive approach, meaning civil and military, we

had the words, and I remember at the time Dan Fata and others said—our Ambassador to NATO, Tori Newland said—yes, it is the right words, and does this translate down to operational competence on the ground.

The answer then was we will see, which is not entirely a comfortable answer, but the answer now is yes, in many cases and growing cases. No, not all units have learned the lessons, but more have and we are beginning to get a sense of what works, so that is a real world answer I guess.

Burden sharing was one of the major issues leading up to the summit. The Canadians were clearly under pressure from their society. They wanted a sense of reinforcements. They told us we need confidence that a combat battalion will come down to the south to help us out, and in fact they were delighted because when the French put forward a combat battalion for the east the Secretary of Defense was able to say an American battalion could move down to the south.

The Canadians were happy, and the sense of solidarity was reinforced. Had we not succeeded that would have been a major problem for the summit. We did succeed so it was scarcely a story, but it is a good story.

The Dutch clearly have fought hard and suffered losses. The son of the Dutch Chief of Defense was killed in combat in the south in Uruzgan, so that is not abstract. That is deeply personal.

The sense of burden sharing was eased I think somewhat by the French commitment, by the Polish commitment, by the Americans coming in. That doesn't mean it is eased completely, but it was I would say less acute at this time than 1 year ago.

Military action is only a fraction of the overall mission is what you said, and that is true. Then the trick is taking that principle and applying it. To make civil/ military operations work you have to spend enough time on the ground to know who you are dealing with. Otherwise all you can do is military operations in the kind of most primitive sense.

That takes time. It takes money. It takes the military marrying up with civilian assistance providers not just in theories in some paper that I will write, but in reality on the ground, and that is the lesson we are just learning and have learned to apply successfully particularly in the east and is being learned sort of filtering down and out.

Mr. TANNER. If I might?

Ambassador FRIED. Yes, sir?

Mr. TANNER. Are we pressing that case with the NATO allies who for some reason are not doing what others think they ought to do militarily?

It looks to me like that is a valid point to press on them. If you can't send a battalion of combat troops, you can send some civil engineers to build water, all of the infrastructure, the things that the PRTs are trying to do to build a civil society.

Ambassador FRIED. Well, we are doing two kinds of things. One is exactly that. We go to allies and say do what you can do and what you can support. The other thing we are doing, which is a bit below the radar, is supporting informal meetings of some of the key

contributors, particularly in the south where the challenge is the greatest.

On the margins of the Bucharest Summit there was a meeting of the RC South contributing nations, and they are working on civil/military strategies, counterinsurgent strategies and sharing information, so this slogan of a comprehensive approach at the top is being filtered down. Each time I see a set of papers it has more detail, more granularity, and that doesn't make for headlines, but it actually provides the basis for better results.

Mr. FATA. If I can just take a quick stab? On burden sharing, I echo what Dan said. Over the past few months you could say the positive benefit of the Canadians and Dutch saying their renewal mandate was dependent upon others helping them in the south actually forced others to come into the south.

We see a bunch of the smaller allies, but also France coming in, so there is actually almost a doubling of the partners that are going to be on the ground in the south, including ourselves. We are dramatically increasing or will increase the number of our forces in the south.

We also see with respect to burden sharing the Germans have agreed or agreed a while ago to provide in extremist support in the south. If conditions got bad, they would flex into the south to help. We have seen the Norwegians take on what is called a QRF, a quick reaction force, to be able to help allies out in the north if something goes bad, so people are getting out of their province.

There is greater burden sharing, but burden sharing will be limited as long as allies don't have the training in order to do the mission in the particular province they want to go to, they have the equipment, and as long as the mission isn't properly explained back home domestically people will wonder well, aren't we going to combat? Didn't we give up combat a long time ago? This is the education that you keep hearing at the NPA.

Next on caveats, we have seen an improvement. We have seen an improvement in the number of caveats that have come down, but again some of the same conditions apply. Not the right equipment. Not the right training. Domestic political concerns continue to keep caveats there.

What we have seen come down are a number of what are called declared caveats; a piece of paper that you can hold where it says this country can't do X, Y and Z. What is unknown to us is the number of what is called undeclared caveats when there is an incident in Location X. You need someone to go there. The commander picks up the phone and says hey, I need a platoon or a company. The forces say okay, we will get back to you in a couple hours.

That is what we don't know. We don't know the undeclared, and that is what we have been spending a lot of time working on is making sure those don't exist anymore. We think we have made progress. We can't quite tell. Training and equipment are a part of that.

There is a logic that if forces aren't trained or don't have the right equipment you actually don't want them going. It actually makes the mission worse. So the counter to that is the following: One, countries need to spend more on defense so they have the capabilities and the training to be broad spectrum.

Second, going on your point, if a country can't do that hard mission in the south, whatever it be—combat, SOF—but they have guys that can do missions maybe, and this has been Gates' point. Maybe you can go guard the Kandahar air field, free up some of those that are trained that are being underutilized at the Kandahar air field by one country, provide a platoon or a company to do the perimeter security, let those that are trained and are capable and do have the equipment be able to go into the south or wherever the mission needs.

Those are the kinds of efforts that we are engaged in the Pentagon trying to find okay, you say you can't do this, but we know you can do A, B and C. Can you consider doing A, B and C? It may be a PRT, may be perimeter security, may be hauling people around in helos that are underutilized. We are looking at ways to help increase burden sharing and make sure that everyone is truly part of the fight.

Mr. TANNER. I guess the other point here is the strictly civilian aspect of this to build a civil society, whether it be social workers, engineers to build water, sewer, all of the infrastructure, to actually create an atmosphere that will give some chance for success with respect to building a country there. Are we really pressing the nonhard mission allies to help out there?

Ambassador FRIED. Yes, and it was our concern about exactly the problem you outlined that prompted us to push hard for Kai Eide, the Norwegian diplomat, to head up the U.N. mission in Afghanistan with a mandate of bringing together the civilian support for the overall effort.

We saw a lot of different civilian agencies and organizations doing their best, but not being pulled together. We decided we needed somebody on the ground. The Afghans decided they wanted somebody on the ground to pull together the international civilian effort and be able to interface with NATO to do exactly what you said you need to be doing, which in fact is obvious, but it wasn't being done.

There was a long, tough search for the right person. Kai Eide has done missions like this in the past. He knows the Balkans very well. He is a tough-minded, very clear-headed, focused senior diplomat, commands a lot of respect, has a broad mandate and the confidence of the Afghan Government, and he is going to be trying to pull this together.

Mr. FATA. You need effort on the civilian side.

Ambassador FRIED. You need that.

Mr. TANNER. Thank you for allowing me so much time.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

Mr. Poe?

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here.

Ambassador, it is good to see you again. We are not going to talk about the United States policy on self-determination. I can assure you of that. We have covered that before.

It seems to me that based on what I have seen when I was at Landstuhl Air Base in Germany, the Ukrainians who had been wounded had been taken there, and about the only word that I

could communicate with them was the word NATO. They wanted to make sure that they support NATO. They wanted NATO.

Ambassador FRIED. Right.

Mr. POE. It seems like they are doing their job.

Just a couple of questions, and I want to pick up on the issue of involvement. Give me a percentage of the troops that are in Afghanistan that are American troops.

Mr. FATA. In Afghanistan?

Mr. POE. Afghanistan.

Ambassador FRIED. In Afghanistan it is less than half. There are 47,000 total troops in ISAF, of which 19,000 are Americans, then another 10,000 Americans in OEF, so even if you add the other 10,000 Americans the allied contribution is very significant.

Mr. POE. Okay. I understand the problem with getting other NATO allies to help. I just heard recently that the Belgian army is unionized, and they can't go into combat unless they vote to go into combat, and that is why they are not in combat in Afghanistan, but they are guarding an air base. I don't know if that is true or not, but I can see the massive problem of trying to get NATO to cooperate.

My real question is this and has to do with the European Union force and its development. Do you see that as a competition with NATO do you see France being kind of the big dog on the block in the European Union force indirectly or directly or politically undermining NATO? Give me some insight on those two issues.

Ambassador FRIED. Sure.

Mr. POE. NATO and the European Union force.

Ambassador FRIED. In my list of concerns, things that bother me at 2 o'clock in the morning, European military force is not on the short list. I don't worry too much about an excess of European military capacity.

Or, to put it another way, I don't think we have to regard a stronger EU—ESDP as it is called in EU—military component as detracting from NATO if we can avoid direct competition.

Now, this has been argued and worked on for well over a decade, but at the NATO summit President Sarkozy said that he wants France to start on a path of reintegrating into NATO. DeGaulle, as you know, in the 1960s pulls France out of the NATO integrated military command. President Sarkozy said look, I want to be a normal member of NATO, and I also want to combine that with a greater European Union force.

President Bush responded saying we think that a stronger European defense, if it is knit up the right way with NATO, is a good thing. We don't look at this as zero sum.

You mentioned the Belgium military. Well, the Dutch, other NATO allies—the Dutch, the Canadians, the British—are fighting hard in the south. The Poles threw in a combat battalion last year. They threw in 400 more combat troops without caveats for the east plus eight combat helicopters, loaning a couple of them to the Canadians, so there are allies that are putting in serious forces in harm's way doing the job in a serious way.

I don't mind an EU military if it isn't simply duplicating NATO structures and detracting from it, but if it gives the Europeans the political will to put more forces in the field and be able to field

more forces that can do the job I am a believer in selling protocol for substance.

After many years of working together, the Defense Department and State Department have started working with NATO and the EU to try to smooth this out, so we have forces that can do the job in the world that needs to be done.

Mr. FATA. I would just say, sir, Secretary Gates has been very forward leaning in his discussion with NATO allies on this topic. He has made clear.

The French introduced the topic. It was last October when we were at a NATO defense ministerial in the Netherlands where we had a meeting with the French minister and he raised this topic of where is the United States on the idea of the EU developing greater defense capabilities and the idea of the EU standing up what is called an operational cell or headquarters for EU operations.

The Secretary made it clear that we are not opposed to a stronger Europe. We all have to bear in mind there is one set of armed forces per country. You guys have small defense budgets. We have always said there should be no duplication. There shouldn't be different standards.

There is a growing range of challenges and threats that both organizations, the EU and NATO, have to be able to address. No one organization should just be seen as the military wing and one the other one should be civilian. There needs to be capabilities in both to be able to do these operations.

If we use those as a benchmark—no duplication, no double standards—then there is nothing to be threatened by a strong Europe as being in competition with a strong NATO.

He has proposed that the allies consider a joint planning cell. When the EU wants to undertake a mission that there be sort of planning elements in each headquarters, NATO and the EU headquarters, that can start thinking with us ahead of time and not only once NATO has passed on the operation does the EU get this. Let them sort of do preplanning so that there is a greater sense of which capabilities can be brought to bear in order to achieve the same effect.

Just a side note. I was in Brussels having dinner with my boss, the Undersecretary, back in January with all the key EU foreign policy folks. They made the point to us that in the EU when the EU meets they have never had at the defense minister level, and 21 of those 27 defense ministers are the same ones that go to the NATO defense meetings. When there are two sessions on Afghanistan each time, in the EU format they have never had a discussion on Afghanistan. Defense ministers have never talked about Afghanistan in the EU format.

It is just striking to us that here is this minister who represents both institutions and only has that discussion in one, so I think Gates has encouraged and gotten allied ministers to start thinking more creatively, breaking down the ideology and figuring out what needs to get done and how do we get it done with the capabilities we have.

Mr. POE. Thank you both very much.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

I think we have about 15 more minutes before there are votes. If that is okay with you gentlemen I would like to go back to Afghanistan, if I could, in terms of the comprehensive approach. We talked a little bit earlier about the effort with respect to Pakistan.

It would seem to me somewhat naive if NATO is going to have an extended operation in Afghanistan that there not be a comprehensive approach with respect to Iran as well in the context of what NATO achieves and whether or not what it achieves is sustainable.

My understanding is that—not initiated by the United States, but initiated by other nations—that there is a desire to facilitate a discussion about a comprehensive approach with Iran in the context of NATO's presence in Afghanistan. Can either one of you gentlemen speak to that issue?

Ambassador FRIED. Our problems with Iran go far beyond the nuclear issue and its attempt to develop nuclear weapons. This has been a particularly bad week in terms of Iran's actions. They are providing weapons to the insurgents being used to kill American diplomats.

When Secretary Rice was in Baghdad a few days ago in the international zone some of the weapons used to attack the international zone when she was there were Iranian supplied, so we are, to say the least, rather unhappy with Iran over this.

There were earlier more productive discussions with Iran about Afghanistan, and we have made clear that if we can break through Iran's denial and unhelpful attitude with respect to its nuclear weapons program that we will be able to have contact with Iran more generally. Secretary Rice has said that if Iran were suspending its enrichment and reprocessing programs she would meet anywhere, any time to discuss anything with her Iranian counterparts. She said that publicly.

But it is a real problem for us, and it is also for Iran to think about what its policy is going to be and whether it wants to continue a very unhelpful course of action. In the abstract, obviously a better relationship with an Iran that was behaving better would be in the American interest, but the principal obstacle to that is Iran's policy itself.

Now, there is much more to say about this, and there are people who follow it more closely than I do, but in my current acting capacity I have done some of that so I can share with you some of our thoughts and approaches.

Mr. FATA. No, sir. I don't have the sort of wisdom on this topic in order to add any value.

Mr. WEXLER. Okay. Thank you.

With respect to the missile defense posture now with Poland and the Czech Republic in the move forward that the summit provided, is there any agreement on who is going to pay for the missile defense program, or is there an assumption that the United States is paying for it entirely?

Ambassador FRIED. Well, the United States pays for its own national military programs. A number of NATO countries have their own missile defense programs, shorter range programs—Germans, Dutch, others. They pay for those programs. Then there are various

NATO programs which can integrate the various national programs.

There are always issues of what is common funded in NATO. We also want to work with Russia on missile defense programs, and our policy seeks to bring together NATO and United States and Russian missile defense programs in an integrated regional architecture which would improve everyone's security in our view.

NATO has undertaken some studies of how best to integrate its own missile defense programs and how best to protect all of its territories. This was one of the decisions at the NATO summit. I can't answer the question of who pays for what until I know what the "what" is.

Generally in NATO things aren't commonly funded. There are very few commonly funded programs. Nations generally pay for their own militaries. How this turns out in NATO I can't say yet, but this was a major step forward.

Remember 1 year and 2 months ago NATO was very divided on missile defense. This was seen as a wedge issue. The Russians had raised all kinds of problems. Putin had made a very sharp speech in Munich about missile defense. It looked like this was another nasty transatlantic dispute brewing.

Fast forward 14 months and you have NATO formally recognizing that ballistic missile proliferation is a problem, missile defense is a way to deal with the problem and endorsing both the U.S. system and the United States offers of cooperation with Russia, so that is progress. It is not there yet, but it is a real step forward.

Mr. WEXLER. Appreciating the progress as you just described, in the context of that progress is there any commitment by any other nation to pay for that system that you describe?

Ambassador FRIED. Which system?

Mr. WEXLER. The system that NATO enforced at the summit.

Ambassador FRIED. No commitment because it is not clear what that system will consist of, but no. I mean, the short, honest answer is no commitment to that. There are some NATO nations paying for their own missile defense national programs, and that is continuing.

Mr. FATA. Sir, on the question, there is not enough information for the allies to sign up to pay for anything yet.

That was actually the Bucharest deliverable, if you will, and that is between now and April 2009 NATO will develop options for what a missile defense architecture would look like, so not until that is completed in 2009, April 2009, will we know what national versus NATO assets can be plugged in.

On the question of Poland and the Czech Republic, the expectation is that the United States would pay for the lion's share of the construction of the facilities in both those countries.

Mr. WEXLER. What does that do for the flexibility of the next administration? Should they have a different view of either the Czech Republic or the Poland endeavor or the broader endeavor? What will they be locked into?

Ambassador FRIED. The next administration will obviously make its own decisions. I think that there are some in the Congress who

urge the administration to make missile defense more multilateral, more NATO compatible and to reach out to Russia.

We have done so after a lot of serious advice, including from some serious critics. I can't speak obviously for the next administration. In our view, there is a good strategic argument to be made for missile defense, having in mind the timeline of Iran's ballistic missile program and its nuclear weapons program as we see it and looking ahead 20 years to what other similar threats may arise.

Missile defense in the administration view is a limited program to deal with a limited challenge. It is not, to be perfectly blunt about it, anything like the missile defense program or ambitions in the Reagan administration when you had a much more primitive technology dealing with a much vaster threat.

You could argue that it didn't add up, technology and challenge. There was a gap between the availability technology and the challenge. Now the technology is 25 years in advance and the challenge is much, much smaller by orders of magnitude and that it does add up and that the strategic case is there, but I can speak only for this administration.

Mr. WEXLER. And my final question. Share with me the argument that I would make if I were to recite your position to my 78-year-old constituent in Boynton Beach, Florida, as to why the United States has a strategic imperative to create a missile defense system centered in Poland and the Czech Republic that we appear to be poised to pay for and Europeans have not yet decided to pay one euro for. What is the argument I would make to that young lady?

Ambassador FRIED. That I would not want to have no recourse to an Iranian nuclear missile, nuclear armed missile, other than preemption or retaliation. I want to have an alternative.

Or, to put it another way, Ahmadinejad with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles really worries me. The thought of that bothers me. I want the United States to have an option to protect its homeland and its allies from that contingency.

Mr. WEXLER. Respectfully, you probably haven't spent that much time in Boynton Beach, but if I were to give that answer—

Ambassador FRIED. That is true.

Mr. WEXLER [continuing]. My constituents would say, "But, Robert, if it is such a threat wouldn't they want to pay for it?"

Ambassador FRIED. In the history of NATO, the United States has often been in advance of its allies in looking over the horizon at emerging threats. Sometimes our assessments have been dismissed only to be recognized later as valid. There are lots of examples of this.

I might say to that constituent we see that threat, and if you think about Ahmadinejad you probably do too. Preemption has its downsides, rather serious ones. So does retaliation. When I think 25 years into the future a modest missile defense system can be deeply stabilizing. A massive missile defense system is probably unachievable technologically.

That is, if you are trying to defend against the Russian strategic arsenal you can't do it so don't try. Again, smaller threats. There is a strong strategic argument. I will make the case.

Mr. WEXLER. I am not going to beat a dead horse, but are you just the slightest bit concerned with the potential view of exceptional intellectual arrogance on behalf of the United States that our policy now is “not only do we better understand the threat to us, but we even better understand the threat to you and we must act to protect you even though you do not necessarily believe in the same threat”?

Ambassador FRIED. I would be bothered by that if we had not made such progress in NATO getting NATO leaders to recognize the threat.

In other words, had the issue remained parked where it was 14 months ago I might not be able to answer you, but at Bucharest NATO leaders endorsed language which recognizes the threat, endorses the American proposed missile defense system as a way to deal with it and tasks NATO with coming up with options so that progress suggests to me that we weren’t arrogant and wrong, but actually are winning the argument.

I think as Europeans, I have spent a lot of time discussing this with Europeans and the way the issue exploded in Europe in early 2007 wrong-footed us. We were at a disadvantage, and we worked the next year to catch up and had to make a lot of arguments, and I made a lot of them including in Europe with the European media.

Slowly, as Europeans began to get away from the notion of missile defense as the Star Wars of this decade and started thinking about Iran and North Korea and contingencies, I noticed—we all noticed—a sobering up and the argument is no longer the same.

So my answer to you is they actually have agreed with the premise of our argument, and they agreed so in a formal way at the summit and now we are working out the details.

Mr. FATA. Sir, may I just take a quick crack at that?

Mr. WEXLER. Of course.

Mr. FATA. So how would you explain it to a 78-year-old constituent that thinks money can be better spent back home or for other things? I guess I would boil it down to a few points.

First would be that this system protects the United States and it protects Europe, and there is recognition that there is a threat to both so therefore we will likely have to pay something.

Second point. We have seen over the decades that on the issues of great strategic concern Europe doesn’t work at lightning speed. It takes time for them to debate. If you look at the timeline of what we believe the threat is growing to be, by the time Europe gets through that debate the threat may have materialized, and then would be the wrong time to start constructing. You would be behind the power curve. You would then be subject to hijack, ransom, blackmail from the country that possesses the weapon, so that gets you to third.

Therefore, if we know it protects us, if we know it is going to take too long for the Europeans to debate it for something that could protect us then it gets to where Dan has gone. I am just going to use a little different term. The leadership. The United States has to pay, as it has paid in NATO before.

If we are able to see the value of the system, if we want to protect Americans, then sometimes it requires us to pay a little more

than our fair share in order to be able to provide the security for the American people.

Here is an example of something that maybe in the short term seems a little expensive, but in the long term the deterrent value and everything else provides a great investment for the security of the American people. That is how I would explain it to a constituent.

Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Tanner, the last word?

Mr. TANNER. I think this is an interesting discourse. If I may indulge the chair for a moment?

The NATO PA is going to Berlin in the latter part of May, and we will talk more about that then. I think you have helped with the uneasiness of some of our allies with regard to burden sharing, caveats, all the rest.

Would it be too much of an imposition, because after we go to Berlin we are going to Turkey. Would it be too much of an imposition to ask you to comment on the situation in Turkey? I know this is not the scope.

Mr. WEXLER. No. Please.

Mr. TANNER. I am frankly a little concerned about it. That is why we are going there.

Ambassador FRIED. There is now a somewhat new chapter in this in Turkey's internal political debate about its identity, about the role of religion in a secular constitutional republic, about democracy as it deepens in Turkey. This is an issue that Turkish institutions are grappling with right now.

I am referring of course to the judicial moves to challenge the AK party on grounds that it is unconstitutional, so there is a Turkish procedure that has to take place. Below that is a massive, intense debate within Turkish society and politics.

I don't know how that will turn out. I do know that Turkish democracy is far deeper than it was 20 years ago when you had many of the trappings of democracy, but it seemed thin. Now it is much deeper, a much freer press, a series of elections a long time since days of military rule, decades.

I am also happy to report that United States-Turkish bilateral relations have improved mightily over the past 6 months thanks to much increased cooperation against the PKK terrorist group. Undersecretary of Defense Adelman and I were in Ankara last October at a really very difficult point during a discussion of the Armenia resolution, which we thought might pass, during a period where the Turks were very unhappy with our cooperation on the PKK.

I can assure you that was just about the most painful meeting I have had with any foreign government ever in my career. When I saw the Turkish Undersecretary of State for Strategic Dialogue Talks last year we all laughed in relief at how much better things were.

I think you will find much greater satisfaction with relations with the United States, greater satisfaction about intelligence sharing over the PKK and, despite the internal ferment interest on the part of the Turks in talking about our shared agenda in the Middle East, in Central Asia, on energy, in the south caucuses, so I think

you will have a better time, although this internal political Turkish context will be on everyone's mind, sort of headlines every day.

Mr. FATA. I would just say, sir, that Secretary Fried hit it exactly right. On the mill to mill, the relationship has changed dramatically since the fall. The most notable event that we have had with the Turks was in January. At the end of January we had our high level defense talks here in Washington, and all around the tone and tenor from 6 months previous could not have been more different; very appreciative of all that we are doing to help them.

Sort of understand a corner has been turned. That still doesn't mean that there aren't some areas of concern or debate between us, but overall wholesale we are in a better place. Between the uniform folks and the civilian side we continue to maintain regular dialogue with the Turks.

You know, we can talk about this when we prebrief you for the code. There are still some issues with Turkey within the alliance in dealing with the Greeks, the Greek side and on NATO-EU cooperation and such, but overall I think a big corner has been turned.

Mr. WEXLER. If I may, Mr. Tanner's questions and your responses to me beg the following question.

If the assessment is that American-Turkish bilateral relations have had this extraordinary resurgence as a result of cooperation with respect to the PKK and other developments and it seems that that resurgence has created goodwill, ironically, with some opposite sides of the Turkish domestic debate, then what is the most constructive role, if any, that the United States can or should play with our newfound goodwill with many aspects of the Turkish political dynamic in helping a resolution to the domestic divide that does not in any way jeopardize the opportunities with respect to, say, Cyprus or some of the other still outstanding issues that could present positive opportunities in the next number of months?

Ambassador FRIED. We do need to be clear on the level of principle that we support Turkey's democracy and a resolution of this current internal dispute that is consistent with democracy and with Turkey's constitutional secular system.

Now, at a level of principle that is fine. To go further and suggest that we should take sides or become more actively involved is tougher. This is a white hot debate in Turkey. The Turks understand what the issues are. We have made clear that Turkish democracy is important to us. Secretary Rice made a major speech last week addressing these issues. I think you must have seen it. I can tell you, we spent a lot of time on exactly those questions.

How much do you say? How do we express our principles firmly, support for Turkish democracy, and how much detail do we get into? That is a tough one. At the same time we have to do as you said, sir, which is use the improved relations with Turkey to try to make progress on issues across the board like Cyprus where there is a new opportunity thanks to the new Cypriot President who seems to be interested in accelerating efforts toward a solution.

We want to encourage the Turks to reach out to the new Armenian Government, as indeed they seem to be doing. We want to encourage Turkish creative thinking on how to get around this block-

ade of NATO and the EU, which is related to the Cyprus problem, so that the two institutions can work together.

So we have a very active agenda with the Turks, and it is true that the better atmosphere is helping us deal with these issues. It doesn't mean that Cyprus is suddenly much easier to solve. It means that we are not burdened by all of these other problems.

Mr. TANNER. I appreciate what you said about the improvement from last fall. Last fall it was the impression that we got from talking to people that the movement, the fundamentalism in Turkey, was going the wrong way.

This resurgence of good relations, do you think that is still moving, or has it stagnated somewhat, or is it I guess hard to judge?

Ambassador FRIED. Well, there is a debate going on in Turkey and a debate among observers of Turkey in the United States as to the issue of religion in Turkish public life. Some private observers think that Islam is resurgent as a political force. Others say no. What is happening is that a kind of rigid secularism is being replaced by a more democratic society in which religion plays a greater part. There is a debate in Turkey, and I am not going to give a final answer because this is something that the Turks are working out now.

It is interesting that the AK Party, which overwhelmingly won the last elections, has been a champion of Turkey's entry into the European Union. Its leaders talk about the need to deepen Turkey's reforms both to improve its chance, improve its speed of accession into the European Union and also to put this debate about religion in public life into a different context.

So this is a fascinating issue. I don't have final answers, but it is unquestionably the case the Turkish democracy has deepened. This issue about religion is going to be debated in Turkey heatedly for some time to come.

Mr. WEXLER. Two hours on the intricacies of NATO I think are enough for anyone except the most studious among us.

Gentlemen, thank you very, very much for your frank and thoughtful discussion, and thank you for giving us your time.

Ambassador FRIED. Thank you for having us, sir.

[Whereupon, at 3 o'clock p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

