

THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE
STRATEGIC COMPETITION BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

DEEPSEEK UNMASKED:

EXPOSING THE CCP'S LATEST TOOL
FOR SPYING, STEALING, AND
SUBVERTING U.S. EXPORT CONTROL
RESTRICTIONS



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“Some in the industry have claimed that the U.S. holds an 18-month AI lead, but that obfuscates reality—it’s closer to three months.”

– U.S. AI Executive

DeepSeek represents a profound threat to our nation’s security. Although it presents itself as just another AI chatbot, offering users a way to generate text and answer questions, closer inspection reveals that the app siphons data back to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), creates security vulnerabilities for its users, and relies on a model that covertly censors and manipulates information pursuant to Chinese law. Equally troubling, the model appears to have been built using stolen U.S. technology on the back of U.S. semiconductor chips that are prohibited from sale to China without an export license and when it was released, PRC-affiliated social media accounts amplified and celebrated the model, according to Graphika research. This report documents some of the risks DeepSeek poses and explains how its development is based on common Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tactics designed to unlawfully undermine U.S. technological leadership and critical American policies to protect national security.

The Committee’s investigation found:

1. **DeepSeek funnels Americans’ data to the PRC** through backend infrastructure connected to a U.S. government-designated **Chinese military company**.
2. **DeepSeek covertly manipulates the results it presents to align with CCP propaganda**, as required by Chinese law.
3. **It is highly likely that DeepSeek used unlawful model distillation techniques** to create its model, stealing from leading U.S. AI models.
4. **DeepSeek’s AI model appears to be powered by advanced chips** provided by American semiconductor giant Nvidia and reportedly utilizes tens of thousands of chips that are currently restricted from export to the PRC.

The Committee therefore makes the following recommendations:

1. **Take swift action to expand export controls**, improve export control enforcement, and address risks from PRC AI models.
2. **Prevent and prepare for strategic surprise** related to advanced AI.

DEEPSEEK'S OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE

DeepSeek operates within a sophisticated ownership structure where founder Liang Wenfeng maintains effective control despite formal separation.¹ While officially owned 99% by Ningbo Cheng'en Enterprise Management Consulting Partnership (LP) (Ningbo Cheng'en), Deepseek is controlled by Liang through his majority stake in Ningbo Chen'en and other affiliated companies.² DeepSeek's close ties to High-Flyer Quant, also founded by Liang, are evidenced by substantial initial funding (\$420 million) and shared access to the powerful Firefly supercomputing infrastructure with 10,000 A100 GPUs.³ These ties are shown in Appendix A.

Beyond this corporate arrangement, DeepSeek's connections to PRC state interests are significant. The company operates within the state-subsidized "Hangzhou Chengxi Science and Technology Innovation Corridor," a government initiative explicitly guided by "Xi Jinping Thought," the guiding ideology of the CCP, that aims to create China's answer to Silicon Valley.⁴ Liang studied under Xiang Zhiyu, whose research includes military applications like drone swarms and battlefield systems.⁵

Through legally distinct entities, DeepSeek and High-Flyer Quant function as an integrated ecosystem under Liang's control, with ties to state-linked hardware distributors and the strategic Zhejiang Lab—described by China's Ministry of Science and Technology as the "core soul" of building "national strategic scientific and technological capabilities."⁶ These connections, along with evidence of data transmission to Chinese servers and censorship of politically sensitive topics, have prompted multiple countries to impose restrictions on the app over security concerns.⁷

KEY FINDINGS

1. Spying: DeepSeek App Funnels Americans' Data to China

DeepSeek collects detailed user data, which it transmits via backend infrastructure that is connected to China Mobile,⁸ a U.S. government-designated Chinese Military Company.⁹

DeepSeek acquires extensive personal data on the Americans who use the chatbot, including chat history, device details, and even the way a person types.¹⁰ It then, by its own admission, funnels the data directly back to China, creating a pipeline of problematic foreign data access.¹¹ ^a

Where We Store Your Information

The personal information we collect from you may be stored on a server located outside of the country where you live. We store the information we collect in secure servers located in the People's Republic of China.

Where we transfer any personal information out of the country where you live, including for one or more of the purposes as set out in this Policy, we will do so in accordance with the requirements of applicable data protection laws.

Privacy Policy, DEEPSEEK

All data uploaded to servers in the PRC is subject to the country's sweeping cybersecurity and intelligence laws, which compel companies to share data with state authorities.¹²

DeepSeek also integrates tracking tools from Chinese tech giants, including ByteDance, Baidu, and Tencent, some of which have been red-flagged by the U.S. Government for serious national security concerns.¹³ This entangles DeepSeek's data harvesting architecture with PRC companies known for their roles in surveillance and CCP control, heightening the risk that foreign adversary entities could gain access to Americans' private information. ByteDance has been caught tracking journalists and deemed a foreign adversary-controlled entity after a multi-year investigatory effort by multiple branches of government;¹⁴ Baidu has played a central role in the PRC's censorship regime;¹⁵ and Tencent has been deemed a Chinese military company by the Department of Defense.¹⁶ Together, these firms constitute a well-documented apparatus of surveillance, censorship, and data exploitation—which DeepSeek reinforces.

Moreover, cybersecurity researchers at Feroot Security uncovered hardcoded links in DeepSeek's web login page that directly connect it to China Mobile,¹⁷ a state-owned telecommunications company also designated as a Chinese military

^a DeepSeek's Privacy Policy is available at available at www.web.archive.org/web/20250306100653/https://cdn.deepseek.com/policies/en-US/deepseek-privacy-policy.html.

company by the U.S. Department of Defense, as mentioned.¹⁸ China Mobile is explicitly tasked by the CCP with supporting China’s broader information control and intelligence objectives.¹⁹ While the extent of data transmission remains unconfirmed, DeepSeek’s integration with China Mobile infrastructure raises serious concerns about potential foreign access to Americans’ private information.

China Mobile’s threat to Americans’ privacy and national security has been clear for years. In 2019, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) banned China Mobile from operating in the United States, warning that “unauthorized access to customer...data could create irreparable damage to U.S. national security.”²⁰ It was subsequently delisted from the New York Stock Exchange in 2021 and officially designated a national security threat in 2022.²¹ By relying on China Mobile’s infrastructure, DeepSeek ensures that Americans’ data is stored and transmitted through networks controlled by the Chinese government.


Making matters worse, researchers have found that DeepSeek does little to protect the information it collects. Unlike most platforms that encrypt sensitive transmissions, DeepSeek sends much of its data without meaningful security measures, exposing it to interception before it even reaches the PRC.²² That practice not only increases the risk of foreign exploitation but also raises questions about why such an application would be designed this way in the first place.

For these reasons, it is evident that the DeepSeek website and app acts as a direct channel for foreign intelligence gathering on Americans’ private data. With its direct ties to China’s security and surveillance infrastructure and its unchecked data collection practices, it can function as an open-source intelligence asset feeding American user data into an adversarial system.

2. DeepSeek Manipulates Information Pursuant to Chinese Law

It has been reported that the DeepSeek chatbot alters or suppresses responses to topics deemed politically sensitive by the CCP in 85% of cases, directly aligning outputs with Beijing’s censorship directives.²³ This is not an accident—it is a calculated effort to expand the PRC’s control over global information. Moreover, it does this without any disclosure to users regarding how specific outputs have been altered pursuant to PRC law. Unlike American AI companies, which impose safeguards to limit genuinely harmful content, DeepSeek functions as a digital enforcer of the CCP, suppressing discussions on topics such as democracy, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and PRC human rights abuses.²⁴ The model’s responses do not just echo Beijing’s messaging—they actively erase dissent, ensuring that only Party-approved narratives reach users.

Compare Deepseek’s responses to those from American AI models like ChatGPT and Claude. In side-by-side tests, DeepSeek either refuses to answer or regurgitates CCP talking points, while American models provide more balanced and critical perspectives.



Zeyi Yang, Here's How DeepSeek Censorship Actually Works—and How to Get Around it, WIRED (Jan. 31, 2025).

Deepseek’s censorship operates on two levels: automated filtering erases responses before they even appear, while built-in biases systematically distort the AI’s overall behavior.²⁵ The platform is designed to ensure the AI aligns with the CCP’s ideological and political objectives. PRC laws mandate that AI-generated content must reflect “core socialist values,” support “correct political direction,” and avoid material that could “incite subversion of state power.”²⁶

Beijing also actively shapes how AI systems interpret, generate, and distribute information. Chinese regulations require firms to ensure algorithm “controllability” to give the PRC government direct influence over AI decision-making and allow authorities to modify AI behavior as needed.²⁷ DeepSeek’s structure makes it inherently vulnerable to state manipulation, and without transparency into the extent of control exercised, its outputs must be assumed to serve Beijing’s strategic interests. Unlike AI models in open societies, DeepSeek

exists in an ecosystem where compliance with state ideology is a prerequisite for survival. The result is an AI chatbot that cannot be trusted to provide an unbiased or unfiltered perspective, making it fundamentally compromised from its inception. To be clear, congressional efforts to date have focused on the data and security vulnerabilities associated with this app. However, it is important for the American people to also be aware of other challenges posed by the emergence of DeepSeek, such as its operator's mandated compliance with PRC laws regarding covert information manipulation.

The danger is clear: millions of Americans are now using an AI system designed to serve the CCP.²⁸ Beijing is not just censoring the internet at home. It is embedding its Great Firewall into platforms Americans use every day.

3. DeepSeek's Potential Unauthorized Distillation of U.S. AI Models

In the leadup to the release of its R1 model, there were allegations that DeepSeek engaged in a practice called "model distillation," which involves the systematic extraction and replication of the reasoning capabilities of existing AI models to expedite their own development at reduced costs. The Select Committee—following meetings with a number of U.S. industry leaders—has determined that it is highly likely that DeepSeek used model distillation techniques to create an imitation AI model, copying leading U.S. AI models' capabilities and violating U.S. companies' terms of service.

Specifically, DeepSeek personnel infiltrated U.S. AI models and fraudulently evaded protective measures under aliases and purchased dozens of accounts using a sophisticated network of international banking channels. This allowed DeepSeek personnel to mask their identities, conceal their transactions, and avoid detection.

U.S. industry leaders told the Select Committee that they had "high confidence" that this has occurred. In one case, OpenAI wrote to the Select Committee that:

Through our review, we found that DeepSeek employees circumvented guardrails in OpenAI's models to extract reasoning outputs, which can be used in a technique known as 'distillation' to accelerate the development of advanced model reasoning capabilities at a lower cost. Observations of DeepSeek's R1 model also indicate instances of reasoning structures and phrase patterns that align with the behavior of OpenAI's models. Additionally, we found that DeepSeek employees used OpenAI models to grade model responses and filter and transform training data, which are key steps in the AI development process. DeepSeek likely also used leading open-source AI models to create high-quality synthetic data.²⁹

Indeed, under Section 2—Usage Requirements—of OpenAI’s Terms of Use, the company expressly prohibits the use of its service to develop or improve competing modules. It states:

(f) You may not (i) use output from the Services to develop models that compete with OpenAI; (ii) use automated or programmatic methods to extract data from the Services; or (iii) use the Services to discover information about the models underlying the Services.³⁰

OpenAI told the Select Committee that the first company to deploy a model replicating OpenAI’s o-series reasoning models was not a U.S. lab—it was DeepSeek.

4. DeepSeek’s Use of Export Controlled Nvidia Chips to Power its Model

DeepSeek’s AI model appears to be powered by advanced chips provided by American semiconductor giant Nvidia and reportedly utilizes tens of thousands of chips that are currently restricted from export to the PRC. Analytics firm SemiAnalysis has estimated that DeepSeek has at least 60,000 Nvidia chips, with orders for thousands more Nvidia H20 chips.³¹ The company estimates that DeepSeek is likely to have current access to the following Nvidia chips:³²

- A100: 10,000
- H20: 30,000
- H800: 10,000
- H100: 10,000


Nvidia designed and manufactured many of these chips to create the most sophisticated possible chip while skirting U.S. export controls. This has allowed these chips to be exported to China as the U.S. government develops stricter restrictions.³³ Since March 2024, it is estimated that Nvidia has produced over 1 million chips for the Chinese market.³⁴

Setting aside the troubling practice of American companies deliberately and knowingly supplying the most advanced chips permissible under the U.S. export control regime to a foreign adversary, there is growing evidence of a coordinated effort by DeepSeek and other Chinese companies to violate U.S. law by illicitly importing banned chips into the PRC.

In 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security announced sweeping export controls on advanced computing chips, looking to curb China’s access to the cutting-edge semiconductors crucial for artificial intelligence and military applications.³⁵ Anticipating these new restrictions, Nvidia’s Chief Executive Officer, Jensen Huang, directed the company’s Head of Engineering for Graphics Processing to design a chip that would allow Nvidia to avoid the export control ban.³⁶ Within a month of the export control

announcement, Nvidia had successfully developed a modified chip that, according to analysts, was nearly as powerful as its top-tier processors at the time—undermining the intent of U.S. policy.³⁷

Another avenue in which DeepSeek and other Chinese firms gain access to highly sensitive chips is through intermediary countries that do not face the same export control restrictions as the PRC. These intermediary nations can serve as transshipment points, where companies can illegally purchase restricted chips before rerouting them to their final destinations.



Data compiled from Nvidia quarterly filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The chart above shows Nvidia’s quarterly revenue breakdown from China and Singapore as a percentage of total sales. In January 2022, China accounted for 25% of Nvidia’s total shares, and Singapore less than 5%.³⁸ Following the imposition of U.S. export controls on certain Nvidia chips, this trend flips. Although Nvidia’s financial filings indicate that Singapore is the destination for a significant portion of its sales, the actual shipments of chips to the country contribute less than 2% of Nvidia’s total revenue.³⁹ This raises questions as to whether PRC customers are arranging for the diversion of sensitive chips that are reportedly sold through Singapore.

Following DeepSeek’s release, Singaporean authorities charged three individuals—including one Chinese national—in connection with the illegal export of advanced Nvidia chips to DeepSeek in China in violation of U.S. export controls.⁴⁰ Reports indicate that Singaporean law enforcement raided 22 locations and arrested at least nine individuals involved in the illicit network.⁴¹ These arrests

occurred immediately after Chairman Moolenaar and Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi sent a bipartisan letter in January highlighting, among other matters, the threat of chip smuggling via Singapore.

The Wall Street Journal further reported that “Chinese buyers are circumventing U.S. export controls to order Nvidia’s latest artificial-intelligence chips.”⁴² This aligns with growing concerns that Chinese companies, often with state backing, are systematically working to evade U.S. restrictions and continue acquiring advanced semiconductor technology. The U.S. Department of Commerce is currently investigating whether DeepSeek illegally imported export-controlled Nvidia chips from Singapore.⁴³

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation I: Take swift action to expand export controls, improve export control enforcement, and address risks from PRC artificial intelligence models.

1. Increase the effectiveness of U.S. export control policy by providing increased funding to the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to expand export control analysis, techniques, and enforcement. BIS’s budget, and therefore its personnel and analytic capabilities, have not kept pace with the increase in export control requirements.

2. Further restrict the PRC’s capability to develop and deploy advanced AI models that threaten our national security by:

a. Maintaining existing export controls and expanding such controls to include additional chips that perform well in inference or training (e.g. the Nvidia H20);

b. Maintaining and expanding exports controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment that can be used to produce such chips, including through enhanced cooperation with Japanese and Dutch authorities.

3. Impose remote access controls on all data center, compute clusters, and models trained with the use of US-origin GPUs and other U.S.-origin data center accelerants, including but not limited to TPUs.

4. Improve the ability of U.S. export controls to keep pace with technology developments by directing BIS to create additional definitions beyond computational operations, such as descriptions of the capability (e.g. “capable of assisting in the creation of weapons”), that can be used to describe AI models with national security significance.

5. Improve enforcement of export controls by creating incentives for industry insiders and external parties to report export control violations. Congress should establish a whistleblower incentive program. Individuals who report

export control violations could receive whistleblower protections, as well as some monetary value of any sanctions that result from their report.

6. Consider requiring chipmakers and semiconductor manufacturing equipment firms to track end-users of appropriate chips and equipment, including by filing reports with BIS regarding end-users of designated products and equipment, including servicing support contracts.

7. Prevent export control circumvention and chip smuggling by scrutinizing chip exports to jurisdictions with a high risk of diversion to the PRC, such as Singapore, including by establishing bilateral and multilateral law enforcement partnerships and increasing prosecutions.

8. Improve enforcement of export controls by directing BIS to require companies to install on-chip location verification capabilities in order to receive an export license for chips restricted from export to any country with a high risk of diversion to the PRC.

9. Ensure the secure and safe use of AI systems by directing a federal agency (e.g., NIST and AISI, CISA, NSA) to develop physical and cybersecurity standards and benchmarks for frontier AI developers to protect against model distillation, exfiltration, and other risks.

10. Address national security risks and the PRC's strategy to capture AI market share with low-cost, open-source models by placing a federal procurement prohibition on PRC-origin AI models, including a prohibition on the use of such models on government devices.

Recommendation II: Prevent and prepare for strategic surprise related to advanced AI.

1. The emergence of DeepSeek is a warning to U.S. policy makers that the PRC remains capable of rapidly innovating in today's most advanced technologies despite U.S. efforts to stop them. As AI continues to advance in capability, U.S. departments and agencies must improve their piecemeal approach to prevent strategic surprises that may prove destabilizing. AI will affect many aspects of government functioning, including aspects relating to defense and national security. Effective interagency coordination is required across relevant departments and agencies to promote AI innovation and adoption, monitor adversarial progress in AI, prepare for the use of AI capabilities by adversaries, examine how the U.S. can leverage AI defensively, coordinate with U.S. commercial AI companies on developing standardized benchmarks and evaluate frontier AI models for safety and security, and perform other relevant tasks.

2. The potential for AI strategic surprise is most acute in the national security space. An AI weaponized and deployed by a U.S. adversary may prove to be a

decisive advantage before a conflict starts. Therefore, we recommend that the national security agencies:

a. Monitor, through the Commerce Department and other appropriate departments and agencies, PRC AI progress toward highly advanced AI systems (such as artificial general intelligence). This work could involve identifying entities, researchers, data centers, energy projects, and chip smuggling networks that are most critical to PRC progress toward highly advanced AI.

b. Incorporate AI as a factor into operational planning activities, such as educational gaming, that focuses on US-PRC competition in order to prepare for and anticipate the use of advanced AI by both U.S. and adversaries within and to deter a future conflict.

c. Elevate the weight of national security considerations within interagency export control deliberations by changing the DoD's Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) director from a career SES position to a Senate-confirmed position equivalent to an Under Secretary of Defense, while maintaining its field component status.

d. Identify plausible national security challenges that could emerge relating to US-PRC AI competition toward advanced AI systems (such as artificial general intelligence) and prepare contingency plans for how to address such challenges.

¹ Documents on file with the Select Committee (Chinese Corporate Filings).

² *Id.*

³ Wei An et al., Fire-Flyer AI-HPC: A Cost-Effective Software-Hardware Co-Design for Deep Learning, Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (Aug. 31, 2024), *available at* <https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.14158>; Li Yu [李域], *Quantitative Trading Giant Ubiquant Disrupts AI Large Model Space: Initial Self-Funded Investment of 3 Billion Yuan* [量化巨头幻方搅局AI大模型: 首期投入自有资金30亿元], 21st Century Business Herald [21世纪经济报道] (July 19, 2024), *available at* <https://web.archive.org/web/20250211030105/https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/1263664.html>; *DeepSeek's Computing Power Comes from Firefly, Firefly Factory Comes from CEC Galaxy* [deepseek算力来自萤火, 萤火工场来自中电港], Xueqiu Exclusive Group [雪球专属交流群] (Feb. 4, 2025), *available at* <https://web.archive.org/web/20250211035651/https://xueqiu.com/1036906315/322218322>.

⁴ Hangzhou Municipal Bureau of Economy and Informatization and Hangzhou Municipal Development and Reform Commission Notice on Issuing the "14th Five-Year Plan" for the Development of Hangzhou's Artificial Intelligence Industry, Municipal Bureau of Economy and Informatization (Dec. 23, 2021), *available at* www.web.archive.org/web/20250215000404/https://jxj.hangzhou.gov.cn/art/2021/12/23/art_122923409

6_3983023.html; John Garrick, *Understanding Xi Jinping Thought: the clear and present implications for democratic nations*, AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE (June 3, 2024).

⁵ Matthew Gabriel and Cazel Brazil, *DeepSeek's Background Raises Multiple Concerns*, Jamestown Foundation (Feb. 14, 2025), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/deepseeks-background-raises-multiple-concerns/>.

⁶ Matthew Johnson, *Predicting the Next 'DeepSeek Event': Early Indicators of Capability Within the PRC's AI Ecosystem*, Jamestown Foundation (Feb. 11, 2025), available at <https://jamestown.org/program/predicting-the-next-deepseek-event-early-indicators-of-capability-within-the-prcs-ai-ecosystem/>.

⁷ Kyle Wiggers, *DeepSeek: The countries and agencies that have banned the AI company's tech*, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 3, 2025) available at www.techcrunch.com/2025/02/03/deepseek-the-countries-and-agencies-that-have-banned-the-ai-companys-tech/.

⁸ Aaron Katersky et al., *Deepseek coding has the capability to transfer users' data directly to the Chinese government*, ABC (Feb. 5, 2025), available at <https://abcnews.go.com/US/Deepseek-coding-capability-transfer-users-data-directly-chinese/story?id=118465451>; Byron Tau, *Researchers link Deepseek's blockbuster chatbot to Chinese telecom banned from doing business in US*, AP (Feb. 5, 2025), available at <https://apnews.com/article/Deepseek-china-generative-ai-internet-security-concerns-c52562f8c4760a81c4f76bc5fbdebad0>; *Deepseek Privacy Policy*, Deepseek (Dec. 5, 2024), available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20250210192628/https://chat.Deepseek.com/downloads/Deepseek%20Privacy%20Policy.html>.

⁹ U.S. Dep't of Def., *Entities Identified as Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States in Accordance With Section 1260H of the William M. ("Mac") Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021* (Jan. 7, 2025), available at <https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jan/07/2003625471/-1/-1/1/ENTITIES-IDENTIFIED-AS-CHINESE-MILITARY-COMPANIES-OPERATING-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES.PDF>.

¹⁰ Andrew Hoog, *NowSecure Uncovers Multiple Security and Privacy Flaws in Deepseek iOS Mobile App*, NowSecure (Feb. 6, 2025), available at <https://www.nowsecure.com/blog/2025/02/06/nowsecure-uncovers-multiple-security-and-privacy-flaws-in-Deepseek-ios-mobile-app/>.

¹¹ Paul Kassianik and Amin Karbasi, *Evaluating Security Risk in Deepseek and Other Frontier Reasoning Models*, Cisco (Jan. 31, 2025), available at <https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evaluating-security-risk-in-Deepseek-and-other-frontier-reasoning-models>; *Privacy Policy*, Deepseek, available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20250306100653/https://cdn.deepseek.com/policies/en-US/deepseek-privacy-policy.html>.

¹² *Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国网络安全法]*, Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017 (China), available at https://www.cac.gov.cn/2016-11/07/c_1119867116.htm; *Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国个人信息保护法]*, Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 20, 2021, effective Nov. 1, 2021 (China), available at https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-08/20/content_5632486.htm; *Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国数据安全法]*, Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 10, 2021, effective Sept. 1, 2021 (China), https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-06/11/content_5616919.htm; *National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国国家情报法]*, Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 27, 2017, amended Apr. 27, 2018 (China), https://www.gd.gov.cn/zwggk/wjk/zcfgk/content/post_2520676.html.

¹³ ByteDance is listed as a foreign adversary-controlled application under U.S. law. See *Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act*, Pub. L. No. 118-50, § 1, 138 Stat. 500 (2024). Tencent is designated as a Chinese military company by the U.S. Department of Defense. See

U.S. Dep’t of Def., Entities Identified as Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States in Accordance With Section 1260H of the William M. (“Mac”) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Jan. 7, 2025), available at <https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jan/07/2003625471/-1/-1/1/ENTITIES-IDENTIFIED-AS-CHINESE-MILITARY-COMPANIES-OPERATING-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES.PDF>.

¹⁴ Emily Baker-White, Months before the U.S. government demanded ByteDance divest from TikTok, the Department Of Justice’s Criminal Division subpoenaed the app’s Chinese parent company, according to a source, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2023) available at www.forbes.com/sites/emilybaker-white/2023/03/16/fbi-doj-investigating-bytedance-tiktok-surveillance-journalists/.

¹⁵ Jeffrey Knockel, Ken Kato, and Emile Dirks, *Missing Links: A comparison of search censorship in China*, CITIZEN LAB (Apr. 26, 2023) available at www.citizenlab.ca/2023/04/a-comparison-of-search-censorship-in-china/.

¹⁶ *U.S. Defense Department says Tencent and other Chinese companies have ties to China’s military*, AP (Jan. 7, 2025), available at <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tencent-ban-catl-stock-us-department-of-defense/>

¹⁷ Byron Tau, *Researchers link DeepSeek’s blockbuster chatbot to Chinese telecom banned from doing business in US*, AP NEWS (Feb. 5, 2025) available at www.apnews.com/article/deepseek-china-generative-ai-internet-security-concerns-c52562f8c4760a81c4f76bc5fbdebad0.

¹⁸ U.S. Dep’t of Def., Entities Identified as Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States in Accordance With Section 1260H of the William M. (“Mac”) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Jan. 7, 2025), available at <https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jan/07/2003625471/-1/-1/1/ENTITIES-IDENTIFIED-AS-CHINESE-MILITARY-COMPANIES-OPERATING-IN-THE-UNITED-STATES.PDF>.

¹⁹ Andy Greenberg, *China’s Surveillance State Is Selling Citizen Data as a Side Hustle*, WIRED (Nov. 21, 2024) available at www.wired.com/story/chineses-surveillance-state-is-selling-citizens-data-as-a-side-hustle/.

²⁰ Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, *FCC Denies China Mobile USA Application To Provide Telecommunications Services* (May 9, 2019) available at <https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-denies-china-mobile-telecom-services-application>.

²¹ Paul Mozar, *New York to Delist Chinese Telecom Firms in Symbolic Shift*, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 1, 2021) available at www.nytimes.com/2021/01/01/business/nyse-delist-china-mobile.html; Fed. Comm’ns Comm’n, List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act (Sep. 3, 2024), available at www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist.

²² Chris Smith, *Deepseek mobile apps send your sensitive data to China with no encryption*, BGR (Feb. 7, 2025) available at <https://bgr.com/tech/Deepseek-mobile-apps-send-your-sensitive-data-to-china-with-no-encryption/>.

²³ 1,156 Questions Censored by Deepseek, PROMPTFOO (Jan. 28, 2025), accessed at <https://web.archive.org/web/20250310162848/https://www.promptfoo.dev/blog/Deepseek-censorship/>.

²⁴ *Safety settings*, GOOGLE, available at <https://ai.google.dev/gemini-api/docs/safety-settings>; Moderation, OPENAI, available at <https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/moderation>.

²⁵ Zeyi Yang, *Here’s How Deepseek Censorship Actually Works—and How to Get Around It*, WIRED (Jan. 31, 2025), accessed at www.wired.com/story/Deepseek-censorship/.

²⁶ *Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services [生成式人工智能服务管理暂行办法]*, Cyberspace Administration of China [国家互联网信息办公室] (July 13, 2023),

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²⁷ Notice on Issuing the 'Measures for Ethical Review of Science and Technology (Trial)' [关于印发《科技伦理审查办法(试行)》的通知], Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China [中华人民共和国科学技术部] (Sept. 7, 2023), available at

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²⁹ Document on file with the Select Committee (emphasis added).

³⁰ *Terms of Use*, OPENAI (Dec. 11, 2024).

³¹ Dylan Patel, DeepSeek Debates: Chinese Leadership on Cost, True Training Cost, Closed Model Margin Impacts, SEMIANALYSIS (Jan. 31, 2025).

³² *Id.*

³³ Matt Hamblen, Raimondo calls out Nvidia, others that sell AI chips to China, FIERCE ELECTRONICS (Dec. 4, 2023).

³⁴ Dylan Patel, DeepSeek Debates: Chinese Leadership on Cost, True Training Cost, Closed Model Margin Impacts, SemiAnalysis (Jan. 31, 2025).

³⁵ Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification, Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce (Oct. 13, 2022).

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³⁷ *Id.*

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Appendix A

DeepSeek and affiliate corporate organization, based on Chinese corporate record sources on file with the Select Committee.

