

TRAINING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

The U.S. Army Adapts to the Post-Cold War World

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UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE



CONTENTS

	Foreword	v
	Key Points	vii
1	Introduction	1
2	Defining the Challenge	5
3	The Response	16
4	Conclusion	27
	Notes	30
	About the Authors	35
	About the Institute	37

FOREWORD

When the United States Institute of Peace announced a joint fellowship program with the U.S. Army War College, some observers unfamiliar with the Institute's work noted an apparent irony: Why should an organization devoted to the peaceful resolution of international conflict work with an institution whose main job is fighting wars? This publication, the first product of the Institute-Army collaboration, demonstrates that there is no irony at all in the relationship.

Colonel John Michael Hardesty arrived at the Institute in August 1995 to serve as the first Army War College fellow assigned to the Institute's Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace. He came to the Institute having served with distinction in several peace operations conducted by the Army's Tenth Mountain Division.

Soon after Col. Hardesty began his fellowship year, it became quite evident that his experiences in peace operations had great relevance to the projects of other Institute fellows, particularly those examining the implementation phase of peace settlements. While much research has been done on the causes and sources of conflict, less attention has been devoted to the often crucial postconflict issues that can determine whether a treaty or peace agreement can produce genuine peace or become the framework for renewed conflict. Our fellows soon came to realize that Col. Hardesty

could help supply the keys to understanding this part of a conflict's life cycle—the “nuts and bolts” of ensuring that the parties to a conflict do not lapse back into mutually destructive behavior.

As explained by Col. Hardesty and Jason Ellis, a doctoral candidate at American University who collaborated on this project, the soldier's task as peacekeeper is, in many ways, much tougher than carrying out a combat operation. The objective of the soldier on the battlefield is the swift defeat of the enemy. A peacekeeper confronts many time-consuming and delicate tasks, all of which require careful, nuanced judgment—from separating hostile forces to assisting in the reconstruction a war-ravaged society.

Col. Hardesty's military specialty is the management of human resources, an amalgam of responsibilities that are crucial to making an army unit run efficiently. The most important part of his job, though, is training—making sure the soldiers in his unit have been adequately prepared and equipped to carry out their missions.

As is the case with combat operations, the military relies heavily on training to carry out entirely new peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era—missions that are helping to redefine the role of this country's armed services as we approach the twenty-first century. As this study shows, the U.S. Army has made remarkable strides in a relatively short time in updating its training for the peace operations that have become a major responsibility of our military in recent years.

Training professionals for a new set of conflict management challenges is also an integral part of the Institute's mission. Our Education and Training Program has conducted numerous International Conflict Resolution Skills Training (ICREST) sessions, most recently in Kenya for the U.S. Agency for International Development staff stationed in the Horn of Africa, and in Greece for diplomatic practitioners from southeastern Europe. Other ICREST training sessions have been conducted for nongovernmental organization leaders and military personnel. Indeed, it was a series of joint programs with the Army War College that led to the creation of the Institute's Army fellowship—an ongoing collaboration that will continue to benefit both organizations.

RICHARD H. SOLOMON
PRESIDENT

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KEY POINTS

- Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. military strategy had to go through some rather dramatic changes. Shifting from a decades-long training strategy of developing and refining a joint, combined-arms approach to war-fighting designed to defeat Cold War opponents, the nation's armed forces must now also train their personnel for "operations other than war," including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian-relief operations.
- This paper examines the relevance of the U.S. Army's training strategy for these new types of operations through an analysis of the institutional changes resulting from lessons it learned in successive peace operations, starting in 1989 with Operation Just Cause in Panama. It also surveys recent policy debates over the use of force, the role of contemporary peace operations in U.S. foreign and national security policy, and the doctrinal underpinnings of the army's training for operations other than war.
- Peace operations have different operating principles than traditional combat missions. They lack clear strategic direction, have an expanded scope, rely on limited intelligence, are characterized by political and cultural diversity, involve the coordination of multiple actors, are media-intensive, typically take place in "failed states" with a limited rule of law, employ constrictive rules of engagement, are likely to occur in austere environments, are dominated by small and independent unit operations, demand a visible presence, are set in primarily built-up or urban areas, require close coordination with Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units, and typically require extensive negotiation skills.
- Commanders who have participated in recent peace missions unequivocally argue that additional skills are required for today's types of military missions. To succeed, the army must train commanders and staffs to cope with the differences between these missions and traditional combat operations.
- The army's professional military education system has expanded its curriculum and improved its techniques to teach the operational principles and tactics associated with the sixteen types of missions in the category of "operations other than war." Each branch service school has incorporated staff, situational, and field training exercises to reinforce the doctrinal principles and tactics associated with its training manuals. The courses of instruction at the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College have undergone similar expansion.
- After evaluating how the army has adjusted its training strategy to accommodate the new realities of conflict in the post-Cold War era, it is evident that the U.S. Army has been able to maintain its war-fighting edge while simultaneously expanding its "playbook" to accommodate the myriad tasks associated with contemporary peace operations.
- In addition, the army has intensified training in urban environments and routinely incorporates new rules of engagement into its exercises. Its Combat Training Centers have expanded their scenarios to incorporate peace operations, testing a unit's ability to apply

appropriate small-unit tactics, whose success often hinge on the unit's effectively integrating Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs personnel into its missions.

- Predeployment training covers detailed cultural orientations and incorporates simulations involving interactions with governmental and nongovernmental organizations and belligerent parties in order to enhance negotiating skills. Moreover, the army has developed specific strategies to deal more effectively with the media and trains its leaders accordingly.
- Contemporary military thought has been revised to consider required tasks following the conflict or crisis stage of an intervention. In addition, considerable attention has been devoted to reconstituting constabularies and to rule-of-law issues that are necessary for the long-term security of local populations. Efforts to revise doctrine, professional military education, and unit training have made the U.S. Army the world's premier peacekeeper.
- The number of peace operations has effectively doubled since the end of the Cold War era, and the potential exists for many similar types of operations in the near future. Indeed, a conflict-prone international environment underscores the possibility of even more frequent deployments. Because of this, the army must continue to refine its training strategy to accommodate such future challenges.
- Three areas require renewed emphasis: updating the curriculum of most Noncommissioned Officer Academy courses, improving the negotiating skills of leaders throughout the army's

ranks, and conducting more combined-arms training in urban environments.

- The army has generally kept pace with the rigorous and increasing demands posed by recent peace operations. However, the increased frequency of deployments, coupled with the burden of expanded peace operations training, has increased the operational tempo of units to unparalleled levels. This situation begs a difficult and problematic question: With increased mission requirements and a continued decline in real defense expenditures, is the army capable of fielding forces for the two "nearly simultaneous" combat missions envisioned in contemporary strategic planning and conducting peace operations at the same time?
- The army obviously benefits from the national debate over maintaining both war-fighting and peacekeeping missions. The ongoing review of the necessity and requirements for such missions improves military planning and provides better overall guidance for long-term training needs. The U.S. Army has already made considerable progress in transforming its training strategies in light of the relatively young debate over peace operations and how they serve the national interest.
- Undoubtedly, there will be more cases of massive humanitarian tragedy and civil breakdown in states and regions that involve the national interest of the United States. The challenge for the U.S. Army will be to build on its new base of knowledge and tactics to serve the national interest in offering assistance and stability to these endangered populations.

1

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the short-lived euphoric expectations of a more peaceful and prosperous “new world order” have necessitated a reexamination of U.S. national military strategy. Today, we face the sobering realities of worldwide armed conflict and humanitarian crises resulting from opposing ethnic, religious, racial, and political ideologies, as well as from natural disasters and failed states.

The U.S. military had spent the previous two decades developing and refining a joint, combined-arms approach to war-fighting designed to defeat Cold War opponents. Preparations for such combat inspired an integrated military strategy that placed a premium on joint operations. Indeed, the overwhelming victory achieved during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was the culmination of the previous two decades of military effort; the structure, doctrine, equipment, and training for U.S. armed forces withstood the tests of war.

Now, with a significantly changed world situation, is it reasonable to expect the same degree of military excellence from the U.S. Army as it participates in missions associated with military operations other than war? This study examines the question in detail by tracing the evolution of U.S. national strategic policy and how military strategy has responded in recent operations, drawing

heavily on the experiences of the Tenth Mountain (Light Infantry) and First Armored Divisions.¹ It also examines the factors that differentiate today’s operations from war-fighting and the relevance of the U.S. Army’s doctrine and training strategies for today’s operations through an analysis of the institutional changes resulting from lessons the army learned from Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989) up to the present.

DEFINITIONS

Although there has been much debate in military circles on how to differentiate and categorize military operations other than war, common definitions have emerged and have been incorporated into the defense establishment’s lexicon. Recent literature on peace operations and traditional war-fighting missions has created some confusion, since terms were being used interchangeably. Since many contemporary military operations fall within the mission category of peace operations and are the primary subjects of this manuscript, it is necessary to establish a common frame of reference by reviewing applicable definitions from the Joint War-Fighting Center’s *Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations* and FM (Field Manual) 100-23, *Peace Operations*:²

- **Peace Operations:** Encompasses peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement operations, and other military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. For this study’s purposes, the terms military operations other than war, peace operations, contingency operations, and stability operations are used interchangeably.
- **Peacekeeping:** Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, etc.) and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement.
- **Peace Enforcement:** Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel

compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.

- **Peacemaking:** The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to the conflict.
- **Peacebuilding:** Postconflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

THE EVOLUTION OF POST-COLD WAR STRATEGIC POLICY AND SUPPORTING MILITARY DOCTRINE

Use of Force

The policy debate on criteria for the use of military force came into sharp focus just over one year after 239 U.S. marines were killed in a suicide-bomb attack during an ill-defined 1983 peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. Shortly thereafter, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger established clearly defined criteria for the use of force abroad. Recalling public antipathy toward the military resulting from the Vietnam debacle and the Lebanon disaster, Weinberger emphasized the need to ensure widespread popular support for U.S. forces for the duration of a conflict:

- Forces should not be committed unless the action is vital to the U.S. national interest or that of allies;
- forces should be committed wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning, or they should not be committed at all;
- if forces are committed, it should be with clearly defined political and military objectives and with a precise sense of how the forces deployed can achieve the objectives;
- the relationship between objectives and forces must be continually reassessed and adjusted, if necessary;

- before committing forces abroad there must be some reasonable assurance of public and congressional support; and
- the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should only be as a last resort.³

Although Weinberger was discussing the commitment of U.S. troops to combat, the criteria are also applicable to operations short of war. Taking the lead to expand upon and revise Weinberger's criteria, Secretary of State George Shultz subsequently argued that the need sometimes exists to employ armed force for objectives short of "vital" national interests, particularly those that rest on moral grounds. For Shultz, the use of force was justified when

- It helps liberate a people or support the yearning for freedom;
- its aim is to bring peace or to support peaceful processes;
- it prevents others from abusing their power through aggression or oppression; and
- it is applied with the greatest effort to avoid unnecessary casualties.⁴

In the post-Cold War era, President George Bush extended this debate, arguing in an address to cadets at West Point that "real leadership requires a willingness to use military force," but that at times such force "may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important but less than vital."⁵ Echoing this statement, senior Clinton administration officials have repeatedly asserted that the "selective but substantial" use of force might be necessary to support coercive diplomacy even when nonvital national interests are at stake.⁶

Peace Operations and U.S. Interests

While such debates revolve around the use of force in general, the first three years of the Clinton administration were also marked by ongoing debates over the nature, relevance, and desirability of peace operations themselves. In its first national

security strategy document, released in July 1994, the administration argued that “multilateral peace operations are an important component of our strategy. From traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement, multilateral peace operations are sometimes the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be far more costly and deadly.”⁷

In the second and third versions of this document, released in February 1995 and February 1996, respectively, the administration differentiated among *vital*, *important*, and *humanitarian* interests.⁸ For the first, “we will do whatever it takes to defend these interests.” For the second category of interests, “military forces should be used only if they advance U.S. interests, they are likely to be able to accomplish their objectives, the costs and risks of their employment are commensurate with the interests at stake, and other means have been tried and have failed to achieve our objectives.” For humanitarian interests, the military “is generally not the best tool, . . . but under certain conditions the use of our armed forces may be appropriate.” The administration believed that such conditions would be fulfilled, for example, when a humanitarian catastrophe is clearly beyond the capacity of civilian relief agencies to respond, when the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to “jump-start” the longer-term response to the disaster, when the response requires resources unique to the military, and when the risk to U.S. troops is minimal.

While the Clinton administration was drafting its first national security strategy document, bitter congressional and public criticism following the problematic U.S. experience in Somalia reduced the administration’s interest in multilateral peace operations. By February 1994, while still supporting U.S. involvement in such multilateral operations, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake declared that “peacekeeping is not at the center of our foreign or defense policy.”⁹ This position became official U.S. policy in the final text of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which stated that peace operations could “prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts” and act as a reinforcing mechanism for U.S. policy in general. PDD-25 established factors to be considered before deciding whether to support a peace operation sponsored by the United Nations or regional organizations. These factors currently serve as the basis for U.S.

involvement in peace operations requiring military intervention.¹⁰

- Whether UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis;
- whether there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security based upon international aggression, urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence, sudden interruption of established democracy, or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence or the threat of violence;
- whether there are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement;
- for traditional peacekeeping operations, whether a cease-fire is in place and the consent of the parties is obtained before the force is deployed;
- for peace enforcement operations, whether the threat to international peace and security is considered significant;
- whether the means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing, and a mandate appropriate to the mission;
- whether the political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable; and
- whether the operation’s anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

In addition to asking the difficult question of whether a proposed operation is in the U.S. national interest, PDD-25 asks whether the operation could succeed without U.S. support and calls for the consideration of other viable alternatives—including the option of doing nothing. Of particular importance is the emphasis on the necessity for sufficient resources and planning in addition to

popular and congressional support to conclude a particular mission successfully. To some informed observers, there is a clear recognition that neither the United Nations, nor America's European allies, nor any other country or organization can substitute for U.S. leadership and involvement in peace operations, owing to resource demands, political will, or logistical and infrastructure capabilities.¹¹

Evolving Military Doctrine

Just as U.S. strategic policy has evolved, U.S. military doctrine has undergone a similar transformation in the post-Cold War international security environment. Former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan best articulated the role of doctrine in FM 100-1, *The Army*, by stating, "our doctrine establishes a common language for professional soldiers, communicates institutional knowledge, and establishes a shared understanding of organizational purpose. . . . [It] establishes war-fighting principles for the employment of the Army which are relevant to the contemporary environment . . . [and] represents the continuing progression of the Army's intellectual adaptation to the changed strategic environment."¹²

Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the army's capstone doctrine, FM 100-5, *Operations*, was based on offense-oriented air-land battle principles that were focused primarily on a potential conflict with Warsaw Pact forces. In the context of a dramatically altered landscape of world politics and entirely new sources of threats to U.S. national security, more attention to activities short of war was clearly needed. Accordingly, FM 100-5 was updated in 1993. The new version included a separate chapter that paid particular attention to the unique operational principles in the sixteen mission categories of operations other than war (see note 2) and provided historical examples to give its readers a better understanding of these types of operations. By incorporating these changes and retaining the tactics and operational concepts covering the full range of military operations, the army has been able to link all military operations to redefined national objectives. The significance of this manual cannot be overemphasized, since it serves as the basis for all supporting

doctrinal manuals, their tactics, and their training strategies.

Quick to expand its revised capstone doctrine, the army published FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, in December 1994. This manual summarized many of the lessons learned from recent deployments like Operations Provide Comfort in Iraq and Restore Hope in Somalia. Directly supporting FM 100-5, this doctrinal manual appropriately depicts the strategic context, organizational principles, and operational imperatives that are unique to peace operations. Considerable attention is paid to the planning considerations and coordination challenges posed by other U.S. and foreign government agencies, multinational military forces, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) typically converging in the area of operation. Similar doctrinal publications accompanied the release of the *Peace Operations* manual. For instance, FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*, was distributed in July 1993, and FM 100-23-1, *Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, appeared in 1995. Branch and Integrating Centers, such as the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, have made major strides in updating the relevant tactical literature as well. These evolving doctrinal principles and concepts, reinforced by hard experience, have established the necessary framework to enhance the military's ability to execute contemporary operations effectively.

2 DEFINING THE CHALLENGE

The very nature of recent peace operations has tested the mettle of the participating military commanders and their units. As noted earlier, the army had been geared to fight on the high-intensity battlefields of Europe, Korea, and the Middle East. Conventional military operations were within the “comfort zone” of the military hierarchy, which was more familiar with fighting and winning wars than waging a soft peace. Units’ mission-essential tasks (those tasks that must be performed with the utmost effectiveness to succeed on the battlefield) did not include conducting peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or humanitarian-relief operations. As a result, commanders participating in initial post-Cold War operations, such as Provide Comfort in war-torn Iraq and Restore Hope in Somalia, were faced with missions for which they had not received appropriate training; they relied on their own best judgment to guide, measure, and evaluate their actions. Although the deployed units consistently achieved tactical success, after-action reports and the professional literature highlighted areas where improvement was needed. The army has responded to these challenges by updating most of its doctrinal literature and adjusting the curriculum at most of its professional military education institutions.

Many in the military establishment maintain that specific units should be secured and trained

solely for peace operation engagements. Others argue that there is no need to establish a separate training strategy for military operations other than war; they assert that war-fighting tactics and procedures are easily modified for these types of missions. Arguably, the reality of a “downsized” army with more frequent peace operation deployments undermines the first argument, and a systematic evaluation of the factors that differentiate these types of operations from war discounts the second argument. The U.S. Army has taken an approach that considers both arguments by expanding the capabilities of its fighting forces to accommodate the special challenges of contemporary peace operations.

Factors that differentiate war-fighting from peace operations include operating principles; lack of strategic direction; expanded scope; limited intelligence; political and cultural diversity; multiple players; media intensity; the lack of (or limited) rule of law; constrictive rules of engagement; likely occurrence in austere environments; domination by small and independent unit operations; the demand for a visible presence; operations set primarily in built-up or urban areas; the need to integrate Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units; and the need to conduct extensive negotiations. Recent interventions highlight unit ineffectiveness resulting from the inappropriate application of operational principles or the failure to understand adequately the environmental characteristics of past operations and the reasons for the success of innovative tactics developed during these operations.¹³ The following discussion elaborates on the differences between conventional military missions and contemporary peace operations to illustrate why the army has had to adjust its training strategy to deal more effectively with the realities of a post-Cold War world.

OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES

The first and probably most important consideration is that there are significant differences between war-fighting principles and those that govern peace operations. The elements of objective and security are common to both categories of operations. Offense, mass, unity of command, economy of force, maneuver, surprise, and simplicity remain the dominant principles for combat operations. However, as military operations become

less “warlike,” various principles emerge from the doctrinal literature that come to dominate military actions: unity of effort, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. The application of these principles can determine mission success or failure.

Recent executive-branch planning guidance and the actions of multilateral force participants in recent operations indicate that unity of command may be impractical for contemporary peace operations. Indeed, PDD-25 clearly underscores “the fact that the President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces” to United Nations or other multinational commands.¹⁴ Italian forces’ failure to comply with command direction and mission tasking in Somalia¹⁵ and a similar breach by a Swedish battalion in Bosnia that refused to relieve Canadian forces in the eastern enclave of Srebrenica serve as illustrative examples.¹⁶ Dual chains of command and parallel command structures are not new; the most notable recent example is the one established in Bosnia between the Implementation Force (IFOR) and the civilian High Representative responsible for coordinating and implementing the nonmilitary aspects of the Dayton Accords. These factors and the requirement to support and coordinate efforts with NGOs, which operate under independent charters, make *unity of effort* the guiding principle for most peace operations.

Restraint appears among the principles guiding peace operations because, unlike conventional operations, which reward the use of overwhelming force, the lack of restraint in peace operations can result in unforeseen, and often adverse, consequences. Adam Roberts has described four possible dilemmas that must be considered before applying force in peacekeeping and humanitarian-relief operations. First, although the use of force may establish credibility, it also makes peacekeepers more vulnerable to attack by belligerent parties. Second, collateral civilian damage and deaths create mass resentment, and accusations of brutality can weaken the political will of countries providing the military forces. Third, the use of force may compromise the perception of impartiality. And finally, countries are reluctant to leave to others the decision to use force when the lives of their peacekeepers and their reputations are at stake.¹⁷

Perseverance is included among the principles because of the long-term nature of peace operations, especially the peacebuilding phase of an intervention. Some analysts estimate that it may take

more than twenty years to provide the social change required for the sustained avoidance of conflict.¹⁸ The U.S. military’s continued engagement in Panama, the Sinai, Iraq, and Macedonia attest to this. Indeed, the Dayton Accords acknowledge this principle by maintaining the oversight responsibility of various international organizations over the Commissions on Human Rights, Refugees, and National Monuments, established in the accords, for five years. The distinctive nature of this protracted conflict mandates a long-term presence of the NGO community as well.

Finally there is a need to understand *legitimacy* as a condition that “sustains the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.”¹⁹ Typically, the U.S. military’s authority to carry out decisions has been legitimized by UN mandates. Conversely, the military’s inadvertent dealings with criminal elements in the early phase of the Somalia operation contributed to the legitimization of some inappropriate—or illegitimate—actors. The same will hold true in Bosnia, where commanders likely will be exposed to inadvertent interaction with indicted war criminals.²⁰ Accordingly, army doctrine warns personnel to use extreme caution when dealing with individuals and organizations in countries or localities where no government exists.

LACK OF STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Unlike war, where the National Command Authority (the president and his most senior national security advisers, including the secretary of defense) gives clear strategic guidance and mission parameters are evident, peace operations often suffer from a lack of clarity and repeated changes of guidance. The mission requirements and desired political objectives of contemporary military operations have been tough to define, often placing commanders in difficult situations. To stay within desired mission boundaries prior to deploying his troops to provide relief and assistance in the wake of Hurricane Andrew and the Somali crisis, the commanding general of the army’s Tenth Mountain Division, Major General S. L. Arnold, prepared a mission statement including a description of the commander’s intent, success criteria, and desired end state. To save time, this statement was forwarded to the leadership at every command

level simultaneously. Reacting to insufficient mission guidance that he believed would force him to assume missions that were outside the desired framework of the senior leadership, General Arnold essentially established the parameters of the operations himself.²¹

In Rwanda, Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder faced a similar challenge. He received incremental guidance from the National Command Authority after the mission statement had already been issued by the commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in Europe and after the mission analysis had been performed by the U.S. European Command staff. In a draft after-action report, ten separate objectives were cited *ex post facto*.²²

The complex nature of peace operations makes it difficult to develop strategic objectives that can be easily translated into supporting operational and tactical mission statements. The simplicity and clarity of the directive from the Combined Chiefs to General Dwight Eisenhower before the Normandy invasion in World War II illustrate the point that strategic direction in support of wartime missions is easier to understand and execute. The mission guidance, in its entirety, was as follows:

Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations.²³

Commanders cannot expect guidance for operations other than war that is similarly succinct, focused, or unrestrained.

EXPANDED SCOPE

In recent operations, the role of the military has been significantly expanded, at times catching the commanders off guard. Despite their increasing attention to circumscribed roles for the peacekeepers, the United States and United Nations have repeatedly failed to develop a strategy that effectively incorporates the military's role in expanded phases of missions, such as postconflict/crisis reconstruction or nation-building efforts. This lacuna was well documented in the aftermath of Operation Just Cause. As Richard Shultz explains,

"Looking back on the experience in Panama, it is evident that the U.S. government was programmatically and structurally ill equipped for the situation that followed the fighting."²⁴ He concludes that the planning challenge was hampered by six obstacles:

- Failure to provide clear postconflict objectives—to restore democracy and critical government functions;
- exclusion of other civilian agencies from the planning process;
- bifurcation of the planning process into war-fighting and postconflict restoration;
- lack of experienced personnel in restoration planning;
- failure to understand the impact of twenty years of authoritarian rule; and
- failure to effectively determine who was in charge.

According to Shultz, "There was no integrated strategy for supporting nation building and democratization in Panama following Just Cause."²⁵ This situation exemplifies a tactical success that could have resulted in a strategic failure because of the ineffectual peacebuilding phase of the campaign plan and the military's inability to recognize that other U.S. government organizations, such as the Departments of Justice or State, may not mobilize as quickly as the military. The lessons from this operation also apply to later operations in Somalia and Rwanda, and perhaps Bosnia as well.

The expanded scope of Operation Restore Hope, from a U.S.-led humanitarian-relief intervention to a conflict-resolution and nation-building mission, further illustrates the point. Contemporary operations tend to encompass peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding components, and all may occur simultaneously. Only the broad scope—not the tactical failures—of Restore Hope in Somalia was replicated during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. During the Haiti operation, the Tenth Mountain Division's focus changed from peace enforcement to nation building as the situation stabilized. Perhaps it was the international community's recognition of this

expanded scope, and the accompanying means that were provided, that account for this intervention's success to date. Clearly, similar mission expansion is likely to occur in Bosnia as the situation allows the belligerent parties to be separated.

Recent operations have increasingly strained division and ad hoc headquarters because a relatively small commitment of forces is believed sufficient to accomplish the mission. The Tenth Mountain Division was the first to serve as an Army Forces headquarters in recent times, significantly expanding the operational scope for which this division's headquarters was designed, performing this function during the Hurricane Andrew operation and again during Operation Restore Hope. The division's mission scope was expanded further when it served as a Joint Task Force headquarters during the Uphold Democracy operation in Haiti.

Although the division demonstrated that it could perform these expanded roles with more personnel (increasing the size of the headquarters from its authorized strength of slightly more than three hundred to approximately five hundred), the staff officers' limited experience with the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) compounded the deployment problems the U.S. Transportation Command had already encountered with the software-driven system during other operations. While JOPES is supposed to facilitate logistical coordination in complex military operations, it functions only as well as the weakest link in the chain—in this case, the training of the staff members who will use it. Arguably, well over half the problems identified in the Rwanda operation's after-action report were directly attributable to the ad hoc nature of the staff and its lack of familiarity with JOPES.²⁶

Ultimately, the expanded scope of military operations will cause a unit's mission-essential tasks to change as it makes the transition from one phase of the operation to another and as new missions are assigned to traditional tactical and operational headquarters. For example, a change in a mission's focus may change an infantry battalion's tasks from conducting air assault, area security, and search-and-cordon operations to conducting humanitarian-relief, election monitoring, and refugee relocation operations. Divisions must also be prepared to serve vastly expanded coordinating roles

as Army Forces or Joint Task Force headquarters with little advance notice.

LIMITED INTELLIGENCE

Recent military interventions have been devoid of useful intelligence, typically occurring in locations where human intelligence capabilities had not been well established. This situation was most evident during Operations Provide Comfort (northern Iraq), Restore Hope (Somalia), and Support Hope (Rwanda). To a lesser extent, it holds true for the interventions in Haiti, Panama, and Bosnia. This shortcoming is well articulated by Richard Best, who argues that "Creating a capability to provide intelligence support to future peacekeeping missions is a significant challenge. Potential opponents of peacekeeping missions may be relatively small, clandestine groups that are difficult to monitor with systems designed for the surveillance of highly sophisticated military establishments."²⁷ This void has led early-deploying units to take ineffective, and sometimes misguided, actions, such as dealing with inappropriate actors.

The Tenth Mountain Division recognized this shortcoming during its mission in Somalia and developed a detailed patrol checklist to determine the nature and extent of anticipated clan interference with military operations, as well as the condition and attitudes of the general populace. The checklist proved so useful that similar checklists were developed for airfield security, roadblocks, and convoy operations. The efficient use of these checklists greatly enhanced overall intelligence assessments and minimized the need for remedial unit training.²⁸

With the realization that human intelligence was the most productive source of information in Somalia, techniques to expand its use were developed. For instance, the threat from land mines hampered operations along major supply routes and at certain relief sites. Since satellite imagery was of limited use in detecting mined areas, Somali translators accompanied mine-sweeping teams that contacted local village leaders to help identify known mined sites. Because of the extent of mining in Bosnia (some estimates put the figure at upwards of three million mines) coalition forces will have to cultivate human intelligence sources, cooperate with local leaders, and exchange key

information with the various intelligence agencies. Indeed, the United States has already authorized certain foreign military officers to be aboard highly classified U.S. signals intelligence flights over Bosnia.²⁹

POLITICAL AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY

With the exception of the U.S. intervention in Panama and domestic disaster-relief operations, recent military deployments have occurred where the local population and foreign peacekeepers have little familiarity with each other's cultural and political orientations. Recognition of and respect for these differences are now emphasized as a training requirement before each deployment. Even though in the past, each U.S. predeployment training program covered cultural and political orientations, the military's insensitivity to cultural differences has been identified as a factor contributing to tensions between the Somalis and UN forces, significantly reducing the military's effectiveness.³⁰ As Mohammed Sahnoun, a former UN envoy to Somalia, observes, "In Somali culture, the worst thing you can do is humiliate them, to do something to them you are not doing to another clan. . . . It's the kind of psychology the UN doesn't understand."³¹ Although intended to be impartial, the mandate for the UN phase of the mission in Somalia, which included disarmament, ran counter to the long-term political objectives of Somali leaders like General Aideed, prompting his hostile military actions.

The outgoing UN commander of the Bosnia operation's northeastern sector, Brigadier General Hårup Haukland of Norway, advised IFOR leaders that U.S. troops should balance peace enforcement aspects of the mission "with acts of goodwill and respect for Bosnian ways and feelings." Addressing IFOR commanders, Haukland cautioned that while "providing security is the primary task . . . you also have to show the local population that you care for them. It's very important to have good relations with the people. . . . They are proud people who want to be masters in their own house."³²

MULTIPLE PLAYERS

Although the U.S. government reserves the right to act unilaterally in defending its foreign policy

interests, as in Operation Just Cause, each U.S. military deployment from the beginning of the post-Cold War period to the present has been as part of a multilateral force. Operation Provide Comfort involved participants from more than twenty nations, Restore Hope had thirty-five, Able Sentry fourteen, Support Hope seventeen, Uphold Democracy twenty-seven, and Joint Endeavor more than thirty. The complexity of peace operations increases even more with the presence of numerous nongovernmental organizations in an operational sector. For example, 132 NGOs were registered with the United Nations during Restore Hope, 70 during Support Hope, and 164 are registered and operating throughout Bosnia. Not only have NGOs been increasing in numbers, but the scope of their missions has been expanding. In addition to their traditional functions of relief and development, more NGOs are including early warning, human rights monitoring, and conflict resolution in their repertoire of activities.³³ While the army has expanded the role of the Civil-Military Operations Center to facilitate dialogue with these relatively new actors, the coordination requirements will increase as many more new players enter the field of contemporary peace operations.³⁴

The sheer number and diversity of the players place increasing demands on commanders (especially those exercising command jurisdiction over coalition forces) and bring with them entirely new challenges. For instance, the court-martial of a private in a Canadian Airborne regiment for the torture and death of a Somali during Operation Restore Hope, and the subsequent investigation into the causes of this tragic event, sent shock waves through the ranks of the Canadian military.³⁵ During the UN Transitional Authority's mission in Cambodia, soldiers in the Bulgarian battalion were dubbed "the Bulgarians" because of widespread allegations of sexual misconduct.³⁶ In Bosnia, investigations centered on allegations of black-marketeering, prostitution, and drug dealing among various members of the multinational forces, resulting in the expulsion of nineteen Ukrainian and four Kenyan soldiers.³⁷ Russian peacekeepers have allegedly diverted UN fuel supplies to Serb forces and have exchanged the services of east European prostitutes for diesel fuel.³⁸

MEDIA INTENSITY

Contemporary military interventions are typically carried out in low-threat zones, enabling relatively unimpeded access by the media. Somalia serves as a case in point. Most military personnel who witnessed the initial phases of Operation Restore Hope on television vividly recall the scenes of U.S. Navy Seals attempting to conduct a stealth predawn landing on Somali beaches amid the glare of news crews' camera lights. While foreign policy analysts continue to debate whether the "CNN effect" has been more than a contributing factor in recent U.S. interventions, there is no disputing the fact that today's almost instantaneous news coverage of crises across the globe has created an immediacy that heavily influences government decision making in Washington and the conduct of operations in the field. One academic observer sums up the phenomenon, stating, "Today, when the body of a single American is dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the American government reverses its foreign policy and begins a withdrawal from the country."³⁹ Similarly, then-UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan lamented that the "impression has been created that the easiest way to disrupt a peacekeeping operation is to kill Americans."⁴⁰ The immediate change in the rules of engagement (ROEs) that occurred after the media televised U.S. troops helplessly watching members of Haiti's FAd'H (the Forces Armées d'Haiti, which comprised members of the country's military and national police) beating exuberant pro-Aristide protesters—resulting in the death of a Haitian woman—further illustrates the point. The ROEs at the time did not permit U.S. soldiers to intervene, but they were changed immediately after the incident in response to public outcry and political fallout, so that soldiers could use both nonlethal and deadly force to prevent the loss of human life.⁴¹

LACKING THE (OR LIMITED) RULE OF LAW

All the interventions examined in this study occurred in either nascent or failed states with nonexistent or ineffective judicial systems. Sheer anarchy perhaps best characterized the situations in Somalia and Rwanda. The legal systems in Panama, Haiti, and Bosnia have been severely

marginalized, a problem compounded by politicized, maladministered, or dismantled constabularies. The U.S. military has been called upon frequently to facilitate and assist constabulary-force training in crisis-ridden countries. Such efforts have proved essential in reconstructing societies in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti, and may be initiated to a limited extent in Bosnia.

In a draft report highlighting the military's role in recent interventions, William Rosenau examines several cases of military support in reconstituting constabulary forces, among them a U.S.-sponsored police training course that included combined U.S. military patrols with local constabulary forces. Marines and army forces helped train what were called "auxiliary forces" in Somalia, and army personnel were involved in establishing a new constabulary after the Haitian military was disbanded following the U.S. intervention.⁴² While the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) has responsibility for such programs, Rosenau argues that ICITAP "has been hampered . . . [by] the lack of a clear mission, inadequate funding, an inability to deploy quickly and operate with [the Department of Defense], and poor access to effective personnel."⁴³ While Rosenau makes some valid points, ICITAP's efforts in Haiti have been extremely successful. To date, it has conducted basic law enforcement training for over five thousand personnel who staff the reconstituted constabulary, significantly enhancing the prospects for long-term democratic stability. The lack of an effective rule of law in Bosnia may also place new demands on the military as the International Police Task Force is established. Although there are legal restrictions on U.S. forces' conducting law-enforcement training, the military has proved to be the only institution capable of effectively performing this mission in the early stages of a peace operation.

CONSTRAINED BY RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team was one of the first units in recent times to experience the challenges associated with ROEs that restricted combat activities in a combat zone. Following Desert Storm, the battalion was charged with establishing a five-thousand-square-mile security

zone in northern Iraq in order to provide humanitarian assistance to and promote cooperation among the country's Kurdish groups by denying access to Iraqi forces. In the course of expanding the security zone, the battalion developed innovative procedures during chance encounters with Iraqi forces. Once visual contact was made, infantry elements immediately began establishing well-protected defensive positions. Bradley fighting vehicles were placed in overwatch mode (able to provide a rapid response capability if hostilities erupted), while other elements maneuvered around the flanks of the Iraqi forces, which were in sight but out of small-arms range. Continuous air cover circled the engagement. Once a strong defensive position was established, unit leaders would initiate negotiations with the Iraqi unit commanders, demanding their withdrawal from the security zone.⁴⁴ The battalion also used mortar-launched flares to illuminate the area to assist in checkpoint operations, to identify and observe belligerent forces, and to demonstrate a military presence and the ability to respond at will. This tactic not only constituted a show of force but helped magnify the capabilities of the U.S. forces.⁴⁵

During the second UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), the Tenth Mountain Division's quick-reaction force most often operated on a graduated response principle, which was determined by the existing ROEs and the necessity to minimize collateral damage. Throughout the operation, the graduated response technique gave belligerents the opportunity to surrender without resorting to violence beforehand. In a typical cordon-and-search mission, the unit would infiltrate an area, establish a cordon, and then announce over loudspeakers that the belligerents were surrounded and would be injured or killed if they resisted. If the belligerents failed to surrender, tear gas would be used to encourage them to leave peacefully. If they continued to resist, the unit would use concussion grenades to enter the area forcefully and apprehend the belligerents. While the Somalia after-action report highlighted successes in applying these techniques, it also listed several considerations that must be evaluated before deciding to use surprise or graduated response tactics, including proximity of innocent bystanders and belligerents, vulnerability to attack, and the potential for and consequences of attracting crowds.

The fact remains that ROEs are complex, and they have varied with each peace operation. Soldiers have the inherent right of self-defense (use of deadly force) when responding to a hostile act. The ability to respond to hostile *intent* is generally more constrained, complex, and subject to interpretation; as such, it has been limited in peace enforcement missions. In Somalia, for instance, there was some apparent confusion over whether the use of deadly force had been authorized to prevent theft of weapons or equipment. For example, did ROEs justify the use of deadly force against a Somali who had just stolen a soldier's night-vision goggles? Although the rules called for a gradual response to hostile intent, the decision of whether or not to allow deadly force in this case was never officially published.⁴⁶

A review of after-action reports and recent articles on military operations reinforces the need for clearly defined rules of engagement. Certainly, the U.S. military has not been immune to the inappropriate application of force. Gunnery Sergeant Harry Conde, a U.S. Marine, was convicted of aggravated assault after firing his weapon at a Somali who had reached into his vehicle to steal his sunglasses during UNOSOM II. Other unfortunate incidents have led commanders to reiterate the acute need for training, not only for U.S. forces, but for other coalition forces as well. In Somalia, the senior U.S. military leadership encouraged other coalition forces to adopt the existing ROEs, which were modified to accommodate the country's political and social conditions, and many units did so. Other senior military officials, such as General Schroeder, commander of the U.S. humanitarian-relief intervention in Rwanda, argue that the ROEs should be standardized to facilitate common training programs across various countries' military services.⁴⁷

Lieutenant Colonel William Martinez, who served with the Tenth Mountain Division in Somalia, writes about the need for unit preparedness: "Part of the training process for any peacekeeping operation must . . . be ROEs. Creating different scenarios or situations to help soldiers practice the ROEs will help them clarify in their minds the situations in which they can or cannot fire. The time to learn this is before coming under fire or getting into a situation that could cost a life."⁴⁸

OPERATING IN AUSTERE ENVIRONMENTS

With the exception of the U.S. intervention in Panama, each operation examined in this study has taken place in a location devastated by a natural disaster or ravaged by conflict. In the aftermath of Florida's Hurricane Andrew in 1993, for instance, the region looked as if a nuclear weapon had been detonated there. The city that suffered the hurricane's greatest intensity was left with a substantially degraded infrastructure, and a majority of homes, buildings, and government facilities along the twenty-mile path of the hurricane were severely damaged or destroyed outright. In Somalia, civil war left the country in a similar state. Most buildings had been damaged either during combat or by looting for building materials. There was no commerce, agriculture, functioning government institutions, or operating utilities. The country had seemingly collapsed into a failed state, immersed in total anarchy. Much of the local population was destitute and almost totally dependent on humanitarian relief.⁴⁹ Since control over the relief supplies became a sudden source of power and wealth, humanitarian-relief efforts often inadvertently contributed to the renewal of violence.⁵⁰

For instance, in and around Rwanda and neighboring Zaire, U.S. forces were surrounded by thousands of Tutsi refugees dying from malnutrition, exhaustion, and a cholera epidemic. Their systematic slaughter at the hands of the Hutus reached genocidal proportions, and the mass exodus of one of Rwanda's major tribes became an instant refugee crisis for Zaire.

DOMINATED BY SMALL AND INDEPENDENT UNIT OPERATIONS

Small, independent operations are the rule rather than the exception in most peace operations, and they place enormous demands on young, relatively inexperienced unit leaders. *Army Times* correspondent Jim Tice described the experience of squad leaders charged with observation duties in Macedonia. One leader summed up his new responsibilities: "When we trained for this mission, I heard all the hoopla that squad leaders would run this, and team leaders would run that, and I didn't believe it. . . . But this is reality. If anything goes wrong, it's my fault, or it's the team leader's fault. They have placed great trust and responsibility in us, and that is a good thing for a leader. We couldn't ask for more."⁵¹

In Somalia, Tenth Mountain Division operations ranged from the battalion task force to the small-team level. Most missions, however, were performed at company level or below. In one article describing such operations, Lawrence Vowels and Major Jeffrey Witsken note that "junior leaders must be confident and competent to make quick, hard decisions. . . . [The] decisions had to be made while operating relatively independently and out of communication range with their superiors."⁵² Likewise, the relatively broad scope of independent, small-unit checkpoint operations placed extraordinary demands on junior leaders in northern Iraq. Lieutenant Colonel John Abizaid, the U.S. Army infantry task force commander during Provide Comfort, emphasizes this point: "The pressures on junior leaders to make the right decisions were enormous, and there was great temptation to put all checkpoints under centralized battalion control."⁵³ Abizaid considers his decision to trust the instincts of his subordinates to be one of the primary reasons the mission succeeded.

Similarly, Brigadier General Michael Hurbottle, commander of UN forces in Cyprus, concludes, "There is no doubt in my mind that the success of a peacekeeping operation depends more than anything else on the vigilance and mental alertness of the most junior soldier and his noncommissioned leader, for it is on their reaction and immediate response that the success of the operation rests."⁵⁴ Senior officers have noted the difficulties involved in making snap judgments in an uncertain environment, recognizing that mistakes have been—and will continue to be—made.

For example, consider the many rapid decisions Major Martin Stanton had to make, as he and his company arrived on the scene of an impending riot at a food distribution warehouse in Somalia:

I looked at the looters. My instructions were pretty clear: I was to go and secure the food site [but] faced with the anarchy before me, it seemed the proper thing was to try to stop [the looting]. I was confident I had sufficient combat power to handle any armed resistance and that the infantry platoon with me could secure the warehouse and eject any looters.

I made the decision to hand out the food. . . . Unfortunately, I did not understand one of the basic economic realities [that] relief supplies were money. When I began handing out supplies it was like handing out free money. . . . At one time, I was

convinced that unless something was done to force the crowd back, our soldiers were in immediate danger. . . . The threat to the troops was such that . . . only reinforcements or an extreme measure such as lethal violence could have prevented us from having people killed or injured. . . .

Handing out the food as a crisis-defusing mechanism failed disastrously. I could have informed representatives of each tribal group that I would hand out a portion of the food to them for distribution. . . . This might not have worked for several reasons. First, many of the people involved in the riot were refugees with no local tribal affiliation. Second, the crowd was looting the food store because of a lack of faith in the distribution supervised by their authority figures. Third, I didn't know if all players were on hand. I could have alienated a large group of the population by unwittingly not including them. . . . I realize that my basic error was in looking at it from an American frame of reference. . . . What I should have asked myself was: Is it worth getting any of my people hurt over? Is it worth killing any Somalis over? What are the consequences of doing nothing?⁵⁵

DEMANDING A VISIBLE PRESENCE

Unlike conventional combat operations, which place a premium on stealth during patrol, peace operations generally use patrols to demonstrate a visible presence and to obtain vital intelligence or to assess the situation in a particular area. During Operation Provide Comfort, for instance, the 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team was involved in what became known as the “checkpoint war” once it established its security zone. To keep the feuding Kurdish groups from engaging one another and to keep the Iraqi forces in check, the team developed a “flying checkpoint” technique, in which a mounted force (typically infantry, combat engineers, and anti-armor vehicles) would move into areas and establish hasty roadblocks where Iraqi or guerrilla fighters were known to be operating. The U.S. unit always had sufficient firepower—air cover and mortar support, plus a quick-reaction force, including anti-armor and infantry carriers—held in reserve for reinforcement or extraction if necessary.⁵⁶

In Somalia, the Tenth Mountain Division's Cavalry Squadron Ground Troop frequently performed checkpoint operations. After a daylight reconnaissance, the checkpoint was established af-

ter dark and continued to operate throughout the night. Two anti-armor vehicles were placed at a road checkpoint site, with their crews using night-vision devices to assist in early warning. Two other vehicles were held in reserve for immediate reaction or to intercept vehicles that did not heed an order to stop. Even though it used a small force, this tactic proved sufficient for a low-threat environment and was instrumental in maintaining a visible presence in a very large humanitarian-relief sector.⁵⁷

In Haiti, “presence patrols” were employed for this purpose. When conducting an area assessment, a patrol would move into a densely populated location, break down into squad-sized groups, and then work a particular area. The same squad would continue to operate in the area so that the local population would become familiar with the soldiers, who would often converse with the residents and shopkeepers and convey standard themes, such as the purpose of the U.S. presence or the efforts being made to establish a legitimate government. The patrols also updated the Haitian citizens in their sectors on world and national news. Finally, the patrols were used to identify and assist in local civic projects, such as putting a new roof on a schoolhouse or moving a small market out of an unsanitary open-sewerage area. This type of civic affairs operation proved so successful that the Haiti after-action report acknowledged that “the American Soldier and his presence on the streets, market places, parks, schools, and businesses of the cities and on the roads, fields, and villages of the countryside were the greatest weapon present to prevent oppression. Professionalism and the proper attitude towards the citizens of Haiti established a standard for the Haitian police and military to follow.”⁵⁸

OPERATING PRIMARILY IN BUILT-UP AREAS

Most recent military operations have taken place in urban areas, drawing on special tactics that have not been employed since the U.S. engagement in Vietnam. The Tenth Mountain Division's 2-87 Infantry Battalion, for example, was one of the most active units during Operation Restore Hope and was often involved in independent or combined cordon-and-search operations in various Somali towns. The battalion effectively employed an air-

borne command post to coordinate unit actions, enabling the commander to move quickly from one side of a town to the other. To minimize the likelihood of friendly-fire casualties, vehicles were clearly marked, and the unit developed a graphic display technique to divide cities into numbered blocks and then put up signs or paint buildings to identify unit boundaries and facilitate easy reference and rapid movement. Smoke grenades or paint bombs were used to mark buildings to be searched. The unit found squad-sized search teams to be most effective, requiring visual coordination between flanks before moving into new buildings when searching a zone. Concertina wire was found to be effective in cordoning off an area.

During the Haiti operation, the division found that belligerents could easily move weapons caches from building to building undetected. In response, a shift from the “known point” technique was developed. Under this modified system, cache targets are plotted, and a zone or target area established, then the zone is occupied by infantry forces to limit weapons movement. Active patrolling, supported by information culled from human intelligence sources, was then used to pinpoint and isolate the cache.⁵⁹

Operation Uphold Democracy presented the Tenth Mountain Division with other challenges as well. While the operation occurred in a “permissive,” or unopposed, environment, the division was able to use urban terrain tactics that worked extremely well. Infantry commanders found that a combined unit, consisting of military police, psychological-operations specialists, and linguistic support staff, proved invaluable in conducting routine operations. This combination of specialists accompanying the normal infantry maneuver force proved essential in assisting Haitian nationals or detaining belligerents and was successful in preventing or defusing violence.

The division also employed innovative crowd control procedures to manage demonstrations, including the fifty-thousand-strong protest in Port-au-Prince in late September 1994. The divi-

sion’s intent was to avoid violence and keep the crowd from destroying facilities and homes; it found that doctrinally modified tactics worked extremely well, among them: showing a unit’s strength up front, incorporating psychological operations in crowd control, using armor as an intimidator, displaying a professional appearance, and integrating military police with maneuver forces to defuse situations with a high potential for violence.⁶⁰ CH-47 helicopters equipped with water buckets were placed on standby in case the demonstrations escalated.

Prior to Operation Restore Hope, doctrinal tactics that applied to army aviation operating over urban terrain were limited. In fact, what doctrine there was called for aircraft to fly patrols on the outskirts of urban areas. In Panama and Somalia, however, army aviation was selected as the prime operational

component because of the limited air threat and the need to minimize collateral damage. Army aviation units found the usual attack methods inappropriate because the urban environment limited the utility of deploying more than a single attack aircraft and because targets typically could be seen only along a one-gun target line.⁶¹

In many cases, young military leaders are faced with perhaps the most important negotiation challenges of their careers.

REQUIRING PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIL AFFAIRS INTEGRATION

The army has made great use of Psychological Operations (“psyops”) and Civil Affairs units in recent peace operations, whose after-action reports all reinforce the need to integrate these Special Operations Command forces with conventional units. Over the past decade, their utility has increased almost exponentially. Operation Uphold Democracy was the culmination of previous experiences with this type of combined-unit approach, effectively incorporating recently developed psyops and civil affairs procedures into all levels of the planning process and the execution phase of the operation. The ability to prepare the area of operations for programs—ranging from “cash for

guns,” using an improvised chit system to make it easier for the local population to turn in its weapons, to activities coordinated with a variety of NGOs to prepare the population for the return of President Aristide—was instrumental in minimizing the level of violence.⁶²

The ability of the U.S. military to work effectively with the many NGOs that respond to humanitarian crises has been enhanced by the creation of a separate Civil-Military Operations Center. Some observers argue that “NGOs have felt uneasy working with the military” and that “military leaders tend to regard NGOs as undisciplined and their operations as uncoordinated and disjointed,”⁶³ but the coordination activities of this center have helped to break down the barriers of different organizational cultures and the perceptions that separate these two different types of institutions. The Tenth Mountain Division used this facility during the Hurricane Andrew disaster-relief operation, when the center helped coordinate the division’s efforts with those of more than eighty NGOs in providing immediate disaster assistance.

The lessons the division learned in Florida were tested just three months later in Somalia, this time in a situation that was significantly more complex because of the hostile environment. Every operation since then has capitalized on the center’s ability to work closely with civilian organizations to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian relief efforts. Not only have Civil Affairs units filled the need for more personnel in the Civil-Military Operations Center caused by limited staffing in the division’s G5 (civil/military operations) section, but their teams have been well integrated into conventional forces. In Somalia, for example, these teams were attached to maneuver units and helped establish credibility with local village leaders by providing routine medical and dental services and keeping residents informed of ongoing military activities as well as world and national news. The relationships they established not only helped defuse potentially hostile situations but also served as a valuable source of intelligence.

down to the platoon level were involved in direct negotiations with local clans when trying to determine how to equitably distribute relief supplies in a humanitarian-relief sector. Senior officers were also actively engaged in such efforts. The commanding general of the Tenth Mountain Division and his senior officers were frequently called upon to negotiate settlements between warring factions and were directly involved in disarmament talks. In a *Military Review* article, General Arnold recalls that “Political negotiation was an area that required extensive coordination. The ARFOR [army forces] was involved in negotiations with clan elders in each small town and village.”⁶⁴ To illustrate this point further, when the Tenth Mountain Division was deployed to Haiti, the quick-reaction force platoon leader from the 2-14 Infantry Battalion had to respond to a situation in which a heavily armed FAd’H member was being harassed by the local population and had barricaded himself in his house. Although a large crowd had gathered around the house, the young platoon leader was able to negotiate a peaceful resolution between the two sides.⁶⁵

Recounting his experiences in northern Iraq, Lieutenant Colonel Abizaid confirms the importance of negotiations at the junior-officer level—for example, during routine checkpoint operations, when Kurdish guerrillas wanted to pass to attack Iraqi forces, or when Iraqi civil authorities wanted to pass in the opposite direction to arrest local Kurdish leaders. In many cases, young military leaders are faced with perhaps the most important negotiation challenges of their careers.⁶⁶

REQUIRING EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS

Beginning with Operation Just Cause, when army personnel negotiated the surrender of General Manuel Noriega, negotiating with belligerent parties has been a recurring theme in recent U.S. military interventions. In Somalia, military leaders

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THE RESPONSE

Although today's military leadership correctly argues that fighting wars remains the most difficult mission and must remain the primary focus of training efforts, commanders who have participated in recent deployments maintain that operations other than war differ significantly from conventional operations and, as such, require additional skills. The ability of a unit to operate effectively in peace operations is directly linked to a leader's ability to apply the supporting operational principles. The very nature of these operations mandates a training strategy that accommodates the challenges posed by much more complex missions.

In order to succeed—however success is measured in these types of operations—the army must train commanders and staffs to deal with the lack of strategic direction and to accommodate the likely expanded scope of such operations. This requires a deeper knowledge of tasks and increased proficiency in performing them. Units must be prepared to operate in an urban environment, employing unconventional tactics. They must know how to conduct a cordon-and-search operation and establish and operate checkpoints, and they must be proficient in crowd control techniques. They must be capable of performing effectively in austere environments with few sources of

intelligence. Finally, they must interact with people of different political and cultural orientations, in areas governed by few or no commonly accepted rule-of-law principles.

The challenge of training the military's leadership and units to meet the new demands of waging peace is significant. The interactions that typically occur among coalition forces that have different values and beliefs, and an expanding NGO community, are the first items to be addressed on the training agenda. The presence of the media throughout the area of operations also presents a new challenge for soldiers and commanders alike, since the inappropriate behavior of a single soldier can be instantaneously broadcast around the world, prompting national debates or public outcry. These factors—as well as the requirement for soldiers to shift rapidly from providing humanitarian-relief assistance to conducting limited combat operations—magnify the challenge. Finally, negotiation skills must be a training priority, as reiterated in a recently published article in the military journal *Parameters*:

Officers and NCOs [noncommissioned officers] will be in close contact with combatant and non-combatant groups in situations where decentralized diplomacy and on-the-spot negotiating skills can defuse a volatile situation, possibly saving American, allied, and noncombatant lives. We cannot place the lives of those officers and NCOs at risk by failing to prepare for the challenges of negotiating under adverse conditions with individuals from different cultures. We have to find ways to adapt our formal training of officers and NCOs to develop the skills they will need in such situations.⁶⁷

Because of the unique nature of these types of missions and the likelihood that our military will frequently be called upon to perform them in the future, the army must incorporate peace operations training into all professional military education courses, starting with the Basic Non-commissioned Officer's Course and continuing on up to the Senior Service College. Units that are likely to be deployed for peace operation missions must adapt their training strategy accordingly. The rest of this section will focus on how well the army has responded to this challenge.

In each operation examined in this study, the U.S. Army made some strategic and tactical errors.

However, instead of trying to dismiss or downplay its mistakes, the army has painstakingly documented them in an attempt to minimize the probability of their recurrence in subsequent missions. During an interview well after Operation Just Cause had been concluded, General Maxwell Thurman, former commander-in-chief of the U.S. Southern Command, did not hesitate to point out that he had focused his efforts primarily on the war-fighting phase of the operation, while neglecting its peacebuilding phase.⁶⁸

Such candor is complemented by each operation's comprehensive after-action reports, produced by the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The center, which normally sends a team on each operation, documents events and provides specific recommendations for improvement. It is through its observations and recommendations that command and control procedures, management of the various battlefield operating systems, planning and staff supervision techniques, organizational structures required for similar missions, and other functions and procedures are improved and enhanced. The reports, which average more than two hundred pages, may provide hundreds of recommendations for improvement, which are then tracked to ensure they are implemented within funding constraints or submitted for further analysis. These documents are a crucial part of the army's training process. Army Branch Service Schools rely on them to update doctrine and the supporting tactics and procedures that are taught in all professional military education courses; units deployed on similar missions use them to design predeployment training. By adopting such a holistic approach to training, the U.S. Army is better prepared to operate effectively in today's complex peace operations.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

As a large, complex, and vital organization, the army relies heavily on training, as do other branches of the armed forces. The army has always maintained that the quality and effectiveness of its fighting force is directly linked to its education system. The first major component of the army's training strategy lies in the formal service schools, where commissioned and noncommissioned officers receive a firm grounding in the tactics,

operational concepts, leadership principles, and military values that will make them effective leaders in the field. This section will examine how this training component has adapted to today's realities by evaluating recent doctrinal and instructional innovations in all of the army's formal schools.

Branch Service Schools

The U.S. Army Infantry School has taken the lead in revising its doctrine and instruction to reflect post-Cold War operational challenges. The school has included specific tactics for operations other than war in all its recently published tactical manuals. FM 7-30, *The Infantry Brigade*, was published in October 1995 and contains a twenty-page appendix on operations other than war. The basic branch manuals covering infantry battalion and company operations, FM 7-20 and FM 7-10, respectively, also have appendixes covering low-intensity operations. The changed nature of conflict and increased frequency of post-Cold War missions resulted in the publication of FM 7-98, *Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict*, in 1992. Based on a well-circulated conceptual article on peace enforcement operations, FM 7-98 is now being updated to incorporate many of the lessons learned in the Somalia and Haiti operations as well as the predeployment training for the current mission in Bosnia. Because of the increase in the number of operations in urban environments, a ninety-five-page addendum to FM 90-10-1, *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas*, was issued in October 1995, including seven new appendixes on tactics.

The Infantry School's efforts to update doctrine have been supplemented by a concurrent project to develop a viable training support package for units scheduled to deploy in peace operations. This draft publication, TC 7-98-1, *Training Support Package for Operations Other Than War*, will contain detailed instructor notes, lesson outlines, and slides to support classroom and field training. Tactics that are likely to be needed in future missions are included so that a unit can quickly establish a predeployment training program focusing on only those tasks that are likely to be performed based on the initial mission analysis. This publication has been validated during numerous Joint

Readiness Training Center rotations and was used to assist both the Tenth Mountain Division before its deployment to Haiti and units undergoing pre-deployment training for Operation Joint Endeavor at the Combat Maneuver Training Center.

Supported by current doctrine that is relevant to today's operational environment, classroom instruction and field training have been adjusted as well. The advanced course for officers is based on a small-group instruction format that is led by highly qualified captains and majors who have successfully commanded companies participating in recent operations or have been through rotations at one of the combat training centers; their experience is invaluable in discussions of doctrinal principles and tactics. Six days are devoted solely to operations other than war to ensure that students have mastered the concepts. The first two days include doctrinal reviews, small-group discussions, and practical exercises involving the sixteen relevant missions (see note 2). The next four days are devoted to staff exercises and after-action reviews, in which the students, acting as a battalion staff, go through the deliberate planning process for three separate missions. The first involves an infantry battalion task force being deployed to a riot zone in a large metropolitan area. The second is based on a Central American scenario, where an infantry battalion task force is assigned the mission of finding and destroying illicit drug laboratories; the scenario includes an opposing hostile infantry battalion operating under the orders of a drug cartel in the task force's operational sector. The final exercise involves a noncombatant evacuation operation on the fictitious island of Cortina. The deliberate planning for these types of missions reinforces doctrinal principles and supporting tactics. The advanced course also televises the monthly National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center teleconferences, during which performance trends based on recent unit rotations are candidly discussed.

The support branches in the U.S. Army—such as engineers, military intelligence, military police, and transportation—have been equally active in adapting their training to peace operations.

The basic course for officers focuses on developing platoon leaders' combat skills. Each class is organized as a platoon, rotating leadership positions throughout the sixteen-week course. Each platoon has a captain and two noncommissioned officers to advise and lead students through the course. The culmination of the basic course is a five-day field training exercise, where the young officers' tactical knowledge is tested in a simulated combat environment. In addition to conventional operations, the exercise exposes the officers to typical peace operation scenarios (that is, those that are constrained by rules of engagement, occur in urban settings, and require negotiations to end disputes).

The small-group discussion approach is also used at the Infantry School's Noncommissioned Officer Academy. Although the program of instruction devotes only one hour to operations other than war, NCOs with experience in peace operations attend almost every class, and their contributions to the typical dialogue that occurs in the small groups give others the flavor of such missions.

Similar efforts have been undertaken at the Army Armor School. The Armored and Mechanized Infantry doctrinal manuals, from the company up through the brigade levels (Field Manuals 71-1 through 71-3), have been or are being updated to incorporate separate chapters on operations other than war. While the training focus within the armor community appropriately remains on the critical combat tasks that are expected on high- to mid-intensity battlefields, a concurrent training strategy has been implemented to make junior leaders proficient in the tactics employed during peace operations.

In addition to presenting and discussing principles of operations other than war in the NCO Courses and the Basic and Advanced Officer Courses, training vignettes have been added to officer field training and situational training exercises. As part of the Basic Course's ten-day tactical training exercise, future armor and scout platoon

leaders have the opportunity to practice tactics that are likely to be employed in peace operations, such as establishing a hasty roadblock, conducting area security, patrolling, constructing and staffing observation and listening posts, and performing convoy escort and security. This training is supplemented with small-group discussions of the mounted force's role in contingency operations as well as lessons culled from recent operations. The Advanced Armor Course has developed a five-day module for operations other than war. The training encompasses a series of situational exercises in a scenario similar to the situation in Bosnia, requiring tactics and procedures ranging from company team to brigade task force. This instruction, which is aided by recently developed mission training plans, helps prepare armor officers for small-unit leadership and staff duties.

The Army Aviation School has expanded its doctrine to incorporate the lessons of recent operations as well. Its capstone doctrine, FM 1-100, *Army Aviation Operations*, is in the final update stage, now clearly delineating aviation's combat, combat support, and combat service support tasks in operations other than war. The manual organizes these activities into three main categories: security and limited conflict, peacekeeping and humanitarian-relief operations, and support to domestic authorities. FM 1-100 also provides detailed descriptions of likely missions, such as show of force, noncombatant evacuation operations, and peace enforcement. The supporting manuals, FM 1-111 (*Aviation Brigades*), FM 1-112 (*Attack Helicopter Operations*), and FM 1-113 (*Utility Helicopter Operations*), are also being updated. Capitalizing on after-action reports and interviews with participants in recent operations, each of these publications devotes significant attention to peace operation missions. FM 1-111 has an eight-page appendix on operations other than war, and FMs 1-112 and 1-113 reinforce the necessary tactics to operate effectively during these types of missions.

This evolving doctrine has enabled the aviation community to provide the necessary orientation for its junior leaders. As with other combat arms branches, the aviation focus remains on combat skills, but operations other than war are incorporated throughout the one-year flight training and basic course instruction. Noncommissioned

officers are provided a doctrinal overview as part of their course of instruction in the NCO Academy. In the Advanced Course, the school maximizes simulation in its flight training and staff instruction, including a five-phase staff exercise, in which students must plan for deployment, forced entry, mid- and low-intensity combat, and follow-on peacekeeping missions. The officers have the opportunity to observe probable outcomes when their plans are run through such war-fighting simulation models, and concepts are reinforced through detailed discussions when the simulation violates the established rules of engagement.

The support branches in the U.S. Army—such as engineers, military intelligence, military police, and transportation—have been equally active in adapting their training to peace operations. Each service school has incorporated peace operations training into its curriculum and has integrated field training to reinforce the instruction on doctrinal principles. Like the combat arms branches, the combat support and combat service support branches have tailored their training to accommodate their particular areas of specialization. For example, the military intelligence community has adjusted its doctrine and force structure to focus more on the human intelligence aspects of operations (as opposed to signals intelligence and satellite reconnaissance, which tend to dominate mission planning for modern combat operations).

The Military Police School has taken a slightly different training approach than others, one that is well suited to the demands placed on the law enforcement community in peace operations. In addition to covering the normal doctrinal material, the Noncommissioned Officer and Basic and Advanced Officer Courses have four primary areas of focus: task and skill proficiency, understanding the human dimension and attitude development, camaraderie and team building, and leadership competence. Instruction is based on a "Leadership Excellence Model," which places the student in various roles based on staged situations that teach and emphasize tasks, conditions, and standards throughout each course of instruction. A former Military Police School commandant notes in a recent article, "By using active student involvement in scenario-based instruction, the course blends the best of task learning with the key ingredient of learning how to think in challenging situations."⁶⁹

Command and General Staff College

As would be expected, the ten-month college that prepares majors for staff duties, from the battalion to the unified or specified command levels, has expanded its instruction for military operations other than war. In addition to being exposed to these activities during the normal classroom discussions that follow doctrinal readings, each student attends a fifteen-day core course.

The first three lessons cover in detail the general concepts, principles, and activities surrounding the root causes of conflict. As part of these lessons (which are conducted in small groups), each student must give a ten-minute oral presentation on one of the sixteen types of operations other than war using a historical example. One lesson is devoted to an expanded mission-analysis model that covers the military, diplomatic, and economic aspects of national power; the model is then applied to a case study of Operation Provide Comfort. Once the students have demonstrated a firm understanding of the technique, they conduct a mission analysis of Vietnam using an early-1960s frame of reference. This is followed by a role-playing exercise set in a pre-occupation Haiti scenario, where the students are required to develop a course-of-action decision brief for a commander-in-chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command.

Other lessons cover senior-level leadership responsibilities, which include developing the desired end state, success criteria, vision, and supporting unit-training strategy. Separate sections are devoted to peacebuilding, counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, domestic support, antinarcotics operations, and humanitarian-relief assistance. These classes are supplemented with presentations by guest speakers from the State Department, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and noted experts in a variety of fields. Selected case studies are also discussed, such as the counterinsurgency operations in El Salvador and, more recently and closer to home, the 1989 San Francisco earthquake and 1992 Los Angeles riots. The course concludes with mission analysis and decision briefs for hypothetical follow-on missions in Rwanda and Bosnia.

The Command and General Staff College has developed elective courses in logistics for operations other than war, military assistance in civilian

reconstruction, and peace operations, which are similar in design and content to the Army War College classes discussed below. Students may also take a "Research in Military Operations Other Than War" elective and write a monograph for possible publication.

Army War College

The army's senior leadership course exposes officers to stability operations concepts and principles during a ten-month period of instruction. As part of its core curriculum, the course requires each student to take a separate, one-week class in operations other than war. The first two days are devoted to discussions of the concepts and principles contained in army and joint publications and recently published articles, reinforced by discussions of a study of Operation Restore Hope and guest speaker presentations. The last three days are devoted to a contingency exercise based on a post-Castro Cuba scenario. During this exercise, students prepare the command assessment and a warning order for executive-branch officials after receiving strategic guidance from the president and secretary of defense, and conduct a comprehensive mission analysis and course-of-action briefing for the theater commander-in-chief.

The Army War College curriculum also incorporates a two-week strategic crisis exercise conducted in the latter part in the course. The exercise is set in the early twenty-first century and is based on a global scenario involving simultaneous military conflicts in Bosnia, northern Africa, and southwest Asia. It also involves scenarios in the areas of operation for the U.S. Pacific Command and Southern Command, requiring a noncombatant evacuation mission in Hong Kong, military-diplomatic interventions in a Spratly Islands dispute, and a border dispute among Bolivia, Peru, and Chile. Within the U.S. Atlantic Command area, the exercise requires crisis planning for a series of natural disasters in the United States. These planning exercises test the students' ability to apply strategic and operational principles and concepts, requiring them to undertake a leadership role in numerous governmental and nongovernmental organizations as well as on the various staffs of the relevant commander-in-chief. These interactive exercises are aided by joint integrated contingency, crisis action, and game analysis

models to simulate probable outcomes of operational plans developed by the students. The variety and complexity of the exercise scenarios provide a rigorous basis for the practical application of conceptual principles presented in the core curriculum. They also give the students an appreciation for the roles of the various players involved in crisis planning, as well as for the decision-making coordination, integration, and synchronization skills required to be an effective leader in the national security establishment.

The Army War College also offers three elective courses that cover important components of peace operations: “How to Negotiate: Strategy and Process,” “Collective Security and Peacekeeping,” and “Operational Issues in Peace Operations.” The first course is designed to improve the student’s negotiation skills through the use of a systematic decision-making process that the student applies to a series of increasingly complex practical exercises and case studies. The “Collective Security and Peacekeeping” course not only covers basic concepts and principles but provides an analysis of peace operation trends and concepts as they have changed over the years. Each student must present a thirty-minute briefing on an assigned case study, covering the situation, mission, and outcome of the operation and including an analysis of the tactics and procedures employed and the reasons for the mission’s success or failure. The final elective, “Operational Issues in Peace Operations,” focuses on the strategic, operational, and tactical relationships in peace operations and the issues associated with multinational efforts. Attention is devoted to the military, political, and humanitarian dimensions of peace operations, with particular emphasis on command-and-control procedures, rules of engagement, and transitional planning considerations. The course is supplemented with guest speakers and panel discussions.

UNIT TRAINING

The ability to fight and win this nation’s wars remains the central focus of army training—and properly so. For the past two decades, the army has made incremental improvements in its ability to train units for combat. In addition to its demanding home-base training, the army continually upgrades its Combat Training Centers, which

remain the cornerstone of its training strategy.⁷⁰ These centers, which use state-of-the-art training equipment, including technologically sophisticated methods to simulate casualties and equipment losses, host task forces up to the brigade level for intensive two- to three-week field training exercises. During the course of a rotation, a unit has the opportunity to practice many of its wartime missions—including infiltration, search and attack, passage of lines, attack/counterattack by fire, and assault—against an expertly trained opposition force permanently assigned to the center and familiar with the local terrain. After each operation, after-action reviews are conducted that detail the unit’s activities during the mission and highlight causal factors for mission success or failure. Most unit commanders who have fought in combat and participated in these exercises agree that a combat training center rotation is usually more difficult than the actual conflict. The goal is for every combat arms battalion to go through a rotation at least once every two years.

The army has made equal strides in enhancing the training made available to division and corps staffs. The Battle Command Training Program, part of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, was designed to develop and test the skills of division and corps commanders and their staffs. During the typical “War-Fighter Exercise,” commanders and their staffs go through the rigors of the deliberate planning process, re-defining the mission and developing the commander’s intent, the desired end state, success criteria, and possible courses of action, based on a mission tasking derived from a typical conflict scenario. After subjecting each alternative to a war game analysis, participants put together a decision briefing recommending the optimal course of action. The decision is then translated into a written campaign plan, which serves as the backbone of what will become a series of computer-simulated battles. Like the Combat Training Centers, the Battle Command Training Program has a staff that acts as an opposition force, developing a plan that constitutes the other half of the gaming process. Over the course of these two-week command-post exercises, adjustments resulting from the output of the simulated battles are made to the base plan. These exercises are typically scheduled once every two years for each corps and division.

Focusing on this base-training methodology, the remainder of this section will examine how the army has adjusted the second major component of its training strategy to better prepare its units for the realities of the post–Cold War environment. A review of the Tenth Mountain Division’s predeployment training strategies for Restore Hope in Somalia and Uphold Democracy in Haiti and the First Armored Division’s training for Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia will demonstrate that the army’s training approach has capitalized on lessons learned in each successive peace operation and has integrated new doctrinal concepts along the way. In essence, the predeployment training strategy for each mission has built upon and improved the approach taken previously—the army has never liked to reinvent the wheel.

Operation Restore Hope

Operation Restore Hope (1992–93) was the second in a series of post–Cold War deployments that would test the army’s ability to conduct humanitarian-relief interventions. Before discussing the training plan for this mission, some background on the division’s readiness strategy is in order. The Tenth Mountain Division had tailored its training to accommodate rapid deployment for combat operations in mid- to low-intensity combat zones. The infantry battalion’s mission-essential tasks were entirely focused on war fighting, including tasks such as air-assault operations, attack/counterattack by fire, and defense in urban terrain. The infantry battalion commanders had also reached a consensus that cohesion; discipline; leader development; physical readiness; and frequent combined-arms, live-fire exercises strengthen units’ readiness. They focused their training efforts accordingly.⁷¹

In this case, the division had been given little preparation time for the mission. Indeed, the first combat unit to deploy to Somalia—the 2-87 Infantry Battalion—had only eleven days to prepare. During this time, in addition to conducting a concurrent mission analysis with the division and brigade staffs and undergoing normal administrative processing for overseas deployment, the battalion staff focused small-unit training on convoy, checkpoint, and cordon-and-search operations. They also conducted health and sanitation

training and a basic country-orientation seminar, using a series of eight vignettes that had been developed to familiarize soldiers with the established rules of engagement. Other units to be deployed were taking similar approaches to predeployment training. Meanwhile, the division headquarters was focusing its efforts on deploying subordinate units and continuing its mission analysis as the situation progressed and more information became available.

The division also sought the advice of recent operation participants and personnel with expertise in Somalia. Lieutenant Colonel Abizaid, who commanded the 3-325 Infantry Battalion (Airborne Combat Team) during Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, and Andrew Natsios from the Agency for International Development were brought in for this purpose. Their insights were instrumental in developing a predeployment training strategy that proved relatively effective, given the short notice. In hindsight, crowd control and negotiations were the only critical tasks that did not receive adequate attention in the unit’s predeployment training plan.

Mission Fallout from Restore Hope. The U.S. and UN missions in northern Iraq and Somalia not only provided the impetus to expand army doctrine and professional military education, but also resulted in other institutional changes that would enhance the army’s ability to achieve its specific military objectives in peace operations.

To this end, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute was established in 1993 as part of the Center for Strategic Leadership at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Its mission is to study the strategic and operational implications of peace operations, develop concepts and doctrine for the senior military leadership, and refine interagency coordination through studies, conferences, exercises, and war games. As part of its training charter, the institute developed an exportable training package for units in the field and an annual peace-operations command-post exercise for command-level staff members. The institute has also been active in developing a predeployment training strategy for subsequent peace operation missions.

The Army’s Combat Training Centers also undertook major changes as a result of experiences relayed to them in successive post–Cold War

peace operations. The Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk was the first to expand its peace operations strategy at the direction of its head, Brigadier General Lawson Magruder, who finalized the design for two rotations that focused entirely on peace operations.⁷² The first, in November 1993, was based on a border-dispute scenario that required a brigade-sized task force to conduct a forced entry, establish a lodgment, move to the disputed area, enact a defense, and conduct a night attack. The exercise gave participants the opportunity to cope with an unclear enemy, deal with civilians and refugees in the combat zone, and coordinate activities with the other governmental, nongovernmental, and media organizations in the area of operation. Units had to observe the rules of engagement when separating the belligerents, demilitarizing a buffer zone, and protecting humanitarian-relief efforts and the local population. The scenario also included sniper fire, ethnic skirmishes, hostile checkpoint operations, and ambushes along supply routes.⁷³ The second peace operation rotation was conducted in August 1994. While similar in design to the first rotation, it was expanded to include the participation of a division staff. The center now has the capability to tailor a rotation to focus entirely on a peace enforcement mission.

These exercises feature validated scenarios involving operations other than war, which are part of each rotation. A typical exercise is based on a scenario involving a conventional operation that is tailored to the participating unit's expected wartime missions. However, commanders will undoubtedly experience the types of situations other units have confronted in recent deployments, such as dealing with local leaders, media, civilian refugees, and other governmental and nongovernmental organizations that are operating throughout the simulated combat zone. All rotations encounter this type of situation, but the degree varies depending on the focus of the exercise.

Although the U.S. European Command prefers to use the term "stability operations" when referring to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, it has undertaken a similar effort to expand the tasks performed at the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany.⁷⁴ This center's training model includes a unit's transition to stability operations after it has participated in a

scenario that involves intense conventional operations. Adding a layer of reality to such training operations, civilians, displaced persons, and reporters and camera crews appear throughout the battlefield for the entire rotation. These preliminary efforts have been instrumental in establishing base scenarios that were expanded for the units undergoing predeployment training for peace operation missions in Macedonia and Bosnia. The National Training Center has adopted a similar approach.

Even while Operation Restore Hope was under way, the Center for Army Lessons Learned was able to respond with training materials. Its special edition *Handbook for Somalia*, published in January 1993, covered country orientation, emerging doctrine, critical tactics, special techniques and procedures units were using there, preventive health and medical tips, and Somali customs. The handbook was used to assist follow-on units in their predeployment training. It was followed by a seventy-page *Operations Other Than War* pamphlet, published in December 1993, specifically devoted to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. In addition to providing insights into the type of environment in which these missions occur, the pamphlet discusses in detail the tactics and lessons learned from the previous checkpoint, convoy, and military operations that had been conducted in Somali urban terrain. In July 1994, a *Handbook for the Soldier in Operations Other Than War* was published, containing descriptions of many of the tactics and procedures developed in recent operations; it also included tips on force protection. The center has also produced recent pamphlets for other missions, including civil disturbance, disaster assistance, and antinarcotics operations.

In addition to making the institutional changes suggested by recent operations, the army began to fill its ranks with officers experienced in peace operations who would play a vital role in assisting with training leaders for subsequent missions.

Operation Uphold Democracy

Unlike the virtually impromptu deployment to Somalia, the Tenth Mountain Division had a month and a half to prepare for its mission in Haiti; it received its warning order in early August 1994, and

the first troops did not arrive in country until September 19. In the interim, the division quickly began planning for what was anticipated to be a peace enforcement mission requiring a forced entry. While most of the soldiers in the division had previously served in Somalia, normal personnel turnover left roughly 25 percent of the officers in need of leader training on the nature of peace operations.

The division selected as the lead task force its First Infantry Brigade, which developed a comprehensive training plan consisting of a series of command post, field training, and live-fire exercises. The brigade also conducted country orientations and training in negotiations, media relations, and other specialized topics. To achieve greater efficiency and standardization in preparing its maneuver battalions, the brigade developed three situational exercise lanes, which took five days each to complete. The first lane was devoted to defense of a fixed site and included tasks such as handling detainees, controlling refugees, establishing hasty roadblocks, and conducting fixed-site security operations. The second lane, involving daytime and nighttime company raids with a live-fire exercise, required synchronization of fire-support elements, including Air Force AC-130 gunships. It also included convoy escort, reaction to a live-fire ambush, and air assault and attack situations. The third lane was devoted to operations in urban terrain, including a live-fire exercise and civil-disturbance training. As part of the brigade's strategy, reinforcement training was devoted to critical individual tasks; all soldiers were required to qualify with their individual weapons and undergo training on the rules of engagement.⁷⁵ According to the First Brigade commander, the rules of engagement were the most difficult training tasks, since separate rules were established for each phase of the operation. This difficulty was compounded by additional changes required as a result of FAd'H members' use of force against Haitian citizens.⁷⁶

The contingency plan called for an air assault launched from a navy aircraft carrier, requiring supplemental training for the division's aviation brigade. Since conventional army aviation units were not familiar with carrier operations, the brigade's aviators had to become deck-landing certified; this certification training occurred during

August aboard the USS *Theodore Roosevelt*. Full-dress rehearsals for the planned air assault took place September 16–17 while en route to the area of operation aboard the USS *Eisenhower*.⁷⁷

To assist in predeployment training, the Center for Army Lessons Learned produced a handbook in July 1994 providing an overview of the Haitian political situation, tactics and procedures that would likely be called for, and common conversational phrases in French and Creole. This handbook was used as a country orientation and tactical training aid for support troops.

While the units were executing their recently developed training plans, the division headquarters, assisted by Fort Leavenworth's Battle Command Training Program and the XVIII Airborne Corps staff, was identifying the personnel requirements to operate as a Joint Task Force. Once the additional personnel had arrived, including liaison officers from each service and other government organizations such as the State Department, the staff immersed itself in the planning process. New staff members were quickly trained on the division's standard operating procedures and the mission analysis was updated to reflect the input of the new staff. By reviewing lessons learned in Somalia, the division was able to organize for its present mission more efficiently. Because their use would be limited, division artillery and air defense personnel were used to augment the Civil-Military Operations Center, which would once again play a major role in the Haiti mission. By the time the division deployed, its headquarters was well organized and trained to assume the role of a Joint Task Force.⁷⁸

Follow-on Initiatives. During Operation Uphold Democracy, the U.S. military was not only busy training its own forces, but extended its expertise to other participants as well. As part of the plan to efficiently hand off control of the operation to the UN Mission in Haiti, the army's Battle Command Training Program/Joint and Combined Operations Group was assigned to assist in training the expanded staff. The stated objective of the training program was to "produce a combined staff that can plan, coordinate, and conduct UN peace operations in Haiti; . . . [build] a cohesive team with the ability to perform deliberate and crisis-action planning; and interact with the UN civilian staff,

Haitian Government, nongovernmental organizations, the populace, and media.”⁷⁹

The Battle Command Training Program brought in personnel from the army’s branch schools, the UN staff, and the U.S. Atlantic Command, as well as specialists on the country’s politics and society, such as the head of the Haitian Institute at the University of Kansas, to teach a structured week-long program of instruction and to familiarize staff members with newly drafted standard operating procedures. The training was conducted March 5–10, 1995, in Haiti and consisted of a country orientation, discussion of the roles and missions of other governmental and nongovernmental organizations, refinement of the deliberate planning process, three exercises involving civil-military cooperation, and initial military support planning for the scheduled presidential elections. The program was well received by the two hundred military and civilian participants and greatly assisted in the team-building process. The army’s after-action report attributes this program’s success to the personal involvement of the incoming UN force commander, Major General Joseph W. Kinzer.⁸⁰

As a separate initiative, army special operations troops were active in training multinational force participants from seven Caribbean nations. The Third Special Forces Group developed a course to reinforce basic infantry skills and build unit cohesion for what would become a composite Caricom (Caribbean Command) Battalion set to deploy to Haiti; this predeployment training was a significant factor in the mission’s success.

Throughout the Haiti mission, the Center for Army Lessons Learned continued to produce relevant training materials, such as the *Peace Operations Training Vignettes Newsletter*, published in March 1995. This was used as a training tool to orient the Twenty-Fifth Division (Light Infantry) brigade task force that was scheduled to replace Tenth Mountain Division units about to return to their home base at Fort Drum, New York. The newsletter contained a review of tactics and procedures for mission tasks such as patrolling, fixed-site security, checkpoints, cordon and search activities, voting place security, and other operations. The Joint Readiness Training Center also continued to play an important role in preparing the units for peace operation duties. The Second

Armored Cavalry Regiment, the third combat replacement unit, went through a predeployment rotation that focused on Uphold Democracy’s basic tasks, such as patrolling, traffic control, force protection, convoy escort, weapons seizure, and quick-reaction force operations. The unit paid considerable attention to training on the rules of engagement, which was a vital part of each training rotation. This specific training episode was significant, since it represents the first time a unit went through predeployment training at a combat training center, and was itself a universally acknowledged factor in the mission’s success.

Operation Joint Endeavor

The army’s European force has been redefining its primary role ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm reinforced the perception of the U.S. Army in Europe that it required a force-projection capability. Indeed, this lesson pervaded the military establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ultimately giving birth to NATO’s Rapid Reaction Corps. Appropriately, the training focus went through a corresponding shift, from defending western Europe to preparing for contingency operations elsewhere. Starting in 1993, training strategy included peace operations rotations at major training centers for infantry and armored brigades in the First Armored Division, a Battle Command Training Program exercise based on a Bosnian scenario, and planning exercises with NATO’s subsidiary Partnership for Peace (PFP) members. The latter exercises incorporated field training on peacekeeping, search-and-rescue, and humanitarian-relief operations.⁸¹ In September 1994, the “Cooperative Bridge” training exercise was conducted in Poszan, Poland, with six NATO and six PFP participants. This initial exercise led to subsequent deployments with former Warsaw Pact countries, which included peace operation rotations at the Combat Maneuver Training Center. These exercises, along with peacekeeping operations in Macedonia, set the stage for the predeployment training strategy carried out by the First Armored Division Task Force for Operation Joint Endeavor.

As in previous operations, the division established specific qualifications for individual soldiers

and units before the deployment. Some of the general requirements included weapons qualification, training in the use of protective suits and gas masks, common soldier tasks such as first aid and land navigation, dealing with the media, military law, code of conduct, and friend/foe identification. Theater-specific training focused on land-mine awareness, cold weather injury prevention, check-point operations, rules of engagement, country orientation, and force protection. Crew and platoon qualification training was also conducted, as was training for rail- and air-load teams.

Collective skills were enhanced through a series of situational training exercises encompassing rules of engagement, land-mine operations, patrolling, checkpoints, assault, actions on the objective, and logistical support. A series of fire-coordination and deployment exercises were also conducted. All this predeployment training culminated in the Combat Maneuver Training Center validation exercises for deploying units; these exercises were linked to simultaneous division task force command-post exercises that extended over several months.

In addition, a team from the Army Peacekeeping Institute was brought in to assist in negotiation training. The team's guidance from the V Corps Commander, Lieutenant General John N. Abrams,

was as follows: "Using a well-trained cadre of role players, confront the command with a spectrum of culturally accurate, interest-based situations designed to provide a laboratory in which the commanders experience the challenges of up to the worst-case scenarios."⁸² With the assistance of Special Operations Command personnel and area experts on the Balkans, institute personnel developed a series of simulations to facilitate the conduct of a "joint military commission" to resolve contentious issues. In a series of role-playing exercises, Balkan leaders were played by personnel who were well versed on the region's political situation and familiar with the culture and leadership style of the particular leader they were playing. Issues included determining meeting structure, adjudicating the control of separation zones, and assessing potential violations of the peace accords. These joint commission scenarios were integrated throughout the command-post exercises and were used to enhance the negotiating skills of the division's senior leaders.

Clearly, the division's strategy encompassed the lessons from other deployments and was specifically tailored to the demands of the Bosnian operation. In December 1995, the division was ready to deploy after what was essentially three years of preparation.

4

CONCLUSION

As U.S. policy on the employment of military force has evolved from the Weinberger Doctrine to the operational principles embodied in PDD-25, the army's training strategy has evolved as well. As General George A. Joulwan, commander-in-chief of the U.S. European Command, said, "With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military now has to focus on worldwide 'peacetime engagements' in operations other than war with the same degree of commitment as it prepared to fight and win its combat roles."⁸³ After evaluating how the army has reoriented its training strategy to accommodate post-Cold War realities, it is evident that General Joulwan's challenge has been answered with enthusiasm and a commitment to excellence. The U.S. Army has been able to maintain its war-fighting edge while simultaneously expanding its "playbook" to accommodate the myriad tasks associated with contemporary peace operations. Efforts to revise doctrine, professional military education, and unit training strategies have made the U.S. Army the world's premier peacekeeper.

The army has learned to operate comfortably within the context of peace operations by learning from past mistakes and applying new doctrine and tactics. Its leadership understands the new operational principles of peace operations and knows how to apply them. Clearly, such principles were

taken into account during the drafting of the Dayton Accords. Today, in a global political environment that confounds strategic guidance, the military leadership seeks clarification of the desired political objectives before developing mission statements and proposing the necessary forces to succeed. To better accommodate the expanded scope of contemporary operations, the military has defined its role more explicitly by using specific language in peace accords and in congressional testimony.⁸⁴

New procedures have been implemented to maximize the human intelligence available to commanders and civilian leaders involved in interventions, and there is unprecedented cooperation among the various intelligence agencies involved in peace operations. Moreover, the army has intensified training in urban environments and routinely incorporates rules of engagement in its exercises. Its Combat Training Centers have expanded their scenarios to incorporate peace operation missions, testing a unit's ability to apply appropriate small-unit tactics, whose success has come to depend more and more on effectively integrating personnel from Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units. Predeployment training covers detailed cultural orientations and incorporates simulations involving interaction with governmental and nongovernmental organizations, as well as belligerent parties, in order to enhance negotiating skills. Additionally, the army has developed specific strategies to work with the media more effectively, and it trains its leaders accordingly. More important, though, contemporary military thought has been expanded to consider the tasks required beyond the immediate conflict or crisis stage of an intervention. The army has devoted considerable attention to reconstituting constabularies and the rule of law in many of the countries where it has been called upon to intervene, although there is little consensus on the military's appropriate role in such tasks vis-à-vis the civilian sector. Needless to say, such institutions are necessary for the long-term security of the local populations, and the military has proved a vital asset in this regard. During the Haiti intervention, these efforts extended to the country's judiciary, where the State Department managed a seventeen-member team of U.S. military legal officers charged with training and evaluating personnel in the Haitian judicial system.⁸⁵

To be sure, the army does not pursue these efforts on its own. Similar innovations are occurring throughout the military and foreign policy communities and among other governmental and non-governmental agencies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff has expanded its doctrine to include a capstone manual on military operations other than war, complemented by seven supporting publications, including doctrine for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and domestic support operations. Each of the theater commanders-in-chief has conducted exercises that include peace operation scenarios involving the participation of other potentially relevant governmental and nongovernmental agencies. The Army Peacekeeping Institute and the United States Institute of Peace conduct ongoing interagency and NGO training and joint seminars on conflict resolution. The military's Senior Service Colleges have increased their spending requests to include nondefense participants. The United Nations has expanded its training efforts as well. All these initiatives have helped to break down the barriers of organizational culture that once separated many organizations ostensibly joined in a common endeavor; now there is a synergy that promotes unparalleled cooperation among the various actors.

The number of peace operations has effectively doubled—from thirteen during the Cold War to twenty-six at present—and there is the potential for many more such missions in the immediate future.⁸⁶ Indeed, a conflict-prone international environment portends the possibility of even more frequent engagements. Because of this, the army must continue to refine its training strategy to accommodate future challenges. Based on this research, three particular areas need renewed emphasis.

First, it is clear that small units dominate peace operations. This reality notwithstanding, only a two-hour block of instruction on operations other than war is included in the curriculum of most Noncommissioned Officer Academy courses. Their instruction remains almost entirely focused on the types of interventions characteristic of the Cold War era. To prepare the army's noncommissioned officers for the types of missions they are likely to experience over the next few decades, the curriculum must be expanded to reflect the nature of contemporary conflict and appropriate intervention strategies.

Second, there is an acute need to improve the negotiating skills of leaders throughout the army. This requirement has not yet received adequate attention within the professional military education system. Indeed, the only formal instruction offered on this subject is an elective course at the Army War College. Clearly, by institutionalizing structures such as "joint military commissions" down to the battalion level, the army will minimize the risks its commanders face with inadequate predeployment training. Army leadership training must be expanded to fill this void, starting with the non-commissioned officer training courses. To reinforce this knowledge, perhaps the Combat Training Centers could expand their repertoire of training devices to incorporate negotiation simulations. Operation Joint Endeavor's predeployment training serves as an exemplary case in point.

Finally, the army must expand its training in urban terrain. Recent interventions demonstrate that a combined-arms approach is necessary for mission success. However, personal observations and numerous interviews indicate that most divisions limit urban training to infantry units only. Aviation, logistics, field artillery, civil affairs, and other appropriate personnel typically are not involved in such training. Because this deficiency is a function of inadequate training sites, the urban facilities that are under construction at the Joint Readiness Training Center should improve the army's ability to operate in urban environments. Site improvements are also necessary at the other combat training centers, branch service schools, and local training areas. The Army Armor School has acknowledged this requirement and now has a major construction project in the design phase.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, the army has generally kept pace with the rigorous and increasing demands contemporary peace operations pose. This has not come without costs, however. The increased frequency of deployments, coupled with the burden of expanded operations training, has increased the operational tempo of units to unparalleled levels. In a recent *Army Times* article, for instance, Jim Tice reports that during a three-year tour in Europe, soldiers in an armor battalion spend 29 percent of their tour away from their home base. Corresponding figures for a mechanized infantry battalion and the typical brigade headquarters are 43 percent and 53 percent, respectively.⁸⁷ These statistics were compiled even

before the Dayton Accords were signed and units deployed for Operation Joint Endeavor. While the operational tempo of tactical units in Europe was driven in part by the potential deployment in Bosnia, other divisions throughout the army are attempting to cope with a similar pace.

This situation begs a difficult and problematic question: With increased mission requirements and a continued decline in real defense expenditures, is the army capable of fielding forces for the two “nearly simultaneous” combat missions envisioned in contemporary strategic planning and conducting peace operations at the same time?⁸⁸ The question should not be seen as a stark choice for U.S. national security officials between a war-fighting or a peacekeeping strategy for the nation’s armed forces. Rather, it is a matter of ensuring appropriate and adequate resources for both. The kind of balance and the priorities involved in maintaining both basic missions will obviously be part of the national debate, as reflected in the close congressional scrutiny of the issues involved in recent peace operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.

The army obviously benefits from such discussion, since the ongoing review of the necessity and requirements for such missions improves military planning and provides better overall guidance for long-term training needs. Indeed, it is remarkable that the U.S. Army has achieved so much progress in transforming its training strategies in light of the relatively young debate over these types of missions and how they serve the national interest.

We can expect such debate to continue, as the United States assesses the potentials and demands of its leadership in a world that is still reeling from the massive geopolitical changes of the last half decade. Undoubtedly, there will be more cases of massive humanitarian tragedy and civil breakdown in states and regions that involve the national interest of the United States. The challenge for the U.S. Army will be to build on its new base of knowledge and tactics to serve the national interest in offering assistance and stability to these endangered populations.

NOTES

1. The Tenth Mountain and First Armored Divisions have been heavily involved in successive post-Cold War peace operations and so provide a wealth of information on the U.S. Army's preparation for and performance in the cases selected. Of course, the marine corps, air force, and navy have also participated in these or similar operations, but a comprehensive examination is beyond the scope of this study. For a comparative assessment of army involvement vis-à-vis the other service branches, see General Accounting Office [hereafter, GAO], *Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts*, GAO/NSIAD-95-51, March 1995; GAO, *Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability*, GAO/NSIAD-96-14, October 1995.
2. Joint Pub. 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense [hereafter, DOD], 1995), lists sixteen types of missions: Arms Control, Combating Terrorism, DOD Support to Counternarcotics Operations, Enforcement of Sanctions/ Maritime Intercept Operations, Enforcing Exclusion Zones, Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight, Humanitarian Assistance, Military Support to Civil Authorities, Nation Assistance/ Support to Counterinsurgency, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations, Protection of Shipping, Recovery Operations, Show of Force Operations, Strikes and Raids, Support to Insurgency, and Peace Operations. See also Joint War-Fighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Fort Monroe, Va., February 1995): GL-5-8; and U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-23, *Peace Operations* (December 1994): 2-12.
3. Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace* (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 445-54.
4. George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 645-51. For a discussion of the Weinberger-Shultz debates and subsequent modifications, see Stephen Daggett and Nina Serafino, *The Use of Force: Key Contemporary Documents*, Report 94-805F (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service [hereafter, CRS], October 1994).
5. White House press release, "Remarks by President Bush to Cadets at West Point Military Academy," January 5, 1993.
6. See the transcript of the interview with Secretary of Defense William Perry on "One on One with John McLaughlin," August 13, 1994; Anthony Lake, "Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War World," address delivered at George Washington University, Washington, D.C., March 6, 1996.
7. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], July 1994), 13. This White House document was later echoed in a supportive national military strategy: DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, February 1995).
8. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, February 1995), 12-13, 16; see also the February 1996 revision, 18-19.
9. Anthony Lake, "The Limits of Peacekeeping," *The New York Times*, February 6, 1994: 17. Still, General Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior officials have indicated their support for involvement in operations other than war, firmly rejecting the so-called Somalia-syndrome notion that the Pentagon should "only do the big ones." See General John Shalikashvili, "Employing Forces Short of War," *Defense* 95 3 (Autumn 1995): 3; Thomas E. Ricks, "Colin Powell's Doctrine on Use of Military Force is Now Being Questioned by Senior U.S. Officers," *The Wall Street Journal*, August 30, 1995: A1; Bruce

- W. Nelan, "What Price Glory?" *Time* (November 27, 1995): 50–51.
10. The text of PDD-25, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," is reprinted in Mark M. Lowenthal, *Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy*, Report for Congress (Washington, D.C.: CRS, May 1994): 26–43. See also Nina Serafino, *Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, Issue Brief 94040 (Washington, D.C.: CRS, September 13, 1995): 2–3; Mark M. Lowenthal, *Peacekeeping and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implementing PDD-25*, Issue Brief 94043 (Washington, D.C.: CRS, September 23, 1994): 1–9.
 11. Stanley R. Sloan, *Global Burdensharing in the Post-Cold War World*, Report for Congress 93-982S (Washington, D.C.: CRS, October 1993).
 12. General Gordon R. Sullivan, "Foreword," in U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-1, *The Army* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 1994).
 13. Specifically, the operations examined in this study include Restore Hope (Somalia), 1993–94; Uphold Democracy (Haiti), 1994–95; Able Sentry (Macedonia), 1993–95; Support Hope (Rwanda), 1994; Provide Comfort (northern Iraq), 1991–95; Joint Endeavor (Bosnia), 1995–96; and Hurricane Andrew disaster relief (Florida), 1993.
 14. Lowenthal, *Peacekeeping and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implementing PDD-25*: 1, 4–5.
 15. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 40–43, 88, 144.
 16. Tom Post, "Blues for the Blue Helmets," *Newsweek* (February 7, 1994): 22–23.
 17. Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in Peacekeeping," *Survival* 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 93–120.
 18. John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Tokyo: United Nations University, November 1994), 36. (Also see the revised edition of this work, forthcoming from the United States Institute of Peace Press.)
 19. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 1993), section 13-4.
 20. Ivica Rajik, indicted war criminal at large and former Croatian militia officer, bluntly stated that he was not afraid of arrest by NATO soldiers: "What can NATO do to me? I run this town." See John Pomfret, "Wanted Man Tests NATO's Mission," *Washington Post*, December 14, 1995: A37.
 21. Interview with Major General S. L. Arnold, Washington, D.C., January 9, 1996.
 22. They included: assisting in the deployment of the full contingent of UN forces, taking steps to establish conditions that will permit the refugees to return home to Rwanda, establishing and managing an airfield hub in Uganda, and other similar objectives. See the draft after-action report on Operation Support Hope by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.), 17–18 (mimeo).
 23. Edward J. Filiberti, "National Strategic Guidance: Do We Need a Standard Format?" *Parameters* 25, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 42.
 24. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., *In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation Building in Panama Following Just Cause* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, August 1993), 17–24.
 25. Shultz, *In the Aftermath of War*, 63–64.
 26. See the draft after-action report on Operation Support Hope (mimeo, n.d.) by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.). Although the draft report made well over two hundred observations on needed improvements, many of the problems could be attributed to an ad hoc staff. For example, some of the problems included a lack of understanding of the functions of the joint staff, a lack of staff cohesion, unclear command-and-control relation-

- ships, and a lack of established standard operating procedures for planning.
27. Richard A. Best, Jr., *Peacekeeping: Intelligence Requirements*, Report for Congress 94-394F (Washington, D.C.: CRS, May 6, 1994), 17.
 28. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Restore Hope, 3 December 1992–4 May 1993: Lessons Learned Report* (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Center for Army Lessons Learned, November 15, 1993), section III.
 29. R. Jeffrey Smith, "High-Tech Cooperation in Bosnia," *Washington Post*, January 19, 1996: A30. According to the article, "At the heart of intelligence efforts in Bosnia is a brigade-sized unit of the army's V Corps consisting of more than 1,000 intelligence officers, analysts, signal officers, and counterintelligence specialists. Supplementing this group are dozens of small teams composed of CIA, NSA [National Security Agency], and Defense Intelligence Agency officers deployed in the field."
 30. Center for Naval Analysis, 1995 Annual Conference (Washington, D.C., October 26, 1995), Breakout Session I, "The Military in Somalia—the Wrong Tool for the Right Job?," 5.
 31. Louise Lief and Bruce B. Auster, "The Unmaking of Foreign Policy," *U.S. News and World Report* (October 18, 1993): 35.
 32. Bradley Graham, "Advice to an Incoming General: Be Firm, Friendly," *Washington Post*, December 12, 1995: A28.
 33. Lederach, *Building Peace*, 36–37.
 34. See, for instance, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Conference Report: Improving Coordination of Humanitarian and Military Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, June 1994).
 35. Andrew Phillips, "A Few Bad Men," *Macleans* (March 28, 1994): 24–33.
 36. Dale Van Atta, "The Folly of U.N. Peacekeeping," *Readers Digest* (October 1995): 101–102.
 37. Post, "Blues for the Blue Helmets": 22.
 38. Lief and Auster, "The Unmaking of Foreign Policy": 35.
 39. John Adams, "The Role of the Media in Peacekeeping Operations," *Special Warfare* (April 1994): 12–13.
 40. Paul Lewis, "U.N. Official Reproves U.S. Over Plan to Pull Out of Somalia," *The New York Times*, January 30, 1994: 10.
 41. Altogether, five different sets of ROEs were established during Uphold Democracy. See Center for Army Lessons Learned (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.), *Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, D-20 to D+40* (December 1994), 119–20.
 42. William Rosenau, "Accepting the Unacceptable: Peace Operations, the U.S. Military, and Emergency Law Enforcement" (paper presented to the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Biennial Conference, Baltimore, Maryland, October 22, 1995).
 43. Rosenau, "Accepting the Unacceptable," 6–7.
 44. Lawrence G. Vowels and Major Jeffrey R. Witsken, "Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry," *Armor* (September–October 1994): 11–12.
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 47. Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder, "Lessons of Rwanda," *Armed Forces Journal* (December 1994): 31–33.
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 49. These are the personal observations of Colonel J. Michael Hardesty, who served with the Tenth Mountain Division during the Hurricane An-

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50. See Pamela Aall, *NGOs and Conflict Management* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, February 1996); Stephen Buckley, “Aid Groups Snared in African Violence,” *Washington Post*, January 23, 1996: A9; Bread for the World Institute, *Countries in Crisis* (Silver Spring, Md.: Bread for the World Institute, 1996); ACTIONAID, *The Reality of Aid 95* (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1995).
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 52. Vowels and Witsken, “Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry”: 29.
 53. Lieutenant Colonel John P. Abizaid, “Lessons for Peacekeepers,” *Military Review* (March 1993): 16–17.
 54. See Joint War-fighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations*, passim.
 55. Major Martin N. Stanton, “A Riot in Wanwaylen: Lessons Learned,” *Army* (December 1994): 24–30. Emphasis in the original.
 56. Vowels and Witsken, “Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry”: 29.
 57. Tice, “Responsibility Comes Early”: 26.
 58. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions* (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Center for Army Lessons Learned, April 1995), section A-1.
 59. U.S. Department of Defense, JULLS Long Report No. 10450-55759 (00284), “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cache Strike Operations” (mimeo).
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 61. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *U.S. Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II: 4 May 93–31 Mar. 94* (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Center for Army Lessons Learned, n.d.), section I-6-1.
 62. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy* (December 1994), passim.
 63. Aall, *NGOs and Conflict Management*, 11; Chris Seiple, *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions* (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, 1996), 5–8.
 64. Major General S. L. Arnold, “Somalia: An Operation Other Than War,” *Military Review* (December 1993): 33.
 65. U.S. Department of Defense, JULLS Long Report No. 10446-58571 (00286), “Search and Clear—‘Wait them out’” (mimeo).
 66. Vowels and Witsken, “Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry”: 17, 19.
 67. William A. Stoft and Gary L. Guertner, “Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention,” *Parameters* (Spring 1995): 41.
 68. Shultz, *In the Aftermath of War*, 16.
 69. Brigadier General Salvatore P. Chidichimo, “Training Leaders for a Force Projection Army,” *Military Review* (March 1993): 20–25.
 70. The army has three Combat Training Centers: the National Training Center (California), the Joint Readiness Training Center (Louisiana), and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (Germany).
 71. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Jim Sikes, former commander of the Second Battalion, Eighty-Seventh Infantry, whose unit was the first to deploy to Somalia from the Tenth Mountain Division on February 19, 1993.
 72. The initial redesign began in January 1993 under the leadership of Brigadier General George A. Fisher, Jr., the center’s commanding general. The project was finalized under Brigadier General Lawson Magruder III, who assumed command in July 1993 after an assignment as the assistant division commander for operations in the Tenth

Mountain Division, where he served during the Hurricane Andrew disaster relief operation and as the Task Force/Kismayu commander in Somalia.

73. U.S. Department of Defense, *Catalog of Peace Operations Training Activities* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, September 1994): 8–9.
74. Jim Tice, “The Busiest Major Command,” *Army Times*, October 30, 1995: 22–24.
75. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy* (December 1994), 2–4.
76. Interview with Colonel Andy Berdy (U.S. Army), Washington, D.C., February 22, 1996.
77. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy* (December 1994), 161–62.
78. Interview with Colonel Jim Campbell (U.S. Army), former chief of staff for the Tenth Mountain Division during Operation Uphold Democracy, Washington, D.C., February 23, 1996.
79. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy* (July 1995), 67.
80. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy* (July 1995), 61.
81. Sarah B. Sewall, “Peace Operations: A Department of Defense Perspective,” *SAIS Review* (Winter/Spring 1995): 128.
82. Interview with Colonel Ed McCarthy (U.S. Army), Washington D.C., February 29, 1996.
83. General George A. Joulwan, “Operations Other Than War: A CINC’s Perspective,” *Military Review* (February 1994): 5–10.
84. In Annex IA of the Dayton Accords, for instance, the military’s role is clearly defined: “IFOR shall have the unimpeded right to observe, monitor, and inspect any force’s facility or activity in Bosnia that the IFOR believes may have military capability.”

According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, “The U.S. and NATO are not going to Bosnia to fight a war. They are not going to

Bosnia to rebuild the nation, resettle refugees, or oversee elections. They are not under UN control, and there will be no dual-key arrangement. This force will have a clear line of command under NATO and a clear mission. That mission is to implement the peace. The tasks of our forces are clear and limited, and our soldiers understand them. For example, they will mark and monitor a four-kilometer-wide zone of separation between the three factions. They will patrol this zone of separation, and oversee the withdrawal of forces and weapons away from the zone, back to cantonments. They will enforce the cessation of hostilities. The military objective of all of this is to provide a secure environment in Bosnia, and that will allow the international civilian organizations to start helping the Bosnian people rebuild their nation, resettle refugees, oversee elections, and achieve a stable balance of power.” See Perry, Department of Defense briefing, December 11, 1995.

85. Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Operation Uphold Democracy* (July 1995), 152.
86. See, for instance, Thomas W. Lippman, “U.S. to Back Burundi Peace Force,” *Washington Post*, March 3, 1996: A3. Since President Clinton’s inauguration, the United Nations has undertaken six new peacekeeping operations: Somalia (UNOSOM II), Georgia, Liberia, Haiti, and Rwanda. Only Somalia involved U.S. troops, although the United States contributed financially to the others. The late-1995 deployment to Bosnia took place under the aegis of NATO, not the UN.
87. Tice, “The Busiest Major Command”: 22.
88. Current force planning is reflected in former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s *The Bottom-Up Review* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, September 1993). For contending perspectives on the ability of the U.S. armed forces to accomplish this mission statement, see Alan Tonelson, “Superpower Without a Sword,” *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer 1993): 166–80; Lawrence G. Korb, “An Overstuffed Military,” *Foreign Affairs* 74 (November/December 1995): 22–34.

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