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HEARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS
FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS

DECEMBER 5 AND 7, 1949; JANUARY 23, 24, 25, AND 26,
AND MARCH 2, 3, AND 7, 1950

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HEARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II

MONDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1949

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to call, at 11:15 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Hon. John S. Wood, chairman; Francis E. Walter, Burr P. Harrison, and Morgan M. Moulder.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Courtney Owens, investigator; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. Wood. Let the committee be in order, please.

Let the record disclose that for purposes of this particular hearing a subcommittee composed of Mr. Walter, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Moulder, and Mr. Wood has been designated. They are all present.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, the committee and its staff has been for some time pursuing an investigation of reported sales of uranium to the Soviet Government. In view of the fact that so much publicity has recently been given to the sale of this material to the Soviets, it appears advisable that the facts developed by the committee thus far be brought to the attention of the American public. I would like, therefore, to call as the first witness this morning, Louis J. Russell, senior investigator for the committee.

A review of the file pertaining to the matter of the uranium shipments to Russia indicates that there is some disagreement or conflict in statements made by various persons examined or interrogated during the course of the investigation conducted in connection with this matter. It therefore appears advisable that this morning's proceedings be confined to the subject of the shipments of uranium and uranium compounds to the Soviet Government, and such other matters that we may be able to develop through another witness if he appears.

Mr. Wood. Very well. Mr. Russell, will you stand up and be sworn. You solemnly swear the evidence you give this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. RUSSELL. I do.

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS J. RUSSELL

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you please state your name?

Mr. RUSSELL. Louis J. Russell.

Mr. TAVENNER. You are employed by the committee as its senior investigator, are you not?

Mr. RUSSELL. I am.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you had occasion to make an investigation of reported sales of uranium to the Russian Government during the period of your employment by the committee?

Mr. RUSSELL. I have.

Mr. TAVENNER. That investigation related, did it not, to the sales of uranium which were made to the Russian Government from sources within this country?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. How many sales of uranium were made to the Soviet Government according to the facts developed by your investigation?

Mr. RUSSELL. Three that we know of.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did the Russians first become interested in the purchase of uranium or uranium compounds within the United States?

Mr. RUSSELL. In February 1943, according to documents which the staff of the committee has examined.

Mr. TAVENNER. What officials of the Soviet Government were principally interested in the Russian attempts to obtain uranium or uranium compounds?

Mr. RUSSELL. There were several. One of them was V. Finogenov of the Soviet Purchasing Commission; and N. S. Fomichev of the Soviet Purchasing Commission; N. S. Stepanov of the Soviet Purchasing Commission; and a General Rudensky. Col. A. N. Kotikov was the ultimate recipient of the uranium material. He too, was attached to the Soviet Purchasing Commission.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Russell, at this point would you relate the details of the first two shipments of uranium compounds to the Soviet Government?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. Regarding the issuance of the export licenses for uranium compounds, the committee received a letter from the United States State Department from which I will quote. However, since the letter contains controversial material as well as confidential data, I will read only the first paragraph. This paragraph discloses that certain export licenses for the shipment of uranium materials to the Soviet Union were granted, according to the records of the Lend-Lease Administration and the successor to that agency, the Foreign Economic Administration.

This is a letter addressed to Donald T. Appell, a member of the investigating staff of the Un-American Activities Committee, from the Department of State.

Mr. MOULDER. What is the date of the letter?

Mr. RUSSELL. June 11, 1948. [Reading:]

Reference is made to your visit to the Department of State, on behalf of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, with reference to a reported shipment of some black uranium oxide to the Soviet Union in 1943. The Department of State had nothing to do with this transaction. However, the records of the Division for Soviet Supply of the Office of Lend-Lease Admin-

istration and its successor agency, the Foreign Economic Administration, which have been absorbed by the Department of State, indicate that in March 1943 two export licenses were granted, one for 200 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate and the other for 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate. The records also indicate that an export license was granted in April 1943 for 25 pounds of uranium metal, and that in November of the same year an export license was granted for 1,000 grams of heavy water which I believe is also of interest to your committee. Notations and memoranda of the Lend-Lease Administration, included in the records, indicate that there was some consultation between representatives of the War Department, FEA, and Lend-Lease on the granting of export licenses for the uranium materials. These records do not, however, include any actual contemporary communications from the War Department.

As to the shipment of the material to the Soviet Union, the following testimony was given to the committee by Herman R. Rosenberg, of Chemator, Inc., New York City. This concern occupied a position similar to that of a broker in the uranium transactions with the Soviet Government:

On February 1, 1943, we received an inquiry from the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union, Washington, D. C., Mr. N. S. Fomichev, for 220 pounds uranium oxide (U₃O₈), 220 pounds uranium nitrate (uranyl nitrate, UO₂ (NO₃)₂·6H₂O), and 25 pounds uranium metal.

We had previously sold to the Russians approximately four or six small lots of various chemicals, during 1942 and 1943, aggregating a few thousand dollars. This was a very minor part of the regular business done by us during the war years with various Allied purchasing commissions which then offered the only opportunity to continue our export business with those countries which they represented, and the United States Treasury Department buying lend-lease supplies.

This inquiry was the first we had ever received for uranium products from any customer. Accordingly, we had first to find manufacturers and dealers in this line, whom we contacted for the purpose of obtaining information about this article and to get quotations. We were able to obtain at least one offer for each of the products.

We also called the War Production Board, New York City, group 2, to inquire about regulations covering these products and were told that order M-285 of January 26, 1943, had just been issued which, however, merely prohibited the use of uranium chemicals in certain domestic industries, like glass, ceramic, and pottery and that said order said nothing regarding export. If the material is destined for war use by the Russians this order definitely did not apply. For further details we were referred to their Washington miscellaneous minerals division. In reply to our formal inquiry, addressed to this division, Mr. Park, Assistant to R. J. Land, confirmed that the Russian uranium requirement was not subject to regulation M-285. In this connection, Mr. Fomichev advised us that the material was not required for any of the uses restricted by regulation M-285 but was urgently needed for Russian military purposes. Specifically, the uranium salts were represented by the Russians to be needed for military medical purposes and the uranium metal for their war industry to harden steel used for gun barrels. This information, together with its source, we submitted to the War Production Board with our aforesaid inquiry.

Accordingly, on February 3, 1943, we invited the Russian Mission to submit to us their firm order for the uranium oxide and the uranium nitrate. Yet, it was not until the middle of March 1943 that such formal order was received by us. In the meantime the Lend-Lease Administration, through Mr. Moore, a subordinate of General Wessen of that agency, had approved the transaction, advising us on March 8, 1943, that "no further clearance will be necessary except the usual export license." Upon advice on March 11, 1943, of the Soviet Commission of the receipt of such export license, we placed on March 15, 1943, our own order for the 200 (rather than 220) pounds uranium oxide and 220 pounds uranium nitrate with S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., Denver, Colo. On March 23, 1943, this company shipped the material directly to "Col. A. N. Kotikov, Resident Representative of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States of America, Air Service Depot of the Air Transport Command, Gore Field, Great Falls, Mont."

As for the uranium metal, no quotation was ever made by us on this inquiry, due to difficulties encountered in supplying this material from our expected source, the Fairmount Chemical Co.

On March 19, 1943, the Soviet Government advised us that they required several tons of uranium nitrate and uranium chloride (preferably uranium oxychloride, otherwise tri-, tetra- or pentachloride) or urano-uranic oxide, which inquiry was passed on to S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., who answered on March 25, 1943, that they could only offer 500 pounds each of urano-uranic oxide and uranium nitrate and further deliveries only if they received the raw materials. We passed this offer on to the Soviet Commission subject to receipt of the necessary export license and other permissions.

On April 1, 1943, the Soviet Commission asked us to "reserve" 500 pounds of each product as offered by us and on April 5, 1943, they confirmed the order subject to receipt of export license. This license (No. 1643180) was issued only on April 26, 1943. By that time the Shattuck Co. had withdrawn their offer as of April 22, 1943, because the material had been sold to "their regular customers." This made it necessary to secure substitute material from the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., New York City, to have the export license amended as of April 29, 1943, to conform to the change in product and price; and to obtain and place the new sales and purchase contracts with the Russian and Canadian parties, respectively.

Even though we had been advised by the Russians at the outset that, contrary to the first uranium transaction, this deal did not come under lend-lease, they advised us on April 12, 1943, that Mr. Moore had granted the necessary approval of the transaction as a cash purchase. With respect to regulation M-285 we obtained an affidavit from the Russians stating that the oxide will be used in the manufacture of ferro-uranium compounds which in turn will be used in the production of armaments and that the uranium nitrate will be used for medical purposes directly connected with the war. This affidavit we sent on to our suppliers who shipped the materials consisting of 500 pounds of black uranium oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate, directly from Port Hope, Ontario, Canada, to the afore-mentioned Colonel Kotikov.

The gross invoice value of both of the uranium deals, described herein, was \$4,400, on which our gross profit is estimated at \$500-\$600. Both transactions were handled, and payment made on behalf of the Russian Government by Amtorg Trading Corp., New York, N. Y.

On August 5, 1943, Mr. Fomichev inquired, among various other chemicals, about uranium compounds. He said that they asked the WPB if not another 10-15 tons could be located for them. The Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. told us that they are not allowed any longer to quote on uranium compounds; we should approach the WPB but the best way would be that the Soviet Purchasing Commission communicate with the Canadian Ministry of Munitions and Supplies. This we passed on to the Soviet Purchasing Commission and had no further dealings in any uranium products since.

Mr. WALTER. When was this statement made, Mr. Russell?

Mr. RUSSELL. It was made on June 28, 1948.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Russell, according to this testimony by Mr. Rosenberg, export license covering the shipment of uranium compounds to the Soviet Government was granted and the material was shipped to Colonel Kotikov of the Soviet Purchasing Commission; is that correct?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was this material, or the uranium compounds, actually flown to the Soviet Union, as far as your investigation disclosed?

Mr. RUSSELL. The staff as of this date has been unable to locate the actual manifests covering the uranium shipments to Russia. It was reported that atomic materials were sent out of the country as ordinary chemicals and that it would be a difficult if not fruitless task to attempt to identify any particular manifest covering a shipment of atomic material. However, oral information received by the committee reflects that the uranium compounds were flown from the bases

at Great Falls, Mont., to Fairbanks, Alaska, and then to Russia. The export license for the first shipment of uranium to Russia reflects that the ultimate destination of the atomic material was to be Rasnoimport, Ul. Kuibysheva, Moscow, U. S. S. R.

MR. TAVENNER. You have told the committee about your investigation relating to the action of the broker in the sale of this uranium?

MR. RUSSELL. Yes.

MR. TAVENNER. Did you conduct a further investigation of the sellers of the uranium?

MR. RUSSELL. Yes. In connection with the second shipment an investigation was made and it was determined that after the first shipment was made from the United States the Manhattan Engineering District, under General Groves, cut off all sources of supply of uranium material in the United States. However, the source from which the Russians obtained the second shipment of the 1,000 pounds of uranium compounds was a Canadian source. The principal officer of this company was investigated by the committee. However, it developed that this person had been the subject of a criminal investigation by the Canadian Government in connection with the sale of uranium and radium products. The criminal case was, according to our investigation, dropped and a civil suit instituted by the Canadian Government in New York City against the individual involved. The records of the civil case were impounded by a Federal court in New York City after a settlement of more than \$1,000,000 was effected by the Canadian Government. Following the impounding of the records, the committee issued a subpoena calling for the production of these records by a firm of attorneys in New York City. After this subpoena was served, the American State Department advised through a letter addressed to the committee that the Canadian Government had requested that the investigation of the person involved in the second shipment be deferred insofar as the production of the court records were concerned, in the interest of the national security of Canada. Because of this request and the fact that the subject of the investigation was at the time in Paris, France, the staff discontinued its investigation, but the investigation has now been reactivated in view of the fact that the subject has returned to this country.

MR. TAVENNER. Did your investigation show that export licenses covering the shipment of other atomic materials to Russia were granted?

MR. RUSSELL. Yes. The documents that the committee examined reflect that program license No. 339 for the shipment of heavy water to Soviet Russia was granted. The amount called for by the license was 1,000 grams or 41 pounds, valued at \$3,250. This license was granted sometime between October 1 and December 31, 1943.

MR. TAVENNER. Was the heavy water actually shipped to Soviet Russia, as far as you could determine?

MR. RUSSELL. The staff was unable to locate the shipping manifest applying to this particular license.

MR. TAVENNER. Was there any peculiarity surrounding the purchase orders issued by the Russian Government in connection with its application for export license covering uranium oxide?

MR. RUSSELL. Yes. One witness interrogated during the course of the investigation said that on the invoice submitted to lend-lease for

approval by the Russians there would be a list of perhaps 30 or 40 different nonessential chemicals. The request for uranium would be placed near the end of the list. This witness stated he surmised the Russians submitted the invoices in this manner hoping the purchase order would be approved by lend-lease without a careful check being made because the other articles set forth in the invoices were non-essential items.

Mr. TAVENNER. During the period that these licenses were being requested, and in some cases issued, the fact that the United States was working on atomic development was a closely guarded secret, was it not?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Therefore, it appears that the Russians knew in February 1943 that this country was engaged in atomic development, does it not?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did your investigation reflect that the shipment of uranium compounds to the Soviet Union was approved by the Manhattan Engineering District?

Mr. RUSSELL. There is a great deal of controversy concerning whether the Manhattan Engineering District actually approved the shipment of uranium material to Soviet Russia. However, in a letter dated November 18, 1946, addressed to a Government official, Gen. Leslie Groves, the head of the Manhattan Engineering District, it is stated:

Early in 1943 the Russian purchasing commission placed an order with a private firm in this country for 220 pounds of uranium nitrate and 200 pounds of uranium oxide. The individual who arranged this purchase for the Russian purchasing commission is not known. I have reason to believe that the material was flown to Russia in a lend-lease plane. When the Manhattan Engineering District became cognizant of this purchase efforts were made to stop the shipment. These efforts were discontinued when we ascertained that the transaction had already been completely arranged. Shortly after this incident the Manhattan Engineering District arranged for prohibitions to be placed on the export of uranium and for the Manhattan Engineering District to be informed of all inquiries concerning uranium. The liaison established was instrumental, insofar as we know, in stopping subsequent shipments of uranium ores. * * *

Mr. TAVENNER. What reasons were advanced, during the course of your investigation, as to the reasons the Russians were interested in obtaining uranium and securing information as to the sources of supply?

Mr. RUSSELL. There were several reasons advanced. One was that the Russians were working on the atomic bomb themselves; two, the Russians had received information that the United States was working on the development of the atomic bomb, and, through the placement of orders for uranium compounds and uranium itself, they could ascertain whether uranium was considered a strategic element by the United States Government, thereby securing in effect some verification of the report that we were engaged in the development of the atomic bomb; three, the Russians hoped to determine whether the United States was using all of the uranium output and, if it was determined that none was available for export, they would be provided with some indication of the extensiveness of the United States atomic program; four, another reason advanced was that the Russians wanted to ascertain the sources of supply for uranium available to the United States.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Russell, there have appeared in the press and over the radio statements relating to the transfer of quantities of uranium to Russia during 1943. Have you endeavored to secure the presence here of the major who made those statements?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. I have been informed that he will appear at 12:30.

Mr. TAVENNER. 12:30 today?

Mr. RUSSELL. Today.

Mr. TAVENNER. In the course of his statements the name of the late Harry Hopkins was mentioned. I would like to ask you whether, during the course of your investigation, any information came to your attention, or to the attention of any other member of the investigating staff, to your knowledge, that the late Harry Hopkins was involved in the transmittal of uranium to Russia?

Mr. RUSSELL. To the best of my knowledge his name was never brought up. Another name was brought up. I would prefer to furnish that name in executive session.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Walter.

Mr. WALTER. When did you first start this investigation, Mr. Russell?

Mr. RUSSELL. Approximately May or June 1948.

Mr. WALTER. As I understand it, you and your staff have been engaged in a continuous investigation of this matter?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes; off and on.

Mr. WALTER. And at no time during the course of this very thorough investigation was there any indication that the late Harry Hopkins had anything to do with the shipment of this material?

Mr. RUSSELL. His name was never brought to my attention, and I am certain it was never brought to the attention of the other investigators.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Harrison.

Mr. HARRISON. No questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Moulder.

Mr. MOULDER. No questions.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you had an opportunity yet to interrogate or question the party who is to be here at 12:30?

Mr. RUSSELL. We have not. I have only talked to him on the phone.

Mr. TAVENNER. And made arrangements for his presence?

Mr. RUSSELL. That is true.

Mr. WALTER. Who is that man, Mr. Russell?

Mr. RUSSELL. His name is Major Jordan. I am not familiar with his first name.

Mr. WALTER. And he assured you that he would be here at 12:30?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. Has he been subpoenaed?

Mr. RUSSELL. He has not been subpoenaed, but I was promised he would appear.

Mr. WOOD. Have you had any opportunity to subpoena him?

Mr. RUSSELL. No. He was out of the city at the time I called him.

Mr. WOOD. Very well. Any further questions?

Mr. TAVENNER. That is all.

Mr. WOOD. The committee will stand at recess until 12:30.
(Thereupon, at 11:45 a. m., a recess was taken.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. WOOD. Let the committee be in order.

Let the record show that the subcommittee heretofore appointed by the chairman are all present—Mr. Walter, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Moulder, and Mr. Wood.

Are you ready to proceed?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir. As the next witness I would like to call Mr. Jordan.

Mr. WOOD. Major Jordan, will you stand, please, and be sworn. You solemnly swear the evidence you give this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. JORDAN. I do, sir.

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE RACEY JORDAN

Mr. TAVENNER. You are Mr. George Racey Jordan?

Mr. JORDAN. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. I believe a subpoena was served on you today requesting your presence here today?

Mr. JORDAN. I have received such a subpoena.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer the original subpoena in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Jordan Exhibit A."¹

Mr. WOOD. Let it be admitted without objection.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your residence, Mr. Jordan?

Mr. JORDAN. Well, I have an apartment in New York City at 307 East Forty-fourth Street. I have a country home in Pennsylvania and own a ranch in the State of Washington, 80 acres on the water front.

Mr. TAVENNER. It has come to the attention of the committee that you recently made a statement relating to the sale of uranium and the transfer of uranium to Russia. We would like to ask you to tell us about that situation fully, but before doing so I would like to get a few facts regarding yourself. I believe you were an officer in the United States Army or Air Force?

Mr. JORDAN. I was a major in the Air Corps.

Mr. TAVENNER. In the Air Corps. During what period of time were you a major?

Mr. JORDAN. I was a major after the Russians got me promoted. I was a captain to start with.

Mr. TAVENNER. Where were you stationed?

Mr. JORDAN. Originally I was ordered to duty on May 4, 1942, to United Nations Depot No. 8 at the Newark Airport, where we were sending Russian lend-lease material to Russia by boat.

Mr. TAVENNER. How long had you been in the service prior to that time?

Mr. JORDAN. That was the first duty I was given upon entering the service. I was a member of the American Legion and they needed me as a liaison officer.

¹ See appendix.

Mr. TAVENNER. You were a veteran of World War I?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. I was in the old Rickenbacker outfit, in the One Hundred and Forty-seventh Aero Squadron, under Billy Mitchell.

Mr. TAVENNER. Prior to your enlistment in World War II, in what business were you engaged?

Mr. JORDAN. Merchandising and selling advertising. I was advertising manager for Ruppert Brewery, and Schaefer Brewery before that, and Piel Brewery before that.

Mr. TAVENNER. How long were you stationed in New Jersey?

Mr. JORDAN. I reported for duty on the 10th day of May 1942, and when the Russian movement was not making much progress in getting material to Russia by boat, we shifted to Great Falls, Mont., to fly the material, and I went there January 1, 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. At the time you were stationed in New Jersey, what is a proper description of your position and your outfit?

Mr. JORDAN. Four days after I arrived at Newark they made me acting executive officer of the airport.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who was your superior officer?

Mr. JORDAN. Col. Robert L. Rockwell.

Mr. TAVENNER. At whose direction were you ordered to shift station?

Mr. JORDAN. Colonel Rockwell appointed me assistant to Col. Anatole N. Kotikov, stationed at Newark. He had a number of Russian expeditors with him of the purchasing commission, and I was contact officer between the Russians and Commanding Officer Rockwell. After the Russian movement became greater than facilities at Newark could afford, and the boats going to Murmansk were being attacked out of Norway, when we lost 21 out of one convoy of 34, it was too much for lend-lease and they decided to try something else. We attempted to fly some medium bombers from South America to Africa, but by the time they got across Africa to Tiflis the motors had to be taken down and they were not much use to the Russians, and they were not able to get enough on boats in Africa to get to the Russia lines, and Mr. Harriman and Mr. Hopkins of lend-lease had promised a great movement of planes, so we finally tried to fly them. We thought if we started at Great Falls, Mont., and used the old Gore Field routes we could establish a route provided the Russians could provide a similar route through Siberia.

In August 1942 Col. L. Ponton de Arce opened the air route and a few planes started through. I have the shipments and the number. It ran about five the first month of A-20's, the so-called Havocs.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the first month?

Mr. JORDAN. August 1942. They went through all right, and quickly, and it was decided that that would be a good route to fly them in a pipe line. So we changed our entire operations to Great Falls, Mont., and started setting up an Air Force operation on Gore Field at Great Falls.

Col. Roy B. Gardner, a First World War veteran, a flier, my immediate superior, went out there and established the route, and when he got the thing kind of going he sent for the Russian contingent and myself, and General Farthing at Newark Airport ordered the whole Russian movement sent to Great Falls, and I had very special orders, orders that gave my activities priority even over the American Air Force. It was a little difficult for a captain to get things, sometimes.

and I used to show these orders. This order is known as a Presidential directive. It says:

The President has directed that "airplanes be delivered in accordance with protocol schedules by the most expeditious means."

Would you like to see it? That was from General Arnold to General Frank, and General Frank sent it to Great Falls and suggested that Captain Jordan "who was recently assigned to your station be appointed" for the purpose of expediting the movement.

Mr. TAVENNER. May we have a copy of that order?

Mr. JORDAN. You may.

Mr. TAVENNER. Before you were transferred to Great Falls, did you have anyone assisting you in your particular duties in New Jersey?

Mr. JORDAN. We had hundreds.

Mr. TAVENNER. In what capacity did those hundreds of people work with you?

Mr. JORDAN. Well, more under the direction of Colonel Gardner, who was a captain at that time. We received the airplanes from the various factories and we treated them so that we could put them on the surface of freighters and the salt water would not corrode the motors so that when they arrived at Murmansk they could be used.

Mr. TAVENNER. I understood you were liaison officer at Newark?

Mr. JORDAN. I was acting executive officer, but directed most of my efforts to seeing that Colonel Kotikov got living quarters and food and automobiles and everything else they needed, because we had been instructed to give them attention and priority in all their needs.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were any persons assigned to you as assistants purely in connection with your work as liaison officer?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. I didn't speak Russian and had an interpreter.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who was the interpreter?

Mr. JORDAN. David Stone.

Mr. TAVENNER. David Stone?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know where he lives?

Mr. JORDAN. No. He was one of several interpreters. The Russians hired an interpreter by the name of Jurist, J-u-r-i-s-t, and he was such an excellent interpreter that we gradually used the Russian interpreter rather than the American interpreter. His name was Simeon Jurist. We gradually had different employees who were hired for the purpose of assisting us with the Russians, stenographers and various people of Russian extraction who could speak and type in Russian. Do you wish their names?

Mr. TAVENNER. No; unless some of those persons went with you to Great Falls. If they did, I would like to have their names.

Mr. JORDAN. The only one who went on to Great Falls was Mr. Jurist, Simeon Jurist.

Mr. TAVENNER. He was a Russian national?

Mr. JORDAN. He is an American, I believe, but the Russians succeeded in hiring him before we did.

Mr. TAVENNER. Where is he now, do you know?

Mr. JORDAN. No; I am sorry.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you seen him at any time since 1943?

Mr. JORDAN. I have never seen him since, although I received a letter from him. The secretary, who I believe was an American, Margo

Stowe, I wanted to take her to Great Falls as a stenographer and interpreter, but it was not possible at that time.

Mr. WOOD. You say you had a letter from Mr. Jurist?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir. Would you care to see it?

Mr. WOOD. Where was it written from?

Mr. JORDAN. Alaska.

Mr. WOOD. What part of Alaska?

Mr. JORDAN. Fairbanks.

Mr. WOOD. How long ago was that?

Mr. JORDAN. It was just before I left the service sometime.

Mr. WOOD. Was he in the service, or did he have a civilian status?

Mr. JORDAN. He had a civilian status.

Here is a letter dated March 30, 1943, from Jurist to me, written from Fairbanks. I haven't read it for some time, but you can have it.

Mr. WOOD. May we retain this letter a sufficient length of time to have it photostated and then return it to you, Major?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. Here is another one. You see, I kept these records in case you might need them. Here is another one.

Mr. TAVENNER. In the letter of March 30, 1943, reference is made to a Lieutenant Silver, I believe.

Mr. JORDAN. He was liaison officer in Fairbanks between Russians and Americans under Major Mortimer.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was he stationed at any time at Great Falls?

Mr. JORDAN. No. He was always at Fairbanks.

Mr. WOOD. Do you know where he is now?

Mr. JORDAN. I am sorry, I don't.

Mr. WOOD. Do you know if he is still in the service?

Mr. JORDAN. No, I don't.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is Lieutenant Silver's first name?

Mr. JORDAN. Just a moment. I will have to look up the officers at Great Falls and Fairbanks.

Mr. MOULDER. What is the date of that letter?

Mr. TAVENNER. March 30, 1943.

Mr. JORDAN. His name was Phillip Silver, assistant supply officer of the Three Hundred and Eighty-fourth Base Headquarters Squadron. He is married and his serial number is 9564291.

Mr. TAVENNER. In the letter of April 19, 1943, addressed to you from Simeon Jurist, reference is made to Captain de Tolly.

Mr. JORDAN. Nicholas S. de Tolly. He is an American citizen, American officer, a fine flyer, and he taught the Russians how to fly our planes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was he stationed at any time at Great Falls?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes; as my assistant.

Mr. TAVENNER. Where is he now?

Mr. JORDAN. Military attaché to Moscow, to the best of my knowledge. His great grandfather defeated Napoleon in 1814. He is quite important to the Russians. He made a hit with them.

Mr. WOOD. For purposes of identification you had better identify those letters, had you not?

Mr. TAVENNER. We will identify the three letters from Simeon Jurist to Capt. George Jordan, dated, respectively, March 30, 1943, April 19, 1943, and September 25, 1943, as Jordan exhibits B, C, and D, and I offer them in evidence as exhibits by those numbers.

Mr. WOOD. They will be admitted, with the understanding that when they are photostated the originals will be returned to the witness.²

Mr. TAVENNER. Major Jordan, describe to us your duties at Great Falls, please.

Mr. JORDAN. I think it would be easier if you would let me read my orders, which I tried to follow:

1. In connection with the movement of aircraft to U. S. S. R. through your station, it is directed that you appoint an officer who will be charged with the following duties:

- (a) Inspect aircraft upon arrival, to determine—
 - (1) Condition.
 - (2) Status of regular equipment.
- (b) Install special flight equipment as requested by Russia.
- (c) Receive and store special flight equipment furnished for this movement.
- (d) Report any shortages of regular equipment to United Nations Branch, Overseas Section, and take necessary action to have them supplied.
- (e) Furnish United Nations Branch, Overseas Section, with daily report covering arrivals and departure of these aircraft and status of those held on field.
- (f) Coordinate activities of Air Service Command, Air Transport Command, and Materiel Command which affect this entire movement of aircraft.
- (g) Receive and transmit messages and requisitions from Fairbanks.
- (h) Coordinate and expedite air freight movements for U. S. S. R. from Great Falls and Edmonton.

2. It is recommended that Captain Jordan who was recently assigned to your station be appointed for this purpose.

By command of Major General Frank:

C. P. KANE, *Colonel, Air Corps.*

Mr. TAVENNER. What assistance did you have in the performance of your duties at Great Falls?

Mr. JORDAN. I started out with a few, and it grew. The air-freight movement was getting heavier, and in 1943 important Russian people used to go through with 5 or 6 suitcases. I didn't stop them at that time because I thought maybe it was legitimate. But when they started sending the suitcases without people I got interested, and sending 50 suitcases with armed couriers didn't seem proper, and didn't have diplomatic immunity as far as I could see. I let the first two or three batches go through, and inquired of the State Department and the War Department whether the bags had diplomatic immunity. I couldn't get an answer from the State Department, but I did out of the War Department, and they said I was to be helpful to the Russians in every way.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have a copy of those communications?

Mr. JORDAN. The telephone calls I made daily to the War Department are a matter of record. The particular complaint that I had was the number of suitcases that seemed to be arriving with just armed guards, and I couldn't reconcile them as belonging to diplomatic immunity status, and I spoke to the security officer on the field and he agreed with me that it looked like they were taking advantage of us, and maybe we ought to ask the Inspector General for an inspector.

Mr. WOOD. Who was the security officer on the field?

Mr. JORDAN. Lt. Col. George F. O'Neal.

Mr. TAVENNER. How many security officers were on duty there?

Mr. JORDAN. If you are talking about Gore Field, Colonel de Arce, the commanding officer, had one or two different security officers, and

² See appendix.

when we consider the freight depot where I was working was under a separate command that was under Colonel Meredith, his security officer was Lieutenant Colonel O'Neal. We were interlopers on the field, and the Russian movement was one thing that grew until it took over the whole business.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you recall Colonel Meredith's first name?

Mr. JORDAN. Colonel Meredith's first name was Russell, Russell L. Meredith.

Mr. WOOD. With whom did you carry on the daily conversations with the War Department.

Mr. JORDAN. I called Col. W. W. Goodman, who, it will be noted, is mentioned in the Presidential directive as the officer I was to communicate with daily, and Colonel Goodman communicated with the purchasing agency direct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Your inquiry relating to the baggage that you thought did not have diplomatic clearance was by telephone, or by word of mouth, and not by written communication; is that right?

Mr. JORDAN. I went to Washington for the purpose of seeing the officers who were my superiors, and there were several questions I had in mind. One was this particular amount of baggage, and another was the number of shortages that were appearing on the planes. I personally reported to the Inspector General. I understand he doesn't remember me, but I told him about this, and I suggested we ought to have this matter looked into. According to my diary, I called on him on the 8th of January. I have a note in my diary on January 8: "Went to Washington to Colonel Page's office." He was Chief of the International Section. Then I have a note: "I saw General Jones." I asked General Jones for an inspector, and on the 25th in my diary I have a note that Lt. Col. Robert H. Dahm from the Inspector General's Office appeared at the field. We went into everything.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the result of the Inspector General's visit, or his agent's visit?

Mr. JORDAN. He went back to Washington and there was a kind of a long period. In the meantime, I had been complaining some more, and on March 3 I have a notation——

Mr. WOOD. What year is that?

Mr. JORDAN. That is the year 1944. All of this diary is 1944. On March 3 I have a note that 10 inspectors arrived from General Jones' office. They went into everything.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did they make a written report?

Mr. JORDAN. I wouldn't know. It wouldn't come to me. I would never see that report. I have been informed they did make a report, but I have never seen it and don't know for certain.

Mr. WALTER. Do you know who the 10 inspectors were?

Mr. JORDAN. I do not, sir. I have the names of some of the inspectors as they arrived, but that particular 10 I do not have.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you give us the names of those inspectors who did appear there from time to time, as far as you know?

Mr. JORDAN. Maj. Bernard Hahn, H-a-h-n, arrived.

Mr. TAVENNER. When?

Mr. JORDAN. I think he must have been one of the group that arrived, because I have 10 inspectors arrived on March 3, then I have the note that Major Hahn departed on March 17, so he is apparently

one of those who arrived on March 3 and he departed on the 17th. I went to lunch with him and knew him very well.

Mr. MOULDER. Where was the investigation?

Mr. JORDAN. Great Falls, Mont.

I have a note April 7, 1944, Friday, that a Maj. Fred A. Farrar, air inspector, arrived. I showed him around and introduced him to the Russians at the hangar, and the next note says Colonel Kotikov departed for Washington. I think he was being annoyed with all this inspection, so he went to Washington immediately.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is there anything else you can report to us regarding the action of the Army regarding your complaint centering around the appearance of the suitcases without diplomatic immunity?

Mr. JORDAN. Well, sir, the Army left it pretty much up—Do you refer to the Army or to the Air Force?

Mr. TAVENNER. Take both. Take first the Army.

Mr. JORDAN. The Army had their own method of inspecting, and I wouldn't know what their decision was. The Air Force I was more familiar with. I can't tell you which officer or how, but I was told that higher authority was passing on these things and that my job was simply to expedite them and not to cause so much ruckus about them.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you tell us your experience with the State Department? I understand you reported the matter to the State Department.

Mr. JORDAN. Well, I went to Washington on that trip and walked up and down the corridors of the State Department trying to find somebody who would tell me they had diplomatic immunity. I was passed from one room to another. The impression I got from the State Department was that I was being too officious, and I would be better off if I helped expedite the movement and did not spend so much time in Washington. So I decided to go back to Great Falls and let the matter rest.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did any person in the State Department make such a statement to you?

Mr. JORDAN. I saw a John Hazard, the chief of the entire outfit, and he told me everything was known in Washington and that they understood thoroughly what was going on, and there wasn't anything for me to worry about; that I should help the Russians all I could, and that they were thoroughly aware of everything that was going on.

Mr. MOULDER. What was the date of that?

Mr. JORDAN. The 8th day of January 1944.

Mr. TAVENNER. Could you determine the source of any of this material, as to whether it was brought from Washington, New York, or various places?

Mr. JORDAN. You mean the air freight?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes. I am speaking now of the suitcases. Do you know the origins of shipment of any of those suitcases?

Mr. JORDAN. On February 28, 1944, Major Hayes, of the American Air Force flew plane 6052 with two Russians and 3,628 pounds of mail from Gravelly Point. I asked him where the mail came from, and he said it arrived in a black limousine from the Russian Embassy, and he flew it to where I took over.

Mr. TAVENNER. Tell us your experience with suitcases.

Mr. JORDAN. The suitcases started early in 1943 in small numbers, and I remember one officer going through with quite a large number of suitcases early in 1944, and he had so many of them I was beginning to wonder if I was doing the right thing in my job to allow a man to take so many suitcases through. A notation in my diary says Col. Pavel Berizine and Colonel Yakiv came through with a large number. I think that amount of suitcases is what caused me to decide that I had better be prepared for the \$64 question if anybody ever asked me what was in the suitcases, and I made up my mind that the next time I would open some of these suitcases.

Mr. TAVENNER. What action did you take with regard to the suitcases?

Mr. JORDAN. Well, sir, I could always tell when suitcases were going to arrive, because one of the cargo planes would be put on the line and left unloaded, and the mechanics would tell me the Russian colonels had told them to leave a plane empty for a very special assignment. The Russians could not give orders, and those people would come to me and say: "The Russian colonels have asked us to do this. Will you give the order?" I would give an order for a cargo plane to be put in readiness, waiting for special cargo.

I could always tell that cargo would arrive in the middle of the night, because that is the way they do things. The Russians are very close with their money. They don't spend anything they don't have to. I used to have to pick their checks up at the officers' club where I ate with them. In fact, we assigned three slot machines where the profits went to pay the checks of the Russians.

This night the Russians, much to my surprise, invited me to Great Falls for a chicken dinner. There was a lot of vodka. It happened I didn't drink. They suggested a toast to Stalin, Molotov, Roosevelt, and everybody else. I was suspicious, but I had left word at the control tower if a plane came in to call me at the restaurant, and a call came there, and I went to the field and two armed Russians were standing over the suitcases. One of them tried to keep me out of the plane. The suitcases were black, cheap, patent leather, with white rope sash cord tied around them and gobs of red sealing wax over the knots. They screamed diplomatic immunity, and I said: "That doesn't look diplomatic to me." I ripped the cords off and opened about one-third of them. I had one of our own guards stand with a rifle on his shoulder so they would know I had a little protection.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you have assistance in that work at that time?

Mr. JORDAN. There were mechanics and freight loaders there. We had a night force. One of the reporters told me they had found a man in Great Falls who claimed he was there and saw me open them.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is his name?

Mr. JORDAN. Just a moment. I have a list of all the employees, their names and addresses. [Looking at list.] What I thought was the address is the date they joined the depot. His name is Marcus McCann, and he joined our depot the first of March 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you spell his name, please?

Mr. JORDAN. MARCUS, M-a-r-c-u-s, McCann, M-c-C-a-n-n.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know his residence?

Mr. JORDAN. No. It does not give his address. It gives the date he arrived at the depot.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you permit us to have this list of employees?

Mr. JORDAN. I certainly will.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer it in evidence and ask that it be marked "Jordan Exhibit E."³

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted with the understanding it will be photostated and the original returned to the witness.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like to introduce at this time copies of the orders, dated January 1, 1943, and January 9, 1943, respectively, as "Jordan Exhibit F" and "Jordan Exhibit G."⁴

Mr. WOOD. Let them be admitted with the same understanding.

Mr. WALTER. Major, do you remember the date on which you opened those suitcases?

Mr. JORDAN. I had a very active and busy life out there. I opened a number of suitcases on a number of occasions. To try to pin it down to the exact date is a little difficult.

Mr. HARRISON. You didn't note it in your diary?

Mr. JORDAN. No, sir. I think I might have noted something like that in my diary, except that it might have happened in December 1943, just before I started this diary. It was cold enough for the fillings to drop out of your teeth at that time, about 20 below zero, and I wouldn't have time to make notes in the middle of the night of that type. I have no notes in my diary of opening suitcases, because that didn't seem to me to be so important at the time. The data I have in my diary is dates of arrival and dates of departure and things of that kind.

Mr. TAVENNER. What did you find in these suitcases?

Mr. WOOD. The ones you speak of that you opened in the middle of the night, were they the first ones you opened?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. I had an envelope in my pocket. Gentlemen, I only opened these suitcases for my own protection. I was a sergeant in the First World War and had been trained to be in a position, if I was ever inspected, to tell the inspectors the situation in my own little particular job, and I was worried to some extent over a long period of time as to what would happen to me if the FBI or anybody asked me what was in those suitcases. I made some notes for my own benefit. I jotted on the back of an envelope the things in the suitcases. To me it meant large masses of folders, and in these folders were various papers and things. I can read from my notes and elaborate as to what I saw, but each note just says one word, and that one word to me means a whole suitcase.

Mr. HARRISON. Were those notes made at the time?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. The notes were made on the back of an envelope I had in my pocket, and I had a hand flashlight. Then when I got in a hangar where it was warm I made all the notes on one piece of paper. I will be glad to read some of the notes to you if that will answer your question.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, I think that will serve the purpose. Before that I want to ask you this: I notice from the newspaper account of your interview over the radio that you named several persons in the

³ See appendix.

⁴ See appendix.

State Department who you thought were implicated in irregularities of one type or another.

Mr. JORDAN. I didn't name anyone.

Mr. TAVENNER. You did not give their names. You spoke of them by letters.

Mr. JORDAN. That was the interviewer's idea. He said to call them "Mr. X" and "Mr. Y."

Mr. TAVENNER. You may have had some good reason for not making public those names, and if you prefer the committee, I believe, will hear those names in a closed session, if there is any reason why you do not wish to make them public.

Mr. JORDAN. I must again tell you that I only made these notes privately, and they were simply notes to remind me—You see, I opened about one-third of the suitcases, and I sometimes would just open a suitcase and note the general contents and go to the next one, because I wanted to get the job done as soon as possible.

In one particular suitcase there was one particular thing that attracted my eye, and I did open that suitcase full length and try to examine it, although, frankly, it didn't mean anything to me at the time. I would rather, if you don't mind, not mention any names, but just tell you the kind of general material that I saw in the suitcases.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you object to telling the committee in closed session the information, not to be released until such time as the committee determines?

Mr. JORDAN. Not whatever. I think I am doing everything I can to be helpful, and I wish to give everything I know, because the small piece of information I happen to have, I have been informed, is the key to other information.

Mr. TAVENNER. With that understanding, just proceed with a description of the material, and we will hear in a closed session, with the chairman's approval, as to the identity of the parties.

Mr. JORDAN. This piece of paper starts off with the word "Notes" and it says:

"Always just 50 black suitcases each load with 2 or 3 couriers. Usually about 3 weeks apart.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am sorry. Will you repeat that?

Mr. JORDAN. The top of the paper, as I had written it that night, says:

Notes. Always just 50 black suitcases each load with 2 or 3 couriers. Usually about 3 weeks apart.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is what you wrote at the time?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. I am reading you the notes that I wrote.

Mr. TAVENNER. And that you wrote at the time?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes; that I wrote at the time to refresh my memory later.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did you actually make the written memorandum?

Mr. JORDAN. That was gathered from three or four envelopes. I put it on this one sheet.

Mr. HARRISON. When did you write it on that sheet?

Mr. JORDAN. Maybe a couple days after I wrote it on the envelopes. I consolidated what was on the envelopes.

Mr. HARRISON. You destroyed the envelopes?

Mr. JORDAN. I threw them away, yes. The second note says: "Papers were always cut close." The first suitcase I opened had a large book on how to ship four-legged animals; how many sheep and calves and veal would go in a car; and the rate on shipments of animals from every city in the United States to every other city. The book was about that big [indicating].

Mr. HARRISON. Information similar to publications put out by—

Mr. JORDAN. The railroads. The next suitcase was full of information from Tass. The next suitcase was full of information from Amtorg Purchasing Commission.

Mr. HARRISON. What do you mean by information?

Mr. JORDAN. Mostly made up of catalogs. My curiosity as to those catalogs was interesting, because I worked for McGraw-Hill Co. at one time and recognized the names of many of the firms. This is what I mean [producing catalog]. This type of catalog would be in the suitcase, just like that. Years later I have another catalog from Russia that shows you what has happened [producing another catalog]. There is the Russian catalog.

Mr. TAVENNER. Give us the date of publication of the first catalog you presented.

Mr. JORDAN. I am showing you this as a sample. In other words, this is an American catalog, and here is the Russian catalog.

Mr. TAVENNER. Where the same thing is reproduced?

Mr. JORDAN. Where the same thing is reproduced in Russian, and many of the catalogs were completely reproduced in Russian.

Mr. TAVENNER. Proceed.

Mr. JORDAN. The next note that I have here—and at that time none of these things meant very much to me. I didn't know the meaning of some of them. My next note says "Panama Canal Commission Maps." There were a couple suitcases about the Panama Canal.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the type of information about the Panama Canal, maps or magazines?

Mr. JORDAN. They were mostly maps, and markings on the maps. It looked to me they had been public, and they could have gotten them easily.

My next note says, "Oak Ridge."

Mr. WOOD. At that time had you ever heard of Oak Ridge?

Mr. JORDAN. No. I didn't know what it was.

Mr. TAVENNER. Tell us more about Oak Ridge. What was the significance of that memorandum as to Oak Ridge?

Mr. JORDAN. The reason that I noticed this particularly, and the reason I looked at it more, was because it had a memorandum on the front from the White House, and it said in handwriting on the White House stationery, it said:

Had a hell of a time getting these away from Groves. H. H.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you know who Groves was?

Mr. JORDAN. No, sir. I do now.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did anyone see that document besides yourself, that you know of?

Mr. JORDAN. The Russians were the only other persons. The American guards were standing outside the door of the plane.

Mr. MOULDER. May I ask a question?

Mr. WOOD. Yes, sir. Mr. Moulder.

Mr. MOULDER. To whom was this note addressed?

Mr. JORDAN. I have been asked that question before, and it is very difficult for me to remember, because I didn't really attach much importance to it; but I would like to tell you that something else happened that makes me think I know. I remember 2 or 3 days later asking Colonel Kotikov who a Mr. Mikoyan was.

Mr. TAVENNER. How do you spell that?

Mr. JORDAN. M-i-k-o-y-a-n, I believe. Colonel Kotikov told me he was one of the three most important men in Russia. I am sure I asked Colonel Kotikov who Mikoyan was because I had seen the name and was trying to be cagey with him. I had never heard the name before.

Mr. MOULDER. How did you observe that note? Was it outside the suitcase?

Mr. JORDAN. No. I had opened the suitcase.

Mr. MOULDER. Was it lying loose in the suitcase?

Mr. JORDAN. No. It was in an envelope or folder.

Mr. MOULDER. Did you have to open an envelope to see this note?

Mr. JORDAN. I had to open a folder, and the folder had an elastic band around it, and there were blueprints and things in the folder, and the note was on the front of the blueprints.

Mr. MOULDER. How many folders did you observe in the suitcase?

Mr. JORDAN. They telescope like an accordion. They were all one.

Mr. MOULDER. How many did you examine?

Mr. JORDAN. I looked through the suitcase perfunctorily.

Mr. MOULDER. How many folders did you examine?

Mr. JORDAN. The suitcase was full of folders.

Mr. TAVENNER. This letter you spoke of, was it typewritten?

Mr. JORDAN. No. It was in handwriting.

Mr. TAVENNER. It was addressed to a person?

Mr. JORDAN. It was addressed to a person of some kind.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the date when you found that letter, as near as you can tell?

Mr. JORDAN. I don't know. It was in the period of the winter of 1943 and 1944 and spring of 1944, because that is when I started opening suitcases.

Mr. TAVENNER. Describe a little more clearly how you happened to find that particular letter. Were all the files opened in such a way you could see the contents of the files?

Mr. JORDAN. They were black suitcases, and the entire suitcases were full of folders. After I had opened all sorts of folders it was all the same material, practically, so it didn't make too much of an impression on me. I was looking for morphine at the time because we had been missing morphine and I was looking for drugs. The maps and various things I saw, I just made a check of every fourth or fifth suitcase. I was doing what we call in the Army spot-checking. I made no attempt to make an inventory, and I only did this for my own benefit, so that if anybody ever asked me what was in the suitcase I could say, "They were full of maps and material on blast furnaces, concrete mixers, oil machinery, and so on."

Mr. WALTER. When were these suitcases delivered to the field?

Mr. JORDAN. On a number of different dates.

Mr. WALTER. This particular incident, the ones you opened?

Mr. JORDAN. The ones I opened, I can't tell you, because I opened several loads.

Mr. HARRISON. You mentioned no dates in your notes?

Mr. JORDAN. There is no date here as to the suitcases I opened, although I have dates of arrival of planes.

Mr. HARRISON. You have that in your diary?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. Why did you note one thing in your diary and not the other thing?

Mr. JORDAN. Because I started the diary in 1944 and opened some suitcases in 1943.

Mr. HARRISON. You opened suitcases in 1943 and 1944?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. And you started keeping your diary in 1944?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. And you made notes about suitcases—

Mr. JORDAN. There is no note in here about suitcases. The notes in here are plane arrivals and the numbers of the planes and the pilots.

Mr. HARRISON. But you did not note suitcases in your diary?

Mr. JORDAN. There were about a million pounds of freight on our field all the time. I opened so much different freight that I did not make a note of suitcases particularly.

Mr. HARRISON. Did the Russians report you to your superior command for opening suitcases over their protests?

Mr. JORDAN. They said I would be removed immediately.

Mr. HARRISON. Did you hear anything from your superior officers?

Mr. JORDAN. Never. I don't think the Russians reported it.

Mr. WALTER. As I understand you, the suitcases came at night and were removed immediately from where they were unloaded to other planes?

Mr. JORDAN. Just a moment. Sometimes if the planes had pilots and were ready to go we would move the suitcases directly from one plane to another, but many times we took them and put them in a warehouse, and the couriers would stretch their blankets over them and sleep on them. One guarded while the other slept, and they never would let them out of their sight. They came prepared to sleep on top of the suitcases.

Mr. WALTER. Then how would it have been possible to put in the suitcases the narcotics you said you thought might be in them?

Mr. JORDAN. The Russians were alone with the suitcases at night, and we had been missing a great deal of morphine from our first-aid kits. We had stockrooms full of first-aid kits, and they were being rifled, and the suitcases were in the same building and same rooms, and I thought it possible these couriers were the culprits.

Mr. MOULDER. You say you were attending a party that the Russians had prearranged for you to be present, a chicken dinner, I believe?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. MOULDER. And there they offered you drinks of vodka?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. MOULDER. How long were you there?

Mr. JORDAN. It wasn't exactly a party. It was a straight dinner. We had to eat every night, and we went together.

Mr. MOULDER. How far was it from the airport?

Mr. JORDAN. About 4 miles.

Mr. MOULDER. And you had left instructions to be called?

Mr. JORDAN. I had a staff car at the restaurant with a driver.

Mr. MOULDER. And when you opened the suitcases the Russian armed guards were there?

Mr. JORDAN. They were always with them.

Mr. MOULDER. And this particular suitcase where you found the note, you say the note was in a folder?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. MOULDER. Loose in a folder?

Mr. JORDAN. The entire suitcase was full of folders.

Mr. MOULDER. I am referring to this one where you found a note. You said it was addressed to someone whose name you couldn't remember, but it stated, "I had a hell of a time getting this from Groves." Was there more on the note?

Mr. JORDAN. There was a great deal more.

Mr. MOULDER. Was it on one sheet?

Mr. JORDAN. Two sheets. It was attached to some maps.

Mr. MOULDER. Did you inspect what it was attached to?

Mr. JORDAN. I have some notes on that.

Mr. MOULDER. Do you have your notes on that?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was that?

Mr. JORDAN. I have a memorandum to myself to look up words on maps that are labeled "Oak Ridge, Manhattan Engineering Department or District," I believe it was.

Mr. WOOD. Had you ever heard of the Manhattan Engineering District before that time?

Mr. JORDAN. Never. The words I noted were "Uranium 92; neutrons; protons; energy produced by fission"; and I had a note to look up the word "cyclotron." I took those words off a memorandum in the suitcase.

Mr. TAVENNER. Off of which particular memorandum in the suitcase?

Mr. JORDAN. It is very difficult to tell which one. I took some of the words off the maps and some off the letters in the suitcase, and some came off the backs. As far as I remember, I put down words so that I could identify them if anybody asked me.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were any of those words taken off the map or plat to which the letter you referred was attached?

Mr. JORDAN. I believe they were all taken off maps.

Mr. TAVENNER. In this particular suitcase it was all maps?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. What type of maps?

Mr. JORDAN. They looked like engineering maps. They looked like duplicates of engineering maps, the kind that are photostated.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you see any secret or confidential stamp, or classified stamp, on them?

Mr. JORDAN. All the places where the word "secret" had been placed had been cut out with a pair of scissors. In fact, in the suitcases from the State Department there was folder after folder after folder where

every single one had been cut off. If I had found the word "secret," I would have grounded the plane. I never did find it, but the place was there where it had been cut off at the top and bottom.

Mr. TAVENNER. You spoke of papers from the State Department. Were such papers in this particular suitcase where the letter was found?

Mr. JORDAN. No. Agriculture and Commerce and State each had their own suitcases.

Mr. TAVENNER. Tell us about these suitcases.

Mr. JORDAN. They simply had the words "Commerce" and "Agriculture." There was one suitcase on the Donetz Siberia; oil machinery; scientific data from Iron Age; and shipping data.

Mr. HARRISON. These notes you are reading from now were made in 1944?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. And were copied at one time from envelopes?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. Why didn't you copy them in your diary instead of that loose sheet of paper?

Mr. JORDAN. That is why I believe they were written in 1943, because I didn't keep a diary in 1943.

Mr. HARRISON. You mean these notes you hold in your hand were made in 1943?

Mr. JORDAN. I believe they were made at the end of 1943.

Mr. HARRISON. And you didn't open suitcases in 1944?

Mr. JORDAN. I did.

Mr. HARRISON. Did you make notes of it?

Mr. JORDAN. I have one note in my diary which seems to be of the kind you are asking about. I opened one batch of suitcases and this is what I said—

Mr. HARRISON. This is a bound book made at the time?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. Here is a note in my diary that says: "C-47, No. 2940, departed today with 3,800 pounds of mail, 50 suitcases." I went through those suitcases, and in every suitcase there were oil-refinery maps, the entire load.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is the date of that entry you have just referred to?

Mr. JORDAN. 27th of March, on Monday.

Mr. TAVENNER. 1944?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Going back to your original memorandum, you referred to State Department documents?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Describe them in more particularity.

Mr. JORDAN. I am sorry I can't give you more of a minute description. I just remember generally. By referring to my notes I can remember I saw a lot of official looking photostats that had the word "Secret" cut off. There were entire suitcases full from the State and Agriculture Departments.

Mr. TAVENNER. How did you know they were from the State and Agriculture Departments?

Mr. JORDAN. I ran my hand through the folders to see if the whole suitcase was the same thing.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was there about the documents that indicated to you they were from the State or Agriculture Departments?

Mr. JORDAN. The heading on the letterheads.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were they letters or documents, do you know?

Mr. JORDAN. I am guessing now. They were all mixed up. They were different kinds of things. I only opened every third or fourth suitcase. If I had a State Department suitcase I would skip the next two or three, and the Russians would follow me and try to put the cords back together.

Mr. TAVENNER. Proceed with your notes and explain everything they call to your attention.

Mr. JORDAN. The only explanation I can give is that I simply jotted down the type of folder I was looking at in one of the suitcases. To give you a minute description would be impossible.

Mr. MOULDER. Just read your notes.

Mr. JORDAN. Another load of suitcases from Aberdeen Proving Ground had folders on Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Cuba; maps of the United States, automobile maps, "marked strangely," I have. The maps were the kind you get at an automobile station. They had been trimmed and cut, and on the maps were marked where our industrial plants were.

Mr. WOOD. You say they had marked on these maps places where our industrial plants were located. Did you know that or ascertain it later?

Mr. JORDAN. I mean by the markings, for instance, at Pittsburgh they would have "Westinghouse" and "Blaw-Knox" and things like that. They had every city in the United States and everything was marked.

Mr. HARRISON. Did you report that to anybody at the time?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. I told Colonel Gardner and Colonel O'Neal and several other officers what I had done.

Mr. HARRISON. Did you report to them what you had seen?

Mr. JORDAN. I remember making a talk downtown at Great Falls, Mont., to some people who asked me to tell them about the Russians. I remember telling them about the silly things I saw in the suitcases about four-legged animals and maps, and I thought my apprehension about the suitcases was unfounded.

Mr. HARRISON. About when did you make that public speech?

Mr. JORDAN. Early in 1944.

Mr. HARRISON. Was it reported in the local press?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. I believe the newspaper made an editorial of it.

Mr. HARRISON. Do you have a copy of it?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. It appeared in the Great Falls Leader.

Mr. HARRISON. This editorial says how highly you regarded Soviet Russia. It doesn't say you found these things in suitcases. Was any record made of your having made a statement at the time as to these things you discovered in the suitcases?

Mr. JORDAN. I mentioned the four-legged animals as an example of the infantile things the Russians thought were important, and that we were risking lives to get through. It seemed to be innocent material.

Mr. HARRISON. There is nothing about that in this editorial.

Mr. JORDAN. This covers the date I made the speech, April 20, 1944.

Mr. WALTER. Were the usual diplomatic pouches being sent through that station?

Mr. JORDAN. Not that I know of.

Mr. WALTER. By that I mean pouches from Government to Government?

Mr. JORDAN. No.

Mr. WALTER. None of them passed through Great Falls?

Mr. JORDAN. Not that I know of. If they did they were accompanied by a diplomatic courier, which is different.

Mr. TAVENNER. What statement did the Russian officer make to you about sending this material?

Mr. JORDAN. He asked if I would wait before opening any more until I could be instructed by the War Department, and he told me I would be removed if I opened any more.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then tell us what occurred. Did you wait until you got instructions?

Mr. JORDAN. No, sir. I continued to open them.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you ever receive instructions?

Mr. JORDAN. Never.

Mr. TAVENNER. Proceed if you have any further statements there.

Mr. JORDAN. Well, I had just come to the part where there were sealed envelopes from Lomatkin. He was a police official we subsequently threw out of the country. Then they had long lists of names, just common ordinary names.

Mr. HARRISON. Would you object to filing the original of that memorandum for the record?

Mr. JORDAN. I promised to do that in another session.

Mr. WOOD. In a closed session?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. That has the names in it?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Can you give us additional light on matters relating to these suitcases?

Mr. JORDAN. I think I know what you are interested in. I received many communications from Washington by phone to do various things. You see, we had around a million pounds of freight all the time in Great Falls waiting for removal, and anything the Russians wanted priority on I had to give the order, so instead of the piece of freight arriving and going to the end of the pile and waiting several weeks, by giving an order from the office I could have the people take that piece of freight and put it immediately on another plane and send it to Moscow.

The Russians got to the point where everything had priority, so I was very busy much of that time trying to select priority over another priority, because the plane space was very limited. Finally it got so bad that I decided to send freight on the medium bombers. We didn't have enough C-47 transport planes to carry the freight, and I started sending it on the bombers. Then the Russians wanted everything to go on the bombers because they were faster.

It was at that point that the Russians inaugurated the practice of phoning the Embassy and handing me the phone while they were talking to the Embassy and telling me to expedite a certain piece of freight. So it was nothing unusual for me to be handed a telephone, and Colonel Kotikov, who spoke very little English, would say: "Here.

Get this straight." And I would make a note of the particular piece of freight I was to expedite when it arrived, which might be 2 weeks later.

Mr. TAVENNER. From whom did you receive those orders?

Mr. JORDAN. General Piskounov or Gromov or various people in positions of authority talking to Colonel Kotikov. There would be something terribly important about a certain piece of freight, and I would be called upon to do a special job of expediting on a special piece.

That was occurring every day. In one of the telephone calls Colonel Kotikov said the Embassy had something very important that had to do with bomb powder, and would I expedite this particular shipment, and I agreed to, because that was my job, to help them expedite things. He had on a piece of paper on his desk things to be expedited, and I saw the word "uranium" and what he called bomb powder was actually uranium. He had it marked "uranium." I did not know what uranium meant and had no inkling at the time it would ever be important. I just knew that that particular shipment I had to expedite. The first shipment of uranium that was so expedited came from Denver.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the approximate date?

Mr. JORDAN. I can't tell you that. I remember 420 pounds came from a firm in Denver.

Mr. WOOD. Do you remember the name of the firm?

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Wood, I would like to keep my memory and what I now know separate. I know now the name of the firm and everything else, but I didn't know it at the time. So if you are asking me if I knew then, I did not know. I simply knew it came from Colorado. Now I know the name of the firm. Do you want me to give it to you.

Mr. WOOD. Is there any reason why you shouldn't?

Mr. JORDAN. No. S. W. Shattuck Co. It was addressed to Colonel Kotikov.

Mr. WOOD. Did you open up any of those shipments of uranium?

Mr. JORDAN. No. They had armed guards with automatic machine guns on them.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you see anything about the shipment to indicate whether or not a license had been granted by any authority to make such a shipment?

Mr. JORDAN. No, sir. I was not high enough up in the echelon to have anything to do with the authority of things. I was simply where the load came on the plane, and my only importance was simply that I selected the particular piece of freight to go on a particular plane.

Mr. WALTER. Did you make a note in your diary of the shipment of uranium?

Mr. JORDAN. No; because it was not important to me.

Mr. WALTER. Was the shipment made about the time you were making the entries in the diary, that is, sometime in 1944?

Mr. JORDAN. Undoubtedly. We made 13 copies of everything. I am sure the War Department can find one of them.

Mr. WALTER. I am talking about this shipment of uranium. Was that made in 1944?

Mr. JORDAN. Sir, I don't know.

Mr. WALTER. The reason I say 1944 is because that was when you were making the entries in your diary.

Mr. JORDAN. I didn't put in my diary the reports to the War Department. We covered many, many details in our reports to the War Department. The accountability was in Dayton. When I signed the shipments over to the Russians, the Russians had charge.

Mr. WALTER. I am directing your attention to the shipment of uranium. Did you make a note of that in your diary?

Mr. JORDAN. No; I never made any such note. I never made a note of any kind that had to do with uranium or anything like that. I only know I was called on the telephone on innumerable occasions and told to expedite certain things, and at the time those certain things went through they looked to me like anything else. It happens now I know what heavy water is.

Mr. WALTER. You have no way of knowing when that shipment of uranium went through?

Mr. JORDAN. We had a 1,200-pound shipment that went through from Canada. That is the one Mr. Hopkins mentioned to me and said to expedite it and not mention it to my superiors.

Mr. HARRISON. When was that?

Mr. JORDAN. In the spring of 1944.

Mr. HARRISON. You say Mr. Harry Hopkins called you on the telephone?

Mr. JORDAN. No, sir. I will say it again. The Russians continually called their own embassy. While they were talking to their embassy, they would on many occasions hand the phone to me and an American personality would come on the phone and ask me if I would allow the Russians to pick a certain shipment and expedite that certain shipment. There was nothing unusual about it.

Mr. HARRISON. You say you talked to Mr. Hopkins on the telephone about this particular shipment?

Mr. JORDAN. The Russian told me there was a special shipment being handled in a very special way, and not to mention it, and I got on the phone. When I got on the phone he said, "Mr. Hopkins speaking" and asked if I had received the pilots I had asked for. I said I had. He said, "There is a certain shipment Colonel Kotikov will point out to you, and keep this very quiet."

Mr. HARRISON. Mr. Hopkins said that?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. When was that?

Mr. JORDAN. Two or three weeks before the shipment came through.

Mr. HARRISON. What year?

Mr. JORDAN. 1944.

Mr. HARRISON. Did you note that in your diary?

Mr. JORDAN. There was nothing important to note.

Mr. HARRISON. How often did Mr. Hopkins call you?

Mr. JORDAN. That was the only time. The Russians talked to him more often.

Mr. HARRISON. How many times did you talk personally to Mr. Hopkins?

Mr. JORDAN. Once.

Mr. HARRISON. Yet, although you were keeping a diary, you made no note of it in your diary?

Mr. JORDAN. That was not important.

Mr. MOULDER. How did you know it was Mr. Hopkins?

Mr. JORDAN. The Russian, Colonel Kotikov, told me it was Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. MOULDER. But you personally don't know if it was Harry Hopkins or not; do you?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes; I am pretty certain it was. It would have to be Mr. Hopkins, because we had phoned Mr. Hopkins 2 or 3 days before, asking for some pilots, and he asked if we had received the pilots.

Mr. MOULDER. You say you were talking to the Embassy?

Mr. JORDAN. The Russian was talking to the Embassy.

Mr. MOULDER. And he told you someone at the Embassy whose name was Harry Hopkins wanted to talk to you?

Mr. JORDAN. The Russian colonel said I would receive instructions from Mr. Hopkins; yes.

Mr. MOULDER. What did he say?

Mr. JORDAN. I don't remember exactly what he said, but I knew from the conversation I had with him that I was to expedite this particular shipment, and the particular shipment came through and it was uranium. I don't think anybody but Mr. Hopkins would talk to me about uranium.

Mr. MOULDER. I am trying to corroborate that it was Harry Hopkins, other than what the colonel said to you.

Mr. JORDAN. The colonel spoke to Hopkins quite frequently.

Mr. MOULDER. How do you know that?

Mr. JORDAN. Because of the conversations that he would have. When we needed pilots or something we couldn't get from the Army, and there was no way of getting them and it was impossible to break down routine, the Russian would say: "We will call Hopkins." And then they would get them.

Mr. MOULDER. Were you there when he called?

Mr. JORDAN. On several occasions. I placed the calls, probably.

Mr. MOULDER. How did you place the calls for Harry Hopkins?

Mr. JORDAN. We placed the call to the Embassy or the Purchasing Commission at Washington.

Mr. MOULDER. You said he would call Harry Hopkins?

Mr. JORDAN. That is correct.

Mr. MOULDER. And that you placed the call for him. When you placed a call, did you place it for Harry Hopkins?

Mr. JORDAN. No; for General Piskounov. We would tell him to go see Harry Hopkins.

Mr. MOULDER. You didn't call Harry Hopkins, then?

Mr. JORDAN. We made the call to the Embassy to get the authority to do things. It always came from Hopkins.

Mr. MOULDER. You are assuming that?

Mr. JORDAN. We knew it.

Mr. MOULDER. How did you know it?

Mr. JORDAN. From the day the movement started at Newark we dealt with Hopkins.

Mr. MOULDER. In an interview with Fulton Lewis, in response to a question he asked you with reference to Hopkins, you said: "He gave me instructions over long-distance phone to expedite certain freight shipments."

Mr. JORDAN. That is correct.

Mr. MOULDER. And you also made the statement, which is a very serious one, that Hopkins told you "to keep quiet and say nothing

about them, even to my superior officers, and not to leave any records of them."

Mr. JORDAN. That is correct.

Mr. MOULDER. So far in answering our questions you haven't specifically testified you ever had a telephone conversation with Hopkins himself.

Mr. JORDAN. I said a moment ago I had a telephone conversation with Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. MOULDER. You said the colonel said he was talking to Mr. Hopkins at the Embassy?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. MOULDER. Did you talk to Mr. Hopkins?

Mr. JORDAN. The telephone was handed to me and I talked to him.

Mr. WOOD. Did you know him personally?

Mr. JORDAN. No; I never met him.

Mr. WOOD. You never saw him face to face?

Mr. JORDAN. No.

Mr. HARRISON. The reason you think it was Hopkins is that he made a statement about pilots that no one but Hopkins would know?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes; and he did get them, and there was a shortage of pilots.

Mr. HARRISON. Do you know when Mr. Hopkins died?

Mr. JORDAN. No; I don't know anything about it.

Mr. HARRISON. Was it after the bomb was exploded at Hiroshima?

Mr. JORDAN. I am sorry. I don't know a thing about Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. HARRISON. Of course, when the bomb was exploded you knew what this meant about uranium?

Mr. JORDAN. I did.

Mr. HARRISON. Were you still in the military service at that time?

Mr. JORDAN. No.

Mr. HARRISON. The war was still on?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, but my work was finished.

Mr. HARRISON. When the bomb was exploded and you realized the significance of what this was all about, did you report it?

Mr. JORDAN. I spoke to Colonel Gardner, my superior, about it on the occasion of the dropping of the bomb, and told him my suspicion was we had sent some uranium through, but I kept hearing the Russians were 10 years away from having the bomb, and didn't think too much about it.

Mr. HARRISON. When did it dawn on you that it was significant?

Mr. JORDAN. When President Truman announced the Russians had the bomb.

Mr. HARRISON. Up to that time you didn't think there was anything significant about the White House telephoning you to send that uranium through and not tell your superiors about it?

Mr. JORDAN. When you say uranium, I only knew it as a shipment.

Mr. HARRISON. But you knew what it was after the explosion of the bomb?

Mr. JORDAN. After the explosion of the bomb; yes.

Mr. HARRISON. You have allowed 4 years to go by before you said anything about it?

Mr. JORDAN. I haven't come forward with anything. The FBI sought me out. I haven't come forth with any story yet. I haven't sought this. The FBI and others came to me and asked if I was at

Great Falls and did anything suspicious come through, and I told them.

Mr. WALTER. When did you tell them you shipped the suspicious boxes through?

Mr. JORDAN. I said in the spring of 1944.

Mr. WALTER. When did you leave the military service?

Mr. JORDAN. In September 1944.

Mr. WALTER. Do you remember when the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima?

Mr. JORDAN. I believe August 1945.

Mr. WALTER. That was after you were out of the service?

Mr. JORDAN. A year, yes.

Mr. WALTER. You have just stated you spoke to your superior officer, Colonel Gardner, at the time the bomb was dropped?

Mr. JORDAN. He was out of the service and so was I.

Mr. HARRISON. Mr. Hopkins lived several years after that bomb was exploded, did he not?

Mr. JORDAN. I am sorry. I don't know anything about Mr. Hopkins?

Mr. MOULDER. I would like to ask further questions about this telephone conversation. Did you ever place a long-distance telephone call to Harry Hopkins?

Mr. JORDAN. Never did.

Mr. MOULDER. Did Harry Hopkins ever place a long-distance telephone call to talk to you?

Mr. JORDAN. Not to me.

Mr. MOULDER. You stated a while ago you had placed calls for Colonel Kotikov?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. MOULDER. That he didn't speak English?

Mr. JORDAN. I said he spoke very poor English.

Mr. MOULDER. And you say he told you it was Harry Hopkins he was talking to at the Embassy?

Mr. JORDAN. It is not a matter of hearsay. You see, Colonel Kotikov, from May 1942 straight through called his Embassy two or three times a day, and he would say something seemed important enough to call Hopkins.

Mr. MOULDER. But you never had a telephone conversation with Hopkins?

Mr. JORDAN. Colonel Kotikov spoke to Hopkins and he handed the telephone to me.

Mr. MOULDER. He couldn't speak English but was carrying on conversations with Hopkins?

Mr. JORDAN. He was carrying on conversations with the Russian Embassy in Russian.

Mr. WALTER. Do I understand Hopkins was at the Russian Embassy?

Mr. JORDAN. There was nothing unusual about Colonel Kotikov calling his Embassy. He called several times a day. He spoke in Russian when the other man spoke in Russian.

Mr. WALTER. This call you are referring to was placed by you to the Russian Embassy; is that correct?

Mr. JORDAN. The Russian contingent had no authority to make long-distance telephone calls on the field. So I was kept busy putting in

the calls to our operator. I would say I wanted to talk to a Michigan number in Washington, and I wanted it to be collect, because I didn't want the Russians running up a bill on my department. Then I would hand the telephone to Colonel Kotikov.

Mr. WALTER. That telephone call you are talking about was placed to the Russian Embassy?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. And presumably Harry Hopkins spoke from the Russian Embassy?

Mr. JORDAN. Oh, no. He spoke from the board, apparently. Kotikov would say to me: "I think this is important enough for me to call Hopkins again." When we used the expression among ourselves "We will call Hopkins" it meant we were pressing the button of authority to get things done. It didn't mean myself or Kotikov would talk to Hopkins, but we would start the chain of events, and it would happen instantly. You can't get 20 pilots immediately when there is a scarcity of them unless somebody in authority sends them to you.

Mr. WALTER. There can be no doubt in your mind that this suspicious shipment you saw was made in 1944 according to your records?

Mr. JORDAN. I have no record of this particular shipment. The Army would have records.

Mr. WALTER. You said a while ago you were certain it was in 1944?

Mr. JORDAN. Spring of 1944.

Mr. WALTER. As a matter of fact the record shows the export licenses were granted in 1943?

Mr. JORDAN. That is for the shipment from Denver?

Mr. WALTER. I am talking about three shipments for which export licenses were granted.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the quantity of uranium in this shipment?

Mr. JORDAN. It is difficult for me to sit here and answer questions about minute details when I was working from 5:45 in the morning until 11 at night almost daily. We started in in January 1943 and worked until September 1944 and much of this is telescoped in my mind together. It is difficult for me to tell you exactly when, but I know it was done, and I know it went through. We had carboys of heavy water we could hardly move that went through.

Mr. TAVENNER. How many shipments of heavy water went through?

Mr. JORDAN. I would suggest you ask General Groves.

Mr. TAVENNER. To your knowledge, was there only this one shipment of uranium or more, to the best of your recollection?

Mr. JORDAN. To the best of my recollection there were 2,500 pounds, roughly.

Mr. WOOD. In only one shipment?

Mr. JORDAN. No. There was one shipment from Canada and one shipment from Army Ordnance and one from Denver.

Mr. WOOD. You recall those three distinctly?

Mr. JORDAN. There were so many priority shipments the Russians had that it is hard for me to pick out the ones you are interested in.

Mr. TAVENNER. Other than the shipment from Canada, were all the shipments from this Shattuck Co.?

Mr. JORDAN. I don't think so. Some came from Army Ordnance.

Mr. TAVENNER. Some came from Army Ordnance?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. What shipping point?

Mr. JORDAN. The War Department records will show that.

Mr. TAVENNER. If you recall?

Mr. JORDAN. I don't recall these special shipments. I can't pin point them for you. I know they did happen, and I know other important priority shipments happened almost daily. We have the records complete out there as to when and where and how they happened.

Mr. WALTER. But there is no question in your mind but that these shipments came from Army Ordnance?

Mr. JORDAN. Some of them, yes, sir.

Mr. MOULDER. May I ask a question?

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Moulder.

Mr. HARRISON. I wonder if you will give me that editorial again from the Montana paper?

(The editorial referred to was handed to Mr. Harrison.)

Mr. JORDAN. The colonel of the field had been invited to make a speech, and he couldn't make it so he asked me to make it for him. He wrote them a letter and said I would appear in his stead.

Mr. MOULDER. I want to go back to the time you were searching the suitcases. The sheet of paper on which you transcribed notes from envelopes, did that sheet cover days when you were not keeping a dairy? Did that cover different occasions?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. MOULDER. How many occasions?

Mr. JORDAN. I don't know specifically

Mr. MOULDER. Then you kept this same loose sheet over a period of weeks?

Mr. JORDAN. It has been folded in my diary.

Mr. MOULDER. You were not keeping it in your diary, then? It was a loose sheet of paper you kept on your person or in your office?

Mr. JORDAN. I have complete records of everything that happened to me at Great Falls.

Mr. MOULDER. I am refering to this one sheet that covered several occasions.

Mr. JORDAN. I kept it right here.

Mr. MOULDER. In that book there?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. MOULDER. And you made those notations on that sheet at different times?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. MOULDER. From envelopes on which you wrote while you were in the plane?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. MOULDER. In your interview with Fulton Lewis that was broadcast, you were describing this occasion and said that with the assistance of a hand flashlight you went through about one-third of the 50 suitcases, or around 18 suitcases?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. MOULDER. And you told him it was 15 below zero at the time and you made notes of what you found when you went through the suitcases, with the aid of this flashlight. Did you have somebody with you?

Mr. JORDAN. The Russian guards. There were lights on the plane. I only used the flashlight when I needed it. The lights on the plane were sufficient to identify the contents.

Mr. MOULDER. And you made your notes after you left the plane?

Mr. JORDAN. No; in the plane, on the envelopes.

Mr. MOULDER. Then you transcribed those notes on a loose sheet?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you recall the origin of the uranium from Canada?

Mr. JORDAN. The only way I know was from a paper that Kotikov had, and a Russian courier came with the shipment. I have a list of over 500 Russians, and I have made a mark after some of them, and opposite this particular one I marked "CC," which means Canadian courier.

Mr. TAVENNER. You said you surmised it was of Canadian origin?

Mr. JORDAN. Because of the particular courier who came only from Toronto. I am looking for his name.

Mr. TAVENNER. And you also said because of a paper which the Russian commanding officer had?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. He had papers on everything, and I used to see them on his desk, but never got hold of them.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you see from his papers that this shipment came from Canada?

Mr. JORDAN. I believe his papers showed that, but I can't definitely testify to that, but the Canadian courier would clinch it.

Mr. TAVENNER. How much was in that shipment?

Mr. JORDAN. I think over 1,000 pounds.

Mr. TAVENNER. When was the shipment from Canada received with reference to the other shipments?

Mr. JORDAN. To tell you the month is most difficult for me. It seems the shipment was in the spring of 1944, and the shipment before that—

Mr. TAVENNER. Forget about the others, but was this the first or last shipment?

Mr. JORDAN. You want the sequence of the shipments?

Mr. TAVENNER. That is right.

Mr. JORDAN. I believe the Colorado shipment was first, and the Canadian shipment would be second, but I am hazy on that.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were there other shipments received after the receipt of the Canadian shipment?

Mr. JORDAN. The heavy water, are you referring to that as the Canadian shipment?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. JORDAN. The carboys of heavy water came along later in separate loads.

Mr. TAVENNER. How many loads, do you know?

Mr. JORDAN. It is very difficult for me to tell how many. I know they had great difficulty in loading them.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is not the shipment of the Canadian uranium you were speaking of?

Mr. JORDAN. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were there shipments of uranium passing through your field which originated at places other than Canada after you received the Canadian shipments?

Mr. JORDAN. I believe the other shipments came from Army Ordnance.

Mr. TAVENNER. With respect to time, were they before or after you received the Canadian shipment? That may be of some importance.

Mr. JORDAN. I am not definite about that, but my memory seems to be it was after the Canadian shipment.

Mr. TAVENNER. In this office in which you say the Russian commanding officer had his desk, and you had yours close by, were there other Russians in that office?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, about eight.

Mr. TAVENNER. Any other Americans?

Mr. JORDAN. I was the only American except the secretary.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who was the secretary?

Mr. JORDAN. One was a WAC, Georgia Bean, who lives in Meadville, Pa.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were there any other secretaries you had who can throw some light on this subject?

Mr. JORDAN. I have a list of the employees who did the work out there, who actually handled the business. I only handled the paper work. I also have a list of the freight that went through and the poundage.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have the poundage of the particular shipments?

Mr. JORDAN. They are included.

Mr. TAVENNER. We are not interested in that. We want to find out facts about your statement, and to corroborate those facts wherever they can be corroborated. That is why I am asking you to give us all the basic information you can which will enable us to investigate the correctness of your statement.

Mr. JORDAN. I am perfectly frank in telling you there are a lot of holes in my statement that I am unable to fill in because I was only in one spot.

Mr. TAVENNER. If you are having difficulty in locating the list of employees, you can give it to us later.

Mr. JORDAN. I will give it to you later.

Mr. WOOD. Any further questions in open session?

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you take your diary and go over it with one of the investigators of our staff?

Mr. JORDAN. I will be glad to. I have a list in the diary of the planes that arrived with suitcases, their numbers, and the pilots.

Mr. TAVENNER. Your appearance before this committee is the first time you have spoken to any member of this committee or its staff regarding these matters?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is all.

Mr. WOOD. Any other questions before we go into executive session?

Mr. TAVENNER. No.

Mr. WOOD. The committee will go into executive session.

(Thereupon, the subcommittee went into executive session.)

HEARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1949

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. Francis E. Walter presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Francis E. Walter, Burr P. Harrison, and Morgan M. Moulder (arriving as indicated hereinafter).

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Donald T. Appell and Courtney Owens, investigators; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; John W. Carrington, clerk; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. WALTER. The committee will be in order.

Because of the large attendance this morning, the Chair is going to insist that there be no talking, and as little smoking as possible. The quarters are cramped, and too much smoking, of course, will make it unpleasant.

General Groves, will you raise your right hand and be sworn. You swear the testimony you will give in the matter now in hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

General GROVES. I do.

Mr. WALTER. The Chair will state for the record that when the committee recessed on Monday a subcommittee consisting of Mr. Harrison and myself were appointed to conduct the hearings today, and Messrs. Harrison and Walter are present.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. LESLIE R. GROVES

Mr. WALTER. Will you state your name, please, General?

General GROVES. Leslie R. Groves.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Tavenner.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Groves, when and where were you born?

General GROVES. Albany, N. Y., August 17, 1896.

Mr. TAVENNER. Without going into too much detail, will you furnish the committee with a brief résumé of your military record?

General GROVES. Appointed to West Point, Presidential appointment in 1916; graduated November 1, 1918; entered the Corps of Engineers as second lieutenant; served at various places in this country and in Hawaii and Nicaragua.

Had a considerable amount of duty in Washington. Graduated from the Army Engineer School, both courses, Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., and Army War College in Washington.

Was on War Department General Staff starting in 1939; left the General Staff in July of 1940 to become a special assistant to the Quartermaster General on matters concerning construction. Was promoted to major on July 1, 1940, and was made temporary colonel in November of 1940. At that time, I took over what might be termed the operations concerning military construction of the United States. After the work was transferred to the Corps of Engineers, I went back in the Corps of Engineers, where I was Deputy Chief of Construction, and our operations during the war until the time I was relieved in September 1942 approximated about 8 billion dollars' worth of construction. At that time the construction peak was over, although there was still a great deal of work to be done, and I was assigned to take charge of the Manhattan project, or, in other words, the development of the atomic bomb.

I remained on that duty until the work was turned over to the Atomic Energy Commission by act of Congress on January 1, 1947.

I was then ordered to duty, after a short period, as commanding general of the Armed Forces Special Weapon Project, a joint Army-Navy-Air command that was responsible for trying, to the best of its endeavor, to see that the armed forces would be ready to use atomic bombs in case of need.

I was also made a member of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission.

I was made lieutenant general in January 1948, applied for retirement soon after that, and was retired from the Army on February 29, 1948.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Groves, you were in charge of the development of the atomic bomb almost from the inception of that project; were you not?

General GROVES. Almost from the inception, speaking of it as when the serious effort really started. There had been a tremendous amount of work done on it before that, but not the major effort.

Mr. TAVENNER. You remained in charge of the project until after the bomb was utilized during the war?

General GROVES. Yes, and for a considerable time after that.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Groves, the committee realizes that a man in a responsible position such as the one you occupied during the development of the atomic bomb must have secured a great deal of information concerning the atomic bomb which raises questions of national security, and if, in the asking of these questions, it occurs to you that we have gone beyond the bounds, and that national security is involved, you, of course, will say so.

General GROVES. I won't hesitate at all.

Mr. TAVENNER. And in that event we would like to hear that testimony in a closed session. The committee also realizes that, with all the time that has elapsed since the occurrences we desire to speak of, you may find it necessary to refresh your memory by reference to documents. If that is true, we want you to know you shall have an opportunity to examine those documents.

General GROVES. I have no document with me, because I didn't know what you were going to ask me.

Mr. TAVENNER. As you know, General, there has been a great deal of publicity in the papers recently concerning certain statements made by Maj. George Racey Jordan, formerly attached to the United States Army at Gore Field, Great Falls, Mont. In the light of these public accusations, the committee conceived it to be its duty to make public certain facts which were ascertained from an investigation started in 1948, and also to obtain first-hand such evidence as Major Jordan was able to produce before this committee.

Major Jordan said in his testimony here that uranium had been shipped from the United States to Soviet Russia during the period the United States was engaged in the actual task of developing the atomic bomb. Will you tell the committee, please, how many shipments of uranium to Soviet Russia actually took place, within your knowledge?

General GROVES. Within my knowledge?

Mr. TAVENNER. Or from knowledge acquired by you.

General GROVES. Knowledge acquired at the time or since then?

Mr. TAVENNER. Both.

General GROVES. All right.

Mr. TAVENNER. First tell us how many shipments were made, from knowledge acquired by you, regardless of the date that you obtained that knowledge.

General GROVES. As far as I know, there was a shipment—at least, I believe this to be the case. I don't know that the shipment was actually made. I wasn't there; but, as far as we could determine at the time, a shipment of 200 pounds, plus or minus, of uranium oxide went through. I don't know whether this was uranium oxide or not. The Russians used different names for it. But, as far as I could tell, it was uranium oxide.

There was also, at the same time, a shipment of 220 pounds of nitro-urano, which is a very complex uranium salt. That shipment, as far as I know, went through in the spring or late winter of 1943. It started with a letter of request from the Russians and various verbal requests which, as far as I have been able to determine, were made to the lend-lease organization. There was one letter that I have seen, signed by a Russian named Fomichev, and I think you have a record of that. That letter also said that they would later ask for 8 tons of uranium oxide and for 8 tons of uranium chloride.

This shipment went through, as far as I have been able to determine, in this way: I believe, as I say, that it went. It was placed through a firm in New York City called Chematar. The letter was signed by a man named Rosenberg. Apparently they were acting for the Russian purchasing agency, either Amtorg or the other purchasing agency.

Mr. TAVENNER. May I interrupt you just there? How many shipments were there in all?

General GROVES. I don't know, because we don't know how many leaked through. The ones I have heard of are these, and then there has been a great deal of reference to two later shipments of somewhere in the vicinity of 1,000 pounds of oxide which were supposed to have originated in Canada and been shipped through Great Falls. But I

cant' find any record that we knew of that at the time or later, until certain things had been said before this committee.

So that the only shipments I have knowledge of that were actually made—I am not talking about attempts to get shipments through—were these two, one of 200 pounds and one of 220 pounds. There was an attempt to get 25 pounds of uranium metal, which, as far as I know, was never obtained.

Mr. TAVENNER. Let us get back to the shipment of the quantity sold to the Russians through the S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co. of Denver. The records we have obtained from the State Department show that that sale took place on March 23, 1943, or at least a license for its export was issued by the Lend-Lease Administration at that time. Will you proceed and give us all the details that you are acquainted with relating to that shipment, which I believe was the first shipment?

General GROVES. As far as we know.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

General GROVES. That shipment was urged by the Russians constantly over a considerable period. There was no way they could obtain this material without the support of the United States authorities in one way or another. They had to have an export license.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did the Manhattan Engineering District first acquire knowledge that the Russians desired that shipment?

General GROVES. I should say that it was sometime along probably in February of 1943. We knew that prior to that time the Russians were engaged in espionage on this project. I knew it personally, I should say, within about 2 weeks or a month from the time I took control. In this instance the approach was always made to various subordinates in my organization through subordinates in lend-lease.

Mr. WALTER. Was that at Oak Ridge, General?

General GROVES. No; that was in Washington. Oak Ridge at that time was not established as an operation. The Manhattan District, when it was established, was established in New York City, and in July 1942 it was so named. In August 1943, approximately, it was moved to Oak Ridge as the headquarters. I believe that is the correct date.

Mr. WALTER. And at that time was Oak Ridge operating?

General GROVES. Oak Ridge was under construction. As to operating, whether we were producing any material, I would say "No," but that is from memory. That is an easy date to find out, as to when the first material was produced, but I would say offhand it would have been considerably later than that.

Mr. WALTER. Sometime in 1944, would you say?

General GROVES. Yes; at least 1944 before we started to produce any material that would be suitable for use in the bomb. The first electromagnetic unit was finished sometime early in 1944, as I remember. It is an easy date to find. The gaseous diffusion plant did not go into operation until about April 1945.

Mr. TAVENNER. I understood you to say it had come to your attention that there had been some efforts at espionage that you knew of prior to the time of the Russians desiring uranium. Did I correctly understand you?

General GROVES. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Explain further, please.

General GROVES. Well, I will have to be excused for a minute while I check on this Presidential directive.

Mr. WALTER. What is the date of that directive?

General GROVES. The Department of the Army circular is dated August 11, 1948. The directive was August 5, 1948.

Mr. WALTER. I would like to inform you, General, that this morning I conversed with one of the Secretaries of the Army and was informed that that directive had been rescinded and a new one issued shortly after Mr. Forrestal left the Department of the Army.

General GROVES. Well, I asked yesterday to obtain the latest instructions, and this is what was handed to me. Unless I could see a copy of it, I would have to be bound by this, as an officer of the Army.

The President's directive said this: "* * * no investigative data of any type, whether relating to loyalty or other aspects of the individual's record, shall be included in the material submitted to a congressional committee." I think that is the only thing that is applicable; and, subject to that, if you can give me your question again, I think I can maybe answer it in part.

Mr. TAVENNER. I asked you to explain the efforts at espionage to which you referred as your having had knowledge of at the time this request by the Russians was made for the shipment of uranium.

General GROVES. There were efforts, very serious efforts, made at Berkeley, Calif., of which I believe your committee has the complete story. Insofar as it has been published, I have found nothing at variance with my knowledge of the facts in that case.

There were certain efforts made at Chicago, but those were discovered at a later date. There were efforts being made—at least, efforts that we were suspicious of—that were occurring in New York City at that time or a trifle later than that. We had deep suspicions about various efforts that were made. In other words, we had enough evidence of espionage to convince any intelligent, prudent man that espionage was going on; that it was being carried on under the direction of officials of the Russian Embassy, and that every effort would be made by them to discover what we were doing.

Mr. TAVENNER. This committee is familiar with the situation you describe as existing at Berkeley, Calif. As to the other matters, do you consider that further information comes within the purview of restricted data?

General GROVES. No. I think that you have also had testimony concerning the situation at Chicago.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

General GROVES. That developed a little bit later than this, as I recall. You have the exact dates. A great deal of it has been published in the papers. There again, I found nothing that I noticed that was at variance with the facts.

You may recall that at the time I testified in executive session there was a considerable dispute between myself and various members of the committee as to the identity of one particular man at Chicago, and I believe that was straightened out to your satisfaction—that there was no question as to who it was. Other than that, I know of no case that I have been made aware of where the committee, with respect to Russian espionage, has made known to me anything that was not correct, in my opinion; and that, I felt at the time, was rather minor,

in that it was a case of two men known to be guilty, and just a question of whether one was a little more guilty. You thought he was. I didn't think he was that bad, but he was still so bad and black in his disloyalty to this country that it didn't make much difference. It is like a murderer who committed 29 murders against one who committed 30.

As to the espionage in New York, I don't think that is anything that should be discussed in public hearings because I don't believe you have developed that as fully as you may wish to do so, and I am afraid I would spoil your development if I talked about it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you answered the question as to when the Manhattan Engineering District first learned of the Russian request for uranium?

General GROVES. No. I said that it was probably in February of 1943. As to how I found out, various people in Lend-Lease, particularly, as I recall, General Wesson and Mr. Moore, were in touch with Capt. Alan Johnson of my office about the shipments of these materials. They were also in touch at various times with representatives of the Manhattan project's offices in New York, and I believe Colonel Crenshaw and Captain Merritt were the ones there, and I believe you have heard them and know their stories. Just when it was brought to my attention, I don't know, but I am reasonably certain—in other words, a thousand to one—that Captain Johnson reported to me this was going on, and I told him there was nothing doing, we were not going to permit it.

That word got to Lend-Lease and General Wesson called me on the telephone. I know there were many telephone calls between General Wesson and myself on that subject. There was a great deal of pressure being brought to bear on Lend-Lease, apparently, to give the Russians everything they could think of. There was a great deal of pressure brought to give them this uranium material.

As far as I could tell with reference to these two shipments, the 200 pounds and 220 pounds, the shipment was either made before I learned of it personally and could stop it, or it was so far along I couldn't stop it without attracting undue attention to the fact it was being shipped. I believe it was the latter. In other words, various things that had been said and done, and the promises that had been made by Lend-Lease, were such that it would have been adverse to our security, our desire to keep the project under cover, to have at that time taken it away from the Russians. That, as far as I know, is the correct analysis of the situation. It was after that time that other efforts were made to obtain material.

I know, for example, that I approved the action of Lend-Lease in approving certain materials for shipment, I think in the amount of about 500 pounds each of various compounds, sometime in the spring of that year.

Mr. TAVENNER. Just one moment, General Groves. This first shipment you told us about, was it actually approved by the Manhattan Engineering District?

General GROVES. That is something I can't find out, whether it was actually approved or not. I have given you the story of what could have happened. Either it was approved in advance and was so far along it could not be stopped without injuring our security, or it was already gone when I learned of it. I think it was the first.

Mr. MOULDER. That was 200 pounds?

General GROVES. Two hundred pounds uranium oxide and 220 pounds nitro-urano.

Mr. TAVENNER. By "injuring our security" do you mean tipping off the Russians as to the importance of the materials?

General GROVES. Exactly. And I knew it not only would tip off the Russians, but would create in Washington a great deal of interest in why we were able to stop the shipment to Russia, and it would result in more people in Washington talking about something they had no business to talk about.

I believe there were two units of 500 pounds. You will find in Lend-Lease a statement that I approved that shipment. I believe that is correct. At the time the shipment was approved we knew they couldn't get that material.

Mr. WALTER. Was that the shipment identified by the license No. 1643180?

General GROVES. I can't answer as to that. It was a shipment of 500 pounds of each of two different compounds, one of which I think was oxide and the other nitrate.

Mr. WALTER. Five hundred pounds black uranium oxide and 500 pounds uranium nitrate?

General GROVES. That would be the one.

Mr. WALTER. How bulky a package would 500 pounds of black uranium oxide be?

General GROVES. It wouldn't be very bulky, I don't think, but I would have to look it up. I don't know what the specific gravity was, but I would say it would be a little lighter than iron in the oxide form, perhaps 25 percent lighter than iron, so it would be rather a small package.

Mr. TAVENNER. Referring again to this first shipment, had any arrangement been made prior to that time or about that time by which the Manhattan Engineering District would be notified of any request that the Russian Government would make regarding the shipment of uranium?

General GROVES. Yes. There had been arrangements made at that time. If you will recall the dates, we started in September of 1942, and this was in January of 1943, and it was not possible to put into operation all the safeguards that we wanted to put in and did put in later. That was handled through a junior officer in New York until such time as all the things could be cleaned up.

To go on with the two 500-pound lots, I think it is important to realize that at that time we didn't feel there were any such materials on hand. If there were, we wanted to know about it. We wanted to know if the Russians could fulfill this order or get it filled. We wanted to know, first, if we had overlooked any supply of uranium in this country; and, second, we wanted to know if any was slipping out of our hands, and we thought if the Russians could find it we wanted to know it. We had no expectation of permitting that material to go out of this country. It would have been stopped.

You have received a memorandum from Mr. Gullion of the State Department dated June 11, 1948, and I would like to ask you to insert in the record at this place the last paragraph on page 11 of that enclosure, because I believe it is very pertinent to this question of the 500 pounds.

Have you found it?

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes.

General GROVES. Will you read it, or do you want me to read it? It winds up with the statement that General Wesson smiled.

Mr. RUSSELL (reading):

A curious development on this entire matter occurred recently when Mr. Fomichev called Mr. Hoopes and stated that in view of the lapse of time since the submission of export license applications for urano-uranic oxide and uranium nitrate, the Soviets were now having difficulty in locating a source of supply. Mr. Hoopes communicated this to General Wesson, who only smiled.

General GROVES. I think that shows the result of the work. That is from the Lend-Lease chronological diary, as I understand it.

With respect to the uranium metal, the 25 pounds at that time were still authorized. We didn't stop their shipment for a very good reason. We were anxious to know if anybody in this country knew how to make uranium metal. We had been unable to make it successfully up to that time, and if anybody could make it we wanted to know how he did it and whether he could make it for us if he could make it for the Russians. We were willing that the Russians have 25 pounds, if we couldn't stop it, on the ground that it would be worth more than that to us to find out how to make uranium metal. As you know, we did find it out later, at a terrific amount of delay and trouble. We would have loved to find it out at that time without so much trouble.

From the spring of 1943 no shipment went to Russia that we knew of at the time or since then until certain testimony was brought out before this committee. Then, for the first time, I became aware of the shipments that had been referred to as having come originally from Canada.

Mr. TAVENNER. This second shipment to which you have referred—

General GROVES. You mean the 500 pounds?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

General GROVES. It was never made.

Mr. TAVENNER. It was never actually made?

General GROVES. No. They never found the material. So that checked with what we had discovered, or thought we knew, that it was not available.

I think it is important for you to realize that for some 20 years prior to the war an average of more than 100 tons of uranium oxide were used commercially every year. It was in the hands of chemical supply houses in small lots all over the country. That is the reason I believe the Russians were able to find these small quantities of 200 and 220 pounds, and those are small quantities.

Mr. TAVENNER. As a basis for further questions relating to those shipments, and for the purpose of clearing the record, the files furnished the committee by the State Department reflect that on January 29, 1943, Mr. W. C. Moore in the office of the Lend-Lease Administration received a letter signed by N. S. Fomichev, in charge of chemicals for the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States of America, in which Fomichev stated that he had just received a request from the U. S. S. R. for 25 pounds of uranium metal, 220 pounds of uranium oxide, and 200 pounds of uranium nitrate, and requested that the products mentioned be shipped to the Soviet Union on the first available ship.

On February 15, 1943, Mr. Moore replied to Mr. Fomichev that his office had been informed that uranium—

is a critical item and its use is strictly limited in the United States.

Moore stated that—

* * * in allocating our limited supply of this material we must consider only the most vital applications. In order that our Government may make a decision favorable to your request, may I suggest that you support it with a precise statement as to its operational use.

On March 6, 1943, Hermann Rosenberg, of Chematar, Inc., who acted as a broker in the first sale of uranium to the Russians, wrote to Mr. Moore and stated:

We have reported to you during our today's telephone conversation the following business which is set to be transacted and have noted that we are permitted to transact same.

Mr. Rosenberg then quotes the uses to which the uranium compounds are to be placed and indicates that the supplier is the S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., of Denver, Colo., and that the purchaser is the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States of America. The last paragraph stated:

We trust that this is the information you require and thank you for your statement that you will treat same strictly confidential.

There are several other items of interest regarding this particular transaction which will be inserted in the record at a later date. However, one memorandum is of particular interest, which states as follows:

Mr. Fomichev, of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union, called to say that beside the Chematar Co.—

that is, Mr. Rosenberg's company—

New York City, he had another source of uranium metal. This was the Manufacturers Chemical Co., New York City, which could supply the metal immediately, apparently out of stock.

Quoting further from that letter:

It appears that "WPB authorization" is necessary if a legitimate transaction is to be accomplished, otherwise the metal would have to be purchased on the black market.

General Groves, do you know anything about black marketing in uranium?

General GROVES. No. I never engaged in it, and I think I probably bought more than anyone else did.

Mr. TAVENNER. You had to compete with the Russians, who were also attempting to obtain it. Do you have any knowledge of any character relating to black-market dealings of anyone else in uranium?

General GROVES. I can't recall any, but I know of one individual who would have engaged in it if he possibly could have.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, that is a rather indefinite statement.

General GROVES. We wouldn't have engaged in it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you learn of any black market transactions?

General GROVES. I can't recall of any, and I think the reason was that there wasn't any uranium in the country to amount to anything. It was very small. You could pick up 5 or 10 pounds, something of that kind, but you couldn't get anything large enough to be of value.

Mr. WALTER. At that time were you making every effort to get all the uranium available?

General GROVES. Yes, sir. We started on that basis as soon as the Army took over the project. That was the first thing done. The question is raised, if you are trying to get material by the ton, will you buy it by the half ounce, if you have to have it by the ton to be of value.

Mr. TAVENNER. You spoke of a shipment made from Canada.

General GROVES. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Rather, the origin was Canada, but the shipment was made through Great Falls?

General GROVES. That is what I have been told.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did you first learn that that shipment had been made?

General GROVES. I believe, although I am not positive, I believe that the first inkling of that came as a result of some work of the House Un-American Activities Committee.

(Representative Moulder arrives in hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. You first learned of it from this committee?

General GROVES. Yes; in a hearing or from one of your investigators. I believe the first inkling came from the committee or the committee staff, who naturally would ask me what I knew about it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you subsequently make an investigation to determine whether that was correct?

General GROVES. No; I don't believe so, because by that time I was no longer responsible for atomic bomb matters. I had no staff. I believe at that time I was retired and had no staff of any kind.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was this sale of uranium the transportation of which originated in Canada—that is, 500 pounds of uranium oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate—sold to the Russians by the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. through the Chematar Co. of New York City?

General GROVES. I don't think so. I remember it as 1,000 pounds each, I believe. That is all the information I obtained, I believe, from some member of your committee or staff.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have no way of knowing, from your independent knowledge, whether that is the same shipment you learned about from this committee?

General GROVES. No; but it certainly had no export license that received the concurrence of the Manhattan District.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like to read to you the following letter dated April 17, 1943, addressed to the Lend-Lease Administration, attention of Mr. James Hoopes, which is signed "Thomas T. Crenshaw, Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Assistant," relating to this Canadian shipment.

General GROVES. What is the date of that?

Mr. TAVENNER. April 17, 1943. The letter states:

This office has been referred to you as being familiar with the status of requests from the Russian Government for uranium compounds and metal. It is understood that you will act for Mr. Moore during his absence.

Copy of letter from the War Production Board, regarding available supplies of ferro-uranium, is enclosed. We had previously advised the War Production Board that we would not be interested in obtaining this material and therefore would suggest that you contact Mr. Punderson directly in order to make sure that the material is still available. In addition to the quantities indicated here, this office is cognizant of another small lot of ferro-uranium totaling approximately 65 pounds.

If the Russian Purchasing Commission is interested in this material from the standpoint of experimental work on alloys as they have previously stated, the ferro-uranium should serve their purpose as well or better than uranium salts. It is suggested that it might be advisable to attempt to secure a commitment from them as to any particular specifications which must be met if they decide to accept ferro-uranium; it would be preferable to obtain this information before making the enclosed analysis available to them.

It is requested that we be kept advised as to the progress of the negotiations regarding this material. If they refuse to accept the ferro-uranium, kindly notify us as we have one alternate proposition which might perhaps be offered as a solution to the present difficulty.

General GROVES. Could I ask you for that chemical analysis they gave? Do you have that as an enclosure?

Mr. TAVENNER. We will secure it for you. That was a letter signed by Thomas T. Crenshaw, lieutenant colonel, Corps of Engineers, assistant.

(The chemical analysis requested was handed to the witness by Mr. Russell.)

General GROVES. All right. You can go ahead if you wish.

Mr. TAVENNER. Continuing with the correspondence relating to this matter, a letter dated April 23, 1943, addressed to Lieutenant Colonel Crenshaw and signed by Mr. Hoopes, state since the receipt of Colonel Crenshaw's letter of April 17 he, Mr. Hoopes, understood that General Groves has advised General Wesson that the particular request for 500 pounds of uranium oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate can be approved. Mr. Hoopes said that—

The Soviet Commission is being advised accordingly. In addition, it has been agreed that an application for 25 pounds of uranium metal would be entertained if submitted.

I assume that General Groves will post you on any details regarding his decision.

If there are further inquiries from the Soviets on these or related materials, we will let you know.

Now, is that shipment the shipment you referred to a little while ago as being the shipment that was not approved?

General GROVES. I believe that if you examine the files a little more in detail, you will find I turned down the ideas of Colonel Crenshaw in this respect, and it was not approved by me.

Mr. WALTER. When did that occur?

Mr. TAVENNER. The date of this letter is April 23, 1943.

Mr. WALTER. The fact of the matter is, General, that both of the shipments that were made, and those that were authorized but which you intended would never be made, all occurred in 1943 in the early spring?

General GROVES. That is correct.

Mr. HARRISON. Could it have been possible that any shipments were made in 1944?

General GROVES. Not if we could have helped it, and not with our knowledge of any kind. They would have had to be entirely secret and not discovered. It was right after this incident—the one that started with the Fomichev letter of January 29, 1943, that talked about the 200 and 220 pounds—it was right after that that the general blockade was put into effect, and I don't think any of it got through. I don't think the ferro-uranium was shipped.

Mr. WALTER. And at that time the Army had control of the entire supply?

General GROVES. We had control of everything we could find out about. Nothing was published to tell everybody they had to turn in any uranium they had, but we had almost complete control.

Mr. WALTER. So if there had been any shipments made in the spring of 1944, they would have been made from the supply the Army had?

General GROVES. Had or knew about, or they might have been made from some supplies we knew nothing about. But I believe a check will show this ferro-uranium shipment was not actually carried through, and that I reversed Colonel Crenshaw on it.

Mr. HARRISON. If Mr. Harry Hopkins knew about it, you surely would have known about it, would you not?

General GROVES. Not necessarily.

Mr. WALTER. Did Mr. Hopkins ever make an attempt to obtain blueprints or maps or other papers with respect to the development of the atomic bomb from you?

General GROVES. From me directly?

Mr. WALTER. Yes.

General GROVES. No.

Mr. HARRISON. There is testimony before this committee, which you probably read in the paper, to the effect that a map of Oak Ridge was shipped to Russia, accompanied by a note on White House stationery, written in longhand, which note said: "I had a hell of a time getting this from Groves." Did anyone in the White House get such a map from you, whether he had a hell of a time getting it or not?

General GROVES. Not from me that I was aware of. If they got it they would have had to get it from somebody on my staff or someone to whom I had for some reason given a map in connection with some discussion or something of that kind. I doubt very seriously if any such thing was done legitimately by anyone. I know it was not done by anyone in my office. I am sure of that.

Mr. WALTER. How many people on your staff had access to maps?

General GROVES. I would say a very large number would have had access to a map of Oak Ridge. Without knowing just what is claimed to have been on that map, I can't tell you whether the story is true or probably isn't true. If you have that, I would be glad to look at it and possibly suggest to the committee in executive session some questions that might be looked into with respect to it.

Mr. WALTER. You knew the men on your staff who had access to these maps?

General GROVES. No. I had over 600,000 people employed on the project.

Mr. WALTER. I am talking about your staff.

General GROVES. The staff in Washington was very, very small, but they were not the ones who would have had those maps. If you are talking about topographical surveys of the Oak Ridge works, they would not have been marked secret. Maps of barracks or residential buildings would not have been marked secret, and I don't know, but this could very easily have been a map showing a lay-out of certain residential construction, firehouses, or office buildings. It could have been almost anything. So that if it was not marked secret or restricted or confidential, it wouldn't mean necessarily that any information that we were trying to hold secret was getting out.

It is true that throughout the project many matters were handled as nonsecret, and handled perfectly openly, that, if people could have

put them all together, they would have had a tremendous amount of information. Actual bomb parts were made by some manufacturing companies in their plants, and they were made without any secret or confidential mark being put on them. Of course, they were shipped and reshipped and everything done to cover tracks, but it was necessary to take a great many chances of security. Those chances were taken deliberately, because the primary purpose was to bring the war to a close earlier than it otherwise would have been. That was the mission, and that mission was accomplished. The secrecy, or guarding from the Russians, particularly, a great deal of it was on our own initiative and in accordance with a Presidential directive to me to keep everything as secret as possible. But I believe those of you who were in Washington at that time realize that suspicion of Russia was not very popular in some circles. It was popular at Oak Ridge, and from 1 month of the time I took over we never trusted them one iota, and from that time on our whole security was based on not letting the Russians find out anything. We were not worried about Germany or Japan. We were worried about Russia.

Mr. WALTER. At any time did any of your officers tell you that pressure had been brought to bear on them to furnish Harry Hopkins with confidential plans or maps?

General GROVES. No; and I think to clear the matter up definitely I would like to add to that answer a little. At no time, to the best of my recollection and belief—and I am sure I would have remembered it—did I ever meet Harry Hopkins, talk to him on the phone, receive any letters from him or write any to him, or have any dealings with anyone who pretended to be talking for him. There may be letters on file that are contrary to that, but if there are, they were of a routine type. I can find no one from the people who were the closest to me during that period in the office who remembers any such contact. I do know, of course, that Mr. Hopkins knew about this project. I know that. But as far as any dealings with me or, as far as I know, with any members of my staff, they didn't occur.

Furthermore, I think it is important to realize that our organization, both in Washington and in New York, was so closely knit, and things were under such a tight centralized control, that I can't imagine any request or effort by Mr. Hopkins along that line ever occurring without my knowledge, unless someone in the office was lacking in the integrity he should have had, and we never discovered that in our organization.

He could have gotten it from one of the scientists who we know were giving information to Russia, but I don't believe he got it from anyone who was from my immediate office, or anyone in charge, first, Colonel Marshall, and then General Nichols.

Mr. HARRISON. You said there was a great deal of pressure on Lend-Lease to ship uranium to Russia. Can you tell us who exerted the pressure?

General GROVES. No; I can't tell you who exerted the pressure on Lend-Lease. Of course it could have been internal pressure. At any rate, we saw every evidence of that pressure, and I believe your files of the Lend-Lease diaries will show how they repeatedly came back. It was evident from reading the diaries that we didn't want this material shipped, yet they kept coming back and coming back.

The first conversation I had was, I believe, with General Wesson, and I made it very plain we did not want it shipped. As you know, General Wesson is not well. It has been impossible for me, since this thing first came up, to have any discussion with him at all. I don't believe he would remember much about it. He was handling hundreds of things every day. I believe it is fair to say that he immediately passed that on to his subordinates, and his subordinates were fully aware that we did not want this material to be shipped abroad, and this continual pressure to ship it was certainly coming from somewhere. Either it was coming internally, from ambitious souls, or it was coming externally.

I am sure if you would check on the pressure on officers handling all supplies of a military nature during the war, you will find the pressure to give to Russia everything that could be given was not limited to atomic matters.

There was one incident that occurred later. I was reminded this morning by one of my former people of how delighted we were when we managed to get some material away from the Russians. It was a major accomplishment. And the only thing we got away from them was time. We were very anxious, in connection with the gaseous diffusion plant, to get certain equipment. If it had not been obtained, that plant would have been delayed in its completion. The Russians had a plant on the way. Of course when I say they had it, you know who paid for it. That plant, some of it was boxed and on the dock when we got it, and I can still remember the difficulties we had in getting it.

One of the agreements we had to make was that we would replace that equipment, and use all our priorities necessary to get it replaced quickly. The agreement even said this:

Said equipment and materials to be essentially the duplicate of all material under the previous procurement number.

That particular plant was oil-refinery equipment, and in my opinion was purely postwar Russian supply, as you know much of it was. I give you that as an example of what people interested in supplying American troops had to contend with during the war.

Where that influence came from, you can guess as well as I can. It was certainly prevalent in Washington, and it was prevalent throughout the country, and the only spot I know of that was distinctly anti-Russian at an early period was the Manhattan project, and we were. There was never any doubt about it from sometime along about October 1942. I believe the people there just a few days before I was were anti-Russian a little before I was. They just learned about it sooner, that is all.

Mr. HARRISON. Learned about espionage activities?

General GROVES. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. In your answer to the chairman's first question as to whether or not the late Harry Hopkins had attempted to obtain any documents or material from you, you used the word that he did not "directly."

General GROVES. That means that it never came to my attention in any way, and I believe if the approach had been made to anyone in a position to furnish those documents legally and properly, it would have been called to my attention. They wouldn't even send a docu-

ment to the White House if the President called for it without asking me if it was all right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was there any occasion that was reported to you when any quantity of secret material or drawings had been removed from the files?

General GROVES. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. Would you have known of it if such a thing had occurred in any quantity?

General GROVES. Yes; and I think I would have known of it if one particular paper had been missing and discovered to be missing. Those things were normally reported to me. There were a few instances where it was not reported to me, but those were cases of officers in the field well removed from my influence, you might say.

Mr. TAVENNER. You may have already answered the question in answer to questions by Judge Harrison, but was there any time during your administration of this project that any higher official of Government attempted to use pressure on you, when you recognized it as such, for the delivery of documents or for the shipping of uranium destined for Russia?

General GROVES. Nothing except what I have already told you about the lend-lease operation. General Wesson did not put pressure on me. General Wesson could not have put pressure on me. But that did not keep his subordinates from constantly bringing it up.

There are two kinds of pressure in Washington. One is the kind that comes from above, that you realize what it is. The other kind is constant hammering, repeating and repeating, in the hope that you wear down or that something slips. If you run an office of some size, eventually something is going to slip. Nobody has a thousand batting average. I believe it was the hope of the people who kept pushing and pushing that they might catch me out of town, or that some day I would say to give it to them to shut them up.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am talking about the kind of pressure that you say you know what it is about.

General GROVES. No, there was not. Any time I discussed my feelings about the Russians with any higher officer of the Government in the executive branch, I never had any signs of any disagreement with what I said. There was not even any indirect pressure, such as saying, "After all, you are unreasonable about the Russians." I am talking about the executive branch.

Mr. TAVENNER. A moment ago I was asking you about the licensing for the shipment of uranium, and the records which we have seen indicate that permission was at first denied to grant a license for the shipping of that quantity of uranium of which we spoke.

General GROVES. You are referring to which one, the first shipment?

Mr. TAVENNER. No, the second; and that later it was reactivated.

General GROVES. And finally granted?

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, I want to ask you.

General GROVES. If you mean by granted, consented to by us or by me, I can tell you no very definitely. I can find no record of it, and can find no record in my memory, and my memory is still reasonably satisfactory, and I am sure it was not done. If somebody got my signature, I would like to see that signature, and I don't mean a photostat, either; I mean the original document.

Mr. TAVENNER. As far as you know was it ever granted?

General GROVES. As far as I know it was not granted with the knowledge of any member of the Manhattan project. If it was done, it was done with the knowledge I did not approve. There was one instance where it was assented to by Colonel Crenshaw, and that was later revoked.

You must realize I am in a position where I no longer have any control over those records. I have had no control since January 1, 1947, when they were turned over to other agencies of the Government.

Mr. TAVENNER. If the license was granted notwithstanding your disapproval, who would have had authority to make that decision?

General GROVES. Whoever issued the license. As far as I know, there was nothing that required a countersignature. They may have been told to get my consent, but as far as I know it did not require countersigning. As far as I know, I never saw an export license in my life.

Mr. TAVENNER. The last letter I read stated that an application for 25 pounds of uranium metal would be entertained if submitted. Is the committee's information correct that 2 pounds of this metal were shipped to the Russians and the shipment approved by the Manhattan Engineering District because the metal was so impure that it was known the Russians could not use it for atomic purposes?

General GROVES. I don't know. We were willing to consent to the export license for 25 pounds of uranium metal because we were very interested in knowing if anyone knew how to make the metal. The metal that was shipped was not doctored; it was simply not well made, and it did not indicate to the Russians what we wanted to get. It was 2 pounds of uranium metal, and that is all there was to it. They might as well have had 2 pounds of oxide so far as determining what we wanted. If they took it as the type we were using, they would have had a delay. I would have been willing to let them have 2 pounds of inferior metal.

Mr. TAVENNER. As far as you know, the Russians didn't ask for the completion of the 25-pound order after receiving the 2 pounds?

General GROVES. No. After approving the shipment of this 25 pounds, I was told they got a little of it, and some comment to the effect "we would like to see the Russians when they try to use that in a pile."

Mr. TAVENNER. General, I would like you to read a memorandum addressed to William C. Moore by J. Hoopes, and ask if you desire to make any comments on it.

General GROVES. Mr. Hoopes was Mr. Moore's assistant, wasn't he?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes. Suppose you look at it and read it and make such comment as you care to make on it.

General GROVES (after examining document). I believe that confirms what I was trying to tell you earlier, and you wouldn't quite agree I was right. In other words, Colonel Crenshaw's consent to this export license was definitely overruled by me, and General Wesson was so informed and agreed to it; and in its place the application for 500 pounds of each kind of materials to be sent to Russia was approved, with the idea of smoking them out and seeing if they could get it. This has reference to General Wesson's smiling when they said they were unable to get the material. So I think that will clear up the matter and show that my testimony was correct.

Mr. WALTER. General Groves, did you ever know Major Jordan?

General GROVES. As far as I can remember, I have never met him or known him at any time, but I have met so many people I can't remember definitely.

Mr. WALTER. Have you ever heard of any complaints that he made sometime in 1944 concerning the shipment of this strategic material you were in charge of?

General GROVES. Not in respect of material I was in charge of, but reading the papers and listening to the radio on the first two nights—I didn't listen last night—I gain the impression that what he was complaining of at the time was not the shipment of uranium, but the tremendous shipments going to Russia. I never heard any complaints from him, but I heard some Washington complaints from a lot of officers as to why on earth we were stripping the United States to give Russia materials, particularly materials not for war purposes but for later activities, commercial and engineering equipment that they could not possibly use to win the war. That was common talk among officers of the Army and Navy who were working on allocation committees on automobiles, trucks, steel, and things of that kind. That is what they told me, and not what I knew of my own knowledge. I used to see them every day as they came out of meetings, and I would get some rather indignant statements from them.

Mr. MOULDER. What use would Russia have for 2 pounds of uranium metal?

General GROVES. The only use would be, it would tell them what we were trying to do, and it would give them a small amount for laboratory purposes. They may not even have been able to make metal as good as they got.

Mr. MOULDER. Is it your contention that such quantity as was shipped was for the purpose of deceiving them in their efforts to know what was going on?

General GROVES. No. I said the reason for approving the metal shipment was essentially to find out if anybody in this country knew how to make metal satisfactory to us.

Mr. MOULDER. I thought you said it would not give them information of value.

General GROVES. It was the wrong kind, but we wanted to find out if anybody in this country could make it satisfactory to us.

Mr. MOULDER. Repeating, you state very definitely and emphatically that no pressure was exerted from the executive department of our Government upon you or any person in your employ?

General GROVES. With respect to my anti-Russian attitude, you might say. That was the statement I made. The other statement was made that I never had any pressure that I know of from Mr. Hopkins. I may have had some contacts from his office when I was on construction, but I don't recall any, and they were just routine and I wouldn't have known of them.

Mr. TAVENNER. With regard to this 500 pounds of uranium oxide, can you give us some idea as to how many pounds of pure uranium could be extracted from it?

General GROVES. Oh, my, I am no longer supposed to know anything about atomic energy. One of your staff ought to be able to tell you. This is just a guess, but I would say 80 percent. That is easy to find. You can find it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Can pure uranium be extracted from uranium nitrate?

General GROVES. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Would the furnishing of this amount of uranium nitrate and uranium oxide to Russia which was contemplated, of 500 pounds each, be of any value for experimental purposes?

General GROVES. Any amount would be of value in certain experimental work. That is, in anything to do with chemistry. After all, we designed and practically built the Hanford plant for separating plutonium and uranium when we had one-millionth of a pound of plutonium. The chemistry part could be very well handled.

But when it came to making a pile there wasn't enough for that. You couldn't even have run an experimental pile such as was used at the University of Chicago. I will not tell you in open session how much would be needed to make a pile such as was used at the University of Chicago, but Joliot-Curie has said how much he had to operate in Paris, and I think it is reasonable.

Mr. TAVENNER. How much did he say?

General GROVES. My recollection is it was something in the order of a ton.

Mr. WALTER. The amount was considerably in excess of the amount shipped?

General GROVES. Oh, yes; in other words, this would be like trying to make something in the way of a kitchen product where we needed three cups of flour and only had one, if you had to make your loaf of bread of a certain size, and that is what you have to do with this.

Mr. TAVENNER. You might have a smaller loaf and still use it for experiments, couldn't you?

General GROVES. Due to the way uranium reacts in fission, you have to have a certain amount to work with. You have to have enough before you can tell anything about it.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Groves, the committee has received information that a certain quantity of heavy water was requisitioned by the Russians, and that an export license was granted for this shipment. Do you know if it was actually shipped?

General GROVES. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was the licensing of the shipment approved by the Manhattan District?

General GROVES. Not as far as I know. Do you know the date?

Mr. TAVENNER. Between October 1 and December 31, 1943.

General GROVES. I just can't imagine that being granted. I am a little in doubt as to whether there was any heavy water to be obtained in this country at that time. I would have to check our production figures to know. I believe it was reported in the Saturday Evening Post regarding the Earl of Norfolk's journey to France, that a supply of heavy water was taken at the same time, and that supply was brought later to Canada, first at Montreal and then at Chalk River. The next amount of heavy water was manufactured under contract for us, and if that escaped from our control we would be very much disappointed to think it got out.

Mr. TAVENNER. During what period were you having it manufactured for you?

General GROVES. I will have to do some thinking on that. I don't recall when the first amount was produced.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you furnish us with that information, as well as the names of the firms manufacturing it?

General GROVES. I will if it is not secret information, but I think it would be better to ask somebody who has access to my old files. I do not have access to my files, which are now in the Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. WALTER. If any had been shipped you would have known about it, would you not?

General GROVES. If it had been called to the attention of the Manhattan District I would have known of it, and I can't conceive of consenting to it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Why not?

General GROVES. I didn't want them to have it.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is the value of heavy water?

General GROVES. As a moderator, just as graphite is used as a moderator in the Hanford pile. If the Hanford pile had failed, we were ready to design a heavy-water pile. We knew the Germans were desperate to get heavy water from Norway, and my thought was if the Germans found heavy water so important, it would be very embarrassing if we had to wait a year or two to make it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Other than the heavy water being manufactured specifically for the Manhattan Engineering District, was there a large quantity of it available in the United States?

General GROVES. Not that I know of. It could be made, of course, and with a very small amount of effort, in a college laboratory, but you would have a drop or so. When it was first discovered I don't know how much was made. But it is a very expensive variety of water to make.

To go on, and to anticipate your question that you are trying to frame, I think, the story I have read in the paper is that large carboys like you buy mineral water in, 5-gallon carboys, at least, marked heavy water, were shipped to Russia through Great Falls.

If the Russians actually got that much heavy water and paid their own money for it, I don't think they got value received. I think somebody just labeled it heavy water. I don't think you could tell the difference between heavy water and plain water, just looking at it.

Mr. MOULDER. How long would it take to make the quantity of heavy water it was said went through Great Falls, Mont?

General GROVES. It depends on the plant. If you were going to make it, you would have to put maybe \$5,000,000 in the plant, and it would cost you maybe \$10 or \$15 a pound; of course a pound is a pint; so I just can't imagine anybody getting it.

Mr. MOULDER. To go through that process would take considerable time?

General GROVES. Yes. It is just like somebody would tell me they shipped a dozen Hope diamonds.

Mr. WALTER. Was there any company in the United States at that time, in 1944, equipped to manufacture that quantity of heavy water?

General GROVES. Not that I know of, and I am sure if there had been we would have had them under contract. It requires a tremendous amount of power in one form or another to do it. The Norwegian plant was hooked to an enormous hydroelectric plant to get the water. They merely passed it through and separated it by the electrolysis method.

Mr. WALTER. Do you know what the capacity of the Norwegian plant was?

General GROVES. Before it was damaged it didn't even then produce very much, and we kept it damaged during the war. But it is a very small amount. If you poured it into a glass you would be sure you got every last drop out of that glass. In other words, if you wish me to comment on the report that there were many of these 5-gallon jugs going through, I would say, "Somehow, I can't believe that is so." I don't say they might not have been labeled heavy water. It is just like the diamonds.

Mr. WALTER. Maybe somebody was paying for heavy water and not getting it.

General GROVES. Maybe so, and if so I know who was paying it.

Mr. TAVENNER. We have a report indicating that a license was granted for the shipment of heavy water to Russia of a value of \$3,250, and apparently it was 41 ounces, or it may have been 41 pounds, but we think it was 41 ounces.

General GROVES. I would think it was 41 ounces, too.

Mr. TAVENNER. Ounces?

General GROVES. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. Last night we were doing some figuring, and we also figured 41 grains and grams.

General GROVES. I would say it was probably 41 ounces. They might have been able to get 41 ounces.

Mr. WALTER. What was the date of that license?

Mr. TAVENNER. Between October 1 and December 31, 1943. Was the Manhattan Engineering District consulted about the granting of that license?

General GROVES. I don't think so. At that time I would have bought the 41 ounces, but I wouldn't have paid \$3,250 for it unless I had to, but without any question at that time I would have bought it if it had been pure. It probably was not pure. It is very difficult to get it pure, and it is very easy to contaminate it.

Mr. TAVENNER. What other Government agencies besides the Manhattan Engineering District had access to reports concerning the progress of the atomic bomb development?

General GROVES. No other agencies. There were individuals in other agencies who did.

Mr. TAVENNER. You say there were individuals in other Government agencies who had access to the reports?

General GROVES. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Explain that.

General GROVES. There were very few reports by the Manhattan district. We didn't have time to write reports, and we didn't write them unless there was some need for them. I believe four or five reports were written. The people who had access to them were: The Chief of Staff, General Marshall; the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and an assistant who handled that work, Mr. Bundy; Rear Admiral Purnell of the Navy; Admiral King of the Navy; General Starr of the Army, who, with Admiral Purnell, was on the Military Policy Committee; General Somervell, if he asked to read it, had a right to, through General Starr.

Then there were Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant. Dr. Conant was one of my two chief advisers, so he was in and out of the project. And

Dr. Bush was so close to it he might well have been considered as being in it, but he wasn't under me, of course.

Then there was the President of the United States; and only one report, the second report that was made, which was made, I believe, August 21, 1943, was shown to the Vice President. That was the only report that was shown to the Vice President.

As you will recall from the history, the original committee appointed by President Roosevelt to look into this question of atomic energy and the possibility of its working, when it got beyond the scientific stages, when it looked like it might be of interest, was made up—and this is from memory—of the Vice President (and there is no doubt about that one); Secretary of War Stimson; General Marshall; Dr. Bush; and Dr. Conant. They were a sort of super committee.

Later, when I was placed in charge of the work, the Military Policy Committee was formed to see that everything was going as they wished it to. I have given you the names of those on that committee. This Military Policy Committee probably operated under the committee I have previously named which included Mr. Wallace. For example, this morning I looked at one report to refresh my memory on one date, and that report was headed: "To Vice President Wallace; to Secretary of War Stimson; and to General Marshall." It was signed by me for the Military Policy Committee. It was not necessary for Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant to see it after they had approved it. That report was the only one I ever showed Mr. Wallace, and as far as I know it was the only report ever shown to him.

Mr. WALTER. What was the date of that report?

General GROVES. It was dated August 21, 1943. It was written that day by myself with General Nichols' assistance. We wrote it very hurriedly, because we had just learned that President Roosevelt was going to discuss atomic energy matters with Mr. Churchill at Quebec, and I didn't want the President to go up there without knowing what was going on.

The report was written, given to General Marshall by General Nichols, who acted as courier. Unfortunately, it got there too late, and the various decisions were reached at Quebec without the benefit of this report.

After it came back to me it was shown in turn to Secretary Stimson; to General Marshall, who had already seen it; and to Vice President Wallace. That is the only time I think Mr. Wallace saw any of those reports. The first one, I think he was out of the country. After that, well, they weren't shown to him.

Mr. WALTER. Did Mr. Wallace ever bring any pressure to bear on you to make shipments to Russia?

General GROVES. Not on me directly. I don't know what pressure he might have brought on somebody else who, in turn, brought pressure on me, but at no time did Mr. Wallace bring any pressure to bear on me directly, and at no time was I aware that any indirect pressure was brought to bear by him.

Mr. MOULDER. Or any requests?

General GROVES. No. He was divorced from this project. Why he chose to divorce himself from this project, I don't know, but he was practically divorced from this project.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did he ever express an opinion to you as to why he divorced himself from it?

General GROVES. No. The one time I took this report to him, the only thing I remember about that is that I had to wait quite a while to see him, which was very annoying, because I had an appointment, and I didn't think the people he was seeing were very important to the war effort. I then showed him the report. He read it. We may have had a brief conversation, but that was all, and I decided that was the last time I was going to show him a report. I may have mentioned it to the Secretary of War, that I wasn't going to show Mr. Wallace any more of those reports, or I may not have bothered to tell the Secretary. I don't know.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know from what atomic installation Dr. Alan Nunn May, who was convicted in England as a result of the exposure of the Canadian spy ring, secured the uranium which he turned over to the Soviet Government?

General GROVES. No. I don't recall whether I ever did know, but I think his history is very clear. It doesn't make any difference—yes, it does make a difference, too. As far as I recall he obtained uranium, and it was separated uranium 235, the purity of which was near the top, and he also obtained a sample of uranium 233, also in nearly pure condition, I believe. I believe he obtained that from the laboratory that he was then working in, which was the Montreal laboratory. I don't believe it had moved to Chalk River yet, but it was the same laboratory whether they had moved or not.

He might have obtained it at Chicago, in which case he would have had to out-and-out steal it or get it through somebody in sympathy with his aims.

It was my belief he obtained it at the Montreal laboratory and that he obtained it by means of false reports. I think he extracted some of it before the experiment started and reported greater losses through the chemical process than he had.

It is possible he got it at Chicago in collusion with someone there. I believe your records show he spent a great deal of time at Chicago. He made a request to visit there which was turned down by me. Not that I had any suspicion of Dr. May. I don't recall ever meeting him. I know I did, but I don't recall. But I didn't see any reason why he should be down there getting information I didn't think he should have.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think you have answered all the questions I had in mind asking you.

Mr. WALTER. Any questions?

Mr. HARRISON. No questions.

Mr. MOULDER. No further questions.

Mr. WALTER. General, this committee is deeply indebted to you for this very fine statement. Thank you very much.

General GROVES. It is a pleasure to be here.

(Thereupon, the committee adjourned.)

HEARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II

MONDAY, JANUARY 23, 1950

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

MORNING SESSION

The committee, met pursuant to call, at 10:45 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood, Burr P. Harrison, John McSweeney, Morgan M. Moulder, Richard M. Nixon, Francis Case, and Bernard W. Kearney.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Courtney Owens and Donald T. Appell, investigators; John W. Carrington, clerk; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. WOOD. The committee will be in order. The record will show that there are present Mr. Harrison, Mr. McSweeney, Mr. Moulder, Mr. Nixon, Mr. Case, Mr. Kearney, and the chairman.

Mr. Counsel.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call Mr. Burman, Mr. Lawrence Burnian.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Burman, will you hold up your right hand and be sworn. You solemnly swear the evidence you will give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BURMAN. I do.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Burman was formerly employed by the Manhattan Engineering District and is presently employed by the United States Atomic Energy Commission. He testified before the committee on Tuesday, June 29, 1948, in connection with uranium sales made to the Soviet Government. We would like now to ask him some further questions.

TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE C. BURMAN

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state your full name?

Mr. BURMAN. Lawrence C. Burnian.

Mr. TAVENNER. When and where were you born?

Mr. BURMAN. In New York City, February 19, 1912.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your present address?

Mr. BURMAN. Five hundred and forty-one East Twentieth Street, New York 10.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your present occupation?

Mr. BURMAN. I am director of the Licensing Division of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. TAVENNER. Would you please furnish the committee with a résumé of your employment background, including any service in the United States Army which you may have had?

Mr. BURMAN. You want that now?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. BURMAN. I was graduated in 1937 as a chemical engineer from the City College of New York. I was employed by the du Pont Co. in Wilmington, Del., in 1937 and 1938; and by Baker & Co. in Newark, as a chemical engineer as well, in the years 1939, 1940, and 1941. In November of 1941 I was sent to War Production Board as a specialist in precious metals, where I was employed from November 1941 to November 1942. In November 1942 I activated a Reserve commission and was assigned to Manhattan District. I was with Manhattan District as a Reserve officer from November 1942 until December 1946.

Mr. TAVENNER. When were you with the War Production Board?

Mr. BURMAN. From November 1941 to November 1942. It was OPM part of that time.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is the full title of OPM?

Mr. BURMAN. It was Office of Production Management from November 1941 to January 1942, then it was War Production Board, the same entity, after January 1942.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the character of your employment with the War Production Board?

Mr. BURMAN. I was in charge of rare metals, the principal of which was the platinum group, and uranium was a minor metal assigned to that branch.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did your connection with that branch of War Production Board have anything to do with your assignment to Manhattan Engineering District?

Mr. BURMAN. I think it did, partially.

Mr. TAVENNER. In what capacity did you serve with Manhattan Engineering District?

Mr. BURMAN. I was in charge of procurement of special materials, special chemicals, for a time, and because of my familiarity with War Production Board procedures, when Manhattan District took over from War Production Board the responsibility for uranium control we did that, keeping the guise of War Production Board, pretending I was a War Production Board employee still, when necessary, but actually I was an officer in Manhattan Engineering District.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then all the restrictions and controls which were placed by War Production Board on the use of uranium were actually handled through the Manhattan Engineering District?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes; the Manhattan District recommended all the actions taken by War Production Board, and the Manhattan District actually exercised the control.

Mr. TAVENNER. But it was the action of War Production Board rather than Manhattan Engineering District that controlled?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes; the War Production Board referred it to us.

Mr. TAVENNER. What agencies of the Government were concerned with purchases and exportation of uranium compounds?

Mr. BURMAN. So far as purchases, only Manhattan District was concerned. There were no restrictions on buying and selling of uranium compounds under War Production Board regulations except that the purchase of uranium for coloring ceramics was prohibited. That is, no glass-manufacturing company or pottery-manufacturing company could purchase uranium to color pottery with.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did that restriction become effective?

Mr. BURMAN. In January 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. In what way was Manhattan Engineering District concerned with the purchase of uranium?

Mr. BURMAN. It bought all of the uranium that was required for the Government atomic-energy project.

Mr. TAVENNER. Through the influence of Manhattan Engineering District, were any controls set up other than the one you mentioned regarding the general purchase of uranium by the public or by foreign countries?

Mr. BURMAN. Aside from the limitation on the purchase of uranium for ceramic use, there was an export control exercised then through the Board of Economic Warfare. That is, an export license would be required from the Board of Economic Warfare to send uranium out of the country.

Mr. TAVENNER. What other Government agencies, if any, were concerned with either the sales or the exporting of uranium, besides War Production Board, Manhattan Engineering District, and Bureau of Economic Warfare?

Mr. BURMAN. None that I can recall.

Mr. TAVENNER. In what way was the Lend-Lease Administration concerned in the problem of handling uranium?

Mr. BURMAN. Only to the extent that Lend-Lease may receive orders from Allied countries for transfer of uranium. If they were to receive a request from any of the Allied countries—in this case, of course, it was from U. S. S. R.—it would be handled in Lend-Lease as any other lend-lease procurement would be handled. If a nation requested through Lend-Lease uranium procurement, it would be processed through Lend-Lease.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have understood that the Bureau of Economic Warfare was the licensing agency for the right to export uranium?

Mr. BURMAN. I think that is correct; yes. It was also the practice, however, of the Board of Economic Warfare, to consult with other interested agencies in the event they had some item which was of obvious interest, and in this case, as I recall it, the Board of Economic Warfare and Lend-Lease all channeled their requests for information and advice to the War Production Board. I don't believe BEW acted independently in all cases, but I can't say that for a certainty. I don't know.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you sufficiently acquainted with procedure to state whether or not it was necessary to obtain approval from Lend-Lease if it was a cash purchase of uranium which was being made, and application for export license was made to the Bureau of Economic Warfare?

Mr. BURMAN. I wouldn't know that at all, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Even in the case where it was necessary to consult Lend-Lease because of the materials being furnished as against lend-

lease quotas, do you know whether or not it still required that the export license be issued by the Bureau of Economic Warfare?

Mr. BURMAN. My belief is that it would require it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Burman, in March 1943, the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission applied for export licenses to export uranium and uranium compounds to the Soviet Union. Are you familiar with details concerning the sale of 200 pounds of uranium oxide and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate to the Soviet Government early in 1943?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Tell us what you know about that transaction.

Mr. BURMAN. The Manhattan District was just then starting to exercise its control over uranium which it didn't own itself, and we were suddenly confronted with a lend-lease order for that quantity of material which had been processed, we understood, through lend-lease channels, and a potential supplier had been consulted and it had been determined that the supply was immediately available for delivery by this supplier. I believe someone, as an afterthought, suddenly decided to consult War Production Board to see if it was all right, it not being generally known that uranium was anything more than of normal interest. When War Production Board was consulted, they sent the information on to us at New York, to the Manhattan District, and it was finally decided, after, I believe, considerable consultation, that the project had gone so far, and it was known the material was available at this company in Denver, that it would be rather pointing a finger at the material if the license was refused at so late a date, and General Groves then authorized the issuance of the license through his own office, and the material was quickly shipped.

Mr. TAVENNER. Manhattan Engineering District first acquired knowledge of that transaction through the War Production Board; is that what I understand you to say?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether or not the Bureau of Economic Warfare, or Lend-Lease Administration, at that time, knew that there was an active uranium project any place within the United States Government?

Mr. BURMAN. I couldn't say at all as regards the Board of Economic Warfare, but Lend-Lease must certainly have been a little surprised by the sudden importance of so small an order in Government circles. It would certainly hint broadly that the material had more than ordinary value.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was there anything in your negotiations, or those of any other official of Manhattan Engineering District, with Lend-Lease officials, indicating that they did not know prior to that time that this material was of strategic importance?

Mr. BURMAN. There was nothing to indicate that they knew it was of any special importance, to the best of my memory, and I believe that that is the case.

Mr. TAVENNER. After you learned of the first sale of uranium products to the Russian Government, do you recall what arrangements were placed in effect in the United States by the Manhattan Engineering District to control the sale of uranium products to the Soviet Government?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes. We took rather strong measures after that to be sure that we had material where we could put our hands on it.

Mr. TAVENNER. What were those arrangements?

Mr. BURMAN. For one thing, we arranged with a contractor, not using the Manhattan District name, for this contractor to purchase all he could of stocks of uranium in the hands of pottery manufacturers and anywhere else where it might be subject to resale. This contractor bought material from the chemical companies and scrounged around in industry to collect odd lots.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who was that contractor?

Mr. BURMAN. Vitro Manufacturing Co., of Pittsburgh. Vitro was the prime source of uranium in that they had for some years processed uranium ores from the Colorado area. We entered into a gentlemen's agreement that they would sell no uranium except to Manhattan District, and they were under contract with the district at the same time for a variety of work.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you discover at any time in the future that they had violated that gentlemen's agreement by selling uranium to other purchasers?

Mr. BURMAN. No. So far as we know they never did. As a matter of fact, they ceased their own operations at that time with uranium and worked exclusively in that business for the district. The Shattuck Chemical Co., in Denver, was also a processor of uranium ores, and, representing myself as War Production Board, and I guess Dr. Merritt talked to Shattuck as well. Mr. Potter, of Shattuck, agreed they would not make any deliveries of uranium anywhere without the permission of the War Production Board, ostensibly, and as far as we know Mr. Potter made no shipments that were not approved in advance thereafter.

Mr. TAVENNER. Could you legally demand that no sales of uranium be made by Shattuck at that time?

Mr. BURMAN. No, we could not. It was a cooperative measure on their part. Mr. Potter had his inklings as to the potentialities of uranium, because of his acquaintanceship with the material and what he had read earlier in the press in the pre-Manhattan District days. He knew of the potentialities of uranium 235, and he agreed not to make shipments that were not approved in advance.

Mr. TAVENNER. When was that agreement reached?

Mr. BURMAN. Immediately after the 200- and 220-pound shipments.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was the matter handled with Mr. Potter by letter, by telephone, or by personal interview?

Mr. BURMAN. Both by letter and telephone to start with, and followed up by personal visits periodically thereafter.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am not certain that I heard the date when that agreement was reached with Mr. Potter?

Mr. BURMAN. It was immediately after the 200-pound and the 220-pound order was placed with Shattuck, right after the delivery was made. The first information which we gave to Mr. Potter when it was decided that the 420-pound shipment would go forward, was to tell Mr. Potter that he might find it difficult in the future to get any export licenses for other shipments of uranium out of the country. We had also talked to him by telephone and had his verbal agreement not to do anything until somebody from War Production Board stopped to see him, and War Production Board was ourselves.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am trying to fix more definitely the time when that agreement was reached.

Mr. BURMAN. I can't give the exact date. It was either February or March 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you certain that it was prior to the time that the matter regarding another export license was raised by Lend-Lease?

Mr. BURMAN. I am certain that it was.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the Manhattan Engineering District endeavor to interview other suppliers of uranium and warn them against shipping out of the United States?

Mr. BURMAN. We had a contractual arrangement with the representatives of the Belgian producers, and while I can't say definitely that there was a written agreement for them not to sell elsewhere, I feel pretty certain that some agreement did exist. The Manhattan District purchased, in early 1943 or late 1942, the stock of material which was lying in the warehouses here which might have gone to the ceramic trade, since the Belgians were shipping to the ceramic trade in those days.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the name of the Belgian company?

Mr. BURMAN. In 1942 they had one representative known as the Central Trading Co., which was dissolved, and later the work was taken over by the African Metals Corp.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then I understand the Manhattan Engineering District acquired their supply in the United States?

Mr. BURMAN. Their warehouse stock of ceramic-type uranium compounds. There was also the Canadian source of material.

Mr. TAVENNER. Before we come to that, let me ask you: Can you be positive that the Belgian company was interviewed regarding the supplying of uranium compounds for the export trade?

Mr. BURMAN. I can say positively because I am certain it was done, but I myself did not do it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who did do it, in your opinion?

Mr. BURMAN. I believe Dr. Merritt can give you the full details of that.

Mr. TAVENNER. You were about to mention another supplier.

Mr. BURMAN. The Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., which is a United States company, was sales representative of Eldorado Mining & Refining Co. The Eldorado Mining & Refining Co. is the producer of uranium at Great Bear Lake. In the same manner in which we had purchased these other miscellaneous types of ceramic uranium, we had made a contract with Canadian Radium & Uranium to pick up their warehouse quantity of uranium oxide and nitrate, and so forth, and the contract had a provision in it whereby the district would have first call for the period of a year against any other uranium that that company had to sell of the same types.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the date of the contract?

Mr. BURMAN. In March 1943. I can't tell you the exact date in the month, but I am sure it was in March 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is that contract accessible to you?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes. It is in the Commission files, however.

Mr. TAVENNER. Could you produce it for the committee?

Mr. BURMAN. I don't know whether I am able to do so. It is a classified document. It is still classified secret.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like to ask you to investigate that and see if it can be declassified and turned over to this committee, and advise me of the result of your inquiry.

Mr. BURMAN. Yes; I will do so.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like for you first to identify the date a little more definitely if you can.

Mr. BURMAN. I know it is in March 1943, and to hazard a guess as to the date, I would say about the 27th.

Mr. TAVENNER. The contract is between the Manhattan Engineering District and what other party?

Mr. BURMAN. Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who were the officials of that corporation at that time?

Mr. BURMAN. Mr. Boris Pregel was the president of the company.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know the names of other officials of the company?

Mr. BURMAN. Alexander Pregel was vice president. Beyond that, I can't recall any other officers of the company.

Mr. TAVENNER. Had that company, prior to March 1943, furnished quantities of uranium to Manhattan Engineering District?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes. We bought it wherever we could find it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you continue in your purchases from that corporation after March 1943?

Mr. BURMAN. Well, we continued to have relations with that company, but they were reduced from time to time in their scope until they practically vanished. I can't tell you over what period of time that was.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you confer with this company, the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., or its president, Mr. Boris Pregel, or its vice president, Mr. Alexander Pregel, regarding the shipment of uranium compounds out of this country?

Mr. BURMAN. No. I was not myself in direct contact with Mr. Pregel. I believe Dr. Merritt can give you that information, because it was his responsibility to deal with Mr. Pregel.

Mr. TAVENNER. I see. I was asking you what arrangement or arrangements were made to stop the flow of uranium to foreign countries during the war period, and you told me about those two arrangements, the interviewing of Shattuck Co. and other suppliers. Now, I notice on the export license of this shipment from the Shattuck Co. that the supplier was Chematar, Inc.

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you interview that company?

Mr. BURMAN. No; we did not.

Mr. TAVENNER. Why didn't you?

Mr. BURMAN. We didn't think we could learn anything that we didn't already know.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, they were acting certainly as an agent or as a broker for the purchase of this material. It seems to have been of importance to have consulted with them likewise.

Mr. BURMAN. Yes. The Chematar Co. was in contact with War Production Board in Washington, the branch which was ostensibly in control of uranium, and was pressing for approval of the license, and

we did receive copies of the correspondence and learn the information we needed. What we were interested in most was where it was going.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes; but you were not protecting the outflow by merely learning what was in their correspondence. I am asking what arrangements were made to stop the export of uranium.

Mr. BURMAN. In the case of the 420-pound order it was agreed it should be permitted to go forward. We had the material blocked through the available sources of supply, we thought.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was any action taken by Manhattan Engineering District with other Government agencies designed to control the exporting to a foreign country of uranium compounds?

Mr. BURMAN. We did have a Washington office. The officer in charge of that office was in contact with all of the Washington bureaus. I can't say what steps he took, but he was the man in direct contact with Lend-Lease and presumably with BEW when any cases of this sort arose, and we felt that so far as raw materials went, we had it stopped at the source.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who was the individual in the Washington office to whom you refer?

Mr. BURMAN. Col. A. C. Johnson.

Mr. TAVENNER. He has testified before this committee, has he not?

Mr. BURMAN. I believe he has.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were any arrangements made with any Government agency by which the Manhattan Engineering District was to be notified in the event of the filing of an application for license or for approval of a license for the shipment of uranium?

Mr. BURMAN. I believe Colonel Johnson had such an arrangement. Where the word "uranium" would pop up in various Government offices, I believe there was a tickler in the case to notify Johnson.

Mr. TAVENNER. You say you believe so. That is rather important. What actual knowledge do you have of that?

Mr. BURMAN. I know that when anybody was looking for uranium he either wound up in Colonel Johnson's office or in our office in New York, and would be referred there by the War Production Board, by field offices, or by the other agencies.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you familiar with the details surrounding the issuance of another export license for 500 pounds of uranium nitrate and 500 pounds of uranium oxide, which was issued to the Soviet Government?

Mr. BURMAN. I know of it now. I was not aware of it when I testified earlier.

Mr. TAVENNER. You did not know at the time that such a license had been issued?

Mr. BURMAN. No, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you know at the time that an application had been made by this Soviet Purchasing Commission for the issuance of such a license?

Mr. BURMAN. No; I didn't. I had known of at least one earlier request that was floating around Lend-Lease for $8\frac{1}{2}$ tons of material. I know that was turned down. I did not know of the request for a 1,000-pound license.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you learn during the course of your employment that during the month of April 1943 a plan was discussed within Manhattan Engineering District by which a license would be approved

to export uranium, with the idea of testing out the Soviet Commission in its ability to locate the material?

Mr. BURMAN. I didn't know of it then, but I have heard of it now and have seen some of the records.

Mr. TAVENNER. I assume, then, from your answers, that you had no conference with any official of Lend-Lease or the Bureau of Economic Warfare relating to that particular license?

Mr. BURMAN. That is right. I may add at this point, this was only a part-time job which took about 5 percent of my time, and that we were busy on many other production problems. This job had only been acquired because of the earlier War Production Board contracts.

Mr. TAVENNER. Regardless of the fact that you were not acquainted with any effort to obtain the issuance of this particular license for the 500 pounds of uranium oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate, were you aware of any pressure being brought on yourself or other members of the staff of the Manhattan Engineering District by officials of the Lend-Lease Administration or officials of the Bureau of Economic Warfare to issue licenses?

Mr. BURMAN. No. I was not aware of any such pressure at any time. The only, it might be called pressure, was a series of telephone calls in relation to the 420-pound order from the War Production Board and Lend-Lease, and Chematar was in touch with War Production Board by telephone periodically, and War Production Board in Washington would call us in New York to get something done.

Mr. TAVENNER. To do what?

Mr. BURMAN. To get something done.

Mr. TAVENNER. That came from War Production Board?

Mr. BURMAN. That came from the War Production Board office which was theoretically in charge of uranium, but since they were sitting in the middle they would transfer these urgent requests from Chematar or Lend-Lease to us.

Mr. TAVENNER. State more fully what you mean by saying you were urged to get something done.

Mr. BURMAN. To get a decision one way or another, because this had been hanging fire for a considerable time, much longer than ordinary. I believe they were about to issue the original license when it was held up because they were trying to get a decision out of Manhattan District.

Mr. NIXON. That is the license for the 420 pounds?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who were the individuals from whom telephone calls were received from Lend-Lease and any of the other Government agencies?

Mr. BURMAN. I don't recall specifically talking to any of the Lend-Lease people myself, but the Chematar people had been in telephone contact with Mr. Lund and Mr. Parks in War Production Board, and Mr. Parks, through error, I believe, gave Mr. Rosenberg of Chematar my telephone number in New York. The Manhattan District as such tried to stay out of those things, it was not to be known that Manhattan District was directly involved, so that I, myself, I don't believe talked to any of these gentlemen.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether that occurred at some time quite a few months later than the transaction we are talking about?

Mr. BURMAN. No. It was in the February 1943 period in relation to the 420 pounds.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the nature of your telephone conversation with Mr. Rosenberg or Chematar?

Mr. BURMAN. I didn't actually receive that telephone call. I was away and another officer, as I recall, talked with him and told him that was a mistake of some sort, that he had Lieutenant Burman's telephone number only because Burman used to be with War Production Board. That cut off short any idea that Lieutenant Burman of New York was interested in uranium.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who was the person who took the call?

Mr. BURMAN. I believe it was Colonel Crenshaw.

Mr. TAVENNER. I was asking you if you knew the names of officials in the various Government agencies who called your office with regard to the releasing of this first shipment.

Mr. BURMAN. I don't recall just who telephoned, but we did receive, through War Production Board in Washington, correspondence from Lend-Lease and Chematar. Chematar correspondence was in the name of Mr. Rosenberg, and Lend-Lease correspondence in the name of Mr. Moore, I believe; that is the only name I can recall; I believe there was somebody else corresponding on the subject.

Mr. TAVENNER. But as to telephone calls, have you any recollection?

Mr. BURMAN. I assure it was the same gentlemen. I don't know, since I didn't talk to them.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you conscious, at any time after this first transaction was closed, of any unusual activity, or any activity, with regard to the officials of other agencies in urging approval of shipments of uranium to any allied power?

Mr. BURMAN. No, sir; none.

Mr. CASE. To what are you referring when you refer to an 8½-ton request that was turned down?

Mr. BURMAN. There was a U. S. S. R. request through Lend-Lease channels for 8½ tons of uranium material which was processed by Chemical Warfare Service.

Mr. CASE. When was that request made?

Mr. BURMAN. Shortly after the 420-pound shipment and prior to the date of the 1,000-pound shipment.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, we have a rather complete record on that transaction which will be introduced later.

Mr. CASE. You asked if he knew of any other activity and he said he didn't recall any.

Mr. BURMAN. I am sorry. That request did go through War Production Board channels, and that was, as I recall, refused, and the information was passed to Lend-Lease through our Washington office.

Mr. CASE. And who turned it down?

Mr. BURMAN. I assume it was turned down by General Groves, since Colonel Johnson was immediately on General Groves' staff and handled such matters.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether or not, as a result of General Groves' recommendation, the Secretary of War, to whom the matter had in the meantime been referred, made the final decision refusing to release the shipment?

Mr. BURMAN. I just don't know, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. In the course of your employment with the Manhattan Engineering District, did any fact or circumstance come to your knowledge and attention which indicated that any pressure was being brought to bear by any Government official, or by any person out of the Government, on your staff to approve the shipment of uranium compounds out of the country?

Mr. BURMAN. We had no such information at all, sir. We know of no such pressure.

Mr. TAVENNER. After this first shipment that you referred to from the Shattuck Co., were any other shipments made of uranium, to your knowledge?

Mr. BURMAN. Only the 1,000-pound shipment which we later learned of.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did you first learn of the shipment of the thousand pounds?

Mr. BURMAN. We had heard about it here in June 1948 and went back and checked more fully with the Canadian authorities, their records on the case, and we learned that a Canadian export license was actually issued and that the material was shipped.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the source of supply of the corporation you refer to as the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.?

Mr. BURMAN. Their source of supply was the Canadian Great Bear Lake mines. Eldorado Gold Mine Co. was the company; Eldorado Mining & Refining Co., it later became.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the Eldorado Gold Mine Co. make a report of any character that you are familiar with that would show the shipment that you have referred to?

Mr. BURMAN. No. That is a company which is entirely in Canada and would not make such a report.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether or not such a report was made by the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. of shipments emanating from Eldorado mines?

Mr. BURMAN. We have checked our files, the old War Production files, and can say that there is no report by Canadian Radium of that shipment.

Mr. TAVENNER. At least you did not know of it at the time you were employed by Manhattan Engineering District?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was any contact made with Eldorado Gold Mines with reference to supplying material to governments other than the United States and Canada?

Mr. BURMAN. I don't know. I believe there was, but Dr. Merritt can tell you that.

Mr. TAVENNER. When you said you first learned here that the 1,000-pound shipment had been made, what did you mean?

Mr. BURMAN. We just had no information on it in the New York office up to that time. All of the activity that we have talked over was carried on out of New York for the Manhattan District. It wasn't always possible to know what the Washington office was thinking or doing.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have since confirmed the fact that the shipment was actually made?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know of any other sales of uranium to the Soviet Government, other than the two which we have mentioned?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes. There was a small shipment of uranium metal which was permitted to go to Russia about the middle of 1944. At the time that the order had been first placed for the 420 pounds of uranium compounds, the same order carried a request for 25 pounds of uranium metal. I understood that 25 pounds of uranium metal were also authorized for shipment, but as far as we knew at that time there was no uranium metal available in the United States that they could lay their hands on. That was the fact of the matter. But the order was placed, eventually, with A. D. McKay, a well-known supply house in New York which specializes in rare minerals and metals. McKay accepted the order conditionally, that he would ship it if he could get it made somewhere, and for a year and a half he tried to have it made. It is rather a difficult process and requires specialized equipment. In all of his efforts to have it made, acting as a representative of the War Production Board, I was looking over his shoulder all the time. He finally did succeed in having about 4.5 pounds of rather poor uranium metal made by a laboratory in Cleveland. We had a sample of the uranium metal analyzed, and it was far poorer than if they had taken just pure uranium oxide to start with and not tried to make the metal.

We told McKay we would have no objection to his shipping a small sample of this metal as representative of what was available in the United States, and he actually shipped a kilogram—that is, 2.2 pounds—against the 25-pound order. The rest of the material he kept in his stock and sold in gram quantities, which he reported to War Production Board monthly, to universities and other laboratories in the country.

Mr. TAVENNER. The Soviet Purchasing Commission did not file a repeat order?

Mr. BURMAN. That was the last we heard of uranium metal from that point.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Burman, have you been apprised of the fact that there was a sale of 45 pounds of uranium nitrate to the Soviet Government in June 1944?

Mr. BURMAN. No, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know of any sales of heavy water to the Soviet Government?

Mr. BURMAN. No. Our office had no contact with heavy water distribution; that is, my own office did not.

Mr. TAVENNER. What office would have been consulted, if any had been, in the Manhattan Engineering District?

Mr. BURMAN. General Groves' office.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who, in particular, in that office would have received knowledge of such a request?

Mr. BURMAN. Colonel Johnson, I am sure.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were there any restrictions imposed upon the export of heavy water by the Manhattan Engineering District through its connection with War Production Board?

Mr. BURMAN. I just don't know, sir. I am not familiar with the manner in which the heavy-water sales were handled.

Mr. TAVENNER. Isn't that a matter which would have normally come under your supervision had it occurred?

Mr. BURMAN. No; it wouldn't. Our office was essentially a uranium-procuring and processing office in New York.

Mr. TAVENNER. Can you tell us whether there is any difference between uranium metal and fused uranium metal?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes; there is some. Most of the early uranium metal appeared in the form of powder, and when the powder was melted later it came out in the form of globules, which was known as the fused metal. It was easier to remelt the fused globules than the powder. The powder would flash into flames in the air.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have any knowledge of the shipment to Soviet Russia of fused uranium metal?

Mr. BURMAN. I believe the kilogram—that is, 2.2 pounds—was in the form of fused metal, but no other shipments, however.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Harrison?

Mr. HARRISON. No questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. McSweeney?

Mr. McSWEENEY. No questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Moulder?

Mr. MOULDER. No, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Nixon?

Mr. NIXON. As I understand it, in your position you generally had knowledge of requests for material of this type, the 420-pound and 1,000-pound shipments. Would you assume in your position you generally would be informed of such shipments?

Mr. BURMAN. The 420-pound shipment was being handled through our War Production Board contacts, and I would know of that.

Mr. NIXON. Your office was not a clearinghouse for all shipments, necessarily?

Mr. BURMAN. No.

Mr. NIXON. You came into the 420-pound shipment because your office was informed?

Mr. BURMAN. No. We came in it because War Production Board was questioned about the advisability of shipping it, and they got in touch with the New York office.

Mr. NIXON. Why was it the 1,000-pound shipment was not handled in the same way?

Mr. BURMAN. It had never, so far as we knew, gone through War Production Board channels or ourselves in New York.

Mr. NIXON. It had gone through private channels?

Mr. BURMAN. No. I believe it may have gone directly from Lend-Lease to General Groves' office, and that the War Production Board was not consulted.

Mr. NIXON. You said you learned of this shipment for the first time when? I am referring to the 1,000-pound shipment.

Mr. BURMAN. June 1948.

Mr. NIXON. At that time what was your position?

Mr. BURMAN. I was with the Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. NIXON. The Atomic Energy Commission?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. NIXON. You don't mean the Atomic Energy Commission did not learn about it until then; do you? Was this their first knowledge of this 1,000-pound shipment?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. NIXON. They had not known of it before then?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. NIXON. Were you surprised to learn of it then?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. NIXON. You were surprised?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. NIXON. Why?

Mr. BURMAN. Because we never suspected the shipment had taken place. We thought we would have known had it taken place, and we thought we had the Canadian supply shut off back in 1943.

Mr. NIXON. In other words, if this shipment had gone through your office you would have disapproved it; would you not, apparently, from what you said?

Mr. BURMAN. I myself would have disapproved it; but in a case of that sort it still would have been referred to General Groves' office.

Mr. NIXON. But, as you understood the policy, the policy after the 420-pound shipment was to shut off all available sources of supply so that additional shipments could not be made?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. NIXON. What agencies in the United States, if any, did have the responsibility for clearing the 1,000-pound shipment?

Mr. BURMAN. I believe the Board of Economic Warfare issuing the license, would have the final responsibility.

Mr. NIXON. The Board of Economic Warfare did issue a license?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. You can testify to that of your own knowledge?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. Who in the Board of Economic Warfare handled the matter; do you know?

Mr. BURMAN. I do not know.

Mr. NIXON. Was any memorandum or other order issued, for instance to BEW, that Manhattan Engineering District should be informed of such shipments?

Mr. BURMAN. I believe Colonel Johnson's office did have that understanding with BEW.

Mr. NIXON. Yet BEW apparently cleared the shipment without consulting Colonel Johnson's office?

Mr. BURMAN. No. It was our understanding it was approved by Colonel Johnson's office with approval by General Groves; that General Groves did approve the license for shipment of 1,000 pounds with the belief that we did have all the sources of supply cut off.

Mr. NIXON. When did you first find out about the 1,000-pound shipment, from what source?

Mr. BURMAN. From right here.

Mr. NIXON. From the Committee on Un-American Activities?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. NIXON. One other question. You are an expert, of course, and most of us are laymen. As far as the use of uranium for commercial purposes other than for the manufacture of atomic energy and atomic products, do I understand that 420 pounds would be considered to be a large order or a small order? In what category would you place it?

Mr. BURMAN. It would not be large enough to excite any attention. The consumption of uranium in 1942 for nonatomic purposes in the

United States was between 150 and 200 tons for the year, so that 420 pounds would be rather small.

Mr. NIXON. Has the Atomic Energy Commission established whether the Soviet Union, prior to 1943, obtained shipments of that size or less than that size from the United States, prior to the time the orders were issued not to approve such shipments?

Mr. BURMAN. It would be very unlikely that they would get it from the United States, since the United States was not a producer of the material. The material was more readily available from Belgium and Canada.

Mr. NIXON. I would seem to me, that in the investigation the Atomic Energy Commission has been making, that would be a relevant point: how large the orders were in the past. I believe you have indicated you were interested in knowing whether the Soviet Union at that time was as far along in the development of the atomic bomb as we were?

Mr. BURMAN. We did ask for records of sales of domestic companies for a number of years prior to 1943.

Mr. NIXON. What did you find out?

Mr. BURMAN. There was no evidence of any purchases in the United States.

Mr. NIXON. There was no evidence of purchases prior to 1943 in the United States?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. NIXON. So it would seem to me this sudden interest in the purchase of uranium would have some definite significance?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes; it would.

Mr. NIXON. This turning down of the 8½-ton order, who did the turning down? General Groves?

Mr. BURMAN. I believe General Groves' office.

Mr. NIXON. Did your office have anything to do with that?

Mr. BURMAN. I believe we referred it to General Groves' office, having received information on it through the trade and through the War Production Board.

Mr. NIXON. Through the trade?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. That they wanted 8½ tons?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. And you proceeded to forward that information to General Groves' office?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. NIXON. Who was attempting to obtain this for the Soviet Union, the Soviet Purchasing Commission?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes. I believe it was through Lend-Lease. There was no private company handling it.

Mr. NIXON. The American agency seeking to expedite the shipment was Lend-Lease?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. Did BEW have anything to do with that?

Mr. BURMAN. I don't believe so.

Mr. NIXON. With expediting?

Mr. BURMAN. No.

Mr. NIXON. I understand it was 8½ long tons?

Mr. BURMAN. I don't know if it was $8\frac{1}{2}$ long or short tons. It was of one of the uranium compounds, not of metal.

Mr. NIXON. What contacts were made with your office by Lend-Lease to get clearance for the $8\frac{1}{2}$ -ton shipment; do you recall?

Mr. BURMAN. I believe they went to the Chemical Warfare procurement office, and either the New York or Pittsburgh office of Chemical Warfare procurement got in touch with Vitro and also managed to find Manhattan District, but we gave them no information.

Mr. NIXON. Eight and one-half tons would be a significant amount to purchase?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes; it would be.

Mr. NIXON. But you indicate that you don't know of any particular individuals who were contacting you in regard to that shipment?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. NIXON. That is all.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Case.

Mr. CASE. Initially did General Groves approve that 420-pound shipment quickly, or did he make any efforts to stop it?

Mr. BURMAN. I can't answer that, sir, because I don't know the period of time before the decision was made. There were so many other things that we were doing that this was really not of great importance.

Mr. CASE. But it was your understanding that the decision to let it go was made on the basis that things had gone so far that to stop it would direct attention to its importance?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CASE. And then it was that you took steps to prevent anything like that happening again?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. CASE. And as far as you were concerned, you said you took steps that you thought would result in future requests turning up in your office or Colonel Johnson's office?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CASE. Did anybody turn up in your office who was making requests, subsequently?

Mr. BURMAN. I can't quite recall any particular cases that were turned up by name. We did have requests for the export of uranium metal to a number of countries.

Mr. CASE. To a number of countries?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes. I think Great Britain wanted a small amount for laboratory work which was outside of their own atomic energy efforts; that is, they were private companies wanting uranium metals for what they said was chemical analysis. Those may have been requests that they had received from elsewhere. They may have been feelers from elsewhere.

Mr. CASE. What happened to those requests?

Mr. BURMAN. Any information of that sort we did receive was passed along to the Washington office, and if they thought it was worth while I am sure they turned it over to Intelligence.

Mr. CASE. Do you know whether or not any shipments were made to Great Britain?

Mr. BURMAN. I believe there was a very small shipment in 1944 or 1945 out of this McKay quantity.

Mr. CASE. That was this four and a fraction pounds?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes; of which 2.2 pounds went to Russia.

Mr. NIXON. From press accounts I understand that this quantity of uranium metal sent to Russia was defective, and that it was sent for that reason?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. NIXON. Did you deliberately send it to Great Britain for the same reason?

Mr. BURMAN. It was for commercial purposes. We didn't think it was much good and didn't care where McKay sold it. It represented a poor stock of material, and if that was available without too much trouble it avoided attention being directed to the material.

Mr. CASE. Were there any other shipments to Great Britain?

Mr. BURMAN. I don't think so.

Mr. CASE. You spoke of requests from other countries. What other countries?

Mr. BURMAN. I don't recall. They were all for trivial quantities.

Mr. CASE. Did any other requests come to your attention from the Soviet Purchasing Commission?

Mr. BURMAN. I don't recall any. There were certainly none for uranium metal after the kilogram shipment.

Mr. CASE. Was this request for uranium metal renewed at any later date?

Mr. BURMAN. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. CASE. Not to your knowledge?

Mr. BURMAN. No, sir.

Mr. CASE. There may have been but not that you know of?

Mr. BURMAN. That is right.

Mr. CASE. In your steps to prevent any further shipments outside the United States following your knowledge of this 420-pound order, did you make any efforts to control shipments through Lend-Lease?

Mr. BURMAN. I feel pretty certain that Colonel Johnson's office had a contact in Lend-Lease who would bring to his attention anything on uranium that would come through that office.

Mr. CASE. Did you contact the BEW to put them on guard in any way?

Mr. BURMAN. I am sure Colonel Johnson's office did the same there.

Mr. CASE. Do you know whether Lend-Lease supported the 8½-ton request?

Mr. BURMAN. I don't know whether they supported it, but they circulated the request for it. The degree of their action I can't say.

Mr. CASE. Isn't it strange Lend-Lease would circulate this request if they had been put on guard?

Mr. BURMAN. They might just as well have circulated the request and taken whatever action with Colonel Johnson's office they had agreed to take. Refusing to circulate it would have aroused the suspicion of the Russian Purchasing Commission.

Mr. CASE. Do you know whether or not Lend-Lease sought to secure the approval of the Chemical Warfare Service?

Mr. BURMAN. I believe Chemical Warfare Service was handling the requisition as a service for Lend-Lease. I don't believe they had any interest other than that.

Mr. CASE. Did I understand you to say that this shipment of 1,000 pounds subsequently, which you didn't know about until June 1948, did have the approval of the Manhattan District?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes. General Groves approved that.

Mr. CASE. And you testified that he approved it because he thought the sources of supply had been shut off and that the order could not be filled?

Mr. BURMAN. That is my understanding.

Mr. CASE. But you were not personally connected with that shipment?

Mr. BURMAN. I was not in on the decision.

Mr. CASE. You were, however, in touch with the sources of supply?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CASE. Did you yourself think you had all sources of supply shut off?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, we did. With regard to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., I was not the direct contact there. Dr. Merritt was in touch with Mr. Pregel of Canadian Radium & Uranium.

Mr. WOOD. Any further questions?

Mr. CASE. Are you personally familiar with approval for that second shipment?

Mr. BURMAN. No, sir.

Mr. CASE. What makes you think General Groves approved it?

Mr. BURMAN. General Groves has testified to that effect and we have reviewed the correspondence in our old Manhattan District files and found some that indicated it.

Mr. CASE. But all that you have said with regard to the approval of this second shipment is second-hand information so far as you are concerned?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Kearney?

Mr. KEARNEY. No questions.

Mr. MOULDER. I would like to ask a question.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Moulder.

Mr. MOULDER. Was there any secret formula by which uranium metal was manufactured, or was it generally known throughout the world how to make it at that time?

Mr. BURMAN. There were a number of processes that were known but Manhattan District, I don't believe, has ever disclosed the method used by the district and now by the Commission.

Mr. MOULDER. It was then a secret?

Mr. BURMAN. The process used by the district was not disclosed. We considered that secret information.

Mr. MOULDER. Was it known in other countries how to make uranium metal, not by that process but by other processes?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes.

Mr. MOULDER. It had many other uses other than the development of atomic energy?

Mr. BURMAN. Uranium metal had very few uses. It was considered as a means for alloying steel, but there were much more effective metals for alloying steel than uranium, which has approximately the same qualities as nickel when used for that purpose.

Mr. MOULDER. You mentioned private companies in England using it for commercial purposes?

Mr. BURMAN. Small quantities were used for experimental purposes.

Mr. MOULDER. Didn't you mention that approximately 150 tons a year were consumed in this country for commercial purposes?

Mr. BURMAN. That was not in the form of uranium metal.

Mr. TAVENNER. You referred to General Groves as having agreed to the shipment of 1,000 pounds, and you referred to his having testified to that effect. As a matter of fact, what General Groves testified was that he agreed eventually that the license be issued in order to ascertain whether or not the Russians could locate a supply in the United States. Do you recall that?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. The records further show that after the issuance of the license the Russian Purchasing Commission advised Lend-Lease that due to the great delay in the issuance of the license their supplier had withdrawn the offer. Do you recall that?

Mr. BURMAN. I believe that was Shattuck Chemical Co., with whom they had placed the order at first.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. BURMAN. And you have refreshed my recollection on that a bit. They did withdraw it on the ground their offer had not been picked up.

Mr. TAVENNER. And the evidence further shows that when that report was made to General Wesson, of Lend-Lease, he significantly smiled when it was stated that the supplier could not furnish the material. Do you recall that testimony?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Groves further testified that he knew nothing about the shipment from Eldorado mines until he appeared before this committee in 1948, just as you have testified. What basis do you have for stating that General Groves agreed to the shipment by Eldorado mines?

Mr. BURMAN. If I implied that, it was not intended. He authorized the export license, but I don't know that anyone ever authorized the actual shipment of the material through Canadian Radium & Uranium.

Mr. NIXON. If he had authorized the shipment, the Atomic Energy Commission would not have had to wait until June 1948 to learn of it?

Mr. BURMAN. That is true.

Mr. TAVENNER. The agreement which you referred to as having been executed between Manhattan Engineering District and the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. provided, as I understood you to say, that no shipments would be made by that corporation within a year, or just what was that agreement?

Mr. BURMAN. According to the terms of the agreement, Manhattan District would have first option to purchase any material other than that covered in the contract in the event Canadian Radium & Uranium had any.

Mr. WOOD. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:20 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The hearing was resumed at 2:45 p. m.)

Mr. WOOD. The committee will be in order.

For the time being the record will disclose that the hearing is proceeding before a subcommittee composed of Mr. Walter, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Velde, and the chairman.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Burman, will you resume the stand, please?

TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE C. BURMAN—Resumed

Mr. Burman, when recess was taken I was asking you a question relating to this alleged contract between Manhattan Engineering District and Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am not going to ask you to attempt to rely on your memory regarding the exact terms of that agreement because we are expecting to have it produced.

Mr. BURMAN. I understand it will be ready about 3:30 this afternoon.

Mr. TAVENNER. 3:30 this afternoon?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Assuming that this agreement does provide, as you indicated it may, that an option was given to Manhattan Engineering District to purchase uranium which may be available for other purchasers, were you notified at any time that other purchasers had requested uranium from this company?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes; I believe the records do show that we were asked to comment on an order for 8 or 8½ tons of uranium nitrate and an equal quantity of uranium chloride. We were asked to make suggestions to Canadian Radium in response to an inquiry they received for export to the U. S. S. R.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did that inquiry come to Manhattan Engineering District by letter?

Mr. BURMAN. I don't recall whether it came by letter or verbally. Our records show that we replied by letter.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have a copy of that letter?

Mr. BURMAN. I don't have a copy of it, but I have a telephone transcription of it which we received during the noon hour today. Mr. Merritt has it, if I could get it from him.

Mr. WOOD. You mean it was read over the telephone?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you receive the telephone communication yourself, or Mr. Merritt?

Mr. BURMAN. Mr. Merritt received it and read it off and I copied it at the same time.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think since we are on this subject it would be well for you to get it at this time.

Mr. BURMAN. Very well. [After producing paper:] Do you want to hear it?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. BURMAN. The letter was dated February 19, 1943, and was addressed to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., at 630 Fifth Avenue, New York:

We understand that you have had a call from Captain Fliegel of Chemical Warfare Service, 292 Madison Avenue, New York, in regard to a request for 8 long tons of uranium nitrate and 8 long tons of uranium chloride. In answer to this inquiry please state that none is available except in experimental quantities.

Under no circumstances is any information to be given to any such inquiry to the effect that this office is interested. It is suggested that your Canadian office be advised to refuse information as to any inquiries.

Mr. WOOD. By whom is it signed?

Mr. BURMAN. By Colonel Crenshaw.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you produce the office copy or a photostat of the office copy and deliver it to the senior investigator of this committee?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes; I think we can do that.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you receive any other report or inquiry from Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. or Eldorado Mines regarding uranium which you were entitled to receive under the option which you stated existed in the contract?

Mr. BURMAN. I don't know of any other.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have shown you what purports to be an excerpt from a report made of uranium sales by Eldorado Mines during the year 1943.

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you made a search of the files maintained by Manhattan Engineering District to determine whether or not such a report is in your files?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes; I have just recently made a search for that particular document, and we haven't been able to find it in the Manhattan District files or the War Production part of the Manhattan District files.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is there a possibility that a record of that report may be in the files of the War Production Board?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes; there may be, but if it did get to War Production Board in Washington a copy would have been sent to us in New York by our contact in War Production Board.

Mr. TAVENNER. I believe that is all I am going to ask, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOOD. Any questions?

Mr. HARRISON. I understand that after you had written that letter to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., without further report to you, this corporation did sell uranium to Russia?

Mr. BURMAN. That is our understanding; yes.

Mr. HARRISON. Without your knowledge. You didn't have any knowledge of it until 1948?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. HARRISON. That is all.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Velde?

Mr. VELDE. No questions.

Mr. WOOD. I think, Mr. Counsel, in the light of the persistence of these bells [bells indicating either quorum calls or calls for roll-call vote on floor of House] this afternoon, we had better give up the idea of continuing further with this hearing, and meet a little earlier in the morning. Let's see if we can't get here at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, until which time the committee stands adjourned.

(Thereupon, at 2:55 p. m. on Monday, January 23, 1950, an adjournment was taken until Tuesday, January 24, 1950, at 10 a. m.)

HEARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II

TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1950

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

MORNING SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:30 a. m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood, Richard M. Nixon, Francis Case, Harold H. Velde, and Bernard W. Kearney.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Donald T. Appell and Courtney Owens, investigators; John W. Carrington, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. WOOD. The committee will be in order.

Let the record show that there are present Mr. Nixon, Mr. Case, Mr. Velde, Mr. Kearney, and Mr. Wood, a quorum.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call as the first witness Dr. Phillip L. Merritt.

Mr. WOOD. Dr. Merritt, will you raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give the committee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. MERRITT. I do.

TESTIMONY OF DR. PHILLIP L. MERRITT

Mr. TAVENNER. Dr. Merritt, will you please state your full name?

Dr. MERRITT. Phillip L. Merritt.

Mr. TAVENNER. When and where were you born?

Dr. MERRITT. I was born in Duluth, Minn., February 8, 1906.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your present occupation?

Dr. MERRITT. I am assistant manager of the Raw Materials Operations Office of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you please furnish the committee with a résumé of your previous employment?

Dr. MERRITT. I graduated from the University of Minnesota in 1928. I then spent about a year and a half in Africa as a geologist. I returned to the United States in 1929, went to Columbia University,

where I studied geology, and obtained a doctor's degree in geology in 1933.

I then went to Colombia, South America, for 2 years as a geologist for the Colombian Government. I returned to the United States in 1936 and took up employment with the American Cyanamid Co.

Mr. WOOD. Will you speak a little louder? I didn't hear the last.

Dr. MERRITT. I was with the American Cyanamid Co. from 1936 until 1942, when I was commissioned as a captain in the Army and was assigned to the Manhattan project. I stayed with the Manhattan project until January 1947, when the Atomic Energy Commission took over the project, and I am now with the Commission.

Mr. VELDE. When were you first assigned to the Manhattan project?

Dr. MERRITT. October 26, 1942.

Mr. TAVENNER. While you were employed by the Manhattan Engineering District, what were your specific duties?

Dr. MERRITT. I was involved in the procurement of raw materials for the Manhattan District, principally uranium.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were inquiries from various Government agencies regarding uranium cleared through your office, or your hands?

Dr. MERRITT. Not necessarily. Most of them were cleared through the Washington office, through Colonel Johnson's office, although we did obtain knowledge of them from time to time.

Mr. TAVENNER. When questions were presented by other Government agencies relating to the licensing, for instance, of uranium for export, were you required to give consideration and make recommendations with regard to such matters?

Dr. MERRITT. I think that Mr. Burman had more close contact with the actual licensing. I was in the same office and oftentimes was involved in the matter, although that was not a principal duty of mine.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you well acquainted with what transpired with regard to the negotiations pertaining to the licensing of uranium for export?

Dr. MERRITT. Fairly well acquainted; yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you hear the testimony yesterday of Mr. Lawrence C. Burman outlining the required procedure for the purchase of uranium compounds during the war period for export?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes; I did.

Mr. TAVENNER. Can you give us any additional light on the general procedural requirements?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't believe so. I believe Mr. Burman covered the subject very thoroughly.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was the Chemical Warfare Service of the United States Army authorized to make uranium compounds available to the Russian Purchasing Commission?

Dr. MERRITT. There was one instance where they were apparently assigned the job of procurement, probably by Lend-Lease. I believe the procurement involved 8 tons of uranium oxide and 8 tons of nitrate. I think that was it; I am not quite certain. They did contact our office to see if it was available, and they were told that we were not directly involved in the subject of uranium; we had been dabbling in it, in the alloy materials, but knew nothing of it.

Mr. TAVENNER. That was done for security reasons?

Dr. MERRITT. For security reasons, yes.

Mr. WOOD. Just who was it took that matter up with you?

Dr. MERRITT. I recall two officers in New York. I believe Captain Fliegel was one, and I believe there was a Captain Clark. I believe I spoke to one of them on the phone once. I believe Colonel Crenshaw carried on most of the negotiations with them. The statement I made about dabbling in uranium was one I believe Colonel Crenshaw made to one of the officers.

Mr. WOOD. What agency did they represent?

Dr. MERRITT. Chemical Warfare Service.

Mr. TAVENNER. Of the United States Army?

Dr. MERRITT. Of the United States Army, yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Just what was the procedure, from the standpoint of the Chemical Warfare Service, as far as you know, in the handling of Russian requests for uranium?

Dr. MERRITT. Apparently they were assigned this job, I suppose, by Lend-Lease, and various officers attempted to secure the material for Lend-Lease. We had reports, I believe, from the Cleveland office. They had contacted one of our officers there and attempted to buy the material. He contacted us directly. And I believe there were reports they contacted someone in Pittsburgh. They were just trying to buy it on behalf of Lend-Lease. I don't believe they realized the significance of the material.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was the Treasury Department of the United States Government authorized to make uranium or uranium compounds available to the Russian Purchasing Commission?

Dr. MERRITT. Not that I know of. We had a report yesterday of 45 pounds being sold to Treasury by Eastman Kodak as a commercial transaction. We have the record on that in the War Production Board files in New York. It was reported only as a commercial transaction.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was that reported as a transaction after the transaction had been consummated?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes. It was reported in a report of July 28 by Eastman Kodak. I believe the transaction took place in June 1944. They were required to make a quarterly report.

Mr. NIXON. Did I understand you to say you had a report yesterday?

Dr. MERRITT. We confirmed it yesterday, or, rather, this morning. We understood yesterday from the testimony that there were 45 pounds shipped.

Mr. NIXON. You didn't know it before that?

Dr. MERRITT. We did not know it was shipped to the Russians, no.

Mr. NIXON. In other words, you learned it for the first time in these hearings yesterday?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. That 45 pounds had been shipped in this manner?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I believe after I asked the question yesterday you had the records of your office searched?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. And you found in the course of that search that there had been a domestic sale to the Treasury Department?

Dr. MERRITT. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. In the case of a domestic sale of that type, was it the procedure that you be consulted?

Dr. MERRITT. It was not required under the regulations for a sale of that type to be asked about in advance.

Mr. TAVENNER. You, of course, as I understand, have no knowledge of what was later done with that shipment to the Treasury?

Dr. MERRITT. We have no knowledge whatever.

Mr. WOOD. Do the records of your office reflect what happened to it?

Dr. MERRITT. They reflect that it was shipped by Eastman Kodak to Treasury Procurement, and that is all.

Mr. WOOD. That is as far as your records go?

Dr. MERRITT. That is as far as our records go.

Mr. TAVENNER. Dr. Merritt, you, of course, know that in March 1943 the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in the United States succeeded in purchasing 200 pounds of uranium oxide and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate, which material was shipped from Great Falls, Mont., to Moscow?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. How did Manhattan Engineering District first acquire knowledge of this proposed sale and shipment?

Dr. MERRITT. Through the records of the War Production Board. As I recall, the War Production Board was notified of this, and they immediately notified us of the proposed shipment.

Mr. WOOD. Before it was made?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. There has been considerable testimony relating to the procedure followed in that original shipment, and I will not question you further relating to those details, because they have been covered pretty fully. But I would like to ask you this: What officials of the War Production Board, the Bureau of Economic Warfare, or Lend-Lease conferred with you or members of the staff of the Manhattan Engineering District with regard to the clearance of that shipment?

Dr. MERRITT. Mr. Lund and Mr. Parks of the War Production Board, I believe, were aware of this; I believe we conferred with them. I believe, in lend-lease, Mr. Moore and Mr. Hoopes. And no one, as far as I know, in the Bureau of Economic Warfare.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the attitude of those who conferred with you or your staff regarding the propriety of making this shipment, which is the first shipment—the material obtained from the Shattuck Co.?

Dr. MERRITT. I believe, so far as the Manhattan District staff was concerned, they were opposed to it, but the arrangements seemed to have progressed so far that it would have been inadvisable to stop it at that point. We would have been giving away more than we would have been saving to stop it at that time, so it was decided by General Groves, I believe, to let the shipment go.

Mr. TAVENNER. My question was more about the attitude of those dealing with the Manhattan Engineering District, rather than of the staff itself.

Dr. MERRITT. There was a great deal of persistence in trying to get a decision on it, I know that—many, many phone calls. Whether they actually favored the shipment or not I couldn't say, but there were a lot of phone calls in connection with it—a persistence of phone calls to get a decision.

Mr. TAVENNER. You say a persistence in getting a decision?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was there an effort made to influence that decision?

Dr. MERRITT. That, I couldn't say. I had very little contact with the officials involved. Most of that contact was carried on by Colonel Crenshaw or Colonel Johnson.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether or not at that time, which was in March 1943, the War Production Board and Lend-Lease Administration knew that a uranium project was being conducted by the Manhattan Engineering District?

Dr. MERRITT. War Production Board, of course, was aware of it; at least, Mr. Lund and Mr. Parks were aware of it. Whether or not the Lend-Lease people were aware of it, I can't say. I believe they were aware of it at a later date, but whether they were aware of it then, I don't know.

Mr. TAVENNER. What measures were taken by Manhattan Engineering District to control the distribution of uranium products, or their sale, after the approval of this first shipment, which was the Shattuck shipment?

Dr. MERRITT. After the initial War Production Board regulations went into effect in January, we then began a program of purchasing all available uranium from chemical supply houses, ceramics producers, and other people who had stocks for legitimate reasons. We carried the program out largely through contractors, in order to keep the Manhattan District name out of the transactions.

We made a contract with Vitro Manufacturing Co., of Pittsburgh, Pa., which at that time was a small producer of uranium and a consumer of uranium, to purchase odd lots of the material from various people for resale to us. We made a contract with Harshaw Chemical Co. to buy what stocks they had. They were involved in the project and we made a direct contract with them. We made a contract with the African Metals Corp. to buy what stocks they had. We never made a contract with Shattuck, but we had an agreement with them that they would not sell to foreign people or other people without our knowledge.

Mr. TAVENNER. When was that agreement reached?

Dr. MERRITT. After the shipment.

Mr. TAVENNER. After they had made their first shipment?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes. They were a very small supplier, really. Then we made a contract with Boris Pregel as agent for the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.

Mr. TAVENNER. I will ask you some questions about that later. Who else did you confer with?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't recall any other companies. Those are the principal companies, I believe.

Mr. TAVENNER. Chematar, Inc., is shown by the record to have been the supplier of some of this material, acting, probably, as agent—unquestionably acting as agent—for others. Did you endeavor to make any arrangement with them by which they would not engage in sales to foreign countries?

Dr. MERRITT. No; we did not.

Mr. TAVENNER. You spoke of a contract with Boris Pregel. Aside from the contract, did you confer with him or any other representative of the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. to ask their cooperation in not selling to any other country?

Dr. MERRITT. We sent them a letter which was reported here yesterday. I do not recall any specific conference with them. Many other

people talked to them besides me. I presume we assumed, with the contract, that should be sufficient to protect ourselves.

Mr. TAVENNER. The letter to which you referred I believe bore a date in February?

Dr. MERRITT. February 19.

Mr. TAVENNER. So that was done prior to the occasion of the sale by the Shattuck Co.?

Dr. MERRITT. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. With regard to the contract that you mentioned, we endeavored yesterday to obtain a copy of that contract. We understand that it has the rating of "secret," and we were unable to get the contract, but our agent was permitted to copy certain things from the contract. He has copied the first page of the contract, the caption of the contract, and an article dealing with the phase of the matter that we are concerned with. I hand you this extract from the contract and ask you to look it over and state whether or not you can identify it as an excerpt from the contract. I will have to prove the accuracy of it later.

Dr. MERRITT. Yes. I can identify it as an excerpt from the contract.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you take part in the preparation of the contract, and were you familiar at the time with the character of it?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes; I did.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you read it, please?

Dr. MERRITT (reading):

THIS CONTRACT entered into this 27th day of March 1943, by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (hereinafter called the "Government"), represented by the Contracting Officer executing this contract, and BORIS PREGEL, AGENT, of the City of New York, in the State of New York (hereinafter called the Contractor), witnesseth that the parties hereto do mutually agree as follows:

ARTICLE I—*Scope of this Contract.*—The Contractor shall furnish and deliver immediately f. o. b. New York, New York, at such point or points as designated by the Contracting Officer, in suitable containers furnished by the Contractor, approximate quantities of materials at their respective prices, as follows:

	<i>Per unit</i>
1. (a) 2,875 Units of P56-----	\$3.895
(b) 2,300 Units of M21-----	3.10
(c) 2,000 Units of L33-----	4.10

2. In addition to the materials contracted for in section (1) above mentioned, the Contractor gives to the Government for a period of one (1) year, from the date hereof, the initial right to purchase from time to time any or all of the P56, M21, and L33 received by the Contractor.

Mr. TAVENNER. It is noted on the face of the contract that there is an undisclosed principal, and it is noted that certain terms were used which I assume were code terms?

Dr. MERRITT. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you explain the reason for that?

Dr. MERRITT. It was our practice to code all contracts so that people who handled the contract for payment purposes, and anyone else who might come in contact with the contract, would not be aware that the materials were actually uranium that we were dealing in. It was a general practice to code all contracts. The code was then explained in a separate letter which was made a part of the contract.

Mr. TAVENNER. I will ask you to state whether or not one of the code numbers indicated covered uranium oxide, black uranium oxide, and uranium nitrate?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes; P56 was explained in the secret letter as being black uranium oxide, L33 was explained as being uranium nitrate, and M21 was sodium uranate.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you explain why there is an undisclosed principal involved in this contract?

Dr. MERRITT. The principal involved in the contract was Canadian Radium & Uranium Co., a company which had been involved in and was identified with the sale of uranium. For security reasons the company was not disclosed in the contract because it possibly would have disclosed what the contents of the contract were. The secret letter which accompanied the contract was addressed to Boris Pregel, agent, and to Canadian Radium & Uranium Co. The secret letter disclosed what a unit meant; it disclosed what the symbols meant; also it disclosed that the principal in the contract was Canadian Radium & Uranium Co., and that Boris Pregel personally was not held liable.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the secret letter also contain a provision that the corporation was liable for all acts of its agents under the terms of this contract?

Dr. MERRITT. As I recall, it did; yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Has a search been made for a copy of that secret letter since this matter first arose yesterday?

Dr. MERRITT. We have the letter in New York.

Mr. TAVENNER. The letter is in New York?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you produce a photostatic copy of it and make it available to the senior investigator?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. The date of that contract is March what?

Dr. MERRITT. March 27, 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to interrupt the testimony of this witness and call to the stand Mr. C. E. McKillips, an investigator of the committee.

Mr. Wood. Very well.

(Witness Merritt temporarily excused.)

Mr. Wood. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give the committee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. McKILLIPS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES EDWARD McKILLIPS

Mr. TAVENNER. State your full name?

Mr. McKILLIPS. Charles Edward McKillips.

Mr. TAVENNER. You are an investigator of the Committee on Un-American Activities?

Mr. McKILLIPS. I am.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you yesterday copy from the contract of March 27, 1943, the excerpt which I now hand you?

Mr. McKILLIPS. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is that a true and correct copy of what purports to be an excerpt?

Mr. McKILLIPS. That is a true and correct copy.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who signed the agreement? Who were the parties to the signature?

Mr. MCKILLIPS. A J. C. Marshall, colonel, Corps of Engineers, contracting officer. One of the witnesses was Alexander Pregel, and another witness was H. B. Kearney.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer this excerpt in evidence, and request that it be marked "McKillips Exhibit 1."

Mr. WOOD. Without objection, it will be admitted.

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Kearney.

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, the legal procedure here, I don't know how a piece of paper like this could be accepted in evidence in a court of law.

Mr. WOOD. The contents of the paper, as I understand, are being tendered as being a correct transcript of an original document in the possession of the agency represented by the witness Merritt, and with the identification that has been made of it, I think it is proper for admission, although if a question is raised about it, we can go in executive session. Do you make an objection, or did you make that as an observation?

Mr. KEARNEY. I make it as an observation, and for the present I will withhold an objection.

Mr. WOOD. Very well. It will be admitted.

(The excerpt above referred to, marked "McKillips Exhibit 1," is hereinafter incorporated in the record.)⁵

Mr. TAVENNER. That is all, Mr. McKillips.

TESTIMONY OF DR. PHILLIP L. MERRITT—Resumed

Mr. TAVENNER. When was the first shipment made to Manhattan Engineering District under this contract?

Dr. MERRITT. Our records indicate that the first receipt was May 20, 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was that the quantity provided for in the original terms of the contract?

Dr. MERRITT. There may have been a slight variation of 50 pounds here or there on some of the substances. The quantities are approximate, as you notice, and I think there was a slight variation in the weights.

Mr. TAVENNER. Evidence has been introduced before the committee that the Manhattan Engineering District acquired quantities of uranium from the Canadian corporation prior to the entering into of this contract.

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. The last paragraph of the excerpt from the contract, McKillips exhibit 1, reads as follows:

The Contractor gives to the Government for a period of one year, from the date hereof, the initial right to purchase from time to time, any or all of the P-56, M-21, and L-33, received by the Contractor.

Was Manhattan Engineering District afforded an opportunity to exercise its initial right under this contract to purchase all the uranium received by the contractor?

⁵ See appendix.

Dr. MERRITT. Apparently it was not, although there were delivered on June 4, 1,900 pounds of sodium uranate under the option. That additional quantity was delivered 2 weeks after the initial delivery.

Mr. TAVENNER. It is noted Eldorado mines is not a party to this contract?

Dr. MERRITT. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. It is also noted that the contract refers to the material which the contractor receives?

Dr. MERRITT. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know what the relationship was between the contractor, that is, the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., and Eldorado mines?

Dr. MERRITT. At that time, as I understand it, Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. was the sole sale agent for Eldorado mines. That is my understanding.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you recall whether or not the Manhattan Engineering District was advised at any time that this material was available if it desired to purchase it?

Dr. MERRITT. I do not recall being so advised, and I found nothing in the records that would so indicate.

Mr. TAVENNER. When I say "this" material, I am referring to the material which was actually sold to the Russian purchasing commission.

Dr. MERRITT. Yes. I found nothing in the records which would indicate so, and I have no personal recollection of its having been offered.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the Manhattan Engineering District, to your knowledge, waive its right to purchase any or all materials which may come into the hands of the contractor, which, of course, is the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.?

Dr. MERRITT. Insofar as I know that right was never waived. There is nothing to indicate so in the records that I can find, and I don't recall anything.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have learned during the course of these hearings that the uranium which was sold by Eldorado mines to the Soviet Purchasing Commission was sold through the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.?

Dr. MERRITT. So I understand, yes. At least, it was carried on their books.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was it the practice of Eldorado mines to make annual reports to the Manhattan Engineering District or the War Production Board showing the sales of uranium made during the preceding year?

Dr. MERRITT. Not the Eldorado mines. Eldorado mines is a foreign company and there was no requirement that they report to us as Eldorado mines.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. make such report?

Dr. MERRITT. I believe that we have a record of some earlier transactions prior to 1943. We received them for information purposes, to find out who were utilizing uranium. I believe at a later date some records of sales were given. I am not thoroughly familiar with that.

Mr. TAVENNER. You are not positive whether such a record was filed for the year 1943?

Dr. MERRITT. I understand it was not filed for 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. Or, at least, the report has not been located?

Dr. MERRITT. At least it has not been located, yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. It is anticipated that evidence will be introduced showing that the purchase price of the products purchased by the Russian Purchasing Commission from Eldorado mines was as follows: Uranium nitrate, \$2.36 a pound; black uranium oxide, \$2.55 a pound.

How do those prices compare with the contract price provided for similar products in McKillips exhibit 1?

Dr. MERRITT. They are slightly in excess, although not a great deal higher. These prices are about the commercial prices at that time. Our prices were less than the commercial prices. These are about the commercial prices, I would say, at that time.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then there was no excessive profit by reason of the sale as it was handled?

Dr. MERRITT. No, not a great deal.

Mr. TAVENNER. Over what you would have paid?

Dr. MERRITT. A little bit. I would say these were 50 or 40 cents a pound higher than we would have paid, in that order, but nothing exorbitant.

Mr. TAVENNER. Dr. Merritt, are you familiar with the details surrounding the issuance of the second export license, that is, the license for 500 pounds of uranium nitrate and 500 pounds of uranium oxide, which was issued in April 1943 to the Soviet Purchasing Commission?

Dr. MERRITT. I am not familiar with all the details on the actual issuance of the license.

Mr. TAVENNER. Let me ask you this: The files of Lend-Lease Administration reflect that on April 14, 1943, a letter was written by Mr. William C. Moore, of the Lend-Lease Administration, to Mr. N. S. Fomichev, in charge of chemicals, Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union, advising him that his application for the issuance of an export license to export 500 pounds each of uranium nitrate and uranium oxide had been denied. However, the files also indicate that export license 1643180 was subsequently issued to the Soviet commission on April 26, 1943. Can you explain why the license which was denied by Lend-Lease on April 14 was subsequently issued?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't know if I have a good explanation of it. I can surmise, if you care for me to do that. I really don't know.

Mr. TAVENNER. I don't want surmises about it, but can you give us any facts relating to the matter which the committee could use for its information?

Dr. MERRITT. I believe that after the date of the original letter by Mr. Moore we had a very firm commitment from Shattuck, who had this order before it at the time, that they would not deliver under it. This order was placed with Shattuck, I believe, early in April—I am not quite certain of the date—and sometime in the latter part of April Mr. Potter told me that they would not deliver under this order. Whether that had anything to do with the change, I don't know. We then were quite certain we had every source blocked up. It may have been that we felt it all right to give them the license because we thought we had every source blocked up. I don't know.

Mr. TAVENNER. When were negotiations conducted between the Manhattan Engineering District and other Government agencies regarding this change of attitude about the license, do you know?

Dr. MERRITT. I didn't have anything to do with those negotiations. I believe General Groves or Colonel Johnson or perhaps Colonel Crenshaw could tell you more about that. I was not too much involved with other agencies, at my level.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you acquainted with James P. Hoopes, formerly associate liaison officer, and finally liaison officer, in the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, Division for Soviet Supply?

Dr. MERRITT. No. I have seen his name on letters, but have never spoken to him to my knowledge.

Mr. TAVENNER. Can you state whether or not you had a telephone conversation with Mr. Hoopes on or about April 22, 1943?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't recall. I recall speaking to Mr. Moore, but not Mr. Hoopes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Whether you thought you were speaking to Mr. Hoopes or Mr. Moore, do you recall whether or not you advised the official in Lend-Lease that pressure had just been brought to bear on General Groves to release the 1,000 pounds?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't recall stating that, Mr. Tavenner.

Mr. TAVENNER. Independently of your recollection of the telephone conversation, did any fact come to your attention, or were you told by any member of your staff, that pressure of any description was brought to bear on General Groves to change the decision about the issuance of the license for this particular shipment?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't recall that at all. There was a great deal of pressure for a decision, I know that, but whether there was any individual pressure or not, I wouldn't know the person, I am sure, who might have brought it.

Mr. NIXON. What do you mean by a great deal of pressure for a decision?

Dr. MERRITT. This thing had been going along for quite a while, and these people wanted to get it decided one way or another so that Lend-Lease could be given an answer.

Mr. NIXON. I assume Lend-Lease was trying to get it expedited. This doesn't mean they were trying to get an adverse decision?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't know.

Mr. NIXON. Do I understand you to say Lend-Lease was interested in getting negative decisions on shipments they were trying to expedite?

Dr. MERRITT. I was involved with Lend-Lease very little.

Mr. NIXON. But it seems obvious that Lend-Lease was interested in expediting shipments rather than getting them turned down?

Dr. MERRITT. Maybe so. I don't know.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know the names of officials of Lend-Lease who conferred with anyone in your office regarding this shipment?

Dr. MERRITT. The only names I recall are Moore and Hoopes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did any official in the Bureau of Economic Warfare confer with anyone in your office regarding this shipment, to your knowledge?

Dr. MERRITT. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was the War Production Board membership involved in any way with this particular license?

Dr. MERRITT. That, I don't know. I presume they were aware of it, but I don't know. They may have been aware of it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did any person other than an official of one of the Government agencies that I mentioned confer with you or any member of your staff with regard to expediting the approval of this particular license?

Dr. MERRITT. Not that I know of.

Mr. NIXON. Why do you say there was a great deal of pressure if none of these people talked to you?

Dr. MERRITT. There were a lot of phone calls from our office in Washington and from us to them.

Mr. NIXON. What do you mean by "to them"?

Dr. MERRITT. To our Washington office.

Mr. NIXON. You are speaking of your own interoffice communications?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes. Colonel Crenshaw carried on most of them, I presume, with Colonel Johnson.

Mr. NIXON. And the reason for that was that the heat was on from Lend-Lease?

Dr. MERRITT. It was not on me.

Mr. NIXON. You said there was a great deal of pressure for a decision?

Dr. MERRITT. That is right.

Mr. NIXON. So you knew it was something more than an ordinary case?

Dr. MERRITT. Surely.

Mr. NIXON. This was a case where you thought it was top priority to get something done?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. Because of the pressure that was coming. Is that correct?

Dr. MERRITT. I think so, Mr. Nixon.

Mr. CASE. You say Colonel Crenshaw handled the negotiations?

Dr. MERRITT. I believe he conferred with officials of Lend-Lease Administration on the subject. I know he did.

Mr. CASE. You don't think Colonel Crenshaw initiated the conversations with Lend-Lease?

Dr. MERRITT. No. It probably came the other way. I am sure Lend-Lease initiated the conversations.

Mr. CASE. So you think there was a great deal of pressure on Colonel Crenshaw, and that it came from Lend-Lease?

Dr. MERRITT. I believe Colonel Crenshaw could answer that better than I could.

Mr. CASE. But you know the telephone calls to Colonel Crenshaw came from Lend-Lease?

Dr. MERRITT. I know he conversed with them quite often, and I am sure Colonel Johnson did, too, in Washington.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was there anyone employed in the Washington office in addition to Colonel Johnson?

Dr. MERRITT. There were a good many people there. I don't know their names. He and his staff handled this particular type of thing.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who composed his staff?

Dr. MERRITT. I can't remember their names, it has been so long. He was our principal contact. He had many other people there.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did you state that you had your conference with the Shattuck Co. and secured the agreement that they would not ship any more uranium?

Dr. MERRITT. It was in the latter part of April that I had a telephone conversation with them. I do not know the exact date. I believe a memorandum I have was dated April 29 to the effect I had conversed with them, presumably in the last few days.

Mr. TAVENNER. The files of Lend-Lease disclose, as shown by evidence already introduced, that the Soviet Purchasing Commission advised Lend-Lease that the delay in issuing the license was so great that the supplier had canceled the order. Do you recall having heard that?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes; that is correct. Mr. Potter, in the early conversations, said he had a feeler for the order—I believe that is the way he put it—but that nothing else had come through and that he would be willing to tell them at that point that he had no more supply.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, at the time of your conference with Potter the order had not been turned down by him or withdrawn?

(Representative Walter enters hearing room).

Dr. MERRITT. Early in April I probably talked to him. I believe I talked to him personally the latter part of March or early in April. I don't know if he had the order at that time or not. He probably did.

Mr. TAVENNER. When you learned that the Soviet Purchasing Commission advised they could not obtain the material from their supplier, was it considered that the strategy of handling the thing had been successful?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes. We felt we had been successful in blocking the sale.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was done about withdrawing the license which had been authorized to be issued and which you now know was issued?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't think anything was done.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was normally the life of such a license?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't know what the life was of a Lend-Lease or BEW license.

Mr. TAVENNER. Whatever the period of its life may be, it existed as a constant threat, did it not, during that period?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes. Still, we felt we had all sources completely blocked and it didn't make any particular difference if there was a license outstanding.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you learn that very soon after the Shattuck Co. withdrew its offer the Soviet Purchasing Commission filed a request with Lend-Lease to amend this license?

Dr. MERRITT. I didn't know of that.

Mr. TAVENNER. You didn't know of that?

Dr. MERRITT. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. You mean as far as you know the Manhattan Engineering District was not advised that an application had been received to amend the license?

Dr. MERRITT. As far as I know. I was not aware of it. Whether someone else was or not, I don't know.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then you don't know of your own knowledge whether or not it actually was amended?

Dr. MERRITT. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Had you known that on the 29th of April, 1943, this license was actually amended to show a different constituency of chemical analysis of the material sought to be exported, wouldn't it have acted as a red flag to you, and you would have known immediately that the material was available?

Dr. MERRITT. Probably so.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is there any other conclusion?

Dr. MERRITT. That is probably correct.

Mr. NIXON. Did I understand you to say earlier that the original license had come to your attention?

Dr. MERRITT. The original license itself never came to my attention. I think probably we were aware something was going on, but I never saw the license and I don't believe I was aware it was actually issued.

Mr. NIXON. Who was aware of it?

Dr. MERRITT. I think the Washington office must have been aware of it.

Mr. NIXON. Your Washington office?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes. I think General Groves testified he was aware of it.

Mr. NIXON. As to the amendment of the original license, was your Washington office informed of that?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't know. They should have been aware of it.

Mr. NIXON. That is the point. In other words, the amendment should have been made——

Dr. MERRITT. Clear to them.

Mr. NIXON. Clear to them?

Dr. MERRITT. Surely.

Mr. NIXON. If they had been made aware of the amendment, they would not have found out about the shipment for the first time last year? You didn't find out about the shipment until last year?

Dr. MERRITT. That is right, here, in June 1948.

Mr. NIXON. In other words, the fact that the office which had jurisdiction over the original license, your Washington office, was not informed of the amendment, indicates it might have been a highly irregular procedure?

Dr. MERRITT. If they were not informed, yes. I can't say whether or not they were informed.

Mr. TAVENNER. During the course of the time that the matter of the issuance of the license was pending, was the question of furnishing a substitute material to the Russians considered?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes. There was some thought at one time, and correspondence, I believe, between Colonel Crenshaw and perhaps Mr. Hoopes. I have read the correspondence recently. I didn't know about it at the time. But we had located some uranium steel alloy. There wasn't much of it. It had been made years before, I believe, by the Latrobe Steel Co. There was some thought at one time of letting them have that useless material rather than what they wanted. Our correspondence showed there was some negotiation along that line, but it stopped and nothing happened about it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you recall talking to Mr. Hoopes about a substitute?

Dr. MERRITT. The correspondence was all between Colonel Crenshaw and Mr. Hoopes, I believe, on that.

MR. TAVENNER. Do you know whether or not the substitute material which you proposed giving to the Russians would have been adequate for the purposes for which the Russians said they wanted to use the material?

DR. MERRITT. I am not a metallurgist. I believe it was quite useless material.

MR. TAVENNER. You think it may have been useless even for the purpose for which they said they wanted it?

DR. MERRITT. It is possible. I don't know.

MR. TAVENNER. You don't know?

DR. MERRITT. No.

MR. TAVENNER. In other words, you are not answering the question in the affirmative or negative?

DR. MERRITT. No.

MR. WALTER. Why was consideration given to the sending of worthless material?

DR. MERRITT. I think Colonel Crenshaw could answer that better than I could.

MR. WALTER. You were in on the discussions as to the sending of this worthless material, were you not?

DR. MERRITT. No; I was not. I read the correspondence.

MR. WALTER. You have just testified from the correspondence?

DR. MERRITT. That is correct.

MR. WALTER. Did the correspondence indicate the reason why consideration was given to the sending of worthless material?

DR. MERRITT. Not that I recall.

MR. TAVENNER. Did you confer at any time with General Groves regarding the issuance of this license?

DR. MERRITT. Not with General Groves personally; no.

MR. VELDE. Did you confer with any member of the security office other than General Groves?

DR. MERRITT. I believe Colonel Johnson and Colonel Crenshaw carried on all our conversations.

MR. CASE. When you said there were negotiations to let "them" have the worthless material, whom did you mean?

DR. MERRITT. The Russians.

MR. CASE. Then you understood there was a determined effort on the part of the Russian Purchasing Commission to obtain uranium?

DR. MERRITT. Apparently; yes.

MR. WALTER. Whose decision was it to send worthless material?

DR. MERRITT. I think General Groves.

MR. WALTER. The final decision would have been his?

DR. MERRITT. I think so; yes.

MR. CASE. That is, if the matter came to him?

DR. MERRITT. If the matter came to him.

MR. CASE. Did the BEW submit to General Groves any request for export licenses for the shipment of uranium?

DR. MERRITT. I don't know whether it did or not.

MR. CASE. In your attempt to corral the sources of supply and distribution of this material, did you make any contact with BEW?

DR. MERRITT. I recall having one meeting with Dr. Bateman and some members of his staff on uranium. It had nothing to do with export; it had to do with possible foreign sources and some way they could assist us in our procurement program.

Mr. CASE. But there was no conversation on the exporting of it?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't believe these people were involved in export control.

Mr. CASE. Who was Dr. Bateman?

Dr. MERRITT. He was professor of geology at Yale.

Mr. CASE. What position was he holding at that time?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't recall exactly. He was in charge of some sort of foreign procurement, I believe.

Mr. CASE. With whom?

Dr. MERRITT. With the Board of Economic Warfare. It was on procurement.

Mr. WOOD. You were aware, were you not, Doctor, at all times during these transactions, that material of this character could not be exported from this country without an export license issued by BEW?

Dr. MERRITT. I believe so, yes.

Mr. WOOD. Why was it you felt impelled to block up all sources of supply if in fact none of it could be shipped out without an export license?

Dr. MERRITT. We felt we could control it.

Mr. WOOD. Were you apprehensive a license might be issued without your knowledge?

Dr. MERRITT. We wanted this material ourselves.

Mr. WOOD. But you were aware the material could not be shipped out of the country without a license, and that the license would have to be issued by an agency of the United States Government which presumably was as much interested in preserving the security as you were, so why didn't you rely on them?

Dr. MERRITT. I think we were trying to do those things ourselves.

Mr. WOOD. There was, in fact, a license issued and amended without your knowledge?

Dr. MERRITT. Apparently so, yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether or not heavy water was shipped to Russia—

Mr. NIXON. Excuse me. Am I correct in the assumption from your testimony that this transaction in regard to the shipment of 1,000 pounds was a well-known transaction in your office and in the office in Washington, it was discussed by telephone and otherwise, because of the efforts being made to get decision?

Dr. MERRITT. I think so, yes.

Mr. NIXON. It was a transaction which was out of the ordinary?

Dr. MERRITT. That is right.

Mr. NIXON. And for that reason, I suppose the fact that this shipment had actually been made as a result of an amended order which apparently did not come to your office was quite surprising?

Dr. MERRITT. It was, Mr. Nixon.

Mr. NIXON. Mr. Burman's testimony yesterday was that you learned for the first time in 1948, from this committee, that this shipment had actually been made as a result of an amended license?

Dr. MERRITT. That is correct.

Mr. NIXON. It means, in other words, that this amended license went around the ordinary channels, assuming it did not go through your Washington office?

Dr. MERRITT. Assuming it did not go through our Washington office and ordinary channels; yes.

Mr. NIXON. And these people who were attempting to get the order filled, Lend-Lease, could not have helped being aware of the fact there was considerable discussion and resistance in your office to having the license issued?

Dr. MERRITT. I believe that is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know what the procedure was for issuing export licenses?

Dr. MERRITT. I do not know the procedure. We were not involved in the actual licenses.

Mr. TAVENNER. And I assume it was not the practice for these licenses to clear through your office?

Dr. MERRITT. Not through our New York office; no.

Mr. CASE. Did you take any steps, other than this talk with Dr. Bateman, to be informed of the issuance of licenses for the shipment of materials of this type out of the country?

Dr. MERRITT. No. Anything like that would have been handled by Colonel Johnson in the Washington office.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether or not heavy-water shipments were made to Russia during the war years?

Dr. MERRITT. I was never involved in the subject at all in any way.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know what controls were set up governing the shipment of heavy water?

Dr. MERRITT. No; I do not. Heavy water was out of my province entirely.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Walter?

Mr. WALTER. Did your office have any direct responsibility, other than a desire to preserve this strategic material, in the issuance of export licenses?

Dr. MERRITT. That is all.

Mr. WALTER. You had no responsibility at all in that regard?

Dr. MERRITT. No.

Mr. WOOD. That was the responsibility of BEW, wasn't it?

Dr. MERRITT. That is correct.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Nixon.

Mr. NIXON. I will pass this time.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Case.

Mr. CASE. Dr. Merritt, as I understand, you stated you had started out trying to buy all the uranium on the market?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. CASE. And you first made a contract with Vitro?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. CASE. Was that a firm contract, that, if they had any to sell or acquired any, they should come to you?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't recall the exact terms of that contract. We worked closely with them, and I am sure nothing could have gone wrong in any way with that company. We had full confidence in them. I don't recall the exact terms of the contract.

Mr. CASE. No sale, as far as you know, was made by Vitro to anyone except yourself, acting for the Manhattan District?

Dr. MERRITT. That is correct.

Mr. CASE. What steps did you take with Shattuck to insure that their sales would be entirely to the Manhattan District?

Dr. MERRITT. We never bought any uranium from Shattuck at all. They were a very, very small supplier, and their sales, I believe, at a later date, were well controlled through the War Production Board. Their sales were for essential domestic purposes.

Mr. CASE. You said you had a firm commitment from them. What was that firm commitment?

Dr. MERRITT. That they would refuse any foreign orders, and I believe that they would keep us informed on other orders they had.

Mr. CASE. Was that by letter, contract, or telephone conversation?

Dr. MERRITT. Personally, I had one telephone conversation with them. I think Mr. Burman visited them many times during the war, I had very little contact with them after that one telephone conversation.

Mr. CASE. Do you know whether or not there was any written understanding with them?

Dr. MERRITT. No; I don't know.

Mr. CASE. In any event, this firm commitment, which you don't know if it was put in writing or not, was made after the shipment of the 420 pounds?

Dr. MERRITT. That is correct.

Mr. CASE. What was Mr. Potter's connection with Shattuck?

Dr. MERRITT. He is president, I believe, of Shattuck Chemical Co.

Mr. CASE. Earlier in your testimony you referred to an effort to control purchases of all ceramics, I believe. Did you say that?

Dr. MERRITT. Uranium for ceramic coloring; yes. We purchased a good deal of uranium from ceramic companies.

Mr. CASE. From pottery companies?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes. That is the transaction we handled through Vitro.

Mr. CASE. Referring to your contract with Boris Pregel, did that contract require the contractor to notify you and tender to you any of the three materials mentioned which they had or might acquire?

Dr. MERRITT. That is the way I would interpret it; yes. That was the intention.

Mr. CASE. It could have been a contract merely that Manhattan would be willing to buy, but did it also provide they must offer to Manhattan any of these materials they had or might acquire?

Dr. MERRITT. The wording is:

In addition to the materials contracted for in section (1) above mentioned, the Contractor gives to the Government for a period of one year, from the date hereof, the initial right to purchase from time to time, any or all of these three materials received by the Contractor.

Mr. CASE. Do you know whether or not the contract provided any methods for implementing that right?

Dr. MERRITT. Except presumably they would notify us when they received anything.

Mr. CASE. You don't know if the contract was specific on that point?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't believe it was specific on that point.

Mr. CASE. Under that contract, would you understand that Manhattan would have the right of refusal before any of these materials were released for sale elsewhere?

Dr. MERRITT. That is correct.

Mr. CASE. Were you offered this material which later the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. sold elsewhere?

Dr. MERRITT. We were not offered this material so far as I am aware.

Mr. CASE. State again what the relationship was between Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. and Eldorado Mines.

Dr. MERRITT. It was my understanding that at that time Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. had a contract whereby they were exclusive sales agents for Eldorado. That agreement is no longer in existence, but it was at that time.

Mr. CASE. At that time they had the same exclusive right to the products of Eldorado Mines that Manhattan had to the materials which Canadian Radium & Uranium acquired?

Dr. MERRITT. So I understand. I have never seen the agreement, but I understand that is correct.

Mr. CASE. Except that the contract between Manhattan and Canadian Radium & Uranium was not limited to material that Canadian Radium & Uranium might get from Eldorado mines?

Dr. MERRITT. Anything they might get from anybody.

Mr. CASE. Were any penalties or forfeitures provided for failure to give Manhattan this first right to buy?

Dr. MERRITT. Not that I recall.

Mr. CASE. I find that it is difficult, without the transcript of the other hearings, to keep all these separate shipments in mind, but I would like to ask you two questions with regard to those that come to my mind. The first question is whether or not you knew of these shipments or sales prior to the disclosures made in the hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities, and, if so, when you learned of them, first in regard to the shipment of the Shattuck material, the 420 pounds, in March 1943?

Dr. MERRITT. I knew of that at the time of shipment.

Mr. CASE. You knew of that at the time of shipment?

Dr. MERRITT. Surely.

Mr. CASE. When did you first hear of the request that was made for 8 or 8½ tons by the Russian Purchasing Commission in 1943?

Dr. MERRITT. I believe we first heard of it early in February 1943.

Mr. CASE. Was that request made to Lend-Lease or to Chemical Warfare?

Dr. MERRITT. I believe to Lend-Lease. I believe we had our information from the War Production Board, but I believe they got it from Lend-Lease.

Mr. CASE. When did you first learn that the request was renewed in 1944?

Dr. MERRITT. Renewed?

Mr. CASE. Yes; that 8-ton request.

Dr. MERRITT. I didn't know it was renewed.

Mr. CASE. When did you first learn of this 1,000-pound item that was involved in this license and amended license of April 1943?

Dr. MERRITT. Before this committee in closed session on June 29, 1948.

Mr. CASE. And you didn't know until this morning that the export license had been amended?

Dr. MERRITT. No; I didn't.

Mr. CASE. And when did you first hear of the MacKay shipment of 2.2 pounds of uranium metal?

Dr. MERRITT. I believe at the time of shipment I was aware of that.

Mr. CASE. When did you first learn of the 45-pound shipment of June 1944, that was purchased by the Treasury?

Dr. MERRITT. Yesterday.

Mr. CASE. That is all.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Velde.

Mr. VELDE. That 45 pounds of uranium, was that what you call pure uranium?

Dr. MERRITT. I believe it was uranium nitrate.

Mr. VELDE. How much actual ore would that represent?

Dr. MERRITT. I believe uranium nitrate is about 50 percent uranium; about half of that is metal; the actual U content would be about half of that.

Mr. VELDE. So that the uranium ore would be about 90 pounds?

Dr. MERRITT. No; about 20 or 25 pounds of uranium element in the shipment of nitrate.

Mr. VELDE. We have been discussing the shipment of 1,000 pounds that was made from Great Falls, Mont. How would you describe that?

Dr. MERRITT. I believe 500 pounds of that was oxide, and would probably run about 97 percent, calculated as uranium oxide; and the other 500 pounds would be about half that. I am not quite certain.

Mr. VELDE. Would you say this 45 pounds of uranium, compared to the 1,000-pound shipment, would be insignificant?

Dr. MERRITT. It would be very small compared to the 1,000-pound shipment, surely.

Mr. VELDE. You mentioned previously that you felt you had the entire output of uranium in the country tied up by contract?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. VELDE. Did you have the feeling you also had the entire output of the Canadian Government tied up?

Dr. MERRITT. We had a good many contracts with them. I don't believe at that time they were exclusive, they could sell to other people, but I don't believe they did in any quantities.

Mr. VELDE. Are there any companies or individuals who control uranium in Canada, other than the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.?

Dr. MERRITT. No. All uranium is controlled through Eldorado, which is a crown company owned by the Government.

Mr. VELDE. By the Canadian Government?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes. It is a crown company. I think that was acquired back in 1944 from the private company that held it prior to that time.

Mr. VELDE. Have you had any contract directly with an agent of the Soviet Purchasing Commission?

Dr. MERRITT. No.

Mr. VELDE. Or has anybody in your immediate office force?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't believe anybody did that I know of.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Kearney.

Mr. KEARNEY. No questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Nixon.

Mr. NIXON. You said you were not concerned with the fact there might be an export license outstanding for this material, because of your feeling you had the sources pretty well tied up?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. On this 1,000-pound shipment which was made, and the other shipment which apparently was made without your knowledge, do I understand those shipments were made from concerns whose outputs you had not tied up?

Dr. MERRITT. The 1,000 pounds were shipped, apparently, from Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., which we thought we had tied up.

Mr. NIXON. I can't quite understand that. When you say that you had it tied up—

Dr. MERRITT. Through this contract.

Mr. NIXON. Through this contract?

Dr. MERRITT. That is correct.

Mr. NIXON. And yet the same company makes the shipment. Do I understand that under the contract Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. gave you the exclusive right to purchase uranium?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. Would that shipment be a violation of the contract?

Dr. MERRITT. I am not a lawyer, but as a layman it would look that way.

Mr. NIXON. Could this have been due to failure to understand the contract on the part of Mr. Pregel and other officials of the company, or had such conversations been had at the time of the entering into of the contract that they knew what you were trying to do?

Dr. MERRITT. The wording is very clear, I think, and it should have been clear what we were trying to do.

Mr. NIXON. The wording and the negotiations preceding the making of the contract?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. This was not a case where you were dealing with a contractor on the other side who was not aware of the very serious nature of this contract insofar as the security of this country was concerned?

Dr. MERRITT. I think he should have been aware of it.

Mr. NIXON. And if under the circumstances the shipment was made, and if that shipment was a violation of the contract, it would appear then that there was a deliberate act which was considerably more than a violation of a business contract?

Dr. MERRITT. I suppose so.

Mr. WALTER. As a matter of fact, the Canadian Government brought suit against these people and recovered from them for a violation of contract; didn't it?

Dr. MERRITT. There was a suit which extended over a long number of years between the two, and it was finally settled out of court, I understand.

Mr. CASE. Between what two?

Dr. MERRITT. Canadian Radium and Eldorado.

Mr. NIXON. You understand, Mr. Chairman, the point I am trying to make goes farther than the money value our Government or the Canadian Government could recover for violation of contract. I think the committee should explore why, under those circumstances, the shipment was made.

Mr. CASE. Did you rely upon the laws of the agency to make the contract by Pregel control Canadian Radium & Uranium, or did Pregel in his contract with you set forth his ability to control the actions of the Canadian Radium & Uranium Co.?

Dr. MERRITT. We relied on him pretty much. He advised us that he was sole sales agent. So, it was not necessary, if that was true, to insert similar clauses in other contracts.

Mr. CASE. What steps did you take to determine if he was the sole sales agent?

Dr. MERRITT. We had attempted prior to that time to deal directly with Eldorado, and were told by officials of Eldorado they could not deal with us, but only Mr. Pregel.

Mr. CASE. Pregel was president of the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. CASE. And he signed this contract as president of Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.?

Dr. MERRITT. He signed as agent, I believe, and they were hooked up in the secret letter.

Mr. CASE. And the contract made the secret letter a part of it?

Dr. MERRITT. That is correct, yes.

Mr. WOOD. Any other questions?

Mr. NIXON. I understood you to mention Vitro, and I believe you said you dealt so closely with them that you had no concern over the possibility that that company would violate a contract?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't recall whether we had a similar clause in our contract with them.

Mr. NIXON. Did you work closely with Mr. Pregel as well?

Dr. MERRITT. We worked with him closely to a point, and then had no further dealings with him later on.

Mr. NIXON. Prior to the time this shipment was made, you had been working with him rather closely?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. Did you work with him yourself?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes; I did. Other people worked with him, too.

Mr. NIXON. Was there any question but that he himself knew why the Government was tying up this material?

Dr. MERRITT. There is no question in my mind but that he knew. He was aware of the Manhattan project.

Mr. NIXON. And he knew why you made this contract?

Dr. MERRITT. I assume so.

Mr. CASE. And he was the sole sales agent. So, if he arranged a sale with another party, he did so knowing of the significance of the sale?

Dr. MERRITT. I suppose so.

Mr. WALTER. You relied entirely upon the representation Mr. Pregel made to you with respect to his ability to control the output in Canada?

Dr. MERRITT. We had contact with officials of Eldorado also.

Mr. WALTER. They refused to do business with you?

Dr. MERRITT. That is right.

Mr. WALTER. Then, as I understand it, you relied entirely on the representation Mr. Pregel made to you of his ability to control the Canadian output?

Dr. MERRITT. At that time; yes.

Mr. CASE. In your contact with Eldorado, did they confirm that Pregel had sole control over their output?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't recall. Our contracts were largely with Canadian Radium & Uranium.

Mr. CASE. Why did you go to Pregel after you had talked to Eldorado?

Dr. MERRITT. They told us to.

Mr. CASE. They told you that because he was the one in charge of their output?

Dr. MERRITT. That is correct.

Mr. NIXON. Did you have the same relations with Pregel up until the time of the contract that you had with Vitro?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't believe so.

Mr. NIXON. I am trying to establish whether there was any reason for you to be apprehensive that such a shipment might be made?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't think so. We had been associated with the other people over a long period of time, and they had our full confidence. They were people of our kind.

Mr. WALTER. Of course, that is only your own conclusion. What do you base your conclusion on?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't know.

Mr. WOOD. Dr. Merritt, when the 1,000-pound shipment was finally made from the Canadian company, had that material been offered to you under your contract?

Dr. MERRITT. No; it had not, that I am aware.

Mr. WOOD. Was there any time during the period of the development of the Manhattan Engineering District that any of your organizations you had under contract offered any of their material to you that you didn't take it?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't believe so.

Mr. WOOD. If this 1,000 pounds shipped to the Russians had been offered to you, would you have taken it?

Dr. MERRITT. Surely.

Mr. TAVENNER. At the time when you were endeavoring in the early part of 1943 to block foreign shipments of uranium compounds, did you confer with the officials of Eldorado mines in Canada regarding that matter?

Dr. MERRITT. I have no recollection of conferring with them regarding the matter at all. We advised Mr. Pregel to so advise them, I believe, in a letter which was placed in the record yesterday.

Mr. TAVENNER. You dealt with their agent regarding the matter?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Rather than dealing with the officials directly?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. After this contract went into force in March 1943, do you know whether Eldorado mines continued to sell small quantities of uranium to various private purchasers or to industry for commercial purposes?

Dr. MERRITT. I don't know.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you recall whether Manhattan Engineering District was advised or requested to agree to the sale of uranium by Eldorado mines to other purchasers than to Manhattan Engineering District, for commercial purposes?

Dr. MERRITT. There may have been some later on that were approved.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have no personal knowledge of that?

Dr. MERRITT. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who would have personal knowledge of that?

Dr. MERRITT. Mr. Burman may.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Burman may?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I may recall him to ask him that question. Was the Canadian Government requested to cooperate in this matter?

Dr. MERRITT. Yes; they were, at a later date.

Mr. TAVENNER. How late? Too late?

Dr. MERRITT. Too late, I believe. They, I think, took over the company officially in January 1944, acquired all the stock at that date, and controlled it from then on.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is all.

Mr. WOOD. Thank you very much, Doctor, for your courtesy and assistance to the committee.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like to recall Mr. Burman for one question.

Mr. WOOD. I believe you were sworn yesterday?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE C. BURMAN—Resumed

(Having been duly sworn by the committee on the day previous, January 23, 1950, was at this point recalled.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Burman, after the contract of March 27, 1943, between Manhattan Engineering District and Boris Pregel, agent, were sales made by Eldorado mines of small quantities of uranium compounds for commercial purposes, to your knowledge?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes; they were.

Mr. TAVENNER. They were?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did Eldorado mines, or the agency, Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., inform Manhattan Engineering District of that fact?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes. They each were approved in advance.

(Representative Velde leaves the hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. They were approved in advance?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Which was it, Eldorado mines or Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., that asked for the approval?

Mr. BURMAN. Canadian Radium & Uranium, and deliveries were made directly from Eldorado mines at Port Hope to the approved receivers. There were a series of shipments, for example, to a company known as Keystone Carbon Co., St. Mary's, Pa., which manufactured a special type of electrical resistor for aircraft. The district did not care to interfere with essential needs for uranium, and were willing to authorize these shipments where the need was approved.

Mr. TAVENNER. But where prospects of such sales occurred, you were consulted?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. And permission given in advance?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. I believe you have already answered the question that no permission was sought in the case of the 1,000 pounds which were sold to the Russian Purchasing Agency?

Mr. BURMAN. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you at any time, or did any other member of your staff, confer with Eldorado mines direct regarding this matter; that is, the provisions of this contract?

Mr. BURMAN. No. I was not engaged in negotiations on the contract.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have no further questions.

Mr. WOOD. Any questions?

Mr. WALTER. As I understand it, for some period of time Manhattan project dealt with Pregel because Eldorado refused to deal directly because Pregel was their agent. Is that correct?

Mr. BURMAN. That is my understanding.

Mr. WALTER. Why did Manhattan then insist at a later date on dealing with Eldorado instead of following the instructions given originally?

Mr. BURMAN. That is rather difficult to answer.

Mr. WALTER. Yes.

Mr. BURMAN. We were directed at a period later in 1943—I can't specify just what the date was—to taper off direct contractual relations with Mr. Pregel.

Mr. WALTER. Who directed you to taper off?

Mr. BURMAN. Those were directions from General Groves.

Mr. WALTER. Did General Groves indicate any reason why you should discontinue dealing with Pregel?

Mr. BURMAN. I didn't receive those directions myself, so I can't answer.

Mr. WALTER. You were in conference where Mr. Pregel was discussed, were you not?

Mr. BURMAN. Not very often, since I was not in direct contact with Mr. Pregel.

Mr. WALTER. You knew why General Groves was desirous of dealing directly with Eldorado and discontinuing dealing with Pregel, did you not?

Mr. BURMAN. No, sir; I am afraid I didn't.

Mr. WALTER. When you learned of the shipment of the 1,000 pounds, did you discuss that with Eldorado?

Mr. BURMAN. No, sir.

Mr. WALTER. Did anybody, that you know of?

Mr. BURMAN. We didn't discuss it with Eldorado, but Dr. Merritt did talk with officials—let me change that. I think Dr. Merritt talked to Mr. Bennett, who, I believe, is an official of Eldorado.

Mr. WALTER. And he protested to Eldorado that the terms of the contract had been violated?

Mr. BURMAN. No; Dr. Merritt asked for information from Mr. Bennett as to the transaction, but the contract that was violated was with Canadium Radium & Uranium Corp., and not Eldorado, and the company existing now as Eldorado is not the same as existed in 1943, since the Canadian Government now controls it.

Mr. WALTER. This shipment of 1,000 pounds was made before the Canadian Government had any direct control over Eldorado?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I don't know if it is clear as to the time when Dr. Merritt had this conference with Mr. Bennett that you referred to.

Mr. BURMAN. That was after the information was obtained from the committee that the 1,000-pound shipment had taken place.

Mr. TAVENNER. So that was sometime in 1948?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes; after June 1948.

Mr. TAVENNER. After June 1948?

Mr. BURMAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is all.

Mr. WOOD. Any questions?

(No response.)

Mr. WOOD. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon the witness was excused.)

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like to call Mr. Hermann H. Rosenberg.

Mr. WOOD. Will you hold up your right hand and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give this committee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Have a seat.

TESTIMONY OF HERMANN H. ROSENBERG, ACCOMPANIED BY MANFRED WOLKISER, ATTORNEY

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your full name, please?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Hermann H. Rosenberg.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you accompanied here by counsel?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will counsel please state his name and address for identification purposes in the record?

Mr. WOLKISER. Manfred Wolkiser, 70 Pine Street, New York City, general counsel of Chematar, Inc., chemical wholesalers.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Rosenberg, when and where were you born?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I was born April 21, 1902, in Berlin, Germany.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you a naturalized citizen of the United States?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did you come to the United States?

Mr. ROSENBERG. In March 1939.

Mr. TAVENNER. When were you naturalized?

Mr. ROSENBERG. In August 1945.

Mr. TAVENNER. In what type of business enterprise were you engaged in Germany?

Mr. ROSENBERG. In the chemical trade. It is the same kind of business I am engaged in now, and as a matter of fact it is the same organization I have been with for the last 30 years. This company I am associated with now, of course, has been incorporated in the United States after our arrival in this country, but it is actually a continuation of our business on the other side.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have testified previously before this committee, I believe?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes; I did.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Rosenberg, when did you first confer with the Russian Purchasing Commission relative to the acquisition of uranium compounds?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Within the course of regular business with allied purchasing commissions during the war, which was practically the only possibility of continuing business with the overseas countries with which we dealt in peacetime, we had contact also with the Russian Purchasing Commission by phone and occasional visits to Washington when we saw the other allied purchasing commissions also, and it was the end of January 1943 when we got an inquiry from the Soviet Purchasing Commission.

Mr. TAVENNER. Regarding uranium?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. It was the latter part of January 1943, that you had your first contact with them regarding uranium?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Had you had transactions with the Russian Purchasing Commission prior to that time?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes. According to my best knowledge and belief we had about five very minor transactions in industrial and fine chemicals with them after the outbreak of war in 1941, since December 1941, and in 1942, aggregating a couple thousand dollars, I would say, according to my memory; a very minor amount.

Mr. TAVENNER. Would you tell us the nature of your first conference with the Russian Purchasing Commission relating to uranium?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I do not remember having had any correspondence with them, but according to my recollection we had quite a number of telephone conferences with them.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you receive a letter?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes; we received inquiry by a letter.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have the letter? We will save time if you have the letter?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We have not all our correspondence with any of our customers for those years.

Mr. WOOD. The question was asked you if you have that letter?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No; I have not that letter, but I have the confirmation of that letter, and may I explain the reason for not having the original letter but having a copy of our letter? The practice in our company is that we have shipping files—that means files pertaining to the particular shipment—and a regular file in which an extra copy of our correspondence is kept. We have disposed of all the shipping files up to, as far as I remember, 1943 or 1944, unless there is correspondence in those particular shipping files of later years, while we have, of course, kept the less voluminous files in which not all the shipping correspondence was collected. So we have the copies of our correspondence in many cases where we do not have the incoming correspondence which was a part of the shipping files.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you produce at this time the letter confirming your first communication from the Soviet Purchasing Commission relating to uranium?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes [producing copy of letter].

Mr. TAVENNER. I think it would save time if I read this in evidence.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Chairman, may I clarify something in my mind at this point?

Mr. WOOD. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. As I understand, in order to avoid an accumulation of useless papers, it is the practice of your company to destroy correspondence after keeping it for a certain period of time?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. Why did you destroy the inquiry to you and retain your reply to the person who sent the inquiry?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We received, of course, incoming correspondence in one copy, while we make two copies of our outgoing correspondence. One copy goes in the so-called shipping file, which naturally is being destroyed periodically, while the other copy of our outgoing correspondence is kept in the general file.

Mr. WALTER. Why would you keep a copy of your letter when it doesn't relate to anything at all?

Mr. WOLKISER. May I please—

Mr. WALTER. No. I am asking him.

Mr. ROSENBERG. The files which pertain to the actual shipments have quite a volume and our office is comparatively small. We keep, of course, all the incoming and outgoing invoices.

Mr. WOOD. Do you desire to read this copy into the record, Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. Without objection you may do so.

Mr. TAVENNER (reading):

FEBRUARY 2, 1943.

THE GOVERNMENT PURCHASING COMMISSION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE U. S. A.,
1610 Park Road NW., Washington, D. C.

(Attention Mr. N. S. Fomichev.)

GENTLEMEN: We acknowledge to have received yesterday your inquiry of January 28 concerning uranium metal, urano-uranic oxide, and nitrouanyl.

We are preparing an interesting proposition, including uranium metal, for you and shall communicate with you within the next few days.

The majority of the inquired items could be shipped promptly.

Should you have to place your order before our offer is in your hands, please give us a ring, so that we can submit our proposition to you, if necessary, by phone, before you make your final decision.

Very truly yours,

By HERMANN ROSENBERG,
CHEMATAR, INC.,

Mr. WOOD. What is the date of that?

Mr. TAVENNER. February 2, 1943. I offer the letter in evidence and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 1."

Mr. CASE. Mr. Rosenberg, I notice there is a mark across the type-written part of the signature. Does that mark have any significance?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No. That is my initial.

Mr. CASE. That is your initial?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. CASE. And you put that initial there yourself?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. CASE. That is your characteristic manner of putting your initial on a carbon copy?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. CASE. No objection.

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 1," is hereinabove incorporated in the record.)⁶

⁶ See appendix.

Mr. TAVENNER. What action did you take after receiving the inquiry for uranium compounds?

Mr. ROSENBERG. As was customary during the war years, we inquired of War Production Board, Chemical Information Section, Group 2, in New York, whether there was any restriction as to the material involved. I approached, on the same day we received the inquiry, January 29, 1943, group 2 of the War Production Board in New York, and got the information that just a few days before, as a matter of fact on January 26, 1943, an order was issued restricting this particular merchandise to certain uses.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was that order M-285?

Mr. ROSENBERG. M-285; yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Proceed.

Mr. ROSENBERG. We were told that this order prohibited the use of uranium compounds in glass, ceramics, pottery, and so on, but that it did not say anything about export and was apparently not applicable. As to details, we were referred to the Miscellaneous Minerals Division of the War Production Board.

Mr. TAVENNER. What quantity of material did the Russian Purchasing Commission show an interest in obtaining?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Two hundred and twenty pounds of uranium nitrate; 220 pounds of uranium oxide; and 25 pounds of uranium metal.

Mr. TAVENNER. After conferring with group 2 of the War Production Board, what did you do?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We had been promised a copy of the restriction order, and approached in the meantime, by phone and wire, a number of possible suppliers of this material.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have copies of your letters and telegrams to possible suppliers?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir. We sent one telegram to the Shattuck Chemical Co. in Denver, Colo., and had telephone conversations with the rest of the companies we knew of at that time, because they were located in New York.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the date of your telegram to the Shattuck Co.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. January 29, 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. You acted very promptly, because you acted prior to acknowledging receipt of the request?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes. Preceding this inquiry we must have received a telephone call from the Russians, because in this telegram to the Shattuck Chemical Co. we say:

For Allied Government order being not subject WPB Order M-285 please wire quotations * * *

Shall I go one?

Mr. TAVENNER. I don't think it is necessary. What is the date of your wire to the Shattuck Co.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. January 29, 1943.

Mr. WALTER. I think the telegram should go in the record in its entirety.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer the telegram in evidence and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 2."

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The copy of telegram above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 2," is hereinafter incorporated in the record.) ⁷

Mr. TAVENNER. And I will read it:

JANUARY 29, 1943.

S. W. SHATTUCK CHEMICAL CO.,

Denver, Colo.:

For Allied Government order being not subject WPB order M-285 please wire quotations including export packing 25 pounds uranium metal, 220 pounds uranium oxide U3O8, 220 pounds uranium nitrate. Indicate earliest possible delivery time and what quantities available from stock we pay against delivery. Please let specifications follow by air mail.

CHEMATAR, INC.,

40 Exchange Place, New York, N. Y.

Mr. KEARNEY. May I ask a question there?

Mr. WALTER (presiding in temporary absence of Mr. Wood). Yes.

Mr. KEARNEY. Was that telegram sent after the receipt of the inquiry from the Russian purchasing agency?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes; the day following the date of the inquiry.

(Representative Wood returns.)

Mr. TAVENNER. What other evidence do you have in the way of copies of telegrams or letters regarding inquiries made of other suppliers?

Mr. ROSENBERG. As I said, these other suppliers were located in New York City, so we merely had telephone conversations with these companies, and made a record of the telephone quotations.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you say you made a record of the telephone conversations?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Of these telephone conversations, since we were not familiar with these items and we had no other record of the telephone quotations.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did you prepare this statement of telephone messages?

Mr. ROSENBERG. On January 29, 1943. Here is a second one of February 1, 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer in evidence the two reports of telephone conferences, the first bearing date January 29, 1943, which I ask to have marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 3," and the second bearing date February 1, 1943, which I ask to have marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 4."

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, whom were the telephone conversations with?

Mr. WOOD. I am asking counsel to develop it a little further.

Mr. TAVENNER. Exhibit 3 shows you made inquiry of A. MacKay & Co. Is that correct?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. And the reply that you received, according to this memorandum, was that the company had made 20 pounds which were supposed to be ready, and another 5 pounds could be ready in a week?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is right. That is of uranium metal.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is of uranium metal?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes. These letters refer to these products [indicating].

⁷ See appendix.

Mr. TAVENNER. I see. That related to uranium metal. Then you asked questions regarding uranium oxide and uranium nitrate?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. And you were given prices?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. You also conferred with Fairmount Chemical Co. on that date?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. And you conferred with B. F. Drakenfeld & Co. on that same date?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. You conferred with du Pont, with a Mr. Sellger of du Pont?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. You were advised that du Pont could not furnish you any material, that it was all requisitioned by the United States Government?

Mr. ROSENBERG. They offered the material. We were offered 220 pounds of uranium oxide and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate for prompt delivery.

Mr. TAVENNER. You conferred also with Mallinkrodt?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, a chemical supplier of fine chemicals in smaller quantities, according to my knowledge, for laboratory and other similar uses.

Mr. TAVENNER. You also conferred with a company the name of which I cannot read.

Mr. ROSENBERG. Merck & Co., M-e-r-c-k. To them applies the same I said about Mallinkrodt, while du Pont is an industrial supplier in larger quantities.

Mr. TAVENNER. A. MacKay & Co. advised that they could only furnish you with black uranium oxide?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Fairmount Chemical Co. could not supply the uranium oxide, and stated that early the next week it would quote you regarding the uranium nitrate?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. B. F. Drakenfeld & Co. advised that uranium oxide was all they could offer, and it was yellow U_3O_8 ?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is right.

Mr. WALTER. What are the dates, Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. TAVENNER. January 29.

Mr. WALTER. What year?

Mr. TAVENNER. 1943.

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Here is a notation in regard to your conference with B. F. Drakenfeld & Co.:

Although he was willing to quote after I gave him the message from WPB, his principals did not permit him to quote for export, but he said we should communicate with the following importers: African Metal Co., 41 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.; Raymond Luber, Bridgeport, Conn.

Did you communicate with African Metal Co.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. According to the memorandum of February 1, 1943, I did; yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Du Pont, as stated, made you a quotation for the 220 pounds of uranium oxide and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. The other organizations referred to there were unable to quote?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is correct.

Mr. WOOD. Does the memorandum show the names of the individuals in these organizations with whom he had these conversations?

Mr. TAVENNER. It does. In one instance it does not give the name of the person speaking, and that was the first instance of A. MacKay & Co.

Mr. WALTER. How many companies indicated their ability to quote on uranium?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Do you mean on uranium metal or uranium compounds?

Mr. WALTER. Both.

Mr. ROSENBERG. May I read—

Mr. WALTER. Just the number.

Mr. ROSENBERG. Uranium metal, two; uranium oxide, two; uranium nitrate, two; and a third one promises to quote early the next week. May I mention this is only part of our investigation at that time.

Mr. WALTER. What is the name of the person with whom you talked when you conferred with the first organization?

Mr. ROSENBERG. A. MacKay & Co.?

Mr. WALTER. Yes.

Mr. ROSENBERG. It is 7 years back, but I remember one name of a gentleman who I ever talked to with this company, Mr. King, and I suppose Mr. King was also in this particular instance the one I talked to.

Mr. CASE. Mr. Chairman, before that is entered I would like to see it.

Mr. TAVENNER. With regard to exhibit 4, which is a record of telephone calls for February 1, 1943, it shows that du Pont, giving in parentheses the name of the person with whom you spoke, made a quotation to you on sodium uranate, showing the complete analysis. That was not part of this inquiry from the Russians, was it?

(Witness makes off-the-record statement to Mr. Tavenner.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Let's get it on the record. You have stated to me there was a mix-up about the material quoted?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Material inquired about. This being the first time we were in contact with this material, we were confused as to the product the Russians actually wanted. These reports bear out this confusion. We had talked the previous day with companies familiar with this material, so I followed on February 1 with conversations with du Pont and African Metals to find out what type of uranium oxide the required product actually is, and I found out there was the yellow grade and the black grade, and from the communications that followed subsequently with Shattuck Co. I remember now that at that time I was informed there was a green grade, which was the one we actually purchased and delivered from Shattuck Co. to the Russians, and which, I have been told, was the purest grade available, purer than the yellow and black grades. And so on February 1 we got information from du Pont, Mr. Sellger; and from African Metals Corp., Mr. Deschepper, about these unclear questions.

Mr. TAVENNER. At the bottom of this report I find this notation:

The packing of the material would not cause them any difficulties, since they would have to pack the merchandise in their original packing as it is, merely in an outside case.

What were you referring to there? Packing for export?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, for export. I told them this material was for an allied country, and they said it was no trouble to pack for export.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you notify them of the country to which the material was to be shipped?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No, because as brokers we are not much interested in bringing our suppliers and our customers together.

Mr. CASE. Page 2 of exhibit 3 is headed: "Telephone reports regarding uranium. January 20, 1943." The first item starts with: "WPB (Murrayhill 3-2520 group 2)." Does WPB there stand for War Production Board?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. CASE. The note which follows in this typewritten carbon copy reads:

There is an order of January 26 M-285 merely prohibiting the use of uranium chemicals in the domestic glass, ceramic, and pottery industries and says nothing regarding export. Besides, no effective date is given yet. If it is for war use by the Russians, this order definitely does not apply. He sends us two copies. For details we might communicate with their Washington Miscellaneous Minerals Division.

Does that represent a summary of the statements by the representative of the War Production Board with whom you talked at this telephone number?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. CASE. Do you recall his specifically saying that "If it is for war use by the Russians, this order definitely does not apply"?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I do not recollect the exact words he used 7 years ago, but I dictated this 5 minutes after the conversation, and at that time I am sure that I got the right gist of the conversation. I have a copy of that order right here.

Mr. CASE. Do you recall with whom you talked at the War Production Board?

Mr. ROSENBERG. There is an information board, group 2, with which we always conferred when materials unknown to us were inquired from us during wartime, and only on the strength of this telephonic information did we approach these suppliers.

Mr. WALTER. So that your contacts with the War Production Board were not with any particular person. You merely called the general information board?

Mr. ROSENBERG. At that time.

Mr. TAVENNER. You discovered later that it was necessary to obtain an export license in order to ship it abroad?

Mr. ROSENBERG. It was our general knowledge at that time that every product going out of this country required an export license to be procured by the actual exporter.

Mr. TAVENNER. Didn't you consult Mr. Alexander Pregel and Mr. Boris Pregel at that time regarding prices for delivery of uranium oxide?

Mr. ROSENBERG. At some later date we did that.

Mr. TAVENNER. How much later, and do you have the record of that telephone call?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I do not have a record of that telephone call, but I have a record of the conversation with these gentlemen at the time of the purchase from the Canadian company.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am talking about the time you put through your first successful effort to sell uranium. Didn't you inquire at the time you made these inquiries, or shortly thereafter, the price at which Pregel could furnish the same material?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I suppose so, and I have possibly also a note about this conversation. However, since we make notes of conversations in cases where we have new and otherwise not confirmed information, there was no necessity at that particular time to make a memorandum about any other conversations.

Mr. TAVENNER. Before we get to that, let us find out a little more about the initial contact you made with Mr. Pregel about it. When did you talk to him about the delivery of this first order of uranium?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I have seen Mr. Pregel, according to my best recollection, only once in my life, and that was during the second part of April 1943. I have had several telephone conversations with him.

Mr. TAVENNER. Answer specifically my question. At the time or about the time that you made inquiries from these various suppliers, a record of which you have, did you not also make the same type of inquiry from Mr. Pregel and, if so, when?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I suppose so. I cannot tell you from my notes when that was.

Mr. TAVENNER. But it is your positive recollection that you did ask him to quote you the price for delivery of 220 pounds of uranium oxide and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir; to my best knowledge and belief I contacted him at that time also.

Mr. TAVENNER. Why didn't you make a memorandum of that telephone conversation?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Mr. Tavenner, I did not say I have not made it. I do not have it. I did not even look for it at this time. There is a possibility if I go through our old records of 1943 I might be able to find a memorandum about this conversation.

Mr. TAVENNER. You think you have a memorandum about it?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I think so. There is a good possibility.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, you knew before you came here that the name of Mr. Pregel was going to be involved, was bound to be, in connection with these transactions, because you later represented him, and I would have thought you would be particularly careful to bring memoranda pertaining to him rather than concerns we have heard of for the first time.

Mr. ROSENBERG. I did not know until I left New York Saturday that Mr. Pregel would be a special subject of this hearing.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like you to furnish us a memorandum of that telephone conversation if you can locate it.

Mr. ROSENBERG. I certainly will if I can locate it.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the result of your telephone conversation with Mr. Pregel, and I should ask you which Mr. Pregel you spoke to?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I spoke to a Mr. Alexander Pregel; and I can say that until I heard it during this hearing and understood from news-

paper reports, I did not know there was a Mr. Boris Pregel, to whom I have never talked, to my knowledge. I remember once when I called Mr. Alexander Pregel was out of town and I talked to another Mr. Pregel who might have been his brother.

Mr. TAVENNER. I will ask you questions about that later on. What were you advised about the availability of this material by Mr. Alexander Pregel when you called him about the time you called these other suppliers?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I can answer that question if I find a memorandum about this conversation.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did he make a quotation to you?

Mr. ROSENBERG. According to my recollection he did.

Mr. TAVENNER. How did that quotation compare with other prices?

Mr. ROSENBERG. It must have been more expensive, if I received it, because we did not consider it until we could not get this merchandise from Shattuck Co. any more.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you satisfied now from your recollection that Mr. Pregel reported he had the stocks on hand that you desired and could make delivery of it?

Mr. ROSENBERG. According to my best knowledge and belief he quoted at that time, but at too high a price.

Mr. TAVENNER. Can you fix the month you had that conversation with him?

Mr. ROSENBERG. About that same time, early February 1943.

(Witness confers with his counsel.)

Mr. ROSENBERG. It was definitely not on the same date I made these telephone reports, because all the calls made on that date appear on this piece of paper.

Mr. TAVENNER. As a result of these calls that you placed, you finally made a deal with Shattuck?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. I now offer exhibit Rosenberg 3 and exhibit Rosenberg 4 in evidence.

Mr. WOOD. They will be admitted.

(The documents above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 3" and "Exhibit Rosenberg 4," are hereinafter incorporated in the record.)^s

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like for you to tell the committee at this time what your procedure was, and what your procedure became, in the handling of these uranium transactions: That is, how you made your contracts, how they were handled before the licensing agency, and the general plan under which these licenses were obtained and the contracts consummated.

Mr. ROSENBERG. I would like to say at the outset that the export-license part was not our business, since we were not the exporters of this material; but I can give information which I got in the course of this transaction about these export-license applications by the Soviet Purchasing Commission.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am going to change my question. I believe it is going to take too long to answer. Tell us just what you did in this

^s See appendix.

transaction with Shattuck after you received their offer, or their commitment?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We received their quotation the same day we had inquired. We received this by wire. We passed this on to the Soviet Purchasing Commission.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have any record of your letter or telegram passing that information on?

Mr. ROSENBERG. May I use notes which I made about these details?

Mr. TAVENNER. That will be satisfactory. That seems to be a prepared memorandum you have there?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes; from the files, which I could locate, plus the deductions which you could make from these files, as, for instance, from that letter of February 2, I deduced we had received an inquiry on February 1.

Mr. CASE. You have already submitted, and there have been placed in evidence, copies of notes made, you stated, at the time the telephone conversations were had with these possible suppliers?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. CASE. In the letter of February 2, 1943, already placed in evidence, you invite the Russian Purchasing Commission to communicate with you by telephone should they have to place their order before your offer is in their hands.

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. CASE. Did they communicate with you by telephone?

Mr. ROSENBERG. They had no reason to, because on February 4 we sent them our quotation.

Mr. CASE. How did you find out the quantities they wanted?

Mr. ROSENBERG. They gave us the quantities, apparently, by phone, and confirmed it by that letter which we received on February 1.

Mr. CASE. They gave you the quantities by telephone?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. CASE. Did you make notes of that telephone conversation, similar to these other notes that we have?

Mr. ROSENBERG. There is a possibility that we did, but I do not have it.

Mr. CASE. You do not have that with you?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That particular telephone conversation, I do not have a note about that here.

Mr. CASE. You stated it was not always your custom to keep the letters that came in, but it was your practice to prepare these telephone reports 5 minutes after the conversation?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Not always; when we were dealing with material that was new to us.

Mr. CASE. Didn't you make a note of the quantities they wanted?

Mr. ROSENBERG. There is a possibility I did. I do not have all my notes with me.

Mr. CASE. Mr. Chairman, this letter which is in evidence invites the Soviet Purchasing Commission to communicate by telephone, and since we have in evidence full notes in regard to other telephone conversations, I would like to ask that the witness examine all the papers he has with him before he leaves under this subpoena, to determine if he has any notes of conversations with the Soviet Purchasing Commission, and also whether he has notes elsewhere supplying this information.

Mr. WOOD. If you have such notes, where would they be now?

Mr. ROSENBERG. In New York.

Mr. CASE. Why weren't they brought here under this subpoena?

Mr. WOOD. You were served with a subpoena to produce all the records you had in this case, were you not?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No; I was not. I brought this correspondence along in order to support as much as I possibly could.

Mr. TAVENNER. You understood, did you not, that I requested your counsel to produce all the records bearing on the transactions relating to uranium, whether the inquiries resulted in failure to produce any uranium or whether they didn't?

Mr. WOLKISER. May I answer that?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. WOLKISER. In our telephone conversation during the week, after I tried to contact you many times, you told me the subject matters in which the committee would be interested, just generally, but any papers and documents you mentioned only Saturday afternoon when I was here, and by that time my client was on his way from New York. But he has an awful lot of papers here, and if you take his recollection plus the papers, I believe that will satisfy the committee right now, but if not, we can still produce any papers you want.

Mr. TAVENNER. Don't you recall, when the appointment was made for Saturday over the telephone some earlier day in the week, that I specified exactly the matters we were investigating?

Mr. WOLKISER. You did say the subject matters, but you did not at that time mention any records. There was no subpoena.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is right; there was no subpoena.

Mr. WOLKISER. The telephone calls are all over the place. This is a 7-year-old case.

Mr. WOOD. Let's get along with the testimony.

Mr. TAVENNER. Proceed. You were telling us you had a telephone conversation on February 4.

Mr. ROSENBERG. No. We wrote a letter on February 4.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have that letter with you?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I am sorry; I do not. But that letter I have, and I can submit it, because from that letter I quote here, so I must have it.

Mr. WOOD. Will you submit it when you return to your office?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes. On February 4 we wrote the Russian Purchasing Commission that one of the oldest United States producers, Shattuck, informs us that black material only contains U_3O_8 . The pure material is green, which we offer, 99.5 percent uranium, at \$4.50, only impurities being traces of iron and what dust might possibly get in during handling. Both products now offered practically chemically pure. Confirming agreement to communicate with each other as soon as either advised by WPB in consequence of our request for authorization.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then what followed?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We had called on February 3, preceding this letter, a Mr. Owen, of WPB, Miscellaneous Minerals Division, who confirmed the information we received from group 2 in New York, and informed us further there is no application or authorization form under M-285.

On February 6 we wrote to the Shattuck Co. confirming substitution of green uranium oxide, confirming their chemical information in that respect, and promised to work on these orders.

Nothing happened until March 2, when the Soviet Purchasing Commission was ready to buy, and we wired to Shattuck to prepare an order for 200 pounds of U_3O_8 and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate. On March 3 Shattuck wired their agreement.

On March 2 we called the War Production Board, Miscellaneous Minerals Division, in regard to M-285. We spoke to a Mr. Park, assistant to R. J. Land, in charge of uranium, who advised they felt the Russian requirement was not affected by M-285, prohibiting only the use of uranium compounds in ceramics, and so forth, but suggested—

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question here?

Mr. WOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARNEY. I would like to ask the witness when that memorandum was prepared?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Last week.

Mr. KEARNEY. Then it is not a record of any telephone conversations made at the time of the telephone conversations?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No. It was prepared for this particular purpose after I had been informed through our counsel what was the subject matter of this hearing.

Mr. KEARNEY. And the information contained in that memorandum comes from your own records or from memory?

Mr. ROSENBERG. It is based on our own records, which, however, are not complete, and in certain cases, as I mentioned an example before, it is deductions based on correspondence we have.

Mr. KEARNEY. And also from your best recollection?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I wish you would support each statement you make by a copy of a memorandum of telephone message, if you have one, or by copy of letter to which you refer.

(Witness confers with his counsel.)

Mr. ROSENBERG. If you want me to complete this file, I can do it very quickly by going to New York and completing it. I think it is hard on my office to find these old papers without my presence, but perhaps it can be done, but it would be better if I went and directed it. I am sure the information I am giving here can be supported to a very great extent.

Mr. TAVENNER. I understood you had your full file records with you?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. If you do not, just use the records you do have and support each statement by the records you have here.

(Witness confers with his counsel.)

Mr. ROSENBERG. We have a rather complete file here, but I did not take all telephone notes along.

Mr. TAVENNER. Use what records you have and we will go into the other records later.

Mr. ROSENBERG. On February 5 we wrote to the Shattuck Co.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer in evidence the letter of February 5, 1943, addressed to the S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., Denver, Colo., and signed by Chematar, Inc., by Hermann Rosenberg, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 5."

Mr. WOOD. Without objection, it will be admitted.

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 5," is hereinafter incorporated in the record.) ⁹

Mr. TAVENNER. Proceed.

Mr. ROSENBERG. On March 2 we sent the following telegram to the Shattuck Co.:

For preparing order 200 pounds Uthreecoeight [U 308], 220 pounds nitrouuranyl, please wire confirmation that offer including delivery times still good as wired January twenty-ninth. Merchandise needed for military purposes of Allied Government.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer that telegram in evidence and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 6."

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The copy of telegram above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 6," is hereinabove incorporated in the record.) ¹⁰

Mr. ROSENBERG. On March 3 we received a telegram from the Shattuck Co. This is an original. It comes out of the general file. In the shipping file we have a copy.

Mr. WOOD. This is one of your original incoming communications of March 3?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir. All the telegrams and cables in our office are copied because we have different departments and all get a copy. Telegrams, I will always have the originals, if I could locate them.

Mr. WOOD. You mean you differentiate between telegrams and letters you receive?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes; because we cannot possibly copy every incoming letter.

Mr. WOOD. Did you copy this?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. Why didn't you destroy the original telegram and keep only the copy?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Because we keep the original telegrams, of which we have sent copies to our so-called shipping files, in the general file, while the incoming letters, being put in the shipping file, there is only one original in our possession.

Mr. CASE. What happened to the shipping file which contained the originals of letters?

Mr. ROSENBERG. All our shipping files up to the year 1943 have been disposed of, I would say, about a year or two ago.

(Witness confers with his counsel.)

Mr. ROSENBERG (continuing). Except if we have correspondence of later years in the same file, then we kept them.

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question before we adjourn for lunch?

Mr. WOOD. Yes.

Mr. KEARNEY. May I see that letter of February 2?

("Exhibit Rosenberg 1" was handed to Mr. Kearney.)

Mr. KEARNEY. I call the witness' attention to the letter dated February 2, 1943, addressed to the Government Purchasing Commission of

⁹ See appendix.

¹⁰ See appendix.

the Soviet Union in the U. S. A. The last paragraph reads as follows:

Should you have to place your order before our offer is in your hands, please give us a ring, so that we can submit our proposition to you, if necessary, by phone, before you make your final decision.

Do you have a record of that telephone conversation?

MR. ROSENBERG. We had no telephone conversation, according to my recollection and according to my files, since 2 days later we were able to submit the quotation.

MR. KEARNEY. You had no communication, by phone, wire, or letter, from the time of this communication of February 2 until February 4?

MR. ROSENBERG. So far as correspondence is concerned, I am able to develop that if I can get the complete file, which I can do in 48 hours.

MR. KEARNEY. This file is in your office in New York City?

MR. ROSENBERG. I am sure that copies of our correspondence can be developed. There might be exceptions, but I don't think so. If I had known that I should bring along the complete file, I could have done so. It would be quite a voluminous file, and I came here in connection with our twentieth anniversary, which we had yesterday, and I didn't want to bring too much stuff with me.

MR. TAVENNER. I offer in evidence the original telegram produced by the witness, dated March 3, 1943, addressed to Chematar, Inc., and signed S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 7."

MR. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The telegram above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 7," is hereinafter incorporated in the record.)¹¹

MR. TAVENNER. I will read that telegram:

Retel U308 and uranyl nitrate, can make deliveries as mentioned our wire January 29.

MR. WOOD. The committee stands recessed until 3 o'clock this afternoon.

(Thereupon, at 1:30 p. m., a recess was taken until 3 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The hearing was resumed at 3:10 p. m.)

MR. WOOD. The committee will be in order.

Let the record show that there are present Mr. Walter, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Moulder, Mr. Velde, Mr. Kearney, and Mr. Wood, a quorum.

MR. TAVENNER. Mr. Rosenberg, will you come forward, please.

TESTIMONY OF HERMANN H. ROSENBERG—Resumed

MR. WOOD. Mr. Rosenberg, before we proceed further, may I suggest that we will save a good deal of time if you will address your answers to the question asked you, unless you think there is a pertinent explanation you may care to make.

MR. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

MR. TAVENNER. Mr. Rosenberg, I ask if you will turn over the records which you have and to which you have referred to an investi-

¹¹ See appendix.

gator on the staff of this committee to review them, and later we will determine whether or not it is necessary to bring you back here and ask you further questions relating to those documents?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. I want you to explain to the committee very briefly just what your procedure was in handling one of these requests from the Russian Purchasing Commission for the acquisition of uranium material.

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have told us what you did in the particular case with Shattuck. After getting in touch with Shattuck, for instance, and finding that the material was available, your next step, as I understood, was to advise the Russian Purchasing Commission that the materials had been found?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, will you tell us what your next step was?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We approached by telephone the War Production Board, Miscellaneous Minerals Division, in Washington, to make sure again, after a month had passed since we got that information about M-285, whether the regulations were still the same, and we were told that this order did not apply to an export delivery to the Soviet Purchasing Commission, but we may inquire further from the United States Engineers in New York. I phoned that office, the number of which I got from the person I spoke to in the War Production Board at Washington, and I spoke to Colonel Crenshaw, who told me that a Lieutenant Burman had just been transferred to them from WPB, that uranium was not their business, but this man would know better than Colonel Crenshaw knew. However, in Lieutenant Burman's absence he would suggest we go back to WPB, Washington, and talk to Mr. Land's office, and if we got satisfaction there we should proceed according to the advice we received there.

That is what I did. I called that office again and was told by Mr. Park—I never had occasion to talk to Mr. Land, but I understand Mr. Park was Mr. Land's assistant—that he had spoken to General Wesson, and that we should take up the matter with their Lend-Lease Department, Mr. Moore.

That is what I did. Mr. Moore told me that he had already been approached by Mr. Fomichev of the Soviet Purchasing Commission sometime back concerning a uranium requirement; that he happened to know Mr. Fomichev; and he would get in touch with him and let me know. That was on or about March 3.

On March 6 I phoned Mr. Moore again and I got the permission which I thought we had to get for this delivery, by phone, and subsequently by letter. I advised the Soviet Purchasing Commission in writing about the fact that we had been informed by Mr. Moore of the Lend-Lease Department that we did not need any further clearance for this transaction, but that the Soviet Purchasing Commission would have to apply for an export license, which I advised them to do.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you say you advised the Soviet Purchasing Commission they should apply for an export license?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That we had been advised by Mr. Moore in writing that no further clearance was required for this transaction except for the export license, which the Soviet Purchasing Commission had to get, and that they were familiar with the procedure. That was part

of that letter. That information I passed on to the Russians, informing them that we would not accept the order unless and until they had received the export license.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you receive the export license for this first shipment?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We never received any export license for any delivery to any Allied mission, because it was the Allied mission's business to attend to this part of the procedure, they being the actual exporters.

Mr. TAVENNER. But you would not undertake to close a transaction with the supplier until you were sure the export license had been issued; is that correct?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Excuse me.

(Witness confers with his counsel.)

Mr. ROSENBERG. This was the procedure in this particular case: We had been notified that this product was subject to a War Production Board order, and we wanted to proceed with particular care and make sure that they received the export license before we accepted the order, because this particular product was covered by a WPB order, regardless of whether it was covered for this particular purpose by the order or not.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether such a license was issued?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes. We have been told that by Mr. Moore and by the Russian Purchasing Commission, who gave us a number and the issuance date.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did that export license accompany the bill of lading on the shipment of the materials?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. What disposition was made of the export license after it was issued?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That I do not know.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did it at any time come into your hands?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you advised by the Russians what the procedure was as to the handling of the license?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No; we got shipping instructions from them and it was a domestic destination.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is all I am going to ask you about the Shattuck shipment. Did you receive another request for uranium after the first one for 220 pounds each of uranium oxide and uranium nitrate?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did you receive that?

Mr. ROSENBERG. On or about March 19, 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you then follow the same procedure with Shattuck that you followed in the first case?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We sent them a telegram. We got an answer we should wait a few days. On March 24 we got an offer from them saying they could not offer what was required, because this Russian inquiry said that they would preferably receive uranium oxychloride, tri-, tetra-, or pentachloride, and Shattuck wired us they could merely offer 500 pounds each of the products which they had shipped before.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was that satisfactory to the Russian Purchasing Commission, and did you attempt to close the transaction with Shattuck?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We took the same stand—that we would not do anything until they had received the export license.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the Soviet Purchasing Commission agree to purchase the 500 pounds each from Shattuck?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes; subject to receipt of export license.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you know whether that export license was denied at any time; say, the 14th of April 1943?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I know that around April 7 we were told by the Soviet Purchasing Commission that the export license would be granted by BEW and they would have it within a week.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who in BEW made that representation?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We had this information from the Russians, because we had no contacts with BEW in this business.

Mr. TAVENNER. Proceed, then, to tell us whether you later learned that the license had been denied.

Mr. ROSENBERG. May I refer to my notes?

Mr. WOOD. He didn't ask for any dates. Did you later learn the export license was denied?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. The Russians never told you they were having trouble getting the license issued?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I think they did, around the time you mentioned; yes. May I read a note?

Mr. TAVENNER. If it is pertinent to this question.

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. All right.

Mr. ROSENBERG. When, on April 22, we received a telegram from the Shattuck Co. that they withdrew their offer, I phoned the Soviet Purchasing Commission and told them that. I will read this note, now, which refers to a conversation with Mr. Fomichev:

Read him Shattuck's wire. He was not surprised. They had written us their last letter because they were experiencing already difficulties with WPB, Miscellaneous Minerals Division, Mr. Peacock, who did not agree as yet to BEW's giving the export license due to urgent domestic requirements.

Mr. TAVENNER. So he was not surprised when the Shattuck Co. withdrew its offer?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is that the first time you knew that there was difficulty in obtaining the license?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am not certain that I understood from your reading whether Fomichev advised you that the license had been denied?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No. [Reading:]

because they were experiencing already difficulties with WPB, Miscellaneous Minerals Division, Mr. Peacock, who did not agree as yet to BEW's giving the export license due to urgent domestic requirements.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, what occurred when you advised Fomichev that the offer had been withdrawn?

Mr. ROSENBERG (reading):

We should try to maintain the offer of our supplier; they, of course, cannot consider us committed toward themselves, but they will do, if still possible, this business with us and keep us posted about any further developments. We might try meanwhile to find some other material for them, for which the chances of materialization might be better, and advise them.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you take the matter up with Mr. Moore or any other person in Lend-Lease when the offer was withdrawn?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Not at this time; no.

Mr. TAVENNER. What supplier did you then contact for the material after you were turned down by Shattuck?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I approached for advice the Fairmount Chemical Co. on April 22, the day when we got the withdrawal from Shattuck. They told us that the only suppliers in the United States were Shattuck and du Pont, who got their stuff from Canada, and that caused me to get in touch the following day, April 23, with the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., Mr. A. J. Pregel.

Mr. TAVENNER. That was April 23 that you conferred with him?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes. That was the only visit with him.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did he tell you he had the material available for you, or what did he tell you?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That as far as uranium compounds are concerned, the United States and Canada are considered one country, with exactly the same authorities in control of the entire production and stock. Nevertheless, if we or the Russians want to find out whether for Canadian material WPB would give allocation and export license easier, they would accept the order.

Mr. TAVENNER. If I understand you correctly, he told you if an export license could be obtained——

Mr. ROSENBERG. Allocation and export license.

Mr. TAVENNER. An allocation could be obtained from Canada?

Mr. ROSENBERG. From our WPB easier for Canadian material than for United States material, then they would accept the order.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am not certain whether that is clear. Will you state again what Mr. Alexander Pregel stated, or if you have it written, let me read it.

(Witness hands paper to Mr. Tavenner.)

Mr. TAVENNER. This is a memorandum dated April 23, and it states:

Uranium compounds. Also as far as uranium compounds are concerned, the United States and Canada are considered one country, with exactly the same authorities in control of the entire production and stock. Nevertheless, if we or the Russians want to find out whether for Canadian material WPB would give allocation and export license easier, they would accept the order.

Mr. HARRISON. In other words, if they would give it easier for Canadian materials than for American materials; is that what you mean?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is what I meant to bring out.

Mr. TAVENNER (reading):

Nevertheless, if we or the Russians want to find out whether for Canadian material WPB would give allocation and export license easier.

In other words, if you could get a WPB authorization on an export license they would be able to get it more easily in Canada?

Mr. ROSENBERG. The Soviets.

Mr. TAVENNER. It says "we or the Russians." Does "we" mean Chematar?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. What did you then proceed to do after receiving that information from Mr. Alexander Pregel?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I informed the Russians of that development and received on April 26 a call from Mr. Fomichev that they had received a letter from the Lend-Lease Administrator saying they had approved the giving of an export license by BEW for the 500 pounds each of uranium uranic oxide and nitrouранyl; that although they had not received yet the actual export license, they now could place the order finally, and we should see what we still could do with our supplier. He said we could mention that they had received that advice from General Wesson of the Lend-Lease Administration.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you know at that time that the license which the Russians received was the license which Lend-Lease approved for the original material which you were expecting to obtain from the Shattuck Co.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is obvious, because I insisted on an amendment of the export license to make it applicable.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you see the license before it was amended?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We never saw any license, but we were advised that the license was amended in writing.

Mr. TAVENNER. In fact, you considered it necessary to obtain an amendment, because you were shipping different materials at different prices?

Mr. ROSENBERG. By all means.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did you advise the Russians that that license would have to be amended?

Mr. ROSENBERG. April 27.

Mr. TAVENNER. What did you advise them?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I phoned them on April 27, and my telephone report reads like this:

When I gave him (Mr. Fomichev) the negative reply as per Shattuck's telegram, he said that he cannot comprehend this outcome but finally accepted the situation as it is.

I made him the proposition concerning Canadian material as per our today's letter, which he wanted to get to file the amendment of the export license. He now has received the export license No. 1643180, dated April 23, for 500 lbs. each, Chematar as supplier.

He objected to the fact our present prices are higher than previously quoted for same material, which I explained was of Canadian origin.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do I understand from that that you advised the Russian purchasing commission that the license should be amended?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir. We wrote them a long letter about it, also, confirming this telephone conversation of the same day.

Mr. TAVENNER. This is a copy of the letter you wrote?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer in evidence that letter, dated April 27, 1943, addressed to Mr. N. S. Fomichev, the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States of America, 1610 Park Road NW., Washington, D. C., signed Chematar, Inc., by Hermann Rosenberg, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 8."

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 8," is hereinafter incorporated in the record.)¹²

Mr. TAVENNER. You state in this letter that it is—

highly advisable that you (the Russian Purchasing Commission) try to get through the respective amendment to your export license within 2 or 3 days.

¹² See appendix.

Mr. WALTER. Is it stated in what respect the license should be amended?

Mr. TAVENNER. Without taking the time to read the entire letter, does it state how the license should be amended?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. Let's see the letter.

(Exhibit Rosenberg 8 was handed to Mr. Wood.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you confer with Lend-Lease about the necessity for the amendment?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No, sir. It was none of our business.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, you had conferred with them before that regarding the issuance of the license. Wasn't it all the more important now to get the license amended promptly?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We had not communicated with them regarding the issuance of the license. We wanted to make absolutely sure that under this WPB order, which prohibited the use of uranium compounds in glassware, ceramics, and so forth, for domestic purposes—

Mr. TAVENNER. I am talking about Mr. Moore, in particular, of Lend-Lease. You had been in touch with him on several occasions about the issuance of the license?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, did you get in touch with Mr. Moore or any other person in Lend-Lease about expediting the amendment, which was the thing that was immediately confronting you at the time you wrote this letter?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I do not think that we did that, and I was by that time under the impression that the special care which we wanted to give this matter was not required under the order, since the clearance was given, and since it was none of our business, anyhow.

Mr. WOOD. I believe a reading of the copy of this letter would clarify a good many of the things we are asking about. The letter, dated April 27, 1943, is directed to Mr. N. S. Fomichev, the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U. S. A., 1610 Park Road NW., Washington, D. C. It is marked "Special delivery" and is re: Uranium compounds:

DEAR MR. FOMICHEV: As we told you this afternoon, the plant, with which we had made the arrangements, subject to actual receipt of Export License, before they have had to dispose elsewhere of the 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of nitrouранyl, could not accept the order any more, due to other arrangements they had to make during the long time until the export license actually came into your hands.

We have actually done the utmost to accommodate you and were pleased that, in spite of the ever growing tightness of the uranium situation, we thus were able to submit to you the following proposition, which is to be understood of course subject to change until you enable us this time to make absolutely final arrangements on the basis of an export license in full conformity with our proposal.

We have made preparatory arrangements with Canadian suppliers, who have told us that under the above outlined conditions the following order could be accepted:

500 pounds of each or 1,000 pounds of one of black uranium oxide 95/98 percent U_3O_8 , at \$3.10. Uranium nitrate crystals 99.5 percent pure, practically chemically pure, at \$2.85; both prices to be understood per pound net weight, including packing, f. o. b. United States point of delivery.

Delivery within about 3 weeks after receipt of order indicating the number of corresponding United States export license.

Usual terms and conditions.

To prevent a repetition of the last experience, it would be highly advisable that you try to get through the respective amendment to your export license within 2 or 3 days, what for emergency amendment of this kind has always been possible, and that you call us up the moment you have this export license in your hands. You should, furthermore, send us the necessary declaration right away, so that we have it on file when your final order is being given. Please find the wording in the draft we sent you on April 5 and change it in accordance with the order you want to give us now.

We have noted that you now have received export license No. 1643180, but its date of April 23 shows, of course, that it could not have reached you before one of the last few days.

We have made our preparatory arrangements in accordance with the quantities of your recent order, but we believe it possible that still somewhat larger quantities could be secured if you would succeed in obtaining for additional quantities export license without too much delay.

We sincerely trust to get your definite advice by phone not later than Friday, the 30th.

Very truly yours,

CHEMATAR, INC.,
By HERMANN ROSENBERG.

Mr. TAVENNER. You indicated in that letter that Mr. Pregel had advised you that there were additional quantities of uranium that may be made available. What did he tell you about that?

Mr. ROSENBERG. In the report of visit of April 23 is the following sentence:

They do not have any stocks, but 1,000 pounds or more of each product can be made up right away and within 2 or 3 weeks delivered to the desired United States point.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did he tell you how much more than 1,000 pounds could be delivered?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Not to my recollection.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you also write a letter to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. in regard to your order?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have that letter there?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. May I see it?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes [producing same].

Mr. TAVENNER. In the first paragraph of this letter, dated April 27, 1943, addressed to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., 630 Fifth Avenue, New York, you state:

In acknowledgment of our understanding, we wish to confirm for good order's sake that we are working on order and export license on the basis of your following quotations:

Then you give the quotations. You say you are working on the export license. Does that refresh your recollection now to the point that you can tell us the nature of the work you were doing in obtaining the export license?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We meant in this case our customers, whom we did not care to disclose to our supplier.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer this letter in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 9."

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 9," is hereinafter incorporated in the record.)¹³

¹³ See appendix.

Mr. TAVENNER. How soon after the writing of that letter on April 27 did you receive word that the license had been amended?

Mr. ROSENBERG. In this particular case I have a copy of the letter from the Soviet Purchasing Commission, because we got this letter in two copies and we maintained the second copy in our file.

Mr. TAVENNER. This letter, dated April 29, 1943, signed by N. S. Fomichev, In Charge of Chemicals, and addressed to Chematar, Inc., states in its first paragraph?

Today we received an amended export license #1643180, covering 500 lbs. of Black Uranium Oxide, at \$3.10 per lb., for \$1550.00, and 500 lbs. of Uranium Nitrate, at \$2.85 per lb., for \$1425.00—total amount, \$2975.

Mr. WOOD. What is the date of that?

Mr. TAVENNER. April 29, 1943. I offer that letter in evidence and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 10."

Mr. WOOD. It will be received.

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 10," is hereinafter incorporated in the record.)¹⁴

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know how the Russian Purchasing Commission was able to obtain an amendment of that license between the date of your letter, April 27, and the date of this letter, April 29?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you advised in any way how it was done?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you at any time see the amended license?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No, sir. It was not our business.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was the transaction consummated for the purchase and shipment of that material?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Tell us briefly about it.

Mr. ROSENBERG. On May 1, after having received the letter from the Soviet Purchasing Commission of April 29, we accepted the order from the Soviet Purchasing Commission "based on export license No. 1643180, as amended," and on the same date we placed the order with the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. of New York "under export license No. 1643180, as amended."

Mr. TAVENNER. How and by whom were you paid for the shipment?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We were paid by Amtorg Corp.—Amtorg Trading Corp., I believe is the full name—of New York.

Mr. TAVENNER. And you remitted the money to whom, after deducting the fee for your services?

Mr. ROSENBERG. To the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., in New York City.

Mr. TAVENNER. How were you paid?

Mr. ROSENBERG. By check.

Mr. TAVENNER. By check of what organization? Did you say Amtorg?

Mr. KEARNEY. Were you paid by check of the Amtorg Corp.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I suppose so. I have not seen the check, but I have a copy of the invoice to Amtorg.

Mr. KEARNEY. Was the check payable to you or to your company?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

¹⁴ See appendix.

Mr. KEARNEY. Did you see it?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I don't see the checks. They go to the bookkeeping department.

Mr. KEARNEY. You personally didn't see it?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No.

Mr. WOOD. Then how did your company pay the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.; by check?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. Do you have that check?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes; I must have the check. I have the bill of the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., and the check must be in accordance with that bill. That is the shipping advice. The bill is in our bookkeeping department.

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Mr. WOOD. Yes. Mr. Kearney.

Mr. KEARNEY. Did the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. know that the Soviet Government was your customer?

Mr. ROSENBERG. They have marked the cases "USSR."

Mr. KEARNEY. You can answer my question, can't you? Did the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. know that your customer was the Soviet Government?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir. They must have known it, because they have marked the cases "USSR."

Mr. KEARNEY. Did they know or didn't they?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir; they did.

Mr. HARRISON. And so marked their invoice?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes. We even notified them. I have a letter here of May 21, in which I say:

We just had a telephone call from the Russian Purchasing Commission, who are very anxious to get the merchandise at the latest in the course of next week * * *

Mr. TAVENNER. Let me read it, if you don't mind. This is a letter dated May 21, 1943, from Chematar, Inc., by Hermann Rosenberg, directed to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., 630 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y., attention Mr. Alexander Pregel, vice president, re order of May 1, 1943 [reading]:

GENTLEMEN: We called you up today to ask you to find out by telegram from your Canadian plant whether the 1,000 pounds uranium compounds as per our captioned order have already been shipped to Great Falls, Mont., or when that will be done. We just had a telephone call from the Russian Purchasing Commission, who are very anxious to get the merchandise at the latest in the course of next week, to make a certain conveyance for transportation to the Soviet Union.

Please do not fail to let us have this advice tomorrow or at the latest Monday morning, all the more as it is today already 3 weeks since we placed this urgent order with you.

Mr. KEARNEY. What is the date?

Mr. TAVENNER. May 21, 1943. I offer that letter in evidence and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 11."

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 11," is hereinabove incorporated in the record.) ¹⁵

¹⁵ See appendix.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then, again, there is another letter written by Chematar, Inc., to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., under date of May 1, 1943, attention Mr. A. J. Pregel, vice president [reading]:

GENTLEMEN: In reference to your attached purchase confirmation, we wish to advise you that we are working on further orders for you from the Soviet Government, for which, as we told you, we are placing these orders.

We hope that we can build up a continuous business with you and trust that we may count on your cooperation hereby.

I offer that letter in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 12."

Mr. ROSENBERG. I am paid for doing business.

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 12," is hereinabove incorporated in the record.)¹⁶

Mr. TAVENNER. What other uranium requests were you working on at that time for the Soviet Government?

Mr. ROSENBERG. There was no other.

Mr. TAVENNER. There was no other?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. Your letter says there was.

Mr. ROSENBERG. That doesn't mean that there was. I tried to impress my customer.

Mr. TAVENNER. A trade practice, you mean?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was there any later time when you did work on further requests from the Russian Government for uranium?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. When was that?

Mr. ROSENBERG. May I have the opportunity of improving my previous statement? I have the original invoice of the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. here.

Mr. WOOD. We have a photostatic copy of it, but we will accept the original. We would rather have the original. All we have is a photostatic copy.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer the invoice in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 13."

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The invoice above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 13," is hereinafter incorporated in the record.)¹⁷

Mr. ROSENBERG. We need it for the income-tax collector.

Mr. TAVENNER. We will make a copy and return the original to you.

Now will you answer my question about further transactions? The invoice you have just presented related to the 1,000 pounds we have been talking about. What other inquiries did you receive requesting that you obtain uranium for the Soviet Purchasing Commission?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I heard from Mr. Pregel that the Canadian representative of the Russians tried to cut us out, and had communicated with them directly, and I asked him not to offer them directly because we want to stay in the business. That was on May 25. On May 27 Mr. Pregel told me he has talked to Toronto and they will not quote to the Russians. His inquiry came from Ottawa. They will try to

¹⁶ See appendix.

¹⁷ See appendix.

refer them to New York and then he will communicate with us; Pregel will communicate with us.

Mr. WOOD. Which Mr. Pregel was that?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Alexander.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, that was looking to future business in uranium?

Mr. ROSENBERG. There must have been an inquiry for uranium from the Russians from Ottawa.

Mr. HARRISON. The next time the Russians wanted uranium, they went directly to the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., and that company, Mr. Pregel's company, notified you?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I don't understand that. Read your memorandum over again.

Mr. ROSENBERG. On May 25, I have a memorandum here, that Mr. A. Pregel promised to call Toronto and have them refrain from quoting to the Russians.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have who refrain from quoting?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I depend on this memorandum.

Mr. TAVENNER. Does that mean have Eldorado mines refrain from quoting?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is my interpretation.

Mr. HARRISON. As I understand, the Russians were attempting to avoid paying a commission to you?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Unfortunately, yes.

Mr. HARRISON. Of course the American taxpayers were paying it all.

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, can I have the date of shipment of the 1,000 pounds?

Mr. WOOD. The original invoice shows May 21, 1943.

Mr. KEARNEY. Where was that shipped to?

Mr. WOOD. Do you understand that this shipment of 1,000 pounds was delivered to the Russians at Great Falls, Mont.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. It was shipped to Col. A. N. Kotikov, resident representative of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, Air Service Depot of the Air Transport Command, Gore Field, Great Falls, Mont., U. S. A. I have that from the shipping advice.

Mr. TAVENNER. It was shipped from Port Hope in Canada to Great Falls, Mont.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes. I have the routing here, and it gives the Russian order number.

Mr. TAVENNER. Finish your statement as to what occurred regarding your conference with Pregel on May 27.

Mr. ROSENBERG. There was a telephone conversation on May 25—two telephone conversations. On May 25 I have a memorandum that I shall call him up tomorrow morning and find out what he has arranged. No point in our calling Toronto directly, because they would not take any directions from us (Chematar) and they do not act without approval of the New York office.

Mr. TAVENNER. Tell us the names of the parties whom you were expected to call. Whom were you going to call?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Mr. Pregel.

Mr. TAVENNER. Whom were you going to call in Canada?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I wanted to call the Toronto office.

Mr. TAVENNER. Of what?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I suppose of Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. I am sorry I don't remember that any more. And on May 27 Mr. Pregel called me back, and I think that telephone report was understood, or shall I read it again?

Mr. TAVENNER. Read it again.

Mr. ROSENBERG (reading):

He has talked to Toronto and they will not quote to the Russians. Since their inquiry was a quite vague one, there is no point in our offering them and quoting them prices at the present moment.

I do not know if that was told to me or if I wrote that down for our company of our intention, but I have a report of June 2, when I spoke to Mr. Cherniakov of the Soviet Purchasing Commission because Mr. Fomichev was out of town for a time and he was taking charge of chemical purchases.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was next?

Mr. ROSENBERG. A letter of the same date to the Russians.

Mr. TAVENNER. Tell us what occurred finally as a result of the inquiries the Russians were making, which apparently started from the Ottawa office?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I have a letter from the Soviet Purchasing Commission, but it has no reference to our shipments.

Mr. TAVENNER. We want to see those letters, but we will not take the time to read them now, unless they have a bearing.

Mr. ROSENBERG. This letter of June 11, 1943, from the Soviet Purchasing Commission to Chematar says:

In reply to your letters of May 29 and June 2 concerning uranium compound and radium, I wish to advise you that we communicated with the lend-lease authorities in order to grant the export license in case we will place an order for the additional quantity of the same material with your company. If the United States authorities will grant us an export license, we will be glad to discuss with you the matter in question.

Mr. HARRISON. Did you locate any additional supply of uranium for them?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No.

Mr. HARRISON. Did you attempt to get any for them, or did they attempt to get approval again?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. And the next time it was not forthcoming?

Mr. WOLKISER. I would like to call attention that this letter is signed "S. S. Cherniakov, In Charge of Explosive Material and Chemical Installation." This is the first time his name appears.

Mr. HARRISON. And, so far as you know, the shipment of May 1943 was the last uranium that the Russians were able to obtain in this country?

Mr. ROSENBERG. From us.

Mr. HARRISON. As far as you know, it was the last uranium they got from any source?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Except from what I heard in this meeting. But they approached us again on August 5.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Rosenberg, the letter that you have produced under date of June 11, 1943, which has a stamp in the right-hand corner "Received June 12," signed by S. S. Cherniakov, is there objection to leaving this letter with us?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No, sir.

Mr. WOOD. The letter is addressed to Chematar, Inc., 40 Exchange Place, New York, N. Y. It is on the letterhead of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States of America, and is marked "Attention: Mr. Herman Rosenberg." The letter is as follows:

GENTLEMEN: In reply to your letters of May 29 and June 2 concerning uranium compound and radium, I wish to advise you that we communicated with the lend-lease authorities in order to grant the export license in case we will place an order for the additional quantity of the said material with your company. If the United States authorities will grant us an export license, we will be glad to discuss with you the matter in question.

Thanking you for your cooperation, we are

Very truly yours,

S. S. CHERNIAKOV,

In Charge of Explosive Material and Chemical Installation.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer the letter of June 11, 1943, in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 14."

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 14," is hereinabove incorporated in the record.)¹⁸

Mr. WOOD. I note in this letter, Mr. Rosenberg, Mr. Cherniakov says, "in case we will place an order for the additional quantity." That indicates, to my mind, that there had been under discussion some additional quantity. It doesn't state place an order for "an" additional quantity, but for "the" additional quantity. Had they been negotiating for further quantities?

Mr. ROSENBERG. The letter of June 2, addressed by me to them, says:

We still are able to supply you with additional quantities of uranium nitrate and black uranium oxide, and, since we understand that further quantities are inquired for the USSR, please advise us for what additional quantity of either compound you would like to have our offer.

That is all I know.

Mr. WALTER. To whom was that letter addressed?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Attention Mr. S. S. Cherniakov.

Mr. WALTER. The man in charge of explosives?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes. It doesn't say that, but it is marked for the attention of Mr. Cherniakov.

Mr. WOOD. Let's receive that letter also.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to introduce in evidence the letter of June 2, 1943, from Chematar, Inc. to the Russian Purchasing Commission, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 15."

Mr. WOOD. It will be received.

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 15," is hereinafter incorporated in the record.)¹⁹

Mr. TAVENNER. You do know the quantity of materials they were inquiring about at that time; do you not?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I do not.

Mr. TAVENNER. Look at your memorandum of August 5.

Mr. ROSENBERG. That was later. We are talking about June now.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you later find out how much they were interested in purchasing?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I think this was later.

¹⁸ See appendix.

¹⁹ See appendix.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did anything happen between June 11 and August 5, 1943, relating to uranium?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Not according to my recollection and the files at my disposal.

Mr. TAVENNER. What happened August 5, 1943?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I read from a telephone report of a conversation on August 5, 1943, with M. N. S. Fomichev:

Uranium compounds.—They recently have asked WPB again to make a survey to the effect if not another 10–15 tons could be located for them.

I suggested they ask Mr. Moore to communicate with us to find out whether our supplier could make available such or a similar quantity against allocation.

See separate telephone report with Mr. Moore.

Mr. WALTER. Do you remember Mr. Moore's first name?

Mr. ROSENBERG. William C. Moore.

Mr. WALTER. You mentioned a Mr. Park a moment ago. Who was that?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Who?

Mr. WALTER. Park of WPB.

Mr. ROSENBERG. He was an assistant to Mr. Land. I talked to him on the phone.

Mr. WALTER. Do you remember his first name?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I don't remember it, but I might have it in my files.

In that conversation with Lend-Lease Administrator William C. Moore of August 5, 1943, to which I referred, it says in the telephone report:

Re uranium compounds.—There is no material available for Russians at the present time, and also the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corporation has reported to him that they have nothing available.

Mr. TAVENNER. You advised Lend-Lease on August 5, 1943, in effect, that you had been doing business with the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. Isn't that the effect of this telephone communication?

Mr. ROSENBERG. May I see it again?

Mr. TAVENNER. Maybe I misunderstood your reading of it.

Mr. ROSENBERG. I do not remember the wording.

Mr. WOLKISER. This is what Mr. Moore told him.

Mr. TAVENNER. You were stating what Mr. Moore said?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I thought you were stating what you said to Mr. Moore.

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes; I told him that. How could Mr. Moore talk to me about the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. unless I told him about that company?

Mr. TAVENNER. In this telephone report you say:

There is no material available for Russians at the present time.

Who made that statement? You or Mr. Moore?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Mr. Moore.

Mr. TAVENNER (reading): * * *

and also the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. has reported to him that they have nothing available.

That is, reported to Mr. Moore?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. Had you told Mr. Moore prior to that time that you had been obtaining uranium through the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I have no record of that, and I have no recollection of it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you at any time talk to a member of the staff of the Manhattan Engineering District about the obtaining of materials from the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Since I have learned at this hearing that Lieutenant Burman was a member of that outfit, and in his absence I spoke to Colonel Crenshaw, I know I talked to that outfit.

Mr. TAVENNER. That occurred during the first shipment from Shattuck. Did you talk to them about the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I never had any further contact with them, because they referred me back to WPB, and my understanding was that they were not interested in our business. As a matter of fact, Colonel Crenshaw told me at that time that uranium was not their business.

Mr. TAVENNER. I understand. I am not talking about that conversation. Did you talk to Mr. Moore or anybody in Lend-Lease about the supply you had been getting from Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. This is my only record of that kind.

Mr. TAVENNER. Why would Mr. Moore have made a statement like that to you if you had not discussed that corporation with him?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That is what I wanted to bring out. I must have told him we were in contact with that company at that time and asked whether we would be permitted to transact business with this company for the Russians; and I have another telephone report of that same date that might be of interest to you.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROSENBERG. I spoke on August 5 to Mr. Pregel of the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.

Mr. TAVENNER. Which Mr. Pregel?

Mr. ROSENBERG. The telephone report says, "Mr. Pregel (Mr. A. G. Pregel out of town)," so it must have been the other one.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were there more than two Pregels that you know of?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I didn't even know of the second one up to that date. This telephone report says:

Re uranium compounds.—They are not allowed any longer to quote or even give us any information. We would have to approach WPB for that. The prices are unchanged, but they have no material for sale. Unofficially, he would say there is no chance in approaching WPB at present. The proper way would be that the Soviet Purchasing Commission communicate with the Canadian Government Ministry of Munitions and Supplies; the Russians know exactly the procedure.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is what Mr. Pregel told you?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. That he could make no further quotations?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did he tell you why?

Mr. ROSENBERG (reading):

They are not allowed any longer to quote or even give us any information.

Mr. WOOD. What did the last sentence in that memorandum mean: That the Russians would know the exact procedure? The exact procedure for what?

Mr. ROSENBERG. For approaching the Canadian Government Ministry of Munitions and Supplies.

Mr. WOOD. Did it refer to the Canadian Government or to a branch of the American Government?

Mr. ROSENBERG. As I understand it refers to the Canadian Government, because it says:

Canadian Government Ministry of Munitions and Supplies.

Mr. WOOD. May I see that memorandum?

(Said memorandum was handed to Mr. Wood.)

Mr. WOOD. This memorandum reads in this language:

They are not allowed any longer to quote or even give us any information.

By "they" you meant the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. The next sentence is:

We would have to approach WPB for that.

Who is "we"?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Chematar, Inc.

Mr. WOOD. And WPB is a branch of the American Government?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. WOOD (reading):

The prices are unchanged, but they have no material for sale.

That is the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOOD (reading):

Unofficially, he would say there is no chance in approaching WPB at present.

What do you mean by "unofficially, he would say"?

Mr. ROSENBERG. He only could tell me his opinion whether there is any change in my approaching WPB or not.

Mr. WOOD (reading):

The proper way would be that the Soviet Purchasing Commission communicate with the Canadian Government Ministry of Munitions and Supplies; the Russians know exactly the procedure.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you convey that information to the Russians?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I don't think I did.

Mr. TAVENNER. From your independent recollection, do you not know you passed that information on?

Mr. WOLKISER. We did pass it on.

Mr. ROSENBERG. I don't recollect it, and I don't have a note here. I will check it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Let us check it now. It is of some importance. Do you have records here that disclose that?

Mr. WOLKISER. There was something that made me think we informed the Soviet Purchasing Commission. In 1948, when we prepared the statement for the committee, we told the committee we passed this information to the Soviet Purchasing Commission and had no further dealings. It is something he presumed he must have told the Soviet Purchasing Commission. In other words, he presumes that he notified them of the outcome of his efforts to obtain the material.

Mr. HARRISON. It was the natural thing to do.

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes; I owed them an answer, and I presumably did. I would normally do so.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you follow up to see whether the Russians did obtain uranium through Canadian sources, to determine whether or not you were entitled to commissions on the sales?

Mr. ROSENBERG. I didn't go that far. Incidentally, this was such a minor deal for us at that time. The entire business we did with the Russians from 1942 to 1945 was \$17,500, which represented about 2½ percent of our total business during those years. OPA was in effect at that time. I wasn't too keen about the business.

Mr. KEARNEY. You did business with them, though?

Mr. ROSENBERG. It was a small customer. I wish we had not, now. I would like to mention that we have last shipped to the Russians in 1946 \$450 worth of merchandise the balance of old orders, and not a penny since our relations with them deteriorated.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you have transactions with the Russian Purchasing Commission relating to heavy water?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Tell us about it briefly.

Mr. ROSENBERG. We got an inquiry from the Soviet Purchasing Commission August 23, 1943, for heavy water.

Mr. TAVENNER. How much?

Mr. ROSENBERG. One thousand grams, for research purposes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Tell us how you went about obtaining a supply?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We were guided in this case by chemical address books which we use in cases where we don't know the product, and I found a supplier here [indicating name in address book] whom I must have approached. I have no note of that, but he must have told me that the Stuart Oxygen Co. in San Francisco was the only commercial manufacturer of that product.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is the name of the company?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Stuart Oxygen Co. in San Francisco. We approached them August 24, 1943, and received an offer right away on 1,000 grams, with an unsolicited firm offer to accept at a later date. We passed this quotation to the Russians. They accepted it on October 21, 1943. The merchandise was ready for immediate shipment, and it actually was shipped on October 30, 1943.

Mr. WOOD. Actually shipped when?

Mr. ROSENBERG. October 30, 1943. We tried to get additional orders from the Russians for this product, and they said they were not interested, until on January 16, 1945, unsolicited, they inquired for another 100 grams, which we purchased from the same company.

Mr. TAVENNER. To whom were those shipments consigned?

Mr. ROSENBERG. To our company in New York.

Mr. TAVENNER. What did you do with them when you received them?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Shipped them, unopened, to the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know anything about the disposition of those shipments after that?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you given packing directions as to how this material should be packed for shipping?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who gave the directions to you?

Mr. ROSENBERG. The Russian Purchasing Commission told us they would like to have the thousand grams shipped in four boxes. Stuart Oxygen Co. told us what was the normal packing, and they assured us they knew best because they are the only commercial manufacturers of this product in this country and have been shipping it since 1934 all over the world, since it was discovered by Professor Urey, and we left it up to them.

Mr. WOOD. How was it packed?

Mr. ROSENBERG. They were packed in four individual boxes, 250 grams net in each box.

Mr. WOOD. Two hundred and fifty grams in each box?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. Net?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Net weight of the heavy water itself, but on account of its special elaborate packing, the gross weight of each box was 5.37 pounds—so that the total shipment, which just contained 1,000 grams, or 2.21 pounds, was 41.12 pounds gross. In other words, the packing was almost 39 pounds.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were those four packages shipped separately?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No. They were in one outside box.

Mr. TAVENNER. They were contained in one outside box?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes; one large box.

Mr. TAVENNER. That was the condition of the shipment at the time you received it and at the time you sent it on to the Russian Purchasing Commission?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Unopened and unhandled. We insisted, since we didn't know about this product and since we didn't want to get anything they did not want, that a neutral laboratory in San Francisco check the merchandise and packing before it was shipped to us.

Abbot A. Hanks, Inc., engineers, assayers, chemists, metallurgists, consulting, testing, inspecting, 624 Sacramento Street, San Francisco, Calif., gave us the following statement, sworn to by Mr. Prentiss T. Bee, chief chemist, dated October 27, 1943, addressed to Stuart Oxygen Co., 351 California Street, San Francisco, Calif.:

DEAR SIRs: Our chief chemist, Mr. Prentiss T. Bee, checked the analysis of over 1,000 grams of deuterium oxide (D_2O) which analyzed between 99.7 and and 99.8 percent D_2O and checked the weighing and filling of the 40 pyrex ampoules, and weighing of the same after filling. Each of these ampoules contains more than 25 grams of D_2O .

Mr. VELDE. Mr. Chairman, I was wondering if we could dispense with the reading of all these papers until counsel has a chance to examine them. It was stated at the beginning of the session that Mr. Rosenberg was willing to turn the papers over to the staff to go through them, and I think we can save time by doing it that way.

Mr. ROSENBERG. There is just one more paragraph about the packing, if you are interested in that.

Mr. WOOD. Very well.

Mr. ROSENBERG (continuing reading):

These were all sealed in his presence, packed in cartons, and placed in mailing tubes, and then he put 10 ampoules, 250 grams, in each four wooden boxes, being packed between layers of cotton in each of the boxes. These four boxes were placed in one large wooden box, which was then strapped and sealed.

Very truly yours,

ABBOT A. HANKS, INC.,
By HERBERT D. IMRIE.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you give us the date of the second shipment of the 100 grams, and if not, will you give it to us now?

Mr. ROSENBERG. February 7, 1945, from San Francisco to us, and February 14, from us to Washington, both times by railway express.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you ever advised that heavy water was considered as a strategic material?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No, sir. We always inquired from WPB, and we did in this case, too, but I didn't make a record of that.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have no further questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Walter?

Mr. WALTER. No.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Velde?

Mr. VELDE. You mentioned in one of your memoranda that the Soviet Government could use another 10 or 15 tons of uranium oxide?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. VELDE. Would that indicate to you they had already received 10 or 15 tons?

Mr. ROSENBERG. That they were looking for them.

Mr. VELDE. That they were looking for 10 or 15 tons?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. VELDE. But it would not be another 10 or 15 tons?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No.

Mr. VELDE. In any of your contacts with the Soviet Purchasing Commission, were you informed as to the use to which these uranium materials and heavy water were going to be put by the Russians?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No.

Mr. VELDE. Did you have any knowledge of your own as to what the uranium products were being used for?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No. I am not a chemist.

(Witness confers with his counsel.)

Mr. ROSENBERG. Uranium, yes.

Mr. VELDE. Did you know what the uranium was to be used for by the Russians?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes. They made a statement.

Mr. VELDE. That is what I asked you. Did they tell you they were going to use it for a certain purpose?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. VELDE. What was that purpose?

Mr. ROSENBERG. We got a declaration from them that says—

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you let me read it?

Mr. ROSENBERG. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. This is a copy of a statement by the Soviet Purchasing Commission:

To Whom It May Concern:

In reference to our order, given on April 2, 1943, Chematar, Inc., 40 Exchange Place, New York, N. Y., we herewith declare that the 500 pounds uranouranic oxide, 99.5 percent pure (green oxide), will be used for making of ferrouanium compounds, which in turn will be used in the production of armaments, and that the 500 pounds of uranium nitrate (uranyl) will be used for medical purposes directly connected with the present war, and that thus neither compound is used for any purpose which would be contradictory to the restrictions imposed by War Production Board Conservation Order M-285 on the use of uranium or uranium compounds.

THE GOVERNMENT PURCHASING COMMISSION OF THE
SOVIET UNION IN THE U. S. A.

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 1943.

Mr. VELDE. Was the word "armaments" mentioned in there?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes—

will be used for making of ferrouanium compounds, which in turn will be used in the production of armaments.

I desire to offer this copy of statement and attached copy of letter of April 5, 1943, from Chematar, Inc., to the Soviet Purchasing Commission, in evidence, and ask that they be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 16."

Mr. WOOD. It will be received.

(The copies of documents above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 16," are hereinafter incorporated in the record.) ²⁰

Mr. VELDE. Did you or your company have a contract to furnish all your uranium output to the Manhattan District?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No; we didn't even know of them.

Mr. VELDE. Did you know of any contract under which any uranium company had to furnish all its uranium output to the Manhattan project?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No.

Mr. VELDE. Did you have any knowledge of any contract of your own that provided for exclusive right to all that you could produce?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No, sir.

Mr. VELDE. With anybody?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No, sir.

Mr. VELDE. I think, Mr. Chairman, that is contrary to what was testified this morning.

Mr. WOOD. As I understand, Mr. Rosenberg's firm was not a producer. Did your company ever produce any of this material?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No; we were only brokers.

Mr. VELDE. You bought this material from Chematar, Inc.?

Mr. ROSENBERG. No; we are Chematar, Inc.

Mr. VELDE. And the only materials you were able to get for the Russians were obtained from whom?

Mr. ROSENBERG. The first shipment from the Shattuck Co. in Denver, and the second shipment from the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. of New York.

Mr. VELDE. And you did not know that either of those companies had a contract to furnish all their uranium output exclusively to the Manhattan District?

²⁰ See appendix.

Mr. ROSENBERG. No.

Mr. WOOD. Any further questions?

Mr. WOLKISER. Will you permit my client to read a short statement?

Mr. WOOD. Would you mind putting it in the record, because we are pressed for time. We will be glad to accept it for the record.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF HERMANN ROSENBERG, VICE PRESIDENT, CHEMATAR, INC.,
NEW YORK CITY

It has been a privilege to appear and testify before this committee. My company and I are glad to cooperate in any way possible to assist the committee in its work by giving you all information regarding these deals which to us were at the time very minor routine transactions, involving a profit of a few hundred dollars.

Following my previous appearance at an executive session in June 1948, which received some publicity in December 1949, we were pleased to see that the press generally reported our business transactions correctly. However, we were somewhat disturbed by the description of one columnist who labeled Chematar, Inc., as "the official purchasing agent of the Soviet Government." That is of course not true. Such implications may well be harmful to our company and our business associates.

The officials of our company are only businessmen. We are for the most part citizens of the United States by naturalization, and are sensitive to any implications that might cast doubt upon our loyalty and devotion to our country.

It is this connection that we appreciate this opportunity to state a few facts and figures showing the purely incidental nature of our involvement in this matter.

We have managed to build up a substantial business in our special field of industrial chemicals, and believe our operations are wholly beneficial to the economy of the United States. We deal in thousands of individual products but are particularly active in handling about 20 items, principally, coal-tar products, with a 30-year experience in this field.

Our standing in the industrial chemical field is well established and may be readily checked by reference to any of the large American chemical manufacturing companies with which we deal.

During the war years our business was about 80 percent with commercial buyers mostly in Latin America and 20 percent with military procurement authorities of the United States and our allies. Our total sales from 1942 to 1945 were approximately \$700,000, of which \$17,500 were sales to the Soviet Purchasing Commission. They represented about 2½ percent of our total business during the war years. In 1946 our total deliveries to Russian purchasing authorities amounted to \$450. This was the balance of two old orders. We have made no sales to Russia since 1946. Our annual business since the war has amounted to several million dollars.

As for the particular Russian orders of interest to the committee, they were for our routine orders, calling for just other common chemicals among the approximately 150 different chemicals sold by us in small lots to the Russians, aggregating the aforesaid \$17,500.

No pressure from any source was used, or indeed necessary, to induce my company to fill these routine orders from the Russian Government out of readily obtainable supplies, in strict compliance with all applicable regulations, at a time when we were rushing all available supplies to our then ally.

On the basis of this record we strongly believe there should be no reflection upon the business conduct of our company or its individual officers and that our absolute loyalty and complete support of our Government both during peace and war should be recognized and acknowledged.

May I thank you for your courtesy in listening.

Mr. WOLKISER. My client has been here twice. He was here in June 1948. We have submitted all the information, and he wanted to say it was a pleasure to have been here; that he is just a businessman, not interested in politics, and has no particular connection with the Russian Government. The statement made by one columnist that Chem-

atar, Inc., was "the official purchasing agent of the Soviet Government" is incorrect, and is not good publicity.

Mr. WOOD. Let us hope it will not be necessary to call him back again.

Mr. WOLKISER. I hope there is no reflection on our company in any way. Mr. Rosenberg, as a naturalized citizen, is particularly sensitive to any suggestion of lack of loyalty.

Mr. WOOD. I think I speak the sentiment of the committee when I say that we understand your client is engaged in the business of buying and selling.

Mr. WOLKISER. Thank you very much for your courtesy.

Mr. WOOD. The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, an adjournment was taken until Wednesday, January 25, 1950, at 10 a. m.).

HEARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1950

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE
ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARING

A Subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Building Hon. John S. Wood, chairman, presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood, Francis E. Walter, Burr P. Harrison (arriving as indicated), Harold H. Velde, and Bernard W. Kearney.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Courtney Owens, investigator; John W. Carrington, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. WOOD. For the purpose of this hearing today a subcommittee has been appointed consisting of Messrs. Walter, Velde, Kearney, and Wood. They are all present.

Are you ready to go forward, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to state at this time that within the past 10 minutes I have had a long-distance telephone call and conversation with officials in the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York regarding the contract between the Manhattan Engineering District and the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., dated March 27, 1943, and I learned as a result of that call that the contract was probably not executed and delivered until a date at least subsequent to May 12, 1943. The exact facts and circumstances are being investigated, and the full facts regarding that will be presented to the committee as soon as they can be obtained and the necessary declassification is made of the documents which would prove that.

Mr. WALTER. In other words, there was no contract for the exclusive right to this material before the export license was issued?

Mr. TAVENNER. The agreement dated March 27, 1943, could not have become effective as a legal document before its execution and delivery. The order in question was placed on May 1, 1943, though the date of shipment may have been after the effective date of this agreement, but those facts will have to be determined. I am informed the actual shipping date of the uranium may have been as late as

June, but those facts are being investigated, and the exact date of shipment I think will appear in the testimony of the next witness.

Mr. OWENS.

Mr. WOOD. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give this subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. OWENS. I do.

TESTIMONY OF COURTNEY E. OWENS

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your full name, please?

Mr. OWENS. Courtney E. Owens.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you an investigator of the Committee on Un-American Activities?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir.

(Representative Harrison enters the hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Owens, considerable testimony has been introduced regarding the issuance of export licenses for shipment of uranium to Russia by the Board of Economic Warfare, the approval by Lend-Lease of the granting of such licenses, and compliance with Order M-285 of the War Production Board. In the course of your investigation, did you also find that the United States Army for a period of time acted as a procurement agency for the purchase of chemicals by the Soviet Union?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration, in a letter signed by John M. Hazard, chief liaison officer, Section of Soviet Supply, under date of June 16, 1942, addressed to Col. John B. Franks, International Division, stated that under the terms of the proposed second protocol, which had been delivered to the Soviet Government for consideration and acceptance, a considerable quantity of chemicals had been offered; that during the past 9 months the War Department had served as the procurement agency for chemicals purchased under the first Moscow protocol; that it was anticipated that the War Department would continue to purchase chemicals to meet Soviet requirements; and it was requested that preparations be made to purchase chemicals in compliance with the terms of the proposed second protocol.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have a photostatic copy of that letter which you obtained from the Army?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer the photostatic copy of the letter from Mr. Hazard in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Owens 1."

Mr. WOOD. Without objection, it will be admitted.

(The photostat of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Owens 1," is hereinafter included in the record.)²¹

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Owens, did you ascertain that the Russian Government made requisition for uranium compounds in the early part of 1943, to the Chemical Warfare Service of the Army?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. Ultimately it reached the Chemical Warfare Service. On March 5, 1943, Capt. W. D. Kavanaugh, CWS, International Branch, Operations Division, wrote a letter to N. S. Fomichev,

²¹ See appendix.

Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, stating that its procurement office had been endeavoring to find sources of supply for uranium nitrate and uranium chloride in connection with Soviet requisition R-12045, and advised that there is no known producer of uranium chloride. The letter further stated that one producer had about 200 pounds of uranium nitrate and had on hand sufficient concentrate to yield about 8,000 pounds at the rate of approximately 4,000 pounds per month, and in addition had a considerable stock of ore on which they could draw for future production. The letter further advised that it would be necessary to have the War Production Board allocate whatever material might be authorized for procurement, inasmuch as General Preference Order M-285 controlled the distribution of uranium compounds.

This was in March of 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer in evidence photostatic copy of the letter from Captain Kavanaugh just referred to, and request that it be marked "Exhibit Owens 2."

Mr. WOOD. Let it be admitted.

(The photostat of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Owens 2," is hereinafter included in the record.)²²

Mr. TAVENNER. What disposition was finally made by the Army of requisition R-12045?

Mr. OWENS. By letter of March 9, 1943, Col. John B. Franks, General Staff Corps, Director, International Division, returned to General Belyaev, chairman, Soviet Purchasing Commission, Soviet requisition R-12045, dated February 4, 1943, and advised him that it would be impossible to make available either uranium nitrate or uranium chloride. The Soviets were further advised in this letter that the production of both of these items was such that no guaranty whatsoever could be given as to any date in the future when the material could be made available, even in small quantities, and it was for this reason alone that the requisition was being returned to the Soviet Purchasing Commission.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer in evidence photostatic copy of the letter dated March 9, 1943, from Col. John B. Franks, and request that it be marked "Exhibit Owens 3."

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The photostat of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Owens 3," is hereinafter included in the record.)²³

Mr. OWENS. It might be well to note that this requisition, of which we have a copy, called for 8 tons of uranium nitrate and 8 tons of uranium oxide.

Mr. WOOD. You say that is revealed?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, by the requisition which will be placed in the record at a later date.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was this requisition renewed?

Mr. OWENS. Yes; it was renewed and again denied. On April 6, 1943, Victor V. Taylor, colonel, Adjutant General's Department Deputy Director, International Division, addressed a letter to Maj. Gen. A. I. Belyaev, the same gentleman I referred to in my answer to the last question, chairman of the Government Purchasing Com-

²² See appendix.

²³ See appendix.

mission of the Soviet Union in the United States of America, marked "Attention: Captain I. Stepanov," in which he acknowledged receipt of a letter of April 3, 1943, in reference to a request to present to the Munitions Assignments Committee for approval of prompt delivery of 8 tons of both uranium nitrate and urano-uranic oxide. The Soviet Purchasing Commission was likewise advised in this letter that it was possible to obtain this material for assignment to the Soviet Union at that time.

The letter of April 3, 1943, mentioned, from the Soviet Purchasing Commission, is in the files of the Atomic Energy Commission, and there is a memorandum addressed to us from the War Department.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer in evidence the photostatic copy of letter from Colonel Taylor, dated April 6, 1943, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Owens 4."

Mr. WOOD. Let it be admitted.

(The photostat of letter above referred to marked "Exhibit Owens 4," is hereinafter included in the record.)²⁴

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Owens, did your investigation disclose that the Russians endeavored to appeal to higher authority for favorable action on their request for 8 tons of uranium nitrate and 8 tons of urano-uranic oxide?

Mr. OWENS. Yes. A letter was addressed by Lt. Gen. L. G. Rudenko, identified as chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union, under date of March 31, 1944, to the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, in which he stated that his country was in most urgent need of the following materials for its war industry:

1. 8 tons of uranium nitrate;
2. 8 tons of urano-uranic oxide;
3. 25 pounds of uranium metal.

The letter also states that:

In 1943 we exerted every effort to obtain these materials through the International Division of the War Department, which has jurisdiction over assignments of such items. However, we were not successful in obtaining these materials.

I would therefore deeply appreciate your giving this requirement your consideration with a view toward ascertaining the possibility of supplying these materials to us from the stocks of the War Department.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer in evidence at this time a photostatic copy of the letter of Lieutenant General Rudenko, bearing date March 31, 1944, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Owens 5."

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The photostat of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Owens 5," is hereinafter included in the record.)²⁵

Mr. TAVENNER. I hand you a photostatic copy of a memorandum prepared by Col. J. W. Boone, acting director, International Division, bearing date April 7, 1944, dealing with the subject of the Soviet request for uranium. Will you please read it?

Mr. OWENS. This is a War Department summary sheet dated April 7, 1944:

1. Representatives of the Soviet Purchasing Commission requested allocation of several forms of uranium in early 1943, and it is understood that they

²⁴ See appendix.

²⁵ See appendix.

also requested it from the Foreign Economic Administration. The War Department turned down the request in a letter of April 6, 1943, from the deputy director, International Division, Headquarters A. S. F.

2. This problem involves important considerations not only of supply but of policy. For this reason an interim reply is necessary in order to allow ample time for thorough consideration.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer the photostatic copy of memorandum in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Owens 6."

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The photostat of memorandum above referred to, marked "Exhibit Owens 6," is hereinafter included in the record.) ²⁶

Mr. WALTER. May I ask a question at this point, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. WOOD. Yes. Mr. Walter.

Mr. WALTER. During the course of your investigation, did you find that the Soviet Purchasing Agency had requested licenses for materials other than the materials you have discussed today?

Mr. OWENS. This does not deal, Congressman, with a request for licenses for export. This is a requisition for supplying it. The issuance of licenses would come after that.

Mr. WALTER. I understand. Did your investigation disclose that the Soviet Purchasing Agency requested that they be supplied with materials other than those materials that were refused?

Mr. OWENS. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. What were those materials?

Mr. OWENS. We have quite a long list. Did you say "and were refused"?

Mr. WALTER. Yes.

Mr. OWENS. We were supplied with a long list of chemicals they requested which were not refused. The uranium was refused.

Mr. TAVENNER. What action was taken regarding the information contained in the summary just read by you?

Mr. OWENS. On the 7th day of April 1944, Col. J. W. Boone, General Staff Corps, Acting Director, International Division, acting for the commanding general, addressed a memorandum to the Chief of Engineers, marked "Attention: Maj. Gen. L. R. Groves," which memorandum is as follows:

7 APRIL 1944.

Memorandum for the Chief of Engineers (attention: Maj. Gen. L. R. Groves).
Subject: Uranium requested by the U. S. S. R.

1. Inclosed is a copy of a letter received from the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission on the above subject, together with a copy of a reply prepared for the signature of the Secretary of War.

2. It is requested that information as to the supply of various forms of uranium and your recommendations as to the policy involved be submitted to this office not later than April 12, 1944, in order that materials involved can be made available.

Beneath this memorandum of request for information, there appears a memorandum for the record only. This memorandum for the record only reads as follows:

For record only:

1. A conference of representatives of this Division and of the Production Division with Major General Groves on April 7 revealed that General Groves wishes to handle this matter in its entirety from here on, since the material requested is involved in the Manhattan project. Information on supply could not be ob-

²⁶ See appendix.

tained from the Chemical Warfare Service of the War Production Board because all details are in the hands of the Chief of Engineers.

2. It is believed that if supply is available a careful study be made of the advisability of making a small allocation, instead of training down the request in toto, as was done last year. Since the material itself is apparently not secret, such a policy might better serve United States interests and might develop the possibility of collaboration or receipt of information which are now ruled out. This Division will seek to determine more about the intended use by the Soviets, which last year was indicated as "the preparation of ferro-uranium compounds which in turn will be used in the production of high quality steel for armaments."

Mr. WALTER. Does the memorandum disclose who were present at that conference?

Mr. OWENS. No. The memorandum is addressed to the Chief of Engineers, attention General Groves. It implies General Groves was there, and that is the only name positively identified as having been there.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer in evidence the memorandum just read, bearing date April 7, 1944, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Owens 7."

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The photostat of memorandum above referred to, marked "Exhibit Owens 7," is hereinafter included in the record.) ²⁷

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the final action taken by the Secretary of War, as far as the records disclose?

Mr. OWENS. On April 17, 1944, the Secretary of War addressed a letter to Lt. Gen. L. G. Rudenko, chairman of the Soviet Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States of America, which reads as follows:

The letter is on the stationery of the War Department, Washington, April 17, 1944, addressed to Lt. Gen. L. G. Rudenko:

DEAR GENERAL RUDENKO. I regret that we find ourselves unable to comply with the request contained in your letter of March 31 for certain uranium compounds.

We have made a careful review of the situation and this review indicates that our supply of this material is not sufficient for us to comply with your request.

I assure you that I will remember your need and will inform you of any change in the situation.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of War.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer that letter in evidence and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Owens 8."

Mr. WOOD. Let it be admitted.

(The photostat of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Owens 8," is hereinafter included in the record.) ²⁸

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. OWENS, in the course of your investigation of the shipments of uranium and heavy water to Russia during the war years, did you find that the United States Air Force had conducted an investigation in December of 1949, and January 1950, and made a report of its findings?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. Such a report of their investigation was made, and the committee has been given access to it.

Mr. TAVENNER. I propose, Mr. Chairman, at a later date during the hearings, to file this report as an exhibit, but for the present I would like to ask the witness several specific questions relating to the shipments of uranium and heavy water.

²⁷ See appendix.

²⁸ See appendix.

Mr. WOOD. As revealed by the report?

Mr. TAVENNER. As revealed by the report.

Mr. WOOD. Very well.

Mr. TAVENNER. What facts, Mr. Owens, were ascertained relating to the record of shipment of uranium from Denver, Colo., to Russia?

Mr. OWENS. I might state that this information is the result of an exhaustive search on the part of the Air Force of its available files in Kansas City, Mo., which are the so-called dead files. This search was made by them. In this search there was disclosed a report of Russian freight shipments for the year ending December 31, 1943, which reflects that there was attached to UN shipping ticket 1056, dated April 3, 1943, freight bill dated April 2, 1943, consigning four boxes of chemicals, weighing 691 pounds, to Col. A. N. Kotikov, resident representative of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States, Air Service Department of the Air Transport Command, Gore Field, Great Falls, Mont. The freight bill numbered 20110J was made out in the name of the Great Northern Railway Co., and indicated that the chemicals were waybilled from Denver, Colo., on March 23, 1943, and that the name of the shipper was Chematar, Inc., 40 Highland Place, New York City. Attached to the freight bill was a letter dated March 29, 1943, from Hermann Rosenberg of Chematar, Inc., addressed to Colonel Kotikov, enclosing the original railway bill of lading, covering 200 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 220 pounds of nitrouранyl shipped from Denver, Colo.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you read the letter written by Mr. Rosenberg just referred to by you?

Mr. OWENS. That is in the report, Mr. Tavenner.

Mr. WALTER. As I understand it, the letter of Mr. Rosenberg was attached to the documents that went to Great Falls?

Mr. OWENS. Attached to the freight bill.

Mr. WALTER. That letter disclosed what the contents of these boxes were?

Mr. OWENS. That is right.

Mr. WALTER. That letter went to the military at Great Falls?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. It was attached to the freight bill as a part of the shipment.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do the records disclose that the Russians received this shipment of uranium?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. A tally sheet bearing date April 5, 1943, was located, upon which is endorsed in Russian the letters "VS" acknowledging the receipt of several items, including four boxes of chemicals, bearing shipping ticket No. US-1056; total weight, 691 pounds. The signed receipt bore on the bottom the signature of Phillip Silver, first lieutenant, Air Corps, who has been identified as a supply officer, stationed at Ladd Field, Fairbanks, Alaska. Lieutenant Silver's signature appeared beneath the Russian initials.

Mr. WALTER. Did the invoices always disclose what the contents of these cases were?

Mr. OWENS. To my recollection this is the only case where a letter accompanied the shipment. I may be wrong, but that is my recollection.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the investigation disclose that records exist of a shipment of uranium originating at Port Hope, Ontario, and, if so, will you please give the pertinent facts relating thereto?

Mr. HARRISON. This is the shipment of 1,000 pounds that Mr. Rosenberg described yesterday as the Shattuck shipment?

Mr. TAVENNER. That is correct.

Mr. OWENS. An examination of the report of Russian air freight shipments for 1943 reflects that on June 10, 1943, 15 boxes of black uranium oxide and uranium nitrate, being shipping ticket No. UN-1369, were received at Great Falls, Mont., and dispatched on the same day. This was an in-transit shipment. The shipping ticket reflected an order No. 21-73/C43058, and the words "Rasnoimport, soli urano, U. S. S. R., trans. No. 66739." The words "soli urano" have been ascertained to mean uranium salts. The total weight of the shipment was 1,585 pounds. Airway bills 465685 and 465686 dated as received June 10, 1943, consisted of five boxes of uranium nitrate, weighing 500 pounds each. Airway bill 465687, dated as received June 10, 1943, consisted of four boxes of uranium oxide, weighing 468 pounds. Airway bill 465688, dated as received June 10, 1943, was for one box black uranium oxide, total weight, 117 pounds. All of the airway bills referred to contained reference to shipping ticket UN-1369, order No. 21-73/C43058. Attached to the above-described documents was a freight bill of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railway, No. 5223, which consigned to Col. A. N. Kotikov, resident representative of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, Air Service Depot of the Air Service Command, Gore Field, Great Falls, Mont., 5 cases of black uranium oxide, and 10 cases of uranium nitrate, for a total weight of 1,585 pounds, waybilled from 4558 Port Hope, Ontario, on May 21, 1943, by means of waybill 1864 and shipped from El Dorado Mines, Ltd., under arms export permit No. OF1666.

Mr. WALTER. So that each of these shipments was identified as containing uranium. There was no attempt to conceal the contents?

Mr. OWENS. The airway bills which accompanied them identified them as containing uranium nitrate and oxide; yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did your investigation disclose the existence of a record acknowledging receipt of this shipment by a Russian representative?

Mr. OWENS. The Air Force states that an examination of the retired files from Great Falls failed to reflect any signed receipts disclosing positive acknowledgement of these shipments by the Russians.

Mr. WALTER. All of these shipments were in 1943?

Mr. OWENS. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. None were in 1944?

Mr. OWENS. Only the two we have covered so far.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the investigation disclose that records exist of a shipment of heavy water to the Russians in 1943?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. An examination of Russian air freight shipments for 1943 reflects the existence of shipping ticket UN 3199, dated November 29, 1943, for one case of 1,000 grams of heavy water, weighing 41 pounds, marked for "Rasnoimport, U. S. S. R., Moscow, U-1, Ruybjshova-22, order No. 21-73/C43090, transportation 66771, heavy water, handle with care, Department of Commerce, No. 8398.98, case No. W-50-308."

Mr. WALTER. Did your investigation disclose the shipment of any large bottles of heavy water?

Mr. OWENS. No, sir.

Mr. WALTER. Did your investigation disclose the shipment of any large bottles of other substances?

Mr. OWENS. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. What were they?

Mr. OWENS. Carboys of sulfuric acid were shipped from Great Falls, Mont.

Mr. WALTER. Were they labeled "Sulphuric acid"?

Mr. OWENS. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you been able to determine yet the significance of the appearance of the Department of Commerce No. 8398.98 endorsement on the shipping instructions?

Mr. OWENS. No, sir. We have made several inquiries in Washington and have been unable to ascertain the meaning of the Department of Commerce number appearing on this shipment.

Mr. HARRISON. That was on the heavy water shipment?

Mr. OWENS. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question at this point about this shipment of 1,000 pounds of uranium that we were on a minute ago?

Mr. WOOD. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. Have you got any information from your investigation as to how the shippers, Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., were able to get an amendment of that shipping authorization, because as I understand, General Groves testified that he issued an order allowing them to purchase this, for the purpose of discovering whether or not they could find it in this country; then I understood from Mr. Rosenberg yesterday that that paper was amended so as to enable them to ship this 1,000 pounds out that they got from the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., and I would like to know if you know how that was done?

Mr. OWENS. Here is what we know on the issuance of the export license: We know it was turned down on April 14, 1943. We know another request was made and, as General Groves stated, they subsequently agreed to the issuance of the license to see if the material could be found in this country. That license was issued April 23, 1943, and delivered on April 26, 1943, to the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington. Mr. Fomichev called Mr. Rosenberg and told him he had the license, and Mr. Rosenberg advised him Shattuck had withdrawn the offer, and he had another supplier, but the license would have to be amended. On April 29, 1943, he got back the license, amended as to commodity and price.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who got it back?

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Fomichev. Mr. Rosenberg called Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp, and said that license 1643180 had been amended.

Mr. HARRISON. You don't know who amended it?

Mr. OWENS. We know it was amended by the Board of Economic Warfare.

Mr. HARRISON. You don't know what official or officials did it?

Mr. OWENS. No. The files of Lend-Lease and the Board of Economic Warfare have not been made available to us. We have made a request for them.

Mr. HARRISON. To whom did you make the request?

Mr. OWENS. To State Department to examine the files of the Protocol Committee, Lend-Lease, and State Department files.

Mr. HARRISON. For the purpose of getting this information?

Mr. OWENS. Yes; and we have had no reply affirming or denying the request.

Mr. WALTER. Who has custody of the Lend-Lease files?

Mr. OWENS. Lend-Lease was absorbed by the Foreign Economic Administration, and as we understand the State Department has the files.

Mr. HARRISON. To whom was your request directed?

Mr. OWENS. As I recall, to Mr. Peurifoy at the State Department in late December.

Mr. HARRISON. And you got no answer?

Mr. OWENS. No answer as yet.

Mr. HARRISON. Nobody expects a reply from the State Department in 3 weeks, but it looks like you should get one in 2 months.

Mr. WALTER. Is that the shipment General Groves said he felt should be made in order not to arouse suspicion?

Mr. OWENS. The 1,000 pounds?

Mr. WALTER. Yes.

Mr. OWENS. No, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Continue.

Mr. OWENS. The shipping ticket disclosed that the 1,000 grams of heavy water were consigned to Mr. Anisimov, in care of the commanding officer, Ladd Field, Fairbanks, Alaska. Airway bill No. 350,199 indicated shipment of the heavy water from Gore Field, Great Falls, Mont., to Mr. Anisimov. Attached to these documents was a Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States release certificate No. 366, approving for export to the U. S. S. R. on November 15, by William C. Moore, Division for Soviet Supply, Office of Lend-Lease Administration, 1,000 grams of heavy water, consigned by the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States, to Rasnoimport, U. S. S. R.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you examine the release certificate signed by Mr. W. C. Moore, and state what the certificate purports to be?

Mr. OWENS. That release certificate is in the report.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did your investigation disclose the existence of a record acknowledging receipt of this shipment of heavy water by a Russian representative?

Mr. OWENS. An examination to determine if the Russians had in fact received the heavy water disclosed a tally sheet dated December 13, 1943, receipting for various shipments, including one of heavy water, bearing shipping ticket No. UN-3199. The signature on this document was identified as being in Russian handwriting.

Mr. WALTER. Where did that come from?

Mr. OWENS. This tally sheet?

Mr. WALTER. Yes.

Mr. OWENS. From Ladd Field.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was an examination made to determine whether a record exists of the shipment of uranium, uranium metal, uranium ore, or heavy water, during the year 1944?

Mr. OWENS. Yes. Such an examination was made and no record of such a shipment was found by the Air Force.

Mr. TAVENNER. Does the report made by the Air Force indicate that an examination of shipments was made for the year 1945, or not?

Mr. OWENS. No, it does not, but I have been advised by the Air Force that their examination of these files was for the entire period of 1941 through 1945. That was a telephone message.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Rosenberg of Chematar, Inc., has testified that an additional shipment of 100 grams of heavy water was made to the Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union at Washington on the 14th day of February 1945. Has an investigation been made regarding the export to Russia of this shipment?

Mr. OWENS. The investigation is still being conducted. We have not traced that shipment of 100 grams of heavy water from the Soviet Purchasing Commission here in Washington.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you conducted an investigation relating to the sale to the Russian Purchasing Commission of 45 pounds of uranium in June 1944?

Mr. OWENS. Yes, sir. The Soviet Purchasing Commission on March 2, 1944, under requisition 8694, requested 63.53 long tons of various chemicals as specified in Form 1-A. Form 1-A lists the various chemicals they requested, and item 9 is 0.02 long tons of uranium nitrate. This is a straight lend-lease transaction.

Lend-Lease then asked the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department to contract to buy this uranium nitrate. The Treasury Department then sent out bids to various companies to bid on this uranium nitrate. Our information is that they sent notices to about a dozen companies. When the bids were received, the Treasury bought from the lowest bidder, being the Eastman Kodak Co. of Rochester, N. Y.

The Treasury Department inspected this uranium at the Eastman Kodak Co. in Rochester on July 19, 1944. It met with Government specifications, and left Rochester on July 19, 1944, via McDaniel's Trucking Co., bound for Terre Haute, Ind., and it arrived at the Army Ordnance Depot at Terre Haute on July 24, 1944.

It was shipped out from Terre Haute on July 27, 1944, in Erie freight car No. 97352. It was not the Erie line, but an Erie freight car by that number. It was bound for North Portland, Oreg., and arrived at North Portland, Oreg., on August 11, 1944. It was loaded aboard the steamship *Kashirstroi* on October 3, 1944, bound for Vladivostok.

Mr. TAVENNER. No further questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Walter?

Mr. WALTER. No questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Harrison?

Mr. HARRISON. No.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Velde?

Mr. VELDE. No.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Kearney?

Mr. KEARNEY. No questions.

Mr. WOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Owens.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like to call Colonel Crenshaw.

Mr. WOOD. Colonel Crenshaw, will you hold up your right hand, please. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give this com-

mittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I do.

TESTIMONY OF COL. THOMAS T. CRENSHAW

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your full name, please?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Thomas T. Crenshaw.

Mr. TAVENNER. Where do you live?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Watertown, N. Y.

Mr. TAVENNER. Where were you born and what is your age?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Unionville, Mo.; age 40.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you give the committee a brief résumé of your educational and employment background?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I am a graduate of Culver Military Academy, Princeton University, graduate study at New York University. I was employed at the time of my graduation from college as an architect. Various concurrent active tours of duty in the Army as a Reserve officer. Called to active duty in August 1940, continuing until April 1946. Employed thereafter as an architect.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you given the course of your employment up until the time you became connected with Manhattan Engineering District?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Beyond that point. That was included in that period.

Mr. TAVENNER. How long were you with the Manhattan Engineering District?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Approximately 2½ years.

Mr. WOOD. Between what dates?

Colonel CRENSHAW. From June or July 1942 until June 1944.

Mr. TAVENNER. Colonel Crenshaw, what position did you hold within the Manhattan Engineering District?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Initially I was area engineer at the University of California in the construction of a pilot plant, and in October of 1942 I came to New York to start the so-called Special Materials Section of the Manhattan District, which was in charge of the procurement and processing of uranium and allied special materials.

In June 1943 I was transferred to Oak Ridge as deputy district engineer, and continued at Oak Ridge until 1944 in various capacities, executive officer, and several other capacities.

Mr. TAVENNER. To what extent did you deal with questions arising in regard to the approval or consideration by Manhattan Engineering District of shipments of uranium?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I was in charge of that particular division and had full knowledge of virtually everything that went on, subject to Colonel Nichols' and General Groves' approval.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was Captain Merritt in your division?

Colonel CRENSHAW. He was.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was he a subordinate of yours?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you his immediate superior?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Burman was connected with your office also, was he not?

Colonel CRENSHAW. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are there any other persons who occupied a position where they would know of the transactions relating to uranium in your office?

Colonel CRENSHAW. There were a great many others who had knowledge of specific details regarding various transactions. The one next to myself who had authority was Lt. Col. John Ruhoff, and he succeeded me in charge of that section when I went to Oak Ridge.

Mr. TAVENNER. Which was in June 1943?

Colonel CRENSHAW. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know his present address?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Mallinkrodt Chemical Co., St. Louis, Mo.

Mr. TAVENNER. You are familiar with the transaction relating to the purchase of 420 pounds of uranium compounds from the Shattuck Co. and their shipment for export, are you not?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes; to the degree permitted by my memory over several years.

Mr. TAVENNER. After that shipment was consummated—and I will not ask you questions about that because it has been very fully covered by other witnesses—but after that time the question came up again regarding another proposed export license, did it not?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes, it did.

Mr. TAVENNER. The State Department has furnished the committee copies of letters from the files of Lend-Lease, and I have here a letter dated April 17, 1943, signed by Thomas T. Crenshaw, directed to Lend-Lease Administration, attention Mr. James Hoopes. Will you look at that letter for the purpose of refreshing your recollection?

Mr. HARRISON. What date is that?

Mr. TAVENNER. April 17, 1943. I will read the letter into the record and ask several questions about it.

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes, I remember that.

Mr. TAVENNER. You recall having written that letter?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I do.

Mr. TAVENNER (reading):

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
MANHATTAN DISTRICT,
New York, N. Y., April 17, 1943.

LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION,
Washington, D. C.

(Attention Mr. James Hoopes.)

GENTLEMEN: This office has been referred to you as being familiar with the status of requests from the Russian Government for uranium compounds and metal. It is understood that you will act for Mr. Moore during his absence.

Copy of letter from the War Production Board, regarding available supplies of ferro-uranium, is enclosed. We had previously advised the War Production Board that we would not be interested in obtaining this material and therefore would suggest that you contact Mr. Punderson directly in order to make sure that the material is still available. In addition to the quantities indicated here, this office is cognizant of another small lot of ferro-uranium totaling approximately 65 pounds.

If the Russian Purchasing Commission is interested in this material from the standpoint of experimental work on alloys as they have previously stated, the ferro-uranium should serve their purpose as well or better than uranium salts. It is suggested that it might be advisable to attempt to secure a commitment from them as to any particular specifications which must be met if they decide to accept ferro-uranium; it would be preferable to obtain this information before making the enclosed analysis available to them.

It is requested that we be kept advised as to the progress of the negotiations regarding this material. If they refuse to accept the ferro-uranium, kindly notify us, as we have one alternate proposition which might perhaps be offered as a solution to the present difficulty.

For the district engineer:

Very truly yours,

(Signed) THOMAS T. CRENSHAW,
Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant.

MR. TAVENNER. Was that letter written during the period that the discussion was going on regarding the advisability of approving the issuance of an export license for the shipment of uranium?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I think it was just prior to discussion of actually issuing an export license. As I recall we considered issuing the license only as a last resort.

MR. TAVENNER. What was the purpose in offering ferro-uranium to the Russians instead of uranium salts?

Colonel CRENSHAW. If they wanted to do metallurgical research, as they said, that should have been just the thing for them.

MR. TAVENNER. Was the purpose of your making this suggestion to escape the decision of your exporting uranium by inducing them to take a substitute?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

MR. TAVENNER. You spoke in the last paragraph of there being an alternate solution in the event the substitutes were not accepted. What was that alternate solution?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I don't know what that might have been, unless it was the issuance of an export license.

MR. HARRISON. Or you may have wanted to know if they would be satisfied with the ferro-uranium?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes. We didn't think they would be, however.

MR. WALTER. What is ferro-uranium used for?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Ferro-uranium is a uranium-bearing steel. Uranium is used in steel hardening and is used in ordnance.

MR. WOOD. Armor plate?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

MR. WOODS. Guns?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

MR. TAVENNER. Did you learn subsequently whether the Russians were interested in material of this character?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes. We were advised they did not want it.

MR. TAVENNER. I show you a letter from Mr. Hoopes in reply to yours of the 17th. This letter is dated April 23, 1943. Do you recognize that letter as having been received?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes, I do.

MR. TAVENNER. I will read this letter in evidence. (Reading:)

APRIL 23, 1943.

Lt. Col. THOMAS T. CRENSHAW,
War Department, United States Engineer Office,
New York, N. Y.

DEAR COLONEL CRENSHAW: I wish to thank you for your letter of April 17, enclosing copy of a February 9 letter from Mr. Punderson of the War Production Board, of Cleveland, on items of ferro-uranium in stock with the Latrobe Electric Steel Co.

Since the receipt of your letter, however, I understand that General Groves has advised General Wesson that the particular request for 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate can be approved. The

Soviet Commission is being advised accordingly. In addition, it has been agreed that an application for 25 pounds of uranium metal will be entertained if submitted.

I assume that General Groves will post you on any details regarding his decision.

If there are further inquiries from the Soviets on these or related materials, we will let you know.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) JAMES P. HOOPES.
*Associate Liaison Officer,
Division for Soviet Supply.*

Mr. TAVENNER. That letter is from Lend-Lease Administration. That indicates a decision had been reached between the date of your letter of April 17 and April 23 to approve an export license. Will you tell the committee all you know about the approval of the export license and the reasons for that action, if you know?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I testified in 1948 that to the best of my recollection a second shipment to the Soviets had been approved. At that time I stated that I believed the reason was that we didn't want to continue to arouse their curiosity regarding a product that had been previously commercially available, and therefore decided to let them have the second quantity.

Since the time of that testimony I have been able to refresh my memory a bit and to talk to several of the other people involved, and I would like to enter a second possibility for that decision, and that is the possibility that we intended to issue the license and then perhaps prevent them from actually getting the material. Which of those possibilities it was at the time, I can't recall.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you recall whether steps were taken after the first shipment to block further shipments from suppliers?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes. We knew that the Soviet Purchasing Commission had contacted the Shattuck Chemical Co., in Denver, regarding procuring a second quantity in addition to the first 420 pounds.

Mr. WALTER. How did you know that?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Through our Intelligence Service, which kept us posted on all requests; and also through arrangements we had with the War Production Board or the Board of Economic Warfare, which turned over to us any requests that came in for uranium, and we were able to block most transactions in that way. The only way we could block them was under the controls set up in January 1943 prohibiting the use of uranium compounds in the ceramics industry. Other than that, we were powerless to take action.

I believe one of our men went to Denver and talked to officials of the Shattuck Co. and asked them not to make the second shipment to the Soviets.

Mr. WALTER. The Shattuck Co. informed officials of our Government that the request had been made to them?

Colonel CRENSHAW. That is quite possible. I don't recall. Shattuck at first, I believe, said they were obligated to make the shipment, that they had accepted the purchase order. I believe we stalled that off for quite a while, with their cooperation, and finally the matter dragged out so long that Shattuck finally agreed not to fill the order. In the meantime, I understand the Soviet Purchasing Commission had become impatient and had gone to another source.

Mr. TAVENNER. At the time the agreement was reached to issue the license, or to approve the license, was it known or suspected that any other source had been found by the Russians?

Colonel CRENSHAW. There were many possible sources throughout the country, a great many firms. The ceramic and other industries had small quantities, and some had large quantities. We were attempting to secure complete listings of those stocks, but it took some time to trace down all those small stocks that existed over the entire country.

Mr. TAVENNER. The evidence introduced here shows that Mr. Rosenberg, of Chematar, Inc., received a letter dated April 22, 1943, canceling the order by Shattuck. The license that was issued is dated April 23. Can you tell us anything to enlighten the committee on any negotiations that were made on or about that date between your office and Lend-Lease or any other agencies?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No, I am afraid I can't clarify that point.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you learn that Shattuck Co. had actually refused to make the shipment and had so notified the broker or agent?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I don't know that we were ever actually advised that they had notified the agent. We were advised that they had decided not to fill the order.

Mr. HARRISON. And thereafter you issued a shipping permit?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No. I think the shipping permit was dated prior to that date.

Mr. HARRISON. I understood you to say the shipping point was dated January 23, Mr. Tavenner, and Shattuck said they would not ship it on the 22d, so the paper issued to them was a worthless piece of paper. Is that correct?

Mr. TAVENNER. I think we will show the action taken was on the 22d, though the paper was dated the 23d.

Mr. HARRISON. But it was a worthless piece of paper when issued?

Mr. TAVENNER. I am not too certain. The time element is too close to be certain. There is a possibility of its being too close.

Colonel CRENSHAW. I have a vague recollection—and this is entirely recollection—to my belief we had about decided to let Shattuck ship the material before they advised us they would comply with our wishes and not ship it.

Mr. WALTER. Why did you decide to let Shattuck ship it?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Again to allay Russian suspicions as to the sudden disappearance of all this material from the market. Previously it had been a commercial product, and if all the sources of supply suddenly dry up, somebody is going to wonder why they dried up.

(Representative Kearney leaves hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the purpose of trying to block the shipments if you were going to turn around and let them go through?

Colonel CRENSHAW. We were using delaying tactics in the hope that sooner or later they would let the whole matter drop, but they did not; they continually kept trying to get the supplies, and we could not stop Shattuck legally from making the sale. The only thing we could do was to prevail on Lend-Lease to refuse to issue an export license.

Mr. WOOD. In that connection, you stated awhile ago that prior to that time they had been offered this ferro-uranium and that they advised you they did not want it. Did that indicate to you that they

had some purpose other than armaments that they wanted this material for?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes. It indicated three possibilities to me. They were asking for uranium oxide and uranium nitrate. The reasons they gave were for research in armaments and research in medicine, which the nitrate would have been used for. They might have wanted the material for either of those purposes; they might have suspected we were doing something in atomic research and might have wanted to know how much we had on hand; and there was a fourth possibility that they were actually getting into atomic research themselves.

Mr. WOOD. But they had asked for material indicating they wanted it only for armament purposes?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I think they indicated medicine in addition to armaments.

Mr. WALTER. At that time it was pretty generally known throughout the world that uranium could be used to make an atomic bomb?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes; it was.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like for you to state more clearly what you know about the reasons which were the basis for the issuance of the license on April 23. Can you recall discussions that you had with any officials of MED, including General Groves, that would throw any light on that decision?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No; I cannot. I did not have an opportunity to discuss it with General Groves at the time. He was in Washington, and the information was furnished him there, and he made the decision there, and I am sure his testimony on this matter would be clearer than that of anybody else and would furnish the actual reason behind the issuance of that license, and it would be better than the series of guesses I might make on the subject.

Mr. WOOD. Did you approve in your official capacity the issuance of that license yourself?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I don't recall whether I did or not. It was not necessary for me to approve the issuance of those licenses, provided General Groves' office in Washington concurred. Many of these transactions were handled by Maj. Allen Johnson.

Mr. WOOD. Wouldn't it have been irregular for the license to have been issued and approved without consulting with you?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Not necessarily. I would have been advised after the fact, however.

Mr. WALTER. As I understand it, your purpose in resorting to these delaying tactics, as you put it, was solely to prevent the Russians from knowing that we were engaged in an atomic bomb project with the use of materials everybody knew could be used for that purpose?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes; and there was a secondary reason which did not apply at that time. If the Russians were actually engaged in atomic research, it might do no harm to give them small quantities of material that was imperfect.

Mr. WALTER. So that for the purpose of preventing them from knowing what the United States was doing, it was to the best interest to make shipments to them from time to time, was it not?

Colonel CRENSHAW. It might well have been.

Mr. VELDE. Did I understand you to say it was generally known throughout the world that uranium could be used to make the atomic bomb?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes; by all competent scientists.

Mr. VELDE. You don't refer to the average citizen?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I don't think it was known to the average citizen, although there had been many tabloid stories in 1940. I would say people generally engaged in scientific work would know, not necessarily physicists.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was General Groves' attitude, so far as you knew it, in regard to permitting the exporting of uranium to Russia?

Colonel CRENSHAW. General Groves' underlying philosophy was that the last thing in the world he wanted to do was to help the Russians in any way.

Mr. WALTER. Was he of that opinion, and did he take that attitude, during the period when they were doing most of the fighting?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Frankly, yes; I think he did. The Russians were our allies, and as to normal raw materials it was the policy to give them all assistance we could, but I think General Groves felt our work on atomic research did not fall in that category and we were not obligated to help them along that line.

Mr. WOOD. Do you share that philosophy?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes, possibly to a stronger degree than General Groves and Colonel Nichols did.

Mr. TAVENNER. I don't want to ask you to speculate on what happened at that time, but do you know of any fact that would indicate that a decision had been reached to let Shattuck ship this second shipment? If so, we would like to know it.

Colonel CRENSHAW. That is pure guessing on my part. I am not even certain that it can be verified in the records.

Mr. TAVENNER. If it could be verified it could be proven as a fact.

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. But do you recall any fact, whether in the record or not, which would throw light one way or another on that point?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No. We discussed it many times, usually informally, as to the Russian situation. The ideas changed from time to time. For example, when the first shipment was authorized there was no question in my mind what the purpose was. We felt it was better to let them have that small quantity than raise a hue and cry.

Mr. WOOD. You say there was no question in your mind what they wanted it for?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes, sir. They may have wanted it for any of the four reasons I have stated or some other reason. I don't know what their reason was.

Mr. TAVENNER. You knew by the letter of April 23 that the license had been granted?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was any action taken from that time on to see whether or not the Russians were going to procure the uranium under that license?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Tell us about that.

Colonel CRENSHAW. My first indication that the Russians had succeeded in obtaining a second quantity was, I believe, a question from Colonel Nichols as to whether I knew anything about procurement of a second quantity from any one whatsoever, and I told him that I did not. He said that he had received an indication, of which he had no proof or other detailed knowledge, that the Russians had succeeded in having the second order filled. We didn't know the quantities, and I don't believe we were even sure where they had gotten it. It was more of a rumor than fact at that time.

Colonel Ruhoff and myself did have a talk with Mr. Pregel of the Canadian Radium and Uranium Corp., and the results of that conversation are, again, purely from long-distance memory and pretty much guesswork. As I recall it, we said to Mr. Pregel: "Have you or have you not filled any orders for the Russians?" I believe he replied that he had.

Mr. WOOD. On that point, Colonel, I grant it has been a long while, but that was a pretty important question, was it not?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Can you be positive that such a conversation as that did take place and that you were informed it had been done?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I can be positive the conversation took place. As to exactly what transpired in that conversation, I cannot be positive, but I think it can be found in the records.

Mr. WOOD. Did you obtain from that conversation the information that the order had been filled?

Colonel CRENSHAW. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did that conversation take place?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I believe May or June 1943. It was just at the time I was getting ready to go to Oak Ridge and was turning my job over to Colonel Ruhoff.

Mr. TAVENNER. According to your best recollection at this time that conversation took place and you gained information that a shipment had been made?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I believe we gained the information that a shipment had been made.

Mr. TAVENNER. How long before that conference was it that Colonel Nichols asked you if you knew of any source of supply?

Colonel CRENSHAW. As soon as he asked about it we immediately got in touch with Mr. Pregel, and he came down to our office on Twenty-seventh Street and we went over the whole matter with him.

Mr. WOOD. For the purpose of the record, which Pregel was that?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Boris.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who were present in that conference besides yourself?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Major Ruhoff and Mr. Pregel.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is Mr. Boris Pregel?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. What do you consider is the value to the Russians of 500 pounds of uranium nitrate and 500 pounds of uranium oxide?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I would say the value would be very, very slight, if any. It might have been useful for experimental purposes; that is about all.

Mr. TAVENNER. Wouldn't experimental purposes have to be the start of an atomic enterprise?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes; that is correct; but they could have obtained that from other sources. Going to sources all over the world and getting 500 pounds here and there, conceivably they may have obtained a stock pile, but that is doubtful.

Mr. TAVENNER. But it would have been of value for experimental purposes?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. Where else was this material available?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I understand that the Russians have rather extensive deposits themselves. I don't know to what extent those deposits have been developed. There are deposits in Tibet and Madagascar and South America; and there were extensive deposits in Czechoslovakia, which were in the hands of the Germans at that time; and there was a large stock pile in Antwerp which was in German hands at that time and not available to the Russians.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you or any person on the staff of the Manhattan Engineering District know that Mr. Pregel was going to fill that order before it was filled and shipped?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. The evidence is that some left the country on May—I do not have the exact date before me—but was any effort made to stop the shipment?

Colonel CRENSHAW. The shipment had already gone, as I recall it, by the time we even knew about it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Had there been any discussion, to your knowledge, with Mr. Pregel, prior to the filling of that order by him, relating to the filling of an order for any government other than the United States or Canada?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes; there had been. I specifically remember a discussion of sales to the British Government, and I believe that discussion was prior to this shipment. I can't be positive of that without the records, but that, again, would be in the records. In addition, we didn't feel that it was particularly necessary to discuss the matter, because we had been offered voluntarily on the part of Mr. Pregel all stocks of uranium and nitrate that they had in the Eldorado mines or elsewhere.

Mr. WOOD. Prior to that shipment?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Prior to that shipment; yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. When was that agreement reached?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I can't be positive of that. It might have been as early as January or February 1943.

Mr. WOOD. Was that commitment in writing or oral?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I think it was in writing.

Mr. TAVENNER. You think it was in writing?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. As early as January or February?

Colonel CRENSHAW. It could have been any time between January and April.

Mr. WOOD. At the time you had your conversation with Mr. Pregel which you have detailed, in the presence of the officer next in command to you, did you have at that time the written commitment from Mr. Pregel giving the Manhattan District first option to any material on hand or that it might acquire?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I believe it was in our files; yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you referring to an agreement of March 27 between Manhattan District and Canadian Radium and Uranium Corp., which specified certain materials should be delivered, and giving the code numbers in the agreement?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No. I am referring to an earlier informal agreement that was later expressed by that contract or by a contract of a later date.

Mr. TAVENNER. And that earlier understanding was reduced to a written agreement?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I think it was. I think Mr. Pregel wrote us a letter offering the stock and I believe stating a time limit on it.

Mr. WOOD. Categorically, can you state that there was such an agreement and understanding with Mr. Pregel that you should have the first option to purchase uranium material?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes; I can.

Mr. TAVENNER. Regarding the contract of March 27, do you have any independent recollection of when it was actually executed and delivered?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No; I do not. It probably would have been negotiated at a considerably earlier date than the actual date of the contract, because those contracts were very complicated and normally they took a long period of time to negotiate.

Mr. TAVENNER. In the earlier part of your testimony you referred to the fact that after this first shipment arrangements were made with other agencies to notify you of interests shown by other governments in uranium?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Tell us about that, what arrangements were made and with whom.

Colonel CRENSHAW. I think we had arranged with both the Board of Economic Warfare and the War Production Board to advise us of any interest in uranium compounds or uranium metal.

Mr. TAVENNER. By the Soviet Purchasing Agency?

Colonel CRENSHAW. By anyone.

Mr. TAVENNER. By anyone?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. With whom were those arrangements made?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I cannot answer that question. Mr. Burman handled those transactions and I believe his memory or his records would be rather complete on that subject.

Mr. TAVENNER. When the time came to consider the advisability of the approval of the second license, with whom did you deal in Lend-Lease? Who conferred with you from Lend-Lease, by telephone or personally or by letter?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Mr. Hoopes, and I think Mr. Moore.

Mr. TAVENNER. Any other persons?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Those were the only two at that time.

Mr. TAVENNER. The Board of Economic Warfare was the issuing agency. Did you have a conference with anyone from the Bureau of Economic Warfare regarding this license?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I did not personally, so far as I can recollect. Lieutenant Burman handled all the details of those transactions.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you at any time confer with anyone from the Board of Economic Warfare, or did any other person in your organization, to your knowledge, with regard to this particular license?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I am sure that Mr. Burman must have conferred with them. It may or may not have been after the license was issued. I know that Maj. Allen Johnson in General Groves' office would have been the logical one to handle that particular transaction.

Mr. WOOD. This is the second quorum call. The committee will have to stand in adjournment until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The hearing was resumed at 2:30 p. m.)

Mr. WOOD. The committee will be in order.

TESTIMONY OF COL. THOMAS T. CRENSHAW—Resumed

Mr. TAVENNER. I was asking you at the close of the morning session about the names of officials of the Bureau of Economic Warfare who conferred with you or other members of your staff relating to the second export license. Can you recall the names of any?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Mr. Hoopes and Mr. Moore.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Hoopes and Mr. Moore were in Lend-Lease. My question related to the Bureau of Economic Warfare.

Colonel CRENSHAW. I do not recall having any direct connection with anyone in BEW. That was all handled through Burman, and I probably talked to various individuals in the Board of Economic Warfare at some time, but I do not recall their names.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did persons in that organization, regardless of what their names may be, confer with you regarding the issuance of this particular license?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Not to my recollection; not directly with me, but they did with my particular group in Manhattan District.

Mr. TAVENNER. What members of your group?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Lieutenant Burman, I am quite sure.

Mr. TAVENNER. Any other persons whose names you can give?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Possibly Captain Merritt.

Mr. TAVENNER. Any others?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I think that would be all; and General Groves.

Mr. TAVENNER. And General Groves?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have any knowledge of the purpose of their interviews and what took place?

Colonel CRENSHAW. There were general discussions regarding the issuance of the license, and it would have been in regard to that. Specifically, I don't have any knowledge of what transpired.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know what attitude or position the officials of the Bureau of Economic Warfare took with regard to the question of whether this license should be issued or not?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Not directly, but during the recess I was searching my memory a bit, and something occurred to my mind that has a bearing on this question, as well as the question you asked earlier as to the motive for issuing the license for the second shipment. I believe that somewhere in the files of the district there will be found a memo-

random with my signature which indicated that General Groves had decided to issue the export license because of pressure that was being brought to bear. That word "pressure" may have been my own word or it may have been General Groves' word. I don't know the implication of it. But I am sure there is such a memorandum.

Mr. WOOD. Did you say that in your memorandum?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes, sir. I believe that will be found in the files. I can't be positive about that.

Mr. KEARNEY. Pressure from whom?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I don't recall. It might have been from Lend-Lease; it might have been the pressure from the Russians themselves that they were exerting on all possible agencies.

Mr. TAVENNER. A matter of that importance, don't you think you could tell us something about the character of the pressure?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No, sir. I don't recall, and I don't know whether the word "pressure" was my own word or whether it occurred in a conversation with General Groves. I didn't talk to him face to face, but did have telephone conversations with him.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was there an indication of where pressure came from, if it existed?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No, sir. I can't clarify it further than that.

Mr. WOOD. You state as a fact that the term "pressure" was used in some connection?

Colonel CRENSHAW. That is my recollection, and I believe such a memorandum could be found.

Mr. TAVENNER. The staff of the committee has been informed that there was a telephone conversation between Captain Merritt of your office and Mr. Hoopes of Lend-Lease, which conversation Captain Merritt could not recall, in which Captain Merritt is alleged to have stated that pressure had just been brought upon General Groves to change his mind with regard to the approval of the license. Does that refresh your recollection in any way?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No; except to the extent that it might be tied in with the other memorandum which I just mentioned.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, the two things may be the same?

Colonel CRENSHAW. It is quite possible, yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you recall discussing the subject of pressure with any member of the staff?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I have no specific recollection of it except that that term does linger in my mind.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did General Groves ever tell you that pressure had been applied or exercised?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I cannot specifically remember. It is quite possible that he used the term himself.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did Captain Merritt or Lieutenant Burman ever refer to pressure being exercised in connection with their discussion of the matter?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No. I have no recollection of that, and I don't believe pressure would have been placed on them, anyway. It would come at the top.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you recall whether or not the pressure you are speaking of came from within some Government agency, or without?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. You mean you have no recollection?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I have no recollection.

Mr. TAVENNER. As you look back upon that occasion now, are you aware of anything that you would now call pressure having been brought to bear upon you by any member of Lend-Lease Administration, directly or indirectly?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No. I don't think pressure would be a proper term to use. Lend-Lease was anxious to cooperate with the Russians. They were our allies. I think that was policy. Naturally, Lend-Lease was doing everything possible to get material for our allies. But I don't know of any instance when anybody attempted to exercise undue pressure on me.

(Representative McSweeney enters the hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Or on any member of your staff?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Or on any member of my staff.

Mr. TAVENNER. Does that apply to BEW?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes; the same there.

Mr. TAVENNER. And what about the War Production Board?

Colonel CRENSHAW. The same.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you learn during the course of your employment that the export license which had been issued for the 500 pounds of uranium nitrate and 500 pounds of uranium oxide on April 23, 1943, was amended on April 29, 1943?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I don't recall.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was the question of amendment of the license ever brought to your attention by an official of the Board of Economic Warfare, which was the licensing agency, or the Lend-Lease Administration?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I don't remember that. If an amendment was made it probably would have been brought to my attention, directly or indirectly, however.

Mr. TAVENNER. At the time when you were concerned with the source of all material of this character in the United States, and when you were actively engaged in protecting it, was the question of amendment, which would indicate a new source of supply had been located, a very important matter to your group?

Colonel CRENSHAW. It would not necessarily have been, in that there could have been many reasons for amendment. As I recall the practice on export licensing, it seems to me an amendment was required even if it was a price change, so it might or might not have been important.

Mr. TAVENNER. But if on the 22d of April you had succeeded in stopping or barricading compliance by Shattuck, then the amendment at a later date for any reason would show a reactivation of interest in that license, wouldn't it?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes. Well, not necessarily, because it may have been the intent to allow that license to stand as a blanket license, giving the Russians what we might term a fishing license to get the material if they could, therefore we were cooperating with them.

Mr. TAVENNER. When that license was prepared in the terms of the original contract with Shattuck Co., that was true, but when a few days later they changed its terms, wouldn't that indicate they had found a new source of supply, otherwise there would be no reason for a change?

Colonel CRENSHAW. In the licensing procedure I assume that the exact quantity must be shown before the license could be issued. I don't remember that point.

Mr. TAVENNER. It showed the description of the material and the price and the supplier.

Colonel CRENSHAW. Well, then, presumably that should have been an indication that something was going on.

Mr. TAVENNER. Would an amendment be made to an export license without conferring again with the Manhattan Engineering District where the original license had been approved?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Not unless someone in the Board of Economic Warfare did a lot of assuming.

Mr. TAVENNER. What do you mean?

Colonel CRENSHAW. That is, unless they had assumed, because we once had authorized the license to be issued, we wanted it to stand in the case of changes. That seems unlikely.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the Board of Economic Warfare know of the general opposition of the Manhattan District to the sale of uranium for export?

Colonel CRENSHAW. They must have inferred that from the difficulty in getting export licenses for the material. I don't think we ever stated to them specifically that we did not want to ship it to the Russians. I think that would have been an unwise statement to have made at the time to another Government agency.

Mr. TAVENNER. As far as you know, there was no reference of the matter back to the Manhattan Engineering District on the question of amendment of the license?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Not to my recollection.

(Representative Velde leaves the hearing room.)

Mr. WOOD. If the fact that this particular export license was amended so as to include a different source of supply had come to your attention before the shipment was made and the deal closed, what would have been your attitude about it?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I think we immediately would have tried to find out what this other source was, and immediately taken steps to block that also.

Mr. WOOD. To block it?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I think we would have; yes.

Mr. WOOD. That had been your policy before?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. And wouldn't it particularly have been your policy if you found that supplier was under contract to you to give the Government first option on all material it was within its power to control?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes. I think the answer to that is "Yes," although it needs some amplification.

Mr. WOOD. Let's see if it does. You say the source of supply that finally furnished this material under an amended license was under an agreement to you prior to the date of shipment. If it had come to your attention that this source of supply was seeking to sell this material that was under option to you to the Russians or any other country on which there was a ban, would you have taken any action?

Colonel CRENSHAW. We would have attempted to do so, but I don't know that we could have done so legally, even under the terms of the

contract. There are several ramifications on that which I can explain, if you wish.

Mr. WOOD. My purpose in asking the question was to find out what your attitude would have been.

Colonel CRENSHAW. We would have attempted to block it. I am sure of that.

Mr. TAVENNER. Assuming Chematar was the supplier through which both Shattuck Co. and the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. furnished the material, do you know whether or not the license would have been in the name of the agent rather than in the name of the actual supplier? Do you know what the practice was?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. You don't know if it was the practice to have the license in the name of the agent rather than the supplier?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I don't recall that.

(Representative Kearney leaves the hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you familiar with the handling of heavy-water transactions?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No. That was outside my department entirely.

Mr. TAVENNER. Whose department was that in?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Colonel Nichols himself handled most of that directly.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether any requests were submitted to the Manhattan Engineering project with regard to the approval of sales of heavy water?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I have no knowledge of any request.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was heavy water considered at that time a strategic material, that is, during 1943, 1944, and 1945, by Manhattan Engineering District?

Colonel CRENSHAW. It was by Manhattan District.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know if the other Government agencies knew of that appraisal that Manhattan Engineering District placed on the material?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I very much doubt it.

Mr. TAVENNER. If that information was solely the information of Manhattan Engineering District, what safeguard could be placed upon the sale for export of heavy water by the action of other Government agencies, if no agency but your own knew about the importance of it?

Colonel CRENSHAW. It would have been possible to do the same thing we did with uranium, that is, to require approval of export licenses, but that would have called attention to heavy water.

Mr. TAVENNER. All materials the Russians asked for were not submitted to you to see whether you were interested in them, were they?

Colonel CRENSHAW. No. But had we gone to BEW and requested them to advise us of any requests for licenses for heavy water, that would have been an indication we were interested in heavy water.

Mr. TAVENNER. Does that mean that the matter was of such a secret character that you would not even want to inform the responsible heads of other Government agencies of the importance of the material?

Colonel CRENSHAW. That is correct, unless it was considered very important to control it. There, again, heavy water was being produced commercially, but it was almost a laboratory curiosity.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know how it occurred that the matter of uranium was first taken up with the Manhattan Engineering District at the time the export license for the first shipment had been issued? Was it the result of initiative on the part of the Manhattan Engineering District, or on the part of some other Government agency?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I don't recall how that matter came to our attention. I think we got a routine list of all requests for uranium compounds.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the character of that list? I haven't heard of it before.

Colonel CRENSHAW. Periodically—I don't remember how often—it is my recollection that either the Board of Economic Warfare or Lend-Lease or both submitted to us a list of all requests for uranium compounds. In addition, after the controls were put on the use of uranium in the ceramics industry, we got a list showing all uranium transactions in the ceramics industry, which had to be approved by BEW, I believe, and indirectly by us.

Mr. TAVENNER. We have located one list furnished by Lend-Lease in July 1943, or it may have been 1944, of transactions which had previously occurred with regard to uranium, but was any list furnished at an earlier date than that?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes, sir; I am sure that it was.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did that list relate solely to the uranium compounds, or did it relate to chemicals generally?

Colonel CRENSHAW. To the best of my recollection it related to uranium compounds only.

Mr. TAVENNER. When was a report of that character first submitted?

Colonel CRENSHAW. It must have been certainly as early as March 1943, and undoubtedly prior to that time.

Mr. TAVENNER. At whose instance was that report filed and prepared?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I think that was an arrangement which Mr. Burman was able to negotiate with Lend-Lease and/or BEW.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then from the time that request was made, those organizations would have known of the importance of that material?

Colonel CRENSHAW. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have no further questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Case.

Mr. CASE. In all, how many requests for uranium compounds from the Soviet Purchasing Commission came to the attention of the Chemical Warfare Service?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I can't answer that question.

Mr. CASE. How many came to your attention?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I recall only one. There may have been others.

Mr. CASE. That one was for how much and what?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I believe the exact quantities were covered in a letter which you showed me earlier, Mr. Tavenner. I don't recall the exact quantities.

Mr. CASE. Were you aware of a request for uranium materials in the summer of 1943?

Colonel CRENSHAW. If it was prior to the 1st of July, I was no longer in that particular department of the district.

Mr. CASE. Prior to July 1, 1943?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes.

Mr. CASE. Did you either hear or know of a renewal of that request in 1944?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I think I have heard of it indirectly, but not in an official capacity.

Mr. CASE. When did you hear of it?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I couldn't answer that, sir. It must have been during my service with Manhattan District. It could even have been after that time.

Mr. CASE. Did any request for uranium compounds from any company or any purchasing commission other than that of the Soviet Union come to your attention when you were connected with the Chemical Warfare Service?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I was not connected with the Chemical Warfare Service, sir.

Mr. CASE. Well, in your capacity?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Will you repeat that question?

Mr. CASE. Did any request for uranium compounds from any purchasing commission other than that of the Soviet Union come to your attention while you were engaged in this work?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I don't recall any that came to the attention of the Manhattan District. The British, of course, were interested in this material, and while we had no control, all the shipments to Great Britain were taken up with us informally.

Mr. CASE. Shipments of uranium to Great Britain?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Yes. May I modify that "shipments" to "shipment." I know of only one.

Mr. CASE. Which one was that?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I believe it was made in the spring of 1943.

Mr. CASE. Do you know how much and what it was?

Colonel CRENSHAW. Approximately 15 tons of uranium oxide.

Mr. TAVENNER. What about sales to the French Government?

Colonel CRENSHAW. I know of none, sir. France was occupied at that time, and we normally would have had no transactions with them.

Mr. WOOD. In view of the continued persistence of the quorum bells, I will adjourn the committee until 10 o'clock in the morning.

(Thereupon, at 3 p. m. on Wednesday, January 25, 1950, an adjournment was taken until Thursday, January 26, 1950, at 10 a. m.)

HEARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II

THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1950

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:30 a. m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood (chairman), Francis E. Walter, Morgan M. Moulder, Richard M. Nixon, Francis Case, Harold H. Velde, and Bernard W. Kearney.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Donald T. Appell and Courtney Owens, investigators; John W. Carrington, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.

If there are any Members of Congress present in the audience, they are invited to come up and sit with the committee.

Mr. Counsel, are you ready to proceed?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, soon after the appearance of Gen. Leslie R. Groves before this committee on December 7, 1949, Mr. Henry A. Wallace expressed a desire to appear before this committee. The committee, at its first meeting after that, unanimously agreed to his appearance, and Mr. Wallace is now here as a volunteer witness. May he be called at this time?

Mr. Wood. Without objection on the part of the committee, yes.

Mr. Wallace, it is noted that there are several photographers here from the press. It is a rule of this committee that a witness brought before it shall not be photographed without his permission. Do you object to having your picture made by the photographers?

Mr. WALLACE. No; I have no objection, although I would prefer if they get them out of the way soon, because if they continue to wait for some abnormal posture, they create some confusion. If we could just get it out of the way now I would appreciate it. If they want me to make certain kinds of gestures, I don't mind.

(Photographs were taken.)

Mr. WALLACE. Mr. Chairman, I understand that the stenographer is going to make a special effort to get the transcript of questions and answers ready as soon as possible, and would it be all right to circulate it among the press that they can, at a certain place, get the transcript of questions and answers?

Mr. TAVENNER. I am certain those arrangements can be made with the reporter. She is very accommodating about matters of that kind.

Mr. WALLACE. Certain members of the press approached me as to whether I would be so kind to provide that service myself, and I said I would in case the committee was not in position to do so.

Mr. WOOD. We must have order in the committee room, ladies and gentlemen, at all times.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest for the sake of orderly procedure that the witness be sworn and I be permitted to make certain inquiries relating to the subject under investigation, after which the witness be given an opportunity to explain any matter relevant to the investigation which is not covered by my examination.

Mr. WOOD. If you will stand, Mr. Wallace, and be sworn, please, sir. Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give this committee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. WALLACE. I do so solemnly swear.

TESTIMONY OF HENRY A. WALLACE

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Wallace, were you a member of the War Production Board, and, if so, over what period of time did you serve as a member?

Mr. WALLACE. I was a member of the War Production Board and the predecessor group, the Supply, Priorities, and Allocation Board, which was set up in late August or early September 1941. I was Chairman of that Board, and if it met with the desire of the committee would go into considerable details as to why I was made Chairman.

That Board was replaced about January 15, 1942, by the War Production Board. I remained as a member of the War Production Board in my capacity as head of the Board of Economic Warfare, and continued as a member until July 19 or 20, 1943, at which time I wrote a letter to Mr. Donald Nelson resigning from the Board, and on July 21 I find in my records a letter to the President of the United States indicating why I resigned from the Board at that time.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who was Chairman of the Board during the year 1943?

Mr. WALLACE. Of the War Production Board?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes; of the War Production Board.

Mr. WALLACE. Mr. Donald Nelson.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who were the members of the Board at that time beside yourself?

Mr. WALLACE. That is a matter of record. They were the heads of the armed services, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of State—it is a matter of the public record. There were quite a number. I think War Manpower was represented. I think you must have that already in your records.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes. I will just ask you this: Was there representation on that Board of other Government agencies, such as the Office of Lend-Lease?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; I am quite sure the Office of Lend-Lease was there. Harry Hopkins, so far as I recollect, did not sit in on the War Production Board meetings.

Mr. TAVENNER. Incidentally, I see you are accompanied by a gentleman here. Are you represented by counsel?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. This is Mr. Walter Freedman, who used to be an attorney with the Board of Economic Warfare, dealing especially with the export licenses, and I have asked him to come both in that capacity and as counsel. Freedman is spelled F-r-e-e-d-m-a-n.

Mr. TAVENNER. And what is his first name and middle initial?

Mr. FREEDMAN. Walter. There is no middle initial.

Mr. TAVENNER. And your address? [Addressing Mr. Freedman.]

Mr. FREEDMAN. Washington Building, Washington, D. C.

Mr. TAVENNER. Briefly, what were your duties as a member of the War Production Board?

Mr. WALLACE. When Mr. Samuel Rosenman approached me, at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, that I sit on SPAB—Supply, Priorities, and Allocation Board—it was suggested that my place on SPAB was particularly to represent those foreign countries that were not under lend-lease. The Supply, Priorities, and Allocation Board had to do with the allotment of the production of the United States. The Board of Economic Warfare was particularly concerned with Latin America. Therefore it was felt that there should be representation on the War Production Board of the Board of Economic Warfare.

There was also another reason why I was on the SPAB which is not particularly germane to the subject under discussion today, and that is because there was a serious disagreement among the predecessor agency—I believe it was OPM—between certain groups. One group thought we ought to stop all production of automobiles, for example, so that we could produce more tanks. We were not in the war yet. Another group thought we should go ahead producing automobiles.

The President and Samuel Rosenman came to the conclusion that I, by reason of my office, could step in and establish a chain of command that would stop the discord and make a firm policy at this time when we were not in the war. In other words, they invoked the prestige of my office to get a job done they would not get done any other way.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you devote quite a bit of time and attention to the duties of your office on that Board?

Mr. WALLACE. As chairman of SPAB, I did. This was in the fall of 1941. I am very proud of the work that I did at that time in connection with Donald Nelson. I think we did a remarkable job that made a very great difference in the later war effort. But after Donald Nelson became Chairman of the War Production Board my activities were not so great.

Mr. TAVENNER. But they were great enough so that you were familiar with the general procedural requirements regarding the transactions of the War Production Board, were they not?

Mr. WALLACE. No. You see, the President urged me, when I took on both of these duties, which were not customary for Vice Presidents, as you well recognize, that I not get into administration details. He urged me not to do that in the first instance. I was, of course, enormously concerned with getting the greatest possible production, and when something came up in connection with rubber, for instance, in which I was intensely interested, I took a definite interest because I had a competence in the field; but with regard to the general run of War Production Board activities, I did not take a detailed interest.

Mr. TAVENNER. The War Production Board was, however, vitally

concerned not only with the production but the control of material that had been produced. Isn't that correct?

Mr. WALLACE. And the Supply, Priorities, and Allocation Board set up the conditions under which the controls were put in effect.

Mr. TAVENNER. And when any matter of policy was involved in questions that would arise in the functioning of the Board, you were active and participated in those matters?

Mr. WALLACE. When they were brought up to the Board level, and there is always a question of what was.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you a member of the committee known as the Military Policy Committee?

Mr. WALLACE. Not to the best of my recollection. You mean of the War Production Board?

Mr. TAVENNER. Whether it was an adjunct of the War Production Board or not, I can't say.

Mr. WALLACE. There was a Military Policy Committee that had to do with the atom bomb. That had nothing to do with the War Production Board.

Mr. TAVENNER. I understand.

Mr. WALLACE. No; I was not connected with the Military Policy Committee.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you connected with that Committee in any way?

Mr. WALLACE. No; I was not connected with that Committee. If you want to go into the entire atomic-bomb matter, I can go into it chronologically.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes; we would like to know what your connection was with the atomic-bomb project.

Mr. WALLACE. The whole matter of atomic energy was first brought to my attention by matters in public print in 1939 and 1940. In one of the popular magazines there was an article about U-235 in 1939; and on May 5, 1940, there was an article by William E. Lawrence of the New York Times; it was on the front page, and went into the details of U-235.

Then it was brought to my attention in a strong way by Dr. Vannevar Bush on June 29, 1940, when I was Secretary of Agriculture. He told me about the job that had just been assigned to him by President Roosevelt. Dr. Vannevar Bush and I had known each other for some time, we had mutual acquaintances, and I think he had respect for my scientific ability. So he told me of this job that had been assigned to him by President Roosevelt a short time previously.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was that job that was assigned to him?

Mr. WALLACE. He was assigned the job of looking into the possibilities of using U-235 to make an atom bomb.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you serve on the Committee with him?

Mr. WALLACE. If you will allow me to go ahead with the chronology, I will indicate just how that worked out.

Mr. TAVENNER. Very well.

Mr. WALLACE. As I remember it, he did not come to see me again until July 23 of 1941, after I was Vice President. In the former meeting he had indicated that the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin was working very hard on this matter of making an atomic bomb. In this July 23, 1941, meeting, he said that it now looked much more possible

to make a bomb than it had when he had seen me before, and at this time we swore each other to secrecy. And then, I guess Pearl Harbor came. I have these dates written down. I want to be sure of getting this just right. I don't want to do too much from memory on this. I think I had better read this off.

It was in the fall of 1941 that a Top Policy Committee was formed composed of myself, I was the ranking member of it, I would assume; the Secretary of War, Secretary Stimson; Chief of Staff, General Marshall; Dr. Bush; and Dr. Conant.

This Top Policy Committee was very important in the early stage of the game, but had no importance after the construction really started. It was very important in 1941 and 1942.

We held a meeting in my office in the Senate Office Building on December 16, 1941, 9 days after Pearl Harbor, which was attended by Secretary Stimson, by Dr. Vannevar Bush, myself, and Harold Smith. Harold Smith was not a member of the committee, but Harold Smith attended in his capacity as Director of the Budget. The work hitherto had largely been of a research nature, and it was now apparent that large sums of money were going to be involved. This was an absolutely secret thing, and I think it is one of the miracles of the war that it was kept so absolutely secret; nobody talked; but the question was how to get large sums of money and yet maintain absolute secrecy. That was the problem before this December 16, 1941, meeting of the top policy committee. Therefore, Harold Smith was present and rendered very valuable service in finding some way of getting the money. What he did, I don't know, but he did get very large sums of money.

At that meeting it was decided that certain pilot plants should be started. Dr. Bush came in to see me several times during 1942 with regard to signing reports to be transmitted to the President.

The only two times the Top Policy Committee met that I am aware of were on this December 16, 1941, and on September 23, 1942. The only meeting I attended was the December 16, 1941, meeting. I just returned from out of town during the day on September 23, and did not attend that meeting. That was the meeting which General Groves attended for the first time, as I understand it. Because I didn't attend the meeting, I did not meet General Groves at that time. So far as I can determine from consulting my record, I did not meet General Groves until April 14, 1944.

I talked with Dr. Vannevar Bush yesterday to confirm my recollection, and I asked him what was his recollection of the relationship between the Military Policy Committee which was set up in the fall of 1942 with General Groves as the executive officer, what was the relationship, the chain of command, and his recollection was the same as mine, that General Groves was under the Military Policy Committee and had no business reporting to the Top Policy Committee unless he was so directed by the Military Policy Committee. In other words, the Top Policy Committee, after that second meeting on September 23, 1942, really ceased to have active existence. However, if any matter of unusual, broad significance came up outside the field of military competence, I have no doubt that Dr. Bush would have consulted me. The chain of command was from Dr. Bush to me, rather than General Groves, unless General Groves was delegated by Dr. Bush or Secretary Stimson to consult me.

The only matter of broad policy that came up after the second meeting of the Top Policy Committee of September 23, 1942, had to do with the sharing of certain construction details of the atom bomb with Great Britain. That is my recollection of it. And Dr. Vannevar Bush came to see me about that on two separate occasions after that September 23, 1942, meeting.

Mr. TAVENNER. Although there were only two occasions, you state, when meetings of the Top Policy Committee were held, there were subsequent occasions, were there not, when the individual members of that committee met informally and discussed problems?

Mr. WALLACE. None, so far as I know. There probably were meetings, I would assume, between Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant, or between Dr. Bush, Dr. Conant, and Secretary Stimson. You see, this became, after September 1942, a military effort, and Dr. Bush was working closely with the military, and Dr. Conant, Dr. Bush's assistant, was working very closely with the military. Secretary Stimson, of course, was Secretary of War, and General Marshall was Chief of Staff. I was the only one not in the military activity. They may have had frequent meetings, but I never sat on any of them.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who was chairman?

Mr. WALLACE. Of the Top Policy Committee?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. WALLACE. So far as I know, I was the ranking member. The first meeting was held in my office. After that, actually the man who was at work continuously on the problem was the man who had been designated by President Roosevelt on June 15, 1940, Dr. Vannevar Bush. He was the man who had been delegated by President Roosevelt to work on the problem, and he was the man who really determined if a meeting was to be held. He was the man who had all the contacts.

From what Dr. Bush told me, Dr. Bush had frequent contacts with the President, and, from what Dr. Bush told me, the President, during these early stages, wanted these matters cleared with me, because I was second in command in the Nation. Also, the President at that time had, I think, considerable confidence in my scientific judgment.

I do know I talked to the President about the importance of the project and why it was important to back it with sufficient money. That was in the early stages, when it was getting off the ground. My significance after 1942, I would say, in regard to this, was practically nil. That doesn't reflect on me or doesn't reflect on anybody else. It had passed out of the scientific stage into the construction stage.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am only asking for the facts.

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you the presiding officer at the meeting of the Top Policy Committee which you attended?

Mr. WALLACE. I can't answer that, for the simple reason I do not have any notes in my records in regard to that. It was held in my office, and, knowing how I act in situations of that kind, I presume it was an absolutely informal thing. Secretary Stimson, Vannevar Bush, and myself talked it over. "We just got into a war, and the Germans are hard at work on this, how are we going to get this job done?" There was nobody there to take any minutes of the meeting. Harold Smith, Director of the Budget, may have taken some. He is dead. Secretary Stimson, I understand, is not in the best of health.

General Marshall was not there. The only one I think would have specific information about that meeting is Dr. Bush.

Mr. TAVENNER. The British problem you mentioned a while ago, what was the general character of that problem which the Top Policy Committee had to deal with, and when did that problem arise?

Mr. WALLACE. On December 20, 1942, Vannevar Bush came to see me about it, and said that there was a disagreement between ourselves and the British in regard to it.

Mr. TAVENNER. In regard to what?

Mr. WALLACE. How much information should be given the British with regard to construction details. The British had been very helpful to us in regard to scientific matters.

Mr. TAVENNER. Had the work of the Manhattan Engineering District progressed at that time, in December 1942, to an advanced stage in the making of original plans?

Mr. WALLACE. To the best of my knowledge I knew nothing about the Manhattan district until Harold Smith told me the name of the district in May 1945. I didn't know anything about the work as it progressed. As a matter of fact, I didn't want to know. This was back in 1941 and 1942, and all I wanted to know was that the work was being pushed with vigor. I had great confidence in Dr. Bush, felt he was a man of unique capacity, and wanted the President to push the work. I didn't know the name of the project or where they had the project, but I assumed Dr. Bush was doing his job.

Mr. TAVENNER. As a member of this Top Policy Committee, wasn't it your duty to determine that work was progressing and that something was being done?

Mr. WALLACE. Not after September 1942. Not after it passed over to the military.

Mr. TAVENNER. After that, on December 20, 1942, you were interviewed by Dr. Bush regarding the extent to which Great Britain was to be informed on policy or experiment?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. Dr. Bush came to me on December 20, 1942. I don't know whether he came to me to determine if there was a line to be followed. This thing was so secret I don't think any definite line was ever set up. You couldn't reduce things to writing. It is quite probable, knowing the way Dr. Bush and the President worked, that the President said to Dr. Bush: "Now, you had better go see Henry about this." That would be my guess.

Mr. TAVENNER. And your discussion at this conference was the extent to which you would furnish materials or equipment needed in the manufacturing of the atomic bomb to Great Britain?

Mr. WALLACE. It never came up. Nothing of that sort ever came up.

Mr. TAVENNER. It was just a question of information at that time?

Mr. WALLACE. It was a question of how far the British would be permitted to get certain types of information.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you discuss how far the United States should go in giving the same information to the Soviet Union?

Mr. WALLACE. It never came up, nothing of that sort.

Mr. TAVENNER. Never at any time?

Mr. WALLACE. Never.

Mr. TAVENNER. Gen. Leslie R. Groves testified before this committee on December 7, 1949, that you disassociated yourself from the Man-

hattan Engineering District project. If you did disassociate yourself from it, when did that occur and what were the reasons?

Mr. WALLACE. I think what I said previously is very clear, and General Groves obviously was not familiar with the relationship between the Military Policy Committee and the Top Policy Committee. You will find, reading his testimony, that he said the Military Policy Committee was probably under the Top Policy Committee. He really didn't know, and there was no reason why he should know. Dr. Bush tells me there was no reason why General Groves should have ever come to me. But General Groves may have come because he was directed on a particular occasion by Dr. Bush or Secretary Stimson, or he may have come out of general curiosity, to see this man who was connected with the project in the early days.

Mr. TAVENNER. General Groves also testified that for reasons of his own he made five different reports, copies of which he gave to a number of the members of this Top Policy Committee, and he further testified he gave one copy to you, in person. Is that correct?

Mr. WALLACE. That is what he testified, I believe. I am not sure whether he testified it or said it to newspaper men.

Mr. TAVENNER. That was the testimony before this committee. Is that correct or not?

Mr. WALLACE. You have the record.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think you understand, Mr. Wallace, that I am not asking what our records show, but I am asking whether or not it was a true statement?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know.

Mr. TAVENNER. You don't know whether General Groves gave you a copy of a report?

Mr. WALLACE. I know General Groves either testified before this committee or stated to newspapermen that he gave me a report in August 1943. He did not give me a report in August 1943 so far as I can ascertain.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is the question I asked you in the first place.

Mr. WALLACE. He did not.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did he call at your office and discuss the matter with you?

Mr. WALLACE. Not in August 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did he call and discuss the matter with you?

Mr. WALLACE. I have a very careful record of that. He called and gave me a report to sign—and my guess is it was a report that had been signed by the other members a long time previously—on April 14, 1944, at 11:15 in the morning. On that occasion, you will remember, General Groves stated that he had been kept waiting, and he was very much annoyed at having been kept waiting, because he thought the people who came out of my office were not important to the war effort.

I know that the man in my office immediately preceding General Groves was a Latin-American diplomat. My secretary knew nothing about the Manhattan project, knew nothing about General Groves, and she couldn't tell by looking at General Groves that he was a very important figure, any more than General Groves could tell by looking at the Latin-American diplomat, when he came out of my office, that he was an important figure.

Mr. TAVENNER. Any facts or circumstances surrounding that meeting which you desire to state, the committee will be glad to hear.

Mr. WALLACE. The two things I have in my record made at the time are to this effect: First, that he gave me a report to sign; that I read the report; that it indicated to me the war would be over in 18 months; and that General Groves said that he was going to chase the foreigners out of the uranium business.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did he tell you to whom he referred as the foreigners?

Mr. WALLACE. No, he did not.

Mr. TAVENNER. What else did he discuss with you at that time, or you with him, relating to uranium?

Mr. WALLACE. He said nothing, and I may say that nobody ever said anything to me, about uranium shipments, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was this the only report, of the five which General Groves said he made, that you saw?

Mr. WALLACE. I can find no record of any contact with General Groves except on this occasion. I have looked through my record and can find no other contact but this one of April 14, 1944.²⁹

Mr. TAVENNER. Aside from your contact with General Groves, did you at any time see any of the five reports, other than the one you have testified to?

Mr. WALLACE. Dr. Vannevar Bush might possibly have brought me in some report; I don't know. He brought me a great many reports in 1942. There is no reason why he should have brought me a report after 1942. There was no reason why General Groves should have brought me a report in 1944. I would assume it would have been through Dr. Bush if I saw any others, because I knew Vannevar Bush very well.

Mr. TAVENNER. According to your best recollection, do you believe you did see other reports through Dr. Bush?

Mr. WALLACE. I just don't know.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you at any time register a disagreement, while a member of the Top Policy Committee, with the policies and functioning of the Manhattan Engineering District, which I understand you did not know by name, but you knew the work was progressing?

Mr. WALLACE. No; never.

Mr. TAVENNER. At the time you were a member of the War Production Board and also a member of this Top Policy Committee, were you also Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare?

Mr. WALLACE. I was Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare from August 1941 until July 15, 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. The Economic Defense Board was created by Executive Order 8839, issued July 30, 1941, and the name was changed to the Board of Economic Warfare by Executive Order 8982 on December 17, 1941. Did you serve in the capacity of Chairman of this Board both before and after its name was changed?

Mr. WALLACE. That Board, as I remember it, was set up in the State Department under General Maxwell, and it had to do specifically with the control of the exportation of materials we thought we might need in the event of possible war.

²⁹ Mr. Wallace, at the time of the hearing, testified that he could find no record of any contact with General Groves except the one of April 14, 1944. In further checking his records, he finds that when he was Secretary of Commerce—this was long after he ceased to be head of BEW—he asked General Groves on September 5, 1945, to make a talk to the Advisory Committee to the Department of Commerce on the peacetime uses of atomic energy.

There was considerable discord between Treasury and the State Department about certain matters, which occasioned the President and Budget Director Harold Smith much concern. They saw no way to get around this difficulty other than to call in someone who out-ranked Dean Acheson, who represented the State Department in this matter, and Secretary Morgenthau. I was called in for the same reason I was called in on SPAB, and at almost the same time. General Maxwell, as I remember, resigned and went into the Regular Army activities in September 1941, and we took over. We may not have been known as the Board of Economic Warfare at that time, but an Executive order had been drawn up, it was a slightly different name, and we took over active control quite specifically in September, and General Maxwell passed out of the picture and we put in his place Col., now Gen., Roy Lord, a very efficient Army man, to handle these export problems. He carried on for about a year, at which time Hector Lazo took charge of the Board of Economic Warfare's Office of Export Control.

Mr. TAVENNER. The Executive order establishing the Board of Economic Warfare provides for representation of the War Production Board and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration on the Board, and the persons selected to represent these two agencies were required to be approved by the Chairman. Who were the representatives of the War Production Board and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration approved by you in 1943?

Mr. WALLACE. Approved by me in 1943?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. WALLACE (to Mr. Walter Freedman). Do you remember that, Walter?

I think Nollenberg sat most of the time for Ed Stettinius. There were provisions for alternates, and I think there was never any difficulty about selecting them. I think Donald Nelson sat for the War Production Board. I have forgotten who the alternate was.

Mr. TAVENNER. The Executive order establishing the Economic Defense Board, later known as the Board of Economic Warfare, provided that its purpose was developing and coordinating policies, plans, and programs designed to protect and strengthen the international economic relations of the United States in the interest of national defense. The term "economic defense" was defined in part as follows:

The term "economic defense," whenever used in this order, means the conduct, in the interest of national defense, of international economic activities including those relating to exports. * * *

Among the functions and duties of the Board are to be found the following:

(b) Coordinate the policies and actions of the several departments and agencies carrying on activities relating to economic defense in order to assure unity and balance in the application of such measures.

(c) Develop integrated economic defense plans and programs for coordinated action by the departments and agencies concerned and use all appropriate means to assure that such plans and programs are carried into effect by such departments and agencies.

Then section 7 of the Executive order reads in part as follows:

The Chairman is authorized to make all necessary arrangements, with the advice and assistance of the Board, for discharging and performing the responsibilities and duties required to carry out the functions and authorities set forth

in this order, and to make final decisions when necessary to expedite the work of the Board.

You, of course, at the time, were very familiar with the provisions of those Executive orders, I assume?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes; I was familiar with those provisions, and I later became very familiar with the soundness of the prophecy Harold Smith made on July 30, 1941, that while I had been given the responsibility, I hadn't really been given the authority. While I did not keep a detailed record at that time, I do have a detailed record on this, that Harold Smith said: "They have given you responsibility here, but they have not given you authority." And he made very clear the point that while Dean Acheson, when he thought he was going to have control of this, favored being given complete authority, when it became apparent the White House wanted me to have it, he didn't want me to have complete authority.

I told Harold Smith I knew these people, and it was not necessary for me to have complete authority at that time. I later found Harold Smith was absolutely right, that I did not have authority, and found it necessary to get cooperation from the departments concerned.

Mr. TAVENNER. How do you construe this language, if you say you did not have authority:

SEC. 7. The Chairman is authorized to make all necessary arrangements, with the advice and assistance of the Board, for discharging and performing the responsibilities and duties required to carry out the functions and authorities set forth in this order. * * *

How could greater authority be given?

Mr. WALLACE. That may appeal to the legal mind, but the history of the situation will demonstrate it was not sufficient, because we found it necessary to amend the order later on to remedy the weakness which existed, and we did get that amendment, and that amendment provoked great resentment on the part of various other agencies.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the date of the amendment; do you recall?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say it was in the spring of 1942.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then in 1943 you did have full authority to make all necessary arrangements for carrying out the provisions in this order, by virtue of the amendment which you now refer to?

Mr. WALLACE. As a matter of fact, the amendment was then sabotaged by certain of the agencies, and the President made an amendment to the amendment.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you mean that the amendment to the amendment took away the authority you had to act?

Mr. WALLACE. In effect; yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the date of that?

Mr. WALLACE. I think early summer, 1942.

Mr. TAVENNER. Explain a little more what you meant by stating that it was sabotaged by an amendment to an amendment.

Mr. WALLACE. Simply that we did not have the full power to do the job; that is what I meant. If you will examine the wording there, you will see that while we were directed to invite the agencies to go along, if there was any agency unwilling to go along, there was no way of enforcing it.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, if Manhattan Engineering District would refuse to agree to the issuance of an export license, you contend

you should have had authority to do it anyway, in a given case, just as an example?

Mr. WALLACE. I am sure nothing of that sort would have ever come up, because the Manhattan District was in a class altogether by itself. Nothing having to do with uranium or the Manhattan project ever came up before the Board of Economic Warfare at any time.

Mr. TAVENNER. If the Office of Lend-Lease Administration took a contrary view to the Board of Economic Warfare regarding the issuance of a license, you contend you should have had authority and power to have exported it anyway?

Mr. WALLACE. We had no disagreements with the Office of Lend-Lease with regard to exports. As a matter of fact, there was a very clear-cut understanding arrived at with regard to Lend-Lease Administration in the fall of 1941, at which time Harry Hopkins turned the job over to Ed Stettinius, and insisted that certain powers in Lend-Lease reside there and not any place else. We were not concerned with having power over the Office of Lend-Lease Administration. That is not where we were having our difficulties.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was it with the War Production Board that you were having your difficulties?

Mr. WALLACE. No. We had no difficulties with the War Production Board.

Mr. TAVENNER. Why was it you were so insistent upon having final authority and say as to matters with which these other agencies were concerned?

Mr. WALLACE. The particular difficulty we had was getting maximum production, particularly in Latin America. We found we had a marked difference with the Secretary of Commerce and the head of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation with regard to how this work ought to be done. That was the big problem involved.

Mr. TAVENNER. When you say that the authority you had obtained by the first amendment to the order had been sabotaged, it could have no meaning other than that some group or individual brought about a change?

Mr. WALLACE. We also had great difficulty in getting our men who were stimulating production, particularly in Latin America, out to those countries. Their visas would be held up, and for a time we were having very great difficulty with the State Department. This was largely a matter of misunderstanding, the way it turned out, but it was because the State Department had very strong feelings that the Board of Economic Warfare was getting into its province that the amendment to the order was changed.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was there any group or individual who did any act of sabotage that you recall?

Mr. WALLACE. I think you are using the word "sabotage" in the wrong sense. I am referring to the weakening. I think possibly the word "sabotage" is unfortunate. Let us say "weakening" of the Executive order.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am just trying to find out in what sense you used it.

Mr. WALLACE. I am referring to a weakening of the Executive order.

Mr. TAVENNER. You were also familiar with the provisions of Executive Order 8926 of October 28, 1941, by which the Lend-Lease

Administrator was directed to arrange with the Board of Economic Warfare for review and clearance of Lend-Lease transactions?

Mr. WALLACE. No, I am not familiar with that particular order.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, it was an order which went into effect in October 1941. You do know, regardless of the order, or whether or not you remember now about the order, that the Lend-Lease Administrator was required to arrange with the Board of Economic Warfare for review and clearance of those transactions?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know of any case where they did.

Mr. TAVENNER. When a request was made to Lend-Lease for shipment of materials to the Soviet Purchasing Commission, your organization was the issuing agency for the license, was it not?

Mr. WALLACE. I think that matter can be very readily cleared up by reading the statement as made by the State Department on December 8. The State Department made a statement on December 7, 1949, which was given considerable publicity in the press. This statement was incorrect in certain particulars.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you referring to a statement in regard to heavy water?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. My question related to uranium.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, I know, but this covers the broad field, their statement of December 7.

Mr. CASE. December 7 of what year?

Mr. WALLACE. December 7, 1949, that Secretary Acheson put out his original statement. This December 8 statement has a very definite bearing on your question. Shall I read that?

Mr. TAVENNER. In just a moment, but does that relate to the regulations that were in effect in 1943?

Mr. WALLACE. I would say so, definitely.

Mr. TAVENNER. Before July 1, 1943?

Mr. WALLACE. I think so. I would say definitely.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like for you to make any explanation about that for the enlightenment of the committee that you can.

Mr. WALLACE. This is a statement of December 8, 1949, issued by the State Department:

In connection with the Secretary's statement yesterday concerning the Jordan allegations, a review of the records of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and the Foreign Economic Administration indicates that although export licenses for commercial items, that is, general items other than lend-lease and munitions, were actually issued by the Board of Economic Warfare, the responsibility for approval of the license applications, including clearance with other interested governmental agencies rested with the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and its successor FEA. This procedure was deemed necessary in order to concentrate control of the wartime Soviet supply program in one agency. In actual practice up to July 1, 1943, licenses approved by OLLA were issued in routine fashion by BEW. After that a general license issued by BEW or its successor agencies became effective which required approval of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration only.

I think that makes it very clear indeed that the relationship of the Board of Economic Warfare to shipments to lend-lease areas, whether they were of a lend-lease nature or a cash nature, was purely pro forma and clerical, and that there was no discretionary authority in the Board of Economic Warfare whatever.

Mr. TAVENNER. You make that statement regardless of the fact that the Executive order says arrangements should be made with the Board

of Economic Warfare for review and clearance of Lend-Lease transactions?

Mr. WALLACE. I do make it—definitely, flatly, completely, and indig-
nantly.

Mr. Walter Freedman was an attorney with the Board of Economic Warfare at the time. He was in the Export Section of BEW. He is making some suggestion to me now which I don't understand the tenor of, but I suggest you ask him.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have no objection to your conferring with him.

Mr. WALLACE. I would prefer your having such a conference with him. He was close to the technical details.

Mr. TAVENNER. You would prefer he make the explanation?

Mr. WALLACE. Frankly, I have never seen an export license in my life. I would like to have you talk to him about that.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to counsel stating what he believes the situation was.

Mr. WOOD. If you wish to call him as a witness, you may do so.

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Mr. WOOD. I would prefer that the members make notes and wait until counsel is through, if that is satisfactory.

Mr. TAVENNER. There is a provision in Executive Order 8926, previously referred to, by which the master agreement with each nation receiving lend-lease aid, setting forth the general terms and conditions under which such nation is to receive such aid, was required to be negotiated by the State Department with the advice of the Board of Economic Warfare and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration. You recall that to be a fact?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. You referred to it earlier.

Mr. TAVENNER. You did advise about what materials should be exported to foreign countries during the period of the war?

Mr. WALLACE. No. That was not a function of BEW.

Mr. TAVENNER. What do you contend is the meaning—

Mr. WALLACE. BEW initiated no exports except exports in connection with the expansion of our program.

Mr. TAVENNER. My question related to master agreements negotiated by the State Department for the furnishing of aid to the various powers.

Mr. WALLACE. That did not come up before BEW.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the purpose of the provision of this Executive order which provided that the master agreements were required to be negotiated by the State Department with the advice of the Board of Economic Warfare and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration?

Mr. WALLACE. Down the line there may have been clearance. I was not aware of anything of the sort, and, as far as I recall, nothing of the sort came before meetings of the Board of Economic Warfare.

Mr. TAVENNER. As Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare, you certainly would have known of such an important thing as the negotiation of an agreement for a large delivery of important materials to foreign countries during the war period if it occurred, would you not?

Mr. WALLACE. It never came to my attention. It is one of those things that never came to my attention.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was it not also true that Executive Order 8900, heretofore mentioned, required the Board of Economic Warfare to

provide a control clearing service to which exporters may submit proposals for the export of materials and commodities, and further required that the Board of Economic Warfare shall obtain clearance for such proposals from the Federal agencies concerned with the control of exports?

Mr. WALLACE. Let's have this question handled by Mr. Freedman later on.

Mr. TAVENNER. Don't you recall?

Mr. WALLACE. No, I don't recall.

Mr. TAVENNER. This is all set forth, Mr. Wallace, in a memorandum from the Board of Economic Warfare approved by you [handing memorandum to the witness].

Mr. WALLACE. Mr. Tavenner, I venture to say if some 7 years from now you are asked for certain details of this year, your recollection will be as hazy as mine about precise words of this kind.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is certainly true about precise words, but I am asking you about the general subject of making clearance of exports to foreign countries through the agencies that control those exports. I would have thought that was a matter of such importance you would have recalled it.

Mr. WALLACE. It might have been important in the daily functioning of the executive section of the Board. I sat on the Board where you had these top people from the various agencies. I was not the executive officer of the Board. I was Chairman of the Board. Matters of this sort were not brought to my attention.

Mr. TAVENNER. At one and the same time you were a member of the War Production Board, you were a member of the Top Policy Committee, and you were the Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare, and in any dispute of policy that may have arisen between those agencies, you were in the position of standing on both sides of the bargain counter, so to speak, with regard to those transactions, were you not?

Mr. WALLACE. There were no disputes that came up regarding this particular matter, and while it may all have been set forth, the mere matter of setting forth probably handled the situation.

Mr. TAVENNER. There was no other person in such a unique position as you were in?

Mr. WALLACE. I was Vice President of the United States and had the relationship to the three agencies to which you refer, and I am very proud of having had that position. I am very proud of having been Vice President at that time.

Mr. TAVENNER. Of course it is a great honor to be Vice President of the United States at any time.

Mr. Wallace, my purpose is to endeavor to develop your opportunities for knowledge and your responsibilities relating to matters that would normally come before the Board of Economic Warfare, the War Production Board, and things that occurred within Manhattan Engineering District.

Mr. WALLACE. May I interpolate, with regard to things that might have occurred within the Manhattan District, nothing came to my attention as to things within the Manhattan District.

Mr. TAVENNER. I understand. You have so stated. With all this background, and all these positions you have held, my sole purpose now is to have you tell this committee all that you know about the

sale of uranium for export to the Soviet Purchasing Commission during the war period, and by that I mean any circumstances related to the entire transaction, as to the fact of issuance of licenses, as to the policy governing it; the committee would like to hear it.

Mr. WALLACE. Thank you very much, Mr. Tavenner. I think the shortest way of handling this, at the risk of some repetition, is to read a short prepared statement that will take about 10 minutes to read it, then there can be questioning, if that is satisfactory.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is it responsive to the question?

Mr. WALLACE. It is definitely responsive to the question.

Mr. WOOD. If it is responsive to the question, yes.

Mr. WALTER. Before he does that, don't you think the Executive orders should be made exhibits?

Mr. TAVENNER. They appear in the Federal Register.

Mr. WALLACE (reading):

I have asked this committee for an opportunity to testify because I want very much to clear up the doubts that have been cast on my conduct in connection with the licensing of uranium and heavy-water shipments to Russia in 1943.

Testimony before this committee has raised two basic questions insofar as I am concerned: (1) It is strongly implied, if not actually said, that I was responsible for the licensing of uranium and heavy water for Russia in 1943; and (2) as a wartime Vice President, I could not be trusted with certain confidential information regarding the atom bomb.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Wallace, the first point is pertinent to the question. The second is not. I will ask you to confine your answer to the first point.

Mr. WALLACE. If I can be allowed to differ slightly with the chairman on that, I would like to read from the record made by General Groves before this committee. There is a suggestion in the record of the committee—

Mr. CASE. Mr. Chairman, it is apparent that the next paragraph deals with attacks that have been made on the witness, not before this committee, but by newspapers and radio commentators. It seems to me the proper thing for Mr. Wallace to do is to answer statements made before this committee, and not use this as a forum to answer statements by commentators and newspapers, over which this committee has no control.

Mr. HARRISON. It appears to me the statement is not very long, and it might save time to let him read it.

Mr. WOOD. Suppose you use whatever material you have.

Mr. WALLACE. I think that will be the shorter procedure. (Continuing reading:)

While it is not for me to pass judgment upon my own conduct, I state unhesitatingly that I am proud of my participation as Vice President of the United States during the time when the war situation was most critical, and I am proud to have been associated with the administration whose policies were so effective in making available the essential materials when they were most needed. The attack being made on me—not only before this committee, but with even more violence in certain newspapers and by certain radio commentators—is, I think, not so much an attack on me as it is upon the Democratic Party and President Roosevelt. At any rate, once and for all, I want the record of this committee to show exactly what my participation was insofar as these shipments are concerned.

Because I knew how important it was to keep secret the fact that this Government was exploring the possibilities of an atom bomb, I never discussed the atom bomb or the shipment of uranium or heavy water to any country with anyone in BEW—or anyone else outside of the selected group of Government officials

directly involved—at any time until the matter was exploded in the press. The subject of uranium shipments was never discussed in any meeting of the Board of Economic Warfare which I attended, or in any contact with any member of the staff. The most important point to remember, however, is that shipments to Russia were not the responsibility of BEW but the responsibility of the Lend-Lease Administration, which in 1943 was under the direction of E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

All license applications for shipments of materials to lend-lease areas which were filed with BEW were forwarded to the Lend-Lease Administration for recommendation. BEW's responsibility for these applications was limited to approving or denying the applications in accordance with the recommendation of the Lend-Lease Administration.

Moreover, the licenses for uranium oxide and uranium nitrate are said to have been issued in March and April of 1943. I want to point out that I personally was in Latin America from March 16, 1943, until April 25 of that year.

In any event, I knew nothing about the issuance of the licenses or the shipments until the matter was stirred up in the press in 1946.

Within the past week I have talked to Milo Perkins, who was executive director of BEW, and Hector Lazo, who in 1943 was head of BEW's Office of Export Control. I am assured by both of them that in 1943 they knew nothing about these licenses, nor, indeed, did they know anything about the atomic-bomb project.

With regard to the licensing of heavy water in late 1943, the shortest and most convincing answer is that I left BEW on July 15, 1943. Leo Crowley took over BEW on July 16, and its name was changed to OEW. On September 25, 1943, OEW was merged with Lend-Lease and the new agency was called Foreign Economic Administration.

Secretary Acheson, on December 7, 1949, issued a statement which received considerable publicity—and which credited BEW with issuing a license for heavy water 4 months after it had ceased to exist. On December 8, Secretary Acheson realized his error, and the State Department issued a new statement which, to the best of my knowledge, never appeared in the press or over the radio.

I have already read that statement, and with your permission I will consider it as in the record at this point and pass it on.

In summary, therefore, it is to be pointed out that not BEW but the Lend-Lease Administration, which by its activities saved so many American lives, was responsible for clearing all shipments to Russia. I was neither responsible nor aware of any of them at that time.

Since I was not even aware, therefore, that the Russians were trying to obtain uranium or heavy water, it is demonstrably apparent that I could not have pressured someone else into issuing the license, or urged them to pressure the Manhattan Engineering District to consent to their issue.

In short, and in fact, I had absolutely nothing to do with any of these licenses. I was not aware that they were being requested. I did not know that Lend-Lease recommended, after consulting with the Manhattan district, that they be issued, and the agency which I headed, the Board of Economic Warfare, had no discretionary authority with respect to them.

Mr. WOOD. Does that prepared statement stand, in the light of the Executive order?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes, sir; I desire that that statement stand.

Mr. WALTER. I think he misread the statement. He said he did not know.

Mr. WALLACE. I am sorry. I did know.

Mr. HARRISON. You read it one way and it is here another way. Which is correct?

Mr. WALLACE. I did not know. That is on page 6. [Continuing reading:]

Now, a word must be said about General Groves' statement that he showed me a report in August 1943, and that that was the only report that he showed to me.

Mr. WOOD. You have already gone into that.

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. I think all of this matter has been covered.

That should be—I did not know, by the way, on page 6. There is an error in the mimeograph.³⁰

Mr. WOOD. Any further questions?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WALLACE. I think everything else has been covered that is in this prepared statement. I might say, if there is no objection, for the sake of the newspapermen we might let them use the latter part of this text as is given.

Mr. WOOD. This committee has no discretion or control over what the press does.

Mr. TAVENNER. You referred to a conference with General Groves in 1944 and stated that he discussed with you the matter of driving foreigners out of the uranium business, or something of that character. Just what did you say about that?

Mr. WALLACE. All I have got in my record is just that single sentence, and that is all I remember.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is that sentence?

Mr. WALLACE. I will try to find it precisely as I have it in my record. [Referring to documents.] He said how important it was to get the foreigners out of the uranium business.

Mr. TAVENNER. What else did he tell you about the difficulties of the foreigners in the uranium business?

Mr. WALLACE. Nothing, so far as I know.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is that all he said?

Mr. WALLACE. The only thing I have a record of or recall.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the purpose of making a note of that particular statement?

Mr. WALLACE. I made a note of various statements made to me at that time.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were other statements made by General Groves to you at that time?

Mr. WALLACE. That is the only statement I have down in my diary, in my statement, that he submitted the report, I read it, it indicated to me the war would be over in 18 months.

Mr. TAVENNER. That and the statement you just read about uranium constituted all the notes you made at that time?

Mr. WALLACE. Simply how important it was to get the foreigners out of the uranium business.

Mr. TAVENNER. You stated you returned from Latin America on April 25, 1943?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Testimony introduced in the course of these hearings indicates that the license issued for the shipment of 1,000 pounds of uranium compounds originating in Canada was amended on April 29, 1943. So the fact that you had been in Latin America would have no validity as far as the time element is concerned.

Mr. WALLACE. I know nothing about the dates of those export licenses.

Mr. TAVENNER. Your absence has nothing to do with the time element of the amendment of the license?

Mr. WALLACE. I just know I had nothing to do with anything of the sort, that is all.

³⁰ Page 6 refers to page number in typed copy from which the witness was reading.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was there brought to your attention the issuance of licenses for the export of uranium?

Mr. WALLACE. Never.

Mr. TAVENNER. By any person in BEW?

Mr. WALLACE. Never.

Mr. TAVENNER. By any person outside of BEW?

Mr. WALLACE. Never.

Mr. TAVENNER. Whose responsibility was it in the Bureau of Economic Warfare to screen these applications for licenses or issue them?

Mr. WALLACE. Well, Hector Lazo was head of Export Control. Who was under Hector Lazo I don't know. Mr. Freedman may be able to tell you that.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you ever discuss his duties with him?

Mr. WALLACE. That particular agency was absorbed completely with the problem of issuing export licenses rapidly to the trade. They had to issue about 8,000 a day, and it was a difficult mechanical job, and the trade was disgusted with the way that job had been done before we took over. I think at one time there were 100,000 of these licenses jammed up, weren't there, Walter? We had to get out from under that log jam. None of these questions of policy came up, because they were cleared more or less automatically with the executive agencies. No question of policy ever came up to my knowledge to the top echelon. I took that up with Mr. Perkins and Mr. Lazo. Mr. Freedman, I think, can assure you from what he knows of the lower echelon that nothing of the sort ever came to anybody on the Board.

Mr. TAVENNER. It was a matter of general knowledge, however, that uranium was being used in this important project, and that the policy was not only to keep it secret, but not let anybody get hold of it?

Mr. WALLACE. Vannevar Bush had sworn me to secrecy, and I was not going to talk to anybody in BEW about the thing. I didn't talk to Milo Perkins about it. You couldn't trust yourself to talk to anybody. If Vannevar Bush wanted to know if uranium was being properly handled, he should go to Lend-Lease or me directly, because I was the only one in BEW who knew about it. I am not even sure Ed Stettinius knew about it. The only thing to do was come to me if they wanted to observe secrecy. They should have said: "Here, you hold the second highest office in Government, and you know about the atomic bomb. How can we get it across to these folks that do the licensing without getting somebody's wind up?" That would have been the proper course, to come to somebody who knew about the atomic bomb. You couldn't expect me, who had sworn myself to secrecy to Dr. Bush, to go to those people and say: "Look out for uranium." That would be tipping your hand.

Mr. TAVENNER. You were cognizant of the importance of preventing the export of uranium from this country?

Mr. WALLACE. I never thought about it.

Mr. TAVENNER. You never thought about it?

Mr. WALLACE. No. This thing had been turned over to the military.

Mr. TAVENNER. You recognized there was a problem of control?

Mr. WALLACE. I never thought of it at all. It was not within my sphere of competence.

Mr. TAVENNER. You are familiar, I presume, with Conservation Order M-285 of the War Production Board, which provides as follows:

The fulfillment of requirements for the defense of the United States has created a shortage in the supply of uranium for defense, for private account, and for export; and the following order is deemed necessary and appropriate in the public interest and to promote the national defense.

That was the regulation that controlled the purposes for which uranium could be sold and distributed within this country.

Mr. WALLACE. I didn't know about that order until I read it in the press, going over the newspaper accounts of the hearing. A lot of these very important things take place very normally in the lower echelon.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidence Executive Order 8839, of July 30, 1941, from which I read, and ask that I be permitted to file as a part of the same exhibit, marked "Wallace Exhibit 1," the subsequent amendments which Mr. Wallace has referred to.

Mr. WOOD. Without objection, it will be admitted.

(The documents above referred to, marked "Wallace Exhibit 1," are hereinafter included in the record.) ³¹

Mr. TAVENNER. I have no further questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Walter.

Mr. WALTER. Was there any occasion for General Groves to ever report to you, or to discuss matters with respect to the progress of the Manhattan project with you?

Mr. WALLACE. General Groves' chain of command did not run to me.

Mr. WALTER. To whom did it run?

Mr. WALLACE. Dr. Vannevar Bush, who was chairman of the Military Policy Committee. There was no reason why he should come to me unless he was directed to do so by Dr. Bush or Secretary Stimson.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Harrison.

Mr. HARRISON. No questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Moulder.

Mr. MOULDER. No questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Nixon.

Mr. NIXON. I will pass.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Case.

Mr. CASE. Mr. Wallace, you have pretty well given the background of your knowledge of research in the development of atomic energy, and indicated you had read magazine articles prior to 1940 on it, and also spoke of your part on the top policy group which met December 16, 1941, at which Dr. Vannevar Bush and Secretary Stimson were present. You may have referred to a further contact you had with the development of the atom bomb program but if so I missed it in your testimony.

I have here a book entitled "Atomic Energy for Military Purposes" by Henry DeWolf Smyth, chairman, department of physics, Princeton University, and consultant, Manhattan District, United States Engineers. This is described as "The Official Report on the Develop-

³¹ See appendix.

ment of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-45," and on pages 81-82 I read this paragraph:

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY BUSH AND CONANT ON JUNE 17, 1942

On June 13, 1942, Bush and Conant sent to Vice President Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, a report recommending detailed plans for the expansion and continuation of the atomic bomb program.

Mr. WALLACE. I might interpolate and say I did refer in the questioning to a meeting with Vannevar Bush on June 16, 1942, which was an important meeting having to do with the expansion of the program.

Mr. CASE (continuing reading):

All three approved the report. On June 17, 1942, the report was sent by Bush to the President, who also approved. * * *

Mr. WALLACE. That is correct.

Mr. CASE. That is correct?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. CASE. So that you saw the report which dealt with the program for the expansion of the atomic bomb project?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. CASE. Then, having had that connection with the development of the project at the outset—

Mr. WALLACE. This was a pilot plant proposition at that time. This did not have to do with what later became the grand effort. It was small stuff. That was when I was still active in the program. My testimony was that my significance in the program ceased after it was kicked over to the military in 1942.

Mr. CASE. I don't want to change your testimony in any respect. I want to get clear what the background was and the importance of uranium in the development of the atomic bomb project.

Mr. WALLACE. I certainly understood the importance of uranium in the atom bomb project.

Mr. CASE. And the importance of secrecy?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

Mr. CASE. With that knowledge and background, and your connection with the Board of Economic Warfare, did it ever occur to you that the Board of Economic Warfare should take steps to prevent uranium and uranium compounds falling in unauthorized hands?

Mr. WALLACE. I felt, under my oath of secrecy to Dr. Bush, I should not talk to anyone in BEW about it. I might mention that at one time when I was with Dr. C. K. Leith of the University of Wisconsin, a noted geologist, I asked him where the uranium deposits of the world were. He was not a member of the Board of Economic Warfare. He was a liaison man, very highly thought of in the geological field. I think that is the only time the word "uranium" ever came up.

Mr. CASE. Did Dr. Leith tell you uranium was produced in Canada?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. CASE. Did he have a list of critical items that were not to be exported under any consideration?

Mr. WALLACE. I presume they did. Mr. Freedman tells me this was a list supplied by the War Production Board.

Mr. CASE. Were you a member of the War Production Board after you became head of the Board of Economic Warfare?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. I was a member of the War Production Board from the time it started, January 15, 1942, until I resigned on July 19 or 20, 1943.

Mr. CASE. Was uranium on the list of critical materials?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know. I have no idea. I looked on this thing as something for me to stay out of, that it was in other hands, and competent hands, and it was not for me to go into.

Mr. CASE. Wasn't it your duty to supervise the issuance of export licenses?

Mr. WALLACE. We were in a negative position. Our powers were negative. We did not take the initiative. We were carrying out orders for other people. I don't remember a single case where we took the initiative. Nor do I recall a single case where we suggested that commodities be placed on the export ban. I would say it was a mechanical, clerical function that we exercised. That is the way the thing came up to us in the first place from General Maxwell.

Mr. CASE. With regard to matters that came up under Lend-Lease, you deferred entirely to the wishes of Lend-Lease?

Mr. WALLACE. So far as I know, there was never any discussion whatsoever with regard to any exports to Russia. I don't recall a single case of exports to Russia, export of uranium, coming up at any time. Lend-Lease would stamp the applications in the lend-lease area field. I haven't seen one of those documents. If you would get hold of one of the export documents that are in Archives Building—I can't get hold of them, but you can—you could find out what the procedure was.

Mr. CASE. The statement you have made indicates that when an application came with the stamp of Lend-Lease, you automatically issued the license?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. CASE. And you would not see it; people in the lower levels would automatically issue the license if Lend-Lease said they wanted it?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

Mr. CASE. Did you have representation in Lend-Lease?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't think so.

Mr. CASE. You said it was under the direction of Mr. Stettinius in 1943?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. It first came under his direction in the fall of 1941. Mr. Stettinius is dead. He had an able assistant by the name of Tom McCabe, now head of the Federal Reserve Board, and a man highly regarded by businessmen of the country. He was on the Business Advisory Board of the Department of Commerce. I am sure he could clear up this problem with you very rapidly.

Mr. CASE. Did you sit in on meetings of Lend-Lease?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. CASE. In connection with this particular export license, it was brought out in testimony yesterday that when the committee sought to go through the Archives to get the particular license that covered the shipment, it could not be found. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. WALLACE. Not the slightest. How many licenses were there?

Mr. CASE. The others were there.

Mr. WALLACE. Which particular one was not found?

Mr. CASE. The one which was missing, according to the testimony, was the one amended April 29, 1943, for 1,000 pounds.

Mr. WALLACE. Where would the original be?

Mr. FREEDMAN. They have to give the original to the collector of customs, or they couldn't ship the stuff.

Mr. CASE. What was the custom of BEW in handling these licenses after they were issued? Were they permanent files?

Mr. FREEDMAN. Yes.

Mr. CASE. They were permanent files?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. CASE. And the property of the Government?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. CASE. If you had ever been given all the power you state you should have had to carry out the responsibilities placed on you, would you have asked for some voice in determining what material should be exported.

Mr. WALLACE. Not in the export field. What we were interested in was in the import field. That is where we wanted the powers.

Mr. CASE. You had a list of critical materials not to be sent out of the country?

Mr. WALLACE. We had a completely happy relationship with Lend-Lease. There was no case of conflict there. We did not feel we had enough critical materials coming into the country. It had nothing to do with the export field. We had no interest in that.

Mr. CASE. Do you recall the top personnel of Lend-Lease in 1943?

Mr. WALLACE. There was a man by the name of Nollenberg. Of course the top was Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., now passed away. I think Tom McCabe was his right-hand man. And there was a man, Van Buskirk, now, I believe, with the Mellons in Pittsburgh. I think Mr. Pratt of General Motors was there. I had very little to do with Lend-Lease at the time.

Mr. CASE. Do you know who had to do with requests for export licenses that came from the Soviet Purchasing Commission?

Mr. WALLACE. I didn't learn that until I was getting ready to go to China via Soviet Russia along in April 1944, and I was trying to find somebody who would go along with me as a Russian translator, and I was told that there was somebody over in Lend-Lease, and I called up General Wesson and was informed at that time that he had to do with this type of activity. That was the first time I had known of him, so far as I can remember.

Mr. CASE. What type of activity do you mean?

Mr. WALLACE. The purchasing on lend-lease account and sending to Russia.

Mr. WOOD. You don't recall anything specifically having to do with the development of the atomic bomb?

Mr. WALLACE. Oh, no. Why do you make a statement like that, sir?

Mr. CASE. Because you used the words "with this type of activity."

Mr. WALLACE. I think your question was friendly, because you did not want my statement misinterpreted. I am sure it was friendly.

Mr. CASE. You said some people in the State Department felt BEW was getting into its province. Who were those people?

Mr. WALLACE. In the first instance, Sumner Wells and Dean Acheson. Later on we straightened this out very comfortably with the State Department, but at the beginning they felt if we sent men to South America to stimulate the production of quinine, or get out quartz crystals, or to make sure there was plenty of tin or rubber coming along, these men would be running around loose, not reporting to the respective embassies, and that they would cross up the wires of the State Department, and for a while there was very great delay in getting visas to get the men out of the country, and very great delay in getting messages from them. The messages that would come from them would lie around the State Department sometimes for a week or more. This was largely due to the cumbersomeness of the State Department machinery, but we did not understand that at the time.

Mr. CASE. Did the State Department have representation on the Board of Economic Warfare?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. CASE. What person or persons represented the State Department?

Mr. WALLACE. Usually Dean Acheson sat on the Board. Sometimes Secretary Hull himself sat on the Board.

Mr. CASE. But most of the time it was Mr. Acheson?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. CASE. Mr. Acheson opposed granting you greater power?

Mr. WALLACE. According to Harold Smith, in January 1941 Mr. Acheson opposed it, yes, and I think later on when it came to this amendment he opposed it as well. Secretary Hull also opposed it. But eventually we worked out the relationship with the State Department on a very satisfactory basis.

Mr. CASE. Did anyone sit in for Mr. Acheson at any time in meetings of the BEW?

Mr. WALLACE. There may have been. I don't recall.

Mr. CASE. He may have had one of his associates or close friends sit in for him?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know. That could be verified from the records, of course.

Mr. CASE. I have here a photostat of a story which appeared in the New York Times on the 22d of September 1945, which reads in part as follows:

WASHINGTON, September 21.—A proposal sponsored by Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace that the United States, Britain, and Canada reveal the secret of the atomic bomb to Russia was discussed at President Truman's Cabinet meeting today and brought about a pointed debate that ended with no decision after having caused the longest Cabinet session of the present administration.

Did you make that proposal?

Mr. WALLACE. I did not, and I have a complete record of that whole incident which, if you wish, I will be glad to read into the record at this time.

Mr. CASE. I don't care to go into it.

Mr. WALLACE. I am sure you don't want to go into it. It is relevant.

Mr. WOOD. You state you did not make the proposal?

Mr. WALLACE. I did not, and President Truman realized I did not, and on his own initiative knocked it down. His attitude was magnificent throughout. The statement the President made appeared in the

New York Times of September 24, 1945, under a September 23, 1945, Washington date line:

The President denied firmly that Mr. Wallace had insisted that the atomic bomb be turned over to Russia. He said Mr. Wallace took a no more active part in the discussion than anybody else at the meeting.

I have a complete statement of the Cabinet meeting at the time, which I don't know if it would be ethical or not to make public. I denounced to the President himself that there had been a "lying leaker" in the Cabinet meeting. He agreed, and he told a subsequent meeting of the members of the top Cabinet at a luncheon—just the top Cabinet—that the man he thought had done this leaking would no longer sit in Cabinet meetings.

Mr. HARRISON. Are you familiar with the identity of that person?

Mr. WALLACE. He didn't mention his name.

Mr. WOOD. Aside from that?

Mr. WALLACE. I could only guess at it, and I think that would be a mistake. I may say Dean Acheson also spoke to me about this, and said what a terrible thing it was, and I might say his guess as to who was responsible for this was quite different from the President's guess.

Mr. CASE. The proposal to share the atomic bomb with Russia was discussed at the meeting?

Mr. WALLACE. It was not.

Mr. CASE. It was not?

Mr. WALLACE. It did not come up. It did not come up.

Mr. CASE. Did you oppose the idea?

Mr. WALLACE. It didn't come up. I can read my complete record, if you want to know what it was.

Mr. CASE. How do you account for the story that appeared in the New York Times that the subject did come up?

Mr. WALLACE. King Solomon should add to the seven things beyond the wisdom of men, the things printed in newspapers. I do not blame the newspapers too much when they are guided by people who have special interests to serve.

Mr. CASE. This story in the New York Times also says:

Mr. Wallace, it is understood, argued in support of his proposal that now is the time to make a real start toward a working world union through a demonstration of good faith to the Soviet Union.

Mr. WALLACE. Again I say, if you want me to read my complete record I will be glad to read it.

Mr. WOOD. I will be glad for you to file it with the committee if you so desire, Mr. Wallace. We will be glad to have it filed with the testimony.

Mr. KEARNEY. Will the gentleman yield? I think, in all fairness to the witness, there have been several questions asked as to whether he did make the statement which appeared in the New York paper, and I think the witness' statement in that connection should be made a part of the record.

Mr. WOOD. I said it could be made a part of the record.

Mr. WALTER. I think it should be read into the record.

Mr. WOOD. How long would it take to read it?

Mr. WALLACE. It would take, I would think, 10 minutes.

Mr. CASE. Mr. Chairman, there are two specific questions I want to ask to bring this to a head, then if the committee wants to hear it, the witness could read his statement.

You state definitely, first of all, that you did not make any such proposal at the Cabinet meeting as was reported in the New York Times?

Mr. WALLACE. I make that statement, and President Truman made the statement.

Mr. CASE. You also say that the proposal to share the atomic-bomb secret with Russia was not discussed at that Cabinet meeting?

Mr. WALLACE. I think I had better consult the record and see just the form in which it came up.

Mr. WOOD. I understood you to say it did not come up?

Mr. WALLACE. I said the question of sharing the atomic bomb with Russia did not come up. [Reading:]

The President asked Secretary Stimson to open the meeting, which he did in an unusually comprehensive statement. He said that all the scientists with whom the War Department worked were convinced there was no possible way of holding the scientific secret of the atomic bomb, and therefore they felt there should be free interchange of scientific information between different members of the United Nations. He said that the scientists told him that the bombs thus far dropped were utilizing only a very small fraction of the power of the atom, and that future bombs would be infinitely more destructive—perhaps as greatly advanced over the present bombs as the present bombs are over the bombs which existed prior to 1945. He said some were afraid they would be so powerful as to ignite the atmosphere and put an end to the world. He said he realized that any interchange of scientific information with the other United Nations would bring into the foreground the problem of Russia. He then entered into a long defense of Russia, saying that throughout history Russia had been our friend, that we had nothing that Russia wanted. He said our relationship during recent months had been improving. President Truman agreed to this.

Mr. HARRISON. Are those the minutes of the Cabinet meeting from which you have just read?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. HARRISON. It is your own memorandum?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. HARRISON. That is what you are reading from?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. There is one other point Secretary Stimson made at the time which I think is of some interest:

Secretary Stimson said it was conceivable that some of the other nations could learn the secret of the atomic bomb without any help from us within 3 years, and almost certainly within 5 years.

Mr. CASE. At any time have you advanced the proposal or supported the proposal that the secret of the atomic bomb should be shared with Russia?

Mr. WALLACE. What I said at that time, I backed up Secretary Stimson in his proposal and said that if we did carry out his proposal and there was an interchange with Russia of scientific information, there should be a proviso that our men should work in Russian laboratories if their men worked in our laboratories.

I came out, by the way, against sharing construction details. I said all scientists knew that the scientific information was known in many foreign nations. The men who did the work for us were mostly foreigners. I said there should be no interchange of know-how.

Let me say this to Mr. Case, and being from South Dakota I believe he will be interested: I am from the corn country. We have inbred strains of corn and chickens. We would not give them to anybody. We employ scientists. If the scientists discover anything they are at liberty to publish that. What the scientist wants is to get credit for having discovered something. And there is something about science that when somebody discovers something, somebody in another part of the world is almost certain to be discovering it at about the same time.

There are secrets with regard to our inbreds (our know-how) which will benefit us for several years, but when it comes to scientific approach what we have learned, someone else will know within a few months. Science never has and never will advance on the basis of compartmentalization and secrets.

The bulk of the people, and I think most Congressmen, don't understand the nature of science; that there isn't any secret and never was any secret that you could lock up and keep away from somebody else.

Back in December of last year they lifted the ban on the articles published in Russian scientific magazines, and now it appears the Russians were abreast of the thing in the scientific world in 1940. That was not known until last December. That is what I am told. I haven't seen it, but a newspaperman told me he had looked it over and found that true. That is why this whole misunderstanding arises.

I told the Cabinet meeting that if they were placing their confidence in scientific secrecy, they were placing their confidence in a Maginot Line, and there was no security there.

Some people said the Russians couldn't discover the atom bomb for 20 years. Secretary Stimson said 3 or 5 years.

Mr. CASE. Then there was a discussion of sharing the atomic bomb?

Mr. WALLACE. There was not. I said very clearly I was against sharing of know-how. I advocated we keep the secrets of construction from any nation. I advocated that with Dr. Bush.

Mr. CASE. And if blueprints of construction details got into the hands of some foreign power, would you regard that as unfortunate?

Mr. WALLACE. Very definitely. I would be against it in the hands of any power.

Mr. CASE. But not scientific information?

Mr. WALLACE. Science is universal. You can't bottle science up, and when you do you condemn your own Nation to backwardness.

Mr. CASE. Coming back to the basic question with which the inquiry was concerned, you say if export licenses were issued through BEW, that was purely a ministerial or clerical function, because the stamp of Lend-Lease would clear them automatically?

Mr. WALLACE. That is right.

Mr. CASE. And that any responsibility for the issuance of those licenses rests at the door of Lend-Lease and the policies determined for it by the State Department?

Mr. WALLACE. It rested with Lend-Lease. I don't know whether the State Department determined policy.

Mr. KEARNEY. Most of your problems came from the Department of State?

Mr. WALLACE. No, Department of Commerce and Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The State Department made objections in the

spring and summer of 1942. We ironed our difficulties out with the State Department very satisfactorily.

Mr. CASE. Wasn't there a feeling on the part of Mr. Byrnes—

Mr. WALLACE. Secretary Hull.

Mr. CASE. You are anticipating the question. I think it was a protest of Mr. Byrnes against statements by you that resulted in your resignation from the Cabinet?

Mr. WALLACE. That does not have to do with the immediate question before this committee.

Mr. KEARNEY. The name Dean Acheson has been mentioned so much that I assumed most of your problems were with him?

Mr. WALLACE. I had a friendly feeling with him, but we did have marked conflicts in administration.

Mr. KEARNEY. During the examination by counsel here, you stated in words or substance that you would rather have Mr. Freedman answer certain questions. Was that because he had knowledge of the particular facts?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes. He was an attorney with the Board of Economic Warfare and operated in this particular field which has to do with export licenses.

Mr. KEARNEY. Following the line of examination by Mr. Case, I am going to ask you specifically, did you have anything to do at any time, directly or indirectly, with the expediting or issuance of any export license to anybody or any nation?

Mr. WALLACE. No. I have no recollection of having entered into that at all, and BEW itself did not enter into that except to a very limited extent.

Mr. KEARNEY. Can you answer my question more specifically?

Mr. WALLACE. I have no knowledge in any way, shape, or form.

Mr. KEARNEY. Can you answer yes or no?

Mr. WALLACE. No.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Nixon.

Mr. NIXON. In regard to the matter of expediting licenses, I understood you to say a moment ago, or your counsel said, that at one time you had a backlog of 100,000 license applications?

Mr. WALLACE. I remember there was a big log-jam. I think I said 100,000 and turned to counsel and asked him if that was about right.

Mr. FREEDMAN. Not quite that much.

Mr. NIXON. And never on any occasion did you take one license out of the bottom of the pile and expedite it?

Mr. WALLACE. Never. I don't know what pressure might have come in sideways on the boys.

Mr. NIXON. But you say that you yourself never expedited the issuance of any license?

Mr. WALLACE. Never, at any time.

Mr. NIXON. What about the Board?

Mr. WALLACE. The Board, which is composed of the heads of Cabinet departments, is one thing. The Board met on questions of top policy. Then there was the executive branch of BEW under the management of Milo Perkins, where there were, I suppose, 3,000 employees, and they did that work.

Mr. NIXON. I am referring to the issuance of the licenses themselves.

Mr. WALLACE. It is a clerical job without policy on our part entering into it.

Mr. NIXON. There was testimony presented to this committee on Tuesday by Colonel Merritt.

Mr. WALLACE. Of what organization?

Mr. NIXON. Manhattan Engineering District in New York. He was in the office which had control over approving the shipments of atomic products—uranium and related products—abroad. He referred specifically to one case that he said became, I think his words were “a very hot case” in their department, involving the shipment of 1,000 pounds of uranium to the Soviet Union through the firm of Boris Pregel; and from his testimony it was apparent to me, and I think to other members of the committee, that this was an unusual case in which action was desired at an early date. It is difficult for me to reconcile that testimony with your statement that in no case did BEW exercise any discretion, you just took them in their order.

Mr. WALLACE. Mr. Freedman informs me that the method of handling the licenses, they were divided by countries and by products. It was not one pile. I know nothing about the mechanical details of handling them.

Mr. NIXON. Do you recall what the backlog was, approximately, in April 1943?

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know.

Mr. NIXON. It was large?

Mr. FREEDMAN. It was always large.

Mr. WALLACE. I don't know. I know there was always pressure from the trade to get them coming along faster.

Mr. NIXON. I understood counsel to say the backlog was always large. When did you first learn that shipments of uranium oxide, uranium nitrate, and heavy water were being made to Russia?

Mr. WALLACE. In 1946, when I read it in the press.

Mr. NIXON. You didn't know of any of the shipments before that time?

Mr. WALLACE. No. I was informed that there was a newspaper effort—this was in the spring of 1946—a newspaper effort in New York to involve me in something of this sort. I didn't know at that time what it was. I was informed that this newspaper effort originated in Washington, that it was in the nature of a sinister plot, and that this sinister plot would develop later in the press. I learned enough in May 1946 so that I did speak to Secretary of War Patterson about it on May 16.

Mr. NIXON. In your statement, on page 6, you say: “I had absolutely nothing to do with any of these licenses. I was not aware that they were being requested. I did know”——

Mr. WALLACE. There is a “not” that belong in there.

Mr. NIXON. “I did not know that Lend-Lease recommended”?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. You did testify that you recognized, obviously because of your broad scientific knowledge, the importance of uranium oxide in the development of the atomic project?

Mr. WALLACE. I recognized the importance of U-235. I didn't know the relationship of U-235 to uranium, but I did recognize the high importance of U-235.

Mr. NIXON. You recognized the importance of the product, and the Board of Economic Warfare issued the licenses, but you did not even know your Board issued licenses in 1943 for this material?

Mr. WALLACE. No. This was a purely mechanical proposition. We issued approximately 8,000 licenses a day.

Mr. NIXON. That is all.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one more question.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Walter.

Mr. WALTER. Did you attempt, either directly or indirectly, to influence anybody in a decision to issue a license for any uranium product?

Mr. WALLACE. No, sir, I did not, and I think this should be cleared up in the record. It is really a very small item, but General Groves said he did not know what indirect pressure Mr. Wallace might have brought on him or Manhattan project through others. Because that was left slightly dangling in General Groves' testimony, I would like to say I certainly did not.

Mr. WALTER. I think General Groves cleared that up in a letter we received this morning.

Mr. WALLACE. There was that little bit of testimony that was left dangling.

Mr. WALTER. That is all.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Velde.

Mr. VELDE. Were you acquainted with any of the producers of uranium while you were head of BEW and Vice President of the United States?

Mr. WALLACE. Yes.

Mr. VELDE. Who were they?

Mr. WALLACE. On December 27, 1943, Boris Pregel came to see me, with the request I put him in touch with scientific men in the Department of Agriculture. He told me he was manufacturing radium at a plant at Mount Kisco. I don't recall that he referred to uranium at the time. He never said anything to me about the atom bomb until 3 days after it had been dropped on Hiroshima.

The first time I met him was December 1943, and at that time he wanted me to put him in touch with scientific men in the Department of Agriculture. I called Eugene Auchter, director of Scientific Research, and asked for Mr. Pregel to meet Eugene Auchter. And I arranged with Mr. Pregel to get some alpha radiation, a byproduct of the manufacture of radium, for experimentation in my garden. I experimented with it in 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, and 1948.

Mr. VELDE. That was in your New York farm?

Mr. WALLACE. No, first in Washington and subsequently my New York farm.

Mr. VELDE. You knew he was a producer of uranium, and that uranium could be used in the manufacture of the atom bomb?

Mr. WALLACE. He did not refer to the atom bomb until August 8, 1945, after it had been dropped on Hiroshima. At that time he gave me photostats of statements he had issued to the Miami paper in 1941 as to the peacetime and wartime importance of atomic energy.

Mr. VELDE. Would you say your relationship with Boris Pregel was a close relationship during that time?

Mr. WALLACE. I wouldn't say a close relationship. I knew him. He translated for me. When I found the President wanted me to go to China via Soviet Asia, when the President first indicated that, I started trying to learn Russian.

Mr. VELDE. Who accompanied you to Russia at the time you made that trip?

Mr. WALLACE. Could we finish one subject at the time, or shall we wander all over the map?

Mr. VELDE. I am sorry I interrupted you.

Mr. WALLACE. I merely wanted to say I had studied Russian very assiduously when the President told me he wanted me to go to China via Russia, and I had one of the teachers here in Washington. I won't mention his name because I don't want to prejudice him in any way. He is not seated in this room, I might say.

What I wanted to do at that time, we felt Russia's part in the war effort was very significant, and I was going to be visiting certain spots in Siberia where they were seeking to produce many products that would save the lives of American boys, and I wanted to make some speeches. So I asked Mr. Pregel—because he was born in Russia and was driven out by the Bolsheviks in 1917, I believe—I asked if he would translate my speeches into Russian. I thought his translation would be better than that of the people I had been working with. He did translate them for me, and I saw him rather frequently during that period.

If you have any further questions on the Pregel matter, would you like to ask them?

Mr. WOOD. It is very interesting, but is it pertinent here?

Mr. VELDE. Yes, I think it is, in view of the fact he has made the statement he did not mention the subject of uranium to anyone, and in view of the fact Boris Pregel was a producer of radium at the time and was a very close friend.

Mr. WOOD. Proceed.

Mr. WALLACE. I didn't say he was a very close friend. I first met Mr. Pregel on December 27, 1943.

Mr. VELDE. Did you discuss the subject of uranium with him?

Mr. WALLACE. We discussed alpha radiation. That has nothing to do with the bomb. It is a byproduct of the manufacture of radium. I don't recall discussing the subject of uranium, as such, until after the bomb was dropped. But we did discuss the use of this byproduct for agricultural purposes. Mr. Pregel did not bring up at any time the subject of shipments of uranium or the bomb.

Mr. VELDE. Mr. Chairman, if you prefer I will not go into the trip to China and Russia at this time, because I don't see that it will serve a useful purpose at this time.

Mr. WALLACE. With regard to this statement, I have some hesitancy about putting it in the record of the committee, because it involves a lengthy statement of what took place at Cabinet meetings, and I would like to clear it with someone at the White House before putting it in. I think probably I have put enough in the record. I may say that the statement that President Truman made knocking the story down in the New York Times was made without solicitation on my part.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the date of that Cabinet meeting?

Mr. WALLACE. September 21, 1945.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidence the memorandum of the Board of Economic Warfare approved by Mr. Wallace to which I referred earlier, and I ask that it be marked "Wallace Exhibit 2."

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The memorandum above referred to, marked "Wallace Exhibit 2," is hereinafter included in the record.) ³²

Mr. WOOD. The committee will stand in recess until 2:30 this afternoon.

(Thereupon, a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m., Thursday, January 26, 1950.)

AFTER RECESS

The committee reconvened, pursuant to the taking of the recess, Hon. Francis E. Walter, presiding.

Mr. WALTER. The committee will come to order.

Whom do you wish to call first, Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Hoopes.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Hoopes, will you raise your right hand, please?

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HOOPES. I do.

Mr. WALTER. Sit down, please.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES P. HOOPES

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state your full name, Mr. Hoopes?

Mr. HOOPES. James P. Hoopes.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your present address?

Mr. HOOPES. 39 Poplar Street, Douglaston, Long Island, N. Y.

Mr. TAVENNER. When and where were you born?

Mr. HOOPES. July 6, 1913, Westchester, Pa.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is your present occupation?

Mr. HOOPES. I am a lawyer.

Mr. TAVENNER. Would you furnish the committee with a résumé of your past employment, including any service that you may have had in the United States Army?

Mr. HOOPES. I had a commission in the Coast Artillery Reserve of the Army from 1933 to 1938. From March of 1942 until early November 1943, I was employed in the Office of the Lend-Lease Administration. At that time I entered the service of the Navy, in November 1943, and I was released to inactive duty in April 1946. I have been engaged in private practice since that time.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Hoopes, will you tell us the exact nature of your employment and your position with Lend-Lease during 1943?

Mr. HOOPES. I was a liaison officer in the Division for Soviet Supply. I had to do in some measure with lend-lease requisitions for materials to be shipped to Russia.

Another one of my jobs was having to do with cash purchases of materials to be exported to Russia.

As a liaison officer, the main function of the job was to handle the Soviet requests with the various Government agencies and persons in the Government who were in a position to pass upon their availability as to material, and so forth, and obtain the necessary priorities to be awarded if the material was to be shipped. That is about the size of it.

³² See appendix.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, now, you spoke of cash purchases and lend-lease purchases. Why was it necessary for you to have to deal with cash purchases, when you were an employee of Lend-Lease? Were not cash purchases handled direct through other agencies?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir. Our office handled, during the time that I was there, the cash purchases for the Soviet Union, which required clearance for export, particularly those which required any priority assistance. All the requests for priority assistance or for clearance for export of those purchases funneled through our office.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, what was the practice in your office when you received a requisition, say, from the Soviet Purchasing Commission for some article of merchandise, or some commodity?

Mr. HOOPES. Do you mean a lend-lease requisition, or do you mean a cash-purchase application?

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, let's take both of them. Lend-Lease, first.

Mr. HOOPES. In the case of a lend-lease requisition, one of the first jobs that we had to do was to check to see if the material requested under the requisition was within the program of aid to the Soviet Union.

Mr. TAVENNER. How did you ascertain that fact?

Mr. HOOPES. Well, the materials were set forth in the protocol that governed the lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union, and certain quantities of various materials were committed by the United States to Russia, and it was our first job to see if any of these requests came within the categories of the material that was authorized. Once we determined that, we checked the particular liaison officer who was handling that particular material. There were several liaison officers. The one liaison officer handling the particular material would check with the various members of the War Production Board and any other agencies that controlled that material.

For instance, if the material was copper or a certain kind of machine, we checked with the people in the War Production Board and the branch that controlled the production and the availability of the supply of that commodity. We would find whether that material was available. We would find what sort of priority was needed to obtain the production and the making of it available to the Russians.

We also checked as to the shipping, the size, the tonnage, and the bulk of the shipment, because it was our job to control the amount and to schedule the shipping. That was not my job, but we made a report on it.

These requisitions, then, after we had had preliminary information on them, were ordinarily taken up in our Division at a requisition meeting, at which General Wesson presided, and they were reviewed and discussed. If there were some questions of policy to be determined, those questions were brought up, and the officers would give a report as to what the War Production Board had to say as to the availability, and so on. If the requisition was ultimately passed, it was then forwarded to the War Production Board for routing through the various branches to obtain priority, and then finally it was turned over to the procurement agency of Lend-Lease to buy the material. Lend-Lease did not buy the material, but there were various Government agencies that did. And the requisition was given to them, and they purchased the material, which was generally put out on bids or however they saw fit to do it.

From that point, when the goods were ready for delivery, they were scheduled for shipment. That was not my particular function, but we followed it through.

Mr. TAVENNER. If that requisition was designed for export to a foreign country, to what extent was that procedure which you have described supplemented?

Mr. HOOPES. I am only talking about the requisitions that were——

Mr. TAVENNER. For export?

Mr. HOOPES. All Lend-Lease requisitions.

Mr. TAVENNER. Of course, the only ones would have been for export.

Mr. HOOPES. And the only ones we were involved with were for export to Russia.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, you have not mentioned anything about the necessity of having an export license.

Mr. HOOPES. No export license was required, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. No export license was required for any material which was being exported to Russia?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir; under lend-lease. There is a distinction to be made between lend-lease materials and cash purchases.

Mr. TAVENNER. And cash purchases. All right.

Mr. HOOPES. The lend-lease requisition itself was the shipping authority. Once it had gone finally through all the various stages it went to, and got into production, and so on, it contained authority to ship; the requisition itself did. And they were shipped pursuant to the Lend-Lease Act, and they were shipped with lend-lease funds. The cash purchases were handled in an entirely different manner.

Mr. TAVENNER. But you issued a certificate of release to accompany the material, did you not, when it was lend-lease?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. You did not?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir; that was for cash purchases only.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, now, describe the situation where it was a cash-purchase transaction.

Mr. HOOPES. I am not entirely familiar with the situation as to the procedure of cash purchases all the way through, until about July of 1943, when the procedure changed. To the best of my recollection, the Soviet Purchasing Commission would send an application through by letter to our office, requesting an export license for shipment of some particular commodity or material. My only part in the picture at that time was the assistance for priority. If the material needed priority assistance, it would be accompanied by a WPB form, and then I got that form and checked with the Government agencies in similar manner to the handling of lend-lease requisitions, to see if the material was available, what priority it needed, and so forth. And even though it was a cash purchase application, these items were considered from many of the same lend-lease points of view, about shipping, the critical nature of supply, and the comparative needs of our own Government agencies for other purposes.

I would send the priority application to the War Production Board and follow it through the branches until it got its priority and was returned to our office. When it was returned, with the necessary priority on it, it was my recollection that we gave approval to the export licensing—I did not handle this ordinarily—and that the export license was actually issued by the Board of Economic Warfare. It

was their document. We gave our approval to it, and it already had its priority, and it was then returned to the Russians. It was given a number and a date on which it was approved; and the export license, together with the priority itself, the priority certificate, was returned to the Russians. They in turn would turn that over to their supplier, who would use it in getting the material and in shipping it.

The procedure was changed later, but up to that point I did not have a great deal to do with the export licensing itself. I had to do mostly with priorities.

Mr. TAVENNER. When you say it "was changed later," you mean at what date?

Mr. HOOPES. I believe the change date was July 1, 1943. I think that was the effective date of the change. We worked out with the Board of Economic Warfare an arrangement whereby they would issue what was called a program license to the Soviet Union. Then the Soviet Purchasing Commission would submit to our office what was called a release certificate. It was a document which set forth the nature of the material that they wanted to purchase, their immediate supplier, several details about what the ingredients of the material were, the shipping weight, and the bulk, and so forth. They sent that to our office. It was up to us, then, to pass upon it and approve it for export under the program license.

The program which the program license covered was the protocol. In other words, it was strictly tying in all Russian shipments, whether they were for cash or lend-lease, to the protocol, so that it was one program. And then one of us would sign the application, the release certificate, give it a number, and return it to the Soviet Purchasing Commission.

Mr. TAVENNER. Let me stop you, there, a moment.

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. The protocol agreement that was negotiated with the Russian Government was negotiated with what agency of the United States Government?

Mr. HOOPES. I am not entirely sure. It wasn't by any specific agency, Mr. Tavenner. It was a document which was signed, like a treaty between ambassadors of the various countries. It wasn't just with the Soviet Government. Great Britain, I believe, and Canada were also parties to the protocol agreement. But it was a program which was worked out by a top level committee composed of our highest Government officials, including the people from the Army and Navy, to decide what materials would go to Russia that following year. And then it was given to us. We were on what you may say was the lower echelon level of this job. The program was worked out, and it was given to us to carry out.

Mr. TAVENNER. In obtaining the priority on cash purchases, with whom did you deal in the War Production Board? What officials?

Mr. HOOPES. Hundreds of them.

Mr. TAVENNER. Would that depend upon the particular character of the material?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes. It would entirely. Because I not only would deal with the individuals who received the applications. There was one whole floor in the building that did nothing but receive the applications and see that they funneled to the right branches. But then

I dealt with the people in all the branches that this application had to go by.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, let us come right to the question that we are concerned with, here. With whom did you deal regarding priorities for the export of uranium?

Mr. HOOPES. I didn't deal with anybody regarding uranium. You are speaking of the particular April transactions?

Mr. TAVENNER. Any transactions.

Mr. HOOPES. I never had any dealing with anybody in the War Production Board regarding uranium.

Mr. TAVENNER. You did not. Do you know who, of the Lend-Lease officials, did have such—

Mr. HOOPES. Excuse me. Could I interpose something there, that may help?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. HOOPES. The War Production Board wasn't always the controlling agency as far as a decision as to whether an item was available or not was concerned. The War Production Board did issue the bulletins that were previously described in this hearing, setting forth the commodities and what agency or what person or what group handled that commodity; but it might very well be that certain commodities were handled by other groups than the War Production Board, and if that were the case, we had to deal with them.

Mr. TAVENNER. I understand. Well, now, do you know, from your contact with the handling of uranium, whether or not the War Production Board was consulted with regard to priorities for uranium?

Mr. HOOPES. I understand that the War Production Board was consulted. It was not by me.

Mr. TAVENNER. By whom?

Mr. HOOPES. I believe Mr. Moore had to do with that.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, did you consult any other agency with regard to the export of uranium? You or any other official of your staff?

Mr. HOOPES. Well, I am not sure who else might have consulted anybody else. I know that Mr. Moore was handling uranium. The only people that I consulted were in the office of Colonel Crenshaw in New York, and that was because I had a memorandum from Mr. Moore that there was something pending on a particular application, and in his absence I happened to handle that. I had understood that there had been considerable background of negotiations and clearance discussions on this particular thing, and it had reached the stage where I was given specific instructions about it. And when the time came, I contacted Colonel Crenshaw's office, under instructions to do so.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is that the first experience that you had in any transaction relating to uranium?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then tell us about the negotiations that had occurred, as far as you learned of them, pertaining to this shipment, which I believe was the 1,000-pound shipment.

Mr. HOOPES. Well, sir, I believe you have more records than I on that. I went up yesterday afternoon and saw some of the old records on this, which I understand were turned over to this committee some time ago.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. HOOPES. I understand that Mr. Moore had been dealing in this matter with the Russians and with General Groves' office and with the WPB. I did not acquaint myself with all the details of that, except to know that this particular transaction, that application for 500 pounds of uranium nitrate and 500 pounds of uranium oxide, had been disapproved. I got into the picture at that time, when it had been disapproved by our office, and a letter had gone to the Russians advising them that it was of a critical nature and could not be supplied.

When Mr. Moore went away, in April—and I am not positive of the date—he left a memorandum for me advising that it might be possible to obtain some substitutes for uranium compounds, I believe.

Mr. WALTER. Have you the memorandum?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir, I don't have the memorandum.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have any note or personal memorandum that you made at the time regarding this transaction?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, let us start with that.

Mr. HOOPES. I have a note on April 16, 1943, and this note is in a little diary notebook that I kept during the course of the day's activities, and from which I later made up daily diaries, which we submitted to the head of our division every day, of work that went on. And I have a note here indicating that Mr. Fomichev called regarding 500 pounds of uranium oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate to be supplied from Chematar, Inc., of New York City. My note doesn't say any more than that, but sometimes it didn't. The diary for that day I think you also have. This is the daily report that was typed up, dated April 17, 1943, for activities on the 16th. One of the items appears as follows:

Conferred with Mr. Fomichev regarding application for export licenses for 1,000 pounds of uranium compounds, on which Soviets had option. This request has definitely been turned down by this division because of strategic need of materials in this country. Mr. Fomichev was advised to consider the matter closed as to this particular request, but that inquiries were being made as to allocation of any possible substitute materials.

In one of the instructions that Mr. Moore had left for me—I think the details are in a memo, there.

Mr. TAVENNER. No, the details are not in the memo. I will read you this. This much does appear from the memo of April 19:

Uranium: This is being handled by General Hoopes, who should be advised by General Wesson should matters become excessively complicated.

Mr. HOOPES. Don't you have another memo there on that, about that date? There was a memo that I saw yesterday that didn't have an exact date, but it indicated that Mr. Moore—it was to me and stated that it may be possible to obtain the substitutes and that Colonel Crenshaw's office was forwarding us a list of substitutes, and if I did not receive them by the following Monday I was to call Colonel Crenshaw's office, and then later to take the matter up with General Wesson.

Mr. McSWEENEY. What are the substitutes for uranium?

Mr. HOOPES. That is in the letter, sir. I am not familiar with them.

Mr. TAVENNER. We have a memorandum similar to that, but that is in June 1943. That is the memorandum, then, that you are speaking of, that should have been dated in April?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes. It must be, sir. Because it was tied in with the instructions for me to carry out when Mr. Moore was away.

Mr. WALTER. Who put the date of June on, when it should have been April?

Mr. HOOPES. I don't know, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you look at the memorandum and state whether that is the memorandum to which you referred?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, that is it.

Mr. WALTER. When was that memorandum made?

Mr. HOOPES. I don't know when it was made, Mr. Walter. It says on it "June 1943," but that is obviously wrong.

Mr. WALTER. Whose memorandum is it?

Mr. HOOPES. It is from Mr. Moore to me.

Mr. WALTER. To you?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. This was a copy prepared by the State Department?

Mr. HOOPES. This is a copy, and perhaps in copying it they may have made an error as to the date. I do not know. Mr. Moore may be able to clear you up on the date of this memo. I don't know.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you read it, please?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes. This copy says:

JUNE 1943.

For: J. P. Hoopes

From: W. C. Moore.

Subject: Uranium compounds.

It appears that it may be possible to get ferro-uranium compounds, and the information should be sent to you. I have talked with Colonel Crenshaw's office in New York and given them your name. If you do not get information by Monday, call them up. Mrs. Cochran has the number.

Get sufficient specifications so that the Soviets can make decisions as to whether it is suitable for their needs and, if possible, quantities available.

Captain Johnston of General Groves' office is the man in Washington who may be able to help you.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, did you follow the direction of Mr. Moore and call Colonel Crenshaw's office?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, I did. Evidently the list didn't come in Monday morning, that they referred to, and I called Colonel Crenshaw's office.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Hoopes, referring to that memorandum again, you saw the original memorandum, didn't you?

Mr. HOOPES. I saw it in 1943, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you see it recently?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir. I saw the same thing that you have here, just a compilation of material that has a bearing on all these transactions. I haven't seen the original memo; no.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you recall, from your independent recollection, that the matter of substitutes arose in April 1943?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir; I do. That is borne out by the subsequent correspondence which we have.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think so.

Mr. HOOPES. It definitely ties into that.

Mr. TAVENNER. All right. So will you proceed, then?

Mr. HOOPES. Well, it seems that—I don't know when it was received, but there was a letter from the Soviet Purchasing Commission to our office dated April 20, in which the Russians were upset about our having turned down this particular application previously, and they stated, in there—

Mr. TAVENNER. Let me hand you what purports to be a copy of the letter, furnished by the State Department, and I ask you if that is the letter to which you refer.

Mr. HOOPES. That is the one I was talking about, sir; yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, will you read the letter, please?

Mr. HOOPES. This letter is dated April 20, 1943. It is addressed to:

Major General CHARLES M. WESSON,

Senior Assistant Administrator,

Office of Lend-Lease Administration,

515 Twenty-second Street NW., Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL WESSON: We were advised by your office that our application of April 3, 1943, for export license for 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate had been declined. Needless to say this decision upsets the most urgent efforts of our war industries at present.

In view of the rejection of our two requisitions for uranium compounds by the War Department, we hoped to obtain small quantities of uranium compounds by direct purchase for cash. In fact we had several propositions from American companies. The materials were offered from the stock for immediate delivery. Your office was kept informed about all negotiations with those companies. Nevertheless, the conceivable purchase of uranium compounds was not authorized.

Because of the very urgent needs which you have always appreciated, I would very much appreciate your reconsidering the above decision of your office, and to authorize us to buy 500 pounds each of the afore-mentioned uranium compounds and 25 pounds of uranium metal, for which we also have a proposition.

Thank you for your early attention to this matter.

Sincerely yours,

N. S. STEPANOV,

Chief of Petroleum Products, Chemical Department.

Mr. TAVENNER. Let me ask you one question about the letter. There is a statement here that—

in fact we had several propositions from American companies. The materials were offered from the stock for immediate delivery. Your office was kept informed about all negotiations with those companies.

Now, what information did you receive regarding companies which had materials in stock for delivery?

Mr. HOOPES. That took place during the time that Mr. Moore was handling this, before I got into it.

Mr. TAVENNER. You had no knowledge of it?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. All right, sir.

Mr. HOOPES. On the 22d of April—I gather that the letter that I had been expecting from Colonel Crenshaw's office with the list of uranium compounds hadn't arrived, because I have a note here, "Call Colonel Crenshaw" and then I have a note "Out" and then later "Captain Merritt." The number is "Murray Hill 3-1761," subject "Uranium compounds," and then "Captain Merritt" and then the substance of what he advised me:

Said pressure had just been brought to bear on General Groves to release the 1,000 pounds. Colonel Crenshaw is willing for Russians to have the list of substitutes. Please try to hold off approval of the 1,000 pounds till Russians have chance to see the substitute list.

Now, after this—

Mr. TAVENNER. Just before you leave that: Did Captain Merritt explain anything further as to what he meant about pressure being brought to bear upon General Groves?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir; he did not.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you have any conversation with Captain Merritt or any other member of the Manhattan Engineering District with regard to that statement?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir. Captain Merritt is the only person I have ever talked to in the Manhattan District.

Mr. TAVENNER. All right. Proceed.

Mr. HOOPES. After this conversation, I have a note here that I spoke with General Wesson. I went in and talked to General Wesson. Mr. Moore had indicated previously that I was to take the matter up with General Wesson.

In discussing with General Wesson, I explained to him my conversation with Captain Merritt. I just indicated what I have read here. And General Wesson said he wanted to speak to General Groves. He gave instructions to his secretary to get him General Groves on the phone.

I have a note here:

Spoke with General Wesson. He called General Groves. Got Groves to say O. K. to export the 1,000 pounds uranium compounds. General Wesson agreed to write Soviets approving the request.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then the decision to approve the request for the issuance of an export license was made at the time of that telephone conversation?

Mr. HOOPES. I would believe so, sir.

Mr. WALTER. Were you present when the telephone conversation took place?

Mr. HOOPES. Mr. Walter, I don't remember. I remember distinctly General Wesson's giving instructions: "Get me General Groves."

And it was generally a pretty busy office around there, and I don't remember whether I stayed during the conversation or not. I rather imagine I did not.

Mr. WALTER. It was shortly thereafter that you were informed that permission had been granted for the export of this 1,000 pounds?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir; it was apparently right after General Wesson's conversation with General Groves, because I have tied it all in on the same note here. There are no intervening phone calls or anything else, so it must have been immediately after that telephone conversation that General Wesson gave me the instructions.

Mr. TAVENNER. And what was the date of that memorandum?

Mr. HOOPES. This memorandum is dated April 22.

Mr. TAVENNER. That was the day on which you talked to Colonel Crenshaw's office?

Mr. HOOPES. That is right, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. But spoke to Captain Merritt?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir.

After getting these instructions from General Wesson——

Mr. TAVENNER. Let me ask you this: Did General Wesson make any statement to you as to the reason for approving the issuance of this license on the 22d of April or at any later date?

Mr. HOOPES. I don't recall exactly whether he made his statement to me. I assume that he did, because in my report I said something about the reason, in my later report. I assume that we had some brief conversation about it. But I don't remember all of it. I can't swear to that, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. That was written in your report of May 31, summarizing these transactions.

Mr. HOOPES. Well, there was a report earlier than that. There was a report for the activities of April 22.

No, it doesn't give that. Shall I read you my report for that?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes; read from your report.

Mr. HOOPES. This is from my diary, dated April 23, 1943, for activities of the 22d:

Conferred with Captain Merritt in the office of Colonel Crenshaw, of War Department Engineers, New York City, on recent list of various substitutes for particular uranium compounds desired by Soviets. General Wesson arranged with General Groves for clearance of the original Soviet application for 1,000 pounds of such compounds, which the Soviets claim they can procure from stock. Prepared letter for General Wesson advising Soviets accordingly in light of their urgent need for this material. Export license now being put through.

Mr. WALTER. As I understand it, General Wesson was opposed to granting the permit. It was not until after this telephone call that he agreed to allow it.

Mr. HOOPES. Yes; that is true. This is conjecture, because I hadn't been in the early negotiations about this, but we had been apparently advised of the tight supply of this particular material. I myself knew nothing of the atomic project or nothing of the strategic situation about uranium. All the instructions I had received was that they couldn't get this material. And it wasn't until the conversation General Wesson had with General Groves that he made the decision.

My memo here to Mr. Moore expands that a little bit.

Mr. TAVENNER. But take the occurrences in the order in which they took place.

Mr. HOOPES. Well, on the 23d, the export license was approved to cover this request for 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate.

Mr. TAVENNER. I hand you what appears to be a copy of the application for the export license, with the notation at the foot of it by you. Will you examine it and state if that is a copy of the application?

Mr. HOOPES. I don't know. I assume it is. I mean these are excerpts. I know that I did make such a note on it and we put the export license through. I don't know whether there was any other material than this. This seems to give the details from the export-license application.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, will you read it, please, into the record?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir. This says:

The following apparently copied from the export license.

It is an application for export dated April 23, 1943.

Order number	Units	Supplier	Value
21-73/C 43058....	500 pounds urano-uranic oxide 99.5 percent pure, at \$4.50... 500 pounds uranium nitrate (uranyl) at \$2.25, total gross weight 1,200 pounds.	Chematar, Inc.	\$3,375

NOTE.—This application has been held up for some time. It has now been approved by General Wesson as of April 22, 1943.

That is all that is on that note. I don't know whether this other note is attached to it or not. There is another note on the next page here.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is the date of that note?

Mr. HOOPES. April 22 is the date of this other note. It is a note appended—I will assume it is appended to the other note. It is addressed to Mrs. Hall, but there is no signature—no indication of a signature—on either one of these notes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you read it? Doesn't it indicate that it was signed by a person?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir; it doesn't indicate it was signed by a person. It says, "Received from J. Hoopes."

Mr. TAVENNER. Received from? All right.

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir. It is a note to Mrs. Hall.

General Wesson has decided that this export license be approved and issued as soon as possible. Received from J. Hoopes.

Office note: Indicates license No. C-1643180 assigned on April 23, 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was that license number assigned by your office?

Mr. HOOPES. I gather that it was, sir. I do not remember that procedure. Mr. Moore handled the export licenses and I don't know whether they were numbers given to us by the Board of Economic Warfare which we assigned as we approved them or whether they were our own numbers. We put the number on the export license. I do know that.

Mr. TAVENNER. All right. Will you proceed?

Mr. HOOPES. Well, on the 23d, a letter was written by General Wesson to Mr. Stepanov of the Soviet Purchasing Commission. Do you wish me to read that?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. HOOPES (reading):

Your letter of April 20, requesting reconsideration of your application for export license covering 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate has received careful study.

Having in mind the urgency of your needs for this material as expressed in your letter, I have reviewed the situation. Our supply of these uranium compounds is critical. However, I am recommending approval of your present export license for the above quantities, which you state that you can purchase from stocks on hand.

As regards the 25 pounds of uranium metal also mentioned in your letter, we shall entertain application for this material provided you can locate a source of supply.

Sincerely yours,

C. M. WESSON,
Major General United States Army,
Senior Assistant Administrator.

Mr. WALTER. When was that letter, please?

Mr. HOOPES. The date of that letter was April 23, sir.

Mr. WALTER. And that was signed by General Wesson?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is notifying the Soviet Purchasing Commission of the approval of the license.

Now, what was the next thing that occurred?

Mr. HOOPES. I have a note, on April 26, of a telephone call that I received from Mr. Fomichev of the Commission.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is, of the Soviet Purchasing Commission?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir. He states:

Option expired for uranium compounds. Will send license application for 25 pounds uranium metal.

That is all that note says. I wrote it up a little fuller in the diary.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you make a comment of your own at that time, after receiving the notice that the option had expired which the Russians had expected to use?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir, I did. As I understand it, or as I understood it at the time, it was that General Wesson and General Groves were skeptical as to the fact that the Russians could get this material. Chematar was the supplier, and Chematar was the broker, and when the request was approved I believe it was approved on the assumption that they would never be able to fill it. And when Fomichev called and advised that he could no longer get it, it sounded as if the original assumption was correct.

Mr. TAVENNER. And did you not make some notation at the time, in your diary, with regard to that?

Mr. HOOPES. In my daily report? Yes, I did.

Mr. TAVENNER. In your daily report. Will you state what that was?

Mr. HOOPES. On April 27th, for activities on the 26th, I have a note here:

Conferred with Mr. Fomichev, who expressed dismay at inability to locate uranium compounds now that the export license has been granted. This development seems to confirm our skepticism regarding the stock supply which the Russians insisted had been offered from several sources.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you communicate that information to General Wesson; that is, the information that you had received about the supply being exhausted?

Mr. HOOPES. I assume that I did, Mr. Tavenner. I don't have a definite recollection of it. I did certainly in this diary, because all these diaries were written up as reports of our activities and were funneled in to General Wesson so that he could see what had been going on. So I imagine I spoke to him about it. I don't have any distinct note of that. I don't believe I do, anyhow. That memorandum of mine to Mr. Moore may indicate that, which you have in the record.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, do you have any other record there of transactions before you made a summary report on May 1?

Mr. HOOPES. I haven't any other—

Mr. TAVENNER. That is, action that you were familiar with?

Mr. HOOPES. I don't believe so, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you have any knowledge of the issuance of an amended or approval of an amended license?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir. I am not sure that one was amended. I know there has been a lot of discussion about it before this committee, but I don't know that there ever was an amended license.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, now, right in that connection, have you seen a request to amend the license?

Mr. HOOPES. Yesterday afternoon I saw this request dated April 28 from the Russians.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes. Had you seen that before yesterday?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir; I had not.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you know of the fact that such a letter had been written prior to yesterday?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir. The request was not addressed to us.

Mr. TAVENNER. To whom was it addressed?

Mr. HOOPES. Do you have a copy of it there? I took notes from that. Yours would be more complete than mine. It was addressed to "Mr. Thad C. Martin."

Mr. TAVENNER. That is right.

Mr. HOOPES. "Administrative Officer" or "Administrative Office"—I don't know which it was—"Operations Branch, Office of Exports, Board of Economic Warfare."

Mr. TAVENNER. I show you a letter of April 28, 1943, addressed to Mr. Martin, as you said. Will you read it?

Mr. HOOPES. It is dated April 28, 1943, addressed to:

Mr. THAD C. MARTIN,

*Administration Officer, Operation Branch,
Office of Exports, Board of Economic Warfare,
Room 2032, Tempo U Building, Twelfth and Constitution Avenue,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SIR: In reference to the above export license number—
excuse me. It was preceded by—

Re: export license No. 1643180.

DEAR SIR: In reference to the above export license number, covering 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate, we request that the license be amended as follows:

Net weight	Commodity	Unit price	Total price
500 pounds.....	Urano-uranic oxide, 95-98 percent pure.....	\$3.10	\$1,550
500 pounds.....	Uranium nitrate (nitrouранyl).....	2.85	1,425
Grand total.....			2,975

By the time our application had received a decision, the supplier, Chematar, Inc., found it necessary to change the specification of urano-uranic oxide and also the prices for both materials, to which changes we gave our consent, Your attention to this matter will be appreciated by us.

Very truly yours,

N. S. FOMICHEV,
In Charge of Chemicals.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, that letter is addressed to the Board of Economic Warfare, is it not?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. How is it that you have a copy of that in your files?

Mr. HOOPES. I haven't the faintest idea.

Mr. TAVENNER. When it was testified this morning by Mr. Wallace, as I recall it and understand, applications were made solely to Lend-Lease and were never made to the Bureau of Economic Warfare. Did you hear that testimony?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes; I did.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you so understand?

Mr. HOOPES. You mean you understand that that is a fact?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes; I understand that to be his testimony.

Mr. HOOPES. Well, that was what was supposed to happen. But the Russians didn't always conform to all procedures, and it was quite possible that when they couldn't get something in one place they would pop up somewhere else to see if they could get it. That was one reason why we ultimately changed their release certificate, their export license procedure. It wasn't anything to do with this, but it was the idea of trying to get the Russians to come to one office in the Government and

not be going all over town; because that way there might be duplicate approvals, and nobody could program anything.

Mr. WALTER. May I interrupt you at that point?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir.

Mr. WALTER. When the approval was received, who received the physical possession of the export license?

Mr. HOOPES. I believe the Soviet Purchasing Commission did, Mr. Walter.

Mr. WALTER. Yes. Then, if they received the possession of the paper authorizing the exportation of something that wasn't in short supply, there was no reason why that permission could not have been attached to something that there was a short supply of, was there?

Mr. HOOPES. Well, the export license itself had details of the commodity which was to be shipped, and it went with that material.

Mr. WALTER. Yes; I understand that full well. But suppose they were interested in obtaining material that our Government felt they should not have, and they were able to find a manufacturer or a producer who was willing to let them have that material. It could have been crated, and to the crate could have been affixed this license that was given to them for the material that was not in short supply.

Mr. HOOPES. The export license contained the information, as I recall, of the supplier, and the supplier in this case was Chematar.

Mr. WALTER. Yes.

Mr. HOOPES. And Chematar was purchasing it from someone else. Your question is whether it wouldn't have made any difference who Chematar was purchasing it from; that they could use it for any shipment?

Mr. WALTER. Precisely.

Mr. HOOPES. I am not so sure of that, although I am not familiar enough with the old export licenses to know, sir.

Mr. WALTER. Assuming the physical possession of the license was delivered over to the Soviet and they wanted to export something that we felt they should not export, and assuming that they could find somebody who was willing to do business with them, there is no reason why the package that that article finally got into could not have contained a false invoice?

Mr. HOOPES. That would sound so, but I am not sure but what the export license may have contained information as to the shipper or the consignor. I would have to see one of the forms.

Mr. WALTER. Well, but suppose the shipper would say that he was going to ship sulfuric acid, when as a matter of fact he was going to ship something else. Who would know what was inside of the container after the license had been attached to it?

Mr. HOOPES. I suppose that there was a certain amount of control at all the points of export by way of examination on the part of the port authorities and any other people who were responsible for export.

Mr. WALTER. Yes; but you know that none of the materials exported were ever examined. None of the crates or cartons were opened to see that they contained what the outside of the package stated they contained.

Mr. HOOPES. I imagine that is true, sir. In most cases they weren't opened.

I don't know how to answer your question as to items that were in stock and didn't need priorities to produce.

Mr. WALTER. Of course, this is perfectly gratuitous, but it certainly seems to me that we were very lax in our security when we delivered over to the Russians physical possession of the permit to export.

Proceed, Mr. Tavenner.

Mr. HOOPES. That was not our license, understand.

Mr. WALTER. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. When that license was approved and, as the evidence in this case shows, was delivered to the Soviet Purchasing Agency on the 26th of April, from that moment on didn't that license virtually occupy the position of a check payable to bearer, so that they could go at any time, find the material at any time during the life of that license, and make a shipment under it?

Mr. HOOPES. I frankly don't know whether there were any restrictions on those licenses or not as to time. On our later release certificates there were. There was a closer check on that. It expired after a certain time if they couldn't get it and ship it, and it would have to be renewed completely.

Mr. TAVENNER. After approval was granted by your agency, Lend-Lease, was there any follow-up investigation to determine whether or not the shipment had actually been made?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir; except in regard to the planning of shipping itself. If the item, for instance, was a large project of considerable bulk and weight, there was planning done as to the shipping. That was handled by another department in our office, and it followed that, to try to program that. On the other hand, there were some requests for specially expedited material that went in other ways, by air. Sometimes medical supplies went that way. Our only follow up, ordinarily, was to see that the material got to its point of export and got on its way. If the material was approved, our job was to keep it going.

Mr. TAVENNER. All right. Now, let me ask you this question: Once this license was amended and the shipment made, did not that shipment have to be assigned some priority in order to get out of Great Falls, Wis., on the same day on which it arrived?

Mr. HOOPES. I don't know, sir. I had nothing to do with that phase of it at all.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have got no priority from War Production Board on this shipment? That is, Lend-Lease got no priority?

Mr. HOOPES. No. I didn't. I don't know whether it had been arranged in any other way.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have enough knowledge of the situation to be able to state whether it could have been reshipped on the same date as its arrival in Great Falls, without having obtained some priority from some source?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir; I don't really have enough information about that. I didn't get into that phase of it at all.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, in going back to the amendment, what was your practice about amending approvals of licenses? Was that done in Lend-Lease, or was it done in the Board of Economic Warfare?

Mr. HOOPES. Well, I don't recall ever having any of them. This was the first export license thing that I had ever gotten into as far as the old type of license was concerned. I don't know what the procedure had been. Certainly, ordinarily, if there were amendments to the request itself, if the Russians came to us, if it required reconsidera-

tion or a different material, or for some other reason it required other priorities, we had to pass upon that.

Mr. TAVENNER. Well, would you not also have been required to pass upon the amendment of a license once it was issued? Was it not just as important that you act upon the matter then as it would have been when you received your initial requisition?

Mr. HOOPES. I would think so, sir. I mean, in answer to your question, if the Russians wanted to amend a request I think it would normally have to come to us, and we would have passed upon it; yes. I don't find any record that this request did come to us, or that we did pass upon it, or that it was amended.

Is there an amended license anywhere? I mean, that we know as a fact?

Mr. TAVENNER. There is testimony in the record that it was amended on the 29th of April, the next day after this letter was addressed to Board of Economic Warfare.

Mr. HOOPES. It may be possible, Mr. Tavenner, that the Russians considered this type of an amendment something which they should take up with the Board of Economic Warfare, because of the Board of Economic Warfare bulletins on the subject giving instructions as to the procedure in export licenses. And the change was one of reduction in purity and reduction in price, which ordinarily would not be one that the American Government would have been much interested in, in the general run of requests. And so it may very well be that the Russians assumed that that sort of thing should be handled with the Board of Economic Warfare. I am just surmising; I don't know. It apparently was not handled by our office.

Mr. TAVENNER. Now, I understand Mr. Moore was absent from a date somewhere around the 17th of April until some day in May. Is that correct?

Mr. HOOPES. Or the latter part of April. I am not sure when he came back.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you make a report to him upon his return?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. TAVENNER. Setting forth in greater detail what had transpired with regard to these transactions?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes; I made a memorandum, which you have there. I have it in the old testimony.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have it there. It is page 10.³³

Mr. HOOPES. I wrote a memorandum to Mr. Moore dated May 1, 1943:

To: William C. Moore.

From: J. Hoopes.

Subject: Summary of Recent Events on Application for Export License on Uranium Compounds.

Lieutenant Colonel Crenshaw of the Corps of Engineers in New York forwarded to this office a list of supplies of ferrouanium which were at one time available at the Latrobe Electric Steel Co. After telephone conversations between Mr. Hoopes and Captain Merritt in Colonel Crenshaw's office, permission was obtained from that office to release to the Soviet Commission the information on then available stocks of ferrouanium as a possible substitute for the urano-uranic oxide and uranium nitrate application for export license, which had been denied by this office April 14, 1943.

³³ Page 10 refers to transcript of earlier testimony which has not been printed.

Before this information was turned over to the Russians, however, Mr. Hoopes was notified that pursuant to telephone conferences between General Wesson and General Groves, the previous decision was reversed by General Groves and General Wesson, and it was decided to allow the Soviets to proceed under the export license to obtain the particular stocks of 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate previously applied for.

General Wesson advised that actually the War Department was anxious to smoke out the ultimate source from which Mr. Rosenberg was going to fill this order.

Mr. Hoopes was advised by General Wesson to advise the Soviet Commission of this new decision, pursuant to an urgent plea for reconsideration of the export license application made to General Wesson by Mr. Stepanov in a letter dated April 20, 1943. General Wesson decided that in such case it would not be necessary to forward to the Soviets any further information regarding ferro-uranium.

Accordingly the Soviet Commission was notified by letter from General Wesson, April 22, 1943, that application for export license to cover the above quantities of urano-uranic oxide and uranium nitrate would be approved, and further that this office would entertain application for export license for 25 pounds of uranium metal, also requested in Mr. Stepanov's letter, April 20, 1943.

Export licenses covering 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate, Order No. 21-73/L 43059 and 25 pounds of uranium metal, Order No. 21-73/C 43058, have now been issued and returned to the Soviet Commission.

A curious development on this entire matter occurred recently, when Mr. Fomichev called Mr. Hoopes and stated that in view of the lapse of time since the submission of export license applications for urano-uranic oxide and uranium nitrate, the Soviets were now having difficulty in locating a source of supply. Mr. Hoopes communicated this to General Wesson, who only smiled.

MR. TAVENNER. Now, did the Russians agree at any time to accept the ferro-uranium substitutes? Was the proposition actually discussed with the Russians, and if so, what position did they take about it?

MR. HOOPES. The proposition was discussed with them before we got the list from Colonel Crenshaw's office, apparently, and I believe they were advised that there would be a list of substitutes—or I don't know whether we used the term "substitutes," but other compounds given to them. And I believe the list from Colonel Crenshaw's office came in the same day that I talked to Captain Merritt on the phone. And since the decision of General Groves was to let them have this particular material, General Groves and General Wesson apparently decided not to go any further with the information as to ferro-uranium compounds. I don't believe that list was ever sent to the Russians.

MR. TAVENNER. Yes. But before that, did the Russians indicate that they would not accept or consider accepting substitutes? Do you have that in your report?

MR. HOOPES. I don't think that I have that in my report, Mr. Tavenner. There were memos and letters back and forth while Mr. Moore was handling it. I don't have any personal knowledge of them. And I think that discussion of that kind had taken place previously, before I got into this picture.

MR. TAVENNER. Now, what officials of the Board of Economic Warfare were consulted by you about the issuance of this particular license?

MR. HOOPES. I don't know of any.

MR. TAVENNER. You approved it. It was approved on the 22d. A letter was sent to the Russians on the 23d advising them that you had approved it?

MR. HOOPES. Yes, sir.

MR. TAVENNER. Now, who in the office of the Board of Economic Warfare actually issued the license? Do you know?

MR. HOOPES. I don't know, sir; no. I don't have, apparently, any records at all indicating that we had any correspondence with them or any talks with them at this time.

MR. TAVENNER. Well, do you know the practice in that office sufficiently well to state who is likely to have known about the issuance of that license?

MR. HOOPES. No, I don't, sir. I have not dealt with them on this at all, previously; not on this or any other applications. So that I don't know what the practice had been.

MR. TAVENNER. Do you know of any type of pressure, directly or indirectly, that was brought to bear on General Groves or any member of his staff to change his decision about the approval of this license?

MR. HOOPES. No; I don't know of any pressure that was brought to bear on him.

I am not entirely sure that the pressure that Captain Merritt was advising me of over the phone wasn't the pressure that he suggested in his testimony; that in this matter there was so much to-do about it, and the Russians were agitating for a decision as to whether we were going to let them have the material or not, and there had been so much negotiations back and forth, that there was great pressure on us for a decision. And it may have been that General Groves was talking about that same thing. They wanted to get it decided as to how they were going to handle it.

MR. TAVENNER. I don't have any further questions.

MR. MCSWEENEY. I was in the Army, and I was rather interested as to your very complete records. Is that a normal course for you: to keep complete records of things? I was interested in your notes and the records that you kept.

MR. HOOPES. Well, yes, this is a normal course for me. I still do it, as a matter of fact. I had a notebook that I used during the course of the day, that I used for the purpose of jotting down a note if I called someone on the phone or they called me or somebody came in. It was mainly for the purpose of my making up the diary to report to the head of our division each day. Because we saw so many people during the day that we wouldn't remember them.

MR. MCSWEENEY. Did you feel that a lot of telephone instructions, and so forth, should be recorded in your notebook? Is that why you did it? You did not like the idea of too many telephonic instructions coming in on an important matter?

MR. HOOPES. I did it, sir, so that I would have a better record in my own mind. There were so many coming that something might slip my mind by the end of the day, when it came time to report on them.

MR. MCSWEENEY. But you did receive a lot of instructions over the telephone, did you not, to do this and that?

MR. HOOPES. A great many, sir. And in the course of clearing applications, very much work like this was done over the phone, particularly in priority work, in talking with the War Production Board and that sort of thing.

MR. MCSWEENEY. You did have the feeling that it would be well to have those telephonic things made more definite in your own mind by taking notes on them?

Mr. HOOPES. Yes, sir; I did it for my own purposes, so that I could carry on my work easier.

Mr. McSWEENEY. You had no feeling, then, that there was a conflict of authority or anything that might put you in an embarrassing position at some time?

Mr. HOOPES. No, sir. It did help on many occasions, that if I talked to someone, for instance, in the War Production Board, that had agreed to approve a certain material, and, then, if the application reached him and he did not approve the material, I had a record that at least I had talked to him, and I could call him and talk to him again and refer him to it. They had a great many applications, too, so that things like that might slip their mind. So it assisted me in carrying on my work as a liaison officer to keep as much of a record on the telephone work that I did as I could.

Mr. McSWEENEY. I am ashamed that I have no nice record like that, and I commend you for it.

Mr. WALTER. Is there anything further?

Mr. TAVENNER. That is all.

Mr. WALTER. The hearing is adjourned. There will be no hearing tomorrow. The other witnesses that were here have been notified that they are still under subpoena and will be called when we next meet.

(Whereupon, at 5:08 p. m., the committee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

HEARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II

THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 1950

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARING

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a. m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood (chairman), Francis E. Walter, Burr P. Harrison (arriving as indicated), Morgan M. Moulder, Richard M. Nixon, Francis Case (arriving as indicated), Harold H. Velde, and Bernard W. Kearney.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Donald T. Appell, investigator; John W. Carrington, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order. Let the record disclose that there are present Messrs. Walter, Moulder, Nixon, Velde, Kearney, and Wood.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, since Maj. George Racey Jordan testified at a subcommittee hearing, the committee staff has conducted an investigation of the shipment by air of uranium compounds and heavy water through Great Falls, Mont., to the Soviet Union, and the circumstances under which such shipments were made.

Mr. Courtney E. Owens, an investigator of this committee, has presented documentary proof relating to these shipments.

The staff has likewise investigated the circumstances surrounding the shipment by air, through Great Falls, Mont., to the Soviet Union, of cargoes with alleged diplomatic immunity from inspection and censorship, the alleged making of reports or complaints by Maj. George Racey Jordan to various governmental departments concerning such shipments, and official action taken with regard thereto.

I desire at this time to offer Mr. Donald T. Appell, committee investigator, as a witness on these matters and other related matters which his testimony will develop.

Mr. VELDE. Are we to understand this is a continuation of the hearings of last December at which the Republican members were not present, and this is at the request of the minority members of the committee?

Mr. Wood. It is a continuation of the hearings that we had last December.

Mr. TAVENNER. And also of the hearings that were conducted in January.

Mr. NIXON. I understand this also bears on the same hearings as to which the statement was made in the press that the Jordan story was "inherently incredible." Is that right?

Mr. WALTER. Is that my quote?

Mr. NIXON. That is not your quote.

Mr. WALTER. Mine was similar.

Mr. WOOD. With reference to the absence of any members of the committee at the time the hearing was initiated, I understand all members of the committee were contacted, or an effort was made to contact them, at the time the testimony of Major Jordan was heard. Because of the peculiar circumstances that existed at the time, the hearing had to proceed; and at the request of the minority members we have brought Major Jordan back.

Mr. Appell, do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. APPELL. I do.

TESTIMONY OF DONALD T. APPELL

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Appell, are you an investigator for this committee?

Mr. APPELL. I am.

Mr. TAVENNER. How long have you been an investigator?

Mr. APPELL. For over 3 years.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you examined the documents obtained from the Departments of State and Army and the United States Air Force which disclose correspondence initiated by Mr. George Racey Jordan relative to materials passing through Great Falls, Mont., destined for the Soviet Union?

Mr. APPELL. Yes; I have examined all available documents.

Mr. MOULDER. Wasn't the question directed to correspondence rather than documents?

Mr. TAVENNER. I asked if, in his examination of these documents, he discovered any correspondence initiated by Mr. Jordan.

Mr. APPELL. Certain documents relating to these matters were procured by the staff from the Department of the Army and the United States Air Force. Certain specific documents were requested from the State Department, some of which have been furnished and some of which have not been located, but I am familiar with the documents which have been procured.

(Representative Harrison arrives in hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Was any record found of correspondence initiated by Major Jordan in 1943?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. The Air Force, after a search of written documents, supplied the committee with four letters initiated by Major Jordan between March 1943 and June 1943. These letters dealt, in great part, with improving the operations of the United Nations unit at Gore Field and other conditions relating to Jordan's official duties.

(Representative Case arrives in hearing room.)

Mr. APPELL (continuing). These letters, however, contained no reference to any irregularities at Gore Field on shipments of uranium compounds or diplomatic cargo. Copies of these communications are set forth as exhibits A, B, C, and D in the Air Force report.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you find in the official records made available to you any reports or references to reports made by Jordan in the year 1944, relating to materials passing through Great Falls under the claim of diplomatic immunity from inspection or censorship?

Mr. APPELL. Yes; I did.

Mr. TAVENNER. Before asking you to testify regarding these reports, I want to develop through other documents the problem of handling mail and baggage at Great Falls claimed to be subject to diplomatic immunity. Was a special request made in January 1944, by the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, for additional transportation facilities in connection with the movement of Soviet diplomatic cargo?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. On January 19, 1944, Col. S. A. Piskounov, Chief, Aviation Department, of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, addressed a letter to Col. H. Ray Paige, Chief, International Section, War Department, in which it is stated that previously Soviet mail was sent from Washington to Great Falls by rail, thereby necessitating reloading the mail three times en route to Ladd Field.

In order to avoid these difficulties in the future, he requested two C-47 planes, twice a month, to be sent from Oklahoma City, from the number of planes allocated to the Soviet Union, to Washington, where the Soviet mail would be loaded and sent to Fairbanks with pilots and crews of the Air Transport Command. The letter indicated that one plane had been so dispatched on the 15th of January, and requested that another plane be made available for the 25th of January, and one for the 30th of January, in order that the Soviet Purchasing Commission could send to Moscow its complete records for the year 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. I herewith tender in evidence the letter of January 19, 1944, and ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 1."

Mr. WOOD. I understand this is a photostatic copy?

Mr. TAVENNER. A photostatic copy of the letter; yes.

Mr. WOOD. Without objection, it will be admitted.

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 1," is filed herewith.)³⁴

Mr. TAVENNER. What action was taken on this request?

Mr. APPELL. On January 22, 1944, the letter was transmitted to Air Section Foreign Liaison Branch, G-2, with an indorsement by Colonel Paige, dated January 24, 1944, as follows: "Do not concur in above request" and an identical indorsement bearing the same date over the initials "J. S. C.," and a subsequent indorsement as follows:

"OPD will concur with J. S. C. and with ATC which is short of crews now for moving these aircraft from Okla. City to Fairbanks."

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer in evidence the transmittal letter of January 22, 1944, with the indorsements referred to, and request that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 2."

Mr. WOOD. Again, these are photostatic copies?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Without objection, they will be admitted.

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 2," is filed herewith.)³⁵

³⁴ See appendix.

³⁵ See appendix.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was any further action taken?

Mr. APPELL. On February 14, 1944, Brig. Gen. B. E. Meyers, international officer for the American Air Force, by Col. H. R. Paige, advised Air Section Foreign Liaison Branch, G-2, as follows:

1. With further reference to the above subject and confirming phone conversation between Major Brazeau and Colonel Paige, we have had from the Soviet Purchasing Commission verbal request to withdraw the request outlined in their letter of 19 January 1944, Ref. No. 175, which was transmitted to you by memorandum on 22 January 1944.

2. Although they promised at the time to confirm this withdrawal in writing they have not done so, but made their verbal withdrawal very clear and desire that their letter of January 1944, Ref. No. 175, be considered as canceled.

Mr. WALTER. That is, the letter requesting that planes be made available to fly mail direct?

Mr. APPELL. Yes.

Mr. WALTER. And they wanted that withdrawn?

Mr. APPELL. Withdrawn and canceled.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer in evidence a photostatic copy of that letter of February 14, 1944, and ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 3."

Mr. WOOD. Without objection, it will be admitted.

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 3," is filed herewith.)³⁶

Mr. TAVENNER. Was an additional request made for special transportation facilities by air?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. On February 24, 1944, the Soviet Purchasing Commission requested that a C-47 plane be flown from the Oklahoma plant to Washington by March 2, 1944, for use in transporting a Soviet Commission of four persons and Assistant to the Chief of Foreign Trade Commissariat, and 4,000 pounds of baggage from Washington to Fairbanks, Alaska, there to be turned over to the Soviet pilots.

The first indorsement, by the Deputy for Administration, G-2, is as follows:

This office does not concur in the proposal to transport four Soviet personnel and 4,000 pounds of baggage and strongly recommends that the action proposed be not taken.

The second indorsement, by the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, called attention to the cancellation of the earlier request for additional transport facilities for the delivery of mail, and suggested that consideration be given for the allowance of this request, under date of February 29, 1944.

And by the third indorsement, of March 6, 1944, the Deputy for Administration G-2 reversed his earlier recommendation and approved the proposed transportation.

Mr. CASE. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Case.

Mr. CASE. The first indorsement was against the proposal?

Mr. APPELL. Yes.

Mr. CASE. And the second indorsement suggested reconsideration?

Mr. APPELL. Yes.

Mr. CASE. Who suggested the second indorsement?

Mr. APPELL. Brig. Gen. B. E. Meyers.

³⁶ See appendix.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer in evidence photostatic copies of the communication of February 24, 1944, and the attachments annexed thereto, and ask that they be marked "Appell Exhibit 4."

Mr. WOOD. Without objection, they will be admitted.

(The documents above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 4," are filed herewith.) ³⁷

Mr. TAVENNER. Notwithstanding the Soviet Purchasing Commission withdrew its request of January 19, 1944, that two planes be made available twice a month for the carrying of diplomatic mail from Washington to Fairbanks, Alaska, and that the special request for a plane to carry four Soviets and 4,000 pounds of baggage from Washington to Fairbanks was not approved until March 3, did G-2 and the Office of the Commanding Officer of the Army Air Forces discover that such special facilities were being used by the Soviet Government during January and February 1944, without their previous knowledge and approval?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. A memorandum by Lt. Col. O. T. Jamerson, foreign-liaison officer, prepared for the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, under date of March 7, 1944, stated that such flights occurred on January 28, February 15, February 17, and February 28, in which 3,563 pounds, 4,180 pounds, 4,000 pounds, and 3,757 pounds, respectively, of diplomatic mail, were sent through Great Falls, Mont., to Fairbanks, Alaska, on lend-lease planes, without previous knowledge of Army Air Forces or the Foreign Liaison Branch of Military Intelligence.

Mr. TAVENNER. How did the Army Air Forces or the Foreign Liaison Branch of Military Intelligence acquire knowledge of this use of lend-lease planes by the Soviet Government?

Mr. APPELL. On February 29, 1944, headquarters, Army Air Forces, ATC station, at Great Falls, Mont., sent Foreign Liaison a report dated February 19, indicating that on February 17 four Soviets and 4,000 pounds of mail arrived at and departed from Great Falls.

Mr. TAVENNER. As diplomatic mail?

Mr. APPELL. So stated.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether or not that report was prepared by Major Jordan?

Mr. APPELL. No. I have been unable to obtain a copy of the report. The memorandum from the Foreign Liaison Office, dated March 7, 1944, states:

Major Jordan, who represents Air Staff at the ATC station at Great Falls, is reported to have examined one of the packages and found it contained blueprints of the A-20 plane, railroad guides showing long- and short-haul routes, and other technical data.

Mr. TAVENNER. I tender in evidence a photostatic copy of the memo of March 7, 1944, just referred to by the witness, and ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 5."

Mr. NIXON. Do I understand this report by Mr. Jordan was made, then, in 1944, the one referred to?

Mr. APPELL. It is included in a memorandum for the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated March 7, 1944.

³⁷ See appendix.

Mr. NIXON. One of the issues which is before the committee is the allegation that Mr. Jordan did not report these findings of his to any person. I want that point particularly cleared up. In other words, a report was made of some type, according to this memorandum you are reading from?

Mr. APPELL. I can read you the exact paragraph. Paragraph 6 of the memorandum says:

Meanwhile on 29 February Hq. AAF, ATC, Great Falls, Mont., sent Foreign Liaison a report dated 19 February (Ref. N) indicating that on 17 February 4 Soviets and 4,000 lbs. diplomatic mail arrived at and departed from Great Falls.

And paragraph 7 says:

Since this office had no knowledge of such an arrangement a memorandum was forwarded by Foreign Liaison and on 3 March to Hq. ATC (Ref. O) requesting full particulars regarding any transportation arrangements made with the Soviets and the names of persons concluding such arrangements. Details of an agreement are contained in 1st Indorsement to that letter (Ref. P). It states that 3 flights had been consummated, namely on 28 January, 15 February and 28 February, none of which were previously known to this office except as indicated in paragraph 6 of this memorandum. This office has since been advised orally by ATC that baggage on these flights was diplomatic mail and the exact amounts were 3563 lbs., 4180 lbs., and 3757 lbs., respectively. Major Jordan who represents Air Staff at the ATC station at Great Falls is reported to have examined one of the packages and found it contained blueprints of the A-20 plane, railroad guides showing long and short haul routes and other technical data.

Mr. NIXON. In other words, the purport of that report is that Major Jordan reported in 1944 that he had examined the cargoes of the planes at least containing this diplomatic mail, and had reported to his superiors the result of his examination?

Mr. APPELL. That is what it states here.

Mr. MOULDER. I dispute Mr. Nixon's statement that there is any issue about that. As I recall Major Jordan's testimony, he testified he made reports.

Mr. NIXON. I don't question that. Immediately after that hearing, the statement was made that the House subcommittee had examined the charges—and this was one of the charges Mr. Jordan made, that he had made the reports—and it was indicated it was not worthy of belief. I wanted to bring out that this charge, at least, is supported by that memorandum.

Mr. WOOD. The documents, of course, will speak for themselves.

Mr. WALTER. And Major Jordan's testimony bears that out, of course.

Mr. WOOD. Without objection, the document will be admitted in evidence.

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 5," is filed herewith.)²⁸

Mr. CASE. Have you made any attempts to identify the Brig. Gen. B. E. Meyers who made the second indorsement on the request I questioned you about previously?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. I identified him.

Mr. CASE. Is he the Benny E. Meyers who recently figured in a trial in connection with his activities in the Air Force?

Mr. APPELL. I understand it is the same officer.

²⁸ See appendix.

Mr. CASE. Mr. Chairman, the thing concerns me a little bit, because it is apparent that the first indorsement after this request was transferred to the Chief of the Air Section, Foreign Liaison Branch, stated very specifically:

This office does not concur in the proposal to transport four Soviet personnel and 4,000 pounds of baggage and strongly recommends that the action proposed be not taken.

This position was finally reversed after this second indorsement by Brig. Gen. B. E. Meyers, or Benny Meyers, who says:

It is also called to your attention that this C-47 aircraft will be one of their own planes from March allocations with the crew provided by Air Transport Command for ferrying the aircraft to Fairbanks where it will be taken over by U. S. S. R. pilots.

Mr. WALTER. Is that indorsement by General Meyers or by somebody for him?

Mr. CASE. The indorsement is:

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces: B. E. Meyers, Brig. General, U. S. Army, International Officer for A. A. F. By: H. R. Paige, Colonel, Air Corps, Chief, International Section, Matériel Div.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Appell, in the memorandum of March 7, 1944, it is stated that Major Jordon is reported to have examined one of the packages. May I ask you what effort was made to obtain such written report or statement by Major Jordon as referred to in the memorandum of March 7, 1944?

Mr. APPELL. On the 2d of February 1950, Maj. Gen. Lawrence S. Kuter, Commanding General of the Military Air Transport Service, which is the successor agency of the Air Transport Command, was sent a copy of the memorandum of March 7, 1944, and was requested to furnish the committee with photostatic copies of all correspondence and memoranda on the approval by the Commanding General ATC of the Soviet Purchasing Commission's request for the transportation on a special mission basis, together with photostatic copies of all correspondence and memoranda on the report of Major Jodan mentioned in paragraph 7 above.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Chairman, I am just looking at this order, "Appell Exhibit 4." I find that the indorsement by General Meyers, by Colonel Paige, did not give the necessary authorization, but that the third indorsement did, and that third indorsement is by Lt. Col. H. A. Kenyon.

Mr. WOOD. The witness so testified.

Mr. CASE. If I may point out, the original indorsement was by Colonel Kenyon, and he strongly recommended against the proposal. It was after the second indorsement, by General Meyers, requesting reconsideration, that Colonel Kenyon finally approved it.

Mr. WALTER. What I would like to know is who Colonel Kenyon is?

Mr. CASE. His title is given on the first page. It is Chief of the Air Section, Foreign Liaison Branch. It apparently was the request for reconsideration from General Meyers that led to the reversal of the first position.

Mr. TAVENNER. What explanation was given by the Air Transport Command as to the furnishing of these special air-transportation facilities to the Soviet Government, to which you have just referred?

Mr. APPELL. General Kuter replied to the committee's letter that

none of the correspondence referred to in the committee's letter of February 2 could be found in the files of Military Air Transport Service in Washington or the Kansas City Record Center. However, documents submitted by the Department of the Army reflect that on March 4, 1944, Lt. Col. Laigh C. Parker, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Priorities and Traffic, Air Transport Command, advised that on January 28, 1943, Col. Sergi Piskounov and others of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission called on the commanding general of the Air Transport Command and requested that assistance be given the purchasing commission in transporting certain personnel and material from Washington to Great Falls, Mont. They stated that these flights would probably be required at least once or possibly twice a month over a period of several months, each flight carrying approximately 3,800 pounds of cargo. Colonel Parker further advised that the commanding general, ATC, agreed to this request.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer in evidence Colonel Parker's indorsement of March 4, 1944, and ask that it be marked "Appell exhibit 6."

Mr. WOOD. Without objection, let it be admitted.

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 6," is filed herewith.)³⁹

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, Mr. Appell, the Soviet request for additional transportation facilities made on January 19, which had been rejected by indorsement on January 24, was still pending in the War Department when the Soviets made an independent request for such facilities from the Air Transport Command on January 28, 1944. Is that correct?

Mr. APPELL. Yes; and apparently after receiving approval from the commanding general, Air Transport Command, withdrew their request of January 19, which they had filed with the International Division of the War Department before being officially notified that this request was denied.

Mr. TAVENNER. Notwithstanding the agreement by the commanding general of the Air Transport Command to furnish additional transportation facilities, which, in fact, were furnished, did the Soviet Purchasing Commission make an additional request of the International Section of the War Department for the use of a lend-lease plane for the same purpose?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. On March 14, 1944, Colonel Piskounov, of the aviation department of the Soviet Purchasing Commission requested from Col. H. R. Paige, Chief of the International Section of the War Department, that one C-47 airplane allotted to them on the April schedule be directed from the Oklahoma plant to the New York Municipal Airport, LaGuardia Field, on March 25, 1944, for the urgent delivery of approximately 4,000 pounds of cargo, which cargo was to be under the supervision of Mr. D. V. Murashenko, who would also be on the airplane.

Mr. TAVENNER. What action was taken on this request?

Mr. APPELL. On March 17 the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, G-2, recommended that permission of the Soviet request be held in abeyance for the present and that the entire problem be referred to the United States Military Mission in Moscow for a

³⁹ See appendix.

determination of policy. Thereafter the matter was taken up with the State Department, which replied on March 30, 1944, that in view of Ambassador Harriman's approval, together with the approval of General Deane, head of the military mission to Moscow, nothing be done to suspend arrangements which had been made between the Soviet Purchasing Commission and the Air Transport Command. Following this advice from our Embassy in Moscow, regular flights on lend-lease aircraft of diplomatic cargo were instituted.

Mr. TAVENNER. I tender in evidence photostatic copies of the letter of Colonel Piskounov bearing date of March 14, 1944, the indorsement of March 17, 1944, the State Department memorandum of March 30, 1944, and the paraphrase of the telegram from the American Embassy in Moscow bearing date of March 24, 1944, and ask that they be marked as Appell Exhibit 7.

Mr. CASE. Mr. Chairman, may I see the exhibit?

(The proposed exhibit was handed to Mr. Case.)

Mr. CASE. Do you know whether the General Deane mentioned here was our chief military liaison in Moscow at this time who has since written the book *The Strange Alliance*?

Mr. APPELL. I understand he is the same officer.

Mr. WOOD. Without objection, the photostatic copies of documents offered by counsel will be admitted.

(The documents above referred to, marked Appell Exhibit 7, are filed herewith.) ⁴⁰

Mr. TAVENNER. I am going to ask you to refer back for a moment to Appell Exhibit 6. You stated in your testimony that Colonel Piskounov and others conferred with the commanding general of the ATC to obtain these added facilities for shipment of cargo, when a similar request to the War Department had been withdrawn. Who were the other persons who took part in that conference between Colonel Piskounov and the commanding general of the ATC?

Mr. APPELL. Lieutenant General Rudenko and Mr. E. S. Sergev.

Mr. TAVENNER. Can you identify Lieutenant General Rudenko?

Mr. APPELL. Lieutenant General Rudenko was head of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, additional information will be obtained relating to him through other witnesses.

Returning, now, to this plane which was requested by Colonel Piskounov in his letter of March 14, 1944, do the records show the type of cargo which the Russians planned to ship on this plane?

Mr. APPELL. On March 15, 1944, Colonel Paige, by letter, asked the Soviet Purchasing Commission the use they intended to make of this aircraft, and on March 20, 1944, in reply to his letter, Colonel Kramarenko of the Soviet Purchasing Commission advised Colonel Paige that the plane was urgently needed to deliver drawings, contracts, and specifications for oil refinery plants to Moscow.

Mr. WOOD. What kind of refinery plants?

Mr. APPELL. Oil.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Appell, you have testified from the G-2 memo of March 7, 1944, Appell Exhibit 5, that a report was made on February 19, 1944, by Headquarters, Army Air Forces, ATC, at Great Falls, regarding the arrival and departure of diplomatic mail at Great Falls,

⁴⁰ See appendix.

and that Major Jordan had examined one of the packages and found it contained blueprints of the A-20 plane, railroad guides, and other technical data. Did you find any record of a further report or conference in which Major Jordan made reference to the character of shipments he saw pass through Great Falls with alleged diplomatic immunity?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. There is a memo bearing date March 28, 1944, made by a special agent, CIC, in which he states as follows:

On 13 March 1944, while in the performance of official duties, this Agent had occasion to contact Major George R. Jordan, United Nations Representative at East Base, Great Falls, Montana. It is his duty to act as liaison man between the United States and any other United Nations' representatives at East Base. Due to the nature of operations at East Base, his activity is confined for the greater part to dealing with the U. S. S. R. Major Jordan stated that he was desirous of conveying certain information to "Intelligence Authorities."

The following interesting information was supplied by Major Jordan:

The Soviet Union has made a practice of shipping freight to Moscow through the Alaskan Wing. This has been done for about two years. For the year 1943, the total freight shipped through Great Falls by the Russians was 768,254.5 pounds. This is to be compared with 433,112 pounds that was shipped to Russia through East Base, Great Falls, from 1 January 1944 to 5 March 1944.

Mr. CASE. Would you read those figures again, please?

Mr. APPELL. The total freight shipped through Great Falls by the Russians in 1943 was 768,254.5 pounds. The weight of the freight shipped between January 1, 1944, and March 5, 1944, was 433,112 pounds.

Mr. CASE. That is a comparison of 2 months and 5 days in 1944 against the total year 1943?

Mr. APPELL. Yes.

Mr. CASE. And in the 2 months and 5 days of 1944, there was more than half as much shipped as in the entire prior year?

Mr. APPELL. We intend to bring in further that the total weight shipped in 1944 was 1,700,000 pounds, roughly. [Continuing reading:]

This material has been sent by members of the Consular Service, Russian Army Officers, Russian Engineers, and families of Russians who pass through here and others. The freight is diversified in nature. It includes American publications—for the most part newspapers and magazines. He recalled one occasion when the Russians shipped detailed data regarding American shipping rates and procedure. Major Jordan questioned this and was told by the Russians that the Russian economic structure is patterned after the German economic system, but that the Soviet Government was interested in changing it with the intention of copying the American economic system. Considerable American clothing is included in the freight. He added that, due to the shortage of personnel, the use of Russian-owned and operated aircraft, and the fact that a great deal of the freight is blanketed by diplomatic immunity, there is insufficient control over material shipped to Russia through East Base.

There is an incredible amount of diplomatic mail sent to Russia through Great Falls. On 29 January 1944, on aircraft C-47 (2440), 3,563 pounds of mail was shipped to Russia. On 17 February 1944, on aircraft C-47 (2579), 4,180 pounds of mail was sent. On 28 February 1944, on aircraft C-47 (92764), 3,757 pounds of mail was sent. All of this was protected from censorship by diplomatic immunity. It may be significant that it is not at all uncommon for the Russian mail or freight shipment to be accompanied by two men, who openly state that they are to see that the mail or freight is not examined and the diplomatic immunity privilege violated. One man sleeps while the other watches the parcels and vice versa. Major Jordan admitted, without reservation, that he knew nothing regarding the amount of mail or freight that a foreign country normally sends through its diplomatic service, but it is thought that that information can be readily obtained.

Many high ranking Russian Army Officers, Civilian Representatives, members of the Russian Diplomatic Service and their families pass through this Base. The United States Justice Department has but two men assigned to the Great Falls area to handle all matters pertaining to customs and immigration in this vicinity. One of the men works during the day and the other at night. Anyone who passes through this Base, other than those in the Armed Forces of the United States, must go through customs. Major Jordan has seen the families of high ranking Russian Army Officers and the wife of former Ambassador Molotov greatly delayed in passage merely because the customs officer had the duties of two or three men. This point is made because it is believed this condition is not conducive to desired feeling between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is suggested that this issue be discussed with the Justice Department.

This Agent observed that Major Jordan appeared to maintain accurate, detailed files and was very anxious to convey his information through intelligence channels. He requested that he be contacted at a time when the Russian activity could be outlined in minute detail and was advised that this would be done by CIC Agent—

and here, Mr. Chairman, I will not name the Agent, because we have been requested not to do so by the Army—

who is currently attached to the Intelligence and Security Office, Station 5, East Base, Great Falls, Montana.

It is recommended that a prolonged interview be conducted with Major Jordan; that his records be scrutinized for information of an intelligence nature; and that he be contacted regularly.

It is further recommended that the facts contained herein be given due consideration, with a view to contacting the State Department in order that they be made cognizant of the situation and that corrective measures be taken.

Mr. CASE. What is the date of that memorandum you are reading?

Mr. APPELL. March 28, 1944, and it is a report of the agent's interview of March 13, 1944, with Major Jordan.

Mr. CASE. So in March 1944 attention was drawn to these things and it was recommended that Major Jordan be contacted and this intelligence be further developed at that time?

Mr. APPELL. That is the recommendation of this special agent.

Mr. WALTER. The principal complaint at that time was the delay in clearing personnel and cargo?

Mr. APPELL. Yes; and that there was not sufficient personnel there to make customs inspections.

Mr. NIXON. And that an undue amount of diplomatic mail was going through?

Mr. APPELL. That was Major Jordan's observation.

Mr. WOOD. The document speaks for itself.

Mr. KEARNEY. I understood you to say Major Jordan was a representative of the United Nations?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. The section was referred to as the United Nations station at the base.

Mr. KEARNEY. In addition to that, he had an official title in the United States Army Air Force?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. The section at the base that handled this was known as the United Nations Section. It was given that name by the Army.

Mr. NIXON. Would you read that section again starting with the part that Major Jordan kept accurate detailed files?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. [Reading:]

This Agent observed that Major Jordan appeared to maintain accurate, detailed files and was very anxious to convey his information through intelligence channels. He requested that he be contacted at a time when the Russian activity could be outlined in minute detail and was advised that this would be done by

CIC Agent ———, who is currently attached to the Intelligence and Security Office, Station 5, East Base, Great Falls, Montana.

Mr. NIXON. That is all.

Mr. VELDE. Can you give us the name of that CIC agent, or is that secret information?

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, we have no clearance of the names of the agents used in this report, and for that reason we have read it in evidence but have not introduced the document in evidence.

Mr. WOOD. Proceed.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Appell, the CIC agent in the report which you have just read referred to a request which he received from Major Jordan to the effect that he, Jordan, be contacted at a time when the Russian activity could be outlined in minute detail. Did your investigation show that Major Jordan was again contacted on this question?

Mr. APPELL. The report of the United States Air Forces reflects that the CIC agent assigned to the Great Falls Air Base has been interviewed and that he has no recollection of having contacted Major Jordan or of having received any instructions to do so.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was the CIC agent's request that the State Department be apprised of the information furnished him by Major Jordan complied with?

Mr. NIXON. Before you leave the first point, that dealt only with the CIC at Great Falls: Has your investigation shown that any further conversation by the CIC with Major Jordan took place, in compliance with the request of this agent that a prolonged interview be had at a later time?

Mr. APPELL. We have been unable to find any reports of intelligence officers of the Army dealing with this subject. The Air Forces and Army have gone to a great deal of time and trouble to cooperate with the committee, and have really gone all out in trying to produce documents, but since the separation of the Air Forces from the Army, the files are not available.

Mr. MOULDER. Did you find any evidence of Major Jordan having personally visited any of the departments here in Washington with reference to his complaints?

Mr. APPELL. We have been unable to find any documents or any information, other than these two occasions, of Major Jordan making a complaint about this diplomatic cargo, and complaints of that nature. The records show that after Major Jordan was out of the service he went to the State Department, and in the memorandum there he reported some Russian pilots bringing furs into the United States without paying duty. But we have been unable to uncover any records or reports by Major Jordan on diplomatic mail, other than the two we have referred to.

(Representative Harrison leaves hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. The conference with the State Department in which he mentioned the bringing of furs into this country by Russian pilots took place, I believe, after his separation from the service?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. I thought I had called that to the attention of the committee.

Mr. WOOD. He did.

Mr. TAVENNER. I beg pardon. Let me repeat my last question: Was the CIC agent's request that the State Department be apprised of the information furnished him by Major Jordan complied with?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. On office memorandum of the State Department, dated June 16, 1944, over the signature of W. H. A. Coleman, addressed to Mr. Lyon, shows that on that day Mr. Bohlen requested, and there was furnished to him, the information supplied by Major Jordan under date of March 13, 1944.

(Representative Harrison returns to hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. Under date of March 28, 1944?

Mr. APPELL. That was the date of the agent's memorandum, but the information was given by Major Jordan on the 13th.

Mr. TAVENNER. What recommendation was made by Mr. Coleman, if any, in his memorandum of June 16, 1944, to which you referred?

Mr. APPELL. Mr. Coleman, after stating it was evident that large quantities of nondiplomatic freight, property of private individuals, was being transported by lend-lease planes with diplomatic immunity, recommended that this irregularity be adjusted with the Soviets, either in Washington or at the United States Embassy in Moscow, by separating the legitimate diplomatic mail under seal of the Soviet Embassy, and that the personal freight be subject to search and export permit, thereby placing both countries on a reciprocal basis.

Mr. MOULDER. Who made that recommendation?

Mr. APPELL. Mr. Coleman of the State Department.

Mr. TAVENNER. What action was taken by the State Department?

Mr. APPELL. Charles E. Bohlen, in an office memorandum dated June 24, 1944, advised Mr. Lyon that a meeting should be called of all interested Government agencies for the purpose of discussing this subject.

Mr. TAVENNER. His name is spelled B-o-h-l-e-n?

Mr. APPELL. Yes.

Mr. CASE. Is that the man commonly referred to as Chet Bohlen?

Mr. APPELL. I don't know. He is on foreign duty in Paris at this time. Mr. Coleman is deceased.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know whether the meeting of interested Government agencies was actually held?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. State Department records indicate that a meeting was held on Thursday, July 6, 1944, in a general conference room of the State Department.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Appell, you have a record, I believe, of the names of those who were in attendance at this conference. For the sake of brevity I will not ask you to read the names of those present at the meeting, but will you state which agencies of the Government were represented?

Mr. APPELL. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Censorship, Military Intelligence, Air Transport Command, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Bureau of Customs, Foreign Economic Administration, and State Department.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Appell, were you able to obtain a copy of the minutes of this meeting?

Mr. APPELL. No. The State Department, after conducting an exhaustive search, was unable to locate any minutes or memoranda dealing with this meeting. However, the documents received from the Army contain a memorandum for the records, dated July 6, 1944, by Col. L. R. Forney, who attended the meeting as a representative of Military Intelligence.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer in evidence a photostatic copy of the memorandum dated July 6, 1944, and ask that it be marked "Appell exhibit 8."

Mr. WOOD. Without objection, let it be admitted.

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 8," is filed herewith.) ⁴¹

Mr. WOOD. If members of the committee so desire, let it be read into the record.

Mr. TAVENNER. That was my next question. Mr. Appell, will you read Colonel Forney's memorandum, but I suggest you omit any reference to the names of individuals attending the meeting.

Mr. APPELL (reading):

All interested Government agencies were represented.

It developed that there was concern on the part of the Department of State regarding an alleged uncontrolled passage of personnel and baggage on Russian planes and on ATC planes along the route indicated. In the actual discussion it developed that such agencies as State, Customs, and Immigration assumed, without justification, that it was the responsibility of the Army to take care of such matters. It was pointed out that such was not the case and that the Army had no authority or responsibility to control nonmilitary travel or to control the passage of diplomatic and nondiplomatic baggage over the route except in so far as was essential in connection with flight safety.

The fundamental position of the War Department was pointed out to be as follows: It is undesirable at this time that there be any interference with the movements of strictly Russian military personnel in the interests of reciprocity we desire from the Russians in facilitating our military operations from air bases in Russia; that the Army had no objection whatever to the proper government agencies applying the required legal controls over diplomatic and nonmilitary travel and baggage. It was pointed out, however, that the Army would not consent to become the agent of other government agencies in these matters.

It also developed that the principal interested agencies such as Customs, Immigration, State, and Censorship had no idea of what was going on at the two places mentioned in so far as their responsibilities were concerned. They agreed to take steps to inform themselves and then, if necessary, consult other agencies involved.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did Mr. Bohlen at a later date make any recommendation as to the situation at Great Falls?

Mr. APPELL. Mr. Bohlen, in a memorandum dated June 29, 1944, summed up the Great Falls situation by recommending that the State Department informally take up with the Soviet Embassy the matter of Soviet couriers protecting from examination packages and freight in addition to properly marked diplomatic packages.

Mr. CASE. May I have that date again?

Mr. APPELL. June 29, 1944. This was before the meeting.

Mr. CASE. But it was after the date of the figures you have given us of the amount of mail going through?

Mr. APPELL. Yes.

Mr. CASE. The date you gave us before was a March 5 date?

Mr. APPELL. Yes.

Mr. CASE. When some 400,000 pounds had already gone through that year?

Mr. APPELL. This deals with the so-called diplomatic cargo. The big bulk of the 400,000 pounds was aircraft parts and such.

Mr. CASE. Up until the June memorandum from Mr. Bohlen there was no attempt apparently to have any understanding with the Rus-

⁴¹ See appendix.

sian Embassy about inspection of this material that went through Great Falls?

Mr. APPELL. We will go into that.

Mr. WOOD. That would be a conclusion, anyway.

Mr. CASE. That seems to be my conclusion, anyway.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do the records of the State Department indicate that this matter was taken up with the Soviet Embassy, as recommended in Mr. Bohlen's memorandum?

Mr. APPELL. The next document dealing with this subject is dated July 28, and it is a follow-up on a conversation held with the second secretary of the Soviet Embassy. It is an informal memorandum of customs and censorship regulations regarding diplomatic and official mail entering or leaving the United States. It was forwarded to the second secretary, and with the memorandum the second secretary of the Soviet Embassy was advised that these regulations were to be strictly enforced in the future.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you briefly summarize the regulations referred to?

Mr. APPELL. The memorandum of regulations in effect notified the Soviet Embassy that pouches for communications addressed to consulates or other Soviet government agencies are not exempt from customs examination, but that any official mail in such pouches, that is, mail from a Soviet government agency in the Soviet Union or abroad to a Soviet government agency in the United States, or vice versa, will as a matter of courtesy not be examined or censored. It was also pointed out that any communications or packages in charge of a courier, which were not sealed and clearly marked as coming from the Embassy to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, or vice versa, are not exempt from customs examination, and that any non-diplomatic packages leaving the United States should be accompanied by proper export permit obtained from the Foreign Economic Administration.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did your investigation disclose that the Soviet Embassy complied with these regulations after this advice from the State Department?

Mr. APPELL. The only document which relates to this is a report of an intelligence and security officer at Great Falls, Mont., dated September 21, 1944, subject, Shipment of Uncensored Communications which reads as follows:

Aircraft number 8643 type C-47 departed this station 20 September 1944 destined for Russia carrying one passenger of Russian nationality and 3,800 pounds of cargo consisting of communications that had not been censored and were not immune of censorship by being diplomatic in nature.

Customs inspector checking the cargo said it consisted of records of the Soviet Purchasing Commission and other service mail, unsealed and written in Russian as well as in English. He failed however to have them removed and sent to the Office of Censorship. Whether any communications needing a license for export were aboard was not ascertained by this officer.

The implication here is that anything going to Russia on aircraft sold to the Soviet Union is immune to censorship and of a diplomatic nature. This is completely incorrect. The removal of communications from the United States prior to Censorship is a violation of the Espionage Act and the rules of the Office of Censorship.

This office makes positive that Custom Officials see all out-bound aircraft by not clearing the American crew that fly it without abiding by AAF Regulation 46-2. That is our limitation.

Mr. MOULDER. Who made that report?

Mr. APPELL. A captain of the Air Corps who was an intelligence and security officer, with the specific designation of travel control officer.

Mr. MOULDER. To whom was it directed?

(Representative Case leaves hearing room.)

Mr. APPELL. It was directed through through channels to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington 25, D. C. Attention: Chief, CIG.

This document contains a fifth indorsement.

Mr. TAVENNER. Would you read that, please? I believe that indorsement deals with the question of whether or not the shipment of materials in this manner is in violation of the Espionage Act.

Mr. APPELL. This indorsement is by the Acting Adjutant General of the United States Army, Robert H. Dunlap, and is as follows:

The action being taken by Army Air Forces, as indicated by paragraph 4 of the basic communication, is correct and constitutes the full discharge of all responsibilities of the War Department in this connection. The security aspects of this matter have been brought to the attention of the Department of State, the Customs Service, Immigration Service, Office of Censorship, and the Department of Justice. Beyond that, the War Department has no authority to act. The agencies mentioned have had this matter under study and investigation for some time and their inquiries continue. While they have arrived at no final conclusions in the matter, it is indicated that the results will be a more comprehensive enforcement of existing laws and regulations than heretofore has been the case.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Appell, it has come to the attention of the staff that Major Jordan has made a public statement relating to the removal by him of radar equipment on a lend-lease plane being flown through Great Falls to the Soviet Union. In the course of your investigation, did you learn anything about this or other similar incidents?

Mr. APPELL. It appears that in December 1942, Lend-Lease aircraft P-39's, B-25C's, and C-47's arrived at Great Falls with receiver portions of radar equipment, and that permission was granted by the Chief of the United Nations Branch, Dayton, Ohio, to remove such equipment from the aircraft at Great Falls, or from any future aircraft arrivals.

(Representative Nixon leaves hearing room.)

Mr. APPELL (continuing). While this was prior to Major Jordan's assignment at the Great Falls base, it appears from an interview with former Lt. Col. Charles H. Gitzinger and confirmed by the Chief of the United Nations Section, Dayton, Ohio, that Major Jordan advised Gitzinger that a plane believed by Jordan to be bearing radar equipment had arrived at Great Falls, and that Gitzinger ordered Jordan to remove this radar from the aircraft. These are the only incidents uncovered in the investigation.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the interview with Gitzinger disclose that he had almost daily contact by telephone with Major Jordan?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. Lieutenant Colonel Gitzinger was Chief of the Russian Unit of the United Nations Branch, Army Air Forces, stationed at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. As Chief of the Russian Unit, Colonel Gitzinger was Jordan's higher authority on any problems relating to Russian lend-lease. For this reason, Major Jordan was in almost daily contact with Colonel Gitzinger over problems that arose in Great Falls.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did Colonel Gitzinger, in his interview, make any statement with regard to the receipt of information from Major Jordan relating to classified materials passing through Great Falls in an irregular or improper manner?

Mr. APPELL. Colonel Gitzinger advised that in addition to his almost daily contact with Major Jordan, he also met Jordan at Wright Field in 1943 and 1944, and that to the best of his recollection at no time was mention made by Jordan of any alleged shipments by the Russians of classified material through Great Falls, and specifically—

(Representative Nixon returns to hearing room.)

Mr. APPELL (continuing). Jordan mentioned nothing of uranium, neutrons, protons, or anything connected with the atom bomb program as we know it today.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Appell, Major Jordan, in his testimony before the committee, stated that on January 8, 1944, he went to Washington and called upon Colonel Paige, who was Chief of the International Section, War Department. He also called upon the Inspector General's Office of the War Department, and upon Mr. John Hazard of the State Department. Has your investigation verified Major Jordan's trip to Washington in January of 1944?

Mr. APPELL. There is no record in the files of the Army or Air Forces which reflects on the visit to either the International Section of the Army or the Inspector General's Office.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Appell, did your investigation disclose that Major Jordan made a call upon John Hazard, who was an official of the Foreign Economic Administration?

Mr. APPELL. No. Mr. Hazard has advised the committee that at no time during his employment with the Office of Lend-Lease, or later its successor, the Foreign Economic Administration, did he see or have any conversation with or with regard to Major Jordan.

Mr. NIXON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go back and clear up a point, because I stepped out a minute.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Nixon.

Mr. NIXON. When I came into the room you were referring to Major Jordan mentioning nothing regarding neutrons and uranium to the officer at Dayton; is that correct?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, to Colonel Gitzinger.

Mr. NIXON. Colonel Gitzinger's interview related to what period of time?

Mr. APPELL. During the entire period Major Jordan was at Great Falls, 1943 and 1944.

Mr. NIXON. In other words, Major Jordan, during the period 1943 and 1944, did not mention this specific type of freight?

Mr. APPELL. Colonel Gitzinger's statement was that he had no recollection of such mention.

Mr. NIXON. That was before, in point of time, the first atomic explosion?

Mr. APPELL. Oh, yes.

Mr. NIXON. It was before we generally knew the significance of these materials?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. Major Jordan left Great Falls in May 1944.

Mr. NIXON. This conversation to which you referred took place before May 1944?

Mr. APPELL. That is right.

Mr. NIXON. Before the first atomic bomb was exploded?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. WALTER. What was Colonel Gitzinger's position at Dayton?

Mr. APPELL. He was in charge of the Russian Unit of the United Nations Branch in Dayton, Ohio.

Mr. WALTER. And I understand Major Jordan had a similar position at Great Falls?

Mr. APPELL. Major Jordan was the United Nations representative at that base. Colonel Gitzinger, while I am not too clear on this and Major Jordan would know it in more detail, was a higher authority than Jordan. If a plane would come through not carrying proper equipment, Major Jordan would call Colonel Gitzinger and say, "These planes are coming in and don't have proper equipment."

Mr. WALTER. In other words, Colonel Gitzinger was not the commanding officer over Major Jordan?

Mr. APPELL. Oh, no.

Mr. WALTER. There was no duty on the part of Major Jordan to report unusual shipments to Colonel Gitzinger?

Mr. APPELL. I don't know.

Mr. KEARNEY. As an American officer, Major Jordan would not be under a Russian officer?

Mr. APPELL. Colonel Gitzinger was an American officer. This is confusing because they refer to the unit he was in charge of as the Russian Unit of the United Nations' Branch.

Mr. KEARNEY. In other words, in no instance was Major Jordan under the control of any Russian officer?

Mr. APPELL. Oh, no, sir. Those officers with whom he had dealings were American officers.

Mr. TAVENNER. Had you completed your answer?

Mr. APPELL. I was dealing with Mr. Hazard's advice to the committee that he had never met, seen, or had any discussion with or with regard to Major Jordan. My investigation did disclose, however, that Major Jordan made a call on the Foreign Economic Administration and did talk with one of their liaison people, although the records of Lend-Lease and Foreign Economic Administration contained no memorandum on Major Jordan's visit.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you able to substantiate any of Major Jordan's testimony with respect to the diagrams relating to the Oak Ridge project and the note on White House stationery initialed "H. H." which was the subject of his testimony.

Mr. APPELL. No documents supplied by the Army, Air Force, or State Department contained any reference to the material described by Jordan. We have been unable to find that the name "Harry Hopkins" was engraved on White House letterheads by the Government Printing Office. We have checked many memoranda and correspondence of Harry Hopkins, and up until today we had found nothing signed "H. H.," all being signed "Harry L. Hopkins" and "H. L. H." I have been told since sitting here that in the Saturday Evening Post articles dealing with Harry Hopkins there is a memorandum signed "H. H.," but I have not seen it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the staff investigate numerous documents to endeavor to determine if there was any set practice in signing?

MR. APPELL. Yes, we did, and we also requested permission to review the files of the President's Protocol Commission, now in the custody of the archives in the Department of State. We were not given permission to do so.

MR. TAVENNER. There was also testimony by Major Jordan relating to copies of State Department documents that were found in one of the suitcases. Has any investigation been made regarding that?

MR. APPELL. Until such time as the committee can determine the subject matter and contents of these documents, there is no way I know of that an investigation is possible.

MR. TAVENNER. Or until the committee has some information as to the source?

MR. APPELL. That is true. According to the testimony of Major Jordan, he was the only one who saw those documents.

MR. WALTER. Did the State Department give you any reason for its refusal to permit you to examine the files regarding Harry Hopkins?

MR. APPELL. It was not files regarding Harry Hopkins, but files of the President's Protocol Commission, dealing with our relationship with other governments, and based on that they did not feel that anyone outside the State Department should go through that type of files. Many of the documents are highly secret, and that was the reason. The State Department did search for us, files of the Foreign Economic Administration, and have been very helpful and cooperative with us in regard to other materials, including supplying the committee with documents dealing with translations, as far as the State Department is concerned, of the shipment of diplomatic cargo.

MR. TAVENNER. In the absence of any information on the character of the documents referred to by Major Jordan in his testimony, was any request made of the State Department for any documents that would throw any light on this subject?

MR. APPELL. No. We had no way of knowing where to ask the State Department to search.

MR. HARRISON. Did you investigate the question of whether it has been the practice in the past to print the name of anyone on White House stationery?

MR. APPELL. I testified that the Government Printing Office has no record of printing the name of anyone on White House stationery.

MR. HARRISON. Do they print all the White House stationery?

MR. APPELL. I understand they do.

MR. HARRISON. Do they have complete records?

MR. APPELL. Yes. They had the plates and they went back over the plates. They did bring this up, that it has been known that people have taken the stationery, after it was engraved at the Government Printing Office, to a private engraver and had a name put on it.

MR. NIXON. That was the practice?

MR. APPELL. No; but they did know it occurred.

MR. NIXON. So it is possible that it did occur in this instance; not that it is probable, but it is possible?

MR. APPELL. We have examined many, many pieces of Hopkins' memoranda on White House stationery, and on none of these did we see his name printed.

MR. HARRISON. Did you do it in the period in question?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, sir; we have contacted former officers of the Government with whom Harry Hopkins had correspondence, and we have looked at these memoranda, and none of these contain his name printed on them. In this examination we never found any signed with the initials "H. H." We found "H. L. H.," "Harry," and "Harry L. Hopkins" but none "H. H."

It was called to my attention this morning that an "H. H." memorandum is published in the Saturday Evening Post. It is here if you want to see it. I haven't seen it.

(At this point, the witness examines the article to which he referred in the Saturday Evening Post, whereupon he continues:) My testimony on this is in error. This is a memorandum by former President Roosevelt which is headed "H. H.," but it is not a memorandum of Mr. Hopkins' signed "H. H."

Mr. MOULDER. President Roosevelt addressed him as "H. H."?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. This memorandum is initialed "F. D. R."

Mr. HARRISON. There is one signed "H. L. H."

Mr. APPELL. Yes. I have seen many documents signed that way.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Appell, did you proceed to Great Falls, Mont., for the purpose of investigating the shipments of uranium and heavy water through Great Falls?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, I did, prior to the receipt by the committee of Air Force documentation on these shipments.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you briefly summarize your investigation at Great Falls?

Mr. APPELL. The majority of the information obtained from my investigation at Great Falls, Mont., dealt with the shipments of uranium and heavy water. It was on this investigation that the committee obtained the documentation on the Canadian shipment in June of 1943.

Since the committee has previously held a hearing and put into the record, through Investigator Owens, the complete documentation on these shipments, with the permission of the chairman I will not go into a repetition of those shipments at this time.

While at Great Falls I interviewed over 20 former employees of the subdepot of which the United Nations Branch was a part. Only three of those employees had any knowledge of other things, other than the shipment of uranium. I would like to go into that.

Leonard E. Woods, who, from November 1942 through 1946, was a civilian employee of the Thirty-fourth Subdepot and assigned to the United Nations Branch, was interviewed. Woods advised that while he was in charge of loading Russian cargo and supplies on lend-lease aircraft, he had no occasion to examine the contents of the boxes or parcels being loaded. He did recall loading, from time to time, many cartons labeled as containing magazines, drawings, newspapers, and technical publications. On one occasion, in the summer of 1944, he was aboard a lend-lease aircraft which contained diplomatic bags, pouches, when the United States customs official came aboard and proceeded to open some of the unsealed pouches. Woods made an examination of the contents of the pouches with the customs official, and observed that one of the pouches contained what he reports in a sworn statement to be the complete plans of the General Electric plant at East Lynn, Mass., and another pouch contained plans of an electric boat, marked as being a boat manufactured by works in Groton, Conn.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have the affidavit?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer the affidavit of Leonard E. Woods in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 9."

Mr. NIXON. What is the name of the person who made the affidavit?

Mr. APPELL. Leonard E. Woods.

Mr. NIXON. Did he work under Jordan?

Mr. APPELL. He was a civilian employee.

Mr. NIXON. Working at the same time as Jordan?

Mr. APPELL. Yes; under Jordan's section.

Mr. NIXON. No objection.

Mr. WOOD. Without objection let it be admitted.

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 9," is filed herewith.) ⁴²

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you also have an affidavit given to you by George J. Mortenson?

Mr. APPELL. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer that affidavit in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 10."

Mr. WOOD. Without objection it will be admitted.

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 10," is filed herewith.) ⁴³

Mr. APPELL. Mr. Mortenson, in his affidavit, states that he was employed at Great Falls during the years 1943 and 1944 as a civilian inspector of aircraft supplies. Mr. Mortenson recalls that on one occasion it was necessary for him to enter a C-47 plane which had been routed from Oklahoma City to Washington, D. C., where it picked up Russian personnel and cargo; that he was refused admittance to the plane and was only able to secure the necessary forms from the pilot; and that this plane remained at the base under constant guard, night and day.

Mr. Mortenson also recalled the arrival at Great Falls of B-25 type aircraft which contained Norden bomb sights. While these bomb sights were taken off at Great Falls, one bomb sight slipped through to Canada, where it was removed and returned by special plane to Washington, D. C.

Mr. WALTER. Did your investigation disclose whether the Norden bomb sight was ever sent through in quantity to the Russians.

Mr. APPELL. No; it was not. The Norden bomb sight was not being sent to the Russians. The factory would prepare a plane for delivery to our people. En route from the plant the plane accidentally would be routed into the B-25's going to Russia under lend-lease. It would indicate some mistake.

Mr. KEARNEY. Through mistake or otherwise, some Norden bomb sights got to Russia?

Mr. APPELL. I remember a plane crashing with one on it, but I don't know of any going through in this channel.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you also interview Capt. Harry Decker?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. Capt. Harry Decker was the traffic control officer at Great Falls. I have a notarized statement from Captain Decker which I would like to read in its entirety.

⁴² See appendix.

⁴³ See appendix.

Mr. WOOD. Is that sworn to?

Mr. APPELL. Yes; it is. It reads as follows:

The duties of the Intelligence and Security Travel Control Unit which I headed acted as liaison between the Civilian Agencies of the Government such as Customs, Immigration, FBI, and the Armed Forces of our Government, and our Allies.

In a short résumé of the unit's duties, it was our responsibility to see that all aircraft, cargo and personnel destined for overseas shipment had proper clearance of these civilian agencies, and that all incoming aircraft and personnel also were routed to these agencies.

My unit consisted wholly of U. S. Military personnel, and consequently the civilian agencies had to do the checking of incoming and outgoing personnel of our Allies.

Before the arrival of our unit to Great Falls in July of 1944, the arrival and departure of aircraft was very poorly supervised, allowing cargo and personnel to leave and enter almost at will without proper clearance of the Government agencies. This poor supervision was caused by the lack of properly trained Military personnel. I would be relatively safe in saying that upon our arrival and setting up operations, that no aircraft was allowed to enter or leave without proper clearance.

The failure of compliance of our laws then rested in the hands of the civilian agencies. The matter that some of the cargoes lacked proper clearance was discussed by myself and the local Customs people many times. I requested that the Commissioner of U. S. Customs come to Great Falls and investigate these shipments. At a meeting held by the Commissioner (a Mr. Johnson of Washington, D. C.) and the local Customs people and myself I personally requested that all shipments not carrying proper clearance be held at Great Falls until complied with. This request was carried to higher quarters in the Treasury Department but no action taken to my knowledge. A Mr. Weiss of the Department of Commerce also came to Great Falls on the same matter and the same request was made of him. His answer was that it was a high echelon decision of the State Department, Board of Economic Warfare and the President's Committee of Protocol.

The cooperation of the agencies of local level was very good. It seemed that the power of enforcement lay at very high levels beyond the reach of us there. The local Customs men inspected all cargoes including those of diplomatic nature, but inspected all except those carrying the Official Russian Diplomatic Seal.

When interviewed before affidavit was given, Mr. Chairman, Captain Decker told us of some Russians coming into the United States having in their possession maps of the east-coast defense zone in the United States. In requesting this affidavit I asked him to go into that, and this is what he said:

The maps in question were carried by arriving Russian Aviators who were on their way to a school in this country. Whether it was Army or Navy, I am not sure. As I recollect it was a Navy School on the East Coast. The maps were those used by our airmen to show the active and passive defense areas of the East Coast. I happened on them by inspecting the map-carrying case of one of the aviators. He didn't mind my looking at his map-carrying case.

This incident was reported through channels to G-2 Washington. Action taken unknown. I do not have in my possession any of these papers or documents as most of these were classified and therefore the property of the Army.

Mr. TAVENNER. I desire to offer this affidavit in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 11."

Mr. WOOD. Let it be admitted.

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 11," is filed herewith.)⁴⁴

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you had an opportunity to examine Major Jordan's diary and other notes?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, I have.

⁴⁴ See appendix.

Mr. TAVENNER. As a result of your review of Major Jordan's diary, have you uncovered any new evidence that would be important for this committee to consider, in your opinion?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. Major Jordan's diary contains an entry—

Mr. HARRISON. This is in the bound book?

Mr. APPELL. This is in the book, in Major Jordan's diary. It contains an entry under date of February 17, 1944, that Soviet couriers Semen Vassilenko, Leonid Rykounin, Enjeny Kojernicov, and Georges Nicolaiev departed with diplomatic pouches. The files of the Committee on Un-American Activities reflect that these pouches contained material regarding new and secret developments in war industries in the United States. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, the committee is now in contact with a former employee of the Soviet Purchasing Commission who helped Semen Vassilenko pack the diplomatic pouches in February of 1944.

Mr. NIXON. Do I understand that you are investigating the possibility that this particular transaction which you have described may be corroborated by a third party?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, by a former employee of the Soviet Purchasing Commission who actually helped this man pack the pouches.

Mr. NIXON. Pouches for this particular date?

Mr. APPELL. Pouches for this particular date.

Mr. WOOD. Proceed.

Mr. APPELL. Other names appearing in Major Jordan's diary have been checked against the committee's files, and considerable evidence is contained on their participation in Soviet espionage activities. As the committee is now preparing a report on Soviet espionage activities, I will not go into this matter in detail at the present time.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Appell, while on your investigation at Great Falls, Mont., did you determine whether or not customs officials at Great Falls, Mont., operations, and a statistical break-down on exports export declarations or for other export approval certificates?

Mr. APPELL. While in Great Falls, I was unable to obtain anything definite on this question. However, upon my return to Washington letters were addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce on this matter.

In the letter to the Secretary of the Treasury we advised the Secretary that information in the possession of the committee indicated that no inspection was made at Great Falls, Mont., to determine whether shipments under the lend-lease program carried export declarations, and requested that the committee be advised whether shipments were checked for export declarations; and asked that copies of all reports of inspections made by customs officials at the Great Falls operation be supplied the committee.

In the committee's letter to the Secretary of Commerce, he was requested to furnish the committee with a copy of the report of inspection made by a Commerce official of the Great Falls operation, together with advice as to whether or not export declarations were filed with the Department of Commerce on lend-lease shipments of a non-military nature to Great Falls, Mont., during the years 1943, 1944, and 1945.

In reply to these letters, the Secretary of Commerce, Secretary Sawyer, submitted a report of inspection dated March 5, 1945, on Great Falls, Mont., operations, and a statistical break-down on exports

to the USSR from the customs district of Montana and Idaho, which district included Great Falls, Mont.

This break-down shows that for the year 1943 no transactions were reported for the customs district in which Great Falls is located. For the year 1944 only one shipment of sodium hydroxide; and for 1945, 15 transactions.

The report of inspection made by Mr. Irving Weiss, referred to in the affidavit of Harry Decker, and who at that time was Acting Assistant Chief of Foreign Trade Division, is as follows:

Shipments of Lend-Lease Material on ATC Planes.—I discussed with the Collector of Customs and Assistant Collector, Mr. Fallon, of the Customs Service, Mrs. Billyard, Chief Clerk, Priorities and Traffic Division, ATC, Captain Romney and Captain Henry of the War Department the procedure followed in the filing of Lend-Lease declarations for shipments on ATC planes. Mrs. Billyard had no recollection of filing any Lend-Lease declarations. She is able to identify Lend-Lease shipments from the information shown on the shipping papers. Since these shipments are consigned to the Army officer in charge at Edmonton, Canada, no declarations are being filed in accordance with present War Department regulations. Mrs. Billyard also described a number of other shipments for which declarations are not being filed at present. These include shipments identified as international aid, Russian war relief, Red Cross shipments, and DOES (Depot Overseas Equipment Section). Captain Henry was not able to define the above categories. It will be necessary to contact the War Department here to determine whether declarations are required for these shipments and to arrange for their filing in the War Department regulations. I attempted to get copies of the various types of shipping papers covering these special categories but was unable to do so because of the security regulations. Captain Henry suggested that we request Major Cohen in the Washington ATC office to obtain copies for us from Great Falls. It is my understanding that copies of the War Department shipping tickets are also filed in Washington. If reports of prior months' transactions are required, it may be possible to use these documents. This question should be discussed with Major Cohen in Washington.

In reply to our letter to the Treasury Department, we were advised by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John S. Graham as follows:

Reference is again made to your letter of January 25, 1950 (DTA), in which you state that the Committee is experiencing difficulty in obtaining copies of export declarations certified by the Bureau of Customs for shipments of uranium compounds and heavy water through the port of Great Falls, Montana. An inquiry by the Committee of certain Governmental agencies failed to disclose export declarations on the above-mentioned shipments. It is alleged, you continue, that no export declarations were received covering Lend-Lease shipments through Great Falls, Montana, and it is therefore assumed that such shipments were not inspected to determine whether they carried an export permit for the reason that these shipments were going through on United States aircraft, even though they were being exported to the Soviet Union.

You ask to be advised whether shipments were checked by customs officers at Great Falls for export declarations, and, if export declarations were certified by customs officers, the office or agency to which these declarations were forwarded. You also ask to be furnished with copies of all reports of inspection made by customs officers of the Great Falls operation as affected the Bureau of Customs.

Export procedure, as prescribed by the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, called for export declarations throughout the war on all Lend-Lease articles transported by air to Russia, except for the aircraft themselves. However, it was expected that Collectors of Customs at some ports would encounter difficulty in enforcing this requirement because of the necessarily overriding demands of military secrecy, and this proved to be the case. It may also be noted that after 1942, the declarations were employed for statistical purposes only by the Bureau of the Census. The control over Lend-Lease shipments was exercised by the Lend-Lease Administration and its successor, at points before the merchandise reached the borders. As the collector has reported the situation at Great Falls to the Bureau of Customs:

"During the war outbound aircraft, which might be either U. S. Army craft or aircraft being exported, were sometimes loaded with cargo at Great Falls. At

times export declarations were filed, but more often a cargo manifest was supplied the customs officer on duty. This manifest was seldom a detailed list of objects contained in the aircraft, and more often stated simply that the load contained so many thousand pounds of military equipment or supplies.

"It was never physically possible to check the cargo of an aircraft departing from Great Falls at any time, for the reason that they were loaded by military personnel before being presented to customs officers. If an export declaration was filed it was certified by the customs officer, and if a cargo manifest was furnished that document was attached to the customs Form 7509 covering the flight. Certified export declarations were forwarded to the Section of Customs Statistics, Bureau of the Census, 434 Customhouse, New York, New York." Such inspection of Great Falls operations as Bureau of Customs officials made during the war was not reported on in writing, and therefore no copy of any such report can be furnished.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the date of that letter?

Mr. APPELL. This letter was dated yesterday—March 1, 1950.

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you received records of shipments from Great Falls by lend-lease aircraft?

Mr. APPELL. Yes. The United States Air Forces have furnished the committee with complete records of air freight shipments through Great Falls during the years 1943 and 1944.

Mr. WALTER. Before you go into that, do you intend to let the letters go in evidence?

Mr. TAVENNER. We have not actually introduced them as exhibits, since they have been read into the record, but we can do so.

Mr. WALTER. I think it is important.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer in evidence the letter of February 7, 1950, from the Secretary of Commerce, and ask that it be marked "Appell exhibit 12"; and I offer in evidence the letter of March 1, 1950, from Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John S. Graham, and ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 13."

Mr. Wood. Let them be admitted.

(The letters above referred to marked respectively "Appell Exhibit 12" and "Appell Exhibit 13" are filed herewith.) ⁴⁵

Mr. TAVENNER. I also offer in evidence the report of inspection of Irving Weiss, Acting Assistant Chief, Foreign Trade Division, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, dated March 5, 1945, and ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 14."

Mr. Wood. Let it be admitted.

(The document above referred to marked "Appell Exhibit 14" is filed herewith.) ⁴⁶

Mr. TAVENNER. Have you itemized the various items shipped by this medium during 1943 and 1944?

Mr. APPELL. The statistics furnished the committee by the Air Forces carry a complete break-down for the year 1944, as follows:

Printed matter in which category is included blueprints, drawings, books, magazines, newspapers, office supplies, and technical publications.....	Pounds 194,638
Airplane parts.....	1,106,307
Miscellaneous tools.....	55,315
Miscellaneous equipment.....	184,236
Explosives.....	5,124
Medical.....	43,618
Routine and diplomatic mail.....	54,309
Personal items, clothing, etc.....	14,155

Total freight shipments during the year 1944..... 1,717,702

⁴⁵ See appendix.

⁴⁶ See appendix.

Mr. TAVENNER. I offer in evidence this statistical data received from the Army Air Forces, which includes documentation of the shipments of uranium oxide and nitrate and heavy water, referred to in the testimony of Mr. Owens and which we said we would introduce as an exhibit, and I ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 15."

Mr. WOOD. Let it be admitted.

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 15," is filed herewith.)⁴⁷

Mr. KEARNEY. Is there any further identification of the blueprints mentioned?

Mr. APPELL. Newspapers to Russia, drawings; total weight.

Mr. KEARNEY. I am speaking particularly about the blueprints.

Mr. WOOD. As I understand, the inquiry is whether they specifically identify the blueprints.

Mr. APPELL. They do not. All we have is the total weight of the package.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Appell, I believe you have already stated that you received the cooperation of the various departments in compiling this information, in a very fine way?

Mr. APPELL. On behalf of the investigators' staff, I want to sincerely thank all the departments for their wonderful cooperation in this matter. It would never have been possible for us to have shown and documented in detail these transactions without their full cooperation and assistance, which they gave us without hesitation.

Mr. TAVENNER. No further questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Walter?

Mr. WALTER. No questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Harrison?

Mr. HARRISON. No, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Moulder?

Mr. MOULDER. No questions.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Nixon.

Mr. NIXON. I have some questions, but I don't want to ask them now.

Mr. WOOD. Can the committee get back at 3 o'clock? The committee will stand adjourned until 3 o'clock.

(Thereupon, a recess was taken until 3 p. m.; and at 3 p. m. the hearing was recessed until Friday, March 3, 1950, at 10:30 a. m.)

⁴⁷ See appendix.

HEARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II

FRIDAY, MARCH 3, 1950

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARING

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a. m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood (chairman), Richard M. Nixon, Francis Case (arriving as indicated), Harold H. Velde, and Bernard W. Kearney.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Donald T. Appell, investigator; John W. Carrington, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. Wood. Let the committee be in order.

Let the record show, please, that for the time being the committee is operating under a subcommittee consisting of Messrs. Nixon, Velde, Kearney, and Wood.

Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir. Major Jordan.

Mr. NIXON. I had some questions I wanted to ask Mr. Appell.

Mr. WOOD. I would like to proceed with this witness.

Mr. NIXON. It would be helpful if I could ask Mr. Appell a few questions to lay the foundation for such questions as we may want to ask Major Jordan. You have no objection, have you?

Mr. TAVENNER. None at all.

Mr. WOOD. I have no questions to ask Mr. Appell. You may proceed.

(Representative Wood leaves hearing room.)

TESTIMONY OF DONALD T. APPELL—Resumed

Mr. NIXON. Mr. Appell, yesterday you testified at considerable length from documents and memoranda, setting forth the results of your own investigation in this case. What I would like to do now is to determine whether the conclusions I have reached from hearing that mass of testimony that went into the record yesterday is correct or not correct. I would like to go into some of the points at issue in this case.

Of course the major point at issue is the over-all credibility of the so-called Jordan story. Some of those points were rather clearly brought out yesterday, and some I have a question on that I would like to clear up.

First of all, a general question. I think immediately after the hearings last December the major concern of the reporters covering the facts brought out at the hearings then was probably fairly well stated by an editorial which appeared in Life magazine. I quote directly from that editorial:

Competent investigators of the FBI and Military Intelligence have gone over this whole ground and have found nothing to substantiate the charges.

Do you agree with that statement, that your investigation has disclosed nothing to substantiate any of the Jordan charges?

Mr. APPELL. Mr. Nixon, as I testified yesterday, Army documents show that on the 7th of March 1944, a report was made to Air Transport Command to the effect that a shipment had gone through, and that one of the parcels that went through had been examined by Jordan and that it contained plans of the A-20 plane, long- and short-haul routes, and other technical data. This was reported to Washington, although we were unable to substantiate the exact manner in which it was reported.

I also testified with regard to an interview with Major Jordan on the 13th of March 1944, in which he advised a CIC agent of certain irregularities at Great Falls, and in which he requested that he be further interviewed in minute detail, and that he was advised this would be done. The records show he was not further interviewed; at least, the agent who was supposed to interview him had no recollection of doing so.

That shows that Major Jordan did make official reports of this matter.

Mr. NIXON. But he only did it on two occasions; is that correct?

Mr. APPELL. Two occasions as far as we could find in documentation.

Mr. VELDE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NIXON. Yes.

Mr. VELDE. Was Major Jordan's story, as far as your investigation was concerned, ever discredited by any of the witnesses whom you contacted?

Mr. APPELL. No. As a matter of fact, I would like to read an indorsement by General Dunlap, who was Acting Adjutant General of the Army.

Mr. VELDE. I think the true facts should be brought out regardless of whom it hurts, and that was the purpose of asking that question.

Mr. APPELL. General Dunlap said this:

The action being taken by Army Air Forces, as indicated by paragraph 4 of the basic communication, is correct and constitutes the full discharge of all responsibilities of the War Department in this connection. The security aspects of this matter have been brought to the attention of the Department of State, the Customs Service, Immigration Service, Office of Censorship, and the Department of Justice. Beyond that, the War Department has no authority to act. The agencies mentioned have had this matter under study and investigation for some time and their inquiries continue. While they have arrived at no final conclusions in the matter, it is indicated that the results will be a more comprehensive enforcement of existing laws and regulations than heretofore has been the case.

The matter that was called to their attention was Major Jordan's statement in evidence which he gave to the CIC agent on March 13, 1944.

Mr. VELDE. Do you recall what report the CIC agent made with respect to Major Jordan that was the background of this statement which you have just read?

Mr. APPELL (reading):

There is an incredible amount of diplomatic mail sent to Russia through Great Falls. On 29 January 1944, on aircraft C-47 (2440), 3,563 pounds of mail was shipped to Russia. On 17 February 1944, on aircraft C-47 (2579) 4,180 pounds of mail was sent. On 28 February 1944, on aircraft C-47 (92764), 3,757 pounds of mail was sent. All of this was protected from censorship by diplomatic immunity. It may be significant that it is not at all uncommon for the Russian mail or freight shipment to be accompanied by two men, who openly state that they are to see that the mail or freight is not examined and the diplomatic immunity privilege violated. One man sleeps while the other watches the parcels and vice versa. Major Jordan admitted, without reservation, that he knew nothing regarding the amount of mail or freight that a foreign country normally sends through its diplomatic service, but it is thought that that information can be readily obtained.

Many high ranking Russian Army Officers, Civilian Representatives, members of the Russian Diplomatic Service and their families pass through this Base. The United States Justice Department has but two men assigned to the Great Falls area to handle all matters pertaining to customs and immigration in this vicinity. One of the men works during the day and the other at night. Anyone who passes through this Base, other than those in the Armed Forces of the United States, must go through customs. Major Jordan has seen the families of high ranking Russian Army Officers and the wife of former Ambassador Molotov greatly delayed in passage merely because the customs officer had the duties of two or three men. This point is made because it is believed this condition is not conducive to desired feeling between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is suggested that this issue be discussed with the Justice Department.

This Agent observed that Major Jordan appeared to maintain accurate, detailed files and was very anxious to convey his information through intelligence channels. He requested that he be contacted at a time when the Russian activity could be outlined in minute detail and was advised that this would be done by CIC Agent—

and here I do not identify the agent—

who is currently attached to the Intelligence and Security Office, Station 5, East Base, Great Falls, Montana.

It is recommended that a prolonged interview be conducted with Major Jordan; that his records be scrutinized for information of an intelligence nature; and that he be contacted regularly.

It is further recommended that the facts contained herein be given due consideration, with a view to contacting the State Department in order that they be made cognizant of the situation and that corrective measures be taken.

Mr. VELDE. I think that material was read at some length yesterday.

Mr. APPELL. Yes, sir. It was this information that was passed by the Army to the State Department.

Mr. NIXON. What I am getting at here, your investigation shows first, then, that Major Jordan did, at least on two occasions, make a report concerning the passage of materials through Great Falls?

Mr. APPELL. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. And that he requested that he be contacted later so that he could outline the shipments in detail; is that correct?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, sir.

(Representative Wood returns to hearing room.)

Mr. NIXON. Of course, in that connection, I suppose Major Jordan is faced with somewhat of a problem, because I recall a similar case—I should say a case in which the committee conducted an investigation involving Mr. Chambers—and as I recall, Mr. Chambers had to tell his story five times before any cognizance was taken of his charges. So apparently if Major Jordan had told his more than twice he might have gotten the Government to do something about it. But be that as it may, as I see it at present the issues are five, and before Major Jordan goes on the stand I want to see which of the charges are still at issue.

First of all, the charge was made that if the shipments were going through, Major Jordan should have made a report. In this regard, he did make a report of the charges at least on two occasions. Is that correct?

Mr. APPELL. Yes; and in respect to Major Jordan's testimony, yesterday I stayed away entirely from shipments of uranium and heavy water.

Mr. NIXON. The fact is that Major Jordan did report the charges; is that correct?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, and I also could add that we made request for reports of Intelligence officers signed at the base, and that these reports could not be located. My testimony is based on documents which we have received.

Mr. NIXON. As far as you have been able to find, at least two reports were made?

Mr. APPELL. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. NIXON. I think that is sufficient, probably; there may have been others; but the point of reporting by Major Jordan stands up.

Another point that was made was whether or not he tore radar equipment out of C-47 planes. As I understand, this particular phase of his story was questioned in the article in Life magazine, in which they said that the report that Mr. Jordan ripped out radar equipment from C-47's was preposterous, and they quoted his superior officer, Meredith, in that respect; and it was further said that as a matter of fact no C-47's were equipped with radar at the time mentioned by Major Jordan.

The investigation of the committee, in addition to your own, has shown, (1) that C-47's equipped with radar and going to Russia did go through Great Falls; and (2) that Mr. Jordan specifically asked permission of Colonel Gitzinger in Dayton to tear the radar equipment out of a specific plane on one occasion.

Mr. APPELL. That is correct, and he received that permission from Colonel Gitzinger.

(Representative Case arrives in hearing room.)

Mr. NIXON. Then on the point of whether Major Jordan did or did not tear radar out of a plane, your investigation substantiates Major Jordan?

Mr. APPELL. That is correct.

Mr. NIXON. Another point that Major Jordan made was that certain documents were going through Great Falls under diplomatic immunity; that he broke into the cases, examined the documents, and that some of the material in there which he examined consisted of plans, secret material, and so on, which it would be assumed normally would not be regarded to be under diplomatic immunity.

I think it is quite clear from your testimony that that phase of Major Jordan's testimony stands up; is that correct?

Mr. APPELL. Well, we do know, we are in contact with a witness, a former employee of the Russian Purchasing Commission, who helped pack one pouch of so-called diplomatic mail that went through, and we know it contained material highly secretive on industrial and war developments. We have been unable to investigate Major Jordan's testimony with respect to other things because we were unable to determine the nature or contents of these documents.

Mr. NIXON. Is it the intention of the staff, then, to present this witness who may be able to substantiate, at least in part, Major Jordan's testimony that secret material was going through?

Mr. APPELL. That is correct.

Mr. NIXON. On the point of the so-called shipments of uranium, as I understand the case, first, there is no question about the shipments going through; is that correct?

Mr. APPELL. As to the shipments of uranium and heavy water, two specific shipments of uranium oxide and nitrate and shipments of heavy water have been completely documented to include even the number of the plane that flew the uranium and heavy water out of Great Falls.

Mr. NIXON. Isn't it true these shipments were made with the knowledge and approval of our officials?

Mr. APPELL. Export declarations on these shipments were approved by Lend-Lease and later by its successor organization, Foreign Economic Administration.

Mr. NIXON. And in the case of one shipment, the first, General Groves and members of the Atomic Energy Commission learned about it was when this committee began its investigation; is that correct?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. NIXON. And the final point is the matter of Mr. Hopkins having attempted to expedite the shipments. Major Jordan's testimony on that was that his notes, written at the time, showed the initials "H. H." on one of the consignments which he broke into. Your investigation has shown no correspondence of Mr. Hopkins in which he used the initials "H. H." Is that correct?

Mr. APPELL. That which we reviewed.

Mr. NIXON. On that point, then, you have been unable to substantiate Major Jordan's charge; is that correct?

Mr. APPELL. That is right, but with respect to documents examined to find out whether or not it was possible for the thing to have happened, we only examined documents furnished us by the Army and Air Forces. We requested permission to review the files of the President's Protocol Commission, now in the possession of Archives, and certain other documents in the custody of the Department of State, and we were not given permission to review these files. Mr. Hopkins was chairman of the President's Protocol Commission.

Mr. NIXON. I understand that. My point is that as far as the investigation you have been able to make is concerned, you as yet have been unable to substantiate Major Jordan's story on that point; is that correct?

Mr. APPELL. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. But you have substantiated it on the four other points I mentioned?

Mr. APPELL. Generally; yes.

Mr. NIXON. That is all.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Case.

Mr. CASE. Mr. Appell, did you look into the significance of the change in position taken with reference to the sending of the C-47 airplane which the Russians requested, in which they wanted to carry four passengers and 4,000 pounds of mail or other material?

Mr. APPELL. I went into the whole record of the transactions between the War Department, ATC, and the Soviet Purchasing Commission for Special Aircraft. When the thing first started, the Russians came to the Army and expressed their difficulty in sending diplomatic mail from Washington to Great Falls by rail, which necessitated reloading three times, and asked for this special aircraft.

Their first request was turned down. It was turned down finally on the recommendation of General Deane, head of our military mission in Moscow. When the Russians made the second request it was again sent to General Deane, and the final decision in the matter was based upon the recommendation of General Deane and Ambassador Harriman, who recommended that nothing be done to disrupt the arrangements which had been agreed to by the ATC.

Mr. CASE. I notice that when the change was made on that C-47, the approval was based on the weight being limited to between 2,500 and 3,000 pounds. Did you look into what the pay load of a C-47 was at that time?

Mr. APPELL. No; but we have seen documentation of flights going through carrying as high as 4,100 pounds.

Mr. CASE. And how many passengers?

Mr. APPELL. Two and 4,100 pounds.

Mr. CASE. Two passengers and 4,100 pounds?

Mr. APPELL. Yes.

Mr. CASE. Allowing 200 pounds for each man, that would be 4,500 pounds. The modification suggested that four people might go with 2,000 or 3,000 pounds. Was that the reason for the modification, or was there a policy involved?

Mr. APPELL. I have been unable to find that. It has been suggested to me that the reasons for it was because the plane was from New York going west, and there was a question of gas load which made them cut down on the weight of the cargo, but I do not know that for a fact.

Mr. CASE. General Deane was head of our military mission in Moscow. That is Gen. John R. Deane. His original recommendation presumably would have been on a question of policy, and later reversed on a question of policy?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CASE. I now have in my hands this confidential memorandum from which you read yesterday but which was not introduced in evidence, with identification of the names. This is the report of a special agent for Counter Intelligence. You will recall yesterday having read two recommendations, following the paragraph in which the agent observed that Major Jordan appeared to maintain accurate, detailed files and was very anxious to convey his information through Intelligence channels; and that he requested that he be contacted at a time when the Russian activity could be outlined in minute detail and was advised that this would be done by CIC agent so and so, who was

attached to the Intelligence and Security Office, Station 5, East Base, Great Falls, Mont.

Then the following two recommendations were made by the special agent:

It is recommended that a prolonged interview be conducted with Major Jordan; that his records be scrutinized for information of an intelligence nature; and that he be contacted regularly.

Did your investigation disclose that that recommendation was carried out?

Mr. APPELL. He was not again interviewed.

Mr. CASE. He was not again interviewed?

Mr. APPELL. No, sir, as far as the records are concerned.

Mr. CASE. Did you find any explanation of why this recommendation was not followed?

Mr. APPELL. The agent mentioned there said he received no instructions to do so.

Mr. CASE. The next recommendation was, and this is the concluding paragraph of this special agent's report:

It is further recommended that the facts contained herein be given due consideration, with a view to contacting the State Department in order that they be made cognizant of the situation and that corrective measures be taken.

Did your investigation disclose whether that recommendation was followed?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, sir, it was, and almost the entire report of that special agent was sent by Army to State Department.

Mr. CASE. That is, they were contacted?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. CASE. But did your investigation determine, after they were made cognizant of the situation, that any corrective measures were taken?

Mr. APPELL. The first action the State Department took was to call a conference of all interested agencies. It was held on July 6, 1944, and the agencies represented were the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Office of Censorship; Military Intelligence; Air Transport Command; Immigration and Naturalization Service; Bureau of Customs; Foreign Economic Administration; and State Department.

Mr. CASE. And what was the final outcome of that?

Mr. APPELL. What transpired at the meeting, the committee has never been able to determine, because minutes of the meeting and memoranda which might have been prepared on the meeting cannot be located by the State Department. The only thing the committee has in connection with that meeting is a report dated July 6, 1944, by Col. L. R. Forney, who was one of Military Intelligence's representatives at that conference. I will be only too happy to read again Colonel Forney's report.

Mr. CASE. I don't know that it is necessary to read that. I would like to have an answer, though, to the direct question as to whether or not that meeting and this review by the State Department led to any corrective measures or any measures to give any assistance to Major Jordan in the inspection of this cargo?

Mr. APPELL. Mr. Bohlen of the State Department advised that he intended to take up with the second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington this question. Then on the 27th or 28th of July

there was forwarded to the second secretary of the Soviet Embassy an informal memorandum of customs and censorship regulations, and the second secretary was advised that these regulations would be strictly enforced, effective upon his receipt of them.

(Representative Nixon leaves hearing room.)

Mr. APPELL (continuing). The record continues on to show that in September 1944 they apparently were not corrected, because another Intelligence and Security officer reported on September 21, 1944, that the condition was still going on, and that while he held up planes and refused to permit planes to fly without the customs people looking at the cargo, that no inspection was made by censorship, and the special agent stated that in his opinion this action was a violation of the espionage statute.

I have been unable to find from any documents received that any corrective measures were ever put into effect to actually search what went through Great Falls.

Mr. KEARNEY. In other words, there was plenty of talk but little action.

Mr. CASE. Whose responsibility would it have been to see that these regulations were enforced in conformity with the notice served on the second secretary of the Soviet Embassy on the 28th of July?

Mr. APPELL. Well, it would seem that the responsibility would have been placed in the hands of, I would say, three agencies.

Customs had a responsibility to inspect to see that only diplomatic mail went through without inspection. If they found that there was cargo involved which should have an export license or which should be inspected, then they should have notified censorship, which was the agency with the responsibility of making examinations. If it was material that required export declarations, customs, under their responsibility, was supposed to refuse permission for that cargo to leave Great Falls until such time as it had an export declaration.

Colonel Forney's memorandum of July 6, 1944, stated that other agencies assumed that it was Army's responsibility, and Army had no responsibility in the matter whatsoever other than—

Mr. CASE. You referred to the report made in September in which the agent then called attention to the fact that the situation was continuing, and I believe you used the expression that apparently it was a violation of the Espionage Act?

Mr. APPELL. That is what the agent said, and that was concurred in by the Acting Adjutant General of the United States Army.

Mr. CASE. Did the report indicate by whom the violation was made?

Mr. APPELL. The violation, as the agent stated it, was in permitting the stuff to go through without Censorship's examination. It didn't place the responsibility on any agency.

Mr. CASE. Did your investigation determine whether or not this report, concurred in by the Adjutant General, was brought to the attention of Customs or the State Department?

Mr. APPELL. General Dunlap, in the last indorsement of the document, said that the condition had been called to the attention of the agencies and that they were studying the question, and that it was anticipated regulations would be placed into effect to correct these conditions. The documents supplied do not indicate that this was done.

Mr. CASE. So, somewhere all of these efforts on the part of Major Jordan and of the agents of Counter Intelligence to correct these conditions ran into a dead end?

Mr. APPELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. VELDE. Just one question with reference to these diplomatic pouches. Did your investigation reveal how the diplomatic pouches were made up and who was responsible for sealing them and so forth?

Mr. APPELL. The responsibility for sealing the diplomatic pouches was the responsibility of the Soviet Purchasing Commission, who sent them.

Mr. VELDE. No American authority had that responsibility?

Mr. APPELL. No. The Russians prepared the so-called diplomatic cargo or diplomatic mail in two different ways, although it was all given the same treatment. In one type they placed the embassy seal, the seal of the government. In another type they would take a box or cheap patent leather suitcase, tie it with a piece of sash cord, knot it, and, either to keep the knot from coming undone or to see that nobody tampered with it, they would put some wax on that knot, but it bore no resemblance to a diplomatic seal.

Mr. VELDE. That is all.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Kearney.

Mr. KEARNEY. Listening to the testimony here, it seems to me the only one who did do his duty, as I see it, was Major Jordan. On two separate occasions, Major Jordan brought this to the attention not only of his superior officers, but as a result conferences were held by the various agencies, named by the witness, then it was dropped.

Mr. WOOD. Thank you, Mr. Appell. That is all.

Mr. TAVENNER. Major Jordan.

Mr. WOOD. Major, I don't think it is necessary to swear you again; but, since we are operating under a subcommittee, do you solemnly swear the testimony you give to this subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. JORDAN. I do, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Have a seat, Major.

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE RACEY JORDAN

Mr. WOOD. Major Jordan, on the 23d of January you directed a communication to me in which you pointed out some discrepancies in your testimony before this committee, and indicated that you would like an opportunity to make some corrections, after having checked the records. On the 28th of January I made a reply to that communication and stated you would be given that opportunity. Is that correct?

(Representative Nixon returns to hearing room.)

Mr. JORDAN. That is correct.

Mr. WOOD. And I also informed you that, as a result of a public announcement that I made in December at the request of the minority members of this committee, your presence would probably be required again so that they would have an opportunity to examine you, they being absent when you were here before.

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. I think in your communication you stated you desired to make a correction of certain dates, particularly the date of your telephone conversation with Mr. Hopkins. You may proceed.

Mr. JORDAN. When I testified I had participated in a telephone conversation with Mr. Hopkins, I had previously told the FBI it was about 3 weeks before the uranium arrived. I was at a disadvantage the last time I was here, because I didn't know when the shipment had been made, and, when you pressed me as to what year it was made, I made an honest attempt to tell you, and said it was 1944. But later, when you found it was in May 1943, I realized my testimony had been in error, because the telephone call I had been discussing to expedite this particular shipment occurred 2 or 3 weeks before the uranium arrived. So, now that you have been able to pin-point the date the uranium arrived, I will have to match it. I did the best I could with my memory after 7 years.

Mr. CASE. The witness is merely changing the date and not the fact of the telephone call.

Mr. JORDAN. Uranium started to go through almost immediately after I went there and continued until the last month I was there, so, for me to pin-point each particular shipment in sequence, I did the best I could.

Mr. CASE. And all you are changing is—

Mr. JORDAN. I am changing the date from 1944 to 1943.

Mr. CASE. The fact of what happened, you are not changing that testimony?

Mr. JORDAN. No; I am not. It has been called to my attention since that time that Mr. Hopkins was sick in a hospital at that time, and I have been hoping to make my testimony more correct. The uranium didn't arrive until the 22d of May 1943. So, it would have to be a few weeks before that, and I want to take this opportunity to change that date.

Mr. WOOD. Any other corrections?

Mr. JORDAN. The misspelling of a Russian officer's name. I said Gromov, and they had Romanov. I never heard of Romanov being with the Soviet Government.

Mr. WOOD. Do you desire to ask the witness any further questions, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir. Major Jordan, when you were previously before the committee you told of shipments of uranium and heavy water which proceeded through Great Falls, Mont. If shipments left the United States from other ports, would any records of these shipments be sent to Colonel Kotikov at Great Falls?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. Colonel Kotikov worked with certain Russians in the Purchasing Commission, and I could tell by the people he worked with as to the type of materials being handled. Eremin was a member of the Purchasing Commission and chief of raw materials. Fomichev was assistant chief of chemicals. And Fomin was in charge of powder and explosives. Even though the chemicals might be shipped from Philadelphia or Portland or Seattle, when they were assembled and on the docks and ready to go, Kotikov would be checked with and would send the papers pertaining to these chemicals to Moscow, where they would be awaiting the arrival of the ships.

On the left-hand side of Colonel Kotikov's desk there were many folders, and I would sometimes get the folders for Kotikov when he

was talking on the telephone. He would say "chemicals" or "metals" and I would get the particular folder. He knew what was going through in practically all parts of the United States that had to do with industrial plants that they were collecting. They were collecting an oil refinery, and I would take out that folder when he was talking on the telephone about that, and when it was assembled he would send the papers to Moscow.

That is how it became possible for me to see the words "uranium," and "thorium," and "cadmium," and all the others. You never asked me for anything but uranium, and I never volunteered the others.

Mr. TAVENNER. We will ask you now. Colonel Kotikov occupied what position at Great Falls?

Mr. JORDAN. I thought he was a perfectly ordinary officer, but I found out he received the highest decoration of all when he got back home; so he evidently was more important than I realized. He seemed to be this end of the pipe line; and, therefore, it is possible he was more important than in other locations in the United States. I was very close to him and very friendly with him and spoke highly of him, because I was trying to help him get the materials he needed. I understood that was what my job was.

Mr. TAVENNER. So the materials that were shipped to Russia from other ports, the records of those shipments, passed through Colonel Kotikov's office; is that what I understand you to say?

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Tavenner, I was very embarrassed when I found you only located 45 pounds of uranium when the papers I had called for 500 pounds. So I listened to General Groves' testimony, and I understand that while they asked for 500 pounds they were only able to locate 45. So when I testified in perfectly good faith they got 500 pounds, I thought they did, but it turned out they only filled that particular order to the extent of 45 pounds. I took it from the papers.

When I talked of heavy water, I saw "heavy water" on the papers. I have since been told there was none in the United States, and that what I thought was heavy water was sulphuric acid. When I testified I saw them loading carboys of heavy water, I was being perfectly honest. Now you find out it went through in different quantities.

Mr. TAVENNER. And in a different container.

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. I received a letter from a Norwegian saying he knew heavy water came from Norway and was smuggled in this country and went to Russia through Great Falls. It is funny, but I do remember seeing the word "Norge." I will be glad to give you the letter.

Mr. TAVENNER. We will be glad to see it. Regardless of where the shipment of these materials might originate, whether at some port such as New York or some airport such as existed in Florida, the records of those shipments would pass through Colonel Kotikov's office at Great Falls? Do I understand that to be the situation?

Mr. JORDAN. It depended entirely on what he was collecting under orders. Radio shipments out of Newark might have gone to Ouspensky, and Ouspensky might have sent them to the Purchasing Commission, and they might have been put in suitcases and sent through without Kotikov having them. But the plants anywhere in the United States would be reported to Kotikov, and when the plants were assembled he would then send them on.

Here is an official Soviet Purchasing Commission letter and the accompanying documents. I simply took that as a souvenir. But here is a letter showing the way the plants were assembled. When the plant was entirely assembled, then he would bundle it up and send it to Moscow.

Mr. TAVENNER. When it was sent to Moscow, through what port or ports would it be sent?

Mr. JORDAN. It depended on where the ships were available. Sometimes they had to be sent from Philadelphia or New York or Seattle. I have been on ships at Newark with Kotikov and have watched the way they were loaded. I saw \$100,000 of butter going abroad when we couldn't get it at home, and I watched how they packed the butter and how Kotikov checked the cases.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then at Great Falls you had an opportunity to review the records regarding the shipment of the various materials that Kotikov was interested in?

Mr. JORDAN. I had them all in my hands.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have knowledge of the use made of thorium, cadmium, graphite, or aluminum tubes?

Mr. JORDAN. I did not know at the time what it was for. I had no conception of what the words "uranium," "cadmium," or "thorium" meant at the time; but, now that I have seen pictures of an atomic pile, I recognize the various things in it as the very things Kotikov was collecting. I never had seen the word "cadmium" before. I see here that controls the heating of the atomic pile.

I looked at my records and saw that we shipped, in 1942, 100,800 pounds cadmium metals; in 1943 we shipped 150,427 pounds cadmium metals, 72,535 pounds of cadmium alloys; and in 1944 we shipped 533,742 pounds cadmium metals. In 1944 the cadmium alloys stopped cold.

As to thorium, in 1942 we shipped 13,440 pounds; in 1943 we shipped 11,912 pounds; and in 1944 not a pound.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the amount of thorium you said was shipped in 1943?

Mr. JORDAN. Thorium, 13,440 pounds in 1942 and 11,912 pounds in 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was that last figure?

Mr. JORDAN. 11,912 pounds in 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I have been able to produce here a shipper's export declaration showing the exact figure of 11,912 pounds of thorium nitrate shipped January 30, 1943, from Philadelphia on the Steamship *John C. Fremont*, the exporter being Amtorg Trading Corp. I desire to introduce this record in evidence and ask that it be marked "Jordan Exhibit 4."

Mr. WOOD. I understand the record tendered is a photostatic copy of the original?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. Without objection, it will be admitted.

(The document above referred to, marked "Jordan Exhibit 4," is filed herewith.)⁴⁸

Mr. NIXON. Do I understand you are reading from your diary at the present time?

⁴⁸ See appendix.

Mr. JORDAN. My diary consists of books and bound volumes and various notebooks that I kept at the time.

Mr. NIXON. I am referring to this shipment of 11,912 pounds.

Mr. JORDAN. I am reading it from the official records the Russians gave me.

Mr. NIXON. At that time?

Mr. JORDAN. No. They were given to me later. Before I went out of the Army, I was afraid there would be a lend-lease investigation, and I asked the Russians if they would let me have the totals that went through, and they gave me the complete totals of everything Russia received in 1942, 1943, and 1944.

Mr. CASE. Everything they received where?

Mr. JORDAN. Entirely.

Mr. CASE. In all forms of lend-lease?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. It runs into billions of dollars.

Mr. NIXON. Do the uranium shipments appear on that?

Mr. JORDAN. No. They were not under lend-lease. They were paid by cash.

Mr. NIXON. This includes only such shipments as were made under lend-lease?

Mr. JORDAN. It includes only such shipments as the American taxpayers paid for.

Mr. CASE. All shipments through every channel?

Mr. JORDAN. Every shipment that went through lend-lease out of the United States.

Mr. KEARNEY. That is, at every port of the United States?

Mr. JORDAN. Every port.

Mr. KEARNEY. Not only from Great Falls?

Mr. JORDAN. Not only from Great Falls. So, what I have been able to do is refresh my memory by reading the total figures and checking them with what I know, and they come out right.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have told us about thorium. What record do you have of the shipment of cadmium?

Mr. JORDAN. Cadmium? I just read the figures.

I didn't read the figures on aluminum tubes. In 1942 we shipped them 3,463,346 pounds of aluminum tubes at a cost of \$3,989,506. In 1943 we shipped them 2,982,209 pounds at a cost of \$2,491,021. In 1944 we shipped them 7,186,172 pounds at a cost of \$6,461,923, or a total cost of \$12,942,450.

The graphite, I have a picture of an atomic pile made up of graphite. According to Colonel Kotikov he was assembling graphite for furnaces.

In 1942 we shipped them 1,818,838 pounds of carbon graphite for furnaces, and 7,069,088 graphite for furnaces. In 1943 we shipped them 11,694,118 graphite for furnaces. And in 1944 we shipped them 9,437,006 graphite for furnaces. The total cost was \$4,327,101.

Mr. TAVENNER. These materials to which you have testified—that is, the thorium, cadmium, aluminum tubes, and graphite—could be used for what purposes, as far as you know?

Mr. JORDAN. I only know that this article on the atomic bomb gives these materials as being the necessary materials to make the atomic bomb. I am not a technician and not a chemist. This article is in Life magazine (indicating publication in hand).

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Counsel, I regret very much to have to suspend at this time, but it is only 5 minutes before the convening of the House. We will take a recess until 3 o'clock this afternoon.

(Thereupon, at 11:55 a. m., a recess was taken until 3 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The subcommittee met at 3 p. m.)

Mr. WOOD. The record will show that of the subcommittee conducting this hearing there are present Messrs. Velde, Kearney, and Wood.

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE RACEY JORDAN—Resumed

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, may I clarify in my own mind a couple of points testified to this morning by the witness?

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Kearney.

Mr. KEARNEY. I understood, Major—and you correct me if I am wrong—this morning you testified to the arrival at Great Falls of a C-47 containing approximately 50 pieces of luggage?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir.

(Representative Nixon arrives in hearing room.)

Mr. KEARNEY. And as I recollect you read from a diary in which the notations were supposed to have been made on or about that time; is that correct?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEARNEY. Can you tell the committee regarding any Russian personnel that was aboard that plane?

Mr. JORDAN. At the beginning, when I first went to Great Falls in 1945, the material I have been complaining about arrived by freight at the railroad station and was brought out to the field in trucks and put in a warehouse and then loaded onto a C-47 which we had specially prepared to fly to Moscow.

It is important to get the point why the transfer had to be made at Great Falls. These C-47 planes that arrived from various depots had to be winterized to make the flight to Moscow. They had to be specially treated so as to operate at temperatures 50 to 60 degrees below zero. So everything would have to be transferred to a plane that had spent 4 days in the hangar being winterized.

So it is entirely possible the freight may have arrived by train and been put into a warehouse, but it could not depart without my authority.

When I referred to a plane ready to go it didn't mean it had just arrived that day with a particular load and particular couriers. Sometimes a load would arrive with a couple of couriers, and they would sleep on the load, and sometimes they would switch couriers. When a courier would spread out a blanket and sleep on the bags I had no way of knowing how the load had arrived, but when I saw it on the plane ready to go, they had to get my authority to depart, and that is when I got on the plane and inspected.

Mr. KEARNEY. The particular plane you referred to this morning, did you examine any of the 50 pieces of luggage on that plane?

Mr. JORDAN. I testified the last time, when you were not here, that I had first seen excessive baggage going through with a Russian general, and I let it go through. Each succeeding Russian officer had

increasing baggage. When it got to 10 or 15 suitcases per person I began to become apprehensive of whether I was doing my duty; and when 50 pieces came without any personnel, just 2 guards, that is when I felt I should be in a spot-check position and see what was in the suitcases.

That was the first time I did it. I can't tell the plane or time.

Mr. KEARNEY. At that time did you make a spot check of them?

Mr. JORDAN. I opened about one-third of the suitcases.

Mr. KEARNEY. Was there opposition by anyone to your opening the bags?

Mr. JORDAN. The two Russians tried to physically stop me, without touching me—tried to stop me at the door, saying it was diplomatic. I said, in the performance of my duty I wanted to open one or two of the suitcases.

Mr. KEARNEY. Did you open one or two?

Mr. JORDAN. I opened about one-third.

Mr. KEARNEY. Can you tell the committee what you found in the suitcases?

Mr. JORDAN. I found a very large amount of office folders, and in each of the folders would be duplicates of papers from various departments of the Government. In my notes made at the time that I actually opened the suitcases, I made a one-word note which to me meant the whole suitcase. Where I have a note "State Department," that meant an entire suitcase or perhaps two or three suitcases. The notes were made at the time, 7 years ago, when this was done, and I can now only say I have a note "Panama Canal Commission maps," and "Amtorg Trading Co.," and "Tass," and "State Department."

I can't go further than to say I remember in some of the State Department papers I took a peek at one, and it was a military report.

Mr. KEARNEY. Do you know where that military report came from?

Mr. JORDAN. From Moscow.

Mr. KEARNEY. Was that a folder?

Mr. JORDAN. It was a folder.

Mr. KEARNEY. Was there any name on that folder?

Mr. JORDAN. The names were on the front of the folders on a piece of white paper, clipped on to show where that particular folder's contents came from.

Mr. KEARNEY. Can you give the committee the name of any individual on the folders you saw?

Mr. JORDAN. I saw Sayre, Hiss, and other members of the State Department whose names I made a note of at the time.

Mr. KEARNEY. Can you tell the committee what was in the folder under the name of Hiss?

Mr. JORDAN. I can only say they were photostats of some kind and seemed to be military reports.

Mr. KEARNEY. Do you know where the military reports came from?

Mr. JORDAN. I can't say where they all came from, but I would say from Moscow.

Mr. KEARNEY. From whom at Moscow?

Mr. JORDAN. The American attaché out there.

Mr. KEARNEY. And they were sent from the American military chief of our mission in Moscow to whom?

Mr. JORDAN. They were sent through channels to Washington to the State Department, and somebody in the State Department had evidently photostated them and was sending them back.

Mr. KEARNEY. You mean to tell the committee these were the reports sent from our mission in Moscow to our own State Department and photostated and returned to Moscow?

Mr. JORDAN. That is what it looked like.

Mr. KEARNEY. They were contained in this baggage you speak of?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. I was looking for morphine, to be truthful. We were missing morphine, and the couriers had been sleeping all night beside the morphine, and I thought they had been stealing it. I was running my hand through and had no intention of reading anything, but since I had opened them I wanted to make a note of what I had seen. I made a note "State Department" with "Secret" cut off, and I have a notation of Sayre, Hiss, and others. This was written that night.

Mr. KEARNEY. This was military information received by the State Department from our mission in Moscow and later returned to the Russians?

Mr. JORDAN. That is what it looked like, but at the time, you must remember, I thought this material was going through under authority, and I had no idea there was anything improper about it. It looked to me the State Department knew what they were doing when they sent things to Moscow. I didn't think it was anything I should do anything about.

Mr. KEARNEY. That sheet you are referring to now, are those notes made by yourself at Great Falls, Mont., on the date you spoke of?

Mr. JORDAN. They were made at the time I opened the first suitcases. Then I opened a number of suitcases later.

Mr. KEARNEY. What I am getting at is, they are your notes made at that time and not some months later?

Mr. JORDAN. They were made the night I opened the suitcases.

Mr. KEARNEY. I think that will be all for the time being.

Mr. NIXON. Let me clear one thing up before you leave this matter of these names that you have brought in. I think the record should be clear that the fact those names appeared in that correspondence and on those folders does not in itself indicate that either of the individuals named was involved in illegal activities in sending folders through the Russian couriers.

Mr. JORDAN. If I had known or thought it was illegal at the time, I would have grounded the plane. I thought it was in perfect order.

Mr. NIXON. You are only testifying that among the things you saw in those folders you opened, you recall seeing those two names?

Mr. JORDAN. I have notes on those two names. There were a number of names.

Mr. NIXON. You saw State Department papers?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. And you saw somewhere in those State Department papers the two names, Sayre and Hiss, and other names?

Mr. JORDAN. That is correct. But the fact is that the folders were in the suitcases in rows with elastic bands around five or six folders, and in the front would be a white piece of paper with "From Hiss" and the next batch "From Sayre" and so on. I just picked the first one or two and made a note to show what was in the suitcase.

Mr. NIXON. I wanted the record to be clear that the testimony of the witness on this point relates only to the fact that certain documents went through with those names appearing on the folders, and in my opinion, certainly, which I think I should express, no inference can be drawn from that fact that either of the individuals named was involved in illegal activity.

Mr. KEARNEY. I don't think from any questions I asked such an inference could be drawn.

Mr. NIXON. I think your questions brought out the contrary, and I wanted to bring out that fact. I think the facts are well brought out by your questions. I just wanted to high-light the same point that you made.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Jordan, I would like to ask you one question about these records. I believe you stated that in the course of your examination of these files you saw one record or report which originated in Moscow. I believe you mentioned that to me earlier this morning for the first time; did you not?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. You had not testified about that in your former testimony?

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Tavenner, I didn't actually read the letter. I simply took a peek at it, and I thought at the time, whoever this military person was in Moscow that was reporting to the State Department, I wondered how he would feel if he knew the Russians had the report back again. Being a military man I couldn't quite understand it, but I let it pass. I thought it was in perfect order.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you see more than one such report?

Mr. JORDAN. No, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then there was only one document you can recall that originated in Moscow?

Mr. JORDAN. I only looked at one document. They looked to me as if they were all of the same nature; they looked as if they were all alike.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is the only one you examined?

Mr. JORDAN. The only one I was sure of. I would rather stick to the things I know.

Mr. KEARNEY. I would like to ask another question.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Kearney.

Mr. KEARNEY. While I was asking the previous questions I was mulling over in my own mind the stories that have followed your appearance on the stand, and I would like, for my own information and for the information of the committee, a direct answer to this question: Prior to your appearance on this stand as a witness last December, did you, directly or indirectly, ever attempt to peddle your so-called story to any newspaper or periodical?

Mr. JORDAN. I never peddled the story. What actually happened was, I heard a radio broadcast that 3 ounces of uranium were missing and that the Government was looking for it. I made the remark to one of my friends that if they were looking for uranium I could tell them where there were a thousand pounds of it.

This remark got to [U. S. Senator] Styles Bridges, who sent word to me that he wanted to see me. I spent over an hour with him. He said: "Are you certain you saw uranium?" I said, "Yes, sir." He said, "Could you be certain enough to testify?" I said, "Yes, sir."

He said, "I will think it over a few days and you will hear from me." That was October 4.

A few days later Fulton Lewis called and said Senator Bridges had told him about my remark, and Fulton Lewis wanted to know if I would give him my story. I said I would, and he came to New York. I saw him at the Sherry-Netherland. He called the FBI, and for weeks I didn't hear anything but FBI. They came to my house, to my office, went through my files, photostated my diary, and so on. It amused me to read that the FBI had discredited my story, because they spent hours on end photostating everything I had. After working on it many weeks they told Mr. Lewis their investigation was finished, and then Mr. Lewis agreed he would make a broadcast of it. But for a couple weeks there were so many FBI men in my office that the news leaked out, and a public relations man offered his services to help me get publicity out of it. First he wanted to tip off another commentator, and then take me to Life. I told him I was not interested, but he had made an appointment at Life, unbeknown to me, and I didn't want to disappoint him. At Life they discredited me and said my story was too full of holes and turned it down.

I had never peddled it. This particular public relations man attached himself to me and did these two things. Inasmuch as the story was turned down by two firms, I went back and rested until Mr. Lewis called me and went on the air.

Immediately the story went the rounds I was paid by the Republican Party and peddling the story, and all of that is untrue.

Mr. KEARNEY. I think for the purpose of the record I will ask the stenographer to read the question I asked the witness to have it directly answered "Yes" or "No."

Mr. JORDAN. The answer is "No."

Mr. KEARNEY. The answer is "No"?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOOD. Proceed.

Mr. TAVENNER. At the close of the session this morning, Major Jordan, we were talking about various other materials that went into the manufacture of the atomic bomb that were shipped to Russia to your knowledge. How did you first become acquainted with the fact that the materials we discussed, such as cadmium, thorium, graphite, and aluminum tubes were used in the manufacture of the atomic bomb?

Mr. JORDAN. Well, I first thought that I might have had something to do with it when President Truman announced the Russians had the bomb. That was the first point where I was quite certain I knew something. I have been increasingly interested in the atomic bomb since my testimony, and a few days ago I saw a complete article in Life magazine on the atomic bomb. This particular article in Life mentions the very things Colonel Kotikov was assembling.

Mr. TAVENNER. It mentions, does it not, the use of cadmium rods, aluminum tubes, graphite, and thorium?

Mr. JORDAN. It shows how they are used in the atomic pile.

Mr. TAVENNER. Which issue of Life are you referring to?

Mr. JORDAN. A recent issue.

Mr. TAVENNER. The past week?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. And was that the first time the importance of those particular elements came to your attention?

Mr. JORDAN. I had never known about cadmium before I saw it there.

Mr. TAVENNER. After you read that article in the recent issue of Life, did you then compile this data regarding the shipments?

Mr. JORDAN. I simply looked it up, and there it was, the full amounts.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I think I should state that on January 19 of this year an investigator of our committee conferred with an atomic scientist regarding the importance of cadmium in the manufacture of the atomic bomb, and he was told it was useful as a neutron absorber in atomic-energy work. He said he believed this particular item was not available in Russia.

Major Jordan, do you know the name of the assistant of Colonel Kotikov at the Great Falls station?

Mr. JORDAN. He had about six different assistants.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know one by the name of Sergeant Vinogradsky?

Mr. JORDAN. Very well. I have a picture of him.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you outline to the committee Sergeant Vinogradsky's activities as far as you know them, in addition to his normal activities in the handling of materials that went through Great Falls.

Mr. JORDAN. I have a suspicion that, despite the fact he was only a sergeant and was in the warehouse practically 100 percent of the time checking materials, he was reporting on Colonel Kotikov.

Mr. TAVENNER. Reporting on Colonel Kotikov?

Mr. JORDAN. I would say so; yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you spell Vinogradsky, please? Do you know the spelling?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. I have it here. V-i-n-o-g-r-a-d-s-k-y.

Mr. WOOD. Reporting to whom on Colonel Kotikov?

Mr. JORDAN. There was a certain Russian who went through there quite frequently by the name of Anisimov, A. A. Anisimov, A-n-i-s-i-m-o-v. He was apparently what we call a card-carrying member. I saw him in Alaska, Washington, Newark, Great Falls, and wherever he went it seemed he was gathering information on personnel. He was chief of personnel of all Russians in America. I was at the Purchasing Commission one day and asked who was the chief, and they said, "Rudenko; or do you mean Anisimov, chief of personnel?"

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know anything about Sergeant Vinogradsky's activities away from Great Falls?

Mr. JORDAN. I know only what he told me. His station was at Great Falls, but for a young sergeant—he was a young man—he made trips away from Great Falls, always mysterious trips. He told me he went to San Francisco and Portland and Newark and different places. I can only tell you what he told me.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did he advise you of any person he talked to in San Francisco?

Mr. JORDAN. He didn't exactly advise me, but I knew the Russian personnel at different places, and when he would apply to go to San Francisco he would see Gregory Khefitz.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you of your own knowledge know anything about Gregory Khefitz?

Mr. JORDAN. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, Gregory Khefitz was attached to the Soviet consulate in San Francisco and has been the subject of previous

testimony in the cases of Martin Kamen, Louise Bransten, Hanns Eisler, and other known espionage agents, and has played a role in known Soviet espionage activities.

Did you become acquainted with a Russian by the name of Semen Vassilenko?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. He was the chemical expert.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you give the spelling of his name?

Mr. JORDAN. S-e-m-e-n V-a-s-s-i-l-e-n-k-o. He departed from the United States February 17, 1944, in airplane No. —. I will have to get that. He departed on February 17, 1944.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have a note of that departure date?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes; I have.

Mr. TAVENNER. In your diary?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes; I have. When Vassilenko would arrive at the airport it would be a signal for Colonel Kotikov to pull out two or three folders on chemicals and walk down the runway where there were no dictographs and put the folders on the wing of an airplane and talk with Vassilenko an hour or so, that is, if the complete chemical plant had been assembled. Vassilenko had three guards with him. I have the names of the three guards.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you give them, please?

Mr. JORDAN. Leonid Rykoukin; Engeny Kojevnitov; and Georges Nicolaiev. They departed, according to my diary, on February 17, 1944, with a load of about 4,000 pounds of special high priority diplomatic mail.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know the place of origin of the mail on that particular plane, or would your records show that?

Mr. JORDAN. I know the plane came from Washington, D. C., because Vassilenko and his guards came directly from the Purchasing Commission in Washington.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to introduce in evidence copies of documents handed us this morning by Major Jordan, and return the originals to him. The first is a letter written by Col. A. Kotikov to Col. R. C. Rockwell, Newark, N. J., bearing date July 6, 1942, with pencil memorandum attached, which I ask be marked "Jordan Exhibit 5."

Mr. WOOD. You are introducing copies?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WOOD. That have been made in the committee?

Mr. TAVENNER. By the reporter.

Mr. WOOD. They will be admitted.

(The documents above referred to, marked "Jordan Exhibit 5," are filed herewith.) ⁴⁹

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like to introduce a copy of letter written by Alex Marquis to Mr. Jordan, dated December 8, 1949, and ask that it be marked "Jordan Exhibit 6."

Mr. WOOD. I understand that was likewise copied by the reporter?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

Mr. WOOD. It will be admitted.

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Jordan Exhibit 6," is filed herewith.) ⁵⁰

⁴⁹ See appendix.

⁵⁰ See appendix.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is all I desire to ask Mr. Jordan, but I would like to have permission from him to photostat the record of shipments which he has brought here with him, together with his diary and notes, and return the originals to him, if he is willing for us to do it.

Mr. JORDAN. O. K.

Mr. WOOD. Very well.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is all.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Nixon.

Mr. NIXON. I was wondering if it might be possible to include in the record the Lend-Lease memorandum which Mr. Jordan has referred to, the memorandum in regard to lend-lease shipments.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is what I am having photostated.

Mr. NIXON. Mr. Jordan, most of the questions which I had have already been answered. One question which still remains is in regard to your having reported these matters to your superior officers or to other agencies who had jurisdiction. The testimony to date has been that at least two reports were made by you which have been corroborated. You heard that testimony?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. NIXON. Can you add anything as to any official reports that you made other than those two times concerning these shipments? Before you answer that, let me first ask you this: The testimony was that the Counter Intelligence agent who first interviewed you was requested by you that you be given an opportunity to elaborate in detail in regard to the shipments to which you had referred. Did Counter Intelligence or any other agency of the Government ever approach you after that time and ask you to make such elaboration?

Mr. JORDAN. The colonel of our post, the colonel of Gore Field, was interviewed by a reporter, and he has a statement in the newspaper to the effect that I had been raising the devil. Well, I can only say that that meant I was talking to everyone that I thought might be helpful in getting something done about it. He remarked to the reporter that the Capitol dome could have been taken for all Jordan could do about it. That was one officer. Several other officers have come forward and have made statements to indicate that at that time I must have done a lot of hollering. One officer said Jordan was always raising hell about it. His words were that he could back me up and knew I had been making a big hullabaloo about it. I will admit I didn't say anything about uranium, and I didn't say anything about State Department papers. I simply talked about the excessive amount of diplomatic mail going uninspected. That seemed to be the crux of my complaint.

Mr. NIXON. Did you know about the atomic bomb in 1943?

Mr. JORDAN. No. I didn't know about the atomic bomb until it was dropped on Hiroshima, and I didn't know the Russians had it until President Truman made the announcement.

Mr. NIXON. I would say if you had particularly singled out uranium in 1943 your story would be inherently incredible. Your answer to the question whether your request that you be given opportunity to go into detail in regard to the shipments to which you had referred was granted—

Mr. JORDAN. The answer is "no." Mr. Appell said there was no record I went to Washington to talk about it, yet I have the official

order to go to Washington for the purpose of discussing movements of Russian aircraft through Great Falls. This is my original record.

Mr. NIXON. I ask that this document be made an exhibit.

Mr. TAVENNER. I suggest it be marked "Jordan exhibit 7."

Mr. WOOD. I don't care to deprive Major Jordan of the original, but with his permission I will ask the reporter to copy it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Or he can read it in the record.

Mr. JORDAN. It is Special Order No. 3, dated January 4, 1944, ordering Maj. George R. Jordan to proceed by military aircraft from Army Air Base at Great Falls, Mont., to Washington, D. C., for the purpose of conferring with AAF officials on the movement of Russian aircraft.

Mr. WOOD. Does that comply with your suggestion?

Mr. KEARNEY. I think the signature of the officer issuing that order should also be made a part of the record.

Mr. JORDAN. Col. Russell L. Meredith, commanding officer of the air base.

I have a note in my diary, "Washington, Colonel Paige's office," and he was Chief of the International Office in charge of Lend-Lease. Then I have another note, "Saw General Jones," and he was Chief Air Inspector. I specifically saw him, and saw Colonel Wilson and Col. Vander Lugt and others, and that was followed by an air inspector, Colonel Dahm, arriving a few days later at the field to follow up my complaint.

Mr. KEARNEY. What date?

Mr. JORDAN. January 25. I took him over the base and showed him what I was complaining about, and he was so incensed that a few days later 10 air inspectors arrived. They arrived on the 3d of March, and one stayed there for months. These 10 were all from the Air Inspector General's office. And I think the security officer of the field, who was called in to the meeting, is sitting back there.

Mr. KEARNEY. I think for the record not only the day and month, but the year, should be given.

Mr. JORDAN. I went to Washington January 4, 1944. I conferred with the Air Inspector General on January 8, 1944. On January 25, 1944, the first air inspector arrived at the field, and on March 3, 1944, 10 other air inspectors arrived.

Mr. NIXON. I don't feel it is necessary to pursue that point any further. I think from the corroboration produced and the testimony just presented, it is at least clear that Mr. Jordan made a number of attempts to bring this information to the attention of Government officials.

Mr. JORDAN. At the same time I made that trip to Washington, Colonel Kotikov asked to go along, and he asked me how to get to 630 Fifth Avenue, New York, which happens to be the address of somebody you know.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who is it?

Mr. JORDAN. The man he wanted to see is merely a conclusion on my part, but he wanted to go to 630 Fifth Avenue, and I understand that is the address of Mr. Boris Pregel, the man who shipped the uranium. So I am taking it for granted his anxiety to go to that address was to see that man.

Mr. NIXON. Your testimony is not in regard to Pregel specifically, but that he was at that address?

Mr. JORDAN. Colonel Kotikov asked how to get to 630 Fifth Avenue.

Mr. NIXON. How do you remember that specific address?

Mr. JORDAN. I knew it was Rockefeller Center, and I told him while he was there he ought to go to the top and see the city. He had never been in New York before and I was telling him how to do some sightseeing.

Mr. WOOD. Any other questions?

Mr. NIXON. Yes. The issue raised as to the memorandum in your diary or on this slip of paper you presented to the committee—and I understand the contents of that paper will appear in this record—is on the use of the initials “H. H.” and what appeared thereafter in the memorandum, and it appears that issue cannot be determined because, assuming the initials “H. H.” refer to Mr. Hopkins, the committee has not as yet been able to establish corroborative evidence to sustain your testimony on that point.⁵¹ On the other hand, the committee has not been able to obtain conclusive evidence that you are incorrect in what you say. I think, however, that a fair appraisal of the testimony is that on that point, at least at this stage, a question certainly has arisen as to whether it would have been possible, (1) that Mr. Hopkins could have had anything to do with such shipments; and (2) if it were possible, whether he actually did.

I wonder if there is anything you would like to add to the record, in addition to your previous testimony, in regard to your contention that Mr. Hopkins did call you or that you called him in regard to these shipments of uranium, specifically?

Mr. JORDAN. I took it for granted, when I was here before, that my testimony about Mr. Hopkins would be accepted, and I didn't bring out a number of points that I knew and that could have gone along with it.

In the first place, we had so much communication, through the Russians, with Mr. Hopkins that we took it for granted. I would like to take a second to tell you that when I was at Newark as acting executive officer and the Russian colonel was new, an American Airlines pilot bumped into a Russian plane, causing a slight amount of damage, and immediately six Russians came storming in my office and wanted to know if I would punish the pilot; they seemed to think I should shoot him. I said we didn't do that. Then they wanted to banish the air line from the airport. I said I wouldn't do that. They said, “Then we will call Mr. Hopkins.”

They called Mr. Hopkins and told him this American Airlines pilot had damaged a Russian A-20 plane and they wanted something done immediately about it.

Much to my surprise, CAA phoned a few days later and banished all commercial air lines from the airport.

Naturally, when something like that happens, I was terribly impressed. One of the remaining officers on that field who was asked about these particular incidents made the remark that the Russians were in constant communication with Hopkins, and he said the Russians talked about it. I will show you his exact words. He was my superior officer.

Mr. TAVENNER. What is his name?

⁵¹ See appendix.

Mr. JORDAN. Col. Roy B. Gardner. He said:

Every time the Russians were dissatisfied with the way things were going, which was frequently, they would get on the telephone with their Embassy in Washington and have them contact Mr. Harry Hopkins, and all difficulties would be straightened out immediately.

I asked Colonel Gardner how he knew Mr. Hopkins did the job. He said it was common information; the Russians referred to it and so did everybody else, and it was common routine information.

Another major on the field who was questioned about my story remarked that at one time there were some very difficult parts that the factory hadn't even made yet, and the Russians said, "We will get them from Mr. Hopkins." So they put in a call, and his exact words were:

I can recall that on many occasions—

this is Major Starkey, engineer officer of the Army air base—

when we were short of parts or had some difference with Col. Kotikov, Col. Kotikov would place a phone call to Washington and before very long Major Jordan would get a telephone call back and the work would be done. Major Jordan mentioned Harry Hopkins' name quite often, because Hopkins was Administrator of Lend-Lease at that time, and I can recall one instance when we were extremely short of airplane parts of one sort and Col. Kotikov called on the telephone and in a matter of a few days we had a good supply. It was remarkable in view of the fact we had been repeatedly told by Wright Field the parts had not yet been made.

Mr. NIXON. At this point I think it is well to differentiate Mr. Hopkins' position as Lend-Lease Administrator in the expediting of normal shipments, and the testimony in issue, in order to get the proper perspective. What you have testified to up to this point is that Mr. Hopkins was called upon from time to time to expedite certain shipments, and that he proceeded to take action which resulted in expediting the shipments. It would seem from the fact he was the Lend-Lease Administrator and had that responsibility, that nobody should be particularly surprised that that occurred.

Mr. JORDAN. Not at all. We were very glad we had a button we could press and get things done.

Mr. NIXON. You yourself were interested, as you have testified, in getting the shipments expedited, and the fact Mr. Hopkins was called upon was not surprising?

Mr. JORDAN. No.

Mr. NIXON. The point at issue is whether or not Mr. Hopkins also expedited the shipments of uranium. On that point considerable question has arisen on two scores, first, as to the date. You have corrected your testimony as to the date, so that the objection that has been previously raised that Mr. Hopkins could not have had a conversation with you because he was in the hospital in 1944 no longer applies, assuming that your recollection is correct as presently stated.

And another point that has been raised, I understand, by those who are quite familiar with Mr. Hopkins' papers and his records, is that he could not have specifically expedited a shipment of uranium or knowingly done so because he individually had nothing to do with and knew nothing about the atomic project. Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. JORDAN. I am burning up on that. That is a point I don't feel very happy about, because I have a copy of Newsweek dated December 19—

Mr. NIXON. What year?

Mr. JORDAN. 1949, which was a week after I was here, in which they have a paragraph which has caused me a great deal of discomfort. It says:

Moreover, according to Sidney Hyman, who organized Hopkins's papers for Robert Sherwood, author of "Roosevelt and Hopkins," F. D. R.'s confidant didn't have the faintest understanding of the Manhattan Project until he read about the A-bomb being dropped on Hiroshima. Hyman said: "He didn't know the difference between uranium and geranium." It wasn't until weeks later that Hopkins talked with several of the atomic scientists and learned about "the engineering feat of production."

Well, I bought myself a copy of Robert E. Sherwood's book when I was here, and there is an item on page 154 I would like permission to read:

Bush had no quick access to anyone on the higher levels of government, but he knew that the man to see en route to Roosevelt was Harry Hopkins and he accordingly went to him with his plan for a National Defense Research Council. Hopkins was already interested in the subject, for the Bureau of Standards of the Commerce Department was engaged in research, and through the Bureau of Patents he had received a suggestion along somewhat similar lines. * * *

Then it tells how the atom bomb was conceived by Bush, taken to Hopkins, Hopkins took it to Roosevelt, and it says:

Subsequently Bush, in consultation with Hopkins, drafted a letter to himself for the President's signature. That letter, with a few additions which provided for close cooperation between N. D. R. C. and the military authorities, was signed by Roosevelt on June 15, the day after the fall of Paris * * *.

Then over a little further, on page 704, it says:

It will be noted that Churchill was conducting this correspondence on the atomic project with Hopkins rather than with the President and he continued to do so for many months thereafter.

Mr. KEARNEY. That date of June 15 is what year?

Mr. JORDAN. 1941, at the start of the atomic project. That was before Manhattan project was even thought of. And in 1943, when Churchill was ill, he conducted his correspondence on the atomic project with Hopkins, and it tells how Hopkins called all the scientists together to get the most recent report. And it is the man who wrote this book that says Hopkins didn't know uranium from geranium.

Mr. NIXON. You mean Hyman wrote the book?

Mr. JORDAN. He organized the papers, and after Hopkins' death he took the papers to Robert Sherwood and Sherwood finished the book.

Mr. NIXON. Do you have anything else to add?

Mr. JORDAN. I am very unhappy about this "H. H." and "H. L. H." business, because I worked under difficulty out there, and it was very cold when I made these notes. It must have been 15 or 20 degrees below zero. I had a flashlight in my overcoat pocket and a little light in the top of the plane, and it was difficult to see what was in the folders. The only reason I particularly noticed this memorandum, I was impressed because it was on White House stationery. I had never seen White House stationery before, and I wondered why it didn't have "D. C." on it. I own some property in the State of Washington, and this just said "The White House, Washington," and I started to put it back in the folder and I noticed it said, "Had a hell of a time getting these away from Groves."

I thought, "This is important, on that piece of stationery, and I will make a note of it."

And this very committee, Mr. Chairman, has been misquoting my testimony. I never have said in my testimony, "I had a hell of a time getting these away from Groves." I said, "Had a hell of a time * * *". And one of the members of this committee asked General Groves the question, "It has been testified by Jordan that he said 'I had a hell of a time getting these away from Groves,'" and naturally Groves said Hopkins never placed pressure on him. I never used the word "I" and this committee has been using the "I" and it never was in my original testimony.

Mr. NIXON. Is it in your notes?

Mr. JORDAN. No. My notes say "Had." So that particular point of whether Hopkins put pressure on General Groves has been a very difficult point for me to overcome, with the press taking the small point and building it up.

Mr. NIXON. As I understand it, your testimony on this point is that you saw a piece of White House stationery with this notation on it?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. NIXON. Which said: "Had a hell of a time getting these away from Groves."

Mr. JORDAN. The second sheet is where I saw that, and copied it.

Mr. NIXON. And second, you recall a telephone conversation allegedly held between Colonel Kotikov and somebody who is supposed to have been Mr. Hopkins in Washington concerning the expediting of one shipment of uranium, and as far as indicating any particular individual putting pressure on General Groves is concerned, you have no testimony on that point; these are just the facts you are testifying to?

Mr. JORDAN. I am only testifying to the things I know of. For the benefit of you gentlemen who were not here before, I want to explain I didn't want Colonel Kotikov making telephone calls on my telephone, because he would stay on the telephone a half hour or an hour at a time, so I used to tell the telephone operator, "If any Russians want to make a telephone call, tell them Major Jordan must make the call." So when Kotikov wanted to get his Embassy, he would say, "Get my Embassy," and I would pick up the telephone and call collect, which was the point I was interested in, and get the Michigan number, and he would speak in Russian, and he would switch many times, sometimes 20 or 30, and talk about different subjects; and sometimes he would lay the receiver down and be gone 15 or 20 minutes to look up a certain part, and I would get on the phone and ask for Colonel Tavetkov or somebody else and talk about another matter until Kotikov came back.

This particular morning he had his files out on chemical plants and was running his finger down and came to various shipments that had to be expedited. I used to sometimes lean over his shoulders and help him turn the pages. This particular morning he said: "Have we room for a thousand pounds?" I said: "No. We have about a million pounds backlog now." He said: "I will make a connection for you."

For a moment or two I think I talked to Piskounov, and then a voice came on the wire, "Are you my expeditor out there?" and I said, "Yes," and he said, "This is Mr. Hopkins speaking." I was naturally very

respectful, and he said: "I want you to expedite a certain shipment that is going through."

Then he must have turned and spoken to somebody, because I could hear him say, "How will he know the shipment when he sees it?" as if he was speaking on the side to someone. I waited and then he came back on and said: "Jordan, Colonel Kotikov will designate that shipment to you. He will point out which shipment he wants expedited, but you expedite it."

Then he said: "I want you to keep this off the record and don't discuss it with anybody. This is something very special."

He asked me a question: "Did you get the pilots I sent you?" We had been screaming our heads off for pilots, and only Mr. Hopkins could get them, and I said "Yes," we had, and thanked him.

Then somebody was talking Russian and I handed the phone back to Kotikov.

Generally speaking, I know that was what was said, and when the box arrived, it was uranium.

Mr. NIXON. That concludes your statement on the Hopkins matter as far as you want to elaborate at this time?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. NIXON. That is all I have.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Velde.

Mr. VELDE. I have nothing, except I want to express appreciation for your holding this investigation and second hearing. It is unfortunate we of the minority were not here at the first hearing, and it is also unfortunate certain defamatory remarks were put in the newspapers and over the air regarding Major Jordan's testimony, and I think it has done a great deal of harm to this committee in getting witnesses to appear. I am sure witnesses will not appear voluntarily and answer questions unless we give credence to the statements they make, and I am particularly glad of the opportunity we had to have this second hearing.

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Kearney.

Mr. KEARNEY. One point in my own mind I want to clear up is on your recent testimony concerning these telephone calls. Where were these calls placed to?

Mr. JORDAN. Our desks were alongside of each other.

Mr. KEARNEY. Where in Washington were they placed?

Mr. JORDAN. The Russian Purchasing Commission or the Russian Embassy.

Mr. KEARNEY. And at the time you referred to, if that was so, Mr. Hopkins would have been in the Russian Purchasing Commission or Embassy?

Mr. JORDAN. Not necessarily. Someone could have called him through the switchboard at the Embassy and he could have been talking from the White House or anywhere he might have been and the operator could have made a conference call.

Mr. KEARNEY. You don't mean to imply Mr. Hopkins was at the Russian Embassy?

Mr. JORDAN. No. I saw headlines that I got very chummy with Mr. Hopkins and talked frequently with him. I never met the man.

I have no reason for saying anything that didn't happen. I only tried to be helpful and give you information because I thought it was my duty to do it.

Mr. WOOD. Any further questions?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes. In referring to the Hopkins note as you have described it, you said there were two pages, and what you saw written and have testified to was on the second page?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. I don't believe you have ever told us what was on the first page, if anything.

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Tavenner, it happened 7 years ago. I can only say I was looking at the first page at the White House stationery, and flipped it over to see who signed it, and after I saw it was in longhand I thought it would be a good idea to copy "Had a hell of a time * * *." The word before "Had" is not clear in my mind. I believe it was some name. I can't swear to that. He was not a good writer.

Mr. TAVENNER. It was written in longhand, and you believe now there was some name placed before the word "Had"?

Mr. JORDAN. I believe if it had been anything else I could have read, I am quite sure I would have made a note of it. I decided to take the tail end of it, that was all.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were both pages on the letterhead of the White House?

Mr. JORDAN. No. The first page was White House stationery, and I believe the second was second-sheet.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was there a letter written on the first sheet?

Mr. JORDAN. It was in longhand; the entire front sheet and about one-third of the second sheet.

Mr. TAVENNER. So it was a continuous letter?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Of two pages?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes; and I think behind the last sheet there were a couple of typewritten letters, and then there was a map which I telescoped out and turned it around to read upside down what was on it, and I took my notes off the map.

(Representative Nixon leaves hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. You have testified fully to that. Were the two pages of this letter clipped together in any manner?

Mr. JORDAN. I think they were clipped to the next couple of sheets and the map.

Mr. TAVENNER. You noticed this very unusual language about the getting of these matters from Groves.

Mr. JORDAN. I didn't know who Groves was.

Mr. TAVENNER. But if it was important enough for you to write down that part of the letter, didn't you look at the rest of the letter to see what it was about? Don't you think you would have looked at the rest?

Mr. JORDAN. I think I must have, but I don't remember what it said.

Mr. TAVENNER. You don't remember anything about the contents of the rest of the letter?

Mr. JORDAN. Except for the notation I have; that is all.

Mr. TAVENNER. I do not believe we have put in as a part of the record your original notes. We would like to have that photostated also and put in.

Mr. JORDAN. Which notes?

Mr. TAVENNER. The memorandum that you took at the time.

Mr. WOOD. Major, do you object to the committee having that sheet of paper photostated and return the original to you?

Mr. JORDAN. No objection at all.

Mr. WOOD. Very well. It will be done.

Mr. TAVENNER. No further questions.

Mr. WOOD. Is there any additional statement you desire to make in connection with this hearing that you think would be beneficial to this committee in its endeavor to carry out the function the committee was set up to do?

Mr. JORDAN. There has been a soldier that came forward and made a statement about finding four dead Russians in a plane in Alaska, and he mentioned that when he discovered this wrecked plane with four dead Russians he found black suitcases similar to the ones I described, and he mentioned he found maps of the Alaska defense areas. I just want to make certain that the committee hooks that up with my testimony, because it happened in 1942, and if he had that happen to him in December 1942, it should show this committee that the suitcases were going through before I got there in 1943. His statement was that "We started looking around for souvenirs"—

Mr. WOOD. Do you know who made that statement?

Mr. JORDAN. Henry J. Cauthen of company G, Fourth Infantry Regiment, Nome, Alaska.

Upon seeing some black suitcases lying on the ground we decided to open them up. Two of the suitcases had been partially destroyed and were of no value, but three or four were lying on the ground and I opened one. These suitcases were black, very cheaply made, and had straps that were very light because they had both been opened up. When we opened it the first thing we saw was a map, and we found they had blueprints on the bottom. We didn't disturb the blueprints but we did look at the map. This was an American engineer map made for the Air Corps and showed our defense area around the Nome air base. The map was in English but had writing in Russian and showed all our defense areas. A couple Russians came from Nome and took the suitcases away from us.

There has been a lot of talk about my story being a trumped-up story, and I wanted this to go in to show the suitcases were going through long before I got to Great Falls.

I want to add there was a Colonel Shumonsky, Stanilaus Shumonsky, who came in a C-47 and he absolutely demanded that I not look at the plane, and I insisted. Finally I had to ground the plane. I told him he would never get off the ground until I saw what was in the plane.

He finally opened the door and the entire plane was loaded with films, canisters of films, and they were tied down with a passageway down the center for the pilot. I opened one film and held it to the light and it showed technical cams and gears, very technical, and intricate technical processes. One canister showed automobile tops being stamped out like doughnuts. I went through canister after

canister and it was the technical know-how of this country sluicing through, and I didn't see what it had to do with the war effort.

Mr. WOOD. Permit me to express to you the appreciation of this committee for your willingness to come back here and afford the other members of the committee, not here at the first hearing, an opportunity to examine you. We hope it has not caused you too much inconvenience.

Anything further?

Mr. TAVENNER. That is all.

Mr. WOOD. The committee will stand adjourned.

(Thereupon, at 4:30 p. m. Friday, March 3, 1950, the committee adjourned.)

HEARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENTS OF ATOMIC MATERIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II

TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 1950

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES,
Washington, D. C.

PUBLIC HEARING

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:45 a. m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C., Hon. Francis E. Walter presiding.

Committee members present: Representatives Francis E. Walter and Bernard W. Kearney.

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; Donald T. Appell, investigator; John W. Carrington, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and A. S. Poore, editor.

Mr. WALTER. Let us have order, please.

Let the record disclose that this hearing is being conducted by a subcommittee designated by the chairman, composed of Messrs. Wood, Kearney, and Walter, and that Messrs. Kearney and Walter are present, a quorum.

Mr. Kravchenko, will you raise your right hand. Do you swear the testimony you are about to give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I do.

Mr. WALTER. And will you [indicating Mr. Wolin] arise, please. Do you swear the translation that you will make of the testimony given by Mr. Kravchenko shall be a true and accurate translation of what he says?

Mr. WOLIN. I do.

TESTIMONY OF VICTOR A. KRAVCHENKO (ACCOMPANIED BY SIMON WOLIN, INTERPRETER)

Mr. TAVENNER. If the Chairman please, I would like to qualify first the interpreter, before asking questions of Mr. Kravchenko.

Your name is Mr. Wolin?

Mr. WOLIN. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state your full name?

Mr. WOLIN. Simon Wolin.

Mr. TAVENNER. How are you employed?

Mr. WOLIN. I am a free lance research worker.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state that again?

Mr. WOLIN. I am a free lance research worker.

Mr. TAVENNER. What has been your experience with the Russian language?

Mr. WOLIN. I was born in Russia and graduated from the faculty of law, of a Russian university. Here in this country I was staff translator in New York for a weekly magazine, and a small book translated by me was published in New York in 1948.

Mr. TAVENNER. What positions have you held in New York?

Mr. WOLIN. I was mostly a free lance researcher. I was assistant editor of that weekly magazine I was speaking of in New York, the New Leader. Last year I was engaged in a Government research project.

Mr. TAVENNER. Are you a naturalized American citizen?

Mr. WOLIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Kravchenko, will you state your full name, please?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Victor A. Kravchenko.

Mr. TAVENNER. When and where were you born?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I was born in Dnepropetrovsk, Russia, in 1905.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have an interpreter present, but you speak English very well and I trust that you will answer directly such questions as you feel you can.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I will try.

Mr. TAVENNER. And call on the interpreter as little as possible. I believe you have a statement that you desire to make?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Yes; I do.

Mr. WOLIN. May I read it, in order to have it clear?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes.

(Thereupon the following statement of Mr. Kravchenko was read by Mr. Wolin:)

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, prior to testifying before your committee, I consider it my duty to make the following statement:

When I testified before this committee once before, some persons criticized me severely and accused me of serving the purposes of the Republican Party. I desire to make my position as a witness before the committee unmistakably clear.

I have been invited to come here, and I am glad to testify. But I do not wish my testimony to be regarded or used in any way as a statement for partisan political purposes.

I am sure that you, gentlemen, will agree with me on that, in these difficult times, important though party interests may be, they must needs take second place. It must surely be the opinion of every patriotic American, be he Republican or Democrat, that our main concern is the security of America, which has now become my home.

It seems to me that it is not right to discredit today those who in the past have acted in accordance with the policies of the time in which they lived, and who scrupulously fulfilled agreements made with the Soviet Union when it was a military ally of the United States.

Now, gentlemen, the relations between these two countries have radically changed—not through any fault of the United States, but through the fault of the Soviet Union—or, to put it more correctly, through the double-faced and dangerous Soviet policy which the Politburo concealed during the war, both from the people of Russia and from its ally, America.

This was revealed only later, creating the threatening situation which exists today.

This is no surprise to me personally. In the past I have written and spoken often enough to my American friends about it.

The Soviet Government has legalized the system of espionage on its own citizenry within its own country. This espionage is conducted on a tremendous scale.

Why should we think that in America, England, or France the Soviet Government does not carry on the most active espionage for the furtherance of its military, political, and police aims to the extent which our easy-going attitude and our lack of understanding of the core of Soviet policy permit?

We make a fatal mistake in not grasping this.

Soviet diplomacy is indivisible from the espionage activities of the Kremlin abroad. Every Soviet diplomat, whether he be Malik in the United Nations, Panyushkin in Washington, or their colleagues in Paris or London, has gone through extensive training along these lines, and has had wide experience.

Espionage is one of the principal duties connected with their official diplomatic work. I feel that I cannot repeat too often that every Soviet representative—diplomatic, military, or economic—is a potential spy. We can and must only consider them as such.

It would be erroneous to judge their activities by their official actions. What should interest us are the actions which they perform behind the curtain of their official capacity, their attempts to ferret out the secrets of those countries to which they are the accredited representatives.

We must regard the representatives of the countries belonging to the Soviet bloc in the same way.

Soviet espionage today is developed to a vast scale. The NKVD, the Ministry of War, work hand in hand, although frequently their various representatives do not know each other. These organizations exploit similar organizations in the satellite countries, and they all use Communists and fellow travelers in whatever country they happen to be, for their own aims and purposes.

The Fuchs case in England is only a prelude to much which we do not know and which is still to come regarding the scope of Soviet espionage in America and other western countries. I do not doubt that many bitter surprises await us.

Gentlemen, I am at your disposal.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Kravchenko, what positions have you held in the Soviet Government?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. After my graduation from the Metallurgical Institute, and studying aviation, I worked in the Soviet industry as director of a factory, as chief engineer of a factory, as chief engineer of the metallurgical trust. During the war I was head of a group of factories and also chief of the department of engineering armaments of the Soviet Russian Republic; I mean of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.

Mr. TAVENNER. What position did you hold with the Soviet Government while you were in the United States?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I was economic attaché of the Soviet Purchasing Commission from August 1943 to April 1944.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you ever a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Yes, I was a member from 1929 until April 1944.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did you leave the employ of the Soviet Government, and will you briefly outline your reasons for leaving?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I left the Soviet service in April 1944; the 1st of April, I think. My reason was very simple. During all my life I had great experience with the party and with the Soviet Government. My father and my grandfather were workmen. I always tried, when I was young, to believe the Communist Party would give us a better life than we had. I also tried to believe the Communist Party would create better living conditions for all people in the world. For this purpose in 1925 I joined the young Communist organization, the Komsomol. And in 1929, after service in the Red Army, I became a member of the party.

All my experience proved that the Communist Party and its policy, both domestic and foreign, did not serve the best interests of the Russian people; nor did it serve the interests of any people in the outside world. With every year of my experience I became more and more disillusioned. The Soviet policy always double-crossed my people and naturally it always double-crossed the outside world, during the war, especially the United States, England, and the other military allies.

When—do you understand my English language?

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes; very well.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. In 1933 I was a student at the Metallurgical Institute. It was during the period of collectivization. I visited many villages. I saw everything that happened during collectivization. I saw terror, injustice, hunger, and so on. That was the beginning of my disillusionment, about 1933; and every year this disillusionment increased. In 1936 I was purged. Well, I had much experience with the Soviet police, the NKVD, and I still better realized the essence of the Russian regime.

During the war I tried to do my duty, to do my best as a Russian man, because we were at war. I worked very hard. I did everything I could. At the same time I was scared of the Soviet Government, and scared of the party, but I did my duty to help win victory over Germany.

Owing to my work during the war, many documents signed by Mr. Molotov, Mr. Stalin, and other members of the Politburo passed daily through my hands. I saw every day examples of how they did their duty, as they called it; and I realized that the Russian people had nothing in common with the Communist Party and the Soviet regime.

I also realized that I had no opportunity inside the country to do anything openly for my people against the Soviet Government. And when they sent me to the United States I decided to break with them and tell the people of the United States and other countries what I knew about the Soviet regime and about the living conditions in my country.

Mr. TAVENNER. When did you arrive in the United States?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. In August 1943.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you meet, upon your arrival in the United States, Consul Lomakin, who at that time was consul of the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Yes; I did. We came to Vancouver from Vladivostok on the ship *Komeles*.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you spell the name of the ship?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. *K-o-m-e-l-e-s*.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is the name of the ship on which you arrived?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Yes. We had a few storms during our trip from Vladivostok to Vancouver, and we had some trouble with the Japanese Navy which stopped us in the open sea and searched our ship. The captain of the ship and the political commissar were worried. I did not understand why.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was this a Russian ship?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. That is right. When we came to Vancouver Mr. Lomakin came aboard. I was in the cabin of the captain, and the captain and the political commissar were there, and I have forgotten

the names of three of my colleagues who also were in the cabin; they all were responsible party members. There was no secret from them. When Mr. Lomakin came to the cabin, the captain gave to Mr. Lomakin a few packages [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). All sealed.

Mr. TAVENNER. Packages which were under seal?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. That is right. He gave them to Mr. Lomakin and Mr. Lomakin took the packages with him and left the ship.

The captain said:

This is the reason I was worried. If something had happened and these papers were seized by the Japanese or somebody else, I would be in great trouble.

Lomakin came aboard. I was in the cabin of the captain, and the captain of the ship was scared. He was the captain and at the same time he was a political commissar for the Soviet government.

Mr. TAVENNER. You of course don't know anything about the contents of those papers?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I don't; but I know that if these were simple papers and had nothing to do with underground work or with conspiracy, there would be no reason for the captain of the ship to take these papers from Moscow and hand them personally to Mr. Lomakin, and for Mr. Lomakin to take these papers as if he were stealing something from somebody. Lomakin was Soviet consul in San Francisco; and you must understand that from my experience with the Soviet Government, from what I knew about them and their methods, I immediately realized what was going on. I worked many years with them. There was nothing new to me in this transaction.

Mr. TAVENNER. Your purpose in coming to the United States was to engage in work with the Soviet Purchasing Commission?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. In what capacity?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Well, as I mentioned before, I was sent to the United States as an economic attaché to the Soviet Purchasing Commission.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you explain to the committee the set-up of the Soviet Purchasing Commission, that is, who controlled the activities in which the Commission was engaged, and any other pertinent matter regarding its functions which this committee would be interested in?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Yes. First I ask your permission to explain the general features of the situation during the war.

Before we came to the United States—when I say “we” I mean all members of the Communist Party who had more or less responsible duties or more or less responsible jobs—before we came to the United States we had received instructions from the central committee of the party.

Mr. TAVENNER. By “party” are you referring to the Communist Party?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Communist Party, of course, because in the Soviet Union there is only one party. From the conversations which I had with officials of the Central Committee of the party, we knew before we left for the United States that we had never been friends with the United States, and the central committee of the party made this absolutely clear. For 2 weeks we had to go from office to office

and we were told repeatedly: "You are going to the capitalistic United States. We are allies today because we need each other, but when the war is over and we shall have won victory—and we are sure we shall win it—we shall again become open enemies." [Speaking in Russian.]

Mr. WOLIN (translating). We shall never modify our philosophy and our doctrine.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO (speaking in Russian).

Mr. WOLIN (translating). We are allies in trouble.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO (speaking in Russian).

Mr. WOLIN (translating). But both partners know that they hate each other.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO (speaking in Russian).

Mr. WOLIN (translating). Sooner or later a clash between the two is inevitable.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO (speaking in Russian).

Mr. WOLIN (translating). Until then the Allies will remain our friends and we shall cooperate in our mutual interests.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. "For this reason and with an eye to the future, we must study carefully the industry in the United States, the military industry, the civilian industry, all technological and industrial processes, and we must get hold of their secrets so that we can achieve similar results in our country and when the time comes we will be ready for the fight."

Mr. WALTER. Did the Russians regard the United States as their enemy during the period we were fighting for the common cause?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Ideologically and secretly, yes. For example, every week we had closed party sessions in our office in Moscow. Somebody would come from the Central Committee or from the Politburo. He would give us a speech on the international situation, the war situation, and so on, and would make it absolutely clear—I mentioned it in my book and it is not necessary to repeat, but I would like to mention that they always said and always repeated [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). We are Allies because there is a war on.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. "But we must realize that the Americans will never like us and we will never like them." Also, "we will never like the English and the French; I mean their political attitudes." And practically [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). As a practical result of all this—

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Every Soviet official, when he goes to the United States or to any other country, he always has two duties to perform. These duties go parallel: One of them is an official duty. For example, a man comes as a simple engineer to the Soviet Purchasing Commission, but before he comes to the United States, the Central Committee of the party or some special government office or department, issues orders indicating where in the United States he must work, which factory or chemical plant, or any kind of industry he has to watch. I am talking now about engineers, because I was one of them and I know their work best. I don't know what orders were given by the general staff.

Now, when this man came to the United States he had to do two jobs at the same time. The one was open and legal, and the other was conspiracy. And when he went back to the Soviet Union, the

Soviet Government would appreciate his work in the U. S. A. according to the secret information he had gathered for the Soviet industry or for the military staff. All of us had such duties.

Mr. WALTER. Is that true of the diplomats as well?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Absolutely. They are absolutely no different. In 1943 or 1944 Mr. Rudenko, who was chairman of the Soviet Purchasing Commission, had an office at 3355 Sixteenth Street in Washington. General Serov was military attaché at that time. Gromyko was Soviet Ambassador to Washington. Gusev, in New York, was head of the organization Amtorg. All these officers worked together [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). It was of no importance who got the information.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Of course there was competition among them, because everyone wanted the "thank you" from the Soviet Union so that upon his return to the Soviet Union he would receive a higher position.

Mr. WALTER. Do I understand the Soviet diplomatic representatives in the United States were engaged in espionage?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Absolutely. Mr. Chairman, that is their system. We must understand that they all received special training, for instance, Mr. Malik, now representative in the United Nations; Mr. Zarubin, Soviet Ambassador in London; Mr. Panyushkin in Washington, who has good experience in military intelligence. All of them—there is no question—all of them are members of the party. That comes first. Their first duty is not diplomatic; their first duty is to be devoted members of the party. They must do everything the Politburo of the Soviet Union requires, at any price.

Now, I come back to your question. For example, the Soviet Purchasing Commission during the war had more than a thousand employees. Some of them came to the United States as simple engineers, but in reality they were in top positions in industry or in scientific research. Some came as civilians, but really they were officers of the Navy or artillery or tank troops or the air force.

No official of the Soviet Purchasing Commission came to the United States as a member of the Communist Party. If you look at the records in the Department of State you will find that no party members came from the Soviet Union.

This was the psychologically favorable moment for the Soviet Government. We were in the midst of a war. Many American people paid great respect to the Soviet Army. Everybody was in sympathy with and liked to talk to men in Soviet military uniform.

In the Soviet Purchasing Commission, Mr. Rudenko, Mr. Serov, and a few chairmen of departments were called "the Politburo of the Purchasing Commission." On the seventh floor of the Soviet Purchasing Commission, behind an iron door at 3355 Sixteenth Street, Washington, D. C.—it was not in Moscow—there was a special department of the NKVD. Everything that came from the Soviet Union, for instance [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). A secret communication.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Came to the seventh-floor department. Also, the seventh-floor department kept agents in every department, in the metal department or chemical department or aviation department.

Secret material went to the special department, one of whose officials was Mrs. Arutunian. Her husband was son of the Deputy Commissariat of Railroads of the Soviet Union. She also worked for this special department and all secret papers went through her hands. With this department I had some trouble, and I know what I am talking about.

All of us knew about the functions of the special department, but we never knew who the representative of the Soviet Secret Police was in the Soviet Purchasing Commission.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did I understand you to say Rudenko was responsible to the NKVD which had its headquarters on the seventh floor? Is that a correct statement?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. The special department formally was under Mr. Rudenko, because he was head of the Soviet Purchasing Commission; this is natural, but [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). In fact they were independent, the NKVD section was independent from the chief of the Purchasing Commission.

Mr. TAVENNER. And the head of the Purchasing Commission, Mr. Rudenko, was compelled to carry out certain activities that were outlined by the NKVD? Is that a correct statement?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. This is absolutely natural. You see, he had two bosses. The one boss—may I make this clear—was Mr. Mikoyan, the member of the Politburo, and second assistant of Mr. Stalin during the war. Mr. Mikoyan was Commissar of Foreign Trade. During the war Mr. Mikoyan was in charge of lend-lease. That was his duty as a member of the Politburo. All supplies for the Soviet Government passed through the hands of Mr. Mikoyan.

As to Leonid Rudenko, I had known him many years. We worked at the same factory in the Ukraine in about 1924 or 1925. Mr. Rudenko received orders from Moscow from Mikoyan, from the foreign office, from the general staff, and from the party. What he did for one office or another I don't know, but the fact is that all these offices were represented in the United States.

At the end of 1943 or beginning of 1944, one day we received orders issued to all responsible members of the Communist Party. It was after work, after 5 o'clock. The office door was closed, and Mr. Serov came in with several sheets of paper containing orders from Mikoyan to Mr. Rudenko and to all members of the party in the Soviet Purchasing Commission. These orders made it absolutely clear that we had to find out all secret information about the industrial development in the United States, and especially in the military industry, and Mr. Mikoyan said [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). We shall appreciate you according to your ability to comply with this order.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. This document was read to us and we were asked to sign a statement that we knew about this order and that we would make every effort [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). To fulfill it.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. This was what I saw, what I knew. It was absolutely clear; there was no mistake about it.

Mr. TAVENNER. What effect did this order have upon the activities of the Russians who were members of the Soviet Purchasing Commission?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. First I will mention a few names and give you a practical example of what they did.

One day I saw big books like this, approximately [indicating] which contained many pictures of the aviation industry, the special machines, special details, and so on. There were pictures and blueprints [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). Three large volumes.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. This material was signed by General Belayev, Alexander Rostartchouk, and Engineer Khimuchin. General Belayev was chairman of the Soviet Purchasing Commission; Alexander Rostartchouk was head of the metal section; and Engineer Khimuchin, who came to the United States as a simple engineer actually was [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). Was doctor of technical sciences.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. And was working on research at an institute in Moscow in that capacity. He came to the United States as a simple engineer.

How they obtained those pictures and blueprints, how they found all this information about the development of aviation in the United States, I don't know. I just saw these documents; I saw the signatures; and I know General Belayev took them when he flew to Moscow. This is the first example.

Second example: I can't mention a certain name in open session of the committee. I have some good reason for that. But I know this: Two Navy captains obtained information on the production of American submarines, on technological processes and details and on the perspective of development of the submarine industry. That is the second example.

The third example: From 1925 or 1926 I have know Semen Vasilenko. Semen Vasilenko, now in the Soviet Union, is head of the whole production of pipes and tubes in the Soviet Union, as part of the metallurgical industry.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you repeat that?

Mr. WOLIN (translating). He is head of the production of pipes and tubes in the Soviet Union.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you spell that name?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. S-e-m-e-n V-a-s-i-l-e-n-k-o. Semen Vasilenko. I knew him many, many years. Vasilenko was a member of the party; he had been a member of the Ukrainian Government and was [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). Was awarded a Stalin premium.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. And also he had a few decorations. He came to the United States for the sole purpose of finding some special information about the metallurgical and tube industry and military industry.

One day in February 1944, I don't remember the date, Vasilenko, myself, and Vdovin got ready to fly to the Soviet Union [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). Six large bags.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state that over again?

Mr. WOLIN (translating). Six large bags.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. That is right; and Vasilenko took the six bags to the Soviet Union [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). I saw that material.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Some of this material was about the production of planes and the new technological processes; some was about artillery; some was about new technological processes in metallurgy; some was about [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). The possibilities of industrial development.

Mr. KEARNEY. Would the witness mind repeating that?

Mr. WOLIN (translating). Among this material there was also an outline of the possibilities of industrial development.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I mean the perspective; for example, what was planned 5 or 10 years ahead; what the plans for the present are; and so on; also the plan in perspective for the general development of industry. Do you understand?

I know all this material was found in an unofficial way. What could be the reason for Mr. Vasilenko, a former member of the government, or for somebody else, to do work as a plain workman? [speaking in Russian.].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). They were working as plain workmen.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. We closed the door. Nobody could see this material. And Vasilenko took this material and flew to the Soviet Union.

Now, one more example. At the end of 1943 or beginning of 1944, Vassili Sergeiev was deputy of Mr. Mikoyan. Mr. Sergeiev came to the United States. He had meetings here and saw many responsible industrial people and so on. He brought from Moscow another order about [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). Various types of information which should be obtained.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Sergeiev [speaking in Russian.].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). Sergeiev gathered the heads of the departments and explained what kind of material they are expected to get at any price.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I must make it clear, Mr. Chairman, all departments of the Soviet Purchasing Commission—aviation, transportation, all of them—were working for this purpose. We transferred to the Soviet Union not just this one package; we transferred to the Soviet Union dozens of tons, of material, and not just by airplane. We also were using Soviet ships that came from lend-lease for the Soviet Union, and they called this material super lend-lease. [Laughter.]

Well, it is true. And they sent material by these ships for the only reason, that the Soviet Government never believed in peace between these two countries. They worked very hard to prepare themselves. They understand very well that a new war, if it comes, will be a great technical war, much more so than the last war, and they know very well that the United States is a great industrial country. They must find all material they can, all kinds of information [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). To be on a level with this country in its military and industrial developments; also, to be up to date.

Mr. WALTER. Do you know how this super lend-lease material was concealed before it was put aboard the ships?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Lomakin [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). Lomakin simply could come to any boat, or anybody else could come, and bring whatever they wanted.

MR. KRAVCHENKO. And any captain and any sailor could go ashore to New York or Philadelphia or Baltimore. They did as they pleased. How could you check on them? I saw in New York Soviet ships [speaking in Russian].

MR. WOLIN (translating). We brought this material on the ship.

MR. KRAVCHENKO. Who cared what we took. Had we taken the Empire State Building and put it on a ship, nobody would have cared. That is true. I know; I saw that. Nobody opened boxes and checked. I witnessed it. [Speaking in Russian.]

MR. WOLIN (translating). I saw dozens of times how Soviet boats were loaded, and I know what I am talking about.

MR. WALTER. So no check was made, and these packing cases containing plans and blueprints were freely passed on the ships with other lend-lease material?

MR. KRAVCHENKO. You see, Mr. Chairman, it was absolutely natural during the war. In the United States, as in many countries in the world, there was much respect for the Red Army. It was a natural feeling. I am talking now about the policy and psychology of the Soviet Government. They did everything against the United States during the war, and now [speaking in Russian].

MR. WOLIN (translating). Why should they change?

MR. KRAVCHENKO. Yes.

MR. KEARNEY. Were any of these packages under diplomatic seal?

MR. KRAVCHENKO. Yes. Vasilenko flew to the Soviet Union with all [speaking in Russian].

MR. WOLIN (translating). This luggage.

MR. KRAVCHENKO. Yes; possessed diplomatic immunity; and Vasilenko was not an exception. Everybody who went back always took something with him under diplomatic immunity. And during the war the Soviet Government received plenty of airplanes from the United States. These airplanes were flown by Soviet pilots to the Soviet Union. It was part of our activity during the war.

MR. KEARNEY. Did you ever help load any of those packages?

MR. KRAVCHENKO. Yes; for the very simple reason that, if I said I wouldn't help, what would have happened? If I said I wouldn't help Mr. Vasilenko, why [speaking in Russian].

MR. WOLIN (translating). I would never survive to come here.

MR. KRAVCHENKO. Any suspicion by the authorities of the Soviet Purchasing Commission or by the Embassy or by the NKVD people in the United States would entail grave danger.

MR. KEARNEY. I would like a direct answer to the question: Did you ever help load any of these packages?

MR. KRAVCHENKO (speaking in Russian).

MR. WOLIN (translating). Do you mean secret material?

MR. KEARNEY. Yes.

MR. KRAVCHENKO. If I did myself? No. [Speaking in Russian.]

MR. WOLIN (translating). But that was known; it was not kept secret.

MR. KRAVCHENKO. I was in the party from 1929, and I knew many Soviet officials who had graduated from college with me. We sat in the same college, in the same room, for many years. Sometimes they spoke of what they had found, but they never said how this was done. And when we talked to Vasilenko he would say: "It is much better if

we never speak about it. If the United States stops me, I will be responsible for my own action only."

Mr. TAVENNER. If I understood you correctly, Vasilenko packed these six bags behind closed doors?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Were you there when they were packed?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Yes. I was helping him.

Mr. TAVENNER. You helped him pack them?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Yes. We worked like simple workmen because they didn't trust anybody.

Mr. TAVENNER. Then you did actually assist in packing that sort of material?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Yes; I did.

Mr. TAVENNER. You probably misunderstood the Congressman's question.

Mr. WOLIN. His question was of loading. This is packing.

Mr. KEARNEY. He helped pack them, but did not help load them?

Mr. WOLIN. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you recall the month and year in which Vasilenko flew those packages to Moscow?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I don't remember exactly the date, but I remember very well it was in February 1944.

Mr. TAVENNER. February 1944?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, it was the testimony of Maj. George Racey Jordan, from his diary, that Vasilenko came through Great Falls on the 17th of February en route to Moscow with diplomatic mail.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Everybody was using diplomatic passports. For example, I knew prominent captains of the Soviet navy fleet. All of them had diplomatic passports, and when we came to Vladivostok some of them put on civilian clothes and came to the United States as civilians.

Mr. KEARNEY. Although they were naval officers?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Yes; and with six or seven decorations.

Mr. TAVENNER. In the course of your testimony you mentioned the name of Alexander Rostartchouk.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. How was he employed?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Rostartchouk was chairman of the metal department of the Soviet Purchasing Commission.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you have any knowledge of any secret material gathered by him?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I saw material on aviation. I saw that material and his signature.

Mr. WALTER. Did you ever fly back to Russia?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. From the United States?

Mr. WALTER. Yes.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. No. I preferred to fly to New York.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was any of the material which was collected by Rostartchouk or signed for by him included in those pouches which Vasilenko took to Russia in February 1944?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. No. Vasilenko's material was quite different from that of Rostartchouk.

Mr. TAVENNER. But this material was taken to Russia?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. By the same general method?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. From the point of view of diplomatic immunity, yes, but different persons were used, because the aviation information was taken by General Belayev.

When General Belayev came to the Soviet Union after what he had done here, Mr. Davies, former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was with General Belayev in Stalingrad and they kissed each other. I am 99 percent sure of this.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know Prof. Paul Emelianenko?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I do. He was graduated from the Metallurgical College at which I studied. He is a very well-known scientist in the Soviet Union. He was also a corresponding member [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). Of the Academy of Science.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. He came to the United States. I have known him since about 1931. [Speaking in Russian.]

Mr. WOLIN (translating). He was also a recipient of a Stalin prize.

Mr. TAVENNER. What part did he play in obtaining information for the Purchasing Commission?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Well, when Emelianenko was in Washington he spent about 75 or 70 percent of his time visiting many cities and many factories in the United States.

Mr. TAVENNER. Just a minute. Are you talking about Emelianenko?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. That is right. I am talking about him. He spent about 70 percent of his time traveling to many cities and many factories in the United States. Because he was a very good scientist, his special duty was to find out what new technological processes and what new kinds of machinery were used in the United States of America. As a prominent scientist, if he saw something a few times he knew how to copy it. He worked here a few months, then he flew to the Soviet Union in the middle of April 1944. He did a great job because he has really a brilliant brain and brilliant experience.

Mr. WALTER. The committee will stand in recess until 2:30.

(Thereupon, at 12:10 p. m. on Tuesday, March 7, 1950, a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m., of the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

(The hearing was resumed at 2:30 p. m., Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.)

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order, please, and the record will disclose that there are present Messrs. Walter, Moulder, and Wood.

TESTIMONY OF VICTOR A. KRAVCHENKO—Resumed

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Kravchenko, did you know Nicolai Kolybalov?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Yes; I know Nicolai Kolybalov since 1938.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you outline to the committee his background, his assignment to the Soviet Purchasing Commission, and any other knowledge you have regarding his activities while with the Soviet Purchasing Commission?

(Representative Kearney enters hearing room.)

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Nicolai Kolybalov is a professional engineer. At the end of 1938 or beginning of 1939 he was assistant to the head of pipe industry in Siberia, and I know him very well. He came to the United States toward the end of 1943 as a representative of some industrial commissariat, and he returned to the Soviet Union about beginning of 1944. I met Nicolai Kolybalov last March in Paris. We had an argument before the court. Frankly, I don't understand why Nicolai Kolybalov should come to the United States in his professional capacity; I don't understand why they sent him, because he is a very bad engineer, but in the Soviet Purchasing Commission [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). He traveled to see industrial plants and collected technical information. As far as I can remember, he had to receive machines and give his expert opinion.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Under the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union during the war. [Speaking in Russian.]

Mr. WOLIN (translating). I have no knowledge of what he was actually doing.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know Fedor V. Vdovin?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Fedor Vdovin was the man who helped me pack secret information for Vasilenko when the latter flew to the Soviet Union.

Mr. TAVENNER. The committee is in possession of information that indicates that Fedor Vdovin was in the pipe-tubing section of the Soviet Purchasing Commission and that he devoted his energy to obtaining aluminum tubing which could be used in the atomic development.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I don't know for what purpose Fedor Vdovin asked the United States for aluminum tubes, but he was working in this section and he received many tubes. I don't know what his purpose was, whether for atomic energy or for any other purpose.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you know Col. Stanislaw Shumousky?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. No; I don't know him.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you know a person whose first name is Zot, Z-o-t, L. Chepurnykh?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Maybe I know him, but it is very difficult to remember names.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Kravchenko, on March 9, 1944, Vassili Sergeiev, accompanied by his wife, Nina, Petri Makiev, Valentina Batanova, and Anatoli Baranovsky, departed from Great Falls, Mont., on a plane, and had in their custody a number of wooden boxes. Will you outline the background of Vassili Sergeiev?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I worked with Sergeiev from 1925 up to 1931. I worked with him in a metallurgical factory in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. He was a member of the party. He graduated from the Lenin-grad Metallurgical Institute. Afterward he worked a few years in Germany as metallurgical attaché and at the end of 1943 or beginning of 1944 he came to the United States as assistant commissar of foreign trade. His wife Nina studied with me in 1930 at the Aviation Institute.

When Sergeiev came to the United States, as I mentioned before, he brought special orders from Mr. Mikoyan, and these orders were

discussed in closed party sessions of the Soviet Purchasing Commission.

Sergeiev inspected many departments of the Soviet Purchasing Commission. He had the right to do so. He also discharged some officials whom he considered not too loyal to their duty, and Sergeiev flew to Soviet Russia [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). He had a great deal of luggage and of course enjoyed diplomatic immunity.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO (speaking in Russian).

Mr. WOLIN (translating). But what material he possessed in that luggage is unknown.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know how he obtained diplomatic immunity?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO (speaking in Russian).

Mr. WOLIN (translating). During the war, as you know, many Soviet employees came with diplomatic passports, and so did Sergeiev. He was Assistant Commissar of Foreign Trade and it was absolutely natural that he should have a diplomatic passport when he came to the United States.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know Petr Makiev?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I don't remember him.

Mr. TAVENNER. Valentina Batanova, do you know him?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Valentina Batanova is a woman.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know her?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. Anatoli Baranovsky?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. No.

Mr. TAVENNER. You do not know him?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I don't know him.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do you know an engineer with the Soviet Purchasing Commission named Khimuchin?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I know him.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you outline his background and connection with the Soviet Purchasing Commission?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. He came to the United States as an ordinary engineer although he is a scientist. Before he came to the United States he worked in a scientific aviation institute in Moscow. His duty in the United States, as I mentioned before, I saw this material [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). He had obtained considerable material concerning the aviation industry.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. He was working in a separate room, and about 60 percent of the people inside the Russian Purchasing Commission didn't know what he was doing. But when I saw the big record he was signing on the aviation industry in the United States, and when this material was taken by General Belayev to Moscow under diplomatic immunity, I understood what Khimuchin had been doing.

Mr. TAVENNER. I believe you told us that while living in Russia you were the manager or head of a manufacturing plant?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. That is right.

Mr. TAVENNER. How many employees were in that plant, approximately?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Sometimes 1,000, sometimes 3,000, sometimes more, sometimes less.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was the labor-union situation in that plant typical of the other plants in Russia at that time?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Yes; absolutely.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was the labor union in that plant free to engage in collective bargaining with management over the matter of rates of compensation for services?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. No. In the Soviet Union there are two kinds of remuneration for labor. One is based on time, the other on piece work. All skills in the Soviet Union are listed in a special book. This book contains a list of all the industries and wages for both time and piecework. Now, the local labor union never decides what wages the workmen must receive from the factory. I mean [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). They take part only in cases when a scale of wages is being modified.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. In my experience of many years with factories in the Soviet Union, I can say no labor union boss in a factory ever came to my office and said: "Will you please pay more to Mr. So and So." He can't ask me that for two reasons: First, he himself is a member of the party, and he knows I can't make any decision concerning wages.

Second, he knows very well what our policy in the factories is, and although I am manager and he is labor-union boss, both of us work for the interest of the party first, and the interests of the workmen come second.

And third, he knows very well that all rates of wages are fixed by the top level of the Government, and our job is just to explain to the workmen how much they must receive and how much they must produce.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, the decision was made by high echelons in Government?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. The decision was made before the union man came to my office, and he knew that very well. He also knew that all our work in the factory, the norm of output, the conditions of the material, and the price of this material had been discussed previously by our factory party meeting. We called the factory party cell "Little Politburo," and the union man knew I would pay much more to every workman, but I couldn't do that.

Mr. TAVENNER. And you could not do it for what reason?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. For a very simple reason: I had from the Government the prices of tubes and metal and everything. I also had a statement of how many workmen I must use and how much I may pay them. And I could do nothing on my own initiative.

Mr. Wolin has just mentioned that the labor union plays an active part when we change the norm of production. What part do they play? I will give you an example.

In a factory employing 1,000 workmen, 300 workmen produce, say, 130 percent, 500 workmen produce 75 percent, and the rest produce something in between.

When the Government decides to change the norm of production for every workman, it never proceeds from the average output of approximately 90 percent. It always bases its decision on a higher norm, for example, 120 percent. This 120 percent is then assigned for all of them, so that wages are very profitable for the Government, but not for the workmen.

Thus, changing the norm of production, the Government always gets a greater profit because before increasing wages, it increases the norm of output.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, there cannot be any decision made by management and labor except that which is made by the Government?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. None. The same orders are issued by the party organization, by management, and by the labor union at the same time.

Now, before we talked to the workmen, we had a session of the party committee on the factory. At this meeting the secretary of the party, the boss of the labor union, and management received the same order.

Then we discussed what was to be done in the factory, and the workmen must accept what we said. The "politburo" of the factory consists of seven or nine persons. We decided what we had to do and we said to the labor union boss: "You must do this; you must do that." We said to management: "You do so and so."

I would come to my office and invite all the engineers and the administration personnel to come to my office.

At the same time, the labor-union boss would gather his little bosses.

The party secretary would invite all active party [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). The organizers.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Party organizers. Everybody would receive instructions as to what he must do and how he must do it. After the decision of the "politburo" was made we opened party meetings for all members of the party and we said to them: "We have received orders from the commissariat or the party. We have discussed this subject at a closed session of the party committee. And we must make the following decision."

We discussed it for a few hours, and every member of the party knew that on the next day we would have an open meeting of members of the party, members of the young Communist organization, and all workmen who were not members of the party. The director of the factory would say a few words; so would the secretary of the party say a few words, and the union representative [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). Nobody will have the courage to say anything against the resolution of the party committee.

Mr. KEARNEY. What happens if they do?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I don't say there is no opportunity to discuss it in a closed party session. But when all was decided and we went to the open meeting, if somebody voiced opposition, some member of the party would say: "It is not true what he said, because we work at the same place and the same hours and I produce so and so much. He is lazy or doesn't pay attention to his machine." Another member of the party would get up and also discredit the opponent and what he had said.

Mr. KEARNEY. What happens?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Nothing will happen, but if you discredit a decision of the Government, for example, if you say the Government decision is against the interest of workers, you will be arrested.

Mr. WOOD. You will be what?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. You will be arrested. You can't say anything against a Government decision, for the very simple reason they will accuse you as an agitator or propagandist against the Government and against the interests of the workmen.

Mr. KEARNEY. Assuming a workman has been arrested, what happens to him in an individual case?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. That is very difficult to say. I published one book, and I am now going to publish another book, and I try to explain this question. If they arrest you they will look at all your past, who was your father, who was your mother, who is your sister and brother, where they are, what they are doing, what is your social past, what you did 10 years ago, what you said against the Soviet Government. They will look at all secret files, and if they find something they will produce it and they will accuse you.

For example, I knew a man, a foreman, his name was Dubinsky. He was a very good foreman. He worked 35 years, had great experience and was a very good man, and when the factory needed his help he worked 24 hours without going home to see his family. He was very sincere and a very good worker. He didn't say anything directly against the Government. He just said once: "The pay is not sufficient and we work under difficult conditions."

It was enough. What did he get? They looked at his past—I was born in 1905—they found that in 1905 this Dubinsky belonged to some political movement which was against the Bolsheviks and in 1936—31 years later, he was arrested. I don't know where he is now.

You see the situation. I will give you an example. I started my work as a metalworker in 1921. I did not come from a rich or aristocratic class. I came from a very simple family, and I knew very well that after I graduated from the institute and became a member of the party, I had not just my duty as a Russian engineer; I realized my social duty to my people, because I was one of them, and because after so many years life was terrible. We couldn't do anything good even if we tried.

In 1939 I came to a new factory. We built that factory by our blood and our tears. We paid everything we had for foreign machinery. We bought it in the United States, England, and elsewhere. I came to this factory to work, and found these people [speaking in Russian].

Mr. WOLIN (translating). In the bitter Ural winter they lived in unheated barns.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. There was not enough bread, no meat, no shoes, nothing. And I was asked to produce 100 percent with these people. How could they do it? And sometimes I didn't get out of the factory for 3 days and nights. And after I did my best as a citizen of my country and sometimes had no time to sleep during 3 days' work, they arrested me.

I found similar conditions in villages where peasants worked day and night. They can't come in at 8 o'clock in the morning and work until 5 o'clock. They must work until sunset and they work very hard.

That is why I broke with the Soviets. I give you human reasons. If you want me to give political reasons, that is something else.

Mr. TAVENNER. I have before me an article entitled "Collective Contracts in the U. S. S. R. for the year 1947," written by V. V. Kuznetsov. Do you know the author of this article?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. I don't know him personally but I know who he is.

Mr. TAVENNER. There appears in this article, in capital letters, in the body of it, this statement:

The collective contract is a bilateral agreement made by the management on the one hand and by the trade-union committee of the enterprise, representing all the workers, on the other hand.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. First of all, the Soviet labor union at the factory never represented the real interest of the people. If it does, we shall hear of a real revolution in the Soviet Union. When we made a contract we did what the party committee asked us to do.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words there was no bilateral agreement whatever; it was merely what the Government stated they should agree to?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. This is fiction for people outside the country and for many idiots inside the country; 99 percent or 95 percent of workmen in Europe or in any country in the world don't know what a Soviet labor union is. They don't know what the Soviet regime is. They don't know either its domestic or foreign policy; they know nothing.

The policy of the Soviet Government in the labor-union problems is very smart. What Mr. Kuznetsov said for people abroad, that is one side of the picture. What Mr. Kuznetsov did in his own country against the interests of Russian workmen, that is the other side of the picture. That is typical of the double talk of the Soviet Government before their own people.

Mr. TAVENNER. Is the statement I read to you a correct statement?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Absolutely not; absolutely not. How is it possible? How can the labor union decide about the wages of the workmen?

Mr. MOULDER. I think he very clearly covered that a while ago.

Mr. TAVENNER. All right.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. We had the plan; it stated how much we must produce; how much it should cost per piece, per ton, or per pound; how many tons of steel we must use; how many tons of ore; how many workmen should produce 1 ton of metal; how much the ton must cost; all the details.

(Representative Kearney leaves hearing room.)

Mr. TAVENNER. I want to ask one more question before introducing these photographs. Were the laborers in your factory free to change their place of employment or quit work?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. No. I had to determine their fate—where they must work, what they must produce, and what wages I must pay them.

Mr. TAVENNER. I would like for you to look at these photographs and identify the persons whose pictures appear there and, with your permission, I would like to photostat these and return the originals to you.

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Please.

Mr. TAVENNER. I show you a photograph marked "No. 1." Will you identify the persons who appear in that photograph?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. This is Romanov, who was head of the metal department. This is Vasilenko, Semen Vasilenko, whom we were talking about.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you identify the persons who appear in this photograph marked "No. 2"?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. General Rudenko, chairman of the Soviet Purchasing Commission. By the way, Rudenko is not a real general. He is a political general. He received a decoration in Stalingrad, not because he was a hero; the hero was the simple Russian soldier who died for our country but not for this regime, and Mr. Rudenko received the decoration.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you identify the persons who appear in photograph No. 3?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. Nicolai Kolybalov.

Mr. TAVENNER. And No. 4?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. The same Vasilenko.

Mr. TAVENNER. And photograph No. 5?

Mr. KRAVCHENKO. General Rudenko and Romanov.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer these photographs in evidence as Kravchenko exhibits 1 to 5, inclusive, and ask permission to substitute photostats and return the originals.

Mr. WOOD. The photostats will be admitted.

(The photostats of photographs above referred to, marked "Kravchenko Exhibits 1 to 5 inclusive," are filed herewith.)⁵²

Mr. WOOD. Mr. Kravchenko, permit me to express the appreciation of the committee for your appearance.

The committee will stand adjourned subject to call.

(Thereupon, at 4 p. m. on Tuesday, March 7, 1950, an adjournment was taken.)

⁵² See appendix.

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