[Hearings Regarding Shipment of Atomic Material to the Soviet Union During World War II]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
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fARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMEEICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPEESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS
FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS
DECEMBER 5 AND 7, 1949; JANUARY 23, 24, 25, AND 26,
AND MARCH 2, 3, AND 7, 1950
Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
S9334 WASHINGTON : 1950
PUBLIC
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MAY 4 1950
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
United States House of Representatives
JOHN S. WOOD, Georgia, Chairman
FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania RICHARD M. NIXON. California
BURR P. HARRISON, Virginia FRANCIS CASE, South Dakota
JOHN McSWEENEY, Ohio HAROLD H. VELDE, Illinois
MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri BERNARD W. KEARNEY, New York
Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., Counsel
Louis J. Russell. Senior Investigator
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research
John W. Carrington. Clerk of Committee
II
CONTENTS
December 5, 1949, testimony of — Page
Louis J. Russell 902
George Racey Jordan 908
December 7, 1949, testimony of Lt. Gen. Leslie R. Groves 935
January 23, 1950, testimony of Lawrence C. Burman 957
January 24, 1950, testimony of —
Dr. Phillip L. Merritt • 979
Charles Edward McKillips 985
Dr. Phillip L. Merritt (resumed). 986
Lawrence C. Burman (resumed) 1002
Hermann H. Rosenberg 1004
January 25, 1950, testimony of —
Courtney E. Owens,..' 1042
Col. Thomas T. Crenshaw 1052
January 26, 1950, testimony of —
Henry A. Wallace 1070
James P. Hoopes 1 100
March 2, 1950, testimony of Donald T. Appell 1120
March 3, 1950, testimony of —
Donald T. Appell (resumed) 1145
George Racey Jordan 1153
March 7, 1950, testimony of Victor A. Kravchenko 1175
III
HEAEINGS KEGAEDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATE-
EIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION DUEING WOELD WAE II
MONDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1949
United States House of Kepresentatives,
Subcommittee of the
Committee on un-American Activities,
W ashington, D. O.
A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met,
pursuant to call, at 11 : 15 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Build-
ing, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Hon. John S. Wood, chairman;
Francis E. Walter, Burr P. Harrison, and Morgan M. Moulder.
Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J.
Russell, senior investigator; Courtney Owens, investigator; Benjamin
Mandel, director of research ; John W. Carrington, clerk ; and A. S.
Poore, editor.
Mr. Wood. Let the committee be in order, please.
Let the record disclose that for purposes of this particular hear-
ing a subcommittee composed of Mr. Walter, Mr. Harrison, Mr.
Moulder, and Mr. Wood has been designated. They are all present.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, the committee and its staff has been
for some time pursuing an investigation of reported sales of uranium
to the Soviet Government. In view of the fact that so much pub-
licity has recently been given to the sale of this material to the Soviets,
it appears advisable that the facts developed by the committee thus
far be brought to the attention of the American public. I would like,
therefore, to call as the first witness this morning, Louis J. Kussell,
senior investigator for the committee.
A review of the file pertaining to the matter of the uranium ship-
ments to Russia indicates that there is some disagreement or conflict
in statements made by various persons examined or interrogated dur-
ing the course of the investigation conducted in connection with this
matter. It therefore appears advisable that this morning's proceed-
ings be confined to the subject of the shipments of uranium and
uranium compounds to the Soviet Government, and such other mat-
ters that we may be able to develop through another witness if he
appears.
Mr. Wood. Very well. Mr, Russell, will you stand up and be sworn.
You solemnly swear the evidence you give this subcommittee will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God ?
Mr. Russell. I do.
901
902 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC :MATERIAL
TESTIMONY OF LOUIS J. RUSSELL
Mr. Tavenner. Will you please state your name?
Mr. Russell. Louis J. Eusseli.
Mr .Tavenneb. You are employed by the committee as its senior in-
vestigator, are you not?
Mr. Russell. I am.
Mr. Tavenner. Have you had occasion to make an investigation of
reported sales of uranium to the Russian Government during the pe-
riod of your employment by the committee ?
Mr. Russell. I have.
Mr. Tavenner. That investigation related, did it not, to the sales
of uranium which were made to the Russian Government from sources
within this country?
Mr. Rltssell. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. How many sales of uranium were made to the Soviet
Government according to the facts developed by your investigation?
Mr. Russell. Three that we know of.
Mr. Tavenner. When did the Russians first become interested in
the purchase of uranium or uranium compounds within the United
States?
Mr. Russell. In February 1943, according to documents which the
staff of the committee has examined.
Mr. Tavenner, What officials of the Soviet Government were prin-
cipally interested in the Russian attempts to obtain uranium or ura-
nium compounds ?
Mr. Russell. There were several. One of them was V. Finogenov
of the Soviet Purchasing Commission; and N. S. Fomichev of the
Soviet Purchasing Commission; N. S. Stepanov of the Soviet Pur-
chasing Commission ; and a General Rudensky, Col. A. N. Kotikov
was the ultimate recipient of the uranium material. He too, was at-
tached to the Soviet Purchasing Commission.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Russell, at this point would you relate the
details of the first two shipments of uranium compounds to the Soviet
Government ?
Mr. Russell. Yes. Regarding the issuance of the export licenses
for uranium compounds, the committee received a letter from the
United States State Department from which I will quote. However,
since the letter contains controversial material as well as confidential
data, I will read only the first paragraph. This paragraph discloses
that certain export licenses for the shipment of uranium materials to
the Soviet Union were granted, according to the records of the Lend-
Lease Administration and the successor to that agency, the Foreign
Economic Administration.
This is a letter addressed to Donald T. Appell. a member of the in-
vestigating staff of the Un-American Activities Committee, from the
Department of State.
Mr. Moulder. What is the date of the letter?
Mr. Russell. June 11, 1948. [Reading:]
Reference is made to your visit to the Department of State, on behalf of
the House Committee on Un-American Activities, with reference to a reported
shipment of some black uranium oxide to the Soviet Union in 1943. The
Department of State had nothing to do with this transaction. However, the
records of the Division for Soviet Supply of the Office of Lend-Lease Admin-
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 903
istration ami its successor agency, the Foreign Economic Administration, which
have been absorbed by the Department of State, indicate that in March 1943
two export licenses were granted, one for 200 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and
220 pounds of uranium nitrate and the other for 500 pounds of urano-uranic
oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate. The records also indicate that an
export license was granted in April 1943 for 25 pounds of uranium metal, and
that in November of tiie same year an export license was granted for 1,000
grams of heavy water which I believe is also of interest to your committee.
Notations and memoranda of the Lend-Lease Administration, included in the
records, indicate that there was some consultation between representatives of
the War Department, FEA, and Lend-Lease on the granting of export licenses
for the uranium materials. These records do not, however, include any actvial
contemporary communications from the War Department.
As to the shipment of the material to the Soviet Union, the fol-
lowing testimony was given to the committee by Herman R. Rosen-
berg, of Chemator, Inc., New York City. This concern occupied a
position similar to that of a broker in the uranium transactions with
the Soviet Government :
On February 1, 1943, we received an inquiry from the Government Purchas-
ing Commission of the Soviet Union, Washington, D. C, Mr. N. S. Fomichev,
for 220 ix)unds uranium oxide (U30S), 220 pounds uranium nitrate (uranyl
nitrate, U02 (NO3)2+6H20), and 25 pounds uranium metal.
We had previously sold to the Russians approximately four or six small
lots of various chemicals, during 1942 and 1948, aggregating a few thousand
dollars. This was a very minor part of the regular business done by us during
the war years with various Allied purchasing commissions which then offered
the only opportunity to continue "our export business with those countries which
they represented, and the United States Treasury Department l)uying lend-lease
supplies.
This inquiry was the first we had ever received for uranium products from
any customer. Accordingly, we had first to find manufacturers and dealers
in this line, whom we contacted for the purpose of obtaining information about
this article and to get quotations. We were able to obtain at least one offer for
each of the products.
We also called the War Production Board, New York City, group 2, to
inquire about regulations covering these products and were told that order
M-2S5 of January 26, 1943, had just been issued which, however, merely pro-
hibited the use of uranium chemicals in certain domestic industries, like glass,
ceramic, and pottery and that said order said nothing regarding export. If the
material is destined for war use by the Russians this order definitely did not
apply. For further details we were referred to their Washington miscellaneous
minerals division. In reply to our formal inquiry, addressed to this division,
Mr. Park, Assistant to R. J. Land, confirmed that the Russian uranium require-
ment was not subject to regulation M-285. In this connection, Mr. Fomichev
advised us that the material was not required for any of the uses restricted by
regulation M-285 but was urgently needed for Russian military puriwses. Spe-
cifically, the uranium salts were represented by the Russians to be needed for
military medical purposes and the uranium metal for .their war industry to
harden steel used for gun barrels. This information, together with its source,
we submitted to the War Production Board with our aforesaid inquiry.
Accordingly, on February 3, 1943, we invited the Russian Mission to submit
to us their firm order for the uranium oxide and the m-anium nitrate. Yet, it
was not until the middle of March 1943 that such formal order was received
by us. In the meantime the Lend-Lease Administration, through Mr. Moore, a
subordinate of General Wessen of that agency, had approved the transaction,
advising us on March 8, 1943, that "no further clearance will be necessary except
the usual export license." Upon advice on March 11, 1943, of the Soviet Com-
mission of the receipt of such export license, we placed on March 15, 1943, our
own order for the 200 ( rather than 220) pounds uranium oxide and 220 pounds
uranium nitrate with S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., Denver, Colo. On March
23, 1943, this company shipped the material directly to "Col. A. N. Kotikov,
Resident Representative of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission of
the Soviet Union in the United States of America, Air Service Depot of the Air
Transport Command, Gore Field, Great Falls, Mont."
904 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
As for the uranium metal, no quotation was ever made by us on this Inquiry,
due to diflBculties encountered in supplying this material from our expected
source, the Fairmount Chemical Co.
On March 19, 1943, the Soviet Government advised us that they reqiaired
several tons of uranium nitrate and uranium chloride (preferably uranium
oxychloride, otherwise tri-, tetra- or pentchloride) or urano-uranic oxide,
which inquiry was passed on to S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., who answered
on March 25, 1943, that they could only offer 500 pounds each of urano-uranic
oxide and uranium nitrate and further deliveries only if they received the raw
materials. We passed this offer on to the Soviet Commission subject to receipt
of the necessary export license and other permissions.
On April 1, 1943, the Soviet Commission asked us to "reserve" 500 pounds of
each product as offered by us and on April 5, 1943, they confirmed the order
subject to receipt of export license. This license (No. 1643180) was issued only
on April 26, 1943. By that time the Shattuck Co. had withdrawn their offer
as of April 22, 1943, because the material had been sold to "their regular cus-
tomers." This made it necessary to secure substitute material from the Canadian
Radium & Uranium Corp., New York City, to have the export license amended
as of April 29, 1943, to conform to the change in product and price ; and to obtain
and place the new sales and purchase contracts with the Russian and Canadian
parties, respectively.
Even though we had been advised by the Russians at the outset that, contrary
to the first uranium transaction, this deal did not come under lend-lease, they
advised us on April 12, 1943, that Mr. Moore had granted the necessary approval
of the transaction as a cash purchase. With respect to regulation M-2S5 we
obtained an affidavit from the Russians stating that theoxide will be used in the
manufacture of ferro-uranium compounds which in turn will be used in the
production of armaments and that the uranium nitrate will be used for medical
pui-poses directly connected with the war. This affidavit we sent on to our sup-
pliers who shipped the materials consisting of 500 pounds of black uranium oxide
and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate, directly from Port Hope, Ontario, Canada,
to the afore-mentioned Colonel Kotikov.
The gross invoice value of both of the uranium deals, described herein, was
$4,400, on which our gross profit is estimated at $50O-$600. Both transactions
were handled, and payment made on behalf of the Russian Government by
Amtorg Trading Corp., New York, N. Y.
On August 5, 1943, Mr. Fomichev* inquired, among various other chemicals,
about uranium compounds. He said that they asked the WPB if not another
10-15 tons could be located for them. The Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.
told us that they are not allowed any longer to quote on uranium compounds ;
we should approach the WPB but the best way would be that the Soviet Pur-
chasing Commission communicate with the Canadian Ministry of Munitions and
Supplies. This we passed on to the Soviet Purchasing Commission and had no
further dealings in any uranium products since.
Mr. Waltek. Wlien was this statement made, Mr. Russell ?
Mr. EussELL. It was made on June 28, 1948.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Russell, according to this testimony by Mr.
Rosenberg, export license covering the shipment of uranium com-
pounds to the Soviet Government was granted and the material was
shipped to Colonel Kotikov of the Soviet Purchasing Commission ; is
that correct?
Mr. Russell. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Was this material, or the uranium compounds,
actually flown to the Soviet Union, as far as your investigation dis-
closed ?
Mr. Russell. The staff as of this date has been unable to locate
the actual manifests covering the uranium shipments to Russia. It
was reported that atomic materials were sent out of the country as
ordinary chemicals and that it would be a difficult if not fruitless task
to attempt to identify any particular manifest covering a shipment
of atomic material. However, oral information received by the com-
mittee reflects that the uranium compounds were flown from the bases
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 905
at Great Falls, Mont., to Fairbanks, Alaska, and then to Russia. The
export license for the first shipment of uranium to Russia reflects
that the ultimate destination of the atomic material was to be Rasno-
import, Ul. Kuibysheva, Moscow, U. S. S. R.
Mr. Tavenner. You have told the committee about your investi-
gation relating to the action of the broker in the sale of this uranium?
Mr. RussELii. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Drd you conduct a further investigation of the
sellers of the uranium ?
Mr. Russell. Yes. In connection with the second shipment an in-
vestigation was made and it was determined that after the first ship-
ment was made from the United States the Manhattan Engineering
District, under General Groves, cut off all sources of supply of
uranium material in the United States. However, the source from
which tlie Russians obtained the second shipment of the 1,000 pounds
of uranium compounds was a Canadian source. The principal offi-
cer of this company was investigated by the committee. However, it
developed that this person had been the subject of a criminal investi-
gation by the Canadian Government in connection with the sale of
uranium and radium products. The criminal case was, according to
our investigation, dropped and a civil suit instituted by the Canadian
Government in New York City against the individual involved. The
records of the civil case were impounded by a Federal court in New
York City after a settlement of more than $1,000,000 was effected by
the Canadian Government. Following the impounding of the records,
the committee issued a subpena calling for the production of these
records by a firm of attorneys in New York City. After this subpena
was served, the American State Department advised through a letter
addressed to the committee that the Canadian Government had re-
quested that the investigation of the person involved in the second
shipment be deferred insofar as the production of the court records
were concerned, in the interest of the national security of Canada.
Because of this request and the fact that the subject of the investi-
gation was at the time in Paris, France, the staff discontinued its
investigation, but the investigation has now been reactivated in view
of the fact that the subject has returned to this country.
Mr. Tavenner. Did your investigation show that export licenses
covering the shipment of other atomic materials to Russia were
granted ?
Mr. Russell. Yes, The documents that the committee examined
reflect that program license No. 339 for the shipment of heavy water
to Soviet Russia was granted. The amount called for by the license
was 1,000 grams or 41 pounds, valued at $3,250. This license was
granted sometime between October 1 and December 31, 1943.
Mr. Tavenner. Was the heavy water actually shipped to Soviet
Russia, as far as you could determine ?
Mr. Russell. The staff was unable to locate the shipping manifest
applying to this particular license.
Mr. Ta\t.nner. Was there any peculiarity surrounding the pur-
chase orders issued by the Russian Government in connection with
its application for export license covering uranium oxide?
Mr. Russell. Yes. One witness interrogated during the course of
the investigation said that on the invoice submitted to lend-lease for
906 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
approval by the Russians there would be a list of perhaps 30 or 40
different nonessential chemicals. The request for uranium would be
placed near the end of the list. This witness stated he surmised the
Kussians submitted the invoices in this manner hoping the purchase
order would be approved by lend-lease without a careful check being
made because the other articles set forth in the invoices were non-
essential items.
Mr. Tavenner. During the period that these licenses were being
requested, and in some cases issued, the fact that the United States
was working on atomic development was a closely guarded secret,
was it not ?
Mr. Russell. Yes.
Mr. Tavexxer. Therefore, it appears that the Russians knew in
February 1943 that this country was engaged in atomic development,
does it not ?
Mr. Russell, Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Did your investigation reflect that the shipment
of uranium compounds to the Soviet Union was approved by the
Manhattan Engineering District?
Mr. Russell. There is a great deal of controversy concerning
whether the Manhattan Engineering District actually approved the
shipment of uranium material to Soviet Russia. However, in a letter
dated November 18, 1946, addressed to a Government official, Gen.
Leslie Groves, the head of the Manhattan Engineering District, it is
stated :
Early in 1948 the Russian purchasing commission placed an order with a
private firm in this country for 220 pounds of uranium nitrate and 200 pounds
of uranium oxide. The individual who arranged this purchase for the Russian
purchasing commission is not known. I have reason to believe that the material
was flown to Russia in a lend-lease plane. When the Manhattan Engineering
District became cognizant of this purchase efforts were made to stop the ship-
ment. These efforts were discontinued when we ascertained that the transac-
tion had already been completely arranged. Shortly after this incident the
Manhattan Engineering District arranged furchase of uranium for coloring ceramics was prohibited.
That is, no glass-manufacturing company or pottery-manufacturing
company could purchase uranium to color pottery with.
Mr. Ta'\t:nner. When did that restriction become effective?
Mr. BuRMAN. In January 1943,
Mr. Tavexner. In what way was Manhattan Engineering District
concerned with the purchase of uranium ?
Mr. BuRMAN. It bought all of the uranium that was required for
the Government atomic-energy project.
Mr. Tavenner. Through the influence of Manhattan Engineering
District, w^ere any controls set up other than the one you mentioned
I'cgarding the general purchase of uranium by the public or by foreign
countries?
Mr. BuRMAN. Aside from the limitation on the purchase of uranium
for ceramic use, there was an export control exercised then through
the Board of Economic Warfare. That is, an export license would be
required from the Board of Economic Warfare to send uranium out
of the country.
Mr. Tavexner. What other Government agencies, if any, were con-
cerned with either the sales or the exporting of uranium, besides War
Pi'oduction Board, Manhattan Engineering District, and Bureau of
Elconomic Warfare ?
Mr. BuRMAX. None that I can recall.
Mr. Tavex^xer. In what way was the Lend-Lease Administration
concerned in the problem of handling uranium ?
Mr. BuRMAx. Only to the extent that Lend-Lease may receive orders
irom Allied countries for transfer of uranium. If they were to re-
ceive a request from any of the Allied countries — in this case, of course,
it was from U. S. S. R. — it w^ould be handled in Lend-Lease as any
other lend-lease procurement would be handled. If a nation requested
through Lend-Lease uranium procurement, it would be processed
through Lend-Lease.
Mr. Ta\^nner. I have understood that the Bureau of Economic
Warfare was the licensing agency for the right to export uranium?
Mr. BuRMAN. I think that is correct ; yes. It was also the practice,
however, of the Board of Economic Warfare, to consult with other
interested agencies in the event they had some item which was of
obvious interest, and in this case, as I recall it, the Board of Economic
Warfare and Lend-Lease all channeled their requests for information
and advice to the War Production Board. I don't believe BEW acted
independently in all cases, but I can't say that for a certainty. I don't
know.
Mr. Ta\t3xner. Are you sufficiently acquainted with procedure to
state whether or not it was necessary to obtain approval from Lend-
Lease if it was a cash purchase of uranium which was being made, and
application for export license was made to the Bureau of Economic
Warfare?
Mr. BuRMAN. I wouldn't know that at all, sir.
Mr. Tavexxer. Even in the case where it was necessary to consult
Lend-Lease because of the materials being furnished as against lend-
if
960 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
lease quotas, do you know whether or not it still required that the
export license be issued by the Bureau of Economic Warfare?
Mr. BuRMAx. My belief is that it would require it.
Mr. Taat:nxer. jNIr. Burman, in March 1943, the Soviet Government
Purchasing Commission apj^lied for export licenses to export uranium
and uranium compounds to the Soviet Union. Are you familiar with
details concerning the sale of 200 pounds of uranium oxide and 220
pounds of uranium nitrate to the Soviet Government early in 1943?
JNIr. Burman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. Tell us what you know about that transaction.
JNIr. Bueman. The Manhattan District was just then starting to
exercise its control over uranium which it didn't own itself, and we
were suddenly confronted with a lend-lease order for that quantity
of material which had been processed, we understood, through lend-
lease channels, and a potential supplier had been consulted and it had
been determined that the supply was immediately available for delivery
by this supplier. I believe someone, as an afterthought, suddenly de-
cided to consult War Production Board to see if it was all right, it not
being generally known that uranium was anything more than of normal
interest. When War Production Board was consulted, they sent the
information on to us at Xew York, to the Manhattan District, and it
was finally decided, after, I believe, considerable consultation, that the
project had gone so far, and it was known the material was available
at this company in Denver, that it wovdcl be rather pointing a finger
at the matei'ial if the license was refused at so late a elate, and General
Groves then authorized the issuance of the license through his own
office, and the material was quickly shipped.
Mr. Ta\'enxer. Manhattan Engineering District first acquired
knowledge of that transaction through the War Production Board; is
that what I understand you to say?
Mr. BuR]\rAN. That is correct.
Mr. Ta\^nner. Do you know whether or not the Bureau of Economic
Warfare, or Lend-Lease Administration, at that time, knew that there
was an active uranium project any place within the United States
Government ?
Mr. Burman. I couldn't say at all as regards the Board of Economic
Warfare, but Lend-Lease must certainly have been a little surprised by
the sudden importance of so small an order in Government circles. It
would certainly hint broadly that the material had more than ordinary
value.
Mr. Tavenner. Was there anything in your negotiations, or those of
any other official of jNIanhattan Engineering District, with Lend-Lease
officials, indicating that they did not know prior to that time that this
material was of strategic importance ?
Mr. Burman. There was nothing to indicate that they knew it was
of any special importance, to the best of my memory, and I believe
that that is the case.
Mr. Tavenner, After you learned of the first sale of uranium prod-
ucts to the Russian Government, do you recall what arrangements were
placed in effect in the United States bv the Manhattan Engineering
Disti-ict to control the sale of uranium products to the Soviet Govern-
ment?
Mr. Burman. Yes. We took rather strong measures after that to be
sure that we had material where we could put our hands on it.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 961
Mr. Ta\'enner. What were those arrangements ?
Mr. BuRMAN. For one thing, we arranged with a contractor, not
using the Manhattan District name, for this contractor to pnrchase
all he could of stocks of uranium in the hands of pottery manufac-
turers and anywhere else where it might be subject to resale. This
contractor bought material from the chemical companies and
scrounged around in industry to collect odd lots.
Mr. Taa^xner. Who was that contractor ?
]\Ir. BuRMAN. Vitro Manufacturing Co., of Pittsburgh. Vitro was
the prime source of uranium in that they had for some years processed
uranium ores from the Colorado area. We entered into a gentle-
men's agreement that they would sell no uranium except to Manhat-
tan District, and they were under contract with the district at the
same time for a variety of work.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you discover at any time in the future that
they had violated that gentlemen's agreement by selling uranium to
other purchasers?
Mr. BuRMAN. No. So far as we know they never did. As a matter
of fact, they ceased their own operations at that time with uranium
and worked exclusively in that business for the district. The Shat-
tuck Chemical Co., in Denver, was also a processor of uranium ores,
and, representing myself as War Production Board, and I guess Dr.
Merritt talked to Shattuck as well. Mr. Potter, of Shattuck, agreed
they would not make any deliveries of uranium anywhere without
the permission of the War Production Board, ostensibly, and as far
as we know Mr. Potter niade no shipments that were not approved
in advance thereafter.
Mr. Tavenner. Could you legally demand that no sales of uranium
be made by Shattuck at that time ?
Mr. BuRMAN. No, we could not. It was a cooperative measure on
their part. Mr. Potter had his inklings as to the potentialities of
uranium, because of his acquaintanceship with the material and what
he had read earlier in the press in the pre-Manhattan District days.
He knew of the potentialities of uranium 235, and he agreed not to
make shipments that were not approved in advance.
Mr. Tavenner. When was that agreement reached?
Mr. BuRMAN. Immediately after the 200- and 220-pound shipments.
Mr. Tavenner. Was the matter handled with Mr. Potter by letter,
by telephone, or by personal interview ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Both by letter and telephone to start with, and
followed up by personal visits periodically thereafter.
Mr. Tavenner. I am not certain that I heard the date when that
agreement was reached with Mr. Potter ?
Mr. Burman. It was immediately after the 200-pound and the 220-
pound order was placed with Shattuck, right after the delivery was
made. The first information which we gave to Mr. Potter when it was
decided that the 420-pound shipment would go forward, was to tell
Mr. Potter that he might find it difficult in the future to get any
export licenses for other shipments of uranium out of the country.
We had also talked to him by telephone and had his verbal agreement
not to do anything until somebody from War Production Board
stopped to see him, and War Production Board was ourselves.
Mr. Tavenner. I am trying to fix more definitely the time when
that agreement was reached.
99334—50 5
962 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. BuRMAN. I can't give the exact date. It was either February
or March 1943.
Mr. Tavenner. Are you certain that it was prior to the time that
the matter regarding another export license was raised by Lend-
Lease ?
Mr. BuRMAX. I am certain that it was.
Mr. Taat:nner. Did the Manhattan Engineering District en-
deavor to interview other suppliers of uranium and warn them against
shipping out of the United States?
Mr. BuRMAN. We had a contractual arrangement with the repre-
sentatives of the Belgian producers, and while I can't say definitely
that there was a written agreement for them not to sell elsewhere, I
feel pretty certain that some agreement did exist. The Manhattan
District purchased, in early 1943 or late 1942, the stock of material
which was lying in the warehouses here which might have gone to the
ceramic trade, since the Belgians were shipping to the ceramic trade
in those days.
Mr. Tavexner. What was the name of the Belgian company?
Mr. Burmax. In 1942 they had one representative known as the
Central Trading Co., which was dissolved, and later the work was
taken over by the African IMetals Corp.
Mr. Tavexxer. Then I understand the ^Manhattan Engineering
District acquired their supply in the United States?
Mr. BuRMAX. Their warehouse stock of ceramic-type uranium
compounds. There was also the Canadian source of material.
Mr. Tavexxer. Before we come to that, let me ask you : Can you
be positive that the Belgian company was interviewed regarding
the supplying of uranium compounds for the export trade?
Mr. BuRMAX. I can say positively because I am certain it was done,
but I myself did not do it.
Mr. Tavexxer. WTio did do it, in your opinion ?
Mr. BuRMAx. I believe Dr. Merritt can give you the full details
of that.
Mr. TA^^:xxER. You were about to mention another supplier.
Mr. BuRMAX. The Canadian Eadium & Uranium Corp., which is
a United States company, was sales representative of Eldorado Min-
ing & Refining Co. The Eldorado Mining & Refining Co. is the
producer of uranium at Great Bear Lake. In the same manner in
which we had purchased these other miscellaneous types of ceramic
uranium, we had made a contract with Canadian Radium & Uranium
to i)ick up their warehouse quantity of uranium oxide and nitrate,
and so forth, and the contract had a provision in it whereby the district
A\ould have first call for the period of a year against any other
uranium that that company had to sell of the same types.
Mr. Tavexxer. What was the date of the contract ?
Mr. BuRMAX. In March 1943. I can't tell you the exact date in
the month, but I am sure it was in March 1943.
jNIr. Tavexxer. Is that contract accessible to you ?
Mr. BuRMAX. Yes. It is in the Commission files, however.
Mr. Tavexxer. Could you produce it for the committee?
Mr. BuRMAX. I don't know whether I am able to do so. It is a
classified document. It is still classified secret.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 963
Mr. Tavenner. I would like to ask you to investigate that and
see if it can be declassified and turned over to this committee, and
advise me of the result of your inquiry.
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes ; I will do so.
Mr. Tavekner. I would like for you first to identify the date a,
little more definitely if you can.
Mr. BuRMAN. I know it is in March 1943, and to hazard a guess as
to the date, I would say about the 27th.
Mr. Tavenner. The contract is between the Manhattan Engineering
District and what other party ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.
Mr. Ta\t:nner. Who were the ofhcials of that corporation at that
time?
Mr. BuRiviAN. Mr. Boris Pregel was the president of the company.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know the names of other officials of the
company ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Alexander Pregel was vice president. Beyond that,
I can't recall any other officers of the company.
Mr. Tavenner. Had that company, prior to March 1943, furnished
quantities of uranium to Manhattan Engineering District?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. We bought it wherever we could find it.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you continue in your purchases from that cor-
poration after March 1943 ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Well, we continued to have relations with that com-
pany, but they were reduced from time to time in their scope until
they practically vanished. I can't tell you over what period of time
that was.
Mr. Tavenner. Did j^ou confer with this company, the Canadian
Radium & Uranium Corp., or its president, Mr. Boris Pregel, or its
vice president, Mr. Alexander Pregel, regarding the shipment of
uranium compounds out of this country ?
Mr. BuRMAN. No. I was not myself in direct contact with Mr.
Pregel. I believe Dr. Merritt can give you that information, because
it was his responsibility to deal with Mr. Pregel.
Mr. Tavenner. I see. I was asking you what arrangement or ar-
rangements were made to stop the flow of uranium to foreign coun-
tries during the war period, and you told me about those two arrange-
ments, the interviewing of Shattuck Co. and other suppliers. Now,
I notice on the export license of this shipment from the Shattuck Co.
that the supplier was Chematar, Inc.
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you interview that company?
Mr. BuRMAN. No: we did not.
Mr. Tavenner. Why didn't you ?
Mr. BuRMAN. We didn't think we could learn anything that we
didn't already know.
Mr. Tavenner. Well, they were acting certainly as an agent or
as a broker for the purchase of this material. It seems to have been
of importance to have consulted with them likewise.
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. The Chematar Co. was in contact with War
Production Board in Washington, the branch which was ostensibly in
control of uranium, and was pressing for approval of the license, and
964 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
we did receive copies of the correspondence and learn the information
we needed. What we were interested in most was where it was going.
Mr. Tavenner, Yes; but yon were not protecting the outflow by
merely learning what was in their correspondence. I am asking what
arrangements were made to stop the export of uranium.
Mr. BuRMAN. In the case of the 420-pound order it was agreed it
should be permitted to go forward. We had the material blocked
through the available sources of supply, we thought.
Mr. Tavenner. Was any action taken by Manhattan Engineering
District with other Government agencies designed to control the ex-
l^orting to a foreign country of uranium compounds ?
Mr. BuRMAN. We did have a Washington office. The officer in
charge of that office was in contact with all of the Washington bureaus.
I can't say what steps he took, but he was the man in direct contact
w4th Lend-Lease and presumably with BEW when any cases of this
sort arose, and we felt that so far as raw materials went, we had it
stopped at the source.
Mr. Ta-stenner. Who was the individual in the Washington office
to whom you refer ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Col. A. C. Johnson.
Mr. Tavenner, He has testified before this committee, has he not ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I believe he has.
Mr. Tavenner. Were any arrangements made with any Govern-
ment agency by which the Manhattan Engineering District was to be
notified in the event of the filing of an application for license or for
approval of a license for the shipment of uranium ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I believe Colonel Johnson had such an arrangement.
Where the word "uranium" would pop up in various Government
offices, I believe there was a tickler in the case to notify Johnson.
Mr. Tavenner. You say you believe so. That is rather important.
What actual knowledge do you have of that ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I know that when anybody was looking for uranium
he either wound up in Colonel Johnson's office or in our office in New
York, and would be referred there by the War Production Board, by
field offices, or by the other agencies.
Mr. Tavenner. Are you familiar with the details surrounding the
issuance of another export license for 500 pounds of uranium nitrate
and 500 pounds of uranium oxide, which was issued to the Soviet
Government ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I know of it now. I was not aware of it when I testi-
fied earlier.
Mr. Tavenner. You did not know at the time that such a license had
been issued ?
Mr. Burman. No, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you know at the time that an application had
been made by this Soviet Purchasing Commission for the issuance of
such a license ?
Mr. Burman. No; I didn't. I had known of at least one earlier
request that was floating around Lend-Lease for Si/o tons of material.
I know that was turned down. I did not know of the request for a
1,000-pound license.
Mr. Ta\"enner. Did you learn during the course of your employ-
ment that during the month of April 1943 a plan was discussed within
Manhattan Engineering District by which a license would be approved
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 965
to export uranium, with the idea of testing out the So^det Commission
in its ability to locate the material ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I didn't know of it then, but I have heard of it now and
have seen some of the records.
Mr. Tavenner. I assume, then, from your answers, that you had no
conference with any official of Lend-Lease or the Bureau of Economic
Warfare relating to that particular license ?
Mr. BuRMAN. That is right. I may add at this point, this was only
a part-time job which took about 5 percent of my time, and that we were
busy on many other production problems. This job had only been
acquired because of the earlier War Production Board contracts.
Mr. TA^^NNER. Regardless of the fact that you were not acquainted
with any effort to obtain the issuance of this particular license for the
500 pounds of uranium oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate, were
you aware of any pressure being brought on yourself or other members
of the staff of the Manhattan Engineering District by officials of the
Lend-Lease Administration or officials of the Bureau of Economic
Warfare to issue licenses ?
Mr. BuRMAN. No. I was not aware of any such pressure at any
time. The only, it might be called pressure, was a series of telephone
calls in relation to the 420-pound order from the War Production
Board and Lend-Lease, and Chematar was in touch with War Produc-
tion Board by telephone periodically, and War Production Board in
Washington would call us in New York to get something done.
Mr. Tavenner. To do what ?
Mr. BuRMAN. To get something done.
Mr. Tavenner. That came from War Production Board ?
Mr. BuRMAN. That came from the War Production Board office
which was theoretically in charge of uranium, but since they were
sitting in the middle tliey would transfer these urgent requests from
Chematar or Lend-Lease to us.
Mr. Tavenner. State more fully what you mean by saying you
were urged to get something done.
Mr. BuRMAN. To get a decision one way or another, because this
had been hanging fire for a considerable time, much longer than ordi-
nary. I believe they were about to issue the original license when it
was held up because they were trying to get a decision out of Man-
hattan District.
Mr. Nixon. That is the license for the 420 pounds ?
Mr. Burman. That is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. Who were the individuals from whom telephone
calls were received from Lend-Lease and any of the other Government
agencies ?
Mr. Burman. I don't recall specifically talking to any of the Lend-
Lease people myself, but the Chematar people had been in, telephone
contact with Mr. Lund and Mr. Parks in War Production Board, and
Mr. Parks, through error, I believe, gave Mr. Rosenberg of Chematar
my telephone number in New York. The Manhattan District as such
tried to stay out of those things, it was not to be known that Manhat-
tan District was directly involved, so that I, myself, I don't believe
talked to any of these gentlemen.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether that occurred at some time
quite a few months later than the transaction we are talking about?
966 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. BuEMAN. No. It was in the February 1943 period in relation
to tlie 420 pounds.
INIr. TA\T.]srNER. "V\niat was the nature of your telephone conversation
with Mr. Rosenberg or Chematar?
Mr, BuRMAN. I didn't actually receive that telephone call. I was
away and another officer, as I recall, talked with him and told him that
was a mistake of some sort, that he had Lieutenant Burman's tele-
phone number only because Burman used to be with War Production
Board. That cut off short any idea that Lieutenant Burman of New
York was interested in uranium.
Mr. Tavenner. Who was the person who took the call ?
Mr. Burman. I believe it was Colonel Crenshaw.
Mr. Tavenxer. 1 was asking you if you knew the names of officials
in the various Government agencies who called your office with regard
to the releasing of this first shipment.
Mr. Btjrman. I don't recall just who telephoned, but we did receive,
through War Production Board in Washington, correspondence from
Lend-Lease and Chematar. Chematar correspondence was in the
name of Mr. Rosenberg, and Lend-Lease correspondence in the name
of Mr. Moore, I believe ; that is the only name I can recall ; I believe
there was somebody else corresponding on the subject.
Mr. Tavenner. But as to telephone calls, have you any recollection?
Mr. Burman. I assure it was the same gentlemen. I don't know,
since I didn't talk to them.
Mr. Tavenner. AVere you conscious, at any time after this first
transaction was closed, of any unusual activity, or any activity, with
regard to the officials of other agencies in urging approval of ship-
m.ents of uranium to any allied power ?
Mr. Burman. No, sir; none.
Mr. Case. To what are you referring when you refer to an 8^-ton
request that was turned down ?
Mr. Burman. There was a U. S. S. R. request through Lend-Lease
channels for 81/9 tons of uranium material which was processed by
Chemical Warfare Service.
Mr. Case. When was that request made ?
Mr. BuRMi\N. Shortly after the 420-pound shipment and prior to the
date of the 1,000-pound shipment.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, we have a rather complete record on
that transaction which will be introduced later.
Mr. Case. You asked if he knew of any other activity and he said he
didn't recall any.
Mr. Burman! I am sorry. That request did go through War Pro-
duction Board channels, and that was, as I recall, refused, and the
information was passed to Lend-Lease through our Washington office.
Mr. Case. And who turned it down ?
Mr. Bukman. I assume it was turned down by General Groves, since
Colonel Johnson was immediately on General Groves' staff and
handled such matters.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether or not, as a result of General
Groves' recommendation, the Secretary of War, to whom the matter
had in the meantime been referred, made the final decision refusing to
release the shipment?
Mr. Burman. I just don't know, sir.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 967
Mr. Tavenner. In the course of your employment with the Man-
hattan Engineering District, did any fact or circumstance come to your
knowledge and attention which indicated that any pressure was being
brought to bear by any Government official, or by any person out of
the Government, on your staif to approve the shipment of uranium
compounds out of the country?
Mr. BuRMAN. We had no such information at all, sir. We know
of no such pressure.
Mr. Tavenner. After this first shipment that you referred to from
the Shattuck Co., were any other shipments made of uranium, to your
knowledge?
Mr. BuRMAN. Only the 1,000-pound shipment which we later
learned of.
Mr. Tavenner. When did you first learn of the shipment of the
thousand pounds?
Mr. BuRMAN. We had heard about it here in June 1948 and went
back and checked more fully with the Canadian authorities, their
records on the case, and we learned that a Canadian export license
was actually issued and that the material was shipped.
Mr. TA^^ENNER. What was the source of supply of the corporation
you refer to as the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Their source of supply was the Canadian Great Bear
Lake mines. Eldorado Gold Mine Co. was the company; Eldorado
Mining & Refining Co., it later became.
Mr. Tavenner. Did the Eldorado Gold Mine Co. make a report of
any character that you are familiar with that would show the ship-
ment that you have referred to ?
Mr. BuRMAN. No. That is a company which is entirely in Canada
and would not make such a report.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether or not such a report was
made by the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. of shipments ema-
nating from Eldorado mines ?
Mr. BuRMAN. We have checked our files, the old War Production
files, and can say that there is no report by Canadian Radium of that
shipment.
Mr. Tavenner. At least you did not know of it at the time you
were employed by Manhattan Engineering District?
Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. Was any contact made with Eldorado Gold Mines
with reference to supplying material to governments other than the
United States and Canada ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I don't know. I believe there was, but Dr. Merritt
can tell you that.
Mr. Tavenner. AVhen you said you first learned here that the
1,000-pouncl shipment had been made, what did you mean?
Mr. Burman. We just had no information on it in the New York
office up to that time. All of the activity that we have talked over
was carried on out of New York for the Manhattan District. It
wasn't always possible to Imow what the Washington office was think-
ing or doing.
Mr. Tavenner, You have since confirmed the fact that the shipment
was actually made ?
Mr. Burman. Yes, sir.
968 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know of any other sales of uranium to the
Soviet Government, other tlian the two which we have mentioned?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. There was a small shipment of uranium metal
which was permitted to go to Russia about the middle of 1944. At the
time that the order had been first placed for the 420 pounds of uranium
compounds, the same order carried a request for 25 pounds of uranium
metal. I understood that 25 pounds of uranium metal were also au-
thorized for shipment, but as far as we knew at that time there was
no uranium metal available in the United States that they could
lay their hands on. That was the fact of the matter. But the order
was placed, eventually, with A. D. McKay, a well-known supply house
in New York which specializes in rare minerals and metals. McKay
accepted the order conditionally, that he would ship it if he could
get it made somewhere, and for a year and a half he tried to have it
made. It is rather a difficult process and requires specialized equip-
ment. In all of his efforts to have it made, acting as a representative
of the War Production Board, I was looking over his shoulder all
the time. He finally did succeed in having about 4.5 pounds of rather
poor uranium metal made by a laboratory in Cleveland. We had a
sample of the uraniinn metal analyzed, and it was far poorer than if
they had taken just pure uranium oxide to start with and not tried to
make the metal.
We told McKay we would have no objection to his shipping a
small sample of this metal as representative of what was available in
the United States, and he actually shipped a kilogram — that is, 2.2
pounds — against the 25-pound order. The rest of the material he
kept in his stock and sold in gi'am quantities, which he reported to
War Production Board monthly, to universities and other laboratories
in the country.
Mr. Tavenner. The Soviet Purchasing Commission did not file a
repeat order ?
Mr. BuRMAN. That was the last we heard of uranium metal from
that point.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Burman, have you been apprised of the fact
that there was a sale of 45 pounds of uranium nitrate to the Soviet
Government in June 1944?
Mr. Burman. Xo, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know of any sales of heavy water to the
Soviet Government ?
Mr. Burman. No. Our office had no contact with heavy water
distribution ; that is, my own office did not.
Mr. Tavenner. What office would have been consulted, if any had
been, in the Manhattan Engineering District ?
Mr. Burman. General Groves' office.
Mr. Tavenner. Who, in particular, in that office would have received
knowledge of such a request ?
Mr. Burman. Colonel Johnson, I am sure.
Mr. Ta^^nner. Were there any restrictions imposed upon the export
of heavy water by the Manhattan Engineering District through its
connection with War Production Board ?
INIr. Burman. I just don't know, sir. I am not familiar with the
manner in which the heavy-water sales were handled.
Mr. Tavenner. Isn't that a matter which would have normally
come under your supervision had it occurred ?
T'v;.:
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 969
Mr. BuRMAN. No ; it wouldn't. Our office was essentially a uranium-
procuring and processing office in New York.
Mr. Tavexner. Can you tell us whether there is any difference
between uranium metal and fused uranium metal?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes ; there is some. Most of the early uranium metal
appeared in the form of powder, and when the powder was melted
later it came out in the form of globules, vrhich was known as the
fused metal. It was easier to remelt the fused globules than the
powder. The powder would flash into flames in the air.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any knowledge of the shipment to I''"
Soviet Russia of fused uranium metal ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I believe the kilogram — that is, 2.2 pounds — was in }, '
the form of fused metal, but no other shipments, however. %,-
JNIr. Tavenxer. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. |^^>V
Mr. Wood. Mr. Harrison ? '• ' ■
Mr. Harrison. No questions.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Mc Sweeney ?
Mr. IMcSwEENEY. No questions.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Moulder?
Mr. Moulder. No, sir.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon ?
Mr. Nixon. As I understand it, in your position you generally had
knowledge of requests for material of this type, the 420-pound and
1,000-pound shipments. Would you assume in your position you
generally would be informed of such shipments?
Mr. BuRMAx\ The 420-pound shipment was being handled through
our War Production Board contacts, and I would know of that.
Mr. NixON. Your office was not* a clearinghouse for all shipments,
necessarily ?
Mr. BuRMAN. No.
Mr. NixoN. You came into the 420-pound shipment because your
office was informed ?
Mr. BuRMAN^. No. We came in it because War Production Board
was questioned about the advisability of shipping it, and they got
in touch with the New York office. t
Mr. NixoN. Why was it the 1,000-pound shipment was not handled
in the same way?
Mr. BuRMAN. It had never, so far as we knew, gone through War ;.'
Production Board channels or ourselves in New York.
Mr. NixON. It had gone through private channels ?
Mr. BuRMAN. No. I beileve it may have gone directly from Lend-
Lease to General Groves' office, and that the War Production Board
was not consulted.
Mr. Nixon. You said you learned of this shipment for the first time
when? I am referring to the 1,000-pound shipment.
Mr. BuRMAN. June 1948.
]\Ir. Nixon. At that time what was your position ?
ISIr. BuRMAN. I was with the Atomic Energy Commission.
Mr. Nixon. The Atomic Energy Commission ?
Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct.
Mr. Nixon. You don't mean the Atomic Energy Commission did
not learn about it until then; do you? Was this their first knowledge
of this 1,000-pound shipment?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, sir.
!'■'..■
970 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Nixon. They had not known of it before then ?
Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct.
Mr. Nixon. Were you surprised to learn of it then ?
Mr. BuEMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Nixon. You were surprised?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Nixon. Why ?
Mr. BrRMAN. Because we never suspected the shipment had taken
place. We thought we would have known had it taken place, and we
thought we had the Canadian supply shut off back in 1943.
Mr. Nixon. In other words, if this shipment had gone through
your office you would have disapproved it ; would you not, apparently^
from what you said ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I myself would have disapproved it; but in a case
of tliat sort it still would have been referred to General Groves' office.
Mr. Nixon. But, as you understood the policy, the policy after the
420-pound shipment was to shut off all available sources of supply so
that additional shipments could not be made ?
Mr. BuEMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Nixon. What agencies in the United States, if any, did have
the responsibility for clearing the 1,000-pound shipment?
Mr. BuRMAN. I believe the Board of Economic Warfare issuing the
license, would have the final responsibility.
Mr. Nixon. The Board of Economic Warfare did issue a license?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. You can testify to that of your own knowledge ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. Who in the Board of Economic Warfare handled the
matter; do you know?
Mr. BuRMAN. I do not know.
Mr. Nixon. Was any memorandum or other order issued, for in-
stance to BEW, that Manhattan Engineering District should be in-
formed of such shij)ments?
Mr. BuRMAN. I believe Colonel Johnson's office did have that under-
standing with BEW.
Mr. Nixon. Yet BEW apparently cleared the shipment without con-
sulting Colonel Johnson's office?
Mr. BuRMAX. No. It was our understanding it was approved by
Colonel Johnson's office with approval by General Groves; that Gen-
eral Groves did approve the license for shipment of 1,000 pounds with
the belief that we did have all the sources of supply cut off.
Mr. Nixon. When did you first find out about the 1,000-pound ship-
ment, from what source?
Mr. BuRMAN. From right here.
Mr. Nixon. From the Committee on Un-American Activities?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Nixon. One other question. You are an expert, of course, and
most of us are laymen. As far as the use of uranium for commercial
purposes other than for the manufacture of atomic energy and atomic
products, do I understand that 420 pounds would be considered to be
a large order or a small order ? In what category would you place it?
Mr. BuRMAN. It would not be large enough to excite any attention.
The consumption of uranium in 1942 for nonatomic purposes in the
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 971
United States was between 150 and 200 tons for the year, so that 420
pounds woukl be rather small.
Mr. Nixon. Has the Atomic Energy Commission established whether
the Soviet Union, prior to 1943, obtained shipments of that size or less
than that size from the United States, prior to the time the orders
were issued not to approve such shipments?
Mr. BuEMAN. It would be very unlikely that they would get it from
the United States, since the United States was not a producer of the
material. The material was more readily available from Belgium
a;id Canada.
Mr. Nixon. I would seem to me, that in the investigation the
Atomic Energy Commission has been making, that would be a rele-
vant point : how large the orders were in the past. I believe you have
indicated you were interested in knowing whether the Soviet Union
at that time was as far along in the development of the atomic bomb
as we were ?
Mr. BuRiNiAN. We did ask for records of sales of domestic com-
panies for a number of years prior to 1943.
Mr. Nixon. What did you find out ?
Mr. BuRMAN. There was no evidence of any purchases in the United
States.
Mr. Nixon. There was no evidence of purchases prior to 1943 in the
United States?
Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct.
Mr. Nixon. So it would seem to me this sudden interest in the pur-
chase of uranium would have some definite significance ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes ; it would.
Mr. Nixon. This turning down of the Si/o-ton order, who did the
turning down ? General Groves ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I believe General Groves' office.
Mr. Nixon. Did your office have anytliing to do with that?
Mr. BmjMAN. I believe we referred it to General Groves' office, hav-
ing received information on it through the trade and through the War
Production Board.
Mr. Nixon. Through the trade ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. That they wanted 8I/2 tons?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. And you proceeded to forward that information to Gen-
eral Groves' office ?
Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct.
Mr. Nixon. Who was attempting to obtain this for the Soviet Union,
the Soviet Purchasing Commission ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. I believe it was through Lend-Lease. There
was no private company handling it.
Mr. Nixon. The American agency seeking to expedite the shipment
was Lend-Lease?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. Did BEW have anything to do with that?
Mr. BuRMAN. I don't believe so.
Mr. Nixon. With expediting?
Mr. BuRMAN. No.
Mr. Nixon. I understand it was 8i/^ long tons ?
972 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. BuRMAN. I don't know if it was Syo long or short tons. It was
of one of the uranium compounds, not of metal.
Mr. Nixon. What contacts were made with your office by Lend-
Lease to get clearance for the Si/^-ton shipment ; do you recall ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I believe they went to the Chemical Warfare procure-
ment office, and either the New York or Pittsburgh office of Chemical
Warfare procurement got in touch with Vitro and also managed to
find INIanhattan District, but we gave them no information.
Mr. Nixon. Eight and one-half tons would be a significant amount
to purchase?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes ; it would be.
Mr. Nixon. But you indicate that you don't know of any particular
individuals who were contacting you in regard to that shipment?
Mr. BuR3iAN. That is correct.
Mr. Nixon. That is all.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Case.
Mr. Case. Initially did General Groves approve tliat 420-pound
shipment quickly, or did he make aii}^ efforts to stop it?
Mr. BuRMAN. I can't answer that, sir, because I don't know the
period of time before the decision was made. There were so many
other things that we were doing that this was really not of great
importance.
Mr. Case. But it was your understanding that the decision to let
it go was made on the basis that things had gone so far that to stop
it would direct attention to its importance ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Case. And then it was that you took steps to prevent anything
like that happening again ?
Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct.
Mr. Case. And as far as you were concerned, you said you took steps
that you thought would result in future requests turning up in your
office or Colonel Johnson's office ?
Mr. Burma N. Yes, sir.
Mr. Case. Did anybody turn up in your office who was making
requests, subsequently ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I can't quite recall any particular cases that were
turned up by name. We did have requests for the export of uranium
metal to a number of countries.
Mr. Case. To a number of countries ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. I think Great Britain wanted a small amount
for laboratory work which was outside of their own atomic energy
efforts; that is, they were private companies wanting uranium metals
for what they said was chemical analysis. Those may have been
requests that they had received from elsewhere. They may have
been feelers from elsewhere.
Mr. Case. What happened to those requests ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Any information of that sort we did receive was
passed along to the Washington office, and if they thought it was worth
while I am sure they turned it over to Intelligence.
Mr. Case. Do you know whether or not an}- shipments were made
to Great Britain ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I believe there was a very small shipment in 1944 or
1945 out of this McKay quantity.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 973
Mr. Case. That was this four and a fraction pounds?
Mr. BuKMAN. Yes ; of which 2.2 pounds went to Russui.
Mr. Nixon. From press accounts I understand that this quantity
of uranium metal sent to Russia was defective, and that it was sent
for that reason?
Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct.
Mr. Nixon. Did you deliberately send it to Great Britain for the
same reason ? t i , i • i
Mr. BuRMAN. It was for commercial purposes. We didn t think
it was much good and didn't care where McKay sold it. It repre-
sented a poor stock of material, and if that was available without too
much trouble it avoided attention being directed to the material.
Mr. Case. Were there any other shipments to Great Britain ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I don't think so.
Mr. Case. You spoke of requests from other countries. What other
countries?
Mr. BuRMAN. I don't recall. They were all for trivial quantities.
Mv. Case. Did any other requests come to your attention from the
Soviet Purchasing Commission?
Mr. Burman. I don't recall any. There were certainly none for
uranium metal after the kilogram shipment.
Mr. Case. Was this request for uranium metal renewed at any later
date?
Mr. Burman. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Case. Not to your knowledge ?
Mr. Burman. No, sir.
Mr. Case. There may have been but not that you know of?
Mr. Burman. That is right.
Mr. Case. In your steps to prevent any further shipments outside
the United States following your knowledge of this 42U-pound order,
did you make any efforts to control shipments through Lend-Lease?
Mr. Burman. I feel pretty certain that Colonel Johnson's office
had a contact in Lend-Lease who would bring to his attention anything
on uranium that would come through that office.
Mr. Case. Did you contact the BEW to put them on guard in any
way?
Mr. Burman. I am sure Colonel Johnson's office did the same there.
Mr. Case. Do you know whether Lend-Lease supported the 8%-
ton request?
Mr. Burman. I don't know whether they supported it, but they
circulated the request for it. The degree of their action I can't say.
Mr. Case. Isn't is strange Lend-Lease would circulate this request
if they had been put on guard ?
Mr. Burman. They might just as well have circulated the request
and taken whatever action with Colonel Johnson's office they had
agreed to take. Refusing to circulate it would have aroused the sus-
picion of the Russian Purchasing Commission.
Mr. Case. Do you know whether or not Lend-Lease sought to secure
the approval of the Chemical Warfare Service?
Mr. Burman. I believe Chemical Warfare Service was handling
the requisition as a service for Lend-Lease. I don't believe they had
any interest other than that.
y74 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Case. Did I understand you to say that this shipment of 1,000
pounds subsequently, which you didn't know about until June 1948,
did have the approval of the Manhattan District ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. General Groves approved that.
Mr. Case. And you testified that he approved it because he thought
the sources of supply had been shut off and that the order could not
be filled?
Mr. BuRMAN. That is my understanding.
Mr. Case. But you were not personally connected with that
shipment ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I was not in on the decision.
Mr. Case. You were, however, in touch with the sources of supply ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Case. Did you yourself think you had all sources of supply
shut off?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, we did. With regard to Canadian Radium &
Uranium Corp., I was not the direct contact there. Dr. Merrittt was
in touch with Mr. Pregel of Canadian Radium & Uranium.
Mr. Wood. Any further questions ?
Mr. Case. Are you personally familiar with approval for that
second shipment ?
Mr. BuRMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Case. What makes you think General Groves approved it ?
Mr. BuRMAN. General Groves has testified to that effect and we
have reviewed the correspondence in our old Manhattan District files
and found some that indicated it.
Mr. Case. But all that you have said with regard to the approval
of this second shipment is second-hand information so far as you are
concerned ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Kearney ?
Mr. Kearney. No questions.
Mr. Moulder. I would like to ask a question.
Mr. Wood. IVIr. IMoulder.
Mr. MoTTLDER. Was there any secret formula by which uranium
metal was manufactured, or was it generally known throughout the
world how to make it at that time ?
Mr. BuRMAN. There were a number of processes that were known
but Manhattan District, I don't believe, has ever disclosed the method
used by the district and now by the Commission.
• Mr. Moulder. It was then a secret ?
Mr. BuRMAN. The process used by the district was not disclosed.
We considered that secret information.
IVIr. Moulder. Was it known in other countries how to make uranium
metal, not by that process but by other processes ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes.
Mr. Moulder. It had many other uses other than the development
of atomic energy ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Uranium metal had very few uses. It was consid-
ered as a means for alloying steel, but there were much more effective
metals for alloying steel than uranium, which has approximately the
same qualities as nickel when used for that purpose.
Mr. Moulder. You mentioned private companies in England using
it for commercial purposes ?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 975
Mr. Btjrman. Small quantities were used for experimental purposes.
Mr. Moulder. Didn't you mention that approximately 150 tons a
year were consumed in this country for coimnercial purposes?
Mr. BuRMAN. That was not in the form of uranium metal.
Mr. Tavenner. You referred to General Groves as having agreed
to the shipment of 1,000 pounds, and you referred to his having testi-
fied to that effect. As a matter of fact, what General Groves testified
was that he agreed eventually that the license be issued in order to
ascertain whether or not the Kussians could locate a supply in the
United States. Do you recall that?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes,
Mr. Tavenner. The records further show that after the issuance of
the license the Russian Purchasing Commission advised Lend-Lease
that due to the great delay in the issuance of the license their sup-
plier had withdrawn the offer. Do you recall that ?
Mr. BuRMAN. I believe that was Shattuck Chemical Co., with whom
they had placed the order at first.
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
Mr. BuRMAN. And you have refreshed my recollection on that a bit.
They did withdraw it on the ground their offer had not been picked up.
Mr. Tavenner. And the evidence further shows that when that
report was made to General Wesson, of Lend-Lease, he significantly
smiled when it was stated that the supplier could not furnish the
material. Do you recall that testimony?
]Mr, BuRMAN. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. General Groves further testified that he knew
nothing about the shipment from Eldorado mines until he appeared
before this committee in 1948, just as you have testified. Wliat basis
do you have for stating that General Groves agreed to the shipment by
Eldorado mines?
Mr. BuRiMAN. If I implied that, it was not intended. He author-
ized the export license, but I don't know that anyone ever authorized
the actual shipment of the material through Canadian Radium &
Uranium.
Mr. Nixon. If he had authorized the shipment, the Atomic Energy
Commission would not have had to wait until June 1948 to learn of it 2
Mr. BuRMAN. That is true.
Mr. Tavenner. The agreement which you referred to as having
been executed between Manhattan Engineering District and the Cana-
dian Radium & Uranium Corp. provided, as I understood you to say,
that no shipments would be made by that corporation within a year,
or just w^iat was that agreement?
Mr. BuRMAN. According to the terms of the agreement, Manhattan
District would have first option to purchase any material other than
that covered in the contract in the event Canadian Radium & Uranium
had any.
Mr. Wood. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
(Thereupon, at 12 : 20 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the
same day.)
afternoon session
(The hearing was resumed at 2 :45 p. m.)
Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.
976 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
For the time being the record will disclose that the hearing is pro-
ceeding before a subcommittee composed of Mr. Walter, Mr. Harrison^
Mr. Velde, and the chairman.
Mr. Tavenxer. Mr. Burman, will you resume the stand, please?
TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE C. BUEMAN— Resumed
Mr. Burman, when recess was taken I was asking you a question
relating to this alleged contract between Manhattan Engineering
District and Canadian Kadium & Uranium Corp.
Mr. Burman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. I am not going to ask you to attempt to rely on your
memory regarding the exact terms of that agreement because we are
expecting to have it produced.
Mr. BurmajST. I understand it will be ready about 3 : 30 this after-
noon.
Mr. Tavenner. 3 : 30 this afternoon ?
Mr. Burman. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Assuming that this agreement does provide, as you
indicated it may, that an option was given to Manhattan Engineering
District to purchase uranium which may be available for other pur-
chasers, were you notified at any time that other purchasers had re-
quested uranium from this company ?
Mr. Burman. Yes ; I believe the records do show that we were asked
to comment on an order for 8 or 8I/2 tons of uranium nitrate and an
equal quantity of uranium chloride. We were asked to make sugges-
tions to Canadian Radium in response to an inquiry they received for
export to the U. S. S. R.
Mr. Ta^tenner. Did that inquiry come to Manhattan Engineering
District by letter ?
Mr. Burman. I don't recall whether it came by letter or verbally.
Our records show that we replied by letter.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you have a copy of that letter ?
Mr. Burman. I don't have a copy of it, but I have a telephone tran-
scription of it which we received during the noon hour today. Mr»
Merritt has it, if I could get it from him.
Mr. Wood. You mean it was read over the telephone?
Mr. Burman. That is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you receive the telephone conmiunication your-
self, or Mr. Merritt ?
Mr. Burman. Mr. Merritt received it and read it off and I copied it
at the same time.
Mr. Tavenner. I think since we are on this subject it would be well
for you to get it at this time.
Mr. Burman. Very well. [After producing paper :] Do you want
to hear it ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
Mr. Burman. The letter was dated February 19, 1943, and was
addressed to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., at 630 Fifth Avenue,
New York:
We understand that you have had a call from Captain Fliegel of Chemical
Warfare Service, 292 Madison Avenue, New York, in regard to a request for
8 long tons of uranium nitrate and 8 long tons of uranium chloride. In.
answer to this inquiry please state that none is available except in experimental
quantities.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 977
Under no circumstances is any information to be given to any such inquiry
to the effect tliat this ofiiee is interested. It is suggested that your Canadian
office be advised to refuse information as to any inquiries.
Mr. Wood. By whom is it signed ?
Mr. BuRMAN. By Colonel Crenshaw.
Mr. TA^^NNER. Will you produce the office copy or a photostat of
the office copy and deliver it to the senior investigator of this com-
mittee?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes ; I think we can do that.
Mr. Ta\-enner. Did you receive any other report or inquiry from
Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. or Eldorado Mines regarding
uranium which you were entitled to receive under the option which
you stated existed in the contract?
Mr. BuRMAN. I don't know of any other.
Mr. Tavenner. I have shown you what purports to be an excerpt
from a report made of uranium sales by Eldorado Mines during the
year 1943.
Mr. Burman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Taa^nner. Have you made a search of the files maintained
by Manhattan Engineering District to determine whether or not such
a report is in your files?
Mr. Burman. Yes; I have just recently made a search for that par-
ticular document, and we haven't been able to find it in the Man-
hattan District files or the War Production part of the Manhattan
District files.
Mr. TA^^5XNER. Is there a possibility that a record of that report
may be in the files of the War Production Board ?
Mr. Burman. Yes ; there may be, but if it did get to War Produc-
tion Board in Washington a copy would have been sent to us in New
York by our contact in War Production Board.
Mr. Tavenner. I believe that is all I am going to ask, Mr. Chair-
man.
Mr. Wood. Any questions ?
Mr. Harrison. I understand that after you had written that letter
to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., without further report to you,
this corporation did sell uranium to Russia?
Mr. BuR^tAN. That is our understanding; yes.
Mr. Harrison. Without your knowledge. You didn't have any
knowledge of it until 1948?'
Mr. Burman. That is correct.
Mr. Harrison. That is all.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde?
Mr. Velde. No questions.
Mr. Wood. I think, Mr. Counsel, in the light of the persistence of
these bells [bells indicating either quorum calls or calls for roll-call
vote on floor of House] this afternoon, we had better give up the icl^ea
of continuing further with this hearing, and meet a little earlier in
the morning. Let's see if we can't get here at 10 o'clock tomorrow
morning, until which time the committee stands adjourned.
(Thereupon, at 2: 55 p. m. on Monday, January 23, 1950, an ad-
journment was taken until Tuesday, January 24, 1950, at 10 a. m.)
99384 — 50-
HEAEINCtS EEGAEDrnG SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATEEIAL
TO THE SOVIET UNION DUEING WOELD WAE II
TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1950
United States House of Representatives,
Committee on Un-American Activities,
Washington^ D. C.
PUBLIC HEARINGS
MORNING SESSION
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 :30 a. m., in room
226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) pre-
siding.
Committee members present : Representatives John S. Wood, Rich-
ard M. Nixon, Francis Case, Harold H. Velde, and Bernard W.
Kearney.
Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J.
Russell, senior investigator ; Donald T. Appell and Courtney Owens,
investigators; John W. Carrington, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, di-
rector of research ; and A. S. Poore, editor.
Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.
Let the record show that there are present Mr. Nixon, Mr. Case,
Mr. Velde, Mr. Kearney, and Mr. Wood, a quorum.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call as the first wit-
ness Dr. Phillip L. Merritt.
Mr. Wood. Dr. Merritt, will you raise your right hand and be sworn.
Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give the committee shall be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Dr. Merriti. I do.
TESTIMONY OF DE. PHILLIP L. MERRITT
Mr. Tavenner. Dr. Merritt, will you please state your full name?
Dr. Merritt. Phillip L. Merritt.
Mr. Tavenner. When and where were you born ?
Dr. Merritt. I was born in Duluth, Minn., February 8, 1906.
Mr. Tavenner. What is your present occupation ?
Dr. Merritt. I am assistant manager of the Raw Materials Opera-
tions Office of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you please furnish the committee with a
resume of your previous employment?
Dr. Merritt. I graduated from the University of Minnesota in
1928. I then spent about a year and a half in Africa as a geologist.
I returned to the United States in 1929, went to Columbia University,
970
980 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
where I studied geology, and obtained a doctor's degree in goology
in 1933.
I tlien went to Colombia, South America, for 2 years as a geologist
for the Colombian Government. I returned to the United States in
1936 and took up employment with the American Cyanamid Co.
Mr. Wood. Will you speak a little louder ? I didn't hear the last.
Dr. Merritt. I was with the American Cyanamid Co. from 1936
until 1942, when I was commissioned as a captain in the Army and
was assigned to the Manhattan project. I stayed with the Manhattan
project until January 1947, when the Atomic Energy Commission took
over the project, and I am now with the Commission.
Mr. Velde. When were you first assigned to the Manhattan project?
Dr. Merritt. October 26, 1942.
Mr. Tavenner. While you were employed by the Manhattan En-
gineering District, what were your specific duties?
Dr. ]\1erritt. I was involved in the procurement of raw materials
for the Manhattan District, principally uranium.
Mr. Tavenner. Were inquiries from various Government agencies
regarding uranium cleared through your office, or j^our hands?
Dr. Merritt. Not necessarily. Most of them were cleared through
the Washington office, through Colonel Johnson's off.ce, although we
did obtain knowledge of them from time to time.
Mr. Tavenner. When questions were presented by other Govern-
ment agencies relating to the licensing, for instance, of uranium for
export, were you requii-ed to give consideration and make recommenda-
tions with regard to such matters?
Dr. jSIerritt. I think that Mr. Burman had more close contact with
the actual licensing. I was in the same office and oftentimes was
involved in the matter, although that was not a principal duty of mine.
Mv. Tavenner. Were j^ou well acquainted with what transpired with
regard to the negotiations pertaining to the licensing of uranium for
export ?
Dr. Merritt. Fairly well acquainted; yes.
Mr. Taat.nner. Did you hear the testimony yesterday of Mr. Law-
rence C. Burman outlining the required procedure for the purchase
of uranium compounds during the war period for export?
Dr. Merritt. Yes; I did.
Mr. TAAa:NNER. Can you give us any additional light on the general
procedural requirements ?
Dr. Merritt. I don't believe so. I believe Mr. Burman covered the
subject very thoroughly.
Mr. Tavenner. Was the Chemical Warfare Service of the United
States Army authorized to make uranium compounds available to the
Russian Purchasing Commission?
Dr. Merritt. There was one instance where they were apparently
assigned the job of procurement, probably by Lencl-Lease. I believe
the procurement involved 8 tons of uranium oxide and 8 tons of nitrate.
I think that was it; I am not quite certain. They did contact our
office to see if it was available, and they were told that we were not
directly involved in the subject of uranium ; we had been dabbling in
it, in the alloy materials, but knew nothing of it.
Mr. Tavenner. That was done for security reasons ?
Dr. Merritt, For security reasons, yes.
Mr. Wood. Just who was it took that matter up with you ?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 981
Dr. Merritt. I recall two ofRcers in New York. I believe Captain
Fliegel was one, and I believe there was a Captain Clark. I believe
1 spoke to one of them on the phone once. I believe Colonel Crenshaw
carried on most of the negotiations with them. The statement I made
about dabbling in uranium was one I believe Colonel Crenshaw made
to one of the ofRcers.
Mr. Wood. What agency did they represent?
Dr. Merritt. Chemical Warfare Service.
Mr. Tavenner. Of the United States Army?
Dr. Merritt. Of the United States Army, yes.
Mr. Taa^nner. Just what was the procedure, from the standpoint of
the Chemical Warfare Service, as far as you know, in the handling of
Russian requests for uranium?
Dr. IMerkitt. Apparently they were assigned this job, I suppose, by
Dend-Lease, and various officers attempted to secure the material for
Lend-Lease. We had reports, I believe, from the Cleveland office.
They had contacted one of our officers there and attempted to buy the
material. He contacted us directly. And I believe there were reports
they contacted someone in Pittsburgh. They were just trying to buy
it on behalf of Lend-Lease. I don't believe they realized the signifi-
cance of the material.
Mr. Tavenner. Was the Treasury Department of the United States
Government authorized to make uranium or uranium compounds
available to the Russian Purchasing Commission ?
Dr. Merritt. Not that I know of. We had a report yesterday of
45 pounds being sold to Treasury by Eastman Kodak as a commercial
transaction. We have the record on that in the War Production Board
files in New York. It was reported only as a commercial transaction.
Mr. Tavenner. Was that reported as a transaction after the trans-
:action had been consummated?
Dr. Merritt. Yes. It was reported in a report of July 28 by East-
man Kodak. I believe the transaction took place in June 1944. They
were required to make a quarterly report.
Mr. Nixon. Did I understand you to say you had a report yesterday ?
Dr. Merritt. We conhrmed it yesterday, or, rather, this morning.
We understood yesterday from the testimony that there were 45
pounds shipped.
Mr, Nixon. You didn't know it before that ?
Dr. Merritt. We did not know it was shipped to the Russians, no.
Mr. Nixon. In other words, you learned it for the first time in these
hearings yesterday ?
Dr. INIerritt. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. That 45 pounds had been shipped in this manner ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Tav-enner. I believe after I asked the question yesterday you
liad the records of your office searched ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. And you found in the course of that search that
there had been a domestic sale to the Treasury Department?
Dr. Merritt. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. In the case of a domestic sale of that type, was it
the procedure that you be consulted ?
Dr. Merritt. It was not required under the regulations for a sale of
that type to be asked about in advance.
982 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Tavenner. You, of course, as I understand, have no knowledge
of what was later done with that shipment to the Treasury ?
Dr. Merritt. We have no knowledge whatever.
Mr. Wood. Do the records of your office reflect what happened to it ?
Dr. Merritt. They reflect that it was shipped by Eastman Kodak
to Treasury Procurement, and that is all.
Mr. Wood. That is as far as your records go ?
Dr. Merritt. That is as far as our records go.
Mr. Tavenner. Dr. Merritt, you, of course, know that in March
1943 the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in the United
States succeeded in purchasing 200 pounds of uranium oxide and 220
pounds of uranium nitrate, which material was shipped from Great
Falls, Mont., to Moscow ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. How did Manhattan Engineering District first ac-
quire knowledge of this proposed sale and shipment ?
Dr. Merritt. Through the records of the War Production Board.
As I recall, the War Production Board was notified of this, and they
immediately notified us of the proposed shipment.
Mr. Wood. Before it was made ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. There has been considerable testimony relating to
the procedure followed in that original shipment, and I will not ques-
tion you further relating to those details, because they have been
covered pretty fully. But I would like to ask you this : Wliat officials
of the War Production Board, the Bureau of Economic Warfare, or
Lend-Lease conferred with you or members of the staff of the Manhat-
tan Engineering District with regard to the clearance of that ship-
ment ?
Dr. Merritt. Mr. Lund and Mr. Parks of the War Production
Board, I believe, were aware of this; I believe we conferred with
tliem. I believe, in lend-lease, Mr. Moore and Mr. Hoopes. And no-
one, as far as I know, in the Bureau of Economic Warfare.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the attitude of those who conferred with
you or your staff regarding the propriety of making this shipment,
which is the first shipment — the material obtained from the Shattuck
Co.?
Dr. IVIerritt. I believe, so far as the Manhattan District staff was
concerned, they were opposed to it, but the arrangements seemed to
have progressed so far that it would have been inadvisable to stop it
at that point. We would have been giving away more than we would
have been saving to stop it at that time, so it was decided by General
Groves, I believe, to let the shipment go.
Mr. Tavenner. My question was more about the attitude of those
dealing with the Manhattan Engineering District, rather than of the
staff itself.
Dr. INIerritt. There was a great deal of persistence in trying to get
a decision on it, I know that — many, many phone calls. Whether they
actually favored the shipment or not I couldn't say, but there were a
lot of phone calls in connection with it — a persistence of phone calls to
get a decision.
Mr. Tavenner. You say a persistence in getting a decision ?
Dr. ]\Ierritt. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Was there an effort made to influence that decision?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 983
Dr. Merritt. That, I couldn't say. I had very little contact with
the officials involved. Most of that contact was carried on by Colonel
Crenshaw or Colonel Johnson.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether or not at that time, which
was in March 1943, tlie War Production Board and Lend-Lease Ad-
ministration knew that a uranium project was being conducted by the
Manhattan Engineering District?
Dr. Mekritt. War Production Board, of course, was aware of it ; at
least, Mr. Lund and Mr. Parks were aware of it. Whether or not the
Lend-Lease people were aware of it, I can't say. I believe they were
aware of it at a later date, but whether they were aware of it then, I
don't know.
Mr. Tavenner. What measures were taken by Manhattan Engineer-
ing District to control the distribution of uranium products, or their
sale, after the approval of this first shipment, which was the Shattuck
shipment ?
Dr. Merritt. After the initial War Production Board regulations
went into effect in January, we then began a program of purchasing
all available uranium from chemical supply houses, ceramics pro-
ducers, and other people who had stocks for legitimate reasons. We
carried the program out largelj^ through contractors, in order to keep
the Manhattan District name out of the transactions.
We made a contract with Vitro Manufacturing Co., of Pittsburgh,
Pa., which at that time was a small producer of uranium and a con-
sumer of uranium, to purchase odd lots of the material from various
people for resale to us. We made a contract with Harshaw Chemical
Co. to buy what stocks they had. They were involved in the project
and we made a direct contract with them. We made a contract with
the African Metals Corp. to buy what stocks they had. We never made
a contract with Shattuck, but w^e had an agreement with them that
they would not sell to foreign people or other people without our
knowledge.
Mr. Tavenner. When was that agreement reached ?
Dr. Merritt. After the shipment.
Mr. Tavenner. After they had made their first shipment ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes. They were a very small supplier, really. Then
we made a contract with Boris Pregel as agent for the Canadian
Radium & Uranium Corp.
Mr. Tavenner. I will ask you some questions about that later. Who
else did you confer with?
Dr. Merritt. I don't recall any other companies. Those are the
principal companies, I believe.
Mr. Tavenner. Chematar, Inc., is shown by the record to have been
the supplier of some of this material, acting, probably, as agent —
unquestionably acting as agent — for others. Did you endeavor to
make any arrangement with them by which they would not engage
in sales to foreign countries?
Dr. Merritt. No ; we did not.
Mr. Tavenner. You spoke of a contract with Boris Pregel. Aside
from the contract, did you confer with him or any other representative
of the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. to ask their cooperation in
not selling to any other country ?
Dr. Merritt. We sent them a letter which was reported here yester-
day. I do not recall any specific conference with them. Many other
984 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
people talked to them besides me. I presume we assumed, with the
contract, that should be sufficient to protect ourselves.
Mr. Tavenner. The letter to which you referred I believe bore a
■date in February ?
Dr. Merritt. February 19.
Mr. Ta\^nner. So that was done prior to the occasion of the sale
by the Shattuck Co. ?
Dr. Merritt. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. With regard to the contract that you mentioned, we
endeavored yesterday to obtain a copy of that contract. We under-
stand that it has the rating of "secret," and we were unable to get the
contract, but our agent was permitted to copy certain things from
the contract. He has copied the first page of the contract, the caption
of the contract, and an article dealing with the phase of the matter that
we are concerned with. I hand you this extract from the contract and
ask you to look it over and state whether or not you can identify it as
an excerpt from the contract. I will have to prove the accuracy of
it later.
Dr. Merritt. Yes. I can identify it as an excerpt from the con-
tract.
Mr. TA^^ENNER. Did you take part in the preparation of the con-
tract, and were you familiar at the time with the character of it?
Dr. Merritt. Yes; I did.
Mr. Ta\'enner. Will you read it, please?
Dr. Merritt (reading) :
This Contract entered into this 27tli day of March 1943, by the United States
OF America (hereinafter called the "Government"), represented by the Contract-
ing Officer executing this contract, and Boris Pregel, Agent, of the City of New
York, in the State of New York (hereinafter called the Contractor), witnesseth
that the parties hereto do mutually agree as follows :
Article I — Scope of this Contract. — The Contractor shall furnish and deliver
immediately f. o. b. New York, New York, at such point or points as designated
by the Contracting Officer, in suitable containers furnished by the Contractor,
approximate quantities of materials at their respective prices, as follows :
Per unit
1. (a) 2,875 Units of P56 $3,895
(b) 2,300 Units of M21 3. 10
(c) 2,000 Units of L33 4.10
2. In addition to the materials contracted for in section (1) above mentioned,
the Contractor gives to the Government for a period of one (1) year, from the
date hereof, the initial right to purchase from time to time any or all of the
P56, M21, and L33 received by the Contractor.
Mr. Tavenner. It is noted on the face of the contract that there is
an undisclosed principal, and it is noted that certain terms were used
which I assume were code terms ?
Dr. Merritt. That is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you explain the reason for that?
Dr. Merritt. It was our practice to code all contracts so that people
who handled the contract for payment purposes, and anyone else who
might come in contact with the contract, would not be aware that the
materials were actually uranium that we were dealing in. It was a
general practice to code all contracts. The code was then explained
in a separate letter which was made a part of the contract.
Mr. Tavenner. I will ask you to state whether or not one of the
code numbers indicated covered uranium oxide, black uranium oxide,
and uranium nitrate?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 985
Dr. Merritt. Yes; P56 was explained in the secret letter as being
black uranium oxide, L33 was explained as being uranium nitrate,
and M21 was sodium uranate.
Mr. TA^^NNER. Will you explain why there is an undisclosed prin-
cipal involved in this contract ?
Dr. Merritt. The principal involved in the contract was Canadian
Radium & Uranium Co., a company which had been involved in and
was identified witli the sale of uranium. For security reasons the
company was not disclosed in the contract because it possibly would
have disclosed what the contents of the contract were. The secret
letter which accompanied the contract was addressed to Boris
Pregel, agent, and to Canadian Radium & Uranium Co. The secret
letter disclosed what a unit meant; it disclosed what the symbols
meant ; also it disclosed that the principal in the contract was Canadian
Radium & Uranium Co., and that Boris Pregel personally was not
held liable.
Mr. Tavenner. Did the secret letter also contain a provision that
the corporation was liable for all acts of its agents under the terms
of this contract ?
Dr. INIerritt. As I recall, it did ; yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Has a search been made for a copy of that secret
letter since this matter first arose yesterday ?
Dr. Merritt. We have the letter in New York.
Mr. Tavenner. The letter is in New York ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you produce a photostatic copy of it and
make it available to the senior investigator ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. The date of that contract is March what ?
Dr. Merritt. March 27, 1943.
Mr, Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to inter-
rupt the testimony of this witness and call to the stand Mr. C. E.
McKillips, an investigator of the committee.
Mr. Wood. Very well.
(Witness Merritt temporarily excused.)
Mr. Wood. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give the com-
mittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God ?
Mr. McKillips. I do.
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES EDWARD McKILLIPS
Mr. Tavenner. State your full name?
Mr. McKillips. Charles Edward McKillips.
Mr. Tavenner. You are an investigator of the Committee on Un-
American Activities ?
Mr. McKillips. I am.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you yesterday copy from the contract of March
27, 1943, the excerpt which I now hand you ?
Mr. McKillips. That is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. Is that a true and correct copy of what purports to
be an excerpt ?
Mr. McKillips. That is a true and correct copy.
986 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Tavenner. Wlio signed the agi^eement ? Who were the parties
to the sijznatiire ?
Mr. McKiLLiPS. A J. C. Marsliall, colonel, Corps of Engineers,
contracting officer. One of the witnesses was Alexander Pregel, and
another witness was H. B. Kearney.
Mr. Tavexxer. I desire to offer this excerpt in evidence, and request
that it be marked "McKillips Exhibit 1."
]\Ir. Wood. Without objection, it will be admitted.
Mr. Kearney. ISIr. Chairman.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Kearney.
Mr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, the legal procedure here. I don't
know how a piece of paper like this could be accepted in evidence in a
court of law.
Mr. Wood. The contents of the paper, as I understand, are being
tendered as being a correct transcript of an original document in the
possession of the agency representee! by the witness Merritt, and with
the identification that has been made of it, I think it is proper for
admission, although if a question is raised about it, we can go in execu-
tive session. Do you make an objection, or did you make that as an
observation ?
Mr. Kearney. T make it as an observation, and for the present I
will withhold an objection.
Mr. Wood. Very well. It will be admitted.
(The excerpt nhoxe referred to, marked "McKillips Exhibit 1," is
hereinafter incorporated in the record.)^
Mr. Ta\-enner. That is all, Mr. McKillips.
TESTIMONY OF DR. PHILLIP L. MERRITT— Eesumed
Mr. Tavenner. AVlien was the first shipment made to Manhattan
Engineering District under this contract?
Dr. Merritt. Our records indicate that the first receipt was May
20, 1943.
Mr. Tavenner. Was that the quantity provided for in the original
terms of the contract?
Dr. Merritt. There may have been a slight variation of 50 pounds
here or there on some of the substances. The quantities are approxi-
mate, as you notice, and I think there was a slight variation in the
weights.
Mr. Ta\t.nner. Evidence has been introduced before the commit-
tee that the JNIanhattan Engineering District acquired quantities of
uranium from the Canadian corporation prior to the entering into
of this contract.
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. The last paragra]>h of the excerpt from the con-
tract, McKillips exhibit 1, reads as follows :
The Contractor gives to the Government for a jieriod of one year, from the date
hereof, the initial right to purchase from tim4 to time, any or all of the P-56,
M-21, and L-So, received by the Contractor.
Was Manhattan Engineering District afforded an opportunity to
exercise its initial right under this contract to purchase all the ura-
nium received by the contractor?
° See appendix.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 987
Dr. Merritt. Apparently it was not, although there were delivered
on June 4, 1,900 pounds of sodium uranate under the option. That
additional quantity was delivered 2 weeks after the initial delivery.
Mr. Tavp:nner. It is noted Eldorado mines is not a party to this
I contract ?
Dr. Merkitt. That is right.
Mr. TA^^':NNER. It is also noted that the contract refers to the
'material which the contractor receives?
Dr. Merritt. That is right.
Mr. Ta-vt^tstner. Do you know what the relationship was between
the contractor, that is, the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., and
Eldorado mines ?
Dr. Merritt. At that time, as I understand it, Canadian Radium
■ & Uranium Corp. was the sole sale agent for Eldorado mines. That
is my understanding.
Mr. TA^^:NNER. Do you recall whether or not the Manhattan Engi-
neering District was advised at any time that this material was avail-
•able if it desired to purchase it?
Dr. Merritt. I do not recall being so advised, and I found nothing
in the records that would so indicate.
Mr. Tavenner. When I say "this" material, I am referring to the
material which was actually sold to the Russian purchasing com-
mission.
Dr. Merritt. Yes. I found nothing in the records which would
indicate so, and I have no personal recollection of its having been
offered.
Mr. Ta\t:nner. Did the Manhattan Engineering District, to your
"knowledge, waive its right to purchase any or all materials which
may come into the hands of the contractor, which, of course, is the
Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.?
Dr. Merritt. Insofar as I know that right was never waived. There
is nothing to indicate so in the records that I can find, and I don't
recall anything.
Mr. Taat^nner. You have learned during the course of these hear-
ings that the uranium which was sold by Eldorado mines to the Soviet
Purchasing Commission was sold through the Canadian Radium &
Uranium Corp.?
Dr. Merritt. So I understand, yes. At least, it was carried on
their books.
Mr. Tavenner. Was it the practice of Eldorado mines to make
annual reports to the jSIanhattan Engineering District or the War
Production Board showing the sales of uranium made during the
q^receding year?
Dr. Merritt. Not the Eldorado mines. Eldorado mines is a foreign
company and there was no requirement that they report to us as
Eldorado mines.
Mr. Tamsnner. Did the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. make
such report ?
Dr. Merritt. I believe that we have a record of some earlier trans-
actions prior to 1943. We received them for information purposes,
"to find out who were utilizing uranium. I believe at a later date some
records of sales were given. I am not thoroughly familiar with that.
Mr. Ta^^nner. You are not positive whether such a record was
filed for the year 1943 ?
988 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Dr. Merritt. I understand it was not filed for 1943.
Mr. Tavenner. Or, at least, the report has not been located ?
Dr. Merritt. At least it has not been located, yes.
Mr. Tavenner. It is anticipated that evidence will be introduced
showing that the purchase price of the products purchased by the
Russian Purchasing Commission from Eldorado mines was as fol-
lows: Uranium nitrate, $2.36 a pound; black uranium oxide, $2.55
a pound.
How do those prices compare with the contract price provided for
similar products in McKillips exhibit 1?
Dr. IMerritt. They are slightly in excess, although not a great deal
higher. These prices are about the commercial prices at that time.
Our prices were less than the commercial prices. These are about
the commercial prices, I would say, at that time.
Mr. Tavenner. Then there was no excessive profit by reason of the
sale as it was handled ?
Dr. Merritt. No, not a great deal.
]Mr. Tavenner. Over what you would have paid?
Dr. Merritt. A little bit. I would say these were 50 or 40 cents a
pound higher than we would have paid, in that order, but nothing
exorbitant.
Mr. Tavenner. Dr. Merritt, are you familiar with the details sur-
rounding the issuance of the second export license, that is, the license
for 500 pounds of uranium nitrate and 500 pounds of uranium oxide,
which was issued in April 1943 to the Soviet Purchasing Commission?
Dr. Merritt. I am not familiar with all the details on the actual
issuance of the license.
Mr. Tavenner. Let me ask you this : The files of Lend-Lease Ad-
ministration reflect that on April 14, 1943, a letter was written by Mr.
William C. Moore, of the Lend-Lease Administration, to Mr. N. S.
Fomichev, in charge of chemicals. Government Purchasing Commis-
sion of the Soviet Union, advising him that his application for the
issuance of an export license to export 500 pounds each of uranium
nitrate and uranium oxide had been denied. However, the files also
indicate that export license 1643180 was subsequently issued to tha
Soviet commission on April 26, 1943. Can you explain why the li-
cense which was denied by Lend-Lease on April 14 was subsequently
issued ?
Dr. Merritt, I don't know if I have a good explanation of it. I can
surmise, if you care for me to do that. I really don't know.
Mr. Tavenner. I don't want surmises about it, but can you give us
any facts relating to the matter which the committee could use for its
information?
Dr. Merritt. I believe that after the date of the original letter by
Mr. Moore we had a very finn commitment from Shattuck, who had
this order before it at the time, that they would not deliA''er under it.
This order was placed with Shattuck, I believe, early in April — I am
not quite certain of the date — and sometime in the latter part of April
Mr. Potter told me that they would not deliver under this order.
Whether that had anything to do with the change, I don't know.
We then were quite certain we had every source blocked up. It may
have been that we felt it all right to give them the license because-
we thought we had every source blocked up. I don't know.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 989
Mr. Tavenner. When were negotiations conducted between the
Manhattan Engineering District and other Government agencies re-
garding this change of attitude about the license, do you know ?
Dr. Merritt. I didn't have anything to do with those negotiations.
I believe General Groves or Colonel Johnson or perhaps Colonel Cren-
shaw could tell you more about that. I was not too much involved with
other agencies, at my level.
Mr. Tavenxer. Are you acquainted with James P. Hoopes, for-
merly associate liaison officer, and finally liaison officer, in the Office
of Lend-Lease Administration, Division for Soviet Supply?
Dr. Merritt. No. I have seen his name on letters, but have never
spoken to him to my knowledge.
Mr. Tavenner. Can you state whether or not you had a telephone
conversation with Mr. Hoopes on or about April 22, 1943 ?
Dr. Merritt. I don't recall. I recall speaking to Mr. Moore, but
not Mr. Hoopes.
Mr. Tavenner. Whether you thought you were speaking to Mr.
Hoopes or Mr. ]\Ioore, do you recall whether or not you advised the
official in Lend-Lease that pressure had just been brought to bear on
General Groves to release the 1,000 pounds?
Dr. Merritt. I don't recall stating that, Mr. Tavenner.
]\Ir. Ta\-enner. Independently of your recollection of the telephone
conversation, did any fact come to your attention, or were you told by
any member of your staff, that pressure of any description was brought
t o bear on General Groves to change the decision about the issuance of
the license for this particular shipment ?
Dr. Merritt. I don't recall that at all. There was a great deal of
pressure for a decision, I know that, but whether there was any indi-
vidual pressure or not, I wouldn't know the person, I am sure, who
might have brought it.
Mr. Nixon. Wliat do you mean by a great deal of pressure for a
decision ?
Dr. Merritt. This thing had been going along for quite a while, and
these people wanted to get it decided one way or another so that Lend-
Lease could be given an answer.
Mr. Nixon. I assume Lend-Lease was trying to get it expedited.
This doesn't mean they were trying to get an adverse decision ?
Dr. Merritt. I don't know.
Mr. Nixon. Do I understand you to say Lend-Lease was interested
in getting negative decisions on shipments they were trying to ex-
pedite ?
Dr. Merritt. I was involved with Lend-Lease very little.
Mr. Nixon. But it seems obvious that Lend-Lease was interested
in expediting shipments rather than getting them turned down?
Dr. Merritt. Maybe so. I don't know.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know tlie names of officials of Lend-Lease
who conferred with anyone in your office regarding this shipment ?
Dr. Merritt. The only names I recall are Moore and Hoopes.
Mr. Tavenner. Did any official in the Bureau of Economic War-
fare confer with anyone in your office regarding this shipment, to
your knowledge ?
Dr. Merritt. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Tavenner. Was the War Production Board membership in-
volved in any way with this particular license?
990 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Dr. Merritt. That, I don't know. I presume they were aware of
it, but I don't know. They may have been aware of it.
Mr. Tavenner. Did any person other than an official of one of the
Government agencies that I mentioned confer with j'ou or any mem-
ber of your staff with regard to expediting the approval of this parti-
cular license?
Dr. Merritt. Not that I know of.
Mr. Nixon. Why do you say there was a great deal of pressure if
none of these people talked to you ?
Dr. Merritt. There were a lot of phone calls from our office in
Washington and from us to them.
Mr. Nixon. What do you mean by "to them" ?
Dr. Merritt. To our Washington office.
Mr. Nixon. You are speaking of your own interoffice communi-
cations ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes. Colonel Crenshaw carried on most of them,
I presume, with Colonel Johnson.
Mr. NixoN. And the reason for that was that the heat was on from
Lend-Lease?
Dr. Merritt. It was not on me.
Mr. Nixon. You said there was a great deal of pressure for a
decision?
Dr. Merritt. That is right.
Mr. Nixon. So you knew it was something more than an ordinary
case ?
Dr. IVIerritt. Surely,
Mr. Nixon. This was a case where you thought it was top priority
to get something done ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. Because of the pressure that was coming. Is that
correct ?
Dr. Merritt. I think so, Mr. Nixon.
Mr. Case. You say Colonel Crenshaw handled the negotiations ?
Dr. Merritt. I believe he conferred with officials of Lend-Lease Ad-
ministration on the subject. I know he did.
Mr. Case. You don't think Colonel Crenshaw initiated the conversa-
tions with Lend-Lease?
Dr. Merritt. No. It probably came the other way. I am sure
Lend-Lease initiated the conversations.
Mr. Case. So you think there was a great deal of pressure on Colonel
Oenshaw, and that it came from Lend-Lease?
Dr. Merritt. I believe Colonel Crenshaw could answer that better
than I could.
Mr. Case. But you know the telephone calls to Colonel Crenshaw
came from Lend-Lease?
Dr. Merritt. I know he conversed with them quite often, and I am
sure Colonel Johnson did, too, in Washington.
Mr. Tavenner. Was there anyone employed in the Washington
office in addition to Colonel Johnson?
Dr. Merritt. There were a good many people there. I don't know
their names. He and his staff handled this particular type of thing.
Mr. Tavenner. Wlio composed his staff ?
Dr. Merritt. I can't remember their names, it has been so long.
He was our principal contact. He had many other people there.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 991
Mr. Ta\tenner. When did you state that you had your conference
with the Shattuck Co. and secured the agreement that they would not
ship any more uranium 'i
l3r. Merritt. It was in the Latter part of April that I had a tele-
plione conversation with tliem. I do not know the exact date. I
believe a memorandum I have was dated April 29 to the effect I had
conversed with them, presumably in the last few days.
Mr. Tavenner, The files of Lend-Lease disclose, as shown by evi-
dence already introduced, that the Soviet Purchasing Commission
advised Lend-Lease that the delay in issuing the license was so great
that the supplier had canceled the order. Do you recall having heard
that i
Dr. Merrttt. Yes ; that is correct. Mr. Potter, in the early conver-
sations, said he had a feeler for the order — I believe that is the way
he put it — but tliat nothing else had come through and that he would
be willing to tell them at that point that he had no more supply.
Mr. Tavenner. In other words, at the time of your conference with
Potter the order had not been turned down by him or withdrawn ?
(Representative Walter enters hearing room).
Dr. MERRi'n\ Early in April I probably talked to him. I believe
I talked to liim personally the latter part of March or early in April.
1 don't know if he had the order at that time or not. He probably did.
Mr. Tavenner. When you learned that the Soviet Purchasing Com-
mission advised they could not obtain the material from their sup-
plier, was it considered that the strategy of handling the thing had
been successful?
Dr. Merritt. Yes. We felt we had been successful in blocking the
sale.
Mr. Tavenner. What was done about withdrawing the license which
had been authorized to be issued and which you now know was issued?
Dr. Merritt. I don't think anything was done.
Mr. Tavenner. What was normally the life of such a license?
Dr. Merritt. I don't know what the life was of a Lend-Lease or
BEW license.
Mr. Tavenner. Wliatever the period of its life may be, it existed
as a constant threat, did it not, during that period ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes. Still, we felt we had all sources completely
blocked and it didn't make any particular difference if there was a
license outstanding.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you learn that very soon after the Shattuck Co.
witlidrew its offer the Soviet Purchasing Commission filed a request
with Lend-Lease to amend this license?
Dr. Merritt. I didn't know of that.
Mr. Tavenner. You didn't know of that?
Dr. Merritt. No.
Mr. Tavenner. You mean as far ^.s you know the Manhattan Engi-
neering District was not advised that an application had been received
to amend the license?
Dr. Merritt. As far as I know. I was not aware of it. Whether
someone else was or not, I don't know.
Mr. Tavenner. Then you don't know of your own knowledge
whether or not it actually was amended ?
Dr. Merritt. That is right.
992 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Tavenner. Had you known that on the 29th of April, 1943,
this license was actually amended to show a different constituency of
chemical analysis of the material sought to be exported, wouldn't it
have acted as a red flag to you, and you would have known immediately
that the material was available ?
Dr. Merritt. Probably so.
Mr. Tavenner. Is there any other conclusion?
Dr. Mekritt. That is probably correct.
Mr. Nixon. Did I understand you to say earlier that the original
license had come to your attention?
Dr. Merritt. The original license itself never came to my attention.
i think probably we were aware something was going on, but I never
saw the license and I don't believe I was aware it was actually issued.
Mr. Nixon. Wlio was aware of it ?
Dr. Merritt. I think the Washington office must have been aware
of it.
Mr. Nixon. Your Washington office?
Dr. Merritt. Yes. I think General Groves testified he was aware
of it.
Mr. Nixon. As to the amendment of the original license, was your
Washington office informed of that ?
Dr. Merritt. I don't know. They should have been aware of it.
Mr. Nixon. That is the point. In other words, the amendment
should have been made
Dr. Merritt. Clear to them.
Mr. Nixon. Clear to them ?
Dr. Merritt. Surely.
Mr. Nixon. If they had been made aware of the amendment, they
would not have found out about the shipment for the first time last
year? You didn't find out about the shipment until last year?
Dr. Merritt. That is right, here, in June 1948.
Mr. Nixon. In other words, the fact that the office which had
jurisdiction over the original license, your Washington office, was
not informed of the amendment, indicates it might have been a highly
irregular procedure ?
Dr. Merritt. If they were not informed, yes. I can't say whether
or not they were informed.
Mr. Tavenner. During the course of the time that the matter of
the issuance of the license was pending, was the question of furnish-
ing a substitute material to the Russians considered ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes. There was some thought at one time, and cor-
respondence, I believe, between Colonel Crenshaw and perhaps Mr.
Hoopes. I have read the correspondence recently. I didn't know
about it at the time. But we had located some uranium steel alloy.
There wasn't much of it. It had been made years before, I believe, by
the Latrobe Steel Co. There was .some thought at one time of letting
them have that useless material rather than what they wanted. Our
correspondence showed there was some negotiation along that line, but
it stopped and nothing happened about it.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you recall talking to Mr. Hoopes about a sub-
stitute ?
Dr. Merritt. The correspondence was all between Colonel Crenshaw
and Mr. Hoopes, I believe, on that.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 993
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether or not the substitute material
which you proposed giving to the Russians would have been adequate
for the purposes for which the Russians said they wanted to use the
material ? .
Dr. Merritt. I am not a metallurgist. I believe it was quite useless
material.
Mr. Tavenner. You think it may have been useless even for the
purpose for which they said they wanted it?
Dr. Merritt. It is possible. I don't know.
Mr. Tavenner. You don't know ^
Dr. Merritt. No.
Mr. Tavenner. In other words, you are not answering the question
in the aflirmative or negative?
Dr. Merritt. No.
Mr. Walter. Why was consideration given to the sending of worth-
less material ?
Dr. Merritt. I think Colonel Crenshaw could answer that better
than I could.
Mr. Walter. You were in on the discussions as to the sending of this
worthless material, were you not?
Dr. Merritt. No; I was not. I read the correspondence.
Mr. Walter. You have just testified from the correspondence?
Dr. Merritt. That is correct.
Mr. Walter. Did the correspondence indicate the reason why con-
sideration was given to the sending of worthless material?
Dr. Merritt. Not that I recall.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you confer at any time with General Groves
regarding the issuance of this license ?
Dr. Merritt. Not with General Groves personally ; no.
Mr. Velue. Did you confer with any member of the security office
other than General Groves ?
Dr. Merritt. I believe Colonel Johnson and Colonel Crenshaw car-
ried on all our conversations.
Mr. Case. When you said there were negotiations to let "them" have
the worthless material, whom did you mean ?
Dr. Merritt. The Russians.
Mr. Case. Then you understood there was a determined effort on
the part of the Russian Purchasing Commission to obtain uranium?
Dr. Merritt. Apparently ; yes.
Mr. Walter. Whose decision was it to send worthless material?
Dr. Merritt. I think General Groves.
Mr. Walter. The hnal decision would have been his?
Dr. Merritt. I think so; yes.
Mr. Case. That is, if tlie matter came to him ?
Dr. Merritt. If the matter came to him.
Mr. Case. Did the BEW submit to General Groves any request for
export licenses for the shipment of uranium?
Dr. Merritt. I don't know whether it did or not.
IVIr. Case. In your attempt to corral the sources of supply and dis-
tribution of this material, did you make any contact with BEW?
Dr. Merritt. I recall having one meeting with Dr. Bateman and
some members of his staff on uranium. It had nothing to do with
export ; it had to do with possible foreign sources and some way they
could assist us in our procurement program.
99334—50 7
994 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Case. But there was no conversation on the exporting of it ?
Dr. IVIerritt. I don't believe these people were involved in export
control.
Mr. Case. Who was Dr. Bateman?
Dr. Merritt. He was professor of geology at Yale.
Mr. Case. What position was he holding at that time ?
Dr. Merritt. I don't recall exactly. He was in charge of some sort
of foreign procurement, I believe.
Mr. Case. With whom?
Dr. Merritt. With the Board of Economic Warfare. It was on
procurement.
Mr, Wood. You were aware, were you not, Doctor, at all times dur-
ing these transactions, that material of this character could not be
exported from this country without an export license issued by BEAV?
Dr. Merritt. I believe so, yes.
Mr. Wood. Wliy was it you felt impelled to block up all sources
of supply if in fact none of it could be shipped out without an export
license '(
Dr. Merritt. We felt we could control it.
Mr. Wood. Were you apprehensive a license might be issued without
your knowledge?
Dr. Merritt. We wanted this material ourselves.
Mr. Wood. But you were aware the material could not be shipped
out of the country without a license, and that the license would have
to be issued by an agency of the United States Government which pre-
sumably was as much interested in preserving the security as you were,
so why didn't you rely on them ?
Dr. IVIerritt. I think we were trying to do those things ourselves.
Mr. Wood. There was, in fact, a license issued and amended without
your knowledge?
Dr. Merritt. Apparently so, yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether or not heavy water was
shi]3ped to Bussia
Mr. Nixon. Excuse me. Am I correct in the assumption from your
testimony that this transaction in regard to the shipment of 1,000
pounds was a well-known transaction in your office and in the office in
Washington, it was discussed by telephone and otherwise, because of
the efforts being made to get decision?
Dr. IVIerritt. I think so, yes'.
Mr. Nixon. It was a transaction which was out of the ordinary?
Dr. Merritt. That is right.
Mr. Nixox. And for that reason, I suppose the fact that this ship-
ment had. actually been made as a result of an amended order which
apparently did not come to your office was quite surprising ?
Dr. Merritt. It was, Mr. Nixon.
Mr. Nixon. Mr. Burman's testimony yesterday was that you learned
for the first time in 1948, from this committee, that this shipment had
actually been made as a result of an amended license ?
Dr. Merritt. That is correct.
Mr. Nixon. It means, in other words, that this amended license
went around the ordinary channels, assuming it did not go through
your Washington office?
Dr. Merritt, Assuming it did not go through our Washington
office and ordinary channels; yes.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 995
Mr. Nixon. And these people who were attempting to get the order
filled, Lend-Lease, could not have helped being aware of the fact there
was considerable discussion and resistance in your office to having the
license issued?
Dr. Merritt. I believe that is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know what the procedure was for issuing
export licenses?
Dr. Merritt. I do not know the procedure. We were not involved
in the actual licenses.
Mr. Ta\t:nner. And I assume it was not the practice for these
licenses to clear through your office?
Dr. Merritt. Not through our New York office ; no.
Mr. Case. Did you take any steps, other than this talk with Dr.
Bateman, to be informed of the issuance of licenses for the shipment
of materials of this tj^pe out of the country?
Dr. Merritt. No. Anything like that would have been handled by
Colonel Johnson in the Wasliington office.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether or not heavy-water ship-
ments were made to Russia during the war years ?
Dr. Merritt. I was never involved in the subject at all in any way.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know what controls were set up governing
the shipment of heavy water ?
Dr. Merritt. No ; I do not. Heavy water was out of my province
entirely.
Mr. Tavenner. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Walter?
Mr. Walter. Did your office have any direct responsibility, other
than a desire to preserve this strategic material, in the issuance of
export licenses?
Dr. Merritt. That is all.
Mr. Walter. You had no responsibility at all in that regard ?
Dr. Merritt. No.
Mr. Wood. That was the responsibility of BEW, wasn't it ?
Dr. Merritt. That is correct.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon.
Mr. Nixon. I will pass this time.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Case.
Mr. Case. Dr. Merritt, as I understand, you stated you had started
out trying to buy all the uranium on the market ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Case. And you first made a contract with Vitro?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Case. Was that a firm contract, that, if they had any to sell or
acquired any, they should come to you ?
Dr. Merritt. I don't recall the exact terms of that contract. We
worked closely with them, and I am sure nothing could have gone
wrong in any way with that company. We had full confidence in.
them. I don't recall the exact terms of the contract.
Mr. Case. No sale, as far as you know, w^as made by Vitro to anyone
except yourself, acting for the Manhattan District ?
Dr. Merritt. That is correct.
Mr. Case. What steps did you take with Shattuck to insure that
their sales would be entirely to the Manhattan District ?
996 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Dr. Merritt. We never bought any uranium from Shattuck at all.
They were a very, very small supplier, and their sales, I believe, at a
later date, were well controlled through the War Production Board.
Their sales were for essential domestic purposes.
Mr. Case. You said you had a firm commitment from them. Wliat
was that firm commitment?
Dr. Merritt. That they would refuse any foreign orders, and I
believe that they would keep us informed on other ordei-s they had.
Mr. Case. Was that by letter, contract, or telephone conversation?
Dr. Merritt. Personally, I had one telephone conversation with
them. I think Mr. Burman visited them many times during the war,
I had very little contact with them after that one telephone con-
versation.
Mr. Case. Do you know whether or not there Avas any written
understanding with them?
Dr. Merritt. No ; I don't know.
Mr. Case. In any event, this firm commitment, which you don't
know if it was put in writing or not, was made after the shipment
of the 420 pounds?
Dr. Merritt. That is correct.
Mr. Case. What was Mr. Potter's connection with Shattuck?
Dr. Merritt. He is president, I believe, of Shattuck Chemical Co.
Mr. Case. Earlier in your testimony you referred to an effort to
control purchases of all ceramics, I believe. Did you say that?
Dr. Merritt. Uranium for ceramic coloring; yes. We purchased a
good deal of uranium from ceramic companies.
Mr. Case. From pottery companies ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes. That is the transaction we handled through
Vitro.
Mr. Case. Keferring to your contract with Boris Pregel, did that
contract require the contractor to notify you and tender to you any
of the three materials mentioned which they had or might acquire?
Dr. Merritt. That is the way I would interpret it ; yes. That was
the intention.
Mr. Case. It could have been a contract merely that Manhattan
would be willing to buy, but did it also provide they must offer to
Manhattan any of these materials they had or might acquire?
Dr. Merritt. The wording is:
In addition to the materials contracted for in section (1) above mentioned,
the Contractor gives to the Government for a period of one year, from the date
hereof, the initial ri.s:ht to purchase from time to time, any or all of these three
materials received by the Contractor.
Mr. Case. Do you know whether or not the contract provided any
methods for implementing that right?
Dr. Merritt. Except presumably they would notify us when they
received anything.
Mr. Case. You don't know if the contract was specific on that
point ?
Dr. Merritt. I don't believe it was specific on that point.
Mr. Case. Under that contract, would you understand that Man-
hattan would have the right of refusal beifore any of these materials
were released for sale elsewhere ?
Dr. Merritt. That is correct.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 997
Mr. Case. Were you offered this material which later the Canadian
Kadium & Uranium Corp. sold elsewhere ?
Dr. Merritt. We were not offered this material so far as I aan
aware.
Mr. Case. State again what the relationship was between Canadian
Radium & Uranium Corp. and Eldorado Mines.
Dr. Merritt. It was my understanding that at that time Cana-
dian Radium & Uranium Corp. had a contract whereby they were
exclusive sales agents for Eldorado. That agreement is no longer
in existence, but it was at that time.
Mr. Case. At that time they had the same exclusive right to the
products of Eldorado Mines that Manhattan had to the materials
which Canadian Radium & Uranium acquired?
Dr. Merritt. So I understand. I have never seen the agreement,
but I understand that is correct.
Mr. Case. Except that the contract between Manhattan and Cana-
dian Radium & Uranium was not limited to material that Canadian
Radium & Uranium might get from Eldorado mines?
Dr. Merritt. Anything they might get from anybody.
Mr. Case. Were any penalties or forfeitures provided for failure to
give jNIanhattan this first right to buy ?
Dr. Merritt. Not that I recall.
Mr. Case. I find that it is difficult, without the transcript of the
other hearings, to keep all these separate shipments in mind, but I
would like to ask you two questions with regard to those that come to
my mind. The first question is whether or not you knew of these ship-
ments or sales prior to the disclosures made in the hearings before
the Committee on Un-American Activities, and, if so, when you
learned of them, first in regard to the shipment of the Shattuck mate-
rial, the 420 pounds, in March 19-i3 ?
Dr. Merritt. I knew of that at the time of shipment.
Mr. Case. You knew of that at the time of shipment?
Dr. Merritt. Surely.
Mr. Case, When did you first hear of the request that was made for
8 or 81/2 tons by the Russian Purchasing Commission in 1943?
Dr. Merritt. I believe we first heard of it early in February 1943.
Mr. Case. Was that request made to Lend-Lease or to Chemical
Warfare?
Dr. Merritt. I believe to Lend-Lease. I believe we had our infor-
mation from the War Production Board, but I believe they got it
from Lend-Lease.
Mr. Case. When did you first learn that the request was renewed
in 1944?
Dr. Merritt. Renewed?
Mr. Case. Yes ; that 8-ton request.
Dr. Merritt. I didn't know it was renewed.
Mr. Case. Wlien did you first learn of this 1,000-pound item that
was involved in this license and amended license of April 1943 2
Dr. Merritt. Before this committee in closed session on June 29,
1948,
Mr. Case. And you didn't know until this morning that the export
license had been amended ?
Dr. Merritt. No ; I didn't.
998 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Case. And when did you first hear of the MacKay shipment
of 2.2 pounds of uranium metal ?
Dr. Merritt. I believe at the time of shipment I was aware of that.
Mr. Case. When did you first learn of the 45 -pound shipment of
June 1944, that was purchased by the Treasury ?
Dr. Merritt. Yesterday.
Mr. Case. That is all.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde.
Mr. Velde. That 45 pounds of uranium, was that what you call pure
uranium ?
Dr. Merritt. I believe it was uranium nitrate.
Mr. Velde. How much actual ore would that represent ?
Dr. Merritt. I believe uranium nitrate is about 50 percent uranium ;
about half of that is metal ; the actual U content would be about half
of that.
Mr. Velde. So that the uranium ore would be about 90 pounds ?
Dr. Merritt. No ; about 20 or 25 pounds of uranium element in the
shipment of nitrate.
Mr. Velde. We have been discussing the shipment of 1,000 pounds
that was made from Great Falls, Mont. How would you describe
that?
Dr. Merritt. I believe 500 pounds of that was oxide, and would
probably run about 97 percent, calculated as uranium oxide ; and the
other 500 pounds would be about half that. I am not quite certain.
Mr. Velde. Would you say this 45 pounds of uranium, compared
to the 1,000-pound shipment, would be insignificant?
Dr. Merritt. It would be very small compared to the 1,000-pound
shipment, surely.
Mr. Velde. You mentioned previously that you felt you had the
entire output of uranium in the country tied up by contract?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Velde. Did you have the feeling you also had the entire output
of the Canadian Government tied up ?
Dr. Merritt. We had a good many contracts with them. I don't
l)elieve at that time they were exclusive, they could sell to other people,
but I don't believe they did in any quantities.
Mr. Velde. Are there any companies or individuals who control
uranium in Canada, other than the Canadian Radium & Uranium
Corp.?
Dr. Merritt. No. All uranium is controlled through Eldorado,
which is a crown company owned by the Government.
Mr. Velde. By the Canadian Government?
Dr. Merritt. Yes. It is a crown company. I think that was
acquired back in 1944 from the private company that held it prior
to that time.
Mr. Velde. Have you had any contract directly with an agent of
the Soviet Purchasing Commission ?
Dr. Merritt. No.
Mr. Velde. Or has anybody in your immediate office force?
Dr. Merritt. I don't believe anybody did that I know of.
Mr. Wood, Mr. Kearney.
Mr. Kearney. No questions.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 999
Mr. Nixon. You said you were not concerned with the fact there
might be an export license outstanding for this material, because of
3'our feeling you had the sources pretty well tied up ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. On this 1,000-pound shipment which was made, and
the other shipment which apparently was made without your knowl-
edge, do I understand those shipments were made from concerns
whose outputs you had not tied up ?
Dr. Merritt. The 1,000 pounds were shipped, apparently, from
Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., which we thought we had tied up.
Mr. Nixon. I can't quite understand that. When you say that you
had it tied up
Dr. Merritt. Through this contract.
Mr. Nixon. Through this contract?
Dr. Merritt. That is correct.
Mr. Nixon. And yet the same company makes the shipment. Do
I understand that under the contract Canadian Radium & Uranium
Corp. gave you the exclusive right to purchase uranium ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. Would that shipment be a violation of the contract?
Dr. Merritt. I am not a lawyer, but as a layman it would look
that way.
Mr. Nixon. Could this have been due to failure to understand the
contract on the part of Mr. Pregel and other officials of the company,
or had such conversations been had at the time of the entering into of
tlie contract that they knew what you were trying to do?
Dr. Merritt. The wording is very clear, I think, and it should have
been clear what we were trying to do.
Mr. Nixon. The wording and the negotiations preceding the mak-
ing of the contract ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. This was not a case where you were dealing with a con-
tractor on the other side who was not aware of the very serious nature
of this contract insofar as the security of this country was concerned?
Dr. INIerritt. I think he should have been aware of it.
Mr. Nixon. And if under the circumstances the shipment was made,
and if that shipment was a violation of the contract, it would appear
then that tliere was a deliberate act which was considerably more than
a violation of a business contract?
Dr. Merritt. I suppose so.
Mr. Walter. As a matter of fact, the Canadian Government
brought suit against these people and recovered from them for a
violation of contract; didn't it?
Dr. jNIerritt. There was a suit which extended over a long number
of years between the two, and it was finally settled out of court, I
understand.
Mr. Case. Between what two ?
Dr. Merritt. Canadian Radium and Eldorado.
Mr. Nixon. You understand, Mr. Chairman, the point I am trying
to make goes farther than the money value our Government or the
Canadian Government could recover for violation of contract. I think
the committee should explore why, under those circumstances, the ship-
ment was made.
1000 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Case. Did you rely upon the laws of the agency to make the con-
tract by Pregel control Canadian Radium & Uranium, or did Pregel
in his contract with you set forth his ability to control the actions
of the Canadian Radium & Uranium Co. ?
Dr. Merritt. We relied on him pretty much. He advised us that
he was sole sales agent. So, it was not necessary, if that was true,
to insert similar clauses in other contracts.
Mr. Case. What steps did you take to determine if he was the sole
sales agent ?
Dr. Merritt. We had attempted prior to that time to deal directly
with Eldorado, and were told by officials of Eldorado they could not
deal with us, but only Mr. Pregel.
Mr. Case. Pregel was president of the Canadian Radium & Ura-
nium Corp. ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Case. And he signed this contract as president of Canadian
Radium & Uranium Corp. ?
Dr. Merritt. He signed as agent, I believe, and they were hooked
up in the secret letter.
Mr. Case. And the contract made the secret letter a part of it ?
Dr. Merritt. That is correct, yes.
Mr. Wood. Any other questions?
Mr. Nixon. I understood you to mention Vitro, and I believe you
said you dealt so closely with them that you had no concern over
the possibility that that company would violate a contract ?
Dr. Merritt. I don't recall whether we had a similar clause in our
contract with them.
Mr. Nixon. Did you work closely with Mr. Pregel as well?
Dr. Merritt. We worked with him closely to a point, and then
had no further dealings with him later on.
Mr. Nixon. Prior to the time this shipment was made, you had
been working with him rather closely ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. Did you work with him yourself?
Dr. Merritt. Yes ; I did. Other people worked with him, too.
Mr. Nixon. Was there any question but that he himself knew why
the Government was tying up this material?
Dr. Merritt. There is no question in my mind but that he knew.
He was aware of the Manhattan project.
Mr. Nixon. And he knew why you made this contract?
Dr. Merritt. I assume so.
Mr. Case. And he was the sole sales agent. So, if he arranged a
sale with another party, he did so knowing of the significance of the
sale?
Dr. Merritt. I suppose so.
Mr. Walter. You relied entirely upon the representation Mr. Pregel
made to you with respect to his ability to control the output in
Canada?
Dr. Merritt. We had contact with officials of Eldorado also.
Mr. Walter. They refused to do business with you ?
Dr. Merritt. That is right.
Mr. Walter. Then, as I understand it, you relied entirely on the
representation Mr. Pregel made to you of his ability to control the
Canadian output?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1001
Dr. Merritt. At that time ; yes.
Mr. Case. In your contact with Eldorado, did they confirm that
Pregel had sole control over their output ?
Dr. Merritt. I don't recall. Our contracts were largely with Cana-
dian Radium & Uranium.
Mr. Case. Why did you go to Pregel after you had talked to Eldo-
rado?
Dr. Merritt. They told us to.
Mr. Case. They told you that because he was the one in charge of
their output ?
Dr. Merritt. That is correct.
Mr. Nixon. Did you have the same relations with Pregel up until
the time of the contract that you had with Vitro?
Dr. Merritt. I don't believe so.
Mr. Nixon. I am trying to establish whether there was any reason
for you to be apprehensive that such a shipment might be made ?
Dr. Merritt. I don't think so. We had been associated with the
other people over a long period of time, and they had our full con-
fidence. They were people of our kind.
Mr. Walter. Of course, that is only your own conclusion. Wliat
do you base your conclusion on ?
Dr. Merritt. I don't know.
Mr. Wood. Dr. Merritt, when the 1,000-pound shipment was finally
made from the Canadian company, had that material been offered to
you under your contract?
Dr. Merritt. No ; it had not, that I am aware.
Mr. Wood. W^as there any time during the period of the development
of the Manhattan Engineering District that any of your organizations
you had under contract offered any of their material to you that you
'didn't take it?
Dr. Merritt. I don't believe so.
Mr. Wood. If this 1,000 pounds shipped to the Russians had been
offered to you, would you have taken it?
Dr. Merritt. Surely.
Mr. Tavenner. At the time when you were endeavoring in the early
part of 1943 to block foreign shipments of uranium compounds, did
you confer with the officials of Eldorado mines in Canada regarding
that matter?
Dr. Merritt. I have no recollection of conferring with them re-
garding the matter at all. We advised Mr. Pregel to so advise them,
I believe, in a letter which was placed in the record yesterday.
Mr. Tavenner. You dealt with their agent regarding the matter?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Rather than dealing with the officials directly?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. After this contract went into force in March 1943,
do you know whether Eldorado mines continued to sell small quan-
tities of uranium to various private purchasers or to industry for com-
mercial purposes ?
Dr. Merritt. I don't know.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you recall whether Manhattan Engineering
District was advised or requested to agree to the sale of uranium by
Eldorado mines to other purchasers than to Manhattan Engineering
District, for commercial purposes ?
1002 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Dr. ISIerritt. There may have been some later on that were
approved.
Mr. Ta\^nner. You have no personal knowledge of that ?
Dr. Merritt. No.
Mr. Tavenner. Who would have personal knowledge of that ?
Dr. Merritt. Mr. Burman may.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Burman may ?
Dr. Merritt. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. I may recall him to ask him that question. Was
the Canadian Government requested to cooperate in this matter?
Dr. Merritt. Yes ; they were, at a later date.
Mr. Tavenner. How late? Too late?
Dr. JSIerritt. Too late, I believe. They, I think, took over the com-
pany officially in eTanuary 1944, acquired all the stock at that date, and
controlled it from then on.
Mr. Tavenner. That is all.
Mr. Wood. Thank you very much, Doctor, for your courtesy and
assistance to the committee.
Mr. Tavenner. I would like to recall ]\Ir. Burman for one question.
Mr. Wood. I believe you were sworn yesterday ?
Mr. Burman. That is correct.
TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE C. BURMAN— Resumed
(Having been duly sworn by the committee on the day previous,
January 23, 1950, was at this point recalled.)
Mr. Taa^nner. 'My. Burman, after the contract of IMarch 27, 1943,
between INIanhattan Engineering District and Boris Pregel, agent,
were sales made by Eldorado mines of small quantities of uranium
compounds for commercial purposes, to your knowledge ?
Mr. Burman. Yes ; they were.
JNIr. Tavenner. They were ?
Mr. Burman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ta\^nner. Did Eldorado mines, or the agency, Canadian
Radium & Uranium Corp., inform Manliattan Engineering District
of that fact?
Mr. Burman. Yes. They each were approved in advance.
(Representative Velde leaves the hearing room.)
Mr. Tavenner. They were approved in advance ?
Mr. BunMAN. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Which was it, Eldorado mines or Canadian Radium
& Uranium Corp., that asked for the approval ?
Mr. Burman. Canadian Radium & Uranium, and deliveries were
made directly from Eldorado mines at Port Hope to the approved re-
ceivers. There were a series of shipments, for example, to a company
known as Keystone Carbon Co., St. Mary's, Pa., which manufactured
a special type of electrical resistor for aircraft. The district did not
care to interfere with essential needs for uranium, and were willing
to authorize these shipments where the need was approved.
Mr. Ta\^nner. But where prospects of such sales occurred, you
were consulted ?
Mr. Burman. That is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. And permission given in advance ?
Mr. Burman. Yes, sir.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1003
Mr. Tavenner. I believe you have already answered the question
that no permission was sought in the case of the 1,000 pounds which
were sold to the Russian Purchasing Agency ?
Mv. BuRMAN. That is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you at any time, or did any other member of
your staff, confer with Eldorado mines direct regarding this matter;
that is, the provisions of this contract ?
Mr. BuRMAN. No. I was not engaged in negotiations on the con-
tract.
Mr. Tavexner. I have no further questions.
Mr. Wood. Any questions ?
Mr. Walter. As I understand it, for some period of time Man-
hattan project dealt with Pregel because Eldorado refused to deal
directly because Pregel was their agent. Is that correct ?
INIr. BuRMAX. That is my understanding.
Mr. Walter. AVliy did Manhattan then insist at a later date on
dealing with Eldorado instead of following the instructions given
originally?
Mr. BuRMAN". That is rather difficult to answer.
]\fr. Walter. Yes.
Mr. BuRMAN. We were directed at a period later in 1943 — I can't
specify just what the date was — to taper off direct contractual re-
lations with Mr. Pregel.
IVIr. Walter. T\'Tio directed you to taper off ?
INfr. BiTJMAN. Those were directions from General Groves.
INlr. Walter. Did General Groves indicate any reason why yoit
should discontinue dealing with Pregel ?
JNIr. BuRMAN. I didn't receive those directions myself, so I can't
answer.
Mr. Walter. You were in conference where Mr. Pregel was dis-
cussed, were you not ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Not very often, since I was not in direct contact with
Mr. Pregel.
Mr. Walter. You knew why General Groves was desirous of deal-
ing directly with Eldorado and discontinuing dealing with Pregel,
did you not?
Mr. BuRMAN. No, sir; I am afraid I didn't.
Mr. Walter. When you learned of the shipment of the 1,000 pounds,
did you discuss that with Eldorado?
Mr. BuRMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Walter. Did anybody, that you know of?
Mr. BuRMAN. We didn't discuss it with Eldorado, ])ut Dr. Merritt
did talk with officials — let me change that. I think Dr. Merritt talked
to Mr. Bennett, who, I believe, is an official of Eldorado.
Mr. Walter. And he protested to Eldorado that the terms of the
contract had been violated?
Mr. BuRMAN. No; Dr. Merritt asked for information from Mr.
Bennett as to the transaction, but the contract that was violated was
with Canadium Radium & Uranium Corp., and not Eldorado, and the
company existing now as Eldorado is not the same as existed in 1943,
since the Canadian Government now controls it.
Mr. Walter. This shipment of 1,000 pounds was made before the
Canadian Government had any direct control over Eldorado?
Mr. Burman. Yes.
1004 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Tavenner. I don't know if it is clear as to the time when Dr.
Merritt had this conference with Mr. Bennett that you referred to.
Mr. BuEMAN. That was after the information was obtained from
the committee that the 1,000-pound shipment had taken place.
Mr. Tavenner. So that was sometime in 1948 ?
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes ; after June 1948.
Mr. Tavenner. After June 1948 ?
Mr. Btjrman. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. That is all.
Mr. Wood. Any questions?
(No response.)
Mr. Wood. Thank you very much.
(Whereupon the witness was excused.)
Mr. Ta\t:nner. I would like to call Mr. Hermann H. Rosenberg.
Mr. Wood. Will you hold up your right hand and be sworn? Do
you solemnly swear the evidence you give this committee shall be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wood. Have a seat.
TESTIMONY OF HERMANN H. ROSENBERG, ACCOMPANIED BY
MANFRED WOLKISER, ATTORNEY
. Mr. Tavenner. Wliat is your full name, please?
Mr. Rosenberg. Hermann H. Rosenberg.
Mr. Tavenner. Are you accompanied here by counsel?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir.
Mr. TA^^NNER. Will counsel please state his name and address for
identification purposes in the record ?
Mr. WoLKiSER. Manfred Wolkiser, 70 Pine Street, New York City,
general counsel of Chematar, Tnc, chemical wholesalers.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Rosenberg, when and where were you born ?
Mr. Rosenberg. I was born April 21, 1902, in Berlin, Germany.
Mr. Tavenner. Are you a naturalized citizen of the United States?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ta-s^nner. When did you come to the United States ?
Mr. Rosenberg. In March 1939.
Mr. Tavenner. Wlien were you naturalized?
Mr. Rosenberg. In August 1945.
Mr. Taat^nner. In what type of business enterprise were you en-
gaged in Germany ?
Mr. Rosenberg. In the chemical trade. It is the same kind of busi-
ness I am engaged in now, and as a matter of fact it is the same organi-
zation I have been with for the last 30 years. This company I am
associated with now, of course, has been incorporated in the United
States after our arrival in this country, but it is actually a continua-
tion of our business on the other side.
Mr. Tavenner. You have testified previously before this commit-
tte, I believe ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes; I did,
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Rosenberg, when did you first confer with the
Russian Purchasing Commission relative to the acquisition of uranium
compounds?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1005
Mr. EosENBERG. Witliiii the course of regular business with allied
purchasino; commissions during the war, which was practicjilly the
only possibility of continuing business with the overseas countries with
which we dealt in peacetime, we had contact also with the Russian
Purchasing Commission by phone and occasional visits to Washington
when we saw the other allied purchasing commissions also, and it was
the end of January 1943 when we got an inquiry from the Soviet Pur-
chasing Commission.
Mr. Tavenner. Regarding uranium ?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct.
Mr. Ta\t;nner. It was the latter part of January 1943, that you had
your first contact with them regarding uranium ?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct.
Mr. TA^^5NNER. Had you had transactions with the Russian Purchas-
ing Commission prior to that time ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. According to my best knowledge and belief
Ave had about five very minor transactions in industrial and fine chemi-
cals with them after the outbreak of war in 1941, since December
1941, and in 1942, aggregating a couple thousand dollars, I would say,
according to my memory ; a very minor amount.
Mr. Tavenner. Would you tell us the nature of your first confer-
ence with the Russian Purchasing Commission relating to uranium?
Mr. Rosenberg. I do not remember having had any correspondence
wnth them, but according to my recollection we hacl quite a number
of telephone conferences with them.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you receive a letter ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes ; we received inquiry by a letter.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you have the letter? We will save time if you
have the letter ?
Mr. Rosenberg. We have not all our correspondence with any of our
customers for those years.
Mr. Wood. The question was asked you if you have that letter?
Mr. Rosenberg. No ; I have not that letter, but I have the confirma-
tion of that letter, and may I explain the reason for not having the
original letter but having a copy of our letter ? The practice in our
company is that we have shipping files — that means files pertain-
ing to the particular shipment — and a regular file in which an extra
copy of our correspondence is kept. We have disposed of all the ship-
ping files up to, as far as I remember, 1943 or 1944, unless there is
correspondence in those particular shipping files of later years, while
we have, of course, kept the less voluminous files in which not all
the shipping correspondence was collected. So we have the copies
of our correspondence in many cases where we do not have the incom-
ing correspondence which was a part of the shipping files.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you produce at this time the letter confirming
your first communication from the Soviet Purchasing Commission
relating to uranium ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes [producing copy of letter].
Mr. Tavenner. I think it would save time if I read this in evidence.
Mr. Walter. Mr. Chairman, may I clarify something in my mind
at this point ?
Mr. Wood. Yes.
1006 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Walter. As I understand, in order to avoid an accumulation
of useless papers, it is the practice of your company to destroy corre-
spondence after keeping it for a certain period of time 'i
Mr. RosENEERG. Yes.
Mr. Walter. Why did you destroy the inquiry to you and retain
your reply to the person who sent the inquiry ?
Mr. Rosenberg. We received, of course, incoming correspondence
in one copy, while we make two copies of our outgoing correspondence.
One copy goes in the so-called shipping file, which naturally is being
destroyed periodically, while the other copy of our outgoing corre-
spondence is kept in the general file.
Mr. Walter. Why would you keep a copy of your letter when it
doesn't relate to anything at all ?
Mr. Wolkiser. May I please
Mr. Walter. No. I am asking him.
Mr. Rosenberg. The files which pertain to the actual shipments
have quite a volume and our ojSice is comparatively small. We keep,
of course, all the incoming and outgoing invoices.
Mr. Wood. Do you desire to read tliis copy into the record, Mr.
Tavenner ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
Mr. Wood. Without objection you may do so.
Mr. Tavenner (reading) :
Februaky 2, 1943.
The Government Purchasing Commission op the Soviet Union in the U. S. A.,
1610 Park Road NW., Washington, D. C.
(Attention Mr. N. S. Fomichev.)
Gentlemen : We acknowledge to have received yesterday your inquiry of
January 28 concerning uranium metal, urano-uranic oxide, and nitrouranyl.
We are preparing an interesting proposition, including uranium metal, for
you and shall communicate with you within the next few days.
The majority of the inquired items could be shipped promptly.
Should you have to place your order before our offer is in your hands, please
give us a ring, so that we can submit our proposition to you, if necessary, by
phone, before you make your final decision.
Very truly yours,
By Hermann Rosenberg.
Chematar, Inc.,
Mr. Wood. What is the date of that ?
Mr. Tavenner. February 2, 1943. I offer the letter in evidence and
ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 1."
Mr. Case. Mr. Rosenberg, I notice there is a mark across the type-
written part of the signature. Does that mark have any significance?
Mr. Rosenberg. No. That is my initial.
Mr. Case. That is your initial ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes.
Mr. Case. And you put that initial there yourself?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes.
Mr. Case. That is your characteristic manner of putting your initial
on a carbon copy?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir.
Mr. Case. No objection.
Mr. Wood. It will be admitted.
(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg
1," is hereinabove incorporated in the record.) ^
« See appendix.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1007
Mr. Tavenner. What action did you take after receiving the in-
quiry for uranium compounds?
Mr. Rosenberg. As was customary during the "war years, we in-
quired of War Production Board, Chemical Information Section,
Group 2, in New York, whetlier there was any restriction as to the
material involved. I approached, on the same day we received the
inquiry, January 29, 1943, group 2 of the War Production Board in
New York, and got the information that just a few days before, as a
matter of fact on January 26, 1943, an order was issued restricting this
particular merchandise to certain uses.
Mr. Tavenner. Was that order M-285 ?
Mr. Rosenberg. M-285; yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Proceed.
Mr. Rosenberg. We were told that this order prohibited the use of
uranium compounds in glass, ceramics, pottery, and so on, but that it
did not say anything about export and was apparently not applicable.
As to details, we were referred to the Miscellaneous Minerals Division
of the War Production Board.
Mr. Tavenner. What quantity of material did the Russian Purchas-
ing Commission show an interest in obtaining?
Mr. Rosenberg. Two hundred and twenty pounds of uranium ni-
trate; 220 pounds of uranium oxide; and 25 pounds of uranium
metal.
Mr. Tavenner. After conferring with group 2 of the War Pro-
duction Board, what did you do?
Mr. Rosenberg. We had been promised a copy of the restriction
order, and apioroached in the meantime, by phone and wire, a number
of possible suppliers of this material.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you have copies of your letters and telegrams to
possible suppliers?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. We sent one telegram to the Shattuck
Chemical Co. in Denver, Colo., and had telephone conversations with
the rest of the companies we knew of at that time, because they were
located in New York.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the date of your telegram to the Shat-
tuck Co. ?
Mr. Rosenberg. January 29, 1948.
Mr. Ta\tenner. You acted very promptly, because you acted prior to
acknowledging receipt of the request?
Mr. Rosenberg, Yes. Pi'eceding this inquiry we must have received
a telephone call from the Russians, because in this telegram to the
Shattuck Chemical Co. we say :
For Allied Government order being not subject WPB Order M-285 please
wire quotations * * *
Shall I go one ?
Mr. Tavenner. I don't think it is necessary. What is the date of
your wire to the Shattuck Co. ?
Mr. Rosenberg. January 29, 1943.
Mr. Walter. I think the telegram should go in the record in its
entirety.
Mr. Tavenner. I offer the telegam in evidence and ask that it be
marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 2."
Mr. Wood. It will be admitted.
1008 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
(The copy of telegram above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosen-
berg 2,'' is hereinafter incorporated in the record.) '
Mr. Tavenner. And I will read it :
January 29, 1943.
S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co.,
Denver, Colo.:
For Allied Government order being not subject WPB order M-285 please wire
quotations including export packing 25 pounds uranium metal, 220 pounds
uranium oxide U30S, 220 pounds uranium nitrate. Indicate earliest possible
delivery time and what quantities available from stock we pay against delivery.
Please let specifications follow by air mail.
Chematar, Inc.,
40 Exchange Place, Netv York, N. Y.
Mv. Kearney. INIay I ask a question there?
Mr. Walter (presiding in temporary absence of ISIr. Wood). Yes.
Mr. Kearney. Was that telegram sent after the receipt of the in-
quiry from the Russian purchasing agency?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes ; the day following the date of the inquiry,
(Representative Wood returns.)
Mr. Tavenner. What other evidence do 3'ou have in the way of
copies of telegrams or letters regarding inquiries made of othen
suppliers ?
Mr. Rosenberg. As I said, these other suppliers were located in
New York City, so we merely had telephone conversations with these
companies, and made a record of the telephone quotations.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you say you made a record of the telephone
conversations?
Mr. Rosenberg. Of these telephone conversations, since we Avere not
familiar with these items and we had no other record of the telephone
quotations.
Mr. TA^^ENNER. When did 30U prepare this statement of telephone
messages ?
Mr. Rosenberg. On January 29, 1943. Here is a second one of
February 1, 1943.
Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer in evidence the two reports of
telephone conferences, the first bearing date January 29, 1943, which
1 ask to have marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 3," and the second bear-
ing date February 1, 1943, which I ask to have marked "Exhibit
Rosenberg 4."
Mr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, whom were the telephone conversa-
tions with ?
Mr. Wood. I am asking coimsel to develop it a little further.
Mr. Tavenner. Exhibit 3 shows you made inquiry of A. MacKay &
Co. Is that correct?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. And the reply that you received, according to this
memorandum, was that the company had made 20 poiuids which were
supposed to be ready, and another 5 pounds could be ready in a week ?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is right. That is of uranium metal.
Mr. Tavenner. That is of uranium metal ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. These letters refer to these products [in-
dicating] .
' See appendix.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1009
Mr. Tavenner. I see. That related to uranium metal. Then you
asked questions regarding uranium oxide and uranium nitrate?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. And you were given prices ?
Mr. Eosenberg. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. You also conferred with Fairmount Chemical Co.
on that date?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. And you conferred with B. F. Drakenfeld & Co. on
that same date?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. You conferred with du Pont, with a Mr. Sellger
of du Pont?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. You were advised that du Pont could not furnish
you any material, that it was all requisitioned by the United States
Government ?
Mr. Rosenberg. They offered the material. We were offered 220
pounds of uranium oxide and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate for
prompt delivery.
Mr. Tavenner. You conferred also with Mallinkrodt?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, a chemical supplier of fine chemicals in smaller
quantities, according to my knowledge, for laboratory and other
similar uses.
Mr. Tavenner. You also conferred with a company the name of
which I cannot read.
Mr. Rosenberg. Merck & Co., M-e-r-c-k. To them applies the same
I said about Mallinkrodt, while du Pont is an industrial supplier in
larger quantities.
Mr. Tavenner. A. MacKay & Co. advised that they could only fur-
nish you with black uranium oxide?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct.
Mr. Ta\t.nner. Fairmount Chemical Co. could not supply the ura-
nium oxide, and stated that early the next week it would quote you
regarding the uranium nitrate?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. B. F. Drakenfeld & Co. advised that uranium oxide
was all they could offer, and it was yellow UsOs ?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is right.
Mr. Walter. Wliat are the dates, Mr. Tavenner ?
Mr. Tavenner. January 29.
Mr. Walter. What year ?
Mv. Tavenner. 1943.
Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct.
Mr. Tave-nner. Here is a notation in regard to your conference
with B. F. Drakenfeld & Co. :
Althoiigh he was willing to quote after I gave him the message from WPB, his
principals did not permit him to quote for. export, but he said we sliould commu-
nicate with the following importers: African Metal Co., 41 Broad Street, New
York, N. Y. ; Raymond Luber, Bridgeport, Conn.
Did you communicate with African Metal Co.?
Mr. Rosenberg. According to the memorandum of February 1,
1943, 1 did; yes.
993.34 — 50 8
2010 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Tavenner. Du Pont, as stated, made you a quotation for the
220 pounds of uranium oxide and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate ?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct.
Mr. Tavenner. The other organizations referred to there were
unable to quote ?
;Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct. ;
Mr. Wood. Does the memorandum show the names of the individ-
uals in these organizations with whom he had these conversations?
Mr. Tavenner. It does. In one instance it does not give the name
of the person speaking, and that was the first instance of A. MacKay
& Co.
Mr. Walter. How many companies indicated their ability to quote
on uranium?
Mr. Rosenberg. Do you mean on uranium metal or uranium
compounds ?
Mr. Walter. Both.
Mr. Rosenberg. May I read
Mr. Walter. Just the number.
Mr. Rosenberg. Uranium metal, two ; uranium oxide, two ; uranium
nitrate, two; and a third one promises to quote early the next week.
May I mention this is only part of our investigation at that time.
Mr. Walter. What is the name of the person with whom you talked
when you conferred with the first organization ?
Mr. Rosenberg. A. MacKay & Co. ?
Mr. Walter. Yes.
Mr. Rosenberg. It is 7 years back, but I remember one name of a
gentleman who I ever talked to with this company, Mr. King, and I
suppose Mr. King was also in this particular instance the one I
talked to.
Mr. Case. Mr. Chairman, before that is entered I would like to see it.
Mr. Ta-st.nner. With regard to exhibit 4, which is a record of tele-
phone calls for February 1, 1943, it shows that du Pont, giving in
parentheses the name of the person with whom you spoke, made a
quotation to you on sodium uranate, showing the complete analysis.
That was not part of this inquiry from the Russians, was it?
(Witness makes oif-the-record statement to Mr. Tavenner.)
Mr. Tavenner. Let's get it on the record. You have stated to me
there was a mix-up about the material quoted ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Material inquired about. This being the first time
we were in contact with this material, we were confused as to the
product the Russians actually wanted. These reports bear out this
confusion. We had talked the previous day with companies familiar
with this material, so I followed on February 1 with conversations
with du Pont and African Metals to find out what type of uranium
oxide the required product actually is, and I found out there was the
yellow grade and the black grade, and from the communications that
followed subsequently with Shattuck Co. I remember now that at
that time I was informed there was a green grade, which was the
one we actually purchased and delivered from Shattuck Co. to the
Russians, and which, I have been told, was the purest grade avail-
able, purer than the yellow and black grades. And so on February 1
we got information from du Pont, Mr. Sellger; and from African
Metals Corp., Mr. Deschepper, about these unclear questions.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1011
Mr. Ta^^nner. At the bottom of this report I find this notation :
The packing of the material would not cause them any difficulties, since they
would have to pack the merchandise in their original packing as it is, merely in
an outside case.
What were you referring to there? Packing for export?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, for export. I told them this material was for
an allied country, and they said it was no trouble to pack for export.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you notify them of the country to which the
material was to be shipped ?
Mr. EosENBERG. No, because as brokers we are not much interested
in bringing our suppliers and our customers together.
Mr. Case. Page 2 of exhibit 3 is headed: "Telephone reports re-
garding uranium. January 20, 1943." The first item starts with:
''WPB (Murrayhill 3-2520 group 2)." Does WPB there stand for
War Production Board?
Mr. EosENBERG. Yes.
Mr. Case. The note which follows in this typewritten carbon copy
reads :
There is an order of January 26 M-285 merely prohibiting the use of uranium
chemicals in the domestic glass, ceramic, and pottery industries and says noth-
ing regarding export. Besides, no effective date is given yet. If it is for war
use by the Russians, this order definitely does not apply. He sends us two
copies. For details we might communicate with their Washington Miscellaneous
Minerals Division.
Does that represent a summary of the statements by the representa-
tive of the War Production Board with whom you talked at this tele-
phone number ?
Mr. EosENBERG. Ycs. .
Mr. Case. Do you recall his specifically saying that "If it is for war
use by the Eussians, this order definitely does not apply" ?
Mr. EosENBERG. I do not recollect the exact words he used 7 years
ago, but I dictated this 5 minutes after the conversation, and at that
time I am sure that I got the right gist of the conversation. I have a
copy of that order right here.
Mr. Case. Do you recall with whom you talked at the War Produc-
tion Board?
Mr. EosENBERG. There is an information board, group 2, with which
we always conferred when materials unknown to us were inquired from
us during wartime, and only on the strength of this telephonic infor-
mation did we approach these suppliers.
Mr. Walter. So that your contacts with the War Production Board
were not with any particular person. You merely called the general
information board ?
Mr. EosENBERG. At that time.
Mr. Tavenner. You discovered later that it was necessary to obtain
an export license in order to ship it abroad ?
Mr. EosENBERG. It was our general knowledge at that time that every
product going out of this country required an export license to be
procured by the actual exporter.
Mr. Tavenner. Didn't you consult Mr. Alexander Pregel and Mr.
Boris Pregel at that time regarding prices for delivery of uranium
oxide ?
Mr. Eosenberg. At some later date we did that.
1012 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Tavexxer. How much later, and do you have the record of that
telephone call?
Mr. Rosenberg. I do not have a record of that telephone call, but I
have a record of the conversation with these gentlemen at the time
of the purchase from the Canadian company.
Mr. TA^'ENNER. I am talking about the time you put through your
first successful effort to sell uranium. Didn't you inquire at the time
you made these inquiries, or shortly thereafter, the price at which
r*regel could furnish the same material ?
Mr. Rosenberg. I suppose so, and I have possibly also a note about
this conversation. However, since we make notes of conversations in
cases where we have new and otherwise not confirmed information,
there was no necessity at that particular time to make a memorandum
about any other conversations.
Mr. Ta\t:nner. Before we get to that, let us find out a little more
about the initial contact you niade with Mr. Pregel about it. When did
you talk to him about the delivery of this first order of uranium?
Mr. Rosenberg. I have seen INIr. Pregel, according to my best recol-
lection, only once in my life, and that was during the second part of
April 1943. I have had several telephone conversations with him.
Mr. Tavenner. Answer specifically my question. At the time or
about the time that you made inquiries from these various suppliers, a
record of which you have, did you not also make the same type of in-
quiry from Mr. Pregel and, if so, when?
Mr. Rosenberg. I suppose so. I cannot tell you from my notes
when that was.
Mr. Tavenner. But it is your positive recollection that you did
ask him to quote you the price for delivery of 220 pounds of uranium
oxide and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir; to my best knowledge and belief I con-
tacted him at that time also.
Mr. Tavenner. Why didn't you make a memorandum of that tele-
phone conversation ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Mr. Tavenner, I did not say I have not made it.
I do not have it. I did not even look for it at this time. There is a
possibility if I go through our old records of 19-13 I might be able
to find a memorandum about this conversation.
Mr. Ta\^nner. You think you have a memorandum about it?
Mr. Rosenberg. I think so. There is a good possibility.
]Mr. Tavenner. Well, you Iniew before you came here that the name
of Mr. Pregel was going to be involved, was bound to be, in connection
with these transactions, because you later represented him, and I would
have thought you would be particularly careful to bring memoranda
pertaining to him rather than concerns we have heard of for the
first time.
Mr. Rosenberg. I did not know until I left New York Saturday that
Mr. Pregel would be a special subject of this hearing.
Mr. Tavenner. I would like you to furnish us a memorandum of
that telephone convereation if you can locate it.
Mr. Rosenberg. I certainly will if I can locate it.
Mr. Tavenner. Wliat was the result o'f your telephone conversation
with Mr. Pregel, and I should ask you which Mr. Pregel you spoke to ?
Mr. Resenberg. I spoke to a Mr. Alexander Pregel ; and I can say
that until I heard it during this hearing and understood from news-
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1013
paper reports, I did not know there was a Mr. Boris Pregel, to whom
I have never talked, to my knowledge. I remember once when I called
Mr. Alexander Pregel was out of town and I talked to another Mr.
Pregel who might have been his brother.
Mr. Tavenner. I will ask you questions about that later on. What
were you advised about the availability of this material by Mr. Alex-
ander Pregel when you called him about the time you called these
other supplier ?
Mr. Rosenberg. I can answer that question if I find a memorandum
about this conversation.
Mr. Ta\'t:nner. Did he make a quotation to you ?
Mr. Rosenberg. According to my recollection he did.
Mr. Ta\tenner. How did that quotation compare with other prices?
Mr. Rosenberg. It must have been more expensive, if I received it,
because we did not consider it until we could not get this merchandise
from Shattuck Co. any more.
Mr. Tavenner. Are you satisfied now from your recollection that
Mr. Pregel repoited he had the stocks on hand that you desired and
could make delivery of it?
Mr. Rosenberg. According to my best knowledge and belief he
quoted at that time, but at too high a price.
Mr. Tavenner. Can you fix the month you had that conversation
with him?
]\lr. Rosenberg. About that same time, early February 1943.
(Witness confers with his counsel.)
Mr. Rosenberg. It was definitely not on the same date I made these
telephone reports, because all the calls made on that date appear on
this piece of paper.
Mr. Ta\^nner. As a result of these calls that you placed, you finally
made a deal with Shattuck?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ta\^nner. I now offer exhibit Rosenberg 3 and exhibit Rosen-
berg 4 in evidence.
Mr. Wood. They will be admitted.
(The documents above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 3"
and "Exhibit Rosenberg 4," are hereinafter incorporated in the
record.) ^
Mr. Tavenner. T would like for you to tell the committee at this
time what your procedure was, and what your procedure became, in
the handling of these uranium transactions : That is, how you made
your contracts, how they were handled before the licensing agency,
and the general plan under which these licenses were obtained and
the contracts consummated.
Mr. Rosenberg. I would like to say at the outset that the export-
license part was not our business, since we were not the exporters of
this material ; but I can give information which I got in the course
of this transaction about these export-license applications by the
Soviet Purchasing Commission.
Mr. Tavenner. I am going to change my question. I believe it is
going to take too long to answer. Tell us just what you did in this
* See appendix.
1014 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
transaction with Sliattuck after you received their offer, or their
commitment ?
Mr. Rosenberg, We received their quotation the same day we had
inquired. We received this bj^ wire. We passed this on to the Soviet
Purchasing Commission.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any record of your letter or telegram
passing that information on?
Mr. Rosenberg. May I use notes which I made about these details?
Mr. Tavenner. That will be satisfactory. That seems to be a pre-
pared memorandum you have there?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes ; from the files, which I could locate, plus the
deductions which you could make from these files, as, for instance,
from that letter of February 2, 1 deduced we had received an inquiry
on February 1.
Mr. Case. You have already submitted, and there have been placed
in evidence, copies of notes made, you stated, at the time the telephone
conversations were had with these possible suppliers ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes.
Mr. Case. In the letter of February 2, 1943, already placed in evi-
dence, you invite the Russian Purchasing Commission to communicate
with you by telephone should they have to place their order before
your offer is in their hands.
]\Ir. Rosenberg. Yes.
Mr. Case. Did they communicate with you by telephone ?
Mr. Rosenberg. They had no reason to, because on February 4 we
sent them our quotation.
Mr. Case. How did you find out the quantities they wanted ?
Mr. Rosenberg. They gave us the quantities, apparently, by phone,
and confirmed it by that letter which we received on February 1,
Mr. Case. They gave you the quantities by telephone ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir.
Mr. Case. Did you make notes of that telephone conversation, sim-
ilar to these other notes that we have ?
]\Ir. Rosenberg. There is a possibility that we did, but I do not
have it.
Mr. Case. You do not have that with you ?
Mr. Rosenberg. That particular telephone conversation, I do not
have a note about that here.
Mr. Case. You stated it was not always your custom to keep the
letters that came in, but it was your practice to prepare these tele-
phone reports 5 minutes after the conversation?
Mr. Rosenberg. Not always; when we were dealing with material
that was new to us.
Mr. Case. Didn't you make a note of the quantities they wanted?
Mr. Rosenberg. There is a possibility I did. I do not have all my
notes with me.
Mr. Case. Mr. Chairman, this letter which is in evidence invites the
Soviet Purchasing Commission to communicate by telephone, and
since we have in evidence full notes in regard to other telephone con-
versations, I would like to ask that the witness examine all the papers
he has with him before he leaves under this subpena, to determine if he
has any notes of conversations with the Soviet Purchasing Commis-
sion, and also whether he has notes elsewhere supplying this
information.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1015'
Mr. Wood. If you have such notes, where would they be now ?
Mr. Rosenberg. In New York.
Mr. Case. Why weren't they brought here under this subpena ?
Mr. Wood. You were served with a subpena to j)roduce all the rec-
ords you had in this case, were you not ?
Mr. Rosenberg. No ; I was not. I brought this correspondence along
in order to support as much as I possibly could.
Mr. Tavenner. You understood, did you not, that I requested your
counsel to produce all the records bearing on the transactions relating
to uranium, whether the inquiries resulted in failure to produce any
uranium or whether they didn't?
Mr. WoLKiSER. May 1 answer that ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
I\Ir. WoLKiSER. In our telephone conversation during the week, after
I tried to contact you many times, you told me the subject matters in
which the committee woiild be interested, just generally, but any
papers and documents you mentioned only Saturday afternoon when
I was here, and by that time my client was on his way from New York.
But he has an awful lot of papers here, and if you take his recollection
plus the papers, I believe that will satisfy the committee right now,
but if not, we can still produce any papers you want.
Mr. Tavenner. Don't you recall, when the appointment was made
for Saturday over the telephone some earlier day in the week, that I
specified exactly the matters we were investigating?
Mr. WoLKiSER. You did say the subject matters, but you did not at
that time mention any records. There was no subpena.
Mr. Tavenner. That is right ; there was no subpena.
Mr. WoLKiSER. The telephone calls are all over the place. This is a
7-year-old case.
IMr. Wood. Let's get along with the testimony.
Mr. Ta\t.nner. Proceed. You were telling us you had a telephone
conversation on February 4.
Mr. Rosenberg. No. We wrote a letter on February 4.
Mr. Ta\t.nner. Do you have that letter witli you ?
Mr. Rosenberg. I am sorry ; I do not. But that letter I have, and
I can submit it. because from that letter I quote here, so I must have it.
Mr. Wood. Will you submit it when you return to your office ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. On February 4 we wrote the Russian Pur-
chasing Commission that one of the oldest United States producers,
Shattuck, informs us that black material only contains UsOg. The
pure material is green, which we offer, 99.5 percent uranium, at $4.50,
only impurities being traces of iron and what dust might possibly get
in during handling. Both products now offered practically chem-
ically pure. Confirming agreement to communicate with each other
as soon as either advised by WPB in consequence of our request for
authorization.
Mr. Tavenner. Then what followed ?
Mr. Rosenberg. We had called on February 3, preceding this letter,
a Mr. Owen, of WPB, Miscellaneous Minerals Division, who confirmed
the information we received from group 2 in New York, and informed
us further there is no application or authorization form under M-285.
On February 6 we wrote to the Shattuck Co. confirming substitution
of green uranium oxide, confirming their chemical information in that
respect, and promised to work on these orders.
1016 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Nothing happened until March 2, when the Soviet Purchasing Com-
mission was ready to buy, and we wired to Shattuck to prepare an order
for 200 pounds of UaOg and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate. On
March 3 Shattuck wired their agreement.
On March 2 we called the War Production Board, Miscellaneous
Minerals Division, in regard to M-285. We spoke to a Mr. Park,
assistant to K. J. Land, in charge of uranium, who advised they felt
the Eussian requirement was not affected by M-285, prohibiting only
the use of uranium compounds in ceramics, and so forth, but sug-
gested
Mr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question here?
Mr. Wood. Yes, sir.
Mr. I^ARNEY. I would like to ask the witness when that memoran-
dum was prepared?
Mr. Rosenberg. Last week.
Mr. IvEARNEY. Then it is not a record of any telephone conversations
made at the time of the telephone conversations?
Mr. Rosenberg. No. It was prepared for this particular purpose
after I had been informed through our counsel what was the subject
matter of this hearing.
Mr. Kearney. And the information contained in that memorandum
comes from your own records or from memory ?
Mr. Rosenberg. It is based on our own records, which, however,
are not complete, and in certain cases, as I mentioned an example be-
fore, it is deductions based on correspondence we have.
Mr. Kearney. And also from your best recollection?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes.
Mr. Ta\':enner. I wish you would support each statement you make
by a copy of a memorandum of telephone message, if you have one, or
by copy of letter to which you refer.
(Witness confers with his counsel.)
Mr. Rosenberg. If you want me to complete this file, I can do it
very quickly by going to New York and completing it. I think it is
hard on my office to find these old papers without my presence, but
perhaps it can be done, but it would be better if I went and directed
it. I am sure the information I am giving here can be supported to
a very great extent.
Mr. Tavenner. I understood you had your full file records with you ?
Mr. Rosenberg. No.
Mr. Tavenner. If you do not, just use the records you do have and
support each statement by the records you have here.
(Witness confers with his counsel.)
Mr. Rosenberg. We have a rather complete file here, but I did not
take all telephone notes along.
Mr. Tavenner. Use what records you have and we will go into the
other records later.
Mr. Rosenberg. On February 5 we wrote to the Shattuck Co.
Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence the letter of February 5, 1943,
addressed to the S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., Denver, Colo,, ancl
signed by Chematar, Inc., by Hermann Rosenberg, and ask that it be
marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 5."
Mr. Wood. Without objection, it will be admitted.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1017
(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosen-
berg 5." is hereinafter incorporated in the record.) ^
Mr. Tavenner. Proceed.
Mr. Rosenberg. On March 2 we sent the following telegram to the
Shattuck Co. :
For in-eparing order 200 ponnds Uthreeoeijilit [U SOS], 220 pounds nitrouranyl,
please wire confirmation that offor including delivery times still good as wired
January twenty-ninth. Merchandise needed for military purposes of Allied
Government.
Mr. Tavenner. I offer that telegram in evidence and ask that it be
marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 6."
Mr. Wood. It will be admitted.
(The copy of telegram above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosen-
berg 6," is hereinabove incorporated in the record.) ^"
Mr. Rosenberg. On March 3 we received a telegram from the Shat-
tuck Co. This is an original. It comes out of the general file. In
the shipping file we have a copy.
Mr. Wood. This is one of your original incoming communications
of March 3 ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. All the telegrams and cables in our office
are copied because we have different departments and all get a copy.
Telegrams, I will always have the originals, if I could locate them.
Mr. Wood. You mean you differentiate between telegrams and let-
ters you receive ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes ; because we cannot possibly copy every incom-
ing letter.
Mr. Wood. Did you copy this ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes.
Mr. Walter. Why didn't you destroy the original telegram and
keep only the copy ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Because we keep the original telegrams, of which
we have sent copies to our so-called shipping files, in the general file,
while the incoming letters, being put in the shipping file, there is only
one original in our possession.
Mr. Case. What happened to the shipping file which contained the
originals of letters?
Mr. Rosenberg. All our shipping files up to the year 1943 have been
disposed of, I would say, about a year or two ago.
(Witness confers with his counsel.)
Mr. Rosenberg (continuing). Except if we have correspondence of
later years in the same file, then we kept them.
Mr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question before we ad-
journ for lunch?
Mr. Wood. Yes.
Mr. Kearney. May I see that letter of February 2 ?
("Exhibit Rosenberg 1" was handed to Mr. Kearney.)
Mr. Kearney. I call the witness' attention to the letter dated Febru-
ary 2, 1943, addressed to the Government Purchasing Commission of
" See appendix.
^° See appendix.
1018 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
the Soviet Union in the U. S. A. The last paragraph reads as follows :
Should you have to place your order before our offer is in your hands, please
give us a ring, so that we can submit our proposition to you, if necessary, by
phone, before you make your final decision.
Do you have a record of that telephone conversation ?
Mr. Rosenberg. We had no telephone conversation, according to my
recollection and according to my files, since 2 days later we were able
to submit the quotation.
Mr. Kearney. You had no communication, by phone, wire, or letter,
from the time of this communication of February 2 until Feljruary 4 ?
Mr. Rosenberg. So far as correspondence is concerned, I am able
to develop that if I can get the complete file, which I can do in 48
hours.
Mr. Kearney. This file is in your office in New York City?
Mr. Rosenberg. I am sure that copies of our correspondence can be
developed. There might be exceptions, but I don't think so. If I had
known that I should bring along the complete file, I could have done so.
It would be quite a voluminous file, and I came here in connection
with our twentieth anniversary, which we had yesterday, and I didn't
want to bring too much stuff with me.
Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence the original telegram produced
by the witness, dated March 3, 1943, addressed to Chematar, Inc., and
signed S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., and ask that it be marked "Ex-
hibit Rosenberg 7."
Mr. Wood. It will be admitted.
(The telegram above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 7,"
is hereinafter incorporated in the record.) ^^
Mr. Tavenner. I will read that telegram :
Retel IT308 and uranyl nitrate, can make deliveries as mentioned our wire
January 29.
Mr. Wood. The committee stands recessed until 3 o'clock this after-
noon.
(Thereupon, at 1 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 3 p. m. of the
same day.)
afternoon session
(The hearing was resumed at 3 : 10 p. m.)
Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.
Let the record show that there are present Mr. Walter, Mr. Harrison,
Mr. Moulder, Mr. Velde, Mr. Kearney, and Mr. Wood, a quorum.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Rosenberg, will you come forward, please.
TESTIMONY OF HERMANN H. ROSENBERG— Resumed
Mr. Wood. Mr. Rosenberg, before we proceed further, may I sug-
gest that we will save a good deal of time if you will address your
answers to the question asked you, unless you think there is a pertinent
explanation you may care to make.
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Rosenberg, I ask if you will turn over the
records which you have and to which you have referred to an investi-
" See appendix.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1019
gator on the staff of this committee to review them, and later we will
determine whether or not it is necessary to bring yon back here and
ask you further questions relating to those documents?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavexner. I want you to explain to the committee very briefly
just what your procedure was in handling one of these requests from
the Russian Purchasing Commission for the acquisition of uranium
material.
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. You have told us what you did in the particular
€ase with Shattuck. After getting in touch with Shattuck, for in-
stance, and finding that the material was available, your next step,
as I understood, was to advise the Russian Purchasing Commission
that the materials had been found ?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. Now, will you tell us what your next step was ?
Mr. Rosenberg. We approached by telephone the War Production
Board. Miscellaneous Minerals Division, in Washington, to make sure
again, after a month had passed since we got that information about
M-285, whether the regulations were still the same, and we were told
that this order did not apply to an export delivery to the Soviet Pur-
chasing Commission, but we may inquire further from the United
States Engineers in New York. I phoned that office, the number of
which I got from the person I spoke to in the War Production Board
at Washington, and I spoke to Colonel Crenshaw, who told me that a
Lieutenant Burman had just been transferred to them from WPB,
that uranium was not their business, but this man would know better
than Colonel Crenshaw knew. However, in Lieutenant Burman's
absence he would suggest we go back to WPB, Washington, and talk
to Mr. Land's office, and if we got satisfaction there we should proceed
according to the advice we received there.
That is what I did. I called that office again and was told by Mr.
Park — I never had occasion to talk to Mr. Land, but I understand
Mr. Park was Mr. Land's assistant — that he had spoken to General
Wesson, and that we should take up the matter with their Lend-Lease
Department, Mr. Moore.
That is what I did. Mr. Moore told me that he had already been
approached by Mr. Fomichev of the Soviet Purchasing Commission
sometime back concerning a uranium requirement; that he happened
to know Mr. Fomichev ; and he would get in touch with him and let
me know. That was on or about March 3.
On March 6 I phoned Mr. Moore again and I got the permission
which I thought we had to get for this delivery, by phone, and subse-
quently by letter. I advised the Soviet Purchasing Commission in
w^riting about the fact that we had been informed by Mr. Moore of the
Lend-Lease Department that we did not need any further clearance for
this transaction, but that the Soviet Purchasing Commission would
have to apply for an export license, which I advised them to do.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you say you advised the Soviet Purchasing
Commission they should apply for an export license ?
Mr. Rosenberg. That we had been advised by Mr. Moore in writing
that no further clearance was required for this transaction except for
the export license, which the Soviet Purchasing Commission had to
get, and that they were familiar with the procedure. That was part
1020 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
of that letter. That information I passed on to the Russians, inform-
ing them that we woukl not accept the order unless and until they had
received the export license.
Mr. Tavenner. Did j^ou receive the export license for this first
shipment?
Mr. EosENBERG. We never received any export license for any deliv-
ery to any Allied mission, because it was the Allied mission's business
to attend to this part of the procedure, they being the actual exporters.
Mr. Tavenner. But you would not undertake to close a transaction
with the supplier until you were sure the export license had been
issued ; is that correct?
Mr. Rosenberg. Excuse me.
(Witness confers with his counsel.)
Mr. Rosenberg. This was ^the procedure in this particular case :
We had been notified that this product was subject to a War Produc-
tion Boaj-d order, and we wanted to proceed with particular care and
make sure that they received the export license before we accepted the
order, because this particular product was covered by a WPB order,
regardless of whether it was covered for this particular purpose by the
order or not.
Mr. Tam5Nner. Do you know whether such a license was issued?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. We have been told that by Mr. Moore and
by the Russian Purchasing Commission, who gave us a number and
the issuance date.
Mr. Tavenner. Did that export license accompany the bill of lading
on the shipment of the materials ?
Mr. Rosenberg. No.
Mr. Tavenner. What disposition was made of the export license
after it was issued ?
Mr. Rosenberg. That I do not know.
Mr. Ta\t:nner. Did it at any time come into your hands ?
Mr. Rosenberg. No.
Mr. Tavenner. Were you advised by the Russians what the pro-
cedure was as to the handling of the license ?
Mr. Rosenberg. No; we got shipping instructions from them and
it was a domestic destination.
Mr. Ta\t:nner. That is all I am going to ask you about the Shat-
tuck shipment. Did you receive another request for uranium after
the first one for 220 pounds each of uranium oxide and uranium
nitrate ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. When did you receive that?
Mr. Rosenberg. On or about March 19, 1943.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you then follow the same procedure with
Shattuck that you followed in the first case ?
Mr. Rosenberg. We sent them a telegram. We got an answer we
should wait a few days. On March 24 we got an offer from them
saying they could not offer what was required, because this Russian
inquiry said that they would preferably receive uranium oxychloride,
tri-, tetra-, or pentchloride, and Shattuck wired us they could merely
offer 500 pounds each of the products which they had shipped before.
Mr. Tavenner. Was that satisfactory to the Russian Purchasing
Commission, and did you attempt to close the transaction with Shat-
tuck?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1021
Mr. Rosenberg. We took the same stand — that we would not do
anythinof until they had received the export license.
Mr. Tavenner. Did the Soviet Purchasing Commission agree to
purchase the 500 pounds each from Shattuck ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes; subject to receipt of export license.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you know whether that export license was
denied at any time ; say, the 14th of April 194.3 ?
Mr. Rosenberg. I know that around April 7 we were told by the
Soviet Purchasing Commission that the export license would be
granted by BEW and they would have it within a week.
Mr. Tavenner. AVlio in BEW made that representation?
Mr. Rosenberg. We had this information from the Russians, be-
cause we had no contacts with BEW in this business.
Mr. Tavenner. Proceed, then, to tell us whether you later learned
that the license had been denied.
Mr. Rosenberg. May I refer to my notes ?
Mr. Wood. He didn't ask for any dates. Did you later learn the
export license w^as denied?
Mr. Rosenberg. No.
Mr. Tavenner. The Russians never told you they were having
trouble getting the license issued?
Mr. Rosenberg. I think they did, around the time you mentioned;
yes. May I read a note ?
Mr. TA^TNNER. If it is pertinent to this question.
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. All right.
Mr. Rosenberg. Wlien, on April 22, we received a telegram from
the Shattuck Co. that they withdrew their offer, I phoned the Soviet
Purchasing Commission and told them that. I will read this note,
now, which refers to a conversation with Mr. Fomichev :
Read him Shattuck's wire. He was not suiprised. They had written us their
last letter because they were experiencing already difUculties with WPB, Mis-
cellaneous Minerals Division, Mr. Peacock, who did not agree as yet to BEW's
giving the export license due to urgent domestic requirements.
Mr. Tavenner. So he was not surprised when the Shattuck Co.
withdrew its offer ?
Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct.
Mr. Ta\T':nner. Is that the first time you knew that there was diffi-
culty in obtaining the license?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir.
Mr. TA^^:NNER. I am not certain that I understood from your read-
ing whether Fomichev advised you that the license had been denied ?
Mr. Rosenberg. No. [Reading :]
because they were experiencing already difficulties with WPB, Miscellaneous
Minerals Division, Mr. Peacock, who did not agi*ee as yet to BEW's giving the
export license due to urgent domestic requirements.
Mr. Tavenner. Well, what occurred when you advised Fomicliev
that the offer had been withdrawn ?
Mr. Rosenberg (reading) :
We should try to maintain the offer of our supplier ; they, of course, cannot
con.sider us committed toward themselves, but they will do, if still jrossible, this
business with us and keep us posted about any further developments. We might
try meanwhile to find some other material for them, for which the chances of
materialization might be better, and advise them.
1022 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Tavennee. Did you take the matter up with Mr. Moore or any
other person in Lend-Lease when the offer was withdrawn ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Not at this time ; no.
Mr. Tavenner. Wliat supplier did you then contact for the material
after you were turned down by Shattuck ?
Mr. Rosenberg. I approached for advice the Fairmount Chemical
Co. on April 22, the day w^hen we got the withdrawal from Shattuck.
They told us that the only suppliers in the United States were Shattuck
and du Pont, who got their stuff from Canada, and that caused me to
get in touch the following day, April 23, with the Canadian Radium
& Uranium Corp., Mr. A. J. Pregel.
Mr. Tavenner. That was April 23 that you conferred with him ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. That was the only visit with him.
Mr. TxWEnner. Did he tell you he had the material available for
you, or what did he tell you ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Tliat as far as uranium compounds are concerned,
the United States and Canada are considered one country, with exactly
the same authorities in control of the entire production and stock.
Nevertheless, if we or the Russians want to find out whether for
Canadian material WPB would give allocation and export license
easier, they would accept the order.
Mr. Tavenner. If I understand you correctly, he told you if an
export license could be obtained
Mr. Rosenberg. Allocation and export license.
Mr. Taa^nner. An allocation could be obtained from Canada ?
Mr. Rosenberg. From our WPB easier for Canadian material than
for United States material, then they would accept the order.
Mr. Tavenner. I am not certain whether that is clear. Will you
state again what Mr. Alexander Pregel stated, or if you have it written,
let me read it.
(Witness hands paper to Mr. Tavenner.)
Mr. Tavenner. This is a memorandum dated April 23, and it
states :
Uranium compounds. Also as far as uranium compounds are concerned, the
United States and Canada are considered one country, with exactly the same
authorities in control of the entire production and stock. Nevertheless, if we or
the Russians want to find out whether for Canadian material WPB would give
allocation and export license easier, tliey would accept the order.
Mr. Harrison. In other words, if they would give it easier for
Canadian materials than for American materials; is that what you
mean ?
ISIr. Rosenberg. That is what I meant to bring out.
Mr. Tavenner (reading) :
Nevertheless, if we or the Russians want to find out whether for Canadian
material WPB would give allocation and export license easier.
In other words, if you could get a WPB authorization on an export
license they would be able to get it more easily in Canada ?
Mr. Rosenberg. The Soviets.
Mr. Tavenner. It says "we or the Russians." Does "we" mean
Chematar ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. What did you then proceed to do after receiving that
information from Mr. Alexander Pregel ?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1023
Mr. Rosenberg. I informed the Russians of that development and
received on April 26 a call from Mr. Fomichev that they had received
a letter from the Lend-Lease Administrator saying they had approved
the giving of an export license by BEW for the 500 pounds each of
uranium uranic oxide and nitrouranyl; that although they had not
received yet the actual export license, they now could place the order
finally, and we should see what we still could do with our supplier.
He said we could mention that they had received that advice from
General Wesson of the Lend-Lease Administration.
]\Ir. Tavenner. Did you know at that time that the license which
the Russians received was the license which Lend-Lease approved for
the original material which you were expecting to obtain from the
Shattuck Co. ? _ . .
Mr. Rosenberg. That is obvious, because I insisted on an amend-
ment of the export license to make it applicable.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you see the license before it was amended ?
Mr. Rosenberg. We never saw any license, but we were advised that
the license was amended in writing.
Mr. Tavenner. In fact, you considered it necessary to obtain an
amendment, because you were shipping different materials at different
prices ?
Mr. Rosenberg. By all means.
Mr. Tavenner. When did you advise the Russians that that license
would have to be amended ?
Mr. Rosenberg. April 27.
Mr. Ta-^tinner. What did you advise them ?
Mr. Rosenberg. I phoned them on April 27, and my telephone
report reads like this :
When I gave him (Mr. Fomichev) the negative reply as per Shattuck's tele-
gram, he said that he cannot comprehend this outcome but finally accepted the
situation as it is.
I made him the proposition concerning Canadian material as per our today's
letter, which he wanted to get to file the amendment of the export license. He
now has received the export license No. 1643180, dated April 23, for 500 lbs. each,
Chematar as supplier.
He objected to the fact our present prices are higher than previously quoted
for same material, which I explained was of Canadian origin.
Mr. TA^^NNER. Do I understand from that that you advised the
Russian purchasing commission that the license should be amended?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. We wrote them a long letter about it, also,
confirming this telephone conversation of the same day.
Mr. Tavenner. This is a copy of the letter you wrote ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes.
Mr. Ta\'enner. I desire to offer in evidence that letter, dated April
27, 1943, addressed to Mr. N. S. Fomichev, the Government Purchas-
ing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States of America,
1610 Park Road NW., Washington, D. C, signed Chematar, Inc., by
Hermann Rosenberg, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 8."
Mr. Wood. It will be admitted.
(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg
8,"' is hereinafter incorporated in the record.) ^^
Mr. Tavenner. You state in this letter that it is —
highly advisable that you (the Russian Purchasing Commission) try to get
through the respective amendment to your export license within 2 or 3 days.
" See appendix.
1024 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr, Walter. Is it stated in what respect the license should be
amended?
Mr. Tavenner. Without taking the time to read the entire letter,
does it state how the license should be amended ?
Mr. KosENBERG. Yes.
Mr. AVooD. Let's see the letter.
(Exhibit Rosenberg 8 was handed to Mr. Wood.)
Mr. Tavenner. Did you confer with Lend-Lease about the neces-
sity for the amendment ?
Mr. EosENBERG. No. sir. It was none of our business.
Mr. Tavenner. Well, you had confered with them before that re-
garding the issuance of the license. Wasn't it all the more important
now to get the license amended promptly ?
Mr. Rosenberg. We had not connnunicated with them regarding
the issuance of the license. We wanted to make absolutely sure that
under this WPB order, which prohibited the use of uranium com-
pounds in glassware, ceramics, and so forth, for domestic purposes
Mr. Tavenner. I am talking about Mr. Moore, in particular, of
Lend-Lease. You had been in touch with him on several occasions
about the issuance of the license ?
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Now, did you get in touch with Mr. Moore or any
other person in Lend-Lease about expediting the amendment, which
was the thing that was immediately confronting you at the time you
wrote this letter?
Mr. Rosenberg. I do not think that we did that, and I was by that
time under the impression that the special care which we wanted
to give this matter was not required under the order, since the clear-
ance was given, and since it was none of our business, anyhow.
Mr, Wood. I believe a reading of the copy of this letter would
clarify a good manj^ of the things we are asking about. The letter,
dated April 27, 1943, is directed to Mr, N. S. Fomichev, the Govern-
ment Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U. S. A.,
1610 Park Road NW., Washington, D. C. It is marked "Special
delivery" and is re : Uranium compounds :
Dear Mr. Fomichev : As we told you this afternoon, the plant, with which
we had made the arran,i,"enients, subject to actual receipt of Export License,
before they have had to dispose elsewhere of the 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide
and 500 pounds of nitrouranyl, could not accept the oi'der any more, due to other
arrangements they had to make during the long time until the export license
actually came into yoiu- hands.
We have actually done the utmost to accommodate you and were pleased that,
in spite of the ever growing tightness of the uranium situation, we thus were
able to submit to you the following proposition, which is to be understood of
course subject to change until you enable us this time to make absolutely iinal
arrangements on the basis of an export license in full conformity with our
proposal.
V^^e have made preparatory arrangements with Canadian supijliers, who have
told us that under the above outlined conditions the following order could be
accepted :
5(X) pounds of each or 1,000 pounds of one of black uranium oxide 95/98
percent UsOg, at .$3.10. Uranium nitrate crystals 99.5 percent pure, prac-
tically chemically pure, at $2.85 ; both prices to be understood per pound net
weight, including packing, f. o. b. United States point of delivery.
Delivery within ab.-i
Colonel Crenshaw. My first indication that t'he Russians had suc-
ceeded in obtaining a second quantity was, I believe, a question from
Colonel Xichols as to whether I knew anything about procurement of a
second quantity from any one whatsoever, and I told him that I did
not. Pie said that he had received an indication, of which he had
no proof or other detailed knowledge, that the Russians had succeeded
in having the second order filled. We didn't know the quantities, and
I don't believe we were even sure where they had gotten it. It was
more of a rumor than fact at that time.
Colonel Ruhoff and myself did have a talk with Mr. Pregel of the
Canadian Radium and Uranium Corp., and the results of that conver-
sation are, again, purely from long-distance memory and pretty much
guesswork. As I recall it, we said to Mr. Pregel : "Have you or have
you. not filled any orders for the Russians?" I believe he replied that
he had.
Mr. Wood. On that point. Colonel, I grant it has been a long while,
but that was a pretty important question, was it not ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, sir.
ISIr. Wood. Can you be positive that such a conversation as that did
take place and that you were informed it had been done ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I can be positive the conversation took places
As to exactly what transpired in that conversation, I cannot be posi-
tive, but I think it can be found in the records.
]Mr. Wood. Did you obtain from that conversation the information
that the order had been filled ?
Colonel Crenshaw. To the best of my knowledge, yes.
Mr. Tavenner. When did that conversation take place ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I believe May or June 1943. It was just at the
time I was getting ready to go to Oak Ridge and was turning my job
over to Colonel Ruhoff.
Mr. Tavenner. According to your best recollection at this time
that conversation took place and you gained information that a ship-
ment had been made ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I believe we gained the information that a ship-
ment had been made.
INIr. Tavenner. How long before that conference was it that Colonel
Nichols asked you if you knew of any source of supply ?
Colonel Crenshaw. As soon as he asked about it we immediately got
in touch with Mr. Pregel, and he came down to our office on Twenty-
seventh Street and we went over the whole matter with him.
Mr. Wood. For the purpose of the record, which Pregel was that ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Boris.
Mr. Tavenner. Who were present in that conference besides
yourself ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Major Ruhoff and Mr. Pregel.
Mr. Tavenner. That is Mr. Boris Pregel ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. What do you consider is the value to the Russians
of 500 pounds of uranium nitrate and 500 pounds of uranium oxide?
Colonel Crenshaw. I would say the value would be very, very
slight, if any. It might have been useful for experimental purposes ;
that is about all.
Mr. Tavenner. Wouldn't experimental purposes have to be the
start of an atomic enterprise ?
1060 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes; that is correct; but they could have
obtained that from other sources. Going to sources all over the world
and getting 500 pounds here and there, conceivably they may have
obtained a stock pile, but that is doubtful.
Mr. Tavenner. But it would have been of value for experimental
purposes ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes.
Mr. Walter. Where else was this material available?
Colonel Crenshaw. I understand that the Russians have rather
extensive deposits themselves. I don't know to what extent those
deposits have been developed. There are deposits in Tibet and Mada-
gascar and South America; and there were extensive deposits in
Czechoslovakia, which were in the hands of the Germans at that time;
and there Avas a large stock pile in Antwerp which was in German
hands at that time and not available to the Russians.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you or any person on the staif of the Man-
hattan Engineering District know that Mr. Pregel was going to fill
tliat order before it was filled and shipped?
Colonel Crenshaw. Xo, sir.
Mr. Tam^nner. The evidence is tliat some left the country on
May — I do not have the exact date before me — but was any effort
made to stop the shipment?
Colonel Crenshaw. The shipment had already gone, as I recall it,
by the time we even knew about it.
Mr. Tavenner. Had there been anv discussion, to vour knowledtje,
with Mr. Pregel, prior to the filling of that order by him, relating to
the filling of an order for any government other than the United
States or Canada ?
Colonel C'RENshav/. Yes ; there had been. I specifically remember
a discussion of sales to the British Government, and I believe that
discussion was prior to this shipment. I can't be positive of that
without the records, but that, again, would be in the records. In
addition, we didn't feel that it was particidarly necessary to discuss
the matter, because we had been oflfered voluntarily on the part of
Mr. Pregel all stocks of uranium and nitrate that they had in the
Eldorado mines or elsewhere.
]Mr. Woon. Prior to that shipment ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Prior to that shipment ; yes.
Mr. Ta\^nner. When was that agreement reached?
Colonel Crenshaw. I can't be positive of that. It might have been
as early as January or February 1943.
Mr. Wood. Was that commitment in writing or oral?
Colonel Crenshaw. I think it was in writing.
Mr. Tav'enner. You think it was in writing?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes.
Mr. Wood. As early as January or February?
Colonel Crenshaw. It could have been any time between January
and April.
]VIr. Wood. At the time you had your conversation with Mr. Pregel
which you have detailed, in the presence of the officer next in command
to you, did you have at that time the written commitment from Mr.
Pregel giving the Manhattan District first option to any material on
hand or that it might acquire ?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1061
Colonel Crenshaw. I believe it was in our files ; yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Are you referring to an agreement of March 27 De-
tween Manhattan District and Canadian Radium and Uranium Corp.,
which specified certain materials should be delivered, and giving the
code numbers in the agreement?
Colonel Crenshaw. No. I am referring to an earlier informal
agreement that was later expressed by that contract or by a contract
of a later date.
Mr, TA^"ENNER. And that earlier understanding was reduced to a
written agreement?
Colonel Crenshaw. I think it was. I think Mr. Pregel wrote us
a letter offering the stock and I believe stating a time limit on it.
Mr. Wood. Categorically, can you state that there was such an
agreement and understanding with Mr. Pregel that you should have
the first option to purchase uranium material ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes ; I can.
Mr. Tavenner. Regarding the contract of March 27, do you have
any independent recollection of when it was actually executed and
delivered?
Colonel Crenshaw. No; I do not. It probably would have been
negotiated at a considerably earlier date than the actual date of the
contract, because those contracts were very complicated and normally
they took a long period of time to negotiate.
Mr. Ta\t.nner. In the earlier part of your testimony you referred
to the fact that after this first shipment arrangements were made with
other agencies to notify you of interests shown by other governments
in uranium?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Tell us about that, what arrangements were made
and with whom.
Colonel Crenshaw. I think we had arranged with both the Bmrd
of Economic Warfare and the War Production Board to advise us of
any interest in uranium compounds or uranium metal.
Mr. Ta\t5nner. By the Soviet Purchasing Agency ?
Colonel Crenshaw. By anyone.
Mr. Ta\^nner. By anyone?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, sir,
Mr, Ta\^nner. With whom were those arrangements made ?
Colonel Crenshaw, I cannot answer that question. Mr, Burman
handled those transactions and I believe his memory or his records
would be rather complete on that subject.
Mr. Ta^'enner. When the time came to consider the advisability of
the approval of the second license, with whom did you deal in Lend-
Lease? Who conferred with you from Lend-Lease, by telephone or
personally or by letter?
Colonel Crenshaw. Mr, Hoopes, and I think Mr, Moore.
Mr. Tavenner. Any other persons?
Colonel Crenshaw. Those were the only two at that time,
Mr. Ta^^nner. The Board of Economic Warfare was the issuing
agency. Did you have a conference with anyone from the Bureau of
Economic Warfare regarding this license?
Colonel Crenshaw. I did not personally, so far as I can recollect.
Lieutenant Burman handled all the details of those transactions.
1062 . SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
JNIr. Tavenner. Did you at any time confer with anyone from the
Board of Economic Warfare, or did any other person in your organiza-
tion, to your knowledge, with regard to this particular license?
Colonel Crenshaw. I am sure that Mr. Burman must have con-
ferred with them. It may or may not have been after the license was
issued. I know that Maj. Allen Johnson in General Groves' office
would have been the logical one to handle that particular transaction.
Mr. Wood. This is the second quorum call. The committee will
have to stand in adjournment until 2 o'clock.
(Thereupon, a recess was taken until '2 p. m. of the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
(The hearing was resumed at 2 : 30 p. m.)
Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.
TESTIMONY OF COL. THOMAS T. CRENSHAW— Resumed
INIr. Tavenner. I was asking you at the close of the morning session
about the names of officials of the Bureau of Economic Warft\re who
conferred with you or other members of your staff relating to the sec-
ond export license. Can you recall the names of any?
Colonel Crenshaw. IMr. Hoopes and Mr. Moore.
IVIr. Tavenner. ]Mr. Hoopes and Mr. Moore were in Lend-Lease.
My question related to the Bureau of Economic Warfare.
Colonel Crenshaw. I do not recall having any direct connection
with anyone in BEW. That was all handled through Burman, and
I probably talked to various individuals in the Board of Economic
Warfare at some time, but I do not recall their names.
Mr. Tavenner. Did persons in that organization, regardless of what
their names may be, confer with you regarding the issuance of this par-
ticular license ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Not to my recollection ; not directly with me,
but they did with my particular group in Manhattan District.
Mr. Tavenner. What members of your group ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Lieutenant Burman, I am quite sure.
Mr. Tavenner. Any other persons whose names you can give?
Colonel Crenshaw. Possibly Captain Merritt.
Mr. Taa-enner. Any others ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I think that would be all ; and General Groves.
Mr. TA^^NNER. And General Groves ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any knowledge of the purpose of their
interviews and what took place?
Colonel Crenshaav. There were general discussions regarding the
issuance of the license, and it would have been in regard to that. Spe-
cifically, I don't have any knowledge of what transpired.
Mr. Taat:nner. Do you know what attitude or position the officials
of the Bureau of Economic Warfare took with regard to the question
of whether this license should be issued or not?
Colonel Crenshaw. Not directly, but during the recess I was search-
ing my memory a bit, and something occurred to my mind that has a
bearing on this question, as well as the question you asked earlier as to
the motive for issuing the license for the secon(i shipment. I believe
that somewhere in the files of the district there will be found a memo-
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1063
raiidum with my signature which indicated that General Groves had
decided to issue' the export license because of pressure that was being
brought to bear. That word "pressure" may have been my own word
or it may have been General Groves' word. I don't know the implica-
tion of it. But I am sure there is such a memorandum.
Mr. Wood. Did you say that in your memorandum ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, sir. I believe that will be found in the
files. I can't be positive about that.
Mr. Kearney. Pressure from whom ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I don't recall. It might have been from Lend-
Lease; it might have been the pressure from the Russians themselves
tliat they were exerting on all possible agencies.
Mr. Ta\tenner. A matter of that importance, don't you think you
could tell us something about the character of the pressure?
Colonel Ckenshaw\ No, sir. I don't recall, and I don't know
whether the word "pressure" was my own word or whether it occurred
in a conversation with General Groves. I didn't talk to him face to
face, but did have telephone conversations with him.
Mr. Tavenner. Was there an indication of where pressure came
from, if it existed ?
Colonel CRENSHA^v. No, sir. I can't clarify it further than that.
]\Ir. Wood. You state as a fact that the term "pressure" was used in
some connection?
Colonel Crenshaw. That is my recollection, and I believe such a
memorandum could be found.
Mr. Tavenner. The staff of the committee has been informed that
there was a telephone conversation between Captain Merritt of your
office and Mr. Hoopes of Lend-Lease, which conversation Captain Mer-
ritt could not recall, in which Captain Merritt is alleged to have stated
that pressure had just been brought upon General Groves to change
his mind with regard to the approval of the license. Does that refresh
your recollection in any way ?
Colonel Crenshaw. No ; except to the extent that it might be tied
in with the other memorandum which I just mentioned.
Mr. Taat.nner. In other words, the two things may be the same ?
Colonel Crenshaw. It is quite possible, yes.
]Mr. Tavenner. Do you recall discussing the subject of pressure
with any member of the staff ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I have no specific recollection of it except that
that term does linger in my mind.
Mr. Tavenner. Did General Groves ever tell you that pressure had
been applied or exercised ?
Colonel Crenshaw\ I cannot specifically remember. It is quite
possible that he used the term himself.
Mr. Tavenner. Did Captain Merritt or Lieutenant Burman ever
refer to pressure being exercised in connection with their discussion
of the matter ?
Colonel Crenshaw^ No. I have no recollection of that, and I don't
believe pressure would have been placed on them, anyway. It would
come at the top,
Mr. Tavenner. Do you recall whether or not the pressure you are
speaking of came from within some Government agency, or without?
Colonel Crenshaw. No, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. You mean you have no recollection ?
1064 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Colonel Crenshaw. I have no recollection.
Mr. TAi'ENNER, As you look back upon that occasion now, are you
aware of anything that you would now call pressure having been
brought to bear upon you by any member of Lend-Lease Administra-
tion, directly or indirectly?
Colonel Crenshaw. No. I don't think pressure would be a proper
term to use. Lend-Lease was anxious to cooperate with the Russians.
They were our allies. I think that was policy. Naturally, Lend-
Lease was doing everything possible to get material for our allies.
But I don't know of any instance when anybody attempted to exercise
undue pressure on me.
(Representative McSweeney enters the hearing room.)
Mr. Tavenner. Or on any member of your staff ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Or on any member of my staff.
Mr. Tavenner. Does that apply to BEW?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes ; the same there.
Mr. Tavenner. And what about the War Production Board?
Colonel Crenshaw. The same.
Mr. TA^^NNER. Did you learn during the course of your employment
that the export license which had been issued for the 500 pounds of
uranium nitrate and 500 pounds of uranium oxide on April 23, 1943,
was amended on April 29, 1943 ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I don't recall.
Mr. Ta\t:nner. Was the question of amendment of the license ever
brought to your attention by an official of the Board of Economic
Warfare, which was the licensing agency, or the Lend-Lease Admin-
istration ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I don't remember that. If an amendment was
made it probably would have been brought to my attention, directly
or indirectly, however.
Mr. Tavenner. At the time when you were concerned with the source
of all material of this character in the United States, and when you
were actively engaged in protecting it, was the question of amendment,
which would indicate a new source of supply had been located, a very
important matter to your group ?
Colonel Crenshaw. It would not necessarily have been, in that there
could have been manj^ reasons for amendment. As I recall the prac-
tice on export licensing, it seems to me an amendment was required
even if it was a price change, so it might or might not have been im-
portant.
Mr. TA^^:NNER. But if on the 22d of April you had succeeded in
stopping or barricading compliance by Shattuck, then the amendment
at a later date for any reason would show a reactivation of intei-est
in that license, wouldn't it?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. Well, not necessarily, because it may have
been the intent to allow that license to stand as a blanket license, giv-
ing the Russians what we might term a fishing license to get the mate-
rial if they could, therefore we were cooperating with them.
Mr. Ta^-enner. When that license was prepared in the terms of the
original contract with Shattuck Co., that was true, but when a few
days later they changed its terms, wouldn't that indicate they had
found a new source of supply, otherwise there woidd be no reason for a
change ?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1065
Colonel Crenshaw. In the licensing procedure I assume that the
exact quantity must be shown before the license could be issued. I
don't remember that point.
Mr. Taat:nner. It showed the description of the material and the
price and the supplier.
Colonel Crenshaw. Well, then, presumably that should have been
an indication that something was going on.
Mr. Tavenner. Would an amendment be made to an export license
without conferring again with the Manhattan Engineering District
where the original license had been approved ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Not unless someone in the Board of Economic
Warfare did a lot of assuming.
Mr. Ta\tenner. What do you mean ?
Colonel Crenshaw. That is, unless they had assumed, because we
once had authorized the license to be issued, we wanted it to stand in
the case of changes. That seems unlikely.
Mr. Tavenner. Did the Board of Economic Warfare know of the
general opposition of the Manhattan District to the sale of uranium
for export ?
Colonel Crenshaw. They must have inferred that from the diffi-
culty in getting export licenses for the material. I don't think we
ever stated to them specifically that we did not want to ship it to the
Russians. I think that would have been an unwise statement to have
made at the time to another Government agency.
Mr. Tavenner. As far as you know, there was no reference of the
matter back to the Manhattan Engineering District on the question
of amendment of the license ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Not to my recollection.
(Representative Velde leaves the hearing room.)
Mr. Wood. If the fact that this particular export license was
amended so as to include a different source of supply had come to
your attention before the shipment was made and the deal closed, what
would have been your attitude about it ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I think we immediately would have tried to
find out what this other source was, and immediately taken steps to
block that also.
Mr. Wood. To block it?
Colonel Crenshaw. I think we would have ; yes.
Mr. Wood. That had been your policy before ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes.
Mr. Wood. And wouldn't it particularly have been your policy if
you found that supplier was under contract to you to give the Govern-
ment first option on all material it was within its power to control?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. I think the answer to that is "Yes,"
although it needs some amplification.
Mr. Wood. Let's see if it does. You say the source of supply that
finally furnished this material under an amended license was under
an agreement to you prior to the date of shipment. If it had come
to your attention that this source of supply was seeking to sell this
material that was under option to you to the Russians or any other
country on which there was a ban, would you have taken any action?
Colonel Crenshaw. We would have attempted to do so, but I don't
know that we could have done so legally, even under the terms of the
1066 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
contract. There are several ramifications on that which I can explain,
if you wish.
Mr. Wood. My purpose in asking the question was to find out what
your attitude would have been.
Colonel Crenshaw. We would have attempted to block it. I am
sure of that.
Mr. Ta\t3XNER. Assuming Chematar was the supplier through
which both Shattuck Co. and the Canadian Eadimn & Uranium Corp.
furnished the material, do you know whether or not the license would
have been in the name of the agent rather than in the name of the
actual supplier ? Do you know what the practice was ?
Colonel Crensiix\w. No.
Mr. Taa'enner. You don't know if it was the practice to have the
license in the name of the agent rather than the supplier ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I don't recall that.
(Eepresentative Kearney leaves the hearing room.)
Mr. Tavenner. Were you familiar with the handling of heavy-
water transactions ?
Colonel Crenshaw. No. That was outside my department entirely.
Mr. Ta\"enner. Whose department was that in ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Colonel Nichols himself handled most of that
directly.
Mr. Taat.nner. Do you know whether any requests were submitted
to the INIanhattan Engineering project with regard to the approval of
sales of heavy water?
Colonel Crenshaw. I have no knowledge of any request.
Mr. Tavenner. Was heavy water considered at that time a strategic
material, that is, during 1943, 1944, and 1945, by Manhattan Engi-
neering District?
Colonel Crenshaw. It was by Manhattan District.
]\Ir. Tavenner. Do you know if the other Government agencies
knew of that appraisal that Manhattan Engineering District placed
on the material?
Colonel Crenshaw. I very much doubt it.
Mr. Tavenner. If that information was solely the information of
Manhattan Engineering District, what safeguard could be placed upon
the sale for export of heavy water by the action of other Govern-
ment agencies, if no agency but your own knew about the importance
of it?
Colonel Crenshaw. It would have been possible to do the same thing
we did with uranium, that is, to require approval of export licenses,
but that would have called attention to heavy water.
Mr. Tavenner. All materials the Russians asked for were not sub-
mitted to you to see whether you were interested in them, were they ?
Colonel Crenshaw. No. But had we gone to BEW and requested
them to advise us of any requests for licenses for heavy water, that
would have been an indication we were interested in heavy water.
Mr. Ta\t:nner. Does that mean that the matter was of such a secret
character that you would not even want to inform the responsible
heads of other Government agencies of the importance of the material ?
Colonel Crenshaw. That is correct, unless it was considered very
important to control it. There, again, heavy water was being pro-
duced commercially, but it was almost a laboratory curiosity.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1067
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know how it occurred that the matter of
uranium was first taken up with the Manhattan Engineering Dis-
trict at the time the export license for the first shipment had been
issued ? Was it the result of initiative on the part of the Manhattan
Engineering District, or on the part of some other Government
agency ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I don't recall how that matter came to our at-
tention. I think we got a routine list of all requests for uranium
compounds.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the character of that list? I haven t
heard of it before.
Colonel Crenshaw. Periodically — I don't remember how often —
it is my recollection that either the Board of Economic Warfare or
Lend-Lease or both submitted to us a list of all requests for uranium
compounds. In addition, after the controls were put on the use of
uranium in the ceramics industry, we got a list showing all uranium
transactions in the ceramics industry, which had to be approved by
BEW, I believe, and indirectly by us.
Mr. Tavenner. We have located one list furnished by Lend-Lease
in July 1943, or it may have been 1944, of transactions which had pre-
viously occurred with regard to uranium, but was any list furnished
at an earlier date than that ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, sir ; I am sure that it was.
Mr. Tavenner. Did that list relate solely to the uranium com-
pounds, or did it relate to chemicals generally ?
Colonel Crenshaw. To the best of my recollection it related to
uranium compounds only.
Mr. Tavenner. When was a report of that character first sub-
mitted?
Colonel Crenshaw. It must have been certainly as early as March
1943, and undoubtedly prior to that time.
Mr. Tavenner. At whose instance was that report filed and
prepared ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I think that was an arrangement which Mr.
Burman was able to negotiate with Lend-Lease and/or BEW.
Mr. Tavenner. Then from the time that request was made, those
organizations would have known of the importance of that material ?
Colonel Crenshaw. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. I have no further questions.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Case.
Mr. Case. In all, how many requests for uranium compounds from
the Soviet Purchasing Commission came to the attention of the
Chemical Warfare Service ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I can't answer that question.
Mr. Case. How many came to your attention?
Colonel Crenshaw. I recall only one. There may have been others.
Mr. Case. That one was for how much and what?
Colonel Crenshaw. I believe the exact quantities were covered in a
letter which you showed me earlier, Mr. Tavenner. I don't recall the
exact quantities.
Mr. Case. Were you aware of a request for uranium materials in
the summer of 1943 ?
c-r
1068 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Colonel Crenshaw. If it was prior to the 1st of July, I was no
longer in that particular department of the district.
Mr. Case. Prior to July 1, 1943?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes.
Mr. Case. Did you either hear or know of a renewal of that request
hi 1944?
Colonel Crenshaw. I think I have heard of it indirectly, but not in
an official capacity.
Mr. Case. When did you hear of it ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I couldn't answer that, sir. It must have been
during my service with Manhattan District. It could even have been
after that time.
Mr. Case. Did any request for uranium compounds from any com-
pany or any purchasing commission other than that of the Soviet
Union come to your attention when you were connected with the
Chemical Warfare Service ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I was not connected with the Chemical War-
fare Service, sir.
Mr. Case. Well, in your capacity ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Will you repeat that question ?
Mr. Case. Did any request for uranium compounds from any pur-
chasing commission other than that of the Soviet Union come to your
attention while you were engaged in this work?
Colonel Crenshaw. I don't recall any that came to the attention of
the Manhattan District. The British, of course, were interested in this
material, and while we had no control, all the shipments to Great
Britain were taken up with us informally.
Mr. Case. Shipments of uranium to Great Britain ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. May I modify that "shipments" to
"shipment." I know of only one.
Mr. Case. Which one was that ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I believe it was made in the spring of 1943.
Mr. Case. Do you know how much and what it was ?
Colonel Crenshaw. Approximately 15 tons of uranium oxide.
Mr. Tavenner. What about sales to the French Government ?
Colonel Crenshaw. I know of none, sir. France was occupied
at that time, and we normally would have had no transactions with
them.
Mr. Wood. In view of the continued persistence of the quorum bells,
I will adjourn the committee until 10 o'clock in the morning.
(Thereupon, at 3 p. m. on Wednesday, January 25, 1950, an adjourn-
ment was taken until Thursday, January 26, 1950, at 10 a. m.)
H BAKINGS EEGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATEEIAL
TO THE SOVIET UNION DUKING WOKLD WAR II
THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1950
United States House of RErRESENTATiVES,
Committee on Un-American Activities,
Washington^ D. C.
PUBLIC HEARINGS
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 : 30 a. m., in
room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman)
presiding.
Committee members present : Eepresentatives John S. Wood (chair-
man). Francis E. Walter, Morgan M. Moulder, Richard M. Nixon,
Francis Case, Harold H. Velde, and Bernard W. Kearney.
Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J.
Russell, senior investigator; Donald T. Appell and Courtney Owens,
investigators; John W. Carrington, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, direc-
tor of research ; and A. S. Poore, editor.
Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order.
If there are any Members of Congress present in the audience, they
are invited to come up and sit W' ith the committee.
Mr. Counsel, are you ready to proceed ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, soon
after the appearance of Gen. Leslie R. Groves before this committee
on December 7, 1949, Mr. Henry A. Wallace expressed a desire to
appear before this committee. The committee, at its first meeting
after that, unanimously agreed to his appearance, and Mr. Wallace is
now here as a volunteer witness. May he be called at this time?
Mr. Wood. Without objection on the part of the committee, yes.
Mr. Wallace, it is noted that there are several photographers here
from the press. It is a rule of this committee that a witness brought
before it shall not be photographed without his permission. Do you
object to having your picture made by the photographers?
Mr. Wallace. No ; I have no objection, although I would prefer if
they get them out of the way soon, because if they continue to wait
for some abnormal posture, they create some confusion. If we could
just get it out of the way now I would appreciate it. If they want me
to make certain kinds of gestures, I don't mind.
(Photographs were taken.)
Mr. Wallace. Mr. Chairman, I understand that the stenographer
is going to make a special effort to get the transcript of questions and
answers ready as soon as possible, and would it be all right to circu-
late it among the press that they can, at a certain place, get the tran-
script of questions and answers?
^ 1069
1070 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Tavenner. I am certain those arrangements can be made with
the reporter. She is very accommodating about matters of that kind.
Mr. Wallace, Certain members of the press approached me as to
whether I would be so kind to provide that service myself, and I said
I would in case the committee was not in position to do so.
Mr. Wood. We must have order in the committee room, ladies and
gentlemen, at all times.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr, Chairman, may I suggest for the sake of orderly
procedure that the witness be sworn and I be permitted to make certain
inquiries relating to the subject under investigation, after which the
witness be given an opportunity to explain any matter relevant to the
investigation which is not covered by my examination.
Mr, Wood, If you will stand, Mr. Wallace, and be sworn, please, sir.
Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give this committee shall be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Wallace, I do so solemnly swear,
TESTIMONY OF HENRY A. WALLACE
Mr, Tavenner, Mr. Wallace, were you a member of the War Pro-
duction Board, and, if so, over what period of time did you serve as
a member?
Mr. Wallace. I was a member of the War Production Board and
the predecessor group, the Supply, Priorities, and Allocation Board,
which was set up in late August or early September 19-11. I was Chair-
man of that Board, and if it met with the desire of the committee would
go into considerable details as to why I was made Chairman.
That Board was replaced about January 15, 191:2, by the War Pro-
duction Board. I remained as a member of the War Production
Board in my capacity as head of the Board of Economic Warfare, and
continued as a member until July 19 or 20, 1943, at which time I wrote
a letter to Mr, Donald Nelson resigning from the Board, and on July 21
I find in my records a letter to the President of the United States in-
dicating why I resigned from the Board at that time,
JNIr. Tavenner. ^^^lo was Chairman of the Board during the year
1943 ?
Mr. Wallace. Of the War Production Board ?
Mr. Ta"\^nner. Yes; of the War Production Board.
Mr, Wallace. Mr. Donald Nelson.
Mr. Tavenner, Who were the members of the Board at that time
beside yourself?
Mr, Wallace, That is a matter of record. They were the heads
of the armed services, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
State — it is a matter of the public record. There were quite a number.
I think War Manpower was represented. I think you must have that
■iilready in your records.
Mr, Ta\^nner. Yes. I will just ask you this : Was there representa-
tion on that Board of other Government agencies, such as the Office
of Lend-Lease?
Mr, Wallace, Yes; I am quite sure the Office of Lend-Lease was
there, Harry Hopkins, so far as I recollect, did not sit in on the War
Production Board meetings.
Mr, Ta\'enner. Incidentally, I see you are accompanied by a gentle-
man here. Are you represented by counsel ?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1071
Mr. Wallace. Yes. This is Mr. Walter Freedman, who used to be
an attorney with the Board of Economic Warfare, dealing especially
with the export licenses, and I have asked him to come both in that ca-
pacity and as counsel. Freedman is spelled F-r-e-e-d-m-a-n.
Mr. Tavenner. And what is his first name and middle initial ?
Mr. Freedman. Walter. There is no middle initial.
Mr. TA^^ENNER. And your address? [Addressing Mr. Freedman.]
Mr. Freedman. Washington Building, Washington, D. C.
Mr. Tavenner. Briefly, what were your duties as a member of the
War Production Board ?
Mr. Wallace. When Mr. Samuel Rosenman approached me, at the
suggestion of President Roosevelt, that I sit on SPAB — Supply, Prior-
ities, and Allocation Board — it was suggested that my place on SPAB
was particularly to represent those foreign countries that were not
under lend-lease. The Supply, Priorities, and Allocation Board had
to do with the allotment of the production of the United States. The
Board of Economic Warfare was particularly concerned with Latin
America, Therefore it was felt that there should be representation on
the War Production Board of the Board of Economic Warfare.
There was also another reason why I was on the SPAB which is
not particularly germane to the subject under discussion today, and
that is because there was a serious disagreement among the predeces-
sor agency — I believe it was 0PM — between certain groups. One
group thought we ought to stop all production of automobiles, for
example, so that we could produce more tanks. We .were not in the
war yet. Another group thought we should go ahead producing
automobiles.
The President and Samuel Rosenman came to the conclusion that I,
by reason of my office, could step in and establish a chain of command
that would stop the discord and make a firm policy at this time when
we were not in the war. In other words, they invoked the prestige
of my office to get a job done they would not get done any other way.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you devote quite a bit of time and attention to
the duties of your office on that Board ?
Mr. Wallace. As chairman of SPAB, I did. This was in the fall
of 1941. I am very proud of the work that I did at that time in
connection with Donald Nelson. I think we did a remarkable job
that made a very great difference in the later war effort. But after
Donald Nelson became Chairman of the War Production Board my
activities were not so great.
Mr. TA^nENNER. But they were great enough so that you were fa-
miliar with the general procedural requirements regarding the trans-
actions of the War Production Board, were they not ?
Mr. Wallace. No. You see, the President urged me, when I took
on both of these duties, which were not customary for Vice Presidents,
as you well recognize, that I not get into administration details. He
urged me not to do that in the first instance. I was, of course, enor-
mously concerned with getting the greatest possible production, and
when something came up in connection with rubber, for instance, in
which I was intensely interested, I took a definite interest because
I had a competence in the field ; but with regard to the general run of
War Production Board activities, I did not take a detailed interest.
Mr. Tavenner. The War Production Board was, however, vitally
1072 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
concerned not only with the production but the control of material
that had been produced. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Wallace. And the Supply, Priorities, and Allocation Bof^rd
set up the conditions under which the controls were put in effect.
Mr. Tav^enxer. And when any matter of policy was involved in
questions that would arise in the functioning of the Board, you were
actJA^e and participated in those matters?
Mr. Wallace. When they were brought up to the Board level, and
there is always a question of what was.
Mr. Taa-exner. Were you a member of the committee known as
the ]Military Policy Committee ?
Mr. Wallace. Not to the best of my recollection. You mean of
the War Production Board?
Mr. Tavenner. Whether it was an adjunct of the War Production
Board or not, I can't say.
Mr. Wallace. There was a Military Policy Committee that had to
do with the atom bomb. That had nothing to do with the War Pro-
duction Board.
Mr. Tavenner. I understand.
Mr. Wallace. No; I was not connected with the Military Policy
Committee.
Mr. Ta\tenner. Were you connected with that Committee in any
way?
Mr. Wallace. No; I was not connected with that Committee. If
you want to go into the entire atomic-bomb matter, I can go into it
chronologically.
Mr. Tavenner. Yes ; we would like to know what your connection
was with the atomic-bomb project.
Mr. Wallace. The whole matter of atomic energy was first brought
to my attention by matters in public print in 1939 and 1940. In one
of the popular magazines there was an article about U-235 in 1939 ;
and on May 5. 1940, there was an article by William E. Lawrence of
the New York Times; it was on the front page, and went into the
details of U-235.
Then it was brought to my attention in a strong way by Dr. Vanne-
var Bush on June 29, 1940, when I was Secretary of Agriculture. He
told me about the job that had just been assigned to him by President
Roosevelt. Dr. Vannevar Bush and I had known each other for some
time, we had mutual acquaintances, and I think he had respect for my
scientific ability. So he told me of this job that had been assigned
to him by President Roosevelt a short time previously.
Mr. Tavenner. What was that job that was assigned to him?
Mr. Wallace. He was assigned the job of looking into the possibili-
ties of using U-235 to make an atom bomb.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you serve on the Committee with him ?
Mr. Wallace. If you will allow me to go ahead with the chronology,
I will indicate just how that worked out.
Mr. Taatenner. Very well.
Mr. Wallace. As I remember it, he did not come to see me again
until July 23 of 1941, after I was Vice President. In the former meet-
ing he had indicated that the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin was
working very hard on this matter of making an atomic bomb. In this
July 23, 1941, meeting, he said that it now looked much more possible
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1073
to make a bomb than it had when he had seen me before, and at this time
we swore each other to secrecy. And then, I guess Pearl Harbor came.
I have these dates written down. I want to be sure of getting this
just right. I don't want to do too much from memory on this. I
think I had better read this off.
It was in tlie fall of 1941 that a Top Policy Committee was formed
composed of myself, I was the ranking member of it, I would assume;
the Secretary of War, Secretary Stimson ; Chief of Staff, General Mar-
shall ; Dr. Bush ; and Dr. Conant.
This Top Policy Committee was very important in the early stage
of the game, but had no importance after the construction really
started. It was very important in 1941 and 1942.
We held a meeting in my office in the Senate Office Building on
December 16, 1941, 9 days after Pearl Harbor, w^liich was attended
by Secretary Stimson, by Dr. Vannevar Bush, myself, and Harold
Smith. Harold Smith was not a member of the committee, but
Harold Smith attended in his capacity as Director of the Budget.
The work hitherto had largely been of a research nature, and it was
now apparent that large sums of money were going to be involved.
This was an absolutely secret thing, and I think it is one of the
miracles of the war that it was kept so absolutely secret; nobody
talked; but the question was how to get large sums of money and
yet maintain absolute secrecj'. That was the problem before this
December 16, 1941, meeting of the top policy committee. Therefore,
Harold Smith was present and rendered very valuable service in find-
ing some way of getting the money. What he did, I don't know, but
he did get very large sums of money.
At that meeting it was decided that certain pilot plants should be
started. Dr. I3ush came in to see me several times during 1942 with
regard to signing reports to be transmitted to the President.
The only two times the Top Policy Committee met that I am aware
of were on this December 16, 1941, and on September 23, 1942. The
only meeting I attended was the December 16, 1941, meeting. I
just returned from out of town during the day on September 23, and
did not attend that meeting. That was the meeting which General
Groves attended for the first time, as I understand it. Because I
didn't attend the meeting, I did not meet General Groves at that time.
So far as I can determine from consulting my record, I did not meet
General Groves until April 14, 1944.
I talked with Dr. Vannevar Bush yesterday to confirm my recollec-
tion, and I asked him what was his recollection of the relationship
between the Military Policy Committee which w^as set up in the fall
of 1942 with General Groves as the executive officer, what was the
relationship, the chain of command, and his recollection was the
same as mine, that General Groves was under the Military Policy
Committee and had no business reporting to the Top Policy Committee
unless he was so directed by the Military Policy Committee. In other
words, the Top Policy Committee, after that second meeting on Sep-
tember 23, 1942, really ceased to have active existence. However, if
any matter of unusual, broad significance came up outside the field of
military competence, I have no doubt that Dr. Bush would have con-
sulted me. The chain of command was from Dr. Bush to me, rather
than General Groves, unless General Groves was delegated by Dr.
Bush or Secretary Stimson to consult me.
99334 — .50 1 2
1074 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
The only matter of broad policy that came up after the second
meeting of the Top Policy Committee of September 23, 1942, had to
do with the sharing of certain construction details of the atom bomb
with Great Britain, That is my recollection of it. And Dr. Vannevar
Bush came to see me about that on two separate occasions after that
September 23, 1942, meeting.
Mr. Tavenner. Although there were only two occasions, you state,
when meetings of the Top Policy Committee were held, there were sub-
sequent occasions, were there not, when the individual members of
that committee met informally and discussed problems 'i
Mr. Wallace. None, so far as I know. There probably were meet-
ings, I would assume, l3etween Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant, or between
Dr. Bush, Dr. Conant, and Secretary Stimson. You see, this became,
after September 1942, a military effort, and Dr. Bush was working
closely with the military, and Dr. Conant, Dr. Bush's assistant, was
working very closely with the military. Secretary Stimson, of course,
was Secretary of War, and General Marshall was Chief of Staff. I
was the only one not in the military activity. They may have had
frequent meetings, but I never sat on any of them.
Mr. Tavenner. Who was chairman ?
Mr. Wallace. Of the Top Policy Committee ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
Mr. Wallace. So far as I know, I was the ranking member. The
first meeting was held in my office. After that, actually the man who
was at work continuously on the problem was the man who had been
designated by President Roosevelt on June 15, 1940, Dr. Vannevar
Bush. He was the man who had been delegated by President Roose-
velt to work on the problem, and he was the man who really determined
if a meeting was to be held. He was the man who had all the contacts.
From what Dr. Bush told me. Dr. Bush had frequent contacts w^ith
the President, and, from what Dr. Bush told me, the President, during
these early stages, wanted these matters cleared with me, because I
was second in command in the Nation. Also, the President at that
time had, I think, considerable confidence in my scientific judgment.
I do know I talked to the President about the importance of the
l^roject and why it was important to back it with sufficient money.
That was in the early stages, when it was getting off the ground. My
significance after 1942, 1 would say, in regard to this, was practically
nil. That doesn't reflect on me or doesn't reflect on anybody else. It
had passed out of the scientific stage into the construction stage.
Mr. Tavenner. I am only asking for the facts.
Mr. Wallace. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. Were you the presiding officer at the meeting of the
Top Policy Committee which you attended ^
Mr. Wallace. I can't answer that, for the simple reason I do not
have any notes in my records in regard to tliat. It was held in my
office, and, knowing how I act in situations of that kind, I presume it
was an absolutely informal thing. Secretary Stimson, Vannevar
Bush, and myself talked it over. ''We just got into a war, and the
Germans are hard at work on this, how are we going to get this job
done?" There was nobody there to take any minutes of the meeting.
Harold Smith, Director of the Budget, may have taken some. He is
dead. Secretary Stimson, I understand, is not in the best of health.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1075
General Marshall was not there. The only one I think would have
specific information about that meeting is Dr. Bush.
Mr. Tavenner. The British problem you mentioned a while ago,
what was the general character of that problem which the Top Policy
Committee had to deal with, and when did that problem arise?
Mr. Wallace. On December 20, 1942, Vannevar Bush came to see
me about it, and said that there was a disagreement between ourselves
and the British in regard to it.
Mr. Tavenner. In regard to what ?
Mr. AVallace. How much information should be given the British
with regard to construction details. The British had been very help-
ful to us in regard to scientific matters.
Mr. Tavenner. Had the work of the Manhattan Engineering Dis-
trict progressed at that time, in December 1942, to an advanced stage
in the making of original plans ?
Mr. Wallace. To the best of my knowledge I knew nothing about
the Manliattan district until Harold Smith told me the name of the
district in May 1945. I didn't know anything about the work as it
progressed. As a matter of fact, I didn't want to know. This was
back in 1941 and 1942, and all I wanted to know was that the work
was being pushed with vigor. I had great confidence in Dr. Bush,
felt he was a man of unique capacity, and wanted the President to push
the work. I didn't know the name of the project or where they had
the project, but I assumed Dr. Bush was doing his job.
Mr. Tavenner. As a member of this Top Policy Committee, wasn't
it your duty to determine that work was progressing and that some-
thing was being done ?
Mr. Wallace. Not after September 1942. Not after it passed over
to the military.
Mr. Tavenner. After that, on December 20, 1942, you were inter-
viewed by Dr. Bush regarding the extent to which Great Britain
was to be informed on policy or experiment?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. Dr. Bush came to me on December 20, 1942.
I don't know whether he came to me to determine if there was a line
to be followed. This thing was so secret I don't think any definite
line was ever set up. You couldn't reduce things to writing. It is
quite probable, knowing the way Dr. Bush and the President worked,
that the President said to Dr. Bush: "Now, you had better go see
Henry about this." That would be my guess.
Mr. TA^^NNER. And your discussion at this conference was the ex-
tent to which you would furnish materials or equipment needed in the
manufacturing of the atomic bomb to Great Britain?
Mr. Wallace. It never came up. Nothing of that sort ever came
Mr. Tavenner. It was just a question of information at that time?
Mr. Wallace. It was a question of how far the British would be
permitted to get certain types of information.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you discuss how far the United States should
go in giving tlie same information to the Soviet Union ?
Mr. Wallace. It never came up, nothing of that sort.
Mr. Tavenner. Never at any time?
Mr. Wallu\ce. Never.
Mr. Tavenner. Gen. Leslie R. Groves testified before this commit-
tee on December 7, 1949, that you disassociated yourself from the Man-
1076 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATEKIAL
hattan Engineering District project. If you did disassociate yourself
from it, when did that occur and what were the reasons ?
Mr. Wallace, I think what I said previously is very clear, and
General Groves obviously was not familiar with the relationship be-
tween the Military Policy Committee and the Top Policy Committee.
You will find, reading his testimony, that he said the Military Policy
Committee was probably under the Top Policy Committee. He really
didn't know, and there was no reason why he should know. Dr. Bush
tells me there was no reason why General Groves should have ever
come to me. But General Groves may have come because he was di-
rected on a particular occasion by Dr. Bush or Secretary Stimson, or
he may have come out of general curiosity, to see this man who was
connected with the project in the early days.
Mr. Tavenner. General Groves also testified that for reasons of his
own he made five different reports, copies of which he gave to a number
of the members of this Top Policy Committee, and he further testified
he gave one copy to you, in person. Is that correct ?
Mr. Wallace. That is what he testified, I believe. I am not sure
whether he testified it or said it to newspaper men.
Mr. Tavenner. That was the testimony before this committee. Is
that correct or not ?
Mr. Wallace. You have the record.
Mr. Tavenner. I think you understand, Mr. Wallace, that I am not
asking what our records show, but I am asking whether or not it was a
true statement ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know.
Mr. Tavenner. You don't know whether General Groves gave you a
copy of a report ?
Mr. Wallace. I know General Groves either testified before this
committee or stated to newspapermen that he gave me a report in
August 1943. He did not give me a report in August 1943 so far as
I can ascertain.
Mr. Tavenner. That is the question I asked you in the first place.
Mr. Wallace. He did not.
Mr. Tavenner. Did he call at your office and discuss the matter with
you?
Mr. Wallace. Not in August 1943.
Mr. Tavenner. When did he call and discuss the matter with you ?
Mr. Wallace. I have a very careful record of that. He called and
gave me a report to sign — and my guess is it was a report that had been
signed by the other members a long time previously — on April 14,
1944, at 11 : 15 in the morning. On that occasion, you will remember,
General Groves stated that he had been kept waiting, and he was very
much annoyed at having been kept waiting, because he thought the
people who came out of my office were not important to the war effort.
I know that the man in my office immediately preceding General
Groves was a Latin-American diplomat. My secretary knew nothing
about the Manhattan project, knew nothing about General Groves,
and she couldn't tell by looking at General Groves that he was a very
important figure, any more than General Groves could tell by looking
at the Latin- American diplomat, when he came out of my office, that
he was an important figure.
Mr. Tavenner. Any facts or circumstances surrounding that meet-
ing which you desire to state, the committee will be glad to hear.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1077
Mr. Wallace. The two things I have in my record made at the time
are to this effect : First, that he gave me a report to sign ; that I read
the report ; that it indicated to me the war would be over in 18 months ;
and that General Groves said that he was going to chase the foreigners
out of the uranium business.
Mr. Tavenner. Did he tell you to whom he referred as the foreign-
ers?
Mr. Wallace. No, he did not.
Mr. Tavenner. What else did he discuss with you at that time, or
you with him, relating to uranium?
Mr. Wallace. He said nothing, and I may say that nobody ever said
anything to me, about uranium shipments, to the best of my recollec-
tion.
Mr. Tavenner. Was this the only report, of the five which General
Groves said he made, that you saw ?
Mr. Wallace. I can find no record of any contact with General
Groves except on this occasion. I have looked through my record and
can find no other contact but this one of April 14, 1944.-^
Mr. Tavenner. Aside from your contact with General Groves, did
you at any time see any of the five reports, other than the one you
have testified to?
Mr. Wallace. Dr. Vannevar Bush might possibly have brought me
in some i-eport ; I don't know. He brought me a great many reports in
1942. There is no reason why he should have brought me a report after
1942. There was no reason why General Groves should have brought
me a report in 1944. I would assume it would have been through Dr.
Bush if I saw any others, because I knew Vannevar Bush very well.
Mr. Tavenner. According to your best recollection, do you believe
you did see other reports through Dr. Bush ?
Mr, Wallace. I just don't know.
Mr. Ta\^nner. Did you at any time register a disagreement, while a
member of the To}) Policy Committee, with the policies and function-
ing of tlie Manhattan Engineering District, which I understand you
did not know by name, but you knew the work was progressing?
Mr. Wallace. No; never.
Mr. Tavenner. At the time you were a member of the War Produc-
tion Board and also a member of this Top Policy Committee, were you
also Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare?
Mr. Wallace. I was Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare
from August 1941 until July 15, 1943.
Mr. Tavenner. The Economic Defense Board was created by Execu-
tive Order 8839, issued July 30, 1941, and the name was changed to the
Board of Economic Warfare by Executive Order 8982 on December
17, 1941. Did you serve in the capacity of Chairman of this Board both
before and after its name was changed ?
Mr. Wallace, That Board, as I remember it, was set up in the State
Department under General Maxwell, and it had to do specifically with
the control of the exportation of materials we thought we might need
in the event of possible war.
^ Mr. Wallace, at the time of the hearing, testified that he could find no record of
any contact with fJeneral Groves except the one of April 14, 1944. In further checl^ing
his records, he finds that when he was Secretary of Commerce — this was long after he
ceased to be head of BEW — he asked General Groves on September 5, 1945, to make a
talk to the Advisory Committee to the Department of Commerce on the peacetime uses of
atomic energy.
1078 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
There was considerable discord between Treasury and the State
Department about certain matters, which occasioned the President
and Budget Director Harold Smith much concern. They saw no way
to get around this difficulty other than to call in someone who out-
ranked Dean Acheson, who represented the State Department in this
matter, and Secretary Morgenthau. I was called in for the same rea-
son I was called in on SPAB, and at almost the same time. General
Maxwell, as I remember, resigned and went into the Reg-ular Army
activities in September 1941, and we took over. We may not have
been known as the Board of Economic Warfare at that time, but an
Executive order had been drawn up, it was a slightly different name,
and we took over active control quite specifically in September, and
General Maxwell passed out of the picture and we put in his place
Col., now Gen., Roy Lord, a very efficient Army man, to handle
these export problems. He carried on for about a year, at which time
Hector Lazo took charge of the Board of Economic Warfare's Office
of Export Control.
Mr. Tavenner. The Executive order establishing the Board of
Economic Warfare provides for representation of the War Production
Board and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration on the Board, and
the persons selected to represent these two agencies were required to
be a]3proved by the Chairman. Who were the representatives of the
War Production Board and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration
approved by you in 1943 ?
Mr. Wallace. Approved by me in 1943 ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
Mr. Wallace (to Mr. Walter Freedman). Do you remember that,
Walter?
I think Nollenberg sat most of the time for Ed Stettinius. There
were provisions for alternates, and I think there was never any diffi-
culty about selecting them. I think Donald Nelson sat for the War
Production Board. I have forgotten who the alternate was.
Mr. Tavenner. The Executive order establishing the Economic De-
fense Board, later known as the Board of Economic Warfare, provided
that its purpose was developing and coordinating policies, plans, and
programs designed to protect and strengthen the international eco-
nomic relations of the United States in the interest of national defense.
The term "economic defense" was defined in part as follows :
The term "economic defense," whenever used in this order, means the con-
duct, in the interest of national defense, of international economic activities in-
cluding those relating- to exports. * * *
Among the functions and duties of the Board are to be found the
following :
(6) Coordinate the policies and actions of the several departments and agen-
cies carrying on activities relating to economic defense in order to assure unity
and balance in the application of such measures.
(c) Develop integrated economic defense plans and programs for coordinated
action by the departments and agencies concerned and use all appropriate means
to assure that such plans and programs are carried into effect by such depart-
ments and agencies.
Then section 7 of the Executive order reads in part as follows :
The Chairman is authorized to make all necessary arrangements, with the
advice and assistance of the Board, for discharging and performing the respon-
sibilities and duties required to carry out the functions and authorities set forth
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1079
in this order, and to make final decisions when necessary to expedite the work
of the Board.
You, of course, at the time, were very familiar with the provisions
of those Executive orders, I assume?
Mr. Wallace. Yes; I was familiar with those provisions, and I
later became very familiar with the soundness of the prophecy Harold
Smith made on July 30, 1941, that while I had been given the re-
sponsibility, I hadn't really been given the authority. While I did not
keep a detailed record at that time, I do have a detailed record on this,
that Harold Smith said : "They have given you responsibility here,
but they have not given you authority." And he made very clear the
point that while Dean Acheson, when he thought he was going to have
control of this, favored being given complete authority, when it be-
came apparent the White House wanted me to have it, he didn't want
me to have complete authority.
I told Harold Smith I knew these people, and it was not necessary
for me to have com])lete authority at that time. I later found Harold
Smith was absolutely right, that I did not have authority, and found
it necessary to get cooperation from the departments concerned.
Mr. Tavenner. How do you construe this language, if you say you
did not have authority :
Sec. 7. The Chairman is authorized to ni'alve all necessary arrangements, with
the advice and assistance of the Board, for discharging and performing the re-
sponsibilities and duties required to carry out the functions and authorities set
forth in this order. * * *
How could greater authority be given ?
Mr. Wallace. That may appeal to the legal mind, but the history
of the situation will demonstrate it was not sufficient, because we found
it necessary to amend the order later on to remedy the weakness which
existed, and we did get that amendment, and that amendment pro-
voked great resentment on the part of varioits other agencies.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the date of the amendment; do you
recall ?
Mr. Wallace. I would say it was in the spring of 1942.
Mr. Tavenner. Then in 1943 you did have full authority to make
all necessary arrangements for carrying out the provisions in this
order, by virtue of the amendment which you now refer to?
Mr. Wallace. As a matter of fact, the amendment was then sabo-
taged by certain of the agencies, and the President made an amend-
ment to the amendment.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you mean that the amendment to the amend-
ment took away the authority you had to act ?
Mr. Wallace. In effect; yes.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the date of that ?
Mr. Wallace. I think early summer, 1942.
Mr. Tavenner. Ex])lain a little more what you meant by stating
that it was sabotaged by an amendment to an amendment.
]Mr. Wallace. Simply that we did not have the full power to do
the job ; that is what I meant. If you will examine the wording there,
you will see that while we were directed to invite the agencies to go
along, if there was any agency unwilling to go along, there was no
way of enforcing it.
Mr, Tavenner. In other words, if Manhattan Engineering District
would refuse to agree to the issuance of an export license, you contend
1080 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
you should have had authority to do it anyway, in a given case, just
as an example ?
Mr. Wallace. I am sure nothing of that sort would have ever
come up, because the Manhattan District M^as in a class altogether by
itself. Xothing having to do with uranium or the Manhattan project
ever came up before the Board of Economic Warfare at any time.
Mr. Tavenner. If the Office of Lend-I-iease Administration took
a contrary view to the Board of Economic AYarfare regarding the
issuance of a license, you contend you should have had authority and
power to have exported it anyway ?
Mr. Wallace. We had no disagreements with the Office of Lend-
Lease with regard to exports. As a matter of fact, there was a very
clear-cut understanding arrived at with regard to Lend-Lease Ad-
ministration in the fall of 1941, at which time Harry Hopkins turned
the job over to Ed Stettinius, and insisted that certain powers in
Lend-Lease reside there and not any place else. We were not con-
cerned with having power over the Office of Lend-Lease Administra-
tion. That is not where we were having our difficulties.
Mr. Tavenner. Was it with the War Production Board that you
were having your difficulties?
]Mr. Wallace. No. We had no difficulties with the War Production
Board.
Mr. Ta\^nner. Why was it you were so insistent upon having final
authority and say as to matters with which these other agencies were
concerned ?
Mr. Wallace. The particular difficulty we had was getting maxi-
mum production, particularly in Latin America. We found we had
a marked difference with the Secretary of Commerce and the head
of the Eeconstruction Finance Corporation with regard to how this
work ought to be done. That was the big problem involved.
Mr. TA^T.XNER. When you say that the authority you had obtained
by the first amendment to the order had been sabotaged, it could have
no meaning other than that some group or individual brought about
a change ?
Mr. Wallace. We also had great difficulty in getting our men who
were stimulating production, particularly in Latin America, out to
those countries. Their visas would be held up, and for a time we
were having very great difficulty with the State Department, This
was largely a matter of misunderstanding, the way it turned out,
but it was because the State Department had very strong feelings
that the Board of Economic Warfare was getting into its province
that the amendment to the order was changed.
Mr. Tavenner. Was there any group or individual who did any
act of sabotage that you recall ?
Mv. Wallace. I think you are using the word "sabotage" in the
wrong sense. I am referring to the weakening. I think possibly the
word "sabotage" is unfortunate. Let us say "weakening" of the
Executive order.
]Mr. Tavenner. I am just trying to find out in what sense you used it.
Mr. Wallace. I am referring to a weakening of the Executive
order.
Mr. Tavenner. You were also familiar with the provisions of
Executive Order 8926 of October 28, 1941, by which the Lend-Lease
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1081
Administrator was directed to arrange with the Board of Economic
Warfare for review and clearance of Lend-Lease transactions?
Mr. AYallace. No, I am not familiar with that particular order.
Mr. TA^'ENNER. Well, it was an order which went into effect in
October 1941. You do know, regardless of the order, or whether or
not you remember now about the order, that the Lend-Lease Admin-
istrator was required to arrange with the Board of Economic War-
fare for review and clearance of those transactions ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know of any case where they did.
Mr, Tavenner. When a request was made to Lend-Lease for ship-
ment of materials to the Soviet Purchasing Commission, your organi-
zation was the issuing agency for the license, was it not ?
ISlr. Wallace. I think that matter can be very readily cleared up
by reading the statement as made by the State Department on Decem-
ber 8. The State Department made a statement on December 7, 1949,
which was given considerable publicity in the press. This statement
was incorrect in certain particulars.
Mr. Tavenner. Are you referring to a statement in regard to heavy
water ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. My question related to uranium.
Mr. Wallace. Yes, I know, but this covers the broad field, their
statement of December 7.
Mr. Case. December 7 of what year ?
Mr. Wallace. December 7, 1949, that Secretary Acheson put out his
original statement. This December 8 statement has a very definite
bearing on your question. Shall I read that ?
Mr. Tavenner. In just a moment, but does that relate to the regula-
tions that were in effect in 1943 ?
Mr. Wallace. I would say so, definitely.
Mr. Ta\tenner. Before July 1, 1943?
Mr. Wallace. I think so. I would say definitely.
Mr. Tavenner. I would like for you to make any explanation
about that for the enlightenment of the committee that you can.
Mr. Wallace. This is a statement of December 8, 1949, issued by the
State Department :
In connection with the Secretary's statement yesterday concerning the Jordan
allegations, a review of the records of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration
and the Foreign Economic Administration indicates that although export licenses
for commercial items, that is, general items other than lend-lease and muni-
tions, were actually issued by the Board of Economic Warfare, the responsibility
for approval of the license applications, including clearance with other interested
governmental agencies rested with the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and
its successor FEA. This procedure was deemed necessary in order to concen-
trate control of the wartime Soviet supply program in one agency. In actual
practice up to July 1, 1943, licenses approved by OLLA were issued in routine
fashion by BEW. After that a general license issued by BEW or its successor
agencies became effective which required approval of tiie Office of Lend-Lease
Administration only.
I think that makes it very clear indeed that the relationship of the
Board of Economic Warfare to shipments to lend-lease areas, whether
they were of a lend-lease nature or a cash nature, was purely pro
forma and clerical, and that there was no discretionary authority in the
Board of Economic Warfare whatever.
ISIr. Ta\t:nner. You make that statement regardless of the fact that
the Executive order says arrangements should be made with the Board
1082 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
of Economic Warfare for review and clearance of Lend-Lease
transactions ?
Mr. Wallace. I do make it — definitely, flatly, completely, and indig-
nantly.
Mr. Walter Freedman was an attorney with the Board of Economic
Warfare at the time. He was in the Export Section of BEW. He is
making some suggestion to me now which I don't understand the tenor
of, but I suggest you ask him.
Mr. Tavenner. I have no objection to your conferring with him.
Mr. Wallace. I would prefer your having such a conierence with
him. He was close to the technical details.
Mr. Tavenner. You would prefer he make the explanation ?
Mr. Wallace. Frankly, I have never seen an export license in my
life. I would like to have you talk to him about that.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to counsel stat-
ing what he believes the situation was.
Mr. Wood. If you wish to call him as a witness, you may do so.
Mr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?
Mr. Wood. I would prefer that the members make notes and wait
until counsel is through, if that is satisfactory.
Mr. Tavenner. There is a provision in Executive Order 8926, pre-
viously referred to, by which the master agreement with each nation
receiving lend-lease aid, setting forth the general terms and conditions
under which such nation is to receive such aid, was required to be
negotiated by the State Department with the advice of the Board of
Economic Warfare and the Oftice of Lend-Lease Administration. You
recall that to be a fact ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. You referred to it earlier.
Mr. TA^^NNER. You did advise about what materials should be
exported to foreign countries during the period of the war?
Mr. Wallace. No. That was not a function of BEW.
Mr. Tavenner. What do you contend is the meaning
Mr. Wall^vce. BEW initiated no exports except exports in connec-
tion with the expansion of our program.
Mr. Tavenner. My question related to master agreements nego-
tiated by the State Department for the furnishing of aid to the various
powers.
Mr. Wallace. That did not come up before BEW.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the purpose of the provision of this Exec-
utive order which provided tliat the master agreements were required
to be negotiated by the State Department with the advice of the Board
of Economic Warfare and tlie Oftice of Lend-Lease Administration ?
Mr. Wallace. Down the line there may have been clearance. I was
not aware of anything of the sort, and, as far as I recall, nothing of
the sort came before meetings of the Board of Economic Warfare.
Mr. Ta^^nner. As Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare,
you certainly would have known of such an important thing as the
negotiation of an agreement for a large delivery of important materials
to foreign countries during the war period if it occurred, would you
not?
Mr. Wallace. It never came to my attention. It is one of those
things that never came to my attention.
Mr. Tavenner. Was it not also true that Executive Order 8900,
heretofore mentioned, required the Board of Economic Warfare to
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1083
provide a control clearing service to which exporters may submit
proposals for the export of materials and commodities, and further
required that the Board of Economic Warfare shall obtain clearance
for such proposals from the Federal agencies concerned with the
control of exports ?
Mr. Wallace. Let's have this question handled by Mr. Freedman
later on.
Mr. Tavenner. Don't you recall ?
Mr. Wallace. No, I don't recall.
Mr. Tavenner. This is all set forth, Mr. Wallace, in a memo-
randum from the Board of Economic Warfare approved by you
[handing memorandum to the witness].
Mr. Wallace. Mr. Tavenner, I venture to say if some 7 years from
now you are asked for certain details of this year, your recollection
will be as hazy as mine about precise words of this kind.
Mr. Tavenner. That is certainly true about precise words, but I
am asking you about the general subject of making clearance of ex-
ports to foreign countries tlirough the agencies that control those
exports. I Avould have thought that was a matter of such importance
you would have recalled it.
Mr. Wallace. It miglit have been important in the daily func-
tioning of the executive section of the Board. I sat on the Board
where you had these top people from the various agencies. I was not
the executive officer of the Board. I was Chairman of the Board.
Matters of this sort were not brought to my attention.
Mr. Tavenner. At one and the same time you were a member of
the War Production Board, you were a member of the Top Policy
Committee, and you were the Chairman of the Board of Economic
Warfare, and in any dispute of policy that may have arisen between
tliose agencies, you were in the position of standing on both sides of
the bargain counter, so to speak, with regard to those transactions,
were you not 'i
Mr' Wallace. There were no disputes that came up regarding this
particular matter, and while it may all have been set forth, the mere
matter of setting forth probably handled the situation.
Mr. Tavenner. There was no other person in such a unique position
as you were in ?
Mr. Waij^ace. I was Vice President of the United States and had
the relationship to the three agencies to which you refer, and I am
very proud of having had that position. I am very proud of having
been Vice President at that time.
Mr. Tavenner. Of course it is a great honor to be Vice President
of the United States at any time.
Mr. Wallace, my purpose is to endeavor to develop your oppor-
tunities for knowledge and your responsibilities relating to matters
that w^ould normally come before the Board of Economic Warfare,
the War Production Board, and things that occurred within Man-
hattan Engineering District.
Mr. Wallace. May I interpolate, with regard to things that might
have occurred within the Manhattan District, nothing came to my
attention as to things within the Manhattan District.
Mr. Tavenner. I understand. You have so stated. With all this
:background, and all these positions you have held, my sole purpose
now is to have you tell this committee all that you know about the
1084 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
sale of uranium for export to the Soviet Purchasing Commission
during the war period, and by that I mean any circumstances related
to the entire transaction, as to the fact of issuance of licenses, as to
the policy governing it ; the committee would like to hear it.
Mr. Wallace. Thank you very much, JNlr. Tavenner. I think the
shortest way of handling this, at the risk of some repetition, is to read
a short prepared statement that will take about 10 minutes to read
it, then there can be questioning, if that is satisfactory.
Mr. Tavenner. Is it responsive to the question ?
]\Ir. Wallace. It is definitely responsive to the question.
Mr. Wood. If it is responsive to the question, yes.
Mr. Walter. Before he does that, don't you think the Executive
orders should be made exhibits ?
Mr. Tavenner. They appear in the Federal Register.
Mr. Wallace (reading) :
I have asked this committee for an opportunity to testify because I want very
much to clear up the doubts that have been cast on my conduct in connection
with the licensing of uranium and heavy-water shipments to Russia in 1943.
Testimony before this committee has raised two basic questions insofar as I
am concerned: (1) It is strongly implied, if not actually said, that I was
responsible for the licensing of uranium and lieavy water for Russia in 1943 ;
and (2) as a wartime Vice President, I could not be trusted with certain con-
Mential information regarding the atom bomb.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Wallace, the first point is pertinent to the question.
The second is not. I will ask you to confine your answer to the first
point.
Mr. Wallace. If I can be allowed to differ slightly with the chair-
man on that, I would like to read from the record made by General
Groves before this committee. There is a suggestion in the record
oi the committee
Mr. Case. Mr. Chairman, it is apparent that the next paragraph
deals with attacks that have been made on the witness, not before this
committee, but bj- newspapers and radio commentators. It seems to
me the proper thing for Mr. Wallace to do is to answer statements
made before this committee, and not use this as a forum to answer
statements by commentators and newspapers, over which this com-
mittee has no control.
Mr. Harrison. It appears to me the statement is not very long,
and it might save time to let him read it.
jVIr. Wood. Suppose you use whatever material you have.
Mr. Wallace. I think that will be the shorter procedure. (Con-
tinuing reading:)
While it is not for me to pass judgment upon my own conduct, I state unhesi-
tatingly that I am proud of my participation as "Vice President of the United
States during the time when the war situation was most critical, and I am proud
to liave been associated witli the administration whose policies were so effective
in making available the essential materials when they were most needed. The
attack being made on me — not only before this committee, but with even more
violence in certain newspapers and by certain radio commentators — is, I think,
not so much an attack on me as it is upon the Democratic Party and President
Roosevelt. At any rate, once and for all, I want the record of this committee to
show exactly what my participation was insofar as tliese shipments are con-
cerned.
Because I knew how important it was to keep secret the fact that this Govern-
ment was exploring the possibilities of an atom bomb, I never discussed the atom
bomb or the shipment of uranium or heavy water to any country with anyone in
BEW — or anyone else outside of the selected group of Government officials
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1085
directly involved — at any time until the matter was exploded in the press. The
subject of uranium shipments was never discussed in any meeting of the Board
of Economic Warfare which I attended, or in any contact with any member of the
staff. The most important point to remember, however, is that shipments to
lUissia were not the responsibility of BEW l)ut the responsibility of the Lend-
Lease Administration, which in 1943 was under the direction of E. K. Stettinius, Jr.
All license applications for shipments of materials to lend-lease areas which
were filed with BEW were forwarded to the Lend-Lease Administration for
recommendation. BEW's responsibility for these applications was limited to
approving or denying the applications in accordance with the recommendation of
the Lend-Lease Administration.
Moreover, the licenses for uranium oxide and uranium nitrate are said to have
been issued in March and April of 1943. I want to point out that I personally
was in Latin America from March 16. 1943, until April 25 of that year.
In any event, I knew nothing about the issuance of the licenses or the ship-
ments until the matter was stirred up in the press in 1946.
Within the past week I have talked to Milo Perkins, who was executive director
of BEW, and Hector Lazo, who in 1943 was head of BEW's Office of Export
control. I am assured by both of them that in 1943 they knew nothing about
tne.se licenses, nor, indeed, did they know anything about the atomic-bomb project.
With regard to the licensing of heavy water in late 1943, the shortest and most
convincing answer is that I left BEW on July 15, 1943. Leo Crowley took over
REW on July 16, and its name was changed to OEW. On September 25, 1943,
OEW was merged with Lend-Lease and the new agency was called Foreign Eco-
nomic Administration.
Secretary Acheson, on December 7, 1949. issued a statement which received con-
siderable publicity — and which credited BEW with issuing a license for heavy
water 4 months after it had ceased to exist. On December 8, Secretary Acheson
realized his error, and the State Department issued a new statement which, to
the best of my knowledge, never appeared in the press or over the radio.
I have already read that statement, and witli your permission I
will consider it as in the record at this point and pass it on.
In summary, therefore, it is to be pointed out that not BEW but the Lend-
Lease Administration, which by its activities saved so many American lives, was
responsible for clearing all shipments to Russia. I was neither responsible nor
aware of any of them at that time.
Since I was not even aware, therefore, that the Russians were trying to
obtain uranium or heavy water, it is demonstrably apparent that I could not have
pressured someone else into issuing the license, or urged them to pressure the
Manhattan Engineering District to consent to their issue.
In short, and in fact, I had absolutely nothing to do with any of these
licenses. I was not aware that they were being requested. I did not know that
Lend-Lease recommended, after consulting with the Manhattan district, that
they be issued, and the agency which I headed, the Board of Economic Warfare,
had no discretionary authority with respect to them.
Mr. Wood. Does that prepared statement stand, in the light of the
Executive order?
Mr. Wallace. Yes, sir; I desire that that statement stand.
Mr. Walter. I think he misread the statement. He said he did not
know.
Mr. Wallace. I am sorry. I did know.
Mr. Harrison. You read it one way and it is here another way.
Which is corect?
Mr. Wallace. I did not know. That is on page 6. [Continuing
reading:]
Now, a word must be said about General Groves' statement that he showed
me a report in August 1943, and that that was the only report that he showed
to me.
Mr. AVooD. You have already gone into that.
Mr. Wall.\ce. Yes. I think all of this matter has been covered.
to
1086 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
That should be — ^I did not know, by the way, on page 6. Tliere is an
error in the mimeograph.^°
Mr. Wood. An}^ further questions?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wallace. I think everything else has been covered that is in
this prepared statement. I mi Page 6 refers to page number in typed copy from which the witness was reading.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1087
Mv. Tavexner. Was there brouglit to your attention the issuance
of licenses for the export of uranium ?
Mr. Wallace. Never.
Mr. Tavenner. By any person in BEW ?
Mr. Wai,lace. Never.
Mr. Tavenner. By any person outside of BEW ?
Mr. Wallace. Never.
Mr. Tavenner. Whose responsibility was it in the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Warfare to screen these applications for licenses or issue them?
Mr. Wallace. Well, Hector Lazo was head of Export Control.
Who was under Hector Lazo I don't know. Mr. Freedman may be
able to tell you that.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you ever discuss his duties with him ?
Mr, Wallace. That particular agency was absorbed completely
with the problem of issuing export licenses rapidly to the trade. They
had to issue about 8,000 a day, and it was a difficult mechanical job,
and the trade was disgusted with the way that job had been done
before we took over. I think at one time there were 100,000 of these
licenses jammed up, weren't there, Walter? We had to get out from
under that log jam. None of these questions of policy came up,
because they were cleared more or less automatically with the execu-
tive agencies. No question of policy ever came up to my knowledge
to the top echelon. I took that up with Mr. Perkins and Mr. Lazo.
Mr. Freedman, I think, can assure you from what he knows of the
lower echelon that nothing of the sort ever came to anybody on the
Board.
Mr. Tavenner. It was a matter of general knowledge, however, that
uranium was being used in this important project, and that the policy
was not only to keep it secret, but not let anybody get hold of it ?
Mr. Wallace. Vannevar Bush had sworn me to secrecy, and I was
not going to talk to anybody in BEW about the thing. I didn't talk
to Milo Perkins about it. You couldn't trust yourself to talk to any-
body. If Vannevar Bush w^anted to know if uranium was being prop-
erly handled, he should go to Lend-Lease or me directly, because I was
the only one in BEW who knew about it. I am not even sure Ed
Stettinius knew about it. The only think to do was come to me if
they wanted to observe secrecy. They should have said: "Here, you
hold the second highest office in Government, and you know about the
atomic bomb. How can we get it across to these folks that do the
licensing without getting somebody's wind up?" That would have
been the proper course, to come to somebody who knew about the
atomic bomb. You couldn't expect me, who had sworn myself to
secrecy to Dr. Bush, to go to those people and say: "Look out for
uranium." That would be tipping your hand.
Mr. Tavenner. You were cognizant of the importance of prevent-
ing the export of uranium from this country?
Mr. Wallace. I never thought about it.
Mr. Ta\T3nner. You never thought about it?
Mv. Wallace. No. This thing had been turned over to the military.
Mr. Ta\^nner. You recognized there was a problem of control?
Mr. Wallace. I nevei' thought of it at all. It was not within my
sphere of competence.
1088 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Tavenner. Yon are familiar, I presume, with Conservation
Order M-285 of the War Production Board, which provides as follows :
The fulfillment of requirements for the defense of the United States has created
a shorta.ire in the supply of uranium for defense, for private account, and for
export; and the following order is deemed necessary and appropriate in the
public interest and to promote the national defense.
That was the regidation that controlled the purposes for which
uranium could be sold and distributed within this country.
Mr. Wx^LLACE. I didn't know about that order until I read it in the
press, going over the newspaper accounts of the hearing. A lot of
these very important things take place very normally in the lowei
echelon.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidencv
Executive Order SSoO, of July 30, 1041. from which I read, and asL
that I be permitted to tile as a part of the same exhibit, marked ""Wal-
lace Exhibit 1,'" the subsequent amendments which Mr. Wallace has
referred to.
Mr. Wood. Without objection, it will be admitted.
(The documents above referred to, marked ''Wallace Exhibit 1,"
are liereinafter included in the record.) ^^
Mr. Tavenner. I have no further questions.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Walter.
Mr. Walter. Was there any occasion for General Groves to ever
report to you, or to divscuss matters with respect to the progress of
the Manhattan project with you?
Mr. Wallace. General Groves'" chain of command did not run to
me.
Mr. Walter. To whom did it run ?
Mr. Wallace. Dr. Vannevar Bush, who was chairman of the Mili-
tary Policy Committee. There was no reason why he should come to
me unlei^s he was directed to do so by Dr. Bush or Secretary Stimson.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Harrison.
IMr. Harrison. No questions.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Moulder.
Mr. IMouLDER. No questions.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon.
Mr. Nixon. I will pass.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Case.
Mr. Case. Mr. WaHace, you have pretty well given the background
of your knowledge of research in the development of atomic energy,
and indicated you had read magazine articles prior to 1940 on it,
and also spoke of your part on the top policy group which met Decem-
ber 16, 1941, at which Dr. Vannevar Bush and Secretary Stimson were
present. You may have referred to a further contact you had with
the development of the atom bomb progran but if so I missed it in
your testimony.
I have here a book entitled "Atomic Ener, ''or Military Purposes"
by Henry DeWolf Smyth, chairman, depar ^t of physics, Prince-
ton University, and consultant, Manhattai rict, United States
Engineers. This is described as "The Official j.i^^,ort on the Develop-
^' See appendix.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL lUoy
ment of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States
Government, 1940-45," and on pages 81-82 I read this paragraph :
Report to the President by Bushj and Conant on June 17, 1942
On June 13, 1942, Bush and Conant sent to Vice President Henry A. Wallace,
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, a
report recommending detailed plans for the expansion and continuation of the
atomic bomb program.
Mr. Wallace. I might interpolate and say I did refer in the ques-
tioning to a meeting with Vannevar Bush on June 16, 1942, which
was an important meeting having to do with the expansion of the
program.
Mr. Case (continuing reading) :
AH three approved the report. On June 17, 1942, the report was sent by Bush
to the President, who also approved. * * *
Mr. Wallace. That is correct.
Mr. Case. That is correct ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Case. So that you saw the report which dealt with the pro-
gram for the expansion of the atomic bomb project?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Case. Then, having had that connection with the development
of the project at the outset
Mr. Wallace. This was a pilot plant proposition at that time.
This did not have to do with what later became the grand effort.
It was small stuff. That was when I was still active in the program.
My testimony was that my significance in the program ceased after
it was kicked over to the military in 1942.
Mr. Case. I don't want to change your testimony in any respect.
I want to get clear what the background was and the importance of
uranium in the development of the atomic bomb project.
Mr. Wallace. I certainly understood the importance of uranium
in the atom bomb project.
Mr. Case. And the importance of secrecy?
Mr. Wallace. That is right.
Mr. Case. With that knowledge and background, and your con-
nection w^ith the Board of Economic Warfare, did it ever occur to
you that the Board of Economic Warfare should take steps to prevent
uranium and uranium compounds falling in unauthorized hands?
Mr. Wallace. I felt, un.der my oath of secrecy to Dr. Bush, I should
not talk to anyone in BEW about it. I might mention that at one
time when I was with Dr. C. K. Leith of the University of Wisconsin,
a noted geologist, I asked him where the uranium deposits of the
world were. He was not a member of the Board of Economic War-
fare. He was a liaison iv#n, very highly thought of in the geological
field. I think that is t' only time the word "uranium" ever came
up. . -ru-
Mr. Case. Did Dr. J j, :% tell you uranium was produced in Canada ?
Mr. Wallace. Yef;.:,£ ^^
Mr. Case. Did B^^^f have a list of critical items that were not to
be exported under any consideration ?
Mr. Wallace. I presume they did. Mr. Freedman tells me this
was a list supplied by the War Production Board.
99334 — 50 13
1090 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Case. Were you a member of the War Production Board after
jou became head of the Board of Economic Warfare?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. I was a member of the War Production Board
from the time it started, January 15, 1942, until I resigned on July
19 or 20, 1943.
Mr. Case. Was uranium on the list of critical materials ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know. I have no idea. I looked on this
thing as something for me to stay out of,. that it was in other hands,
and competent hands, and it was not for me to go into,
Mr. Case. Wasn't it your duty to supervise the issuance of export
licenses ?
]Mr. Wallace. We were in a negative position. Our powers were
negative. We did not take the initiative. We were carrying out
orders for other people. I don't remember a single case where we
took the initiative. Nor do I recall a single case where we suggested
that commodities be placed on the export ban. I would say it was a
mechanical, clerical function that we exercised. That is the way the
thing came up to us in the first place from General Maxwell.
Mr. Case. With regard to matters that came up under Lend-Lease,
you deferred entirely to the wishes of Lend-Lease ?
Mr. Wallace. So far as I know, there was never any discussion
whatsoever with regard to any exports to Russia. I don't recall a
single case of exports to Russia, export of uranium, coming up at
any time. Lend-Lease would stamp the applications in the lend-lease
area field. I haven't seen one of those documents. If you would get
hold of one of the export documents that are in Archives Building —
I can't get hold of them, but you can — you could find out what the
procedure was.
Mr. Case. The statement you have made indicates that when an
application came with the stamp of Lend-Lease, you automatically
issued the license?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Case. And you would not see it; people in the lower levels
would automatically issue the license if Lend-Lease said they wanted
it?
Mr. Wallace. That is right.
Mr. Case. Did you have representation in Lend-Lease ?
Mr. Wallace, t don't think so.
Mr. Case. You said it was under the direction of Mr. Stettinius
in 1943 ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. It first came under his direction in the fall
of 1941. Mr. Stettinius is dead. He had an able assistant by the name
of Tom McCabe, now head of the Federal Reserve Board, and a man
highly regarded by businessmen of the country. He was on the Busi-
ness Advisory Board of the Department of Commerce. I am suro
he could clear up this problem with you very rapidly.
Mr. Case. Did you sit in on meetings of Lencl-Lease?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. Case. In connection with this particular export license, it was
brought out in testimony yesterday that when the committee sought
to go through the Archives to get the particular license that covered
the shipment, it could not be found. Do you know anything about
that?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1091
Mr. Wallace. Not the slightest. How many licenses were there ?
Mr. Case. The others were tliere.
Mr. Wallace. Which particular one was not found ?
Mr. Case. The one which was missing, according to the testimony,
was the one amended April 29, 1943, for 1,()0() pounds.
Mr. Wallace. Where would the original be ?
Mr. Freedman. They have to give the original to the collector of
customs, or they couldn't ship the stuif .
Mr. Case. What was the custom of BEW in handling these licenses
after they were issued ? Were they permanent files ?
Mr. Freedman. Yes.
Mr. Case. They were permanent files ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Case. And the property of the Government?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Case. If you had ever been given all the power you state you
should have had to carry out the responsibilities placed on you, would
you have asked for some voice in determining what mateiial should
be exported.
Mr. WalLuVce. Not in the export field. What we were interested
in was in the import field. That is where we wanted the powers.
Mr. Case. You had a list of critical materials not to be sent out of
the country ?
Mr. Wallace. We had a completely happy relationship with Lend-
Lease. There was no case of conflict there. We did not feel we had
enough critical materials coming into the country. It had nothing to
do with the export field. We had no interest in that.
Mr. Case. Do you recall the top personnel of Lend-Lease in 1943 ?
Mr. Wallace. There was a man by the name of Nollenberg. Of
course the top was Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., now passed away. I
think Tom McCabe was his right-hand man. And there was a man,
Van Buskirk, now, I believe, wdth the Mellons in Pittsburgh. I think
Mr. Pratt of General Motors was there. I had very little to do with
Lend-Lease at the time.
Mr. Case. Do you know who had to do with requests for export
licenses that came from the Soviet Purchasing Commission?
Mr. Wallace. I didn't learn that until I was getting ready to go to
China via Soviet Russia along in April 1944, and I was trying to find
somebody who would go along with me as a Russian translator, and I
was told that there was somebody over in Lend-Lease, and I called
up General Wesson and was informed at that time that he had
to do with this type of activity. That was the first time I had known
of him, so far as I can remember.
Mr. Case. Wliat type of activity do you mean ?
Mr. Wallace. The purchasing on lend-lease account and sending to
Russia.
Mr. Wood. You don't recall anything specifically having to do with
the development of the atomic bomb ?
Mr. Wallace. Oh, no. Why do you make a statement like that, sir ?
Mr. Case. Because you used the words "with this type of activity.''*
Mr. Wallace. I think your question was friendly, because you did
not want my statement misinterpreted. I am sure it was friendly.
Mr. Case. You said some people in the State Department felt BEW
was getting into its province. Who were those people ?
1092 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. "Wallace, In the first instance, Sumner Wells and Dean Ache-
son. Later on we straightened this out very comfortably with the
State Department, but at the beginning they felt if we sent men to
South America to stimulate the production of quinine, or get out
quartz crystals, or to make sure there was plenty of tin or rubber
coming along, these men would be running around loose, not report-
ing to the respective embassies, and that they would cross up the wires
of the State Department, and for a Vhile there was very great delay
in getting visas to get the men out of the country, and very great delay
in getting messages from them. The messages that would come from
them would lie around the State Department sometimes for a week
or more. This was largely due to the cumbersomeness of the State
Department machinery, but we did not understand that at the time.
Mr. Case. Did the State Department have representation on the
Board of Economic Warfare ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
IMr. Case. What person or persons represented the State
Department ?
Mr. Wallace. Usually Dean Acheson sat on the Board. Some-
times Secretary Hull himself sat on the Board.
Mr. Case. But most of the time it was Mr. Acheson ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Case. Mr. Acheson opposed granting you greater power ?
Mr. Wallace. According to Harold Smith, in January 1941 Mr.
Acheson opposed it, yes, and I think later on when it came to this
amendment he opposed it as well. Secretary Hull also opposed it.
But eventually we worked out the relationship with the State Depart-
ment on a very satisfactory basis.
Mr. Case. Did anyone sit in for Mr. Acheson at any time in meetings
of theBEW?
Mr. Wallace. There may have been. I don't recall.
Mr. Case. He may have had one of his associates or close friends
sit in for him ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know. That could be verified from the
records, of course.
Mr. Case. I have here a photostat of a story which appeared in the
NeAv York Times on the 22d of September 1945, which reads in part
as follows :
Washington, September 21. — A proposal sponsored by Secretary of Commerce
Henry A. Wallace that the United States, Britain, and Canada reveal the secret
of the atomic bomb to Russia was discussed at President Truman's Cabinet
meeting today and brought about a pointed debate that ended with no decision
after having caused the longest Cabinet session of the present administration.
Did you make that proposal ?
Mr. Wallace. I did not, and I have a complete record of that
whole incident which, if you wish, I will be glad to read into the record
at this time.
Mr. Case. I don't care to go into it.
Mr. Wallace. I am sure you don't want to go into it. It is relevant.
Mr. Wood. You state you did not make the proposal ?
Mr. Wallace. I did not, and President Truman realized I did not,
and on his own initiative knocked it down. His attitude was magnifi-
cent throughout. The statement the President made appeared in the
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1093
New York Times of September 24, 1945, under a September 23, 1945,
Washington date line :
The President denied firmly that Mr. Wallace had insisted that the atomic
bomb be turned over to Russia. He said Mr. Wallace took a no more active part
In the discussion than anybody else at the meeting.
I have a complete statement of the Cabinet meeting at the time,
which I don't know if it would be ethical or not to make public. I
denounced to the President himself that there had been a "lying
leaker" in the Cabinet meeting. He agreed, and he told a subsequent
meeting of the members of the top Cabinet at a luncheon — just the
top Cabinet — that the man he thought had done this leaking would
no longer sit in Cabinet meetings.
Mr. Harrison. Are you familiar with the identity of that person ?
Mr. Wallace. He didn't mention his name.
Mr. Wood. Aside from that?
Mr. Wallace. I could only guess at it, and I think that would be a
mistake. I may say Dean Acheson also spoke to me about this, and
said what a terrible thing it was, and I might say his guess as to who
was responsible for this was quite different from the President's
guess.
Mr. Case. The proposal to share the atomic bomb with Russia was
discussed at the meeting ?
Mr. Wallace. It was not.
Mr. Case. It was not?
Mr. Wallace. It did not come up. It did not come up.
Mr. Case. Did you oppose the idea ?
Mr. Wallace. It didn't come up. I can read my complete record, if
you want to know what it was.
Mr. Case. How do you account for the story that appeared in the
New York Times that the subject did come up ?
Mr. Wallace. King Solomon should add to the seven things be-
yond the wisdom of men, the things printed in newspapers. I do not
blame the newspapers too much when they are guided by people who
have special interests to serve.
Mr. Case. This story in the New York Times also says :
Mr. Wallace, it is understood, argued in support of his proposal that now is
the time to make a real start toward a working world union through a demon-
stration of good faith to the Soviet Union.
Mr. Wallace. Again I say, if you want me to read my complete
record I will be glad to read it.
Mr. Wood. I will be glad for you to file it with the committee if you
so desire, Mr. Wallace. We will be glad to have it filed with the
testimony.
Mr. K^ARNET. Will the gentleman yield? I think, in all fairness
to the witness, there have been several questions asked as to whether
he did make the statement which appeared in the New York paper,
and I think the witness' statement in that connection should be made
a part of the record.
Mr. Wood. I said it could be made a part of the record.
Mr. Walter. I think it should be read into the record.
Mr. Wood. How long would it take to read it?
Mr. Wallace. It would take, I would think, 10 minutes.
1094 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Case. Mr. Chairman, there are two specific questions I want
to ask to bring this to a head, then if the committee wants to hear it,
the witness could read his statement.
You state definitely, first of all. that you did not make any such
proposal at the Cabinet meeting as was reported in the New York
Times?
Mr. Wallace. I make that statement, and President Truman made
the statement.
Mr. Case. You also say that the proposal to share the atomic-bomb
secret with Kussia was not discussed at that Cabinet meeting?
Mr. Wallace. I think I had better consult the record and see just
the form in which it came up.
Mr. Wood. I understood you to say it did not come up ?
Mr. Wallace. I said the question of sharing the atomic bomb with
Russia did not come up. [Reading:]
The President asked Secretary Stimson to open the meeting, which he did in
an iinnsually comprehensive statement. He said that all the scientists with
whom the War Department worked were convinced there was no possible
way of holding the scientific secret of the atomic bomb, and therefore they felt
there should be free interchange of scientifie information between different
members of the United Nations. He said that the scientists told him that the
bombs thus far dropped were utilizing only a very small fraction of the power
of the atom, and that future bombs would be infinitely more destructive — per-
haps as greatly advanced over the present bombs as the present bombs are over
the bombs which existed prior to 1945. He said some were afraid they would
be so powerful as to ignite the atmosphere and put an end to the world. He
said he realized that any interchange of scientific information with the other
United Nations would bring into the foregi'ound the problem of Russia. He
then entered into a long defense of Russia, saying that throughout liistory
Russia had been our friend, that we had nothing that Russia wanted. He said
our relationship during recent months had been improving. President Truman
agreed to this.
Mr. Harrison. Are those the minutes of the Cabinet meeting from
■which you have just read?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. Harrison. It is your own memorandum?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Harrison. That is what you are reading from ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. There is one other point Secretary Stimson
made at the time which I think is of some interest :
Secretary Stimson said it was conceivable that some of the other nations could
learn the secret of the atomic bomb without any help from us within 3 years,
and almost certainly within 5 years.
Mr. Case. At any time have you advanced the proposal or sup-
ported the proposal that the secret of the atomic bomb should be
shared with Russia?
Mr. Wallace. Wliat I said at that time, I backed up Secretary
Stimson in his proposal and said that if we did carry out his pro-
posal and there was an interchange with Russia of scientific infor-
mation, there should be a proviso that our men should work in Rus-
sian laboratories if their men worked in our laboratories.
I came out, by the way, against sharing construction details. I
said all scientists knew that the scientific information was known
in many foreign nations. The men who did the work for us were
mostly foreigners. I said there should be no interchange of know-
how.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1095
Let me say this to Mr. Case, and being from South Dakota I believe
he will be interested : I am from the corn country. We have inbred
strains of corn and chickens. We would not give them to anybody.
We employ scientists. If the scientists discover anything they are at
liberty to publish that. What the scientist wants is to get credit for
having discovered something. And there is something about science
that when somebody discovers something, somebody in another part
of the world is almost certain to be discovering it at about the same
time.
There are secrets with regard to our inbreds (our know-how) which
will benefit us for several years, but when it comes to scientific ap-
proach what we have learned, someone else will know within a few
juonths. Science never has and never will advance on the basis of
compartmentalization and secrets.
The bulk of the people, and I think most Congressmen, don't under-
vStand the nature of science : that there isn't any secret and never was
any secret that you could lock up and keep away from somebody else.
Back in December of last year they lifted the ban on the articles
published in Russian scientific magazines, and now it appears the
Russians were abreast of the thing in the scientific world in 1940.
That M'as not known until last December. That is what I am told.
I haven't seen it, but a newspaperman told me he had looked it over
and found that true. That is why this whole misunderstanding arises.
I told the Cabinet meeting that if they were placing their confidence
in scientific secrecy, they w^ere placing their confidence in a Maginot
Line, and there was no security there.
Some people said the Russians couldn't discover the atom bomb
for 20 years. Secretary Stimson said 3 or 5 years.
]Mr. Case. Then there was a discussion of sharing the atomic bomb ?
Mr. Wallace. There was not. I said very clearly I was against
sharing of know-how. I advocated we keep the secrets of constructioii
from any nation. I advocated that with Dr. Bush.
Mr. Case. And if blueprints of construction details got into the
hands of some foreign power, would you regard that as unfortunate?
Mr, Wallace. Very definitely. I would be against it in the hands
of any power.
Mr. Case. But not scientific information?
Mr. Wallace. Science is universal. You can't bottle science up,
and when you do you condemn your own Nation to backwardness.
Mr. Case. Coming back to the basic question with which the inquiry
was concerned, you say if export licenses were issued through BEW,
that was purely a ministerial or clerical function, because the stamp of
Lend-Lease would clear them automatically?
Mr. Wallace. That is right.
Mr. Case. And that any responsibility for the issuance of those
licenses rests at the door of Lend-Lease and the policies determined for
it by the State Department ?
Mr. Wallace. It rested with Lend-Lease. I don't know whether the
State Department determined policy.
Mr. Kearney. Most of your problems came from the Department
of State?
Mr. Wallace. No, Department of Commerce and Reconstruction
Finance Corporation. The State Department made objections in the
1096 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
spring and summer of 1942. We ironed our difficulties out with the
State Department very satisfactorily.
]\Ir. Case. Wasn't there a feeling on the part of Mr. Byrnes •
Mr. Wallace. Secretary Hull,
Mr. Case. You are anticipating the question. I think it was a pro-
test of Mr. Byrnes against statements by you that resulted in your
resignation from the Cabinet ?
Mr. Wallace. That does not have to do with the immediate ques-
tion before this committee.
]\Ir. Kearney. The name Dean Acheson has been mentioned so much
that I assumed most of your problems were with him ?
Mr. Wallace. I had a friendly feeling with him, but we did have
marked conflicts in administration.
Mr. Kearney. During the examination by counsel here, you stated
in words or substance that you would rather have Mr. Freedman
answer certain questions. Was that because he had knowledge of the
particular facts?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. He was an attorney with the Board of Eco-
nomic Warfare and operated in this particular field which has to do
with export licenses.
Mr. Kearney. Following the line of examination by Mr. Case,
I am going to ask you specifically, did you have anything to do at any
time, directly or indirectly, with the expediting or issuance of any
export license to anybody or any nation ?
Mr. Wallace. No. I have no recollection of having entered into
that at all, and BEW itself did not enter into that except to a very
limited extent.
Mr. Kearney. Can you answer my question more specifically?
Mr. Wallace. I have no knowledge in any way, shape, or form.
Mr. Kearney. Can you answer yes or no ?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon.
Mr. Nixon. In regard to the matter of expediting licenses, I under-
stood you to say a moment ago, or your counsel said, that at one
time you had a backlog of 100,000 license applications ?
Mr. Wallace. I remember there was a big log- jam. I think I said
100,000 and turned to counsel and asked him if that was about right.
Mr. Freedman. Not quite that much.
Mr. Nixon. And never on any occasion did you take one license
out of the bottom of the pile and expedite it?
Mr. Wallace. Never. I don't know what pressure might have come
in sideways on the boys.
Mr. Nixon. But you say that you yourself never expedited the issu-
ance of any license ?
Mr. Wallace. Never, at any time.
Mr. Nixon. What about the Board?
Mr. Wallace. The Board, which is composed of the heads of Cabi-
net departments, is one thing. The Board met on questions of top
policy. Then there was the executive branch of BEW under the man-
agement of Milo Perkins, where there were, I suppose, 3,000 employees,
and they did that work.
Mr. Nixon. I am referring to the issuance of the licenses themselves.
Mr. Wallace. It is a clerical job without policy on our part entering
into it.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATEKIAL iUy/
Mr. Nixon. There was testimony presented to this committee on
Tuesday by Colonel Merritt.
Mr. Wallace. Of what organization?
Mr. Nixon. Manhattan Engineering District in New York. He was
in the office which had control over approving the shipments of atomic
products — uranium and related products — abroad. He referred
specifically to one case that he said became, I think his words were "a
very hot case" in their department, involving the shipment of 1,000
pounds of uranium to the Soviet Union through the firm of Boris
Pregel ; and from his testimony it was apparent to me, and I think to
other members of the committee, that this was an unusual case in which
action was desired at an early date. It is difficult for me to reconcile
that testimony with your statement that in no case did BEW exercise
any discretion, you just took them in their order.
Mr. Wallace. Mr. Freedman informs me that the method of han-
dling the licenses, they were divided by countries and by products. It
was not one pile. I know nothing about the mechanical details of
handling them.
Mr. Nixon. Do you recall what the backlog was, approximately,
iu April 1943?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know.
Mr. Ntxon. It was large ?
Mr. Freedman. It was always large.
Mr. Wallace. I don't know. I know there was always pressure
from the trade to get them coming along faster.
Mr. Nixon. I understood counsel to say the backlog was always
large. When did you first learn that shipments of uranium oxide,
uranium nitrate, and heavy water were being made to Russia?
Mr. Wallace. In 1946, when I read it in the press.
Mr. Nixon. You didn't know of any of the shipments before that
time?
Mr. Wallace. No. I was informed that there was a newspaper
t-tfort — this was in the spring of 1946 — a newspaper effort in New
York to involve me in something of this sort. I didn't know at that
time what it was. I was informed that this newspaper effort originated
in Washington, that it was in the nature of a sinister plot, and that
this sinister plot would develop later in the press. I learned enough
in May 1946 so that I did speak to Secretary of War Patterson about
it on May 16.
Mr. Nixon. In your statement, on page 6, you say : "I had absolutely
nothing to do with any of these licenses. I was not aware that they
were being requested. I did know"
Mr. Wallace. There is a "not" that belong in there.
INIr. Nixon. "I did not know that Lend-Lease recommended"?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. You did testify that you recognized, obviously because
of. your broad scientific knowledge, the importance of uranium oxide
in the development of the atomic project?
Mr. Wallace. I recognized the importance of U-235. I didn't know
the relationship of U-235 to uranium, but I did recognize the high
importance of U-235.
Mr, Nixon. You recognized the importance of the product, and
the Board of Economic Warfare issued the licenses, but you did not
oven know your Board issued licenses in 1943 for this material ?
1098 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Wallace. No. This was a purely meclianical proposition.
We issued approximately 8,000 licenses a day.
Mr. Nixon. That is all.
Mr. Walter. Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask one more question.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Walter.
Mr. Walter, Did you attempt, either directly or indirectly, to in-
fluence anybody in a decision to issue a license for any uranium
product ?
Mr. Wallace. No, sir, I did not, and I think this should be cleared
up in the record. It is really a very small item, but General Groves
said he did not know what indirect pressure Mr. Wallace mig-ht have
brought on him or Manhattan project through others. Because that
was left slightly dangling in General Groves' testimony, I would like
to say I certainly did not.
Mr. Walter. I think General Groves cleared that up in a letter
we received this morning.
Mr. Wallace. There was that little bit of testimony that was left
dangling.
Mr. Walter. That is all.
^Ir. Wood. Mv. Velde.
Mr. Velde. Were you acquainted with any of the producers of
uranium while you were head of BEW and Vice President of the
United States?
Mr. Wall-vce. Yes.
Mr. Velde. Who were they ?
Mr. Wallace. On December 27, 1943, Boris Pregel came to see me,
with the request I put him in touch with scientific men in the Depart-
ment of Agriculture. He told me he was manufacturing radium at a
plant at Mount Kisco. I don't recall that he referred to uranium
at the time. He never said anything to me about the atom bomb
until 3 days after it had been dropped on Hiroshima.
The first time I met him was December 1943, and at that time he
wanted me to put him in touch with scientific men in the Department
of Agriculture. I called Eugene Auchter, director of Scientific Re-
search, and asked for Mr. Pregel to meet Eugene Auchter. And I
arranged with Mr. Pregel to get some alpha radiation, a byproduct
of the manufacture of radium, for experimentation in my garden.
I experimented with it in 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, and 1948.
Mr. Velde. That was in your New York farm ?
Mr. Wallace. No, first in Washington and subsequently my New
York farm.
JNIr. Velde. You knew he was a producer of uranium, and that
uranium could be used in the manufacture of the atom bomb ?
Mv. Wallace. He did not refer to the atom bomb until August 8,
1945, after it had been dropped on Hiroshima. At that time he gave
me photostats of statements he had issued to the Miami paper in 1941
as to the peacetime and wartime importance of atomic energy.
Mr. Velde. Would you say your relationship with Boris Pregel
was a close relationship during that time?
Mr. Wallace. I wouldn't say a close relationship. I knew him.
He translated for me. When I found the F'resident wanted me to go
to China via Soviet Asia, when the President first indicated that,
I started trying to learn Russian.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL lUyy
Mr. Velde. Who accompanied you to Russia at the time you made
that trip ?
JNIr. Wallace. Could we finish one subject at the time, or shall we
wander all over the map ?
Mr. Velde. I am sorry I interrupted you.
Mr. Wallace. I merely wanted to say I had studied Russian very
assiduously when the President told me he wanted me to go to China
via Russia, and I had one of the teachers here in Washington. I won't
mention his name because I don't want to prejudice him in any way.
He is not seated in this room, I might say.
What I wanted to do at that time, we felt Russia's part in the war
effort was very significant, and I was going to be visiting certain spots
in Siberia where they were seeking to produce many products that
would save the lives of American boys, and I wanted to make some
speeches. So I asked Mr. Pregel — because he was born in Russia and
was driven out by the Bolsheviks in 1917, I believe — I asked if he
would translate my speeches into Russian. I thought his translation
would be better than that of the people I had been working with. He
did translate them for me, and I saw him rather frequently during
that period.
If you have any further questions on the Pregel matter, would you
like to ask them?
Mr. Wood. It is very interesting, but is it pertinent here?
Mr. Velde. Yes, I think it is, in view of the fact he has made the
statement he did not mention the subject of uranium to anyone, and
in view of the fact Boris F'regel was a producer of radium at the time
and was a very close friend.
Mr. Wood. Proceed.
Mr. Wallace. I didn't say he was a very close friend. I first met
Mr. Pregel on December 27, 1943.
Mr. Velde. Did you discuss the subject of uranium with him?
Mr. Wallace. We discussed alpha radiation. That has nothing to
do with the bomb. It is a byproduct of the manufacture of radium.
I don't recall discussing the subject of uranium, as such, until after
the bomb was dropped. But we did discuss the use of this byproduct
for agricultural purposes. Mr. Pregel did not bring up at any time
the subject of shipments of uranium or the bomb.
Mr. Velde. Mr. Chairman, if you prefer I will not go into the trip
to China and Russia at this time, because I don't see that it will serve
a useful purpose at this time.
Mr. Wallace. With regard to this statement, I have some hesitancy
about putting it in the record of the committee, because it involves a
lengthy statement of what took place at Cabinet meetings, and I would
like to clear it with someone at the White House before putting it in.
I think probably I have put enough in the record. I may say that the
statement that President Truman made knocking the story down in the
New York Times was made without solicitation on my part.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the date of that Cabinet meeting?
Mr. Wallace. September 21, 1945.
Mr. Ta\t<:nner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidence
the memorandum of the Board of Economic Warfare approved by
Mr. Wallace to which I referred earlier, and I ask that it be marked
"Wallace Exhibit 2."
Mr. Wood. It will be admitted.
1100 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
(The memorandum above referred to, marked "Wallace Exhibit
2," is hereinafter included in the record,) ^^
Mr. Wood. The committee will stand in recess until 2 : 30 this
afternoon.
(Thereupon, a recess was taken until 2 : 30 p. m., Thursday, January
26, 1950.)
AFTER RECESS
The committee reconvened, pursuant to the taking of the recess,
Hon. Francis E. Walter, presiding.
Mr. Walter. The committee will come to order.
Whom do you wish to call first, Mr. Tavenner ?
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Hoopes.
Mr. Walter. Mr. Hoopes, will you raise your right hand, please?
Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give before
this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God ?
Mr. HooPES. I do.
Mr. Walter. Sit down, please.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES P. HOOPES
Mr. Tavenner. Will you state your full name, Mr. Hoopes?
Mr. HooPES. James P. Hoopes.
Mr. Tavenner. What is your present address?
Mr. Hoopes. 39 Poplar Street, Douglaston, Long Island, N. Y.
Mr. Ta\^nner. When and where were you born ?
Mr. Hoopes. July 6, 1913, Westchester, Pa.
Mr. Tavenner. What is your present occupation ?
Mr. Hoopes. I am a lawyer.
Mr. Tavenner. Would you furnish the committee with a resume
of your past employment, including any service that you may have had
in the United States Army ?
Mr. HooPES. I had a commission in the Coast Artillery Reserve of
the Army from 1933 to 1938. From March of 1942 until early Novem-
ber 1943, 1 was employed in the Office of the Lend-Lease Administra-
tion. At that time I entered the service of the Xavy, in November
1943, and I was released to inactive duty in April 1946. I have been
engaged in private practice since that time.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Hoopes, will you tell us the exact nature of your
employment and your position with Lend-Lease during 1943?
Mr. Hoopes. I was a liaison officer in the Division for Soviet Sup-
ply. I had to do in some measure with lend-lease requisitions for
materials to be shipped to Russia.
Another one of my jobs was having to do with cash purchases of
materials to be exported to Russia.
As a liaison officer, the main function of the job was to handle the
Soviet requests with the various Government agencies and persons in
the Government who were in a position to pass upon their availaiblity
as to material, and so forth, and obtain the necessary priorities to be
awarded if the material was to be shipped. That is about the size of it.
^ See appendix.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 11 OX
Mr. Tavenner. Well, now, you spoke of cash purchases and lend-
lease purchases. Why was it necessary for you to have to deal with
cash purchases, when you were an employee of Lend-Lease? Were
not cash purchases handled direct through other agencies ?
Mr. HooPES. No, sir. Our office handled, during the time that I
was there, the cash purchases for the Soviet Union, which required
clearance for export, particularly those which required any priority
assistance. All the requests for priority assistance or for clearance
for export of those purchases f unneled through our office.
Mr. Tavenner. Now, what was the practice in your office when you
received a requisition, say, from the Soviet Purchasing Commission for
some article of merchandise, or some commodity?
Mr. Hoopes. Do you mean a lend-lease requisition, or do you mean
a cash-purchase application?
Mr. Tavenner. Well, let's take both of them. Lend-Lease, first.
Mr. HooPES. In the case of a lend-lease requisition, one of the first
jobs that we had to do was to check to see if the material requested
under the requisition was within the program of aid to the Soviet
Union.
Mr. Tai'enner. How did you ascertain that fact ?
Mr. Hoopes. Well, the materials were set forth in the protocol that
governed the lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union, and certain quantities
of various materials were committed by the United States to Russia,
and it was our first job to see if any of these requests came within the
categories of the material that was authorized. Once we determined
that, we checked the particular liaison officer who was handling that
particular material. There were several liaison officers. The one
liaison officer handling the particular material would check with the
various members of the War Production Board and any other agencies
that controlled that material.
For instance, if the material was copper or a certain kind of
machine, we checked with the people in the War Production Board
and the branch that controlled the production and the availability
of the supply of that commodity. We would find whether that ma-
terial was available. We would find what sort of priority was needed
to obtain the production and the making of it available to the Russians.
We also checked as to the shipping, the size, the tonnage, and the
bulk of the shipment, because it was our job to control the amount
and to schedule the shipping. That was not my job, but we made
a report on it.
These requisitions, then, after we had had preliminary information
on them, were ordinarily taken up in our Division at a requisition
meeting, at which General Wesson presided, and they were reviewed
and discussed. If there were some questions of policy to be deter-
mined, those questions were brought up, and the officers would give
a report as to what the War Production Board had to say as to the
availability, and so on. If the requisition was ultimately passed, it
was then forwarded to the War Production Board for routing through
the various branches to obtain priority, and then finally it was turned
over to the procurement agency of Lend-Lease to buy the material.
Lend-Lease did not buy the material, but there were various Govern-
ment agencies that did. And the requisition was given to them, and
they purchased the material, which was generally put out on bids or
however they saw fit to do it.
1102 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
From that point, when the goods were ready for delivery, they
were scheduled for shipment. That was not my particular function,
but we followed it through.
Mr. Tavenner. If that requisition was designed for export to a
foreign country, to what extent was that procedure which you have
described supplemented ?
Mr. HoopES. I am only talking about the requisitions that were
Mr. Tavenner. For export ?
Mr. Hoopes. All Lend-Lease requisitions.
Mr. Tavenner. Of course, the only ones would have been for export.
Mr. HoopES. And the only ones we were involved with were for
export to Russia.
Mr. Tavenner. Now, you have not mentioned anything about the
necessity of having an export license.
Mr. HooPES. No export license was required, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. No export license was required for any material
which was being exported to Russia ?
Mr. HooPEs. No, sir ; under lend-lease. There is a distinction to be
made between lend-lease materials and cash purchases.
Mr. Tavenner. And cash purchases. All right.
Mr. HooPES. The lend-lease requisition itself was the shipping
authority. Once it had gone finally through all the various stages it
went to, and got into production, and so on, it contained authority
to ship; the requisition itself did. And they were shipped pursuant
to the Lend-Lease Act, and they were shipped with lend-lease funds.
The cash purchases were handled in an entirely different manner.
Mr. Tavenner. But you issued a certificate of release to accompany
the material, did you not, when it was lend-lease?
Mr. HooPES. No, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. You did not?
]Mr. Hoopes. No, sir ; that was for cash purchases only.
Mr. Ta\t:nner, Well, now, describe the situation where it was a
cash-purchase transaction.
Mr. Hoopes. I am not entirely familiar with the situation as to the
procedure of cash purchases all the way through, until about July of
1943, when the procedure changed. To the best of my recollection,
the Soviet Purchasing Commission would send an application through
by letter to our office, requesting an export license for shipment of
some particular commodity or material. My only part in the picture
at that time was the assistance for priority. If the material needed
priority assistance, it would be accompanied by a WPB form, and then
I got that form and checked with the Government agencies in similar
manner to the handling of lend-lease requisitions, to see if the material
was available, what priority it needed, and so forth. And even though
it was a cash purchase application, these items were considered from
many of the same lend-lease points of view, about shipping, the
•critical nature of supply, and the comparative needs of our own Gov-
•ernment agencies for other purposes.
I would send the priority application to the War Production Board
and follow it through the branches until it got its priority and was
returned to our office. Wlien it was returned, with the necessary
priority on it, it was my recollection that we gave approval to the ex-
port licensing — I did not handle this ordinarily — and that the export
license was actually issued by the Board of Economic Warfare. It
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1103
was their clociiment. We gave our approval to it, and it already had
its priority, and it was then returned to the Russians. It was given
a number and a date on which it was approved ; and the export license,
together with the priority itself, the priority certificate, was returned
to the Russians. They in turn would turn that over to their supplier,
who would use it in getting the material and in shipping it.
The procedure was changed later, but up to that point I did not
have a great deal to do with the export licensing itself. I had to do
mostly with priorities.
Mr. Tavenner. When you say it "was changed later," you mean at
what date ?
Mr. HooPES. I believe the change date was July 1, 1943. I think
that was the effective date of the change. We worked out with the
Board of Economic Warfare an arrangement whereby they would
issue what was called a program license to the Soviet iQnion. Then
the Soviet Purchasing Commission would submit to our office what
was called a release certificate. It was a document which set forth the
nature of the material that they wanted to purchase, their immediate
supplier, several details about what the ingredients of the material
were, the shipping weight, and the bulk, and so forth. They sent that
to our office. It was up to us, then, to pass upon it and approve it for
export under the program license.
The program which the program license covered was the protocol.
In other words, it was strictly tying in all Russian shipments, whether
they were for cash or lend-lease, to the protocol, so that it was one
program. And then one of us would sign the application, the release
certificate, give it a number, and return it to the Soviet Purchasing
Commission.
Mr. Taa'enner. Let me stop you, there, a moment.
Mr. HooPEs. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. The protocol agreement that was negotiated with
the Russian Government was negotiated with what agency of the
United States Government?
Mr. HoopES. I am not entirely sure. It wasn't by any specific
agency, Mr. Tavenner. It was a document which was signed, like
a treaty between ambassadors of the various countries. It wasn't
just with the Soviet Government. Great Britain, I believe, and Ca-
nada were also parties to the protocol agreement. But it was a pro-
gram which was worked out by a top level committee composed of
our highest Government officials, including the people from the Army
and Navy, to decide what materials would go to Russia that follow-
ing year. And then it was given to us. We were on what you may
say was the lower echelon level of this job. The program was worked
out, and it was given to us to carry out.
Mr. Tavenner. In obtaining the priority on cash purchases, with
whom did you deal in the War Production Board ? What officials ?
Mr. Hoopes. Hundreds of them.
Mr. Ta\t.nner. Would that depend upon the particular character
of the material?
Mr. HooPES. Yes. It would entirely. Because I not only would
deal with the individuals who received the applications. There was
one whole floor in the building that did nothing but receive the appli-
cations and see that they funneled to the right branches. But then
1104 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
I dealt with the people in all the branches that this application had
to go by.
Mr. Tavenner. Well, let us come right to the question that we are
concerned with, here. With whom did you deal regarding priorities
for the export of uranium ?
Mr. HooPES. I didn't deal with anybody regarding uranium. You
are speaking of the particular April transactions ?
Mr. Tavenner. Any transactions.
Mr. Hoopes. I never had any dealing with anybody in the War Pro-
duction Board regarding uranium.
Mr. Ta\tnner. You did not. Do you know who, of the Lend-Lease
officials, did have such
Mr. HooPEs. Excuse me. Could I interpose something there, that
may help ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
Mr. HooPES. The War Production Board wasn't always the con-
trolling agency as far as a decision as to whether an item was avail-
able or not was concerned. The War Production Board did issue the
bulletins that were previously described in this hearing, setting forth
the commodities and what agency or what person or what group
handled that commodity ; but it might very well be that certain com-
modities were handled by other groups than the War Production
Board, and if that were the case, we had to deal with them.
Mr. Ta\t:nner. I understand. Well, now, do you know, from your
contact with the handling of uranium, whether or not the War Pro-
duction Board was consulted with regard to priorities for uranium ?
Mr. HooPES. I understand that the War Production Board was
consulted. It was not by me.
Mr. Tavenner. By whom ?
Mr. Hoopes. I believe Mv. Moore had to do with that.
Mr. Tavenner. Now, did you consult any other agency with regard
to the export of uranium ? You or any other official of your staff?
Mr. HooPES. Well, I am not sure who else might have consulted
anybody else. I know that Mr. Moore was handling uranium. The
only people that I consulted were in the office of Colonel Crenshaw
in New York, and that was because I had a memorandum from Mr.
Moore that there was something pending on a particular application,
and in his absence I happened to handle that. I had understood that
there had been considerable background of negotiations and clearance
discussions on this particular thing, and it had reached the stage where
I was given specific instructions about it. And when the time came,
I contacted Colonel Crenshaw's office, imder instructions to do so.
Mr. Tavenner. Is that the first experience that you had in any
transaction relating to uranium ?
Mr. Hoopes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. Then tell us about the negotiations that had oc-
curred, as far as you learned of them, pertaining to this shipment,
which I believe was the 1,000-pound shij)ment.
Mr. HooPBS. Well, sir, I believe you have more records than I on
that. _ I went up yesterday afternoon and saw some of the old records
on this, which I understand were turned over to this committee some
time ago.
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1105
Mr. HooPES. I understand that Mr. Moore had been dealing in this
matter with the Russians and with General Groves' office and with the
WPB. I did not acquaint myself with all the details of that, except
to know that this particular transaction, that application for 500
pounds of uranium nitrate and 600 pounds of uranium oxide, had been
disapproved. I got into the picture at that time, when it had been
disapproved by our office, and a letter had gone to the Russians advis-
ing them that it was of a critical nature and could not be supplied.
When Mr. Moore went away, in April — and I am not positive of the
date — he left a memorandum for me advising that it might be possible
to obtain some substitutes for uranium compounds, I believe.
Mr. Walter. Have you the memorandum ?
Mr. HooPES. No, sir, I don't have the memorandum.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any note or personal memorandum
that you made at the time regarding this transaction ?
Mr. HooPES. Yes, sir ; I do.
Mr. Tavenner. Well, let us start with that.
Mr. Hoopes. I have a note on April 16, 19-1:3, and this note is in a
little diary notebook that I kept during the course of the day's activi-
ties, and from which I later made up daily diaries, which we sub-
mitted to the head of our division every day, of work that went on.
And I have a note here indicating that Mr. Fomichev called regarding
500 pounds of uranium oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate to
be supplied from Chematar, Inc., of New York City. My note
doesn't say any more than that, but sometimes it didn't. The diary
for that day I think you also have. This is the daily report that was
typed up, dated April 17, 1943, for activities on the 16th. One of the
items appears as follows :
Conferred with Mr. Fomichev regarding application for export licenses for
1,000 pounds of uranium compounds, on which Soviets had option. This request
has definitely been turned down by this division because of strategic need of
materials in this country. Mr. Fomichev was advised to consider the matter
closed as to this particular reciuest, but that inquiries were being made as to
allocation of any possible substitute materials.
In one of the instructions that Mr. Moore had left for me — I think
the details are in a memo, there.
Mr. Tavenner. No, the details are not in the memo. I will read
you this. This much does appear from the memo of April 19 :
Uranium : This Is being handled by General Hoopes, who should be advised by
General Wesson should matters become excessively complicated.
Mr. HooPES. Don't you have another memo there on that, about
that date? There was a memo that I saw yesterday that didn't have
an exact date, but it indicated that Mr. Moore — it was to me and
stated that it may be possible to obtain the substitutes and that Colonel
Crenshaw's office was forwarding us a list of substitutes, and if I did
not receive them by the following Monday I was to call Colonel
Crenshaw's office, and then later to take the matter up with General
Wesson.
Mr. McSwEENEY. What are the substitutes for uranium?
Mr. HooPES. That is in the letter, sir. I am not familiar with
them.
Mv. Tavenner. We have a memorandum similar to that, but that
is in June 1043. That is the memorandum, then, that you are speaking
of, that should have been dated in April ?
99334—50 14
1106 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. HooPES. Yes. It must be, sir. Because it was tied in with the
instructions for me to carry out when Mr. Moore was away.
Mr. Walter. Who put the date of June on, when it should have
been April ^
Mr. HooPES. I don't know, sir.
Mr, Tavenner. Will you look at the memorandum and state
whether that is the memorandum to which you referred ?
Mr. HooPES. Yes, that is it.
Mr. Walter. When was that memorandum made?
Mr. HooPES. I don't know when it was made, Mr. Walter. It says
on it "June 1943," but that is obviously wrong.
Mr. Walter. Whose memorandum is it?
Mr. HooPES. It is from Mr. Moore to me.
Mr. W^vLTER. To you?
Mr. HoopES. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. This was a copy prepared by the State Department?
Mr. HooPES. This is a copy, and perhaps in copying it they may
have made an error as to the date. I do not know. Mr. Moore may be
able to clear you up on the date of this memo. I don't know.
Mr. Tavenner, AVill you read it, please ?
Mr. HooPES. Yes. This copy says :
June 1943.
For : J. P. Hoopes
From : W. C. Moore.
Subject : Urauium compounds.
It appears that it may be possible to get ferro-uraniiim compounds, and the
information should be sent to yon. I have talked with Colonel Crenshaw's office
in New York and given tliem your name. If you do not get information by Mon-
day, call them up. Mrs. Cochran has the number.
Get sufficient specifications so that the Soviets can make decisions as to
whether it is suitable for their needs and, if possible, quantities available.
Captain Johnston of General Groves' office is the man in Washington who may
be able to help you.
Mr. Ta\t:nner. Well, did you follow the direction of Mr. Moore and
call Colonel Crenshaw's office ?
Mr. Hoopes. Yes, I did. Evidently the list didn't come in Monday
morning, that they referred to, and 1 called Colonel Crenshaw's office.
Mr. Walter. Mr. Hoopes, referring to that memorandum again, you
saw the original memorandum, didn't you?
Mr. Hoopes. I saw it in 1943, sir.
Mr. Ta-st^nner. Did you see it recently ?
Mr. Hoopes. No, sir. I saw the same thing that you have here, just
a compilation of material that has a bearing on all these transactions.
I haven't seen the original memo ; no.
INIr. Tavenner. Do you recall, from your independent recollection,
that the matter of substitutes arose in April 1943 ?
Mr. Hoopes. Yes, sir; I do. That is borne out by the subsequent
correspondence which we have.
Mr. Tavenner. I think so.
Mr. Hoopes. It definitely ties into that.
Mr. Tavenner. All right. So will you proceed, then ?
Mr. Hoopes. Well, it seems that — I don't know Avhen it was received,
but there was a letter from the Soviet Purchasing Commission to our
office dated April 20, in which the Russians were upset about our
having turned down this particular application previously, and they
stated, in there
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1107
Mr. Tavenner. Let me hand you what purports to be a copy of the
letter, furnished by the State Department, and I ask you if that is the
letter to which you refer.
Mr. HoopES. That is the one I was talking about, sir; yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Well, will you read the letter, please ?
Mr. HooPES. This letter is dated April 20, 1943. It is addressed to :
Major General Charles M. Wesson,
Senior Assistant Administrator,
Office of Lend-Lease Administration,
515 Twenty-second Street NW., Washington, D. C.
Deak General Wesson : We were advised by your office that our application
of April 3, 1948, for export license for 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and .500
pounds of uranium nitrate had been declined. Needless to say this decision
upsets the most urgent efforts of our war industries at present.
In view of the rejection of our two requisitions for uranium compounds by the
War Department, we hoped to obtain small quantities of uranium compounds by
direct purchase for cash. In fact we had several propt)sitions from American
companies. The materials were offered from the stock for immediate delivery.
Your office was kept informed about all negotiations with those companies.
Nevertheless, the conceivable purcliase of uranium compounds was not authorized.
Because of the very lu-gent needs which you have always appreciated, I would
vei*y much appreciate your reconsidering the above decision of your office, and
to authorize us to buy 50O pounds each of the afore-mentioned uranium com-
pounds and 25 pounds of uranium metal, for which we also have a proposition.
Thank you for your early attention to this matter.
Sincerely yours,
N. S. Stepanov.
Chief of Petroleum Products, Chemical Department.
Mr. Taatnxer. Let me ask you one question about the letter. There
is a statement here that —
in fact we had several propositions from American companies. The materials
were offered from the stock for immediate delivery. Your office was kept
informed about all negotiations with those companies.
Now, what information did you receive regarding companies which
had materials in stock for delivery ?
Mr. Hoopes. That took place during the time that Mr. Moore was
handling this, before I got into it.
Mr. Tavenner. You had no knowledge of it ?
Mr. Hoopes. No, sir.
Mr. Tavi:nner. All right, sir.
Mr. Hoopes. On the 22d of April — I gather that the letter that I had
been expecting from Colonel Crenshaw's office with the list of uranium
compounds hadn't arrived, because I have a note here, "Call Colonel
Crenshaw" and then I have a note "Out" and then later "Captain
Merritt." The number is "Murray Hill 3-1761," subject "Uranium
compounds," and then "Captain Merritt" and then the substance of
what he advised me :
Said pressure had just been brought to bear on General Groves to release the
1,000 pounds. Colonel Crenshaw is willing for Russians to have the list of
substitutes. Please try to hold off approval of the 1,000 pounds till Russians
have chance to see the substitute list.
Now, after this-
Mr. Tavenner. Just before you leave that: Did Captain Merritt
explain anything further as to what he meant about pressure being
brought to bear upon General Groves ?
Mr. Hoopes. No, sir ; he did not.
1108 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Tavenner. Did 3^011 have any conversation with Captain Mer-
ritt or any other member of the Manhattan Engineering District with
regard to that statement?
Mr. HoopES. No, sir. Captain Merritt is the only person I have ever
talked to in the Manhattan District.
Mr. Tavenner. All right. Proceed.
Mr. HooPES. After this conversation, I have a note here that I spoke
with General Wesson. I went in and talked to General Wesson. Mr.
Moore had indicated previously that I was to take the matter up with
General Wesson.
In discussing with General Wesson, 1 explained to him my con-
versation with Captain Merritt. I just indicated what I have read
here. And General Wesson said he wanted to speak to General
Groves. He gave instructions to his secretary to get him General
Groves on the phone.
I have a note here :
Spoke with General Wesson. He called General Groves. Got Groves to say
O. K. to export the 1,000 pounds iiraniiim compounds. Genei'al Wesson agreed to
write Soviets approving the request.
Mr. Tavenner. Then the decision to approve the request for the
issuance of an export license was made at the time of that telephone
conversation ?
Mr. Hoopes. I would believe so, sir.
Mr. Walter. Were you present when the telephone conversation
took place ?
Mr. HooPES. Mr. Walter, I don't remember. I remember distinctly
General Wesson's giving instructions : "Get me General Groves."
And it was generally a pretty busy office around there, and I don't
remember whether I stayed during the conversation or not. I rather
imagine I did not.
Mr. Walter. It was shortly thereafter that you were informed that
permission had been granted for the export of this 1,000 pounds?
Mr. Hoopes. Yes, sir; it was apparently right after General Wes-
son's conversation with General Groves, because I have tied it all in
on the same note here. There are no intervening phone calls or any-
thing else, so it must have been immediately after that telephone
conversation that General Wesson gave me the instructions.
Mr. Tavenner. And what was the date of that memorandum ?
Mr. HooPES. This memorandum is dated April 22.
Mr. Tavenner. That was the day on which you talked to Colonel
Crenshaw's office ?
Mr. HooPES. That is right, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. But spoke to Captain Merritt?
Mr. Hoopes. Yes, sir.
After getting these instructions from General Wesson
Mr. Tavenner. Let me ask you this: Did General Wesson make
any statement to you as to the reason for approving the issuance of
this license on the 22d of April or at any later date ?
Mr. HooPES. I don't recall exactly whether he made his statement
to me. I assume that he did, because in my report I said something
about the reason, in my later report. I assume that we had some brief
conversation about it. But I don't remember all of it. I can't swear-
to that, sir.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
1109
Mr. Tavenner. That was written in your report of May 31, sum-
marizing these transactions.
Mr. HooPES. Well, there was a report earlier than that. There was
a report for the activities of April 22.
No, it doesn't give that. Shall I read you my report for that ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes ; read from your report.
Mr. HooPES. This is from my diary, dated April 23, 1943, for activi-
ties of the 22d :
Conferred with Captain Merritt in the oflSce of Colonel Crenshaw, of War
Department Engineers, New York City, on recent list of various substitutes for
particular uranium compounds desired by Soviets. General Wesson arranged
with General Groves for clearance of the original Soviet application for 1,000
pounds of such compounds, which the Soviets claim they can procure from stock.
Prepared letter for General Wesson advising Soviets accordingly in light of their
urgent need for this material. Export license now being put tiirough.
Mr. Walter. As I understand it, General Wesson was opposed to
granting the permit. It was not until after this telephone call that
he agreed to allow it.
Mr. HooPES. Yes; that is true. This is conjecture, because I hadn't
been in the early negotiations about this, but we had been apparently
advised of the tight supply of this particular material. I myself
knew nothing of the atomic project or nothing of the strategic situa-
tion about uranium. All the instructions I had received was that they
couldn't get this material. And it wasn't until the conversation Gen-
eral Wesson had with General Groves that he made the decision.
My memo here to Mr. Moore expands that a little bit.
Mr. Tavenner. But take the occurrences in the order in which they
took place.
Mr. HooPES. Well, on the 23d, the export license was approved to
cover this request for 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds
of uranium nitrate.
Mr. Tavenner. I hand you what appears to be a copy of the appli-
cation for the export license, with the notation at the foot of it by you.
Will you examine it and state if that is a copy of the application ?
Mr. HooPEs. I don't know. I assume it is. I mean these are ex-
cerpts. I know that I did make such a note on it and we put the
export license through. I don't know whether there was any other
material than this. This seems to give the details from the export-
license application.
Mr. Tavenner. Well, will you read it, please, into the record?
Mr. HooPES. Yes, sir. This says :
The following apparently copied from the export license.
It is an application for export dated April 23, 1943.
Order number
Units
Supplier
Value
21-73/C 43058...-
500 pounds urano-uranic oxide 99.5 percent pure, at $4.50-.
500 pounds uranium nitrate (uranyl) at $2.25, total gross
weight 1,200 pounds.
Chematar, Inc
$3,375
Note. — This application has been held up for some time. It has now been
approved by General Wesson as of April 22, 1943.
That is all that is on that note. I don't know whether this other
note is attached to it or not. There is another note on the next page
here.
1110 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Ta^t:nner. What is tlio date of that note ?
Mr, HoopES. April 22 is the date of this other note. It is a note
appended — I will assume it is appended to the other note. It is
addressed to Mrs. Hall, but there is no signature — no indication of
a signature — on either one of these notes.
Mr. Ta\'exner. Will j^ou read it? Doesn't it indicate that it was
signed by a person ?
Mr. HooPES. No, sir ; it doesn't indicate it was signed by a person.
It says, "Received from J. Hoopes."
Mr. TA^'ENNER. Received from ? All right.
Mr. HooPEs. Yes, sir. It is a note to Mrs. Hall.
General Wesson has decided that this export license be approved and issued as
soon as possible. Received from J. Hoopes.
Office note : Indicates license No. C-1G431S0 assigned on April 23, 1943.
Mr. Tavenner. Was that license number assigned by your office ?
Mr. HooPES. I gather that it was, sir. I do not remember that
procedure. Mr. Moore handled the export licenses and I don't know
whether they were numbers given to us by the Board of Economic War-
fare which we assigned as we approved them or whether they were our
own numbers. We put the number on the export license. I do know
that.
Mr. Tavexner. All right. Will you proceed?
Mr. HooPES. Well, on the 23d, a letter was written by General Wes-
son to Mr. Stepanov of the Soviet Purchasing Commission. Do you
wish me to read that?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
Mr. HooPES (reading) :
Your letter of April 20, requesting reconsideration of your application for
export license covering 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of
uranium nitrate has received careful study.
Having in mind tlie urgency of your needs for this material as expressed in
your letter, I have reviewed the situation. Our supply of these uranium com-
pounds is critical. However, I am recommending approval of your present ex-
port license for the above quantities, whicli you state that you can iiurchase
from stocks on hand.
As regards the 25 pounds of lu-anium metal also mentioned in your letter,
we shall entertain application for this material provided you can locate a source
of supply.
Sincerely yours,
C. M. Wesson,
Major Oeneral United States Army,
S&nior Assistant Administrator.
Mr. Walter. When was that letter, please ?
Mr. Hoopes. The date of that letter was April 23, sir.
Mr. Walter. And that was signed by General Wesson ?
Mr. HooPEs. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. That is notifying the Soviet Purchasing Commis-
sion of the approval of the license.
Now, what was the nexr thing that occurred ?
Mr. HooPES. I have a note, on April 26, of a telephone call that I
received from Mr. Fomichev of the Commission.
JNIr. Tavenner. That is, of the Soviet Purchasing Commission ?
Mr. HooPES. Yes, sir. He states :
Option expired for uranium compounds. Will send license application for
25 pounds uranium metal.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1111
That is all that note says. I wrote it up a little fuller in the diary.
Mr. Tavenner. Did 3'ou make a comment of your own at that time,
after receiving the notice that the option had expired which the
Russians had expected to use ?
Mr. HooPES. Yes, sir, I did. As I understand it, or as I understood
it at the time, it was that General AYesson and General Groves were
skeptical as to the fact that the Russians could get this material.
Chematar was the supplier, and Chematar was the hroker, and when
the request was approved I believe it was approved on the assumption
that they would never be able to fill it. And when Fomichev called
and advised that he could no longer get it, it sounded as if the original
assumption was correct.
]\Ir. Tavenner. And did you not make some notation at the time,
in your diary, with regard to that?
Mr. Hoopes. In my daily report ? Yes, I did.
Mr. Ta\^nner. In your daily report. Will you state what that
was 'I
]\Ir. HooPES. On April 27th, for activities on the 26th, I have a note
here :
Conferred with Mr. Fomichev, who expressed dismay at inability to locate
uranium compounds now that the export license has been granted. This de-
velopment seems to confirm our skepticism regarding the stock supply which
the Russians insisted had been offered from several sources.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you communicate that information to General
Wesson; that is, the information that you had received about the
supply being exhausted ?
Mr. HooPES. I assume that I did, Mr. Tavenner. I don't have a
definite recollection of it. I did certainly in this diary, because all
these diaries were written up as .reports of our activities and were
funneled in to General Wesson so that he could see what had been
going on. So I imagine I spoke to him about it. I don't have any
distinct note of that. I don't believe I do, anyhow. That memo-
randum of mine to Mr. Moore may indicate that, which you have in
the record.
Mr. Tavenner. Now, do you have any other record there of trans-
actions before you made a summary report on May 1 ?
Mr. HoopES. I haven't any other
Mr. Tavenner. That is, action that you were familiar with ?
Mr. Hoopes. I don't believe so, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you have any knowledge of the issuance of an
amended or approval of an amended license ?
Mr. Hoopes. No, sir. I am not sure that one was amended. I know
there has been a lot of discussion about it before this committee, but
I don't know that there ever was an amended license.
]\Ir. Tavenner. Well, now, right in that connection, have you seen
a request to amend the license ?
Mr. Hoopes. Yesterday afternoon I saw this request dated April 28
from the Russians.
Mr. Taa-enner. Yes. Had yovi seen that before yesterday ?
Mr. Hoopes. No, sir ; I had not.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you know of the fact that such a letter had been
written prior to yesterday ?
Mr. Hoopes. No, sir. The request was not addressed to us.
Mr. Tavenner. To whom was it addressed ?
1112
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. HoorES. Do you have a copy of it there? I took notes from
that. Yours woukl be more complete than mine. It was addressed
to "Mr. Thad C. Martin."
Mr. Tavenner. That is right.
Mr. HoopES. "Administrative Officer" or "Administrative Office" —
I don't know which it was — "Operations Branch, Office of Exports,
Board of Economic Warfare."
Mr. Tavenner. I show you a letter of April 28, 1943, addressed to
Mr. Martin, as you said. Will you read it ?
Mr. Hoopes. It is dated April 28, 1943, addressed to :
Mr. Thad C. Martin,
Administration Officer, Operation Branch,
Office of Exports, Board of Economic Warfare,
Room 2032, Tempo U Building, Twelfth and Constitution Avenue,
Washington, D. C.
In reference to the above export license number —
Dear Sib
excuse me
It was preceded by-
Re : export license No. 1643180.
Dear Sir : In reference to the above export license number, co\ ering 500 pounds
of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate, we request that the
license be amended as follows :
Net weight
Commodity
Unit
price
Total
price
finn pnnnd.q
Urano-uranic oxide, 95-98 percent pure
$3.10
2.85
$1,550
fiOn ponnd. Mr. Tavenner. Then at Great Falls you had an opportunity to re-
view the records regarding the shipment of the various materials that
Kotikov was interested in ?
Mr. Jordan. I had them all in my hands.
Mr. Ta^tenner. Do you have knowledge of the use made of thorium,
cadmium, graphite, or aluminum tubes?
Mr. Jordan. I did not know at the time what it was for^ I had no
concepton of what the words "uranium," "cadmium," or "thorium"
meant at the time ; but, now that I have seen pictures of an atomic pile,
I recognize the various things in it as the very things Kotikov was
collecting. I never had seen the word "cadmium" before. I see here
that controls the heating of the atomic pile.
I looked at my records and saw that we shipped, in 1942, 100,800
pounds cadmium metals ; in 1943 we shipped 150,427 pounds cadmium
metals, 72,535 pounds of cadmium alloys; and in 1944 we shipped
533,742 pounds cadmium metals. In 1944 the cadmium alloys stopped
cold.
As to thorium, in 1942 we shipped 13,440 pounds ; in 1943 we shipped
11,912 pounds ; and in 1944 not a pound.
Mr. Tavenner. What was the amount of thorium you said was
shipped in 1943 ?
Mr. Jordan. Thorium, 13,440 pounds in 1942 and 11,912 pounds
in 1943.
Mr, Tavenner. Wliat was that last figure ?
Mr. Jordan. 11,912 pounds in 1943.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I have been able to produce here a
shipper's export declaration showing the exact figure of 11,912 pounds
of thorium nitrate shipped January 30, 1943, from Philadelphia on
the Steamship John C. Fremont^ the exporter being Amtorg Trading
Corp. I desire to introduce this record in evidence and ask that it be
marked "Jordan Exhibit 4."
]\Ir. Wood. I understand the record tendered is a photostatic copy
of the original?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes.
Mr, Wood. Without objection, it will be admitted.
(The document above referred to, marked "Jordan Exhibit 4," is
filed herewith.) *^
Mr. Nixon. Do I understand you are reading from your diary at
the present time?
** See appendix.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1157
Mr. Jordan. My diary consists of books and bound volumes and
various notebooks that I kept at the time.
Mr. Nixon. I am referring to this shipment of 11,912 pounds.
Mr. Jordan. I am reading it from the official records the Russians
gave me.
Mr. Nixon. At that time ?
Mr. Jordan. No. They were given to me later. Before I went out
of the Army, I was afraid there would be a lend-lease investigation,
and I asked the Russians if they would let me have the totals that
went through, and they gave me the complete totals of everything
Russia received in 1942, 1943, and 1944.
Mr. Case. Everything they received where ?
Mr. Jordan. Entirely.
Mr. Case. In all forms of lend-lease?
Mr. Jordan. Yes. It runs into billions of dollars.
Mr. Nixon. Do the uranium shipments appear on that?
Mr. Jordan. No. They were not under lend-lease. They were paid
by cash.
Mr. Nixon. This includes only such shipments as were made under
lend-lease?
Mr. Jordan. It includes only such shipments as the American
taxpayers paid for.
Mr. Case. All shipments through every channel?
Mr. Jordan. Every shipment that went through lend-lease out of
the United States.
Mr. Kearney. That is, at every port of the United States?
Mr. Jordan. Every port.
Mr. Kearney. Not only from Great Falls ?
Mr. Jordan. Not only from Great Falls. So, what I have been
able to do is refresh my memory by reading the total figures and
checking them with what I know, and they come out right.
Mr. Tavenner. You have told us about thorium. What record do
you have of the shipment of cadmium ?
Mr. Jordan. Cadmium? I just read the figures.
I didn't read the figures on aluminum tubes. In 1942 we shipped
them 3,463,346 pounds of aluminum tubes at a cost of $3,989,506. In
1943 we shipped them 2,982,209 pounds at a cost of $2,491,021. In
1944 we shipped them 7,186,172 pounds at a cost of $6,461,923, or a
total cost of $12,942,450.
The graphite, I have a picture of an atomic pile made up of graphite.
According to Colonel Kotikov he was assembling graphite for fur-
naces.
In 1942 we shipped them 1,818,838 pounds of carbon graphite for
furnaces, and 7,069,088 graphite for furnaces. In 1943 we shipped
them 11,694,118 graphite for furnaces. And in 1944 we shipped them
9,437,006 graphite for furnaces. The total cost was $4,327,101.
Mr. Tavenner. These materials to which you have testified — that
is, the thorium, cadmium, aluminum tubes, and graphite — could be
used for what purposes, as far as you know?
^ Mr. JoRDON. I only know that this article on the atomic bomb gives
these materials as being the necessary materials to make the atomic
bomb. I am not a technician and not a chemist. This article is in
Life magazine (indicating publication in hand) .
1158 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Wood. Mr. Counsel, I regret very much to have to suspend at
this time, but it is only 5 minutes before the convening of the House.
We will take a recess until 3 o'clock this afternoon.
(Thereupon, at 11 : 55 a. m., a recess was taken until 3 p. m. of the
same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
(The subcommittee met at 3 p. m.)
Mr. Wood. The record will show that of the subcommittee conduct-
ing this hearing there are present Messrs. Velde, Kearney, and Wood.
TESTIMONY OF GEOKGE RACEY JORDAN— Resumed
Mr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, may I clarify in my own mind a couple
of points testified to this morning by the witness ?
Mr. Wood. Mr. Kearney.
Mr. I^ARNET. I understood, Major— and you correct me if I am
wrong — this morning you testified to the arrival at Great Falls of a
C-47 containing approximately 50 pieces of luggage?
Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir.
(Representative Nixon arrives in hearing room.)
Mr. Kearney. And as I recollect you read from a diary in which
the notations were supposed to have been made on or about that time ;
is that correct?
Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kearney. Can you tell the committee regarding any Russian
personnel that was aboard that plane ?
Mr. Jordan. At the beginning, when I first went to Great Falls in
1945, the material I have been complaining about arrived by freight
at the railroad station and was brought out to the field in trucks and
put in a warehouse and then loaded onto a C-47 which we had specially
prepared to fly to Moscow.
It is important to get the point why the transfer had to be made at
Great Falls. These C-47 planes that arrived from various depots had
to be winterized to make the flight to Moscow. They had to be spe-
cially treated so as to operate at temperatures 50 to 60 degrees below
zero. So everything would have to be transferred to a plane that had
spent 4 days in the hangar being winterized.
So it is entirely possible the freight may have arrived by train and
been put into a warehouse, but it could not depart without my
authority.
When I referred to a plane ready to go it didn't mean it had just
arrived that day with a particular load and particular couriers. Some-
times a load would arrive with a couple of couriers, and they would
sleep on the load, and sometimes they would switch couriers. "When
a courier would spread out a blanket and sleep on the bags I had no
way of knowing how the load had arrived, but when I saw it on the
plane ready to go, they had to get my authority to depart, and that
is when I got on the plane and inspected.
Mr. Kearney. The particular plane you referred to this morning,
did you examine any of the 50 pieces of luggage on that plane ?
Mr. Jordan. I testified the last time, when you were not here, that
I had first seen excessive baggage going through with a Russian
general, and I let it go through. Each succeeding Russian officer had
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1159
increasing baggage. When it got to 10 or 15 suitcases per person I
began to become apprehensive of whether I was doing my duty ; and
when 50 pieces came without any personnel, just 2 guards, that is when
I felt I should be in a spot-check position and see what was in the
suitcases.
That was the first time I did it. I can't tell the plane or time.
Mr. Kearney. At that time did you make a spot check of them ?
Mr. Jordan. I opened about one-third of the suitcases.
Mr. Kearney. Was there opposition by anyone to your opening the
bags?
Mr. Jordan. The two Russians tried to physically stop me, without
touching me — tried to stop me at the door, saying it was diplomatic.
I said, in the performance of my duty I wanted to open one or two
of the suitcases.
Mr. Kearney. Did you open one or two ?
Mr. Jordan. I opened about one-third.
Mr. Kearney. Can you tell the committee what you found in the
suitcases ?
Mr. Jordan. I found a very large amount of office folders, and in
each of the folders would be duplicates of papers from various depart-
ments of the Government. In my notes made at the time that I actu-
ally opened the suitcases, I made a one-word note which to me meant
the whole suitcase. Where I have a note "State Department," that
meant an entire suitcase or perhaps two or three suitcases. The notes
were made at the time, 7 years ago, when this was done, and I can now
only say I have a note "Panama Canal Commission maps," and
"Amtorg Trading Co.," and "Tass," and "State Department."
I can't go further than to say I remember in some of the State De-
partment papers I took a peek at one, and it was a military report.
Mr. Kearney. Do you know where that military report came from ?
Mr. Jordan. From Moscow.
Mr. Kj^arney. Was that a folder ?
Mr. Jordan. It was a folder.
Mr. Kearney. Was there any name on that folder?
Mr. Jordan. The names were on the front of the folders on a piece
of white paper, clipped on to show where that particular folder's con-
tents came from.
Mr. Kearney. Can you give the committee the name of any in-
dividual on the folders you saw ?
Mr. Jordan. I saw Sayre, Hiss, and other members of the State
Department whose names I made a note of at the time.
Mr. Kjiarney. Can you tell the committee what was in the folder
under the name of Hiss ?
Mr. Jordan. I can only say they were photostats of some kind and
seemed to be military reports.
Mr. Kearney. Do you know where the military reports came from ?
Mr. Jordan. I can't say where they all came from, but I would
say frcm Moscow.
Mr. Kearney. From whom at Moscow ?
Mr. Jordan. The American attache out there.
Mr. Kearney. And they were sent from the American military
chief of our mission in Moscow to whom ?
1160 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr, Jordan. They were sent through channels to Washington to the
State Department, and somebody in the State Department had evi-
dently photostated them and was sending them back.
Mr. Kearnet. You mean to tell the committee these were the re-
ports sent from our mission in Moscow to our own State Department
and photostated and returned to Moscow ?
Mr. Jordan. That is what it looked like.
Mr. KJEARNET. They were contained in this baggage you speak of ?
Mr. Jordan. Yes. I was looking for morphine, to be truthful. We
were missing morphine, and the couriers had been sleeping all night
beside the morphine, and I thought they had been stealing it. I was
running my hand through and had no intention of reading anything,
but since I had opened them I wanted to make a note of what I had
seen. I made a note "State Department" with "Secret" cut off, and
I have a notation of Sayre, Hiss, and others. This was written that
night.
Mr. Kjearney. This was military information received by the State
Department from our mission in Moscow and later returned to the
Russians ?
Mr. Jordan. That is what it looked like, but at the time, you must
remember, I thought this material was going through under authority,
and I had no idea there was anything improper about it. It looked
to me the State Department knew what they were doing when they
sent things to Moscow. I didn't think it was anything I should do
anything about.
Mr. Kearney. That sheet you are referring to now, are those notes
made by yourself at Great Falls, Mont., on the date you spoke of?
Mr. Jordan. They were made at the time I opened the first suitcases.
Then I opened a number of suitcases later.
Mr. Kearney. What I am getting at is, they are your notes made
at that time and not some months later ?
Mr. Jordan. They were made the night I opened the suitcases.
Mr. Kearney. I think that will be all for the time being.
Mr. Nixon. Let me clear one thing up before you leave this matter
of these names that you have brought in. I think the record should
be clear that the fact those names appeared in that correspondence and
on those folders does not in itself indicate that either of the individuals
named was involved in illegal activities in sending folders through the
Russian couriers.
Mr. Jordan. If I had known or thought it was illegal at the time, I
would have grounded the plane. I thought it was in perfect order.
Mr. Nixon. You are only testifying that among the things you saw
in those folders you opened, you recall seeing those two names ?
Mr. Jordan. I have notes on those two names. There were a num-
ber of names.
Mr. Nixon. You saw State Department papers?
Mr. Jordan. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. And you saw somewhere in those State Department
papers the two names, Sayre and Hiss, and other names?
Mr. Jordan. That is correct. But the fact is that the folders were
in the suitcases in rows with elastic bands around five or six folders,
and in the front would be a white piece of paper with "From Hiss"
and the next batch "From Sayre" and so on. I just picked the first
one or two and made a note to show what was in the suitcase.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1161
Mr. NixON. I wanted the record to be clear that the testimony of
the witness on this point rehites only to the fact that certain docu-
ments went through with those names appearing on the folders, and in
my opinion, certainly, which I think I should express, no inference can
be drawn from that fact that either of the individuals named was
involved in illegal activity.
Mr. Kearney. I don't think from any questions I asked such an
inference could be drawn.
Mr. NixON. I think your questions brought out the contrary, and I
wanted to bring out that fact. I think the facts are well brought out
by your questions. I just wanted to high-light the same point that
you made.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Jordan, I would like to ask you one question
about these records. I believe you stated that in the course of your
examination of these files you saw one record or report which origi-
nated in Moscow. I believe you mentioned that to me earlier this
morning for the first time; did you not?
Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir.
Mv. Tavenner. You had not testified about that in your former
testimony ?
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Tavenner, I didn't actually read the letter. I
simply took a peek at it, and I thought at the time, whoever this mili-
tary person was in Moscow that was reporting to the State Depart-
ment, I wondered how he would feel if he knew the Russians had the
report back again. Being a military man I couldn't quite understand
it, but I let it pass. I thought it was in perfect order.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you see more than one such report ?
Mr. Jordan. No, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. Then there was only one document you can recall
that originated in Moscow?
Mr. Jordan. I only looked at one document. They looked to me as
if they were all of the same nature; they looked as if they were all
alike.
Mr. Tavenner. That is the only one you examined ?
Mr. Jordan. The only one I was sure of. I would rather stick to
the things I know.
Mr. Kearney. I would like to ask another question.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Kearney.
Mr. Kearney. While I was asking the previous questions I was
mulling over in my own mind the stories that have followed your
appearance on the stand, and I would like, for my own information
and for the information of the committee, a direct answer to this ques-
tion : Prior to your appearance on this stand as a witness last Decem-
ber, did you, directly or indirectly, ever attempt to peddle your so-
called story to any newspaper or periodical?
Mr. Jordan. I never peddled the story. What actually happened
was, I heard a radio broadcast that 3 ounces of uranium were missing
and that the Government was looking for it. I made the remark to
one of my friends that if they were looking for uranium I could tell
them where there were a thousand pounds of it.
This remark got to [U. S. Senator] Styles Bridges, who sent word
to me that he wanted to see me. I spent over an hour with him. He
said: "Are you certain you saw uranium?" I said, "Yes, sir." He
said, "Could you be certain enough to testify?" I said, "Yes, sir."
1162 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
He said, "I will think it over a few days and you will hear from me."
That was October 4.
A few days later Fulton Lewis called and said Senator Bridges
had told him about my remark, and Fulton Lewis wanted to know if
I would give him my story. I said I would, and he came to New York.
I saw him at the Sherry-Netherland. He called the FBI, and for
weeks I didn't hear anything but FBI. They came to my house, to
my office, went through my files, photostated my diary, and so on. It
amused me to read that the FBI had discredited my story, because
they spent hours on end photostating everything I had. After work-
ing on it many weeks they told Mr. Lewis their investigation was
finished, and then Mr. Lewis agreed he would make a broadcast of it.
But for a couple weeks there were so many FBI men in my office that
the news leaked out, and a public relations man offered his services
to help me get publicity out of it. First he wanted to tip off another
commentator, and then take me to Life. I told him I was not inter-
ested, but he had made an appointment at Life, unbeknown to me,
and I didn't want to disappoint him. At Life they discredited me
and said my story was too full of holes and turned it down.
I had never peddled it. This particular public relations man at-
tached himself to me and did these two things. Inasmuch as the story
was turned down by two firms, I went back and rested until Mr. Lewis
called me and went on the air.
Immediately the story went the rounds I was paid by the Republican
Party and peddling the story, and all of that is untrue.
Mr. Kearney. I think for the purpose of the record I will ask the
stenographer to read the question I asked the witness to have it
directly answered "Yes" or "No."
Mr. Jordan. The answer is "No."
Mr. Kearney. The answer is "No" ?
Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wood, Proceed.
Mr. Tavenner. At the close of the session this morning, Major
Jordan, we were talking about various other materials that went into
the manufacture of the atomic bomb that were shipped to Russia to
your knowledge. How did you first become acquainted with the fact
that the materials we discussed, such as cadmium, thorium, graphite,
and aluminum tubes were used in the manufacture of the atomic bomb ?
Mr. Jordan. Well, I first thought that I might have had something
to do with it when President Truman announced the Russians had the
bomb. That was the first point where I was quite certain I knew
something. I have been increasingly interested in the atomic bomb
since my testimony, and a few days ago I saw a complete article in
Life magazine on the atomic bomb. This particular article in Life
mentions the very things Colonel Kotikov was assembling.
Mr. Tavenner. It mentions, does it not, the use of cadmium rods,
aluminum tubes, graphite, and thorium ?
Mr. Jordan. It shows how they are used in the atomic pile.
Mr. Tavenner. Which issue of Life are you referring to ?
Mr. Jordan. A recent issue.
Mr. Tavenner. The past week?
Mr. Jordan. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. And was that the first time the importance of those
particular elements came to your attention I
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1163
Mr. Jordan. I had never known about cadmium before I saw it there.
Mr. Tavenner. After you read that article in the recent issue of
Life, did you then compile this data regarding the shipments ?
Mr. Jordan. I simply looked it up, and there it was, the full
amounts.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I think I should state that on Jan-
uary 19 of this year an investigator of our committee conferred with
an atomic scientist regarding the importance of cadmium in the manu-
facture of the atomic bomb, and he was told it was useful as a neutron
absorber in atomic-energy work. He said he believed this particular
item was not available in Russia.
Major Jordan, do you know the name of the assistant of Colonel
Kotikov at the Great Falls station?
Mr. Jordan. He had about six different assistants.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know one by the name of Sergeant Vino-
gradsky ?
Mr. Jordan. Very well. I have a picture of him.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you outline to the committee Sergeant Vino-
gradsky's activities as far as you know them, in addition to his normal
activities in the handling of materials that went through Great Falls.
Mr. Jordan. I have a suspicion that, despite the fact he was only a
sergeant and was in the warehouse practically 100 percent of the time
checking materials, he was reporting on Colonel Kotikov.
Mr. Tavenner. Reporting on Colonel Kotikov ?
Mr. Jordan. I would say so ; yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you spell Vinogradsky, please? Do you know
the spelling ?
Mr. Jordan. Yes. I have it here. V-i-n-o-g-r-a-d-s-k-y.
Mr. Wood. Reporting to whom on Colonel Kotikov ?
Mr. Jordan. There was a certain Russian who went through there
quite frequently by the name of Anisimov, A. A. Anisimov, A-n-i-s-i-
m-o-v. He was apparently what we call a card-carrying member. I
saw him in Alaska, Washington, Newark, Great Falls, and wherever
he went it seemed he was gathering information on personnel. He
was chief of personnel of all Russians in America. I was at the Pur-
chasing Commission one day and asked who was the chief, and they
said, "Rudenko; or do you mean Anisimov, chief of personnel?"
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know anything about Sergeant Vinograd-
sky'a activities away from Groat Falls?
Mr. Jordan. I know only what he told me. His station was at Great
Falls, but for a young sergeant — he was a young man — he made trips
away from Great Falls, always mysterious trips. He told me he went
to San Francisco and Portland and Newark and different places. I
can only tell you what he told me.
Mr. Tavenner. Did he advise you of any person he talked to in San
Francisco ?
Mr. Jordan. He didn't exactly advise me, but I knew the Russian
personnel at different places, and when he would apply to go to San
Francisco he would see Gregory Khefitz.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you of your own knowledge know anything
about Gregory Khefitz ?
Mr. Jordan. No.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, Gregory Khefitz was attached to the
Soviet consulate in San Francisco and has been the subject of previous
1164 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
testimony in the cases of Martin Kamen, Louise Bransten, Hanns
Eisler, and other known espionage agents, and has played a role in
known Soviet espionage activities.
Did you become acquainted with a Russian by the name of Semen
Vassilenko ?
Mr. Jordan. Yes, He was the chemical expert,
Mr, Tavenner, Will you give the spelling of his name ?
Mr, Jordan. S-e-m-e-n V-a-s-s-i-1-e-n-k-o. He departed from the
United States February 17, 1944, in airplane No. . I will have to
get that. He departed on February 17, 1944.
Mr. Tavenner. You have a note of that departure date?
Mr. Jordan. Yes ; I have.
Mr. Tavenner. In your diary ?
Mr. Jordan. Yes; I have. When Vassilenko would arrive at the
airport it would be a signal for Colonel Kotikov to pull out two or
three folders on chemicals and walk down the runway where there
were no dictographs and put the folders on the wing of an airplane
and talk with Vassilenko an hour or so, that is, if the complete chemical
plant had been assembled, Vassilenko had three guards with him. I
have the names of the three guards.
Mr. Ta\T3nner. Will you give them, please?
Mr, Jordan. Leonid Rykoukin; Engeny Kojevnitov; and Georges
Nicolaiev. They departed, according to my diary, on February 17,
1944, with a load of about 4,000 pounds of special high priority diplo-
matic mail.
Mr. TA^^ENNER. Do you know the place of origin of the mail on that
particular plane, or would your records show that ?
Mr. Jordan. I know the plane came from Washington, D. C, be-
cause Vassilenko and his guards came directly from the Purchasing
Commission in Washington.
Mr. Tavenner, I would like, Mr, Chairman, to introduce in evidence
copies of documents handed us this morning by Major Jordan, and
return the originals to him. The first is a letter written by Col. A.
Kotikov to Col. R. C. Rockwell, Newark, N. J., bearing date July 6,
1942, with pencil memorandum attached, which I ask be marked
"Jordan Exhibit 5."
Mr. Wood. You are introducing copies ?
Mr. Ta\t:nner. Yes, sir,
Mr, Wood. That have been made in the committee ?
Mr. Tavenner. By the reporter.
Mr, Wood. They will be admitted.
(The documents above referred to, marked "Jordan Exhibit 5," are
filed herewith.) ^'
Mr. Tavenner. I would like to introduce a copy of letter written
by Alex Marquis to Mr. Jordan, dated December 8, 1949, and ask that
it be marked "Jordan Exhibit 6."
Mr. Wood. I understand that was likewise copied by the reporter ?
Mr, Tavenner. Yes,
Mr. Wood. It will be admitted,
(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Jordan Exhibit 6," is
filed herewith, ) ^°
^ See appendix.
*" See appendix.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1165
Mr. Tavenner. That is all I desire to ask Mr. Jordan, but I would
like to have permission from him to photostat the record of shipments
which he has brought here with him, together with his diary and
notes, and return the originals to him, if he is willing for us to do it.
Mr. Jordan. O. K.
Mr. Wood. Very well.
Mr. Tavenner. That is all.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon.
Mr. Nixon. I was wondering if it might be possible to include in
the record the Lend-Lease memorandum which Mr. Jordan has re-
ferred to, the memorandum in regard to lend-lease shipments.
Mr. Tavenner. That is what I am having photostated.
Mr. Nixon. Mr. Jordan, most of the questions which I had have
already been answered. One question which still remains is in regard
to your having reported these matters to your superior officers or to
other agencies who had jurisdiction. The testimony to date has been
that at least two reports were made by you which have been corrobo-
rated. You heard that testimony?
Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Nixon. Can you add anything as to any official reports that
you made other than those two times concerning these shipments?
Before you answer that, let me first ask you this : The testimony was
that the Counter Intelligence agent who first interviewed you was re-
quested by you that you be given an opportunity to elaborate in detail
in regard to the shipments to which you had referred. Did Counter
Intelligence or any other agency of the Government ever approach
you after that time and ask you to make such elaborjition ?
Mr. Jordan. The colonel of our post, the colonel of Gore Field,
was interviewed by a reporter, and he has a statement in the news-
paper to the eti'ect that I had been raising the devil. Well, I can
only say that that meant I was talking to everyone that I thought
might be helpful in getting something done about it. He remarked
to the reporter that the Capitol dome could have been taken for all
Jordan could do about it. That was one officer. Several other
officers have come forward and have made statements to indicate
that at that time I must have done a lot of hollering. One officer
said Jordan was always raising hell about it. H*is words were that
he could back me up and knew I had been making a big hullabaloo
about it. I will admit I didn't say anything about uranium, and
I didn't say anything about State Department papers. I simply talked
about the excessive amount of diplomatic mail going uninspected.
That seemed to be the crux of my complaint.
Mr. Nixon. Did you know about the atomic bomb in 1948 ?
Mr, Jordan. No. I didn't know about the atomic bomb until it
was dropped on Hiroshima, and I didn't know the Russians had it
until President Truman made the announcement.
Mr. Nixon. I would say if you had particularly singled out uranium
in 1943 your story would be inherently incredible. Your answer to
the question whether your request that you be given opportunity to
go into detail in regard to the shipments to which you had referred
was granted
Mr. Jordan. The answer is "no." Mr. Appell said there was no
record I went to Washington to talk about it, yet I have the official
1166 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
order to go to Washington for the purpose of discussing movements
of Russian aircraft through Great Falls. This is my original record.
Mr. Nixon. I ask that this document be made an exhibit.
Mr. Tavenner. I suggest it be marked "Jordan exhibit 7."
Mr. Wood. I don't care to deprive Major Jordan of the original,
but with his permission I will ask the reporter to copy it.
Mr. Tavenner. Or he can read it in the record.
Mr. Jordan. It is Special Order No. 3, dated January 4, 1944,
ordering Maj. George R. Jordan to proceed by military aircraft
from Army Air Base at Great Falls, Mont., to Washington, D. C,
for the purpose of conferring with AAF officials on the movement
of Russian aircraft.
Mr. Wood. Does that comply with your suggestion ?
Mr. Kearney. I think the signature of the officer issuing that order
should also be made a part of the record.
Mr. Jordan. Col. Russell L. Meredith, commanding officer of the
air base.
I have a note in my diary, "Washington, Colonel Paige's office," and
he was Chief of the International Office in charge of Lend-Lease.
Then I have another note, "Saw General Jones," and he was Chief Air
Inspector. I si)ecifically saw him, and saw Colonel Wilson and Col.
Vander Lugt and others, and that was followed by an air inspector,
Colonel Dahm, arriving a few days later at the field to follow up my
complaint,
Mr. Kearney. What date ?
Mr. Jordan. January 25. I took him over the base and showed
him what I was complaining about, and he was so incensed that a
few days later 10 air inspectors arrived. They arrived on the 3d
of March, and one stayed there for months. These 10 were all from
the Air Inspector General's office. And I think the security officer
of the field, who was called in to the meeting, is sitting back there.
Mr. Kearney. I think for the record not only the day and month,
but the year, should be given.
Mr. Jordan. I went to Washington January 4, 1944. I conferred
with the Air Inspector General on January 8, 1944. On January 25,
1944, the first air inspector arrived at the field, and on March 3, 1944,
10 other air inspectors arrived.
Mr. Nixon. I don't feel it is necessary to pursue that point any
further. I think from the corroboration produced and the testimony
just presented, it is at least clear that Mr. Jordan made a number of
attempts to bring this information to the attention of Government
officials.
Mr. Jordan. At the same time I made that trip to Washington,
Colonel Kotikov asked to go along, and he asked me how to get to 630
Fifth Avenue, New York, which happens to be the address of some-
body you know.
Mr. Tavenner. Who is it ?
Mr. Jordan. The man he wanted to see is merely a conclusion on
my part, but he wanted to go to 630 Fifth Avenue, and I understand
that is the address of Mr. Boris Pregel, the man who shipped the
uranium. So I am taking it for granted his anxiety to go to that
address was to see that man.
Mr. Nixon. Your testimony is not in regard to Pregel specifically,
but that he was at that address ?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1167
Mr. Jordan. Colonel Kotikov asked how to get to 630 Fifth Avenue.
Mr. Nixon. How do you remember that specific address?
Mr. Jordan. I knew it was Rockefeller Center, and I told him while
he was there he ought to go to the top and see the city. He had never
been in New York before and I was telling him how to do some
sightseeing.
Mr. Wood. Any other questions ?
Mr. Nixon. Yes. The issue raised as to the memorandum in your
diary or on this slip of paper you presented to the committee — and
I understand the contents of that paper will appear in this record — is
on the use of the initials "H. H." and what appeared thereafter in
the memorandum, and it appears that issue cannot be determined
because, assuming the initials ''H. H." refer to Mr, Hopkins, the com-
mittee has not as yet been able to establish corroborative evidence to
sustain your testimony on that point.^^ On the other hand, the com-
mittee has not been able to obtain conclusive evidence that you are
incorrect in what you say. I think, however, that a fair appraisal of
the testimony is that on that point, at least at this stage, a question
certainly has arisen as to whether it would have been possible, (1) that
Mr. Hopkins could have had anything to do with such shipments;
and (2) if it were possible, whether he actually did.
I wonder if there is anything you would like to add to the record,
in addition to your previous testimony, in regard to your contention
that Mr. Hopkins did call you or that you called him in regard to
these shipments of uranium, specifically?
Mr. Jordan. I took it for granted, when I was here before, that
my testimony about Mr. Hopkins would be accepted, and I didn't
bring out a number of points that I knew and that could have gone
along with it.
In the first place, we had so much communication, through the
Russians, with Mr. Hopkins that we took it for granted. I would
like to take a second to tell you that when I was at Newark as acting
executive officer and the Russian colonel was new, an American Air-
lines pilot bumped into a Russian plane, causing a slight amount of
damage, and immediately six Russians came storming in my office
and wanted to know if I would punish the pilot; they seemed to think
I should shoot him. I said we didn't do that. Then they wanted to
banish the air line from the airport. I said I wouldn't do that. They
said, "Then we will call Mr. Hopkins."
They called Mr. Hopkins and told him this American Airlines pilot
had damaged a Russian A-20 plane and they wanted something done
immediately about it.
Much to my surprise, CAA phoned a few days later and banished
all commercial air lines from the airport.
Naturally, when something like that happens, I was terribly im-
pressed. One of the remaining officers on that field who was asked
about these particular incidents made the remark that the Russians
were in constant communication with Hopkins, and he said the Rus-
sians talked about it. I will show you his exact words. He was my
superior officer.
Mr. Tavenner. Wliat is his name ?
" See appendix.
Mr. Jordan. Col. Roy B. Gardner. He said :
Every time the Russians were dissatisfied with the way things were going,
which 'was frequently, they would get on the telephone with their Embassy in
Washington and have them contact Mr. Harry Hopliins, and all difficulties would
be straightened out immediately.
I asked Colonel Gardner how he knew Mr. Hopkins did the job.
He said it was common information ; the Russians referred to it and
so did everybod}^ else, and it was common routine information.
Another major on the field who was questioned about my story
remarked that at one time there were some very difficult parts that
the factory hadn't even made yet, and the Russians said, "We will
get them from Mr. Hopkins." So they put in a call, and his exact
words were:
I can recall that on many occasions —
this is Major Starkey, engineer officer of the Army air base —
when we were short of parts or had some difference with Col. Kotikov, Col.
Kotikov would place a phone call to Washington and before very long Major
Jordan would get a telephone call back and the work would be done. Major
Jordan mentioned Harry Hopkins' name quiti- often, because Hopkins was Ad-
ministrator of Lend-Lease at that time, and I can recall one instance when we
were extremely short of airplane parts of one sort and Col. Kotikov called on
the telephone and in a matter of a few days we had a good supply. It was re-
markable in view of the fact we had been repeatedly told by Wright Field the
parts had not yet been made.
Mr. Nixon. At this point I think it is well to differentiate Mr.
Hopkins" position as Lend-Lease Administrator in the expediting of
normal shipments, and the testimony in issue, in order to get the
proper peispective. What you have testified to up to this point is
that Mr. Hopkins was called upon from time to time to expedite cer-
tain shipments, and that he proceeded to take action wiiicii resulted in
expediting the shipments. It would seem from the fact he was the
Lend-Lease Administrator and had that responsibility, that nobody
should be particularly surprised that that occurred.
Mr. Jordan. Not at all. We were very glad we had a button we
ccu]d press and get things done.
Mr. NixoN. You yourself were interested, as you have testified, in
getting the shipments expedited, and the fact Mr. Hopkins was called
upon was not surprising'^
Mr. Jordan. No.
Mr. NixoN. The point at issue is whether or not Mr. Hopkins also
expedited the shipments of uranium. On thnt point considerable
question has arisen on two scores, first, as to tiie date. You have cor-
rected your testimony as to the date, so that the objection that has
been previously raisinl that Mr. Hopkins could not have had a con-
versation with you because he was in the hospital in 19-14 no longer
applies, assuming that your recollection is correct as presently stated.
And another point that has been raised, I understand, by those who
are quite familiar with Mr. Hopkins' papers and his records, is that
he could not have specifically expedited a shipment of uranium or
knowingly done so because he individually had nothing to do with
and knew nothing about the atomic project. Do you have any com-
ment on that ?
Mr. Jordan. I am burning up on that. That is a point I don't feel
very happy about, because I have a copy of Newsweek dated Decem-
ber 19
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1169
Mr. Nixon. What year?
Mr. Jordan. 1949, which was a week after I was here, in which they
have a paragraph which has caused me a great deal of discomfort.
It says :
Moreover, according to Sidney Ilyman, who organized Hopkins's papers for
Robert Sherwood, author of "Roosevc^lt and Hopkins,"' F. D. K.'s confidant didn't
have the faintest understanding of the Manhattan Project until he read about
the A-bomb being dropped on Hirosliima. Hynian said: "He didn't know the
difference between uranium and geranium." It wasn't until weeks later that
Hopkins talked with several of the atomic scientists and learned about "the
engineering feat of production."
Well. I bought myself a copy of Eobert E. Sherwood's book when I
was here, and there is an item on page 154: I would like permission to
read :
Bush had no quick access to anyone on the higher levels of government, but
he knew that the man to see en route to Roosevelt was Harry Hopkins and
he accordingly went to him with his plan for a National Defense Research
Council. Hopkins was already interested in the subject, for the Bureau of
Standards of the Commerce Department was engaged in research, and through
the Bureau of Patents he had received a suggestion along somewhat similar
lines. * * *
Then it tells how the atom bomb was conceived by Bush, taken to
Hopkins, Hopkins took it to Roosevelt, and it says :
Subsequently Bush, in consultation with Hopkins, drafted a letter to himself
for the President's signature. That letter, with a few additions which provided
for close cooperation between N. D. R. C. and the military authorities, was
signed by Roosevelt on June 15, the day after the fall of Paris * * *.
Then over a little further, on page 704, it says :
It will be noted that Churchill was conducting this correspondence on the
atomic project with Hopkins rather than with the President and he continued
to do so for many months thereafter.
Mr. Kearney. That date of June 15 is Avhat year?
Mr. Jordan. 1941, at the start of the atomic project. That was be-
fore Manhattan project was even thought of. And in 1943, when
Churchill was ill, he conducted his correspondence on the atomic proj-
ect with Hopkins, and it tells how Hopkins called all the scientists
together to get the most recent report. And it is the man who wrote
this book that says Hopkins didn't know uranium from geranium.
Mr. Nixon. You mean Hyman wrote the book?
Mr. Jordan. Pie organized the papers, and after Hopkins' death he
took the papers to Robert Sherwood and Sherwood finished the book.
Mr. NixoN. Do you have anything else to add?
Mr. Jordan. I am very unhappy about this "H. H." and "H. L. H."
business, because I worked under difficulty out there, and it was very
cold when I made these notes. It must have been 15 or 20 degrees below
zero. I had a flashlight in my overcoat pocket and a little light in the
top of the plane, and it was difficult to see what was in the folders. The
only reason I particularly noticed this memorandum, I was impressed
because it was on White House stationery. I had never seen White
House stationery before, and I wondered why it didn't have "D. C." on
it. I own some property in the State of Washington, and this just
said "The White House, Washington," and I started to put it back in
the folder and I noticed it said, "Had a hell of a time getting these
away from Groves."
99334 — 50 18
11 70 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
I thought, "This is important, on that piece of stationery, and I will
make a note of it."
And this very comiiiiUee, Mr. Chairman, has been misquoting my
testimony. I never have said in my testimony, "I had a hell of a time
getting these away from Groves." I said, "Had a hell of a time
* * *" And one of the members of this committee asked General
Groves the question, "It has been testified by Jordan that he said 'I had
a hell of a time getting these away from Groves,' " and naturally
Groves said Hopkins never placed pressure on him. I never used the
work "I" and this committee has been using the "I" and it never was
in my original testimony.
Mr. Nixon. Is it in your notes ?
Mr. Jordan. No. My notes say "Had." So that particular point of
whether Hopkins put pressure on General Groves has been a very
difficult point for me to overcome, with the press taking the small
point and building it up.
Mr. Nixon. As I understand it, your testimony on this point is that
you saw a piece of White House stationery with this notation on it ?
Mr. Jordan. Yes.
Mr. Nixon. Which said : "Had a hell of a time getting these away
from Groves."
Mr. Jordan. Tlie second sheet is where I saw that, and copied it.
Mr. Nixon. And second, you recall a telephone conversation al-
legedly held between Colonel Kotikov and somebody who is supposed
to have been Mr. Hopkins in Washington concerning the expediting of
one shipment of uranium, and as far as indicating any particular in-
dividual putting pressure on General Groves is concerned, you have no
testimony on that point: these are just the facts you are testifying to?
Mr. Jordan. I am only testifying to the things I know of. For the
benefit of you gentlemen who were not here before, I want to explain
I didn't want Colonel Kotikov making telephone calls on my telephone,
because he would stay on the telephone a half hour or an hour at a
time, so I used to tell the telephone operator, "If any Russians want
to make a telephone call, tell them Major Jordan must make the call."
So when Kotikov wanted to get his Embassy, he would say, "Get my
Embassy," and I would pick up the telephone and call collect, which
was the point I was interested in, and get the Michigan number, and
he would speak in Russian, and he would switch many times, sometimes
20 or 30, and talk about different subjects ; and sometimes he would lay
the receiver down and be gone 15 or 20 minutes to look up a certain
part, and I would get on the phone and ask for Colonel Tavetkov or
somebody else and talk about another matter until Kotikov came
back.
This particular morning he had his files out on chemical plants and
was running his finger down and came to various shipments that had
to be expedited. I used to sometimes lean over his shoulders and help
him turn the pages. This particular morning he said : "Have we room
for a thousand pounds?" I said: "No. We have about a million
pounds' backlog now." He said : "I will make a connection for you."
For a moment or two I think I talked to Piskounov, and then a voice
came on the wire, "Are you my expediter out there?" and I said, "Yes,"
and he said, "This is Mr. Hopkins speaking." I was naturally very
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1171
respectful, and he said : "I want you to expedite a certain shipment
that is going through."
Then he must have turned and spoken to somebody, because I could
hear him say, "How will he know the shipment when he sees it?" as
if he was speaking on the side to someone. I waited and then he came
back on and said : "Jordan, Colonel Kotikov will designate that ship-
ment to you. He will point out which shipment he wants expedited,
but you expedite it."
Then he said : "I want you to keep this off the record and don't dis-
cuss it with anybody. This is something very special."
He asked me a question : "Did you get the pilots I sent you?" We
had been screaming our heads off for pilots, and only Mr. Hopkins
could get them, and I said "Yes," we had, and thanked him.
Then somebody was talking Russian and I handed the phone back
to Kotikov.
Generally speaking, I know that was what was said, and when the
box arrived, it was uranium.
Mr. Nixon. That concludes your statement on the Hopkins matter
as far as you want to elaborate at this time ?
Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Nixon. That is all I have.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde.
Mr. Velde. I have nothing, except I want to express appreciation
for your holding this investigation and second hearing. It is unfor-
tunate we of the minority were not here at the first hearing, and it is
also unfortunate certain defamatory remarks were put in the news-
papers and over the air regarding Major Jordan's testimony, and I
think it has done a great deal of harm to this committee in getting
witnesses to appear. I am sure witnesses will not appear voluntarily
and answer questions unless we give credence to the statements they
make, and I am particularly glad of the opportunity we had to have
this second hearing.
Mr. Wood. Mr. Kearney.
Mr. Kjearney. One point in my own mind I want to clear up is on
your recent testimony concerning these telephone calls. Where were
these calls j^laced to?
Mr. Jordan. Our desks were alongside of each other.
Mr. Kearney. Where in Washington were they placed?
Mr. Jordan. The Russian Purchasing Commission or the Russian
Embassy.
Mr. Kearney. And at the time you referred to, if that was so, Mr.
Hopkins would have been in the Russian Purchasing Commission or
Embassy ?
Mr. Jordan. Not necessarily. Someone could have called him
through the switchboard at the Embassy and he could have been
talking from the White House or anywhere he might have been and
the operator could have made a conference call.
Mr. Kearney. You don't mean to imply Mr. Hopkins was at the
Russian Embassy ?
Mr. Jordan, No. I saw headlines that I got very chummy with
Mr. Hopkins and« talked frequently with him. I never met the man.
117z SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
I have no reason for saying anything that didn't happen. I only-
tried to be helpful and give you information because I thought it was
my duty to do it.
Mr. Wood. Any furthere questions?
Mr. Tavennek. Yes. In referring to the Hopkins note as you have
described it, you said there were two pages, and what you saw written
and have testified to was on the second page ?
Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir.
]Mr. Taatennek. 1 don't believe you have ever told us what was on
the first page, if anything.
Mr. Jordan. Mi-. Tavenner, it happened 7 years ago. I can only
say I was looking at the first page at the White House stationery, and
flipped it over to see who signed it, and after I saw it was in long-
hand I thought it would be a good idea to copy "Had a hell of a
time * * *." Tlie word before "Had" is not clear in my mind.
I believe it was some name. I can't swear to that, lie was not a
good writer.
Mr. Tavenner. It was written in longhand, and you believe now
there was som.e name placed before the word "Had"?
Mr. Jordan. I believe if it had been anything else I could have
read, I am quite sure I would have made a note of it. I decided to
take the tail end of it, that was all.
Mr. Tavenner. Were both pages on the letterhead of the White
House ?
Mr. Jordan. No. The first paije was "Wliite House stationery, and
I believe the second was second-sheet.
I^Ir. Tavenner. Was there a letter written on the first sheet?
Mr. Jordan. It was in longhand; the entire front sheet and about
one-third of the second sheet.
Mr. Tavenner. So it was a continuous letter ?
Mr. Jordan. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Of two pages?
Mr. Jordan. Yes; and I think behind the last sheet there were a
couple of typewritten letters, and then there was a map which I
telescoped out and turned it around to read upside down what was on
it, and I took my notes off the map.
(Representative Nixon, leaves hearing room.)
Mr. Tavenner. You have testified fully to that. Were the two
pages of this letter clipped together in any manner?
Mr. Jordan. I think they were clipped to the next couple of sheets
and the map.
Mr. Tavenner. You noticed this very unusual language about the
getting of these matters from Groves.
Mr. Jordan. I didn't know who Groves was.
Mr. TA^T.NNER. But if it was important enough for you to write
down that part of the letter, didn't you look at the rest of the letter
to see what it was about ? Don't you think you would have looked at
the rest ?
Mr. Jordan. I think I must have, but I don't remember what it said.
Mr. Taa^nner. You don't remember anything about the contents of
the rest of the letter ? »
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1173
~Mv. JoEDAi^, Except for the notation I have; that is all.
Mr. Tavenner. I do not believe we have put in as a part of the
record your original notes. We would like to have that photostated
also and put in.
Mr. Jordan. Which notes?
Mr. Tavenner. The memorandum that you took at the time.
Mr. Wood. Major, do you object to the committee having that sheet
of paper photostated and return the original to you ?
Mr. Jordan. No objection at all.
Mr. Wood. Very well. It will be done,
Mr. Tavenner. No further questions.
Mr. Wood. Is there any additional statement you desire to make in
connection with this hearing that you think w^ould be beneficial to
this committee in its endeavor to carry out the function the committee
was set up to do ?
Mr. Jordan. There has been a soldier that came forward and made
a statement about finding four dead Eussians in a plane in Alaska,
and he mentioned that when he discovered this wrecked plane with four
dead Russians he found blacl^c suitcases similar to the ones I desci'ibed,
and he mentioned he found maps of the Alaska defense areas. I just
want to make certain that the committee hooks that up with my testi-
mony, because it happened in 1942, and if he had that happen to him
in December 1942, it should show this committee that the suitcases were
going through before I got there in 1943. His statement was that
"We started looking around for souvenirs"
Mr. Wood. Do you know who made that statement ?
Mr. Jordan. Henry J. Cauthen of company G, Fourth Infantry
Regiment, Nome, Alaska.
Upon seeing some black suitcases lying on the ground we decided to open them
lip. Two of the suitcases had been partially destroyed and were of no value,
but three or four were lying on the ground and I opened one. These suitcases
were black, very cheaply made, and had straps that were very light because they
had both been opened up. When we opened it the first thing we saw was a map,
and we found they had blueprints on the bottom. We didn't disturb the blue-
prints but we did look at the map. This was an American engineer map made
for the Air Corps and showed our defense area around the Nome air base. The
map was in English but had writing in Russian and showed all our defense
areas. A couple Russians came from Nome and took the suitcases away from us.
There has been a lot of talk about my story being a trumped-up
story, and I wanted this to go in to show the suitcases were going
through long before I got to Great Falls.
I want to add there was a Colonel Shumonsky, Stanilaus Shumon-
sky, who came in a C^7 and he absolutely demanded that I not look
at the plane, and I insisted. Finally I had to ground the plane. I
told him he would never get off the ground until I saw wdiat w^as in
the plane.
He finally opened the door and the entire plane was loaded with
films, canisters of films, and they were tied down with a passageway
down the center for the pilot. I opened one film and held it to the
light and it showed technical cams and gears, very technical, and in-
tricate technical processes. One canister showed automobile tops
being stamped out like doughnuts. I went through canister after
1174 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
canister and it was the technical know-how of this country sluicing
through, and I didn't see what it had to do with the war effort.
Mr. Wood. Permit me to express to you the appreciation of this
committee for your willingness to come back here and afford the other
members of the committee, not here at the first hearing, an opportunity
to examine you. We hope it has not caused you too much incon-
venience.
Anything further?
Mr. Tavenner. That is all.
Mr. Wood. The committee will stand adjourned.
(Thereupon, at 4 : 30 p. m. Friday, March 3, 1950, the committee ad-
journed.)
HEARINGS EEGAEDING SHIPMENTS OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II
TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 1950
United States House of Representatia'es,
Subcommittee of the
Committee on Un-American Activities,
Washington^ JD. C.
PUBLIC HEARING
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 : 45 a. m., in room 226,
Old House Office Building, Wasliington, D. C, Hon. Francis E.
Walter presiding.
Committee members present: Representatives Francis E. Walter
and Bernard W. Kearney.
Staff members present : Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel ; Louis J.
Russell, senior investigator ; Donald T. Appell, investigator ; John W.
Carringlon, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and A. S.
Poore, editor.
Mr. Walter. Let us have order, please.
Let the record disclose that this hearing is being conducted by a
subcommittee designated by the chairman, composed of Messrs. Wood,
Kearney, and Walter, and that Messrs. Kearney and Walter are pres-
ent, a quorum.
Mr. Kravchenko, will you raise your right hand. Do you swear the
testimony you are about to give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God ?
Mr. Kravchenko. I do.
Mr. Walter. And will you [indicating Mr. Wolin] arise, please.
Do you swear the translation that you will make of the testnnony
given by Mr. Kravchenko shall be a true and accurate translation of
what he says ?
Mr. WoLiN. I do.
TESTIMONY OF VICTOR A. KRAVCHENKO (ACCOMPANIED BY
SIMON WOLIN, INTERPRETER)
Mr. Tavenner. If the Chairman please, I would like to qualify
first the interpreter, before asking questions of Mr. Kravchenko.
Your name is Mr, Wolin ?
Mr. WoLiN. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you state your full name ?
Mr. WoLiN. Simon Wolin.
Mr. Tavenner. How are you employed ?
Mr. Wolin. I am a free lance research worker.
1175
1176 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Taveistner. Will you state that again ?
Mr. WoLiN. I am a free lance research worker.
Mr. Tavexxer. What has been j^our experience with the Russian
language ?
Mr. WoLix. I was born in Russia and graduated from the faculty
of law, of a Russian university. Here in this country I was statf
translator in New York for a weekly magazine, and a small book
translated b}^ me was published in New York in 1948.
Mr. Tavenner. What positions have you held in New York?
Mr. WoLiN. I was mostly a free lance researcher. I was assistant
editor of that weekly magazine I was speaking of in New York, the
New Leader. Last year I was engaged in a Government research
project.
Mr. Tavexner. Are you a naturalized American citizen?
Mr. WoLiN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Kravchenko, will you state your full name,
please ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Victor A. Kravchenko.
Mr. Tavenner. When and where were you born?
Mr. Kravchenko. I was born in Dnepropetrovsk, Russia, in 1905.
Mr. Tavenner. You have an interpreter present, but you speak
English very well and I trust that you will answer directly such ques-
tions as you feel you can.
Mr. Kravchenko. I will try.
Mr. Tavenner. And call on the interpreter as little as possible. I
believe you have a statement that you desire to make?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes; I do.
JMr. WoLiN. May I read it, in order to have it clear?
Mr. TA^T.NNER. Yes.
(Thereupon the following statement of Mr. Kravchenko was read by
Mr. Wolin:)
Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, prior to testifying before your committee, I consider
it my duty to make tlie following statement :
When I testified before this committee once before, some persons criticized
me severely and accused me of serving the purposes of the Republican Party.
I desire to make my position as a witness before the committee unmistakably
•clear.
. I have been invited to come here, and I am glad to testify. But I do not
wish my testimony to be regarded or used in any way as a statement for partisan
political piu-poses.
I am sure that you, gentlemen, will agree with me on that, in these diflScult
times, important though party interests may be, they must needs take second
place. It must surely be the opinion of evei-y patriotic American, be he Repub-
lican or Democrat, that our main concern is the security of America, which
has now become my home.
It seems to me that it is not right to discredit today those who in the past
have acted in accordance with the policies of the time in which they lived, and
who scrupulously fulfilled agreements made with the Soviet Union when it was
a military ally of the United States.
Now, gentlemen, the relations between these two countries have radically
changed — not through any fault of the United States, but through the fault of
the Soviet Union — or, to put it more correctly, through the double-faced and
dangerous Soviet policy which the Politburo concealed during the war, both
from the people of Russia and from its ally, America.
This was revealed only later, creating the threatening situation which exists
today.
This is no surprise to me personally. In the past I have written and spoken
•often enough to my American friends about it.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1177
The Soviet Government has legalized the system of espionage on its own
citizenry within its own country. This espionage is conducted on a tremendous
scale.
AVhy should we think that in America, England, or France the Soviet Gov-
ernment does not carry on the most active espionage for the fvirtherance of its
military, political, and police aims to the extent w^hich our easy-going attitude
and our lack of understanding of the core of Soviet policy permit?
We make a fatal mistake in not grasping this.
Soviet diplomacy is iiulivisible from the espionage activities of the Kremlin
abroad. Every Soviet diplomat, whether he be Malik in the United Nations,
Panyushkin in Washington, or their colleagues in Paris or London, has gone
through extensive training along these lines, and has had wide experience.
Espionage is one of the principal duties connected with their ofl&cial diplomatic
work. I feel that I cannot repeat too often that every Soviet representative —
diplomatic, military, or economic — is a potential spy. We can and must only
consider them as such.
It would be erroneous to judge their activities by their oflBcial actions. What
should interest us are the actions which they perform behind the curtain of
their oflBcial capacity, their attempts to ferret out the secrets of those countries
to which they are the accredited i*epreseutatives.
We must regard the representatives of the countries belonging to the Soviet
bloc in the same way.
Soviet espionage today is developed to a vast scale. The NKVD, the Ministry
of War, work hand in hand, although frequently their various representatives
do not know each other. These organizations exploit similar organizations in the
satellite countries, and they all use Communists and fellow travelers in whatever
country they happen to be, for their own aims and purposes.
The Fuchs case in England is only a prelude to much which we do not know
and which is still to come regarding the scope of Soviet espionage in America
and other western countries. I do not doubt that many bitter surprises await us.
Gentlemen, I am at your disposal.
Mr. Tavennek. Mr. Ivravchenko, what positions have you held in
the Soviet Government ?
Mr. Kravchenko. After my graduation from the MetaUurgical
Institute, and studying aviation, I worked in the Soviet industry as
director of a factory, as chief engineer of a factory, as chief engineer of
the metalktrgical trust. During the war I was head of a group of
factories and also chief of the department of engineering arma-
ments of the Soviet Russian Eepublic; I mean of the Russian Soviet
Federal Socialist Republic.
Mr. Tavenner. TMiat position did you hold with the Soviet Govern-
ment while you were in the United States ?
Mr. Kravchenko. I was economic attache of the Soviet Purchasing
Commission from August 1943 to April 1944.
Mr. Tavenner. Were you ever a member of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes, I was a member from 1929 until April 1944.'
Mr. Tavenner. A^Hien did you leave the employ of the Soviet Gov-
ernment, and will you briefly outline your reasons for leaving?
Mr. Kravchenko. I left the Soviet service in April 1944 ; the 1st of
April, I think. My reason was very simple. During all my life I had
great experience with the party and with the Soviet Government. My
father and my grandfather were workmen. I always tried, when I was
young, to believe the Communist Party would give us a better life
than we had. I also tried to believe the Communist Party would create
better living conditions for all people in the world. For this purpose
in 1925 I joined the young Communist organization, the Komsomol.
And in 1929, after service in the Red Army, I became a member of
the party.
1178 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
All my experience proved that the Communist Party and its policy,
both domestic and foreign, did not serve the best interests of the
Russian people; nor did it serve the interests of any people in the
outside world. With every year of my experience I oecame more
and more disillusioned. The Soviet policy always double-crossed
my people and naturally it always double-crossed the outside world,
during the war, especially the United States, England, and the other
military allies.
When — do you understand my English language ?
Mr. Tavenner. Yes ; very well.
Mr. Kravchenko. In 1933 I was a student at the Metallurgical In-
stitute. It was during the period of collectivization. I visited many
villages. I saw everything that happened during collectivization. I
saw terror, injustice, hunger, and so on. That was the beginning of
my disillusionment, about 1933; and every year this disillusionment
increased. In 1936 I was purged. Well, I had much experience with
the Soviet police, the NKVD, and I still better realized the essence of
the Russian regime.
During the war I tried to do my duty, to do my best as a Russian
man, because we were at war. I worked very hard. I did everything
I could. At the same time I was scared of the Soviet Government,
and scared of the party, but I did my duty to help win victory over
Germany.
Owing to my work during the war, many documents signed by Mr.
Molotov, Mr. Stalin, and other members of the Politburo passed daily
through my hands. I saw every day examples of how they did their
duty, as they called it; and I realized that the Russian people had
nothing in common with the Communist Party and the Soviet regime.
I also realized that I had no opportunity inside the country to do
anything openly for my people against the Soviet Government. And
when they sent me to the United States I decided to break with them
and tell the people of the United States and other countries what I
knew about the Soviet regime and about the living conditions in my
country.
Mr. Tavenner. "Wlien did you arrive in the United States?
Mr. Kravchenko. In August 1943.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you meet, upon your arrival in the United
States, Consul Lomakin, who at that time was consul of the Soviet
Consulate in San Francisco ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes ; I did. We came to Vancouver from Vladi-
•vostok on the ship Komeles.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you spell the name of the ship ?
Mr. Kravchenko. K-o-m-e-l-e-s.
Mr. Tavenner. That is the name of the ship on which you arrived?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes. Whe had a few storms during our trip from
Vladivostok to Vancouver, and we had some trouble with the Japanese
Navy which stopped us in the open sea and searched our ship. The
captain of the ship and the political commissar were worried. I did
not understand wliy.
Mr. Tavenner, Was this a Russian ship?
Mr. Kravchenko. That is right, ^^^len we came to Vancouver Mr.
Lomakin came aboard. I was in the cabin of the captain, and the
captain and the political commissar were there, and I have forgotten
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1179
the names of three of my colleagues who also were in the cabin ; they
all were responsible party members. There was no secret from them.
When Mr. Lomakin came to the cabin, the captain gave to Mr. Lomakin
a few packages [speaking in Russian] .
Mr. WoLiN (translating). All sealed.
Mr. Tavenner. Packages which were under seal ?
Mr. Kravchenko. That is right. He gave them to Mr. Lomakin
and Mr. Lomakin took the packages with him and left the ship.
The captain said :
This is the reason I was worried. If somethiug had happened and these
papers were seized by the Japanese or somebody else, I would be in great
trouble.
Lomakin came aboard. I was in the cabin of the captain, and the
captain of the ship was scared. He was the captain and at the same
time he was a political commissar for the Soviet government.
Mr. Tavenner. You of course don't know anything about the con-
tents of those papers?
Mr. Kravchenko. I don't; but I know that if these were simple
papers and had nothing to do with underground work or with con-
spiracy, there would be no reason for the captain of the ship to take
these papers from Moscow and hand them personally to Mr. Lomakin,
and for Mr. Lomakin to take these papers as if he were stealing some-
thing from somebody. Lomakin was Soviet consul in San Francisco ;
and you must understand that from my experience with the Soviet
Government, from what I knew about them and their methods, I im-
mediately realized what was going on. I worked many years with
them. There was nothing new to me in this transaction.
Mr. Tavenner. Your purpose in coming to the United States was
to engage in work with the Soviet Purchasing Commission?
Mr. Kravchenko. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. In what capacity?
Mr. Kravchenko. Well, as I mentioned before, I was sent to the
United States as an economic attache to the Soviet Purchasing Com-
mission.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you explain to the committee the set-up of the
Soviet Purchasing Commission, that is, who controlled the activities
in which the Commission was engaged, and any other pertinent matter
regarding its functions which this committee would be interested in ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes. First I ask your permission to explain the
general features of the situation during the war.
Before we came to the United States — when I say "we" I mean all
members of the Communist Party who had more or less responsible
duties or more or less responsible jobs — before we came to the United
States we had received instructions from the central committee of
the party.
Mr. Tavenner. By "party" are you referring to the Communist
Party?
Mr. Kravchenko. Communist Party, of course, because in the
Soviet Union there is only one party. From the conversations which
I had with officials of the Central Committee of the party, we knew
before we left for the United States that we had never been friends
with the United States, and the central committee of the party made
this absoluely clear. For 2 weeks we had to go from office to office
1180 SHIPMENT OF ATOAnC JVIATERIAL
and we were told repeatedly : ''You are going to the capitalistic United
States. We are allies today because we need each other, but when the
war is over and we shall have won victory — and we are sure we shall
win it — we shall again become open enemies." [Speaking in Russian.]
Mr. WoLix (translating). We shall never modify our philosophy
and our doctrine.
Mr. Kravchenko (.speaking in Eussian).
Mr. WoLiN (translating). We are allies in trouble.
Mr. Kkavchenko (speaking in Russian).
Mr. WoLiN (translating). But both partners know that they hate
each other.
Mr. Kravchenko (speaking in Russian).
Mr. WoLiN (translating). Sooner or later a clash between the two
is inevitable.
Mr. Kravchenko (speaking in Russian).
Mr. WoLix (translating). Until then the Allies will remain our
friends and we shall cooperate in our mutual interests.
Mr. Kravchenko. "For this reason and with an eye to the future,
we must study carefully the industry in the United States, the military
industry, the civilian industry, all technological and industrial proc-
esses, and we must get hold of their secrets so that we can achieve
similar results in our country and when the time comes we will be
ready for the fight."
Mr. Walter. Did the Russians regard the United States as their
enemy during the period we Mere fighting for the common cause?
Mr. Kravchenko. Ideologically and secretly, yes. For example,
every week we had closed party sessions in our office in Moscow.
Somebody would come from the Central Committee or from the Polit-
buro. He would give us a speech on the international situation, the
war situation, and so on, and would make it absolutely clear — I men-
tioned it in my book and it is not necessary to repeat, but I would
like to mention that they always said and always repeated [speaking
in Russian] .
Mr. WoLiN (translating). We are Allies because there is a war on.
Mr. Kravchenko. "But we must realize that the Americans will
never like us and we will never like them." Also, "we will never like
the English and the French ; I mean their political attitudes." And
practically [speaking in Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). As a practical result of all this
Mr. Kravchenko. Every Soviet official, when he goes to the United
States or to any other country, he alwaj^s has two duties to perform.
These duties go parallel : One of them is an official duty. For ex-
ample, a man comes as a simple engineer to the Soviet Purchasing
Commission, but before he comes to the United States, the Central
Committee of the party or some special government office or depart-
ment, issues orders indicating where in the United States he must
work, which factor}^ or chemical plant, or any kind of industry he
has to watch. I am talking now about engineers, because I was one of
them and I know their work best. I don't know what orders were
given by the general staff.
Now, when this man came to the United States he had to do two
jobs at the same time. The one was open and legal, and the other
was conspiracy. And when he went back to the Soviet Union, the
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1181
Soviet Government would appreciate his work in the U. S. A. accord-
ing to the secret information he had gathered for the Soviet industry
or for the military staff. All of us had such duties.
Mr. Walter. Is that true of the diplomats as well ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Absolutely. They are absolutely no different.
In 1943 or 1944 INIr. Rudenko, who was chairman of the Soviet Pur-
chasing Commission, had an office at 3355 Sixteenth Street in Wash-
ington. General Serov was military attache at that time. Gromyko
was Soviet Ambassador to Washington. Gusev, in New York, was
head of the organization Amtorg. All these officers worked together
[speaking in Russian] .
Mr. WoLiN (translating). It was of no imj)ortance who got the
information.
Mr. Kravchenko. Of course there was competition among them, be-
cause everyone wanted the "thank you" from the Soviet Union so that
upon his return to the Soviet Union he would receive a higher
position.
Mr. Walter, Do I understand the Soviet diplomatic representatives
in the United States were engaged in espionage ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Absolutely. Mr. Chairman, that is their sys-
tem. We must understand that they all received special training, for
instance, Mr. Malik, now representative in the United Nations; Mr.
Zarubin, Soviet Ambassador in London ; Mr. Panyushkin in Washing-
ton, who has good experience in military intelligence. All of them —
there is no question — all of them are members of the party. That
comes first. Their first duty is not diplomatic; their first duty is
to be devoted members of the party. They must do everything the
Politburo of the Soviet Union requires, at any price.
Now, I come back to your question. For example, the Soviet Pur-
chasing Commission during the war had more than a thousand em-
ployees. Some of them came to the United States as simple engineers,
but in reality they were in top positions in industry or in scientific
research. Some came as civilians, but really they were officers of the
Navy or artillery or tank troops or the air force.
No official of the Soviet Purchasing Commission came to the United
States as a member of the Communist Party. If "you look at the
records in the Department of State you will find that no party members
came from the Soviet Union.
This was the psychologically favorable moment for the Soviet Gov-
ernment. We were in the midst of a war. Many American people
paid great respect to the Soviet Army. Everybody was in sympathy
with and liked to talk to men in Soviet military uniform.
In the Soviet Purchasing Commission, Mr. Rudenko, Mr. Serov,
and a few chairmen of departments were called "the Politburo of the
Purchasing Commission." On the seventh floor of the Soviet Purchas-
ing Commission, behind an iron door at 3355 Sixteenth Street, Wash-
ington, D. C. — it was not in Moscow — there was a special department
of the NKVD. Everything that came from the Soviet Union, for in-
stance [speaking in Russian] .
Mr. WoLiN (translating) . A secret communication.
Mr. Kravchenko. Came to the seventh-floor department. Also,
the seventh-floor department kept agents in every department, in
the metal department or chemical department or aviation department.
11 §2 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Secret material went to the special department, one of whose officials
was Mrs. Arutunian. Her husband was son of the Deputy Commis-
sariat of Kailroads of the Soviet Union. She also worked for this
special department and all secret papers went through her hands.
With this department I had some trouble, and I know what I am
talking about.
All of us knew about the functions of the special department, but
we never knew who the representative of the Soviet Secret Police was
in the Soviet Purchasing Commission.
Mr. Tavenner. Did I understand you to say Rudenko was re-
sponsible to the NKVD which had its headquarters on the seventh
floor? Is that a correct statement?
Mr. Kravciienko. The special department formally was under Mr.
Rudenko, because he was head of the Soviet Purchasing Commission ;
this is natural, but [speaking in Russian] .
Mr. WoLTN (translating). In fact they were independent, the
NKVD section was independent from the chief of the Purchasing
Commission.
Mr. Tavenner. And the head of the Purchasing Commission, Mr.
Rudenko, was compelled to carry out certain activities that were out-
lined by the NIvVD ? Is that a correct statement ?
Mr. Kravciienko. This is absolutely natural. You see, he had two
bosses. The one boss — may I make this clear — was Mr. Mikoyan, the
member of the Politburo, and second assistant of Mr. Stalin during
the war. Mr. Mikoyan was Commissar of Foreign Trade. During
the war Mr. Mikoyan was in charge of lend-lease. That was his duty
as a member of the Politburo. All supplies for the Soviet Govern-
ment passed through the hands of Mr. Mikoyan.
As to Leonid Rudenko, I had known him many years. We worked
at the same factory in the Ukraine in about 1924 or 1925. Mr. Rudenko
received orders from Moscow from Mikoyan, from the foreign office,
from the genera] staff, and from the party. Wliat he did for one office
or another I don't know, but the fact is that all these offices were rep-
resented in the United States.
At the end of 1943 or beginning of 1944, one day we received orders
issued to all responsible members of the Communist Party. It was
after work, after 5 o'clock. The office door was closed, and Mr. Serov
came in with several sheets of paper containing orders from Mikoyan
to Mr. Rudenko and to all members of the party in the Soviet Pur-
chasing Commission. These orders made it absolutely clear that we
had to find out all secret information about the industrial develop-
ment in the United States, and especially in the military industry, and
Mr. Mikoyan said [speaking in Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). We shall appreciate you according to
your ability to comply with this order.
Mr. Kravchenko. This document was read to us and we were asked
to sign a statement that we knew about this order and that we would
make every effort [speaking in Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). To fulfill it.
Mr. Kravchenko. This was what I saw, what I knew. It was
absolutely clear ; there was no mistake about it.
Mr. Tavenner. What effect did this order have upon the activities
of the Russians who were members of the Soviet Purchasing Com-
mission ?
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1183
Mr. Kravchenko. First I will mention a few names and give you
a practical example of what they did.
One day I saw big books like this, approximately [indicating]
which contained many pictures of the aviation industry, the special
machines, special details, and so on. There were pictures and blue-
prints [speaking in Eussian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). Three large volumes.
Mr. Kravchenko. This material was signed by General Belayev,
Alexander Rostartchouk, and Engineer Khinuichin. General Belayev
was chairman of the Soviet Purchasing Conunission ; Alexander Ros-
tartchouk was head of the metal section; and Engineer Khinuichin,
who came to the United States as a simple engineer actually was
[speaking in Russian] .
Mr. WoLiN (translating). Was doctor of technical sciences.
Mr. Kravchenko. And was working on research at an institute in
Moscow in that capacity. He came to the United States as a simple
engineer.
How they obtained those pictures and blueprints, how they found
all this information about the development of aviation in the United
States, I don't know. I just saw these documents; I saw the signa-
tures ; and I know General Belayev took them when he flew to Moscow.
This is the first example.
Second example : I can't mention a certain name in open session
of the committee. I have some good reason for that. But I know
this: Two Navy captains obtained information on the production of
American submarines, on technological processes and details and on
the perspective of development of the submarine industry. That is
the second example.
The third example: From 1925 or 1926 I have know Semen Vasi-
lenko. Semen Vasilenko, now in the Soviet Union, is head of the
whole production of pipes and tubes in the Soviet Union, as part of
the metallurgical industry.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you repeat that ?
Mr. WoLiN (translating). He is head of the production of pipes
and tubes in the Soviet Union.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you spell that name?
Mr. Kravchenko. S-e-m-e-n V-a-s-i-1-e-n-k-o. Semen Vasilenko.
I knew him many, many years. Vasilenko was a member of the
party; he had been a member of the Ukrainian Government and was
[speaking in Russian].
Mr. Wolin (translating). Was awarded a Stalin premium.
Mr. Kravchenko. And also he had a few decorations. He came to
the United States for the sole purpose of finding some special infor-
mation about the metallurgical and tube industry and miiltary
industry.
One day in February 1944, I don't remember the date, Vasilenko,
myself, and Vdovin got ready to fly to the Soviet Union [speaking in
Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). Six large bags.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you state that over again ?
Mr. WoLiN (translating) . Six large bags.
Mr. Kravchenko. That is right ; and Vasilenko took the six bags
to the Soviet Union [speaking in Russian] .
Mr, Wolin (translating). I saw that material.
1184 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Kravciienko. Some of this material was about the production
of planes and the new technological processes; some was about ar-
tillery; some was about new technological processes in metallurgy;
some was about [speaking in Eussian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). The possibilities of industrial develop-
ment.
Mr. Kearnet. Would the witness mind repeating that ?
Mr. WoLiN (translating). Among this material there was also an
outline of the possibilities of industrial development.
Mr. Kravchenko. I mean the perspective ; for example, what was
planned 5 or 10 years ahead ; what the plans for the present are ; and
so on; also the plan in perspective for the general development of
industry. Do you understand ?
I know all this material was found in an unofficial way. What could
be the reason for Mr. Vasilenko, a former member of the govern-
ment, or for somebody else, to do work as a plain workman ? [speaking
in Russian.].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). They were working as plain workmen.
Mr. Kravchenko. We closed the door. Nobody could see this
material. And Vasilenko took this material and flew to the Soviet
Union.
Now, one more example. At the end of 1943 or beginning of 1944,
Vassili Sergeiev was deputy of Mr. Mikoyan. Mr. Sergeiev came
to the United States. He had meetings here and saw many respon-
sible industrial people and so on. He brought from Moscow another
order about [speaking in Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). Various types of information which
should be obtained.
Mr. Kravchenko. Sergeiev [speaking in Russian.]
Mr. WoLiN (translating). Sergeiev gathered the heads of the de-
partments and explained what kind of material they are expected to
get at any price.
Mr. Kravchenko. I must make it clear, Mr. Chairman, all depart-
ments of the Soviet Purchasing Commission — aviation, transporta-
tion, all of them — were working for this purpose. We transferred
to the Soviet Union not just this one package; we transferred to the
Soviet Union dozens of tons, of material, and not just by airplane. We
also were using Soviet ships that came from lend-lease for the Soviet
Union, and they called this material super lend-lease. [Laughter.]
Well, it is true. And they sent material by these ships for the only
reason, that the Soviet Government never believed in peace between
these two countries. They worked very hard to prepare themselves.
They understand very well that a new war, if it comes, will be a great
technical war, much more so than the last war, and they know very
well that the United States is a great industrial country. They must
find all material they can, all kinds of information [speaking in
Russian] .
Mr. WoLiN (translating). To be on a level with this country in its
military and industrial developments; also, to be up to date.
Mr. Walter. Do you know how this super lend-lease material was
concealed before it was put aboard the ships ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Lomakin [speaking in Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). Lomakin simply could come to any boat,
or anybody else could come, and bring whatever they wanted.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1185
Mr. Kravchenko. And any captain and any sailor could go ashore
to New York or Philadelphia or Baltimore. They did as they pleased.
How could you check on them? I saw in New York Soviet ships
[speaking in Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). We brought this material on the ship.
Mr. Kravchenko. \Y1io cared what we took. Had we taken the
Empire State Building and put it on a ship, nobody would have cared.
That is true. I know ; I saAv that. Nobocly opened boxes and checked.
1 witnessed it. [Speaking in Russian.]
Mr. WoLiN (translating). I saw dozens of times how Soviet boats
Avere loaded, and I know^ what I am talking about.
Mr. Walter. So no check was made, and these packing cases con-
taining plans and blueprints were freely passed on the ships with other
lend-lease material ?
Mr. Kravchenko. You see, Mr. Chairman, it was absolutely natural
during the war. In the United States, as in many countries in the
world, there was much respect for the Red Army. It was a natural
feeling. I am talking now about the policy and psychology of the
Soviet Government. They did everything against the United States
during the war, and now [speaking in Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). Why should they change?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes.
Mr. Kearney. Were any of these packages under diplomatic seal?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes. Vasilenko flew to the Soviet Union with all
[speaking in Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). This luggage.
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes ; possessed diplomatic immunity ; and Vasi-
lenko was not an exception. Everybody who went back always took
something with him under diplomatic immunity. And during the
war the Soviet Government received plenty of airplanes from the
United States. These airplanes were flown by Soviet pilots to the
Soviet Union. It was part of our activity during the war.
Mr. Kearney. Did you ever help load any of those packages ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes ; for the very simple reason that, if I said
I wouldn't help, what would have happened? If I said I wouldn't
help Mr. Vasilenko, why [speaking in Russian] .
Mr. WoLiN (translating). I would never survive to come here.
Mr. Kravchenko. Any suspicion by the authorities of the Soviet
Purchasing Commission or by the Embassy or by the NKVD people
in the United States would entail grave danger.
Mr, Kearney. I Avould like a direct answer to the question : Did you
ever help load any of these packages ?
Mr. Kravchenko (speaking in Russian).
Mr. WoLiN (translating) . Do you mean secret material?
Mr. Kearney. Yes.
Mr. Kravchenko. If I did myself ? No. [Speaking in Russian.]
Mr. WoLiN (translating). But that was known; it was not kept
secret.
Mr. Kravchenko. I was in the party from 1929, and I knew many
Soviet officials who had graduated from college with me. We sat in
the same college, in the same room, for many years. Sometimes they
spoke of what they had found, but they never said how this was done.
And when we talked to Vasilenko he would say : "It is much better if
09334—50 19
118o SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
we never speak about it. If the United States stops me, I will be
resiDonsible for my own action only."
Mr. Tavenner. If I understood you correctly, Vasilenko packed
these six bags behind closed doors ?
Mr. Kravchenko. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. Were you there when they were packed ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes. I was helping him.
Mr. Tavenner. You helped him pack them ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes. We worked like simple workmen because
they didn't trust anybody.
Mr. Tavenner. Then you did actually assist in packing that sort
of material ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes; I did.
Mr. Tavenner. You probably misunderstood the Congressman's
question.
Mr. WoLiN. His question was of loading. This is packing.
Mr. Kearney. He helped pack them, but did not help load them ?
Mr. WoLiN. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you recall the month and year in which Vasi-
lenko flew those packages to Moscow ?
Mr. Kravchenko. I don't remember exactly the date, but I remem-
ber very well it was in February 1944.
Mr. Tavenner. February 1944 ?
Mr. Kravchenko. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, it was the testimony of Maj. George
Racey Jordan, from his diary, that Vasilenko came through Great
Falls on the I7th of February en route to Moscow with diplomatic
mail.
Mr. Kravchenko. Everybody was using diplomatic passports.
For example, I knew prominent captains of the Soviet navy fleet. All
of them had diplomatic passports, and when we came to Vladviostok
some of them put on civilian clothes and came to the United States as
civilians.
Mr. Kearney. Although they were naval officers ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes ; and with six or seven decorations.
Mr. Tavenner. In the course of your testimony you mentioned the
name of Alexander Rostartchouk.
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes.
Mr. Tavenner. How mas he employed ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Eostartchouk was chairman of the metal depart-
ment of the Soviet Purchasing Commission.
Mr, Tavenner. Do you have any knowledge of any secret material
gathered by him ?
Mr. Kravchenko. I saw material on aviation. I saw that material
and his signature.
Mr. Walter. Did you ever fly back to Russia ?
Mr. Kravchenko. From the United States ?
Mr. Walter. Yes.
Mr. Kravchenko. No. I preferred to fly to New York.
Mr. Tavennerr. Was any of the material which was collected by
Rostartchouk or signed for by him included in those pouches which
Vasilenko took to Russia in February 1944 ?
Mr. Kravchenko. No. Vasilenko's material was quite different
from that of Rostartchouk.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1187
Mr. Tavenner. But this material was taken to Russia ?
Mr. Kravchenko. That is right.
Mr. Tavenner. By the same general method ?
Mr. Kravchenko. From the point of view of diplomatic immunity,
yes, but different persons were used, because the aviation information
was taken by General Belayev.
When General Belayev came to the Soviet Union after what he had
done here, Mr. Davies, former American Ambassador to the Soviet
Union, was with General Belayev in Stalingrad and they kissed each
other. I am 99 percent sure of this.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know Prof. Paul Emelianenko ?
Mr. Kravchenko. I do. He was graduated from the Metallurgical
College at which I studied. He is a very well-known scientist in the
Soviet Union. He was also a corresponding member [speaking in
Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). Of the Academy of Science.
Mr. Kravchenko. He came to the United States. I have known
him since about 1931. [Speaking in Russian.]
Mr. WoLiN (translating) . He was also a recipient of a Stalin prize.
Mr. Tavenner. What part did he play in obtaining information for
the Purchasing Commission ?
Mr. I^jiavchenko. Well, when Emelianenko was in Washington
he spent about 75 or TO percent of his time visiting many cities and
many factories in the United States.
Mr. Tavenner. Just a minute. Are you talking about Emelianenko ?
Mr. Kravchenko. That is right. I am talking about him. He spent
about 70 percent of his time traveling to many cities and many fac-
tories in the United States. Because he was a very good scientist, his
special duty was to find out what new technological processes and what
new kinds of machinery were used in the United States of America. As
a prominent scientist, if he saw something a few times he knew how
to copy it. He worked here a few months, then he flew to the Soviet
Union in the middle of April 1944. He did a great job because he
has really a brilliant brain and brilliant experience.
Mr. Walter. The committee will stand in recess until 2 : 30.
(Thereupon, at 12 : 10 p. m. on Tuesday, March 7, 1950, a recess was
taken until 2 : 30 p. m., of the same day.)
after recess
(The hearing was resumed at 2 : 30 p. m., Hon. John S. Wood
(chairman) presiding.
Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order, please, and the record
will disclose that there are present Messrs. Walter, Moulder, and
Wood.
TESTIMONY OF VICTOR A. KRAVCHENKO— Resumed
Mr. Tavenner. Mr, Kravchenko, did you know Nicolai Kolybalov ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes; I know Nicolai Kolybalov since 1938.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you outline to the committee his background,
his assignment to the Soviet Purchasing Commission, and any other
knowledge you have regarding his activities while with the Soviet
Purchasing Commission ?
1188 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
(Representative Kearney enters hearing room.)
Mr. Kravchenko. Nicolai Kolybalov is a professional engineer.
At the end of 1938 or beginning of 1939 he was assistant to the head of
pipe industry in Siberia, and I know him very well. He came to the
United States toward the end of 1943 as a representative of some
industrial commissariat, and he returned to the Soviet Union about
beginning of 1914. I met Nicolai Kolybalov last March in Paris.
We had an argiunent before the court. Frankly, I don't understand
why Nicolai Kolybalov should come to the United States in his pro-
fessional capacity; I don't understand why they sent him, because
he is a very bad engineer, but in the Soviet Purchasing Commission
[speaking in Russian] .
Mr. WoLiN (translating). He traveled to see industrial plants and
collected technical information. As far as I can remember, he had
to receive machines and give his expert opinion.
Mr. Kravchenko. Under the agreement between the United States
and the Soviet Union during the war. [Speaking in Russian.]
Mr. WoLiN (translating). I have no knowledge of what he was
actually doing.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know Fedor V. Vdovin ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Fedor Vdovin was the man who helped me pack
secret information for Vasilenko when the latter flew to the Soviet
Union.
Mr. Tavenner. The committee is in possession of information that
indicates that Fedor Vdovin was in the pipe-tubing section of the
Soviet Purchasing Commission and that he devoted his energy to
obtaining aluminmn tubing which could be used in the atomic devel-
opment.
Mr. Kravchenko. I don't know for what purpose Fedor Vdovin
asked the United States for aluminum tubes, but he was working in
this section and he received many tubes. I don't know what his pur-
pose was, whether for atomic energ;\^ or for any other purpose.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you know Col. Stanislaw Shumousky?
Mr. Kravchenko. No ; I don't know him.
Mr. Tavenner. Did you know a person whose first name is Zot,
Z-o-t, L. Chepurnykh ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Maybe I know him, but it is very difficult to
remember names.
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Kravchenko, on March 9, 1944, Vassili Serge-
iev, accompanied by his wife, Nina, Petri Makiev, Valentina Batanova,
and Anatoli Baranovsky, departed from Great Falls, Mont., on a
plane, and had in their custody a number of wooden boxes. Will you
outline the background of Vassili Sergeiev ?
Mr. KJRAVCHENKO. I workcd with Sergeiev from 1925 up to 1931. I
worked with him in a metallurgical factory in the city of Dnepropet-
rovsk. He was a member of the party. He graduated from the Lenin-
grad Metallurgical Institute. Afterward he worked a few years in
Germany as metallurgical attache and at the end of 1943 or beginning
of 1944 he came to the United States as assistant commissar of foreign
trade. His wife Nina studied with me in 1930 at the Aviation
Institute.
When Sergeiev came to the United States, as I mentioned before,
he brought special orders from Mr. Mikoyan, and these orders were
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 11 89
discussed in closed party sessions of the Soviet Purchasing Commis-
sion.
Sergeiev inspected many departments of the Soviet Purchasing
Commission. He liad the right to do so. He also discharged some
officials whom he considered not too loyal to their duty, and Sergeiev
flew to Soviet Russia [speaking in Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). He had a great deal of luggage and of
course enjoyed diplomatic immunity.
Mr. Kravchenko (speaking in Russian).
Mr. WoLiN (translating). But what material he possessed in that
luggage is unknown.
Mr. Tai-enner. Do you know how he obtained diplomatic immu-
nity?
Mr. Kravchenko (speaking in Russian).
Mr. WoLiN (translating). During the war, as you know, many So-
viet employees came with diplomatic passports, and so did Sergeiev.
He was Assistant Commissar of Foreign Trade and it was absolutely
natural that he should have a diplomatic passport when he came to
the United States.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know Petr Makiev ?
Mr. Kravchenko. I don't remember him.
Mr. Tavenner. Valentina Batanova, do you know him?
Mr. Kravchenko. Valentina Batanova is a woman.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know her?
Mr. Kravchenko. No. .
Mr. Ta^^nner. Anatoli Baranovsky?
Mr, Kravchenko. No.
Mr. Tavenner. You do not know him ?
Mr. IvRAVCHENKO. I dou't know him.
Mr. Tavenner. Do you know an engineer with the Soviet Purchas-
ing Commission named Khimuchin?
Mr. Kravchenko. I know him.
Mr. Tavenner. Will you outline his background and connection
with the Soviet Purchasing Commission?
Mr. Kravchenko. He came to the United States as an ordinary
engineer although he is a scientist. Before he came to the United
States he worked in a scientific aviation institute in Moscow. His
duty in the United States, as I mentioned before, I saw this material
[speaking in Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). He had obtained considerable material
concerning the aviation industry.
Mr. Kravchenko. He was working in a separate room, and about
60 percent of the people inside the Russian Purchasing Commission
didn't know what he was doing. But when I saw the big record he
was signing on the aviation industry in the United States, and when
this material was taken by General Belayev to Moscow under diplo-
matic immunity, I understood what Kliimuchin had been doing.
Mr. Tavenner. I believe you told us that while living in Russia
you were the manager or head of a manufacturing plant ?
Mr. Kravchenko. That is right.
Mr. Ta\t:nner. How many employees were in that plant, approxi-
mately ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Sometimes 1,000, sometimes 3,000, sometimes
more, sometimes less.
J.J.J7U oxiirivarjiN J. \jr AiUiVLiu iviAi. rjniAJj
Mr. Tavenner. Was the labor-union situation in that plant typical
of the other plants in Russia at that time ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Yes ; absolutely.
Mr. Ta^^nner, Was the labor union in that plant free to engage in
collective bargaining with management over the matter of rates of
compensation for services ?
Mr. Kravchenko. No. In the Soviet Union there are two kinds
of remuneration for labor. One is based on time, the other on piece
work. All skills in the Soviet Union are listed in a special book.
This book contains a list of all the industries and wages for both time
and piecework. Now, the local labor union never decides what wages
the workmen must receive from the factory. I mean [speaking in
Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). They take part only in cases when a
scale of wages is being modified.
Mr. Kravchenko. In my experience of many years with factories
in the Soviet Union, I can say no labor union boss in a factory ever
came to my office and said : "Will you please pay more to Mr. So and
So." He can't ask me that for two reasons: First, he himself is a
member of the party, and he laiows I can't make any decision con-
cerning wages.
Second, he knows very well what our policy in the factories is,
and although I am manager and he is labor-union boss, both of us
work for the interest of the party first, and the interests of the work-
men come second.
And third, he knows very well that all rates of wages are fixed by
the top level of the Government, and our job is just to explain to the
workmen how much they must receive and how much they must
produce.
Mr. Taat^nner. In other words, the decision was made by high eche-
lons in Government ?
Mr. Kravchenko. The decision was made before the union man
came to my office, and he knew that very well. He also knew that all
our work in the factory, the norm of output, the conditions of
the material, and the price of this material had been discussed pre-
viously by our factory party meeting. We called the factory party
cell "Little Politburo," and the union man knew I would pay much
more to every workman, but I couldn't do that.
Mr. Tavenner. And you could not do it for what reason ?
Mr. Kravchenko. For a very simple reason : I had from the Gov-
ernment the prices of tubes and metal and everything. I also had
a statement of how many workmen I must use and how much I may
pay them. And I could do nothing on my own initiative.
Mr. Wolin has just mentioned that the labor union plays an active
part when we change the norm of production. What part do they
play ? I will give you an example.
In a factory employing 1,000 workmen, 300 workmen produce, say,
130 percent, 500 workmen produce 75 percent, and the rest produce
something in between.
Wlien the Government decides to change the norm of production
for every workman, it never proceeds from the average output of
approximately 90 percent. It always bases its decision on a higher
norm, for example, 120 percent. This 120 percent is then assigned
for all of them, so that wages are very profitable for the Government,
but not for the workmen.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1191
Thus, changing the norm of production, the Government always
gets a greater profit because before increasing wages, it increases
the norm of output.
Mr. Tavenner. In other words, there cannot be any decision made
by management and labor except that which is made by the Gov-
ernment ?
Mr. Kravchenko. None. The same orders are issued by the party
organization, by management, and by the labor union at the same
time.
Now, before we talked to the workmen, we had a session of the
party committee on the factory. At this meeting the secretary of the
party, the boss of the labor union, and management received the
same order.
Then we discussed what was to be done in the factory, and the work-
men must accept what we said. The "politburo" of the factory
consists of seven or nine persons. We decided Avhat we had to do and
we said to the Labor union boss: "You must do this; you must do
that." AVe said to management : "You do so and so."
I would come to my office and invite all the engineers and the ad-
ministration personnel to come to my office.
At the same time, the labor-union boss would gather his little
bosses.
The party secretary would invite all active party [speaking in
Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). The organizers.
Mr. Kravchenko. Party organizers. Everybody would receive in-
structions as to what he must do and how he must do it. After the
decision of the "politburo" was made we opened party meetings for
all members of the party and we said to them: "We have received
orders from the commissariat or the party. We have discussed this
subject at a closed session of the party committee. And we must
make the following decision."
We discussed it for a few hours, and every member of the party
knew that on the next day we would have an open meeting of members
of the party, members of the young Communist organization, and all
workmen who were not members of the party. The director of the
factory would say a few words ; so would the secretary of the party
say a few words, and the union representative [speaking in Russian].
Mr. WoLiN (translating). Nobody will have the courage to say
anything against the resolution of the party committee.
Mr. Kearney. Wliat ha]:)pens if they do?
Mr. Kravchenko. I don't say there is no opportunity to discuss it
in a closed party session. But when all was decided and we went to
the open meeting, if somebody voiced opposition, some member of the
party would say : "It is not true what he said, because we work at the
same place and the same hours and I produce so and so much. He is
lazy or doesn't pay attention to his machine." Another member of
the party would get up and also discredit the opponent and what he
had said.
Mr. Kearney. What happens ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Nothing will happen, but if you discredit a de-
cision of the Government, for example, if you say the Government de-
cision is against the interest of workers, you will be arrested.
1192 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Wood. You will be what ?
Mr. Kravchknko. You will be arrested. You can't say anything
against a Government decision, for the very simple reason they will
accuse you as an agitator or propagandist against the Government
and against the interests of the workmen.
Mr. Kearney. Assuming a workman has been arrested, what hap-
pens to him in an individual case ?
Mr. Kravchenko. That is very difficult to say. I published one
book, and I am now going to publish another book, and I try to ex-
plain this question. If they arrest you they will look at all your past,
who was your father, who was your mother, who is your sister and
brother, where they are, what they are doing, what is your social
past, what you did 10 years ago, what you said against the Soviet
Government. They will look at all secret files, and if they find some-
thing they will produce it and they will accuse you.
For example, I knew a man, a foreman, his name was Dubinsky.
He was a very good foreman. He worked 35 years, had great experi-
ence and was a very good man, and when the factory needed his help
he worked 24 hours without going home to see his family. He was
very sincere and a very good worker. He didn't say anything directly
against the Government. He just said once : "The pay is not sufficient
and we work under difficult conditions."
It was enough. WTiat did he get? They looked at his past — I was
horn in 1905 — they found that in 1905 this Dubinsky belonged to some
political movement which was against the Bolsheviks and in 1936 —
31 years later, he was arrested. I don't know where he is now.
You see the situation, I will give you an example. I started my
work as a metalworker in 1921. I did not come from a rich or
aristocratic class. I came from a very simple family, and I knew very
well that after I graduated from the institute and became a member
of the party, I had not just my duty as a Russian engineer; I realized
my social duty to my people, because I was one of them, and because
after so many years life was terrible. We couldn't do anything good
even if we tried.
In 1939 I came to a new factory. We built that factory by our
blood and our tears. We paid everything we had for foreign
machinery. We bought it in the United States, England, and else-
where. I came to this factory to work, and found these people [speak-
ing in Russian] ,
Mr. WoLiN (translating). In the bitter Ural winter they lived in
unheated barns.
Mr. Kravchenko. There was not enough bread, no meat, no shoes,
nothing. And I was asked to produce 100 percent with these people.
How could they do it? And sometimes I didn't get out of the factory
for 3 days and nights. And after I did my best as a citizen of my
country and sometimes had no time to sleep during 3 days' work, they
arrested me.
I found similar conditions in villages where peasants worked day
and night. They can't come in at 8 o'clock in the morning and work
until 5 o'clock. They must work until sunset and they work very
hard.
That is why I broke with the Soviets. I give you human reasons.
If you want me to give political reasons, that is something else.
SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1193
Mr. TA\T:]srNER. I have before me an article entitled "Collective
Contracts in the U. S. S. R. for the year 1947," written by V. V.
Kuznetsov. Do you know the author of this article ?
Mr. Kravchenko. I don't know him personally but I know who
he is.
Mr. Tavenner. There appears in this article, in capital letters, in the
body of it, this statement :
The collective contract is a bilateral agreement made by tlie management
on the one hand and by the trade-union committee of the enterprise, repre-
senting all the workers, on the other hand.
Mr. Kravchenko. First of all, the Soviet labor union at the factory
never represented the real interest of the people. If it does, we shall
hear of a real revolution in the Soviet Union. "Wlien we made a con-
tract we did what the party committee asked us to do.
Mr. Tavenner. In other words there was no bilateral agreement
whatever ; it was merely what the Government stated they should agree
to?
Mr. Kravchenko. This is fiction for people outside the country and
for many idiots inside the country ; 99 percent or 95 percent of work-
men in Europe or in any country in the world don't know what a
Soviet labor union is. They don't know what the Soviet regime is.
They don't know either its domestic or foreign policy; they know
nothing.
The policy of the Soviet Government in the labor-union problems is
very smart. Wliat Mr. Kuznetsov said for people abroad, that is
one side of the picture. What Mr. Kuznetsov did in his own country
against the interests of Russian workmen, that is the other side of
the picture. That is typical of the double talk of the Soviet Govern-
ment before their owii people.
Mr. Tavenner. Is the statement I read to you a correct statement?
Mr. Kravchenko. Absolutely not ; absolutely not. How is it pos-
sible ? How can the labor union decide about the wages of the work-
men ?
Mr. Moulder. I think he very clearly covered that a while ago.
Mr. Tavenner. All right.
Mr. Kravchenko. We had the plan ; it stated how much we must
produce; how much it should cost per piece, per ton, or per pound;
how many tons of steel we must use ; how many tons of ore ; how many
workmen should produce 1 ton of metal ; how much the ton must cost ;
all the details.
(Representative Kearney leaves hearing room.)
Mr. Tavenner. I want to ask one more question before introduc-
ing these photographs. Were the laborers in your factory free to
change their place of employment or quit work ?
Mr. Kravchenko. No. I had to determine their fate — where they
must w^ork, what they must produce, and what wages I must pay them.
Mr. Tavenner. I would like for you to look at these photographs
and identify the persons whose pictures appear there and, with your
permission, I would like to photostat these and return the originals
to you.
Mr. Kravchenko. Please.
Mr. Tavenner. I show you a photograph marked "No. 1." Will
you identify the persons who appear in that photograph?
1194 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL
Mr. Kravchenko. This is Romanov, who was head of the metal
department. This is Vasilenko, Semen Vasilenko, whom we were talk-
ing about.
Mr. Tavenner, Will you identify the persons who appear in this
photograph marked "No. 2" ?
Mr. Kravchenko. General Rudenko, chairman of the Soviet Pur-
chasing Commission. By the way, Rudenko is not a real general.
He is a political general. He received a decoration in Stalingrad,
not because he was a hero; the hero was the simple Russian soldier
who died for our country but not for this regime, and Mr. Rudenko
received the decoration.
Mr. TA^^:NNER. Will you identify the persons who appear in photo-
graph No. 3 ?
Mr. Kravchenko. Nicolai Kolybalov.
Mr. Tavenner. And No. 4?
Mr. Kravchenko. The same Vasilenko.
Mr. TA^^:NNER. And photograph No. 5 ?
Mr. Kravchenko. General Rudenko and Romanov.
Mr. TA^^NNER. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer these photographs
in evidence as Kravchenko exhibits 1 to 5, inclusive, and ask permis-
sion to substitute photostats and return the originals.
Mr. Wood. The photostats will be admitted.
(The photostats of photographs above referred to, marked "Krav-
chenko Exhibits 1 to 5 inclusive," are filed herewith.) ^-
Mr. Wood. Mr. Kravchenko, permit me to express the appreciation
of the committee for 5^our appearance.
The committee will stand adjourned subject to call.
(Thereupon, at 4 p. m. on Tuesday, March 7, 1950, an adjournment
was taken.)
"2 See appendix.
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