    [Hearings Regarding Shipment of Atomic Material to the Soviet Union During World War II]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

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    fARINGS  REGARDING  SHIPMENT  OF  ATOMIC  MATERIAL
    TO  THE  SOVIET  UNION  DURING  WORLD  WAR  II

    HEARINGS

    BEFORE  THE

    COMMITTEE  ON  UN-AMEEICAN  ACTIVITIES
    HOUSE  OF  REPEESENTATIVES

    EIGHTY-FIRST  CONGRESS

    FIRST  AND  SECOND  SESSIONS

    DECEMBER  5  AND  7,  1949;  JANUARY  23,  24,  25,  AND  26,
    AND  MARCH  2,  3,  AND  7,  1950

    Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities

    UNITED  STATES
    GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE
    S9334  WASHINGTON  :   1950

    PUBLIC

    (

    A

    i//i

    MAY   4  1950

    COMMITTEE  ON  UN-AMERICAN  ACTIVITIES
    United  States  House  of  Representatives

    JOHN  S.  WOOD,  Georgia,  Chairman

    FRANCIS  E.  WALTER,  Pennsylvania  RICHARD  M.  NIXON.  California

    BURR  P.  HARRISON,  Virginia  FRANCIS  CASE,  South  Dakota

    JOHN  McSWEENEY,  Ohio  HAROLD  H.  VELDE,  Illinois

    MORGAN  M.  MOULDER,  Missouri  BERNARD  W.  KEARNEY,  New  York

    Frank  S.  Tavenner,  Jr.,  Counsel
    Louis  J.  Russell.  Senior  Investigator
    Benjamin  Mandel,  Director  of  Research
    John  W.  Carrington.  Clerk  of  Committee

    II

    CONTENTS

    December  5,  1949,  testimony  of —  Page

    Louis  J.  Russell 902

    George  Racey  Jordan 908

    December  7,  1949,  testimony  of  Lt.  Gen.  Leslie  R.  Groves 935

    January  23,  1950,  testimony  of  Lawrence  C.  Burman 957

    January  24,  1950,  testimony  of —

    Dr.  Phillip  L.  Merritt • 979

    Charles  Edward  McKillips 985

    Dr.  Phillip  L.  Merritt  (resumed). 986

    Lawrence  C.  Burman  (resumed) 1002

    Hermann  H.  Rosenberg 1004

    January  25,  1950,  testimony  of —

    Courtney  E.  Owens,..' 1042

    Col.  Thomas  T.  Crenshaw 1052

    January  26,  1950,  testimony  of —

    Henry  A.  Wallace 1070

    James  P.  Hoopes 1 100

    March  2,  1950,  testimony  of  Donald  T.  Appell 1120

    March  3,  1950,  testimony  of —

    Donald  T.  Appell  (resumed) 1145

    George  Racey  Jordan 1153

    March  7,  1950,  testimony  of  Victor  A.  Kravchenko 1175

    III

    HEAEINGS  KEGAEDING  SHIPMENT  OF  ATOMIC  MATE-
    EIAL  TO  THE  SOVIET  UNION  DUEING  WOELD  WAE  II

    MONDAY,   DECEMBER   5,    1949

    United  States  House  of  Kepresentatives,

    Subcommittee  of  the
    Committee  on  un-American  Activities,

    W ashington,  D.  O.

    A  subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  met,
    pursuant  to  call,  at  11 :  15  a.  m.  in  room  226,  Old  House  Office  Build-
    ing, Hon.  John  S.  Wood  (chairman)  presiding.

    Committee  members  present:  Hon.  John  S.  Wood,  chairman;
    Francis  E.  Walter,  Burr  P.  Harrison,  and  Morgan  M.  Moulder.

    Staff  members  present:  Frank  S.  Tavenner,  Jr.,  counsel;  Louis  J.
    Russell,  senior  investigator;  Courtney  Owens,  investigator;  Benjamin
    Mandel,  director  of  research ;  John  W.  Carrington,  clerk ;  and  A.  S.
    Poore,  editor.

    Mr.  Wood.  Let  the  committee  be  in  order,  please.

    Let  the  record  disclose  that  for  purposes  of  this  particular  hear-
    ing a  subcommittee  composed  of  Mr.  Walter,  Mr.  Harrison,  Mr.
    Moulder,  and  Mr.  Wood  has  been  designated.     They  are  all  present.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  committee  and  its  staff  has  been
    for  some  time  pursuing  an  investigation  of  reported  sales  of  uranium
    to  the  Soviet  Government.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  so  much  pub-
    licity has  recently  been  given  to  the  sale  of  this  material  to  the  Soviets,
    it  appears  advisable  that  the  facts  developed  by  the  committee  thus
    far  be  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  American  public.  I  would  like,
    therefore,  to  call  as  the  first  witness  this  morning,  Louis  J.  Kussell,
    senior  investigator  for  the  committee.

    A  review  of  the  file  pertaining  to  the  matter  of  the  uranium  ship-
    ments to  Russia  indicates  that  there  is  some  disagreement  or  conflict
    in  statements  made  by  various  persons  examined  or  interrogated  dur-
    ing the  course  of  the  investigation  conducted  in  connection  with  this
    matter.  It  therefore  appears  advisable  that  this  morning's  proceed-
    ings be  confined  to  the  subject  of  the  shipments  of  uranium  and
    uranium  compounds  to  the  Soviet  Government,  and  such  other  mat-
    ters that  we  may  be  able  to  develop  through  another  witness  if  he
    appears.

    Mr.  Wood.  Very  well.  Mr,  Russell,  will  you  stand  up  and  be  sworn.
    You  solemnly  swear  the  evidence  you  give  this  subcommittee  will  be
    the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you
    God  ?

    Mr.  Russell.  I  do.

    901

    902  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    :MATERIAL

    TESTIMONY  OF  LOUIS  J.  RUSSELL

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  please  state  your  name?

    Mr.  Russell.  Louis  J.  Eusseli.

    Mr  .Tavenneb.  You  are  employed  by  the  committee  as  its  senior  in-
    vestigator, are  you  not?

    Mr.  Russell.  I  am.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Have  you  had  occasion  to  make  an  investigation  of
    reported  sales  of  uranium  to  the  Russian  Government  during  the  pe-
    riod of  your  employment  by  the  committee  ?

    Mr.  Russell.  I  have.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  investigation  related,  did  it  not,  to  the  sales
    of  uranium  which  were  made  to  the  Russian  Government  from  sources
    within  this  country?

    Mr.  Rltssell.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  How  many  sales  of  uranium  were  made  to  the  Soviet
    Government  according  to  the  facts  developed  by  your  investigation?

    Mr.  Russell.  Three  that  we  know  of.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  did  the  Russians  first  become  interested  in
    the  purchase  of  uranium  or  uranium  compounds  within  the  United
    States?

    Mr.  Russell.  In  February  1943,  according  to  documents  which  the
    staff  of  the  committee  has  examined.

    Mr.  Tavenner,  What  officials  of  the  Soviet  Government  were  prin-
    cipally interested  in  the  Russian  attempts  to  obtain  uranium  or  ura-
    nium compounds  ?

    Mr.  Russell.  There  were  several.  One  of  them  was  V.  Finogenov
    of  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission;  and  N.  S.  Fomichev  of  the
    Soviet  Purchasing  Commission;  N.  S.  Stepanov  of  the  Soviet  Pur-
    chasing Commission ;  and  a  General  Rudensky,  Col.  A.  N.  Kotikov
    was  the  ultimate  recipient  of  the  uranium  material.  He  too,  was  at-
    tached to  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Russell,  at  this  point  would  you  relate  the
    details  of  the  first  two  shipments  of  uranium  compounds  to  the  Soviet
    Government  ?

    Mr.  Russell.  Yes.  Regarding  the  issuance  of  the  export  licenses
    for  uranium  compounds,  the  committee  received  a  letter  from  the
    United  States  State  Department  from  which  I  will  quote.  However,
    since  the  letter  contains  controversial  material  as  well  as  confidential
    data,  I  will  read  only  the  first  paragraph.  This  paragraph  discloses
    that  certain  export  licenses  for  the  shipment  of  uranium  materials  to
    the  Soviet  Union  were  granted,  according  to  the  records  of  the  Lend-
    Lease  Administration  and  the  successor  to  that  agency,  the  Foreign
    Economic  Administration.

    This  is  a  letter  addressed  to  Donald  T.  Appell.  a  member  of  the  in-
    vestigating staff  of  the  Un-American  Activities  Committee,  from  the
    Department  of  State.

    Mr.  Moulder.  What  is  the  date  of  the  letter?

    Mr.  Russell.  June  11,  1948.     [Reading:]

    Reference  is  made  to  your  visit  to  the  Department  of  State,  on  behalf  of
    the  House  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  with  reference  to  a  reported
    shipment  of  some  black  uranium  oxide  to  the  Soviet  Union  in  1943.  The
    Department  of  State  had  nothing  to  do  with  this  transaction.  However,  the
    records  of  the  Division  for  Soviet  Supply  of  the  Office  of  Lend-Lease  Admin-

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  903

    istration  ami  its  successor  agency,  the  Foreign  Economic  Administration,  which
    have  been  absorbed  by  the  Department  of  State,  indicate  that  in  March  1943
    two  export  licenses  were  granted,  one  for  200  pounds  of  urano-uranic  oxide  and
    220  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate  and  the  other  for  500  pounds  of  urano-uranic
    oxide  and  500  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate.  The  records  also  indicate  that  an
    export  license  was  granted  in  April  1943  for  25  pounds  of  uranium  metal,  and
    that  in  November  of  tiie  same  year  an  export  license  was  granted  for  1,000
    grams  of  heavy  water  which  I  believe  is  also  of  interest  to  your  committee.
    Notations  and  memoranda  of  the  Lend-Lease  Administration,  included  in  the
    records,  indicate  that  there  was  some  consultation  between  representatives  of
    the  War  Department,  FEA,  and  Lend-Lease  on  the  granting  of  export  licenses
    for  the  uranium  materials.  These  records  do  not,  however,  include  any  actvial
    contemporary  communications  from  the  War  Department.

    As  to  the  shipment  of  the  material  to  the  Soviet  Union,  the  fol-
    lowing testimony  was  given  to  the  committee  by  Herman  R.  Rosen-
    berg, of  Chemator,  Inc.,  New  York  City.  This  concern  occupied  a
    position  similar  to  that  of  a  broker  in  the  uranium  transactions  with
    the  Soviet  Government  :

    On  February  1,  1943,  we  received  an  inquiry  from  the  Government  Purchas-
    ing Commission  of  the  Soviet  Union,  Washington,  D.  C,  Mr.  N.  S.  Fomichev,
    for  220  ix)unds  uranium  oxide  (U30S),  220  pounds  uranium  nitrate  (uranyl
    nitrate,  U02  (NO3)2+6H20),  and  25  pounds  uranium  metal.

    We  had  previously  sold  to  the  Russians  approximately  four  or  six  small
    lots  of  various  chemicals,  during  1942  and  1948,  aggregating  a  few  thousand
    dollars.  This  was  a  very  minor  part  of  the  regular  business  done  by  us  during
    the  war  years  with  various  Allied  purchasing  commissions  which  then  offered
    the  only  opportunity  to  continue  "our  export  business  with  those  countries  which
    they  represented,  and  the  United  States  Treasury  Department  l)uying  lend-lease
    supplies.

    This  inquiry  was  the  first  we  had  ever  received  for  uranium  products  from
    any  customer.  Accordingly,  we  had  first  to  find  manufacturers  and  dealers
    in  this  line,  whom  we  contacted  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  information  about
    this  article  and  to  get  quotations.  We  were  able  to  obtain  at  least  one  offer  for
    each  of  the  products.

    We  also  called  the  War  Production  Board,  New  York  City,  group  2,  to
    inquire  about  regulations  covering  these  products  and  were  told  that  order
    M-2S5  of  January  26,  1943,  had  just  been  issued  which,  however,  merely  pro-
    hibited the  use  of  uranium  chemicals  in  certain  domestic  industries,  like  glass,
    ceramic,  and  pottery  and  that  said  order  said  nothing  regarding  export.  If  the
    material  is  destined  for  war  use  by  the  Russians  this  order  definitely  did  not
    apply.  For  further  details  we  were  referred  to  their  Washington  miscellaneous
    minerals  division.  In  reply  to  our  formal  inquiry,  addressed  to  this  division,
    Mr.  Park,  Assistant  to  R.  J.  Land,  confirmed  that  the  Russian  uranium  require-
    ment was  not  subject  to  regulation  M-285.  In  this  connection,  Mr.  Fomichev
    advised  us  that  the  material  was  not  required  for  any  of  the  uses  restricted  by
    regulation  M-285  but  was  urgently  needed  for  Russian  military  puriwses.  Spe-
    cifically, the  uranium  salts  were  represented  by  the  Russians  to  be  needed  for
    military  medical  purposes  and  the  uranium  metal  for  .their  war  industry  to
    harden  steel  used  for  gun  barrels.  This  information,  together  with  its  source,
    we  submitted  to  the  War  Production  Board  with  our  aforesaid  inquiry.

    Accordingly,  on  February  3,  1943,  we  invited  the  Russian  Mission  to  submit
    to  us  their  firm  order  for  the  uranium  oxide  and  the  m-anium  nitrate.  Yet,  it
    was  not  until  the  middle  of  March  1943  that  such  formal  order  was  received
    by  us.  In  the  meantime  the  Lend-Lease  Administration,  through  Mr.  Moore,  a
    subordinate  of  General  Wessen  of  that  agency,  had  approved  the  transaction,
    advising  us  on  March  8,  1943,  that  "no  further  clearance  will  be  necessary  except
    the  usual  export  license."  Upon  advice  on  March  11,  1943,  of  the  Soviet  Com-
    mission of  the  receipt  of  such  export  license,  we  placed  on  March  15,  1943,  our
    own  order  for  the  200  ( rather  than  220)  pounds  uranium  oxide  and  220  pounds
    uranium  nitrate  with  S.  W.  Shattuck  Chemical  Co.,  Denver,  Colo.  On  March
    23,  1943,  this  company  shipped  the  material  directly  to  "Col.  A.  N.  Kotikov,
    Resident  Representative  of  the  Soviet  Government  Purchasing  Commission  of
    the  Soviet  Union  in  the  United  States  of  America,  Air  Service  Depot  of  the  Air
    Transport  Command,  Gore  Field,  Great  Falls,  Mont."

    904  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    As  for  the  uranium  metal,  no  quotation  was  ever  made  by  us  on  this  Inquiry,
    due  to  diflBculties  encountered  in  supplying  this  material  from  our  expected
    source,  the  Fairmount  Chemical  Co.

    On  March  19,  1943,  the  Soviet  Government  advised  us  that  they  reqiaired
    several  tons  of  uranium  nitrate  and  uranium  chloride  (preferably  uranium
    oxychloride,  otherwise  tri-,  tetra-  or  pentchloride)  or  urano-uranic  oxide,
    which  inquiry  was  passed  on  to  S.  W.  Shattuck  Chemical  Co.,  who  answered
    on  March  25,  1943,  that  they  could  only  offer  500  pounds  each  of  urano-uranic
    oxide  and  uranium  nitrate  and  further  deliveries  only  if  they  received  the  raw
    materials.  We  passed  this  offer  on  to  the  Soviet  Commission  subject  to  receipt
    of  the  necessary  export  license  and  other  permissions.

    On  April  1,  1943,  the  Soviet  Commission  asked  us  to  "reserve"  500  pounds  of
    each  product  as  offered  by  us  and  on  April  5,  1943,  they  confirmed  the  order
    subject  to  receipt  of  export  license.  This  license  (No.  1643180)  was  issued  only
    on  April  26,  1943.  By  that  time  the  Shattuck  Co.  had  withdrawn  their  offer
    as  of  April  22,  1943,  because  the  material  had  been  sold  to  "their  regular  cus-
    tomers." This  made  it  necessary  to  secure  substitute  material  from  the  Canadian
    Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.,  New  York  City,  to  have  the  export  license  amended
    as  of  April  29,  1943,  to  conform  to  the  change  in  product  and  price ;  and  to  obtain
    and  place  the  new  sales  and  purchase  contracts  with  the  Russian  and  Canadian
    parties,  respectively.

    Even  though  we  had  been  advised  by  the  Russians  at  the  outset  that,  contrary
    to  the  first  uranium  transaction,  this  deal  did  not  come  under  lend-lease,  they
    advised  us  on  April  12,  1943,  that  Mr.  Moore  had  granted  the  necessary  approval
    of  the  transaction  as  a  cash  purchase.  With  respect  to  regulation  M-2S5  we
    obtained  an  affidavit  from  the  Russians  stating  that  theoxide  will  be  used  in  the
    manufacture  of  ferro-uranium  compounds  which  in  turn  will  be  used  in  the
    production  of  armaments  and  that  the  uranium  nitrate  will  be  used  for  medical
    pui-poses  directly  connected  with  the  war.  This  affidavit  we  sent  on  to  our  sup-
    pliers who  shipped  the  materials  consisting  of  500  pounds  of  black  uranium  oxide
    and  500  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate,  directly  from  Port  Hope,  Ontario,  Canada,
    to  the  afore-mentioned  Colonel  Kotikov.

    The  gross  invoice  value  of  both  of  the  uranium  deals,  described  herein,  was
    $4,400,  on  which  our  gross  profit  is  estimated  at  $50O-$600.  Both  transactions
    were  handled,  and  payment  made  on  behalf  of  the  Russian  Government  by
    Amtorg  Trading  Corp.,  New  York,  N.  Y.

    On  August  5,  1943,  Mr.  Fomichev*  inquired,  among  various  other  chemicals,
    about  uranium  compounds.  He  said  that  they  asked  the  WPB  if  not  another
    10-15  tons  could  be  located  for  them.  The  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.
    told  us  that  they  are  not  allowed  any  longer  to  quote  on  uranium  compounds ;
    we  should  approach  the  WPB  but  the  best  way  would  be  that  the  Soviet  Pur-
    chasing Commission  communicate  with  the  Canadian  Ministry  of  Munitions  and
    Supplies.  This  we  passed  on  to  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  and  had  no
    further  dealings  in  any  uranium  products  since.

    Mr.  Waltek.  Wlien  was  this  statement  made,  Mr.  Russell  ?

    Mr.  EussELL.  It  was  made  on  June  28, 1948.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Russell,  according  to  this  testimony  by  Mr.
    Rosenberg,  export  license  covering  the  shipment  of  uranium  com-
    pounds to  the  Soviet  Government  was  granted  and  the  material  was
    shipped  to  Colonel  Kotikov  of  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission ;  is
    that  correct?

    Mr.  Russell.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  this  material,  or  the  uranium  compounds,
    actually  flown  to  the  Soviet  Union,  as  far  as  your  investigation  dis-
    closed ?

    Mr.  Russell.  The  staff  as  of  this  date  has  been  unable  to  locate
    the  actual  manifests  covering  the  uranium  shipments  to  Russia.  It
    was  reported  that  atomic  materials  were  sent  out  of  the  country  as
    ordinary  chemicals  and  that  it  would  be  a  difficult  if  not  fruitless  task
    to  attempt  to  identify  any  particular  manifest  covering  a  shipment
    of  atomic  material.  However,  oral  information  received  by  the  com-
    mittee reflects  that  the  uranium  compounds  were  flown  from  the  bases

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  905

    at  Great  Falls,  Mont.,  to  Fairbanks,  Alaska,  and  then  to  Russia.  The
    export  license  for  the  first  shipment  of  uranium  to  Russia  reflects
    that  the  ultimate  destination  of  the  atomic  material  was  to  be  Rasno-
    import,  Ul.  Kuibysheva,  Moscow,  U.  S.  S.  R.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  have  told  the  committee  about  your  investi-
    gation relating  to  the  action  of  the  broker  in  the  sale  of  this  uranium?

    Mr.  RussELii.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Drd  you  conduct  a  further  investigation  of  the
    sellers  of  the  uranium  ?

    Mr.  Russell.  Yes.  In  connection  with  the  second  shipment  an  in-
    vestigation was  made  and  it  was  determined  that  after  the  first  ship-
    ment was  made  from  the  United  States  the  Manhattan  Engineering
    District,  under  General  Groves,  cut  off  all  sources  of  supply  of
    uranium  material  in  the  United  States.  However,  the  source  from
    which  tlie  Russians  obtained  the  second  shipment  of  the  1,000  pounds
    of  uranium  compounds  was  a  Canadian  source.  The  principal  offi-
    cer of  this  company  was  investigated  by  the  committee.  However,  it
    developed  that  this  person  had  been  the  subject  of  a  criminal  investi-
    gation by  the  Canadian  Government  in  connection  with  the  sale  of
    uranium  and  radium  products.  The  criminal  case  was,  according  to
    our  investigation,  dropped  and  a  civil  suit  instituted  by  the  Canadian
    Government  in  New  York  City  against  the  individual  involved.  The
    records  of  the  civil  case  were  impounded  by  a  Federal  court  in  New
    York  City  after  a  settlement  of  more  than  $1,000,000  was  effected  by
    the  Canadian  Government.  Following  the  impounding  of  the  records,
    the  committee  issued  a  subpena  calling  for  the  production  of  these
    records  by  a  firm  of  attorneys  in  New  York  City.  After  this  subpena
    was  served,  the  American  State  Department  advised  through  a  letter
    addressed  to  the  committee  that  the  Canadian  Government  had  re-
    quested that  the  investigation  of  the  person  involved  in  the  second
    shipment  be  deferred  insofar  as  the  production  of  the  court  records
    were  concerned,  in  the  interest  of  the  national  security  of  Canada.
    Because  of  this  request  and  the  fact  that  the  subject  of  the  investi-
    gation was  at  the  time  in  Paris,  France,  the  staff  discontinued  its
    investigation,  but  the  investigation  has  now  been  reactivated  in  view
    of  the  fact  that  the  subject  has  returned  to  this  country.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  your  investigation  show  that  export  licenses
    covering  the  shipment  of  other  atomic  materials  to  Russia  were
    granted  ?

    Mr.  Russell.  Yes,  The  documents  that  the  committee  examined
    reflect  that  program  license  No.  339  for  the  shipment  of  heavy  water
    to  Soviet  Russia  was  granted.  The  amount  called  for  by  the  license
    was  1,000  grams  or  41  pounds,  valued  at  $3,250.  This  license  was
    granted  sometime  between  October  1  and  December  31,  1943.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  the  heavy  water  actually  shipped  to  Soviet
    Russia,  as  far  as  you  could  determine  ?

    Mr.  Russell.  The  staff  was  unable  to  locate  the  shipping  manifest
    applying  to  this  particular  license.

    Mr.  Ta\t.nner.  Was  there  any  peculiarity  surrounding  the  pur-
    chase orders  issued  by  the  Russian  Government  in  connection  with
    its  application  for  export  license  covering  uranium  oxide?

    Mr.  Russell.  Yes.  One  witness  interrogated  during  the  course  of
    the  investigation  said  that  on  the  invoice  submitted  to  lend-lease  for

    906  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    approval  by  the  Russians  there  would  be  a  list  of  perhaps  30  or  40
    different  nonessential  chemicals.  The  request  for  uranium  would  be
    placed  near  the  end  of  the  list.  This  witness  stated  he  surmised  the
    Kussians  submitted  the  invoices  in  this  manner  hoping  the  purchase
    order  would  be  approved  by  lend-lease  without  a  careful  check  being
    made  because  the  other  articles  set  forth  in  the  invoices  were  non-
    essential items.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  During  the  period  that  these  licenses  were  being
    requested,  and  in  some  cases  issued,  the  fact  that  the  United  States
    was  working  on  atomic  development  was  a  closely  guarded  secret,
    was  it  not  ?

    Mr.  Russell.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavexxer.  Therefore,  it  appears  that  the  Russians  knew  in
    February  1943  that  this  country  was  engaged  in  atomic  development,
    does  it  not  ?

    Mr.  Russell,  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  your  investigation  reflect  that  the  shipment
    of  uranium  compounds  to  the  Soviet  Union  was  approved  by  the
    Manhattan  Engineering  District?

    Mr.  Russell.  There  is  a  great  deal  of  controversy  concerning
    whether  the  Manhattan  Engineering  District  actually  approved  the
    shipment  of  uranium  material  to  Soviet  Russia.  However,  in  a  letter
    dated  November  18,  1946,  addressed  to  a  Government  official,  Gen.
    Leslie  Groves,  the  head  of  the  Manhattan  Engineering  District,  it  is
    stated :

    Early  in  1948  the  Russian  purchasing  commission  placed  an  order  with  a
    private  firm  in  this  country  for  220  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate  and  200  pounds
    of  uranium  oxide.  The  individual  who  arranged  this  purchase  for  the  Russian
    purchasing  commission  is  not  known.  I  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  material
    was  flown  to  Russia  in  a  lend-lease  plane.  When  the  Manhattan  Engineering
    District  became  cognizant  of  this  purchase  efforts  were  made  to  stop  the  ship-
    ment. These  efforts  were  discontinued  when  we  ascertained  that  the  transac-
    tion had  already  been  completely  arranged.  Shortly  after  this  incident  the
    Manhattan  Engineering  District  arranged  furchase  of  uranium  for  coloring  ceramics  was  prohibited.
    That  is,  no  glass-manufacturing  company  or  pottery-manufacturing
    company  could  purchase  uranium  to  color  pottery  with.

    Mr.  Ta'\t:nner.  When  did  that  restriction  become  effective?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  In  January  1943,

    Mr.  Tavexner.  In  what  way  was  Manhattan  Engineering  District
    concerned  with  the  purchase  of  uranium  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  It  bought  all  of  the  uranium  that  was  required  for
    the  Government  atomic-energy  project.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Through  the  influence  of  Manhattan  Engineering
    District,  w^ere  any  controls  set  up  other  than  the  one  you  mentioned
    I'cgarding  the  general  purchase  of  uranium  by  the  public  or  by  foreign
    countries?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Aside  from  the  limitation  on  the  purchase  of  uranium
    for  ceramic  use,  there  was  an  export  control  exercised  then  through
    the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare.  That  is,  an  export  license  would  be
    required  from  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  to  send  uranium  out
    of  the  country.

    Mr.  Tavexner.  What  other  Government  agencies,  if  any,  were  con-
    cerned with  either  the  sales  or  the  exporting  of  uranium,  besides  War
    Pi'oduction  Board,  Manhattan  Engineering  District,  and  Bureau  of
    Elconomic  Warfare  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAX.  None  that  I  can  recall.

    Mr.  Tavex^xer.  In  what  way  was  the  Lend-Lease  Administration
    concerned  in  the  problem  of  handling  uranium  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAx.  Only  to  the  extent  that  Lend-Lease  may  receive  orders
    irom  Allied  countries  for  transfer  of  uranium.  If  they  were  to  re-
    ceive a  request  from  any  of  the  Allied  countries — in  this  case,  of  course,
    it  was  from  U.  S.  S.  R. — it  w^ould  be  handled  in  Lend-Lease  as  any
    other  lend-lease  procurement  would  be  handled.  If  a  nation  requested
    through  Lend-Lease  uranium  procurement,  it  would  be  processed
    through  Lend-Lease.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  I  have  understood  that  the  Bureau  of  Economic
    Warfare  was  the  licensing  agency  for  the  right  to  export  uranium?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  think  that  is  correct ;  yes.  It  was  also  the  practice,
    however,  of  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare,  to  consult  with  other
    interested  agencies  in  the  event  they  had  some  item  which  was  of
    obvious  interest,  and  in  this  case,  as  I  recall  it,  the  Board  of  Economic
    Warfare  and  Lend-Lease  all  channeled  their  requests  for  information
    and  advice  to  the  War  Production  Board.  I  don't  believe  BEW  acted
    independently  in  all  cases,  but  I  can't  say  that  for  a  certainty.  I  don't
    know.

    Mr.  Ta\t3xner.  Are  you  sufficiently  acquainted  with  procedure  to
    state  whether  or  not  it  was  necessary  to  obtain  approval  from  Lend-
    Lease  if  it  was  a  cash  purchase  of  uranium  which  was  being  made,  and
    application  for  export  license  was  made  to  the  Bureau  of  Economic
    Warfare?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  wouldn't  know  that  at  all,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavexxer.  Even  in  the  case  where  it  was  necessary  to  consult
    Lend-Lease  because  of  the  materials  being  furnished  as  against  lend-

    if

    960  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    lease  quotas,  do  you  know  whether  or  not  it  still  required  that  the
    export  license  be  issued  by  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Warfare?

    Mr.  BuRMAx.  My  belief  is  that  it  would  require  it.

    Mr.  Taat:nxer.  jNIr.  Burman,  in  March  1943,  the  Soviet  Government
    Purchasing  Commission  apj^lied  for  export  licenses  to  export  uranium
    and  uranium  compounds  to  the  Soviet  Union.  Are  you  familiar  with
    details  concerning  the  sale  of  200  pounds  of  uranium  oxide  and  220
    pounds  of  uranium  nitrate  to  the  Soviet  Government  early  in  1943?

    JNIr.  Burman.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Tell  us  what  you  know  about  that  transaction.

    JNIr.  Bueman.  The  Manhattan  District  was  just  then  starting  to
    exercise  its  control  over  uranium  which  it  didn't  own  itself,  and  we
    were  suddenly  confronted  with  a  lend-lease  order  for  that  quantity
    of  material  which  had  been  processed,  we  understood,  through  lend-
    lease  channels,  and  a  potential  supplier  had  been  consulted  and  it  had
    been  determined  that  the  supply  was  immediately  available  for  delivery
    by  this  supplier.  I  believe  someone,  as  an  afterthought,  suddenly  de-
    cided to  consult  War  Production  Board  to  see  if  it  was  all  right,  it  not
    being  generally  known  that  uranium  was  anything  more  than  of  normal
    interest.  When  War  Production  Board  was  consulted,  they  sent  the
    information  on  to  us  at  Xew  York,  to  the  Manhattan  District,  and  it
    was  finally  decided,  after,  I  believe,  considerable  consultation,  that  the
    project  had  gone  so  far,  and  it  was  known  the  material  was  available
    at  this  company  in  Denver,  that  it  wovdcl  be  rather  pointing  a  finger
    at  the  matei'ial  if  the  license  was  refused  at  so  late  a  elate,  and  General
    Groves  then  authorized  the  issuance  of  the  license  through  his  own
    office,  and  the  material  was  quickly  shipped.

    Mr.  Ta\'enxer.  Manhattan  Engineering  District  first  acquired
    knowledge  of  that  transaction  through  the  War  Production  Board;  is
    that  what  I  understand  you  to  say?

    Mr.  BuR]\rAN.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  the  Bureau  of  Economic
    Warfare,  or  Lend-Lease  Administration,  at  that  time,  knew  that  there
    was  an  active  uranium  project  any  place  within  the  United  States
    Government  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  I  couldn't  say  at  all  as  regards  the  Board  of  Economic
    Warfare,  but  Lend-Lease  must  certainly  have  been  a  little  surprised  by
    the  sudden  importance  of  so  small  an  order  in  Government  circles.  It
    would  certainly  hint  broadly  that  the  material  had  more  than  ordinary
    value.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  there  anything  in  your  negotiations,  or  those  of
    any  other  official  of  jNIanhattan  Engineering  District,  with  Lend-Lease
    officials,  indicating  that  they  did  not  know  prior  to  that  time  that  this
    material  was  of  strategic  importance  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  There  was  nothing  to  indicate  that  they  knew  it  was
    of  any  special  importance,  to  the  best  of  my  memory,  and  I  believe
    that  that  is  the  case.

    Mr.  Tavenner,  After  you  learned  of  the  first  sale  of  uranium  prod-
    ucts to  the  Russian  Government,  do  you  recall  what  arrangements  were
    placed  in  effect  in  the  United  States  bv  the  Manhattan  Engineering
    Disti-ict  to  control  the  sale  of  uranium  products  to  the  Soviet  Govern-
    ment?

    Mr.  Burman.  Yes.  We  took  rather  strong  measures  after  that  to  be
    sure  that  we  had  material  where  we  could  put  our  hands  on  it.

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  961

    Mr.  Ta\'enner.  What  were  those  arrangements  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  For  one  thing,  we  arranged  with  a  contractor,  not
    using  the  Manhattan  District  name,  for  this  contractor  to  pnrchase
    all  he  could  of  stocks  of  uranium  in  the  hands  of  pottery  manufac-
    turers and  anywhere  else  where  it  might  be  subject  to  resale.  This
    contractor  bought  material  from  the  chemical  companies  and
    scrounged  around  in  industry  to  collect  odd  lots.

    Mr.  Taa^xner.  Who  was  that  contractor  ?

    ]\Ir.  BuRMAN.  Vitro  Manufacturing  Co.,  of  Pittsburgh.  Vitro  was
    the  prime  source  of  uranium  in  that  they  had  for  some  years  processed
    uranium  ores  from  the  Colorado  area.  We  entered  into  a  gentle-
    men's agreement  that  they  would  sell  no  uranium  except  to  Manhat-
    tan District,  and  they  were  under  contract  with  the  district  at  the
    same  time  for  a  variety  of  work.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  discover  at  any  time  in  the  future  that
    they  had  violated  that  gentlemen's  agreement  by  selling  uranium  to
    other  purchasers?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No.  So  far  as  we  know  they  never  did.  As  a  matter
    of  fact,  they  ceased  their  own  operations  at  that  time  with  uranium
    and  worked  exclusively  in  that  business  for  the  district.  The  Shat-
    tuck  Chemical  Co.,  in  Denver,  was  also  a  processor  of  uranium  ores,
    and,  representing  myself  as  War  Production  Board,  and  I  guess  Dr.
    Merritt  talked  to  Shattuck  as  well.  Mr.  Potter,  of  Shattuck,  agreed
    they  would  not  make  any  deliveries  of  uranium  anywhere  without
    the  permission  of  the  War  Production  Board,  ostensibly,  and  as  far
    as  we  know  Mr.  Potter  niade  no  shipments  that  were  not  approved
    in  advance  thereafter.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Could  you  legally  demand  that  no  sales  of  uranium
    be  made  by  Shattuck  at  that  time  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No,  we  could  not.  It  was  a  cooperative  measure  on
    their  part.  Mr.  Potter  had  his  inklings  as  to  the  potentialities  of
    uranium,  because  of  his  acquaintanceship  with  the  material  and  what
    he  had  read  earlier  in  the  press  in  the  pre-Manhattan  District  days.
    He  knew  of  the  potentialities  of  uranium  235,  and  he  agreed  not  to
    make  shipments  that  were  not  approved  in  advance.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  was  that  agreement  reached?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Immediately  after  the  200-  and  220-pound  shipments.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  the  matter  handled  with  Mr.  Potter  by  letter,
    by  telephone,  or  by  personal  interview  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Both  by  letter  and  telephone  to  start  with,  and
    followed  up  by  personal  visits  periodically  thereafter.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  am  not  certain  that  I  heard  the  date  when  that
    agreement  was  reached  with  Mr.  Potter  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  It  was  immediately  after  the  200-pound  and  the  220-
    pound  order  was  placed  with  Shattuck,  right  after  the  delivery  was
    made.  The  first  information  which  we  gave  to  Mr.  Potter  when  it  was
    decided  that  the  420-pound  shipment  would  go  forward,  was  to  tell
    Mr.  Potter  that  he  might  find  it  difficult  in  the  future  to  get  any
    export  licenses  for  other  shipments  of  uranium  out  of  the  country.
    We  had  also  talked  to  him  by  telephone  and  had  his  verbal  agreement
    not  to  do  anything  until  somebody  from  War  Production  Board
    stopped  to  see  him,  and  War  Production  Board  was  ourselves.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  am  trying  to  fix  more  definitely  the  time  when
    that  agreement  was  reached.

    99334—50 5

    962  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  can't  give  the  exact  date.  It  was  either  February
    or  March  1943.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Are  you  certain  that  it  was  prior  to  the  time  that
    the  matter  regarding  another  export  license  was  raised  by  Lend-
    Lease  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAX.  I  am  certain  that  it  was.

    Mr.  Taat:nner.  Did  the  Manhattan  Engineering  District  en-
    deavor to  interview  other  suppliers  of  uranium  and  warn  them  against
    shipping  out  of  the  United  States?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  We  had  a  contractual  arrangement  with  the  repre-
    sentatives of  the  Belgian  producers,  and  while  I  can't  say  definitely
    that  there  was  a  written  agreement  for  them  not  to  sell  elsewhere,  I
    feel  pretty  certain  that  some  agreement  did  exist.  The  Manhattan
    District  purchased,  in  early  1943  or  late  1942,  the  stock  of  material
    which  was  lying  in  the  warehouses  here  which  might  have  gone  to  the
    ceramic  trade,  since  the  Belgians  were  shipping  to  the  ceramic  trade
    in  those  days.

    Mr.  Tavexner.  What  was  the  name  of  the  Belgian  company?

    Mr.  Burmax.  In  1942  they  had  one  representative  known  as  the
    Central  Trading  Co.,  which  was  dissolved,  and  later  the  work  was
    taken  over  by  the  African  IMetals  Corp.

    Mr.  Tavexxer.  Then  I  understand  the  ^Manhattan  Engineering
    District  acquired  their  supply  in  the  United  States?

    Mr.  BuRMAX.  Their  warehouse  stock  of  ceramic-type  uranium
    compounds.     There  was  also  the  Canadian  source  of  material.

    Mr.  Tavexxer.  Before  we  come  to  that,  let  me  ask  you :  Can  you
    be  positive  that  the  Belgian  company  was  interviewed  regarding
    the  supplying  of  uranium  compounds  for  the  export  trade?

    Mr.  BuRMAX.  I  can  say  positively  because  I  am  certain  it  was  done,
    but  I  myself  did  not  do  it.

    Mr.  Tavexxer.  WTio  did  do  it,  in  your  opinion  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAx.  I  believe  Dr.  Merritt  can  give  you  the  full  details
    of  that.

    Mr.  TA^^:xxER.  You  were  about  to  mention  another  supplier.

    Mr.  BuRMAX.  The  Canadian  Eadium  &  Uranium  Corp.,  which  is
    a  United  States  company,  was  sales  representative  of  Eldorado  Min-
    ing &  Refining  Co.  The  Eldorado  Mining  &  Refining  Co.  is  the
    producer  of  uranium  at  Great  Bear  Lake.  In  the  same  manner  in
    which  we  had  purchased  these  other  miscellaneous  types  of  ceramic
    uranium,  we  had  made  a  contract  with  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium
    to  i)ick  up  their  warehouse  quantity  of  uranium  oxide  and  nitrate,
    and  so  forth,  and  the  contract  had  a  provision  in  it  whereby  the  district
    A\ould  have  first  call  for  the  period  of  a  year  against  any  other
    uranium  that  that  company  had  to  sell  of  the  same  types.

    Mr.  Tavexxer.  What  was  the  date  of  the  contract  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAX.  In  March  1943.  I  can't  tell  you  the  exact  date  in
    the  month,  but  I  am  sure  it  was  in  March  1943.

    jNIr.  Tavexxer.  Is  that  contract  accessible  to  you  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAX.  Yes.    It  is  in  the  Commission  files,  however.

    Mr.  Tavexxer.  Could  you  produce  it  for  the  committee?

    Mr.  BuRMAX.  I  don't  know  whether  I  am  able  to  do  so.  It  is  a
    classified  document.    It  is  still  classified  secret.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  963

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  would  like  to  ask  you  to  investigate  that  and
    see  if  it  can  be  declassified  and  turned  over  to  this  committee,  and
    advise  me  of  the  result  of  your  inquiry.

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes ;  I  will  do  so.

    Mr.  Tavekner.  I  would  like  for  you  first  to  identify  the  date  a,
    little  more  definitely  if  you  can.

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  know  it  is  in  March  1943,  and  to  hazard  a  guess  as
    to  the  date,  I  would  say  about  the  27th.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  contract  is  between  the  Manhattan  Engineering
    District  and  what  other  party  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner.  Who  were  the  ofhcials  of  that  corporation  at  that
    time?

    Mr.  BuRiviAN.  Mr.  Boris  Pregel  was  the  president  of  the  company.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  the  names  of  other  officials  of  the
    company  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Alexander  Pregel  was  vice  president.  Beyond  that,
    I  can't  recall  any  other  officers  of  the  company.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Had  that  company,  prior  to  March  1943,  furnished
    quantities  of  uranium  to  Manhattan  Engineering  District?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes.    We  bought  it  wherever  we  could  find  it.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  continue  in  your  purchases  from  that  cor-
    poration after  March  1943  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Well,  we  continued  to  have  relations  with  that  com-
    pany, but  they  were  reduced  from  time  to  time  in  their  scope  until
    they  practically  vanished.  I  can't  tell  you  over  what  period  of  time
    that  was.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  j^ou  confer  with  this  company,  the  Canadian
    Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.,  or  its  president,  Mr.  Boris  Pregel,  or  its
    vice  president,  Mr.  Alexander  Pregel,  regarding  the  shipment  of
    uranium  compounds  out  of  this  country  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No.  I  was  not  myself  in  direct  contact  with  Mr.
    Pregel.  I  believe  Dr.  Merritt  can  give  you  that  information,  because
    it  was  his  responsibility  to  deal  with  Mr.  Pregel.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  see.  I  was  asking  you  what  arrangement  or  ar-
    rangements were  made  to  stop  the  flow  of  uranium  to  foreign  coun-
    tries during  the  war  period,  and  you  told  me  about  those  two  arrange-
    ments, the  interviewing  of  Shattuck  Co.  and  other  suppliers.  Now,
    I  notice  on  the  export  license  of  this  shipment  from  the  Shattuck  Co.
    that  the  supplier  was  Chematar,  Inc.

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  interview  that  company?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No:  we  did  not.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Why  didn't  you  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  We  didn't  think  we  could  learn  anything  that  we
    didn't  already  know.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Well,  they  were  acting  certainly  as  an  agent  or
    as  a  broker  for  the  purchase  of  this  material.  It  seems  to  have  been
    of  importance  to  have  consulted  with  them  likewise.

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes.  The  Chematar  Co.  was  in  contact  with  War
    Production  Board  in  Washington,  the  branch  which  was  ostensibly  in
    control  of  uranium,  and  was  pressing  for  approval  of  the  license,  and

    964  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    we  did  receive  copies  of  the  correspondence  and  learn  the  information
    we  needed.    What  we  were  interested  in  most  was  where  it  was  going.

    Mr.  Tavenner,  Yes;  but  yon  were  not  protecting  the  outflow  by
    merely  learning  what  was  in  their  correspondence.  I  am  asking  what
    arrangements  were  made  to  stop  the  export  of  uranium.

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  In  the  case  of  the  420-pound  order  it  was  agreed  it
    should  be  permitted  to  go  forward.  We  had  the  material  blocked
    through  the  available  sources  of  supply,  we  thought.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  any  action  taken  by  Manhattan  Engineering
    District  with  other  Government  agencies  designed  to  control  the  ex-
    l^orting  to  a  foreign  country  of  uranium  compounds  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  We  did  have  a  Washington  office.  The  officer  in
    charge  of  that  office  was  in  contact  with  all  of  the  Washington  bureaus.
    I  can't  say  what  steps  he  took,  but  he  was  the  man  in  direct  contact
    w4th  Lend-Lease  and  presumably  with  BEW  when  any  cases  of  this
    sort  arose,  and  we  felt  that  so  far  as  raw  materials  went,  we  had  it
    stopped  at  the  source.

    Mr.  Ta-stenner.  Who  was  the  individual  in  the  Washington  office
    to  whom  you  refer  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Col.  A.  C.  Johnson.

    Mr.  Tavenner,  He  has  testified  before  this  committee,  has  he  not  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  believe  he  has.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Were  any  arrangements  made  with  any  Govern-
    ment agency  by  which  the  Manhattan  Engineering  District  was  to  be
    notified  in  the  event  of  the  filing  of  an  application  for  license  or  for
    approval  of  a  license  for  the  shipment  of  uranium  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  believe  Colonel  Johnson  had  such  an  arrangement.
    Where  the  word  "uranium"  would  pop  up  in  various  Government
    offices,  I  believe  there  was  a  tickler  in  the  case  to  notify  Johnson.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  say  you  believe  so.  That  is  rather  important.
    What  actual  knowledge  do  you  have  of  that  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  know  that  when  anybody  was  looking  for  uranium
    he  either  wound  up  in  Colonel  Johnson's  office  or  in  our  office  in  New
    York,  and  would  be  referred  there  by  the  War  Production  Board,  by
    field  offices,  or  by  the  other  agencies.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Are  you  familiar  with  the  details  surrounding  the
    issuance  of  another  export  license  for  500  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate
    and  500  pounds  of  uranium  oxide,  which  was  issued  to  the  Soviet
    Government  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  know  of  it  now.  I  was  not  aware  of  it  when  I  testi-
    fied earlier.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  did  not  know  at  the  time  that  such  a  license  had
    been  issued  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  No,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  know  at  the  time  that  an  application  had
    been  made  by  this  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  for  the  issuance  of
    such  a  license  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  No;  I  didn't.  I  had  known  of  at  least  one  earlier
    request  that  was  floating  around  Lend-Lease  for  Si/o  tons  of  material.
    I  know  that  was  turned  down.  I  did  not  know  of  the  request  for  a
    1,000-pound  license.

    Mr.  Ta\"enner.  Did  you  learn  during  the  course  of  your  employ-
    ment that  during  the  month  of  April  1943  a  plan  was  discussed  within
    Manhattan  Engineering  District  by  which  a  license  would  be  approved

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  965

    to  export  uranium,  with  the  idea  of  testing  out  the  So^det  Commission
    in  its  ability  to  locate  the  material  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  didn't  know  of  it  then,  but  I  have  heard  of  it  now  and
    have  seen  some  of  the  records.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  assume,  then,  from  your  answers,  that  you  had  no
    conference  with  any  official  of  Lend-Lease  or  the  Bureau  of  Economic
    Warfare  relating  to  that  particular  license  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  That  is  right.  I  may  add  at  this  point,  this  was  only
    a  part-time  job  which  took  about  5  percent  of  my  time,  and  that  we  were
    busy  on  many  other  production  problems.  This  job  had  only  been
    acquired  because  of  the  earlier  War  Production  Board  contracts.

    Mr.  TA^^NNER.  Regardless  of  the  fact  that  you  were  not  acquainted
    with  any  effort  to  obtain  the  issuance  of  this  particular  license  for  the
    500  pounds  of  uranium  oxide  and  500  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate,  were
    you  aware  of  any  pressure  being  brought  on  yourself  or  other  members
    of  the  staff  of  the  Manhattan  Engineering  District  by  officials  of  the
    Lend-Lease  Administration  or  officials  of  the  Bureau  of  Economic
    Warfare  to  issue  licenses  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No.  I  was  not  aware  of  any  such  pressure  at  any
    time.  The  only,  it  might  be  called  pressure,  was  a  series  of  telephone
    calls  in  relation  to  the  420-pound  order  from  the  War  Production
    Board  and  Lend-Lease,  and  Chematar  was  in  touch  with  War  Produc-
    tion Board  by  telephone  periodically,  and  War  Production  Board  in
    Washington  would  call  us  in  New  York  to  get  something  done.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  To  do  what  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  To  get  something  done.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  came  from  War  Production  Board  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  That  came  from  the  War  Production  Board  office
    which  was  theoretically  in  charge  of  uranium,  but  since  they  were
    sitting  in  the  middle  tliey  would  transfer  these  urgent  requests  from
    Chematar  or  Lend-Lease  to  us.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  State  more  fully  what  you  mean  by  saying  you
    were  urged  to  get  something  done.

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  To  get  a  decision  one  way  or  another,  because  this
    had  been  hanging  fire  for  a  considerable  time,  much  longer  than  ordi-
    nary. I  believe  they  were  about  to  issue  the  original  license  when  it
    was  held  up  because  they  were  trying  to  get  a  decision  out  of  Man-
    hattan District.

    Mr.  Nixon.  That  is  the  license  for  the  420  pounds  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Who  were  the  individuals  from  whom  telephone
    calls  were  received  from  Lend-Lease  and  any  of  the  other  Government
    agencies  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  I  don't  recall  specifically  talking  to  any  of  the  Lend-
    Lease  people  myself,  but  the  Chematar  people  had  been  in,  telephone
    contact  with  Mr.  Lund  and  Mr.  Parks  in  War  Production  Board,  and
    Mr.  Parks,  through  error,  I  believe,  gave  Mr.  Rosenberg  of  Chematar
    my  telephone  number  in  New  York.  The  Manhattan  District  as  such
    tried  to  stay  out  of  those  things,  it  was  not  to  be  known  that  Manhat-
    tan District  was  directly  involved,  so  that  I,  myself,  I  don't  believe
    talked  to  any  of  these  gentlemen.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  whether  that  occurred  at  some  time
    quite  a  few  months  later  than  the  transaction  we  are  talking  about?

    966  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    Mr.  BuEMAN.  No.    It  was  in  the  February  1943  period  in  relation

    to  tlie  420  pounds.

    INIr.  TA\T.]srNER.  "V\niat  was  the  nature  of  your  telephone  conversation
    with  Mr.  Rosenberg  or  Chematar?

    Mr,  BuRMAN.  I  didn't  actually  receive  that  telephone  call.  I  was
    away  and  another  officer,  as  I  recall,  talked  with  him  and  told  him  that
    was  a  mistake  of  some  sort,  that  he  had  Lieutenant  Burman's  tele-
    phone number  only  because  Burman  used  to  be  with  War  Production
    Board.  That  cut  off  short  any  idea  that  Lieutenant  Burman  of  New
    York  was  interested  in  uranium.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Who  was  the  person  who  took  the  call  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  I  believe  it  was  Colonel  Crenshaw.

    Mr.  Tavenxer.  1  was  asking  you  if  you  knew  the  names  of  officials
    in  the  various  Government  agencies  who  called  your  office  with  regard
    to  the  releasing  of  this  first  shipment.

    Mr.  Btjrman.  I  don't  recall  just  who  telephoned,  but  we  did  receive,
    through  War  Production  Board  in  Washington,  correspondence  from
    Lend-Lease  and  Chematar.  Chematar  correspondence  was  in  the
    name  of  Mr.  Rosenberg,  and  Lend-Lease  correspondence  in  the  name
    of  Mr.  Moore,  I  believe ;  that  is  the  only  name  I  can  recall ;  I  believe
    there  was  somebody  else  corresponding  on  the  subject.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  But  as  to  telephone  calls,  have  you  any  recollection?

    Mr.  Burman.  I  assure  it  was  the  same  gentlemen.  I  don't  know,
    since  I  didn't  talk  to  them.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  AVere  you  conscious,  at  any  time  after  this  first
    transaction  was  closed,  of  any  unusual  activity,  or  any  activity,  with
    regard  to  the  officials  of  other  agencies  in  urging  approval  of  ship-
    m.ents  of  uranium  to  any  allied  power  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  No,  sir;  none.

    Mr.  Case.  To  what  are  you  referring  when  you  refer  to  an  8^-ton
    request  that  was  turned  down  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  There  was  a  U.  S.  S.  R.  request  through  Lend-Lease
    channels  for  81/9  tons  of  uranium  material  which  was  processed  by
    Chemical  Warfare  Service.

    Mr.  Case.  When  was  that  request  made  ?

    Mr.  BuRMi\N.  Shortly  after  the  420-pound  shipment  and  prior  to  the
    date  of  the  1,000-pound  shipment.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  a  rather  complete  record  on
    that  transaction  which  will  be  introduced  later.

    Mr.  Case.  You  asked  if  he  knew  of  any  other  activity  and  he  said  he
    didn't  recall  any.

    Mr.  Burman!  I  am  sorry.  That  request  did  go  through  War  Pro-
    duction Board  channels,  and  that  was,  as  I  recall,  refused,  and  the
    information  was  passed  to  Lend-Lease  through  our  Washington  office.

    Mr.  Case.  And  who  turned  it  down  ?

    Mr.  Bukman.  I  assume  it  was  turned  down  by  General  Groves,  since
    Colonel   Johnson   was   immediately   on   General   Groves'   staff   and
    handled  such  matters.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not,  as  a  result  of  General
    Groves'  recommendation,  the  Secretary  of  War,  to  whom  the  matter
    had  in  the  meantime  been  referred,  made  the  final  decision  refusing  to
    release  the  shipment?

    Mr.  Burman.  I  just  don't  know,  sir.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  967

    Mr.  Tavenner.  In  the  course  of  your  employment  with  the  Man-
    hattan Engineering  District,  did  any  fact  or  circumstance  come  to  your
    knowledge  and  attention  which  indicated  that  any  pressure  was  being
    brought  to  bear  by  any  Government  official,  or  by  any  person  out  of
    the  Government,  on  your  staif  to  approve  the  shipment  of  uranium
    compounds  out  of  the  country?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  We  had  no  such  information  at  all,  sir.  We  know
    of  no  such  pressure.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  After  this  first  shipment  that  you  referred  to  from
    the  Shattuck  Co.,  were  any  other  shipments  made  of  uranium,  to  your
    knowledge?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Only  the  1,000-pound  shipment  which  we  later
    learned  of.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  did  you  first  learn  of  the  shipment  of  the
    thousand  pounds?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  We  had  heard  about  it  here  in  June  1948  and  went
    back  and  checked  more  fully  with  the  Canadian  authorities,  their
    records  on  the  case,  and  we  learned  that  a  Canadian  export  license
    was  actually  issued  and  that  the  material  was  shipped.

    Mr.  TA^^ENNER.  What  was  the  source  of  supply  of  the  corporation
    you  refer  to  as  the  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Their  source  of  supply  was  the  Canadian  Great  Bear
    Lake  mines.  Eldorado  Gold  Mine  Co.  was  the  company;  Eldorado
    Mining  &  Refining  Co.,  it  later  became.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  the  Eldorado  Gold  Mine  Co.  make  a  report  of
    any  character  that  you  are  familiar  with  that  would  show  the  ship-
    ment that  you  have  referred  to  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No.  That  is  a  company  which  is  entirely  in  Canada
    and  would  not  make  such  a  report.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  such  a  report  was
    made  by  the  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.  of  shipments  ema-
    nating from  Eldorado  mines  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  We  have  checked  our  files,  the  old  War  Production
    files,  and  can  say  that  there  is  no  report  by  Canadian  Radium  of  that
    shipment.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  At  least  you  did  not  know  of  it  at  the  time  you
    were  employed  by  Manhattan  Engineering  District?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  any  contact  made  with  Eldorado  Gold  Mines
    with  reference  to  supplying  material  to  governments  other  than  the
    United  States  and  Canada  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  don't  know.  I  believe  there  was,  but  Dr.  Merritt
    can  tell  you  that.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  AVhen  you  said  you  first  learned  here  that  the
    1,000-pouncl  shipment  had  been  made,  what  did  you  mean?

    Mr.  Burman.  We  just  had  no  information  on  it  in  the  New  York
    office  up  to  that  time.  All  of  the  activity  that  we  have  talked  over
    was  carried  on  out  of  New  York  for  the  Manhattan  District.  It
    wasn't  always  possible  to  Imow  what  the  Washington  office  was  think-
    ing or  doing.

    Mr.  Tavenner,  You  have  since  confirmed  the  fact  that  the  shipment
    was  actually  made  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  Yes,  sir.

    968  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  of  any  other  sales  of  uranium  to  the
    Soviet  Government,  other  tlian  the  two  which  we  have  mentioned?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes.  There  was  a  small  shipment  of  uranium  metal
    which  was  permitted  to  go  to  Russia  about  the  middle  of  1944.  At  the
    time  that  the  order  had  been  first  placed  for  the  420  pounds  of  uranium
    compounds,  the  same  order  carried  a  request  for  25  pounds  of  uranium
    metal.  I  understood  that  25  pounds  of  uranium  metal  were  also  au-
    thorized for  shipment,  but  as  far  as  we  knew  at  that  time  there  was
    no  uranium  metal  available  in  the  United  States  that  they  could
    lay  their  hands  on.  That  was  the  fact  of  the  matter.  But  the  order
    was  placed,  eventually,  with  A.  D.  McKay,  a  well-known  supply  house
    in  New  York  which  specializes  in  rare  minerals  and  metals.  McKay
    accepted  the  order  conditionally,  that  he  would  ship  it  if  he  could
    get  it  made  somewhere,  and  for  a  year  and  a  half  he  tried  to  have  it
    made.  It  is  rather  a  difficult  process  and  requires  specialized  equip-
    ment. In  all  of  his  efforts  to  have  it  made,  acting  as  a  representative
    of  the  War  Production  Board,  I  was  looking  over  his  shoulder  all
    the  time.  He  finally  did  succeed  in  having  about  4.5  pounds  of  rather
    poor  uranium  metal  made  by  a  laboratory  in  Cleveland.  We  had  a
    sample  of  the  uraniinn  metal  analyzed,  and  it  was  far  poorer  than  if
    they  had  taken  just  pure  uranium  oxide  to  start  with  and  not  tried  to
    make  the  metal.

    We  told  McKay  we  would  have  no  objection  to  his  shipping  a
    small  sample  of  this  metal  as  representative  of  what  was  available  in
    the  United  States,  and  he  actually  shipped  a  kilogram — that  is,  2.2
    pounds — against  the  25-pound  order.  The  rest  of  the  material  he
    kept  in  his  stock  and  sold  in  gi'am  quantities,  which  he  reported  to
    War  Production  Board  monthly,  to  universities  and  other  laboratories
    in  the  country.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  did  not  file  a
    repeat  order  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  That  was  the  last  we  heard  of  uranium  metal  from
    that  point.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Burman,  have  you  been  apprised  of  the  fact
    that  there  was  a  sale  of  45  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate  to  the  Soviet
    Government  in  June  1944?

    Mr.  Burman.  Xo,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  of  any  sales  of  heavy  water  to  the
    Soviet  Government  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  No.  Our  office  had  no  contact  with  heavy  water
    distribution ;  that  is,  my  own  office  did  not.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  office  would  have  been  consulted,  if  any  had
    been,  in  the  Manhattan  Engineering  District  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  General  Groves'  office.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Who,  in  particular,  in  that  office  would  have  received
    knowledge  of  such  a  request  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  Colonel  Johnson,  I  am  sure.

    Mr.  Ta^^nner.  Were  there  any  restrictions  imposed  upon  the  export
    of  heavy  water  by  the  Manhattan  Engineering  District  through  its
    connection  with  War  Production  Board  ?

    INIr.  Burman.  I  just  don't  know,  sir.  I  am  not  familiar  with  the
    manner  in  which  the  heavy-water  sales  were  handled.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Isn't  that  a  matter  which  would  have  normally
    come  under  your  supervision  had  it  occurred  ?

    T'v;.:

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC   MATERIAL  969

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No ;  it  wouldn't.  Our  office  was  essentially  a  uranium-
    procuring  and  processing  office  in  New  York.

    Mr.  Tavexner.  Can  you  tell  us  whether  there  is  any  difference
    between  uranium  metal  and  fused  uranium  metal?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes ;  there  is  some.  Most  of  the  early  uranium  metal
    appeared  in  the  form  of  powder,  and  when  the  powder  was  melted
    later  it  came  out  in  the  form  of  globules,  vrhich  was  known  as  the
    fused  metal.  It  was  easier  to  remelt  the  fused  globules  than  the
    powder.    The  powder  would  flash  into  flames  in  the  air.

    Mr.  Tavenner.    Do  you  have  any  knowledge  of  the  shipment  to  I''"

    Soviet  Russia  of  fused  uranium  metal  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.   I  believe  the  kilogram — that  is,  2.2  pounds — was  in  },  '

    the  form  of  fused  metal,  but  no  other  shipments,  however.  %,-

    JNIr.  Tavenxer.  I  have  no  further  questions,  Mr.  Chairman.  |^^>V

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Harrison  ?  '• '  ■

    Mr.  Harrison.  No  questions.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Mc Sweeney  ?

    Mr.  IMcSwEENEY.  No  questions.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Moulder?

    Mr.  Moulder.  No,  sir.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Nixon  ?

    Mr.  Nixon.  As  I  understand  it,  in  your  position  you  generally  had
    knowledge  of  requests  for  material  of  this  type,  the  420-pound  and
    1,000-pound  shipments.  Would  you  assume  in  your  position  you
    generally  would  be  informed  of  such  shipments?

    Mr.  BuRMAx\  The  420-pound  shipment  was  being  handled  through
    our  War  Production  Board  contacts,  and  I  would  know  of  that.

    Mr.  NixON.  Your  office  was  not*  a  clearinghouse  for  all  shipments,
    necessarily  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No.

    Mr.  NixoN.  You  came  into  the  420-pound  shipment  because  your
    office  was  informed  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN^.  No.  We  came  in  it  because  War  Production  Board
    was  questioned  about  the  advisability  of  shipping  it,  and  they  got
    in  touch  with  the  New  York  office.  t

    Mr.  NixoN.  Why  was  it  the  1,000-pound  shipment  was  not  handled
    in  the  same  way?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  It  had  never,  so  far  as  we  knew,  gone  through  War  ;.'

    Production  Board  channels  or  ourselves  in  New  York.

    Mr.  NixON.  It  had  gone  through  private  channels  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No.  I  beileve  it  may  have  gone  directly  from  Lend-
    Lease  to  General  Groves'  office,  and  that  the  War  Production  Board
    was  not  consulted.

    Mr.  Nixon.  You  said  you  learned  of  this  shipment  for  the  first  time
    when?    I  am  referring  to  the  1,000-pound  shipment.

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  June  1948.

    ]\Ir.  Nixon.  At  that  time  what  was  your  position  ?

    ISIr.  BuRMAN.  I  was  with  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission.

    Mr.  Nixon.  The  Atomic  Energy  Commission  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Nixon.  You  don't  mean  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  did
    not  learn  about  it  until  then;  do  you?  Was  this  their  first  knowledge
    of  this  1,000-pound  shipment?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes,  sir.

    !'■'..■

    970  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Nixon.  They  had  not  known  of  it  before  then  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Were  you  surprised  to  learn  of  it  then  ?

    Mr.  BuEMAN.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Nixon.  You  were  surprised?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Why  ?

    Mr.  BrRMAN.  Because  we  never  suspected  the  shipment  had  taken
    place.  We  thought  we  would  have  known  had  it  taken  place,  and  we
    thought  we  had  the  Canadian  supply  shut  off  back  in  1943.

    Mr.  Nixon.  In  other  words,  if  this  shipment  had  gone  through
    your  office  you  would  have  disapproved  it ;  would  you  not,  apparently^
    from  what  you  said  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  myself  would  have  disapproved  it;  but  in  a  case
    of  tliat  sort  it  still  would  have  been  referred  to  General  Groves'  office.

    Mr.  Nixon.  But,  as  you  understood  the  policy,  the  policy  after  the
    420-pound  shipment  was  to  shut  off  all  available  sources  of  supply  so
    that  additional  shipments  could  not  be  made  ?

    Mr.  BuEMAN.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Nixon.  What  agencies  in  the  United  States,  if  any,  did  have
    the  responsibility  for  clearing  the  1,000-pound  shipment?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  believe  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  issuing  the
    license,  would  have  the  final  responsibility.

    Mr.  Nixon.  The  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  did  issue  a  license?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  You  can  testify  to  that  of  your  own  knowledge  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Who  in  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  handled  the
    matter;  do  you  know?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  do  not  know.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Was  any  memorandum  or  other  order  issued,  for  in-
    stance to  BEW,  that  Manhattan  Engineering  District  should  be  in-
    formed of  such  shij)ments?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  believe  Colonel  Johnson's  office  did  have  that  under-
    standing with  BEW.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Yet  BEW  apparently  cleared  the  shipment  without  con-
    sulting Colonel  Johnson's  office?

    Mr.  BuRMAX.  No.  It  was  our  understanding  it  was  approved  by
    Colonel  Johnson's  office  with  approval  by  General  Groves;  that  Gen-
    eral Groves  did  approve  the  license  for  shipment  of  1,000  pounds  with
    the  belief  that  we  did  have  all  the  sources  of  supply  cut  off.

    Mr.  Nixon.  When  did  you  first  find  out  about  the  1,000-pound  ship-
    ment, from  what  source?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  From  right  here.

    Mr.  Nixon.  From  the  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Nixon.  One  other  question.  You  are  an  expert,  of  course,  and
    most  of  us  are  laymen.  As  far  as  the  use  of  uranium  for  commercial
    purposes  other  than  for  the  manufacture  of  atomic  energy  and  atomic
    products,  do  I  understand  that  420  pounds  would  be  considered  to  be
    a  large  order  or  a  small  order  ?     In  what  category  would  you  place  it?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  It  would  not  be  large  enough  to  excite  any  attention.
    The  consumption  of  uranium  in  1942  for  nonatomic  purposes  in  the

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  971

    United  States  was  between  150  and  200  tons  for  the  year,  so  that  420
    pounds  woukl  be  rather  small.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Has  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  established  whether
    the  Soviet  Union,  prior  to  1943,  obtained  shipments  of  that  size  or  less
    than  that  size  from  the  United  States,  prior  to  the  time  the  orders
    were  issued  not  to  approve  such  shipments?

    Mr.  BuEMAN.  It  would  be  very  unlikely  that  they  would  get  it  from
    the  United  States,  since  the  United  States  was  not  a  producer  of  the
    material.  The  material  was  more  readily  available  from  Belgium
    a;id  Canada.

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  would  seem  to  me,  that  in  the  investigation  the
    Atomic  Energy  Commission  has  been  making,  that  would  be  a  rele-
    vant point :  how  large  the  orders  were  in  the  past.  I  believe  you  have
    indicated  you  were  interested  in  knowing  whether  the  Soviet  Union
    at  that  time  was  as  far  along  in  the  development  of  the  atomic  bomb
    as  we  were  ?

    Mr.  BuRiNiAN.  We  did  ask  for  records  of  sales  of  domestic  com-
    panies for  a  number  of  years  prior  to  1943.
    Mr.  Nixon.  What  did  you  find  out  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  There  was  no  evidence  of  any  purchases  in  the  United
    States.

    Mr.  Nixon.  There  was  no  evidence  of  purchases  prior  to  1943  in  the
    United  States?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Nixon.  So  it  would  seem  to  me  this  sudden  interest  in  the  pur-
    chase of  uranium  would  have  some  definite  significance  ?
    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes ;  it  would.

    Mr.  Nixon.  This  turning  down  of  the  Si/o-ton  order,  who  did  the
    turning  down  ?     General  Groves  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  believe  General  Groves'  office.
    Mr.  Nixon.  Did  your  office  have  anytliing  to  do  with  that?
    Mr.  BmjMAN.  I  believe  we  referred  it  to  General  Groves'  office,  hav-
    ing received  information  on  it  through  the  trade  and  through  the  War
    Production  Board.
    Mr.  Nixon.  Through  the  trade  ?
    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  That  they  wanted  8I/2  tons?
    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  And  you  proceeded  to  forward  that  information  to  Gen-
    eral Groves'  office  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Who  was  attempting  to  obtain  this  for  the  Soviet  Union,
    the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes.  I  believe  it  was  through  Lend-Lease.  There
    was  no  private  company  handling  it.

    Mr.  Nixon.  The  American  agency  seeking  to  expedite  the  shipment
    was  Lend-Lease?
    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Did  BEW  have  anything  to  do  with  that?
    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  don't  believe  so.
    Mr.  Nixon.  With  expediting?
    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No.
    Mr.  Nixon.  I  understand  it  was  8i/^  long  tons  ?

    972  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  don't  know  if  it  was  Syo  long  or  short  tons.  It  was
    of  one  of  the  uranium  compounds,  not  of  metal.

    Mr.  Nixon.  What  contacts  were  made  with  your  office  by  Lend-
    Lease  to  get  clearance  for  the  Si/^-ton  shipment ;  do  you  recall  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  believe  they  went  to  the  Chemical  Warfare  procure-
    ment office,  and  either  the  New  York  or  Pittsburgh  office  of  Chemical
    Warfare  procurement  got  in  touch  with  Vitro  and  also  managed  to
    find  INIanhattan  District,  but  we  gave  them  no  information.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Eight  and  one-half  tons  would  be  a  significant  amount
    to  purchase?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes ;  it  would  be.

    Mr.  Nixon.  But  you  indicate  that  you  don't  know  of  any  particular
    individuals  who  were  contacting  you  in  regard  to  that  shipment?

    Mr.  BuR3iAN.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Nixon.  That  is  all.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Case.

    Mr.  Case.  Initially  did  General  Groves  approve  tliat  420-pound
    shipment  quickly,  or  did  he  make  aii}^  efforts  to  stop  it?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  can't  answer  that,  sir,  because  I  don't  know  the
    period  of  time  before  the  decision  was  made.  There  were  so  many
    other  things  that  we  were  doing  that  this  was  really  not  of  great
    importance.

    Mr.  Case.  But  it  was  your  understanding  that  the  decision  to  let
    it  go  was  made  on  the  basis  that  things  had  gone  so  far  that  to  stop
    it  would  direct  attention  to  its  importance  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Case.  And  then  it  was  that  you  took  steps  to  prevent  anything
    like  that  happening  again  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Case.  And  as  far  as  you  were  concerned,  you  said  you  took  steps
    that  you  thought  would  result  in  future  requests  turning  up  in  your
    office  or  Colonel  Johnson's  office  ?

    Mr.  Burma N.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  anybody  turn  up  in  your  office  who  was  making
    requests,  subsequently  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  can't  quite  recall  any  particular  cases  that  were
    turned  up  by  name.  We  did  have  requests  for  the  export  of  uranium
    metal  to  a  number  of  countries.

    Mr.  Case.  To  a  number  of  countries  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes.  I  think  Great  Britain  wanted  a  small  amount
    for  laboratory  work  which  was  outside  of  their  own  atomic  energy
    efforts;  that  is,  they  were  private  companies  wanting  uranium  metals
    for  what  they  said  was  chemical  analysis.  Those  may  have  been
    requests  that  they  had  received  from  elsewhere.  They  may  have
    been  feelers  from  elsewhere.

    Mr.  Case.  What  happened  to  those  requests  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Any  information  of  that  sort  we  did  receive  was
    passed  along  to  the  Washington  office,  and  if  they  thought  it  was  worth
    while  I  am  sure  they  turned  it  over  to  Intelligence.

    Mr.  Case.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  an}-  shipments  were  made
    to  Great  Britain  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  believe  there  was  a  very  small  shipment  in  1944  or
    1945  out  of  this  McKay  quantity.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC   MATERIAL  973

    Mr.  Case.  That  was  this  four  and  a  fraction  pounds?

    Mr.  BuKMAN.  Yes ;  of  which  2.2  pounds  went  to  Russui.

    Mr.  Nixon.  From  press  accounts  I  understand  that  this  quantity
    of  uranium  metal  sent  to  Russia  was  defective,  and  that  it  was  sent
    for  that  reason?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Did  you  deliberately  send  it  to  Great  Britain  for  the

    same  reason  ?  t  i   ,     i  •   i

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  It  was  for  commercial  purposes.  We  didn  t  think
    it  was  much  good  and  didn't  care  where  McKay  sold  it.  It  repre-
    sented a  poor  stock  of  material,  and  if  that  was  available  without  too
    much  trouble  it  avoided  attention  being  directed  to  the  material.

    Mr.  Case.  Were  there  any  other  shipments  to  Great  Britain  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  don't  think  so.

    Mr.  Case.  You  spoke  of  requests  from  other  countries.  What  other
    countries?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  don't  recall.     They  were  all  for  trivial  quantities.

    Mv.  Case.  Did  any  other  requests  come  to  your  attention  from  the
    Soviet  Purchasing  Commission?

    Mr.  Burman.  I  don't  recall  any.  There  were  certainly  none  for
    uranium  metal  after  the  kilogram  shipment.

    Mr.  Case.  Was  this  request  for  uranium  metal  renewed  at  any  later
    date?

    Mr.  Burman.  Not  to  my  knowledge.

    Mr.  Case.  Not  to  your  knowledge  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  No,  sir.

    Mr.  Case.  There  may  have  been  but  not  that  you  know  of?

    Mr.  Burman.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Case.  In  your  steps  to  prevent  any  further  shipments  outside
    the  United  States  following  your  knowledge  of  this  42U-pound  order,
    did  you  make  any  efforts  to  control  shipments  through  Lend-Lease?

    Mr.  Burman.  I  feel  pretty  certain  that  Colonel  Johnson's  office
    had  a  contact  in  Lend-Lease  who  would  bring  to  his  attention  anything
    on  uranium  that  would  come  through  that  office.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  you  contact  the  BEW  to  put  them  on  guard  in  any
    way?

    Mr.  Burman.  I  am  sure  Colonel  Johnson's  office  did  the  same  there.

    Mr.  Case.  Do  you  know  whether  Lend-Lease  supported  the  8%-
    ton  request?

    Mr.  Burman.  I  don't  know  whether  they  supported  it,  but  they
    circulated  the  request  for  it.     The  degree  of  their  action  I  can't  say.

    Mr.  Case.  Isn't  is  strange  Lend-Lease  would  circulate  this  request
    if  they  had  been  put  on  guard  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  They  might  just  as  well  have  circulated  the  request
    and  taken  whatever  action  with  Colonel  Johnson's  office  they  had
    agreed  to  take.  Refusing  to  circulate  it  would  have  aroused  the  sus-
    picion of  the  Russian  Purchasing  Commission.

    Mr.  Case.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  Lend-Lease  sought  to  secure
    the  approval  of  the  Chemical  Warfare  Service?

    Mr.  Burman.  I  believe  Chemical  Warfare  Service  was  handling
    the  requisition  as  a  service  for  Lend-Lease.  I  don't  believe  they  had
    any  interest  other  than  that.

    y74  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    Mr.  Case.  Did  I  understand  you  to  say  that  this  shipment  of  1,000
    pounds  subsequently,  which  you  didn't  know  about  until  June  1948,
    did  have  the  approval  of  the  Manhattan  District  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes.     General  Groves  approved  that.

    Mr.  Case.  And  you  testified  that  he  approved  it  because  he  thought
    the  sources  of  supply  had  been  shut  off  and  that  the  order  could  not
    be  filled?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  That  is  my  understanding.

    Mr.  Case.  But  you  were  not  personally  connected  with  that
    shipment  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  was  not  in  on  the  decision.

    Mr.  Case.  You  were,  however,  in  touch  with  the  sources  of  supply  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  you  yourself  think  you  had  all  sources  of  supply
    shut  off?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes,  we  did.  With  regard  to  Canadian  Radium  &
    Uranium  Corp.,  I  was  not  the  direct  contact  there.  Dr.  Merrittt  was
    in  touch  with  Mr.  Pregel  of  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium.

    Mr.  Wood.  Any  further  questions  ?

    Mr.  Case.  Are  you  personally  familiar  with  approval  for  that
    second  shipment  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No,  sir.

    Mr.  Case.  What  makes  you  think  General  Groves  approved  it  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  General  Groves  has  testified  to  that  effect  and  we
    have  reviewed  the  correspondence  in  our  old  Manhattan  District  files
    and  found  some  that  indicated  it.

    Mr.  Case.  But  all  that  you  have  said  with  regard  to  the  approval
    of  this  second  shipment  is  second-hand  information  so  far  as  you  are
    concerned  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Kearney  ?

    Mr.  Kearney.  No  questions.

    Mr.  Moulder.  I  would  like  to  ask  a  question.

    Mr.  Wood.  IVIr.  IMoulder.

    Mr.  MoTTLDER.  Was  there  any  secret  formula  by  which  uranium
    metal  was  manufactured,  or  was  it  generally  known  throughout  the
    world  how  to  make  it  at  that  time  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  There  were  a  number  of  processes  that  were  known
    but  Manhattan  District,  I  don't  believe,  has  ever  disclosed  the  method
    used  by  the  district  and  now  by  the  Commission.
    •  Mr.  Moulder.  It  was  then  a  secret  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  The  process  used  by  the  district  was  not  disclosed.
    We  considered  that  secret  information.

    IVIr.  Moulder.  Was  it  known  in  other  countries  how  to  make  uranium
    metal,  not  by  that  process  but  by  other  processes  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes.

    Mr.  Moulder.  It  had  many  other  uses  other  than  the  development
    of  atomic  energy  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Uranium  metal  had  very  few  uses.  It  was  consid-
    ered as  a  means  for  alloying  steel,  but  there  were  much  more  effective
    metals  for  alloying  steel  than  uranium,  which  has  approximately  the
    same  qualities  as  nickel  when  used  for  that  purpose.

    Mr.  Moulder.  You  mentioned  private  companies  in  England  using
    it  for  commercial  purposes  ?

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  975

    Mr.  Btjrman.  Small  quantities  were  used  for  experimental  purposes.

    Mr.  Moulder.  Didn't  you  mention  that  approximately  150  tons  a
    year  were  consumed  in  this  country  for  coimnercial  purposes?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  That  was  not  in  the  form  of  uranium  metal.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  referred  to  General  Groves  as  having  agreed
    to  the  shipment  of  1,000  pounds,  and  you  referred  to  his  having  testi-
    fied to  that  effect.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  what  General  Groves  testified
    was  that  he  agreed  eventually  that  the  license  be  issued  in  order  to
    ascertain  whether  or  not  the  Kussians  could  locate  a  supply  in  the
    United  States.     Do  you  recall  that?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes,

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  records  further  show  that  after  the  issuance  of
    the  license  the  Russian  Purchasing  Commission  advised  Lend-Lease
    that  due  to  the  great  delay  in  the  issuance  of  the  license  their  sup-
    plier had  withdrawn  the  offer.     Do  you  recall  that  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  believe  that  was  Shattuck  Chemical  Co.,  with  whom
    they  had  placed  the  order  at  first.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes.

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  And  you  have  refreshed  my  recollection  on  that  a  bit.
    They  did  withdraw  it  on  the  ground  their  offer  had  not  been  picked  up.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  the  evidence  further  shows  that  when  that
    report  was  made  to  General  Wesson,  of  Lend-Lease,  he  significantly
    smiled  when  it  was  stated  that  the  supplier  could  not  furnish  the
    material.     Do  you  recall  that  testimony?

    ]Mr,  BuRMAN.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  General  Groves  further  testified  that  he  knew
    nothing  about  the  shipment  from  Eldorado  mines  until  he  appeared
    before  this  committee  in  1948,  just  as  you  have  testified.  Wliat  basis
    do  you  have  for  stating  that  General  Groves  agreed  to  the  shipment  by
    Eldorado  mines?

    Mr.  BuRiMAN.  If  I  implied  that,  it  was  not  intended.  He  author-
    ized the  export  license,  but  I  don't  know  that  anyone  ever  authorized
    the  actual  shipment  of  the  material  through  Canadian  Radium  &
    Uranium.

    Mr.  Nixon.  If  he  had  authorized  the  shipment,  the  Atomic  Energy
    Commission  would  not  have  had  to  wait  until  June  1948  to  learn  of  it  2

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  That  is  true.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  agreement  which  you  referred  to  as  having
    been  executed  between  Manhattan  Engineering  District  and  the  Cana-
    dian Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.  provided,  as  I  understood  you  to  say,
    that  no  shipments  would  be  made  by  that  corporation  within  a  year,
    or  just  w^iat  was  that  agreement?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  According  to  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  Manhattan
    District  would  have  first  option  to  purchase  any  material  other  than
    that  covered  in  the  contract  in  the  event  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium
    had  any.

    Mr.  Wood.  The  committee  will  stand  in  recess  until  2  o'clock.

    (Thereupon,  at  12 :  20  p.  m.,  a  recess  was  taken  until  2  p.  m.  of  the
    same  day.)

    afternoon  session

    (The  hearing  was  resumed  at  2 :45  p.  m.)
    Mr.  Wood.  The  committee  will  be  in  order.

    976  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    For  the  time  being  the  record  will  disclose  that  the  hearing  is  pro-
    ceeding before  a  subcommittee  composed  of  Mr.  Walter,  Mr.  Harrison^
    Mr.  Velde,  and  the  chairman.

    Mr.  Tavenxer.  Mr.  Burman,  will  you  resume  the  stand,  please?

    TESTIMONY  OF  LAWRENCE  C.  BUEMAN— Resumed

    Mr.  Burman,  when  recess  was  taken  I  was  asking  you  a  question
    relating  to  this  alleged  contract  between  Manhattan  Engineering
    District  and  Canadian  Kadium  &  Uranium  Corp.

    Mr.  Burman.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  am  not  going  to  ask  you  to  attempt  to  rely  on  your
    memory  regarding  the  exact  terms  of  that  agreement  because  we  are
    expecting  to  have  it  produced.

    Mr.  BurmajST.  I  understand  it  will  be  ready  about  3 :  30  this  after-
    noon.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  3  :  30  this  afternoon  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Assuming  that  this  agreement  does  provide,  as  you
    indicated  it  may,  that  an  option  was  given  to  Manhattan  Engineering
    District  to  purchase  uranium  which  may  be  available  for  other  pur-
    chasers, were  you  notified  at  any  time  that  other  purchasers  had  re-
    quested uranium  from  this  company  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  Yes ;  I  believe  the  records  do  show  that  we  were  asked
    to  comment  on  an  order  for  8  or  8I/2  tons  of  uranium  nitrate  and  an
    equal  quantity  of  uranium  chloride.  We  were  asked  to  make  sugges-
    tions to  Canadian  Radium  in  response  to  an  inquiry  they  received  for
    export  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.

    Mr.  Ta^tenner.  Did  that  inquiry  come  to  Manhattan  Engineering
    District  by  letter  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  I  don't  recall  whether  it  came  by  letter  or  verbally.
    Our  records  show  that  we  replied  by  letter.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  have  a  copy  of  that  letter  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  I  don't  have  a  copy  of  it,  but  I  have  a  telephone  tran-
    scription of  it  which  we  received  during  the  noon  hour  today.  Mr»
    Merritt  has  it,  if  I  could  get  it  from  him.

    Mr.  Wood.  You  mean  it  was  read  over  the  telephone?

    Mr.  Burman.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  receive  the  telephone  conmiunication  your-
    self, or  Mr.  Merritt  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  Mr.  Merritt  received  it  and  read  it  off  and  I  copied  it
    at  the  same  time.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  think  since  we  are  on  this  subject  it  would  be  well
    for  you  to  get  it  at  this  time.

    Mr.  Burman.  Very  well.  [After  producing  paper :]  Do  you  want
    to  hear  it  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes.

    Mr.  Burman.  The  letter  was  dated  February  19,  1943,  and  was
    addressed  to  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.,  at  630  Fifth  Avenue,
    New  York:

    We  understand  that  you  have  had  a  call  from  Captain  Fliegel  of  Chemical
    Warfare  Service,  292  Madison  Avenue,  New  York,  in  regard  to  a  request  for
    8  long  tons  of  uranium  nitrate  and  8  long  tons  of  uranium  chloride.  In.
    answer  to  this  inquiry  please  state  that  none  is  available  except  in  experimental
    quantities.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  977

    Under  no  circumstances  is  any  information  to  be  given  to  any  such  inquiry
    to  the  effect  tliat  this  ofiiee  is  interested.  It  is  suggested  that  your  Canadian
    office  be  advised  to  refuse  information  as  to  any  inquiries.

    Mr.  Wood.  By  whom  is  it  signed  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  By  Colonel  Crenshaw.

    Mr.  TA^^NNER.  Will  you  produce  the  office  copy  or  a  photostat  of
    the  office  copy  and  deliver  it  to  the  senior  investigator  of  this  com-
    mittee?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes ;  I  think  we  can  do  that.

    Mr.  Ta\-enner.  Did  you  receive  any  other  report  or  inquiry  from
    Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.  or  Eldorado  Mines  regarding
    uranium  which  you  were  entitled  to  receive  under  the  option  which
    you  stated  existed  in  the  contract?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  I  don't  know  of  any  other.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  have  shown  you  what  purports  to  be  an  excerpt
    from  a  report  made  of  uranium  sales  by  Eldorado  Mines  during  the
    year  1943.

    Mr.  Burman.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Taa^nner.  Have  you  made  a  search  of  the  files  maintained
    by  Manhattan  Engineering  District  to  determine  whether  or  not  such
    a  report  is  in  your  files?

    Mr.  Burman.  Yes;  I  have  just  recently  made  a  search  for  that  par-
    ticular document,  and  we  haven't  been  able  to  find  it  in  the  Man-
    hattan District  files  or  the  War  Production  part  of  the  Manhattan
    District  files.

    Mr.  TA^^5XNER.  Is  there  a  possibility  that  a  record  of  that  report
    may  be  in  the  files  of  the  War  Production  Board  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  Yes ;  there  may  be,  but  if  it  did  get  to  War  Produc-
    tion Board  in  Washington  a  copy  would  have  been  sent  to  us  in  New
    York  by  our  contact  in  War  Production  Board.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  believe  that  is  all  I  am  going  to  ask,  Mr.  Chair-
    man.

    Mr.  Wood.  Any  questions  ?

    Mr.  Harrison.  I  understand  that  after  you  had  written  that  letter
    to  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.,  without  further  report  to  you,
    this  corporation  did  sell  uranium  to  Russia?

    Mr.  BuR^tAN.  That  is  our  understanding;  yes.

    Mr.  Harrison.  Without  your  knowledge.  You  didn't  have  any
    knowledge  of  it  until  1948?'

    Mr.  Burman.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Harrison.  That  is  all.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Velde?

    Mr.  Velde.  No  questions.

    Mr.  Wood.  I  think,  Mr.  Counsel,  in  the  light  of  the  persistence  of
    these  bells  [bells  indicating  either  quorum  calls  or  calls  for  roll-call
    vote  on  floor  of  House]  this  afternoon,  we  had  better  give  up  the  icl^ea
    of  continuing  further  with  this  hearing,  and  meet  a  little  earlier  in
    the  morning.  Let's  see  if  we  can't  get  here  at  10  o'clock  tomorrow
    morning,  until  which  time  the  committee  stands  adjourned.

    (Thereupon,  at  2:  55  p.  m.  on  Monday,  January  23,  1950,  an  ad-
    journment was  taken  until  Tuesday,  January  24,  1950,  at  10  a.  m.)

    99384 — 50-

    HEAEINCtS  EEGAEDrnG  SHIPMENT  OF  ATOMIC  MATEEIAL
    TO  THE  SOVIET  UNION  DUEING  WOELD  WAE  II

    TUESDAY,  JANUARY  24,   1950

    United  States  House  of  Representatives,

    Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,

    Washington^  D.  C.

    PUBLIC  HEARINGS

    MORNING   SESSION

    The  committee  met,  pursuant  to  adjournment,  at  10 :30  a.  m.,  in  room
    226,  Old  House  Office  Building,  Hon.  John  S.  Wood  (chairman)  pre-
    siding.

    Committee  members  present :  Representatives  John  S.  Wood,  Rich-
    ard M.  Nixon,  Francis  Case,  Harold  H.  Velde,  and  Bernard  W.
    Kearney.

    Staff  members  present:  Frank  S.  Tavenner,  Jr.,  counsel;  Louis  J.
    Russell,  senior  investigator ;  Donald  T.  Appell  and  Courtney  Owens,
    investigators;  John  W.  Carrington,  clerk;  Benjamin  Mandel,  di-
    rector of  research ;  and  A.  S.  Poore,  editor.

    Mr.  Wood.  The  committee  will  be  in  order.

    Let  the  record  show  that  there  are  present  Mr.  Nixon,  Mr.  Case,
    Mr.  Velde,  Mr.  Kearney,  and  Mr.  Wood,  a  quorum.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  call  as  the  first  wit-
    ness Dr.  Phillip  L.  Merritt.

    Mr.  Wood.  Dr.  Merritt,  will  you  raise  your  right  hand  and  be  sworn.
    Do  you  solemnly  swear  the  evidence  you  give  the  committee  shall  be
    the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ?

    Dr.  Merriti.  I  do.

    TESTIMONY  OF  DE.  PHILLIP  L.  MERRITT

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Dr.  Merritt,  will  you  please  state  your  full  name?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Phillip  L.  Merritt.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  and  where  were  you  born  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  was  born  in  Duluth,  Minn.,  February  8,  1906.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  is  your  present  occupation  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  am  assistant  manager  of  the  Raw  Materials  Opera-
    tions Office  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  please  furnish  the  committee  with  a
    resume  of  your  previous  employment?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  graduated  from  the  University  of  Minnesota  in
    1928.  I  then  spent  about  a  year  and  a  half  in  Africa  as  a  geologist.
    I  returned  to  the  United  States  in  1929,  went  to  Columbia  University,

    970

    980  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    where  I  studied  geology,  and  obtained  a  doctor's  degree  in  goology
    in  1933.

    I  tlien  went  to  Colombia,  South  America,  for  2  years  as  a  geologist
    for  the  Colombian  Government.  I  returned  to  the  United  States  in
    1936  and  took  up  employment  with  the  American  Cyanamid  Co.

    Mr.  Wood.  Will  you  speak  a  little  louder  ?     I  didn't  hear  the  last.

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  was  with  the  American  Cyanamid  Co.  from  1936
    until  1942,  when  I  was  commissioned  as  a  captain  in  the  Army  and
    was  assigned  to  the  Manhattan  project.  I  stayed  with  the  Manhattan
    project  until  January  1947,  when  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  took
    over  the  project,  and  I  am  now  with  the  Commission.

    Mr.  Velde.  When  were  you  first  assigned  to  the  Manhattan  project?

    Dr.  Merritt.  October  26,  1942.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  While  you  were  employed  by  the  Manhattan  En-
    gineering District,  what  were  your  specific  duties?

    Dr.  ]\1erritt.  I  was  involved  in  the  procurement  of  raw  materials
    for  the  Manhattan  District,  principally  uranium.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Were  inquiries  from  various  Government  agencies
    regarding  uranium  cleared  through  your  office,  or  j^our  hands?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Not  necessarily.  Most  of  them  were  cleared  through
    the  Washington  office,  through  Colonel  Johnson's  off.ce,  although  we
    did  obtain  knowledge  of  them  from  time  to  time.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  questions  were  presented  by  other  Govern-
    ment agencies  relating  to  the  licensing,  for  instance,  of  uranium  for
    export,  were  you  requii-ed  to  give  consideration  and  make  recommenda-
    tions with  regard  to  such  matters?

    Dr.  jSIerritt.  I  think  that  Mr.  Burman  had  more  close  contact  with
    the  actual  licensing.  I  was  in  the  same  office  and  oftentimes  was
    involved  in  the  matter,  although  that  was  not  a  principal  duty  of  mine.

    Mv.  Tavenner.  Were  j^ou  well  acquainted  with  what  transpired  with
    regard  to  the  negotiations  pertaining  to  the  licensing  of  uranium  for
    export  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Fairly  well  acquainted;  yes.

    Mr.  Taat.nner.  Did  you  hear  the  testimony  yesterday  of  Mr.  Law-
    rence C.  Burman  outlining  the  required  procedure  for  the  purchase
    of  uranium  compounds  during  the  war  period  for  export?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes;  I  did.

    Mr.  TAAa:NNER.  Can  you  give  us  any  additional  light  on  the  general
    procedural  requirements  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  believe  so.  I  believe  Mr.  Burman  covered  the
    subject  very  thoroughly.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  the  Chemical  Warfare  Service  of  the  United
    States  Army  authorized  to  make  uranium  compounds  available  to  the
    Russian  Purchasing  Commission?

    Dr.  Merritt.  There  was  one  instance  where  they  were  apparently
    assigned  the  job  of  procurement,  probably  by  Lencl-Lease.  I  believe
    the  procurement  involved  8  tons  of  uranium  oxide  and  8  tons  of  nitrate.
    I  think  that  was  it;  I  am  not  quite  certain.  They  did  contact  our
    office  to  see  if  it  was  available,  and  they  were  told  that  we  were  not
    directly  involved  in  the  subject  of  uranium ;  we  had  been  dabbling  in
    it,  in  the  alloy  materials,  but  knew  nothing  of  it.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  was  done  for  security  reasons  ?

    Dr.  Merritt,  For  security  reasons,  yes.

    Mr.  Wood.  Just  who  was  it  took  that  matter  up  with  you  ?

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  981

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  recall  two  ofRcers  in  New  York.  I  believe  Captain
    Fliegel  was  one,  and  I  believe  there  was  a  Captain  Clark.  I  believe
    1  spoke  to  one  of  them  on  the  phone  once.  I  believe  Colonel  Crenshaw
    carried  on  most  of  the  negotiations  with  them.  The  statement  I  made
    about  dabbling  in  uranium  was  one  I  believe  Colonel  Crenshaw  made
    to  one  of  the  ofRcers.

    Mr.  Wood.  What  agency  did  they  represent?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Chemical  Warfare  Service.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Of  the  United  States  Army?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Of  the  United  States  Army,  yes.

    Mr.  Taa^nner.  Just  what  was  the  procedure,  from  the  standpoint  of
    the  Chemical  Warfare  Service,  as  far  as  you  know,  in  the  handling  of
    Russian  requests  for  uranium?

    Dr.  IMerkitt.  Apparently  they  were  assigned  this  job,  I  suppose,  by
    Dend-Lease,  and  various  officers  attempted  to  secure  the  material  for
    Lend-Lease.  We  had  reports,  I  believe,  from  the  Cleveland  office.
    They  had  contacted  one  of  our  officers  there  and  attempted  to  buy  the
    material.  He  contacted  us  directly.  And  I  believe  there  were  reports
    they  contacted  someone  in  Pittsburgh.  They  were  just  trying  to  buy
    it  on  behalf  of  Lend-Lease.  I  don't  believe  they  realized  the  signifi-
    cance of  the  material.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  the  Treasury  Department  of  the  United  States
    Government  authorized  to  make  uranium  or  uranium  compounds
    available  to  the  Russian  Purchasing  Commission  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Not  that  I  know  of.  We  had  a  report  yesterday  of
    45  pounds  being  sold  to  Treasury  by  Eastman  Kodak  as  a  commercial
    transaction.  We  have  the  record  on  that  in  the  War  Production  Board
    files  in  New  York.    It  was  reported  only  as  a  commercial  transaction.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  that  reported  as  a  transaction  after  the  trans-
    :action  had  been  consummated?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.  It  was  reported  in  a  report  of  July  28  by  East-
    man Kodak.  I  believe  the  transaction  took  place  in  June  1944.  They
    were  required  to  make  a  quarterly  report.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Did  I  understand  you  to  say  you  had  a  report  yesterday  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  conhrmed  it  yesterday,  or,  rather,  this  morning.
    We  understood  yesterday  from  the  testimony  that  there  were  45
    pounds  shipped.

    Mr,  Nixon.  You  didn't  know  it  before  that  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  did  not  know  it  was  shipped  to  the  Russians,  no.

    Mr.  Nixon.  In  other  words,  you  learned  it  for  the  first  time  in  these
    hearings  yesterday  ?

    Dr.  INIerritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  That  45  pounds  had  been  shipped  in  this  manner  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tav-enner.  I  believe  after  I  asked  the  question  yesterday  you
    liad  the  records  of  your  office  searched  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  you  found  in  the  course  of  that  search  that
    there  had  been  a  domestic  sale  to  the  Treasury  Department?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  In  the  case  of  a  domestic  sale  of  that  type,  was  it
    the  procedure  that  you  be  consulted  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  It  was  not  required  under  the  regulations  for  a  sale  of
    that  type  to  be  asked  about  in  advance.

    982  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You,  of  course,  as  I  understand,  have  no  knowledge
    of  what  was  later  done  with  that  shipment  to  the  Treasury  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  have  no  knowledge  whatever.

    Mr.  Wood.  Do  the  records  of  your  office  reflect  what  happened  to  it  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  They  reflect  that  it  was  shipped  by  Eastman  Kodak
    to  Treasury  Procurement,  and  that  is  all.

    Mr.  Wood.  That  is  as  far  as  your  records  go  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  as  far  as  our  records  go.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Dr.  Merritt,  you,  of  course,  know  that  in  March
    1943  the  Soviet  Government  Purchasing  Commission  in  the  United
    States  succeeded  in  purchasing  200  pounds  of  uranium  oxide  and  220
    pounds  of  uranium  nitrate,  which  material  was  shipped  from  Great
    Falls,  Mont.,  to  Moscow  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  How  did  Manhattan  Engineering  District  first  ac-
    quire knowledge  of  this  proposed  sale  and  shipment  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Through  the  records  of  the  War  Production  Board.
    As  I  recall,  the  War  Production  Board  was  notified  of  this,  and  they
    immediately  notified  us  of  the  proposed  shipment.

    Mr.  Wood.  Before  it  was  made  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  There  has  been  considerable  testimony  relating  to
    the  procedure  followed  in  that  original  shipment,  and  I  will  not  ques-
    tion you  further  relating  to  those  details,  because  they  have  been
    covered  pretty  fully.  But  I  would  like  to  ask  you  this :  Wliat  officials
    of  the  War  Production  Board,  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Warfare,  or
    Lend-Lease  conferred  with  you  or  members  of  the  staff  of  the  Manhat-
    tan Engineering  District  with  regard  to  the  clearance  of  that  ship-
    ment ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Mr.  Lund  and  Mr.  Parks  of  the  War  Production
    Board,  I  believe,  were  aware  of  this;  I  believe  we  conferred  with
    tliem.  I  believe,  in  lend-lease,  Mr.  Moore  and  Mr.  Hoopes.  And  no-
    one,  as  far  as  I  know,  in  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Warfare.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  was  the  attitude  of  those  who  conferred  with
    you  or  your  staff  regarding  the  propriety  of  making  this  shipment,
    which  is  the  first  shipment — the  material  obtained  from  the  Shattuck
    Co.?

    Dr.  IVIerritt.  I  believe,  so  far  as  the  Manhattan  District  staff  was
    concerned,  they  were  opposed  to  it,  but  the  arrangements  seemed  to
    have  progressed  so  far  that  it  would  have  been  inadvisable  to  stop  it
    at  that  point.  We  would  have  been  giving  away  more  than  we  would
    have  been  saving  to  stop  it  at  that  time,  so  it  was  decided  by  General
    Groves,  I  believe,  to  let  the  shipment  go.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  My  question  was  more  about  the  attitude  of  those
    dealing  with  the  Manhattan  Engineering  District,  rather  than  of  the
    staff  itself.

    Dr.  INIerritt.  There  was  a  great  deal  of  persistence  in  trying  to  get
    a  decision  on  it,  I  know  that — many,  many  phone  calls.  Whether  they
    actually  favored  the  shipment  or  not  I  couldn't  say,  but  there  were  a
    lot  of  phone  calls  in  connection  with  it — a  persistence  of  phone  calls  to
    get  a  decision.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  say  a  persistence  in  getting  a  decision  ?

    Dr.  ]\Ierritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  there  an  effort  made  to  influence  that  decision?

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  983

    Dr.  Merritt.  That,  I  couldn't  say.  I  had  very  little  contact  with
    the  officials  involved.  Most  of  that  contact  was  carried  on  by  Colonel
    Crenshaw  or  Colonel  Johnson.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  at  that  time,  which
    was  in  March  1943,  tlie  War  Production  Board  and  Lend-Lease  Ad-
    ministration knew  that  a  uranium  project  was  being  conducted  by  the
    Manhattan  Engineering  District?

    Dr.  Mekritt.  War  Production  Board,  of  course,  was  aware  of  it ;  at
    least,  Mr.  Lund  and  Mr.  Parks  were  aware  of  it.  Whether  or  not  the
    Lend-Lease  people  were  aware  of  it,  I  can't  say.  I  believe  they  were
    aware  of  it  at  a  later  date,  but  whether  they  were  aware  of  it  then,  I
    don't  know.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  measures  were  taken  by  Manhattan  Engineer-
    ing District  to  control  the  distribution  of  uranium  products,  or  their
    sale,  after  the  approval  of  this  first  shipment,  which  was  the  Shattuck
    shipment  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  After  the  initial  War  Production  Board  regulations
    went  into  effect  in  January,  we  then  began  a  program  of  purchasing
    all  available  uranium  from  chemical  supply  houses,  ceramics  pro-
    ducers, and  other  people  who  had  stocks  for  legitimate  reasons.  We
    carried  the  program  out  largelj^  through  contractors,  in  order  to  keep
    the  Manhattan  District  name  out  of  the  transactions.

    We  made  a  contract  with  Vitro  Manufacturing  Co.,  of  Pittsburgh,
    Pa.,  which  at  that  time  was  a  small  producer  of  uranium  and  a  con-
    sumer of  uranium,  to  purchase  odd  lots  of  the  material  from  various
    people  for  resale  to  us.  We  made  a  contract  with  Harshaw  Chemical
    Co.  to  buy  what  stocks  they  had.  They  were  involved  in  the  project
    and  we  made  a  direct  contract  with  them.  We  made  a  contract  with
    the  African  Metals  Corp.  to  buy  what  stocks  they  had.  We  never  made
    a  contract  with  Shattuck,  but  w^e  had  an  agreement  with  them  that
    they  would  not  sell  to  foreign  people  or  other  people  without  our
    knowledge.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  was  that  agreement  reached  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  After  the  shipment.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  After  they  had  made  their  first  shipment  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.  They  were  a  very  small  supplier,  really.  Then
    we  made  a  contract  with  Boris  Pregel  as  agent  for  the  Canadian
    Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  will  ask  you  some  questions  about  that  later.  Who
    else  did  you  confer  with?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  recall  any  other  companies.  Those  are  the
    principal  companies,  I  believe.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Chematar,  Inc.,  is  shown  by  the  record  to  have  been
    the  supplier  of  some  of  this  material,  acting,  probably,  as  agent —
    unquestionably  acting  as  agent — for  others.  Did  you  endeavor  to
    make  any  arrangement  with  them  by  which  they  would  not  engage
    in  sales  to  foreign  countries?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No  ;  we  did  not.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  spoke  of  a  contract  with  Boris  Pregel.  Aside
    from  the  contract,  did  you  confer  with  him  or  any  other  representative
    of  the  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.  to  ask  their  cooperation  in
    not  selling  to  any  other  country  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  sent  them  a  letter  which  was  reported  here  yester-
    day.   I  do  not  recall  any  specific  conference  with  them.    Many  other

    984  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    people  talked  to  them  besides  me.  I  presume  we  assumed,  with  the
    contract,  that  should  be  sufficient  to  protect  ourselves.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  letter  to  which  you  referred  I  believe  bore  a
    ■date  in  February  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  February  19.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  So  that  was  done  prior  to  the  occasion  of  the  sale
    by  the  Shattuck  Co.  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  With  regard  to  the  contract  that  you  mentioned,  we
    endeavored  yesterday  to  obtain  a  copy  of  that  contract.  We  under-
    stand that  it  has  the  rating  of  "secret,"  and  we  were  unable  to  get  the
    contract,  but  our  agent  was  permitted  to  copy  certain  things  from
    the  contract.  He  has  copied  the  first  page  of  the  contract,  the  caption
    of  the  contract,  and  an  article  dealing  with  the  phase  of  the  matter  that
    we  are  concerned  with.  I  hand  you  this  extract  from  the  contract  and
    ask  you  to  look  it  over  and  state  whether  or  not  you  can  identify  it  as
    an  excerpt  from  the  contract.  I  will  have  to  prove  the  accuracy  of
    it  later.

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.  I  can  identify  it  as  an  excerpt  from  the  con-
    tract.

    Mr.  TA^^ENNER.  Did  you  take  part  in  the  preparation  of  the  con-
    tract, and  were  you  familiar  at  the  time  with  the  character  of  it?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes;  I  did.

    Mr.  Ta\'enner.  Will  you  read  it,  please?

    Dr.  Merritt  (reading)  :

    This  Contract  entered  into  this  27tli  day  of  March  1943,  by  the  United  States
    OF  America  (hereinafter  called  the  "Government"),  represented  by  the  Contract-
    ing Officer  executing  this  contract,  and  Boris  Pregel,  Agent,  of  the  City  of  New
    York,  in  the  State  of  New  York  (hereinafter  called  the  Contractor),  witnesseth
    that  the  parties  hereto  do  mutually  agree  as  follows :

    Article  I — Scope  of  this  Contract. — The  Contractor  shall  furnish  and  deliver
    immediately  f.  o.  b.  New  York,  New  York,  at  such  point  or  points  as  designated
    by  the  Contracting  Officer,  in  suitable  containers  furnished  by  the  Contractor,
    approximate  quantities  of  materials  at  their  respective  prices,  as  follows :

    Per  unit

    1.  (a)  2,875  Units  of  P56 $3,895

    (b)  2,300  Units  of  M21 3. 10

    (c)  2,000  Units  of  L33 4.10

    2.  In  addition  to  the  materials  contracted  for  in  section  (1)  above  mentioned,
    the  Contractor  gives  to  the  Government  for  a  period  of  one  (1)  year,  from  the
    date  hereof,  the  initial  right  to  purchase  from  time  to  time  any  or  all  of  the
    P56,  M21,  and  L33  received  by  the  Contractor.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  It  is  noted  on  the  face  of  the  contract  that  there  is
    an  undisclosed  principal,  and  it  is  noted  that  certain  terms  were  used
    which  I  assume  were  code  terms  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  explain  the  reason  for  that?

    Dr.  Merritt.  It  was  our  practice  to  code  all  contracts  so  that  people
    who  handled  the  contract  for  payment  purposes,  and  anyone  else  who
    might  come  in  contact  with  the  contract,  would  not  be  aware  that  the
    materials  were  actually  uranium  that  we  were  dealing  in.  It  was  a
    general  practice  to  code  all  contracts.  The  code  was  then  explained
    in  a  separate  letter  which  was  made  a  part  of  the  contract.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  will  ask  you  to  state  whether  or  not  one  of  the
    code  numbers  indicated  covered  uranium  oxide,  black  uranium  oxide,
    and  uranium  nitrate?

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  985

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes;  P56  was  explained  in  the  secret  letter  as  being
    black  uranium  oxide,  L33  was  explained  as  being  uranium  nitrate,
    and  M21  was  sodium  uranate.

    Mr.  TA^^NNER.  Will  you  explain  why  there  is  an  undisclosed  prin-
    cipal involved  in  this  contract  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  The  principal  involved  in  the  contract  was  Canadian
    Radium  &  Uranium  Co.,  a  company  which  had  been  involved  in  and
    was  identified  witli  the  sale  of  uranium.  For  security  reasons  the
    company  was  not  disclosed  in  the  contract  because  it  possibly  would
    have  disclosed  what  the  contents  of  the  contract  were.  The  secret
    letter  which  accompanied  the  contract  was  addressed  to  Boris
    Pregel,  agent,  and  to  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Co.  The  secret
    letter  disclosed  what  a  unit  meant;  it  disclosed  what  the  symbols
    meant ;  also  it  disclosed  that  the  principal  in  the  contract  was  Canadian
    Radium  &  Uranium  Co.,  and  that  Boris  Pregel  personally  was  not
    held  liable.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  the  secret  letter  also  contain  a  provision  that
    the  corporation  was  liable  for  all  acts  of  its  agents  under  the  terms
    of  this  contract  ?

    Dr.  INIerritt.  As  I  recall,  it  did ;  yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Has  a  search  been  made  for  a  copy  of  that  secret
    letter  since  this  matter  first  arose  yesterday  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  have  the  letter  in  New  York.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  letter  is  in  New  York  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  produce  a  photostatic  copy  of  it  and
    make  it  available  to  the  senior  investigator  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  date  of  that  contract  is  March  what  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  March  27,  1943.

    Mr,  Tavenner.  Mr.  Chairman,  at  this  time  I  would  like  to  inter-
    rupt the  testimony  of  this  witness  and  call  to  the  stand  Mr.  C.  E.
    McKillips,  an  investigator  of  the  committee.

    Mr.  Wood.  Very  well.

    (Witness  Merritt  temporarily  excused.)

    Mr.  Wood.  Do  you  solemnly  swear  the  testimony  you  give  the  com-
    mittee shall  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,
    so  help  you  God  ?

    Mr.  McKillips.  I  do.

    TESTIMONY  OF  CHARLES  EDWARD  McKILLIPS

    Mr.  Tavenner.  State  your  full  name?

    Mr.  McKillips.  Charles  Edward  McKillips.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  are  an  investigator  of  the  Committee  on  Un-
    American  Activities  ?

    Mr.  McKillips.  I  am.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  yesterday  copy  from  the  contract  of  March
    27,  1943,  the  excerpt  which  I  now  hand  you  ?

    Mr.  McKillips.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Is  that  a  true  and  correct  copy  of  what  purports  to
    be  an  excerpt  ?

    Mr.  McKillips.  That  is  a  true  and  correct  copy.

    986  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Wlio  signed  the  agi^eement  ?  Who  were  the  parties
    to  the  sijznatiire  ?

    Mr.  McKiLLiPS.  A  J.  C.  Marsliall,  colonel,  Corps  of  Engineers,
    contracting  officer.  One  of  the  witnesses  was  Alexander  Pregel,  and
    another  witness  was  H.  B.  Kearney.

    Mr.  Tavexxer.  I  desire  to  offer  this  excerpt  in  evidence,  and  request
    that  it  be  marked  "McKillips  Exhibit  1."

    ]\Ir.  Wood.  Without  objection,  it  will  be  admitted.

    Mr.  Kearney.  ISIr.  Chairman.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Kearney.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  legal  procedure  here.  I  don't
    know  how  a  piece  of  paper  like  this  could  be  accepted  in  evidence  in  a
    court  of  law.

    Mr.  Wood.  The  contents  of  the  paper,  as  I  understand,  are  being
    tendered  as  being  a  correct  transcript  of  an  original  document  in  the
    possession  of  the  agency  representee!  by  the  witness  Merritt,  and  with
    the  identification  that  has  been  made  of  it,  I  think  it  is  proper  for
    admission,  although  if  a  question  is  raised  about  it,  we  can  go  in  execu-
    tive session.  Do  you  make  an  objection,  or  did  you  make  that  as  an
    observation  ?

    Mr.  Kearney.  T  make  it  as  an  observation,  and  for  the  present  I
    will  withhold  an  objection.

    Mr.  Wood.  Very  well.     It  will  be  admitted.

    (The  excerpt  nhoxe  referred  to,  marked  "McKillips  Exhibit  1,"  is
    hereinafter  incorporated  in  the  record.)^

    Mr.  Ta\-enner.  That  is  all,  Mr.  McKillips.

    TESTIMONY  OF  DR.  PHILLIP  L.  MERRITT— Eesumed

    Mr.  Tavenner.  AVlien  was  the  first  shipment  made  to  Manhattan
    Engineering  District  under  this  contract?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Our  records  indicate  that  the  first  receipt  was  May
    20,  1943.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  that  the  quantity  provided  for  in  the  original
    terms  of  the  contract?

    Dr.  Merritt.  There  may  have  been  a  slight  variation  of  50  pounds
    here  or  there  on  some  of  the  substances.  The  quantities  are  approxi-
    mate, as  you  notice,  and  I  think  there  was  a  slight  variation  in  the
    weights.

    Mr.  Ta\t.nner.  Evidence  has  been  introduced  before  the  commit-
    tee that  the  JNIanhattan  Engineering  District  acquired  quantities  of
    uranium  from  the  Canadian  corporation  prior  to  the  entering  into
    of  this  contract.

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  last  paragra]>h  of  the  excerpt  from  the  con-
    tract, McKillips  exhibit  1,  reads  as  follows :

    The  Contractor  gives  to  the  Government  for  a  jieriod  of  one  year,  from  the  date
    hereof,  the  initial  right  to  purchase  from  tim4  to  time,  any  or  all  of  the  P-56,
    M-21,  and  L-So,  received  by  the  Contractor.

    Was  Manhattan  Engineering  District  afforded  an  opportunity  to
    exercise  its  initial  right  under  this  contract  to  purchase  all  the  ura-
    nium received  by  the  contractor?

    °  See  appendix.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  987

    Dr.  Merritt.  Apparently  it  was  not,  although  there  were  delivered
    on  June  4,  1,900  pounds  of  sodium  uranate  under  the  option.  That
    additional  quantity  was  delivered  2  weeks  after  the  initial  delivery.

    Mr.  Tavp:nner.  It  is  noted  Eldorado  mines  is  not  a  party  to  this
    I  contract  ?

    Dr.  Merkitt.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  TA^^':NNER.  It  is  also  noted  that  the  contract  refers  to  the
    'material  which  the  contractor  receives?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Ta-vt^tstner.  Do  you  know  what  the  relationship  was  between
    the  contractor,  that  is,  the  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.,  and
    Eldorado  mines  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  At  that  time,  as  I  understand  it,  Canadian  Radium
    ■  &  Uranium  Corp.  was  the  sole  sale  agent  for  Eldorado  mines.  That
    is  my  understanding.

    Mr.  TA^^:NNER.  Do  you  recall  whether  or  not  the  Manhattan  Engi-
    neering District  was  advised  at  any  time  that  this  material  was  avail-
    •able  if  it  desired  to  purchase  it?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  do  not  recall  being  so  advised,  and  I  found  nothing
    in  the  records  that  would  so  indicate.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  I  say  "this"  material,  I  am  referring  to  the
    material  which  was  actually  sold  to  the  Russian  purchasing  com-
    mission.

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.  I  found  nothing  in  the  records  which  would
    indicate  so,  and  I  have  no  personal  recollection  of  its  having  been
    offered.

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner.  Did  the  Manhattan  Engineering  District,  to  your
    "knowledge,  waive  its  right  to  purchase  any  or  all  materials  which
    may  come  into  the  hands  of  the  contractor,  which,  of  course,  is  the
    Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Insofar  as  I  know  that  right  was  never  waived.  There
    is  nothing  to  indicate  so  in  the  records  that  I  can  find,  and  I  don't
    recall  anything.

    Mr.  Taat^nner.  You  have  learned  during  the  course  of  these  hear-
    ings that  the  uranium  which  was  sold  by  Eldorado  mines  to  the  Soviet
    Purchasing  Commission  was  sold  through  the  Canadian  Radium  &
    Uranium  Corp.?

    Dr.  Merritt.  So  I  understand,  yes.  At  least,  it  was  carried  on
    their  books.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  it  the  practice  of  Eldorado  mines  to  make
    annual  reports  to  the  jSIanhattan  Engineering  District  or  the  War
    Production  Board  showing  the  sales  of  uranium  made  during  the
    q^receding  year?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Not  the  Eldorado  mines.  Eldorado  mines  is  a  foreign
    company  and  there  was  no  requirement  that  they  report  to  us  as
    Eldorado  mines.

    Mr.  Tamsnner.  Did  the  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.  make
    such  report  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  believe  that  we  have  a  record  of  some  earlier  trans-
    actions prior  to  1943.  We  received  them  for  information  purposes,
    "to  find  out  who  were  utilizing  uranium.  I  believe  at  a  later  date  some
    records  of  sales  were  given.    I  am  not  thoroughly  familiar  with  that.

    Mr.  Ta^^nner.  You  are  not  positive  whether  such  a  record  was
    filed  for  the  year  1943  ?

    988  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  understand  it  was  not  filed  for  1943.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Or,  at  least,  the  report  has  not  been  located  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  At  least  it  has  not  been  located,  yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  It  is  anticipated  that  evidence  will  be  introduced
    showing  that  the  purchase  price  of  the  products  purchased  by  the
    Russian  Purchasing  Commission  from  Eldorado  mines  was  as  fol-
    lows: Uranium  nitrate,  $2.36  a  pound;  black  uranium  oxide,  $2.55
    a  pound.

    How  do  those  prices  compare  with  the  contract  price  provided  for
    similar  products  in  McKillips  exhibit  1?

    Dr.  IMerritt.  They  are  slightly  in  excess,  although  not  a  great  deal
    higher.  These  prices  are  about  the  commercial  prices  at  that  time.
    Our  prices  were  less  than  the  commercial  prices.  These  are  about
    the  commercial  prices,  I  would  say,  at  that  time.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Then  there  was  no  excessive  profit  by  reason  of  the
    sale  as  it  was  handled  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No,  not  a  great  deal.

    ]Mr.  Tavenner.  Over  what  you  would  have  paid?

    Dr.  Merritt.  A  little  bit.  I  would  say  these  were  50  or  40  cents  a
    pound  higher  than  we  would  have  paid,  in  that  order,  but  nothing
    exorbitant.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Dr.  Merritt,  are  you  familiar  with  the  details  sur-
    rounding the  issuance  of  the  second  export  license,  that  is,  the  license
    for  500  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate  and  500  pounds  of  uranium  oxide,
    which  was  issued  in  April  1943  to  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  am  not  familiar  with  all  the  details  on  the  actual
    issuance  of  the  license.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Let  me  ask  you  this :  The  files  of  Lend-Lease  Ad-
    ministration reflect  that  on  April  14,  1943,  a  letter  was  written  by  Mr.
    William  C.  Moore,  of  the  Lend-Lease  Administration,  to  Mr.  N.  S.
    Fomichev,  in  charge  of  chemicals.  Government  Purchasing  Commis-
    sion of  the  Soviet  Union,  advising  him  that  his  application  for  the
    issuance  of  an  export  license  to  export  500  pounds  each  of  uranium
    nitrate  and  uranium  oxide  had  been  denied.  However,  the  files  also
    indicate  that  export  license  1643180  was  subsequently  issued  to  tha
    Soviet  commission  on  April  26,  1943.  Can  you  explain  why  the  li-
    cense which  was  denied  by  Lend-Lease  on  April  14  was  subsequently
    issued  ?

    Dr.  Merritt,  I  don't  know  if  I  have  a  good  explanation  of  it.  I  can
    surmise,  if  you  care  for  me  to  do  that.     I  really  don't  know.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  don't  want  surmises  about  it,  but  can  you  give  us
    any  facts  relating  to  the  matter  which  the  committee  could  use  for  its
    information?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  believe  that  after  the  date  of  the  original  letter  by
    Mr.  Moore  we  had  a  very  finn  commitment  from  Shattuck,  who  had
    this  order  before  it  at  the  time,  that  they  would  not  deliA''er  under  it.
    This  order  was  placed  with  Shattuck,  I  believe,  early  in  April — I  am
    not  quite  certain  of  the  date — and  sometime  in  the  latter  part  of  April
    Mr.  Potter  told  me  that  they  would  not  deliver  under  this  order.
    Whether  that  had  anything  to  do  with  the  change,  I  don't  know.
    We  then  were  quite  certain  we  had  every  source  blocked  up.  It  may
    have  been  that  we  felt  it  all  right  to  give  them  the  license  because-
    we  thought  we  had  every  source  blocked  up.     I  don't  know.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  989

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  were  negotiations  conducted  between  the
    Manhattan  Engineering  District  and  other  Government  agencies  re-
    garding this  change  of  attitude  about  the  license,  do  you  know  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  didn't  have  anything  to  do  with  those  negotiations.
    I  believe  General  Groves  or  Colonel  Johnson  or  perhaps  Colonel  Cren-
    shaw could  tell  you  more  about  that.  I  was  not  too  much  involved  with
    other  agencies,  at  my  level.

    Mr.  Tavenxer.  Are  you  acquainted  with  James  P.  Hoopes,  for-
    merly associate  liaison  officer,  and  finally  liaison  officer,  in  the  Office
    of  Lend-Lease  Administration,  Division  for  Soviet  Supply?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No.  I  have  seen  his  name  on  letters,  but  have  never
    spoken  to  him  to  my  knowledge.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Can  you  state  whether  or  not  you  had  a  telephone
    conversation  with  Mr.  Hoopes  on  or  about  April  22,  1943  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  recall.  I  recall  speaking  to  Mr.  Moore,  but
    not  Mr.  Hoopes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Whether  you  thought  you  were  speaking  to  Mr.
    Hoopes  or  Mr.  ]\Ioore,  do  you  recall  whether  or  not  you  advised  the
    official  in  Lend-Lease  that  pressure  had  just  been  brought  to  bear  on
    General  Groves  to  release  the  1,000  pounds?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  recall  stating  that,  Mr.  Tavenner.
    ]\Ir.  Ta\-enner.  Independently  of  your  recollection  of  the  telephone
    conversation,  did  any  fact  come  to  your  attention,  or  were  you  told  by
    any  member  of  your  staff,  that  pressure  of  any  description  was  brought
    t  o  bear  on  General  Groves  to  change  the  decision  about  the  issuance  of
    the  license  for  this  particular  shipment  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  recall  that  at  all.  There  was  a  great  deal  of
    pressure  for  a  decision,  I  know  that,  but  whether  there  was  any  indi-
    vidual pressure  or  not,  I  wouldn't  know  the  person,  I  am  sure,  who
    might  have  brought  it.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Wliat  do  you  mean  by  a  great  deal  of  pressure  for  a
    decision  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  This  thing  had  been  going  along  for  quite  a  while,  and
    these  people  wanted  to  get  it  decided  one  way  or  another  so  that  Lend-
    Lease  could  be  given  an  answer.

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  assume  Lend-Lease  was  trying  to  get  it  expedited.
    This  doesn't  mean  they  were  trying  to  get  an  adverse  decision  ?
    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  know.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Do  I  understand  you  to  say  Lend-Lease  was  interested
    in  getting  negative  decisions  on  shipments  they  were  trying  to  ex-
    pedite ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  was  involved  with  Lend-Lease  very  little.
    Mr.  Nixon.  But  it  seems  obvious  that  Lend-Lease  was  interested
    in  expediting  shipments  rather  than  getting  them  turned  down?
    Dr.  Merritt.  Maybe  so.    I  don't  know.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  tlie  names  of  officials  of  Lend-Lease
    who  conferred  with  anyone  in  your  office  regarding  this  shipment  ?
    Dr.  Merritt.  The  only  names  I  recall  are  Moore  and  Hoopes.
    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  any  official  in  the  Bureau  of  Economic  War-
    fare confer  with  anyone  in  your  office  regarding  this  shipment,  to
    your  knowledge  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Not  to  my  knowledge.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  the  War  Production  Board  membership  in-
    volved in  any  way  with  this  particular  license?

    990  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Dr.  Merritt.  That,  I  don't  know.  I  presume  they  were  aware  of
    it,  but  I  don't  know.    They  may  have  been  aware  of  it.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  any  person  other  than  an  official  of  one  of  the
    Government  agencies  that  I  mentioned  confer  with  j'ou  or  any  mem-
    ber of  your  staff  with  regard  to  expediting  the  approval  of  this  parti-
    cular license?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Not  that  I  know  of.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Why  do  you  say  there  was  a  great  deal  of  pressure  if
    none  of  these  people  talked  to  you  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  There  were  a  lot  of  phone  calls  from  our  office  in
    Washington  and  from  us  to  them.

    Mr.  Nixon.  What  do  you  mean  by  "to  them"  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  To  our  Washington  office.

    Mr.  Nixon.  You  are  speaking  of  your  own  interoffice  communi-
    cations ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.  Colonel  Crenshaw  carried  on  most  of  them,
    I  presume,  with  Colonel  Johnson.

    Mr.  NixoN.  And  the  reason  for  that  was  that  the  heat  was  on  from
    Lend-Lease?

    Dr.  Merritt.  It  was  not  on  me.

    Mr.  Nixon.  You  said  there  was  a  great  deal  of  pressure  for  a
    decision?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Nixon.  So  you  knew  it  was  something  more  than  an  ordinary
    case  ?

    Dr.  IVIerritt.  Surely,

    Mr.  Nixon.  This  was  a  case  where  you  thought  it  was  top  priority
    to  get  something  done  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Because  of  the  pressure  that  was  coming.  Is  that
    correct  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  think  so,  Mr.  Nixon.

    Mr.  Case.  You  say  Colonel  Crenshaw  handled  the  negotiations  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  believe  he  conferred  with  officials  of  Lend-Lease  Ad-
    ministration on  the  subject.     I  know  he  did.

    Mr.  Case.  You  don't  think  Colonel  Crenshaw  initiated  the  conversa-
    tions with  Lend-Lease?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No.  It  probably  came  the  other  way.  I  am  sure
    Lend-Lease  initiated  the  conversations.

    Mr.  Case.  So  you  think  there  was  a  great  deal  of  pressure  on  Colonel
    Oenshaw,  and  that  it  came  from  Lend-Lease?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  believe  Colonel  Crenshaw  could  answer  that  better
    than  I  could.

    Mr.  Case.  But  you  know  the  telephone  calls  to  Colonel  Crenshaw
    came  from  Lend-Lease?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  know  he  conversed  with  them  quite  often,  and  I  am
    sure  Colonel  Johnson  did,  too,  in  Washington.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  there  anyone  employed  in  the  Washington
    office  in  addition  to  Colonel  Johnson?

    Dr.  Merritt.  There  were  a  good  many  people  there.  I  don't  know
    their  names.     He  and  his  staff  handled  this  particular  type  of  thing.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Wlio  composed  his  staff  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  can't  remember  their  names,  it  has  been  so  long.
    He  was  our  principal  contact.    He  had  many  other  people  there.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  991

    Mr.  Ta\tenner.  When  did  you  state  that  you  had  your  conference
    with  the  Shattuck  Co.  and  secured  the  agreement  that  they  would  not
    ship  any  more  uranium  'i

    l3r.  Merritt.  It  was  in  the  Latter  part  of  April  that  I  had  a  tele-
    plione  conversation  with  tliem.  I  do  not  know  the  exact  date.  I
    believe  a  memorandum  I  have  was  dated  April  29  to  the  effect  I  had
    conversed  with  them,  presumably  in  the  last  few  days.

    Mr.  Tavenner,  The  files  of  Lend-Lease  disclose,  as  shown  by  evi-
    dence already  introduced,  that  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission
    advised  Lend-Lease  that  the  delay  in  issuing  the  license  was  so  great
    that  the  supplier  had  canceled  the  order.  Do  you  recall  having  heard
    that  i

    Dr.  Merrttt.  Yes ;  that  is  correct.  Mr.  Potter,  in  the  early  conver-
    sations, said  he  had  a  feeler  for  the  order — I  believe  that  is  the  way
    he  put  it — but  tliat  nothing  else  had  come  through  and  that  he  would
    be  willing  to  tell  them  at  that  point  that  he  had  no  more  supply.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  In  other  words,  at  the  time  of  your  conference  with
    Potter  the  order  had  not  been  turned  down  by  him  or  withdrawn  ?

    (Representative  Walter  enters  hearing  room).

    Dr.  MERRi'n\  Early  in  April  I  probably  talked  to  him.  I  believe
    I  talked  to  liim  personally  the  latter  part  of  March  or  early  in  April.
    1  don't  know  if  he  had  the  order  at  that  time  or  not.     He  probably  did.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  you  learned  that  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Com-
    mission advised  they  could  not  obtain  the  material  from  their  sup-
    plier, was  it  considered  that  the  strategy  of  handling  the  thing  had
    been  successful?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.  We  felt  we  had  been  successful  in  blocking  the
    sale.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  was  done  about  withdrawing  the  license  which
    had  been  authorized  to  be  issued  and  which  you  now  know  was  issued?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  think  anything  was  done.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  was  normally  the  life  of  such  a  license?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  know  what  the  life  was  of  a  Lend-Lease  or
    BEW  license.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Wliatever  the  period  of  its  life  may  be,  it  existed
    as  a  constant  threat,  did  it  not,  during  that  period  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.  Still,  we  felt  we  had  all  sources  completely
    blocked  and  it  didn't  make  any  particular  difference  if  there  was  a
    license  outstanding.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  learn  that  very  soon  after  the  Shattuck  Co.
    witlidrew  its  offer  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  filed  a  request
    with  Lend-Lease  to  amend  this  license?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  didn't  know  of  that.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  didn't  know  of  that?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  mean  as  far  ^.s  you  know  the  Manhattan  Engi-
    neering District  was  not  advised  that  an  application  had  been  received
    to  amend  the  license?

    Dr.  Merritt.  As  far  as  I  know.  I  was  not  aware  of  it.  Whether
    someone  else  was  or  not,  I  don't  know.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Then  you  don't  know  of  your  own  knowledge
    whether  or  not  it  actually  was  amended  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  right.

    992  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Had  you  known  that  on  the  29th  of  April,  1943,
    this  license  was  actually  amended  to  show  a  different  constituency  of
    chemical  analysis  of  the  material  sought  to  be  exported,  wouldn't  it
    have  acted  as  a  red  flag  to  you,  and  you  would  have  known  immediately
    that  the  material  was  available  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Probably  so.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Is  there  any  other  conclusion?

    Dr.  Mekritt.  That  is  probably  correct.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Did  I  understand  you  to  say  earlier  that  the  original
    license  had  come  to  your  attention?

    Dr.  Merritt.  The  original  license  itself  never  came  to  my  attention.
    i  think  probably  we  were  aware  something  was  going  on,  but  I  never
    saw  the  license  and  I  don't  believe  I  was  aware  it  was  actually  issued.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Wlio  was  aware  of  it  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  think  the  Washington  office  must  have  been  aware
    of  it.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Your  Washington  office?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.  I  think  General  Groves  testified  he  was  aware
    of  it.

    Mr.  Nixon.  As  to  the  amendment  of  the  original  license,  was  your
    Washington  office  informed  of  that  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  know.    They  should  have  been  aware  of  it.

    Mr.  Nixon.  That  is  the  point.  In  other  words,  the  amendment
    should  have  been  made

    Dr.  Merritt.  Clear  to  them.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Clear  to  them  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Surely.

    Mr.  Nixon.  If  they  had  been  made  aware  of  the  amendment,  they
    would  not  have  found  out  about  the  shipment  for  the  first  time  last
    year?     You  didn't  find  out  about  the  shipment  until  last  year?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  right,  here,  in  June  1948.

    Mr.  Nixon.  In  other  words,  the  fact  that  the  office  which  had
    jurisdiction  over  the  original  license,  your  Washington  office,  was
    not  informed  of  the  amendment,  indicates  it  might  have  been  a  highly
    irregular  procedure  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  If  they  were  not  informed,  yes.  I  can't  say  whether
    or  not  they  were  informed.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  During  the  course  of  the  time  that  the  matter  of
    the  issuance  of  the  license  was  pending,  was  the  question  of  furnish-
    ing a  substitute  material  to  the  Russians  considered  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.  There  was  some  thought  at  one  time,  and  cor-
    respondence, I  believe,  between  Colonel  Crenshaw  and  perhaps  Mr.
    Hoopes.  I  have  read  the  correspondence  recently.  I  didn't  know
    about  it  at  the  time.  But  we  had  located  some  uranium  steel  alloy.
    There  wasn't  much  of  it.  It  had  been  made  years  before,  I  believe,  by
    the  Latrobe  Steel  Co.  There  was  .some  thought  at  one  time  of  letting
    them  have  that  useless  material  rather  than  what  they  wanted.  Our
    correspondence  showed  there  was  some  negotiation  along  that  line,  but
    it  stopped  and  nothing  happened  about  it.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  recall  talking  to  Mr.  Hoopes  about  a  sub-
    stitute ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  The  correspondence  was  all  between  Colonel  Crenshaw
    and  Mr.  Hoopes,  I  believe,  on  that.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  993

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  the  substitute  material
    which  you  proposed  giving  to  the  Russians  would  have  been  adequate
    for  the  purposes  for  which  the  Russians  said  they  wanted  to  use  the

    material  ?  .

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  am  not  a  metallurgist.    I  believe  it  was  quite  useless

    material.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  think  it  may  have  been  useless  even  for  the
    purpose  for  which  they  said  they  wanted  it?

    Dr.  Merritt.  It  is  possible.     I  don't  know.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  don't  know  ^

    Dr.  Merritt.  No.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  In  other  words,  you  are  not  answering  the  question
    in  the  aflirmative  or  negative?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No.

    Mr.  Walter.  Why  was  consideration  given  to  the  sending  of  worth-
    less material  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  think  Colonel  Crenshaw  could  answer  that  better

    than  I  could.

    Mr.  Walter.  You  were  in  on  the  discussions  as  to  the  sending  of  this
    worthless  material,  were  you  not?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No;  I  was  not.     I  read  the  correspondence.

    Mr.  Walter.  You  have  just  testified  from  the  correspondence?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Walter.  Did  the  correspondence  indicate  the  reason  why  con-
    sideration was  given  to  the  sending  of  worthless  material?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Not  that  I  recall.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  confer  at  any  time  with  General  Groves
    regarding  the  issuance  of  this  license  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Not  with  General  Groves  personally ;  no.

    Mr.  Velue.  Did  you  confer  with  any  member  of  the  security  office
    other  than  General  Groves  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  believe  Colonel  Johnson  and  Colonel  Crenshaw  car-
    ried on  all  our  conversations.

    Mr.  Case.  When  you  said  there  were  negotiations  to  let  "them"  have
    the  worthless  material,  whom  did  you  mean  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  The  Russians.

    Mr.  Case.  Then  you  understood  there  was  a  determined  effort  on
    the  part  of  the  Russian  Purchasing  Commission  to  obtain  uranium?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Apparently ;  yes.

    Mr.  Walter.  Whose  decision  was  it  to  send  worthless  material?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  think  General  Groves.

    Mr.  Walter.  The  hnal  decision  would  have  been  his?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  think  so;  yes.

    Mr.  Case.  That  is,  if  tlie  matter  came  to  him  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  If  the  matter  came  to  him.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  the  BEW  submit  to  General  Groves  any  request  for
    export  licenses  for  the  shipment  of  uranium?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  know  whether  it  did  or  not.

    IVIr.  Case.  In  your  attempt  to  corral  the  sources  of  supply  and  dis-
    tribution of  this  material,  did  you  make  any  contact  with  BEW?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  recall  having  one  meeting  with  Dr.  Bateman  and
    some  members  of  his  staff  on  uranium.  It  had  nothing  to  do  with
    export ;  it  had  to  do  with  possible  foreign  sources  and  some  way  they
    could  assist  us  in  our  procurement  program.

    99334—50 7

    994  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Case.  But  there  was  no  conversation  on  the  exporting  of  it  ?

    Dr.  IVIerritt.  I  don't  believe  these  people  were  involved  in  export
    control.

    Mr.  Case.  Who  was  Dr.  Bateman?

    Dr.  Merritt.  He  was  professor  of  geology  at  Yale.

    Mr.  Case.  What  position  was  he  holding  at  that  time  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  recall  exactly.  He  was  in  charge  of  some  sort
    of  foreign  procurement,  I  believe.

    Mr.  Case.  With  whom?

    Dr.  Merritt.  With  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare.  It  was  on
    procurement.

    Mr,  Wood.  You  were  aware,  were  you  not,  Doctor,  at  all  times  dur-
    ing these  transactions,  that  material  of  this  character  could  not  be
    exported  from  this  country  without  an  export  license  issued  by  BEAV?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  believe  so,  yes.

    Mr.  Wood.  Wliy  was  it  you  felt  impelled  to  block  up  all  sources
    of  supply  if  in  fact  none  of  it  could  be  shipped  out  without  an  export
    license '(

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  felt  we  could  control  it.

    Mr.  Wood.  Were  you  apprehensive  a  license  might  be  issued  without
    your  knowledge?

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  wanted  this  material  ourselves.

    Mr.  Wood.  But  you  were  aware  the  material  could  not  be  shipped
    out  of  the  country  without  a  license,  and  that  the  license  would  have
    to  be  issued  by  an  agency  of  the  United  States  Government  which  pre-
    sumably was  as  much  interested  in  preserving  the  security  as  you  were,
    so  why  didn't  you  rely  on  them  ?

    Dr.  IVIerritt.  I  think  we  were  trying  to  do  those  things  ourselves.

    Mr.  Wood.  There  was,  in  fact,  a  license  issued  and  amended  without
    your  knowledge?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Apparently  so,  yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  heavy  water  was
    shi]3ped  to  Bussia

    Mr.  Nixon.  Excuse  me.  Am  I  correct  in  the  assumption  from  your
    testimony  that  this  transaction  in  regard  to  the  shipment  of  1,000
    pounds  was  a  well-known  transaction  in  your  office  and  in  the  office  in
    Washington,  it  was  discussed  by  telephone  and  otherwise,  because  of
    the  efforts  being  made  to  get  decision?

    Dr.  IVIerritt.  I  think  so,  yes'.

    Mr.  Nixon.  It  was  a  transaction  which  was  out  of  the  ordinary?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Nixox.  And  for  that  reason,  I  suppose  the  fact  that  this  ship-
    ment had.  actually  been  made  as  a  result  of  an  amended  order  which
    apparently  did  not  come  to  your  office  was  quite  surprising  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  It  was,  Mr.  Nixon.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Mr.  Burman's  testimony  yesterday  was  that  you  learned
    for  the  first  time  in  1948,  from  this  committee,  that  this  shipment  had
    actually  been  made  as  a  result  of  an  amended  license  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Nixon.  It  means,  in  other  words,  that  this  amended  license
    went  around  the  ordinary  channels,  assuming  it  did  not  go  through
    your  Washington  office?

    Dr.  Merritt,  Assuming  it  did  not  go  through  our  Washington
    office  and  ordinary  channels;  yes.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  995

    Mr.  Nixon.  And  these  people  who  were  attempting  to  get  the  order
    filled,  Lend-Lease,  could  not  have  helped  being  aware  of  the  fact  there
    was  considerable  discussion  and  resistance  in  your  office  to  having  the
    license  issued?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  believe  that  is  correct.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  what  the  procedure  was  for  issuing
    export  licenses?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  do  not  know  the  procedure.  We  were  not  involved
    in  the  actual  licenses.

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner.  And  I  assume  it  was  not  the  practice  for  these
    licenses  to  clear  through  your  office?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Not  through  our  New  York  office ;  no.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  you  take  any  steps,  other  than  this  talk  with  Dr.
    Bateman,  to  be  informed  of  the  issuance  of  licenses  for  the  shipment
    of  materials  of  this  tj^pe  out  of  the  country?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No.  Anything  like  that  would  have  been  handled  by
    Colonel  Johnson  in  the  Wasliington  office.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  heavy-water  ship-
    ments were  made  to  Russia  during  the  war  years  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  was  never  involved  in  the  subject  at  all  in  any  way.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  what  controls  were  set  up  governing
    the  shipment  of  heavy  water  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No  ;  I  do  not.  Heavy  water  was  out  of  my  province
    entirely.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  have  no  further  questions,  Mr.  Chairman.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Walter?

    Mr.  Walter.  Did  your  office  have  any  direct  responsibility,  other
    than  a  desire  to  preserve  this  strategic  material,  in  the  issuance  of
    export  licenses?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  all.

    Mr.  Walter.  You  had  no  responsibility  at  all  in  that  regard  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No.

    Mr.  Wood.  That  was  the  responsibility  of  BEW,  wasn't  it  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Nixon.

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  will  pass  this  time.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Case.

    Mr.  Case.  Dr.  Merritt,  as  I  understand,  you  stated  you  had  started
    out  trying  to  buy  all  the  uranium  on  the  market  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  And  you  first  made  a  contract  with  Vitro?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  Was  that  a  firm  contract,  that,  if  they  had  any  to  sell  or
    acquired  any,  they  should  come  to  you  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  recall  the  exact  terms  of  that  contract.  We
    worked  closely  with  them,  and  I  am  sure  nothing  could  have  gone
    wrong  in  any  way  with  that  company.  We  had  full  confidence  in.
    them.     I  don't  recall  the  exact  terms  of  the  contract.

    Mr.  Case.  No  sale,  as  far  as  you  know,  w^as  made  by  Vitro  to  anyone
    except  yourself,  acting  for  the  Manhattan  District  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Case.  What  steps  did  you  take  with  Shattuck  to  insure  that
    their  sales  would  be  entirely  to  the  Manhattan  District  ?

    996  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  never  bought  any  uranium  from  Shattuck  at  all.
    They  were  a  very,  very  small  supplier,  and  their  sales,  I  believe,  at  a
    later  date,  were  well  controlled  through  the  War  Production  Board.
    Their  sales  were  for  essential  domestic  purposes.

    Mr.  Case.  You  said  you  had  a  firm  commitment  from  them.  Wliat
    was  that  firm  commitment?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  they  would  refuse  any  foreign  orders,  and  I
    believe  that  they  would  keep  us  informed  on  other  ordei-s  they  had.

    Mr.  Case.  Was  that  by  letter,  contract,  or  telephone  conversation?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Personally,  I  had  one  telephone  conversation  with
    them.  I  think  Mr.  Burman  visited  them  many  times  during  the  war,
    I  had  very  little  contact  with  them  after  that  one  telephone  con-
    versation.

    Mr.  Case.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  there  Avas  any  written
    understanding  with  them?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No ;  I  don't  know.

    Mr.  Case.  In  any  event,  this  firm  commitment,  which  you  don't
    know  if  it  was  put  in  writing  or  not,  was  made  after  the  shipment
    of  the  420  pounds?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Case.  What  was  Mr.  Potter's  connection  with  Shattuck?

    Dr.  Merritt.  He  is  president,  I  believe,  of  Shattuck  Chemical  Co.

    Mr.  Case.  Earlier  in  your  testimony  you  referred  to  an  effort  to
    control  purchases  of  all  ceramics,  I  believe.    Did  you  say  that?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Uranium  for  ceramic  coloring;  yes.  We  purchased  a
    good  deal  of  uranium  from  ceramic  companies.

    Mr.  Case.  From  pottery  companies  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.  That  is  the  transaction  we  handled  through
    Vitro.

    Mr.  Case.  Keferring  to  your  contract  with  Boris  Pregel,  did  that
    contract  require  the  contractor  to  notify  you  and  tender  to  you  any
    of  the  three  materials  mentioned  which  they  had  or  might  acquire?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  the  way  I  would  interpret  it ;  yes.  That  was
    the  intention.

    Mr.  Case.  It  could  have  been  a  contract  merely  that  Manhattan
    would  be  willing  to  buy,  but  did  it  also  provide  they  must  offer  to
    Manhattan  any  of  these  materials  they  had  or  might  acquire?

    Dr.  Merritt.  The  wording  is:

    In  addition  to  the  materials  contracted  for  in  section  (1)  above  mentioned,
    the  Contractor  gives  to  the  Government  for  a  period  of  one  year,  from  the  date
    hereof,  the  initial  ri.s:ht  to  purchase  from  time  to  time,  any  or  all  of  these  three
    materials  received  by  the  Contractor.

    Mr.  Case.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  the  contract  provided  any
    methods  for  implementing  that  right?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Except  presumably  they  would  notify  us  when  they
    received  anything.

    Mr.  Case.  You  don't  know  if  the  contract  was  specific  on  that
    point  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  believe  it  was  specific  on  that  point.

    Mr.  Case.  Under  that  contract,  would  you  understand  that  Man-
    hattan would  have  the  right  of  refusal  beifore  any  of  these  materials
    were  released  for  sale  elsewhere  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  correct.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  997

    Mr.  Case.  Were  you  offered  this  material  which  later  the  Canadian
    Kadium  &  Uranium  Corp.  sold  elsewhere  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  were  not  offered  this  material  so  far  as  I  aan
    aware.

    Mr.  Case.  State  again  what  the  relationship  was  between  Canadian
    Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.  and  Eldorado  Mines.

    Dr.  Merritt.  It  was  my  understanding  that  at  that  time  Cana-
    dian Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.  had  a  contract  whereby  they  were
    exclusive  sales  agents  for  Eldorado.  That  agreement  is  no  longer
    in  existence,  but  it  was  at  that  time.

    Mr.  Case.  At  that  time  they  had  the  same  exclusive  right  to  the
    products  of  Eldorado  Mines  that  Manhattan  had  to  the  materials
    which  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  acquired?

    Dr.  Merritt.  So  I  understand.  I  have  never  seen  the  agreement,
    but  I  understand  that  is  correct.

    Mr.  Case.  Except  that  the  contract  between  Manhattan  and  Cana-
    dian Radium  &  Uranium  was  not  limited  to  material  that  Canadian
    Radium  &  Uranium  might  get  from  Eldorado  mines?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Anything  they  might  get  from  anybody.

    Mr.  Case.  Were  any  penalties  or  forfeitures  provided  for  failure  to
    give  jNIanhattan  this  first  right  to  buy  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Not  that  I  recall.

    Mr.  Case.  I  find  that  it  is  difficult,  without  the  transcript  of  the
    other  hearings,  to  keep  all  these  separate  shipments  in  mind,  but  I
    would  like  to  ask  you  two  questions  with  regard  to  those  that  come  to
    my  mind.  The  first  question  is  whether  or  not  you  knew  of  these  ship-
    ments or  sales  prior  to  the  disclosures  made  in  the  hearings  before
    the  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  and,  if  so,  when  you
    learned  of  them,  first  in  regard  to  the  shipment  of  the  Shattuck  mate-
    rial, the  420  pounds,  in  March  19-i3  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  knew  of  that  at  the  time  of  shipment.

    Mr.  Case.  You  knew  of  that  at  the  time  of  shipment?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Surely.

    Mr.  Case,  When  did  you  first  hear  of  the  request  that  was  made  for
    8  or  81/2  tons  by  the  Russian  Purchasing  Commission  in  1943?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  believe  we  first  heard  of  it  early  in  February  1943.

    Mr.  Case.  Was  that  request  made  to  Lend-Lease  or  to  Chemical
    Warfare?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  believe  to  Lend-Lease.  I  believe  we  had  our  infor-
    mation from  the  War  Production  Board,  but  I  believe  they  got  it
    from  Lend-Lease.

    Mr.  Case.  When  did  you  first  learn  that  the  request  was  renewed
    in  1944?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Renewed?

    Mr.  Case.  Yes ;  that  8-ton  request.

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  didn't  know  it  was  renewed.

    Mr.  Case.  Wlien  did  you  first  learn  of  this  1,000-pound  item  that
    was  involved  in  this  license  and  amended  license  of  April  1943  2

    Dr.  Merritt.  Before  this  committee  in  closed  session  on  June  29,
    1948,

    Mr.  Case.  And  you  didn't  know  until  this  morning  that  the  export
    license  had  been  amended  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No  ;  I  didn't.

    998  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Case.  And  when  did  you  first  hear  of  the  MacKay  shipment
    of  2.2  pounds  of  uranium  metal  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  believe  at  the  time  of  shipment  I  was  aware  of  that.

    Mr.  Case.  When  did  you  first  learn  of  the  45 -pound  shipment  of
    June  1944,  that  was  purchased  by  the  Treasury  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yesterday.

    Mr.  Case.  That  is  all.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Velde.

    Mr.  Velde.  That  45  pounds  of  uranium,  was  that  what  you  call  pure
    uranium  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  believe  it  was  uranium  nitrate.

    Mr.  Velde.  How  much  actual  ore  would  that  represent  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  believe  uranium  nitrate  is  about  50  percent  uranium ;
    about  half  of  that  is  metal ;  the  actual  U  content  would  be  about  half
    of  that.

    Mr.  Velde.  So  that  the  uranium  ore  would  be  about  90  pounds  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No  ;  about  20  or  25  pounds  of  uranium  element  in  the
    shipment  of  nitrate.

    Mr.  Velde.  We  have  been  discussing  the  shipment  of  1,000  pounds
    that  was  made  from  Great  Falls,  Mont.  How  would  you  describe
    that?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  believe  500  pounds  of  that  was  oxide,  and  would
    probably  run  about  97  percent,  calculated  as  uranium  oxide ;  and  the
    other  500  pounds  would  be  about  half  that.    I  am  not  quite  certain.

    Mr.  Velde.  Would  you  say  this  45  pounds  of  uranium,  compared
    to  the  1,000-pound  shipment,  would  be  insignificant?

    Dr.  Merritt.  It  would  be  very  small  compared  to  the  1,000-pound
    shipment,  surely.

    Mr.  Velde.  You  mentioned  previously  that  you  felt  you  had  the
    entire  output  of  uranium  in  the  country  tied  up  by  contract?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Velde.  Did  you  have  the  feeling  you  also  had  the  entire  output
    of  the  Canadian  Government  tied  up  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  had  a  good  many  contracts  with  them.  I  don't
    l)elieve  at  that  time  they  were  exclusive,  they  could  sell  to  other  people,
    but  I  don't  believe  they  did  in  any  quantities.

    Mr.  Velde.  Are  there  any  companies  or  individuals  who  control
    uranium  in  Canada,  other  than  the  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium
    Corp.?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No.  All  uranium  is  controlled  through  Eldorado,
    which  is  a  crown  company  owned  by  the  Government.

    Mr.  Velde.  By  the  Canadian  Government?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.  It  is  a  crown  company.  I  think  that  was
    acquired  back  in  1944  from  the  private  company  that  held  it  prior
    to  that  time.

    Mr.  Velde.  Have  you  had  any  contract  directly  with  an  agent  of
    the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No.

    Mr.  Velde.  Or  has  anybody  in  your  immediate  office  force?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  believe  anybody  did  that  I  know  of.

    Mr.  Wood,  Mr.  Kearney.

    Mr.  Kearney.  No  questions.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Nixon.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  999

    Mr.  Nixon.  You  said  you  were  not  concerned  with  the  fact  there
    might  be  an  export  license  outstanding  for  this  material,  because  of
    3'our  feeling  you  had  the  sources  pretty  well  tied  up  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  On  this  1,000-pound  shipment  which  was  made,  and
    the  other  shipment  which  apparently  was  made  without  your  knowl-
    edge, do  I  understand  those  shipments  were  made  from  concerns
    whose  outputs  you  had  not  tied  up  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  The  1,000  pounds  were  shipped,  apparently,  from
    Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.,  which  we  thought  we  had  tied  up.

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  can't  quite  understand  that.  When  you  say  that  you
    had  it  tied  up

    Dr.  Merritt.  Through  this  contract.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Through  this  contract?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Nixon.  And  yet  the  same  company  makes  the  shipment.  Do
    I  understand  that  under  the  contract  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium
    Corp.  gave  you  the  exclusive  right  to  purchase  uranium  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Would  that  shipment  be  a  violation  of  the  contract?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  am  not  a  lawyer,  but  as  a  layman  it  would  look
    that  way.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Could  this  have  been  due  to  failure  to  understand  the
    contract  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Pregel  and  other  officials  of  the  company,
    or  had  such  conversations  been  had  at  the  time  of  the  entering  into  of
    tlie  contract  that  they  knew  what  you  were  trying  to  do?

    Dr.  Merritt.  The  wording  is  very  clear,  I  think,  and  it  should  have
    been  clear  what  we  were  trying  to  do.

    Mr.  Nixon.  The  wording  and  the  negotiations  preceding  the  mak-
    ing of  the  contract  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  This  was  not  a  case  where  you  were  dealing  with  a  con-
    tractor on  the  other  side  who  was  not  aware  of  the  very  serious  nature
    of  this  contract  insofar  as  the  security  of  this  country  was  concerned?

    Dr.  INIerritt.  I  think  he  should  have  been  aware  of  it.

    Mr.  Nixon.  And  if  under  the  circumstances  the  shipment  was  made,
    and  if  that  shipment  was  a  violation  of  the  contract,  it  would  appear
    then  that  tliere  was  a  deliberate  act  which  was  considerably  more  than
    a  violation  of  a  business  contract?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  suppose  so.

    Mr.  Walter.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Canadian  Government
    brought  suit  against  these  people  and  recovered  from  them  for  a
    violation  of  contract;  didn't  it?

    Dr.  jNIerritt.  There  was  a  suit  which  extended  over  a  long  number
    of  years  between  the  two,  and  it  was  finally  settled  out  of  court,  I
    understand.

    Mr.  Case.  Between  what  two  ?
    Dr.  Merritt.  Canadian  Radium  and  Eldorado.
    Mr.  Nixon.  You  understand,  Mr.  Chairman,  the  point  I  am  trying
    to  make  goes  farther  than  the  money  value  our  Government  or  the
    Canadian  Government  could  recover  for  violation  of  contract.  I  think
    the  committee  should  explore  why,  under  those  circumstances,  the  ship-
    ment was  made.

    1000  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    Mr.  Case.  Did  you  rely  upon  the  laws  of  the  agency  to  make  the  con-
    tract by  Pregel  control  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium,  or  did  Pregel
    in  his  contract  with  you  set  forth  his  ability  to  control  the  actions
    of  the  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium  Co.  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  relied  on  him  pretty  much.  He  advised  us  that
    he  was  sole  sales  agent.  So,  it  was  not  necessary,  if  that  was  true,
    to  insert  similar  clauses  in  other  contracts.

    Mr.  Case.  What  steps  did  you  take  to  determine  if  he  was  the  sole
    sales  agent  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  had  attempted  prior  to  that  time  to  deal  directly
    with  Eldorado,  and  were  told  by  officials  of  Eldorado  they  could  not
    deal  with  us,  but  only  Mr.  Pregel.

    Mr.  Case.  Pregel  was  president  of  the  Canadian  Radium  &  Ura-
    nium Corp.  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  And  he  signed  this  contract  as  president  of  Canadian
    Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  He  signed  as  agent,  I  believe,  and  they  were  hooked
    up  in  the  secret  letter.

    Mr.  Case.  And  the  contract  made  the  secret  letter  a  part  of  it  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  correct,  yes.

    Mr.  Wood.  Any  other  questions?

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  understood  you  to  mention  Vitro,  and  I  believe  you
    said  you  dealt  so  closely  with  them  that  you  had  no  concern  over
    the  possibility  that  that  company  would  violate  a  contract  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  recall  whether  we  had  a  similar  clause  in  our
    contract  with  them.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Did  you  work  closely  with  Mr.  Pregel  as  well?

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  worked  with  him  closely  to  a  point,  and  then
    had  no  further  dealings  with  him  later  on.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Prior  to  the  time  this  shipment  was  made,  you  had
    been  working  with  him  rather  closely  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Did  you  work  with  him  yourself?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes ;  I  did.    Other  people  worked  with  him,  too.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Was  there  any  question  but  that  he  himself  knew  why
    the  Government  was  tying  up  this  material?

    Dr.  Merritt.  There  is  no  question  in  my  mind  but  that  he  knew.
    He  was  aware  of  the  Manhattan  project.

    Mr.  Nixon.  And  he  knew  why  you  made  this  contract?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  assume  so.

    Mr.  Case.  And  he  was  the  sole  sales  agent.  So,  if  he  arranged  a
    sale  with  another  party,  he  did  so  knowing  of  the  significance  of  the
    sale?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  suppose  so.

    Mr.  Walter.  You  relied  entirely  upon  the  representation  Mr.  Pregel
    made  to  you  with  respect  to  his  ability  to  control  the  output  in
    Canada?

    Dr.  Merritt.  We  had  contact  with  officials  of  Eldorado  also.

    Mr.  Walter.  They  refused  to  do  business  with  you  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Walter.  Then,  as  I  understand  it,  you  relied  entirely  on  the
    representation  Mr.  Pregel  made  to  you  of  his  ability  to  control  the
    Canadian  output?

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1001

    Dr.  Merritt.  At  that  time ;  yes.

    Mr.  Case.  In  your  contact  with  Eldorado,  did  they  confirm  that
    Pregel  had  sole  control  over  their  output  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  recall.  Our  contracts  were  largely  with  Cana-
    dian Radium  &  Uranium.

    Mr.  Case.  Why  did  you  go  to  Pregel  after  you  had  talked  to  Eldo-
    rado?

    Dr.  Merritt.  They  told  us  to.

    Mr.  Case.  They  told  you  that  because  he  was  the  one  in  charge  of
    their  output  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Did  you  have  the  same  relations  with  Pregel  up  until
    the  time  of  the  contract  that  you  had  with  Vitro?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  believe  so.

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  am  trying  to  establish  whether  there  was  any  reason
    for  you  to  be  apprehensive  that  such  a  shipment  might  be  made  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  think  so.  We  had  been  associated  with  the
    other  people  over  a  long  period  of  time,  and  they  had  our  full  con-
    fidence.   They  were  people  of  our  kind.

    Mr.  Walter.  Of  course,  that  is  only  your  own  conclusion.  Wliat
    do  you  base  your  conclusion  on  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  know.

    Mr.  Wood.  Dr.  Merritt,  when  the  1,000-pound  shipment  was  finally
    made  from  the  Canadian  company,  had  that  material  been  offered  to
    you  under  your  contract?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No  ;  it  had  not,  that  I  am  aware.

    Mr.  Wood.  W^as  there  any  time  during  the  period  of  the  development
    of  the  Manhattan  Engineering  District  that  any  of  your  organizations
    you  had  under  contract  offered  any  of  their  material  to  you  that  you
    'didn't  take  it?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  believe  so.

    Mr.  Wood.  If  this  1,000  pounds  shipped  to  the  Russians  had  been
    offered  to  you,  would  you  have  taken  it?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Surely.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  At  the  time  when  you  were  endeavoring  in  the  early
    part  of  1943  to  block  foreign  shipments  of  uranium  compounds,  did
    you  confer  with  the  officials  of  Eldorado  mines  in  Canada  regarding
    that  matter?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  have  no  recollection  of  conferring  with  them  re-
    garding the  matter  at  all.  We  advised  Mr.  Pregel  to  so  advise  them,
    I  believe,  in  a  letter  which  was  placed  in  the  record  yesterday.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  dealt  with  their  agent  regarding  the  matter?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Rather  than  dealing  with  the  officials  directly?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  After  this  contract  went  into  force  in  March  1943,
    do  you  know  whether  Eldorado  mines  continued  to  sell  small  quan-
    tities of  uranium  to  various  private  purchasers  or  to  industry  for  com-
    mercial purposes  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  I  don't  know.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  recall  whether  Manhattan  Engineering
    District  was  advised  or  requested  to  agree  to  the  sale  of  uranium  by
    Eldorado  mines  to  other  purchasers  than  to  Manhattan  Engineering
    District,  for  commercial  purposes  ?

    1002  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Dr.  ISIerritt.  There  may  have  been  some  later  on  that  were
    approved.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  You  have  no  personal  knowledge  of  that  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  No.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Who  would  have  personal  knowledge  of  that  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Mr.  Burman  may.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Burman  may  ?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  may  recall  him  to  ask  him  that  question.  Was
    the  Canadian  Government  requested  to  cooperate  in  this  matter?

    Dr.  Merritt.  Yes ;  they  were,  at  a  later  date.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  How  late?     Too  late?

    Dr.  JSIerritt.  Too  late,  I  believe.  They,  I  think,  took  over  the  com-
    pany officially  in  eTanuary  1944,  acquired  all  the  stock  at  that  date,  and
    controlled  it  from  then  on.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  all.

    Mr.  Wood.  Thank  you  very  much,  Doctor,  for  your  courtesy  and
    assistance  to  the  committee.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  would  like  to  recall  ]\Ir.  Burman  for  one  question.

    Mr.  Wood.  I  believe  you  were  sworn  yesterday  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  That  is  correct.

    TESTIMONY  OF  LAWRENCE  C.  BURMAN— Resumed

    (Having  been  duly  sworn  by  the  committee  on  the  day  previous,
    January  23,  1950,  was  at  this  point  recalled.)

    Mr.  Taa^nner.  'My.  Burman,  after  the  contract  of  IMarch  27,  1943,
    between  INIanhattan  Engineering  District  and  Boris  Pregel,  agent,
    were  sales  made  by  Eldorado  mines  of  small  quantities  of  uranium
    compounds  for  commercial  purposes,  to  your  knowledge  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  Yes ;  they  were.

    JNIr.  Tavenner.  They  were  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  Did  Eldorado  mines,  or  the  agency,  Canadian
    Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.,  inform  Manliattan  Engineering  District
    of  that  fact?

    Mr.  Burman.  Yes.     They  each  were  approved  in  advance.

    (Representative  Velde  leaves  the  hearing  room.)

    Mr.  Tavenner.  They  were  approved  in  advance  ?

    Mr.  BunMAN.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Which  was  it,  Eldorado  mines  or  Canadian  Radium
    &  Uranium  Corp.,  that  asked  for  the  approval  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  Canadian  Radium  &  Uranium,  and  deliveries  were
    made  directly  from  Eldorado  mines  at  Port  Hope  to  the  approved  re-
    ceivers. There  were  a  series  of  shipments,  for  example,  to  a  company
    known  as  Keystone  Carbon  Co.,  St.  Mary's,  Pa.,  which  manufactured
    a  special  type  of  electrical  resistor  for  aircraft.  The  district  did  not
    care  to  interfere  with  essential  needs  for  uranium,  and  were  willing
    to  authorize  these  shipments  where  the  need  was  approved.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  But  where  prospects  of  such  sales  occurred,  you
    were  consulted  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  permission  given  in  advance  ?

    Mr.  Burman.  Yes,  sir.

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1003

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  believe  you  have  already  answered  the  question
    that  no  permission  was  sought  in  the  case  of  the  1,000  pounds  which
    were  sold  to  the  Russian  Purchasing  Agency  ?

    Mv.  BuRMAN.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  at  any  time,  or  did  any  other  member  of
    your  staff,  confer  with  Eldorado  mines  direct  regarding  this  matter;
    that  is,  the  provisions  of  this  contract  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No.  I  was  not  engaged  in  negotiations  on  the  con-
    tract.

    Mr.  Tavexner.  I  have  no  further  questions.

    Mr.  Wood.  Any  questions  ?

    Mr.  Walter.  As  I  understand  it,  for  some  period  of  time  Man-
    hattan project  dealt  with  Pregel  because  Eldorado  refused  to  deal
    directly  because  Pregel  was  their  agent.     Is  that  correct  ?

    INIr.  BuRMAX.  That  is  my  understanding.

    Mr.  Walter.  AVliy  did  Manhattan  then  insist  at  a  later  date  on
    dealing  with  Eldorado  instead  of  following  the  instructions  given
    originally?

    Mr.  BuRMAN".  That  is  rather  difficult  to  answer.

    ]\fr.  Walter.  Yes.

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  We  were  directed  at  a  period  later  in  1943 — I  can't
    specify  just  what  the  date  was — to  taper  off  direct  contractual  re-
    lations with  Mr.  Pregel.

    IVIr.  Walter.  T\'Tio  directed  you  to  taper  off  ?

    INfr.  BiTJMAN.  Those  were  directions  from  General  Groves.

    INlr.  Walter.  Did  General  Groves  indicate  any  reason  why  yoit
    should  discontinue  dealing  with  Pregel  ?

    JNIr.  BuRMAN.  I  didn't  receive  those  directions  myself,  so  I  can't
    answer.

    Mr.  Walter.  You  were  in  conference  where  Mr.  Pregel  was  dis-
    cussed, were  you  not  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Not  very  often,  since  I  was  not  in  direct  contact  with
    Mr.  Pregel.

    Mr.  Walter.  You  knew  why  General  Groves  was  desirous  of  deal-
    ing directly  with  Eldorado  and  discontinuing  dealing  with  Pregel,
    did  you  not?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No,  sir;  I  am  afraid  I  didn't.

    Mr.  Walter.  When  you  learned  of  the  shipment  of  the  1,000  pounds,
    did  you  discuss  that  with  Eldorado?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No,  sir.

    Mr.  Walter.  Did  anybody,  that  you  know  of?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  We  didn't  discuss  it  with  Eldorado,  ])ut  Dr.  Merritt
    did  talk  with  officials — let  me  change  that.  I  think  Dr.  Merritt  talked
    to  Mr.  Bennett,  who,  I  believe,  is  an  official  of  Eldorado.

    Mr.  Walter.  And  he  protested  to  Eldorado  that  the  terms  of  the
    contract  had  been  violated?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  No;  Dr.  Merritt  asked  for  information  from  Mr.
    Bennett  as  to  the  transaction,  but  the  contract  that  was  violated  was
    with  Canadium  Radium  &  Uranium  Corp.,  and  not  Eldorado,  and  the
    company  existing  now  as  Eldorado  is  not  the  same  as  existed  in  1943,
    since  the  Canadian  Government  now  controls  it.

    Mr.  Walter.  This  shipment  of  1,000  pounds  was  made  before  the
    Canadian  Government  had  any  direct  control  over  Eldorado?

    Mr.  Burman.  Yes.

    1004  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  don't  know  if  it  is  clear  as  to  the  time  when  Dr.
    Merritt  had  this  conference  with  Mr.  Bennett  that  you  referred  to.

    Mr.  BuEMAN.  That  was  after  the  information  was  obtained  from
    the  committee  that  the  1,000-pound  shipment  had  taken  place.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  So  that  was  sometime  in  1948  ?

    Mr.  BuRMAN.  Yes ;  after  June  1948.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  After  June  1948  ?

    Mr.  Btjrman.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  all.

    Mr.  Wood.  Any  questions?

    (No  response.)

    Mr.  Wood.  Thank  you  very  much.

    (Whereupon  the  witness  was  excused.)

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner.  I  would  like  to  call  Mr.  Hermann  H.  Rosenberg.

    Mr.  Wood.  Will  you  hold  up  your  right  hand  and  be  sworn?  Do
    you  solemnly  swear  the  evidence  you  give  this  committee  shall  be  the
    truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Wood.  Have  a  seat.

    TESTIMONY   OF  HERMANN  H.   ROSENBERG,   ACCOMPANIED  BY
    MANFRED  WOLKISER,  ATTORNEY

    .     Mr.  Tavenner.  Wliat  is  your  full  name,  please?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Hermann  H.  Rosenberg.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Are  you  accompanied  here  by  counsel?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  TA^^NNER.  Will  counsel  please  state  his  name  and  address  for
    identification  purposes  in  the  record  ?

    Mr.  WoLKiSER.  Manfred  Wolkiser,  70  Pine  Street,  New  York  City,
    general  counsel  of  Chematar,  Tnc,  chemical  wholesalers.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Rosenberg,  when  and  where  were  you  born  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  was  born  April  21, 1902,  in  Berlin,  Germany.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Are  you  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United  States?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Ta-s^nner.  When  did  you  come  to  the  United  States  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  In  March  1939.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Wlien  were  you  naturalized?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  In  August  1945.

    Mr.  Taat^nner.  In  what  type  of  business  enterprise  were  you  en-
    gaged in  Germany  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  In  the  chemical  trade.  It  is  the  same  kind  of  busi-
    ness I  am  engaged  in  now,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  the  same  organi-
    zation I  have  been  with  for  the  last  30  years.  This  company  I  am
    associated  with  now,  of  course,  has  been  incorporated  in  the  United
    States  after  our  arrival  in  this  country,  but  it  is  actually  a  continua-
    tion of  our  business  on  the  other  side.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  have  testified  previously  before  this  commit-
    tte,  I  believe  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes;  I  did,

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Rosenberg,  when  did  you  first  confer  with  the
    Russian  Purchasing  Commission  relative  to  the  acquisition  of  uranium
    compounds?

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1005

    Mr.  EosENBERG.  Witliiii  the  course  of  regular  business  with  allied
    purchasino;  commissions  during  the  war,  which  was  practicjilly  the
    only  possibility  of  continuing  business  with  the  overseas  countries  with
    which  we  dealt  in  peacetime,  we  had  contact  also  with  the  Russian
    Purchasing  Commission  by  phone  and  occasional  visits  to  Washington
    when  we  saw  the  other  allied  purchasing  commissions  also,  and  it  was
    the  end  of  January  1943  when  we  got  an  inquiry  from  the  Soviet  Pur-
    chasing Commission.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Regarding  uranium  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Ta\t;nner.  It  was  the  latter  part  of  January  1943,  that  you  had
    your  first  contact  with  them  regarding  uranium  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  TA^^5NNER.  Had  you  had  transactions  with  the  Russian  Purchas-
    ing Commission  prior  to  that  time  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes.  According  to  my  best  knowledge  and  belief
    Ave  had  about  five  very  minor  transactions  in  industrial  and  fine  chemi-
    cals with  them  after  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1941,  since  December
    1941,  and  in  1942,  aggregating  a  couple  thousand  dollars,  I  would  say,
    according  to  my  memory ;  a  very  minor  amount.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Would  you  tell  us  the  nature  of  your  first  confer-
    ence with  the  Russian  Purchasing  Commission  relating  to  uranium?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  do  not  remember  having  had  any  correspondence
    wnth  them,  but  according  to  my  recollection  we  hacl  quite  a  number
    of  telephone  conferences  with  them.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  receive  a  letter  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes ;  we  received  inquiry  by  a  letter.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  have  the  letter?  We  will  save  time  if  you
    have  the  letter  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  We  have  not  all  our  correspondence  with  any  of  our
    customers  for  those  years.

    Mr.  Wood.  The  question  was  asked  you  if  you  have  that  letter?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  No  ;  I  have  not  that  letter,  but  I  have  the  confirma-
    tion of  that  letter,  and  may  I  explain  the  reason  for  not  having  the
    original  letter  but  having  a  copy  of  our  letter  ?  The  practice  in  our
    company  is  that  we  have  shipping  files — that  means  files  pertain-
    ing to  the  particular  shipment — and  a  regular  file  in  which  an  extra
    copy  of  our  correspondence  is  kept.  We  have  disposed  of  all  the  ship-
    ping files  up  to,  as  far  as  I  remember,  1943  or  1944,  unless  there  is
    correspondence  in  those  particular  shipping  files  of  later  years,  while
    we  have,  of  course,  kept  the  less  voluminous  files  in  which  not  all
    the  shipping  correspondence  was  collected.  So  we  have  the  copies
    of  our  correspondence  in  many  cases  where  we  do  not  have  the  incom-
    ing correspondence  which  was  a  part  of  the  shipping  files.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  produce  at  this  time  the  letter  confirming
    your  first  communication  from  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission
    relating  to  uranium  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes  [producing  copy  of  letter].

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  think  it  would  save  time  if  I  read  this  in  evidence.

    Mr.  Walter.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  clarify  something  in  my  mind
    at  this  point  ?

    Mr.  Wood.  Yes.

    1006  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Walter.  As  I  understand,  in  order  to  avoid  an  accumulation
    of  useless  papers,  it  is  the  practice  of  your  company  to  destroy  corre-
    spondence after  keeping  it  for  a  certain  period  of  time  'i

    Mr.  RosENEERG.  Yes.

    Mr.  Walter.  Why  did  you  destroy  the  inquiry  to  you  and  retain
    your  reply  to  the  person  who  sent  the  inquiry  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  We  received,  of  course,  incoming  correspondence
    in  one  copy,  while  we  make  two  copies  of  our  outgoing  correspondence.
    One  copy  goes  in  the  so-called  shipping  file,  which  naturally  is  being
    destroyed  periodically,  while  the  other  copy  of  our  outgoing  corre-
    spondence is  kept  in  the  general  file.

    Mr.  Walter.  Why  would  you  keep  a  copy  of  your  letter  when  it
    doesn't  relate  to  anything  at  all  ?

    Mr.  Wolkiser.  May  I  please

    Mr.  Walter.  No.    I  am  asking  him.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  The  files  which  pertain  to  the  actual  shipments
    have  quite  a  volume  and  our  ojSice  is  comparatively  small.  We  keep,
    of  course,  all  the  incoming  and  outgoing  invoices.

    Mr.  Wood.  Do  you  desire  to  read  tliis  copy  into  the  record,  Mr.
    Tavenner  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes.

    Mr.  Wood.  Without  objection  you  may  do  so.

    Mr.  Tavenner  (reading)  :

    Februaky  2,  1943.

    The  Government  Purchasing  Commission  op  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  U.  S.  A.,
    1610  Park  Road  NW.,  Washington,  D.  C.
    (Attention  Mr.  N.  S.  Fomichev.)

    Gentlemen  :  We  acknowledge  to  have  received  yesterday  your  inquiry  of
    January  28  concerning  uranium  metal,  urano-uranic  oxide,  and  nitrouranyl.

    We  are  preparing  an  interesting  proposition,  including  uranium  metal,  for
    you  and  shall  communicate  with  you  within  the  next  few  days.

    The  majority  of  the  inquired  items  could  be  shipped  promptly.

    Should  you  have  to  place  your  order  before  our  offer  is  in  your  hands,  please
    give  us  a  ring,  so  that  we  can  submit  our  proposition  to  you,  if  necessary,  by
    phone,  before  you  make  your  final  decision.
    Very  truly  yours,

    By  Hermann  Rosenberg.
    Chematar,  Inc.,

    Mr.  Wood.  What  is  the  date  of  that  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  February  2, 1943.  I  offer  the  letter  in  evidence  and
    ask  that  it  be  marked  "Exhibit  Rosenberg  1."

    Mr.  Case.  Mr.  Rosenberg,  I  notice  there  is  a  mark  across  the  type-
    written part  of  the  signature.    Does  that  mark  have  any  significance?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  No.    That  is  my  initial.

    Mr.  Case.  That  is  your  initial  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  And  you  put  that  initial  there  yourself?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  That  is  your  characteristic  manner  of  putting  your  initial
    on  a  carbon  copy?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Case.  No  objection.

    Mr.  Wood.  It  will  be  admitted.

    (The  copy  of  letter  above  referred  to,  marked  "Exhibit  Rosenberg
    1,"  is  hereinabove  incorporated  in  the  record.)  ^

    «  See  appendix.

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1007

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  action  did  you  take  after  receiving  the  in-
    quiry for  uranium  compounds?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  As  was  customary  during  the  "war  years,  we  in-
    quired of  War  Production  Board,  Chemical  Information  Section,
    Group  2,  in  New  York,  whetlier  there  was  any  restriction  as  to  the
    material  involved.  I  approached,  on  the  same  day  we  received  the
    inquiry,  January  29,  1943,  group  2  of  the  War  Production  Board  in
    New  York,  and  got  the  information  that  just  a  few  days  before,  as  a
    matter  of  fact  on  January  26, 1943,  an  order  was  issued  restricting  this
    particular  merchandise  to  certain  uses.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  that  order  M-285  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  M-285;  yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Proceed.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  We  were  told  that  this  order  prohibited  the  use  of
    uranium  compounds  in  glass,  ceramics,  pottery,  and  so  on,  but  that  it
    did  not  say  anything  about  export  and  was  apparently  not  applicable.
    As  to  details,  we  were  referred  to  the  Miscellaneous  Minerals  Division
    of  the  War  Production  Board.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  quantity  of  material  did  the  Russian  Purchas-
    ing Commission  show  an  interest  in  obtaining?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Two  hundred  and  twenty  pounds  of  uranium  ni-
    trate; 220  pounds  of  uranium  oxide;  and  25  pounds  of  uranium
    metal.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  After  conferring  with  group  2  of  the  War  Pro-
    duction Board,  what  did  you  do?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  We  had  been  promised  a  copy  of  the  restriction
    order,  and  apioroached  in  the  meantime,  by  phone  and  wire,  a  number
    of  possible  suppliers  of  this  material.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  have  copies  of  your  letters  and  telegrams  to
    possible  suppliers?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.  We  sent  one  telegram  to  the  Shattuck
    Chemical  Co.  in  Denver,  Colo.,  and  had  telephone  conversations  with
    the  rest  of  the  companies  we  knew  of  at  that  time,  because  they  were
    located  in  New  York.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  was  the  date  of  your  telegram  to  the  Shat-
    tuck Co.  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  January  29,  1948.

    Mr.  Ta\tenner.  You  acted  very  promptly,  because  you  acted  prior  to
    acknowledging  receipt  of  the  request?

    Mr.  Rosenberg,  Yes.  Pi'eceding  this  inquiry  we  must  have  received
    a  telephone  call  from  the  Russians,  because  in  this  telegram  to  the
    Shattuck  Chemical  Co.  we  say :

    For  Allied  Government  order  being  not  subject  WPB  Order  M-285  please
    wire  quotations     *     *     *

    Shall  I  go  one  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  don't  think  it  is  necessary.  What  is  the  date  of
    your  wire  to  the  Shattuck  Co.  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  January  29,  1943.

    Mr.  Walter.  I  think  the  telegram  should  go  in  the  record  in  its
    entirety.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  offer  the  telegam  in  evidence  and  ask  that  it  be
    marked  "Exhibit  Rosenberg  2."

    Mr.  Wood.  It  will  be  admitted.

    1008  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    (The  copy  of  telegram  above  referred  to,  marked  "Exhibit  Rosen-
    berg 2,''  is  hereinafter  incorporated  in  the  record.)  '
    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  I  will  read  it :

    January  29, 1943.
    S.  W.  Shattuck  Chemical  Co.,

    Denver,  Colo.:

    For  Allied  Government  order  being  not  subject  WPB  order  M-285  please  wire
    quotations  including  export  packing  25  pounds  uranium  metal,  220  pounds
    uranium  oxide  U30S,  220  pounds  uranium  nitrate.  Indicate  earliest  possible
    delivery  time  and  what  quantities  available  from  stock  we  pay  against  delivery.
    Please  let  specifications  follow  by  air  mail.

    Chematar,  Inc.,
    40  Exchange  Place,  Netv  York,  N.  Y.

    Mv.  Kearney.  INIay  I  ask  a  question  there?

    Mr.  Walter  (presiding  in  temporary  absence  of  ISIr.  Wood).  Yes.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Was  that  telegram  sent  after  the  receipt  of  the  in-
    quiry from  the  Russian  purchasing  agency?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes ;  the  day  following  the  date  of  the  inquiry,

    (Representative  Wood  returns.)

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  other  evidence  do  3'ou  have  in  the  way  of
    copies  of  telegrams  or  letters  regarding  inquiries  made  of  othen
    suppliers  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  As  I  said,  these  other  suppliers  were  located  in
    New  York  City,  so  we  merely  had  telephone  conversations  with  these
    companies,  and  made  a  record  of  the  telephone  quotations.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  say  you  made  a  record  of  the  telephone
    conversations?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Of  these  telephone  conversations,  since  we  Avere  not
    familiar  with  these  items  and  we  had  no  other  record  of  the  telephone
    quotations.

    Mr.  TA^^ENNER.  When  did  30U  prepare  this  statement  of  telephone
    messages  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  On  January  29,  1943.  Here  is  a  second  one  of
    February  1,  1943.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  desire  to  offer  in  evidence  the  two  reports  of
    telephone  conferences,  the  first  bearing  date  January  29,  1943,  which
    1  ask  to  have  marked  "Exhibit  Rosenberg  3,"  and  the  second  bear-
    ing date  February  1,  1943,  which  I  ask  to  have  marked  "Exhibit
    Rosenberg  4."

    Mr.  Kearney.  Mr.  Chairman,  whom  were  the  telephone  conversa-
    tions with  ?

    Mr.  Wood.  I  am  asking  coimsel  to  develop  it  a  little  further.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Exhibit  3  shows  you  made  inquiry  of  A.  MacKay  &
    Co.     Is  that  correct?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  the  reply  that  you  received,  according  to  this
    memorandum,  was  that  the  company  had  made  20  poiuids  which  were
    supposed  to  be  ready,  and  another  5  pounds  could  be  ready  in  a  week  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  right.     That  is  of  uranium  metal.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  of  uranium  metal  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes.  These  letters  refer  to  these  products  [in-
    dicating] .

    '  See  appendix.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1009

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  see.     That  related  to  uranium  metal.     Then  you
    asked  questions  regarding  uranium  oxide  and  uranium  nitrate?
    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  right.
    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  you  were  given  prices  ?
    Mr.  Eosenberg.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  also  conferred  with  Fairmount  Chemical  Co.
    on  that  date?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  you  conferred  with  B.  F.  Drakenfeld  &  Co.  on
    that  same  date?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  conferred  with  du  Pont,  with  a  Mr.  Sellger
    of  du  Pont?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  were  advised  that  du  Pont  could  not  furnish
    you  any  material,  that  it  was  all  requisitioned  by  the  United  States
    Government  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  They  offered  the  material.  We  were  offered  220
    pounds  of  uranium  oxide  and  220  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate  for
    prompt  delivery.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  conferred  also  with  Mallinkrodt?
    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  a  chemical  supplier  of  fine  chemicals  in  smaller
    quantities,  according  to  my  knowledge,   for  laboratory   and   other
    similar  uses.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  also  conferred  with  a  company  the  name  of
    which  I  cannot  read.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Merck  &  Co.,  M-e-r-c-k.  To  them  applies  the  same
    I  said  about  Mallinkrodt,  while  du  Pont  is  an  industrial  supplier  in
    larger  quantities.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  A.  MacKay  &  Co.  advised  that  they  could  only  fur-
    nish you  with  black  uranium  oxide?
    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Ta\t.nner.  Fairmount  Chemical  Co.  could  not  supply  the  ura-
    nium oxide,  and  stated  that  early  the  next  week  it  would  quote  you
    regarding  the  uranium  nitrate?
    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  B.  F.  Drakenfeld  &  Co.  advised  that  uranium  oxide
    was  all  they  could  offer,  and  it  was  yellow  UsOs  ?
    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  right.
    Mr.  Walter.  Wliat  are  the  dates,  Mr.  Tavenner  ?
    Mr.  Tavenner.  January  29.
    Mr.  Walter.  What  year  ?
    Mv.  Tavenner.  1943.
    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Tave-nner.  Here  is  a  notation  in  regard  to  your  conference
    with  B.  F.  Drakenfeld  &  Co. :

    Althoiigh  he  was  willing  to  quote  after  I  gave  him  the  message  from  WPB,  his
    principals  did  not  permit  him  to  quote  for.  export,  but  he  said  we  sliould  commu-
    nicate with  the  following  importers:  African  Metal  Co.,  41  Broad  Street,  New
    York,  N.  Y. ;  Raymond  Luber,  Bridgeport,  Conn.

    Did  you  communicate  with  African  Metal  Co.?
    Mr.  Rosenberg.  According  to  the  memorandum  of  February  1,
    1943, 1  did;  yes.

    993.34 — 50 8

    2010  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Du  Pont,  as  stated,  made  you  a  quotation  for  the
    220  pounds  of  uranium  oxide  and  220  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  other  organizations  referred  to  there  were
    unable  to  quote  ?

    ;Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  correct.  ;

    Mr.  Wood.  Does  the  memorandum  show  the  names  of  the  individ-
    uals in  these  organizations  with  whom  he  had  these  conversations?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  It  does.  In  one  instance  it  does  not  give  the  name
    of  the  person  speaking,  and  that  was  the  first  instance  of  A.  MacKay
    &  Co.

    Mr.  Walter.  How  many  companies  indicated  their  ability  to  quote
    on  uranium?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Do  you  mean  on  uranium  metal  or  uranium
    compounds  ?

    Mr.  Walter.  Both.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  May  I  read

    Mr.  Walter.  Just  the  number.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Uranium  metal,  two ;  uranium  oxide,  two ;  uranium
    nitrate,  two;  and  a  third  one  promises  to  quote  early  the  next  week.
    May  I  mention  this  is  only  part  of  our  investigation  at  that  time.

    Mr.  Walter.  What  is  the  name  of  the  person  with  whom  you  talked
    when  you  conferred  with  the  first  organization  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  A.  MacKay  &  Co.  ?

    Mr.  Walter.  Yes.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  It  is  7  years  back,  but  I  remember  one  name  of  a
    gentleman  who  I  ever  talked  to  with  this  company,  Mr.  King,  and  I
    suppose  Mr.  King  was  also  in  this  particular  instance  the  one  I
    talked  to.

    Mr.  Case.  Mr.  Chairman,  before  that  is  entered  I  would  like  to  see  it.

    Mr.  Ta-st.nner.  With  regard  to  exhibit  4,  which  is  a  record  of  tele-
    phone calls  for  February  1,  1943,  it  shows  that  du  Pont,  giving  in
    parentheses  the  name  of  the  person  with  whom  you  spoke,  made  a
    quotation  to  you  on  sodium  uranate,  showing  the  complete  analysis.
    That  was  not  part  of  this  inquiry  from  the  Russians,  was  it?

    (Witness  makes  oif-the-record  statement  to  Mr.  Tavenner.)

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Let's  get  it  on  the  record.  You  have  stated  to  me
    there  was  a  mix-up  about  the  material  quoted  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Material  inquired  about.  This  being  the  first  time
    we  were  in  contact  with  this  material,  we  were  confused  as  to  the
    product  the  Russians  actually  wanted.  These  reports  bear  out  this
    confusion.  We  had  talked  the  previous  day  with  companies  familiar
    with  this  material,  so  I  followed  on  February  1  with  conversations
    with  du  Pont  and  African  Metals  to  find  out  what  type  of  uranium
    oxide  the  required  product  actually  is,  and  I  found  out  there  was  the
    yellow  grade  and  the  black  grade,  and  from  the  communications  that
    followed  subsequently  with  Shattuck  Co.  I  remember  now  that  at
    that  time  I  was  informed  there  was  a  green  grade,  which  was  the
    one  we  actually  purchased  and  delivered  from  Shattuck  Co.  to  the
    Russians,  and  which,  I  have  been  told,  was  the  purest  grade  avail-
    able, purer  than  the  yellow  and  black  grades.  And  so  on  February  1
    we  got  information  from  du  Pont,  Mr.  Sellger;  and  from  African
    Metals  Corp.,  Mr.  Deschepper,  about  these  unclear  questions.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1011

    Mr.  Ta^^nner.  At  the  bottom  of  this  report  I  find  this  notation :

    The  packing  of  the  material  would  not  cause  them  any  difficulties,  since  they
    would  have  to  pack  the  merchandise  in  their  original  packing  as  it  is,  merely  in
    an  outside  case.

    What  were  you  referring  to  there?     Packing  for  export?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  for  export.  I  told  them  this  material  was  for
    an  allied  country,  and  they  said  it  was  no  trouble  to  pack  for  export.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  notify  them  of  the  country  to  which  the
    material  was  to  be  shipped  ?

    Mr.  EosENBERG.  No,  because  as  brokers  we  are  not  much  interested
    in  bringing  our  suppliers  and  our  customers  together.

    Mr.  Case.  Page  2  of  exhibit  3  is  headed:  "Telephone  reports  re-
    garding uranium.  January  20,  1943."  The  first  item  starts  with:
    ''WPB  (Murrayhill  3-2520  group  2)."  Does  WPB  there  stand  for
    War  Production  Board?

    Mr.  EosENBERG.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  The  note  which  follows  in  this  typewritten  carbon  copy
    reads :

    There  is  an  order  of  January  26  M-285  merely  prohibiting  the  use  of  uranium
    chemicals  in  the  domestic  glass,  ceramic,  and  pottery  industries  and  says  noth-
    ing regarding  export.  Besides,  no  effective  date  is  given  yet.  If  it  is  for  war
    use  by  the  Russians,  this  order  definitely  does  not  apply.  He  sends  us  two
    copies.  For  details  we  might  communicate  with  their  Washington  Miscellaneous
    Minerals  Division.

    Does  that  represent  a  summary  of  the  statements  by  the  representa-
    tive of  the  War  Production  Board  with  whom  you  talked  at  this  tele-
    phone number  ?

    Mr.  EosENBERG.  Ycs.  .

    Mr.  Case.  Do  you  recall  his  specifically  saying  that  "If  it  is  for  war
    use  by  the  Eussians,  this  order  definitely  does  not  apply"  ?

    Mr.  EosENBERG.  I  do  not  recollect  the  exact  words  he  used  7  years
    ago,  but  I  dictated  this  5  minutes  after  the  conversation,  and  at  that
    time  I  am  sure  that  I  got  the  right  gist  of  the  conversation.  I  have  a
    copy  of  that  order  right  here.

    Mr.  Case.  Do  you  recall  with  whom  you  talked  at  the  War  Produc-
    tion Board?

    Mr.  EosENBERG.  There  is  an  information  board,  group  2,  with  which
    we  always  conferred  when  materials  unknown  to  us  were  inquired  from
    us  during  wartime,  and  only  on  the  strength  of  this  telephonic  infor-
    mation did  we  approach  these  suppliers.

    Mr.  Walter.  So  that  your  contacts  with  the  War  Production  Board
    were  not  with  any  particular  person.  You  merely  called  the  general
    information  board  ?

    Mr.  EosENBERG.  At  that  time.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  discovered  later  that  it  was  necessary  to  obtain
    an  export  license  in  order  to  ship  it  abroad  ?

    Mr.  EosENBERG.  It  was  our  general  knowledge  at  that  time  that  every
    product  going  out  of  this  country  required  an  export  license  to  be
    procured  by  the  actual  exporter.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Didn't  you  consult  Mr.  Alexander  Pregel  and  Mr.
    Boris  Pregel  at  that  time  regarding  prices  for  delivery  of  uranium
    oxide  ?

    Mr.  Eosenberg.  At  some  later  date  we  did  that.

    1012  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Tavexxer.  How  much  later,  and  do  you  have  the  record  of  that
    telephone  call?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  do  not  have  a  record  of  that  telephone  call,  but  I
    have  a  record  of  the  conversation  with  these  gentlemen  at  the  time
    of  the  purchase  from  the  Canadian  company.

    Mr.  TA^'ENNER.  I  am  talking  about  the  time  you  put  through  your
    first  successful  effort  to  sell  uranium.  Didn't  you  inquire  at  the  time
    you  made  these  inquiries,  or  shortly  thereafter,  the  price  at  which
    r*regel  could  furnish  the  same  material  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  suppose  so,  and  I  have  possibly  also  a  note  about
    this  conversation.  However,  since  we  make  notes  of  conversations  in
    cases  where  we  have  new  and  otherwise  not  confirmed  information,
    there  was  no  necessity  at  that  particular  time  to  make  a  memorandum
    about  any  other  conversations.

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner.  Before  we  get  to  that,  let  us  find  out  a  little  more
    about  the  initial  contact  you  niade  with  Mr.  Pregel  about  it.  When  did
    you  talk  to  him  about  the  delivery  of  this  first  order  of  uranium?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  have  seen  INIr.  Pregel,  according  to  my  best  recol-
    lection, only  once  in  my  life,  and  that  was  during  the  second  part  of
    April  1943.     I  have  had  several  telephone  conversations  with  him.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Answer  specifically  my  question.  At  the  time  or
    about  the  time  that  you  made  inquiries  from  these  various  suppliers,  a
    record  of  which  you  have,  did  you  not  also  make  the  same  type  of  in-
    quiry from  Mr.  Pregel  and,  if  so,  when?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  suppose  so.  I  cannot  tell  you  from  my  notes
    when  that  was.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  But  it  is  your  positive  recollection  that  you  did
    ask  him  to  quote  you  the  price  for  delivery  of  220  pounds  of  uranium
    oxide  and  220  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir;  to  my  best  knowledge  and  belief  I  con-
    tacted him  at  that  time  also.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Why  didn't  you  make  a  memorandum  of  that  tele-
    phone conversation  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Mr.  Tavenner,  I  did  not  say  I  have  not  made  it.
    I  do  not  have  it.  I  did  not  even  look  for  it  at  this  time.  There  is  a
    possibility  if  I  go  through  our  old  records  of  19-13  I  might  be  able
    to  find  a  memorandum  about  this  conversation.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  You  think  you  have  a  memorandum  about  it?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  think  so.     There  is  a  good  possibility.

    ]Mr.  Tavenner.  Well,  you  Iniew  before  you  came  here  that  the  name
    of  Mr.  Pregel  was  going  to  be  involved,  was  bound  to  be,  in  connection
    with  these  transactions,  because  you  later  represented  him,  and  I  would
    have  thought  you  would  be  particularly  careful  to  bring  memoranda
    pertaining  to  him  rather  than  concerns  we  have  heard  of  for  the
    first  time.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  did  not  know  until  I  left  New  York  Saturday  that
    Mr.  Pregel  would  be  a  special  subject  of  this  hearing.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  would  like  you  to  furnish  us  a  memorandum  of
    that  telephone  convereation  if  you  can  locate  it.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  certainly  will  if  I  can  locate  it.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Wliat  was  the  result  o'f  your  telephone  conversation
    with  Mr.  Pregel,  and  I  should  ask  you  which  Mr.  Pregel  you  spoke  to  ?

    Mr.  Resenberg.  I  spoke  to  a  Mr.  Alexander  Pregel ;  and  I  can  say
    that  until  I  heard  it  during  this  hearing  and  understood  from  news-

    SHIPMENT   OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1013

    paper  reports,  I  did  not  know  there  was  a  Mr.  Boris  Pregel,  to  whom
    I  have  never  talked,  to  my  knowledge.  I  remember  once  when  I  called
    Mr.  Alexander  Pregel  was  out  of  town  and  I  talked  to  another  Mr.
    Pregel  who  might  have  been  his  brother.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  will  ask  you  questions  about  that  later  on.  What
    were  you  advised  about  the  availability  of  this  material  by  Mr.  Alex-
    ander Pregel  when  you  called  him  about  the  time  you  called  these
    other  supplier  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  can  answer  that  question  if  I  find  a  memorandum
    about  this  conversation.

    Mr.  Ta\'t:nner.  Did  he  make  a  quotation  to  you  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  According  to  my  recollection  he  did.

    Mr.  Ta\tenner.  How  did  that  quotation  compare  with  other  prices?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  It  must  have  been  more  expensive,  if  I  received  it,
    because  we  did  not  consider  it  until  we  could  not  get  this  merchandise
    from  Shattuck  Co.  any  more.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Are  you  satisfied  now  from  your  recollection  that
    Mr.  Pregel  repoited  he  had  the  stocks  on  hand  that  you  desired  and
    could  make  delivery  of  it?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  According  to  my  best  knowledge  and  belief  he
    quoted  at  that  time,  but  at  too  high  a  price.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Can  you  fix  the  month  you  had  that  conversation
    with  him?

    ]\lr.  Rosenberg.  About  that  same  time,  early  February  1943.

    (Witness  confers  with  his  counsel.)

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  It  was  definitely  not  on  the  same  date  I  made  these
    telephone  reports,  because  all  the  calls  made  on  that  date  appear  on
    this  piece  of  paper.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  As  a  result  of  these  calls  that  you  placed,  you  finally
    made  a  deal  with  Shattuck?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  I  now  offer  exhibit  Rosenberg  3  and  exhibit  Rosen-
    berg 4  in  evidence.

    Mr.  Wood.  They  will  be  admitted.

    (The  documents  above  referred  to,  marked  "Exhibit  Rosenberg  3"
    and  "Exhibit  Rosenberg  4,"  are  hereinafter  incorporated  in  the
    record.)  ^

    Mr.  Tavenner.  T  would  like  for  you  to  tell  the  committee  at  this
    time  what  your  procedure  was,  and  what  your  procedure  became,  in
    the  handling  of  these  uranium  transactions :  That  is,  how  you  made
    your  contracts,  how  they  were  handled  before  the  licensing  agency,
    and  the  general  plan  under  which  these  licenses  were  obtained  and
    the  contracts  consummated.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  would  like  to  say  at  the  outset  that  the  export-
    license  part  was  not  our  business,  since  we  were  not  the  exporters  of
    this  material ;  but  I  can  give  information  which  I  got  in  the  course
    of  this  transaction  about  these  export-license  applications  by  the
    Soviet  Purchasing  Commission.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  am  going  to  change  my  question.  I  believe  it  is
    going  to  take  too  long  to  answer.     Tell  us  just  what  you  did  in  this

    *  See  appendix.

    1014  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    transaction  with  Sliattuck  after  you  received  their  offer,  or  their
    commitment  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg,  We  received  their  quotation  the  same  day  we  had
    inquired.  We  received  this  bj^  wire.  We  passed  this  on  to  the  Soviet
    Purchasing  Commission.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  have  any  record  of  your  letter  or  telegram
    passing  that  information  on?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  May  I  use  notes  which  I  made  about  these  details?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  will  be  satisfactory.  That  seems  to  be  a  pre-
    pared memorandum  you  have  there?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes ;  from  the  files,  which  I  could  locate,  plus  the
    deductions  which  you  could  make  from  these  files,  as,  for  instance,
    from  that  letter  of  February  2, 1  deduced  we  had  received  an  inquiry
    on  February  1.

    Mr.  Case.  You  have  already  submitted,  and  there  have  been  placed
    in  evidence,  copies  of  notes  made,  you  stated,  at  the  time  the  telephone
    conversations  were  had  with  these  possible  suppliers  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  In  the  letter  of  February  2,  1943,  already  placed  in  evi-
    dence, you  invite  the  Russian  Purchasing  Commission  to  communicate
    with  you  by  telephone  should  they  have  to  place  their  order  before
    your  offer  is  in  their  hands.

    ]\Ir.  Rosenberg.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  they  communicate  with  you  by  telephone  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  They  had  no  reason  to,  because  on  February  4  we
    sent  them  our  quotation.

    Mr.  Case.  How  did  you  find  out  the  quantities  they  wanted  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  They  gave  us  the  quantities,  apparently,  by  phone,
    and  confirmed  it  by  that  letter  which  we  received  on  February  1,

    Mr.  Case.  They  gave  you  the  quantities  by  telephone  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  you  make  notes  of  that  telephone  conversation,  sim-
    ilar to  these  other  notes  that  we  have  ?

    ]\Ir.  Rosenberg.  There  is  a  possibility  that  we  did,  but  I  do  not
    have  it.

    Mr.  Case.  You  do  not  have  that  with  you  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  particular  telephone  conversation,  I  do  not
    have  a  note  about  that  here.

    Mr.  Case.  You  stated  it  was  not  always  your  custom  to  keep  the
    letters  that  came  in,  but  it  was  your  practice  to  prepare  these  tele-
    phone reports  5  minutes  after  the  conversation?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Not  always;  when  we  were  dealing  with  material
    that  was  new  to  us.

    Mr.  Case.  Didn't  you  make  a  note  of  the  quantities  they  wanted?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  There  is  a  possibility  I  did.  I  do  not  have  all  my
    notes  with  me.

    Mr.  Case.  Mr.  Chairman,  this  letter  which  is  in  evidence  invites  the
    Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  to  communicate  by  telephone,  and
    since  we  have  in  evidence  full  notes  in  regard  to  other  telephone  con-
    versations, I  would  like  to  ask  that  the  witness  examine  all  the  papers
    he  has  with  him  before  he  leaves  under  this  subpena,  to  determine  if  he
    has  any  notes  of  conversations  with  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commis-
    sion, and  also  whether  he  has  notes  elsewhere  supplying  this
    information.

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1015'

    Mr.  Wood.  If  you  have  such  notes,  where  would  they  be  now  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  In  New  York.

    Mr.  Case.  Why  weren't  they  brought  here  under  this  subpena  ?

    Mr.  Wood.  You  were  served  with  a  subpena  to  j)roduce  all  the  rec-
    ords you  had  in  this  case,  were  you  not  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  No  ;  I  was  not.  I  brought  this  correspondence  along
    in  order  to  support  as  much  as  I  possibly  could.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  understood,  did  you  not,  that  I  requested  your
    counsel  to  produce  all  the  records  bearing  on  the  transactions  relating
    to  uranium,  whether  the  inquiries  resulted  in  failure  to  produce  any
    uranium  or  whether  they  didn't?

    Mr.  WoLKiSER.  May  1  answer  that  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes.

    I\Ir.  WoLKiSER.  In  our  telephone  conversation  during  the  week,  after
    I  tried  to  contact  you  many  times,  you  told  me  the  subject  matters  in
    which  the  committee  woiild  be  interested,  just  generally,  but  any
    papers  and  documents  you  mentioned  only  Saturday  afternoon  when
    I  was  here,  and  by  that  time  my  client  was  on  his  way  from  New  York.
    But  he  has  an  awful  lot  of  papers  here,  and  if  you  take  his  recollection
    plus  the  papers,  I  believe  that  will  satisfy  the  committee  right  now,
    but  if  not,  we  can  still  produce  any  papers  you  want.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Don't  you  recall,  when  the  appointment  was  made
    for  Saturday  over  the  telephone  some  earlier  day  in  the  week,  that  I
    specified  exactly  the  matters  we  were  investigating?

    Mr.  WoLKiSER.  You  did  say  the  subject  matters,  but  you  did  not  at
    that  time  mention  any  records.    There  was  no  subpena.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  right ;  there  was  no  subpena.

    Mr.  WoLKiSER.  The  telephone  calls  are  all  over  the  place.  This  is  a
    7-year-old  case.

    IMr.  Wood.  Let's  get  along  with  the  testimony.

    Mr.  Ta\t.nner.  Proceed.  You  were  telling  us  you  had  a  telephone
    conversation  on  February  4.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  No.    We  wrote  a  letter  on  February  4.

    Mr.  Ta\t.nner.  Do  you  have  that  letter  witli  you  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  am  sorry ;  I  do  not.  But  that  letter  I  have,  and
    I  can  submit  it.  because  from  that  letter  I  quote  here,  so  I  must  have  it.

    Mr.  Wood.  Will  you  submit  it  when  you  return  to  your  office  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes.  On  February  4  we  wrote  the  Russian  Pur-
    chasing Commission  that  one  of  the  oldest  United  States  producers,
    Shattuck,  informs  us  that  black  material  only  contains  UsOg.  The
    pure  material  is  green,  which  we  offer,  99.5  percent  uranium,  at  $4.50,
    only  impurities  being  traces  of  iron  and  what  dust  might  possibly  get
    in  during  handling.  Both  products  now  offered  practically  chem-
    ically pure.  Confirming  agreement  to  communicate  with  each  other
    as  soon  as  either  advised  by  WPB  in  consequence  of  our  request  for
    authorization.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Then  what  followed  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  We  had  called  on  February  3,  preceding  this  letter,
    a  Mr.  Owen,  of  WPB,  Miscellaneous  Minerals  Division,  who  confirmed
    the  information  we  received  from  group  2  in  New  York,  and  informed
    us  further  there  is  no  application  or  authorization  form  under  M-285.

    On  February  6  we  wrote  to  the  Shattuck  Co.  confirming  substitution
    of  green  uranium  oxide,  confirming  their  chemical  information  in  that
    respect,  and  promised  to  work  on  these  orders.

    1016  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    Nothing  happened  until  March  2,  when  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Com-
    mission was  ready  to  buy,  and  we  wired  to  Shattuck  to  prepare  an  order
    for  200  pounds  of  UaOg  and  220  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate.  On
    March  3  Shattuck  wired  their  agreement.

    On  March  2  we  called  the  War  Production  Board,  Miscellaneous
    Minerals  Division,  in  regard  to  M-285.  We  spoke  to  a  Mr.  Park,
    assistant  to  K.  J.  Land,  in  charge  of  uranium,  who  advised  they  felt
    the  Eussian  requirement  was  not  affected  by  M-285,  prohibiting  only
    the  use  of  uranium  compounds  in  ceramics,  and  so  forth,  but  sug-
    gested

    Mr.  Kearney.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  a  question  here?

    Mr.  Wood.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  I^ARNEY.  I  would  like  to  ask  the  witness  when  that  memoran-
    dum was  prepared?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Last  week.

    Mr.  IvEARNEY.  Then  it  is  not  a  record  of  any  telephone  conversations
    made  at  the  time  of  the  telephone  conversations?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  No.  It  was  prepared  for  this  particular  purpose
    after  I  had  been  informed  through  our  counsel  what  was  the  subject
    matter  of  this  hearing.

    Mr.  Kearney.  And  the  information  contained  in  that  memorandum
    comes  from  your  own  records  or  from  memory  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  It  is  based  on  our  own  records,  which,  however,
    are  not  complete,  and  in  certain  cases,  as  I  mentioned  an  example  be-
    fore, it  is  deductions  based  on  correspondence  we  have.

    Mr.  Kearney.  And  also  from  your  best  recollection?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes.

    Mr.  Ta\':enner.  I  wish  you  would  support  each  statement  you  make
    by  a  copy  of  a  memorandum  of  telephone  message,  if  you  have  one,  or
    by  copy  of  letter  to  which  you  refer.

    (Witness  confers  with  his  counsel.)

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  If  you  want  me  to  complete  this  file,  I  can  do  it
    very  quickly  by  going  to  New  York  and  completing  it.  I  think  it  is
    hard  on  my  office  to  find  these  old  papers  without  my  presence,  but
    perhaps  it  can  be  done,  but  it  would  be  better  if  I  went  and  directed
    it.  I  am  sure  the  information  I  am  giving  here  can  be  supported  to
    a  very  great  extent.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  understood  you  had  your  full  file  records  with  you  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  No.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  If  you  do  not,  just  use  the  records  you  do  have  and
    support  each  statement  by  the  records  you  have  here.

    (Witness  confers  with  his  counsel.)

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  We  have  a  rather  complete  file  here,  but  I  did  not
    take  all  telephone  notes  along.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Use  what  records  you  have  and  we  will  go  into  the
    other  records  later.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  On  February  5  we  wrote  to  the  Shattuck  Co.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  offer  in  evidence  the  letter  of  February  5,  1943,
    addressed  to  the  S.  W.  Shattuck  Chemical  Co.,  Denver,  Colo,,  ancl
    signed  by  Chematar,  Inc.,  by  Hermann  Rosenberg,  and  ask  that  it  be
    marked  "Exhibit  Rosenberg  5."

    Mr.  Wood.  Without  objection,  it  will  be  admitted.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1017

    (The  copy  of  letter  above  referred  to,  marked  "Exhibit  Rosen-
    berg 5."  is  hereinafter  incorporated  in  the  record.)  ^

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Proceed.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  On  March  2  we  sent  the  following  telegram  to  the
    Shattuck  Co. :

    For  in-eparing  order  200  ponnds  Uthreeoeijilit  [U  SOS],  220  pounds  nitrouranyl,
    please  wire  confirmation  that  offor  including  delivery  times  still  good  as  wired
    January  twenty-ninth.  Merchandise  needed  for  military  purposes  of  Allied
    Government.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  offer  that  telegram  in  evidence  and  ask  that  it  be
    marked  "Exhibit  Rosenberg  6."

    Mr.  Wood.  It  will  be  admitted.

    (The  copy  of  telegram  above  referred  to,  marked  "Exhibit  Rosen-
    berg 6,"  is  hereinabove  incorporated  in  the  record.)  ^"

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  On  March  3  we  received  a  telegram  from  the  Shat-
    tuck Co.  This  is  an  original.  It  comes  out  of  the  general  file.  In
    the  shipping  file  we  have  a  copy.

    Mr.  Wood.  This  is  one  of  your  original  incoming  communications
    of  March  3  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.  All  the  telegrams  and  cables  in  our  office
    are  copied  because  we  have  different  departments  and  all  get  a  copy.
    Telegrams,  I  will  always  have  the  originals,  if  I  could  locate  them.

    Mr.  Wood.  You  mean  you  differentiate  between  telegrams  and  let-
    ters you  receive  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes ;  because  we  cannot  possibly  copy  every  incom-
    ing letter.

    Mr.  Wood.  Did  you  copy  this  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes.

    Mr.  Walter.  Why  didn't  you  destroy  the  original  telegram  and
    keep  only  the  copy  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Because  we  keep  the  original  telegrams,  of  which
    we  have  sent  copies  to  our  so-called  shipping  files,  in  the  general  file,
    while  the  incoming  letters,  being  put  in  the  shipping  file,  there  is  only
    one  original  in  our  possession.

    Mr.  Case.  What  happened  to  the  shipping  file  which  contained  the
    originals  of  letters?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  All  our  shipping  files  up  to  the  year  1943  have  been
    disposed  of,  I  would  say,  about  a  year  or  two  ago.

    (Witness  confers  with  his  counsel.)

    Mr.  Rosenberg  (continuing).  Except  if  we  have  correspondence  of
    later  years  in  the  same  file,  then  we  kept  them.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  a  question  before  we  ad-
    journ for  lunch?

    Mr.  Wood.  Yes.

    Mr.  Kearney.  May  I  see  that  letter  of  February  2  ?
    ("Exhibit  Rosenberg  1"  was  handed  to  Mr.  Kearney.)

    Mr.  Kearney.  I  call  the  witness'  attention  to  the  letter  dated  Febru-
    ary 2,  1943,  addressed  to  the  Government  Purchasing  Commission  of

    "  See  appendix.
    ^°  See  appendix.

    1018  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    the  Soviet  Union  in  the  U.  S.  A.    The  last  paragraph  reads  as  follows :

    Should  you  have  to  place  your  order  before  our  offer  is  in  your  hands,  please
    give  us  a  ring,  so  that  we  can  submit  our  proposition  to  you,  if  necessary,  by
    phone,  before  you  make  your  final  decision.

    Do  you  have  a  record  of  that  telephone  conversation  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  We  had  no  telephone  conversation,  according  to  my
    recollection  and  according  to  my  files,  since  2  days  later  we  were  able
    to  submit  the  quotation.

    Mr.  Kearney.  You  had  no  communication,  by  phone,  wire,  or  letter,
    from  the  time  of  this  communication  of  February  2  until  Feljruary  4  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  So  far  as  correspondence  is  concerned,  I  am  able
    to  develop  that  if  I  can  get  the  complete  file,  which  I  can  do  in  48
    hours.

    Mr.  Kearney.  This  file  is  in  your  office  in  New  York  City?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  am  sure  that  copies  of  our  correspondence  can  be
    developed.  There  might  be  exceptions,  but  I  don't  think  so.  If  I  had
    known  that  I  should  bring  along  the  complete  file,  I  could  have  done  so.
    It  would  be  quite  a  voluminous  file,  and  I  came  here  in  connection
    with  our  twentieth  anniversary,  which  we  had  yesterday,  and  I  didn't
    want  to  bring  too  much  stuff  with  me.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  offer  in  evidence  the  original  telegram  produced
    by  the  witness,  dated  March  3,  1943,  addressed  to  Chematar,  Inc.,  and
    signed  S.  W.  Shattuck  Chemical  Co.,  and  ask  that  it  be  marked  "Ex-
    hibit Rosenberg  7."

    Mr.  Wood.  It  will  be  admitted.

    (The  telegram  above  referred  to,  marked  "Exhibit  Rosenberg  7,"
    is  hereinafter  incorporated  in  the  record.)  ^^

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  will  read  that  telegram :

    Retel  IT308  and  uranyl  nitrate,  can  make  deliveries  as  mentioned  our  wire
    January  29.

    Mr.  Wood.  The  committee  stands  recessed  until  3  o'clock  this  after-
    noon.

    (Thereupon,  at  1 :  30  p.  m.,  a  recess  was  taken  until  3  p.  m.  of  the
    same  day.)

    afternoon  session

    (The  hearing  was  resumed  at  3 :  10  p.  m.)
    Mr.  Wood.  The  committee  will  be  in  order.

    Let  the  record  show  that  there  are  present  Mr.  Walter,  Mr.  Harrison,
    Mr.  Moulder,  Mr.  Velde,  Mr.  Kearney,  and  Mr.  Wood,  a  quorum.
    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Rosenberg,  will  you  come  forward,  please.

    TESTIMONY  OF  HERMANN  H.  ROSENBERG— Resumed

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Rosenberg,  before  we  proceed  further,  may  I  sug-
    gest that  we  will  save  a  good  deal  of  time  if  you  will  address  your
    answers  to  the  question  asked  you,  unless  you  think  there  is  a  pertinent
    explanation  you  may  care  to  make.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Rosenberg,  I  ask  if  you  will  turn  over  the
    records  which  you  have  and  to  which  you  have  referred  to  an  investi-

    "  See  appendix.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1019

    gator  on  the  staff  of  this  committee  to  review  them,  and  later  we  will
    determine  whether  or  not  it  is  necessary  to  bring  yon  back  here  and
    ask  you  further  questions  relating  to  those  documents?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavexner.  I  want  you  to  explain  to  the  committee  very  briefly
    just  what  your  procedure  was  in  handling  one  of  these  requests  from
    the  Russian  Purchasing  Commission  for  the  acquisition  of  uranium
    material.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  have  told  us  what  you  did  in  the  particular
    €ase  with  Shattuck.  After  getting  in  touch  with  Shattuck,  for  in-
    stance, and  finding  that  the  material  was  available,  your  next  step,
    as  I  understood,  was  to  advise  the  Russian  Purchasing  Commission
    that  the  materials  had  been  found  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Now,  will  you  tell  us  what  your  next  step  was  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  We  approached  by  telephone  the  War  Production
    Board.  Miscellaneous  Minerals  Division,  in  Washington,  to  make  sure
    again,  after  a  month  had  passed  since  we  got  that  information  about
    M-285,  whether  the  regulations  were  still  the  same,  and  we  were  told
    that  this  order  did  not  apply  to  an  export  delivery  to  the  Soviet  Pur-
    chasing Commission,  but  we  may  inquire  further  from  the  United
    States  Engineers  in  New  York.  I  phoned  that  office,  the  number  of
    which  I  got  from  the  person  I  spoke  to  in  the  War  Production  Board
    at  Washington,  and  I  spoke  to  Colonel  Crenshaw,  who  told  me  that  a
    Lieutenant  Burman  had  just  been  transferred  to  them  from  WPB,
    that  uranium  was  not  their  business,  but  this  man  would  know  better
    than  Colonel  Crenshaw  knew.  However,  in  Lieutenant  Burman's
    absence  he  would  suggest  we  go  back  to  WPB,  Washington,  and  talk
    to  Mr.  Land's  office,  and  if  we  got  satisfaction  there  we  should  proceed
    according  to  the  advice  we  received  there.

    That  is  what  I  did.  I  called  that  office  again  and  was  told  by  Mr.
    Park — I  never  had  occasion  to  talk  to  Mr.  Land,  but  I  understand
    Mr.  Park  was  Mr.  Land's  assistant — that  he  had  spoken  to  General
    Wesson,  and  that  we  should  take  up  the  matter  with  their  Lend-Lease
    Department,  Mr.  Moore.

    That  is  what  I  did.  Mr.  Moore  told  me  that  he  had  already  been
    approached  by  Mr.  Fomichev  of  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission
    sometime  back  concerning  a  uranium  requirement;  that  he  happened
    to  know  Mr.  Fomichev ;  and  he  would  get  in  touch  with  him  and  let
    me  know.     That  was  on  or  about  March  3.

    On  March  6  I  phoned  Mr.  Moore  again  and  I  got  the  permission
    which  I  thought  we  had  to  get  for  this  delivery,  by  phone,  and  subse-
    quently by  letter.  I  advised  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  in
    w^riting  about  the  fact  that  we  had  been  informed  by  Mr.  Moore  of  the
    Lend-Lease  Department  that  we  did  not  need  any  further  clearance  for
    this  transaction,  but  that  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  would
    have  to  apply  for  an  export  license,  which  I  advised  them  to  do.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  say  you  advised  the  Soviet  Purchasing
    Commission  they  should  apply  for  an  export  license  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  we  had  been  advised  by  Mr.  Moore  in  writing
    that  no  further  clearance  was  required  for  this  transaction  except  for
    the  export  license,  which  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  had  to
    get,  and  that  they  were  familiar  with  the  procedure.     That  was  part

    1020  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    of  that  letter.  That  information  I  passed  on  to  the  Russians,  inform-
    ing them  that  we  woukl  not  accept  the  order  unless  and  until  they  had
    received  the  export  license.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  j^ou  receive  the  export  license  for  this  first
    shipment?

    Mr.  EosENBERG.  We  never  received  any  export  license  for  any  deliv-
    ery to  any  Allied  mission,  because  it  was  the  Allied  mission's  business
    to  attend  to  this  part  of  the  procedure,  they  being  the  actual  exporters.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  But  you  would  not  undertake  to  close  a  transaction
    with  the  supplier  until  you  were  sure  the  export  license  had  been
    issued ;  is  that  correct?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Excuse  me.

    (Witness  confers  with  his  counsel.)

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  This  was  ^the  procedure  in  this  particular  case :
    We  had  been  notified  that  this  product  was  subject  to  a  War  Produc-
    tion Boaj-d  order,  and  we  wanted  to  proceed  with  particular  care  and
    make  sure  that  they  received  the  export  license  before  we  accepted  the
    order,  because  this  particular  product  was  covered  by  a  WPB  order,
    regardless  of  whether  it  was  covered  for  this  particular  purpose  by  the
    order  or  not.

    Mr.  Tam5Nner.  Do  you  know  whether  such  a  license  was  issued?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes.  We  have  been  told  that  by  Mr.  Moore  and
    by  the  Russian  Purchasing  Commission,  who  gave  us  a  number  and
    the  issuance  date.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  that  export  license  accompany  the  bill  of  lading
    on  the  shipment  of  the  materials  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  No.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  disposition  was  made  of  the  export  license
    after  it  was  issued  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  I  do  not  know.

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner.  Did  it  at  any  time  come  into  your  hands  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  No.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Were  you  advised  by  the  Russians  what  the  pro-
    cedure was  as  to  the  handling  of  the  license  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  No;  we  got  shipping  instructions  from  them  and
    it  was  a  domestic  destination.

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner.  That  is  all  I  am  going  to  ask  you  about  the  Shat-
    tuck  shipment.  Did  you  receive  another  request  for  uranium  after
    the  first  one  for  220  pounds  each  of  uranium  oxide  and  uranium
    nitrate  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  did  you  receive  that?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  On  or  about  March  19,  1943.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  then  follow  the  same  procedure  with
    Shattuck  that  you  followed  in  the  first  case  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  We  sent  them  a  telegram.  We  got  an  answer  we
    should  wait  a  few  days.  On  March  24  we  got  an  offer  from  them
    saying  they  could  not  offer  what  was  required,  because  this  Russian
    inquiry  said  that  they  would  preferably  receive  uranium  oxychloride,
    tri-,  tetra-,  or  pentchloride,  and  Shattuck  wired  us  they  could  merely
    offer  500  pounds  each  of  the  products  which  they  had  shipped  before.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  that  satisfactory  to  the  Russian  Purchasing
    Commission,  and  did  you  attempt  to  close  the  transaction  with  Shat-
    tuck?

    SHIPMENT   OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1021

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  We  took  the  same  stand — that  we  would  not  do
    anythinof  until  they  had  received  the  export  license.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  agree  to
    purchase  the  500  pounds  each  from  Shattuck  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes;  subject  to  receipt  of  export  license.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  know  whether  that  export  license  was
    denied  at  any  time ;  say,  the  14th  of  April  194.3  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  know  that  around  April  7  we  were  told  by  the
    Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  that  the  export  license  would  be
    granted  by  BEW  and  they  would  have  it  within  a  week.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  AVlio  in  BEW  made  that  representation?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  We  had  this  information  from  the  Russians,  be-
    cause we  had  no  contacts  with  BEW  in  this  business.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Proceed,  then,  to  tell  us  whether  you  later  learned
    that  the  license  had  been  denied.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  May  I  refer  to  my  notes  ?

    Mr.  Wood.  He  didn't  ask  for  any  dates.  Did  you  later  learn  the
    export  license  w^as  denied?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  No.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  Russians  never  told  you  they  were  having
    trouble  getting  the  license  issued?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  think  they  did,  around  the  time  you  mentioned;
    yes.     May  I  read  a  note  ?

    Mr.  TA^TNNER.  If  it  is  pertinent  to  this  question.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  All  right.

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Wlien,  on  April  22,  we  received  a  telegram  from
    the  Shattuck  Co.  that  they  withdrew  their  offer,  I  phoned  the  Soviet
    Purchasing  Commission  and  told  them  that.  I  will  read  this  note,
    now,  which  refers  to  a  conversation  with  Mr.  Fomichev :

    Read  him  Shattuck's  wire.  He  was  not  suiprised.  They  had  written  us  their
    last  letter  because  they  were  experiencing  already  difUculties  with  WPB,  Mis-
    cellaneous Minerals  Division,  Mr.  Peacock,  who  did  not  agree  as  yet  to  BEW's
    giving  the  export  license  due  to  urgent  domestic  requirements.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  So  he  was  not  surprised  when  the  Shattuck  Co.
    withdrew  its  offer  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Ta\T':nner.  Is  that  the  first  time  you  knew  that  there  was  diffi-
    culty in  obtaining  the  license?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  TA^^:NNER.  I  am  not  certain  that  I  understood  from  your  read-
    ing whether  Fomichev  advised  you  that  the  license  had  been  denied  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  No.     [Reading :]

    because  they  were  experiencing  already  difficulties  with  WPB,  Miscellaneous
    Minerals  Division,  Mr.  Peacock,  who  did  not  agi*ee  as  yet  to  BEW's  giving  the
    export  license  due  to  urgent  domestic  requirements.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Well,  what  occurred  when  you  advised  Fomicliev
    that  the  offer  had  been  withdrawn  ?
    Mr.  Rosenberg  (reading)  :

    We  should  try  to  maintain  the  offer  of  our  supplier ;  they,  of  course,  cannot
    con.sider  us  committed  toward  themselves,  but  they  will  do,  if  still  jrossible,  this
    business  with  us  and  keep  us  posted  about  any  further  developments.  We  might
    try  meanwhile  to  find  some  other  material  for  them,  for  which  the  chances  of
    materialization  might  be  better,  and  advise  them.

    1022  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    Mr.  Tavennee.  Did  you  take  the  matter  up  with  Mr.  Moore  or  any
    other  person  in  Lend-Lease  when  the  offer  was  withdrawn  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Not  at  this  time ;  no.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Wliat  supplier  did  you  then  contact  for  the  material
    after  you  were  turned  down  by  Shattuck  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  approached  for  advice  the  Fairmount  Chemical
    Co.  on  April  22,  the  day  w^hen  we  got  the  withdrawal  from  Shattuck.
    They  told  us  that  the  only  suppliers  in  the  United  States  were  Shattuck
    and  du  Pont,  who  got  their  stuff  from  Canada,  and  that  caused  me  to
    get  in  touch  the  following  day,  April  23,  with  the  Canadian  Radium
    &  Uranium  Corp.,  Mr.  A.  J.  Pregel.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  was  April  23  that  you  conferred  with  him  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes.    That  was  the  only  visit  with  him.

    Mr.  TxWEnner.  Did  he  tell  you  he  had  the  material  available  for
    you,  or  what  did  he  tell  you  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Tliat  as  far  as  uranium  compounds  are  concerned,
    the  United  States  and  Canada  are  considered  one  country,  with  exactly
    the  same  authorities  in  control  of  the  entire  production  and  stock.
    Nevertheless,  if  we  or  the  Russians  want  to  find  out  whether  for
    Canadian  material  WPB  would  give  allocation  and  export  license
    easier,  they  would  accept  the  order.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  If  I  understand  you  correctly,  he  told  you  if  an
    export  license  could  be  obtained

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Allocation  and  export  license.

    Mr.  Taa^nner.  An  allocation  could  be  obtained  from  Canada  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  From  our  WPB  easier  for  Canadian  material  than
    for  United  States  material,  then  they  would  accept  the  order.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  am  not  certain  whether  that  is  clear.  Will  you
    state  again  what  Mr.  Alexander  Pregel  stated,  or  if  you  have  it  written,
    let  me  read  it.

    (Witness  hands  paper  to  Mr.  Tavenner.)

    Mr.  Tavenner.  This  is  a  memorandum  dated  April  23,  and  it
    states :

    Uranium  compounds.  Also  as  far  as  uranium  compounds  are  concerned,  the
    United  States  and  Canada  are  considered  one  country,  with  exactly  the  same
    authorities  in  control  of  the  entire  production  and  stock.  Nevertheless,  if  we  or
    the  Russians  want  to  find  out  whether  for  Canadian  material  WPB  would  give
    allocation  and  export  license  easier,  tliey  would  accept  the  order.

    Mr.  Harrison.  In  other  words,  if  they  would  give  it  easier  for
    Canadian  materials  than  for  American  materials;  is  that  what  you
    mean  ?

    ISIr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  what  I  meant  to  bring  out.

    Mr.  Tavenner  (reading)  :

    Nevertheless,  if  we  or  the  Russians  want  to  find  out  whether  for  Canadian
    material  WPB  would  give  allocation  and  export  license  easier.

    In  other  words,  if  you  could  get  a  WPB  authorization  on  an  export
    license  they  would  be  able  to  get  it  more  easily  in  Canada  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  The  Soviets.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  It  says  "we  or  the  Russians."  Does  "we"  mean
    Chematar  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  did  you  then  proceed  to  do  after  receiving  that
    information  from  Mr.  Alexander  Pregel  ?

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1023

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  informed  the  Russians  of  that  development  and
    received  on  April  26  a  call  from  Mr.  Fomichev  that  they  had  received
    a  letter  from  the  Lend-Lease  Administrator  saying  they  had  approved
    the  giving  of  an  export  license  by  BEW  for  the  500  pounds  each  of
    uranium  uranic  oxide  and  nitrouranyl;  that  although  they  had  not
    received  yet  the  actual  export  license,  they  now  could  place  the  order
    finally,  and  we  should  see  what  we  still  could  do  with  our  supplier.
    He  said  we  could  mention  that  they  had  received  that  advice  from
    General  Wesson  of  the  Lend-Lease  Administration.

    ]\Ir.  Tavenner.  Did  you  know  at  that  time  that  the  license  which
    the  Russians  received  was  the  license  which  Lend-Lease  approved  for
    the  original  material  which  you  were  expecting  to  obtain  from  the
    Shattuck  Co.  ?  _  .  .

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  That  is  obvious,  because  I  insisted  on  an  amend-
    ment of  the  export  license  to  make  it  applicable.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  see  the  license  before  it  was  amended  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  We  never  saw  any  license,  but  we  were  advised  that
    the  license  was  amended  in  writing.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  In  fact,  you  considered  it  necessary  to  obtain  an
    amendment,  because  you  were  shipping  different  materials  at  different
    prices  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  By  all  means.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  did  you  advise  the  Russians  that  that  license
    would  have  to  be  amended  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  April  27.

    Mr.  Ta-^tinner.  What  did  you  advise  them  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  phoned  them  on  April  27,  and  my  telephone
    report  reads  like  this :

    When  I  gave  him  (Mr.  Fomichev)  the  negative  reply  as  per  Shattuck's  tele-
    gram, he  said  that  he  cannot  comprehend  this  outcome  but  finally  accepted  the
    situation  as  it  is.

    I  made  him  the  proposition  concerning  Canadian  material  as  per  our  today's
    letter,  which  he  wanted  to  get  to  file  the  amendment  of  the  export  license.  He
    now  has  received  the  export  license  No.  1643180,  dated  April  23,  for  500  lbs.  each,
    Chematar  as  supplier.

    He  objected  to  the  fact  our  present  prices  are  higher  than  previously  quoted
    for  same  material,  which  I  explained  was  of  Canadian  origin.

    Mr.  TA^^NNER.  Do  I  understand  from  that  that  you  advised  the
    Russian  purchasing  commission  that  the  license  should  be  amended?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes,  sir.  We  wrote  them  a  long  letter  about  it,  also,
    confirming  this  telephone  conversation  of  the  same  day.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  This  is  a  copy  of  the  letter  you  wrote  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes.

    Mr.  Ta\'enner.  I  desire  to  offer  in  evidence  that  letter,  dated  April
    27,  1943,  addressed  to  Mr.  N.  S.  Fomichev,  the  Government  Purchas-
    ing Commission  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  United  States  of  America,
    1610  Park  Road  NW.,  Washington,  D.  C,  signed  Chematar,  Inc.,  by
    Hermann  Rosenberg,  and  ask  that  it  be  marked  "Exhibit  Rosenberg  8."

    Mr.  Wood.  It  will  be  admitted.

    (The  copy  of  letter  above  referred  to,  marked  "Exhibit  Rosenberg
    8,"'  is  hereinafter  incorporated  in  the  record.)  ^^

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  state  in  this  letter  that  it  is —

    highly   advisable  that  you    (the  Russian  Purchasing  Commission)    try   to  get
    through  the  respective  amendment  to  your  export  license  within  2  or  3  days.

    "  See  appendix.

    1024  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    Mr,  Walter.  Is  it  stated  in  what  respect  the  license  should  be
    amended?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Without  taking  the  time  to  read  the  entire  letter,
    does  it  state  how  the  license  should  be  amended  ?

    Mr.  KosENBERG.  Yes.

    Mr.  AVooD.  Let's  see  the  letter.

    (Exhibit  Rosenberg  8  was  handed  to  Mr.  Wood.)

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  confer  with  Lend-Lease  about  the  neces-
    sity for  the  amendment  ?

    Mr.  EosENBERG.  No.  sir.     It  was  none  of  our  business.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Well,  you  had  confered  with  them  before  that  re-
    garding the  issuance  of  the  license.  Wasn't  it  all  the  more  important
    now  to  get  the  license  amended  promptly  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  We  had  not  connnunicated  with  them  regarding
    the  issuance  of  the  license.  We  wanted  to  make  absolutely  sure  that
    under  this  WPB  order,  which  prohibited  the  use  of  uranium  com-
    pounds in  glassware,  ceramics,  and  so  forth,  for  domestic  purposes

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  am  talking  about  Mr.  Moore,  in  particular,  of
    Lend-Lease.  You  had  been  in  touch  with  him  on  several  occasions
    about  the  issuance  of  the  license  ?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Now,  did  you  get  in  touch  with  Mr.  Moore  or  any
    other  person  in  Lend-Lease  about  expediting  the  amendment,  which
    was  the  thing  that  was  immediately  confronting  you  at  the  time  you
    wrote  this  letter?

    Mr.  Rosenberg.  I  do  not  think  that  we  did  that,  and  I  was  by  that
    time  under  the  impression  that  the  special  care  which  we  wanted
    to  give  this  matter  was  not  required  under  the  order,  since  the  clear-
    ance was  given,  and  since  it  was  none  of  our  business,  anyhow.

    Mr,  Wood.  I  believe  a  reading  of  the  copy  of  this  letter  would
    clarify  a  good  manj^  of  the  things  we  are  asking  about.  The  letter,
    dated  April  27,  1943,  is  directed  to  Mr,  N.  S.  Fomichev,  the  Govern-
    ment Purchasing  Commission  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  U.  S.  A.,
    1610  Park  Road  NW.,  Washington,  D.  C.  It  is  marked  "Special
    delivery"  and  is  re :  Uranium  compounds :

    Dear  Mr.  Fomichev  :  As  we  told  you  this  afternoon,  the  plant,  with  which
    we  had  made  the  arran,i,"enients,  subject  to  actual  receipt  of  Export  License,
    before  they  have  had  to  dispose  elsewhere  of  the  500  pounds  of  urano-uranic  oxide
    and  500  pounds  of  nitrouranyl,  could  not  accept  the  oi'der  any  more,  due  to  other
    arrangements  they  had  to  make  during  the  long  time  until  the  export  license
    actually  came  into  yoiu-  hands.

    We  have  actually  done  the  utmost  to  accommodate  you  and  were  pleased  that,
    in  spite  of  the  ever  growing  tightness  of  the  uranium  situation,  we  thus  were
    able  to  submit  to  you  the  following  proposition,  which  is  to  be  understood  of
    course  subject  to  change  until  you  enable  us  this  time  to  make  absolutely  iinal
    arrangements  on  the  basis  of  an  export  license  in  full  conformity  with  our
    proposal.

    V^^e  have  made  preparatory  arrangements  with  Canadian  supijliers,  who  have
    told  us  that  under  the  above  outlined  conditions  the  following  order  could  be
    accepted :

    5(X)  pounds  of  each  or  1,000  pounds  of  one  of  black  uranium  oxide  95/98
    percent  UsOg,  at  .$3.10.  Uranium  nitrate  crystals  99.5  percent  pure,  prac-
    tically chemically  pure,  at  $2.85 ;  both  prices  to  be  understood  per  pound  net
    weight,  including  packing,  f.  o.  b.  United  States  point  of  delivery.

    Delivery  within  ab.-i

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  My  first  indication  that  t'he  Russians  had  suc-
    ceeded in  obtaining  a  second  quantity  was,  I  believe,  a  question  from
    Colonel  Xichols  as  to  whether  I  knew  anything  about  procurement  of  a
    second  quantity  from  any  one  whatsoever,  and  I  told  him  that  I  did
    not.  Pie  said  that  he  had  received  an  indication,  of  which  he  had
    no  proof  or  other  detailed  knowledge,  that  the  Russians  had  succeeded
    in  having  the  second  order  filled.  We  didn't  know  the  quantities,  and
    I  don't  believe  we  were  even  sure  where  they  had  gotten  it.  It  was
    more  of  a  rumor  than  fact  at  that  time.

    Colonel  Ruhoff  and  myself  did  have  a  talk  with  Mr.  Pregel  of  the
    Canadian  Radium  and  Uranium  Corp.,  and  the  results  of  that  conver-
    sation are,  again,  purely  from  long-distance  memory  and  pretty  much
    guesswork.  As  I  recall  it,  we  said  to  Mr.  Pregel :  "Have  you  or  have
    you.  not  filled  any  orders  for  the  Russians?"  I  believe  he  replied  that
    he  had.

    Mr.  Wood.  On  that  point.  Colonel,  I  grant  it  has  been  a  long  while,
    but  that  was  a  pretty  important  question,  was  it  not  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes,  sir.

    ISIr.  Wood.  Can  you  be  positive  that  such  a  conversation  as  that  did
    take  place  and  that  you  were  informed  it  had  been  done  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  can  be  positive  the  conversation  took  places
    As  to  exactly  what  transpired  in  that  conversation,  I  cannot  be  posi-
    tive, but  I  think  it  can  be  found  in  the  records.

    ]Mr.  Wood.  Did  you  obtain  from  that  conversation  the  information
    that  the  order  had  been  filled  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  did  that  conversation  take  place  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  believe  May  or  June  1943.  It  was  just  at  the
    time  I  was  getting  ready  to  go  to  Oak  Ridge  and  was  turning  my  job
    over  to  Colonel  Ruhoff.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  According  to  your  best  recollection  at  this  time
    that  conversation  took  place  and  you  gained  information  that  a  ship-
    ment had  been  made  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  believe  we  gained  the  information  that  a  ship-
    ment had  been  made.

    INIr.  Tavenner.  How  long  before  that  conference  was  it  that  Colonel
    Nichols  asked  you  if  you  knew  of  any  source  of  supply  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  As  soon  as  he  asked  about  it  we  immediately  got
    in  touch  with  Mr.  Pregel,  and  he  came  down  to  our  office  on  Twenty-
    seventh  Street  and  we  went  over  the  whole  matter  with  him.

    Mr.  Wood.  For  the  purpose  of  the  record,  which  Pregel  was  that  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Boris.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Who  were  present  in  that  conference  besides
    yourself  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Major  Ruhoff  and  Mr.  Pregel.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  Mr.  Boris  Pregel  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  do  you  consider  is  the  value  to  the  Russians
    of  500  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate  and  500  pounds  of  uranium  oxide?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  would  say  the  value  would  be  very,  very
    slight,  if  any.  It  might  have  been  useful  for  experimental  purposes ;
    that  is  about  all.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Wouldn't  experimental  purposes  have  to  be  the
    start  of  an  atomic  enterprise  ?

    1060  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes;  that  is  correct;  but  they  could  have
    obtained  that  from  other  sources.  Going  to  sources  all  over  the  world
    and  getting  500  pounds  here  and  there,  conceivably  they  may  have
    obtained  a  stock  pile,  but  that  is  doubtful.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  But  it  would  have  been  of  value  for  experimental
    purposes  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes.

    Mr.  Walter.  Where  else  was  this  material  available?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  understand  that  the  Russians  have  rather
    extensive  deposits  themselves.  I  don't  know  to  what  extent  those
    deposits  have  been  developed.  There  are  deposits  in  Tibet  and  Mada-
    gascar and  South  America;  and  there  were  extensive  deposits  in
    Czechoslovakia,  which  were  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans  at  that  time;
    and  there  Avas  a  large  stock  pile  in  Antwerp  which  was  in  German
    hands  at  that  time  and  not  available  to  the  Russians.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  or  any  person  on  the  staif  of  the  Man-
    hattan Engineering  District  know  that  Mr.  Pregel  was  going  to  fill
    tliat  order  before  it  was  filled  and  shipped?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Xo,  sir.

    Mr.  Tam^nner.  The  evidence  is  tliat  some  left  the  country  on
    May — I  do  not  have  the  exact  date  before  me — but  was  any  effort
    made  to  stop  the  shipment?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  The  shipment  had  already  gone,  as  I  recall  it,
    by  the  time  we  even  knew  about  it.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Had  there  been  anv  discussion,  to  vour  knowledtje,
    with  Mr.  Pregel,  prior  to  the  filling  of  that  order  by  him,  relating  to
    the  filling  of  an  order  for  any  government  other  than  the  United
    States  or  Canada  ?

    Colonel  C'RENshav/.  Yes ;  there  had  been.  I  specifically  remember
    a  discussion  of  sales  to  the  British  Government,  and  I  believe  that
    discussion  was  prior  to  this  shipment.  I  can't  be  positive  of  that
    without  the  records,  but  that,  again,  would  be  in  the  records.  In
    addition,  we  didn't  feel  that  it  was  particidarly  necessary  to  discuss
    the  matter,  because  we  had  been  oflfered  voluntarily  on  the  part  of
    Mr.  Pregel  all  stocks  of  uranium  and  nitrate  that  they  had  in  the
    Eldorado  mines  or  elsewhere.

    ]Mr.  Woon.  Prior  to  that  shipment  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Prior  to  that  shipment ;  yes.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  When  was  that  agreement  reached?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  can't  be  positive  of  that.  It  might  have  been
    as  early  as  January  or  February  1943.

    Mr.  Wood.  Was  that  commitment  in  writing  or  oral?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  think  it  was  in  writing.

    Mr.  Tav'enner.  You  think  it  was  in  writing?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes.

    Mr.  Wood.  As  early  as  January  or  February?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  It  could  have  been  any  time  between  January
    and  April.

    ]VIr.  Wood.  At  the  time  you  had  your  conversation  with  Mr.  Pregel
    which  you  have  detailed,  in  the  presence  of  the  officer  next  in  command
    to  you,  did  you  have  at  that  time  the  written  commitment  from  Mr.
    Pregel  giving  the  Manhattan  District  first  option  to  any  material  on
    hand  or  that  it  might  acquire  ?

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1061

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  believe  it  was  in  our  files ;  yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Are  you  referring  to  an  agreement  of  March  27  De-
    tween  Manhattan  District  and  Canadian  Radium  and  Uranium  Corp.,
    which  specified  certain  materials  should  be  delivered,  and  giving  the
    code  numbers  in  the  agreement?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  No.  I  am  referring  to  an  earlier  informal
    agreement  that  was  later  expressed  by  that  contract  or  by  a  contract
    of  a  later  date.

    Mr,  TA^"ENNER.  And  that  earlier  understanding  was  reduced  to  a
    written  agreement?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  think  it  was.  I  think  Mr.  Pregel  wrote  us
    a  letter  offering  the  stock  and  I  believe  stating  a  time  limit  on  it.

    Mr.  Wood.  Categorically,  can  you  state  that  there  was  such  an
    agreement  and  understanding  with  Mr.  Pregel  that  you  should  have
    the  first  option  to  purchase  uranium  material  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes ;  I  can.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Regarding  the  contract  of  March  27,  do  you  have
    any  independent  recollection  of  when  it  was  actually  executed  and
    delivered?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  No;  I  do  not.  It  probably  would  have  been
    negotiated  at  a  considerably  earlier  date  than  the  actual  date  of  the
    contract,  because  those  contracts  were  very  complicated  and  normally
    they  took  a  long  period  of  time  to  negotiate.

    Mr.  Ta\t.nner.  In  the  earlier  part  of  your  testimony  you  referred
    to  the  fact  that  after  this  first  shipment  arrangements  were  made  with
    other  agencies  to  notify  you  of  interests  shown  by  other  governments
    in  uranium?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Tell  us  about  that,  what  arrangements  were  made
    and  with  whom.

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  think  we  had  arranged  with  both  the  Bmrd
    of  Economic  Warfare  and  the  War  Production  Board  to  advise  us  of
    any  interest  in  uranium  compounds  or  uranium  metal.

    Mr.  Ta\t5nner.  By  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Agency  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  By  anyone.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  By  anyone?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes,  sir,

    Mr,  Ta\^nner.  With  whom  were  those  arrangements  made  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw,  I  cannot  answer  that  question.  Mr,  Burman
    handled  those  transactions  and  I  believe  his  memory  or  his  records
    would  be  rather  complete  on  that  subject.

    Mr.  Ta^'enner.  When  the  time  came  to  consider  the  advisability  of
    the  approval  of  the  second  license,  with  whom  did  you  deal  in  Lend-
    Lease?  Who  conferred  with  you  from  Lend-Lease,  by  telephone  or
    personally  or  by  letter?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Mr,  Hoopes,  and  I  think  Mr,  Moore.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Any  other  persons?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Those  were  the  only  two  at  that  time,

    Mr.  Ta^^nner.  The  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  was  the  issuing
    agency.  Did  you  have  a  conference  with  anyone  from  the  Bureau  of
    Economic  Warfare  regarding  this  license?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  did  not  personally,  so  far  as  I  can  recollect.
    Lieutenant  Burman  handled  all  the  details  of  those  transactions.

    1062  .  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    JNIr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  at  any  time  confer  with  anyone  from  the
    Board  of  Economic  Warfare,  or  did  any  other  person  in  your  organiza-
    tion, to  your  knowledge,  with  regard  to  this  particular  license?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  am  sure  that  Mr.  Burman  must  have  con-
    ferred with  them.  It  may  or  may  not  have  been  after  the  license  was
    issued.  I  know  that  Maj.  Allen  Johnson  in  General  Groves'  office
    would  have  been  the  logical  one  to  handle  that  particular  transaction.

    Mr.  Wood.  This  is  the  second  quorum  call.  The  committee  will
    have  to  stand  in  adjournment  until  2  o'clock.

    (Thereupon,  a  recess  was  taken  until  '2  p.  m.  of  the  same  day.)

    AFTERNOON  SESSION

    (The  hearing  was  resumed  at  2 :  30  p.  m.)
    Mr.  Wood.  The  committee  will  be  in  order.

    TESTIMONY  OF  COL.  THOMAS  T.  CRENSHAW— Resumed

    INIr.  Tavenner.  I  was  asking  you  at  the  close  of  the  morning  session
    about  the  names  of  officials  of  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Warft\re  who
    conferred  with  you  or  other  members  of  your  staff  relating  to  the  sec-
    ond export  license.     Can  you  recall  the  names  of  any?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  IMr.  Hoopes  and  Mr.  Moore.

    IVIr.  Tavenner.  ]Mr.  Hoopes  and  Mr.  Moore  were  in  Lend-Lease.
    My  question  related  to  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Warfare.

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  do  not  recall  having  any  direct  connection
    with  anyone  in  BEW.  That  was  all  handled  through  Burman,  and
    I  probably  talked  to  various  individuals  in  the  Board  of  Economic
    Warfare  at  some  time,  but  I  do  not  recall  their  names.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  persons  in  that  organization,  regardless  of  what
    their  names  may  be,  confer  with  you  regarding  the  issuance  of  this  par-
    ticular license  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Not  to  my  recollection ;  not  directly  with  me,
    but  they  did  with  my  particular  group  in  Manhattan  District.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  members  of  your  group  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Lieutenant  Burman,  I  am  quite  sure.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Any  other  persons  whose  names  you  can  give?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Possibly  Captain  Merritt.

    Mr.  Taa-enner.  Any  others  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  think  that  would  be  all ;  and  General  Groves.

    Mr.  TA^^NNER.  And  General  Groves  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  have  any  knowledge  of  the  purpose  of  their
    interviews  and  what  took  place?

    Colonel  Crenshaav.  There  were  general  discussions  regarding  the
    issuance  of  the  license,  and  it  would  have  been  in  regard  to  that.  Spe-
    cifically, I  don't  have  any  knowledge  of  what  transpired.

    Mr.  Taat:nner.  Do  you  know  what  attitude  or  position  the  officials
    of  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Warfare  took  with  regard  to  the  question
    of  whether  this  license  should  be  issued  or  not?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Not  directly,  but  during  the  recess  I  was  search-
    ing my  memory  a  bit,  and  something  occurred  to  my  mind  that  has  a
    bearing  on  this  question,  as  well  as  the  question  you  asked  earlier  as  to
    the  motive  for  issuing  the  license  for  the  secon(i  shipment.  I  believe
    that  somewhere  in  the  files  of  the  district  there  will  be  found  a  memo-

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1063

    raiidum  with  my  signature  which  indicated  that  General  Groves  had
    decided  to  issue' the  export  license  because  of  pressure  that  was  being
    brought  to  bear.  That  word  "pressure"  may  have  been  my  own  word
    or  it  may  have  been  General  Groves'  word.  I  don't  know  the  implica-
    tion of  it.     But  I  am  sure  there  is  such  a  memorandum.

    Mr.  Wood.  Did  you  say  that  in  your  memorandum  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes,  sir.  I  believe  that  will  be  found  in  the
    files.     I  can't  be  positive  about  that.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Pressure  from  whom  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  don't  recall.  It  might  have  been  from  Lend-
    Lease;  it  might  have  been  the  pressure  from  the  Russians  themselves
    tliat  they  were  exerting  on  all  possible  agencies.

    Mr.  Ta\tenner.  A  matter  of  that  importance,  don't  you  think  you
    could  tell  us  something  about  the  character  of  the  pressure?

    Colonel  Ckenshaw\  No,  sir.  I  don't  recall,  and  I  don't  know
    whether  the  word  "pressure"  was  my  own  word  or  whether  it  occurred
    in  a  conversation  with  General  Groves.  I  didn't  talk  to  him  face  to
    face,  but  did  have  telephone  conversations  with  him.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  there  an  indication  of  where  pressure  came
    from,  if  it  existed  ?

    Colonel  CRENSHA^v.  No,  sir.     I  can't  clarify  it  further  than  that.

    ]\Ir.  Wood.  You  state  as  a  fact  that  the  term  "pressure"  was  used  in
    some  connection?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  That  is  my  recollection,  and  I  believe  such  a
    memorandum  could  be  found.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  staff  of  the  committee  has  been  informed  that
    there  was  a  telephone  conversation  between  Captain  Merritt  of  your
    office  and  Mr.  Hoopes  of  Lend-Lease,  which  conversation  Captain  Mer-
    ritt could  not  recall,  in  which  Captain  Merritt  is  alleged  to  have  stated
    that  pressure  had  just  been  brought  upon  General  Groves  to  change
    his  mind  with  regard  to  the  approval  of  the  license.  Does  that  refresh
    your  recollection  in  any  way  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  No ;  except  to  the  extent  that  it  might  be  tied
    in  with  the  other  memorandum  which  I  just  mentioned.

    Mr.  Taat.nner.  In  other  words,  the  two  things  may  be  the  same  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  It  is  quite  possible,  yes.

    ]Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  recall  discussing  the  subject  of  pressure
    with  any  member  of  the  staff  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  have  no  specific  recollection  of  it  except  that
    that  term  does  linger  in  my  mind.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  General  Groves  ever  tell  you  that  pressure  had
    been  applied  or  exercised  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw\  I  cannot  specifically  remember.  It  is  quite
    possible  that  he  used  the  term  himself.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  Captain  Merritt  or  Lieutenant  Burman  ever
    refer  to  pressure  being  exercised  in  connection  with  their  discussion
    of  the  matter  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw^  No.  I  have  no  recollection  of  that,  and  I  don't
    believe  pressure  would  have  been  placed  on  them,  anyway.  It  would
    come  at  the  top,

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  recall  whether  or  not  the  pressure  you  are
    speaking  of  came  from  within  some  Government  agency,  or  without?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  No,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  mean  you  have  no  recollection  ?

    1064  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  have  no  recollection.

    Mr.  TAi'ENNER,  As  you  look  back  upon  that  occasion  now,  are  you
    aware  of  anything  that  you  would  now  call  pressure  having  been
    brought  to  bear  upon  you  by  any  member  of  Lend-Lease  Administra-
    tion, directly  or  indirectly?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  No.  I  don't  think  pressure  would  be  a  proper
    term  to  use.  Lend-Lease  was  anxious  to  cooperate  with  the  Russians.
    They  were  our  allies.  I  think  that  was  policy.  Naturally,  Lend-
    Lease  was  doing  everything  possible  to  get  material  for  our  allies.
    But  I  don't  know  of  any  instance  when  anybody  attempted  to  exercise
    undue  pressure  on  me.

    (Representative  McSweeney  enters  the  hearing  room.)

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Or  on  any  member  of  your  staff  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Or  on  any  member  of  my  staff.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Does  that  apply  to  BEW?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes ;  the  same  there.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  what  about  the  War  Production  Board?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  The  same.

    Mr.  TA^^NNER.  Did  you  learn  during  the  course  of  your  employment
    that  the  export  license  which  had  been  issued  for  the  500  pounds  of
    uranium  nitrate  and  500  pounds  of  uranium  oxide  on  April  23,  1943,
    was  amended  on  April  29, 1943  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  don't  recall.

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner.  Was  the  question  of  amendment  of  the  license  ever
    brought  to  your  attention  by  an  official  of  the  Board  of  Economic
    Warfare,  which  was  the  licensing  agency,  or  the  Lend-Lease  Admin-
    istration ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  don't  remember  that.  If  an  amendment  was
    made  it  probably  would  have  been  brought  to  my  attention,  directly
    or  indirectly,  however.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  At  the  time  when  you  were  concerned  with  the  source
    of  all  material  of  this  character  in  the  United  States,  and  when  you
    were  actively  engaged  in  protecting  it,  was  the  question  of  amendment,
    which  would  indicate  a  new  source  of  supply  had  been  located,  a  very
    important  matter  to  your  group  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  It  would  not  necessarily  have  been,  in  that  there
    could  have  been  manj^  reasons  for  amendment.  As  I  recall  the  prac-
    tice on  export  licensing,  it  seems  to  me  an  amendment  was  required
    even  if  it  was  a  price  change,  so  it  might  or  might  not  have  been  im-
    portant.

    Mr.  TA^^:NNER.  But  if  on  the  22d  of  April  you  had  succeeded  in
    stopping  or  barricading  compliance  by  Shattuck,  then  the  amendment
    at  a  later  date  for  any  reason  would  show  a  reactivation  of  intei-est
    in  that  license,  wouldn't  it?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes.  Well,  not  necessarily,  because  it  may  have
    been  the  intent  to  allow  that  license  to  stand  as  a  blanket  license,  giv-
    ing the  Russians  what  we  might  term  a  fishing  license  to  get  the  mate-
    rial if  they  could,  therefore  we  were  cooperating  with  them.

    Mr.  Ta^-enner.  When  that  license  was  prepared  in  the  terms  of  the
    original  contract  with  Shattuck  Co.,  that  was  true,  but  when  a  few
    days  later  they  changed  its  terms,  wouldn't  that  indicate  they  had
    found  a  new  source  of  supply,  otherwise  there  woidd  be  no  reason  for  a
    change  ?

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1065

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  In  the  licensing  procedure  I  assume  that  the
    exact  quantity  must  be  shown  before  the  license  could  be  issued.  I
    don't  remember  that  point.

    Mr.  Taat:nner.  It  showed  the  description  of  the  material  and  the
    price  and  the  supplier.

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Well,  then,  presumably  that  should  have  been
    an  indication  that  something  was  going  on.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Would  an  amendment  be  made  to  an  export  license
    without  conferring  again  with  the  Manhattan  Engineering  District
    where  the  original  license  had  been  approved  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Not  unless  someone  in  the  Board  of  Economic
    Warfare  did  a  lot  of  assuming.

    Mr.  Ta\tenner.  What  do  you  mean  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  That  is,  unless  they  had  assumed,  because  we
    once  had  authorized  the  license  to  be  issued,  we  wanted  it  to  stand  in
    the  case  of  changes.     That  seems  unlikely.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  know  of  the
    general  opposition  of  the  Manhattan  District  to  the  sale  of  uranium
    for  export  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  They  must  have  inferred  that  from  the  diffi-
    culty in  getting  export  licenses  for  the  material.  I  don't  think  we
    ever  stated  to  them  specifically  that  we  did  not  want  to  ship  it  to  the
    Russians.  I  think  that  would  have  been  an  unwise  statement  to  have
    made  at  the  time  to  another  Government  agency.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  As  far  as  you  know,  there  was  no  reference  of  the
    matter  back  to  the  Manhattan  Engineering  District  on  the  question
    of  amendment  of  the  license  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Not  to  my  recollection.

    (Representative  Velde  leaves  the  hearing  room.)

    Mr.  Wood.  If  the  fact  that  this  particular  export  license  was
    amended  so  as  to  include  a  different  source  of  supply  had  come  to
    your  attention  before  the  shipment  was  made  and  the  deal  closed,  what
    would  have  been  your  attitude  about  it  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  think  we  immediately  would  have  tried  to
    find  out  what  this  other  source  was,  and  immediately  taken  steps  to
    block  that  also.

    Mr.  Wood.  To  block  it?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  think  we  would  have ;  yes.

    Mr.  Wood.  That  had  been  your  policy  before  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes.

    Mr.  Wood.  And  wouldn't  it  particularly  have  been  your  policy  if
    you  found  that  supplier  was  under  contract  to  you  to  give  the  Govern-
    ment first  option  on  all  material  it  was  within  its  power  to  control?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes.  I  think  the  answer  to  that  is  "Yes,"
    although  it  needs  some  amplification.

    Mr.  Wood.  Let's  see  if  it  does.  You  say  the  source  of  supply  that
    finally  furnished  this  material  under  an  amended  license  was  under
    an  agreement  to  you  prior  to  the  date  of  shipment.  If  it  had  come
    to  your  attention  that  this  source  of  supply  was  seeking  to  sell  this
    material  that  was  under  option  to  you  to  the  Russians  or  any  other
    country  on  which  there  was  a  ban,  would  you  have  taken  any  action?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  We  would  have  attempted  to  do  so,  but  I  don't
    know  that  we  could  have  done  so  legally,  even  under  the  terms  of  the

    1066  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    contract.     There  are  several  ramifications  on  that  which  I  can  explain,
    if  you  wish.

    Mr.  Wood.  My  purpose  in  asking  the  question  was  to  find  out  what
    your  attitude  would  have  been.

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  We  would  have  attempted  to  block  it.  I  am
    sure  of  that.

    Mr.  Ta\t3XNER.  Assuming  Chematar  was  the  supplier  through
    which  both  Shattuck  Co.  and  the  Canadian  Eadimn  &  Uranium  Corp.
    furnished  the  material,  do  you  know  whether  or  not  the  license  would
    have  been  in  the  name  of  the  agent  rather  than  in  the  name  of  the
    actual  supplier  ?     Do  you  know  what  the  practice  was  ?

    Colonel  Crensiix\w.  No.

    Mr.  Taa'enner.  You  don't  know  if  it  was  the  practice  to  have  the
    license  in  the  name  of  the  agent  rather  than  the  supplier  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  don't  recall  that.

    (Eepresentative  Kearney  leaves  the  hearing  room.)

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Were  you  familiar  with  the  handling  of  heavy-
    water  transactions  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  No.    That  was  outside  my  department  entirely.

    Mr.  Ta\"enner.  Whose  department  was  that  in  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Colonel  Nichols  himself  handled  most  of  that
    directly.

    Mr.  Taat.nner.  Do  you  know  whether  any  requests  were  submitted
    to  the  INIanhattan  Engineering  project  with  regard  to  the  approval  of
    sales  of  heavy  water?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  have  no  knowledge  of  any  request.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  heavy  water  considered  at  that  time  a  strategic
    material,  that  is,  during  1943,  1944,  and  1945,  by  Manhattan  Engi-
    neering District?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  It  was  by  Manhattan  District.

    ]\Ir.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  if  the  other  Government  agencies
    knew  of  that  appraisal  that  Manhattan  Engineering  District  placed
    on  the  material?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  very  much  doubt  it.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  If  that  information  was  solely  the  information  of
    Manhattan  Engineering  District,  what  safeguard  could  be  placed  upon
    the  sale  for  export  of  heavy  water  by  the  action  of  other  Govern-
    ment agencies,  if  no  agency  but  your  own  knew  about  the  importance
    of  it?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  It  would  have  been  possible  to  do  the  same  thing
    we  did  with  uranium,  that  is,  to  require  approval  of  export  licenses,
    but  that  would  have  called  attention  to  heavy  water.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  All  materials  the  Russians  asked  for  were  not  sub-
    mitted to  you  to  see  whether  you  were  interested  in  them,  were  they  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  No.  But  had  we  gone  to  BEW  and  requested
    them  to  advise  us  of  any  requests  for  licenses  for  heavy  water,  that
    would  have  been  an  indication  we  were  interested  in  heavy  water.

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner.  Does  that  mean  that  the  matter  was  of  such  a  secret
    character  that  you  would  not  even  want  to  inform  the  responsible
    heads  of  other  Government  agencies  of  the  importance  of  the  material  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  That  is  correct,  unless  it  was  considered  very
    important  to  control  it.  There,  again,  heavy  water  was  being  pro-
    duced commercially,  but  it  was  almost  a  laboratory  curiosity.

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1067

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  how  it  occurred  that  the  matter  of
    uranium  was  first  taken  up  with  the  Manhattan  Engineering  Dis-
    trict at  the  time  the  export  license  for  the  first  shipment  had  been
    issued  ?  Was  it  the  result  of  initiative  on  the  part  of  the  Manhattan
    Engineering  District,  or  on  the  part  of  some  other  Government
    agency  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  don't  recall  how  that  matter  came  to  our  at-
    tention. I  think  we  got  a  routine  list  of  all  requests  for  uranium
    compounds.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  was  the  character  of  that  list?  I  haven  t
    heard  of  it  before.

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Periodically — I  don't  remember  how  often —
    it  is  my  recollection  that  either  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  or
    Lend-Lease  or  both  submitted  to  us  a  list  of  all  requests  for  uranium
    compounds.  In  addition,  after  the  controls  were  put  on  the  use  of
    uranium  in  the  ceramics  industry,  we  got  a  list  showing  all  uranium
    transactions  in  the  ceramics  industry,  which  had  to  be  approved  by
    BEW,  I  believe,  and  indirectly  by  us.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  We  have  located  one  list  furnished  by  Lend-Lease
    in  July  1943,  or  it  may  have  been  1944,  of  transactions  which  had  pre-
    viously occurred  with  regard  to  uranium,  but  was  any  list  furnished
    at  an  earlier  date  than  that  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes,  sir ;  I  am  sure  that  it  was.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  that  list  relate  solely  to  the  uranium  com-
    pounds, or  did  it  relate  to  chemicals  generally  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection  it  related  to
    uranium  compounds  only.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  was  a  report  of  that  character  first  sub-
    mitted?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  It  must  have  been  certainly  as  early  as  March
    1943,  and  undoubtedly  prior  to  that  time.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  At  whose  instance  was  that  report  filed  and
    prepared  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  think  that  was  an  arrangement  which  Mr.
    Burman  was  able  to  negotiate  with  Lend-Lease  and/or  BEW.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Then  from  the  time  that  request  was  made,  those
    organizations  would  have  known  of  the  importance  of  that  material  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  have  no  further  questions.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Case.

    Mr.  Case.  In  all,  how  many  requests  for  uranium  compounds  from
    the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  came  to  the  attention  of  the
    Chemical  Warfare  Service  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  can't  answer  that  question.

    Mr.  Case.  How  many  came  to  your  attention?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  recall  only  one.    There  may  have  been  others.

    Mr.  Case.  That  one  was  for  how  much  and  what?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  believe  the  exact  quantities  were  covered  in  a
    letter  which  you  showed  me  earlier,  Mr.  Tavenner.  I  don't  recall  the
    exact  quantities.

    Mr.  Case.  Were  you  aware  of  a  request  for  uranium  materials  in
    the  summer  of  1943  ?

    c-r

    1068  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  If  it  was  prior  to  the  1st  of  July,  I  was  no
    longer  in  that  particular  department  of  the  district.

    Mr.  Case.  Prior  to  July  1, 1943?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  you  either  hear  or  know  of  a  renewal  of  that  request
    hi  1944?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  think  I  have  heard  of  it  indirectly,  but  not  in
    an  official  capacity.

    Mr.  Case.  When  did  you  hear  of  it  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  couldn't  answer  that,  sir.  It  must  have  been
    during  my  service  with  Manhattan  District.  It  could  even  have  been
    after  that  time.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  any  request  for  uranium  compounds  from  any  com-
    pany or  any  purchasing  commission  other  than  that  of  the  Soviet
    Union  come  to  your  attention  when  you  were  connected  with  the
    Chemical  Warfare  Service  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  was  not  connected  with  the  Chemical  War-
    fare Service,  sir.

    Mr.  Case.  Well,  in  your  capacity  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Will  you  repeat  that  question  ?

    Mr.  Case.  Did  any  request  for  uranium  compounds  from  any  pur-
    chasing commission  other  than  that  of  the  Soviet  Union  come  to  your
    attention  while  you  were  engaged  in  this  work?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  don't  recall  any  that  came  to  the  attention  of
    the  Manhattan  District.  The  British,  of  course,  were  interested  in  this
    material,  and  while  we  had  no  control,  all  the  shipments  to  Great
    Britain  were  taken  up  with  us  informally.

    Mr.  Case.  Shipments  of  uranium  to  Great  Britain  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Yes.  May  I  modify  that  "shipments"  to
    "shipment."    I  know  of  only  one.

    Mr.  Case.  Which  one  was  that  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  believe  it  was  made  in  the  spring  of  1943.

    Mr.  Case.  Do  you  know  how  much  and  what  it  was  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  Approximately  15  tons  of  uranium  oxide.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  about  sales  to  the  French  Government  ?

    Colonel  Crenshaw.  I  know  of  none,  sir.  France  was  occupied
    at  that  time,  and  we  normally  would  have  had  no  transactions  with
    them.

    Mr.  Wood.  In  view  of  the  continued  persistence  of  the  quorum  bells,
    I  will  adjourn  the  committee  until  10  o'clock  in  the  morning.

    (Thereupon,  at  3  p.  m.  on  Wednesday,  January  25, 1950,  an  adjourn-
    ment was  taken  until  Thursday,  January  26,  1950,  at  10  a.  m.)

    H BAKINGS  EEGARDING  SHIPMENT  OF  ATOMIC  MATEEIAL
    TO  THE  SOVIET  UNION  DUKING  WOKLD  WAR  II

    THURSDAY,  JANUARY  26,   1950

    United  States  House  of  RErRESENTATiVES,

    Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,

    Washington^  D.  C.

    PUBLIC    HEARINGS

    The  committee  met,  pursuant  to  adjournment,  at  10 :  30  a.  m.,  in
    room  226,  Old  House  Office  Building,  Hon.  John  S.  Wood  (chairman)
    presiding.

    Committee  members  present :  Eepresentatives  John  S.  Wood  (chair-
    man). Francis  E.  Walter,  Morgan  M.  Moulder,  Richard  M.  Nixon,
    Francis  Case,  Harold  H.  Velde,  and  Bernard  W.  Kearney.

    Staff  members  present:  Frank  S.  Tavenner,  Jr.,  counsel;  Louis  J.
    Russell,  senior  investigator;  Donald  T.  Appell  and  Courtney  Owens,
    investigators;  John  W.  Carrington,  clerk;  Benjamin  Mandel,  direc-
    tor of  research ;  and  A.  S.  Poore,  editor.

    Mr.  Wood.  The  committee  will  be  in  order.

    If  there  are  any  Members  of  Congress  present  in  the  audience,  they
    are  invited  to  come  up  and  sit  W' ith  the  committee.

    Mr.  Counsel,  are  you  ready  to  proceed  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes,  sir.  Mr.  Chairman,  as  you  are  aware,  soon
    after  the  appearance  of  Gen.  Leslie  R.  Groves  before  this  committee
    on  December  7,  1949,  Mr.  Henry  A.  Wallace  expressed  a  desire  to
    appear  before  this  committee.  The  committee,  at  its  first  meeting
    after  that,  unanimously  agreed  to  his  appearance,  and  Mr.  Wallace  is
    now  here  as  a  volunteer  witness.    May  he  be  called  at  this  time?

    Mr.  Wood.  Without  objection  on  the  part  of  the  committee,  yes.

    Mr.  Wallace,  it  is  noted  that  there  are  several  photographers  here
    from  the  press.  It  is  a  rule  of  this  committee  that  a  witness  brought
    before  it  shall  not  be  photographed  without  his  permission.  Do  you
    object  to  having  your  picture  made  by  the  photographers?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No ;  I  have  no  objection,  although  I  would  prefer  if
    they  get  them  out  of  the  way  soon,  because  if  they  continue  to  wait
    for  some  abnormal  posture,  they  create  some  confusion.  If  we  could
    just  get  it  out  of  the  way  now  I  would  appreciate  it.  If  they  want  me
    to  make  certain  kinds  of  gestures,  I  don't  mind.

    (Photographs  were  taken.)

    Mr.  Wallace.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  understand  that  the  stenographer
    is  going  to  make  a  special  effort  to  get  the  transcript  of  questions  and
    answers  ready  as  soon  as  possible,  and  would  it  be  all  right  to  circu-
    late it  among  the  press  that  they  can,  at  a  certain  place,  get  the  tran-
    script of  questions  and  answers?

    ^  1069

    1070  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  am  certain  those  arrangements  can  be  made  with
    the  reporter.    She  is  very  accommodating  about  matters  of  that  kind.

    Mr.  Wallace,  Certain  members  of  the  press  approached  me  as  to
    whether  I  would  be  so  kind  to  provide  that  service  myself,  and  I  said
    I  would  in  case  the  committee  was  not  in  position  to  do  so.

    Mr.  Wood.  We  must  have  order  in  the  committee  room,  ladies  and
    gentlemen,  at  all  times.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr,  Chairman,  may  I  suggest  for  the  sake  of  orderly
    procedure  that  the  witness  be  sworn  and  I  be  permitted  to  make  certain
    inquiries  relating  to  the  subject  under  investigation,  after  which  the
    witness  be  given  an  opportunity  to  explain  any  matter  relevant  to  the
    investigation  which  is  not  covered  by  my  examination.

    Mr,  Wood,  If  you  will  stand,  Mr.  Wallace,  and  be  sworn,  please,  sir.
    Do  you  solemnly  swear  the  evidence  you  give  this  committee  shall  be
    the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God?

    Mr.  Wallace,  I  do  so  solemnly  swear,

    TESTIMONY  OF  HENRY  A.  WALLACE

    Mr,  Tavenner,  Mr.  Wallace,  were  you  a  member  of  the  War  Pro-
    duction Board,  and,  if  so,  over  what  period  of  time  did  you  serve  as
    a  member?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  was  a  member  of  the  War  Production  Board  and
    the  predecessor  group,  the  Supply,  Priorities,  and  Allocation  Board,
    which  was  set  up  in  late  August  or  early  September  19-11.  I  was  Chair-
    man of  that  Board,  and  if  it  met  with  the  desire  of  the  committee  would
    go  into  considerable  details  as  to  why  I  was  made  Chairman.

    That  Board  was  replaced  about  January  15,  191:2,  by  the  War  Pro-
    duction Board.  I  remained  as  a  member  of  the  War  Production
    Board  in  my  capacity  as  head  of  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare,  and
    continued  as  a  member  until  July  19  or  20,  1943,  at  which  time  I  wrote
    a  letter  to  Mr,  Donald  Nelson  resigning  from  the  Board,  and  on  July  21
    I  find  in  my  records  a  letter  to  the  President  of  the  United  States  in-
    dicating why  I  resigned  from  the  Board  at  that  time,

    JNIr.  Tavenner.  ^^^lo  was  Chairman  of  the  Board  during  the  year
    1943  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Of  the  War  Production  Board  ?

    Mr.  Ta"\^nner.  Yes;  of  the  War  Production  Board.

    Mr,  Wallace.  Mr.  Donald  Nelson.

    Mr.  Tavenner,  Who  were  the  members  of  the  Board  at  that  time
    beside  yourself?

    Mr,  Wallace,  That  is  a  matter  of  record.  They  were  the  heads
    of  the  armed  services,  the  Secretary  of  Commerce,  the  Secretary  of
    State — it  is  a  matter  of  the  public  record.  There  were  quite  a  number.
    I  think  War  Manpower  was  represented.  I  think  you  must  have  that
    ■iilready  in  your  records.

    Mr,  Ta\^nner.  Yes.  I  will  just  ask  you  this :  Was  there  representa-
    tion on  that  Board  of  other  Government  agencies,  such  as  the  Office
    of  Lend-Lease?

    Mr,  Wallace,  Yes;  I  am  quite  sure  the  Office  of  Lend-Lease  was
    there,  Harry  Hopkins,  so  far  as  I  recollect,  did  not  sit  in  on  the  War
    Production  Board  meetings.

    Mr,  Ta\'enner.  Incidentally,  I  see  you  are  accompanied  by  a  gentle-
    man here.    Are  you  represented  by  counsel  ?

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1071

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.  This  is  Mr.  Walter  Freedman,  who  used  to  be
    an  attorney  with  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare,  dealing  especially
    with  the  export  licenses,  and  I  have  asked  him  to  come  both  in  that  ca-
    pacity and  as  counsel.    Freedman  is  spelled  F-r-e-e-d-m-a-n.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  what  is  his  first  name  and  middle  initial  ?

    Mr.  Freedman.  Walter.    There  is  no  middle  initial.

    Mr.  TA^^ENNER.  And  your  address?     [Addressing  Mr.  Freedman.]

    Mr.  Freedman.  Washington  Building,  Washington,  D.  C.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Briefly,  what  were  your  duties  as  a  member  of  the
    War  Production  Board  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  When  Mr.  Samuel  Rosenman  approached  me,  at  the
    suggestion  of  President  Roosevelt,  that  I  sit  on  SPAB — Supply,  Prior-
    ities, and  Allocation  Board — it  was  suggested  that  my  place  on  SPAB
    was  particularly  to  represent  those  foreign  countries  that  were  not
    under  lend-lease.  The  Supply,  Priorities,  and  Allocation  Board  had
    to  do  with  the  allotment  of  the  production  of  the  United  States.  The
    Board  of  Economic  Warfare  was  particularly  concerned  with  Latin
    America,  Therefore  it  was  felt  that  there  should  be  representation  on
    the  War  Production  Board  of  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare.

    There  was  also  another  reason  why  I  was  on  the  SPAB  which  is
    not  particularly  germane  to  the  subject  under  discussion  today,  and
    that  is  because  there  was  a  serious  disagreement  among  the  predeces-
    sor agency — I  believe  it  was  0PM — between  certain  groups.  One
    group  thought  we  ought  to  stop  all  production  of  automobiles,  for
    example,  so  that  we  could  produce  more  tanks.  We  .were  not  in  the
    war  yet.  Another  group  thought  we  should  go  ahead  producing
    automobiles.

    The  President  and  Samuel  Rosenman  came  to  the  conclusion  that  I,
    by  reason  of  my  office,  could  step  in  and  establish  a  chain  of  command
    that  would  stop  the  discord  and  make  a  firm  policy  at  this  time  when
    we  were  not  in  the  war.  In  other  words,  they  invoked  the  prestige
    of  my  office  to  get  a  job  done  they  would  not  get  done  any  other  way.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  devote  quite  a  bit  of  time  and  attention  to
    the  duties  of  your  office  on  that  Board  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  As  chairman  of  SPAB,  I  did.  This  was  in  the  fall
    of  1941.  I  am  very  proud  of  the  work  that  I  did  at  that  time  in
    connection  with  Donald  Nelson.  I  think  we  did  a  remarkable  job
    that  made  a  very  great  difference  in  the  later  war  effort.  But  after
    Donald  Nelson  became  Chairman  of  the  War  Production  Board  my
    activities  were  not  so  great.

    Mr.  TA^nENNER.  But  they  were  great  enough  so  that  you  were  fa-
    miliar with  the  general  procedural  requirements  regarding  the  trans-
    actions of  the  War  Production  Board,  were  they  not  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No.  You  see,  the  President  urged  me,  when  I  took
    on  both  of  these  duties,  which  were  not  customary  for  Vice  Presidents,
    as  you  well  recognize,  that  I  not  get  into  administration  details.  He
    urged  me  not  to  do  that  in  the  first  instance.  I  was,  of  course,  enor-
    mously concerned  with  getting  the  greatest  possible  production,  and
    when  something  came  up  in  connection  with  rubber,  for  instance,  in
    which  I  was  intensely  interested,  I  took  a  definite  interest  because
    I  had  a  competence  in  the  field ;  but  with  regard  to  the  general  run  of
    War  Production  Board  activities,  I  did  not  take  a  detailed  interest.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  War  Production  Board  was,  however,  vitally

    1072  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    concerned  not  only  with  the  production  but  the  control  of  material
    that  had  been  produced.    Isn't  that  correct?

    Mr.  Wallace.  And  the  Supply,  Priorities,  and  Allocation  Bof^rd
    set  up  the  conditions  under  which  the  controls  were  put  in  effect.

    Mr.  Tav^enxer.  And  when  any  matter  of  policy  was  involved  in
    questions  that  would  arise  in  the  functioning  of  the  Board,  you  were
    actJA^e  and  participated  in  those  matters?

    Mr.  Wallace.  When  they  were  brought  up  to  the  Board  level,  and
    there  is  always  a  question  of  what  was.

    Mr.  Taa-exner.  Were  you  a  member  of  the  committee  known  as
    the  ]Military  Policy  Committee  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Not  to  the  best  of  my  recollection.  You  mean  of
    the  War  Production  Board?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Whether  it  was  an  adjunct  of  the  War  Production
    Board  or  not,  I  can't  say.

    Mr.  Wallace.  There  was  a  Military  Policy  Committee  that  had  to
    do  with  the  atom  bomb.  That  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  War  Pro-
    duction Board.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  understand.

    Mr.  Wallace.  No;  I  was  not  connected  with  the  Military  Policy
    Committee.

    Mr.  Ta\tenner.  Were  you  connected  with  that  Committee  in  any
    way?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No;  I  was  not  connected  with  that  Committee.  If
    you  want  to  go  into  the  entire  atomic-bomb  matter,  I  can  go  into  it
    chronologically.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes ;  we  would  like  to  know  what  your  connection
    was  with  the  atomic-bomb  project.

    Mr.  Wallace.  The  whole  matter  of  atomic  energy  was  first  brought
    to  my  attention  by  matters  in  public  print  in  1939  and  1940.  In  one
    of  the  popular  magazines  there  was  an  article  about  U-235  in  1939 ;
    and  on  May  5.  1940,  there  was  an  article  by  William  E.  Lawrence  of
    the  New  York  Times;  it  was  on  the  front  page,  and  went  into  the
    details  of  U-235.

    Then  it  was  brought  to  my  attention  in  a  strong  way  by  Dr.  Vanne-
    var  Bush  on  June  29, 1940,  when  I  was  Secretary  of  Agriculture.  He
    told  me  about  the  job  that  had  just  been  assigned  to  him  by  President
    Roosevelt.  Dr.  Vannevar  Bush  and  I  had  known  each  other  for  some
    time,  we  had  mutual  acquaintances,  and  I  think  he  had  respect  for  my
    scientific  ability.  So  he  told  me  of  this  job  that  had  been  assigned
    to  him  by  President  Roosevelt  a  short  time  previously.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  was  that  job  that  was  assigned  to  him?

    Mr.  Wallace.  He  was  assigned  the  job  of  looking  into  the  possibili-
    ties of  using  U-235  to  make  an  atom  bomb.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  serve  on  the  Committee  with  him  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  If  you  will  allow  me  to  go  ahead  with  the  chronology,
    I  will  indicate  just  how  that  worked  out.

    Mr.  Taatenner.  Very  well.

    Mr.  Wallace.  As  I  remember  it,  he  did  not  come  to  see  me  again
    until  July  23  of  1941,  after  I  was  Vice  President.  In  the  former  meet-
    ing he  had  indicated  that  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Institute  in  Berlin  was
    working  very  hard  on  this  matter  of  making  an  atomic  bomb.  In  this
    July  23,  1941,  meeting,  he  said  that  it  now  looked  much  more  possible

    SHIPMENT   OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1073

    to  make  a  bomb  than  it  had  when  he  had  seen  me  before,  and  at  this  time
    we  swore  each  other  to  secrecy.  And  then,  I  guess  Pearl  Harbor  came.
    I  have  these  dates  written  down.  I  want  to  be  sure  of  getting  this
    just  right.  I  don't  want  to  do  too  much  from  memory  on  this.  I
    think  I  had  better  read  this  off.

    It  was  in  tlie  fall  of  1941  that  a  Top  Policy  Committee  was  formed
    composed  of  myself,  I  was  the  ranking  member  of  it,  I  would  assume;
    the  Secretary  of  War,  Secretary  Stimson ;  Chief  of  Staff,  General  Mar-
    shall ;  Dr.  Bush ;  and  Dr.  Conant.

    This  Top  Policy  Committee  was  very  important  in  the  early  stage
    of  the  game,  but  had  no  importance  after  the  construction  really
    started.     It  was  very  important  in  1941  and  1942.

    We  held  a  meeting  in  my  office  in  the  Senate  Office  Building  on
    December  16,  1941,  9  days  after  Pearl  Harbor,  w^liich  was  attended
    by  Secretary  Stimson,  by  Dr.  Vannevar  Bush,  myself,  and  Harold
    Smith.  Harold  Smith  was  not  a  member  of  the  committee,  but
    Harold  Smith  attended  in  his  capacity  as  Director  of  the  Budget.
    The  work  hitherto  had  largely  been  of  a  research  nature,  and  it  was
    now  apparent  that  large  sums  of  money  were  going  to  be  involved.
    This  was  an  absolutely  secret  thing,  and  I  think  it  is  one  of  the
    miracles  of  the  war  that  it  was  kept  so  absolutely  secret;  nobody
    talked;  but  the  question  was  how  to  get  large  sums  of  money  and
    yet  maintain  absolute  secrecj'.  That  was  the  problem  before  this
    December  16,  1941,  meeting  of  the  top  policy  committee.  Therefore,
    Harold  Smith  was  present  and  rendered  very  valuable  service  in  find-
    ing some  way  of  getting  the  money.  What  he  did,  I  don't  know,  but
    he  did  get  very  large  sums  of  money.

    At  that  meeting  it  was  decided  that  certain  pilot  plants  should  be
    started.  Dr.  I3ush  came  in  to  see  me  several  times  during  1942  with
    regard  to  signing  reports  to  be  transmitted  to  the  President.

    The  only  two  times  the  Top  Policy  Committee  met  that  I  am  aware
    of  were  on  this  December  16,  1941,  and  on  September  23,  1942.  The
    only  meeting  I  attended  was  the  December  16,  1941,  meeting.  I
    just  returned  from  out  of  town  during  the  day  on  September  23,  and
    did  not  attend  that  meeting.  That  was  the  meeting  which  General
    Groves  attended  for  the  first  time,  as  I  understand  it.  Because  I
    didn't  attend  the  meeting,  I  did  not  meet  General  Groves  at  that  time.
    So  far  as  I  can  determine  from  consulting  my  record,  I  did  not  meet
    General  Groves  until  April  14,  1944.

    I  talked  with  Dr.  Vannevar  Bush  yesterday  to  confirm  my  recollec-
    tion, and  I  asked  him  what  was  his  recollection  of  the  relationship
    between  the  Military  Policy  Committee  which  w^as  set  up  in  the  fall
    of  1942  with  General  Groves  as  the  executive  officer,  what  was  the
    relationship,  the  chain  of  command,  and  his  recollection  was  the
    same  as  mine,  that  General  Groves  was  under  the  Military  Policy
    Committee  and  had  no  business  reporting  to  the  Top  Policy  Committee
    unless  he  was  so  directed  by  the  Military  Policy  Committee.  In  other
    words,  the  Top  Policy  Committee,  after  that  second  meeting  on  Sep-
    tember 23,  1942,  really  ceased  to  have  active  existence.  However,  if
    any  matter  of  unusual,  broad  significance  came  up  outside  the  field  of
    military  competence,  I  have  no  doubt  that  Dr.  Bush  would  have  con-
    sulted me.  The  chain  of  command  was  from  Dr.  Bush  to  me,  rather
    than  General  Groves,  unless  General  Groves  was  delegated  by  Dr.
    Bush  or  Secretary  Stimson  to  consult  me.

    99334 — .50 1 2

    1074  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    The  only  matter  of  broad  policy  that  came  up  after  the  second
    meeting  of  the  Top  Policy  Committee  of  September  23,  1942,  had  to
    do  with  the  sharing  of  certain  construction  details  of  the  atom  bomb
    with  Great  Britain,  That  is  my  recollection  of  it.  And  Dr.  Vannevar
    Bush  came  to  see  me  about  that  on  two  separate  occasions  after  that
    September  23,  1942,  meeting.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Although  there  were  only  two  occasions,  you  state,
    when  meetings  of  the  Top  Policy  Committee  were  held,  there  were  sub-
    sequent occasions,  were  there  not,  when  the  individual  members  of
    that  committee  met  informally  and  discussed  problems  'i

    Mr.  Wallace.  None,  so  far  as  I  know.  There  probably  were  meet-
    ings, I  would  assume,  l3etween  Dr.  Bush  and  Dr.  Conant,  or  between
    Dr.  Bush,  Dr.  Conant,  and  Secretary  Stimson.  You  see,  this  became,
    after  September  1942,  a  military  effort,  and  Dr.  Bush  was  working
    closely  with  the  military,  and  Dr.  Conant,  Dr.  Bush's  assistant,  was
    working  very  closely  with  the  military.  Secretary  Stimson,  of  course,
    was  Secretary  of  War,  and  General  Marshall  was  Chief  of  Staff.  I
    was  the  only  one  not  in  the  military  activity.  They  may  have  had
    frequent  meetings,  but  I  never  sat  on  any  of  them.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Who  was  chairman  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Of  the  Top  Policy  Committee  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes.

    Mr.  Wallace.  So  far  as  I  know,  I  was  the  ranking  member.  The
    first  meeting  was  held  in  my  office.  After  that,  actually  the  man  who
    was  at  work  continuously  on  the  problem  was  the  man  who  had  been
    designated  by  President  Roosevelt  on  June  15,  1940,  Dr.  Vannevar
    Bush.  He  was  the  man  who  had  been  delegated  by  President  Roose-
    velt to  work  on  the  problem,  and  he  was  the  man  who  really  determined
    if  a  meeting  was  to  be  held.    He  was  the  man  who  had  all  the  contacts.

    From  what  Dr.  Bush  told  me.  Dr.  Bush  had  frequent  contacts  w^ith
    the  President,  and,  from  what  Dr.  Bush  told  me,  the  President,  during
    these  early  stages,  wanted  these  matters  cleared  with  me,  because  I
    was  second  in  command  in  the  Nation.  Also,  the  President  at  that
    time  had,  I  think,  considerable  confidence  in  my  scientific  judgment.

    I  do  know  I  talked  to  the  President  about  the  importance  of  the
    l^roject  and  why  it  was  important  to  back  it  with  sufficient  money.
    That  was  in  the  early  stages,  when  it  was  getting  off  the  ground.  My
    significance  after  1942, 1  would  say,  in  regard  to  this,  was  practically
    nil.  That  doesn't  reflect  on  me  or  doesn't  reflect  on  anybody  else.  It
    had  passed  out  of  the  scientific  stage  into  the  construction  stage.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  am  only  asking  for  the  facts.

    Mr.  Wallace.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Were  you  the  presiding  officer  at  the  meeting  of  the
    Top  Policy  Committee  which  you  attended  ^

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  can't  answer  that,  for  the  simple  reason  I  do  not
    have  any  notes  in  my  records  in  regard  to  tliat.  It  was  held  in  my
    office,  and,  knowing  how  I  act  in  situations  of  that  kind,  I  presume  it
    was  an  absolutely  informal  thing.  Secretary  Stimson,  Vannevar
    Bush,  and  myself  talked  it  over.  ''We  just  got  into  a  war,  and  the
    Germans  are  hard  at  work  on  this,  how  are  we  going  to  get  this  job
    done?"  There  was  nobody  there  to  take  any  minutes  of  the  meeting.
    Harold  Smith,  Director  of  the  Budget,  may  have  taken  some.  He  is
    dead.    Secretary  Stimson,  I  understand,  is  not  in  the  best  of  health.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1075

    General  Marshall  was  not  there.    The  only  one  I  think  would  have
    specific  information  about  that  meeting  is  Dr.  Bush.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  British  problem  you  mentioned  a  while  ago,
    what  was  the  general  character  of  that  problem  which  the  Top  Policy
    Committee  had  to  deal  with,  and  when  did  that  problem  arise?

    Mr.  Wallace.  On  December  20,  1942,  Vannevar  Bush  came  to  see
    me  about  it,  and  said  that  there  was  a  disagreement  between  ourselves
    and  the  British  in  regard  to  it.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  In  regard  to  what  ?

    Mr.  AVallace.  How  much  information  should  be  given  the  British
    with  regard  to  construction  details.  The  British  had  been  very  help-
    ful to  us  in  regard  to  scientific  matters.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Had  the  work  of  the  Manhattan  Engineering  Dis-
    trict progressed  at  that  time,  in  December  1942,  to  an  advanced  stage
    in  the  making  of  original  plans  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge  I  knew  nothing  about
    the  Manliattan  district  until  Harold  Smith  told  me  the  name  of  the
    district  in  May  1945.  I  didn't  know  anything  about  the  work  as  it
    progressed.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  didn't  want  to  know.  This  was
    back  in  1941  and  1942,  and  all  I  wanted  to  know  was  that  the  work
    was  being  pushed  with  vigor.  I  had  great  confidence  in  Dr.  Bush,
    felt  he  was  a  man  of  unique  capacity,  and  wanted  the  President  to  push
    the  work.  I  didn't  know  the  name  of  the  project  or  where  they  had
    the  project,  but  I  assumed  Dr.  Bush  was  doing  his  job.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  As  a  member  of  this  Top  Policy  Committee,  wasn't
    it  your  duty  to  determine  that  work  was  progressing  and  that  some-
    thing was  being  done  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Not  after  September  1942.     Not  after  it  passed  over

    to  the  military.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  After  that,  on  December  20,  1942,  you  were  inter-
    viewed by  Dr.  Bush  regarding  the  extent  to  which  Great  Britain
    was  to  be  informed  on  policy  or  experiment?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.  Dr.  Bush  came  to  me  on  December  20,  1942.
    I  don't  know  whether  he  came  to  me  to  determine  if  there  was  a  line
    to  be  followed.  This  thing  was  so  secret  I  don't  think  any  definite
    line  was  ever  set  up.  You  couldn't  reduce  things  to  writing.  It  is
    quite  probable,  knowing  the  way  Dr.  Bush  and  the  President  worked,
    that  the  President  said  to  Dr.  Bush:  "Now,  you  had  better  go  see
    Henry  about  this."    That  would  be  my  guess.

    Mr.  TA^^NNER.  And  your  discussion  at  this  conference  was  the  ex-
    tent to  which  you  would  furnish  materials  or  equipment  needed  in  the
    manufacturing  of  the  atomic  bomb  to  Great  Britain?

    Mr.  Wallace.  It  never  came  up.     Nothing  of  that  sort  ever  came

    Mr.  Tavenner.  It  was  just  a  question  of  information  at  that  time?

    Mr.  Wallace.  It  was  a  question  of  how  far  the  British  would  be
    permitted  to  get  certain  types  of  information.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  discuss  how  far  the  United  States  should
    go  in  giving  tlie  same  information  to  the  Soviet  Union  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  It  never  came  up,  nothing  of  that  sort.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Never  at  any  time?

    Mr.  Wallu\ce.  Never.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Gen.  Leslie  R.  Groves  testified  before  this  commit-
    tee on  December  7, 1949,  that  you  disassociated  yourself  from  the  Man-

    1076  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATEKIAL

    hattan  Engineering  District  project.  If  you  did  disassociate  yourself
    from  it,  when  did  that  occur  and  what  were  the  reasons  ?

    Mr.  Wallace,  I  think  what  I  said  previously  is  very  clear,  and
    General  Groves  obviously  was  not  familiar  with  the  relationship  be-
    tween the  Military  Policy  Committee  and  the  Top  Policy  Committee.
    You  will  find,  reading  his  testimony,  that  he  said  the  Military  Policy
    Committee  was  probably  under  the  Top  Policy  Committee.  He  really
    didn't  know,  and  there  was  no  reason  why  he  should  know.  Dr.  Bush
    tells  me  there  was  no  reason  why  General  Groves  should  have  ever
    come  to  me.  But  General  Groves  may  have  come  because  he  was  di-
    rected on  a  particular  occasion  by  Dr.  Bush  or  Secretary  Stimson,  or
    he  may  have  come  out  of  general  curiosity,  to  see  this  man  who  was
    connected  with  the  project  in  the  early  days.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  General  Groves  also  testified  that  for  reasons  of  his
    own  he  made  five  different  reports,  copies  of  which  he  gave  to  a  number
    of  the  members  of  this  Top  Policy  Committee,  and  he  further  testified
    he  gave  one  copy  to  you,  in  person.     Is  that  correct  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  That  is  what  he  testified,  I  believe.  I  am  not  sure
    whether  he  testified  it  or  said  it  to  newspaper  men.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  was  the  testimony  before  this  committee.  Is
    that  correct  or  not  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  You  have  the  record.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  think  you  understand,  Mr.  Wallace,  that  I  am  not
    asking  what  our  records  show,  but  I  am  asking  whether  or  not  it  was  a
    true  statement  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  don't  know.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  don't  know  whether  General  Groves  gave  you  a
    copy  of  a  report  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  know  General  Groves  either  testified  before  this
    committee  or  stated  to  newspapermen  that  he  gave  me  a  report  in
    August  1943.  He  did  not  give  me  a  report  in  August  1943  so  far  as
    I  can  ascertain.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  the  question  I  asked  you  in  the  first  place.

    Mr.  Wallace.  He  did  not.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  he  call  at  your  office  and  discuss  the  matter  with
    you?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Not  in  August  1943.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  did  he  call  and  discuss  the  matter  with  you  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  have  a  very  careful  record  of  that.  He  called  and
    gave  me  a  report  to  sign — and  my  guess  is  it  was  a  report  that  had  been
    signed  by  the  other  members  a  long  time  previously — on  April  14,
    1944,  at  11 :  15  in  the  morning.  On  that  occasion,  you  will  remember,
    General  Groves  stated  that  he  had  been  kept  waiting,  and  he  was  very
    much  annoyed  at  having  been  kept  waiting,  because  he  thought  the
    people  who  came  out  of  my  office  were  not  important  to  the  war  effort.

    I  know  that  the  man  in  my  office  immediately  preceding  General
    Groves  was  a  Latin-American  diplomat.  My  secretary  knew  nothing
    about  the  Manhattan  project,  knew  nothing  about  General  Groves,
    and  she  couldn't  tell  by  looking  at  General  Groves  that  he  was  a  very
    important  figure,  any  more  than  General  Groves  could  tell  by  looking
    at  the  Latin- American  diplomat,  when  he  came  out  of  my  office,  that
    he  was  an  important  figure.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Any  facts  or  circumstances  surrounding  that  meet-
    ing which  you  desire  to  state,  the  committee  will  be  glad  to  hear.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1077

    Mr.  Wallace.  The  two  things  I  have  in  my  record  made  at  the  time
    are  to  this  effect :  First,  that  he  gave  me  a  report  to  sign ;  that  I  read
    the  report ;  that  it  indicated  to  me  the  war  would  be  over  in  18  months ;
    and  that  General  Groves  said  that  he  was  going  to  chase  the  foreigners
    out  of  the  uranium  business.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  he  tell  you  to  whom  he  referred  as  the  foreign-
    ers?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No,  he  did  not.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  else  did  he  discuss  with  you  at  that  time,  or
    you  with  him,  relating  to  uranium?

    Mr.  Wallace.  He  said  nothing,  and  I  may  say  that  nobody  ever  said
    anything  to  me,  about  uranium  shipments,  to  the  best  of  my  recollec-
    tion.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  this  the  only  report,  of  the  five  which  General
    Groves  said  he  made,  that  you  saw  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  can  find  no  record  of  any  contact  with  General
    Groves  except  on  this  occasion.  I  have  looked  through  my  record  and
    can  find  no  other  contact  but  this  one  of  April  14,  1944.-^

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Aside  from  your  contact  with  General  Groves,  did
    you  at  any  time  see  any  of  the  five  reports,  other  than  the  one  you
    have  testified  to?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Dr.  Vannevar  Bush  might  possibly  have  brought  me
    in  some  i-eport ;  I  don't  know.  He  brought  me  a  great  many  reports  in
    1942.  There  is  no  reason  why  he  should  have  brought  me  a  report  after
    1942.  There  was  no  reason  why  General  Groves  should  have  brought
    me  a  report  in  1944.  I  would  assume  it  would  have  been  through  Dr.
    Bush  if  I  saw  any  others,  because  I  knew  Vannevar  Bush  very  well.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  According  to  your  best  recollection,  do  you  believe
    you  did  see  other  reports  through  Dr.  Bush  ?

    Mr,  Wallace.  I  just  don't  know.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  Did  you  at  any  time  register  a  disagreement,  while  a
    member  of  the  To})  Policy  Committee,  with  the  policies  and  function-
    ing of  tlie  Manhattan  Engineering  District,  which  I  understand  you
    did  not  know  by  name,  but  you  knew  the  work  was  progressing?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No;  never.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  At  the  time  you  were  a  member  of  the  War  Produc-
    tion Board  and  also  a  member  of  this  Top  Policy  Committee,  were  you
    also  Chairman  of  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  was  Chairman  of  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare
    from  August  1941  until  July  15, 1943.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  Economic  Defense  Board  was  created  by  Execu-
    tive Order  8839,  issued  July  30, 1941,  and  the  name  was  changed  to  the
    Board  of  Economic  Warfare  by  Executive  Order  8982  on  December
    17, 1941.  Did  you  serve  in  the  capacity  of  Chairman  of  this  Board  both
    before  and  after  its  name  was  changed  ?

    Mr.  Wallace,  That  Board,  as  I  remember  it,  was  set  up  in  the  State
    Department  under  General  Maxwell,  and  it  had  to  do  specifically  with
    the  control  of  the  exportation  of  materials  we  thought  we  might  need
    in  the  event  of  possible  war.

    ^  Mr.  Wallace,  at  the  time  of  the  hearing,  testified  that  he  could  find  no  record  of
    any  contact  with  fJeneral  Groves  except  the  one  of  April  14,  1944.  In  further  checl^ing
    his  records,  he  finds  that  when  he  was  Secretary  of  Commerce — this  was  long  after  he
    ceased  to  be  head  of  BEW — he  asked  General  Groves  on  September  5,  1945,  to  make  a
    talk  to  the  Advisory  Committee  to  the  Department  of  Commerce  on  the  peacetime  uses  of
    atomic  energy.

    1078  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    There  was  considerable  discord  between  Treasury  and  the  State
    Department  about  certain  matters,  which  occasioned  the  President
    and  Budget  Director  Harold  Smith  much  concern.  They  saw  no  way
    to  get  around  this  difficulty  other  than  to  call  in  someone  who  out-
    ranked Dean  Acheson,  who  represented  the  State  Department  in  this
    matter,  and  Secretary  Morgenthau.  I  was  called  in  for  the  same  rea-
    son I  was  called  in  on  SPAB,  and  at  almost  the  same  time.  General
    Maxwell,  as  I  remember,  resigned  and  went  into  the  Reg-ular  Army
    activities  in  September  1941,  and  we  took  over.  We  may  not  have
    been  known  as  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  at  that  time,  but  an
    Executive  order  had  been  drawn  up,  it  was  a  slightly  different  name,
    and  we  took  over  active  control  quite  specifically  in  September,  and
    General  Maxwell  passed  out  of  the  picture  and  we  put  in  his  place
    Col.,  now  Gen.,  Roy  Lord,  a  very  efficient  Army  man,  to  handle
    these  export  problems.  He  carried  on  for  about  a  year,  at  which  time
    Hector  Lazo  took  charge  of  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare's  Office
    of  Export  Control.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  Executive  order  establishing  the  Board  of
    Economic  Warfare  provides  for  representation  of  the  War  Production
    Board  and  the  Office  of  Lend-Lease  Administration  on  the  Board,  and
    the  persons  selected  to  represent  these  two  agencies  were  required  to
    be  a]3proved  by  the  Chairman.  Who  were  the  representatives  of  the
    War  Production  Board  and  the  Office  of  Lend-Lease  Administration
    approved  by  you  in  1943  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Approved  by  me  in  1943  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes.

    Mr.  Wallace  (to  Mr.  Walter  Freedman).  Do  you  remember  that,
    Walter?

    I  think  Nollenberg  sat  most  of  the  time  for  Ed  Stettinius.  There
    were  provisions  for  alternates,  and  I  think  there  was  never  any  diffi-
    culty about  selecting  them.  I  think  Donald  Nelson  sat  for  the  War
    Production  Board.     I  have  forgotten  who  the  alternate  was.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  Executive  order  establishing  the  Economic  De-
    fense Board,  later  known  as  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare,  provided
    that  its  purpose  was  developing  and  coordinating  policies,  plans,  and
    programs  designed  to  protect  and  strengthen  the  international  eco-
    nomic relations  of  the  United  States  in  the  interest  of  national  defense.
    The  term  "economic  defense"  was  defined  in  part  as  follows :

    The  term  "economic  defense,"  whenever  used  in  this  order,  means  the  con-
    duct, in  the  interest  of  national  defense,  of  international  economic  activities  in-
    cluding those  relating-  to  exports.     *     *     *

    Among  the  functions  and  duties  of  the  Board  are  to  be  found  the
    following :

    (6)  Coordinate  the  policies  and  actions  of  the  several  departments  and  agen-
    cies carrying  on  activities  relating  to  economic  defense  in  order  to  assure  unity
    and  balance  in  the  application  of  such  measures.

    (c)  Develop  integrated  economic  defense  plans  and  programs  for  coordinated
    action  by  the  departments  and  agencies  concerned  and  use  all  appropriate  means
    to  assure  that  such  plans  and  programs  are  carried  into  effect  by  such  depart-
    ments and  agencies.

    Then  section  7  of  the  Executive  order  reads  in  part  as  follows :

    The  Chairman  is  authorized  to  make  all  necessary  arrangements,  with  the
    advice  and  assistance  of  the  Board,  for  discharging  and  performing  the  respon-
    sibilities and  duties  required  to  carry  out  the  functions  and  authorities  set  forth

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1079

    in  this  order,  and  to  make  final  decisions  when  necessary  to  expedite  the  work
    of  the  Board.

    You,  of  course,  at  the  time,  were  very  familiar  with  the  provisions
    of  those  Executive  orders,  I  assume?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes;  I  was  familiar  with  those  provisions,  and  I
    later  became  very  familiar  with  the  soundness  of  the  prophecy  Harold
    Smith  made  on  July  30,  1941,  that  while  I  had  been  given  the  re-
    sponsibility, I  hadn't  really  been  given  the  authority.  While  I  did  not
    keep  a  detailed  record  at  that  time,  I  do  have  a  detailed  record  on  this,
    that  Harold  Smith  said :  "They  have  given  you  responsibility  here,
    but  they  have  not  given  you  authority."  And  he  made  very  clear  the
    point  that  while  Dean  Acheson,  when  he  thought  he  was  going  to  have
    control  of  this,  favored  being  given  complete  authority,  when  it  be-
    came apparent  the  White  House  wanted  me  to  have  it,  he  didn't  want
    me  to  have  complete  authority.

    I  told  Harold  Smith  I  knew  these  people,  and  it  was  not  necessary
    for  me  to  have  com])lete  authority  at  that  time.  I  later  found  Harold
    Smith  was  absolutely  right,  that  I  did  not  have  authority,  and  found
    it  necessary  to  get  cooperation  from  the  departments  concerned.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  How  do  you  construe  this  language,  if  you  say  you
    did  not  have  authority :

    Sec.  7.  The  Chairman  is  authorized  to  ni'alve  all  necessary  arrangements,  with
    the  advice  and  assistance  of  the  Board,  for  discharging  and  performing  the  re-
    sponsibilities and  duties  required  to  carry  out  the  functions  and  authorities  set
    forth  in  this  order.     *     *     *

    How  could  greater  authority  be  given  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  That  may  appeal  to  the  legal  mind,  but  the  history
    of  the  situation  will  demonstrate  it  was  not  sufficient,  because  we  found
    it  necessary  to  amend  the  order  later  on  to  remedy  the  weakness  which
    existed,  and  we  did  get  that  amendment,  and  that  amendment  pro-
    voked great  resentment  on  the  part  of  varioits  other  agencies.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  was  the  date  of  the  amendment;  do  you
    recall  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  would  say  it  was  in  the  spring  of  1942.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Then  in  1943  you  did  have  full  authority  to  make
    all  necessary  arrangements  for  carrying  out  the  provisions  in  this
    order,  by  virtue  of  the  amendment  which  you  now  refer  to?

    Mr.  Wallace.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  amendment  was  then  sabo-
    taged by  certain  of  the  agencies,  and  the  President  made  an  amend-
    ment to  the  amendment.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  mean  that  the  amendment  to  the  amend-
    ment took  away  the  authority  you  had  to  act  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  In  effect;  yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  was  the  date  of  that  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  think  early  summer,  1942.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Ex])lain  a  little  more  what  you  meant  by  stating
    that  it  was  sabotaged  by  an  amendment  to  an  amendment.

    ]Mr.  Wallace.  Simply  that  we  did  not  have  the  full  power  to  do
    the  job ;  that  is  what  I  meant.  If  you  will  examine  the  wording  there,
    you  will  see  that  while  we  were  directed  to  invite  the  agencies  to  go
    along,  if  there  was  any  agency  unwilling  to  go  along,  there  was  no
    way  of  enforcing  it.

    Mr,  Tavenner.  In  other  words,  if  Manhattan  Engineering  District
    would  refuse  to  agree  to  the  issuance  of  an  export  license,  you  contend

    1080  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    you  should  have  had  authority  to  do  it  anyway,  in  a  given  case,  just
    as  an  example  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  am  sure  nothing  of  that  sort  would  have  ever
    come  up,  because  the  Manhattan  District  M^as  in  a  class  altogether  by
    itself.  Xothing  having  to  do  with  uranium  or  the  Manhattan  project
    ever  came  up  before  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  at  any  time.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  If  the  Office  of  Lend-I-iease  Administration  took
    a  contrary  view  to  the  Board  of  Economic  AYarfare  regarding  the
    issuance  of  a  license,  you  contend  you  should  have  had  authority  and
    power  to  have  exported  it  anyway  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  We  had  no  disagreements  with  the  Office  of  Lend-
    Lease  with  regard  to  exports.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  was  a  very
    clear-cut  understanding  arrived  at  with  regard  to  Lend-Lease  Ad-
    ministration in  the  fall  of  1941,  at  which  time  Harry  Hopkins  turned
    the  job  over  to  Ed  Stettinius,  and  insisted  that  certain  powers  in
    Lend-Lease  reside  there  and  not  any  place  else.  We  were  not  con-
    cerned with  having  power  over  the  Office  of  Lend-Lease  Administra-
    tion.   That  is  not  where  we  were  having  our  difficulties.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  it  with  the  War  Production  Board  that  you
    were  having  your  difficulties?

    ]Mr.  Wallace.  No.  We  had  no  difficulties  with  the  War  Production
    Board.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  Why  was  it  you  were  so  insistent  upon  having  final
    authority  and  say  as  to  matters  with  which  these  other  agencies  were
    concerned  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  The  particular  difficulty  we  had  was  getting  maxi-
    mum production,  particularly  in  Latin  America.  We  found  we  had
    a  marked  difference  with  the  Secretary  of  Commerce  and  the  head
    of  the  Eeconstruction  Finance  Corporation  with  regard  to  how  this
    work  ought  to  be  done.    That  was  the  big  problem  involved.

    Mr.  TA^T.XNER.  When  you  say  that  the  authority  you  had  obtained
    by  the  first  amendment  to  the  order  had  been  sabotaged,  it  could  have
    no  meaning  other  than  that  some  group  or  individual  brought  about
    a  change  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  We  also  had  great  difficulty  in  getting  our  men  who
    were  stimulating  production,  particularly  in  Latin  America,  out  to
    those  countries.  Their  visas  would  be  held  up,  and  for  a  time  we
    were  having  very  great  difficulty  with  the  State  Department,  This
    was  largely  a  matter  of  misunderstanding,  the  way  it  turned  out,
    but  it  was  because  the  State  Department  had  very  strong  feelings
    that  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  was  getting  into  its  province
    that  the  amendment  to  the  order  was  changed.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  there  any  group  or  individual  who  did  any
    act  of  sabotage  that  you  recall  ?

    Mv.  Wallace.  I  think  you  are  using  the  word  "sabotage"  in  the
    wrong  sense.  I  am  referring  to  the  weakening.  I  think  possibly  the
    word  "sabotage"  is  unfortunate.  Let  us  say  "weakening"  of  the
    Executive  order.

    ]Mr.  Tavenner.  I  am  just  trying  to  find  out  in  what  sense  you  used  it.

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  am  referring  to  a  weakening  of  the  Executive
    order.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  were  also  familiar  with  the  provisions  of
    Executive  Order  8926  of  October  28,  1941,  by  which  the  Lend-Lease

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1081

    Administrator  was  directed  to  arrange  with  the  Board  of  Economic
    Warfare  for  review  and  clearance  of  Lend-Lease  transactions?

    Mr.  AYallace.  No,  I  am  not  familiar  with  that  particular  order.

    Mr.  TA^'ENNER.  Well,  it  was  an  order  which  went  into  effect  in
    October  1941.  You  do  know,  regardless  of  the  order,  or  whether  or
    not  you  remember  now  about  the  order,  that  the  Lend-Lease  Admin-
    istrator was  required  to  arrange  with  the  Board  of  Economic  War-
    fare for  review  and  clearance  of  those  transactions  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  don't  know  of  any  case  where  they  did.

    Mr,  Tavenner.  When  a  request  was  made  to  Lend-Lease  for  ship-
    ment of  materials  to  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission,  your  organi-
    zation was  the  issuing  agency  for  the  license,  was  it  not  ?

    ISlr.  Wallace.  I  think  that  matter  can  be  very  readily  cleared  up
    by  reading  the  statement  as  made  by  the  State  Department  on  Decem-
    ber 8.  The  State  Department  made  a  statement  on  December  7,  1949,
    which  was  given  considerable  publicity  in  the  press.  This  statement
    was  incorrect  in  certain  particulars.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Are  you  referring  to  a  statement  in  regard  to  heavy
    water  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  My  question  related  to  uranium.

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes,  I  know,  but  this  covers  the  broad  field,  their
    statement  of  December  7.

    Mr.  Case.  December  7  of  what  year  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  December  7, 1949,  that  Secretary  Acheson  put  out  his
    original  statement.  This  December  8  statement  has  a  very  definite
    bearing  on  your  question.    Shall  I  read  that  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  In  just  a  moment,  but  does  that  relate  to  the  regula-
    tions that  were  in  effect  in  1943  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  would  say  so,  definitely.

    Mr.  Ta\tenner.  Before  July  1, 1943?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  think  so.   I  would  say  definitely.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  would  like  for  you  to  make  any  explanation
    about  that  for  the  enlightenment  of  the  committee  that  you  can.

    Mr.  Wallace.  This  is  a  statement  of  December  8, 1949,  issued  by  the
    State  Department :

    In  connection  with  the  Secretary's  statement  yesterday  concerning  the  Jordan
    allegations,  a  review  of  the  records  of  the  Office  of  Lend-Lease  Administration
    and  the  Foreign  Economic  Administration  indicates  that  although  export  licenses
    for  commercial  items,  that  is,  general  items  other  than  lend-lease  and  muni-
    tions, were  actually  issued  by  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare,  the  responsibility
    for  approval  of  the  license  applications,  including  clearance  with  other  interested
    governmental  agencies  rested  with  the  Office  of  Lend-Lease  Administration  and
    its  successor  FEA.  This  procedure  was  deemed  necessary  in  order  to  concen-
    trate control  of  the  wartime  Soviet  supply  program  in  one  agency.  In  actual
    practice  up  to  July  1,  1943,  licenses  approved  by  OLLA  were  issued  in  routine
    fashion  by  BEW.  After  that  a  general  license  issued  by  BEW  or  its  successor
    agencies  became  effective  which  required  approval  of  tiie  Office  of  Lend-Lease
    Administration  only.

    I  think  that  makes  it  very  clear  indeed  that  the  relationship  of  the
    Board  of  Economic  Warfare  to  shipments  to  lend-lease  areas,  whether
    they  were  of  a  lend-lease  nature  or  a  cash  nature,  was  purely  pro
    forma  and  clerical,  and  that  there  was  no  discretionary  authority  in  the
    Board  of  Economic  Warfare  whatever.

    ISIr.  Ta\t:nner.  You  make  that  statement  regardless  of  the  fact  that
    the  Executive  order  says  arrangements  should  be  made  with  the  Board

    1082  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    of  Economic  Warfare  for  review  and  clearance  of  Lend-Lease
    transactions  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  do  make  it — definitely,  flatly,  completely,  and  indig-
    nantly.

    Mr.  Walter  Freedman  was  an  attorney  with  the  Board  of  Economic
    Warfare  at  the  time.  He  was  in  the  Export  Section  of  BEW.  He  is
    making  some  suggestion  to  me  now  which  I  don't  understand  the  tenor
    of,  but  I  suggest  you  ask  him.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  have  no  objection  to  your  conferring  with  him.

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  would  prefer  your  having  such  a  conierence  with
    him.     He  was  close  to  the  technical  details.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  would  prefer  he  make  the  explanation  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Frankly,  I  have  never  seen  an  export  license  in  my
    life.     I  would  like  to  have  you  talk  to  him  about  that.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  no  objection  to  counsel  stat-
    ing what  he  believes  the  situation  was.

    Mr.  Wood.  If  you  wish  to  call  him  as  a  witness,  you  may  do  so.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  a  question?

    Mr.  Wood.  I  would  prefer  that  the  members  make  notes  and  wait
    until  counsel  is  through,  if  that  is  satisfactory.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  There  is  a  provision  in  Executive  Order  8926,  pre-
    viously referred  to,  by  which  the  master  agreement  with  each  nation
    receiving  lend-lease  aid,  setting  forth  the  general  terms  and  conditions
    under  which  such  nation  is  to  receive  such  aid,  was  required  to  be
    negotiated  by  the  State  Department  with  the  advice  of  the  Board  of
    Economic  Warfare  and  the  Oftice  of  Lend-Lease  Administration.  You
    recall  that  to  be  a  fact  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.     You  referred  to  it  earlier.

    Mr.  TA^^NNER.  You  did  advise  about  what  materials  should  be
    exported  to  foreign  countries  during  the  period  of  the  war?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No.     That  was  not  a  function  of  BEW.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  do  you  contend  is  the  meaning

    Mr.  Wall^vce.  BEW  initiated  no  exports  except  exports  in  connec-
    tion with  the  expansion  of  our  program.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  My  question  related  to  master  agreements  nego-
    tiated by  the  State  Department  for  the  furnishing  of  aid  to  the  various
    powers.

    Mr.  Wallace.  That  did  not  come  up  before  BEW.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  was  the  purpose  of  the  provision  of  this  Exec-
    utive order  which  provided  tliat  the  master  agreements  were  required
    to  be  negotiated  by  the  State  Department  with  the  advice  of  the  Board
    of  Economic  Warfare  and  tlie  Oftice  of  Lend-Lease  Administration  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Down  the  line  there  may  have  been  clearance.  I  was
    not  aware  of  anything  of  the  sort,  and,  as  far  as  I  recall,  nothing  of
    the  sort  came  before  meetings  of  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare.

    Mr.  Ta^^nner.  As  Chairman  of  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare,
    you  certainly  would  have  known  of  such  an  important  thing  as  the
    negotiation  of  an  agreement  for  a  large  delivery  of  important  materials
    to  foreign  countries  during  the  war  period  if  it  occurred,  would  you
    not?

    Mr.  Wallace.  It  never  came  to  my  attention.  It  is  one  of  those
    things  that  never  came  to  my  attention.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  it  not  also  true  that  Executive  Order  8900,
    heretofore  mentioned,  required  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  to

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1083

    provide  a  control  clearing  service  to  which  exporters  may  submit
    proposals  for  the  export  of  materials  and  commodities,  and  further
    required  that  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  shall  obtain  clearance
    for  such  proposals  from  the  Federal  agencies  concerned  with  the
    control  of  exports  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Let's  have  this  question  handled  by  Mr.  Freedman
    later  on.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Don't  you  recall  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No,  I  don't  recall.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  This  is  all  set  forth,  Mr.  Wallace,  in  a  memo-
    randum from  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  approved  by  you
    [handing  memorandum  to  the  witness].

    Mr.  Wallace.  Mr.  Tavenner,  I  venture  to  say  if  some  7  years  from
    now  you  are  asked  for  certain  details  of  this  year,  your  recollection
    will  be  as  hazy  as  mine  about  precise  words  of  this  kind.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  certainly  true  about  precise  words,  but  I
    am  asking  you  about  the  general  subject  of  making  clearance  of  ex-
    ports to  foreign  countries  tlirough  the  agencies  that  control  those
    exports.  I  Avould  have  thought  that  was  a  matter  of  such  importance
    you  would  have  recalled  it.

    Mr.  Wallace.  It  miglit  have  been  important  in  the  daily  func-
    tioning of  the  executive  section  of  the  Board.  I  sat  on  the  Board
    where  you  had  these  top  people  from  the  various  agencies.  I  was  not
    the  executive  officer  of  the  Board.  I  was  Chairman  of  the  Board.
    Matters  of  this  sort  were  not  brought  to  my  attention.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  At  one  and  the  same  time  you  were  a  member  of
    the  War  Production  Board,  you  were  a  member  of  the  Top  Policy
    Committee,  and  you  were  the  Chairman  of  the  Board  of  Economic
    Warfare,  and  in  any  dispute  of  policy  that  may  have  arisen  between
    tliose  agencies,  you  were  in  the  position  of  standing  on  both  sides  of
    the  bargain  counter,  so  to  speak,  with  regard  to  those  transactions,
    were  you  not  'i

    Mr'  Wallace.  There  were  no  disputes  that  came  up  regarding  this
    particular  matter,  and  while  it  may  all  have  been  set  forth,  the  mere
    matter  of  setting  forth  probably  handled  the  situation.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  There  was  no  other  person  in  such  a  unique  position
    as  you  were  in  ?

    Mr.  Waij^ace.  I  was  Vice  President  of  the  United  States  and  had
    the  relationship  to  the  three  agencies  to  which  you  refer,  and  I  am
    very  proud  of  having  had  that  position.  I  am  very  proud  of  having
    been  Vice  President  at  that  time.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Of  course  it  is  a  great  honor  to  be  Vice  President
    of  the  United  States  at  any  time.

    Mr.  Wallace,  my  purpose  is  to  endeavor  to  develop  your  oppor-
    tunities for  knowledge  and  your  responsibilities  relating  to  matters
    that  w^ould  normally  come  before  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare,
    the  War  Production  Board,  and  things  that  occurred  within  Man-
    hattan Engineering  District.

    Mr.  Wallace.  May  I  interpolate,  with  regard  to  things  that  might
    have  occurred  within  the  Manhattan  District,  nothing  came  to  my
    attention  as  to  things  within  the  Manhattan  District.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  understand.  You  have  so  stated.  With  all  this
    :background,  and  all  these  positions  you  have  held,  my  sole  purpose
    now  is  to  have  you  tell  this  committee  all  that  you  know  about  the

    1084  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    sale  of  uranium  for  export  to  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission
    during  the  war  period,  and  by  that  I  mean  any  circumstances  related
    to  the  entire  transaction,  as  to  the  fact  of  issuance  of  licenses,  as  to
    the  policy  governing  it ;  the  committee  would  like  to  hear  it.

    Mr.  Wallace.  Thank  you  very  much,  JNlr.  Tavenner.  I  think  the
    shortest  way  of  handling  this,  at  the  risk  of  some  repetition,  is  to  read
    a  short  prepared  statement  that  will  take  about  10  minutes  to  read
    it,  then  there  can  be  questioning,  if  that  is  satisfactory.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Is  it  responsive  to  the  question  ?

    ]\Ir.  Wallace.  It  is  definitely  responsive  to  the  question.

    Mr.  Wood.  If  it  is  responsive  to  the  question,  yes.

    Mr.  Walter.  Before  he  does  that,  don't  you  think  the  Executive
    orders  should  be  made  exhibits  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  They  appear  in  the  Federal  Register.

    Mr.  Wallace  (reading)  :

    I  have  asked  this  committee  for  an  opportunity  to  testify  because  I  want  very
    much  to  clear  up  the  doubts  that  have  been  cast  on  my  conduct  in  connection
    with  the  licensing  of  uranium  and  heavy-water  shipments  to  Russia  in  1943.

    Testimony  before  this  committee  has  raised  two  basic  questions  insofar  as  I
    am  concerned:  (1)  It  is  strongly  implied,  if  not  actually  said,  that  I  was
    responsible  for  the  licensing  of  uranium  and  lieavy  water  for  Russia  in  1943 ;
    and  (2)  as  a  wartime  Vice  President,  I  could  not  be  trusted  with  certain  con-
    Mential  information  regarding  the  atom  bomb.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Wallace,  the  first  point  is  pertinent  to  the  question.
    The  second  is  not.  I  will  ask  you  to  confine  your  answer  to  the  first
    point.

    Mr.  Wallace.  If  I  can  be  allowed  to  differ  slightly  with  the  chair-
    man on  that,  I  would  like  to  read  from  the  record  made  by  General
    Groves  before  this  committee.  There  is  a  suggestion  in  the  record
    oi  the  committee

    Mr.  Case.  Mr.  Chairman,  it  is  apparent  that  the  next  paragraph
    deals  with  attacks  that  have  been  made  on  the  witness,  not  before  this
    committee,  but  bj-  newspapers  and  radio  commentators.  It  seems  to
    me  the  proper  thing  for  Mr.  Wallace  to  do  is  to  answer  statements
    made  before  this  committee,  and  not  use  this  as  a  forum  to  answer
    statements  by  commentators  and  newspapers,  over  which  this  com-
    mittee has  no  control.

    Mr.  Harrison.  It  appears  to  me  the  statement  is  not  very  long,
    and  it  might  save  time  to  let  him  read  it.

    jVIr.  Wood.  Suppose  you  use  whatever  material  you  have.

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  think  that  will  be  the  shorter  procedure.  (Con-
    tinuing reading:)

    While  it  is  not  for  me  to  pass  judgment  upon  my  own  conduct,  I  state  unhesi-
    tatingly that  I  am  proud  of  my  participation  as  "Vice  President  of  the  United
    States  during  the  time  when  the  war  situation  was  most  critical,  and  I  am  proud
    to  liave  been  associated  witli  the  administration  whose  policies  were  so  effective
    in  making  available  the  essential  materials  when  they  were  most  needed.  The
    attack  being  made  on  me — not  only  before  this  committee,  but  with  even  more
    violence  in  certain  newspapers  and  by  certain  radio  commentators — is,  I  think,
    not  so  much  an  attack  on  me  as  it  is  upon  the  Democratic  Party  and  President
    Roosevelt.  At  any  rate,  once  and  for  all,  I  want  the  record  of  this  committee  to
    show  exactly  what  my  participation  was  insofar  as  tliese  shipments  are  con-
    cerned.

    Because  I  knew  how  important  it  was  to  keep  secret  the  fact  that  this  Govern-
    ment was  exploring  the  possibilities  of  an  atom  bomb,  I  never  discussed  the  atom
    bomb  or  the  shipment  of  uranium  or  heavy  water  to  any  country  with  anyone  in
    BEW — or  anyone  else  outside  of  the  selected  group  of  Government  officials

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1085

    directly  involved — at  any  time  until  the  matter  was  exploded  in  the  press.  The
    subject  of  uranium  shipments  was  never  discussed  in  any  meeting  of  the  Board
    of  Economic  Warfare  which  I  attended,  or  in  any  contact  with  any  member  of  the
    staff.  The  most  important  point  to  remember,  however,  is  that  shipments  to
    lUissia  were  not  the  responsibility  of  BEW  l)ut  the  responsibility  of  the  Lend-
    Lease  Administration,  which  in  1943  was  under  the  direction  of  E.  K.  Stettinius,  Jr.

    All  license  applications  for  shipments  of  materials  to  lend-lease  areas  which
    were  filed  with  BEW  were  forwarded  to  the  Lend-Lease  Administration  for
    recommendation.  BEW's  responsibility  for  these  applications  was  limited  to
    approving  or  denying  the  applications  in  accordance  with  the  recommendation  of
    the  Lend-Lease  Administration.

    Moreover,  the  licenses  for  uranium  oxide  and  uranium  nitrate  are  said  to  have
    been  issued  in  March  and  April  of  1943.  I  want  to  point  out  that  I  personally
    was  in  Latin  America  from  March  16.  1943,  until  April  25  of  that  year.

    In  any  event,  I  knew  nothing  about  the  issuance  of  the  licenses  or  the  ship-
    ments until  the  matter  was  stirred  up  in  the  press  in  1946.

    Within  the  past  week  I  have  talked  to  Milo  Perkins,  who  was  executive  director
    of  BEW,  and  Hector  Lazo,  who  in  1943  was  head  of  BEW's  Office  of  Export
    control.  I  am  assured  by  both  of  them  that  in  1943  they  knew  nothing  about
    tne.se  licenses,  nor,  indeed,  did  they  know  anything  about  the  atomic-bomb  project.

    With  regard  to  the  licensing  of  heavy  water  in  late  1943,  the  shortest  and  most
    convincing  answer  is  that  I  left  BEW  on  July  15,  1943.  Leo  Crowley  took  over
    REW  on  July  16,  and  its  name  was  changed  to  OEW.  On  September  25,  1943,
    OEW  was  merged  with  Lend-Lease  and  the  new  agency  was  called  Foreign  Eco-
    nomic Administration.

    Secretary  Acheson,  on  December  7,  1949.  issued  a  statement  which  received  con-
    siderable publicity — and  which  credited  BEW  with  issuing  a  license  for  heavy
    water  4  months  after  it  had  ceased  to  exist.  On  December  8,  Secretary  Acheson
    realized  his  error,  and  the  State  Department  issued  a  new  statement  which,  to
    the  best  of  my  knowledge,  never  appeared  in  the  press  or  over  the  radio.

    I  have  already  read  that  statement,  and  witli  your  permission  I
    will  consider  it  as  in  the  record  at  this  point  and  pass  it  on.

    In  summary,  therefore,  it  is  to  be  pointed  out  that  not  BEW  but  the  Lend-
    Lease  Administration,  which  by  its  activities  saved  so  many  American  lives,  was
    responsible  for  clearing  all  shipments  to  Russia.  I  was  neither  responsible  nor
    aware  of  any  of  them  at  that  time.

    Since  I  was  not  even  aware,  therefore,  that  the  Russians  were  trying  to
    obtain  uranium  or  heavy  water,  it  is  demonstrably  apparent  that  I  could  not  have
    pressured  someone  else  into  issuing  the  license,  or  urged  them  to  pressure  the
    Manhattan  Engineering  District  to  consent  to  their  issue.

    In  short,  and  in  fact,  I  had  absolutely  nothing  to  do  with  any  of  these
    licenses.  I  was  not  aware  that  they  were  being  requested.  I  did  not  know  that
    Lend-Lease  recommended,  after  consulting  with  the  Manhattan  district,  that
    they  be  issued,  and  the  agency  which  I  headed,  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare,
    had  no  discretionary  authority  with  respect  to  them.

    Mr.  Wood.  Does  that  prepared  statement  stand,  in  the  light  of  the
    Executive  order?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes,  sir;  I  desire  that  that  statement  stand.

    Mr.  Walter.  I  think  he  misread  the  statement.  He  said  he  did  not
    know.

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  am  sorry.    I  did  know.

    Mr.  Harrison.  You  read  it  one  way  and  it  is  here  another  way.
    Which  is  corect?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  did  not  know.  That  is  on  page  6.  [Continuing
    reading:]

    Now,  a  word  must  be  said  about  General  Groves'  statement  that  he  showed
    me  a  report  in  August  1943,  and  that  that  was  the  only  report  that  he  showed
    to  me.

    Mr.  AVooD.  You  have  already  gone  into  that.

    Mr.  Wall.\ce.  Yes.     I  think  all  of  this  matter  has  been  covered.

    to

    1086  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    That  should  be — ^I  did  not  know,  by  the  way,  on  page  6.  Tliere  is  an
    error  in  the  mimeograph.^°

    Mr.  Wood.  An}^  further  questions?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  think  everything  else  has  been  covered  that  is  in
    this  prepared  statement.  I  mi  Page  6  refers  to  page  number  in  typed  copy  from  which  the  witness  was  reading.

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1087

    Mv.  Tavexner.  Was  there  brouglit  to  your  attention  the  issuance
    of  licenses  for  the  export  of  uranium  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Never.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  By  any  person  in  BEW  ?

    Mr.  Wai,lace.  Never.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  By  any  person  outside  of  BEW  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Never.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Whose  responsibility  was  it  in  the  Bureau  of  Eco-
    nomic Warfare  to  screen  these  applications  for  licenses  or  issue  them?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Well,  Hector  Lazo  was  head  of  Export  Control.
    Who  was  under  Hector  Lazo  I  don't  know.  Mr.  Freedman  may  be
    able  to  tell  you  that.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  ever  discuss  his  duties  with  him  ?

    Mr,  Wallace.  That  particular  agency  was  absorbed  completely
    with  the  problem  of  issuing  export  licenses  rapidly  to  the  trade.  They
    had  to  issue  about  8,000  a  day,  and  it  was  a  difficult  mechanical  job,
    and  the  trade  was  disgusted  with  the  way  that  job  had  been  done
    before  we  took  over.  I  think  at  one  time  there  were  100,000  of  these
    licenses  jammed  up,  weren't  there,  Walter?  We  had  to  get  out  from
    under  that  log  jam.  None  of  these  questions  of  policy  came  up,
    because  they  were  cleared  more  or  less  automatically  with  the  execu-
    tive agencies.  No  question  of  policy  ever  came  up  to  my  knowledge
    to  the  top  echelon.  I  took  that  up  with  Mr.  Perkins  and  Mr.  Lazo.
    Mr.  Freedman,  I  think,  can  assure  you  from  what  he  knows  of  the
    lower  echelon  that  nothing  of  the  sort  ever  came  to  anybody  on  the
    Board.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  It  was  a  matter  of  general  knowledge,  however,  that
    uranium  was  being  used  in  this  important  project,  and  that  the  policy
    was  not  only  to  keep  it  secret,  but  not  let  anybody  get  hold  of  it  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Vannevar  Bush  had  sworn  me  to  secrecy,  and  I  was
    not  going  to  talk  to  anybody  in  BEW  about  the  thing.  I  didn't  talk
    to  Milo  Perkins  about  it.  You  couldn't  trust  yourself  to  talk  to  any-
    body. If  Vannevar  Bush  w^anted  to  know  if  uranium  was  being  prop-
    erly handled,  he  should  go  to  Lend-Lease  or  me  directly,  because  I  was
    the  only  one  in  BEW  who  knew  about  it.  I  am  not  even  sure  Ed
    Stettinius  knew  about  it.  The  only  think  to  do  was  come  to  me  if
    they  wanted  to  observe  secrecy.  They  should  have  said:  "Here,  you
    hold  the  second  highest  office  in  Government,  and  you  know  about  the
    atomic  bomb.  How  can  we  get  it  across  to  these  folks  that  do  the
    licensing  without  getting  somebody's  wind  up?"  That  would  have
    been  the  proper  course,  to  come  to  somebody  who  knew  about  the
    atomic  bomb.  You  couldn't  expect  me,  who  had  sworn  myself  to
    secrecy  to  Dr.  Bush,  to  go  to  those  people  and  say:  "Look  out  for
    uranium."     That  would  be  tipping  your  hand.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  were  cognizant  of  the  importance  of  prevent-
    ing the  export  of  uranium  from  this  country?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  never  thought  about  it.

    Mr.  Ta\T3nner.  You  never  thought  about  it?

    Mv.  Wallace.  No.     This  thing  had  been  turned  over  to  the  military.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  You  recognized  there  was  a  problem  of  control?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  nevei'  thought  of  it  at  all.  It  was  not  within  my
    sphere  of  competence.

    1088  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yon  are  familiar,  I  presume,  with  Conservation
    Order  M-285  of  the  War  Production  Board,  which  provides  as  follows :

    The  fulfillment  of  requirements  for  the  defense  of  the  United  States  has  created
    a  shorta.ire  in  the  supply  of  uranium  for  defense,  for  private  account,  and  for
    export;  and  the  following  order  is  deemed  necessary  and  appropriate  in  the
    public  interest  and  to  promote  the  national  defense.

    That  was  the  regidation   that  controlled  the   purposes   for   which
    uranium  could  be  sold  and  distributed  within  this  country.

    Mr.  Wx^LLACE.  I  didn't  know  about  that  order  until  I  read  it  in  the
    press,  going  over  the  newspaper  accounts  of  the  hearing.  A  lot  of
    these  very  important  things  take  place  very  normally  in  the  lowei
    echelon.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  offer  in  evidencv
    Executive  Order  SSoO,  of  July  30,  1041.  from  which  I  read,  and  asL
    that  I  be  permitted  to  tile  as  a  part  of  the  same  exhibit,  marked  ""Wal-
    lace Exhibit  1,'"  the  subsequent  amendments  which  Mr.  Wallace  has
    referred  to.

    Mr.  Wood.  Without  objection,  it  will  be  admitted.
    (The  documents  above  referred  to,  marked  ''Wallace  Exhibit  1,"
    are  liereinafter  included  in  the  record.)  ^^

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  have  no  further  questions.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Walter.

    Mr.  Walter.  Was  there  any  occasion  for  General  Groves  to  ever
    report  to  you,  or  to  divscuss  matters  with  respect  to  the  progress  of
    the  Manhattan  project  with  you?

    Mr.  Wallace.  General  Groves'"  chain  of  command  did  not  run  to
    me.

    Mr.  Walter.  To  whom  did  it  run  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Dr.  Vannevar  Bush,  who  was  chairman  of  the  Mili-
    tary Policy  Committee.  There  was  no  reason  why  he  should  come  to
    me  unlei^s  he  was  directed  to  do  so  by  Dr.  Bush  or  Secretary  Stimson.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Harrison.

    IMr.  Harrison.  No  questions.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Moulder.

    Mr.  IMouLDER.  No  questions.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Nixon.

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  will  pass.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Case.

    Mr.  Case.  Mr.  WaHace,  you  have  pretty  well  given  the  background
    of  your  knowledge  of  research  in  the  development  of  atomic  energy,
    and  indicated  you  had  read  magazine  articles  prior  to  1940  on  it,
    and  also  spoke  of  your  part  on  the  top  policy  group  which  met  Decem-
    ber 16, 1941,  at  which  Dr.  Vannevar  Bush  and  Secretary  Stimson  were
    present.  You  may  have  referred  to  a  further  contact  you  had  with
    the  development  of  the  atom  bomb  progran  but  if  so  I  missed  it  in
    your  testimony.

    I  have  here  a  book  entitled  "Atomic  Ener,  ''or  Military  Purposes"
    by  Henry  DeWolf  Smyth,  chairman,  depar  ^t  of  physics,  Prince-
    ton University,  and  consultant,  Manhattai  rict,  United  States
    Engineers.     This  is  described  as  "The  Official  j.i^^,ort  on  the  Develop-

    ^'  See  appendix.

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  lUoy

    ment  of  the  Atomic  Bomb  under  the  Auspices  of  the  United  States
    Government,  1940-45,"  and  on  pages  81-82  I  read  this  paragraph :

    Report  to  the  President  by  Bushj  and  Conant  on  June  17,  1942

    On  June  13,  1942,  Bush  and  Conant  sent  to  Vice  President  Henry  A.  Wallace,
    Secretary  of  War  Henry  L.  Stimson,  and  Chief  of  Staff  George  C.  Marshall,  a
    report  recommending  detailed  plans  for  the  expansion  and  continuation  of  the
    atomic  bomb  program.

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  might  interpolate  and  say  I  did  refer  in  the  ques-
    tioning to  a  meeting  with  Vannevar  Bush  on  June  16,  1942,  which
    was  an  important  meeting  having  to  do  with  the  expansion  of  the
    program.

    Mr.  Case  (continuing  reading)  :

    AH  three  approved  the  report.  On  June  17,  1942,  the  report  was  sent  by  Bush
    to  the  President,  who  also  approved.     *     *     *

    Mr.  Wallace.  That  is  correct.

    Mr.  Case.  That  is  correct  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  So  that  you  saw  the  report  which  dealt  with  the  pro-
    gram for  the  expansion  of  the  atomic  bomb  project?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  Then,  having  had  that  connection  with  the  development
    of  the  project  at  the  outset

    Mr.  Wallace.  This  was  a  pilot  plant  proposition  at  that  time.
    This  did  not  have  to  do  with  what  later  became  the  grand  effort.
    It  was  small  stuff.  That  was  when  I  was  still  active  in  the  program.
    My  testimony  was  that  my  significance  in  the  program  ceased  after
    it  was  kicked  over  to  the  military  in  1942.

    Mr.  Case.  I  don't  want  to  change  your  testimony  in  any  respect.
    I  want  to  get  clear  what  the  background  was  and  the  importance  of
    uranium  in  the  development  of  the  atomic  bomb  project.

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  certainly  understood  the  importance  of  uranium
    in  the  atom  bomb  project.

    Mr.  Case.  And  the  importance  of  secrecy?

    Mr.  Wallace.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Case.  With  that  knowledge  and  background,  and  your  con-
    nection w^ith  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare,  did  it  ever  occur  to
    you  that  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  should  take  steps  to  prevent
    uranium  and  uranium  compounds  falling  in  unauthorized  hands?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  felt,  un.der  my  oath  of  secrecy  to  Dr.  Bush,  I  should
    not  talk  to  anyone  in  BEW  about  it.  I  might  mention  that  at  one
    time  when  I  was  with  Dr.  C.  K.  Leith  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin,
    a  noted  geologist,  I  asked  him  where  the  uranium  deposits  of  the
    world  were.  He  was  not  a  member  of  the  Board  of  Economic  War-
    fare. He  was  a  liaison  iv#n,  very  highly  thought  of  in  the  geological
    field.    I  think  that  is  t'      only  time  the  word  "uranium"  ever  came

    up.  .   -ru-

    Mr.  Case.  Did  Dr.  J  j,  :%  tell  you  uranium  was  produced  in  Canada  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yef;.:,£  ^^

    Mr.  Case.  Did  B^^^f  have  a  list  of  critical  items  that  were  not  to
    be  exported  under  any  consideration  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  presume  they  did.  Mr.  Freedman  tells  me  this
    was  a  list  supplied  by  the  War  Production  Board.

    99334 — 50 13

    1090  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Case.  Were  you  a  member  of  the  War  Production  Board  after
    jou  became  head  of  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.  I  was  a  member  of  the  War  Production  Board
    from  the  time  it  started,  January  15,  1942,  until  I  resigned  on  July
    19  or  20,  1943.

    Mr.  Case.  Was  uranium  on  the  list  of  critical  materials  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  don't  know.  I  have  no  idea.  I  looked  on  this
    thing  as  something  for  me  to  stay  out  of,. that  it  was  in  other  hands,
    and  competent  hands,  and  it  was  not  for  me  to  go  into,

    Mr.  Case.  Wasn't  it  your  duty  to  supervise  the  issuance  of  export
    licenses  ?

    ]Mr.  Wallace.  We  were  in  a  negative  position.  Our  powers  were
    negative.  We  did  not  take  the  initiative.  We  were  carrying  out
    orders  for  other  people.  I  don't  remember  a  single  case  where  we
    took  the  initiative.  Nor  do  I  recall  a  single  case  where  we  suggested
    that  commodities  be  placed  on  the  export  ban.  I  would  say  it  was  a
    mechanical,  clerical  function  that  we  exercised.  That  is  the  way  the
    thing  came  up  to  us  in  the  first  place  from  General  Maxwell.

    Mr.  Case.  With  regard  to  matters  that  came  up  under  Lend-Lease,
    you  deferred  entirely  to  the  wishes  of  Lend-Lease  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  So  far  as  I  know,  there  was  never  any  discussion
    whatsoever  with  regard  to  any  exports  to  Russia.  I  don't  recall  a
    single  case  of  exports  to  Russia,  export  of  uranium,  coming  up  at
    any  time.  Lend-Lease  would  stamp  the  applications  in  the  lend-lease
    area  field.  I  haven't  seen  one  of  those  documents.  If  you  would  get
    hold  of  one  of  the  export  documents  that  are  in  Archives  Building —
    I  can't  get  hold  of  them,  but  you  can — you  could  find  out  what  the
    procedure  was.

    Mr.  Case.  The  statement  you  have  made  indicates  that  when  an
    application  came  with  the  stamp  of  Lend-Lease,  you  automatically
    issued  the  license?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  And  you  would  not  see  it;  people  in  the  lower  levels
    would  automatically  issue  the  license  if  Lend-Lease  said  they  wanted
    it?

    Mr.  Wallace.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  you  have  representation  in  Lend-Lease  ?

    Mr.  Wallace,  t  don't  think  so.

    Mr.  Case.  You  said  it  was  under  the  direction  of  Mr.  Stettinius
    in  1943  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.  It  first  came  under  his  direction  in  the  fall
    of  1941.  Mr.  Stettinius  is  dead.  He  had  an  able  assistant  by  the  name
    of  Tom  McCabe,  now  head  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board,  and  a  man
    highly  regarded  by  businessmen  of  the  country.  He  was  on  the  Busi-
    ness Advisory  Board  of  the  Department  of  Commerce.  I  am  suro
    he  could  clear  up  this  problem  with  you  very  rapidly.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  you  sit  in  on  meetings  of  Lencl-Lease?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No.

    Mr.  Case.  In  connection  with  this  particular  export  license,  it  was
    brought  out  in  testimony  yesterday  that  when  the  committee  sought
    to  go  through  the  Archives  to  get  the  particular  license  that  covered
    the  shipment,  it  could  not  be  found.  Do  you  know  anything  about
    that?

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1091

    Mr.  Wallace.  Not  the  slightest.    How  many  licenses  were  there  ?

    Mr.  Case.  The  others  were  tliere.

    Mr.  Wallace.  Which  particular  one  was  not  found  ?

    Mr.  Case.  The  one  which  was  missing,  according  to  the  testimony,
    was  the  one  amended  April  29,  1943,  for  1,()0()  pounds.

    Mr.  Wallace.  Where  would  the  original  be  ?

    Mr.  Freedman.  They  have  to  give  the  original  to  the  collector  of
    customs,  or  they  couldn't  ship  the  stuif .

    Mr.  Case.  What  was  the  custom  of  BEW  in  handling  these  licenses
    after  they  were  issued  ?    Were  they  permanent  files  ?

    Mr.  Freedman.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  They  were  permanent  files  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  And  the  property  of  the  Government?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  If  you  had  ever  been  given  all  the  power  you  state  you
    should  have  had  to  carry  out  the  responsibilities  placed  on  you,  would
    you  have  asked  for  some  voice  in  determining  what  mateiial  should
    be  exported.

    Mr.  WalLuVce.  Not  in  the  export  field.  What  we  were  interested
    in  was  in  the  import  field.    That  is  where  we  wanted  the  powers.

    Mr.  Case.  You  had  a  list  of  critical  materials  not  to  be  sent  out  of
    the  country  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  We  had  a  completely  happy  relationship  with  Lend-
    Lease.  There  was  no  case  of  conflict  there.  We  did  not  feel  we  had
    enough  critical  materials  coming  into  the  country.  It  had  nothing  to
    do  with  the  export  field.    We  had  no  interest  in  that.

    Mr.  Case.  Do  you  recall  the  top  personnel  of  Lend-Lease  in  1943  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  There  was  a  man  by  the  name  of  Nollenberg.  Of
    course  the  top  was  Edward  R.  Stettinius,  Jr.,  now  passed  away.  I
    think  Tom  McCabe  was  his  right-hand  man.  And  there  was  a  man,
    Van  Buskirk,  now,  I  believe,  wdth  the  Mellons  in  Pittsburgh.  I  think
    Mr.  Pratt  of  General  Motors  was  there.  I  had  very  little  to  do  with
    Lend-Lease  at  the  time.

    Mr.  Case.  Do  you  know  who  had  to  do  with  requests  for  export
    licenses  that  came  from  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  didn't  learn  that  until  I  was  getting  ready  to  go  to
    China  via  Soviet  Russia  along  in  April  1944,  and  I  was  trying  to  find
    somebody  who  would  go  along  with  me  as  a  Russian  translator,  and  I
    was  told  that  there  was  somebody  over  in  Lend-Lease,  and  I  called
    up  General  Wesson  and  was  informed  at  that  time  that  he  had
    to  do  with  this  type  of  activity.  That  was  the  first  time  I  had  known
    of  him,  so  far  as  I  can  remember.

    Mr.  Case.  Wliat  type  of  activity  do  you  mean  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  The  purchasing  on  lend-lease  account  and  sending  to
    Russia.

    Mr.  Wood.  You  don't  recall  anything  specifically  having  to  do  with
    the  development  of  the  atomic  bomb  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Oh,  no.     Why  do  you  make  a  statement  like  that,  sir  ?

    Mr.  Case.  Because  you  used  the  words  "with  this  type  of  activity.''*

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  think  your  question  was  friendly,  because  you  did
    not  want  my  statement  misinterpreted.     I  am  sure  it  was  friendly.

    Mr.  Case.  You  said  some  people  in  the  State  Department  felt  BEW
    was  getting  into  its  province.     Who  were  those  people  ?

    1092  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  "Wallace,  In  the  first  instance,  Sumner  Wells  and  Dean  Ache-
    son.  Later  on  we  straightened  this  out  very  comfortably  with  the
    State  Department,  but  at  the  beginning  they  felt  if  we  sent  men  to
    South  America  to  stimulate  the  production  of  quinine,  or  get  out
    quartz  crystals,  or  to  make  sure  there  was  plenty  of  tin  or  rubber
    coming  along,  these  men  would  be  running  around  loose,  not  report-
    ing to  the  respective  embassies,  and  that  they  would  cross  up  the  wires
    of  the  State  Department,  and  for  a  Vhile  there  was  very  great  delay
    in  getting  visas  to  get  the  men  out  of  the  country,  and  very  great  delay
    in  getting  messages  from  them.  The  messages  that  would  come  from
    them  would  lie  around  the  State  Department  sometimes  for  a  week
    or  more.  This  was  largely  due  to  the  cumbersomeness  of  the  State
    Department  machinery,  but  we  did  not  understand  that  at  the  time.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  the  State  Department  have  representation  on  the
    Board  of  Economic  Warfare  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.

    IMr.  Case.  What  person  or  persons  represented  the  State
    Department  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Usually  Dean  Acheson  sat  on  the  Board.  Some-
    times Secretary  Hull  himself  sat  on  the  Board.

    Mr.  Case.  But  most  of  the  time  it  was  Mr.  Acheson  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.

    Mr.  Case.  Mr.  Acheson  opposed  granting  you  greater  power  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  According  to  Harold  Smith,  in  January  1941  Mr.
    Acheson  opposed  it,  yes,  and  I  think  later  on  when  it  came  to  this
    amendment  he  opposed  it  as  well.  Secretary  Hull  also  opposed  it.
    But  eventually  we  worked  out  the  relationship  with  the  State  Depart-
    ment on  a  very  satisfactory  basis.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  anyone  sit  in  for  Mr.  Acheson  at  any  time  in  meetings
    of  theBEW?

    Mr.  Wallace.  There  may  have  been.     I  don't  recall.

    Mr.  Case.  He  may  have  had  one  of  his  associates  or  close  friends
    sit  in  for  him  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  don't  know.  That  could  be  verified  from  the
    records,  of  course.

    Mr.  Case.  I  have  here  a  photostat  of  a  story  which  appeared  in  the
    NeAv  York  Times  on  the  22d  of  September  1945,  which  reads  in  part
    as  follows :

    Washington,  September  21. — A  proposal  sponsored  by  Secretary  of  Commerce
    Henry  A.  Wallace  that  the  United  States,  Britain,  and  Canada  reveal  the  secret
    of  the  atomic  bomb  to  Russia  was  discussed  at  President  Truman's  Cabinet
    meeting  today  and  brought  about  a  pointed  debate  that  ended  with  no  decision
    after  having  caused  the  longest  Cabinet  session  of  the  present  administration.

    Did  you  make  that  proposal  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  did  not,  and  I  have  a  complete  record  of  that
    whole  incident  which,  if  you  wish,  I  will  be  glad  to  read  into  the  record
    at  this  time.

    Mr.  Case.  I  don't  care  to  go  into  it.

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  am  sure  you  don't  want  to  go  into  it.    It  is  relevant.

    Mr.  Wood.  You  state  you  did  not  make  the  proposal  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  did  not,  and  President  Truman  realized  I  did  not,
    and  on  his  own  initiative  knocked  it  down.  His  attitude  was  magnifi-
    cent throughout.    The  statement  the  President  made  appeared  in  the

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1093

    New  York  Times  of  September  24,  1945,  under  a  September  23,  1945,
    Washington  date  line :

    The  President  denied  firmly  that  Mr.  Wallace  had  insisted  that  the  atomic
    bomb  be  turned  over  to  Russia.  He  said  Mr.  Wallace  took  a  no  more  active  part
    In  the  discussion  than  anybody  else  at  the  meeting.

    I  have  a  complete  statement  of  the  Cabinet  meeting  at  the  time,
    which  I  don't  know  if  it  would  be  ethical  or  not  to  make  public.  I
    denounced  to  the  President  himself  that  there  had  been  a  "lying
    leaker"  in  the  Cabinet  meeting.  He  agreed,  and  he  told  a  subsequent
    meeting  of  the  members  of  the  top  Cabinet  at  a  luncheon — just  the
    top  Cabinet — that  the  man  he  thought  had  done  this  leaking  would
    no  longer  sit  in  Cabinet  meetings.

    Mr.  Harrison.  Are  you  familiar  with  the  identity  of  that  person  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  He  didn't  mention  his  name.

    Mr.  Wood.  Aside  from  that?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  could  only  guess  at  it,  and  I  think  that  would  be  a
    mistake.  I  may  say  Dean  Acheson  also  spoke  to  me  about  this,  and
    said  what  a  terrible  thing  it  was,  and  I  might  say  his  guess  as  to  who
    was  responsible  for  this  was  quite  different  from  the  President's
    guess.

    Mr.  Case.  The  proposal  to  share  the  atomic  bomb  with  Russia  was
    discussed  at  the  meeting  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  It  was  not.

    Mr.  Case.  It  was  not?

    Mr.  Wallace.  It  did  not  come  up.    It  did  not  come  up.

    Mr.  Case.  Did  you  oppose  the  idea  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  It  didn't  come  up.  I  can  read  my  complete  record,  if
    you  want  to  know  what  it  was.

    Mr.  Case.  How  do  you  account  for  the  story  that  appeared  in  the
    New  York  Times  that  the  subject  did  come  up  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  King  Solomon  should  add  to  the  seven  things  be-
    yond the  wisdom  of  men,  the  things  printed  in  newspapers.  I  do  not
    blame  the  newspapers  too  much  when  they  are  guided  by  people  who
    have  special  interests  to  serve.

    Mr.  Case.  This  story  in  the  New  York  Times  also  says :

    Mr.  Wallace,  it  is  understood,  argued  in  support  of  his  proposal  that  now  is
    the  time  to  make  a  real  start  toward  a  working  world  union  through  a  demon-
    stration of  good  faith  to  the  Soviet  Union.

    Mr.  Wallace.  Again  I  say,  if  you  want  me  to  read  my  complete
    record  I  will  be  glad  to  read  it.

    Mr.  Wood.  I  will  be  glad  for  you  to  file  it  with  the  committee  if  you
    so  desire,  Mr.  Wallace.  We  will  be  glad  to  have  it  filed  with  the
    testimony.

    Mr.  K^ARNET.  Will  the  gentleman  yield?  I  think,  in  all  fairness
    to  the  witness,  there  have  been  several  questions  asked  as  to  whether
    he  did  make  the  statement  which  appeared  in  the  New  York  paper,
    and  I  think  the  witness'  statement  in  that  connection  should  be  made
    a  part  of  the  record.

    Mr.  Wood.  I  said  it  could  be  made  a  part  of  the  record.

    Mr.  Walter.  I  think  it  should  be  read  into  the  record.

    Mr.  Wood.  How  long  would  it  take  to  read  it?

    Mr.  Wallace.  It  would  take,  I  would  think,  10  minutes.

    1094  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Case.  Mr.  Chairman,  there  are  two  specific  questions  I  want
    to  ask  to  bring  this  to  a  head,  then  if  the  committee  wants  to  hear  it,
    the  witness  could  read  his  statement.

    You  state  definitely,  first  of  all.  that  you  did  not  make  any  such
    proposal  at  the  Cabinet  meeting  as  was  reported  in  the  New  York
    Times?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  make  that  statement,  and  President  Truman  made
    the  statement.

    Mr.  Case.  You  also  say  that  the  proposal  to  share  the  atomic-bomb
    secret  with  Kussia  was  not  discussed  at  that  Cabinet  meeting?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  think  I  had  better  consult  the  record  and  see  just
    the  form  in  which  it  came  up.

    Mr.  Wood.  I  understood  you  to  say  it  did  not  come  up  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  said  the  question  of  sharing  the  atomic  bomb  with
    Russia  did  not  come  up.     [Reading:]

    The  President  asked  Secretary  Stimson  to  open  the  meeting,  which  he  did  in
    an  iinnsually  comprehensive  statement.  He  said  that  all  the  scientists  with
    whom  the  War  Department  worked  were  convinced  there  was  no  possible
    way  of  holding  the  scientific  secret  of  the  atomic  bomb,  and  therefore  they  felt
    there  should  be  free  interchange  of  scientifie  information  between  different
    members  of  the  United  Nations.  He  said  that  the  scientists  told  him  that  the
    bombs  thus  far  dropped  were  utilizing  only  a  very  small  fraction  of  the  power
    of  the  atom,  and  that  future  bombs  would  be  infinitely  more  destructive — per-
    haps as  greatly  advanced  over  the  present  bombs  as  the  present  bombs  are  over
    the  bombs  which  existed  prior  to  1945.  He  said  some  were  afraid  they  would
    be  so  powerful  as  to  ignite  the  atmosphere  and  put  an  end  to  the  world.  He
    said  he  realized  that  any  interchange  of  scientific  information  with  the  other
    United  Nations  would  bring  into  the  foregi'ound  the  problem  of  Russia.  He
    then  entered  into  a  long  defense  of  Russia,  saying  that  throughout  liistory
    Russia  had  been  our  friend,  that  we  had  nothing  that  Russia  wanted.  He  said
    our  relationship  during  recent  months  had  been  improving.  President  Truman
    agreed  to  this.

    Mr.  Harrison.  Are  those  the  minutes  of  the  Cabinet  meeting  from
    ■which  you  have  just  read?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No.

    Mr.  Harrison.  It  is  your  own  memorandum?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.

    Mr.  Harrison.  That  is  what  you  are  reading  from  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.  There  is  one  other  point  Secretary  Stimson
    made  at  the  time  which  I  think  is  of  some  interest :

    Secretary  Stimson  said  it  was  conceivable  that  some  of  the  other  nations  could
    learn  the  secret  of  the  atomic  bomb  without  any  help  from  us  within  3  years,
    and  almost  certainly  within  5  years.

    Mr.  Case.  At  any  time  have  you  advanced  the  proposal  or  sup-
    ported the  proposal  that  the  secret  of  the  atomic  bomb  should  be
    shared  with  Russia?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Wliat  I  said  at  that  time,  I  backed  up  Secretary
    Stimson  in  his  proposal  and  said  that  if  we  did  carry  out  his  pro-
    posal and  there  was  an  interchange  with  Russia  of  scientific  infor-
    mation, there  should  be  a  proviso  that  our  men  should  work  in  Rus-
    sian laboratories  if  their  men  worked  in  our  laboratories.

    I  came  out,  by  the  way,  against  sharing  construction  details.  I
    said  all  scientists  knew  that  the  scientific  information  was  known
    in  many  foreign  nations.  The  men  who  did  the  work  for  us  were
    mostly  foreigners.  I  said  there  should  be  no  interchange  of  know-
    how.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1095

    Let  me  say  this  to  Mr.  Case,  and  being  from  South  Dakota  I  believe
    he  will  be  interested :  I  am  from  the  corn  country.  We  have  inbred
    strains  of  corn  and  chickens.  We  would  not  give  them  to  anybody.
    We  employ  scientists.  If  the  scientists  discover  anything  they  are  at
    liberty  to  publish  that.  What  the  scientist  wants  is  to  get  credit  for
    having  discovered  something.  And  there  is  something  about  science
    that  when  somebody  discovers  something,  somebody  in  another  part
    of  the  world  is  almost  certain  to  be  discovering  it  at  about  the  same
    time.

    There  are  secrets  with  regard  to  our  inbreds  (our  know-how)  which
    will  benefit  us  for  several  years,  but  when  it  comes  to  scientific  ap-
    proach what  we  have  learned,  someone  else  will  know  within  a  few
    juonths.  Science  never  has  and  never  will  advance  on  the  basis  of
    compartmentalization  and  secrets.

    The  bulk  of  the  people,  and  I  think  most  Congressmen,  don't  under-
    vStand  the  nature  of  science :  that  there  isn't  any  secret  and  never  was
    any  secret  that  you  could  lock  up  and  keep  away  from  somebody  else.

    Back  in  December  of  last  year  they  lifted  the  ban  on  the  articles
    published  in  Russian  scientific  magazines,  and  now  it  appears  the
    Russians  were  abreast  of  the  thing  in  the  scientific  world  in  1940.
    That  M'as  not  known  until  last  December.  That  is  what  I  am  told.
    I  haven't  seen  it,  but  a  newspaperman  told  me  he  had  looked  it  over
    and  found  that  true.     That  is  why  this  whole  misunderstanding  arises.

    I  told  the  Cabinet  meeting  that  if  they  were  placing  their  confidence
    in  scientific  secrecy,  they  w^ere  placing  their  confidence  in  a  Maginot
    Line,  and  there  was  no  security  there.

    Some  people  said  the  Russians  couldn't  discover  the  atom  bomb
    for  20  years.     Secretary  Stimson  said  3  or  5  years.

    ]Mr.  Case.  Then  there  was  a  discussion  of  sharing  the  atomic  bomb  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  There  was  not.  I  said  very  clearly  I  was  against
    sharing  of  know-how.  I  advocated  we  keep  the  secrets  of  constructioii
    from  any  nation.     I  advocated  that  with  Dr.  Bush.

    Mr.  Case.  And  if  blueprints  of  construction  details  got  into  the
    hands  of  some  foreign  power,  would  you  regard  that  as  unfortunate?

    Mr,  Wallace.  Very  definitely.  I  would  be  against  it  in  the  hands
    of  any  power.

    Mr.  Case.  But  not  scientific  information?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Science  is  universal.  You  can't  bottle  science  up,
    and  when  you  do  you  condemn  your  own  Nation  to  backwardness.

    Mr.  Case.  Coming  back  to  the  basic  question  with  which  the  inquiry
    was  concerned,  you  say  if  export  licenses  were  issued  through  BEW,
    that  was  purely  a  ministerial  or  clerical  function,  because  the  stamp  of
    Lend-Lease  would  clear  them  automatically?

    Mr.  Wallace.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Case.  And  that  any  responsibility  for  the  issuance  of  those
    licenses  rests  at  the  door  of  Lend-Lease  and  the  policies  determined  for
    it  by  the  State  Department  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  It  rested  with  Lend-Lease.  I  don't  know  whether  the
    State  Department  determined  policy.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Most  of  your  problems  came  from  the  Department
    of  State?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No,  Department  of  Commerce  and  Reconstruction
    Finance  Corporation.    The  State  Department  made  objections  in  the

    1096  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    spring  and  summer  of  1942.    We  ironed  our  difficulties  out  with  the
    State  Department  very  satisfactorily.

    ]\Ir.  Case.  Wasn't  there  a  feeling  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Byrnes •

    Mr.  Wallace.  Secretary  Hull,

    Mr.  Case.  You  are  anticipating  the  question.  I  think  it  was  a  pro-
    test of  Mr.  Byrnes  against  statements  by  you  that  resulted  in  your
    resignation  from  the  Cabinet  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  That  does  not  have  to  do  with  the  immediate  ques-
    tion before  this  committee.

    ]\Ir.  Kearney.  The  name  Dean  Acheson  has  been  mentioned  so  much
    that  I  assumed  most  of  your  problems  were  with  him  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  had  a  friendly  feeling  with  him,  but  we  did  have
    marked  conflicts  in  administration.

    Mr.  Kearney.  During  the  examination  by  counsel  here,  you  stated
    in  words  or  substance  that  you  would  rather  have  Mr.  Freedman
    answer  certain  questions.  Was  that  because  he  had  knowledge  of  the
    particular  facts?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.  He  was  an  attorney  with  the  Board  of  Eco-
    nomic Warfare  and  operated  in  this  particular  field  which  has  to  do
    with  export  licenses.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Following  the  line  of  examination  by  Mr.  Case,
    I  am  going  to  ask  you  specifically,  did  you  have  anything  to  do  at  any
    time,  directly  or  indirectly,  with  the  expediting  or  issuance  of  any
    export  license  to  anybody  or  any  nation  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No.  I  have  no  recollection  of  having  entered  into
    that  at  all,  and  BEW  itself  did  not  enter  into  that  except  to  a  very
    limited  extent.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Can  you  answer  my  question  more  specifically?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  have  no  knowledge  in  any  way,  shape,  or  form.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Can  you  answer  yes  or  no  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Nixon.

    Mr.  Nixon.  In  regard  to  the  matter  of  expediting  licenses,  I  under-
    stood you  to  say  a  moment  ago,  or  your  counsel  said,  that  at  one
    time  you  had  a  backlog  of  100,000  license  applications  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  remember  there  was  a  big  log- jam.  I  think  I  said
    100,000  and  turned  to  counsel  and  asked  him  if  that  was  about  right.

    Mr.  Freedman.  Not  quite  that  much.

    Mr.  Nixon.  And  never  on  any  occasion  did  you  take  one  license
    out  of  the  bottom  of  the  pile  and  expedite  it?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Never.  I  don't  know  what  pressure  might  have  come
    in  sideways  on  the  boys.

    Mr.  Nixon.  But  you  say  that  you  yourself  never  expedited  the  issu-
    ance of  any  license  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Never,  at  any  time.

    Mr.  Nixon.  What  about  the  Board?

    Mr.  Wallace.  The  Board,  which  is  composed  of  the  heads  of  Cabi-
    net departments,  is  one  thing.  The  Board  met  on  questions  of  top
    policy.  Then  there  was  the  executive  branch  of  BEW  under  the  man-
    agement of  Milo  Perkins,  where  there  were,  I  suppose,  3,000  employees,
    and  they  did  that  work.

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  am  referring  to  the  issuance  of  the  licenses  themselves.

    Mr.  Wallace.  It  is  a  clerical  job  without  policy  on  our  part  entering
    into  it.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATEKIAL  iUy/

    Mr.  Nixon.  There  was  testimony  presented  to  this  committee  on
    Tuesday  by  Colonel  Merritt.

    Mr.  Wallace.  Of  what  organization?

    Mr.  Nixon.  Manhattan  Engineering  District  in  New  York.  He  was
    in  the  office  which  had  control  over  approving  the  shipments  of  atomic
    products — uranium  and  related  products — abroad.  He  referred
    specifically  to  one  case  that  he  said  became,  I  think  his  words  were  "a
    very  hot  case"  in  their  department,  involving  the  shipment  of  1,000
    pounds  of  uranium  to  the  Soviet  Union  through  the  firm  of  Boris
    Pregel ;  and  from  his  testimony  it  was  apparent  to  me,  and  I  think  to
    other  members  of  the  committee,  that  this  was  an  unusual  case  in  which
    action  was  desired  at  an  early  date.  It  is  difficult  for  me  to  reconcile
    that  testimony  with  your  statement  that  in  no  case  did  BEW  exercise
    any  discretion,  you  just  took  them  in  their  order.

    Mr.  Wallace.  Mr.  Freedman  informs  me  that  the  method  of  han-
    dling the  licenses,  they  were  divided  by  countries  and  by  products.  It
    was  not  one  pile.  I  know  nothing  about  the  mechanical  details  of
    handling  them.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Do  you  recall  what  the  backlog  was,  approximately,
    iu  April  1943?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  don't  know.

    Mr.  Ntxon.  It  was  large  ?

    Mr.  Freedman.  It  was  always  large.

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  don't  know.  I  know  there  was  always  pressure
    from  the  trade  to  get  them  coming  along  faster.

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  understood  counsel  to  say  the  backlog  was  always
    large.  When  did  you  first  learn  that  shipments  of  uranium  oxide,
    uranium  nitrate,  and  heavy  water  were  being  made  to  Russia?

    Mr.  Wallace.  In  1946,  when  I  read  it  in  the  press.

    Mr.  Nixon.  You  didn't  know  of  any  of  the  shipments  before  that
    time?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No.  I  was  informed  that  there  was  a  newspaper
    t-tfort — this  was  in  the  spring  of  1946 — a  newspaper  effort  in  New
    York  to  involve  me  in  something  of  this  sort.  I  didn't  know  at  that
    time  what  it  was.  I  was  informed  that  this  newspaper  effort  originated
    in  Washington,  that  it  was  in  the  nature  of  a  sinister  plot,  and  that
    this  sinister  plot  would  develop  later  in  the  press.  I  learned  enough
    in  May  1946  so  that  I  did  speak  to  Secretary  of  War  Patterson  about
    it  on  May  16.

    Mr.  Nixon.  In  your  statement,  on  page  6,  you  say :  "I  had  absolutely
    nothing  to  do  with  any  of  these  licenses.  I  was  not  aware  that  they
    were  being  requested.    I  did  know"

    Mr.  Wallace.  There  is  a  "not"  that  belong  in  there.

    INIr.  Nixon.  "I  did  not  know  that  Lend-Lease  recommended"?

    Mr.  Wallace.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  You  did  testify  that  you  recognized,  obviously  because
    of.  your  broad  scientific  knowledge,  the  importance  of  uranium  oxide
    in  the  development  of  the  atomic  project?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  recognized  the  importance  of  U-235.  I  didn't  know
    the  relationship  of  U-235  to  uranium,  but  I  did  recognize  the  high
    importance  of  U-235.

    Mr,  Nixon.  You  recognized  the  importance  of  the  product,  and
    the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  issued  the  licenses,  but  you  did  not
    oven  know  your  Board  issued  licenses  in  1943  for  this  material  ?

    1098  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Wallace.  No.  This  was  a  purely  meclianical  proposition.
    We  issued  approximately  8,000  licenses  a  day.

    Mr.  Nixon.  That  is  all.

    Mr.  Walter.  Mr.  Chairman.  I  would  like  to  ask  one  more  question.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Walter.

    Mr.  Walter,  Did  you  attempt,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  to  in-
    fluence anybody  in  a  decision  to  issue  a  license  for  any  uranium
    product  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No,  sir,  I  did  not,  and  I  think  this  should  be  cleared
    up  in  the  record.  It  is  really  a  very  small  item,  but  General  Groves
    said  he  did  not  know  what  indirect  pressure  Mr.  Wallace  mig-ht  have
    brought  on  him  or  Manhattan  project  through  others.  Because  that
    was  left  slightly  dangling  in  General  Groves'  testimony,  I  would  like
    to  say  I  certainly  did  not.

    Mr.  Walter.  I  think  General  Groves  cleared  that  up  in  a  letter
    we  received  this  morning.

    Mr.  Wallace.  There  was  that  little  bit  of  testimony  that  was  left
    dangling.

    Mr.  Walter.  That  is  all.

    ^Ir.  Wood.  Mv.  Velde.

    Mr.  Velde.  Were  you  acquainted  with  any  of  the  producers  of
    uranium  while  you  were  head  of  BEW  and  Vice  President  of  the
    United  States?

    Mr.  Wall-vce.  Yes.

    Mr.  Velde.  Who  were  they  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  On  December  27,  1943,  Boris  Pregel  came  to  see  me,
    with  the  request  I  put  him  in  touch  with  scientific  men  in  the  Depart-
    ment of  Agriculture.  He  told  me  he  was  manufacturing  radium  at  a
    plant  at  Mount  Kisco.  I  don't  recall  that  he  referred  to  uranium
    at  the  time.  He  never  said  anything  to  me  about  the  atom  bomb
    until  3  days  after  it  had  been  dropped  on  Hiroshima.

    The  first  time  I  met  him  was  December  1943,  and  at  that  time  he
    wanted  me  to  put  him  in  touch  with  scientific  men  in  the  Department
    of  Agriculture.  I  called  Eugene  Auchter,  director  of  Scientific  Re-
    search, and  asked  for  Mr.  Pregel  to  meet  Eugene  Auchter.  And  I
    arranged  with  Mr.  Pregel  to  get  some  alpha  radiation,  a  byproduct
    of  the  manufacture  of  radium,  for  experimentation  in  my  garden.
    I  experimented  with  it  in  1944,  1945,  1946,  1947,  and  1948.

    Mr.  Velde.  That  was  in  your  New  York  farm  ?

    Mr.  Wallace.  No,  first  in  Washington  and  subsequently  my  New
    York  farm.

    JNIr.  Velde.  You  knew  he  was  a  producer  of  uranium,  and  that
    uranium  could  be  used  in  the  manufacture  of  the  atom  bomb  ?

    Mv.  Wallace.  He  did  not  refer  to  the  atom  bomb  until  August  8,
    1945,  after  it  had  been  dropped  on  Hiroshima.  At  that  time  he  gave
    me  photostats  of  statements  he  had  issued  to  the  Miami  paper  in  1941
    as  to  the  peacetime  and  wartime  importance  of  atomic  energy.

    Mr.  Velde.  Would  you  say  your  relationship  with  Boris  Pregel
    was  a  close  relationship  during  that  time?

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  wouldn't  say  a  close  relationship.  I  knew  him.
    He  translated  for  me.  When  I  found  the  F'resident  wanted  me  to  go
    to  China  via  Soviet  Asia,  when  the  President  first  indicated  that,
    I  started  trying  to  learn  Russian.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  lUyy

    Mr.  Velde.  Who  accompanied  you  to  Russia  at  the  time  you  made
    that  trip  ?

    JNIr.  Wallace.  Could  we  finish  one  subject  at  the  time,  or  shall  we
    wander  all  over  the  map  ?

    Mr.  Velde.  I  am  sorry  I  interrupted  you.

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  merely  wanted  to  say  I  had  studied  Russian  very
    assiduously  when  the  President  told  me  he  wanted  me  to  go  to  China
    via  Russia,  and  I  had  one  of  the  teachers  here  in  Washington.  I  won't
    mention  his  name  because  I  don't  want  to  prejudice  him  in  any  way.
    He  is  not  seated  in  this  room,  I  might  say.

    What  I  wanted  to  do  at  that  time,  we  felt  Russia's  part  in  the  war
    effort  was  very  significant,  and  I  was  going  to  be  visiting  certain  spots
    in  Siberia  where  they  were  seeking  to  produce  many  products  that
    would  save  the  lives  of  American  boys,  and  I  wanted  to  make  some
    speeches.  So  I  asked  Mr.  Pregel — because  he  was  born  in  Russia  and
    was  driven  out  by  the  Bolsheviks  in  1917,  I  believe — I  asked  if  he
    would  translate  my  speeches  into  Russian.  I  thought  his  translation
    would  be  better  than  that  of  the  people  I  had  been  working  with.  He
    did  translate  them  for  me,  and  I  saw  him  rather  frequently  during
    that  period.

    If  you  have  any  further  questions  on  the  Pregel  matter,  would  you
    like  to  ask  them?

    Mr.  Wood.  It  is  very  interesting,  but  is  it  pertinent  here?

    Mr.  Velde.  Yes,  I  think  it  is,  in  view  of  the  fact  he  has  made  the
    statement  he  did  not  mention  the  subject  of  uranium  to  anyone,  and
    in  view  of  the  fact  Boris  F'regel  was  a  producer  of  radium  at  the  time
    and  was  a  very  close  friend.

    Mr.  Wood.  Proceed.

    Mr.  Wallace.  I  didn't  say  he  was  a  very  close  friend.  I  first  met
    Mr.  Pregel  on  December  27, 1943.

    Mr.  Velde.  Did  you  discuss  the  subject  of  uranium  with  him?

    Mr.  Wallace.  We  discussed  alpha  radiation.  That  has  nothing  to
    do  with  the  bomb.  It  is  a  byproduct  of  the  manufacture  of  radium.
    I  don't  recall  discussing  the  subject  of  uranium,  as  such,  until  after
    the  bomb  was  dropped.  But  we  did  discuss  the  use  of  this  byproduct
    for  agricultural  purposes.  Mr.  Pregel  did  not  bring  up  at  any  time
    the  subject  of  shipments  of  uranium  or  the  bomb.

    Mr.  Velde.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  you  prefer  I  will  not  go  into  the  trip
    to  China  and  Russia  at  this  time,  because  I  don't  see  that  it  will  serve
    a  useful  purpose  at  this  time.

    Mr.  Wallace.  With  regard  to  this  statement,  I  have  some  hesitancy
    about  putting  it  in  the  record  of  the  committee,  because  it  involves  a
    lengthy  statement  of  what  took  place  at  Cabinet  meetings,  and  I  would
    like  to  clear  it  with  someone  at  the  White  House  before  putting  it  in.
    I  think  probably  I  have  put  enough  in  the  record.  I  may  say  that  the
    statement  that  President  Truman  made  knocking  the  story  down  in  the
    New  York  Times  was  made  without  solicitation  on  my  part.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  was  the  date  of  that  Cabinet  meeting?

    Mr.  Wallace.  September  21,  1945.

    Mr.  Ta\t<:nner.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  like  to  offer  in  evidence
    the  memorandum  of  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare  approved  by
    Mr.  Wallace  to  which  I  referred  earlier,  and  I  ask  that  it  be  marked
    "Wallace  Exhibit  2."

    Mr.  Wood.  It  will  be  admitted.

    1100  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    (The  memorandum  above  referred  to,  marked  "Wallace  Exhibit
    2,"  is  hereinafter  included  in  the  record,)  ^^

    Mr.  Wood.  The  committee  will  stand  in  recess  until  2 :  30  this
    afternoon.

    (Thereupon,  a  recess  was  taken  until  2 :  30  p.  m.,  Thursday,  January
    26, 1950.)

    AFTER  RECESS

    The  committee  reconvened,  pursuant  to  the  taking  of  the  recess,
    Hon.  Francis  E.  Walter,  presiding.

    Mr.  Walter.  The  committee  will  come  to  order.

    Whom  do  you  wish  to  call  first,  Mr.  Tavenner  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Hoopes.

    Mr.  Walter.  Mr.  Hoopes,  will  you  raise  your  right  hand,  please?

    Do  you  swear  that  the  testimony  that  you  are  about  to  give  before
    this  committee  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the
    truth,  so  help  you  God  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  I  do.

    Mr.  Walter.  Sit  down,  please.

    TESTIMONY  OF  JAMES  P.  HOOPES

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  state  your  full  name,  Mr.  Hoopes?

    Mr.  HooPES.  James  P.  Hoopes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  is  your  present  address?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  39  Poplar  Street,  Douglaston,  Long  Island,  N.  Y.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  When  and  where  were  you  born  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  July  6,  1913,  Westchester,  Pa.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  is  your  present  occupation  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  I  am  a  lawyer.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Would  you  furnish  the  committee  with  a  resume
    of  your  past  employment,  including  any  service  that  you  may  have  had
    in  the  United  States  Army  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  I  had  a  commission  in  the  Coast  Artillery  Reserve  of
    the  Army  from  1933  to  1938.  From  March  of  1942  until  early  Novem-
    ber 1943, 1  was  employed  in  the  Office  of  the  Lend-Lease  Administra-
    tion. At  that  time  I  entered  the  service  of  the  Xavy,  in  November
    1943,  and  I  was  released  to  inactive  duty  in  April  1946.  I  have  been
    engaged  in  private  practice  since  that  time.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Hoopes,  will  you  tell  us  the  exact  nature  of  your
    employment  and  your  position  with  Lend-Lease  during  1943?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  I  was  a  liaison  officer  in  the  Division  for  Soviet  Sup-
    ply. I  had  to  do  in  some  measure  with  lend-lease  requisitions  for
    materials  to  be  shipped  to  Russia.

    Another  one  of  my  jobs  was  having  to  do  with  cash  purchases  of
    materials  to  be  exported  to  Russia.

    As  a  liaison  officer,  the  main  function  of  the  job  was  to  handle  the
    Soviet  requests  with  the  various  Government  agencies  and  persons  in
    the  Government  who  were  in  a  position  to  pass  upon  their  availaiblity
    as  to  material,  and  so  forth,  and  obtain  the  necessary  priorities  to  be
    awarded  if  the  material  was  to  be  shipped.     That  is  about  the  size  of  it.

    ^  See  appendix.

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  11  OX

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Well,  now,  you  spoke  of  cash  purchases  and  lend-
    lease  purchases.  Why  was  it  necessary  for  you  to  have  to  deal  with
    cash  purchases,  when  you  were  an  employee  of  Lend-Lease?  Were
    not  cash  purchases  handled  direct  through  other  agencies  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  No,  sir.  Our  office  handled,  during  the  time  that  I
    was  there,  the  cash  purchases  for  the  Soviet  Union,  which  required
    clearance  for  export,  particularly  those  which  required  any  priority
    assistance.  All  the  requests  for  priority  assistance  or  for  clearance
    for  export  of  those  purchases  f unneled  through  our  office.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Now,  what  was  the  practice  in  your  office  when  you
    received  a  requisition,  say,  from  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  for
    some  article  of  merchandise,  or  some  commodity?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  Do  you  mean  a  lend-lease  requisition,  or  do  you  mean
    a  cash-purchase  application?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Well,  let's  take  both  of  them.    Lend-Lease,  first.

    Mr.  HooPES.  In  the  case  of  a  lend-lease  requisition,  one  of  the  first
    jobs  that  we  had  to  do  was  to  check  to  see  if  the  material  requested
    under  the  requisition  was  within  the  program  of  aid  to  the  Soviet
    Union.

    Mr.  Tai'enner.  How  did  you  ascertain  that  fact  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  Well,  the  materials  were  set  forth  in  the  protocol  that
    governed  the  lend-lease  aid  to  the  Soviet  Union,  and  certain  quantities
    of  various  materials  were  committed  by  the  United  States  to  Russia,
    and  it  was  our  first  job  to  see  if  any  of  these  requests  came  within  the
    categories  of  the  material  that  was  authorized.  Once  we  determined
    that,  we  checked  the  particular  liaison  officer  who  was  handling  that
    particular  material.  There  were  several  liaison  officers.  The  one
    liaison  officer  handling  the  particular  material  would  check  with  the
    various  members  of  the  War  Production  Board  and  any  other  agencies
    that  controlled  that  material.

    For  instance,  if  the  material  was  copper  or  a  certain  kind  of
    machine,  we  checked  with  the  people  in  the  War  Production  Board
    and  the  branch  that  controlled  the  production  and  the  availability
    of  the  supply  of  that  commodity.  We  would  find  whether  that  ma-
    terial was  available.  We  would  find  what  sort  of  priority  was  needed
    to  obtain  the  production  and  the  making  of  it  available  to  the  Russians.

    We  also  checked  as  to  the  shipping,  the  size,  the  tonnage,  and  the
    bulk  of  the  shipment,  because  it  was  our  job  to  control  the  amount
    and  to  schedule  the  shipping.  That  was  not  my  job,  but  we  made
    a  report  on  it.

    These  requisitions,  then,  after  we  had  had  preliminary  information
    on  them,  were  ordinarily  taken  up  in  our  Division  at  a  requisition
    meeting,  at  which  General  Wesson  presided,  and  they  were  reviewed
    and  discussed.  If  there  were  some  questions  of  policy  to  be  deter-
    mined, those  questions  were  brought  up,  and  the  officers  would  give
    a  report  as  to  what  the  War  Production  Board  had  to  say  as  to  the
    availability,  and  so  on.  If  the  requisition  was  ultimately  passed,  it
    was  then  forwarded  to  the  War  Production  Board  for  routing  through
    the  various  branches  to  obtain  priority,  and  then  finally  it  was  turned
    over  to  the  procurement  agency  of  Lend-Lease  to  buy  the  material.
    Lend-Lease  did  not  buy  the  material,  but  there  were  various  Govern-
    ment agencies  that  did.  And  the  requisition  was  given  to  them,  and
    they  purchased  the  material,  which  was  generally  put  out  on  bids  or
    however  they  saw  fit  to  do  it.

    1102  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    From  that  point,  when  the  goods  were  ready  for  delivery,  they
    were  scheduled  for  shipment.  That  was  not  my  particular  function,
    but  we  followed  it  through.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  If  that  requisition  was  designed  for  export  to  a
    foreign  country,  to  what  extent  was  that  procedure  which  you  have
    described  supplemented  ?

    Mr.  HoopES.  I  am  only  talking  about  the  requisitions  that  were

    Mr.  Tavenner.  For  export  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  All  Lend-Lease  requisitions.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Of  course,  the  only  ones  would  have  been  for  export.

    Mr.  HoopES.  And  the  only  ones  we  were  involved  with  were  for
    export  to  Russia.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Now,  you  have  not  mentioned  anything  about  the
    necessity  of  having  an  export  license.

    Mr.  HooPES.  No  export  license  was  required,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  No  export  license  was  required  for  any  material
    which  was  being  exported  to  Russia  ?

    Mr.  HooPEs.  No,  sir ;  under  lend-lease.  There  is  a  distinction  to  be
    made  between  lend-lease  materials  and  cash  purchases.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  cash  purchases.    All  right.

    Mr.  HooPES.  The  lend-lease  requisition  itself  was  the  shipping
    authority.  Once  it  had  gone  finally  through  all  the  various  stages  it
    went  to,  and  got  into  production,  and  so  on,  it  contained  authority
    to  ship;  the  requisition  itself  did.  And  they  were  shipped  pursuant
    to  the  Lend-Lease  Act,  and  they  were  shipped  with  lend-lease  funds.
    The  cash  purchases  were  handled  in  an  entirely  different  manner.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  But  you  issued  a  certificate  of  release  to  accompany
    the  material,  did  you  not,  when  it  was  lend-lease?

    Mr.  HooPES.  No,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  did  not?

    ]Mr.  Hoopes.  No,  sir ;  that  was  for  cash  purchases  only.

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner,  Well,  now,  describe  the  situation  where  it  was  a
    cash-purchase  transaction.

    Mr.  Hoopes.  I  am  not  entirely  familiar  with  the  situation  as  to  the
    procedure  of  cash  purchases  all  the  way  through,  until  about  July  of
    1943,  when  the  procedure  changed.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection,
    the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  would  send  an  application  through
    by  letter  to  our  office,  requesting  an  export  license  for  shipment  of
    some  particular  commodity  or  material.  My  only  part  in  the  picture
    at  that  time  was  the  assistance  for  priority.  If  the  material  needed
    priority  assistance,  it  would  be  accompanied  by  a  WPB  form,  and  then
    I  got  that  form  and  checked  with  the  Government  agencies  in  similar
    manner  to  the  handling  of  lend-lease  requisitions,  to  see  if  the  material
    was  available,  what  priority  it  needed,  and  so  forth.  And  even  though
    it  was  a  cash  purchase  application,  these  items  were  considered  from
    many  of  the  same  lend-lease  points  of  view,  about  shipping,  the
    •critical  nature  of  supply,  and  the  comparative  needs  of  our  own  Gov-
    •ernment  agencies  for  other  purposes.

    I  would  send  the  priority  application  to  the  War  Production  Board
    and  follow  it  through  the  branches  until  it  got  its  priority  and  was
    returned  to  our  office.  Wlien  it  was  returned,  with  the  necessary
    priority  on  it,  it  was  my  recollection  that  we  gave  approval  to  the  ex-
    port licensing — I  did  not  handle  this  ordinarily — and  that  the  export
    license  was  actually  issued  by  the  Board  of  Economic  Warfare.    It

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1103

    was  their  clociiment.  We  gave  our  approval  to  it,  and  it  already  had
    its  priority,  and  it  was  then  returned  to  the  Russians.  It  was  given
    a  number  and  a  date  on  which  it  was  approved ;  and  the  export  license,
    together  with  the  priority  itself,  the  priority  certificate,  was  returned
    to  the  Russians.  They  in  turn  would  turn  that  over  to  their  supplier,
    who  would  use  it  in  getting  the  material  and  in  shipping  it.

    The  procedure  was  changed  later,  but  up  to  that  point  I  did  not
    have  a  great  deal  to  do  with  the  export  licensing  itself.  I  had  to  do
    mostly  with  priorities.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  you  say  it  "was  changed  later,"  you  mean  at
    what  date  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  I  believe  the  change  date  was  July  1,  1943.  I  think
    that  was  the  effective  date  of  the  change.  We  worked  out  with  the
    Board  of  Economic  Warfare  an  arrangement  whereby  they  would
    issue  what  was  called  a  program  license  to  the  Soviet  iQnion.  Then
    the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  would  submit  to  our  office  what
    was  called  a  release  certificate.  It  was  a  document  which  set  forth  the
    nature  of  the  material  that  they  wanted  to  purchase,  their  immediate
    supplier,  several  details  about  what  the  ingredients  of  the  material
    were,  the  shipping  weight,  and  the  bulk,  and  so  forth.  They  sent  that
    to  our  office.  It  was  up  to  us,  then,  to  pass  upon  it  and  approve  it  for
    export  under  the  program  license.

    The  program  which  the  program  license  covered  was  the  protocol.
    In  other  words,  it  was  strictly  tying  in  all  Russian  shipments,  whether
    they  were  for  cash  or  lend-lease,  to  the  protocol,  so  that  it  was  one
    program.  And  then  one  of  us  would  sign  the  application,  the  release
    certificate,  give  it  a  number,  and  return  it  to  the  Soviet  Purchasing
    Commission.

    Mr.  Taa'enner.  Let  me  stop  you,  there,  a  moment.

    Mr.  HooPEs.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  protocol  agreement  that  was  negotiated  with
    the  Russian  Government  was  negotiated  with  what  agency  of  the
    United  States  Government?

    Mr.  HoopES.  I  am  not  entirely  sure.  It  wasn't  by  any  specific
    agency,  Mr.  Tavenner.  It  was  a  document  which  was  signed,  like
    a  treaty  between  ambassadors  of  the  various  countries.  It  wasn't
    just  with  the  Soviet  Government.  Great  Britain,  I  believe,  and  Ca-
    nada were  also  parties  to  the  protocol  agreement.  But  it  was  a  pro-
    gram which  was  worked  out  by  a  top  level  committee  composed  of
    our  highest  Government  officials,  including  the  people  from  the  Army
    and  Navy,  to  decide  what  materials  would  go  to  Russia  that  follow-
    ing year.  And  then  it  was  given  to  us.  We  were  on  what  you  may
    say  was  the  lower  echelon  level  of  this  job.  The  program  was  worked
    out,  and  it  was  given  to  us  to  carry  out.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  In  obtaining  the  priority  on  cash  purchases,  with
    whom  did  you  deal  in  the  War  Production  Board  ?     What  officials  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  Hundreds  of  them.

    Mr.  Ta\t.nner.  Would  that  depend  upon  the  particular  character
    of  the  material?

    Mr.  HooPES.  Yes.  It  would  entirely.  Because  I  not  only  would
    deal  with  the  individuals  who  received  the  applications.  There  was
    one  whole  floor  in  the  building  that  did  nothing  but  receive  the  appli-
    cations and  see  that  they  funneled  to  the  right  branches.     But  then

    1104  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    I  dealt  with  the  people  in  all  the  branches  that  this  application  had
    to  go  by.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Well,  let  us  come  right  to  the  question  that  we  are
    concerned  with,  here.  With  whom  did  you  deal  regarding  priorities
    for  the  export  of  uranium  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  I  didn't  deal  with  anybody  regarding  uranium.  You
    are  speaking  of  the  particular  April  transactions  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Any  transactions.

    Mr.  Hoopes.  I  never  had  any  dealing  with  anybody  in  the  War  Pro-
    duction Board  regarding  uranium.

    Mr.  Ta\tnner.  You  did  not.  Do  you  know  who,  of  the  Lend-Lease
    officials,  did  have  such

    Mr.  HooPEs.  Excuse  me.  Could  I  interpose  something  there,  that
    may  help  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes.

    Mr.  HooPES.  The  War  Production  Board  wasn't  always  the  con-
    trolling agency  as  far  as  a  decision  as  to  whether  an  item  was  avail-
    able or  not  was  concerned.  The  War  Production  Board  did  issue  the
    bulletins  that  were  previously  described  in  this  hearing,  setting  forth
    the  commodities  and  what  agency  or  what  person  or  what  group
    handled  that  commodity ;  but  it  might  very  well  be  that  certain  com-
    modities were  handled  by  other  groups  than  the  War  Production
    Board,  and  if  that  were  the  case,  we  had  to  deal  with  them.

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner.  I  understand.  Well,  now,  do  you  know,  from  your
    contact  with  the  handling  of  uranium,  whether  or  not  the  War  Pro-
    duction Board  was  consulted  with  regard  to  priorities  for  uranium  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  I  understand  that  the  War  Production  Board  was
    consulted.     It  was  not  by  me.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  By  whom  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  I  believe  Mv.  Moore  had  to  do  with  that.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Now,  did  you  consult  any  other  agency  with  regard
    to  the  export  of  uranium ?     You  or  any  other  official  of  your  staff?

    Mr.  HooPES.  Well,  I  am  not  sure  who  else  might  have  consulted
    anybody  else.  I  know  that  Mr.  Moore  was  handling  uranium.  The
    only  people  that  I  consulted  were  in  the  office  of  Colonel  Crenshaw
    in  New  York,  and  that  was  because  I  had  a  memorandum  from  Mr.
    Moore  that  there  was  something  pending  on  a  particular  application,
    and  in  his  absence  I  happened  to  handle  that.  I  had  understood  that
    there  had  been  considerable  background  of  negotiations  and  clearance
    discussions  on  this  particular  thing,  and  it  had  reached  the  stage  where
    I  was  given  specific  instructions  about  it.  And  when  the  time  came,
    I  contacted  Colonel  Crenshaw's  office,  imder  instructions  to  do  so.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Is  that  the  first  experience  that  you  had  in  any
    transaction  relating  to  uranium  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Then  tell  us  about  the  negotiations  that  had  oc-
    curred, as  far  as  you  learned  of  them,  pertaining  to  this  shipment,
    which  I  believe  was  the  1,000-pound  shij)ment.

    Mr.  HooPBS.  Well,  sir,  I  believe  you  have  more  records  than  I  on
    that.  _  I  went  up  yesterday  afternoon  and  saw  some  of  the  old  records
    on  this,  which  I  understand  were  turned  over  to  this  committee  some
    time  ago.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1105

    Mr.  HooPES.  I  understand  that  Mr.  Moore  had  been  dealing  in  this
    matter  with  the  Russians  and  with  General  Groves'  office  and  with  the
    WPB.  I  did  not  acquaint  myself  with  all  the  details  of  that,  except
    to  know  that  this  particular  transaction,  that  application  for  500
    pounds  of  uranium  nitrate  and  600  pounds  of  uranium  oxide,  had  been
    disapproved.  I  got  into  the  picture  at  that  time,  when  it  had  been
    disapproved  by  our  office,  and  a  letter  had  gone  to  the  Russians  advis-
    ing them  that  it  was  of  a  critical  nature  and  could  not  be  supplied.

    When  Mr.  Moore  went  away,  in  April — and  I  am  not  positive  of  the
    date — he  left  a  memorandum  for  me  advising  that  it  might  be  possible
    to  obtain  some  substitutes  for  uranium  compounds,  I  believe.

    Mr.  Walter.  Have  you  the  memorandum  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  No,  sir,  I  don't  have  the  memorandum.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  have  any  note  or  personal  memorandum
    that  you  made  at  the  time  regarding  this  transaction  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  Yes,  sir ;  I  do.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Well,  let  us  start  with  that.

    Mr.  Hoopes.  I  have  a  note  on  April  16,  19-1:3,  and  this  note  is  in  a
    little  diary  notebook  that  I  kept  during  the  course  of  the  day's  activi-
    ties, and  from  which  I  later  made  up  daily  diaries,  which  we  sub-
    mitted to  the  head  of  our  division  every  day,  of  work  that  went  on.
    And  I  have  a  note  here  indicating  that  Mr.  Fomichev  called  regarding
    500  pounds  of  uranium  oxide  and  500  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate  to
    be  supplied  from  Chematar,  Inc.,  of  New  York  City.  My  note
    doesn't  say  any  more  than  that,  but  sometimes  it  didn't.  The  diary
    for  that  day  I  think  you  also  have.  This  is  the  daily  report  that  was
    typed  up,  dated  April  17, 1943,  for  activities  on  the  16th.  One  of  the
    items  appears  as  follows :

    Conferred  with  Mr.  Fomichev  regarding  application  for  export  licenses  for
    1,000  pounds  of  uranium  compounds,  on  which  Soviets  had  option.  This  request
    has  definitely  been  turned  down  by  this  division  because  of  strategic  need  of
    materials  in  this  country.  Mr.  Fomichev  was  advised  to  consider  the  matter
    closed  as  to  this  particular  reciuest,  but  that  inquiries  were  being  made  as  to
    allocation  of  any  possible  substitute  materials.

    In  one  of  the  instructions  that  Mr.  Moore  had  left  for  me — I  think
    the  details  are  in  a  memo,  there.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  No,  the  details  are  not  in  the  memo.  I  will  read
    you  this.    This  much  does  appear  from  the  memo  of  April  19 :

    Uranium :  This  Is  being  handled  by  General  Hoopes,  who  should  be  advised  by
    General  Wesson  should  matters  become  excessively  complicated.

    Mr.  HooPES.  Don't  you  have  another  memo  there  on  that,  about
    that  date?  There  was  a  memo  that  I  saw  yesterday  that  didn't  have
    an  exact  date,  but  it  indicated  that  Mr.  Moore — it  was  to  me  and
    stated  that  it  may  be  possible  to  obtain  the  substitutes  and  that  Colonel
    Crenshaw's  office  was  forwarding  us  a  list  of  substitutes,  and  if  I  did
    not  receive  them  by  the  following  Monday  I  was  to  call  Colonel
    Crenshaw's  office,  and  then  later  to  take  the  matter  up  with  General
    Wesson.

    Mr.  McSwEENEY.  What  are  the  substitutes  for  uranium?

    Mr.  HooPES.  That  is  in  the  letter,  sir.  I  am  not  familiar  with
    them.

    Mv.  Tavenner.  We  have  a  memorandum  similar  to  that,  but  that
    is  in  June  1043.  That  is  the  memorandum,  then,  that  you  are  speaking
    of,  that  should  have  been  dated  in  April  ?

    99334—50 14

    1106  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  HooPES.  Yes.  It  must  be,  sir.  Because  it  was  tied  in  with  the
    instructions  for  me  to  carry  out  when  Mr.  Moore  was  away.

    Mr.  Walter.  Who  put  the  date  of  June  on,  when  it  should  have
    been  April  ^

    Mr.  HooPES.  I  don't  know,  sir.

    Mr,  Tavenner.  Will  you  look  at  the  memorandum  and  state
    whether  that  is  the  memorandum  to  which  you  referred  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  Yes,  that  is  it.

    Mr.  Walter.  When  was  that  memorandum  made?

    Mr.  HooPES.  I  don't  know  when  it  was  made,  Mr.  Walter.  It  says
    on  it  "June  1943,"  but  that  is  obviously  wrong.

    Mr.  Walter.  Whose  memorandum  is  it?

    Mr.  HooPES.  It  is  from  Mr.  Moore  to  me.

    Mr.  W^vLTER.  To  you?

    Mr.  HoopES.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  This  was  a  copy  prepared  by  the  State  Department?

    Mr.  HooPES.  This  is  a  copy,  and  perhaps  in  copying  it  they  may
    have  made  an  error  as  to  the  date.  I  do  not  know.  Mr.  Moore  may  be
    able  to  clear  you  up  on  the  date  of  this  memo.    I  don't  know.

    Mr.  Tavenner,  AVill  you  read  it,  please  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  Yes.    This  copy  says :

    June  1943.
    For  :  J.  P.  Hoopes
    From  :  W.  C.  Moore.
    Subject :  Urauium  compounds.

    It  appears  that  it  may  be  possible  to  get  ferro-uraniiim  compounds,  and  the
    information  should  be  sent  to  yon.  I  have  talked  with  Colonel  Crenshaw's  office
    in  New  York  and  given  tliem  your  name.  If  you  do  not  get  information  by  Mon-
    day, call  them  up.    Mrs.  Cochran  has  the  number.

    Get  sufficient  specifications  so  that  the  Soviets  can  make  decisions  as  to
    whether  it  is  suitable  for  their  needs  and,  if  possible,  quantities  available.

    Captain  Johnston  of  General  Groves'  office  is  the  man  in  Washington  who  may
    be  able  to  help  you.

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner.  Well,  did  you  follow  the  direction  of  Mr.  Moore  and
    call  Colonel  Crenshaw's  office  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  Yes,  I  did.  Evidently  the  list  didn't  come  in  Monday
    morning,  that  they  referred  to,  and  1  called  Colonel  Crenshaw's  office.

    Mr.  Walter.  Mr.  Hoopes,  referring  to  that  memorandum  again,  you
    saw  the  original  memorandum,  didn't  you?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  I  saw  it  in  1943,  sir.

    Mr.  Ta-st^nner.  Did  you  see  it  recently  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  No,  sir.  I  saw  the  same  thing  that  you  have  here,  just
    a  compilation  of  material  that  has  a  bearing  on  all  these  transactions.
    I  haven't  seen  the  original  memo ;  no.

    INIr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  recall,  from  your  independent  recollection,
    that  the  matter  of  substitutes  arose  in  April  1943  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  Yes,  sir;  I  do.  That  is  borne  out  by  the  subsequent
    correspondence  which  we  have.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  think  so.

    Mr.  Hoopes.  It  definitely  ties  into  that.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  All  right.    So  will  you  proceed,  then  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  Well,  it  seems  that — I  don't  know  Avhen  it  was  received,
    but  there  was  a  letter  from  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  to  our
    office  dated  April  20,  in  which  the  Russians  were  upset  about  our
    having  turned  down  this  particular  application  previously,  and  they
    stated,  in  there

    SHIPMENT  OF  ATOMIC  MATERIAL  1107

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Let  me  hand  you  what  purports  to  be  a  copy  of  the
    letter,  furnished  by  the  State  Department,  and  I  ask  you  if  that  is  the
    letter  to  which  you  refer.

    Mr.  HoopES.  That  is  the  one  I  was  talking  about,  sir;  yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Well,  will  you  read  the  letter,  please  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  This  letter  is  dated  April  20,  1943.    It  is  addressed  to :

    Major  General  Charles  M.  Wesson,
    Senior  Assistant  Administrator,

    Office  of  Lend-Lease  Administration,

    515  Twenty-second  Street  NW.,  Washington,  D.  C.

    Deak  General  Wesson  :  We  were  advised  by  your  office  that  our  application
    of  April  3,  1948,  for  export  license  for  500  pounds  of  urano-uranic  oxide  and  .500
    pounds  of  uranium  nitrate  had  been  declined.  Needless  to  say  this  decision
    upsets  the  most  urgent  efforts  of  our  war  industries  at  present.

    In  view  of  the  rejection  of  our  two  requisitions  for  uranium  compounds  by  the
    War  Department,  we  hoped  to  obtain  small  quantities  of  uranium  compounds  by
    direct  purchase  for  cash.  In  fact  we  had  several  propt)sitions  from  American
    companies.  The  materials  were  offered  from  the  stock  for  immediate  delivery.
    Your  office  was  kept  informed  about  all  negotiations  with  those  companies.
    Nevertheless,  the  conceivable  purcliase  of  uranium  compounds  was  not  authorized.

    Because  of  the  very  lu-gent  needs  which  you  have  always  appreciated,  I  would
    vei*y  much  appreciate  your  reconsidering  the  above  decision  of  your  office,  and
    to  authorize  us  to  buy  50O  pounds  each  of  the  afore-mentioned  uranium  com-
    pounds and  25  pounds  of  uranium  metal,  for  which  we  also  have  a  proposition.

    Thank  you  for  your  early  attention  to  this  matter.
    Sincerely  yours,

    N.  S.  Stepanov.
    Chief  of  Petroleum  Products,  Chemical  Department.

    Mr.  Taatnxer.  Let  me  ask  you  one  question  about  the  letter.  There
    is  a  statement  here  that —

    in  fact  we  had  several  propositions  from  American  companies.  The  materials
    were  offered  from  the  stock  for  immediate  delivery.  Your  office  was  kept
    informed  about  all  negotiations  with  those  companies.

    Now,  what  information  did  you  receive  regarding  companies  which
    had  materials  in  stock  for  delivery  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  That  took  place  during  the  time  that  Mr.  Moore  was
    handling  this,  before  I  got  into  it.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  had  no  knowledge  of  it  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  No,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavi:nner.  All  right,  sir.

    Mr.  Hoopes.  On  the  22d  of  April — I  gather  that  the  letter  that  I  had
    been  expecting  from  Colonel  Crenshaw's  office  with  the  list  of  uranium
    compounds  hadn't  arrived,  because  I  have  a  note  here,  "Call  Colonel
    Crenshaw"  and  then  I  have  a  note  "Out"  and  then  later  "Captain
    Merritt."  The  number  is  "Murray  Hill  3-1761,"  subject  "Uranium
    compounds,"  and  then  "Captain  Merritt"  and  then  the  substance  of
    what  he  advised  me :

    Said  pressure  had  just  been  brought  to  bear  on  General  Groves  to  release  the
    1,000  pounds.  Colonel  Crenshaw  is  willing  for  Russians  to  have  the  list  of
    substitutes.  Please  try  to  hold  off  approval  of  the  1,000  pounds  till  Russians
    have  chance  to  see  the  substitute  list.

    Now,  after  this-

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Just  before  you  leave  that:  Did  Captain  Merritt
    explain  anything  further  as  to  what  he  meant  about  pressure  being
    brought  to  bear  upon  General  Groves  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  No,  sir ;  he  did  not.

    1108  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  3^011  have  any  conversation  with  Captain  Mer-
    ritt  or  any  other  member  of  the  Manhattan  Engineering  District  with
    regard  to  that  statement?

    Mr.  HoopES.  No,  sir.  Captain  Merritt  is  the  only  person  I  have  ever
    talked  to  in  the  Manhattan  District.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  All  right.     Proceed.

    Mr.  HooPES.  After  this  conversation,  I  have  a  note  here  that  I  spoke
    with  General  Wesson.  I  went  in  and  talked  to  General  Wesson.  Mr.
    Moore  had  indicated  previously  that  I  was  to  take  the  matter  up  with
    General  Wesson.

    In  discussing  with  General  Wesson,  1  explained  to  him  my  con-
    versation with  Captain  Merritt.  I  just  indicated  what  I  have  read
    here.  And  General  Wesson  said  he  wanted  to  speak  to  General
    Groves.  He  gave  instructions  to  his  secretary  to  get  him  General
    Groves  on  the  phone.

    I  have  a  note  here :

    Spoke  with  General  Wesson.  He  called  General  Groves.  Got  Groves  to  say
    O.  K.  to  export  the  1,000  pounds  iiraniiim  compounds.  Genei'al  Wesson  agreed  to
    write  Soviets  approving  the  request.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Then  the  decision  to  approve  the  request  for  the
    issuance  of  an  export  license  was  made  at  the  time  of  that  telephone
    conversation  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  I  would  believe  so,  sir.

    Mr.  Walter.  Were  you  present  when  the  telephone  conversation
    took  place  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  Mr.  Walter,  I  don't  remember.  I  remember  distinctly
    General  Wesson's  giving  instructions :  "Get  me  General  Groves."

    And  it  was  generally  a  pretty  busy  office  around  there,  and  I  don't
    remember  whether  I  stayed  during  the  conversation  or  not.  I  rather
    imagine  I  did  not.

    Mr.  Walter.  It  was  shortly  thereafter  that  you  were  informed  that
    permission  had  been  granted  for  the  export  of  this  1,000  pounds?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  Yes,  sir;  it  was  apparently  right  after  General  Wes-
    son's conversation  with  General  Groves,  because  I  have  tied  it  all  in
    on  the  same  note  here.  There  are  no  intervening  phone  calls  or  any-
    thing else,  so  it  must  have  been  immediately  after  that  telephone
    conversation  that  General  Wesson  gave  me  the  instructions.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  what  was  the  date  of  that  memorandum  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  This  memorandum  is  dated  April  22.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  was  the  day  on  which  you  talked  to  Colonel
    Crenshaw's  office  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  That  is  right,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  But  spoke  to  Captain  Merritt?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  Yes,  sir.

    After  getting  these  instructions  from  General  Wesson

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Let  me  ask  you  this:  Did  General  Wesson  make
    any  statement  to  you  as  to  the  reason  for  approving  the  issuance  of
    this  license  on  the  22d  of  April  or  at  any  later  date  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  I  don't  recall  exactly  whether  he  made  his  statement
    to  me.  I  assume  that  he  did,  because  in  my  report  I  said  something
    about  the  reason,  in  my  later  report.  I  assume  that  we  had  some  brief
    conversation  about  it.  But  I  don't  remember  all  of  it.  I  can't  swear-
    to  that,  sir.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    1109

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  was  written  in  your  report  of  May  31,  sum-
    marizing these  transactions.

    Mr.  HooPES.  Well,  there  was  a  report  earlier  than  that.  There  was
    a  report  for  the  activities  of  April  22.

    No,  it  doesn't  give  that.    Shall  I  read  you  my  report  for  that  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes ;  read  from  your  report.

    Mr.  HooPES.  This  is  from  my  diary,  dated  April  23, 1943,  for  activi-
    ties of  the  22d  :

    Conferred  with  Captain  Merritt  in  the  oflSce  of  Colonel  Crenshaw,  of  War
    Department  Engineers,  New  York  City,  on  recent  list  of  various  substitutes  for
    particular  uranium  compounds  desired  by  Soviets.  General  Wesson  arranged
    with  General  Groves  for  clearance  of  the  original  Soviet  application  for  1,000
    pounds  of  such  compounds,  which  the  Soviets  claim  they  can  procure  from  stock.
    Prepared  letter  for  General  Wesson  advising  Soviets  accordingly  in  light  of  their
    urgent  need  for  this  material.    Export  license  now  being  put  tiirough.

    Mr.  Walter.  As  I  understand  it,  General  Wesson  was  opposed  to
    granting  the  permit.  It  was  not  until  after  this  telephone  call  that
    he  agreed  to  allow  it.

    Mr.  HooPES.  Yes;  that  is  true.  This  is  conjecture,  because  I  hadn't
    been  in  the  early  negotiations  about  this,  but  we  had  been  apparently
    advised  of  the  tight  supply  of  this  particular  material.  I  myself
    knew  nothing  of  the  atomic  project  or  nothing  of  the  strategic  situa-
    tion about  uranium.  All  the  instructions  I  had  received  was  that  they
    couldn't  get  this  material.  And  it  wasn't  until  the  conversation  Gen-
    eral Wesson  had  with  General  Groves  that  he  made  the  decision.

    My  memo  here  to  Mr.  Moore  expands  that  a  little  bit.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  But  take  the  occurrences  in  the  order  in  which  they
    took  place.

    Mr.  HooPES.  Well,  on  the  23d,  the  export  license  was  approved  to
    cover  this  request  for  500  pounds  of  urano-uranic  oxide  and  500  pounds
    of  uranium  nitrate.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  hand  you  what  appears  to  be  a  copy  of  the  appli-
    cation for  the  export  license,  with  the  notation  at  the  foot  of  it  by  you.
    Will  you  examine  it  and  state  if  that  is  a  copy  of  the  application  ?

    Mr.  HooPEs.  I  don't  know.  I  assume  it  is.  I  mean  these  are  ex-
    cerpts. I  know  that  I  did  make  such  a  note  on  it  and  we  put  the
    export  license  through.  I  don't  know  whether  there  was  any  other
    material  than  this.  This  seems  to  give  the  details  from  the  export-
    license  application.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Well,  will  you  read  it,  please,  into  the  record?

    Mr.  HooPES.  Yes,  sir.    This  says :

    The  following  apparently  copied  from  the  export  license.
    It  is  an  application  for  export  dated  April  23, 1943.

    Order  number

    Units

    Supplier

    Value

    21-73/C  43058...-

    500  pounds  urano-uranic  oxide  99.5  percent  pure,  at  $4.50-.
    500  pounds  uranium  nitrate  (uranyl)  at  $2.25,  total  gross
    weight  1,200  pounds.

    Chematar,  Inc

    $3,375

    Note. — This  application  has  been  held  up  for  some  time.  It  has  now  been
    approved  by  General  Wesson  as  of  April  22,  1943.

    That  is  all  that  is  on  that  note.  I  don't  know  whether  this  other
    note  is  attached  to  it  or  not.  There  is  another  note  on  the  next  page
    here.

    1110  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Ta^t:nner.  What  is  tlio  date  of  that  note  ?

    Mr,  HoopES.  April  22  is  the  date  of  this  other  note.  It  is  a  note
    appended — I  will  assume  it  is  appended  to  the  other  note.  It  is
    addressed  to  Mrs.  Hall,  but  there  is  no  signature — no  indication  of
    a  signature — on  either  one  of  these  notes.

    Mr.  Ta\'exner.  Will  j^ou  read  it?  Doesn't  it  indicate  that  it  was
    signed  by  a  person  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  No,  sir ;  it  doesn't  indicate  it  was  signed  by  a  person.
    It  says,  "Received  from  J.  Hoopes."

    Mr.  TA^'ENNER.  Received  from  ?     All  right.

    Mr.  HooPEs.  Yes,  sir.     It  is  a  note  to  Mrs.  Hall.

    General  Wesson  has  decided  that  this  export  license  be  approved  and  issued  as
    soon  as  possible.     Received  from  J.  Hoopes.

    Office  note :  Indicates  license  No.  C-1G431S0  assigned  on  April  23,  1943.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  that  license  number  assigned  by  your  office  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  I  gather  that  it  was,  sir.  I  do  not  remember  that
    procedure.  Mr.  Moore  handled  the  export  licenses  and  I  don't  know
    whether  they  were  numbers  given  to  us  by  the  Board  of  Economic  War-
    fare which  we  assigned  as  we  approved  them  or  whether  they  were  our
    own  numbers.  We  put  the  number  on  the  export  license.  I  do  know
    that.

    Mr.  Tavexner.  All  right.    Will  you  proceed?

    Mr.  HooPES.  Well,  on  the  23d,  a  letter  was  written  by  General  Wes-
    son to  Mr.  Stepanov  of  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission.  Do  you
    wish  me  to  read  that?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes.

    Mr.  HooPES  (reading)  :

    Your  letter  of  April  20,  requesting  reconsideration  of  your  application  for
    export  license  covering  500  pounds  of  urano-uranic  oxide  and  500  pounds  of
    uranium  nitrate  has  received  careful  study.

    Having  in  mind  tlie  urgency  of  your  needs  for  this  material  as  expressed  in
    your  letter,  I  have  reviewed  the  situation.  Our  supply  of  these  uranium  com-
    pounds is  critical.  However,  I  am  recommending  approval  of  your  present  ex-
    port license  for  the  above  quantities,  whicli  you  state  that  you  can  iiurchase
    from  stocks  on  hand.

    As  regards  the  25  pounds  of  lu-anium  metal  also  mentioned  in  your  letter,
    we  shall  entertain  application  for  this  material  provided  you  can  locate  a  source
    of  supply.

    Sincerely  yours,

    C.  M.  Wesson,
    Major  Oeneral  United  States  Army,

    S&nior  Assistant  Administrator.

    Mr.  Walter.  When  was  that  letter,  please  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  The  date  of  that  letter  was  April  23,  sir.

    Mr.  Walter.  And  that  was  signed  by  General  Wesson  ?

    Mr.  HooPEs.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  notifying  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commis-
    sion of  the  approval  of  the  license.

    Now,  what  was  the  nexr  thing  that  occurred  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  I  have  a  note,  on  April  26,  of  a  telephone  call  that  I
    received  from  Mr.  Fomichev  of  the  Commission.

    JNIr.  Tavenner.  That  is,  of  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  Yes,  sir.    He  states :

    Option  expired  for  uranium  compounds.  Will  send  license  application  for
    25  pounds  uranium  metal.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1111

    That  is  all  that  note  says.    I  wrote  it  up  a  little  fuller  in  the  diary.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  3'ou  make  a  comment  of  your  own  at  that  time,
    after  receiving  the  notice  that  the  option  had  expired  which  the
    Russians  had  expected  to  use  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  Yes,  sir,  I  did.  As  I  understand  it,  or  as  I  understood
    it  at  the  time,  it  was  that  General  AYesson  and  General  Groves  were
    skeptical  as  to  the  fact  that  the  Russians  could  get  this  material.
    Chematar  was  the  supplier,  and  Chematar  was  the  hroker,  and  when
    the  request  was  approved  I  believe  it  was  approved  on  the  assumption
    that  they  would  never  be  able  to  fill  it.  And  when  Fomichev  called
    and  advised  that  he  could  no  longer  get  it,  it  sounded  as  if  the  original
    assumption  was  correct.

    ]\Ir.  Tavenner.  And  did  you  not  make  some  notation  at  the  time,
    in  your  diary,  with  regard  to  that?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  In  my  daily  report  ?    Yes,  I  did.

    Mr.  Ta\^nner.  In  your  daily  report.  Will  you  state  what  that
    was  'I

    ]\Ir.  HooPES.  On  April  27th,  for  activities  on  the  26th,  I  have  a  note
    here :

    Conferred  with  Mr.  Fomichev,  who  expressed  dismay  at  inability  to  locate
    uranium  compounds  now  that  the  export  license  has  been  granted.  This  de-
    velopment seems  to  confirm  our  skepticism  regarding  the  stock  supply  which
    the  Russians  insisted  had  been  offered  from  several  sources.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  communicate  that  information  to  General
    Wesson;  that  is,  the  information  that  you  had  received  about  the
    supply  being  exhausted  ?

    Mr.  HooPES.  I  assume  that  I  did,  Mr.  Tavenner.  I  don't  have  a
    definite  recollection  of  it.  I  did  certainly  in  this  diary,  because  all
    these  diaries  were  written  up  as  .reports  of  our  activities  and  were
    funneled  in  to  General  Wesson  so  that  he  could  see  what  had  been
    going  on.  So  I  imagine  I  spoke  to  him  about  it.  I  don't  have  any
    distinct  note  of  that.  I  don't  believe  I  do,  anyhow.  That  memo-
    randum of  mine  to  Mr.  Moore  may  indicate  that,  which  you  have  in
    the  record.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Now,  do  you  have  any  other  record  there  of  trans-
    actions before  you  made  a  summary  report  on  May  1  ?

    Mr.  HoopES.  I  haven't  any  other

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is,  action  that  you  were  familiar  with  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  I  don't  believe  so,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  have  any  knowledge  of  the  issuance  of  an
    amended  or  approval  of  an  amended  license  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  No,  sir.  I  am  not  sure  that  one  was  amended.  I  know
    there  has  been  a  lot  of  discussion  about  it  before  this  committee,  but
    I  don't  know  that  there  ever  was  an  amended  license.

    ]\Ir.  Tavenner.  Well,  now,  right  in  that  connection,  have  you  seen
    a  request  to  amend  the  license  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  Yesterday  afternoon  I  saw  this  request  dated  April  28
    from  the  Russians.

    Mr.  Taa-enner.  Yes.     Had  yovi  seen  that  before  yesterday  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  No,  sir ;  I  had  not.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  know  of  the  fact  that  such  a  letter  had  been
    written  prior  to  yesterday  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  No,  sir.     The  request  was  not  addressed  to  us.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  To  whom  was  it  addressed  ?

    1112

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  HoorES.  Do  you  have  a  copy  of  it  there?  I  took  notes  from
    that.  Yours  woukl  be  more  complete  than  mine.  It  was  addressed
    to  "Mr.  Thad  C.  Martin."

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  HoopES.  "Administrative  Officer"  or  "Administrative  Office" —
    I  don't  know  which  it  was — "Operations  Branch,  Office  of  Exports,
    Board  of  Economic  Warfare."

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  show  you  a  letter  of  April  28,  1943,  addressed  to
    Mr.  Martin,  as  you  said.     Will  you  read  it  ?

    Mr.  Hoopes.  It  is  dated  April  28, 1943,  addressed  to :

    Mr.  Thad  C.  Martin,

    Administration  Officer,  Operation  Branch,

    Office  of  Exports,  Board  of  Economic  Warfare,

    Room  2032,  Tempo  U  Building,  Twelfth  and  Constitution  Avenue,
    Washington,  D.  C.

    In  reference  to  the  above  export  license  number —

    Dear  Sib
    excuse  me

    It  was  preceded  by-

    Re  :  export  license  No.  1643180.

    Dear  Sir  :  In  reference  to  the  above  export  license  number,  co\  ering  500  pounds
    of  urano-uranic  oxide  and  500  pounds  of  uranium  nitrate,  we  request  that  the
    license  be  amended  as  follows :

    Net  weight

    Commodity

    Unit
    price

    Total
    price

    finn  pnnnd.q

    Urano-uranic  oxide,  95-98  percent  pure

    $3.10
    2.85

    $1,550

    fiOn  ponnd.  Mr.  Tavenner.  Then  at  Great  Falls  you  had  an  opportunity  to  re-
    view the  records  regarding  the  shipment  of  the  various  materials  that
    Kotikov  was  interested  in  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  had  them  all  in  my  hands.

    Mr.  Ta^tenner.  Do  you  have  knowledge  of  the  use  made  of  thorium,
    cadmium,  graphite,  or  aluminum  tubes?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  did  not  know  at  the  time  what  it  was  for^  I  had  no
    concepton  of  what  the  words  "uranium,"  "cadmium,"  or  "thorium"
    meant  at  the  time ;  but,  now  that  I  have  seen  pictures  of  an  atomic  pile,
    I  recognize  the  various  things  in  it  as  the  very  things  Kotikov  was
    collecting.  I  never  had  seen  the  word  "cadmium"  before.  I  see  here
    that  controls  the  heating  of  the  atomic  pile.

    I  looked  at  my  records  and  saw  that  we  shipped,  in  1942,  100,800
    pounds  cadmium  metals ;  in  1943  we  shipped  150,427  pounds  cadmium
    metals,  72,535  pounds  of  cadmium  alloys;  and  in  1944  we  shipped
    533,742  pounds  cadmium  metals.  In  1944  the  cadmium  alloys  stopped
    cold.

    As  to  thorium,  in  1942  we  shipped  13,440  pounds ;  in  1943  we  shipped
    11,912  pounds ;  and  in  1944  not  a  pound.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  was  the  amount  of  thorium  you  said  was
    shipped  in  1943  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Thorium,  13,440  pounds  in  1942  and  11,912  pounds
    in  1943.

    Mr,  Tavenner.  Wliat  was  that  last  figure  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  11,912  pounds  in  1943.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  been  able  to  produce  here  a
    shipper's  export  declaration  showing  the  exact  figure  of  11,912  pounds
    of  thorium  nitrate  shipped  January  30,  1943,  from  Philadelphia  on
    the  Steamship  John  C.  Fremont^  the  exporter  being  Amtorg  Trading
    Corp.  I  desire  to  introduce  this  record  in  evidence  and  ask  that  it  be
    marked  "Jordan  Exhibit  4."

    ]\Ir.  Wood.  I  understand  the  record  tendered  is  a  photostatic  copy
    of  the  original?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes.

    Mr,  Wood.  Without  objection,  it  will  be  admitted.

    (The  document  above  referred  to,  marked  "Jordan  Exhibit  4,"  is
    filed  herewith.)  *^

    Mr.  Nixon.  Do  I  understand  you  are  reading  from  your  diary  at
    the  present  time?

    **  See  appendix.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1157

    Mr.  Jordan.  My  diary  consists  of  books  and  bound  volumes  and
    various  notebooks  that  I  kept  at  the  time.

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  am  referring  to  this  shipment  of  11,912  pounds.

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  am  reading  it  from  the  official  records  the  Russians
    gave  me.

    Mr.  Nixon.  At  that  time  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  No.  They  were  given  to  me  later.  Before  I  went  out
    of  the  Army,  I  was  afraid  there  would  be  a  lend-lease  investigation,
    and  I  asked  the  Russians  if  they  would  let  me  have  the  totals  that
    went  through,  and  they  gave  me  the  complete  totals  of  everything
    Russia  received  in  1942,  1943,  and  1944.

    Mr.  Case.  Everything  they  received  where  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Entirely.

    Mr.  Case.  In  all  forms  of  lend-lease?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes.     It  runs  into  billions  of  dollars.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Do  the  uranium  shipments  appear  on  that?

    Mr.  Jordan.  No.  They  were  not  under  lend-lease.  They  were  paid
    by  cash.

    Mr.  Nixon.  This  includes  only  such  shipments  as  were  made  under
    lend-lease?

    Mr.  Jordan.  It  includes  only  such  shipments  as  the  American
    taxpayers  paid  for.

    Mr.  Case.  All  shipments  through  every  channel?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Every  shipment  that  went  through  lend-lease  out  of
    the  United  States.

    Mr.  Kearney.  That  is,  at  every  port  of  the  United  States?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Every  port.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Not  only  from  Great  Falls  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Not  only  from  Great  Falls.  So,  what  I  have  been
    able  to  do  is  refresh  my  memory  by  reading  the  total  figures  and
    checking  them  with  what  I  know,  and  they  come  out  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  have  told  us  about  thorium.  What  record  do
    you  have  of  the  shipment  of  cadmium  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Cadmium?    I  just  read  the  figures.

    I  didn't  read  the  figures  on  aluminum  tubes.  In  1942  we  shipped
    them  3,463,346  pounds  of  aluminum  tubes  at  a  cost  of  $3,989,506.     In

    1943  we  shipped  them  2,982,209  pounds  at  a  cost  of  $2,491,021.     In

    1944  we  shipped  them  7,186,172  pounds  at  a  cost  of  $6,461,923,  or  a
    total  cost  of  $12,942,450.

    The  graphite,  I  have  a  picture  of  an  atomic  pile  made  up  of  graphite.
    According  to  Colonel  Kotikov  he  was  assembling  graphite  for  fur-
    naces.

    In  1942  we  shipped  them  1,818,838  pounds  of  carbon  graphite  for
    furnaces,  and  7,069,088  graphite  for  furnaces.  In  1943  we  shipped
    them  11,694,118  graphite  for  furnaces.  And  in  1944  we  shipped  them
    9,437,006  graphite  for  furnaces.     The  total  cost  was  $4,327,101.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  These  materials  to  which  you  have  testified — that
    is,  the  thorium,  cadmium,  aluminum  tubes,  and  graphite — could  be
    used  for  what  purposes,  as  far  as  you  know?
    ^  Mr.  JoRDON.  I  only  know  that  this  article  on  the  atomic  bomb  gives
    these  materials  as  being  the  necessary  materials  to  make  the  atomic
    bomb.  I  am  not  a  technician  and  not  a  chemist.  This  article  is  in
    Life  magazine  (indicating  publication  in  hand) .

    1158  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Counsel,  I  regret  very  much  to  have  to  suspend  at
    this  time,  but  it  is  only  5  minutes  before  the  convening  of  the  House.
    We  will  take  a  recess  until  3  o'clock  this  afternoon.

    (Thereupon,  at  11 :  55  a.  m.,  a  recess  was  taken  until  3  p.  m.  of  the
    same  day.)

    AFTERNOON  SESSION

    (The  subcommittee  met  at  3  p.  m.)

    Mr.  Wood.  The  record  will  show  that  of  the  subcommittee  conduct-
    ing this  hearing  there  are  present  Messrs.  Velde,  Kearney,  and  Wood.

    TESTIMONY  OF  GEOKGE  RACEY  JORDAN— Resumed

    Mr.  Kearney.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  clarify  in  my  own  mind  a  couple
    of  points  testified  to  this  morning  by  the  witness  ?

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Kearney.

    Mr.  I^ARNET.  I  understood,  Major— and  you  correct  me  if  I  am
    wrong — this  morning  you  testified  to  the  arrival  at  Great  Falls  of  a
    C-47  containing  approximately  50  pieces  of  luggage?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes,  sir.

    (Representative  Nixon  arrives  in  hearing  room.)

    Mr.  Kearney.  And  as  I  recollect  you  read  from  a  diary  in  which
    the  notations  were  supposed  to  have  been  made  on  or  about  that  time ;
    is  that  correct?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Can  you  tell  the  committee  regarding  any  Russian
    personnel  that  was  aboard  that  plane  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  At  the  beginning,  when  I  first  went  to  Great  Falls  in
    1945,  the  material  I  have  been  complaining  about  arrived  by  freight
    at  the  railroad  station  and  was  brought  out  to  the  field  in  trucks  and
    put  in  a  warehouse  and  then  loaded  onto  a  C-47  which  we  had  specially
    prepared  to  fly  to  Moscow.

    It  is  important  to  get  the  point  why  the  transfer  had  to  be  made  at
    Great  Falls.  These  C-47  planes  that  arrived  from  various  depots  had
    to  be  winterized  to  make  the  flight  to  Moscow.  They  had  to  be  spe-
    cially treated  so  as  to  operate  at  temperatures  50  to  60  degrees  below
    zero.  So  everything  would  have  to  be  transferred  to  a  plane  that  had
    spent  4  days  in  the  hangar  being  winterized.

    So  it  is  entirely  possible  the  freight  may  have  arrived  by  train  and
    been  put  into  a  warehouse,  but  it  could  not  depart  without  my
    authority.

    When  I  referred  to  a  plane  ready  to  go  it  didn't  mean  it  had  just
    arrived  that  day  with  a  particular  load  and  particular  couriers.  Some-
    times a  load  would  arrive  with  a  couple  of  couriers,  and  they  would
    sleep  on  the  load,  and  sometimes  they  would  switch  couriers.  "When
    a  courier  would  spread  out  a  blanket  and  sleep  on  the  bags  I  had  no
    way  of  knowing  how  the  load  had  arrived,  but  when  I  saw  it  on  the
    plane  ready  to  go,  they  had  to  get  my  authority  to  depart,  and  that
    is  when  I  got  on  the  plane  and  inspected.

    Mr.  Kearney.  The  particular  plane  you  referred  to  this  morning,
    did  you  examine  any  of  the  50  pieces  of  luggage  on  that  plane  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  testified  the  last  time,  when  you  were  not  here,  that
    I  had  first  seen  excessive  baggage  going  through  with  a  Russian
    general,  and  I  let  it  go  through.    Each  succeeding  Russian  officer  had

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1159

    increasing  baggage.  When  it  got  to  10  or  15  suitcases  per  person  I
    began  to  become  apprehensive  of  whether  I  was  doing  my  duty ;  and
    when  50  pieces  came  without  any  personnel,  just  2  guards,  that  is  when
    I  felt  I  should  be  in  a  spot-check  position  and  see  what  was  in  the
    suitcases.

    That  was  the  first  time  I  did  it.    I  can't  tell  the  plane  or  time.

    Mr.  Kearney.  At  that  time  did  you  make  a  spot  check  of  them  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  opened  about  one-third  of  the  suitcases.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Was  there  opposition  by  anyone  to  your  opening  the
    bags?

    Mr.  Jordan.  The  two  Russians  tried  to  physically  stop  me,  without
    touching  me — tried  to  stop  me  at  the  door,  saying  it  was  diplomatic.
    I  said,  in  the  performance  of  my  duty  I  wanted  to  open  one  or  two
    of  the  suitcases.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Did  you  open  one  or  two  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  opened  about  one-third.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Can  you  tell  the  committee  what  you  found  in  the
    suitcases  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  found  a  very  large  amount  of  office  folders,  and  in
    each  of  the  folders  would  be  duplicates  of  papers  from  various  depart-
    ments of  the  Government.  In  my  notes  made  at  the  time  that  I  actu-
    ally opened  the  suitcases,  I  made  a  one-word  note  which  to  me  meant
    the  whole  suitcase.  Where  I  have  a  note  "State  Department,"  that
    meant  an  entire  suitcase  or  perhaps  two  or  three  suitcases.  The  notes
    were  made  at  the  time,  7  years  ago,  when  this  was  done,  and  I  can  now
    only  say  I  have  a  note  "Panama  Canal  Commission  maps,"  and
    "Amtorg  Trading  Co.,"  and  "Tass,"  and  "State  Department."

    I  can't  go  further  than  to  say  I  remember  in  some  of  the  State  De-
    partment papers  I  took  a  peek  at  one,  and  it  was  a  military  report.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Do  you  know  where  that  military  report  came  from  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  From  Moscow.

    Mr.  Kj^arney.  Was  that  a  folder  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  It  was  a  folder.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Was  there  any  name  on  that  folder?

    Mr.  Jordan.  The  names  were  on  the  front  of  the  folders  on  a  piece
    of  white  paper,  clipped  on  to  show  where  that  particular  folder's  con-
    tents came  from.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Can  you  give  the  committee  the  name  of  any  in-
    dividual on  the  folders  you  saw  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  saw  Sayre,  Hiss,  and  other  members  of  the  State
    Department  whose  names  I  made  a  note  of  at  the  time.

    Mr.  Kjiarney.  Can  you  tell  the  committee  what  was  in  the  folder
    under  the  name  of  Hiss  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  can  only  say  they  were  photostats  of  some  kind  and
    seemed  to  be  military  reports.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Do  you  know  where  the  military  reports  came  from  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  can't  say  where  they  all  came  from,  but  I  would
    say  frcm  Moscow.

    Mr.  Kearney.  From  whom  at  Moscow  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  The  American  attache  out  there.

    Mr.  Kearney.  And  they  were  sent  from  the  American  military
    chief  of  our  mission  in  Moscow  to  whom  ?

    1160  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr,  Jordan.  They  were  sent  through  channels  to  Washington  to  the
    State  Department,  and  somebody  in  the  State  Department  had  evi-
    dently photostated  them  and  was  sending  them  back.

    Mr.  Kearnet.  You  mean  to  tell  the  committee  these  were  the  re-
    ports sent  from  our  mission  in  Moscow  to  our  own  State  Department
    and  photostated  and  returned  to  Moscow  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  That  is  what  it  looked  like.

    Mr.  KJEARNET.  They  were  contained  in  this  baggage  you  speak  of  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes.  I  was  looking  for  morphine,  to  be  truthful.  We
    were  missing  morphine,  and  the  couriers  had  been  sleeping  all  night
    beside  the  morphine,  and  I  thought  they  had  been  stealing  it.  I  was
    running  my  hand  through  and  had  no  intention  of  reading  anything,
    but  since  I  had  opened  them  I  wanted  to  make  a  note  of  what  I  had
    seen.  I  made  a  note  "State  Department"  with  "Secret"  cut  off,  and
    I  have  a  notation  of  Sayre,  Hiss,  and  others.  This  was  written  that
    night.

    Mr.  Kjearney.  This  was  military  information  received  by  the  State
    Department  from  our  mission  in  Moscow  and  later  returned  to  the
    Russians  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  That  is  what  it  looked  like,  but  at  the  time,  you  must
    remember,  I  thought  this  material  was  going  through  under  authority,
    and  I  had  no  idea  there  was  anything  improper  about  it.  It  looked
    to  me  the  State  Department  knew  what  they  were  doing  when  they
    sent  things  to  Moscow.  I  didn't  think  it  was  anything  I  should  do
    anything  about.

    Mr.  Kearney.  That  sheet  you  are  referring  to  now,  are  those  notes
    made  by  yourself  at  Great  Falls,  Mont.,  on  the  date  you  spoke  of?

    Mr.  Jordan.  They  were  made  at  the  time  I  opened  the  first  suitcases.
    Then  I  opened  a  number  of  suitcases  later.

    Mr.  Kearney.  What  I  am  getting  at  is,  they  are  your  notes  made
    at  that  time  and  not  some  months  later  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  They  were  made  the  night  I  opened  the  suitcases.

    Mr.  Kearney.  I  think  that  will  be  all  for  the  time  being.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Let  me  clear  one  thing  up  before  you  leave  this  matter
    of  these  names  that  you  have  brought  in.  I  think  the  record  should
    be  clear  that  the  fact  those  names  appeared  in  that  correspondence  and
    on  those  folders  does  not  in  itself  indicate  that  either  of  the  individuals
    named  was  involved  in  illegal  activities  in  sending  folders  through  the
    Russian  couriers.

    Mr.  Jordan.  If  I  had  known  or  thought  it  was  illegal  at  the  time,  I
    would  have  grounded  the  plane.     I  thought  it  was  in  perfect  order.

    Mr.  Nixon.  You  are  only  testifying  that  among  the  things  you  saw
    in  those  folders  you  opened,  you  recall  seeing  those  two  names  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  have  notes  on  those  two  names.  There  were  a  num-
    ber of  names.

    Mr.  Nixon.  You  saw  State  Department  papers?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  And  you  saw  somewhere  in  those  State  Department
    papers  the  two  names,  Sayre  and  Hiss,  and  other  names?

    Mr.  Jordan.  That  is  correct.  But  the  fact  is  that  the  folders  were
    in  the  suitcases  in  rows  with  elastic  bands  around  five  or  six  folders,
    and  in  the  front  would  be  a  white  piece  of  paper  with  "From  Hiss"
    and  the  next  batch  "From  Sayre"  and  so  on.  I  just  picked  the  first
    one  or  two  and  made  a  note  to  show  what  was  in  the  suitcase.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1161

    Mr.  NixON.  I  wanted  the  record  to  be  clear  that  the  testimony  of
    the  witness  on  this  point  rehites  only  to  the  fact  that  certain  docu-
    ments went  through  with  those  names  appearing  on  the  folders,  and  in
    my  opinion,  certainly,  which  I  think  I  should  express,  no  inference  can
    be  drawn  from  that  fact  that  either  of  the  individuals  named  was
    involved  in  illegal  activity.

    Mr.  Kearney.  I  don't  think  from  any  questions  I  asked  such  an
    inference  could  be  drawn.

    Mr.  NixON.  I  think  your  questions  brought  out  the  contrary,  and  I
    wanted  to  bring  out  that  fact.  I  think  the  facts  are  well  brought  out
    by  your  questions.  I  just  wanted  to  high-light  the  same  point  that
    you  made.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Jordan,  I  would  like  to  ask  you  one  question
    about  these  records.  I  believe  you  stated  that  in  the  course  of  your
    examination  of  these  files  you  saw  one  record  or  report  which  origi-
    nated in  Moscow.  I  believe  you  mentioned  that  to  me  earlier  this
    morning  for  the  first  time;  did  you  not?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes,  sir.

    Mv.  Tavenner.  You  had  not  testified  about  that  in  your  former
    testimony  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Mr.  Tavenner,  I  didn't  actually  read  the  letter.  I
    simply  took  a  peek  at  it,  and  I  thought  at  the  time,  whoever  this  mili-
    tary person  was  in  Moscow  that  was  reporting  to  the  State  Depart-
    ment, I  wondered  how  he  would  feel  if  he  knew  the  Russians  had  the
    report  back  again.  Being  a  military  man  I  couldn't  quite  understand
    it,  but  I  let  it  pass.    I  thought  it  was  in  perfect  order.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  see  more  than  one  such  report  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  No,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Then  there  was  only  one  document  you  can  recall
    that  originated  in  Moscow?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  only  looked  at  one  document.  They  looked  to  me  as
    if  they  were  all  of  the  same  nature;  they  looked  as  if  they  were  all
    alike.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  the  only  one  you  examined  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  The  only  one  I  was  sure  of.  I  would  rather  stick  to
    the  things  I  know.

    Mr.  Kearney.  I  would  like  to  ask  another  question.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Kearney.

    Mr.  Kearney.  While  I  was  asking  the  previous  questions  I  was
    mulling  over  in  my  own  mind  the  stories  that  have  followed  your
    appearance  on  the  stand,  and  I  would  like,  for  my  own  information
    and  for  the  information  of  the  committee,  a  direct  answer  to  this  ques-
    tion :  Prior  to  your  appearance  on  this  stand  as  a  witness  last  Decem-
    ber, did  you,  directly  or  indirectly,  ever  attempt  to  peddle  your  so-
    called  story  to  any  newspaper  or  periodical?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  never  peddled  the  story.  What  actually  happened
    was,  I  heard  a  radio  broadcast  that  3  ounces  of  uranium  were  missing
    and  that  the  Government  was  looking  for  it.  I  made  the  remark  to
    one  of  my  friends  that  if  they  were  looking  for  uranium  I  could  tell
    them  where  there  were  a  thousand  pounds  of  it.

    This  remark  got  to  [U.  S.  Senator]  Styles  Bridges,  who  sent  word
    to  me  that  he  wanted  to  see  me.  I  spent  over  an  hour  with  him.  He
    said:  "Are  you  certain  you  saw  uranium?"  I  said,  "Yes,  sir."  He
    said,  "Could  you  be  certain  enough  to  testify?"    I  said,  "Yes,  sir."

    1162  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    He  said,  "I  will  think  it  over  a  few  days  and  you  will  hear  from  me."
    That  was  October  4.

    A  few  days  later  Fulton  Lewis  called  and  said  Senator  Bridges
    had  told  him  about  my  remark,  and  Fulton  Lewis  wanted  to  know  if
    I  would  give  him  my  story.  I  said  I  would,  and  he  came  to  New  York.
    I  saw  him  at  the  Sherry-Netherland.  He  called  the  FBI,  and  for
    weeks  I  didn't  hear  anything  but  FBI.  They  came  to  my  house,  to
    my  office,  went  through  my  files,  photostated  my  diary,  and  so  on.  It
    amused  me  to  read  that  the  FBI  had  discredited  my  story,  because
    they  spent  hours  on  end  photostating  everything  I  had.  After  work-
    ing on  it  many  weeks  they  told  Mr.  Lewis  their  investigation  was
    finished,  and  then  Mr.  Lewis  agreed  he  would  make  a  broadcast  of  it.
    But  for  a  couple  weeks  there  were  so  many  FBI  men  in  my  office  that
    the  news  leaked  out,  and  a  public  relations  man  offered  his  services
    to  help  me  get  publicity  out  of  it.  First  he  wanted  to  tip  off  another
    commentator,  and  then  take  me  to  Life.  I  told  him  I  was  not  inter-
    ested, but  he  had  made  an  appointment  at  Life,  unbeknown  to  me,
    and  I  didn't  want  to  disappoint  him.  At  Life  they  discredited  me
    and  said  my  story  was  too  full  of  holes  and  turned  it  down.

    I  had  never  peddled  it.  This  particular  public  relations  man  at-
    tached himself  to  me  and  did  these  two  things.  Inasmuch  as  the  story
    was  turned  down  by  two  firms,  I  went  back  and  rested  until  Mr.  Lewis
    called  me  and  went  on  the  air.

    Immediately  the  story  went  the  rounds  I  was  paid  by  the  Republican
    Party  and  peddling  the  story,  and  all  of  that  is  untrue.

    Mr.  Kearney.  I  think  for  the  purpose  of  the  record  I  will  ask  the
    stenographer  to  read  the  question  I  asked  the  witness  to  have  it
    directly  answered  "Yes"  or  "No."

    Mr.  Jordan.  The  answer  is  "No."

    Mr.  Kearney.  The  answer  is  "No"  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Wood,  Proceed.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  At  the  close  of  the  session  this  morning,  Major
    Jordan,  we  were  talking  about  various  other  materials  that  went  into
    the  manufacture  of  the  atomic  bomb  that  were  shipped  to  Russia  to
    your  knowledge.  How  did  you  first  become  acquainted  with  the  fact
    that  the  materials  we  discussed,  such  as  cadmium,  thorium,  graphite,
    and  aluminum  tubes  were  used  in  the  manufacture  of  the  atomic  bomb  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Well,  I  first  thought  that  I  might  have  had  something
    to  do  with  it  when  President  Truman  announced  the  Russians  had  the
    bomb.  That  was  the  first  point  where  I  was  quite  certain  I  knew
    something.  I  have  been  increasingly  interested  in  the  atomic  bomb
    since  my  testimony,  and  a  few  days  ago  I  saw  a  complete  article  in
    Life  magazine  on  the  atomic  bomb.  This  particular  article  in  Life
    mentions  the  very  things  Colonel  Kotikov  was  assembling.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  It  mentions,  does  it  not,  the  use  of  cadmium  rods,
    aluminum  tubes,  graphite,  and  thorium  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  It  shows  how  they  are  used  in  the  atomic  pile.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Which  issue  of  Life  are  you  referring  to  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  A  recent  issue.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  past  week?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  was  that  the  first  time  the  importance  of  those
    particular  elements  came  to  your  attention  I

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1163

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  had  never  known  about  cadmium  before  I  saw  it  there.
    Mr.  Tavenner.  After  you  read  that  article  in  the  recent  issue  of
    Life,  did  you  then  compile  this  data  regarding  the  shipments  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  simply  looked  it  up,  and  there  it  was,  the  full

    amounts.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  I  should  state  that  on  Jan-
    uary 19  of  this  year  an  investigator  of  our  committee  conferred  with
    an  atomic  scientist  regarding  the  importance  of  cadmium  in  the  manu-
    facture of  the  atomic  bomb,  and  he  was  told  it  was  useful  as  a  neutron
    absorber  in  atomic-energy  work.  He  said  he  believed  this  particular
    item  was  not  available  in  Russia.

    Major  Jordan,  do  you  know  the  name  of  the  assistant  of  Colonel
    Kotikov  at  the  Great  Falls  station?

    Mr.  Jordan.  He  had  about  six  different  assistants.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  one  by  the  name  of  Sergeant  Vino-
    gradsky  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Very  well.     I  have  a  picture  of  him.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  outline  to  the  committee  Sergeant  Vino-
    gradsky's  activities  as  far  as  you  know  them,  in  addition  to  his  normal
    activities  in  the  handling  of  materials  that  went  through  Great  Falls.

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  have  a  suspicion  that,  despite  the  fact  he  was  only  a
    sergeant  and  was  in  the  warehouse  practically  100  percent  of  the  time
    checking  materials,  he  was  reporting  on  Colonel  Kotikov.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Reporting  on  Colonel  Kotikov  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  would  say  so ;  yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  spell  Vinogradsky,  please?  Do  you  know
    the  spelling  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes.     I  have  it  here.     V-i-n-o-g-r-a-d-s-k-y.

    Mr.  Wood.  Reporting  to  whom  on  Colonel  Kotikov  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  There  was  a  certain  Russian  who  went  through  there
    quite  frequently  by  the  name  of  Anisimov,  A.  A.  Anisimov,  A-n-i-s-i-
    m-o-v.  He  was  apparently  what  we  call  a  card-carrying  member.  I
    saw  him  in  Alaska,  Washington,  Newark,  Great  Falls,  and  wherever
    he  went  it  seemed  he  was  gathering  information  on  personnel.  He
    was  chief  of  personnel  of  all  Russians  in  America.  I  was  at  the  Pur-
    chasing Commission  one  day  and  asked  who  was  the  chief,  and  they
    said,  "Rudenko;  or  do  you  mean  Anisimov,  chief  of  personnel?"

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  anything  about  Sergeant  Vinograd-
    sky'a  activities  away  from  Groat  Falls?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  know  only  what  he  told  me.  His  station  was  at  Great
    Falls,  but  for  a  young  sergeant — he  was  a  young  man — he  made  trips
    away  from  Great  Falls,  always  mysterious  trips.  He  told  me  he  went
    to  San  Francisco  and  Portland  and  Newark  and  different  places.  I
    can  only  tell  you  what  he  told  me.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  he  advise  you  of  any  person  he  talked  to  in  San
    Francisco  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  He  didn't  exactly  advise  me,  but  I  knew  the  Russian
    personnel  at  different  places,  and  when  he  would  apply  to  go  to  San
    Francisco  he  would  see  Gregory  Khefitz.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  of  your  own  knowledge  know  anything
    about  Gregory  Khefitz  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  No.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Chairman,  Gregory  Khefitz  was  attached  to  the
    Soviet  consulate  in  San  Francisco  and  has  been  the  subject  of  previous

    1164  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    testimony  in  the  cases  of  Martin  Kamen,  Louise  Bransten,  Hanns
    Eisler,  and  other  known  espionage  agents,  and  has  played  a  role  in
    known  Soviet  espionage  activities.

    Did  you  become  acquainted  with  a  Russian  by  the  name  of  Semen
    Vassilenko  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes,     He  was  the  chemical  expert,

    Mr,  Tavenner,  Will  you  give  the  spelling  of  his  name  ?

    Mr,  Jordan.  S-e-m-e-n  V-a-s-s-i-1-e-n-k-o.     He  departed  from  the

    United  States  February  17,  1944,  in  airplane  No. .     I  will  have  to

    get  that.     He  departed  on  February  17,  1944.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  have  a  note  of  that  departure  date?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes ;  I  have.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  In  your  diary  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes;  I  have.  When  Vassilenko  would  arrive  at  the
    airport  it  would  be  a  signal  for  Colonel  Kotikov  to  pull  out  two  or
    three  folders  on  chemicals  and  walk  down  the  runway  where  there
    were  no  dictographs  and  put  the  folders  on  the  wing  of  an  airplane
    and  talk  with  Vassilenko  an  hour  or  so,  that  is,  if  the  complete  chemical
    plant  had  been  assembled,  Vassilenko  had  three  guards  with  him.  I
    have  the  names  of  the  three  guards.

    Mr.  Ta\T3nner.  Will  you  give  them,  please?

    Mr,  Jordan.  Leonid  Rykoukin;  Engeny  Kojevnitov;  and  Georges
    Nicolaiev.  They  departed,  according  to  my  diary,  on  February  17,
    1944,  with  a  load  of  about  4,000  pounds  of  special  high  priority  diplo-
    matic mail.

    Mr.  TA^^ENNER.  Do  you  know  the  place  of  origin  of  the  mail  on  that
    particular  plane,  or  would  your  records  show  that  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  know  the  plane  came  from  Washington,  D.  C,  be-
    cause Vassilenko  and  his  guards  came  directly  from  the  Purchasing
    Commission  in  Washington.

    Mr.  Tavenner,  I  would  like,  Mr,  Chairman,  to  introduce  in  evidence
    copies  of  documents  handed  us  this  morning  by  Major  Jordan,  and
    return  the  originals  to  him.  The  first  is  a  letter  written  by  Col.  A.
    Kotikov  to  Col.  R.  C.  Rockwell,  Newark,  N.  J.,  bearing  date  July  6,
    1942,  with  pencil  memorandum  attached,  which  I  ask  be  marked
    "Jordan  Exhibit  5."

    Mr.  Wood.  You  are  introducing  copies  ?

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner.  Yes,  sir,

    Mr,  Wood.  That  have  been  made  in  the  committee  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  By  the  reporter.

    Mr,  Wood.  They  will  be  admitted.

    (The  documents  above  referred  to,  marked  "Jordan  Exhibit  5,"  are
    filed  herewith.)  ^'

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  would  like  to  introduce  a  copy  of  letter  written
    by  Alex  Marquis  to  Mr.  Jordan,  dated  December  8,  1949,  and  ask  that
    it  be  marked  "Jordan  Exhibit  6."

    Mr.  Wood.  I  understand  that  was  likewise  copied  by  the  reporter  ?

    Mr,  Tavenner.  Yes,

    Mr.  Wood.  It  will  be  admitted,

    (The  copy  of  letter  above  referred  to,  marked  "Jordan  Exhibit  6,"  is
    filed  herewith, )  ^°

    ^  See  appendix.
    *"  See  appendix.

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1165

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  all  I  desire  to  ask  Mr.  Jordan,  but  I  would
    like  to  have  permission  from  him  to  photostat  the  record  of  shipments
    which  he  has  brought  here  with  him,  together  with  his  diary  and
    notes,  and  return  the  originals  to  him,  if  he  is  willing  for  us  to  do  it.

    Mr.  Jordan.  O.  K.

    Mr.  Wood.  Very  well.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  all.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Nixon.

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  was  wondering  if  it  might  be  possible  to  include  in
    the  record  the  Lend-Lease  memorandum  which  Mr.  Jordan  has  re-
    ferred to,  the  memorandum  in  regard  to  lend-lease  shipments.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  what  I  am  having  photostated.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Mr.  Jordan,  most  of  the  questions  which  I  had  have
    already  been  answered.  One  question  which  still  remains  is  in  regard
    to  your  having  reported  these  matters  to  your  superior  officers  or  to
    other  agencies  who  had  jurisdiction.  The  testimony  to  date  has  been
    that  at  least  two  reports  were  made  by  you  which  have  been  corrobo-
    rated.   You  heard  that  testimony?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Can  you  add  anything  as  to  any  official  reports  that
    you  made  other  than  those  two  times  concerning  these  shipments?
    Before  you  answer  that,  let  me  first  ask  you  this :  The  testimony  was
    that  the  Counter  Intelligence  agent  who  first  interviewed  you  was  re-
    quested by  you  that  you  be  given  an  opportunity  to  elaborate  in  detail
    in  regard  to  the  shipments  to  which  you  had  referred.  Did  Counter
    Intelligence  or  any  other  agency  of  the  Government  ever  approach
    you  after  that  time  and  ask  you  to  make  such  elaborjition  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  The  colonel  of  our  post,  the  colonel  of  Gore  Field,
    was  interviewed  by  a  reporter,  and  he  has  a  statement  in  the  news-
    paper to  the  eti'ect  that  I  had  been  raising  the  devil.  Well,  I  can
    only  say  that  that  meant  I  was  talking  to  everyone  that  I  thought
    might  be  helpful  in  getting  something  done  about  it.  He  remarked
    to  the  reporter  that  the  Capitol  dome  could  have  been  taken  for  all
    Jordan  could  do  about  it.  That  was  one  officer.  Several  other
    officers  have  come  forward  and  have  made  statements  to  indicate
    that  at  that  time  I  must  have  done  a  lot  of  hollering.  One  officer
    said  Jordan  was  always  raising  hell  about  it.  H*is  words  were  that
    he  could  back  me  up  and  knew  I  had  been  making  a  big  hullabaloo
    about  it.  I  will  admit  I  didn't  say  anything  about  uranium,  and
    I  didn't  say  anything  about  State  Department  papers.  I  simply  talked
    about  the  excessive  amount  of  diplomatic  mail  going  uninspected.
    That  seemed  to  be  the  crux  of  my  complaint.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Did  you  know  about  the  atomic  bomb  in  1948  ?

    Mr,  Jordan.  No.  I  didn't  know  about  the  atomic  bomb  until  it
    was  dropped  on  Hiroshima,  and  I  didn't  know  the  Russians  had  it
    until  President  Truman  made  the  announcement.

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  would  say  if  you  had  particularly  singled  out  uranium
    in  1943  your  story  would  be  inherently  incredible.  Your  answer  to
    the  question  whether  your  request  that  you  be  given  opportunity  to
    go  into  detail  in  regard  to  the  shipments  to  which  you  had  referred
    was  granted

    Mr.  Jordan.  The  answer  is  "no."  Mr.  Appell  said  there  was  no
    record  I  went  to  Washington  to  talk  about  it,  yet  I  have  the  official

    1166  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    order  to  go  to  Washington  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  movements
    of  Russian  aircraft  through  Great  Falls.     This  is  my  original  record.

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  ask  that  this  document  be  made  an  exhibit.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  suggest  it  be  marked  "Jordan  exhibit  7."

    Mr.  Wood.  I  don't  care  to  deprive  Major  Jordan  of  the  original,
    but  with  his  permission  I  will  ask  the  reporter  to  copy  it.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Or  he  can  read  it  in  the  record.

    Mr.  Jordan.  It  is  Special  Order  No.  3,  dated  January  4,  1944,
    ordering  Maj.  George  R.  Jordan  to  proceed  by  military  aircraft
    from  Army  Air  Base  at  Great  Falls,  Mont.,  to  Washington,  D.  C,
    for  the  purpose  of  conferring  with  AAF  officials  on  the  movement
    of  Russian  aircraft.

    Mr.  Wood.  Does  that  comply  with  your  suggestion  ?

    Mr.  Kearney.  I  think  the  signature  of  the  officer  issuing  that  order
    should  also  be  made  a  part  of  the  record.

    Mr.  Jordan.  Col.  Russell  L.  Meredith,  commanding  officer  of  the
    air  base.

    I  have  a  note  in  my  diary,  "Washington,  Colonel  Paige's  office,"  and
    he  was  Chief  of  the  International  Office  in  charge  of  Lend-Lease.
    Then  I  have  another  note,  "Saw  General  Jones,"  and  he  was  Chief  Air
    Inspector.  I  si)ecifically  saw  him,  and  saw  Colonel  Wilson  and  Col.
    Vander  Lugt  and  others,  and  that  was  followed  by  an  air  inspector,
    Colonel  Dahm,  arriving  a  few  days  later  at  the  field  to  follow  up  my
    complaint,

    Mr.  Kearney.  What  date  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  January  25.  I  took  him  over  the  base  and  showed
    him  what  I  was  complaining  about,  and  he  was  so  incensed  that  a
    few  days  later  10  air  inspectors  arrived.  They  arrived  on  the  3d
    of  March,  and  one  stayed  there  for  months.  These  10  were  all  from
    the  Air  Inspector  General's  office.  And  I  think  the  security  officer
    of  the  field,  who  was  called  in  to  the  meeting,  is  sitting  back  there.

    Mr.  Kearney.  I  think  for  the  record  not  only  the  day  and  month,
    but  the  year,  should  be  given.

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  went  to  Washington  January  4,  1944.  I  conferred
    with  the  Air  Inspector  General  on  January  8,  1944.  On  January  25,
    1944,  the  first  air  inspector  arrived  at  the  field,  and  on  March  3,  1944,
    10  other  air  inspectors  arrived.

    Mr.  Nixon.  I  don't  feel  it  is  necessary  to  pursue  that  point  any
    further.  I  think  from  the  corroboration  produced  and  the  testimony
    just  presented,  it  is  at  least  clear  that  Mr.  Jordan  made  a  number  of
    attempts  to  bring  this  information  to  the  attention  of  Government
    officials.

    Mr.  Jordan.  At  the  same  time  I  made  that  trip  to  Washington,
    Colonel  Kotikov  asked  to  go  along,  and  he  asked  me  how  to  get  to  630
    Fifth  Avenue,  New  York,  which  happens  to  be  the  address  of  some-
    body you  know.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Who  is  it  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  The  man  he  wanted  to  see  is  merely  a  conclusion  on
    my  part,  but  he  wanted  to  go  to  630  Fifth  Avenue,  and  I  understand
    that  is  the  address  of  Mr.  Boris  Pregel,  the  man  who  shipped  the
    uranium.  So  I  am  taking  it  for  granted  his  anxiety  to  go  to  that
    address  was  to  see  that  man.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Your  testimony  is  not  in  regard  to  Pregel  specifically,
    but  that  he  was  at  that  address  ?

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1167

    Mr.  Jordan.  Colonel  Kotikov  asked  how  to  get  to  630  Fifth  Avenue.

    Mr.  Nixon.  How  do  you  remember  that  specific  address?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  knew  it  was  Rockefeller  Center,  and  I  told  him  while
    he  was  there  he  ought  to  go  to  the  top  and  see  the  city.  He  had  never
    been  in  New  York  before  and  I  was  telling  him  how  to  do  some
    sightseeing.

    Mr.  Wood.  Any  other  questions  ?

    Mr.  Nixon.  Yes.  The  issue  raised  as  to  the  memorandum  in  your
    diary  or  on  this  slip  of  paper  you  presented  to  the  committee — and
    I  understand  the  contents  of  that  paper  will  appear  in  this  record — is
    on  the  use  of  the  initials  "H.  H."  and  what  appeared  thereafter  in
    the  memorandum,  and  it  appears  that  issue  cannot  be  determined
    because,  assuming  the  initials  ''H.  H."  refer  to  Mr,  Hopkins,  the  com-
    mittee has  not  as  yet  been  able  to  establish  corroborative  evidence  to
    sustain  your  testimony  on  that  point.^^  On  the  other  hand,  the  com-
    mittee has  not  been  able  to  obtain  conclusive  evidence  that  you  are
    incorrect  in  what  you  say.  I  think,  however,  that  a  fair  appraisal  of
    the  testimony  is  that  on  that  point,  at  least  at  this  stage,  a  question
    certainly  has  arisen  as  to  whether  it  would  have  been  possible,  (1)  that
    Mr.  Hopkins  could  have  had  anything  to  do  with  such  shipments;
    and  (2)  if  it  were  possible,  whether  he  actually  did.

    I  wonder  if  there  is  anything  you  would  like  to  add  to  the  record,
    in  addition  to  your  previous  testimony,  in  regard  to  your  contention
    that  Mr.  Hopkins  did  call  you  or  that  you  called  him  in  regard  to
    these  shipments  of  uranium,  specifically?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  took  it  for  granted,  when  I  was  here  before,  that
    my  testimony  about  Mr.  Hopkins  would  be  accepted,  and  I  didn't
    bring  out  a  number  of  points  that  I  knew  and  that  could  have  gone
    along  with  it.

    In  the  first  place,  we  had  so  much  communication,  through  the
    Russians,  with  Mr.  Hopkins  that  we  took  it  for  granted.  I  would
    like  to  take  a  second  to  tell  you  that  when  I  was  at  Newark  as  acting
    executive  officer  and  the  Russian  colonel  was  new,  an  American  Air-
    lines pilot  bumped  into  a  Russian  plane,  causing  a  slight  amount  of
    damage,  and  immediately  six  Russians  came  storming  in  my  office
    and  wanted  to  know  if  I  would  punish  the  pilot;  they  seemed  to  think
    I  should  shoot  him.  I  said  we  didn't  do  that.  Then  they  wanted  to
    banish  the  air  line  from  the  airport.  I  said  I  wouldn't  do  that.  They
    said,  "Then  we  will  call  Mr.  Hopkins."

    They  called  Mr.  Hopkins  and  told  him  this  American  Airlines  pilot
    had  damaged  a  Russian  A-20  plane  and  they  wanted  something  done
    immediately  about  it.

    Much  to  my  surprise,  CAA  phoned  a  few  days  later  and  banished
    all  commercial  air  lines  from  the  airport.

    Naturally,  when  something  like  that  happens,  I  was  terribly  im-
    pressed. One  of  the  remaining  officers  on  that  field  who  was  asked
    about  these  particular  incidents  made  the  remark  that  the  Russians
    were  in  constant  communication  with  Hopkins,  and  he  said  the  Rus-
    sians talked  about  it.  I  will  show  you  his  exact  words.  He  was  my
    superior  officer.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Wliat  is  his  name  ?

    "  See  appendix.

    Mr.  Jordan.  Col.  Roy  B.  Gardner.     He  said :

    Every  time  the  Russians  were  dissatisfied  with  the  way  things  were  going,
    which  'was  frequently,  they  would  get  on  the  telephone  with  their  Embassy  in
    Washington  and  have  them  contact  Mr.  Harry  Hopliins,  and  all  difficulties  would
    be  straightened  out  immediately.

    I  asked  Colonel  Gardner  how  he  knew  Mr.  Hopkins  did  the  job.
    He  said  it  was  common  information ;  the  Russians  referred  to  it  and
    so  did  everybod}^  else,  and  it  was  common  routine  information.

    Another  major  on  the  field  who  was  questioned  about  my  story
    remarked  that  at  one  time  there  were  some  very  difficult  parts  that
    the  factory  hadn't  even  made  yet,  and  the  Russians  said,  "We  will
    get  them  from  Mr.  Hopkins."  So  they  put  in  a  call,  and  his  exact
    words  were:

    I  can  recall  that  on  many  occasions —

    this  is  Major  Starkey,  engineer  officer  of  the  Army  air  base —

    when  we  were  short  of  parts  or  had  some  difference  with  Col.  Kotikov,  Col.
    Kotikov  would  place  a  phone  call  to  Washington  and  before  very  long  Major
    Jordan  would  get  a  telephone  call  back  and  the  work  would  be  done.  Major
    Jordan  mentioned  Harry  Hopkins'  name  quiti-  often,  because  Hopkins  was  Ad-
    ministrator of  Lend-Lease  at  that  time,  and  I  can  recall  one  instance  when  we
    were  extremely  short  of  airplane  parts  of  one  sort  and  Col.  Kotikov  called  on
    the  telephone  and  in  a  matter  of  a  few  days  we  had  a  good  supply.  It  was  re-
    markable in  view  of  the  fact  we  had  been  repeatedly  told  by  Wright  Field  the
    parts  had  not  yet  been  made.

    Mr.  Nixon.  At  this  point  I  think  it  is  well  to  differentiate  Mr.
    Hopkins"  position  as  Lend-Lease  Administrator  in  the  expediting  of
    normal  shipments,  and  the  testimony  in  issue,  in  order  to  get  the
    proper  peispective.  What  you  have  testified  to  up  to  this  point  is
    that  Mr.  Hopkins  was  called  upon  from  time  to  time  to  expedite  cer-
    tain shipments,  and  that  he  proceeded  to  take  action  wiiicii  resulted  in
    expediting  the  shipments.  It  would  seem  from  the  fact  he  was  the
    Lend-Lease  Administrator  and  had  that  responsibility,  that  nobody
    should  be  particularly  surprised  that  that  occurred.

    Mr.  Jordan.  Not  at  all.  We  were  very  glad  we  had  a  button  we
    ccu]d  press  and  get  things  done.

    Mr.  NixoN.  You  yourself  were  interested,  as  you  have  testified,  in
    getting  the  shipments  expedited,  and  the  fact  Mr.  Hopkins  was  called
    upon  was  not  surprising'^

    Mr.  Jordan.  No.

    Mr.  NixoN.  The  point  at  issue  is  whether  or  not  Mr.  Hopkins  also
    expedited  the  shipments  of  uranium.  On  thnt  point  considerable
    question  has  arisen  on  two  scores,  first,  as  to  tiie  date.  You  have  cor-
    rected your  testimony  as  to  the  date,  so  that  the  objection  that  has
    been  previously  raisinl  that  Mr.  Hopkins  could  not  have  had  a  con-
    versation with  you  because  he  was  in  the  hospital  in  19-14  no  longer
    applies,  assuming  that  your  recollection  is  correct  as  presently  stated.

    And  another  point  that  has  been  raised,  I  understand,  by  those  who
    are  quite  familiar  with  Mr.  Hopkins'  papers  and  his  records,  is  that
    he  could  not  have  specifically  expedited  a  shipment  of  uranium  or
    knowingly  done  so  because  he  individually  had  nothing  to  do  with
    and  knew  nothing  about  the  atomic  project.  Do  you  have  any  com-
    ment on  that  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  am  burning  up  on  that.  That  is  a  point  I  don't  feel
    very  happy  about,  because  I  have  a  copy  of  Newsweek  dated  Decem-
    ber 19

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1169

    Mr.  Nixon.  What  year?

    Mr.  Jordan.  1949,  which  was  a  week  after  I  was  here,  in  which  they
    have  a  paragraph  which  has  caused  me  a  great  deal  of  discomfort.
    It  says :

    Moreover,  according  to  Sidney  Ilyman,  who  organized  Hopkins's  papers  for
    Robert  Sherwood,  author  of  "Roosevc^lt  and  Hopkins,"'  F.  D.  K.'s  confidant  didn't
    have  the  faintest  understanding  of  the  Manhattan  Project  until  he  read  about
    the  A-bomb  being  dropped  on  Hirosliima.  Hynian  said:  "He  didn't  know  the
    difference  between  uranium  and  geranium."  It  wasn't  until  weeks  later  that
    Hopkins  talked  with  several  of  the  atomic  scientists  and  learned  about  "the
    engineering  feat  of  production."

    Well.  I  bought  myself  a  copy  of  Eobert  E.  Sherwood's  book  when  I
    was  here,  and  there  is  an  item  on  page  154:  I  would  like  permission  to
    read :

    Bush  had  no  quick  access  to  anyone  on  the  higher  levels  of  government,  but
    he  knew  that  the  man  to  see  en  route  to  Roosevelt  was  Harry  Hopkins  and
    he  accordingly  went  to  him  with  his  plan  for  a  National  Defense  Research
    Council.  Hopkins  was  already  interested  in  the  subject,  for  the  Bureau  of
    Standards  of  the  Commerce  Department  was  engaged  in  research,  and  through
    the  Bureau  of  Patents  he  had  received  a  suggestion  along  somewhat  similar
    lines.     *     *     *

    Then  it  tells  how  the  atom  bomb  was  conceived  by  Bush,  taken  to
    Hopkins,  Hopkins  took  it  to  Roosevelt,  and  it  says :

    Subsequently  Bush,  in  consultation  with  Hopkins,  drafted  a  letter  to  himself
    for  the  President's  signature.  That  letter,  with  a  few  additions  which  provided
    for  close  cooperation  between  N.  D.  R.  C.  and  the  military  authorities,  was
    signed  by  Roosevelt  on  June  15,  the  day  after  the  fall  of  Paris     *     *     *.

    Then  over  a  little  further,  on  page  704,  it  says  :

    It  will  be  noted  that  Churchill  was  conducting  this  correspondence  on  the
    atomic  project  with  Hopkins  rather  than  with  the  President  and  he  continued
    to  do  so  for  many  months  thereafter.

    Mr.  Kearney.  That  date  of  June  15  is  Avhat  year?

    Mr.  Jordan.  1941,  at  the  start  of  the  atomic  project.  That  was  be-
    fore Manhattan  project  was  even  thought  of.  And  in  1943,  when
    Churchill  was  ill,  he  conducted  his  correspondence  on  the  atomic  proj-
    ect with  Hopkins,  and  it  tells  how  Hopkins  called  all  the  scientists
    together  to  get  the  most  recent  report.  And  it  is  the  man  who  wrote
    this  book  that  says  Hopkins  didn't  know  uranium  from  geranium.

    Mr.  Nixon.  You  mean  Hyman  wrote  the  book?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Pie  organized  the  papers,  and  after  Hopkins'  death  he
    took  the  papers  to  Robert  Sherwood  and  Sherwood  finished  the  book.

    Mr.  NixoN.  Do  you  have  anything  else  to  add?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  am  very  unhappy  about  this  "H.  H."  and  "H.  L.  H."
    business,  because  I  worked  under  difficulty  out  there,  and  it  was  very
    cold  when  I  made  these  notes.  It  must  have  been  15  or  20  degrees  below
    zero.  I  had  a  flashlight  in  my  overcoat  pocket  and  a  little  light  in  the
    top  of  the  plane,  and  it  was  difficult  to  see  what  was  in  the  folders.  The
    only  reason  I  particularly  noticed  this  memorandum,  I  was  impressed
    because  it  was  on  White  House  stationery.  I  had  never  seen  White
    House  stationery  before,  and  I  wondered  why  it  didn't  have  "D.  C."  on
    it.  I  own  some  property  in  the  State  of  Washington,  and  this  just
    said  "The  White  House,  Washington,"  and  I  started  to  put  it  back  in
    the  folder  and  I  noticed  it  said,  "Had  a  hell  of  a  time  getting  these
    away  from  Groves."

    99334 — 50 18

    11 70  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    I  thought,  "This  is  important,  on  that  piece  of  stationery,  and  I  will
    make  a  note  of  it."

    And  this  very  comiiiiUee,  Mr.  Chairman,  has  been  misquoting  my
    testimony.  I  never  have  said  in  my  testimony,  "I  had  a  hell  of  a  time
    getting  these  away  from  Groves."  I  said,  "Had  a  hell  of  a  time
    *  *  *"  And  one  of  the  members  of  this  committee  asked  General
    Groves  the  question,  "It  has  been  testified  by  Jordan  that  he  said  'I  had
    a  hell  of  a  time  getting  these  away  from  Groves,'  "  and  naturally
    Groves  said  Hopkins  never  placed  pressure  on  him.  I  never  used  the
    work  "I"  and  this  committee  has  been  using  the  "I"  and  it  never  was
    in  my  original  testimony.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Is  it  in  your  notes  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  No.  My  notes  say  "Had."  So  that  particular  point  of
    whether  Hopkins  put  pressure  on  General  Groves  has  been  a  very
    difficult  point  for  me  to  overcome,  with  the  press  taking  the  small
    point  and  building  it  up.

    Mr.  Nixon.  As  I  understand  it,  your  testimony  on  this  point  is  that
    you  saw  a  piece  of  White  House  stationery  with  this  notation  on  it  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes.

    Mr.  Nixon.  Which  said :  "Had  a  hell  of  a  time  getting  these  away
    from  Groves."

    Mr.  Jordan.  Tlie  second  sheet  is  where  I  saw  that,  and  copied  it.

    Mr.  Nixon.  And  second,  you  recall  a  telephone  conversation  al-
    legedly held  between  Colonel  Kotikov  and  somebody  who  is  supposed
    to  have  been  Mr.  Hopkins  in  Washington  concerning  the  expediting  of
    one  shipment  of  uranium,  and  as  far  as  indicating  any  particular  in-
    dividual putting  pressure  on  General  Groves  is  concerned,  you  have  no
    testimony  on  that  point:  these  are  just  the  facts  you  are  testifying  to?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  am  only  testifying  to  the  things  I  know  of.  For  the
    benefit  of  you  gentlemen  who  were  not  here  before,  I  want  to  explain
    I  didn't  want  Colonel  Kotikov  making  telephone  calls  on  my  telephone,
    because  he  would  stay  on  the  telephone  a  half  hour  or  an  hour  at  a
    time,  so  I  used  to  tell  the  telephone  operator,  "If  any  Russians  want
    to  make  a  telephone  call,  tell  them  Major  Jordan  must  make  the  call."
    So  when  Kotikov  wanted  to  get  his  Embassy,  he  would  say,  "Get  my
    Embassy,"  and  I  would  pick  up  the  telephone  and  call  collect,  which
    was  the  point  I  was  interested  in,  and  get  the  Michigan  number,  and
    he  would  speak  in  Russian,  and  he  would  switch  many  times,  sometimes
    20  or  30,  and  talk  about  different  subjects ;  and  sometimes  he  would  lay
    the  receiver  down  and  be  gone  15  or  20  minutes  to  look  up  a  certain
    part,  and  I  would  get  on  the  phone  and  ask  for  Colonel  Tavetkov  or
    somebody  else  and  talk  about  another  matter  until  Kotikov  came
    back.

    This  particular  morning  he  had  his  files  out  on  chemical  plants  and
    was  running  his  finger  down  and  came  to  various  shipments  that  had
    to  be  expedited.  I  used  to  sometimes  lean  over  his  shoulders  and  help
    him  turn  the  pages.  This  particular  morning  he  said :  "Have  we  room
    for  a  thousand  pounds?"  I  said:  "No.  We  have  about  a  million
    pounds'  backlog  now."    He  said :  "I  will  make  a  connection  for  you."

    For  a  moment  or  two  I  think  I  talked  to  Piskounov,  and  then  a  voice
    came  on  the  wire,  "Are  you  my  expediter  out  there?"  and  I  said,  "Yes,"
    and  he  said,  "This  is  Mr.  Hopkins  speaking."    I  was  naturally  very

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1171

    respectful,  and  he  said :  "I  want  you  to  expedite  a  certain  shipment
    that  is  going  through."

    Then  he  must  have  turned  and  spoken  to  somebody,  because  I  could
    hear  him  say,  "How  will  he  know  the  shipment  when  he  sees  it?"  as
    if  he  was  speaking  on  the  side  to  someone.  I  waited  and  then  he  came
    back  on  and  said :  "Jordan,  Colonel  Kotikov  will  designate  that  ship-
    ment to  you.  He  will  point  out  which  shipment  he  wants  expedited,
    but  you  expedite  it."

    Then  he  said :  "I  want  you  to  keep  this  off  the  record  and  don't  dis-
    cuss it  with  anybody.     This  is  something  very  special."

    He  asked  me  a  question :  "Did  you  get  the  pilots  I  sent  you?"  We
    had  been  screaming  our  heads  off  for  pilots,  and  only  Mr.  Hopkins
    could  get  them,  and  I  said  "Yes,"  we  had,  and  thanked  him.

    Then  somebody  was  talking  Russian  and  I  handed  the  phone  back
    to  Kotikov.

    Generally  speaking,  I  know  that  was  what  was  said,  and  when  the
    box  arrived,  it  was  uranium.

    Mr.  Nixon.  That  concludes  your  statement  on  the  Hopkins  matter
    as  far  as  you  want  to  elaborate  at  this  time  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Nixon.  That  is  all  I  have.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Velde.

    Mr.  Velde.  I  have  nothing,  except  I  want  to  express  appreciation
    for  your  holding  this  investigation  and  second  hearing.  It  is  unfor-
    tunate we  of  the  minority  were  not  here  at  the  first  hearing,  and  it  is
    also  unfortunate  certain  defamatory  remarks  were  put  in  the  news-
    papers and  over  the  air  regarding  Major  Jordan's  testimony,  and  I
    think  it  has  done  a  great  deal  of  harm  to  this  committee  in  getting
    witnesses  to  appear.  I  am  sure  witnesses  will  not  appear  voluntarily
    and  answer  questions  unless  we  give  credence  to  the  statements  they
    make,  and  I  am  particularly  glad  of  the  opportunity  we  had  to  have
    this  second  hearing.

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Kearney.

    Mr.  Kjearney.  One  point  in  my  own  mind  I  want  to  clear  up  is  on
    your  recent  testimony  concerning  these  telephone  calls.  Where  were
    these  calls  j^laced  to?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Our  desks  were  alongside  of  each  other.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Where  in  Washington  were  they  placed?

    Mr.  Jordan.  The  Russian  Purchasing  Commission  or  the  Russian
    Embassy.

    Mr.  Kearney.  And  at  the  time  you  referred  to,  if  that  was  so,  Mr.
    Hopkins  would  have  been  in  the  Russian  Purchasing  Commission  or
    Embassy  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Not  necessarily.  Someone  could  have  called  him
    through  the  switchboard  at  the  Embassy  and  he  could  have  been
    talking  from  the  White  House  or  anywhere  he  might  have  been  and
    the  operator  could  have  made  a  conference  call.

    Mr.  Kearney.  You  don't  mean  to  imply  Mr.  Hopkins  was  at  the
    Russian  Embassy  ?

    Mr.  Jordan,  No.  I  saw  headlines  that  I  got  very  chummy  with
    Mr.  Hopkins  and« talked  frequently  with  him.    I  never  met  the  man.

    117z  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    I  have  no  reason  for  saying  anything  that  didn't  happen.  I  only-
    tried  to  be  helpful  and  give  you  information  because  I  thought  it  was
    my  duty  to  do  it.

    Mr.  Wood.  Any  furthere  questions?

    Mr.  Tavennek.  Yes.  In  referring  to  the  Hopkins  note  as  you  have
    described  it,  you  said  there  were  two  pages,  and  what  you  saw  written
    and  have  testified  to  was  on  the  second  page  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes,  sir.

    ]Mr.  Taatennek.  1  don't  believe  you  have  ever  told  us  what  was  on
    the  first  page,  if  anything.

    Mr.  Jordan.  Mi-.  Tavenner,  it  happened  7  years  ago.  I  can  only
    say  I  was  looking  at  the  first  page  at  the  White  House  stationery,  and
    flipped  it  over  to  see  who  signed  it,  and  after  I  saw  it  was  in  long-
    hand I  thought  it  would  be  a  good  idea  to  copy  "Had  a  hell  of  a
    time  *  *  *."  Tlie  word  before  "Had"  is  not  clear  in  my  mind.
    I  believe  it  was  some  name.  I  can't  swear  to  that,  lie  was  not  a
    good  writer.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  It  was  written  in  longhand,  and  you  believe  now
    there  was  som.e  name  placed  before  the  word  "Had"?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  believe  if  it  had  been  anything  else  I  could  have
    read,  I  am  quite  sure  I  would  have  made  a  note  of  it.  I  decided  to
    take  the  tail  end  of  it,  that  was  all.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Were  both  pages  on  the  letterhead  of  the  White
    House  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  No.  The  first  paije  was  "Wliite  House  stationery,  and
    I  believe  the  second  was  second-sheet.

    I^Ir.  Tavenner.  Was  there  a  letter  written  on  the  first  sheet?

    Mr.  Jordan.  It  was  in  longhand;  the  entire  front  sheet  and  about
    one-third  of  the  second  sheet.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  So  it  was  a  continuous  letter  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Of  two  pages?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Yes;  and  I  think  behind  the  last  sheet  there  were  a
    couple  of  typewritten  letters,  and  then  there  was  a  map  which  I
    telescoped  out  and  turned  it  around  to  read  upside  down  what  was  on
    it,  and  I  took  my  notes  off  the  map.

    (Representative  Nixon,  leaves  hearing  room.)

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  have  testified  fully  to  that.  Were  the  two
    pages  of  this  letter  clipped  together  in  any  manner?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  think  they  were  clipped  to  the  next  couple  of  sheets
    and  the  map.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  noticed  this  very  unusual  language  about  the
    getting  of  these  matters  from  Groves.

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  didn't  know  who  Groves  was.

    Mr.  TA^T.NNER.  But  if  it  was  important  enough  for  you  to  write
    down  that  part  of  the  letter,  didn't  you  look  at  the  rest  of  the  letter
    to  see  what  it  was  about  ?  Don't  you  think  you  would  have  looked  at
    the  rest  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  I  think  I  must  have,  but  I  don't  remember  what  it  said.

    Mr.  Taa^nner.  You  don't  remember  anything  about  the  contents  of
    the  rest  of  the  letter  ?  »

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1173

    ~Mv.  JoEDAi^,  Except  for  the  notation  I  have;  that  is  all.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  do  not  believe  we  have  put  in  as  a  part  of  the
    record  your  original  notes.  We  would  like  to  have  that  photostated
    also  and  put  in.

    Mr.  Jordan.  Which  notes?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  memorandum  that  you  took  at  the  time.

    Mr.  Wood.  Major,  do  you  object  to  the  committee  having  that  sheet
    of  paper  photostated  and  return  the  original  to  you  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  No  objection  at  all.

    Mr.  Wood.  Very  well.     It  will  be  done,

    Mr.  Tavenner.  No  further  questions.

    Mr.  Wood.  Is  there  any  additional  statement  you  desire  to  make  in
    connection  with  this  hearing  that  you  think  w^ould  be  beneficial  to
    this  committee  in  its  endeavor  to  carry  out  the  function  the  committee
    was  set  up  to  do  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  There  has  been  a  soldier  that  came  forward  and  made
    a  statement  about  finding  four  dead  Eussians  in  a  plane  in  Alaska,
    and  he  mentioned  that  when  he  discovered  this  wrecked  plane  with  four
    dead  Russians  he  found  blacl^c  suitcases  similar  to  the  ones  I  desci'ibed,
    and  he  mentioned  he  found  maps  of  the  Alaska  defense  areas.  I  just
    want  to  make  certain  that  the  committee  hooks  that  up  with  my  testi-
    mony, because  it  happened  in  1942,  and  if  he  had  that  happen  to  him
    in  December  1942,  it  should  show  this  committee  that  the  suitcases  were
    going  through  before  I  got  there  in  1943.  His  statement  was  that
    "We  started  looking  around  for  souvenirs"

    Mr.  Wood.  Do  you  know  who  made  that  statement  ?

    Mr.  Jordan.  Henry  J.  Cauthen  of  company  G,  Fourth  Infantry
    Regiment,  Nome,  Alaska.

    Upon  seeing  some  black  suitcases  lying  on  the  ground  we  decided  to  open  them
    lip.  Two  of  the  suitcases  had  been  partially  destroyed  and  were  of  no  value,
    but  three  or  four  were  lying  on  the  ground  and  I  opened  one.  These  suitcases
    were  black,  very  cheaply  made,  and  had  straps  that  were  very  light  because  they
    had  both  been  opened  up.  When  we  opened  it  the  first  thing  we  saw  was  a  map,
    and  we  found  they  had  blueprints  on  the  bottom.  We  didn't  disturb  the  blue-
    prints but  we  did  look  at  the  map.  This  was  an  American  engineer  map  made
    for  the  Air  Corps  and  showed  our  defense  area  around  the  Nome  air  base.  The
    map  was  in  English  but  had  writing  in  Russian  and  showed  all  our  defense
    areas.     A  couple  Russians  came  from  Nome  and  took  the  suitcases  away  from  us.

    There  has  been  a  lot  of  talk  about  my  story  being  a  trumped-up
    story,  and  I  wanted  this  to  go  in  to  show  the  suitcases  were  going
    through  long  before  I  got  to  Great  Falls.

    I  want  to  add  there  was  a  Colonel  Shumonsky,  Stanilaus  Shumon-
    sky,  who  came  in  a  C^7  and  he  absolutely  demanded  that  I  not  look
    at  the  plane,  and  I  insisted.  Finally  I  had  to  ground  the  plane.  I
    told  him  he  would  never  get  off  the  ground  until  I  saw  wdiat  w^as  in
    the  plane.

    He  finally  opened  the  door  and  the  entire  plane  was  loaded  with
    films,  canisters  of  films,  and  they  were  tied  down  with  a  passageway
    down  the  center  for  the  pilot.  I  opened  one  film  and  held  it  to  the
    light  and  it  showed  technical  cams  and  gears,  very  technical,  and  in-
    tricate technical  processes.  One  canister  showed  automobile  tops
    being  stamped  out  like  doughnuts.     I  went  through  canister  after

    1174  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    canister  and  it  was  the  technical  know-how  of  this  country  sluicing
    through,  and  I  didn't  see  what  it  had  to  do  with  the  war  effort.

    Mr.  Wood.  Permit  me  to  express  to  you  the  appreciation  of  this
    committee  for  your  willingness  to  come  back  here  and  afford  the  other
    members  of  the  committee,  not  here  at  the  first  hearing,  an  opportunity
    to  examine  you.  We  hope  it  has  not  caused  you  too  much  incon-
    venience.

    Anything  further?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  all.

    Mr.  Wood.  The  committee  will  stand  adjourned.

    (Thereupon,  at  4 :  30  p.  m.  Friday,  March  3, 1950,  the  committee  ad-
    journed.)

    HEARINGS  EEGAEDING  SHIPMENTS  OF  ATOMIC  MATERIAL
    TO  THE  SOVIET  UNION  DURING  WORLD  WAR  II

    TUESDAY,   MARCH  7,   1950

    United  States  House  of  Representatia'es,

    Subcommittee  of  the
    Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,

    Washington^  JD.  C.

    PUBLIC  HEARING

    The  subcommittee  met,  pursuant  to  call,  at  10 :  45  a.  m.,  in  room  226,
    Old  House  Office  Building,  Wasliington,  D.  C,  Hon.  Francis  E.
    Walter  presiding.

    Committee  members  present:  Representatives  Francis  E.  Walter
    and  Bernard  W.  Kearney.

    Staff  members  present :  Frank  S.  Tavenner,  Jr.,  counsel ;  Louis  J.
    Russell,  senior  investigator ;  Donald  T.  Appell,  investigator ;  John  W.
    Carringlon,  clerk;  Benjamin  Mandel,  director  of  research;  and  A.  S.
    Poore,  editor.

    Mr.  Walter.  Let  us  have  order,  please.

    Let  the  record  disclose  that  this  hearing  is  being  conducted  by  a
    subcommittee  designated  by  the  chairman,  composed  of  Messrs.  Wood,
    Kearney,  and  Walter,  and  that  Messrs.  Kearney  and  Walter  are  pres-
    ent, a  quorum.

    Mr.  Kravchenko,  will  you  raise  your  right  hand.  Do  you  swear  the
    testimony  you  are  about  to  give  shall  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and
    nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  do.

    Mr.  Walter.  And  will  you  [indicating  Mr.  Wolin]  arise,  please.
    Do  you  swear  the  translation  that  you  will  make  of  the  testnnony
    given  by  Mr.  Kravchenko  shall  be  a  true  and  accurate  translation  of
    what  he  says  ?

    Mr.  WoLiN.  I  do.

    TESTIMONY  OF  VICTOR  A.  KRAVCHENKO  (ACCOMPANIED  BY
    SIMON  WOLIN,  INTERPRETER)

    Mr.  Tavenner.  If  the  Chairman  please,  I  would  like  to  qualify
    first  the  interpreter,  before  asking  questions  of  Mr.  Kravchenko.
    Your  name  is  Mr,  Wolin  ?
    Mr.  WoLiN.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  state  your  full  name  ?
    Mr.  WoLiN.  Simon  Wolin.
    Mr.  Tavenner.  How  are  you  employed  ?
    Mr.  Wolin.  I  am  a  free  lance  research  worker.

    1175

    1176  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    Mr.  Taveistner.  Will  you  state  that  again  ?

    Mr.  WoLiN.  I  am  a  free  lance  research  worker.

    Mr.  Tavexxer.  What  has  been  j^our  experience  with  the  Russian
    language  ?

    Mr.  WoLix.  I  was  born  in  Russia  and  graduated  from  the  faculty
    of  law,  of  a  Russian  university.  Here  in  this  country  I  was  statf
    translator  in  New  York  for  a  weekly  magazine,  and  a  small  book
    translated  b}^  me  was  published  in  New  York  in  1948.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  positions  have  you  held  in  New  York?

    Mr.  WoLiN.  I  was  mostly  a  free  lance  researcher.  I  was  assistant
    editor  of  that  weekly  magazine  I  was  speaking  of  in  New  York,  the
    New  Leader.  Last  year  I  was  engaged  in  a  Government  research
    project.

    Mr.  Tavexner.  Are  you  a  naturalized  American  citizen?

    Mr.  WoLiN.  Yes,  sir.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Kravchenko,  will  you  state  your  full  name,
    please  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Victor  A.  Kravchenko.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  When  and  where  were  you  born?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  was  born  in  Dnepropetrovsk,  Russia,  in  1905.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  have  an  interpreter  present,  but  you  speak
    English  very  well  and  I  trust  that  you  will  answer  directly  such  ques-
    tions as  you  feel  you  can.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  will  try.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  call  on  the  interpreter  as  little  as  possible.  I
    believe  you  have  a  statement  that  you  desire  to  make?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes;  I  do.

    JMr.  WoLiN.  May  I  read  it,  in  order  to  have  it  clear?

    Mr.  TA^T.NNER.  Yes.

    (Thereupon  the  following  statement  of  Mr.  Kravchenko  was  read  by
    Mr.  Wolin:)

    Mr.  Chairman,  gentlemen,  prior  to  testifying  before  your  committee,  I  consider
    it  my  duty  to  make  tlie  following  statement :

    When  I  testified  before  this  committee  once  before,  some  persons  criticized
    me  severely  and  accused  me  of  serving  the  purposes  of  the  Republican  Party.
    I  desire  to  make  my  position  as  a  witness  before  the  committee  unmistakably
    •clear.

    .  I  have  been  invited  to  come  here,  and  I  am  glad  to  testify.  But  I  do  not
    wish  my  testimony  to  be  regarded  or  used  in  any  way  as  a  statement  for  partisan
    political  piu-poses.

    I  am  sure  that  you,  gentlemen,  will  agree  with  me  on  that,  in  these  diflScult
    times,  important  though  party  interests  may  be,  they  must  needs  take  second
    place.  It  must  surely  be  the  opinion  of  evei-y  patriotic  American,  be  he  Repub-
    lican or  Democrat,  that  our  main  concern  is  the  security  of  America,  which
    has  now  become  my  home.

    It  seems  to  me  that  it  is  not  right  to  discredit  today  those  who  in  the  past
    have  acted  in  accordance  with  the  policies  of  the  time  in  which  they  lived,  and
    who  scrupulously  fulfilled  agreements  made  with  the  Soviet  Union  when  it  was
    a  military  ally  of  the  United  States.

    Now,  gentlemen,  the  relations  between  these  two  countries  have  radically
    changed — not  through  any  fault  of  the  United  States,  but  through  the  fault  of
    the  Soviet  Union — or,  to  put  it  more  correctly,  through  the  double-faced  and
    dangerous  Soviet  policy  which  the  Politburo  concealed  during  the  war,  both
    from  the  people  of  Russia  and  from  its  ally,  America.

    This  was  revealed  only  later,  creating  the  threatening  situation  which  exists
    today.

    This  is  no  surprise  to  me  personally.  In  the  past  I  have  written  and  spoken
    •often  enough  to  my  American  friends  about  it.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1177

    The  Soviet  Government  has  legalized  the  system  of  espionage  on  its  own
    citizenry  within  its  own  country.  This  espionage  is  conducted  on  a  tremendous
    scale.

    AVhy  should  we  think  that  in  America,  England,  or  France  the  Soviet  Gov-
    ernment does  not  carry  on  the  most  active  espionage  for  the  fvirtherance  of  its
    military,  political,  and  police  aims  to  the  extent  w^hich  our  easy-going  attitude
    and  our  lack  of  understanding  of  the  core  of  Soviet  policy  permit?

    We  make  a  fatal  mistake  in  not  grasping  this.

    Soviet  diplomacy  is  iiulivisible  from  the  espionage  activities  of  the  Kremlin
    abroad.  Every  Soviet  diplomat,  whether  he  be  Malik  in  the  United  Nations,
    Panyushkin  in  Washington,  or  their  colleagues  in  Paris  or  London,  has  gone
    through  extensive  training  along  these  lines,  and  has  had  wide  experience.

    Espionage  is  one  of  the  principal  duties  connected  with  their  ofl&cial  diplomatic
    work.  I  feel  that  I  cannot  repeat  too  often  that  every  Soviet  representative —
    diplomatic,  military,  or  economic — is  a  potential  spy.  We  can  and  must  only
    consider  them  as  such.

    It  would  be  erroneous  to  judge  their  activities  by  their  oflBcial  actions.  What
    should  interest  us  are  the  actions  which  they  perform  behind  the  curtain  of
    their  oflBcial  capacity,  their  attempts  to  ferret  out  the  secrets  of  those  countries
    to  which  they  are  the  accredited  i*epreseutatives.

    We  must  regard  the  representatives  of  the  countries  belonging  to  the  Soviet
    bloc  in  the  same  way.

    Soviet  espionage  today  is  developed  to  a  vast  scale.  The  NKVD,  the  Ministry
    of  War,  work  hand  in  hand,  although  frequently  their  various  representatives
    do  not  know  each  other.  These  organizations  exploit  similar  organizations  in  the
    satellite  countries,  and  they  all  use  Communists  and  fellow  travelers  in  whatever
    country  they  happen  to  be,  for  their  own  aims  and  purposes.

    The  Fuchs  case  in  England  is  only  a  prelude  to  much  which  we  do  not  know
    and  which  is  still  to  come  regarding  the  scope  of  Soviet  espionage  in  America
    and  other  western  countries.    I  do  not  doubt  that  many  bitter  surprises  await  us.

    Gentlemen,  I  am  at  your  disposal.

    Mr.  Tavennek.  Mr.  Ivravchenko,  what  positions  have  you  held  in
    the  Soviet  Government  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  After  my  graduation  from  the  MetaUurgical
    Institute,  and  studying  aviation,  I  worked  in  the  Soviet  industry  as
    director  of  a  factory,  as  chief  engineer  of  a  factory,  as  chief  engineer  of
    the  metalktrgical  trust.  During  the  war  I  was  head  of  a  group  of
    factories  and  also  chief  of  the  department  of  engineering  arma-
    ments of  the  Soviet  Russian  Eepublic;  I  mean  of  the  Russian  Soviet
    Federal  Socialist  Republic.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  TMiat  position  did  you  hold  with  the  Soviet  Govern-
    ment while  you  were  in  the  United  States  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  was  economic  attache  of  the  Soviet  Purchasing
    Commission  from  August  1943  to  April  1944.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Were  you  ever  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party
    of  the  Soviet  Union  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes,  I  was  a  member  from  1929  until  April  1944.'

    Mr.  Tavenner.  A^Hien  did  you  leave  the  employ  of  the  Soviet  Gov-
    ernment, and  will  you  briefly  outline  your  reasons  for  leaving?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  left  the  Soviet  service  in  April  1944 ;  the  1st  of
    April,  I  think.  My  reason  was  very  simple.  During  all  my  life  I  had
    great  experience  with  the  party  and  with  the  Soviet  Government.  My
    father  and  my  grandfather  were  workmen.  I  always  tried,  when  I  was
    young,  to  believe  the  Communist  Party  would  give  us  a  better  life
    than  we  had.  I  also  tried  to  believe  the  Communist  Party  would  create
    better  living  conditions  for  all  people  in  the  world.  For  this  purpose
    in  1925  I  joined  the  young  Communist  organization,  the  Komsomol.
    And  in  1929,  after  service  in  the  Red  Army,  I  became  a  member  of
    the  party.

    1178  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    All  my  experience  proved  that  the  Communist  Party  and  its  policy,
    both  domestic  and  foreign,  did  not  serve  the  best  interests  of  the
    Russian  people;  nor  did  it  serve  the  interests  of  any  people  in  the
    outside  world.  With  every  year  of  my  experience  I  oecame  more
    and  more  disillusioned.  The  Soviet  policy  always  double-crossed
    my  people  and  naturally  it  always  double-crossed  the  outside  world,
    during  the  war,  especially  the  United  States,  England,  and  the  other
    military  allies.

    When — do  you  understand  my  English  language  ?

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Yes ;  very  well.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  In  1933  I  was  a  student  at  the  Metallurgical  In-
    stitute. It  was  during  the  period  of  collectivization.  I  visited  many
    villages.  I  saw  everything  that  happened  during  collectivization.  I
    saw  terror,  injustice,  hunger,  and  so  on.  That  was  the  beginning  of
    my  disillusionment,  about  1933;  and  every  year  this  disillusionment
    increased.  In  1936  I  was  purged.  Well,  I  had  much  experience  with
    the  Soviet  police,  the  NKVD,  and  I  still  better  realized  the  essence  of
    the  Russian  regime.

    During  the  war  I  tried  to  do  my  duty,  to  do  my  best  as  a  Russian
    man,  because  we  were  at  war.  I  worked  very  hard.  I  did  everything
    I  could.  At  the  same  time  I  was  scared  of  the  Soviet  Government,
    and  scared  of  the  party,  but  I  did  my  duty  to  help  win  victory  over
    Germany.

    Owing  to  my  work  during  the  war,  many  documents  signed  by  Mr.
    Molotov,  Mr.  Stalin,  and  other  members  of  the  Politburo  passed  daily
    through  my  hands.  I  saw  every  day  examples  of  how  they  did  their
    duty,  as  they  called  it;  and  I  realized  that  the  Russian  people  had
    nothing  in  common  with  the  Communist  Party  and  the  Soviet  regime.

    I  also  realized  that  I  had  no  opportunity  inside  the  country  to  do
    anything  openly  for  my  people  against  the  Soviet  Government.  And
    when  they  sent  me  to  the  United  States  I  decided  to  break  with  them
    and  tell  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  other  countries  what  I
    knew  about  the  Soviet  regime  and  about  the  living  conditions  in  my
    country.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  "Wlien  did  you  arrive  in  the  United  States?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  In  August  1943.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  meet,  upon  your  arrival  in  the  United
    States,  Consul  Lomakin,  who  at  that  time  was  consul  of  the  Soviet
    Consulate  in  San  Francisco  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes ;  I  did.  We  came  to  Vancouver  from  Vladi-
    •vostok  on  the  ship  Komeles.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  spell  the  name  of  the  ship  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  K-o-m-e-l-e-s.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  That  is  the  name  of  the  ship  on  which  you  arrived?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes.  Whe  had  a  few  storms  during  our  trip  from
    Vladivostok  to  Vancouver,  and  we  had  some  trouble  with  the  Japanese
    Navy  which  stopped  us  in  the  open  sea  and  searched  our  ship.  The
    captain  of  the  ship  and  the  political  commissar  were  worried.  I  did
    not  understand  wliy.

    Mr.  Tavenner,  Was  this  a  Russian  ship?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  That  is  right,  ^^^len  we  came  to  Vancouver  Mr.
    Lomakin  came  aboard.  I  was  in  the  cabin  of  the  captain,  and  the
    captain  and  the  political  commissar  were  there,  and  I  have  forgotten

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1179

    the  names  of  three  of  my  colleagues  who  also  were  in  the  cabin ;  they
    all  were  responsible  party  members.  There  was  no  secret  from  them.
    When  Mr.  Lomakin  came  to  the  cabin,  the  captain  gave  to  Mr.  Lomakin
    a  few  packages  [speaking  in  Russian] .

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  All  sealed.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Packages  which  were  under  seal  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  That  is  right.  He  gave  them  to  Mr.  Lomakin
    and  Mr.  Lomakin  took  the  packages  with  him  and  left  the  ship.

    The  captain  said :

    This  is  the  reason  I  was  worried.  If  somethiug  had  happened  and  these
    papers  were  seized  by  the  Japanese  or  somebody  else,  I  would  be  in  great
    trouble.

    Lomakin  came  aboard.  I  was  in  the  cabin  of  the  captain,  and  the
    captain  of  the  ship  was  scared.  He  was  the  captain  and  at  the  same
    time  he  was  a  political  commissar  for  the  Soviet  government.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  of  course  don't  know  anything  about  the  con-
    tents of  those  papers?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  don't;  but  I  know  that  if  these  were  simple
    papers  and  had  nothing  to  do  with  underground  work  or  with  con-
    spiracy, there  would  be  no  reason  for  the  captain  of  the  ship  to  take
    these  papers  from  Moscow  and  hand  them  personally  to  Mr.  Lomakin,
    and  for  Mr.  Lomakin  to  take  these  papers  as  if  he  were  stealing  some-
    thing from  somebody.  Lomakin  was  Soviet  consul  in  San  Francisco ;
    and  you  must  understand  that  from  my  experience  with  the  Soviet
    Government,  from  what  I  knew  about  them  and  their  methods,  I  im-
    mediately realized  what  was  going  on.  I  worked  many  years  with
    them.     There  was  nothing  new  to  me  in  this  transaction.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Your  purpose  in  coming  to  the  United  States  was
    to  engage  in  work  with  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  In  what  capacity?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Well,  as  I  mentioned  before,  I  was  sent  to  the
    United  States  as  an  economic  attache  to  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Com-
    mission.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  explain  to  the  committee  the  set-up  of  the
    Soviet  Purchasing  Commission,  that  is,  who  controlled  the  activities
    in  which  the  Commission  was  engaged,  and  any  other  pertinent  matter
    regarding  its  functions  which  this  committee  would  be  interested  in  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes.  First  I  ask  your  permission  to  explain  the
    general  features  of  the  situation  during  the  war.

    Before  we  came  to  the  United  States — when  I  say  "we"  I  mean  all
    members  of  the  Communist  Party  who  had  more  or  less  responsible
    duties  or  more  or  less  responsible  jobs — before  we  came  to  the  United
    States  we  had  received  instructions  from  the  central  committee  of
    the  party.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  By  "party"  are  you  referring  to  the  Communist
    Party?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Communist  Party,  of  course,  because  in  the
    Soviet  Union  there  is  only  one  party.  From  the  conversations  which
    I  had  with  officials  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  party,  we  knew
    before  we  left  for  the  United  States  that  we  had  never  been  friends
    with  the  United  States,  and  the  central  committee  of  the  party  made
    this  absoluely  clear.     For  2  weeks  we  had  to  go  from  office  to  office

    1180  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOAnC    JVIATERIAL

    and  we  were  told  repeatedly  :  ''You  are  going  to  the  capitalistic  United
    States.  We  are  allies  today  because  we  need  each  other,  but  when  the
    war  is  over  and  we  shall  have  won  victory — and  we  are  sure  we  shall
    win  it — we  shall  again  become  open  enemies."    [Speaking  in  Russian.]

    Mr.  WoLix  (translating).  We  shall  never  modify  our  philosophy
    and  our  doctrine.

    Mr.  Kravchenko  (.speaking  in  Eussian).

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  We  are  allies  in  trouble.

    Mr.  Kkavchenko  (speaking in  Russian).

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  But  both  partners  know  that  they  hate
    each  other.

    Mr.  Kravchenko  (speaking  in  Russian).

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  Sooner  or  later  a  clash  between  the  two
    is  inevitable.

    Mr.  Kravchenko  (speaking  in  Russian).

    Mr.  WoLix  (translating).  Until  then  the  Allies  will  remain  our
    friends  and  we  shall  cooperate  in  our  mutual  interests.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  "For  this  reason  and  with  an  eye  to  the  future,
    we  must  study  carefully  the  industry  in  the  United  States,  the  military
    industry,  the  civilian  industry,  all  technological  and  industrial  proc-
    esses, and  we  must  get  hold  of  their  secrets  so  that  we  can  achieve
    similar  results  in  our  country  and  when  the  time  comes  we  will  be
    ready  for  the  fight."

    Mr.  Walter.  Did  the  Russians  regard  the  United  States  as  their
    enemy  during  the  period  we  Mere  fighting  for  the  common  cause?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Ideologically  and  secretly,  yes.  For  example,
    every  week  we  had  closed  party  sessions  in  our  office  in  Moscow.
    Somebody  would  come  from  the  Central  Committee  or  from  the  Polit-
    buro. He  would  give  us  a  speech  on  the  international  situation,  the
    war  situation,  and  so  on,  and  would  make  it  absolutely  clear — I  men-
    tioned it  in  my  book  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  repeat,  but  I  would
    like  to  mention  that  they  always  said  and  always  repeated  [speaking
    in  Russian] .

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  We  are  Allies  because  there  is  a  war  on.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  "But  we  must  realize  that  the  Americans  will
    never  like  us  and  we  will  never  like  them."  Also,  "we  will  never  like
    the  English  and  the  French ;  I  mean  their  political  attitudes."  And
    practically  [speaking  in  Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  As  a  practical  result  of  all  this

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Every  Soviet  official,  when  he  goes  to  the  United
    States  or  to  any  other  country,  he  alwaj^s  has  two  duties  to  perform.
    These  duties  go  parallel :  One  of  them  is  an  official  duty.  For  ex-
    ample, a  man  comes  as  a  simple  engineer  to  the  Soviet  Purchasing
    Commission,  but  before  he  comes  to  the  United  States,  the  Central
    Committee  of  the  party  or  some  special  government  office  or  depart-
    ment, issues  orders  indicating  where  in  the  United  States  he  must
    work,  which  factor}^  or  chemical  plant,  or  any  kind  of  industry  he
    has  to  watch.  I  am  talking  now  about  engineers,  because  I  was  one  of
    them  and  I  know  their  work  best.  I  don't  know  what  orders  were
    given  by  the  general  staff.

    Now,  when  this  man  came  to  the  United  States  he  had  to  do  two
    jobs  at  the  same  time.  The  one  was  open  and  legal,  and  the  other
    was  conspiracy.     And  when  he  went  back  to  the  Soviet  Union,  the

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1181

    Soviet  Government  would  appreciate  his  work  in  the  U.  S.  A.  accord-
    ing to  the  secret  information  he  had  gathered  for  the  Soviet  industry
    or  for  the  military  staff.    All  of  us  had  such  duties.

    Mr.  Walter.  Is  that  true  of  the  diplomats  as  well  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Absolutely.  They  are  absolutely  no  different.
    In  1943  or  1944  INIr.  Rudenko,  who  was  chairman  of  the  Soviet  Pur-
    chasing Commission,  had  an  office  at  3355  Sixteenth  Street  in  Wash-
    ington. General  Serov  was  military  attache  at  that  time.  Gromyko
    was  Soviet  Ambassador  to  Washington.  Gusev,  in  New  York,  was
    head  of  the  organization  Amtorg.  All  these  officers  worked  together
    [speaking  in  Russian] .

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  It  was  of  no  imj)ortance  who  got  the
    information.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Of  course  there  was  competition  among  them,  be-
    cause everyone  wanted  the  "thank  you"  from  the  Soviet  Union  so  that
    upon  his  return  to  the  Soviet  Union  he  would  receive  a  higher
    position.

    Mr.  Walter,  Do  I  understand  the  Soviet  diplomatic  representatives
    in  the  United  States  were  engaged  in  espionage  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Absolutely.  Mr.  Chairman,  that  is  their  sys-
    tem. We  must  understand  that  they  all  received  special  training,  for
    instance,  Mr.  Malik,  now  representative  in  the  United  Nations;  Mr.
    Zarubin,  Soviet  Ambassador  in  London ;  Mr.  Panyushkin  in  Washing-
    ton, who  has  good  experience  in  military  intelligence.  All  of  them —
    there  is  no  question — all  of  them  are  members  of  the  party.  That
    comes  first.  Their  first  duty  is  not  diplomatic;  their  first  duty  is
    to  be  devoted  members  of  the  party.  They  must  do  everything  the
    Politburo  of  the  Soviet  Union  requires,  at  any  price.

    Now,  I  come  back  to  your  question.  For  example,  the  Soviet  Pur-
    chasing Commission  during  the  war  had  more  than  a  thousand  em-
    ployees. Some  of  them  came  to  the  United  States  as  simple  engineers,
    but  in  reality  they  were  in  top  positions  in  industry  or  in  scientific
    research.  Some  came  as  civilians,  but  really  they  were  officers  of  the
    Navy  or  artillery  or  tank  troops  or  the  air  force.

    No  official  of  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  came  to  the  United
    States  as  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party.  If  "you  look  at  the
    records  in  the  Department  of  State  you  will  find  that  no  party  members
    came  from  the  Soviet  Union.

    This  was  the  psychologically  favorable  moment  for  the  Soviet  Gov-
    ernment. We  were  in  the  midst  of  a  war.  Many  American  people
    paid  great  respect  to  the  Soviet  Army.  Everybody  was  in  sympathy
    with  and  liked  to  talk  to  men  in  Soviet  military  uniform.

    In  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission,  Mr.  Rudenko,  Mr.  Serov,
    and  a  few  chairmen  of  departments  were  called  "the  Politburo  of  the
    Purchasing  Commission."  On  the  seventh  floor  of  the  Soviet  Purchas-
    ing Commission,  behind  an  iron  door  at  3355  Sixteenth  Street,  Wash-
    ington, D.  C. — it  was  not  in  Moscow — there  was  a  special  department
    of  the  NKVD.  Everything  that  came  from  the  Soviet  Union,  for  in-
    stance [speaking  in  Russian] .

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating) .  A  secret  communication.
    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Came  to  the  seventh-floor  department.     Also,
    the  seventh-floor  department  kept  agents  in  every  department,  in
    the  metal  department  or  chemical  department  or  aviation  department.

    11  §2  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Secret  material  went  to  the  special  department,  one  of  whose  officials
    was  Mrs.  Arutunian.  Her  husband  was  son  of  the  Deputy  Commis-
    sariat of  Kailroads  of  the  Soviet  Union.  She  also  worked  for  this
    special  department  and  all  secret  papers  went  through  her  hands.
    With  this  department  I  had  some  trouble,  and  I  know  what  I  am
    talking  about.

    All  of  us  knew  about  the  functions  of  the  special  department,  but
    we  never  knew  who  the  representative  of  the  Soviet  Secret  Police  was
    in  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  I  understand  you  to  say  Rudenko  was  re-
    sponsible to  the  NKVD  which  had  its  headquarters  on  the  seventh
    floor?    Is  that  a  correct  statement?

    Mr.  Kravciienko.  The  special  department  formally  was  under  Mr.
    Rudenko,  because  he  was  head  of  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission ;
    this  is  natural,  but  [speaking  in  Russian] .

    Mr.  WoLTN  (translating).  In  fact  they  were  independent,  the
    NKVD  section  was  independent  from  the  chief  of  the  Purchasing
    Commission.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  the  head  of  the  Purchasing  Commission,  Mr.
    Rudenko,  was  compelled  to  carry  out  certain  activities  that  were  out-
    lined by  the  NIvVD  ?    Is  that  a  correct  statement  ?

    Mr.  Kravciienko.  This  is  absolutely  natural.  You  see,  he  had  two
    bosses.  The  one  boss — may  I  make  this  clear — was  Mr.  Mikoyan,  the
    member  of  the  Politburo,  and  second  assistant  of  Mr.  Stalin  during
    the  war.  Mr.  Mikoyan  was  Commissar  of  Foreign  Trade.  During
    the  war  Mr.  Mikoyan  was  in  charge  of  lend-lease.  That  was  his  duty
    as  a  member  of  the  Politburo.  All  supplies  for  the  Soviet  Govern-
    ment passed  through  the  hands  of  Mr.  Mikoyan.

    As  to  Leonid  Rudenko,  I  had  known  him  many  years.  We  worked
    at  the  same  factory  in  the  Ukraine  in  about  1924  or  1925.  Mr.  Rudenko
    received  orders  from  Moscow  from  Mikoyan,  from  the  foreign  office,
    from  the  genera]  staff,  and  from  the  party.  Wliat  he  did  for  one  office
    or  another  I  don't  know,  but  the  fact  is  that  all  these  offices  were  rep-
    resented in  the  United  States.

    At  the  end  of  1943  or  beginning  of  1944,  one  day  we  received  orders
    issued  to  all  responsible  members  of  the  Communist  Party.  It  was
    after  work,  after  5  o'clock.  The  office  door  was  closed,  and  Mr.  Serov
    came  in  with  several  sheets  of  paper  containing  orders  from  Mikoyan
    to  Mr.  Rudenko  and  to  all  members  of  the  party  in  the  Soviet  Pur-
    chasing Commission.  These  orders  made  it  absolutely  clear  that  we
    had  to  find  out  all  secret  information  about  the  industrial  develop-
    ment in  the  United  States,  and  especially  in  the  military  industry,  and
    Mr.  Mikoyan  said  [speaking  in  Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  We  shall  appreciate  you  according  to
    your  ability  to  comply  with  this  order.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  This  document  was  read  to  us  and  we  were  asked
    to  sign  a  statement  that  we  knew  about  this  order  and  that  we  would
    make  every  effort  [speaking  in  Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  To  fulfill  it.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  This  was  what  I  saw,  what  I  knew.  It  was
    absolutely  clear ;  there  was  no  mistake  about  it.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  effect  did  this  order  have  upon  the  activities
    of  the  Russians  who  were  members  of  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Com-
    mission ?

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1183

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  First  I  will  mention  a  few  names  and  give  you
    a  practical  example  of  what  they  did.

    One  day  I  saw  big  books  like  this,  approximately  [indicating]
    which  contained  many  pictures  of  the  aviation  industry,  the  special
    machines,  special  details,  and  so  on.  There  were  pictures  and  blue-
    prints [speaking  in  Eussian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  Three  large  volumes.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  This  material  was  signed  by  General  Belayev,
    Alexander  Rostartchouk,  and  Engineer  Khinuichin.  General  Belayev
    was  chairman  of  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Conunission ;  Alexander  Ros-
    tartchouk was  head  of  the  metal  section;  and  Engineer  Khinuichin,
    who  came  to  the  United  States  as  a  simple  engineer  actually  was
    [speaking  in  Russian] .

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  Was  doctor  of  technical  sciences.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  And  was  working  on  research  at  an  institute  in
    Moscow  in  that  capacity.  He  came  to  the  United  States  as  a  simple
    engineer.

    How  they  obtained  those  pictures  and  blueprints,  how  they  found
    all  this  information  about  the  development  of  aviation  in  the  United
    States,  I  don't  know.  I  just  saw  these  documents;  I  saw  the  signa-
    tures ;  and  I  know  General  Belayev  took  them  when  he  flew  to  Moscow.
    This  is  the  first  example.

    Second  example :  I  can't  mention  a  certain  name  in  open  session
    of  the  committee.  I  have  some  good  reason  for  that.  But  I  know
    this:  Two  Navy  captains  obtained  information  on  the  production  of
    American  submarines,  on  technological  processes  and  details  and  on
    the  perspective  of  development  of  the  submarine  industry.  That  is
    the  second  example.

    The  third  example:  From  1925  or  1926  I  have  know  Semen  Vasi-
    lenko.  Semen  Vasilenko,  now  in  the  Soviet  Union,  is  head  of  the
    whole  production  of  pipes  and  tubes  in  the  Soviet  Union,  as  part  of
    the  metallurgical  industry.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  repeat  that  ?

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  He  is  head  of  the  production  of  pipes
    and  tubes  in  the  Soviet  Union.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  spell  that  name?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  S-e-m-e-n  V-a-s-i-1-e-n-k-o.  Semen  Vasilenko.
    I  knew  him  many,  many  years.  Vasilenko  was  a  member  of  the
    party;  he  had  been  a  member  of  the  Ukrainian  Government  and  was
    [speaking  in  Russian].

    Mr.  Wolin  (translating).  Was  awarded  a  Stalin  premium.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  And  also  he  had  a  few  decorations.  He  came  to
    the  United  States  for  the  sole  purpose  of  finding  some  special  infor-
    mation about  the  metallurgical  and  tube  industry  and  miiltary
    industry.

    One  day  in  February  1944,  I  don't  remember  the  date,  Vasilenko,
    myself,  and  Vdovin  got  ready  to  fly  to  the  Soviet  Union  [speaking  in
    Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  Six  large  bags.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  state  that  over  again  ?

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating) .  Six  large  bags.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  That  is  right ;  and  Vasilenko  took  the  six  bags
    to  the  Soviet  Union  [speaking  in  Russian] .

    Mr,  Wolin  (translating).  I  saw  that  material.

    1184  SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL

    Mr.  Kravciienko.  Some  of  this  material  was  about  the  production
    of  planes  and  the  new  technological  processes;  some  was  about  ar-
    tillery; some  was  about  new  technological  processes  in  metallurgy;
    some  was  about  [speaking  in  Eussian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  The  possibilities  of  industrial  develop-
    ment.

    Mr.  Kearnet.  Would  the  witness  mind  repeating  that  ?

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  Among  this  material  there  was  also  an
    outline  of  the  possibilities  of  industrial  development.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  mean  the  perspective ;  for  example,  what  was
    planned  5  or  10  years  ahead ;  what  the  plans  for  the  present  are ;  and
    so  on;  also  the  plan  in  perspective  for  the  general  development  of
    industry.     Do  you  understand  ?

    I  know  all  this  material  was  found  in  an  unofficial  way.  What  could
    be  the  reason  for  Mr.  Vasilenko,  a  former  member  of  the  govern-
    ment, or  for  somebody  else,  to  do  work  as  a  plain  workman  ?  [speaking
    in  Russian.].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  They  were  working  as  plain  workmen.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  We  closed  the  door.  Nobody  could  see  this
    material.  And  Vasilenko  took  this  material  and  flew  to  the  Soviet
    Union.

    Now,  one  more  example.  At  the  end  of  1943  or  beginning  of  1944,
    Vassili  Sergeiev  was  deputy  of  Mr.  Mikoyan.  Mr.  Sergeiev  came
    to  the  United  States.  He  had  meetings  here  and  saw  many  respon-
    sible industrial  people  and  so  on.  He  brought  from  Moscow  another
    order  about  [speaking  in  Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  Various  types  of  information  which
    should  be  obtained.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Sergeiev  [speaking  in  Russian.]

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  Sergeiev  gathered  the  heads  of  the  de-
    partments and  explained  what  kind  of  material  they  are  expected  to
    get  at  any  price.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  must  make  it  clear,  Mr.  Chairman,  all  depart-
    ments of  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission — aviation,  transporta-
    tion, all  of  them — were  working  for  this  purpose.  We  transferred
    to  the  Soviet  Union  not  just  this  one  package;  we  transferred  to  the
    Soviet  Union  dozens  of  tons,  of  material,  and  not  just  by  airplane.  We
    also  were  using  Soviet  ships  that  came  from  lend-lease  for  the  Soviet
    Union,  and  they  called  this  material  super  lend-lease.     [Laughter.]

    Well,  it  is  true.  And  they  sent  material  by  these  ships  for  the  only
    reason,  that  the  Soviet  Government  never  believed  in  peace  between
    these  two  countries.  They  worked  very  hard  to  prepare  themselves.
    They  understand  very  well  that  a  new  war,  if  it  comes,  will  be  a  great
    technical  war,  much  more  so  than  the  last  war,  and  they  know  very
    well  that  the  United  States  is  a  great  industrial  country.  They  must
    find  all  material  they  can,  all  kinds  of  information  [speaking  in
    Russian] .

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  To  be  on  a  level  with  this  country  in  its
    military  and  industrial  developments;  also,  to  be  up  to  date.

    Mr.  Walter.  Do  you  know  how  this  super  lend-lease  material  was
    concealed  before  it  was  put  aboard  the  ships  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Lomakin  [speaking  in  Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  Lomakin  simply  could  come  to  any  boat,
    or  anybody  else  could  come,  and  bring  whatever  they  wanted.

    SHIPMENT    OF    ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1185

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  And  any  captain  and  any  sailor  could  go  ashore
    to  New  York  or  Philadelphia  or  Baltimore.  They  did  as  they  pleased.
    How  could  you  check  on  them?  I  saw  in  New  York  Soviet  ships
    [speaking  in  Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  We  brought  this  material  on  the  ship.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  \Y1io  cared  what  we  took.  Had  we  taken  the
    Empire  State  Building  and  put  it  on  a  ship,  nobody  would  have  cared.
    That  is  true.  I  know ;  I  saAv  that.  Nobocly  opened  boxes  and  checked.
    1  witnessed  it.    [Speaking  in  Russian.]

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  I  saw  dozens  of  times  how  Soviet  boats
    Avere  loaded,  and  I  know^  what  I  am  talking  about.

    Mr.  Walter.  So  no  check  was  made,  and  these  packing  cases  con-
    taining plans  and  blueprints  were  freely  passed  on  the  ships  with  other
    lend-lease  material  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  You  see,  Mr.  Chairman,  it  was  absolutely  natural
    during  the  war.  In  the  United  States,  as  in  many  countries  in  the
    world,  there  was  much  respect  for  the  Red  Army.  It  was  a  natural
    feeling.  I  am  talking  now  about  the  policy  and  psychology  of  the
    Soviet  Government.  They  did  everything  against  the  United  States
    during  the  war,  and  now  [speaking  in  Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  Why  should  they  change?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Were  any  of  these  packages  under  diplomatic  seal?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes.  Vasilenko  flew  to  the  Soviet  Union  with  all
    [speaking  in  Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).    This  luggage.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes ;  possessed  diplomatic  immunity ;  and  Vasi-
    lenko was  not  an  exception.  Everybody  who  went  back  always  took
    something  with  him  under  diplomatic  immunity.  And  during  the
    war  the  Soviet  Government  received  plenty  of  airplanes  from  the
    United  States.  These  airplanes  were  flown  by  Soviet  pilots  to  the
    Soviet  Union.     It  was  part  of  our  activity  during  the  war.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Did  you  ever  help  load  any  of  those  packages  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes ;  for  the  very  simple  reason  that,  if  I  said
    I  wouldn't  help,  what  would  have  happened?  If  I  said  I  wouldn't
    help  Mr.  Vasilenko,  why  [speaking  in  Russian] .

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  I  would  never  survive  to  come  here.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Any  suspicion  by  the  authorities  of  the  Soviet
    Purchasing  Commission  or  by  the  Embassy  or  by  the  NKVD  people
    in  the  United  States  would  entail  grave  danger.

    Mr,  Kearney.  I  Avould  like  a  direct  answer  to  the  question :  Did  you
    ever  help  load  any  of  these  packages  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko  (speaking in  Russian).

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating) .  Do  you  mean  secret  material?

    Mr.  Kearney.  Yes.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  If  I  did  myself  ?    No.    [Speaking  in  Russian.]

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  But  that  was  known;  it  was  not  kept
    secret.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  was  in  the  party  from  1929,  and  I  knew  many
    Soviet  officials  who  had  graduated  from  college  with  me.  We  sat  in
    the  same  college,  in  the  same  room,  for  many  years.  Sometimes  they
    spoke  of  what  they  had  found,  but  they  never  said  how  this  was  done.
    And  when  we  talked  to  Vasilenko  he  would  say :  "It  is  much  better  if

    09334—50 19

    118o  SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    we  never  speak  about  it.  If  the  United  States  stops  me,  I  will  be
    resiDonsible  for  my  own  action  only."

    Mr.  Tavenner.  If  I  understood  you  correctly,  Vasilenko  packed
    these  six  bags  behind  closed  doors  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Were  you  there  when  they  were  packed  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes.     I  was  helping  him.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  helped  him  pack  them  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes.  We  worked  like  simple  workmen  because
    they  didn't  trust  anybody.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Then  you  did  actually  assist  in  packing  that  sort
    of  material  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes;  I  did.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  probably  misunderstood  the  Congressman's
    question.

    Mr.  WoLiN.  His  question  was  of  loading.     This  is  packing.

    Mr.  Kearney.  He  helped  pack  them,  but  did  not  help  load  them  ?

    Mr.  WoLiN.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  recall  the  month  and  year  in  which  Vasi-
    lenko flew  those  packages  to  Moscow  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  don't  remember  exactly  the  date,  but  I  remem-
    ber very  well  it  was  in  February  1944.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  February  1944  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Chairman,  it  was  the  testimony  of  Maj.  George
    Racey  Jordan,  from  his  diary,  that  Vasilenko  came  through  Great
    Falls  on  the  I7th  of  February  en  route  to  Moscow  with  diplomatic
    mail.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Everybody  was  using  diplomatic  passports.
    For  example,  I  knew  prominent  captains  of  the  Soviet  navy  fleet.  All
    of  them  had  diplomatic  passports,  and  when  we  came  to  Vladviostok
    some  of  them  put  on  civilian  clothes  and  came  to  the  United  States  as
    civilians.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Although  they  were  naval  officers  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes ;  and  with  six  or  seven  decorations.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  In  the  course  of  your  testimony  you  mentioned  the
    name  of  Alexander  Rostartchouk.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  How  mas  he  employed  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Eostartchouk  was  chairman  of  the  metal  depart-
    ment of  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission.

    Mr,  Tavenner.  Do  you  have  any  knowledge  of  any  secret  material
    gathered  by  him  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  saw  material  on  aviation.  I  saw  that  material
    and  his  signature.

    Mr.  Walter.  Did  you  ever  fly  back  to  Russia  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  From  the  United  States  ?

    Mr.  Walter.  Yes.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  No.     I  preferred  to  fly  to  New  York.

    Mr.  Tavennerr.  Was  any  of  the  material  which  was  collected  by
    Rostartchouk  or  signed  for  by  him  included  in  those  pouches  which
    Vasilenko  took  to  Russia  in  February  1944  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  No.  Vasilenko's  material  was  quite  different
    from  that  of  Rostartchouk.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC    MATERIAL  1187

    Mr.  Tavenner.  But  this  material  was  taken  to  Russia  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  By  the  same  general  method  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  From  the  point  of  view  of  diplomatic  immunity,
    yes,  but  different  persons  were  used,  because  the  aviation  information
    was  taken  by  General  Belayev.

    When  General  Belayev  came  to  the  Soviet  Union  after  what  he  had
    done  here,  Mr.  Davies,  former  American  Ambassador  to  the  Soviet
    Union,  was  with  General  Belayev  in  Stalingrad  and  they  kissed  each
    other.     I  am  99  percent  sure  of  this.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  Prof.  Paul  Emelianenko  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  do.  He  was  graduated  from  the  Metallurgical
    College  at  which  I  studied.  He  is  a  very  well-known  scientist  in  the
    Soviet  Union.  He  was  also  a  corresponding  member  [speaking  in
    Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  Of  the  Academy  of  Science.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  He  came  to  the  United  States.  I  have  known
    him  since  about  1931.    [Speaking  in  Russian.]

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating) .  He  was  also  a  recipient  of  a  Stalin  prize.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  What  part  did  he  play  in  obtaining  information  for
    the  Purchasing  Commission  ?

    Mr.  I^jiavchenko.  Well,  when  Emelianenko  was  in  Washington
    he  spent  about  75  or  TO  percent  of  his  time  visiting  many  cities  and
    many  factories  in  the  United  States.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Just  a  minute.   Are  you  talking  about  Emelianenko  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  That  is  right.  I  am  talking  about  him.  He  spent
    about  70  percent  of  his  time  traveling  to  many  cities  and  many  fac-
    tories in  the  United  States.  Because  he  was  a  very  good  scientist,  his
    special  duty  was  to  find  out  what  new  technological  processes  and  what
    new  kinds  of  machinery  were  used  in  the  United  States  of  America.  As
    a  prominent  scientist,  if  he  saw  something  a  few  times  he  knew  how
    to  copy  it.  He  worked  here  a  few  months,  then  he  flew  to  the  Soviet
    Union  in  the  middle  of  April  1944.  He  did  a  great  job  because  he
    has  really  a  brilliant  brain  and  brilliant  experience.

    Mr.  Walter.  The  committee  will  stand  in  recess  until  2 :  30.

    (Thereupon,  at  12 :  10  p.  m.  on  Tuesday,  March  7, 1950,  a  recess  was
    taken  until  2 :  30  p.  m.,  of  the  same  day.)

    after  recess

    (The  hearing  was  resumed  at  2 :  30  p.  m.,  Hon.  John  S.  Wood
    (chairman)  presiding.

    Mr.  Wood.  The  committee  will  be  in  order,  please,  and  the  record
    will  disclose  that  there  are  present  Messrs.  Walter,  Moulder,  and
    Wood.

    TESTIMONY  OF  VICTOR  A.  KRAVCHENKO— Resumed

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr,  Kravchenko,  did  you  know  Nicolai  Kolybalov  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes;  I  know  Nicolai  Kolybalov  since  1938.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  outline  to  the  committee  his  background,
    his  assignment  to  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission,  and  any  other
    knowledge  you  have  regarding  his  activities  while  with  the  Soviet
    Purchasing  Commission  ?

    1188  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    (Representative  Kearney  enters  hearing  room.)

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Nicolai  Kolybalov  is  a  professional  engineer.
    At  the  end  of  1938  or  beginning  of  1939  he  was  assistant  to  the  head  of
    pipe  industry  in  Siberia,  and  I  know  him  very  well.  He  came  to  the
    United  States  toward  the  end  of  1943  as  a  representative  of  some
    industrial  commissariat,  and  he  returned  to  the  Soviet  Union  about
    beginning  of  1914.  I  met  Nicolai  Kolybalov  last  March  in  Paris.
    We  had  an  argiunent  before  the  court.  Frankly,  I  don't  understand
    why  Nicolai  Kolybalov  should  come  to  the  United  States  in  his  pro-
    fessional capacity;  I  don't  understand  why  they  sent  him,  because
    he  is  a  very  bad  engineer,  but  in  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission
    [speaking  in  Russian] .

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  He  traveled  to  see  industrial  plants  and
    collected  technical  information.  As  far  as  I  can  remember,  he  had
    to  receive  machines  and  give  his  expert  opinion.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Under  the  agreement  between  the  United  States
    and  the  Soviet  Union  during  the  war.     [Speaking  in  Russian.]

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  I  have  no  knowledge  of  what  he  was
    actually  doing.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  Fedor  V.  Vdovin  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Fedor  Vdovin  was  the  man  who  helped  me  pack
    secret  information  for  Vasilenko  when  the  latter  flew  to  the  Soviet
    Union.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  The  committee  is  in  possession  of  information  that
    indicates  that  Fedor  Vdovin  was  in  the  pipe-tubing  section  of  the
    Soviet  Purchasing  Commission  and  that  he  devoted  his  energy  to
    obtaining  aluminmn  tubing  which  could  be  used  in  the  atomic  devel-
    opment.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  don't  know  for  what  purpose  Fedor  Vdovin
    asked  the  United  States  for  aluminum  tubes,  but  he  was  working  in
    this  section  and  he  received  many  tubes.  I  don't  know  what  his  pur-
    pose was,  whether  for  atomic  energ;\^  or  for  any  other  purpose.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  know  Col.  Stanislaw  Shumousky?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  No ;  I  don't  know  him.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Did  you  know  a  person  whose  first  name  is  Zot,
    Z-o-t,  L.  Chepurnykh  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Maybe  I  know  him,  but  it  is  very  difficult  to
    remember  names.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Mr.  Kravchenko,  on  March  9,  1944,  Vassili  Serge-
    iev,  accompanied  by  his  wife,  Nina,  Petri  Makiev,  Valentina  Batanova,
    and  Anatoli  Baranovsky,  departed  from  Great  Falls,  Mont.,  on  a
    plane,  and  had  in  their  custody  a  number  of  wooden  boxes.  Will  you
    outline  the  background  of  Vassili  Sergeiev  ?

    Mr.  KJRAVCHENKO.  I  workcd  with  Sergeiev  from  1925  up  to  1931.  I
    worked  with  him  in  a  metallurgical  factory  in  the  city  of  Dnepropet-
    rovsk. He  was  a  member  of  the  party.  He  graduated  from  the  Lenin-
    grad Metallurgical  Institute.  Afterward  he  worked  a  few  years  in
    Germany  as  metallurgical  attache  and  at  the  end  of  1943  or  beginning
    of  1944  he  came  to  the  United  States  as  assistant  commissar  of  foreign
    trade.  His  wife  Nina  studied  with  me  in  1930  at  the  Aviation
    Institute.

    When  Sergeiev  came  to  the  United  States,  as  I  mentioned  before,
    he  brought  special  orders  from  Mr.  Mikoyan,  and  these  orders  were

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  11 89

    discussed  in  closed  party  sessions  of  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commis-
    sion.

    Sergeiev  inspected  many  departments  of  the  Soviet  Purchasing
    Commission.  He  liad  the  right  to  do  so.  He  also  discharged  some
    officials  whom  he  considered  not  too  loyal  to  their  duty,  and  Sergeiev
    flew  to  Soviet  Russia  [speaking  in  Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  He  had  a  great  deal  of  luggage  and  of
    course  enjoyed  diplomatic  immunity.

    Mr.  Kravchenko  (speaking  in  Russian).

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  But  what  material  he  possessed  in  that
    luggage  is  unknown.

    Mr.  Tai-enner.  Do  you  know  how  he  obtained  diplomatic  immu-
    nity?

    Mr.  Kravchenko  (speaking  in  Russian).

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  During  the  war,  as  you  know,  many  So-
    viet  employees  came  with  diplomatic  passports,  and  so  did  Sergeiev.
    He  was  Assistant  Commissar  of  Foreign  Trade  and  it  was  absolutely
    natural  that  he  should  have  a  diplomatic  passport  when  he  came  to
    the  United  States.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  Petr  Makiev  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  don't  remember  him.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Valentina  Batanova,  do  you  know  him?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Valentina  Batanova  is  a  woman.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  her?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  No.   .

    Mr.  Ta^^nner.  Anatoli  Baranovsky?

    Mr,  Kravchenko.  No.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  You  do  not  know  him  ?

    Mr.  IvRAVCHENKO.  I  dou't  know  him.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Do  you  know  an  engineer  with  the  Soviet  Purchas-
    ing Commission  named  Khimuchin?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  know  him.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Will  you  outline  his  background  and  connection
    with  the  Soviet  Purchasing  Commission?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  He  came  to  the  United  States  as  an  ordinary
    engineer  although  he  is  a  scientist.  Before  he  came  to  the  United
    States  he  worked  in  a  scientific  aviation  institute  in  Moscow.  His
    duty  in  the  United  States,  as  I  mentioned  before,  I  saw  this  material
    [speaking  in  Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  He  had  obtained  considerable  material
    concerning  the  aviation  industry.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  He  was  working  in  a  separate  room,  and  about
    60  percent  of  the  people  inside  the  Russian  Purchasing  Commission
    didn't  know  what  he  was  doing.  But  when  I  saw  the  big  record  he
    was  signing  on  the  aviation  industry  in  the  United  States,  and  when
    this  material  was  taken  by  General  Belayev  to  Moscow  under  diplo-
    matic immunity,  I  understood  what  Kliimuchin  had  been  doing.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  believe  you  told  us  that  while  living  in  Russia
    you  were  the  manager  or  head  of  a  manufacturing  plant  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  That  is  right.

    Mr.  Ta\t:nner.  How  many  employees  were  in  that  plant,  approxi-
    mately ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Sometimes  1,000,  sometimes  3,000,  sometimes
    more,  sometimes  less.

    J.J.J7U  oxiirivarjiN  J.     \jr     AiUiVLiu    iviAi. rjniAJj

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Was  the  labor-union  situation  in  that  plant  typical
    of  the  other  plants  in  Russia  at  that  time  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Yes ;  absolutely.

    Mr.  Ta^^nner,  Was  the  labor  union  in  that  plant  free  to  engage  in
    collective  bargaining  with  management  over  the  matter  of  rates  of
    compensation  for  services  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  No.  In  the  Soviet  Union  there  are  two  kinds
    of  remuneration  for  labor.  One  is  based  on  time,  the  other  on  piece
    work.  All  skills  in  the  Soviet  Union  are  listed  in  a  special  book.
    This  book  contains  a  list  of  all  the  industries  and  wages  for  both  time
    and  piecework.  Now,  the  local  labor  union  never  decides  what  wages
    the  workmen  must  receive  from  the  factory.  I  mean  [speaking  in
    Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  They  take  part  only  in  cases  when  a
    scale  of  wages  is  being  modified.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  In  my  experience  of  many  years  with  factories
    in  the  Soviet  Union,  I  can  say  no  labor  union  boss  in  a  factory  ever
    came  to  my  office  and  said :  "Will  you  please  pay  more  to  Mr.  So  and
    So."  He  can't  ask  me  that  for  two  reasons:  First,  he  himself  is  a
    member  of  the  party,  and  he  laiows  I  can't  make  any  decision  con-
    cerning wages.

    Second,  he  knows  very  well  what  our  policy  in  the  factories  is,
    and  although  I  am  manager  and  he  is  labor-union  boss,  both  of  us
    work  for  the  interest  of  the  party  first,  and  the  interests  of  the  work-
    men come  second.

    And  third,  he  knows  very  well  that  all  rates  of  wages  are  fixed  by
    the  top  level  of  the  Government,  and  our  job  is  just  to  explain  to  the
    workmen  how  much  they  must  receive  and  how  much  they  must
    produce.

    Mr.  Taat^nner.  In  other  words,  the  decision  was  made  by  high  eche-
    lons in  Government  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  The  decision  was  made  before  the  union  man
    came  to  my  office,  and  he  knew  that  very  well.  He  also  knew  that  all
    our  work  in  the  factory,  the  norm  of  output,  the  conditions  of
    the  material,  and  the  price  of  this  material  had  been  discussed  pre-
    viously by  our  factory  party  meeting.  We  called  the  factory  party
    cell  "Little  Politburo,"  and  the  union  man  knew  I  would  pay  much
    more  to  every  workman,  but  I  couldn't  do  that.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  you  could  not  do  it  for  what  reason  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  For  a  very  simple  reason :  I  had  from  the  Gov-
    ernment the  prices  of  tubes  and  metal  and  everything.  I  also  had
    a  statement  of  how  many  workmen  I  must  use  and  how  much  I  may
    pay  them.     And  I  could  do  nothing  on  my  own  initiative.

    Mr.  Wolin  has  just  mentioned  that  the  labor  union  plays  an  active
    part  when  we  change  the  norm  of  production.  What  part  do  they
    play  ?     I  will  give  you  an  example.

    In  a  factory  employing  1,000  workmen,  300  workmen  produce,  say,
    130  percent,  500  workmen  produce  75  percent,  and  the  rest  produce
    something  in  between.

    Wlien  the  Government  decides  to  change  the  norm  of  production
    for  every  workman,  it  never  proceeds  from  the  average  output  of
    approximately  90  percent.  It  always  bases  its  decision  on  a  higher
    norm,  for  example,  120  percent.  This  120  percent  is  then  assigned
    for  all  of  them,  so  that  wages  are  very  profitable  for  the  Government,
    but  not  for  the  workmen.

    SHIPMENT    OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1191

    Thus,  changing  the  norm  of  production,  the  Government  always
    gets  a  greater  profit  because  before  increasing  wages,  it  increases
    the  norm  of  output.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  In  other  words,  there  cannot  be  any  decision  made
    by  management  and  labor  except  that  which  is  made  by  the  Gov-
    ernment ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  None.  The  same  orders  are  issued  by  the  party
    organization,  by  management,  and  by  the  labor  union  at  the  same
    time.

    Now,  before  we  talked  to  the  workmen,  we  had  a  session  of  the
    party  committee  on  the  factory.  At  this  meeting  the  secretary  of  the
    party,  the  boss  of  the  labor  union,  and  management  received  the
    same  order.

    Then  we  discussed  what  was  to  be  done  in  the  factory,  and  the  work-
    men must  accept  what  we  said.  The  "politburo"  of  the  factory
    consists  of  seven  or  nine  persons.  We  decided  Avhat  we  had  to  do  and
    we  said  to  the  Labor  union  boss:  "You  must  do  this;  you  must  do
    that."    AVe  said  to  management :  "You  do  so  and  so."

    I  would  come  to  my  office  and  invite  all  the  engineers  and  the  ad-
    ministration personnel  to  come  to  my  office.

    At  the  same  time,  the  labor-union  boss  would  gather  his  little
    bosses.

    The  party  secretary  would  invite  all  active  party  [speaking  in
    Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  The  organizers.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Party  organizers.  Everybody  would  receive  in-
    structions as  to  what  he  must  do  and  how  he  must  do  it.  After  the
    decision  of  the  "politburo"  was  made  we  opened  party  meetings  for
    all  members  of  the  party  and  we  said  to  them:  "We  have  received
    orders  from  the  commissariat  or  the  party.  We  have  discussed  this
    subject  at  a  closed  session  of  the  party  committee.  And  we  must
    make  the  following  decision."

    We  discussed  it  for  a  few  hours,  and  every  member  of  the  party
    knew  that  on  the  next  day  we  would  have  an  open  meeting  of  members
    of  the  party,  members  of  the  young  Communist  organization,  and  all
    workmen  who  were  not  members  of  the  party.  The  director  of  the
    factory  would  say  a  few  words ;  so  would  the  secretary  of  the  party
    say  a  few  words,  and  the  union  representative  [speaking  in  Russian].

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  Nobody  will  have  the  courage  to  say
    anything  against  the  resolution  of  the  party  committee.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Wliat  ha]:)pens  if  they  do?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  don't  say  there  is  no  opportunity  to  discuss  it
    in  a  closed  party  session.  But  when  all  was  decided  and  we  went  to
    the  open  meeting,  if  somebody  voiced  opposition,  some  member  of  the
    party  would  say :  "It  is  not  true  what  he  said,  because  we  work  at  the
    same  place  and  the  same  hours  and  I  produce  so  and  so  much.  He  is
    lazy  or  doesn't  pay  attention  to  his  machine."  Another  member  of
    the  party  would  get  up  and  also  discredit  the  opponent  and  what  he
    had  said.

    Mr.  Kearney.  What  happens  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Nothing  will  happen,  but  if  you  discredit  a  de-
    cision of  the  Government,  for  example,  if  you  say  the  Government  de-
    cision is  against  the  interest  of  workers,  you  will  be  arrested.

    1192  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Wood.  You  will  be  what  ?

    Mr.  Kravchknko.  You  will  be  arrested.  You  can't  say  anything
    against  a  Government  decision,  for  the  very  simple  reason  they  will
    accuse  you  as  an  agitator  or  propagandist  against  the  Government
    and  against  the  interests  of  the  workmen.

    Mr.  Kearney.  Assuming  a  workman  has  been  arrested,  what  hap-
    pens to  him  in  an  individual  case  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  That  is  very  difficult  to  say.  I  published  one
    book,  and  I  am  now  going  to  publish  another  book,  and  I  try  to  ex-
    plain this  question.  If  they  arrest  you  they  will  look  at  all  your  past,
    who  was  your  father,  who  was  your  mother,  who  is  your  sister  and
    brother,  where  they  are,  what  they  are  doing,  what  is  your  social
    past,  what  you  did  10  years  ago,  what  you  said  against  the  Soviet
    Government.  They  will  look  at  all  secret  files,  and  if  they  find  some-
    thing they  will  produce  it  and  they  will  accuse  you.

    For  example,  I  knew  a  man,  a  foreman,  his  name  was  Dubinsky.
    He  was  a  very  good  foreman.  He  worked  35  years,  had  great  experi-
    ence and  was  a  very  good  man,  and  when  the  factory  needed  his  help
    he  worked  24  hours  without  going  home  to  see  his  family.  He  was
    very  sincere  and  a  very  good  worker.  He  didn't  say  anything  directly
    against  the  Government.  He  just  said  once :  "The  pay  is  not  sufficient
    and  we  work  under  difficult  conditions."

    It  was  enough.  WTiat  did  he  get?  They  looked  at  his  past — I  was
    horn  in  1905 — they  found  that  in  1905  this  Dubinsky  belonged  to  some
    political  movement  which  was  against  the  Bolsheviks  and  in  1936 —
    31  years  later,  he  was  arrested.    I  don't  know  where  he  is  now.

    You  see  the  situation,  I  will  give  you  an  example.  I  started  my
    work  as  a  metalworker  in  1921.  I  did  not  come  from  a  rich  or
    aristocratic  class.  I  came  from  a  very  simple  family,  and  I  knew  very
    well  that  after  I  graduated  from  the  institute  and  became  a  member
    of  the  party,  I  had  not  just  my  duty  as  a  Russian  engineer;  I  realized
    my  social  duty  to  my  people,  because  I  was  one  of  them,  and  because
    after  so  many  years  life  was  terrible.  We  couldn't  do  anything  good
    even  if  we  tried.

    In  1939  I  came  to  a  new  factory.  We  built  that  factory  by  our
    blood  and  our  tears.  We  paid  everything  we  had  for  foreign
    machinery.  We  bought  it  in  the  United  States,  England,  and  else-
    where. I  came  to  this  factory  to  work,  and  found  these  people  [speak-
    ing in  Russian] ,

    Mr.  WoLiN  (translating).  In  the  bitter  Ural  winter  they  lived  in
    unheated  barns.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  There  was  not  enough  bread,  no  meat,  no  shoes,
    nothing.  And  I  was  asked  to  produce  100  percent  with  these  people.
    How  could  they  do  it?  And  sometimes  I  didn't  get  out  of  the  factory
    for  3  days  and  nights.  And  after  I  did  my  best  as  a  citizen  of  my
    country  and  sometimes  had  no  time  to  sleep  during  3  days'  work,  they
    arrested  me.

    I  found  similar  conditions  in  villages  where  peasants  worked  day
    and  night.  They  can't  come  in  at  8  o'clock  in  the  morning  and  work
    until  5  o'clock.  They  must  work  until  sunset  and  they  work  very
    hard.

    That  is  why  I  broke  with  the  Soviets.  I  give  you  human  reasons.
    If  you  want  me  to  give  political  reasons,  that  is  something  else.

    SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL  1193

    Mr.  TA\T:]srNER.  I  have  before  me  an  article  entitled  "Collective
    Contracts  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  for  the  year  1947,"  written  by  V.  V.
    Kuznetsov.     Do  you  know  the  author  of  this  article  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  I  don't  know  him  personally  but  I  know  who
    he  is.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  There  appears  in  this  article,  in  capital  letters,  in  the
    body  of  it,  this  statement :

    The  collective  contract  is  a  bilateral  agreement  made  by  tlie  management
    on  the  one  hand  and  by  the  trade-union  committee  of  the  enterprise,  repre-
    senting all  the  workers,  on  the  other  hand.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  First  of  all,  the  Soviet  labor  union  at  the  factory
    never  represented  the  real  interest  of  the  people.  If  it  does,  we  shall
    hear  of  a  real  revolution  in  the  Soviet  Union.  "Wlien  we  made  a  con-
    tract we  did  what  the  party  committee  asked  us  to  do.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  In  other  words  there  was  no  bilateral  agreement
    whatever ;  it  was  merely  what  the  Government  stated  they  should  agree
    to?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  This  is  fiction  for  people  outside  the  country  and
    for  many  idiots  inside  the  country ;  99  percent  or  95  percent  of  work-
    men in  Europe  or  in  any  country  in  the  world  don't  know  what  a
    Soviet  labor  union  is.  They  don't  know  what  the  Soviet  regime  is.
    They  don't  know  either  its  domestic  or  foreign  policy;  they  know
    nothing.

    The  policy  of  the  Soviet  Government  in  the  labor-union  problems  is
    very  smart.  Wliat  Mr.  Kuznetsov  said  for  people  abroad,  that  is
    one  side  of  the  picture.  What  Mr.  Kuznetsov  did  in  his  own  country
    against  the  interests  of  Russian  workmen,  that  is  the  other  side  of
    the  picture.  That  is  typical  of  the  double  talk  of  the  Soviet  Govern-
    ment before  their  owii  people.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  Is  the  statement  I  read  to  you  a  correct  statement?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Absolutely  not ;  absolutely  not.  How  is  it  pos-
    sible ?  How  can  the  labor  union  decide  about  the  wages  of  the  work-
    men ?

    Mr.  Moulder.  I  think  he  very  clearly  covered  that  a  while  ago.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  All  right.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  We  had  the  plan ;  it  stated  how  much  we  must
    produce;  how  much  it  should  cost  per  piece,  per  ton,  or  per  pound;
    how  many  tons  of  steel  we  must  use ;  how  many  tons  of  ore ;  how  many
    workmen  should  produce  1  ton  of  metal ;  how  much  the  ton  must  cost ;
    all  the  details.

    (Representative  Kearney  leaves  hearing  room.)

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  want  to  ask  one  more  question  before  introduc-
    ing these  photographs.  Were  the  laborers  in  your  factory  free  to
    change  their  place  of  employment  or  quit  work  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  No.  I  had  to  determine  their  fate — where  they
    must  w^ork,  what  they  must  produce,  and  what  wages  I  must  pay  them.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  would  like  for  you  to  look  at  these  photographs
    and  identify  the  persons  whose  pictures  appear  there  and,  with  your
    permission,  I  would  like  to  photostat  these  and  return  the  originals
    to  you.

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Please.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  I  show  you  a  photograph  marked  "No.  1."  Will
    you  identify  the  persons  who  appear  in  that  photograph?

    1194  SHIPMENT   OF   ATOMIC   MATERIAL

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  This  is  Romanov,  who  was  head  of  the  metal
    department.  This  is  Vasilenko,  Semen  Vasilenko,  whom  we  were  talk-
    ing about.

    Mr.  Tavenner,  Will  you  identify  the  persons  who  appear  in  this
    photograph  marked  "No.  2"  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  General  Rudenko,  chairman  of  the  Soviet  Pur-
    chasing Commission.  By  the  way,  Rudenko  is  not  a  real  general.
    He  is  a  political  general.  He  received  a  decoration  in  Stalingrad,
    not  because  he  was  a  hero;  the  hero  was  the  simple  Russian  soldier
    who  died  for  our  country  but  not  for  this  regime,  and  Mr.  Rudenko
    received  the  decoration.

    Mr.  TA^^:NNER.  Will  you  identify  the  persons  who  appear  in  photo-
    graph No.  3  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  Nicolai  Kolybalov.

    Mr.  Tavenner.  And  No.  4?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  The  same  Vasilenko.

    Mr.  TA^^:NNER.  And  photograph  No.  5  ?

    Mr.  Kravchenko.  General  Rudenko  and  Romanov.

    Mr.  TA^^NNER.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  desire  to  offer  these  photographs
    in  evidence  as  Kravchenko  exhibits  1  to  5,  inclusive,  and  ask  permis-
    sion to  substitute  photostats  and  return  the  originals.

    Mr.  Wood.  The  photostats  will  be  admitted.

    (The  photostats  of  photographs  above  referred  to,  marked  "Krav-
    chenko Exhibits  1  to  5  inclusive,"  are  filed  herewith.)  ^-

    Mr.  Wood.  Mr.  Kravchenko,  permit  me  to  express  the  appreciation
    of  the  committee  for  5^our  appearance.

    The  committee  will  stand  adjourned  subject  to  call.

    (Thereupon,  at  4  p.  m.  on  Tuesday,  March  7,  1950,  an  adjournment
    was  taken.)

    "2  See  appendix.
    X

    (:

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