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THE BALANCE OF POWER

August 1948 to October 1950

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THE BALANCE OF POWER: AUGUST 1948 TO OCTOBER 1950

Following the death of Andrei Zhdanov, Malenkov rapidly re-occupied a prominent position in the Soviet hierarchy and apparently was allowed to re-establish control over the Party apparatus by carrying out a purge of important Zhdanov adherents. In this process Nikolai Voznesensky, Chairman of Gosplan and a member of the Politburo since only February 1947, disappeared. There was no subsequent reference to him until December 1952, when an article published by M. A. Suslov attacked the so-called Voznesensky deviation.

Concurrently with the Party purge in February and March 1949, several changes were made in governmental appointments. Voznesensky's case has already been mentioned. In March 1949, Molotov, Bulganin and Mikoyan all surrendered their respective ministerial portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Armed Forces, and Foreign Trade.

Through this period - August 1948 to October 1950 - there were two significant changes in the order of listing of the Politburo members. First, Malenkov moved up to fourth position in Politburo listings in mid-1948 (after Molotov and Beria) and then moved to third position (after Molotov) in mid-1949. Second, Bulganin rose markedly in Politburo listings in late 1949, and A. A. Andreev dropped markedly at the same time. However, neither Andreev nor Bulganin were at that time - 1948 to 1950 - among the Big Five.

Despite the Party purge and the ministerial changes, however, the basic balance in the distribution of power among the top five members of the Politburo probably remained substantially unchanged.

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Molotov, even though he experienced some reduction in prominence, held his post as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and presumably remained largely responsible for foreign affairs.

Malenkov, while resuming control over personnel matters and widening his interests to include a wide variety of problems, maintained his previous interest in agriculture.

Beria remained in charge of the security function, forced labor, atomic energy, and transport. A minor change in Beria's responsibilities occurred in February 1950 when timber industry matters were transferred to Pervukhin.

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Kaganovich remained responsible for building materials, and also was Chief of the State Committee for Material-Technical Supply (Gossnab). This committee was responsible for the planning and allocation of material for the Soviet economy.

Mikoyan was in charge of the fish, meat, dairy and food industries, and presumably also retained responsibility for internal and foreign trade. He was identified in foreign trade matters in February 1950.

On the second level of the Politburo, however, a number of changes took place in the distribution of power:

Andreev retained his interest in agriculture and his post as Chairman of the Council for Collective Farm Affairs, but was publicly rebuked in a Pravda article of 19 February 1950 for pursuing an incorrect line on agricultural labor questions.

Voznesensky disappeared in March 1949, and was replaced as Chairman of Gosplan by M. Z. Saburov, a reported Malenkov adherent.

Khrushchev was transferred from the Ukrainian Party organization to replace G. M. Popov as All-Union Secretary and as Secretary of the important Moscow Oblast Committee. Khrushchev also became the Politburo spokesman on agricultural policy, following Andreev's humiliation.

Bulganin and Kosygin both apparently retained their responsibilities for national defense and light industry respectively; Suslov, not a Politburo member, became the leading Soviet functionary who most often represented the USSR at Satellite political ceremonies. Other newcomers to sub-Politburo level were Ponomarenko and Shkiryatov.

Aside from the political events mentioned in the above paragraphs, the chief events and developments of the period under review were the following:

1. The adoption by the USSR, sometime in late 1948, of a rearmaments program. This program was apparently scheduled for completion by 1952.
2. The withdrawal of the USSR from its exposed position in Europe, i.e., the liquidation of the Berlin blockade and the Greek Civil War.

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3. The internal consolidation of the East European Satellites, and the initiation of programs calculated to integrate their economies with that of the USSR.

4. The triumph of the Chinese Communists on the mainland, and the proclamation of the Peoples Republic of China in October 1949.

5. The attack on South Korea by the North Korean Government on 25 June 1950, the subsequent intervention of the UN, and the commitment of the Chinese Communist armies in October 1950.

MALENKOV'S RISE

The clearest indication of Malenkov's rise to prominence is found in the official listings of the Politburo members published from time to time. Prior to Zhdanov's death, Malenkov had usually occupied a position in the Politburo varying from fifth to ninth. In late 1948, however, he moved to the number four position, following Molotov (number two) and Beria (number three). Malenkov then changed places with Beria in early 1949, but shortly thereafter dropped again to number four position. He moved back to third position in mid-1949 and held it until the time of Stalin's death.

During this period, Malenkov's name again began to appear [REDACTED]
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Malenkov had reappeared as a Party Secretary in July 1948 and, from the time of Zhdanov's death on, joint decrees issued by the Government and the Central Committee were signed by Stalin for the Council of Ministers, and by Malenkov for the Central Committee of the Party.

On 7 November 1949, Malenkov delivered the speech on the anniversary of the Revolution, which in previous years had been given by Molotov. In December 1949, in a series of articles written by the various Politburo members on the occasion of Stalin's seventieth birthday, Malenkov's article preceded all others, including even Molotov's, in both the Pravda and Bolshevik versions.

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The same trend was also evident in the propaganda treatment accorded Malenkov. On the occasion of Malenkov's 50th birthday in January 1952, for example, a propaganda statement was made that Malenkov had been "a faithful pupil of Lenin," an outright fabrication, of course. All this culminated in the selection of Malenkov as the person to give the keynote speech on behalf of the Central Committee at the long overdue Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952.

COMMUNIST PARTY CHANGES OF 1949

A summary review of key Communist Party appointments between 1944 and 1952 demonstrates conclusively that a shift of some magnitude in the control of the Party took place in 1949. This apparently involved the removal of the so-called Zhdanov clique. Important changes took place in the All-Union Secretariat, the secretarial appointments in the Moscow and Leningrad City and Oblast organizations and in the Ukrainian organization, and in the Chief Political Administration of the Soviet Army.

Prior to 1949 there was a certain pattern of continuity in the appointments of First Secretaries in the Moscow and Leningrad Party organizations. In each case when a First Secretary was promoted to a position of greater influence (or, as in the case of Shcherbakov, who died in 1945)^{1/}, the second ranking man in the organization took over. When these shifts took place, there were no known significant upsets in the staffing of these Party organs. This clearly indicates continuity and stability in the political power structure through these changes.

In 1949, however, there was an abrupt change in this pattern and an abrupt end to the careers of A. A. Kuznetsov, All-Union Secretary, G. M. Popov, All-Union Secretary and Secretary of the Moscow City and Oblast organizations, and P. S. Popkov, Leningrad

^{1/} Shcherbakov had held, at the time of his death, the Moscow City and Oblast Secretaryship. He was also the Chief of the Army Political Administration, a Secretary of the Central Committee and an alternate member of the Politburo. Shcherbakov was Zhdanov's son-in law.

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Oblast Secretary. Both A. A. Kuznetsov and P. S. Popkov utterly disappeared in early 1949.^{1/} Beginning in December 1949, G. M. Popov was demoted to a succession of third-order positions; he disappeared in 1951.^{2/} N. S. Khrushchev moved up from the Ukraine to replace G. M. Popov as Secretary of the Moscow Oblast organization and as a member of the All-Union Secretariat.^{3/} The pattern which had previously applied to Moscow and Leningrad held true in the Ukraine following Khrushchev's departure: the Second Secretary in the Ukraine, L. G. Melnikov, stepped into Khrushchev's former position, and thus continuity of political leadership was maintained there.

In Leningrad, the City and Oblast First Secretary positions were taken by a newcomer to Leningrad, V. N. Andrianov. Andrianov held both positions until June 1950, when he surrendered the City Secretaryship to F. R. Kozlov, following the precedent established in Moscow when Khrushchev was moved in there. Both the Moscow and Leningrad Party organizations were completely shaken up following the displacement of the incumbent Secretaries and the introduction of the "outsiders" to directing positions.

The Chief Political Administration of the Army had been held during the war by Shcherbakov. Upon his death in May 1945, the position was taken by Colonel General Shikin, who held it until early 1949. In 1949, Colonel General F. F. Kuznetsov, who had been the Chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate since 1945, took over this position and held it, so far as is known, through 1952.

1/ [redacted] Party and other figures were arrested in early 1949. [redacted] January and February 1949 appeared to be months of unusual police activity.

2/ G. M. Popov reappeared in June 1953, upon his appointment as Ambassador to Poland.

3/ This constituted another departure from the previous pattern. Khrushchev did not assume both the Moscow City and Oblast Secretaryships, but rather, a Rummyantsov was appointed to Moscow City position some months later. This point does not affect the argument.

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He was last identified in this position in September 1952.^{1/}

The coincidence of all these changes occurring in 1949 arouses interest in the political careers and connections of the persons affected. Of the persons concerned --- A. A. Kuznetsov, P. S. Popkov, Col. Gen. Shikin and G. M. Popov --- all have direct or secondary connections with Andrei Zhdanov:

A. A. Kuznetsov succeeded Zhdanov as Secretary in the Leningrad Oblast organization, having held positions in Leningrad since at least 1940. (For example, he was Secretary of the City Committee in 1940 and 1943.)

P. S. Popkov succeeded Kuznetsov in both the City and Oblast positions, after having been Chairman of the Leningrad Executive Committee since 1941.

Colonel General Shikin had been Political Officer on the Leningrad Front during the war and succeeded Shcherbakov in the Army Political Administration.

G. M. Popov, who succeeded Shcherbakov in the Moscow Party positions, was, along with Molotov, A. A. Kuznetsov and Marshal Govorov, a speaker at Zhdanov's funeral in September 1948.

G. M. Popov and A. A. Kuznetsov both became members of the Orgburo and All-Union Secretariat in March of 1946, and remained there throughout Zhdanov's tenure as First Secretary.

N. A. Voznesensky, who disappeared in March 1949, was also associated with Zhdanov. He first attained a prominent position in 1935 as Chairman of the Leningrad City Planning Commission, and later moved up to become the Chief of Gosplan. He was made a member of the Politburo in February 1947, at the height of Zhdanov's eminence. Further aspects of the Voznesensky case will be discussed in connection with the governmental changes of March 1949.

^{1/} On 16 July 1953, Colonel General A. S. Zheltov was identified as Chief of the Political Administration of the newly organized Ministry of Defense. F. F. Kuznetsov appeared in an obituary on 22 July 1953, and probably has remained as Chief of the Army Political Administration.

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GOVERNMENT CHANGES IN 1949

In March, Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov, Minister of Foreign Trade Mikoyan and Minister of War Bulganin relinquished their direct control of ministries. They remained as Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, which still left them in the governmental picture, and, of course, they retained their Politburo positions. Voznesensky, however, was relieved of his positions as Chairman of Gosplan and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers at this time. Subsequently, he was not present at the various appearances of the Politburo, and he was not thereafter listed among the Politburo members. Of the various changes that took place in 1949, those affecting Molotov and Voznesensky are the most important and interesting.

Molotov had been Stalin's chief lieutenant in the Soviet governmental apparatus since the late twenties. He had been Prime Minister, i.e., Chairman of the Council of People's Commissariats, in the 1930's. In 1939, Stalin took over leadership of the Government as Prime Minister, and Molotov became Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position he held through and after the war.

Molotov may have been involved in a conflict concerning Soviet policy toward the Marshall Plan. There is information indicating disparate views in Moscow regarding the Marshall Plan and suggesting that Molotov may have been instrumental in the Soviet decision to oppose the plan.

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It is worth noting that both Poland and Czechoslovakia initially accepted invitations to attend the July conference on the Marshall Plan, and later suddenly withdrew their acceptances. According to the published transcript of the Moscow discussions which culminated in order to Czechoslovakia to withdraw from the July conference, Stalin stated that it had become evident, upon receipt of information from Paris, that the purpose of the Marshall Plan was to aid the formation of a Western bloc and to isolate the Soviet Union. Stalin then told the Czechs that their country's participation in the Marshall Plan would be an unfriendly act against the USSR. Molotov had been the Soviet representative at the preliminary discussion on the Marshall Plan, held in Paris in June 1947.

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Molotov's failure to deliver the annual 7 November anniversary speech in 1949 may be one indication that he had lost some degree of influence. At the end of the war, Molotov took over from Stalin the honor of delivering this speech; he gave it in 1945, 1947 and 1948.^{1/} Thereafter the honor was rotated among younger Politburo members, Malenkov giving it in 1949.^{2/} It is quite possible, of course, that Molotov -- aging and, [REDACTED] ill -- was no longer capable of handling this speech.^{3/} Nevertheless, his withdrawal from public prominence was evident and was commented upon by a number of sources, including Russian defectors.

However, in spite of having relinquished direct control of Foreign Affairs, Molotov remained as First Deputy Chairman to Stalin on the Council of Ministers. Furthermore, he also appeared to have suffered no change in formal political status, since he was listed first after Stalin in all Politburo listings up until Stalin's death. A possible explanation of this is suggested by speculation current in 1949 to the effect that Molotov was being relieved of the day-to-day administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that he could concentrate on broad policy-planning functions -- in particular, relations with the Chinese Communists, who at that time were beginning to show signs that they would take over the mainland that year.

This speculation is supported by information put out through an informal Soviet channel. In April 1949, Madame Kollontai, who had been former Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm and who had occasionally been used by the Soviet Government to contact foreign embassies, called in the Swedish Ambassador in an obvious effort to comment on the various governmental changes that had taken place the month before. Among other things, she said that Molotov had been relieved of responsibility for day-to-day problems in order to concentrate on

^{1/} Zhdanov delivered the speech in 1946.

^{2/} At the 7 November 1949 parade, Molotov was present on the reviewing stand, but departed some two-and-a-half hours before the demonstrations were over. Malenkov stood next to Molotov, but, according to the US Military Attache, noticeably shunned and turned his back on him.

^{3/} [REDACTED] reported that Molotov has heart, stomach and liver trouble, and that he was ill in 1948 and 1949. He failed to appear with the Politburo on two occasions in mid-1949. He frequently has been reported resting at Karlovy Vary, in Czechoslovakia.

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"essential and fundamental problems," in particular relations with Communist China. She added that both Molotov and Mikoyan were quite busy in connection with the forthcoming Party Congress (which, it may be noted, did not take place until October 1952).

Furthermore, Molotov was identified in matters related to foreign policy after his release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even though no longer Foreign Minister of the USSR, he attended a conference of Foreign Ministers of the East European Satellites, held in Prague in late October 1950. The same "VIP" plane that carried the Soviet delegation to Prague had earlier been noted in the Soviet Far East (in the period from 2 to 9 October), suggesting that Molotov may have been in the Far East at that time.^{1/}

THE VOZNESENSKY CASE

The problem of explaining Voznesensky's disappearance in 1949 has been complicated further by the appearance of his name in December 1952 and in January-February 1953 in connection with the so-called "Voznesensky deviation," i.e., his alleged deviation from Stalin's views on Marxism and the economic laws of socialism. Voznesensky, as we have already had occasion to note, first achieved prominence as Chairman of the City Planning Commission in Leningrad in 1935. Subsequently, he went to Moscow to head the State Planning Commission and during the war he served on the State Defense Committee, the all-powerful "war cabinet". He was not one of the original members of the committee, having joined it on 4 February 1943. In March 1949, he disappeared from sight and his name was not mentioned in the Soviet press until the December 1952 attack on his views by M. A. Suslov in Pravda.

Three principal hypotheses have been advanced to explain Voznesensky's political demise. The first hypothesis is that Voznesensky was associated with the so-called Zhdanov clique in Moscow, in opposition to Malenkov, and that following Zhdanov's death in 1948 and his apparent disgrace, Voznesensky was purged. The second hypothesis is that Voznesensky had made many mistakes in Gosplan and, according to some sources, had badly advised Stalin and the other leaders in regard to the Soviet economic situation and capabilities. The third hypothesis is that Voznesensky opposed Stalin either on ideological questions regarding the nature of the economic problems and the laws

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and policies of a Socialist state or on practical policy matters affecting the Soviet economy and the planning function.

The first hypothesis, that Voznesensky was associated with the Zhdanov group, is supported by the circumstantial evidence of Voznesensky's career -- and particularly by the fact that his disappearance was concurrent with a series of other important political shifts of early 1949, which in turn clearly indicated the unseating of a powerful political group. During the war, [redacted] that Voznesensky was a supporter of Malenkov, [redacted] later reports stated that he switched sides when Zhdanov returned to Moscow and took over control of the Soviet Communist Party. [redacted]

[redacted] Saburov, it will be remembered, took part in the dismantling of German industry, as the Berlin representative of the Special Committee in Moscow headed by Malenkov. Saburov replaced Voznesensky as Chairman of Gosplan in March 1949 and held this position until Stalin's death. For many years he had been associated with Gosplan, moving in and out of it, as a Deputy Chairman, several times. Not all aspects of Saburov's history are clear and it is impossible to say just what his relations with Voznesensky were. At the most, his history tends to support this first hypothesis.

There is considerable evidence to support the second hypothesis that Voznesensky had made serious mistakes in Gosplan and had perhaps presented an incorrectly optimistic picture of the Soviet economy. [redacted]

the Soviet Government had reformulated its economic plans and tightened its plan controls, and that there had been changes in the Soviet planning structure in late 1948 and early 1949. These changes affected the organizational aspects of the planning function; certain of them had actually begun in January 1948. In late 1948, the State Statistical Commission was removed from the jurisdiction of Gosplan and placed under the Council of Ministers. In the beginning of 1949, the wholesale price structure was reformed: the prices on producers goods were increased and a movement was begun to abolish subsidies for these industries. This economy drive was accompanied by the imposition of stricter controls over enterprises and their costs and inventories; the plan fulfillment report published in April 1949 stated that "new additional plant capacity has come to light," resulting in increased plan targets for the first quarter of 1949.

Madame Kollontai, in her talk with the Swedish Ambassador, said that Voznesensky had been removed because he was "no executive and Gosplan had made many mistakes under his administration." A Soviet engineer who defected from the USSR in 1949, reported hearing that

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Voznesensky had been removed because he had attempted to deceive Stalin regarding the degree of the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan. Finally, in late 1948 and early 1949, just preceding Voznesensky's disappearance, Soviet propaganda media embarked on a very short-lived campaign for the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan in four years. The "five year plan in four years" theme was first voiced by Molotov in the 7 November 1948 anniversary speech. This was followed by intensive propaganda on this theme through November, December and up until the publication of a Gosplan report in mid-January 1949. In the 21 January 1949 speech on the anniversary of Lenin's death, however, the theme was not mentioned and, while there were occasional references to it in subsequent months, for all practical purposes it had disappeared from Soviet propaganda. The cessation of this propaganda in mid-January, taken with the above-mentioned indications of organizational and economic readjustment in 1948, tends to support the hypothesis that there had been serious mistakes in planning and perhaps a seriously distorted picture of the state of the economy at the top level of the Government.

The third hypothesis -- that Voznesensky was disgraced because he opposed Stalin either on theoretical questions or on practical policy decisions -- was given a great deal of additional weight by the December 1952 disclosures, which have already been noted. One version of this hypothesis is that Voznesensky opposed the inauguration of a limited rearmament program by the USSR in the latter half of 1948 and instead favored the further development of consumer goods industries. This hypothesis will be discussed in two parts, the first devoted to its theoretical and ideological aspects, and the second to the practical policy problem.

The so-called "Voznesensky deviation" is drawn from his book, The War Economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, which was published in 1947 and which received a Stalin prize in May 1948. According to this book, planning is an economic law of socialism and one of the chief characteristics differentiating the socialist from the capitalist system. Capitalism, in Communist dogma, is unable to plan and is characterized by a veritable anarchy of competing monopolistic interests.^{1/} In a sense, the assertion that planning is an "economic law" of socialism is a natural one for economic planners to hold; Voznesensky appears to have been the chief exponent of this point of view. A series of articles by members of Gosplan, published

^{1/} The question whether or not it is possible for a capitalist government to plan had been one of the major issues in the Varga dispute.

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in journals, monographs and books, likewise explicitly stated that "planning is an economic law of Socialism."

This thesis was categorically denounced by Stalin in his Economic Problems of Socialism, written in February 1952 as commentary on a conference of economists held in November 1951, but not published until October 1952. Stalin also denounced a number of other views, including the view that "the proportional development of the economy" was an economic law of socialism and the view that the Socialist state was able "to do anything." Stalin ascribed this latter view to numerous young and inexperienced Communists who had been "dazzled" by the accomplishments of the USSR. In an article written in December 1952, Suslov attacked P. Fedoseev for writing articles on Stalin's Economic Problems without admitting that he, Fedoseev, had himself been one of the persons who had held the erroneous points of view. In his article, Suslov quoted the text of a Central Committee decree issued in July 1949 which removed several leading figures from the editorial board of Bolshevik, the theoretical Communist Party journal, for disseminating Voznesensky's views and for "praising his book to the skies."

The 1949 decree also mentioned D. T. Shepilov, who at that time was Chief of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee apparatus (Agitprop). Shepilov subsequently lost his job in Agitprop, probably as a result of this decree. He too had been criticized, among other things, for "praising Voznesensky's book to the skies" and recommending it to the Party apparatus for study.

The hypothesis that Voznesensky was removed for ideological deviation and heresy and for developing points of view contrary to Stalin's appears to be unfounded. It is true that Voznesensky had argued that planning is the economic law of socialism and that the principle of "the proportional development of the economy" is another economic law of socialism. There is no evidence, however, to support the contention that these views were critical theoretical issues in late 1948 or early 1949. These "heresies" were expounded, for example, in a book written in 1946 by A. Kursky, a prominent economic theorist of Gosplan. A revised version of Kursky's book published in 1949 was changed only to the extent that it was brought up to date by use of contemporary examples. Kursky's contention that planning is an economic law of socialism was not expurgated. As one study of the development of economic theory in the USSR has pointed out: "Voznesensky's personal fortunes do not appear to have affected the general climate of opinion." The study pointed out, for example, that on 8 October 1949, six months after Voznesensky's fall, Pravda carried an editorial eulogizing the power of planning and

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minimizing the so-called "objective" factors in the development of the Soviet economy. The editorial went on to say that Soviet man had become master of his fate and that this was the greatest achievement of the revolution and Socialism.^{1/} The lines of thought which supposedly represent the Voznesensky deviation continued to appear in Soviet theoretical journals and in various propaganda articles through 1951 and into 1952. As late as issue No. 4 of Vopresi Ekonomiki (April 1952) the "erroneous" doctrine is expounded.

It is extremely difficult to believe that if Voznesensky had been removed for theoretical, ideological deviation in 1949, a directive would not have been issued at that time which would have proscribed these views.^{2/} In other words, it appears that the deviation of which Voznesensky was accused was something manufactured in 1952, or late 1951, rather than in 1949 or 1948. This itself is a fact of considerable significance and the problem will be taken up subsequently.

There is very little evidence to either support or refute the hypothesis that Voznesensky opposed Stalin or others on questions of practical policy regarding the Soviet economy and, in particular, regarding rearmament. It is perhaps unreasonable to suppose that Voznesensky would have opposed the necessity for rearmament. There is no reason to believe that he would have arrogated to himself the problem of evaluating the intentions of foreign governments, in particular of the US. Rearmament began in 1948, probably nine months before Voznesensky disappeared; it is possible that he became involved in controversy regarding the manner in which this program should be carried out. It is also possible to read into his book an heretical point of view on agriculture (e.g., praise of the war-time system), but there is no evidence that Voznesensky was involved in such a controversy. The agriculture controversy did not

^{1/} Soviet Studies, April 1953, "A Political Economy in the Making", J. Miller.

^{2/} The decree of July 1949 reproving Bolshevik and Agitprop does not meet this test. In this decree, praise of Voznesensky's book was only one of the many "shortcomings" criticized; the reason given was that this praise was unjustified. The book itself was not denounced. Suslov's article in December 1952, on the other hand, described Voznesensky's views as "un-Marxist", while discussions in January 1953 said that they were "anti-Marxist". Thus, the evolution of a "deviation".

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the end of 1951 or early 1952. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reported that the Russians intended to have their fighter units completely re-equipped with jet aircraft by 1951. An independent source commenting on Soviet military developments reported that he had heard important Russians speaking quite openly in 1948 of the prospects of another war and that the USSR was to be completely prepared by the end of 1951. A third [REDACTED] reporting on a conference which Stalin had held with Satellite leaders in September 1948 at Sochi, said that one of the chief purposes of the conference was to plan for the consolidation and integration of the Satellite economies with the Soviet economy. In addition he reported that Stalin had assigned Czechoslovakia the task of completely transforming its economy to heavy industry in order to contribute to the military potential of the USSR, and that this program was to be completed in three and a half years. This would place the target date in the spring of 1952. This supposition on the target date of the program is supported by the completion of a number of projects and by the appearance of substantial amounts of new model equipment in 1951 and 1952.

There are a few other indications suggesting that, in 1948, Soviet leaders became more concerned over the possibility of war with the West. In October 1948 orders were given to develop a stay-behind network in Germany, in the event that the Soviet Army vacated Germany. [REDACTED]

a ministerial decree was issued in 1948, which criticized the operation of Ministry of State Security (MGB) personnel for shortcomings in security administration. This decree reportedly charged security officers with professional laxity and lack of discipline, and called for "reconstruction" of State Security operations "aimed at the imperialistic intelligence." According to this report, all foreigners in the USSR were to be placed under close observation. [REDACTED]

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On the other hand, available evidence does not indicate that the rearmament program was so great that all other aspects of economic development were subordinated to it. The major emphasis of the Soviet economy remained on heavy industrial development, which was long-range in nature. Thus the possibility exists that the rearmament program was little more than one for re-equipment of the Soviet armed forces with modern weapons. Bulganin, speaking on the thirtieth anniversary of the Red Army on 23 February 1948, said that

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the army had completed its conversion to a peace-time basis, and was beginning to re-equip itself with the latest weapons.

At any rate, while the exact character and scope of the Soviet rearmament effort remains an unsolved problem, there is no reason to presume that it was a highly controversial issue within the Kremlin.

THE AGRICULTURAL CONTROVERSY

After Voznesensky's ouster, the only striking manifestation of possible dissension within the Politburo was the criticism levied against A. A. Andreev, on agricultural matters, by Pravda on 19 February 1950. It may be recalled that Andreev, Commissar for Agriculture during the war, was made Chairman of the Council for Collective Farm Affairs in October 1946. He apparently remained the Politburo spokesman on agricultural matters, even after Malenkov's entry into agricultural problems in 1947.

The Pravda article, entitled "Against Distortions in Collective Farm Labor Organization," was an attack on the so-called "link" or "team" system of collective farming, as opposed to the "brigade" system. The practice denounced was that of parcelling out parts of a collective farm to small teams, or sub-groups, of collective farmers. The team system had been endorsed by the Party since at least 1939, and had been reaffirmed in decrees of 1947 and 1948. The Pravda article took exception to the indiscriminate application of this system to grain farming and to areas where the Kolkhozes were supplied with adequate agricultural machinery. It was argued that the system precluded the effective utilization of agricultural machinery and made overall control of the farmers impossible.

The article went on to say that "the incorrect views expressed in this matter by Comrade A. A. Andreev cannot be overlooked." It then proceeded to document the history of Andreev's incorrect views from 1939 to 1949. The author of the article is unknown.^{1/}

Following the attack on Andreev and his subsequent recantation, which appeared in Pravda on 25 February 1950, a movement was begun by N. S. Khrushchev, as Chairman of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee, to enlarge the collective farms in the Moscow Oblast by merging or

^{1/} Stylistic characteristics of the article tentatively suggest authorship by Khrushchev.

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amalgamating the small farms. Khrushchev outlined this new policy in Pravda on 25 April 1950. Although some observers suggested that this was an experimental program applied only in Moscow Oblast, Khrushchev revealed in a December 1950 speech that a Central Committee decree on kolkhoz amalgamation had been issued, and implied that the policy was being implemented throughout the USSR. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] indicated that the program was already underway there.

The open censure of A. A. Andreev for his "incorrect" policy probably represented more than an effort to provide a scapegoat for a change in policy: such public censures of Politburo figures are quite rare, and there are numerous cases of dramatic reversals in Soviet policy with no effort made to provide a scapegoat; such changes are frequently justified on the grounds that "new conditions" require the change, while in many cases there will be complete denial that any change has been effected at all.

Andreev's humiliation would appear, therefore, to reflect fundamental political controversy, and presumably it signaled the temporary triumph of one political faction over an opposing one. Thus, after Andreev's censure, Khrushchev became the top-level spokesman for agriculture, even though Andreev remained Chairman of the Council for Collective Farms Affairs.^{1/}

The further development of the agricultural controversy takes us beyond 1950. The problem will be considered further in the CAESAR Report covering the period from October 1950 to December 1952.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE KOREAN WAR

A distinct change in Soviet foreign policy took place in 1949, involving a shift in Soviet effort and attention from Western Europe to the Far East. This shift coincided with the victory of the Chinese Communists on the mainland. In Europe, the Berlin blockade and the Greek Civil War were brought to an end in 1949, and from then on, Soviet diplomatic activity in Europe was negligible, entailing only a few sporadic propagandistic gestures. In the East European

^{1/} Agriculture was not a new field of activity for Khrushchev. He was assigned to the Ukraine in 1938; in 1939, according to available records, he began writing on agricultural problems and, subsequently, he became known as an agricultural specialist.

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Satellites the degree of Soviet control was increased, opposition elements were severely repressed, and efforts were begun to integrate the Satellite economies with that of the USSR.

Some observers attribute this foreign policy shift to the disappearance of Zhdanov's influence and the rise of Malenkov. Malenkov, it is said, saw an opportunity for major international successes in the Far East, whereas Zhdanov and Molotov reportedly had ignored the Far East and concentrated their attention on Europe.

For example, Dedijer's biography of Tito alleges that Stalin admitted, at a February 1948 conference, that he and the other Soviet leaders had underestimated the future prospects of the Chinese Communist revolution. In the summer of 1948, Stalin signed a condolence telegram to Fogliatti, whereas it was Malenkov who signed a similar telegram in July 1948 to the Secretary General of the Japanese Communist Party, Tokuda.

The existence of such a foreign policy controversy is substantiated only by fragmentary indications of this kind. There is no reliable intelligence on this question, and the shift in Soviet policy which did in fact occur was clearly as much a result of circumstances as of anything else: The Berlin blockade had not only been a failure, but had also been a strong irritant to the West and had created a possibly explosive situation. The conclusion of the Greek Civil War was simply a matter of time after Yugoslavia withdrew its support. The militant Communist policy in France and Italy had failed. In the Far East, however, new possibilities appeared as the Chinese Communists neared final success.

Soviet Politburo members who regularly appeared at Chinese Communist parties and receptions from 1949 on were Molotov, Mikoyan and Bulganin. It will be remembered that Madame Kollontai specifically mentioned Chinese Communist affairs in discussing Molotov; further, Molotov was tentatively identified in the Far East in early August and in early October 1950.

The Soviet Ambassador to China from February 1948 to June 1952 was N. V. Roshchin.^{1/} The Soviet Political Representative in Japan,

^{1/} Roshchin was renamed Ambassador to the Chinese Peoples Republic after relations with the Nationalist Government were severed in October 1949. Roshchin was replaced as Ambassador to China in June 1952 by A. S. Panyushkin, who had formerly been Ambassador to the United States. Roshchin was identified on 7 October 1952 as Chief of the Southeast Asia Division of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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Derevyanko, was assigned to this post in 1946 and remained there until May 1950. The Soviet representative in Pyongyang, Colonel General T. F. Shtykov, had been the Chief of the Soviet delegation to the Joint Commission on Korea and Commander of Soviet Forces in Korea from 1946 until 1948, at which time he was designated Ambassador to the North Korean Government.^{1/} Shtykov presumably remained Soviet Ambassador to Korea until August 1951; at that time a new Ambassador, V. N. Razuvaev, was identified.

The above data would appear to establish that there was no change in the Kremlin in late 1948 or early 1949, in the persons responsible for Far Eastern affairs. This conclusion tends to discount the hypothesis that there had been important policy differences relating to the Far East and that the shift in Soviet attention to the Far East was a result of Malenkov's rise.

The new expansive policy in the Far East culminated in the North Korean invasion of South Korea. There is little reason to believe that the proposal for the invasion would have provoked violent controversy in the Kremlin. There were sound military reasons for the Soviet leaders to desire to control all of Korea. (The same military considerations apply equally well to the Chinese Communists.) Furthermore, there is convincing circumstantial evidence that the Soviet leaders did not expect UN intervention in Korea; all evidence would appear to suggest that they expected the Korean invasion to be a short, fast campaign which would result in the consolidation of the entire peninsula under Soviet control.

[REDACTED]

Numerous press rumors and reports from [REDACTED] placed Molotov in Peiping in late July or early August 1950. Then in early October 1950, just before the Chinese

1/ Shtykov may well have been a member of Zhdanov's so-called Leningrad clique. He had been a Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Committee in 1939; during the war he was a member of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front and also a Political Officer there, presumably under Colonel General Shikin. In 1945 he was identified as a member of the Military Council of the First Far Eastern Front.

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Communist intervention in Korea, he was again tentatively identified in the Soviet Far East.

Despite the evidence suggesting Molotov's presence at these presumed policy conferences in the Far East, there are no grounds for concluding that Molotov himself was the primary sponsor of the North Korean attack. No one person or group of persons can be so identified. Moreover, despite the obvious reverse suffered by the USSR in the Korean development, and despite the obvious possible ramifications of these developments, no readjustments or other changes were noted in the Soviet hierarchy. It thus appears that nobody on the Politburo level was held immediately responsible or made a scapegoat for the reverses.

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