



TECHNICAL EVALUATION FOR A U.S. CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY SYSTEM

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About this Document

Executive Order (EO) 14067 directed the Office of Science and Technology Policy to produce a technical evaluation to facilitate and support the introduction of a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) system in the United States (U.S.), should one be proposed. This report lays out the policy objectives for a U.S. CBDC system, and proceeds to analyze technical design choices for a U.S. CBDC system with respect to those policy objectives. This report also estimates the feasibility of building a U.S. CBDC minimum viable product and assesses how a U.S. CBDC system may impact Federal processes. This report makes recommendations on how to prepare the U.S. Government for a U.S. CBDC system, but it does not make an assessment or recommendation about whether a U.S. CBDC system should be pursued.

About the Office of Science and Technology Policy

The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) was established by the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 to provide the President and others within the Executive Office of the President with advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of the economy, national security, health, foreign relations, the environment, and the technological recovery and use of resources, among other topics. OSTP leads interagency science and technology policy coordination efforts, assists the Office of Management and Budget with an annual review and analysis of Federal research and development in budgets, and serves as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal government. More information is available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp>.

About the Interagency Process

The creation of this report was coordinated through an interagency process led by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, as described in Section 3 of EO 14067. A list of departments and agencies involved in this interagency process can be found in Appendix B.

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Introduction

A Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is a digital form of a country’s sovereign currency.¹ If the United States issued a CBDC, this new type of central bank money may provide a range of benefits for American consumers, investors, and businesses. For example, a U.S. CBDC might enable transactions that are more efficient and less expensive, particularly for cross-border funds transfers. However, there are also potential risks to consider. A U.S. CBDC might affect everything ranging from the stability of the financial system to the protection of sensitive data. Recognizing these potential upsides and downsides, the Biden-Harris Administration is committed to further exploring the implications of, and options for, issuing a CBDC.

On March 9, 2022, President Biden signed Executive Order (EO) 14067, *Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets*, placing the highest urgency on research and development efforts into the potential design and deployment options of a U.S. Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC).² EO 14067 further directed the Federal government to “prioritize timely assessments of potential benefits and risks under various designs to ensure that the United States remains a leader in the international financial system.” To help advance this directive, Section 5(b)(ii) of EO 14067 ordered the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the Chief Technology Officer of the United States – in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chair of the Federal Reserve, and the heads of other relevant agencies – to submit to the President a technical evaluation for a U.S. CBDC system, should one be proposed.

This report begins by laying out the policy objectives for a U.S. CBDC system, outlined in EO 14067 and developed in further detail through an interagency process led by the National Economic Council and the National Security Council. These policy objectives reflect the Administration’s ongoing commitment to develop and use technology in accordance with democratic values. This report then analyzes the technical design choices for a U.S. CBDC system, focusing on how those choices would impact the policy objectives for a U.S. CBDC system. Next, this report estimates the feasibility of building a minimum viable product for a U.S. CBDC system, based on hypothetical combinations of technical design choices. Finally, this report assesses how a U.S. CBDC system may impact Federal processes, focusing on cybersecurity and privacy, customer experience, and social safety net programs.

This report concludes by making recommendations on how to prepare the Federal government for a U.S. CBDC system, should one be pursued. It recommends that OSTP help advance technology related to CBDCs as part of the CBDC Working Group outlined in the Department of the Treasury’s report on *The Future of Money and Payments*. It encourages the Federal Reserve to continue its research and experimentation on CBDC systems, while recommending that the National Science Foundation (NSF) and OSTP develop a National Digital Assets Research and Development (R&D) Agenda to help spur innovation that could support the Federal Reserve’s

¹ Other U.S. Government reports explain CBDCs in greater depth. See, e.g., [The Future of Money and Payments](#). (Sep. 2022). *Department of the Treasury*; and [Money and Payments: The US Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation](#). (Jan. 2022). *The Federal Reserve*.

² [Executive Order 14067: Ensuring Responsible Development of Digital Assets](#). (Mar. 2022). *Federal Register*.



efforts. Finally, it recommends scaling up relevant technological infrastructure, capacity, and expertise across the Federal government to harness benefits and mitigate risks of digital assets.

It is also important to briefly note what this report does not do. This report does not make any assessments or recommendations about whether a U.S. CBDC should be pursued. Additionally, this report does not make any design choices for a U.S. CBDC system, if one were proposed. Instead, it fulfills the mission of EO 14067 by providing a timely assessment of potential benefits and risks for a U.S. CBDC system.



Policy Objectives for a U.S. CBDC System

EO 14067 outlines the principal policy objectives of the United States with respect to digital assets and provides additional priorities for a U.S. CBDC. This document provides considerations related to choices and limitations that should inform the design of a U.S. CBDC system, where a “CBDC system” includes the CBDC itself, the public sector and private sector components that are built to interact with it, and the laws and regulations that apply to each of those components.³

Building on the policy objectives described in EO 14067, a U.S. CBDC system should support the following objectives.⁴ While some of these objectives may be in tension, it is not the aim of this document to reconcile or prioritize the policy objectives listed below. Additionally, the purpose of this document is not to take a position on whether a U.S. CBDC should be pursued, or to make decisions regarding particular design choices for a U.S. CBDC system to achieve the stated objectives.

1. Provide benefits and mitigate risks for consumers, investors, and businesses

- a. **Consumers, investors, and businesses should be financially protected.** The CBDC system should include appropriate protections for custodial and other arrangements related to customer assets and funds, fraudulent and other illegal transactions, and market failures. It should also provide for appropriate disclosures of risk.
- b. **Consumers, investors, and businesses should be digitally protected.** The CBDC system should include consumer protections by design and default. These protections should include mechanisms for human consideration and remedy of harms, and these protections should be accessible, equitable, effective, maintained, accompanied by appropriate operator training, and should not impose an unreasonable burden on the public.

2. Promote economic growth and financial stability and mitigate systemic risk

- a. **The CBDC system should support economic activity.** The CBDC system should be designed to integrate seamlessly with traditional forms of the U.S. dollar. In addition, the CBDC should be flexible enough to facilitate a range of economic policy objectives, including promoting competition and innovation. To support these objectives, the CBDC system should be both governable and sufficiently adaptable.
- b. **The CBDC system should ensure the resilience of the financial system.** The CBDC system should be designed in a way that is consistent with broad financial intermediation and that mitigates concentration risks. The CBDC system should be designed to minimize the occurrence of destabilizing runs and liquidity risks. The CBDC system should not increase systemic risk.

³ The term “components” is broadly construed. For example, components might include smart cards, mobile applications, and intermediaries that fulfill various roles in the CBDC system.

⁴ These objectives are also consistent with the [G7 Public Policy Principles for Retail CBDCs](#). (Oct. 2021). G7.



- c. **The CBDC system should be operable in normal circumstances and under stress.** The CBDC system should be resilient under a range of adverse circumstances, both at initial deployment and over its lifecycle. When problems are discovered in CBDC functionality, there should be a clear process and adequate support for mitigating and resolving those problems.

3. Improve payment systems

- a. **The CBDC system should be functional.** The CBDC system should support the smooth functioning of the payment system by ensuring that the CBDC system works, including at initial deployment, over its lifecycle, and when parts of the systems are nonoperational. Furthermore, the CBDC system should function efficiently relative to the costs to operate so that it can also achieve the promised benefits of a CBDC system. To do so, the CBDC system should be designed such that adequate resources and personnel training will exist for developing and maintaining the CBDC system's components.
- b. **The CBDC system should be efficient.** The CBDC system should be usable and provide a good customer experience. It should also allow for efficiencies that make investments and domestic and cross-border fund transfers and payments cheaper, faster, and safer, by promoting greater and more cost-efficient access to financial products and services.
- c. **The CBDC system should be secure.** The CBDC system should be protected against cybersecurity attacks and failures, and the system should ensure assurance and integrity of the CBDC and the system as a whole. The CBDC system should be designed so that consumers, investors, businesses, and the public can trust it to be secure and resilient to potential attacks, disasters, and failures, as well as cyber, fraud, counterfeiting, and other operational risks. The CBDC system should include appropriate cybersecurity and privacy incident management, contingency plans, and continuity plans to ensure availability of its functionalities, including in the case of natural disasters and foreign attacks.
- d. **The CBDC system should be flexible.** The CBDC system should support an ecosystem of innovation from the public and private sectors in order to meet the various goals of the United States. The CBDC system itself should be extensible and upgradeable such that it can be iterated upon quickly to improve and harness new innovation, as well as changing technologies, regulations, and needs.

4. Ensure the global financial system has transparency, connectivity, and platform and architecture interoperability or transferability, as appropriate

- a. **The CBDC system should be appropriately interoperable.** The CBDC system should, where appropriate and consistent with other policy priorities, facilitate transactions with other currencies and systems, such as physical cash, commercial bank deposits, CBDCs issued by other monetary authorities, and the global financial system. The CBDC system should be designed to avoid risks of harm to the international monetary system and financial system, including broad monetary sovereignty and financial stability. The CBDC system should be designed with



appropriate considerations for transferability and orderly termination in events such as a change in policy or end of life.

5. Advance financial inclusion and equity

- a. **All should be able to use the CBDC system.** The CBDC system should enable access for a broad set of potential consumers and uses, with appropriate restrictions to mitigate specific risks (e.g., destabilizing runs, money laundering). While the CBDC system may initially support fewer potential consumers and uses, it should scale and support a broader range of use cases over time. As it is designed, implemented, and maintained, the CBDC system should take particular notice of EO 13985 (*Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government*) and EO 14058 (*Transforming Federal Customer Experience and Service Delivery to Rebuild Trust in Government*).
- b. **The CBDC system should expand equitable access to the financial system.** The CBDC system should expand equitable access to deposit and payment products and services, as well as credit provided by banks and other sources. This includes expanding equitable access for people of color, rural communities, individuals without the resources to maintain expensive devices or reliable Internet access, and individuals with cognitive, motor, or sensory impairments or disabilities. The CBDC system should not create new inequities, including through technological barriers to use. Technological advances, educational material, and support should be leveraged to overcome the potential technical and economic barriers to using CBDC that may disproportionately harm some communities. The CBDC system should support payments to and from the public sector and equity-advancing initiatives, such as the administration of social safety net programs. However, use of the CBDC system should not be mandated. Offline capability should be incorporated, and the role of cash should be preserved.

6. Protect national security

- a. **The CBDC system should promote compliance with AML/CFT requirements and mitigate illicit finance risks.** The CBDC system should be designed to facilitate compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) requirements, as well as relevant sanctions obligations. The CBDC system should allow for the collection of information necessary to fulfill these requirements, but not more. The system should also enable adequate transaction monitoring to detect and report suspicious activity to the relevant authority. The CBDC system should be designed to include features, or enable intermediaries to include features, to identify and mitigate illicit finance risks (e.g., fraud, sanctions evasion, money laundering), while providing appropriate protections for privacy, civil and human rights, and cybersecurity.
- b. **The CBDC system should support U.S. leadership in the global financial system, including the global role of the dollar.** The CBDC system should be at the forefront of responsible development and design of digital assets and should underpin new forms of payments. The CBDC system should support scalability



and be capable of maintaining high throughput, speed, resiliency, security, and privacy as it facilitates millions or billions of users and global transactions that are fast, efficient, and convenient (for both domestic and cross-border payments, if deemed appropriate). The fully operational CBDC system should support high user and transaction loads, including during surges in transaction volume.

7. Provide ability to exercise human rights

- a. **The CBDC system should respect democratic values and human rights.** The CBDC system should be designed and used in accordance with civil and human rights, such as those protected by the U.S. Constitution, as well as those outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The CBDC system should have oversight and accountability mechanisms to ensure compliance with civil and human rights. The CBDC system should be able to incorporate technical protections that prevent the use of CBDC in ways that violate civil or human rights. The CBDC system should also be protected from abuse during periods of high political volatility or deviation from democratic values.

8. Align with democratic and environmental values, including privacy protections

- a. **Sensitive financial data should be private.** The CBDC system should maintain privacy and protect against arbitrary or unlawful surveillance. The CBDC design, deployment, and maintenance should adhere to privacy engineering and risk management best practices, including privacy by design and disassociability.⁵ Built-in protections and design choices should ensure that privacy is included by default, including ensuring that data collection conforms to reasonable expectations and only data that is strictly necessary for advancing CBDC system policy objectives is collected.
- b. **The CBDC system should be sustainable.** The CBDC system should be compatible with U.S. environmental priorities, including cutting U.S. greenhouse gas pollution by 50-52% from 2005 levels by 2030 and transitioning to a net-zero emissions economy by 2050. The CBDC system should minimize energy use, resource use, greenhouse gas emissions, other pollution, and environmental impacts on local communities. The system should improve environmental performance relative to the traditional financial system.

⁵ Disassociability refers to the processing of data or events without association to individuals or devices beyond the operational requirements of the system. See, e.g., [NIST Privacy Framework](#). (Jan. 2020). *National Institute of Standards and Technology*, 29.



Technical Design Choices for a U.S. CBDC System

EO 14067 directed OSTP to submit to the President a report that addresses the technical aspects of the various CBDC designs, including with respect to emerging and future technological developments. This section provides a list of design choices that could inform the technical design of a U.S. CBDC system, as well as an analysis of their benefits and risks. This section focuses on 18 design choices, divided into six categories: Participants, Governance, Security, Transactions, Data, and Adjustments.

This section:

- Does not presuppose that a CBDC system would use any particular technology (e.g., a distributed ledger technology or a centrally managed database);
- Does not assume that a CBDC system would maintain identical functionality to cash;
- Does not take any position on whether establishing a CBDC system would be in the best interest of the United States;
- Does not prioritize the design choices in order of importance;
- Does not claim that the list of design choices is complete;
- Does not assume a particular distribution model, but does, for the sake of analysis, focus on design choices with more applicability for a retail CBDC system;⁶
- Does not assume that all applicable design features need to be incorporated into a CBDC system at initial deployment;
- Does emphasize that many design choices are linked to other design choices; and
- Does, for the sake of analysis, focus on the two endpoints for the spectrum of possibilities for a design choice, even though hybrid options are possible, or potentially desired.

In order to focus the analysis on the design choices that likely matter to policymakers, this section makes a few starting assumptions about the design of a U.S. CBDC system. While a U.S. CBDC system could, in theory, be mostly “permissionless”⁷ from a governance standpoint, this design choice introduces a large number of technical complexities and practical limitations that strongly suggest that a permissionless approach does not make sense for a system that has at least one trusted entity (i.e., the central bank). It is possible that the technology underpinning a permissionless approach will improve significantly over time, which might make it more suitable to be used in a CBDC system. However, given the state of the technology, most of the analysis that follows assumes that there is a central authority and a permissioned CBDC system.

⁶ Many of these design choices are likely also applicable to a wholesale or hybrid CBDC system.

⁷ A CBDC system could either be managed by a set of trusted entities (“permissioned”) or by a network of system participants (“permissionless”), or some combination of the two. This is discussed further in the permissioning design choice later in this report.



Deciding whether a CBDC is in the best interest of the United States will depend, in part, on the specific design choices contemplated for the CBDC system under consideration. The aim of this section is to help policymakers understand these technical design choices and their associated tradeoffs, especially with respect to the policy objectives for a U.S. CBDC system outlined in Section 4 of EO 14067 and expanded upon in the Policy Objectives section of this report. U.S. policymakers should read this section in conjunction with the Department of the Treasury’s report titled *The Future of Money and Payments*, in order to get a fuller picture of the design choices important to the decision of whether to issue a CBDC.

Participants

Transport Layer: Less Intermediated vs. More Intermediated

What roles do intermediaries take on, and can people opt to pay each other without intermediaries in certain conditions? Who has access to the payment system technology and at what level?

The transport layer of a CBDC system determines whether a third party must facilitate transfers between two parties, and if so, who the third party or parties are.

A CBDC system could be less intermediated by allowing some amount of peer-to-peer (P2P) transactions, which are transactions that occur without the direct involvement of a financial intermediary.⁸ Alternatively, the system could be more intermediated, which would mean that most or all transactions occur with the involvement of a financial intermediary (e.g., transfers made via a bank or private services). This is not a binary choice; there are many fine-grained design choices embedded in this question, including the option to support both less intermediated and more intermediated transactions under different conditions. Even if a P2P funds transfer could be completed without an intermediary, other functions of the system (e.g., account creation) could still require intermediation. Furthermore, though it is easy to imagine transactions being settled by current-day private sector intermediaries, such as banks, it is possible for other CBDC system functionalities to be fulfilled by non-traditional public or private intermediaries.⁹

This design choice is linked to the design choices on transactions, as the transport layer would set the foundation for who can facilitate transactions. This design choice is also linked to the Data design choices, as the transport layer would affect who gets write access to the ledger history, if it exists. This design choice is also linked to the governance design choices, as a less intermediated system would require a vastly different set of governance guidelines and

⁸ Potential intermediaries for transaction processing include the central bank, commercial banks, and other third-party entities.

⁹ A non-exhaustive list of possible intermediation functionalities includes issuing currency, distributing currency, custody and wallets for currency, validating transactions, settling transactions, provisioning access (e.g., user accounts, know your customer), providing user interfaces, providing customer service, conducting fraud detection, conducting AML/CFT compliance, and resolving disputes. Some of these functionalities would likely require compliance with banking laws and regulations, as well as other applicable laws, such as Federal securities laws. However, other functionalities (e.g., provisioning access) could have different eligibility criteria for intermediaries, allowing a broader range of private entities (e.g., pharmacies, grocery stores) and public entities (e.g., libraries, post offices) to provide these functionalities. In turn, this could help increase financial inclusion and equity, could bring more relevant expertise to bear on providing specific intermediary functionalities, and may promote more innovation in payments technology.



requirements (e.g., who conducts transaction-level remediation when there isn't an intermediate party facilitating transactions?). Finally, this design choice intersects with transaction signing, since multiple-signature transactions may make more sense for an intermediated transport layer.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

Less intermediated:

- *Could improve the privacy of sensitive financial data:* A key feature of enabling P2P transactions is that it could mimic the cash-like experience in terms of anonymity and functionality.¹⁰ P2P transactions may not need to be known or recorded by an intermediary, which may increase the CBDC system's capacity to protect the privacy of sensitive data. The privacy benefits would depend on the specific way the P2P system is set up; for example, if P2P transactions are recorded on a public ledger, then it may be easier to identify and track users than via a well-constructed intermediated system that does not record on a public ledger.
- *Could hamper compliance with AML/CFT requirements:* Pure P2P transactions can be designed either where tokens are bearer assets,¹¹ or where there is account creation. A P2P design with a bearer-asset type token could enable transactions without any intermediary and therefore complicate, and potentially circumvent, AML/CFT obligations even where registration and reporting obligations apply.¹² Alternatively, should transactions be recorded on a public ledger, investigators may be able to use analytics tools to trace transactions.
- *Could affect the improvement of payment systems:* A P2P system may have more limited intermediary¹³ costs and fees (which would likely be passed on to participants), possibly making it easier to achieve more cost-efficient financial product and services. P2P transactions can also process small-amount retail transactions quickly and cheaply, freeing capacity for an intermediated layer to handle larger transactions. However, a less intermediated system may displace traditional financial intermediaries and their business models, which may have ripple effects – some potentially negative – throughout the American financial system.

More intermediated:

- *May provide traditional financial and digital protections:* CBDC intermediaries – such as financial institutions or new businesses created for processing CBDC transactions¹⁴ – could help provide key requirements or benefits for a CBDC system, such as facilitating

¹⁰ This could also help with CBDC adoption, and thus, financial inclusion. See, e.g., [How America Banks: Household Use of Banking and Financial Services, 2019 FDIC Survey](#). (Oct. 2020). *Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation*, which notes that one of the top reasons cited by unbanked households for not having a bank account is a concern about privacy.

¹¹ Here, “bearer asset” refers to an asset where its value is derived from its own digital representation.

¹² In the current U.S. framework, Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) obligations are placed on financial intermediaries.

¹³ Even if the CBDC system supports P2P transactions, the complexity needed to facilitate P2P transactions could lead consumers to seek out intermediaries, similar to what has happened in the present crypto-asset ecosystem.

¹⁴ The Bank of England describes a potential industry of “Payment Interface Providers” (PIPs) for processing the commercial and retail sectors’ CBDC transactions. See [Central Bank Digital Currency: Opportunities, challenges and design](#). (Mar. 2020). *Bank of England*.



remediation, implementing AML/CFT controls, performing customer service functions, abiding by privacy regulations, and facilitating cross-border exchanges of currencies.¹⁵

- *Could provide additional benefits and mitigate risks for consumers, investors, and businesses:* An intermediated system could also promote payments innovation by creating incentives for intermediaries to provide new services that build on top of the CBDC system, thus promoting the improvement of payment systems. For example, intermediated exchange can facilitate additional cybersecurity safeguards to protect CBDC system assets. Enlisting intermediaries' existing expertise on this topic would likely benefit the servicing of CBDC system core activities. Furthermore, intermediaries may be better able to bear certain types of transaction risk, because laws and regulations require them to be better capitalized.
- *Could advance financial inclusion and equity:* This approach could allow for non-traditional, more accessible entities to fulfill various roles in the CBDC system, which could help expand access to the CBDC system. For example, there are a variety of intermediaries that have identity verification infrastructure, which could help play a role in increasing the accessibility of the CBDC.¹⁶ It is also possible, however, that intermediaries could negatively affect financial inclusion (e.g., with high fees for CBDC-related services, by not providing equitable access to consumers), as has sometimes happened in the corresponding banking context.
- *May reduce security of CBDC system:* Intermediaries can be attractive targets for attacks. In an intermediated system, the security of the CBDC system as a whole could be harmed by the compromise of intermediaries with inadequate cybersecurity practices.

A CBDC system may also permit people to provision their own intermediary.¹⁷ For example, while most people use intermediary services for email provision, it is possible to set up and host one's own email service. If the permissioning of intermediaries was flexible enough to include individuals, then that may reduce some of the downsides of intermediation by introducing more competition.¹⁸ Additionally, a CBDC system could also make it easy to switch accounts between intermediaries, similar to how mobile phone users can switch between carriers while still keeping their phone numbers.

Aside from intermediation of individual payments, there is also a question of intermediation with the CBDC system itself. A CBDC system could allow retail users (e.g., consumers, businesses) access to CBDC directly from the CBDC system operator, via layers of intermediaries,¹⁹ as a

¹⁵ For example, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and the Bank of Canada (BOC) explored an intermediated, blockchain-based multi-currency payment system that could facilitate international exchange of currencies. See [Jasper-Ubin Design Paper: Enabling Cross-Border High Value Transfer Using Distributed Ledger Technologies](#). (2019). *Bank of Canada and Monetary Authority of Singapore*.

¹⁶ Note that a less intermediated system could be similarly accessible and be marketed by similar entities.

¹⁷ Self-provisioning would not necessarily sidestep obligations under U.S. laws and regulations. Without a third party, these obligations potentially shift to the user designing, implementing, and/or operating as an intermediary. A full consideration of regulatory treatment of such self-provisioned intermediaries is outside the scope of this paper.

¹⁸ A CBDC system could either be managed by a set of trusted entities ("permissioned") or by a network of system participants ("permissionless"), or some combination of the two. Here, permissioning refers to the act of designating an intermediary as a trusted entity.

¹⁹ If this design choice is implemented, a key question concerns the number of layers of intermediaries. In a model where there is only one layer of intermediaries, banking institutions might interface with retail and wholesale



liability of intermediaries, or not at all. Much has been written about this distinction, often framed as a difference between “retail CBDC” and “wholesale CBDC,” in other fora.²⁰

Interoperability: Less vs. More Technical Interoperability with Other Payment Systems

Can CBDC be widely transferred such that private and public payment systems can be interlinked (including international CBDCs) so as not to fragment the payment system? What kind of interfaces should be built to interface with other payment systems?

Interoperability refers to whether and how a CBDC system can communicate, execute transactions, or transfer data with other payment systems (e.g., fiat systems, international payment systems, other CBDC systems, or other digital assets systems, such as stablecoins) while users may have limited knowledge of the unique characteristics (e.g., data structures) of other payment systems.²¹ Here, interoperability is not the same as integration, as the former refers to systems that can talk to each other, while the latter refers to more direct access to other systems.

A CBDC system could be designed to prevent interoperation with other systems or it could be designed to allow for interoperation where appropriate. With less technical interoperability, it could be harder for a CBDC system to communicate, execute transactions, or transfer data with other payment systems. Alternatively, a CBDC system could have more technical interoperability with other payment systems, having the opposite effect.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

Less interoperability:

- *May provide consumers with better financial protection:* By reducing interdependence with systems that increase or introduce new risks of cybersecurity and operational incidents, the CBDC system might better protect consumers from spillover effects of issues with other payment systems. Less interoperability can also protect against counterparty risk. There are also non-technical ways to protect consumers that are also relevant here. For example, a certain degree of centralization is beneficial to ensuring consumers can more easily exercise the financial protections they are accustomed to with the transfer of U.S. dollars, such as protections afforded by Regulation E. Additionally, if a U.S. CBDC system were connected with a foreign CBDC system that required different standards for a range of issues, such as privacy, U.S. consumers could lose protections.
- *May provide a more secure CBDC system:* A less technically interoperable CBDC system could provide better resilience during a wide-scale cyberattack. Interoperability

customers, as well as the CBDC system operator. In a model with more than one layer of intermediaries between the CBDC system operator and end users, different banking institutions may interact with different types of users; in this model, smaller banking institutions could interact with retail and potentially wholesale customers, and larger banking institutions could perform other activities necessary for the operating of the CBDC system.

²⁰ See, e.g., Auer, R. and Böhme, R. (2020). The technology of retail central bank digital currency. *BIS Quarterly Review, March*, 89.

²¹ This definition of interoperability is derived from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) definition of interoperability. See [ISO/IEC 19763-1:2015\(en\)](#).



could expand the attack surface, even if the CBDC is not directly integrated with other payment systems.

- *May provide a more functional CBDC system:* Interoperability has a number of challenges that make it relatively challenging to implement with full functionality. For example, in the international context, governance and standards alignment can provide a key roadblock to more interoperability. A less technically interoperable CBDC system may not have to deal with as many obstacles to achieve high functionality as expected.

More interoperability:

- *May improve payment systems:* A CBDC system designed to be technically interoperable with foreign payment systems including CBDCs could enable cross-border funds transfers and payments that are cheaper and faster. Envisioned international, private sector, and non-government organization CBDC system interlinkages have explored asset swaps through a trusted intermediary, interconnected CBDC ledgers, and holding multiple currencies within a single ledger. These interconnections could be difficult to manage, expand the attack surface, and likely require intermediaries to manage the associated risks.
- *May benefit financial inclusion and equity:* With easy interoperability with traditional stores of value, a CBDC system may receive increased uptake from communities and businesses that make limited use of the traditional financial system. Interoperability could also make cross-border payments, such as remittances, cheaper, quicker, more accessible, and more transparent.

The possibility of some interconnection would depend on the type of ledger and transaction structure. Interconnections could also depend on intermediaries or P2P options in the transport layer.

Decisions regarding interoperability should also consider if and how CBDC can be converted to non-CBDC currency on the spot, such as at a point of sale. This may be an important functionality to enable in order to mitigate certain risks, such as the challenge that holding limits might pose for businesses that hold or exchange large volumes of CBDC at a time. A potential solution to this risk might be to enable quick routing of CBDC to a commercial bank deposit account with ease.

Governance

Permissioning: Permissioned vs. Permissionless

Is the system permissioned (and if so, how) or permissionless?

A CBDC system could either be managed by a set of trusted entities ("permissioned") or by a network of system participants ("permissionless"), or some combination of the two.²² This design choice does not assume the use of distributed ledger technology, but rather focuses on the governance structure of the system regardless of the technology used.

²² For example, a CBDC system might allow permissionless management for most actions, but require heightened permissions for some actions.



In environments without trusted entities, permissionless systems often trade efficiency or other design features to potentially permit transactions to settle without established counterparty trust relationships or trusted third parties. By contrast, we assume that a U.S. CBDC system will rely on one or more trusted entities, such as the Federal Reserve.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

Permissioned:

- *Often better protects privacy of sensitive financial data:* While permissionless systems often build trust and consensus using public ledgers, permissioned systems generally do not require a public ledger. This means that transaction history is generally only viewable by a small number of trusted entities, such as the Federal Reserve, and kept private with respect to others.²³
- *Helps mitigate risks for consumers, investors, and businesses:* Permissioned systems can simplify transaction remediation, making it easier to protect consumers, investors, and businesses. They could also make it easier to prohibit migrating CBDC to non-compliant trading venues or other organizations engaged in misconduct or fraud, which can also help protect consumers, investors, and businesses.

Permissionless:

- *May have implications for the security of the CBDC system, and thus have effects on the resilience of the financial system:* A CBDC system needs to be highly resilient to vulnerabilities (e.g., insider threats, malicious actors, liquidity risks). A permissionless system invites additional types of malicious behavior, so many other permissionless payment systems have incorporated additional cybersecurity considerations into their design. That design philosophy may make the system more likely to stay operational if several entities go offline or malfunction at any point. It may also mitigate attacks related to trust in one or more trusted entities. However, in practice, vulnerabilities introduced by permissionless systems (e.g., 51% attacks, ambiguity from code forks in the case of a distributed ledger)²⁴ may offset the purported resiliency benefits from permissionless systems.²⁵
- *May not be sustainable or support economic activity:* One of the best-known methods to maintain synchronicity between distributed ledgers – the proof-of-work consensus mechanism – uses a significant amount of energy.²⁶ Although a permissionless CBDC system would not be required to use proof-of-work, if a U.S. CBDC system did choose to use such a method to synchronize a ledger of transactions, it may not align with the policy objective that a CBDC system should be environmentally sustainable.

²³ This is true for P2P transactions too. A permissioned CBDC system could be designed to permit accessing after-the-fact transaction-level details of P2P transactions, in accordance with appropriate legal protections.

²⁴ For explanations of these terms and a greater discussion of cybersecurity vulnerabilities, see, e.g., Hasanova, H., Baek, U. J., Shin, M. G., Cho, K., & Kim, M. S. (2019). [A survey on blockchain cybersecurity vulnerabilities and possible countermeasures](#). *International Journal of Network Management*, 29(2), e2060.

²⁵ For a more extensive discussion of vulnerabilities, see research cited in [DARPA-Funded Study Provides Insights into Blockchain Vulnerabilities](#). (Jun. 2022). *Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency*.

²⁶ See *Climate and Energy Implications of Crypto-Assets in the United States*. (Sep. 2022). *Office of Science and Technology Policy*.



Access Tiering: Tiering by User Account vs. Transaction Amount vs. Counterparty vs. None

Are there differences in how transactions or accounts are treated? If so, how are the tiers of accounts or transactions determined (e.g., user account, transaction amount) and for what purposes?

Access tiering refers to the various features that a CBDC system offers that vary based on the attributes of a given transaction.

Transactions could be tiered for a variety of purposes, such as privacy, security, financial inclusion, and promoting a risk-based approach to AML/CFT compliance. For example, a CBDC system could provide “lower” tier(s) where users who provided less identity verification information are subject to transaction limits, while providing “higher” tier(s) whereby users who opened an account and are subject to robust customer due diligence standards could transact without limitations. The tier used for a transaction could be based on the user accounts (e.g., level of customer due diligence) involved in the transaction, the amount being transacted, counterparties involved, or other criteria (e.g., characteristics of an intermediary). Transactions between two less risky accounts (e.g., two personal accounts with small balances) could be facilitated on a lower tier. Transactions below a certain amount (e.g., \$3,000, \$10,000, or some other dollar amount) could also be facilitated on a lower tier.²⁷ Transactions could be tiered based on counterparties (e.g., business-to-business payments could be one tier, business-to-consumer and consumer-to-business payments could be another tier, and consumer-to-consumer payments could be yet another tier). Hybrid options are also possible; for example, switching to a higher tier once the total amount transacted between two accounts exceeds a certain amount. Transactions could also not be tiered.

A tiered system has implications for the data design choices; a tiered system requires the ability to record different amounts of permanent and temporary history for different tiers. Access tiering might also be linked to offline transactions, where a lower tier may facilitate offline transactions and a higher tier may require online capabilities. Access tiering is linked to the transport layer, where a CBDC system could support P2P transactions for lower tiers but require intermediaries to facilitate higher tiers (though intermediaries could have the choice to only support certain tiers). Governance, along with whether the tiering needs to be universally adopted within the CBDC system, would also need to be addressed. Finally, access tiering may be linked to identity privacy, with lower tiers facilitating a higher level of privacy in transactions than higher tiers. This report does not address specific tiering thresholds or which entity in a CBDC system would be responsible for setting them.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

²⁷ Canada and Sweden are considering tiering systems based on the value of the transaction. See [Central Bank Digital Currency \(CBDC\): Retail Considerations](#). (2021). *Bank of Canada*, 13. Note that the specific dollar amount does not have to be taken from existing precedent in other types of financial transactions; a new threshold could be set for the CBDC system’s access tiers, based on the unique AML/CFT risk profile of the CBDC system.



Tiering based on user account:

- *Has implications for privacy and AML/CFT compliance:* Tiering based on user accounts, depending on how customer information is collected and stored, would promote a risk-based approach rather than solely the amount being transacted.²⁸
- *Has implications for financial inclusion and equity:* Tiering based on actors could raise equity questions based on the types of criteria used to determine a customer risk profile.²⁹ For example, such a system might subject immigrants to enhanced due diligence, if they engage in more cross-border transactions to send money home. Alternatively, by allowing for simplified customer due diligence on lower tiers, financial inclusion might be increased by giving access to individuals who may have previously had problems getting access to an intermediary.

Tiering based on transaction amount:³⁰

- *Has implications for privacy:* Tiering based on transaction amount allows for users to conduct lower-value transactions while not meeting other requirements to transact on a higher tier (e.g., providing more identity verification information).
- *Has implications for AML/CFT compliance:* Tiering based on amount would provide a unified way to assess risk, but given that some types of illicit finance transactions (e.g., terrorist financing) could regularly involve lower transaction amounts, this approach might create new vulnerabilities and might be difficult to implement.

Tiering based on counterparty:

- *Has implications for AML/CFT compliance:* Tiering based on counterparty makes it possible to better assess the nature of a transaction, rather than just the amount or accounts involved. This information can then be used as part of a risk-based approach to due diligence.

None:

- *Has implications for AML/CFT compliance:* A lack of tiering means that intermediaries would likely develop and implement their own risk-based compliance programs and incorporate simplified or enhanced due diligence in line with customer risk profiles.
- *Easier to make functional:* A lack of tiering means that only one transaction method must be developed, which then applies to all transactions.

Hybrid approaches are also possible. For example, if a form of self-custodied wallets were to be adopted, they could be limited to the lower tier with temporal restrictions on cumulative transfer amounts. It may be ideal to include these access tiers directly in the CBDC system's protocol, rather than allowing them to be easily adjusted through programmable functionality. This could help increase consumer trust that the CBDC system's rules will not be changed haphazardly, and

²⁸ The regulatory ramifications and scaffolding necessary for this approach are beyond the scope of this report.

²⁹ These equity concerns may be exacerbated when automated systems are used to make determinations about customer risk profiles.

³⁰ This could also be done as an amount over time. The tier could capture information about the sender and amount, but not retain information about the recipient. This might be facilitated more easily with zero-knowledge proofs.



this could also help protect the CBDC system from being abused during periods of high political volatility.

Identity Privacy: Known to Central Bank vs. Intermediary vs. No One

What aspects of identity are kept private/confidential, from whom, and under what circumstances?

Identity privacy concerns the extent to which individuals can keep various attributes related to their identity confidential from different parties, such as the central bank and intermediaries.

Identity-related information within transactions – such as payment addresses – could be known to the central bank, intermediaries, or no one.

Identity privacy is linked to access tiering, as identity privacy could vary between higher and lower tiers, allowing lower tiers to facilitate transactions while keeping more attributes confidential from specific actors.

This design choice applies for each piece of sensitive identity-related information. Hence, for each piece of sensitive identity-related information, the following design choice benefits and drawbacks should be considered:

Collected by central bank:

- *May harm human rights and democratic values:* Identity-related information known to the central bank for all or most transactions would represent a significant expansion of the central bank’s access to customer information, which would raise significant privacy concerns. This centralized data must therefore not only have extensive cybersecurity protections, but also significant legal protections; for instance, it could be designed to be either legally or technologically (via use of encryption keys) challenging to view this data without judicial approval and oversight. Even if policies exist to prevent this harm at this time (e.g., law enforcement needing to seek a subpoena to get identity-related information from intermediaries), enabling this capacity could allow a future Administration to use the CBDC system to surveil the population in close detail, and cybersecurity compromise may still occur.
- *Has implications for privacy and AML/CFT compliance:* If “collected by central bank” was the design choice chosen for many pieces of sensitive identity-related information, it may place responsibility for AML/CFT compliance on the central bank, greatly increasing its responsibility. This would raise novel concerns about the central bank being subject to supervision for their compliance. This approach may provide users less privacy from the central bank and entities able to get information from it compared to the current system, but if combined with other design choices (e.g., access tiering), it may be possible to protect sensitive financial data from disclosure to most parties. If “collected by central bank” was the design choice chosen for many pieces of sensitive identity-related information, it may place a large burden on the central bank for AML/CFT Compliance; this may also raise novel concerns, since the central bank may need to be subject to supervision for compliance.
- *May not help expand equitable access to the financial system:* Consumer discomfort with central bank collection of identity-related information could discourage adoption and use



of the CBDC system, which may limit the potential for a CBDC system to expand equitable access to the financial system. Outside of the context of consumer use and adoption, decreased domestic and global use of the U.S. CBDC system may harm U.S. leadership in the global financial system and the global role of the dollar, and may also harm economic growth.

- *May introduce new risks:* This approach would be a significant departure from current models in the financial system and may introduce unforeseen risks.

Collected by intermediaries:

- *Has implications for privacy and AML/CFT compliance:* This approach is more similar to the current AML/CFT regulatory framework, where key reporting and recordkeeping obligations are generally imposed upon intermediaries, providing consistency with that approach. This approach has some key advantages, including many that are inverses of the drawbacks noted above. While this system may limit the amount of new risk introduced, it would also implicitly endorse an imperfect status quo.³¹

No one:

- *Has implications for privacy and AML/CFT compliance:* Keeping some pieces of identity-related information anonymous from the central bank and intermediaries could help enable cash-like privacy for those pieces of information. This may not be possible or sensible for some pieces of sensitive identity-related information. Given that a CBDC is not subject to the same physical limitations as cash, such an approach might make it harder to identify, trace, and disrupt money laundering and the financing of terrorism and for relevant financial institutions to comply with existing AML/CFT obligations. If “no one” was the design choice chosen for many pieces of sensitive identity-related information, it may functionally provide some level of anonymity, which may complicate intermediaries’ compliance with AML/CFT obligations and may be out of line with global AML/CFT standards.³²

A key question is what kind of information would be considered “identity-related information” for the purpose of this design choice. This design choice should be considered for all key pieces of identity-related information, and it is probably better for privacy and civil and human rights purposes for some pieces of information to be collected by intermediaries rather than the central bank. Additionally, not all intermediaries are the same, and criteria may need to be established to determine which types of intermediaries are allowed to collect which types of identity-related information.

Pseudonymous payment addresses may provide a privacy-enhancing feature, but they must be designed carefully so as not to be trivially linked back to individuals based on other information (e.g., transaction history). For example, it may be possible for intermediaries to hold or rotate pseudonymous keys on behalf of individuals such that external parties may not view or use them

³¹ The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that 2-5% of the global Gross Domestic Product is laundered every year, with the International Monetary Fund estimating that \$1.6-4 trillion is laundered annually. See, Miller, R. (Apr. 2022). [Overview of Correspondent Banking and “De-Risking” Issues](#). *Congressional Research Service*, 1.

³² Whether this approach is legally possible in the context of current regulation and other obligations is outside of the scope of this report.



without sufficient authority. However, in general, vulnerabilities in pseudonymous methods could allow for deanonymization, and sufficiently motivated parties can often render pseudonymity ineffective. Still, for certain threat models, pseudonymity may provide a layer of privacy.

If identity-related information is known to some party, some entities likely need to verify the identity of an individual seeking to transact CBDC.³³ This could be done by intermediaries, establishing their own procedures and systems to verify identity, in line with regulatory obligations.

Crucially, it is worth noting that any privacy scheme will likely have some vulnerabilities, so even the “more private” choices will still not guarantee privacy. It is important to take a systems-level view of privacy, and not consider a system “private” just because information is being collected by intermediaries and not the central bank. Following best practices on privacy engineering – such as minimizing the amount of extraneous data collected in the first place – will likely be vital to minimizing the risk of unauthorized disclosures. Privacy-enhancing technologies could play a key role here, helping to ensure that privacy and AML/CFT objectives can be advanced in tandem.³⁴

Remediation: On-ledger vs. Off-ledger

Does remediation (e.g., chargebacks, liens) get facilitated through core CBDC system functionality, or is it mandated through external governance processes? Who authorizes these actions, and what transparency is provided?

Remediation refers to the ability to fix mistakes made with the CBDC system, such as transactions that occurred accidentally or fraudulently.

We assume a CBDC system will be required to facilitate remediation, so that persons or entities can conduct activities such as recovering accounts, voiding transactions, ordering restitution, and conducting recovery and resolution activities. These functionalities could be primarily provided on-ledger, such that affordances for remediation are built into the CBDC system’s protocol (e.g., transactions can be reversed until settlement is final, the central bank conducts remediation). Alternatively, these functionalities could be primarily provided off-ledger, so that remediation can be retroactively ordered (e.g., intermediaries settling disputes and conducting chargebacks equivalent to the incorrectly-transacted amount, courts mandating intermediaries to close accounts, etc.) and reflected by new offsetting transactions. For example, if Alice mistakenly pays Bob \$100, an on-ledger remediation approach could simply void that transaction, leaving Alice and Bob the way they were before the transaction. Off-ledger remediation in this example would mean allowing the \$100 transaction from Alice to Bob to settle but then, based on that off-ledger action, create a new transaction that pays \$100 from Bob to Alice, again attempting to leave Alice and Bob where they were before the original transaction.

³³ If access tiering is used, this may only need to apply to individuals seeking to transact on higher tiers.

³⁴ The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom launched a set of innovation prize challenges in privacy-enhancing technologies to tackle financial crime, working with synthetic global transaction data created by SWIFT, the global provider of secure financial messaging services. See [U.S. and U.K. Launch Innovation Prize Challenges in Privacy-Enhancing Technologies to Tackle Financial Crime and Public Health Emergencies](#). (Jul. 2022). *Office of Science and Technology Policy*.



The key questions here are *who* has the ability to authorize these actions, and what technical features would enable them to conduct these actions. Remediation would likely be easiest to implement in a permissioned and centralized CBDC system with intermediaries that have visibility onto a ledger and the ability to submit transactions. In this case, the primary challenge will likely lie in establishing the governance mechanism to determine the conditions that allow for remediation. Some of these procedures and principles can likely be drawn from an existing body of property, payment, contract, and banking law that spells out rules for settlement, finality, and liability. Additionally, remediation is also linked to offline transactions; if intermediaries are facilitating remediation in general, then P2P offline transactions may pose additional challenges. Finally, this also relates to access tiering, as higher tiers may want to use more of an on-ledger approach, in order to increase scrutiny for higher risk transactions.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

On-ledger:

- *Provides additional financial protections:* Embedding remediation into the CBDC system’s core architecture could provide additional guarantees for the ability to conduct remediation. For example, transactions could take a certain amount of time³⁵ to settle with finality, during which period parties may have the ability to seek remediation. While this approach would render some CBDC unusable for a period of time and may be a disincentive toward using the CBDC system, it would also ensure that the CBDC is not fully transferred until the validity of the transaction is verified.
- *May harm the improvement of payment systems:* Building remediation directly into the CBDC system’s protocol would be challenging, as the central bank is not set up to conduct remediation in the same way private payment services can (e.g., chargebacks via a credit card company). This would raise governance concerns.

Off-ledger:

- *May improve payment systems by making the CBDC system faster to settle:* Providing remediation as a new offsetting transaction after the initial transaction has settled would likely allow for more speed for transaction settlement, as transactions could be made “final” more quickly.
- *May have implications for advancing financial inclusion and equity:* More off-ledger remediation would likely allow transfers to settle faster, meaning that Americans waiting for a payment would have access to that capital more quickly. This is particularly important for Americans living paycheck to paycheck, who may also be more vulnerable to predatory lending (e.g., payday loans). On the other hand, if intermediaries are tasked with facilitating remediation, then offline transactions without intermediaries would pose additional challenges for remediation.

³⁵ It may be possible to design a CBDC system where this amount of time could be specified per transaction. For example, a CBDC system might enable Alice to send money to her trusted friend Bob with no wait time, but if Alice wants to send money to untrusted merchant Charlie, then she could set a wait time of 3 days. This system would still support instant settlement, which is described as a core attribute of a CBDC system in [The Future of Money and Payments](#). (Sep. 2022). *Department of the Treasury*.



Security

Cryptography: Public-Key Cryptography vs. PKC with Zero-Knowledge Proofs vs. Other

What cryptographic techniques are used and for what purposes? How would quantum computers affect public-key cryptography systems and how would the system change post-quantum? How can the system be protected against abuses such as fraud and money laundering?

Cryptographic design choices are based upon the computationally intractable problems that invert and enable the secure storage, transmission, and usage of the information needed to operate a CBDC system.

A CBDC system could use public-key cryptography (PKC), in which users have a public key that represents a payment address to receive funds, and a private key that can authorize future payments to spend once funds are received, using digital signatures. A CBDC system could also use a PKC approach with zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to help facilitate secrecy, where users send proof of knowledge and validity of particular data (e.g., transaction details such as recipients and amount), rather than sending the data. There are several other cryptographic methods (e.g., secure multiparty computation, private set intersection, homomorphic encryption) that could also enhance the security of the CBDC system, and these methods should also be considered if developing a CBDC system.

Cryptography design choices are vital to security as quantum computing becomes feasible at scale, as discussed below. The cryptography scheme chosen would also impact how privacy, fungibility, and programmability are designed as well.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

PKC:

- *Likely to be more efficient:* PKC is an extensively tested and used cryptographic method, and there is familiarity with this approach among developers. It would be relatively easy to roll out a CBDC system with a functional and efficient PKC-based system using longstanding and well-tested code libraries, which would advance the policy objective of improving payment systems. As quantum-resistant cryptography protocols (discussed below) are standardized, libraries are tested and deployed, and adoption across government and industry become the norm, they can be integrated into the CBDC system.

PKC with ZKPs:

- *Provides increased privacy for sensitive financial data:* ZKPs can be used to provide enhanced privacy safeguards by verifying if attributes of a transaction are valid without revealing anything about the underlying data itself. By not needing to share this underlying data during transactions, it is generally easier to keep that data private.
- *May introduce complexities for AML/CFT compliance:* ZKPs may prevent discoverability information and the enforcement of AML/CFT regulations in general, unless combined with a scheme to facilitate compliance. This may increase the complexity of enforcing AML/CFT regulations.



- *Likely more secure:* ZKPs limit the amount of potentially-revealing information sent across networks, reducing potential security vulnerabilities. The use of ZKPs may advance the policy priority of improving payment systems. Furthermore, some ZKP approaches are quantum resistant while others are not, and choosing an approach will depend on the standardization process.
- *Possibly not as sustainable:* Executing ZKPs requires more computation than PKC by itself, especially in order to operate approaches that remain viable when cryptanalytically relevant quantum computers are developed. There are methods to improve the performance of ZKPs, so there may be reasonable mitigations of this concern. If this approach is chosen, it will be important that the hardware that generates ZKPs is sufficiently decentralized or protected (including from distributed denial-of-service attacks) in order to not invite targeted attacks.

The security of PKC is based on the inefficacy of certain computations using known algorithms; however, quantum computers are theoretically able to perform some of these computations quickly. Thus, many PKC protocols will be insecure when quantum computing becomes feasible at scale. The PKC systems that are resistant to attacks from such future “cryptanalytically-relevant quantum computers” are referred to as “quantum-resistant cryptography.” National Security Memorandum 10 (NSM-10)³⁶ prioritizes the transition to quantum-resistant cryptography and sets the policy that agencies should only transition to quantum-resistant cryptography once the first set of NIST standards for quantum-resistant cryptography is complete (expected in 2024) and implemented in commercial products.

If a CBDC system were to be launched in the near future, a traditional non-quantum-resistant PKC system could be developed, with the concern that older transactions may be vulnerable to tampering from future cryptanalytically-relevant quantum computers. Alternatively, a longer-term strategy would be to develop a CBDC system with a quantum-resistant PKC system after standardization has been completed. Regardless of the cryptographic approach taken, consistent with NSM-10, the CBDC system should maintain “cryptographic agility” in that the system should allow for seamless updates for future cryptographic standards. Given this, further research and analysis should be conducted on possible challenges in upgrading any non-quantum-resistant cryptography protocols to quantum-resistant methods at a later date.

There is also policy³⁷ concerning the government’s ability to retain and manage encrypted records. A relatively complex change in policies and regulations would take significant effort, and should be careful to align with recent Executive Orders and memoranda³⁸ regarding the Federal government’s posture toward cybersecurity.

³⁶ [National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems](#). (2022). *The White House*.

³⁷ See, e.g., [Bulletin 2007-02, Guidance concerning the use of Enterprise Rights Management \(ERM\) and other encryption-related software on Federal records](#). (Apr. 2007). *National Archives and Records Administration*.

³⁸ See, e.g., [Executive Order 14028: Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity](#). (May 2021). *Federal Register*; [M-22-09: Moving the U.S. Government Toward Zero Trust Cybersecurity Principles](#). (Jan. 2022). *Office of Management and Budget*.



Secure Hardware: More Hardware-Based vs. More Software-Based

Is there support for secure hardware interfaces?

Secure hardware refers to computing equipment (i.e., hardware) that is designed to protect data and computation, especially from other processes running on that equipment.

A CBDC system could base a large part of its security model on secure hardware-based approaches. This could include the use of a separate module (i.e., physically separated from other hardware) that isolates specific data and/or computations. This could also include the use of a trusted execution environment, where there are limitations placed on the code that can be executed on the equipment. Such a system could connect to a user's smartphone, could be made as a specialized part of the user's cellphone, or could function as a standalone device. A CBDC system could also run with limited or no secure hardware-based approaches, prioritizing software-based approaches to security.

Secure hardware is likely to be important for enabling offline transactions, in order to combat fraud and abuse (e.g., counterfeiting money) when transacting parties are offline.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

More hardware-based:

- *Likely more secure:* This approach can better secure cryptographic keys and certify code performance, helping to provide higher levels of security.
- *May promote AML/CFT compliance and limit concerns with privacy of sensitive financial data:* Secure hardware could possibly be the place where encrypted transactions take place, and much of the information necessary for compliance with AML/CFT regulations may reside. This can provide additional mechanisms for limiting illicit activity while minimizing risks to the privacy of individuals, but would put additional pressure on the security of that hardware.
- *May harm the expansion of equitable access to the financial system:* Consumers may need to purchase a piece of hardware that would enable them to participate in the network, which would create a barrier to equitable access to the financial system. However, if there was widespread access to secure hardware-based approaches (e.g., if most cellphones had the appropriate capability), then secure hardware could possibly execute trusted code that ensures CBDC cannot be double-spent even without access to a network; this would help facilitate offline transactions, which may expand equitable access to the financial system.
- *Introduces new risks to security and sensitive financial data:* Secure hardware also sometimes still shares hardware with other parts of the system, allowing for data to leak onto insecure hardware. Without adequate protections, secure hardware may also be manipulated by those with physical access to the system. This could be counter to the policy objectives of having a secure CBDC system and keeping sensitive financial data private.
- *Exacerbates systemic risk:* It is vital that secure hardware can be trusted to be secure, and appropriate protections can be incorporated. However, secure hardware is only developed by a few key players, and there would be large incentives for those throughout the supply



chain (including end users) to exploit the system, as the reward could potentially be the ability to mint unlimited CBDC. This would also add another potential vulnerability for the CBDC system by increasing reliance on supply chain security beyond security through software only (which also has risks for supply chain attacks).

More software-based:

- *Likely provides more flexibility:* Software-based approaches to wallets or other cryptographic primitives allow a variety of platforms and languages to adopt implementations which can improve security, and interoperability of a protocol.
- *Supports expansion of equitable access to the financial system:* By providing lower barriers to entry for consumers who do not need secure hardware, it may encourage adoption from consumers not having to acquire hardware-based technologies.

If secure hardware is part of a CBDC system design, it should be layered on top of other security measures, and not be used as a standalone guarantor of CBDC system integrity.

Transactions

Signatures: No-signature vs. Single-signature vs. Multi-signature Signing

Do transactions use digital signatures, and if so, are transactions single-signed or multiple-signed? How do you protect threshold keys/signatures? What does signing confer to the transaction? What signing algorithm is the right one?

A CBDC system could require zero, one, or multiple digital signatures to execute a valid transaction.

The CBDC system could use a no-signature approach, where transactions are not signed with any verification of identity; this would rely on a custodian to provide a user account and facilitate access to funds. The CBDC system could use a single-signature approach, where only the payer is needed to authorize the transaction. In this process, a single individual—typically the payer in possession of a private key to a digital wallet—can execute a transfer of funds to another wallet. The CBDC system could also use a multi-signature approach, where multiple signatures are needed in order to execute the transaction. In this approach, multiple private keys – possibly held by separate actors³⁹ – must be used in a transaction before the CBDC is transferred. These options are not mutually exclusive; all three could be supported by the CBDC system in different circumstances. In a multi-signature approach, there will also be additional design choices concerning who holds the appropriate keys, and whether a threshold approach is to be adopted (i.e., requiring some subset of possible signatures to be given, rather than requiring all of them).

This design choice could be linked to access tiering, where higher tiers use multiple-signature or single-signature approaches, and lower tiers use single-signature or no-signature approaches. This design choice is closely linked to the cryptography and quantum-proofing design choices. This design choice is also linked to transaction privacy; for example, if the recipient is not one of

³⁹ The transaction recipient may want to hold one of these keys. Should a CBDC system grow to interoperate with digital assets from many sources, unsolicited assets might be sent to accounts. This could introduce off-ledger attack vectors (e.g., compromised privacy, phishing).



the signers of a transaction, a bad actor might try to send unsolicited assets to a target in order to glean information about them.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

No-signature:

- *Likely less secure than other options:* If transactions do not require any direct authentication by the owner, there would be fewer safeguards to prevent the unauthorized transfer of CBDC.
- *May limit improvements to payment systems:* This approach may make it harder to introduce transaction programmability into the CBDC system, as signatures are a method to provide proof of ownership.

Single-signature:

- *Possibly less secure than multiple-signature approach:* This would be more secure than no-signature. However, because transactions only require one private key, there is a single point of failure. If a less intermediated transport layer is used, or if a private key is lost or stolen, that could lead to the loss of CBDC held in the associated wallet; similar to cash, once the asset has been lost or stolen, regaining possession can be difficult. This may not be as much of a problem with a multi-signature threshold approach, because that approach allows for “backup” keys to exist if some keys are lost or stolen. Fraud detection and prevention measures may also mitigate some of these problems.
- *Possibly more functional and efficient:* This approach is likely simple to understand and implement. Single-signature (and its analogs) are the default in the retail commerce environment (e.g., credit and debit card transactions, transferring money from individual bank accounts) and among many private sector-administered digital assets.

Multiple-signature:

- *Likely more secure than other options:* Multi-signature offers security enhancements over single-signature. In P2P transactions, the payer might hold two private keys on different devices that are needed to execute the transaction, providing additional security (similar to two-factor authentication). A threshold approach allows for, say, two of three possible signatures to be present; for example, the payer and the intermediary can each hold a key, and a third key is stored with a trusted third party in case either of the other keys is compromised. This could advance the policy objective of improving payment systems.
- *Possibly less functional and efficient:* Multi-signature requires more steps to complete a transaction, possibly adding roadblocks to easy use of CBDC. For example, if multi-signature is used for low-value transactions, the safety features may not outweigh the poorer customer experience (e.g., requiring two-factor authentication at every point-of-sale). Multi-signature would also require more effort to implement than single-signature. Additionally, more research will have to be done to determine what offline capabilities can be achieved with a multi-signature approach.
- *Possibly better for ensuring appropriate interoperability:* Multi-signature can provide a method to enable cross-border, cross-currency exchanges. In this model, one of the required signatures is from an intermediary that holds the transfer in escrow until all



transfer conditions are met. The multi-signature serves not only as an additional layer of security, but also as a facilitator of the transaction.

Transaction Privacy: More Private vs. More Observable Transactions vs. Layering

What level of transaction privacy is supported? What aspects of transactions are private, and from whom? Are amounts, destinations, and smart contracts private from the central bank? Can transactions be chained?

Transaction privacy concerns which entities are able to access which characteristics of transactions, including data privacy (e.g., account balances, location of participants, information about goods) and program privacy (e.g., source code and inputs used for a smart contract transaction).

A CBDC system could be more private, limiting access to sensitive data for legal reasons only (e.g., for compliance with AML/CFT regulations, to competent authorities for AML/CFT regulation and supervision). A CBDC system could be more observable, such as by maintaining a public record of all transactions associated with pseudonyms (e.g., the way that many private sector-administered digital assets work). A CBDC system could be a hybrid of these options, providing a public record of some characteristics and only allowing limited discoverability of others. A CBDC system could also support a layering approach, where intermediaries capture information about transactions or accounts that meet some established set of concerning characteristics, and that information could be retained for some fixed period of time during which proper legal authorities could petition to review that information in accordance with legal standards.

This design choice could be enabled in a variety of ways that intersect with other design choices. For example, if the cryptography design choice includes ZKPs, it may be possible to use ZKPs to facilitate transactions that require fewer entities to view sensitive data. Or, if the CBDC system has access tiering, design choices could be chosen for the lower tiers that provide greater transaction privacy. Additionally, if the CBDC system has intermediaries, these intermediaries could facilitate a layering approach.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

More private:

- *Better protects the privacy of sensitive financial data:* This approach would limit the data and program information that is accessible to transacting parties and third parties. It also may increase public trust and financial inclusion in a CBDC system.
- *Might introduce challenges for promoting compliance with AML/CFT requirements:* Some methods for enabling transaction privacy (e.g., some ZKP-based approaches) have limitations in how much information would be saved for future discoverability. If this approach is chosen, thought should be given to how sufficient transaction information could be preserved and remain accessible only for a limited set of verified use cases (e.g., competent authorities or financial institutions for AML investigations or to comply with AML/CFT obligations). Limitations on data preservation or access could also have implications for existing recordkeeping obligations of relevant financial institutions.



More observable:

- *Promotes AML/CFT compliance:* This approach would increase the amount of information readily available for AML/CFT compliance purposes, albeit in pseudonymous form, to competent authorities and could support relevant financial institutions compliance with existing AML/CFT obligations. Competent authorities and relevant financial institutions would still need to be able to access and share, when appropriate, detailed transaction information to facilitate compliance with AML/CFT obligations.
- *Might reduce privacy of sensitive financial data:* Even if pseudonymous identities are used for transactions, vulnerabilities in pseudonymous methods could lead to deanonymization in the future. This could potentially reduce public trust and financial inclusion if deanonymization incurs privacy harms to innocent actors.
- *May help support economic activity:* Some public information about characteristics of transactions may be useful for understanding consumer preferences and promoting private sector innovation.

Layering:

- *Aims to protect privacy of sensitive financial data and promote AML/CFT compliance, via intermediaries:* In this approach, transaction information would be mostly unavailable to the general public, while intermediaries or programmatic rules would get access to transaction information necessary to support compliance with AML/CFT obligations, and data would be available to competent authorities. For example, AML/CFT compliance practices could be standardized at the CBDC system level (e.g., along the rails), which could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of AML/CFT processes, but may place a large burden on the CBDC system operator to be responsible for a large part of AML/CFT compliance. In addition, a one-size-fits-all AML/CFT program may not be aligned with the risk-based approach promoted by international standards. However, if intermediaries play a role in such a process, care would likely be required to ensure that intermediaries do not sell, transfer, or lose this sensitive financial data in a manner that unreasonably breaches privacy.
- *Possibly less secure:* Because intermediaries would need to access transaction information, this approach would have an access point that could be compromised, either directly (e.g., since the information is being captured somewhere) or indirectly (e.g., unauthorized access to intermediaries' databases).

Offline Transactions: Online Only vs. Both Online and Offline

How can offline capabilities be provided, such that some transactions can occur without connectivity to the broader CBDC system? Would tokens or debit cards tied to the CBDC operate as a tool to permit a higher level of privacy for some transactions?

Offline transactions refer to exchanges of CBDC that occur when the exchanging parties can communicate with each other, but they cannot communicate with the transaction processor.

One design choice is to forgo offline transactions, instead requiring some form of connectivity in order to complete a transaction of CBDC. Alternatively, offline transactions could be provided,



for example, by using trusted execution environments for individuals to verify to each other that they have the CBDC they claim to have, and to facilitate the transaction securely.

This option is closely linked to the Secure Hardware design choice, as that might provide the guarantees needed to facilitate some transactions offline without the broader CBDC system's features and safeguards. It is also linked to the governance design choices, as there could be future punishments and remediation for offline transactions that were incorrect or malicious. Finally, the data model and fungibility of CBDC would also have an impact on the privacy implications of offline transactions.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

Online only:

- *Could be more secure:* An online-only model would not introduce vulnerabilities from offline capabilities, such as flaws in a trusted execution environment that functionally allows individuals to create CBDC out of thin air. However, there are reasons that offline capability could also boost the CBDC system's security, as discussed below.
- *May harm financial inclusion and equity:* The requirement to have connectivity to the CBDC system would disproportionately disadvantage underserved communities that lack access to reliable and high-speed Internet. Additionally, the inability to use CBDC like physical cash may not be enticing to communities that have been particularly disenchanting with the traditional banking and financial systems.

Both online and offline:

- *Has implications for security and AML/CFT controls:* An offline-capable system would be more resilient if the network or intermediaries were rendered dysfunctional at any point. This resiliency would be important during potential attacks or failures, allowing CBDC to be exchanged while the system comes back online. However, if someone breaks the mechanism (e.g., secure hardware) that ensures CBDC cannot be spent twice, then it could be possible to counterfeit CBDC. In addition, offline transactions could presumably take place without being subject to real-time transaction monitoring or investigative tracing, which could complicate compliance with AML/CFT obligations.
- *Could be more private:* An offline system, based on how it is implemented, could offer more cash-like privacy in offline transactions. For example, if transactions are only recorded when they intersect with intermediaries, then CBDC could be exchanged between many hands offline before being re-tracked in the ledger.

There is a spectrum of options between fully online-only and fully offline-compatible. Limitations could also be placed on the amounts, frequency, or types of transactions that could occur offline. For example, third-party network transactions have a reporting requirement for transactions exceeding \$600.⁴⁰ Furthermore, cash transactions in trade and business over \$10,000 are required to be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under current law; an analogous norm in offline CBDC transfers might mean that more than \$10,000 cannot be transferred offline. However, P2P cash transactions not considered in the context of trade or business do not have this reporting requirement.

⁴⁰ [Instructions for Form 1099-K](#). (Jan. 2022). *Internal Revenue Service*.



Transaction Programmability: Supported vs. Not Supported

Are transaction-level application programming interfaces (APIs) supported? If so, can they be created in a permission-less manner, only by the CBDC authority, or somewhere in between? Who defines the API? Is there a governance process to determine API requirements?

Transaction programmability refers to whether, broadly, third-party developers are able to code rules into a CBDC system, such that those rules are executed when the predefined conditions are met.⁴¹ This does not refer to the ability to uniquely identify specific CBDC units and place restrictions on their use; for a discussion of that design choice, refer to the fungibility design choice.

Transaction programmability can be supported, such that the CBDC system has smart contract programming capabilities that developers can use to develop programs to run on the CBDC system. Alternatively, transaction programmability could not be supported, so that most or all CBDC cannot be programmed to function in more specific ways. Hybrid options are also possible; for example, programmability could be supported for broad use cases (e.g., regulatory and monetary policy) and execution of some smart contracts could be extended to intermediaries, but direct programming against a ledger could be unsupported. Programmability could also be allowed for applications that use data from the CBDC system without having direct access to CBDC system infrastructure.

Trustworthy programmability is highly entangled with the cryptographic primitives that are chosen to enable security and trust. Because programmability can also have tradeoffs with privacy, the design choices about identity privacy and transaction privacy are also closely linked to programmability. The data model chosen is relevant here; for example, an unspent transaction outputs (UTXO) model, as described below, may make it harder to conduct auctions using smart contracts.⁴² Finally, questions of governance are also important here – if transaction programmability is supported on a centralized system, it will likely be important to ensure that the central authority or authorities are verifiably committed to following and executing the rules.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

Transaction programmability supported:

- *Likely supports payments innovation:* Allowing entities or developers to build in their own programs could enable new forms of payment technologies, similar to the ecosystem of innovation seen with smart contracts. This may not be fully realized if programmability is only partly supported (e.g., if the CBDC system is deployed with programmed rules established, but does not support third parties to build in their own programs).
- *May harm the privacy of sensitive financial data:* Programmability is often based on verifying that a certain set of conditions is true, which then initiates the execution of the smart contract. In order to verify that set of conditions, the smart contract needs access to

⁴¹ Transaction programmability is often implemented through transaction-level APIs.

⁴² Allen, S., Čapkun, S., Eyal, I., Fanti, G., Ford, B. A., Grimmelmann, J., ... & Zhang, F. (Aug. 2020). [Design choices for central bank digital currency: Policy and technical considerations](#) (No. w27634). *National Bureau of Economic Research*, 51-2.



certain sets of data. This can lead to privacy risks to sensitive financial data, although various privacy-enhancing approaches (e.g., ZKPs) could help mitigate these risks.

- *May make the CBDC system less secure:* In the private sector use of smart contracts, there have been a number of bugs, mistakes, and hacks that have caused smart contracts to behave in unexpected or malicious ways. While this can be partly mitigated via controlled libraries for smart contract programming languages, upgradable code, and code verification, there will likely still remain key security risks with programmable CBDC.
- *May worsen systemic risk:* A network of smart contracts – and the potentially high interdependency between them – could create unexpected feedback loops, where the whole system triggering rules in parallel could collectively create systemic issues for the financial system.
- *May reduce financial protections for consumers:* Programmability might introduce challenges for stopping code execution in response to bankruptcy, recovery and resolution, or other court prescribed activities. The smart code execution is driven by standard external inputs and may have additional challenges for adjusting or accommodating “extraordinary” events such as bankruptcy or receivership, which could lead to violations of laws or regulations.

Transaction programmability not supported:

- The benefits and drawbacks of not implementing transaction programmability are the inverse of implementing it.

Data

Data Model: Unspent Transaction Outputs vs. Account Balances

What model is used to maintain records: Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXOs) or Account Balances?

The data model refers to the method of keeping records about ownership of CBDC.

The CBDC system could use the UTXO data model, where the transfer of specific CBDC units is tracked (e.g., like coins being transferred between individuals). Alternatively, the CBDC system could use the Account Balances model, where it tracks the aggregate amounts of CBDC held in different places. The system could also use a hybrid of these approaches.

The data model is closely linked to many other design choices, including those involving the transport layer, identity privacy, transaction privacy, and offline capabilities.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXOs)

- *May enable more privacy for sensitive financial data:* It is a bit easier to do privacy-preserving cryptography with this model. Individual UTXOs can be linked to unique keys, so that they are not all easily tied back to one individual’s account. Meanwhile, with the Account Balances model, many people will likely use one account for their



transactions, which means all transactions could be linked back to a single person more easily.

- *Likely easier to expand access for all Americans:* As a CBDC system scales, the UTXO data model is likely to make it easier to facilitate more transactions (e.g., transactions can happen in parallel without needing to sequence them to avoid double-spending). With the Account Balances model, transactions require editing a global state about account balances, and these edits likely have to happen sequentially so that money isn't double-spent; this might provide a challenge to scaling the CBDC system.

Account Balances:

- *May support certain types of payments innovation:* The Account Balances model could make it easier to reference outside states via oracles or smart contracts. Global account states would make it easier to incorporate transaction programmability. It is harder for a UTXO data model to reference the full global state of the CBDC system, which is likely a key feature for achieving extensive programmability (e.g., enabling the checking of other users' balances).

There is also a spectrum of designs between the UTXO and Account Balances data models. For example, some projects have used a hybrid approach that features a “collection of object states” as its data model.

Ledger History: None vs. Centralized vs. Distributed

Does the CBDC maintain a history of issuances and transactions, and what information is stored (e.g., value, issuer) and for how long? If a decentralized system is used, do nodes contain all or part of the transaction history (e.g., full versus light nodes) or partition the storage workload (e.g., sharding⁴³)?

Ledger history refers to the maintenance of a history of issuances and transactions in a CBDC system.

A CBDC system could not store ledger history; for example, a system of smart cards (e.g., mobile phone SIM cards) may not need a ledger. A CBDC system could store ledger history on a more centralized ledger, with the central bank providing the core infrastructure and with trusted intermediaries operating key features (e.g., adding transactions to the ledger). Alternatively, a CBDC system could store ledger history in a more decentralized manner, with trusted intermediaries or individuals being able to operate their own nodes to facilitate part of the CBDC system.

The specific questions about which information is recorded are addressed in previous sections on identity privacy, transaction privacy, remediation, and data. The choices made in those sections are highly relevant here; because different pieces of historical data could be accessed together, the risks to privacy and AML/CFT controls would be shaped by the specific pieces of information being stored. Additionally, remediation will likely be more challenging if a distributed ledger is chosen such that no trusted entities have unilateral write access to the ledger.

⁴³ Sharding refers to taking natural subsets of data in a database, often to help improve performance. See, e.g., Amiri, M. J., Agrawal, D., & El Abbadi, A. (Jul. 2019). [On sharding permissioned blockchains](#). *2019 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain*, 282-5.



Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

None:

- *May improve security and privacy of sensitive financial data:* A key way to protect privacy and security is to not capture information.⁴⁴ By not maintaining a ledger, there would be fewer places where sensitive financial data could be accessed.
- *May introduce risks for consumers, investors, and businesses:* It may be impossible to offer all the features and requirements of a central bank asset without any ledger. A lack of a ledger, even one that only temporarily records transactions, could make it harder to resolve critical failures and conduct remediation.
- *May have implications for expanding equitable access to the financial system:* A lack of any historical ledger directly tied into the core CBDC system could foster widespread distrust in the CBDC system, especially during its early adoption phase when there may be doubts as to whether the system works properly. Alternatively, because privacy concerns are one of the most-cited reasons for not having a bank account among unbanked households,⁴⁵ the lack of a ledger may help increase adoption of a CBDC among the unbanked and underbanked.

Centralized ledger:

- *Likely more functional and efficient:* A centralized ledger would likely be easier to build and operate, especially at the scale needed for a U.S. CBDC system.
- *May have implications for payments innovation and consumer protection:* Since a centralized ledger approach is similar to how electronic money transactions are currently tracked, this approach is more familiar and better tested. However, this familiarity may limit full consideration given to incorporating the latest features in areas like encryption and programmability, possibly limiting innovation, but also possibly better protecting consumers, investors, and businesses.

Distributed ledger:

- *May be less functional and efficient:* Further research would have to be performed to understand if distributed ledgers can support transaction rates and latency likely required by a U.S. CBDC system. This could build on the considerable energy that has been invested into research on additional technologies to enhance underlying distributed ledgers to provide them with the ability to transact (e.g., something similar to a “layer two” technology⁴⁶). Additionally, many of distributed ledger technology’s features—immutability, cryptography, programmability and smart contracts—can also be realized through a centralized ledger approach, if desired.

⁴⁴ See, e.g., Fanti, G., Kostianen, K., Howlett, W., Lipsky, J., Moehr, O., Schnapper-Casteras, J., & Wolff, J. (Jun. 2022). [Missing Key: The challenge of cybersecurity and central bank digital currency](#). *The Atlantic Council*. (“CBDCs with stronger privacy rules may generate and store less sensitive data in the first place. In turn, potential attackers have a smaller incentive to infiltrate the system.”)

⁴⁵ [How America Banks: Household Use of Banking and Financial Services, 2019 FDIC Survey](#). (Oct. 2020). Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Martinazzi, S., & Flori, A. (2020). [The evolving topology of the Lightning Network: Centralization, efficiency, robustness, synchronization, and anonymity](#). *Plos one*, 15(1), e0225966.



- *May harm security and consumer protection:* When coupled with permissionless governance, distributed ledgers create new potential ways of attacking the system (e.g., 51% attacks). Some of the additional functionality that such systems have enabled in private sector-administered digital assets (e.g., transaction programmability) has been a prime target for attacks.
- *May promote payments innovation:* Incorporating a technology with significant industry research and development could have downstream effects on innovation in the CBDC system and the government as a whole. For example, assuming that distributed ledger technology has some role within the “ecosystem” of CBDC ledgers, it may enable increased innovation in programmable money and smart contracts.
- *May not be sustainable:* Some types of consensus mechanisms used to maintain synchronicity between distributed ledgers raise environmental concerns. If one of these consensus mechanisms were used in a CBDC system with a distributed ledger, this design choice may not align with the policy objective that a CBDC system should be sustainable.

The length of historical storage is also an important question. Ledger history would likely be required to be recorded for long enough to facilitate AML/CFT compliance and to ensure that offline transactions can be verified against the history of previous transactions. However, data would likely not be required to be stored indefinitely in order to enable any core parts of a CBDC system’s functionality; for security and privacy purposes, it would make sense to store ledger history for as little time as required to fulfill policy objectives.

Adjustments

A CBDC system could facilitate a number of financial design choices, such as special purpose CBDC, holding limits, fees, and interest whose merit is outside the scope of this report.⁴⁷ This section focuses on analyzing the associated technical design choices that would enable those financial design choices.

Fungibility: Fungible vs. Non-Fungible Units

Can the CBDC system support non-fungible units?

A non-fungible unit is a discrete unit of CBDC that has a unique identifier (e.g., a serial code). For example, even though physical dollar bills are often considered fungible, under this definition, a physical dollar bill is a non-fungible object. Each physical dollar bill is a unique physical object that has a serial number, and can be held, destroyed, or exchanged for another unique physical dollar.

A CBDC system could support fungible units that are not unique, and thus function identically to each other. A CBDC system could also support non-fungible units, and thus can enable different

⁴⁷ For further consideration of some of these design choices, see [The Future of Money and Payments](#). (Sep. 2022). Department of the Treasury.



processes for their use.⁴⁸ A CBDC system could also use both approaches. In a corollary to cash as a unit of payment, cash can be serialized. If something is wrong, a participant can take it out of circulation and reprint that note with the same serial number with an annotation of reprint.

Fungibility will likely overlap with choices made about storage and the transaction model. Fungibility could also impact how CBDC is packaged for offline transactions, and how the CBDC system interoperates with other payment systems.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

Fungible units:

- *May promote privacy of sensitive financial data:* Fungible units are not marked to be uniquely traceable down to specific CBDC units, potentially increasing the privacy afforded by the CBDC system. This could advance the policy objective of aligning with democratic values.
- *May promote increased interoperability:* Fungible units could be subdivided and exchanged with each other, as the uniqueness of any specific CBDC unit would not need to be preserved. This could advance the policy objective of ensuring the CBDC system should be appropriately interoperable.

Non-fungible units:

- *Likely helpful for economic activity:* Non-fungible units could enable the limiting of certain CBDC to be used toward more economically-beneficial uses, especially during times of recession. This could be a helpful tool for regulatory and monetary policy.
- *May promote national security, possibly at the risk of human rights and aligning with democratic values:* Specific CBDC units could be marked as “tainted” if they are used in illicit activity. Regulated entities could be prohibited from engaging with this tainted CBDC, which would reduce the market value of those CBDC units, thus making it less profitable to use the CBDC system for illicit activity. This could advance the policy objective of national security, although misuse of this power (e.g., to target political adversaries) could be counter to the policy objectives of protecting human rights and aligning with democratic values.⁴⁹
- *Could affect human rights and democratic values:* Because non-fungible CBDC could enable some CBDC units to be treated differently than other CBDC units, this design choice could be used to restrict how individuals use CBDC. For example, some CBDC could only be able to be spent on travel or, in a more sinister example, could be limited to disallow certain lawful transactions, such as not allowing spending for religious causes. This may also limit adoption of the CBDC, which could be counter to the objectives of improving payment systems and U.S. leadership in the global financial system. On the other hand, programmability could also be used to prevent currency from being used in various ways that harm consumers or violate human rights.

⁴⁸ There are further technical specifications that could limit the actors that could treat different units of CBDC differently from each other. For example, CBDC could be serialized with numbers that are encrypted, such that only certain intermediaries are able to decrypt those numbers.

⁴⁹ This is not the only way to control usage of CBDC. Assets or accounts might be restricted from using CBDC in other ways, based on other design choices made for the CBDC system.



It is also possible to operate a hybrid version, where some units are fungible and some units are non-fungible. For example, standard CBDC could be fungible while there could be some CBDC that is non-fungible (e.g., benefit disbursements for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, which could be non-fungible so it could be limited to being spent on SNAP-eligible purchases).

Holding Limits: Limits or No Limits

Are there limits on how much CBDC any particular entity can hold?

Holding limits refer to limits on how much CBDC any particular person or entity can hold.

The CBDC system could impose limits on how much any particular entity can hold in CBDC. Alternatively, the CBDC system could not have such limits. The CBDC system could likely enable this functionality if there are mechanisms, such as Consumer Due Diligence, requirements or costs, to prevent entities from creating multiple accounts.

This design choice is closely related to identity privacy, for the reason mentioned above. This design choice may also be linked to access tiering, as it is possible that holding limits could be imposed for some tiers and not for others.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

Limits:

- *May help mitigate risks for consumers, investors, and businesses:* Limits would cap the damage that consumers, investors, and businesses might incur via the CBDC system.
- *May introduce risks for keeping sensitive financial data private:* Limits might be implemented in a way that requires intermediaries monitoring the balance of individual accounts, or by linking balances across accounts together; these approaches might harm privacy. However, more privacy-preserving approaches are possible; for example, ZKPs and secure hardware-based approaches could prevent transactions (including P2P ones) from completing if the recipient's balance would exceed a certain threshold.

No limits:

- *May limit benefits to economic activity:* No limits may be a benefit for businesses that hold or exchange large volumes of CBDC at a time. This might make it easier to use the CBDC system for economic activity. Though economic considerations are out of scope for this report, it is worth noting that there are important economic considerations here. For example, if a substantial portion of deposits are held in the CBDC system, this might reduce loan creation by financial intermediaries due to lower deposit volumes. Additionally, without appropriate safeguards, this could increase the likelihood, severity, and speed of bank runs, as a CBDC system could allow users to quickly withdraw deposits from a bank if they believe it might fail (even with the existence of deposit insurance).^{50, 51}

⁵⁰ A recent paper finds that bank runs can be more frequent with a CBDC system. Williamson, S. D. (2021). [Central bank digital currency and flight to safety](#). *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, 104146.

⁵¹ The European Central Bank simulated systemic runs on banks based on the recent experience by Greece and Cyprus; they found that no limit accounts can allow for faster and larger withdrawals. Adalid, R., Álvarez-Blázquez,



Adjustments on Transactions: Fees vs. No Fees

Can the CBDC system support fees?

Adjustments on transactions refer to the costs imposed by the Federal Reserve, intermediaries, or other third parties for the use of the CBDC system.

The Federal Reserve or the appropriate entity could administer fees for using the CBDC system, or fees could be allowed to be charged by intermediaries as part of transactions in an intermediated system. Alternatively, the system could be built without the concept of fees and any such charges could be managed as separate transactions.

This design choice intersects with many other design choices. For example, the transport layer likely matters a lot; if intermediaries are involved, then fees might be levied on intermediaries rather than consumers directly. In a less intermediated system, fees may help solve efficiency and cybersecurity concerns that might otherwise be handled by intermediaries. Fees may also intersect with access tiering, where lower tiers may not involve fees, while higher tiers could involve fees.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

Fees:

- *May improve efficiency:* Fees can help the CBDC system prioritize transactions. This is likely less of a concern in an intermediated system where intermediaries can institute their own processes to prioritize transactions.
- *May improve security:* Fees can also provide a disincentive for CBDC system users to spam the network with a large number of transactions. This is likely less of a concern in an intermediated system where intermediaries can institute their own processes to prevent spamming.
- *May improve functionality:* Fees can help recuperate some of the costs of operating the CBDC system. This would help the CBDC system function efficiently relative to the costs to operate. This may also be a requirement based on existing law and regulation.

No fees:

- *May help improve efficiency and extensibility:* Fees add complexity to a CBDC system. The lack of fees would allow for a more straightforward CBDC system, which may be more efficient and extensible.
- *May not help improve payment systems:* Fees would create an additional barrier to the use of the CBDC system, which may prevent all Americans from using the CBDC system. Even if fees were assessed on intermediaries, some of those costs would likely be passed on to consumers.

If fees are assessed, there would also be choices about how they are administered (e.g., a percentage of each transaction, a fixed fee to access the CBDC system for a certain period of time).

Adalid, R., Álvarez-Blázquez, Á., Assenmacher, K., Burlon, L., Dimou, M., López-Quiles, C., ... & Veghazy, A. V. (2022). [Central bank digital currency and bank intermediation](#). *ECB Occasional Paper*, (2022/293), 36-41.



Adjustments on Balances: Adjustable vs. Not Adjustable

Can the CBDC system support CBDC that is interest-bearing?

Adjustments on balances refers to whether account balances can be adjusted to facilitate features such as interest-bearing CBDCs or fees based on accounts.

Accounts could be adjustable outside of fund transfers or not. These adjustments could be made by the central bank, intermediaries, or other third parties. Alternatively, such adjustments could not be built into the CBDC system and accomplished through transfers instead. Either way, the CBDC system could likely enable this functionality, should it make sense from a monetary perspective.

This design choice intersects with the transport layer, as an intermediated system would provide more technological methods for creating an interest-bearing CBDC. This design choice also intersects with offline capabilities; if the interest rate is varied over time, it may be challenging – but may be technically possible – to provide interest on wallets that are not able to receive information about the updated interest rate.

Design choice benefits and drawbacks are described below:

Adjustable balance:

- *Increases technical and governance complexity:* A way to change balances outside of ordinary transfers will increase the technical complexity of the system and will add to the governance complexity as deciding who can make those decisions and when will be important. Implementation would be harder and overhead of system design would likely be much higher.
- *May have implications for financial inclusion and equity:* If adjustments require connectivity and are mostly positive, such adjustments may make offline functionality less desirable. On the other hand, an interest-bearing CBDC may provide a more accessible option for consumers to retain value for their CBDC and may help enable more options for monetary policy.
- *May reduce trust:* Depending on governance decisions, a direct monetary policy lever controlled by the central bank on accounts may reduce public trust in the CBDC system, particularly if negative changes are considered.
- *May help improve payment systems:* An interest-bearing incentive to hold may help bring more capital into storage in the CBDC system. This would help increase uptake of the CBDC system, which could help improve payment systems. However, this may also come at the expense of reducing deposits, which could exacerbate risks to loan creation and bank runs.

Not adjustable balance:

- The benefits and drawbacks of not implementing adjustable balances are the inverse of implementing it.



Feasibility and Resources for a U.S. CBDC System Minimum Viable Product

This section aims to address what steps could be taken if the United States decided that launching a CBDC system was in the best interests of the United States. In particular, this section attempts to provide an outline for steps that could be taken to pursue the effort to deploy a CBDC minimum viable product (“CBDC MVP”). For the purposes of this section, a CBDC MVP refers to a CBDC prototype that provides the minimal set of features needed to solve a specific set of problems, but is not a fully-functional “CBDC pilot” that could directly evolve into a real CBDC.

This section does not intend to suggest that the U.S. Government would pursue the deployment of a CBDC system, nor does it intend to suggest any specific bundling of CBDC system design choices as the correct combination. Instead, this section intends to show the range of possibilities and the associated effects on implementation and to convey lessons from the challenges of launching large technology projects in the Federal government.

It is unlikely that any presupposed design for a CBDC system can succeed without testing, evaluation, and feedback. Rather than shipping a fully featured product, the development of a CBDC MVP would aim to validate the assumptions, understandings, and implications of introducing a novel financial instrument and technological product into the market. The U.S. Digital Service, per their Digital Services Playbook,⁵² notes that launching a functional MVP that solves a core need as soon as possible is part of the best practices for reducing the risk of overall failure. Incremental design and development should increase the likelihood of eventually launching a successful CBDC system.

This section presents an array of design choices and tradeoffs that might be chosen in order to achieve a CBDC MVP while addressing a variety of competing policy choices. The section means to highlight the range of possibilities, not suggest any set in particular. Since this analysis builds on the aforementioned design choices, the same list of assumptions at the outset of the design choices section also generally apply in this section.

Brief Survey of Relevant Experimentation

The following is meant to be a non-comprehensive survey of CBDC experimentation efforts, to help contextualize the CBDC MVP discussion that follows. A more extensive discussion of these efforts can be found in the Department of the Treasury’s report on *The Future of Money and Payments*, as well as a variety of other sources.

Public Sector

Many other jurisdictions are conducting research and development related to CBDC systems, such as establishing research or pilots, or even deploying early-stage CBDCs. Approximately

⁵² The Digital Services Playbook provides a baseline set of practices and resources that are used to inform the assessments in this document. See Appendix for additional information on the Digital Services Playbook.



90% of central banks are engaging in some work related to CBDCs and approximately 62% of central banks are conducting experiments or developing proofs-of-concept. A recent survey suggests that some emerging market economies are issuing or have piloted “a live retail CBDC, and it is likely that other jurisdictions will follow in the foreseeable future: about 68% of central banks consider that they are likely to or might possibly issue a retail CBDC in the short or medium term.”⁵³

In the United States, the Federal Reserve has been doing a broad range of experimentation related to CBDCs, which is discussed in more detail in the Recommendations section of this report, in the Federal Reserve Board’s *Money and Payments: The US Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation* paper,⁵⁴ and in the Department of the Treasury’s *The Future of Money and Payments* report.

Private Sector

Private sector experimentation in the digital assets ecosystem has been much broader than only experimentation related to CBDC systems, and a summary of this experimentation is outside of the scope of this report. However, technological features that have been developed in the digital assets ecosystem could be relevant to developing a U.S. CBDC system, and they should be examined for their ability to advance policy objectives for a U.S. CBDC system. Examples include privacy-enhancing technologies (e.g., ZKPs), digital wallet software and hardware, and smart contracts. Unsuccessful or fraudulent activities, as well as hacks and exploits, in the private sector digital assets ecosystem can also provide learning opportunities for developing a U.S. CBDC system.

Estimating Resources Required Based on Sets of Hypothetical CBDC Design Choices

When attempting to estimate the resources required to launch a CBDC MVP, a set of technical design choices must be made. In what follows, three different sets of design choices are considered: (1) a set that is minimally complex, (2) a set that is more complex focused on broader participation, and (3) a set that is more complex focused on programmability, privacy, and inclusion.

These sets of design choices are meant to be illustrative only; they do not represent exhaustive nor comprehensive sets of design choices or U.S. priorities. They are not suggestions or recommendations for how a U.S. CBDC should be designed, if such a decision is made. Should the United States decide to start building a pilot, as defined above, for a CBDC with the intention of launching it, the entity tasked with overseeing this work should iteratively go back and forth between design choices and policy objectives, so that the technology and policy both inform each other.⁵⁵

⁵³ Kosse, A., & Mattei, I. (May 2022). [Gaining momentum—Results of the 2021 BIS survey on central bank digital currencies](#). *BIS Papers*, 9.

⁵⁴ [Money and Payments: The US Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation](#). (Jan. 2022). *The Federal Reserve*, 23.

⁵⁵ In the actual design of a CBDC MVP, it would be helpful to start by defining the primary objectives – from within the larger set of Policy Objectives laid out in this document – that will be used to identify the proper design choices necessary to demonstrate success for those objectives in line with the overall U.S. CBDC policy objectives. Defining a set of use cases and primary objectives will help develop an approach to objectively evaluate the success and



The sets of design choices defined below provide examples of varying levels of complexity. They are meant to represent the potential challenges that delivering a CBDC MVP with a particular set of expectations could present.

Example Set #1: Minimally Complex

One set of design choices for a CBDC MVP is minimally complex, which should provide for a faster development speed. This set of design choices could provide early access for retail consumers and involves low interoperability with other payment systems. This approach de-prioritizes concepts like offline payments and privacy-enhancing features. These choices also lend themselves to simplicity of development, administration, and delivery.

The minimum set of participants in this set of design choices could be retail consumers and intermediaries facilitating CBDC accounts. Under this approach, there could exist intermediaries, public or private, for the online intermediation of all retail CBDC customers.

If the set of intermediaries were limited to those in the United States, existing Know Your Customer (KYC) infrastructure might be applied in a similar manner to the current system,⁵⁶ which would likely reduce the technical challenges that need to be addressed and make it easier to achieve higher adoption in less time.

Access to the system could be controlled by well-known identity-based and role-based access controls. It would be permissioned, and there would be little or no access tiering. Remediation could be done very simply because there would be a centralized settlement and transaction layer. There would be no offline transactions. Adjustments or fees could be administered in a straightforward fashion by system administrators. Privacy and oversight controls would be governed by whomever is appointed to administrate the system.

Developing and launching a CBDC MVP with requirements that look like this set of design choices has relatively low complexity, compared to other sets of design choices. The tools and systems that would underpin a secure and functional system of this nature are more well-known and pose less complexity than those in the other example sets of design choices. A CBDC MVP with these design choices could be tested in a bounded context within a relatively short time frame and with relatively few resources.

Estimating specific build timelines, especially with limited information about the product and team, is largely a futile exercise, both for this example set and the two that follow below. In support of a relatively fast timeline is that a small set of skills and expertise should be required under these requirements as all of the components are well known. Much would depend on clearing various non-technical hurdles in a timely manner. As examples: intermediaries would

effectiveness of a CBDC system toward achieving the policy priorities. Without a specific use case, it would be harder to demonstrate the potential benefits and risks of adopting any novel financial instrument relative to existing or planned payment rails. Additionally, along with use cases and primary objectives, a CBDC MVP should incorporate a well-defined scope so that it may be evaluated safely. Assessing the effectiveness of a CBDC MVP while bounding the risk amongst a well-defined set of participants will provide a baseline for distinguishing a CBDC MVP from existing forms of currency. An appropriate boundary could be either geographically, socially, or technologically defined.

⁵⁶ There are other factors that could make this more or less challenging; for example, the ease of implementing a KYC infrastructure would depend, in part, on the intermediary or intermediaries chosen and the legal and regulatory constraints.



need to be able to develop sufficient core functionality on a similar timeframe, a legal framework for the CBDC MVP operation would need to be developed, and funding would need to be secured and budgeted.

Additionally, it is worth repeating that this set of design choices are all chosen with simplicity and reduction of development time for a CBDC MVP in mind. It is highly unlikely that development speed will be a significant objective, let alone the primary criteria, in the development of an actual U.S. CBDC system.

Example Set #2: More Complex Focusing on Broader Participation

Another set of design choices might focus on promoting a broader set of intermediaries to possibly be able to participate as an intermediary in the CBDC MVP. A corresponding CBDC MVP would be permissioned and built with access tiering. Intermediaries in this system may include bank, non-bank, and potentially individuals (e.g., operating self-provisioned intermediation on lower tiers).⁵⁷

A CBDC MVP of this form could be introduced for voluntary adoption and integration into existing payment systems. In order to accelerate the development of a CBDC MVP, the development team could start by supporting a handful of intermediaries responsible for fulfilling specific roles and build out from there. This report estimates that a core team supported by intermediaries' teams would need to spend longer than the team in Example #1 developing a CBDC MVP with these design features. Also, like Example #1, non-technical hurdles would also need to be addressed. For example, it may be challenging to identify the right set of participants to create an appropriately competitive network of intermediaries.

The design choices here would present considerable design and implementation challenges. It would likely require several teams across multiple organizations to effectively coordinate to create the right tools and interoperability capabilities to deliver these requirements.

Example Set #3: More Complex Focusing on Programmability, Privacy, and Inclusion

One promising yet complex feature of a potential CBDC system is the ability to enable transaction programmability in certain ways. Another potential opportunity lies in utilizing cryptographic approaches to go beyond the minimum level of security and privacy provided in the prior two examples, while simultaneously enabling more powerful tools for regulators. Ensuring access for the broadest possible population is another much-touted potential feature of a CBDC system and significantly adds to its complexity.

A CBDC MVP that focuses on these objectives could be designed to enable transaction programmability, use cryptographic techniques like ZKPs, prioritize robust mitigation of privacy risks, and employ a potentially novel storage mechanism like sharded distributed ledgers.⁵⁸ This system would also make several other design choices intended to advance retail inclusion, such as facilitating offline transactions.

Deploying this CBDC MVP, even within a smaller set of known participants, would present a reasonable amount of complexity in order to ensure its security and reliability. Additionally,

⁵⁷ Note that “individuals” here is not referencing or suggesting direct accounts, but rather self-provisioning of an intermediary.

⁵⁸ See the design choice about ledger history for a brief discussion on sharding.



there are specific additional risks related to fraud, thefts, and hacks that are posed by transaction programmability, as discussed in the design choice analysis for transaction programmability.

A reasonably sized team of technology, cryptography, payment systems, user experience, consumer protection, and policy experts would be required to ensure that not only were the objectives of the design met, but that they fell into the appropriate compliance with existing laws and regulations.

The use of some of the emerging technologies that would underpin this set of design choices poses significant challenges and would require dealing with higher levels of complexity and risk. There are many known unknowns that present risks to implementation and operation, and some of the technologies that could help advance privacy and compliance in tandem are relatively new and not yet well understood.

A CBDC MVP with these design choices would likely be best delivered in a small and isolated context, in order to better understand how such a system would interoperate with other financial products and services, as well as to understand what kinds of risks would be introduced. This report estimates that building this MVP should take longer than Example Set #2. Given the personnel, research, and time necessities here, this option likely carries a greater technical risk than the other two example sets of design choices.

As a reminder, these three combinations of design choices were illustrative for the sake of analysis, and they may not comport with the policy objectives for a U.S. CBDC system.



Impact of a U.S. CBDC System on Federal Processes

This section focuses on the U.S. Government work and services that would be affected by the inclusion of a U.S. CBDC system. It does not consider the risks and benefits of the Federal government accepting private forms of digital assets as a form of payment, as no surveyed agency indicated current or future plans to do so.

If the U.S. Government chose to adopt a CBDC system, it might also incorporate CBDC as an additional method to make or receive payments in a variety of situations. For example, the IRS might offer CBDC as an option for individuals, businesses, and organizations to pay their taxes and receive refunds. Or, the Department of Agriculture might disburse child nutrition benefits in the form of CBDC. The Department of Health and Human Services may reimburse healthcare providers and provide allotments to states with CBDC. Note that none of these have been proposed at this time, and the question of whether the United States should adopt a CBDC system is outside of the scope of this report.

CBDC's potential role in Federal payments may be more evolutionary than revolutionary. Since 1999, there has been a requirement that most U.S. Government payments be made electronically.⁵⁹ Today, a large share of Federal recurring benefits payments – including 99% of Social Security payments – are made electronically, either by Automated Clearing House (ACH) or debit card. These are often scheduled payments (e.g., on the third day of the month), making speed of payments a relative non-issue. However, there may be some cases in which CBDC could provide a unique benefit—such as cases where a one-time benefits payment needs to be made quickly or where traditional banking infrastructure is unavailable. And, there may be other benefits from providing another option to receive payments electronically, especially if the CBDC system provides additional functionalities (e.g., transaction programmability) that other payment systems do not.

It may take significant time and resources to incorporate CBDC as a payment method into Federal work and services, and this may be especially true at the Department of the Treasury, which sends out payments on behalf of many agencies. Care should be taken to mitigate potential short- and long-term challenges for cybersecurity and privacy, customer experience, and social safety net programs during this period of transition. The precise technical challenge of incorporating CBDC payments would depend, in part, on the design choices of the CBDC system, the technical infrastructure at agencies, and the availability of talent to incorporate the CBDC system into agencies' infrastructure.

Cybersecurity and Privacy

Adoption of a U.S. CBDC system, and use of it by the U.S. Government, may introduce risks for U.S. Government cybersecurity and privacy. Based on how the CBDC system is linked to agencies' infrastructure, attacks on the CBDC system could be used to compromise various

⁵⁹ [Final Rule for Electronic Government Payments Will Balance Recipient Needs with Benefits of Electronic Payment](#). (Jun. 1998). *Department of the Treasury*.



aspects of agencies' infrastructure. Likewise, attacks on agencies' infrastructure could also be used to compromise parts of the CBDC system. Core architectural and security features in the CBDC system, coupled with effective remediation and governance approaches, will be important to help mitigate these risks.

Agencies are currently responsible for conducting an internal risk management assessment to determine their risks in the use of a new technology, balanced with the agency mission needs and context of its stakeholders, customers and the potential for adverse impact due to loss of confidentiality, availability or integrity of the associated information or information system. These risks and benefits will likely be different for each agency and would be affected by CBDC system design choices such as the transport layer. Large-scale funding and payment organizations (e.g., Department of the Treasury, Department of Defense, National Science Foundation, National Finance Center, General Services Administration) would likely have different risk, benefit, and impact determinations than agencies like the Bureau of Industry and Security. Additionally, if the Department of the Treasury manages CBDC payments for many agencies, the associated risk, benefit, and impact determinations may depend on risk management choices made by Treasury.

Of particular note, there are cybersecurity and privacy risks related to the collection, storage, and transmission of payment information and associated business identifiable and personally identifiable information. For example, agencies would need to be able to detect if its CBDC holdings were compromised or improperly disbursed to mitigate the potential of improper payments; if such actions occurred, agencies would also need to be able to take steps to notify entities, seek restitution, and maintain public trust. While similar risks also exist in legacy systems, these new systems will likely add new layers of complexity, with new software applications and interfaces that create untested attack surfaces for adversaries to attempt to exploit. Applications, interfaces, and technologies needed for receipt, storage, and transmission of the CBDC by businesses and individuals are also a new area of risk for fraud, theft, and abuse.

It will be important to better understand the potential threat models at play with the U.S. Government's inclusion of a CBDC system in its work and services. A robust whole-of-government approach to CBDC system development should consider including red teaming⁶⁰ of those pilots in collaboration with relevant agencies (e.g., Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, U.S. Secret Service), which would help develop a deeper understanding of potential cybersecurity threats.

Customer Experience

EO 14058 states that it is the policy of the United States that improving service delivery and customer experience should be fundamental priorities.⁶¹ EO 14058 directs agencies to continually improve their understanding of their customers, reduce administrative hurdles and paperwork burdens to minimize time required of their customers, enhance transparency, create greater efficiencies across Government, and redesign compliance-oriented processes to improve

⁶⁰ The National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies defines "[red teaming](#)" as "the process of using tactics, techniques, and procedures to emulate real-world threats in order to train and measure the effectiveness of the people, processes, and technology used to defend environments."

⁶¹ [Executive Order 14058: Transforming Federal Customer Experience and Service Delivery To Rebuild Trust in Government](#). (Dec. 2021). *Federal Register*.



customer experience and more directly meet the needs of the people of the United States, while maintaining or enhancing protections related to civil rights, civil liberties, privacy, confidentiality, and information security.

The Federal government's adoption and use of a CBDC system poses benefits and risks to customer experience. The CBDC system could help agencies fulfill the goals of EO 14058 by improving services such as prompt payment, tracking and servicing of loans, purchasing and contracting, grant administration, payment processing overhead, and compliance-oriented processes related to AML/CFT. It may also have obstacles for ideal customer experience; for example, if every Federal process that accepts payments in CBDC required consumers to manually link their CBDC account to the agency in a time-intensive process, this might introduce additional steps that worsen customer experience. Consistent with EO 14058, it is crucial that a CBDC system takes customer experience with the Federal government into account.

A CBDC system will also raise concerns about accessibility, particularly for underserved communities. It will be important for agencies to take steps to ensure the CBDC system can benefit all Americans. For example:

- Agencies should consider and evaluate how to provide functionalities related to the CBDC system (e.g., payments, customer service) in multiple languages and ensure equal access and fraud protection for all recipients, such as those with limited English proficiency or limited digital proficiency.
- Members of certain vulnerable populations, such as immigrant populations, may have significant mistrust or unfamiliarity with financial institutions and the U.S. financial system. Agencies should consider and evaluate how a CBDC system for administering public benefits can be deployed to help establish and maintain trust for these vulnerable populations.
- Agencies should also consider and evaluate how to protect individual privacy and limit data sharing so that vulnerable populations are not prevented from seeking benefits via CBDC that they are eligible for (e.g., emergency rental assistance), out of fear that their information may be shared with other entities.

Social Safety Net Programs

Whether the CBDC system fulfills the policy objective of equity and inclusion will partly depend on how it interacts with social safety net programs. The recipients of social safety net programs – such as Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits, and unemployment insurance – are more likely to be lower income, underbanked, and have limited access to fast broadband. A CBDC system will need to be accessible by all Americans for social safety net programs to effectively be administered using CBDC. Some access issues may be exacerbated by technical design choices; for example, a CBDC system that does not enable offline transactions may not be sufficiently accessible for Americans in areas with limited broadband availability.

If social safety net programs include CBDC as an option for delivery, State, local, Tribal and territorial governments, as well as non-governmental organizations, will likely need to take steps



to accommodate CBDC transactions. For example, children’s nutrition programs are administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in conjunction with relevant State departments, schools, and local food providers. These State and local entities will likely need to interface to some extent with the CBDC system if USDA intends to disburse children’s nutrition benefits via CBDC.

If the CBDC is non-fungible, this may also introduce new benefits and risks to social safety net programs. As a benefit, non-fungible CBDC could provide a mechanism for administering certain benefit programs. For example, like SNAP benefits that can only be spent in certain ways, individuals could receive CBDC that is marked to only be used on certain food items or during particular time periods. However, there are risks to this, such as potentially precluding the use of such benefits for valid expenses. A non-fungible CBDC used in these ways, without effective and transparent governance, may cause the public to lack trust in the CBDC system. This may also introduce other technical challenges; for example, merchants may need a conversion mechanism to convert this non-fungible CBDC into a more widely-accepted currency.



Recommendations on Preparing for a U.S. CBDC System

Advance Technical Work Related to Digital Assets

Section 10671 of the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 directs OSTP to coordinate Federal activities and research and development relating to a number of technologies underpinning digital assets. For technological developments related to CBDCs, OSTP should participate in the CBDC Working Group recommended in the Department of the Treasury’s report on *The Future of Money and Payments*.

Continue Digital Assets Research and Experimentation Within the Federal Reserve

The Federal Reserve is already doing significant experimentation on CBDC systems and is leading a broad program rooted in the fundamental nature of a CBDC as a liability of the central bank. For example, the Federal Reserve Board's Technology Lab is pushing forward a significant amount of research and experimentation related to CBDC systems; the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston is working with a university to explore innovative arrangements for retail CBDC payments; and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is collaborating with the Bank for International Settlements on wholesale CBDC payments. The Federal Reserve also published a discussion paper in January 2022 titled *Money and Payments: The U.S. Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation*,⁶² which solicited comments on a variety of policy considerations and discussed ongoing technological experimentation.

The Federal Reserve is well-positioned to continue research and technological experimentation as described in its January 2022 discussion paper and on the Federal Reserve Board’s public website.⁶³ This approach has been relatively nimble – driven by small teams within one agency – and has facilitated experimentation and collaborations in new directions. Additionally, other departments and agencies should also pursue their own experimentation to tackle discrete questions involving the potential application of CBDC systems in their areas of responsibility. To this end, other agencies should continue to engage bilaterally with the Federal Reserve, as well as through the CBDC Working Group.

Establish a Digital Assets R&D Agenda

There are a significant number of open questions related to digital assets, including CBDC systems. It is important that the U.S. Government highlight these open questions and direct resources and the research community toward solving them.

⁶² [Money and Payments: The US Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation](#). (Jan. 2022). *The Federal Reserve*.

⁶³ [CBDC Research and Publications](#). *The Federal Reserve*.



The Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program should form a Fast-Track Action Committee (FTAC) that is tasked with developing a National Digital Assets R&D Agenda. The FTAC should be chaired by NSF and OSTP, and include broader participation from other agencies for an all-of-government approach to better understand digital assets. The R&D agenda should include a focus on advancing research that could be helpful to CBDC experimentation and development at the Federal Reserve, as well as both foundational and translational R&D relevant to digital assets technology more broadly (e.g., cryptography, environmentally-sustainable technologies).

The R&D agenda could inform research investments by Federal agencies including NITRD member agencies, so that agencies' resources can help advance understanding of outstanding questions. For example, NSF could explore establishing national institutes, like the National AI Research Institutes, that bring together universities, nonprofits, companies, and/or government agencies to collectively make progress on a research and development agenda. Where appropriate, the R&D agenda should consider addressing issues and gaps highlighted by the CBDC working group.

It will be vital to bring an all-of-government approach to bear on a digital assets R&D agenda. The R&D agenda should shape and be shaped by other efforts across the Federal government. For example, the National Laboratories and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency could marshal some of their technical expertise and resources directly toward tackling some of the questions in the R&D agenda. Agencies engaged in standards-setting activities, such as NIST and Treasury's Office of Financial Research, might work with relevant agencies to push forward international technical standards-setting efforts related to digital assets. Consumer protection and other relevant agencies could help identify technology initiatives (e.g., research on privacy-enhancing technologies or digital identity) to increase the digital assets ecosystem's compliance with regulations and alignment with democratic values.⁶⁴ A variety of agencies could solicit public and expert input to shape the R&D agenda (e.g., the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau could convene discussions with consumer groups, Commerce could help convene academics via the advisory committee recommended in their report pursuant to EO 14067 Section 8(b), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency could provide interviews with cybersecurity experts).

Finally, the R&D agenda should be viewed as dynamic, being updated periodically as previously open questions are answered, and as new open questions are identified.

Scale Up Tech Capacity Across the Federal Government

The Federal government should have the technological infrastructure, capacity, and expertise needed to harness benefits and mitigate risks from digital assets. For example, this includes having the capacity and resources to pursue fraud and misconduct related to digital assets. To fulfill this goal, departments and agencies should ensure they have the talent and skill mix necessary to accelerate progress on issues related to digital assets (e.g., pursuing misconduct in the digital assets ecosystem, combating money laundering involving digital assets). In doing so, departments and agencies should build on the latest developments and best practices to onboard

⁶⁴ For an analysis of the consumer protection issues concerning the digital assets ecosystem, see [Crypto-Assets: Implications for Consumers, Investors, and Businesses](#). (Sep. 2022). *Department of the Treasury*.



new tech talent⁶⁵ and provide appropriate education and training to the existing agency workforce.

Should a CBDC be deemed in the national interest and pursued, Federal departments and agencies will also need to realign their processes and capabilities, including but not limited to facilitating CBDC payments to and from the public sector. We do not currently recommend scaling up hiring specifically for the purpose of incorporating a CBDC system into agency programs at this time because a decision on whether to implement a CBDC system has yet to be made, and what form that system would take is still sufficiently undecided. Instead, departments and agencies should continue taking general steps to improve their information technology systems (e.g., strengthening cybersecurity), so they are well-maintained if steps need to be taken to incorporate a CBDC system.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., [Subject Matter Expert Qualification Assessments \(SME-QA\)](#). *U.S. Digital Service*.



Appendix A: Digital Services Best Practices

Over the past two decades, the Federal government rolled out a number of large technology projects. In doing so, the Federal government learned valuable lessons about the challenges and best practices related to delivering digital services in the Federal government. Building on these lessons, including from the aforementioned Digital Services Playbook,⁶⁶ this appendix highlights a handful of key best practices for delivering digital services. While the appendix attempts to show how these insights may apply to the development of a CBDC system, it should not be interpreted as the guidebook for developing a CBDC system. Rather, it provides a baseline set of practices and resources that are used to inform some of the assessments above about the challenge of developing CBDC MVPs with different design choices.

Open Source

The Digital Services Playbook recommends that services “default to open.” Building software in the open increases trust, security, reproducibility, and collaboration. For a U.S. CBDC, open-source development could encourage financial innovation, promote global technical standards, and reduce barriers to adoption. For example, an open-source approach could allow the system to get contributions from anywhere, enabling innovation around the world that is built on top of the U.S. CBDC system. In turn, open-source development could help advance some U.S. CBDC policy objectives.

It is worth noting that “open source” does not mean exposing all parts of the CBDC system to the world. For example, this does not include giving the public access to passwords or databases with sensitive financial information. It also does not mean that any developer could edit the code underpinning the CBDC system. Rather, “open source” describes a well-tested approach in software development that includes key safeguards to protect sensitive information, maintain cybersecurity, and prevent malicious activity.⁶⁷ Even if a U.S. CBDC system is built primarily with open-source software, there may be components that might not be open source. The specification or implementation of a protocol layer could be a good candidate for what might be maintained and developed in the open, while a number of specific implementations of security-related features may be better to keep closed. Similarly, some features may be better suited to accepting external code contributions, while others would not.

For a CBDC system, a degree of auditability will be important. Open-source principles would also recommend the publication of data about the CBDC system using appropriate privacy-preserving approaches. This type of transparency can build public trust in a CBDC system, which is vital for people to believe the system is sufficiently safe, effective, and private for them to use. As a reference point, the Federal Reserve currently publishes substantial amounts of data publicly – ranging from industrial activity to banks’ structure data. Key questions might include: What type of data should a CBDC host publish for a CBDC system? What information is too

⁶⁶ [Digital Services Playbook](#). *U.S. Digital Service*.

⁶⁷ This poses both challenges and benefits for cybersecurity, that this also increases risks in some ways. For example, it could expose possibly sensitive aspects of the codebase, including through accidentally pushing code to the open source repository that was not meant to go public. However, open sourcing certain pieces of a CBDC system may improve cybersecurity, as more experts from the tech and security communities would be able to evaluate these pieces of the system and provide insight into potential vulnerabilities. Open source best practices can help harness the benefits and mitigate the risks of this approach.



sensitive to be shared directly beyond the people running the CBDC system? These are important questions that will also have a technical component in ensuring the data can be collected, processed, and disseminated in a usable, timely, and privacy-preserving manner.

Importantly, developing open-source software still requires the Federal government to develop the skills and teams required to effectively manage, maintain, and develop software effectively.

Modern Technology Stack

As the Digital Services Playbook notes, “digital services teams should consider using open source, cloud-based, and commodity solutions across the technology stack, because of their widespread adoption and support by successful consumer and enterprise technology companies in the private sector.” In other words, a U.S. CBDC should default to using existing tools, where possible, for standard technology infrastructure (e.g., database management, networking stack, logging infrastructure, memory caches, and cryptographic libraries). This has many benefits, such as the resource and security benefits of using well-tested and regularly-updated tools. Crucially, it increases access in an important way: allowing software engineers to use tools they are either already familiar with, or have extensive documentation and developer communities. It is also worth noting that popular private sector-administered digital assets also build on top of existing tech infrastructure and tools.

Note that this does not mean a U.S. CBDC system should build on top of existing, full-fledged transaction processing systems. If an existing transaction processing system provides all the features that a U.S. CBDC would ideally provide, this may be an option worth considering; however, because this seems unlikely, there will still likely be a need to build key functionalities for a U.S. CBDC system. The key is that core functionalities that underpin a U.S. CBDC system should not be reinvented unless necessary.

Agile Development

The Digital Services Playbook notes that “we should use an incremental, fast-paced style of software development to reduce the risk of failure.” Experimentation and prototypes are crucial for building a U.S. CBDC system that achieves the policy objective of ensuring a CBDC system is functional.

Good code development requires fast detection and remediation of code vulnerabilities. This requires a robust code auditing regime. If the CBDC operates on a small set of networks or with few intermediaries, this will be easier to implement. But, as a CBDC system incorporates offline capabilities and intermediated transactions, implementation becomes more challenging. Pushing updates to code across an ecosystem of offline and intermediate actors is technically more difficult and warrants further attention.

Agile development is also closely related to other good design practices, such as user testing new features early in the development process. It is also related to the importance of conducting discovery sprints, which are short processes where a small team with technical and subject matter expertise partner with organizations already working on a problem in order to jointly explore a problem or challenge.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ [Discovery Sprint Guide](#). U.S. Digital Service.



Overall, it is vital to ensure that U.S. CBDC features are truly usable and provide a good customer experience, consistent with EO 14058.

Team Structure

An effective team structure with the proper skillsets will be required in order to effectively deliver an innovative and novel product. A proposed set of roles and configuration based on best practices is outlined below, though, as noted in the report, any actual team structure should be decided based on the specifics of the CBDC MVP being pursued.

How teams are built and aligned to various aspects of either research or development will rely strongly on the existing state of research and development across several key areas that might impact a CBDC system. In general, the team will need the resources and assets to quickly pivot to meet shifting needs as the MVP is built. At this moment, it is challenging to estimate the number of people needed to staff the development of an MVP, as well as the specific skills they would need.

Based on other large technical MVPs, it seems likely that at least 10 people would be needed to build a CBDC MVP, and that the team size would need to be flexible in order to scale up significantly as needed.^{69, 70}

Sample skills for developing a CBDC MVP:

- Product managers
 - Product managers could facilitate the development of an MVP toward meeting the stated objectives for the product and ensure that the team is properly organized to build such a product.
- User experience (UX) and user interface (UI) researchers
 - UX and UI researchers could improve the development process by testing and iterating to ensure that the product is meeting the needs of the intended consumers.
- Designers
 - Design experts could help provide insight into aspects of interface and protocol design that achieve the desired policy and primary objective constraints.
- Policy and compliance experts
 - Experts in policy and compliance could coordinate with product and design to ensure that technical outcomes align effectively with broader policy requirements. This type of expertise may need to include: national payments, international payments, consumer and privacy protection, financial inclusion and equity, law,

⁶⁹ This presupposed minimum team size is only for the purposes of a CBDC MVP, and should not be used to infer any insight into the team size necessary for building and maintaining a CBDC pilot or a launched CBDC system.

⁷⁰ Some of the following positions are elaborated upon in 18F's [De-risking Government Technology](#) (Sep. 2020). This list should not be read to imply that every skill must be done by a different person, or by multiple people; it may be possible for one person to be able to cover multiple responsibilities on the list below.



monetary policy, financial stability, bank supervision and regulation, AML/CFT compliance, banking, and finance.

- Application developers
 - Application developers could help ensure that the CBDC MVP is appropriately accessible on a variety of device operation systems, which would likely be a critical factor for adoption. Note that even if application development is entirely left to intermediaries, there is likely still a role for application developers to develop applications for testing and to help coordinate with intermediaries in their app development.
- DevSecOps and platform engineers
 - Development, security, and operations engineers can provide the infrastructure and scaffolding to promote effective and responsive development of the CBDC system.
- Systems architects
 - System architects could help ensure that the consumer and networking systems affiliated with the CBDC system are built properly and function effectively.
- Data infrastructure engineers
 - Data infrastructure engineers could help properly configure the delivery of metadata and reporting information (e.g., to relevant authorities for AML/CFT purposes).
- Quality assurance engineers
 - Quality assurance engineers could help test, evaluate, validate, and verify the CBDC MVP to ensure that it works as intended.
- Cryptography experts
 - Cryptography experts could help build, maintain, test, and upgrade a cryptographic mechanism that underpins privacy and security in the CBDC system.⁷¹
- Information security experts
 - Security experts could help the CBDC system remain secure and comply with cybersecurity best practices, including those outlined in EO 14028.
- Payment systems experts
 - Payment systems experts could help ensure that interoperability with other payment systems, if supported, is successful.
- Digital currency programmability experts

⁷¹ Including the implementation of directives in NSM-10.



- Digital currency programmability experts could help ensure that transaction programmability, if supported, is designed and implemented successfully.
- Hardware engineers
 - Hardware engineers could help implement features that are based on the use of secure hardware, if supported.



Appendix B: Interagency Process

The creation of this report was coordinated through an interagency process led by Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, as described in Section 3 of EO 14067. OSTP is grateful for the contributions and feedback received from departments and agencies across the Federal government that played an integral part in the formation of this report.

Departments and agencies involved in this interagency process included:

- Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
- Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
- Department of Commerce (DOC)
- Department of Defense (DOD)
- Department of Energy (DOE)
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
- Department of Justice (DOJ)
- Department of Labor (DOL)
- Department of State (DOS)
- Department of Transportation (DOT)
- Department of the Treasury (Treasury)
- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- Executive Office of the President (EOP)
- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
- Federal Reserve Board (FRB)
- Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
- General Services Administration (GSA)
- National Science Foundation (NSF)
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
- Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
- U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)