[Sixteenth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations : For the Period Ended June 30, 1944]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

SIXTEENTH REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS »
For the Period Ended June 30, Í944
SIXTEENTH REPORT TO CONGRESS ON LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS
For the Period Ended June 30, 1944
“The President from time to time, but not less frequently than once every ninety days, shall transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this Act except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest to disclose.”
[From Section 5, subsection b of “An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States” (Public Law No. 11, 77th Congress, 1st Session).]
CONTENTS
Chapter	Page
President’s Letter of Transmittal................... 5
1.	Lend-Lease and the United States............... 7
2.	Lend-Lease and the War Fronts................. 18
3.	Reverse Lend-Lease Aid........................ 39
4.	Statistical Tables and Charts................. 49
Appendix
I.	Lend-Lease Act............................  66
IL British Master Agreement........................  70
III.	Reciprocal-Aid Agreements.................. 73
IV.	Modus Vivendi on Reciprocal Aid in French North and West Africa........................... 82
V.	Executive Order Establishing Foreign Economic Administration........................... 85
VI.	Executive Order Establishing Office of Lend-Lease Administration............................ 87
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PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
To the Congress of the United States of America:
Pursuant to law, I am submitting herewith the Sixteenth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations.
Lend-Lease supplies and services provided to our Allies in the three months ending June 30, 1944, amounted to $4,045,000,000 in value. In all, lend-lease aid has been provided in the amount of $28,270,000,000.
Three years ago the Axis aggressors were well along the road to domination of the world. The United States itself was in grave danger. Today the United Nations are moving relentlessly along the roads which lead to Berlin and Tokyo.
In the preparation and execution of the powerful offensives on which we are now jointly engaged with our Allies, lend-lease has fulfilled its promise. Every day that the men of our Army and our Navy go into battle lend-lease is being effectively used in the common cause by the heroic men of the other United Nations. Through lend-lease, the full power of American production is being brought to bear against our common enemies by the millions of fighting men of our Allies. Through lend-lease, American weapons and other war supplies are being used by our Allies to destroy our enemies and hasten their defeat.
We should not permit any weakening of this system of combined war supply to delay final victory a single day or to cost unnecessarily the life of one American boy. Until the unconditional surrender of both Japan and Germany, we should continue the lend-lease program on whatever scale is necessary to make the combined striking power of all the United Nations against our enemies as overwhelming and as effective as we can make it.
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We know now that by combining our power we can speed the day of certain victory. We know also that only by continuing our unity can we secure a just and durable peace.
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
The White House,
August 23, 1944.
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Chapter 1
LEND-LEASE AND THE UNITED STATES
For the Benefit of the United States
The title of the Lend-Lease Act is “An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States’’. Everything that has been done under the Lend-Lease Act has been for the defense of the United States and for no other purpose. The program of lend-lease aid began on March 11, 1941, at a time when the security of the United States was already gravely threatened by the Axis aggressors who were seeking to dominate the world. We gave aid to Britain and the other nations resisting the aggressors because these nations held positions vital to our own defenses. If they had been defeated, the Western Hemisphere would have been left isolated and surrounded by overwhelmingly powerful forces that made no secret of their hostility to our continued existence as a free and independent people. We gave lend-lease aid in order to aid ourselves.
When we were ourselves attacked on December 7, 1941, the nations to whom we had sent lend-lease aid were still in the fight and they became our strong fighting partners in the coalition war waged since then by the United Nations. Since December 7th we have given lend-lease aid in order to help our allies help us win complete and final victory over our common enemies at the earliest possible moment and at the' lowest cost in lives. We have continued to provide lend-lease aid in order to aid ourselves.
The accounting of lend-lease aid is kept in dollar figures. But no money is either loaned or given away to other nations under lend-lease. The money that is used for the lend-lease
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program is spent by the United States Government for arms and other war supplies and services needed for the fight against the Germans and the Japanese. Virtually all of these supplies are produced in the United States and virtually all of the money is spent in the United States. This money goes into the pockets of American farmers and American war-workers and American businessmen. Some of it comes back to the United States Treasury in the form of taxes.
It is not money, but tanks, planes, guns and ships, warproduction materials, and food, that go abroad under lend-lease. And they go for one purpose only—to be used by our allies either directly or indirectly against our enemies—the Germans and the Japanese. The ultimate recipients of lend-lease supplies are not our allies. The ultimate recipients are the Germans and the Japanese whom our allies are able to kill or capture by using these supplies.
ALLOCATION OF U.S. MUNITIONS PRODUCTION
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 1
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Take, for example, a lend-lease bomb. This particular bomb is turned over to the British and the dollar cost goes into the books as lend-lease aid to the United Kingdom. But the British don’t keep the bomb. It is dropped by a British plane square on a German gun emplacement holding up our tanks in northern France. It is the German gun crew that ultimately gets the bomb and is wiped out in the process.
We made that bomb for use against our enemies. The British used it against our enemies. Because the bomb was dropped by a British plane its cost was charged up to lend-lease. If the bomb had been dropped by an American plane its cost would be included in the U. S. Army Air Forces’ own procurement costs. In either case the ultimate destination of the bomb and the benefits of its use to the United States and .to the other United Nations are the same—the enemy is hurt, the lives of men in our own and allied forces are saved and victory is brought that much nearer. What is true of the bomb is also true of the other supplies that we send under lend-lease. American materials were combined with British materials in the British factory that produced the plane that dropped the bomb. And the British workers who built the plane and the RAF crew that flew it against the Germans got enough to eat because lend-lease food was included in their rations.
The statistics of lend-lease aid simply measure that part of our total production of war goods and services that is used by the forces of our allies, instead of by our own forces, against our enemies. In the same way, the statistics of their reverse lend-lease aid to us simply measure that part of their total production of war goods and services that is used by our forces, instead of theirs. But we benefit equally from that part of our allies’ production that goes to their own armed forces, just as they benefit equally from that part of our production that goes to our own armed forces.
The ultimate measurement of the aid that we have given and have received is not to be found in the dollar figures of lend-lease and reverse lend-lease. Nor can it be found in any dollar figures, since human lives as well as material resources are involved in the accounting. It can be found only in terms
604251—44----------2
9
of the battles won, the millions of enemy troops killed and captured, and the hundreds of thousands of lives saved, because the United Nations have successfully combined all their resources in men and materials for winning victory and winning it far sooner than would otherwise have been possible.
Lend-Lease Aid
From March 11, 1941, to June 30, 1944, lend-lease supplies and services valued at $28,270,351 ;000 were provided to our allies under the Lend-Lease Act. In addition $678,241,000 worth of supplies were consigned to U. S. commanding generals in the field for subsequent lend-lease transfer to allied forces. The decisions as to whether these war supplies and services should be provided to our allies instead of being used by our own, forces were made by the United States’ own military chiefs of staff and war production high command on the basis of one consideration only—that these supplies and
MUNITIONS
TOTAL LEND-LEASE AID $28 BILLION TO JUNE 30,1944
Billions of Dollars
INDUSTRIAL MATLS. AND PRODUCTS
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
SHIPPING AND OTHER SERVICES
Above figures do not include goods consigned to U.S. commanding generals for subsequent transfer to lend-lease countries, which amounted to $ 678,241,000 to June 30, 1944.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 2
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TOTAL LEND-LEASE AID March 1941 Through June 30, 1944
Category	Amount	% of Total
Goods Transferred: Munitions		$15,162,329,000	53.6
Industrial Materials and Products		6,026,086,000	21.3
Agricultural Products.		3,630,585,000	12.9
Total Transfers		24,819,000,000	87.8
Services Rendered: Servicing and Repair of Ships, etc		522,853,000	1.9
Rental of Ships, Ferrying of Aircraft, etc		2,210,752,000	7.8
Production Facilities in U. S		621,700,000	2.2
Miscellaneous Expenses		96,046,000	0.3
Total Services		3,451,351,000	12.2
Total Lend-Lease Aid		28,270,351,000	100.0
Consignments to Commanding Generals*...	678,241,000	
*Goods consigned to United States commanding generals for subsequent transfer in the field to lend-lease countries. The value of such goods transferred is not included in the lend-lease aid total of $28,270,351,000. Further information on consignments to commanding generals is given in Table 17, pag^ 54.
Table,1
services would do more good toward winning the war and toward aiding the United States if they were provided to our allies than if they were retained for our own use.
Ninety-seven percent of all lend-lease aid has been provided to our major fighting allies—the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and China. The total dollar figure of lend-lease aid—over $28,000,000,000—is about 15 percent of all that the United States has spent for defense and war purposes. Out of each dollar 85 cents has been spent for supplies and services used by our own forces in defense of the United States and toward winning the war; and 15 cents has been spent for supplies and services used by our allies toward winning the same war and therefore used equally in the interests of our own defense.
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Approximately 54 percent of lend-lease aid has consisted of all types of fighting equipment, including ships, and classified as munitions. These are used by our allies directly against our enemies.
Approximately 21 percent of lend-lease aid has consisted of industrial materials and products. These are also used by our allies against our enemies. Some of these products, such as aviation gasoline, are used to power allied bombers and fighters. The rest of these supplies are used in the factories of our allies to produce munitions and other vital war materials. With these supplies the factories of our allies can produce more fighting equipment.
Approximately 13 percent of lend-lease aid consists of foods and other agricultural products. These supplies, too, are used by our allies indirectly against our enemies. Lend-lease food makes it possible for the soldiers in their armies and the workers in their factories to get enough to eat.
The balance of lend-lease aid—about 12 percent of the total— consists of services, such as the repair and rental of ships, the ferrying of aircraft, and the building of factories in the United States to produce lend-lease supplies. These services enable our allies to use more effectively against our enemies both what they themselves produce and what we send to them.
Lend-Lease Munitions and U. S. Production
Lend-lease munitions transfers totalled $15,162,000,000 by June 30, 1944. Yet this great amount was only 15 percent of our total munitions production since the beginning of our defense and war production program in 1940. Our allies purchased another 3 percent for cash. Our own armed forces have received 82 percent—over four-fifths—of all the munitions we have produced.
We have sent 30,900 lend-lease planes to our allies since March 11,1941. They have purchased another 7,000 for cash. We retained for the use of our own forces over 175,000 planes. Lend-lease planes, great as their numbers have been, have accounted for only 15 percent of our total plane production.
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HOW WE HAVE SHARED OUR PLANE AND TANK PRODUCTION
EACH SYMBOL REPRESENTS 2% OF'U. S. PRODUCTION
15% of our plane production was lend-leased and 3% was sold to our allies for cash. 41% of our tank production was lend-leased and 3% was sold.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Above percentages are based on numbers of finished planes and tanks.
Chart 3
We have sent to our allies 26,900 lend-lease tanks and 637,600 other military motor vehicles, including ordnance vehicles, jeeps, and trucks. Our allies have purchased from us for cash an additional 1,600 tanks and 270,000 trucks. We have retained for our own use 36,500 tanks and 1,500,000 other military motor vehicles. The lend-lease share of our total production of tanks and other military motor vehicles is larger than for any other category of munitions—25 percent.
On the other hand, the $2,641,776,000 worth of naval and merchant ships and small craft leased to our allies for the war have amounted to less than 10 percent in value of all ships built in, American yards—so great has been our ship building program. We have leased 511 cargo ships of 1,000 gross tons or over and 1,284 merchant and auxiliary craft of under 1,000
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gross tons. We have leased over 1,400 naval vessels of all types, the great majority of which are landing craft, PT boats, and other small craft, but including also a few score of larger combat types, such as convoy escort aircraft carriers and corvettes. All ships provided under the Lend-Lease Act are leased for the duration of the war and remain the property of the United States.
Industrial Materials and Products
Similarly the industrial materials and products sent to our allies have been a comparatively small part of our total production of these war supplies. We have, for example, sent $1,009,399,000 of petroleum products under lend-lease. This was less than 9 percent of our total production of petroleum products, and much of the gasoline and oil we have sent abroad under lend-lease has been used by our own overseas air and naval forces.
Foodstuffs
Between March 11, 1941, and June 30, 1944, we sent over $3,300,000,000 worth of food, almost entirely to the United Kingdom and Russia. The British cannot raise enough food on their crowded island to feed themselves; they must import much of their food or starve. And the Soviet Union’s best food-producing areas were in the hands of the Germans for more than two years. The food we have sent has been vital to winning the war. Yet it has been less than 10 percent of our total food production since the beginning of the lend-lease program. In the first six months of this year we have shipped under lend-lease, for example, 8 percent of all our meat, including only 1 percent of our beef and veal and 13 percent of our pork; less than 2 percent of our butter, slightly over 19 percent of our cheese, less than 4 percent of our canned vegetables and 8 percent of our canned fruits and juices.
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Lend-Lease Exports and Cash Exports
Actual shipments of lend-lease supplies reached a cumulative dollar value of $21,534,870,000 on June 30, 1944.1 For the past 12 months lend-lease exports have averaged close to $1,000,000,000 a month. In spite of this tremendous volume of lend-lease exports and the inevitable effects of war requirements and shipping shortages on normal commercial trade, the dollar value of cash exports from the United States has been maintained at pre-war levels and has been increasing for the past 12 months. Our cash exports between March 11, 1941, when the Lend-Lease Act became law, and June 30, 1944, totaled $10,900,000,000, approximately half as much as our lend-lease exports in the same period.
UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE
Value in Millions of Dollars
	Exports			Imports
	Lend-Lease	Cash	Total	
1935			2 283	2 283	9 047
1936			2456	2 456	9 493
1937			3 349	3 349	3 084
1938			3 094	3 094	1 060
1939			3 177	3 177	9 31 S
1940			4 021	4 021	9 695
1941		739	4,408	5,147	3,345
1942			4	891	3 144	8 035	9 749
1943		.... 10 1Ò9	2 609	12 718	3 364
1944*		11,586	2'822	14,408	4,094
* First 6 months at annual rate.
Table 2
1 The value of total lend-lease aid exceeds the value of lend-lease exports, since the figures on aid include, and the export statistics do not include, the following items:
1. Goods transferred and awaiting export. 2. Goods transferred for use in this country, such as trainer planes used in the training of United Nations pilots. 3. Lend-lease services. 4. Ships leased for the duration of the war. 5. Supplies purchased outside the United States and transferred under lend-lease.
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Although the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 cut into our normal commercial exports, the total of our cash exports increased sharply in 1940 and 1941 because of large purchases of military equipment and other war supplies made by the nations now our allies, principally before the lend-lease program went into effect. Shipments on these war contracts continued through 1942 and into 1943. From 1939 through 1943 we exported $2,389,000,000 worth of military equipment for which we were paid cash, principally by the British. In addition, billions of dollars worth of other supplies purchased by the British and others for war purposes were included in our cash exports. As these pre-lend-lease contracts were completed the cash export totals declined from the 1941 level. This decline continued through the first six months of 1943. Since July 1, 1943, however, the trend has been reversed, and a gradual increase in cash exports has continued for a full year.
In the four pre-war years, 1935-1938, total United States exports averaged less than $2,800,000,000 a year. In the first six months of 1944 our cash exports, exclusive of lend-lease, were at an annual rate in excess of $2,800,000,000 a year.
Even after allowance is made for differences in price levels, this is a surprising record. It is in sharp contrast to the experience of the United Kingdom, for example, whose exports, excluding munitions, have declined by more than 50 percent in value and by 70 percent in volume since the war began.
Including lend-lease, our total exports in the first six months of 1944 were at an annual rate of over $14,400,000,000 a year, far in excess of the highest peacetime levels.
While lend-lease is a war program, it is likely to have stimulating effects on the commercial post-war foreign trade of the United States. The war has introduced American products to other countries in a volume and variety never approached before. After the war these countries will want to continue to obtain many of these products by buying them. American industry will have a greatly expanded foreign market, provided that our international economic policies make it possible for these nations to pay for their purchases.
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PROPORTION OF OUR MUNITIONS PRODUCTION WE HAVE LEND'LEASED (BASED ON DOLLAR VALUE)
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 4
Lend-Lease on the Battlefronts
These effects of lend-lease on United States foreign trade are, however, incidental.	.
The lend-lease program is being carried out for one purpose, to help win the war—and to win it as quickly as possible. The results that have been and are being obtained from the lend-lease program are to be found, therefore, on the battlefronts around the world.
604251—44----------3
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Chapter 2
LEND-LEASE AND THE WAR FRONTS
Three years ago, on June 30, 1941, the lend-lease program was just getting under way. The Nazis and the Fascists were the masters of all Western Europe. The British Isles were beleaguered by sea and by air, threatened by invasion and still fighting on only by a miracle of courage and united effort. Most of the Mediterranean was an Axis lake and the lifeline of the British Empire at Suez was in imminent danger of being cut. To the east, Hitler had launched his great offensive against the Soviet Union. The German armies were moving rapidly ahead and the Axis leaders were confident they would be in Moscow by fall. In the Far East, Japan was tightening her stranglehold upon China and secretly preparing her attack upon us, the British, and the Dutch. The Axis powers had not won the war, but they were winning all the battles and they appeared to possess overwhelming superiority in military equipment and trained manpower over the nations opposing them.
From Trickle to Torrent
The first lend-lease shipments were small. Between March 11, 1941, and December 7, 1941, we shipped only $620,000,000 worth of supplies to the fighting fronts. But this aid and the promise that lay behind it of much more to come was given at a critical moment. The first lend-lease food shipments arrived in England at a time when the German submarine campaign had come so close to starving Britain out that her warehouses were almost empty of food stocks. The first American tanks
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and planes arrived at Suez in time to strengthen the British 8th Army sufficiently to launch a counter-attack against Rommel. The first convoy of American and British supplies reached Murmansk at a time when the Nazi armies were at the gates of Moscow. In the Far East, American engineers and materials arrived for the development of the Burma Road into a passable, although still dangerous highway, and thousands of American trucks arrived to triple the volume of supplies carried over the road into China.
Lend-lease shipments were a trickle in 1941. But they helped our allies hold the line while we worked against time
DISTRIBUTION OF LEND-LEASE EXPORTS BY AREA OF DESTINATION
MARCH 1941- JUNE 1944
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 5
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to expand our war production and train our armed forces in defense against the growing menace of the Axis. When we were attacked, Britain, Russia, and China were still fighting strongly and we were far better prepared than we would otherwise have been.
In the three years between June 30, 1941, and June 30, 1944, our lend-lease shipments to our allies, now combined with the tremendous striking power of our own forces, have fulfilled the prophecy made to Congress in the Second Lend-Lease Report on September 11, 1941: “Planes, tanks, guns, and ships have begun to flow from our factories and yards, and the flow will accelerate from day to day, until the stream becomes a river, and the river a torrent, engulfing this totalitarian tyranny which seeks to dominate the world.’’
Lend-lease shipments from the United States to the war theatres now total $21,534,870,000. In addition we have leased for the duration $2,448,039,000 of naval and merchant shipping and provided $3,451,350,000 worth of lend-lease
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO ALL COUNTRIES
Thousands of Dollars
Category	Mar. 1941-June 1942	July 1942- June 1943	July 1943- June 1944	Total
Ordnance and Ammunition 		328,766	1,277,206	1,694,146	3,300,118
Aircraft and Parts		375,034	1,287,499	2,711,680	4,374,213
Tanks and Parts		161,206	768,629	886,000	1,815,835
Motor Vehicles and Parts. .	208,988	617,826	1,285,876	2,112,690
Watercraft		29,460	196,919	234,911	461,290
Total Munitions. .. .	1,103,454	4,148,079	6,812,613	12,064,146
Industrial Materials and Products		687,092	1,865,696	2,903,458	5,456,246
Agricultural Products		784,441	1,300,054	1,929,983	4,014,478
Total		2,574,987	7,313,829	11,646,054	21,534,870
Table 3
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services. For the past 12 months lend-lease exports have averaged close to a billion dollars each month, almost as much as in the entire first 12 months of the lend-lease program put together.
The enemy has felt the results of these shipments, just as he has felt the power of our own armed forces. For the United Nations the prospect has changed from the imminent danger of disaster to the certainty of complete victory, sooner than we had hoped, provided we do not allow the enemy to divide us, nor weaken the combined program that has brought us where we are today.
Combined Offensives
The forces of the Soviet Union, strengthened by lend-lease supplies, have pushed the Nazis back 1,200 miles from the Caucasus to the gates of Warsaw. The Red Army is over half of the way to Berlin. In the three years from June 22, 1941, to June 22, 1944, the Soviet Government has announced that the Soviet forces, while suffering the terrible number of 5,300,000 dead and missing soldiers themselves, have killed or captured 7,800,000 of the enemy. Hitler will not be able to use these men on the Western front.
Combined British, French, and other allied forces, fighting beside Americans and strengthened by lend-lease, have driven the enemy from all of Africa, cleared the Mediterranean and liberated over two-thirds of Italy.
In Western Europe the combined British-American air offensive upon Germany is continuing while the American, British, French, Canadian, Belgian, Dutch, and Polish forces are liberating France and destroying hundreds of thousands of the enemy. They, too, are headed for Berlin.
In the war against Japan the United States’ drive across the Central Pacific has been supported by the decisive participation of Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch forces in General MacArthur’s campaign back toward the Philippines by way of New Guinea. In the China-Burma-India theatre, Chinese, American, British, and Indian troops are fighting their way across Burma under General Stilwell; the Japanese have been
21
ejected from India; British naval forces in the Bay of Bengal are gaining strength for future blows in the direction of Singapore; and our air power inside China is growing fast as our B-29’s hit the Japanese homeland again and again.
The combined forces of the United Nations are well on the way to Berlin and Tokyo. They are much further along the road than they could possibly have been without lend-lease and mutual aid. We shall shorten the war still further and save the lives of additional tens of thousands of Americans and allied soldiers by continuing the lend-lease program to the full extent necessary to win final victory over Japan—as well as Germany—at the earliest possible moment.
THE OFFENSIVES IN WESTERN EUROPE
When the combined American, British, French, and Canadian forces began the liberation of France on June 6, 1944, they were the best equipped and best supplied armies ever to move against an enemy. United States, British, and Canadian production had been pooled for three years to produce
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 6
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this result. Through lend-lease and mutual aid United States and Canadian production supplemented British production. Through reverse lend-lease Britain furnished our forces with supplies that could be provided locally. Most of the ships engaged in the landing and supply operations were British-manned. A majority of the ground forces have been Americans. The Air Forces are about equally divided. Regardless of nationality, every man who has participated in these operations has had what he needs to fight successfully against a dangerous and treacherous enemy. General Eisenhower has welded these armies into a single fighting team.
Guns, Planes, Tanks and Ships
Lend-lease shipments to the United Kingdom between March 11, 1941, and June 30, 1944, had a dollar value of $9,321,549,-000. About half of these supplies consisted of fighting equipment. Guns, shells, and bombs alone amounted to almost $1,500,000,000. Many of these guns are now firing against the
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO UNITED KINGDOM
Thousands of Dollars
Category	Mar. 1941-June 1942	July 1942- June 1943	July 1943- June 1944	Total
Ordnance and Ammuntion. ..	103,899	463,704	878,044	1,445,647
Aircraft and Parts		136,412	370,588	1,000,170	1,507,170
Tanks and Parts		20,831	352,476	390,953	764,260
Motor Vehicles and Parts....	40,532	103,179	337,123	480,834
Watercraft.			16,305	108,615	86,444	211,364
Total Munitions	 Industrial Materials and Prod-	317,979	1,398,562	2,692,734	4,409,275
ucts				424,247	793,100	1,065,776	2,283,123
Agricultural Products		662,015	867,123	1,100,013	2,629,151
Total		1,404,241	3,058,785	4,858,523	9,321,549
Table 4
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same enemy our men are facing in France and many of the bombs are now being dropped by British planes, on our enemy’s defense points, communications lines, and war-production centers.
The British produce themselves over three-quarters of the planes used by the R. A. F., including all their heavy bombers and most of their fighters, but we have shipped under lend-lease over 6,000 medium and light bombers, fighters and other planes to the United Kingdom, besides the thousands the British bought from us for cash or have received from Canada. We have also sent to the United Kingdom over 9,900 tanks. Many of these planes and tanks, manned by British crews, are fighting in the French campaign today.
We have also leased to the British for the duration $1,610,-027,000 worth of combat ships and small naval craft. Many of the planes lend-leased to the British have been carrier planes which are now flying from British aircraft carriers. With this assistance to their own naval production, the British have been able to carry the major part of the burden of convoying men and supplies across the Atlantic and of covering our landing operations in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and France, while the United States fleet has concentrated on the Pacific phase of the war.
British Factories and Food Rations
The British have themselves produced by far the larger share of the equipment needed for their forces. We have assisted them to maintain their war production record by supplying $2,283,123,000 worth of industrial materials and products. Our shipments have included over 6,000,000 tons of steel and 550,000 tons of other metals for the production in British factories of more guns and planes and tanks and bombs to use against the enemy.
Before the war Britain imported about two-thirds of her food. By strict rationing and greatly increased home production the British have reduced their food imports by neatly two-thirds and thus saved ships for fighting equipment.
. 24
Part of their reduced food imports comes from the United States under lend-lease. We have sent Britain $2,143,590,000 of food. This has been about 10 percent of Britain’s total food supply. With this additional food from us, the British have been able to maintain the rations of their war workers, at a level considerably lower than ours, but still sufficient for working efficiency.
Italy and Southern France
Lend-lease shipments to the Mediterranean theatre totaled $3,070,829,000 up to June 30, 1944. Almost all of these shipments have consisted of military supplies for the British, Indian, Polish, French, New Zealand, Australian, Greek, and other allied armies that have made up a majority of the United Nations fighting forces in this theatre. Until our landings in North Africa these supplies all had to be shipped around Africa and up the Red Sea or flown across Africa.
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST, AND MEDITERRANEAN AREA
Thousands of Dollars
Category	Mar. 1941-June 1942	July 1942- June 1943	July 1943- June 1944	Total
Ordnance and Ammunition..	65,665	294,808	263,148	623,621
Aircraft and Parts		11,147	238,928	439,844	689,919
Tanks and Parts		44,108	177,175	308,234	529,517
Motor Vehicles and Parts... .	63,218	121,558	211,896	396,672
Watercraft		8,476	9,372	26,973	44,821
Total Munitions	 Industrial Materials and Prod-	192,614	841,841	1,250,095	2,284,550
ucts		77,813	236,500	275,651	589,964
Agricultural Products		17,917	61,249	117,149	196,315
Total		288,344	1,139,590	1,642,895	3,070,829
Table 5
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■4
664251—44
We have sent in all 4,800 lend-lease planes, 5,100 tanks, and 73,000 trucks and other motor vehicles to this theatre. This equipment has played a major role in the campaigns that began at El Alamein and Algiers in the fall of 1942 and have now reached Florence in northern Italy. It has strengthened the striking power of the allied forces fighting beside Americans in the invasion of southern France. In these campaigns, the Axis armies have lost hundreds of thousands of men and tremendous quantities of equipment.
The Army of France Reborn
With the fall of France, the French Army was virtually destroyed. Now there is an army of France again. It is equipped with lend-lease arms. In addition to equipment lend-leased directly to the French, we have sent $420,369,000 worth of lend-lease equipment to the U. S. Commanding General in the field for subsequent transfer to the French. Some divisions of the reborn French Army have been playing a gallant and important role for months in the Italian campaign. Others are now engaged in southern France. In northern France a French armored division has been striking toward Paris as a powerful unit of Lieut. Gen. Patton’s Third Army. Its commander is General Jacques LeClerc, who led the French in their 1,200 mile drive across the Sahara from Lake Chad to Tripoli in January 1943. Then his men rode in a few old and battered British and American trucks and light tanks.
The Germans thought that the men in this army would not be able to fight again in this war, because they had lost their arms and their homeland. They are back in the fight because we have sent them the Sherman tanks, the American halftracks and artillery and the other equipment to replace what they had lost.
There are hundreds of thousands of men in the armed forces of Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Belgium who are also back in the fight, though their homelands are occupied, because of the equip-
26
ment that we and the British have been able to supply. Nor does this figure include the millions of partisan and underground forces fighting behind the German lines. All of them are doing their full share toward winning battles and killing Germans and Japanese.
THE EASTERN FRONT
In one of the most rapid and overwhelming military campaigns in history, the Red Army has advanced to the borders of East Prussia and the gates of Warsaw. . Fighting on an 800-mile front from the Gulf of Finland to the foothills of the Carpathian mountains, the Soviet forces have broken through the German Baltic defenses, spanned the Vistula River in Poland, and covered more than half the distance to Berlin. The Soviet summer campaign began on June 23rd. In the first 38 days the Red Army had driven the enemy out of 110,000 square miles of territory, an area larger than New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland combined.
For Soviet War Production
Behind the advance of the Red Army and supplying its vital needs are Soviet production—now largely relocated and rebuilt in Siberia—and American lend-lease, supplemented by large amounts of British and Canadian mutual aid goods.
With the assistance of more than $1,500,000,000 worth of industrial supplies and equipment that the United States has shipped to the U. S. S. R. from October 1941 through June 30, 1944, the Soviet Union has strengthened its own industrial ability and capacity to meet the growing needs of its armies. U. S. Government officials who have visited the Soviet Union have seen American steel, American machine tools, and other industrial products in the Soviet war factories, shipyards, and repair shops that are providing the Soviet forces with the greater part of their equipment.
The rapid advance of the Red Army has meant increasingly long lines of transportation and communication to the rear, much of the way over lands that have been scorched by the retreating enemy. Lend-lease shipments of mobile equipment
27
and large quantities of supplies 'for its transportation and communication systems have aided the Red Army materially as it advances farther and farther from its home bases.
For Soviet Supply Lines
We have sent 300,000 trucks and other military motor vehicles to the Soviet Union. Half of all the supplies for the advancing Red Army that are sent by road are now being carried in American lend-lease trucks, according to estimates of U. S. Army observers. Almost 84,000 military motor vehicles were shipped to Russia in the first six months of 1944 alone.
Last year we began a program for shipments of railroad rolling stock to the Soviet Union. By June 30, 1944, we had sent to the Soviet 339 locomotives and 1,640 flat cars. We also increased our shipments of railroad rails and accessories. By June 30, we had shipped more than 455,000 tons of railroad rails and accessories, car and locomotive wheels and axles to aid in the rebuilding and expansion of the Soviet railroads. For the Soviet Army’s communications system, we have shipped 934,000 miles of field telephone wire and 325,000 field telephones.. American supply officers attached to the U. S. military mission have reported from the Soviet front that American transport and communications equipment has contributed immeasurably to success on the eastern front.
11,000 Planes
In the first six months of this year we sent more than 3,000 planes to the Soviet Union. From October 1, 1941, through June 30, 1944, more than 11,000 planes have been flown or shipped from the United States. Most of the planes sent to the Soviet Union have been Bell Airacobra P-39 and Curtiss P-40 fighters, Douglas A-20 attack bombers, and North American B-25’s. The ace of all allied fighter pilots, Lt. Col. Alexander Pokryshkin of the Soviet Air Force, shot down 48 of his 59 Nazi planes in a Bell Airacobra. Nine other Soviet aces have shot down between 20 and 44 German planes each in lend-lease Airacobras. The German planes shot down by Russian airmen flying lend-lease planes cannot be used by Hitler against our men in France.
28
SOVIET OFFENSIVE AIDED BY LEND-LEASE
Columns represent lend-lease shipments to the U.S.S.R. in years ended June 30. Figures are in billions of dollars.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 7
29
American fighter pilots are now also giving direct support to the Soviet offensive on the eastern front. From shuttlebombing fields behind the Soviet front, American long-range pursuit ships have participated in operations in the Lwow, area in Poland. American air forces stationed at these bases in Soviet territory are being provided with living quarters and other services and supplies by the U. S. S. R. under reverse lencl-lease.
Food shipments to the Soviet Union have totalled 3,079,000 short tons since October 1, 1941, and are valued at more than $900,000,000. These shipments include 588,000 tons of wheat and flour, 510,000 tons of canned meat, 356,000 tons of vegetable oils, and 62,000 tons of canned and dried milk. Our food shipments have made it possible for the Soviet Union to maintain the rations of the Red Army. To assist the Soviet people in the production of their own foods, particularly in the recently liberated Ukraine, and to relieve their dependence on outside sources, we have also shipped 17,000 tons of seeds since lend-lease aid to Russia began.|
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO U. S. S. R.
Thousands of Dollars
Category	Mar. 1941-June 1942	July 1942- June 1943	July 1943- June 1944	Total
Ordnance and Ammunition.	49,176	266,684	398,502	714,362
Aircraft and Parts		120,884	400,362	659,732	1,180,978
Tanks and Parts		81,930	- 101,135	134,795	317,860
Motor Vehicles and Parts. ...	59,979	256,120	500,607	816,706
Watercraft		3,624	52,281	91,519	147,424
Total Munitions	 Industrial Materials and Prod-	315,593	1,076,582	1,785,155	3,177,330
ucts		110,054	524,295	1,094,483	1,728,832
Agricultural Products		85,468	330,200	610,114	1,025,782
Total		511,115	1,931,077	3,489,752	5,931,944
Table 6
30
30% Ahead of Schedule
From the beginning of the Soviet lend-lease program in October 1941 through June 30, 1944, total United States lend-lease exports to the U. S. S. R. have amounted to $5,900,000,000. Of that amount, more than $1,650,000,000 has been shipped in the first six months of this year.
Because of the increased and pressing needs of the Soviet armies for the final drives against Germany as American and British forces attack from the west and south, shipments from the United States in the period between July 1, 1943, and June 30, 1944, exceeded the schedules called for under the Third Protocol by 30 percent. The schedules of the Third Protocol have been extended with necessary modifications to meet special circumstances, until the Fourth Protocol negotiations, now under way, are completed.
THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Southwest Pacific
Over $2,641,000,000 worth of lend-lease supplies have been sent to Australia, New Zealand, and the China-Burma-India theatre for the war against Japan. These supplies have included almost 5,000 lend-lease planes and almost 3,000 lend-lease tanks which are being used against the Japanese by Australian, New Zealand, British, Chinese, Indian, and Dutch forces. With this help from us, they are inflicting heavy damage on the same enemy our men are fighting.
About a billion dollars’ worth of these supplies have been sent to Australia and New Zealand in order that their participation in the allied campaign under General MacArthur may, be as effective as possible. Australian and New Zealand troops, naval units, and air forces have continued to play an important part in the fighting in New Guinea and the Solomons alongside United States forces. Dutch airmen and troops in increasing numbers are also seeing action in this theatre. These allied forces have taken a heavy toll of the Japanese, and are now heading, along with our own forces, in the direction of the Philippines and the East Indies.
31
LEND-LEASE AID IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
TANKS AND OTHER MOTOR VEHICLES
AIRCRAFT AND PARTS
GUNS AND AMMUNITION
OTHER WAR SUPPLIES
$ 605,889,000
505,685,000
577,108,000
952,631,000
TOTAL. TO JUNE 30, 1944
$ 2,641,31 3,000
The above figures represent: (a), lend-lease exports to China, India, Australia and New Zealand; and (b), goods consigned to U.S command* ing generals for subsequent transfer to China.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 8
This war theatre offers a vivid example of lend-lease and reverse lend-lease as a means of uniting the assets of the allies for fighting the war. In the 100,000 square miles embraced by the Solomons, New Britain, and New Ireland to the Carolines in the north and the outer Netherlands Indies on the west, troops are widely scattered and supply lines are difficult to maintain. To help meet this supply problem, engines built in the United States and sent out as lend-lease are fitted into Australian-built hulls, and the resulting motorships move among the scattered islands carrying food and supplies to the combined allied forces under MacArthur.
Industrial materials sent by the United States are also making possible a vastly increased production of munitions in the factories of Australia and New Zealand, while munitions shipped from this country and from the United Kingdom supplement the domestic output.
32
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
Thousands of Dollars
Category	Mar. 1941-June 1942	July 1942- June 1943	July 1943-. June 1944	Total
Ordnance and Ammunition..	21,867	80,883	25,571	128,321
Aircraft and Parts		34,350	70,962	141,341	246 653
Tanks and Parts		2 J 76	48/727	4343	55 246
Motor Vehicles and Parts....	3^981	59^586	94',019	157,586
Watercraft		4	3,594	3,645	7,243
Total Munitions		62,378	263,752	268,919	595,049
Industrial Materials and Prod-				
ucts				34,032	150 785	197,425	382 242
Agricultural Products			5^153	14^087	15,354	34,594
Total		101,563	428,624	481,698	1,011,885
Table 7
Australia and New Zealand are supplying over 90 percent of the food needs of our troops in the South and Southwest Pacific. In New Zealand only 25 percent of the total food production is retained for civilian consumption. Fifty percent is sent to the United Kingdom and 25 percent assigned to the American troops. In Australia, too, where agriculture is the principal industry, 20 percent of the total war budget is devoted to reverse lend-lease, and hundreds of thousands of tons of food are made available to the American troops.
China-Burma-India
China has been cut off by land and sea since the Burma Road was lost in April 1942, more than two years ago. Even when the Burma Road was open, the amount of supplies that could be carried over its hairpin turns and dizzy precipices never much exceeded 15,000 tons a month. Since April 1942 the only transportation into China has been by air. The air
604251—44-----------5	33
route from Assam in upper India, to Yunnan province in China, crosses some of the worst country in the world through weather that is equally bad a large part of the year. Until recently the route has also been constantly subject to attack by Japanese fighter planes using bases in upper Burma.
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO INDIA AND CHINA
Thousands of Dollars
Category	Mar. 1941-June 1942	July 1942-June 1943	July 1943-June 1944	Total
Ordnance and Ammunition..	57,639	105,971	72,808	236,418
Aircraft and Parts		30,777	60,889	267,570	359,236
Tanks and Parts			10,287	63,550	31,833	105,670
Motor Vehicles and Parts....	38,272	47,328	109,525	195,125
Watercraft		469	8,004	20,014	28,487
Total Munitions	 Industrial Materials and Prod-	137,444	285,742	501,750	924,936
ucts		30,623	120,885	223,792	375,300
Agricultural Products		6,084	23,955	72,151	102,190
Total				174,151	430,582	797,693	1,402,426
Table 8
Nevertheless, the planes that fly this route now carry into China a considerably greater tonnage than was ever carried over the Burma Road. It is still only a relative trickle, and most of the supplies consist of gasoline, bombs, and ammunition for the United States and Chinese Air Forces operating inside China. All the gasoline that is used by the increasing number of combat planes flying from bases inside China, from our giant B-29’s to P-40 fighters, has to be flown into China over the Hump.
Chinese Fliers and Tankmen
We have been able to get only a small amount o f lend-lease supplies to the Chinese forces inside China. We have therefore brought Chinese fighting men out from China to the
34
supplies. Hundreds of Chinese student pilots have been flown out of China, brought to the United States, trained under lend-lease, and then sent back to China to fly lend-lease planes against the Japanese. Many of these Chinese fliers are now members of the Chinese-American wing of General Cbennault’s Fourteenth U. S. Army Air Force.
The survivors of the Chinese forces whom General Stilwell led into India after the loss of Burma in the spring of 1942 have been joined by many other Chinese soldiers flown out from China. Trained and equipped under lend-lease in India, they have formed several divisions and a tank corps and are now fighting their way back to China ahead of the new road that is being cut across upper Burma. With the aid of small numbers of veteran American and British troops, this campaign has resulted in the capture of the main Japanese base in upper Burma - Myitkina. The air route into China has already been made safer by this campaign and eventually a land route into China will be reestablished.
Among the lend-lease supplies that we have sent into China have been spare parts for the few thousand American trucks that reached China over the Burma road before April 1942. Many of these trucks have been converted to charcoal-burners and are being kept in operation by shipments of spare parts and tires. Some of them are being used to maintain the supply lines inside China to General Chennault’s air bases.
It is because it has been impossible to get supplies in any volume into China that lend-lease shipments to China up to June 30, 1944, totaled only $153,584,000, and that lend-lease consignments to General Stilwell for subsequent transfer to China totaled only $227,000,000 additional.
Much the greater part of our lend-lease shipments to this theatre—over $1,248,000,000—have gone to India, which is the major base for operations against the Japanese from the east that will eventually free China, just as our naval operations from the west in the Pacific are directed to the same end.
35
Once land and sea communications with China are restored, lend-lease supplies can be sent to China in the volume needed to finish quickly the war against Japan.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Lend-lease aid to the other American Republics has been exclusively military in character and given for the purpose of strengthening the southern defenses of the Western Hemisphere and the development and protection of vital military supply routes by air and water.
Lend-lease aid to the other American Republics from March 11, 1941, to June 30, 1944, had a dollar value of $197,000,000. The value of all lend-lease supplies actually shipped to the other American Republics in this period of three years and three months was $171,970,000. This was less than one percent of all lend-lease exports and considerably less than what the United States Government spends in a single day toward fighting and winning the war.
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO LATIN AMERICA *
Thousands of Dollars
Category	Mar. 1941-June 1942	July 1942- June 1943	July 1943- June 1944	Total
Ordnance and Ammunition..	1,041	11,642	13,949	26,632
Aircraft and Parts		6,003	28,399	34,877	69,279
Tanks and Parts			17,783	12,148	29331
Motor Vehicles and Parts....	1,778	8 J 96	8315	18389
Watercraft				450	677	1,127
Total Munitions		8,822	66,470	69,966	145,258
Industrial Materials and Prod-				
ucts	 •'		455	8,202	17,981	26,638
Agricultural Products			' 23	51	' 74
Total		9,277	74,695	87,998	171,970
♦The 20 other American Republics.
Table 9
36
The security of the Panama Canal and of the southern half of our hemisphere against aggression has been made infinitely stronger than ever before through the full cooperation of all our neighbor republics except Argentina and at a cost in necessary assistance from us that is infinitesimal by comparison with the strategic value of this combined program to ourselves and to all the nations of this hemisphere.
Bases and Supply Routes
All the lend-lease supplies that we have shipped have consisted of military and naval equipment or materials for manufacture into war equipment. More than half of all lend-lease shipments to Central and South American countries have gone to Brazil. Natal in Brazil is the nearest point in the Western Hemisphere to Africa. It commands the South Atlantic approaches to the Caribbean and the Panama Canal. It is the jumping off point for the South Atlantic Trans-African Air Route over which most of our own Army and Navy planes, as well as lend-lease planes, have been ferried for the African and Mediterranean campaigns. It continues to be heavily used today, along with an additional ferry route that Portugal made possible by granting landing rights on the Azores.
Brazilian naval and air forces, as well as the naval and air forces of other American Republics, have participated fully in antisubmarine patrols and convoy duty in the Caribbean and South Atlantic. On both the Atlantic and Pacific, bases vital to the defenses of the Panama Canal have been made available to us. Brazil is also participating in the war overseas. Her first expeditionary force landed at Naples July 16th to take part in the Italian campaign.
The cooperative war program of the American Republics has also resulted in a great expansion of trade between the United States and our neighbors to the south. We have imported from Latin America tremendously increased quantities of strategic materials vital to the production of the planes, guns, tanks, and ships United Nations forces are using to win the war—copper, manganese, quartz crystals, tin.
37
rubber, rope fibers, and other materials. Since the Philippines and the Indies fell, virtually all the new supply of quinine which our soldiers need to fight off malaria has come from Latin America.
At the same time, our commercial exports to Latin America, for which we are paid in cash, have risen to 50 percent above pre-war levels, except to Argentina.
All the other American Republics receive lend-lease aid with the exception of Argentina and Panama. The defense needs of Panama are met by our own Panama Canal defenses.
SHIPMENTS TO OTHER AREAS
Lend-lease supplies valued at $624,267,000Tiad been shipped as of June 30, 1944, to countries other than those discussed previously in this report. About two-thirds of the total went to Canada for transshipment to the United Kingdom or other United Nations, for further fabrication, or for use of United Nations forces training in Canada. No lend-lease aid is furnished to the Canadian Government by the United States. Canada has, however, purchased for cash in this country supplies needed for her war effort, using lend-lease procurement machinery for some of these purchases.
The balance of lend-lease exports, amounting to approximately $175,000,000, has gone to widely scattered areas. Sorely needed munitions were rushed to Greece in the spring of 1941 when she was valiantly resisting the overwhelming Nazi forces. Subsequently we have sent limited quantities of foodstuffs to the starving people of Greece. Lend-lease has provided Red Cross food packages for Polish, Yugoslav, and other allied prisoners of war. Needed industrial equipment and materials have been shipped under lend-lease, although paid for in cash, to Curacao and Surinam, sources of bauxite ore for making aluminum, and of petroleum. Various outposts of the Fighting French and of other countries have been strengthened by lend-lease.
38
Chapter 3
REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID
The United States has never been bombed, it is far from the fighting fronts, and it has the greatest industrial capacity among the United Nations. The circumstances of our geographical position and our material strength have therefore called upon us to give most toward winning the war in production and in money, while our major fighting allies have been called upon to give more in lives, in destruction to their homelands and in the suffering of their people. The Russians have lost 5,300,000 soldiers dead, captured, or missing besides millions of civilians who have met death at the hands of the Nazis. Millions of Chinese soldiers and civilians have been killed by the Japanese. The armed forces of the United Kingdom alone, with a population one-third of ours, had already suffered almost 400,000 casualties by September 1943—a year ago. This figure does not include the casualties of Dominion, Indian, or Colonial forces. Many more thousands of British soldiers have laid down their lives for our common victory since then. By June 30, 1944, over 50,000 British civilians—men, women, and children—had been killed by Nazi bombs and this was before the robot bombs had done most of their damage. Since then the robot bombs destroyed or damaged an average of 700 houses every hour of the day and night in England. Others of our allies have suffered proportionately heavy losses in lives and property.
We have been able to produce more than our own forces could use effectively against the enemy. Our fighting allies, on the other hand, have generally required most or all of the war supplies that they could produce for their own fighting forces, in addition to all that we could send them. The greatest return we have received for the lend-lease supplies that we have sent is in the extra damage our allies have been able to do to our common enemies with the help of these supplies from us.
39
Nevertheless, by June 30, 1944, we had received in addition and without cost to us over $3,000,000,000 of reverse lend-lease supplies and services from our allies. Most of this aid has been provided to American forces overseas by the British Commonwealth. Expenditures for reverse lend-lease aid by the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have been reported up to April 1, 1944. These expenditures for reverse lend-lease supplies and services provided to United States Army and Navy forces overseas and United States merchant shipping overseas in the three months between January 1 and April 1, 1944, amounted to $483,500,000. Reports on reverse lend-lease aid furnished to American forces in India have not yet been received for the full first quarter of 1944, but partial figures available indicate that more than $35,000,000 has been expended in India for reverse lend-lease aid for our forces during this period. This would make the total of reverse lend-lease aid received from the British Commonwealth for the first quarter of 1944 well in excess of $500,000,000, or an annual rate of more than $2,000,000,000.
The following table shows the expenditures for reverse lend-lease aid by the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand in the first quarter of 1944 and cumulatively since June 1, 1942.	,
REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID
Furnished to U. S. Forces and Merchant Shipping Overseas
	Jan. 1-Apr. 1,1944	Cumulative to Apr. 1,1944
United Kingdom		$370,760,000	$1,934,400,000
Australia		95,258,000	457,623,000
New Zealand		17,482,000	109,368,000
TOTAL			483,500,000	1 2,501,391,000
1 Figures for Jan. 1-Apr. 1, 1944, are preliminary.
Table 10
40
In addition to the $2,501,391,000 reverse lend-lease aid received by the United States from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, reverse lend-lease aid to our forces in India already had totalled more than $100,000,000 by January 1, 1944.
These figures include only reverse lend-lease aid furnished to our forces and to our shipping overseas. They do not include strategic raw materials, commodities,1 and foodstuffs furnished by the British under reverse lend-lease without cost to us for shipment to the United States.
Under arrangements made in accordance with the agreement announced last November, strategic raw materials and commodities governmentally procured in the United Kingdom and the British Colonial Empire are provided to us as reverse lend-lease. These supplies include crude rubber and tea from Ceylon, cocoa, palm kernels and palm oil, rope fibers, chrome, and asbestos from British Africa, copra from the British Islands of the Pacific and many other commodities needed for the United States war effort. In addition, we are also receiving mica, burlap, jute, and other strategic commodities on reverse lend-lease terms from India.
The volume of reverse lend-lease supplies and services provided to our forces overseas under reverse lend-lease has continued to rise. In the United Kingdom, for example, the figure for the third quarter of 1943 (exclusive of construction and supplies and services provided outside the United Kingdom) was $120,000,000. In the fourth quarter of 1943 it was $224,000,000. In the first quarter of 1944 it was $260,000,000.
In the first quarter of 1944 the expenditures reported by Australia and New Zealand for reverse lend-lease aid to our forces were more than the value of our lend-lease shipments to these two countries in the same period.
1 Except benzol.
604251—44-----------6
41
United Kingdom
The following table shows the expenditures reported by the United Kingdom for her reverse lend-lease aid to the United States forces and shipping overseas cumulatively to the end of 1943 and to April 1, 1944.
REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID BY UNITED KINGDOM
	Cumulative to Dec. 31,1943	Cumulative to Apr. 1,1944
Goods and services transferred in United Kingdom	 Shipping services	 Airports, barracks, hospitals and other construction	 Goods and services transferred out- side the United Kingdom	 TOTAL....		$572,260,000 274,040,000 556,140,000 161,200,000	$777,790,000 330,460,000 624,650,000 201,500,000
	11,563,640,000	21,934,400,000
1 Revised.
2 Figures for Jan. 1-Apr. 1,1944, are preliminary.
(Conversion from pound sterling at $4.03.)
Table 11
Reverse lend-lease supplies and services from the British, like our lend-lease aid to the British, played a vital role in preparing for the operations for the liberation of Europe. One of the biggest last-minute rush jobs done for us by the British was the waterproofing of many hundreds of our wading tanks, as well as trucks and other mechanized equipment so they would reach the invasion beaches in fighting condition after plowing through the surf.
The job was done for allied mechanized equipment, United States and British alike, by British industry. In order to get it done in time the entire output of Britain’s sheet steel rolling industry was taken for three months. To move the finished waterproofing sets from the factories to the hundreds of ordnance depots in the British Isles a great fleet of »trucks was kept operating day and night. The waterproofing sets were assembled and installed by British engineers. General Eisen
42
hower’s headquarters has reported that the quantities of sheet steel used for this pre-invasion job would have been enough for a bridge 150 feet wide across the English Channel from Dover to Calais. The great majority of American wading tanks, as well as British tanks, armored cars, supply trucks, and scout vehicles used in the landings were fitted with this waterproofing equipment.
The waterproofing equipment furnished under reverse lend-lease was only one of many thousands of other categories of supplies and services provided out of British stocks or by British facilities to the American forces taking part in the liberation of Europe. These are a few examples of the scope of this aid:
All rail transportation to the invasion ports; the costs of transporting many U. S. troops on British ships, including the world’s two largest liners—the Queen Elizabeth and Queen Mary; 1,100 Spitfires and other British-made planes; more than 100 airfields and other construction for our forces which cost the British $624,650,000 up to April 1; fresh vegetables and other British-produced foodstuffs that took care of 20 percent of our soldiers’ rations; tens of thousands of easily-jettisoned light-weight gas tanks for our P-47 Thunderbolt fighters on long-range missions to the heart of Germany; more than 25,000 miles of steel landing mats; 2,000,000 pairs of wool socks; thousands of parachutes; quantities of howitzers, antiaircraft and anti-tank equipment; all heat, light, and water bills at our bases and barracks.
So wide is the scope of the reverse lend-lease aid we receive from the British that a U. S. naval base in Britain has been operated for a full 12 months without making a single cash payment.
We have also benefited greatly from British engineering and research in new weapons. No money valuation is put on this type of aid, but it is freely made available to us. For example, rockets based on a British design are now being used by American forces against the Japanese in the Pacific; a British-developed radio set has been widely used in American
43
tanks built for Britain and Russia; and the jet-propulsion plane uses an engine based on the Whittle design developed in Britain.
Australia
The following table shows the expenditures reported by Australia for her reverse lend-lease aid to United States forces in that area, cumulatively to the end of 1943 and to April 1, 1944.
REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID FROM AUSTRALIA
	Cumulative to Dec. 31, 1943	Cumulative to Apr. 1,1944
Stores and provisions		$95 1 21 000	$120 348 000
Technical equipment		8 229 000	10 137 000
Motor transport		31 479 000	40 805 Ò00
Aircraft stores and equipment		35,442,000	50^545^000
General stores		43 371 000	54 270 000
Transportation and communication. .	28,926,000	34 J 90^000
ShiDDinQ		23 280 000	31 652 000
Works, buildings, and hirings		92^990^000	108*224,000
Miscellaneous		3,526,000	7,452,000
TOTAL		362,364,000	1 457,623,000
figures for Jan. 1-Apr. 1, 1944, are preliminary.
(Conversion from Australian pound at $3.23.)
Table 12
Australia is providing tremendously increased quantities of food to United States forces in the Pacific as reverse lend-lease. In the first three months of 1944 alone our forces in the Pacific theatres received from Australia more than 380,000,000 pounds of food, an annual rate of a billion and a half pounds. In the entire period up to January 1 of this year the total was 500,000,000 pounds. Our men have received from Australia more than 150,000,000 pounds of beef,
44
veal, lamb, mutton, pork and canned meats; 19,500,000 quarts of fresh milk; 38,800,000 dozens of fresh eggs; and more than 15,000,000 pounds of butter. Transfers of food to April 1, 1944, in pounds, included the following:
Beef and veal................................ 69,440,000
Lamb and mutton.............................. 13,440,000
Pork.......................................	35,840,000
Canned meats................................. 36,960,000
Miscellaneous meats........................... 4,928,000
Bread, biscuits and cereals (including
flour)...................................... 222,880,000
Potatoes..................................... 73,920,000
Fruits and vegetables, fresh................. 87,360,000
Fruits and vegetables, canned............... 101,920,000
Fruits and vegetables, dehydrated and
dried.......................................  23,744,000
Butter, fresh................................ 15,232,000
Butter substitutes............................ 9,408,000
Sugar.....................................    49,728,000
Milk, condensed and evaporated.............	39,648,000
Milk, fresh (19,500,000 quarts)............	41,925,000
Eggs,[fresh (38,800,000 doz.)................ 58,200,000
TOTAL........................ 884,573,000
New Zealand
Foodstuffs constituted more than one-third of the reverse lend-lease aid provided to United States forces by New Zealand. The cumulative totals through March 31, 1944, as compared with the totals to January 1, 1944, are shown in the following table.
45
REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID FROM NEW ZEALAND
	Cumulative to Dec. 31,1943	Cumulative to Apr. 1,1944
Foodstuffs		$29 500 000	$39 704 000
Equipment and supplies		13 367 000	16 317 000
Repairs and services		13 955 000	18 277 000
Camps		6 737 000	6 738 000
Warehouses		6 604 000	6 606 000
Hospitals... .		6 903 000	6 904 000
Miscellaneous building projects....	8,320^000	8,322,000
Ship construction		6,500,000	6,500,000
TOTAL			91,886,000	1109,368,000
1 Figures for Jan. 1-Apr. 1, 1944, are preliminary. (Conversion from New Zealand pound at $3.25.)
Table 13
United States forces in the South and Southwest Pacific received 456,939,150 pounds of foodstuffs valued at $39,704,000 from the Government of New Zealand without cost, as reverse lend-lease up to April 1, 1944.
The transfers, in pounds, included the following:
Beef and veal............................... 63,380,000
Lamb and mutton............................. 31,910,000
Pork.........................................18,270,000
Bacon and ham............................... 26,380,000
Meat, canned................................ 42,000,820
Other fresh and processed meat.............. 11,160,000
Butter......................................	24,550,000
Cheese....................................... 7,460,000
Milk and cream.............................. 14,667,000
Milk, evaporated............................ 16,120,000
Other dairy products......................... 8,000,560
Potatoes.................................... 43,000,000
Other fresh vegetables...................... 43,560,000
Vegetables, canned.......................... 13,820,000
46
Apples, fresh.............................. 15,130,000
Sugar. . .................................. 36,530,000
Other foodstuffs........................... 41,000,770
TOTAL............................ 456,939,150
Over 90 percent of all the food consumed by the American forces in the South and Southwest Pacific is provided by Australia and New Zealand without cost, under reverse lend-lease. Because of this, hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping space have been saved for the transport of munitions and other war materiel from the United States to the Pacific war theatre and it has been possible to allocate more of our own food supply to American civilians.
REVERSE LEND-LEASE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES
Soviet Union
The Soviet Union, which fought until this summer on her own soil, has needed virtually all she could produce for her own forces. Moreover, until this year no United States forces were stationed on Soviet territory and the occasion for reverse lend-lease aid did not arise, except in connection with supplies, repairs, and other services provided as reverse lend-lease for United States merchant ships in Soviet ports. With the establishment of the shuttle-bombing bases in Russia, the Soviet Union has provided our Air Forces, as reverse lend-lease aid without cost to us, with much of the equipment, supplies, and services needed for these bases. This aid has included many of the materials and most of the labor used in building the bases, part of the equipment, much of the food for our Air Force crews and mechanics, and many other operational supplies and services.
China
China has been fighting the Japanese on her own soil for seven years. She has needed more aid than we have up to
47
now been able to send her by the single air route that connects her with the outside world. Nevertheless the Chinese people have rendered heroic and effective aid to our forces in China, although technically this help is not classified as reverse lend-lease.
The bases in China from which our B-29 Super Fortresses take off to raid Japan were built by 400,000 Chinese laborers, working with their bare hands. There was virtually no equipment in China for building these bases, nor could it be brought in from outside by air. The airfields were built by hand-labor. The Chinese hauled by hand 160,000 tons of rock and sand to build the runways needed for the planes, crushed the rock by hand and laid it stone by stone, then smoothed the surface by hand-hauled stone rollers. They built so effectively that within three months of the time construction started, the first of the B-29’s was able to land in China.
The many bases used by General Chennault’s Fourteenth Air Force in China were built in the same fashion. And the success of the operations of our Air Force in China depends in large part on China’s grapevine air-raid warning system on the approach of Japanese planes. This system extends by underground connections into the Japanese-occupied areas of China. In spite of the lack of modern communication equipment, it is one of the fastest and most efficient in the world.
France
The French are providing many supplies and services to United States forces in the Mediterranean theatre as reverse lend-lease, including thousands of tons of grains, fresh fruits and vegetables, and other foodstuffs produced in French Africa. The estimated dollar value of this reverse lend-lease aid to us was already $30,000,000 by the first of this year. Later figures are not yet available.
48
Chapter 4
STATISTICAL TABLES AND CHARTS
AMOUNTS OF LEND-LEASE AID AUTHORIZED
The amount of lend-lease aid that may be provided under the various acts is summarized as follows :
I.	Lend-Lease Appropriations to the President
First Lend-Lease Appropriation....................... $7,000,000,000
Second Lend-Lease Appropriation....................... 5,985,000,000
Third Lend-Lease Appropriation......................   5,425,000,000
Fourth Lend-Lease Appropriation....................... 6,273,629,000
Fifth Lend-Lease Appropriation........'............... 3,538,869,000
Total
28,222,498,000
II.	Transfers Authorized From Other Appropriations
Direct appropriations have been made to the War and Navy Departments and to the Maritime Commission for the procurement of items which are in the main common to the uses of our own armed forces and those of our allies. These items when produced can be used, in other words, by our own armed forces or those of our allies in the manner in which they can be most effective in defeating our common enemies. It is not until they are ready for distribution that they are allocated by the military experts in accordance with the strategic needs. The Appropriation Acts in question authorize transfers to our allies up to stated amounts under the Lend-Lease Act. That docs not mean that transfers up to the stated amounts have to or will necessarily be made. All that it means is that there is sufficient flexibility for the military experts to assign the supplies where they will do the most good in winning the war.
War Department:
Third Supplemental, 1942..............................$2,000,000,000
Fourth Supplemental, 1942 ............................ 4,000,000,000
Fifth Supplemental, 1942............................. 11,250,000,000
Sixth Supplemental, 1942 ............................. 2,220,000,000
Military Appropriation Act, 1943..................... 12,700,000,000
Navy Department—Second Supplemental, 1943 .............. 3,000,000,000
Departments other than War—Third Supplemental, 1942..	800,000,000
Total..................................................   35,970,000,000
Note: In addition to the foregoing, Congress has with certain limitations authorized the leasing of ships of the Navy and merchant ships constructed with funds appropriated to the Maritime Commission without any numerical limitation as to the dollar value or the number of sueb ships which may be so leased. (See for example, Public Law 1, 78th .Congress, approved February 19, 1943, and Public Law 11, 78th Congress, approved March 18, 1943.)
Table 14
49
LEND-LEASE AID IN % OF
TOTAL WAR EXPENDITURES
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 9
50
INTERNATIONAL AID IN % OF TOTAL U.S. PRODUCTION
■■LEND-LEASE TRANSFERS E"—] DIRECT PURCHASE EXPORTS
AIRPLANES
SHIPS
GUNS
AMMUNITION
TANKS
OTHER MILITARY
MOTOR VEHICLES
MACHINERY
IRON ANO STEEL
NON-FERROUS METALS
PETROLEUM ANO COAL
FOODSTUFFS
OTHER AGR. PRODUCTS
Percentages are based on dollar value of production, transfers and exports. 1944 data ore estimated.
SOURCE OF BASIC DATA! WAR PRODUCTION BOARD, BUREAU OF PLANNING AND STATISTICS.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 10
51
LEND-LEASE AID
Millions of Dollars
	Monthly			Cumulative		
	Goods	Services	Total	Goods	Services	Total
Mar 1941		6	4	10	6	4	10
Apr..		20	8	28	26	12	38
May		35	10	45	61	22	83
Jun		41	22	63	102	44	146
Jul		73	28	101	175	72	247
Aug		95	31	126	270	103	373
Sep.		144	37	181	414	140	554
Oct				131	50	181	545	190	735
Nov		165	70	235	710	260	970
Dec		200	74	274	910	334	1,244
Jan 1942......	220	102	322	1,130	436	1,566
Feb		260	128	388	1,390	564	1,954
Mar		362	106	468	<752	670	2/22
Apr		455	99	554	2^207	769	2,976
May		394	55	449	2^601	824	3/25
Jun		459	89	548	3*060	913	3,973
Jul		504	91	595	3^564	1,004	4,568
Aug		446	114	560	4*010	<118	5,128
Sep		544	99	643	4*554	<217	5*771
Oct		680	235	915	5*234	<452	6A86
Nov		620	190	810	5*854	<642	7/96
Dec		694	63	757	6*548	<705	8,253
Jan 1943		627	55	682	7,175	1,760	8,935
Feb		656	41	697	7,831	1,801	9,632
Mar		663	24	687	8/94	<825	10,319
Apr		720	63	783	9,214	1,888	11,102
May.....'		716	74	790	9*930	1,962	11 ^892
Jun				954	77	1,031	10,884	2,039	12,923
Jul		1,018	32	1,050	11 *902	2,071	13,973
Aug		1 ' 114	148	<262	i 3*016	2^219	15,235
Sep"		1J 21	76	<197	14*137	2^295	16,432
Oct		<028	73	<101	15/165	2,368	17'533
Nov		971	105	<076	16,136	2,473	18,609
Dec	%.	1,300	77.	<377	17,436	2,550	19,986
Jan 1944		1,214	45	1,259	18,650	2,595	21,245
Feb		1,124	226	1,350	19,774	2,821	22,595
Mar		<406	224	<630	21,180	3,045	24,225
Apr		<266	18	<284	22,446	3,063	25,509
May		1J 61	238	<399	23A07	3301	26,908
Jun		1,212	150	<362	24*819	3'451	28,270
Table 15
52
LEND-LEASE AID
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION	o-tora-res-oobu-fimi
Chart 11
BREAK-DOWN OF LEND-LEASE AID
Category	Mar. 1941-June 1942	July 1942-June 1943	July 1943-June 1944	Total
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Munitions (Including Ships)		33.7	54.3	58.4	53.6
Industrial Materials & Products....	22.1	21.7	20.9	21.3
Agricultural Products..		21.2	11.5	11.5	12.9
Services.				23.0	12.5	9.2	12.2
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Table 16
GOODS CONSIGNED TO U. S. COMMANDING GENERALS, IN THE FIELD, FOR SUBSEQUENT TRANSFER UNDER LEND-LEASE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AS OF JUNE 30, 1944
Thousands of Dollars
Category	French Forces in North and West Africa	China	Other Countries	Total
Ordnance and Ammunition..	74,329	140,946	8,534	223,809
Aircraft and Parts		56,209		101	56 310
Tanks and Other Vehicles....	196',534	63,482	3,318	263,334
Miscellaneous Supplies		93,297	22,574	18,917	134,788
Total		420,369	227,002	30,870	678,241
Table 17
54
LEND-LEASE GOODS TRANSFERRED AND SERVICES RENDERED
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 12
55
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO ALL COUNTRIES
Thousands of Dollars
Country	Mar. 1941-June 1942	July 1942-June 1943	July 1943-June 1944	Total
United Kingdom	 U. S. S. R	 Africa, Middle East & Mediterranean Area.. China and India	 Australia and New Zealand	 Latin America	 Other Countries		1,404,241 511,115 288,344 174,151 101,563 9,277 86,296	3,058,785 1,931,077 1,139,590 430,582 428,624 74,695 250,476	4,858,523 3,489,752 1,642,895 797,693 481,698 87,998 287,495	9,321,549 5,931,944 3,070,829 1,402,426 1,011,885 171,970 624,267
Total		2,574,987	7,313,829	11,646,054	21,534,870
Percentage Distribution
Country	Mar. 1941- June 1942	July 1942-June1943	July 1943- June 1944	Total
United Kingdom		54.5	41.8	41.7	43.3
U. S. S. R	 Africa, Middle East &	19.8	26.4	30.0	27.5
Mediterranean Area	11.2	15.6	14.1	14.3
China and India	 Australia and New	6.8	5.9	6.8	6.5
Zealand		3.9	5.9	4.1	4.7
Latin America		0.4	1.0	0.8	0.8
Other Countries		3.4	3.4	2.5	2.9
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Table 18
56
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS—MONTHLY
Millions of Dollars
		United Kingdom	U. S. S. R.	Africa, Middle East, and Mediterranean Area	China, India, Australia, and New Zealand	Other Countries	Total
	Mar 1941						1	1
	Apr		1				4	5
	May	 Jun	 Jul		9		5	1	1	16
		26		6	1	2	35
		49		19	1	3	72
	Aug;		46		14	5	2	67
	Sep		74		7	2	3	86
	Oct		142		12	12	1	167
	Nov		107		10	18	2	137
	Dec	 Jan 1942		119 105	1 15	23 24	12 18	13	155 175
	Feb		79	55	26	22	12	194
	Mar		149	97	25	47	11	329
	Apr		144	164	45	55	17	425
	May		144	70	37	47	8	306
	Jun		210	110	35	36	14	405
	Jul		175	103	66	59	21	424
	Aug		152	150	58	56	18	434
	Sep		214	102	71	67	18	472
	Oct		223	128	98	82	31	562
	Nov		203	191	95	54-	18	561
	Dec	 Jan 1943		207 178	166 167	112 94	97 75	25 21		607 535
	Feb	,... .	222	185	45	49	27	528
	Mar		310	211	133	67	56	777
	Apr		352	210	117	67	29	775
	May		400	177	151	83	37	848
	Jun		424	140	100	101	25	790
	Jul		401	232	221	146	32	1,032
	Aug		371	313	164	113	25	986
	Sep		398	303	190	81	32	1,004
	Oct		364	263	165	128	32	952
	Nov		271	344	121	88	33	857
	Dec		383	382	107	116	34	1,022
	Jan 1944		341	313	113	92	32	891
	Feb		411	233	122	77	35	878
	Mar		436	261	90	89	37	913
	Apr		447	249	128	90	28	942
	May		560	316	131	130	22	1,159
	Jun		474	281	91	131	34	1,011
	TOTAL EX-						
	PORTS...	9,321	5,932	3,071	2,415	796	21,535
Table 19
57
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS March 1941 through June 30, 1944 Millions of Dollars
Category	United Kingdom	U. S. S. R.	Africa, Middle East, and Mediterranean Area		China, India, Australia, and New Zealand	Other Countries	Total
MUNITIONS Ordnance		471	279	273	154	79	1,256
Ammunition		975	435	351	211	72	2,044
Aircraft and Parts		1,507	1,181	690	606	390	4,374
Tanks and Parts		764	318	529	161	44	1,816
Motor Vehicles and Parts		481	817	397	352	66	2,113
Watercraft			211	147	45	36	22	461
Total Munitions		4,409	3,177	2,285	1,520	673	12,064
INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS						
AND PRODUCTS						
Machinery		458	673	131	192	28	1,482
Metals		664	596	171	226	27	1,684
Petroleum Products		732	42	65	162	8	1,009
Other		429	418	223	178	33	1,281
Total Industrial		2,283	1,729	590	758	96	5,456
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS						
Foodstuffs				2,144	915	181	105	23	3,368
Other Agric. Products.^		485	111	15	32	4	647
Total Agric. Products		2,629	1,026	196	137	27	4,015
TOTAL EXPORTS		9,321	5,932	3,071	2,415	796	21,535
Table 20
58
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 13
59
TRANSFERS OF WATERCRAFT UNDER LEND-LEASE As of June 30, 1944 Thousands of Dollars
•	Type of Ship	United Kingdom	U. S. S. R.	Other Countries	Total
Combatant. . 	 Naval Auxiliary and Small Craft	 Merchant		87,062 1,522,965 693,899	6,954 49,967 113,438	11,918 84,895 70,678	105,934 1,657,827 878,015
Total		2,303,926	170,359	167,491	2,641,776
Table 21
UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 14
60
EXPORTS FROM THE U.S.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC AOMINISTATION '
Chart 1 5
61
LEND-LEASE FOOD SHIPMENTS IN RELATION TO SUPPLY AND TO U. S. CIVILIAN POPULATION
Commodity	Exports in Percent of Supply		Exports in Ounces per Week per United States Civilian	
	Year 1943	Jan.-June 1944	Year 1943	Jan.-June 1944
All Meats (Dressed Weight Basis)..	9.3	8.2	5.7	5.6
Beef and Veal		1.7	1.0	0.4	0.3
Lamb and Mutton		11.2	11.3	0.3	0.3
Pork		14.6	12.8	5.0	5.0
All Milk Products (Fluid Milk				
Equiv.)		3.8	3.2	11.4	9.9
Dry Whole Milk		14.4	14.2	0.05	0.05
Dry Skim Milk		40.9	23.7	0.6	0.3
Condensed and Evaporated				
Milk		13.0	11.5	1.3	1.1
Butter*		4.1	1.8	0.2	0.1
Cheese		14.3	19.2	0.4	0.6
Eggs, Dried (Shell Egg Equiv.)		12.4	12.9	2.4	2.6
Edible Fats and Oils		16.6	13.3	2.9	2.3
Canned Fish		26.5	9.8	0.6	0.2
Fruits:				
Canned Fruits and Juices		7.4	7.9	0.8	1.0
Dried Fruits		19.2	26.8	0.7	0.9
Vegetables:				
Canned Vegetables		1.5	3.9	0.3	0.7
Dried Beans		11.3	9.8	0.8	0.7
Dried Peas		9.4	14.8	0.3	0.4
Corn and Corn Products (Grain				
Equiv.)		0.1	0.1	1.1	0.6
Wheat and Wheat Products (Grain				
Equiv.)		0.9	1.1	2.7	3.0
*lndudes Carter’s Spread (butter content).
Table 22
62
Data shown above exclude miscellaneous military equipment.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 16
63
STATUS OF NATIONS Lend-Lease Countries and United Nations
Earliest Date Earliest Date of Existence of Severance of State of of Diplomatic War With	Relations Any Axis	With Any Power	Axis Power	c VC r c «	Sept. 3, 1939 	’	 May 9, 1940 	 Apr. 7, 1943 Jan. 28, 1942 Aug. 22, 1942 Jan. 28, 1942 Sept. 10, 1939 	 Tan 90 104^				s .«-<...• n s	. os	•	.	•	•	a r	• oo	•	•	•	•	o ;	•	;	;	n Í	: «	:	:	:	:	c l:«	:	:	:	:^ O\ Ch Ch O\ Ch O\ OS fn 00 OS OS 00 ni o y ó ó ú Q O O u o o QZQQQQ			! ° s a s r<	Dec. 8, 1941 	 Dec. 1, 1942 	 Sept. 3, 1939 		Oct. 28, 1940 	 Dec. 8, 1941 	 Dec. 8, 1941 			 Dec. 8, 1941 			
United Nations Declaration Signed		Jan. 1, 1942 Jan. 1, 1942 Apr. 27, 1943 Feb. 6, 1943 Jan. 1, 1942				N V N N N N OS Os OS OS OS OS A A A A d d d d d d				Jan. 1, 1942 July 28,1942	Jan.	1,	1942 Jan.	1,	1942 Jan.	1,	1942 Jan.	1,	1942		
Reciprocal Aid Agreement Signed		Sept. 3, 1942 Jan. 30, 1943								Sept. 3, 1942 Sept. 25, 1943			
Lend-Lease Agreement Signed '		nl i-h ni en m ml ml r-i n| r—i nl O>O\O\ 0\00\0>OM7\0^0\  t*	^n tn n												
Country	« a c u w <	á a 73 g.s 3 00 ■ 5 V O  tu tì	El Salvador		 Ethiopia			 French Committee of National Liberation 3		4. 4. 4J á	Guatemala	 Haiti		Honduras	 Iceland	 -I
64
	0 oc c t (Z	June 7, 1941 Oct. 2, 1942		Dec. 19, 1941			Jan. 28, 1942 Jan. 24, 1942				i c 3 a c	tain.	Aug. 2. 1944 							Jan. 25, 1942 Dec. 31, 1941		
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			Apr. 10, 1944	June 14, 1943 Sept. 3, 1942										Sept. 3, 1942				
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1
LEND-LEASE ACT
Further to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled^ That this Act may be cited as “An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States.”
Section 2
As used in this Act—
(a)	The term “defense article” means—
(1)	Any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, or boat;
(2)	Any machinery, facility, tool, material, or supply necessary for the manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, or operation of any article described in this subsection;
(3)	Any component material or part of or equipment for any article described in this subsection;
(4)	Any agricultural, industrial, or other commodity or article for defense.
Such term “ defense article” includes any article described in this subsection manufactured or procured pursuant to section 3, or to which the United States or any foreign government has or hereafter acquires title, possession, or control.
(b)	The term “defense information” means any plan, specification, design, prototype, or information pertaining to any defense article.
Section 3
(a)	Noth withstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—
(1)	To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, to the extent to which funds are ‘ made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for the government of any
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country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.
(2)	To sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government, any defense article, but no defense article not manufactured or procured under paragraph (1) shall in any way be disposed of under this paragraph except after consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, or both. The value of defense articles disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph, and procured from funds heretofore appropriated, shall not exceed $1,300,000,000. The value of such defense articles shall be determined by the head of the department or agency concerned or such other department, agency, or officer as shall be designated in the manner provided in the rules and regulations issued hereunder. Defense articles procured from funds hereafter appropriated to any department or agency of the Government, other than from funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act, shall not be disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph except to the extent hereafter authorized by the Congress in the Acts appropriating such funds or otherwise.
(3)	To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise to place in good working order, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for any such government, or to procure any or all such services by private contract.
(4)	To communicate to any such government any defense information, pertaining to any defense article furnished to such government under paragraph (2) of this subsection.
(5)	To release for export any defense article’disposed of in any way under this subsection to any such government.
(b)	The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United- States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.
(c)	After June 30,1945, or after the passage of a concurrent resolution by the two Houses before June 30, 1945, which declares that the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) are no longer necessary to promote the defense of the United States, neither the President nor the head of any department or agency shall exercise any of the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a); except that until July 1,1948, any of such powers may be exercised to the extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement with such a foreign government made before July 1, 1945, or before the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever is the earlier.
(d)	Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of convoying vessels by naval vessels of the United States.
(e)	Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of the entry of any American vessel into a combat area in violation of section 3 of the Neutrality Act of 1939.
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Section 4
All contracts or agreements made for the disposition of any defense article or defense information pursuant to section 3 shall contain a clause by which the foreign government undertakes that it will not, without the consent of the President, transfer title to or possession of such defense articles or defense information by gift, sale, or otherwise, or permit its use by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of such foreign government.
Section 5
(a)	The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government involved shall, when any such defense article or defense information is exported, immediately inform the department or agency designated by the President to administer section 6 of the Act of July 2, 1940 (54 Stat. 714), of the quantities, character, value, terms of disposition, and destination of the article and information so exported.
(b)	The President, from time to time, but not less frequently than once every ninety days, shall transmit to the Congress a. report of operations under this Act except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest to disclose. Reports provided for under this subsection shall be transmitted to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, if the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, is not in session.
Section 6
(a)	There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this Act.
(b)	All money and all property which is converted into money received under section 3 from any government shall, with the approval of the Director of the Budget, revert to the respective appropriation or appropriations out of which funds were expended with respect to the defense article or defense information for which such consideration is received, and shall be available for expenditure for the purpose for which such expended funds were appropriated by law, during the fiscal year in which such funds are received and the ensuing fiscal year;-but in no event shall any funds so received be available for expenditure after June 30, 1948.
Section 7
The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the head of the department or agency shall, in all contracts or agreements for the disposition of any defense article or defense information, fully protect the rights of all citizens of the United States who have patent rights in and to any such article or information which is hereby authorized to be disposed of and the payments collected for royalties on such'patents shall be paid to the owner and holders of such patents.
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Section 8
The Secretaries of War and of the Navy are hereby authorized to purchase or otherwise acquire arms, ammunition, and implements of war produced within the jurisdiction of any country to which section 3 is applicable, whenever the President deems such purchase or acquisition to be necessary in the interests of the defense of the United States.
Section 9
The President may, from time to time, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act; and he may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act through such department, agency, or officer as he shall direct.
Section 10
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to change existing law relating to the use of the land and naval forces of the United States, except insofar as such use relates to the manufacture, procurement, and repair of defense articles, the communication of information and other noncombatant purposes enumerated in this Act.
Section 11
If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any circumstance shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and the applicability of such provision to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
☆ ☆ ☆
On March 11, 1943, after affirmative votes of 407-6 in the House of Representatives and 82-0 in the Senate the President signed the Act extending the Lend-Lease Act until July 1, 1944.
On April 19, 1944, by vote of 344-21, the House of Representatives voted to extend the Lend-Lease Act until July 1, 1945, with the following amendment to Section 3 (b) of the Act as follows (new matter in italics):
“The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory: Provided, however, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to authorize the President in any final settlement to assume or incur any obligations on the part of the United States with respect to post-war economic policy, post-war military policy, or any post-war policy involving international relations except in accordance with established constitutional procedure."
On May 8, 1944, by vote of 63-1, the Senate also voted to extend the Act, with the same amendment as that adopted by the House except for deletion of the words “in any final settlement.” On May 12 the House concurred in this change made by the Senate; On May 17 the President signed the Act.
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Appendix II
BRITISH MASTER AGREEMENT
Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression, Authorized and Provided for by the Act of March 11, 1941.
Whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declare that they are engaged in a cooperative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of laying the bases of a just and enduring world peace securing order under law to themselves and all nations;
And whereas the President of the United States of America has determined, pursuant to the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, that the defense of the United Kingdom against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States of America;
And whereas the United States of America has extended and is continuing to extend to the United Kingdom aid in resisting aggression;
And whereas it is expedient that the final determination of the terms and conditions upon which the Government of the United Kingdom receives such aid and of the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor should be deferred until the extent of the defense aid is known and until the progress of events makes clearer the final terms and conditions and benefits which will be in the mutual interests of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and will promote the establishment and maintenance of world peace;
And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom ate mutually desirous of concluding now a preliminary agreement in regard to the provision of defense aid and in regard to certain considerations which shall be taken into account in determining such terms and conditions and the making of such an agreement has been in all respects duly authorized, and all acts, conditions and formalities which it may have been necessary to perform, fulfill, or execute prior to the making of such an agreement in conformity with the laws either of the United States of America or of the United Kingdom have been performed, fulfilled, or executed as required;
The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows :
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Article I
The Governments of the United States of America will continue to supply the Government of the United Kingdom with such defense articles, defense services, and defense information as the President shall authorize to be transferred or provided.
Article II
The Government of the United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and will provide such articles, services, facilities of information as it may be in a position to supply.
Article III
The Government of the United Kingdom will not without the consent of the President of the United States of America transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information transferred to it under the Act or permit the use thereof by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of the United Kingdom.
Article IV
If, as a result of the transfer to the Government of the United Kingdom of any defense article or defense information, it becomes necessary for that Government to take any action or make any payment in order fully to protect any of the rights of a citizen of the United States of America who has patent rights in and to any such defense article or information, the Government of the United Kingdom will take such action or make such payment when requested to do so by the President of the United States of America.
Article V
The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President, such defense articles transferred under this Agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost, or consumed and as shall be determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States of America.
Article VI
In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom full cognizance shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities, or other benefits or considerations provided by the Government of the United Kingdom subsequent to March 11, 1941, and accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States of America.
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Article Vil
In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which áre the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 12, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
At an early convenient date, conversations shall be begun between the two Governments with a view to determining, in the light of governing economic conditions, the best means of attaining the above-stated objectives by their own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of other like-minded Governments.
Article VIII
This Agreement shall take effect as from this day’s date. It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two Governments.
Signed and sealed at Washington in duplicate this 23d day of February, 1942. .
For the Government of the United States of America:
[seal]	•	Sumner Welles,
Acting Secretary of State of the United States of America.
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
[seal]	Halifax
His Majesty’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Washington.
☆ ☆ ☆
Identical Master Lend-Lease Agreements have been signed with the following countries: Belgium, China, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, Liberia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia. Australia and New Zealand have accepted the principles of the Master Agreements.
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Appendix III
RECIPROCAL AID AGREEMENTS
Reciprocal aid agreements with United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Fighting France were concluded September 3, 1942, by the following exchanges of notes. The first three agreements were signed in Washington and the agreement with Fighting France was signed in London.
Agreement With United Kingdom
The Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State, United States Department of State, Washington, D. C.
Sir: In the United Nations declaration of January 1, 1942, the contracting governments pledged themselves to employ their full resources, military or economic, against those nations with which they are at war and in the Agreement of February 23, 1942, each contracting government undertook to provide the other with such articles, services, facilities, or information useful in the prosecution of their common war undertaking as each may be in a position to supply. It is further the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the general principle to be followed in providing mutual aid as set forth in the said Agreement of February 23,1942, is that the war production and the war resources of both Nations should be used by the armed forces of each and of the other United Nations in ways which most effectively utilize the available materials, manpower, production facilities, and shipping space.
With a view, therefore, to supplementing Article 2 and Article 6 of the Agreement of February 23, 1942, between our two Governments for the provision of reciprocal aid, I have the honour to set forth below the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the armed forces of the United States and the manner in which such aid will be correlated with the maintenance of those forces by the United States Government.
1.	While each Government retains the right of final decision, in .the light of its own potentialities and responsibilities, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, so far as possible, be made in common, pursuant to common plans for winning the war.
2.	As to financing the provision of such aid, within the fields mentioned below, it is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the general principle to be applied, to the point at which the common war effort is most effective, is that as large a portion as possible of the articles and services which each Government may authorize to be provided to the other shall be in the form of reciprocal aid so that the need of each Government for the currency of the other may be reduced to a minimum.
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It is accordingly the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the United States Government will provide, in accordance with the provisions of, and to the extent authorized under, the.Act of March 11, 1941, the share of its war production made available to the United Kingdom. The Government of the United Kingdom will provide on the same terms and as reciprocal aid so much of its war production made available to the United States as it authorizes in accordance with the Agreement of February 23, 1942.
3.	The Government of the United Kingdom will provide the United States or its armed forces with the following types of assistance as such reciprocal aid, when it is found that they can most effectively be procured in the United Kingdom or in the British Colonial Empire:
(a)	Military equipment, munitions, and military and naval stores.
(b)	Other supplies, materials, facilities, and services for the United States forces, except for the pay and allowances of such forces, administrative expenses, and such local purchases as its official establishments may make other than through the official establishments of the Government of the United Kingdom as specified in paragraph 4.
(c)	Supplies, materials, and services needed in the construction of military projects, tasks, and similar capital works required.for the common war effort in the United Kingdom or in the British Colonial Empire, except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens.
(d)	Supplies, materials, and services needed in the construction of such military projects, tasks, and capital works in territory other than the United Kingdom or the British Colonial Empire or territory of the United States to the extent that the United Kingdom or the British Colonial Empire is a more practicable source of supply than the United States or another of the United Nations.
4.	The practical application of the principles formulated in this note, including the procedure by which requests for aid by either Government are made and acted upon, shall be worked out as occasion may require by agreement between the two Governments, acting when possible through their appropriate military or civilian administrative authorities. Requests by the United States Government for such aid will be presented by duly authorized authorities of the United States to official agencies of the United Kingdom which will be designated or established in London and in the areas where United States forces are located for the purpose of facilitating the provision of reciprocal aid.
5-	It is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that all such aid, as well as other aid, including information, received under Article 6 of the Agreement of February 23,1942, accepted by the President of the United States or his authorized representatives from the Government of the United Kingdom will be received as a benefit to the United States under the Act of March 11, 1941. Insofar as circumstances will permit, appropriate record, of aid received under this arrangement, except for miscellaneous facilities and services, will be kept by each Government.
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If the Government of the United States concurs in the foregoing, I would suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter.
I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration, Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,
Halifax.
September 3, 1942
His Excellency the Right Honorable The Viscount Halifax, K. G., British Ambassador.
Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency’s note of today’s date concerning the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the armed forces of the United States of America.
In reply I wish to inform you that the Government of the United States agrees with the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as expressed in that note. In accordance with the suggestion contained therein, your note and this reply will be regarded as placing on record the understanding between our two Governments in this matter.
This further integration and strengthening of our common war effort gives me great satisfaction.
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States of America. September 3,1942
Agreement With Australia
The Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
Sir: As contracting parties to the United Nations Declaration of January 1,1942, the Governments of the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Australia pledged themselves to employ their full resources, military and economic, against those nations with which they are at war.
With regard to the arrangements for mutual aid between our two governments, I refer to the agreement signed at Washington on February 23, 1942, between the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom on principles applying to mutual aid in the present war authorized and provided for by the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, and have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia accepts the principles therein contained as governing the provision of mutual aid between itself and the Government of the United States of America.
It is the understanding of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia that the general principle to be followed in providing such aid is that the war production and war resources of both nations should be
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used by the armed forces of each, in the ways which most effectively utilize available materials, manpower, production facilities, and shipping space.
I now set forth the understanding of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia of the principles and procedure -applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia to the armed forces of the United States and the manner in which such aid will be correlated with the maintenance of those forces by the United States Government.
1.	While each Government retains the right of final decision, in the light of its own potentialities and responsibilities, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, so far as possible, be made in common, pursuant to common plans for winning the war.
2.	As to financing the provision of such aid, within the fields mentioned below, it is my understanding that the general principles to be applied to the point at which the common war effort is most effective, is that as large a portion as possible of the articles and services which each Government may authorize to be provided to the other shall be in the form of reciprocal aid so that the need of each Government for the currency of the other may be reduced to a minimum.
It is accordingly my understanding that the United States Government will provide, in accordance with the provisions of, and to the extent authorized under, the Act of March 11,1941, the share of its war production made available to Australia. The Government of Australia will provide on the same terms and as reciprocal aid so much of its war production made available to the United States as it authorizes in accordance with the principles enunciated in this note.
3.	The Government of Australia will provide as reciprocal aid the following types of assistance to the armed forces of the United States in Australia or its territories and in such other cases as may be determined by common agreement in the light of the development of the war.
(a)	Military equipment, ammunition, and military and naval stores.
(b)	Other supplies, materials, facilities, and services for the United States forces except for the pay and allowances of such forces, administrative expenses, and such local purchases as its official establishments may make other than through the official establishments of the Australian Government as specified in paragraph 4.
(c)	Supplies, materials, and services needed in the construction of military projects, tasks, and similar capital works required for the common war effort in Australia and in such other places as may be determined, except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens.
4.	The practical application of the principles formulated in this note, including the procedure by which requests for aid by either Government are made and acted upon, shall be worked out as occasion may require by agreement between the two Governments, acting when possible through their appropriate military or civilian administrative authorities. Requests by the United States Government for such aid will be presented by duly authorized authorities of the United States to official agencies of the Commonwealth of Australia which will be designated or established in Can
76
berra and in the areas where United States forces are located for the purpose of facilitating the provision of reciprocal aid.
5.	It is my understanding that all such aid accepted by the President of the United States or his authorized representatives from the Government of Australia will be received as a benefit to the United States under the Act of March 11,1941. Insofar as circumstances will permit appropriate record of aid received under this arrangement, except for miscellaneous facilities and services, will be kept by each Government.
If the Government of the United States concurs in the foregoing, I would suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter.
I have the honor to be with the highest consideration, Sir, your obedient servant,
Owen Dixon. September 3, 1942.
The Honorable Sir Owen Dixon, K. C. M. G.,
Minister of Australia.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of today’s date concerning the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia to the armed forces of the United States of America.
In reply I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States of America likewise accepts the principles contained in the agreement of February 23, 1942, between it and the Government of the United Kingdom as governing the provision of mutual aid between the Governments of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Australia. My Government agrees with the understanding of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as expressed in your note of today’s date, and, in accordance with the suggestion contained therein, your note and this reply will be regarded as placing on record the understanding between our two Governments in this matter.
This further integration and strengthening of our common war effort gives me great satisfaction.
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States of America September 3, 1942.
Agreement With New Zealand
The Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
United States Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
Sir: As contracting parties to the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, the Governments of the United States of America and New Zealand
77
pledged themselves to employ their full resources, military and economic, against those nations with which they are at war.
In the Agreement of February 23, 1942, between the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the United States of America, the provisions and principles of which the Government of New Zealand considers applicable to its relations with the Government of the United States, each contracting Government undertook to provide the other with such articles, services, facilities, or information useful in the prosecution of their common war undertaking as each may be in a position to supply.
It is the understanding of the Government of New Zealand that the general principle to be followed in providing such aid is that the war production and war resources of both nations should be used by each, in the ways which most effectively utilize available materials, manpower, production facilities, and shipping space.
I now set forth the understanding of the Government.of New Zealand of the principles and procedure applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of New Zealand to the armed forces of the United States and the manner in which such aid will be correlated with the maintenance of those forces by the United States Government.
1.	While each Government retains the right of final decision, in the light of its own potentialities and responsibilities, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, so far as possible, be made in common, pursuant to common plans for winning the war.
2.	As to financing the provision of such aid, within the fields mentioned below, it is my understanding that the general principle to be applied, to the point at which the common war effort is most effective, is that as large a portion as possible of the articles and services to be provided by each Government to the other ¿shall be in the form of reciprocal aid so that the need of each Government for the currency of the other may be reduced to a minimum.
It is accordingly my understanding that the United States Government will provide, in accordance with the provisions of, and to the extent authorized under, the Act of March 11, 1941, the share of its production made available to New Zealand. The Government of New Zealand will provide on the same terms and as reciprocal aid so much of its production made available to the United States as it authorizes in accordance with the principles enunciated in this note.
3.	The Government of New Zealand will provide the United States or its armed forces with the following types of assistance, as such reciprocal aid, when it is found thaj they can most effectively be procured in New Zealand.
(a)	Military equipment, munitions, and military and naval stores.
(b)	Other supplies, materials, facilities, and services for the United States forces, except for the pay and allowances of such forces, administrative expenses, and suçh local purchases as its official establishments may make-other than through the official establishments of the Government of New Zealand as specified in Paragraph 4.
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(c)	Supplies, materials, and services needed in th e construction of military projects, tasks, and similar capital works required for the common war effort in New Zealand, except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens.
(d)	Supplies, materials, and services needed in the construction of such military projects, tasks, and capital works in territory other than New Zealand or territory of the United States to the extent that New Zealand is a more practicable source of supply than the United States or another of the United Nations.
4.	The practical application of the principles formulated in this note, including the procedure by which requests for aid by either Government are made and acted upon, shall be worked out as occasion may require by agreement between the two Governments, acting when possible through their appropriate military or civilian administrative authorities.
5.	It is my understanding that all such aid accepted by the President of the United States or his authorized representatives from the Government of New Zealand will be received as a benefit to the United States under the Act of March 11, 1941. Insofar as circumstances will permit, appropriate record of aid received under this agreement, except for miscellaneous facilities and services, will be kept by each Government.
If the Government of the United States concurs in the foregoing, I would suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
Walter Nash,
Minister of New Zealand. September 3,1942
The Honorable Walter Nash,
Minister of New Zealand.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of today’s date concerning the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of New Zealand to the armed forces of the United States of America.	«
In reply I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States of America likewise considers the provisions and principles contained in the agreement of February 23, 1942, between it and the Government of the United Kingdom as applicable to its relations with the Government of New Zealand. My Government agrees with the understanding of the Government of New Zealand as expressed in your note of today’s date, and, in accordance with the suggestion contained therein, your note and this, reply will be regarded as placing on record the understanding between our two Governments in this matter.
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This further integration and strengthening of our common war effort gives me great satisfaction.
Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States of America.
September 3,1942
Agreement With French National Committee
Text of Note to General Dahlquist From French National Committee
The French National Committee sets forth below its understanding of the principles governing the provision of reciprocal aid by the United States of America to Fighting France and by Fighting France to the United States:
1.	The United States of America will continue to supply Fighting France with such defense articles, defense services, and defense information as the President shall authorize to be transferred or provided.
2.	Fighting France will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and will provide such articles, services, facilities, or information as it may be in a position to supply.
3.	The fundamental principle to be followed in providing such aid is that the war production and war resources of Fighting France and of the United States of America should be used by the armed forces of each in the ways which most effectively utilize available materials, manpower, production facilities, and shipping space. While each retains the right of final decision, in the light of its own potentialities and responsibilities, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, so far as possible, be made in common, pursuant to common plans for winning the war.
4.	As to financing the provision of such aid, within the fields mentioned below, it is the Committee’s understanding that the general principle to be applied, to the point at which the common war effort is most effective, is that as large a portion as possible of the articles and services to be provided by each to the other shall be in the form of reciprocal aid.
It is accordingly the Committee’s understanding that the United States Government will provide, in accordance with the provisions of, and to the extent authorized under, the Act of March 11, 1941, the share of its war production made available to Fighting France. Fighting France will provide on the same terms and as reciprocal aid so much of its war production made available to the United States as it authorized in accordance with the principles enunciated in this note.
5.	Within the territories under the control of Fighting France, or within the same theater of operations, the National Committee will provide the United States or its armed forces with the following types of assistance, as such reciprocal aid, when it is found that they can most effectively be procured in territory under the control of Fighting France:
(a)	Military equipment, munitions, and military and naval stores.
(b)	Other supplies, materials, facilities, and services for the United States forces, except for the pay and allowances of such forces, adminis
80
trative expenses, and such local purchases as its official establishments may make other than through the official establishments of Fighting France as specified in paragraph 6.
(c)	Supplies, materials, and services, except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens, needed in the construction of military projects, tasks, and similar capital works required for the common war effort in territory under the control of Fighting France, or in the same theater of operations, to the extent that such territory is the most practicable source of supply.
6.	The practical application of the principles formulated in this note, including the procedure by which requests for aid are made and acted upon, shall be worked out by agreement as occasion may require through the appropriate military or civilian administrative authorities. Requests by the United States forces for such aid will be presented by their duly authorized authorities to official agencies of Fighting France which will be designated or established in the areas where United States forces are located for the purpose Of facilitating the provision of reciprocal aid.
7.	It is the Committee’s understanding that all such aid accepted by the President of the United States or his authorized representatives from Fighting France will be received as a benefit to the United States under the Act of March 11, 1941. Insofar as circumstances will permit, appropriate record of aid received under this arrangement, except for miscellaneous facilities and services, will be kept by each.
If the Government of the United States concurs in the foregoing, the present note and a reply to that effect will be regarded as placing on record the understanding in this matter.
Text of Note to French National Committee From General Dahlquist
The Government of the United States of America agrees with the understanding of the National Committee, as expressed in the English text of the Committee’s note of today’s date, concerning the principles and procedures applicable to the provisions of aid by Fighting France to the armed forces of the United States of America and, in accordance with the suggestion contained therein, that note and this reply will be regarded as placing on record the understanding in this matter.
September 3i, 1942
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Appendix IV
MODUS VIVENDI ON RECIPROCAL AID IN FRENCH NORTH AND WEST AFRICA
The Government of the United States and the French Committee of National Liberation, desirous of lending each other the reciprocal aid necessary to the prosecution of the joint war effort, are agreed upon the following provisional Modus Vivendi which will, following signature, be applicable in French North and West Africa:
I.	With reference to supplies and services urgently needed to maintain the French war effort, which the United States has furnished to the French authorities and will continue to furnish, within limitations of need and supply, it is understood that:
(a)	Military aid, including supplies for railroads, docks, public utilities, and other facilities to the extent that such supplies ate determined to be military aid is made availablé on a straight Lend-Lease basis, in the light of the considerations set forth in Paragraph V. Such aid does not include the pay and allowances of French forces. The United States reserves the right to require the return of any articles furnished under this paragraph and not lost, destroyed, or consumed,
(i)	if at any time it is decided that such restitution would be an advantage in the conduct of the war, or
(ii)	if at the end of the present emergency as determined by the President of the United States, the President shall determine that such articles are useful in the defense of the United States or of the Western Hemisphere, or to be otherwise of use to the United States.
(b)	For all civilian supplies imported from the United States, the French authorities will pay upon the basis of prices to be agreed. Payment will be made, currently at convenient intervals, in dollars, to an appropriately designated account in the United States.
(c)	The distinction between civilian and military aid, supplies and services, where such distinction may be necessary, will be made by agreement.
(d)	All aid furnished under Paragraph I (a) and I (b) will be made available by the United States under the authority and subject to the terms and conditions provided for in the Act of Congress of 11 March, 1941, as amended (P. L. 11, 77th Congress, 1st Session).
II.	With reference to supplies and services urgently needed to maintain the United States war effort, which the French authorities have furnished
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to the United States and will continue to furnish, within limitations of need and supply, it is understood that:
(a)	The French authorities undertake to make available to or for the use of the armed forces and other governmental agencies of the United States, as reverse Lend-Lease aid to the United States, on a straight Lend-Lease basis, when it is found that such aid can most effectively be procured in territory under their control.
(i)	military equipment, munitions, and military and naval stores;
(ii)	other supplies, materials,' facilities, and services for United States forces, including the use of railway and port facilities, but not including the pay and allowances of such forces nor the administrative expenses of American missions;
(iii)	supplies, materials, facilities, and services, except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens, needed in the construction of military projects, tasks, and similar capital works required in the common war effort, to the extent that French North or West Africa is the most practicable source of such supplies, materials, facilities, or services, (iv) such other supplies, materials, services, or facilities as may be agreed upon as necessary in the prosecution of the war, but not including exports of civilian supplies to the United States from North and West Africa.
While the French authorities retain, of course, the right of final decision, subject to the obligations and arrangements they have entered into for the prosecution of the war, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, so far as possible, be made in common, pursuant to common plans for winning the war.
(b)	All civilian supplies exported from French. North and West Africa to the United States will be paid for on the basis of prices to be agreed. Payment will be made currently, at convenient intervals, in dollars, to an appropriate designated account in the United States.
(c)	The distinction between civilian and military aid, supplies and services, where such distinction may be necessary, will be made by agreement.
(d)	In order to obtain the supplies and services included within the scope of Paragraph II (a), duly authorized United States officers or other officials will submit their requests to the official services duly designated by the French authorities. These services will be established in Algiers, Casablanca, Oran, Tunis, Dakar, and other places where it may be found practicable and convenient to establish organizations for facilitating the transfer of reciprocal aid.
(e)	For use in those exceptional cases, and particularly in cases of local procurement of supplies, in which it is agreed to be more practicable to secure such reverse Lend-Lease supplies, facilities, and services by direct purchase, rather than by the method of procurement set forth in Paragraph II (b), it is agreed that the French authorities establish a franc account in convenient banking institutions and in the name of a designated officer of the United States to facilitate the provision of reverse Lend-Lease aid as con
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templated by Paragraph II (a). The French contributions to this account will be mutually agreed upon from time to time in the light of the changing needs of the American forces, and other appropriate factors. Such an account will not be used for the payment of wages and salaries of American military or civilian personnel, nor for administrative expenses of American missions. Estimates of the franc requirements of the United States will be submitted to designated French authorities from time to time, as may be found convenient. The French authorities will be kept fully and currently informed of all transactions in this account.
III.	In exceptional cases, and when they deem it preferable, the American military forces, or other agencies of the United States Government, may continue to use their present practice of acquiring francs against dollars from the French authorities.
IV.	Adequate statistical records will be kept of all goods and services exchanged as mutual aid under paragraphs I and II above.
V.	The provisions of this modus vivendi correspond to a desire to reduce to an appropriate minimum the need of either party for currency of the other party. Provisions which call for payments in dollars have been decided upon in view of the special situation arising from accumulated dollar balances and availabilities of dollar funds due to the presence of United States trpops in French North and West Africa. Revision of the payment provisions of this modus vivendi will be made should the situation require.
Signed at Algiers this 25th day of September, A. D. 1943.
For the Government of the United States of America:
/s/Robert Murphy
For the French Committee of National Liberation:
/s/Massigli
/s/Jean Monnet September 25, 1945.
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Appendix V
EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to unify and consolidate governmental activities relating to foreign economic affairs, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1.	There is established in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President the Foreign Economic Administration (hereinafter referred to as the Administration), at the head of which shall be an Administrator.
2.	The Office of Lend-Lease Administration, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, the Office of Economic Warfare (together with the corporations, agencies, and functions transferred thereto by Executive Order No. 9361 of July 15, 1943), the Office of Foreign Economic Coordination (except such functions and personnel thereof as the Director of the Budget shall determine are not concerned with foreign economic operations) and their respective functions, powers, and duties are transferred to and consolidated in the Administration.
3.	The Administrator may establish such offices, bureaus, or divisions in the Administration as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this order, and may assign to them such of the functions and duties of the offices, agencies, and corporations consolidated by this order as he may deem desirable in the interest of efficient administration.
4.	The powers and functions of the Administration shall be exercised in conformity with the foreign policy of the United States as defined by the Secretary of State. As soon as military operations permit, the Administration shall assume responsibility for and control of all activities of the United States Government in liberated areas with respect to supplying the requirements of and procuring materials in such areas.
5.	All the personnel, property, records, funds (including all unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds now available), contracts, assets, liabilities, and capital stock (including shares of stock) of the offices, agencies, and corporations consolidated by paragraph 2 of this order are transferred to the Administration for use in connection with the exercise and performance of its functions, powers, and duties. In the case of capital stock (including shares of stock), the transfer shall be to such agency, corporation, office, officer, or person as the Administrator shall designate. The Administrator is authorized to employ such personnel as may be necessary in the performance of the functions of the Administration and in order to carry out the purposes of this order.
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6.	No part of any funds appropriated or made available under Public Law 139, approved July 12, 1943, shall hereafter be used directly or indirectly by the Administrator for the procurement of services, supplies, or equipment outside the United States except for the purpose of executing general economic programs or policies, formally approved by a majority of the War Mobilization Committee in writing filed with the Secretary of State prior to any such expenditure.
7.	All prior Executive Orders insofar as they are in conflict herewith are amended accordingly. This order shall take effect upon the taking of office by the Administrator, except that the agencies'and offices consolidated by paragraph 2 hereof shall continue to exercise their respective functions pending any contrary determination by the Administrator.
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
The White House, September 25, 1943.
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Appendix VI
EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING
OFFICE OF LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and particularly by the Act of March 11, 1941, entitled “An Act further to promote the defense of the United States and for other purposes” (hereafter referred to as the Act), and by the Defense Aid Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1941, approved March 27, 1941, and acts amendatory or supplemental thereto, in order to define further the functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President in respect to the national emergency as declared by the President on May 27, 1941, and in order to provide for the more effective administration of those Acts in the interests of national defense, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1.	There shall be in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President an Office of Lend-Lease Administration, at the head of which shall be an Administrator, appointed by the President, who shall receive compensation at such rate as the President shall approve and, in addition, shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of his duties.
2.	Subject to such policies as the President may from time to time prescribe, the Administrator is hereby authorized and directed, pursuant to Section 9 of the Act, to exercise any power or authority conferred upon the President by the Act and by the Defense Aid Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1941, and any acts amendatory or supplemental thereto, with respect to any nation whose defense the President shall have found to be vital to the defense of the United States: Provided, That the master agreement with each nation receiving lend-lease aid, setting forth the general terms and conditions under which such nation is to receive such aid, shall be negotiated by the State Department, with the advice of the Economic Defense Board and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration.
3.	The Administrator shall make appropriate arrangements with the Economic Defense Board for the review and clearance of lend-lease transactions which affect the economic defense of the United States as defined in Executive Order No. 8839 of July 30,1941.
4.	Within the limitation of such funds as may be made available for’ that purpose, the Administrator may appoint one or more Deputy or Assistant Administrators and other personnel, delegate to such Deputy or Assistant Administrators any power or authority conferred by these orders, and make provision for such supplies, facilities, and services as shall be necessary to
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carry out the provisions of this Order. Insofar as practicable, the Office of Lend-Lease Administration shall use such general business services and facilities as may be made available to it through the Office for Emergency Management.
5.	Executive Order No. 8751 of May 2,1941, establishing the Division of Defense Aid Reports and defining its functions and duties, is hereby revoked.
Franklin D. Roosevelt. The White House, October 28, 1941.
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1944