[Twentieth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations : For the Period Ended June 30, 1945]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
TWENTIETH REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS
For the Period Ended June 30, 1945
TWENTIETH REPORT TO CONGRESS ON LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS
For the Period Ended June 30z 1945
“The President from time to time, but not less frequently than once every ninety days, shall transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this Act except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest to disclose.”
[From Section 5, subsection b, of “An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States” (Public Law No. 11, 77th Congress, 1st Session).]
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CONTENTS
Chapter Page
President’s Letter of Transmittal................................ 5
1. -Lend-Lease: Indispensable Ingredient in Victory......... 7
Lend-Lease in the War................................».......... 7
Lend-Lease Aid............................................... 10
Where Lend-Lease Goods Have Gone...................... 12
Reverse Lend-Lease.......................................... 13
2. The United Kingdom and British Armed Forces............. 16
3. The Soviet Union....................................... 21
4. China and India........................................ 24
China.................»........................................ 24
India........................................................ 26
5. Australia and New Zealand............................... 29
Australia...................................................... 29
New Zealand. . ;............................................... 31
6. Continental Europe...................................... 33
France......................................................... 33
Belgium........................................................ 35
The Netherlands................................................ 36
Italy......................................................... 37
7. Lend-Lease and the Peace................................ 39
Benefits to the United States from Lend-Lease.................. 39
Comparative War Expenditures................................... 40
The Economic Foundations of Peace..................... 42
8. Statistical Tables...................................... 44
Appendix
I. Lend-Lease Act.................................................. 56
II. Soviet Master Agreement................................. 60
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PRESIDENT’S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
To The Congress of the United States of America:
I am transmitting herewith the twentieth report of operations under the Lend-Lease Act for the period ending June 30, 1945.
The costliest, bloodiest, and most destructive war in history has resulted in victory for the cause of decency. All peace-loving men are resolved and determined that the peace and freedom we have won at such tremendous sacrifices shall be preserved.
With the defeat of the Axis powers, whose ruthless plan for world conquest and enslavement came so close to succeeding, the United States has realized the major objective for which lend-lease aid has been extended. That objective, like the objective of our war effort as a whole, was the speeding of victory and the saving of American and other allied lives. Lend-lease and reverse lend-lease helped to unite in a mighty and victorious fighting partnership the separate efforts of the combination of nations resisting the Axis aggressors. Each of our principal fighting partners has contributed to the pool of armed might in accordance with its full abilities and capacities.
The great task of lend-lease has now ended. The programs of lend-lease to our allies are being terminated in an expeditious and orderly manner, subject to military needs for the movement of troops or for occupation purposes.
The United States is assisting in the relief and reconstruction of the war-torn areas of our allies and in the establishment of world trade on the high level necessary to insure full and useful employment and production at home and abroad.
To win the lasting peace for which we and our allies have so bitterly and bloodily fought, we and the other United Nations are firmly resolved to establish in concert the political and economic conditions which are the foundation of freedom and welfare among the nations of the earth.
Harry S. Truman.
The White House,
August 30, 1945.
(Filed August 30, 1945 with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as provided in Section 5~b of the Lend-Lease Act.}
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Chapter 1
LEND-LEASE: INDISPENSABLE INGREDIENT IN VICTORY
After, almost six years of the most terrible war in history, the United Nations have achieved complete and total victory over the treacherous and ruthless Axis aggressors. The scheme of the Axis powers to divide and conquer the world has failed.
Nazi Germany is decisively conquered and occupied by the victorious allies. Italy, and the Axis satellites, have been liberated from their Fascist leaders. Japan, the remaining partner in aggression, has capitulated to avoid complete annihilation by the allied armed forces.
America’s role as the arsenal of democracy has proved a wise and farsighted military investment. Following Germany’s attack on Poland and while Nazi armies prepared to invade the Western European democracies, those democracies spent hundreds of millions of dollars in our plants and factories for planes and munitions. When their dollars ran out the American people decided to provide war supplies, through lend-lease, to the nations still resisting the Axis aggressors.
When Britain faced Hitlerite Europe alone, the bridge of ships across the Atlantic was the lifeline of supply which enabled Britain to carry on the struggle. When the Nazi armies invaded Russia, the millions of tons of lend-lease goods furnished to the Soviet people aided immensely their resistance to the German attacker and constituted an essential ingredient in the mighty offensives of the Soviet Army from Stalingrad, Moscow and Leningrad to Berlin. When Japan treacherously attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor and Germany and Italy declared war upon us, the Axis scheme to divide and conquer, which had subjugated almost all of Europe, met its crucial test. The decision of the allies to deal first with the stronger and more powerful enemy in Europe and the pooling of resources through lend-lease and reverse lend-lease established the pattern for final victory.
Lend-Lease in the War
The time gained through lend-lease prior to Pearl Harbor was invaluable. Conversion to war production, already stimulated by purchases of war supplies by democratic countries, was greatly advanced by the production of lend-lease supplies for the countries resisting the aggressors. Industrial
7
experience in the manufacture of lend-lease planes and munitions and the battle experience of the lend-lease nations with fighting equipment, were a vital beginning in American technological improvements that were later to make our armed forces the best equipped in the world.
In the time gained measures of national defense were taken. The United States Army was being enlarged and trained in the methods of modern mechanized warfare. The United States Navy began a ship building program that was later to make it greater than the combined fleets of all other nations. The world’s most powerful air force was rapidly developing. A vast merchant marine to carry the cargoes of war to the democracies and battle fronts was under construction. The joint American-British effort to harness uranium and develop the atomic bomb was launched in this country in secrecy. Great, guarded laboratories and plants, erected and supplied at a cost of $2 billion, were the workshops where American and British scientists, engineers, and military experts won the race to unlock the mystery of uranium and its tremendous power.
On Sunday, December 7, 1941, when Japanese planes dropped their bombs on Pearl Harbor, the United States faced the Axis with determined allies. The lend-lease supplies furnished and the assurance of further supplies to the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the other foes of the Axis had helped to provide our allies with vital and indispensable sinews of war and strengthened their determination during the dark days when the Wehrmacht ruled most of Europe and seemed invincible. While the United States was taking steps to build its great natural resources, its tremendous industrial and agricultural capacity, and its manpower into a mighty war machine and the arsenal of democracy, Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and other nations were fighting heroically against the Axis aggressors.
The miracle of all-out American production for war was soon felt. American planes, tanks, guns, food and other war supplies for our armed forces overseas and for the lend-lease countries were carried by American and allied merchant ships across the vast sea lanes of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, protected by the American and British fleets. As lend-lease shipments mounted in tonnage and made their telling blows against the enemy on the battlefields, strategic plans for mighty allied counter-offensives were developed.
In less than 1 year after Pearl Harbor, the tide of Japanese conquest was turned back at Midway and Guadalcanal, and in less than 2 years American forces, teamed with British and other United Nations fighting men, invaded North Africa. While great battles were being fought in Tunisia, Algeria, and Italy and on the long, bloody Eastern Front, and while American marines and doughboys were storming the Jap-held islands in the Pacific, the British Isles were being converted into a gigantic invasion base by American lend-lease supplies and British production. In
8
the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand, with the help of tremendous quantities of lend-lease goods and supplies that added strength and power to their own great efforts, became important bases for the long, hard-fought campaigns back to the Philippines. For the offensives launched against the Japanese in Burma and China—the longest of all the allied land fronts, except for the Soviet Eastern front—millions of dollars worth of lend-lease planes, munitions, and other supplies had long been moving forward to China and India.
Chart 1
The stream of lend-lease aid which had been flowing to the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the other United Nations arrayed against the Axis Powers reached an all-time high of $1.6 billion in the month of March 1944. That aid was a vital factor in the crushing flood of power which burst forth upon Hitlerite Europe when American, British and Canadian armies under General Eisenhower landed on the Normandy beaches on June 6, 1944, and when the Soviet armies opened new drives against the Wehrmacht from the east. The speed and striking power of the British, French and Russian drives into the heart of Germany were greatly aided by the tremendous quantities of American planes, tanks, guns, transportation and communication equipment, and other supplies furnished under lend-lease. The victories of the American armed forces over the Nazis were in turn aided by the critical supplies and services of all kinds provided as reverse lend-lease by our allies.
Lend-lease and reverse lend-lease aid were also vital factors in the great allied air, sea, and land offensives in the Far East that turned the tide of Japanese conquest and forced the capitulation of Japan. The victories of
662505—45-
-2
9
the Australians, New Zealanders and Dutch in the Southwest Pacific, of the British and Indians in India and Burma, and of the Chinese in China, were achieved with the help of lend-lease supplies and equipment. The flow of lend-lease aid to the Soviet Far East helped to strengthen the Soviet Union in its preparation for entry into the war against Japan.
On May 6, 1945, Germany surrendered to the combined forces of the United Nations. On August 14, 1945, Japan capitulated to avoid complete annihilation.
TOTAL LEND-LEASE AID March 1941 to July 1,1945
Category Amount Percent of Aid
Goods transferred: Munitions (including ships) $20,691,562,000 2,184,730,000 8,657,714,000 5,906,466,000 49.2
Petroleum products 5.2
Industrial materials and products*.. Agricultural products 20.6 14.1
Total transfers 37,440,472,000 4,580,307,000 89.1
Shipping and other services 10.9
Total lend-lease aid 42,020,779,000 100.0
Consignments to commanding generals**. 788,603,000
*lncludes signal, chemical warfare, and engineer equipment; medical supplies; chemicals, machinery, metals, and minerals; and other military and war production equipment and supplies.
**Goods consigned to United States commanding generals for subsequent transfer in the field to lend-lease countries. The value of such goods transferred is not included in the lend-lease aid total of $42,020,779,000,
Table 1
Lend-Lease Aid
The total financial cost to the United States of its contribution to the allied victory over Germany and Japan amounted to more than $280 billion as of June 30, 1945. Approximately 15 percent of this amount represented the cost of the munitions, industrial and agricultural supplies, shipping and other services furnished to our allies under lend-lease. The remainder, or 85 percent of our total war costs, was spent on our own direct war effort.
In the period from the approval of the Lend-Lease Act on March 11, 1941, through June 30, 1945, lend-lease aid totaled $42,021,000,000. In addition, we had consigned munitions and other war supplies valued at $789 million to United States commanding generals in the field for sub
10
sequent transfer under lend-lease, largely to the French forces during the campaign in North Africa and to the Chinese armies.
The peak in lend-lease aid was reached early in 1944 when preparations were being made for the landings in Normandy and the great Soviet offensives on the Eastern Front. Aid furnished in the first half of 1944 exceeded by $1,645,000,000, or 25 percent, aid in the corresponding period of 1945. Exports of lend-lease goods in June 1945 were a third less than in May and were only half as large as in June 1944. They were the smallest for any month since September 1942.
Munitions, and petroleum products for fueling allied planes, ships, military vehicles and war production and transportation totaled $22,876,-000,000 and accounted for more than half of total lend-lease aid through June 30, 1945.
Chart 2
The next largest category, totaling $8,658,000,000 or 21 percent of all lend-lease aid, consisted of non-combat military supplies, such as signal, engineer and communication equipment and medical supplies, and industrial materials and equipment. Of the total, approximately $3 billion represented various types of military equipment and supplies furnished to the armed forces of our allies. Industrial and transportation machinery, equipment, tools and supplies amounted to about $3.5 billion. We had lend-leased a billion dollars worth of iron and steel and nearly a billion dollars worth of other metals and minerals.
Foodstuffs which we had lend-leased to the end of June amounted to $5,095,000,000 and other agricultural products amounted to $812,000,000. The combined total accounted for about 14 percent of the total value of lend-lease aid. In 1944, when food production in this country was at an all-time peak, we sent to our allies under lend-lease about 6 percent of
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our total food supplies. The proportion of such scarce items as beef and veal was much less than the over-all average. Lend-lease shipments of butter, cheese, eggs and canned fish declined during 1945. Table 23 on page 52 shows the proportion of our supply of various kinds of food which was exported in each of the last three years and in the first 5 months of this year.
Where Lend-Lease Goods Have Gone
Munitions and other war supplies furnished under lend-lease have been sent to the areas where they would prove most effective in the winning of the war. As conditions on the war fronts changed and the emphasis shifted from one war theater to another, there was a consequent shift in the distribution of lend-lease goods.
Chart 3
In the early period of lend-lease during the Battle of Britain, when that country was threatened with invasion, most of the goods exported under lend-lease went to the United Kingdom. Later, when the French and British armies were fighting with American forces to drive the Germans out of North Africa, large quantities of lend-lease goods were shipped to that area to help equip the allied troops. The successful Russian offensives on the Eastern Front were preceded by a tremendous, increased flow of lend-lease planes, tanks, and guns, and industrial, transportation and communication supplies to the U. S. S. R. Lend-lease shipments to the United Kingdom reached their peak in the spring of 1944 as preparations were being completed for the invasion of the Continent and the march through Germany.
12
With the defeat of Germany, the emphasis on lend-lease shipments was altered in accordance with the aid required by allied forces against Japan. Lend-lease goods shipped across the Pacific in June, to aid the British, Russian, Chinese, and other allied forces, accounted for about 50 percent of total shipments in that month. Another 31 percent went to the United Kingdom to support that country’s vital effort in the war against Japan.
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO ALL COUNTRIES
Thousands oi Dollars
Jan.-Mar, 1945 Apr.-June 1945 Cumulative to July 1, 1945
United Kingdom 81 3,036 690,947 13,498,748
U.S.S.R Africa, Middle East, and Med- 664,547 707,051 9,128,875
iterranean area 117,922 87,258 3,334,656
China and India 193,357 80,414 207,434 121,431 2,231,384 1,378,698
Australia and New Zealand - .
Latin America 12,148 16,398 243,378
Other Countries 150,822 186,943 1,553,170
Total 2,032,246 2,017,462 31,368,909
Table 2
From the beginning of lend-lease through the end of June 1945, 42 percent of all lend-lease goods exported went to the United Kingdom. The U. S. S. R. ranked second with 28 percent of total shipments. Most of the arms and materials sent to those two countries in the past were used in the offensives against Germany from the west and from the east. To aid in the offensives against the Wehrmacht from the south, 13 percent of lend-lease shipments went to Africa and the Mediterranean area. Twelve percent of total shipments went to the Pacific and Asiatic areas.
Detailed information on lend-lease exports by country is given in Table 22, pages 50 and 51.
Reverse Lend-Lease
The United States has benefited greatly from reverse lend-lease aid, as the facts set forth in this report indicate. The system of lend-lease and reverse lend-lease has been one of the most powerful and effective weapons devised by the allies in this war. Its sole purpose has been to make the most effective use against the enemy of the combined resources of all the United Nations, regardless of the origin of the supplies or which of us used them.
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REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID RECEIVED BY THE UNITED STATES, BY CATEGORY AND COUNTRY
Cumulative to April 1, 1945
(Data in some cases are preliminary and are subject to revision)
Category Amount
Capital installations Foodstuffs Clothing Petroleum and coal products Air Force supplies and equipment Other military supplies and equipment Shipping and other transportation Other services Raw materials and food shipped to United States $1,195,789,000 422,231,000 67,157,000 1,209,379,000 450,1 37,000 857,257,000 1,032,618,000 200,100,000 165,696,000
Total „ 5,600,364,000
Country Amount
United Kingdom Fiji Islands Nigeria Gold Coast Other Colonies $3,777,383,000 10,075,000 2,531,000 6,286,000 608,000
Total from United Kingdom Australia New Zealand*. India Union of South Africa 3,796,883,000 791,282,000 189,003,000 516,713,000 885,000
Total British Empire : France** .■ French Africa* France—New Caledonia* Belgium* Belgian Congo Netherlands Netherlands—Curacao and Surinam* China ,. .. . U. S. S. R 5,294,766,000 200,615,000 70,335,000 1,012,000 25,935,000 182,000 1,133,000 575,000 3,672,000 2,139,000
Total 5,600,364,000
*To May 1, 1945.
**To February 1, 1945.
Table 3
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By April 1, 1945, the United States had received from our allies a total of about $5,600,000,000 of reverse lend-lease aid. Each of our major fighting partners has contributed as much as it could effectively make available, though the contributions of each differed with the circumstances of the war. The major share of reverse lend-lease has been furnished by Britain. Tremendous quantities of supplies and equipment, barracks, and airfields were provided to American forces as reverse lend-lease aid during the entire period when the Biritish Isles were the principal base for operations against the Nazis in the West. In France, Belgium and the Netherlands a vast variety of aid has been supplied since D-day to the liberating American armies under reverse lend-lease. Behind the lines these countries furnished General Eisenhower’s forces under reverse lend-lease with the use of their buildings and railroads, the output of their factories, and the service of hundreds of thousands of their workingmen for the common war effort. The Soviets, on the other hand, have required all that they could produce in addition to the aid supplied under lend-lease to throw back the German invaders in the greatest land war in history, although they have provided under reverse lend-lease supplies and services for American vessels and airmen.
The same successful system of combined war supply has been at work in the Far East. The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, India and China have supplied American forces in this theater with reverse lend-lease aid to the utmost of their abilities. The continuing flow of such aid was a vital factor in the final allied offensives against Japan.
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Chapter 2
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH ARMED FORCES
Lend-lease shipments to the United Kingdom and British Armed Forces continued to move forward following the defeat of Germany, although on a reduced scale, as an essential and integral part of the combined strategy in the war against Japan. The mobilization of Britain’s great war industry for the Far Eastern war, the redeployment of the Empire’s army and navy, and the heavy commitments undertaken by the British for the redeployment of American forces and in the occupation of Germany necessitated limited amounts of lend-lease aid to enable Britain to support fully the common war effort and speed the unconditional surrender of Japan.
From the beginning of the lend-lease program in March 1941 through June 30, 1945, lend-lease shipments to the United Kingdom amounted to $13,499,000,000, of which $1,504,000,000 was shipped during the first 6 months of this year.
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO UNITED KINGDOM
Thousands of Dollars
Jan.-Mar. 1945 Apr-June 1945 Cumulative to July 1, 1945
Ordnance and ammunition.... 131,482 61,41 5 1,939,511
Aircraft and parts 192,333 189,685 2,402,900
Tanks and parts 30,083 26,100 1,046,662
Motor vehicles and parts 59,489 38,949 703,982
Watercraft 5,085 3,926 691,898
All munitions 418,472 320,075 6,784,953
Petroleum products Industrial materials and prod- 172,352 186,488 1,479,045
ucts 73,388 58,655 1,925,304
Agricultural products 148,824 125,729 3,309,446
Total 813,036 690,947 13,498,748
Table 4
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By VE-day lend-lease shipments to the United Kingdom had already declined substantially, and this was possible because of the success of the hard battles of March and April which proved to be the final drives that led to the destruction of the beaten but desperate Wehrmacht and the capitulation of fanatical Nazi forces.
The total value of lend-lease exports, to the United Kingdom in the second quarter of this year was $691 million compared with $813 million in the first quarter. March exports amounted to $301 million. In April, shipments declined to $276 million and showed a further reduction in May to $251 million. By June the dollar value of lend-lease shipments to Britain was the lowest since August 1942 and amounted to $164 million. In June only 31 percent of lend-lease exports to all countries went to the United Kingdom, whereas from March 1941 through June 1945 it received 42 percent of lend-lease exports to all countries.
Materials of an immediate and direct military nature, including ordnance, aircraft, tanks, vehicles, and watercraft, represent approximately one-half of all lend-lease shipments to Britain and the remainder is divided almost equally between industrial materials and agricultural products.
Munitions supplied to the United Kingdom since the beginning of the lend-lease program through June 30,1945, have amounted to $6,785,000,000, of which $739,000,000 were shipped in 1945. Vast quantities of munitions were used up by the British armed forces in the great campaigns on the Continent and more were required to force the capitulation of Japan.
The United Kingdom itself manufactured more than 125,000 planes. All the heavy bombers and most of the fighters that RAF pilots used were produced in the United Kingdom, but we have shipped more than 10,000 medium and light bombers and fighters and miscellaneous aircraft. These
Chart 4
662^05—45---3 1 7
planes do not include the thousands the British purchased early in the war from us or from Canada. Aircraft and parts shipped under lend-lease in the first half of 1945 had a dollar value of $382 million.
Throughout the war American-made tanks have supplemented British tanks in the armored divisions of the Anglo-American liberating armies. America’s General Sherman and General Grant tanks were part of the famed? British Eighth Army that drove Rommel’s forces from Egypt, Libya, and Tripolitania. In Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy British tankmen also fought in them. British armored divisions were in the thick of the fierce tank battles that crushed the vaunted Wehrmacht’s armored divisions in Europe and opened the way to western Germany. Since March 1941 we have shipped 12,750 tanks of all kinds to the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom has produced 70 percent of all the munitions, equipment, and supplies used by the armed forces of the British Commonwealth and Empire in the prosecution of the war. Britain has been a war production arsenal for the United Nations second only to the United States. We have assisted them to maintain their war production by sending them $1,925,000,000 worth of industrial materials and products. British war production with lend-lease raw materials and equipment saved critical shipping space in the months when Nazi U-boats were taking a heavy toll of allied shipping and when bottoms were at a premium for the long, dangerous voyage across the Pacific.
The grave coal shortage in Europe, that has threatened to paralyze activities on the Continent in support of the redeployment of American and other allied armed forces, has made it necessary to supply the United Kingdom with additional spare parts, machinery, and equipment for coal mining. Inadequate coal supplies will hamper the allied effort to maintain order and restore conditions in the liberated countries and occupied zones. The Allied Control Commission in Berlin has already ordered the German people to gather wood from their forests, for no coal will be available for heating German houses this winter. The tremendous increase in rail transportation in the United Kingdom in preparation for the invasion of Europe and for the continuous flow of goods across the Channel and now for the redeployment of American troops to the United States has taxed heavily British coal supplies. Lend-lease coal machinery and parts have aided England and Wales in increasing their production and thereby relieving the drain upon American coal supplies.
Food has been and will remain for some time a critical problem for the British Isles. In the first 6 months of 1945 we shipped $275 million worth of food and other agricultural products to the United Kingdom, of which $125 million worth were shipped in the last 3 months. To save shipping and to divert agricultural workers to the armament industry and to meet the demands of the armed forces, the United Kingdom had reduced the importation of foodstuffs from the prewar levels of 22 million tons annually to only half that volume in 1942, 1943, and 1944.
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There were 50 percent more acres under the plow in 1944 than 5 years earlier. Lend-lease shipments of fertilizers and limited quantities of agricultural machinery helped Britain to increase its acreage under cultivation. Since V-E day some food requirements have actually become more urgent than before. Food supplies from the normal sources of British imports—the Continent and Australia and New Zealand—are still not available to Britain in prewar quantities. The impact of providing rations for British, American and other allied armed forces and rations for thousands of prisoners of war has reduced Britain’s food reserves.
'As of March 31, 1945, the United Kingdom had provided 553,690,000 pounds of foodstuffs to American fighting men. This was valued at $68,078,000 and included flour, canned meat, sugar, and tea and other foodstuffs.
REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM
Thousands of Dollars
Category Cumulative to April 1, 1945
Capital installations 833 385
Foodstuffs 68 078
Clothing 51769
Petroleum and coal products 910 365
Air Force supplies and equipment 373 093
Other military supplies and equipment 603 590
Shipping and other transportation 705 443
Other services 87 074
Raw materials and food shipped to U. S Total 164^086 3 796 883
(Conversion from pound sterling at $4.03.)
Table 5
The United Kingdom has furnished to the United States to the end of March 1945 reverse lend-lease aid valued at $3,796,883,000. The aid which the United Kingdom has furnished to the United States as reverse lend-lease has come from all parts of the Empire and has consisted of a great variety of supplies and services for our armed forces on the far-flung battlefronts, strategic materials such as crude rubber for American war production, foodstuffs such as cocoa, tea, fats and oils, and valuable technical information and inventions for our armed forces and war production.
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The exchange of technical information with the British as lend-lease and reverse lend-lease began before our forces started to assemble in the British Isles, where the major portion of reverse lend-lease aid has been supplied. The development of radar is an example of the manner in which American and British scientists and engineers, as well as military personnel, have worked side by side, pooling their knowledge and technological information to perfect this vital weapon which has played such a major part in the allied victory and saved thousands of American and allied lives. Such aid cannot be measured in monetary terms.
Two outstanding achievements of British science and engineering that were made available to the American armed forces for the offensives against Germany were “Pluto” and “Fido,” military security names for the oil pipe line under the Channel and the fog dispersal project, respectively. “Pluto” solved the fuel supply problem for allied operations on the Con-'tinent. Since August 12, 1944, “Pluto” pumped 1 million gallons of fuel daily from depots in England to General Eisenhower’s Anglo-American armies. “Fido” enabled USAAF and RAF planes to operate from bases in the United Kingdom in spite of heavy fog and mist that often blanketed the airfields.
The use of British passenger ships and freighters to carry American troops and military cargoes have been made available as required under reverse lend-lease. The Queen Mary and the Queen Elizabeth have recently transported back to the United States under reverse lend-lease the first large contingents of American veterans, of the European campaigns. These vessels alone have transported more than a million American troops, and other British liners have similarly been placed at our disposal.
From October 1942 when United States troops began to arrive in the United Kingdom in large numbers, our troops in Britain received approximately three-quarters of their total medical requirements as reverse lend-lease. In addition to medicines of all kinds, surgical dressings, instruments and apparatus, hospitals and recreation centers were also provided.
The two-way supply program still continued after Germany’s surrender. Although German guns no longer fired upon allied soldiers, the United Kingdom continued to make available as reciprocal aid supplies, services, and facilities to American forces in the Far East and to American war production, as well as to our forces of occupation in Europe and our forces in the British Isles and on the Continent awaiting redeployment.
The combined system of lend-lease and reverse lend-lease which contributed so much to the victory over Germany was employed fully and effectively in the war against Japan.
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Chapter 3
THE SOVIET UNION
On August 8 the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan. As America’s mighty navy and air force, made overwhelmingly more formidable by the atomic bomb, struck at the Nipponese homeland, Soviet Far Eastern forces—3 months after the defeat of Germany—crossed the Manchurian border into Jap-dominated Manchukuo.
Never before in history had such a combination of military power confronted an enemy. Only immediate capitulation could prevent the utter annihilation of the Japanese Empire by the allied forces.
The same lend-lease strategy that helped to make the allies victorious over Hitlerite Europe was an integral part of our plans for the combined offensives against Japan. As lend-lease munitions and supplies lent speed and striking power to the Soviet armies in their great drives on the Eastern Front in Europe, the planes, landing mats, food, transportation
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO U. S. S. R.
Thousands of Dollars
Jan.-Mar. 1945 Apr.-June 1945 Cumulative to July 1,1945
Ordnance and ammunition. •.. 22,376 12,776 809,580
Aircraft and parts 85,804 87,988 1,583,827
Tanks and parts 36*416 18'221 478Í394
Motor vehicles and parts 99^086 165*942 1,322,933
Watercraft 16,760 12,634 267,610
All munitions 260,442 297,561 4,462,344
Petroleum products 13'237 19^098 '103,975
Industrial materials and prod-
ucts 261,966 247,189 2,946,336
Agricultural products 128*902 143^203 1,616*220
Total 664,547 707,051 9,128,875
Table 6
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equipment and other war supplies which we sent to Soviet Siberia for the Soviet Far Eastern army were effectively used against the vaunted Kwantung army to hasten the day of final victory.
Since the beginning of the lend-lease program for the U. S. S. R. in the fall of 1941 through June 30, 1945, the United States had shipped lend-lease goods valued at $9,129,000,000, which amounted to 28 percent of the total sent to all our allies. The total value of lend-lease aid supplied to the Soviet Union for the war against the aggressors has been second only to that supplied to the United Kingdom. In the second quarter of this year, lend-lease exports to the U. S. S. R. exceeded those shipped to the United Kingdom.
By the end of June we had shipped to the Soviet armies munitions valued at $4,462,000,000, which accounted for 49 percent of total lend-lease shipments to our Soviet ally. Airplanes, parts and spare engines constituted the largest single group of munitions, amounting to $1,584,000,000. More than 14,450 planes, including 9,700 pursuit planes and 3,800 bombers, had left this country for the Soviet Union by June 30, 1945. We also shipped more than 47,700,000 square feet of aircraft landing mats,, equivalent to 60 miles of landing strip, 150 feet wide.
Lend-lease made a substantial contribution to the striking power and mobility of the Red Army by providing 7,000 tanks, 3,200 armored scout cars, 2,200 ordnance service vehicles, 52,000 jeeps, 363,000 trucks, and 35,000 motorcycles. Other muntions sent under lend-lease to the Soviet forces to June 30 include 8,200 antiaircraft guns, 135,000 submachine guns, 343,000 tons of explosives, 105 submarine chasers, 195 torpedo boats, and 7,600 marine Diesel engines.
Many of the munitions which we exported under lend-lease to the U. S. S. R. for the war against Germany were used by the Soviet armies in the war against Japan. The speed and crushing power which characterized the Soviet offensives on the Eastern Front were again demonstrated in the drives on the Japanese Kwantung Army.
When the German Wehrmacht overran the Ukraine and the rich industrial areas of southwestern Russia in an attempt to carve out of the Soviet Union a Nazi empire stretching to the Urals, a large part of Soviet industry, which was not destroyed by the Nazis or by the Russians under their scorched-earth policy, was moved inland. Industrial cities and modern factories rose in Soviet Siberia, far from the reach of the Luftwaffe.
To help this Soviet military program and to aid in the expansion of Soviet munitions production, the United States lend-leased large quantities of industrial machinery and equipment to the U. S. S. R. Machine tools valued at $320,000,000, additional metal-cutting tools worth $35,000,000, petroleum-refining equipment having a value of $43,000,000, and $171,-000,000 worth of electric generator sets have been supplied under lend-lease for the Soviet production to defeat the Axis. Lend-lease metal exports
22
include 2,688,000 tons of steel, 17,600 tons of ferro-alloys, and 810,000 tons of nonferrous metals.
Soviet war factories and resources supplied by far the greater needs of the Russian armies in Europe and of the Soviet Far Eastern armies. But lend-lease munitions and industrial products and materials have been essential ingredients in the victories achieved against the Nazis by the Soviet forces. Soviet Far Eastern armies, with the aid of lend-lease munitions and supplies, also pinned down powerful divisions of the Kwantung Army along the Manchurian border, which the Japanese were consequently not able to divert against American, Chinese, and other allied forces. Later planes and guns and tanks and ammunition, made with Soviet and lend-lease materials, struck telling blows in the Soviet offensives against the Japanese.
When VE-day was proclaimed shipments of lend-lease supplies to European Russia, with certain minor exceptions, ended. Lend-lease aid to the the Soviet Far East was continued. In the period from VE-day until the Soviet declaration of war against Japan, lend-lease exports to the Soviet Far East consisted of war materials and food needed to support the Soviet Far Eastern armies.
The total value of reverse lend-lease aid provided by the U. S. S. R. to the United States to April 1, 1945, is placed at $2,139,000. Inasmuch as American troops have not been stationed in the Soviet Union, there has been little occasion for the extension of reverse lend-lease aid to our armed forces by this ally. However, American merchant ships in Soviet ports have been repaired and provided with supplies as reverse lend-lease without cash expenditure by us. Also, during the height of the attack against Germany, when American pilots based in the United Kingdom were blasting Nazi war plants on shuttle raids, the Soviet Union under reverse lend-lease made available bases at which our planes obtained supplies, and the air-force crews and mechanics were given food and various services.
23
Chapter 4
CHINA AND INDIA
China
The Japanese sea blockade of China, the occupation of Chinese coastal areas, and the closing of the Burma Road seriously hindered the flow of lend-lease and other supplies and equipment to our Chinese ally. The allied supply line to China has been through India. In one of the epic feats of the war, American and allied pilots flew supplies from India “over the Hump’ ’ to China on the most dangerous air routes in the world to keep American and Chinese bases supplied. Deliveries by air reached a level of more than three times the maximum monthly tonnage ever delivered over the old Burma Road. It was recently announced that the United States Army Air Forces in one day carried in 5,327 tons of freight.
LEND-LEASE SHIPMENTS TO CHINA
TOTAL SHIPMENTS TO JULY 1,1945: $397,000,000
Lend-lease helps China in two ways: munitions increase the effectiveness of the Chinese army; transportation and industrial equipment helps China increase her war production.
FEA
Chart 5
Lend-lease shipments to China through June 30, 1945, were valued at $397 million, including military supplies consigned to the United States Commanding General for subsequent transfer under lend-lease. These exports were in addition to the maintenance and replacement items for both ground and air forces which were shipped by the War Department to
24
maintain stocks for the United States Air Service Command and Services of Supply in India and China. When any of these supplies were delivered to the Chinese Air Force and Army they were recorded as lend-lease aid.
In anticipation of further continued improvement in the supply lines into China, the procurement program for lend-lease supplies other than munitions was being stepped up as the war ended. Heavy emphasis was being placed upon efforts to improve China’s internal transportation system in preparation for a large scale offensive upon the mainland of Asia should that be necessary. Increasing amounts of raw materials and industrial equipment needed to expand Chinese production of war supplies were also being transported over the long supply line for the same purposes.
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO CHINA* Thousands of Dollars
Jan.-Mar. 1945 Apr.-June 1945 Cumulative to July 1, 1945
Ordnance and ammunition.... △ ¡rrrnft nnn nnrts 4 756 9 3,568 22,956 110,498
1 ank$ Qiia pairs Motor vehicles and parts 5,504 11,110 37,503
YY arercrarr
All munitions 6,264 11 14,687 170,957
Poiroloiim nmnucts 146 1,787
Industrial materials and prod- □cts 449 508 25,158
97
AAyricu11urai piuuucij Total 6,724 15,341 197,999
*The above table shows goods exported to China under direct lend-lease. In addition/ munitions and war supplies valued at $198,646,000 have been consigned to United States Commanding Generals for transfer to China under lend-lease. We nave .also supplied to China certain items in this country, such as trainer planes used in training Chinese pilots in the United States, which are not included in either exports or consignments. _ . .
Table 7
Under lend-lease we were conducting a program to train in the United States a diversified group of Chinese technicians in American transportation and industrial techniques. The program provided for short, intensified periods of training to enable these men to use their newly acquired knowledge and techniques to intensify the Chinese war effort. By the end of August a group of 600 will have finished its training and returned to China.
662505—45-
25
4
China has required in her own direct war effort all the supplies she could produce in addition to what has been provided on lend-lease. She has not therefore been in a position to furnish reverse lend-lease to our forces in any considerable quantity. However, the services of hundreds of thousands of workmen were provided for the construction of air bases in China. The Chinese, under reverse lend-lease, provided food and lodging to some of our military forces stationed in China and turned over the P-40 fighter planes that remained when General Chennault’s Flying Tigers were disbanded in 1942. The $3,672,000 of the reverse lend-lease reported as received from China represents only the agreed value of these planes.
India
With the heightened tempo of the Pacific war, the role of India increased greatly. India was a supply base for the Southeast Asia Command, which directed the allied armies in Burma and north Borneo, and was a terminal for the movement of materials of war into China. Her urgent need of transportation facilities and industrial and agricultural supplies expanded accordingly. By means of lend-lease the United States helped to meet many of India’s needs and strengthened the striking power of the allied forces in the far flung China-Burma-India theater.
Total lend-lease shipments to India from the beginning of the program through June 30, 1945, amounted to $2,033,385,000.
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO INDIA*
Thousands of Dollars
Jan.-Mar. 1945 Apr.-June 1945 Cumulative to July 1, 1945
Ordnance and ammunition.... Aircraft and parts. Tanks and parts Motor vehicles and parts Watercraft 6,817 44,883 1,505 28,155 4,050 10,834 41,422 3,904 37,269 19,574 248,644 507,874 125,946 305,967 61,420
All munitions Petroleum products Industrial materials and products Agricultural products 85,410 38,795 46,981 15,447 113,003 32,644 31,039 15,407 1,249,851 149,292 471,138 163,104
Total 186,633 192,093 2,033,385
♦Includes Ceylon, Burma, and British Malaya.
Table 8
26
The major share of these shipments was munitions. Aircraft represented one-quarter of the dollar value of all lend-lease materials sent to India; tanks and vehicles amounted to more than 20 percent; and ordnance 12 percent. With the help of this equipment, Indian and British troops drove the Japanese out of Burma, a country larger in size than Germany.
United States industrial equipment has been of vital assistance to the war program of India since the beginning of the lend-lease program. Modern machinery and tools were required to make full use of the vast capacity of India’s factories and mills for the production of weapons and other war materials. Food-processing equipment has been supplied to help increase food production. Through June 30, we had sent industrial materials and products valued at $471,000,000, which represents more than 23 percent of total lend-lease exports to India.
India’s transportation, coal production, and dock facilities were not adequate to support the allied campaigns in this theater and the other demands of the war. Through lend-lease, the United States has provided locomotives and other equipment which have helped India effectively to carry the tremendous quantities of war materials required in the allied war effort. India’s ports have proved extremely valuable, for example, in the movement of war materials, like jute and mica, provided under reverse lend-lease for war plants in the United States for manufacture into vital war products, such as communication equipment and rope, for the American
REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID IN INDIA*
Thousands of Dollars
Category Cumulative to April 1, 1945
Copitol installations 121,148
Foodstuffs 36,427
Clothing . .. 7,045
Pptrolptim and coal products 248,435
Air Fore* supplies ond equipment 8,630
Other military supplies and equipment 46,638
Shipping and other transportation 34,153
Other services 14,237
Total .... 516,713
*Provided both by the United Kingdom and the Government of India. Based on estimates by the United States Army.
(Conversion from Indian rupee: 330.44= $100.)
Table 9
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forces. Under reverse lend-lease, India produced these strategic materials, transported them to shipside and provided loading facilities. The United States under lend-lease provided hauling and transportation equipment. We have also supplied large quantities of tire-making materials to enable Indian plants to produce tires for military vehicles.
Steel drum sheets provided under lend-lease for the production in India of gasoline containers were an important factor in the transportation of gasoline to the allied fighting forces throughout Burma, and also for transportation of gasoline “over the Hump” of the Himalayas to American and allied forces in China. The combination of American steel and Indian manpower in the construction of these containers resulted in a highly effective system of oil transport throughout the theater which has now been supplemented by an oil pipe line into China.
Our forces in India have been provided with substantial amounts of supplies, facilities, and services as reverse lend-lease, without cash payment by us. The most recent figures available, covering the period ended March 31, 1945, indicate that the Indian Government and the British forces in India provided assistance valued at $516,713,000. In the first 3 months of this year alone, we received reverse lend-lease aid in India valued at $104,744,000.
The major part of this aid has consisted of military supplies and equipment and construction. Harbor facilities in Indian ports have been made available to American ships without cost, and expenses in connection with the handling of petroleum products consigned to the United States forces in India have been borne by the Indian Government as reverse lend-lease. Our troops have been provided with 628,000,000 pounds of food valued at $36,427,000.
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Chapter 5
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
Australia and New Zealand,with the help of lend-lease aid, were fully geared for an all-out effort in the war against Japan. In addition to production for their own armed forces, who had fought in extensive campaigns against both Germany and Japan, Australia and New Zealand have furnished large quantities of reverse lend-lease supplies to our armed forces in the Southwest Pacific and the Philippines. Our armed forces in the Pacific have received under reverse lend-lease from Australia and New Zealand 90 percent as much beef and veal as we have exported under lend-lease to all countries.
Australia
Lend-lease exports from the United States to Australia from the beginning of the program to July 1, 1945, amounted to $1,169,260,000. Exports in the first half of 1945 were valued at $189,901,000.
The declining trend in lend-lease aid to Australia, despite her important role in the war against Japan, was accounted for by Australia’s increased domestic production made possible by lend-lease equipment received from the
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO AUSTRALIA
COMPARED WITH REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID FROM AUSTRALIA CUMULATIVE TO APRIL I, 1945
FEA
Chart 6
29
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO AUSTRALIA* Thousands oí Dollars
Jan.-Mar. 1945 Apr.-June 1945 Cumulative to July 1, 1945
Ordnance and Ammunition... 5,656 5,985 112,210
Aircraft and parts 33,339 65,609 364 425
Tanks and parts 41 185
Motor vehicles and parts 9,884 10,701 179 J 00
Watercraft. 1,147 4,588 14,445
All munitions 50 026 86 883 711 365
Petroleum products. 4361 6344 134 054
Industrial materials and prod-
ucts 17 655 17 308 285 040
Agricultural products 2372 4352 38,801
Total 75,114 114,787 1,169,260
includes British Oceania, and New Guinea
Table 10
United States early in the war; current reduction of stocks on hand; and the supplying of Australia with military goods on a replacement rather than an initial supply basis.
Lend-lease goods supplied Australia included munitions and military equipment, petroleum products, trucks, synthetic rubber for tires, wood-pulp and paper used in part for packaging the food sent to United States troops by Australia, farm machinery and food processing machinery to increase Australian food production, tin plate for canning, and some tobacco for the Australian armed forces.
The total value of reverse lend-lease aid furnished by Australia to April 1, 1945, amounted to $791,282,000. This compares with $1,054,473,000 worth of lend-lease exports to Australia by the same date. Shipping costs and other lend-lease services furnished to Australia are not included in the export statistics.
Food has continued to be a major reverse lend-lease contribution by Australia to United States forces. As of April 1, 1945, Australia had supplied nearly 200 million dollars worth of food to our troops in the Pacific, thereby relieving the strain on United States food supplies and shipping. This included 372,600,000 pounds of meat and fish, 293,200,000 pounds of dairy products, 714,900,000 pounds of fruits and vegetables, 150,900,000 pounds of sugar and sirups, and 590,600,000 pounds of other foods.
30
REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID FROM AUSTRALIA
Thousands of Dollars
Category Cumulative to April 1,1945
Capital installations ». Foodstuffs Air Force supplies and equipment Other military supplies and equipment Shipping and other transportation Other services 143,309 199,720 62,872 153,727 216,689 14,965
Total 791,282
(Conversion from Australian pound at $3.23.)
Table 11
New Zealand
Through June 30, 1945, lend-lease supplies shipped to New Zealand totaled $209,438,000 of which only 12.6 percent was shipped during the last year. Lend-lease exports to New Zealand have declined from a peak quarterly value of 29 million dollars in the second quarter of 1943 to a value of only 5 million dollars in the first quarter of 1945.
Munitions accounted for 52 percent of total shipments in the last year; the balance consisted of petroleum, and products and materials for industrial and agricultural uses which were required by New Zealand to keep running at top efficiency the war plant developed in part with materials previously supplied under lend-lease.
The total value of reverse lend-lease aid furnished by New Zealand by May 1,1945 was $189,003,000, including services and the use of hospitals and other buildings, as well as goods supplied to our armed forces. This compares with $204,693,000 of lend-lease exports of goods to New Zealand by the same date. Shipping costs and other lend-lease services furnished to New Zealand are not included in the export statistics. -
New Zealand’s principal contribution as reverse lend-lease has been food for our fighting forces. Four days after the first landing of United States Marines on Iwo Jima, food and other supplies from New Zealand were delivered to the beachheads. Food constituted 69 percent of the value of total reverse lend-lease aid from New Zealand during the 12 months ending March 31, 1945. Meats and dairy products make up more than half of the 905 million pounds of foodstuffs received. Other foods included 72 million pounds of sugar and sirups.
31
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO NEW ZEALAND
Thousands of Dollars
Jan.-Mar. 1945 Apr.-June 1945 Cumulative to July 1, 1945
Ordnance and ammunition. .. . 104 238 33,310
Aircraft and parts 1,305 1,497 48,900
Tanks and parts 14,109
Motor vehicles and parts..... 1,035 1,395 26*056
Watorcroft 2,445
AH munitions 2,444 3,130 124,820
Petroleum products 546 1^598 15*601
Industrial materials and prod-
ucts 1,922 1,551 62,971
Agricultural products '388 '365 6*046
Total 5,300 6,644 209,438
Table 12
REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID FROM NEW ZEALAND
Thousands of Dollars
Category Cumulative to May 1,1945
Capital installations , 25,559
Foodstuffs 102,142
Clothing 8 J 34
Petroleum and coal products 3*282
Air Force supplies and equipment 678
Other military supplies and equipment 22,737
Shipping and other transportation 11,124
Other services 15,347
Total 189,003
(Conversion from New Zeland pound at $3.25.)
Table 13
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Chapter 6
CONTINENTAL EUROPE
French and Dutch forces have fought with American and other allied forces against the Japanese in the Far East. French naval units including the battleship Richelieu, refitted under lend-lease in American ports, have for some time been operating in the war against Japan. Dutch fliers trained in the United States under lend-lease have been flying in the Pacific, and Dutch ground forces.participated in the campaigns in the Netherlands East Indies.
Subsequent to their liberation, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands placed their material resources, as well as their fighting men, at the disposal of the United Nations, which have received under reverse lend-lease from these countries millions of dollars worth of supplies and services which were essential to the final victory over Nazi Germany.
These countries have continued to be important bases of allied military activities in Europe. Their ports and transportation facilities, severely damaged as the result of enemy action and the bombings and offensives of the liberating allied forces, their production facilities and the services of thousands of their civilians are indispensable to the redeployment of millions of American and other allied forces and their equipment and to the support of our forces of occupation. Lend-lease aid to these countries has helped to increase the effectiveness of their assistance in our military tasks of redeployment and occupation.
France
Total lend-lease aid from March 1941 through June 30,1945, to the French • in all areas totaled $1,205 million, of which $396 million was supplied in the first half of this year. Of this amount, France has paid or is committed to pay for approximately $400 million worth of essential civilian supplies, sent principally to French Africa.
The supplies and services included in the lend-lease program for continental France enabled our ally to provide more effectively the goods and services indispensable to our military operations on the Continent and in the Far East. In the second quarter of this year, lend-lease food products amounted to 40 percent in tonnage of total shipments to France in this
33
quarter and included soybeans, legumes, rice, lard, condensed milk, wheat, sugar, corn, and cattle feed; agricultural raw materials, including cotton, wool, and jute products, accounted for 13 percent of the total; drugs and medical supplies, 3 percent; equipment and industrial raw materials, including agricultural machinery, trucks and boats, tires and tubes, chemicals, paper, metals and minerals, iron and steel products, tinplate, barracks and building materials, 44 percent. Long-life items having a potential postwar use are paid for by France, 20 percent down and the remainder over a period of 30 years.
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO FRANCE *
Thousands of Dollars
Jan.-Mar. 1945 Apr.-June 1945 Cumulative to July 1, 1945
Ordnance and ammunition.... 2,924 7,363 18,733
Aircraft and parts 369
Tanks and parts 475 475
Motor vehicles and parts 4 259 4 781 10 980
Watercraft 4534 4512 9/46
All munitions 12117 17 131 40 003
Petroleum products 1 ' 15 16
Industrial materials and prod-
ucts 9 171 17 618 31 176
Agricultural products 23,645 37504 63,524
Total 44,934 72,668 134,719
*The above fable shows only the value of lend-lease goods shipped to metropolitan France since its liberation. Total lend-lease aid to France, including aid to the French forces and civilian population in French Africa and including the goods sent to U. S. Commanding Generals for transfer to the French forces, amounted to $1,205,000,000 to July 1, 1945.
Table 14
The value of total reverse lend-lease aid supplied by France from D-day to January 31, 1945, according to figures furnished by the French Government, amounted to approximately $200 million. Complete figures for later periods are not yet available.
Under reverse lend-lease, nearly 3 million American troops which landed in France between D-day and VE-day were billeted and transported on French railways without cash expenditure by the United States. Under reverse lend-lease, the French also provided and paid the labor to unload the ships in the harbors and furnished the warehouses to shelter the goods and the railway cars to transport men and materials, goods, and ammuni
34
tion. They also furnished under reverse lend-lease the manpower to build airfields, barracks, and military camps. French industry has repaired large quantities of war matériel such as tanks and trucks, and made uniforms and an immense variety of other articles indispensable to the United States Army.
The total number of persons employed in France by the United States Army increased from about 25,000 in September 1944 to more than 150,000 in January 1945. The French Government paid these workers as reverse lend-lease aid.
Belgium
Antwerp is the most important single port of embarkation for American men and matériel, and great quantities of goods and services have been furnished by the Belgians to our armed forces under reverse lend-lease without payment by us.
The lend-lease program for Belgium has included essential civilian supplies and short-life equipment necessary for the support of our military activities. Two hundred six thousand long tons of lend-lease materials with a value of $42,057,000 had been shipped to Belgium by June 30, 1945.
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG
Thousands of Dollars
Jan.-Mar. 1945 Apr.-June 1945 Cumulative to July 1,1945
Ordnance and ammunition....
Aircraft and parts
Tanks and parts
Motor vehicles and parts 4 81 85
Watercraft
All munitions
4 81 85
Petroleum products
Industrial materials and prod- ucts 257 6,161 4,408 31,146 4,665 37,307
Agricultural products
Total
6,422 35,635 42,057
Table 15
35
The bulk of these shipments was composed of foodstuffs and other agricultural supplies, mainly stock feeds. These shipments, together with shipments sponsored by the military forces, were instrumental in raising the official Belgian food ration from its near-starvation ratio of 1,400 calories and in increasing the working efficiency of the Belgian civilians. The shipments of stock feeds under lend-lease helped to avoid the necessity for destroying the underfed Belgian cattle herds which would have resulted in a heavy drain on outside sources of meat, including the United States, for many years to come. Small quantities of clothing and shoes were shipped to Belgium under lend-lease for distribution to dock and transport workers whose labor has been essential to the operations of our forces.
As of May 1, the Belgian Government officially reported reverse lend-lease aid to the United States amounting to $26,117,000 including aid from the Belgian Congo. It has been estimated, however, that because of arrears in reporting, about $53 million of reverse lend-lease aid had been provided as of that date and about $90 million as of May 31. In addition to the services of thousands of its workers, Belgium has provided to the United States Army steel in finished and semifinished form, coal, chemicals, photographic equipment, and nonferrous metals. It has also produced enamelware, paper and glassware in substantial quantities for our troops, and Belgian industry has aided in the reconditioning of Army' vehicles. The reconditioning program for vehicles in Belgium has proved highly successful and has been a major factor in speeding up the redeployment of troops through Belgium.
The Netherlands
Lend-lease shipments to the Netherlands through June 30,1945, amounted to $1,550,000. In addition, 120,000 tons of supplies valued at $20,735,000 were being processed during May and June for the Dutch, although they had not been shipped as of June 30. Among the urgently needed supplies which the program included were food and medical items, to supplement the supplies brought in by the military forces, for the prevention of disease and starvation which would endanger the health and safety of the allied forces. When the Germans surrendered, caloric intake in the most densely populated sections was down to 500 per day. Starvation was rampant and epidemics of typhus and other diseases resulting from malnutrition were being reported.
Fertilizers, farm machinery, seeds, and other agricultural items were also being procured for shipment as fast as possible from the United States in order to restore food production. About 500,000 acres of the most fertile farmland in the Netherlands were flooded by the Nazis before retreating.
Two of the worst bottlenecks affecting military activities in the Netherlands as in the rest of Europe—have been coal and transport. While the coal mines in South Limburg Province were liberated at an early date and
36
were relatively untouched by the Germans, conveyer belting needed for coal production had been almost completely worn out. Coal production consequently fell at its lowest point to less than 20 percent of the prewar figure and continues at present at around 40 percent of the prewar rate. To remedy this situation 430 tons of belting were ordered in this country, and this is expected, together with the necessary pitprops also being furnished, to increase Dutch output of coal by about 6 million tons annually—or to about double the present figure. Such a coal increase will in turn start the wheels of industry moving once again and increase production of supplies required by allied occupation forces.
Steps had been taken to alleviate the transportation crisis in the Netherlands. Approximately 1,700 excess U. S. Army trucks were transferred. Railroad operations were almost completely stopped by the Germans in retaliation for the strike of Dutch railroad workers at General Eisenhower’s request. Rails had been torn up and locomotives and rolling stock removed to Germany. Waterways which formerly carried 60 percent of the country’s freight are blocked by sunken barges and destroyed bridges.
The Dutch have not yet supplied any substantial amounts of reverse lend-lease to the United States for three reasons: it was one of the last continental countries to be liberated; it was not within the American theater of military operations; and its shipping facilities were so thoroughly destroyed that the principal ports have only recently become usable. Reverse lend-lease aid to us from the Netherlands through March 31 amounted to $1,133,000. In addition Curasao and Surinam provided reverse lend-lease aid amounting to $575,000 through April 30. A considerable quantity of petroleum from the recently liberated island of Tarakan off Borneo has also been provided under reverse lend-lease.
Italy
During the last phases of the war against Germany, Italy was a cobelligerent of the United States and Italian troops were fighting alongside our troops. Italy also declared war on Japan.
Italy has not, however, been declared eligible to receive aid under the Lend-Lease Act and no aid has been furnished by the United States to the Italian Government on lend-lease terms.
The United States Army has had the responsibility for furnishing the supplies required to maintain the minimum standards of subsistence in Italy necessary to military security and the redeployment and occupation activities of our armed forces. The responsibility for financing this program, however, was recently shifted from the War Department to the Foreign Economic Administration. In the lend-lease program for which Congress recently appropriated funds, $100 million were included for the purchase of foodstuffs and other items required for distribution in Italy. These supplies were for transfer to the Army, which was to administer the program and supervise the distribution of supplies.
37
Considerable quantities of goods were shipped to Italy under lend-lease in the period between the invasion of Italy and the fall of Germany. All of these goods, however, were supplied to the British forces stationed there as lend-lease aid to the United Kingdom.
38
Chapter 7
LEND-LEASE AND THE PEACE
Lend-lease to our allies has been provided for the sole purpose of winning the war in the shortest time and with the least loss of American and other allied lives. These primary benefits to the United States from lend-lease have been amply demonstrated in the defeat of Nazi Germany and in the victory over Japan.
To win the lasting peace for which we and our allies have so bitterly and bloodily fought, we and the other United Nations are firmly resolved to establish in concert the political and economic conditions which are the foundation of freedom and welfare among the nations of the earth. To achieve this end, and in order that we shall not lose the fruits of our own efforts, the settlements for the lend-lease aid we have provided our allies and for the reverse lend-lease aid they have provided us must fully recognize the great benefits of achieving victory for which lend-lease was created, must satisfy the common-sense requirements of justice among allies, and must promote mutually advantageous economic relations between the United States and other nations.
Benefits to the United States from Lend-Lease
In the original enactment of the Lend-Lease Act, the American people decided through their representatives in Congress that economic assistance by the United States to the governments resisting the Axis aggressors should take the form not of money loans—which was the method used in World War I, with disastrous political and economic consequences—but should take the form of direct war supply assistance. The Lend-Lease Act was entitled, and was envisaged as, an Act to Promote the Defense of the United States. It recognized the fact that the defense of the freedom-loving nations against the aggressors was vital to the defense of the United States, and that it was in our own national interest to furnish aid to these nations for use in their defense. The act provided -that the terms and conditions upon which any foreign government receives lend-lease aid should be “those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.”
Since the enactment of the Lend-Lease Act and the subsequent attack and declaration of war on the United States by the aggressors, the world-wide pattern of lend-lease and reverse lend-lease has been developed as an essential part of the common war effort of the United Nations.
39
Very great benefits have already been received by the United States and further benefits are assured from the lend-lease aid we have furnished to the other United Nations.
The principal and overriding benefit is the defeat of the aggressors. The speeding of victory and the saving of American lives which have flowed from the use of lend-lease aid by the armed forces and war workers of the other United Nations have been the fundamental objectives of the lend-lease system.
A second great benefit is the reverse lend-lease aid which has been furnished by the other United Nations from their own resources for use by the United States against our common enemies. The reverse lend-lease supply of essential goods and services not available in the United States or most effectively made available by our allies has been a vital factor in strengthening our own armed forces and industrial war effort.
Comparative War Expenditures
The United States has benefited greatly from lend-lease and reverse lend-lease aid, as the facts set forth in this report indicate. But we have benefited far more, and in a far larger sense, from the total fighting effort of our allies, as they in turn have benefited in a far larger sense from our fighting effort.
The United States, which has by far the greatest industrial capacity, has been able to make available to its allies much larger quantities than if has received of munitions and other war supplies, while still retaining the greatest part of its own output for our own armed forces. At the same time, however, the bulk of the munitions and other supplies used by our allies in the war effort have been produced from their own resources, frequently with the vital help of lend-lease aid.
The costs of mutual aid—of lend-lease and reverse lend-lease—are only a small part of the war expenditures even of those nations which have contributed most heavily to their allies in the form of supplies. For example, 15 percent of the war expenditures of the United States have been for lend-lease. These expenditures have not been less effective in promoting the defense of the United States and bringing nearer the ultimate defeat of the enemy than has the 85 percent of our war production which has been used by our armed forces.
The decision as to whether one of the United Nations is to use directly the whole of its production or is to send a part of it to its allies has been made by the military authorities in the light of the over-all war and supply situation without regard to purely financial considerations. The particular contributions of our major fighting partners have differed with the circumstances of war and the resources that are available.
Some countries, like Russia and China, whose productive facilities were overrun or destroyed, have used in the war all they could produce, and have supplied the manpower and the courage to use all the goods and munitions
40
that their allies could send them, with magnificent effect against the enemy. The United Kingdom, despite heavy destruction and loss of life from blitz air raids and robot bombs, served as a base for the air offensive against Germany and for the invasion of the Continent. With the material aid of her allies, she has also been able to produce great quantities of war supplies for the use of the forces of the United States, the Soviet Union and other United Nations, as well as of her own forces.
WAR EXPENDITURES IN PERCENT OF NATIONAL INCOME
Notional income statistics are for net national income, at market prices.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
Chart 7
41
The over-all costs of the war cannot be measured in dollars. They must be and have been met in blood and toil, in lives lost and men maimed, in the immeasurable wreckage of human lives and happiness and the destruction of homes and cities. These are the costs of war that can never be evaluated in monetary terms.
To the extent that the cost of each nation’s contribution to the war can be measured in financial terms, probably the best measurement is the proportion of its national income which each of the United Nations is devoting to the war. Trends of war expenditures of several nations as percentages of their national income are shown in Chart 7« These ratios were prepared in the Foreign Economic Administration on the basis of the best and most recent information available. Obviously the accuracy and reliability of such measurements vary from year to year and country to country. In view of the great imperfections in the basic data, the ratios shown in the chart should be regarded as general approximations of trends and magnitudes rather than as. exact statistical measurements.
From 1939 when the war broke out in Europe until we were attacked at Pearl Harbor in 1941, the principal nations of the British Commonwealth and the U. S. S. R. were spendingmuch larger portions of theirnational income for war purposes than the United States was spending for defense purposes. By 1943, the United States, the principal nations of the British Common-wealth and the U. S. S. R. were spending about one-half of their income on war, including their spending for lend-lease and reverse lend-lease. Thus, after 1942 the relative financial costs of the war contributions of the United States and our principal allies were, for practical purposes, approximately equal.
Such a distribution of the financial costs of the war means that no nation can grow rich, or benefit unfairly, from the war efforts of its allies. Although the nations richest in resources make larger contributions in absolute terms, the financial costs of war for each will still be relatively the same. On this basis each ally fulfills its responsibility to contribute its full measure to the defeat of the enemy, and the money costs of war will fall according to the rule of equality of sacrifice and equality in effort.
The Economic Foundations of Peace
In winning the war against the aggressors who sought to enslave the world, we look forward to a lasting period of freedom and economic welfare, in which self-governing men everywhere may freely live as they choose and in which there will be full and useful production and employment in all nations. To win such an enduring peace, we must, in cooperation with the other United Nations, establish mutually advantageous economic relationships between nations. Toward this end, we have sought and shall continue to seek high levels of commerce and stable monetary exchange relationships. These aims have been affiimed by the Congress in the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1945 and in the Bretton Woods legislation.
42
These aims are also affirmed in the reciprocal obligations established under Article VII of the Master Lend-Lease Agreements made with the principal lend-lease governments.
Additional great peacetime benefits from lend-lease aid are thus contemplated as a result of the pledges made in Article VII that agreed action shall be sought by all countries of like mind, directed to the expansion of production, employment and the exchange and consumption of goods, to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers, and in general to the attainment of the economic objectives of the Atlantic Charter.
By this undertaking, we have declared our intention to avoid the political and economic mistakes of our debt policy in and after World War I. The overwhelming portion of lend-lease aid, which now totals over $42 billion, has been directly consumed by our allies in the war. Invaluable though such lend-lease aid has been to our allies and to us in the common war effort, it differs from articles furnished in normal commerce in that it has not created the wherewithal to repay. If a debt approaching the magnitude of $42 billion were to be added to the other enormous financial obligations that foreign governments have incurred for war purposes and must necessarily incur hereafter for rehabilitation and reconstruction of their war devastated countries, it would have a disastrous effect upon our trade with the United Nations and hence upon production and employment at home. Debts of such magnitudes would drive our chief fighting partners into desperate measures like those developed before the war by the Axis for the forcing of export surpluses, in order to repay us. In a world thus overburdened with unproductive debts, the sound expansion of United States foreign trade and investments abroad would meet almost insuperable barriers. The resulting desperate international commercial rivalry would threaten political stability, and would help to sow the seeds of a new world conflagration.
The attainment of the long-range security and economic objectives of the United States and the other United Nations is a task of the greatest importance if we are not to lose the victory we have won at such tremendous sacrifices. We shall seek, under the procedure prescribed in the Lend-Lease Act and our subsequent lend-lease agreements with other countries, and through other appropriate national and international measures, to achieve settlements of our wartime lend-lease relations which will best attain these objectives, and which will thus establish the indispensable foundations of our economic well-being.
43
Chapter 8
STATISTICAL TABLES
LEND-LEASE AID
Millions of Dollars
Monthly Cumulative from March 11, 1941
Goods Services Total Goods Services Total
1943—January 627 55 682 7,175 1,760 8,935
February.... 656 41 697 7,831 1,801 9,632
March 663 24 687 8,494 1,825 10,319
April 720 63 783 9^214 <888 1<102
May 716 74 790 9,930 1,962 11,892
June 954 77 1,031 10,884 2,039 12,923
July 1,018 32 1,050 11 902 2 071 13 973
August Í J14 147 1 '261 13'016 2,219 15,235
September. . . 1 '121 76 <197 14/137 2,294 16X31
October 1,028 73 1,101 15,165 2,368 17,533
November. . . 971 105 1,076 16,136 2,473 18,609
December. . . 1,300 77 1,377 17,436 2,550 19,986
1944—January 1,214 45 1,259 18,650 2,595 21,245
February.... 1,124 226 1,350 19,774 2,821 22,595
March 1,406 224 1,630 21,180 3,045 24,225
April 1,266 18 1,284 22,446 3,063 25,509
May 1,160 239 1,399 23,607 3,301 26,908
June 1,212 150 1,362 24,819 3,451 28,270
July 1,308 82 1,390 26,127 3,533 29,660
August 1,009 156 1,165 27,136 3,689 30,825
September. . . 1,116 82 1,198 28,252 3,771 32,023
October 1,048 97 1,145 29,300 3,868 33,168
November. . . 856 39 895 30,156 3,907 34,063
December. . . 1,254 65 1,319 31,410 3,972 35,382
1945—January 997 179 1,176 32,407 4,151 36,558
February.... 1,407 55 1,462 33,814 4,206 38,020
March 993 *-41 952 34,807 4,165 38,972
April 902 68 970 35,709 4,233 39,942
May 846 33 879 36,555 4,266 40,821
June 886 314 1,200 37,441 4,580 42,021
*Negative figure results from adjustment to reflect downward revision in ship charter rates.
Table 16
44
LEND-LEASE AID—BY CATEGORY
Cumulative to July 1, 1945 Percent of Total Aid
Goods Transferred: Muntions: Ordnance Ammunition Aircraft Aircraft engines, parts, etc.. ... Tanks and parts Motor vehicles and parts Watercraft Total Petroleum products Industrial materials and products: Machinery Metals.., Miscellaneous materials and manufactures Total Agricultural products: Foods Other agricultural products.... Total Total transfers Services Rendered: Rental of ships, etc Servicing, repair of ships, etc Production facilities in U. S Miscellaneous expenses Total services Total direct aid Consignment to United States commanding generals for subsequent transfer under lend-lease $1,291,672,000 2,652,458,000 4,967,466,000 2,543,882,000 3,542,997,000 2,074,751,000 3,618,336,000 3.1 6.3 11.8 6.1 8.4 4.9 8.6
20,691,562,000 2,184,730,000 49.2 5.2.
2,180,020,000 2,069,780,000 4,407,914,000 5.2 4.9 10.5
8,657,714,000 20.6
5,094,724,000 811,742,000 12.1 2.0
5,906,466,000 14.1
37,440,472,000 89.1
3,268,092,000 570,433,000 634,210,000 107,572,000 7.8 1.4 1.5 .2
4,580,307,000 10.9
42,020,779,000 788,603,000 100.0
•
Table 17
45
LEND-LEASE AID IN PERCENT OF TOTAL U. S. WAR EXPENDITURES
Monthly Cumulative from beginning of war program
1943—January 11 5 19 7
February 12 1 19 7
March 10 2 19 4
April... 11 2 19 4
May 11 1 19 3
June■.' 13 1 19 4
July 16 3 19 6
August 17 4 19 9
September 17 2 13 1
October 15 8 13 3
November 14 3 13 3
December 20 5 13 7
1944““January 17 6 13 8
February 18 0 14 0
March 21 1 14 4
April • 17 5 14 5
May 17 8 14 6
June 18 0 14 8
July 19 3 14 9
August 15 4 14 9
September : 17 1 15 0
October 15 3 15 0
November 12 1 14 9
December 17 6 15 0
1945—January 15 6 15 0
February 21 0 15 2
March 11 5 15 1
April 13 6 15 0
May 10 8 14 9
June 153 14.9
Table 18
46
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS—CUMULATIVE TO JULY 1, 1945 Millions of Dollars
United Kingdom U. S. S. R. China, India, Australia, and New Zealand Other countries Total
Munitions:
Ordnance 638 325 175 385 1 593
Ammunition 1 301 484 243 504 9 539
Aircraft and parts 2/03 1,584 1,032 1,464 6,483
Tanks and parts 1,047 478 181 687 9 3Q3
Motor vehicles and
parts 704 1 323 548 579 3 1 54
Watercraft 692 268 ~78 94 1,132
Total munitions 6,785 4,462 2,257 3,713 17,217
Petroleum products. 1,479 104 301 108 1 9Q9
Industrial materials and
products:
Machinery 592 1 290 277 914 9 373
Metals 741 898 290 951 9 1 80
Other 592 759 277 363 1,991
Total industrial 1,925 2,947 844 828 6,544
Agricultural products:
Foodstuffs 2,683 1,453 166 ’ 420 4 799
Other agricultural
products. .... 627 163 42 62 894
Total agricultural
products 3,310 1,616 208 482 5,616
Total 13,499 9,129 3,610 5,131 31,369
Table 19
47
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS-BY CATEGORY Millions of Dollars
Munitions Petroleum Products Industrial Items Agric. Products Total
1943—January.. 322 27 112 93 554
February. . 292 20 112 110 534
March.... 454 24 152 153 783
April 457 28 178 121 784
May 545 30 159 121 855
June 426 32 175 158 791
July 654 49 177 155 1 035
August. . . 592 42 229 200 1^063
September. 591 43 200 207 1,041
October. . 585 36 193 181 995
November. 505 27 195 130 857
December. 654 28 198 184 1,064
1944—January... 559 37 184 144 924
February.. 575 43 172 110 900
March.... 599 42 177 133 951
April 627 58 163 139 987
May 700 73 219 200 1,192
June 578 90 222 146 1 036
July 486 80 230 139 935
August. . . 477 97 225 129 928
September. 512 83 194 164 953
October. . 445 100 191 159 895
November. 472 66 227 137 902
December. 349 69 166 102 686
1945—January... 322 78 152 98 650
February. . 320 62 140 137 659
March •• • • 335 95 155 138 723
April..... 319 95 140 147 701
May 373 84 183 148 788
June 246 76 101 106 529
Table 20
48
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS-BY COUNTRY
Millions oí Dollars
United Kingdom U. S. S. R. China, India, Australia, and New Zealand Other countries Total
1943—January .. 189 174 75 116 554
February. . 222 193 47 72 534
March.... 309 217 67 190 783
April 355 217 67 145 784
May 406 178 83 188 855
June 424 141 101 125 791
July 403 234 146 252 1,035
August ... 445 316 112 190 1,063
September. 430 308 81 222. 1,041
October . . 406 263 130 196 995
November. 271 345 87 154 857
December. 425 380 116 143 1,064
1944—January... 375 313 91 145 924
February. . 435 232 76 157 900
March.... 476 260 89 126 951
April 485 254 91 157 987
May. . . 593 315 131 153 1,192
495 286 130 125 1,036
July 398 335 87 115 935
August ... 404 305 76 143 928
September. 413 305 109 126 953
October .. 420 258 105 112 895
November. 368 299 120 115 902
December. 237 268 97 84 686
1945—January... 256 212 102 80 650
February. . 256 229 72 102 659
March.... 301 223 100 99 723
April 276 241 84 100 701
May 251 336 102 99 788
June 164 130 143 92 529
Table 21
49
LEND-LEASE EXPORTS
Exports are classified by the country to which the goods are shipped, not by the country for whose account they are shipped. The bulk of supplies exported to Egypt, for example, was for use by the British troops in North Africa and the Middle East and was charged to the United Kingdom account.
Thousands of Dollars
Jan.-Mar. 1945 Apr.-June 1945 Cumulative to July 1,1945
EUROPE: United Kingdom 813,036 690,947 1 3,498,748
U.S.S.R 664,547 707,051 9,128,875
France 44,934 72,668 134,719
Netherlands 509 1,041 1,550
Belgium and Luxembourg 6,422 35,635 42,057
Iceland 157 929 6,758
Other Countries 68,058 53,689 609,814
Total Europe 1,597,663 1,561,960 23,422,521
AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST: French Morocco 8,297 16,396 4,977 19,655 99,653 389,859
Algeria
Tunisia 5,048 4,159 20,520
Libya. * 138 112 1,293
Egypt. 70,492 43,825 1,994,670
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 46 23 13,180
French Equatorial Africa 222 '526 8,919
French West Africa 3,387 4,859 32,486
Gold Coast. 37 106 42,183
Nigeria 38 93 21,899
British West Africa 128 222 19,999
Belgian Congo 187 181 20,027
British East Africa 1,109 543 66,285
Union of South Africa 6,829 2,724 233,031
Southern Rhodesia 55 17 12,621
Other Africa 452 1,137 7,599
Turkey 26 1 103,952
. Syria 50 132 1,766
Iraq 1,276 1,421 887 160,644 62,473
Iran 1,723
Palestine and Transjordan 293 388 15,292
Other Middle East 1,995 968 6,304
Total Africa and Middle East. 117,922 87,258 3,334,655
50
FAR EAST AND OCEANIA: China 6,724 15 341 197 999
India and Ceylon 186^634 192,093 2,021,169
Burma 3,427
British Malaya 102 8,790
Netherlands Indies. 75,073 23,652
Australia 114,438 1,153,746
New Guinea 5,300 90 13,675
New Zealand 6,644 209,438
British Oceania 41 258 1,839
French Oceania 34 51 1,395
Total - 273,806 329,017 3,635,130
NORTH, CENTRAL AND SOUTH
AMERICA:
Canada..^ 26,792 17,735 618,072
Newfoundland and Labrador. .. . 43 69 2,141
Mexico 1,415 3,066 20,315
Guatemala 21,089
El Salvador 851
Honduras 7 1 313
Nicaragua. 18 12 628
Costa Rica 1 39 139
Bermuda 54 2,464
Bahamas 2,105 3,586 57,350
Cuba 95 510 4,385
Jamaica . .. . 18 105 6,895
Haiti 6 1 713
Dominican Republic 99 24 1,140
Trinidad and Tobago 551 542 27,379
Curacao 7.. . 51 15 8,086
French West Indies. 850 505 4,771
Colombia 374 17 5,285
Venezuela 222 10 2,715
Surinam 52 19 3,125
Ecuador 181 425 4,847
Peru • 1,405 13,996
Bolivia 1,095 1,106 4,392
Chile 1,094 584 20,663
Brazil... 5,942 9,161 154,286
Paraguay 22 140 1,387
Uruguay 172 1,339 5,618
Other Countries 191 214 3,558
Total 42,855 39,227 976,603
Total, All Countries 2,032,246 2,017,462 31,368,909
Table 22
51
LEND-LEASE FOOD SHIPMENTS IN PERCENT OF SUPPLY
Commodity 1942 1943 1944 Jan.-May 1945
Meats:
Beef and veal .3 1 7 7 1 2
Lamb and mutton .4 11 2 6 3 5 6
Pork . ., .. 11.8 14.6 11.0 • 12.3
Total 6.0 9.3 6.5 6.6
Manufactured dairy products:
Dry whole milk 3.7 13 1 11 5 11 1
Dry skim milk 22.5 37.4 28.6 5.9
Condensed and evaporated
milk 8.4 12 9 13 4 8 8
Butter .7 4 1 4 2 1 2
Cheese* 22 8 141 23 2 7 4
Eqqs 9 5 12 4 12 1 8 8
Edible fats and oils 11.0 16.8 15.3 14.5
Canned fish 14 6 26.5 12.7 10.0
Fruits:
Canned fruits and juices 2.4 7 2 5 9 3 7
Dried fruits 14 2 18.2 23.3 22.3
Vegetables:
Canned vegetables .7 1,3 1.9 2.0
Dried beans 4.8 12.6 8.8 14.0
Dried peas 6.1 10 2 8 6 11 9
Corn and corn products ,2 1 1 3
Wheat and wheat products .4 .9 .1 1.0
Table 23
52
FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE FOR LEND-LEASE
Funds for lend-lease purposes are made available in two ways :
I. Lend-Lease Appropriations to the President
First Lend-Lease Appropriation (March 27, 1941).................$7,000,000,000
Second Lend-Lease Appropriation (October 28, 1941).............. 5,985,000,000
Third Lend-Lease Appropriation (March 5,1942)................... 5,425,000,000
Fourth Lend-Lease Appropriation (June 14, 1943)................. 6,273,629,000
Fifth Lend-Lease Appropriation (June 30, 1944).................. 3,538,869,000
Sixth Lend-Lease Appropriation (July 5,1945).................... 2,475,000,000
Total...................................................................... 30,697,498,000
II. Transfers Authorized from Other Appropriations
-, Direct appropriations have been made to the War and Navy Departments and to the Maritime Commission for the procurement of items which are in the main common to the uses of our own armed forces and those of our allies. These items when produced can be used, in other words, by our own armed forces or those of our allies in the manner in which they can be most effective in defeating our common enemy. It is not until they are ready for distribution that they are allocated by the military authorities in accordance with the strategic needs. The appropriation acts in question authorize transfers to our allies under the Lend-Lease Act up to a maximum total of about $36 billion.
This does not mean that $36 billion has been appropriated for lend-lease purposes or that the difference between this amount and the lend-lease transfers made to date is in the form of appropriations available for expenditure for lend-lease purposes. The amounts anticipated to be expended for lend-lease purposes during a particular year by the War and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission are taken into account when appropriations are requested from the Congress by these agencies. Consequently, it is these budgeted amounts, and the decisions of the military authorities as to the strategic needs of our own forces and the requirements of our allies at the time the transfers are made, rather than the outstanding transfer authority, which determine the amount of funds which are in fact available for expenditure for lend-lease purposes.
War Department:
Third Supplemental, 1942................................................ $2,000,000,000
Fourth Supplemental, 1942 ................................................. 4,000,000,000
Fifth Supplemental, 1942.................................................. 11,250,000,000
Sixth Supplemental, 1942 .................................................. 2,220,000,000
Military Appropriation Act, 1943.......................................... 12,700,000,000
Navy Department: Second Supplemental, 1943 ............................... 3,000,000,000
Departments Other Than War: Third Supplemental, 1942 ....................... 800,000,000
Total.............................................................. 35,970,000,000
Note.—In addition to the foregoing, Congress has with certain limitations authorized the leasing of ships of the Navy and merchant ships constructed with funds appropriated to the Maritime Commission without any numerical limitation as to the dollar value or the number . of such ships which may be so leased. (See for example, Public Law 1, 78tb Cong., approved February 19, 1943, and Public Law 11, 78th Cong., approved March 18, 1943.)
Table 24
53
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55
APPENDICES
Appendix 1
LEND-LEASE ACT
Further to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That this Act may be cited as “An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States.”
Section 2
As used in this Act—
(a) The term “defense article” means—
(1) Any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, or boat;
(2) Any machinery, facility, tool, material, or supply necessary for the manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, or operation of any article described in this subsection;
(3) Any component material or part of or equipment for any article described in this subsection;
(4) Any agricultural, industrial, or other commodity or article for defense»
Such term “defense article” includes any article described in this subsection manufactured or procured pursuant to section 3, or to which the United States or any foreign government has or hereafter acquires title, possession, or control.
(b) The term “defense information” means any plan, specification, design, prototype, or information pertaining to any derense article.
Section 3
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—
(1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.
(2) To sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government, any defense article, but no defense article not manufactured or procured under paragraph (1) shall in any way be disposed of under this paragraph except after consultation with
56
the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, or both. The value of defense articles disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph, and procured from funds heretofore appropriated, shall not exceed $1,300,000,000. The value of such defense articles shall be determined by the head of the department or agency concerned or such other department, agency, or officer as shall be designated in the manner provided in the rules and regulations issued hereunder. Defense articles procured from funds hereafter appropriated to any department or agency of the Government, other than from funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act, shall not be disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph except to the extent hereafter authorized by the Congress in the Acts appropriating such funds or otherwise.
(3) To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise to place in good working order, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for any such government, or to procure any or all such services by private contract.
(4) To communicate to any such government any defense information, pertaining to any defense article furnished to such government under paragraph (2) of this subsection.
(5) To release for export any defense article disposed of in any way under this subsection to any such government.
(b) The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory: Provided, however, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to authorize the President to assume or incur any obligations on the part of the United States with respect to post-war economic policy, postwar military policy, or any post-war policy involving international relations except in accordance with established constitutional procedure.
(c) After June 30, 1946, or after the passage of a concurrent resolution by the two Houses before June 30, 1946, which declares that the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) are no longer necessary to promote the defense of the United States, neither the President nor the head of any department or agency shall exercise any of the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a); except that until July 1, 1949, any of such powers may be exercised to the extent to carry out a contract or agreement with such a foreign government made before July 1, 1946, or before the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever is the earlier; Provided, however, That nothing in section 3 (c) shall be construed to authorize the President to enter into or carry out any contract or agreement with a foreign government for post-war relief, post-war rehabilitation or post-war reconstruction; except that a contract or agreement entered into in accordance with this Act in which the United States undertakes to furnish to a foreign government defense articles, services, or information for use in the prosecution of the present war and which provides for the disposition, on terms and conditions of sale prescribed by the President, of any such defense articles, services, or information after the President determines they are no longer necessary for use by such government in
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promoting the defense of the United States shall not be deemed to be for post-war relief, post-war rehabilitation or post-war reconstruction.
(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of convoying vessels by naval vessels of the United StateSi
(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of the entry of any American vessel into a combat area in violation of section 3 of the Neutrality Act of 1939.
Section 4
All contracts or agreements made for the disposition of any defense article or defense information pursuant to section 3 shall contain a clause by which the foreign government undertakes that it will not, without the consent of the President, transfer title to or possession of such defense articles or defense information by gift, sale, or otherwise, or permit its use by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of such foreign government.
Section 5
(a) The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government involved shall, when any such defense article or defense information is exported, immediately inform the department or agency designated by the President to administer section 6 of the Act of July 2, 1940 (54 Stat. 714), of the quantities, character, value, terms of disposition, and destination of the article and information so exported.
(b) The President, from time to time, but not less frequently than once every 90 days, shall transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this Act except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest to disclose. Reports provided for under this subsection shall be transmitted to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, if the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, is not in session.
Section 6
(a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this Act.
(b) All money and all property which is converted into money received under section 3 from any government shall, with the approval of the Director of the Budget, revert to the respective appropriation or appropriations out of which funds were expended with respect to the defense article or ■defense information for which such consideration is received, and shall be available for expenditure for the purpose for which such expended funds were appropriated by law, during the fiscal year in which such funds are received and the ensuing fiscal year; but in no event shall any funds so received be available for expenditure after June 30, 1949.
Section 7
The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the head of the department or agency shall, in all contracts or agreements for the disposition of any defense article or defense information, fully protect the rights of all citizens of the United States who have patent rights in and to any such
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article or information which, is hereby authorized t o be disposed of and the payments collected for royalties on suc h patents shall be paid to the owner and holders of such patents.
Section 8
The Secretaries of War and of the Navy are hereby authorized to purchase or otherwise acquire arms, ammunition, and implements of war produced within the jurisdiction of any country to which section 3 is applicable, whenever the President deems such purchase or acquisition to be necessary in the interests of the defense of the United States.
Section 9
The President may, from time to time, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act; and he may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act through such department, agency, or officer as he shall direct.
Section 10
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to change existing law relating to the use of the land and naval forces of the United States, except insofar as such use relates to the manufacture, procurement, and repair of defense articles, the communication of information and other noncombatant purposes enumerated in this Act.
Section 11
If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any circumstance shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and the applicability of such provision to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
☆ ☆ ☆
On March 13, 1945, the House of Representatives voted 354-8 to extend the Lend-Lease Act, as amended, until July 1, 1946. The Senate voted unanimously for the extension of the Act, as amended, on April 10, 1945. The President signed the Act on April 18, 1945- The Amendment consisted of a proviso added to subsection (c) of section 3.
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Appendix II
SOVIET MASTER AGREEMENT
Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the principles applying to mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression.
Whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declare that they are engaged in a cooperative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of laying the bases of a just and enduring world peace securing order under law to themselves and all nations;
And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as signatories, of the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, have subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration, known as the Atlantic Charter, made on August 14, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the basic principles of which were adhered to by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on September 24, 1941;
And whereas the President of the United States of America has determined, pursuant to the act of Congress of March 11, 1941, that the defense of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States of America;
And whereas the United States of America has extended and is continuing to extend to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aid in resisting aggression;
And whereas it is expedient that the final determination of the terms and conditions upon which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics receives such aid and of the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefor should be deferred until the extent of the defense aid is known and until the progress of events makes clearer the final terms and conditions and benefits which will be in the mutual interests of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and will promote the establishment and maintenance of world peace;
And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are mutually desirous of concluding now a preliminary agreement in regard to the provision of defense aid and in regard to certain considerations which shall be taken into account in de-
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ret-mining such terms and conditions and the making of such an agreement has been in all respects duly authorized, and all acts, conditions and formalities which it may have been necessary to perform, fulfill or execute prior to the making of such an agreement in conformity with the laws either of the United States, of America or of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have been performed, fulfilled or executed as required;
The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows:
Article I
The Government of the United States of America will continue to supply the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with such defense articles, defense services, and defense information as the President of the United States of America shall authorize to be transferred or provided.
Article li
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and will provide such articles, services, facilities or information as it may be in a position to supply.
Article III
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not without the consent of the President of the United States of America transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information transferred to it under the Act of March 11, 1941 of the Congress of the United States of America or permit the use thereof by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Article IV
If, as a result of the transfer to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of any defense article or defense information, it becomes necessary for that Government to take any action or make any payment in order fully to protect any of the rights of a citizen of the United States of America who has patent rights in and to any such defense article or information, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will take such action or make such payment when requested to do so by the President of the United States of America.
Article V
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President of the United States of America, such defense articles transferred under this Agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed and as shall be determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States of America.
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Article VI
In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics full cognizance shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities, or other benefits or considerations provided by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics subsequent to March 11, 1941, and accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States of America.
Article VII
In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of worldwide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 14,1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the basic principles of which were adhered to by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on September 24, 1941.
At an early convenient date, conversations shall be begun between the two Governments with a view to determining, in the light of governing economic conditions, the best means of attaining the above-stated objectives by their own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of other like-minded Governments.
Article VIII
This Agreement shall take effect as from this day’s date. It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two Governments.
Signed and sealed at Washington in duplicate this eleventh day of June, 1942.
For the Government of the United States of America
Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States of America.
For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Maxim Litvinoff, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Washington.
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The following is an exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Washington:
Department of State
Washington, June 11, 1942. Excellency:
In connection with the signature on this date of the Agreement between our two Governments on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression, I have the honor to confirm our understanding that this Agreement replaces and renders inoperative the two prior arrangements on the same subject between our two Governments, the most recent of which was expressed in the exchange of communications between the President and Mr. Stalin dated respectively February 13, February 20, and February 23, 1942.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States of America.
His Excellency Maxim Litvinoff,
Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
June 11, 1942. Excellency:
In connection with the signature on this date of the Agreement between our two Governments on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression, I have the honor to confirm our understanding that this Agreement replaces and renders inoperative the two prior arrangements on the same subject between our two Governments, the most recent of which was expressed in the exchange of communications between the President and Mr. Stalin dated respectively February 13, February 20, and February 23, 1942.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
Maxim Litvinoff,
Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Washington.
His Excellency Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States of America,
. Washington, D. C.
☆ ☆
Similar Master Lend-Lease Agreements have been signed with the following countries: Belgium, China, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, Iraq, Liberia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, The United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. Australia and New Zealand have accepted the principles of the Master Agreements.
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: I94S
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