[Civilian War Transport]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
CIVILIAN WAR TRANSPORT
A Record of the Control of Domestic Traffic Operations by the
OFFICE OF DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION
1941-1946
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D. C. - Price $1.75
FOREWORD
The Office of Defense Transportation was created by President Roosevelt’s Executive Order No. 8989 on December 18, 1941. The Honorable Joseph B. Eastman, Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, was appointed Director of the agency, which he served with great devotion and ability until his death on March 15, 1944.
The over-all function of the Office of Defense Transportation as set forth in the preamble to the Executive order was “to assure maximum utilization of the domestic transportation facilities of the Nation for the successful prosecution of the war.” This task has been accomplished. The war has been won. And a major factor in this victory was the winning of the battle of transportation.
The very magnitude of transportation in this war amazes us as we view it in retrospect. No war was ever before fought at such great distances. Never before were such incredible numbers of men and such stupendous quantities of material transported. The solution of the logistics involved no less a problem than those encountered in establishing sound policies of tactics and strategy.
Statistics are usually dull reading. But there is something dramatic about the very figures showing how—in the domestic field alone—the various American transportation agencies handled in World War II vastly increased traffic with less equipment than in World War I.
One of the Office of Defense Transportation’s main responsibilities was to secure material for transportation equipment considered necessary to wage successful war. In spite of all of our efforts, the material was otherwise assigned. For instance, during 1942, 1943, and 1944, the Office of Defense Transportation asked the War Production Board for 311,500 freight cars and received 130,826; asked for 4,159 locomotives and received 2,500; asked for 5,150 passenger train cars and received 1,977 (including 1,600 troop sleepers and kitchen cars); asked for 5,410,000 tons of steel rail and received 4,701,850; asked for 429,367 trucks and received 223,709; asked for 26,000 integral buses and received 15,206. The result was that while the war load increased, the relative supply of transportation equipment decreased.
The railroads operated in the present war with 400,000, or 25 percent, fewer employees than in 1918. By January 1, 1945, the railroads had furnished the armed services with 30 divisions. The railroads operated in this war with 22,000 fewer locomotives than in 1918; with 600,000 fewer freight cars; with 18,000 fewer passenger train cars; with 1,000 fewer Pullman sleeping cars.
And yet, in World War II the railroads, with this decreased personnel and equipment, carried much heavier traffic than in World War I. Railroad passenger miles in 1944 were up 122 percent above the 1918 figure. Revenue freight ton miles were up 81 percent. During World War I, congestion at ports and terminals was the rule, with few exceptions. During this war, there was not a single serious transportation congestion at the ports or in the inland terminals.
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Thé railroads emerged from World War I and the Federal control and guaranty periods with freight rates up 75 percent from the prewar year of 1914. The Director General of Railroads made an average increase of about 28 percent in 1918 and this was followed by increases varying from 25 percent in the South to 40 percent in the East made in 1920 by the Interstate Commerce Commission. This resulted in the average rate in 1921 being up 75 percent over 1914. No general increases in rates were made during World War II. The average rates in 1945 were slightly less than in the prewar year of 1939. In 1946 the railroads asked for an increase of about 25 percent.
The war burden on transportation was more than a matter of carrying military personnel and the material of war produced in such enormous volume.
The submarine warfare and the demand for shipping for war purposes ended substantially all coastwise and intercoastal traffic by water for the duration. In 1940 intercoastal freight traffic via the Panama Canal was equivalent to 217,000 carloads. This was added to the rail burden. Taking off oil tankers from the coastal water routes gave the railroads more than a million barrels of petroleum to be carried per day by railroad tank cars. The handling of this oil traffic was one of the transportation epics of the war. Many other products once hauled entirely or partly by water had to be carried by rail during the war, adding enormously to the traffic burden of the railroads.
Nature responded generously to our need for food by giving us four bumper wheat crops in succession, while other products of farms and orchards were brought forth in similar abundance. Result—a constant demand for more box cars and refrigerator cars than could be supplied— a problem which is still with us.
The only way to move this enormous traffic was by complete utilization of all available equipment. Here a veritable miracle was accomplished. And let me say that this applied to busses, trucks, air lines, and waterways, as well as the railroads.
The railroad record of accomplishment in this direction under guidance of the Office of Defense Transportation—with that all-round cooperation I have described—is shown by a few significant figures. During the war period the number of “bad order” freight cars was reduced by 46,100. Heavier loading requirements resulted in 1944 in the addition of 105,000 cars to the car supply by ODT General Order No. 1 and of 82,000 cars by ODT Order No. 18 and ICC Service Order No. 68. Altogether, the increased efficiency of operation, including faster handling by both railroads and shippers was equivalent to adding over 600,000 freight cars to the supply.
Rail congestion on roads leading to the eastern seaboard—so serious a hampering factor in World War I—was completely prevented by the export permit system. The activities of the Office of Defense Transportation’s field service in rerouting freight traffic west of the Mississippi prevented congestion in that area;
If we turn from freight to passenger traffic the picture is much the same. Total railroad passenger miles jumped from 16 billion in 1941 to 64 billion in 1944. Pullman sleeping car mileage went up from 9 billion in 1941 to 27 billion in 1944.
The Office of Defense Transportation achieved remarkable results in the efficient use of rail passenger equipment to meet these demands. This was done in large part by securing public cooperation in “Don’t Travel” campaigns. The convention ban, which was in effect from February 1 to
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October 1, 1945, saved nearly a billion passenger miles, and voluntary abandonment of conventions through the war period probably saved more than two billion more.
Various orders and restrictions cut down nonessential train service and put needed passenger equipment into use for troop transportation.
A new passenger traffic problem was thrust upon us by the Army redeployment program instituted after VE-day, and still another even more difficult by the demobilization program after VJ-day. The big movement of soldiers and sailors from the Pacific was in full swing before the movement from Europe began to fall off. In »consequence, arrivals of personnel on the two coasts totalled over a million for the month of December. And if we include all interior moves, the railroads carried that month nearly a million and a half men—the peak movement of the war.
I have said so much about rail traffic with which the Office of Defense Transportation was still actively concerned after the end of hostilities, but during the war three-fourths of the Office of Defense Transportation personnel were connected with the Highway Transport Department, which had regional and district offices scattered all over the United States. The Office of Defense Transportation kept buses, taxis, and trucks running and giving effective service throughout the war despite the rubber and gasoline shortages. Nearly everybody in the country felt the effects of such ODT programs as the joint action truck plans, the restrictions on wholesale and retail deliveries, the limitations on taxicab, local transit, and intercity bus service, the vehicle maintenance program, the certificate of war necessity program, minimum load requirements, and the 35-mile speed limit. After VE-day, Office of Defense Transportation regulations in the highway field were removed in quick succession and the Highway Transport Department was terminated on December 14,1945.
At one time or another, labor difficulties have compelled the Office of Defense Transportation, on requests from the White House, to take over the operation of transportation facilities — three railroads, more than a hundred truck lines, a towing concern on the Great Lakes, the tug lines in New York Harbor, and two local transit companies. These have been operated successfully and at a minimum expense to the Government.
During the brief railroad strike in the Spring of 1946 the Office of Defense Transportation by Executive order took possession and control of all railroads in the United States, and also coordinated the operations of all other forms of domestic transportation.
In the execution of its diversified task the Office of Defense Transportation, at the height of its activities had a total of 4,917 employees, of whom 4,221 were operating in the field. Of its own volition this agency reduced its force as the war burden eased, until by December 31, 1945, there remained of this large trained field and departmental staff only 141 employees. By the close of the fiscal year June 30, 1946, there was left only a skeleton organization of 70 employees, with which the Office of Defense Transportation carried on its transportation control work during the country’s complicated period of reconversion and readjustment.
The charters of the war agencies of the Government were the Presidential Executive orders. In the future they should clearly define the functions so as to minimize overlapping authority and there should be a final coordinating officer with the sole duty of enforcing cooperation between agencies, with right of appeal to the over-all War Mobilization Director. From these Executive orders stems the degree of cooperation between agencies so necessary to the fullest success. Such cooperation
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existed to a surprising degree between the Office of Defense Transportation and certain of the Government agencies, the industry and the public. Without it, the pages of the history of the Office of Defense Transportation could not have been the story as told in the chapters of this book—the effective solving of problems, the weathering of crises, and the creating of policies that are already being fitted into the pattern of peacetime transportation.
The magnitude of the cooperation given to the Office of Defense Transportation was no less than the magnitude of the task itself, and the credit for winning of the battle of transportation cannot be ascribed to the efforts of any individual or even to the group of transportation experts who have carried on the diverse activities of the Office of Defense Transportation in their respective capacities.
No, the chief credit must be given to the almost miraculous cooperation of all who shared in any way in the effort. This includes the thousands of businessmen on the various volunteer committees and advisory boards in every field of transportation who gave their aid so unselfishly without compensation or public acclaim.
Fullest credit must also be given to the men actively running transportation, all cooperating with the Office of Defense Transportation: the railway, waterway, truck, bus, and airway associations—to these groups collectively, and to all their members individually. The executives of all the transportation companies and all their employees—each and every one—must take full share in the credit for the winning of the battle of transportation.
For all who thus rose to the war occasion, the story of the Office of Defense Transportation, as unfolded in the chapters that follow, stands as a monument to their share in the war’s great exemplification of the American spirit.
J. Monroe Johnson,
Director,
Office of Defense Transportation
Washington, D. C. May 1,1948.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This history was written from the standpoint of the transportation problems presented and how they were met, with accent on how things were done rather than what was achieved or who achieved it. The procedure, in practically every case, was for the writer of a chapter to develop his subject and reconstruct the processes, as far as posssible, from available documents. Verifying the interpretation of such research and developing the background of important moves required extended interviews with the heads of departments, their assistants, and those who specialized in the branches under consideration. Out of the series of preliminary drafts thus evolved, there emerged completed versions which were cleared factually by responsible sources for the final editing and revision for publication. Complete authorship, therefore, cannot be ascribed to the several persons to whom the texts are credited. Each chapter is the joint effort of the authors, the supervisors, and the unsung rank and file.
The scope and arrangement of the history was outlined by Joseph R. Rose, of the University of Pennsylvania, after conferences with Joseph L. White, executive officer of the Office of Defense Transportation, who had general supervision over the work.
The editing of the history was done by Otto Praeger, Chief of the Historical Section.
Sidney L. Miller, Assistant to the Deputy Director, assisted in the revision of text. The final revision of the entire text for approval by the Director was performed by Joseph L. White, executive officer, and Homer C. King, Deputy Director of the Office of Defense Transportation.
J. L. W.
Washington, D. C,
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CONTENTS
Page
Foreword ..................................................................... Ill
Acknowledgment ............................................................... VII
I. Functions and organization ...................................... 1
IL Railroad transportation ...............'.......................... 9
III. Increased utilization of freight cars ........................... 11
IV. The traffic channels plan ....................................... 17
V. Diversion and rerouting of traffic .............................. 21
VI. Refrigerator car movement........................................ 27
VII. Export-import traffic ........................................... 35
VIII. The storage problem .............................................. 47
IX. Control of rail transport of coal................................ 55
X. Grain transport by rail ......................................... 69
XI. Railroad passenger traffic .................................. 81
XII. Traffic movement forecasts .................................. 87
XIII. Railroad waybill studies .....»................................. 95
XIV. Motor transport................................................... 101
XV. Certificates of war necessity .................................... Ill
XVI. Joint action plans ....-.......................................... 121
XVII. Traffic and vehicle registration ............................... 127
XVIII. Conservation of farm vehicles ................................... 131
XIX. Trade barriers ................................................... 143
XX. Motor passenger transport—general policies ....................... 149
XXI. Private automobiles .............................................. 157
XXII. Control by general and special orders ........................... 161
XXIII. Enforcing speed limit ............................................ 171
XXIV. Waterway transport............................................... 177
XXV. Liquid transport.................................................. Ige
XXVI. Domestic air transport ........................................... 191
XXVII. Allotment of materials ..........................*.............. 193
XXVIII. Allocation of new equipment .................................... 199
XXIX. Fuel and tires for motor vehicles................................ 205
XXX. Motor transport maintenance ..................................... 209'
XXXI. Tax amortization.................................................. 213
XXXII. Transport personnel .............................................. 217
XXXIII. Ligitation involving ODT ....................................... 227’
XXXIV. Adjusting wartime rates.......................................... 235.
XXXV. Territorial transportation in Puerto Rico ........................ 245
XXXVI. Hawaiian transport ............................................... 253
XXXVII. Alaskan transport................................................. 261
XXXVIII. Partnership with the public.................................... 265-
XXXIX. Federal management of railway transport .......................... 269
XL. Federal management of motor transport ............................ 283
XLI. Federal management of waterway transport ......................... 289
XLII. Operating and traffic conditions in World War I and II............ 293
XLIII. Postwar operations of ODT.......................................... 399
Appendix A. Sources of authority ............................................ 325
Appendix B. Organization charts and biographies .............................. 345
Index ..................................................359.
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CHAPTER I
FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATION
Functions of the ODT
The Office of Defense Transportation functioned in the country’s mightiest war effort, from the rush to arms in 1942 to the reconversion in 1946. This war, by reason of its magnitude, relied more desperately on transportation than ever did war before. It was the task of the Office of Defense Transportation to keep that transportation functioning without break so as to meet in full the war’s mounting exactions.
The multitudinous activities that the task involved, the much that was achieved with so little to work with, the disasters that good fortune and resourcefulness averted, can be grasped only in retrospect by those of the Office of Defense Transportation who were busied with the parts assigned to them. There were many others who merely saw the war plants rise, shifts of men from distant parts moving into and out of them, then the endless flow of combat materials from the production lines to the waiting transports, and in time read how valor turned these efforts into victory. For those, also, the attempt has been made in these chapters to re-create the picture of the part which the Office of Defense Transportation played in World War II.
The precipitateness with which the Office of Defense Transportation had to act to meet or forestall crises in transportation often developed shortcomings, usually in procedure. The work was largely pioneering, but by pursuing a method of trial and error, the agency was able to modify procedures promptly, as need developed.
The real weaknesses and shortcomings that arose were inherent in the transportation situation under war conditions. They were due chiefly to shortages of manpower and materials. This required a determination of the relative importance to the war effort of the requirements in men and materials of the armed forces, domestic transportation, and other activities necessary to promote the war effort, including the civilian economy.
During 1942 the Office of Defense Transportation was handicapped in its attempt to secure materials for the transportation agencies because the requirements of the transportation machine were not con
sidered as important as those of the armed services. At the end of 1942 the War Production Board revised its procedures. The Office of Defense Transportation became claimant agency for all materials for transportation agencies under its jurisdiction and early in 1943 the Director was made a member of the War Production Board. With the gradual realization by the military agencies that adequate transportation was necessary to get the men and material to the fighting front, the situation improved.
The chief dangers in the transportation situation lay in the inability to obtain equipment, replacement parts, tires, and manpower. There was a limit to the extent to which greater utilization of equipment and its operation could overcome the handicap of a shortage of material. Through the great fortune of clement weather conditions up to the severe winter of 1944-45 in the eastern part of the country, it was possible to just carry on sufficiently to meet the war demands with only a precarious margin of safety. There was never available a reserve that could have staved off collapse from possible disastrous weather or operational catastrophes. Such was the challenge to experience, resourcefulness, and cooperation by industry, labor, and the public. How well it was met is evidenced by the fact that for 4 years the wheels of war did move without break, and the obligations of transportation to the war effort were discharged in full.
The Office of Defense Transportation was organized by the Honorable Joseph B. Eastman, the first Director of the agency, in pursuance to Executive Order 8989 dated December 18, 1941. The general purpose for which the Office of Defense Transportation was established is set forth in the preamble to Executive Order 8989 in the following words: to assure maximum utilization of the domestic transportation facilities of the Nation for the successful prosecution of the war.
The purpose is further defined in section 3 (a) as follows:
Coordinate the transportation policies and activities of the several Federal agencies and private transportation groups in effecting such adjustments in the domestic transportation systems of the Nation as the successful prosecution of the war may require.
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The order then proceeds to place on the Office of Defense Transportation certain specific duties and responsibilities, namely :
3 (b) Compile and analyze estimates of the requirements to be imposed upon existing domestic transport facilities by the needs of the war effort; determine the adequacy of such facilities to accommodate the increased traffic volume occasioned by the war effort; develop measures designed to secure maximum use of existing domestic transportation facilities; and stimulate the provision of necessary additional transport facilities and equipment in order to achieve the level of domestic transportation services required; and in this connection advise the Supply Priorities and Allocation Board as to the estimated requirements and recommend allocations of materials and equipment necessary for the provision of adequate domestic transportation service.
3 (c) Coordinate and direct domestic traffic movements with the objective of preventing possible points of traffic congestion and assuring the orderly and expeditious movement of men, materials, and supplies to points of need.
3 (d) In cooperation with the United States Maritime Commission and other appropriate agencies, coordinate domestic traffic movements with ocean shipping in order to avoid terminal congestion at port areas and to maintain a maximum flow of traffic.
3 (e) Perform the functions and exercise the authority vested in the President by the following, subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 3 of this order:
(1) Sec. 1 (15) of Interstate Commerce Act as amended, USC title 49, Sec. 1 (15).
(2) Sec. 6 (8) of Interstate Commerce Act as amended, USC title 49, Sec. 6 (8).
3 (f) Survey and ascertain present and anticipated storage and warehousing requirements at points of transfer and in terminal areas; and encourage the provision of increased storage, loading and unloading facilities where necessary.
3 (g) Represent the defense interest of the Government in negotiating rates with domestic transportation carriers and in advising the appropriate governmental agencies with respect to the necessity for rate adjustments caused by the effect of the defense program.
3 (h) Advise upon proposed or existing emergency legislation affecting domestic transportation, and recommend such additional emergency legislation as may be necessary or desirable.
3 (i) Keep the President informed with respect to progress made in carrying out this order; and perform such related duties as the President may, from time to time, assign or delegate to it.
Section 7 of Executive Order 8989 contains the following provisions with respect to the organization of the Office of Defense Transportation:
There shall be within the Office of Defense Transportation a Division of Railway Transport, a Division of Motor Transport, a Division of Inland Waterway Transport, a Division of Coastwise and Intercoastal Transport, and such other operating and staff divisions as the Director may determine. The Director may provide for the internal management of the Office of Defense Transportation and shall obtain the President’s approval for the appointment of the heads of the above divisions and such other divisions as may be established.
Accordingly, the Director, on January 8,1942, announced the establishment of the Divisions of Railway Transport and Motor Transport, required by section 7 of the order, and also the following additional staff divisions: Traffic Movement, Rates, and Transport Personnel.
He also announced on that date the establishment of the offices of two Assistants to the Director, one to coordinate the work of pipe lines, tankers, tank cars,- and tank trucks, and the other to coordinate
the work in connection with Great Lakes carriers’ transportation. The appointment of a general counsel, and of an executive assistant to assist the Director in effectuating policies and supervising administration within the Office of Defense Transportation was also announced.
On January 14, 1942, the Director announced two additional Divisions: Storage, and Local Transport. The organization of the other two Divisions mentioned specifically in section 7 were announced as follows: Division of Inland Waterways on January 16, 1942, and the Division of Coastwise and Intercoastal Transport on January 31, 1942. In addition, the Director announced on January 14, 1942, the creation of a Section of Materials and Equipment to supply the staff work on materials and equipment for the carrier divisions.
An organization chart showing the functions of the various divisions in the Eastman administration will be found at the end of this chapter.
The selection by the President of Joseph B. Eastman as Director, and the selection by Director Eastman of the fourteen key men of the organization to head the Divisions enumerated above, was generally accepted as a promise of the effective handling of the grave transportation problems of the war. Director Eastman’s conception of the task to be undertaken by the Office of Defense Transportation was reflected not only by the type of the officials whom he selected for key positions but by his statement announcing the appointments of his principal assistants :
The purpose of the Office of Defense Transportation is to lend the aid and authority of the Government to the maintenance and development of transportation services which will effectively and efficiently meet the needs of the country in its war effort.
The Executive order creating the Office imposes heavy duties and responsibilities upon the Director. My intent is to lay out an organization so planned and officered that it will be capable of whatever expansion proves to be necessary for the proper discharge of these duties and responsibilities.
I shall endeavor, however, to make full use of the collaboration and cooperation of other departments and agencies of the Government and of private transportation groups, as the Executive order contemplates, and I have every confidence that I shall receive whole-hearted cooperation from all these sources.
I shall try not to duplicate work which is being done effectively, nor to interfere where interference is unnecessary.
Thus far, since the beginning of the defense emergency, the transportation systems of the country have functioned admirably, with equally admirable cooperation and help from both the public and the private shippers.
Difficult problems lie ahead for them, but I am sure that they are prepared to deal courageously, ably, and effectively with these problems, and I shall do everything in my power to help them.
The sources of authority under which the Office of Defense Transportation functioned, together with the organization charts of the agency, personnel and fiscal data will be found in the appendixes.
The increasing activities of all parts of the na
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tional economy arising from the rapid development of our war machine brought with them many perplexing transportation problems. These were accentuated by the activities of enemy submarines against our coastwise transportation, and shortage of rubber and other raw materials ordinarily imported from the Far East which had come under the domination of the enemy. This necessitated a rapid expansion in the organization of the Office of Defense Transportation. The expansion in the organization will be described step by step as it developed into the full-fledged ODT. At the height of its activities it had 4,910 employees handling the problems of transportation in all the states and territories of the Nation.
The official personnel was recruited in part from other branches of the Government on a nonreimbursable basis—that is to say, loaned to the Office of Defense Transportation—and in part, from private transportation agencies. As a result, the original organization chart for the period between January 2 and June 30, 1942, showed that 12 of its 27 key men were serving without compensation. The latter class included the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation and seven of his division directors.
This skeleton organization of transportation men who, in the main, either had served with Director Eastman in the Interstate Commerce Commission or in the Office of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, or had left responsible positions in the transportation field, carried the Office of Defense Transportation through its formative period during the first months of 1942. In that time they mapped out the enlargement of the organization to meet its responsibilities in solving the transportation problems that speedily developed out of the launching of the superproduction program for the war.
It soon became apparent that the conservation of motor vehicles, their parts and supplies, as well as control over rubber-borne traffic movements was im-perative so that existing facilities could carry their share of the war load. This resulted in the issuance on May 2, 1942, of Executive Order 9156, further defining the functions and duties of the Office of Defense Transportation so as to cover all rubber-borne transportation facilities, including passenger ears, busses, taxicabs, and trucks, with a directive to develop programs to facilitate continuous adjustment of the Nation’s motor transportation requirements to the available facilities. There was also the specific directive for the Office of Defense Transportation to limit rubber-borne transport facilities in the matter of nonessential activities, and to regulate the use of these transportation facilities among essential activities. The Presidential order thus ex
tending the functions of the Office of Defense Transportation was followed on May 4, 1942, by Directive 1-F of the War Production Board directing the Office of Price Administration to so administer its rationing power for vehicles and supplies as to implement the transportation policies of the Office of Defense Transportation.
This development had an immediate effect on the organization and personnel plans of the Office of Defense Transportation. It called for an expansion particularly of the field services to meet the enlarged responsibilities placed on the agency by Executive Order No. 9156. The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation on May 5,1942, announced the formation of the Division of Transport Conservation to formulate programs and measures for the continuous adjustment of national transportation requirements and the available transport facilities; the conservation and distribution of transportation; and the restrictions of transportation to essential needs. This Division was planned to operate with a large personnel at headquarters in Washington and in the field, but the plan was not developed and the Division itself was abolished at the end of 1942. The brunt of the activities in the field was carried by the Motor Transport Division.
Meeting of Crucial Problems
Much of the organization work of the Office of Defense Transportation was designed to effectuate the long-range and anticipatory policies of the agency, such as conservation and maximum utilization of local transport to and from war plants, as well as the maintenance of essential community transportation. This was the province of the Division of Local Transport which, operating at State and district levels, and through its liaison officers, supervised the work of some 10,000 volunteer local committee workers for share-riding, staggered business hours, and improved traffic requirements in communities. Ultimately a staff of 150 employees, about two-thirds of which were in the field, was developed to carry on the work of this Division.
The expansion of the Office of Defense Transportation activities made necessary the establishment on April 16, 1942, of an administrative office to serve the administrative needs of the staff and operating divisions, and an information office on June 13, 1942, to guide operating officials in their relations with the public.
As indicated above, the greatest single advance in the field activities of the Office of Defense Transportation was in the Division of Motor Transport, and arose out of the necessity to control fuel and tire consumption of commercial vehicles. This was accomplished through the issuance of certificates of
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war necessity for some 5,000,000 pieces of vehicular equipment. The expansion of the motor transport field staff also necessitated the establishment in October 1942 of nine regional administrative offices and later, a force of regional attorneys and regional information offices. This conservation control was later followed by placing a force of maintenance specialists in 142 districts to assist all vehicle owners to obtain tires and replacement parts, the scarcity of which was threatening to retire from service a large part of commercial passenger equipment. Thus, within its first year’s operation, the Motor Transport Division increased its personnel from a few scantily manned field offices to a total of over 3,000 employees. Its field and headquarters forces reached a peak of 3,750 employees on April30, 1944.
By Executive Order No. 9214 of August 5, 1942, the jurisdiction of the Office of Defense Transportation was extended specifically to the Territories and possessions of the United States, and the operations of the agency were extended gradually to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, Hawaii, and Alaska.
The broad scope of the activities of the Office of Defense Transportation were fully envisioned from the beginning, and the organization of the agency, in the main, was laid out accordingly. Changes in conditions developed as the war progressed, and modifications in the organizations became desirable.
For instance, the U-boat “blitz’’ against the American tankers which supplied the Atlantic coast’s requirements of oil and gasoline, was not in the war’s blueprints. It resulted in a critical situation that had to be met by throwing upon the railways, waterways and motor trucks the tremendous burden of delivering into the so-called gasoline shortage area a peak load of about 1,000,000 barrels of oil and gasoline daily, until the completion of pipe lines could bring relief. The repercussion of this situation on the organizational structure of the Office of Defense Transportation was the development of the Division of Petroleum and Other Liquid Transport, to coordinate the work of the Tank Car Section of the Division of Railway Transport, the Waterway Divisions and the Tank Truck Section of the Division of Motor Transport, and to regulate the movement of petroleum and other liquids essential to the war effort.
The growing importance and the interlacing of the interest of our various forms of domestic shipping under the increased magnitude and complexity of war requirements resulted in the establishment of the Waterways Division, which had administrative direction over the Divisions of Inland Waterways, Coastwise and Intercoastal and Lake Carriers’ Transport.
With the abolishing of the Division of Transport Conservation on January 5, 1943, a new staff unit was established, the Division of Review and Special Studies. To this Division were assigned the ascertaining of the requirements of private automobiles (passenger cars) for rubber and repair parts; the changes in the supply situation with respect to motor fuel, rubber, and private automobiles; also other analyses, studies, and reviews.
Thus, out of a succession of crucial problems bred by war, rose the structure of the Office of Defense Transportation to meet sudden crises, prepare for future problems, and at the same time conserve transport facilities to meet the rising demands of the great conflict.
Death of Director Eastman.
The endeavor exacted by this steady enlarging of the functions and activities of the Office of Defense Transportation was constant and strenuous. It told heavily on all those in executive positions who shouldered the responsibilities of the task. It prematurely brought to a close the life of its Director, Joseph B. Eastman, who died on March 15, 1944, directing the work to the last. Officially and in the press, the work of the Office of Defense Transportation under his direction was extolled, and his passing was called a war casualty. On June 4, 1945, he was awarded posthumously the Government’s Medal of Merit, with this citation:
The Office of Defense Transportation, under the leadershin of Mr. Eastman, cooperated in full measure with the Army in meeting its critical wartime transportation problems. His broad experience and wisdom were given unstintedly to the armed forces. His sound transportation policies were of immeasurable assistance to the Army in enabling it to move personnel and supplies in numbers and quantities without precedent in its history. The value of his contribution to the war is incalculable.
Following the death of Mr. Eastman, the direction of the agency devolved upon Brig. Gen. Charles D. Young, the Deputy Director, who served as Acting Director until April 4, 1944, when the President appointed Col. J. Monroe Johnson as Director of the Office of Defense Transportation. Colonel Johnson was born in Marion, S. C., May 5, 1878. He was a civil engineer by profession. His military career began with the Spanish-American War. He rendered notable service in World War I, for which he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. In 1935 President Roosevelt appointed him Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and in 1940, Interstate Commerce Commissioner. He was serving in this position when on April 4,1944, President Roosevelt appointed him Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, in addition to his position as a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
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Streamlining the ODT.
In 1944, under the leadership of Colonel Johnson, the work of streamlining the organization of the agency was begun. Divisions with closely related functions or whose activities supplemented the work of each other were merged and became departments, so that with the beginning of the new fiscal year on July 1, 1944, the organizational structure of the Office of Defense Transportation was as follows:
Office of the Director
Executive Division Administrative Office Alaska and Hawaii Transport Staff divisions:
General Counsel Information Materials and Equipment Rates
Review and Special Studies
Storage
Transport Personnel
Carrier Departments:
Highway Transport (combining the former Motor and Local Transport Divisions)
Railway Transport (combining the former Railway and Traffic Movement Divisions)
Waterway Transport (formerly the Division of Waterways)
Liquid Transport
Puerto Rican Transport
The Office of Defense Transportation functioned in the field through regional representatives of the various departments or divisions reporting to their Washington headquarters. Originally, the Division of Motor Transport divided the country into nine regions, and regional offices were set up in the following cities:
New York Philadelphia Atlanta
Cleveland Chicago Kansas City
Dallas Denver San Francisco
Most of the other units of the Office of Defense Transportation set up their field organizations in regions conforming geographically to those of the Motor Transport Division for closer cooperation in the field. The Railway Transport Department, however, operated on a sectional and State level, conforming to the areas of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Liquid Transport Department was divided into five regional areas, and the Transport Personnel Division field organization conformed to the 12 regions of the War Manpower Commission.
In the field, each of these departments or divisions had its own offices as well as personnel, and the contacts between the various departments or divi
sions and their field forces were supervisory and cooperative. In addition to the unscheduled contacts between the field representatives of the various departments and divisions of the Office of Defense Transportation in the course of their field activities, regular meetings were held in the various regions for the purpose of discussing transportation situations in the respective regions and methods of cooperation.
The growth of the Office of Defense Transportation, from the beginning of the war to the peak of its strength in April 1944, and the gradual reduction in its forces as various controls were discontinued, is shown in the chart on page 7. It depicts the filled positions of the Office of Defense Transportation in Washington and the field from December 31,1941, to June 30, 1946, when the agency was reduced to its present skeleton organization in preparation for final liquidation in 1947.
Throughout its existence, the Office of Defense Transportation was one of the war agencies which generally enjoyed popular support and a good press. “Is This Trip Necessary?” became a familiar household phrase and one of the widely heard expressions of the war years.
Among the news items to which the press gave wide publicity on March 9, 1946, was the following, which brought pride and pleasure to the employees of the Office of Defense Transportation as recording Presidential appreciation of a great task completed, in which each had participated to the height of his or her ability. The item read :
President Truman has awarded to Col. J. Monroe Johnson, Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, the Medal of Merit for extraordinary fidelity and exceptionally meritorious conduct.
The presentation was made at the White House on March 8, 1946, and was accompanied by the following citation :
John Monroe Johnson, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the United States as Director of the Office of Defense Transportation. His broad experience and understanding of transportation problems were of inestimable value to both the armed forces of the Nation and its transportation agencies, when transportation was more vital to the war effort than in any previous war. The soundness of his concept of the problem and his policies were of immeasurable assistance to the Nation in satisfactorily handling the movements of personnel and materials, in numbers and volume without parallel in history. His ability, his industry, and his untiring devotion to duty were of incalculable benefit to the war effort of the Nation.
5
ORGANIZATION CHART AND FUNCTIONS OF DIVISIONS THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION, HEADED BY A DIRECTOR APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT, WAS INCLUDED IN THE OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 8989. ITS OVERALL FUNCTIONS WERE TO ASSURE MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES OF THE NATION FOR THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF THE WAR
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7
CHAPTER II
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION
American wartime domestic transportation has been described as a problem of “making the ends meet.” With by far the biggest load of property and persons to carry in the history of the country, and a desperate need that there be no failure of performance, the work had to be done with a short supply of transportation facilities and a tight curb on expansion of that supply. That applied to no form of domestic transportation more than to railway operations.
Prior to 1941, the record year for ton-miles of revenue freight carried by the railroads was 1929, and the record year for passenger-miles was 1920. In 1942, after a year at war, revenue ton-miles exceeded the 1929 record by 42.6 percent, and passenger-miles exceeded the 1920 record by 14.6 pencent, yet in 1942 the total tractive capacity of all railroad locomotives in service was 15.2 percent less than in 1929 and 7.3 percent less than in 1920; the total capacity of freight cars, measured in tons, was 16.5 percent less than in 1929 and 11.3 percent less than in 1920; and the number of passenger cars was 27.9 percent less than in 1929 and 30.8 percent less than in 1920. The performance of the railroads in 1943, and again in 1944, was the more remarkable because increasingly heavy traffic was successfully handled with little increase in equipment.
How the railroads, with as short supply of facilities, and with expansion drastically curbed were enabled to carry traffic which rose high above former peaks, may be explained briefly thus: In the dozen years which followed the last World War, the railroads spent several billions of dollars in the im-provement of roadbed, track, and terminal facilities. While their rolling stock decreased in quantity, it increased in efficiency; and average speed of movement was increased, in part, because a large volume of short-haul package freight was moved by motortruck. Much the same happened in passenger service. In the loading and unloading of freight, the railroads had, in striking contrast with the situation at the beginning of the last World War, splendid cooperation not only from the shipping public, but also from the Army, the Navy, and other Federal ship
ping agencies. Cooperation between the railroads and shippers in the movement of an unparalleled volume of freight was outstanding.
Heavy loads and the reduction of empty or partially loaded mileage also were means of getting more work out of equipment. In the railroad field, Office of Defense Transportation orders were successful in raising the average load of less-than-carload freight from an estimated 5.5 tons to 9.2 tons per car, and in bringing the loading of carload freight much more nearly to capacity. It is estimated that the effect was equivalent to adding as many as 150,000 cars to the supply. It also relieved the strain on motive power materially. Because of these orders, carloadings compared with prior years ceased to be a reliable index of traffic volume. The virtual pooling of refrigerator cars under an Interstate Commerce Commission order saved many million empty carmiles.
Equipment was made to do more work by keeping it in repair. This principle was applied intensively to railroad rolling stock, to eke out the scant supply. The percentages of bad-order locomotives and cars were brought down to all-time record low levels.
Passenger as well as freight equipment, shifted from routes or areas of surplus, aided in meeting deficits elsewhere. Coaches of Pennsylvania, New York Central, and New Haven ownership were seen all over the West. Nearly 900 locomotives were leased by roads which had more than needed to others which were in need. Much the same thing was done by diverting freight from routes which were congested to others which were less heavily loaded.
When the fast-rising tide of civilian and military passenger traffic threatened to get out of control at a period of the war when more than two-thirds of the serviceable passenger equipment was required to move the armed forces, including wounded and furloughed personnel, the Office of Defense Transportation was able to escape resort to travel rationing by steady and urgent appeals to the public to engage only in essential trips. Despite insistent demands that were made for positive control of civilian travel, the Director of the Office of Defense Trana-
9
portation continued to put faith in the agency’s “Don’t travel” campaign. That faith was largely justified. Thus, through public cooperation and with a minimum of governmental intervention through
regulatory orders, the railroads were able to handle both the freight and passenger load during the Nation’s mightiest effort at war.
10
CHAPTER III
INCREASED UTILIZATION OF FREIGHT CARS
Transportation of freight by rail carriers during peacetime is conducted generally under conditions which have a tendency to load both less-than-carload and carload freight substantially below either the weight limit or cubical capacity of freight cars, thereby reducing the fullest utilization of such equipment. Merchandise freight loading has contributed largely to this uneconomical utilization of cars. In 1941 the average loading of intercity cars was about 5.5 tons per car, which constituted about 12 percent of the loading capacity of an ordinary freight car and only 25 percent of its cubical capacity.
The average load of merchandise cars used within terminal districts was about 2 tons per car. Less-than-carload freight constituted approximately 1.5 percent of all freight traffic handled by class I railroads, yet such loading required the use of about 20,000 closed freight cars out of a total of approximately 850,000 such cars. The average loading of merchandise is shown below for the periods indicated :
Tons
1945 .....................................9.1
1944 .....................................9.2
1943 .....................................9.6
1942 .....................................9.8
1941 (before ODT control) (est.)... .5.5
The measure of unused car utilization insofar as it pertains to carload freight is more or less difficult to gage. The average capacity of a freight car is approximately 50 tons, and the average loading of carload freight for the periods indicated was as follows:
Tons
1945 ..........................................39.89
1944 ......................................... 40.27
1943 ......................................... 41.01
1942 ..........................................40.14
1941 (before ODT control)......................38.15
1940 ” ” ” .........37.66
1939 ” ” ” .........36.77
The above figures indicated, on the whole, the high measure of car utilization, but nevertheless, they do not reveal particular situations wherein there is considerable light loading. This is due to the fact that cars moving heavy commodities such as coal, iron, etc., are generally loaded to their maxi
mum capacity which is usually well above the average loading for all such cars, while a substantial amount of other carload freight is lightly loaded, thereby resulting in an under utilization of the cars.
In using carloading tonnage statistics as a measure of utilization of freight cars, it must be borne in mind that space is a limitation factor as well as weight, such as so-called balloon freight which is light in weight, and large in size. The loading of such freight will not indicate the measure of car utilization, and there are other similar factors which do not indicate accurately the possibilities of increasing the car utilization. The uneconomic effects of light loading of cars are cumulative. In the first place, light loading obviously increases the number of freight cars used, and requires the use of additional motive power to transport.
Control of Loading.
Due to the war conditions that existed in this country and the enormous amount of freight that it was necessary to transport, coupled with reduced freight equipment to handle this extraordinarily heavy tonnage, the Office of Defense Transportation undertook to increase the use of available equipment. To this end, General Order ODT No. 1 was issued to increase the loading of less-than-carload freight, and later, General Order ODT No. 18 was issued, designed to secure capacity loading of carload freight.
General Order ODT No. 1, effective May 1, 1942, applied principally to all rail carriers and to freight forwarders using railway closed cars in 1. c. 1. traffic except shipments carried in passenger train cars.
The provisions of General Order ODT No. 1, as amended, may be grouped in five categories: (1) Loading regulations; (2) use of cars within muni-cipalities; (3) diversion; (4) joint action plans; and, (5) reporting requirements.
Loading Regulations.
The order established minimum loading requirements for 1. c. 1. traffic. Between May 1942 and July 1, 1942, it prohibited carriers from loading in railway closed cars less than 6 tons per car; between
11
July 1,1942, and September 1,1942, less than 8 tons; and, thereafter, less than 10 tons. This gradual introduction of the 10-ton minimum was designed to permit the carriers to adjust their practices and facilities to the new regulations. The order provided, however, for certain exceptions to the minimum loading requirements: cars loaded to full legal or visible cubic capacity, cars used because no other adequate common carrier service was available, noninter-changeable cars, cars containing principally freight consigned to war agencies, cars containing perishables and explosives, and cars operated under special or general permits issued by the Office of Defense Transportation. Upon application by the railroads and good cause appearing, special permits were issued to allow the carriers to load and forward cars containing less than the 10-ton minimum fixed. During this period there were many instances of light loading authorized by special permit to expedite the movement of traffic, where terminals or transfer stations were experiencing an acute labor shortage. Six general permits were issued two of which played an important part in getting equipment into the territory needed. One permit authorized the railroads to load and forward cars with a 5-ton minimum from eastern points and far western points into the grain areas where boxcars were needed for grain movements. The other permit authorized them to load and forward refrigerator cars containing a minimum of 5 tons of merchandise, when such cars were destined to points in far western and northwestern States —territory covered by Interstate Commerce Commission Service Order No. 104.
Use of Cars Within Municipalities.
Rail carriers were prohibited from transporting 1. c. 1. freight in closed cars within a municipality or between contiguous municipalities. However, certain exceptions to this provision were recognized, such as the necessity of relieving freight-house facilities congested because of the lack of motor vehicles, or due to the inaccessibility of freight house facilities to motortrucks. It was believed that the use of motortrucks in municipal areas would provide more economical and expeditious movement of rail freight than could be provided by rail exclusively. Prohibition of the use of boxcars in this service was considered a positive step forward, not only in saving freight cars, but also in more efficient handling of terminal merchandise freight. According to a statement of the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, at the time General Order ODT No. 1 was issued, the average merchandise load of terminal cars in 1941 was approximately 2 tons per car.
For the period May 1942 through April 1943, the first full year this order was in effect, 278,124 cars were loaded with intraterminal merchandise freight, with an average of 9.6 tons per car. In the period from May 1943 to April 1944, 323,311 cars were loaded with such freight, averaging 8.7 tons per car. This increase in the number of intraterminal cars during the record year resulted from curtailment of truck operations, due to such economic factors as inadequate supply of replacements, repair parts, tires, and manpower. The decrease in the number of cars used in terminal service, because of the prohibition against their use except in specified cases, together with the higher average loading attained when such cars were used, resulted in the release of many cars for intercity carload freight.
The order prohibited also holding cars at freight houses for an accumulation of 1. c. 1. freight. When a rail carrier was unable to obtain the minimum load required under this order within the time specified, it was required to divert such traffic to another carrier, thereby reducing to a minimum delays in handling of such traffic.
To expedite the movement of traffic, carriers were permitted to establish joint action plans as set forth in the order. Among the permissible actions were (a) scheduled regular “ sailing days”; (b) staggered merchandise vehicle schedules: (c) arrange reciprocal exchange of merchandise between two or more points; and (d) pool traffic. Joint action plans such as were covered by this order were normally forbidden under the Interstate Commerce Act; however, such restrictions were relaxed during this period of emergency. These joint action plans resulted in a considerable saving in car days and afforded relief in critical labor areas.
Carrier performances in loading equipment under General Order ODT No. 1 were policed largely through reports filed monthly by the various carriers themselves. These reports were carefully analyzed in the Car Utilization Section of the Division of Traffic Movement to determine whether the provisions of the order were being observed.
Car Savings Achieved.
General Order ODT No. 1 resulted in much heavier loading of boxcars with merchandise tonnage, thereby accomplishing the release of a substantial number of cars for use in the movement of military and civilian carload freight. These additions to the car supply are indicated in the following statement compiled from the monthly ODT-SMS reports submitted by the carriers:
12
Year May-December 1942
1945 1944 1943
Total tonnage (estimated) .. 52,742,425 52,030,861 50,870,062 31,443,508
Total cars (estimated) 5,704,036 5,663,665 5,317,124 3,225,726
Average loading (tons) 9.2 9.2 9.6 9.7
Average loading 1941 (tons estimated) ....... 5.5 5.5 5.5
Carloadings if tonnage had moved at 1941 average .... 9,589,532 9,460,157 9,249,102 5,717,001
Savings in car loadings ..... 3,885,496 3,796,492 3,931,978 2,491,275
Average trips per car per year (estimated) 36 36 86 36
Additional car supply 107,930 105,458 •| 109,221 69,202
Under the provisions of General Order ODT No. 1, the Office of Defense Transportation issued six general permits to expedite the movement of traffic and increase the supply of cars of particular types in the grain and perishable loading areas. The pertinent provisions of such general permits were:
General Permit ODT No. 1-1 covered the movement of freight between points in the same municipalities or between contiguous municipalities consigned to or from the armed forces.
General Permit ODT No. 1-2 covered the movement of freight from any city or town consigned to the armed forces in connection with field maneuvers, etc.
General Permit ODT No. 1-3 covered the movement of cotton to and from warehouses where railroads had entered into contracts covering such shipments.
General Permit ODT No. 1-4 covered the loading of not less than 5 tons of merchandise freight in cars destined to points within the grain loading territory, or moving toward that territory.
General Permit ODT No. 1-5 covered the return movement of specially equipped cars used in the shipment of rayon yarn.
General Permit ODT No. 1-6 covered the loading of not less than five net tons of merchandise freight in refrigerator cars to destinations in the States of Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, or Wyoming to El Paso, Tex., that such refrigerator cars might be available for loading perishables eastbound.
Rail-Truck Coordination.
The minimum loading requirements of General Order ODT No. 1 stimulated efforts to coordinate rail and truck services. In the case of way trains, that is, trains moving 1. c. 1. freight to local stations, it was found especially difficult to comply with the 10-ton minimum loading. Furthermore, local services usually can be more economically performed by truck. As a result, rail carriers substituted trucks for freight cars whenever possible.
Difficulty was encountered in promoting coordin
ation where the railroads did not have the motor equipment or lacked authority to operate it. In some such situations, the railroads made agreements with independent motor carriers to perform services formerly furnished by freight cars. Railroads that had the equipment sometimes failed to obtain approval to operate it from the regulatory commissions, in view of the shortage of rubber, fuel, and other critical materials, or because of the desire of the regulatory agencies to encourage agreements between railroads and independent motor carriers, under which the latter would handle the traffic.
These agreements were not readily consummated, however. The railroads advanced numerous reasons for refusing to allow motor carriers to perform the service. The latter, of course, disputed the validity of the railroads’ position. The railroads contended, that any arrangement made with independent motor carriers required them to deal with a large number of such carriers whereas the traffic had to be handled under common control; that the motor carriers did not have sufficient equipment to move the freight involved ; and that the motor carriers did not have certain specialized equipment required by certain freight as, for example, perishables. Needless to say, the motor carriers denied these assertions and considered themselves capable of performing the service. But the failure of the parties to agree thwarted in large measure the coordination program of the Office of Defense Transportation.
General Order ODT No. 1 directed attention to railroad methods of handling 1. c. 1. freight. Because the carriers claimed the loading requirements of the order often delayed and hampered the free flow of traffic, the Office of Defense Transportation instituted numerous studies throughout the country to determine the effect of the heavier loading on the movement of merchandise cars. Before discussing the results of these studies, it is necessary to understand the manner in which railroads normally handle 1. c. 1. freight.
In general, merchandise freight is handled at three points, namely, at origin, at transfer station, and at destination. Points of origin are various and often located at important traffic centers where large shipments are concentrated. These shipments usually move to transfer stations where they are broken up and 1. c. 1. lots grouped in separate cars for local on-line deliveries, or for distant off-line transfer stations. Frequently cars loaded with 1. c. 1. freight and destined to distant points, stop at several transfer stations en route to break bulk and consolidate shipments consigned to the same destination.
Through L.C.L. Traffic.
Transfer points or stations vary in importance,
13
according to the volume of traffic and the number of cars handled. At some stations freight is both originated and transferred, at others, only transfer functions are performed. The most important and congested transfers are found at or near large cities because a large proportion of 1. c. 1. shipments are consigned to such cities. The customary practice is to break up the shipments there and then consolidate through consignments on other cars moving toward destination.
The railroads complained that the loading requirements of General Order ODT No. 1 obstructed the free flow of 1. c. 1. freight by delaying the movement of cars. Several reasons were advanced by the carriers. First, the 10-ton minimum loading often was not available, and cars were kept waiting for loads. This resulted in an accumulation of empties at stations and terminals. Then, as a consequence of heavier loading, more cars had to stop at transfers to break bulk and consolidate shipments consigned to the same destinations. This not only served to aggravate the congestion already existing at many stations, because of heavy war traffic, but it also taxed the limited labor supply at such points. In addition, heavier loading and unloading took more time. There were, however, other factors operating to expedite merchandise movement. Heavier loading meant fewer cars, and therefore less switching and handling.
It was to determine the effects of the order as precisely as possible, with a view of making any needed modifications that the Section of Rail-Truck Coordination in the Division of Railway Transport undertook to survey conditions affecting the movement of 1. c. 1. freight at 53 important points scattered throughout the region east of the Mississippi.
It was found that, where the trend of loaded boxcars was predominantly in one direction, empties accumulated, thus making for congestion and delay. This condition was particularly noted in New England. The war had increased the movement of loaded cars into that region and sufficient loading was not available for transport in the reverse direction. In this situation, inflexible application of the minimum loading requirements of the order tended to tie up cars and delay their movement. It was found also that frequent stops were made at transfers.
As a result of the studies conducted by the Office of Defense Transportation, corrective measures were taken. In January 1944 the Office of Defense Transportation, after consultation with carriers and shippers, established through scheduled merchandise car service between important New England points and destinations beyond local transfers and gateways. Direct lines, for example, were operated between such
cities as Boston, Bridgeport, Fall River, Hartford, and Lawrence; and Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Cincinnati. Shipments consigned to the same areas were consolidated for movement to destinations. When necessary to expedite transport and avert congestion, cars were permitted to move with less than the minimum lading required by the order.
Similar arrangements were made between important centers throughout the region east of the Mississippi, and between certain important centers in Western Territory. The objective was always the same: to expedite the movement of 1. c. 1. freight in the direction of empty-car movements, and to by-pass transfers. When necessary, the restrictions of the order were relaxed to achieve these ends.
The cooperation of shippers was essential to the success of the program, for the through scheduled merchandise services could be maintained only if shippers concentrated sufficient tonnage at the designated points of origin to justify the operation of such cars. The Office of Defense Transportation enlisted the aid of the National Industrial Traffic League to urge shippers to utilize these services. The Office drew up lists of the scheduled merchandise cars and, through the League, distributed them as widely as possible.
In general, the program proved successful. It served to speed the movement of 1. c. 1. freight, to relieve congestion at terminals and transfers, and to ease the pressure on the short supply of labor at these points. In January 1944 there were 91 car lines in New England alone furnishing direct scheduled services. The result was a reduction of approximately 23 percent in the tonnage handled at transfers. Furthermore, shipments formerly requiring 25 days to reach destination covered the same distance in 5 days. Comparable results were achieved in other regions.
Carload Freight Controls.
General Order ODT No. 18 was designed to bring about a more efficient utilization of freight cars by increasing, often sharply, the minimum load of cars containing carload freight. It was originally issued August 15, 1942, to become effective September 15. The effective date was subsequently postponed to October 15, but on October 13, General Order ODT No. 18, Revised, was promulgated, replacing the original order. General Order ODT No. 18, Revised, became effective November 1, 1942, and remained in force until November 1, 1943, when it was superseded by General Order ODT No. 18A. The changes embodied in these revisions, as issued from time to time, did not affect essentially the basic purpose or provisions of the original order.
14
The importance of the shipper was clearly recognized by the Office of Defense Transportation. Not only was the counsel of the carriers sought through the Association of American Railroads, but the benefit of shippers’ counsel was obtained through the National Industrial Traffic League, regional shippers’ advisory boards, and the War Production Board. Based on their experience, the shippers furnished advice and information to the Office of Defense Transportation in making the order practicable. To meet the requirements of this order, shippers incurred substantial expenditures to cover the added costs of loading, bracing and packaging, and, in addition, responded most effectively to appeals for faster loading and unloading of equipment, which, in turn, reduced the turn-around time of the equipment.
The principal provisions of General Order ODT No. 18A may be conveniently summarized under the following topics: (1) Loading regulations; (2) exemptions and permits; (3) stop-over and consolidation privileges; and (4) responsibility for compliance. These were the pertinent features of an order designed to bring about maximum utilization of carrier equipment.
Under these provisions, shippers were prohibited from offering, and rail »carriers from accepting for transportation, any freight car which was not so loaded that the contents equalled or exceeded in weight the marked capacity of the car; or, were ■sufficient in quantity in the case of nonbulk freight in an open freight car, to occupy and utilize all practicable stowage space of such car.
It was realized that in certain situations full utilization of equipment would often not only defeat the purpose of the order, but would also hamper the free movement of war materials. To »cope with this situation certain exemptions from the loading requirements of the order were noted and departures permitted through the issuance of special and general permits. These exemptions covered, among other types, freight consigned to the armed forces, livestock, explosives, or other dangerous articles, and freight loaded in cars which did not qualify for interchange under MCB rules. Special permits were issued by the Office of Defense Transportation primarily to expedite the movement of traffic or to safe
guard lading, but, under certain emergencies such permits might be issued by the carriers to avoid delay in the movement of the particular traffic in question.
To relax all rules covering the stop-over and consolidating privileges as customarily noted in the rail carriers’ tariffs, the order permitted additional stopovers as the carriers might deem necessary to expedite the prompt movement of traffic, and also for multiple loading or consolidation of shipments in cars.
The responsibility for »complying with the loading requirements of this order was shared by both shipper and carrier and it was due in no small measure to the splendid cooperation between shipper and carrier that substantial savings in the use of freight equipment were made possible.
The order contemplated that no undue hardships should be caused any particular shipper, though it was recognized that considerable extra effort and expense were imposed upon the shippers by heavier loading. The great saving in carloadings and the ability to move the increased tonnage with a lesser number of cars was due mostly to the cooperation of the shippers and the receivers of freight. The section of Car Utilization in the Division of Traffic Movement in addition to administering General Order ODT No. 1 also administered General Order ODT No. 18A and issued general and special permits to shippers where such were necessary to enable them to move their products.
Car Savings Under General Order ODT No. 18.
General Order ODT No. 18 was not in effect until November 1, 1942, but an estimate of the gains resulting during 1943 and 1944, made upon the basis of the average weight of lading in 1941, indicates the benefits which flowed from this order:
Year
1944 1943
Total carload tonnage 1,471,366,021 1,462,314,059
Number of cars loaded 36,540,944 35,657,030
Average loading (tons) 40.3 41.0
Average loading, 1941 (tons) Number of carloads if 1941 average 38.2 38.2
loading used 38,517,435 38,280,473
Savings in cars loaded 1,976,491 2,623,443
Average trips per car per year Additional cars that would have been required had 1941 loading average 24 24
prevailed 82,354 109,810
15
CHAPTER IV
THE TRAFFIC CHANNELS PLAN
Railroad operations in wartime require more centralized supervision than in peacetime. Because railroad facilities are normally adequate to meet peacetime demands, no unusual strain is imposed on the railroad system except in unusual circumstances. Furthermore, there is in peacetime an established and definite pattern of rail movement to which the available railroad equipment is adjusted through ■controls exercised on a nationwide scale by the Car Service Division of the Association of American Railroads.
The war effected radical changes in rail transport. It increased tremendously the freight load at a time when the supply of equipment was at best fixed, and it disrupted the normal pattern of traffic movement. New industries and military establishments were developed on sites which had lacked rail connections, but now required them. There was a lengthening in the rail haul on this account and also on account of increasing movement of freight to ports for shipment abroad. These conditions modified and sometimes reversed the direction of loaded and empty car movement. They constantly menaced the free flow of rail traffic by increasing the burden on individual lines and portions thereof, as well as by adding to the congestion at terminals and gateways. In these circumstances, obstructions could be averted most effectively by a centralized supervisory authority continuously informed of conditions likely to affect the free flow of traffic and using such information to remove them. It was for this purpose that the Office of Defense Transportation established its traffic channels plan.
The basic feature of the plan was a daily reporting .system which was instituted early in 1942 by the ■Office of Defense Transportation, and which was altered from time to time to meet changing conditions. The plan functioned under a purely voluntary arrangement between the carriers and the Office of Defense Transportation. No order was promulgated by the Office of Defense Transportation to enforce it.
Daily Reports Submitted.
To obtain the necessary data to enable the Office
to anticipate conditions likely to interrupt the free and continuous flow of traffic and to take measures to prevent obstructions, the Office of Defense Transportation designed a report form, SC-1, which secured for it a detailed account of rail operations. Originally the major railroads, 121 in all, made these reports. This form asked data for a period of 24 hours, for each division, terminal, and railroad. The following subjects were covered:
1. Freight, passenger and mixed trains dispatched.
2. Loaded and empty cars dispatched and awaiting movement.
3. Freight trains held out of yards 1 hour or more.
4. Freight trains delayed 2 hours or more for motive power.
5. Freight trains delayed 2 hours or more for road crews.
6. Cars set off short of terminals.
7. Cars held 4 hours or more account of connections not accepting currently.
8. Crews relieved account 16-hour law.
Prior to June 1942 the plan was operated on an experimental basis. Each superintendent transmitted essential data daily to the chief operating official of his railroad, and the latter, in turn, sent a consolidated report for the entire road by air mail to the. Office of Defense Transportation in Washington.
The plan was made effective officially on June 1, 1942. In November reports from the carriers were speeded by the installation of three commercial telegraph circuits at the Washington headquarters of the Office of Defense Transportation. These were used on a time basis for the transmission of the reports. As a result, a saving of 24 hours was effected in the time required for the compilation of data on car and train movements.
Immediately after midnight, under the plan, each divisional superintendent telegraphed the requested data for his division and terminal or terminals for the preceding 24 hours to the chief operating officer of the railroad. After every superintendent had reported, this official transmitted the information to the Office of Defense Transportation. The data were received in code and then compiled for each road. Normally, by early afternoon the last report was completed.
Each report as it was received was turned over to an analyst in the Traffic Channels Section of the
17
Division of Traffic Movement who was familiar with the territory in which the reporting railroad operated. The analyst reviewed the data by divisions and gateways, and noted for consideration by the Traffic Channels Chief any irregularities revealed by the record of the day’s movements.
A tabulation was then made for all railroads, and a summary prepared for the Director of the Division of Traffic Movement and for the Director of the Division of Railway Transport. At the same time, a map of the United States was drawn showing by colored shading areas in which congestion threatened. It was this map, showing trouble spots and areas, upon which the attention of the Office of Defense Transportation was focused and which constituted the héart of , the plan.
Traffic Channels Map.
The map was divided into three channels, each extending latitudinally across the country, and again into seven channels, each extending longitudinally between the Canadian and southern boundaries. Each channel was created with a view to grouping the principal railroads operating within it in the direction of the lines circumscribing it. All the principal railroad lines appeared on the map, as well as symbols representing terminals and gateways. The boundaries of the channels enclosed 21 zones, each of which was designated by a number. Since zones frequently covered parts of several States, reference could most conveniently be made by number. Conditions relative to the movement of traffic and to terminal and gateway operations, as determined from the tabulated data, were represented on the map by appropriate annotations. It was possible, therefore, to obtain from the map a comprehensive view of conditions as they existed daily in all parts of the country. < .
In addition to the daily reports and maps, the Traffic Channels Section prepared and circulated other analyses of the data. These included a daily running record of the preceding 2 weeks’ traffic flow for each channel, zone, and gateway. Graphic illustrations of traffic flow were also made, and tabulations were set up semimonthly as were reports covering a similar period summarizing railway conditions throughout the country. The latter reports were discontinued after June 1944. A daily memorandum also was prepared, giving outstanding features of railway operating conditions and indicating spots where trouble had developed or was imminent. This daily memorandum was furnished not only to those divisions of the Office of Defense Transportation which were concerned with rail transport, but also
to other Government agencies interested and to the Association of American Railroads.
At the end of 1942 the traffic channels plan had functioned for 8 months. In that period the Section charged with its administration had accumulated evidence that changing conditions warranted revision of several features of the plan. At the same time, the carriers, as a result of their operating experiences under the plan, were prepared to make recommendations for changes. The plan was consequently revised in accordance with proposals submitted by both the Office of Defense Transportation and the railroads.
In the first place, it was concluded that daily reports from all terminals and gateways were no longer essential. While 121 class I railroads reported in the initial stages of the plan, after June 1, 1942, this number was reduced to 108, covering 955 divisions and terminals. Since many of these roads were not congested and were not engaged in the transport of freight moving over long distances to crucial gateways or ports, there was no compelling reason to require all to transmit daily reports. Such reports could be requested when conditions at particular terminals required it. Accordingly, beginning February 23, 1943, only 70 railroads were asked to submit daily reports. This number was varied from, time to time as conditions changed. Beginning in April 1944, 64 roads reported for 210 terminals, and in the fall of that year, 57 roads reported for 204 terminals. As of December 31,1944, only nine roads, all of them transcontinental lines, were required to report, this number being increased subsequently to 32. In short, daily reports were submitted only for important terminals at which congestion threatened and need of corrective action by the Office of Defense Transportation anticipated.
Another change, effective as of February 23,1943, simplified the report form. The number of items of information called for in the revised form were substantially reduced. They were the following:
(a) Trains dispatched in each direction.
(b) Freight cars, loaded and empty, dispatched in each direction.
(c) Cars awaiting movement, loaded and empty.
In addition, the statement from each reporting divisional or terminal superintendent included trains held out of terminals, shortage of locomotives, freight cars, and crews, and interferences with movement, such as wrecks or floods, requiring that traffic be rerouted or diverted. Part of this information had not been contained in the original report form and had been the subject of special reports, made from time to time. The revised form eliminated
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these special reports and thus relieved the carriers of a considerable burden on its limited clerical forces.
To summarize: The Traffic Channels Section, under the Division of Traffic Movement, originally a staff division, received reports, made studies, prepared charts, graphs, and visual and tabular presentations indicating traffic trends, peak movements, directional flow, and potential additional capacities,
and advised upon matters connected with the movement by rail traffic within the United States. The SC-1 report continued to be a basic and vital source of information for the Washington Office, as well as the regional offices, relative to daily operating conditions upon major rail lines. From it could be determined readily where difficulty lay and where additional capacity remained.
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CHAPTER V
DIVERSION AND REROUTING OF TRAFFIC
In the fall of 1942 it became evident that the rail carriers serving the Pacific coast area, especially south of Oregon, were confronted with conditions that threatened congestion and delay in their operation. War activities in the region, both industrial and military, had induced the movement of an unprecedented volume of freight by rail. The expansion of industries, their locations without the benefit of expert transportation advice, the establishment of military camps and training grounds, the increase of export traffic through Pacific coast ports, and the elimination of intercoastal shipping by way of the Panama Canal taxed railroad capacity to the breaking point. And to this burden was added the heavy and continuous westward flow of military passenger traffic for the war in the Pacific.
While similar conditions were present in varying measure in all sections of the country during the war, the transcontinental carriers operating in western territory were most acutely affected. Their equipment and facilities were adjusted to peacetime requirements and were far less adequate to meet wartime demands than those of the important carriers in eastern territory, because the increase in traffic in western territory had been proportionately greater. This was true in spite of the fact that the western carriers spent large sums in expanding their plants. In this regard scarcity of labor and materials was a limiting factor.
The difficulties of the western carriers, furthermore, were aggravated by a reversal in the flow of traffic. In peacetime, the movement of loaded cars was predominantly eastward. But the activities in the Pacific theater of the war operated chiefly to augment the westward movement of traffic. As a result, the westward movement of loaded cars advanced so sharply that it generally equaled or exceeded the eastward movement. This change in flow of traffic created special problems for the carriers although it also was helpful in creating a better balanced movement with consequent improvement in westward car and train loading.
Traffic, of course, was unevenly distributed among the carriers. For example, the load on transcontin
ental lines operating in the northern tier of States between Oregon and Washington and the Twin Cities was not nearly so heavy as on the central and southern routes serving California terminals. Again congestion tended to develop at specific terminals and gateways. This was conspicuously true of the Ogden-Salt Lake City gateway area. Thus, while facilities in some western areas were burdened beyond capacity, in others, surplus capacity was available which, if the flow of traffic were properly regulated, could be used to relieve congestion elsewhere.
It was clear then that to improve utilization of equipment, and to prevent congestion and delay, traffic had to be diverted or rerouted from overburdened rail lines to those with excess «capacity. The task was beyond the ability of shippers or agencies routing traffic. Conditions changed from day to day, and it was impossible for shippers or even the individual carriers to keep currently informed of the situation on all lines in the area. Furthermore, the shipper could not anticipate obstructions to the flow of traffic that might arise while his shipment was en route. What was clearly needed in the circumstances was a central agency, continuously informed of conditions throughout the whole of the transcontinental territory, and having authority to divert and reroute traffic in such a manner as to avoid congestion.
Jurisdiction Over Problem.
Three agencies were directly concerned with the problem, and at least as early as November 1942 were engaged in devising remedial measures. They were the Association of American Railroads, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Office of Defense Transportation. Numerous conferences were held at which each of these agencies submitted plans for regulating the flow of traffic in transcontinental territory. The Association of American Railroads, through its Car Service Division, was most directly associated with railroad operations in consequence of its powers to control the movement and distribution of freight and passenger cars. It proposed further extension of the functions of the Car Service Divi
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sion to include rerouting and diversion. It was decided, however, that the exercise of such control by the industry itself was undesirable as a probable violation of the antitrust laws. Director Boatner, of the Division of Railway Transport, suggested a method envisioning car diversion at Chicago. There were objections to the scheme by Director McCarthy, of the Division of Traffic Movement, and the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation called for an alternative plan. This was a counter proposal to the Association of American Railroads and to the previous Boatner plan. Meetings were held in Washington with western executives who made a counter proposal which, in time, was worked out.
To set forth clearly the arrangement made to direct the flow of transcontinental traffic, it is necessary to distinguish between the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission and that of the Office of Defense Transportation. The Interstate Commerce Act (sec. 1, pars. 10-17, inclusive) gave the Commission comprehensive regulatory authority over “car service” which was defined as the—
use, control, supply, movement, distribution, exchange, interchange, and return of locomotives, cars, and other vehicles used in the transportation of property.
The Commission’s duties in this regard were performed by its Bureau of Service which functioned through 16 regional offices located at strategic railroad centers throughout the country, and 40 service agents who operated in the field under the regional offices. In 1942 Col. J. M. Johnson, later Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, was the Commissioner in charge of the Bureau of Service. The service agents of the Bureau were constantly in the field inspecting railroad terminals and other facilities, and reported on all conditions affecting rail operations.
The Interstate Commerce Act (sec. 1, par. 15) granted special powers to the Commission in time of emergency. Under this provision of the act, the Commission was authorized to direct rail traffic movements. The act provided:
Whenever the Commission is of opinion that shortage of equipment, congestion of traffic, or other emergency requiring immediate action exists in any section of the country, the Commission***is hereby given authority***(b) to make just and reasonable directions with respect to car service without regard to the ownership as between carriers of locomotives, cars, and other vehicles—as in its opinion will best promote the service in the interest of the public and the commerce of the people***.
At the same time, the Office of Defense Transportation, under Executive Order 8989, Sec. 3 (c) was empowered by the President to—
Coordinate and direct domestic traffic movements with the objective of preventing possible points of traffic congestion and assuring the orderly and expeditious movement of men, materials and supplies to points of need.
Also, under sec. 3 (e) was given the same emergency powers given the Interstate Commerce Commission under sec. 1, par. 15, of the Interstate Commerce Act quoted above.
Without deciding which of the two agencies had paramount authority to direct traffic movement, the Office of Defense Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Commission agreed to act jointly in the field through a common agent. W. F. Kirk, assistant general manager of the Missouri Pacific Railroad, and long experienced in railroad operations, was appointed, upon recommendation of the Association of American Railroads, agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission and also western director of the Division of Railway Transport of the Office of Defense Transportation. He was placed in charge of western territory with offices at Chicago. His duties were defined by the Office of Defense Transportation as follows:
To coordinate and direct domestic traffic movements by rail to the extent necessary to eliminate and prevent traffic congestion on lines of common carriers by railroad located west of a direct line extending northward along the west banks of the Mississippi and Illinois Rivers, from New Orleans, La., to Chicago, Ill., thence northward and eastward along the west and north banks of Lake Michigan to the international boundary.
In other words, the common agent was charged with responsibility for all activities of the Division of Railway Transport in western territory, subject, of course, to the direction of the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation and the Director of the Division of Railway Transport. As Associate Director, he was chief not only of his staff, operating in his Chicago office, but also of the district rail and port directors located at strategic rail centers throughout the territory. This entire staff was within the organization of the Office of Defense Transportation.
Mr. Kirk was designated as agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission by Service Order No. 99, issued February 3,1943. The service order defined his authority and functions, and vested him with authority thus :
(a) To divert or reroute transcontinental carload traffic from the line of any railroad which in his opinion, could not currently accept and move such traffic over the line or lines of any other railroad less congested, and in a better position to handle the traffic.
(b) To set up, subject to the approval of the Commission, advisory committee including at least one representaive of the Office of Defense Transportation, and one of the Association of American Railroads.
(c) To avail himself of the facilities of the Association of American Railroads, its various departments, field forces, records, and reports.
In addition, the order arranged for the application and division of rates relating to diverted traffic. This was a subject within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission as the Office of Defense Trans
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portation had no rate-making powers. Service Order No. 99 provided that since diversion or rerouting was necessary because of the disability of the carrier, the rates applicable to traffic diverted or rerouted by the agent should be the rates that were applicable on the shipment as originally routed.
The order directed the carriers to disregard all existing agreements and arrangements governing the division of rates in respect of diverted traffic and enjoined them to agree upon divisions voluntarily. Upon failure to agree, the Commission undertook to fix divisions in accordance with its authority under the Interstate Commerce Act. In practice, it proved unnecessary for the Commission to exercise this power.
Administration of Work.
Service Order No. 99, unlike the grant of authority from the Office of Defense Transportation, did not define in geographical terms the area in which Mr. Kirk was authorized to act as agent of the Commission. The order stated merely that he was authorized to divert or reroute “transcontinental carload traffic.” “Transcontinental” traffic is usually defined as traffic for which the Transcontinental Freight Bureau files rates. The term embraces, therefore, all traffic moving in either direction between points in Arizona, California, the northern part of Idaho, the western part of New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, the western part of Utah, Washington, and the extreme western points in British Columbia in the vicinity of Vancouver and Victoria, on the one hand and, on the other, points on and east of a line extending from El Paso, through Denver, Cheyenne, thence along the eastern boundary lines (of Wyoming and Montana to the Canadian boundary line. In practice, however, it was found that congested conditions arising in western areas tributary to transcontinental territory, although not technically included within it occasionally threatened the expeditious movement of transcontinental traffic proper. The agent’s authority under Service Order No. 99, was construed to extend to such areas. The principal carriers affected by his diversion and rerouting activities were the large transcontinental railroads, that is, the Southern Pacific, the Union Pacific, the Western Pacific, the Santa Fe, the Great Northern, the Northern Pacific, the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific, and their connecting lines.
Mr Kirk received reports from both the field offices of the Division of Railway Transport, Office of Defense Transportation, and the agents of the Bureau of Service, Interstate Commerce Commission, concerning conditions affecting the operations of transcontinental carriers, and, as has been noted, 700494—48—3
received daily reports by wire from the railroads under the traffic channels plan.
In addition, he was assisted by an advisory committee that Service Order No. 99 directed him to establish, subject to the approval of the Commission. A committee was established, consisting originally of 24 members: 22 of these represented transcontinental railroads; one represented the Office of Defense Transportation, and one the Association of American Railroads. The committee functioned in a purely advisory capacity. Mr. Kirk served as chairman and submitted to it matters of general concern. The committee furnished information and offered advice not only on invitation but also on its own initiative. In issuing specific diversion orders, however, action was taken after consultation with the carriers directly affected, that is, the diverting railroad and the road to which the diversion was directed.
Diversion and Rerouting Orders.
In general, two situations were distinguishable that called for diversion or rerouting. One resulted from causes that were entirely unpredictable, such as wrecks, floods, slides, and the like. The second resulted from congestion at terminals or sluggish movement due to facilities or equipment inadequate to handle effectively the traffic offered. This latter condition could often be anticipated by close scrutiny of traffic flow, and could be averted or minimized, therefore, by transferring traffic to a less congested line or by rerouting it in such a manner as to bypass congested points.
Diversion or rerouting orders generally directed one carrier to divert to another carrier a specified number of loaded cars per day. Most of the orders were issued on request of the carriers to relieve congestion at gateways. In such cases, or when lines were disabled because of obstructions, the order prescribed the routing to be followed. When conditions responsible for the issuance of an order were corrected, the order was revoked, or it terminated in accordance with its provisions.
The elimination of cross-hauling between the Salt Lake City and Ogden gateways was an especially notable achievement. In peacetime, the Denver & Rio Grande Western interchanged traffic with the Southern Pacific at Ogden. This required moving through the Salt Lake gateway to Ogden. On Mr. Kirk’s recommendation, the interchange was effected at Salt Lake City on the lines of the Western Pacific, and the movement to Ogden was eliminated. Similarly, east-bound traffic on the Southern Pacific destined for the Denver & Rio Grande Western instead of moving to Ogden and then to Salt Lake City, was
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transferred to the Western Pacific at Elko and interchanged at Salt Lake City. Following the same principle, traffic normally moving via the Union Pacific for interchange with the Western Pacific at Salt Lake City was delivered to the Southern Pacific at Ogden and moved by it to Elko for delivery to the Western Pacific, thus eliminating the movement through Ogden to Salt Lake City.
Military Traffic.
Service Order No. 99, as originally framed, made no distinction between Army and civilian freight, nor did the common agent, in his orders. When an order directed a carrier to divert or reroute a specific number of cars, the carrier exercised its discretion in selecting the cars, so long as it created no preference or priority. What the carrier generally did was to select those cars for diversion that could be most conveniently handled in compliance with the order.
An exception was made to this general policy by Kirk’s order No. 25, issued June 1,1943. It exempted from Service Order No. 99 traffic “consisting of supplies or equipment of troops, when accompanied by such troops either on the same train or on a solid special train.” The purpose of this exception was to prevent the separation of cars carrying military equipment from troops for whose use it was being transported.
The Transportation Corps, Army Service Forces, requested, in addition, that all carload freight consigned by or to the Army be exempted from the provisions of Service Order No. 99. Such freight moved under the direction of the Traffic Control Division of the Corps, and Army officers located at strategic railroad points checked and expedited its movement. When carload Army traffic was diverted in accordance with a diversion or rerouting order, the Army complained that it became impossible for its transportation officers to trace or follow it,' and that urgent shipments were often delayed.
The exemption was partially granted. Since such exemption created a preference or priority, it was necessary that the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation issue a certificate of preference and priority in accordance with section 1 (15) of the Interstate Commerce Act. The act provides, in this respect, that in time of war the President may certify to the Commission that it is essential to the national defense and security that certain traffic shall have preference and priority in transportation, andi the Commission shall *** direct that such preference or priority be afforded.
Executive Order 8989 transferred to the Office of Defense Transportation the powers and duties of the President under this part of the act, and the Director, accordingly, issued Certificate of Preference and Priority in Transportation No. 2 dated
January 19, 1944. The certificate requested that the Interstate Commerce Commission afford “preference and priority” to carload freight traffic of the War Department moving under symbols to the extent that such traffic should “not be subject to any diversion order of the Interstate Commerce Commission or its agents.” The Interstate Commerce Commission then issued amendment No. 1 to Service Order No. 99, providing that War Department traffic moving under symbols should not be subject to diversion. These symbols were applied to traffic that required expedited movement because of special need or circumstance.
After the termination of the War in Europe, it was anticipated that the flow of traffic in support of the war against Japan would increase substantially to the Pacific coast ports and necessitate the use of the Gulf ports as well. To meet any contingencies that might result, Service Order No. 99 was expanded by amendment No. 2, issued May 10,1945.
This amendment defined the area in which the common agent was authorized to issue diversion and rerouting orders in geographical terms. It authorized him to direct such orders to any railroad subject to the Interstate Commerce Act *** in the territory on or west of the following line: The west bank of Lake Michigan; the Illinois-Indiana State line; thence the west bank of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to the Gulf of Mexico.
This expansion eastward of the common agent’s jurisdiction enabled him to cope with any problem that might arise from the increased military traffic through the western Gulf ports. These ports, beginning in March 1945, were exporting large quantities of grain and flour to the distressed nations of Europe and north Africa and, on that account, might become congested. The amendment removed all uncertainty inherent in the use of the term “transcontinental” in the original order.
Under the amendment, the common agent was empowered to divert and reroute empty as well as .loaded freight cars. This was considered necessary because of the increased car movement that was anticipated, but largely it was designed to give him authority to move empties as expeditiously as loaded cars in order to relieve possible congestion within any port area or upon any line of railroad in western and southwestern territory.
The ICC Service Order No. 99 expired on October 31, 1945. Post-war developments, however, made continued control over diversion and rerouting of traffic imperative for the better serving of the economic readjustment of the country and for its large-scale humanitarian services abroad.
Thus, on November 1, 1945, the old Service Order No. 99 was superseded by Service Order No. 99, Re
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vised, which designated Deputy Director Homer C. King of the Office of Defense Transportation also as an agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission. It gave him authority to divert or reroute all carload freight traffic and empty freight cars. On
January 4, 1946, the service order was further revised to extend his control over the movement of less than carload traffic in addition to his authority over carload and empty car movements.
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CHAPTER VI
REFRIGERATOR CAR MOVEMENT
Plans for increased utilization of freight cars that were made soon after the organization of the Office of Defense Transportation included refrigerator cars. The allocation of materials by the War Production Board for freight car construction in 1942 was barely sufficient to provide for railroad equipment as a whole and no materials were allocated for the construction of refrigerator cars. It had already become apparent that the demand for rail transportation of perishable products would increase substantially during the war. This expectation was based on various changing conditions, including the virtual discontinuance of water-borne transportation between producing and consuming areas particularly from Florida to northern markets, a gradual but steady reduction in the volume of long-haul truck traffic, and increased diversification of consumption due to the establishment of large military camps in areas of hitherto sparse population.
Supply of Refrigerator Cars.
Both the number of refrigerator cars in railroad service and the volume of perishable traffic moved by rail had decreased in the decade preceding the war emergency. In 1941> however, the volume of perishable traffic increased slightly, and in 1942 it approached the record volume of 1928 and 1929 while
the car supply at the beginning of 1942 was only 82.7 percent of the number of cars available in 1928. From these changes in the volume of perishable traffic and in the supply of refrigerator cars it was evident that effective measures to increase car efficiency would have to be taken in order to avoid acute shortages of refrigerator cars. There had been a slight increase in the average loading of refrigerator cars from 1937 through 1941 and a significant increase occurred when the average tons per carload rose from 14.6 tons in 1941 to 15.95 tons in 1942, an increase of 9.2 percent. But the nature of perishable traffic is such that substantial increases in average loading were considered improbable and other measures for increasing refrigerator car utilization became an urgent necessity.
A statement prepared by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, entitled “Perishable Rail Freight Traffic in Relation to Refrigerator-Car Supply,” which was issued in June 1943 shows the changes in the volume of perishable traffic, car supply and average loading per car by years from 1928 to 1942 inclusive with percentage changes in relation to 1928. This statement of perishable traffic originated by class I railroads and moved in refrigerator cars is given below:
Rail carloads and tons of perishable traffic, not including beverages and canned goods, originated by class I steam railroads, and number of refrigerator cars, in United States, 1928 to 1942, inclusive, are shown in the following table. Index, 1928=100.
COMPARATIVE PERISHABLE TRAFFIC
Year Carloads originated Tons originated Average tons per carload Number of refrigerator cars on January 1. Percent i Relative
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
1928 1,548,981 100.0 21,762,926. 100.0 14.05 100.0 173,019 100.0
1929 1,551,992 100.2 22,011,412 101.1 14.18 100.9 175,545 101.5
1930 1,504,710 97.1 21,163,944 97.2 14.07 100.1 175,262 101.3
1931 1,451,652 93.7 20,404,184 93.8 14.06 100.1 176,107 101.8
1932 1,231,345 79.5 17,468,949 80.3 14.19 101.0 173,010 100.0
1933 1,193,172 77.0 16,846,300 77.4 14.12 100.5 (’)
1934 1,270,786 82.0 17,929,177 82.4 14.11 100.4 (’)
1935 1,140,182 73.6 16,083,917 73.9 14.11 100.4 158,776 91.8
1936 1,214,284 78.4 16,972,039 78.0 13.98 99-5 151,882 87.8
1937 1,214,604 78.4 16,979,281 78.0 13.98 99.5 149,875 86.6
1938 1,223,910 79.0 17,254,937 79.3 14.10 100.4 149,492 86.4
1939 1,200,634 77.5 16,979,784 78.0 14.14 100.6 146,799 84.4
1940 1,192,593 77.0 17,019,102 78.2 14.27 101.6 144,838 • 83.7
1941 1,245,749 80.4 18,191,317 83.6 14.60 103.9 142,169 82.2
1942 1,325,243 85.6 21,135,039 97.1 15.95 113.5 143,078 82.7
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture. ’Not available.
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Ownership of Refrigerator Cars.
Refrigerator cars, unlike most other cars of the other principal classes used in railroad transportation, are largely operated by private car lines. While the largest number of refrigerator cars is owned by private car companies that are railroad-owned or railroadrcontrolled, the operation of these cars is entirely under the control of the private car lines. Excluding the Railway Express Agency, the railroad-owned or controlled private car companies include the following:
American Refrigerator Transit Co. owns about 10,000 cars and is controlled by the Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., for which it furnishes cars. It also has contracts to supply cars for the Wabash Railroad and the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad.
Burlington Refrigerator Express Co., Fruit Growers Express Co., and Western Fruit Express Co. have an aggregate ownership of about 25,000 cars, all operated by the Fruit Growers Express Co. The Burlington Réfrigerator Express Co. has contracts to supply cars for the Burlington lines. The Fruit Growers Express Co. has contracts with the Florida East Coast Railway, the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, the Seaboard Air-line Railroad, the Southern Railway System, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, the Pennsylvania Railroad, the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, and about 30 other railroads.
Merchants Dispatch Transportation Corp, and Northern Refrigerator Lines, Inc., own a total of about 17,700 cars, most of which are used to supply the needs of the New York Central Railroad, which owns the companies. They also furnish cars to the ✓Illinois Central Railroad, the Northern Pacific Railway, and others.
Pacific Fruit Express Co. owns over 36,000 cars. It is owned jointly by the Union Pacific Railroad and the Southern Pacific Co., to which it supplies cars. It also furnishes cars to the Western Pacific Railroad Co.
The next largest group of private car companies own a total of slightly over 22,000 cars which they lease to other car companies, to shippers and, in some instances, to railroads. This group includes General American Transportation Corp., North American Car Corp., and North Western Refrigerator Line.
The packinghouse group had in excess of 10,000 refrigerator cars in service.
The operation of refrigerator cars of all ownerships has in the past been competitive and to some extent the equipment was designed to meet the peculiar needs of the perishable products of the areas which the various lines serve. As a consequence,
there has been less comman use of refrigerator cars than of most classes of equipment. For example, MDT cars loaded with potatoes in Maine and made empty at destinations as far south as Florida or as far west as Illinois, were ordinarily returned empty to the New England area, while FGE cars loaded with perishable products from Florida, PFE and SFRD cars loaded with similar commodities from California and made empty in the New England area were moved back empty to the areas served by their railroad owners or contract lines. This enormous cross-haul empty movement involved not only excessive payments for empty mileage on these private cars, but also created a wasteful use of motive power that could not be justified in a time of national emergency.
Plans for Increased Utilization.
In order to produce economies in the operation of the available supply of refrigerator cars that would be sufficient to enable it to meet the growing wartime needs, the Office of Defense Transportation prepared a plan for a Nation-wide refrigerator car pool to be operated by a pool manager under the direction of the Office of Defense Transportation with the aid of a board of control composed of representatives of the refrigerator car lines including both railroad-controlled and non-railroad-controlled lines. The board of control was to be under the chairmanship of a representative of the Office of Defense Transportation and the pool manager was to be selected by the board of control with the approval of the Association of American Railroads and the Office of Defense Transportation. The proposed plan authorized the pool manager to create an organization to operate all standard refrigerator cars of all ownerships without regard to car initials or contract obligations and to eliminate unnecessary cross-haul movements when necessary to protect the car supply needed for the movement of perishable products. The pool manager was also to be given the power to restrict the use of refrigerator cars for non-perishable traffic when necessary to meet the requirements of perishable traffic. The authority of the Office of Defense Transportation to organize a car pool to be operated without regard to car ownership or existing contracts for car supply was established in Executive Order No. 8989 Sec. 3(c).
At the request of the Office of Defense Transportation the chairman of the car service division, Association of American Railroads, submitted this plan to representatives of all private car lines at a conference called for that purpose. The private car lines’ representatives, after consideration of the Office of Defense Transportation’s proposal, submitted a sub
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stitute proposal which retained the proposed board of control and the proposed pool manager, but fell far short of the objectives of the Office of Defense Transportation to control the refrigerator car supply, and even eliminated from the board of control all representation of the Office of Defense Transportation. When the subject came up for consideration at a meeting of the advisory committee of railroad presidents, the president of the Association of American Railroads announced that at a meeting held the previous day the board of directors of the Association of American Railroads had established an organization for the operation of refrigerator cars under the direction of the manager of the refrigerator car section, car service division, Association of American Railroads, along lines similar to those proposed by the Office of Defense Transportation.
Without the participation of a representative of the Office of Defense Transportation in the operation of the plan proposed by the Association of American Railroads it lacked all semblance of the control needed for the discharge of the responsibility placed on the Office of Defense Transportation by Executive Order No. 8989. After further consideration by all parties, the plan was amended to more nearly meet the objectives of the Office of Defense Transportation and to provide for representation of that agency on the board of control. With some changes the Office of Defense Transportation agreed to give the plan a trial.
At that point, however, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice expressed the view that it could not give approval to the plan of the Association of American Railroads which had been worked out in conjunction with representatives of the refrigerator car owners for the control of refrigerator car movement, since the plan would be considered as being opposed to the policy of the Department of Justice in such matters. The advisory committee of railroad presidents was notified that because of the disapproval of the Department of Justice the plan of operation proposed by the Association of American Railroads could not be adopted. Shortly thereafter an ODT order was drafted to put into effect the refrigerator car pooling plan originally proposed by the Office of Defense Transportation. This order was referred to other Government agencies concerned with transportation matters in line with regular procedure. The Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission called attention to the statutory powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission in car service matters and emphasized the provisions of Executive Order No. 8989, which
directed the Office of Defense Transportation to maintain close liaison with the Interstate Commerce Commission in problems of car service.
A series of conferences between the Office of Defense Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Commission produced an agreement for a cooperative effort in matters over which the two agencies had overlapping jurisdiction. In pursuance of this agreement the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation certified to the Interstate Commerce Commission the need for certain controls over the distribution and movement of refrigerator cars and suggested that the Interstate Commerce Commission take appropriate action under its emergency powers to establish such controls. In certifying to the Interstate Commerce Commission the need for controls the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation expressed the view that refrigerator cars, without regard to ownership, should be used by shippers, and be distributed by rail carriers, so as to accomplish the following purposes:
1. To accord preference and precedence over other traffic normally transported in refrigerator cars, for the transportation of materials and supplies of war, and commodities requiring special protection from heat or cold;
2. To make such refrigerator cars available for use in the various loading areas in accordance with the relative needs therein;
3. To eliminate unnecessary hauls and to reduce the crosshaul of such refrigerator cars when empty;
<4. To reduce the use of such refrigerator cars for the transportation of canned goods, bottled goods, barreled goods, and other similar commodities in areas where seasonal or weather conditions permit the movement of such commodities without special protection from heat or cold;
5. To reduce the time for loading and unloading of commodities in such refrigerator cars;
6. To increase efficiency in the utilization operation and transportation of such refrigerator cars.
The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation also expressed the desire that refrigerator cars owned or operated by or leased to any of the military or naval authorities of the United States be exempted from the effect of action taken to control refrigerator car service.
Control of Refrigerator Cars by ICC.
In order to accomplish the objectives of the Office of Defense Transportation the Interstate Commerce Commission issued Service Order No. 95 on November 9, 1942, in which the manager of the refrigerator car section, car service division, Association of American Railroads, was appointed as agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission and vested with authority to control the movement of refrigerator cars and to carry out the Commission’s directions as to refrigerator car service. In outlining the duties of the agent of the Commission, Service Order No. 95 authorized and directed him to set up, subject to the approval of the Commission, and
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utilize the services of an advisory committee consisting of at least one representative of the Office of Defense Transportation, of the Association of American Railroads, of the railroad industry, of railroad-controlled refrigerator car companies, of non-railroad-controlled refrigerator car companies, and a representative of shipper-owned refrigerator •car companies. The order authorized and directed the agent to supervise, coordinate, and direct the distribution of all refrigerator cars according to the needs of the various loading areas and with due regard to economy in their use and mileage. It also authorized the agent, when necessary, to direct the distribution of all refrigerator cars, without regard to ownership or assignment, so as to accomplish the purposes stated in the certification of the Office of Defense Transportation.
The advisory committee provided for in Service Order’No. 95 was duly established and continued to function throughout the emergency. All matters relating to refrigerator car service were considered at its regular monthly meetings. Its recommendations for orders to be issued, modified, or canceled by the Commission or by the agent of the Commission, pursuant to his authority under Service Order No. 95, were given most careful consideration by the Commission and its agent. In the period of the emergency which followed the issuance of Service Order No. 95 on November 9, 1942, until the end of 1945 the Interstate Commerce Commission issued over 60 service orders affecting refrigerator car service, many of which, together with orders issued prior to the date of Service Order No. 95, were modified by amendments made effective subsequent to that date. Some of the service orders relating to refrigerator cars were issued on recommendations from the Office of Defense Transportation, some were issued in response to requests from the railroads, and some were issued on its own initiative by the Commission to remedy conditions reported by its service agents or by the advisory committee.
The effective control of refrigerator car service maintained by the Interstate Commerce Commission was made possible by a combination of factors which contributed in varying degree to the success of the effort to increase the utilization of refrigerator cars. Detailed weekly car reports showing car location, car loadings, and estimated loadings for ensuing weeks were made to the agent of the Commission and the Office of Defense Transportation. Summaries of these reports showing the constantly changing relation of car supply to car requirements in all loading areas, were made by the agent of the Commission for the guidance of the advisory committee. With representatives of all
branches of the refrigerator car supply industry on the advisory committee, its recommendations were based on the counsel of members who had an intimate knowledge of car supply problems derived from close daily contact in the areas served by their lines. During the emergency the number of service agents of the Interstate Commerce Commission was increased to 60, most of whom were located at points of potential traffic congestion. Their reports on the condition of yards and terminals, on delays in loading or unloading of cars, and on other matters affecting refrigerator car movement and supply provided valuable guidance to the Commission and its agent in efforts to meet the ever-changing wartime needs for refrigerator cars. Similar reports from the field representatives of the car service division, Association of American Railroads, were made available to the agent of the Commission in his position as manager of the refrigerator car section of the car service division. The representative of the Office of Defense Transportation on the advisory committee had the benefit of weekly reports from regional and district offices of the Office of Defense Transportation on refrigerator car supply and requirements in their respective areas.
Refrigerator cars are to some extent specialized with respect to their size, construction, and products they are particularly designed to transport. There are about a dozen different types of refrigerator cars. These differences in adaptability to the widely varying needs of the different perishable products ordinarily transported in refrigerator cars made it impracticable to operate all of the refrigerator cars in railroad service as a single pool, but as far as possible cars of all ownerships were used wherever and whenever needed and returned to their respective territories as circumstances permitted.
The methods evolved for the distribution and control of refrigerator cars proved to be effective in avoiding disastrous car shortages. They were effective because they utilized the existing machinery for car checks and reports on car supply and requirements by the service agents of the Commission and the field representatives of the car service division of the Association of American Railroads as well as of the regional and district offices of the Office of Defense Transportation. This method of operation also made available the enforcement machinery of the Bureau of Inquiry of the Interstate Commerce Commission for the violation of service orders, though the number of violations of service orders relating to refrigerator cars that came to the attention of the Commission were relatively few in number. From past experience in handling traffic made subject to service orders of the Commission,
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because of emergency conditions, both shippers and carriers accepted the control imposed on them as a result of the war emergency without serious question of its legality and with a minimum of complaint.
In the case of orders issued under Service Order No. 95, by the agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission, who also was manager of the refrigerator car section, car service division, Association of American Railroads, governmental authority for such orders was necessary to relieve private car lines from liability for failure to meet their obligations to supply cars to contract lines, when such orders prevented the meeting of contract obligations for car supply.
Service Orders for Refrigerator Cars.
Service orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are used to correct a wide variety of adverse conditions in rail transportation. Some of them are applicable to conditions that exist on all railroads and are applied on a Nation-wide basis, others are applied in limited areas only, and some are applied only to cars that are specified by initials and numbers. For example, changes in demurrage rates on certain classes of equipment have been applied on a Nation-wide basis, restrictions on the use of certain classes of equipment for certain commodities have been applied in certain loading areas only, and orders for the unloading of cars that have been held for extended periods of time have been applied to specified cars in order to avoid further car detention.
About half of the service orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission relating to refrigerator cars and refrigerator car service placed restrictions on the icing of perishable products. Some of these orders were amended several times in order to change the territorial application of the order, or to revise the restriction on the number or extent of icings permitted as conditions indicated that such changes should be made.
Another group of service orders placed restrictions on the use of the diversion and reconsignment privileges for certain commodities originating in specified areas. These restrictions included orders prohibiting the holding of specified commodities such as potatoes or fresh fruits and vegetables, at specified points for diversion or reconsignment. Similar restrictions limited the number of diversions permitted certain commodities moving in refrigerator cars. •
Service orders were issued prohibiting the use of refrigerator cars for specified commodities which at times included canned goods, watermelons, juice grapes, shell eggs, except in standard containers, and Irish potatoes below a certain grade.
Several orders were issued permitting or requiring the substitution of not more than three refrigerator cars in lieu of one boxcar for loading to certain areas. The most extensively used of this type of orders was Service Order No. 104, issued on January 19, 1943, which was designed to reduce the excess movement of empty refrigerator cars to destinations in five western States by using refrigerator cars for freight usually loaded in boxcars. With a tremendous flow of empty boxcars east-bound from California and nearby States and a heavy westbound movement of empty refrigerator cars to that area, it was obvious that an order providing for the substitution of refrigerator cars for boxcars on west-bound traffic destined to that area would make a corresponding reduction in the cross-haul of empty boxcars moving in the opposite direction.
The original order provided that railroads “transporting west-bound/ transcontinental shipments, in carloads, destined to points in the States of California, Idaho, Arizona, Nevada, and Utah may, at their option, furnish and transport not more than three refrigerator cars of Pacific Fruit Express or Santa Fe Refrigerator Dispatch ownership in lieu of each boxcar ordered subject to the carload mini* mum weight which would have applied if the shipment had been loaded in a boxcar.”
Service Order No. 104 specified that it did not apply to shipments on which the carload minimum weight varies with the size of the car and suspended all rules, regulations, and tariff provisions that were inconsistent with the order. As originally issued the order was permissive as applied to carriers and mandatory as applied to shippers. Subsequent amendments to the order made changes in the territorial application and made it mandatory for carriers to supply refrigerator cars, when freight to be transported is suitable and facilities are suitable for loading in refrigerator cars, and when PFE or SFRD refrigerator cars are reasonably available.
Commodities on which the carload minimum weight varies with the size of the car were also included by an amendment which directed the substitution of two refrigerator cars in lieu of one boxcar ordered of a length of 40 feet, 7 inches or less, and three refrigerator cars in lieu of one boxcar ordered of a length of over 40 feet, 7 inches, and not over 50 feet, 7 inches, subject to the carload minimum weight which would have applied if the shipment had been loaded in a boxcar of the size ordered. This amendment also appointed as the agent of the Commission the manager of the refrigerator car section, car service division, Association of American Railroads, and authorized him to direct the use of refrigerator cars other than PFE or SFRD cars, and of either
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private or railroad ownership, for loading as provided in the order, if PFE and SFRD cars were not reasonably available. Acting under this authority the agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission issued several permits to railroads authorizing loading of refrigerator cars of miscellaneous ownerships where sufficient PFE and SFRD cars were not available to meet requirements.
Service Order No.104 made an important contribution toward greater utilization of both refrigerator and box cars by reducing the empty haul of both classes of equipment used in transcontinental traffic, despite the fact that refrigerator cars could not be used for any kind of freight that would damage the interior walls, insulation, floors,* floor racks, or bunkers of refrigerator cars, nor for freight requiring the use of dunnage or bracing that would damage the cars. Additional disadvantages in the use of refrigerator cars for boxcar traffic resulted from loading by industries whose freight is ordinarily loaded in boxcars. This was because refrigerator car doors cannot be opehed or closed while the cars are spotted at the loading platform.
Several service orders with numerous amendments thereto applicable to the demurrage rules and charges on refrigerator cars were issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The order of this type having the broadest application was No. 180, which was issued in its original form on February 5, 1944. With respect to demurrage charges on refrigerator cars this order provided as follows:
After the expiration of the free time allowed by tariffs lawfully on file with this Commission, the demurrage charges on a refrigerator car loaded with any commodity which is not unloaded within the free time shall be. $2.20 per car per day or a fraction thereof for the first two (2) days; $5.50 per car per day or a fraction thereof for the third day; $11 per car per day or a fraction thereof for the fourth day; $22 per car per day or a fraction thereof for the fifth day; and, $44 per car per day or a fraction thereof for each succeeding day.
The order also provided that detention of refrigerator cars held for unloading could not be included in, or computed on the basis of, any average agreement, and further provided for its application to intrastate as well as interstate traffic. The terms of this order, which applied to cars held for unloading only, made no change in the period of free time allowed for unloading before penalty charges were assessed, and no change in the charges for the first day of car detention after the free time, but made substantial increases in the penalty charges for further car detention in the belief that the sharply increased penalties for unreasonable car detention produced favorable results. Amendments to Service Order No. 180 suspending and restoring its application were issued as the supply of refrigerator cars
in relation to requirements indicated the need for increased penalties for excessive car detention. In October 1944, Service Order No. 180 was revised to apply to refrigerator cars held for either loading or unloading and the exclusion of such cars from average agreements was retained, but refrigerator cars held for loading or unloading under the provisions of Service Order No. 104 were exempted from its provisions.
The agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission who was appointed by Service Order No. 95 was authorized and directed by the order to supervise, coordinate and direct the distribution of all refrigerator cars according to the needs of the various loading areas and with due regard to economy in their use and mileage.
Acting under this authority the agent of the Commission issued numerous orders to the railroads directing the flow of empty refrigerator cars to loading areas where car supplies were insufficient for loading requirements. He also issued orders restricting or forbidding the use of refrigerator cars for semiperishable or nonperishable commodities in areas where the refrigerator car supply was insufficient for the loading requirements of highly perishable commodities.
By an amendment to Service Order No. 95, which became effective December 26,1945, the Commission appointed its service agent in San Francisco as agent of the Commission and gave him authority to control the movement of empty refrigerator cars within and between the States of Arizona and California. Acting on instructions from the Director of the Bureau of Service of the Commission, the agent was authorized and directed by this amendment to Service Order No. 95 to require the railroads operating in Arizona and California to deliver, accept or transport empty refrigerator cars for the purpose of equalizing the supply of such cars on railroads serving points where fresh fruits and vegetables are tendered for loading in those States.
In like manner the same amendment to Service Order No. 95 appointed its service agent in Houston, Tex., as agent of the Commission and gave him the same authority to control the movement of empty refrigerator cars within the State of Texas.
This amendment to Service Order No. 95 enabled the Commission, through its agents in areas where demands for refrigerator cars for loading of fresh fruits and vegetables wefe heavy, to maintain close supervision over car distribution in those areas and to apply preventive measures before car shortages became acute.
Results of the Control Program.
Control of refrigerator cars by the Interstate Com
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merce Commission, together with the increase in average loading of refrigerator cars resulting from General Order ODT No. 18 (18A), which prescribed minimum loads for all carload freight and of other measures taken by the Office of Defense Transportation to promote transportation efficiency, produced substantial increase in the utilization of refrigerator cars during the war emergency.
While it is impossible to measure statistically the full extent of the increased car efficiency resulting from the controls applied to refrigerator car traffic during the war emergency the reports of the agent of the Commission under Service Order No. 95 show the nature and in part the extent of the car savings.
Refrigerator car loadings increased from a weekly average of 32,326 in 1941 to averages of 35,865 in 1942, 36,346 in 1943, and 42,950 in 1944, without substantial additional equipment.
Because of the highly competitive nature of the perishable traffic that normally moves in refrigerator cars and the practice of returning most of the cars
empty to loading areas served by their railroad owners or contract lines, the ratio of empty to total movement of refrigerator cars had normally been about 45 percent. One of the principal objectives of the controls established during the emergency was to reduce the cross-haul empty movement of refrigerator cars as much as possible. The monthly reports of the Commission’s agent show that this ratio of empty to total movement of refrigerator cars was steadily decreased from 43.8 percent in 1942 to 38.1 percent in 1943, 35.3 percent in 1944, and 32.1 percent in the first 6 months of 1945. The table that follows shows this improvement in car efficiency by quarters for 1943, 1944, and 1945 by percentage comparisons of both loaded and empty mileage of refrigerator cars with 1942, which is used as a base year because the controls established by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Service Order No. 95, issued November 9, 1942, did not become fully effective until the following year.
Mileage of Refrigerator Cars LOADED MILEAGE
Year First Quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter Total for year
1942 1943 Percent of 1942 1944 Percent of 1942 1945 Percent of 1942 ....... 554,819,978 557,695,605 100.5 689,474,061 124.3 672,427,664 121.2 506,698,085 532,564,112 105.1 652,810,277 128.8 656,936,303 129.7 450,127,694 564,511,158 125.4 664,218,616 147.6 533,297,960 656,421,064 123.1 688,878,542 129.2 2,044,943,717 2,311,191,939 113.0 2,695,381,496 131.8
EMPTY MILEAGE
1942 1943 Percent of 1942 1944 Percent of 1942 1945 Percent of 1942 417,815,511 357,087,291 85.5 373,104,018 89.3 336,266,793 80.5 437,062,108 381,228,197 87.2 394,609,539 90.3 379,204,912 * 86.8 376,922,970 359,457,488 95.4 871,875,793 98.7 859,403,119 826,627,464 90.9 330,432,958 91.9 1,591,203,708 1,424,400,440 89.5 1,470,022,308 92.4
One of the most effective measures for reducing empty mileage of refrigerator cars was Service Order No. 104, which provided for the substitution of refrigerator cars for boxcars for west-bound transcontinental traffic destined to points in Pacific coast territory. Reports from the Commission’s agent show that in 1942, 34,645 loaded refrigerator cars were moved to points in destination territory under Service Order No. 104. This indicates the normal volume of loaded movement to that territory as Service Order No. 104 was not issued until January 19, 1943. In 1943 the volume of loaded movement to destination territory under Service Order No. 104 increased to 92,082 cars, in 1944 to 136,902 cars, and in 1945 to 148,192 cars. Most of these increases, which amounted to 165.7 percent in 1943, 295.1 per
cent in 1944, and 328.6 percent in 1945, were the result of the use of refrigerator cars for west-bound boxcar traffic under Service Order No. 104, representing loaded movement of refrigerator cars that normally would have moved empty. Substantial as they were, these increases in loaded movement did not fully measure the car savings resulting from Service Order No. 104. With a heavy movement of empty boxcars east-bound from Pacific coast territory it is apparent that the number of refrigerator cars loaded in lieu of boxcars west-bound made a corresponding reduction in the number of empty boxcars moving east-bound. The total savings from both west-bound and east-bound movements were substantially in excess of 500,000 cars and the empty car-mile savings have been estimated at more than
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100,000,000 because of the long haul to and from the west coast.
While the total volume of traffic transported in refrigerator cars was increasing from 28,581,338 tons in 1941 to 36,029,038 tons in 1942, 41,630,387 tons in 1943, and 49,755,219 tons in 1944, the number of refrigerator cars available to move this increased traffic volume steadily declined. From 143,-078 refrigerator cars owned on January 1,1942, the car supply as of January 1 of each year decreased to 141,867 in 1943, 140,185 in 1944, and 137,818 in 1945. The number of refrigerator cars retired from service during the 3-year period starting January 1, 1942, exceeded the number of new cars added to the supply by over 5,000.
The average number of tons per carload of those commodities customarily loaded in refrigerator cars increased about 5 tons during the war emergency. This increase resulted largely from the heavier loading requirements of General Order ODT No. 18 (18A). The effect of the increase in average loading, together with expedited handling by railroads and reduced car detention by shippers, was equivalent to an increase of about 40,000 cars, which was equal to 30 percent of the available car supply in 1943 and 1944.
Monthly reports of the number of bad-order refrigerator cars held at owners’ shops for repairs show that the number of cars removed from service for repairs gradually increased from about 4,000 in early days of the emergency to over 9,000 in the fall of 1945. Not only did the total number of bad-order cars increase substantially, but the percentage of cars held for heavy repairs increased from less than 1.5 percent of the total car supply to nearly 5.0 percent, while the number of cars held for light repairs increased only slightly. Heavy repairs take longer than light repairs, so it is apparent that not only
retirements from service but bad-order cars in shops for repairs made substantial reductions in the available supply of refrigerator cars.
The more serious reductions in the refrigerator car supply resulting from bad order cars as compared with other classes of equipment was due to the fact that except for ice, practically all commodities shipped in refrigerator cars require equipment that is in first-class condition. Consequently, when a refrigerator car is not in condition to meet this exacting requirement it is removed from service and sent to the repair shops. In contrast to this situation boxcars, when not fit for loading of grain or other commodities requiring class A equipment, are downgraded and used for freight less susceptible to loss or damage from a slightly defective car. The railroads down-graded thousands of boxcars during the war and kept them in service despite the need for repairs, which in the case of refrigerator cars had to be made before they could be used for perishable traffic.
But reports of increased car loadings, savings in empty car mileage, and the increasing volume of traffic moved despite a decreasing car supply do not adequately explain the real significance of the efforts made to increase refrigerator car efficiency during the war emergency. It is impossible to measure the savings resulting from prompt movement to markets of perishable products that would have rotted on the ground without refrigerator cars in the right place at the right time to move them. The prevention of such losses in the movement of perishable traffic is largely a matter of timing whether the protection afforded by the refrigerator car is from heat or cold. And timing, having an adequate supply of refrigerator cars in the right place at the right time, saved millions of dollars in highly perishable food supplies that were indispensable in the war effort.
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CHAPTER VII
EXPORT-IMPORT TRAFFIC
All the difficulties that attended railroad terminal operations during the war existed at the principal ports in aggravated form. There was, in the first place, a convergence of freight cars at ports quite similar to that at important terminals. These cars could be moved and put back into use, and port facilities efficiently utilized only if railroad and overseas shipping operations were properly articulated. In other words, freight cars had to be unloaded and their lading transferred to ocean-going vessels expeditiously if this operation was not to cause congestion and appreciably reduce the usefulness of ports as well as tie up railroad cars and locomotives. The volume of incoming freight at ports for overseas transport had to be nicely adjusted to available shipping space. It was this task of adjustment that made it more difficult to maintain the free flow of export traffic through ports than to achieve the same end at inland railroad terminals and gateways. The volume of import traffic was relatively small and was not an important factor in contributing to port congestion.
The task of coordinating domestic rail transport with ocean shipping required control under a single authority of two separate movements to the ports: First, the domestic movement of export freight; and second, the movement of ocean-going vessels. Under Executive Order No. 8989 the Office of Defense Transportation was charged with responsibility for the efficient operation of the domestic transportation system and, under Executive Order No. 9054, the War Shipping Administration was given ¿control of the operation of most of the American merchant fleet. In addition, Executive Order No. 8989 (sec. 3, par. d) stated,
* * * The Office of Defense Transportation shall, in connection with the United States Maritime Commission and other appropriate agencies, coordinate domestic traffic movements with ocean shipping in order to avoid terminal congestion at port areas to maintain a maximum flow of traffic.
By Executive Order No. 9054, the powers of the Maritime Commission in connection with wartime control of ocean tonnage were transferred to the War Shipping Administration, and that order (sec. 6) enjoined the War Shipping Administration to collaborate
* * * with the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation with respect to the relation of overseas transportation to coastwise and intercoastal shipping and inland transportation.
It was, therefore, the duty of these two agencies acting in concert, to develop an effective plan for handling export freight in such a manner as to maintain a “maximum flow of traffic” through the ports.
The Office of Defense Transportation and the War Shipping Administration, accordingly, proceeded to create an administrative organization to coordinate movements of export traffic. The Transportation Control Committee was first established, and later, when the need for it became apparent, the Port Utilization Committee. These committees stood at the apex of an administrative scheme which also included control measures, embodied chiefly in ODT general and administrative orders as well as a reporting and policing system. A discussion of the whole scheme falls, therefore, in three parts: (a) the committees, (b) the control measures, and (c) the reporting and policing systems.
Transportation Control Committee.
The Transportation Control Committee was organized March 18, 1942. Upon it sat representatives of the Army, the Navy, the British Ministry of War Transport, the War Shipping Administration, and the Office of Defense Transportation.
Each of these agencies controlled an important segment in the line of movement of export traffic. The Army and Navy were not only the most important shippers of export freight, but they also controlled directly the movement of a significant portion of the American merchant fleet. In addition, they operated almost half of the merchant fleet under allocation by the War Shipping Administration. The other half, devoted to lend-lease and commercial shipments, was controlled by the War Shipping Administration. The British Ministry of War Transport administered British shipping, an important factor in the ocean-going tonnage of the United Nations. These agencies, together with the Office of Defense Transportation, were continuously concerned with different phases of the movement of
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export freight, and they »controlled the shipping and transport resources of the Nation. It was through the Transportation Control Committee that their activities in connection with the transport of export freight were coordinated.
It was the function of the War Shipping Administration and the British Ministry of War Transport to allocate shipping space among the Federal procurement agencies and commercial exporters. At the same time, the War Shipping Administration designated the port where, and the approximate date when, individual vessels would be available for loading. The British Ministry of War Transport had similar functions. It then became the responsibility of the Committee to control the movement of freight to the ports in such a manner as to meet the established shipping schedules.
This inland movement to the ports was under the general direction of the Committee. The Committee first allocated permits to the various procurement agencies and shippers in accordance with the shipping space that had been assigned to them. Transport to the ports by domestic carriers was allowed only under permit. In issuing permits, the Committee gave consideration to the transport burden imposed on individual carriers and sought to secure an even distribution of the load among them. It also had authority to hold shipments or expedite them, in the event of sudden changes in ship schedules, and to fake other measures required for the orderly and efficient handling of cargo at the ports.
The Committee met daily. It surveyed the existing situation on the basis of information furnished by a reporting system and revised its decisions, when necessary, in accordance* with current conditions. Changes were often required because shipping schedules were set up for a period in the future (usually 1 month), and in wartime accurate estimates of the performance of ocean-going vessels were often impossible. Due to its constant vigilance, the port congestion that occurred during the First World War was avoided.
Port Utilization Committee.
An important link in the chain of control forged to coordinate domestic and overseas transport was the allocation of shipping tonnage among the various ports. Authority to make this allocation was originally exercised by the War Shipping Administration, and it was not delegated to the Transportation Control Committee. But assignment of the appropriate volume of ocean tonnage to each port clearly depended upon conditions beyond the control of the War Shipping Administration. It depended not only upon the capacity of port facilities but also upon the
working of the domestic transport system, which was the particular concern of the Office of Defense Transportation. The Office of Defense Transportation and the War Shipping Administration early recognized this connection and urged the formation of another committee to collaborate in allocating shipping space among the ports. The Port Utilization Committee was accordingly set up by the War Shipping Administration and commenced to function in the spring of 1943. It was subsequently formalized on February 16, 1944, by WSA Administrative Order No. 57. The order provided for the establishment of a Port Utilization Committee constituted of representatives of the War Shipping Administration, the Army, the Navy, and the Office of Defense Transportation, under the chairmanship of the Associate Deputy Administrator of the War Shipping Administration. A representative of the British Ministry of War Transport was subsequently added.
The order stated it to be a function of the Committee—to coordinate the various activities pertaining to the movement of ocean freight in order to avoid congestion in United States ports, and to permit the most effective utilization of the ports in meeting over-all requirements.
An early step sponsored by the Committee was a survey by the Office of Defense Transportation and the War Shipping Administration of the maximum transshipment capacity of the major ports of export of the United States. Subsequently, the Office of Defense Transportation made a more comprehensive and accurate inventory of port facilities and issued a compilation of the data as of August 15, 1944, for the use of the Committee. Supplements were issued from time to time as facilities at individual ports underwent changes. A chart showing these capacities is given at the end of this chapter.
The Port Utilization Committee met monthly. At these meetings, the shipping tonnage and the export load were assigned to each of the ports. Shipping schedules were planned for a month in advance. These schedules were then compared with the statement of the Office of Defense Transportation as to the capacity of each port for handling the volume of tonnage allotted to it. In this way, overburdening of port facilities was prevented.
In addition, the Committee, whenever possible, directed in-bound and out-bound vessels to ports located near centers of consumption and production to minimize the use of inland transport. It also so controlled import cargoes as not to interfere with export movements, and it routed imports to ports that had the type of equipment required to handle them.
Labor, as well as port facilities, was a limiting
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factor in the movement of export freight and, therefore, an important consideration in guiding the Committee in the use of ports. Sometimes ports were selected for the purpose of maintaining their available supply of labor which would otherwise migrate.
In practice, the work of the Port Utilization Committee in allocating the export load among the ports preceded that of the Control Committee in allocating shipping space among shippers. The reason for discussing here the latter Committee before the Port Utilization Committee is that, historically, the Control Committee was created first.
Control Measures.
Movement of export freight to the ports in accordance with the program of these committees was directed largely by measures devised and administered by the Office of Defense Transportation, in collaboration with other interested agencies. Procedures were introduced on a voluntary basis during an experimental period, beginning with the creation of the Transportation Control Committee. Because a minority of shippers and carriers, however, failed to conform to the requirements under a voluntary arrangement, the Office of Defense Transportation first issued instructions to domestic carriers engaged in export traffic and later promulgated General Order ODT No. 16, formalizing the control scheme and making its provisions mandatory. This order, modified from time to time in harmony with changing conditions, together with cognate administrative orders, embodied the essentials of the wartime plan to regulate the flow of traffic to and through the ports.
Instruction ODT No. 1, effective June 1, 1942, was directed to “all carriers * * * covering export freight.” Its principal effect was to transfer the informal arrangement then in effect into a more formal and precise system of administration and control. The instruction did not have the mandatory’ character of a formal order, but the expectation was that it would be more closely observed than the plan preceding it.
Under the instruction, carriers were to accept carload, bargeload, and truckload export freight for transport to ports only upon presentation of permits authorizing such transport. These were the permits that were issued initially by the Transportation Control Committee. They constituted the keystone in the structure of export control.
The issuance of permits was closely tied to the allocation of shipping space. The War Shipping Administration allocated shipping space to all Government procurement agencies in blocks estimated to meet their needs for a period in advance, rather than
in specific space units. Important procurement agencies treated in this manner were the Treasury, Army and Navy, the ¡Lend-Lease Administration, and the Department of Agriculture. The Transportation Control Committee then released corresponding blocks of permits authorizing the domestic transport of export freight in such volume as was calculated to fill the block of shipping space allocated to each agency. Hence these permits were designated as ODT “block” permits.
Vessel space to commercial, that is, non-Govern-ment, shippers was allotted in a different manner. A commercial shipper had, first, to' secure an export license from the Board of Economic Warfare, later, the Foreign Economic Administration. Then he had to obtain a definite space booking from an ocean carrier which was subject to approval by the War Shipping Administration. Because a permit covering a commercial shipment was issued to cover only shipping space specifically booked, it was called an ODT unit permit. In practice, however, the distinction between block and unit permits tended to become blurred because, actually, shipping space was released to procurement agencies in substantially the same manner as to commercial shippers, and permits were issued to such agencies to cover specific movements of export freight for which vessel space had been booked. Commercial shipments originating in Canada, incidentally, and moving to ports in the United States for export required block permits.
The Transportation Control Committee notified each of the agencies of its allotment of shipping space. But block permits were actually issued by the Traffic Control Division, Office of Chief of Transportation, Army Service Forces, Washington, D. C., upon application by the procurement agencies. Unit permits for carload shipments, upon application by commercial shippers, were issued by the manager of port traffic, Association of American Railroads, New York City, or at his field offices located at the principal ports.
Unit permits for truckload shipments were issued by the field offices of the Division of Motor Transport, and unit permits for bargeload shipments by the Division of Inland Waterways, both of the Office of Defense Transportation, at Washington, D. C.
Separate regulations were established for less-than-carload, less-than-bargeload, and less-than-truckload lots,. No restrictions were imposed on such shipments when made by Government agencies, and when made by others to Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico, they moved without restrictions through Tampa, Fla. In general, export freight moving by truck or barge did not assume a significant place in the system established to regulate traf
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fic by permit, and subsequently such freight moving by those means was largely freed from permit control.
Tightening of the Control.
Instruction ODT No. 1 was superseded by General Order ODT No. 16, which became effective in part on July 10, 1943, and in full on August 1. The order was promulgated, not only to give mandatory effect to the control system, but also to correct defects revealed in the operation of the plan under the instruction.
The cardinal purpose of that plan had been to adjust the volume of permits issued to available shipping space. The instruction did not expressly provide such a limitation upon the issuance of permits, however; in fact, the issuance of permits was not always closely coordinated with available shipping space. Furthermore, for reasons set forth below in connection with this discussion of the reporting system subsequently established, permits could be forged and used with little risk of detection. As a result of these gaps in the instruction, export freight moving into ports occasionally exceeded the supply of shipping and of storage facilities.
General Order ODT No. 16 was designed to correct these defects. It expressly stated that no block or unit permit was to issue unless cargo space was available in a vessel named in the permit, or unless such space would be available within a reasonable time after the arrival of the freight, or unless a “bank” was maintained at the port. A “bank” was defined as a reserve of freight at ports designated by the Transportation Control Committee, in cooperation with other interested agencies, for the storage of export freight pending the availability of cargo space. It served the important purpose of maintaining a continuous supply of export freight, thus eliminating the need to delay ocean-going vessels at any time for lack of lading.
To coordinate more closely the issuance of unit permits with the supply of available shipping space, the order designated the War Shipping Administration in place of the Association of American Railroads as the issuing authority. Under the new arrangement, the commercial shipper, after securing an export license from the Board of Economic Warfare, presented an application for a permit to the operator of the vessel he intended to employ. If cargo space were available, the operator transmitted the application to the War Shipping Administration for disposition. No change was made in procedure governing block permits, except that block permits for shipments originating in Canada and moving
through United States ports were issued by the Canadian Transport Controller.
General Order ODT No. 16 made other changes of less significance. Special arrangements were made in respect of commercial shipments to Latin America. Application for permits covering such shipments to that region exceeding 2,240 pounds in weight was made to the Board of Economic Warfare. If the Board approved the application, it was then forwarded to the War Shipping Administration for issuance of an Office of Defense Transportation unit permit. Shipments under 2,240 pounds did not require permits. When covered by valid export licenses, they were booked by steamship operators within rigid restrictions based on Board of Economic Warfare priority ratings.
The order further provided that its provisions might be suspended by joint action of the Directors of Traffic Movement and of Railway Transport, Office of Defense Transportation, in respect of any freight “when the needs or exigencies of the war or of the military or naval forces will be better served by any such suspension.”
General Order ODT No. 16 also extended the use of permits to control freight movements from and to storage in port areas. In this connection, General Order ODT No. 16 must be considered in relation to the port storage problem in general and to General Order ODT No. 12, in particular.
The storage problem had several aspects. First, the unprecedented volume of wartime freight converging on the ports had to be funneled through holding and reconsigning depots constructed behind the ports to handle it. This subject has been fully discussed in the chapter on Storage.
Second, there was the special difficulty created by the accumulation at the ports of so-called frustrated freight. This was export freight that had been shipped by the consignor before the outbreak of war, but could not be transported overseas after hostilities began because of lack of shipping or because service to foreign destinations had been restricted. Large quantities of this frustrated freight accumulated at the ports, both in freight cars and in warehouses. In New York alone, for example, 2,866 cars were on hand June 1, 1942, loaded with frustrated freight.
To clear port areas for the expeditious movement of military and other vital traffic, the Office of Defense Transportation formulated measures designed to remove this freight. Before issuing an order for this purpose, the Office of Defense Transportation urged the procurement agencies and other shippers concerned to convert the freight to uses other than those originally planned, or to store it at points dis
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tant from the ports. At the same time, the Office of Defense Transportation made an inventory of all shipments stored on railroad property at the ports.
After affording an opportunity to consignors of frustrated freight to remove it, the Office of Defense Transportation issued, on June 27, 1942, General Order ODT No. 12. The order authorized the Director, Division of Railway Transport, Office of Defense Transportation, to require any railroad serving a port to move to such destination as he may specify “any export, coastwide, or intercoastal shipment of freight which it may have in its possession ♦*♦ in such port.” As a result, the freight was either disposed of by the owners’ agencies or moved to inland storage.
General Order ODT No. 12 was canceled and superseded by General Order ODT No. 12A, issued January 5, 1944. The new order broadened the scope of control over freight stored in ports. It authorized the Director, Division of Railway Transport, to direct the removal of import as well as export freight and applied to any “person having possession or control” of such freight in port areas. General Order ODT No. 12 had been confined to rail carriers.
Whereas General Orders ODT Nos. 12 and 12A were concerned with the static feature of storage at ports, that is, with goods actually stored there, General Order ODT No. 16 was directed to the control of movements of goods to and from storage in port areas. General Order ODT No. 16 regulated the transport of freight from storage in port areas to shipside by extension of the permit system. The order required that such movements be covered by permits, these being granted by the authorized issuing authorities only when cargo space was available.
Later, on January 1,1944, by amendment No. 1 to General Order ODT No. 16, carload and truckload shipments of Government, domestic or import freight to or within port areas for storage in public warehouses were subjected to regulation. The transport of such freight required authorization in the form of an ODT port storage forwarding permit, issued by the Director, Division of Storage, Office of Defense Transportation. Only movements to storage in port areas were affected by this control; movements to holding and reconsigning depots located in the interior were excluded. Export freight was likewise excluded, since it moved under block or unit permits. A storage forwarding permit was required only of Government domestic freight or Government imports consigned to storage in port areas.
These measures regulating storage enabled the Office of Defense Transportation to prevent excessive accumulation of freight cars at ports awaiting stor-700494—48—4
age space. This was potentially as great a cause of port congestion as the accumulation of freight cars awaiting cargo space. The storage permit system allowed the orderly absorption of freight by storage facilities in accordance with storage capacity, and the movement of such freight from storage for transport abroad in accordance with shipping capacity.
General Order ODT No. 16 was superseded by General Order ODT No. 16A, which became effective March 15, 1944. In general, the new order provided for stricter control of export freight where experience had shown it to be necessary, and it also authorized the Director of the Division of Traffic Movement, Office of Defense Transportation, to issue' such administrative orders as necessary to effectuate its provisions. The Director was expressly empowered to designate in ODT permits “the route or routes within the continental United States, over which* *♦ shipments covered by any such permit shall be transported.” Pursuant to his authority, the Director of Traffic Movement issued Administrative Order ODT No. 17, which became effective concurrently with General Order ODT No. 16A.
General Order ODT No. 16A discontinued the use of the term “block” permit to identify a permit covering a Government shipment of export freight. The term “unit” permit was henceforth applied to any permit covering either Government or commercial shipments abroad, but shipping space continued to be released in blocks to Government agencies.
The new order placed responsibility for observance of its provisions on shippers as well as carriers. General Order ODT No. 16 had been directed to carriers alone; General Order ODT No. 16A, on the other hand, stated:
No person shall offer for transportation, and no carrier shall accept for transportation or transport any carload or truckload shipment of overseas freight to any port unless the permit requirement has been met.
(Like responsibility was imposed on shippers and carriers of less-than-carload and less-than-truckload freight. But permit requirements for such shipments were eliminated, other controls being created. Such shipments were allowed to move to ports only when consigned to an officer of the Army or Navy, to the War Shipping Administration, or to a specific warehouse facility, or when Covered by a booking with an ocean carrier.
General Order ODT No. 16A also incorporated the provisions of General Order ODT No. 38A (originally General Order ODT No/38, effective May 20, 1943), issued July 1,1943, which established permit requirements for Government carload and truckload freight consigned from points in the United States to or through the Dominion of Canada.
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This order imposed for the first time comprehensive reporting requirements on rail carriers accepting carload shipments moving under ODT unit permits. The carriers were obliged to make reports designated as P-2, P-5, and P-6. The order in this respect did not constitute an innovation. The reports had been developed by the Office of Defense Transportation over a period of time in connection with the agency’s activities in controlling export traffic movements, but they had not been formally required by the order.
Routing to Ports Controlled.
A similar observation is applicable to Administrative Order ODT No. 17 which was issued by the Director, Division of Traffic Movement, Office of Defense Transportation, pursuant to and concurrently with General Order ODT No. 16A, for the purpose of establishing procedures for the execution of the general order. Here again, in the main, practices that had been previously employed were merely made formal requirements.
Especially noteworthy in Administrative Order ODT No. 17 was the provision that unit permits “shall be subject to conditions stated therein, including routes named.” This provision was expressly authorized by General Order ODT No. 16A. It enabled the Office of Defense Transportation to control by specific directions movements of freight to port areas and thus to coordinate more effectively domestic and ocean transport. It also made possible the allocation of export traffic among the various ports in accordance with port facilities and cargo space, and among rail carriers in accordance with the capacity of each.
The order delegated authority to issue ODT unit permits as follows:
(1) Transportation Division, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Navy Department, was to issue ODT unit permits covering the transport of property originating in continental United States and consigned to the Navy Department.
(2) Division of Cargo Clearance, War Shipping Administration, New York City, was to issue ODT unit permits covering consignments of commercial freight originating in continental United States of in Mexico and moving to a port area in the United States.
(3) The Transport Controller, Canada, was to issue ODT unit permits covering shipments of overseas freight originating in Canada and moving to a port area in the United States, subject to such restrictions as might be imposed by the Traffic Control Division, Transportation Corps, Army Service Forces, covering the transport of such shipments
within the United States, and also subject to clearance with the War Shipping Administration.
(4) The Traffic Control Division, Transportation Corps, Army Service Forces, was to issue all other ODT unit permits covering shipments to export freight which were subject to the provisions of General Order ODT No. 16A.
General Order ODT No. 16B, revoking and replacing General Order ODT 16A, was promulgated September 12,1944, at a time when the end of the war in Europe was imminently expected, and in anticipation of a material reduction of the burden on the transport resources of the country. This order was, therefore, less restrictive in character than its predecessor. It eliminated all the reports required of carriers under General Order ODT No. 16A, and this modification afforded considerable relief to railroad personnel, then under heavy pressure because of the limited labor supply.
The order also relaxed permit requirements. It confined the issuance of permits to carload traffic. Less-than-carload export freight, and all export freight moving by truck or waterway, was allowed to enter port areas without permit when consigned to the Army or Navy, to the War Shipping Administration, to a specific warehouse facility or when covered by a booking with an ocean carrier. Port storage forwarding permits were required only for Government shipments of domestic or import freight in excess of 20,060 pounds consigned for storage within a port area.
Administrative Order ODT No. 17A was issued simultaneously with General Order ODT No. 16B, revoking and superseding Administrative Order ODT No. 17. The new administrative order provided for administrative changes in conformity with the changes made in the general order. In other respects, the most important change was'the substitution of the Association of American Railroads for the War Shipping Administration as the agency authorized to issue permits covering shipments of commercial freight originating in the United States or Mexico and consigned to foreign destinations.
Reporting and Policing.
The general and administrative orders of the Office of Defense Transportation constituted the scaffolding of the control scheme constructed to regulate the flow of export traffic. The first step in the control of export traffic was the distribution of the total load among the various ports by the Port Utilization Committee. The next step was the allocation by the Transportation Control Committee of block permits for Government procurement agencies and of specific shipping space for commercial shipment by the War
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Shipping Administration. Permits were then issued by the various agencies as authorized by the ODT general and administrative orders.
Permits were the devices used to control the movement of export traffic in accordance with the policies of the Committees. They were issued on the basis of information secured through several reports developed by the Office of Defense Transportation. These reports were also used to safeguard against violations of the requirements of the orders. It follows, therefore, that the manner in which export traffic was actually controlled will be revealed by an examinar tion of practices and procedures connected with the issuance of permits and the making of reports.
When the Transportation Control Committee released block permits for the use of a procurement agency, the agencywas notified and was then allowed to apply for permits covering specific shipments. Application for permits was made to the Traffic Control Division, Army Service Forces, the authorized issuing agent of the Office of Defense Transportation. Since the Army initiated more than 60 percent of the total export tonnage, this arrangement for the issuance of block permits centralized the administrative control of virtually all freight moving to ports.
Permits for commercial shipments were issued at various times, either by the War Shipping Administration or the Association of American Railroads, and were properly granted only when shipping space, approved by the War Shipping Administration, had been booked.
The applications of procurement agencies or commercial shippers specified the port of destination, the consignee at the port, and the week of intended arrival. The permit was a release in code, consisting of letters and numbers which represented the data included in the application. When a procurement agency obtained a permit, it stamped the code symbols on the Government bill of lading, which was then transmitted to the consignor who was under contract with the agency to make the shipment. When a commercial permit was issued by the Association of American Railroads, the latter furnished a copy to the agent of the railroad originating the shipment. In either event, the shipment became eligible to move from origin only upon presentation to the carrier of the permit in code.
As soon as the Traffic Control Division issued a permit, the data were recorded on an International Business Machine card which was immediately transmitted to the Export-Import Section, Division of Traffic Movement, Office of Defense Transportation. Data relating to commercial permits were transmitted daily to the Office of Defense Transportation by mail
by agents of the Association of American Railroads at ports where such permits were issued.
On the basis of these data relating to the issuance of permits, the Export-Import Section made up a weekly report designated as P-1. Upon the P-1 report appeared the number of permits issued, the volume of export freight authorized to move to the ports, the expected time of arrival, the procurement agency, the shipping agency at port, the designated port, and the rail carrier over which shipment was authorized to move. It was used by the Transportation Control Committee in allocating permits among the various agencies authorized to issue them, by the Port Utilization Committee in allocating the load of each port, and by the port as a source of advance knowledge of traffic flow.
The P-1 report by no means furnished all the information necessary for strict control of domestic movement of overseas freight. It indicated only the number of permits issued, together with data relating to shipments, but there was no way of determining from it whether the permits issued had actually been used. It was conceivable and, indeed, occasionally true, that an applicant in receipt of a permit either delayed shipment or failed to ship at all. The Transportation Control Committee could not, therefore, ascertain from the P-1 report with complete assurance the volume of freight moving to the ports nor anticipate with accuracy the conditions at the ports for a reasonable period in advance.
To enable the Committee to do this, the P-2 report was designed. It was a telegraphic report to the Traffic Control Division by the carrier of origin and showed, in connection with export freight, the car number, date forwarded, ODT permit number, name of shipper, and point of origin. These individual reports were likewise transferred to IBM cards and summarized in daily reports. When the P-2 cards were mechanically matched with the P-1 cards, it was possible to determine somewhat more accurately the volume of freight actually moving to the ports, to anticipate its arrival, and to take needed steps to regulate this traffic in accordance with the ability of the ports and ocean carriers to handle it. Furthermore, by comparing P-2 and P-1 cards, it was possible to detect freight that was under unauthorized permits.
The next step was to secure accurate current infor-mation of traffic conditions at the ports to avoid overloading. This was accomplished through the P-5 report. Each railroad at each of the principal ports was given a supply of cards on which it recorded daily the numbers of all incoming cars as well as the ODT permit numbers covering freight consignments con
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tained therein, and the disposition of such cars. These cards were then given to employees of the Office of Defense Transportation at the ports, who transmitted the information by teletype to the Office of Defense Transportation at Washington. A compilation was there made of daily arrivals, deliveries, and cars on hand for each carrier and shipper. These data were prepared as of noon of the preceding day, and afforded the Transportation Control Committee and the Port Utilization Committee precise information as to operating conditions at each port. In addition, summaries of the data were issued periodically to such procurement agencies as Treasury, Lend-Lease, and Foreign Economic Administration, which enabled them to keep a tabulated record of export traffic moving for their account.
As a periodic check on the accuracy of the P-5 report, the carriers were required to furnish the Office of Defense Transportation a statement of all carloads on hand 30 days or more as of the first day of each month. This statement constituted a section of the P-6 report. The report also showed, for each shipment, the name of consignor, type of pier on which shipment was stored (that is, open or closed), type of car in which shipment was being held, if still on tracks, and whether any portion of the shipment had been delivered since arrival. The P-6 report reflected port conditions as of a particular date ; the P-5 report was a continuing inventory.
Important to effective port use was a report which indicated the capacity of all port facilities operated by railroads. It was prepared August 15, 1944, by the Export-Import Section of the Railway Transport Department, Office of Defense Transportation, in cooperation with the Association of American Railroads, and superseded a preliminary port facilities report issued by the Office of Defense Transportation on May 13,1943. The later report, unlike the earlier, excluded facilities and equipment not actually operated by railroads. It was the first complete survey of its kind. Changes in port facilities occurring after the date of its publication were publicized through the issuance of supplements.
Included in this report were data showing the capacity of the following facilities and equipment of each railroad at each port :
(a) Yards and tracks used for classification purposes, whether or not used exclusively for the classifications of export or import freight.
(b) Trackage in hold or storage yards within switching or lighterage limits.
(c) Piers and covered storage available for loading general cargo.
(d) Ground storage in yards served directly by tracks.
(e) Other facilities, such as outside hold yards, special lift and marine equipment.
In all instances, the capacities shown represented
the maximum amount of export cargo that could be held or stored without interfering with efficient operations at the port.
The maximum capacity of all railroad storage facilities at all United States ports was found to be 141,605 cars. The original distribution of this total was as follows:
Cars P&rc&Tit
North Atlantic ports ...................... 79,928 56.4
South Atlantic ports .......................14,150 10.0
Gulf ports .................................33,404 23.6
Pacific ports ..............................14,123 10.0
Total...........................141,605
The capacity of each of the principal ports was as follows:
Cars Percent
New York...............................36,847 26.0
Boston ................................ 5,389 3.8
Portland (N.H.) ....................... 1,846 1.3
Philadelphia .......................... 8,625 6.1
Baltimore ............................. 9,805 6.9
Hampton Roads..........................13,221 9.3
New Orleans............................13,528 9.6
Los Angeles ............................2,875 2.0
San Francisco.......................... 1,731 1.2
Portland (Oreg.) .......................1,380 1.0
The importance of this information in the whole scheme for controlling export traffic is obvious. The War Shipping Administration used it as a guide in scheduling ships and agreed not tp direct ships to any port in excess of its maximum capacity. Ships were scheduled monthly in advance, but were subject to revised directions in accordance with changing conditions, which in wartime, could not always be anticipated. Ship schedules were approved by the Port Utilization Committee and served as “targets” for the Committee. That is, the Committee, in allocating traffic among the ports, sought to meet the shipping schedules set up by the War Shipping Administration. It was the object of the permit control scheme, functioning under the general supervision of the Transportation Control Committee, to insure the timely arrival of export traffic at the ports. A flow chart showing capacity of ports and distribution of traffic is given at the close of this chapter.
ODT Coordinating Committee.
In March 1945 the Office of Defense Transportation established a coordinating committee which was to concern itself with the demands on domestic transportation, including the domestic phase of export and import transportation. The Committee’s function was to devise the distribution of transportation facilities in such a way as to create least delay to commodities of lesser importance.
This Committee acted under the chairmanship of the Director of the Railway Transport Department, of the O.D.T., which was a consolidation of the Divisions of Railway Transport and Traffic Movement.
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It included representatives of the Army, Navy, War Food Administration, Commodity Credit Corporation, War Production Board, Foreign Economic Administration, War Shipping Administration, and the Interstate Commerce Commission, with representatives of the Association of American Railroads and the American Short Line Railroad Association acting in an advisory capacity. Meetings were held weekly until the conclusion of the war with Japan. In January 1946, because of the increased emphasis on the export of grain, grain products, and coal, the Committee was expanded to include representatives of the Solid Fuels Administration for War and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Weekly meetings were resumed, in view of postwar conditions.
Each week the Army presented to the Committee a summary of the status of the monthly programs of the U. S. Military Civil Affairs Division and British and European nationals for the export of grain and grain products showing by individual ports the tonnage required to meet ship loading schedules and by countries the destinations of the shipments. A weekly report showing the amount of grain in port elevators and the unused capacity of grain elevators at each port, together with the number of carloads of grain on hand and the number unloaded at each port was supplied by the Office of Defense Transportation. This information, supplemented by reports from field representatives of the Office of Defense Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Association of American Railroads on car supply in each of the various grain-loading territories, enabled the Committee to regulate the flow of grain to the various Atlantic and Gulf ports to meet ship-loading schedules.
Through the greatest possible use of water transportation on the Great Lakes, the New York State Barge Canal, and on the Mississippi River, the northwest grain crop was routed to load ships at north Atlantic ports and the southwest crop was routed for ship loadings at Gulf ports, thus reducing the length and volume of the rail haul as much as possible. The movement of grain on the Great Lakes during the open season of navigation in 1945 reached a total of 345,627,820 bushels, of which 327,664,820 bushels were transported in vessels of United States registry to or from ports in the United States and 17,693,000 bushels were moved to United States ports in vessels of Canadian registry. The movement of grain and grain products by rail to ports for export in 1945 totaled 164,648 carloads of which 111,157 carloads moved to Atlantic and 53,489 carloads to Gulf ports.
It was the responsibility of the Office of Defense
Transportation to direct the movement of this export grain traffic to the ports and to coordinate the flow of both export and domestic traffic in such a manner as to avoid railroad and port congestion, and to assure an orderly and expeditious movement of all freight. This required the extensive use of controls over cars suitable for grain loading into the various jrain-loading areas where the need at times was most acute. To this end orders to the railroads regulating the flow of empty cars to loading areas were issued by the Association of American Railroads at the re-* quest of the Office of Defense Transportation as reports on car supplies indicated need for such empty car movements. In like manner embargoes were placed to prevent the accumulation and detention of box cars that were needed for grain loadings. Service orders were issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission at the request of the Office of Defense Transportation in order to control by embargoes and permits, the flow of grain to terminal elevators, mills, and ports so as to protect both domestic and export shipments. An example of this type of control was ICC Service Order No. 304, effective May 1, 1945, which forbade, except by permit, the movement of grain in box cars from specified grain-loading areas to destination territory east of the west bank of T^kp Michigan, the Illinois-Indiana State line and the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to New Orleans, La., except to New Orleans for export. By this order the carriers were required to keep the permit agents of the interstate Commerce Commission informed daily of the number of empty cars available for grain loading in the specified loading areas and the permit agents were instructed to limit the number of permits issued to the number of available cars.
In February 1946 the President instructed the appropriate agencies of the Government to put into effect a number of emergency measures designed co help meet critically urgent needs for food in foreign countries to the greatest possible extent in the shortest possible time, and directed that
specific preference will be given to the rail movement of wheat, corn, meat, and other «essential foods in order to export promptly maximum quantities to the destinations where most needed.
In response to this instruction, the Interstate Commerce Commission, at the request of the Office of Defense Transportation issued several service orders giving preference to export shipments of grain, grain products and other essential foodstuffs for the relief program in the placing of cars for loading and in the delivery of loaded cars at ports for unloading.
The effectiveness of these orders was evidenced by the fact that within a short time the grain-loading territory was entirely free from blocked grain ele
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vators and »cars were being supplied wherever grain was available for loading.
Like the grain movement to the ports the movement of coal for export was in unprecedented volume. Starting the latter half of 1945 the volume of export coal traffic increased to well over a million tons per month in the first quarter of 1946. Many difficult transportation problems were presented by this heavy movement of coal for export, which was in addition to the normal domestic movement of coal and without any addition to the supply of coal cars.
An agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission was empowered also to reroute bituminous coal ship
ments billed for export through Baltimore and Philadelphia to Hampton Roads, if necessary, in order to control the flow of traffic to the ports, and avoid congestion at the piers. New routes from the Pennsylvania coal fields to Hampton Roads were opened to make available the facilities of that port for export volume in excess of capacity at Philadelphia and Baltimore. With these measures to coordinate the flow of coal traffic to the ports the volume of coal exported reached a total of 1,874,400 tons in February 1946, of which 1,668,600 tons went to liberated countries and 205,800 tons to neutral countries.
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CHAPTER Vili
THE STORAGE PROBLEM
The Executive order of December 18, 1941, establishing the Office of Defense Transportation, took cognizance of the buffer role of storage as a traffic control device between war production and transportation. The program of both combat and production for combat were to be put on a scale beyond anything known in history. The available transportation of the country, though ample for peacetime, and capable of handling a heavy overload still needed the aid of storage to care properly for the endless flow of goods that came from the heavily expanded production lines.
Section 3 (f) of Executive Order 8989 accordingly directed the Office of Defense Transportation to—
(f) Survey and ascertain present and anticipated storage and warehousing requirements at points of transfer and in terminal areas; and encourage the provision (of increased storage, loading and unloading facilities where necessary.
It will be noted that this direction to the Office of Defense Transportation contained no definite grant of authority to take regulatory action. In an address at the Second Wartime Warehousing Industry Conference in Chicago, on February 16, 1944,, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation said, referring to the phraseology of this direction:
This was recognition of the fact that centralized attention to the storage problem was necessary. However, so many procurement agencies are directly concerned with storage that there was some hesitation about accompanying this centralization with any grant of authority. The verbs used, you will note, were “survey,” “ascertain,” and “encourage”—none of them words of power.
It was in the light of the limited grant of power, which made the Division of Storage a consulting and advisory agency, that the achievements of the Office of Defense Transportation must be viewed. It attained desired ends entirely by indirection. It had no authority to compel the storage industry to provide the ample storage space that the war effort required ; neither could it legally build and operate this space itself. Yet, under its leadership the storage industry met effectively the wartime challenge. Federal warehouse associations were formed which pooled the resources of 289 warehouses in 34 cities, making available to the Government enough space to obviate an expenditure of $50,000,000 for 10,000,000
square feet of needed storage room. It found facilities for a stock pile of 160,000,000 gallons of ethyl alcohol to protect the synthetic rubber program. It sponsored the erection of three cold-storage warehouses on the Pacific coast with a total of 1,500,000 cubic feet for the Army, Navy, and Lend-Lease use. It sponsored the erection of a 2,000,000-square-foot holding and reconsignment dry storage depot in the Puget Sound area and 500,000 square feet in the San Francisco Bay area for lend-lease and Army use. It persuaded the War Department to erect 11 stock pile depots containing a total of 22,000,000 square feet of covered floor space in the heavy production areas of Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. These facilities were necessary to house war production pending final determination as to the ultimate overseas destination. The record is full of “persuaded” and “induced” actions on the part of the railroads, the storage industries and Government agencies. It even administered a million-dollar revolving fund for creation of storage space for the lend-lease operations.
Its method usually was to determine storage needs, select the sites, help obtain the land, pave the way with the Lend-Lease Administration to advance the money, so that the agency actively concerned had only to close the deals and construct the warehouse^. Its success is an indication of what a merely consulting or advisory agency can accomplish when it adopts a realistic approach to its problem.
The success of the Office of Defense Transportation as a persuasive agency in the storage field was in part a consequence of the fact that it was dealing with compact groups of business interests that had much at stake, and that needed only to be convinced to obtain their cooperation. An instance was the control over movement of grain to the grain elevators. There was a large carry-over of the 1941 grain crop, and there was the prospect of a bumper crop for 1942. The available grain elevator storage facilities would not be able to cope with the situation, and there was grave danger of serious loss to this important crop. Increasing the elevator facilities, which would call for the heavy use of critical ma
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terials, was out of question ; it was apparent that only the institution of complete control over grain facilities would be effective. Fortunately, the machinery for such control by the Government existed through the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Department of Agriculture. So, with the cooperation of these two agencies, the Office of Defense Transportation set up a permit system which the Interstate Commerce Commission undertook to administer.
The regulation under which grain storage was brought under control was Interstate Commerce Commission Service Order No. 80, issued July 16, 1942, on representation made by the Office of Defense Transportation and the Department of Agriculture. It provided that no railroad might move grain to markets specified by the Interstate Commerce Commission, except under permit of the Commission’s agents in such market areas. The permits authorized the movement of grain among areas according to a fair proration of the available storage facilities, preference being given to the grain in gravest danger of damage or loss. So-called cash grain, that which had been purchased or which was destined for immediate sale, took precedence over grain merely intended for storage or reconditioning in connection with storage. The agents of the Interstate Commerce Commission who were authorized to issue permits were members of the ICC Grain Permit Committee and were required to advise and consult with the other members of that Committee. Permits could be issued upon application of a shipper or buyer or receiver of grain, or upon the agent’s initiative.
’ In collaboration with the Office of Defense Transportation in this work of providing storage for the bumper grain crop was the Department of Agriculture, which used its field machinery to induce farmers to find or provide additional storage space on their farms or in the neighborhood. The control of the grain movement is discussed in Chapter X.
The Port Problem.
While seasonal problems arose from time to time to complicate the port and the traffic situation, there was one constant problem which faced the Office of Defense Transportation. This was to prevent port congestion. At the ports converged the vast traffic destined for the armed forces in the several fields of action and the traffic moving under the direction of the Foreign Economic Administration, including lend-lease and other tonnage which brought to port areas great quantities of materials. The peacetime facilities of the ports were not geared for such volume, which was at some of the ports as much as 400 percent above peacetime normal. Add to that the
irregular nature of the wartime ocean movement, as compared with the more or less orderly shipping schedules from fixed ports in time of peace, and the magnitude of the port problem becomes apparent.
The storage problem was not one that could be handled through cooperation alone. There were too many interests and too many emergencies involved. So it soon became necessary to resort to direct action as well as collaboration. The approach to the problem was : first, the Office of Defense Transportation developed with the Departments of War, Navy, and Treasury, a comprehensive warehouse construction program to house lend-lease cargoes within reasonably short distances from the ports. At the same time, a program was worked out with the War Department for the construction of many large warehouses in so-called Central Freight Association territory to accommodate the mounting tonnage of war material produced in that area, and which was held awaiting necessary cargo space for movement to the theaters of war. The Office of Defense Administration did not authorize such construction; it functioned as a procurement agency for these Government branches up to the point of signing contracts.
The port problem was treated in detail in Chapter VII. The storage angle of the problem was reviewed briefly, with the statement that it would be discussed in detail in this chapter on storage.
Warehousing to Protect Ports.
The immediate storage problem in connection with the war was to so control the flow of supplies for overseas shipment as to avert congestion at the ports. The concern of the Army, Navy, and Lend-Lease Administrations was to maintain uninterrupted the stream of supplies essential to the needs of the war program. The responsibility of the Office of Defense Transportation was to prevent congestion at ports, which would have had an immediate and demoralizing effect on transportation leading from the centers of production to the piers. The teamwork among these several agencies of the Government was close and harmonious throughout the war. The Storage Division did the planning for the storage facilities. It blueprinted the procedure from the storage controls at the headquarters of production to the feeder controls at the ports. Its contribution went beyond merely planning. As the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation stated in his 1942 report to the President:
The Division of Storage, through its exhaustive survey of available storage facilities, has become the storage procurement agency for many of the Federal departments and agencies.
In this program, the agencies for the armed forces and the lend-lease branch of the Foreign Economic
48
Administration provided the funds and operated the establishments.
In the area of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, near important sources of war production, was the first control. Here were constructed nine stock pile warehouses, ’each with approximately 1,000,000 square feet of covered space and large areas of hard standing open storage. Into these flowed the streams from production lines in the area from Buffalo and Pittsburgh west to the Mississippi River and north of the Ohio, and in them shipments were held until their overseas destinations could be determined.
From these stock pile warehouses the war and lend-lease supplies moved in a controlled stream either to the ports, of embarkation or to the 10 holding and reconsigning depots which had an aggregate covered storage area of approximately 15,500,000 square feet. These depots were located at points relatively close to the principal ports from which the best control could be exercised over the flow of supplies to port areas when ship space became available. The 10 holding and reconsigning depots, locations, and covered space, were as follows:
Voorheesville, N. Y., (near Albany) ............2,000,000
Elmira, N. Y....................................2,000,000
Marietta, Pa (near Harrisburg) .................2,000,000
Richmond, Va....................................2,000,000
Montgomery, Ala.................................1,500,000
Shreveport, La................................... 500,000
Yermo, Calif, (near Barstow) ...............-...1,000,000
Lathrop, Calif, (near Stockton) ................1,500,000
Pasco, Wash.....................................1,000,000
Auburn, Wash, (near Seattle) ................'..2,000,000
Total.........................................15,500,000
At these points the supplies were finally consigned to specific ports and ships, being fed to available cargo space in such manner as to keep the ports free from congestion. The major port areas served were New York and Boston from Voorheesville; New York, Boston, and Philadelphia from Elmira; New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore from Marietta; Hampton Roads from Richmond and Marietta; Mobile and New Orleans from Montgomery; New Orleans and Texas ports from Shreveport; Los Angeles from Yermo; San Francisco from Lathrop; Portland, Seattle, Tacoma, and other Puget Sound ports from Pasco and Auburn. These covered warehouses and depots were semipermanent one-story buildings.
Leased Warehouse Operations.
The demands for storage space for the vast undertakings of the lend-lease and* other war activities were further met through renting suitable floor space in sufficient volume to serve the lend-lease program and to provide a reserve for other war needs. In its role as storage space procurement agency for the Government, the Storage Division of the Office of
Defense Transportation undertook the task of leasing properties and contracting for their operation on behalf of the Lend-Lease Administration. These warehouses were operated by the local Federal emergency warehouse associations, which were composed of warehousemen whom the Division of Storage had induced to pool their facilities to more effectively meet the storage requirements of the Government. For the purpose of carrying out the lend-lease storage plan, the lend-lease branch of the Foreign Economic Administration allocated to the Office of Defense Transportation $1,000,000 as a revolving fund. This fund was administered by the Division of Storage, and at the end of the third year of operation it was 85 percent intact.
Out of this revolving fund the Division leased and had in operation during 1944 twelve buildings in Chicago, Jacksonville, Philadelphia, Rochester, San Francisco, St. Louis, and Coxsackie, N. Y. The average space under lease to the Government in these buildings monthly during the fiscal year ending J une 30,1944, was 840,170 square feet.
The storage operations in ¡the buildings were carried on by Federal emergency warehouse associations under contract. The compensation to the operating association was an annual management fee equal to 5 percent of the annual rental paid by the Government for the building, and a monthly operating fee equal to 25 percent of the storage charges received for the second and succeeding months’ storage. All operating contracts for leased buildings followed this pattern except in the case of the property at Coxsackie, N. Y., for which the operating fee was a guaranty of $1,500 a month minimum. The operator of the building took all of the storage charges and paid all of the operating expenses. If these collections fell under $1,500 per month, the Government paid the operator the difference. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1944, thé Government had no deficiency to make up, and the arrangement assured the availability of 100,000 square feet of heavy-duty crane-type storage space.
For the entire leased warehouse operations during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1944, the revenues for storage grossed $246,693.75, for which $84,810.56 was the net received from commercial storage, while $161,833.19 was paid by the various agencies of the Government for the storage space used by them. Expenses, including all charges, were $291,249.40, making the net cost to the Government $44,555.65, or, at the rate of 5.3 cents per square foot per annum. Expenses for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1945, were $183,150.34; receipts, $166,316.48; and loss, $16,833.86. The Government-leased space in these warehouses was considered as a reserve for con
49
tingencies. Due to fairly accurate forecasting of the Government’s requirements for public warehouse facilities, the net cost of the reserve space was extremely low.
Industry Pools Facilities.
The Federal emergency warehouse associations, which operated the approximately 1,000,000 square feet of space in the 12 leased storage buildings, also served as safety valves in the country’s“ storage situation. They placed at the disposal of the Government on short notice a minimum of 10 percent of their combined storage facilities. There were 34 of these local associations and they controlled as high as 289 warehouses, with an aggregate storage space of 41,113,000 square feet.
The Federal emergency warehouse associations came into existence through the efforts of the Division of Storage. The plan was to pool all warehousing facilities in a community through the organization of a local association which would deal with the Government as a unit. An executive »committee was selected by each association with broad powers to act, and a contracting officer was designated by the Division of Storage to serve on behalf of the Government. Each association member listed in the organization agreement the total occupiable space under his control and t^e minimum amount of space which it would set apart for the Government. Each association kept the Government informed of the »changes in amount of space available to it. Happily, the associations always found needed storage space for Government property above these individual quotas. The relationship between the Government and the associations was direct and simple. The local association arranged with its members for the space, and furnished the Government with the necessary shipping directions. The customary warehouse service was performed, and the Government was billed monthly. The storage charges for Government storage, sanctioned by the Office of Price Administration, were slightly under those for commercial storage. They were on a hundred-weight basis, and divided into from 6 to 14 classes, based on density, or weight per cubic foot.
The volume of goods stored in the warehouses controlled by the association for the year ending June 30,1944, aggregated 17,456 carloads. Of this amount the Army stored 14,086 carloads; the Navy, 1,059; Treasury, 1,652; War Shipping Administration, 49; and miscellaneous Government agencies, 610. The cities in which these Federal emergency associations were organized by the storage industry, and the carloads of goods which were received between July 1, 1943, and June 30, 1944, were as follows: .
. Carload»
Baltimore ..................................... 915
Boston.................................. ...... 102
Buffalo........................................ 149
Chicago ......................................1,992
Cincinnati................................... 243
Corpus Christi................................. 21
Coxsackie ..................................... 540
Dallas-Ft Worth................................ 269
Denver........................................ 447
Des Moines ..................................... 52
Evansville..................................... 268
Fort Dodge...................................... 11
Grand Rapids.................................. 204
Huntington-Charleston ......................... 100
Jacksonville .................................. 125
Los Angeles.................................... 852
Louisville ...............’.................... 162
Memphis ....................................... 257
Milwaukee ..................................... 310
Minneapolis-St. Paul........................... 910
New Orleans.................................... 250
New York......................................2,870
Norfolk ....................................... 367
Oklahoma City................................. 25
Philadelphia ............................... 1,695
Pittsburgh..................................... 800
Rochester, N. Y- ............................ 110
St. Louis.....................................1,227
San Francisco ................................1,739
Savannah ....................................... n
Seattle......................................... 55
Syracuse ...................................... 70
Tampa........................................... 36
Toledo ........................................ 263
Total ...................................... 17,456
In an address at Chicago on February 14, 1944, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation said:
We believe that by the organization and use of these as-(sociations in all the ways in which they are used, the building by the Government of as much as 10,000,000 square feet of warehouse space at a cost of $50,000,000 has been saved, to say nothing of critical materials and manpower in demand for other purposes.
Refrigerated Storage.
The great links in the control of perishable food were the cold-storage warehouses and sharp-freezing facilities under general coverage and collaboration of the Office of Defense Transportation. The function of these was controlled distribution of the transport load as well as the preservation of perishable foods for overseas and domestic movements.
Cold storage includes two kinds of refrigerated space: “cooler,” at 30° and above; and “freezer,” usually carried in the zero range. Under the sharpfreezing process the products are hard-frozen, and stay stored in freezer space until loaded aboard cars or ships. The low temperature within the products will then carry them safely through long periods of rail or ocean trasportation where low freezer temperatures may not be available. Cooler space in warehouses in most areas was ample in the first 2 years of the war, though tight situations occasionally arose. The cold-storage problem of the country during the war was chiefly, therefore, one involving the
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adequacy of sharp-freezing and freezing storage facilities.
The war demands called for a far greater proportion of low-temperature freezer space than was required for peacetime commerce, and the Office of Defense Transportation early in the first year of the war urged the cold-storage industry to convert 10,-000,000 or more cubic feet of cooler space into freezer space.
In December 1943, at the end of the second year of the war, the War Food Administration reported a total of 1,462,000,000 pounds of commodities stored in freezer storage space, an increase above the 5-year peacetime average for 1936-40, just preceding the war, of 745,000,000 pounds, or 104 percent. Combined stocks in cooler and freezer space, as of October 1, 1944, totaled 3,610,000,000 pounds.
The problem of freezer storage space presented, in wartime, serious difficulties. In the first place, needed additional space could not be provided through construction because of inability to obtain essential critical materials for the amount of such space believed essential to top war needs. The Division of Storage had to persuade the cold-storage industry, therefore, to convert as much as possible of its cooler space into freezer space. For this program, the Division assisted the industry in obtaining from the War Production Board the necessary priorities for material and equipment. It also assisted in procuring certificates of war necessity where such were required.
By the end of 1943, despite the fact that the Division had brought about the conversion of approximately 8,000,000 cubic feet of cooler into freezer space, freezer storage facilities had become so congested that a critical situation impended. Relief lay to a substantial extent with the Office of Price Administration and the War Food Administration, since these agencies could by policies adopted encourage greater consumption of those foodstuffs that were causing the glut in freezer storage. The Office of Defense Transportation urged these agencies, from June to December 1943, to ease rationing and other restrictions. In his last quarterly report of that year to the President, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation commented on this situation as follows:
The corrective measures urged by this Office on WFA, OPA, and WPB, contemplated (1) elimination of rationing or drastic reductions in point values on frozen fruits and vegetables and pork products; (2) increased allocations to public consumption of surplus butter; and (3) adjustment between WFA and OPA of price levels on eggs in order to speed the movement of frozen eggs from storage to the egg-drying processsors. Had these measures been taken by WFA and OPA, even as late as October or early November 1943, the critically serious situation could have been averted.
The recent action of the OPA in reducing point values on
certain items of frozen fruits and vegetables and elimination from rationing of certain frozen vegetables, plus the reduction in point values and granting of bonus points on pork, should tend to relieve the congestion somewhat, but with the heavy run of cattle and hogs to slaughter at this time, it is feared that the relief will not be sufficient.
As a result of discontinuing rationing points on frozen fruits and vegetables, to which the OPA finally consented in January 1944, and due also to the final decision of the War Food Administration to prohibit the storage of perishable commodities in public cold-storage warehouses for a period longer than 10 months, freezer storage space began to ease slightly. By March 1944 the occupancy of available space for this type of storage, as reported by War Food Administration, had dropped from 92 percent to 87 percent.
Thereupon developed a situation involving eggs, economics, and lack of cooperation, that seriously congested cooler space, and, by the middle of the third year of the war, threatened to wipe out the narrow margin of available freezer space. The Director of the Division of Storage reported that, of the 1,541,500,000 pounds of commodities in freezer storage on July 1,1944, frozen eggs contributed 354,-900,000 pounds. “Egg-breaking plants,” he wrote, “have been and are operating at full capacity to convert Government shell-egg holdings into frozen eggs. This has resulted in the unprecedented total of 354,000,000 pounds of frozen eggs in storage on July’l, 1944, and reports of holdings as of August 1, 1944, will undoubtedly be substantially higher.” They rose to 397,182,000 pounds.
Several elements were involved in the problem. The maintenance by the Government of a floor under the price of eggs on the farm had a direct effect upon the retail price and this, in turn, influenced the volume of consumption. Price maintenance also influenced the size of the producing flocks. Finally there was the problem of »cooperation among the procurement, regulatory, and storage agencies of Government. In fact, so interrelated and confused were the functions of these branches of administration that it was found desirable to create an interagency »cold-storage committee with representation from the War Food Administration, War Department, Navy Department, War Production Board, Office of Price Administration, and the Office of Defense Transportation. This committee recommended to the War Food Administration policies designed to relieve »congestion of cold-storage facilities. These recommendations urged basically stricter enforcement of the limitations on the period during which perishable commodities might remain in storage, and prohibition upon the use of cold storage for commodities that »could be safely trusted to nonre
51
frigerated facilities. They also asked that ceiling quotas be placed on the storage of certain commodities.
While improvement of the cold-storage situation was in progress, the agency was prompting the construction of much-needed additional dry- and cold-storage space on the Pacific coast. Under construction or completed in 1943 or early in 1944, were 500,000 cubic feet of freezer space at Seattle, and 500,000 cubic feet at Auburn, Wash.; also 1,-000,000 cubic feet at San Francisco which, because of fire, was not completed until later in 1944. The construction at Auburn included also 2,000,000 square feet of covered and 2,000,000 square feet of paved, but open, dry-storage space, with 540,000 square feet of dry covered space at San Francisco»
The magnitude of the storage facilities of the country created in connection with its war activities was enormous. It had to be if we were to avoid the congestions that arose as a consequence of deficient storage space during World War I, and if provision were to be made for the tremendous increase in production during World War II. In addition to the nine stock-piling warehouses in the inland production area, the 10 holding and reconsigning depots designed to regulate the flow to shipside, the 12 leased buildings, the pooling of the facilities of the warehouse industry, the va,st dry- and cold-storage facilities, there were constructed by the Navy huge storage facilities at or near the coasts, and numerous depots by the Army to serve the military camps. The total new storage facilities thus created for the war aggregated some 500,000,000 square feet, enough to cover about 10,000 acres, or approximately 15 square miles of area.
Storage-in-Transit. '
Imposing as was this physical system for storage, it required close cooperation from the railroads in the matter of in-transit rates to give it flexibility. Without that cooperation, under the then existing tariffs, the movements from factory to storage, from one storage point to another, and then the final movement to the ports, or to inland points of destination, would each have piled up transportation charges that would have robbed the plan- of much of its efficiency. So the Office of Defense Transportation induced the railroads to accord to such multiple movements for the Government and for some commodities for the public certain storage-in-transit privileges. This gave to such freight the established export or domestic rate from point of origin to final point of destination, with a nominal service charge for each in-transit handling.
Storage-in-transit eased the pressure upon trans
portation equipment, made possible a better control of the flow of goods and proved most helpful to the storage industry through more effective utilization of available storage space. Various forms of commodities were in regular course affected, especially those of a seasonal character that at times of flush production overflowed storage facilities at the sources of production. These could be stored as well under storage-in-transit at points intermediate to the areas of their final disposal. In an address at the University of Baltimore, May 17, 1943, Director Nicolson, of the Division of Storage, cited the case of the Pacific coast canned goods pack:
The willingness of the carriers to establish a general storage-in-transit arrangement on Pacific coast canned goods and frozen fruits and vegetables is typical of the cooperation I speak of. The armed forces have been compelled to take over a substantial amount of storage space on the Pacific coast, consequently, there is insufficient storage capacity for any appreciable proportion of the Pacific coast canned goods pack. As rapidly as it can be inspected, the pack must be moved eastward for storage-in-transit where storage space is available. Also, in order to effect conservation of refrigerator car equipment, the Pacific coast canners have been encouraged to move a large portion of their pack east of the Rocky Mountains in ordinary boxcars before cold weather sets in and thus avoid the use of insulated equipment for this movement during the winter months.
' The railroads were liberal in their application of the in-transit arrangements for the war effort. Under section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act, which permits the carriers to make in-transit storage arrangements with the Government without publication of tariffs, and at rates to individual shippers, the carriers have applied the arrangements to the movement of goods from a congested port to another shiploading point that was free of congestion. The in-transit rate has been a helpful factor in keeping ports functiohing successfully.
The storage-in-transit arrangements were negotiated with the railroads by the Divisioh of Rates as discussed in Chapter XXXIV on rates. One of these arrangements was to place in effect storage-in-transit privileges for export commercial shipments in carload lots, when moving under ODT unit permits. Another agreement extended storage-in-trans-it privileges to the movement of frozen fruits and vegetables from the Pacific coast to interior points in western, southern, and eastern districts. This was followed by an extension of the intransit privilege to permit consolidation of several shipments into one movement from the s'torage-in-transit point. The concessions involving the Pacific coast canned and frozen packs were made at the requests of the War, Navy, and Agriculture Departments and the Office of Defense Transportation, to free more storage facilities on the west coast for overseas movement of war supplies and lend-lease.
In February 1944 Col. Nicolson, Director of the
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Division of Storage, called all interested Government agencies together.
to explore the possibilities of coordination of the usage of buildings, both private and Government-owned, which may become vacant as a result of cancellation of war contracts, particularly suitable for storage.
This was just at the time that the Surplus War Property Administration was created by Presidential order with William L. Clayton as its head.
On March 2, as a result of this meeting, Col. Nicolson addressed Mr. Clayton, recommending the formation of a «committee for—
a centralized control over the storage program in order that the most efficient use could be made of the relatively small amount of suitable storage space that is now available as well as the necessity of conserving transportation in the handling of this rapidly growing volume of surplus property.
Mr. Clayton appointed a committee comprised of
representatives of the War and Navy Departments, Defense Plant Corporation, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Office of Defense Transportation. .The chairman of this committee was Col. John J. O’Brien, of the Army Corps of Engineers. He presented, on March 11, a plan of organization. Out of this grew the Space Control Committee which reported to the Surplus Property Administrator. The Director of the Storage Division acted through the early stages of this work as consultant, suggesting the solicitation of assistance from experienced public warehousemen, and, finally, a form of contract. The Space Control Committee approved and adopted these procedures and thereafter performed a huge task of activitating available buildings, constructing new temporary buildings, and preparing hard standing ground for open storage.
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CHAPTER IX
CONTROL OF RAIL TRANSPORT OF COAL
In some respects the difficulties attending the wartime transport of coal were the same as those encountered in other fields of transport. The insatiable demands of war required an unprecedented increase in industrial and agricultural production, which was reflected in a corresponding increase in railway traffic generally. Since coal is a basic raw material used in the steel industry and also is a basic source of power in nearly all branches of industry, increased industrial activity during the war was the cause of a comparable increase in coal production. This discussion is exclusively concerned with bituminous coal. Anthracite, produced almost wholly in one State, Pennsylvania, amounts annually to about 10 percent of bituminous production. The principal transport job, so far as coal was concerned, therefore, was the movement of bituminous.
The trend of bituminous coal production in recent years in this country is shown by the following data from the Bureau of Mines, Department of Interior:
Total production—Net tons
1938 .................................... 348,544,764
1939 .............................. ....... 394,855,325
1940 ...................................... 460,771,500
1941 ...................................... 514,149,245
1942 ...................................... 582,692,937
1943 ...................................... 590,177,069
1944 ...................................... 619,576,240
1945 ...................................... 576,000,000
Most, although not all of this coal is loaded at the mines for shipment by rail. Some of it is consumed at the mines and some shipped by water and highway, but the principal load by far fell on the railroads. Of the coal tonnage produced in 1943, 84 percent was loaded at the mines for shipment by rail, and this represents the normal contribution of the railroads in hauling coal from the mines. In terms of tonnage, however, the burden on the railroads constantly increased. In 1939, the roads carried 331,-089,620 tons of bituminous coal, in 1940, 380,387,674 tons; in 1941, 425,184,319 tons; in 1942, 582,693,000 tons; in 1943, 590,177,000 tons; in 1944, 527,135,-000 tons and in 1945, 576,000,000 tons.
At the same time, coal transport was affected by the usual shortages incident to war conditions. There was during the war no significant expansion in the 700494—48—5
supply of hopper and gondola cars employed in the movement of coal by rail, and the labor shortage was acute not only on the railroads but also at both the lake and tidewater ports where coal is transferred to water carriers, and where delay in loading vessels limits directly the supply of coal cars available for loading at the mines.
In addition, difficulties arose that were peculiar to coal transport. The numerous interruptions to coal production had an immediate and marked effect on such transport. No storage facilities exist at the mines, and when coal is not continuously produced in a given area, coal cars remain idle unless immediately redistributed. For the same reason, the regulations of the Solid Fuel Administration for War affecting the production and the distribution of coal often required redistribution of coal cars and their diversion from their customary routes.
A special problem existed at the lake and tidewater ports where, huge quantities of coal are transferred from rail to water carriers. Rail operations at these ports encountered the difficulties typical of all important gateways and terminals, but the conditions making for delay were present in aggravated form at the ports. Coal is loaded in cars according to size and quality, and before a vessel can be loaded, many carloads of coal of uniform size and quality must be assembled. This requires considerable switching in a restricted area. In addition, the coal must be transferred to water carriers, and the speed with which this can be done depends upon the availability of adequate shipping tonnage and the labor supply. Furthermore, during the war, the ocean route from Hampton Roads to coastwise points was disrupted by enemy submarines and a shortage of vessels, so that all-rail and rail-barge movements had to be substituted.
It was the task of those agencies responsible for the transport of coal by rail, that is, the Office of Defense Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Association of American Railroads to surmount the obstacles in the way of the expeditious movement of coal, and to effect maximum utilization of existing coal transport facilities. Each
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of these agencies controlled certain phases of coal transport, and, in addition, the Solid Fuels Administration for War exerted a strong influence on coal transport through its authority to control the production and distribution of coal during the war.
Coal Production and Distribution.
Bituminous coal is produced in 26 States scattered throughout the country, but production is concentrated largely in a few areas. By far the most productive are those situated east of the Mississippi River. Here are two main fields: the Appalachian, consisting of the mines in Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland, and Virginia; and the Middle Western, consisting of mines in Illinois, Indiana, and western Kentucky. The southern Appalachian fields in Virginia and southern West Virginia are commonly designated as “Pocahontas” territory and are especially productive. In 1943, the Appalachian fields produced more than 67 percent of the total bituminous output of the country and the midwestern fields slightly less than 20 percent. Other bituminous areas rank substantially below these. Alabama is noteworthy in the Southeast and, in the West, Colorado, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming constitute a source of supply for industry in the Rocky Mountain and Pacific coast regions.
It is clear from the locations of the producing areas that most of the rail coal tonnage in the country originates in the Appalachian and midwestem fields. From these fields rail carriers move coal to all consuming areas of the United States and to Canada. Of particular importance are four movements : that to Lake Erie ports from the Appalachian fields for transshipment across the Lakes to both American and Canadian points; the west-bound movement from both the Appalachian and midwestern fields to the Mississippi valley; the movement from the Pocahontas area through Hampton Roads for ultimate delivery by way of the Atlantic to New England; and the movement through New York Harbor from the northern Appalachian fields to the same destination. There is also an important all-rail movement from the northern fields to New England. These movements make up the normal pattern of rail coal transport in the roads for ultimate delivery by way of the Atlantic to New England; and the movement through New York Harbor from the northern Appalachian fields to the same destination. Certain of the movements were so disrupted by the impact of war that important shifts were necessary to maintain a continuous flow of coal to industrial and domestic consumers.
The pattern of coal distribution among the various
classes of consumers has an effect on rail transport. The principal classes are the railroads themselves, electric power utilities, coke and coal gas producers, industrial establishments, and retail distributors. Of these, the railroads are the largest users. In 1943 class I carriers consumed 130,283,000 tons of bituminous coal, or about 21 percent of total output. The railroads thus divert for their own use a substantial proportion of the available coal transport facilities. The length of the haul involved in supplying each individual road and the period of car detention have an important effect on the supply of coal cars available for other consumers, and were therefore subject to close surveillance by the regulatory agencies charged with responsibility for the equitable and efficient distribution of such cars.
Similar supervision was exercised over other consignees for the same reason. The conditions under which coal cars are unloaded at ordinary sidings permit more rapid unloading than at ports of transshipment. This.is reflected in the demurrage rules which allow a normal free period of only 48 hours at ordinary sidings, while 7 days are customarily allowed at the ports. But in wartime the regulatory authorities were not merely interested in keeping car detention below the free period; they sought to reduce car detention to the minimum to maintain a maximum number of cars continuously in use. They were constantly engaged, therefore, in urging large consignees to unload and return cars to the carriers as quickly as possible.
Solid Fuels Administration for War.
In addition to the Government agencies which had jurisdiction over transport facilities, the Solid Fuels Administration for War, through its authority to regulate wartime production and distribution of coal, exercised a strong influence on coal transport. Indeed, its influence was so great and its activities so intimately connected with those of the Office of Defense Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Commission that the functions of the agency must be clearly defined.
The Solid Fuels Administration for War was created by Executive Order No. 9332, issued April 19, 1943. By that order the Office of Solid Fuels Coordinator for War was abolished and the Solid Fuels Administration established within the Department of the Interior, with the Secretary of the Interior as Administrator. This agency, like its predecessor, was vested with responsibility for maximizing the efficiency of the coal industry during the war in all its aspects. It was enjoined by the order to— establish basic policies and formulate plans and programs to assure for the prosecution of the war the conservation and most effective development and utilization of solid fuels in the
56
United States * * * issue necessary policy and operating directives to parties engaged in the solid fuels industries * * *
In carrying out this mandate, the order specifically directed the Administrator to : (1) prepare estimates as to the quantities of solid fuels necessary to meet military and essential requirements; (2) recommend to the War Production Board programs for distribution of solid fuels designed to meet these requirements; and (3) to provide adequate supplies of solid fuels.
Several provisions of Executive Order No. 9332 provided for collaboration between the Solid Fuels Administration and the Office of Defense Transportation. Thus, the Solid Fuels Administration was directed—
to prepare and submit to the Office of Defense Transportation recommendations concerning the provision of transportation facilities adequate for the transportation and distribution of the solid fuels necessary to meet * * ♦ military and essential civilian requirements.
The Executive order also required the Administrator to consult with other Federal departments and agencies whose functions affect the solid fuels industries, in advance of any action taken by him. Where transportation was concerned, this meant that the Administrator was to consult with the Interstate Commerce Commission as well as with the Office of Defense Transportation.
As a result, a large measure of coordination was achieved in planning the production and distribution of coal on the one hand and providing facilities for its transport on the other. The Solid Fuels Administration prepared annual coal production programs in advance, and the Office of Defense Transportation prepared estimates of the capacity of the railroads to transport coal. The Office of Defense Transportation and the carriers thus were informed in advance of the total load and were enabled to make preparations to meet their responsibilities. At no time was the total load beyond the capacity of the railroads.
There was similar coordination, insofar as possible, between the distribution programs of the Solid Fuels Administration and transport. The Solid Fuels Administration issued regulations establishing priorities among various classes of consumers, fixing the quantities of coal for each class, often including shipping instructions and indicating sources of supply. The carrier agencies, when advised in advance of these distribution regulations, could anticipate more precisely the services expected of them and allocate their facilities accordingly. These regulations of the Solid Fuels Administration tended to regularize the movement of coal and to mitigate the burden on the railroads.
Solid Fuels Administration Regulation No. 25, is
sued January 20, 1945, prohibited shipments of coal via the Great Lakes except (1) pursuant to a written contract executed on or before February 20, 1945, that is, prior to the opening of the season of lake navigation, or (2) pursuant to written permission of the Solid Fuels Administration. The regulation also fixed the quantities of coal that might be shipped to and received at the lake docks. The requirements of the regulation enabled the carrier agencies concerned with the rail-lake movement of coal, that is, the Office of Defense Transportation and the carriers themselves, to determine in advance the volume of shipments and to make the necessary arrangements to handle them. The efficient transshipment of coal at the Lake Erie ports required coordination between rail and lake carriers, and advance knowledge of the size of the movement helped to achieve it.
The provisions of Regulation No. 25, with respect to lake shipments of coal were supplemented by Regulation No. 27, issued March 14, 1945. This was the basic regulation governing the allocation and distribution of bituminous coal among the various classes of consumers. While providing for the equitable distribution of coal, it also sought the maximum utilization of the lake route during the navigation season. It directed shippers of coal in mining districts which are tributary to the Great Lakes, from a transport point of view, to arrange their distribution schedules for the period, April 1 to November 17, so that orders received for coal moving by way of the Lakes could be met in full.
Solid Fuels Administration Regulation No. 3, issued August 20,1943, likewise had the effect of economizing rail transport by eliminating excessive hauling. The increase in fuel requirements of war industries in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming induced the movement of large and unusual shipments of coal to those states from docks located on Lake Superior and the west bank of Lake Michigan. This movement was undesirable for two reasons: First, it made more difficult the task of supplying the requirments of purchasers who normally obtain coal from these lake docks ; and, second, it involved excessive hauling as there were less distant sources of supply available in the West. The Solid Fuels Administration thereupon issued Regulation No. 3, prohibiting the— selling or otherwise arranging for the ex-lake dock distribution of coal by any method of transportation to any destination not located in the States of Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota, or located in the provinces of Ontario or Manitoba, in the Dominion of Canada.
The effect of the regulation was to limit lake coal shipments to areas normally receiving them and to prohibit excessive hauling.
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To meet emergency situations and to avoid the inequitable distribution of solid fuels in some instances, thé Solid Fuels Administration found it necessary, on occasion, to control rail movements more directly by reconsigning, diverting, or rerouting solid fuels in transit. The Interstate Commerce Commission, accordingly, issued Service Order No. 177, requiring railroads subject to the Interstate Commerce Act to accept reconsignment, diversion or rerouting orders from the Solid Fuels Administration. Pursuant to this order, the Solid Fuels Administration issued Regulation No. 14, which prescribed procedure in such cases.
General Control Measures.
Wartime control measures regulating the transport of coal by railmay be classified logically in two categories: first, those measures applied to coal transport generally; and, second, those applied to particular areas which required special treatment. The most important of those areas were at the lake and tidewater ports where coal was transshipped in large volume and where conditions affecting rail operations created distinctive problems.
As a major goal, all control agencies sought to reduce the turn-around time of coal cars and to maintain a maximum number of cars in active use. They constantly directed their efforts, therefore, to investigating the practices either by order or by informal methods when necessary to improve the performance of coal transport facilities. They were especially concerned with (1) the distribution of cars at the mines; (2) car detention ; (3) “no-billing” ; and (4) other practices affecting efficiency in coal car operations, such as classifications and excessive hauling.
Because of the peculiar conditions under which coal is produced, it is necessary, even in peacetime, to establish by legislation special rules for the distribution of coal cars at the mines. The principal reason for such legislative action is that storage facilities are not available at mines and, if production is to continue uninterruptedly, coal cars must be supplied at each mine in sufficient number to transport current output. In times when coal cars are in adequate supply, no difficulties arise. But during periods marked by unusually large output, measures had to be taken to assure the fair and equitable distribution of cars.
The Interstate Commerce Act, accordingly, imposed the duty on every rail carrier “to make just and reasonable distribution of cars for transportation of coal among the coal mines served by it.” During any period when the supply of cars does not equal all the requirements, the Act obliges the carriers to determine and rate the productivity capacity
of each mine served by it and “to count each and every car furnished to any such mine for transportation of coal against the mine.”
Implementing the Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission laid down specific principles that were to guide the carriers in rating coal mines. The carriers were enjoined in determining ratings to take into consideration with respect of each mine, physical conditions, past performance, labor supply, and other factors that affect the production and shipment of coal.
Proper distribution of coal cars is thus, under the Act, the primary responsibility of the carriers. Each railroad determines the car supply for each mine served by it and sets forth in tariffs filed with the Commission the rules followed in each determination. Inter-carrier relations affecting the use and distribution of coal cars are supervised by the open-top section of the car service division, Association of American Railroads. The administration and enforcement of the provisions of the Act, however, are the responsibility of the Commission, which is in the last analysis responsible for the equitable distribution of coal cars.
During the war sharply increased production and changes in output and distribution in particular mining areas, in accordance with the program and policies of the Solid Fuels Administration, required changes in the customary pattern of car allocation. In order that the urgent needs of war industries might be promptly met, coal cars often had to be shifted from one area to another with a minimum of delay. It was also important to eliminate unnecessary car detention at the mines. Normally, cars were distributed by the Association of American Railroads upon the basis of current information relative to the needs of the various producing areas. But specific cases of car accumulation were investigated by the service agents of the Commission and, when necessary, embargoes issued on the basis of their recommendations either by the Association of American Railroads or the Commission, to prevent congestion at terminals and elsewhere. The service agents also reported undue detention of cars at mines and the Commission took measures to expedite their movement.
In dealing with the problem of rail coal-carrying equipment, the Office of Defense Transportation was primarily concerned with the problem of an adequate supply of cars to meet the demands of the war effort. A Coal Section in the Division of Railway Transport was specially charged with this responsibility. The Section utilized the service of the field agents of the regional directors of the Railway Transport Division in eastern, western and southern territories. These
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agents investigated all aspects of coal car operations, including car distribution and detention at the mines; they were particularly concerned with car shortages at mines, and they reported each instance where carriers furnished less than 100 percent of the number of cars ordered. These reports were made to the appropriate regional director who, in turn, notified the Associate Director of Railway Transport in charge of the Coal Section in Washington. Minor shortages were usually eliminated when the Association of American Railroads was apprised of them. Complicated situations, involving questions of major policy and the shifting of coal cars on a large scale, were adjusted in conference between the Association of American Railroads, the Office of Defense Transportation, and the Interstate Commerce Commission. In the same manner, the Office of Defense Transportation sought to anticipate car shortages .and avert them by the timely redistribution of cars.
Applying Demurrage Rules.
Demurrage rules for coal cars differ from those generally applied to other types of freight cars. No demurrage charge is made for the maximum number of cars to which a mine is entitled according to its rating, as long as the cars are at the mine awaiting load on designated tracks or sidings or awaiting shipping instructions. When cars are held elsewhere than at ports, principally at consignee’s sidings, 48 hours free time are allowed, after which demurrage charges accrue. Demurrage charges are also made on loaded cars at the mine when held in excess of the allowable maximum.
These demurrage rules were not made more severe during the war. The constant aim of agencies seeking to expedite coal traffic was to reduce the period of car detention, regardless of the allowable free time. The free period was not accepted as a minimum standard, but shippers and consignees were continuously urged to improve methods of unloading, thus releasing cars to the carriers as quickly as possible. The field agents of the Office of Defense Transportation and service agents of the Interstate Commerce Commission investigated undue car detention by consignees and shippers, also methods of unloading, and recommended corrective measures. They also insisted upon strict observance of the demurrage rules.
In normal circumstances, it is a common practice for the railroads to assign coal cars up to the rated capacity of a mine under “no-billing” terms. This means that the cars may be loaded although no consignee is designated. “No-billing” is allowed to permit the uninterrupted production of coal, whether or
not a market has been found for it. In peacetime it is often impossible for shippers to procure purchasers concurrently with the production of coal, and if transport were denied until purchasers are found, production would be subject to all the inefficiencies resulting from irregular operations.
In time of car shortages, and this is a normal condition in wartime, no-billing must be restricted and preference in the allocation of cars given to mines that are in position to bill cars to specified consignees. During the war, the percentage of no-bill cars was steadily reduced as the supply of coal cars became progressively tighter. On September 12, 1942, the maximum of such cars for each bituminous mine was fixed at 75 percent of rated loading capacity. Subsequently this was reduced to 25 percent. These limitations were imposed by the Association of American Railroads, on advice of the Office of Defense Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In the spring of 1944 the Office of Defense Transportation made a comprehensive investigation of nobilling. It concluded that no-billing in wartime was defensible only in rare circumstances as the demand for coal for war purposes was so great as to leave inconsequential quantities of coal without specific markets. This study was instrumental in reducing the percentage of no-bills. It seems, however, that the practice cannot be altogether eliminated. Coal is offered upon the market in numerous grades and sizes and ready sale cannot always be had for all of them. Furthermore, the amount of some grades and sizes cannot be estimated accurately in advance and, when more is produced than expected, time must be allowed to find purchasers. Again, partially filled cars of byproduct coals awaiting a full load are treated as “no-bills,” as are loaded cars awaiting the completion of a trainload order consigned to the same destination.
Efficiency in Coal Car Operations.
The Office of Defense Transportation made special studies of coal classifications, excessive hauling, and turn-around performance of coal cars over important routes. Shippers of coal have developed numerous classifications for merchandising purposes. These classifications are based on differences in the size and heating value of various coals. There are variations not only in coals produced in different mines but also in those extracted from the same mine. The result is to make loading more difficult as each classification must be separately handled. When great numbers of cars converge at a terminal as at ports of transshipment, the existence of numerous classifications causes many and complicated switching opera
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tions. The Office of Defense Transportation made a survey of coal classifications with a view to removing those that were not based on substantial differences in heating value. Both the Office of Defense Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Commission constantly urged shippers to consolidate and reduce» the number of classifications. As a result, a considerable number of classifications were eliminated.
An effort was made to determine whether coal was cross-hauled in such degree as to justify the disruption of normal routes established during peacetime for the movement of coal. Under war conditions, when carriers, shippers, and dealers were subject to strict regulation by governmental agencies and when, in the face of labor shortages, they were required to file numerous reports in regular course, the Office of Defense Transportation found it difficult to obtain exhaustive data on the subject. The length of conspicuously excessive hauls in some instances was reduced. Occasionally it was found that consumers bought coal from distant fields but in such cases it was revealed that the particular size or quality involved was not available from nearer mines.
The Office of Defense Transportation made studies of turn-around time of coal cars over several railroads. The results were used to decide upon the merits of alternative routes. For example, when it was proposed to shift coal traffic from the all-rail route between the southern Appalachian fields and New England to the rail-water route through New York Harbor, it was found that the difference in turn-around time of the coal cars was insignificant, despite the longer haul on the all-rail route.
Lake Coal Movements.
Coal transport involving coordination of rail and water facilities required special attention during the war. This was due to the unusual difficulties in transferring coal from one type of carrier to another and to the large volume of coal moving over railwater routes.
The principal rail-water routes radiate from the Appalachian coal fields to the Lake Erie ports, to the northern tidewater ports of the New York area, and to the southern tidewater ports of Hampton Roads. Service Order No. 92, issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission on October 27, 193*2, was the basic regulation governing rail operations in these areas. The order designated agents for each of the port areas and authorized them to control the movement of coal cars to Lake Erie, New York Harbor, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Hampton Roads respectively. These agents were assisted by the field forces of the Bureau of Service of the Interstate Commerce Commission, ‘ and of the Railway Trans
port Division, Office of Defense Transportation, as well as by the Association of American Railroads and industry organizations concerned with various phases of the coal traffic. The ports in each area presented distinctive problems and had to be considered separately.
Lake coal is largely bituminous coal that moves by rail from the Appalachian mines to Lake Erie ports. These ports, ten in number, extend from Toledo, in the West, to Buffalo, in the East. From them cargoes of coal are transshipped upon the Great Lakes to destinations in both the United States and Canada.
The magnitude of lake bituminous coal transport in recent years is revealed by the following tonnage data taken from the reports of the Coal and Ore Exchange :
Tonnage
1938 ....................................... 34,172,963
1939 ....................................... 39,836,786
1940 ....................................... 46,547,987
1941 ....................................... 49,733,234
1942 ....................................... 47,814,592
1943 ....................................... 46,059,334
1944 ....................................... 53,981,331
1945 ....................................... 49,901,311
Most important of the lake ports of transshipment is Toledo, which usually receives and ships approximately half of the total lake coal tonnage. Next comes Sandusky, with less than half the tonnage of Toledo, followed by Ashtabula, Conneaut, Erie, Lorain, Cleveland, Fairport, Buffalo, and Huron. From these ports coal is transshipped to Duluth and Superior on Lake Superior; to Chicago, Milwaukee, Green Bay, and Sheboygan on Lake Michigan, and to the river ports on the St. Clair and Detroit. In addition, shipments are made to points on the Canadian side of the Great Lakes, especially to Fort William on Lake Superior. Usually the tonnage consigned to Canada totals between one-fifth and onefourth of the entire lake coal movement.
A serious factor influencing the transshipment of coal through lake ports is that the season of navigation is limited. Officially, the season opens April 15 and closes November 15, but actually it terminates about December 15. During this period, lake facilities must be utilized to the maximum if additional burdens are not to be shifted to the rails.
Maximum utilization of lake facilities requires a continuous uninterrupted flow of coal through the ports. This depends not only on maintaining regular rail movement but also the expeditious dumping of coal from railroad cars into vessels. The docks and unloading apparatus are owned and operated by the railroads and the carriers perform all services incident to transshipment, which include car dump
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ing and the difficult switching operations characteristic of congested port areas.
The efficiency of these rail carrier operations depends largely also on conditions surrounding movement beyond the rail terminals. The transshippers initiate the movement when they order coal from the mines. They either operate or charter vessels for delivery. They are, therefore, the principal factor influencing the period of car detention. Although they do not control the movement of lake vessels they can arrange, so far as possible, for vessel space simultaneously with the arrival of the coal at the ports, and thus permit prompt dumping. Business practices relating to coal classification and consignments also have a strong effect on port operations.
Production conditions at the mines create other problems. The productivity of small mines is not great enough to provide full cargoes in a short period of time and such cargoes can be provided only by detaining cars. Labor shortages and interruptions in mining also detain cars.
It is obvious, because of these reasons, that special efforts were required by regulatory authority to coordinate the operations of transshippers, carriers, and producers in order to reduce car detention to a minimum, to maintain a maximum of cars in active use, and to keep coal continuously flowing through the ports.
Coal and Ore Exchange.
Even in peacetime coordinating activities were necessary. After the entry of the United States into World War I in 1917, all lake coal was pooled under the supervision of the Lake Erie Bituminous Coal Association, an organization maintained by the railroads. On March 1,1918, the railroads, lake coal, and ore shippers and receivers, and vessel interests established the Coal and Ore Exchange, to aid in handling the lake coal tonnage. After the close of the 1918 season, pooling of lake coal was abandoned, but the operation of the Exchange was continued by the United States Railroad Administration until March 1920, when the railroads were returned to their owners.
On March 25, 1920, the exchange was reorganized by the railroads for the purpose of assisting lake shippers. It furnishes information as to coal at the ports and in transit and as to the operation of dumping machines at the docks. It supervises the supply, movement, routing, and delivery of ore to furnaces. It establishes contacts between railroads, coal shippers, and lake vessel owners, and furnishes other services designed to facilitate the movement of coal and ore, thereby reducing car detention, increasing
car supply, and adding to the facilities handling lake traffic.
The exchange is an agency of the Association of American Railroads? Its jurisdiction in respect to shipments of lake coal normally extends to all Lake Erie ports but does not cover the movement of lake coal to the ports. It receives daily reports from all docks west of Buffalo of coal at the ports and the number of cars of coal in transit and due at the ports for each transshiper or consignee; these reports showing the amount of coal at each dock and in transit; the previous day’s dumping and estimated dumping for the current day; and vessels unloading at the various ports that are named for coal loading, and the time each vessel will be unloaded and ready to sail. This report upon vessels enables the dock at which each vessel receives its cargo to know of the vessel’s probable time of arrival, and thus avoid delay in loading. The exchange keeps all interested lake coal transshippers or consignees and carriers informed, with the object of coordinating their activities to facilitate the prompt unloading of cars and the dispatch of vessels.
The needs of war required that the machinery developed by private interests be supplemented and strengthened by governmental authority. Accordingly, ICC Service Order No. 92 was issued on October 27, 1942. It designated W. J. McGarry, manager of the exchange, as agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission with authority— to control the movement of railroad cars used in the transportation of coal for transshipment by vessel at Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and Lake Michigan ports.
His jurisdiction was thus expanded to include ports beyond Lake Erie.
As agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission, he had specific authority to (1) issue permits for the movement of coal to the Lakes for transshipment in such a manner as to prevent the accumulation of cars at the ports in excess of the ability of transshipment to provide vessels for prompt dumping, and (2) to provide consolidation for transshipment of various grades and consignment designations of coal. In addition, as agent of the Association of American Railroads, he was empowered to issue embargoes prohibiting the movement of coal cars to lake ports when congestion existed or threatened. He exercised this power only after consultation with the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Mr. McGarry was assisted by an advisory committee representing the Coal and Ore Exchange, by a committee of lake coal transshippers and by a policy committee made up of the operating vice presidents of the coal-originating railroads. Meeting of
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these committees were held prior to the opening of the lake navigation season, at which the estimates were submitted of the volume of coal tonnage anticipated for the coming season and plans were made for moving it. These committees also met during the season to consider new conditions as they arose and such extraordinary measures as might be necessary to meet them. Carrier and transshipper practices were constantly reviewed and cooperative action encouraged to increase efficiency in handling cargo.
Mr. McGarry worked in close collaboration with the Office of Defense Transportation. He filed with it daily reports which portrayed operating conditions at the ports in detail, supplementing these with weekly and monthly summaries.
Control Measures.
In the main, the efforts to improve the handling of lake coal during the war were concentrated on reducing car detention at the ports. There are special conditions affecting lake coal that make it more difficult to unload than ordinary coal delivered on track to consignees. The latter, as a rule, can be unloaded without delay. But lake-cargo coal must be held at the port of transshipment until an entire cargo, sometimes 200 to 250 cars, is ready to be dumped into the vessel. The accumulation of such cargo lots necessarily entails considerable delay and detention of cars.
This condition is aggravated by the great variety of classifications used in the coal business to differentiate the numerous grades, qualities and sizes of coal. The number of classifications used by a transshipper varies. The extent of this variation is indicated by the experience of the Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad at Toledo for the season of 1935, when that road had 55 transshippers, some of whom having 20 classifications.
Each classification must be handled separately, and this results in intricate switching operations. Upon arrival of cars of lake coal at the ports, a card showing the date of arrival, the name of the transshipper, and the grade of coal is attached to each car. The cars are then switched and grouped as to different classifications for the same transshipper. This practice of arranging cars by coal classifications rather than by car numbers is known as the consignment method and reduces the amount of switching necessary to deliver cars to the dumping machine. A consignment is defined as a shipment consisting of a single classification moving to a single consignee. The method requires a vast amount of initial switching but it saves a like amount or more at the time of delivery, as compared with the switch -
ing necessary if cars were placed in order of their arrival without regard to classifications and consignees.
The policy followed by regulatory authorities in lessening obstacles to the more expeditious handling of lake coal was rested largely on voluntary actions. Through pressure exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the exchange, transshippers were induced to reduce the number of their consignments. Whereas there were about 1,900 consignments in use at the ports in 1941. These were reduced to about 1,300 in 1942. In addition, the trans-shjppers, acting through the medium of the exchange, arranged exchanges and combinations of the same or similar coals. These measures tended to reduce switching operations and expedite dumping.
Many factors inherent in the transport of lake coal and the use of facilities provided could not be modified. The arrival of lake vessels at ports, often delayed by fog, accidents, or other unexpected occurrences, could not be fixed with certainty. The number of consignments that could be eliminated were limited. Some of the difficulties connected with compartment loading of vessels could not be overcome. For example, vessels often had to be loaded with coal of specific grades and in specific compartments, because receiving facilities at the upper lake ports were so constructed as to make unloading impossible if vessels were otherwise loaded. This often required the accumulation of different grades of coal from differenttmines and delayed loading and dumping.
On the other hand, definite improvement was effected. Transshippers were induced to charter vessels whose presence at the ports coincided with the arrival of coal at the ports. The system of issuing permits for loaded cars of coal moving into the ports, and issuing embargoes when necessary, averted congestion. Complete information and daily reporting concerning conditions at the ports enabled the authorities to anticipate difficulties. Close supervision of demurrage regulations prevented abuses. A considerable number of consignments were eliminated. Constant pleas to transshippers and carriers to speed up operations stimulated their best efforts. The average detention period of each car for each carload and transhipper was frequently computed as well as averages for all transshippers and carloads.
The demurrage rules regularly in effect at the lake ports, recognizing the peculiar operating difficulties existing there, were made liberal. The free period allowed for each car is 5 days. When cars are returned to carriers, it is assumed that they are released in order of arrival, whether that is the fact or not. Each car receives five credits for free time
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and a debit is charged against each for each day of detention. Demurrage accounts are settled semiannually on January 1 and July 1. Credits for the 6 months are set off against the debits, and demurrage is paid on the excess of the latter.
The reason for the extensive period of settlement is that seasonal factors strongly influence vessel operations and the period of detention. Uncertain weather at the opening of the season often delays the opening of navigation and leads to the accumulation of cars at the ports. It is considered fair to give transshippers an opportunity to balance debits accruing at this time against net credits resulting from improved conditions in May and June. In the second half of the season, the situation is reversed: excess credits accumulated in late summer and early fall tend to be balanced by debits resulting from the difficult weather conditions in November and December. As a consequence, demurrage payments are held to a minimum.
During the war, the aim of transshippers, carriers, and regulatory authorities was to reduce car detention, regardless of demurrage. The efficiency of the measures and policies adopted is attested by the relatively brief average period of car detention achieved in the face of the unprecedented volume of lake coal handled during the emergency. Average net detention for all cars dumped at Lake Erie ports was 4.3 days in 1935, 4.32 days in 1936, and 4.53 days in 1937. The average in 1941 was 4.28 days, in 1942, 3.5 days, in 1943, 3.38 days, and in 1944, 3.31 days, according to reports filed by the Coal and Ore Exchange with the Bureau of Service, Interstate Commerce Commission.
Hampton Roads Ports.
Bituminous coal moves normally in large volume from the southern Appalachian fields to Newport News, Lambert Point, and Sewalls Point, Va., commonly termed Hampton Roads. From here normally moves by far the most important tonnage of coal to New England. This coal is brought to Hampton Roads by three rail carriers, the Chesapeake & Ohio, the Norfolk & Western, and the Virginian, commonly known as the Pocahontas railroads. During the war period, the volume of coal flowing through Hampton Roads varied widely, being determined by conditions affecting the ocean routes.
In many respects operating conditions at Hampton Roads resemble those at the lake ports. Difficulties arising from established practices of producing and marketing coal were, for example, the same. Thus, at Hampton Roads, as at the lake ports, vessel cargoes had to be assembled by combining a sufficient number of carloads, and consignments for trans
shippers tagged and classified at the rail terminals.
In other respects, however, conditions were different at Hampton Roads. The colliers and barges plying open ocean routes from Hampton Roads are subject to greater uncertainties than are vessels on the protected lakes^ Movements of the latter can be predicted with some measure of assurance and schedules formulated accordingly, but the vagaries of ocean climate and currents make it impossible to schedule the arrival and departure of colliers. This is especially true in winter and during the war when submarines made ocean routes extremely hazardous. Because vessel sailings could not be scheduled in advance, a large bank of coal cars had to be maintained at the ports to load promptly such vessels as they became available.
There are other important differences between operations through the lake ports and through Hampton Roads. The movement through Hampton Roads continues the year round and is not concentrated within certain months. Only three rail carriers serving a geographically limited area of production in southern West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, and Virginia serve Hampton Roads, and each of these roads not only originates the traffic, but also makes delivery at the docks. No foreign cars are, therefore, involved. As compared with the great number of transshippers operating at the lake ports, there are only 44 using Hampton Roads. In general, these conditions tend to make the problem of transshipment less complex in peacetime. While the demurrage rules allowed normally 7 days free time at Hampton Roads, this was reduced to 6 days by ICC Service Order No. 87, issued October 8, 1942. The period of settlement was 60 days as compared with 6 months at the Lakes.
The use of Hampton Roads for the transshipment of coal was sharply restricted during the war. In the summer of 1942, enemy submarines made the open water route between the Delaware breakwater and Sandy Hook exceedingly dangerous. In addition, the War Shipping Administration transferred several colliers from the coastwise coal trade. As a result, it was necessary to divert coal shipments from the southern fields to all-rail routes and to rail-barge routes via the northern ports of New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, and the volume of coal moving through Hampton Roads fell off sharply. The problems at Hampton Roads, therefore, was to make the most efficient use of the facilities, at the ports by reducing the detention period of coal cars.
The total net tons of bituminous coal dumped over Hampton Roads piers from 1941 to 1945 was as follows:
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Net tons
1941 ........................ 21,972,860
1942 ........................ 13,306,940
1943 ........................ 10,642,980
1944 ........................ 16,261,130
1945 ........................ 16,753,070
Coastwise colliers and barges withdrawn in the early part of 1942 resulted in diversion to all-rail routes and rail-barge routes via New York Harbor piers for delivery to points in New England and destinations in New York Harbor. The increase in tonnage over 1943 reflects the improvement in the collier situation.
Coal Emergency Committee.
At the outbreak of war, no organization existed at Hampton Roads comparable to the Coal and Ore Exchange on the Great Lakes. Early in 1942, however, the transshippers and the Pocahontas railroads created the Hampton Roads Coal Emergency Committee to regulate the transshipment of coal at the ports in the same general manner as does the exchange on the Lakes. The work of this committee was performed by a manager, with offices in Norfolk.
The manager sought to expedite the transshipment of coal by keeping shipments to the ports in balance with the supply of colliers. He was continuously informed of coal cars in transit and at the ports, also of vessel movements. He continuously urged transshippers to keep consignments in balance with the supply of vessels and the carriers to expedite unloading. He advised them of conditions at the ports and urged them from time to time to withhold or to divert shipments to avert congestion. He urged transshippers also to reduce the number of classifications and consignments, and assisted them in disposing of left-over coal in order to fill any available vessel space.
Special emphasis was laid on reducing car detention. The average period of car detention was compiled for each railroad and transshipper. Those with records in excess of the average were admonished by the manager and, when further action was found necessary, the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Office of Defense Transportation intervened. When congestion could be avoided in no other way, the Commission issued embargoes or diversion orders, depending upon the nature of each case.
The Bureau of Service of the Commission closely supervised the work of the Hampton Roads committee. An agent of the Bureau made periodic investigations of conditions at the ports. The Bureau manager filed the following reports with the Bureau in Washington and with the Office of Defense Transportation :
(1) A daily report showing number of cars at the ports.
(2) A daily report showing cars moving via Little Creek and Cape Charles.
(3) A weekly showing of the various coal classifications on hand, tonnage dumped, and other data relative to coal moving through the ports.
(¡0 Monthly reports showing New England coal dumped.
(®) a monthly report showing coal car detention.
(6) A monthly report showing destinations of coal cargoes from Hampton Roads.
The work of the Hampton Roads committee was handicapped in some measure by its unofficial status and lack of authority to control the movements of railroad cars. Consequently, by Service Order No. 92, issued October 27, 1942, the Interstate Commerce Commission made the committee manager its agent and enlarged his authority. He was expressly em-powered to—
(1) Control the movement of railroad cars used to transport coal for transshipment at Hampton Roads and cars from mmes of the Virginian Railroad to Little Creek, Va., for fu™er movement; by car floats to ^aPe Charles, Va.
Represent the Interstate Commerce Commission in the regulation of the shipment of coal to piers and storage yards in efforts to prevent the accumulation of cars at such piers and yards by any transshipper in excess of the ability of such transshipper to provide vessel capacity for the promut dumping of coal.
Advise the Interstate Commerce Commission in the establishment of the maximum number of cars which any transshipper may have on hand at any pier or storage yard or m transit from point or origin.
(4) Promote the voluntary consolidation for transshipment of various grades and consignments of coal, and to urge reduction m the number of grades and consignments to a minimum.
(5) Take necessary action to obtain embargoes against transshippers, piers, or ports to control properly the movement of cars.
In general, the operations of the committee continued to be substantially the same as prior to this expansion in authority. The agent worked not only in cooperation with the Interstate Commerce Commission but also with the Office of Defense Transportation. The latter agency received copies of all reports filed by the agent, made periodical investigation of conditions at the ports, and proposed measures designed to expedite transshipment and reduce car detention.
The average period of car detention declined markedly after the establishment of the committee. For the 3 months ending April 30, 1942, the average period of detention was 9.2 days per car. For the remainder of 1942 the average was 6.2 days. In 1943, the average was further reduced to 5.4 days, and in 1944 it was 5.3 days.
Northern Tidewater Ports.
The northern tidewater coal ports consist of New York Harbor, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. New York Harbor includes the neighboring New Jersey ports at Edgewater, Jersey City, Hoboken, Perth Amboy, Harsimus Cove, South Amboy, and Port Reading. Bituminous coal from the northern Appalachian fields in central Pennsylvania, Maryland,
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and northern West Virginia, as well as anthracite from Pennsylvania, moves to these ports. As a result of the disruption in the flow of coal through Hampton Roads, the normal pattern of coal transport to coastwise points was radically altered and the movement through New York for water delivery to New England destinations and points in New York Harbor was greatly increased.
The peak year was in 1943, when 20,539,110 net tons of bituminous coal were dumped over the New York piers as compared with 8,976,800 tons in 1941. The movement of southern coal which started in April 1942, contributed 8,545,580 tons toward the 1943 tonnage. Of this amount, 5,372,780 tons were for delivery in New England and 3,172,800 tons for points in New York Harbor.
The movement from all origins over the New York Harbor piers from 1941 to 1945 was as follows:
Net tons (bituminous coal)
1941 .................................... 8,976,800
1942 .................................... 17,208,730
1943 .................................... 20,539,110
1944 ..................................... 18,462,160
1945 ..................................... 16,434,570
Out-of-Route Movement of Southern Coal Over New York Harbor Piers for New England and Destinations in New York Harbor
Year For New England For destinations in New York Harbor Total (net tons)
1941 — —
1942 2,669,320 2,115,610 4,784,930
1943 5,372,780 3,172,800 8,545,580
1944 3,322,020 1,233,180 4,557,200
1945 2,648,430 ’ 1,130,650 3,779,080
In general, operating conditions within New York' resemble those at Hampton Roads rather than the lake ports because ocean navigation is continuous throughout the year. But there are several differences which tend to make operations more difficult at New York than at Hampton Roads. The weather is more uncertain, especially in winter. This is presumably the reason for the slightly more liberal demurrage rules in effect at New York. While the free time is the same as at Hampton Roads, that is, 7 days in peacetime and 6 days under ICC Service Order No. 87, the period of settlement is 90 days at New York as compared with 60 days at Hampton Roads.
Other factors also make rail operations at New York more complex. The northern Appalachian mines feeding the New York rail movement are more scattered and greater in number. There is considerable variance in transit line from mines to piers. The haul is longer and interchange of cars common, while at Hampton Roads no interchange is necessary. This became even a greater factor when the
movement of coal from southern fields to New York was increased to make up for the decline in the use of Hampton Roads because of enemy submarines. There are 110 transshippers of bituminous coal using New York Harbor and 68 anthracite transshippers, whereas at Hampton Roads only 44 are active. The number of coal classifications and consignments also are correspondingly greater at New York.
During the war, however, New York Harbor was favored in several respects. The routes from Hampton Roads to coastwise points were disrupted by enemy submarines and numerous colliers and barges were withdrawn from this service for other use. Because of the inside and protected route to New England by way of Long Island Sound, New York Harbor, employing barges, had the advantage; Barges could also be operated from Hampton Roads via the Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware capes, but the turn-around time was slower and the movement less economical.
Tidewater Bituminous Committee.
In broad outline, the movement of tidewater coal into New York Harbor was controlled in the same manner as at Hampton Roads. The carriers and transshippers organized the Tidewater Bituminous Emergency Committee and appointed a manager, who also was designated as its agent by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Service Order No. 92, with power to control the movement of coal cars to New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Maryland ports. This order was amended February 19, 1943, extending the manager’s authority to include the diversion of cars moving to these ports from the line or piers of any railroad unable to accept or move such traffic to the line or piers of any other railroad less congested and in better position to handle the traffic. This was a power that the committee manager at Hampton Roads did not have, but the usefulness and possibilities of diversion at New York were greater because of the larger number of railroads and piers there available. The manager also worked in close cooperation with the Bureau of Service, Interstate Commerce Commission. In addition, the regional director of the Division of Railway Transport, Office of Defense Transportation, with offices in New York, made periodical surveys of conditions at the coal piers.
The activities of the committee manager, as agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission, consisted of accumulating information relative to conditions at the ports, reporting them to the Bureau of Service in Washington, bringing pressure to bear on transshippers to reduce the number of their classifica
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tions, establishing ceilings on the number of cars each transshipper might have at the ports, and controlling movement of cars into the ports, either by suspending classifications or recommending embargoes ordered by the Association of American Railroads or the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The railroads informed the committee daily by telegraph the number of coal cars in transit and of cars arriving and dumped at ports for the preceding 24 hours. This information was received in time to enable the manager to take measures to prevent congestion. The information was received according to railroad, pier, transshipper, and classification, and it gave the manager a complete picture of conditions at each port. He could ascertain the position of each transshipper in the light of vessel space available and expected, and determine whether such transshipper had an excessive amount of coal on hand or in transit in view of his established ceiling.
The manager at each port made daily reports that revealed the number of cars on hand and in transit and the number dumped the previous 24 hours. He also filed a monthly report showing total number of cars dumped and average period of detention. Exceptional instances of car detention were reported at frequent intervals.
As a result of the pressure exercised by the Bureau of Service and the Office of Defense Transportation, there was a considerable reduction in the number of bituminous classifications at New York Harbor. When the control system began, there were 750 different classifications in use, these were subsequently reduced to 583. A slight reduction was also affected in anthracite classifications.
Particular effort was exerted to reduce the average detention period of cars held at New York Harbor. This period declined after the inauguration of the committee, and was well under the maximum free time allowance provided in the demurrage tariff.
Emergency Movements in New England.
In peacetime New England is supplied with coal from both the northern and southern Appalachian fields. Northern coal moves in part all-rail from mine to destination, and in part to New York Harbor, Philadelphia, and Baltimore for transshipment by barge and collier. Southern coal moves through Hampton Roads, then by collier and barge either up Chesapeake Bay and over the inland route to Delaware break-water or by the open ocean route all the way to New England.
Normally, as has been pointed out, the Hampton Roads movement from the southern fields is by far the most important because it is the most economical, while the movement from the northern Appalachian
region through New York Harbor to New England is ordinarily inconsequential. The all-rail tonnage from the northern fields lags behind Hampton Roads, but is quite substantial.
In the spring of 1942 the ocean movement from Hampton Roads was disrupted by enemy submarines and by the withdrawal of several colliers and tugs for other uses. To compensate for the resulting deficiency in coal transport facilities, the Office of Defense Transportation adopted measures designed to increase coal shipments by all rail, and rail-barge routes. These measures provided for increased allrail shipments from the northern fields to New England and also of rail shipments to New York Harbor. Not only were the established routes utilized, but the Office of Defense Transportation developed a new all-rail route to New England and a rail-barge route via New York Harbor. All coal moving into New York Harbor is subsequently delivered by barge for local consumption or is shipped by barge to New England. In normal circumstances, the allrail and rail-barge movements from the southern fields are not economical as compared with movements through Hampton Roads, but under war conditions they were essential if the needs of New England were to be met.
All rail movements from southern fields were principally through Potomac Yards and Hagerstown, where interchange was made with trunk-line carriers. To relieve Potomac Yards of congestion, other routes were set up through Marion and Columbus, Ohio. These were extremely circuitous and were used only when traffic through Potomac Yards approached capacity.
One route from the southern fields to New England and New York Harbor made no use of any important gateway. This was via the Virginian Railroad to Little Creek, Va., then across Chesapeake Bay to Cape Charles, and finally northward by way of the Pennsylvania Railroad. The rail movement on the Virginian had to be carefully adjusted to the supply of car floats for the water movement, and it was for that reason that Service Order No. 92 empowered the manager of the Hampton Roads Coal Emergency Committee to control the coal cars used in the service. When Little Creek became congested, the rail movement on the Virginian was diverted northward at junctions to the west.
The use of routes required the establishment of new rates for the service. These were worked out by the carriers in cooperation with the Office of Defense Transportation, and were based on old inactive rates which were still in existence although they had not been in use since the movement of southern coal to New England and New York had shifted exclusively
66
through Hampton Roads. These rates were substantially higher than the rail-water rates through Hampton Roads and, to prevent an increase in the price of coal in New England, the Office of Price Administration promulgated Compensatory Adjustment Regulation No. 1, May 19, 1942. Under this regulation purchasers of coal moving all-rail, who had previously received their coal through Hampton Roads, were given a subvention equivalent to the difference between the normal rate and the all-rail rate.
In the summer of 1943, conditions limiting the use of Hampton Roads measurably improved. Certain vessels which had been diverted to other services by the War Shipping Administration were restored and new Liberty colliers also were put into this service. However, it was found necessary to continue the use of emergency routes due to a shortage in supply of southern coal which prevented the accumulation of coal in cargo lots at Hampton Roads and also because small vessels needed to serve shoal draft berths in New England were not yet available. The net tonnage movement of bituminous coal to New England over these different routes from 1941 to 1945 is given in the table that follows:
FROM SOUTHERN DISTRICTS
Year Via Hampton Roads Out-of-route Movement Total
1941 12,960,450 — 12,960,450
1942 8,158,980 5,192,060 13,351,040
1943 6,999,580 7,702,580 14,702,160
1944 10,009,890 4,587,900 14,597,790
1945 9,381,300 3,389,560 12,770,860
FROM NORTHERN DISTRICTS VIA NORMAL ALL-RAIL AND TIDEWATER ROUTES
Year All-rail Via New York Harbor pien Via Philadelphii piers Via Baltimore piers Total
1941 ..... 7,170,350 382,400 85,640 7,638,390
1942 ..... 9,004,930 896,850 1,420 — 9,903,200
1943 8.194,340 251,030 1,190 — 8,446,560
1944 8,591,940 645,860 — 35,030 9,272,830
1945 7,136,910 984,160 49,170 54,410 8,224,650
FROM ALL ORIGINS BY ORIGIN GROUPS
Year Northern origins Southern origins Total
1941 7,638,390 12,960,450 20,598,840
1942 9,903,200 13,351,040 23,254,240
1943 8,446,560 14,702,160 23,148,720
1944 9,272,830 14,597,790 23,870,620
1945 8,224,650 12,770,860 20,995,510
FROM ALL ORIGINS, BY ROUTES
Year Via all-rail Via tidewater Total
1941 7,170,350 13,428,490 20,598,840
1942 11,527,670 11,726,570 23,254,240
1943 10,524,140 12,624,580 23,148,720
1944 9,857,820 14,012,800 23,870,620
1945 7,878,040 13,117,470 20,995,510
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CHAPTER X
GRAIN TRANSPORT BY RAIL
The leading grains produced in the United States are wheat, corn, oats, barley, rye, sorghum, buckwheat, soybeans, flaxseed, and rice. Quantitatively, the corn and wheat crops exceed all the others. The annual production of corn surpasses that of wheat by a substantial margin. From a transport point of view, however, wheat is of greater significance than corn. The reason is that normally only about 20 percent of the corn crop as compared with 75 percent of the wheat crop is shipped out cf the county in which it is grown.
The average annual production of wheat in the period 1934 to 1941, inclusive, was approximately 754,000,000 bushels; the crop for 1942 was 974,176,-000 bushels. In 1943 it was 836,298,000 bushels; in 1944 it was 1,078,647,000 bushels, and in 1945 the crop was 1,123,143,000 bushels.
The heaviest movement of wheat is to the east. Wheat from the north'ern tier of States (Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota) moves to the east principally through Minneapolis and Duluth. The out-bound shipments from Duluth, which has a limited milling capacity, are principally of grain which moves, during the period of open navigation, over the Great Lakes to Montreal or Quebec, or to Buffalo; thence via the New York State Barge Canal to New York or over rail lines to New York and other eastern ports; and, when navigation is closed, all-rail through Chicago. Out-bound shipments from Minneapolis are largely of flour, and move eastward over rail routes through Duluth and Buffalo, or all-rail through Chicago. Wheat from Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas moving eastward goes principally by rail via Missouri River gateways through Chicago or St. Louis. These Missouri River gateways are Sioux City, Council Bluffs, Leavenworth, Omaha, Atchison, St. Joseph, and Kansas City. These gateways, with Minneapolis, Duluth, St. Louis, Peoria, Chicago, Milwaukee, and other important markets for grain, are commonly designated as the primary markets. On the north Pacific coast, Seattle and Portland are important export markets.
Grain Storage.
The storage of grain is an integral part of the
marketing process, much of the wheat shipped being stored several times before reaching its ultimate destination. Storage facilities include country elevators and warehouses, terminal and subterminal elevators, flour-mill elevators and warehouses, elevators and warehouses of other processors, as well as bins on the farms.
In addition to these elevators and other storage facilities, grain in large quantities is stored in vessels during the winter season at the lower lake ports. This results from the practice of not unloading vessels carrying grain on their final voyage over the lake route before the lake navigation season terminates. During the winter of 1944-45 a total of 112 lake vessels containing 37,000,000 bushels of grain was held under load at Lake Erie ports. When navigation opens in the spring, these vessels are unloaded so that they can become active in the ore and grain trade on the Great Lakes.
Most of the wheat shipped outside the county in which it is grown is initially handled by country elevators. These elevators are located at shipping points conveniently located with respect to the grain fields and railroad connections. Most of the grain thus received is shipped to primary interior markets. There the grain is stored again preliminary to its shipment to seaboard markets, to secondary markets throughout the United States, and to foreign countries.
Not all the grain produced is marketed immediately. There is usually a substantial quantity that is withheld for various reasons—sometimes due to the effect of prices on the movement of grain and sometimes to Government policy of maintaining safe reserves. In 1944 the wheat carry-over was 316,000,-000 bushels, in 1943, 622,000,000, and in 1942, 632,-000,000. For the 10-year period 1932-41 the average carry-over was 235,000,000 bushels per year. The unprecedented carry-over in 1942 and 1943 raised special problems in connection with storage as well as with transportation.
Wartime Problem of Grain Transport.
The basic problem confronting carriers and regulatory authorities during the war in respect of grain
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transport was to maintain a continuous and unimpeded flow of grain and grain products to market to meet the unusual demands of the Nation’s food program. Storage and transport facilities were taxed to the breaking point by the unprecedented crops. It was necessary to keep these facilities working at maximum efficiency. This required such control of transport to and from storage as to insure the movement of grain in accordance with the capacity of the available facilities. At times the pressure on storage facilities was so great as to require extraordinary control measures. The pressure on transport facilities, however, was continuous throughout the emergency, and demanded the closest supervision at all times.
In 1941 the grain crop was marked by probably the greatest pressure on grain storage capacity ever experienced in this country. Almost every practicable commercial storage facility was in full use. Substantial temporary capacity was made available on farms and at commercial points, and still it was necessary to pile wheat on the ground in certain areas of heaviest production. This pressure on storage facilities resulted in congestion of market^ extra handling, and inadequate protection for a part of the grain supply. The situation was occasioned by the fact that the grain carry-over and crop were in 1941 about 12 percent above 1940 and 31 percent above 1939. A major factor was the low-priced grain which moved farmers to withhold rather than to market their crops.
In these circumstances, the Department of Agriculture in 1941 took the initiative in mobilizing the resources of the Government, the grain trade, and the carriers to insure orderly movement of grain to storage. It called meetings of representatives of all interested groups for the purpose of organizing committees at grain marketing centers throughout the country. These committees made surveys of their respective areas, ascertaining grain storage capacity, amount of available space, railroad cars needed, and other pertinent data classified according to counties and crop reporting districts.
The 1941 Kansas crop was particularly large, and the voluntary and informational activities of the committees had to be supplemented early in the harvesting season. The committee operating in that area, because of a critical situation, recommended to the Association of American Railroads that an embargo be placed on important terminal and subterminal markets in Kansas to prevent overtaxing of storage facilities and congestion at the terminals. An embargo was accordingly issued which served as a precedent and a pattern for the future control of the movement of grain. This embargo prohibited the
transport of grain to the important terminal and subterminal markets for storage unless storage space had been previously allocated for it. To insure that the demand for cash grain be met, however, it was provided that markets were to be kept open for any grain shipped *f or sale upon arrival. As storage conditions became easier, the embargo was removed.
Similar situations developed and were met in like manner at St. Louis, Minneapolis, Columbus, Indianapolis, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Chicago. In the hard spring wheat areas of the Northwest conditions were so acute that the committee for the region met almost daily at Minneapolis during the entire harvesting season of 1941 to allocate storage and transport facilities for grain originating in the four principal spring wheat states, North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, and Montana.
Restrictions on Storage Grain.
Early in 1942 it appeared that storage conditions generally would be even more acute than in late 1941. The unprecedented carryover of wheat induced by the Government’s loan program resulted in loading grain storage facilities of every description to a degree never before known. In addition, the bumper crop of 1942 then in prospect was certain to increase the burden still more on both storage and transport. In general, the railroads were able to move all the grain that could be absorbed at the markets. From a railroad point of view, the problem was to prevent the loading of grain in cars that could not be released promptly at destination. The carriers from the beginning had issued strict instructions that cars were not to be used for storage. In the face of the dearth of storage, however, it was felt that there was increasing danger of delay in unloading cars, and that, therefore, sterner measures were necessary in regulating the rail movement of grain.
Prior to the harvesting season of 1942, meetings of the grain committees were called by the Department of Agriculture throughout the country to plan for the transport and storage of the grain crop. At the meeting in Kansas City on May 11, it was agreed that to avoid undue detention of cars, it was advisable for the car service division of the Association of American Railroads to issue an embargo regulating the movement of all grain intended for storage. Car service division embargo No. 45 was accordingly issued, effective as of May 20,1942.
The embargo prohibited the railroads from accepting any shipment of grain for consignment or reconsignment to any destination unless the shipper or consignor certified that the grain had been sold or was intended for sale and not for storage. This restriction did not apply to shipments of grain for
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storage to Minneapolis, St. Paul and Duluth, Minn., or to Superior and Itasca, Wis., since shippers to these points were required to obtain loading permits from the Northwest Grain Storage Committee. The restriction, furthermore, did not apply to any shipments when satisfactory evidence was furnished to the loading carrier that storage space at destination was actually available for such cars as were offered for transportation, and assurance given that the cars would be unloaded promptly at destination. Neither did it apply to grain shipments consigned to elevators, mills, or stations where specific embargo regulations issued by serving railroads were already in effect. At the time embargo No. 45 became effective, embargoes were already in force at export elevators located at Atlantic and Gulf ports.
Eimbargo No. 45 contemplated control of the movement of grain to storage by permit committees similar to the Northwest Grain Storage Committee, and it provided that, as other local grain storage committees were organized for the purpose of controlling movements to terminal storage points, shipments would be accepted when covered by permits issued by such committees.
Under embargo No. 45, two types of permit committees developed. One type effected the pooling of terminal space and made allocations to country shippers in accordance with the necessity and importance of relieving congestion at shipping points. The other type of committee intervened only to the extent required to effect as nearly as possible an equitable and fair distribution between various shippers served by the market concerned, space being allocated initially by the terminal elevators themselves.
The railroads, in furnishing grain cars, recognized both types of control. Although aware of their obligation as common carriers to serve all shippers without discrimination, they considered it lawful to furnish cars on the basis of permits, because the permit committees represented the grain warehousing interests which owned or controlled available storage space and had, therefore, the legal right to assign it. The railroad view was that the committees were acting for the grain trade, not as agents for the carriers.
Embargo No. 45 was generally effective in preventing an overload of storage facilities and the disruption of orderly marketing. At the same time, the railroads became fearful that, in distributing grain cars on the basis of permits, they were exposing themselves to the charge of discrimination. They felt they would be especially vulnerable in the event it became necessary, as seemed likely, to control the movement of cash grain.
For these reasons the carriers, the Department of 700494—48—6
Agriculture, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Office of Defense Transportation concluded that a formal order should be promulgated. The Department of Agriculture advised the Office of Defense Transportation and the Commission that, due to inadequate storage space, there was great danger of loss and damage to the 1942 grain crop, unless its movement were subjected to control. The Office of Defense Transportation in turn addressed a letter to the Commission stating “that it is both desirable and necessary that some system of embargo, or movement of grain traffic under permit, or both, be established at once.” In pursuance of this recommendation, Service Order No. 80 was issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, effective as of July 22,1942.
As a result of the issuance of Service Order No. 80, again two systems for controlling the grain movement became operative. A number of markets continued to apply embargo No. 45 because Service Order No. 80 was issued in the middle of the southwest crop season, and it was not considered advisable to make a change during the crop movement. Before the movement got under way the following year, however, Service Order No. 80 was, on May 15, 1943, extended to the Southwest, and transport of the entire grain crop came under uniform regulation.
Originally the order defined the term grain to cover “all bulk grain and sacked grain, including soybeans, flaxseed, grain screenings, and dry edible beans,” but not rice. In 1942, after a series of meetings with representatives of all the interests in the rice trade, permit committees were organized and, on recommendation of the Department of Agriculture and the Office of Defense Transportation, amendment 11 was added to Service Order No. 80, as of August 1,1943, extending the provisions of the order to the movement of the rice crop. As a result, the movement of all the basic grains to storage and to market became subject to the terms of the order.
The order expressly applied to both storage and cash grain. “Grain for storage” was defined as grain consigned or reconsigned to a market for storage and reconditioning services incidental to storage. “Cash grain” was grain purchased out of storage to arrive at a market, or consigned or reconsigned to a market for immediate sale. The term “market” meant ány railroad point or group of such points, at which industries are located which receive grain in carload lots. Service Order No. 80 was thus more extensive in scope than Embargo No. 45, which restricted only the movement of grain for storage. At the time the order was issued, the huge carry-over crop and the record production of 1942 threatened
71
to break the'prices of cash grain and disrupt its «orderly marketing, if movements were unrestricted.
Permit Committees and Agents.
Thè order established a permit system, quite similar to that already in existence, to control the movement of grain. It set up grain permit committees at specified grain markets. These committees were voluntary groups, and were very similar in their make-up to those previously organized in 1941 at the Tequest of the Department of Agriculture. As Service Order No. 80 was extended from time to time, ■the committees already functioning under embargo No. 45 were commonly continue^ in existence.
Each committee was representative of all branches of the grain trade. Appointments to the committees were subject to the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Director of the Bureau of Service of the Commission, also representatives of the Office of Defense Transportation and the Department of Agriculture, were ex officio members of each committee.
Permits authorizing the movement of grain were issued by an agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission who was designated in the order to serve at each of the principal grain markets. The agent was usually an important figure in the grain trade who had served previously as perhaps an officer of a permit committee. The members of the permit committees served without remuneration.
Railroads were prohibited by the order from supplying or moving cars loaded with grain, consigned or reconsigned to the principal grain markets, except upon permits issued by an agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The agent at each market, in issuing permits for the movement of grain for storage, was authorized to give first consideration to grain in gravest danger of damage or loss; thereafter he was to issue permits in such a manner as to allocate fairly and equitably the storage facilities available at the market.
This agent had similar authority in respect of the movement of cash grain. He was required to issue permits fairly and equitably covering grain in the .gravest danger of loss, and to supply the needs of particular markets, also of dealers, processors or distributors customarily dependent upon those markets for grain. Thereafter, the agent could issue permits so as to accord a fair and equitable allocation of the facilities available. The total number of permits to be issued was limited to the capacity of the market to handle and release cars without undue delay or detention and to avoid congestion.
In effect, Service Order No. 80 operated to pool the grain storage facilities at the markets. The
claims of regular patrons of elevators were completely ignored in the common interest. Grain in greatest danger of damage was handled first regardless of ownership; after that, any remaining storage capacity was equitably divided among all shippers. In the same manner, cash grain was first protected from damage, and then the requirements of the markets safeguarded. Traditional and long-established relationships gave way to the public interest.
So far as the carriers were concerned, their principal aim was to cut car detention. They felt that if cars were not detained at congested storage points, they could meet the transport demands of the grain trade. In 1942, at least, the pinch came in the first instance from storage difficulties which in turn constituted a threat to the efficient utilization of transport facilities. Under Service Order No. 80 grain moved to storage in an orderly manner, and, as a result, the carriers were able to furnish effective service to grain shippers.
Controlling Car Detention.
In 1943 and during the war period thereafter, emphasis in the administration of Service Order No. 80 shifted from storage to transport. While the storage situation improved after 1942, Government loan values on grain were raised so that they equaled approximately market values. This served as an incentive to ship rather than to store grain. At the same time, transport demands for other purposes connected with the war prevented the railroads from accumulating prior to the 1943 wheat harvest a substantial number of cars for grain movement in accordance with their customary practice. This deficiency aggravated by labor shortages delayed loading and unloading. As a result, the grain roads were unable to move the crop as it was offered.
Because of the shortage of grain-fit cars, permits under the order were issued on the basis of available cars rather than storage space. An important factor influencing the issuance of permits was prompt loading and unloading of cars. Shippers who ordered cars beyond their ability to load promptly, or consigned them to consignees unable to unload without delay were generally denied permits. In this manner, the turn-around time of cars was reduced, and for practical purposes the supply of cars increased.
In general, the permit system under Service Order No. 80 worked satisfactorily. When congestion threatened in any local area, the Association of American Railroads supplemented the permit system by issuing embargoes. Relatively few embargoes, however, were found necessary. Yet, the permit system alone could not increase materially the supply of grain cars. By preventing congestion, the
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order accelerated the turn-around time of grain cars, but, when the shortage of cars for grain became acute, only an increase in the supply of cars available for loading in the western producing areas could substantially correct the situation.
Grain Car Shortage.
During the war period the condition of cars for moving grain deteriorated rapidly for a variety of reasons. Major among these were shortage of maintenance labor, and the rendering of cars unfit for hauling grain through transporting freight that either damaged the interior of the cars or impregnated them with objectionable matter which contaminated the grain.
Ordinarily boxcars are classified A, B, C, and D. Classes A and B cars are leakproof, and are particularly suitable for grain loading. Class C includes waterproof merchandise cars suitable for boxed freight, but which, by reason of their interior condition, are not acceptable to the grain and flour trade. Class D cars are those having leaky roofs. They are used to carry freight that is not affected by such exposure.
The need for boxcars was always urgent, as carload traffic of all kinds carried in such cars rose even more markedly than loadings of grain and grain products. Grain loading alone showed an increase on class I railroads from 1,940,064 carloads in 1939 to 2,645,308 in 1943, or 37 percent, whereas the increase in the number of boxcars of all classes owned by the railroads increased from 707,877 in 1939 to 747,604 in 1943, or only 5^ percent. At the same time, annual acquisition of new cars by the railroads was not up to their needs. During the 3-year period just prior to the war, the number of new cars acquired by the railroads averaged 26,059 a year. The average annual acquisition of new cars for 1942, 1943, and 1944 was 17,990. It is true that the annual demolition of cars had dropped off sharply during the war. This was not an economy but a dire necessity. In a 6-year period before the war, the completely demolished box cars averagfed 12,705 a year, while for the three hectic war years, 1942, 1943, and 1944, the complete demolition of boxcars averaged only 4,854 per year. This meant that cars that normally would have been scrapped were kept in service and operated continuously, practically until their wheels were run off.
Efforts were made by the carriers and the governmental authorities to compensate for deficiency in equipment not only by expediting the movement of grain cars, but in the emergency by loading even hopper, stock, and refrigerator cars with bulk grains. Service Order No. 104, originally issued by
the Interstate Commerce Commission on January 19,1943, for example, permitted refrigerator cars in. western territory to be loaded with grain consigned to Pacific coast destinations. Such loading served a double purpose: it eliminated an empty return haul westward and increased somewhat the equipment available for grain loading. In the emergency that developed in the spring of 1945, approximately 1,350/ hopper cars, a type not well suited to this commodity were loaded per week with bulk grain.
The effects of the deficiency and the depreciated condition of cars were aggravated by an increase in the average length of haul during the war. In 1939 the average length of haul of all freight on class I, II and III railroads considered as a system was 351 miles; in 1944 it was 473 miles, an increase of 34.8= percent. No separate statistics are kept on the length of haul of commodities shipped in boxcars as distinguished from other classes of equipment, but, on the assumption that the average haul of a boxcar equaled the average haul of all freight, each boxcar travelled 122 miles farther in 1944 than in 1939. The result was the same as an actual diminution in the available supply of cars.
Effect of Seasonal Factors.
The seasonal movements of grain crops have an important effect on transport. At the end of May„ the Texas winter wheat crop is ready for movement and, before that movement is completed, the Oklahoma winter wheat crop must be handled. Before the Oklahoma crop is moved, the winter wheat of Kansas, Colorado, and Nebraska is ready for transport. All of these movements are usually over by the end of July. At that time, however, the spring wheat crop of Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana is ready for movement by the rail carriers. Yet even before the carriers have completed the movement of northwestern wheat, the soybean crop and the corn crop mature, and superimposed on these are rye, barley, oats, sorghum, and flaxseed which demand transport.
Most of this grain is transported by rail. The burden on the railroads is especially heavy when the movement of wheat in the Northwest is at its peak-When the harvest of the Southwest winter wheat crop is late and that of the Northwest spring crop early, additional difficulties are encountered by the railroads. These were conditions immediately im-pinging on the business of moving grain by rail.
From a broad viewpoint, what was required to meet the situation was the greatest possible utilization of the available equipment. This necessitated maximum efficiency in the distribution of grain cars among their users and maximum efficiency in their
73
use. The efforts of the regulatory agencies were directed to achieving these ends.
Distribution of Grain Cars.
There were two aspects to the problem of proper distribution of grain cars. First, cars must be available to meet the transport needs of the various regions of the country as these needs arise; and second, cars available to an area must be distributed fairly and equitably among jhe individual shippers. After midyear 1943, car shortages were frequent and acute and the problem confronting the carriers was not only to distribute the available supply of cars fairly and equitably among areas and individual shippers, but also to do this in a manner to serve most effectively the war program of the Nation.
In general, the regional pattern of car ownership reflects the needs of the various sections of the country for particular types of equipment. In 1943 boxcar ownership was distributed as follows: Railroads operating in the western district, the largest grain producing area, owned 325,710 boxcars; railroads in the southern district, 132,552 boxcars; and those in the eastern district, 289,342 boxcars. These statistics, however, do not reflect the dominant ownership by western roads of cars peculiarly suited for the grain trade.
The fact that a particular railroad or group of railroads operating in a given area own a sufficient number of cars to meet their requirements is no assurance that such owning carriers will have these cars in their possession and available for use when needed. Grain cars belonging to western roads are constantly being loaded in that area for points in the southern and eastern districts. During the war, when the burden on the grain-carrying roads was •especially heavy, failure to return grain cars promptly to the western roads had serious consequences.
The annual movement of grain to market involves the greatest single job of boxcar distribution throughout the year. Each year the Car Service Division, not later than May 1, sets up a program of boxcar accumulation on the principal western grain loading roads, particularly on the roads serving the .southern winter wheat area. The objective of the program is to provide the roads with sufficient box cars by the opening of the harvest in late May or early J une. Cars for this bank are drawn in the largest possible number from eastern and southern roads. On completion of the harvest of the Southwest winter wheat crop, the Car Service Division arranges the transfer of any excess boxcars on the .southwestern roads to the Northwest to handle the
spring wheat crop, maturing late in July or in early August.
Methods employed by the Car Service Division in accumulating this surplus depend upon conditions affecting rail transport in general and the car supply in particular. The usual practice is to instruct individual eastern and southern roads to reduce the number of box cars of western ownership in their possession so that by June 15 or not later than July 1, the number of such cars on these roads aggregate 20,000 or 30,000 fewer than on May 1. The magnitude of the reduction depends upon the boxcar supply on the western roads and their prospective requirements at harvest time.
Another method used is the so-called quota plan. This plan requires eastern and southern roads to deliver to their western connections a specified number of empty boxcars each day, regardless of whether such cars are of eastern and southern or western ownership.
Under normal conditions, the former plan is the more practicable. The return of cars to home rails enables the owners to make repairs to them and to distribute the cars to country loading stations in advance of harvest. The quota plan is used only in emergency situations to effect a quick increase in the boxcar supply of carriers critically short of cars. The increase, on February 1, 1945, of the per diem charge from $1 to $1.15 per car against foreign cars line, while an incentive to return such cars to the home line, could not be relied upon to effect such a prompt redistribution of cars as an emergency situation required.
During the war, the Car Service Division often found it necessary to adopt extraordinary measures to expedite the return of cars from the South and East to the grain-producing regions. Beginning in 1943, the increased demand for boxcars in all sections of the country prevented the usual accumulation of cars in the wheat growing States in advance of harvest. The railroads, however, met the situation without serious effects on grain marketing. Early in 1944, however, boxcar requirements of the Northwest and Central West were abnormally heavy, and cars were not moving to those areas in sufficient numbers. The Car Service Division thereupon issued Special Car Order No. 46, on January 10, 1944. This order was directed to all carriers and applied to boxcars owned by the principal grain-carrying roads. It prohibited any railroad in possession of such cars from loading them except to destinations on or by way of the owners’ rails, and enjoined the return of the cars on the shortest route to their owners. The order further provided that cars were not to be delayed or back-hauled for loading.
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Grain Car Shortage in 1945.
These measures would probably have been effective in securing the transfer of a reasonably adequate supply of cars to the West, had it not been for the intervention of a series of unexpected difficulties.
In 1944 the harvest of the southwestern winter wheat crop was late while that of the northwest spring crop was early, so that they overlapped. It was, therefore, impossible to make the usual transfer of cars between these regions and, as a result, ! the northwestern carriers entered the harvest with no boxcar reserve. The quota program was estab-| lished late in July, and every effort was made to expedite the transfer of empty boxcars to the graincarrying roads.
Although numerous elevators in western territory continued to be blocked because of lack of grain cars, considerable progress was being made in diverting cars to that area until operating conditions were almost completely disrupted in the eastern territory because of almost unprecedented snow storms at the end of 1944. Railroad yard operations, especially at Buffalo, New York, and in surrounding territory, were often virtually at a standstill as yard crews could not perform switching because yards were blocked by snow and ice. The effects of these conditions on a transport system already overtaxed, were widespread since the Buffalo-Niagara frontier is the third largest interchange point in the country.
The dislocation of boxcars as between the East and the West after January 1, 1945, was almost unprecedented. As of March 1, 1945, there were on eastern lines approximately 35,000 boxcars in excess of the number on January 1, with a proportionate decrease on the western roads. The effect of unusual weather conditions upon an already serious situation was such as to compel drastic action.
When weather conditions were worst, the Association of American Railroads issued embargoes against the storm-bound area to facilitate the dispatch of cars that had accumulated in terminals and to prevent further congestion. The transport requirements of the country during the war were so great and so much traffic was of an essential nature, however, that it was not practicable to embargo movements for more than 3 or 4 days. These short-lived embargoes gave the railroads a breathing spell, nonetheless, during which some of the accumulated equipment was moved out. Genuine relief came only when the abnormal storm period ended late in March.
The efforts of the carriers during this difficult period were supplemented by action by both the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Office of Defense Transportation. On October 7,1944, in order
to reduce detention of boxcars, the Commission issued Service Order No. 242. The order prohibited average demurrage agreements and increased demurrage charges. As the situation became more acute, such charges were further increased until they reached $16.50 per car per day.
On January 20, 1945, Service Order No. 275 was issued, permitting the railroads to divert or reroute traffic over any open lines that could be found; and on January 27, 1945, this order was revised to include the appointment of an agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission with authority to divert or reroute traffic over any open railroad line in the eastern territory, regardless of rates or original routing instructions.
Special measures were taken also, to retain boxcars in the West. Plans were adopted whereby southwestern wheat for the Army moved through Gulf ports and northern wheat through Duluth and over the Great Lakes.
In addition, Service Order No. 304 was issued to become effective May 1, 1945. It set up an embargo and permit system to control the movement of grain cars from western territory east of the Illinois-Indiana State line and east and south of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. F. S. Keiser, Associate Director of the Railway Transport Department, Office of Defense Transportation, was designated as its general grain agent by the Interstate Commerce Commission in charge of grain transport for the purposes of the order, and permit agents subject to his direction were placed at local terminal areas. The shipment of grain from western to eastern points was prohibited except under permits, the number of permits issued being governed by the available car supply. The order was designed to reduce movements of grain cars out of grain-producing areas.
Cars for Canadian Grain.
The use of American-owned cars in Canada and Mexico presents problems different from those attending the regional distribution of cars within the country. Once a car crosses the boundary line, American railroads lose control of it, and may experience considerable delay in securing its return. Normally, this occasions no major difficulty, especially in the case of interchange of cars between Canada and the United States, because the railroad officials of the two countries have long enjoyed satisfactory working relations. Under normal conditions the trend of traffic is out of Canada into the United States, so this country is usually indebted to Canadian roads for equipment. The exigencies of war, however, often resulted in departures from this normal situation.
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During the war, the War Food Administration and the Commodity Credit Corporation found it necessary to supplement the grain supply of this country with purchases of Canadian grain. In March 1943 the Department of Agriculture stated that, because of a deficiency of corn and other grains, it had been necessary to purchase large quantities of Canadian wheat to feed livestock, particularly in the West and the South. This wheat was moved to Duluth and Fort William by rail, then down the Lakes to Buffalo. At that time there was a balance of 12,-000 American cars in Canada, and these cars were used to move the wheat to the United States. These cars were not sent to Canada for the specific purpose of moving grain to this country; they found their way there in regular course, and were merely utilized to advantage.
The volume of grain shipped by way of the Lakes during the navigation season of 1943 exceeded all expectations, and helped relieve the feed shortage in the United States without placing an impossible burden on the American railroads. At the beginning of the season, the War Production Board had planned to move' 150,000,000 bushels of grain on the lakes, although this meant that some vessels would have to be diverted from the all-important ore trade. In fact, 190,000,000 bushels of grain were carried over the Lakes during the 1943 season. This helped immensely in meeting feed requirements in the Eastern and Southern States, but in September 1943, before the lake movement was completed, the War Food Administration found it necessary to import from Canada an additional 75,000,000 bushels of wheat.
At the time the additional purchases were made, an agreement was reached between American and Canadian authorities relative to transport. Under this agreement the Canadians were to move 150 cars of grain daily to Duluth, 100 by rail over the Canadian National Railroad and 50 by the lakes. The out-bound movement from Duluth was to be in American cars. Subsequently, however, the Canadians found it impossible to fulfill this agreement, as they could not furnish the equipment for the allrail movement.
Since the Department of Agriculture and the War Food Administration considered the importation of the Canadian wheat essential to the food program of the Nation, they insisted that American equipment be furnished to meet the transport requirements. The War Food Administration certified to the War Production Board that the movement was essential, and the latter, in turn, directed the Office of Defense Transportation to supply the necessary cars. Both the Bureau of Service of the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Association of American Railroad were, in general, opposed to allocating American cars to this service. The Association of American Railroads agreed, however, to furnish as many cars as possible, and the Office of Defense Transportation, therefore, did not issue a formal order as it was obligated to do in pursuance of the directive of the War Production Board.
It was estimated that 325 cars per day from September 1943 to March 15, 1944, would be necessary to bring the Canadian grain into the country. The American railroads at the time these arrangements were made (September 1943) were engaged in moving the Northwest wheat crop and their facilities were taxed to the limit. In the northwest grainproducing States, large quantities of wheat were then on the ground and numerous elevators were blocked because of lack of cars. It was, therefore, impossible for the American railroads to furnish all the cars required to move the Canadian wheat. They were allowed, however, to send 55 cars per day, presently to be increased to 70. In November or December, after the peak of the spring wheat movement in this country had passed, it was planned to increase this number to 150. The Canadians agreed to furnish the remainder of the required cars.
During the fall of 1943, grain shipments over the Lakes were in excess of all the estimates, totaling for the entire navigation season of that year, as has been noted, 190,000,000 bushels. Probably as a result of this favorable factor, the War Food Administration revised its earlier plans in respect to Canadian grain imports, and decided to bring a minimum of 40,000,000 instead of 75,000,000 bushels of wheat from Canada during the 4 months from January to April, inclusive. On January 7, 1944, the War Food Administration certified to the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation the necessity of supplying Canadian carriers with 20 cars daily to transport the required wheat imports. The American railroads supplied the cars as demanded by the War Food Administration.
This diversion of American cars to Canada provoked what was perhaps the most spirited controversy regarding transport during the war. Grain producers in the Northwest protested strongly against sending American equipment to Canada at a time when their grain was on the ground in large quantities and when numerous elevators were blocked for lack of transport facilities. As a consequence, the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce instituted an investigation of the situation. Hearings began on November 4,1943, and continued intermittently through February 7,1944.
The hearings brought to light a marked difference
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in viewpoint between those charged with responsibility for the Nation’s food program and those having responsibility for transport—a difference that had persisted from the inception, in March 1943, of the policy of increasing imports of Canadian grain for feed purposes. In general, the former contended that Canadian grain was indispensable to maintain American livestock and that, therefore, transport must be furnished for it even at the cost of diverting cars from American shippers. On the other hand, western grain producers held that American wheat in the Northwest or corn in the West could be used" to the same end. The haul from these sources of supply was substantially shorter than that required to move Canadian grain, and would, therefore, economize the use of transport equipment.
Corn was not moving to market at the time, however, because of ceiling prices which were unsatisfactory to producers, and the proposal to use com was coupled with a recommendation to raise prices. The Office of Defense Transportation, sympathetic to the northwestern wheat growers, took the position that American cars should not be assigned to Canadian service, and refused to order their diversion except upon certification of the War Food Administration and the War Production Board. The Office considered itself bound to respect any such certification when made, and ultimately did so. The Bureau of Service, Interstate Commerce Commission, under the direction of Commissioner Johnson, strongly opposed the diversion of American cars to Canada. A similar position was taken by the Association of American Railroads, but officials of the association felt that some cars could be diverted to Canada after the peak of the American grain movement had passed in the fall of 1943. The association stated it would comply with any order of the Office of Defense Transportation or the Commission and, in the end, furnished the cars when promulgation of an order was imminent.
Cars for Use in Mexico.
Cooperation with Mexican railroads is ordinarily less satisfactory than with the Canadian. There is greater difficulty in securing the prompt return of American equipment and, as Mexican railroad resources are far less than Canadian, the normal flow of American cars into Mexico is not balanced by the movement of Mexican cars into this country. Thus it became essential during the war to regulate closely the number of American cars moving into Mexico and to limit the period of detention.
Early in 1943, it was discovered that a great volume of grain was bought in Canada to move all-rail across the United States into Mexico in American
cars. Service Order No. 103, issued on January 12, 1943, prohibited all railroads subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission from participating in this movement. At about the same time, it was found that considerable quantities of bananas were being moved into Canada shipped in American cars from southern Mexico across the United States. Service Order No. 117, issued April 13, 1943, prohibited the use of American cars for such service. In addition, to reduce the detention of American cars, Service Order No. 135, issued July 10, 1943, increased sharply demurrage Charges at Mexican border points. Later, American authorities recognized the need of making a contribution to Mexico railroad facilities by fixing quotas to control the number of American cars employed in the Mexican service.
ODT-ICC Grain Committees.
A primary obligation of American railroads is to meet the transport requirements of domestic shippers through economical use of the equipment. In December 1942, when the burden on western railroads was growing critically heavy, it became apparent that wasteful practices in the use of cars had to be eliminated if the requirements of the Nation’s food program were to be met. The regulatory authorities, the carriers, and the grain shipping interests were convinced that the supply of box cars could be substantially augmented by removing, so far as practicable, back hauls, out-of-Iine hauls, and circuitous routes, and by increasing efficiency in handling of equipment. Originally, regulatory auth-ities planned to limit practices that tended to inefficient use of transport facilities by orders from Washington. Later, it was decided to place primary responsibility on the grain trade itself. This end was sought through the organization of a committee designed to secure the cooperation of all parties concerned with grain transport in reducing wasteful practices to a minimum.
Both the railroads and the regulatory authorities were active in creating the committee. Preliminary efforts in January 1943 of representatives of the western railroads, the Bureau of Service of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and of the grain trade culminated in a meeting held in Chicago on February 10. From this meeting came the Office of Defense Transportation and Interstate Commerce Commission Grain and Grain Products Transportation Conservation Committee of 22 members, serving without compensation.
To assist it in its work, the Committee authorized an executive committee and regional committee covering every section of the country. The executive
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committee consisted of nine members and its primary function was to handle emergency matters.
Originally 15 regional committees were established throughout the country, each of these regional committees providing for subregional committees so that grain transport practices came under close scrutiny in every locality. These regional and subordinate committees were charged with carrying out the work of the general committee at regional and local levels. They were authorized to take voluntary steps to induce carriers and shippers to economize in the use of facilities and to expedite the movement of grain and grain products.
Scope and Policy of Committee.
From a broad point of view, the activities of the Committee were essentially investigatory and remedial. During its existence it investigated virtually every practice connected with grain transport that constituted a potential source of waste in the use of equipment. The Committee was instrumental in removing many such practices. While several orders prohibiting abuses were issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission on the basis of recommendations of the Committee, it depended largely and wherever possible on the voluntary cooperation of the grain trade and the carriers. To encourage cooperation, the executive committee resolved that all actions taken should terminate with the conclusion of the war, and any changes in current railroad tariffs made in pursuance of any action by this Committee should be deemed to be of an emergency nature.
Similarly, the Committee sought the cooperation of the carriers. The basis for close working regulations between the Committee and the railroads was laid at a meeting held in Chicago on September 14, 1943, the Committee, the Association of American Railroads, and the chief traffic officers of the carriers participating. As a result of this meeting carrier contact committees were established by the carriers to investigate and report practices that caused delay and inefficiency in handling grain cars. These carrier committees were formed in local areas and were instructed to furnish information and advice to the regional committees. In addition, traffic associations made surveys and reports relative to circuitous routing and other wasteful practices.
Among the more important practices investigated by the Committee were circuitous routing, inspection and reconsignment, hold-for-order cars, light weighing of cars, cross-hauling, etc. These subjects were referred to the executive committee, which was instructed by the general committee to offer specific recommendations covering each individual
transit and circuitous route. Circuity was to be eliminated where serious detriment to the grain trade would not result.
The executive committee utilized the services of the regional committees which were directed to survey all cases of backhauls, out-of-line hauls, and circuitous routing in its territory and make recommendations to the executive committee. In addition, reports were prepared by the Western Trunk Line Association and the Southwestern Freight Bureau Association. The carriers also contributed to the survey by reporting instances of excessive hauling in connection with transit and circuity directly to the regional committees.
The general and executive committees prescribed the scope of the activities of the regional committees in this matter of defining circuity and by setting forth the general policy to be followed in proposing remedial measures. Backhauls under transit were defined as hauls from a transit point over rails in reverse direction used into the transit point, when full flat (local) rates to and from the transit point have not been paid to and retained by the carriers. Out-of-line hauls and circuity were defined as the routing of freight along routes other than over the shortest tariff route between transit origin and transit destination and transiting at an intermediate point, where full flat (local) rates to and from transit points have not been paid to and retained by the carriers. Circuity in connection with direct shipments, that is, where transit is not involved, was considered simply as the use of a route considerably longer than the direct route.
Circuity, as such, was not condemned. The regional committees were instructed to regard the following limits as not unduly circuitous: 75 percent circuity for distances up to 150 miles; 50 percent circuity for distances between 150 and 500 miles; 33 1/3 percent circuity for distances in excess of 500 miles.
The general committee decided that wasteful transportation could not be determined on the basis of mileage alone, and that circuity even in excess of these limits was not in itself wasteful. All relevant circumstances had to be considered, and excessive hauling could be justified where necessary to maintain in operation storage facilities, milling, and other plants which were important in the general war program. Furthermore, the use of indirect and circuitous rail routes was often necessary to avoid congestion on the direct route. The shortest tariff route from the standpoint of mileage was not always the shortest in time. It was in the light of these general considerations that the subject of circuity was examined by the Committee.
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Originally, the general committee planned to rely upon the voluntary cooperation of shippers and carriers in eliminating circuitous routes found to be wasteful. It was found advisable, however, that service orders and tariff publications be used to effectuate recommendations for changes in circuitous routes.
On March 23, 1944, the Interstate Commerce Commission, on recommendation of the Committee, issued Order No. 189, effective May 10, 1944. This order dealt with backhauls, out-of-line hauls and circuity in connection with transit shipments. It was amended from time to time to include items recommended by the Committee as a result of further investigation. Altogether, the order embargoed approximtely 539,484 transit items which involved excessive hauling.
Another order was issued in the same manner affecting circuitous routing of direct shipments. Service Order No. 222, effective September 10, 1944, enjoined the use of 10,052 circuitous routes for the duration “because of the time consumed in transporting this traffic over such routes as compared with more direct routes * * * ”
In measuring the achievements of the Committee in respect of circuity, it must be remembered that many routes were eliminated through the voluntary cooperation of carriers and shippers as well as through orders, and that many tariff routes were not actually in use when prohibited by order.
Inspection and Reconsignment.
Inspection arid reconsignment of grain shipments were under continuous surveillance by the Committee. These practices are an integral part of the process of marketing grain. They are, however, often the cause of undue delay in the movement of cars, and the Committee endeavored to expedite inspection and reconsignment without, at the same time, disrupting orderly marketing procedure.
One of the first accomplishments of the Committee was the restriction of the number of full stops for inspection and reconsignment. Prior to May 1, 1942, no demurrage charge was made regardless of the number of occasions on which such services were Tendered. On that date a restrictive rule was adopted after conferences with the National Reconsigning and Demurrage Committee and with representatives of the Traffic Bureau of the Commission. The new rule permitted without charge not more than two inspections or one inspection and one reconsignment en route, and one inspection or re-consignment within the switching limits of the destination at which the car was unloaded. If more inspections were made, the shipment was subject to a combination of tariff rates applicable to and from
the point where the additional inspections occurred.
The possibilities of reducing free time for inspection and reconsignment were also thoroughly' explored by the Committee. As a result of negotiations between the Committee and carriers and shippers, the 24-hour free time as provided in the general rule included time for sampling and disposition. At primary markets the time was computed from the hour the grade was given and the car disposed of. Under the general rule the shipper was notified of arrival by bulletin at 9 a.m. and therefore had 31 hours altogether to dispose of his grain ; at the primary markets, the period was 7 hours after inspection and grading.
Under date of October 12, 1943, Commissioner Johnson of the Interstate Commerce Commission requested the opinion of the Committee concerning the feasibility of limiting the time a grain car might be held for inspection to 24 hours and of allowing no additional time for reconsignment. The Committee’s study disclosed that inspection was an obligation imposed by law, and in practice sale or reconsignment was possible only after official inspection and grading. The Committee concluded that the existing rules provided the minimum period in which these operations could be performed; It was the Committee’s opinion that further limitations enforced by the imposition of higher rates or demurrage charges would depress the price of grain to the producer without economizing the use of railroad equipment or manpower.
Backhauls in connection with inspections were eliminated wherever possible. A notable instance was the arrangement for inspection at Klamath Falls. It had been the usual practice to move cars from Klamath Falls into Portland for inspection and then back through Klamath Falls on their way east. Inspection at Klamath Falls canceled two movements of 368 miles each. Similar backhauls were eliminated between Portland and Seattle.
Through cooperation between the regional committees, the grain exchanges, and carriers, grain cars in numerous instances bypassed hold or inspection yards in congested terminals and moved directly to the point of unloading, where inspection was made. This resulted in a marked reduction in switching operations and expedited inspection.
Hold-for-Orders Cars.
Investigation by the Office of Defense Transportation revealed that a substantial portion of Northwest grain moving into Minneapolis and Duluth was being held for orders at Glenwood, St. Cloud, Thief River Falls, and Wilmer, Minn. It was found that there was considerable loss of time in handling such
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cars as compared with those billed for sampling and inspection at those points. After the grain trade failed in its attempt to improve conditions, the Office of Defense Transportation recommended that the Interstate Commerce Commission issue a service order to deal with the situation. On October 13, 1943, Service Order No. 160 was issued prohibiting holding for order of carloads of grain at the points above specified. The order expressly permitted sampling, but imposed full local or joint rates on shipments reconsigned or held for other disposition. The order was lifted from time to time as permitted by trade and market conditions.
Cars Consigned to “Notify” Party.
Another source of delay in the movement of grain cars examined by the Committee was the practice of brokers of consigning cars to “notify” party at a designated destination at which the party was not located. The Committee, failing to obtain correction of this abuse by persuasive measures, recommended the promulgation of a service order.
Service Order No. 174 was accordingly issued January 7, 1944. It prohibited the transport of grain when consigned on order-notify or on straight-advise bills of lading, unless there was present at the billed destination a party who was to accept notice of arrival of the shipment, and to furnish disposition orders to the carrier’s agent at such destination.
Other Committee Activities.
Early investigations showed that, throughout the country, elevators customarily ordered cars beyond their ability to load and unload promptly. It was also common practice to place orders for cars for the same loading with more than one carrier.
Through the efforts of the regional committees these abuses were almost completely eliminated.
Much was accomplished by the committees in accelerating terminal operations through urging loading and unloading on Sundays and holidays. As a result of the cooperation of the Board of Trade of Minneapolis, for example, 1,774 cars moved on Labor Day, 1944. Similarly, terminal and country elevators were induced to operate on holidays when threatened with congestion and during periods of car shortages. Cross-hauling of cars in switching service was also thoroughly examined by the Committee. Some carriers refused to permit shippers to reload cars that had been unloaded by them. This practice increased needlessly the number of outbound and in-bound cars.
The Committee investigated the operation of minimum weight requirements fixed by General Order ODT No. 18 as they related to grain and grain products, and waged an aggressive campaign to secure heavier loading. As a result, average loading of grain cars was consistently in excess of the minimum limits of the order, reaching 70,000 and 80,000 pounds per car on grain products and feeds, and 70,000 pounds per car on flour.
Another activity of the Committee was the issuance of circulars to the shipping public urging economy and efficiency in the use of transport facilities generally. Through its regional organization and its close contact with shippers throughout the country, the Committee was in an advantageous position to make such appeals effective. Circulars published by the Committee not only urged shippers to economize in the use of facilities, but also informed them of conditions affecting transport and specifically instructed them in the applications of efficient methods.
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CHAPTER XI
RAILROAD PASSENGER TRAFFIC
Railroad passenger traffic increased phenomenally during the war years. Movements of troops, of wounded soldiers arriving from the front, and of prisoners of war, furlough travel of military personnel, travel by relatives visiting persons in the armed services, transport of agricultural workers to harvesting areas and industrial workers to west coast shipyards, a growing national income, curtailed services by competing passenger-carrying agencies, and severe restrictions in the amounts of gasoline and tires available for private automobiles, all contributed to the rising passenger load of the railroads. The result was that railroad traffic during the war years increased 182.8 percent in 1942, 299.1 percent in 1943, 325.5 percent in 1944, and 310 percent in 1945 over the prewar year of 1941. In the same period, the average length of journey per passenger, other than commutation, lengthened from 99.45 miles per passenger, in 1941, to 151.12 miles. In 1944, of the entire passenger travel in the country, 41.4 percent was by railroad as compared with 9.6 percent in 1941. Passenger travel-statistics are given in chapter XLII.
Transport of military personnel made up a significant proportion of railroad passenger travel. In 1942, troop movements accounted for 20 percent of total passenger-miles. In 1943, it accounted for 40 percent of the passenger-miles, other than commutation. About half of this was due to official military movements, about 2,000,000 men per month during, the early part of the year, and 1,750,000 men in the latter part. The estimated furlough travel accounted for as many passenger miles as official military movements.
This unprecedented burden was imposed upon the railroads with virtually no increase in their passenger-carrying equipment. In 1942, the War Production Board refused to permit the construction of additional railroad passenger cars of any type, even denying the builders the privilege of completing all units under construction. However during 1943 and 1944 there were added 1,200 specially-designed troop sleepers and. 400 kitchen cars. This represented an increase of 3.5 percent in cars operat
ing after January 1, 1942, but the increase in the usual type of passenger cars during the war period was only 1.8 percent.
While the burden of meeting the demands of the heavy war traffic fell to the carriers, it was the constant concern of the Office of Defense Transportation to see that essential military and civilian passengers were accommodated; that a disproportionate share of railroad facilities were not diverted to pleasure travel; and that such travel was discouraged whenever it threatened to impede the war effort. What is to be particularly noted is that the decision was early made to seek these objectives without resort to a compulsory priority system governing civilian travel, or any scheme requiring the rationing of passenger travel, except as a last and desperate resort.
Measures to Control Operations.
In the beginning intercity motorbus operations were of primary concern, due to the shortage of rubber for the manufacture of; tires and of critical metals essential to bus construction. The tight control over the extension of bus operations also affected the railroads, some of which had begun abandoning unproductive branch lines, and of replacing train service by bus service. To stop this practice, except where a justifiable gain in service or equipment could be shown, the Office of Defense Transportation put into effect, on April 1, 1942, its General Order ODT No. 2.
This order provided that no carrier of passengers by rail should substitute a bus for any vehicle theretofore operated on rails over any existing route of such railroad without the approval of the Office of Defense Transportation. Where justification from a service or conservation standpoint was established, such authorization was given. A typical instance in which the change was found desirable was that of the Northern Pacific Railway Co. In this case the substitution of bus and truck service released for important through service, two mail and express trains daily. The number of such authorizations was not large. By the end of 1944, when the progress of the war gave promise of an early successful
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termination, and when steps were already under consideration to ease restrictions, only nine such applications had been approved.
Another general order which undertook to achieve economical use of railroad passenger equipment was General Order ODT No. 24, effective October 4, 1942. This order froze all railroad passenger schedules as of September 26, 1942. It prohibited railroads, with certain exceptions, from running special passenger trains, or adding new trains to existing schedules, or running extra sections of regular trains unless such extra sections had been in operation at least 20 percent of the time during the 90 days prior to effective date of the order. The order further prohibited the operation of a passenger or mixed train which included a chartered car, or one the use of which was restricted to an individual or group of persons traveling together. The order was designed to give effect to the policy of the Office of Defense Transportation to restrict the use of passenger equipment for transporting crowds to football games, races, and other sporting events, and for luxury travel in general.
It soon became evident that the few exceptions provided in the order, namely, operations for the exclusive service' of the Government, or to meet emergencies, were not flexible enough to meet necessary travel situations. This was remedied by the adoption of 3 amendments and 11 clarifying and liberalizing general permits. Thus, empty equipment from one-way troop movements or other exempted operations was made available for additional passenger transportation on the return trips. The exemptions to the ban on special trains or special cars were extended to include Presidential travel, tours of Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in a national political campaign, circuses, and carnivals, etc., traveling in their own or leased equipment. It likewise applied to passenger trains generally during the Christmas and New Year’s holiday season, when additional service was necessary to meet the travel demands of members of the armed forces. The exemptions were extended to trains or cars carrying accredited delegates and members of the press to conventions of the two chief national political parties. Finally general exemptions to the General Order ODT No. 24 were extended to all electric urban and interurban service. This order was revoked in its entirety as of September 16, 1945.
Passenger Schedules Reduced.
The issuance of orders to assure the most economical use of facilities that the rapidly growing volume of passenger travel might be handled successfully by the railroads was but a small part of
the work of the Office of Defense Transportation in the field of passenger movement. There was constant cooperation between the agency and the carriers in an effort to meet varied situations. The response of the carriers to the appeal of the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation for voluntary revisions in passenger schedules resulted in the first 6 months of 1942, in the release of 114 locomotives and 533 passenger cars for more urgent needs. The reductions in service resulted in a saving of 24,700 passenger train-miles and 176,000 passenger car-miles daily for the 6-month period. Measured in equipment units, the cars released by schedule and equipment revisions were 149 mail, express, and baggage cars, 150 coaches, and 204 pullman cars of several types. In addition, 31 rail motorcars were released for more urgent traffic. As a result of the cooperation between the railroads and the Office of Defense Transportation, the Director of the agency was able to report to the President, in August 1942, that the carriers had met all military requirements and accommodated the heavy summer travel with no serious points of congestion, and only temporary crowding at active centers on week ends.
The railroad passenger situation was handled without further restrictive orders throughout 1943 and in a large part of 1944. It was not until early in 1945, when the rising tide of civilian traffic threatened to interfere with the movement of troops and wounded, that the Office of Defense Transportation found it necessary to act further to limit unnecessary travel and to compel the more economical use of equipment. General Order ODT No. 47, issued January 11, 1945, ordered the discontinuance of passenger schedules providing seasonal service to any resort, recreational, or vacation areas, and forbade the operation of passenger trains on which the occupancy of seats and space did not average 35 percent during the preceding month of November. This order was revoked effective August 21, 1945.
On June 30, 1945, General Order ODT No. 52 was issued prohibiting the reservation, allocation, or assignment of seats or sleeping car space on passenger trains or the sale of tickets for such space more than 120 hours in advance of the scheduled departure time of such train. On September 14, with the close of hostilities, this restriction was eased so that reservations might be made 14 days in advance of the scheduled departure of a train.
After VE-day the swelling movement of t he troops from Europe to the Pacific made it necessary to withdraw from regular service all sleeping cars operated for distances of 450 miles or less, except for military personnel. The cars so withdrawn,
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numbering approximately 900, were required to be held in a pool for the use of the military forces to be employed in such ways as the Office of Defense Transportation approved. This action was accomplished through General Order ODT No. 53, issued July 7, 1945.
By midsummer 1945 the armed forces had difficulty in obtaining sufficient railroad passenger cars, as well as sleeping cars, baggage cars, and express cars. This situation was met by the Office of Defense Transportation which issued General Order ODT No. 55, effective July 17, 1945, directing that all such railroad equipment be operated only as the Office of Defense Transportation might direct. The order also appointed an agent with full authority to act on behalf of the Office of Defense Transportation in assigning such equipment as required to meet the needs of the military.
On July 20, 1945, the Office of Defense Transportation issued General Order ODT No. 56, which required military personnel to travel three persons to one sleeping car section, or to occupy not more than two double or four single coach seats. The last order intended to control civil and military travel during the closing months of the war was General Order ODT No. 57, effective July 21, 1945, which restricted the activities of travel bureaus and group travel generally. The order forbade the reservation for or sale to travel agencies of any ticket for use on passenger trains. It also forbade agencies to cause tickets to be reserved or sold. Finally, it barred carriers from knowingly carrying persons participating in organized group travel. This sweeping order was modified on August 17, 1945, by a general permit which exempted from its operations the reservation or sale through travel agencies or profession, or on business for the Government; for travel between the United States and foreign countries, except Canada or Mexico; or for children and their supervisors returning from summer camps. General Order ODT No. 57 was revoked as of October 1, 1945.
Checking Unnecessary Travel
As these restrictive orders were being issued to control railroad passenger traffic, there was conducted a continuous aggressive and Nation-wide campaign against unnecessary travel. This campaign was launched early in 1942 when Director Eastman of the Office of Defense Transportation urged voluntary restriction of unessential travel to avoid forcing a resort to some form of positive control of railroad passenger traffic. President Roosevelt admonished the country that “recreation as usual” should be limited to such activities as served
to promote the war effort while the Office of Defense Transportation stressed the importance of applying to every contemplated journey the test: “Is this trip necessary.” The cooperation of national organizations was sought and many consented to forego their annual conventions. Appeal was made to the general public to curtail the length of vacation journeys and,, as the demands on the carrier facilities increased, a carefully worked out program for vacationing without travel was brought home to the public through an intensive publicity drive. Despite urgent appeals not to travel to distant winter resorts, such as California or Florida, one season found a large number of winter tourists stranded in these resorts for lack of return travel space.
The campaign to eliminate unnecessary travel was pressed hard also upon all agencies and departments of the Federal Government. Urged by the Office of Defense Transportation, a majority of the agencies issued directives restating the pertinent facts regarding the need for reduction in travel. Measures were instituted requiring closer supervision of travel by superiors, and travel authorizations were issued for specific trips rather than for blanket travel.
While these results were a fair beginning, much more drastic steps by the Government agencies were necessary to effect substantial reduction in official travel. Therefore Director James F. Byrnes of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, on the recommendation of Director Johnson of the Office of Defense Transportation, issued a directive to all Federal agencies in January 1945 to reduce official travel and to report the extent of such reduction to the Office of Defense Transportation. The reports requested by the Office of Defense Transportation were to list the measures taken to reduce travel of the personnel of the agencies, and to give the percentage of reduction in travel cost for the first 6 months of 1945 as compared with the same period in 1944. Information also was requested as to how many persons located in Washington attended group meetings during June and July in cities outside of Washington, and how many located in the field attended group meetings in Washington during the same period.
“I am firmly convinced that Government agencies can and must make still further and greater reductions in travel,” Director Johnson wrote to the agencies. “Government officials should discontinue the scheduling of group meetings, both in Washington and elsewhere, during this critical transportation period.”
Of the 51 Federal agencies that reported, 2 organizations had no travel expenditures. One of these was the Government Printing Office; the other
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was the Board of War Communications. The latter, being purely a planning board composed of officials from other agencies, had no travel budget. Following this there was a group of 11 agencies that were unable to offer an exact percentage figure. One of this group, however, indicated a 20 percent reduction in expenditures; 6 others indicated that there were no changes in the amount of travel and three others were unable to make an estimate. The important fact is that more than half of the agencies reporting estimated travel reductions ranging from 24 to 73 percent as a consequence of this special drive.
While the statistics show that over half of the Government agencies were able to show reduction in travel expenses ranging from 24 percent upward, there were results that could not be charted, such as an awareness of a shared responsibility in this task, and the avowed appreciation of and cooperation with this work of the Office of Defense Transportation.
The railroads cooperated with the Office of Defense Transportation in the campaign to curb unnecessary travel and to provide equipment for essential travel. They were everywhere giving preference to military over civilian passenger traffic. Early in 1942 they converted 141 club cars, 47 observation cars, and 314 parlor cars into day coaches to meet the steadily rising tide of travel. By the beginning of 1943 a total of 800 railroad lounge, club, observation, and chair cars had been converted into coaches or three-tier troop sleeping cars. Individual military travel to and from the training camps and mass troop movements to embarkation points continued to make tremendous demands on passenger equipment. In 1944 a heavy movement of furloughed and disabled soldiers from the eastern and Pacific fronts augmented the traffic burden. In addition to this the redeployment of troops from the European to the Pacific theater was in early prospect. It is difficult to visualize the enormity of this particular operation. It would amount to transporting in less than 10 months halfway around the world .substantially the same army sent to the European theater.
The time had come for more drastic action than any yet taken to meet the situation. Accordingly, on June 20, 1944, Col. J. M. Johnson, Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, certified to the Interstate Commerce Commission the necessity for affording preference and priority in the transportation of invalid, disabled, and infirm members of the military forces and merchant marine. Specifically, the Office of Defense Transpertation certified to the
Interstate Commerce Commission the necessity of I requiring carriers to:
(1) Divert equipment and transportation facilities and I supplies from use in freight or passenger service;
(2) Cancel or discontinue passenger train service; and
(3) Refuse permission to passengers, other than invalid, I disabled, or infirm members of the military, naval, or merchant marine forces of the United States or of any government allied with the United States in the war, and their attendants, to board passenger trains; and in the case of invalid, disabled, or infirm members of such military, naval, or merchant marine forces to be transported pursuant to a medical certificate issued by an authorized medical officer of the | branch of the service in which they are serving, and their at- I tendants; also that each such common carrier by railroad and sleeping car company be required to—
(1) Cancel passenger reservations and space assignments, or tickets therefor;
(2) Cause and require passengers to vacate, prior to departure of train from point of origin or at any time of the day or night thereafter, the space and accommodations occupied by them.
The response to this certification was the issuance of Service Order No. 213, by the Interstate Commerce Commission, effective June 27, 1944, which made effective the recommendations of the Office of Defense Transportation.
While this insured the uninterrupted movement of military personnel from the battle fronts to hospitals and rest centers, it still left transportation facing a situation that threatened to engulf it with a great resurgence of civilian travel. For more than 2 years patriotically minded organizations had refrained from holding their annual meetings in deference to the appeal of the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation. With the end of large-scale war operations in Europe supposedly in sight, a hopeful public expected transportation conditions to revert quickly to a peacetime status and permit travel as usual. A large amount of individual travel of a social and recreational nature had been eliminated in consequence of the Office of Defense Transportation’s campaign against nonessential trips, but the volume of unnecessary travel was still tremendous. Revenue passenger-miles increased from 29,-000,000 in 1941 to 96,000,000 for 1944. To make the outlook more serious, there was a rapidly mounting movement of military forces. Over an 18-month period 16,000,000 military persons were carried. This alone was two and a half times as great as for the entire period of World War I.
In the face of these conditions a great convention movement was coming to life. In 1943 there were 14,500 organizations that called for either national or State conventions, with an uncounted number of district, county, and local conventions, conferences, festivals, dinners, and shows—all designed to attract a prosperous travel-loving public, after 3 years of more or less travel restraint.
When the transportation and military authorities of the Government were faced with this prospect,
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the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, at the behest of the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, stepped in to halt this menace to a transportation which already had to be nursed with sedulous care to keep it running until the war effort was no longer so desperately dependent upon its full functioning.
On January 5, 1945, Justice F. Byrnes, the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, issued a directive which was called Ban on Conventions. It was in reality an appeal to the public to defer holding meetings and other travel-inducing events unless the travel attendance at them could be held down* to not more than 50 persons. Director Byrnes made three requests as follows:
1. That all conventions after February 1, 1945, which were to be attended by more than 50 persons be canceled unless approved as “necessary to the war effort.”
2. That hotels refuse to make reservations for unapproved meetings.
3. That all trade shows be canceled.
War Committee on Conventions.
To make this program effective, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation was designated to head an interdepartmental committee to which were appointed the Under Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman of the War Production Board, and the Deputy Chairman of the War Manpower Commission. The activities of the committee were conducted by a secretary.
The Byrnes appeal called for voluntary cooperation and compliance with his directive. Policies were laid down covering hotel accommodations for convention groups, but no coercive steps were taken. However, the public statement of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion indicated that enforcement procedure might be instituted if voluntary public compliance were not had. The public was told that Justice Byrnes felt so certain that his appeal would receive immediate public support and general cooperation that he had taken no measures to determine Government enforcement procedure which might be instituted.
With this background and authority, the interdepartmental committee, officially known as the War Committee on Conventions, took up its task. It entered upon a program bringing into collaboration the hotels of the country through their national association, the leaders of the religious organizations, and the governing bodies of various great national associations. The spirit of cooperation of all these elements was inspiring to the Committee, and it served to hold in line recalcitrant units of the various organizations, with the result that the authority of the Committee was never seriously challenged, though often assailed by the promoters of commer
cialized events and by individuals fearful of curtailment of their constitutional liberties. The wholehearted support given by the hotels, to whom fell the task of refusing reservations except for conventions or gatherings sanctioned by the War Committee-on Conventions, gave powerful support to the Committee.
A few organizations to whom permission was refused sought to disregard the actions of the Committee, but hotels refused to grant them reservations. Some attempted to circumvent the Committee by seeking to hold their conventions in Montreal, Canada. However, the spirit of cooperation that the Committee had built up extended to the Canadian Government which did agree to refuse the privilege-of meeting in Canada to any group from the United States that did not have a permit from the Committee. This was the order No. 535 of the Canadian Wartime Prices and Trade Board, the order remaining in effect until November 1, 1945.
In its handling of the convention problems, the Committee first decided that the yardstick it would use to measure the essentiality of any meeting would be “Would winning the war be impeded if the proposed meeting were held to an attendance of 50 persons, or canceled outright?” An application form was devised to develop this information and was given Nation-wide circulation through the field offices of the Office of Defense Transportation, as well as through convention bureaus and hotels.
At the outset, complications were encountered. Only 3 weeks elapsed between the Byrnes appeal and February 1, the date of the application of the restrictions, while months of work had been expended in preparation for many large national and State-conventions, especially of educational and scientific groups which required the preparation of original papers. Also a large number of trade shows, involving considerable outlays and obligations, were scheduled for the months of February and March. There-were also questions of local attendance that confused the simple yardstick of more than fifty persons participating, and there was the factor of means of travel, whether by private or public conveyance. The result was a series of clarifying modifications of the requirements which finally settled down to this kind of a workable formula :
1. Requiring permits.—Meetings of more than 50 persons attending from beyond the local and suburban areas, or, in rural districts, from beyond the normal local trading zone, without regard to means of travel employed.
2. Not requiring permits.—Meetings at which the attendance from beyond the local commuting or normal trading area would not exceed 50 persons, in
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addition to any number of persons who might attend from within the local and suburban areas. These gatherings or events were classed as local meetings.
With these statements as a guide, the public generally could tell whether a permit was necessary. In case of doubt, the Committee asked that an application be filed to enable it to make the decision.
The determination of whether a permit was to be granted, or refused, constituted the important work of the Committee. The conditions on which such determinations were based also evolved out of condition and borderline situations. While the test, “in what way and to what extent the war effort would suffer if this meeting were to be deferred or canceled,” as applied generally, there were some departures to give recognition to the desirability of community morale building.
Athletic, and to an extent, general sporting events were not brought under the scope of this Committee, nor were church or secular summer camp activities when they followed the normal vacation pattern combining recreation and instruction.
The Committee announced its recognition of the essentiality to the war effort of the organized church and adopted the policy of granting permits in all instances where a central church governing body made application for a legislative meeting to transact essential business for the continuance or survival of the church, such as fiscal operations and control of church properties; amendment of canonical laws; election of bishop, moderator, or other chief executive officer; examination or selection of candidates for ordination; assignment of pastors; etc.
All other church meetings or events had to be held on a local basis, that is, with attendance drawn from the community and its commuting and normal trading area. The Committee sought to make clear that it had no intent to abridge or restrict religious worship, only to restrict heavy group travel from one community to another in order to participate in religious activities other than those of a church governing character.
A different problem faced the Committee in the matter of general membership meetings of mutual benefit and cooperative organizations which, under State laws were required to hold meetings annually or at other stated periods. In these cases, the Committee did not take final action. Its task was to secure compliance with a request from the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion with no program of enforcement devised to make the request effective
because he felt certain of an effective public support. The Committee sought cooperation from State authorities in easing State requirements so as to permit such meetings to be deferred. At the same time, on the possibility that later in the year the situation might improve, the Committee wrote to applicants suggesting that in all such cases the meetings be deferred until later in the year.
By February 1, 1945, the effective date of the Byrnes restriction, a total of 224 applications for permits to hold conventions and other group meetings had been reviewed by the Committee. Of this number, 222 were denied. Permits were issued for only two: one for a Red Cross meeting and the other, a war fund meeting. By March 1 the Committee had reviewed 1,331 applications, denying 1,278 and granting 53, chiefly for church legislative and wagecontract conferences.
The device of the local meeting already mentioned, with unlimited local attendance plus a maximum of 50 persons from beyond the local area, was a practical solution for many serious situations in the convention and show fields. Those sponsoring fairs, trade shows, horse, dog, and other animal shows often elected to hold these events on a reduced scale until postwar conditions should permit them to be held upon a broader basis. An application had to be filed for each such event to substantiate the claims that attendance, exhibits, and exhibitors all came from within the local area. For all other forms of local meetings or events, no permits were required.
The local area meetings permitted business sessions of organizations to be held without the glamor of mass assemblage in a distant city. Such meetings afforded, too, the opportunity for complete religious worship on the community basis, yet many groups and individuals who preferred the spectacular and dramatic effect of mass worship and pilgrimages by train, bus, or rubber-borne caravan complained bitterly to the Committee and to Congressmen that this constituted an invasion of their constitutional rights.
The record of the Committee during the 8-month period of its functioning was as follows:
Applications received for meetings .................. 4,095
Applications approved ................................. 495
Applications for meetings exempt................... 1,486
Applications denied ................................. 2,114
Attendance at meetings denied .................. 3,248,775
Estimated savings in rail passenger miles because of denials ................... 965,570,250*
*Based on the estimated use of rail transportation by 55 percent of persons attending and an estimated average round trip of 310 miles per passenger.
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CHAPTER XII
TRAFFIC MOVEMENT FORECASTS
The duties of the Office of Defense Transportaion, as laid down in Executive Order 8989, included compiling and analyzing estimates of the requirements to be imposed upon existing domestic transportation facilities by the needs of the war effort.
In section (c) of the Executive order, the duties were further described:
Coordinate and direct domestic traffic movements with the objective of preventing possible points of traffic congestion and assuring the orderly and expeditious movement of men, materials and supplies to points of need.
From the first it was apparent that to discharge these duties information would be needed about the movement pattern of commodities on a national jasis by types of equipment and in advance of actual movement. Without such information, particularly as regards rail traffic, the Office of Defense Transportation would have been inadequately equipped to administer all of its responsibilities.
Three types of forecasting and traffic analysis work seemed necessary in this connection:
1. Long-range, for 6, 12, or 18 months in advance of movement, in order that the Office of Defense Transportation might be more alert to equipment and material needs of the carriers and could more adequately advise and, later, serve in the capacity of claimant agency for all carriers with the War Production Board.
2. Midterm, for 3 to 6 months in advance of movement, to measure the impending burden on the carriers from a freight standpoint to determine the relationship of the current load with that which must be met in the future.
3. Short-term, for 30 days in advance of movement, to provide refinements not available in a midterm forecast, in terms of current evaluations of car supply, traffic flow, commodity movements, possible points of traffic congestion, etc.
Long-range forecasting was done in the Office of the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, with the aid of other Government and private agencies. Government agencies called upon to assist in preparation of factual data as the basis for Office of Defense Transportation long-range estimates of future traffic included the War Production Board,
Interstate Commerce Commission, Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, United States Maritime Commission, Public Roads Administration, Petroleum Administration for War, Solid Fuel Administration for War, Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, Office of Price Administration, and Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Similar service was received from statisticians of various carrier organizations such as the Association of American Railroads, American Short Line Railroad Association, American Transit Association, American Trucking Association, Great Lakes Carriers Association, Regulated Mississippi River Carriers Association, National Water Carriers Association, Southern Water Carriers Association, American Petroleum Institute, and Petroleum Industry War Council. The data received from these sources were reviewed by the principal statistician reporting to the executive officer of the Office of Defense Transportation and also by the operating statisticians of the various carrier divisions. On the basis of these analyses, the Office of Defense Transportation prepared its own estimates of traffic requirements for submission to the War Production Board.
Current and advance quarterly forecasts of the regional shippers’ advisory boards eventually were relied upon for the 3- to 6-month estimates, while the short-term forecast was based upon estimates from comparatively few shippers, together with information available in other Government agencies, and was made in a unit of the Division of Traffic Movement, set up primarily for that purpose.
Development of Short-Term Forecasting.
Estimates of future traffic in one form or another seemed necessary to agencies other than the Office of Defense Transportation. For some time during 1942 there was considerable discussion as to which agency, public or private, should provide the required materials from which policy determinations and actions might be made. From the first the Office of Defense Transportation maintained that it had inescapable responsibilities and could not discharge these duties by accepting on faith conclusions
700494—48—7
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reached by other agencies. It was recognized that other agencies must have knowledge of various phases of transportation for their own use, and their aid and advice was solicited, but in general the Office of Defense Transportation felt that it must control the sources of information necessary to itself. There was no objection to other agencies acting in the same field, except so far as duplication of effort was an unnecessary burden upon those who furnished the information, and so far as confusion resulted from different estimates concerning the same subject. The Bureau of the Budget agreed with this interpretation of the duties of the Office of Defense Transportation.
Late in the summer of 1942 a committee on traffic forecasting was set up to advise the Transportation Branch of the War Production Board. Representatives of the War Production Board, the Office of Defense Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission, War Shipping Administration, War and Navy Departments, and the Bureau of the Budget served upon this committee which endeavored to develop what types of forecasts were desired by different agencies, in what forms they should be, and what should be the various bases and sources of information.
The Office of Defense Transportation felt that its field had been invaded particularly when representatives of the War Production Board committee met with the executive committee of the National Association of Shippers Advisory Boards, which worked closely with the Office of Defense Transportation, and discussed with the shippers possible changes in their forecasts. Further concern as to overlapping activities developed with the issuance of War Production Board Administrative Order No. 19, which set up the Division of Stock-Piling and Transportation, and under “Functions” included as section 3.032:
Obtaining from such sources as may be deemed to be the most appropriate and suitable, estimates of probable transportation requirements, and, after correlation, advising the Office of Defense Transportation of these estimates in order that plans may be formulated by the Office of Defense Transportation to handle such requirements.
In consequence, joint conferences were held between staff members of the Office of Defense Transportation, War Production Board, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Bureau of the Budget and a specially designated committee from the National Association of Shippers Advisory Boards. Finally it was agreed that the long-term forecast would be made in the Office of Defense Transportation; that the regular quarterly forecast made by the shippers’ advisory boards, together with special confidential board forecasts for the fol
lowing quarter, would satisfy the midterm requirements, in which chiefly the War Production Board was interested; and that the short-term or mohthly forecast would be made by the Office of Defense Transportation, largely from special reports furnished to that office by a selected sample of shippers. In this manner the forecasting functions were crystallized to the point where there was no duplication of effort among the agencies and only one forecast extant for a given period.
About 3,000 shippers, widely distributed as to location and product, were asked to furnish estimates of their shipments by both rail and truck 1 month in advance, as well as certain other information as to past shipments. Two features of these monthly reports, as finally developed, were unique: estimates as to the destination zone or State of the shipments, and distribution of the estimates by specific type of car. Variations in types of car used for the same commodity made this feature important from the standpoint of car utilization and supply, while destination information, which provided traffic flow material, was not obtainable from any other source.
The Office of Defense Transportation made the forecast in consultation with a committee of experts suggested by the Bureau of the Budget. Included on this committee as finally organized were outstanding technical authorities from the Bureau of the Budget, as well as representatives of the War Production Board, the Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the War Department, the Association of American Railroads, and the Institute of Applied Econometrics. At first, the traffic Forecast Committee met almost weekly. Later, the meetings were held the last day of the month, prior to formal issue of the forecast, and after July 1944 were held about the 20th of the month to provide current information for use in the forthcoming forecast.
As the technical aspects of the short-term forecast were cleared up, advisers on these matters tended to withdraw from the committee, which was from time to time expanded to include authorities on commodity movements from the War Food Administration, the Bureau of Mines, and the Petroleum Administration for War. Moreover, experts in special lines not represented formally upon the committee were consulted freely. Cooperation from other government agencies and from private organizations was helpful.
Forecasts Continued for ICC.
After the Allied invasion of Europe in June 1944, widespread opinion held that the European phase
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of the war would be finished in the fall. Future transportation problems were expected to be of a type easily met locally. In short, the Office of Defense Transportation felt that its need for a shortterm forecast was past. The Bureau of the Budget, however, was unwilling to allow elimination of any activity which would indicate a comfortable feeling as far as the war was concerned. Except for the War Department Transportation Corps and the Association of American Railroads, other agencies which had been using the forecast reported that it was still useful to them, and indicated that this type of forecast would probably spring up in several other agencies if the Office of Defense Transportation dropped it. The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation was unwilling to have shippers burdened with duplicate reports to several agencies, as were shippers’ advisory board representatives. Governmental thought inclined to the view that techniques used could be useful in a permanent and expanded forecast. The Office of Defense Transportation believed that it should be continued in the Interstate Commerce Commission, where it could be of use in rate proceedings. After consultation between the Office of Defense Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Bureau of the Budget, the short-term forecasting function of the war agency was transferred on August 1, 1944, to the Interstate Commerce Commission, under supervision by the Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics. In reality there was little change in administration of the forecast. The Office of Defense Transportation continued to pay all salaries and expenses connected with the project. Supervision remained the same, ‘as the head of the section for several months had been on detail from the staff of the Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics. However, the forecast booklet, after the transfer, was issued under the double sponsorship of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Office of Defense Transportation, and all routine letters to shippers were in the name of the Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics. During the spring and summer of 1945 the Interstate Commerce Commission considered the feasibility of taking over all responsibilities in connection with the forecast as a necessary part of its work. Due to budget limitations this was not deemed possible, and the short-term forecast was discontinued with the October 1945 traffic estimate.
Monthly forecasting as a war project had served its purpose of indicating impending traffic loads by regions, commodities, and type of equipment, as well as traffic flow in critical areas.
Contact with Shippers’ Advisory Boards.
During the development of the short-term forecast within the Office of Defense Transportation, the National Association of Shippers Advisory Boards expressed a desire to cooperate in the project. Under date of May 20, 1942, the president of the national association wrote the Director:
Inasmuch as the regional shippers advisory boards have this established and efficiently functioning machinery, I think we could greatly relieve you if you would care to have us adjust our forecasts to the form you desire and prepare these forecasts monthly, instead of quarterly, as heretofore. This would have the advantage of being a complete country-wide report, instead of merely a sampling of typical industries. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, other members of the shippers’ advisory boards did not believe a country-wide comprehensive monthly forecast was feasible and, in fact, did not feel that even the quarterly forecast could be broken down into months.
At the joint meeting in November 1942 referred to above, the shippers’ advisory boards agreed to furnish, in addition to the usual quarterly forecast, a confidential forecast for one quarter beyond that, or forecasts for 6 months in all. The Office of Defense Transportation was to continue receiving monthly reports from a small sample of shippers, many of whom were members of the shippers’ advisory boards.
Possible duplication between the board and the Office of Defense Transportation forecasts was discussed and it was agreed at that time that there was little, if-any, since the advisory boards’ forecasts were not expressed in terms suitable for Office of Defense Transportation purposes, particularly with respect to geographic boundaries of the boards, type of equipment, flow, and time period.
Relations were smooth until early 1944 when certain members of the shippers’ advisory boards became restive and again raised the’subject of duplication. By this time the Office of Defense Transportation forecast had established its worth in its own field, and emphasis in discussion was shifted to possible cooperation, looking toward improvement of the advisory boards’ forecasts. At its meeting in October 1944 the executive committee of the national association discussed possible cooperation with the Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission. It was evident that the shippers’ advisory boards recognized the need for improvement in their forecasts by widening of coverage and by exercise of greater care in estimating shipments.
As mentioned, the basic material for the shortterm forecast was obtained from a maximum of some 3,000 individual shippers, furnishing roughly 5,000 reports monthly to the Office of Defense Trans
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portation. Names of shippers who might possibly cooperate in the forecast by furnishing monthly estimates were obtained from many sources. The office of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation had developed a sizeable mailing list which was used. Membership rolls of trade associations were canvassed. Waybills were studied for consignors of carload freight. At first there was no attempt to see that the list was balanced geographically and commodity-wise but, as the group of reporting shippers began to stabilize, a serious effort was made to stratify reports, to choose shippers who were reliable and regular in their estimates, and to fill gaps in the sample. During development of techniques, the number of shippers was cut to around 800, who sent in each month a total of 2,000 reports, one for each commodity at a particular shipping point, and who together accounted for about 20 percent of total loadings of carload freight in the country.
Shipper Participation.
The first in a series of report forms, known as ZD-1, requested information from shippers as to location of shipping plant, nature of business, and principal product shipped from the plant. No standardization was suggested in descriptions of the products, an omission which led to much confusion. Shippers were asked to furnish, in terms of zones defined by the Office of Defense Transportation, destinations of shipments for some months in the past, as well as destinations of estimated shipments for an undefined number of months in the future, the latter broken down somewhat into types of cars. Likewise, information as to future truckload shipments was requested by destination zone, as well as “total cars shipped this month, directly or indirectly for war purposes.” It was discovered that this form supplied more confusion than information, and it was supplanted by Form ODT P-7, which was more specific only to months covered in the report and types of equipment, and which further broke down “war products” into “finished” or “other materials.” Form ODT FC-1, in effect from late summer of 1942 through February 1943, was in essence the same as Form ODT P-7, except that certain control data to be entered by the shipper were added, to insure better understanding on his part as to what was required.
From March 1943 through June 1945 Form ODT FC-2 was used. Development of this form arose from recognition of weaknesses in the prior forms. Zones used by the Office of Defense Transportation, as developed by the Federal Coordinator of Transportation some years previous, had little meaning for shippers, who could, however, estimate fairly well desti
nations of goods in terms of States. Hence the basis of destinations was changed from zone to State. All truck movements were omitted, as the limited amount of information obtained from this source did not lend itself to any practical use. Commodity group number codes were provided the shippers, to insure a higher degree of comparability in descriptions. These code numbers were in most cases those used by the Interstate Commerce Commission in its freight commodity statistics. Certain modifications were made, such as combination of all livestock under one number. This was done also for all packing-house products, dairy products, hides and leather, petroleum, and iron and steel. Certain other combinations recommended themselves for office use, but were not extended to shippers. On the other hand, the large ICC class 701, “Manufactures and miscellaneous, n.o.s.,” was subdivided into several classes for reporting purposes. “Actual carloads shipped last month” and “Estimate of cars to be shipped next month,” by type of equipment and destination, were continued on the new form, and another line, “Total cars shipped same (forecast) month of 1942,” broken down by equipment but not by destination, was added. This form furnished basic material for any flow estimates which became necessary, as well as commodity and type of car information. It was sufficiently flexible that it could be varied to suit the needs of any particular shipper without interference with the routine necessary for machine tabulation.
In July 1945, Form FC-3, approved by the Bureau of the Budget for the Interstate Commerce Commission, took the place of Form FC-2. Control information as to location, commodity number, and months was retained. Total shipments for the previous and forthcoming month, and for the year previous were likewise kept, but all equipment and all destination information except for Oregon, Washington, and California was eliminated. West coast States were retained, as it was evident that redeployment of men and material from the European to the Pacific theater of war would place a record-breaking burden on western rail carriers. The final form required seven spaces to be filled with needed traffic data, as compared with the elaborate break-down of earlier forms.
Evolution of Forecast Procedure.
Short-term forecasting was originally undertaken to provide advance warning of car needs, by type of equipment, in various parts of the country, and in terms of commodities to be carried in these cars, as well as advance notice of the flow of traffic from one part of the country to another, to measure the impact upon traffic channels and gateways. At the start, neither technique nor basic material was suffi-
90
tient to achieve these purposes and, by the time both had been improved, the gateway project had been abandoned as not feasible with the means at hand. Gateway congestion seemed to be more of a day-to-day problem, better met through daily channel reports which had been developed.
The sample was improved as to representativeness in commodity and geographic senses, and through trial and error a firm method of using the shipper material was developed. The main forecast was eventually stated in terms of average weekly loadings of carload freight, divided into the seven districts and seven (later eight) commodity groups used by the car service division of the Association of American Railroads. Thus the results were expressed in a manner familiar to individuals who dealt with operating and traffic problems and could be tested almost immediately as to accuracy, important to those responsible for development of the project. At the request of the Office of Defense Transportation, freight commodity statistics collected by the Interstate Commerce Commission were placed on a monthly rather than quarterly basis in October 1942. These figures were rearranged in a manner corresponding to the Association of American Railroads carloading reports. Thus a tentative change from the preceding year, as the first basis of a forecast, was developed for the particular commodity group and district under consideration. Any other information bearing upon the matter was brought in and discussed, and a final estimate made. Good as the shipper sample became, it could be used as only one of the bases of a forecast. While it was invaluable for the large miscellaneous group, specialized commodities such as coal were better treated by discussion with local experts in those fields. Another reason why it was necessary to temper shippers’ estimates with other opinion was found to be the changing character of the sample. In such wide geographic and commodity coverage, it is impossible to obtain -and maintain a perfect sample. The over-all accuracy of the estimates is shown below, where estimates proved high being indicated by the plus sign and where estimates were low by the minus sign :
Percent Deviation of Forecast From Actual Loadings
1943 1944 1945
January —2.0 —1.8
February 4-1.5 4-2.1
March 4-2.4 , —1.7
April —1 ■■ 4-2.9 4-0.1
May 4- 3.2 —3.3 —3.0
June 4-14.8 4-2.1 4-0.6
July i, 4- 4.2 —0.2 4-2.0
August 4- o.i -f-i.o 4-9.4
September 4- 2.4 4-i.o 4-1.4
October 4- 1.4 4-0.08
November 4- 0.3 —2.3
December 4- 2.5 4-8.9
Compensating errors in detail within the forecast, of course, tended to balance each other to some degree. Large overestimates as appeared in June 1943 and August 1945 can be explained in terms of labor difficulties and VJ-day celebrations and holidays. On the other hand, the low deviation in November 1943 covered up several serious poor estimates: the estimate of coal loadings proved high due to coal strikes, but was compensated by underestimates for other commodities. On the whole, however, the techniques used proved themselves, and it was felt by most individuals connected with the project that a careful survey of a limited amount of selected source material could produce a better forecast than a large amount of material and no judgment.
In June 1943 the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation instructed all division directors to use this forecast for short-term purposes. Beginning in July 1944 the general forecast of carload traffic originated was extended to cover several months, and a summary table of average weekly loadings by commodity groups and by months for 6 months in advance was carried in the (Monthly Comment on Transportation Statistics of the Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission from January through October 1945. Accuracy of the extended forecasts compared favorably with that of the shippers’ advisory boards’ quarterly forecasts. If forecasting had been continued as a function of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the carloading estimate would have been further extended to a period of 1 year. Shippers’ reports for the single month were considered necessary to such a forecast as a guide to shipper thinking and a safeguard against possible bias in judgment of local sources of information.
Publication of Results.
Formal carloading estimates in almost final form were made first for March 1943. Until then, activity had been largely experimental with respect to form, units in which statements were to be made, and so forth. Forecasts for both March and April were stated in terms of total monthly carloadings by car service districts and commodity groups. In May, average weekly loadings were used to avoid effects of varying lengths of months and to present better the general impact of expected traffic upon the transportation system. The form of the May estimate seemed to be satisfactory and the June forecast was presented in a more striking manner with duplication by the multilith process. Tables were accompanied by charts in two colors, superimposed upon pertinent photographs. The first issue contained 2 pages of text, 8 tables, and 19 charts, while the October book
91
let consisted of 3 pages of text, 19 tables, and 47 charts.
Within a few months it was agreed that photographs under the charts were unnecessary. Duplication difficulties, due in part to the haste required, also made the two-color chart impractical, as was learned from a series of incidents when title, scale, black line, and red line each pertained to a different subject. Consequently, the charts of the November 1943 booklet appeared in one color on white background, a form maintained thereafter. Sample of a forecast chart is given at the close of this chapter.
In terms of money cost, the booklet was inexpensive. The most elaborate form cost $225 for 800 copies, while a simpler version cost $150 for the same number of copies.
Presentation of the forecast had assumed an elaborate form which caused some discussion, both internally and outside the agency. Copies of the booklet were sent for suggestions to many of the shippers cooperating in the project, as well as to railroad officials. Those circularized whck expressed a desire and need to receive further issues were placed on a mailing list. All other shippers were sent the summary or text sheets included in the booklets. It was felt that if the shippers received concrete evidence of the use of their reports they would be more inclined to render their estimates regularly and promptly, and, equally important, would receive an additional psychological prod on the subject of car conservation.
Outside circulation was curtailed in July 1944, although governmental distribution remained about the same, except that the Interstate Commerce Commission asked for many copies to familiarize various members of the staff with the fact that a forecast was being prepared and might be of use in their work.
Flow Forecasts.
Originally the short-term forecast was desired to measure increased loads in terms of flow from one part of the country to another by gateways, and therefrom to anticipate and prevent congestion. As indicated above, technique and material did not permit the development of such a forecast in the desired detail. After changes in the report form in 1943 were well established, monthly forecasts of traffic to and from the 11 Mountain Pacific States were presented with the general forecast. Estimated movement was compared with that of the second preceding month, giving a picture of a relative increase or decrease which at least indicated where trouble might develop. After July 1945 directional forecasts were made for the three Pacific Coast States only. For several months during each of two different
periods similar estimates of movement to, from, and within the North Atlantic States were made. Since in this area the absolute magnitude of coal shipments had a tendency to hide trends in the remainder of the traffic, forecasts were made both with and without coal. Distribution of carloads originating in a district or state was made on the basis of destinations reported by shippers, as to both estimated and past movements. As far as could be determined, the destination estimates of the shippers were fairly accurate, when allowance was made for deviation of the general forecasts from actual loadings.
By-Product Material.
Shippers’ reports indicated, among other things, the number of loaded boxcars which they expected to ship to the west coast in the next month. In connection with Interstate Commerce Commission Service Order No. 104, which provided for the substitution of refrigerator cars for boxcars on certain movements into the western area, these reports furnished ammunition for shipper education. Lasts of those shippers who might possibly take advantage of the service order were sent to Office of Defense Transportation field agents and Interstate Commerce Commission Bureau of Service agents at the s^me time that letters were written to shippers concerned, explaining the conservation program and asking their cooperation. Many shippers replied that they would do all possible to use refrigerator cars west-bound, and indicated that this letter was their first source of information as to the order.
Running records of loadings of different types of equipment by commodity classes and districts were maintained and have proved useful in a historical sense. Shippers’ reports as to equipment needs for their shipments were fairly reliable, but limited staff facilities made full use of this information impossible, if the basic commodity forecasts were to be made in the limited time between receipt of tabulated data and end of month. Consequently, the Association of American Railroads was asked to make spot checks of equipment used in the various districts for the various commodities, which were adjusted by the forecast group from time to time in the light of further knowledge of equipment use, and provided satisfactory estimates of impending traffic needs in terms of equipment.
Evaluation of Short-Term Forecast.
Although the short-term forecast procedure did not become stabilized before alternate means of anticipating traffic congestion were developed, the forecast was important from the standpoint of car supply, which became increasingly acute as loadings increased and the net supply of cars decreased. The fact that
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shippers were asked to prepare estimates month by month caused many of them to become very car conscious at a time when their fullest help in saving cars was particularly needed. In trying to anticipate their car requirements, they not only provided vitally needed information but also made their own organizations the more alert to the need of conserving transportation as much as possible during a critical period. Many developed traffic records which had not been kept previously. When these were no longer required by the Office of Defense Transportation, they volun-tered to furnish them again if they should be needed. Psychologically, the Office of Defense Transportation forecast was very helpful.
In its own work, the Office of Defense Transportation used the forecast as an extremely current picture of the geographic balance of cars by type of equipment, the flow of various commodities, and danger signals by areas from the standpoint of car supply. Upon several occasions, such as in December 1943, the monthly forecast indicated accurately developments not generally expected. The Association of American Railroads, while very cooperative in furnishing desired available data, constantly maintained an indifferent attitude toward the forecast, on the theory that any railroad man could tell what would happen next month in his territory, particularly with the aid of the association-sponsored shippers’ advisory boards forecasts. If the association ever used material appearing in the monthly forecast directly for operational purposes, that fact is unknown to the Office of Defense Transportation. However, the fore
cast was used as a general indicator of the immediate future. The monthly forecast enabled a quick study of any special conditions which might be burdensome to the carriers. Data collected in connection with the forecast provided a store of information in connection with problems arising later, such as grain car shortages, future traffic flow to the west coast, and general equipment analysis.
The experience of the Office of Defense Transportation in this work leads to these conclusions: A transportation forecast should be made by a transportation agency, and basic production figures should be furnished by agencies and individuals concerned with production, but should be translated into transportation terms by agencies thoroughly familiar with the field. In this way, the transportation agency is in a better position to know what makes up its own forecast, what materials are used, what judgment is brought into play, and how much influence can be placed in the results. Equally important, is that a transportation forecast made internally can mean establishment of a group primarily concerned with estimating, which can be used in situations outside the frame of the forecast proper. Forecasting requires a rather broad, if not exhaustive, knowledge of many subjects, with resultant correlation of facts which may seem to have little relation to each other. For both of these reasons, as well as because of the reaction of the public to the forecast, a forecast section should be established as a part of the staff of any such agency as the Office of Defense Transportation that might be required in the future.
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FORECAST OF AVERAGE WEEKLY CARLOAD SHIPMENTS TOTAL UNITED STATES
WfWA » FORECAST
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CHAPTER XIII
RAILROAD WAYBILL STUDIES
During its existence, the Office of Defense Transportation made two general rail traffic studies based upon waybills, and in cooperation with the Interstate Commerce Commission, a detailed study of circuity of routing of rail freight from similar material. These studies are here discussed separately, due to their different purposes and techniques.
General Traffic Studies
Early in 1942 it became necessary for the Office of Defense Transportation to make a basic statement of the volume, origin, flow, and destination of each principal article moving in commerce. Factual information as to the character of rail traffic was required by the War Production Board in connection with the determination of priorities in the transportation of commodities for military and economic defense and civilian defense, and by the Office of Defense Transportation in connection with the national transportation requirements and carrier service available therefor. Very little such data were available at that time. Freight commodity statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission, compiled quarterly, included data on originated and terminated freight, divided into 157 commodity classes. Detail as to movement was totally lacking. The Association of American Railroads collected weekly and published promptly loadings of freight on its member lines, classified into eight commodity groups. Here, also, detail as to movement was not known. It was evident that adequate information as to traffic patterns, channels of flow, routing, and possible areas of action to conserve transportation must be derived largely from a detailed study of actual movements.
Accordingly, by arrangements made through the Association of American Railroads and the American Short Line Railroad Association, each railroad furnished to the Office of Defense Transportation copies of waybills for each unit of carload freight originated on its lines on May 27 and September 23,1942. A total of 131,402 cars originated on May 27, and 137,196 on September 23,1942.
From the waybills pictures of traffic movement of individual commodities were developed. Cross-hauling
was noted and, in some cases, drastically reduced by limitation orders of the War Production Board on distribution of the commodities concerned. Loading characteristics of the various commodities were studied, particularly with respect to types of equipment used and possible substitutions, if necessary, and weights loaded as compared with equipment capacities.
Routing shown on the waybills not only enabled determination of circuity of movement but also provided a basis for discussion of the circuity in any given case, as to whether or not it was justified in the light of transportation conditions. Differentiation between governmental and commercial traffic made it possible to study separately the character of each • type of movement. Government traffic on May 27 included 8.8 percent of all carloads originated, and on September 23, 11.5 percent, an increase of 30.4 percent in relative importance in the four months. Government traffic was defined as all traffic moving on Government bills of lading, or consigned to or from a Federal Government installation or agency or consigned to the order of any allied government. Carloads consigned to or from local or State governments were not considered Government freight.
The Office of Defense Transportation and other agencies were thus provided with factual information to aid in policy determinations. As indicated above, these included such actions as limitation of the region of distribution of commodities manufactured widely, such as cement, to avoid the wastes of crosshauling of traffic in any possibly congested area. The waybill data indicated not only what goods might be embargoed with least injury to the war effort, but also what the practical effects of such embargoes might be. Fortunately, no occasion arose to issue such general embargoes, but waybill material was being utilized continually until the end of the war in anticipation of such need.
Coding the Material
Information appearing on the waybills was coded and punched on cards, so that machine tabulation could be used in analysis. Items coded included (1)
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car owner and number; (2) originating, intermediate, and terminating carriers; (3) origin and destination stations, including identification as to state, ODT zone, and ICC freight rate territory; (4) commodity, with major code based upon the 156 carload commodity classes of the Interstate Commerce Commission freight commodity statistics, and minor code, an item break-down of each carload class taken from the 1928 handbook of the Railway Accounting Officers Association, with provision for such additions as seemed necessary; (5) weight; (6) revenue; (7) rate; and (8) type of traffic; i. e., domestic, export, or import, and governmental or commercial. Weight, revenue, and rate were not available on about 20 percent of the carloads, due to mixed shipments at different rates, transit rates, and memorandum rather than revenue waybills.
Coding operations, including supervision and necessary clerical work, required about 1,250 man-days per study. As Office of Defense Transportation personnel was not sufficient to complete the studies with reasonable speed, several railroads provided clerical assistance from their accounting and auditing departments on a per diem expense basis. Additional help was obtained from the Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
As coding was completed, cards were punched in the ODT machine tabulation unit. Primary tabulations for the May study were made for the Office of Defense Transportation by the Social Security Board in Baltimore, but all machine work for the second study was completed in the ODT unit.
Graphic interpretations of flow material by important individual commodities were made by the Division of Traffic Movement, but the only complete report of movement which is of public record appeared as “Territorial Movement of Carload Freight, May 27, and September 23, 1942,” Exhibit 194, I. C. C. Docket No. 28,300, Class Rate Investigation, 1939.
Pertinent material from this exhibit is given in the tables at the end of this chapter.
Long-Range Effects of ODT Waybill Studies
The Office of Defense Transportation waybill studies have provided a stimulus for further investigation of traffic from basic documents. Interstate Commerce Commission needs in fulfilment of its responsibilities were met in part by the ODT studies, particularly as to traffic flow and the use of equipment. Information acquired suggested further information, probably readily available to reporting carriers, which could be requested later. An additional source of interest in future waybill studies developed from the request of the Board of Investiga
tion and Research, a temporary agency set up under the Transportation Act of 1940, for 1939 waybill information. In consequence, the Interstate Commerce Commission has embarked upon a long-range waybill analysis.
If an Office of Defense Transportation becomes necessary in the future, there should be immediately available from the files of the Interstate Commerce Commission full information as to the normal movement of traffic, as well as an effective organization for following current trends. Because the Office of Defense Transportation took the initiative in this matter during World War II, it should not be necessary in the future for any emergency agency to assume the burdens involved in collection and analysis of such basic data.
Circuity of Routing of Rail Traffic
Pursuant to suggestions contained in Report No. 10, part 13, December 15,1943, of the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Office of Defense Transportation jointly investigated the feasibility of conserving transportation facilities during the war by issuance of general orders designed to limit the circuitous hauling of freight traffic.
Circuity of routing or movement is a function of the ratio of actual miles traveled by a shipment to the short line distance between origin and destination points, and may be measured in terms of the average of the percentages of circuity for the individual movements, hereinafter termed “average circuity,” or in terms of the circuity of total movement where the individual movements are considered as part of one large or total movement, hereinafter called “total circuity.”
An analysis of circuity of routing of interline traffic had been made for carload traffic originated on May 27,1942. Since conditions probably had changed somewhat since that time it was decided to obtain and analyze additional data. A new survey of circuity was made, based on all carload traffic originated on January 12, 1944.. A joint committee of staff members of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Office of Defense Transportation made the analysis, after basic work had been completed by the Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics and the Bureau of Traffic of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Division of Traffic Movement of the Office of Defense Transportation. Upon consideration of the May 1942 and the January 1944 studies and a review of all specific cases which involved circuity, the following conclusions were reached and transmitted to the Senate Committee:
(1) Considering the relatively few instances in
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which freight shipments were transported over unnecessarily long routes in May 1942, neither the degree of circuity nor the number of such instances • were such as to warrant the issuance of formal orders imposing general limitations on circuitous hauling with rigid application to all traffic. The January 1944 study indicated that there had been no marked increase in the use of circuitous routes.
(2) Traffic factors which had caused some increased circuity after 1942 had apparently been balanced by other traffic factors and by the efforts of the Office of Defense Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the carriers and shippers to discourage the use of unduly circuitous routes.
(3) Examination of all car movements showing a circuity of over 35 percent revealed that a considerable proportion of the more aggravated cases consisted of shipments accorded transit, chiefly grain and grain products. Specific attention was being given elsewhere to the possible reduction of circuitous hauling of grain and grain products.
(4) Where transit was not concerned, the same examination showed that a number of cases involved cars handled via service routes, via single-line routes to avoid interline switching, via designated channels to avoid congested terminals or lighterage, or for other similar reasons related to savings in car days, which were of great importance from a car service and motive power standpoint. There remained, however, a small percent of the total carload shipments which showed apparently unjustifiable circuity.
(5) It was considered that the imposition at that time of rigid limitations on circuitous hauling for the purpose of preventing the use of unduly circuitous routes in connection with the small proportion of the total shipments which might move over such routes without good cause would probably do more harm than good. General limitations on circuitous routing, it was thought, undoubtedly would tend to divert to the more direct routes additional traffic and thus endanger the ability of the carriers to handle the war transportation load.
(6) It was decided to continue the then current method of both agencies in dealing with this problem through field study and specific case handling with shippers and carriers in order to discover and to eliminate excessive circuity in routing, and to obtain full utilization of the more serviceable routes.
The Senate committee had before it an Office of Defense Transportation estimate of the circuity of rail freight movement as of May 27, 1942. On this date the circuity of total movement, where the individual movements were considered as a part of one large or total movement, was figured at 11.2 percent. The May study was made hurriedly from data collect
ed primarily for another purpose, and did not pretend to be a statistically exact estimate. Only a rough approximation of the amount of circuity was desired at that time in order to enable some check on the current reports and rumors regarding the prevalence of unduly circuitous movements. In 1944 the data on which the May 1942 study was based were recomputed on a basis comparable with that of the 1944 study insofar as it was practicable to do so, and the total circuity was found to be 13.3 percent, for interline shipments, with transit points considered as origins. The 1944 study showed a total circuity of 13.9 percent for the same type of traffic treated in the same manner.
Detail of the 1944 Study
On January 12, 1944, approximately 112,250 revenue carload shipments originated on the railroads of the country. Total circuity of routing for these shipments was 13.8 percent, while the average circuity of the individual movements was 12.2 percent. Local traffic, that which originated and terminated on the same carrier, showed a total circuity of 9.6 percent and an average circuity of 7.6 percent, while interline shipments as a whole covered a total of 14.7 percent more miles than would have been the case had the movements followed short-line routings. The average circuity for interline movements was 15.0 percent. Shipments consigned by or to an agency of the Federal Government showed a total circuity of 12.8 percent and an average circuity of 13.7 percent .for the individual movements. All other, or commercial, shipments yielded a total circuity of 14.1 percent and an average circuity of 11.9 percent. The reversed relations between total circuity and average circuity for Government and commercial traffic may be accounted for in the lengths of haul at which the higher percents of individual circuities exist. For government traffic the great individual circuities occurred in the shorter hauls. Thus the total circuity in this case is less than average circuity. On the other hand, the larger individual circuities were found in the long hauls in commercial traffic, so that the total circuity is greater than the average circuity. These results are presented in the following table:
Circuity of Routing of Rail Shipments January 12,1944
Type of traffic Total shipments Total circuity Average circuity
Percent Percent Percent
All carload traffic 100.0 13.8 12.2
Interline traffic 62.5 14.7 15.0
Government 10.5 18.0 15.2
Commercial 52.0 15.2 14.9
Local traffic 87.5 9.6 7.6
Govern men t. 4.1 11.4 9.8
Commercial 33.4 9.2 7.4
Government traffic 14.6 12.8 18^7
Commercial traffic 85.4 14.1 11.9
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Over one-fourth, or 27.7 percent, of all shipments on January 12, 1944, moved by short-line routings. About 17 percent of Government traffic was sent by short routes, as compared with about 30 percent of commercial shipments. Almost 85 percent of all shipments, Government or commercial, were routed to ’move with no more than 25 percent circuity, and 95 percent with not more than 50 percent circuity. There was one case of “excess” movement of 434 percent, raw material from a producing area to the nearest adequate processing plant and back as processed material to a point near the producing area.
Some marked differences in circuity were found in regional movements. In terms of freight rate territories, traffic originating in Official and Southern territories yielded total circuities of 13.3 and 13.2 percent, respectively, while traffic originating in Western Trunk Line Territory showed total circuity of 11.2 percent. The highest circuity was 17.0 percent in Southwestern Territory, while Mountain-Pacific originations were routed, as a whole, only 8.3 percent above short-line movement. The following table gives detailed information on this circuity : Total Circuity of Movement between Rate Territories (eliminating
Canadian and Mexican destinations) January 12, 1944 PERCENT QF CIRCUITY
Rate territory of origin of movement Rate territory of destination
All territories Official Southern Western Trunk Line Southwestern Mountain- Pacific
All Traffic % % % % % %
All territories 12.8 13.4 15.1 13.1 16.1 9.2
Official 13.3 12.8 18.5 20.1 19.8 9.9
Southern 13.2 13.2 12.5 14.2 30.2 10.5
Western Trunk Line 11.2 11.4 9.9 9.9 18.7 11.7
Southwestern 17.0 19.1 17.9 16.6 13.4 4.1
Mountain-Pacific 8.3 10.0 12.1 6.5 7.6 7.3
Local Traffic All territories 7.1 7.3 10.3 6.7 9.3 3.2
Official 7.4 7.1 14.1 10.8 —
Southern 9.9 5.6 10.1 16.1 - —
Western Trunk Line 7.7 12.4 5.7 17.5 mm
Southwestern 7.3 ■MM 2.3 4.7 8.1 ——
Mdùntain-Pacific .............. 3.3 — — 5.4 — 3.2
Interline Traffic All territories 13.6 14.5 15.8 15.6 18.1 8.7
Official 14.6 15.0 18.7 21.4 19.8 9.9
Southern 13.7 13.5 13.6 13.8 30.6 10.5
Western Trunk Line 12.2 11.3 9.9 16.1 19.7 11.7
Southwestern 17.7 19.1 19.0 17.6 16.7 4.1
Mountain-Pacific 9.4 10.0 12.1 6.7 8.8 9.7
Government Traffic All territories 11.9 14.5 17.5 11.4 14.3 8.4
Official 11.3 13.4 17.9 7.9 20.4 8.1
Southern 12.0 12.3 19.8 15.3 —— 8.3
Western Trunk Line 15.2 15.8 9.3 20.3 7.7 16.1
Southwestern ...................... 14.1 16.9 MM« —— 16.6 4.3
Mountain-Pacific .............. 6.1 — — — 6.0 6.1
Commercial Traffic All territories 13.0 13.1 14.5 13.2 16.2 9.9
Official .................................. 14.0 12.7 18.7 20.4 19.8 12.0
Southern 13.5 13.4 11.7 13.5 30.6 22.2
Western Trunk Line ...... 10.3 10.5 10.0 9.8 20.6 5.5
Southwestern 18.1 20.0 17.9 17.8 12.4 3.2
Mountain-Pacific .............. 8.5 10.0 12.1 6.5 7.8 7.6
By-Product Information from Study
Although Government traffic comprised a relatively small part of the total carloadings, the Government’s share of car-miles was relatively larger in both local and interline traffic. On the test day, carloadings of Government freight were 14.6 percent of total loadings of carload freight, but 22.9 percent of actual car-miles resulting from the day’s business came from the Government traffic, as shown below.
Relative Share of Government Traffic in Carloadings and Car-Miles, January 12,1944
Type of traffic Percent of total assigned to Government traffic
Carloadings Actual car-miles Short-line car-miles
All traffic 14.6 22.9 23.2
Local 10.7 17.0 16.8
Interline . 17.0 24.2 24.5
The average length of haul for Government shipments was well over half again as long as the average length of haul for commercial shipments, whether local or interline. The over-all average haul of shipments made on the test .day was 605 miles, 13.8 percent higher than the average haul of 532 miles had short-line routes been used in all cases. It should be pointed out that average hauls are seasonably high in January.
Average Length of Haul Per Car by Type of Traffic
Type of traffic Average haul in miles
Actual routing Short-line routing
All traffic 605 532
Interline traffic 806 703
Government 1,149 1,017
Commercial 736 639
Local traffic 270 246
Government 435 391
Commercial 250 229
Government traffic 949 846
Commercial traffic 546 478
Car-mile and ton-mile information by large commodity groups was likewise derived from the sample data used in conjunction with the regular freight commodity statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
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Movement of carload traffic, by commodity divisions and territory of destination*, May ^7 and September 23, 1942
Origin: All territories
Commodity Total carloads originating in all freight rate territories Carloads originating in all freight rate territories consigned to
Official territory Southern territory Western Trunk-Line territory Southwestern territory Mountain-Pacific territory Canada and Mexico
GROUP I. Products of Agriculture (C.L.) —
Grain 8,180 3,076 524 3,455 566 559 -
Processed grain, cereal, mill products, n. o. s 4,803 2,495 705 703 513 381 6
Cotton, linters, noils, etc 1,872 250 1,084 45 437 11 45
Cottonseed, vegetable meal, and cake 1,153 287 433 163 218 50 2
Citrus fruits 1,037 598 113 107 56 75 88
Other fresh fruits 1,401 740 123 223 88 184 43
Potatoes, other than sweet 1,717 889 191 349 66 203 19
Other fresh vegetables 1,580 802 155 281 98 100 144
Dried fruits and vegetables ..... 634 291 67 91 36 116 33
Agricultural products, n. o. s 3,045 1,366 444 483 126 608 18
Total Products of Agriculture 25,422 10,794 3,839 5,900 2,204 2,287 398
GROUP II. Animals and Products (C.L.)
Livestock and live poultry 4,707 2,090 149 1,618 315 535
Packing-house products, edible, dressed poultry.... 2,757 1,764 390 191 152 260 —r
Eggs, butter, and cheese r_T„„„- 744 484 55 123 19 63
Wool 431 303 21 45 50 6 6
Green hides and leather 345 280 17 31 2 2 13
Animal products, n. o. s - 998 753 63 63 48 71
Total Animals and Products 9,982 5,674 695 2,071 586 937 19
GROUP III. Products of Mines (C.L.)
Coal and coke 61,533 46,897 6,027 6,085 328 1,155 1,041
Iron ore 23,494 6,107 332 17,003 5 39 8
Other ore and concentrates 3,416 992 192 41 117 1,929 145
Sand, gravel, and stone 18,273 6,432 4,394 2,539 3,283 1,599 26
Crude petroleum ................................................ 4,136 3,488 339 97 127 83 2
Asphalt 1,355 653 163 178 75 286
Products of mines, n. o. s 8,714 5,400 1,429 622 467 644 152
Total Products of Mines ............................ 120,921 69,969 12,876 26,565 4,402 5,735 1,374
GROUP IV. Products of Forests (C.L.)
Logs, poles, fuel, and pulpwood 8,708 891 2,762 659 1,126 3,266 4
Lumber, cooperage, plywood, etc 11,836 4,760 2,327 1,573 1,224 1,927 25
Rosin, turpentine, crude rubber 214 132 26 22 5 9 20
Products of forests, n. o. s 615 336 141 73 28 33 4
Total Products oi Forests 21,373 6,119 5,256 2,327 2,383 5,235 53
GROUP V. Manufacturers and Miscellaneous
(C. L.)
Refined petroleum and products 13,015 6,831 1,664 2,039 1,138 1,308 40
Vegetable oils 447 246 88 14 55 44
Sugar, syrup, and molasses 1,122 544 201 133 95 133 16
Pig iron,*and iron and steel (6th class) n. o. s..... 3,278 2,915 197 51 1 15 99
Railway material, iron and steel 655 409 55 94 37 60
Iron and steel pipe, fittings, wire, nails 1,877 1,011 253 117 213 263 20
Iron and steel (6th class) 7,640 5,205 603 349 312 979 192
Other processed metals 668 498 17 54 21 72 8
Machinery and boilers 1,845 1,017 223 119 97 348 41
Cement 5,086 2,345 688 880 571 597 5
Brick and building tile 1,583 945 213 127 122 149 27
Lime and plaster 857 538 92 92 39 94 2
535 188 90 126 93 88
Agricultural implements, tractors, etc 666 266 69 110 125 73 23
Autos, trucks, and parts 2,903 1,468 417 100 295 533 90
Furniture 1,138 560 151 124 91 212
Beverages 1,473 573 238 200 171 290 1
Fertilizers ................................................................. 2,179 1,101 698 164 139 47 30
Newsprint paper 418 297 47 24 7 43 1 ■
Printing and wrapping paper, paper bags 1,174 798 115 115 49 95 2
Fabrics, bagging, and bags - 653 ‘ 347 180 40 40 41 5
Canned food products, n. o. s 2,220 1,224 300 209 129 856 2
Furnace slag „ 2,655 2,087 518 28 16 5 1
Scrap iron and scrap steel 3,727 3,037 214 268 53 153 2
Building materials 2,057 1,083 327 282 175 189 1
Glass products ......... 1,487 928 156 212 62 120 9
Other manufacturers, n.o.i.b.n 2,889 1,491 451 298 195 439 15
Manufacturers and miscellaneous, n. o. s 26,653 15,099 3,137 2,700 1,944 3,567 206
Total Manufactures and Miscellaneous 90,900 53,051 11,402 9,069 6,280 10,263 835
Grand Total, Carload Traffic 268,598 145,607 34,068 45,932 15,855 24,457 2,679
*Data taken from Table 1. Exhibit 194, I. C. C. ; Docket No. 28300
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Movement of carload, traffic, by commodity divisions and territory of origin*. May £7 and September 23, 1942
Destination: All territories
Commodity GROUP I. Products of Agriculture (C.L.) Total carloads consigned to all territories 8,180 4,797 1,827 1,151 949 1,358 1,698 1,436 601 3,027 25,024 4,707 2,757 744 425 332 998 9,963 60,492 23,486 3,271 18,247 4,134 1,355 8,561 119,546 8,704 11,811 194 611 21,320 12,975 447 1,106 3,179 655 1,857 7,454 662 1,804 5,081 1,556 855 535 643 2,813 1,138 1,472 2,149 418 1,172 648 2,218 2,654 3,725 2,056 1.478 2,874 26,447 90,071 265,924 Carloads consigned to all territories originating in
Official territory 2,241 1,992 69 357 6 249 352 238 136 1,046 6,686 1,029 908 211 176 198 594 3,116 43,460 6,002 599 6,336 1,096 613 4,861 62,967 583 1,411 60. 236 2,290 3,734 137 246 2,895 482 1,448 6,656 326 1,513 2,572 841 471 242 441 2,130 588 836 1,153 294 635 198 1,062 2,085 2,590 996 1,009 1,709 17,829 55,118 130,177 Southern territory 128 191 980 387 285 162 458 305 16 546 3,458 295 78 19 16 32 57 497 11,883 331 224 4,473 1,505 100 1,626 20,142 3,008 4,387 104 159 7,658 1,504 130 266 233 61 266 344 50 66 556 283 63 90 27 173 335 115 532 8 173 424 204 529 313 452 146 439 2,493 10,275 42,030 Western Trunk-Line territory 4,707 1,811 63 117 Southwestern territory 491 450 671 266 Mountain-Pacific territory 613 353 44 24 658 858 662 504 348 639 4,703 927 73 34 146 10 110 1,300 1,544 199 1,996 1,655 126 363 675 6,558 3,303 3,625 6 39 6,973 1,258 . 37 252 6 19 55 139 196 62 595 86 91 28 21 153 81 207 195 49 83 6 548 4 188 144 117 299 2,111 7,030 26,564
Processed grain, cereal, mill products, n. o. s......... Cotton linters noils, etc
mt mía t muta -----..............
47 155 144 57 590 7,691 1,700 1,526 455 44 69 180 3,974 2,872 16,951 109 2,277 37 59 615 ' 22,920 690 870 3 139 1,702 1,318 62 230 44 80 37 202 51 137 875 262 178 142 81 203 88 291 138 62 207 3 318 36 394 283 63 309 2,625 8,719 45,006 42 71 245 44 206 2,486 756 172 25 43 23 57 1,076 733 3 343 3,506 1,370 220 784 6,959 1,120 1,518 21 . 38 2,697 5,161 81 112 1 13 51 113 39 26 483 84 52 33 73 154 46 23 131 5 74 17 86 240 181 143 118 1,389 8,929 22,147
Other fresh fruits •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••♦••••••••••••••••••••
Potatoes other than sweet ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Other fresh vegetables •.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
n&ilvUllulcU piuuuvi/O) xi. w. o» •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••■•• Total Products of Agriculture
GROUP II. Animals and Products (C.L.)
Packing-house products, edible, dressed poultry....
Total Animals and Products ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
GROUP III. Products of Mines (C.L.) Coal and colee t.*TTT............................
Iron ore •••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •
Other ore and concentrates
Sand gravel and stone
Crude petroleum
Asphalt
Total Products of Maines ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
GROUP IV. Products of Forests (C.L.) ypoles fuel and pulpwood
T mm her cooperage, plywood, etc ...........
Rosin turpentine, crude rubber ——
Products of forests, n. o» s. ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Total Products of Forests
GROUP V. Manufacturers and Miscellaneous , (C.L.) Refined petroleum and products
Vegetable oils t..»—.........
Sugar syrup, and molasses •••••••
Pig iron, and iron and steel (6th class) n. o. s Railway material, iron and steel
Iron and steel pipe, fittings, ■wire, nails ••••••••••••••••
Iron 'and steel (Kth class) ............................................
Other processed metals ••••••
Machinery and boilers ..........
Clement ....................
Brick and building tile ••••••• •••••
TJme end plaster ......................................................
Sewer pipe and drain tile, hot metal ........................ Agricultural implements, tractors, etc. ••••••••••••••••••••
Autos ■ trucks, and parts
Furniture ...............................
Beverages ...................
Fertilizers ••••••••••••
Newsprint paper
Printing and wrapping paper, paper bags............ Fabrics bagging, and hags
Canned food products, n. o. s. ....................................
Furnace slag
Scrap iron and scrap steel
Building materials •
Glass products ..••••...••• •
Other manufactures, n. o. 1. b. n. ••••••«•••••••■•••••••••••••
Manufactures and miscellaneous, n. o. s Total Manufactures and "Miscellaneous................
Grand Total, Carload Traffic
•Data take from Table 5, Exhibit 194, I.C.C. Docket 283001
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CHAPTER XIV
MOTOR TRANSPORT
In conserving and marshaling motor carrier resources for war, numerous difficulties peculiar to the motor transport industry were encountered. In the first place, the organization of the industry is such as to render centralized regulation, which war often requires, almost impossible. This is best illustrated by comparison with the railroads. Whereas the American railroad network is operated and directed by relatively few companies which lend themselves easily to Federal regulation, there were as of June 30, 1944, approximately 4,750,000 trucks in this country controlled by more than 2,750,000 operators. Of the trucks, 1,600,000 were owned by almost that many farmers, and 2,240,000 by about 1,100,000 other private carriers. The remainder were principally in the hands of 295,000 operators who employed 630,000 vehicles in transporting property for compensation. The figures for private carriers do not include about 233,421 trucks operated by Government agencies. These agencies are included in total number of operators and their vehicles in total number of trucks. (See table at end of chapter XV.)
All of this equipment was used to furnish services of a most diversified nature which was reflected in the existence of many different types of carriers. There were carriers who confined themselves to transporting specific commodities such as dairy or livestock or vegetable products, or furniture, or nu-erous other articles ; there were carriers who accepted any kind of a shipment which might be tendered; and then there were local and over-the-road carriers, common, contract and private carriers. This diversified organization of the industry made impossible the adoption of a general and simplified policy of control uniformly applicable to all carriers or even to large numbers of them; it required, on the contrary, the issuance of numerous regulations in the form of general, special and supplementary orders which took account of the unique characteristics of each type of carrier. And the sheer number of vehicles and carriers involved added to the burden of administration and enforcement.
A second difficulty resulted from the fact that of all the operators of motor vehicles, only those trans
porting property for compensation were accustomed to regulation. This meant that the vast majority of carriers were unfamiliar with the technique of Government control to which they had to adapt themselves for the first time under the stress of wartime conditions. Federal regulation was also novel to many carriers normally subject only to state control as the authority vested in the Office of Defense Transportation did not distinguish between intra- and interstate operations but placed them all for wartime purposes under the jurisdiction of the Federal agency. The numerous farm vehicles and private carriers functioned ordinarily under highly individualistic conditions. In peacetime, they were largely unregulated, and in the emergency they presented many special problems to the Office of Defense Transportation.
Finally, the difficulties of the Office of Defense Transportation in conserving and marshaling motor transport resources in behalf of the war effort were aggravated by an acute shortage of rubber and other critical materials used in the manufacture and maintenance of vehicles at a time when the carriers were required to handle a larger volume of freight than ever before in their history. This scarcity in materials and the needs of the armed forces meant that few new trucks could be produced for civilian purposes, and that the unprecedented traffic had to be carried in a diminishing supply of vehicles. It was the business of the Office of Defense Transportation to adjust this traffic to the available vehicles in a manner best calculated to further the war effort.
In addition to the problems arising from these shortages of material throughout the country there was a serious shortage of motor fuel on the eastern seaboard due to the disruption of coastwise tanker service from the activities of enemy submarines.
Organization of the Division of Motor Transport
A departmental and field organization to handle these problems was developed by the Division of Motor Transport along the following lines:
The departmental organization of the Division of Motor Transport originally consisted of a Director, Associate Director, Executive Assistant and nine
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Assistant Directors each in charge of one of the sections named below.
The Executive Assistant exercised administrative control over the departmental organization and the Associate Director over the field organization. The nine sections were :
Bus Allocation
Operations—Property Vehicle Maintenance
Petroleum Carriers Tire Maintenance
City Deliveries ' Inventory
Farm Vehicle
The Bus Section dealt with intercity busses and later was transferred to the Division of Local Transport. The Tire Maintenance Section was discontinued in September 1942, and its functions were absorbed by the Vehicle Maintenance Section. There were no further changes until the consolidation of the Division of Local Transport and Motor Transport into the Highway Transport Department in the Johnson administration.
The field organization was under the supervision of the Associate Director and consisted of 9 regions, 142 district offices and a varying number of branch offices. Each regional office supervised the district offices in its region. The district offices administered and enforced the programs and orders developed by the Washington staff. Branch offices were set up within districts from time to time as conditions warranted.
With the creation of the Highway Transport Department on June 1, 1944, the activities of the Local Transport and Motor Transport Divisions were coordinated. Control of passenger and property carriers in the departmental organization were placed under separate division directors but other functions applicable to both passenger and property carriers were grouped under the same division director.
Authority and Responsibility
Executive Order No. 8989, as amended, which created the Office of Defense Transportation, conferred upon it the duty “to assure maximum utilization of the domestic transportation facilities of the nation for the successful prosecution of the war.” The order defined “domestic transportation” to include motor transport. As the critical situation affecting the supply of rubber became increasingly acute, it was found necessary to provide for more rigid control of transport relying on rubber. Consequently, Executive Order No. 9156 was issued in May 1942, further defining the responsibilities of the Office of Defense Transportation in respect to motor transport. These two executive orders constituted the principal source of authority exercised by the Office of Defense Transportation in discharging its functions in the field of motor carriers of property.
The jurisdiction of the Office of Defense Trans
portation embraced all rubber-bome transport facilities—passenger cars, busses, taxicabs and trucks. Executive Order No. 9156 enjoined the Office to develop programs designed to facilitate the continuous adjustment of transport requirements to the avail-able supply of such equipment. It further required the agency to formulate measures to conserve and assure maximum utilization of civilian transport service dependent upon rubber, “including the limitation of the use of rubber-borne transportation facilities in nonessential civilian activities, and regulation of the use or distribution of such transportation facilities among essential activities.” The authority of the War Production Board to establish priority in deliveries and the rationing authority of the Office of Price Administration were, however, expressly preserved.
The Office of Defense Transportation’s responsibility concerning motor carriers of freight may be summarily stated as follows: To conserve and to maximize the utilization of transport resources and to divert them insofar as possible to activities necessary to the war effort or to the maintenance of essential civilian economy. The Office discharged its responsibilities principally through the issuance of general orders which required the carriers to eliminate wasteful operations and as a corollary, to employ operating methods calculated to increase efficiency. It sought in this manner to create adequate facilities for essential traffic in the face of a diminishing supply of vehicles. In connection with its control of the allocation of the very little new equipment available for civilian use, it gave preference to those carriers whose operations were most intimately related to the war, and it followed a similar policy in fixing the mileage of vehicles pursuant to General Order ODT No. 21. The Office, also, continuously and aggressively urged upon carriers the adoption of improved maintenance practices and to that end conducted numerous educational campaigns.
Control Over Carriers
General Order ODT No. 3, Revised, issued to become effective August 1, 1942, and amended from time to time, was the basic regulation governing wartime operations of over-the-road common carriers of freight. Its purposes were to secure maximum utilization of facilities, to prevent shortages in motor vehicle equipment, to conserve such equipment and thus to provide for the prompt and continuous movement of traffic essential to the successful prosecution of the war.
A “common carrier” was defined in the order as any person holding himself out to engage in the transport of property for the general public in ova’*
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the-road service for compensation. The term “over-the-road” service generally meant motor truck operations extending more than 25 miles. There were, however, several exceptions to this 25-mile standard. A motortruck operating within a municipality and a zone extending 25 air miles from its boundaries did not come under the order, although clearly in such circumstances the truck might travel more than 25 miles. Similarly outside the order, were all truck services performed within an urban community or between contiguous urban communities regardless of distance. On the other hand, operations by a carrier between its terminals were included within the terms of the order whether or not such operations exceeded 25 miles.
The principal provisions of the order may be classified in six categories: (1) Elimination of waste, (2) loading and operating requirements, (3) interchange of traffic, (4) extension of service, (5) substitution of rail for truck service, and (6) submission of joint action plans. Some of these provisions were mandatory, imposing upon the carriers the duty of taking definite and affirmative measures; others were prohibitory in character, forbidding certain practices and operations which were common under normal conditions but which prevented maximum utilization of equipment; and, finally, there were optional provisions which were clearly indicated as desirable but which the carriers were not compelled to adopt.
Elimination of Waste
In competitive circumstances, common carriers are often obliged to maintain parallel and duplicate routes for the convenience of shippers. In peacetime, it is generally felt that the waste resulting from this situation is more than compensated by other advantages that accrue from competition. But in wartime, when transport equipment is scarce, the emphasis must be on conservation. General Order ODT No. 3, accordingly, required carriers to adjust their routes and schedules so as to eliminate duplicate and parallel services. It also required them to operate equipment in a manner calculated to conserve and properly maintain tires and other facilities.
A special and unusual application of the general order is particularly notable because of the conservation in motor equipment that resulted from it. Pursuant to the provisions of the order requiring the elimination of wasteful operations and the conservation of motor equipment, the Office of Defense Transportation on June 4, 1943, issued Supplementary Order ODT No. 25. This supplementary order prohibited common or contract carriers of freight from operating trailers or semitrailers between Detroit and Cleveland. It provided that all carriers 700494—48—8
affected by the supplementary order tender, upon the direction of the Office of Defense Transportation, trailers, or semitrailers, whether loaded or empty, to any authorized common carrier by water operating between the two cities. Such water carriers were required upon tender to accept the trailers and semitrailers for transport. ;
Supplementary Order ODT No. 25 remained in effect until October 29, 1943. It resulted in the movement by ferry of 15,000 trucks between Cleveland and Detroit. As a consequence, 4,000,000 truck miles and 500,000 gallons of gasoline were saved together with corresponding amounts of rubber.
Another wasteful feature of the motor carrier business in normal times is the operation of partially loaded and empty vehicles. Ordinarily, many carriers find it impossible to secure full loading for all their trucks, and find it difficult to obtain even partial loading on the back-haul. This results in under-utilization of equipment, and is due in part to the refusal of shippers to permit carriers to wait for full loading, and in part, to the dearth of traffic in peacetime.
It is normally difficult to obtain loading for the back-haul. In wartime, however, the volume of traffic available for carriage tends to outstrip the supply of existing transport facilities, and it becomes not only possible but necessary to take steps to insure full loading so far as possible. General Order ODT No. 3, therefore, generally required such full loading, and permitted the hauling of partially loaded or empty trucks only after the carrier had taken measures, specific in the order, to obtain a full load. This part of General Order ODT No. 3 was tied up with the traffic registration program administered first under General Order ODT No. 13, and later under Administrative Order ODT No. 10.
Limitations were imposed on the obligation to load to capacity. The capacity of a truck is determined by the load-carrying ability of the tires, less the weight of the vehicle. The rated load-carrying ability of all types of truck tires was set forth in an appendix to the order which provided that the load was not to exceed by more than 20 percent the rated load-carrying ability of the tires.
No truck was to be loaded so that its gross weight exceeded the safe capacity of any bridge or other structure enroute as determined by state or local authorities, or exceeded maximum regulations fixed by State or Federal agencies. Furthermore, no carrier was obliged to perform any service beyond his authority or beyond his transportation capacity.
An operating prohibition of special interest concerned the use of circuitous routes. According to the order, such routes might be used only when no adequate common-carrier service over a direct route
103
was feasible, or when the direct route was unsafe or unusable or was more destructive to tires or motor trucks. The term “circuitous route” was defined as any highway route or combination of routes the mileage of which exceeded the mileage of the most direct highway route by 10 percent or more.
Pursuant tq this provision in General Order ODT No. 3, the Office of Defense Transportation issued a supplementary order in November 1944, requiring three truck lines engaged in transporting freight between San Francisco and Denver to discontinue service over any circuitous route between Wells, Nev., and Salt Lake City or Ogden, Utah, via any point in the State of Idaho. Through mutual arrangements between the companies, long-distance freight eastbound from San Francisco to Denver and west-bound from Denver to San Francisco had been interchanged at Twin Falls, Idaho, and at Ogden or Salt Lake City. The route between San Francisco and Salt Lake City via Wells and Twin Falls was 21.6 percent longer than the direct route between these points. The mileage between San Francisco and Ogden via Twin Falls was 12 percent longer than the direct route. It was estimated that .the order prohibiting the use of the Twin Falls route saved about 120,000 truck miles per year.
Interchange of Traffic
To expedite the movement of traffic, the order obliged every common carrier by motor vehicle to accept for transport all shipments tendered by other common carriers. When a motor carrier was unable to transport freight offered it by another carrier at an interchange point, it was obliged to register such freight with the district office nearest the point at which the traffic was available. Registration of freight offered to a motor carrier by a shipper which the carrier was unable to pick up within twenty-four hours was also required. Likewise, over-the-road freight that a motor carrier could not transfer, divert or otherwise arrange to move within 36 hours had to be registered. A qualified exemption was made in favor of a motor carrier who did not provide regular daily service. Such a carrier was not required to register except when unable to transport all freight offered to it on its next regular schedule.
As the truck situation deteriorated because of inability to replace worn-out equipment and because tires became increasingly scarce, it was found necessary to establish tighter controls to insure the continuous movement of essential traffic. On October 25, 1943, amendment No. 4 to General Order ODT No. 3 was issued providing that truck operators were not to inaugurate new services or extend routes without
the prior approval of the Office of Defense Transportation.
This section of General Order ODT No. 3 was administered under Administrative Order ODT No. 15, which prescribed in detail the procedure for motor truck operators to follow in applying for approval of the extension of existing operations or the institution of new services. An operator seeking to expand his operations filed an application with the district office nearest his headquarters. If the application was denied in whole or in part by the district manager, the applicant appealed to the regional director; and if he was not satisfied with the regional director’s decision, he appealed to the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation. In his disposition of the case, the Director issued an order affirming, amending, modifying or reversing the regional director’s order together with an opinion setting forth in full the reason for his action. The district manager or the regional director, on the other hand, made a full statement of the grounds of their decisions only when an appeal was anticipated.
Administrative Order ODT No. 15 also included a statement of policy relating to applications for new or extended services. Such applications were approved only when the proposed services (1) were necessary to the war effort or the maintenance of essential civilian economy; (2) could not be performed at all by any existing means of transportation; or, were needed for the war effort and were shown to be more expeditious; (3) did not merely add to the pleasure or convenience of civilians but contributed in important degree to the war effort; and (4) could be furnished without detriment caused by additional use of critical materials or manpower.
Before an application was filed with the district manager in the. first instance, the carrier was required to obtain the approval of the State commission or the Interstate Commerce Commission, depending upon which agency had jurisdiction, for the new or extended service. The Office of Defense Transportation did not grant such applications merely as a matter of course after such regulatory agencies had acted favorably upon them. The operating authority conferred by a regulatory commission was generally based upon either a finding of public convenience and necessity, or upon a finding that the operation was consistent with the public interest, whereas the test for approval by the Office of Defense Transportation was whether the proposed operation was necessary to the war effort or to the maintenance of essential civilian economy. This test was different from and more stringent than either of those employed by regulatory commissions.
104
Rail for Truck Service
In peacetime transport facilities tend to expand or contract with the demand for transport services. This is true of transport in general as well as in particular areas. In time of war, however, this adjustment is not possible because the total supply of transportation facilities is either fixed or decreased, while traffic requirements are increasing. The increasing traffic burden, moreover, does not affect all forms of transport or all geographical areas alike. Since rubber and gasoline were exceedingly scarce, the burden on motor carriers was often beyond their capacity. This was especially true of particular areas, where congestion in motor transport made it necessary to take measures designed to conserve motor equipment and permit the transfer, under proper conditions, of part of the traffic burden to the rails.
Amendment No. 9 to General Order ODT No. 3 permitted this to be done by allowing the substitution of rail for motor-carrier service upon certification by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation. Under the amendment a motor carrier filed a written application with the district office concerned, requesting authority to substitute rail service for its own over-the-road service in any particular area in order to conserve motor-carrier equipment or relieve traffic congestion. This was allowed only when the shipper did not specify on the bill of lading that his shipment was to be made by truck. The district manager then investigated to determine whether or not the proposed substitution aided in conserving motor ^carrier facilities and did not adversely affect rail transport. The district manager made his recommendation to his regional director. If the latter approved the application, he transmitted a copy of his approval to the regional director of the Division of Railway Transport who investigated to determine whether the proposed substitution adversely affected rail transport. He then made his recommendation to the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation and transmitted with it a copy of the approval of the regional director of the Division of Motor Transport. Upon this record, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation determined whether to issue a certificate permitting the substituted rail service.
Substitution of service was effected only between points authorized to be served by the substituting motor carrier, and between which the motor carrier continued to provide over-the-road service. The diversion to rail did not change the rates or charges to shippers or relieve the motor carrier from his responsibility to the owners of the property.
The order authorized two or more carriers to ag
gregate shipments so as to provide carload lots, and, of course, any one motor carrier might consolidate shipments to secure carload rates. One effect, therefore, of this procedure was to encourage the forwarding of freight by rail. In most cases of substitution motor carriers consolidated less-than-carload shipments and obtained carload rates while charging motor carrier rates.
Another provision of General Order ODT No. 3 encouraged the establishment of joint action plans. The order permitted carriers to formulate and submit plans to the Office of Defense Transportation establishing pooling and other cooperative schemes designed to conserve equipment by eliminating duplicate and parallel services and thus reduce mileage.
To meet the needs of particular types of vehicles, numerous exemptions to the provisions of General Order ODT No. 3 were made. Thus, loading requirements as above set forth did not apply to trucks transporting high explosives; trucks operated under the direction of the armed forces or the Federal or State Governments; trucks engaged exclusively in the transport of repair or service men; trucks operated exclusively in the maintenance of public utilities; trucks operated in emergencies exclusively for the protection or preservation of life, health or public safety, and trucks engaged in sanitation services. Such vehicles, however, were subject to other provisions of the order relating to the elimination of duplicating services, and to the proper maintenance of tires and equipment.
Loading requirements and limitations upon gross weights did not apply to special equipment, which was defined as a motor vehicle the bed of which was of less than standard elevation above the ground and which was especially intended for the transport of extremely heavy machinery or other unusually heavy articles.
Entirely exempt from the order were tank trucks and motor trucks operated by farmers when used in the transport of agricultural commodities from a farm or in the transport of farm supplies to a farm. Common carriers of farm products engaged in over-the-road service were, however, subject to all the terms of the order. Common carriers of household goods were originally included under the order but subsequently were governed by General Order ODT No. 43, issued March 24,1944.
Special or General Permits
In addition to the above exceptions which were expressly included in the order itself, provision was made for the issuance of special and general permits to meet specific needs or exceptional circumstances or to prevent undue hardships. Numerous such permits
105
were granted relieving carriers from some or all of the requirements of the order. The use of permits gave flexibility to the application of the general order, enabling the Office of Defense Transportation to treat exceptional transport operations in the light of the peculiar conditions surrounding them.
There was a distinction between general and special permits issued under General Order ODT No. 3. General permits were issued on the initiative of the Office of Defense Transportation and were designed to relieve groups or special types of vehicles from all or some of the provisions of the general order. Thus, General Permit ODT No. 3-3 relieved motor trucks employed in the transport of exposed motion-picture film from the loading and operating requirements; General Permit ODT No. 3-4 temporarily relieved common carriers engaged in the transport of farm products; and General Permit ODT No. 3-5 did the same for small and specially designed trucks.
Special permits, on the other hand, were issued only upon application by individual carriers for the purpose of exempting their operations from compliance with specified provisions of the order. Procedure in applying for special permits was prescribed in Administrative Order ODT No. 14. Under the order, a truck operator seeking a special permit was required to file his application with the district office of the Office of Defense Transportation in the area where the operations under the special permit were to be conducted. The district manager was authorized to require reasonable proof of statements made in support of the application and to make any investigation he deemed necessary within 30 days from the filing of the application. He either approved or disapproved the application in whole or in part. The applicant, however, had the right to appeal to the regional director, and, if not satisfied, might have his case reviewed by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation.
Local For-Hire Carriers
The character and volume of local transport services are in substantial measure directly influenced by the pleasure and convenience of the general public. This is particularly true of retail deliveries. Because of the keenly competitive conditions under which retail business usually operates, merchants will normally go far in making frequent deliveries of small parcels to customers. Many deliveries are in the nature of a luxury service which should be eliminated in wartime in order to conserve transport equipment and permit its diversion to more essential purposes. While the carriers, whether common, contract, or private, furnishing the services can be controlled by Office of Defense Transportation orders,
the purchasing public cannot be reached in this manner. But the public can be made conscious of the problem by being informed of it, and perhaps induced to reduce voluntarily its demand for unnecessary deliveries.
With this end in view, the Office of Defense Transportation from its inception conducted educational campaigns bringing home to the general public the shortage in transport facilities and exhorting the measures calculated to relieve the strain on them. Appeals were made to the housewives of the country urging them to space their purchases so that fewer trips were necessary, to carry their own packages whenever possible, and to advise those upon whom they depended for deliveries that they were anxious to cooperate in the Office of Defense Transportation’s conservation program. Special and repeated pleas to this effect were made prior to holiday-buying seasons importuning shoppers to buy before the rush and to carry packages with them on busses and streetcars during the off-peak hours. Householders were warned throughout the country to fill their coal bins during the summer months and avert the use of trucks during the winter when operating conditions are difficult. These educational efforts produced significant results, and made the general public more receptive of the curtailment of transport services as required in the orders issued by the Office of Defense Transportation.
General Order ODT No. 6A, as amended, effective June 28, 1943, embraced the formal and mandatory program of the Office of Defense Transportation relating to the operations of local common carriers and with some qualifications of local contract carriers. This order was preceded by General Order ODT No. 6, issued originally, April 20, 1942. The terms of General Order ODT No. 6 were applicable to common, contract and private carriers engaged in local transport, but it was found that circumstances affecting the various types of carriers differed so radically between common carriers, on the one hand, and contract and private carriers, on the other, that separate orders had to be issued taking account of the peculiarities of each. Subsequently, General Order ODT No. 17 was published July 23, 1942, regulating all contract and private carriers both local and over-the-road. It superseded General Order ODT No. 6, so far as local contract and private carriers were concerned. General Order ODT No. 6A revoked and replaced General Order ODT No. 6. The new order was applicable not only to local common carriers, but also to the operations of local contract carriers to the extent that such operations were not governed by the terms of General Order ODT No. 17.
General Order ODT No. 6A defined a local carrier
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as “any person, regardless of the designation of such person under any Federal or State statute, to the extent that he engages in the transportation of property in collection and delivery service or local cartage service by motor truck for compensation.” The obvious effect of this definition was to destroy for purposes of the order the customary distinction between common and contract services and to include both within its terms. “Collection and delivery service” or “local cartage service” was defined as “all operations of a motor truck, except those between the terminals of a carrier, which are either: (1) within an area which includes any municipality or urban community and a zone extending 25 air miles from the boundaries thereof; or (2) within and between contiguous municipalities; or (3) not more than 25 miles in length.”
Like General Order ODT No. 3, in the field of over-the-road common carriers, General Order ODT No. 6A sought in the case of for-hire local services the elimination of wasteful operations and increased utilization of motor equipment. It provided for (1) the elimination of waste; (2) operating requirements; (3) the submission of joint action plans; and (4) extension and inauguration of services.
Operating Requirements
Operating requirements were quite different from those of general Order ODT No. 3, and expectedly so in view of the difference in the nature of the services. General Order ODT No. 6A prohibited any carrier from making:
(a) Any collection or delivery during any calendar day, the order for which has been received after 3 p.m. during such day;
(b) Any collection or delivery without ascertaining, prior to the operation of a truck for such purpose, that it may be completed;
(c) Any call with a motor truck except for the purpose of collecting or delivering property or servicing, maintaining or repairing a truck; or
(d) More than one collection during any calendar day from any one point, nor more than one delivery during any calendar day to any point from any one point. •
The following carriers were exempt by the terms of the order from the prohibition to make delivery or collection during any calendar day only when the order for such service was received after 3 p.m., and to make more than one collection from any one point of origin for transportation to any one or more points of destination in any calendar day:
(1) Any motortruck while being operated to make a collection or delivery to meet the needs of the military or naval forces of the United States, the U. S. Maritime Commission or the War Shipping Administration;
(2) Any motortruck while operated exclusively in construction and maintenance of essential telegraph, telephone, organized radio communications, electric light and power, gas or water supply utilities, pipe lines, railroads, street railways or public highways;
(3) Any motortruck while being operated exclusively in
making deliveries to a vessel which is being loaded or unloaded;
(4) Any motortruck while being operated exclusively in the collection or delivery of household goods;
(5) Any motortruck fully loaded while being operated in the collection from one consignor, or delivery to one consignee.
The following were exempt from all of the operating requirements :
(1) 'Special equipment;
(2) Any motortruck while operated exclusively in the transport or repair of service personnel and their supplies or equipment;
(3) Any motortruck while operated in emergencies for protection of life, health or public safety;
(4) Any motortruck while operated pursuant to government order, regulation or contract for sanitation purposes;
(5) Any motortruck while operated for the purpose of making collection or delivery of telegraph, radio and cable communications, or the United States mail.
None of the provisions of the order applied to the following :
(1) Tank trucks.
(2) Trucks operated by a farmer when used in the transport of agricultural products from a farm, or in transport of farm supplies to a farm.
(3) Trucks operated under direction of the military or naval forces of the United States or a State.
The same provisions were made in General Order ODT No. 6A with respect to the issuance of general and special permits as in General Order ODT No. 3. Procedure in making application for special permits was governed by Administrative Order ODT No. 14.
Private and Contract Carriers
Private and contract carriers, engaged in both local and over-the-road operations, were generally governed by General Order ODT No. 17. An important exception, however, will be noted. It related to local contract carriers which were subject to the provisions of General Order ODT No. 6A to the extent that such carriers were not governed by the provisions of General Order ODT No. 17.
General Order ODT No. 17, promulgated July 17, 1942, was preceded by General Orders ODT Nos. 4, 5, and 6. General Order ODT No. 4 was confined to over-the-road contract carriers; General Order ODT No. 5 to over-the-road private carriers, and General Order ODT No. 6 covered all local carriers, common, contract, and private. It was found, however, that for purposes of wartime control, the operating features of private and contract carriers were sufficiently similar to permit their regulation by one order. It was also discovered that no distinction could be made between local and over-the-road private carriers. Private carriers were not in peacetime restricted by State or Federal authorities as to the length of their hauls and consequently private carriers engaged indiscriminately in both local and over-the-road operations. It proved impossible for the purposes of the conservation orders of the Office of Defense Transportation to segregate these opera
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tions. Therefore, General Order ODT No. 17 was originally framed so as to embrace all private carriers as well as all contract carriers.
But whereas no distinction could be made between local and over-the-road private carriers, experience under General Order ODT No. 17 and General Order ODT No. 6 demonstrated that local contract carriers had to be treated separately from over-the-road contract carriers. This was because it proved administratively impossible to distinguish between local common carriers under General Order ODT «No. 6 and local contract carriers under General Order ODT No. 17. Therefore, General Order ODT No. 6 was revoked and replaced by General Order ODT No. 6A which was formulated so as to embrace both common and contract local carriers. The result was to leave all private carriers and over-the-road contract carriers subject to General Order QDT No. 17, while local contract carriers were, in the main, subject to General Order ODT No. 6A.
The important provisions in General Order ODT No. 17 may be summarized as follows: (1) Elimination of waste; (2) mileage reduction requirements; (3) special deliveries, call-backs, number of deliveries; (4) loading and operating requirements; (5) extension of service; (6) submission of plans for joint action; (7) limitation of wholesale and retail deliveries ; and (8) establishment of delivery areas or routes. The terms of General Order ODT No. 17 with respect to the elimination of waste and the extension of service were similar to those in General Order ODT No. 3 and General Order ODT No. 6A.
Mileage Reduction Requirements
The order required of truck operators a reduction of 25 percent of the total mileage operated as compared with a corresponding month of 1941, the year preceding the promulgation of the order. This was a unique provision not be to found in General Orders Nos. 3 and 6A. By virtue of General Permit ODT No. 17-15, October 5, 1942, however, when a certificate of war necessity under General Order ODT No. 21 was issued to a motor carrier, certifying the total maximum mileage to be operated that motor carrier was relieved of the mileage reduction requirements of General Order ODT No. 17. In computing the mileage allowance for certificates, these requirements were taken into consideration.
To eliminate unnecessary services, the order prohibited special deliveries, except to hospitals, callbacks and more than one delivery from any one point of origin to any one point of destination. The last-mentioned prohibition was subject to certain exceptions. More than one delivery was permitted, provided that each delivery was a capacity load except
the final one. One additional delivery was allowed on the day next preceding a national holiday when the holiday fell on a Saturday, or the Saturday next preceding a national holiday when the holiday fell on a Monday, provided no delivery was made on the holiday.
A motor carrier was prohibited from operating any truck in over-the-road service unless loaded to capacity. A truck, however, might be operated empty or partially laden on a portion of any route if loaded to capacity while operated over a considerable portion of the out-bound or in-bound route provided that the carrier endeavored in good faith to lease the truck to another carrier or to a motor common carrier prior to the departure of the truck from any point along the route when empty, or if he complied with the registration requirements. This differed from General Order ODT No. 3 in that it required the truck to be loaded to capacity over a considerable portion of its out-bound or in-bound route, and also to comply with the registration requirements. General Order ODT No. 3 simply required registration. In other words, an over-the-road common carrier truck was allowed to operate empty or partially loaded if it complied with the' registration order and failed to secure lading. On the other hand, a private or contract carrier might not operate at all unless the truck was fully loaded over a considerable portion of its out-bound or in-bound route. Loading limitations in respect of over-the-road carriers were the same as those in General Order ODT No. 3.
Establishment of Delivery Areas
In the spring of 1943, unusual floods in the Middle West disrupted transport to the East and created an acute shortage in that region in the supply of petroleum. Drastic measures to reduce dispensable motor carrier services .became necessary and General Order ODT No. 17 was modified May 24, 1943, by amendment No. 3, which was designed to meet the situation by reducing the mileage of contract and private carriers. Originally the amendment applied only to a portion of Petroleum District No. 1, that is, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, most of Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, except for two municipalities, the District of Columbia, and eastern West Virginia. However, as the situation with respect to increasing shortages in motor transportation facilities including equipment, tires, gasoline, repair parts, and manpower became more acute, the restrictions were extended to the entire nation by virtue of amendment No. 3B of September 17, 1943.
The order as thus amended required every motor
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carrier subject to its provisions to establish delivery areas or routes which were neither duplicating nor overlapping and to prepare and maintain appropriate maps showing such routes. At the same time, carriers were prohibited from performing any wholesale or retail delivery service over any such route or within any such area on any greater number of days in a week than the minimum weekly number of such deliveries specified in appendix No. 2 to General Order ODT No. 17. This prohibition was not applicable to any wholesale or retail delivery from one point of origin to one consignee at one point of destination of a shipment constituting a capacity load in the largest truck ordinarily used by the carrier in making such delivery. These restrictions were applicable only to wholesale and retail deliveries, and such deliveries together with deliveries other than wholesale and retail, were subject to the restrictions which prohibited special deliveries except to hospitals, call-backs and more than one delivery per day from any one point of origin to any one point of destination with certain exceptions heretofore noted.
Appendix No. 2 classified commodities of which wholesale and retail deliveries were usually made and specified the maximum number of weekly deliveries permissible. The number of such deliveries varied in accordance with the need for the two types of deliveries of the commodities specified with due regard to the operating requirements of the carriers. Perishability of certain commodities necessarily requires important consideration of the transportation needs to adequately distribute those commodities.
Thus seven wholesale deliveries of ice were allowed per week, whereas only five wholesale deliveries and two retail deliveries of laundry and dry cleaning were permitted. The essentiality of deliveries ' of certain commodities was also another important factor. Thus, only two wholesale deliveries and three retail deliveries of bread and perishable bakery products were allowed.
Deliveries on Sunday were prohibited except wholesale deliveries of ice and retail deliveries of ice and fresh milk or cream and other related dairy products when delivered together with fresh milk or cream. Retail delivery was prohibited of any article, package, or lot of goods less than 60 inches in combined length and girth or less than 5 pounds in weight. The purpose of this restriction was to have the customer carry a purchased commodity, if it were possible and susceptible of being carried. There were, of course, several exceptions such as retail deliveries of fresh milk or cream and related dairy products, bread and perishable bakery products, and certain other commodities such as medicine and laundry.
On the whole, carriers and vehicles exempt from the provisions of General Order ODT No. 17, as amended, were similar to those exempt from General Order ODT No. 3. It is to be noted, however, that trucks controlled and operated by farmers when used in the transportation of agricultural commodities from the farm or in the transportation of supplies to the farm were exempt. The order did apply to the transportation in retail delivery service of agricultural commodities or products thereof from farms.
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CHAPTER XV
CERTIFICATES OF WAR NECESSITY
The general orders thus far discussed were designed to conserve and maximize utilization of motorcarrier equipment. They required freight carriers to adopt positive measures calculated to increase efficiency, and at the same time, to eliminate wasteful and unnecessary practices and services. They did not, however, create any machinery for enforcement; they did not bring individual carriers into any such relationship with the Office of Defense Transportation as to permit that agency to control their operations. In other words, the effectiveness of the general orders in practice depended largely upon the voluntary compliance of the carriers. To correct this situation by enabling the Office of Defense Transportation to fashion carrier operations in accordance with the terms of the orders, General Order ODT No. 21 was promulgated. It constituted an innovation in transport regulation.
Scope of the Control
General Order ODT No. 21 was issued September 8,1942, and was originally intended to become effective November 15,1942, when gasoline rationing was extended to a Nation-wide basis. The order brought every commercial vehicle in the country within the direct control of the Office of Defense. Transportation by requiring every owner of such a vehicle to secure from the office a certificate of war necessity to permit its operation.
The term “commercial vehicle” was defined so as to include virtually all trucks, busses, taxicabs, and similar motor conveyances. Exempt from the requirements of the order were private passenger cars, motor vehicles operated under the direction of the military or naval forces of the United States, motor vehicles operated by dealers exclusively for the purpose of sale and motor vehicles having a capacity of not more than seven persons used in group riding to haul persons to and from work if such vehicles were not used in any other service for compensation. General Order ODT No. 21, therefore, applied not only to trucks covered by General Orders ODT Nos. 3, 6A, 17 and 43, but also to vehicles engaged in the transport of agricultural products from the farm.
It tied together in a common scheme of enforce
ment the separate conservation measures directed to each type of carrier by the various orders. For, in the certificates issued under General Order ODT No. 21, the Office of Defense Transportation prescribed limitations on the operations of carriers with a view to giving effect to those measures. These limitations, recorded in each certificate, fixed the maximum mileage, minimum loads, and the gasoline allowance for each vehicle for which a certificate was issued.
The ultimate goal of the Office of Defense Transportation under the certificate of war necessity program was to control the operations of motor vehicles so that such operations were (1) confined to those necessary to the war effort or to the maintenance of essential civilian economy; (2) conducted in a manner to assure maximum utilization of commercial motor vehicles, and (3) conducted in a manner to conserve rubber and other critical materials used in the manufacture, maintenance, and operation of such vehicles.
This goal, however, was approached gradually. Certificates were originally issued to all applicants regardless of the nature of the services rendered by their vehicles. A certificate of war necessity, however, did not necessarily entitle a holder thereof to tire and tube ration coupons. Operators were required to establish their eligibility for tires and tubes in accordance with the Tire Rationing Regulations of the Office of Price Administration. It was necessary at first to follow a liberal policy in order to avert the risk of disrupting the whole motor-carrier transport system by attempting to decide hastily what services were necessary to the war effort or to the maintenance of essential civilian economy, and con? fining the issuance of certificates to carriers engaged in furnishing such services. For the same reason, a liberal policy was also adopted at the outset in establishing mileage, motor fuel and load requirements in the certificates. These requirements, at first, were not generally as severe as the conservation orders warranted, but the duty to comply with those orders remained, and the original limitations specified in the certificates were subsequently reviewed so that they came to reflect the conservation policies of the Office of Defense Transportation.
Ill
Certificates of war necessity served as enforcement services through an arrangement between the Office of Defense Transportation and the Office of Price Administration. Under the arrangement, coupons or other instruments authorizing the purchase of fuel, tires, and tubes were issued by the Office of Price Administration only upon presentation of certificates. The Office of Price Administration rationed fuel in accordance with terms specified in the certificates. In addition, General Order ODT No. 21 prohibited any person from transferring any fuel, part, tire, or tube to the operator of a commercial motor vehicle except on presentation of a valid certificate of war necessity pertaining to the vehicle.
Under the order, conservation of tires was mandatory. Detailed instructions were distributed among all commercial vehicle owners enjoining proper care and maintenance of tires and tubes. Tires had to be inspected within 6 months or every 5,000 miles. The burden of proof was on the motor vehicle owner to show that he exercised reasonable diligence in the care of his tires, and if he failed to do so, he could be denied replacements, recaps, or retreads.
According to the order, the Office of Defense Transportation could for “good cause” amend, suspend, or cancel any certificate. As originally framed the order did not define “good cause.” Later, by amendment 9, September 24,1943, the term was declared to include: (1) Willful or negligent failure to comply with the terms of the certificate or of any order of the Office of Defense Transportation pertaining to operations covered by the certificate; (2) fraud, practiced or willful misrepresentation made in obtaining the certificate; (3) willful falsification of any record or report required by the Office of Defense Transportation; (4) when the operations described in the cer-. tificate have been abandoned or discontinued by the holder; (5) when the operations described in the certificate have been prohibited by an order of the Office of Defense Transportation; (6) when any vehicle in respect of which a certificate was issued is no longer operated by the holder in the service described therein; or (7) when it appears from the application that the certificate was erroneously issued.
Administration of the Program
The administrative burden assumed by the Office of Defense Transportation in carrying out the certificate of war necessity program proved by far the heaviest it undertook. The program occasioned an unprecedented enlargement in personnel, the creation of a field force on a Nation-wide scale and a sharp increase in expenditures. To bring all motor-carrier operations within the direct control of a Government
agency was novel in transport regulation and produced new problems and unanticipated difficulties. For these reasons, the experience of the Office in this work merits careful attention.
As a first step in putting the program into operation, it was necessary to apprise every owner of a commercial vehicle of the requirements of General Order ODT No. 21 so that he might take steps to secure a certificate of war necessity. In this task, the Office of Defense Transportation retained the services of an experienced automotive directory firm. The company prepared a list as of December 31,1941, of all persons registered as owners of trucks, busses, taxicabs, or other types of vehicles subject to the order. An Office of Defense Transportation central mailing office, staffed by personnel hired by the directory company was established in Detroit. From this office, beginning October 2, 1942, application blanks, together with full instructions on how to fill them out and copies of General Order ODT No. 21, were mailed to every registered owner of a commercial motor vehicle. Each application blank was also accompanied by a self-addressed envelope in which the completed application was to be returned to the Detroit office. It was planned to mail the certificates from the same office upon receipt of properly executed applications.
The magnitude of the administrative load is indicated by the fact that approximately 3,500,000 application blanks were mailed. These blanks were sent to the registered owners of roughly 5,000,000 commercial vehicles. The number of applications was less than the number of vehicles because the order distinguished between fleets and single units. A fleet was defined as three or more self-powered vehicles owned or operated by one person, whereas a single unit consisted of one or two such vehicles owned or operated by one person. Single-unit operators comprised about 95 percent of the truck operators in the country-
A separate application and certificate were required for each vehicle in a single unit. In the case of fleets, a distinction was made between trucks subject to the provisions of General Order ODT No. 17, that is, trucks employed in private and contract services, and trucks not subject to General Order ODT No. 17. The latter category embraced principally common carriers and farm trucks. Fleet operators subject to General Order ODT No. 17 applied for certificates by operating unit. An operating unit consisted of motortruck operations performed wholly within a local area, that is, any, urban community and a zone extending 25 air miles from its boundaries, together with operas tions extending beyond such boundaries from a home or base terminal within the local area. Operations
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performed wholly outside such an area were also included in a unit when controlled from a base within the area. A master certificate was issued for each operating unit as though it were an independent fleet and a fleet unit certificate also known as a subcertificate for each vehicle in the fleet.
An operator of a fleet not subject to General Order ODT No. 17 filed a single application for a certificate from his home office covering all his vehicles, or, at his option, filed separate applications by any operating unit he desired. For example, if a common carrier maintained more than one operating division, he submitted either a separate application for each division, or if he had trucks registered in more than one municipality, he filed a separate application for vehicles registered at each location. A motor carrier of passengers filed a single application from his home office covering all vehicles operated.
Detailed information was called for in each application relative to the operations of the motor vehicles to which it related. The applicant was required to state his type of business, purpose for which the vehicle was used, area of operations, nature of the services rendered, number of vehicles owned or leased, miles operated quarterly and annually, number of trips made quarterly, average load per trip, capacity of vehicle, load factor, that is, the ratio of average load to capacity of vehicle, steps taken to conserve tires and equipment in compliance with Office of Defense Transportation orders, and other data. The application provided a mine of information concerning the motor carrier industry never before available. Of particular concern here are the procedure and data employed by the Office of Defense Transportation’s mailing office at Detroit, in fixing in the certificate of war necessity the allowable mileage, minimum loads and quantities of gasoline for each vehicle. The procedure was called tailoring.
Tailoring of Applications
When applications covering either fleet or singleunit vehicles were received at the Detroit office, they were first reviewed for completeness and consistency, and then classified and coded according to the occupations in which the vehicles were employed and also according to types of vehicles. The next step was the analyses and tailoring of loads and mileage. Tailoring constituted the crux of the certificate of war necessity program. Its purpose was to eliminate waste from motor carrier operations by increasing loads and abolishing under-utilized mileage. These tailoring measures were designed to bring individual operations into general harmony with Office of Defense Transportation orders and policies.
Applications for single-unit certificates were tail
ored as well as reviewed, classified and coded at the Detroit office. Single-unit certificates were then sent directly to applicants. Fleet applications were treated differently. They were reviewed, classified and coded at the Detroit office and then sent to the appropriate district offices for tailoring.
In order to decentralize the administration of General Order ODT No. 21, the Office of Defense Transportation had created 142 district offices throughout the country. Fleet applications were sent for purposes of tailoring to the district offices having jurisdiction of the territory in which the applicants were domiciled. This was done because each fleet master certificate involved more complex operations than a single-unit application, and therefore, required a more detailed knowledge of the carriers’ operations. It was felt that this could be accomplished by district offices because of their familiarity with local conditions affecting carrier operations. After tailoring the applications, the district offices sent the fleet master and fleet unit certificates to the applicants.
Tailoring was the process by which the Office of Defense Transportation established for each vehicle in its certificate of war necessity the following: (1) Maximum mileage for the year consisting of a portion of the last quarter of 1942 and a full calendar year by quarters; (2) the maximum mileage per calendar quarter; (3) the minimum average load per trip per year; (4) the minimum average load per trip per calendar quarter. Closely related to this process was the method by which the Office of Defense Transportation fixed for each vehicle the amount of gasoline allowed for the period, Novemer 22 to December 31, 1942, and a full calendar year by quarters.
These operations varied somewhat according to the classification of the vehicle, but the general nature of the tailoring process can be revealed by showing how it was applied to a property-carrying truck engaged in local service.
As a first step, the examiner started with the mileage and load factor as reported in the application relating to the vehicle. The load factor was a percentage figure indicating the ratio between the average load of the vehicle and its capacity. Estimated mileage and load factors were reported for the year consisting of the last two quarters of 1942 and the first two quarters of 1943. They were based on the actual experience for the third quarter of 1942 and estimated for the other quarters.
For example, if the applicant’s load factor were 25 percent and his mileage 2,000, the examiner had recourse to one of several tables prepared by the Office of Defense Transportation. In the illustration, the table showed that mileage of 2,000 operated at a
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load factor of 25 percent had to be reduced by 65 percent. In this case, therefore, the maximum annual mileage recorded in the certificate would be 700.
The allowable maximum miles per calendar quarter was fixed by taking the largest of the four figures reported in the application for the last two quarters of 1942 and the first two quarters of 1943 and reducing it by the same percentage as that applied to the reported annual mileage. Thus, if in the illustration given, 800 miles appeared as the maximum per quarter, this amount was reduced by 65 percent, resulting in 280 miles as the maximum allowable under the certificate.
The minimum average load per trip per year was then fixed. A trip in local service was defined as a movement from base of operation and return thereto; in over-the-road service as a movement from a point of origin to a point of destination. The minimum load per trip per year was arrived at by taking a percentage of the capacity of the vehicle. The percentage figure used was established by the Office of Defense Transportation and varied with the types of services in which vehicles were employed. In the case of a truck engaged in local service it was 90 percent. Therefore, if the capacity of the vehicle in the illustration was 1 ton, it was required to carry a minimum average of nine-tenths of a ton per trip per year.
Next, the minimum average load per trip per calendar quarter was prescribed. This was a lower figure than the annual minimum. It was computed by applying a percentage figure to the latter amount. In the illustration, this was done by taking 75 percent of nine-tenths of a ton. The result was the establishment in this instance of .675 of a ton as the minimum average load per trip per quarter.
Establishment of Gasoline Allotments
After an application was tailored, gasoline allotments were established and prescribed in each certificate. First, the information appearing in the application relative to gasoline requirements was tested for reasonableness. Referring again to another table constructed by the Office of Defense Transportation, the examiner found the reasonable upper and lower limits of gasoline consumption for a truck of the given capacity operated over the given mileage.
In the second step, the examiner fixed the amount of gasoline allowed the applicant for the period, November 22 to December 31,1942, and for the four quarters of 1943. The application showed the actual amount of gasoline reported as consumed in the third quarter of 1942 and the estimated consumption for the fourth quarter of 1942 and the first two quarters of 1943. In computing the gasoline allotment, the
amount reported for each of these periods, if determined as reasonable, was reduced by the same percentage figure as that applied in the determination of the maximum mileage. The amounts reported for each quarter of 1942 and 1943 were used as a basis of calculating the quarterly gasoline allotments for each of the corresponding quarters of 1943. For the period, November 22 to December 31, 1942, account was, of course, taken of the fact that it was less than a quarter.
The work in tailoring applications and establishing gasoline allotments was done by examiners in the Detroit office- A Review Board, comprised of Office of Defense Transportation supervisory personnel, was set up to examine for obvious errors and injustices those applications on which reductions of 25 percent or greater were made in fixing mileage and gasoline allowances.
Numerous applications, particularly those of single-unit operators failed to furnished complete answers to the questions. The practice was to tailor applications insofar as it was possible to do so on the basis of such information as they revealed. Applications were returned to their senders only when they lacked minimum rudimentary data that could serve as a plausible support for estimates of mileage, load factor and gasoline requirements.
Defective applications varied in degree of inadequacy. When the information in an application was complete except for one or two minor omissions, it was treated as a complete return. When an application failed only to state gasoline requirements, gasoline was allowed according to the rated capacity of the vehicle and the established mileage. In the case of an application that omitted a statement on annual mileage, mileage was fixed in the certificate according to ascertained averages. When data concerning average loads were missing, minimum average loads were based on the rated capacity of the vehicle.
It was anticipated that the results of treating incomplete applications in this manner would often meet with disapproval. Applicants, however, were afforded an opportunity to appeal to district offices to correct errors and injustices. By issuing certificates of war necessity in response to incomplete applications rather than returning such applications for additional information, the Office of Defense Transportation was able to launch its conservation program under General Order ODT No. 21 more promptly than otherwise would have been possible.
District and Field Offices
In furtherance of the program, the Office of Defense Transportation set up numerous district and branch offices. Prior to the establishment of the
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Detroit mailing office, 51 district offices were in existence. Ninety-one additional such offices, 142 in all, and numerous branches were created in connection with the administration of certificates of war necessity. They furnished assistance in tailoring applications and issuing certificates.
The original plan to process single-unit applications at the Detroit office by November 15, 1942, proved difficult to consummate. By the middle of October 1942, applications had been mailed to all fleet operators, but to only one-third of the single-unit operators. In order to mitigate the burden on the Detroit office and to expedite the work, greater use was made of the district and branch offices. In addition, the 3,022 County War Boards were enlisted to aid farmers in procuring certificates.
In the first week of November 1942, a considerable portion of the work in handling applications was shifted to the field. The Detroit office had completed the mailing of applications on October 21, 1942. All single-unit applications at that time being processed in Detroit, as well as applications thereafter received there, continued to be treated in accordance with < the original program. Single-unit operators, however, who had not received applications were instructed to get them at their district offices. The applications were to be completed and returned to the district offices where they were tailored. Certificates were then issued by such offices directly to applicants. Since under the original arrangements fleet applications were tailored in the field and certificates issued by district offices, the only change made was to require fleet operators, who for some reason had not received applications, to procure them at district offices.
As November 15 approached, the Office of Defense Transportation waged an aggressive campaign to induce truck operators who had not already done so to obtain applications. Office of Defense Transportation officials through the radio and the press urged such operators to go to their district offices for applications. As many operators failed to apply for certificates it was found necessary to postpone the effective date of the certificate of war necessity program to December 1, 1942. Subsequently, commercial motor vehicle operators who had applied for certificates but had not received them were permitted to continue their operations without a certificate until January 1, 1943. Temporary gasoline rations were issued by the Office of Price Administration to such operators sufficient to meet their needs until January 31.
On December 23, 1942, the central mailing office at Detroit was closed, and all matters pertaining to certificates were transferred to the district offices.
By that date, the bulk, but by no means all trucks subject to General Order ODT No. 21 had received certificates. For the convenience of operators domiciled at a distance from district offices, Office of Defense Transportation representatives were sent to 500 cities and towns throughout the country. They nade their headquarters in local Chambers of Com-nerce and other civic centers. They assisted vehicle )wners who had not received certificates as well as certificate holders who had been allotted insufficient nileage and gasoline for their necessary operations.
Subsequently, rationing procedure was simplified by an arrangement between the Office of Price Administration and the Office of Defense Transportation. Third and fourth-quarter gasoline ration coupons were mailed by the Office of Price Administration to single-unit certificate holders. This meant that after July 1, 1943, only about 229,000 of the nation’s 3,400,000 commercial motor vehicle operators had to appear before the ration boards for the quarterly renewal of their rations. Fleet operators were not similarly accommodated because fleet rations usually involved such large quantities of gasoline as to make mailing impractical. Holders of single-unit certificates presented them to ration boards only once prior to July 1, 1943. Upon presentation, the quarterly allotments established in the certificates were recorded and ration coupons mailed in the amounts called for. When gasoline allotments were altered by the Office of Defense Transportation district concerned, that office notified the local Office of Price Administration Board of the change, and the Board issued coupons accordingly. This new procedure was of great convenience to farmers and other operators of trucks who resided at a considerable distance from local rationing boards.
Review of Certificates of War Necessity
Under the circumstances attending the original issuance of certificates, it was inevitable that the mileage and gasoline allotments should in numerous instances fail either to meet the requirements of applicants or to fulfill the conservation policies of • the Office of Defense Transportation. The volume of applications, the frequent omissions in them of necessary information and the administrative burden inherent in the tailoring process made precise computation of allowable mileage and gasoline according to any fixed standards impossible. In this situation the Office of Defense Transportation used such information as the inadequate application afforded to make the most reasonable estimates possible in allotting mileage and gasoline. At the same time, it provided for a continuing process of reviewing and adjusting certificates of war necessity in order to cor
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rect errors and injustices and to bring the program in harmony with its conservation policies.
Prior to October 1,1943, procedure and policy governing appeals by carriers .were established in instructions directed to the Office of Defense Transportation field force. Petitions setting forth reasons for requesting increased allowances of mileage and gasoline were filed with the district offices having jurisdiction over the areas in which petitioners were domiciled. If petitions were denied by the district offices, appeals were permitted to Regional Directors.
Appeals constituted a heavy administrative burden on the district offices. By the end of the first quarter of 1944, approximately 2,572,000 appeals had been filed. Obvious errors in allotments apparent on the face of certificates were easily corrected. But when additional gasoline was requested on the ground that the original allowances in the certificates did not permit the holders to perform essential services, the Office of Defense Transportation district managers and their assistants had to solve debatable issues requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion. At the same time, the need for reducing mileage became acute as the shortage of gasoline, tires, and equipment grew critical. Instructions were issued to the field force by the Office of Defense Transportation to guide it in passing upon appeals. According to these instructions before carriers were granted increased allotments they were required to show that they had complied with all outstanding Office of Defense Transportation orders relating to their operations in eliminating wasteful practices, duplicating services, circuitous routes, call-backs, special deliveries, empty or lightly laden mileage, tire abuse, and improper maintenance. In addition, it was mandatory on the carriers to establish clearly that the increased gasoline they sought was for the purpose of conducting transport necessary to the war effort or to the maintenance of essential civilian economy.
On October 1,1943, Administrative Order ODT No. 8 became effective. It formalized procedure regarding review of the terms and conditions in certificates of war necessity. In substance, the order continued the practices and policies that preceded it, except that it permitted carriers to appeal from adverse decisions by regional directors to the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation.
The Office of Defense Transportation took the initiative in reviewing certificates of war necessity. The district offices were almost continuously engaged in making investigations in their areas with a view to discovering excessive allowances in certificates so that they could be reduced to a level consistent with the conservation orders and policies.
Critical Situation in the East
In January 1943, a gasoline shortage threatened in the eastern seaboard area. The district offices there immediately made a survey for the current quarter of gasoline rations issued to operators of commercial vehicles. The purpose was to determine whether an excess quantity of gasoline was represented either by temporary ration coupons or by coupons issued pursuant to certificates of war necessity. The survey indicated the possibility that a substantial amount of excess gasoline or coupons were in the possession of some operators.
Gasoline supplies in the east coast area became dangerously low in May 1943, due to the disrupting of transport in the Middle West by spring floods which affected the movement of petroleum products to the East. Consumption in that area was estimated as being between 50,000 and 60,000 barrels per day in excess of supplies available for civilian needs. The situation called for emergency measures.
Operations of private and contract motor carriers already were sharply curtailed by amendment No. 3 to General Order ODT No. 17. But more drastic reduction in gasoline consumption proved necessary. Consequently the Office of Price Administration, at the request of the Office of Defense Transportation announced that gasoline rations for the second quarter issued to all commercial motor carriers in the shortage area and reviewed as of May 24,1943, would continue in effect until July 25. Third quarter rations ordinarily valid July 1 were not usable until July 26. The effect of thus extending the expiration date of second quarter ration coupons was to cut by 40 percent the amount of gasoline distributed to commercial vehicle operators in the period between May 24 and July 25.
In view of this sweeping reduction, many appeals were anticipated. It was inevitable that hardship was caused to many operators. But above everything it was necessary not to impair carrier services vital to the war effort. At the same time consumption had to be reduced by 25,000 barrels of motor fuel per day, and care had to be taken not to restore through appeals the reduction effected by the 40 percent cut.
To meet these requirements, the War Production Board drew up a priority list of essential industries, and this list was used by the Office of Defense Transportation in passing upon appeals for supplementary gasoline rations. All industries in the list were vital either to the war effort or to the maintenance of essential civilian economy.
The industries included were classified in four categories as follows: AA-1, A-l, A-2, and A-3. No distinction was made between industries within any one category. AA-1 authorized preferential treatment as
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against all other truck operations for movement of Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, Coast Guard, or lend-lease supplies for export. A-l came next in priority and was designated as “very critical.” Examples of industries in this category were those concerned with producing and procuring of certain perishable foods, public utilities and other services of a public nature. A-2 followed and was considered “critical.” It included among others, industries concerned with cereals, flour, coffee, sugar, and tea. Finally, industries in A-3 were characterized as “important.” Examples of these were mining, milling, and newspaper publishing. All industries, in the list were considered vital to the war effort. The intention underlying the scheme was to supply trucks that served them with sufficient gasoline to perform the transport services for their “basic functions.” hen the supply of gasoline was inadequate for the needs of all these industries, lesser amounts were given to those in the lower categories but it was not planned to restrict substantially the transport services of any industry in any category.
The term “basic function” requires explanation. A truck operator hauling luxury food, for example, to a plant cafeteria in an essential industry was not given preferential treatment under the priority list. On the other hand, an operator carrying aluminum to an aircraft plant was treated' according to the classification of the plant.
In addition, even operators serving the basic functions of an essential industry had to eliminate wasteful practices to qualify for supplemental rations. Elimination of wasteful practices required the use of Joint Information Offices and participation in joint action plans as well as other conservation methods enjoined by Office of Defense Transportation policies and orders.
Another measure taken to enforce the 40 percent reduction was to put each district office in the shortage area on a “quota” basis. This meant that a limit was placed on the amount of gasoline each office could restore in passing on appeals. It was necessary to do this to prevent the overissue of rations and to preserve the reduction program.
By August 1943, the situation in the critical area was relieved, and the orderly restoration of necessary motor vehicle services made possible. After July 26, use of the priority list was discontinued and appeals for supplementary gasoline rations were decided in accordance with policies previously established.
Records and Reports
The task of enforcing the certificates of war necessity program was facilitated by records and reports
required of carriers subject to General Order ODT No. 21. Data gathered from these sources as well as from the applications originally submitted were made public by the Office of Defense Transportation. These records and reports furnished information concerning carrier operations never before available to regulatory authorities.
The Office of Defense Transportation required single-unit operators to maintain weekly operating and tire inspection records on a form printed on the reverse side of the certificates. On this form operators entered for each vehicle on a weekly basis the number of trips, miles operated, out-bound and inbound loads, gallons of fuel used, new, recapped, and retreaded tires and dates of tire inspection. These data were summarized quarterly and the average load per trip during the period computed. These records were required to be maintained currently and in a condition permitting ready examination. In addition, single-unit operators were required to submit monthly to district offices a report showing such vehicles as had been idle during the last 14 days of the month.
Operators of fleets had to report idle equipment in the same manner. In addition such operators kept three records: First, a quarterly report form prescribed by the Office of Defense Transportation; second, a daily report furnishing support for the quarterly report ; and third, a weekly record of operations in accordance with a form provided on the reverse side of each fleet unit certificate. This record included the number of tire inspections. The daily reports consisted of operating details such as origin of operations, destinations, number of trips, types of operation, miles, total units of property transported, capacity of vehicle, hours of use, and other such information. The information furnished on the quarterly report was a summary of that reflected in the daily and weekly records.
Quarterly reports were filed with district offices. Their data were classified, summarized and tabulated and the results transmitted to the regional offices; which in turn reviewed them and furnished the Washington office of the Office of Defense Transportation with such abstracts as were called for. The purpose of the reporting system was to furnish such basic statistical information as was necessary to the formulation of conservation policy with respect to commercial vehicles.
In the course of time, reporting procedure was simplified to meet the changing needs of the Office of Defense Transportation and the carriers. In July 1943, quarterly reports were discontinued. In their place, a selected group of truck operators were required to file monthly reports. Groups selected to
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make reports varied with changing circumstances affecting motor transport. For example, when conditions foreshadowed a break-down in the farmtruck movement, either locally or nationally, reports were requested of haulers selected from carriers of farm products. On the basis of their reports, the Office of Defense Transportation undertook to provide sufficient motor fuel, parts, manpower, vehicles, or whatever else was necessary to prevent a transportation break-down. The reports also enabled the Office of Defense Transportation to maintain current checks on the efficiency of truck operators, the effect of Office of Defense Transportation orders and regulations, freight movement trends, and gasoline consumption.
Subsequently, record keeping was also simplified. On October 18, 1943, Administrative Order ODT No. 9 became effective and brought recording requirements in harmony with the selective reporting system. Whereas formerly 24 questions appeared on the report form only 6 were included in the new form, and the new form prescribed for records was comparably simplified. Only single-unit operators were required to observe the prescribed forms; fleet operators were allowed to keep their records in any convenient form, except that tire records had to be kept on a prescribed form.
The regulations of Administrative Order ODT No. 9 were further liberalized. By amendment 1, January 25,1944, fleet operators of trucks were permitted to keep an integrated record for all vehicles in fleets, rather than an individual record for each vehicle. Furthermore, when it was found impracticable to maintain records of loads, fleet operators were permitted subject to approval of district offices to use estimates. Operators of vehicles engaged in retail deliveries, other than tank trucks, were not required to keep any records of loads. And operators who found it impracticable to keep weekly records were allowed to record entries on a monthly basis or on the basis of a shorter period.
By amendment 2, February 26, 1944, to Administrative Order ODT No. 9, report forms were again simplified. The new form required substantially the same information as before but was simpler and more concise. Finally, by amendment 3, June 30, 1944, formalities in the prescription of record forms were abandoned, and all operators were allowed to use any form they found most convenient, so long as they furnished the information required. After September 1944, operating records were no longer required of any single-unit operators, or of fleet operators engaged in local services. Over-the-road fleet operators were still required to file reports.
With certain exceptions, a record of loads trans
ported was required for each vehicle. Certificate holders engaged in nondistributive operations were required to keep such records only in respect of loads transported in over-the-road operations. In general, certificate holders were not required to keep a record of loads transported in vehicles employed in (1) retail distribution service (other than tank vehicles) ; (2) construction operations; (3) maintenance or repair services ; (4) transport of property wholly within the boundaries of any property under common control or management or between such properties when not separated by more than 1 mile; (5) public health, safety or public utility service; and (6) farming or the transport of farm products or supplies (not including for-hire vehicles).
Every certificate holder operating a truck was required to keep a record for each vehicle of the number of days the vehicle was idle, with reasons therefor.
General Order ODT No. 21 was revoked as of October 16,1944, and replaced by General Order ODT No. 21A. In general, the new order reenacted the policies and procedures established under General Order ODT No. 21 and its amendments. Several important changes were, however, effected.
Fleet unit certificates were abolished by General Order ODT No. 21A. In lieu thereof, fleet certificate holders were required to keep the Office of Defense Transportation informed of the specific vehicles operated by them under their respective certificates.
A more radical change governed applications by commercial motor vehicle operators for temporary and nonrecurring increases in quarterly rations. Under amendment 1 to Administrative Order ODT No. 8, issued simultaneously with General Order ODT No. 21A, such applications were filed with local war price and rationing boards of the Office of Price Administration and not with Office of Defense Transportation district offices. The local boards passed on these applications, and appeals from their decisions were handled by the Office of Price Administration. The change was of substantial convenience to carriers as there were 5,500 Office of Price Administra-tion local boards scattered throughout the country as compared with 142 Office of Defense Transportation district offices in existence at the time General Order ODT No. 21A was issued. Recommendations on temporary and nonrecurring gasoline allotments for farm trucks were left undisturbed and continued to be made by county farm transportation committees. They, however, were referred to the Office of Price Administration local boards for action and not to Office of Defense Transportation district offices.
Administration of applications for the issuance of certificates of war necessity and for permanent adjustments in such certificates remained with the
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Office of Defense Transportation. Nevertheless the transfer to the Office of Price Administration for temporary changes in certificates relieved the Office of Defense Transportation of a considerable volume of work because they constituted a majority of all applications processed.
As a result of the new arrangement, the Highway Department of the Office of Defense Transportation was enabled to reduce its field force. Regional and district offices of the Office of Defense Transportation were changed so as to coincide more closely with the Office of Price Administration regional and district office locations and boundaries, and the number of regions was reduced from nine to eight. On
August 16, 1945, the entire certificate of war necessity program was revoked.
The certificate of war necessity program enabled the presentation of a comprehensive picture of the commercial vehicle industry of the country. A total of 3,454,885 such certificates were outstanding at the close of August 1944. They covered 5,088,381 power units and 219,465 trailers and semitrailers. A summary, by vocational groups, of the commercial vehicles together with the annual mileage and the annual gallons of motor fuel authorized for them in the certificates of war necessity as of August 31, 1944, is presented in the following table :
Certificates of War Necessity
Vocational Group Certificates Outstanding No. Power Units No. Trailers and Semi-Trailers No. Annual Mileage Certified Total (000) Annual Fuel Certified Gallons (000)
A, Property Carrying Vehicles: Private (Other than'For-hire): Agriculture 1,682,499 1,651,220 9,536 11,638,753 1,105,814
Government Agencies 40,701 233,935 8,214 1,958,658 272,912
Other Private: Extractive 41,285 94,382 10,616 1,348,169 185,625
Construction 320,057 436,315 8,207 3,596,228 389,127
Manufacturing 83,318 190,338 20,848 2,535,024 328,599
Wholesale Distribution 145.898 367,143 15,411 4,480,349 524,390
Consumer Distribution 427,519 678,085 10,822 5,891,053 649,765
Other Public Utilities 13,592 88,695 12,038 788,286 76,326
Business, Prof. & Pers. Service .... Institutional Agencies 103,015 130,523 4,128 1,016,823 108,545
10,384 21,101 359 145,553 15,303
Personal Transportation 150.581 152,286 141 915,182 79,611
Tank Trucks (All private uses) ... 52,686 90,907 7,495 1,399,326 211,594
Not Elsewhere Classified 1,931 1,998 14 4,662 408
Total Other Private 1,350,266 2,251,773 90,079 22,120,655 2,569,293
Total' Private 2,973,466 4,136,928 107,829 35,718,066 3,948,019
For-Hire: Intercity Common Carriers 45,653 151,963 65,537 4,757,998 765,288
Local Common Carriers 53,534 118,434 11,056 1,193,418 169,477
All Contract Carriers 256,275 347,177 26,407 6,251,576 817,922
Tank Trucks (All For-Hire Uses) ... 5.466 14,934 7,440 733,980 132,788
Total For-Hire 360,928 632,508 110,440 12,936,972 1,885,475
Total—Property Carrying Vehicles .. 3,334,394 4,769,436 218,269 48,655,038 5,833,494
B. Passenger Carriers & Rental Cars: Ambulances & Hearses 26,889 49,313 20 353,035 35,473
School Busses 50,675 84,784 10 743,220 99,149
Taxicabs 32,460 78,717 1 2,878,204 262,874
Rental Cars (Incl. 13,000 trucks) 1,864 25,015 780 295,037 37,850
Local and Suburban Busses 4,291 59,363 220 2,160,757 443,394
Intercity Busses 2,312 21,753 165 1,350,635 228,505
Total—Passenger Carrying Vehicles . 118,491 318,945 1,196 7,780,888 1,107,245
GRAND TOTAL 3,452,885 5,088,381 219,465 56,435,926 6,940,739
700494—48—9
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CHAPTER XVI
JOINT ACTION PLANS
The principal objective of registration of freight and empty vehicles with district offices referred to in the preceding chapter, was to provide loads for return hauls. But empty return hauls were by no means the sole or even chief reason for under-utilization of motor transport equipment. The extreme competitive conditions that normally characterize the motor-carrier business often produce duplicate and parallel services, and bring about such a division of traffic between carriers operating over the same routes as to occasion light loading and numerous trips. In general, light loading and excessive hauling can be most effectively eliminated among competing carriers operating in the same area according to plans that safeguard the interests of all concerned. Through such plans, parallel services and the number of trips can be reduced and average loading measurably increased. These were the objectives of those provisions in General Orders Nos. 3, 6A, and 17 that authorized joint action by carriers and defined the conditions under which it was permitted.
General Order ODT No. 3 governed the formulation of joint action plans of over-the-road common carriers. It authorized any two or more carriers to draft and submit to the Office of Defense Transportation a plan for joint action between such carriers, or between them and common carriers by rail or other means. The order specified the following methods that carriers participating in a joint action plan might employ in abolishing wasteful services:
1. Alternate, stagger, or coordinate schedules.
2. Suspend services in respect to shipments in less than truck load lots.
3. Reciprocally, exchange shipments of property.
4. Pool traffic or revenues, or both.
5. Jointly load for transport or operate a motor truck.
6. Divert traffic, operate joint terminals or joint pick-up or delivery vehicles.
7. Establish arrangements with other carriers for interchange of equipment.
8. Appoint a joint agent to concentrate, receive, load, unload, distribute, and deliver freight; receive, account for and distribute gross or net revenue, or otherwise handle or conduct a common carrier business.
Under the order, plans could be consummated only pursuant to an order issued by the Office of Defense Transportation. After a plan was drawn up and agreed to by the participating carriers, it was sub
mitted to the Office of Defense Transportation for approval which was evidenced in the form of a supplementary order. Upon the promulgation of such an order, the plan became effective. Although the carriers were authorized to take the initiative in establishing joint action plans, the Office of Defense Transportation could direct them to make plans or to explain their failure to do so.
Procedure in Formulating Plans
Originally it was intended that for-hire carriers advisory committees would initiate joint action plans between for-hire carriers. The expectation was that these committees because of close connection with the industry would stimulate carriers to draft plans for submission. This did not occur as often as was contemplated. Plans drawn up by the carriers frequently proved technically defective and required revision. The resulting delay tended to discourage the formulation of plans, and Office of Defense Transportation district offices found it necessary to take aggressive measures in promoting them.
The promotion of joint action plans became the particular concern of the for-hire carrier specialist in the district office. He explored conditions in his district with a view to discovering favorable prospects for the establishment of plans. He maintained contact with the carrier committees and with all carriers within his district. He investigated the records of traffic and empty vehicle registrations, and where the data indicated that joint action would increase utilization of equipment, he urged it upon the carriers. He persistently solicited individual carriers and interviewed all prospects. It was the business of the for-hire carrier specialist, in short, to exploit every potentiality in his district in behalf of the joint action program.
When carriers desired to enter a joint action plan, they advised the district manager nearest their home offices. The district manager, principally through his for-hire carrier specialist, accumulated all available data relating to the proposed plan and transmitted the information in a memorandum to his regional director. At the same time, he forwarded a copy to the director of regional operations in Washington.
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The regional director reviewed the data and where the plan covered operations in more than one district assigned responsibility for its consummation to the district manager in the best position to supervise the participants. In addition, the regional director notified each district manager within his region and the divisional director of regional operations in Washington of all ^he essential facts bearing on the plan and invited their assistance. When a plan affected two or more regions, the regional directors concerned, conferred and selected one of their number to assume responsibility for the advancement of the joint action.
A district manager who was given the task of developing a plan was required to draft and submit it to the parties for their signatures. In the early days of the joint action program, plans were drawn up by the carriers themselves. It was found, however, that for-hire carrier specialists because of their knowledge of the general orders affecting plans, and because of their technical competence could do this work more expeditiously, and so it became one of their functions.
After a plan was drafted and signed, the district manager mailed it to his regional director together with his findings and recommendations. These were examined by- the regional director with the aid of his for-hire carrier specialist. Improperly drafted plans were returned to the district manager for correction. Plans satisfactorily executed were forwarded by the regional director, with his comments and recommendations, to the district director of the Bureau of Motor Carriers of the Interstate Commerce Commission having jurisdiction over the participating carriers. This was done, of course, only when the carriers concerned were subject to regulation by the Commission.
It was the responsibility of the Bureau of Motor Carriers to scrutinize joint action plans for potential conflicts with or violations of the Interstate Commerce Act. The Bureau also was concerned with the effect of plans upon individual carriers and upon services to the public generally. Its personnel, long experienced in the motor-carrier field, was in a position to render valuable assistance in the administration of the joint action program.
The district director of the Bureau, after reviewing the plan, mailed it with his recommendations to the Bureau of Motor Carriers in Washington. At the same time, he transmitted his findings and recommendations to the Office of Defense Transportation Regional Director, who, in turn, forwarded a copy of these to the district manager originating the proceedings and the plan itself to the director of regional operations in Washington.
In order to expedite the consummation of a plan, the latter issued a tentative approval if the plan (a) provided for one or more of the methods of achieving joint action as set forth in .General Order ODT No. 3; (b) was practical from an operating viewpoint; (c) resulted in substantial conservation; (d) was informally approved by the appropriate district director of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and if (e) all participants possessed the authority to perform the services and operations called for in the proposed plan.
The regional director submitting the plan to Washington was notified by air mail when a joint action plan was tentatively approved, and upon such notification, he directed the participants to put the plan in operation. If the plan was disapproved on final review, the participants were required to terminate operations under it immediately.
When a plan was approved in Washington, the Office of Defense Transportation issued a supplementary order putting it into effect. This was ordinarily done after approval by the Bureau of Motor Carriers of the Interstate Commerce Commission. But such approval was not invariably a condition precedent to a supplementary order, and several supplementary orders were issued without it.
Immunity from Anti-Trust Proceedings
Since joint action plans usually had the effect of reducing competition among the participating carriers, it was necessary to adopt measures to insure immunity from prosecution under the antitrust laws. Provision was made for this by Congress in the Small Business Mobilization Act (Public Law No. 603,77th Congress, 56. Stat. L. 357). Section 12 of the Act stated :
“Whenever the Chairman of the War Production Board, shall after consultation with the Attorney General find, and so certify, to the Attorney General in writing, that the doing of any act or thing, or the omission to do any act or thing, by one or more persons during the period that this section is in effect, in compliance with any request or approval made by the chairman in writing, is requisite to the prosecution of the war, such act, thing or omission shall be deemed in the public interest and no prosecution or civil action shall be commenced with reference thereto under the antitrust laws of the United States or the Federal Trade Commission Act. Such finding and certificate may in his discretion be withdrawn at any time by the chairman by giving notice of such withdrawal to the Attorney General, whereupon the provisions of this section shall not apply to any subsequent act or omission by reason of such finding or certificate.***”
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According to the procedure originally followed under the act, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation made a separate recommendation to the chairman of the War Production Board for the certification to the Attorney General of each joint action plan proposed. The practice of issuing certifications for individual plans caused interminable delay and tended to discourage the formulation and submission of plans by carriers. In order to expedite the issuance of certifications, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation addressed, April 8, 1943, a recommendation to the Chairman of the War Production Board requesting that all joint action plans made in pursuance of the provisions of General Order ODT No. 3, be certified as requisite to the prosecution of the war. The Chairman of the Board, accordingly, executed and transmitted Certificate No. 51 to the Attorney Genera,!. As a consequence, participants in joint action plans under General Order ODT No. 3 were exempt from prosecution under the antitrust laws when the plans embraced the specific methods set forth in the order, and it was no longer necessary to secure a certificate in each instance.
Subsequently, as General Order ODT No. 3 was broadened so as to include additional methods of joint action, the recommendation and Certificate No. 51 were correspondingly amended. Thus, when on January 25, 1944, General Order ODT No. 3 by amendment No. 6, expanded the list of methods which over-the-road common carriers might employ in joint action plans to include suspension of less-than-truckload shipments and the coordination of schedules between two or more points, the recommendation and Certificate No. 51 were likewise amended.
When a joint action plan provided for methods not expressly specified in General Order ODT No. 3 or its amendments, special arrangements had to be made with the Attorney General to secure immunity from antitrust proceedings. Examples of joint action falling outside the scope of Certificate No. 51, as amended, were total suspension of service by a carrier or carriers participating in a plan, or the suspension of truck load service when less-than-truck-load service was not suspended. Such plans and others not included in the general certification and thus requiring special treatment by the Attorney General were not encouraged by the Office of Defense Transportation.
Three situations were distinguishable in which joint action plans were approved by the Office of Defense Transportation outside the terms of Certificate No. 51. In one, the provisions in the plan not covered by the certificate were excepted from the approval; in another, such provisions were given a qualified approval, and in the third situation, they were ap
proved on motion of the Office of Defense Transportation without the benefits conferred by the certificate.
Plans for Local For-Hire Carriers
Joint action methods for local for-hire carriers were prescribed in General Order No. 6A, as amended. The provisions of this order applied to local contract as well as to local common carriers. But insofar as the operations of local contract carriers were not regulated by General Order ODT No. 6A, they were subject to the terms of General Order ODT No. 17. It therefore followed that a local contract carrier was prohibited from assuming any undertaking in a joint action plan that violated General Order ODT No. 17.
In principle, the methods enumerated in General Order ODT No. 6A were similar to those included in General Order ODT Ko. 3. Differences between the two orders in this respect reflected the differences in operating conditions between local and over-the-road carriers.
Likewise, administration and procedure governing the execution and consummation of joint action plans of local for-hire carriers were substantially the same as for over-the-road common carriers. Plans were put into effect pursuant to supplementary orders promulgated by the Office of Defense Transportation and immunity from prosecution under the antitrust laws was provided by General Certificate No. 200, issued March 14, 1944, by the Chairman of the War Production Board on recommendation of the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation.
Over-the-Road Contract and Private Carriers
With certain exceptions, which have been previously discussed, General Order ODT No. 17 governed the operations of contract and private carriers. The important exception was the application of General Order ODT No. 6A to local contract carriers. Since that order specifically provided for joint action, local contract carriers were not in that matter subject to General Order ODT No. 17, except again that such carriers were not permitted to undertake pursuant to a joint action plan any operation in conflict with General Order ODT No. 17.
The requirements in General Order ODT No. 17 relating to joint action distinguished between private and over-the-road contract carriers. No distinction was drawn between local and over-the-road private carriers because private carriers in peacetime are not restricted by governmental authority as to distances over which they operate and in practice the same private carriers perform both local and over-the-road services indiscriminately. It was, therefore, impossible for purposes of the conservation program to segregate the former services from the latter.
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General Order ODT No. 17 required joint action plans made by private carriers to conform to the provisions of a joint statement issued by the Office of Defense Transportation and the Department of Justice, dated March 12, 1942. The statement specified the conditions under which joint action did not constitute restraint of trade, and compliance with them was enjoined to protect participants in plans from prosecution under the antitrust laws. Plans were not required to be submitted to the Office of Defense Transportation for examination and approval before becoming effective, but they had to be filed with the Office for informational purposes.
Plans formulated by over-the-road contract carriers, on the other hand, were subject to the approval of the Office of Defense Transportation. Like the plans of over-the-road common carriers, they were put into operations pursuant to supplementary orders issued by the Office of Defense Transportation.
Policy on Joint Action
The statement of March 12,1942, executed jointly by the Office of Defense Transportation and the Department of Justice, was directed to joint action in connection with local delivery services by private carriers. It expressed the opinion of the Department of Justice concerning the legal consequences of the methods usually incorporated in plans to effect conservation in manpower and equipment. These methods were described under two categories, one, pooling of service, and two, diminishing the frequency of service.
Pooling of service was defined as the joint use of the same truck to deliver goods sold by competitors» each of whom, formerly made separate arrangements for delivery. Its effect was to eliminate duplicate mileage of delivery trucks on the same street in residential areas. The Department of Justice declared the mere establishment of a jointly used facility did not necessarily violate the antitrust laws. So long as joint systems of delivery were established for the purpose of conserving scarce materials and did not in fact unnecessarily restrain trade, the Department saw no reason to view them during the emergency as violations of the antitrust laws. It warned carriers who participated in plans, however, not to exclude competitors from markets or handicap them in access to markets by discrimination in the use of joint systems of delivery. The opinion further prohibited the use of joint delivery as an excuse for joint selling activities, the merger of production and selling facilities, the establishment of joint sales agents or the adoption of a single brand name to replace separate brands sold by business rivals. According to the statement, the extension of joint action in
these directions raised issues under the antitrust laws irrelevant to the central need of conserving scarce transport resources.
With respect to plans providing for less frequent delivery service, the Department stated they were unobjectionable so long as they purposed only to conserve rubber during the emergency by the reduction of tire mileage. Restrictions not logically required for that purpose were, however, prohibited.
Finally, the statement cautioned carriers not to use any joint action plan as a basis for an organized attack upon nonparticipants. It held there were various methods of reducing delivery mileage, and competitors were not to be coerced into adopting a single method or consumers denied the right to favor the most convenient one.
Experience in promoting joint action among private and contract carriers subject to General Order ODT No. 17 paralleled in general that in promoting joint action among over-the-road common carriers subject to General Order ODT No. 3, prior to the promulgation of Certificate No. 51. While private carriers were not required to submit their plans to the Office of Defense Transportation for approval, they had to do so in order to be certain of immunity from prosecution for violation of the antitrust laws. Each plan was examined by the Office of Defense Transportation and the Department of Justice, and immunity granted when it was found to accord with the joint statement of March 12,1942. This practice caused delay in the consummation of plans and operated to discourage their formulation.
Two measures were taken to correct this situation. First, special provision was made to expedite the process of securing immunity from antitrust prosecution for private carriers of solid fuels participating in joint action plans. And second, similar action was taken in respect of all other private and contract carriers subject to General Order ODT No. 17.
Private Carriers of Solid Fuels
On October 18, 1943, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation addressed a recommendation to the Chairman of the War Production Board requesting that joint action plans made by private carriers of solid fuels pursuant to its terms be certified to the Attorney General as necessary to the prosecution of the war and that participating carriers be protected from antitrust proceedings in conformity with the Small Business Mobilization Act. In response, the Chairman of the Board issued Certificate No. 155, November 3, 1943.
Conditions peculiar to the coal industry justified this separate trt^tment of private carriers of solid fuels. When production of coal was interrupted at
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the mines it became especially urgent to make the most expeditious and efficient distribution of the available supply. This required the elimination of all wasteful operations and the maximum utilization of existing transport equipment through joint action. In addition, solid fuel is a fungible commodity; that is, one replaceable in kind. This facilitates cooperation in transport since it is immaterial what sources of supply are used in distribution. Transport equipment can therefore be allocated among such sources with the sole view of effecting the most efficient transport arrangements.
Another factor contributed to the promulgation of Certificate No. 155. For some time before its issuance, Solid Fuels Industry Advisory Committees had been created throughout the country by the Office of Defense Transportation on a local, district, regional, and national basis, and they had functioned effectively in promoting conservation. The recommendation of October 18,1943, gave special recognition to these committees as well as to the other conditions peculiar to the solid fuels industry.
In accordance with the recommendation the Office of Defense Transportation appointed a National Solid Fuels Industry Advisory Committee. This Committee consisted of representatives of the industry in each of the Office of Defense Transportation districts and of such local advisory committees as were deemed necessary in particular municipalities or other areas. These national, district and local committees were directed to consult with members of the industry for the purpose of the formulation and adoption of joint action plans.
In general, the methods of joint action specified in the recommendation of October 18, 1943, resembled those subsequently provided in recommendation No. 122a for private carriers other than those engaged in the transport of solid fuels. Two features of the former recommendation are, however, noteworthy. One of them permitted the filling of orders for solid fuel by one carrier from the supply of another. This practice has, of course, special efficacy in joint action by carriers of solid fuel because of the fungible nature of the commodity. It was not equally feasible in the transport of differentiated products. Another method of joint action provided for in the solid fuel recommendation was the dispatching of only full truck loads from coal yards. This again was practicable chiefly because of the character of solid fuel.
Recommendation 122a issued January 8,1944, and Certificate No. 190 published January 10, 1944, in response to it, applied to all other private and contract carriers subject to General Order ODT No. 17, except private carriers of solid fuel. Since local con
tract carriers were governed by General Order ODT No. 6A, Certificate No. 190 covered only over-the-road contract carriers and private carriers with the above exception.
Permissible Scope of Actions
The recommendation for purposes of joint action permitted carriers to:
(1) Operate jointly collection and delivery vehicles, pool collections or deliveries for customers in the same neighborhood, collect or deliver orders for each other, or refer persons seeking any product or service to other participants, whenever any such action reduced mileage operated by collection and delivery vehicles.
(2) Fill orders from each other’s supplies of merchandise in order to reduce mileage of collection and delivery vehicles by making delivery from a point of supply nearer the customer to be served.
(3) Lease or rent collection and delivery vehicles with or without drivers and helpers in order to achieve more efficient utilization of such vehicles.
(4) Exchange customers in outlying areas when so doing results in conservation or more efficient utilization of collection and delivery vehicles and is done with the customer’s express consent.
(5) Adopt operating rules or practices requiring advance notices to carriers of shipments and limiting the hours of service for shippers.
(6) Appoint agents in effecting joint action by any of the above methods.
In addition, the recommendation warned that it was not to be construed as approving any program that fixed prices, allocated markets among participants in joint action, established a joint or common selling agent, exchanged customers except as specified above, used coercion to secure participation in joint action or boycotted any manufacturer, distributor, consumer or other person.
For purposes of clarity it is essential to recall that private carriers were not required to submit joint action plans for the approval of the Office of Defense Transportation. Plans were submitted under recommendation 122a only for the purpose of safeguarding participants from antitrust proceedings. But private carriers had the right to establish plans without prior approval. In that event, plans were filed merely for the information of the Office of Defense Trans-pdrtation and were examined by the Office and the Department of Justice with a view to determining whether or not they were in harmony with the joint statement of March 12, 1942. If plans violated the provisions of that declaration, participants incurred the risk of prosecution under the antitrust laws.
Over-the-road contract carriers were permitted by General Order No. 17 to put plans in operation only by supplementary order of the Office of Defense Transportation. In addition, joint action by such
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carriers had in general to conform to recommendation No. 122a.
Under recommendation No. 122a, when private carriers elected to seek approval of a joint action plan, they filed it with the district office best situated to supervise their operations. The district manager made a preliminary examination of the plan with the assistance of the private carrier specialist attached to his office. When a plan included provisions that appeared doubtful or outside the scope of recommendation No. 122a, and if such provisions could be omitted without affecting the conservation features of the plan, the district manager discussed the matter with the participants and endeavored to bring the plan within the recommendation. The plan was then forwarded to the director of regional operations in Washington, together with the comments and recommendations of the district manager. In Washington, the plan was reviewed by the general counsel, and if it conformed to the recommendation and was likely to effect substantial conservation, it was approved. Thereupon the Office of Defense Transportation directed the participants to put the plan in operation. Other persons engaged in the same business as the participants had the right to petition for permission to become parties to the joint action and upon authorization by the office, might do so.
Copies of all plans approved by the Office of Defense Transportation were sent to the Chairman of the War Production Board and to the Attorney General.
Recommendation No. 122a was not sufficiently inclusive to embrace every conceivable joint action method. It was, therefore, sometimes necessary to
include in a plan provisions not specified in the recommendation. When such provisions were not considered essential for conservation purposes, they were omitted and approval given under Certificate No. 190 of the remainder of the plan. When provisions outside the scope of the recommendation were deemed essential, the whole of the proposed plan was considered for approval under a separate order of the Office of Defense Transportation.
District managers, with the assistance of their private carrier specialists, explored all prospects for joint action by private carriers. They interviewed private carriers and examined traffic and vehicle registration records for the purpose of discovering situations where joint action was desirable. The private carrier district advisory committees aided in advancing the program by conducting educational campaigns encouraging carriers to participate in joint action plans. In this they cooperated closely with the Office of Defense Transportation district offices.
Records of the Office of Defense Transportation indicate that over 3900 joint action plans were consummated by the motor carriers of property, and that these plans accounted for estimated annual savings of about 452,000,000 vehicle miles. The saving in much needed man-hours is not recorded but probably was in excess of 15,000,000, not to mention savings by vitally important affiliated activities. The savings were effected principally within the group of intercity common carriers, who actually possessed only a small portion of the power units in the property-carrying field.
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CHAPTER XVII
TRAFFIC AND VEHICLE REGISTRATION
One of the continuing efforts of the Office of Defense Transportation was to eliminate empty and partially loaded trucks. Maximum loading of all vehicles was necessary to care for the vast load to be transported. Both General Order No. 3 and No. 17 contained provisions designed to insure full loading. General Order No. 3 was originally issued in April 1942. General Orders Nos. 4 and 5 were predecessors of General Order No. 17. Both these latter orders provided that no over-the-road carrier could operate a truck unless loaded to capacity at the point of origin and unless loaded to at least 75 percent capacity on the return trip. But this provision soon proved too inflexible and difficult to comply with. Except for the joint action procedure, which was voluntary, the order created no machinery to aid the carriers in obtaining full loads; and the carriers themselves found it impossible to work out programs on any large scale to effectuate this feature of the orders.
To correct this lack and furnish a means for carriers to obtain capacity loads when feasible, General Order ODT No. 13 was issued July 2, 1942. This order authorized the establishment of “Joint Information Offices” to aid in advising carriers on matters of loading. The inflexible provisions concerning loading in General Orders Nos. 4 and 5 were eased. Operators were now required to carry a capacity load over a “considerable portion” of the trip out or the trip back. However, trucks were permitted to operate with less than capacity load, or even empty, over a portion of the trip out or return, if after exercising due diligence the operator was unable to obtain a full load. “Due diligence” was defined as endeavoring in good faith to obtain a capacity load.
If unsuccessful in obtaining a load upon their own initiative, over-the-road common carriers were required to make inquiry concerning possible lading at a joint information office established pursuant to General Order ODT No. 13; or, if no such office was available, they were required to check with other carriers individually in an effort to obtain a load. If no loads were then available, the common carrier was to attempt to lease his trucks.
In the case of contract and private carriers, General Order ODT No. 17 required them, prior to operating an empty truck, to endeavor to lease or rent it to another operator through the assistance of the joint information office; or, no such office being available, of other carriers.
The order provided that a joint information office could be set up by two or more carriers or by an association of carriers. Such offices could be located anywhere, subject to approval by the Office of Defense Transportation. Carriers were instructed to study local traffic conditions before deciding upon an office location. The order intended that offices be established at all important traffic centers and suitable points from which the offices could assist carriers in effecting conservation in the use of equipment. Approval by the Office of Defense Transportation was signified by the issuance of a certificate to be conspicuously posted in the office.
Such office had a manager and a governing committee or board. The members were selected by the carriers, subject to approval by the Office of Defense Transportation. The name and address of each person selected as a member of a governing board, each manager and employee, together with information as to his character, experience, past and present, were submitted to the Office of Defense Transportation with the application to establish an office.
When such permission was granted, the Office of Defense Transportation retained authority to remove any member of a governing board, any manager or employee, at any time. A manager worked full or part-time, depending on the amount of work the office had to do.
Application to set up an office, filed with the nearest field office of the Office of Defense Transportation, would be held for 10 days to give carriers not participating in the application an opportunity to present objections to theproposaL Applications were then forwarded to the Motor Transport Division at Washington, together with the recommendations of the field office manager.
At the time of filing an application, the participating carriers notified by mail a representative number
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of all classes of carriers, operating in that area, of the action taken and the location of the new office.
In addition, the manager of the Motor Transport Division field office posted a notice in his office that such an application had been received. Objections were filed with the field office manager concerned and were forwarded with the applications to Washington. Final decision on the application was made by the Director of the Motor Transport Division.
The offices were financed by the carriers. Nocar-rier could be required to pay a membership fee, though he could be charged for services. The governing board of an office was empowered to fix “nondis-c ri minatory charges” subject to change by the Office of Defense Transportation, for services rendered to individual carriers. Charges for clearance ranged from 50c to $1. Plans for charges and apportionment of costs were outlined in the application for. permission to set up an office.
If a carrier obtained a load for his truck or leased it as a result of registering with a joint information office, division of revenues or rental charges was to be agreed upon by the carriers concerned. If they failed to agree, and if charges were not prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, or by a state regulatory body, then division of revenues or rental charges was determined by the Office of Defense Transportation.
General Order ODT No. 13 stipulated that no joint information office was authorized “to fix compensation for the interchange of traffic, or for the transport of traffic interchange, or the rental price of a vehicle leased, or to designate any particular carriers to receive any given traffic, or to lease, rent, or exchange any given vehicle.”
Procedure in Registering
A common carrier was required to register every partially loaded or empty truck and to obtain a clearance statement before continuing a trip. Contract and private carriers registered all empty trucks, but were not required to register partially loaded trucks, since only empty trucks could be rented or leased by other carriers. A clearance statement was issued to common carriers when (1) truck carried less-than-capacity load and no information was on file showing that property was available for shipment to the truck’s destination or any point intermediate to, or beyond, that destination; when (2) the carrier had accepted for transport and loaded up to capacity all property available for transport to such points; or (3) when a truck was empty and there was no information on file with the office to indicate that another carrier desired to use the truck for transporting
property to the truck’s destination or to an intermediate point.
When there was a need for the services of an office in a city where none existed, a common carrier was required to make appropriate inquiries of other carriers in an effort to secure a load, or to rent or lease his truck. A contract or private carrier had to make similar inquiries in an effort to lease or rent an empty truck.
Office managers were required to maintain records of all information filed with them and to make regular reports to the Office of Defense Transportation. All records, files, and correspondence were available to representatives of the Office of Defense Transportation at all times.
No carrier was to refuse a load offered through a joint information office because of unsatisfactory compensation. Such a disagreement constituted no basis for operating an insufficiently loaded vehicle. The proper procedure in such cases was for the carrier to accept the load and then submit the question of compensation to the Office of Defense Transportation for decision.
Experience under General Order ODT No. 13
On August 24,1943, the Director of the Division of Motor Transport wrote to 560 members of the boards of governors of the various joint information offices, asking them: Should the Office of Defense Transportation take over the functions of the joint information offices ? By September 26,218 members replied. Of this number, 30 percent believed that industry should continue to operate the offices. Sixty-four percent requested the Office of Defense Transportation to assume their functions. Six percent were noncommittal. Offices at that time were operating in 78 cities throughout the country.
This query was sent out, after less than a year’s trial, because the net results of the joint information plan left much to be desired. The unimpressive record was due to several things. Carriers were reluctant to come forward with applications to establish offices because of the initial expense involved. The length of time required to organize an office also proved discouraging. Then, once an office was organized, carriers were often reluctant to register freight or vehicles for fear of revealing business secrets. The groups also found it difficult to agree upon compensation. When there was ample equipment, the compensation offered was low; when equipment was scarce, lessors held out for exorbitant fees.
There was also a tendency to circumvent the use of offices. Often after a lessor and lessee had met through a joint information office, they later made their own deals outside the office to avoid the payment of fees. Private and contract carriers showed
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little interest in the plan, since they regarded transport as merely incidental to their principal business. Hence they were not active in eliminating empty hauls. Contract carriers also were more concerned with maintaining schedules than in securing return loads.
Two difficulties also arose in connection with leasing empty trucks, especially by private and contract carriers, subject to General Order ODT No. 17. It was found generally more practical in lease agreements for the lessors’ drivers to operate the trucks since most leases were for vehicles engaged in back hauls to the area of their home terminals. In such circumstances, a question arose: Did the drivers of the vehicles become the employees of the lessors or the lessees?
Another difficulty related to responsibility under ICC regulations. Those regulations imposed on carriers certain duties with respect to their employees toward shippers, consignees, and the general public. As originally issued, General Order ODT No. 17 was not clear as to who was responsible when the lessors’ drivers operated a truck leased to another party. Such confusion served to discourage the registration and leasing of empty equipment.
Still another question arose: Who was required to withhold income taxes under the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, in cases of drivers and helpers supplied by lessors of trucks? Under the form of lease generally used, the lessee paid no compensation, as such, though he did agree to pay the lessor a sum computed on mileage or flat-fee basis to cover the equipment and all other expenses. But it was not altogether clear, in this situation, whether lessor or lessee was responsible for withholding tax payments. This uncertainty was in turn reflected in an unwillingness to enter into leases.
In time both situations were clarified. Amendment No. 4 to General Order ODT No. 17 (superseded by amendment No. 7, March 10, 1944) provided that the lessee utilize the services of the driver regularly employed by the lessor in connection with the operation under the lease. The driver, or any other helper, however, was not to be transferred to the lessee’s payroll although the lessee was to assume full direction and control and full responsibility to the public, shippers, and consignees for the operation of the vehicle. A form of lease was drawn up by the Office of Defense Transportation embodying these conditions and its use recommended. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that under such a lease, it was the responsibility of the lessor to withhold tax payments. Later, General Order ODT No. 3 was amended (amendment No. 5, March 10, 1944) in conformity with the ruling. The cause of confusion
was thus removed, but in the meantime the Office of Defense Transportation decided to revoke General Order ODT No. 13 and take over the functions of the joint information office.
Examination of the obstacles encountered under General Order ODT No. 13 shows that most, if not all, resulted from joint information offices being organi-zed and operated by the carriers themselves. It was felt that the Office of Defense Transportation could assume the function and do a better job. All interested parties agreed that the elimination of empty return hauls and the improvement of the load factor were of great benefit to the general conservation program and to the financial interest of the carriers. It would be unwise to abandon the project altogether. The Office of Defense Transportation, therefore, issued Administrative Order ODT No. 10, effective March 27,1944, vesting in its 142 district offices the former duties of the joint information offices, and at the same time revoked General Order ODT No. 13.
The basic obligation to register empty vehicles and freight was imposed upon the carriers by General Orders ODT Nos. 3 and 17. Amendment No. 5 to General Order ODT No. 3, issued March 10,1944, required every over-the-road common carrier to obtain a capacity load for an empty or partially loaded truck or to lease it to another common or contract carrier. If the point of departure of such a truck was not at or near a district office of the Office of Defense Transportation, the carrier was to make inquiry of shippers, contract carriers, and common carriers with a view to obtaining full loading or leasing the truck.
If the point of departure was at or near a district office, the carrier was to register the truck with the office and either lease it or obtain full loading for the transport of freight to, toward, or beyond the destination point of the truck. A point was considered at or near a district office when within a municipality in which a district office was located or within 25 miles from the boundary thereof. In order to facilitate the loading or leasing of trucks through district offices, a common carrier who anticipated that his truck would leave any point empty or partially loaded as often as five times within 60 days, was to notify the nearest district office to that effect..
Amendment No. 5 to General Order ODT No. 3 also changed the original provisions in the order concerning interchange of freight between carriers. When freight was offered to a common carrier by a shipper at, or near, a district office, and when such freight exceeded 10,000 pounds or 500 cubic feet, the carrier was required to make collection within 24 hours. If unable to make collection, the carrier was to register the freight with the nearest district office. Where freight was offered to a carrier not at or near a
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district office, it was to be registered if it exceeded 20,000 pounds or 1,000 cubic feet.
This situation was distinguished, in the amendment, from one in which the freight, in possession of a carrier, was either in his vehicle, warehouse, or terminal, and the carrier was unable to move or direct it to another motor, rail, or water common carrier within 36 hours. In the latter situation, the carrier, at the end of 36 hours, was to register the freight with? the nearest district office. Neither this provision nor the one relating to freight offered by a shipper was to apply to carriers regularly operating weekly or semiweekly service.
Amendment No. 7 to General Order ODT No. 17
As originally planned General Order ODT No. 17 required private and contract carriers to register empty trucks, but not freight, with joint information offices. Amendment No. 7 provided that registration was to be made with the district offices. Administrative Order ODT No. 10 permitted, but did not require, contract carriers to register freight.
A district office, however, had no authority to direct that freight registered by a contract carrier be transported by a common carrier who had registered a truck. Nor was a contract carrier required by General Order ODT No. 17 to interchange freight with or divert it to a common carrier. Furthermore, a contract carrier as a general rule was not authorized by regulatory statute to so interchange with or divert to another carrier. Therefore, the provision in Administrative Order ODT No. 10 permitting a contract carrier to register freight and the authority of the district office under that order, meant only this: The district office might direct a contract carrier registering freight to lease from another carrier a registered truck to transport such freight.
Administrative Order ODT No. 10 required the district office to give to any private carrier, when asked, information as to empty trucks registered by
private or contract carriers. Only in this sense could a private carrier who obtained such information from an office be said to lease a truck through an office. General Order ODT No. 17 (sec. 501.69) required private carriers under specified circumstances to lease or endeavor to lease empty vehicles to other carriers, including common and contract carriers, and they might do so without resort to a district office. Furthermore, in leasing transactions, they could not be compelled to do anything which would have changed their status as private carriers.
Through the media of these offices, vehicles of private, contract, and common carriers, which normally would move empty, were made available to other carriers for the purpose of-augmenting their equipment. Empty mileage was eliminated and delays in handling traffic reduced. Through the records developed daily, ODT was enabled to determine where empty mileage was being operated and excess tonnage accumulated. This information was of material value in connection with requests for recommendations to the Defense Plant Corporation with respect to the need for motor transportation equipment and facilities involving Defense Plant Corporation aid in the purchase of such equipment or facilities. Ninety-two of these recommendations were made of which eighty-four were favorable.
Motor carriers recognized the fact that the facilities provided effective means of utilization of equipment that would otherwise travel without lading and was of material value in meeting the demands made on industry due to abrupt changes that occurred almost daily during the war period. Industry members acknowledged that this program fulfilled a definite I transportation need brought about through lack of equipment, replacement parts, tires, and manpower, and increased the efficiency of operators and aided them in securing complete utilization of equipment.
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CHAPTER XVIII
CONSERVATION OF FARM VEHICLES
Several characteristic features of farm transport by truck clearly differentiate it from other transport by motor vehicle and make necessary the employment of distinctive control measures in order to achieve maximum utilization and conservation in the use of equipment. First of all, the sheer number of farm truck operators increased enormously the administrative and enforcement difficulties incident to any regulatory program. There are approximately 1,650,-000 farm trucks in the country controlled by almost that many operators. The magnitude of this figure can be appreciated when it is compared with the 632,000 trucks operated by about 295,000 for-hire carriers in all types of services.
But the difference in numbers does not, by itself, indicate the additional burden involved in regulating farm trucks. There is also present a qualitative factor which must be considered in measuring the burden of administering a farm transport program. Farm truck owners in peacetime operate largely under conditions free from Government regulation or control. They are, therefore, unfamiliar with the restrictions and techniques of regulation. Nearly all for-hire carriers are, on the other hand, normally subject to a large measure of Government control, intrastate carriers by state commissions and interstate carriers by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The task, therefore, of bringing home to the farmers the nature and the requirements of the farm truck program and of familiarizing them for the first time during the war with the methods and practices of Government regulation was a much more difficult one than the same task connected with the for-hire truck program. The latter program, as has been seen, encountered numerous obstacles, but the carriers, because of their previous experience, needed at least no introduction to regulation as such.
The Pattern of Farm Transport
Subject to numerous exceptions depending upon the nature of the commodity and upon population density, local customs and competitive business practices, three broad stages are distinguishable in the movement of agricultural products from producer to consumer. They are (1) transport from farms to
assembly or shipping points, packing and other processing plants; (2) over-the-road carriage from such initial marketing centers to distribution centers; and (3) redistribution from terminal markets through wholesaling and retailing channels to points of final consumption. Movements in the first and third stages are performed almost exclusively by motor vehicles as is also a large part of over-the-road transport. Of principal concern here are the vehicles engaged in the first stage. They are generally referred to as “farm vehicles.”
Any governmental program purporting to regulate farm vehicles in behalf of the war effort must take account of at least three salient characteristics inherent in transport from farms to initial marketing outlets. These are the participation of several types of carriers in the movement; the carriage of farm supplies to the farm as a return haul ; and the conditions peculiar to the production of each class of farm products.
The 1,650,000 farm vehicles owned and operated by farmers furnish by far the principal means of transport employed in moving farm products from farms. But sharing measurably in this work are a large number of trucks belonging to processors and for-hire carriers. The for-hire carriers are usually contract carriers because movement of most agricultural commodities is seasonal and irregular and therefore not suited to the business of common carriers operating on regular schedules. The volume of farm traffic transported by processors, and by for-hire carriers particularly, is greater than their number indicates, and they constitute an important factor in hauling products from farms. Another factor peculiar to the farm transport situation is the presence of cooperative associations. There are numerous marketing and processing cooperatives, and they often own and operate trucks in transporting products from farms. As a consequence of this participation in agricultural transportation by carriers, other than farmers operating their own vehicles, regulatory policy and administration must often be designed on the basis of the use to which vehicles are put rather than type of carrier involved.
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Another distinctive feature in the pattern of farm trucking is the carrying of supplies to farms. In sparsely populated areas, farmers ordinarily make periodic trips to town to sell their produce, transact farm or personal business, and procure farm and household supplies. Many farmers like to inspect supplies before they purchase them. This is generally true of farm tools and equipment, feed, seed, fertilizer, and other items. Altogether agricultural supplies constitute an important and peculiar element in farm transport. From the point of view of a conservation program, they open up the possibility of increasing the utilization of equipment on the return haul.
Conditions under which the various farm products are produced vary with the products, and the transport services required often vary accordingly. Some commodities are produced in widely scattered regions and others under conditions of large-scale production in relatively restricted areas. Some farm products, like fluid milk and eggs, move to market continuously throughout the year. Fresh fruits and vegetables, on the other hand, are produced in season and a whole year’s supply may move within a few weeks. Commodities, like livestock and others that require refrigeration, must be moved in special equipment while many products can be handled in any kind of a truck. Again, there is a difference in marketing with respect to complexity. Some farm products move directly over short distances from farm to market or shipping point. Examples of these are dairy products, andffruits and vegetables shipped to local consuming centers or to local processing plants. Other products reach their destination after long and complex journeys, and their ultimate destination often depends upon transitory market conditions. The best example of these is livestock, which may be handled by several dealers and in several markets before finally reaching a slaughterhouse. Cattle and sheep are commonly shipped from ranges to stocker and feeder farms for finishing before they are finally marketed. A complicated movement such as this obviously presents transportation problems different from a direct movement from farms to consuming center or processing plant. Because conditions under which various agricultural products are produced vary as the products vary, and these conditions directly affect transport, regulatory policy must be formulated for each class of products rather than for farm products generally.
These characteristics of transport by farm vehicles set such transport apart and made necessary special control measures to achieve conservation and maximum utilization of equipment. As a result, General Orders ODT Nos. 3, 6-A, and 17 exempt from their
provisions “any motor truck controlled and operated by any person* **principally engaged in farming when used in the transportation of agricultural commodities and products thereof, from a farm***” General Order ODT No. 17 expressly applied to farm trucks employed in retail or house-to-house delivery of agricultural products, and such trucks did not come within the definition of farm trucks as here used. General Order ODT No. 17 also applied to over-the-road contract carriers of agricultural products, and General Order ODT No. 3 to over-the-road common carriers of such products.
Farm trucks owned by farmers and operated between farms and initial marketing points were excluded from the general orders, but the farm transport conservation program of the Office of Defense Transportation did include vehicles operated by processors and for-hire carriers. For example, the Industry Transportation Committee, an important feature of the program, embraced all vehicles carrying farm products whether they were operated by farmers, processors, cooperatives or for-hire carriers.
Cooperation with Department of Agriculture
It was the responsibility of the Office of Defense Transportation to, provide for the orderly movement of farm products from producing areas and of farm supplies to the farms. In discharging its responsibility, the Office of Defense Transportation was assisted by the United States Department of Agriculture. The conservation program formulated by the Office of Defense Transportation was directed to every operator of a farm truck in the country, and in its administration, several agencies of the Department of Agriculture, because their representatives reached into every corner of the land, furnished invaluable aid.
On July 5, 1941, the Secretary of Agriculture established War Boards in each State and in each of the 3,022 agricultural counties of the nation, as well as in Puerto Rico and Hawaii. They were originally designated as United States Department of Agriculture State and County Defense Boards. Their function was to coordinate the war activities of Department of Agriculture agencies., The name of the boards was changed January 7, 1942, to U.S.D.A. State and County War Boards in order to reflect the more active and aggressive spirit that swept the country after Pearl Harbor.
The State War Board was composed of one representative from each of the following state agencies of the Department of Agriculture : The Agricultural Adjustment Administration, Agricultural Marketing Administration, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Extension Service, Farm Credit Administration,
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Farm Security Administration, Forest Service, Rural Electrification Administration, and Soil Conservation Service. A county War Board was similarly constituted, being made up of county representatives of these agencies, if available.
The major functions of the War Boards were to coordinate in the field the work of the various agencies of the Department in helping farmers play their full part in the war agricultural program ; and to serve as the field representatives of the Department in cooperating with war agencies outside the Department.
County Farm Transportation Committees
On October 6, 1942, the Secretary of Agriculture, at the request of the Office of Defense Transportation, directed the County War Boards to establish County Farm Transportation Committees to assist in effectuating the Certificate of War Necessity program. These committees consisted of five regular and four alternate members. The chairman of each was the chairman of the County War Board. Other members included a farmer representative of the principal type of agriculture in the county ; a farmer representative of the next important type of agriculture ; a representative of farm truck transport ; and a dealer in farm supplies.
State War Boards served as State Farm Transportation Committees and had supervisory authority over the county committees.
The County Farm Transportation Committees utilized the services of the community committeemen of the county Agricultural Adjustment Administration Committee. One purpose of these community organizations was to assist the advancement of the farm transport program to their localities.
In October 1943, the responsibilities of the agencies in the Department of Agriculture were redefined and the County Farm Transportation Committees were placed under the State and County Agricultural Adjustment Administration offices subject to the general direction of the Office of Materials and Facilities. The sole reason for the change was that the Agricultural Adjustment Administration agencies were the only full-time representatives of the Department of Agriculture in every county in the country. The composition, qualifications, and responsibilities of the County Farm Transportation Committees remained unchanged, and their transfer from the Department of Agriculture War Boards was without significance from the viewpoint of the Office of Defense Transportation.
The farm transport program formulated by the Office of Defense Transportation provided for conservation and increased utilization of farm trucks;
proper allocation of new trucks for agricultural purposes; requisitioning idle trucks; and improved maintenance practices in the operation of farm trucks.
Three phases were distinguishable in the measures and policies pursued by the Office of Defense Transportation in seeking to conserve farm trucks and increase their utilization. They were interrelated and simultaneously prosecuted. They were the application of the Certificate of War Necessity program to farm trucks ; community pooling of farmer-owned trucks ; and the organization of Industry Transportation Advisory Committees.
Certificates of War Necessity
General Order ODT No. 21 required a Certificate of War Necessity for the operation of every “commercial vehicle” in the country, and farm trucks were included within the definition of the term “commercial vehicle.” Because of the peculiar conditions under which farm trucks are operated, it was necessary to make special arrangements in applying the order to such vehicles. A cardinal feature of these arrangements was the contribution made by the field offices of the Department of Agriculture.
The functions performed by the County Farm Transportation Committees were particularly important in connection with the issuance, tailoring, and adjustment of Certificates of War Necessity pertaining to farm trucks. It was necessary in the first place to inform all farmers operating trucks that they were required to secure certificates. Since there were 3,022 county committees, they were in a far better position to do this than the small number of Office of Defense Transportation district offices, which often were not easily accessible to farmers.
Applications pertaining to Certificates of War Necessity for farm trucks called for the same information relative to average loads, mileage, and gasoline consumption as other applications. Farmers found it particularly difficult to furnish these data because they did not generally maintain records adequate for the purpose. In the absence of operating records, they were permitted to make estimates, and in this, they found the assistance of the County Farm Transportation Committee indispensable.
Circumstances attending the tailoring and issuance of certificates by the central mailing office have already been recited. What has been said of certificates issued to carriers generally was equally applicable to those issued to farmers, that is, mileage and gasoline allowances were often computed on the basis of inadequate information and were bound to meet with frequent disapproval. Agricultural production and transport, however, occupied such a crucial place
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in the war program that special efforts were made to supply the reasonable and necessary requirements of farm trucks.
In the administrative machinery set up to pass upon appeals by farmers for greater mileage and gasoline allowance, use was again made of the County Farm Transportation Committees. Appeals were filed by farmers with these committees. The committees reviewed the appeals, made recommendations as to their disposition and then transmitted them to the Office of Defense Transportation district offices.
The recommendations of the committees related to allowable mileage and gasoline rations and in determining these, the committees were guided by policies established by the Office of Defense Transportation. Fundamentally the Office of Defense Transportation evinced a special concern for the requirements of farm transport but, at the same time, sought to remove from such transport all wasteful practices. Committees in making mileage and gasoline recommendations were accordingly instructed to consider and eliminate the following operations as wasteful:
1. The operation of a farm truck to transport farm products to, or farm supplies from, a point beyond the nearest practicable market.
2. The operation of an empty farm vehicle when a full or partial load was available for transport.
3. The operation of a farm vehicle with less than a full load where a regular collection route was established and was available.
4. The operation of a farm vehicle in a scheduled service over a road or highway the condition or surface of which was apt to cause undue wear of either tires or vehicle.
5. The operation of a heavy or large farm vehicle when a lighter or smaller one was available and suitable.
6. The use of a farm vehicle to transport persons exclusively when other means were available.
Also considered as wasteful was failure by an operator of a farm vehicle to cooperate with any other person engaged in operating a farm vehicle and with shippers and receivers in the making of route reorganization or pooling arrangements designed to conserve the use of vehicles; to comply with the preventive maintenance program outlined by the Office of Defense Transportation; and to curtail services and reduce schedules and miles operated to the extent necessary to assure maximum utilization and conservation of vital equipment, materials, and supplies.
While it was thus the goal of the Office of Defense Transportation to eliminate all wasteful operations of farm trucks, there was, at the same time, a particular concern to maintain essential services performed by such trucks. This was evidenced in May 1943, when the gasoline supply in the eastern region became critically low, and it was necessary to reduce by 40 percent the fuel allotments to motor carriers
generally. No such reduction, however, was imposed on farm trucks.
Recommendations of County Farm Transportation Committees in passing upon appeals carried special authority. For example, when a district manager did not concur in the recommendations of a committee he was required by the Office of Defense Transportation procedure to confer with the committee and arrive at an agreement. In the event an appeal was disapproved, if the certificate holder believed his mileage and gasoline allowance inadequate to enable him to conduct transport services necessary to the war effort or to the maintenance of essential civilian economy, he was permitted to file a second appeal with the district office for transmittal to the appropriate regional director. According to the provisions of Administrative Order ODT No. 8, adopted September 24, 1943, a final appeal from an adverse decision by the regional director was submitted to the director of the Office of Defense Transportation in Washington.
Under General Order ODT No. 21A recommendations for permanent changes on Certificates of War Necessity continued to be made by the County Farm Transportation Committees and arrangements were made between War Food Administration and the Office of Price Administration for recommendations on temporary and nonrecurring gasoline rations which were referred to the Office of Price Administration’s local boards for action and not to the Office of Defense Transportation district offices.
Community Pooling of Trucks
The second phase of the farm transport conservation program may be conveniently referred to as community pooling. It was largely fostered by the County Farm Transportation Committee and local community leaders in cooperation with the Office of Defense Transportation. Pooling was encouraged and publicized in agricultural communities through press releases, radio shorts, and meetings. “Pooling transportation” was explained as “just another name for neighborly cooperation to save miles on motor and tires, to save gas and out-of-pocket expense, and make cars and trucks last longer by having one trip to town serve several errands.” Farm organizations were urged to sponsor pooling plans, and farmers were advised to join with their neighbors in making informal arrangements to share transport facilities. Although the Certificate of War Necessity furnished a means of exerting pressure on farmers to pool their equipment, this’ phase of the conservation program depended principally on the voluntary cooperation of the farmers.
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Industry Transportation Advisory Committees
While thus encouraging and stimulating neighborly and local cooperation, the Office of Defense Transportation attacked the problem of effecting conservation in the transport of farm products from another point of view. In October 1942, after consultation with the Department of Agriculture and with representatives of farm-truck operators, the Office of Defense Transportation announced the formulation of a program providing for cooperation by the producers, carriers, and processors. The announcement recommended the forming of Industry Transportation Committees which were to be representative of all of them. These committees were to assume responsibility for the development of joint transportation plans in their areas. An essential feature of the program was that it contemplated the establishment of committees and plans on a commodity as well as a geographical basis.
Industry Transportation Plans
In order to expedite the organization of Industry Committees and the formulation of plans, the Office of Defense Transportation obtained from the Chairman of the War Production Board, in accordance with the terms of the Small Business Mobilization Act, a certificate safeguarding participants from prosecution under the antitrust laws. Certificate No. 28, issued February 2,1943, granted immunity from the antitrust laws to all participants in plans complying with the terms of the recommendation. An amended certificate was issued, March 22,1943, in response to an amended recommendation of the same date. Neither made any change significant from the point of view of this discussion in the original certificate and recommendation.
Although making a few minor changes in detail, the recommendation on the whole embodied and formalized the procedure and policy of the original announcement in respect of Industry Transportation Committees. Under it, procedure was substantially as follows:
(1) Producers, motor carriers, processors, and dealers in any particular farm commodity in a designated area met and selected an Industry Transportation Committee. The Committee was chosen in such a manner as to be equally representative of these various groups. After the Committee was approved by the Office of Defense Transportation, it proceeded to develop an Industry Transportation Plan for the efficient transportation of the commodity concerned.
(2) An Industry Transportation Plan consisted either of only one part, providing for relocation of routes within the designated area, or also of a second part providing for the zoning of producing and marketing areas.
(3) A plan providing only for the relocation of routes contained the following information: (a) description of the area involved; (b) number and location of plants and dealers; (c) number of producers; (d) present routes of haulers; (e) pro-
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posed routes of haulers; (f) truck and tire mileage savings expected; (g) relation of the plan to carrier regulation; (h) names of any haulers suspending operations.
If zoning was contemplated, a second part was included. This part furnished a description of the zoning planned, a statement that prices paid for the commodity involved were not to be affected without the consent of producers, and a list of any producers, motor carriers, processors, or dealers in the area not participating in the plan and their reasons for staying out.
The first part provided for the greatest possible conservation of equipment in the transport of farm commodities to markets shown by producers. The second part proceeded a step further in that it provided for the transport of farm commodities to markets nearest the producers.
Safeguards were established to prevent unfair interference with the operations of either participants or nonparticipants. Each plan provided that prices received by the producer could not be changed without his consent, and that the processor or dealer was to receive and the producer to deliver approximately the same quantity of the product concerned as before. No plan denied the producer, processor, or dealer the right to deliver or procure agricultural commodities by the use of transport facilities other than those of the motor carriers participating in the plan; nor did any plan require a particular carrier to perform any transportation service not authorized by law or beyond his capacity.
Before a plan was submitted to the Office of Defense Transportation, it was published by the Industry Transportation Committee so that everyone in the area affected by it had an opportunity to study its provisions. Any producer, motor carrier, processor, or dealer in agricultural commodities within such area was afforded an opportunity to complain or comment in respect of the proposed relocation of routes or zoning of market areas as described in the plan. The Industry Transportation Committee considered and, if possible, adjusted complaints. Any unadjusted complaints were attached to the plan together with a brief statement setting forth the position of the committee.
The plan was then submitted to the general counsel of the Office of Defense Transportation. If, in his opinion, its adoption accomplished substantial conservation and efficient utilization of motor trucks, he approved it.
The Office of Defense Transportation designated one of its employees to serve as administrator of the plan. He acted in that capacity with the advice and assistance of an Industry Advisory Committee. This committee was selected by the participants in the
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plan subject to the same conditions and limitations as prescribed for the selection of the Industry Transportation Committee.
After a plan was put into operation, any participant could file a complaint in respect to it with the administrator. In the event no satisfactory adjustment was made, the complainant could appeal to the director of Regional Operations, Office of Defense Transportation, Washington, whose decision was final.
Transportation of Dairy Products
In practice, the terms of certificate No. 28 proved especially helpful in stimulating the organization of industry committees by producers, haulers, and processors of fluid milk and dairy products. There were several reasons for this. Dairy products are produced in all sections of the country. Milk is produced for fluid consumption in the areas surrounding urban communities. In most other sections, milk and cream are produced for butter and cheese and for making canned and dried milk. The magnitude of the movement involved in transporting milk and dairy products to various processors afforded opportunities for substantial reduction in mileage through conservation measures. Furthermore, the production of dairy products is largely a year around business. The perishability of milk and cream makes it necessary that they be assembled from the farm at frequent and regular intervals. This continuity and regularity of dairy transport led in the past to the development of assembly systems on an area basis with regular routes and with established relationships between producers, haulers and receivers. It was, therefore, entirely feasible for them to come together, organize committees and formulate plans making adjustments in schedules, in pick-up service and in marketing practices in accordance with the requirements of certificate No. 28.
Livestock Movements
Special arrangements were made to meet the peculiar conditions attending the transport of other agricultural products that were of vital importance to the war effort. This was particularly true of livestock. The assembly and marketing of hogs, cattle, and sheep presented special problems. Not only is each species of stock handled differently, but classes and grades of stock within each species require special treatment. A farmer or stockman markets only a few times a year and consequently it is impossible for a livestock trucker to have a regular route. Livestock cannot be picked up as milk is assembled. Again, unlike the dairyman, the livestock producer does not depend upon one market outlet for all classes of his livestock. A livestock farmer in the
Middle West may market his hogs, for example, at one or more interior packing plants or concentration points, his well-finished cattle and lambs at Chicago, and his butcher stock and veal calves at other markets. Other conditions and practices affecting the production and marketing of livestock made it necessary to treat its movement separately for purposes of transport conservation. This was initially done under Certificate No. 115, issued August 20, 1943.
This certificate established a program for conservation of livestock transport by motor vehicle which was more flexible than the program for dairy transport. Whereas the latter looked forward to the creation of definite plans, essentials of which were clearly set forth in certificate No. 28, the emphasis in the livestock program was on area industry transportation committees whose functions were to investigate and advise on livestock movements in the area. Each area committee was representative of producers, motor carriers, dealers, and processors within an Office of Defense Transportation district engaged in the livestock business. It was selected and organized in substantially the same manner as the dairy committee. The same precautions as were taken in the dairy program were provided to protect the interests of all groups concerned and to afford an opportunity for complaint.
The selection of area committees was subject to approval of the Office of Defense Transportation. The office appointed an administrator, who in practice was the district manager in whose territory the committee functioned. The administrator with the advice and assistance of the Area Livestock Industry Transportation Advisory Committee was authorized to direct the movement of trucks in the transport of livestock within an area in a manner calculated to conserve such trucks and, insofar as possible, provide for the continuous movement of livestock by truck.
Under the supervision and the direction of the administrator, the committee acquired and recorded data relative to the quantity, type and kind of livestock located within its area and the points to or from which the transport of such livestock was required. On the basis of this information the committee made recommendations concerning the issuance, revision, or revocation of Certificates of War Necessity in the hands of operators of motor vehicles employed in the movement of livestock.
Conservation was effected through the authority of the administrator to direct the movement of trucks, and the power of the Office of Defense Transportation to control the issuance and revocation of certificates. Recommendations took a variety of forms. They urged the elimination of specific truck operations considered wasteful, or the establishment
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of definite arrangements to pick-up and move live-tock in a particular community or the adoption of a more elaborate plan approximating the type or plan contemplated by Certificate No. 28, adapted, of course, to the needs of livestock transport.
To assist it, the Area Livestock Industry Transportation Advisory Committee was authorized to appoint subcommittees, known as Local Livestock industry Transportation Committees. Local committees were formed in each county and were representative of all the interests engaged in the production, transport, and processing of livestock in ;heir territory. They performed such duties as the administrator delegated to them and advised and aided him in directing the movement of livestock trucks.
Area Industry Advisory Committees
Recommendations and certificates issued in connection with dairy committees constituted simply a statement of principles and a skeletal outline of procedure that had to be observed in organizing committees and formulating plans in order to insure immunity from prosecution under the antitrust laws. The Office of Defense Transportation implemented ;he recommendations with a detailed scheme of administration for the promotion and control of committees and plans. In addition, it was necessary to adapt the general program as outlined in the recommendations to the needs of particular industries. Since the transport of milk products presented the greatest opportunities for conservation, special efforts were early directed to advancing the program in the dairy industry.
The procedure established for the creation of a Dairy Industry Advisory Committee comprised the designation of a coordinating district manager; the organizatir .1 of a State Dairy Industry Transportation Cooruinating Committee ; the organization of an Area Dairy Transportation Committee; and, the lorganization of an Area Dairy Industry Advisory [Committee.
I The system of administration worked out revolved around the Office of Defense Transportation district offices and the dairy associations. Managers of district offices located near the administrative offices of the State managers and secretaries of Dairy Products Associations were designated as coordinating district managers and vested with responsibility for encouraging the creation of industry transportation [advisory committees.
State Dairy Transportation Advisory Committee
I As a next step, the coordinating district manager organized a State Dairy Industry Transportation Coordinating Committee. In this he invoked the
assistance of the State Department of Agriculture, dairy producers’ associations, executives of dairy processing plants, State United States Department of Agriculture Boards and dairy specialists of the State colleges of agriculture. From these, the coordinating manager obtained the names of individuals best qualified to form a State Dairy Industry Transportation Coordinating Committee.
Membership of this committee was representative of independent or proprietary dairy producers, haulers and processors, cooperative association producers and processors, dairy products haulers and associations, the State Departments of Agriculture and Health, the State Commercial Motor Vehicle Regulatory Body, the Milk Market Administrator’s Office, the Milk Control Board, State USDA Boards, and any other State or Federal agency that could contribute to the transport conservation program. To avoid unequal representation from any group, the coordinating district manager selected an outstanding individual from each to serve as a member of the State committee.
After a State committee was created, it proceeded to appoint several subcommittees. The function of the subcommittee for the selection of areas was to designate natural milksheds, production and marketing areas, or any other boundaries within which it was deemed advisable to develop dairy industry transportation plans. Areas were not necessarily limited by State lines since a natural milkshed often covered territory in several States.
The subcommittee for Area Dairy Industry Transportation Committees assisted the coordinating district manager in the selection of Area Dairy Transportation Committees.
Copies of Dairy Industry Transportation plans submitted to the Office of Defense Transportation for approval were filed with the subcommittee for review. This subcommittee analyzed such plans and made recommendations in respect of them. In general, it functioned as an “executive” or “action” committee for the State Dairy Industry Transportation Coordinating Committee. The membership of this subcommittee, insofar as possible, was representative of each section of the State.
As soon as the State Coordinating Committee and its subcommittee for selection of areas determined the boundaries of any milkshed or producing area, the Office of Defense Transportation’s district manager in whose district the milkshed or producing area was located assumed responsibility for advancing the organization of the Area Dairy Transportation Committees and the submission of plans in his district. Area Dairy Transportation Committee
The first step leading to the formulation of a plan
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w^s the organization of an Area Dairy Transportation Committee. Farmers, truckers, processors, or any others interested in conserving the use of dairy vehicles participated in forming a committee. The committee was chosen in accordance with the requirements of Certificate No. 28, and whether its members were elected by the groups concerned or their appointments ratified, they were representative of each of the groups equally. After a committee was established, its chairman submitted to the Director of Property Operations, the names of the members, with a complete description of the manner in which they were chosen, the groups they represented, the type of dairy products involved, and the area which the committee covered. If it appeared that the committee members represented all the groups or interests affected by the proposed plan, the Office of Defense Transportation formally approved the committee.
After approval was received by the chairman of the committee, work then proceeded on a truck conservation plan. The plan followed the principles laid down in Certificate No. 28. When it was prepared, all members of the committee expressed their aproval by signing it. If any member refused to sign, he stated his reasons in writing. When a majority of the committee signed the plan, the chairman of the committee forwarded it to the Director of Property Operations, Office of Defense Transportation, for approval.
The plan was reviewed by the Farm Vehicle Section and the general counsel of the Office of Defense Transportation. If the latter found the plan satisfactory, he advised the chairman of the War Production Board and the Attorney General by letter that the plan was necessary to the successful prosecution of the war. Upon issuance of this letter, the general counsel of the Office of Defense Transportation directed the chairman of the Industry Transportation Committee to put the plan in operation. At that time, the Office of Defense Transportation designated one of its Motor Transport district managers as “Administrator of the Plan.” The participants were then notified of the name of the “administrator” and were advised to select an “Industry Advisory Committee” whose duties were to assist the administrator in putting the plan in effect and to advise him in connection therewith.
The Dairy Industry Advisory Committee consisted either of the same membership as the original committee, or differed from it, but was in either event, equally representative of producers, haulers, and processors. All those affected by the plan were given an opportunity to approve or disapprove of the com
mittee when its membership differed from the original.
After conferring with his Industry Advisory Committee, the administrator adjusted the certificates of war necessity of all participating haulers in accordance with provisions of the plan. The certificate of an individual hauler was revised upward or downward depending upon whether the plan increased or reduced the mileage that was originally prescribed in his certificate.
Administration of Livestock Committees
The administration of the livestock transport conservation program followed principles similar to those underlying the milk transport program. In the case of livestock, the assistance of State Industry Associations was also utilized. In each State, the regional manager of the Office of Defense Transportation designated a district manager to arrange a meeting of all Office of Defense Transportation district managers and other persons interested in the conservation of livestock transportation. Such other persons included marketing specialists of State colleges of agriculture and experiment stations, secretaries and managers of the various livestock associations, representatives of the livestock division of the State Department of Agriculture, producers’ associations, executives of packing plants, National ant State farm associations, livestock truckers, livestock producers and feeders, livestock markets and exchanges, livestock sales and auctions, representatives of the State motor vehicle regulatory boards and any other Federal or State agency that could contribute to the program.
At this meeting, each Office of Defense Transportation district manager obtained the name of persons residing in each district best qualified to participate actively in a program to conserve facilities and equipment employed in livestock transport, and proceeded to organize an Area Livestock Industry Transportation Advisory Committee. Each district constituted an area for this purpose.
While the Livestock Industry Committee program did not provide for the formulation and submission for Office of Defense Transportation approval ofj such formal plans as featured the dairy program, the livestock committees nevertheless developed definite plans for the economical and efficient movement of livestock. On the basis of principles set forth in the recommendation and with the advice of competent research experts such as marketing specialists from State agricultural colleges, plans were made which included one or more of the following provisions:
(1) Designation of a person in a county or segment of a county who received information from producers in the area
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specifying the kind of livestock to be moved and the place to which it was to be consigned. The person collecting this information assisted haulers in planning their pick-ups in such a manner as to carry full loads with the least amount of travel between the first and last pick-ups.
(2) Schedules for trucks so that cross-hauling would be reduced or eliminated.
(3) Schedules in any area where a surplus of trucks existed so that one hauler picked up livestock on Monday, another on Tuesday, and so on through the week, thus rotating the operation of livestock trucks in the community.
(4) Loads on return trips.
Each district manager submitted monthly progress reports to the director of regional operations in Washington and to his regional director showing the status of the Advisory Industry Committee program in his district. The reports included information concerning the stage of committee formation, the number of plans submitted, number approved, number put into effect, mileage saved, and similar data reflecting the efficiency of conservation measures. A map of the district concerned was prepared, and it indicated by appropriate shading the extent to which the district was covered by plans.
Conserving Farm Transport
In 1944, mounting difficulties were anticipated by the Office of Defense Transportation in moving the Nation’s crops from farm to market. The average age of farm vehicles, already relatively high at the time of America’s entry into the war in December 1941, was increasing; spare parts for replacement purposes were scarce; the load of agricultural products was ever growing, and the supply of new vehicles available for civilian purposes constantly dwindling. At the same time, for-hire carriers of farm products were drifting to more remunerative fields. These factors were causing an alarming attrition in farm transport equipment and impelled the Office of Defense Transportation to intensify its efforts to bring every farm vehicle in the country within its conservation program. This was the objective of Administrative Order ODT No. 19, issued March 15, 1944, relating to dairy vehicles and Administrative Order ODT No. 26 issued July 3, 1944, relating to other vehicles employed in the transport of farm products, including livestock.
Administrative Order ODT No. 19 placed responsibility upon each Office of Defense Transportation district manager to effect conservation and maximum utilization in the transport of dairy products by truck within his district. It did so by authorizing the district manager to administer the provisions of section 501.101 of General Order ODT No. 21A. That section stated that the Office of Defense Transportar tion may direct commercial motor vehicles to be operated “in such manner, for such purpose, and between such points” as necessary to the “prosecution of the war or to the maintenance of essential
civilian economy or in the public interest.”
The district manager acted generally after consultation with and upon the recommendation of Dairy Industry Transportation Advisory Committees. Under Administrative Order ODT No. 19, therefore, these committees remained as an essential feature of the dairy transport program.
The administrative order contemplated the extension of committees throughout the country except where local conditions did not justify their existence. It requested producers, motor carriers, dealers, and processors of dairy products to organize committees unless they had already done so. Committees created pursuant to Certificate No. 28 were recognized by the order and instructed to function according to its terms. The order further prescribed the procedure that was to be observed in organizing new committees. Its provisions in this respect and also in regard to the administration and promotion of the program in general resembled those in the recommendation to Certificate No. 28. All committees required the approval of the Office of Defense Transportation.
The functions of the committees were to investigate conditions in their areas affecting the production and transport of dairy products, to explore the possibilities of conserving and increasing the utilization of trucks and to formulate conservation plans and programs. District managers were empowered to issue directions requiring vehicles to be operated according to the provisions of General Order ODT No. 21 A, and they were required to do so by Administrative Order ODT No. 19 on the basis of recommendations made by committees where committees existed; elsewhere district managers made investigations of their own and adopted measures in accordance with their findings.
Dairy transport conservation plans drawn up by committees were submitted to the Office of Defense Transportation either under the terms of Adminis-trative Order ODT No. 19 or under certificate No. 28, at the option of the participants. Committees were not expected to be organized nor plans consummated in areas where the number of producers and the volume of dairy products were too small to support a comprehensive conservation undertaking.
Plans, recommendations made by committees, or action taken by district managers on their own initiative usually required changes in schedules and routes of dairy carriers ; the services of some carriers were reduced while those of others were increased, and occasionally services were discontinued altogether. These results were effected by directions issued by district managers to the carriers involved. The certificates of war necessity of these carriers were revised or revoked accordingly. Likewise, where
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the district managers issued directions independently of any plan approved by the Office of Defense Transportation, their authority to make changes in transport services was subject to specific limitations enumerated in the order. In general, these limitations safeguarded the rights of producers, dealers, processors, or carriers, affected by directions, in substantially the same manner as provided in the recommendation to certificate No. 28. Directions that infringed upon these limitations had to be approved by the Office of Defense Trahsportation. In addition, any party in interest was given the right of filing complaints with district managers against such directions and of appealing to the appropriate regional director and ultimately to the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation.
Prior to the promulgation of Administrative Order ODT No. 26, the Office of Defense Transportation had for some time conducted conservation campaigns and had established policies and administrative procedures in connection therewith relative to the transport by motor vehicle from farm to processing plant of livestock, poultry and poultry products, perishable and seasonal farm products, cotton, cottonseed products, and citrus fruits. The livestock program was governed by the recommendation to Certificate No. 115, and has been discussed above. Measures taken in respect of other farm products followed a pattern outlined in administrative instructions, issued by the Office of Defense Transportation to its district managers.
Technically, the program relating to farm products other than livestock came within the terms of the recommendation to Certificate No. 28.-Actually the scheme applied to the transport of these products was a flexible one, revolving around Industry Transportation Advisory Committees in substantially the same manner as did the livestock program. In general, Administrative Order ODT No. 26 set up a system and policy of controlling the transport by truck of farm commodities other than dairy products analogous to those established in Administrative Order ODT No. 19.
Administrative Order ODT No. 19 requested the various interested groups to organize committees for the purpose of assisting the Office of Defense Transportation district managers in achieving the aims of General Order ODT No. 21A in relation to the transport of farm products, except dairy products, from producing areas to destination points. Destination points were defined as a farm, processing or packing plant, dehydrating, freezing or storage point, warehouse, rail or waterhead, wholesale or retail market place. Retail distribution did not come within the scope of the order.
Committees created prior to the effective date of Administrative Order ODT No. 26 continued to operate, but they were required to conform to the provisions of the order. New committees had to obtain the cooperation of farm trucks in their areas, advise the district managers regarding conservation and make recommendations with that end in view. The committees formulated comprehensive plans or recommended specific directions. In this respect, administration under Administrative Order ODT No. 26 differed from that under Administrative Order ODT No. 19, since plans adopted under the former did not generally require the approval of the Office of Defense Transportation. Administrative Order ODT No. 26, however, imposed the similar limitations upon the authority of district managers to issue directions as did Administrative Order ODT No. 19, and when district managers failed to observe these limitations, their directions required the approval of the Office of Defense Transportation. With respect to the adjustment of certificates of war necessity, the filing of complaints and appeal procedure, Administrative Order ODT No. 26 followed Administrative Order ODT No. 19.
Such were the controls by which the Office of Defense Transportation brought the very diverse and highly individualistic activity of farm transportation under the scope of its program for conservation of and maximum use of equipment. It presentéd many problems that could not be solved by the same procedure that brought results in the more readily controllable city and intercity operations.
Cooperation by Farmers
Thus, in the inauguration of the system of certificates .of war necessity a highly centralized procedure of controlling commercial vehicles was established. Truck activities other than farm trucks were of readily discernible patterns, the factors of which, could be resolved into formulas, and millions of these vehicles were speedily brought under control through the certificate of war necessity plan. The widely diffused locations and the more or less emergency character of farm truck operations, however, necessitated a change to a thoroughly decentralized initiation of the control at the county or rural community level. Under that approach, the solution of the problem proceeded successfully to a high degree of efficiency that included the pooling and other economical business devices of the more systematically organized commercial carriers.
It took a closely pressed conservation control and a cooperative spirit on the part of the farmers, and of the field service of the Department of Agriculture, with the efforts of the Office of Defense Transporta
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tion to keep functioning to the end of the war the old motorized equipment of the farms. Without these factors, it would not have been possible to have successfully coped with the staggering farm production (effort of the country. The magnitude of the problem was summarized by Director Eastman of the Office of Defense Transportation early in the war as follows:
It is estimated that the 1942 crop of fruits and vegetables will require a movement in trucks aggregating 700 million miles from growing areas to market. Over 77 billion pounds of milk and cream will be hauled by truck an estimated 1,775 million miles. Trucks will move something like 83 million hogs, 28 million slaughter cattle and calves, 23 million sheep and lambs, 2 billion pounds of chicken, and around 100 million cases of eggs. Almost 9 million tons of seed cotton from about 2 million cotton farms will be hauled by truck an average of 5 miles to approximately 11 thousand gins serving the
cotton belt, and from these gins about 5 million tons of baled lint will also be trucked. About 750 thousand farmers will haul one and one-half billion pounds of tobacco by truck to markets and warehouses. While about 389 million pounds of shorn wool and 66 million pounds of pulled wool will move by rail or water, nearly 90 percent of the total will be trucked from the shearing points to warehouses or rail sidings.
It was possible for the Office of Defense Transportation to report to the President, in the Annual Progress Report for 1943, as follows:
During 1943, American farms produced record crops of all kinds and raised record numbers of livestock. The transportation of a large part of this production reached its peak in the fall and winter of 1943. Reports from our field offices, the War Food Administration, U. S. Department of Agriculture, associations and individuals interested in agricultural production, transportation and marketing, indicate that no farm products- remained on American farms because of the lack of motor transportation during 1943.
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CHAPTER XIX
TRADE BARRIERS
A trade barrier has been defined as “any State statute or regulation which on its face, or in practical effect, tends to operate to the disadvantage of persons, products or services coming from sister States, to the advantage of local residents, products, and business.” Trade barriers as thus generally conceived are created by States pursuant to their powers to tax, to protect health and sanitation, including inspection and quarantine, to license and regulate business, and to conserve their natural resources and property. The exercise of these powers by States, even when interstate commerce is affected thereby, is not unjustifiable in many instances. Under the Constitution, these are residual powers left to the States which they may properly use in raising revenue, safeguarding health and protecting property. It is only when a State enactment discriminates against the products or persons of other States or when it imposes an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in a manner tending to discourage such commerce that it may be said to constitute a “barrier.”
State laws and regulations which affect out-ofState vehicles operated on the highways of the enacting State, may be classified in three categories: (a) those imposing limitations on weight and size; (b) those requiring licenses and fees; and (c) miscellaneous restrictions. These measures are not by any means inevitably discriminatory against interstate commerce; on the contrary, they are normally necessary and proper to protect legitimate State interests. They become harmfully burdensome to the commerce of the Nation in special circumstances.
Weight and Size Limitations
The States have a proprietary interest in their roads because they furnish either the whole or part of the funds used in their construction, and because they own all roads within State borders. To safeguard this interest each State quite properly takes measures designed to save its highways from damage and avoidable wear and tear. To that end, it is the common practice to limit the weight, length, width and height of vehicles using the highways whether
such vehicles are engaged in intra- or interstate commerce. These restrictions are also necessary for the protection of bridges and tunnels and for the safety of State residents.
Barriers arise not because of the existence of such limitations in each State but because the regulations often differ from State to State. Specific weights and sizes are prescribed as maximum according to the capacity of roads to bear them with a view to minimizing the cost of highway maintenance and replacement. Since there are often Qualitative differences in road construction from State to State, and since in any event legislatures charged with making highway policy, and officials charged with administration in one State, will differ from those of another as their judgment concerning road capacity, weight and size limitations are not uniform among the States. It is this absence of uniformity which creates barriers to interstate commerce. For vehicles operating in interstate transport and conforming to the limitations imposed by the State in which they are registered often exceed in size and weight the regulations of other States through which they must pass to reach their destination and from which they may therefore be barred. The measure in which limitations produce an obstructionist effect is in direct proportion to the range in their differences. Reasonable variation is to be expected but when a State strategically located fixes weight and size maxima which are uncommonly low, question arises as to its motive.
Two examples will serve to illustrate the consequences of diversity in weight regulations. Normally, Kentucky does not allow vehicles exceeding 18,000 pounds in gross weight to operate on its highways while the neighboring States of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio permit weights of 40,000, 50,000 and 57,750 pounds, respectively. When vehicles from these States pass through Kentucky, as often as they must, their loads have to be reduced to 18,000 pounds. The paralyzing effect on interstate transport is obvious.
Another case involves the neighboring States of California and Oregon. The former permits truck and
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trailer combinations up to 76,000 pounds gross, the latter fixes the maximum at 64»000 pounds gross. It is therefore necessary for truck and trailer combinations coming from California to drop the trailer at the Oregon State line and to return empty to pick up the trailer in order to complete the trip through Oregon.
Additional difficulties result from the manner in which weight limitations are prescribed. Ordinarily, specific load limits are fixed by statute for a singleaxle and for two-axle vehicles. For three-axle and five-axle tractor-semitrailer combinations, however, the maximum gross weight is often not expressly stated but is arrived at by use of a formula. This complication often results in some uncertainty in computing the maximum allowable gross weight and affords overzealous State officials an opportunity to render arbitrary decisions which have an obstructionist effect.
Width, height, and length restrictions are explicit and certain. There is no trouble occasioned by allowable width which with very few exceptions is 96 inches in all the States. Height and length regulations, on the other hand, vary frequently from State to State and often operate as barriers in the same manner as weight limitations. Lack of uniformity in permissible lengths is especially notorious. The range in peacetime is from 30 feet in Kentucky to 85 feet in Arizona, Georgia and Rhode Island. To comply with the more stringent requirements, carriers must often drop trailer units at State borders and return for them.
It should be added that the effect of size and weight limitations is only in some measure mitigated by provisions in the laws of all the States that under special circumstances, vehicles in isolated cases may be permitted to operate when they exceed such limitations.
Licenses and Fees
In every State motor vehicles are required to pay various fees and taxes. For the sake of clarity it is necessary to distinguish between private passenger cars, on the one hand, and on the other, commercial vehicles, that is, private and for-hire carriers of property and for-hire carriers of persons. In the case of the former, for instance, they are subject to registration fees, and in addition, their operators are usually required to procure licenses upon payment of another fee.
Numerous taxes and fees, however, are levied upon commercial vehicles. In the first place registration fees, increasing sharply with the weight of the vehicle, are imposed upon all carriers, both private and for-hire. Usually interstate vehicles must pay
this fee in the same measure as intrastate vehicles; when, as sometimes is the case, an interstate vehicle is not compelled to pay the registration fee, other taxes are imposed in substitution therefor. For-hire carriers are also subject to gross receipts taxes, mileage taxes, certificate fees, plate fees, and other fees and taxes.
Ostensibly» the policy of taxing both intra- and interstate operations is not discriminatory, as both make use of the same roads and should presumably contribute to their maintenance. In theory, there can be no valid objection to any system of taxation which seeks compensation from carriers in proportion to the use they make of State highways. In practice, however, the cumulative effect of taxes levied by several States upon interstate carriers clearly produces an onerous burden upon them.
This is true in particular of the registration fee. It usually is quite substantial, depending upon the weight of the vehicle and varying from State to State. On a 5-ton truck, for example, the range is from $30 in Idaho to $400 in Alabama. The manner in which this fee becomes burdensome and creates a genuine barrier to interstate transport may be seen from the following illustration which may be an extreme case, but which nevertheless indicates a general tendency. A trucker traveling from Alabama to South Carolina is required to pay $400 in Alabama, $400 in Georgia, and $300 in South Carolina on a 5- or 6-ton truck, a total of $1,100. This is clearly prohibitive and discriminatory, and in many cases bears no relation to the use made of the roads by interstate carriers.
The evil consequences of this situation are somewhat abated by reciprocity agreements. In 1942, the laws of 41 States provided for agreements, but actually only 9 States granted complete reciprocity. Nebraska presents a typical example of the effect of such agreements. The laws of that State provided that full reciprocity on license fees was to be extended to trucks registered in other States provided that such States allowed similar privileges to Nebraska trucks. Only 18 States cooperated to such an extent as to enable their trucks to pass through Nebraska without purchasing licenses. The requirements imposed by Nebraska upon trucks from the other 30 States varied with the regulations to which Nebraska trucks were subjected. This lack of uniformity in treatment of out-of-State vehicles creates confusion» adds to the burden of administration and in itself tends to operate as a barrier to the free movement of interstate traffic.
Another practice which relaxes in slight measure rigorous license requirements applicable to interstate vehicles is noteworthy. A few States permit
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certain types of operations by out-of-State trucks for a short period of time or for a limited number of trips either without payment of the regular fees or upon payment of part of them. Frequently, however, such permission is granted only to a limited type of truck operators, such as private carriers ; it has not substantially ameliorated the difficulties attending interstate carriers in general.
Restrictions upon interstate carriers in addition to those arising from limitation on weights and sizes and from taxes and fees are too many to permit summary generalization. Only the most common of them can be mentioned here. They include ports of entry, safety regulations, prohibitions to enter except during specified hours, regulations delaying unloading and city and town ordinances, which are especially annoying because they often depart from State-wide standards and are subject to the vagaries of local administration.
The Effect of State Barriers in War
In time of war, State restrictions on highway transport have a more serious effect upon the welfare of the Nation than at any other time. In the emergency nearly all traffic carried on the highways is either directly related to the war effort or is necessary for the maintenance of essential civilian economy. It is especially urgent that such traffic move as expeditiously as possible. At the same time, however, State restrictions operate with greater severity as barriers in war than in normal circumstances. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, heavier loading of vehicles is required because of the need to utilize to the fullest all available transport facilities. This means that vehicles more frequently exceed weight and size limitations and are thus exposed to greater delay at State borders. In the second place, in wartime the normal pattern of distributing goods and materials is altered in such a manner as to accentuate the effect of State restrictions. The sites of plants, army camps, quartermaster depots» air bases and numerous other recipients of supplies are determined on the basis of strategic rather than economic considerations and are often located in States where traffic formerly was relatively light and where weight and size limitations were exceptionally low. In this situation, with heavier loads requiring speedy delivery because of the exigencies of war, such limitations became a more effective bar to interstate transport than ever before.
Multiple taxation levied on carriers also assumes unprecedented significance. In peacetime the effect upon the Nation may be inconsequential, for example, when a carrier refuses traffic because excessive State
fees render it unprofitable. In wartime, however, it is usually of vital importance for the safety of the Nation that the traffic be handled, and the financial burden on transport unless relieved becomes an obstacle in the way of the war effort. Similarly all other State and local restrictions operate with greater severity upon interstate transport in war than in peacetime.
Program to Eliminate Barriers
The Office of Defense Transportation was quick to realize that State barriers constituted a menace to the efficient use of the Nation’s transport resources in the war effort and proceeded to the task of removing them insofar as it was capable of doing so. It formulated a program and policy in this regard which became an integral part of the work of the agency. In May 1942, a consultant on State barriers was designated who became exclusively concerned with the problem. He was attached to the Division of Petroleum and Other Liquid Transport because petroleum products are of crucial importance from the military viewpoint and because the unusual weight and size of the vehicles employed in their transport bring them more often under the special scrutiny of State officials than other vehicles. His duties, however, extended to the transport of all products, and it was his job to expedite their interstate movement whenever obstructed by State barriers.
At the same time, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation announced the policy his office planned to follow in eliminating barriers. Relying on the patriotism of the States, he requested that “peacetime restrictions on weight and length of trucks be changed voluntarily by State action where necessary in order to permit maximum utilization of all highway transport facilities in the war effort.” This course was consistently followed. The Office of Defense Transportation continuously urged the States themselves to remove not only barriers resulting from weight and length limitations but also those arising from other restrictive regulations. As a corollary, it also suggested to the States the adoption of specific and uniform standards regarding weights and sizes and the enactment of legislation regarding reciprocity in respect of license requirements. In addition, the Office of Defense Transportation intervened in many individual cases brought to its attention where important shipments were delayed. Here it was the practice of the Office of Defense Transportation to persuade State and local officials to relax rigorous restrictions by urging them to make liberal interpretations of laws and ordinances and to mitigate or even waive penalties in
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curred by motor vehicles in technical violation of them. In this connection, much was accomplished by the Office of Defense Transportation by informally advising State officials of the need for expeditious transport in the interest of the war effort and by vouching occasionally for the good faith of the carriers concerned.
Another feature of the Office of Defense Transportation program was cooperation with other Federal and State agencies having an interest in the field of State barriers. Notable among these were the Department of Commerce, the Public Roads Administration, the Federal War Agencies Committee, the Federal-State Division of the Department of Justice and the Council of State Governments. Some of these agencies were for a long time before the war active in surveying and studying the field and in discouraging State practices which tended to obstruct the free flow of interstate commerce. It was natural that their efforts in this respect continued during the war emergency, and that the Office of Defense Transportation should make use of their experience and information in discharging its responsibilities with regard to wartime transport.
Especially noteworthy was the work of the Department of Commerce. In connection with its general concern with the commerce of the Nation, the Department has a continuing interest in State barriers. On May 5,1942, its Secretary, Jesse Jones, called a conference attended by the heads of ten Federal Departments and war agencies, including the Office of Defense Transportation, and by more than 200 State officials, to discuss measures to be taken to eliminate delay in transporting war materials and equipment occasioned by differences in State regulations.
President’s Committee on State Barriers
Following the conference, the President appointed a committee to consider the matter, consisting of the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Under Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman of the War Production Board, the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration, the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, and the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation. On May 20, 1942, this committee met with the executive committee of the Governor’s Conference consisting of Harold E. Stassen, Minnesota, chairman; Herbert H. Lehman, New York, Herbert O’Conor, Maryland; J. Melville Broughton, North Carolina; Leverett Salstonstall, Massachusetts; and Frank Bane, executive secretary.
After extensive discussion, the executive committee agreed,
(1) That the solution of the difficulty should be referred to the States;
(2) That uniform minimum standards for motor transportation, developed by a number of the States in cooperation with the U. S. Public Roads Administration and approved by the War Department, were satisfactory standards for the duration of the emergency;
(3) That the Council of State Governments would devote all of its energies toward obtaining approval of these standards on the part of all the States within the next ten days.
The Governors’ Conference implemented this statement of principles with a concrete plan which embodied specific regulations of weights and sizes of commercial motor vehicles and which were submitted to the 48 States for approval. These regulations were to serve as an “Emergency Formula” in war time and were to be effective for the duration. They established the following truck limitations:
Width—96 inches
Height—12^ feet
Length of single vehicle—35 feet
Length of any combination—45 feet Weight of single-axle—18,000 pounds Weight on two axles—30,000 pounds Weight on three axles or any combination
—40,000 pounds
Within 10 days after May 20,1942 all States gave assurance that they had adopted the formula, and that they would enforce it. This action resulted in immeasurable improvement. In many States the prevailing standards were the same as or greater than those in the formula, and one or two such States lowered their existing regulations accordingly. In other States, however, the effect of the formula was to raise existing standards, and to this extent the general situation was improved. The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation endorsed the program and later as a result of experience in adjusting difficulties arising from weight and size regulations commended the States for having “complied in good faith” with its provisions.
Reciprocity in Licenses
Reciprocity in relation to motor vehicle licenses was also on the agenda of the Conference between the President’s Committee and the Governors’ Committee. The States were urged to make arrangements whereby the validity of licenses issued by one State would be recognized for the current year in other States. A number of States immediately agreed to follow such a program and did so. Other States adopted measures providing for limited reciprocity in varying degrees. In general, however, conditions continued unsatisfactory because the diversity in State policy created confusion and rendered it difficult to determine clearly what the situation really was in respect of reciprocity.
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In particular, the Office of Defense Transportation found three especially troublesome situations arising from lack of general reciprocity among the States. One involved migratory war workers. These are workers who in the interest of the war production program and through no fault of their own move in the course of a year from war plant to war plant in different States. They are often required to purchase license plates for their passenger cars in each State, and this imposed upon them an unjustifiable financial burden.
A second situation affected the transfer of motor equipment from one State to another. We have seen that during the war many army camps, air bases and the like were established for strategic considerations in areas where previously no such activities existed. To supply these regions, more transport facilities, particularly in the form of motor vehicles, were required than normally were available, and it was highly essential that motor equipment be easily transferable to meet their needs. Frequently, too, change in sources of supply necessitated the transfer of vehicles from one State to another. This applied notably to petroleum trucks. What was desirable in all these circumstances was mobility in transfer so that equipment could move quickly wherever it was needed. Whenever any State insisted upon the payment of a license fee for any one year, mobility was seriously impaired, and the result was to retard the apportionment of transport resources in accordance with the wartime needs of the country.
Thirdly, there were the occasional or isolated trips of motor vehicles across State lines. They frequently occurred in emergency circumstances in response to sudden demands for war materials; and it was unreasonable to require carriers, especially when so engaged, to pay an annual license fee merely for the casual use of a State’s highways.
Emergency Transportation Act
To improve these conditions, and if possible, to eliminate them, the Office of Defense Transportation in collaboration with other agencies drafted an “Emergency Transportation Act” which each State legislature was urged to enact into law. The cardinal purpose of the act was to get rid of multiple licenses and registration fees. It was to be effective for the duration of the war, and to apply solely to licensing and registration, no attempt being made to affect
mileage taxes, gross receipt taxes and other levies involving the issue of compensating States for the use of their highways in accordance with benefits derived by users and detriment suffered by the roads.
The act provided in substance that any motor vehicle properly licensed under the laws of one State, while being used in the transport of war workers or persons in the armed or Government service, might be operated within another State without being licensed in the latter, to the same extent that the State in which the motor vehicle was licensed granted substantially similar privileges. The act, likewise, extended reciprocity in the matter of operators’ licenses. It vested in the Governors the administrative function to determine the extent to which other States grant the privileges specified in the Act.
This proposed legislation was designed not only to eliminate payment of multiple license fees but also to lessen the complications in which reciprocity was enmeshed. The complications were due to the fact that many States entered into numerous reciprocity agreements through action taken by their Governors. These agreements were by no means uniform in their terms as they provided for reciprocity in varying degree and subject to varying conditions. As a result it was difficult to determine any general principle underlying reciprocity or even to establish with certainty in a given case to what extent, if at all, reciprocity existed. ¡Moreover, these agreements were sometimes of questionable validity as they were often consummated by Governors exercising authority pursuant to war powers of doubtful validity or meaning.
The proposed act sought to correct these defects inherent in a system of agreements. It created reciprocity through the operation of its own provisions and thus rendered agreements unnecessary. And since these provisions were the same for all States enacting the law, conditions under which reciprocity would exist would be uniform in such States, and the maze of complications attending agreements would be reduced. Although unified action by the States on the Emergency Transportation Act could not be achieved, much helpful legislation in many States in line with the provisions of the proposed act was obtained. The net results were sufficient to bring about a substantial improvement in the situation of interstate war transportation by motor vehicles.
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CHAPTER XX
MOTOR PASSENGER TRANSPORT - GENERAL POLICIES
Passenger transportation by motor vehicle comprised intercity as well as local operations. Its principal task was meeting the demands of local passenger traffic. Engaged in the same task and closely linked with motor passenger transport was the city and suburban rail transport including street railway, rapid transit line and ferry operations. In addition to these for-hire facilities, which dealt with mass movement of persons, was the fleet of millions of private passenger automobiles, without whose activities the Nation’s entire for-hire facilities would not have been able to carry the load.
To meet the problems which centered around the heavy flow of local travel incident to the war effort, the Division of ¡Local Transport was created at the inception of the Office of Defense Transportation. In a statement to the public, dated January 14, 1942, Director Eastman announced the establishment of the Division “because of the many and pressing problems of local transportation by rail, bus, and private automobile, which have already arisen and will continue to arise in increasing volume in connection with the movement of workers to and from the plants and offices engaged in war work, and in connection with local transportation generally in the populous centers of the country.”
The Local Transport problem comprised control over the operation of about 343,000 vehicles on rails and rubber as of August 31, 1944, based on Highway Transport Department Studies. This number, according to type of service, is broken down as follows:
Streetcars......................................27,180
Rapid transit cars.............................. 10,105
Trolley coaches ................................ 8,555
School busses.................................. 84,784
Intercity busses................................21,753
City busses.................................... 55,808
Taxicabs ..................................... 78,717
Ambulances and hearses..........................49,313
Rental cars..................................... 12,015
Total............................................343,230
According to the 1943 traffic statistics report of the Local Transport Division, 867 local and intercity rail and bus operators, representing 90,076 vehicles, reported for the month of December 1943, a total of
307,476,317 vehicle miles operated, with a total of 1,463,851,505 revenue passengers carried. Statistical tables and charts on local transportation are given in chapter XLII.
In the first 2 years of the war, in December 1943 as compared with December 1941, these reporting companies showed an increase of 39.8 percent in revenue passengers carried, with 16.1 percent increase in vehicle miles operated and 12.2 percent increase in the number of vehicles owned. The rate of increase of revenue passengers per vehicle mile was 15.8 percent for local rail operations, 30 percent for local bus operations; and 69 percent for intercity bus operations.
The comparative data on taxicab operations during the same period, based on samplings made by the Cab Research Bureau, Cleveland, Ohio, showed the following increases: Revenue passengers carried, 49.6 percent, and vehicle miles operated, 20.6 percent. The revenue passengers per vehicle mile increased 25 percent.
For school bus operations, the data compiled by the Division largely from reports of state school authorities, showed that on the one hand, there was a decrease of 14.8 percent of busses operated, and a decrease of 19.4 percent of vehicle miles; while on the other hand, pupil rides per vehicle mile increased 33.3 percent. It was not felt necessary to carry the surveys beyond 1943.
The following data taken from the reports of operating companies and authoritative trade sources show relatively the part that local and intercity busses and taxicabs played in the task of war trans-
portation:
Local bus Operations Intercity bus Ope rations Taxicab Operations
45,465 9,994 48,464
Percent over 12/41 ... 19.1 23.6 — 12.5
Vehicle miles 12/4S ... Percent over 12/41 ... 138,278,979 19.0 62,100,640 23.0 2,642,742,000 20.6
Passengers 12/48 Percent over 12/41 ... 712,747,870 54.1 80,229,865 108.1 1,446,138,000 49.6
Passengers per vehicle 5.20 0.49 .55
Percent over 12/41 .... 80.0 69.0 25.0
(—) Decreases
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Control of private automobiles also came under the jurisdiction of the Office of Defense Transportation with Executive Order No. 9156, and while the conservation and economic use of such equipment formed a considerable part of the Division’s activity as described in the next chapter, it was not possible to reduce achievements in this unorganized field of transportation to statistical terms. However, the following data, based upon the reports of various mass transportation activities, epitomize the results achieved in the commercial passenger vehicle field by the Highway Transport Department in its program for complying with the injunction laid on the Office of Defense Transportation by Executive Order No. 8989, to “develop measures designed to secure maximum use of existing domestic transportation facilities.”
Estimated equivalent number of vehicles saved Estimated annual savings in rubber-tired vehicle miles
676 Local rail & bus companies 286 Intercity bus companies.... Subtotal ' School busses ' Taxicabs 16,620 1,670 218,933,000 49,441,000
17,190 20,180 6,930 268,374,000 156,000,000 400,000,000
1 Total 44,300 824,374,000
The organization of the Division of Local Transport, set up as a separate unit in the Office of Defense Transportation to cope with the problems of local transport was fully developed during the first year of operation. At the beginning of 1943 the central organization was composed of a director, four associate directors, and four section chiefs. The executive control over the activities of the Divisions were divided between the four associate directors. The four sections of the Division were:
Contract Clearance, which dealt with the enforcement of Public Law 779 and Executive Order No. 9294, under which the Office of Defense Transportation was required to approve or disapprove the purchase and use of local passenger transportation equipment by any Government department, or war contractor for the transportation of military and civilian personnel.
Intercity Bus, which dealt with the administration of the intercity bus service.
School Bus, which had charge of the maintenance, conservation, and economic use of school bus equipment.
Taxicab, which exercised Nation-wide control over the operation of taxicabs and other passenger forbire vehicles.
In addition to the central organization above indicated, there were five and later nine regional directors, one for each of the Motor Transport Divi
sion regions. The names of these key men in the central and regional organization are given in Appendix B.
Originally the jurisdiction of the Division of Local Transport extended over suburban, elevated, street and interurban railway systems, local, suburban and school buses, taxicabs, for-hire cars, and local water carriers, such as ferries. This gave local transport control over all rubber-borne passenger transportation, except that of the intercity busses. So, in the process of administrative adjustments, the control over intercity buses was transferred on July 24,1942, from the Division of Motor Transport to the Division of Local Transport. This left to the Division of Motor Transport jurisdiction over motor carriers of property and to Local Transport jurisdiction over motor carriers of persons. This distinction between the Local and Motor Transport Divisions obtained throughout the history of the two Divisions, while they functioned as independent units of the Office of Defense Transportation.
Another readjustment arising out of the expansion of the work, especially in the field, was the delegation of authority over certain Local Transport activities to the Motor Transport Division. This latter division had built up a large field staff to enforce various regulations governing rubber-borne motor carriers of property, and was in an advantageous position to enforce for Local Transport the regulatory control over taxicabs, rental cars, school busses, and other commercial passenger vehicles throughout the country. Local Transport, on the contrary, had but a small field organization designed to maintain contact with the larger carriers and carry on the Division’s activities with the transit operators.
To avoid the possibility of conflict with which such split authority arrangements are fraught, the agreement of September 23, 1943, between the two Divisions made a clean-cut definition of the powers of each, whereby (Local Transport retained complete control over all matters of policy relating to transport of persons while Motor Transport acted on such matters as an administrative agency whose acts were subject to review and control by Local Transport. In respect to these, the agreement stipulated that “any action taken with regard to a certificate of war necessity shall first be submitted to the appropriate Regional Director of the Division of Local Transport for conference.”
By this restriction Local Transport reserved to itself full control over the mileage operation of the media for the mass movement of passengers.
When on June 1, 1944, the Highway Transport Department was created, the Local Transport Division was transferred to that Department. All of the
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functions of the abolished Division of Local Transport that dealt with control over passenger activities were lodged in the Division of Passenger Operations under a division director. Under him were four sections: Transit, which dealt with city busses and other local mass transportation; Intercity Bus Section which administered the activities of the Division relating to intercity rubber-borne transportation; School Bus Section, which controlled the operation of carriers for transporting students to and from schools; and Taxicab Section, which dealt with taxicabs and rental cars.
Before the creation of the Highway Transport Department, the allocation and release of commercial trucks rested with the Motor Transport Division, and the allocation of busses with the Local Transport Division. Under the Highway Transport Department these two allocation sections were united under a section chief who operated under the director of the Division of Equipment and Research. This section handled the applications for trucks and busses and all forms of passenger carriers except taxicabs, these being rationed by the Office of Price Administration. The section known as Contract Clearance, under the original organization of Local Transport became a section of the Division of Management of the new department. This section, in addition to clearing contracts of other Government agencies for transporting war-plant workers, was also charged with making recommendations to the Defense Plant Corporation to assist carriers in obtaining financial assistance to provide the necessary equipment to carry on the wartime activities of both passenger and property carriers.
The nine regional organizations of the Local Transport Division were also completely merged with the nine regional organizations of the old Motor Transport Division. In this manner, the entire activities of the former Local Transport Division were merged into the streamlined organization of the present Highway Transport Department. The names of the men holding the key positions in the Highway Transport Department which handled transport of property as well as persons are given in Appendix B.
The program for controlling local transport operations for which public and operator cooperation was sought, was outlined in a statement of policy issued by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation on April 17, 1942. The text of this statement is given below:
General Statement of Policy
April 17, 1942.
To all operators of street cars and busses and all pub
lic authorities having regulatory powers over such operators:
The Office of Defense Transportation, through its Division of Local Transport, is using two means for requiring that existing passenger transport vehicles be utilized to the utmost and that critical materials be conserved.
First, general or specific orders have and will be issued in matters which warrant the direct exercise of the authority vested in the Director by the Executive Order of December 18,1941.
Second, statements of policy will be made to public authorities and operators of transit vehicles whose cooperation with the objects of this Office is assumed. This is such a statement of policy.
Our present policy in the folowing matters is determined almost entirely by the stoppage of rubber imports and the desperate need for conserving all the rubber now in our possession. Waste of rubber tires under present conditions is little short of disloyalty to the national interest.
(1) Staggered hours.—A carefully prepared plan of staggering working, store and office hours offers by far the greatest opportunity for increasing the carrying capacity of existing transit vehicles. Regulatory authorities and transit operators should encourage the development of such programs and participate in the preparation of plans for carrying them out.
In communities where the number of buses required in the rush hours can be reduced by opening schools at a later hour, public officials and transit operators should cooperate to attain this objective.
(2) Full use of all street railway lines.—Transit companies and regulatory authorities should take immediate steps to obtain the fullest possible use of all operable rail lines and equipment. This will require discontinuance of bus and trolley coach services which are being provided over routes where street railway lines are or can be made operable as well as on street railway routes now being served part of the time by busses or trolley coaches.
(3) Diversion of traffic to street railway routes.— Wherever it is practicable to alter schedules and routes so as to divert passengers from present bus lines to street railway routes, such alteration of schedules and routes should be made.
(4) Turn back service.—On transit routes to outlying districts much capacity is wasted by sending too many vehicles to the outer ends of such routes. This waste should be eliminated by turning back some vehicles at intermediate points, or by operating shuttle vehicles over the outer portions of such routes at less frequent intervals. In other cases, waste should be eliminated by operating shuttle services
700494—48—11
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over branch lines which are presently through routed.
(5) Fewer stops.—The number of passenger stopping places on bus and street car routes should be reduced wherever possible. A stopping place within 500 feet of another is undesirable and wasteful and should be eliminated. A reasonable standard is to space stopping places at distances of 660 feet to 1,200 feet.
(6) Standard of service in non-rush hours.—The general practice of bus operators is to provide seats in excess of the number of passengers during nonrush hours. This practice should be modified so that busses and trolley coaches carry at least full seated loads during nonrush hours.
(7) Extension of bus services.—Extensions of existing bus routes and inauguration of new routes should be made only to places of defense employment and military and naval establishments or to meet similar situations where failure to provide such additional service will have a definitely unfavorable effect on the war effort.
(8) Charter busses.—Busses not operated in regularly scheduled service whether run on a chartered or individual fare basis, should be operated only to carry workers to and from places of defense employment or to meet similar situations where failure to provide such service will have a definitely unfavorable effect on the war effort.
Acceptable charter or special business includes transportation of selectees, of groups made up principally of members of the armed forces, of participants in organized recreational activities at military posts, and school children, teachers and other school employees to and from school only, and under appropriate conditions the necessary transportation of under-privileged children.
Unacceptable charter or special business includes civilian parties to beaches, pleasure resorts, picnic places, points of historic interest, race tracks, baseball and other sporting events.
A bus operator who has filed public tariffs as a charter carrier, should not be subject to any penalty on account of his refusal to accept proffered charter business not compatible with this statement of policy. Regulatory authorities should discourage the acceptance of charter business by one operator which has been refused by another in accordance herewith.
(9) School busses.—It may be necessary in some localities during the period of the war emergency to utilize school busses which are capable of providing safe transportation where established common carriers are unable to provide the service. Operators of school busses should cooperate with transit companies and defense industries located in the vicinity
of schools served by them in solving the transportation problems of their communities.
(10) Street traffic control.—Traffic regulations and controls have generally been operated to facilitate the movement of automobiles. During the present emergency the movement of mass transit vehicles should take precedence, and the efficient movement of such vehicles should be the major consideration in the timing of traffic control devices.
(11) Revision of schedules.—Operators of transit vehicles should continuously analyze their schedules, first, in order to minimize standing time of vehicles at terminals, and, second, in order to take full advantage of opportunities for saving time as street traffic congestion is reduced. Both of these measures will reduce the number of vehicles required to render a given service.
(12) Use of parkway roads by busses.—The use of parkway roads by busses would in many places permit substantial savings in mileage, time and rubber. In such cases, parkway authorities should remove restrictions on bus operation unless the roadway construction is too light to withstand such traffic.
Joseph B. Eastman,
Director, Office of Defense Transportation.
Voluntary Local Organization
An administrative section was established in the Division of Local Transport under a chief liaison officer charged with effectuating the program through five regional offices which were to have field liaison officers to work directly with volunteer groups at the local level. The Highway Traffic Advisory Committee to the War Department and the Office of Civilian Defense rendered well organized collaboration in carrying on this work. The local volunteer groups were under the direction of local administrators appointed by mayors in cities having a population of 10,000 or more. The plan was to give local participation and flavor to the conservation propaganda and program indicated in the statement of policy of April 17. Like all voluntary support, its effectiveness was not general, but depended upon the capacity for leadership found in the local groups, and upon the cooperative spirit of the local authorities. Outstanding results were achieved in Kansas City, Chicago, Cincinnati, and the State of New Jersey, where transportation administrators were clothed with authority that enabled them to enforce the conservation program, and in New York and Connecticut where the Office of Defense Transportation’s recommendations and directives were generally adopted and enforced.
The Local Transport Division, however, later established a regional field organization which con
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ducted the administrative work of the Division in the respective regions. Dealing with the operators and local and State transportation authorities direct, and clothed with authority to carry out the policies and orders of the Division, the field forces were in position to effectuate the conservation features of the statement of policy in a more effective way than was to be expected of voluntary local groups.
The program of the Office of Defense Transportation for conservation and improvement of transportation stressed the following objectives:
Staggered Hours
The plan of staggering factory, store, and school hours was regarded as an effective means for increasing the carrying capacity of transit systems. The idea met with enthusiastic acclaim, but its execution often met with such lack of spirit on the part of workers and officials, based chiefly on personal inconvenience that the Office of Defense Transportation, with the cooperation of the branches of the Government vitally concerned in war production, had to press and prod considerably to achieve results. The fruits of the campaign, as disclosed in the reports of 174 street car and bus companies to the Office of Defense Transportation, indicated an estimated saving, as of February 15, 1944, equivalent to 2,887 vehicles, while 144 operators reported a mileage saving equivalent to 23,741,274 rubber-tired vehicle miles a year. Subsequently, however, changes in the policy of factory management towards a two-shift operation began to upset the staggered-hour program so seriously that the war agencies most concerned were induced to step in and prohibit war plants from changing the number of shifts without making satisfactory staggered-hour arrangements.
Control Over Bus and Street Car Services
The solicitude of the Office of Defense Transportation in its conservation program was the protection of the critical rubber supply, and much of its effort was directed toward transferring as much rubber-borne traffic as practicable to rail equipment. One step was to order the reestablishment of abandoned street railway service on lines of which the trackage and equipment were still available for operation. This resulted in discontinuance of bus and trolley-coach service and the restoration of rail service which had been abandoned. According to the Highway Transport Department’s Traffic Statistics for 1943, 27 companies estimated that the plan saved the equivalent of 537 vehicles, and 32 companies reported an estimated saving equivalent to 37,165,677 rubber-tired vehicle miles annually. No directives were required to put this plan into effect, as the companies which had changed from street car to bus, or contemplated
doing so, realized that the fast-mounting war traffic might not be handled by their bus equipment and that under war conditions they might not be able to increase such equipment to meet traffic requirements.
In addition to achieving the restoration of abandoned street car service, the Office of Defense Transportation also sought the canceling of plans for substituting busses for rail cars. A notable case was that of the Third Avenue Railway System in New York, which had announced that on March 15, 1942, it would substitute bus for street car service on Broadway, Forty-Second Street, and other important sections of the system. The Office of Defense Transportation took up the matter with the company in a series of conferences. The company had purchased several hundred busses to put its plan in operation. On March 13, 1942, 2 days before the announced change from car to bus service was to go into effect, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation sent the following telegraphic notification to the company:
After full consideration of facts concerning your situation as presented at conferences with my staff and otherwise, I am now convinced that present substitution of busses for trolleys would be contrary to public interest. Consequently you are hereby notified not to make such substitution until further advice from me. New York City officials are being informed of the contents of this telegram.
The Third Avenue Railway System acquiesced in the demand of the Office of Defense Transportation. The Navy purchased the busses and put them in warworker service at its various land activitiies from the Atlantic coast to Honolulu. There were still many other similar bus substitution plans in the making, and to cover all future instances the Office of Defense Transportation on March 25,1942, issued its General Order ODT No. 2, which provided that no substitution of bus or busses could be made for any vehicle or vehicles theretofore operated on rails, unless first authorized by the Office of Defense Transportation.
Diversion of Traffic to Street Railway Routes
This activity called for altering schedules and routes so as to divert passengers from bus lines to street railway routes. In this matter, as in the case of restoring abandoned street car service, the cooperation of State and municipal regulatory authorities generally was freely given. However, in many cases, an Office of Defense Transportation directive, in the form of a special order, brought desired results. Where cooperation failed, the Office of Defense Transportation proceeded to issue local bus special orders, even though they conflicted with municipal or Public Service Commission orders. Fifteen such special orders based on Executive Orders Nos. 8989 and 9156 were issued, usually “in order to assure the orderly and expeditious movement
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of necessary passenger traffic, and to conserve and providently utilize manpower and existing transportation facilities and services, the attainment of which purposes is essential to the successful prosecution of the war.”
In New York and Chicago the mileages operated by bus and transit companies were reduced, and in Philadelphia 60 busses were eliminated. In Washington, D. C., the Capital Transit Co., under order by the Public Utilities Commission to operate an extensive crosstown line in the suburbs, was ordered by the Office of Defense Transportation’s Special Order L-B No. 10 to refrain from operating the service. The company refrained and the Public Utilities Commission accepted the situation.
As described in Chapter XXXIII the City of Akron, Ohio, was the only municipality that challenged one of these traffic adjustment orders in the courts.
In a way, the first nine special local bus orders issued simultaneously by the Office of Defense Transportation were the most important. Their enforcement, without challenge in the courts, made the way easier for acceptance of other orders by the operators and the public. In addition, the first nine special orders were estimated by the Office of Defense Transportation, in a public statement, dated November 10,1942, to result in the following savings of bus tire miles annually:
New York City—Fifth Avenue Coach Company, 7,800,000; New York Omnibus Corp., 18,900,000; East Side Omnibus Corp, and Comprehensive Omnibus Corp., 4,050,000; Avenue B and East Broadway Transit Co., Inc., 750,000. Total 31,-500,000.
Philadelphia—Philadelphia Transportation Co., 20,460,000.
Chicago—Chicago Surface Lines, 11,250,000; Chicago Motor Coach Co,, 14,100,000. Total 25,350,000.
Cincinnati—fThe Cincinnati Street Railway Co., 9,360,000.
Baltimore—The Baltimore Coach Co., 4,800,000.
Richmond—Virginia Electric and Power Co., 4,800,000.
Turn-Back Service and Fewer Stops
Transit routes to outlying districts represented much wasteful operation through the dispatching of too many vehicles to the outer ends of such routes where thinning population made such frequent service unwarranted. The Office of Defense Transportation program called for turning back some of the vehicles at intermediate points to insure fuller loads. The turn-back service was an important feature of many of the readjustments of city traffic made by the Office of Defense Transportation. The Highway Transport Department statistics for 1943 record that 173 companies reported an estimated saving equivalent to 1,093 vehicles, and a saving equivalent to 22,946,654 in rubber-tired vehicle miles annually among 204 companies.
The program called for fewer stops on bus and
streetcar routes. Elimination of stopping places within 500 feet of other stops became quite general, and many short-stop distances were extended to between 660 and 1,200 feet. The operating companies found the fewer-stops policy economic; 113 companies reporting that it saved them operating the equivalent of 666 vehicles.
The transportation conservation program called also for other devices, such as adjusting seating capacity operated in non-rush hours; use of charter busses only for carrying workers to and from defense plants; utilizing school busses between school runs to assist in handling local traffic when practicable; continuous revision of car and bus schedules to eliminate idle time between trips.
Street Traffic Control
In addition to the economical use of equipment for which the Office of Defense Transportation labored in the larger cities, it made a special effort to have municipalities adjust their street traffic controls to wartime requirements. On February 9, 1943, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation issued a 12-point program for modifying traffic regulations and called on all municipal authorities having jurisdiction over traffic to “review critically all street and highway traffic controls, and to make whatever adjustments may be required to conform to the policies set forth.” This program undertook to achieve the following improvements:
Elimination of unnecessary signals if the total traffic entering from all directions did not average at least 1,000 vehicles an hour for 8 hours a day, of which at least 250 entered from the minor streets, or if the pedestrians crossing the major street did not average 300 an hour for 6 hours a day, and vehicles entering the intersection did not average 750 an hour for the same six hours.
Substitution of flashing lights for stop-and-go signals when for a period of four or more consecutive hours traffic fell below 500 vehicles an hour, or in the case of pedestrian protection signals, not less than 375 vehicles an hour or 150 pedestrians an hour were using the intersection.
Shortening of the signal cycles to between 35 and 50 seconds, unless conditions were unusual.
Adjustment of green light period to conform to the volume of traffic, with, however, special consideration to busses, streetcars, and trucks.
Progressive signal operation when fixed-time signals were within a quarter of a mile from each other so as to reduce vehicle stops.
Assignment of traffic policemen to fixed posts.
Making stop-and-go periods by traffic officers as
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short as possible, with special effort to expedite busses, street cars, and trucks.
Elimination of stop signs except in cases where restricted view or accident records indicated a need at intersections along legally designated through streets or highways ; or, at railroad crossings when required by law.
Modification of traffic regulations governing turning restrictions, through streets, and parking so as to expedite vehicle movements where war demands had affected traffic.
Designation of a system of primary war transportation routes for preferred traffic control for war workers and carrying of war materials.
This program for better traffic control was worked out after conferences with leading traffic engineers, and was supported by 15 leading national associations interested in fitting traffic control to wartime conditions. In order to obtain a measure of results achieved, a questionnaire was forwarded to the mayors of cities and towns of over 10,000 population, under date of June 18, 1943. Reports from approximately 600 urban communities, according to the annual report of the Division of Local Transport for 1943, showed that for 6,000 signalized locations given consideration, over 1,500 traffic lights were eliminated; 1,000 were changed to flashing operations; 2,000 had their cycle lengths shortened; and 2,000 had their hours of operation reduced. Nearly 4,000 stop signs were eliminated, which offset the number of new ones installed due to the opening of new roads and congested traffic in the vicinity of war plants. Substantial results were obtained in the case of traffic lights operated under the jurisdiction of the State Highway Departments on State-controlled arteries. Approximately 500 traffic signals were eliminated ; 1,000 were changed to flashing operation ; 300 had their cycle lengths shortened, and the hours of operation at 1,000 locations were reduced. Over 3,300 State highway stop signs were removed, and only 600 new ones were installed.
Recommendations To Defense Plant Corporation
Another collateral duty of the Divisions of Local Transport and Motor Transport, later Highway Transport Department, was to make recommendations as to the needs of transportation units which were being financed by the Defense Plant Corporation. This work fell to the Contract Clearance Section, which, up to the close of the war, issued certifications of need involving the acquisition of transport vehicles and necessary garage construction in the aggregate sum of $8,666,887. The bulk of this governmental financial aid through the Defense Plant Corporation was for trucks for maintaining over-the-
road freight transportation as is shown in the following summation:
Applications received—83 freight (over-the-road); 7 passenger (local); 2 passenger (intercity); total 92.
Recommendations to Defense Plant Corporation—75 freight (over-the-road); 7 passenger (local); 2 passenger (intercity), total 84.
Equipment Recommended to Defense Plant Corporation—34 trucks, 663 tractors, 814 trailers, 371 busses, 1 garage or a total of 1,882 pieces of equipment and 1 garage.
The estimated cost of equipment and facilities recommended was $9,800,264, the amount authorized by the Defense Plant Corporation through August 31, 1945, was $8,666,887.17.
Ferries and Rapid Transit Lines
Other forms of local transport were the elevated and subway rapid transit lines and the ferries. These presented no serious war problem. Each functioned fully and satisfactorily. In the matter of subways, a single case came up for disposal. An important Chicago subway development was halted by the war. A part of the project had reached the stage where the tunnel was completed, and the Office of Defense Transportation assisted in getting release of copper and other materials to finish the task. It disapproved, however, the plan to construct and equip an east and west branch of the subway. That project would have made a heavy draft on manpower and critical materials and could not have been completed in time to render service during the war.
The expansion of subway transportation in New York City had resulted in the discontinuance of service on the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Avenue elevated railway. This released over 1000 elevated coaches for scrap or other disposition.
The Office of Defense Transportation salvaged the best conditioned cars and allocated them to possible future trouble points. For example 213 of these reconditioned coaches were sent to the following locations : (
Maritime Commission for Richmond, Calif............. 90
Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, N. J....................... 8
Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Ark................. 30
Sangamon Ordnance Plant, Illiopolis, Ill............ 33
Oak Ordnance Plant, near Illiopolis, Ill............ 22
Ravenna Ordnance Plant, Apco, Ohio............... 30
Some of the cars allocated were never put into service, but were available in case of need. Those that were used had to be equipped with steps, as the platforms of the elevated systems, like those of the subways, were flush with the floors of the coaches and required no steps.
Whatever problem arose in regard to ferries related to providing facilities to serve war plants, or readjusting existing services to meet changes in the war industries. These problems frequently came through the U. S. Maritime Commission to keep shipbuilding yards manned and sometimes through
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the National Housing Agency which had responsibility in the matter of housing war workers, and therefore, was concerned with the matter of transportation facilities to serve such housing projects. The Division of Local Transport made a survey of war-worker transportation at Jamestown and Newport, R. I., for the Federal Works Administration in connection with a requested grant of $162,400 to insure the continuation of ferry service. The transportation need for the service was certified by the Office of Defense Transportation together with recommendation for Federal control over the rates to be charged.
Baltimore, Md., and Norfolk, Va., had ferry troubles in the readjustment of which the Office of Defense Transportation served as a vitally interested mediator. Through its efforts a Chesapeake Bay operating line was induced to operate a boat on a ferry run between Baltimore, the Maryland Dry Dock Plant and the Bethlehem-Fairfield plant. At Mobile, the Office of Defense Transportation assisted the U. S. Maritime Commission in getting a 5-boat ferry service established to the Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Co. on Pinto Island, effecting a large saving of time, rubber, and oil in the transportation of the plant workers. All new ferry projects, however, did not work out satisfactorily through the lack of plant-worker cooperation. These workers could get enough gasoline to travel more conveniently in ride-sharing automobiles, or they could go by bus or rail. Thus, a ferry project between San Francisco and two shipbuilding plants, and other ferry projects at West coast points failed of sufficient patronage to pay expenses, while a ferry plant at Portland, Maine, folded up permanently after 3 days of operation.
Railway Suburban Traffic
In essence, the traffic of the suburban railway trains is local transportation. In some instances, it is the chief public means of travel between the city or suburbs and war plants located on the lines. Often railways were urged to supplement local transport by extending service to plants inadequately served by bus or ride-sharing automobiles. With these requests the railroads complied when it fitted into their over-all operations, and refused when their managements felt that line operations did not lend themselves practically to such local service. It was found that where suburban industrial needs were already
taken care of in the train schedules, the matter of providing increased car capacity to provide for in-creased war-plant traffic adjusted itself readily through action by the railroads.
The most extensive single readjustment of suburban passenger service on railways was provided in ODT Special Order R-7, effective on March 1, 1944, directing the Central Railroad of New Jersey to discontinue 68 of its suburban passenger trains, and to curtail the service that was being afforded on 16 other such trains. These changes affected commuters principally in the Jersey City-Newark-Elizabethport area. The traffic of the abandoned and curtailed services, the Office of Defense Transportation stated, would be taken care of in the main by busses and by readjustment of service on 56 other trains. It was pointed out that 13 trains which were discontinued, or on which service was curtailed, carried an average of 25 or less passengers and 44 trains handled 100 or fewer passengers. “Our investigation,” said the Office of Defense Transportation’s statement issued in connection with the order, “indicates the following conditions existed on the lines of the carrier in the area during January and the first 13 days of February 1944. Nineteen thousand three hundred twenty-four cars were set off short of terminals due to the inability of the carrier to handle them. Fifty trains were delayed 2 hours or more due to a shortage of switch crews. Seventy-five trains were delayed 2 hours or more due to lack of motive power.” The order was designed to release motive power for freight and regular passenger traffic and switching work, besides freeing 16 locomotive engineers, 16 firemen, 14 conductors and 16 trainmen.
The readjustment of this suburban operation was not so much in the interest of conservation of local transportation, as for needed improvement in handling freight traffic by the railways. The action of the Office of Defense Transportation was accepted by the railway company, but a group of commuters living in New Jersey filed suit for injunction against the Office of Defense Transportation, seeking to test the validity of the order. The suit was filed in the United States District Court of the District of Columbia. It was still on the docket when the Office of Defense Transportation revoked the order at the close of the war.
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CHAPTER XXI
PRIVATE AUTOMOBILES
In administering its control over motor vehicles the Office of Defense Transportation also was deeply concerned over the role which the private automobile would probably play in relation to all other land transportation during the war. It was evident at the start that available railway, bus, and street car facilities could not absorb all, or the greater part, of the traffic moving by private automobile, and that to prevent a transportation breakdown, or a slowing up of the war effort, private automobile transportation would have to be maintained to supplement, in a substantial way, public passenger transportation.
The private automobile fleet of the United States, as of December 31,1942, was estimated by the Public Roads Administration on the basis of registration, to have numbered 27,869,000 units, and credited with 85 percent of the total passenger mileage, it constituted a serious factor in the over-all transportation situation. The manufacture of the private automobile had ceased under a freeze order on February 11, 1942, leaving a pool of but 535,000 new cars available during the entire period of the war for replacing worn-out equipment.
The determination of the number of passenger automobiles in use in the United States and the extent of their operation in essential work was important to the Office of Defense Transportation for its task as claimant agency for gasoline for this type of transportation. The starting point for the count of passenger automobiles was the registration of these vehicles throughout the country at the close of 1942. The Office of Defense Transportation’s estimate for gasoline required for passenger cars for the last quarter of 1943 was based on its calculation that approximately 24,506,000 such cars would be in operation in the last quarter of 1943, and 23,750,000 during 1944. The indications were that approximately 22,937,000 passenger automobiles would be in use in the last quarter of 1945, the fourth year of the war. These estimates were based on the net registration figures less the scrappage which was estimated at about 1,500,000 cars a year plus replacements from the passenger car pool.
The gasoline requirements were based on the
essential annual operation of these cars, which was determined in the following manner as set forth in the justification of the petroleum estimates for the final quarter of 1943.
“During normal times, the average privately owned automobile was operated about 9,600 miles annually. Of this amount something like 57 percent, or 5,400 miles per year, was accumulated in what may be termed the basic transportation work of the private automobile. The remainder of normal mileage was accounted for by the very extensive social and recreational use of the private automobile.
“Under wartime conditions, the demands on the passenger automobile for some of these fundamental transportation services have increased. However, as in all other areas of the transportation system, each vehicle has been forced to perform an additional amount of work. In the field of automobile transport, this has been accomplished primarily through the service of organized group riding and informal car sharing. Other portions of automobile use, primarily in the field of social and recreational travel must, of course, under wartime conditions be reduced to an absolute minimum. And still other parts of the transportation work normally done by the passenger automobile have been transferred to other forms of transportation.
“Drawing a balance of these various factors, it is the judgment of this office that the indispensable wartime transportation work of the passenger automobile can be performed with an annual mileage of about 5,250 miles per vehicle.”
Various estimates and polls placed at about 50 percent or better the huge army of war workers who used passenger automobiles to go to work. To prevent serious impairment of private automobile transportation, two general lines of action were developed by the Office of Defense Transportation—elimination of nonessential driving and fuller utilization of space in the private automobile, supplemented by better maintenance and operation of equipment. This task the Office of Defense Transportation set for itself soon after it was organized. Thus, early in 1942, it began a campaign of education to conserve equip
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ment through better driving and better maintenance practices. It stressed also the curtailment of pleasure driving and the further utilization of car capacity through car sharing. The problem was one that lent itself better to a campaign of education than to the issuance of orders or directives which would have required extensive policing. There were but two gen-ral orders that were applicable to passenger automobile operators. One was General Order ODT No. 14A, which provided that no person should use transportation by motor vehicle to attend or participate in any motorcycle race. The other regulation was General Order ODT No. 23 which forbade driving any motor vehicle at a speed in excess of 35 miles an hour. The Office of Price Administration amended its gasoline regulations so as to deny supplemental gas rations in connection with racing events, and to prohibit the use of gasoline for driving in violation of the 35-mile-per-hour speed limit.
The operation of passenger automobiles divided between essential and unessential driving, a differentiation often difficult to establish because the passenger automobile was always an all-purpose vehicle. Its unessential operations comprised driving purely for recreation or pleasure driving for convenience, or driving for purposes, which in themselves were essential, but which could be easily attained by using public transportation facilities.
In its determination of gasoline requirements for passenger automobiles in the third quarter of 1943, the Office of Defense Transportation estimated that about 57 percent of the normal peacetime driving was basic transportation work, which included home-to-work and other business trips, incidental commodity hauls, such as milk, farm produce, etc., and a wide variety of activities basic to community life, such as shopping, driving to school and church. The remainder of the prewar mileage was accounted for by social and recreational use of the private automobile. Throughout the war the amount of unessential driving with the private passenger automobile, remained a substantial factor.
In the critical gasoline period early in 1943, a ban was put on all pleasure driving in the Eastern States comprising the gasoline shortage area. The ban which covered the months of January and February 1943 was lifted on March 3. The consumption of gasoline, according to the Petroleum Administration for War, increased immediately. It was 20 percent greater in March over February. The consumption of gasoline which was between 315,000 and 325,000 barrels per day in the district during the ban, had risen to about 400,000 barrels per day before the restrictions on unessential driving were again put into effect on May 20, 1943. This restriction was termi
nated on September 1, 1943, and it was not found necessary thereafter to again enforce general restrictions on pleasure driving.
Car-Sharing Campaign
The efforts of the Office of Defense Transportation and the Office of Price Administration were directed toward fuller utilization of the capacity of the private passenger automobile through car sharing. That campaign was the most widely and most systematically pressed conservation effort in the field of the private automobile. At first, it was a purely voluntary undertaking, without penalty or inducement, conducted by the Highway Traffic Advisory Committee for the War Department. At the request of the Office of Defense Transportation on March 28, 1942, this committee supervised a national campaign of education and persuasion to bring about fuller utilization of the seating capacity of passenger cars. In this work, the Highway Traffic Advisory Committee utilized the services of the numerous local citizen committees which worked under the -Office of Civilian Defense, and also organized share-riding committees in industrial plants. In March 1943, the Highway Traffic Advisory Committee reported the result of a group-riding survey which showed an increase in car occupancy from two passengers per car prior to July 1, 1942, to 2.44 passengers by December 31, 1942, and 2.66 passengers per car by March 1,1943.
These results, it was felt, were not commensurate with the effort expended, but seemingly represented the limit that could be reached through appeal alone. While they constituted a helpful contribution to the conservation program, the results would have to be greatly increased to exercise a real influence on the problem of conserving motor equipment.
In April 1943, the Office of Price Administration gave its cooperation to the ride-sharing campaign in an effective way. Under its function of rationing gasoline, it was in position to offer a tangible inducement to car owners to enter into share-riding agreements by extending to such operators gasoline allowances in excess of that alloted under the A card. The additional gasoline ration was on a mileage basis under the B and C card classification, and the general requirement was that the car was to carry regularly not less than four persons including the driver, who could not avail themselves of such alternate means of transportation as busses or transit lines.
Although by Executive Order No. 9156 of March 2, 1942, the original jurisdiction of the Office of Defense Transportation over motor transportation was clarified as embracing “all rubber-borne transportation facilities, including passenger cars, busses, taxicabs, and trucks,” regulatory control over passenger
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cars was exercised by the Office of Price Administration, although responsibility for the effective functioning of transportation lay with the Office of Defense Transportation.
there were practical considerations in the problem of regulating passenger automobiles. The 27 odd million cars were so widely spread that passenger automobiles were domiciled in perhaps every community no matter how small. All this territory was covered by the Nation-wide organization of local Office of Trice Administration boards to ration all controlled materials, including gasoline, tires and automobiles themselves. The Office of Defense Transportation concerned itself with exercising full control over commercial vehicles under Executive Order No. 9156 and under certain allocations of authority by the War Production Board. The Office of Price Administration by degrees exercised wider control over passenger automobiles through its rationing regulations of gasoline and tires, subject however to War Production Board Directive No. 1-F of May 4, 1942, which stipulated that: “In the exercise of rationing authority delegated to the Office of Price Administration with respect to tires, passenger cars, gasoline, or other products used in transportation, such office shall, to the full extent administratively practicable, implement any policies or programs with respect to transportation which the Office of Defense Transportation may formulate.”
There was an element of conflict in the situation of one agency being held responsible for the functioning of transportation, and another agency responsible for rationing of fuel, tires and equipment that were necessary to enable transportation to function. Gradually the rationing of equipment and gasoline passed into the hands of the Office of Defense Transportation through allocation of authority by the War Production Board, as far as commercial vehicles were concerned, but not with regard to passenger automobiles. Full control over the rationing of the passenger car equipment, gasoline, and tires remained in the hands of the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration. The Office of Defense Transportation served merely as a claimant agency for gasoline for passenger automobile transportation before the Petroleum Administration for War, and as the supporter of various efforts to conserve private passenger equipment to the end that it might function throughout the war in easing the traffic burden of the common carriers of passengers.
At many points the administrative and educational programs of the Office of Defense Transportation for the conservation of commercial vehicles affected the passenger automobile and brought to it the benefits of the policies which it pressed vigorously in behalf
of commercial transportation. Staggering the hours of shifts in the manufacturing and commercial fields so as to spread the load on bus and transit lines; the carrying out of the 12-point conservation program under the Office of Defense Transportation’s policy statement of April 17, 1942, and the ban on certain events, such as racing and thrill shows, etc., while designed to conserve gasoline and tires, all contributed to the reduced employment of the passenger automobile and consequent extension of its useful life.
The conservation campaign had three interdependent objectives—conserving gasoline, tires, and equipment. The less gasoline used, the less consumption of rubber, and the less tire mileage, the less wear and tear on the car itself. Conserving gasoline was largely a matter of adjusting car operations to the available stocks on the Atlantic coast which were affected by transportation limitations in replenishing the unpredictable draining of the Eastern supplies for the forces of Europe. Aside from these adjustments to the variable current supply, the gasoline conservation program also was directed at the preservation of the rubber pile. The Baruch Committee said bluntly: “The limitation on the use of gasoline is not due to shortage of that commodity—it is wholly a matter of rubber saving.”
The final beneficiary of the program was the motor vehicle—the less mileage and the more moderate the speed, the longer it would last.
The situation in private passenger transportation grew more precarious each year since the manufacture of passenger cars for civilians ceased entirely in February 1942. By the time the hostilities in Europe came to an end in May 1945, the rationable supply of new passenger cars had fallen below 4,000 cars available for civilian use, a scant reserve for keeping functioning in essential work a transportation activity that prior to the war was served by more than 28,-000,000 units. To make the supply of cars last for the more essential requirements, eligibility for new cars was restricted sharply by the rationing authorities. Thus, new passenger automobiles by March 15, 1945, became available only to a few classes. Besides the Government, for safety and law-enforcing purposes, allocation of new cars was made only to the medical profession, ministers, certain military officers, taxicabs and rental-car operators. By July 18, 1945, an estimated 99 percent of the frozen stock of passenger cars had been rationed out by the Office of Price Administration, and production prospects had become so improved that as of that date, rationing restrictions on 1942 passenger cars were eased. Finally, on October 30, 1945, the last vestige of rationing passenger automobiles instituted on February 1, 1942, disappeared.
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CHAPTER XXII
CONTROL BY GENERAL AND SPECIAL ORDERS
In the two preceding chapters we have reviewed the methods used at the outset by the Office of Defense Transportation to conserve motor passenger transport facilities through statements of policy and voluntary cooperation. While good results were obtained in most quarters these results were not uniform. As the shortage of materials and equipment increased it became necessary to stiffen the controls by a series of 12 General Orders as follows :
Order No. Type of Transport Covered
2 All carriers by steam railroad and street railway.
10 (10A) Sightseeing and chartered busses.
11 Intercity busses.
14 (14A) Automobile thrill shows.
20 (20A) Taxicabs.
21 (21 A) Certificates of War Necessity (all motor transport).
22 Taxicabs in New York City.
23 Speed Limits of 35 Miles Per Hour.
26 (26A) Rental Cars.
35 Agency passenger transport (Public Law 799).
39 All rubber-tired passenger transport vehicles.
46 Rental cars in 3 Florida Counties.
While all operations covered by the general orders were important, the operations which required the greatest supervision, particularly in the field, were the Nation-wide operation of the local transit systems, the intercity busses, the school busses, the taxicabs, and rental cars. After reviewing briefly the other operations covered by the general orders listed above a more detailed discussion of the control of the Nation-wide mass transportation of passengers by rubber-borne transport will follow.
Substitution of Bus for Rail Service
After the beginning of the war, a number of local rail carriers, or local transit lines, as well as regular railroads continued to readjust their operations, usually in the form of substituting bus for streetcar and railway service. The changes were made out of I economic considerations. While these considerations, especially in city transport, were influenced largely by volume of traffic, they did not necessarily fit into the program of the Office of Defense Transportation to make transportation serve primarily the war effort. Moreover, they represented a formidable attack on the shrinking rubber supply through the
substitution of tire-borne transport for steel-borne. The effects of this substitution held grave promise, if permitted to go unchecked, or if not closely integrated with the conservation plans of the Office of Defense Transportation.
Sightseeing and Charter Busses
It was to control this situation that the Office of Defense Transportation on March 15, 1942, issued General Order ODT No. 2. This order provided that “no carrier by railroad, in respect of the transportation of passengers, shall substitute a bus, or busses, for any vehicle or vehicles theretofore operated on rails, over any existing lane or route of such carrier by railroad unless it shall have been authorized so to do by prior order or orders issued by this Office.” This order was revoked on August 31, 1945.
The next general order to effectuate the policy of conserving equipment and to direct it into channels of essential use was General Order ODT No. 10 later amended to 10A, which undertook to ban two types of passenger-carrier services. It forbade, except in certain specified cases, the sightseeing activity and the chartering of busses by groups of passengers for their exclusive use as well as the operation of busses to or from points or over routes not regularly served by the common carrier facilities of the persons performing such transportation. Exceptions to this sweeping prohibition of charter service were made in cases where such transportation could not well be performed by existing facilities in the case of military personnel or in service for military activities, student and teacher groups to or from schools, employees between their homes and their work, children to or from summer camps, persons to or from places of worship, passengers from common carriers in emergencies, inmates of institutions, juries and court attendants, and persons traveling under specific approval by the Office of Defense Transportation. The order provided no exceptions to the ban on sightseeing services. It was revoked August 13, 1945.
Control Over U. S. Agency Equipment and Service
The Seventy-seventh Congress on December 1,
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1942, passed Public Law 779, a transportation conservation measure under which the War and Navy Departments and the U. S. Maritime Commission were required to obtain clearance from the Office of Defense Transportation for the operation of their own fleets of passenger vehicles for conveying workers to and from their extensive war plants. The Office of Defense Transportation was to determine whether existing private and other facilities were adequate or could be made so to meet the needs of those three war agencies.
On January 4, 1943, the President issued Executive Order No. 9294, by which the scope of the activities of the Office of Defense Transportation, as set forth in Public Law 779, was amplified to the extent that the Office of Defense Transportation might review and approve contracts for local transportation facilities made by any Federal agency or department, or by any private firm, except common carriers holding contracts with such agencies or departments. Under this authority the Office of Defense Transportation issued its General Order ODT No. 35, to formulate procedure under Public Law No. 779. The administration of this order, together with the performance of tasks in collaboration with the Defense Plant Corporation in findings, was assigned to the Contract Clearance Section of the Division of Local Transport later a section in the Management Division of the Highway Transport Department.
Under the provision of paragraph 4, section 1, of Public Law 779, Seventy-seventh Congress, the Office of Defense Transportation, when requested by the Department of War, the Department of the Navy, or the Maritime Commission, made determinations as to the adequacy of passenger transportation facilities and the need for proposed transportation services to provide transportation for personnel attached to or employed by the department or agency, including personnel attached to or employed by private war plants. The Office of Defense Transportation was called upon to make similar determinations under Public Law 170, Seventy-eighth Congress, with respect to proposed operations of automotive equipment by the Veterans’ Administration at its field stations, and under the annual appropriation acts of the Department of the Interior covering transportation to be provided by that Department for personnel of helium plants and synthetic liquid fuel demonstration plants and school children of such personnel.
A total of 1,250 determinations was made by the Office of Defense Transportation under the several public laws; of which 1,057 were issued to the Department of War, 151 to the Department of the Navy, 18 to the Maritime Commission, 13 to the Vet
erans’ Administration, and 11 to the Department of the Interior.
The provision of General Order ODT No. 35, known as the “freeze” section, restricted the use of any local passenger transportation equipment, obtained by reason of an Office of Defense Transportation recommendation to the War Production Board, to the purpose or routes and in the particular service for which it was acquired, except under specific permission by the Office of Defense Transportation, and prohibited the physical removal of such equipment from such services or routes except by specific authorization. This provision enabled the Office of Defense Transportation to exercise a powerful control in keeping common-carrier and contract-passenger equipment in the essential services. However, on October 15, 1944, the Office of Defense Transportation suspended the operation of the provision, the tight situation in regard to obtaining new equipment having materially improved.
Intercity Busses
As stated above, in order to unify control over all bus operations, the supervision over intercity bus operations was transferred from the Division of Motor Transport to the Division of Local Transport on July 24,1942.
This nonlocal passenger-carrying activity thus brought under Local Transport’s administration was a Nation-wide operation. Two hundred eighty-five companies reported that their operations at the beginning of the war involved 7,700 vehicles carrying in December 1941, a total of 14,881,000 passengers. In the course of the war the business of the intercity busses increased greatly. The revenue passengers of these bus companies more than doubled. To adapt this mounting service to the dwindling supply of equipment, rubber, fuel, and manpower, required a heavy elimination of wasteful service and duplication in the administration of the activity. This was undertaken by enforcement of the general orders already discussed as applicable to local busses and transit lines ; by the operating controls provided in connection with the issuance of certificates of war necessity; and by special intercity bus orders directing elimination of specifically designated wasteful competitive operations, and by directing the participation in joint or pooling actions under General Order ODT No. H While such general and special orders accounted for the greater part of the economies achieved, a share of the total improvement arose out of the benefits that flowed to bus operation from the general conservation program of the Office of Defense Transportation, as set forth in the Director’s statement of policy
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of April 17, 1942, governing rubber-tired transportation.
Various general orders prescribed a general 40 percent load factor, coordination with competing lines, staggering of schedules, complying with the requirements for certificates of war necessity, eliminating charter busses for pleasure and sightseeing. As stated above the general order dealing directly with intercity bus transport was General Order ODT No. 11, effective July 1, 1942. It required of intercity bus operators that they discontinue all limited or express service; discontinue schedules which did not come up to efficiency standards as determined by the average load; discontinue services to places of amusement ; pool competitive facilities; and freeze all existing routes.
Under General Order ODT 11 numerous special orders were issued which were designed to deal with specific cases of waste and unnecessary operations. Some were orders to desist from certain operations, but most of them were orders to enter into joint action arrangements with competitive lines. These joint action plans were arrangements between competitive lines in a given territory which provided for the maximum utilization of equipment during the period of the emergency through one or more of ttye following methods:
(a) Pooling or joint use of equipment or other facilities;
(b) Pooling or division of traffic, service or revenues;
(c) Alternating or staggering schedules between two or more points;
(d) Mutual honoring of one another’s tickets at the option of the passenger;
(e) Suspension, lease, exchange or joint use of operating rights.
Special Directives to Economize
There were issued 60 special intercity bus orders. The citing of a few of these will illustrate their scope and character.
Special Order ODT No. B-l directed the Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., Safeway Trails, Inc., Eastern Trails, Inc., and Quaker City Bus Lines, which operated either all the way or part of the way between New York City and Washington, D. C., to enter into an agreed plan that was satisfactory to the Office of Defense Transportation and which provided that the four lines operate as follows:
1. Honor each other’s tickets between all points where equal fares apply in order to reduce overloads and the need for extra sections;
2. Eliminate duplication in schedules, except between Washington and Baltimore, where peak loads make such duplication necessary;
3. Discontinue 1-day excursions between New York and Philadelphia.
4. Discontinue week-end excursions between New York and Camp Dix, New Jersey, via Trenton, this traffic to be handled by the Quaker City Bus Company’s direct line;
5. Make available to each other, subject to approval by State regulatory authorities, their exclusive operating rights in any of the States involved.
Special Order ODT No. B-9, and Amendments, directed the All-American Bus Lines, Inc., of Chicago and the Northern Trails, Inc., of Chicago to enter into a joint arrangement covering their operations between New York City and Chicago. It provided the usual joint operations and joint use of facilities with elimination of duplicate schedules and alternate routes.
Special Order ODT B-30 placed the 1,436-mile operation between New York City and Miami, Fla., under a joint action arrangement. The lines affected were the Pan American Greyhound Lines, Inc., of Charleston, W. Va.; Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., of Cleveland; Atlantic Greyhound Corp, of Charleston, W. Va.; and the Florida Motor Lines’ Corp, of Jacksonville, Fla. In this case, pool traffic operations were ordered “to the end that the average load factor, i.e., the ratio of passenger miles to seat miles of Pan American Greyhound Lines, Inc., for each portion of its route which duplicates or closely parallels a route of any of the other carriers shall be at least equal during each calendar month to the average load factor of each of the other carriers on that portion of its routes which duplicates or closely parallels the route of Pan American Greyhound Lines, Inc.”
Emergency Measure General Order ODT No. 39
In addition to the special orders for joint action, the intercity bus lines were subject to General Order ODT No. 39, which reduced rubber-tired passenger transportation in 13 States and the District of Columbia in the gasoline-shortage area. This emergency measure embodied plan No. 2 of the three-part emergency plans for reducing mileage. Through the loss of 14 oil tankers through enemy action in December 1942, a serious gasoline shortage resulted on the Atlantic coast, and to prepare for any future emergencies, the Office of Defense Transportation on January 25, 1943, called on all operators of busses and taxicabs to submit plans by which they could curtail their respective services 10 percent, also 20 percent and 30 percent. On May 22, 1943, the Office of Defense Transportation brought about a drastic 40 percent reduction in bus and taxicab mileage in the eastern gasoline shortage area, by having the Office of Price Administration stretch out ration coupons in the area by 25 days for busses and taxicabs. However, on May 27,1943, the Office of Defense Transportation felt compelled to issue its General Order ODT No. 39 requiring bus and taxicab operators to reduce their mileage at once by 20 percent. “This action was forced,” said an ODT press release of that date, “by failure of some operators to begin stretching their T gasoline ration voluntarily to meet
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the over-all 40 percent reduction in mileage imposed by extending the validity period for the current rations for an extra 25 days.” This step resulted in effective savings and enabled the operators to carry on through the emergency period. The order was revoked on August 15, 1943. In this 81-day period, according to the annual report of the Director of the Division of Local Transport, savings in gasoline by intercity busses amounted to some 100,000 gallons.
Speed Limits
Another Office of Defense Transportation General Order, which closely concerned the intercity bus services was General Order ODT No. 23, prohibiting the operation of any motor vehicle “at any rate of speed which is (1) in excess of the applicable speed limit duly prescribed by competent public authority, or (2) in excess of 35 miles per hour, whichever speed is the lesser.”
School Busses
A problem of magnitude in rubber-borne passenger transportation was control over school bus operations. The number of school busses exceeded the total of all other kinds of busses, including local transit and intercity busses. The necessity for keeping the school bus system operating through the war period in spite of shortages of critical materials caused school officials and the Office of Defense Transportation to be concerned about school bus conservation. The Office of Defense Transportation also recognized that the large fleet of 93,000 school busses in December 1941 might be used in an emergency to provide other services in addition to transporting children to school.
Generally, school busses are controlled by many small governmental units. School district boards of education own about one-third of the busses and the majority are owned by individual contractors who perform the service requested by boards of education or school superintendents. In only two States, Delaware and North Carolina, are the busses supervised almost entirely by the State. Several States have county systems for management, but in most of the States the local school unit is in charge of the school transportation service provided in the local area. This produces a great variation in service rendered, and in the operational practices.
Early in 1942, the school authorities in several States gave evidence of much interest in the school transportation system as it might be affected by the war. Several informal conferences with the U .S. Office of Education, the Office of Defense Transportation, the National Education Association and the American Automobile Association led to the arrangement of a six-day work conference in connection
with the National Institute for Traffic Training held in June at Yale University. This was followed a month later by a 4-day conference in Washington. The attendance included representatives from State Departments of Education, the U. S. Office of Education, the Office of Defense Transportation, the National Education Association, the War Production Board, the American Automobile Association, the National ‘Safety Council, the Highway Education Board, and representatives of other interested groups.
The work conference developed a handbook “School Transportation in Wartime” approved by the National Council of Chief State School Officers and published by the American Automobile Association in September 1942. Facts, discussions, and recommendations were presented in the 100-page handbook that would be useful to school authorities in reorganizing school transportation service to meet wartime conditions.
The Office of Defense Transportation followed this preliminary work by establishing in September 1942 in the Division of Local Transport, a School Bus Section. Work of the section was organized on a basis of close collaboration with and through the State and Federal school authorities. It exercised jurisdiction over school bus operation, maintenance, and utilization with a view to meeting the basic minimum school transportation needs with the existing equipment, and in addition, assisting in the transportation of war workers to the extent found possible and necessary.
By the end of 1943, the Office of Defense Transportation’s control over the school-bus situation showed gratifying results. According to the Traffic Statistics of the Highway Transport Department of the Office of Defense Transportation for 1943, the 93,398 school busses in operation in December 1941 had been reduced 14.8 percent to 79,569 by December 1943, and the vehicle miles reduced from 89,333,000 to 72,000,000, or 19.4 percent. These decreases were ascribed to service restrictions in accordance with the Office of Defense Transportation’s policies, to the transfer of bus units to worker transportation, and to the excess of worn-out units over available replacements. On the other hand, the number of pupils transported in December 1943 had increased to 4,424,000 as compared with 4,141,000 in December 1941, an increase of 6.8 per cent, and the number of pupil rides per vehicle mile increased likewise. In other words, despite the 14.8 percent reduction in vehicles in operation, 6.8 percent more pupils were being transported.
The steps that led to this achievement were a series of requirements for conservation of existing
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equipment and for fuller utilization of the equipment imposed upon school bus operations.
Provisions of the statement of policy on school bus operations were:
1. Elimination of unnecessary mileage by organizing line routes and reducing empty mileage.
2. Providing transportation service only for children more than 2 miles from school or more than one and one-half miles from the trunk route.
3. Elimination of school bus mileage by diverting children to common carriers wherever practicable.
4. Elimination of road mileage also driven by the bus of another school unit, and providing no service for children that do not attend the nearest school having space and facilities in tie appiopnate grade level and school work.
5. Elimination of stops so that the remaining stops are from one-eighth to one-quarter mile apart.
6. Staggering of school opening and closing hours to permit a bus to serve more than one load of children.
7. Renegotiation of existing contracts that interfered with the conservation program.
8. Elimination of extra services and the limitation of use to the movement of public, teachers, and other school employees to one round trip to the school daily.
9. Cooperation with war transportation committees on the provision of worker transportation where necessary.
10. Provision for adequate care and vehicle maintenance.
11. Provision for safe and well-trained drivers.
12. Cooperation with adjoining school units, and with State and Federal authorities in making comprehensive school transportation studies for the elimination of waste.
The preliminary conferences between the Office of Defense Transportation and school authorities indicated that a large measure of voluntary compliance with the Office of Defense Transportation requirements could be relied upon, but to bring the thousands of individual county and school subdivisions completely in line with the conservation requirements called for a certain amount of enforceable persuasion. This was at hand in the War Production Board’s General Conservation Order M-100, governing the rationing of commercial vehicles, and in General Order ODT No. 21, which regulated the approval of miles and fuel by the Office of Defense Transportation. Accordingly, in announcing the requirements “to all authorities having regulatory power on school transportation, and to all school bus operators,” the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation stated:
Every school bus in the Nation is required by General Order ODT No. 21 to have after November 30, 1942, a certificate of war necessity fixing the maximum number of miles of operation. and authorizing the necessary fuel, parts, tires, and tubes for same. These certificates will be continuously reviewed and revised to meet only the basic minimum transportation needs. Adherence to policies adopted following many conferences with school authorities and set forth below, will be the basis for determining such minimum needs.
The Office of Defense Transportation issued Form LT-5, an application for the approval of school bus operations and the necessary fuel. The four parts of the application sought to elicit information establishing the extent to which the applicant was conforming to the Office of Defense Transportation’s school bus policy; details as to the service rendered and the
mileage and amount of gasoline required; certification by local and county school superintendents as to the correctness and completeness of the information furnished; and finally, approval by the chief State school officer or his representative.
As a further means of assuring school bus conservation, the Office of Defense Transportation released new busses only to schools which had reorganized the bus service in accordance with the conservation policies and needed the new bus to prevent absence from school.
Applications for new busses originated with the local school unit and were submitted to the chief ¡State school officer for approval. The approved applications were transmitted to the Office of Defense Transportation’s Local Allocation Officers in the field, and if approved, were sent to Washington for further consideration and approval. Prior to the War, the schools had purchased an average of about 10,400 busses annually, but under the plan of rationing commercial vehicles provided in General Conservation Order M-100, the following numbers of school busses were released:
Number of
Year new busses
1942 ............................................. 36
1943 ............................................ 401
1944 ............................................. 5421
1945 .......................................... 8,41.1
Total during war ........................ 14,269
On June 24, 1944, the War Production Board and the Office of Defense Transportation agreed upon a transfer of responsibility to the Office of Defense Transportation for the allocation of commercial motor vehicles. The new responsibilities were described in Administrative Order ODT No. 27, which prescribed the procedure for allocation. In addition to compliance with the school bus policy, Administrative Order ODT No. 27 required that the district managers of the Office of Defense Transportation, to whom chief State school officers submitted their approved applications for new equipment, should be assured:
1. That the applicant could not fill its needs by leasing available vehicles of others, by pooling its present vehicles with those of other operators, by purchasing a used vehicle, er by utilizing the service of other operators;
2. That the applicant could not transfer some of its present vehicles now being used for less essential purposes to the use for which it is now requesting the new vehicle; and
3. That if the new vehicle is to be used for replacement, the vehicle to be replaced is incapable of being repaired to serve the applicant’s purpose.
While the Office of Defense Transportation originally had encouraged the transfer of excess school busses to the transportation of workers, the practice was abused because of the more profitable nature of this field of transportation. In the spring of 1943, therefore it became necessary for the Office of De-
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fense Transportation to take drastic steps to avert the diversion of busses and other passenger carrying commercial vehicles from their established operations in the field of local transportation to other and more lucrative operations. This was accomplished by the issuance of General Order ODT No. 35 on March 17, 1943, forbidding the transfer of passenger equipment seating 12 or more persons, without first having obtained the approval of the Office of Defense Transportation. The order applied to all forms of local passenger equipment, but to the school bus operation it was a special boon. There had been more than 93,000 school busses in service. Contractor-owned school busses were disappearing from the service at a rapid rate, some 4,000 vehicles having been transferred to other more profitable work. The school authorities viewed the situation with alarm, as some 30,000 bus-service contracts were due to expire by the close of the 1942-43 school year. In an Office of Defense Transportation press release, dated March 17,1943, it was stated:
An immediate effect of the order will be to stop developing a black market in school busses which was threatening to deprive children of transportation between their homes and schools. Reports received' from 15 States indicate losses already of from 200 to 500 busses in a State. School authorities, petitioning for a “freeze” of such equipment, had informed the Office of Defense Transportation that a mass exodus of school busses was in prospect.
Typical examples reported to the Office of Defense Transportation indicated a speedy disruption of school transportation, unless school busses were “frozen” in their existing work. One contractor who had been providing school service at $1,800 a year, transferred to new work where the vehicle could earn $1,800 a month. Another bus owner, after taking children to school in the morning, sold his vehicle for a large profit during lunch hour, leaving the children without return transportation. Some contractors were forfeiting their guarantee of performance bonds to school districts in order to get into a more lucrative operation immediately. Brokers, particularly in the Southeast and Southwest were, in many cases, offering school bus owners as much as twice the original cost for a 2 year-old vehicle.
This situation had been anticipated by those who attended the work conference in June and July of 1942. In the handbook is recorded a resolution approved at Yale University that reads as follows:
WHEREAS, Privately owned school busses essential to a basic minimum school transportation program are being transferred indiscriminately to other services through sale or through assignment exclusively to nonschool purposes, there-for© be it
RESOLVED, That the National Council of Chief State School Officers urgently recommends that the responsible Federal agency or agencies put into effect such regulations or measures as may be necessary to prevent the transfer, to nonschool services, of school busses essential to a basic minimum school transportation program.
The freeze order proved effective. Transfers of equipment out of the school services to other activities were authorized only upon the recommendation of the chief State school officers. During the life of this freeze order, 487 school busses were transferred from school service to school service; 271 busses were transferred from nonschool service to school service; and 1,130 busses were transferred from school service to nonschool (war-worker) service. Thus, only 859 busses were released from school work during the 19 months the order was in effect. Feeling that the “freeze” order had served its purpose, the Office of Defense Transportation on October 4, 1944, announced the “suspension until further notice” of the order insofar as freezing passenger commercial vehicles, including school busses, was concerned.
It should be noted that the “freeze” order was the only order issued for the wartime regulation of school busses, and that this order was to assist the school authorities in the operation of their program. Orders compelling conservation or absolutely preventing certain operations did not seem to be necessary. Instead, the School Bus Section attempted to administer the wartime school transportation program by stating policies, recommending eliminations of service and urging cooperation.
Only one case of resistance to the conservation measures got into the courts. In Tama County, Iowa, a school patron obtained an order of mandamus compelling the Board of Education to provide transportation for his three children, a distance of nine-tenths of a mile from the home to the bus line. The Board of Education had eliminated a side trip off the main bus route as recommended by the Office of Defense Transportation’s Statement of Policy. Later the decision was reversed by the Iowa State court, thereby upholding the local Board of Education in the elimination of side trips and in planning transportation service in accord with wartime recommendations.
With the easing of the situation affecting the supply of busses, the task of the School Bus Section of the Highway Transport Department speedily came to an end. When the cessation of hostilities brought an end to all restrictions effecting the manufacture and distribution of motor passenger vehicles, the School Bus Section wrote finis to its contribution to the war transportation effort of the Office of Defense Transportation.
Taxicabs
In 1942 there were 55,400 taxicabs in strictly call or demand services which carried nearly one million passengers. This activity constituted an important specialized part of local transportation. The flexible
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on-call character of taxi operation supplemented in an essential way the fixed or scheduled services of bus and streetcar lines. Under the stimulus of newly established training camps and war plants, the number of taxicabs had risen and the miles of operation had increased to an extent that gave cause for anxiety as to the inroads on the supply of rubber and gasoline.
In April 1941, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation sounded a warning to the taxicab industry, saying that in view of the scarcity of mar terials, the highly personalized cab service of peace times could no longer be maintained. “With the entire American civilian economy being stripped of nonessentials,” he said, “rubber and other replacement parts cannot be allotted to taxicabs until the operators and local regulatory authorities prove that present equipment is not being wasted in the performance of nonessential service.” To bring about improvement in the operations of the industry and to keep it alive, the Director announced the establishment of a Taxicab Section in the Division of Local Transport. The improvement sought at the start included a cessation of wasteful operations such as cruising to seek fares; the elimination of nonessential riding; and the encouragement of group riding. The Taxicab Section of the Division, through educational and persuasive methods, effected economies in operation, but the deep cuts that were required to bring the taxicab operations more in line with available equipment and supplies, could be accomplished only through drastic regulatory steps.
This led to issuing of General Order ODT No. 20, which first froze the number of taxicabs in operation to the number in operation on September 1,1942, the date on which the order went into effect, and further confined the operations of taxicabs to those persons authorized to operate as of September 1, 1942.
The order applied to all power operated rubber-tired vehicles seating less than 10 persons and transporting passengers on call to or from any points demanded by the passengers; regardless of any other definition fixed by administrative or judicial authority.
The regulation prohibited seven practices: Driving of a taxicab for any purpose personal to the driver; pick-up and delivery of merchandise other than medical supplies; cruising to pick up passengers; operating farther than 10 miles beyond the limit of a municipality which has a population of 10,000 or more; transporting a passenger on a trip exceeding 25 miles, or to a community which does not permit him to pick up fares for the return trip, or delivering him to another taxicab which will relay him to a point beyond the 25-mile limit. These prohibitions 700494—48—12
applied to passengers as well as operators of such vehicles. The order also required taxicab operators to participate in group-riding which might be authorized by communities.
A new General Order ODT No. 20A was made effective July 1, 1943, which was more drastic. It retained and strengthened the regulatory features of the original order, and provided further for the introduction of joint action plans by competitive operators, under which large operational economies coupled with greatly increased capacity for service were achieved. The taxicab joint action plans followed the general pattern of these plans for other services. This provided for pooling of equipment, traffic, and service arrangements.
The provisions of the order requiring joint action operations between competitive services directed:
(a) Pooling or joint use of concessions, equipment of other facilities;
(b) Pooling, or division of traffic, service or revenues;
(c) Alteration, staggering or suspension of services; (d) Elimination of duplicating dispatching service.
The keeping of daily traffic and operating records was required. Flexibility was given the regulations, in the way of special and general permits in order to meet emergency situations. The order applied only to the continental United States and to Alaska. As commercial motor vehicles, taxicabs also came under the-scope of General Order ODT No. 21, covering certificate of war necessity. The joint action agreements-were cleared by the Attorney General’s approval of War Production Board’s Certificate No. 86. By the-middle of 1944 the Office of Defense Transportation was able to announce the conclusion of more than 109 such arrangements throughout the country. By the end of the war the number of joint action arrangements numbered 216.
The estimated savings from joint action plans alone for the period July 19, 1943, to July 16, 1945,, were 50,161,388 miles and 4,179,452 gallons of gasoline.
Special Situations
By reason of the taxicab situation in New York City, where there was in 1942, one taxicab for each-640 inhabitants, need was felt for regulation in that city in addition to the Nation-wide restrictions prescribed in General Order ODT No. 20. This new order dated September 10, 1942, and designated as General Order ODT No. 22, provided that each operator of a fleet of three or more taxicabs in New York City should discontinue the operation of 33^ percent of the total number of vehicles that he was licensed to operate by the local police regulations and surrender such excess licenses to the city for the duration of the war, while those who operated less
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than three taxicabs could operate them not more than 6 days in any calendar week. The order further forbade the operation of a taxicab from any point in New York City to any point outside of the State, and its operation to any point more than 5 miles outside of the corporate limits of New York City. In all other respects, General Order ODT No. 20A was applicable in that city. General exceptions to the application of the order were cases of emergency due to accident, illness, or ipilitary necessity.
In a public statement issued by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, it was estimated that the restriction would result in the saving of the operation of 107,000,000 taxi miles, and the need for 15,000 new tires and that the same number of recaps would be eliminated, accompanied by a reduced consumption of 10,000,000 gallons of gasoline per year. While General Order ODT No. 22 was not extended to include other metropolitan centers, a special order was issued on April 24, 1943, decreeing additional restrictions for certain taxicabs in the city of Chicago. On petition of 82 taxicab services in that city, it was ordered that the operations of the petitioning operators be suspended between 3 a.m. and 6 a.m. each day except Sundays; that no taxicab would be driven more than 190 miles during any calendar day; all operations 10 miles beyond a defined area within the city limits be discontinued; passengers be discharged only at street intersections; all operations in or through alleys be discontinued; traffic be diverted to each other to reduce empty mileage, and to eliminate duplicating service; that dispatching service be conducted jointly, and that speed be held to 30 miles or less per hour. All orders affecting taxicabs were revoked August 16, 1945, except that the joint action provision was continued until September 16, 1945.
The general results achieved under the supervision of the Office of Defense Transportation over taxicabs is shown in the following data compiled by the Gab Research Bureau, Inc.
Cabs operated Vehicle miles Live miles Passengers carried Average passenger per trip
Thousands Percent Thousands
1941 55,400 2,191,790 52.2 966, 721 1.7
1942 50,800 2,567,330 57.2 1,288,360 1.9
1943 48,464 2,642,741 62.5 1,446,138 2.3
1944 47,301 3,193,709 65.6 1,616,029 2.2
The tabulation shows that while 14.6 percent fewer taxicabs were operated in 1944 than in 1941, the vehicle miles increased 45.7 percent; the live mileage increased 25.6 percent; passengers carried increased 66.7 percent and the average number of passengers per trip increased 29.4 percent.
The satisfaction of the taxicab operators with the Office of Defense Transportation’s wartime control over their industry was perhaps reflected by the following excerpt from the pamphlet, “Wartime Regulations of Taxicabs in the United States,” published by the Cab Research Bureau, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio, which said:
By July 1944, about 150 joint action plans had been approved. While they have been developed as a wartime conservation measure there is hope that having tasted the sweets of cooperation, many operators will not want to go back to chaotic dog-eat-dog practices. In this case, the good that wartime agencies do may live after them.
In a memorandum discussing the legality of the taxicab action arrangements made at the direction of the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, the general counsel of this agency points out that the authority for the joint actions was based on the certification that they were “requisite to the prosecution of the war.” He said:
The Federal anti-trust law makes it unlawful for two or more persons to enter into an agreement which will result in an unreasonable restraint of trade or will unduly restrain competition. Consequently, when two or more taxicab operators agree to prescribe the service that each will render to the public, restrict the territory in which each will operate, or otherwise eliminate competition between them, there is always the possibility that they may be in violation of the anti-trust laws.
Public Law 603, 77th Congress, approved June 11, 1942, provides a means by which prosecution for violation of the anti-trust laws may be barred in respect of joint action requisite to the prosecution of the war. If the Office of Defense Transportation determines that a plan of joint action by two or more taxicab operators will result in substantial motor vehicle conservation and issues an order directing the operators to carry the plan into effect, this law may be made effective by obtaining a certificate from the Chairman of the War Production Board.
There was not only an over-all reduction of gasoline consumed or tires saved, but also there was a far-reaching change of turning wasteful operation into essential service that qualified the taxicab industry for allotment of the critical materials and supplies necessary to keep it going and carrying its share of the war transportation load. Such was the aim of the Office of Defense Transportation in exercising its functions for coordinating the entire transportation industry for war. The lessons of economic administration and operation which may take root, and which the industry may project into its postwar activities would be fruitful byproduct.
Rental Cars
A type of for-hire vehicle business which rendered a distinctive service was that of the rental car, of which there are two forms. One is the “U Drive” or “Drive-ur-Self” service, and the other is the livery service in which the driver as well as the car is furnished.
The rental car business was regulated by General Order ODT No. 26, effective December 1, 1942. It
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covered all passenger cars of less than 10-passenger capacity in the United States and its territories, and “froze” them at the number in lawful operation at the date of the effectiveness of the order. It also required that the “U Drive” concerns record for each contract the names, address, purpose, mileage, and operating period. In this order rental car was defined as one that is “leased or rented, or held for leasing or renting, with or without driver or operator.” On April 15, 1943, the order was reissued in amended form as General Order ODT No. 26A, and was restricted in application to the 48 States and the District of Columbia, but was later extended to Alaska. It was made to apply only to passenger vehicles of less than 10-passenger capacity which were available for hire “without the services of a driver being provided with the vehicle, and which, when under hire, is to be driven by the person to whom it is to be hired.” Thus, this excluded application to so-called livery, or cars furnished with drivers, including funeral limousines. The driver-vehicles were treated as though they were taxicabs, but with a smaller gasoline allowance. The confused status of the rental vehicles was presented as follows in a memorandum dated May 6,1943, to the field officers:
* Most vehicles which are known as “livery cars” come under the definition of taxicabs, as set forth in General Order ODT No. 20. To all practical intents and purposes, they are in call-and-demand service, even though they do not ply the streets like taxicabs and usually operate from a definite stand or off-the-street base.
In order to render the service for which livery cars are intended, we believe that they are entitled to a greater distance limit in exchange for this very much lower annual mileage. It has been suggested that the limit which a livery car can go from its home base should be 35 to 50 miles.
A legitimate livery car is also entitled to be relieved of the provisions in ODT-20 for marking as a taxicab. Both this relief and the extra distance privilege should be covered by a special permit.
The term “funeral limousine” is intended to apply only to limousines used exclusively in funeral service. These are not covered by any ODT order except No. 21. Obviously, where limousines are used on this basis and with the suggested lower mileage ceiling, there is little opportunity for waste or abuse. Where, however, a limousine is used occasionally in funeral service and at other times is engaged in call-or-demand service, it comes under the provisions of ODT-20.
The rental cars rendered a wide variety of service. They were used to a far greater extent by utility corporations and general commercial institutions than by individuals for recreational purposes. Persons renting cars provided for the gasoline used out of their basic ration cards and signed agreements that they would not use the car in violation of the Office of Defense Transportation’s regulations. If a customer owned no car and therefore had no ration card, he was furnished with a car and enough gallonage of gasoline to cover the proposed driving of the vehicle. It was a loose situation that was difficult to police. However on April 9,1943, the Local Transport Division fixed a Nation-wide quota of gasoline mile
age to rental car operators for their fleets under thei certificate of war necessity at 1,500 miles per month per car and 12 miles per gallon for Drive-ur-Self cars; 1,500 miles per car per month at 10 to 12 miles per gallon for livery cars, or cars with drivers; and 1,250 miles per car per month at 10 miles per gallon for funeral limousines.
There were, however, a few spots in the country where the Office of Defense Transportation’s General Orders were not effective in controlling the situation. These spots were resort localities in Florida, particularly Miami, where there was a very heavy rental car business that in the opinion of the Office of Defense Transportation field authorities, was largely of a pleasure-driving character. In the Miami section the Office of Defense Transportation’s regional administration sought to bring the rental car gas consumption in line with the rest of the country where that consumption was principally for more essential purposes, and they reduced the rental car ration to something like an average of 300 miles per car per month. The result was that operators had. the choice of laying up the bulk of their rental fleets to their loss or helping build up a large local black market to their profit. On further investigation, the; Office of Defense Transportation undertook to improve the rental car situation in the southern part of the Florida east coast area by issuing General Order ODT No. 46, applicable to Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties. This covered the winter resort area between Palm Beach and Miami. The purpose of the regulation was set forth as follows in the general outline of the Order:
Approximately 25 percent of the total number of rental cars in the United States are located in these three counties. This is far in excess of the number required for essential business purposes in the area. In the past, many people in the area have used rental cars as a means of circumventing the rationing regulations applicable to the private automobile. The purpose of the order is to conserve tires, motor fuel,, motor equipment, and at the same time permit sufficient rental car service in the area so as to take care of essential business needs.
The Order supplemented General Order ODT No. 26A, regulating the rental car business, except in such matters in regard to which the provisions of the General Order ODT No. 26A were in conflict. It fixed the monthly mileage at which a rental car may be operated at 650 miles for a calendar month. However, if an operator’s fleet of rental cars was reduced to 50 percent of the number of cars operated on December 1, 1944, the average allowance per car was increased to 1,500 miles per calendar month. This reduction of the fleet was accomplished through filing notice of withdrawal of certain described cars from the rental service and receiving certificate of war necessity providing for the larger mileage allowance for the remaining cars of the fleet. All such rental'
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cars were for hire for not more than 30 days ; however, the withdrawn cars also could be operated if rented under hiring agreements for periods in excess of 30 days. They had to be operated exclusively under more than 30 days’ agreements. Such cars were relieved of the mileage and certain other restrictions applicable to the short-term rental cars. To obtain
this status, the certificate of war necessity of such cars had to be surrendered. Thus, the vehicle being no longer a commercial vehicle, was not eligible for gasoline rationing under General Order ODT No. 21A, but was eligible for gasoline as a private automobile subject to all the essentiality requirements under the Office of Price Administration rationing.
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CHAPTER XXIII
ENFORCING SPEED LIMIT
To the Office of Defense Transportation fell the task of enforcing speed limits of motor vehicles as a measure for conserving the tire and rubber supply of the Nation. When the principal rubber-producing areas of the world fell into the hands of the Japanese, the United States had in store and in prospect up to January 1,1944, a total of 631,000 tons of crude rubber. This was 210,000 tons short of the estimated military and essential civilian demands, with nothing available for the manufacture of new tires for the 27,000,000 passenger cars.
The transportation of the country, other than rail and water, was strictly on an automotive vehicle basis. No substitute transportation on a substantial scale was feasible. The obvious solution of the problem was the conservation of the tires in storage and in use. The Office of Defense Transportation entered at once upon an educational tire conservation program of preventive maintenance, careful driving, and speed reduction on a basis of voluntary compliance. According to surveys made by the Public Roads Administration, the average speed at that time for all types of vehicles for 21 States was 47.1 miles per hour. The average for passenger cars was 48 miles per hour; for trucks, 40.4 miles per hour; and for busses, 50.7 miles per hour.
The campaign for slower driving eventuated on March 14,1942, in the sending of an identical letter by President Roosevelt to the governors of the 48 States requesting each one to take appropriate action to establish and enforce a 40-mile-per-hour speed limit as a part, of the program to conserve tires. The response by the governors was wholehearted. However, in only 11 of the States did the laws empower the State executives or highway commissions to modify the maximum speed limits. In each of these States the 40-mile-per-hour limit was established. In the remaining States, the governors generally issued proclamations urging the people to observe the 40-mile-per-hour limit, and State highway departments, in many instances, had road signs altered to conform to the 40-mile-per-hour policy. The Office of Defense Transportation did not embody its 40-mile-per-hour policy in a general order. It would not have had the
personnel to enforce it on a Nation-wide scale, so it depended upon voluntary compliance by the patriotic-minded, upon the enforcement authorities in the 12 States in which 40 miles per hour was the legal maximum speed, and upon its power to enforce such a maximum speed in connection with its general orders regulating the operation of common carriers under General Order ODT No. 3; motor trucks under General Order ODT No. 17; taxicabs under General Order ODT No. 20; and the revocation of certificates of war necessity under General Order ODT No. 21.
The Public Roads Administration surveys covering 25 States made between May 15 and October 1, 1942, the period covered by the President’s 40-miles-per-hour proclamation, showed that the average speed of all vehicles had dropped from 47.1 miles per hour to 42.3 miles per hour. The average speed of passenger cars dropped from 48 to 43.3 miles per hour; trucks from 40.4 to 39.4; and busses from 50.7 miles to 45.5 miles per hour. Thus the average mileage of passenger cars was still 3.3 miles over the 40-mile maximum speed and of busses 5.5 miles, with only the average speed of trucks within the 40-mile maximum speed limit.
Cooperation by States
To hold State administrations in line with the speed curtailment program and spur the work of getting State legislation that would permit the modification of existing maximum speed laws, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation on July 23# 1942, addressed a letter to each of the governors inviting a report on what steps had been taken in regard to achieving speed reduction. The responses indicated no progress in regard to obtaining legally enforceable 40-mile speed limits, but there was a general record of strong appeal by the governors to the public for observance of the 40-mile speed limit.
Voluntary compliance with the State enforcement of the 40-mile speed limit suffered to some extent from the conflicting views which persisted as to the state of the Nation’s rubber supply. The conflict of views finally led to the creation by the President on August 6, 1942, of a commission headed by Bernard M. Baruch, to investigate the whole rubber problem
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and make recommendations. The committee recommended that the annual average mileage of motor vehicles be reduced to 5,000 miles a year through gasoline rationing, and that the maximum speed limit be reduced to 35 miles per hour for all vehicles. The country accepted the report as an authoritative expression on the whole rubber controversy and the President requested prompt compliance with the recommendations of the committee. On September 26,1942, the Office of Defense Transportation, acting in response to the Baruch Committee recommendations, issued General Order ODT No. 23, prescribing a general 35-mile speed limit. This was made effective for passenger cars on October 1, and for commercial vehicles on regular scheduled routes, on October 15, 1942.
The attitude of the Office of Defense Transportation in regard to the recommendations of the Baruch Committee was expressed by Director Eastman at the conference between military and civilian transportation officials, and representatives of the transportation industry on November 12, 1942. According to a War Department abstract of the discussion, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation told the conference he did not know where the Baruch Committee got the idea of a 35-mile speed limit. In his many dealings with the committee it had never been discussed. The Office of Defense Transportation always thought of the limit as 40 miles per hour as requested by the President.
Tb e report, however, he said, had a salutary effect in resolving the confusion that existed in regard to the rubber supply, and the Office of Defense Transportation was loath to start puncturing a report that the public had accepted, although the Director felt that the 35-mile limit would diminish by as much as 10 percent the capacity of the busses to serve, as compared with the 40-mile limit.
“I talked the matter over with Mr. Jeffers,” Director Eastman told the conference, “and we agreed at that time it would be desirable to issue an order requiring the 35-mile speed limit and make uniform application to all vehicles just as soon as possible.”
The order in question was issued on September 26, 1942, as General Order ODT No. 23. It provided that no person should operate or permit the driving of any motor vehicle within the continental United States “at a rate of speed which is in excess of the applicable speed limit duly prescribed by competent public authority, or in excess of 35 miles per hour, whichever rate is the lesser.” Exceptions to the rule originally were operations by or under the direction of the armed forces, and driving in emergencies to save or protect lives. Subsequent exceptions authorized by several amendments were for runs to test
tires, fuel, etc., and for operations to furnish expedited transportation for armed forces and certain Government departments.
At the same time, the Office of Defense Transportation revoked the provisions in its Orders Nos. 3, 17, and 20, which prescribed the 40 mile per hour speed limit. The rationing orders of the Office of Price Administration governing gasoline and tires required compliance with the 35-mile speed limit. The Office of Price Administration regulations provided for penalizing speed law violators by its own organization in cases involving passenger automobiles, and the turning over to the Office of Defense Transportation the cases of such violations by commercial vehicles. A means of enforcement also lay in power of the Office of Defense Transportation to revoke certificates of war necessity for certain violations of its orders.
Effect on Heavy Equipment
Operators of heavy equipment engaged in scheduled over-the-road driving protested against the application of this speed limit to their form of transport. To enable a full and orderly presentation of the objections voiced against General Order ODT No. 23, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation gave a hearing on October 7, 1942, to the operators interested in the matter.
The hearing developed testimony designed to support the contention that the saving of rubber by operating a vehicle at a lower speed would, in part, be counterbalanced by an increase in tire wear due to the necessity of more frequent brake applications and gear shifts. Testimony was also offered tending to show that since the vehicles were constructed to operate primarily at a higher speed, the operation at a lower speed would cause excessive wear on engine parts not designed for long-time operation at such lower speed. It was further brought out that by reducing the speed, the amount of transportation service of which the vehicle was capable would also be reduced, and the number of vehicles and drivers required to produce the service would be increased.
The loss of transportation service by operating at 35 miles per hour instead of at 40 miles per hour was susceptible to calculation, but the difference in tire-tread wear at the two speeds could be determined only by a road test. The Office of Defense Transportation was requested to conduct such a test and it was made in the spring of 1943. The test covered 436 road trips of 660 miles each under actual operating conditions at the control speeds of 45, 40, and 35 miles per hour. The data collected at the test included the actual speed at which each vehicle was operated on each trip, number and time duration of brake applications, number and changes into high
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gear and length of time vehicles were operated in that gear for each control speed, vehicle axle load on each axle, payload, tire pressure at beginning and end of each trip and temperature inside the tires, tire-tread wear per 6,000 miles for each speed group, and carcass failures.
The conclusions reached by the Division of Review and Special Studies from these tests, and from other studies made of the relation of tire wear to controlled speed over a 3-year period, may be summarized as follows:
1. So far as tire-tread wear is concerned, no rubber conservation is accomplished by reducing from 45 to 35 miles per hour the maximum operating speed of vehicles used in typical over-the-road commercial transport service. This failure to save rubber is due primarily to the fact that the limitation of commercial vehicle operations to a top speed of 35 miles per hour sharply increases the frequency and number of brake applications and the number of gear shifts and these increases result in greater tire wear.
2. Carcass failures induced by excessive overloading of individual commercial vehicle tires tend to increase as top operating speeds are stepped up. Recommended load: at 45 miles per hour, 110 percent of manufacturers’ rated tire capacity.
3. Over-the-road motor transport services cannot be performed with optimum efficiency if strictly limited to top speeds at 35 miles per hour. Such limitations result in a net wastage of manpower, equipment, and aggregate carrying capacity.
4. The importance of speed control as a means of conserving passenger car tires has been greatly reduced as a result of the concentration of wartime automobile operation in areas and types of driving that do not afford an opportunity for sustained highspeed operations.
5. The passenger automobile mileage rationing program has resulted in a drastic reduction in the proportion of total automobile use that occurs on the open rural highway. A direct result of this is passenger automobile tire conservation.
6. Regulation of highway speeds is traditionally a local police function. Federal agencies are not equipped for this task. Moreover, the creation of a Federal enforcement organization would lead to unnecessary duplication of effort.
In the matter of enforcement, the Division of Review and Special Studies recommended that in view of the general disregard of the 35-mile-an-hour speed limit and the difficulties which it found to be in the way of feasible enforcement, the General Order ODT No. 23 be revised “to permit highway speeds of 45-miles per hour for all motor vehicles, this action to be accompanied by an organized and continuing ef
fort on the part of the Office of Defense Transportation to obtain formal adoption and enforcement by State authorities of the revised standards.”
No action was taken on the recommendations of the Division of Review and Special Studies for modification of the 35-mile speed order. However, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation called a conference of representatives of the International Association of Police Chiefs, State, and Provincial Sections at his office on September 19,1944, for a discussion of the speed-limit problem including the advisability of revoking General Order ODT No. 23, and calling on the States to set a legal 45-mile-per-hour standard. On September 18, the day previous to the conference, the Joint Committee on Postwar Speed Control, with which the State enforcement officers affiliated, held a meeting in Washington, and adopted the following recommendation:
For psychological reasons only, the committee does not favor lifting of the Office of Defense Transportation’s 35-mile-per-hour limit until at least after the cessation of European hostilities. As soon as possible thereafter, and considering the condition of tires and vehicles at that time, and any other special conditions existing then, the Office of Defense Transportation should withdraw the 35-mile-per-hour order.
At the conference on September 19, the representatives of the Police Chiefs Association stated that they had reached the unanimous conclusion that from a psychological standpoint any change upward from the 35-mile-per-hour limit would be unfortunate at this time, in view of the present tire situation. The conference closed with an earnest request by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation that the State officials strive steadily for a vigorous enforcement of the speed laws.
The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation kept in touch with the governors of States in the matter of State enforcement and in reference to legislation to confer on State authorities the power to bring the State maximum speed laws in line with the 35-mile-per-hour maximum. On May 2, 1945, Colonel Johnson, the Director, took up with each of the governors this subject, stressing especially the importance of strict enforcement by the State authorities. During the years 1943 and 1944 many State legislatures had met and acted on the urgent requests of the Office of Defense Transportation that the governors or the proper State regulatory bodies be given power to modify the State maximum speed laws.
Director Johnson, therefore, called upon the governors for rigid enforcement of the speed laws and a continuance of their efforts to bring the users of automobiles and commercial cars to voluntary compliance with the 35-mile speed regulation in the 20 States which had not yet legalized the reduced rate of speed. “The past cooperation of governors and of
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other State officials in arranging for the enforcement of reduced speed limits,” wrote Colonel Johnson, “has been of inestimable value to date in our effort to conserve tires. Such control of speeds through action by enforcement officers assists motor vehicle operators to conserve vehicles also. I again urge you in all earnestness to stress with your State and local enforcement organizations the deep importance of continuing, in the interest of the war effort, the limitations suggested op speed.”
Results of Speed Law Enforcement
Thirty-eight governors reported on the enforcement work in their respective States in reply to this appeal by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation. They promised enforcement of the statutes and summarized the steps taken to enlist public support for the reduced speed program. The letters from the 38 governors were cooperative in spirit, but in spite of everything, the average speed of driving on the highways continued inching higher and higher, according to a comprehensive series of tests and studies made by the Public Roads Administration. The net achievemeht in the way of speed reduction, according to the tests of the Public Roads Administration appeared to be that as of June 1, 1945, the average speed for all cars represented a reduction from the days before the establishment of the 40-mile-per-hour limit of but 5.8 miles per hour for passenger cars, 1.9 miles for trucks, and 7.8 miles per hour for busses.
At first, there was a marked reduction in average speeds for all vehicles. During October and November 1942, the average speed for all motor vehicles fell from 42.3 miles per hour prior to October 1942 to 36.3 miles per hour; passenger cars from 43.3 miles per hour to 36.8; trucks from 39.4 miles per hour to 35.1; and busses from 45.5 to 39.7 miles per hour. Then the average speeds began to rise, except for busses, which dropped off another .6 of a mile per hour before they, too, started increasing speed. The failure to comply with the 35-mile-per-hour speed limit is graphically told in the following two tabulations taken from the speed surveys of the Public Roads Administration:
Average Speed on Main Rural Highways
Periods Average speed
All vehicles (m.p.h.) Passenger cars (m.p.h.) Trucks (m.p.h.) Busses (m.p.h.)
Prior to March 14. 1942 47.1 48.0 40.4 50.7
May 15, 1942 to Oct. 1, 1942 . 42.3 43.8 89.4 45.5
Oct. 1, 1942 to Dec. 1, 1942 .. 36.8 36.8 35.1 89.7
Dec. 1, 1942 to Mar. 1, 1943 . 87.8 38.1 36.4 89.1
Mar. 1, 1943 to May 20, 1943 . 38.4 89.1 86.5 40.8
May 20, 1943 to May 1, 1944 . 39.4 40.1 87.4 41.6
May 1, 1944 to June 1, 1944 40.1 40.9 38.4 43.2
Oct. 1, 1944 to June 1, 1945 .. 41.3 42.4 38.5 42.9
Percentage of Vehicles Exceeding 35 and 50 Miles per Hour
Periods Percent exceeding 35 m.p.h. Percent exceeding 50 m.p.h.
All veh. Pass, cars Trucks Busses All veh. Pass, can Trucks Busses
Prior to March 14, 1942 88 91 75 92 35 38 9 61
May 15, 1942 to Oct. 1, 1942 80 84 71 95 15 19 6 16
Oct. 1, 1942 to Dec. 1, 1943 65 57 46 70 4 5 2 8
Dec. 1, 1942 to May 20, 1943 53 69 57 76 6 7 2 8
May 20, 1943 to May 1, 1944 71 74 63 82 8 10 3 12
May 1, 1944 to Oct. 1, 1944 76 79 69 86 8 10 4 13
Oct. 1, 1944 to June 1,1945 79 83 68 83 13 15 5 16
With the Office of Price Administration forbidding the use of gasoline and tires in the operation of a vehicle at a speed in excess of 35 miles per hour and providing penalties for such violations, and the Office of Defense Transportation, by amendment No. 9 to General Order ODT No. 21, making revocable a certificate of war necessity for willful or negligent failure to comply with any order covered by the certificate, the way was prepared for enforcement of the speed limit through Federal control. This was in addition to enforcement by State police of violations of the 35-mile speed limit in at least 28 States where such speed limit obtained during 1944.
All violations of the 35-mile order were not reported by State authorities. In some States, the police made no reports whatever; in some, only the most flagrant cases were reported; while in other States, reports of violations were numerous. These cases were reported by the State authorities to the local ration boards which were authorized to act in the matter of passenger automobiles, and to transfer to the Office of Defense Transportation cases involving commercial cars. The instructions to the local ration boards were to take penalizing action in only those cases in which a conviction had been obtained in the State courts. Court convictions, however, could not be obtained for driving in excess of the 35-mile speed limit unless the driving speed also exceeded the maximum State limit.
The general practice of the Office of Defense Transportation field service was to admonish in the case of occasional offenders, or where operators sought to comply with the Office of Defense Transportation’s regulations but could not control drivers under wartime conditions. It was found helpful that representatives of the Office of Defense Transportation sat, in an advisory way, on the Office of Price Administration truck tire panels, and thus were able to contribute to the penalizing of flagrant offenders by having tire rations withheld from them.
The situation at the close of the war was that 28
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States had decreed a 35-mile-an-hour maximum speed limit; the Office of Defense Transportation had the power to modify or revoke certificates of war necessity for violating any Office of Defense Transportation order; the Office of Price Administration gasoline regulations had decreed that “no person shall use or permit the use of gasoline in the operation of a motor vehicle at any rate of speed in excess of 35-miles per hour”; also the Office of Price Administration tire regulations provided that no person may use tubes or tires in the operation of motor vehicles at any speed in excess of 35 miles per hour. Yet, the Public Roads Administration tests covering
3,854 studies in 43 States and involving 1,165,515 vehicles, extending over an 8-month-period ending May 31, 1945, indicated that at the end of the test period 83 percent of the passenger cars exceeded the 35 miles per hour speed limit, and 15 percent exceeded a speed of 50 miles per hour. Also, 68 percent of the trucks and 83 percent of the busses exceeded the 35-mile limit, while 5 percent of the trucks and 16 percent of the busses were exceeding 50 miles per hour. On August 19,1945, immediately following the collapse of Japan, General Order ODT No. 23, prescribing the 35-mile per hour speed limit was revoked.
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CHAPTER XXIV
WATERWAY. TRANSPORT
Immediately following the outbreak of the war, the Nation’s waterways, along with other mediums of domestic transportation, passed under control of the Office of Defense Transportation. As provided in Executive Order 8989, two separate divisions were established; Inland Waterways, and Coastwise and Intercoastal Transport. To these divisions was added Great Lakes carriers, making three carrier divisions concerned with Waterway Transport. To coordinate and direct traffic by water, a Waterway Transport Department was evolved out of these three divisions. Included under the control of this department were the deepwater fleets moving in the coastwise and intercoastal service, on the Great Lakes, and the light-draft river traffic of the Mississippi-Ohio River system and of intracoastal canals, the latter providing protected inside routes along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. There also were the freight carriers of the New York State Barge Canal between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic seaboard, and smaller craft on certain rivers of the Pacific coast and in the bays, sounds, and harbors of the United States.
Altogether these routes were carrying a vast traffic, more than 6,000 freight units, including deep-sea ships as well as barges and smaller craft to serve the Atlantic coast, Gulf coast and tributary waters, including the intracoastal canals. In addition 900 units designed for the carriage of liquid cargoes and including deep-sea coastwise tankers as well as barges and other smaller craft operated on these waters. On the Great Lakes, a fleet of 460 large freighters transported ore, grain, coal, etc. On the 10,000 miles of the Mississippi-Ohio River system moved the largest inland merchant fleet in this country’s history— 1,000 towboats and 5,000 barges.
The principal problems of waterway transport during the war which this department was called upon to solve were as follows:
1. Increase the utilization of existing waterway equipment and coordinate operation of waterways and other transportation agencies on:
a. Inland waterways,
b. Coastwise service (Domestic Intercoastal service was discontinued during the war),
c. Great Lakes.
2. Determine need for new waterway equipment, sponsor construction programs and assist the waterway transport industry to obtain priorities on materials for new construction and maintenance.
3. Aid waterway transport industry in securing deferments from selective service.
The Waterway Transport Department increased the utilization of existing equipment on the waterways largely through the voluntary cooperation of the operators without resort to formal orders and regulations.
Industrial Advisory Committees
It was apparent that the creation of a system of advisory committees would enable the department and the waterway transportation industry to work more closely together in the field. The department had only a small staff and it was not possible to establish personal contact with every operator in that industry. It therefore sponsored the creation of Regional Advisory Committees strategically located. These committees, familiar with the problems peculiar to their particular regions, could represent and speak for the body of operators, as well as interpret the orders of the department, and encourage compliance with its policies.
The set-up in the Advisory Committee organization was Nationwide. Serving the Great Lakes region was the Lake Vessel Committee and its three subcommittees—'Upper, Lower and Middle Lake Grain Committees. Serving the coastwise and intercoastal regions, committees were established in Boston, Mass.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Baltimore, Md.; Norfolk, Va.; Jacksonville, Fla.; New Orleans, La.; and San Francisco, Calif.; Seattle, Wash.; and Portland, Ore. Serving the inland waterways was the Inland Waterway Committee with three active subcommittees— Executive, Manpower, and Towboat Charterers Committees. There was a Gulf Committee with Manpower and other subcommittees located in Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi.
Some of these advisory boards rendered outstanding service, and practically all served a useful purpose as liaison between the Office of Defense Transportation, the industry and the public.
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Regulations and Restrictions
Some formal orders, however, were found necessary particularly to expedite the movement of petroleum from the producing centers in the southwest to east coast points.
The Office of Defense Transportation issued, in all, six general orders and three special orders, designed to bring about greater utilization of water transport. Only two of these orders were applicable to the entire waterways system. The others affected operations on specific parts of the system.
These orders were General Orders ODT Nos. 19 and 40 (applicable to entire waterways system), Special Orders ODT Nos. Wl, W2 and W3 (applicable to inland waterways only), General Order ODT No. 15 (applicable to coastwise service only), and General Orders ODT Nos. 8, 9 and 25 (applicable to Great Lakes only).
The two orders with general application had the following ends in view':
General Order ODT No. 19, effective September 10,1942, aimed at increasing the movement of petroleum and its products from producing and refining points in the Gulf area to the Atlantic seaboard area. The immediate purpose of the order was to increase the northerly and easterly waterway movements, the regulation providing that movements in opposite directions must be under special permit. General Order ODT No. 19 was issued after it had been determined through conferences with the Petroleum Administration for War and representatives of the industry, that certain existing movements were back-hauls and duplications of movements. The effect of the order manifested itself in a healthy reduction of these back-hauls and a substantial increase in movement in the desired direction. The Waterways Transport Department, through its Research and Permit Section, administered the order and its permit provisions. There was gratifying cooperation by the waterways industry which screened its water movements, and, in many cases, voluntarily rearranged the routes to conform with the objectives of this order.
The purpose of General Order ODT No. 40 was to control the use of inland boats and barges so that there would be available in every area, a sufficient fleet to handle essential movements. Under its provisions, vessels of over 500 gross tons or 150 horsepower could not, with certain exceptions, be sold, chartered, or transferred, except by approval of the Waterway Transport Department. Within the first 6 months after issuance of the order, 225 applications were approved. Numerous applications were disapproved, particularly those involving sale or charter of vessels to foreign countries. The orders applied specifically to inland waterways, coastwise service or
the Great Lakes and the activities on those waterways are now described in that order.
Inland Waterways
Occasionally it was found advisable for the Waterway Transport Department to issue special orders in the interest of unimpeded movement of commodities on waterways. These were coordinating orders, designed to speed up barge shipments by the interchange of equipment between carriers.
Special Order ODT No. W-l of November 6 applied to two competitive towing companies operating on the Illinois River. Each of these companies was authorized to pick up and tow barges belonging to the other in cases where such an action would expedite the movement of cargoes essential to the war effort or civilian needs. Special Order ODT No. W-2 of February 15, 1943, sponsored similar pooling arrangements among six carriers on the Ohio, Mississippi, and tributary rivers and on the Gulf of Mexico, while Snecial Order ODT No. W-3, effective November 20, 1944, concerned two gulf towing companies. All three orders resulted in increased transportation efficiency.
One of the principal activities of the Waterway Transport Department was assisting the railways and pipelines move vast supplies of petroleum and its products from the Texas and Louisiana oil fields and refineries to the Atlantic coast ports and to inland points for further distribution. This was achieved through barge systems operating on inland waterways, on protected intracoastal canals, and by deep sea barge operations along the coast.
Petroleum Movement On Inland Waterways
Feeding oil from the Texas oil fields to the Atlantic proved a major task for the barge lines on the intracoastal canal routes. To avoid the dangerous and time-consuming open water passage for barges around the tip of Florida, a pipe line operation was established between Carrabelle, on the west coast of Florida to Jacksonville on the eastern coast. To feed this pipe line a constant procession of barges skirted the Gulf coast from Texas to Florida through the protected waters of the Gulf Intracoastal Canal. At the Jacksonville terminal of the pipe line other strings of barges received the oil and carried it up the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway to Charleston, Savannah, Wilmington, and other strategic points for further distribution.
This movement began early in 1943 and continued without interruption until the close of hostilities. More than 27,000 barrels moved daily by this bargepipeline-barge route, 16,000 barrels of it completing its route by barge, the balance being transferred to tank trucks and tank cars for overland distribution.
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Yet another important route was the Southeastern Pipe line extending from Port St. Jo, Fla., to Knoxville, Tenn., with intermediate terminals at various points in the southeastern States. Barges kept 30,-000 barrels per day feeding into the Port St. Jo terminal from Louisiana and Texas refineries, the pipe line carrying it on to final destinations. By means of an extension of the Plantation Pipe Line, 10,000 barrels per day of petroleum products of the throughput of 30,000 barrels per day pumped from Baton Rouge, La., to Greensboro, N. C., were further pumped to Hopewell, Va., on the James River. From this point barges moved a substantial portion of the pipe line through-put to many military and naval installations in the Chesapeake-Hampton Roads area and to civilian terminals in the same areas.
It was not all plain sailing on the Gulf Intracoastal Canal during the first year of the war. There were sharp bends and shoaling channels at various places which held up the free passage of boats and barges en route to western Florida terminals. Government dredges deepened the shoaled areas and in course of time improved the channel so that all barges could be loaded to their maximum draft of 9 feet, and tugboats with as many as four barges in tow could pass safely through.
One of the more important joint pipeline-barge operations was effected by coordinating the movement of gasoline and fuel oil put through the pipeline from Texas to Helena, Ark., with tank barges operating on the Mississippi at that point. This pipeline had a capacity of 50,000 barrels per day, all of which moved from Helena by tank barge to destination points on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers.
A large segment of this same movement reached the Atlantic coast area by tank cars which picked up their loads from barges at up-river terminals. Such was the case with No. 2 fuel oil which went by barge from Helena, Ark., to Cincinnati, Ohio, thence by rail to New England for ultimate distribution. To Steubenville, Ohio, also, barges brought gasoline and light fuel oil from Helena and fed it into another pipe line to go on to Baltimore and Washington.
There were many other movements of petroleum and its products on these protected waterways. On different stretches of the canal system, barges sometimes served as the gathering agency, picking up their loads at wells and refineries; sometimes as the delivery agency, loading up at some pipe line terminal; sometimes as an intermediary carrier, working between two pipe line or tank car terminals.
Fuel Oil for New England
Another need for barge service arose in the early months of 1945 when the tank-car situation was at
its worst. New England needed fuel oil badly. Supplies had been coming by rail all the way from the fields in the Southwest. But now barges were called upon to take over part of the movement. The Waterway Transport Department made arrangements to move about 30,000 barrels a day up the Mississippi from the Southwest to storage tanks at Gale, Ill., 70' miles south of St. Louis. At Gale, the oil was pumped into tanks, then moved by tank car to New England points. The movement continued until well after VE-day but never reached more than 15,000 barrels per day, due to greater demands for tank barges to move aviation gasoline and for other services in which more tank-car days could be saved.
Barge Service for Flying Fields
One of the more direct contributions of the government tank barge fleet to the war effort was keeping the flying fields of the Army Air Forces supplied with aviation gasoline. Located at numerous places along the Mississippi River and its tributaries, as well as at many midwest points not immediately on the river, these flying fields were admirably adapted to service by barge and tank truck. It fitted well into their over-all system of supply. It was more economical. It released railway tank cars for other services.
During the greater part of the war, planes operating from these fields used 91-octane gasoline, the principal source of which was the Texas-Gulf area from which barges operated direct. During 1944 and the first 6 months of 1945 an average of 36 barges worked constantly in this trade keeping flying fields supplied with fuel.
This system of steady, slow-moving supply was a very desirable medium of transportation to the Army Air Forces, which were handicapped by a limited storage capacity and heavy withdrawals at unexpected times. That difficulty was alleviated by the Waterway Transport Department through placing in this service those particular barges assigned to common carriers whose regular routes enabled them to divert barges to points of depleted supply with the least loss of barge days.
These air fields continued to operate principally on 91-octane gasoline until the spring of 1945. Refinery production of 100-octane had, by that time, increased greatly, thus reducing the demand for 91-octane. Since most 100-octane was produced in the St. Louis area, shorter hauls resulted. Many barges that had formerly carried 91-octane were diverted to other services.
Barge Service on the Pacific Coast
Congested rail traffic in the Pacific Northwest presented one more possibility for the use of barges
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•early in 1944. Flying fields of the Army Air Forces in and around Walla Walla and Spokane were in great need of aviation gasoline. Plans were made to relieve the tank-car shortage by moving gasoline via barge from Portland to Umatilla, Oreg., or to Pasco, Wash.
—a distance on the Columbia River of over 300 miles. .From these points distribution to the air fields would be made by motor tank trucks. A number of barges were placed in this service. Because of the swift currents prevailing in the Columbia River, more power per ton is required to move cargoes than on any other navigable waterway in the United States. For example, a tug of 4,000 horsepower is required to move 9,000 barrels of oil on the Columbia River to Umatilla and Pasco, while on the Mississippi River a 2,000 horsepower boat can move 90,000 barrels.
Control of Coastwise Service
An early concern of the Office of Defense Transportation in 1942 was the dwindling number of colliers and cargo ships for transportation of coal on the Atlantic coast from Hampton Roads to New England. This called for a careful control over coal shipments to insure the economical utilization of cargo space. The means of control was a permit system set up under General Order ODT No. 15, effective July 22,1942. It was designed to concentrate all self-propelled coal ships of 1,000 tons registry or over, on the long-haul coal movements from Hampton Roads to the New England ports which it was not possible to serve by barge lines.
The order was revised and expanded as of February 1, 1943, so as to provide that no shipments of coal might be made or accepted from any place on the Atlantic coast, including the Hampton Roads area, to any place in the United States without a special or general permit by the Office of Defense Transportation. It also required that operators of competitive vessels enter into joint plans to be approved by the Office of Defense Transportation, and contained provisions for pooling equipment, port facilities, etc. It provided further than any vessel engaged in transportation between points on the Atlantic seaboard should be operated subject to any directions given by the Office of Defense Transportation. Excepted from the provisions was any vessel consigned by or to the Government, or transporting bunker coal for its own use. General Order ODT No. 15, revised, was modified from time to time to meet the changing requirements of industry and transportation along the Atlantic coast. The order was repealed on January 1, 1946, coastwise shipping having become stabilized.
The removal of coastwise vessels from the sulphur trade early in 1942 for offshore duty made it neces
sary that other forms of transportation be utilized for the movement of this vital war commodity from origin in Louisiana and Texas to the New York area. The shortage of railway cars and power suggested the utilization of an all-water inland route. To insure the success of this medium, it was necessary to coordinate the movement of barges on the Gulf Intracoastal Canal and the Mississippi River to Chicago with the bulk vessel movement on the Great Lakes, and the barges on the New York State Barge Canal from Buffalo and Oswego to the New York area. While somewhat more expensive to shippers than the normal prewar coastwise route, some 700,000 tons of sulphur which otherwise would have had to be carried in critically short railway equipment moved via this inland waterway route.
Control of Lake Shipping
The most vital link of the entire national inland waterways system, the Great Lakes, also came under the jurisdiction of the Waterway Transport Department. Down the lakes passed the immense quantity of iron ore to feed the war demand and also a very heavy grain movement. Up the lakes was a heavy return movement of coal from Lake Erie ports. To step up the supply of iron ore for the mills, it was found necessary to divert as much of the grain movement as was possible from the lake carriers to the railways. This was accomplished through General Order ODT No. 8, issued May 6, 1942, to facilitate increased iron ore shipments, whereby the Great Lakes were enabled to move 92,000,000 tons of iron ore in 1942 as compared with the then all-time high of 80,000,000 carried in 1941. This order No. 8 restricted, with certain exceptions, the shipment of grain in favor of iron ore. Under it, special permits were required for loading and transporting grain in vessels of more than 1,000 tons which were capable of moving iron ore. Vessels not suited to the ore trade could still haul grain and other commodities.
As a result of this order, 340 ships with a gross carrying capacity of nearly 3 million tons, all suitable for ore purposes, became available for the ore trade, as Well as a number of general cargo ships used for carrying scrap, grain and coal. Under an Interstate Commerce Commission service order (ICC No. 80), issued at the same time as General Order ODT No. 8, permit committees were set up to allocate storage space for grain on the basis of need.
To still further increase the iron-ore shipments on the Great Lakes the Office of Defense Transportation in May 1942, issued General Order ODT No. 9. Its purpose was to further insure maximum facilities for the ore trade by restricting the shipment of coal on the Great ¡Lakes. This order provided that common carriers could not move coal destined to points on the
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Detroit and St. Clair Rivers south of, and including Port Huron, Mich., or destined for transshipment through Lake Erie ports to other Lake Erie ports, or to points on Lake Ontario, or in the Chicago area.
A general permit (ODT No. 9-1) made it possible to ship some coal on the Great Lakes. This permit was worked out in cooperation with the Office of Solid Fuels Coordinator, and authorized the shipment of coal under certain specified conditions determined by the direction in which the coal was to move.
Some of the results of the operation of General Order ODT No. 9 and General Permit No. 9-1 were these: It made available shipping facilities to handle an additional 2,000,000 tons of iron ore. It placed upon the rail lines a load of 2,225,000 tons of coal for 1942 (based upon the 1941 waterborne coal movement into the Chicago industrial area). Coal which hitherto had been moving in indirect routes on the Lakes, decreased sharply, while the direct coal movements increased somewhat, much of it moving in return trips of iron ore boats from down the Lakes.
Certain provisions of General Order ODT No. 9 were flexible and worked upon a seasonal basis. These provisions made it possible to exercise the controls during specified months of the year and lift them at other times when the essential traffic permitted it. Thus restrictions on coal shipments were lifted, under a section of General Order ODT No. 9, during the 1943 season to allow the free flow of coal before the iron ore traffic hit its full seasonal stride. Another removal of restrictions in General Order ODT No. 9 granted the use of Great Lakes vessels to haul coal before the break-up of ice in the Soo Locks leading to Lake Superior. Usually the ice does not break until the first of April. Still other provisions in General Order ODT No. 9 governed the flow of coal by rail to lake terminals by requiring special permits to move coal when transshipped by vessels to certain destinations.
Scope of Control Widened
The need for an adequate flow of ships to carry the mounting volume of iron ore was the main cause for the issuance of General Order ODT No. 25, on October 7, 1942. A contributing cause was the purpose of the Office of Defense Transportation to put into effect a schedule of shipping priorities contained in the War Production Board’s certificate of necessity for priority action No. 2, which became effective early in the fall of 1942. That schedule gave iron ore an A-l priority rating; coal and coke (in specified types of vessels) an A-2 priority, and other commodities lower priority ratings. This was made necessary by the increased estimate of the amount of iron ore which the Great Lakes would be called upon
to carry in order to supply the furnaces and mills of Pittsburgh and other industrial centers.
Briefly, General Order ODT No. 25 restricted, with certain exceptions, the use of all vessels on the Great Lakes to hauling only those cargoes authorized by a special or general permit of the Office of Defense Transportation. Thus control over grain vessels was continued and General Order ODT No. 8 was revoked.
The new order enabled the Office of Defense Transportation to put into effect a new schedule of domestic shipping priorities which was transmitted as a directive to the Office of Defense Transportation by the War Production Board. The order, which became effective October 19, 1942, asserted the Office of Defense Transportation’s authority to direct the service of affected craft in any manner which the agency believed necessary for the preferential movement of war materials. It could, at any time, order the vessels to operate between any Great Lakes ports and serve under the charter or lease of any persons that it might specify. Concurrently with the issuance of the general order, the Office of Defense Transportation suspended permit requirements with respect to the transportation of iron ore and certain other commodities shipped under specified conditions and the operation of craft of less than 1,000 gross tons.
Assumption of control of the ¡Lakes vessels by the Office of Defense Transportation was prompted by steadily increasing requirements of cargo space for the movement of iron ore from the Lake Superior mines and for the transportation of other commodities essential in war production. Growth of these requirements made necessary the systematic distribution of vessels according to most vital war needs.
The order brought under the Office of Defense Transportation approximately 3,500,000 of the gross tonnage of Great Lakes craft—about 735 in number. The 32 Lakes vessels capable of transporting liquid cargo in bulk already were controlled by the Office of Defense Transportation through General Order ODT No. 19.
Insurance For Post-Season Operations
Toward the close of the 1943 navigation season on the Great Lakes it became evident that ore carriers must continue operations beyond the normal closing date of November 30, in order to meet quotas established by the War Production Board. Effective with the official close of navigation, underwriters increase vessel insurance rates to compensate for the additional risks involved in post-season operations. These rates are increased every 3 days following November 30, to such an extent that a vessel operating 3 weeks post season would pay more money for the 3 weeks
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insurance than for the entire normal season. Unless the carriers were relieved of this extra expense, no vessels could afford to operate beyond November 30. The Office of Defense Transportation therefore requested the War Shipping Administration to provide, through its Division of Wartime Insurance, protection at normal rates to vessels certified by this Office for coverage. By these means, ore carriers operated post season in 1943; tankers, post season in 1944, and grain and coal carriers, post season in 1945. This insurance was made available to certified vessels through commercial underwriters, who then reinsured through the War Shipping Administration. No accidents occurred requiring payment under such insurance terms so that the venture cost the Government nothing at all. By means of this insurance, many trips were made possible carrying commodities that otherwise would have been forced on overburdened railways.
Use of Canadian Vessels
The shortage of vessels, especially tankers, on the lakes resulting from the increased volume of essential war materials that had to be moved, led the Waterway Transport Department to recommend the use of Canadian vessels, where necessary, in domestic commerce. Under Federal law, foreign vessels may not operate between United States ports. During the war emergency, however, the Treasury Department may waive this law if it is deemed essential to the conduct of the war. As a matter of policy it will not exercise this power except upon certification by the head of a Government agency. The Office of Defense Transportation certified a large number of ships for waiver. By these means a huge volume of cargo, principally petroleum and its products, for which no other means of transport was available, was moved between our domestic ports by foreign flag vessels.
Manpower Problems On Great Lakes
In the year 1942 the shipping operations on the Great Lakes utilized 27,090 men offshore and onshore. There was no difficulty in keeping the fleet properly manned, but after the ice laid up the vessels for the winter months, complications with the Selective Service developed. The Service held that the men laid off by winter conditions were not engaged in essential employment, and it laid a heavy hand on the lake shipping personnel for the draft. If this personnel were not deferred it would cripple lake operations severely in the opening of navigation in the spring of 1943. Through the joint efforts of the Office of Defense Transportation and the War Shipping Administration the lake shipping lines obtained deferment
for those of its seasonally laid off men who had obtained work in essential industries.
In 1943 lake shipping personnel reached its peak of 28,000 seamen. But before the end of the lake shipping season, voluntary separations for the purpose of taking higher-paid shore jobs had risen to 24 out of each 100 employees. During this year, the Selective Service had to draw on young men in the lake service, but the Office of Defense Transportation and the War Shipping Administration brought about a long-range selective arrangement whereby the men of least importance in the lake services were drawn first and the men of most importance were drawn last. This was also accompanied by an intensive recruiting of men for the lake vessels. While the voluntary turnover continued heavy until the end of the war, the favorable conditions obtained for certifying deferments to the Selective Draft and the recruiting work kept the lake carriers manned to the end of hostilities.
Construction Program
In its program of adding new units to floating equipment already in service, the Office of Defense Transportation sponsored the construction of the following fleet:
21 steel 2000 horsepower twin screw river towboats. 100 steel Diesel powered 600 horsepower tug boats. 116 steel dry cargo barges converted to tank barges. 100 welded steel tank barges of 9500 barrels capacity.
55 welded steel dry cargo hopper barges of 1500 tons capacity.
500 wooden barge^ (269 actually constructed).
All of this equipment, except some of the wooden barges released for other war service, went into use on the inland waterway routes. In this task, the Office of Defense Transportation sponsored the program. The Defense Plant Corporation supplied the necessary funds and owned the equipment and the United States army engineers let the contracts to various shipbuilding plants and supervised the construction.
So great was the need for this new equipment that arrangements were made to charter each unit to private operators selected by the Office of Defense Transportation as soon as it was completed. The units were then placed immediately in service on the Mississippi and its tributaries and the gulf or Atlantic intracoastal canals.
The construction program moved forward as rapidly as the exigencies of the times would permit. By the third quarter of 1943,116 dry-cargo barges with a total capacity of 1,136,048 barrels had been converted to tank barges and placed in service. Eighteen of these barges were assigned to the Atlantic Intracoastal Canal to move gasoline from the Florida
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Emergency Pipe Line Jacksonville Terminal for delivery to south Atlantic points.
The end of 1943 found 53 of the new steel tank barges and 7 of the large 2,000 horsepower towboats in service on the rivers. Seventy-five of the 100 tugboats had been completed; 33 of them were working in domestic service and 42 had been released to the War Shipping Administration and to the armed forces for military duty.
The work of construction continued through 1944. By December 1 the original program sponsored by the Office of Defense Transportation had been entirely completed. All floating equipment built or converted under that program, with the exception of 57 of the Diesel tugs and 125 of the wooden tank barges released to the War Shipping Administration and the armed forces, went into domestic transportation service.
The new fleet was distributed over various routes. On the Ohio and Mississippi systems, 91 steel tank barges were carrying liquid commodities. All the 21 steel towboats were busy in the same trade, as were four of the Diesel tugboats and the 55 steel drycargo barges.
On the Gulf Intracoastal Canal, the remaining nine steel tank barges augmented the normal fleet, and 21 Diesel tugboats towed units of four tank barges each —84 barges in all, moving an average of 25,000 barrels of Navy special fuel oil daily. Seventeen more of these tugs towed gasoline for military and essential commercial purposes.
The 116 converted steel tank barges were divided up as follows: 63 on the Ohio-Mississippi; 33 on the Gulf Intracoastal Canal; and 20 on the Atlantic intracoastal Canal.
Meanwhile as the tempo of war mounted, so did the need for more floating equipment, and the Office of Defense Transportation had to sponsor the building of 25 additional tank steel barges of 9,500 barrel capacity. This closed a program of construction that began on August 1,1943, and was completed in April 1945.
Wooden Barge Construction
In 1942 the President appointed an Executive Committee, composed of the heads of various wartime agencies to study the critical problem of transporting petroleum and petroleum products to the eastern States and to propose methods for solving this problem. The President’s Committee recommended that 500 tank barges built of wood be constructed. It was decided that the Office of Defense Transportation was the proper agency to sponsor this construction. Although the Waterway Transport Department was reluctant to recommend the construction 700494—48—13
of wooden tank barges, nevertheless, in the face of the impossibility of securing steel allotments, it found it necessary to proceed with the sponsorship of this program as a last resort in a war crisis.
The department considered tank barges of wooden construction impractical for the following reasons: (1) wood absorbs petroleum and after the wooden interiors of barges become impregnated with petroleum or petroleum products, it is impossible to sufficiently free them of gas to permit repair work; (2) the cost of wooden barges greatly exceeds the cost of steel barges; (3) wooden barges being heavier than steel barges require a greater expenditure of energy in towing; (4) wooden barges do not have the strength of steel barges, and when lashed together as a unit cannot stand the stresses and strains of high power pushing against river currents; (5) it is difficult to insure wooden barges against leaks, and contamination of cargo and pollution of waterways is inevitable.
As stated above, however, in the absence of steel the construction of these wooden barges was considered to be necessary and the War Production Board on December 15, 1942, allotted the necessary materials for their construction. After a review of the program in the spring of 1943, the Waterway Transport Department recommended cancellation of 195 of these wooden barges, as there was then some indication that the submarine menace along our coast was being brought under control, and that coastwise tanker operations in some degree could be resumed. In August 1943, it became possible to cancel an additional 36 wooden barges, leaving a total of 269 which were finally completed.
After completion of the wooden barges, every effort was made by the Office of Defense Transportation to employ them in useful service. The U. S. Coast Guard would not certificate the barges for the carriage of petroleum or petroleum products, but the Secretary of the Navy finally authorized their use in moving residual fuel over certain waterways. The principal work of these barges was moving Navy residual fuel oil from Texas points to Lynn Haven, Fla., from which terminal it went by rail to Navy terminals in the Norfolk area. The initial movements of this product were unsuccessful, as water gained access into the tanks of the barges and made the oil unacceptable to the Navy. Improvement of the barges considerably lessened the water contamination and by the summer of 1943 deliveries of oil in wooden barges to Panama City, Fla., were acceptable to the Navy Department. At the peak of operations a total of 84 wooden barges was used in this service moving an average of 25,000 barrels per day of Navy residual fuel oil.
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Other possible uses for the wooden barges were diligently explored. Experimental runs from Port Everglades, Fla., to Baltimore, Md., were made with molasses, but contamination by sea water made necessary the abandonment of this experiment. Studies were also made to determine the practicability of using them for grain, but it developed that grain cargoes could not be carried in the hold and the cost of construction of housing on decks was prohibitive. Consideration was also given to the use of the barges as bunker barges for large ports such as New York harbor, and also as scows for handling heavy freight on deck, but the construction of the barges and the hazards of operation in ports such as New York harbor, plus the cost of transferring the barges from the Gulf area to New York Harbor rendered these proposals unsatisfactory. A number of the barges, however, were taken over by the military for use as deck scows and as oil storage plants, and in the final analysis all but 47 barges found some essential service.
The Office of Price Administration late in 1944 decided that all private shipbuilding should come under general maximum price Regulation No. 1. This action was taken without prior consultation with the Waterway Transport Department. Hence, the Department objected on the grounds that the shipyards would be forced to work at a loss, if their cost basis was established, as planned, at the levels of March, 1942. Finally the Office of Price Administratiofi decided to exempt all towboat, tug, and barge construction. The competitive character of the field made an effective barrier to price inflation.
Delivery of Materials Speeded
The construction of private vessels for the waterways was also supervised by the Department of Waterway Transport. The requirements of materials for such construction was cleared in the usual manner through the Division of Materials and Equipment of the Office of Defense Transportation, but the allotments of materials were made to the contractor's by the Department of Waterway Transport direct, instead of through the War Production Board as was the procedure with the other transport departments of the Office of Defense Transportation. The amount of materials used for building new barges, towboats, etc., in the terms of carbon steel, was 191,452 tons.
There was virtually no private building of workboats during 1942 or 1943 as neither facilities nor materials were available. Some construction did start late in 1943. During 1944 private construction produced 11 towboats, 19 steel tugboats, 11 wooden tugboats, 42 steel barges, and 9 wooden barges. There was a notable increase in 1945. Thirty-nine towboats, 69 steel tugboats, 34 wooden tugboats, 309
steel barges, and 19 wooden barges were completed.
One of the major problems in keeping the vessels in service was obtaining Diesel and gasoline engine parts and replacements. Dealers’ shelves were bare. Necessary priorities were readily obtainable, but military orders had first priority, and most manufacturers were working on military backlogs. Many of these backlogs ran to a year or more.
By 1944 a new engine replacement procedure was devised by the Waterway Transport Department under which a stock pile of marine, gasoline and Diesel engines was established. Five manufacturers agreed to produce an assigned number of gasoline engine units each month to be released only to approved workboat operators upon the authorization of the Office of Defense Transportation, and for replacement purposes only. About 10 days was usually required to fill an order under this system.
Between June 1, 1944, and September 30, 1945, more than 600 requests for directives or upratings were submitted by the Waterway Transport Department to the War Production Board. After careful screening in the field and in Washington, all cases were rated essential.
Manpower Problems in Shipyards
A construction program for 17 railway car floats was launched by the Waterway Transport Department in 1944 to replace those requisitioned by the Army Transportation Corps for the Normandy invasion. These floats had been taken over the protests of the railroads and had to be replaced promptly. A program determination was approved by the War Production Board which assigned a basic rating of AA-1 to the replacement. The Waterway Transport Department was also able to obtain directives for the steel rolling and certain critical components. Thus, although 40 car floats had been requisitioned from 11 railroads, all roads which wished that equipment replaced with new construction received effective priorities cooperation. From April 1, 1943, through September 30, 1945, railway marine new construction absorbed 14,501 tons of carbon steel. Approximately 70 percent of it was for car floats. The rest went into the construction of tugs, car ferries, and minor items.
The matter of manpower at shipyards presented intermittent perplexities. These were met fairly well with the cooperation of the War and Navy Departments, the U. S. Maritime Commission, and the Shipbuilding Coordinating Committee. This last-named group consisted of representatives of all claimant agencies concerned with vessel construction. It was a helpful group from which the nonmilitary representatives could learn of prospective plans of the Anny, Navy, and Maritime Commission.
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CHAPTER XXV
LIQUID TRANSPORT
Th? Liquid Transport Department of the Office of Defense Transportation, originally called the Division of Petroleum and Other Liquid Transport, was the only Division organized along commodity lines. It was created to control the movement of liquid products and administer the problems peculiar to the traffic. During its existence the department, in collaboration with the Railway, Highway, and Waterway Transport Departments of the Office of Defense Transoprtation, the petroleum industry, cooperating Government agencies, and the carriers, coordinated and directed the movement of more than 3 billion barrels of petroleum and its products and some 360 million tons of other liquids—alcohol, acids, fats, oils, and various liquid foodstuffs. These commodities moved in tank cars, pipe lines, trucks, and barges.
Early in 1941 it became evident that the weakest link in the Nation’s system of transporting liquids was the Gulf-to-North Atlantic tanker movement. This coastwise fleet was currently supplying the eastern seaboard with 95 percent of its daily million and one-half barrels of petroleum consumption. Not only was this the most important single liquid movement, but the one most susceptible to interruption. In addition to their vulnerability to attack by submarines, the ships engaged in this traffic were subject to call by the Navy virtually without warning. Also, Great Britain and other friendly nations in a critical position with respect to tankers were seeking immediate relief which could be granted only at the expense of this domestic tanker fleet.
Railway tank cars, of which there were approximately 145,000 scattered throughout the United States, offered the most immediate relief for the Atlantic Coast area, known as Petroleum District No. 1. Although many were rusting on sidings or being used for storage, still they were in existence, and there was a surplus. The big question was whether these cars, averaging at least 18 years of age, could stand the strain of long-haul operation. As a test, 20,000 were pressed into service transporting crude oil from producing regions of the southwest to eastern refineries. By the end of October 1941, these tankcar shipments were averaging 600 cars or 135,000
barrels per day, compared with 5,000 barrels per day earlier in the year. The record mounted steadily from then on. The railroads on occasion reached and passed the million-barrel-a-day mark.
In November 1941, the tankers assigned to British service were returned, and total shipments into district I set a new record in this month. Before additional facilities could be provided, our entrance into the war quickly halted the coastwise movement. Many tankers were diverted to naval and other military use, and the remainder actually became targets for enemy attack. The rate of sinkings increased until, by the spring of 1942, it had reached astounding proportions. Thus, with the prospect of domestic tanker transportation virtually wiped out, the shortage of materials and the exigency of time made it necessary to secure maximum utilization of all other existing transportation facilities.
The distribution of petroleum and products by rail, pipeline, tanker, and barge into district I during the war was as follows:
19kl 19 k2 19k3 19kk 19 k5 (6 mosi)
percent percent percent percent percent
By Barge .... . ... 1.8 5.9 7-0 7.5 7.0
By Pipeline .. .... 3.5 9.9 19.2 38.7 40-4
By Rail .... 2.3 51.6 61.2 37.7 27.8
By Tanker ... ....92.4 32.6 12.6 16.1 24.8
Tank Car Movements
Tank cars, being the most flexible vehicles for long-haul movements, were called upon immediately to take over the bulk of the load which the tankers had handled. At the same time, tank cars had to maintain other essential distribution of liquid products. The new eastern movement and the distribution movement both had to be continued and expanded to meet the demand.
The Office of Defense Transportation in February 1942 sought to increase the tank-car fleet by 20,000 cars and additional locomotive power, but the request was denied by the War Production Board because of other heavy demands on the supply of critical mar terials. Therefore, the task of transporting petroleum liquid products had to be met with 104,801 tank cars in the petroleum service exclusive of railroad Army and Navy owned tank cars. For transporting other than petroleum liquid products, except milk, there
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were available 25,700 cars, 14,500 of which were used for chemicals.
From this traditional pattern of widely scattered and independent movements, with their attendant duplication of facilities and multiplicity of cross and back-hauls, the liquid transport network had to be coordinated and almost completely reoriented.
A number of important steps were taken. On short hauls, tank cars were replaced by tank trucks, which were more efficient for the purpose, thus leaving tank cars free for long-haul service. Barge movements on rivers and canals had to be built up where none existed before. Pipelines, designed to carry crude oil or petroleum products in one direction, were reversed and diverted to another service. Various joint railbarge-pipeline movements were established and coordinated. Although the emphasis in this coordination and reorientation was a northerly and easterly direction of movement, there was simultaneously a rising volume of other movements to be accommodated, among them an entirely new mass movement of liquids to the west coast for military use.
The basic authority and functions to effectuate this utilization of tank cars were defined on March 7, 1942, General Order ODT No. 7. Stated generally, it covered the following subjects:
The control of tank car operations.
The assignment of tank cars.
Supervision of inventory of tank cars.
Handling of permits for short-hard tank car movements. Maintenance and repair of tank cars.
Surveying of loading and unloading facilities.
Supervision of prompt loading and unloading of tank cars.
Although the Office of Defense Transportation assumed control of tank cars under General Order ODT No. 7, it was not found necessary to exercise this control too tightly or to distribute cars exclusively from one central Government office. Due to the close cooperation between the Office of Defense Transportation, the oil industry and the tank-car leasing companies, the various industries were able to continue actual operation of tank cars under a minimum of Government supervision.
In its efforts to obtain the maximum car movements out of the available equipment, the Office of Defense Transportation put into effect the following program:
Daily reports were required from shippers and carriers showing the use of tank cars, in order to assure that all available cars were being employed, that there were no unnecessary delays and that only the minimum number were assigned to uses other than for petroleum transportation. In line with this, many tank cars were removed from the transportation of other liquids and placed in petroleum movements.
Wherever possible, tank cars of the largest capa
city were placed in the long-haul movements into District No. I in order to deliver the greatest possible volume with the fewest pieces of equipment. Smaller cars were employed for short hauls, where tank trucks were not available or operations practical in intradistrict movements.
It was found, in many cases, that one tank truck continuously in use, could do the work of as many as 25 tank cars in congested areas such as Chicago, Philadelphia, etc. In these areas, due to heavy war traffic, tank cars required from 6 to 10 days for a round-trip. Accordingly, permits were required, under General Order ODT No. 7, in the beginning, for the use of tank cars for distances under 100 miles, and later for the substitution of tank trucks. This made available approximately 18,000 tank cars for long-haul petroleum service.
Efforts were made to concentrate shipments of oil going to large central terminals on the eastern seaboard. This helped in reducing the turn-around time of tank cars in the long-haul service, as distribution was more efficiently maintained with a minimum of equipment from large central terminals. This required an order from the Office of Petroleum Administration for War, with approval by the Department of Justice. Cooperation of both of these agencies was obtained and the Petroleum Administration for War issued Directive No. 59, which prescribed the control over distribution and storage of petroleum products, and provided for surveys and reports on the supply situation affecting the various petroleum districts. The Office of Defense Transportation representatives were placed at critical origin, destination, and gateway points to speed the movement of tank cars and eliminate wasteful and slow operations.
The structural strain upon tank cars in the long-haul service began to take its toll; tank cars broke down as. a result of hard and constant usage. This served not only to slow down train movements but reduce rapidly the tank-car supply. The usual practice of sending tank cars to the shops of their owners for needed heavy repairs, often necessitating long hauls of crippled cars, was discontinued, and such cars were required to be sent to the nearest repair point regardless of ownership either of the cars or of the repair shops.
The Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Association of American Railroads furnished daily reports from railroads showing delays of tank cars held over 24 hours. A prompt follow-up of these reports resulted in locating more than 2,000 surplus tank cars and speeding up the turn-around time of many cars, not only at loading and unloading points but also in railroad yards.
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In order to maintain a sufficient number of cars for the long-haul to District No. I, orders were issued on December 29, 1942, freezing all tank cars in this service. Initially, approximately 70,000 cars were in this movement. In August 1943, a peak of 74,000 cars was reached. As of June 15, 1944, there were about 60,143 cars in use. The reduction was due to urgent transportation needs in other parts of the country. The shortage of tank cars necessary to transport essential liquid products continued to the end of the war.
An important decision was reached on August 1, 1942, by the Division of Railway Transport and the Division of Traffic Movement of the Office of Defense Transportation in conferences with shippers, receivers represented by the Petroleum Industry Routing Committee, the Association of American Railroads and railroad representatives. This decision was for the Office of Defense Transportation to sponsor the operation of symbol trains. These operations made it necessary for the Office of Defense Transportation to assume a centralized control over train routings so that symbol train-load movements of petroleum would be coordinated with other equally important traffic. The centralized control worked out satisfactorily.
These symbol trains were solid trainloads of cars, either loaded or empty, which originated at one point, or in one area, and proceeded without breakup or reclassification to a designated destination or dispersal point. They moved over scheduled routes set up by the Office of Defense Transportation, Division of Traffic Movement, in conjunction with the Association of American Railroads and the Petroleum Administration for War Joint Tank Car Committee. Tank cars in these trains had to be loaded or unloaded and shipped within 24 hours after arrival. The railroads assembled and arranged tank cars in symbol train blocks. Trains of less than 30 cars were dispatched within 5 hours, and blocks of larger numbers which averaged around 60 to 70 cars, within 10 hours. Whenever a carrier could not move the cars within the time scheduled, these cars were diverted in the field by Office of Defense Transportation representatives to other symbol routes in order to expedite deliveries. In 1943 over 90 percent of the petroleum traffic was moved in symbol trains.
Most petroleum shippers and receivers on the eastern seaboard lacked adequate facilities for loading and unloading tank cars at points of origin and destination. The railroads spent more than 18 million dollars on improving their facilities to meet the need. New faciliies for handling an estimated 200,000 additional barrels per day were made available at 23 I terminals located from Norfolk, Va., to Portland,
Maine. Numerous additional equipment was improved or constructed at other loading and unloading points.
Through the device of pooling tank cars, a substantial increase in carrying power was achieved. Such pools eliminated the necessity of hauling specified cars for certain individual companies or for making shipments to designated companies. It permitted the spotting of any car at a loading rack and of moving that car for the account of any company in the pool to any consignee. These pooling arrangements reduced terminal switching service, thereby speeding up the movements Such pools were organized early at the terminals of the Great ¡Lakes Pipeline, at Tinsley Field in Mississippi, and later at Norris City, Ill., when the Big Inch Pipeline was completed at that terminus. Deliveries to District No. I by tank car reached a peak of 1,027,012 barrels per day during the week of July 3 to 10,1943.
Increase in deliveries toward this peak began in March 1943 when approximately 200,000 barrels per day of crude petroleum were taken out of the long tank car haul from Texas and transported by pipeline to Norris City, Ill. At that point it was transferred to tank cars and moved by rail eastward. This shuttle movement between Norris City and District No. I shortened the tank car turn-around time on the volume moved from Norris City to approximately 10 days, as against 18 days from Texas.
Eight of the larger oil companies participated in the Norris City pool. Each of these companies contributed tank cars in accordance with their tank-car requirements as estimated by the Office of Defense Transportation, the calculation used being on the company’s crude oil allocation. The round-trip mileage for most cars in the pool was over 2,000 miles. An average turn-around time of 10 days was established. That required an average daily running mileage of nearly 250 miles per car, figuring 2 days terminal time.
The Norris City tank car pool was practically a pipeline on wheels, extending from Norris City to the eastern seaboard. On July 10, 1943, this movement reached a maximum of approximately 217,000 barrels. More than 10,000 cars were in the Norris City pool at the peak of its operation, each of which represented more than 20 barrels of crude oil per day delivered. This figure compares with about 12 barrels per day per car from the Gulf Coast area.
On August 15, 1943, the first crude oil was delivered through the eastern extension of the Big Inch Pipeline from Norris City to the eastern seaboard. From that time on, tank car movements from Norris City naturally declined as increasing supplies flowed eastward by pipeline. By November 1943, these tank car movements had dropped to about 50,-
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000 barrels per day. All tank car operations from Norris City were discontinued on November 27 and the tank car pool was dissolved. Most of the remaining cars were sent to Midland, Texas, where another tank car pool operation—carrying West Texas sour crude oil to the East—was getting under way.
Besides the large tank car fleet engaged in transporting petroleum products, there were some 25,700 tank cars used to move liquids other than petroleum, excluding milk,—chemicals, vegetable oils, fish oils, and packing-house products. Of that number, chemical products required 14,500 cars and 8,000 were engaged in the movement of oils and packing house byproducts. Others used to carry cargoes of alcohol and butadiene essential to the synthetic rubber program were given high priorities. Due to the interchangeability of certain of the types of tank-car equipment, the nonpetroleum tank-car fleet represented a reserve which was good for a few thousand extra cars to meet emergencies in the petroleum movement.
Tank Truck Operation
The Motor Transport Division of the Office of Defense Transportation in March 1942 conducted a country-wide survey which disclosed that petroleum motor transport equipment was operating at only about 50 percent of capacity. Clearly, a major effort would have to be made to put all the idle tank trucks to maximum use, wherever possible to replace tank cars, if the flow of petroleum and its products was to continue to meet the demand. »
In an effort to divert as many rail shipments as possible to tank trucks, Petroleum Transport Advisory Committees were established in 13 regions, each of these regions consisting of two or more States. As nearly as possible, these regions were established around the five petroleum districts designated by the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator for War. In addition to the regional organizations, other committees were established in each of the States and in the District of Columbia. Membership in these regional committees was made up of the chairman and vice chairman of each State committee within the region. Membership of all committees was composed of representatives of for-hire-over-the-road transport operators, major oil companies, jobbers and distributors. Selection for this committee membership was made by the carriers and the nominations were then confirmed by the Office of Defense Transportation.
Requests for permits to move petroleum and other liquid products by tank cars, for distances of less than 100 miles, were investigated by the committees. The committee would then report on the feasibility of changing the proposed tank car movement to a tank-truck movement. If the Office of Defense Trans
portation, Washington office, decided that tank-truck transportation was feasible, the permit to use tank cars was refused. Otherwise it was granted. The peak of these substitutions of tank trucks for tank cars was reached in 1943. It is estimated that approximately 18,000 tank cars were thus released from short-haul service and placed in long-distance transportation.
During the fall of 1943, a critical shortage of pressure tank cars to haul liquefied petroleum gases became extremely acute. Strenuous efforts were therefore necessary to use tank trucks in this type of short-haul service also. One notable example of the successful uses of tank trucks for this service was the 18-mile iso-butane haul between the Sun Oil Co.’s plant at Marcus Hook, Pa., and the Atlantic Refining Co.’s plant at Point Breeze, Philadelphia, Pa. Meanwhile, an additional volume of iso-butane was being moved from the Gulf Refining Co. at Girard Point to the Atlantic Refining Co. at Point Breeze. This was a cross-town haul of approximately 5 miles. In order to maintain the volume of delivery of both these movements, it normally was necessary to keep 40 pressure tank cars in use. But a bulk petroleum transporter, using pressure tank truck equipment, with two 4500-gallon tractor-trailer units took over and did the job.
Special measures had to be taken in several cases to obtain the full use of equipment engaged in part-time operations. It was necessary to take equipment in the hands of small private carriers and place it in service where a greater need existed.
Chief among such actions was the creation of the War Emergency Cooperative Association, operating in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. The group included a number of private carriers who found their-equipment idle because of their inability to transport from the pipeline terminals of the Southeastern pipelines. This association was made up not only of the private carriers operating in that territory, but also of the for-hire carriers, both common and contract. Authority to transport petroleum products between all points in those four States was issued to the Association by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Association transported petroleum products in excess of $100,000 gross revenue per month at a managerial cost to its members of 3 percent of the gross revenue. A similar organization was established in the State of Wisconsin.
In order to insure the greatest amount of flexibility and to prevent possible delays in transport operation, tank trucks were exempt from all general orders of the Office of Defense Transportation with the exception of General Order ODT No. 21, which required a Certificate of War Necessity, and General
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Order ODT No. 23, limiting the speed of vehicles to 35 miles per hour.
Through the efforts of the Office of Defense Transportation, the highway petroleum carriers were successful in obtaining a sufficient number of truck tires to keep all transport trucks operating 24 hours a day. By advising the carriers of the necessary procedure to follow in securing tires and truck parts, it was possible to prevent many transport trucks from being tied up, due to the inability of the carrier to proceed in the proper manner to contact the right source. The tank truck fleet which had to be nursed through the war shortages of tires, replacement parts, and manpower, comprised 5,538 trucks, 10,407 tractors, 2,582 trailers, and 9,147 semitrailers. This fleet was operated by 4,998 carriers, in the latter half of the war. As the hostilities came to a close in mid-1945, the deterioration of truck equipment and the lack of parts was beginning to tell on this transportation and the number of tank car permits that had to be issued for short-haul operations were mounting steadily.
In addition to this over-the-road tank-truck operation, there was also the problem of controlling liquid transport local delivery. The problem was attacked through the promulgation of General Order ODT No. 37, which provided that every truck engaged in less-than-truck-load deliveries must:
1. Be fully loaded when it leaves its terminal.
2. Not be compelled to fill orders on less than 48-hours’ notice.
3. Be used solely for making tank truck deliveries.
4. Make no call-backs.
5. Make no deliveries directly into fuel supply tanks of automotive equipment.
6. Make at least minimum drops specified for motor fuel.
7. Respond under certain emergency conditions.
Provision was made to relieve any undue hardship which might result under certain circumstances from strict application of the Order, by a special permit system under Administrative Order ODT No. 14. This Order provided for the issuing of special permits in property-carrying motor vehicles relieving persons from complying with provisions of ODT general orders.
Other steps were being taken to effectuate Order No. 37 and secure national compliance with its basic concepts. On January 8, 1944, the Office of Defense Transportation authorized the appointment of Tank Truck Advisory Committees at National, Regional, State and District levels, for the development of both over-the-road and local delivery subjects. Approximately 300 such committees with a total membership of 700 were organized. The order also established a Procedure for legalizing joint action in making deliveries of petroleum products, and for effecting conservation of trucks, tires and manpower. Creation of
suitable plans became the obligation of persons desiring to coordinate their activity to effect conservation, and the advice of this group was used to permit unimpeded progress.
Pipe Line Movements
Through the Department of Liquid Transport the Office of Defense Transportation cooperated with the Petroleum Administration for War in the movement of petroleum products in pipe lines. Under Executive Order No. 9276, establishing the Petroleum Administration for War, that Office had the designation of the quantity and kind of petroleum to be shipped and received by those engaged in the petroleum industry and the approval of plans for providing adequate supplies of petroleum, subject to the over-all responsibility of the Office of Defense Transportation for the transportation movement. The Office of Defense Transportation was charged with the responsibility of providing the necessary transportation, as well as the over-all review of all plans or proposals for the construction, extension, enlargement or interconnection of petroleum pipe lines.
To carry out its functions, the Liquid Transport Department established a division of Pipe Lines. This division’s duties were to obtain, review and analyze data relative to current operations and report on such operations. This was done in order to ascertain if pipe line transportation facilities were being fully used and to develop plans to secure maximum utilization. The pipe line division also was to advise and report on construction, both in progress and projected; study all programs involving building of new lines, additions, extensions, relocations, interconnections, maintenance, repair and operating supplies; make studies of industrial situations where it appeared that replacement of existing transportation by construction of pipe lines might increase the overall transportation efficiency. A further duty of this section was to investigate the possibilities of converting gas lines to petroleum service and the location and adequacy of terminal facilities and their relation to other modes of transportation.
Functionally the extensive pipe line systems of the country were divided into two groups—carriers of crude oil and carriers of refined products. The most important of the crude carriers was the great system serving the Gulf Coast, Mid-Continent and Illinois fields and connected to the Montana-Wyoming area by a long line from the Salt Creek region. The main lines of this group served the refining centers in these as well as the east coast areas. The second major crude system consisted of lines serving the California fields and refineries in that section. The principal products lines extended north from the midcontinent area and throughout the territory east of
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the Mississippi and north of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers.
Crude petroleum pipe lines in the United States on May 1, 1941, had a total length of 118,350 miles while the total length of products lines was 9,001 miles. The average diameter of the crude trunk lines was 8.40 inches and of the products lines, 7 inches. By January 1, 1943, the mileage of lines carrying crude petroleum had been increased by the war program to 121,425 miles and products lines to 11,605 miles—a grand total of 133,000 miles. The average diameter of the crude truck lines was 8.65 inches and of the products lines 7.34 inches. As of January 1, 1944, the total pipe line mileage in the United States stood up at 141,790.
This vast network contained 8,700,000 tons of line pipe and approximately 9,500,000 tons of steel of all kinds. It had a calculated volumetric capacity of 40,-920,616 barrels, exclusive of tanks. It represented an investment of approximately $1,400,000,000. It transported annually, through some portion of its journey to refineries and consumer areas, practically the entire production of crude oil in the United States, which in the calendar year 1943 amounted to 1,501,903,000 barrels.
The outstanding feat of pipe line construction was the building of the 24-inch line from the Texas oil fields to the east coast known as the Big Inch. In 1941 the Supply, Priority and Allocation Board twice refused to approve this project, but on June 10,1942, the War Production Board, on recommendation of the Petroleum Administration for War and the Office of Defense Transportation authorized the allocation of materials for its construction. The work began on August 3, 1942, and on August 15, 1943, oil poured out of the line at Philadelphia. Its daily output at the close of the war was 300,000 barrels a day. A second war emergency 20-inch pipe line, known as the Little Inch, designed to deliver 235,000 barrels per day from the Gulf Coast to the New York area, was completed on March 2, 1944.
Overshadowed by the immensity of these two War Emergency Lines, but important in the over-all picture, were other projects designed to round out finally the transportation of oil by pipe line. These included new gathering systems in Louisiana to augment supplies to refineries; a products line by the Sinclair Refining Company from East Chicago, Ind., to Toledo, Ohio, to bridge the gap when lake navigation was'closed and bring the products closer to the eastern markets; increases in capacity of the Stanolind system; and construction of a line by Magnolia Pipe Line Co. from Seminole, Tex., to Corsicana, Tex. The 383-mile, 16-inch line being built by Stanolind from
West Texas to the Cushing, Okla., area was designed to handle 65,000 barrels of crude oil per day.
Movement by Barges
In addition to the activities of the Liquid Transport Department in connection with the movement of petroleum and other liquids by tank cars, tank trucks, and pipe lines, was the study and coordination of the movement by inland and intracoastal waters. These waterways, exclusive of the Great Lakes, and intra-harbor, covered 11,600 miles of navigable channels. The work of the Liquid Transport Department was research, planning, and cooperation with the Waterway Transport Department of the Office of Defense Transportation and with other branches of the Government. The problem in the movement of petroleum products was to augment the pipe line and rail movement of these products north and east for final distribution on the eastern seaboard. The quantity moved by barges in support of the various land routes including the Great Lakes, reached a total of 1,730,-000,000 barrels for the entire war period—an average of 1,279,000 barrels loaded daily. The peak of waterway traffic was reached in October 1944, during which month, a total of 30,355,000 barrels was loaded.
The success achieved by the Office of Defense Transportation in its control over liquid transportation was made possible by generous cooperation received from other Government agencies and from the transportation industry.
The Interstate Commerce Commission, through its Bureau of Service, made its office and field forces available at all times to supply daily reports of tank cars held over 24 hours at destinations. It furnished reports of failures to unload tank cars promptly, and gave notice of irregularities of shipping schedules which might cause congestion of tank cars. In addition, the Interstate Commerce Commission issued embargoes, service orders, and demurrage orders, at the request of the Office of Defense Transportation, which helped the whole tank car situation.
The Car Service Division of the Association of American Railroads put the office and field forces of its Tank Car Section on call from the Office of Defense Transportation at all times. Their reports covering every kind of tank car delay and inefficiency went to the Office of Defense Transportation daily.
The Army, the Navy, War Shipping Administration, Petroleum Administration for War, War Production Board, War Food Administration, Defense Plants, Inc., Defense Supplies Corporation, and the Rubber Reserve Board were some of the Government agencies whose cooperation was helpful in attaining the utmost use of tank cars.
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CHAPTER XXVI
DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT
The Executive Order No. 8989 establishing the Office of Defense Transportation included domestic air transport in the definition of “domestic transportation.” The same order directed the ODT “to collaborate with existing departments and agencies which perform functions and activities pertaining to transportation and to utilize their facilities and services to the maximum.”
Executive Order No. 8974, dated December 13, 1941, directed the Secretary of Commerce in the administration of the statutes relating to civil aviation to exercise his control and jurisdiction in accordance with requirements for the successful prosecution of the war, as requested by the Secretary of War. By the same order the Secretary of War was authorized and directed to take possession and assume control of the civil aviation lines to the extent necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.
The Secretary of War established in the Army Air Forces an office for the coordination of War Department relations with civil aviation and for liaison with other Goverment agencies responsible for civil aviation activities. Problems relating to the control and regulation of the domestic air lines, including the acquisition of aircraft, were cleared through the Air Transport Command by requests to the Department of Commerce and other agencies as appeared necessary in order to effectively serve military needs. It was the policy of the War Department to accomplish the requisite coordination through the established civil aviation agencies. The fixing of priorities for passengers and cargo space in civil air transport was the direct responsibility of the War Department.
Early in 1942 by Presidential direction, the military control over civilian air transport became complete. The Government commandeered all civilian transport aircraft in excess of 200 transport planes which were to be maintained and flown by personnel of the domestic air carriers under prescribed schedules conforming to the requirements of the war program.
Travel on these commercial planes was strictly under the priority system administered by the military authorities. This priority was given to personnel en
gaged in essential defense work, and included members of the armed forces, other employees of the Government, representatives of allied governments and civilian personnel. Priority also was given to essential war materials.
In view of this situation the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation confined activities to problems relating to the needs of the domestic airlines for materials and manpower. On February 3, 1942, the Director delegated to the War Production Board its responsibility for reporting the needs of civil aviation. The Civil Aircraft Committee of WPB was then making a survey of domestic air transport needs. This Office was represented on that committee.
After the controlled materials plan was developed by the WPB, the responsibility of the ODT as claimant agency for the civil air lines was also delegated to WPB. Representation of the ODT on the Requirements Committee of the Aircraft Production Board was maintained throughout the war.
In February 1943 a plan was adopted by national headquarters of Selective Service whereby replacement schedules for the air lines were reviewed by ODT before they were sent to the State directors of Selective Service for final review and approval.
Upon the surrender of Japan, the Director took up the matter of rescinding the wartime priority system. On September 11, 1945, he received assurance from the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Hon. Robert A. Lovett, that effective September 15, 1945, the volume of priority traffic would be reduced to approximately one-tenth of the previous volume, and that on October 15, 1945, by direction of President Truman, the air priority policy, in effect since May 6, 1942, would be terminated.
To meet the transportation demands in the west coast area incident to heavy arrivals of troops from the Pacific theater beginning in November 1945, General Order ODT No. 58, effective December 3, 1945, was issued. This order directed that air carriers operating east-bound flights from Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego make available daily to the armed services for the transportation of
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organized troop movements destined to various east coast destinations not less than 70 percent of the space allotted for passenger traffic. Under its provisions the domestic air lines carried approximately
20,000 military personnel each month from the coast to such cities as Boston, New York, Philadel phia, Baltimore, and Washington. General Ord ODT No. 58 was revoked on February 15, 1946.
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CHAPTER XXVII
ALLOTMENT OF MATERIALS
Providing adequate transportation facilities for serving the war effort was enjoined upon the Office of Defense Transportation by the President’s Executive Order No. 8989, as set forth in paragraph 3 (b) :
Compile and analyze estimates of the requirements to be imposed upon existing domestic transport facilities by the needs of the effort; determine the adequacy of such facilities to accommodate the increased traffic volume occasioned by the war effort; * * * and stimulate the provisions of necessary additional transport facilities and equipment in order to achieve the level of domestic transportation services required; and in this connection advise the Supply Priorities and Allocation Board as to the estimated requirements and recommend allocations of materials and equipment necessary for the provision of adequate domestic transportation service.
The increased traffic volume which this Executive Order mentions, its distribution among the various types of transport facilities, together with the shifts of the greatly increased loads among the various facilities as the war progressed, are illustrated by the graphs and tables given in chapter XLII. The following comparison between the traffic in 1941 and 1944 is particularly significant :
Intercity inland domestic freight and passenger transportation (Including for-hire and private carriers)
1941 1944 Percent increase 1944 over ^1941
Freight Traffic (Millions) (Millions)
Estimated Freight Ton-Miles:
Railways 481,748 745,854 54.8
Inland waterways 140,484 150,155 6.9
Pipe lines 68,359 133,000 94.6
Highways 64,800- 49,300 —23.9
Airways 20 75 275.0
Total 755,381 1,078,384 42.8
Percent railways to total .. 63.8 67.1
Total excluding highways ... 690,581 1,029,084 49.1
Passenger Traffic
Estimated passenger-miles:
Private automobiles 264,300 151,300 —42.8
Motor busses 13,700 32,900 140.1
Total highways 278,000 184,200 —33.7
Railways 30,583 97,700 219.5
Inland waterways 1,821 1,930 6.0
Airways 1,385 2,264 63.5
Total 311,789 286,094 —8.2
Percent railways to total .... 9.8 29.8
Total excluding private
automobiles ... 47,489 184,794 183.8
This table indicates that, due to shortage of gasoline, tires, and new equipment, intercity freight ton-miles over the highways decreased 24 percent in 1944
as compared with 1941, whereas the ton-miles by other forms of intercity transportation increased 49 percent.
For the same reasons, the intercity passengermiles by private automobile, which in 1941 accounted for 85 percent of the intercity travel, decreased 43 percent, and their percentage of total intercity travel was reduced to 58 percent. Other forms of transportation, including highway motor busses, increased 183 percent and accounted for 42 percent of the travel as compared with only 15 percent in 1941.
The greater part of this increased traffic load fell on the railways.
Equipment for Transportation
It was the province of the Division of Materials and Equipment of the Office of Defense Transportar tion, in cooperation with the carrier divisions to determine the amount of equipment required to enable the transportation agencies to cope with the increasing domestic traffic, and to present these requirements to the War Production Board. Out of the quantity of material which the War Production Board felt it could allot for railway transportation in response to the Office of Defense Transportation’s estimates of requirements, the following railroad equipment was built during the four war years of 1942-1945 as compared with the 4 years 1926-1929, the previous peak of railroad freight traffic, and with the low traffic years 1937-1940:
Railroad Equipment Built
1942-45 1926-29 Percent 1942-45 of 1926-29 1937-40
Locomotives 3,143 4,156 75.6 1,571
Freight cars 181,576 2,919 279,882 8,773 64.9 33.2 181,441 1,564
Passenger Train Cars
Troop. Sleeper and Kitchen Cars ; 2,436
Other Passenger Train Cars. 483 8.773 5.5 1,564
Average Annual Traffic Freight Net Ton-Miles (millions) » 740,851 480,430 154.2 371,137
Passenger Miles (millions)' 82,011 82,950 248.8 23,176
This table, covering all railroads in the United States, indicates that both freight and passenger traffic during the war years 1942-45 were greatly in
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excess of that in the 4 year period 1926-29, the previous peak for freight traffic; yet, due to the extraordinary demands of the armed forces and the shipyards for steel and other materials required for construction of equipment, the locomotives constructed were about the same as the 1926-29 output, and freight and passenger train cars were only 65.1 percent and 33.2 percent, respectively, of the 1926-29 figures.
Even less generous was the allotment of material for constructing motortrucks, trailers, and busses. The prewar annual average construction of motortrucks for highway use was 766,885, while the annual average for the first 3 years of the war was 74,-570. The construction of highway trailers was at the annual average prewar rate of 36,487, while the annual average war year construction was 12,966. The five-year average prewar integral bus construction was 7,139, while during the three-year war period the annual average was 5,068.
The following comparison of the railroad equipment on lines and the traffic requirements in the four war years with the situation in 1926-29 brings out the difficulties the railroads found in handling the tremendous volume of war traffic:
Class I Railways
Annual Average Percent change 26-2.9 to 42-45
1942-45 1926-29
Locomotives assigned : Freight service 22,142 30,458 —27.3
Passenger service 6,748 13,208 —48.9
Aggregate tractive power: All locomotives (thousands) 2,073,382 2,608,570 —20.5
Average tractive power 52,687 42,759 +28.2
Traffic units: Gross freight ton-miles (millions) 1.582,200 1,108,403 +42.7
Passenger train car-miles (millions) 4,160 3,760 +10.7
Freight cars on line 2,015,212 2,494,326 —19.2
Aggregate capacity (tons) 89,391,201 105,632,778 —15.4
Average capacity (tons) 50.8 45.7 +11.6
Total freight car miles (millions) 35,112 28,324 +24.0
Magnitude of Material Requirements
Even though the construction program for transportation equipment fell far short of the needs of the transportation agencies, the vast amount of materials required for this program will be seen from the volume of materials which the War Production Board assigned to the Office of Defense Transportation in 1944, a very active period in the war. These
Copper alloy foundry products..............14,223,000 pounds
Aluminum products .........................27,678,250 pounds
There were many materials subject to wartime controls for which the Office of Defense Transportation did not have to prepare specific estimates of requirements as they represented only a small part of the over-all requirements of the civilian economy. They were taken care of by the proper Industry Divisions of the War Production Board.
Toward the end of the war, the lumber shortage became so acute that this material was put under a special allocation procedure in 1944 by the War Production Board. The estimated lumber requirements for the various types of transportation for the year (1944) reached the prodigious total of 3,888,232,235 board feet of lumber; 82,887,840 square feet of plywood; 15,051,430 linear feet of poles and piles; 1,-420,757 fence posts; 2,774,000 square feet of shingles and 64,505,934 railroad ties. These last four items were railroad requirements, in addition to the lumber and plywood needs. Railroad ties comprised the largest single item of the transportation lumber bill. The estimated requirement of ties, 64,505,934, was equivalent to approximately two and a half billion board feet, while the railroad plywood demand was 12,272,840 square feet. Of the lumber requirements, 900,000,000 board feet went into maintenance of rolling stock and of buildings and structures.
The grand total summary of the Office of Defense Transportation 1944 requirements for lumber and plywood was as follows:
Lumber (board feet) Plywood (square feet)
Kailroads 3,619,565,235 12,272,840
Motor Transport 134,476,000 65,650,000
Local Transport 37,731,000 3,905,000
Water Transport 96,460,000 1,060,000
Total 1944 Requirements 3,888,232,235 82,887.840
Total 1945 Requirements 4,156,144,885 405,287,064
The following figures, in the terms of short tons of carbon steel, as the index to the controlled materials entering into the production, show to what extent the War Production Board granted the total requirements of transportation claimed by the Office of Defense Transportation as claimant agency :
ODT stated requirements Total allotted to ODT by WPB (Including transfers) Percent allotted
1943 5,561,289 7,409,918 3.908,635 6,453,100 70.3 87.1
1944
were:
Carbon steel.............................. 6,453,078 tons
Alloy steel ............................... 390,706 tons
Copper base alloys.........................35,762,900 pounds
Copper brass mill products.................19,710,100 pounds
Copper wire mill products .................28,855,000 pounds
The figures given in the table above cover only the last three quarters of 1943, as the allotments under the Controlled Materials Plan began only with the second quarter.
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The story of the actual wartime production of complete equipment units, as compared with the stated requirements of transportation, discloses a precarious situation during the entire first year of the war, fluctuating improvement in 1943, but no substantial meeting of the requirements until 1944. A tabulation constituting a comparison between the stated requirements for transportation and the actual production of completed units, covering locomotives, freight and passenger cars, replacement rail (short tons), motor trucks and integral busses follows :
Equipment Needs and Production
. Stated Requirements Produced Percent Produced
1942:
Locomotives • Total 2,126 1,048 1,020 705 284 398 83.2 27.1 39.0
Steam ....
Diesel
Electric ...................................... 58 23 89.7
Freight Cars: Total 175,000 59,866 34.2
Box Not Segregated 30,437
Others ........................................ Not Segregated 29,429
Passenger Train Cars 3,000 377 12.6
Replacement Rail (short tons) 1,400,000 1,260,000 90.0
Trucks 261,500 125,294 47.9
Integral Busses ............................ 14,000 8,540 61.0
1943:
■ Locomotives: Total .................... 900 830 92.2
Steam 646 427 66.1
Diesel ........................................... 254 388
Electric ...................................... Freight Cars: Total .................. 73,500 15 28,790 39.2
Box ............................................... 3,500 954 27.3
Others ........................................ 70,000 27,836 39.8
Passenger Train Cars ................ 1,600 661 41.3
Replacement Rail (short tons) 1,800,000 1,539,000 85.5
Trucks ............................................ 7,867 2,888 36.7
Integral Busses ............................ 5,000 1,545 30.9
1944:
Locomotives : Total 1,133 965 85.2
Steam .......................................... 385 319 82.9
Diesel .......................................... 748 646 86.4
Electric ...................................... Freight Cars: Total .................. 63,000 42,150 66.9
Box Not Segregated 18,766
Others ........................................ Not Segregated 23,384
Passenger Train Cars ................ 550 939
Replacement Rail (short tons) 2,210,000 1,902,850 86.1
Trucks ............................................ 160,000 95,527 59.7
Integral Busses .......................... 70,000 5,120 73.1
1945:
Locomotives : Total ..................... 800 643 80.4
Steam .......................................... Diesel .......................................... Freight Cars: Total 44,000 109 534 50,770
Box Others ......................................... Passenger Train Cars .........w.... 600 88 14.7
Replacement Rail 2,200,000 3,118,366
Trucks ...................... 773,935 313,000 40.4
Integral Busses ............................. 10,000 17,641
Early Difficulties in Programming Requirements
Prior to its designation as Claimant Agency, the Office of Defense Transportation was unable to obtain adequate recognition of transportation requirements. This situation was chargeable, fundamentally to the unsound administrative organization within the War Production Board before the establishment of the Controlled Materials Plan and Claimant Agency procedure. It was also attributable in part to the obstructive attitudes of certain minds which could not or would not realize the vital part transportation must play in modern war—or realize the consequences of a transportation system inadequate or seriously weakened.
Throughout 1942 all requests for materials and
supplies to maintain and strengthen domestic transport had to be submitted to the Office of Civilian Supply, a division of War Production Board, for re-. view and for presentation to the Requirements Committee. Approach to this committee, exercising control over the distribution of basic and scarce materials, had little chance of success when this approach had to be made through a group with little sympathy for, or understanding of, the essential needs of transport and the vital part it must play in the prosecution of the war. Considering transportation merely as one of the elements in the over-all civilian program, the Office of Civilian Supply made drastic reductions in the stated requirements of the Office of Defense Transportation in presenting the transport program and openly opposed the appeals which the Office of Defense Transportation made to the Requirements Committee to secure a modification in the inadequate Civilian Supply program. This opposition usually was successful.
For example, in its program for 1943, the Office of Defense Transportation requested 900 locomotives, the Office of Civilian Supply recommended 400; instead of 73,500 freight car units, it recommended 20,-000. The Office of Defense Transportation’s requirements called for 5,284,290 tons of carbon steel for new equipment, rails, truck accessories, and other maintenance material, but the Office of Civilian Supply recommended only 3,655,866 tons. Director Eastman of the Office of Defense Transportation stated at the hearing before the War Production Board’s Requirements Committee that “the representatives of the War and Navy Departments supported the Office of Defense Transportation’s recommendations for new equipment and rails because of the importance of an efficient transportation machine to the movement of troops and materials required in the war effort.” The War Production Board then substituted for the recommendations of Civilian Supply, a program on a quarterly basis for the carbon steel allotments, and on an approximately 8 months’ basis for locomotives.
The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, however, felt that the views of the office of Civilian Supply on the subject of railroad requirements were such that domestic transportation should be represented directly on the Requirements Committee by the ODT. On November 18, 1942, the Director wrote to the chairman of the Requirements Committee of the War Production Board protesting against the portion of the Controlled Materials Plan of November 2, 1942, which set up seven claimant agencies that did not include the Office of Defense Transportation, and requesting that the Office of Defense Transportation be designated as the claimant agency for domestic transportation. He wrote:
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The plan gives no recognition whatsoever to the powers vested in and duties imposed upon the Office of Defense Transportation by Executive Order No. 8989.. dated December 18,1941, in respect of the requirements for materialfe and equipment of the domestic transportation systems of the nation. That order (paragraph 3 (b)) specifically charges this Office with the duty of determining the adequacy of domestic transport facilities to accommodate the increased traffic volume occasioned by the war effort, and for the purpose of stimulating the provision of necessary additional transport facilities and equipment, to advise the War Production Board “as to the estimated requirements and recommend allocations of materials and equipment necessary for the provision of adequate domestic transportation service.” I respectfully suggest that this mandate of the President cannot properly be disregarded.
ODT Becomes Claimant Agency
In response to the representations made by the Office of Defense Transportation, Chairman Nelson of the War Production Board announced the designation of the Office of Defense Transportation as the claimant agency for transportation in a letter dated December 10, 1942, to the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, in which he said :
“In view of the increasing importance of the transportation program, we have determined that its priority and material needs should be presented directly to the Requirements Committee by your agency as a claimant agency. This will assure that the fullest consideration is given to these vital needs which your agency represents.”
With the presentation of requirements for the second quarter of 1943, the Office of Defense Transportation assumed its full duties as a claimant agency under the Controlled Materials Plan of the War Production Board. Its responsibilities in obtaining steel, copper, and aluminum for the fields of rail transport, local transport, motor transport, and water transport were discharged by the Division of Materials and Equipment, working under the general direction of the Deputy Director of the Office of Defense Transportation. Claims for materials were submitted each quarter, and allotments were made to the Office of Defense Transportation’s programs in amounts which, although less than the stated requirements in many cases, were sufficient to prevent any serious failure in transportation service. As the war progressed, the supply of controlled materials, on the whole, became easier and Office of Defense Transportation claims and allotments increased, so that by the end of 1943 the Office of Defense Transportation was the largest claimant of controlled materials outside of the military agencies—Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission. Slippage, or failure to meet scheduled production, continued, however, in numerous items of equipment, because of a number of factors not within Office of Defense Transportation control, such as delayed delivery of component parts, overly optimistic scheduling induced by manu
facturers’ estimates of capacity, and growing scarcity of manpower. Gradually, the chief emphasis of the Division’s work changed from the struggle to obtain adequate quantities of controlled materials to the problem of seeing that scheduled quantities of end-products were actually produced.
Controlled Materials Plan
The Controlled Materials Plan has been described as an arrangement to provide a method for having the materials required for essential production at the right place at the right time. “To do that,” explained Mr. A. D. MacLean, Assistant Production Director of the U. S. Maritime Commission, “there must be a definite organization, which the War Production Board will provide along with the Controlled Materials Plan, some means of making sure that the material is available, and that manpower and machinery are there to produce at the necessary time.” Capt. John S. Cooke, Controlled Materials Office of the U. S. Army, described the Controlled Materials Plan also as a plan that “provides for establishing a program balanced against available supply of materials, and then purports to control the flow of materials and end items.”
The materials covered by the Controlled Materials Plan were steel, copper, and aluminum, and all products that contained any of these metals which came within the scope of the Controlled Materials Plan. In addition to these tightly controlled materials, there were other scarce materials like beryllium, magnesium, nickel, etc., over which there was control through other methods than CMP, such as allotments or allocations and scheduling.
The controlled materials were divided into class A and class B. This classification had no reference to their importance or their urgency to the war effort, but related rather to the manner and character of their distribution. Class A articles were defined as including all products containing controlled materials, except class B articles, and class B articles were defined as articles that could be purchased out of stocks in stores or in the warehouses. These were so-called end-products or finished articles which could be used independently, or as component parts of other articles. There was an official, though not complete, list of what constituted class B articles, based on the following four general characteristics, according to the “Courses of Instruction for Key Men,” issued by the War Production Board:
(1) Civilian type end products, like farm machinery and sewing machine needles, which are distributed through thousands of outlets;
(2) Industrial machinery and equipment, which are sold to thousands of firms, except where these are specially designed and installed in conjunction with construction projects;
(3) Products which require very small quantities of controlled materials like wood furniture and apparel findings;
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(4) Certain components, like standard bolts and nuts, electric motors, etc., which are ordered, in general in small quantities, frequently from the shelf, and whose producers supply many thousands of customers.
Claimant agencies, under the Controlled Materials Plan, were 13 Government units listed in CMP Regulation No. 1. They were closely identified with the conduct of the war. In addition to the War and Navy Departments, Aircraft Resources Control Office, and Maritime Commission, the claimant agencies comprised nine civil branches of the Government, including the Office of Defense Transportation. It was the duty of all claimant agencies to develop definite programs and to compute accurately the requirements of materials which would be needed to meet their programs.
Claimant agencies developed programs for A products by type, size, and number. They translated their programs into material requirements. Products of B class were excluded because the Office of the Vice Chairman for Operations, representing the Industry Divisions of the War Production Board, presented these claims. The Office of Defense Transportation prepared a tabulation of its B products requirements, expressed in units or dollars, which it transmitted to the proper industry divisions which were responsible for translating these requirements into controlled materials, except in the case of automotive replacement parts, which were claimed direct by the Office of Defense Transportation as a “Special B product.”
The procedure of the Office of Defense Transportation in developing its needs for specified programs in order to obtain allotments of controlled materials, was as follows :
Processing the Requirements
The several carrier or operating divisions of the Office of Defense Transportation compiled, from the information furnished by the areas of the transportation industry under their control, the requirements for transportation equipment and related materials. The estimates of the divisions were sent to the Office of Defense Transportation Division of Materials and Equipment, which prepared them for submission to the Program Bureau of the War Production Board. Each carrier division had a representative, designated as materials officer, who sat with the Division of Materials and Equipment and who was responsible for the preparation of the requirements of his division. The group, as a whole, acted as the Materials Committee of the Office of Defense Transportation and coordinated its activities as a claimant. The problems and requests of each operating division were passed upon by the committee before being consolidated and presented as the Office of Defense Transportation’s program before the War Production Board.
The Program Bureau of the War Production Board screened the estimates and submitted them to the Program Adjustment Committee. Here they were reviewed and adjustments made to balance them with the requirements of the other claimant agencies. All of the claimant agencies were represented on this committee. When the requirements were thus fully considered, the chairman of the Program Adjustment Committee filed with the War Production Board Requirements Committee its proposal allotments of controlled materials to each agency.
The Requirements Committee was the final determining unit. Its chairman was the program vice-chairman of the War Production Board, and each of the claimant agencies was represented on the committee. The chairman of the Requirements Committee then issued a series of program determinations, which constituted the judgment of the War Production Board as to the quarterly allotments of controlled materials for the various claimant agencies.
Thereupon, the Controller Division of the War Production Board sent to the Office of Defense Transportation the transfer of allotments assigned to it, and the Office of Defense Transportation authorized the War Production Board’s Transportation Equipment Division and the War Production Board’s Automotive Division to distribute the allotted materials to prime consumers, such as equipment manufacturers, etc., on the basis of approved applications. An exception to this procedure was that the Waterway Transport Department made its allotments direct to the approved consumers.
The Office of Defense Transportation had representatives in the various divisions of the War Production Board through which requirements programs received consideration. The Deputy Director of the Office of Defense Transportation was a member of the War Production Board’s Requirements Committee, which was the final authority as to whether, or to what extent, a claimant agency’s program should be approved. The Director of the Division of Materials and Equipment of the Office of Defense Transportation was a member of the Program Adjustment Committee, which shaped up the claimant agency’s program for submission to the Requirements Committee, and the materials officers of the carrier divisions of the Office of Defense Transportation served as members of the Requirements Committees of the various industry divisions of the War Production Board.
After the Office of Defense Transportation had piloted its production programs through the Controlled Materials Plan procedure, the production of the completed transportation vehicles or supplies de
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pended upon the manufacturers and other essential suppliers. Yet, much remained to be done by several War Production Board divisions in which this claimant agency for transportation had a vital interest. In an article on “Railway Purchases and Stores,” January 1944, H. H. Kelly, Director of the Division of Materials and Equipment, Office of Defense Transportation, explained certain phases of the procedure, particularly scheduling and priorities, as follows:
The work of scheduling and expediting Office of Defense Transportation programs is the responsibility of appropriate War Production Board Industry Divisions. The reason for this is apparent. The Office of Defense Transportation’s programs must be scheduled in conjunction with those of all other agencies, and the only neutral ground on which this oft-times difficult task can be performed is that of the industry which is held responsible for implementing all approved programs. Since scheduling therefore is inescapably a part of
the. War Production Board’s functions, it follows that expediting when necessary, should also be handled- by these Divisions, and definite decision to this effect was made some mqnths ago after a period of uncertainty in which the Office of Defense Transportation took a leading part in calling to the attention of the War Production Board the unsatisfactory status of a number of important programs.
Preference ratings play an important phrt in the production of transportation equipment. Strictly speaking, they are applicable only to B products and to noncontrolled materials, since the three controlled materials (steel, copper and aluminum) are issued under the direct allotment procedure already described. Until recently, Office of Defense Transportation programs had only an AA-2X rating,, except for maintenance, repair and operating supplies which have constantly enjoyed an AA-1 rating. In October and November, 1943 however, War Production Board’s Requirements Committee authorized AA-1 ratings for locomotives, trucks, trailers, integral buses, and automotive replacement parts, and the B product components and noncontrolled materials required for these programs are expected to flow more efficiently during 1944 as a result
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CHAPTER XXVIII
ALLOCATION OF
The problems and the methods for acquiring the materials and equipment for transportation as set forth in Chapter XXVII were within the province of the Division of Materials and Equipment. It processed the estimates of the materials required ; piloted them through the intricate channels of the War Production Board ; and stood by in a cooperative way until the equipment for which the Office of Defense Transportation was claimant agent came off the production line.
Allocation of Railroad Equipment and New Rail
The next step in the process of equipping transportation was the distribution of the manufactured equipment to the various agencies of transportation. With the railroads the process was simple. Railroad companies estimating their requirements for the ensuing year, filed tentative orders with builders for the number of locomotives and other equipment they expected to need. The tentative orders were submitted to the Division of Materials and Equipment of the Office of Defense Transportation, which made recommendations of approval or disapproval to the Transportation Equipment Division, War Production Board, and the latter then gave authority to the builder to produce the equipment, usually in conformity with the Office of Defense Transportation’s recommendations. The time, manner, and quantities of delivery were prescribed by the Office of Defense Transportation.
The one exception to this simple procedure arose in connection with Diesel locomotives, both road and switching. While steam locomotives were built to individual order, Diesel locomotives were not and all such power units of a given type produced by a given builder were identical. This made it possible, as emergency need arose, to shift the delivery of Diesel power to the carrier or carriers whose immediate necessities were greatest in view of the service demands of war traffic. Indeed, with only moderate regard to the dates when orders were placed for Diesel power, lists were compiled from time to time by the Office of Defense Transportation which fixed the order of delivery of Diesel units to particular carriers —and this program usually was final. Occasionally
NEW EQUIPMENT
and upon the basis of adequate presentation, the order of delivery was modified to meet a situation unforseen when the list was initially prepared. It was natural that certain carriers should protest vigorously against changes in delivery dates, particularly those that had placed orders early. Yet there is no doubt but that the interests of war traffic were well served by this allocation of power upon the basis of need.
Allocation of Rail Tonnage
Another problem of distribution arose incident to rail tonnage. During the ’30’s rail traffic was light and the need for extensive rail replacement was not urgent; furthermore, the financial situation of even the stronger railways was not such as to justify expenditures beyond immediate necessities. When the volume of rail traffic began to increase, replacement became urgent and, with greater revenues to aid, rail purchases increased. In 1938 599,752 tons of new rail were laid in replacement by class 1 railways. In 1939 that figure rose to 878,643 tons, and in 1940 tonnage was 998,914. In 1941 replacement reached 1,197,593 tons—and then, because of our entry into the war and the heavy demand for steel to serve directly the war effort, it was judged necessary by the Requirements Committee that purchases of new rail by the carriers be restricted sharply. For 1942 the allotment of steel for new rail for the domestic railway was restricted to 1,279,000 net tons, in the face of insistent requests from the carriers for some 1,590,000 tons. The marked disparity between tonnage asked and tonnage available made some plan of distribution essential.
When first faced with this problem the Office of Defense Transportation sought the cooperation of the carriers to devise a plan under which available tonnage would be distributed according to need. A careful study was made by a committee of railway engineers and, after giving consideration to all available factors which might measure need, recommendations were offered. Because the Director of the Division of Railway Transport decided that relative need could not be judged with any degree of accuracy the recommendations of the committee were refused
700494—48—14
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and available rail tonnage was distributed throughout the war years solely upon a pro rata basis. Under this plan, each railway was asked to submit its estimate of rail needs for the ensuing year; these requests, unmodified to eliminate any “padding” were then totalled and the percentage found that each road’s request constituted of that total—and this percentage was applied to the tonnage authorized by the Requirements Committee to determine the tonnage received by each carrier. In scheduling the assigned rolling by quarters, thought was given to seasonal and other factors—rollings for northern carriers were scheduled to make the rail available for spring and summer, while for southern roads it was not essential that time of delivery be so closely watched. In 1943 tonnage requested was 2,100,000 tons while the allotment was 1,539,000 tons ; in 1944 the figures were 2,580,000 and 1,892,000 tons respectively, while in 1945 requests totalled 2,913,000 tons and the allotment was 1,881,000 tons.
Allocation of Motor Vehicles
. For rubber-borne commercial motor vehicles there was a system of allocation administered by the Allocations Section of the Division of Motor Transport (later called the Division of Research and Equipment of the Highway Transport Department) under authority conferred on the Office of Defense Transportation by the War Production Board. Private automobiles were not allocated, but were rationed by the Office of Price Administration to consumers under established rules of eligibility. The allocated commercial vehicles were trucks, trailers, busses and certain other forms of commercial passenger carriers.
Soon after the outbreak of war, the manufacture of all new motor vehicles was stopped, and the sale of all such new vehicles not in the hands of operators was “frozen” on January 1, 1942, by WPB Order L-l-c until the Government could devise a system for directing them into channels of use essential to community needs and the war effort.
Construction of new commercial trucks for civilian Use terminated as follows: Light trucks, December 31, 1941; medium trucks, February 28, 1942; and heavy trucks, March 31, 1942. The ban on sales of new trucks lasted from January 1 to March 9, 1942, when the stocks on hand were pooled for release to the public under an allocation system that became effective on March 9, 1942. Into this pool went 185,-000 commercial vehicles, of which 97,000 were earmarked for civilian use as follows: Light trucks, 20,000; medium trucks, 38,000; and heavy trucks, 9,000. This was 37 percent of the 261,500 commercial vehicles which the Office of Defense Transportation had requested of the War Production Board during February 1942 for civilian use. As the end of the
pooled stockpile approached, the construction of nev commercial trucks began in a small way, with 2,88! in 1943, and rose to 95,527 in 1944.
Equipment From Motor Pool
It was evident that the allotment of 97,000 vehicles out of the pool could take care of only the most urg ent replacement needs. The Office of Defense Trans portation cooperated with the War Production Boan in preparing WPB Conservation Order M-100 o March 9, 1942, which undertook to screen out un warranted applications by prescribing as a basis fo preferential allocation a list of five classes of usage in the order in which preference for releasing neA vehicles was to be granted. The preference was a follows:
Class I—Vehicles used in connection with military forces public health and safety, or with channels of communications
Class II—Vehicles principally used directly in connectio with the war effort.
Cass III—Vehicles principally used in connection wit essential functions indirectly connected with the war effort.
Class IV—Vehicles used for the transportation of person or goods, except as above.
Class V—Vehicles used for non-essential or “luxury” fun« tions not connected with the war effort.
The WPB Conservation Order M-100, besides dedi eating the new commercial vehicles to essential opei ation in the preferential order of its five classes, als established the procedure for release of the vehicles to operators.
The order provided that no new commercial motor vehicle might be transferred without a Certificate o Transfer. Certain persons were exempt from thes provisions, such as those holding Government Es emptlon Permits; those who acquired such vehicles through inheritance or process of law; dealers, onl for the purpose of resale; etc.; but vehicles so ai quired might not be retransferred without a Certifi cate of Transfer.
Certificates of Transfer were issued by the Wa Production Board “pursuant to an application file with the Office of Defense Transportation and upo recommendation of the Office of Defense Transporta tion, based upon its determination that the transfer of the vehicle for a specified use included in the Usag Classification List is required for the maximum util zation of domestic transportation facilities for th prosecution of the war, or essential civilian requirements.” Manufacturers, distributors and dealers were required to make transfer upon presentation of Certificates of Transfer regardless of any contract or sale or other commitment with any other person
The Office of Defense Transportation was author ized to establish local appeal boards for hearing an determining appeals from the rulings of the fiel allocation officials in these matters. Dealers’ records were to be preserved for a period of 2 years an
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reports were to be submitted as might be required by the Office of Defense Transportation or the War Production Board. The usual penalties for violating War Production Board Orders were prescribed.
The task of receiving applications for allocation of vehicles and of determining the essentiality of the uses to which the vehicles were put, called for a field organization which the Office of Defense Transportation did not have in 1942. Through cooperation of the Interstate Commerce Commission the field forces of the Bureau of Motor Carriers of that body were placed at the disposal of the Office of Defense Transportation and an Interstate Commerce Commission official at each such field station was designated as Local Allocation Officer. This gave coverage in every State in the Union. These officials received the applications, made the investigations as to the essentiality of the uses to which the vehicles were to be put, and submitted the approved applications to the allocation officials in Washington. On these reports from the field the Office of Defense Transportation based its recommendations to the War Production Board for issuance of certificates of transfer. This arrangement between the Office of Defense Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Commission continued until July 1, 1944, when the Office of Defense Transportation took over this field work which the Interstate Commerce Commission had administered through 79 field offices as an accommodation. The Office of Defense Transportation carried on the task with its district managers operating through 142 district offices.
At this time, an important change was made in the original allocation procedure whereby the Office of Defense Transportation had recommended to the War Production Board the issuance of specific certificates of transfer. The change authorized the Office of Defense Transportation to issue certificates of transfer and Government exemption permits as set forth in- the original WPB Directive No. 36 of June 23, 1944. This directive provided that out of the old stock pile and the newly manufactured supply of trucks, chassis, etc., quotas be allotted to the Army and Navy, the Office of Defense Transportation, and other prime agencies of the Government, to be rationed by each agency independently of the War Production Board. It was stipulated:
(a) Within the limits of its own quota each agency shall determine the use to which the particular vehicle is put and the Director shall not refuse to authorize the transfer on any ground other than that the particular quota has been exhausted
(b) In the rationing of new commercial motor vehicles from the quota established for the Office of Defense Transportation, the Director shall authorize the transfer, sale, delivery, use, or other disposition of new commercial vehicles pursuant to such standards, orders and regulations as he may deem necessary in the public interest and to promote national defense.
Concurrent with the ’issuance of this directive by the War Production Board, the Office of Defense Transportation issued its General Order ODT No. 44 and the Administrative Order No. 27, which harmonized its allocation procedure with the new policy fixed by the War Production Board. The procedure set up in General Order ODT No. 44 was stated to include the territories and possessions of the United States. Other provisions were:
Certificates of Transfer were required for the sale, lease, loan, gift, etc., of new commercial vehicles, which included trucks, truck chassis, truck trailers, off-the-highway motor vehicles, full or semitrailers with load capacity exceeding 10,000 pounds, ambulances, hearses, bus chassis, station wagons, carry-all suburbans, sedan deliveries, utility sedans, coupes with pick-up boxes, and cab pick-up, but not taxicabs or integral busses which were otherwise rationed.
Applications from private persons were required to be submitted in writing to the nearest Office of Defense Transportation offices. Exempted from requirement of certificates of transfer were certain Government departments closely identified with war operations, and individuals acquiring vehicles for export, at the request of the Foreign Economic Administration. For such agencies, Government exempt permits were issued.
Certificates of transfer were issued only for a specific use included within the four classes of preferential usage established by War Production Board Order M-100 plus the determination by the Office of Defense Transportation that the proposed use was necessary to essential civilian economy and the war effort; also, that the vehicle would be used in the area and for the purpose set forth in the application.
If the vehicle was intended to be used in connection with an extension or the inauguration of a service that required the prior approval of the Office of Defense Transportation under General Order ODT No. 3, as amended, by General Order ODT No. 6A, or General Order ODT No. 17, or if the issuance of a new or amended certificate of war necessity under General Order ODT No. 21A was required, the applicant for a certificate of transfer had to file, at the same time or before, an application for such a new or amended certificate of war necessity.
Manufacturers and dealers could acquire vehicles for sale, but not for use. However, such vehicles could not be retransferred except upon certificates of transfer. Manufacturers and dealers were required to make such transfer whenever a proper certificate was presented. Vehicles obtained under certificates of transfer could not be retransferred within a period of 6 months without prior approval by the Office of Defense Transportation.
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Allocation Procedure
The step-by-step procedure for obtaining the allocation of new commercial vehicles was set forth in Administrative Order No. 27 of June 24,1944.
The Office of Defense Transportation district manager approved or disapproved the applications after investigation.
If the application was approved, it was forwarded to the Highway Transport Department in Washington for final action. The district manager’s approval rested on his determination of essentiality according to the prescribed four classes of usage, and on the fact that other equipment was not available to do the work.
If the district manager disapproved an application, the applicant had the privilege of appealing to a local appeal board which consisted of three members appointed by the Office of Defense Transportation. Such appeal was required to be filed in writing within 30 days. No appeal was permissible from the decision of the local appeal board, and no rejected application could be renewed within 3 months of the date of disapproval.
Certificates of transfer were issued by the assistant director of the Highway Transport Department after considering the findings of the district manager or the appeal board. His action was final. Application for the same usage could not be renewed until after a lapse of 3 months.
In July 1945, the Office of Defense Transportation issued General Order ODT No. 44A and Administrative Order ODT No. 27A, whereby the rationing of all light and medium trucks, those of less than 16,000 pounds gross weight, were handled entirely in the field by district managers or local appeal boards. Approved recommendations for heavy trucks continued to be sent to the Washington headquarters of the Office of Defense Transportation for final determination. This was an administrative step toward decentralizing some of the local level work that was being done at Washington. It was made practicable by the promise of early production of light and medium trucks on a large scale as the end of the war came closer.
Within the framework of this procedure, from the filing of applications for new vehicles to the final issuing of certificates of transfer, there were no departures from the procedures laid down by the Office of Defense Transportation in its general and administrative orders, but there were important elaborations to better serve farm, food, and other forms of transportation requiring special treatment.
During the period from March 9, 1942, to September 30, 1945, there were issued jointly by the War Production Board and the Office of Defense
Transportation 593,729 certificates of transfer consisting of 128,792 lights, 310,552 mediums, 89,215 heavies, and 65,170 trailers; In the following tabulation, the counts as given do not cover entirely the full years:
Year Light trucks and truck tractors Medium trucks and truck tractors Heavy trucks and truck tractors Total trucks and truck tractors Trailers ÄÄ.. Grand total
1942 7,129 20,453 5,217 32,799 5,150 37,949
1943 14,223 40,940 8,403 63,566 10,575 74,141
1944 7,763 83,030 30,645 121,438 23,561 144,999
1945 99,677 166,129 44,950 310,756 25,884 336,640
Total 128,792 310,552 89,215 528,559 65,170 593,729
Allocation of Busses
The allocation of busses followed a somewhat different procedure from the allocation of trucks. There were structurally two types of busses—the vehicles constructed as an integral unit, known as the integral bus, and the bus of which the body and the chassis were acquired separately, known as body-on-chassis bus. For this latter type of bus it was originally necessary to process through the War Production Board an order for the bus body, after approval by the Office of Defense Transportation was obtained. However, after July 1, 1944, no application for such bus body was necessary, but an application for the chassis for the bus had to be made, the procedure being as follows:
1. Application Form ODT No. 663, the same as was used for obtaining a certificate of transfer for a truck, accompanied by answers to a list of 17 questions to determine eligibiliy for the vehicle, had to be filed with the Office of Defense Transportation.
2. If the application was approved in the field, it was sent to the Allocation Section of the Office of Defense Transportation in Washington for final action. If the application was finally approved, a certificate of transfer for the chassis was issued to the applicant.
During the period of rationing a total of 13,922 separate bodies for chassis and a total of 23,216 chassis for bus bodies were released.
In the matter of integral busses, there was first determination by the War Production Board of the number of busses that could be constructed for civili-lian use after the requirements for the war effort were met. Then followed the division by the War Production Board of this quota among the various manufacturers according to their expressed willingness and ability to produce. These assignments permitted the manufacturers to obtain the necessary materials and component parts for the manufacture of the busses approved by the Office of Defense Transportation. The next step was submission by the manufacturers to the War Production Board of the approved orders for busses which they had received together with the names of the operators ordering them.
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Under the regulations in effect until the lifting of all restrictions on May 17, 1945, procedure for obtaining a new integral bus was as follows :
(1 ) Applicant for integral motor bus placed his order with a manufacturer who would accept it ; (2) applicant then submitted his application to the Highway Transport Department of the Office of Defense Transportation, on Form ODT-L-15; (3) the Office of Defense Transportation requested the Regional Director of the region in which the applicant operated to make a recommendation on the application ; (4) if the application was acted on favorably, the Office of Defense Transportation recommended to the War Production Board that the vehicle or vehicles be released for delivery; (5) if the War Production Board concurred in the recommendation, it instructed the manufacturer and also notified the applicant of the action taken.
On May 17, 1945, all restrictions and procedural requirements for obtaining integral busses were revoked.
Shortly after the formation of the Division of Local Transport in, January, 1942, the Office of Defense Transportation was asked to prepare an estimate of its requirements for bus equipment to be produced in the year 1942. It was estimated that 12,000 integral city-type busses and 2,000 integral intercity type busses would be required to meet the great upsurge in traffic resulting from war activity. Under the arrangements current at that time, as described in Chapter XXVII the Office of Defense Transportation’s claims were presented through the Office of Civilian Supply, a division of the War Production Board. The Office of Civilian Supply was in theory to act as a representative of the Office of Defense Transportation before the War Production Board. The Transportation and Rubber Divisions of the Office of Civilian Supply, however, worked out a plan which was diametrically opposite to the Office of Defense Transportation’s plan and endeavored to convince the Office of Defense Transportation that it should reduce the amount of its estimates. The Office of Defense Transportation wanted integral busses produced for the prospective heavy movement of war workers. The Office of Civilian Supply presented plans and arguments to prove that rubber could be more economically used by hauling workers in private cars rather than in busses. Their plan did not take into consideration the volume of the worker movements, the location of hewly created plants and the need for mass transportation to handle the crowds. In the early stages of the negotiations, therefore, it was rather difficult for the Office of Defense Transportation to get its point of view present
ed to the War Production Board Requirements Committee.
Discussions proceded along these lines during the early months of 1942. The Army proposed a complete stoppage of integral bus production on the ground that the continued manufacture of these units might interfere with war production. The War Production Board questioned all bus manufacturers as to the amounts of materials and component parts for integral busses which were on hand in the plants of their suppliers, and it was stated that 50 percent or more of the materials were available for completing approximately 3,000 busses.
As discussions of integral bus production continued, the thought was presented that these accumulated parts and materials should be scrapped to make steel for direct implements of war rather than to be built into busses. The Army, as previously stated, was against building any busses at all. The Office of Defense Transportation endeavored to show that without busses to bring the workers to the machines, the resulting end-products which the Army needed in the war effort would not be produced. A suggestion was made that the 3,000 integral busses referred to might be built, held by the Government, and “exchanged” for worn-out busses.
Another suggestion, supported by the Office of Defense Transportation and the Transportation Equipment Division of the War Production Board was that the busses be completed and released to operators after a “screening” as to need, and with “strings” attached to make them part of a national emergency pool of vehicles, and to conserve their use by limiting them roughly to peak-hour-worker haul. Under such a plan the equipment could be placed at spots where it was vitally needed at no cost to the Government and made subject to later transfer to places of greater need with the development of the war effort.
Integral Bus Construction Starts
While the Army maintained its position that no further integral busses should be produced, the Office of Civilian Supply reversed its former position when the advisory vote of the Requirements Committee was taken. It favored permitting the building of busses and putting them in a pool as described. The Navy also favored this plan. The result was that the 3,000 busses were authorized to be built, considered part of an emergency pool, and released to the operators under conditions approved by the War Production Board and the Office of Defense Transportation. The necessary controls were accomplished through the War Production Board’s Limitation Order L-101, which had been in effect since May, 1942. A directive was issued under the order which provided that on and after August 1, 1942, no person
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should deliver or accept a new passenger carrier (which included integral busses), except in accordance with specific directions issued by the War Production Board which “may incorporate therein such requests and recommendations as may be submitted by the Office of Defense Transportation.” All integral busses until July 1, 1944, were released under the terms and conditions of agreement Form ODT-LT-1.
A harmonious working relationship under this arrangement was built up between the Division of ¡Local Transport, Office of Defense Transportation, and the Transportation Equipment Division of the War Production Board, under which Office of Defense Transportation recommendations as to whether a bus should be released to an applicant were followed by the War Production Board rather consistently, with the War Production Board reserving the right to overrule the Office of Defense Transportation in case of anticipated serious consequences.
The.requirements of Form ODT-LT-1 included a stipulation that the Office of Defense Transportation could order busses which had been released to an operator from the pool to be shifted into areas where they were more needed, but it developed that the busses were so well placed initially at strategic warworker centers by the Division of Local Transport that the Office of Defense Transportation did not have to avail itself of this authority to shift busses to other locations.
In December 1942, the War Production Board introduced its Controlled Materials Plan (CMP) and the Office of Defense Transportation was made a claimant agency in its own right. Instead of presenting the requirements for additional busses through the Office of Civilian Supply, the Division of Local Transport was able to present these requirements directly and support them with the assistance of the Division of Materials and Equipment before the various levels of the War Production Board. So convincing was its presentation of the need for additional busses that the Requirements Committee authorized the production of 3,000 integral busses for the year 1943, approximately 7,000 for the year 1944, and 10,000 for the year 1945.
This expanding program proceeded from the fact that the need for integral busses became well recognized by air the Government agencies, including the Army and the Navy. As conditions surrounding the production of additional integral busses authorized under the 1943 and 1944 quotas improved, the mileage restriction and the reporting provisions of Form ODT-LT-1 were progressively relaxed. The option “clause,” under which the sale of these busses might be directed into other areas, however, was retained
on approximately 7,500 busses released under this procedure.
Finally, with the approval of the Transportation Equipment Division of the War Production Board, persons who acquired busses on which recommendation for release had been made on and after July 1, 1944, were relieved informally from executing the ODT-LT-1 Form as a requirement in the allocation of integral busses.
With the cessation of hostilities in Europe, the War Production Board on May 17, 1945, revoked Limitation Order L-101, under which it restricted the production and delivery of street cars, trolley coaches and integral busses. The order was issued on May 21, 1942, and under it, for practically the three most critical production years of the war, the Office of Defense Transportation was able to direct, with approval of tKe War Production Board, the flow of the small pooled stock and new production of trucks and busses into channels that kept rubber-borne transportation functioning effectively. This revocation freed the commercial passenger carriers from the allocation procedure.
During the period of rationing, August 1, 1942 to May 16, 1945, inclusive, the following numbers of integral busses were recommended for release by the Office of Defense Transportation and authorized by the War Production Board :
1942 (After August 1st).....................2,294
1943 .......................................1,964
1944 ..................................... 7.696
1945 (To May 15th) ........................ 4,076
Total ..................................... .16,030
Victory in Europe brought the first hopeful turn for the construction of equipment. Victory in the Pacific in August 1945 brought speedy termination of the Controlled Materials Plan. The Office of Defense Transportation filed its stated requirements with the War Production Board as usual for the fourth quarter of 1945, and allotments were made by a War Production Board Program Determination on August 6. On August 14, however, VJ-day was announced and immediately thereafter the War Production Board began a series of actions to close out activities under the Controlled Materials Plan. The fourth quarter allotments to all claimant agencies including the Office of Defense Transportation were cancelled, most preference ratings were abolished, and the Controlled Materials Plan was ordered terminated as of September 30, 1945. Estimated requirements for gasoline and tires were stopped in August 1945, but the rationing of trucks was continued by the Office of Defense Transportation until November 1, 1945, by which time manufacturers were again in production.
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CHAPTER XXIX
FUEL AND TIRES FOR MOTOR VEHICLES
The work of the Division of Materials and Equipment for insuring transportation of its needed controlled materials was not confined to the more closely controlled materials that entered into war production and repairs. It also represented the estimates and claims of the Office of Defense Transportation for such necessities as tires, which were allotted to the industry by the Office of Rubber Administration, and gasoline and fuel oil which were allotted by the Petroleum Administration for War. The requirements for tires and petroleum products were developed by the Highway Transport Department.
On February 10,1943, the Petroleum Administration for War adopted the policy of having Government claimant agencies present their claims for petroleum products in the same manner as they made their claims to the War Production Board for controlled materials. Accordingly, the Office of Defense Transportation created a Committee on Petroleum Requirements which compiled the requirements for transportation, and the Division of Review and Special Studies processed them through the Petroleum Administration for War.
The procedure for distributing petroleum products for transportation was in three steps:
1. The Office of Defense Transportation determined the amount of gasoline and fuel oil required for maintaining
transport operations in each of the five petroleum districts, and made claim for its share of the products.
2. The Petroleum Administration for War allocated out of the nation’s supply of gasoline and fuel oil as much.of the amount claimed by the Office of Defense Transportation for each of the five petroleum districts as was possible out of the supply for civilian uses after the military needs had been met. - 3. The Office of Price Administration then rationed to the consumer the amounts of fuel which the Office of Defense Transportation had certified as available for each of the .five districts, allocated among trucks, busses, private 'automobiles, and other transport purposes.
The procedure, involving the establishing of a Petroleum Requirements Committee within the Office of Defense Transportation to make the requirements survey, and the creation of a Petroleum Requirements Committee within the Petroleum Administration for War to adjust the programs of the various claimant agencies to the available civilian supply of petroleum products, worked satisfactorily. The Petroleum Administration for War followed the recommendations of the Office of Defense Transportation closely, and the transportation requirements for essential operations were met as fully as could be expected under the uncertain and unforeseeable war conditions.
The tabulation that follows shows the volume of gasoline and fuel oil allotted for war transportation divided between principal types of transport operation to the close of the war:
Allocation of Gasoline for Civilian Use by Quarters (Barrels Per Day)
Total Passenger cars Trucks Local transport Water transport Railroads
1943
4th Quarter 1,022,000 567,160 378.470 74,700 150 1,520
1944
1st Quarter 984,000 563,274 346,057 73,294 126 1,249
2nd Quarter 1,009,000 560,354 360,412 72,772 14,212 1,250
3rd Quarter ........ 1,015,000 561,633 368,368 69,881 13,898 1,220
4th Quarter 1,013,000 560,279 364,352 72,907 14,212 1,250
1945 1st Quarter 980,000 552,413 345,436 72,689 14,212 1,250
2nd Quarter 993.000 546,223 359,214 72,101 14,212 1,250
3rd Quarter 1,018,000 549,606 380,968 71,926 14,250 1,250
Local transportation in the foregoing calculation covers intercity busses as well as all forms of local and suburban transportation, including taxicabs, and other forms of on-call and for-hire passenger vehicles.
In addition to the gasoline allotments there was al
located to transportation, mostly for other than rubber-borne transportation, a daily average of 37,500 barrels of Diesel fuel, and 287,300 barrels of residual fuel oil.
The methods by which the fuel requirements of transportation were ascertained by the Office of De-
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fense Transportation were based on certain well-established factors with proper seasonal and other adjustments for each of the five petroleum districts. The products themselves, in the order of volume required were gasoline, crude fuel oil, Diesel oil, lubricants, and in negligible quantities, kerosene, mainly for boats, and certain lighting fuels for city and suburban transit lines. Not only were all these products estimated for each of the five petroleum districts, but they were broken down for the intercity busses, local and suburban busses, street railways and rapid transit.
Of the several types of transportation, private passenger automobiles presented the most difficult problem for fuel determination. The first determination was the estimated number of cars in use, taken from registration records with adjustments for variations in registration practices, and for the speculative factor of scrapping. The next determination was the annual mileage for passenger cars in useful driving, as distinguished from recreational driving. This determnation was based on the results of a highway planning survey by the Public Roads Administration, which indicated that about 5,400 miles, or 57 percent of the average annual per car operation, was in what might be termed the useful transportation of the private automobile. That figure, adjusted on the one hand, and such factors as organized group riding and informal car sharing, etc., on the other, led to the finding of 5,250 miles as the estimated average annual useful operation per car. This ascertainment approximated the goal of an average of 5,000 miles per year per car which was set by the Baruch Committee report on rubber. From the two factors of estimated cars in use at 5,250 miles per car, the total annual mileage for passenger cars was obtained. This operation was reduced to barrels of gasoline per day, and the total requirements were divided between the five petroleum districts. In this allocation by districts, different factors in the several districts that had a bearing on the need for use of a car, such as the availability of other means of transportation, and the growing dependence in certain areas on the automobile were taken into account with the result that in some districts the basis of allocation was greater, and in others less than the average 5,250 miles per car.
The estimates thus arrived at, together with those for commercial vehicles and other forms of transportation, like railroads, river boats, etc., were reviewed by the Office of Defense Transportation Committee on Petroleum Requirements, and submitted to the Petroleum Administration for War by the Division of Materials and Equipment for final approval and allocation.
Tire Allocations
At the beginning of the war there was in the hands of the manufacturers and dealers in the United States an estimated stock of 13,750,000 automobile tires of all types of which 2,750,000 were commercial. Originally, control over the distribution of all tires lay with the Office of Price Administration by reason of War Production Board Directive No. 1, issued on January 29,1942, allocating to the Office of Price Administration general ration authority over the “distribution of products by any person to an ultimate consumer.” However, on September 8, 1942, the Office of Defense Transportation issued its General Order ODT No. 21, under which it exercised sweeping control over commercial motor vehicles, their mileage operation, as well as their eligibility for acquiring motor fuel and tires.
On September 17, 1942, the entire rubber and tire program passed under the control of the Office of Rubber Director, whose functions included the allocation of tires for transportation. In the beginning, there were no allocations. The tires that manufacturers produced, after satisfying military needs, went direct into rationing channels under the authority of the Office of Price Administration as to passenger tires and the Office of Defense Transportation for commercial motor vehicles under its Certificates of War Necessity procedure. Finally, in September 1943, the Rubber Director requested the Office of Defense Transportation, in its capacity as claimant agency for transportation, to submit estimates of tire requirements for commercial motor vehicles.
The procedure for submitting estimates was to prepare the requirements for three-quarters of a year at a time, the first-quarter figures being the firm estimate of the immediate needs, and the second and third quarters merely forecasts of what probably would be required during those periods.
Tire estimates were grounded on a fairly stable base period in which all the major factors affecting unit replacement requirements had reached a fair degree of stability. The figures of the numbers and sizes of tires actually delivered by manufacturers to meet the needs of the operators in the basic period were subject to certain major adjustments for the various quarters of the year, such as :
1. Seasonal variations due to weather and to normal fluctuations in traffic movement. F
2. Additional new tire replacements required because of reduced recapability of tires.
3. Increased net replacements because of reduced tire life expectancy resulting from under maintenance of vehicles through increasing scarcity of trained maintenance help, a very limited supply of new motor vehicles and of replacement parts.
4. Tires required to equip new vehicles needed to keep truck and bus transportation at a strength that would enable it to meet the exactions of the war effort.
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The results obtained from these processes represented the reasonable requirements for maintaining necessary domestic transportation facilities for the war and civilian economy. Requirements were estimated for each of the various sizes of tires, and the allotments were for groups of sizes. Within each group of sizes manufacturers were permitted to make adjustments to meet trade requirements.
The civilian tire program was fraught with great uncertainty throughout the war. There was the un-1 certainty of production due, presumably, to manpower and technical difficulties and, on a much larger scale, to the unpredictable demands for war needs, especially during the critical period of 1944. The low in production that year was in the month of July, when, according to a chart of the Highway Department of the Office of Defense Transportation, production of tires fell to a minimum of approximately 1,100,000, while the allotment available during the same month for rationing to transportation reached its high mark of 500,000 tires. From then on, production increased in a fairly constant curve to 1,149,000 tires in December.
At the same time, the rationable quota of tires fell off until, in January 1945, it reached the low of 325,-000 tires. The production of tires was allocated to satisfy first military needs, and the remainder was allotted for civilian use. The smallest amount of production to go to the Army was 1,100,000 tires in July 1944, and the largest portion was in February 1945, when the Army got 1,465,000 tires out of the total production of 1,790,000.
The result of this policy was that in 1944 stocks became practically exhausted ; that many heavy trucks were being operated without spares; and that ac
cording to weekly reports from the field to the Office of Defense Transportation for the last 4 months of that year, an average of 5,500 trucks, busses, and tank trucks were laid up for lack of tires, despite large-scale recapping.
Responsibility for this situation did not lie with the Office of Defense Transportation, which during that critical year had claimed for replacements alone for truck and bus transportation a total of 6,384,996 tires, while the Office of Rubber Director granted a total allocation of but 4,764,347 tires. The situation was inevitable under the methods for allocating very scarce materials, such as rubber, in the United States between the armed services and the home front.
Fortunately for the commercial vehicle branch of transportation, it was possible for tire manufacturers to produce more civilian types of truck and bus tires than were allocated. This came about through the Army stating its requirements in excess of the capacity of the molds of the manufacturers for some of the sizes which the Army had ordered. So the tire plants filled the Army’s requirements up to the capacity of their tire molds, which was all that they could produce of the sizes the Army specified. The materials and manpower that were to have gone into the military size tires in excess of the capacity of the molds, went into making needed commercial type tires, the molds for which were not being used to full capacity. Thus, the number of tires allotted for commercial size tires usually exceeded the number allotted by the Rubber Director for civilian trucks and busses, sometimes by as much as 10 percent. Without this windfall, the commercial tire situation would have been even more serious.
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CHAPTER XXX
MOTOR TRANSPORT MAINTENANCE
To the problems relating to the release of materials for manufacturing transportation equipment, the channeling of the motorized highway equipment into essential transportation activities through allocation and the presentation of the requirements for replacement parts, fuel, and tires for motor transport, was added the vital problem of keeping the meager equipment in operating condition throughout the war.
To help the country maintain its fleet of approximately 4,769,000 trucks, 165,900 busses, and some 28,000,000 registered passenger cars in operating condition was one of the vital tasks of the Office of Defense Transportation. The machinery with which it carried on this function was the Maintenance Section of the Highway Transport Department. Direction, collaboration, and education were the means through which the section operated. “Keep ’Em Rolling,” in the language of the men on the highways and in the shops, was its slogan. An approximate measure of responsiveness of the commercial vehicle operators and of the effectiveness of the methods employed to attain results is indicated by a study made by the statisticians of the automotive industry which showed that by the middle of the third year of the war, the registration of trucks was but 2.9 percent below that of 1941; and of passenger automobiles, only 12.9 percent under the 1941 registration.
The central organization of the Vehicle Maintenance Section comprised a Chief of the Section, an Assistant Chief, and eight branches dealing with the following activities :
Parts availability, supply and distribution.
Materials procurement and manufacture of replacement parts and materials.»
Materials procurement and manufacture of tools and equipment.
Materials procurement and manufacture of new vehicles. Preventive maintenance, training methods and tire maintenance.
Maintenance facilities.
Maintenance methods, SAE-ODT reports and Maintenance Advisory contact.
Maintenance statistics.
In the field, in addition to the close cooperation it received from the extensive regional and district organizations of the Office of Defense Transportation, the Vehicle Maintenance Section created a force of
maintenance specialists to cope with the critical spare parts and replacement situation and cooperate in the other functions of the section. The task of these maintenance specialists was to lend a hand in every motor vehicle maintenance and supply difficulty to prevent the laying up of equipment for lack of parts and tires. They cooperated with the automotive field branch of the War Production Board in locating and putting replacement parts at the disposal of distressed operators. Through the local offices of the Office of Price Administration, they worked to obtain tires for trucks, busses, and other essential vehicles. Their work also included halting of the junking of essential used automotive parts which could be reclaimed or rebuilt.
In addition to this staff of maintenance specialists, the Vehicle Maintenance Section had created a strong volunteer body known as Maintenance Advisory Committees, with leadership from the automotive and transport industries. The organization had a national chairman and eight transportation and maintenance consultants drawn from the membership of the Society of Automotive Engineers, one for each of the Office of Defense Transportation’s regional offices. Under them were 100 District Maintenance Advisory Committees, with an approximate total membership of 1,325 ; and more than 600 local Maintenance Advisory Committees, with a total of more than 6,000 members. In a way these 7,500 volunteers with a very tangible interest in the “Keep ’Em Rolling” program served to keep the Office of Defense Transportation in touch with the automotive maintenance and tire situations throughout the country. Other functions of these committees included expediting procurement of parts, surveying of parts, surveying shop facilities, promoting preventive maintenance and training of automotive personnel, and disseminating technical information from headquarters. The liaison between the maintenance specialists and these 712 district and local Vehicle Maintenance Industry Committees was very close.
Automotive Engineers Cooperate
Another cooperating volunteer body that rendered effective service to the vehicle maintenance service
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was the SAE-ODT Maintenance Coordinating Committee, which functioned at the staff level of the section, for the study of maintenance methods and the preparation of maintenance reports. This committee was established by the Transportation and Maintenance Activity of the Society of Automotive Engineers, with the Chief of the Vehicle Maintenance Section, Office of Defense Transportation, as its Chairman.
An elaborate program was developed by the Coordinating Committee, and in order to carry out this work, 30 Project Committees were set up. The number of committee members varied in accordance with the service and type of the projects undertaken. The reports of the committees ranged from mechanical shop practice and technique to preventive maintenance procedure and wartime vehicle storage and removal practices. Eleven of these reports were presented, and the material in them was made available to maintenance men and establishments for use as a basis for training and for maintenance clinics. Appraising the contribution of the Coordinating Committee, the Vehicle Maintenance Section said, in one of its reports on its operations: “The work of the SAE Maintenance Methods Coordinating Committee and its 30 Project Sub-Committees (on which there were some 250 experienced automotive engineer members) was of great value in the work of keeping America’s highway transport equipment rolling during the war and in providing scientific reference material for the maintenance of automotive equipment after the war.”
These activities of the Vehicle Maintenance Section were supplemented by a nationwide voluntary program of truck maintenance designed to pledge every truck owner and operator to follow a preventive maintenance regimen. The plan was for every truck operator to do three things : Cooperate in the preventive maintenance program ; have frequent mechanical inspections of trucks made and follow up with prompt repairs and adjustments ; to drive trucks so as to prevent damage, excessive wear, and waste of gasoline. A similar pledge was required of driver-mechanics. In this campaign, the automotive operating industry, together with oil and tire companies, rendered generous service to sell preventive maintenance to truck operators. The body of pledges was called the “U. S. Truck Conservation Corps,” which name was affixed to the trucks of every cooperating operator. Approximately 3,000,000 trucks bore the decalcomania insignia, “U. S. Truck Conservation Corps.” The “steam” to the campaign was furnished by a striking booklet of which 3,500,000 were distributed to the registered owners of approximately 5,000,000 trucks. The booklet bore the title, “America’s Trucks—Keep
’Em Rolling.” It was estimated that the automotive and trucking industries spent about one million dollars to forward the campaign.
Depletion of Repair Parts
With but 33,000 new trucks made available for the replacement of worn equipment during the first year of the war, the ruthless scrapping of used motor vehicle parts and the restrictions by the War Production Board of the use of critical materials in the manufacture of new parts, it was apparent that a shortage of parts was inevitable. In fact, motor vehicles engaged in essential operation were already beginning to be laid up temporarily for lack of vital repair parts. By the end of 1942 inventories, which were none too high at the outbreak of the war, were all but wiped out. The following comparative statement of inventories of one representative manufacturer’s stock gives the picture of the parts situation early in the war:
Inventories
Part December 31, 1941 December 31, 1942
Piston (1941) 14 5
Valve push-rod stud nut (1927) ..... 6,002 0
Cylinder-head bolt (1936) 1,866 30
Connecting-rod bearing (1939) 487 12
Intake-exhaust-valve springs (1940).. 15,467 9
Crankshaft gear (1936) « 350 1
Piston-ring retainer (1937) 5,797 9
Cylinder head (1939) 0 0
Differential-carrier gasket (1939) ... 237 59
Bear-axle shaft (1939) 15 0
The need for a practical order controlling the production of essential parts was obvious. In the hope of establishing a stockpile of replacement parts sufficient to maintain vehicles for a period of 2 to 3 years, Limitation Order WPB L-AA, amendment No. 1 was issued, January 23, 1942, permitting the manufacturers of parts to produce at their discretion 150 percent of the parts produced in 1941 during the 6 months’ period ending June 30, 1942. However, it was impossible to determine in advance the quantities of specific type of parts needed to maintain vehicles for a long period of time. Besides this, the priority rating of A-10 was not adequate to obtain the critical materials needed.
To hold parts production to the manufacture of the more essential parts, an order was issued in May 1942, prohibiting the production of nonfunctional parts and continuing the production of passenger-car and light-truck parts through September 30,1942. In the interim, an order designed to limit the production of all replacement parts, incorporating limitations on passenger car, truck and bus parts, to meet the current demand, was developed primarily to bring the inventory and production of parts into balance, and
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at the same time, permit production on a continuing basis for the duration. This was Limitation Order WPB L-158, issued on July 4,1942.
Limitation Order WPB L-158 provided for a 70 percent of the 1941 production rate for passenger-car and light-truck parts, and 125 percent of the 1941 rate for medium and heavy truck trailer, bus and off-the-highway vehicle replacement parts. The order placed a 120-day inventory limitation on producers, a 60-day inventory limitation on dealers and distributors in the eastern or central wartime zone, and a 90-day inventory limitation on dealers and distributors in any other wartime zone. The order also called for an exchange of an old part for a new one at the time the vehicle owner purchased a new part. Preference ratings to obtain finished replacement parts were no longer required.
Two fundamental changes for the distribution of critical materials took place at the end of 1942. The Maintenance Section of the Office of Defense Transportation, instead of the Office of Civilian Supply of the War Production Board then became claimant agent for transportation equipment and parts, and the Controlled Materials Plan of the War Production Board superseded its Production Requirements Plan. Also by the end of the year, the highest civilian blanket priority rating of AA-2X was assigned to the production of repair and maintenance parts.
Improvement in the situation was quickly manifest, although the quantity of parts produced was always limited to the amount of critical materials that it was possible to persuade the War Production Board to allocate for the manufacture of civilian automobile parts after the requirements for the armed forces were taken care of. There was also the problem of fitting the geographical distribution of the reduced quantity of parts to fit the needs of transportation.
During the period an important revision to Limita-tion Order WPB L-158 allowed the vehicle owner to certify his vehicle was laid up because of the need of a certain part, at which time, the War Production Board allotted priority sufficient to provide him with the part indicated in the certification.
Parts Shortage Hampers Operations
To enable it to keep constantly advised as to the parts situation throughout the country, the Vehicle Maintenance Section early in 1942 began to collect information regarding truck and bus tie-ups due to replacement parts shortage. This was done through the Bureau of Motor Carriers of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the 82 local allocation offices of the Office of Defense Transportation. These reports showed the situation as it existed each month in each of the 16 allocation districts, indicating days
lost beyond normal, through lay-ups due to lack of parts. A list of the parts short in supply that resulted in these delays was also included. A summary, calculated on a percentage basis showed the condition as it existed the previous month. Month-by-month comparison with preceding months revealed a steady increase in hauling time lost because of parts shortage.
The vehicle-days lost per month over the normal average because of delay in obtaining replacement parts were, for over-the-road carriers, 2.25 percent in December 1942; 2.94 percent in December 1943; 2.04 percent in December 1944; and 1.17 percent in July 1945. Improvement began in the middle of 1944 and continued steadily until the close of hostilities. This was due in part to the easing of the restrictions on critical materials and the constant work of the Office of Defense Transportation maintenance specialists, the War Production Board automotive field specialists, and the cooperation given by the District Maintenance Advisory Committees. These forces worked directly with the vehicle operators, assisting them in locating and obtaining parts or supplies necessary to keep their equipment functioning.
The procedure in the field for direct assistance to operators was set up by Maintenance Memorandum No. 9 of the Office of Defense Transportation and the War Production Board Instruction Letter No. 13. Under these two sets of field instructions, the collaboration between the 142 maintenace specialists of the Office of Defense Transportation and the 52 War Production Board automotive field specialists was very close. The War Production Board had liberalized its preference ratings so that its 12 regional directors had authority to issue such ratings for emergency repair parts up to a AA-2X and a value not exceeding $500. If an operator was unable to obtain a needed part, the Office of Defense Transportation’s Maintenance Advisory Committee, if necessary, combed the district or the State for the part. If the part required a preference rating, the War Production Board’s Automotive Field Specialists issued the needed ratings in the field or at the factory level. This decentralized direct action by the field forces of the two agencies brought rapid improvement in the parts situation that had threatened serious disruption in truck, bus, and private car transportation. The ODT Form MT-109 was then recognized by the War Production Board and industry as of sufficiently high priority to obtain directly from military production, if necessary, any emergency parts for civilian vehicles actually inoperative for lack of parts.
During the fourth quarter of 1944 expediting of parts for vehicles not actually out of service but in imminent danger of being so, was authorized by the
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Office of Defense Transportation and the War Production Board, which was of further assistance to operators in keeping their vehicles on the road. It is estimated that on the average, 80 percent of the requests for parts expediting was handled at the district^ or regional level, leaving only 20 percent to be referred by the Office of Defense Transportation to the regional offices of the War Production Board for factory expediting.
In addition to this, the Maintenance Section successfully sponsored the policy of continuous expansion in the production of needed critical parts to keep civilian transportation running.
The quarterly over-all civilian parts program was more than doubled from the first quarter of 1943 to the third quarter of 1945, being raised from $96,000,-000 to $250,000,000 of sales at manufacturers’ selling prices in these comparative quarters.
While the Office of Defense Transportation, assisted by an advisory committee that represented users and manufacturers of automotive vehicle parts, was employing various resources to pilot transportation through the critical maintenance period, the Office of Price Administration undertook the establishment of a maximum price regulation for automotive parts. It was not the experience of the Vehicle Maintenance Section, or of its forces in the field, that vehicles were being laid up, or that essential operations on the highways were being slackened, by reason of the costs of replacements, but by shortage of parts and by the shortage of manpower. In the opinion of the Office of Defense Transportation officials, charged with the physical maintenance of the transportation fleets, the policy of maximum price fixing contributed no tangible helpful results to their efforts.
During all of 1942 the Steel Division of the War Production Board put on steel scrap drives. The main source of their supply was used automobiles and trucks, as well as segregated parts of the vehicles in the salvage and car-wreckers’ yards. These were the main sources of supply for very old vehicles. Through the efforts of the Vehicle Maintenance Section of the Office of Defense Transportation, supported by the Automotive Division of the War Production Board, WPB Order M-311 was issued, which was a restrictive order protecting against the scrapping of salable used parts for all types of vehicles. However, before this order was finally approved, it was estimated that several million vehicles had been forced into the scrap market, as well as segregated used parts in inventory which normally were held by the automotive scrap and wrecking trade. After this order was issued, it was policed by the Automotive Division of the War Production Board with the assistance of the Office of Defense Transportation’s field offices, and further de
pletion of this used parts stock pile was checked, thus saving the remaining parts for the use of operators. New parts were then in minimum supply, and it was very essential that every source of new and used parts be protected.
Training Automotive Maintenance Employees
The disturbed labor conditions arising out of the draft and the nation’s swing into full war production by the end of 1942 was affecting every phase of the automotive industry. The Vehicle Maintenance Section in 1943 entered upon a specialized training program having in view the speedy equipping of trainees in certain branches of maintenance and repair work so as to obviate a full 4 years of training to cover the entire field of the work. There were some 100,-000 shops in the country and they averaged three mechanics per shop in 1941.
The Office of Defense Transportation did not itself engage in the training operations, but entered into a cooperative arrangement with the United States Office of Education, which had taken leadership in a great national manpower training program through the participation of 2,700 vocational schools. As time was short and the need was immediate, the vocational schools opened classes for specialists who could be trained to perform several important skills within a few months. The training of these men who had been classified as helpers were given up-grading training, and mechanics were trained to be supervisors.
To obtain the necessary cooperation in this program, the Vehicle Maintenance Section solicited the help of its Maintenance Advisory Committee members representing all branches of the industry. Classes were started in July 1943 with a total attendance of 2,485. By the end of June 1944, 44,905 men had received training. The following year, 83,234 men were trained, making 128,139 men trained in automotive maintenance work in the 2 year program.
The first step in the establisment of training centers was a local survey to establish the transport manpower needs in an area. The information developed by the survey determined the magnitude of the undertaking and the character of the training. An instance typical of large-scale training was the Memphis, Tenn., training program in which some 2,000 persons were given vocational training in 15 different skills for motor transportation. The work was carried on in more than 200 cities and constituted one of the more important activities of the Vehicle Maintenance Section of the Office of defense Transportation to keep essential transportation rolling.
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CHAPTER XXXI
TAX AMORTIZATION
The rearmament program of the Government started in 1940 vitally concerned transportation also. Industry hesitated to accept contracts requiring private capital for the building of new facilities in the execution of this program. It could not ignore the possibility that conversions and expansions undertaken for defense purposes might not be kept in operation long enough to repay their cost if the usual rate of amortization were employed. The existing revenue laws, too, treated harshly facility costs in computing income for tax purposes.
On July IQ, 1940, it was announced from the White House that it was decided to incorporate in the excess profits tax bill a provision for amortization over a 5-year period, for new facilities certified as necessary for the purpose of national defense.
The amortization law of World War I had not been passed until 3 months after the armistice. It provided for amortization on the basis of loss-of-useful value, an intangible factor determinable only by the courts. Consequently, litigation had dragged on for years. The new amortization law was to provide a means for exact calculation. It was to be based upon the depreciation rather than on loss-of-useful value. Deduction of the entire cost of new defense plants was to be permitted during the period in which orders for war material continued. The tentative amortization period was to be 5 years with accelerated amortization and proper adjustment of back taxes, if war orders did not require the use of the facilities for the full period of 5 years.
Following joint hearings of the Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, House Bill No. 10413 was introduced in Congress on August 27, 1940, and was finally passed and approved on October 8,1940.
It provided for the issue of necessity certificates for facilities acquired or constructed after June 10, 1940. Under the Act were the Advisory Commission and either the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy were empowered to issue a “necessary certificate” certifying the expenditure as necessary in the interest of national defense. The act authorized an
annual deduction of 20 percent of the cost to be taken at the election of the taxpayer.
The law as passed on October 8, 1940, provided that necessity certificates should be issued only before the beginning of the construction, or the date of acquisition; except that in the case of facilities already started or acquired when the law was passed, the certificate had to be issued before February 6, 1941.
On January 31, 1941, an amendment was passed to eliminate the fixed date and provide instead that an application for a necessity certificate must be filed within 60 days of the beginning of construction or of the date of acquisition, or before February 6,1941.
On July 30,1941, the War and Navy Departments proposed to Congress that the law be amended to extend to 6 months the period in which applications must be filed. This amendment together with others was passed by Congress and approved by the President on October 30,1941.
The law, as originally passed, required joint certification by two governmental authorities, the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense and the Secretary of War or Navy. Experience with the amortization law proved the disadvantage of divided responsibility. The armed services urged that they be either relieved of the responsibility or given the sole responsibility.
. By the fall of 1941 the Advisory Commission had practically no active functions other than that of certifying orders under the amortization law. The armed services, being the procuring agencies, were in the best position to decide the facility needs of the procurement program. War Department cases were decided by the War Department alone and Navy Department cases were decided by the Navy Department alone. In due course of time both agencies came to lean heavily upon the assistance of the War Production Board in matters involving civilian supply.
The War Production Board contacted different agencies to secure expert reports on each case prior to making its report to the War and Navy Departments. The practice was for the War Production
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Board to attempt to secure two independent reports for each application. In matters concerning transportation, as well as cold and dry storage, the War Production Board contacted the Office of Defense Transportation and such matters were referred to the Tax Amortization Section of that agency.
The amortization law was intended to overcome the hesitancy of contractors to invest private funds in needed facilities. By the end of 1941 necessity certificates had been issued by the War Department on facilities costing $1,210,700,000.
Further amendments were made to the law. As a consequence, in the revenue act of 1942 the amortization was extended to individuals and partnerships. This same act also permitted for the first time amortization of facilities acquired prior to June 10,1940, the earliest permissible date of acquisition being extended back to January 1,1940.
In the spring of 1942 a working committee of three was formed by the Under-Secretary of War which made regular trips to Washington to advise on policies on specific cases and preside over hearings with applicants.
In determining the need for facilities it was necess-sary not only to consider contract commitments and future demands related thereto, but to place the request for certification in its proper place in the overall picture of expansion, priorities, contract distribution, and other problems and policies. Although some general trends of procedure might be traced, the policy was predominantly one of judging each case on its merits. There were cases where applications were not received until after the facility was no longer necessary. However, amortization was granted because the facilities were necessary when constructed.
When an application was received for purchase of formerly leased property, careful inquiry was made as to whether the purchase was actually necessary or whether it was feasible for the applicant to continue to lease. Certificates were often granted when it was revealed that a decided increase in usefulness would result from the purchase of second-hand material or equipment.
Amortization Procedure on Transportation Facilities
In the beginning certificates of necessity were recommended by the War and Navy Departments and referred to the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense for concurrence and approval by the Secretary of the Advisory Commission. The Advisory Commission delegated the authority for approval to a group of alternates, known as the Tax Amortization Committee, each alternate representing a member of the Advisory Commission. The policy was to determine if the facility recommended
for rapid tax amortization was necessary, in whole or in part, for the national defense. Any part that was declared unnecessary was deleted from the application and all certificates provided for amortization of the total cost of the facility for rapid tax amortization as provided under Section 124, of the Internal Revenue Code as amended. The Tax Amortization Committee took advantage of the various departments of the Government, especially Reconstruction Finance Corporation, in making and securing the result of independent investigation of the applications for certificates of necessity where questions arose.
The taxpayer made application for certificates of necessity with the War and Navy Departments. The departments set up special tax amortization branches. The taxpayers’ applications were on prescribed forms containing answers to certain questions with descriptions of the facilities to be afforded rapid tax amortization and the estimated cost of the facilities. The tax amortization branch of the armed services thereafter secured the necessary information from their constituent parts, i. e., Munitions and Air branches of the Army, Bureau of Ships, and Ordnance of the Navy.
Transportation facilities were generally cleared through the War and Navy Departments after consultation and supporting report from the Transportation Division of the Advisory Commission to the Gouncil of National Defense. The greater number of applications for certificates of necessity for transportation facilities were filed with the War Department because of the greater need for land transportation facilities by that branch of the armed services. In limited number of cases applications for certificates of necessity for transportation facilities were filed jointly with the War and Navy Departments.
The railroad industry was unique in preparing for the defense program by financing almost exclusively through private capital. Since the period immediately preceding the emergency was one of decreasing revenues and reduced transportation requirements, the railroads were required to start immediately on a program of expanding facilities to provide the necessary national transportation plant.
As a result of this situation the Tax Amortization Committee of the Advisory Commission very quickly realized that railroad facilities, constructed at the urgent request of the Commissioner of Transportation and approved as a necessity in the defense emergency by the War and Navy Departments and the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense, were entitled to certificates of necessity for
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.00% of the cost of the facilities and were so approved.
The Office of Defense Transportation took over the ‘unctions of the Commissioner of Transportation of ;he Office for Emergency Management with respect ;o recommendations to the War and Navy Departments on applications for certificates of necessity on ;ransportation facilities and equipment. As the greater part of these applications covered railroad •acilities and equipment the investigation of these applications for certificates of necessity was assigned to the Division of Railway Transport. The general procedures and policies established by the Commissioner of Transportation of the Office for Emergency Management were followed by the Office of )efense Transportation during 1942 and 1943, when ;he issue of certificates of necessity was in the hands of the War and Navy Departments.
lestricting Factors
By the spring of 1943 the War Department decided that the chief limiting factor in the production of war supplies no longer was facility capacity, but materials and manpower; that the search for maximum war production now required, not an encouragement of facility expansion, but a curbing of it. The War Department suggested therefore that steps be ;aken either to restrict certification very rigidly, or to terminate it entirely. The War and Navy Departments insisted that the current applications for necessity certificates covered projects with which they were not directly conversant. It was thought ;hat if these cases were going to increase, certifica-ion ought to be made by some other agency better able to judge their merits.
On June 25, 1943, the matter was submitted to the Office of War Mobilization, with a suggestion of possible alternatives. The Director of War Mobilization, after considering the matter, directed the War and Navy Departments to amend the regulations governing the issuance of necessity certificates so as to provide that certification should be discontinued.
An amendment to the existing regulations was approved by the President, which provided that no facility should be considered for certification unless the certificate was issued before the expansion started. It also provided that further certification under this restriction should be made only in cases of facilities for military or naval uses, and then after consideration of the relative advantage of governmental financing as against private financing with amortization.
The Office of Defense Transportation, in particular, had urged that transportation facilities be expanded to relieve the tight situation created by 700494—48—15
increasingly heavy traffic to the west coast. On November 1, 1943, the War Department called this situation to the attention of the Office of War Mobilization with the suggestion that if certification was to be made in such cases it should be done by the War Production Board. This suggestion was accepted by the President and Executive Order No. 9406, dated December 17, 1943, was issued, transferring the function of issuing necessity certificates in all future cases from the Secretaries of War and Navy to the Chairman of the War Production Board. The War and Navy Departments, however, were to act upon the applications then on file, except those describing facilities on which construction had not been begun or which had not been acquired.
Procedure Under WPB
Under the new order the Chairman of the War Production Board passed upon applications for necessity certificates filed after December 17, 1943, describing facilities, the beginning of the construction, reconstruction, erection, installation or the date of acquisition of which was prior to October 5, 1943. He also passed upon applications for necessity certificates filed on and after October 5,1943, and pending December 17, 1943, with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy which describe facilities, the construction, reconstruction, erection or installation of which has not begun or which have not been acquired, and upon applications for such necessity certificates filed after December 17,1943.
Executive Order 9406 introduced a new requirement with respect to the issue of necessity certificates, namely, that it was to the advantage of the Government that the additional facilities covered by the necessity certificaté be privately financed (Section 3 (g)).
The Chairman of the War Production Board designated a Deputy Director for tax amortization. The latter called several meetings of all personnel directly connected with the processing of applications for necessity certificates. It was stressed that in determining whether it is to the advantage of the Government that the facilities be privately financed, consideration should be given to the probable marketability or useful value of the facility after the war.
For the first time the theory of allowing percentage certification was introduced. The expression used by the Deputy Director was that in considering the marketability of a facility after the war, thought should be given to the fact that it may still be advantageous to the Government to have private financing under a necessity certificate if such certificate were issued for less than 100 percent of the cost of
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the facility. For example it was suggested that certificate be issued for 35 percent of the cost of the facility to cover only the excess cost attributed to the war.
Railroad Equipment (rolling stock)
The following policy was adopted by the War Production Board with respect to issue of necessity certificates so far as railroad equipment and facilities were concerned. For freight locomotives and cars ordered for delivery during 1944, the previous policy of issuing certificates for 100 percent of the cost was continued. This policy also applied to such equipment when the delivery was delayed beyond December 31,1944, through no fault of the applicant. For freight equipment ordered for delivery in 1945, necessity certificates were issued for only 35 percent of the cost. During the war the construction of passenger equipment had been prohibited by the War Production Board except for 1,200 troop sleepers and 400 kitchen cars which were ordered by the Defense Plant Corporation and leased to the Pullman Company. After V-J Day due to the increased burden on railway passenger equipment arising from the rapid demobilization of the armed forces, this policy was relaxed. The construction of passenger equipment was permitted and necessity certificates for 35 percent of the cost, as in the case of freight equipment, were issued by the War Production Board.
The policy with respect to fixing railroad facilities was somewhat different from that followed on railroad rolling stock, as outlined above. Facilities such as track extensions to camps which would be abandoned after the war had no post-war value. On such facilities necessity certificates for 100 percent of cost were issued. On the other hand, installations for centralized traffic control, although sorely needed to handle expeditiously the huge volume of war traffic during 1945 and the rapid demobilization of the armed forces in 1946, had some post-war value. Each case was considered separately and the percentage of cost covered by necessity certificates ranged from 35 to 50 percent.
A total of 4,669 applications for certificates of necessity covering transportation projects involving $1,820,445,954 were approved, and 614 applications, amounting to $132,127,491, were denied. The statistics include the disposition of 157 applications for amortization of cold-and dry-storage and of miscellaneous improvements and equipment for manufacturing and operating plants devoted exclusively to keeping transportation functioning. Of these applications, 125 were approved in the total sum of $33,-155,685, and 32, aggregating $2,896,477, were denied. A summary of the disposition of applications
for tax amortization affecting transportation is given below. By Proclamation No. 2669, dated September 29, 1945, the President declared the emergency was over so far as the tax amortization was concerned.
Disposition of applications for Tax Amortization on Transportation Facilities
Total Applications
Approved Denied
No. Amount No. Amount
Steam Railroads: 3,782 $105,612,201
Class I Roads $1,594,783,809 423
Other than Class L....... 174 31,530,364 32 1,936,117
Total Steam Railroads 3,956 1,626,314,173 455 107,548,318
Other Transportation
Facilities: Electric Railways ........ 196 17,725,842 37 5,907,907
Highway Freight ............ 58 2,241,217 11 740,311
Highway—Passenger 62 5,922,806 18 1,415,057
Water Transport 231 113,069,661 63 12,340,995
Pipe Lines Total Other Transportation Facilities .... 41 22,017,070 3 1,288,426
588 160,976,096 127 21,692,696
Miscellaneous Facilities Related to Transportation: 2,193,587 646,766
Cold & Dry Storage ..... 38 10
Miscellaneous 47 3,033,970 17 1,164,333
Miscellaneous ................. 40 27,928,128 5 1,085,378
Total Miscellaneous .... Grand Total — Applications ........................ 125 33,155,685 82 2,896,477
4,669 1,820,445,954 614 132,187,491
The amounts involved in the grand total of approved applications for tax amortization for transport are classified as follows :
For all railroads: $273,606,228
St earn 1 ocom oti ves ••»•••••••••••••••••
j^æsel-electric locomotives ••••••••••••• 331,349,820
Freight cars arid cabooses ••••••••••••' 688,363,227
Passenger train cars »»••••••••••••••••< 80,877,677
Tracks ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••♦••• 135,755,593
Pni 1 dings shops, etc»••••••»»••••»•••••• 48,116,466
CTC and communications ••••••••••••»• 45,691,914
Tools and ecjuipment »•»••••••••••••••• 13,005,615
9,547,633
1.626,314,173
For electric railway lines: Stationary improvements ............ Busses .................................................
Street cars ........................................
Tracks ........................................;....
CTC and communications .............................
Diesel-electric .... Steam locomotives ..................................
Freight cars ...............«.......................
892,873 9,266,274 3,252,900 1,943,482 1,780,142
523,516 73,707
2,448
17,725,342
For highway freight transport: Trucks and trailers ................................ Stationary improvements ............................
For highway passenger transport: Stationary improvements ............................»• • •
Busses ..................................................
Trucks and trailers .....................................
1,904,919
336,298
2,241,217
,191,218
5,614,519 117,069
5,922,806
10,737,721
98,112,294
954,206
3,000,805
264 635
For waterways: Barges..................................................
Tugs and boats ...........*........................
Stationary improvements ....................... • •
Pipe lines ........................................ Trucks and trailers ...........................................
113,069,661
For pipe lines: Stationary improvements ........ Pipe lines .............................................
Freight cars................................................... 34,665
22,017,070
For storage:
Cold storage
Dry storage
Miscellaneous....................................... - •
Miscellaneous ..........................................
Grand total approved applications .......................
1,366,662
826,925
2,193,587
. ' 3,033,970
. 27,928,128
1,820,445,954
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CHAPTER XXXII
TRANSPORT PERSONNEL
The President’s purpose, as stated in Executive Order No. 8989, “to insure maximum utilization of the domestic transportation facilities of the nation for the successful prosecution of the war,” required maintaining the manpower as well as the equipment of the national transportation facilities.
With the nation’s very large military program, the problem of maintaining transportation personnel at a level to meet war transportation requirements became one of the Office of Defense Transportation’s earliest concerns. The problem was not one of immediate necessity but one certain to arise as the tempo of the war preparation progressed.
Before the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation was formally inducted into office, he had a study made of transportation manpower, which is embodied in a memorandum dated December 31, 1941, by Otto Beyer, a member at that time of the National Mediation Board. The memorandum after indicating nine of the chief problems in the field of transport personnel, suggested that a staff division be set up under the title of the “Division of Transport Personnel.” It suggested that the division’s functions should be to deal with the general problems listed in the memorandum, but that it should not deal with conventional labor disputes which might arise in the various branches of the industry. These were to be handled by agencies already established for such purposes. The division was to do all within its power to insure the most efficient utilization of manpower and to assist employees as well as employers in the work of placing all branches of the transportation industry on an all-out war basis.
The chief transport problems as visioned in the Beyer memorandum were listed as follows:
1. Personnel displacement problems resulting from the rerouting of traffic, coordination of facilities, etc.
2. Personnel problems arising out of diversion of transportaton manpower for military needs.
3, Recruiting and training of new employees as well as retraining and upgrading of old employees.
4. Problems of coordinating the personnel activities of transportation companies and the various public agencies concerned with the matters mentioned above.
5. Problems of adapting defense transportation policies and needs to transportation labor rules and practices and of adapting these rules and practices to defense transportation policies and needs.
6. Problems of securing the full cooperation of employees and their labor organizations as well as employers in carrying out the policies initiated by the office.
7- Consideration of existing or proposed emergency legislative matters which might affect transportation personnel.
8. Collaboration with other Federal departments, private agencies, labor and carrier organizations interested in and concerned with personnel matters.
9. Preparation, encouragement, and installation of programs of labor-management cooperation to increase efficiency in the utilization of transportation manpower, plant equipment, to conserve fuel, tools, and the like so as to insure the most intensive use of existing facilities, eliminate waste, save materials and time, improve safety, and expedite service.
The recommendations submitted in the memorandum formed the scope and functions of the Division of Transport Personnel when it was organized. However, as the war progressed, the effect of the heavy drafting of transport employees for the armed forces shifted the emphasis to problems relating to manpower depletion.
Activities of the Division
The probability of a tight manpower situation in the transportation industry by reason of the large military program and huge production plans, coupled with the absence of control over labor to fit in an orderly and effective way into the production and transportation programs, was taken into account at the very inception of the Office of Defense Transportation.
The Division of Transport Personnel is described, in Director Eastman’s annual report to the President for 1942, as a coordinating and consulting agency. He pointed out “that with the conflicting and growing demands that are being made for the' limited manpower, the nation’s individual companies cannot be expected to solve their personnel problems without assistance.”
The activities of the division as a coordinating and consulting agency were thus directed to three broad objects: (1) To hold enough skilled men in transportation industries to maintain the flow of traffic for war and essential civilian affairs; (2) to develop new sources of manpower from which to draw upon for filling the places of men taken from transportation by the Selective Service and by industries engaged in production for the war; and (3) to foster harmonious relationship between employers and em-
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ployees for full contribution by the transportation industry to the war effort.
In carrying out these purposes, the division collected and analyzed basic labor data regarding labor supply; worked with labor-management and other Government agencies in the development of effective manpower programs in* transportation; explored and encouraged the use of new sources of workers; advised with the War Manpower Commission and other Government agencies with respect to transportation manpower; encouraged efficient utilization of existing transportation personnel; encouraged the establishment of adequate training and up grading programs; and participated with the War Labor Board in adjusting critical situations arising out of the application of the “Little Steel Formula.”
Magnitude of the Problem
The total employment in the various transportation industries increased during the war from an estimated grand total of 2,377,300 as of July 1941 to 2,915,500 as of July 1944. The distribution of employment among transportation industries is shown in the following table:
Estimated increase in employment in for-hire transportation industry between July 19^1 and July 19^
{Private carriers not included)
Industry July 1941 July 1944 Increase
Tjnnnl transit 207,000 251,000 44,000
Intercity bus 34,900 52,000 17,100
486,900 550,000 63,100
PuMid warehousing ........ 60,900 70,000 9,100
Pipe lines .. ......■•••••••• 21,000 22,500 1,500
Great Lakes water carriers . 27,200 27,500 300
Inland water carriers 36,500 37,200 700
Air and other transport
services 194,300 275,000 80,700
Total, except railroads 1,068,700 1,285,200 216,500
Railroads:
1,187,942 1,442,887 254,945
Others 120,658 187,413 66,755
Total railroads 1,308,600 1,630,300 321,700
Grand Total 2,377,300 2,915,500 538,200
Percent, railroads to total . 55.0 55.9 59.8
To build up this manpower, estimated at 2,377,300 in July 1941, to 2,915,50’0 in July 1944, and to maintain its heavy monthly tolls of “quits,” discharges, retirements, drafts and deaths, required a great reservoir of available labor to draw upon.
The available sources that were constantly combed by the transportation industry and Government agencies in an attempt to satisfy the calls from all forms of transportation comprised, besides men who had not yet been lured into war plants, other groups which normally do not figure heavily in transportation. The promotional efforts of the Office of Defense Transportation succeeded in attracting to transportation work a large number of women. The esti
mated number of women employed rose from about 82,000 in 1940 to approximately 244,000 in 1944 despite certain legislative, labor union, and physical restrictions. In 1944 women comprised 8.1 percent of the local transit employees; 20.1 percent of the intercity bus; 11 percent of the for-hire trucking;
6.4 percent of the pipe lines; 2.9 percent of the Great Lakes water carriers; 6.6 percent of the inland water carriers; and 7.1 percent of the class I railroad personnel.
Estimates for January 1944 indicated that approximately 265,000 nonwhite workers, 82 percent of them Negroes, were employed in various forms of transportation. This estimate included 15,870 Mexican track workers admitted to the country under temporary immigration arrangements with Mexico. The number of Mexican importees rose to 38,000 by the end of 1944, with 60,000 as the ultimate goal.
High school boys and girls to the estimated number of 127,000 were employed in various activities, from messengers to locomotive firemen.
And, finally, there were recruited out of the reservoir men over military age, many handicapped workers, returned veterans, as well as housewives and school children as part-time workers.
While effective work was done in thus broadening the base of labor supply and in tapping the manpower reservoir, the great problem of transportation employment continued to be the labor turnover. Important causes of this problem included the tapping of efficient manpower by the service draft, and by the labor demands of war industrial plants. It was to the ameliorating of the effects of this problem on the transportation industry that the Division of Transport Personnel devoted unremitting effort.
Drain on Manpower Supply
In the early part of the war, as the country swung with great strides into war production, the greatest disturbance to the manpower situation in transportation was the competition from war plants. This war plant activity, economically, was an abnormal operation. The war effort needed the output of the war plants regardless of costs. In the effort to comply with the incessant demand for more war equipment, the plants bid not only against each other for laborers, but against all other industries. It was an unequal contest. Against such competition transportation, whose wage scales and working conditions were built upon the normal pattern of private enterprise, was helpless. It saw its manpower melt away rapidly. Its losses to competing war plants far outnumbered those occasioned by the draft.
There are no statistics available in the literature and records of the Division of Transport Personnel
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as to the relative drain of manpower of the entire industry by induction into the armed forces and the competition for manpower from the war plants. However, in the annual report of the Office of Defense Transportation to the President for 1943, it was pointed out that “voluntary quits were the major components of separations” in local transportation. In regard to the for-hire trucking industry, the report said : “There have been wide-spread reports of mechanics and other trucking employees shifting to high-wage war plants.” In a report to a Congressional Committee which had under consideration the Luce bill, authorizing the armed forces to furnish manpower for certain essential services, the division on March 6, 1944, submitted a breakdown of the causes of separation during 1943 made by one large eastern railroad to the Office of Defense Transportation, showing that out of a total of 67,-300 separations for all causes during the year, 23,570 were separations to engage in other employment, while only 8,971 were military separations.
As the combat areas spread over many fronts, the armed forces were greatly augmented, while heavy casualties called for a constant flow of replacements by young men to keep the combat units at war strength. To enable the Selective Service to perform this task without utterly demoralizing domestic transportation became the chief concern of the Office of Defense Transportation until the. close of hostilities. In this effort the Office of Defense Transportation, working in effective partnership with the Selective Service and the War Manpower Commission, achieved gratifying results.
The depletion of transport manpower from all causes was felt in all categories of employment from track workers on the railroads to skilled mechanics and trained administrative personnel in all forms of transportation. The result was a heavy turnover year by year beginning with 1942.
The railroads, without which the country’s vast production and the utilization of that production would have been futile, furnished a striking illustration of the battle for manpower. In March 1944, a 2-months’ national recruiting drive was launched to fill 100,000 railroad jobs. In that period a total of 142,000 persons was hired by the class I railroads, but in the same period the roads had 113,518 separations, leaving 28,482 as the net contribution toward the 100,000 needed, according to weekly surveys during that period by the Association of American Railroads. The class I railways’ personnel in July 1945 was 1,451,306 persons.
The shifting manpower situation in transportation is shown in the May 1944 studies of the Employment Service of the War Manpower Commission. These
analyses indicated a total employment in all branches of transportation in April 1944 of 2,791,200, and the estimated replacements needed in the ensuing 6 months—April to October—of 562,935.
Training Programs
The reservoir from which manpower replacements for transportation were drawn was composed largely of inexperienced personnel. It was realized, therefore, that if such workers were to be absorbed successfully and in the shortest possible time, there would be definite need for intensified programs of adequate and organized training.
With these facts in mind a Personnel Training Section was established in the Division to concentrate on the many types of training problems that would arise in the industry. To have established an elaborate training organization that would actually develop and administer training programs in the field would have been a duplication of the efforts of the Federal and State training agencies that were already in a position to offer many types of training assistance to transportation employers. Accordingly, the Personnel Training Section acted mainly in a liaison capacity between the several Federal training agencies and transportation trade associations and employers. There was, however, a notable exception to this policy in the program for training automotive maintenance employees which is described in Chapter XXX. Otherwise the training functions of the Division of Transport Personnel were :
• To survey and establish the need for training in the transportation industry.
To work closely with individual employers in providing technical assistance in developing and carryng through adequate training programs.
To cooperate closely with the training agencies in acquainting them with the locations where assistance was needed and to provide technical help on the type of training to be developed for transportation employers.
To sell employers on the value and need of organized training and the numerous opportunities that were available to them in securing training advice and assistance.
The division prepared and published a descriptive bulletin entitled “Federal Aids to Training with Special Reference to the Transportation Industry.” This bulletin, describing the activities of various Fédéral and industrial training agencies, was distributed through trade associations, and it was necessary to publish a second edition in July 1943.
Two additional bulletins under the title “Transportation Training,” were prepared late in 1943 and early in 1944. They contained descriptions of successful training programs that were in operation in the transportation industry. Also included was additional material for the use of company officials in getting training programs under way or determining the best type of programs for their particular purpose.
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Throughout the early part of the war years, members of the training staff spent considerable time in working with individual employers on the solution of specific problems and in meeting with trade association groups and others in an effort to sell the importance of adequate organized training.
In major transportation industries old training programs were intensified and many short-term speed-up courses were introduced. Although much of the training in the railroad industry was carried on by the companies themselves there were numerous cases of cooperative programs in which several companies jointly utilized the facilities of the training agencies and carried on their training at a central location. Two such examples were the training schools for firemen, switchmen, and brakemen at St. Louis and Seattle. The courses usually were developed jointly by training specialists and railroad officials. War Production Training funds were used to defray the major expenses of instruction. In each instance experienced railroaders were secured as instructors and the training was given adjacent to or oh railroad property. The Seattle school started 842 persons in classes. Of this number 749 on completing the courses went into service of the four railroads for whom they were trained.
Selective Service
While under the law, men between the ages of 18 and 65 were required to register, only those between 18 and 38 were subject to induction into the armed forces. As a matter of practice, however, men over 26 years of age generally were not selected for strenuous war service.
At these various age levels the draft held a threat of serious disturbance to manpower in transportation, and the Office of Defense Transportation was constantly engaged in working out with the Selective Service plans for procedure for easing the impact of the draft on the nation’s transportation.
These procedures centered around the provisions of the law permitting deferments of induction for several causes, one of them being the draftee’s occupational status. Under the law, employers were permitted to request of local boards deferment for indispensable employees. Appeal lay from the local board to an appeal board and from an appeal board, in case of a divided opinion, to the President. The efforts of the Office of Defense Transportation were directed to devising practical applications of the law so that the draft operations would not cripple the transportation industry, which was already hampered by manpower competition from war industries.
The Division of Transport Personnel acting for the Office of Defense Transportation established at
the outset a very close liaison with National Headquarters of Selective Service and was able to obtain a high degree of cooperation with this agency which resulted in much constructive help both to the transportation industry in general and to individual companies having specific problems involving the Selective Service. Through the activities of the division it was possible to obtain reconsideration of hundreds of cases by the Selective Service system, most of which resulted in a reversal of the original deferment decisions. Policy was established that no individual cases would be sent to National Headquarters of Selective Service unless the facts clearly indicated the necessity of reconsideration in view of the effect on the war effort. Because of this stringent policy many requests coming into the Washington Office for help in obtaining reconsideration of individual deferment cases were not acted upon but whenever it could be shown that essential transportation would be affected and the individual was otherwise eligible for deferment there was very little question on the part of Selective Service in taking the necessary action to grant the deferment.
Among other activities of the division with respect to Selective Service problems were the following:
Drew up a list of essential occupations in transportation to be considered for occupational deferment. This list was accepted both by the Selective Service and the War Manpower Commission with little change. This is the list that was used in the* determination of whether an individual was employed in an occupation essential to the war effort.
Secured the inclusion of certain transportation occupations in the War Manpower Commission and Selective Service System list of critical occupations. This list was developed for the purpose of giving special occupational deferment consideration to those occupations which were extremely critical and vital to the successful prosecution of the war.
Reviewed all occupational bulletins dealing with transportation issued by Selective Service. These were the bulletins used by the local draft boards in ruling on individual deferment cases. Through the efforts of the division certain important changes were obtained in these bulletins such as the inclusion of tank-car repair companies and private carrier pipe lines as important and essential parts of the transportation industry. A second type of activity in this respect was concerned with such things as broadening the definition of warehousing in order to bring the commonly accepted phases of this segment of transportation within the definition.
Promoted and advised on the use of replacement schedules by transportation companies. As a result of these efforts it was nossible for transportation companies to secure an understanding with Selective Service whereby their employees were inducted into the Army in an orderly manner. This avoided the situation wherein a great number of workers might be lost at one time and substituted a planned and orderly withdrawal agreed to by both sides. In cooperation with the Air Transport Command and the Selective Service System a special replacement schedule program was developed for the airlines.
From time to time it was necessary to request the assistance of the Selective Service in taking special action to care for critical situations which arose in different branches of the industry and in different sections of the country. Though the details of such actions were not always identical the purpose in
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every case was to protect essential transportation manpower in cases where Selective Service withdrawals were apt to seriously disrupt services. In July 1943, special action was obtained with respect to truck transportation in the west coast States; also in July 1943, the division in cooperation with the War Shipping Administration prepared a special statement to all local boards emphasizing the need for keeping an adequate supply of marine workers. During the winter of 1942, petroleum transporters in New England were given special consideration; during the winters of 1942 and 1943, arrangements were completed whereby eligible workers in the Great Lakes industry were able to receive continued deferments by working in an essential industry during the lay-off season with the understanding that they would again be able to work on the Great Lakes with the opening of the navigation season; in Sep-temper 1943 and January 1944 two postponements of induction up to periods of 90 days were granted for vital workers in the railroad industry; and in 1942 and 1943 similar treatment was obtained for airline transportation.
An important activity of the division with respect to Selective Service was advising with transportation employers and trade associations on their rights and obligations under the Selective Service law. In this connection several bulletins were prepared dealing in simple terms with the application of Selective Service regulations to transportation companies. Early in 1944, following a Presidential directive, regulations affecting the deferment of workers under the age of 26 became very stringent. Only the most vital employees in this age bracket were to be eligible for deferment. The small list of eligible occupations and the numbers to be deferred were determined by an Inter-Agency Committee which had full power to establish policies in this respect. The Office of Defense Transportation was represented on this committee. Although a determined effort was made to include vital maintenance occupations it was the determination of the committee that only the following personnel under the age of 26 would be eligible for deferment:
Bailroad workers in freight or yard service employed as engineers, conductors, switchmen and yard masters, also those employed as train dispatchers.
For-hire trucking workers handling equipment in excess of 16,000 pounds gross weight of vehicle, employed as owners, general managers, operation managers, vehicle dispatchers, freight dispatchers, maintenance superintendents and terminal superintendents.
Great Lakes or inland waterway workers employed as captains, chief engineers, and other licensed officers.
Airline flight personnel and also ground personnel if located outside of the United States.
In order to obtain a deferment for a worker under 26 in any of these occupations it was necessary for
the Office of Defense Transportation to attest to the fact that such workers were necessary and should be granted deferments. Accordingly, there was appointed in each State an Office of Defense Transportation special representative on Selective Service deferment matters to screen and countersign requests for deferments for transportation workers under 26. Special instructions were prepared by the Division of Transport Personnel for these representatives and advisors were appointed from the several branches of transportation to assist in the determination of specific problems.
Early in January 1945, it became apparent that it would be necessary to fill a substantial part of Selective Service calls from registrants in the 26 through 29 age group since the supply in the age group 18 through 25 was practically exhausted. At this time, the War Manpower Commission’s List of Essential Activities was revised to indicate the activities which were most critical to the war program at that time. It was intended that workers in the critical occupations should be the last to be inducted.
In February 1945, national headquarters of Selective Service announced an entirely new procedure for the deferment of registrants under 30 years of age. Each employer had to submit a list of all his employees under 30 who were on January 1, 1945, classified as II-A or II-B. The names on this list were arranged in the order of importance, the men whose loss would be most serious coming first on the list. Forms 42-A Special Revised were to be prepared and forwarded to the claimant agencies which would certify the forms and forward them to the local boards. When this procedure was first started each claimant agency was to be allowed to certify for deferment only 30 percent of the registrants coming under their jurisdiction. However, just at the time this new procedure was announced the manpower situation in the transportation industry was becoming more critical than ever. As a result of these representations the industry received a much higher percentage of deferments and the Office of Defense Transportation was enabled subsequently to certify between 80 and 90 percent of the skilled transportation workers in the 18 through 29 age group. Out of 83,887 names presented by 13,432 employers 64,060 were certified by the Office of Defense Transportation for deferment. The certified deferments were 37,885 for railroads; 2,049 for waterways; 17,874 for highways; 6,157 for airways; 61 for storage; and 34 for liquid transport.
After the collapse of Japanese hostilities all requests for deferment were dealt with directly by the local draft boards, and the Office of Defense Transportation gradually closed out its important activity
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of tempering the rigors of the draft to the transportation manpower situation.
Cooperation with War Manpower Commission
The Division of Transport Personnel, functioning as a coordinating and consulting agency, maintained a very close relationship with all bureaus of the War Manpower Commission. Although the Office of Defense Transportation was activated prior to the War Manpower Commission, the activities of the Division of Transport Personnel fitted in closely with the objectives and functions of the War Manpower Commission. The director of the division served as a member of the National War Manpower Commission representing the Office of Defense Transportation and the War Shipping Administration. In the development of manpower policies and regulations affecting transportation a very close liaison was established with the result that the Office of Defense Transportation was aware of and often assisted in such deliberations.
An important activity in this respect was the efforts directed toward the development of a cooperative relationship between transportation companies and Federal placement agencies. The Division induced the United States Employment Service to adopt a program of reporting shortages for all branches of transportation except railroads. This information on current employment and shortages was necessary as a basis for intelligent planning. Such information was not available except for the reports of current employment of class I railroads filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. The first efforts in this direction were directed toward a Nation-wide survey by the division of the employment and needs of each major branch of transportation. This survey showed that employers in most branches of transportation tended to place undue emphasis on the occupational deferment under the Selective Service Act as a means of maintaining adequate personnel. Also evident was a reluctance to use women and minority groups, and the surveys disclosed the need of transportation training programs on a wider scale than anything then contemplated.
During March 1942 arrangements were made with the United States Employment Service to include all branches of transportation except railroads in the regular bimonthly surveys of current and anticipated employment made by that agency. The results of these surveys were then processed by the Personnel Requirements Section of the division as a means of keeping up-to-date on the needs and shortages in each branch of transportation. It induced the United States Employment Service to take effective measures in changing the practices of their local offices which had been recruiting for war industries certain
groups of transportation employees on the ground that they were not in a war industry. Although transportation, as mentioned, had been declared an essential activity, the division continued to receive many reports that local United States Elnployment Service offices were not taking this view.
It obtained cooperation and approval of the War Manpower Commission for all transportation manpower programs issued by the Office of Defense Transportation. These programs were developed by the Division of Transport Personnel, but in each case were approved by the War Manpower Commission before being released.
It obtained War Manpower Commission recognition of all automotive maintenance as an essential transportation activity. Though the several branches of transportation had been declared essential to the war effort, considerable negotiation was necessary in obtaining a similar interpretation with respect to automotive maintenance activities which were very closely related to local transit, over-the-road bus, etc. As a result of these negotiations, automotive maintenance was placed in a list of essential activities as a part of repair services.
It obtained inclusion of transportation activities and occupations in the list of those accepted by the War Manpower Commission for the expenditure of Federal funds for war training. It was necessary to stress the importance of transportation as vital to the war effort although not directly involved in the manufacture of munitions and other instruments of war.
It initiated the national recruiting drive for railroad workers carried out in cooperation with War Manpower Commission, the Railroad Retirement Board, the brotherhoods and the carriers. Earlier in 1944, steps were taken to launch a Nation-wide recruiting campaign for the railroads which was contemplated in the railroad manpower program of September 1,1943, but which could not be effectively launched pending settlement of a wage controversy in that industry. The campaign was successfully carried out by a Railroad Manpower Mobilization Committee composed of representatives of Railway Labor-Management Committees, the War Manpower Commission, Railroad Retirement Board, Office of War Information, and the Office of Defense Transportation.
Priority Referral Plan
In September 1943 the west coast manpower plan was put into operation following a study of conditions there by Bernard M. Baruch. In brief, this plan provided for the careful study of all contracts coming into the region in the light of manpower requirements ànd established a system of controlled
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referrals with respect to the allocation of manpower. A similar plan had been developed and put into operation in the Buffalo, N. Y., area because of the stringent manpower situation there. Production Urgency a>nd Manpower Priorities Committees were established in each of the principal cities on the west coast for the purpose of rating the urgency of individual establishments to the war effort and in the light of this urgency to assign a priority to all applications requesting additional manpower. Office of Defense Transportation representatives were appointed on each of these committees and considerable activity was necessary at the Washington level in order to coordinate the work and establish policies with respect to transportation’s interest in the work done by the committees.
In the ensuing months other communities established such committees and on July 1,1944, the plan was put into operation nation-wide and became known as the Priority Referral Plan. The Division of Transport Personnel was in close touch with each of these developments and served as the appointing agency for all Office of Defense Transportation representatives on these committees. By the fall of 1944, there were in the neighborhood of 120 Production Urgency and Manpower Priority Committees throughout the country. In most cases their membership was identical in character and their meetings were held simultaneously. The chairman of the Production Urgency Priority Committee was in all cases the War Production Board representative and regulations governing the activities of the Production Urgency Priority Committee were to pass on all applications for new construction of projects which involved the use of manpower and to rate the relative urgency of particular plants or services in the community.
This urgency rating was then used by the Manpower Priority Committee as a guide in determining the priority rating which should be granted to a particular establishment in need of hiring additional workers. The War Manpower Commission representative served as chairman of this committee. With the advent of the Priority Referral Plan, a program of manpower ceilings was also placed into effect in order to prevent the hoarding of labor and to place a limit on the number of workers which any establishment might employ. The Manpower Priority Committee also had responsibilities in this connection.
Transportation companies were directly affected by the activities of these committees in various ways— the construction of shops, the increase of operating or maintenance manpower. All these requirements were cleared through the Office of Defense Transportation working through its Division of Transport Per
sonnel which investigated and sponsored such projects. Among its services Vas the obtaining of high priority ratings for certain roads in the West for recruiting campaigns to meet manpower emergencies.
Manpower controls were continued after the end of the war in Europe, and Production Urgency and Manpower Priority Committees were maintained although there was some relaxation with respect to employment ceilings and the stringency with which workers could transfer from one type of activity to another. With the end of the Japanese war, however, manpower controls were released almost immediately and transportation employers were able to hire workers without the clearance that had heretofore been necessary. Generally speaking, this did not result in a mass exodus of workers. In a few instances, especially on western railroads, some difficulties were encountered, primarily because war transferees wished to return to their home localities or workers displaced from high-paying war jobs were not immediately inclined to accepting the lower paid jobs in the railroad industry. It also became more difficult to recruit workers from the different parts of the country primarily because of the feeling that the length of employment would be short and they would soon be out of a job when persons with greater seniority would return to their former work.
Labor Disputes
The Office of Defense Transportation being responsible for the uninterrupted flow of transportation, was concerned with any actual or impending work stoppages which threatened to disrupt essential transportation operations. The function of the Division of Transport Personnel was not only to collaborate with the transportation industry to keep it supplied with manpower, but also to strive to produce such conditions within the industry as would tend to keep management and labor working in harmonious relationship. The Office of Defense Transportation having no authority to attempt to settle directly any strike or dispute, pursued the policy of working closely with, and of supplying pertinent facts to the Government agencies responsible for the actual settlement of strikes, disputes, and lock-outs.
The field of such activities lay for the most part with those portions of the industry whose employees were not subject to the Railway Labor Act. Under this act, railway employees involved in a dispute could get the matter before an Emergency Board without threatening a strike. In fact, railway strikes were few and for the most part of relatively little consequence. When railway labor disputes arose, the Division of Transport Personnel kept in close touch with the National Mediation Board, and with the sit
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uation in the field through Office of Defense Transportation field representatives.
In the matter of disputes arising in other branches of the transportation industry, the procedure in general was as follows:
If the division learned of a dispute in the transportation field, or in a matter that would affect transportation adversely, and that was not being settled successfully through direct negotiation, the Office of Defense Transportation would request the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor to assign a conciliator to the case, provided such request had not been already made by either of the contesting parties, or by another Government agency. If conciliation failed of results the Department of Labor certified the case to the National War Labor Board which made an award.
The specific steps taken by the division were: (1) Ascertain the facts involved in the dispute; (2) ascertain the extent of the Office of Defense Transportation’s interest in the situation; and (3) bring it to the attention of the proper Government agency for settlement. In many instances formal requests were made to the national or regional War Labor Boards, to the Trucking Commission, or to the War Shipping Panel for expeditious handling in order to avert unauthorized stoppages of work as a protest against delay in settlements of the cases.
Overcoming Wage Obstacles
Successful results were achieved by the division in the development of facts on which it was possible to obtain wage increases in certain critical cases constituting “rare and unusual” wage situations. Such cases arose out of restrictions imposed on the National War Labor Board by the President’s Executive Order No. 9328, known as “hold the line order.” As a result, the National War Labor Board undertook the adjustment of wages generally for the following purposes: (1) to correct maladjustments according to the “little steel formula”; (2) to eliminate substandards of living; (3) to correct interplant inequities; (4) to authorize adjustments predicated on promotions, reclassifications, incentive wage, etc.
Most transportation industries had already secured wage rate adjustments under the “little steel formula.” However, in many cases the board permitted adjustments to correct gross inequities existing between transportation companies in the same area. To do this the board established what is known as “going wage rate brackets,” and it usually authorized increases up to the lowest wage rate within the bracket. Often this increase was not sufficient to enable employers to compete with other war industries paying higher wages, with the result that serious manpower
shortages occurred. The National War Labor Board, therefore, sometimes made exceptions and increased wages beyond the lowest wage in the bracket in so-called “rare and unusual” cases. These cases were considered only when interested Government agencies intervened and formally certified that the particular activity was of critical importance to the war effort. A number of such certificates were initiated and pressed by the division with success.
Such cases covered a wide range of conditions, but most of them related to disparity between wages permissible in transportation under the “hold the line” order and what the operators had to pay to hold their employees in face of higher wages paid in other branches of war industry. Numerically, the cases were not important, but each represented a critical moment in war transportation.
There was the case of the General American Transportation Corp, which conducted an oil storage facility at Panama City, Fla. The plant facilitated the transfer of oil and gasoline from barges arriving from the Port Arthur, Tex., district to tank cars for rail distribution for military and essential civilian use. Shipyard and war plant wages in the vicinity ranged from 60 to 65 cents an hour. The company, therefore, filed an application with the Regional War Labor Board for approval of common labor rate of 60 cents. In the meantime, it became necessary for the company to commence operations and therefore hired workers at the rate of 60 cents. Subsequently, the regional board determined that the “going wage rate” was 50 cents and directed the company to adopt that rate. The company had experienced a great deal of difficulty in securing laborers at 60 cents and believed with considerable justification that men would quit if a substantial reduction were made. Apparently, there was no way whereby the 60-cent rate could be approved under usual policies of the War Labor Board. The Office of Defense Transportation supported by the Petroleum Administrator for War and the War Manpower Commission certified this case to the National War Labor Board as “rare and unusual.” The National War Labor Board determined that the certification was valid and referred the matter to the regional board which in turn approved the rate sought, thereby averting a critical situation.
The Key System was a local transit system serving the city of Oakland, Calif., and other cities located in the East Bay across from San Francisco. The company succeeded in obtaining a wage rate increase for its operating personnel but was denied a comparable increase for its mechanical workers. The immediate result was that the efficiency of the system serving a population of well over a million people suddenly declined until it reached a point where 31 percent of its
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busses and 16 percent of its street cars were laid up for lack of sufficient mechanical workers, skilled and unskilled. The Office of Defense Transportation, with the support of War Manpower Commission, War Production Board, and the United States Navy, initiated a certification pointing out that the service of the Key System was of critical importance to the war effort. The Regional Board granted a 10 percent weighted average increase for these workers, which enabled the system to reduce turnover and obtain new workers.
The Dunbar Spring Service operates a spring service shop at Phoenix, Ariz., for repairing and building springs for heavy-duty trucks of all types. The nearest similar establishment is located 400 miles away in Los Angeles. The company applied for a wage rate for four highly skilled employees upon whom the operation of this plant depended. The men served notice that unless the requested increase in wages was granted they would quit and seek other work. The Office of Defense Transportation supported by the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board initiated a certification pointing out that at least 25,000 trucks were dependent upon this establishment for service. The increase was obtained.
The Mutual Ice Co. engaged in furnishing ice for refrigerated cars at Potomac Yards, Va., one of the nation’s largest railroad classification yards, obtained approval of its rate of 60 cents an hour for common labor through intercession by the Office of Defense Transportation.
The Duffy Construction Co. which contracted to extend classification yards of the New York Central at Jackson, Mich., was permitted to establish a 90-cent-an-hour rate, although the “going wage rate” at Jackson was 65 cents. This was obtained through certification by the Office of Defense Transportation, as a “rare and unusual” situation. t
These and similar cases constituted part of the contribution of the Office of Defense Transportation in bringing about adjustments of the “hold the line” policy to meet critical manpower situations in war transportation.
The work of the Division of Transport Personnel continued beyond the close of hostilities in order to assist transportation in solving not only its manpower problems, but also its problem of acquiring materials and supplies during the stormy period of post war reconversion and readjustment.
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CHAPTER XXXIII
LITIGATION INVOLVING ODT
One of the results of the policy of the Office of Defense Transportation of consulting with the transportation industry in framing measures intended to assure conservation and maximum utilization of the domestic transportation facilities of the nation for the successful prosecution of the war, and of keeping the public informed of the purpose and reasons for such'measures, is reflected in the small volume of litigation that attended the more than 4 years of activity of the agency.
Court cases in which the Office of Defense Transportation or officials thereof participated or were involved in connection with its orders or policies numbered but 22, not including any suits arising out of or incidental to seizures made of transportation systems by the director of the Office of Defense Transportation upon the direction of the President of the United States. Such seizures were made because of labor disputes interfering with the war effort and not by reason of any failure to comply with the orders or requirements of the Office of Defense Transportation.
Of the 22 cases, 5 civil and 4 criminal actions were instituted at the request of the Office of Defense Transportation. These involved violations of certain of its orders. Eight actions were brought against the Office of Defense Transportation or officials thereof to enjoin enforcement of certain of its orders or to require specific relief to be granted under the terms of existing orders. In five cases in which neither the Office of Defense Transportation nor any of its officials were named parties, but which involved orders or policies of the Office of Defense Transportation, the Director was permitted by the court to intervene or to appear either as amicus curiae or informally to present the interests of the Office of Defense Transportation in the issues raised.
A brief statement of the nature of the 22 cases follows:
Actions to Enforce ODT Orders
The first application to a court for assistance in enforcing the provisions of an order of the Office of Defense Transportation was brought to restrain violations of General Order ODT No. 14 (United States vs Rodeo Circus et al., District Court of the United
States, Buffalo, N. Y. Civil No. 1122. Filed August 22, 1942.) This general order prohibited, in the interest of conserving and providently utilizing motor vehicle equipment, materials and supplies, including rubber, the use of any rubber-tired motor vehicle in any exhibition, contest or competitive trial of speed, endurance, or performance.
The defendants had advertised a so-called “Rodeo Circus” for performance in Buffalo, N. Y., Among the events advertised as “thrill acts” were driving a passenger automobile over a ramp at such a rate of speed that the momentum carried the vehicle over , a motor bus and a passenger automobile, and “rolling, smashing, crashing automobiles.”
The Government was successful in obtaining temporary and permanent injunctive relief.
Two similar cases involving violations of General Order ODT No. 14 by operators of “thrill shows” were subsequently filed in other jurisdictions (United States vs Allegan County Fair et al., United States District Court, Grand Rapids, Mich. Civil No. 273. Filed September 21, 1942; United States vs. Larry Sunbrock et al. United States District Court, Washington, District of Columbia. Civil No. 21757. Filed October 26, 1943), and in each case a restraining order was issued enjoining the use of rubber-tired vehicles in such exhibitions.
To enforce compliance with the provisions of two complementary orders issued by the Office of Defense Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Commission—Supplementary Order ODT No. 3, Revised 25 and ICC Emergency Order No. M-2—suit was instituted against 20 common carriers of property by motor vehicle (United States et al vs. George F. Alger Co., et al., United States District Court, Detroit, Mich. Civil No. 3881. Filed August 3, 1943).
These orders prohibited, in general, any common or contract carrier of property by motor vehicle from operating any trailer or semitrailer over the highways between the Detroit, Mich., and Cleveland, Ohio areas except under general or special permit issued by the Office of Defense Transportation. Such carriers were directed to have their trailers and semi-
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trailers ferried between the areas mentioned instead of operating them over the highways.
A temporary restraining order was issued by the court upon application of the Government at the time the complaint was filed. It was maintained in effect until the offending carriers were in substantial compliance with the orders.
Ferry service between the areas involved for trailers and semitrailers was subsequently discontinued and the suit was dismissed without prejudice.
Supplementary Order ODT No. 3, Revised 416, was involved in the final enforcement action brought at the instance of the Office of Defense Transportation {United States vs. Cotant Truck Lines, Inc, et al., United States District Court, San Francisco, Calif. Civil No. 24414G. Filed February 20, 1945). This order was issued to effectuate in a particular situation the provisions of General Order ODT No. 3 (applicable to over-the-road operations of motor common carriers of property), which forbade operations over circuitous routes, directed the elimination of wasteful operations, and required the expeditious and efficient handling of interchanged traffic.
The supplementary order directed the motor carriers named in the order to discontinue acceptance of property for transportation over any circuitous route between Ogden and Salt Lake City, Utah, on the one hand, and Wells, Nev., on the other, via Twin Falls, Idaho, or any other point in Idaho.
The Government made application for a preliminary injunction but before hearing was had thereon, the defendants ceased the operations complained of and assured the Office of Defense Transportation that the practice would not be resumed except with its prior approval. Upon the recommendation of the Office of Defense Transportation, the action was dismissed without prejudice.
In separate criminal informations, filed under the Second War Powers Act, which made it an offense to violate any regulation adopted under authority of the act, four taxicab operators engaged in business in Emeryville and Oakland, Calif., were charged with operating taxicabs without certificates of war necessity in violation of General Order ODT No. 21A {United States vs. John P, Benson; United States vs. Paul Albert Wagner; United States vs. Robert Dunn; United States vs. Oliver Davis. United States District Court, San Francisco, Calif. Filed December 1944 and January 1945). In each case a conviction was obtained and a fine imposed.
Actions Brought Against ODT
Of the persons who challenged in the courts action of the Office of Defense Transportation, taxicab operators were in the majority. In the first case filed
against the Office of Defense Transportation {Harry Buckley et al. vs. United States, et al., United States District Court Louisville, Ky., Civil Action No. 604, Filed July 29,1943), nine taxicab operators of Louisville, Ky., joined together as plaintiffs in an action to restrain the local district manager of the Office of Defense Transportation from taking alleged threatened action in respect of their separate certificates of war necessity. At the time the action was filed, the Office of Defense Transportation was in the process of formulating a formal administrative procedure to govern the suspension, recall, cancellation or revocation of certificates of war necessity. Proceedings in the suit were stayed by agreement pending the adoption of the procedure. Administrative Order ODT No. 5, regulating the recall, etc., of certificates of war necessity was issued September 24,1943, and the suit was later dismissed without ever having been brought to issue.
The second suit filed against the Office of Defense Transportation also involved taxicab operations {John B. Dietrich, et al. vs. Joseph B. Eastman et al. United States District Court, Baltimore, Md. Civil No. 2165. Filed February 11,1944). The plaintiffs sought to require the defendants as officials of the Office of Defense Transportation to issue a special permit to plaintiffs under General Order ODT No. 20A authorizing them to engage in taxi service in Dundalk, Md., and to issue a certificate of war necessity governing the operation of eight taxicabs in such service. The court sustained the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that, apart from jurisdictional questions raised, the court was of the opinion that the granting or withholding of the license which plaintiffs sought by their action was a matter entirely within the discretion of the Office of Defense Transportation, and that no showing had been made of any improper exercise of such discretion by the Office of Defense Transportation.
Two taxicab cases were filed in State courts. In one (W. B. Stepp vs. Foster T. Ward, et al. Circuit Court of Martin County, Ky. No. 827. Filed March 18, 1944), the plaintiff joined a local district manager of the Office of Defense Transportation and several local officials of the Office of Price Administration as defendants in an action to recover damages for their alleged failure to issue to plaintiff appropriate authorization for obtaining gasoline to carry on a taxicab business in Inez, Ky. The plaintiff had been given a special permit under General Order ODT No. 20A to operate two taxicabs in Inez and and two certificates of war necessity governing their operation but the local war price and rationing board at Inez refused to issue any gasoline rations. The plaintiff charged that all of the defendants were
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engaged in a conspiracy to prevent him from obtaining gasoline to operate his taxicabs. The action was dismissed by the court as to the district manager of the Office of Defense Transportation upon his plea to the jurisdiction of the court.
In the second taxicab case filed in a State court (Arthur Mack et al. vs. David H. Roberts ei al. Probate Court of Vanderburgh County, Ind., Civil Action No. 3943. Filed May 26 1945), the plaintiffs sought to review the action of a local district manager of the Office of Defense Transportation in refusing to grant to plaintiffs a special permit under General Order ODT No. 20A to operate taxicabs in the City of Evansville, Ind. Before any appearance was entered upon behalf of the defendants the action was dismissed by the plaintiffs.
Only one truck operator resorted to the courts for relief against action taken by the Office of Defense Transportation. In that case (Earl Rash vs. Ftoyd Ritchie. United States District Court, Seattle, Wash. Civil Action No. 1234. Filed May 28,1945), the plaintiff sought to compel a local district manager of the Office of Defense Transportation to restore reductions made by him in mileage and motor fuel allotments certified for plaintiff’s motor carrier operations in a certificate of war necessity. At the hearing upon plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction it was shown that the plaintiff had not made any application to the district manager for a review and reconsideration of the allotments certified in accordance with the procedure established by the Office of Defense Transportation by Administrative Order ODT No. 8. The application for provisional relief was thereupon withdrawn, and later the plaintiff pursued his administrative remedy. The case was never brought to issue and was finally dismissed upon stipulation of the parties that the action had become moot due to the revocation of General Order ODT No. 21A following VJ-day.
In another case in which a holder of a certificate of war necessity requested a court order to compel a local district manager of the Office of Defense Transportation to increase the allotment of motor fuel certified for a motor carrier operation (Byron Ellice Copeland vs. Office of Defense Transportation et al. United States District Court, Wash., District of Columbia. Civil No. 24028. Filed April 27,1944), the plaintiff, a motor carrier of passengers for hire, alleged arbitrary action on the part of the district manager. The plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction was denied by the court on the ground that plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedy before the Office of Defense Transportation. After the revocation of General Order
ODT No. 21A, the action was dismissed by plaintiff as having become moot.
The Office of Defense Transportation and its Director were made codefendants with the Office of Economic Stabilization, its Director, the Office of Price Administration and its Administrator, in a suit which sought to enjoin the efforts of the Office of Economic Stabilization to enforce a directive of the National War Labor Board (Wentworth Bus Lines, fnc. vs. William H. Davis et al. United States District Court, Concord, N. H. Civil No. 409. Filed July 2,1945).
Under a directive issued by the Office of Economic Stabilization, the Office of Defense Transportation and the Office of Price Administration were required to deny to the plaintiff, a motor carrier of passengers for hire, all applications for priority assistance or for the allocation of materials which were in short supply and to cancel all outstanding priorities and allocations of the motor carrier. The action of the Office of Economic Stabilization was taken pursuant to the terms of Executive Order No. 9370.
The Office of Defense Transportation, in compliance with the directive, issued an order canceling the certificate of war necessity theretofore issued to the motor carrier. The Office of Price Administration issued an order canceling the rationing rights of the motor carrier.
Before hearing was had upon the motor carrier’s application for a preliminary injunction and before the cancellation orders of the Office of Defense Transportation and the Office of Price Administration had become effective, VJ-day occurred and the Office of Economic Stabilization withdrew its directive, which resulted in the Office of Defense Transportation and the Office of Price Administration cancellation orders being withdrawn. Thereafter the suit was dismissed without prejudice.
The only rail order issued by the Office of Defense Transportation that was brought under attack in the courts was Special Order ODT No. R-7. This order required the Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey to discontinue thé operation of a number of its passenger trains, specifically set forth in the order, in the transportation of passengers between certain points in New Jersey, and also to adjust the service afforded by some of its other trains by rearranging the stops made and the points served in such a manner that reasonable service would be provided for the communities affected by the suspensions directed.
Three commuters on the lines of the Central Railroad of New Jersey instituted an action to restrain the Office of Defense Transportation from putting the special order into effect (Nicholas W. Kaiser et al. vs. Joseph B. Eastman et al. United States Dis
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trict Court, Washington, District of Columbia. Civil No. 23313. Filed March 2, 1944). The plaintiffs alleged that the order constituted an unauthorized interference with the rights and an invasion of the prerogatives of the New Jersey Public Utilities Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to safety of operations and adequacy of service; also that the order was beyond the power invested in the Office of Defense Transportation by Executive Order No. 8989.
An application by the plaintiffs for a temporary injunction was heard and denied before the order became effective. The order remained in effect until after the surrender of Japan. Following revocation of The order, the suit was dismissed upon stipulation of the parties.
Actions in Which ODT Intervened
The New Hampshire Milk Control Board, at the suggestion of the Boston, Mass., field office of the Office of Defense Transportation, issued an order forbidding in certain areas in the State of New Hampshire retail deliveries of milk more often than once in any 48-hour period. The order was similar in character to regulations adopted in the other New England States and in other parts of the country and was in furtherance of the national policy of conservation of transportation facilities.
A Manchester, N. H., dairy attacked the order as being unreasonable, arbitrary, unjust, discriminatory, and unconstitutional. (Germain E. Cloutier et al. vs. Allen M. Freeman et al. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Concord, N. H. Civil Action No. 3377. Filed August 4, 1942). With the permission of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation filed a brief as amicus curiae in the proceedings.
In a unanimous decision the Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the order of the Milk Control Board insofar as it applied to deliveries of milk by motor vehicles or by rubber-tired vehicles, but set it aside as to deliveries by other means of transportation (Germain E. Cloutier, etc., doing business as Green Acres Farm Dairy vs. State Milk Control Board, 28 A. 2d 554).
At the request of the Office of Defense Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission issued Service Order No. 103, under the terms of which all common carriers by railroad were ordered not to accept or move grain, in carloads, originating in any foreign country and moving by rail through the United States, all-rail, to points in another foreign country, and not to furnish cars for such a movement. The order was subject to the issuance of special or
general permits to meet specific needs or exceptional circumstances.
The service order was assailed in an action (Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co. vs. United States. United States District Court, Dallas, Tex. Civil Action No. 801. Filed February 26,1943) by a grain dealer and mill operator. Plaintiff alleged that it was under contract with the Republic of Mexico to deliver Canadian grain at Mexican gateways, and complained that the order was issued without notice and without hearing, and was arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, and void.
The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, appearing specially in the action and with leave of court to intervene as parties defendant, moved to dismiss the action for the reason that the applicable statutes fixed the venue in a district other than the northern district of Texas. The court granted the motion (Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills vs. United States, 49 F.Bupp. 516).
The Akron Transportation Co., a common carrier of passengers by motor bus within the City of Akron, Ohio, and its suburbs, was ordered by the Office of Defense Transportation in Special Order ODT LB-13 to curtail some of its transportation services in the interest of saving gasoline, rubber, and manpower. The order was made after investigation. The carrier gave notice to the City of Akron and to the public of the changes it would make in its operations in conforming to the ODT order. Prior to the effective date of the order, the City of Akron brought suit to compel the carrier to operate motor busses over the routes described in its franchise from the City of Akron and not otherwise (City of Akron vs. Akron Transportation Co. Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, Ohio, Akron, Ohio. Case No. 143,659 Filed August 14,1943), and secured a temporary restraining order without notice.
The carrier filed its answer in which it denied the jurisdiction of the court to determine the issues presented because the ultimate issue presented involved a conflict between the obligations of franchise contract with a municipal corporation in the State of Ohio and an order duly issued by a Federal agency exercising war powers under the direction and authority of the President of the United States; because the United States Government was the real party in interest and had not been duly and properly joined in the action, and because the court did not have the authority to collaterally or otherwise question the legality or propriety of an order issued by the United States Government. Upon consideration of the objections, the court ordered that the United States and the Director of the Office of Defense
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Transportation be made parties defendant and directed the issuance of summons therefor. The summons was never served. However, the United States and the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation appeared specially in the case and moved the court to vacate its order making them parties defendant.
Upon motion of the defendant carriers the court dismissed the proceedings as a collateral attack on a Federal order over which it had no jurisdiction and dissolved the temporary restraining order. Its action was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Ninth Ohio Judicial District which likewise found no jurisdiction of the subject of the action. The carrier thereupon put into effect the changes in operations required by the ODT order. Subsequently, the City of Akron filed an appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
During the pendency of the appeal, the Office of Defense Transportation in cooperation with the City of Akron and the carrier effected several alterations in the requirements of the order and added other requirements, the net effect of which was greater conservation. These changes were embodied in Special Order ODT LB-13A. Following the issuance of this order, the appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio was dismissed by stipulation of the parties.
The policy of the Office of Defense Transportation with respect to the operation of school busses became involved indirectly in a suit filed in the State of Iowa by a parent against a school district to compel the district to arrange for the transportation of his children between their home and the nearest school maintained by the school district (John Flowers vs. The Independent School District of Tama, Iowa et al. District Court, Tama County, Iowa. Equity No. 19653. Filed October 19,1943).
In connection with the allocation by the Office of Defense Transportation of maximum mileage and motor fuel for the operation of school busses under its certificate of war necessity program, the Office of Defense Transportation issued a statement calling for the elimination of unnecessary school bus mileage and setting forth as part of its basic policy that, subject to certain exceptions, transportation should be provided only for students, teachers, or other employees who would have to walk more than two miles to school or more than a mile and a half to a school bus trunk route.
The Iowa State Department of Education, in cooperation with representatives of the Office of Defense Transportation, arranged school bus routes throughout the Btate of Iowa which would comply with the requirements of the Office of Defense Transportation, and recommended such routes to school
boards. The route recommended to the Independent School District of Tama was what had been the main trunk route serving the school involved in the above-mentioned case. The residence of the plaintiff was situated on a side road nine-tenths of a mile from its intersection with the main trunk route.
The plaintiff was successful in securing a writ of mandamus in the lower court, but its action was reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court of Iowa (John Flowers vs. Independent School District of Tama, Iowa et al. 16 N. W. 2d 570), the Supreme Court holding, among other things, that, although the regulations of the Office of Defense Transportation did not supersede or modify the statutory duties of the school board, such regulations did prevent the operator of a school bus from securing a certificate of war necessity to operate over other highways than the main trunk route, and that hence it was no longer reasonably possible for the board to arrange for such transportation for plaintiff’s children for the nine-tenths of a mile between their home and the main trunk route.
As amicus curiae, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, through his general counsel, participated in the trial and argument in lower court and in the oral and written presentation of the matter before the Supreme Court of Iowa.
In an action instituted by the Attorney General of the United States against the Southern Pacific Co., a common carrier by railroad, to require the defendant to operate through rail passenger transportation service, in accordance with its alleged statutory obligation, between Portland, Oregon, and San Francisco, Calif., over its Siskiyou route (United State# vs. Southern Pacific Co. United States District Court, Portland, Ore. Civil Action No. 2460. Filed May 1944), the defendant, by way of abatement, pleaded the existence of General Order ODT No. 24 imposing restrictions upon passenger train operations. That order prohibited a rail carrier from operating any passenger train schedule in addition to those which were operated during the week ending September 26, 1942. It appeared from the complaint that through rail passenger service had been discontinued by the defendant over the Siskiyou route during 1938.
At a pretrial conference held in the case, a member of the staff of the general counsel of the Office of Defense Transportation was permitted to appear and bring to the attention of the court the history, purpose, and provisions of General Order ODT No. 24, and to suggest that in any decree that might be entered in favor of the plaintiff a proviso be incorporated to the effect that nothing in the decree should be deemed to require the defendant to institute or main
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tain passenger service in contravention of any applicable order of the Office of Defense Transportation which might be in effect with regard to such service.
While decision in the case was under advisement by the court, the Office of Defense Transportation, following the surrender of Japan, revoked General Order ODT No. 24. The issue with respect to the effect of the general order in the situation presented in the case was thus removed.
In addition to the cases here discussed, there was litigation arising out of the Government seizure and operation of transportation properties. An outstanding case was that brought by the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad against Holly Stover, Federal manager of the properties of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad, and George Voelkner, general manager for Holly Stover, Federal manager of the properties of Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois, Northern Division, Peoria, Ill. It was filed June 22,1944.
This action was instituted by the plaintiff in the Circuit Court of McDonough County, Ill., to recover possession of its transportation system and for certain incidental relief. The defendants caused the suit to be removed to the United States District Court.
Possession of the transportation system of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad was taken by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation on March 22,1942, pursuant to Executive Order No. 9108, issued by the President of the United States on March 21, 1942 (7 F.R. 2201). The Executive order recited that the national interest and security demanded that there be no interruption in the flow of goods essential to the effective prosecution of the war; that a labor dispute existed between the employees and the management of plaintiff since December 29, 1941, which had interrupted the transportation of goods essential for the prosecution of the war, that plaintiff had refused to submit the dispute to arbitration despite urgent requests by the National War Labor Board and by the President, and that under the circumstances it was essential that the plaintiff company be operated by or for the United States in order to assure successful prosecution of the war.
On December 27, 1943, the President, by Executive Order 9412 (8 F.R. 17395), took possession of all the railroads in the continental United States through the Secretary of War who, on the same day, gave notice that he took possession of the plaintiff’s railroad then in the possession and control of the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation by virtue of Executive Order 9108. The Director of the
Office of Defense Transportation continued to operate the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad under the authority of the Secretary of War. This state of affairs continued until on January 18, 1944, the emergency which precipitated the seizure of all the railroads having terminated, the Secretary of War relinquished his possession of the railroad systems of the nation. Thereafter, the plaintiff, on the theory that this order of the Secretary of War had the effect of terminating all Federal control of its railroad, requested the Secretary of War to turn over to it possession of its properties. This the Secretary declined to do and instead delivered possession of the company’s property to the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation.
The plaintiff contended that the seizure of its property under Executive Order 9108, as amended (7 F.R. 2201, 8 F.R. 3687, 10 F.R. 7315), was unconstitutional ; that conceding the contrary, Federal control and possession was relinquished by the Secretary of War’s order of January 18,1944, and that thereafter possession of the property by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation was illegal.
A motion by the plaintiff for a temporary injunction to restrain the defendants from making certain proposed betterments and additions was denied August 7, 1944, by the United States District Judge.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was submitted to the court upon written and oral argument.
On May 19,1945, the United States District Judge rendered a written opinion in which he held that, while Executive Order 9108 directing the seizure of the plaintiff’s property was valid and legal and therefore the possession and operation of the property by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation under that order was legal, nevertheless Executive Order 9214 vested the right to possession of the property exclusively in the Secretary of War and automatically terminated the effectiveness of Executive Order 9108. Continuing this reasoning, the judge expressed the opinion that the surrender of the property of all railroads by the Secretary of War on January 18,1944, carried with it the abandonment of all Federal control over the property of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad. The court then concluded that after the latter date the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation had no legal right to assume and continue possession of the railroad’s property.
An order was entered overruling the motion of defendants to dismiss the action and requiring that they file an answer to the complaint. In proper time an answer was filed setting forth, among other things, that on June 16, 1945, the President had
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issued Executive Order 9572 (10 F.R. 7315) approving, ratifying, confirming, and adopting on and in behalf of the United States all acts performed by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation since March 21,1942, with respect to the possession, control, and operation of the property of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad in reliance upon the provisions of Executive Order 9108, as amended. It was pointed out also that Executive Order 9572 authorized the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to continue in the possession and operation of the railroad in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 9108, as amended.
This answer was later amended in which, among
other things, it was shown that on September 6, 1945, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation issued a notice and order terminating and relinquishing possession, operation, and control of the plaintiff’s property, effective October 1, 1945 (10 F.R. 11529), and that pursuant to such notice and order of .'termination, possession, and control of plaintiff’s property actually was relinquished and terminated as of October 1, 1945.
The defendants then moved for judgment upon the pleadings, taking the position that, among other things, the case had now become moot and that no substantial question remained to be decided.
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CHAPTER XXXIV
ADJUSTING WARTIME RATES
Both in its origin and in its subsequent development there was close relationship between the Division of Rates of the Office of Defense Transportation and the Division of Transportation of the Office of Price Administration.
The Division of Rates of the Office of Defense Transportation was created on January 8,1942, pursuant to the directive in the Executive Order 8989 requiring that the Office of Defense Transportation should “represent the defense interests of the Government in negotiating rates with the domestic transportation carriers and in advising for rate adjustments caused by the effect of the defense program.”
The Division of Transportation in the Office of Price Administration, originally known as the Transportation Unit, was particularly concerned with the transportation phase of the general duties of the Office of Price Administration in respect of price control. It was charged with responsibility of advising the Office of Price Administration of increases in carriers’ rates, of acting to prevent rate increases by negotiating with carriers or by litigation, and of negotiating for the revision of rates to prevent them from contributing unduly to higher commodity prices.
G. Lloyd Wilson, Professor of Transportation and Public Utilities, University of Pennsylvania, the Director of the Division of Transportation of the Office of Price Administration, was appointed also Director of the Division of Rates of the Office of Defense Transportation.
Many of the problems relating to carrier rates were common to both the Office of Price Administration and the Office of Defense Transportation, and it was therefore possible for Dr. .Wilson to function in both agencies until March 12, 1942. By that time it became apparent that the Office of Price Administration was exclusively concerned with maintaining existing prices and rate levels and was opposed to all rate increases which affected prices, regardless of whether they were warranted. On the other hand, the rate functions of the Office of Defense Transportation expressly related to the defense program
and were to be interpreted in the light of keeping necessary transportation services in operation. In view of possible conflict of policy, Dr. Wilson resigned from his position with the Office of Price Administration and continued as Director of the Division of Rates of the Office of Défense Transportation.
A large amount of collaboration between the two agencies in rate matters, however, was continued. A part of the staff of the Transportation Division of the Office of Price Administration, for example, was concerned with the quotation of rates. This group worked with carriers’ tariffs on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission. As identical work had to be performed for the Division of Rates of the Office of Defense Transportation, the Office of Price Administration group served both agencies, thereby eliminating duplication of personnel and assuring closer cooperation between the Office of Defense Transportation and the Office of Price Administration.
In the exercise of its functions the Office of Defense Transportation, through its Division of Rates, frequently appeared before the Interstate Commerce Commission to represent the defense interests of the Government whenever those interests were involved in rate controversies. The Office of Defense Transportation only “represented” and “advised” ; it did not, in any sense, make rates. It maintained the same relationship with State regulatory commissions since the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission extended only to interstate transport, whereas the Office of Defense Transportation was concerned with both interstate and intrastate rates.
The Division of Rates of the Office of Defense Transportation also was authorized to handle rate matters with carriers on behalf of the War Production Board. Applications for rate adjustments originating in the various industry branches of the board were channeled through its Stockpiling and Transportation Division, which correlated and evaluated them and then presented them to the Office of Defense Transportation for handling.
Working Through Carriers’ Committees
Arrangements were made for collaboration with
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the railroads on rate matters. There was created a Traffic Executive Chairmen’s Committee to serve as consultants to the Office of Defense Transportation in regard to rate adjustments, and to function as the general channel for the negotiation of rates which various Government departments and agencies wished to have established as emergency rates. The committee was appointed by the president of the Association of American Railroads and was comprised of the chairmen of the three principal railway traffic executive committees, with the traffic vice president of the Association of American Railroads as chairman. It was established after assurance by the Department of Justice that its proposed activities would not expose the carriers or members of the committee to prosecution for violation of the antitrust laws.
Whenever a proposed amendment was disapproved by the committee, or whenever a negative recommendation was made, the conclusion of the committee was recorded and communicated, together with reasons for the action taken and the recommendations and suggestions of the Division of Rates, to the Government agency initiating or endorsing the proposal. The authority delegated to the committee was not exclusive and the Government agencies, including the Office of Defense Transportation, were free at all times to negotiate with individual carriers or with associations of carriers concerning individual or joint rate adjustments.
On March 2, 1942, the Interstate Commerce Commission rendered a decision favorable to the carriers in the application of the railroads of the country for increased rates and fares. In its decision in Ex-Parte No. 148—Increased Railway Rates, Fares and Changes, 1942—the Commission stated that the record would be held open for the purpose of giving consideration to any necessary adjustments or corrections warranted by circumstances. At the suggestion of the Division of Rates of the Office of Defense Transportation, a committee of 21 traffic vice presidents of the principal railroads of the country, together with the chairmen of the three major freight traffic associations, and A. F. Cleveland, vice president of the Association of American Railroads, was appointed by the railroads with full authority to #ct in making readjustments in interterritorial and intraterritorial rates established under Ex Parte No. 148. Essentially, the purpose of the committee was to handle rate changes required to preserve commercial and market relationships and to substitute rate bases mutually satisfactory to shippers and railroads in place of those prescribed in Ex Parte No. 148. Later, at the suggestion of the Office of Defense Transportation, the president of the Association of
American Railroads formed a new committee consisting of 25 chief traffic officers who proceeded to handle Ex Parte No. 148 adjustments. The functions of the committee were cleared for possible antitrust violations through the Department of Justice.
On May 15, 1943, the Interstate Commerce Commission suspended the increases authorized in its prior report of Ex Parte No. 148, Increased Railway Rates, Fares and Charges, (284 I.C.C., 545), 1942. An exception to the order, however, provided that the suspension would not apply to reductions in rates and charges that were made at the request of the Government. The carriers proceeded to amend the tariffs and furnished the Commission with a list of the items on which the increases were to remain in effect after May 15, 1943. Included in these items were the line-haul rates in instances where Government agencies had requested and were granted storage in transit. In other words, the carriers decided to maintain the increase on the line-haul rates, as well as on the transit charges. There was no objection by the division of rates to the maintenance of the increase on the transit charges, but it was felt that it should not have remained on the line-haul rates. Strenuous and continued efforts were made to persuade the railroads that the increases should not have been continued upon these rates, but since the rates were made for Government agencies by the medium of section 22 Quotations, no action could be brought to determine the issue.
Pacific coast canned goods shippers also objected to the increases being included in the line-haul rates on shipments of canned goods from the Pacific coast that were accorded transit, and they took the matter up informally with the Interstate Commerce Commission for interpretation of its intention with respect to commercial shipments moving at tariff rates.
On June 11, 1943, the Commission ruled that the continuance of the increases in the line-haul rates on canned goods were not warranted by the exceptions contained in the Commission’s report, and the carriers were requested to remove them immediately. On July 27, 1943, the railroads filed a petition for reconsideration of this ruling, but it was denied by the Commission.
The War and Navy Departments and the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department, then directed attention to the ruling of the Commission ordering the carriers to remove the increases on Pacific coast canned goods accorded transit, and requested that where transit was involved for the account of these Government agencies, similar treatment be given to line-haul rates that had been increased in the tariff or under section 22 Quotation. The requests of the agencies were refused by the
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carriers. Thereupon the Office of Defense Transportation again requested the carriers to remove the increases authorized by the Commission’s decision in Ex Parte No. 148. The carriers again denied the request. The Division of Rates protested the decision and offered to explore further possibilities of action, but the interested Government agencies advised that since all available facts and arguments were presented to the highest railroad traffic officers without success there remained nothing further that could be done by the Office of Defense Transportation.
Storage-in-Transit at Ports
The Office of Defense Transportation storage program provided for the maintenance of “banks” of goods at the ports to furnish a continuous supply of export freight and eliminate delay to ocean-going vessels through lack of lading. To accumulate a bank or stock pile, it was necessary to store goods at the ports as well as at interior points. Therefore, the Division of Rates requested the railroads to extend storage-in-transit privileges on Government traffic stored in public or outside warehouses reached by tracks of the terminal carriers at North Atlantic, South Atlantic and Gulf ports. The Traffic Executive Chairmen’s Committee declined to grant the privileges. The committee contended that if such storage-in-transit privileges were established, inland storage points would be by-passed and congestion created at the ports. The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, however, agreed to extend storage privileges so that Government freight for export could be stored in transit at Harlem River, N. Y., and subsequently be delivered to points within the free lighterage limits of New York harbor under a through rate plus a transit charge.
Although the carriers refused to extend storage-in-transit privileges to Government freight stored at the ports, they were more liberal in respect of such freight which was moving to the ports. Under the original arrangement made under section 22 between the Treasury Department and the carriers, only one stop in transit was permitted to freight intended for transshipment by vessel from port, and a storage period of 24 hours. These limitations were found inadequate, and upon request of the Treasury Department, the Division of Rates asked the carriers to provide an additional stop because shipment originally consigned to a storage point for reforwarding to the port of transshipment had to be diverted frequently to a second storage point on account of unforeseen congestion or lack of shipping space. Local rates were applied from the second storage point to port. The request for storage in transit at this second point was granted by the car
riers and the through rate from point of origin preserved. At the same time, the carriers extended the storage period on nonferrous metal stores for the account of the Treasury Department from 24 to 36 months.
Much lend-lease traffic moving for the account of the Treasury Department often did not move under Government bills of lading. As. a result, this traffic did not qualify for transit privileges to which Government shipments were eligible. At the request of the Division of Rates, the carriers made these privileges applicable to shipments covered by collect commercial bills of lading, endorsed so as to indicate Government ownership of the goods, the bills of lading to be converted at destination to Government bills of lading or prepaid commercial bills of lading endorsed so as to indicate Government ownership of the property.
Land-Grant Deductions
The carriers, as a war emergency measure, established storage-in-transit privileges on carload export freight at points intermediate to the ports so as to relieve and to avert port congestion. These privileges were made effective through the publication on August 17, 1942, of a nationally applicable storage-in-transit tariff. The purpose was to permit flexibility in the use of storage facilities strategically located within short running time to the principal ports and to facilitate the prompt delivery of export traffic to these ports to meet vessels in which cargo space had been allocated.
The question was raised by the Treasury Department as to whether the tariff was applicable to Government traffic. The Government agencies took the position that it was. The carriers opposed the application of the tariff to Government traffic on the ground that the rates applicable to the shipments stopped off and stored in transit would become subject to land-grant rate deductions which would in many instances reduce the charge below section 22 Quotation rates. As a result, carriers served notice that the tariff would be canceled May 3, 1943, on full statutory notice. The Division of Rates undertook to avoid the land grant difficulties met in applying the tariff on a national basis. It urged the carriers to publish a tariff in eastern territory simultaneously with the cancellation of the general tariff. The railroads agreed and issued such a tariff, effective May 8, 1943.
Although the tariff provided expressly that it was inapplicable to Government freight, the Comptroller General’s Office contended that this provision was ineffectual and that Government freight could be offered under the tariff. The railroads held that this was wholly inconsistent with the theory under which
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the tariff was established as a privilege granted by this device to commercial traffic in which the Government was interested. The Government had the opportunity of storage-in-transit arrangements under Section 22 Quotations which were even more liberal. The tariff arrangements, however, were satisfactory to the Division of Storage of the Office of Defense Transportation and were serviceable in enabling goods to be held back from the ports until shipping facilities could be arranged.
At the request of the Under Secretary of War, and supported by the Army Air Corps, Navy Department, and the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department, the Division of Rates instituted negotiations on September 9, 1942, with rail carriers and freight forwarding companies through the Railroad Traffic Executive Chairmen’s Committee and Freight Forwarders Institute for the application of land-grant deductions from the tariff rates to be made on Government freight shipped by the forwarders’ services over land-grant routes.
This proposal was approved on October 9, 1942, for the account of the War Department and Navy Department, including the Marine Corps, to become operative December 22,1942, by a section 22 Quotation. The carriers declined to include the Treasury Department, Procurement Division, in their tender. Subsequently, the Division of Rates requested the carriers to make the arrangement to include U. S. Coast Guard and U. S. Maritime Commission. Carriers approved the request for inclusion of the U, S. Coast Guard, but declined to include the Maritime Commission in the Quotation. The reason ascribed for not making the arrangement for the Treasury Department, Procurement Division, and the Maritime Commission was that their traffic shipped direct via railroad freight service was not entitled to landgrant deductions, under the Interstate Commerce Act.
Storage in Transit of Canned Goods
Early in the war the Army and Navy took over a large amount of warehouse storage on the Pacific coast previously used for commercial storage. One of the industries most seriously affected by this action was the canning industry which had large quantities of canned goods stored in various warehouses awaiting shipment to Eastern markets and distributors. It was decided to utilize inland storage facilities insofar as possible and where such facilities were available. A proposal was filed with the Trans-Continental Freight Bureau by the eastern purchasers and distributors of canned goods for storage-in-transit privileges. The transcontinental rail carriers established transit privileges permitting these
arrangements to be consummated. This was at the request of the Division of Rates, upon the recommendation of the Division of Storage. Later similar arrangements were made in Southwestern, Western Trunk Line, Southern and Eastern Territories as a result of negotiations conducted by the Division of Rates.
In April 1943, the Army informed the Division of Rates that although the bulk of their in-bound shipments would be forwarded from the transit points within the period of 12 months permitted by the railroads’ tariffs, a reserve sufficient to supply the demand was needed to be kept in storage until the following season’s pack arrived. The carriers complied with a request of the Division of Rates to extend to 2 years the period in consideration of a small additional storage-in-transit charge.
On July 22, 1942, on behalf of the Division of Storage of the Office of Defense Transportation, the War Production Board, and the Traffic Control Branch of the Service of Supply, U. S. Army, the Division of Rates filed an application with the Association of American Railroads for the establishment of storage-in-transit privileges on trans-continental east-bound shipments of frozen fruits, vegetables, meats and other foodstuffs at approximately 100 points throughout the United States, east of the^ Pacific coast area, at which cold storage facilities were available. This application was approved by the carriers and through rates were established from the original points of shipment to final destinations via the transit points with the normal transit charges added.
Transit privileges were granted by the carriers on sodium nitrate moving from Hopewell, Va., to points in Southern Territory and on scrap iron for baling in Western Trunk Line Territory. Storage-in-transit privileges were also established on soda products exported to South America through New Orleans. Shipments were made direct to shipside through New Orleans but because of the uncertainty of the arrival of vessels it became necessary to store the products to avoid undue delay. Storage-in-transit was established at New Orleans, and the goods moved at the export rate plus the normal transit charges. This arrangement enabled exporters to maintain sufficient stocks on hand and draw immediately from the warehouses at New Orleans when, and as ships were available.
Export Rates on Frustrated Traffic
General Order ODT No. 12, effective June 27,1942, required that export, coastwise and intercoastal freight be removed from the ports to inland points. The object of the order was to clear the ports of freight which originally had been consigned for
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export to designated destinations but which could not be shipped because of the discontinuance of ocean carrier services due to the war and for other reasons. This freight was characterized as frustrated freight.
On July 2, 1942, the Interstate Commerce Commission, upon the petition of the carriers serving the New York port area, authorized the application of export rates and export storage rules on frustrated freight eventually exported through the original port. Domestic rates were to apply on traffic domesticated or forwarded through another port. Subsequently, on the initiative of the National Industrial Traffic League, the carriers, after consulting the Commission and the Office of Defense Transportation, established a tariff providing for export rates to the port to which the freight was originally consigned and for export rates from that port to the port of transshipment.
The tariff effective at all ports in the United States was issued December 25, 1942. It applied to export traffic originating in the United States and Canada when consigned to a port in the United States for export which, after arrival at such port, was reshipped, due to the war emergency, to another port for export, or was reshipped to a point in the interior and there domesticated, or again reshipped to a port for export.
The arrangements were effective in permitting the ports to be cleared of the frustrated shipments, and enabled the owners of the goods to move the freight into the interior and later export it without being penalized by having to pay domestic rates to and from the original port and to the port of actual exportation. Since the export rates are usually substantially lower than the domestic rates, the arrangement enabled shippers of goods which could not be exported through no fault of their own, to move the goods at substantially lower charges.
The Division of Rates attempted also to induce the carriers to make this tariff retroactive to be applicable to numerous shipments intended for the Government of China which had arrived at Newport News, Va., during the period December 7, 1941, to December 28, 1942, and which “frustrated” as a result of the war. The request was not granted by the railroads concerned.
War conditions frequently disrupted the normal pattern of export shipments, and it was often necessary to move freight consigned for export through ports not utilized in peacetime. Since no export rates were in effect, it became necessary for the Division of Rates to negotiate with the carriers for the purpose of establishing such rates. It was successful in having the carriers establish new export rates on various commodities moving from points in Trunk
Line and Central Freight Association Territory to many ports not used in peacetime.
One of the most important freight rate adjustments negotiated by the Division of Rates concerned the application of export rates on Government freight handled through Pacific coast ports in Army transports. Because of security reasons and ocean shipping conditions, this freight moved on domestic rates which were considerably higher than export rates.
Existing export tariffs of the trans-continental lines included the following restrictions which prevented the application of export rates on Government traffic :
(1) Freight was not nermittted to leave the possession of the rail carriers until delivered to common carriers by ocean.
(2) Specific destinations beyond Pacific Coast ports were required to be shown in the bill of lading or shipping order issued at time of shipment.
(3) Ocean space for carload freight was required to be secured with a description of the freight and declaration of the first loading date of the vessel on which reservation was made confirmed by the ocean carrier to a terminal line.
Several Government agencies having freight moving to Pacific coast ports for movement overseas, held that these restrictions resulted in rates on Government freight that were unreasonable, under existing conditions. Ocean transport was disrupted to such an extent that very few common carriers by ocean were operating as such, and those that were had no established sailing schedules. Even under normal conditions, the greater part of Government property shipped to foreign ports was Army and Navy supplies handled by Army and Navy transports. Large quantities of public property were being shipped under the lend-lease program in such ships as could be made available, regardless as to whether they were common carriers, tramps, or transports. Furthermore, war conditions did not permit the showing of foreign destinations on bills of lading or shipping receipts nor allow information regarding ocean space or sailing dates to be given to the terminal rail carriers at points of export. These conditions made it impossible for Government shipping agencies to comply with the restrictive clauses in the rail carriers’ tariffs so as to obtain the benefit of export rates.
At the outset, the railroads offered a section 22 Quotation to the Army, Navy, Treasury Department, and the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation which would have made applicable the normal commercial export rate, but in addition the railroads proposed to apply a terminal charge of 5 cents per 100 pounds. These rates were not to be subject to land-grant deductions.
This initial offer not being accepted by the Government departments, the Office of Defense Trans
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portation undertook to negotiate an adjustment with the railroads concerned. It filed a formal appeal with the transcontinental railroad carriers for a determination. as to the applicability of export rates on United States Government traffic when destined abroad beyond Pacific coast ports to be moved by water transport services other than common carriers by water.
The Office of Defense Transportation took the position that it did not object to a section 22 Quotation provided that land-grant deductions were not withheld. The carrier members of the Transcontinental Freight Bureau through its chairman replied that the carriers were willing to extend export rates to Government traffic under a section 22 Quotation regardless of the kind of ocean carrier employed, but would not permit land-grant deductions to be made. So the matter was presented to the Interstate Commerce Commission for determination.
The Interstate Commerce Commission ordered an investigation under Interstate Commerce Commission Docket No. 29006. The Office of Defense Transportation was not a party to the proceeding and only channeled the matter to the Interstate Commerce Commission at the request of the Comptroller General functioning in its capacity of intermediary. On January 15, 1944, after numerous conferences between the parties concerned, the railroad carriers offered the Government a section 22 Quotation whereby the carriers would protect the export rates without land-grant deductions, and with a terminal allowance of 3 cents per 100 pounds, to be granted on all traffic exports over Government and public piers, including railroad piers. Such Government shipments were not required to comply with rules in the tariff restricting the service and application of the export rates. The Government agencies accepted the offer. At the request of the Office of Defense Transportation the Commission then discontinued the formal proceedings.
The carriers issued section 22 Quotation No. 258 on February 3, 1944. This Quotation was later supplanted by Quotation No. 265, dated February 10, 1944. Both of these quotations authorized a port allowance of 3 cents per 100 pounds on traffic stored at the ports by the Government without a time limitation. This was later changed so that the rates and allowance applied only on traffic stored not over 90 days at the port. There was subsequently considerable controversy over this 90-day period and later the carriers extended it to 6 months. It was estimated by the various agencies that aggregate savings resulting from this Quotation approximated $72,-000,000 by the end of 1945.
Quotation 265-A superseded No. 265. It provided
for export rates, not subject to land-grant deductions, on port traffic moving from origins to Pacific coast ports and forwarded overseas to destinations named in the applicable export tariff but without requiring compliance with the restrictions in the tariff as mentioned above. The tariff was made retroactive to January 1, 1942. The Quotation permitted an alternate application of export rates without land-grant deductions, or domestic rates minus land-grant deductions, whichever produced the lower charges. There was also permitted another alternate, rates made applicable in other section 22 Quotations whenever lower than the others.
As to such traffic moving from origins on and after January 1, 1944, and to United States ports named in Agent Kipp’s Tariff No. 29 Series, carriers applied either the export rates or the domestic rates, both in effect May 14,1943, whichever produced the lower charges, neither to be subject to land-grant deductions. A terminal allowance of 3 cents per 100 pounds was made.
Import Rates Established
The same conditions, namely the disruption of normal export routes and the need to resort to new and emergency routes, required in many instances the negotiation and establishment of import rates.
One of the most important series of import rate negotiations conducted by the Office of Defense Transportation was concerned with the importation of Cuban sugar. On March 13, 1942, the special assistant to the Secretary of Commerce advised the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation that the Defense Supplies Corporation had purchased the 1942 Cuban sugar crop, including blackstrap and invert molasses, and that it was estimated that 354,-000,000 gallons of molasses would be acquired under this contract. The Maritime Commission asked that arrangements be made for shipment to Port Everglades, Fla. ; Mobile, Ala. ; and New Orleans, La. ; for movement beyond by rail to Baltimore ; Philadelphia ; Carneys Point, N. J.; Newark; Peekskill, N. Y.; and Everett, Mass. There were no through rail rates in effect to cover a movement of this kind, and it was essential that quick action be taken to establish commodity rates as early as possible. It was felt that existing combination rates were too high.
The Division of Rates, after a study of the rates in effect on molasses from southern points to official territory, proceeded to negotiate with the carriers. After conferences with the War Production Board, the Defense Supplies Corporation, and the Traffic Executive Committee, the carriers issued a section 22 Quotation establishing rates materially lower than the combination rates.
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Another import rate adjustment negotiated was for the rates on newsprint brought from Newfoundland to the United States. Owing to the shortage of pulpwood, it was estimated that the supply available to the paper industry in this country for 1943 would be far short of the 3,536,796 tons needed to cover minimum requirements. In view of this circumstance, the War Production Board urged the import of newsprint from Newfoundland.
Normally, a large volume of newsprint paper moves by water from origins in Canada and Newfoundland to ports in the United States nearest consuming destinations. The entrance of the United States into the war removed the possibility of shipping through the Atlantic coast ports, and it became necessary to restrict this traffic to northern ports in the Atlantic and in the Great Lakes, from which deliveries were made by rail at greatly increased transportation costs. Because of the importance of conserving shipping, the Newfoundland paper companies considered the use of Canadian ports of entry which would also result in a substantial increase in costs because of the greater rail haul.
The difference between ocean and rail rates was wide. On long hauls, rail rates sometimes were four times greater than water rates. The establishment of such rail rates, however, w^s made unnecessary by a reallocation of newsprint paper production for the United States, Canada, and Great Britain so that transportation services could be conserved by supplying the requirements of these countries from the mills nearest the markets.
Numerous other import rates were established to cover emergency movements necessitated by the disruption of peacetime routes. Such rates were established on grapefruit moving from Isle of Pines (Cuba) through Tampa and Miami to New York and other eastern destinations; on flax fiber and flax tow moving through Pacific coast ports to eastern destinations ; on castor beans moving from Mexico through Rio Grande crossings to eastern seaboard points; on cinchona bark moving from Central and South America through Mexico and the Rio Grande crossings to eastern United States; on alcohol produced in Cuba and shipped to Port Everglades, Fla., and then moved by rail to points in Kentucky, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania.
Petroleum and Products in Tank Cars
Before the war, the eastern seaboard received daily one and a half million barrels of petroleum and petroleum products. About 95 percent of it moved by tank steamers by way of the sea routes between the Gulf of Mexico and North Atlantic ports. This service was disrupted as early as the spring of 1941,
when a large number of tankers were withdrawn from the intercoastal movement and assigned to the British during the Battle of Britain. To meet the petroleum requirements of the northeastern States, long-idle railroad tank cars were brought back into use and put in service between Texas and Oklahoma and the Northeast. After this country entered the war, the increased needs of the East and the activities of submarines aggravated the problem of petroleum transport. A detailed discussion of this problem is given in chapter XXV.
Because of the unprecedented volume of petroleum moving by tank car over this emergency route, the subcommittee of the Petroleum Administration for War on Tank Cars (Eastern district) requested the carriers to establish reduced emergency freight rates on petroleum products, and this the carriers did as of September 15, 1941. The general effect was to provide rates on petroleum 13 percent of the first class rates, a basis far below the previous level of these rates, and substantially below the level of rates found by the Interstate Commerce Commission in prewar cases to be reasonable minimum rates. Special rates were likewise made upon certain refined petroleum products on the basis of 75 percent of the existing rates for transport from points in districts Nos. 2 and 3 in the southwestern petroleum producing regions, to the destinations in the East, district No. 1. The carriers proposed to allow these rates to expire on June 30, 1942, and place in effect new rates reflecting an increase of 23 percent on crude petroleum, 6^ percent on refined gasoline and 33^3 percent on benzine, casing-head gasoline, naptha and naptha distillates .
These and other changes in the rates of petroleum products contemplated by the railroads were calculated to yield them additional revenue amounting to $30,000,000 on shipments of crude oil and $10,000,-000 on petroleum products. The proposed changes were objected to in negotiations conducted with the railroad traffic executives by the Petroleum Coordinator for War, the Office of Price Administration, the Petroleum Industry Committee, and the Office of Defense Transportation. As a result of the efforts of these groups, the proposed rates were suspended by the Commission, and subsequently the carriers filed an application with the Commission to withdraw them and to extend the existing rates, which remained in effect for the duration of the war.
In order to expedite the movement of petroleum to the East, the Office of Defense Transportation, on August 1, 1942, established the symbol train operations of tank cars. These solid trainloads of cars, either loaded or empty, originated at one point or area and proceeded without break-up or classifica
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tion to a designated destination or disposal point over scheduled routes. The Division of Rates negotiated with the railroads to establish through rates by the symbol routes. These rates were made applicable generally in southwestern territory, and from the eastern seaboard territory. The carriers, as a rule were cooperative and established such rates when the necessity for them was demonstrated despite the assertion of some of the carriers that the rates were depressed rates and unremunerative. The Interstate Commerce Commission cooperated with the Office of Defense Transportation in this work by permitting the carriers to establish rates to become effective on less than full statutory notice of 3 days.
The Office of Defense Transportation further had occasion to negotiate with the carriers for the establishment of many rates on petroleum and its products for particular services. In August 1944, for example, the Division of Rates was successful in arranging for the Southwestern rail carriers to establish short-distance routes in connection with rates applicable to export movements of natural gasoline from Youens, Tex., to Houston and Texas City, Tex. The purpose of this arrangement was to make rates applicable by direct routes in order to reduce materially the turn-around time of urgently needed tank cars.
Negotiations were successfully conducted also with the National Tank Car Committee of the Association of American Railroads and the American Petroleum Institute in suspending the rail carriers* rule requiring equalization of empty and loaded mileage of tank cars. It was felt to be equitable that owners of tank cars should be relieved of the burden of equalizing mileage during the emergency. This was arranged through negotiations with the carriers through the Association of American Railroads.
Tank Truck Petroleum Rates
Many petroleum tank motor truck operators in various parts of the country found themselves in need of additional revenue because of mounting operating costs. They conferred with the Division of Rates in regard to obtaining an equitable adjustment in rates in order to meet operating costs. In many instances, schedules of increased rates were filed with regulatory bodies without consulting the Division of Rates. It was necessary in such cases to obtain approval of the adjustments in rates. This was true particularly in those cases where the rate schedules or tariffs were suspended for lack of justification as a result of petitions for suspension filed by various Government agencies.
The Office of Price Administration exercised max
imum rate powers over contract carriers and required that financial reports be submitted with schedules providing for higher rates. These were accompanied by a statement signed by the shipper that the effect of the higher rates would not be reflected in the prices of the commodities transported or used as a basis for an adjustment in ceiling prices.
The Office of Price Administration’s maximum price regulation for contract carrier operation prohibited a carrier from increasing its rates without sufficient justification above those in effect in March 1942, for the same or similar service, and if the carrier had not been in operation at that time, the rates and charges of a competitor were to be used as a basis for adjustment by the Office of Price Administration. Maximum rates were adjusted where carriers showed financial hardship and where higher rates were necessary to permit the continuance of essential services for which there were no adequate substitute services available at lower rates. As to common carriers, the Office of Price Administration could petition the Interstate Commerce Commission and State regulatory commissions to suspend proposed increases pending hearings to determine their lawfulness.
There was a general lack of uniformity in the rates of contract and common carriers of petroleum products throughout the country. Each situation that arose had to be considered in the light of the facts surrounding it. Many conferences were held with Government agencies, carriers, and shippers to determine the course of action to be followed in these cases. For example, a cross section of opinion was sought by the War Department at a meeting held June 13,1944, at which the Traffic Control Branch of the Transportation Corps of the Army invited shippers and the various Governmental departments to discuss a tendency on the part of tank truck operators to bring a general upward revision in existing rates on gasoline, and particularly to establish relatively higher rates on aviation and high octane gasoline than were applicable on ordinary gasoline within the same area. Arrangements were made as a result of this conference, which resulted in assuring the continuance of tank truck service at rates satisfactory to the users of the services.
Emergency Coal Rates
In the spring of 1942, when the ocean movement of coal from Hampton Roads was disrupted by enemy submarines and by the withdrawal of colliers and tugs from other services, it became necessary to establish emergency rail routes in order to supply New England with needed fuel. The Office of Defense Transportation developed all-rail routes from south
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ern Appalachian fields to New England and also railbarge routes via New York harbor to the same destinations. The use of these routes required the establishment of new rates which were worked out by the Division of Rates in cooperation with the rail and water carriers.
The new rates were based on old inactive rates still in existence although they had not been in use since the time when southern coal began to move to New England and New York exclusivëly through Hampton Roads. Rates were established to New Jersey piers for transshipment to New England and for local delivery in New York Harbor. Subsequently, because of the increased coal movement rates were also established from the Pocahontas fields to St. George piers on Staten Island .
In June 1942, the burden on the Potomac Yards gateway became so heavy that additional routes were set up through Columbus and Marion, Ohio, where connections were made between the Pocahontas roads and the New York Central. Specific rates were established, but this route was extremely circuitous and was used only when traffic through Potomac Yards approached capacity. In the summer of 1942, coal traffic at Sewalls Point, Va., awaiting transfer to the Pennsylvania coal ferries exceeded the capacity of that port, and the Virginian Railroad was directed by the Interstate Commerce Commission to divert coal cars by way of the Roanoke Gateway. The Office of Defense Transportation pressed the Virginian Railroad to establish competitive rates through Roanoke and after much difficulty persuaded the road to do so. Through the war additional coal rates had to be established by negotiations with the carriers as new emergencies arose.
The Division of Rates participated in numerous other rate adjustments. It negotiated numerous emergency rates on behalf of the Dominion of Canada with United States railroads, including rates on sugar via South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico ports to ports in Canada, and rates on Canadian war traffic from points in Canada to Pacific Coast ports in the United States for overseas transshipment. The establishment of rates on old tin cans is a notable example of these miscellaneous rate negotiations. The War Production Board initiated tin salvage campaigns throughout the country and collections were concentrated for shipment to detinning plants. No established rates on old tin cans were in existence, and the Division of Rates was requested by the War Production Board and by the War Department to secure rates and appropriate carload minimum weights which would enable this traffic to move freely under existing ceiling prices and thereby contribute to the recovery of increased quantities of the critical mate
rial. Such rates and weights were established by the carriers as a result of negotiations in the various rate territories of the country. In addition, arrangements were made for stop-off-in-transit privileges to complete loading.
Among numerous other rate adjustments, the Division of Rates negotiated or participated in the negotiations to secure rates satisfactory to the Government agencies concerned on such varied materials as iron and steel ship sections; silver to be used as substitute for copper in the electrical industry and other purposes; pulpwood from eastern Texas; pyri-tis cinder; pig iron; switching charges at various points; potash from New Mexico; consolidated cars forwarded from Army-Navy consolidating stations in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and East St. Louis to West Coast destinations; iron ore on the Great Lakes; unfinished grain spirits and alcohol from interior Kentucky and official territory to eastern points; alcohol in bond from defense plants of Defense Plant Corporation in western trunk line territory to be used in the alcohol production and explosive production programs; logs from the Southwest and grain moving to major centers by water and outward by rail at proportional rates.
Motor Carrier Rates Adjusted
Pursuant to the recommendations of the Federal manager of the Mid-west Motor Carriers then under Government operation, the Central States Motor Freight Bureau filed a petition with the Interstate Commerce Commission requesting permission to discontinue the use of rates on “freight, all kinds” and at the same time, filed specific commodity rates on certain traffic that had been moving under the allfreight rates. The Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau also revised its tariffs by reducing the number of minimum ratings. The effect of this was that freight formerly moving on all-commodity rates became subject to class rates or exceptions.
As a result of the intervention of the Office of Defense Transportation, the Office of Price Administra-tion agreed not to oppose these rate increases. The Commission then permitted the cancellation of the all-commodity rates with some modifications.
Later, the motor carriers began to examine all their tariffs and selected about 500 items for revision. In some instances, the revisions were in the form of increases in the truckload minimum weight; in others, the rate itself; and in still others, the item was entirely canceled on the ground of obsolescence. Out of the 500 items the Office of Price Administration requested the suspension of a little over half of them. The Commission subsequently suspended 75 items, which were finally cleared up and the suspension order vacated.
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Numerous other motor freight rate adjustments were effected. The minimum charge on interstate traffic was increased to $1.05 per 100 pounds. Rates on dairy products were increased from class 42^ to class 50 rate plus 4 percent on traffic to Chicago and points taking the same rate, originating in Minnesota, North Dakota, and Michigan. The Office of Price Administration opposed the addition of 4 percent increase, but the Commission permitted the rates to become effective. Minimum charges were also raised in Iowa and South Dakota. In North Dakota class rates were increased by 4 percent.
The Division of Rates assisted the War Department in securing a rate reduction to 75 percent of first class, subject to minimum fourth class—on all freight by motor truck between points in Wisconsin and Minnesota, and Chicago for consolidating stations. The arrangements made were similar to those allowed carriers operating between Central states territory and Chicago.
Coordination of Rail-Truck Service
Although no comprehensive plan for the coordination of rail-truck services was consummated by ODT during the war, the Division of Rates participated actively in several proposals for coordination. One major difficulty in enforcing any mandatory plan was
the determination of the compensation payable for the rail and for the motor service. In connection with a proposed truck-rail coordination order drafted in 1943, the division was asked to determine the basis for the charges to be paid the rail carriers for their part of the service. Hie division advised that it was impracticable and inadvisable because of inadequate data to reach a sound basis applicable to all cases of diversion of traffic of all kinds and for varying distances. The division suggested that voluntary rate agreements be made by the carriers concerned, that these rates be divided on a mileage pro-rate, a first class pro-rate, or a rate-pro-rate basis and that the Interstate Commerce Commission be requested to prescribe the division of joint rates after hearing in the event the carriers failed to agree. The division further pointed out the dangers of limiting truck hauls to 250 or 300 miles, as was often proposed. A Rail-Truck Committee was formed to consider applications for the substitution of rail for truck service, and the Division of Rates was represented on this committee, together with the Legal and Motor Carrier Divisions.
The Division of Rates ceased to function as an integral Division of the Office of Defense Transportation on January 1,1946.
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CHAPTER XXXV
TERRITORIAL TRANSPORTATION IN PUERTO RICO
The transportation problems in the territories, as in the continental United States, but on a much smaller scale, centered around conservation of equipment and traffic to meet civilian and military requirements.
Transport Control in the Territories
It was in Puerto Rico that the transportation problems more nearly approached those of the continental United States, except in magnitude. In Hawaii, distribution of population and military activities made local transportation an outstanding problem. In Alaska, far from the bases of supply, the great task was replacements to keep vehicles in operation and conservation of equipment to reduce the necessity for replacements. The other outlying provinces were Panama, where civilian transportation revolved around military activities for protection of the Canal and where, by agreement with the Secretary of War, control over transportation was left to the military authorities; and lastly, the Virgin Islands, where transportation was primitive and where the Office of Defense Transportation’s activities consisted of a small amount of vehicle allocation.
The authority of the Office of Defense Transportation was specifically extended to domestic transportation within the territories and possessions of the United States by Executive Order No. 9124, of August 5,1942, which provided as follows:
In addition to the powers conferred upon it by Executive Order 8989, December 18,1941, and Executive Order 9156 of May 2, 1942, the Office of Defense Transportation shall include within the scope of its authority as defined in the said orders, all domestic transportation within the territories and possessions of the United States.
Prior to the issuance of this Executive order, administration of the orders of the Office of Defense Transportation was confined to the continental United States. When the transportation situation in Puerto Rico became acute in the summer of 1942, and the Secretary of the Interior represented to the President that no insular government agency possessed sufficient authority to cope with transportation problems, the question was raised as to whether the Office of Defense Transportation had jurisdiction under existing executive orders beyond the continental boundaries of the United States. To allay any doubt
on this score Executive Order 9214 was issued. Subsequently, railroads operating in Hawaii, expressing apprehension that General Order ODT No. 1, relating to merchandise traffic, issued March 23,1942, might be construed as applicable to the Territory of Hawaii, requested exemption from the terms of this general order. On October 15, 1942, Suspension Order ODT 1-1 was issued suspending the provisions of General Order ODT No. 1, as amended, with respect to the operations of any carrier in Hawaii, Alaska, and the Panama Canal Zone. Puerto Rico was not included in the suspension order, there being then in progress the preparation of a series of orders, later issued, applicable exclusively in Puerto Rico.
After the issuance of the Executive order specifically extending the authority of the Office of Defense Transportation to the territories and possessions of the United States, the orders issued by the agency generally defined their territorial application. Two orders—General Order ODT No. 20, relating to taxicabs and taxi service, issued August 29, 1942, and General Order ODT No. 26, relating to rental cars, issued November 30,1942, which did not contain any proviso limiting their territorial application, were construed as applicable, to the territories and possessions as well as the continental United States. General Order ODT No. 20 was revised July 1, 1943, by the issuance of General Order ODT No. 20A and was made specifically applicable within the continental United States and the territories and possessions of the United States except Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. General Order ODT No. 26A, issued April 15, 1943, revised General Order ODT No. 26 and made it applicable within the continental United States and the territories and possessions except Puerto Rico. By amendments adopted March 10, 1944, each of these general orders was restricted in its application to the continental United States and Alaska.
Three other general orders, applicable within the continental United States, were specifically made applicable to the territories and possessions. These were: General Order ODT No. 14A, banning the use of motor vehicles in connection with horse, dog, or
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motor vehicle races; General Order ODT No. 35, controlling the acquisition and use of local passenger transportation equipment by the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, and restricting the physical transfer of local passenger transportation equipment; and General Order ODT No. 44, governing the rationing of new commercial motor vehicles.
Transport Conditions in Puerto Rico
The transportation problem in the Territory of Puerto Rico in 1942 centered around approximately 23,063 passenger automobiles, including public touring cars, busses, etc.; 3,440 light trucks; 5,144 heavy trucks; or, a grand total of 31,647 motor vehicles, and some 400 miles of steam common carrier railroads. The motorized equipment was in distress for lack of replacements', repair parts, and tires. The railroads were overburdened by a heavy military movement, which would be seasonably augmented by a heavy sugar cane harvest.
The situation on this island of 3,435 square miles, with a population normally of nearly 2,000,000 persons, gave concern to the Office of Defense Transportation, which sent a commission to Puerto Rico in August 1942, immediately after the extension of its jurisdiction to the territories and possessions of the country by Executive Order No. 9214. The Commission, composed of rail and motor vehicle transportation experts, with M. Garcia de Quevedo, transportation consultant on the Office of Defense Transoprta-tion’s staff, as its chairman, was directed to make a study of conditions and recommend steps to be taken to control the situation.
On September 1 and September 11, 1942, the commission reported to the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation in substance as follows:
Shipping is the backbone of the welfare of Puerto Rico. The land transportation of the island is wholly dependent upon it for rail equipment, automotive vehicle parts, and supplies, including tires and gasoline. The shipping at that period of the war was critical. Though there was ample tonnage, it could not be made available for lack of sufficient Naval escort vessels.
Commercial vehicle equipment was obtained without reference to the essentiality of the use to which it was to be put. It was operated without restraint and was generally in bad state of maintenance from overloading, wasteful operation, and inability to recap in time or to replace worn-out tires.
The railroads were rendering a fairly satisfactory service, but they could render greater service with the equipment on hand by expediting loading and unloading of cars, interchanging equipment, and prompt movement of all cars, whether loaded or empty,
whenever ready to move. “So it is clear,” said the commission, “that the greatest cooperation possible must be brought about between shippers and receivers and rail carriers particularly during the oncoming sugar cane season.”
A number of operations and practices not in conformity with the Office of Defense Transportation policies and regulations were pointed out, and the taking over of the transportation situation in Puerto Rico by an Office of Defense Transportation organization, together with the adaptation of applicable ODT General Orders to meet the conditions on the island, was recommended.
Pursuant to the recommendations made' by the commission sent to Puerto Rico to investigate transportation conditions on the island, the Office of Defense Transportation, on October 20, 1942, established the Division of Puerto Rican Transport for the purpose of “coordinating the transportation policies and activities of Government agencies and private transportation groups in order to bring about maximum utilization of transportation facilities and conservation of essential material within the island of Puerto Rico.” At the same time there was established the Office of Assistant to Director in Charge of Puerto Rican Affairs, the title of which later was changed to Director of the Division of Puerto Rican Transport, with headquarters in Washington, D. C. A regional office of the Office of Defense Transportation was opened in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on October 30, 1942, with a regional director, three assistant directors and a field force of eight dispatchers. Subsequently, the positions of two of the assistant directors were abolished.
Immediate attention was given to improving the motor vehicle situation. The director of the Division of Puerto Rican Transport reported that on November 21, 1942, there was not a single tire in the hands of dealers on the island, nor had there been for 30 days previous. At the same time he reported that only 2 or 3 percent of the truck and bus tires in use could be recapped. Wear and waste were responsible for this situation plus the fact that the 1942 tire quota for Puerto Rico was only 10 percent of that of 1941, and it was the practice of the military authorities to requisition tires and other critical material intended for civilian use. An instance was cited of the armed forces requisitioning 6,783 tires out of a shipment of 11,621, and 2,962 cases of tubes out of a shipment of 5,067 cases. To prevent impending collapse of motor transportation on the island, the Office of Defense Transportation obtained an allotment for Puerto Rico of approximately 40,000 units of tires, tubes and camelback for recapping.
Looking to the future control over motor and rail
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transportation, and the prevention of congestion at the docks, the Office of Defense Transportation promptly issued a series of general orders applicable specifically to Puerto Rico. These orders may be summarized as follows:
Intercity Passenger Carriers —(General Order ODT No. 27)—Operators of intercity busses prohibited from operating limited service, from operating to places of amusement, or from transporting soldiers or sailors within so-called “off-limit” areas; from extending or inaugurating service without approval of the Office of Defense Transportation, and from operating over any except most-direct routes practicable. Present routes frozen, and operators required to pool competitive services which cover the same or closely parallel routes. Round-trip schedules prohibited over any route where the average passenger load in any calendar month would be less than 40 percent of capacity.
Speed Limit—(General Order ODT No. 28)—Vehicles prohibited from exceeding a speed of more than 48 milometers an hour, except in transportation of the armed forces in emergencies. This limit ap-. proximated 30 miles per hour instead of 35 miles on the mainland.
Taxicabs—(General Order ODT No. 29)—No operation of a taxicab permitted for any social or recreational purpose of the driver or operator; for making commercial deliveries of property; more than eight kilometers beyond the corporate limits of the municipality in which the trip originated; or on any trip exceeding 20 kilometers from point of origin to point of destination; and without distinctly marking the vehicle to indicate that it is a taxicab; for carrying military personnel in military “off-limits.” Taxicabs “frozen” at the number then in use, and cruising prohibited.
Common Carriers by Truck — (General Order ODT No. 30)—Over-the-road trucft operators offering their facilities to the general public for compensation, regardless of their designation under Federal or insular statute, required to carry capacity loads over a considerable portion of each trip and to use due diligence in an effort to maintain capacity loads at all times. Carriers prohibited from loading trucks beyond load-carrying ability of the tires and from accepting property for shipment over a circuitous route except when no adequate conpnon carrier service over a direct route was available or when the direct route was unsafe or more destructive to tires and equipment. The order also provided for submission of joint action plans and for the interchange of traffic. Exempted from certain provisions of the order were farmer-operated trucks, tank trucks,
trucks operated under the direction of the armed forces, and others.
Contract and Private Carriers by Truck—(General Order ODT No. 31)—Over-the-road contract and private carriers by truck (as distinguished from common carriers) prohibited from making special deliveries except to hospitals, and prohibited from making call-backs or more than one delivery a day from the same point of origin to the same point of destination except under certain conditions. Carriers subject to the order also required to endeavor in good faith to operate their trucks at capacity at all times. Provision also made for the submission of joint action plans.
Local Delivery Carriers—(General Order ODT No. 32)—Trucks operating within an urban zone and an area extending 24 air kilometers from its boundaries, or between contiguous urban zones, or making hauls not exceeding 24 kilometers in length, were prohibited from making special deliveries, call-backs or more than one delivery a day between the same point of origin and the same point of destination.
Railway Passenger Trains—(General Order ODT No. 33)—No rail carrier permitted to operate chartered passenger train, or train (that contained a chartered car, or one that by prior arrangement was restricted to goups, etc., other than a railroad business car used exclusively on railroad business, unless traveling under Office of Defense Transportation permit, or for the United States or an allied nation.
Certificate of War Necessity — (General Order ODT No. 34).—Certificate of War Necessity required for every commercial vehicle; without certificate, no gasoline, tires or parts obtaintable; under the order limitations could be prescribed to insure essentiality of operation, maximum utilization of space, and conservation of equipment.
Control of Local Passenger Operations—(General Order ODT No. 36)—Elimination of wasteful operation, duplication of service and unessential operations prohibiting inauguration or changing of service without prior approval by the Office of Defense Transportation; submission of joint action plans, and banning of military personnel to or from military “off-limits” areas.
Freight Shipments to Ports—(General Order ODT No. 41)—Regional director given authority to prohibit movement of freight by rail, truck or boat to any warehouse, wharf or dock to prevent congestion; to designate wharf or dock requiring Office of Defense Transportation permit for freight to be shipped tp it; procedure for issuing permits.
Conversion of Equipment—(General Order ODT No. 49)—Changing motor truck to any other type of conveyance without approval of the regional director
700494—48—17
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prohibited; equipment of military forces excepted; regional director’s decision subject to review by Director of Division of Puerto Rican Transport.
In addition to the foregoing orders specifically applicable to Puerto Rico, the regional director’s office enforced the following general orders which were applicable to the continental United States and its territories and possessions:
General Order ODT No. 14A, prohibiting driving a motor vehicle in a race.
General Order ODT No. 35, relating to acquisition of passenger equipment by Federal Government departments or their contractors.
General Order ODT No. 44A, authorizing the rationing of new commercial vehicles on application made to the regional director in Puerto Rico or district managers in continental United States.
Administrative Order ODT No. 27A, establishing procedure under General Order ODT No. 44A, for rationing commercial vehicles, the rationing of less that 1,600 pounds gross vehicle weight to be done by the regional director in Puerto Rico; and of heavier trucks, tractors, etc., by the Director of the Division of Puerto Rican Transport in Washington, after investigation and recommendation by the regional office in Puerto Rico.
There was another Administrative Order, ODT No. 20, which had to be issued in 1944 to prevent interference with the enforcement of Office of Defense Transportation regulations. Unruly persons had assaulted Office of Defense Transportation field officials in the course of their duties, and it became necessary to promulgate this order which assessed a fine or jail term for such interference with the work of the regional office in Puerto Rico.
Railway Operations
Seven railroad lines operating in Puerto Rico, with an aggregate length of routes of approximately 400 miles came under the jurisdiction of the Office of Defense Transportation. The island is 100 miles'long, with an average rather uniform width of 35 miles. Through the center, from east to west, extends a range of mountains rising in places up to 4,000 feet. This gave two long more or less level stretches, one along the northern and the other along the southern coast line. The agricultural and the urban development lay largely in these two coastal areas, and determined the course of the transportation routes.
Only five of the railroads of Puerto Rico were common carriers, the others being privately owned, or sugar plantation roads. The most important of these lines was the American Railroad Company of Porto Rico. It had a length of 226 miles, and it circled a large part of the island, serving the principal coastal cities. In its peacetime operations it carried in 1940
a total of 574,640 passengers; 121,959 tons of sugar; 1,222,668 tons of sugar cane; 244,545 tons of merchandise. Three years later in 1943, the passenger traffic rose to 1,232,311 ; sugar moved, 146,000 tons; sugar cane, 1,351,106 tons. Its total freight movements were 1,589,172 tons in 1941 ; 1,724,301 in 1942; and 1,927,480 tons in 1943. These increases reflect the added load which war operations imposed on the facilities of this railroad. In 1943, 65 percent of the road’s freight, exclusive of cane and sugar, was military and Government traffic.
The equipment of the road was not in physical condition to function satisfactorily under the increased demands made upon it. It was particularly weak in the matter of motive power much , of which had outlived its usefulness. Of the company’s 59 locomotives, only two-thirds were operable, while only one-third could be considered as being in good repair. Then, in the height of the cane-grinding season, the railroad employees went on a strike. The President, of the United States promptly ordered the road taken over and operated by the Office of Defense Transportation which issued Administrative Order ODT No. 3, appointing M. G. de Quevedo, the Office of Defense Transportation’s director of Puerto Rican Transport as Federal manager of the line. The road remained under Federal management from May 17, 1943, to July 1, 1944. This Federal operation is described in Chapter XXXIX, Federal Management of Railway Transport.
Naturally, there was close and effective cooperation by the road under Federal operation with the Office of Defense Transportation. Outside of the General Order ODT No. 33, relating to charter of trains or cars, and General Order ODT No. 41, controlling shipments to ports, no Office of Defense Transportation orders were issued relating to railroad operation. All the policies of the Office of Defense Transportation designed to bring about the maximum utilization of equipment and prevent wasteful operation were rigidly applied by the Federal manager, with the following conservation results :
Decreased car detention under the 24-hour release policy which increased the availability of cars.
Reduced congestions at principal terminals through tighter control over shipments.
Reduced number of trains operated by increasing length of trains.
Reduced overloading of cars to a minimum through better loading practices.
Reduced empty car mileage by better routing and loading.
Reduced special passenger trains and special cars by conforming to General Order ODT No. 33.
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Reduced wasteful car operation through setting up a car pool.
Of the remaining railroads on the island, which together handled only approximately 25 percent of the rail traffic, the road next in importance to the American Railroad, was the Fajardo Development Company Line, operating 68.8 miles of road. Its prewar traffic, according to the report of the Governor of the island for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, was composed of the following freight movements, stated in short tons: Sugar, 23,246 tons; cane, 529,878 tons; and general merchandise, 17,853 tons. The traffic of the other roads was smaller, some primarily serving plantations, but practically all being drawn into the heavy military traffic. For the last quarter in 1944 out of a total of 1,665 car movements for the armed forces and the Federal agencies, 1,217 were army car movements, in addition to four special troop trains. There were also 40 car movements for special army projects. The military activity on the island arose out of the fact that Puerto Rico was a key defense post for the Panama Canal.
Conserving Motor Transport
The transportation problem in Puerto Rico, in reference to rubber-borne motor transport, was (1) to put it in physical condition to function more fully through supplying it with tires and replacement parts; (2) to so direct its utilization that the available equipment would be able to take care of the essential traffic; and (3) to so maintain and operate the equipment that it would last over the critical years of the war.
The first part of the program was taken care of through obtaining for Puerto Rico greater consideration in the allotment of tires and equipment, and improving the rate of flow of repair and replacement parts from the mainland. The second part of the program was effectuated through the adoption and enforcement of a series of general orders specifically applicable to Puerto Rico, in addition to the enforcement of regulations applicable to all of the United States and territories, such as General Order ODT No. 14, prohibiting automobile racing and thrill exhibitions, until its revocation on May 9, 1945; General Order ODT No. 35, exercising control over acquisition and transfer of motorized equipment by branches of the Federal Government, and the freezing of commercial local transportation vehicles in their services and routes, until the revocation on October 15, 1944, of the “freeze” provision of that Order.
The trouble spots in passenger transportation centered around local public transportation, which was laxly controlled, particularly in the matter of taxicab or on-call services. Taxicabs comprised two
classes of operations, those which served the public exclusively and “publicos,” which were in fact private automobiles, serving primarily their owners, but which were also licensed to do public “jitney” service. They were allowed greater gasoline rations than strictly private cars.
The Office of Defense Transportation struck at the wasteful operations and chaotic conditions that prevailed in the taxicab field through its General Order ODT No. 29, regulating taxicabs in Puerto Rico. It prohibited certain wasteful operational practices, and the vehicles were held strictly to essential transportation within certain fixed geographical limits. These vehicles were also held to the established maximum speed limit of 48 kilometers per hour. They were the largest single violators. Out of 2,357 convictions against speed violators in a 13-month period, 1,045 were against the operators of taxicabs, 878 involved private automobiles, 380 trucks, and 58 operators of insular Government vehicles. Suspension of operations for from 2 to 4 weeks was the usual penalty. This was done through withdrawal of the certificate of war necessity for commercial vehicles, suspension of the gasoline rations by the Office of Price Administration for private vehicles, and disciplinary action by the Provost Marshal if the offender was of the Army personnel.
The situation with the busses in Puerto Rico was not as chaotic as with the large number of taxicabs, but the bus problem, particularly intercity, was nonetheless grave. There were 1,441 miles of highways on the island. Some of them paralleled the railways on the coastal plains. Many of the roads, however, crossed the island over the ridge of mountains that traversed its length from east to west. There were sharp curves and steep grades in abundance. They made rough going for tires and vehicles, which, on the average, were driven by men who were not trained to careful operation. There was under-inflation of tires in order to insure smoother riding, overloading, and a wide disregard of the maximum speed limit. The result was that when the Office of Defense Transportation came to Puerto Rico there were many idle vehicles due in part to lack of essential replacement parts. The serious conditions applied also to the operation of city busses. Here the situation was augumented by wasteful use of equipment. In large cities like San Juan, there were too many scantily loaded busses operating in the dead hours of the day. The regional director reported that busses, particularly in the metropolitan areas, were badly in need of tires, and that a great number of vehicles were out of commission owing to lack of spare parts.
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To meet the situation, General Order ODT No. 36, for regulation of common carriers in local transportation, was made effective on January 15, 1943, and through its application much wasteful operation and duplication of service were eliminated, and the extension of old routes and the inauguration of new ones were brought under control. In a similar manner the situation with regard to intercity bus operations was brought under control through General Order ODT No. 27, which followed closely the pattern of General Order ODT No. 11, by which intercity bus operations on the mainland were regulated. Teeth were put into these and other Office of Defense Transportation regulations through the issuance in March 1943 of General Order ODT No. 21 A, requiring all commercial vehicles to obtain certificates of war necessity. Prescribing the conditions and the purpose for which such vehicles might be operated, and being subject to suspension or revocation in whole or in part “for wilful violation of any order of the Office of Defense Transportation, or other good cause,” the control over the whole commercial vehicle situation was made more effective through this order. The suspension of the certificate of war necessity was frequently applied for violation of the maximum speed regulation. Private automobiles were not covered by the Office of Defense Transportation regulations, but the Office of Price Administration acted in speed-violation cases involving private automobiles by suspending gasoline rations.
Cooperation With the Authorities
The cooperation in Puerto Rico between the Office of Defense Transportation and the Office of Price Administration and with the Governor and the Public Service Commission of the island in dealing with their related problems was very close throughout the war. The cooperation of the military authorities through the Provost Marshal, and afterward with the insular police, was helpful in enforcing the maximum speed limit. The Provost Marshal certified all instances of such violations by passenger car drivers to the Office of Defense Transportation, which investigated them and certified the violators to the Office of Price Administration. That agency then took punitive action through denying to the offenders gasoline rations for periods of from 2 to 4 weeks.
There were other situations which sometimes involved possible conflict in policy or authority between Federal and insular agencies. One such instance arose in connection with tire rationing. The Office of Price Administration Order RO-1B, applying to Puerto Rico required as proof of eligibility for passenger common carriers the holding of a certificate of convenience and necessity from the insular Public
Service Commission. There were some 5,850 vehicles engaged in this work with only 850 such certificates issued to them. Through cooperation between the three agencies a plan was evolved whereby the Public Service Commission would issue such certificates to the rest of these operators only on prior approval by the Office of Defense Transportation, to insure conformity with its transportation conservation policy. By the end of 1943 the Office of Defense Transportation had approved applications involving 1,600 operators. This number, with the 850 previously issued by the Public Service Commission, made a total of 2,450 such certificates issued, which it was felt would meet satisfactorily the intercity bus requirements on the island.
The motor truck situation was considerably worse than the passenger carrier problem. There was no attempt to control their numbers or their operations. All that a truck owner had to do was to purchase his tag and he could embark in the public trucking business, without reference to convenience and necessity. The answer to the situation was the certificate of war necessity, which was provided for in General Order ODT No. 34. Under it the control over the essentiality and maintenance of trucks was established. Other Office of Defense Transportation General Orders Nos. 30, 31, and 32 covered the entire range of truck traffic from loading restrictions to elimination of unnecessary operations, including widespread cross-hauling by truck operators, especially in connection with hauling sugar cane during the annual cane-grinding season. Some 2,500 trucks we/e utilized in this work. About 2,000 were engaged in hauling sugar cane to the mills, and the remainder in moving the sugar from the mills to the ports.
Curb on Overloading
The chief violators of General Order ODT No. 30, prohibiting the overloading of trucks, were the haulers of sugar cane. A check of the loads during the cane-grinding season in 1943 showed that on 100,894 out of 394,818 trips, or 25.5 percent, the trucks were overloaded from 5 to 20 percent. The following year, however, this percent dropped to 24.4, and in 1945 to 13.85 percent. Overloading of 20 percent was permissible on the mainland but not in Puerto Rico. The regional director reported that before the Office of Defense Transportation regulations went into effect, the average overload under normal conditions was at least 50 percent. The checking was done with the cooperation of the sugar*“centrals” where the cane was brought for grinding. These “centrals” or mills allotted to the truckers their gasoline rations. Where a trucker was a constant or excessive violator, he
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was refused gasoline rations at the request of the Office of Defense Transportation. The first season’s operations showed that the maintenance costs of trucks under the reduced overloading program had been lowered considerably, according to the statements of plantation managers.
The shortcomings of the trucks engaged in general hauling were largely the same as those for the crosscountry busses: under-inflation of tires for easier riding, overloading, speeding, poor driving, back-hauling, and poor maintenance. Such conditions made heavy demands on the small supply of repair parts and tires for a large fleet of property carriers. The regional director of the Office of Defense Transportation reported at the close of 1942 that not a single motor vehicle axle had been imported during the year for Puerto Rico’s motorized vehicles which in that year comprised 5,850 common carriers of passengers and 8,584 trucks, of which 3,440 were light and 5,144 were heavy trucks.
To replenish the truck fleet in Puerto Rico applications were approved for new commercial vehicles aggregating 1,389 units. In the beginning application's for trucks in Puerto Rico were handled by the War Production Board direct through its representative on the island, but beginning with December 1943, that agency began to refer all applications for new commercial vehicles to the regional director of the Office of Defense Transportation for investigation and recommendation. This continued until July 1, 1944, when the Office of Defense Transportation was authorized by the War Production Board to take over the entire task of rationing new commercial vehicles without reference to the Board. Accordingly, the Office of Defense Transportation issued General Order ODT No. 44, replaced later by General Order ODT No. 44A, and in it provided that “an applicant located in Puerto Rico shall file the application with the regional director of the division of Puerto Rican Transport.” The Office of Defense Transportation also issued Administrative Order ODT No. 27, and then Administrative Order ODT No. 27A, which prescribed the procedure for the transfer of trucks, trailers, etc., from one person to another, and for the allocation of a new truck or tractor in Puerto Rico. Transfers of trailers when no new trucks were required, and new commercial vehicles of light
weight were disposed of locally by the regional director, with appeal to the director of Puerto Rican Transport in Washington.
Considering that during 1942 and 1943 very few trucks had come into Puerto Rico, and that the deterioration of the vehicles in use was very heavy, the total number of applications for new commercial equipment over a period of 3 years was moderate. The registration figures over a period of 4 years show that 52 more trucks were registered in 1942 than in 1941, when the truck registration totaled 8,584 vehicles. In 1943 the registration was greater by 346 trucks than in 1942, and in 1944 when a total of 8,608 trucks was registered, 318 more trucks were recorded than in the previous year. This year-by-year increase in registration of trucks is interesting in the light of the fact that the registration of all motor vehicles dropped from 32,195 in 1941 to 27,333 in 1944, a decrease of 4,862 vehicles of all kinds over a period of 3 years.
The principal function of the regional director in regard to water transportation was to prevent traffic congestion at the docks. In 1943, not including tankers, empties for loading sugar, Army transport or Naval supply ships, a total of 158 commercial vessels docked in Puerto Rico. Congestion at the piers was practically eliminated. This was due to the tight control over land transportation to the docks through the permit system, the practice of segregating cargoes by ports in loading the ships, which the Office of Defense Transportation constantly urged, and requiring consignees to remove their unloaded freight from piers within 48 hours.
Virgin Islands ,
Transportation on the Virgin Islands was of such minor nature that the Office of Defense Transportation did not set up an organization in that possession, but vested jurisdiction over the island’s transportation in the regional director’s office in San Juan, P. R. A half dozen taxis were in daily operation in St. Thomas, and most of the 60 trucks were not active. In St. Croix, there were 140 trucks owned by a Federal agency. The private passenger cars in use numbered 126. Arrangements were made that enabled the Puerto Rico headquarters to act promptly should necessity arise.
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CHAPTER XXXVI
HAWAIIAN TRANSPORT
Hawaiian transportation was being controlled under two forms of administration before the Office of Defense Transportation’s territorial director entered upon his duties in August 1943. Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the military forces took over the administration of the Government under a military governor, who remained in control until March 10, 1943, when the civil control, except in a few matters closely connected with military defense and operations, was returned to the jurisdiction of the civilian governor. The exceptions related to blackout, defense plant labor, and certain utilities and essential businesses.
The military governor almost immediately set up an agency for control of land transportation, known as the LTC, or Land Transport Control. This organization proceeded to ration gasoline and tires, and to regulate miscellaneous phases of transportation. The military governor was appointed as Office of Defense Transportation Allocation Officer for Hawaii, and as Office of Price Administration representative to ration tires and gasoline. The military governor adapted to the needs and conditions in the islands such Office of Defense Transportation general orders as he felt would serve the purpose. Thus he issued his General Order No. 147 for control of taxicabs, based on General Order ODT No. 20. He undertook to control the chartering of busses along the lines of General Order ODT No. 10, through cooperation instead of through the issuance of an order. The military governor also put into effect the staggered-hour program, not through persuasion, but by an enforceable general order. He maintained a current file on the ownership, location, capacity, and availability of all trucks in the territory. Likewise, the military governor had the Office of Civilian Defense work out a pooling arrangement by truckers for the hauling of produce to the cities and supplies to the farm. “Other parts of the job of rationalizing of motor transportation,” says the Office of Price Administration summary under date of May 1,1943, “were assumed by the tire and gas rationing subunits of LTC. Acting more or less informally and relying on the cooperation of merchants, who were
probably induced through their fear of otherwise being cut off from gasoline and tires, the LTC put into effect bans on call-backs, on all special deliveries, and required merchants to cut their retail and wholesale deliveries substantially. Here also many of the ideas came from ODT orders which were all carefully studied, but were never adopted in the sense of being officially promulgated.”
When the military rule over the Hawaiian Islands, except in a few matters closely related to military security and operations, came to a close, there was considerable ill feeling among the public and officials over the firm reign by the military governor. There was also a feeling of distrust, that with the return to civilian control the various war agencies of the mainland might invade the islands and take over direction of such activities as came within their respective provinces. So, on the'eve of the change from military to civil control the legislature of the Territory of Hawaii adopted a concurrent resolution on February 20, 1943, requesting the War Production Board, the Office of Price Administration, the Office of Defense Transportation, and the Secretary of Agriculture, each to appoint the Governor of Hawaii as its representative, and to direct their respective agencies in Hawaii, to modify or suspend the application to Hawaii of their respective regulations, orders, and directives, as the Governor might request, pending appeal by him to the headquarters of the agencies in Washington, D. C. This request went far beyond the position taken by any of the 48 States, in each of which the agencies had State, district, or local organizations.
To this resolution the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation replied on March 10, 1943, saying, “We have not yet established a regional office in the Territory, but the need for such an organization is under consideration. In the course of this study we shall give careful attention to the resolution of the territorial legislature.” Substantially the same response was given to the Governor of the Territory in reference to his messages to the Interior Department which were strongly in support of the request of the legislature. However, on March 17, 1943, the
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Director of the Office of Defense Transportation appointed the Governor of Hawaii as Local Allocation Officer so that the clearance of requests for equipment might not be interrupted. Shortly thereafter, the Governor designated the territorial official who later became the ODT assistant regional director, to take over the function of allocating vehicles. On April 27, 1943, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation further authorized the Governor of the Territory to serve ad interim as special representative of the Office of Defense Transportation for the purpose of issuing special permits contemplated by General Order ODT No. 20, relating to the physical transfer of commercial local passenger equipment.
ODT Enters the Field
On July 22, 1943, directions were given for opening of the Office of Defense Transportation’s office in Honolulu, with a regional director, an assistant director, and a small clerical staff. The office began to function on August 21, 1943, with the arrival of the new director in Honolulu. The policy of the Office of Defense Transportation was promptly made clear. In the words of the regional director, it was not to take over in Hawaii but to work in cooperation with the established civil territorial Government. The necessary orders for control of transportation were offered as Hawaii Defense Act Rules. They were prepared by the Office of Defense Transportation regional office, and submitted to the Assistant Attorney General for clearance as to legality. The Hawaiian adaptation of General Order ODT No. 20A, regulating taxicabs, was already in force, the civil governor having taken the military governor’s order as an order of the civil administration. In a like manner, he also had adopted and promulgated the military governor’s order establishing staggered hours in the Honolulu business section.
The Office of Defense Transportation’s policy in Hawaii which met with public favor, and with cooperation from the Government and the operators generally, called also for a wide measure of joint administration. In his report of October 13, 1943, the regional director of the Office of Defense Transportation for Hawaii offered the following suggestion of jurisdictional procedure which, in the main, became the pattern for administering control over transportation in that Territory :
(1) Let the Office of Defense Transportation apply its general policies to the situation here with detailed policies revised to suit local conditions. Let this cover all phases of transportation wherein the Office of Defense Transportation and the Territorial Governor believe it can improve the present transportation situations.
(2) Let the Territorial Governor designate the regional director of the Office of Defense Transportation as the Director of Land Transportation for the Territory of Hawaii, and let
the present Hawaiian Director of Land Transportation be appointed chairman of Emergency Land Transportation. The assistant directors of Land Transportation on each of the islands to continue to function
(3) Let the Office of Defense Transportation withdraw General Orders ODT Nos. 20A and No. 26A as applied to the Territory covering those requirements in (4) below.
(4) Let the Governor with suggestions from Office of Defense Transportation issue orders covering all policies, rules, etc., which are considered desirable by the Office of Defense Transportation. These to be administered by the director of Land Transportation who would also be Territorial director of the Office of Defense Transportation.
(5) Office of Defense Transportation would retain all its authority to step in at any time and issue orders which might need the Federal authority back of them or which might be needed to go beyond the authority of the Territorial governor.
As a result of the jurisdictional cooperation between the Territory of Hawaii and the Office of Defense Transportation, the governor of the Territory designated the regional director of the Office of Defense Transportation as director of Land Transportation of Hawaii. The Territorial director of Land Transportation on each of the islands was designated by the Office of Defense Transportation as its director of Land Transportation in the respective jurisdictions.
The governor of the Territory of Hawaii fitted into the picture of transportation control as an active, cooperating partner, rather than in the role of controlling factor, as was visioned in the concurrent resolution of the Territorial legislature. In the last analysis, all authority over civilian transportation stemmed back to the Executive orders creating the Office of Defense Transportation and extending its functions to the territories and possessions. The spirit of cooperation between the Office of Defense Transportation and the Territorial Government prevailed during the critical stages of the transportation period, and enabled the Office of Defense Transportation to accomplish its task in a manner satisfactory to Federal and Territorial authorities and the people.
The first judgment of the regional director of the Office of Defense Transportation in a report written October 13, 1943, was that “transportation in the Territory is not critical and does not appear likely to become so. It is in a development stage and is undergoing expansion pains emphasized by the lack of proper local regulation, control and direction.” This first appraisal held good throughout the administration of the Office of Defense Transportation in the Territory, but the Control steps, coupled with the easing of restrictions on materials and equipment by the War Production Board, brought steady improvement.
Railway Transportation
The regional director referred entirely to land civilian transportation, and chiefly to rubber-borne
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operations, as the War Shipping Administration exercised control over shipping activities. Railroad transportation was not disassociated from the problems of rubber-borne transport, as the three common carrier roads in the Territory also operated substantial fleets of over-the-road trucks and busses. The railway situation itself offered no serious problems except in the matter of manpower and equipment to take care of the increased war traffic. Especially on the Island of Oahu, on which Honolulu and Pearl Harbor are located, the military authorities had to help the Oahu Railroad and Land Co. over its equipment difficulties in order to meet their own transportation needs. This line, like the other two common carrier roads in the Territory, is under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In its report to that body, as of December 31,1944, it listed equipment to the value of $9,960,365. Its total length of route was 86 miles, over which it maintained service on a 24-hour basis, with 26 locomotives, 1,460 freight cars and 62 passenger cars. Its operating revenue was $3,911,270. Its rail passenger movement increased seven times, and its ton-mile freight increased four and one-half times, over the first year of the war. In addition to the rail service, the company operated a large fleet of trucks over the road, which showed a 250 percent traffic increase, while its fleet of busses also showed a heavy increase. The principal freight business of this line in addition to sugar, pineapples, etc. was freight for the military forces, although a heavy passenger movement developed to and from Pearl Harbor. This rail movement was supplemented by the operation of a large fleet of trucks and busses. The principal problem which the regional office of the Office of Defense Transportation faced in connection with the passenger operations in Oahu was the heavy irregular movement of military personnel. The problem also of handling liberty parties in lots of 15,000 men, sometimes as many as 30,000, beside the regular transportation of the 25,000 men employed at Pearl Harbor, resulted in impossible transportation situations on liberty days.
The second largest railway in the Territory was the Hawaii Consolidated Railway which operated 78.58 miles of route out of Hilo, on the Island of Hawaii. Its equipment at the close of 1944 comprised 8 locomotives, 6 passenger coaches and 245 freight cars, which represented practically no increase over the prewar equipment. The road, nevertheless, carried additional traffic to the extent of 124,000 tons in a year over what was considered its prewar capacity. This additional traffic was for other than its prewar consignees, according to its report to the Governor of the Territory. The work of this railway
was increased through lengthening of hauls by the closing of all but one port for security reasons. This was the experience also on the other Islands. The operating revenues during 1944 were $1,231,836 for freight and $25,017 for passenger traffic. Serving plantations was its chief activity. This was the only standard gauge railway in the entire Territory. The roads in Oahu and Maui were narrow gauge. As on the other Islands, it was not the railroad situation, so much as local mass transportation, that required the attention of the Office of Defense Transportation’s Regional Office.
On the Island of Maui, about 70 miles from Honolulu, there was a short common carrier railway, the Kahului Railroad Company. It operated a route 26% miles long with an equipment comprising 4 locomotives and 359 freight cars. It had no passenger equipment, but it operated a fleet of 30 busses, which carried two-and one-half million passengers in 1943. Its freight equipment was supplemented by 56 trucks for serving plantations. The operating revenues of the railroad in 1944 amounted to $534,390, all of it freight. It moved on an average over 32,000 tons of rail freight a month. In addition, the road operated 56 trucks and 18 trailers. Its tariffs for rail traffic were filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. It had no tariff for its traffic by trucks. Consideration for hauling was on a letter agreement. Each customer requesting service agreed to pay a certain amount per ton or per package.
In addition to the three common carrier railroads there were in the Territory at the outbreak of the war approximately 30 narrow-gauge private service (plantation) roads equipped with 121 locomotives and 11,787 cars. The operations usually were from the fields to the sugar mills. By means of portable tracks the transportation could be shifted from one place on the plantation to another, and thus connect with the stationary track the various areas of harvesting operations. It was found, however, by some operators that operation by heavy truck was more economical and that fewer employees were necessary, so a number of the private rail operations were replaced by motor vehicles.
Local Mass Transportation
The local mass transportation problem in the Territory, in so far as it concerned the regular movement of the civilian and the very large military personnel and war-plant workers, was fairly satisfactorily taken care of by reason of the cooperative spirit of the transport operators. It was the unpredictable heavy Navy liberty traffic that swamped the available transportation facilities. “The Navy thinks nothing of turning 14,000 or 15,000 servicemen loose on liberty with practically no notice,” the re
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gional director reported. “The Army and Navy have busses and trucks which they use to transport workers to and from certain defense and construction projects. These are not used to transport servicemen on leave although they could be available for such use between the times when they were needed by workers. This use of equipment (other than equipment which was used or designed for use in active service) ties up an extensive source of transportation equipment which could relieve the peak loads caused by emergency leaves, etc. Another unused source of equipment is that stored in certain armed forces storage yards waiting for repairs or stored there between construction jobs. Much of that could be used in emergency transportation. For instance, there are a number of 140-passenger bus trailers which are not being used but held by the armed forces: There is no attempt to use equipment cooperatively.”
Honolulu had the largest mass passenger traffic problem in the Territory. It was served by the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., Ltd., originally an all-electric street car operation. It changed over to a bus and trolley coach operation shortly before the war. In the period of high war activity on the island in 1943, it operated 316 electric trolley coaches, gas busses, and Diesel-electric busses. They served 108 miles of one-way route and carried on the average approximately 275,000 passengers per day. The equipment was in good order and a large stock of replacement parts was maintained. The problems presented related chiefly to the quality of the manpower available for operating the vehicles.
The taxicab situation on Oahu presented difficulties due to ineffective control by city and county ordinances. In 1943, there were 693 taxicabs in service. Of these, 475 operated in Honolulu, 72 in the rural district, and 146 operated from point-to-point, that is on a fixed route. The taxis served well for the essential driving on the island. The so-called “point-to-point” taxicabs operating on a fixed route, and in some instances on a schedule, carried seven passengers and were a substitute for the local bus in smaller rural communities.
On the Island of Hawaii, the county Government in the city of Hilo exercised control over the transportation situation through confining passengercarrying operations to such persons as were given franchise. There was not a heavy transportation traffic, and a form of vehicle called a “Sampan” which is a taxicab rebuilt to accommodate 12 persons, served very well in lieu of the bus. In 1944 and 1945 larger busses were brought into Hilo to replace the sampans on the heavy traffic routes.
Passenger transportation on the Island of Maui
was effectively handled by the Kalului Railroad Company which was the only large operator on the island. The road had 30 busses and 7 smaller vehicles in operation which carried an average of 248,-000 passengers per month. There were also 91 taxicabs operating on the Island of Maui.
Staggered Hours in Honolulu
The mass transportation in the City of Honolulu was given great assistance through a staggered-hour edict that covered the congested commercial area of the city. Elsewhere throughout the United States the staggered-hour program was not based on compulsion, but on cooperation. Under the edict of the military governor, and that of the civil Territorial administration which followed, Honolulu had a vigorous staggered-hour rule. When the War Manpower Commission at the close of 1943 decreed a 48-hour week in lieu of the existing shorter week for the Territory, the staggered hour edict was revised by the civil Governor to meet the change. The assistant regional director of Land Transportation put the new order into effect. The edict defined the congested area and divided the commercial establishments into five groups and prescribed the closing hours substantially as follows :
Group A—To close at 3:45 P.M. or earlier or if on shifts, the afternoon shift shall be before 3:30 P.M.
Manufacturing & manufacturing plants, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.
Transportation, communication and public utilities.
Group B—To close at 4:00 P.M.
Canneries and can manufacturers (Except in pineapple peak periods).
Territorial, city, and county government.
Group C—-To close at 4.00 P.M. or 4:15 P.M.
Construction and related operations, agriculture, forestry and fishing commission merchants, wholesaling.
Group D—¡To close at 4:15 P.M. or 4.30 P.M. Laundry and clothes cleaning establishments. Barbering, tailoring, and dressmaking.
» Printing, publishing and public service organizations other than governmental.
Any business of a type not otherwise specifically mentioned herein.
Group E—To close at 5:00 P.M. or later.
All retail establishments.
The regulation did not prescribe the opening hours, and did not apply to Sundays or holidays, or to certain specified classes of retail business, such as drug stores, food stores, hotels, etc., or to establishments the closing hours of which were otherwise established by law; or in regard to employees engaged in the occupation of retailing ice or milk, preparing or serving food, operating a public carrier, serving as watchman, janitor, or stevedore; or to any employee who normally stopped work at any time other than between 3:30 and 5:00 P.M.
Improving Equipment Situation
In 1944 the Office of Defense Transportation’s regional director in view of the growing demands on
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local transportation in Honolulu and the need for replacing worn-out equipment, approved the allocation of 25 new trolley coaches and 50 additional gasoline busses, all of 44-passenger capacity, for the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., the principal passenger carrier. The 50 busses were delivered in 1945 in lots of 7 vehicles per month, owing to the shortage of shipping space. Faster delivery of the equipment would have gained nothing as under the critical manpower situation it was not feasible to put busses into service at a faster rate. A special committee of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Naval Affairs, which visited Honolulu in March 1945, took cognizance of this situation in its recommendations as follows :
The transit system of this area should be augmented with more busses and staffed with more drivers. Greatest assistance can come from the War Production Board in granting, priorities, the War Shipping Administration in assigning shipping space, and the Army and Navy in permitting its uniformed personnel, while off duty to man the busses.
The chief local transportation problem in the Territory, especially in and around Honolulu, was the sudden great expansion of the traffic, 320 percent in 1944 over 1941, with but 60 percent increase in vehicles. The adjustment that was involved is indicated by the following consolidated statement of the Public Utilities Commission of the Territory of the passenger operations on the Island of Oahu (Honolulu and suburbs) :
Year .Passengers carried Miles operated Vehicles used
1941 42,166.284 74,241,506 110,110,680 133,777,630 8,886,332 278
1942 13,677,485 894
1943 17,064,949 441
1944 18,460,769 448
The Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. trolley coaches and busses carried 92 percent of this traffic with 73 percent of the total equipment involved. The next largest single passenger carrier was the Oahu Railroad which in 1944 carried 3,037,823 passengers with 35 busses and with 1,408,016 miles of operation. On the other islands of the group the passenger traffic was much smaller, but facilities for handling it were also smaller. Yet the expansion of the traffic was everywhere taken care of except when the establishment of temporary military rest or recreation centers exceeded the capacity of the transportation facilities. Everywhere, however, the Office of Defense Transportation, the Office of Price Administration, and the Territorial government, working hand in hand, succeeded in achieving their prime object —to take care of the war load so far as handling the regular work and civilian personnel was concerned. In this respect, the records show there was never a
serious breakdown in local transportation, though there were some jittery moments.
Controlling Motor Transport
The Office of Defense Transportation’s general orders originally applicable to Hawaii Territory were gradually revoked. The 35-mile-an-hour speed limit and the ODT General Orders Nos. 20A, 26A, and 10A, regulating taxicabs, rental cars, and charter busses, respectively, were withdrawn and replaced by three Hawaii Defense Act Rules covering the same subjects. In the main, these Defense Act Rules followed the original Office of Defense Transportation Orders, but were modified to fit conditions on the Islands. In the Rule No. 90, governing taxicabs, were also a few regulatory provisions applicable to busses. These prohibited the operation of busses and taxicabs (a) for recreational purposes; (b) at more than 35 miles an hour; (c) for making commercial deliveries; (d) for cruising for passengers; (e) for sight-seeing purposes; (f) with less than a full load if it were possible to obtain the passengers without too much delay; and (g) unless the vehicles bore proper markings. There was no counterpart in the Territory for General Order ODT No. 11, covering intercity bus passenger operations. Between the general authority possessed by the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission over scheduled point-to-point transportation, by the Office of Price Administration in the matter of tire and gasoline rationing, and by the Office of Defense Transportation over allocation of new equipment, there was no pressing need for an order or rule to control the situation. As compared with truck or local mass transportation, the intercity bus activity was small.
Commercial vehicles in Hawaii were not required to obtain certificates of war necessity, as the General Order ODT No. 21 was not made applicable to the territories and possessions. The gasoline rationing of commercial vehicles was done by the Office of Price Administration through its Commercial Vehicle Board in whose sessions the regional director of the Office of Defense Transportation participated. The most serious lack of control over commercial vehicle operations concerned trucking. In 1944 the Public Roads Administration reported a total of 12,-955 trucks in the Territory. Approximately 60 percent or well over 7,000 of the trucks operated on Oahu Island, in and out of Honolulu. Hawaii Island, with its extensive sugar plantations and its average 60-mile hauls to Hilo, the only open port, employed considerably over 2,000 trucks.
Overloading of trucks was general throughout the Territory, due to the excessive demands of the war. This, with the war-worn condition of the roads and the rough work of moving the sugar cane from the
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fields to the mills and the hauls of the sugar from the mills to the port of Hilo was exceedingly hard on the tires, and t{ie constant call was for heavy-duty tires, which were equally scarce on the mainland.
, Motor Truck Operations
The plantation truck was a conservation problem of magnitude as well as an ever-present problem with the Office of Defense Transportation in obtaining tires and replacement parts to keep the Hawaiian sugar crop of around 850,000 tons a year in production. In a memorandum dated September 1, 1943, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association reported to the War Food Administration that the 37 sugar plantations on the Island hauled 3,500,000 tons of cane from the fields to the mills by motor truck. In the operation 300 heavy-duty trucks, largely of the 10-ton capacity type, were in daily service. In the hard, off-the-road operations, the life span of these trucks seldom exceeded 5 years. The plantation equipment on the Island of Hawaii alone also moved 150,000 tons of sugar and 50,000 tons of molasses to the port of Hilo for shipment to the mainland. The large part of this equipment was of unusually heavy construction, which added to the difficulty of obtaining spare parts. The tires on the trucks for use in the fields were 1300 x 24—10-ply, and there were crop losses through lack of mechanized equipment and labor shortage, but serious transportation breakdowns were averted.
The bulk of the for-hire trucking was done by operators who maintained no consistent rate structure, but changed it continually as circumstances seemed to warrant. There were but two important motor vehicle common carriers on the Island of Oahu. The operations were satisfactory and their rate structure was dependable and equitable. The operations of the numerous individual for-hire truckers were wasteful in the use of equipment. This situation led the military governor, soon after the war, to create a pool of the truckers operating between Honolulu and the rural farms, whereby the work theretofore done by 269 trucks was done on a more efficient scale by 39 trucks operating from four rural stations to which the farmers brought their products. The operation not only released from the farm to city haul some 230 trucks for other work, but by reason of the short hauls from farms to the substations it enabled the producer greater use of his equipment in his farm operations. In the beginning, the farmers’ pool was operated by the Office of Civilian Defense for the military government, but in August 1943 the farmers took over the pool and operated it themselves. It functioned efficiently throughout the war.
New Equipment
Not only did the operations under the grueling conditions that prevailed require a steady flow of repair and replacement parts, usually of the heavy-duty types, but also new equipment itself to replace worn-out trucks and new busses to meet the expanding passenger traffic demands. In March 1942, the Office of Defense Transportation designated the military governor as its local allocation officer to screen out initially the applications for new equipment. He served in this capacity until March 10, 1943, when the military government ceased to control transportation. The total applications and approvals for allocation of motor vehicles in the Territory of Hawaii from the beginning of the war to June 26, 1945 were as follows:
Type of vehicle Applications Approvals
Trucks: Light 341 293
Medium 832 802
Heavy 447 388
Total Trucks 1,620 1,483
Trailers 50 47
Third Axles .... ^ 106 91
Busses 75 50
Total vehicles 1,851 1,671
Transport Manpower
Transportation manpower in the Territory of Hawaii was an ever-present problem, arising out of similar causes as on the mainland, but complicated by the smaller reservoir of competent material to draw upon. Only 30.41 percent of the population was Caucasian, while the Japanese constituted 34.28 percent of the inhabitants of the islands. The native Hawaiian element was but 3.06 percent, while the part-Hawaiian amounted to 11,27 percent; Filipinos were 11.19 percent; and Chinese, 6.28 percent. Japanese were found in all types of key positions. The great majority of the bus and taxi drivers were Japanese. The net manpower shortage in 1943, when Hawaii was designated a “critical labor area,” was 14,000 workers. The war projects drew heavily on all forms of occupation. It stripped the plantations of nearly one-half of their employees and made impossible the harvesting of full crops of sugar. For war projects^ thousands of workers were brought in from the mainland. From the records of the Selective Service it was estimated that 32,000 registrants were war workers. All lines of transportation were heavily drawn upon for the war projects. Between March 1944 and March 1945 the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., already short of trained men, suffered a drop from 519 full-time drivers to 391. It managed to get along through the use of 144 part-time drivers, 60 of whom were soldiers who were permitted to work off duty. The average hours per
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week worked by the Honolulu vehicle operators were 56, including overtime. Approximately $1 an hour was the rate of pay, but at Pearl Harbor the men could get higher pay driving trucks. -
The situation in Honolulu was in the hands of the military authorities in so far as war workers were concerned, and the situation was steadily growing worse for the civilian employer, including transportation, when the War Manpower Commission stepped in and took over the labor field in Hawaii. The Selective Service, which already had affected transport personnel, also came to the rescue by giving blanket deferment to bus drivers on the Island of Oahu. Afterward, the Selective Servce adopted the policy of drafting men„between 18 and 29 years, first from unessential and then from essential employment, and lastly from “critically essential” occupations, which included the principal transportation services on the Island of Oahu. This helped stabilize the transport labor situation in Honolulu. The principal rapid transit company had 268 of its bus drivers subject to the draft. If all had been taken, it would have tied up 150 of its 316 busses and coaches. There was no new manpower reservoir to draw on. Government
labor recruiting agencies had calls from various activities for 2,200 women, and could fill only a minor part of the order. The Honolulu Rapid Transit Company attempted to recruit women bus operators and and got only three applications. The part-time employment of Army personnel off duty was, for a while, the only thing there was to rely on. “The Navy,” said the report of a Congressional committee that investigated the manpower and housing situations in Hawaii in 1944, “could well follow the policy of the Army in permitting its uniformed personnel to work while off duty on certified essential jobs.” The report also urged heavier recruiting of labor from the mainland to ease the manpower situation in the Territory.
At this time the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. lacked 84 full-time drivers necessary to keep its equipment in full-time operation. Yet, through ingenuity, cooperation, and the flexible services of the small operators of busses and taxicabs, the regular wartime traffic on the islands functioned continuously, without serious breakdown, though usually with a precarious margin of safety.
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CHAPTER XXXVII
ALASKAN TRANSPORT
The importance of Alaska in the scheme of controlled transportation arose out of the war preparations on the Alaskan mainland and the Aleutian Islands. These preparations began in 1940 with the enlargement of the port facilities at Anchorage and Seward and the creation of the large port of Whittier, south of Seward. At the outbreak of the war, Alaska was served by five steamship lines, covering 13 ports of entry. The total incoming shipping in 1937, a normal peace year, was 444,170 long tons, and the outbound was 335,862 long tons. The inland waterway operations were a biweekly service by the Alaska Railroad’s river line on the Yukon and the Tanana rivers. There were 470 miles of operation over the Government’s Alaska Railroad, with several short branches. Its passenger service approximated three trips a week in the summer and one in the winter between Seward and Fairbanks. The road moved 157,717 tons of freight in 1937 and 27,675 passengers. The Alaska Road Commission in 1942 reported that there were 6,984 registered motor vehicles of all classes, or one to each 10.4 persons. There were 2,288 miles of highway, 80 percent of which was usable for automobiles.
With the outbreak of war in December 1941, all this changed rapidly. The emphasis on the type of transportation changed from civilian service to war service; from intercity transport to local transport for mass movement of workers to and from war plants, and to trucking in connection with extensive war construction projects. This called for prompt action in controlling the taxicab and local bus operations, and in processing the applications for new trucks under the allocation responsibility delegated to the Office of Defense Transportation. It was these subjects, local transport and vehicle allocation, that represented the larger part of the activity of the Office of Defense Transportation in Alaska, in addition to its conservation program, which was especially essential on account of the bad condition of the equipment, the low state of replacement and tire stocks, and the long distance of Alaska from the sources of supplies in the States. Numerically, the fleet was small—2,494 trucks, 3,909 passenger automobiles, and 530 taxicabs and busses, in 1944—but much depended on it.
The War Production Board order rationing new motor vehicles covered the territories and possessions, and the applications for trucks and vehicles had to be cleared through the Office of Defense Transportation. For lack of ODT representatives in Alaska, the Governor of the Territory consented to serve as ODT Allocation Officer for Alaska. In the first 10 months under this arrangement, which began in April 1942, the Governor’s office processed 113 applications, mostly trucks, and most of them coming from interior Alaska, points very remote from Juneau, the seat of the Government. The work became more onerous as the tempo of war construction was stepped up, and in the next 4 months alone, 115 applications for vehicles were processed.
Control Over Taxicabs
There were other situations besides allocation of new vehicles that needed attention, and they were covered by ODT general orders applicable to Alaska. The most pressing of these were the on-call passenger vehicles, the taxicabs. There were barely enough of these vehicles in serviceable condition to meet the demands for transporting workers to and from military plants and construction jobs. They operated uncontrolled except for city licenses, and they were wearing out fast through neglect and wasteful operations.
The complaints pointed to violations of Office of Defense Transportation orders and policies. The Coast Guard captain, in charge of the 13th Naval District, reported unessential taxicab operation between Ketchikan and the evacuation camp for the Aleutian Islanders near Ketchikan, saying, “it has been definitely established that a great majority of these trips have not been of an essential nature.” An Office of Price Administration inspector from Kodiak reported that there was no regular inspection for cars driving on the road between Kodiak and Fort Greely, and that a large percentage of the cabs appeared to be in dangerous condition. He said there had been no compliance with the Office of Defense Transportation regulations, and that 50 percent of the available busses and taxicabs were not in operating condition on account of shortage of repair and replacement parts. The Kodiak operations embraced 66 taxicabs and 4 busses.
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General Order ODT No. 20 appeared to cover the situation, especially in the matter of controlling the numbers of these vehicles in accordance with the essential needs. The Office of Defense Transportation, however, had not yet extended its field operations to Alaska, and at its request the Office of Price Administration agreed to assist the Office of Defense Transportation through its local rationing boards, by making recommendations on applications to operate taxicabs. This was done by the Office of Price Administration’s director in Alaska, who had investigations made in the field and then submitted recommendations through the Office of Price Administrar tion to the Office of Defense Transportation in Washington.
The Office of Price Administration was limited by the arrangement to recommending to the Office of Defense Transportation whether specific applications for permits to operate taxicabs ought to be granted or denied. At the same time, the Alaskan director of the Office of Price Administration was confronted with complaints about wasteful operation, with urgent calls for special permits to meet emergencies, and requests for intercity bus operations. The situation was given attention by the Taxicab Section of the Local Transport Division, and on November 23, 1942, the chief of the Taxicab Section issued a letter to the Alaskan director of the Office of Price Administration delegating specific authority to that official to act for the Taxicab Section of the Division of Local Transport in handling the following matters in connection with the administration of General Order ODT No. 20:
Section 501.81.—It is satisfactory for you to issue special permits for the transfer of taxicab licenses where such transfer does not increase the number of taxicabs to be placed in operation. Also in communities where local licenses are not required, it is satisfactory to certify to your rationing boards as taxicabs any vehicles which are to be used for replacement purposes and do not increase the number of taxicabs in operation. In case application is made for permit to operate additional cabs, please refer applications to this Office with your recommendation.
Section 501.84.—You are authorized to issue special permits where in your judgment it is necessary to make exceptions to any provision of this section in order to meet specific needs or exceptional circumstances -or, to prevent undue public hardships.
Section 501.86.—You are authorized to accept and pass upon such reports as may be necessary under paragraph (c) of this section: To the transportation of passengers incidental to emergencies arising from an accident, sickness, death, public calamity or military necessity.
In effect, the letter conferred authority on the 'Alaskan director of the Office of Price Administration to act, without reference to Washington, in certain emergencies, so long as such action did not result in authorizing the installation of additional taxicabs. In the matter of permits for additional vehicles, the Office of Price Administration official could merely
submit a recommendation to the Office of Defense Transportation.
The Office of Price Administration, however, was dissatisfied with the mere extension of its functions to act with finality only in emergency cases. Its objection was voiced in a letter written January 28, 1943, from the Office of Price Administration’s director or region IX (territories and possessions) to Director Eastman of the Office of Defense Transportation, asking that the Office of Price Administration be relieved of this Alaskan arrangement. He wrote:
Within the past few weeks Mrs. Hermann (OPA Director for Alaska) has forwarded numerous requests for interpretations of the various Office of Defense Transportation regulations. We have consulted with representatives of the Office of Defense Transportation who deplore the present situation in Alaska. Our Director has but limited authority and no apparent enforcement powers, and. in view of the fact that the major portion of her time is devoted to price control and rationing activities, she has little time to devote to matters concerning the Office of Defense Transportation.
I would appreciate therefore, if you would find it possible to establish a small local office in Alaska. This would relieve Mrs. Hermann of the duties she is now performing by virtue of the delegation heretofore issued, and would enable you to resolve the many problems which seem to be pressing. Should you decide not to establish an office in Alaska, we would like to have Mrs. Hermann’s legal authority clarified in order to eliminate existing confusion.
The Office of Defense Transportation, however, was giving thought to the policy of centering control over its administration in Alaska in the hands of a staff of its own in that territory, and Director Eastman on February 21, 1943, withdrew the letter of authority given on November 23, 1942, to the Office of Price Administration Director for Alaska by the Taxicab Section of the Division of Local Transport. In this letter of revocation the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation wrote :
It is contemplated that in the near future it will be necessary for the Office of Defense Transportation to reexamine the need for wartime controls over the various types of transportation in the territories and possessions and formulate definite policies with respect thereto. This reexamination will in all probability make it necessary for us to revise General Order ODT No. 20 and other orders of this Office in respect of their applicability to Alaska so as to give effect to the policies formulated.
Until such time as we have completed our survey, it will be difficult for us to fully cooperate with you pursuant to the terms of the letter to you from Mr. Clewell Sykes, Chief, Taxicab Section, Division of Local Transport, Office of Defense Transportation, dated November 23,1942. Consequently, it is felt that you should not be held responsible for the administration of Order 20 in Alaska and the letter to you from Mr. Sykes should be considered to be withdrawn.
At about the same time, the Territorial Secretary of Alaska, speaking for the governor who was serving as Office of Defense Transportation officer for Alaska, expressed himself critically of the policy of administering affairs in Alaska from headquarters in the States, and of referring each administrative matter to officials in the States for determination. He wrote on June 4, 1943, that in a letter of March 31, 1943, he had proposed that the Office of Defense
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Transportation authorize him to have a part-time employee at Fairbanks where most of the truck allocation applications originated, and that the Office of Defense Transportation send someone from its staff to Alaska to “look the situation over.” He cited the increase of the Office of Defense Transportation’s allocation work and other war duties assigned to the Governor’s office and concluded as follows.
I call your attention to the facts with the thought in mind that it might in the long run be in the best interest of Government for you to establish your own office at some more strategic location in Alaska. If this cannot be done, I should far rather go on doing the work here than to have the applications sent to some point in the States for initial approval or for rejection, since our experience has been that there is too much time lost 'and too little knowledge of local conditions in administering matters pertaining to Alaska directly from the States.
ODT Opens Regional Office
During this period, and prior to the date of the foregoing letter, the Office of Defense Transportation was working out an administrative plan for Alaska. The Division of Review and Special Studies developed what the situation in Alaska was through an agent sent to the Territory in March, 1943. As a result of his report, the division on June 3,1943, recommended the establishment of an office in Alaska. This recommendation was adopted by the Office of Defense Transportation, and the Office of Alaskan Representative with headquarters at Fairbanks was created. Owing to distance, war conditions and slowness of transportation, considerable time elapsed in getting the Alaska office under way. Finally on March 31, 1944, the Office of Alaskan Representative was opened at Fairbanks. The Governor of Alaska, the Office of Price Administration Director for the Territory, and the Forestry Service cooperated generously in overcoming the difficult problems of getting the office located, staffed, and started.
The Alaskan representative took over the allocation of vehicles which the office of the Governor of Alaska had performed since February 1,1942, as well as all other Office of Defense Transportation functions applicable to Alaska, except the task of issuing local transport permits which was reallocated to the Office of Price Administration Director at Juneau.
The functions of the Alaskan representatives were defined in ODT Administrative Order No. 13, effective January 15,1944, as follows :
(1) To execute and issue the special permits contemplated by General Orders ODT No. 20A, covering taxicabs, and No. 2§A, covering rental cars ;
(2) To execute and issue the authorization as contemplated by section 501.307 of General Order ODT No. 35, prohibiting the physical transfer of commercial vehicles without prior permit, a section which was later revoked.
700494—48—18
The authority conferred by the order was subject to the general control and direction of the director, Division of Local Transport, Office of Defense Transportation, and could be exercised by such Alaskan representative through such agents or employees of the United States as he might designate.
The functions of the Office were extended by letters of instruction to include the processing of applications for allocating new vehicles which the office of the governor of the Territory had conducted since February 1, 1942, and to other essential work under the various ODT general orders and policies applicable to Alaska. The authority vested in the Alaskan representative for administration of the regulations of taxicabs, etc., were reallocated to the Office of Price Administration Director for Alaska, and the whole administrative control over transportation in Alaska, in so far as it came under the jurisdiction of the Office of Defense Transportation, was at the local level, subject to over-all control at the national level under the direction of the executive officer of the Office of Defense Transportation.
A transportation activity in Alaska that was not covered by the Office of Defense Transportation was the intercity bus, since General Order ODT No. 11, which provided for control of intercity bus operations was not made applicable to Alaska. Yet problems arose over the proposed inauguration or extension of such services. The situation was presented to the director of the Division of Local Transport by the Office of Price Administration Administrator for Alaska who wrote on March 27, 1944, as follows:
No local agency appears to have jurisdiction over busses in the Territory (except those which operate in municipalities). We are at a loss to know what to do with applications to enter bus service which we receive occasionally, and whicia may become more numerous with completion of highways.
Please advise us whether or not they should be referred to your office, or if bus companies may operate as intercity conveyances at will up here, provided busses can be obtained.
The Office of Defense Transportation proposed to control the intercity bus situation in Alaska through control over the release of equipment for such operations. New equipment could not be obtained without an allocation permit, while existing equipment, under section 501.307 (afterward suspended) could not be transferred from one service to another without Office of Defense Transportation sanction. “It is my suggestion” wrote the director of the Division of Local Transport, in reply to the foregoing inquiry, “that you advise carriers desiring to operate busses that they communicate with this office before commencing the operations. We would also appreciate your advising us of any proposed new operations that may come to your attention giving us your views as to the need for the proposed service.”
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In the matter of water transportation and port facilities which were especially closely identified with war operations, the control was entirely military, and presented no current problems for the Office of Defense Transportation. Earlier in the war, control by the Office of Defense Transportation over vessels was delegated to the War Shipping Board, including vessels operating at territorial ports, by General Order ODT No. 40.
Railway Situation
As to the railroad operation, no ODT railway measures were ever made applicable to Alaska. The principal line wag that of the Government-owned-and-conducted Alaska Railroad, operating from the seaports of Whittier, Anchorage, and Seward, to Fairbanks. Beginning with the pre-war defense preparations, its business increased rapidly, but the increases represented war traffic which was developed in connection with very extensive Army, Navy, and aviation projects. The peak of this traffic was reached in the fiscal year ending June 30,1944, and then it began to fall off steadily. The traffic trend during three years of the war, shown in the annual report of the road for 1944, was as follows:
1942 Total operating revenue.. .$5,951,590 Total operating expenses.. 3,496,813
1943 1944
$8,464,590 $11,289,637
3,950,631 6,025,083
These operations represented a huge increase in
traffic that called for a heavy increase in equipment of a road that in the years preceding the outbreak of the war moved only about 160,000 tons of freight and 26,000 passengers a year. The added equipment to meet this increased war operation included 6 new locomotives obtained from the Army ; 2 two Diesel engines obtained through the Office of Defense Transportation; 18 new flat cars; 20 new insulated box cars ; 50 used box cars ; 50 used gondola cars ; and 21 outfit cars converted from used refrigerator cars. The machinery of the Office of Defense Transportation as claimant agency for transportation was not invoked, except in the case of the purchase of the two new 1,000 horsepower Diesel switch engines. The road’s purchases were effected through its own or the Interior Department’s purchasing facilities, and it piloted its requirements through the War Production Board, with strong support of the military commanders, and against the background of Japanese troops still clinging tenaciously to some of the Aleutian Islands.
In the matter of transport personnel, which was a serious problem with the railroad, the Army also came to its support, detailing from April 1943 to the close of 1944, a labor battalion of 1,100 men to keep the line functioning on a scale sufficient to meet the demands of the military activities in that theater of the war.
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CHAPTER XXXVIII '
PARTNERSHIP WITH THE PUBLIC
The successful functioning of the Office of Defense Transportation rested upon its policy of taking the public into a partnership arrangement for adjusting the nation’s transportation to the problems arising out of the war. To accomplish this the public had to be educated on the requirements of the situation and then brought to acquiesce in and support the far-reaching wartime controls.
The medium for carrying out this policy was a well planned public relations program. Like other activities of the Office of Defense Transportation, the work started in a small way and then expanded as war demands increased. Its purpose was to keep the public closely informed on transportation developments and to rally it behind each of the Office of Defense Transportation’s national campaigns for the conservation and maximum utilization of transport facilities.
At first an information service for the agency was provided by the Division of Information of the Office for Emergency Management which assigned a staff of six persons to Office of Defense Transportation work. When, in June 1942, the Office of War Information was established, the Office of Defense Transportation set up its own Information Division with a staff that by the middle of July 1942 had increased to 18 members.
By the end of 1942 the staff was further increased to 37 members and there were created two main divisions, a news or press section, and a campaign or program section. The first of these sections devoted its efforts to keeping the nation informed on the fastmoving developments in transportation crises, and the second, to sparking the extensive campaigns designed to effectuate the policies and control measures of the agency.
As the work of the News Section increased it was organized under a section chief with information specialists assigned to the respective Office of Defense Transportation transport divisions. They prepared and issued press releases which reported Office of Defense Transportation activities. Normally a draft of a release was cleared with the proper Office of Defense Transportation operating official, and if it referred to another agency, clearance with such
agency was made through the Office of War Information. In the beginning distribution outside of the Office of Defense Transportation organization was done primarily by the Office of War Information, but from April 1,1943, to October 23,1944, a distribution unit in the Information Division handled the distribution of all releases, orders, and permits.
The News Section also handled newspaper clippings received from the division of press intelligence of the Office of War Information and later of the Bureau of the Budget. These came in daily in great numbers and were assorted, read, and mounted for presentation to operating officials. For a considerable period, digests of these clippings were made and distributed to operating heads and to regional information officers.
Launching National Campaigns
The Campaigns Section developed programs in cooperation with the Office of War Information and other Government agencies, and with the use of all media, to enlist public cooperation in meeting Office of Defense Transportation objectives. The program of this section at the end of 1942 called for large sums to be spent in printing pledges, handbooks, manuals, booklets, folders, posters, etc.
In a campaign to secure better utilization of railroad freight equipment, the Campaigns Section in 1943 prepared and gaye wide distribution to a folder “Getting over the Hump,” acting in collaboration with the War Transportation Efficiency Committee which represented war agencies, government departments, railroads, and shippers. This leaflet contained 22 suggestions to the railroads and 22 to shippers pointing out how freight equipment could be used more efficiently. This campaign was continued through the issuance of a cartoon sequence entitled “Give ’Em the Old 1-2,” depicting proper techniques for loading and unloading freight cars.
A local transit campaign was carried on with the cooperation of railway and bus carriers, using the slogan “War Traffic Must Come First.”
In 1944 the Campaigns Section was carrying on six Office of Defense Transportation campaigns as follows:
1. A “Don’t Travel” campaign to discourage unnecessary intercity rail and bus travel.
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2. A campaign to promote group riding and staggering of hours in order to conserve rubber and reduce the load on mass transit facilities.
3. A campaign to increase efficiency of railroad freight car handling by 10 percent.
4 A campaign to improve the maintenance of trucks ana busses and reduce the time spent in repairing this equipment.
5. A campaign to discourage business and social conventions during the war» entitled, “Conventions by Mail.
6. A campaign to promote joint action by private earners to increase efficiency of truck operations, entitled, bhare Your Truck.”
In campaigns involving the railroads the Association of American Railroads and individual railroads cooperated by helping to tell the Office of Defense Transportation story through their own posters and paid advertisements. Similar help was given by rapid transit lines in various cities and by industrial organizations and companies directly or indirectly concerned with transportation. Motion picture shorts were prepared and were used in motion picture theatres. Industry cooperated in the campaigns for maximum utilization of highway transport. The “Don’t Travel” campaign was aided by voluntary committees in practically every city in the country, and the “Va-cation-At-Home” idea was widely promulgated.
The work of this section continued with increasing momentum until the summer of 1945. Some idea of the activities of this section at the period of maximum effort may be obtained from a progress report made in April 1945, dealing with the “Vacation-At-Home” campaign. A two-color poster by Gluyas Williams was prepared under the direction of the Office of Defense Transportation and more than 275,-000 copies were distributed by the Office of War Information. The magazine Woman’s Day contributed a cartoon which was used in an issue distributed to some 3,000,000 people by the A&P stores. Several thousand copies of a “Vacation-At-Home” brochure were mimeographed and distributed through the Graphic Arts Victory Committee, the American Retail Federation, the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, the Industrial Recreation Association for American Industry, and various associations and corporations. The Treasury Department approved the insertion of 1,500,000 slips carrying the Office of Defense Transportation’s “Vacation-At-Home” message into Government pay envelopes. A similar message was carried on the front cover of one monthly issue of the War agencies telephone directory. A number of magazines used special boxes or editorials or feature articles plugging the “Vacation-At-Home” idea. A number of other magazines made plans to furnish similar cooperation which did not materialize owing to the unexpectedly early termination of hostilities.
Localizing the News
In July 1943, the Office of War Information liquidated its news bureau field offices following a cut in
its appropriation. The Office of Defense Transportation then, on July 21, set up its own field information service with five field offices. On September 10, the number was increased to nine, each with a field information officer and a secretary. These field information offices were located in New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Cleveland, Chicago, Kansas City, Dallas, Denver, and San Francisco. The field information offices handled matters involving local activities of Office of Defense Transportation district or regional offices, or the local aspect of ODT general orders or programs. They frequently took Washington releases and released them locally. It was found that in this'way, many stories of Office of Defense Transportation activities received a much wider play than when they were sent over press association wires from Washington. In a number of cases regional information officers had to handle news originating in their regions directly with the local press and on their own responsibility. The work of the regional offices on the whole was a valuable contribution to the success of Office of Defense Transportation programs. There was a certain amount of shuffling and consolidation of regional informational offices in 1944 and 1945 and all regional offices were closed in October 1945.
For a time in 1944 the Office of Information published an ODT News Letter prepared by the Division of Motor Transport and circulated within the organization. It contained pertinent news items regarding the work of the Office of Defense Transportation and other Government agencies.
After March 1944, the Information Office, which had been a part of the Director’s office, became a staff division with its chief a staff division director. At this time, the division had a personnel of 22 in Washington and an additional field force of 18.
During 1942 and 1943, Director Eastman followed the policy of outlining the aims and work of the Office of Defense Transportation to the public by making frequent speeches at important meetings throughout the country. These speeches were publicized by the Information Division. In 1944, after Colonel J. Monroe Johnson became Director, on account of the difficulties of the railroads in handling the tremendous load of military and civilian travel,, it became the policy of the Office of Defense Transportation to have its officials help in the “Don’t Travel” campaign by avoiding speech making outside of Washington. Thus it became more and more important to give wide publicity to speeches made by the Director and the officials in Washington. Many of these speeches, as well as radio talks by the Director and other officials, were widely publicized by the Division.
During the existence of the so-called ban on con
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ventions the Division assisted the War Committee on Conventions, which operated .within the framework of the Office of Defense Transportation from February to October 1945. Inquiries and protests came in daily from individuals and organizations affected by the convention ban. Similarly, the agreements by amateur and professional sports officials to limit sport-connected travel were drawn up by the Division of Information which conducted conferences and negotiations on these matters.
Fruits of the Labor
The Information Division participated in the campaigns to reduce holiday travel at each recurring holiday season, using posters, radio appeals, and special press releases with statements by the Director and other Office of Defense Transportation officials and representatives of the Government. The Division received many letters from individuals expressing their approval of these efforts, indicating that the campaigns were helping to flatten the peak of personal travel. At times when troop movements were very heavy, special appeals were made by use of all media at the command of the Division to make civilians understand that the country’s limited railroad equipment must be used primarily to carry troops first toward the battlefronts, and later to their homes.
The reasonableness of the entire Office of Defense Transportation conservation program had wide popular acceptance, and the ceaseless campaigns conducted by the Information Division resulted in winning a popular cooperation that helped make unnecessary threatened rationing of travel. On the whole, and throughout its existence, the Office of Defense Transportation was one of the war agencies which enjoyed popular support and widespread cooperation by voluntary organization of public-spirited citizens aggregating more than 6,000 committees with a
membership in excess of 100,000, as is shown in the table below:
Industry Advisory Committees
General Type of Committee Number Membership
Railway Transport: Tank Car Service 5 2 1 1 1 3 19 28 8 51 18 9 10 9 16 464 205 36
National Advisory Committees ............................. Industrial Alcohol, Distilled Spirits & Molasses Passenger Travel
Refrigerator Car Service ..................................... Railway Operations
Grain and Grain Products ■ Local Advisory Committees District Committees in Puerto Rico ................. Total
68 4 11 10 25 4,005 143 713 322 712 20 5,915 8 5 818 36 60 85 181 90,570 435 2,532 1,955 7,425 78 102,995 74 68
Water Transport: Great Lakes Committees Coastwise & Intercoastal ..................................... Inland Waterways
Total Waterways ......................................... Highway Transport: Fann Committees
.tor-Hire Property Carriers ...» Private Carriers
Petroleum Transport & Local Delivery Vehicle Maintenance ........................................ National Advisory Committees ............................. Total Highways ............................................ Transport Personnel: Manpower Committees , Labor & Labor-Management Total Transport Personnel Storage: Regional Consultants ,,,,, Legal: Advisory Committee
13 7 1 6,029 142 18 7 104,161
Total .................
They had been educated in regard to the transportation situations arising out of the war effort, and they served not only the primary purpose of providing the Office of Defense Transportation with expert counsel from the industries that were chiefly affected by the wartime control, but they also helped to secure and retain understanding support for these transportation regulations.
After VJ-day, the Information Division in common with other Office of Defense Transportation departments began a rapidly accelerating process of liquidation. All regional offices were closed, the Campaigns Section was terminated, and the office staff reduced. The activities of the News Section, however, continued to the end of the operations of the Division. In November 1945, the Division experienced a renewal of activity due to the necessity of making close contact with the press in connection with the Federal operation of strike-bound transport properties, and the hectic task of the Office of Defense Transportation in moving supplies to the ports for relief of postwar famine abroad.
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CHAPTER XXXIX
FEDERAL MANAGEMENT OF RAILWAY TRANSPORT
During the war emergency, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, in a series of Executive orders, was directed to take possession and assume control of certain transportation systems where operations had been interrupted by strikes, or were threatened by interruptions arising from labor difficulties.
He was directed to operate these properties through, or with the aid of such public officers, Federal agencies, or other governmental instrumentalities as he might designate. In each case a Federal manager was appointed for the seized property. Some of the operations were conducted directly by the Federal manager, and in other instances the Federal manager arranged with the owners of the properties to operate them subject to the general supervision of the Federal manager under a management contract.
The Executive orders provided generally for the return of the properties to the owners upon determination by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation that continued possession and control of the properties by the United States were no longer necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.
At first only railroad properties were involved. The Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad was taken over on March 21, 1942, and the American Railroad of Porto Rico on May 13, 1943. Later other forms of transport required Federal assistance in solving their labor difficulties, as shown below:
Federal possession and control over the following systems of transportation were taken by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation under various Executive Orders and were relinquished as follows: Railway properties:
Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad, March 21, 1942; Executive Order 9108; relinquished October 1, 1945; (direct Federal operation).
American Railroad of Porto Rico, May 13, 1943; Executive Order 9341; relinquished Juy 1, 1944. Illinois Central Railway System, August 23, 1945; Executive Order 9602; relinquished May 27, 1946; (management contract).
Principal railroads of the United States (general strike) May 17, 1946; Executive Order 9727; relinquished May 27, 1946; (management contracts).
Monongahela Connecting Railroad, June 14, 1946; Executive Order 9736; relinquished August 12, 1946; (management contract).
Motor truck properties:
Midwest Motor Carriers, August 11, 1944; Executive
Order 9462; relinquished November 1, 1945; (pari; Federal operation and part management contracts).
Chicago Teamsters, May 23, 1945; Executive Order 9554; Federal possession and control ended August 16, 1945; (management contracts).
Local transit properties:
Scranton Transit Company, June 14, 1945; Executive Order 9570; relinquished July 8, 1945; (management contract).
Capital Transit Company, November 21, 1945; Executive Order 9658; relinquished January 8, 1946; (management contract).
Towing properties:
.Great Lakes Towing Company, November 29, 1945; Executive Order 9661; relinquished December 18, 1946; (initial management contract was followed on July 19, 1946, by direct Federal operation which continued until properties were relinquished).
New York Tugboat lines, February 5, 1946; Executive Order 9693; Federal operation ended March 3, 1946; (management contracts).
After this general review of Federal management of transport by the Office of Defense Transportation, we now shall discuss the Federal management of railways. The following chapters will cover respectively the Federal management of motor transport and waterway transport.
TOLEDO, PEORIA & WESTERN RAILROAD
On March 21, 1942, the President of the United States issued Executive Order No. 9108 authorizing and instructing the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to take possession and operate the properties of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad. On the same day, Director Joseph B. Eastman appointed John W. Barriger, Associate Director of the Division of Railway Transport of the Office of Defense Transportation, Federal manager of the road. Mr. Barriger served as Federal manager until December 31,1942, when he resigned and was succeeded by Holly Stover. The President’s order was made effective at 6:00 P. M. on March 22,1942. This action brought an end to a strike of the railroad’s train, engine, and yard employees which had arisen out of failure of settlement of a dispute over wages and working conditions between the carrier’s management and the Brotherhoods of Railway Trainmen, and of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, representing those employees.
Summary of Labor Controversy
On November 10, 1940, the two brotherhoods served formal requests upon the Toledo, Peoria &
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Western Railroad for a new schedule of wages and working conditions. Wage rates which it then paid were below those in effect on other class I railroads operating in the same territory. The employees regarded the then effective rules governing the application of rates of pay to service performed and other working conditions as being less favorable to them than those established by other lines. There were the usual proposals, but at the time of the President’s action, more than a year had passed and the parties were not in accord. The services of the National Mediation Board had been invoked inconclusively.
The railroad management urged the National Mediation Board to recommend to the President of the United States that an “Emergency Fact Finding Board” should be appointed to investigate and report upon the controversy. This the National Mediation Board declined to do and suggested arbitration under the terms of the' Railway Labor Act. The railroad management, in turn, refused to accept this method of procedure. Thereupon the National Mediation Board withdrew from the case on November 21,1941. Following this action ,the brotherhoods circulated a “strike ballot” on November 29,1941, and on December 6, 1941, announced that the transportation employees would strike on December 9,1941.
An embargo was placed upon all freight traffic, but later this restriction was modified to apply only to perishable freight and livestock. The National Mediation Board on December 8,1941, requested the disputants to confer with it again on December 11,1941. Their acceptance of this invitation led to a postponement of the strike. These final efforts to solve the problem also proved fruitless and the railroad management on December 21,1941, issued formal notice that a new and unnegotiated basis of wages and revised rules of working conditions, which it had previously submitted to the employees, would be placed in effect on December 29,1941. All but two or three of the 109 men on the roster of transportation employees as of that date stopped work. The newly formed National War Labor Board assumed jurisdiction over the controversy and, following a hearing on February 27, 1942, ordered arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, as the National Mediation Board had previously recommended, but the railroad management remained firm in its refusal to submit the problem to this method of settlement. The War Department advised the President of the United States that the interruption in the train service of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad caused by the strike of its transportation employees was detrimental “to the successful prosecution of the war.” Following this informa
tion, Executive Order No. 9108 was issued on March 21,1942.
Basis for Settlement of Strike
On March 23, 1942, the Federal manager and his staff held several conferences with officers of the two brotherhoods to discuss the possibility of terminating the strike. The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation instructed the Federal manager to abrogate the unnegotiated schedule of wages and working conditions established on December 29,1941, and to afford the striking employees an opportunity to return to duty on the terms under which they had formerly worked, pending settlement of the controversy by the National War Labor Board. This proposal was accepted by the brotherhoods, and the strike was formally terminated at 11:59 P. M. on March 24, 1942.
The National War Labor Board retained jurisdiction over the labor dispute which was not settled by the resumption of operations under the former schedules of pay and working conditions. On April 3,1942, it appointed Benjamin C. Hilliard of Denver, Colo., a member of the Supreme Court of that state, to serve as arbitrator to investigate the controversy and submit findings and recommendations to the National War Labor Board. The owner corporation was invited to participate in the proceedings, but refused to appear. Hearings were held before Judge Hilliard in Chicago, RI., on May 6-8, June 10, and July 2,1942.
The Federal manager was not a party to the dispute over wages and working conditions applicable to the transportation employees of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad and did not participate in the hearings before the arbitrator. He indicated his willingness, however, to furnish any information needed respecting the probable effect of any new “rules” upon the operations of the railroad. Judge Hilliard asked the Federal manager to make a complete analysis of the schedule submitted by the Brotherhoods and to report the results of this study to him at a later date. Pursuant to this request, the Federal manager applied the terms and provisions of the proposed schedules to the work performed by each road and yard crew during the month of May 1942. The results of that study were submitted to the arbitrator at the hearing held on June 10,1942. The Brotherhood representatives requested the right to review the report of the Federal manager. The arbitrator thereupon recessed the proceedings for this purpose and to afford the Federal manager and the officers of the two labor organizations an opportunity to reach an agreement on the details of fair wages and equitable “rules” governing working conditions. Both parties accepted the eastern lines’ wage scales, which had been made effective by other class 1 railroads on Sep
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tember 1 and December 1,. 1941, and a basic schedule of rules was prepared by the Federal manager to embody the mutual understandings with respect to working conditions. The latter was supplemented by a memorandum of agreement between the superintendent of the railroad and the general chairman of the brotherhoods, dated June 29, 1942, for the purpose of adapting the standard rules to the operating necessities of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad. Three additional supplementary memoranda of understanding, dated July 7, August 3, and September 9, 1942, were later agreed to by the parties.
A final hearing before Judge Hilliard was held on July 2, 1942, at which the representatives of the two brotherhoods withdrew the proposed schedules of wages and working conditions submitted by them on May 6, 1942, and in lieu thereof substituted the schedules approved by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation on the preceding day, together with the supplementary memorandum. They requested the arbitrator to recommend to the National War Labor Board this basis for the settlement of the controversy. The employees also asked for “back pay” from November 10, 1940, the date of filing of their initial request for increased wages with the owner company.
War Labor Board Issues Directive
Judge Hilliard submitted his report to the National War Labor Board on July 23,1942. It recommended that the new schedules of wages and working conditions, which included the supplementary memoranda established by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, should be adopted as the basis of settlement of the controversy between the railroad corporation and its train, engine and yard employees. He also recommended that (1) these should be embodied in formal agreements between the parties (the Federal manager did not enter into any contracts, but issued schedules of wages and working rules as a pamphlet in the form of a notice to employees) ; and (2) the establishment of the “standard” wages of the class I railroads in the eastern district which should be made retroactive to November 10,1940. Judge Hilliard further recommended that if both parties to the controversy would accept these conditions, the property should be returned to the corporate owner for operation, after the terms had been fulfilled.
On October 9,1942, the National War Labor Board issued its directive order and opinion, dated September 23, 1942, approving all details of the settlement proposed by the arbitrator except in respect to “back pay” which it limited to the period beginning September 1, 1941. This was the date of the first of the
two increases resulting from the “wage movement” of that year. Those general advances which included a second one, effective on December 1,1941, had been ratified on December 3,1941, by the 21 standard railway labor organizations and the “Carriers Conference Committee.” The Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad was not a member of the conference committee, and the controversy between the railroad management and its transportation employees was approaching a crisis when the national railway labor dispute was settled.
The Brotherhoods of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and of Railway Trainmen notified the National War Labor Board on October 14, 1942, that they would accept the proposed terms for ending the controversy, but the railroad management rejected them on October 30, 1942. This refusal was followed by a series of telegrams from the president of the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad which criticized the National War Labor Board and the arbitrator designated to hear the case, and proposed a review of the entire question by a new proceeding which would be outside of the jurisdiction of the National War Labor Board.
The correspondence and exchange of telegrams between the National War Labor Board and the president of the Toledo, Peroria & Western Railroad culminated in the issuance by the former on November 4, 1942, of a “directive” holding that continued management of the railroad under the jurisdiction of the Government “for the duration” was imperative in the interest of the war effort. This directive further stated that the operation of this railroad by its owner corporation would result only in further labor trouble because of the latter’s refusal to accept the terms and conditions of the National War Labor Board’s final determination of the labor dispute.
Working Conditions on T. P. & W.
The arrangements under which the train and engine service employees worked prior to July 16, 1942, provided for no separation of yard and road services, and in this respect differed from the practices of practically every other class I railroad in the United States. The railroad management could absorb the benefit of road trips made in less than the time equivalent of the distance run by using road crews in yard service without extra pay, except for additional mileage run, if any, outside of yard limits up to the time limit for which overtime would commence. The practical result of this practice was to abolish mileage (piecework) as a basis of pay and substitute time on duty. The objection of the employees to this practice was second only to the controversy over “substandard” wage rates as a
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factor in the dispute between the employees and the management.
The terms of the schedule in effect prior to July 16, 1942, not only permitted the management to absorb the employees’ gains from road trips made in less than the time equivalent of the mileage run, but they also provided that miles run in excess of the minimum would be paid for at only one-half of pro rata rates. This made 25 service miles instead of 121/2 miles, the equivalent of one hour’s additional compensation, after the first 100 miles of any continuous assignment had been completed. This schedule also provided for road crews to make certain transfer runs and perform transfer and switching services at outlying terminals which were compensated on a mileage basis with no minimum allowance. The nature of these transfer and terminal services is such that a longer time is required to perform them than the time equivalent of the miles run. For example, if the crew made a transfer movement to and from the Minneapolis and St. Louis railroad yard, it would be paid for the 12 miles of service run in making the round trip. This was equivalent to 58 minutes’ pay on an hourly basis, but the assignment often required several houp to complete.
Additional provisions of the work schedule in effect prior to July 16, 1942, the application of which affected the compensation of the transportation employees, related to “pusher service” performed by crews that received no additional pay for the work.
The work schedule adopted on July 16, 1942, discontinued the use of road crews for performance of any yard or terminal service within the Peoria terminal district, but authorized using them for any work at the eastern and western terminals. This schedule, however, provided additional compensation for yard switching and transfer runs made by road crews at these points, at the hourly rates of pay of the road service. Formerly, the yard service of road crews was incompletely reported to the extent that much of this yard service was not separately compensated and that which was paid on mileage rates inadequately reflected the time required.
The previous method of providing “pusher service” and related work was also discontinued under the “rules” adopted in July 1942, and time required in such services included in operating statistics.
The new rates of wages established as of July 1, 1942, but retroactive to March 25, raised the basic scales per mile and per hour for train and enginemen in road and yard service to the levels paid by class I railroads of the eastern district. This represented an average payroll increase of 26 percent compared to the wage costs of the former schedule.
Besides the provisions that have been described, the new rules contained other provisions which either reduced established practices to writing, or introduced new practices of such minor character as to have only an incidental effect on the services or expenses of the railroad.
The supplementary agreement of June 29, 1942, made changes in the standard starting-time rule in yard service which were estimated to .save the railroad a maximum of $13,000 per year, including wage costs, costs of additional fuel, engine supplies, and maintenance. The other three memoranda of understanding were estimated to save the railroad a maximum of $1,000 per year in wage costs.
Corporation Criticizes Federal Management
During the period of Federal management the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad (corporation) issued several printed statements criticizing the management of its railroad by the Office pf Defense Transportation. In substance, these statements charged that the rates pf pay and regulations to govern working conditions of the transportation employees which had been made effective by the Federal management on July 1,1942, with the agreement of the interested railroad brotherhoods and the approval of the National War Labor Board, established inexcusably wasteful practices in the operations of the railroad.
The terms of Executive Order No. 9108 under which the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation took possession of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad ordered him “to operate or arrange for the operation of such railroad in such manner as he deems necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.” Executive Order 9108 also ordered the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to “manage or arrange for the management of said railroad under such terms and conditions of employment as he deems advisable and proper pending such termination of the existing labor dispute as may be approved by the National War Labor Board.” From these excerpts, it is apparent that the objective of the President’s order was to keep the railroad in operation for its value in the prosecution of the war and to do so under such conditions of employment as would accomplish that purpose until the labor dispute could be settled on terms that, would be approved by the National War Labor Board.
Pending a settlement of the labor controversy the Federal manager established the rates of pay and rules governing working conditions that had been in effect under written agreements prior to December 29, 1941, when the new and unnegotiated basis
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of wages and revised rules of working conditions were put in force by the railroad management. The order for the reestablishment of these rates and rules served to accomplish immediately the objective of the Executive order insofar as resumption of transportation service on the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad was concerned. The rates of pay and rules governing working conditions which were adopted by the Federal management on July 1,1942, were the “standard” wages and rules governing working conditions on all class I railroads in the eastern district with such modifications in the rules as seemed advisable to adapt them to operating conditions on the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad. Such adaptations of the “standard” working rules are made by agreements between railroad managements and the brotherhoods representing their transportation employees on all railroads using these rules in order to reflect the operating necessities of each individual railroad. These rates of pay and working rules, with modifications, were accepted by the interested brotherhoods and when approved by the National War Labor Board, they effected full compliance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 9108.
The controversy about the merits of the dual system of interchangeable piece and time work as a basis for compensation of transportation employees of railroads has been going on for many years. It did not originate with the charges against the Federal management of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad by the owner corporation. However, it is probable that the “standard” wages and working rules were as good a basis for efficient operation on the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad as on the other class I railroads that use them. The unprecedented volume of traffic that was moved by American railroads during the war despite serious manpower shortages is evidence of the efficiency of their operations. Likewise, the results obtained on the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad by the Federal management are the best evidence of the operating efficiency of the road under the “standard” wages and rules governing working conditions that were adopted on July 1, 1942.
Efforts to Regain Possession of Road
Besides issuing printed statements criticizing the Federal management of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad, in efforts to discredit the Federal management, the owner corporation made several attempts by direct negotiations and by court proceedings to regain possession of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad without accepting the settlement of the labor controversy that had been approved by the National War Labor Board. One such attempt
was an application to the Circuit Court of McDonough County, Illinois, for an injunction forbidding further possession, control and operation of the properties of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad by the Office of Defense Transportation and demanding their return to the corporate owner. This case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Northern Division, where it was still pending when the railroad was returned to its owners. This litigation is more fully discussed in Chapter XXXIH.
The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation was prepared to recommend to the President of the United States that the properties of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad be returned to the corporate owner at any time when the corporation would accept the terms of the settlement of the labor controversy as approved by the National War Labor Board in its directive order and opinion of September 23, 1942. Compliance with the order of the National War Labor Board as a condition precedent to the return of the railroad properties required that the corporation conclude agreements with the railroad brotherhoods representing the transportation employees on the basis of the wage rates and rules governing working conditions that had been established by the Federal manager on July 1, 1942, including the changes in the regulations that were made prior to September 23,1942, when the National War Labor Board order was issued. The owner corporation never agreed to accept that settlement of the dispute as a basis for continued wartime operation of the railroad under its own management.
Neither Executive Order No. 9108 nor the legislation under which it was issued by the President contained any specific provision for compensation to be paid to the corporate owner for the possession and use of the properties of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad by the Federal Government. Immediately after possession of the properties was taken by the Federal manager on March 22, 1942, an inventory of all properties taken over was made by representatives of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Nonoperating properties were subsequently returned to the owner corporation. All obligations of the corporation except unmatured bonds were paid either directly by the Federal manager, or by the corporation from funds provided by the Federal manager.
On March 24, 1943, the President of the United States issued an amendment to Executive Order No. 9108, authorizing the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to make advances from the
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net cash earnings from his operation of the railroad for the discharge of lawful obligations of the railroad corporation and for the preservation of its property, corporate organization and franchise, rights, and other assets. However, Executive Order No. 9108, as amended, restrained the Director from making advances for the purpose of paying dividends or for paying executive salaries beyond an amount which the Director deemed necessary for corporate purposes. Pursuant to this authority advances of $1,000 per month were made to the corporation for the purpose of providing funds with which to pay the salaries of certain employees, office rent and other recurring expense items. Likewise, advances were made from time to time, to pay irregular and unusual expense items. The question of compensation to be paid by the Federal Government for the possession and use of the properties of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad remains to be determined.
Results of Operation Under Federal Management
The balance sheet covering 3^ years of Federal operation shows an accumulated surplus of $7,000,-000. The extraordinary events which occurred in the history of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad early in 1942 necessitates separation of that year’s accounts into two parts for purposes of records and comparisons. Possession of the railroad was taken by the Federal manager on March 22, 1942, and the strike ended on the 25th, but the adverse traffic reaction to the strike continued to curtail tonnage and revenues for more than a month. For this reason the year’s statements are divided into two periods ; the first quarter and the remaining three quarters of the year.
During the last 9 months of 1942, increased revenues from the mounting volume of war impelled traffic together with effective control of expenses, which were also increasing, reduced the ratio of operating expenses to revenues to 50.4 percent, a ratio which was further decreased in 1943 and 1944. This record was made under Federal management in spite of wage increases and changes in the schedules of working conditions applicable to train, engine, and yard service which added materially to operating expenses. Likewise, the ratios of total maintenance to revenues and of transportation expenses to revenues were maintained on a favorable basis throughout the period of Federal management. Figures for these basic operating ratios from the monthly reports of revenues and expenses made to the Interstate Commerce Commission are shown as follows :
Period Ratio of expenses to revenues Ratio of total maintenance to revenues Ratio of transportation expense to revenuei
Percent Percent Percent
Year, 1941 58.6 21.8 22.0
First 3 months, 1942 . 100.6 28.0 27.8
Last 9 months, 1942 50.4 19.9 39.5
Year, 1942 57.0 21.0 26.8
Year, 1943 43.8 14.4 19.8
Year, 1944 43.5 14.3 20.6
First 9 months, 1945. 51.6 17.3 24.5
The Federal manager paid neither Federal income taxes nor state sales and excise taxes, but did pay the same property taxes and railroad payroll taxes which would have been assessed against the corporation. This exemption from certain tax liabilities must be considered in making comparisons of net earnings under Federal management with earnings of the railroad in prior periods under corporate management. Computation of net earnings under Federal management with adjustments for income, sales, and excise taxes for which the corporation would have been liable would produce only a hypothetical and misleading result because the corporation would have been entitled to certain amortization tax credits that were not available to the Federal management. For that reason, no such computation has been made.
Return of Railroad to Corporation
On August 25, 1945, the President of the United States issued Executive Order No. 9603, directing that all plants, mines, facilities, and all other property of whatever kind seized or taken by the United States under Executive orders, or amendments thereof, should be restored to the owners thereof as soon as practicable, as determined in each case by the officer by whom the property in question is held and operated for the Government with the approval of the Director of Economic Stabilization.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 9108, as amended, and Executive Order No. 9603 and with the approval of the Director of Economic Stabilization, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation on September 6, 1945, issued a notice and order for the termination of possession, operation and control by the United States of the properties of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad at 12 :01 a.m. on October 1, 1945.
AMERICAN RAILROAD COMPANY OF PORTO RICO
In May 1943, it became necessary for the United States Government to take over the operation of the properties of the American Railroad Company of Porto Rico in order to prevent the collapse of rail transportation on the Island of Puerto Rico by reason of a strike. This railroad was the most important rail operation on the island. It was the only rail car
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rier engaging in the general transportation of passengers and property. At the time, about 65 percent of its freight was military and governmental in character.
The strike which stopped the operation of the railroad arose out of the road’s denial of the demands of its operating employees in a proposed new wage contract. In August 1942, the railroad signed a contract with the railway labor union, which provided that a revision of the contract might be brought about at the end of each 6-month period. Early in 1943 the union requested a revision of provisions concerning wages of the operating personnel and demanded wage increases. The union demands were denied. Negotiations failing to settle the trouble, a strike went into effect on May 13,1943. On the same day the President of the United States issued Executive Order No. 9341, instructing the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to take immediate possession of the railroad property and operate it. The order also directed the National War Labor Board to make a final determination of the dispute between the company and its striking employees. On May 14, 1943, the Office of Defense Transportation issued Administrative Order No. 3, appointing M. Garcia de Quevedo, who was in charge of the division of Puerto Rican Transport as the Federal manager of the properties, subject to the orders of the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation.
When the strike occurred, the military authorities protected the property with troops, which were withdrawn after the Federal management of the properties began on May 17. The labor unions promised cooperation, the old employees Were reinstated at the existing wage scale, and the operation of the road was resumed. Only two important changes in administrative personnel were made. The general manager of the road was replaced by a Federal operating manager, and the treasurer of the road was replaced by a Federal director of accounts. The relations of the Federal management with the employees and with the owners of the railroad properties were satisfactory throughout the period of Federal control.
Originally, the Federal management made few adjustments in rates of pay among supervisory officers and office employees, taking the position that there would be no general changes prior to the announcement by the National War Labor Board of its decision in the wage matter which resulted in the strike in May 1943 and which award would not include executives, supervisory officers, and office personnel.
Relations with the representatives of labor, principally the president and secretary of the union, were generally very good. The Federal manager early adopted a policy of recognizing the established labor
union as spokesman for all of the railroad employees except executive and office personnel and supervisory employees, while at the same time denying the rights of arbitration, collective bargaining, or recognition of a contract as such. On the other hand, the Federal manager recognized all existing agreements with the union and the rules of the company which did not conflict with Federal authority. This policy resulted in the union making direct and indirect efforts to compel the Federal manager to sign a contract or to be specific as to working conditions to an extent which would be equivalent to a contract. The Federal manager adopted his own rules governing labor relations.
Regardless of possible future development, it appears that real progress was made in relations with labor; this in spite of the fact that the Federal manager’s policy did not in many ways go as far down the road of labor’s demands as did the signed contract of the private corporation. This was admitted by union leaders. The office of Federal manager was open to labor leaders almost at their convenience. Conferences with labor representatives were frequent, and more than 200 grievances were brought to a conclusion. Approximately 40 percent of these grievances were settled in accordance with the union viewpoint. The other 60 percent were negative to the union viewpoint, but, with few exceptions, were gracefully accepted. The general nature of the grievances involved alleged discriminations, working conditions, transfers, discipline, dismissals, and, in addition, many new demands, reasonable and unreasonable. Bitterness following the strike and other past occurrences still existed on the part of both supervisory officials and certain elements of labor. Resolutions requesting dismissal of certain high supervisory officials continued to come to Federal management from the executive council of the union, and certain supervisory officials never overlooked the opportunity to criticize the union. This situation at times became burdensome, but a better understanding of management-labor relations did generally exist than at the beginning of Federal control.
The physical condition of the properties of the American Railroad Company of Porto Rico was found by a party of Interstate Commerce Commission valuation engineers, at the time of the take-over, to reflect long-deferred maintenance, especially of track and bridges, a dangerous lack of usable motive power, and a lack of materials for repairs in all categories of work, i. e., painting, car repairs, building repairs, locomotive repairs, due in large part to inability to obtain them. The railroad was being called upon to move more traffic for military agencies, other Federal agencies, sugar mills, and the general
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public than at any time in its history. Old and inefficient steam engines were actually in operation 24 hours out of each day. Equipment was being operated until it simply stopped and could not be used again without repairs. The railroad listed 59 locomotives two-thirds of which were operable but only one-third of which could be considered as being in fairly good repair.
The condition of the tracks of the American Railroad Company of Porto Rico at the time of the takeover indicated that maintenance had been deferred many months but was not yet out of hand, and, with reasonable effort, could be improved sufficiently to eliminate a large number of derailments and generally reduce the hazards of operation. Many kilometers of track which were apparently ballasted, merely had a top dressing of ballast. Ties were distributed under the track only 14 to each 30-foot fail, and, in one section particularly, there had been considerable surface bending. Switch layouts were not properly maintained and were in bad alignment. Frequently reports were made indicating derailments at switches. Fortunately engineering on the tracks had been of a rather high standard through the years past and all track equipment was standardized throughout. Bridges, owing to lack of paint and certain lack of materials, had not been well maintained but had not reached a dangerous condition. More frequent inspections of the bridges, certain physical work tending to improve them, a few changes due to expected new motive power, and centering of track in the bridges were carried on under Federal management.
The Federal management increased the hours of shop work so as to keep motive power functioning and made sorely needed track repairs as rapidly as possible, with the result that the road functioned with diminished mechanical breakdowns and derailments. Under this practice the road succeeded in meeting the transportation demands made upon it. Frequently, more than 150 separate train operations were carried out in a 24-hour period, and, frequently, more than 65 percent of the cars of the company were under load, with no cars on demurrage. The Federal manager operated entirely, except for fuel and tires, on short-term commitments, as it was intended to return the property at an early period with no Federal management commitments to be passed on to the owners of the road.
In the course of Federal operation, a modern accounting system was established, a few rates were adjusted, and the acquirement of 12 Diesel locomotives was effected through the Defense Plant Corporation for the railway corporation. Bank balances during Federal operations were satisfactory, and the
funds on which the railroad operated were entirely from the railroad revenues, and were adequate. In September 1943, the National War Labor Board announced its award in the labor dispute which had caused the strike. This award, being retroactive to May 13,1943, increased the road’s operating payroll by $100,000, and this sum, too, was met out of the road’s revenue by the close of the year. Subsequent to this award, the Federal manager voluntarily increased by about 10 percent the salaries of the supervisory officers and office employees.
With the award by the National War Labor Board, the cause of the strike was removed, and the need for Federal operation was gradually coming to an end. The final details of liquidating the Federal control were completed on June 27,1944, when the Office of Defense Transportation issued its Administrative Order No. 28, directing the return of the property to the owners on July 1, 1944. The order sets forth that possession, operation, and control of the railroad were “no longer required for the successful prosecution of the war,” and waived all claims and rights of the United States against the road in return for an agreement by the road adopting and ratifying all acts performed by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation in relation to the operation of the property; indemnifying and saving harmless the United States Government and its agents against liabilities arising out of the Federal management and waiving any claims that the road had against the Government. Thus, after 14 months of Federal operation, the road passed back to its owners, the purpose of Federal management being achieved in the continuous operation of the line on a scale adequate for military and civilian tranpor-tation requirements during the height of the war activities.
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD
The Office of Defense Transportation seized the properties of the Illinois Central Railroad on August 24, 1945, at the identical hour that the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen was to go on a strike on this railroad system. The strike did not go into effect, and the operations of the railroad continued without interruption under Federal control.
Unlike the direct operation by the Federal manager of the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad and the American Railroad Company of Porto Rico, the operation of the Illinois Central Railroad under Federal control and possession was by the company itself, under control of the Federal manager for the purposes of carrying out the objectives of the Executive order under which the property was seized.
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A dispute had existed between the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and the Illinois Central Railroad since 1933 regarding the joint promotion rule, which until that year appeared in both Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers agreements governing the establishment of the seniority date of promoted firemen to positions as engineers. Failure to adjust the dispute in conference, and through mediation, resulted in the ordering of a strike and the seizure of the road by the Government.
The crux of the conflicting provisions was that under the firemen’s rule, the promotion and the establishment of seniority as engineers would date from the first service as engineer “when called for such service,” whereas the seniority provision of the rules of the engineers stipulated that such seniority would begin with the first trip made “after having been assigned to the extra board, or to a regular position of an engineer,” and that any emergency service rendered prior to being so assigned should not be considered. The railroad company consistently applied the engineers’ rule of seniority. The firemen asserted that this worked to their detriment in the matter of promotion to engineer.
Following the announcement of the result of the vote on the strike ballot, which was adopted by a substantial majority, the President on May 25, 1945 appointed an emergency board under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act to investigate and report on the dispute. This board, having failed to mediate the controversy, reported its findings and recommendations on July 24, 1945. These were unacceptable to the firemen’s brotherhood, which set August 24 as the strike date.
The Government’s action of taking over the railroad followed repeated attempts to bring about an agreement between the railroad and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen. These efforts failed to reconcile the differences which were leading to the threatened strike, and the seizure of the property was ordered by the President through Executive Order No. 9602, issued on August 23, 1945. This order instructed the Director of the Office Defense Transportation to take over and operate the Illinois Central and the Yazoo and Mississippi Valley Railroads. Accordingly, Col. J. M. Johnson, Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, took possession of the system and appointed William F. Kirk, who was western director of the Office of Defense Transportation, Federal manager of the properties. All employees and officials were requested to carry on the operations of the railroad.
Control of the railway properties passed into the
hands of the Government on August 24 at the hour designated for the men to strike. These properties served as common carriers of goods and passengers over an area extending from Chicago to New Orleans, with connecting lines to Omaha, St. Louis, Shreveport, Louisville and other points. While hostilities had ceased the armed forces of the country were engaged in a large-scale deployment of'troops from the European to the Asiatic theatres of war, and were also at the threshold of an intensive demobilization operation. The undisturbed operation of the Illinois Central Railroad and its properties was regarded as essential to prevent the interruption of the country’s rail transportation at this time. The smooth transition from private to Government control was made possible through the assurances of cooperation given the Federal manager by the railway officials and the employees, including the firemen, who did not carry out the strike, once the property was taken over by the Government.
The Federal manager did not directly operate the railroad system, but entered into a contract whereby the railroad company continued uninterrupted operation of the properties subject to the control of the Federal manager, for the purpose of preventing interruptions or threatened interruptions in the system’s service.
The contract for the operation of the railroads provided, among other things:
(1) That the railroad company assume full financial responsibility for operating the property, taking all the income and paying all the operating and related expenses, except the salaries of the Government employees;
(2) That the seizure of the. property by the Government is not an assertion of ownership but the title to the property remains in the hands of the owners;
(3) That the Government exercise only such, rights as are necessary to accomplish the purpose of Executive Order No. 9206.
(4) That the company make no disposition of assets which would impair the working capital, or interfere with its continued transportation service, and that the company make .no major change in itfe policy in respect to the manner in which its normal operations are conducted without the prior approval of the Government.
(5) That the company release the Government from claims and liabilities except those arising out of specific directives issued by the Government.
The agreement was subject to termination by written notice from either party, and would become effective 10 days thereafter.
On November 1, 1945, Federal Manager Kirk resigned to return to the Missouri Pacific Railroad, and Homer C. King, Deputy Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, was appointed Federal manager of the property.
Executive Order No. 9206 directed that the property should be “managed and operated under the terms and conditions of employment at the time possession is taken under this order.” Thus, the ques
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tion of seniority status, which had resulted in the threat of a strike, did not affect the operation of the road under Federal control.
The Illinois Central was not one of the roads involved in the general railroad strike of May 23,1946, as it already was being operated under the control of a Federal manager. However, its control was merged with that of the 337 railroads involved in the general railroad strike, and Charles H. Buford, Federal manager of this group of seized roads, superseded Homer C. King as Federal manager of the Illinois Central. Control over the road was returned to its owners on May 27 as being no longer necessary for the purpose of the Executive order under which control of the property was seized.
GENERAL RAILROAD STRIKES
A controversy over wages and rules, which had been in course of negotiation for more than a year between railway labor unions and the carriers, resulted in a 2-day Nation-wide strike from May 23 to May 25, 1946.
Two out of 20 labor unions, namely, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, were involved, and operations on 337 railroads of the country practically ceased for the 2-day period. Involved in the strike were all the railroads of the country, except the Illinois Central, which was already under Federal management, and a number of so-called “standby” roads which were not parties to the controversy.
The events leading to a breakdown of negotiations and the calling of the strike were set forth in the following statement issued at the White House on May 17:
A request for wage increases and 44 rules changes was made by the five operating unions. The carriers, on July 24, 1945, made a counter-proposal calling for 29 rules changes. At about the same time proposals and counterproposals were made by 15 nonoperating unions and the carriers.
The Railway Labor Act provides for negotiations, mediation, and voluntary arbitration, or if arbitration cannot be agreed upon, emergency fact-finding boards or panels may be selected to hear and make recommendations as to the settlement of wage or rules issues.
In following the Railway Labor Act machinery, 3 of the operating unions and the 15 nonoperating unions, representing 85 per cent of all the railroad employes, agreed to give wages first attention, thereby taking the rules out of the discussion until the wage requests were settled. These 18 organizations then agreed to arbitrate the wage question. 'The arbitration boards heard the wage case and awarded an increase of $1.28 a day.
The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the Brotherhood of Railroad TraiAmen rejected the emergency board recommendation in its entirety.
The union executive officers of the engineers and trainmen set 4 p. m., May 18, 1946, as the date for striking unless a settlement satisfactory to them should be reached prior to that time.
Government Seizes Railroads
As the controversy approached the strike dead
line with little prospect of a settlement, the Government took steps for meeting the transportation emergency should it arise. On May 17, President Truman issued Executive Order 9727, taking possession and control of all the transportation properties involved in the strike threat. The seizure was made as of 4 p.m., May 17, 24 hours in advance of the time set for the strike.
The Executive order for the seizure of the roads declared that the pending interruption of transportation would unduly impede the war effort, and that it was necessary to take over the roads “for purposes that are needful or desirable in connection with the present wartime emergency.” The order then announced that possession and control “are hereby taken and assumed through the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation.” In all other such orders, the President instructed the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to take and assume control. By the President thus seizing the properties directly, the provisions of the Smith-Connàlly strike law became effective somewhat earlier than if the seizure had been made by someone else at a subsequent time. While only 337 strike-bound roads are named in the Executive order, the Director was authorized to assume control of any other rail carrier if necessary to purposes of the order. The President also authorized the Secretary of War “to take such action as he deems necessary to furnish such protection, equipment, manpower or other facilities or services” as the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation was authorized to request. The text of. Executive Order 9727, which in the main follows the pattern of all similar seizure orders, is given in Appendix A.
Director Johnson, of the.ODT, on assuming control of the properties, named Charles H. Buford, executive vice president of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Co., as Federal manager of the seized carrier properties. At the same time the Director made request upon the chief of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and on the president of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen to rescind the orders for the strike scheduled to take place at 4 p.m., May 18.
On May 17, immediately upon assuming his duties as Federal manager, Mr. Budford issued an operational order directing the railroad companies affected to continue operations in the usual manner as going concerns. He informed them that only such control over the properties as may be necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Executive order would be exercised; that the carriers would assume all financial responsibility, retain all income resulting from operations, and pay all expenses; and that existing
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wage scales and working conditions would be continued.
On the following day, May 18, about 18 minutes before the strike was to go into effect, the two brotherhood chiefs postponed it for a period of 5 days. This was in response to a last minute appeal from President Truman to resume negotiations. A compromise was offered by the President of a rate of $1.28 per hour, as recommended by the Fact Finding Board, plus 2^ cents additional per hour in lieu of the changes in rules requested. These changes in rules were to be held in abeyance for 1 year. The compromise was acceptable to 18 of the unions, but was rejected by the engineers and the trainmen, and the strike went into effect at 4:00 p.m. on May 23.
As a strike would make operation stoppage practically complete on all roads affected, steps were taken during the 5-day postponement period to lessen the impact of the strike on the public should a strike ensue. The plan was to bring into action all available auxiliary forms of transportation, such as waterways, motortrucks, and air transport, for moving essentials and lessening congestions, while the railroads undertook to build up operations.
To insure full power to the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to allocate the use of transportation equipment of rail, motor, water, and air carriers as planned, the President, on May 23, 1946, issued Executive Order No. 9729. This order authorized the Director to “perform the functions and exercise the power, authority, and discretion conferred upon the President of the United States by sec. 2 (a) of the act of June 28, 1940, as amended by title III of the Second War Powers Act, 1942, as amended0 for the purpose of making such allocations. The Director was also empowered to obtain information, require reports, require attendance and testimony of witnesses, etc. The allocation of vessels was to be made by the Administrator of the War Shipping Administration, but “according to such cargo requirements, and according to such priorities and policies” as might be established by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation. At the same time, to ease the traffic load by holding freight offerings to essentials, the Office of Defense Transportation issued a series of control orders which were implemented by Interstate Commerce Commission service orders.
The first of these service orders established authority to reroute freight traffic and empty cars, and appointed Homer C. King, the Deputy Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, as agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission with authority to divert or reroute all carload and less-than-carload
700494—48—19
freight traffic and empty cars to lines more able to handle such movements. This was Service Order 514. It became effective on May 18,1946.
Embargo on Unessential Freight
On May 23 the Interstate Commerce Commission issued Service Order No. 520, which put a general embargo on all rail freight and express traffic, except under permit. The chairman of the car service division of the Association of American Railroads was appointed general permit agent of the Interstate Commerce Commission with authority to issue or withhold such permits. This order established nine categories of priorities for the issuance of permits. Food and animal feeds, fuel, drugs and hospital supplies, chemicals for hygienic purposes, and newsprint lead the priority list in the order given.
The other Interstate Commerce Commission service orders were in support of the Office of Defense Transportation general orders setting up the emergency machinery and controls for meeting the strike situation by use of motor trucks and busses and waterways. These ODT orders were as follows:
General Order ODT 61, setting up priorities for motor freight, was implemented by ICC Service Order No. 522, which directed motor transport property carriers to transport all property designated by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation as of an emergency nature regardless of the scope of present operating authorities. General Order ODT 61 further prescribed directions and controls for utilisation of motor property vehicles during the strike. To give flexibility to the order, general and special permits were authorized. These were to be issued by the Director and field officials of the Bureau of Motor Carriers of the Interstate Commerce Commission, who were designated agents of the Office of Defense Transportation.
General Order ODT 62 established controls for private motor property carriers similar to those in force during the war.
General Order ODT 63 revived controls similar to those in war time for intercity bus common carriers. It was implemented by ICC Service Order No. 521, which directed that operations shall be as designated by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation. The ODT controls covered pooling of equipment, services or revenues, coordination of schedules, etc., as in the war period.
General Order ODT 64 revived some of the essential controls of war days in the field of waterways traffic, and presented a priority list for freight, similar to the priority lists for Other forms of transport. It was implemented by the two ICC Service Orders 521 and 522 relating to freight and passenger traffic by both waterways and motor vehicles.
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General Order ODT 65 established control over commercial aircraft, designating passengers and nine classes of freight which they were authorized to carry to the exclusion of other freight, and forbidding new or increased overseas service to foreign countries without prior approval of the Office of Defense Transportation. ,
General Order ODT 66 provided that each rail carrier operating passenger train schedules should give priority to the transportation of the mails, even to the extent of restricting the number of passengers carried.
In addition to the full cooperation given by the Interstate Commerce Commission, there was full support by the Civil Aeronautics Board, which temporarily exempted from the Civil Aeronautics act and the Board’s regulations, all certified air carriers with respect to rates and charges and the limitations or restrictions of their certificates insofar as these provisions would have prevented the air carriers from transporting persons or property as required by the Director of the ODT. The Office of Price Administrar-tion also gave relief from the regulations of that Office in order to permit the rapid installation of services by water, motor, and air carriers.
Emergency Organization Acts
To carry out the purpose of Executive order 9729 for maintaining transportation, Director Johnson set up an emergency organization of staff officials and of operating departments. The existing Railway Transport Department and Waterway Transport Department were strengthened. The directors and their assistants of the wartime Highway Transport Department and Petroleum Transport Department were recalled to service, and a new organization, the Airways Transport Department, was set up. These emergency sections worked in cooperation with coordinating and liaison units of the Army, Navy, and commercial aviation.
To integrate £he work of these various departments of the emergency organization set up by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, and to act as liaison with the Federal manager and with Government and private agencies having transportation responsibilities, the Office of Coordinator of Transportation was established, with Dr. G. Lloyd Wilson, consultant on rates, as coordinator. The coordinator also arranged with the Office of Price Administration, Interstate Commerce Commission, and Civil Aeronautics Board for appropriate authority with respect to rates, fares, and operations in order to avoid operational delays in the emergency.
Thus, when the 5-day truce expired and the strike started at 4:00 p. m., May 23, the Director of the
Office of Defense Transportation was in position to set the emergency machinery in action. Thousands of local agencies of the railroads were put in readiness to book orders for essential traffic by trucks in communities which were served only by railroads. Every cubic foot of unused space on scheduled air liners, with their surplus equipment, and all of the airplanes of some 80 nonscheduled commercial air operators were at the disposition of the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation. All truck and bus operations were subject to his direction. The Army and Navy handled as much of its traffic as possible with its own transportation, to make room for fuller use of civilian equipment. The War Shipping Administration made available 170 vessels, and the Army and Navy placed at the disposal of the Office of Defense Transportation various forms of floating equipment suitable for coastal and inland waters, in addition to all their air service equipment over and above what was required for their essential work. The Department of Liquid Transport took prompt steps to line up the tank car, tank truck, and the pipeline facilities, should the rail interruption last any considerable time. Fortunately, the situation affecting the petroleum supply was satisfactory, and there was time to restore closed down Big Inch and Little Inch pipelines, should the liquid fuel requirements exceed the available tank car and tank truck equipment or a possible maritime strike tie up the coastal tankers. With these several facilities at his disposal, a step-by-step plan for their utilization worked out, and with embargoes on less essential freight to hold the tonnage to strictly urgent traffic, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation was in position to render such service as would lessen the strike impact on the vital requirements of communities for a reasonable period.
The strike, however, lasted only 2 days, coming to an end a short time after 4 o’clock, May 25. The several orders issued in connection with this emergency were at once revoked, and the seized carrier properties were restored to their owners on May 26.
This emergency operation by the Office of Defense Transportation while brief was perhaps the most dynamic in its history. The results are not to be gauged by the actual operations, but by the thoroughness of the planning, organizing and setting of the stage for keeping essential freight moving, and reducing traffic congestion to the fullest extent of available facilities.
In a preliminary report to the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion on the activities of the Office of Defense Transportation in effectuating the Executive order, Director Johnson said:
We were fortunate in having available for use more capa
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city in air, water, and motor transportation facilities during the 2 daysr in which the orders were effective than we were called upon to use. This was due, no doubt, to the fact that many large cities had several days’ food supply on hand when the strike occurred. As the food supplies in these cities diminished, shippers would have had to seek transportation facilities other than the railroads excepting as railroad service could have been maintained and established. I am confident that we could have maintained a flow of necessaries and emergency goods into the consuming cities for an indefinite period. It would have been impossible to maintain, however, anything like normal transportation services, but air, water and motor carriers, and the coordinated use of the services of several types of carriers, under our direction and control, would have supplied the necessities of life.
MONONGAHELA CONNECTING RAILROAD
In the nature of a sequel to the short-lived general railroad strike of May 23-25,1946, was the strike of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen against the Monongahela Connecting Railroad. This line performs switching service between the Baltimore and Ohio, the Pennsylvania, and the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroads in Pittsburgh, and thus has connections with all roads entering that city. It also serves various Pittsburgh steel mills and warehouses.
The Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, a party to the general railroad strike and the negotiations leading to it, declined to accept President Truman’s compromise wage increase of 16 cents per hour plus 2^ cents an hour in lieu of the demanded change in rules, which were to be held in abeyance for 1 year. The
employees insisted on inclusion of the rule changes. Failing to receive this concession, the men refused to return to work when the 2-day general strike came to an end on May 25, 1946.
Because of the importance of the services of this railroad, President Truman on June 14,1946, issued Executive Order 9736, which instructed the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to take over possession, control, and operation of the property. Director Johnson appointed Homer C. King, the Deputy Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, as Federal manager of the road, and so advised the officials of the railroad and the president of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, asking for their cooperation in restoring the interrupted service. President Whitney replied that all men on strike would be instructed to comply with Director Johnson’s request, and that strike benefits would stop at 6:00 p. m. on June 14. The strikers returned to work, their unions announcing that the strike was deferred to a later date. The returning employees were paid the wage increase of 18 cents an hour, the amount named in President Truman’s compromise offer.
The railroad was operated by its owners under a contract with the Federal manager, and under his control, for the purpose of carrying out the purposes of the Executive order. Federal control and possession was reliquished on August 12, 1946.
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CHAPTER XL
FEDERAL MANAGEMENT OF MOTOR TRANSPORT
While labor difficulties had arisen from time to time in motor truck companies, there was no interruption of war traffic serious enough to justify Federal possession and control until the strike of the employees of 103 ¡Midwest motor carriers on August 4, 1944. This operation covered 103 motor truck companies operating in nine States: Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma. The only other Federal seizure of motor carriers, 10 months later, involved all of the motor truck carriers of prop-ety in and about Chicago which had agreements or contracts with certain labor unions. In each instance the properties seized were tied up by strikes or were threatened to become idle through strikes.
The Government seizure of the 103 Midwest motor carriers in the nine States mentioned was pursuant to Executive Order No. 9462 issued on August 11, 1944, which instructed the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to take possession of and operate or arrange for the operation of these systems. The Presidential action took place on the eighth day of a strike of over-the-road drivers that practically paralyzed intercity motor carriers* transportation in the Midwest. Diversion to the rails of tonnage formerly handled by motor carriers had resulted in railroad, dock, and terminal congestion, which in some localities had become extremely serious. Transportation service by both rail and motor to plants engaged in war activities in many instances suffered noticeably.
The strike of the struck drivers followed the refusal of motor carrier managements to comply with the directive of the National War Labor Board, issued on February 7, 1944. This directive provided, among other things, for an increase in the rate of pay for over-the-road drivers, retroactive to November 16,1943. Settlement of the strike by negotiations was not in prospect at the time of the President’s order, but even had the employees returned to work at that time, the precarious financial condition of many carriers made doubtful an early resumption of satisfactory motor transportation service in the area.
On August 12, 1944, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation took possession and control of the properties and appointed Ellis T. Longenecker, an official of the Highway Transport Department, Office of Defense Transportation, as Federal manager. Headquarters for the Federal management were established in Minneapolis, Minn. Operations Order No. 1 was issued on the day that Federal possession and control were assumed. The operations order directed all carriers to resume operations as nearly as practicable in the same manner as under private management with wage payments at the scale prescribed by the National War Labor Directive. The carriers were not required to make the retroactive payments of wages prescribed by the National War Labor Board award, unless done out of their net earnings of which usually there were none. Operations on some lines commenced promptly by August 15, 1944. Service was approximately normal on all lines within a week after Federal possession and control, and they remained normal until termination of Federal control over the last of this group of properties on November 1, 1945.
In a few months it became apparent that it was not advisable for eight of the carriers to continue under Operations Order No. 1, which permitted each company to operate its property in the same manner as it had before the seizure—however, under general supervision of the Federal manager. In November and December 1944, it was deemed necessary to assume direct operation of the eight systems to obtain changes in operating methods which could not be otherwise achieved. In some instances satisfactory operating results might have been obtained under Operations Order No. 1, by making continued and unlimited advances of Federal funds. In each of the eight cases the individual who had been serving as manager of the carrier under private operation was notified that his service would be dispensed with for the time being, and Federal operating managers were placed in charge. Some of these company managers were reinstated in other positions.
The record of the extensive Government operation is set forth ip a voluminous report by Federal Man
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ager Longenecker. In it is disclosed the state of motor freight operations, the problems presented, and how they were met. In a way it offers a study for management of motor truck operations to fit this type of transportation normally into the transportation picture of the country.
The motor carriers in the Midwest immediately preceding and during the war experienced steadily rising operating costs which, by the middle of 1943, reached a point where net revenues were insufficient for adequately operating the properties. The margin between revenue and expense was so narrow that proper replacement of equipment, or the meeting of major increases in operating costs generally, was not feasible. The composite operating revenues and expenses and ratio of expenses to revenues of the 103 Midwest carriers under Federal management during 1944, when the Federal manager took over the properties, showed the following results: Revenues, $51,698,255; expenses, $51,941,061; operating ratios, 100.5 percent. The following tabulation of composite revenues, expenses and operating ratio of a group of 33 of the carriers, fairly representative of the entire group of 103 from a geographical standpoint, portrays the situation of the Midwest carriers:
Year Revenue Expense Operating Ratios Percent
1938 811,999.439 311,699,429 97.5
1939 15,182,385 14,576,253 96.0
1940 18,058,238 17,576,524 97.3
1941 22,335,888 21,830,826 97.7
1942 24,896,774 24,267,484 97.5
1943 27,747,094 27,361,314 98.6
1944 28,247,626 28,793,900 101.9
1945 (1st Quarter)... 7,758,400 7,536,136 97.1
1945 (2nd Quarter).. 7,626,485 7,577,800 99.4
With the narrow margin between revenues and expense, it was anticipated that considerable advances of money would have to be made to keep a good percentage of the companies in operation on a scale adequate to meet wartime requirements. Out of a sum of $5,000,000 set apart out of the President’s emergency fund for operating the systems taken over by the Government, the Federal manager, as of June 30, 1946, disbursed and obligated $1,566,-624.79 for administrative expenses, cost of operating the carriers, and advances to some carriers that were needed to keep them going. Out of the 103 carriers under Federal management, about 75 required no advances of funds by the Federal Government. Out of sums advanced, $25,088.39 was repaid in cash, $158,000 was to be repaid in installments, and $95,-900 was expected to be withheld by the Government out of sums owing to the carriers for moving Government freight. The net cost to the Government
attributable to the Federal possession, control, and operation of these truck lines was $354,698.11.
The policy that guided the making of advances to carriers was that the funds would be provided only where the operations involved were necessary to the war effort. The advances were made on an agreement which provided for repayment and for the Government, when deemed necessary, to exercise supervision over the disbursements. The report of the Federal manager states that: “Some advances have been repaid voluntarily; some have been made the subject of withholding of Government vouchers for payment of freight charges on the movement of Government freight; and some remain uncollected.” The uncollected amounts were to be turned over to a proper Government agency for collection proceedings.
Out of the Federal management of these properties, there evolved much constructive information for the guidance of the motor trucking industry as a whole. Supplementing the operating report of the Federal manager is a 300-page volume of statistical materials embodying the Government’s studies during the Federal management of motor truck physical operations, finances, and business administration.
The important subject of rate structure for the trucking industry received considerable attention from the Federal manager. On interstate movements of motor carriers, there was found to exist a confusing and inconsistent mass of charges, established most often on the basis of rail or motor competitive conditions. Some rates reflected Interstate Commerce Commission action and others apparently had some sort of historical origin difficult to trace. Bargaining with particular shippers with respect to the movement of particular commodities between designated points appeared to be the basis of many charges; and a rate thus established was likely to become a pattern or standard for setting rates by other carriers. Evidence of any effort to relate particular rates to particular costs on particular movements could not be discovered.
A 1-day tariff flow cost and rate study showed that only 37.63 percent of motor carriage moved on class rates; that 28.08 percent of the tonnage moved on exception ratings at an operating ratio of 100; and that 27.98 percent of the tonnage moved on commodity rates at an operating ratio of 106.
To improve the situation the Federal manager resorted to the immediate expedient of removing some of the worst exception and commodity rates and laid the groundwork for the assembly and study of statistical data upon which proposals for structural adjustment could be made. The program which he proceeded to put into effect was (1) to secure elimi
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nation of depressed volume rates applicable to movement by carriers which were in particularly critical financial condition and for the institution of higher interstate minimum charges; (2) to obtain the speediest possible elimination of certain exceptions which were clearly unjustifiable by existing costs or competitive conditions; (3) to propose a general 4 percent horizontal increase of all interstate rates to be effective for a limited period of time; (4) to take action to obtain increases in established intrastate minimum charges to a basis more nearly compensatory of costs, and to obtain temporary 4 percent horizontal intrastate increases; and (5) to take steps for the collection and assembly of data upon which permanent structural revisions could be planned. A minority of the carriers fearful of losing traffic through the 4 percent increase in interstate rates sought to block this step and it became necessary to issue a formal order forbidding these carriers from establishing rates not approved by the Federal management. The Federal manager states in his report: “There can be no question but that a substantial part of the improvement in net income noted for the first two quarters of 1945 is attributable to these rate adjustments.”
The efforts of the Federal manager for a lasting improvement in the operating finances of the companies under his control extended also to a determined effort in six middle western states to obtain sanction from state regulatory bodies to increase intrastate rates. The objective in each instance was a temporary horizontal 4 percent increase and an increase in each intrastate minimum charge to something approximating the $1.05 interstate minimum charge.
As in the case of the proposed interstate increases, many carriers opposed any increase at all. Many carriers believed that particular interstate adjustments would prove disadvantageous from a traffic diversion standpoint. Once the cooperation of a substantial number of intrastate carriers was assured appropriate action was instituted before the state regulatory commission either by the Federal manager or by carriers under the sponsorship of the Federal manager. Some of these proceedings were still pending when Federal control over the lines had ceased.
It was the early conclusion of the Federal manager that the rate situation in the Midwest area could not be put on a permanently satisfactory basis by the piecemeal cancellation of “low spot” exceptions and commodity rates, by increases in minimum charges nor by temporary or permanent rate level adjustments. The necessity for comprehensive structural revision was evident. However, the organization of
the Federal manager was not equipped to make tabulations and analyze statistical material in volume and detail sufficient to permit an intelligent appraisal of the total rate requirements of the carriers. Therefore, at the request of the Office of Defense Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commission agreed to make a study. The complete report of the Interstate Commerce Commission on this subject appears in the supplemental report of the Federal manager.
The properties under the control of the Federal manager were returned piecemeal, those companies not requiring Federal assistance being the first to be released from Government operation. The last of the properties returned to the owners were released on November 1,1945. On March 5, 1946, the Federal manager completed his difficult task.
CHICAGO TEAMSTERS STRIKE
As the culmination of a labor wage and hour dispute, some 6,500 members of the Chicago Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union—known as the Independent Union—went on a strike on May 17, 1945. Also approximately 80 percent of the 15,000 members of Local 705 International Brotherhood of Teamsters were idle though no strike had been called.
The labor disturbance arose because of dissatisfaction on the part of the Chicago Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union of Chicago and Vicinity No. 705, Independent, and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 705, A. F. L., with the award of the Trucking Commission of the National War .Labor Board, and the subsequent modification of the award by the National War Labor Board. The Trucking Commission awarded the men an increase in wages of 8 cents per hour and directed that time and one-half be paid after a work week of 48 hours instead of after a work week of 51 hours as provided in the prevailing contract. The National War Labor Board affirmed the decision of the Trucking Commission except insofar as it related to the payment of overtime.
In a strike election held on May 16, 1945, the Independent Union, by a vote of 1,677 to 103 decided to strike. On the following day the membership of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union held a meeting for the purpose of considering strike action. The meeting was adjourned without a strike vote being taken.
During the period from May 16, 1945, to May 23, 1945, inclusive, few, if any, members of the Independent Union reported for work. A number of the members of the International Brotherhood of Team
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sters Union did not report for duty, although no strike vote had been taken by the I. B. T. Union.
In this period, with practically all of the for-hire trucks in the Chicago area idle, the military authorities grew alarmed as to its effect on the war effort. They undertook to transport critical war goods under Government bills of lading at first by 50 and later by 150 Army trucks. Likewise, arrangements were made for police escorts for private trucks hauling war goods. Through these arrangements many vital war plants were able to continue operations although a tremendous amount of civilian freight was piled up.
As a result of the strike action, the National War Labor Board directed the parties to appear before it in Washington on Sunday, May 20, 1945. On re? ceipt of advice from the National War Labor Board on May 23,1945, that upon termination of the strike the Board would schedule a public hearing in Washington at which the union would be heard on its request for reconsideration of the Board’s decision, officials of the Independent Union requested their men to return to work. In the meantime, Executive Order 9554 had been issued and by notice and order dated May 23, 1945, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation took possession and assumed control of the transportation systems, facilities, and other assets of motor carriers engaged in the transportation of property in or about the City of Chicago, Ill., whose operations were then being interrupted by a labor dispute. The notice and order provided that Government possession and control of the properties were taken and assumed as of 12:01 o’clock a.m., May 24, 1945. The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation appointed Ellis T. Longe-necker as Federal manager of the properties taken over.
Following the taking of possession and control of the properties, the National War Labor Relations Board proceeded with plans for holding a strike election in accordance with notices filed with the Board by the two unions. Employees of the companies whose properties were under Government possession and control were not eligible to participate in the election. Strike action followed on June 16, 1945.
By a second notice and order issued by the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, effective as of 12:01 o’clock a.m., June 16, 1945, the Director took possession and assumed control of the motor carrier transportation systems, plants, and facilities of all motor carriers engaged in the transportation of property in or about the City of Chicago, HL, who had a labor agreement or contract with either of the labor unions referred to above, or with any local labor organization affiliated with either of such unions.
Executive Order 9554 authorized the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to request the Secretary of War to furnish protection for persons employed in the plants, facilities or transportation systems taken over, and to furnish manpower and other facilities or services deemed necessary by the Director to carry out the purposes of the Executive order. Major General McCoach of the Sixth Service Command was designated by the Secretary of War to act for the War Department in matters incident to carrying out the provisions of the Executive order.
Immediately upon the resumption of the strike on June 16, 1945, requests came in for military protection for trucks that were to be operated by public and private carriers. These requests in the first 2 days exceeded 3,500. The Federal manager advised the military authorities that an estimated force of 15,000 men would be required. In response to the requests for military protection 641 military policemen were sent to the various terminals. They rode trucks as guards for civilian drivers. In addition, city police escorted numerous trucks to their destinations. By June 18,15,000 escorts or guards, 480 drivers and 100 dockmen were dispatched to various carriers for duty on that date. Although there were many rumors of violence, few definite instances were disclosed and these were limited to property damage such as cutting tires, pulling pins on trailers, or throwing bricks through windshields. No physical injuries to drivers were reported.
The Government operation of this service under military protection was through the convoy system. Truckers assembled at scheduled places and the trucks in convoys of 25 each moved to their destinations. In this manner the Government prevented the collapse of essential transportation in and around Chicago.
The number oi military personnel available for duty as guards, drivers, and dockmen increased daily during the strike period. By June 23, 1945, over 9,000 guards, drivers, and dockmen were dispatched to the offices of carriers requesting assistance. The drivers and dockmen were furnished to the carriers under arrangements which contemplated that the carriers were to pay the Government for the services of the drivers and dockmen at the current rates paid by the carriers to their own employees for the same services. No payments were to be made to the Government for the services of guards or for convoy service. Approximately $40,000 has been paid to the Government for the services of drivers and dockmen furnished the carriers during the strike period.
By June 25,1945, it was apparent that many of the men were returning to work. Requests for the services of drivers decreased, but there was an increase
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in the number of guards requested. Substantially all demands of the carriers for the services of guards, drivers, and dockmen were being met by June 25, 1945. The strike ended on June 27,1945, and normal operations were resumed shortly thereafter. Government possession and control of the properties taken over were terminated and relinquished on August 16, 1945.
SCRANTON TRANSIT COMPANY
On May 20, 1945, employees of the Scranton Transit Co., Scranton, Pa., went on strike. The dispute centered around the demands of Division 168, Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America, for a new contract providing among other things for a wage increase of 20 cents per hour, and overtime after 8 hours. The strike did not have the sanction of the international union. Some 400 men were involved. The company handled about 83,000 passengers a day. The Third Regional Board of the War Labor Board ordered the strike terminated. The strikers refused to comply and the case was referred by the National War Labor Board to the Office of Economic Stabilization.
On June 14,1945, President Truman issued Executive Order No. 9570, directing the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to take possession and assume control of the carrier’s transportation system. On the same day, Thomas L. Nicholl, an official of the Office of Defense Transportation, was designated as Federal manager, and the employees of the company were requested to resume work.
The Federal manager reported that immediately upon the Government taking control of the properties the employees voted to return to work, and in the negotiations that followed the company and the men reached complete agreement. He suggested, therefore, that Federal possession and control of the properties be terminated. This was done on July 8,1945.
CAPITAL TRANSIT COMPANY
In November 1945 service on the street car and bus lines operated by the Capital Transit Co. of Washington, D. C., was twice interrupted by a strike of operating employees, who were seeking higher wages. The employees were working under an agreement with the Capital Transit Co., which was executed on October 1, 1945, with Division 689 of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America. This agreement was based on the findings of a board of arbitration made on August 13,1945, and covered the period from July 1, 1945, to June 30, 1946. The following section of the agreement was of particular significance in con-
nection with the wage controversy that led to the strike:
Sect. 36. Upon any substantial change in the National Wage Stabilization policies brought about by legislation, executive order, presidential proclamation, or through interpretation by, or directives of, the Economic Stabilization Director, or upon any change in the minimum stabilized rates applicable to the transit industry, either party upon thirty (30) days’ written notice to the other shall have the right to reopen the contract for renegotiation of the present wage scale in conformance with such newly established wage policy.
Another section of the agreement set up the procedure for arbitrating differences between the company and its employees. The agreement provided that the findings of the arbitrators shall be binding on both parties and that during the period covered by the contract, there should be- no interruption to the services on the lines of the company.
In accordance with the terms of this agreement the union notified the company on October 9,1945, of its desire to reopen the contract for renegotiation of the hourly wage scale. In its notice the union requested an increase of 30 cents an hour in the wage rate. The company and the union began negotiations immediately during which the company offered to include in the basic hourly wage rate the 7-cent hourly bonus which was being paid because of unusually high revenue per mile due to wartime operating conditions. This proposal would have increased the basic hourly wage rate of trainmen and bus operators working one-man cars or busses from 95 cents to $1.02, if accepted by the union. The company indicated, but did not agree to inclusion as a guarantee in the contract, that the current overtime work opportunity would be continued through the terms of the ’ contract.
At a meeting called by the officials of the local union for November 6,1945, the members in attendance at the meeting indicated sharp dissatisfaction with the progress of negotiations as reported to them and voted to hold a “continuous” meeting until the company agreed to meet their demand for a 30-cents-an-hour increase in the wage rate. As a result of this action, all service of the Capital Transit Co. was halted. A special committee of three men was appointed at the union meeting to represent the members in further negotiations with the company.
The U. S. Conciliation Service intervened at this point, as did the District Committee of the House of Representatives. Through their efforts the three-man committee was prevailed upon to recommend to the members a 14-day truce during which negotiations with the company would be resumed under the supervision of the United 'States Conciliator. The union members accepted this proposal on November 7 and agreed to resume work immediately. As a result, street car and bus service was restored. Negotiations between the company and the union were re
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sumed and were continued without interruption until November 20,1945.
On that date the company agreed to a proposal submitted by the United States Conciliation Service which in effect provided for proceeding, under the terms of the contract between the company and the union, to arbitrate the wage dispute. The three-man committee representing the union also accepted this proposal and agreed to submit it to the union members at a meeting, which was called for midnight, November 20. The majority of the union members in attendance at this meeting rejected the proposal and again voted to hold a “continuous” meeting. This action by the union members resulted in a complete suspension of service by all street cars and busses.
On November 21, the President of the United States issued Executive Order No. 9658, which authorized and directed the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation to take possession of the properties of the Capital Transit Company and to operate, or to arrange for the operation of its system. The order stated that the war effort would be unduly impeded by the existing interruption of the transportation system.
At the time of this action, a meeting of union members was in progress. Guy A. Richardson, the Director of the Highway Transport Department, who was named Federal manager of the properties, appeared at this meeting accompanied by the deputy director and the general counsel of the Office of Defense Transportation. The deputy director had sent telegrams to the union officials notifying them of the Government seizure of the properties and of the appointment of a Federal manager, and requesting that the striking members report immediately for their regularly assigned duties. The Federal manager read this message to the men at the meeting and urged them to return to work immediately. The general counsel read the Executive order to the men and the Federal manager again urged them to report for
work at once. The employees responded to the request of the Federal manager and service on the streetcar and bus lines was restored before the end of the day.
The Federal manager issued instructions to both company and union officials to the effect that operation of streetcar and bus lines would continue under the terms of the agreement of October 1, 1945, between the company and the union. He also advised them that the wage controversy would have to be settled by arbitration as provided in the agreement.
Under the agreement of October 1, 1945, each of the parties proceeded to choose its representatives on the board of arbitration. These two arbitrators met several times in an effort to agree upon a third member of the board. Unable to agree upon a third member, they met with company and union officials who agreed to ask the Secretary of Labor to select the third member.
The Secretary of Labor named the public representatives on the Board of Arbitration on December 6, 1945, and the board commenced to hold hearings on December 11, 1945. After the presentation of evidence and argument by both parties the board of arbitration announced an award, based on a two-to-one vote of the board, providing for an increase in the basic hourly wage rate from 95 cents to $1.14. This award included the hourly bonus of 7 cents, which the company had previously offered to include in the basic hourly wage rate. The board award also obligated the company to provide a minimum of 48 hours work per week. After consultation with the Office of Stabilization Director, the company announced that the wage increase would become effective immediately.
On January 7, 1946, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation issued an order terminating possession and control by the United States of the transportation of plants and facilities of the Capital Transit Co. This order became effective at 12:01 a. m., January 8,1946.
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CHAPTER XLI
FEDERAL MANAGEMENT OF WATERWAY TRANSPORT
Two large towing operations, one on the Great Lakes and the other in the New York harbor, were interrupted by strikes and required possession and control by the Federal government to keep essential traffic moving.
GREAT LAKES TOWING CO.
On July 19, 1946, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, acting under Executive Order No. 9661, took over the physical operation of the facilities of the Great Lakes Towing Co. This was the second step in the control of the properties of this company since its seizure by direction of the President on November 29, 1945. The first step was the control over the operations of the company through a management contract with the owners of the company to operate the properties, subject, however, to the direction of the Federal manager. The object was to accomplish the purpose of the Executive order to maintain adequate transportation service on the Great Lakes.
The Great Lakes Towing Co. owned 60 vessels, of which 54 were steel towboats engaged in towing on the Great Lakes and tributary waters. The other six were vessels engaged in wrecking work. The company employees numbered 600. A work stoppage began at Buffalo on September 4, 1945, and gradually spread to other Lake ports, so that by November 1, all of the ports on the Great Lakes except Milwaukee, Duluth and the Soo were without towing service. This interruption of towing service had serious consequence on the movement of grain and coal on the Great Lakes.
The Department of Agriculture had expected to store 32,000,000 bushels of grain at the lower lake ports in ships, and the Solid Fuels Administration was expecting to get 4^ million tons of coal transported to ports on Lake Michigan and Lake Superior before the close of navigation.
In the beginning the work stoppage had not seriously interfered with the movement of vessels, owing to favorable weather conditions, but it was anticipated that after November 1 serious delays could be expected. Under these circumstances, the Depart
ment of Agriculture and the Solid Fuels Administration urged the necessity of moving grain and coal to destinations as long as navigation was possible. They recommended that the Government take over the operation of the tugboats and restore service.
President Truman on November 29, 1945, issued Executive Order No. 9661 providing for the seizure and operation. of the tugboats involved. Director Johnson appointed Laurence C. Turner Federal manager of the properties of the towing company. Mr. Turner was the Director of the Waterway Transport Department, Office of Defense Transportation. Telegrams were sent to the Great Lakes Towing Co. and to the national presidents of the tugboat men’s organizations, advising them of the seizure by the Government and requesting that operations be resumed immediately. The towing company officials and the union officials agreed to cooperate with the Government. Some of the operations were resumed on the evening of November 29, and normal operations were under way by December 2.
The Department of Labor resumed its efforts at conciliation, but these efforts were without results. On March 19,1946, the unlicensed employees through their union, the Tug Firemen, Linemen, Oilers and Watchmen’s Protective Association, filed application with the National Wage Stabilization Board, requesting the following changes in the terms and conditions of employment:
(1) Wages—20 percent increase for 1945 contract.
(2) Lockout by company—men are requesting full pay for time lost due to lockout.
(3) Adjustment of disputes and grievances so as to complete the 1945 contract.
The National Wage Stabilization Board held a hearing on the application on April 24,1946. On May 29, 1946, the board issued its order in the matter, which was approved by the President on May 31. The board ordered that with respect to the plants and facilities of the company now in possession of the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation:
(1) That the wage rate of all employees in the bargaining unit of the Great Lakes Towing Company, represented by the Teamsters, Firemen, Linemen, Oilers and Watchmen’s Protective Association, I.L.A. and A.F.L., shall be increased, by $1.53 per day, effective as of November 29, 1945.
(2) That the dispute with regard to the union’s allegation
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of contract violation, discharges, lock out and the union’s claim for compensation thereunder shall be immediately submitted to final and binding arbitration.
The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation immediately recommended to the Great Lakes Towing Co. that it take such action as might be necessary to give full effect to the terms of the order. The company replied that it could not accept this recommendation. Finally, on July 11, 1946, the Office of Defense Transportation gave notice of the termination of its operating contract with the Great Lakes Towing Co., effective 12:01 a. m., July 19, and at that time it took over physical operation of the properties. Federal operation of the properties continued until December 18, 1946, at which time Government possession, control and operation of the properties were terminated.
NEW YORK TUGBOAT STRIKE
On February 4,1946, some 3,500 tugboat and barge workers in the New York harbor area—members of Local 333 International Longshoremen’s Association, United Marine Division—went on strike. The issues involved in the dispute which led to the strike included, among others, a demand for substantial increases in wages and other compensation, the establishment of a 40-hour work week, and retroactivity to January 1,1946, of the wage increases and other claims. Conferences called by the mayor of New York and the efforts of the United States Conciliation Service both before and after the strike failed to effect a settlement of the controversy.
The metropolitan area of New York is peculiarly dependent upon tug and barge transportation for the delivery of its fuel supplies—‘both coal and oil. The large oil terminals in the area are on the Jersey side and on Staten Island, and supplies for the City of New York must depend upon water transportation to the distribution terminals in the metropolitan area. Terminals of the rail lines delivering coal to the area are also on the Jersey side and coal supplies must be delivered to metropolitan New York substantially through the use of tug and barge equipment. Some of the coal deliveries are made by railroad-owned tugs and barges and these were not affected by this strike.
Further complicating the situation was the fact that ¿storage facilities for fuel supplies in the New York metropolitan area are notoriously small and even under normal conditions, many of the large distributing terminals on Manhattan Island do not maintain more than a 3 or 4 day supply of coal and oil. Close proximity of the large sources of supply on the Jersey shore make unnecessary at normal times assembly of large inventories in the metropolitan area, and storage facilities in this area are purposely constructed of small capacity.
It was inevitable, therefore, that a cessation of tug and barge operations would have an immediate effect upon the fuel supply of the metropolitan area.
The work stoppage also affected the free berthing of ships in New York harbor, including the tankers and colliers which are required to maintain supplies in the large accumulation centers for fuel on the Jersey shore. Many of these terminals are on small streams that provide great hazards to navigation without tug assistance.
Recognizing the gravity of the situation, the President issued Executive Order 9693, dated February 5, 1946, directing the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, effective February 6, 1946, to take possession and assume control of the transportation systems, plants and facilities of 91 companies conducting towing or transportation operations in New York harbor and contiguous waters. The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation took such action effective February 6, 1946, and designated ¡Laurence C. Turner as Federal manager of the properties taken over. At this time, the Director dispatched telegrams to each of the 91 companies named in the Executive Order and to the union officials advising of the Government seizure and requesting that normal operations be resumed at once. The companies agreed to cooperate with the Government and to endeavor to restore service but at a meeting called by union officials on February 6,1946, the men by a vote of 451 to 219 voted to remain on strike.
The Executive Order provided that the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation might request the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy to funish protection, equipment, manpower and other facilities and services deemed necessary by the Director to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of the order. The order also authorized the Director to use other Federal agencies or Governmental instrumentalities as he might designate to accomplish the purposes of the order. Upon being advised of the action of the members of the union in declining to return to work under Government operation, the Director formally requested the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy to provide such protection, furnish equipment, manpower, or other facilities or services as required by the Federal manager to restore service.
The Federal manager called upon Major General Kells, Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation, and Admiral Kelly, Commandant, Third Naval District, to make available for immediate use under his direction, at least 50 percent of the tugboats operated by the Army and the Navy, respectively, in the New York Harbor area, and he advised
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that this percentage would be increased as developments demanded. The federal manager also requested that all tugboats under Army or Navy operation at all ports on the Atlantic coast except those needed for urgent military requirements be dispatched to New York. The United States Coast Guard and the War Shipping Administration were asked to make available all tugs under their control. No immediate demand for military protection was made but the Army and the Navy were requested to remain on the alert to provide such protection immediately if trouble developed.
A formal request was made of the United States Employment Service in New York to immediately endeavor to recruit crews for the 400 odd tugboats immobilized by the strike. This demand upon the U. S. Employment Service was later withdrawn at the request of the United States Department of Labor. The Federal manager immediately activated an advisory committee which had been previously appointed. This committee consisted of representatives of the Army and the Navy, the Coast Guard and the War Shipping Administration, and representative members of the tugboat industry. The committee met daily and many of the details of the emergency operation which followed were resolved at these meetings.
Arrangements were made for the establishment of a central dispatching office for all emergency operating tugs at the Brooklyn Navy Yard and throughout the strike all dispatching operations were conducted at that point under the supervision of the Navy. A request was made upon the industry to provide volunteer dispatchers familiar with the oil and coal terminals in the area to advise Navy officers in their dispatching work. The companies complied and provided these men who were based at the navy yard. Their activities were coordinated by an executive of one of the towing companies, always subject to the immediate supervision of the Navy and the over-all direction of the Federal manager.
" Operations began on the morning of February 7, 1946, when a total of 14 Navy tugs, two Coast Guard tugs, and two Army tugs commenced delivering fuel to New York City. Two armed Marines were assigned to each unit of equipment during the first 2 days’ operation, but as it became evident that no attempt would be made to interfere with the operation, they were ordered withdrawn at the end of the second day’s operation. All operations throughout the strike were on a 24-hours-a-day basis.
As tugboats began arriving from other ports in response to our demands, and as the assembly of crews by the Navy began to bear results, permitting the manning of some of the commercial tugboats,
the number of tugboats in operation increased daily until it reached a total of 68 tugs available for service when the strike ended. Another week’s operation would have brought this figure to at least 100 tugs as the Navy alone was furnishing crews at the rate of five per day. In addition to the operation of Government-owned tugs, 15 commercial tugs manned both with crews assembled by the Navy and civilian crews volunteered by the City of New York were operated under our direction. The Army and Navy efforts to secure tugboat crews from their military ranks were reasonably successful. As an example, at the time the strike ended on February 13, the Navy alone had 760 men and 29 officers available in New York for manning commercial tugs. These men were being trained and instructed on the details of New York Harbor navigation and were being made available as their training was completed. In addition, 230 officers and men were in readiness at the U. S. Naval Base at Philadelphia to move to New York and 120 officers and men were available at the U. S. Naval Base in Norfolk. The U. S. Coast Guard was particularly helpful in being able to supply experienced New York harbor pilots to instruct these men and also to serve as pilots on the tugs. The commercial companies also supplied some pilots for instruction work.
In addition to the tugboats, a total of 24 large commercial oil barges were seized and operated— manned by crews supplied by the Navy. Also a large number of harbor coal lighters—commercially owned —were technically seized and operated. These did not require manning.
As these efforts bore fruit, the number of tugs in operation increased daily, and hence the quantities of coal and oil delivered and the number of ships shifted in the harbor correspondingly accelerated. By February 9, on which day a total of 17,678 tons of coal and 3,015,600 gallons of oil were delivered by the Office of Defense Transportation controlled operations alone, it was apparent that the minimum essential fuel requirements of the city would be met and that, assuming no weaknesses in the city distribution after the fuel was delivered to metropolitan New York, no serious hardships from lack of fuel would develop. On February 10, the Office of Defense Transportation operation resulted in deliveries of 4,-620,000 gallons of fuel oil, and a tanker was able to make a direct delivery to a metropolitan terminal. The total oil deliveries on that day to the metropolitan New York area were therefore, 9,781,952 gallons.
On the evening of February 11, basing his action on depleted oil inventories, the mayor of New York issued a surprise drastic restricting order which had the effect of practically closing down the city. He
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ordered that “all motion picture houses, theaters, night clubs, and all places of assembly and amusements, all schools, and other educational institutions, all commercial business and industrial establishments, irrespective of what type of fuel is used, and without regard to available supplies at hand, cease operating and close, effective 11:59 p. m., February 11.” All persons engaged in the buildings affected and in the occupations mentioned, were directed to remain away from such buildings and activities. Transit schedules were ordered curtailed. This order was rescinded except as to schools, the next day, February 12, about 5:00 p. m.; the schools which had been closed since February 8 were ordered reopened in the early afternoon of February 13th.
In an effort to return to more normal operations as soon as possible., the Federal manager on the afternoon of February 12 dispatched individual telegrams to all of the striking tugboat workers asking them to return to work under Government operation. Strikers had not reported for work by the time the strike ended on the afternoon of the following day, February 13,1946.
On that afternoon the operators and the unions agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration, and pending results of the arbitration, the men agreed to return to work for their employers. They began returning to work on the morning of February 14, 1946, at which time, the Government operations except with respect to incompleted missions were terminated. By the afternoon of February 14,1946, reasonably normal operations had been resumed.
On March 3, 1946, following the signing of the arbitration agreement, the Government relinquished possession and control of the properties of 90 of the 91 companies named in the Executive order. Possession and control of the properties of one company had been previously relinquished.
In order to anticipate any extravagant claims for
damage, arrangements for in and out surveys on seized commercial equipment were made with the U. S. Salvage Association through the Navy Department. Employees of the Office of Defense Transportation were stationed at the dispatching office to maintain a record of missions for statistical as well as billing purposes. Approximately $50,000 was collected by the Government for towing service provided during the operations.
During the period of Government operation, emphasis was placed upon the desperate fuel situation, and most of the emergency tugboat fleet was utilized in the moving of coal and oil to New York. This movement of coal and oil to the metropolitan area of New York City from February 7 to 13, inclusive, was as follows:
COAL (in tons)
Date By O. D. T. Hard and Soft By rail-barge By all rail Total
Hard Soft Hard Soft
Feb. 7 , 9,495 5,916 17,270 7,905 1,595 42,181
Feb. 8 7,344 18,205 10,251 1,760 37,560
Feb. 9 ..... 17,678 7,701 13,310 12,138 1,430 52,257
Feb. 10 10,000 1,683 11,385 9,435 1,760 34,263
Feb. 11 15,150 4,029 23,430 10,863 1,925 55,397
Feb. 12 ..... 14,300+8,600 5,508 25,245 10,353 2,475 66,481
Feb. 13 24,300+2,850 2,142 22,880 10,455 1.265 63,892
Total .. 102,373 34,323 131,725 71,400 12,210 352,031
OIL (in gallons)
Date By 0. D. T. Heavy and Light By oil companies not on strike By direct tanker deliveries to metropolitan tanks Total
Heavy Light
Feb. 7 .. 420,000 131,166 551,166
Feb. 8 .. 1,776,000 1,432,746 310,002 • e • 3,518,748
Feb. 9 .. 3,015,600 103,194 488,838 3,607,632
Feb. 10 .. 4,620,000 175,014 786,938 4,200,000 9,781,952
Feb. 11 .. 1,230,600 3,045.000 634,494 4,910,094
Feb, 12 .. 3,045,000 2,384,000 553,418 5,982,418
Feb. 18 .. 1,554,000 2,562,000 4,116,000
Total ' 23,652,200 2,898,866 1,716,944 4,200,000 12,468,01(
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CHAPTER XLII
OPERATING AND TRAFFIC CONDITIONS IN WORLD WARS I AND II
Domestic transportation over which the Office of Defense Transportation was given jurisdiction covers all movements of persons and property within the continental United States and its Territories and possessions. As such it includes a tremendous ranged of activity entering into all phases of our complex economic life. Movements of property vary from the use of trucks on farms or in retail distribution to the movements of ore by boat on the Great Lakes or rail movements of trainloads of coal; and in the passenger field, from home-to-work movements in private passenger cars or by local transit facilities to transcontinental movements by rail or air. There is no adequate basis of comparison between different forms of transportation since the service performed by each is so different and quite often of a supplementary nature ; however, for comparative purposes transportation is generally divided into two broad fields—the so-called intercity, or long-haul field, and local, or short-haul transportation. The relative importance of the several forms of transportation in each type of service, so far as it is possible to be demonstrated, is shown in the following sections, To be borne in mind in such comparisons are speed, flexibility, and other considerations dictating the choice of a given type of transport.
Transportation Facilities in 1916 and in 1941
Transportation facilities available in 1941 differed substantially from those prior to our entry into World War I. In 1916 the domestic intercity transportation of the United States was practically all handled by the railroads, the only material exception being the large movement of coal, ore, grain, and other bulk freight by vessels on the Great Lakes during the open season. Transportation of crude oil by pipe line had been in effect on a relatively small scale since 1879. There were only 19,441 miles of interstate crude oil trunk lines in 1916 as compared with 57,-502 miles in 1941. There was no transportation of refined oils by pipe line in 1916, but in 1941 6,075 miles of interstate trunk lines transported refined oils. The operation of the great modern system of inland waterway transportation on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers and their tributaries had not yet
begun. The enlargement of the Erie Canal into the New York State Barge Canal was not completed until 1918.
In World War I the role of automotive transportation, though important, was quite small, and such equipment then in use was predominantly in local or short-haul service, mostly on city streets.
By the start of World War II, however, automotive equipment had become an indispensable part .of our everyday life, and practically all local movements of property and the bulk of the local movement of persons were performed by it. In the intercity field, automotive transportation—hardly a factor in World War I—had grown to perform an important part of the total intercity movement. In 1941 registrations of trucks were almost 23 times, and passenger cars almost 9 times, those in 1916. Busses, negligible in importance in 1916, numbered about 148,000 in 1941 including both school busses and those in common-carrier operations. Domestic air lines, which operated 41,915 scheduled route-miles in 1941, were nonexistent in 1916.
Intercity Transport
In 1941 the intercity transportation systems by railway and the Great Lakes were much the same' in mileage and extent as in 1916; however, as a result of the increase in importance of highway, inland waterway, pipe line, and airway transport facilities, the dependence on the railroads was not so complete as in 1916. The railroads in 1916, as shown by schedule 1 at the end of this chapter, handled 77.2 percent of the inland intercity freight ton-miles and 98 percent of the passenger-miles. In 1941 the railroads handled 63.7 percent of the ton-miles and only 9.4 percent of the passenger-miles. While the foregoing is confined to inland transportation, the tonnage handled by coastwise and intercoastal steamship lines increased from less than 4 percent of the tons originated by railroads in 1916 to 12 percent in 1941. With the exception of the steamship lines, the foregoing comparisons are on the basis of ton-miles, and since there is considerable difference in the average length of haul by different agencies of transport, the importance of each agency differs when ranked on the basis
293
of tons handled. For example, while trucks in 1941 accounted for only 8.6 percent of the ton-miles, they accounted for approximately 16 percent of the total tons handled, owing to the fact that the average haul is substantially less than in the case of the railroads. Local Transport
In 1916 in the local field of transportation, the streetcar (including elevated, subway, and suburban lines) was the principal mover of passengers, and the horse-drawn vehicle was the principal mover of property, although approximately 3,000,000 passenger cars and about 215,000 trucks then in use contributed to handling the load. The use of automotive equipment increased rapidly during the years prior to 1941, in which year registrations were at an all-time high: In 1941 practically all property and the bulk of passengers were handled by rubber-bome equipment. Rail equipment (street, subway, elevated), which handled substantially all of the transit traffic in 1916, handled only about 60 percent of the total transit traffic in 1941, the remainder being handled by bus and motor coach. The proportion of the total local passenger traffic handled in 1941 by all rubber-tired vehicles, including private passenger cars, can only be approximated; however, it is probably in excess of 90 percent.
The foregoing indicates broadly the general changes in traffic which occurred between World War I and World War II. Before turning to a more detailed discussion of traffic handled by individual agencies during World War II, consideration should be given to operating conditions on the railroads in 1917, which led to Federal control and operation during World War I, as compared to conditions existing in 1941.
Comparison of Operating Conditions in 1917 and 1941
In 1917 the Railroad War Board, consisting of a group of railroad presidents, tried to pool the facilities and coordinate the operations of the railroads in order to use the railroad plant to its utmost efficiency in the wartime emergency. Their efforts failed chiefly because:—
First, the earnings of some railroads would have been seriously affected through the necessary rerouting of traffic to provide the greatest efficiency for the railroad transportation machine as a whole, and this naturally prevented fullest cooperation. The Department of Justice did not feel it had authority to waive the provisions of the Sherman antitrust law and permit pooling of revenue and facilities to relieve these inequalities between roads.
Second, there had been a great increase in operating costs in 1917 with further increases in prospect without any increase in rates. Consequently, earn
ings were decreasing and quick and large increases in rates were necessary, which could not be expected under private operation.
Third, the various Government departments issued priority orders indiscriminately to expedite the transportation of materials without regard to the necessity for the expedited movement. Under private operation, the railroads were not in a position to question the relative priority of these orders. This resulted in serious congestion on the railways at the ports, servicing the shipyards, and in the Pittsburgh district, and was the compelling reason for taking over the railroads in the last days of December 1917. It was necessary to have a Director General of Railroads of equal rank with Cabinet officers in order to stop the indiscriminate issuance of transportation priority orders and give preference to essential war materials in the order of actual requirements.
In 1941, however, the conditions of 1917, described above, which made Federal control and operation necessary, were not present.
In spite of a record freight traffic, there was no congestion and, therefore, no issue of conflicting priority orders. The Car Service Division of the Association of American Railroads kept in close touch with the situation at the ports and at construction projects and prevented the serious accumulation of cars under load, which caused so much difficulty in 1917.
There also had been close cooperation among the railroads, the armed forces, the United States Maritime Commission, and the shippers. Furthermore, the railroads had made extensive additions and improvements to their plants since 1918, particularly with respect to additional main tracks, yards and terminals, block signals and other devices for expediting traffic. The combination of these factors enabled the railroads to handle a record volume of traffic in 1941 without congestion.
In 1941 the Class I railroads handled 6 percent more revenue ton-miles than in 1929, the previous peak, and 31 percent more than in 1916. In passenger traffic the peak was in 1920. The railroads in 1941 handled 5.5 percent less passenger-miles than in 1929, 37.0 percent less than in 1920, and 15.0 percent less than in 1916. Therefore, while the freight traffic load in 1941 was much greater than in 1316, the passenger traffic load was substantially less.
It is true that while the aggregate mileage and capacity of railroad tracks was much the same in 1941 as in 1929, there had been a substantial reduction in the number of locomotives and cars on account of the severe falling off in freight traffic during the depression and the more serious falling off in passenger traffic resulting from the development of highway travel.
294
The unit capacity of the equipment in service of Class I railroads, however, had 'been greatly improved by the retirement of a large number of light locomotives and cars particularly since 1929. For example, while the aggregate tractive power of steam locomotives in service of Class I railroads had decreased 20 percent since 1929, the average unit tractive power had increased 11.4 percent and in 1941 was 51,217 pounds. The total number of passengertrain cars, including cars owned by the Pullman Co., in 1941 was 25.8 percent less than in 1929, but many of the old wooden passenger coaches had been replaced by modern lightweight, all-steel coaches, and most of the cars in main-line express train service had been air-conditioned. The railroads also had added a number of high-speed streamlined trains and made substantial reductions in the time between important centers, particularly in the West and the South.
In 1941 the railways, the principal domestic intercity transportation machine, were functioning smoothly and were carrying the heaviest freight traffic load of all time without congestion. The other intercity transportation systems—highway, waterway, airway, and pipe lines—also were functioning smoothly. The first important diversion to the railways from other forms of transportation, namely, from the intercoastal shipping lines operating through the Panama Canal to trancontinental rail movement—began in 1941, but this was easily absorbed by the railroads.
Review of Traffic Handled During the War Years
Compared with 1941
An over-all comparison of intercity inland domestic transportation, measured by ton-miles and passenger-miles of service performed, is shown for the years 1941 to 1945 in schedule 2. The percentage of change in the average annual traffic during the period 1942-45 and the peak year, 1944, compared with 1941 are given in the following tabulation:
Percent increase in volume of inland intercity domestic traffic Average 19 ¿$-45 and 1944 compared with 1941
Average, 1942-45, compared with 1941 1944 compared with 1941
Tonmiles Passengermiles Tonmiles Passengermiles
Railways (Including electric) Highway: Private Passengar Car.. 46.1% 176.5% —35.7 54.8% 219.5% —42.8
Truck: All —21.1 —1.7 15.0
For-hire 15.0
Bus 115.2 3.7 140.0 5.9
Inland waterways (including Great Lakes) ......... 3.4 63.2 6.9 94.5
Pipe lines
Airways 225.0 59.2 279.4 63.5
Total 33.9 —7.8 42.8 —8.2
—Indicates decrease
700494—48—20
In the local field, complete statistics are not available as to property carriers; however, analysis of a sample of carriers indicates that on the average, substantial increases occurred. Changes in the passenger field are shown in the following tabulation:
Percent increase in passengers carried, annual average, 194^-45 compared with 1941
Transit facilities:
Rail --------------------------:_______________j________ 35.4%
Bus ____________________________________________________ 91.7
Total ________________________________.'________________ 53.2
School Bus ______________________.._____________________■ 7.6
Taxicab ________________________________________________ 50.0
Railroads
The trend of rail traffic, 1941-45, segregated by the three major statistical districts—eastern, southern, and western—is shown in schedule 3. In each of the three areas, rail traffic during the period 1942-45 was substantially in excess of any prior year’s traffic. The index numbers of traffic for each of the years in the period 1942-45 as compared with 1929 and' 1941 taken as 100 are shown in the following tabulation for each of the three areas:
Area Index. 1929=100
1942 1943 1944 1945
Freight Traffic Revenue ton-miles: Eastern * 131.1 144.7 155.3 146.0 160.4 183.7 143.5 161.5 192.3 132.6 149.3 177.7
Southern Western Total United States.. Passenger Traffic Passenger-miles Eastern
142.7 162.6 164.9 152.3
135.1 274.8 199.1 198.5 451.0 364.5 217.3 469.7 402.2 208.4 452.3 378.5
Southern Western
Total United States. Freight Traffic Revenue ton-miles: Eastern
172.7 282.6 307.5 292.8
Index, 1941=100
131.4 128.8 140.7 146.4 142.8 166.5 143.9 143.8 174.2 133.0 132.9 161.0
Southern
Western Total United States. Passenger Traffic Passenger-miles: Eastern
134.4 153.1 155.2 143.5
160.0 206.4 204.7 235.0 338.7 . 374.8 257.3 352.7 413.6 246.8 339.7 389.2
Southern
Western
Total United States., 182.8 299.1 325.5 310.0
The greatest change in freight traffic compared with 1941 is noted in the western district, which in the year 1944 was 174.2 percent of the 1941 level, and averaged 160 percent for the 4 year period. In the case of passenger traffic, the greatest change also occurred in the western district, which in 1944 was 413.6 percent and averaged 345 percent for the period.
Some indication of the importance of organized military movements in rail passenger traffic is given
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by schedule 4. The extensive movements of military personnel on furlough is not included in these organized military movements, but they contributed largely to the tremendous increase in passenger traffic shown above. Furthermore, as shown by the following table, this unprecedented volume of freight and passenger traffic was handled with substantially less equipment than was available in 1929 and with only slightly more than was available in 1941:
Equipment on all railways
1929 1941 1944
Locomotives. Number in service 61,257 44,375 46,305
Average tractive power 44,801 51,217 52,822
Passenger-train cars. Owned by railroads ... Owned by Pullman Co... 53,838 9,469 38,334 7,059 38,217 8.751
63,307 45,393 46,968
2,353,918 1,755,598 1,822,407
Average capacity (tons)1.. 46.3 50.3 50.8
1Clasa I Railways.
The more efficient utilization of equipment and facilities which enabled the railroads to meet the sharp increases in both freight and passenger traffic is brought out in schedules 5, 6, and 7. The peak year was 1944, during which Class I railroads handled over 95 billion passenger-miles and 737 billion revenue ton-miles for the greatest traffic load in their history.
While there were some instances of local congestion and shortage of car supply, these were temporary and did not seriously impede the war effort; however, many problems arose which required prompt steps to prevent delay to war traffic.
Highways
Highway operations as herein described include the operation of trucks, busses, taxicabs, and passenger cars; also, local transit operations on railways as well as on highways. Statistics for these multitudinous operations are not accurately kept, except for regulated for-hire carriers and in some cases for carriers operated by private industries.
The use of automotive equipment now is quite diversified and enters into every phase of our activity. In World War I it was confined largely to city streets, but with the improvement of rural roads, it also became an important factor in intercity travel. In the passenger field, intercity passenger miles performed by automotive equipment (including private passenger cars) exceeded rail travel for the first time about 1924, and in subsequent years became increasingly important, reaching a point in 1941 where more than 89 percent of the total passenger-miles were performed by automotive equipment (schedule 1). The truck
has never attained the relative importance of the passenger car in intercity transportation; however, its use for such purposes was rapidly expanding prior to 1941, in which year, the truck accounted for 9.6 percent of total intercity ton-miles. Eliminating those commodities such as coal, ore, etc., which move in intercity traffic by truck only to a very minor extent, the importance of the truck in traffic competitive with other agencies of transport is much greater.
The restrictions on civilian consumption of automotive equipment and supplies were drastic. The diminished supply of new equipment and sharp reductions in the supply of tires, motor fuel, etc., necessitated conservation steps initiated by operators or required under Government order. In the case of passenger cars under OPA rationing controls, the mileage during 1943-44 was about 40 percent under the 1941 peak and, considering the entire period 1942-45, about 23 percent under 1941 levels. Much of the loss was in recreational or social travel, which was largely discontinued by private motor car during the war period. However, a considerable volume of this travel was diverted to the busses and railroads.
Intercity Movement of Property
Intercity movements of property by truck during the period 1942-45 were approximately 21.0 percent under the 1941 level. The decline resulted largely from the withdrawal of private trucks from the long-haul field. While no adequate statistics are available, it appears that intercity ton-miles performed by private trucks during the war period probably were between 40 and 50 percent below the 1941 level. Traffic handled by for-hire carriers increased considerably during the war period. Schedule 8 shows, for Class I motor carriers of property reporting to the Interstate Commerce Commission, indices of tons handled, miles operated, and operating revenues and expenses for the period 1938-45. Tons handled in 1943 and 1944 were approximately 19 percent greater than in 1941; however, because of a slight decline in average length of haul, ton-miles increased by only about 15 percent. While traffic in the first nine months of 1945 held at the general levels of 1943 and 1944, it declined by almost 10 percent in the fourth quarter of 1945.
Substantial differences are noted in the trends in traffic for different regions of the country.
Intercity Movement of Passengers
As shown in schedule 2, passenger-miles performed by all automotive equipment in intercity service during the period 1942-45 were approximately 27.1 percent below 1941 as a result of the impact of wartime restrictions on private passenger use. During this period passenger-miles of’ intercity busses, however,
296
increased 115 percent. Schedule 9 shows that the load during the war years increased substantially for intercity Class I ICC carriers of passengers.
Local Transport Operations.
Passengers handled by alii transit facilities (rapid transit systems, electric street and interurban railways, and local and suburban bus operations) in the country increased sharply during the war period as shown in schedule 10, averaging during the period 1942-45 about 53.2 percent above the 1941 level. Marked changes occurred in many localities in which population increased substantially as a result of wartime demands. This is illustrated in schedule 11 which shows, for 47 individual transit properties, the percent increase in the number of revenue passengers carried in the 12 months ended June 30, 1945, over the number carried in the calendar year 1941. Of the properties shown on the chart, nine show increases of 100 percent or more. Increases vary from 8 percent for the rapid transit lines in New York City to 231 percent for San Diego. In San Diego, population doubled between 1940 and 1944. In general, the larger the city the less the increase over 1941 rider demands. This is illustrated in the following tabulation comparing, by population groups, passengers handled in 1944 and 1941:
Transit or population group Millions of passengers Percent increase
1944 1941 1944 over 1941 .
2,621 2,421 8.3
Surface:
Cities over 1,000,000.... 5,714 4,178 36.8
500,000 to 999,999 .... 3,523 2,084 69.0
250,000 to 499,999 .... 3,865 2,017 91.6
100,000 to 249,999 .... 2,829 1,464 93.2
50,000 to 99,999 ... 2,137 929 130.0
Less than 50,000 ..... 945 381 148.0
Suburban and other... 1,383 611 126.4
Total 23,017 14,085 63.4
Taxicabs.
While not included in the foregoing operations taxicabs played a substantial part in the local movement of persons. The number of passengers carried during the period 1942-45 averaged about 50 percent above the 1941 level. As shown by schedule 10, passengers carried by taxicabs in 1944 were 67 percent greater than in 1941.
School Bus Operations.
Another important factor in local movement of passengers is the school bus. In 1944 the number of children transported daily was approximately 4.5 million, or about 9 percent above the corresponding 1941 figure. The average during the period 1942-45 was 7.6 percent greater than in 1941.
Waterway Transport.
Waterway operations in domestic transportation 700494—48—21
cover the deep water fleets moving in the coastwise and intercoastal trades and on the Great Lakes ; and lighter draft vessels operating on the Mississippi-Ohio River system, the intracoastal canal, and the numerous bays, sounds, and other inland waterways of the country. Waterway operations on the great modern system of inland waterways comprising the Mississippi-Ohio system as we know them today did not begin until after World War I.
The traffic on these waterways, except coastal and intercoastal traffic during the period 1941-45, is shown in schedule 12 and in summary form in schedule 2.
As shown in schedule 12, traffic during the period 1942-45 was less than in 1941 on Atlantic and Gulf coast rivers and greater than in 1941 on Pacific coast rivers. Traffic on the Mississippi-Ohio system during the period 1942-45 was 5.0 percent greater than in 1941 ; on the Great Lakes, 4.5 percent greater than in 1941; and on canals and connecting channels, 12.4 percent greater than in 1941. Wartime demands and conditions produced many changes in the type and direction of flow of traffic.
Pipe Lines.
The volume of traffic handled by pipe lines increased substantially during the war. Production of crude oil, practically all of which is carried by pipe line in one or more stages of its movement to market, increased from approximately 1.4 billion barrels in 1941 to 1.7 billion barrels in 1945, an increase of about 22 percent. The diversion, however, of petroleum and its products destined for the east coast from coastwise tankers placed a heavy burden on the railroads and required the construction of additional pipe lines. The longer haul by pipe lines on this account is shown by the following table. While production increased 22 percent in 1945 compared with 1941, ton-miles by pipe line increased 104 percent. Production of crude oil and the ton-miles of transportation of all liquid petroleum products by pipe line by years 1941 to 1945, inclusive, were as follows :
Crude Oil Production and Pipe Line Traffic, 1941 through 1945
Year Production of crude oil Ton-miles of pipe-line traffic
Barrels Millions Index (1941=100) Ton-miles Millions Index (1941=100)
1941 1,402 100.00 68,359 100.00
1942 1,387 98.89 74,730 109.32
1943 1,503 107.20 98,708 144 40
1944 1,678 119.65 133,000 194.56
1945 1,712 122.07 139,555 204.15
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Schedule I
298
Schedule 2
INTERCITY INLAND DOMESTIC FREIGHT AND PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION (INCLUDING FOR-HIRE AND PRIVATE CARRIERS)
1941 - 1945
ESTIMATED FREIGHT TON-MILES
ESTIMATED PASSENGER-MILES
FREIGHT TON-MILES IN MILLIONS
PASSENGER-MILES IN MILLIONS
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
AIRWAYS 20 35 55 75 96
HIGHWAYS _ 64,800 50,200 48,200 49,300 56,900
INLAND WATERWAYS- -140,454 148,565 141,652 150,155 140,700
PIPE LINES _ 68,359 74,730 98,708 133000 139055
RAILWAYS -481,748 645,262 734,715 745,854 688,713
TOTA1 - 755,38 1 918,792 1,023,330 1,078,384 1,025,964
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
AIRWAYS 1,385 1,418 1,634 2,264 3007
INLAND WATERWAYS-—_ 1,821 1,860 1,927 1,930 1040
PRIVATE AUTOMOBILES _ _ 264,300 199,600 147,100 151,300 181,500
MOTOR BUS 13,700 21,500 30,100 32,900 33,400
RAILWAYS 30,583 55,073 89,865 97,700 93,366
TOTAL 311,789 279,451 270,626 286094 313,613
299
Schedule 3
FREIGHT AND PASSENGER TRAFFIC
CLASS I RAILWAYS
1911 - 1945
ALL RAILWAYS
LOCOMOTIVES
FREIGHT CARS
PASSENGER TRAIN CARS
AVERAGE WORLD WAR I I9lfc-'I7 -'18 AVERAGE WORLD WAR IL 1941-’42-'4 3-44 PERCENT DECREASE
Number 66,534 45,1 12 32.2
Troctive Power (lbs. OOO) Estimoted 2,263,632 2,353,046 + 3.9
Number 2,368,946 1,771,515 25.2
Copocity (Tons) Estimated 97,926,015 89,554,000 8.5
Railroad Owned 55,914 38,409 31.3
Pullman 7,613 7,693 + 1. 1
300
Schedule 4
MILITARY * AND NET CIVILIAN PASSENGER - MILES
1943 - 1944 - 1945
ORGANIZED MOVEMENTS OF GROUPS OF 40 OR MORE FROM FEBRUARY,1943
source: TOTAL PASSENGER-MILES, I.C.C. REPORTS
MILITARY PASSENGER-MILES, A.A.R. REPORTS
301
Schedule 5
TREND OF GROSS TON - MILES AND LOCOMOTIVES ASSIGNED TO FREIGHT SERVICE
1929 - 1944 CLASS I RAILWAYS
302
Schedule 6
TREND IN PASSENGER TRAIN CAR - MILES AND LOCOMOTIVES ASSIGNED TO PASSENGER TRAIN SERVICE
1929 - 1944 CLASS I RAILWAYS
303
Schedule 7
TREND OF SERVICEABLE CARS ON LINE, REVENUE TON - MILES, AVERAGE CARLOAD AND MILES PER CAR PER DAY
1929 - 1945 CLASS I RAILWAYS
304
Schedule 8
INDEX OF TONS TRANSPORTED, MILES OPERATED, OPERATING REVENUE AND EXPENSE CLASS I I.C.C. MOTOR CARRIERS OF PROPERTY 1938 - 1945
Schedule 9
INDEX OF PASSENGERS CARRIED, MILES OPERATED, OPERATING REVENUE AND EXPENSE CLASS I ICC CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS 1938 ■ 1945
305
Schedule 10
INDICES OF PASSENGERS CARRIED AND MILES OPERATED BY TRANSIT COMPANIES, TAXICABS AND SCHOOL BUS OPERATORS 1937 - 1945
306
Schedule 11 PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN REVENUE PASSENGERS CARRIED BY TRANSIT SYSTEMS SERVING LARGEST CITIES
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1945 COMPARED WITH 1941
SAN DIEGO, Calif. SAN ANTONIO, Texas PORTLAND, Ore.
LOS ANGELES, Calif. - RE. Ry. OAKLAND, Calif.
DENVER, Colo.
AKRON, Ohio HOUSTON, Texas. MEMPHIS, Tenn. OMAHA, Neb. KANSAS CITY, Mo. ATLANTA, MACON, Ga., etc. SEATTLE, Wash DALLAS, Texas BRIDGEPORT, WATERBURY, Conn., etc. NEW ORLEANS, La. WASHINGTON, D. C. PROVIDENCE, R. I. LOUISVILLE, Ky.
NEW HAVEN, HARTFORD, Conn., etc. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL, Minn., etc. TOLEDO, Ohio BUFFALO, N.Y.
DETROIT, Mich. BALTIMORE, Md. MILWAUKEE, Wise. BIRMINGHAM, Ala. INDIANAPOLIS, Ind. PITTSBURGH, Pa NEW JERSEY CINCINNATI, Ohio ROCHESTER, N.Y. SAN FRANCISCO, Calif. COLUMBUS, Ohio PHILADELPHIA, Pa. DAYTON, Ohio LOS ANGELES Ry. Co. NEW YORK, N.Y., 3rd. Ave. Transit CLEVELAND, Ohio BOSTON, Mass.
CHICAGO, III., Motor Coach CHICAGO, III., Rapid Transit CHICAGO, III., Surface Lines NEW YORK, N. Y, Omnibus Group BROOKLYN, N.Y., Surface Lines NEW YORK, N. Y., All Rapid Transit
PERCENT OF INCREASE ISO
307
Schedule 12
TON-MILES OF FREIGHT CARRIED ON THE INLAND WATERWAYS (EXCLUSIVE OF COASTAL AND INTERCOASTAL) OF THE UNITED STATES, BY SYSTEMS
1940- 1944
(All amounts in thousands)
System 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1942-44 Average Percent change from 1941
Atlantic coast rivers 1,858.685 1,956,129 1,331,064 921,546 875,105 1,059,238 —45.8
Gulf coast rivers 593.451 676,477 568,980 473,555 343,080 461,872 —31.7
Pacific coast rivers 1,228,652 1,231,765 1,069,688 1,365,-829 1,350,808 1,262,108 -f- 2.5
Mississippi River system (including Ohio River and tributaries) 13,934,427 17,037,435 16,498,840 16,765,204 20,381,558 17,881,867 + 5.0
Other waterways 9,524 9,427 9,552 8,988 9,433 9,324 — 1.1
Canals and connecting channels 4,787,222 5,903,639 6,870,254 6,771,282 8,425,989 7,355,842 +12.4
Great Lakes system1 95,645,008 113,639,050 122,166,646 115,345,775 118,768,819 118,760,413 + 4.5
Total 118,056,969 140.453,922 148,565,024 141,652;178 150,154,792 146,790,664 + 4.5
1Does not include traffic between foreign ports on Great Lakes.
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CHAPTER XL1II
POST-WAR OPERATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION
The post-war activities of the Office of Defense Transportation can be divided into two groups of operations:
First—The Federal management of transportation properties due to stoppage of vital transportation because of strikes. These Federal operations, both during and after the war period, have been described in the three chapters XXXIX, XL, and XU, relating to Federal management of transport.
Second—The continuation of the other activities of ODT which had not been discontinued by the end of 1945, as set forth in earlier chapters. The Highway and Liquid Transport Departments had been abolished prior to December 31,1945, and all controls over highway and local transport and pipe lines had been discontinued. These controls, however, still remained in the hands of the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation and could be reinstated in case of emergency. This was done during the general railroad strike’ in the spring of 1946, when control of other forms of transportation was required. (See chapter XXXIX, Federal Management of Railway Transport).
Aside from these emergencies arising out of labor difficulties, the principal problems facing the ODT after December 31, 1945, were those connected with the supply of new freight cars for the railways, and the distribution» of the inadequate existing supply. In addition, control of coastwise movements of coal to New England and the movement of ore, coal, and grain on the Great Lakes required supervision by the Office of Defense Transportation.
This chapter consequently relates to the control exercised over railway and waterway transport and collateral activities after December 31, 1945.
Post-War Organization of ODT
Following the termination of the Highway and Liquid Transport Departments the greater part of the field force of the Office of Defense Transportation was discontinued. Further reductions in the force at Washington and the field were made during the spring of 1946, in anticipation of liquidating the
agency on June 30, 1946, and transferring its functions to the Interstate Commerce Commission and other agencies. Due to the complexity of the problems, particularly those relating to freight car supply and to the unsettled claims and other legal problems arising from Federal management of transport agencies, it finally was decided to continue the agency through at least a part of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947. The reasons for this continuation were summarized in the following statement which was made to the House Committee on Appropriations when the appropriation of $525,000 was requested for the fiscal year 1947.
General Statement—Reasons for requesting extension of the Office of Defense Transportation beyond June 30, 1946
On February 2,1946, the President submitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a supplemental estimate of appropriation for fiscal year 1946 in the amount of $159,000 for the Office of Defense Transportation- This supplemental request became necessary because of an emergency caused by an acute shortage of box cars and refrigerator cars which required a continuation of the’Railway Transport Department to the end of the fiscal year instead of its termination on March 31, 1946, and also the use of the full field force of the Bureau of Service of the Interstate Commerce Commission to the end of the fiscal year.
After hearings before the Appropriation Committee this supplemental appropriation was approved and subsequently was added to the appropriation of the Office of Defense Transportation for 1946. It was stated at the hearings in connection with this deficiency appropriation that the Office of Defense Transportation would be terminated on June 30, 1946.
The coal strike this spring made it necessary to embargo a large portion of freight movements. The recent railroad strike caused further embargoes and delay to freight shipments. As a result it now appears that a serious shortage of freight equipment in the next 12 to 18 months is inevitable.
In addition, the movement of coal, ore and grain on the Great Lakes may be jeopardized by the strike of tug boat employees and it will require the continued attention of the Director of our Waterway Transport Department to insure that these important movements continue at capacity during both the 1946 and 1947 periods of navigation. Substantial all-rail movements of these commodities after navigation closes may be necessary to make up shortages. This will place additional burdens on railroad equipment. Coastwise movements of coal to New England also will require careful atten
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tion. If coastwise shipping is tied up by a strike of Maritime employees further burdens will be placed on the rails.
There is a serious shortage in the supply of steel, lumber and other materials for maintenance and for new equipment for all transportation agencies on account of the housing program. The Office of Defense Transportation is Claimant Agency before the Civilian Production Administration for these materials for transportation agencies and it is important that this function be continued if the transportation machine is to function reasonably well during this emergency.
As stated above all of our plans had been made to terminate the Office of Defense Transportation on June 30, 1946. In view of the serious emergency arising from the coal and railroad strikes and the possibility of further emergencies in waterway transport, I believe that it would be unwise to do so, and that provision should be made to extend the Office of Defense Transportation with all of its powers for at least 10 months beyond June 30, 1946. Provision also would be made for additional forces in the Bureau of Service of the Interstate Commerce Commission in order to enforce the controls of ODT and the Car Service Orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The field f orces of ODT will be discontinued with the exception of three employees at Chicago to supervise the grain movement.
Consequently an appropriation of $525,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947 is requested for the following purposes:
Personal Services..............................$256,700
Travel & other obligations including $193,000 to reimburse the Interstate Commerce Commission for the compensation, travel and other expenses of the additional forces in the Bureau of Service not provided for in its 1947 budget.......................... 268,300
Total ...................................$525,000
As indicated above, it was contemplated that the work of the Office of Defense Transportation and the Bureau of Service of the Interstate Commerce Commission would be closely coordinated and that the field force of service agents of the ICC Bureau of Service would constitute the entire field force of the Office of Defense Transportation except for a small office in Chicago to handle the problems of grain transport.
It was proposed that the ODT appropriation should be used to pay the salaries and expenses of 40 ICC Bureau of service agents and 3 stenographers in addition to those included in the ICC budget for 1947. The successful integration of the railway car service activities of the two agencies was made possible by the fact that the Bureau of Service of the ICC and the ODT both were under the direct jurisdiction of Colonel Johnson.
Under this plan the personnel of the Office of Defense Transportation was reduced to 70 as of July 1, 1946, divided into the following divisions and departments headed by the official named:
Office of the Director:
Director ........................J. Monroe Johnson
Deputy Director ....................Homer C. King
Executive Officer ............... Joseph L. White
Executive Assistant .................Frank Perrin
Staff Divisions:
General Counsel .............. Francis A. Silver
Manpower and Materials ...........Robert L. Glenn Transport Departments:
Railway ..........................Arthur H. Gass
Waterway........................Laurence C. Turner
Closely associated with these ODT officials was V. C. Clinger, Director of the ICC Bureau of Service, who reported directly to Colonel Johnson.
When the appropriation of $525,000 for the Office of Defense Transportation was requested, it was contemplated that the operating forces of ODT and the additional forces of the ICC Bureau of Service paid out of the ODT appropriation would be terminated by March 1, 1947, and that the agency would be liquidated by April 30, 1947. During the fall of 1946, however, as subsequently described in this chapter, the shortage of railway freight cars became so serious that it seemed advisable to request a supplemental appropriation to carry on the operating activities to about June 1, 1947, and liquidation of the agency on June 30, 1947.
A supplemental appropriation in the amount of $136,500 was approved for this purpose and also a supplemental appropriation of $62,400 to cover wage increases subsequent to July 1, 1946, under Public Law 390. The total appropriation for the Office of Defense Transportation for the fiscal year 1947, including salaries and expenses of ICC Bureau of Service agents paid out of ODT funds, therefore, amounted to $723,900.
In the spring of 1947, the President decided that the shortage of railway freight cars was still so serious that it was necessary to ask for an extension of certain wartime powers which gave him control over the distribution of the existing freight car supply and the construction of new equipment. At the same time he requested an appropriation to extend the Office of Defense Transportation to June 30,1948.
Post-war Problems of Freight Car Supply
As outlined above, the Office of Defense Transportation met the post-war problems of freight car supply by integration of the activities of the Railway Transport Department of ODT with those of the IOC Bureau of Service. The alarming increase in the shortage of freight cars, particularly box cars in the latter part of 1946, is brought out by the chart on the following page. The shortages were greater than any that occurred during 1945 and previous war years. The joint ODT-ICC Bureau of Service organization sought to reduce these shortages by:
1. Increasing the available supply of existing cars through heavier loading and reducing terminal delays and the time between loadings, and
2. Expediting the construction of new cars.
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SUMMARY OF BOX CAR SURPLUSES AND SHORTAGES
DAILY AVERAGES - BY WEEKS
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Increasing Available Supply of Existing Cars
The experience gained during the war years showed that the availability of the existing car supply could be increased in three ways, namely by:
1. Increasing the number of serviceable cars through a reduction in the number of bad order cars,
2. Increasing the average carload, and
3. Reducing the turn-around time; e. g., times car was empty between loadings.
Reducing the Bad Order Cars
During the war years the percentage of bad order cars to total cars on line averaged about 2.8% and fell to an all-time low of 2.4% on November 1,1942. This had the effect of adding approximately 15,130 cars to the supply of serviceable cars if this percentage of 2.8% is compared with the percentage of 3.7 % on December 31, 1941.
Due to general relaxation of effort following the war, the greater age and excessive wear and tear on the equipment arising from the heavy war traffic and the difficulties in securing material for maintenance of freight cars after the abolition of the controlled materials plan in the fall of 1945, the number of bad order cars had increased, on June 1, 1946, by about 35,000 cars over June 1943 when the percentage of bad order cars was 2.8 percent of total cars on line.
This situation was described in the following letter of August 28,1946, from Colonel J. M. Johnson to the Honorable John R. Steelman, Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion:
The progressive increase in the number of railroad freight cars awaiting repair from the low point reached during the war is shown by the following tabulation. These figures represent freight cars on line of Class I railroads and include practically all railroad owned cars! Private car ownership of freight cars is discussed in a later paragraph.
No. of cars Percent of of all types total on awaiting line Repair
November 1, 1942 ...................... 41,608 2.4
June 1, 1943 ...........................48,141 2.8
January 1, 1944 ........................42,425 2.5
June 1, 1944 ...........................52,637 3.1
January 1, 1945 ....................... .50,885 3.0
June 1, 1945 ...........................65,531 3.9
August 15, 1945 ........................68,467 4.0
January 1, 1946 ....................... 72,163 4.3
June 1, 1946 ...........................83,052 4.9
July 15, 1946 ..........................82,088 4.9
Total railroad car ownership is approximately 1,750,000 cars and the ownership in private car lines is about 275,000 cars. Of this latter number it can be said that only about 250,000 are available for general usage—the balance being restricted to assigned services. No firm current figures are available on the percentages of private line cars awaiting repair but it is generally understood that it is between 8% and 10%.
It will be noted from the above figures that the percentage of railroad owned cars awaiting repair was kept below 3% for the greater part of the war period. If, as a minimum figure,
8% of the private line cars are out of service and this could be reduced to 3%, 12,500 additional would be made available for service and if, in addition, the railroad figure could be reduced from 4.9% to 3%, 32,800 cars or a total of more than 45,000 cars would be back in service. It should be understood that many of the cars awaiting repair have deteriorated beyond the point where further repairs can be justified, but a reduction can be made which would go a long way toward relieving the present critical car shortage.
At the present time with weekly revenue car loadings at about 900,000 the present average daily car shortages are running about 23,000 cars per day and it is feared when the most acute period is reached in October, at which time the weekly car demand is expected to exceed 1,000,000 that the daily car shortage may run to 100,000 unless there is great improvement in the bad order situation and in the delivery of new cars. The Office of Defense Transportation and the Civilian Production Administration have been making an active effort to have industry unload and load cars quickly. It can be seen that unless a decided reduction is made in turn around time of cars, an additional weekly loading of 100,000 cars, in view of the existing car shortages, would lead inevitably to the predicted 100,000 shortages unless car repair performance and delivery of new cars is greatly improved.
The cars awaiting repair on July 15,1946, were divided into types as follows:
No. of cars
Box .....................:........... 32,825
Refrigerator .......................... 1,366
Gondola ...............................18,438
Hopper.................................23,044
Stock....................*.............3,388
Flat .................................. 3,026
Percentage
4.7
7.8
5.8
4.6
6.4
5.4
While shortages of all types exist, the largest and most damaging shortages are those of box cars, hopper cars and refrigerator cars. About one-half of the private line cars are refrigerator cars.
In order to keep the car shortages from ascending to the 100,000 level, which would indicate a serious collapse of .rail transportation, a major effort will be required from the railroads to reduce the number of bad order cars. This must be accompanied by an adequate flow of steel, lumber, and car components required to repair the cars. If this material is not forthcoming, the railroads will be unable to reduce their bad orders appreciably and the daily car shortages will go to much higher figures.
A further discussion of the activities of the ODT in securing material for the repair of freight cars will be found in a subsequent section of this chapter relating to expediting the construction of new freight cars.
Increasing Carloads
During the war years General Orders ODT 1 and 18, which required heavier loading of 1. c. 1. merchandise cars by the railroads and of carload freight by the shippers, resulted in adding about 190,000 cars to the available supply. The methods by which this result was accomplished are described in Chapter III, Increased Utilization of Freight Cars. These orders were continued in the post-war period and while relaxed in some minor respects, they prevented
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any serious slippage in the available car supply due to lighter loading.
Reducing Turn-Around Time
The third method of increasing the availability of the existing car supply was to reduce the time of cars between loadings called turn-around time. The delays were chiefly at terminals as the over-the-road movements were generally satisfactory.
The responsibility for detention of cars at terminals was divided between the railroads and the shippers or receivers of freight. On March 19, 1946, Colonel J. M. Johnson, Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, brought the increase in turnaround time and in bad order cars to the attention of the railroads in the following letter addressed to J. J. Pelley, President of the Association of American Railroads, and J. M. Hood, President of the American Short Line Railroad Association:
On February 28, I wrote you a letter urging that you take up with the railroads the matter of improvement of performance, without which improvement the railroads are going to find themselves presently very much more stretched and extended than at any time during the war. I sincerely hope that you did so and that you will continue to bring this matter before railroad executives everywhere and insist on their positive action to that end. I now want to call your attention to the present and prospective situation so that you may appreciate the seriousness of conditions.
My latest report on turn-around time is for February 1946, which is 16% days. Frequently, we approached 12 days during the war itself and often for months we were slightly over 13, which indicates that it takes three more days now to turn a car than during the war. One day of turn-around time is, I am informed, equal to 114,600 cars- Your line haul is free and easy. The delay occurs in exchanges in your yards and in yard areas. Something must be done about it.
The carloadings for the week ending March 9 were higher than 1944 and 1945. The box carloadings for the week ending March 2 are just equal to the fall peak of 1945 and are equal to the high tide of the war. The refrigerator carloadings reached 37,200 cars the week ending March 9, the highest in the history of American railroads, and it is prognosticated that they will go still higher. Coal loadings for the week ending March 9 approached 13,000,000 tons, which is the highest in American history, except for the fall of 1943. This extreme transportation volume exists even with reconversion held back by strikes. The strikes are now being settled rapidly.
Steel and motors will go into production apparently at a very early date. Both their raw materials and their products must be transported in addition to the present volume.
Additional coal has to be moved to the Great Lakes, where navigation opens now in a few days. This, as you know, will consume thousands and thousands of cars. Tidewater coal, too, will be greatly increased.
There is promised another heavy crop of wheat.
Preparations must be made for this movement, which will begin in June.
The housing program will entail a tremendous volume of tonnage in lumber, cement, sand, gravel, brick, stone, and steel.
700494—48—22
The highway program, of which we have heard much, will consume a great deal of transportation.
The situation in respect to bad order cars must be given further attention. At the low point during the war the percentage of all cars awaiting repairs declined to 2.4 percent of ownership. At that time, 2.3 percent of all box cars were awaiting repair. Throughout 1943 and 1944 the percentage remained under 3 percent. In April 1945 we began to lose ground until at the present time the figures stand at 4.3 percent of all cars and 4.2 percent of box cars. These are of course average figures for all roads and the situation on numerous large roads is considerably worse than the average indicates. I understand that the material shortages play a part in the problem at this time and we are now endeavoring to remedy this through the Civilian Production Administration. Nevertheless, our present condition calls for the same close attention by each carrier to the job of keeping the number of cars awaiting repair at a minimum as was applied during the war.
There are some cars on order already delayed. But even were those cars rolled out on the tracks today, they would be insufficient and would be only a small part of cars we could get by an improvement in turn-around time. The turn-around time must be decreased. Railroad transportation is not in condition to move the avalanche that reconversion will now soon put on the rails. Every effort must be made to speed up the completion and delivery of the railroad cars now on order and to order quickly additional cars and have their de-, livery expedited.
Following the extension of ODT beyond June 30, 1946, and the integration of the Office of Defense Transportation and the IOC Bureau of Service, the field forces of the Bureau of Service patrolled important railway terminals likely to become bottlenecks and reported conditions daily to the Director of the IOC Bureau of Service. These reports gave car numbers and detention of seriously delayed cars whether in the hands of the railroads or the shippers and the more serious cases were taken up by correspondence with the operating heads of the railroads after review by the transportation experts in the Railway Transport Department of the ODT. In this way many situations were brought to the personal attention of the railroad operating heads which apparently had been overlooked and the necessary remedy was applied.
During the war the shippers and receivers of freight had cooperated wholeheartedly with the railroads and made a remarkable record for the rapid loading and unloading of cars. After the war, how-• ever, many industries adopted a five-day work week and as a result many cars that ordinarily would have been released either loaded or empty on Saturday were held over until Monday. Thus, the turn-around time for such cars was increased a day. With the war over, there also was some natural relaxation in the speed of loading and unloading and it became necessary in order to prevent further increase in the turnaround time and consequent depletion in the car sup-
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ply for the ICC at the request of the ODT to increase demurrage charges.
These charges were increased as follows:
Summary of Service Orders to Increase Demurrage
113—Flats. Issued 3/3/43, effective 3/10/43. Vacated 9/6/45. Increased demurrage up to $11.00 on regular and $15.00 on heavy duty. Logging cars and cars for military exempted.
135—All cars at Mexican border points up to $22.00 per day. Issued 7/10/43, expires 12/31/47.
180—Refrigerators. Issued and effective 2/5/44, increasing to $44.00 per day. Suspended 8/5 to 9/9/44, then reissued. Amendment 12 effective 6/1/47 to 7/1/47 reduces maximum to $11.00. Expires 12/31/47.
188—Companion order to 180 applying to California State Belt Railroad.
242—Boxes. Issued 10/7/44, effective 12/19/44. Increased demurrage to $11.00 per day. Revised 10/13/44 to $16.50 per day. Vacated 12/1/44 by amendment “A.” Reinstated 3/15/45. Amendment “B” effective 4/1/45 at $16.50 per day. Suspended 7/7/45, vacated 9/30/45.
369—Boxes. Issued 11/9/45, effective 11/15/45, increased rates to $16.50. Suspended 4/2/46. Reinstated by 369B 6/7/46. Expires 12/31/47.
370—Companion order to 369.
328—'Covered hoppers. Issued 7/4/45, effective 7/10/45, increased rates to $16-50 per day. Expired 9/30/45.
559—Gondolas, open and covered hoppers. Effective 7/25/46. Increased rates to $16.50 per day, exempting export and import and coastwise shipments. Expired 12/I/46.
653—Issued 12/16/46, effective 12/20/46. Reissue on same cars at same rate. Expires 12/31/47.
263—Tank cars. Issued 12/33/44, effective 1/15/45. Increased demurrage to $22.00 per day. Pressure tanks excluded. Suspended 6/15/45. Vacated Ï1/1/45.
394 — Refrigerators. Issued 12/7/45, effective 12/15/45-Provides 48 hours on domestic and 5 days free time at ports.
434—Other than refrigerators. Issued 1/14/46, effective 1/18/46. Reduces free time at ports to 7 days-
The net results of these efforts to reduce the turnaround time were summarized at the hearing before the Interstate Commerce Commission in the spring of 1947, as follows :
Average turn-around time for freight cars - all types
Pre War War Years Average War Years Post War
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947
January 15.6 14.8 IO 15.8 16 0 15.85 16.3
February 15.2 14.7 15.5 15.2 15.8 15.30 16.5 14.68
March 14.1 14.6 15.5 15.3 15.0 15.10 14.9 14.16
April ------ 15.5 13.9 15.1 14.7 14 2 14.47 18.4*
May 7 13.0 13.9 14.3 13 8 13 9 13.97 18 3*
June 12.5 13.8 15.0 13.8 13 7 14.07 14 7
July 12.9 14.2 13.7 13.7 14.1 13.92 13.9
August ......................... 12.4 13.5 13.3 13 3 14.7 13.70 13 2
September 12.6 13.5 13.4 13.5 14 4 13.70 13 5
October 12.3 13 1 13.2 13.3 15 1 13.67 13 0
November 13.1 14.7 14.4 14.2 14 8 14.52 14 3
December 14.9 16.7 15.5 16.2 16 7 16.27 15 98
Yearly Average 13.6 14 2 14.6 14.3 14 9 14.50 14 96
Average 5 Months 14.68 14.38 15.44 14.96 14.98 14.93 16.88 14.35
*Coal and Railroad Strikes
Expediting Production of New Freight Cars
On February 5, 1947, at a hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in connection with Senate Resolution 47, Colonel Johnson testified at length on the situation with respect to freight car supply. He outlined the various steps described above that had been taken by the Office of Defense Transportation to improve the utilization of existing equipment and thereby increase the available car supply.
With respect to the efforts of the Office of Defense Transportation to promote increased production of new freight cars and reduce the number of bad order cars he introduced in his testimony the following statement by Robert L. Glenn, Director of the Division of Manpower and Materials of the Office of Defense Transportation:
Throughout the war years the Office of Defense Transportation, as claimant agency for transportation, was active in efforts to obtain expanded allotments of controlled materials
from the War Production Board for railroad equipment repair and new freight car construction. Coincident with this we sought to have a maximum number of new freight cars ordered by the railroads. There were 80,623 new freight cars produced in 1941 and solid commitments had been made by the railroads for the purchase of 150,000 in 1942 and 180,000 in 1943. These programs were blocked in 1942 because of thé need for devoting production energies and materials to the manufacture of armament and as a result production of new cars fell to the following figures in susequent years:
1942 ..................................... 62,873
1943 ..................................... 31,836
1944 ..................................... 43,003
1945 ..................................... 43,864
1946 ..................................... 41,916
More than 32 percent or 574,000 freight cars are over-age by normal railroad standards and should be retired. If consideration is given to the acceleration of wear and tear during the, war years it is safe to state that about 960,000 cars are over-age.
We were successful during the war in otaining allocations of steel for freight car repairs which kept the percentage of cars awaiting repairs below 2.8% of ownership for the greater
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part of the period of hostilities. Towards the end of the war manpower shortages intervened and the percentage of cars awaiting repairs increased. The heavy wear and tear of wartime service and the inadequate repairs which the cars received added materially, of course, to the slippage towards the end of the war. The railroads’ situation in this respect was further worsened in the early part of 1946 and the percentage of cars awaiting repair rose in June to 4.9% of ownership.
At the beginning of 1946 we found the following situation: The Controlled Material Plan of the War Production Board had been abandoned and the Civilian Production Administration, successor to the War Production Board, proposed to approach the problem of overcoming material shortages in industrial reconversion by limited application of priority and directive action on production bottlenecks. Apparently this approach was based to some extent on the assumption that reconversion to civilian production would be much less rapid than it proved to be. Losses of steel and manufactured products resulting from the steel and coal strikes immediately precipitated critical shortages which have not been fully overcome up to this time.
In February 1946 we apprehended the serious position in which transportation, particularly the railroads, would be placed as a result of the lost steel production, the rapidly expanding requirements of civilian production and the serious inroads threatened by the housing program. We tried to do something about it. The Office of Defense Transportation has no power to direct the channeling of steel and other materials needed for car repairs and new car construction and we of necessity had to seek the assistance of the agencies having that responsibility. Our major post-war efforts in this direction began in February 1946 though I had pointed out to Administrator Small, of the Civilian Production Administration, on previous occasions the problems that would be facing raH-way transportation later in 1946.
Beginning in February we urged immediate attention by the Civilian Production Administration to providing sufficient, steel and lumber for car building and car repairs and thereafter we strove continuously to improve the Supply of materials going to the railroads and car builders. On March 7th we provided the Civilian Production Administration with a full statement of the situation at that time and a detailed list of materials necessary for the purpose, (See Attachment 2). In innumerable conferences and in correspondence with the Civilian Production Administration, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, and Office of Economic Stabilization in the following months we continued to bring to the attention of responsible parties the need for serious attention to the material procurement difficulties of the railroads and car builders. We repeatedly stressed to the railroads and car builders the need for maximum utilization of available materials to complete domestic freight cars as quickly as possible and to reduce the accumulation of bad orders.
The reluctance of the Civilian Production Administration to issue material priorities on a broad basis in the face of the disruption in supply caused by strikes is understandable and we would have little or no criticism if they had not at the same time set up procedures which amounted to material allocations to the housing industry and to producers of agricultural machinery. We believe that a healthful economy must necessarily be based on a fully effective transportation system. The fact that we were meeting only about 85% of the demand for railway transportation led us to demand that materials be provided for the railroad industry as a first step
in the reconversion of industry to civilian production at the fastest possible rate and the carrying forward of government programs, such as housing and famine food relief. The records show that in subsequent months all industry was seriously retarded by car shortages but our arguments for additional allocations of steel and other materials went unheeded for the most part during 1946 until the month of December when a policy decision was made which we believe will finally bring about an improvement in the freight car supply.
In the early part of 1946 shortages of lumber were of particular concern to the railroads and car builders. Lumber in the form of car lining is of prime importance in maintaining the maximum availability of grain cars. OPA adjustments of construction lumber prices had distorted the lumber price structure so that purchasers of car lumber were at a disadvantage and found it impossible to place orders for lumber. We sought earnestly through the proper agencies to obtain lumber price adjustments which would correct this condition. We also sought to correct maladjustments in the prices of switch ties and cross ties. We began this activity in March and by June we had obtained partial correction of the cross tie and switch tie prices. Correction of the Southern pine car lumber prices was not obtained until July and though some partial adjustments were made in Douglas fir prices in June, proper adjustments had not been made by the time OPA controls were lifted. There is no doubt that the delay in obtaining the necessary price adjustments contributed to the increase in the number of bad order cars which rose, as indicated in previous paragraph, to 4.9 percent of ownership in June. The price changes in lumber had their reflection in a partially improved car repair performance.
The attached correspondence will show that our requests for an over-all procedure for obtaining steel and other materials were met by the Civilian Production Administration with Repeated counter offers to provide spot assistance on any individual cases which we would bring to their attention. A sufficient number of individual cases was directed to CPA to prove that this type of assistance was of little or no value. Our continued insistence on a comprehensive system of allocations which would increase the quotas allowed by the steel mills to individual car builders and railroads brought about, in the early part of September, a plan under which the car builders and railroads were supposed to bring their requirements for steel for an accelerated car building and repair program to the attention of the steel mills with the assurance that they would be properly taken care of. It quickly developed that the steel mills did not propose to increase the quotas of steel being made available for freight cars and any increased shipment of freight car steel would have had to come out of steel being used by the car builders in other essential manufacturing. On September 26th Mr. Steelman directed the Civilian Production Administration to take steps to provide sufficient steel to build 7,060 domestic freight carsper month and to effect a pronounced reduction in bad order cars but nothing concrete was done- It was not until the reorganization brought about under the Office of Temporary Controls in December that a firm policy decision was made to take the required measures to provide the materials, particularly steel, required for a proper program of car construction and car repair. This culminated in a meeting of the Civilian Production Steel Products Industry Advisory Committee on January 16th, in which the steel industry representatives promised to make the necessary quantities of steel available to the car builders and railroads. Our statement, presented to this meeting, is appended as Attachment 29. It
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is to be regretted that action of this kind was not taken five or six months previously.
A discussion of material shortages hindering freight car construction and repair would not be complete without a reference to the problem of pig iron. The housing program made heavy demands on the supply of this commodity and the production of railroad car equipment, such as air brakes, was seriously affected. There was difficulty also in the production of brake shoes but direct assistance was provided by the Civilian Production Administration in this instance. Although the production of pig iron has been improving in recent months there is no doubt that the expanded program we now contemplate in building new cars and repairing bad orders will make additional demands on the pig iron suppliers and we must have enlarged allotments of pig iron made available for the production of chilled car wheels and other castings.
In June it was apparent that the ordering of new freight cars by the railroads was lagging, primarily because of the uncertain financial position of the carriers. The slowness in ordering cars had its reflection, justifiably or not, in a tendency on the part of the car builders to slow down production in order that particular car shops would not run out of work. I advocated a program whereof the government would underwrite the purchase of 50,000 additional freight cars to be paid for subsequently on a reasonable basis by the railroads- The program, though it found approval at the highest policy levels was not approved by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and was finally dropped in September.
In October we were given the problem of providing high pressure and low pressure tank cars tQ replace Army cars which the War Department proposed to withdraw from commercial service in connection with the Army fertilizer program for occupied countries. The withdrawal of the Army cars without adequate replacements would have the most serious consequences to the domestic economy and we supported the policy that the withdrawal should be deferred until new production and other arrangements could fill the gap. We worked with the Civilian Production Administration on the issuance of directives on the car builders and the steel mills for an accelerated production of high pressure tank cars for use in transportation of anhydrous ammonia and liquefied petroleum gas to a total of approximately 490 cars. The problem of providing replacements for the low pressure cars required by the Army has not yet been satisfactorily disposed of.
As stated in previous paragraphs, we were in constant contact with the Civilian Production Administration and other agencies on the problem of providing materials for an expanded car construction and car repair program. The correspondence, on the various phases of this subject was voluminous. I have selected some of the letters written, concerning the problem, by myself as well as other individuals and arranged them in chronological order in the following attachments to show development in this connection during the past year. I have included correspondence from other agencies to illustrate the views of all concerned.
The correspondence submitted by Mr. Glenn with his statement to the Senate Committee is too voluminous to include in this chapter. Those interested will find it in the record of the hearing in connection with Senate Resolution 47. The situation at that time with respect to the freight car shortage, however, is well summarized in Mr. Glenn’s letter of January 8, 1947, to Mr. P. J. Treacy, Chairman of the
Steel Products Industry Advisory Committee of the Civilian Production Administration, which is quoted below:
This statement outlines first, in brief fashion, the present situation in respect to car shortages. The deficiencies of car construction and repair programs during the recent past are analyzed and there is a tabulation of steel requirements for new cars and equipment repairs needed during the first and second quarters of 1947 to restore the railroads to full efficiency. The basis on which these requirements have been developed is fully established.
Average daily freight car shortages in recent weeks as reported by the Association of American Railroads were as follows:
December 21 .....................'.........28,390
December 14 ...............................25,502
December 7 ................................23,477
At this time of year car loadings normally fall off sharply but we observe an increasing car shortage that compares with the figures for the peak traffic period of October and November 1946, when the shortage figure reached 39,089. There is no need to elaborate on the consequences to the national economy of continuing freight car shortages. All segments of industry are entirely familiar with the production delays caused by lack of cars needed to move raw materials and finished products though the effects in increased inflationary pressures can never be measured. It is estimated that during the past year only 85% of the cars required by industry have been supplied when needed.
We can expect, unless there is a serious economic setback in the following months, that car shortages will continue to increase until the building of new cars overcomes the loss by retirement of old equipment and provides a net increase in ownership. The National Shippers Advisory Boards estimate that the freight car requirements during the first quarter of 1947 will increase over those for the first quarter of 1946 by 8.8%. The shortage of box cars is particularly acute and we find that box carloadings (including LCL) during the week of last December 21st total 505,676^ while the average week during January 1946 was 461,000.
The Office of Defense Transportation asked in February 1946, and continued to insist thereafter, that the Civilian Production Administration take steps to provide the materials needed for construction, as quickly as possible, of the freight cars then on order and reduction of the large accumulation of bad order cars, so that the railroads would be prepared to handle with dispatch the huge volume of traffic foreseen for the following months. A sustained though unsuccessful effort was made by the Office of Defense Transportation to set up a plan for government financing of an additional 50,000 freight cars when it became apparent that the state of railroad finances would deter ordering by the carriers of new cars. That the necessary assistance in the procurement of materials, particularly steel, was not forthcoming is evidenced by the accelerating decline in car ownership.
The Association of American Railroads’ report of freight car ownership on all Class I railroads shows the following:
Jan. 1, 1946 Dec. 1, 1946
Box............................ 739,924 ‘ 726,885
Hoppers ........................ 525,771 533,136
Gondolas........................ 338,124 329,570
Refrigerators ................... 19,893 19,530
Other ...............J......... 135,950 133,369
Total ...................1,759,662 1,742,490
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The decline in ownership since the first of this year from 1,759,662 to 1,742,490 on December 1st represents a. loss of 17,172 cars- AAR record of new cars placed in service during this period was 34,891. A net loss of 17,172 plus the addition of 34,891- indicates actual retirement of 52,063 pieces of freight equipment. These figures cover only Class I ownership and do not reflect short line or private car line ownership, the total of which is approximately 15% of Class I ownership.
It should be emphasized at this point that the tendency will be for retirements to increase over the average of 1946 this year. In recent months freight cars have been retired at a rate in excess of 5,600 cars per month. Since new car production has fallen in December to 3,135 we fear that we will soon be losing cars at a rate of two to one.
Increasing rate of retirements is due, of course, to the fact that a large percentage of the railroad car ownership is overage by normal standards and would ordinarily have been removed from service long before this time- Heavy war-time usage and insufficient maintenance have hastened the attritional process. Exhibit I shows graphically the age group of freight cars and it is observed that 32.42% of the cars are over 25 years of age—an age when they should be retired. Moreover it can be safely assumed that war service doubled the normal deterioration in each of the five years of the war. In Exhibit II, on this assumption, it is shown that an adjusted percentage for the war-time service would make 54.71% (968,816 cars) rather than 32.42% (574,190 cars) over age.
If the nation is to sustain the present high levels of industrial activity and go on to even higher levels, as we all hope, this large number of obsolescent cars must be replaced at the highest rate consistent with the ability of the railroads to support the cost. With increased freight rates now in effect we are assured that the railroads will continue to order cars at a rate which will guarantee back logs in the car shops for a long time to come. As evidence of the railroads’ realization of the need for new equipment it can be noted that there were solid commitments made in 1941 under which the carriers would have ordered 159,000 cars in 1942 and 180,000 in 1943-This was blocked at that time as emphasis was placed on armament production and we have lost ground steadily since (See Exhibit III). The limit has been reached and if the process is not now reversed the damage to the economy in future years will be incalculable.
Car Repairs in 1946
At the beginning of the year freight cars awaiting repair on Class I railroads totaled 72,163 or 4-3 percent of ownership. The percentage increased in June to 4.9 percent. It was evident that the most immediate assistance in overcoming current car shortages,would be obtained by improving car repair performance. Earlier in the year the Office of Defense Transportation sought to bring this about. The objective was 3 percent of ownership which would have meant, as compared to the June percentage, availability of an additional 32,900 cars. The railroads have set themselves seriously to the task of reducing the number of bad orders and there has been some improvement. The percentage of cars awaiting repairs on December 1st was 4 percent. One of the factors in the reduction has been the use by certain railroads for car repairs of steel tonnage available to them historically for the construction of new equipment. However, the reduction in the percentage from 4.9 percent to 4 percent is for the most part not an improvement at all. In the same period that bad order cars were being reduced by about 16,999 cars, retirements through scrapping of old equipment exceeded 49,999. The
largest part of the reduction in the bad order percentage therefore reflects only lost equipment since cars to be scrapped are carried temporarily, at least in part, as awaiting repair.
New Freight Car Construction During 1946
Exhibit III shows the number of freight cars built both in contract shops and in railroad shops for each year since 1941. It will be noted that the production of new cars during 1946 totaling 41,916 was lower than for any war year except 1943. It is difficult to believe that during the war years, when there was insufficient steel available for the production of the desired quantities of war materials, enough could be found to produce freight cars in greater quantities than in a post-war year when it was plain to all who knew the facts that transportation needs should have been given first consideration. The car builders’ schedules of production as forecast in various months are shown on Exhibit IV- The contrast is striking between the production estimates, which took account of anticipated difficulty in obtaining materials, and the actual production. There has been a steady decline in production since August and a telephone survey of recent date indicates that prospects for first quarter production under present conditions will show little if any improvement.
Steel Requirements
The estimated steel requirements during the first and second quarters of 1947 both for MRO and new cars are shown in Exhibit V.
MRO (Maintenance and Repairs)
In 1943 when the freight car fleet was three years younger than at present, steel requirements in MRO to keep the percentage of cars awaiting repair below 3 percent totaled approximately 319,099 tons per quarter for direct mill shipments to the railroads. This figure includes a relatively small tonnage for requirements of private car lines. We can assume, though retirements will continue at present high figures, that the cars set out as bad order and eventually scrapped will be balanced by retirements so that the bad order percentage would be stabilized at about 4%. There is every probability that it will start climbing again unless steel supplies for MRO are increased. However, the immediate objective will be taken as the reduction of the percentage from 4% to 3% during the next six months. It is estimated that this will require about 52,999 tons per quarter additional over the 1943 figures. This accounts for the total of 217,999 plus 145,999, or 362,999 tons shown for railroad MRO in Exhibit V. After six months with steel deliveries on this level the requirements would revert to the lower figures.
Exhibit V shows a separation between rolled steel and other products to emphasize the rolled steel requirements since the greatest procurement difficulties lie in the mill steel category. The steel required for component manufacturing has been combined with the direct requirements of the railroads in order to show the complete picture and stress the inseparability of these requirements.
New Freight Cars.
The objective of 10,090 cars per month is considered reasonable in the light of the high rate of retirements which as noted in the preceding paragraph is exceeding 5,599 per month and because of the current car shortages, which are expected to increase materially in coming months as railroad car loadings increase. The construction of 5,599 cars per month to offset retirements and of an additional 4,599 per month to increase car ownership is deemed conservative. On this basis no appreciable indent would be made on car short
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ages until the third quarter of 1947 even though car repairs be materially improved.
Exhibit V shows estimated steel requirements, by products, for the 10,000 car per month objective. We believe that this rate of construction must be reached as quickly as possible and maintained for an indefinite period. The contract car
shops and the railroad car shops reached a production of over 10,000 cars per month for several months in 1941 and we believe that it can be done again on a sustained basis without difficulty. The car builders have assured us repeatedly that they have shop capacity to produce 17,000 cars per month— 14,000 in contract shops and 3,000 in railroad shops.
EXHIBIT II
Actual and adjusted age of freight-carrying cars from American Railway Car Institute record as of
January 1, 1946, for Class I railroad cars
EXHIBIT I
^4 ye °f freight-carrying cars in the United States Class I Railroads
JANUARY I, 1946
TOTAL OWNERSHIP 1,770,852
TOTAL OWNERSHIP OCTOBER. I, 1946 DECLINED TO t, 745,675 (A.A.R. Figure)
SOURCE. AMERICAN RAILWAY CAR INSTITUTE
Actual age No. of cars
21 ..........................T....... 92,210
22 ................................... 85,409
23 .................................. 116,482
24 ................................‘. 73,465
25 ................................... 27,060
26 ................................... 25,054 394,626
27 ................-................ 64,356
28 ................................... 30,598
29 ................................... 42,903
30 .................................. 80,743
Over 30 .............................. 330,536 „ .
-------— 574,190
968,816
Total ownership 1-1-46 = 1,770,852
968,816
♦Adjusted % over-age cars J 770 §52 — 04. (I/O
574,190
Actual % over-age cars 77Q gg2 — 0^.44 /O
♦Adjustment based on assumption that heavy service during the war years 1941 thru 1945 added 5 years to age of cars. An over-age car is defined as one 26 years old or older. Adding 5 years to actual age this study counts cars 21 years old or older as over-age.
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EXHIBIT HI
Domestic freight cars delivered by months American Railway Car Institute
Nov. 8, 1946
Jan., 1941 - Dec. 31, 1946. Revised Jan. 9, 1947
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Total Average
1941—Carbuilders 4993 4057 4987 5416 4551 5145 5467 3856 5044 6626 6073 7181 63396 5283
Co. Shops
1456 1059 1426 900 ' 1529 1508 1539 1596 1713 1789 1271 1441 17227 1436
1941 TOTAL
6449 5116 6413 6316 6080 6658 7006 5452 6757 8415 7344 8622 80623 6719
1942— Carbuilders
6247 7686 7896 7539 5766 2946 1486 813 1599 2151 1891 1409 47429 8951
Co. Shops
1874 1646 2278 2631 848 949 1266 1361 1070 539 407 575 15444 1287
1942 TOTAL
8121 9332 10174 10170 6614 8895 2752 2174 2669 2690 2298 1984 62873 5238
1943—Carbuilders
1441 1321 1469 1641 1034 1420 2382 2995 3599 3068 2282 1964 24616 2051
Co. Shops
752 328 522 106 632 878 685 862 642 667 475 7220 602
1943 TOTAL .................... 671 8739
2193 1649 1991 1747 1666 2298 3067 3857 4241 2949 2439 31836 2653
1944—Carbuilders
2425 2092 1999 713 1501 1698 2197 2662 2807 3517 3244 3098 27953 2329
Co. Shops
562 550 1475 1512 1249 1407 1189 1156 1226 1668 1658 1398 15050 1255
1944 TOTAL .................... ...
2987 2642 8474 2225 2750 3105 3386 3818 4033 5885 4902 4496 43003 3584
1945—Carbuilders
8074 3211 3708 2550 2540 3428 2316 2414 2046 2361 1689 1674 31011 2584
Co. Shops
1432 987 1868 1148 1126 1144 718 995 787 1079 1142 927 12853 1071
1945 TOTAL
4506 4198 5076 8698 3666 4572 3034 3409 2833 3440 2831 2601 43864 3655
1946—Carbuilders
2202 1664 2325 8181 2816 2094 2570 4234 3244 3057 2442 2017 31846 2653
Co. Shops
913 741 682 3498 1362 3456 853 3423 907 5141 772 4016 771 3828 802 3246 1118 3135 10070 41916 840 8493
1946 TOTAL 8115 2278 2860 3922
W
<0
EXHIBIT IV
Production schedule of domestic freight cars in car building plants based on their ability in securing an adequate supply of material Estimates by contract and railroad builders {Capacity 17,000 cars per mo.)*
Estimated As Of: 1946 June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 1947 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. Maj June
June 4435 6103 6747 5217 4663 3953 2208 1304 656 995
July .. 4947 6208 4821
5243 4218 2967 3011 1937 1418 285
Aug. Sept. Oct. . Nov. Dec. .. 5757 5513 6026
4721 4201 3964 4064 3492 2717 735
4833 5306 5252 4999 5717 6064 5313 4146 3010 1846
5211 4806 4791 6002 6162 6889 5399 4232 2968
3985 4654 5579 5902 7396 7785 6165 3938
4546 4538 4929 6992 8654 7913 7023
Telephone Survey 12/23 3259 2834 3662
Number of Cars Actually Delivered Out of the Above Schedule:
3456 3423 5141 4016 3828 3244 3135
Note: Changes in the above production schedules were necessary due to the inability of the car builders to obtain a proper flow of materials.
♦Civilian Production Administration was directed by Mr. Steelman on Sept. 20th to provide sufficient steel for construction of 7,000 freight cars per month.
Revised Dec. 31, 1946
CO to. O
EXHIBIT V
Estimated steel requirements — 1st and 2nd quarters — 1947 Net Tons
Rolled Steel: MRO—Railroads & Priv. Car Lines (*) Total for Railroad Use and Component Manufacturers For 10,000 New Cars Per Month Grand Total
By Car Builders and Railroad Shops By Component Manufacturers Total
Bars 82,370 16,800 156,000 32,760 29,070 37,500 5,400 144,800 145,300 74,300 9,200 1,300 35,600 35,700 18,200 46,700 6,700 180,400 181,000 92,500 129,070 23,500 336,400 219,760 121,570
Billets Plates ............................. Shapes
Sheet & Strip
Total
323,000 (*♦) 21,700 86,100 8,200 29,000 407,300 2,900 86,600 85,200 100,000 507,300 830,300 24,600 172,700 8,200 114,200
Other Steel : Pipe & Tubing
Wheels, Axles & Tires
Wire Rods & Wire Prod
Steel Castings
Total
145,000 468,000 (*♦) 174,700 582,000 174,700 682,000 315,700 1,150,000
Grand Total
(*) Includes Freight Cars, Passenger Cars and Locomotives
(♦♦) 217,000 — Kailroad Use 310,000 — Normal Railroad—MRO
106,000 — Component Manufacturers 52,000 — Added Need
------------- 106,000 — Components
323,000 --------
468,000
CO to
The more favorable attitude displayed by the Civilian Production Administration towards special assistance for freight car production, as described in the preceding excerpts from Colonel Johnson’s testimony before the ^Senate Subcommittee on Freight Car Shortages, coincided with the establishment of the Office of Temporary Controls which had jurisdiction over CPA. The Advisory Committee on Distribution of Steel for Freight Cars called together by CPA on January 10 agreed, as previously stated, to underwrite sufficient steel for the production of 7,-000 freight cars per month together with adequate railroad equipment repairs to a total of 165,000 tons of various steel products. Delivery of steel in this volume was not to be fully effective until April rollings.
The Office of Defense Transportation insisted that the target of 7,000 cars per month was entirely inadequate if we were to make any headway in overcoming the accelerating loss of freight car ownership due to retirement of worn out cars from service. The hearings held by Senate Subcommittee on Freight Car Shortages culminated in an agreement by the steel industry to increase their commitments for new freight car construction to cover production of 10,-000 cars per month. At a subsequent meeting of the Advisory Committee on Distribution of Steel for Freight Cars in late March agreement was reached between the steel companies for distribution of a total of 210,000 tons, which was deemed sufficient by the steel industry to cover freight car construction at the 10,000 car level together with necessary equipment repairs. The steel industry committee agreed to provide full delivery of the 210,000 tons beginning with July rollings.
As liquidation of the Civilian Production Administration progressed in March 1947 the Office of Defense Transportation was asked to assume full direction of the freight car building program. ODT took over full control of the Advisory Committee on Distribution of Steel for Freight Cars and set up a freight car builders advisory committee and a freight car builders production committee for the purpose of planning a coordinated program aimed at maximum utilization of the steel tonnages for which the steel industry had committed itself. The car builders production committee included panels representing contract car builders, railroad and private car lines, as well as specialty and component manufacturers. With their advice and assistance ODT prepared in midMarch a detailed schedule of deliveries during subsequent months of freight cars then on order, which totaled approximately 90,000 cars at that time, as well as detailed steel requirements needed to meet this schedule by all major participants. Attention
was also given to requirements of pig iron. The efforts of ODT to induce the railroads to order additional equipment began to bear fruit, and it was understood that the railroads would place orders for an additional 40,000 cars at the fastest possible rate. Placement on new car orders has proceeded satisfactorily so that in June cars on order totaled approximately 102,000 of all types.
Shipments by the steel industry to the car builders and railroads were stepped up much more rapidly than had been anticipated so that in the month of March 202,000 tons of steel were shipped and in April 206,000 tons. While these tonnages have not had a full reflection in the production of new freight cars at this writing in mid-June 1947, it is expected that the production in subsequent months will rise rapidly toward the 10,000 cars per month, goal. Production in May 1947 of new domestic freight cars totaled 3,903 as against the low point of recent months in February when production totaled only 2,392 cars. Because of the entirely voluntary nature of the freight car program there have resulted acute dislocations in the supply of steel flowing to individual car plants with the result that the builders found themselves unable to assemble the number of full car sets of steel products which might have been expected from the total tonnages made available to the car building industry. Steady progress is being made at this writing in balancing the supplies of steel products flowing to car builders, railroads and component manufacturers, and it is expected, as has been stated, that real progress will be made in the coming months in the direction of overcoming the present serious car shortages. Difficulties existing in the recent past in respect to pig iron and also to some extent to lumber have begun to disappear and it is anticipated that supplies of these and other incidental materials will be adequate to meet the program.
Postwar Problems of Waterway Transport
The postwar activities of the Waterway Transport Department during the year 1946 were principally in connection with Federal Management of the.prop-erties of the Great Lakes Towing Company of Cleveland, Ohio, and properties of 91 tug and towboat companies in the New York harbor area, both of which operations have been previously described in Chapter XLI, Federal Management of Waterway Transport.
Among other activities of this department were:
1. The establishment of a temporary organization, headed by the Director of the Waterway Transport Department, assisted by a staff composed of operating men from industry, to assist in relieving the transportation crisis arising from the strike of
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railway engineers and railway trainmen in May 1946;
2. The administration of General Order 67 which restricted the handling of grain by American vessels on the Great Lakes to American ports; and
3. Assisting the waterway industry in obtaining draft deferment of irreplaceable and indispensable employees.
To enable the Waterway Transport Department to accomplish its purposes during the railway strike, General Order 64 was issued. This order, effective at 4:00 p. m. May 23, 1946 (24 hours prior to time set for strike), was applicable to all carriers by water on the Great Lakes, inland waterways, and coastwise and intercoastal routes. Carriers were directed to give preference in booking cargo to 14 classes of commodities listed by the Office of Defense Transportation as most essential to the needs of the people. Carriers were instructed to transport maximum loads during the emergency and were advised that if a company did not have authority to handle a given commodity, necessary authority could be obtained through field representatives who were named in an attachment to the order. Carriers were further directed to formulate joint action plans with other carriers by coordination of schedules, exchange of shipments and pooling of traffic. The Office of Defense Transportation was given the authority, if necessary, to order any vessel to be operated between such points and for such purposes as the Office of Defense Transportation might direct, and to order the lease or charter of any vessel. Provision was also made for the issuance of permits waiving compliance with the order in cases of emergency or undue hardship.
Because of a serious shortage of transportation equipment to move necessary quantities of grain, coal and ore during the remaining six weeks of navigation on the lakes, the Office of Defense Transportation on October 14, 1946, issued General Order 67, effective
October 15, 1946. This order prohibited American vessels from loading grain at points outside the United States except shipments of grain from Fort William, Ontario, to Duluth, Minnesota, or Superior, Wisconsin. On October 16, in order to meet specific needs, exceptional circumstances, or undue hardship. Amendment 1 to General Order 67 was issued. Under this amendment the Director and the Assistant Director of Waterway Transport were severally authorized to issue general or specific permits. A total of fifteen special permits was issued (after careful investigation indicated that, in the circumstances, capacity would be lost by strict adherence to provisions of the order) between October 16 and October 30, on which date the order was suspended.
Manpower problems of water carriers under Selective Service continued acute during 1946, especially on the lakes, where strict licensing requirements made it practically impossible to replace officers who were drafted. The Division of Manpower and Materials of the Office of Defense Transportation was authorized to certify for deferment, irreplaceable and indispensable men in the transportation industry. The Waterways Transport Department was responsible for the screening of all applications for deferment and recommendations for deferment of personnel of water carriers. All requests for deferment received careful consideration. Generally, recommendations for deferment were confined to licensed men, and then only in those cases where interruption to service would follow induction of any officer were recommendations for deferment made. Recommendations for deferment of unlicensed men were made only after on-the-spot investigation determined that the registrant was in fact indispensable and irreplaceable.
The Waterway Transport Bepartment was abolished in January 1947.
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APPENDIX A
Section I
SOURCES OF AUTHORITY
Adjustments to meet varying situations in the war transportation picture, or to achieve better administrative results, occurred from time to time. Increased activities through delegations of new powers from the President and from other war agencies also brought about a number of changes in the organization. These expansions of authority and of cooperation with other governmental activities may be summarized as follows:
Powers derived from the President
Executive Order 8989, December 18, 1941.— Creating ODT and prescribing functions.
Executive Order 9156, May 2, 1942.—......... Extending jurisdiction to all rubber-bome transport, program-
ming for continuous adjustment of rubber-bome transportation to Nation’s needs.
Executive Order 9214, August 5, 1942.— .. Extending jurisdiction of ODT to Territories and possessions.
Executive Order 9294, January 4, 1943.— .. Extending control over local passenger mass transportation equipment and operations; vesting ODT with powers qf requisitioning.
Specific authorization by Public Law 779, Seventy-seventh Congress.—.................. Power to approve or veto plans of Army, Navy, or Maritime
Commission for providing special transportation facilities in connection with war plants.
Executive Order 9729, May 23, 1946.— .... Delegating allocation power over the use of transportation equipment and facilities by rail carriers, motor carriers, water carriers (except vessels under the jurisdiction of WSA), and air carriers.
Executive Order 9108, March 21, 1942.— .. ODT to take control and operate Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad.
Executive Order 9341, March 13, 1943.— .. ODT to take over control and operate American Railroad Co. of Porto Rico.
Executive Order 9165, May 19, 1942.— .... Empowered to take steps to protect railway and other facilities against sabotage, in accordance with the Office of Civilian Defense facility security program.
Authority delegated by other agencies
Letter from Chairman of the War Produc-
tion Board to Director of ODT, December
10, 1942.—.......................... Confers on ODT status of claimant agency for transportation.
WPB Directive 21, May 1, 1943.—............ ^Delegates authority to ODT for allocating the use of rubber-
bome transportation equipment by carriers.
WPB Directive 36, July 1, 1944.—........... Delegates rationing of new trucks and other commercial motor
vehicles to ODT.
325
Relationship with other agencies
Executive Order 8989, December 18, 1941.— ODT made part of Office for Emergency Management’s principal departments to maintain liaison with ODT through designated liaison officers.
Executive Order 8989, December 18, 1941.— Advisory to Supply Priorities and Allocation Board on need of transportation equipment and supplies.
Executive Order 8989, December 18, 1941.— Cooperative with United States Maritime Commission on coordination of ocean with inland traffic.
Executive Order 9335, April 19, 1943.— ... Director of ODT designated a member of the War Production Board.
Executive Order 9246, September 17, 1942.— ODT to carry out such aspects of the rubber program as the Rubber Director may require.
Executive Order 9276, December 2, 1942.— ODT to provide transportation required to carry out directions of Petroleum Administration for War for movement of petroleum, subject to ODT’s jurisdiction over traffic movement.
Executive Order 9332, April 19,1943.— .... Solid Fuels Administration to submit to ODT recommendations for providing adequate transporation facilities for distributing such fuels.
Executive Order 9280, December 5, 1942.— ODT to take into consideration in determining traffic movement, the schedules of priorities of the War Food Administration.
Executive Order 9139 and 9409.—............. ODT authorized to have a representative on the War Man-
power Commission and to comply with its directives.
Letter from Rubber Director to Director of
ODT, September 25, 1942.—.................. ODT to review effects of gasoline rationing program on trans-
portation services of the nation.
Letter from Chairman of the War Production Board to Director of ODT, December 10, 1942.—................................ Designating ODT as claimant agency for dealing with Re-
quirements Committee of WPB on transportation requirements.
WPB Directive 1 F.—....................... Requiring OPA to administer rationing of cars, tires, and gaso-
line, so as to implement ODT policies.
ODT General Order 40.—.................... Division of control with War Shipping Administration over
transfer, charter, and sale of ships.
Jurisdiction of other agencies affecting ODT
Executive Order 8875, August 28, 1941.— .. Gives Office of Production Management authority over priority with respect to transportation of materials, commodities, etc.
Executive Order 9040, January 24,1942.— .. Transfers to the War Production Board the functions of the Office of Production Management, which is abolished.
Executive Order 8734, April 11, 1941.— .... Creates Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply for controlling prices, preventing hoarding, stimulating the providing of materials and commodities for civilian use, and to plan their equitable distribution.
Executive Order 8875, August 28, 1941.— .. Section 8 changes name of Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply to Office of Price Administration.
Executive Order 9125, April 7, 1942.— .... Transfers to War Production Board authority over the Office of Price Administration, and authorizes War Production Board to delegate to Office of Price Administration powers with respect to priorities and rationing.
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WPB Directive 1-Q, July 1, 1943.— ......... Delegates to Office of Price Administration authority to ration
tires, gasoline, and passenger autos, heretofore authorized in Directives 1-H (for gasoline), 1-B (for tires), and 1-A (for passenger autos).
WPB General Administrative Order 2-158.— Creates Bureau of Stock-piling and Transportation, charged with elimininating uneconomical routing, cross hauling, etc.
Executive Order 9347, May 27, 1943.— .... To establish Office of War Mobilization for unifying production, transportation, and other activities in respect to military and civilian supplies.
Executive Order 9139, April 18, 1942.— .... Establish War Manpower Commission, whose programs affect transportation.
Executive Order 9332, April 19, 1943.— .... Establishing Solid Fuels Administration, which submits recommendations to Office of Defense Transportation in regard to the movement of solid fuels.
Executive Order 9276, December 2, 1942.— Establishes the Office of Petroleum Administration for War to control production, transportation, etc., of petroleum.
Executive Order 9280, December 5, 1942.— Establishes War Food Administration to control production and movement of foods.
Section II
TEXTS OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Executive Order 8989. (December 18, 1941)
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to define further the functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Management with respect to the state of war and to assure maximum utilization of the domestic transportation facilities of the Nation for the successful prosecution of the war, it is hereby ordered :
1. The term “domestic transportation” whenever used in this Order shall include railroad, motor, inland waterway, pipe line, air transport, and coastwise and intercoastal shipping.
2. There shall be in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President an Office of Defense Transportation, at the head of which shall be a Director appointed by the President. The Director shall discharge and perform his responsibilities and authorities under the direction and supervision of the President. The Director shall receive compensation at such rate as the President may determine and, in addition, shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation, subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of his duties.
3. Subject to such policies, regulations, and directions as the President may from time to time prescribe, the Office of Defense Transportation shall :
a. Coordinate the transportation policies and activities of the several Federal agencies and private trans-, portation groups in effecting such adjustments in the
domestic transportation systems of the Nation as the successful prosecution of the war may require.
b. Compile and analyze estimates of the requirements to be imposed upon existing domestic transport facilities by the needs of the war effort; determine the adequacy of such facilities to accommodate the increased traffic volume occasioned by the war effort; develop measures designed to secure maximum use of existing domestic transportation facilities; and stimulate the provision of necessary additional transport facilities and equipment in order to achieve the level of domestic transportation services required; and in this connection advise the Supply Priorities and Allocation Board as to the estimated requirements and recommend allocations of materials and equipment necessary for the provision of adequate domestic transportation service.
c. Coordinate and direct domestic traffic movements with the objective of preventing possible points of traffic congestion and assuring the orderly and expeditious movement of men, materials, and supplies to points of need.
d. In cooperation with the United States Maritime Commission and other appropriate agencies, coordinate domestic traffic movements with ocean shipping in order to avoid terminal congestion at port areas and to maintain a maximum flow of traffic.
e. Perform the functions and exercise the authority vested in the President by the following, subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 3 of this Order:
(1) Sec. 1(15) of Interstate Commerce Act as amended, USC title 49, sec. 1(15).
(2) Sec. 6(8) of Interstate Commerce Act as amended, USC title 49, sec. 6(8).
f. Survey and ascertain present and anticipated storage and warehousing requirements at points of transfer and in terminal areas; and encourage the provision of increased storage, loading, and unloading facilities where necessary.
g. Represent the defense interest of the Government in negotiating rates with domestic transportation carriers and in advising the appropriate governmental agencies with respect to the necessity for rate adjustments caused by the effect of the defense program.
h. Advise upon proposed or existing emergency leg
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islation affecting domestic transportation, and recommend such additional emergency legislation as may be necessary or desirable.
i. Keep the President informed with respect to progress made in carrying out this Order; and perform such related duties as the President may from time to time assign or delegate to it.
4. In the exercise of its functions and authority with respect to transportation priorities and preferences, the Office of Defense Transportation shall be governed as to the relative importance of deliveries required for defense by such instructions, certifications, and directives as may be issued by the Office of Production Management pursuant to the provisions of the* Executive Order of August 28, 1941, entitled “Delegation and Coordination of Priority Authority”; and the Office of Defense Transportation shall take all lawful steps within the scope of its authority to effect such deliveries through appropriate public or private agencies.
5. In the study of problems and in the discharge of its responsibilities, it shall be the policy of the Office of Defense Transportation to collaborate with existing departments and agencies which perform functions and activities pertaining to transportation and to utilize their facilities and services to the maximum. Particularly, the Office of Defense Transportation shall maintain close liaison with the United States Maritime Commission in the consideration of problems involving the relationship of ocean shipping with coastwise and intercoastal shipping and inland transport; with the Interstate Commerce Commission on problems of rates, routing, and car service; and with the War and Navy Departments with respect to the strategic movement of troops and supplies by domestic transportation carriers. The Office of Defense Transportation may arrange for the establishment of committees or groups of advisers representing two or more departments and agencies or private transportation groups, as the case may require, to study and develop plans for the coordination. and most effective use of existing domestic transportation facilities.
6. To facilitate unity of policy and action and the use of existing governmental services, the heads of each of the following departments and agencies shall designate a responsible representative or representatives to maintain formal liaison with the Office of Defense Transportation: The Department of War, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the United States Maritime Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Works Agency, the Federal Loan Agency, the Board of Investigation and Research appointed under the
Transportation Act of 1940, the Office of Production Management, the Office of Price Administration, the Economic Defense Board, and such additional departments and agencies as the President may subsequently designate.
7. There shall be within the Office of Defense Transportation a Division of Railway Transport, a Division of Motor Transport, a Division of Inland Waterway Transport, a Division of Coastwise and Intercoastal Transport, and such other operating and staff divisions as the Director may determine. The Director may provide for the internal management of the Office of Defense Transportation and shall obtain the President’s approval for the appointment of the heads of the above divisions and such other divisions as may be established.
8. Within the limits of such funds as may be appropriated or allocated to the Office of Defense Transportation, the Director may employ necessary personnel and make provision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services. However, the Office of Defense Transportation shall use such statistical, informational, fiscal, personnel, and other general business services and facilities as may be made available through the Office for Emergency Management.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
Executive Order 9156 (May 2, 1942)
Further defining the f unctions and duties of the Office of Defense Transportation.
By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, it is hereby ordered:
1. In addition to the functions, duties and powers conferred upon it by Executive Order No. 8989, approved December 18, 1941, the Office of Defense Transportation shall:
a. Include within the scope of its authority and responsibility, as defined in said order, all rubber-borne transportation facilities, including passenger cars, buses, taxicabs, and trucks.
b. Develop programs to facilitate the continuous adjustment of the Nation and its transport requirements to the available supply of transportation services relying upon rubber.
c. Formulate measures to conserve and assure maximum utilization of the existing supply of civilian transport services dependent upon rubber including the limitation of the use of rubber-borne transportation facilities in non-essential civilian activities, and regulation of the use or distribution of such transportation facilities, among essential activities.
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2. The several Federal departments and agencies which perform functions relating to the conservation or use of rubber-bome transportation facilities shall, in discharging such functions, conform to such policies, programs, and measures as the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation may prescribe in the execution of the powers vested in him by this order and by Executive Order No. 8989.
3. Nothing herein shall be deemed in any way to limit the functions and authority of the Chairman of the War Production Board under paragraph 4 of Executive Order No. 8989 of December 18, 1941, and paragraph 1-a of Executive Order No. 9040 of January 24, 1942, nor the rationing authority delegated to the Office of Price Administration by War Production Board Directives No. 1 of January 24,1942, No. 1A of February 2,1942, No. IB of February 9, 1942, No. IC of February 28, 1942, or any other Directive of the War Production Board supplementary thereto.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
Executive Order 9214. (August 5, 1942)
Extending the authority of the Office of Defense Transportation to domestic transportation within the territories and possessions of the United States.
By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, it is hereby ordered as follows :
In additiort to the powers conferred upon it by Executive Order 8989 of December 18, 1941, and Executive Order No. 9156 of May 2,1942, the Office of Defense Transportation shall include within the scope of its authority, as defined in the said orders, all domestic transportation within the territories .and possessions of the United States.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
Executive Order 9294. (January 4, 1943)
Further defining of the functions and duties of the Office of
Defense Transportation.
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, it is hereby ordered :
I
1. The term “local passenger transportation equipment” whenever used in this Order shall include buses, street railway cars, trolley coaches, trucks converted for passenger transportation, ferryboats, and other vehicles and vessels used or capable of being used to carry nine or more passengers (including the operator) in public or private carrier service.
2. In addition to the functions, duties, and powers conferred upon it by Executive Order No. 8989, approved December 18,1941, Executive Order No. 9156, approved May 2,1942, and Executive Order No. 9214, approved August 5,1942, the Office of Defense Transportation shall :
a. Advise and assist Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and private organizations in surveying the need for and planning the provision of transportation service for the movement of personnel to and from war plants and establishments, and where necessary, initiate and develop such surveys and plans. Due consideration should be given in making such surveys and plans to all transportation needs of each area, including those related to production in the war effort, agricultural as well as industrial, to military and naval establishments, and to essential civilian services.
b. Review and approve such contracts, agreements, or arrangements hereafter made by Federal departments and agencies, or by private firms (except common carriers) holding contracts from such departments and agencies, for the purchase, lease, requisition, or use of new or used local passenger transportation equipment, as the Director considers necessary to ensure the proper provision of passenger transportation services to war plants and establishments ; in the discretion of the Director, review, approve, or direct the re-negotiation of such contracts, agreements, or arrangements now in effect, except those on which final payment has been made prior to the date of this Order.
c. Advise the War Production Board on the allocations of new local passenger transportation equipment; and, as necessity arises, recommend to the War Production Board programs and procedures for controlling the transfer and placement of used local passenger transportation equipment.
3. No Federal department or agency or private firm (except common carriers) holding a contract from such department or agency shall hereafter complete arrangements for the purchase, lease, requisition, or use of local passenger transportation equipment without giving prior notice thereof to the Office of Defense Transportation, and, if the Director considers it necessary, without submitting the contract, agreement, or arrangement to the Office of Defense Transportation for review and approval. The Office of Defense Transportation shall establish appropriate procedures for carrying out the purpose of this Order and each affected department or agency shall designate an official representative to advise with the Office of Defense Transportation on such matters.
4. Nothing herein shall be deemed in any way to
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limit the functions and authority of the Chairman of the War Production Board under paragraph 4 of Executive Order No. 8989 of December 18, 1941, and paragraph 1 (a) of Executive Order No. 9040 of January 24,1942, of the War Shipping Administrator, or of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
5. The provisions of this Order respecting the use of local passenger transportation equipment shall not apply to movements of military and naval personnel when on maneuvers, on trips made under orders, or on other special operations necessary for the prosecution of the war.
II
1. The Office of Defense Transportation shall include within the scope of its authority as defined in this and all other Orders defining its functions all domestic transportation within the territories and possessions of the United States.
2. The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation is hereby designated as the head of an agency which may initiate action for the requisitioning of property under the terms of and in accordance with the procedures established by Executive Order No. 8942, approved November 19,1941.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
Executive Order 9335. (April 19, 1943)
Providing additional members of the War Production Board.
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, as President of the. United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy, it is hereby ordered as follows :
1. Paragraph 1 of Executive Order 9024 of January 16,1942, as amended, is hereby amended to include the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, the Director of the Office of Defense Transportation, and the Petroleum Administrator for War as members of the War Production Board.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
Executive Order 9406. (8 F. R. 16955)
Transfer of Functions With Respect to Necessity Certificates From the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to the Chairman of the War Production Board.
By virtue of the authority vested in me by Title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, and as President of the United States, and in order to enable the Chairman of the War Production Board more effectively to carry out his responsibilities with respect to the regulation of production and supply of materials, articles, and equipment, and services required for the national defense, it is hereby ordered as follows :
1. Subject to the provisions of section 2 of this order, the functions, powers, and duties of the Secre
tary of War and the Secretary of the Navy with respect to the certification, pursuant to section 124 (f) of the Internal Revenue Code, of the construction, reconstruction, erection, installation or acquisition of facilities necessary in the interest of national defense during the emergency period, and with respect to prescribing from time to time with the approval of the President regulations governing such certification, are transferred to the Chairman of the War Production Board.
2. (a) The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy shall act upon
(1) all applications for Necessity Certificates filed before October 5,1943, and
(2) applications for Necessity Certificates filed between and including October 5, 1943 and December 17, 1943 describing facilities the beginning of the construction, reconstruction, erection, installation or the date of acquisition of which was prior to October 5, 1943.
When the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have made final determination upon all applications specified in this subsection, their functions, powers and duties to issue Necessity Certificates shall cease.
(b) The Chairman of the War Production Board shall act upon
(1 ) applications for Necessity Certificates filed after December 17, 1943 describing facilities the beginning of the construction, reconstruction, erection, installation or the date of acquisition of which was prior to October 5, 1943. Such applications for Necessity Certificates filed after the effective date of this order shall be filed with the War Production Board,
(2 ) applications for Necessity Certificates filed on and after October 5, 1943 and pending December 17, 1943 with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy which describe facilities the construction, reconstruction, erection or installation of which has not begun or which have not been acquired, and
(3 ) applications for Necessity Certificates filed after December 17, 1943 which describe facilities the construction, reconstruction, erection, or installation of which has not begun or which have not been acquired.
3. (a) The regulations of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy in effect prior to October 5, 1943 shall govern the issuance of Necessity Certificates for all applications for Necessity Certificates describing facilities the beginning of the construction, reconstruction, erection, installation or the date of acquisition of which was prior to October 5, 1943.
(b) In acting upon applications for Necessity Certificates filed on and after October 5,1943 describing
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facilities the construction, reconstruction, erection or installation of which was not begun or which were not acquired prior to October 5,1943, Necessity Certificates shall not be issued unless the Chairman of the War Production Board has determined prior to the beginning of the construction, reconstruction, erection, installation, or the date of acquisition of the facilities (1) that the facilities to be constructed or acquired are clearly necessary for the war effort, and (2) that it is to the advantage of the Government that such additional facilities be privately financed.
4. In the exercise of the functions, powers and duties transferred by this order, the Chairman of the War Production Board may consult the War Department and the Navy Department with regard to facilities required primarily for military or naval use, and other departments and agencies with regard to facilities required primarily for uses within their respective jurisdictions. :
5. Such civilian personnel, property, and records used primarily in the administration of the functions, powers and duties transferred by this order, and so much of the unexpended balance of the appropriations, allocations and funds available to the War Department and the Navy Department for the said purposes as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine, shall be transferred to the Chairman of the War Production Board on such date or dates as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall; determine, for use in connection with the exercise of the functions, powers and duties so transferred.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
The White House, December 17, 1943.
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
Issuance of Necessity Certificates
Amended regulations (December 17, 1943) governing the issuance of Necessity Certificates under section 124 (f) of the Internal Revenue Code, prescribed by the Chairman of the War Production Board, with the approval of the President.
The following regulations are hereby prescribed by the Chairman of the War Production Board, with the approval of the President, pursuant to the authority contained in Executive Order 9406, dated December 17, 1943.
(1) Applications for Necessity Certificates to which these regulations apply. These1 regulations shall apply to (a) applications for Necessity Certificates filed on and after October 5, 1943 and pending December 17, 1943, with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy which describe facilities
700494—48—23
the construction, reconstruction, erection or installation of which has not begun or which have not been acquired, and (b) applications for Necessity Certificates filed after December 17, 1943 which describe facilities the construction, reconstruction, erection, or installation of which has not begun or which have not been acquired.
(2) Definitions. As used throughout these regulations :
(a) “Emergency facility” means any facility, land, building, machinery, or equipment or part thereof, the construction, reconstruction, erection or installation of which was completed after December 31, 1939, or which was acquired after such date, and with respect to which a Necessity Certificate has been made.
(b) “Emergency period” means the period beginning January 1, 1940, and ending on the date on which the President proclaims that the utilization of a substantial portion of the emergency facilities, with respect to which Necessity Certificates have been made, is no longer required in the interest of national defense.
(c) “Taxpayer” means a person as that term is defined in section 3797 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code.
(d) “Certifying authority” means the Chairman of the War Production Board, or his duly authorized representative.
(e) “Commissioner” means the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
(f) “Necessity Certificate” means a certificate made pursuant to section 124 (f) of the Internal Revenue Code, certifying that the construction, reconstruction, erection, installation or acquisition of the facilities, referred to in the certificate, is necessary in the interest of national defense during the emergency period.
(g) “Supply” means any article, product, material or service.
(3) Determination of necessity. In determining whether the construction, reconstruction, erection, installation or acquisition of a facility is necessary in the interest of national defense during the emergency period, and that a Necessity Certificate may therefore be issued, the certifying authority will be guided by the following considerations :
(a) Supplies required for national defense. The certifying authority will consider whether the supply to be produced with the facility sought to be certified is required in the interest of national defense during the emergency period. A supply may be found to be so required if it :
(i) Is essential for military or naval uses by the
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Armed Forces of the United States or auxiliary personnel, including civilian defense, or by any nation which may be furnished supplies under any Act of Congress or any authorization of the President; or
(ii) Is for essential civilian use, domestic or foreign, or for any nation which may be furnished supplies under any Act of Congress or any authorization of the President, and is clearly necessary in the interest of national defense.
(b) Shortage of supplies required for national defense— (i) General rule. The certifying authority will consider whether, at the time of the expansion or conversion there is an existing or prospective shortage of facilities for the production of the supply which is to be produced by the facility sought to be certified. Every attempt must be made to utilize existing productive capacity in the United States for the production of supplies, through the medium of prime contracts, subcontracts, conversion, greater utilization of existing plant and equipment or otherwise, before expansion of facilities for emergency purposes is undertaken. As a general rule, facilities will be certified only if an over-all shortage of facilities exists or is threatened for producing such supply-
(ii) Exceptions. (1) Impracticability of using existing facilities elsewhere. Existing capacity will be regarded as insufficient if, notwithstanding an overall adequate capacity, facilities are lacking in a particular region, there is a necessity of insuring a regional supply, and the lack of the supply cannot be met by surplus capacity in other regions because of the shortage of manpower or transportation facilities.
(c) Other considerations. The certifying authority will be guided by the following additional considerations :
(i) Depreciable assets. With the exception of land, facilities will not be certified unless they are subject to the deduction provided for by section 23 (1) of the Internal Revenue Code.
(ii) Land. Land will not be certified as necessary unless directly related to the production, storage, transportation or protection of supplies necessary in the interest of national defense.
(iii) Acquisition of going concern. Acquired facilities previously constituting the principal productive assets of a going concern will not ordinarily be certified unless there is a clear prospect of a substantial increase in the usefulness of such facilities resulting from such acquisition and such increase cannot be obtained by other practical means or unless a probable substantial loss of usefulness would result except for such acquisition.
(iv) Replacements. If it is established that re
placements would have been made, at or about the time made, regardless of the emergency, they will not be eligible for certification.
(v) Applications for certification of certain facilities must be filed with request for priority assistance or specific authorization. The issuance of a Necessity Certificate will not be considered for tax amortization of facilities acquired after the issuance of these regulations and for which an application for a Necessity Certificate is filed after the issuance of these regulations, .the acquisition of which can be made only with priority assistance or specific authorization of the War Production Board, unless the application for a certificate is filed together with the application for priority assistance or specific authorization; and the specific authorization or priority assistance will not be granted until a determination upon issuance of the Necessity Certificate has been made.
(vi) Government and privately financed facilities. Necessity Certificates will be issued only where it is to the advantage of the Government that the facilities in question be privately financed.
(d) Procedure. The certifying authority may transmit a copy of any application to such other Government department or agency as it may designate, for recommendation. In any such case, no action will be taken by the certifying authority until such other Government department or agency has made its recommendation as to the disposition of such application or has notified the certifying authority that it will make no recommendation.
(4) Application must be filed before construction is begun or date of acquisition. The construction, reconstruction, erection, installation or acquisition of a facility will not be deemed necessary within the terms of these regulations unless a determination of necessity is made by the certifying authority prior to the beginning of the construction, reconstruction, erection, installation or date of acquisition.
(5) Effect of Necessity Certificates.
(a) General rule. A Necessity Certificate is conclusive evidence of certification by the certifying authority that the facilities therein described are necessary in the interest of national defense, up to the percentage therein designated of the cost attributable to the construction, reconstruction, erection, installation or acquisition thereof after December 31, 1939. i I
(b) As to descriptions, costs and dates. The certifying authority will not certify the accuracy of the cost of any facility or of any date relative to the construction, reconstruction, erection, installation or acquisition thereof. It will be incumbent upon tax
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payers electing to take the amortization deduction to establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner the identities of the facilities, the costs thereof and the dates relative thereto, except that in the case of Emergency Plant Facilities contracts the War Department or Navy Department will furnish the Com-sioner with a copy of the Final Cost Certificate.
(c) Further description after certification. Where after the completion of an expansion the taxpayer finds that the description or cost of any facility appearing in the Necessity Certificate materially varies from the actual desciption or cost of the facility, a statement should be filed by the taxpayer with the certifying authority setting forth the correct description or cost of the emergency facility actually constructed, reconstructed, erected, installed or acquired. A copy of the statement will be forwarded by the certifying authority to the Commissioner, provided the description or cost in the opinion of the certifying authority is within the scope of the original certification, and when so forwarded, the statement will have the effect of an amendment of the original certificate.
(6) Form of application. The formal application filed after the effective date of these regulations shall conform to the standard form prescribed by the Chairman of the War Production Board, shall clearly and concisely set forth the information called for in the form, and shall be executed in the manner and by the person prescribed by the form. The standard form of application for a Necessity Certificate with accompanying instructions may be obtained from the certifying authority.
(7) Place and time of filing of application.
(a) After the effective date of this regulation, an application for a Necessity Certificate for facilities for which, within the meaning of prior regulations, the date of beginning of construction or acquisition was prior to October 5, 1943, shall be filed with the War Production Board in Washington, D. C., and shall be deemed to be filed when received at that office.
(b) All other applications for Necessity Certificates filed under the terms of these regulations shall be filed with the War Production Board in Washington, D. C.; except that if an application is required by paragraph (3) (c) (v) above to be filed together with an application for priority assistance or specific authorization, it shall be filed at such office of the War Production Board or of another Government agency as may be specified at the time of filing for such accompanying form.
(c) The proper places for filing application for a Necessity Certificate may be changed by the certifying authority from time to time.
(8) Exercise of powers of Chairman of War Production Board. Any actions taken in exercise of the powers and authority vested in the Chairman of the War Production Board by the Executive Order referred to above may be taken in the name of the War Production Board, countersigned or attested by the Executive Secretary or the Recording Secretary of the War Production Board.
(9) Amendment of regulations. These regulations may be amended by the Chairman of the War Production Board with the approval of the President.
DONALD M. NELSON, Chairman.
Approved : December 17, 1943.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President.
Executive Order 9729. (May 23, 1946)
Further defining the functions and duties of the Office of Defense Transportation.
By virtue of the power and authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, particularly by Title III of the Second War Powers Act, 1942, as amended, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, it is hereby ordered as follows :
1. The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation is hereby authorized to perform the functions and exercise the power, authority and discretion conferred upon the President of the United States by section 2(a) of the Act of June 28, 1940 (54 Stat. 676) as amended by Title III of the Second War Powers Act, 1942, as amended (56 Stat. 177, 58 Stat. 827, 59 Stat. 658), for the purpose of allocating the use of transportation equipment and facilities by rail carriers, motor carriers, water carriers (except vessels under the jurisdiction of the Administrator of the War Shipping Administration), and air carriers, upon such conditions, and to such extent, as the said Director shall deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest and to promote the national defense. In order to perform such functions and exercise such power, authority and discretion, the Director is further authorized to exercise the authority conferred upon the President by said Second War Powers Act, 1942, as amended, to obtain information, require reports and the keeping of records, make inspection of books, records and other writings, premises or property of any person, make investigations, administer oaths and affirmations, and require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, records or other documentary or physical evidence pursuant to said statute.
2. The allocation of vessels by the Administrator
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of the War Shipping Administration under Executive Order No. 9054 of February 7,1942, as amended, shall be subject to and shall be determined and made by the Administrator according to such cargo requirements, and according to such priorities and policies with respect thereto, as may be established by the Director.
3. The Director of the Office of Defense Transportation may exercise the power, authority and discre
tion conferred upon him by this order through such persons and agencies, and in such manner, as he may determine. ,
4. Nothing in this order shall be construed as limiting the authority vested in the Administrator of the Civilian Production Administration pursuant to Executive Orders 9125 and 9638.
HARRY S. TRUMAN.
Section III SUMMARIZED STATEMENT OF THE GENERAL ORDERS OF THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE TRANSPORTATION
The general sources of authority under which the Office of Defense Transportation carried on its functions were contained in the Executive Orders of the President given above. The extent to which it was necessary to implement this general authority received from the President by specific general orders of the Office of Defense Transportation has been described in the preceding chapters. There follows a brief summary of these general orders:
General Order ODT 1, Revised, as Amended.— This order required carriers by railroad to observe a minimum load of 10 net tons per car for merchandise traffic (less-than-carload and any quantity shipments), and required such carriers to divert merchandise traffic to other carriers—rail, highway, or forwarder—before it had been held on hand for forwarding more than 36 hours. To further the purposes of the order, carriers by railroad were authorized and directed to depart from or disregard shipper routings and to formulate and submit plans— within the scope of methods outlined—for joint action with other carriers. Rules for the diversion of shipments, division of revenue accruing from such shipments, and requiring records and reports were prescribed. Exceptions were made in favor of certain designated types of shipments and to cover certain specified transportation situations. During the period May 1, 1942, to September 1, 1942, carriers were permitted to observe a minimum load per car of less than 10 net tons.
(This order was issued March 23, 1942, effective May 1 ,1942. As of August 10, 1946, the order superseded General Order ODT No. 1, as amended.)
General Order ODT 2.—This order prohibited any carrier of passengers .by railroad from substituting a bus or busses for any vehicle or vehicles theretofore operated on rails over any existing line or route unless it was authorized to do so by prior order of
the Office of Defense Transportation. A procedure for obtaining such prior authorization was established.
(This order was issued March 25, 1942, effective April 1, 1942, and was revoked August 17, 1945, effective August 31, 1945.)
General Order ODT 3, Revised, as Amended— This order was applicable to over-the-road operations of common carriers of property by motor vehicle.
It established limitations and requirements with respect to operations of such carriers and provided procedures for accomplishing the purposes of the order. Carriers were required to eliminate wasteful operations, to conserve and properly maintain tires, trucks and other carrier facilities, to lease or rent trucks and to register trucks and traffic with ODT to avoid operation of trucks loaded to less-than-capa-city and to eliminate holding or storing shipments beyond stated periods. The operation of trucks with less-than-capacity loads was prohibited, except under stated circumstances, and limitations upon gross vehicle weights of trucks were established. Circuitous operations, except under certain circumstances, were banned, and the inauguration or extension of motor carrier service could only be made with prior ODT approval. To aid in accomplishing the purposes of the order, methods for joint and collective action by carriers were specified, and carriers were permitted to substitute rail for truck service to conserve motor carrier transportation facilities when it had been certified by ODT that it would not adversely affect the transportation of freight by railroad.
(This order was issued July 13, 1942, effective August 1, 1942; and was revoked August 22, 1945, effective November 1, 1945. As of August 1, 1942, the order superseded General Order ODT 3, as
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amended, issued April 20,1942, and effective June 1, 1942.)
General Order ODT 4, as Amended.— This order was applicable to contract carriers of property by motor vehicle.
With certain exceptions, such carriers were required : To eliminate waste in operations and to curtail schedules and services; and to conserve and maintain tires, motor truck equipment, and other facilities. On and after the effective date of the order such carriers were forbidden, with certain exceptions, to operate motor trucks transporting a gross load which exceeded its capacity by more than a stated percent; to operate a motor truck in over-the-road service unless such truck was loaded to capacity at origin point and to not less than a stated percent of its capacity on the return trip or in the alternative loaded to a stated percent of its capacity at point of origin and to its capacity on the return trip; or to accept or receive any property for transportation over any circuitous route or routes; Provision was made for joint action by two or more carriers to effectuate the purposes of the order.
(This order was issued April 20, 1942, effective June 1, 1942, and as of August 1, 1942, was superseded by General Order ODT 17 issued July 23, 1942.)
General Order ODT 5, as Amended.—This order was applicable to private carriers of property by motor vehicle.
With certain exceptions, such carriers were required to eliminate waste in operations and to conserve and properly maintain tires, motor truck equipment and other necessary facilities and to curtail schedules. With certain exceptions, such carriers were forbidden, on and after the effective date of the order, to operate a motor truck transporting a gross load which exceeded its capacity by more than a stated percent; to operate a motor truck in over-the-road service unless the truck was loaded to capacity at origin point and to not less than a stated percent thereof on its return trip or in the alternative unless the truck was loaded to a stated percent of its capacity at the point of origin, and loaded to its full capacity on the return trip; or to use a circuitous route in any transportation movement.
(This order was issued April 20, 1942, effective June 1,1942, and as of August 1,1942 was superseded by General Order ODT 17, issued July 23, 1942.)
General Order ODT 6A, as Amended.—This order applied to collection and delivery and local cartage operations of for-hire motor carriers of property.
These carriers were required to eliminate wasteful operation, conserve and maintain tires, motor trucks and other necessary facilities, and to lease or rent
trucks. Specifically, such local carriers, with certain exceptions, were forbidden to make: Any collection or delivery in any calendar day unless the order therefor was received by a stated hour of that day ; any collection from or delivery to any point where no regular hours for shipping or receiving were maintained unless the carrier first ascertained that he might relinquish or take possession of the property to be transported ; any operation by motor truck for a purpose other than collection or delivery of property or the servicing of a truck; or more than one collection from one point of origin to one or more points of destination, or more than one delivery from one point of origin to one point of destination, in any calendar day. Inauguration or extension of service could be done only with prior ODT approval. Methods were provided for joint action by two or more local carriers to accomplish the purposes of the order.
(This order was issued June 25, 1943, effective June 28, 1943, and was revoked August 22, 1945, effective November 1, 1945. As of June 28,1943, it superseded General Order ODT 6, as amended, issued April 20,1942, and effective in part on May 15,1942, and the remainder on June 1, 1942.)
General Order ODT 7, Revised, as Amended.— This order was applicable to the movement of traffic in railway tank cars. The order prescribed the conditions under which (a) tank car service was governed and administered ; (b) eastern petroleum traffic was received, transported, and delivered; (c) eastern petroleum service was conducted; and (d) symbol petroleum trains were operated to and from District No. 1 (Atlantic Seaboard States and the District of Columbia). The order provided for the control of tank cars by the Office of Defense Transportation and prescribed rules, regulations, and directions with respect to the assignment, inventory, maintenance, loading and unloading, switching and return of tank cars, the movement, dispatch, consolidation, change of route, interchange and turn around of symbol petroleum trains. It also contained provisions relating to loading and unloading facilities, concentration of tank cars in eastern petroleum service, filling out of symbol petroleum trains and the preferred handling of switching and movement of empty tank cars in eastern petroleum service. The movement of any tank car loaded to any destination less than 200 miles from the shipping point was expressly prohibited except under the authority of a general or special permit issued by the Office of Defense Transportation and a procedure for the issuance of permits was established. Certain restrictions of the order were made inapplicable to tank cars owned by the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps,
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and to the Maritime Commission, and the War Shipping Administration.
(This order was issued December 12, 1942, effective same day. As of December 12, 1942, it superseded General Order ODT 7, as amended, issued May 4, 1942, effective June 1, 1942.)
General Order ODT 8—This order prohibited, except under general or special permit issued by the Office of Defense Transportation, the operation of vessels capable of transporting iron ore in the transportation of grain from and to points on the Great Lakes. It also prohibited, except under permit from the Office of Defense Transportation, the operation of vessels in the transportation of grain from points on Lake Michigan and from Canadian points on the Great Lakes. A vessel within the terms of the order meant any ship having a gross register tonnage of one thousand tons or more, documented under the laws of the United States or owned by a citizen of the United States, and capable of transporting cargo in bulk. Provision for the keeping of records and «the making of reports was also contained in the order.
(This order was issued May 6,1942, effective May 15, 1942. It was revoked October 7, 1942, effective October 19, 1942.)
General Order ODT 9 A—This order prohibited, except under special permit issued by or under authority of the Office of Defense Transportation, any operator of a vessel from transporting any shipment of coal from any point on three of the Great Lakes (Erie, Ontario, and Michigan) to any point in the United States. It likewise prohibited, except under special permit, any carrier by railroad from transporting any shipment of coal intended for such transshipment. The order exempted the transportation of coal by vessels having a gross registered tonnage of less than 1,000 tons and in railroad cars by railroad car ferries.
(This order was issued May 14, 1943, effective May 17, 1943, and was revoked August 23, 1945, effective August 24, 1945. As of May 17, 1943, the order supersended General Order ODT 9, issued May 18, 1942, effective June 1,1942. General Order ODT 9 was suspended from March 11, 1943, to May 5, 1943, and General Order ODT 9A was suspended from March 3 ,1944, to August 24,1945.)
General Order ODT 10A—This order applied to the transportation of passengers by motor buskin charter service or other special services.
Such transportation was forbidden, with certain exceptions essential to the public interest and the prosecution of the war. Sightseeing service was specifically prohibited.
(This order was issued March 1, 1943, effective
March 15, 1943, and was revoked August 17, 1945, effective August 31, 1945. As of March 15,1943, it superseded General Order ODT 10, as amended, issued May 20, 1942, and effective June 1, 1942).
General Order ODT 11, As Amended—This order was applicable to intercity common carriers of passengers by bus.
These carriers were required to eliminate waste in operations and duplication of services, to curtail schedules and services, and to conserve and properly maintain tires, equipment and other necessary facilities. Such carriers were forbidden to operate limited schedules in intercity service or to operate more than one daily roundtrip schedule in intercity service on any route where experience and prospective travel indicated that the number of passenger miles on such schedule would be less than a stated per cent of the number of seat miles in any calendar month, or to operate intercity service for the primary purpose of serving any place conducted primarily for amusement or entertainment. They were also forbidden to extend or inaugurate intercity service without prior ODT approval. Provision was made for joint action by two or more carriers to accomplish the purposes of the order.
(This order was issued June 8,1942, effective July 1, 1942, and was revoked August 17, 1945, effective September 30, 1945).
General Order ODT 12A—This order laid the requirement upon any person having possession or control, within a port area, of any freight which had moved by ocean vessel to such port area, or which was intended for movement by ocean vessel from such port area, to cause such freight to be removed from such port area upon direction of the Office of Defense Transportation in order to eliminate or avoid traffic congestion. If such freight was loaded in or on a railway car, such person was required, upon direction of the Office of Defense Transportation, to unload the freight in order to release railway cars for other service. The order did not apply to freight held in a storage facility (excluding a railway car) operated by, or under the exclusive control of, an agency or department of the United States.
(This order was issued January 5, 1944, effective same day, and was revoked October 19, 1945, effective October 20,1945. As of January 5,1944, it superseded General Order ODT 12, issued June 27, 1942, effective same day).
General Order ODT 13, As Amended—This order authorized two or more motor carriers or any motor carrier association to establish joint information offices to assist motor carriers in complying with the requirements of General Order ODT 3, Revised, and
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General Order ODT 17 by obtaining and receiving from motor carriers information as to the availability of traffic and equipment and furnishing such information to other motor carriers. The procedure for establishing such joint information offices and the rules governing their operation were prescribed in the order.
(This order was issued July 2,1942, effective same day, and was revoked March 10, 1944, effective March 27, 1944).
General Order ODT 14A, As Amended—This order forbade, with certain exceptions, the use of motor vehicles in connection with horse, dog, and motor vehicle races.
(This order was issued December 30, 1944, effective same day, and was revoked August 16, 1945, effective same day. As of its date, it superseded General Order ODT 14, as amended, issued July 3, 1942, effective July 31,1942.)
General Order ODT 15, Revised—This order prohibited, subject to general or special permit issued by the Office of Defense Transportation, the shipment, forwarding, or transportation of any shipment of coal by vessel, and any shipment of ex-dock coal by any method of transportation, from any point on the Atlantic Coast north of and including the Hampton Roads area to any point in the United States. Provision was made for the formulation and submission of joint action plans by operators of vessels in competitive service in the transportation of coal from the above-mentioned points. The order also established control over all vessels engaged in transportation by water between points in the United States on the Atlantic Ocean and tributary waters. Records and reports were required to be kept by persons subject to the order. The order did not apply to vessels operated by or under the direction of the military or naval forces of the United States and it exempted the transportation of coal consigned by or to any agency of the United States and coal intended for use as bunker fuel.
(This order was issued December 14, 1942, effective in part upon issuance and in full on February 1,1943. It superseded General Order ODT 15, issued July 6, 1942, effective July 22, 1942.)
General Order ODT 16C, Revised, As Amended— This order prohibited, with certain exceptions, the transportation by rail of carload shipments of overseas freight to or within any port area named in the order for storage within such port area or for delivery to an ocean carrier at such port area. Excepted from the prohibition of the order, under conditions stated therein, were shipments of specified commodities, Government freight, and commercial freight covered by firm booking with ocean carrier
or firm commitment with respect to storage in the port area.
(This order was issued October 12,1945, effective October 15, 1945. As of November 15, 1946, this order superseded General Order ODT IBC, which in turn, on October 15,1945, superseded General Order 16B, issued September 12, 1944, effective same day, which in turn superseded General Order ODT 16A, issued March 10, 1944, effective March 15, 1944. This latter order superseded General Order ODT 16, as amended, issued July 6, 1942, effective in part July 10, 1942, and fully effective August 1, 1942; and it also superseded General Order ODT 38A, issued July 1,1943, effective same day.)
General Order ODT 17, As Amended—This order applied to private and contract carriers of property by motor vehicle.
It required private and contract carriers to eliminate wasteful operation and duplication of services, curtail schedules and services, conserve and properly maintain tires, trucks and other facilities and to lease or rent trucks. Such carriers were also required, with certain exceptions, to reduce the total mileage of trucks in each operating unit by a specified per cent of the mileage of trucks in the same unit operated during the corresponding calendar month of 1941. They were forbidden, with certain exceptions, to make any special delivery, call back, or more than one delivery from any one origin to any one destination in any calendar day; to operate, except under stated conditions, any truck in over-the-road service unless it was loaded to capacity, or to operate any truck in over-the-road service the gross weight of which truck exceeded its load-carrying ability by more than a stated per cent; or to extend or inaugurate service without prior ODT approval. Carriers were further required, with certain exceptions, to establish delivery areas or routes to avoid duplication, and were restricted as to the number of wholesale and retail deliveries which might be made weekly, and were forbidden to make retail deliveries of packages or lots of goods of less than stated weight or size. Provision was made for joint action by two or more carriers to carry out the purposes of the order.
(This order was issued July 23, 1942, effective in part August 1, 1942, the remainder September 1, 1942; and was revoked August 22,1945, effective November 1,1945. As of August 1,1942, it superseded General Order ODT 4, as amended, relating to contract carriers of property, General Order ODT 5, as amended, relating to private carriers of propety and that portion of General Order ODT 6 (relating to local delivery carriers) which applied to private and contract carriers.)
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General Order ODT 18A, Revised, As Amended— This order established loading requirements for carload freight. With certain exceptions, the order prohibited any person from offering for transportation, and any rail carrier from accepting for transportation at point of origin, or forwarding therefrom, any carload freight unless it was loaded in a freight car in accordance with one of the specified alternative loading requirements. Provision was made in the order for the issuance of special directions and general and special permits by the Office of Defense Transportation and the issuance of special permits by rail carriers. The order also contained regulations with respect to stop-offs to complete loading or for partial unloading and for consolidation of shipments in a single car. Established carload minima and rates and charges were protected against any change or increase as a result of compliance with the requirements of the order.
(This order was issued October 23,1943, effective November 1, 1943, except one section which became effective on date of issuance of the order. As of August 10, 1946, this order superseded General Order ODT 18A, as amended, which in turn, on November 1, 1943, superseded General Order ODT 18, Revised, as amended, issued October 13, 1942, effective in part same day and in full November 1, 1942, which in turn superseded General Order ODT 18, as amended, issued August 15, 1942, effective in part same day and in full oh September 15, 1942.)
General Order ODT 19—This order established control over vessels designed or capable of being used for the transportation by water of liquid cargo in bulk and prohibited any such vessel from being operated in domestic transportation (between points and places in the United States) except under general or special permits issued by the Office of Defense Transportation. Vessels of nationals of a friendly nation not documented under the laws of. the United States were exempted from the order as were vessels owned, controlled, or operated by any agency or department of the United States.
(This order was issued August 17, 1942, effective September 10, 1942, and was revoked August 18, 1945, effective August 19, 1945.)
General Order ODT 20A, As Amended—This order applied to the business of furnishing taxi service.
It restricted such business to those persons who were engaged therein on September 1, 1942, and their successors in interest, and limited the number of taxicabs that might be operated in the taxicab business. Taxi operators were required to eliminate waste, to conserve and efficiently utilize their equipment and facilities, and to participate in group rid
ing plans lawfully in effect in their municipalities or other governmental subdivisions. They were forbidden, with certain exceptions, to operate a taxi for any personal purpose of the driver ; for any pick-up or delivery of merchandise ; for securing passengers while cruising; for any unlawful undertaking; for carrying passengers other than in taxi service ; without specified markings on the cab; beyond a stated distance from municipalities of a given size; for a trip exceeding a given number of miles ; for carrying passengers to a municipality from which passengers could not lawfully be transported on return trips ; or for transporting passengers to a point for transfer to another taxicab to proceed to destination. Provision was made for joint action by two or more operators to effectuate the purposes of the order.
(This order was issued July 1,1943, effective same day, and was revoked August 16, 1945, effective same day. As of its date it superseded General Order ODT 20, as amended, issued August 29,1942, and effective September 1,1942.)
General Order ODT 21A, As Amended—This order was applicable to commercial motor vehicles.
It forbade, with certain exceptions, the operation of any such vehicle unless there was in force with respect thereto a certificate of war necessity issued by the Office of Defense Transportation. Provision was made for the filing of applications and the issuance of certificates when the operation of commercial motor vehicles was in furtherance of transportation service necessary to the war effort or the maintenance of essential civilian economy. Provision was also made for modification, cancellation, revocation, and suspension of certificates. The order also required the periodic inspection of tires of commercial motor vehicles and provided for control of commercial motor vehicles by the ODT when deemed necessary to the prosecution of the war or to the maintenance of essential civilian economy.
(This order was issued October 12, 1944, effective October 16, 1944, and it was revoked August 16, 1945, effective same day. As of its date it superseded General Order ODT 21, as amended, issued September 8,1942, and effective December 1, 1942.)
General Order ODT 22,. As Amended—This order was applicable to taxicab operators in the city of New York, New York.
Fleet operators were required at a stated time to discontinue operation of one-third of the total number of cabs they were entitled to operate as of the date the order was issued. Individual operators were forbidden to operate any taxicab more than six days in any calendar week or to operate any cab for more than the number of shifts it was regularly operated at the time of the issuance of the order. All opera
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tors were forbidden fo operate a taxicab to any point more than five miles beyond the corporate limits of the city. Certain exceptions were made to all provisions in cases of emergency.
(This order was issued September 10, 1942, effec-tive September 20,1942, and was revoked August 16, 1945, effective same day.)
General Order ODT 23—This order applied to all operators of motor vehicles and forbade, with certain exceptions, the operation of such vehicles in excess of the speed limit prescribed by competent public authority or in excess of 35 miles per hour, whichever rate of speed was lesser.
(This order was issued September 26, 1942, effective in part October 1, 1942, remainder October 15, 1942; and was revoked August 18, 1945, effective August 19, 1945.)
General Order ODT 24, As Amended—This order imposed restrictions upon passenger train operations. It prohibited, with certain exceptions, the operation by any railroad (a) of any passenger schedule in addition to those which were operated during the week ending September 26, 1942, (b) of any extra, special, or charter passenger trains, and (c) of extra sections to scheduled passenger trains except under stated conditions. The order was subject to general and special permits issued by the Office of Defense Transportation to meet specific needs or exceptional circumstances arising from the war effort or to prevent undue public hardship.
(This order was issued September 30, 1942, effective October 4, 1942; and was revoked September 4, 1945, effective September 16, 1945.)
General Order ODT 25A, As Amended—This order established control over vessels (other than liquid bulk carriers) documented under the laws of the United States or owned by a citizen of the United States and engaged in operation on the Great Lakes. It prohibited, with certain exceptions, any person from operating any such vessel on the Great Lakes, except in the transportation of such property and from and to such points and places, as was authorized by a general or special permit issued by the Office of Defense Transportation.
(This order was issued June 9, 1943, effective June 14, 1943; and was revoked October 19, 1945, effective October 22, 1945. As of June 14, 1943, it' superseded General Order ODT 25, issued October 7, 1942, effective in part on the same day and in full on October 19 ,1942.)
General Order ODT 26A, As Amended—This order applied to the hiring of rental cars.
It restricted the business of hiring rental cars to others to those persons who were engaged therein on December 1, 1942, and their successors in interest,
and limited the number of rental cars that might be employed in such business. No person was permitted to operate a rental car for a purpose for which a private passenger automobile might not be lawfully operated under any regulation of OPA or for the purpose of making any commercial pickup or delivery of merchandise, and restrictions were placed upon the hiring and use of rental car^ by persons owning or controlling private passenger automobiles in respect of which gasoline rations had been issued by OPA. Agreements for the hiring of rental cars were required and the form and contents thereof were prescribed. Certain exceptions and exemptions were provided to meet given situations growing out of emergencies and war necessities.
(This order was issued April 15, 1943, effective sanje day, and was revoked August 16, 1945, effective same day. As of its date it superseded General Order ODT 26, issued November 30,1942, and effective December 1, 1942.)
General Orders ODT 27-34, inclusive— These orders applied to Puerto Rico. See chapter XXXV.
General Order ODT 35—This order regulated the physical transfer of local passenger transportation equipment having a carrying capacity of nine or more persons and established procedures for the administration of Public Law 779, 77th Congress, and Executive Order 9294.
Local passenger transportation equipment released by the War Production Board on recommendation of the Office of Defense Transportation was restricted by the order for use only in the particular service for which it was acquired, or for such other service as was specifically authorized by the Office of Defense Transportation. Local passenger transportation equipment not released by the War Production Board on recommendation of the Office of Defense Transportation was frozen in the service or services of any common carrier or group of common carriers under a common control or common management (a) owning or operating such equipment on the date of the order, or (b) using such equipment by approval from the Office of Defense Transportation. Removal of such equipment from such service for a period of not to exceed three consecutive days was permitted. Such equipment used and operated by a person not a common carrier was frozen in the service of supplying transportation to and from the particular points to and from which such equipment (a) was so used and operated, or held for use and operation, on the date of the order, or (b) was used with the approval of ODT. Provision was made for the issuance by ODT of general or special permits to meet specific needs or exceptional circumstances.
(This order was issued March 17, 1943, effective
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same day, and was revoked September 24, 1945, effective same day.)
General Order ODT 36—This order applied to Puerto Rico. See chapter XXXV.
General Order ODT 37, As Amended—This order applied to less-than-truckload deliveries of motor fuel and fuel oil by tank trucks.
With certain exceptions, it was required that every such truck operated for the purpose of making less-than-truckload deliveries should be dispatched with a full load and so routed as to conserve mileage and time. No person could be required to make any less-than-truckload delivery within less than a given number of hours from receipt of the order therefor. Minimum drop provisions were established for less-than-truckload deliveries to a retail outlet, bulk consumer, or farm. It was provided that no call should be made by a tank truck for any purpose other 'than the loading or delivering of liquid petroleum products, and no call-back for the purpose of making a less-than-truckload delivery could be made on the same calendar day as the original call. It was also forbidden to make any delivery of motor fuel from a tank truck into the fuel tank of any automotive equipment or vehicle. Some exceptions, applicable under stated conditions, were made to all the foregoing regulations.
(This order was issued May 5, 1943, effective June 1, 1943, and was revoked August 17, 1945, effective August 19, 1945.)
General Order ODT 38A—This order established control over certain carload and truckload shipments moving from points in the United States to or through points in the Dominion of Canada. Shipments covered by the order were prohibited except under shipping permits issued by the Office of Defense Transportation.
(This order was issued July 1,1943, effective same day, and was revoked March 14, 1944, effective March 15,1944. It was superseded by General Order ODT 16A, issued March 10,1944, effective March 15, 1944. As of July 1, 1943, General Order ODT 38A superseded General Order ODT 38, as amended, issued May 20, 1943, effective same day.)
General Order ODT 39—This order applied to passenger carrying motor vehicles operating under certificates of war necessity within the States of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania (certain portions excepted), Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia (certain portions excepted), the District of Columbia, and the eastern part of West Virginia. It required a reduction in mileage by forbidding, with certain exceptions, any person, within the area covered by the order, to operate dur-
ing any calendar week more than a stated percent of the total motor vehicle miles operated by such person in such area during the week ending May 22, 1943. Any person who had previously submitted a plan to ODT for emergency curtailment of mileage was required to comply with the order by placing into effect a designated portion of the plan.
(This order was issued May 27, 1943, effective same day, and was revoked August 14,1943, effective August 16, 1943.)
General Order ODT 40—This order was issued jointly by the Office of Defense Transportation and the War Shipping Administration and imposed restrictions upon the transfer or charter of certain classes of vessels documented under the laws of the United States, allocated to the United States or owned or controlled by a citizen of the United States. Subject to certain stated exemptions, the order prohibited the sale, purchase, transfer, or charter of any such vessel without first securing approval thereof from either ODT or WSA, whichever was appropriate under the terms of the order.
(This order was issued July 2,1943, effective same day, and was revoked September 4, 1945, effective same day. As of July 2, 1943, this order revoked War Shipping Administration General Order No. 27, dated November 23, 1942, and Supplement No. 1 thereto, dated December 8, 1942.)
General Order ODT 41—This order applied to Puerto Rico. See chapter XXXV.
General Order ODT 42—:This order prohibited the transportation by railroad of any shipment of anchor chain when the point of origin and point of destination of such shipment were both within the switching limits of Portland, Oregon.
(This order was issued September 21, 1943, effective same day, and was revoked August 23, 1945, effective August 24, 1945.)
General Order ODT 43—This order applied to common carriers of household goods by motor vehicle.
Such carriers were required to eliminate wasteful operations and to conserve and maintain tires, motor trucks and other facilities. It was forbidden to operate any motor truck for the transportation of household goods in over-the-road service unless loaded to a ' stated percent of its capacity, except under certain conditions. Provision was made for the registration of trucks and shipments and the issuance of clearance authority. Time limitations were placed upon loading and holding shipments. Permission was granted for the transportation of property other than household goods and for leasing of trucks. The order also contained provisions governing interchange and diversion of traffic, determination of ap
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plicable rates and charges, division of revenues and settlements between carriers, and filing of tariffs and carrier liability. Joint action between two or more carriers to effectuate the purposes of the order was authorized. Extension or inauguration of service was forbidden unless authorized by ODT.
(This order was issued on March 24, 1944, effective March 27, 1944 and was revoked August 22, 1945, effective November 1,1945.)
General Order ODT 44A, As Amended—This order applied to transfers of new commercial motor vehicles.
Such transfers were forbidden, with certain exceptions, unless authorized by ODT. Provision was made for issuance of certificates of transfer when shown to be necessary to the war effort or to the maintenance of essential civilian economy and it was required that ODT be notified of each transfer of a new commercial motor vehicle when made pursuant to a certificate issued by that office. Subsequent transfers were forbidden for a stated period after the original transfer without prior approval of ODT.
(This order was issued July 23, 1945, effective August 1, 1945, and was revoked on September 7, 1945, effective as follows: In part September 22, 1945, in part October 1, 1945, in part November 1, 1945, and as to the remainder on December 1, 1945. As of August 1, 1945, it superseded General Order ODT 44, as amended, issued June 24, 1944, and effective July 1,1944.)
General Order ODT 45—This order prohibited the transportation by any carrier of “restricted cotton” (cotton having its origin outside the continental limits of the United States and shipped into the United States under bond for storage and intended for transshipment to a foreign country) except under permit issued by the War Food Administration.
(This order was issued November 2, 1944, effective same day, and was revoked December 14, 1945, effective same day.)
General Order ODT 46—This order applied to rental cars in the counties of Broward, Dade and Palm Beach, Florida.
With certain exceptions, any rental car operator was forbidden to operate, or to hire to any person for operation, or to permit the operation, of any rental car under his control, more than a stated number of miles in any calendar month. A limitation was also placed upon the time for which such cars might be rented or hired, with certain exceptions. Requirements were established for the marking of rental cars and the filing of descriptions of such cars with ODT.
(This order was issued January 1, 1945, effective
the same day and was revoked August 16, 1945, effective same day.)
General Order ODT 47, As Amended—This order established controls over passenger train service in addition to those prescribed by General Order ODT 24, as amended. The order required rail carriers to discontinue seasonal passenger service to resort, recreational and vacation areas. It also prohibited, unless authorized by ODT, the operation of passenger train schedules on and after March 1, 1945, on which the occupancy of seats and space thereon did not average 35 per cent during the calendar month of November, 1944. This latter provision did not apply to mixed trains.
(This order was issued January 11,1945, effective same day, and was revoked August 21,1945, effective same day.)
General Order ODT 48—This order applied to transfers, conversions, diversions, and changes in service of fluid food motor tank vehicles.
With certain exceptions, it was forbidden without prior approval of ODT to transfer, dismantle, convert, remodel or otherwise alter the character of any fluid-food motor tank vehicle or to divert or remove such vehicle from the service or territory in which it was engaged or used on the effective date of this order.
(This order was issued January 17, 1945, effective the same day and was revoked August 17,1945, effective same day.)
General Order ODT 49—This order applied to Puerto Rico. See chapter XXXV.
General Order ODT 50—This order applied to the issuance of certificates of war necessity to veterans of World War II.
The order made inapplicable to such veterans the provisions of other general ODT orders requiring a showing that a proposed motor carrier operation was necessary to the war effort or to the maintenance of essential civilian economy, and authorized the issuance of a nontransferable certificate of war necessity in respect of one property carrying commercial motor vehicle only to be used by the veteran in furtherance of a business or activity owned, controlled or operated by the veteran exclusively when it appeared that the issuance of a certificate would not adversely affect the war effort or the maintenance of essential civilian economy. Such certificates were made subject to modification, suspension, revocation and recall in the same manner as regular certificates of war necessity. It was also provided that a certificate issued to a veteran under the terms of the order would become void upon the transfer of his business or activity.
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(This order was issued May 11,1945, effective the same day and was revoked on August 17, 1945, effective the same day.)
General Order ODT 51—This order prohibited the transportation by rail carrier or barge line of any carload shipment of grain, in bulk, consigned to New Orleans, Louisiana, for domestic use or for export, except under permit issued by the Office of Defense Transportation.
(This order was issued June 7,1945, effective June 11, 1945, and was revoked August 17, 1945, effective same day.)
General Order ODT 52, As Amended—This order prohibited railroads and sleeping car companies from reserving seating or sleeping space on a passenger train, or issuing a ticket for a reserved seat or sleeping space on a passenger train, more than fourteen days in advance of the scheduled departure of such train. It did not apply to reservations made prior to the effective date of the order which had not been picked up.
(This order was issued June 29, 1945, effective June 30, 1945. It was revoked January 18,1946, effective March 15, 1946.)
General Order ODT 53, As Amended—This order prohibited the operation of any sleeping car to a point of destination 450 miles or less from the point of origin of such car, such distance being measured the shortest distance by railroad over which sleeping cars operate between such points. Deadheading of equipment was excluded from the order. It also provided that sleeping cars taken out of service as a result of compliance with the order should be delivered to The Pullman Company which was directed to operate such cars in a pool for the benefit of the military. Unless authorized by the Office of Defense Transportation. The Pullman Company was forbidden to assign any sleeping cars to any railroad for regular service in addition to those regularly assigned on the date of the order. Provision for the cancellation of reservations already made for space after 12:00 o’clock noon on July 15,1945, on sleeping cars to be discontinued was contained in the order.
(This order was issued July 7,1945, effective same day, and was revoked January 18, 1946, effective March 15, 1946.)
General Order ODT 54—This order applied to the transportation of race horses or show animals by common or contract carriers by motor vehicles.
With certain exceptions, such carriers were forbidden to transport or accept for transportation any race horse or show animal.
(This order was issued July 11,1945, effective the same day and was revoked August 17,1945, effective the same day.)
General Order ODT 55—This order established control over railway passenger cars, baggage cars and express cars. It provided that all such cars should be used for such purposes, in such service and by such persons as the Office of Defense Transportation should direct. The agent appointed by the order to administer its provisions was authorized to distribute and assign such cars in such manner as would provide sufficient suitable equipment to meet the demands of the military.
(This order was issued July 17, 1945, effective same day, and was revoked April 24, 1946, effective May 1, 1946.)
General Order ODT 56—This order prescribed uniform standards for the occupancy of railway passenger equipment when used for organized military movement. Sleeping cars were required to have an occupancy of three persons in each section and day coaches were required to have an occupancy of three persons for each two double seats or four single seats.
(This order was issued July 20, 1945, effective same day, and was revoked April 24, 1946, effective May 1, 1946.)
General Order ODT 57—This order prohibited the sale of railway tickets or space to travel agencies and likewise prohibited organized group travel.
(This order was issued July 21, 1945, effective same day, and was revoked September 12, 1945, effective October 1, 1945.)
General Order ODT 58—This order required air carriers operating from certain Pacific Coast cities to make available daily to the armed services of the United States for the transportation of organized movement of military and naval personnel being returned from the Pacific theater of war and destined to certain eastern seaboard cities not less than seventy per cent of The space allocated for passenger traffic on November 20, 1945, on the scheduled commercial passenger flights operated eastbound from such points of origin. Connecting air carriers were required to make available a sufficient amount of space eastbound to provide uninterrupted through service for such traffic to points of destination.
(This order was issued November 20, 1945, effective December 3, 1945; and was revoked January 30, 1946, effective February 15, 1946.)
General Order ODT 59—This order required each rail carrier engaged in operations west of the Mississippi River to establish and maintain schedules for troop trains, including deadhead equipment, moving over its lines, equal in respect of speed to that of the normal passenger train schedules established and maintained over its lines.
(This order was issued December 18, 1945, effec
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tive December 19, 1945, and was revoked January 25, 1946, effective same day.)
General Order ODT 60, As Amended—/This order provided restrictions upon certain passenger train service, due to a short supply of coal. It required a reduction in coal-burning passenger service locomotive mileage ; restricted the transportation of circus or carnival trains ; and banned, except under special ODT permit, special passenger trains which required coal-burning locomotive power.
(This order was issued May 2,1946, effective May 10, 1946. It was revoked May 29, 1946, effective the same date.)
General Order ODT 61—This order provided restrictions upon motor carriers of property for compensation. It required certain designated commodities to be given priority in over-the-road transportation ; it authorized carriers to apply for emergency operating authority or to make their equipment available to other carriers; it required motor carriers to augment their facilities by lease or other arrangement; it provided for utilization of excess truck capacity for the transportation of non-priority traffic and directed joint action among carriers, wherever practicable.
(This order was issued May 23, 1946, effective May 23, 1946. It was revoked May 27, 1946, effective in part May 27, 1946, and in full May 31, 1946.)
General Order ODT 62—This order provided for joint action by private motor carriers, wherever practicable, through reciprocal exchange of shipments, pooling of traffic, joint loading, joint terminal operation, joint pick-up and delivery services, and interchange of trucks and 'other equipment. Such carriers were also directed to lease or make available to other motor carriers—common, contract, or private—any of their serviceable idle equipment.
(This order was issued May 23, 1946, effective May 23, 1946. It was revoked May 27, 1946, effective in part May 27, 1946, and in full May 31,1946.)
General Order ODT 63—This order pertained to intercity common carriers of passengers by bus. It provided for joint action through pooling of equipment or other facilities, pooling or division of traffic, service or revenues, coordination of schedules, mutual honoring of tickets at passenger’s option, and lease, exchange, or joint use of operating rights. It also required such carriers to increase their equipment, wherever needed, through lease or other arrangement.
(This order was issued May 23, 1946, effective May 23, 1946. It was revoked May 27, 1946, effective May 31, 1946.)
General Order ODT 64—This order placed restrictions upon transportation of property by carriers by
water. It required certain designated commodities to be given priority; directed water carriers to charter their vessels when idle to other water carriers; and provided for joint action by such carriers. The order also provided for direct control by ODT of the use or operation of vessels.
(This order was issued May 23, 1946, effective May 23, 1946. It was revoked May 27, 1946, effective in part May 27,1946, and in full May 31, 1946.)
General Order ODT 65—This order placed restrictions upon commercial carriers by air. It required certain designated commodities to be given priority and authorized such carriers to cancel such reservations and arrangements for the transportation of passengers or property as might be necessary. Direct control by ODT of aircraft and aircraft capacity or air lift was provided. Leasing of idle aircraft by and to commercial carriers by air was directed, and the inauguration of new service to points outside the continental United States was prohibited.
(This order was issued May 23, 1946, effective May 23, 1946. It was suspended May 25, 1946, effective at 6:00P. M., on that day, and it was revoked May 31,1946, effective the same date.)
General Order ODT 66—This order provided for preference and priority for the transportation by rail of United States mail. Carriers by rail were directed to give preference and priority to United States mail and, where necessary to accord such preference and priority, to limit or restrict the number of passengers.
(This order was issued May 23, 1946, effective May 23, 1946. It was revoked May 25, 1946, effective the same date.)
General Order ODT 67, As Amended—This order prohibited the transportation on the Great Lakes in an American vessel of any shipment of grain from any point on the Great Lakes located outside the Continental United States. Shipments of grain from Fort William, Ontario, to Duluth, Minnesota, and Superior, Wisconsin, were excepted. The order also provided for direct control by ODT of the use or operation of American vessels on the Great Lakes.
(This order was issued October 11, 1946, effective October 15,1946. It was suspended October 30,1946 and revoked January 13, 1947, effective January 15, 1947.)
General Order ODT 68, As Amended—This order, like its prototype General Order ODT 60, as amended, imposed restrictions upon certain passenger train service, due to a shortage in the supply of bituminous coal. A reduction in coal-burning passenger service locomotive mileage was required; the transportation of circus or carnival trains was restricted; and special passenger trains involving the use of
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coal-burning locomotive power were banned, except tive 11:59 P. M., November 24, 1946, and was re-under special ODT permit. voked December 7, 1946, effective at 3:30 P. M. the
(This order was issued November 18, 1946, effec- same date.)
Section IV
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
The Administrative Division of the Office of Defense Transportation had its beginning on April 16, 1942, with the appointment of an administrative officer, responsible to the executive officer. Prior to that date administrative matters had functioned directly under the executive officer, working through assistants.
The Administrative Division functioned in a service capacity to the various carrier departments and staff divisions through the performance of those administrative acts related to the organization and staffing of field offices, personnel management, budget and fiscal services, studies of special operating problems, and the furnishing of general business services.
Originally much of the detailed work incident to the performance of Office of Defense Transportation administrative functions was handled by the Office for Emergency Management, Division of Central Administrative Services. Gradually, however, CAS services to the various OEM constituent agencies were discontinued until its eventual abolishment by direction of the President in the fall of 1944. For example, CAS personnel functions were transferred to the Office of Defense Transportation on April 7, 1943, in Washington, and April 16, 1943, in the field; the maintenance of official leave records was transferred on May 15, 1944, and the maintenance of allotment accounts on July 1, 1944. All remaining CAS fiscal functions had been transferred to the Office of Defense Transportation by October 31,1944, as had the various business services, except that the Public Buildings Administration assumed responsibility for the procurement of space and communications facilities in the field, and the Procurement Division took over the duplicating, purchase, and supply services.
Throughout the life of the Office of Defense Transportation the Administrative Division has striven to carry on its many activities with the smallest number of employees consistent with efficient management. For example, in the peak month of Office of Defense Transportation employment, April 1944, when there were 4,910 full-time employees, the Administrative Division had a total employment of 212 persons,
many of whom were engaged in such direct service as messenger and stenographic work to operating divisions. The administrative work load in the field was held to a minimum by the promulgation in Washington of standardized systems and procedures. For example, staffing patterns were developed for the various operating units in the field and standard job descriptions applicable to the entire field service were prepared. This eliminated the large amount of work which would have been necessary in preparing individual job descriptions for all positions in the field. As the various personnel, fiscal, and business service functions were transferred from CAS to the Office of Defense Transportation, it was possible to assume the additional work load with very little increase in personnel.
The appropriations and expenditures for the Office of Defense Transportation, according to fiscal years, are shown in the following tabulation :
Appropriation Actual Obligations
Fiscal year: 1942 $855,650 $855,650
1943 14,416,515 12,279,782
1944 16,650,000 16,458,347
1945 17,000,000 13,868,401
1946 7,350,000 4,483,164
Total 56,272,165 47,945,344
Special working funds : Allocation from Lend-Lease, Apr. 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945 (Federal warehousing program) • 1,000,000 165,747
Allocation from Lend-Lease, Dec. 3, 1943 (A.- R. training program for 110 Chinese trainees) 350,000 132,881
Allocation from President’s emergency fund, Aug. 16, 1944 (for operation of trucking companies taken over under Executive Order No. 9426) 5,000,000 1,740,365
Statistics with respect to full-time employment are as follows:
Date Departmental Field Total
June 30, 1942 472 285 757
June 30, 1943 795 3,547 4,342
Apr. 30, 1944 (peak) ... 729 4,181 4,910
June 30, 1944 695 4,116 4,811
June 30, 1945 •. 524 2,585 3409
June 30, 1946 .......... 67 3 ’ 70
NOTE.—In April 1944, the peak month of employment, there were also 244 employees serving on a part-time, WAE, or WOO basis, making a grand total of 5,1S4 employees in that month.
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APPENDIX B
ORGANIZATION CHARTS AND BIOGRAPHIES
Section I
KEYMEN IN THE EASTMAN AND JOHNSON ORGANIZATIONS
The fourteen keymen originally selected by Director Eastman to head the Divisions named below were:
Office of the Director: Executive Assistant ..................Joseph L. White
Assistants to the Director:
Great Lakes Carriers .....................A. T. Wood
Pipelines, Tankers, Tank Cars,
Tank Trucks............................Fayette B. Dow
Staff Divisions:
General Counsel ..................Jack Garrett Scott
Materials and Equipment..........Charles D. Young Rates .........................G. Lloyd Wilson
Storage .........................Leo M. Nicolson
Traffic Movement ....................John R. Turney
Transport Personnel ...................Otto S. Beyer
Carrier Divisions:
Local Transport .................Guy A. Richardson
Motor Transport........................John L. Rogers
Railway Transport .................Victor V. Boatner
Waterway Transport
Coastwise and Intercoastal ... .Ernst R. Holzborn Inland Waterways ...............Edward Clemens
When the Division of Transport Conservation was established on May 5, 1942, under John R. Turney as Director, Henry F. McCarthy, Associate Director of the Division of Traffic Movement, was promoted to Director. The Division of Transport Conservation was abolished on the resignation of Mr. Turney at the end of 1942. Some of its functions were transferred to a new Division of Review and Special Studies under Charles L. Dearing, Consultant of the Division of Transport Conservation.
Other changes during the first year of operation consisted in changing the staff functions of Fayette B. Dow, Assistant to the Director—Pipelines, Tankers, Tank Cars, Tank Trucks, to operating functions as director of the carrier division of Petroleum and Other Liquid Transport. The staff functions of A. T. Wood, Assistant to the Director, Great Lakes Carriers, also were changed to operating functions as Director of the Carrier Division of Great Lakes Carriers. Ernst R. Holzborn, Director of the Division of Coastwise and Intercoastal Transport was appointed Assistant Director—Waterway Transport, to supervise and coordinate the operations of the
three waterway transport divisions, viz., Coastwise and Intercoastal, Inland Waterways and Great Lakes Carriers. Charles F. Kellers succeeded Ernst R. Holzborn as director of the first-named division.
Although the personnel of the agency, particularly in the field, expanded rapidly during 1942 and 1943, Director Eastman made no further changes in the general framework of the organization except the appointment of John L. Rogers as Assistant Director—Trucks on June 30, 1943. Mr. Rogers was succeeded as Director of the Division of Motor Transport by Harold C. Arnot. The functions of the various divisions included in the Eastman organization are given in the organization chart at the. end of chapter I.
Colonel J. Monroe Johnson was appointed Director of the Office of Defense Transportation on April 4, 1944. He reorganized the carrier divisions by consolidating one staff and eight carrier divisions into four transport departments. The heads of the staff divisions and new transport departments are given below. They all had been in Director Eastman’s organization except Homer C. King, Executive Assistant, who had been Director of the Bureau of Service of the Interstate Commerce Commission over which Colonel Johnson, as Commissioner, had direct jurisdiction, E. J. Connors, Vice-President of the Union Pacific Railroad, who succeeded Otto Beyer on the latter’s resignation as Director of the Division of Transport Personnel, and C. E. V. Prins, head of the Information Division.
Office of the Director:
Deputy Director......Brig. Gen. Charles D. Young Executive Assistant ............Homer C. King
Executive Officer ..............Joseph L. White
Chief Consultant on Rates...........G. Lloyd Wilson Staff Divisions:
General Counsel .................Clair M. Roddewig
Information..........................C. E. V. Prins
Materials and Equipment ............. .H. H. Kelly
Rates ..............................John C. Howard
Review and Special Studies .... Charles L. Dearing Storage ........................Leo M. Nicolson
Transport Personnel............. E. J. Connors
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Transport Departments:
Highway Transport ................Guy A. Richardson
Liquid Transport....................Fayette B. Dow
Railway Transport.................Henry F. McCarthy
Waterway Transport ...............Ernst R. Holzbom
On October 11, 1944 the organization was saddened by the death of Ernst R. Holzborn, Director of the Waterway Transport Department. Like the death of Joseph B. Eastman, this was another war casualty brought about by the responsibilities and strain of the war transportation problems.
Later vacancfes in these key positions as well as in lower grades were filled so far as possible from members of the Office of Defense Transportation organization with transportation experience and ability comparable to that of their predecessors. While some of these men had been junior executives in the transportation field prior to joining the staff of the Office of Defense Transportation, their several years’ experience in handling the different problems of administering transportation controls often made them better qualified to fill these vacancies than any available senior executives in the trans
portation field without this Office of Defense Transportation experience.
The post-war organization with which Colonel Johnson handled the complex transportation problems of reconversion was as follows:
Office of Director:
Deputy Director.......................Homer C. King
Executive Assistant...................Frank Perrin
Staff Divisions:.
General Counsel ..................Francis A. Silver
Manpower and Materials...............Robert L. Glenn
Transport Departments:
Railway Transport ...................Arthur H. Gass
Waterway Transport ..............Laurence C. Turner
The academic background and business experience of the keymen in the Eastman and Johnson administrations are given below.
In the following pages also will be found a list of the key positions and their various incumbents in the Eastman and Johnson war administrations, as well as the more detailed lists of ODT officials in these two administrations, as published in the Official Railway Guide of January 1944 and June 1945 respectively.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES
Otto S. Beyer, Washington, D. C.
Born in Woodridge, New Jersey, in 1886. Attended Stevens Institute (M. E. 1907), New York University and Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Engaged as a railway engineer in experimental work with the University of Illinois from 1916 to 1918. Captain in the United States Army in World War I.- In 1933 appointed by the Federal Coordinator of Transportation as Director, Section of Labor Relations. In 1935 appointed a member of the National Mediation Board, of which he has served as Chairman. At Mr. Eastman’s request loaned by the National Mediation Board to the ODT and later transferred to this agency.
V. V. Boatner, Chicago, Illinois.
Born in Bethlehem, Mississippi, in 1881. Entered railway service as a station helper on the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad, a subsidiary of the Illinois Central, in 1901, and remained in the service of the Illinois Central System for 20 years in various positions, the last five years serving as Division Superintendent. President of the Peoria and Pekin Union Railroad from 1921 to 1929, and President of the Chicago Great Western Railroad from 1929 to 1931. Served as Director, Section of Regional Coordination of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation. At time of appointment to ODT was Director, member of the Executive Committee, and a Representative of the Gulf, Mobile and Northern Rail
road, and had been engaged for many years in transportation consultation and railroad reorganization. Edward Clemens, St. Louis, Missouri.
Born in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1884. Entered railroad service with the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis in 1901 and served with that company in various positions such as Superintendent Car Service, Assistant Federal Manager, Assistant General Manager and Traffic Manager. In 1936 elected Vice-President and Treasurer of the Mississippi Valley Barge Line Company, which position he held at time of appointment to ODT.
E. J. Connors, Omaha, Nebraska.
Born in Albany, New York, in 1892. Entered railroad service in the transportation department of the New York Central Railroad at Albany in 1907. In 1918 became supervisor of wages of the Board of Railroad Wages and Working Conditions in Washington, D. C. Served with that Board from 1918 to 1920 and with the U. S. Labor Board from 1920 to 1922. From 1923 to 1944 served with the Union Pacific Railroad; Vice-President, Operations, at time of appointment to ODT.
Charles L. Dearing, Washington, D. C.
Born in Parkeville, Missouri, in 1903. Attended University of New Mexico, University of Michigan and George Washington University (A.B. 1929). Since 1929 associated with Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C. From December 1934 to Septem-
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ber 1935 served as Senior Assistant Deputy Administrator of the National Industrial Relations Administration in charge of the formulation and administration of transportation codes. All of his work at the Brookings Institution on economics and transportation was published in the form of books or reports. His latest books are American Highway Policy, 1941, and Automobile Transportation in the War Effort, 1942.
Fayette B. Dow, Washington, D. C.
Born in Peru, Indiana, in 1881. Attended Amherst (A. B. 1904) and Columbia (LL. B. 1909). For several years was in the employ of the Interstate Commerce Commission and during part of World War I conducted its investigation into car shortages and other transportation conditions. Practiced before the Interstate Commerce Commission and made special studies on petroleum transportation. At time of appointment to ODT was General Counsel of the National Petroleum Association, Western Petroleum Refiners Association and Pennsylvania Grade Crude Oil Association. Since 1920 had been Washington Representative of the American Petroleum Institute. Arthur H. Gass, Washington, D. C.
Bom in Rolfe, Pennsylvania, in 1893. Attended Columbia University and Sorbonne (Paris). Entered railroad service in 1912 with the Chesterfield and Lancaster Railroad Company and remained with that Company until 1914. From 1917 to 1919 served with AEF, Company B, 23rd Engineers. Since 1919 has been with the Car Service Division, Association of American Railroads ; in May 1940 became Assistant to Chairman of the Car Service Division, AAR, Washington, D. C. Loaned to the Federal Housing Administration 1933-1934, to the French Government February 1940 to July 1940, and to the Military Transportation Section, War Department, 1940-1945. Returned to the AAR as Vice Chairman, Operations and Maintenance Department, Car Service Division. Loaned to the ODT to serve as Director of the Railway Transport Department.
Robert L. Glenn, Arlington, Virginia.
Born in Philadelphia, Pa., January 1886. Employed by Pennsylvania Railroad, New York Division, as fireman from 1911 to 1917. From 1917 to 1920 employed by Traylor Ship Building Company as Assistant Superintendent. In 1921 entered service of the Atlantic Coast Line Roailroad as fireman and was promoted to engineer in 1923. Served as Local and General Chairman of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen from 1922 to 1937. Served as Editor and Manager of the Brotherhood Magazine 1937 to 1941. Prior to the war
was on the staff of the Office of Production Management as Labor Supply Officer for Ohio, Kentucky and Michigan at Cleveland, Ohio. In 1942 transferred to Washington to organize the field service of the Labor Division of the War Production Board. Served as director of the various departments of the Labor Division until April 16, 1945, in a liaison capacity between WPB and railroad labor and railroad management. Transferred to ODT on April 16, 1945, as Acting Director of the Division of Transport Personnel and became Director of that Division July 1, 1946. Remained in the position of Director when that Division was reorganized as the Division of Manpower and Materials in March 1946.
Ernst Holzborn, New Orleans, La.
Born in Mobile, Alabama, in 1895. Served with Mobile Liners, Inc., from 1911 to 1917 when he entered the Army in World War I. Served with United States Shipping Control Committee at New Orleans, in charge of dock operations. Resumed post of Assistant Manager of Mobile Lines, Inc., and in 1920 accepted position with the Luckenbach Steamship Company at Mobile. Became Gulf Manager of Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd., in 1932. On January 6, 1941, made Assistant Director, Bureau of Water Carriers, Interstate Commerce Commission. On December 15,1941, became Executive Vice-President of the Atlantic Coastwise and Inland Water Carriers Association, Inc.
John C. Howard, Tenafly, Pennsylvania.
Born in Dover, New Jersey, in 1910. Received a B. S. degree in 1934 from Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Served with the traffic department of the U. S. Rubber Company from 1936 to 1942 and was Manager of Rate and Tariff Division when appointed to ODT in January 1942. Continued as Director of Rates in the Johnson administration.
H. H. Kelly, Washington, D. C.
Born in Bloomfield, Ohio, in 1897. Attended University of Pittsburg two years. Served in the Army in World War I and entered Government service in 1923 in the Automotive Division, Department of Commerce, and from 1925 to 1928 served as the Department’s first Automotive Trade Commissioner in Europe. From 1928 to 1930 served as Special Export Representative for the Hudson Motor Car Company in charge of Asiatic territory. In 1930 returned to Government service as Assistant Chief of the Division of Highway Transport, Bureau of Public Roads. In 1935 became the first Chief of the Section of Safety in the Bureau of Motor Carriers, Interstate Commerce Commission. Joined staff of ODT in
700494—48—24
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March 1942 as Chief of the Allocation Section of the Division of Motor Transport. Appointed Director of the Division of Materials and' Equipment by Director Eastman on January 28, 1943, and continued in this position under Director Johnson.
Homer C. King, Washington, D. C.
Born in Pomona, Kansas, in 1892. Attended Franklin County Normal Institute (Kansas) and admitted to the Bar in Georgia in 1926. Entered railroad service with the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway in 1917 in the transportation department. Served in the Army in World War I. In 1922 joined the Bureau of Locomotive Inspection, Interstate Commerce Commission. From 1931 until 1944, Examiner, Assistant Director and Director, Bureau of Service, Interstate Commerce Commission.
Henry F. McCarthy, Boston, Massachusetts.
Born in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in 1906. Attended Harvard (B. S. 1927) and Yale (M. S. in transportation 1930). Entered railroad service with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in 1929. Served with the St. Louis Southwestern Railroad from 1930 to 1934 and with the Boston and Maine Railroad and the Maine Central Railroad from 1934 to 1942, since 1937 as Passenger Traffic Manager.
Leo M. Nicolson, Chicago, Illinois.
Born in Alma, Kansas, in 1889. During World War I served as Colonel in the Q.M.C., U. S. A., and as Director of Quartermaster Operations under General Goethals, then Acting Quartermaster General. Later served as Assistant Director of Storage in the Purchase, Storage and Traffic Division of the United States Army under the directorship of General Goethals; remained in same position when General Robert Wood became Acting Quartermaster General, succeeding General Goethals. Since 1920 engaged in real estate and warehousing operations in Chicago.
Frank Perrin, Washington, D. C.
Bom in Stone Bluff, Indiana, in 1903. Attended Muncie Normal School 1924 to 1925; Benjamin Harrison Law School 1935 to 1937, and National University 1937 to 1939 and received an LL.B. degree in December 1939. From 1924 to 1936 held various positions with various railroads and in 1936 entered the service of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Motor Carriers, and transferred to the ODT May 3, 1942, as Senior Administrative Assistant, Motor Transport Division. In July 1943 transferred back to the ICC, Bureau of Service, and then again returned to the ODT as Acting General Counsel and held successive positions as Assistant General Counsel, Secretary of the War Committee on
Conventions and Assistant Director of Railway Transport Department. Subsequently, in May 1946 he was made Executive Assistant to the Director.
C. E. V. Prins, Washington, D. C.
Born in the Netherlands in 1900. Attended New York University, 1919-1921. Associated with James F. Newcomb & Co., New York City; Advertising and Merchandising Counsel from 1925 to 1935. Then formed his own company as Public Relations and Merchandising Counsel. In 1940 entered Government service as Director of Information, National Housing Agency, in Washington, D. C. From 1942 to date of appointment to ODT served as Information Program Manager of the Office of Price Administration.
Guy A. Richardson, Chicago, Illinois.
Born in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1882. Identified with local transportation since 1901, when he entered the service of the Boston Elevated Railway. Employed on properties under the management of Stone and Webster from 1905 to 1919. Operating Vice-President of the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company from 1919 to 1923 and of the Chicago Surface Lines from 1923 to 1932; Chairman of Board and President 1932-1941. Retired in 1941, but at Mr. Eastman’s request joined the staff of the ODT in January 1942.
Clair M. Roddewig, Chicago, Illinois.
Born in Newcastle, Nebraska, in 1903. Admitted to the Bar in Nebraska in 1926 and in South Dakota in 1931. Served as Assistant Attorney General of South Dakota from 1933 to 1937 and as Attorney General from 1937 to 1939. In 1939 appointed Senior Attorney in the Bureau of Motor Carriers, Interstate Commerce Commission. Transferred to the General Counsel’s office, ODT, in April 1942;
John L. Rogers, Washington, D. C.
Born in Knoxville, Tennessee, in 1889. Served apprenticeship as boilermaker, Southern Railway, 1907-1911. Received a degree in Mechanical Engineering from University of Tennessee (1915) and LL.B. degree from National University, Washington, D. C. (1925). Entered the service of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1917 in the Bureau of Locomotive Inspection. In 1933 named Executive Assistant of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation and in 1935 made Director of the Bureau of Motor Carriers, Interstate Commerce Commission. Appointed Interstate Commerce Commissioner in 1937, and after appointment to the ODT continued to perform duties of Interstate Commerce Commissioner as well as those of Director of the Motor Transport Division of the ODT.
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Jack Garrett Scott, Washington, D. C.
Born in Oberlin, Kansas, in 1895. Attended University of Colorado (A. B. 1917) and University of Denver (LL. B. 1921). Practiced law in Colorado from 1921 to 1933, and from 1933 to 1935 was a member of the legal staff of the National Recovery Administration, Washington, D. C. From 1935 to time of appointment to ODT was Chief Attorney, Bureau of Motor Carriers, Interstate Commerce Commission.
Francis A. Silver, Washington, D. C.
Bom in Butte, Montana, in 1895. Attended Georgetown University College of Law, Washington, D. C., and Creighton College of Law, Omaha, Nebraska, deceiving an LL.B, degree from the latter in May 1916. Engaged in private law practice in Butte from 1918 to 1925. Member of the Butte City Council 1919 to 1921. Member of the Montana Legislature 1921 to 192^. Assistant U. S. Attorney, Department of Justice, Helena, Montana, 1925 to 1927. County Commissioner for Silver Bow County, Montana, February 1927 to September 1927. Secretary-Counsel for the Board of Railroad Commissioners of the State of Montana 1927 to 1935. Senior Attorney, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D. C., 1935 to 1936. Principal Attorney, Interstate Commerce Commission, 1936 to 1942. Transferred to ODT on August 17, 1942, as Assistant General Counsel, and became General Counsel on December 17, 1945.
Laurence C. Turner, New Orleans.
Born in New Orleans, La., in 1906. Attended Tulane University 1924-1929. 1930 to 1940 was New Orleans Manager for Swayne Hoyt, Ltd. President of American Agencies, Ltd., January 1942 to July 1942. Operating Manager, Hedger SS Corp., New York City. From July 1942 until he joined the staff of ODT in September 1942 was Assistant Manager, Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, Inc., New Orleans. Became Director of Waterway Transport Department in October 1944 and remained in that position until his resignation in January 1947.
John R. Turney, Washington, D. C.
Bom in Nashville, Tennessee, in 1887. Received LL.B. degree from Vanderbilt University in 1908 and engaged in private law practice for several years. Was connected as an attorney and counsel with the St. Louis Southwestern Railway from 1907 to 1929, served as Vice-President in charge of law and traffic of that road from 1929 to 1933; Director of the Section of Transportation Service, Federal Coordinator of Transportation, from 1933 to 1935. Engaged in
general transportation practice in Washington since 1935.
Joseph L. White, Upper Montclair, New Jersey.
Born in Ithaca, New York, in 1884. Attended Cornell (one year) and Harvard (A. B. 1906). Entered railroad service with the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway in 1906, and served successively with the Wabash, Monon and Union Pacific. During World War I was statistician to the Director General and later Assistant Comptroller of the United States Railroad Administration. After some years of service in the railroad, industrial and financial fields, was appointed to Co-Director of the Section of Transportation Service, Federal Coordinator of Transportation in 1935. After the termination of that office in 1936 became a Transportation Consultant in railroad reorganizations and for the National Resources Planning Board. Was Assistant Director of the Transportation Division in the Office of Price Administration when appointed Executive Assistant to Director Eastman.
G. Lloyd Wilson, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Born in Philadelphia in 1896. Attended Swarthmore (A. B. 1918); University of Pennsylvania (M. A. 1924, Ph.D. 1925, M. B. A. 1926, LL.B. 1940) and Temple University (1931 Cert, in Traffic Law). Has been Professor of Transportation and Public Utilities at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, since 1921. Practiced before the Interstate Commerce Commission and was on the staff of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation. Author of a number of books dealing with transportation, traffic and public utilities. Was consultant for the Federal Communications Commission and the National Resources Planning Board and was Director of the Division of Transportation of the Office of Price Administration when appointed to the ODT.
A. T. Wood, Cleveland, Ohio.
Born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1903. Attended Michigan School of Mines (B. S. 1925) and Harvard (M. B. A .1927). In 1927 became Marine Superintendent of the Wilson Transit Company and vice-president in 1937. Since 1938 served as President of the Lake Carriers’ Association, retaining his position as Vice-President of the Wilson Transit Company.
Brigadier General Charles D. Young, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Born in Washington, D. C., in 1878. Received degree in Mechanical Engineering at Cornell in 1902. Entered Pennsylvania Railroad Service as an apprentice. Held various positions in the Mechanical, Engineering, Operating and Supply Departments,
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1900 to 1932, and then became Vice President in charge of Purchases, Stores and Insurance. Was past President of the American Society of Testing Materials. Served in the United States Navy during the Spanish-American War. Was Lieutenant Colonel, Transportation Corps, World War I. Became Director General of Military Railways under Chief of Engineers, United States Army. Appointed
to ODT as Director in charge of Materials and Equipment. Was appointed Director, Procurement and Distribution Services of Supply, United States Army, and returned to ODT as Deputy Director of ODT until November 1945 when returned to the Pennsylvania Railroad as Vice President in charge of Purchases, Stores and Insurance.
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Key positions and their various incumbents, with dates of service, in the Eastman and Johnson war administrations.
EASTMAN ORGANIZATION List of Directors, Principal Assistants, Staff and Carrier Division Directors, January 2, 1942, to April 4, 1944
Title and incumbent From— To—
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR Directors: Joseph B. Eastman, Jan. 2, 1942 Mar. 15, 1944 July 1,1942 Feb. 22, 1943 June 30, 1943 Aug. 20, 1942 Jan. 8, 1942 Mar. 27, 1943 Feb. 9, 1942 June 28, 1943 Jan. 8,1942 Jan. 14, 1942 Mar. 10, 1942 June 30, 1942 Jan. 28, 1943 Jan. 8, 1942 Mar. 27, 1943 Jan. 14, 1942 Jan. 8,1942 May 5, 1942 May 5, 1942 J an. 1,1943 Jan. 8, 1942 Jan. 8, 1942 Apr. 1,1944 Jan. 14, 1942 Jan. 8,1942 June 30, 1943 Jan. 8, 1942 Jan. 31, 1942 Mar. 15, 1944 Apr. 4, 1944 Feb. 22, 1943 Apr. 4, 1944 Apr. 4, 1944 Apr. 4, 1944 Apr. 4, 1944 Apr. 4, 1944 June 28, 1943 Apr. 4, 1944 Apr. 4, 1944 Mar. 1, 1942 June 30, 1942 Jan. 28, 1943 Apr. 4, 1944 Mar. 27, 1943 Apr. 4, 1944 Apr. 4, 1944 May 5, 1942 Apr. 4, 1944 Jan. 1, 1943 Sept. 15, 1944 Apr. 4, 1944 Apr. 1, 1944 Apr. 4, 1944 Apr. 4, 1944 June 30, 1943 Apr. 4, 1944 Apr. 4, 1944 Aug. 20, 1942 Apr. 4, 1944 Jan. 29, 1943 Apr. 4, 1944 Apr. 4, 1944
Brig. Gen. Charles D. Young (acting!
Assistant Director: Brig. Gen. Charles D. Young
Deputy Director: Brig. Gen. Charles D. Young
Assistant Director Motor Trucks: John L. Rogers Assistant Director Waterways: Ernst R. Holzborn
Executive Assistant,: Joseph L. White
Chief Consultant on Rates: G. Lloyd Wilson
Information Officer: Bryant Putney
Samuel Botsford
STAFF DIVISION’S General Counsel: Jack G. Scott Materials and Equipment: Brig. Gen. Chas. D. Young Philip A. Hollar (acting) W. W. Kelly
H. H. Kelly*.
Rates: G. Lloyd Wilson3
John C. Howard
Storage: Leo N. Nicolson Traffic Movement: John R. Turney
Henry F. McCarthy
Transport Conservation^: John R Turney
Review and Special Studies: Charles I.. Dearing
Transport Personnel: Otto S Beyer
CARRIER DIVISIONS Railway Transport: Victor V. Boatner
J. H. Aydelott (acting) .... Local Transport: Guy A. Richardson
Motor Transport: • John L. Rogers
Harold C. Arnot
Petroleum and Other Liquid Transport: Fayette B. Dow.... Coastwise and Intercoastal Transport: Ernst R. Holzborn
Charles F. Kellers Inland Waterways: Edward Clemens Glenn E. Taylor Great Lakes Carriers: • A. T. Wood Aug. 20, 1942 Jan. 16, 1942 Jan. 29, 1943 Jan. 8, 1942
1Died in office.
’Title changed from Executive Assistant to Executive Officer, Nov. 1, 1943. ’Appointed Chief Consultant on Rates in Office of the Director, Mar. 27, 1943.
‘Changed to Division of Review and Special Studies, Jan. 1, 1943.
Johnson organization
List of Directors, Principal Assistants, Staff Division and Transport Departments April 4, 1944, to Dec. 31, 1945.
Title and incumbent From To
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR Director: Col. J. Monroe Johnson Apr. 4, 1944 Dec. 31, 1945*
Deputy Director: Brig. Gen. Charles D. Young Apr. 4, 1944 Oct. 31, 1945
Homer C. King Oct. 31, 1945 Dec. 31, 1945*
Executive Assistant: Homer C King ..... Apr. 4, 1944 Oct. 31, 1945
Executive Officer: Joseph L. White Apr. 4, 1944 Dec. 31, 1945*
Chief Consultant on Rates: G. Lloyd Wilson Apr. 4, 1944 Dec. 31, 1945*
STAFF DIVISIONS General Counsel: Frank Perrin (acting) Apr. 4, 1944 July 29, 1944
Clair M. Roddewig July 29, 1944 Dec. 17, 1945
Francis A .Silver Dec. 17, 1945 Dec. 31, 1945*
Information Officer: Samuel Botsford Apr. 4, 1944 May 16, 1944
C. E. V. Prins (Division Director)’ May 16, 1944 July 14, 1945
Charles V .Warren (Division Director)1 July 14, 1945 Dec. 31, 1945
Materials and Equipment2: H. H. Kelly Apr. 4, 1944 Sept. 7, 1945
Carroll W. Brown (acting) Sept. 7, 1945 Dec. 31, 1945*
Transport Personnel’: Otto S. Beyer Apr. 4, 1944 May 15, 1944
E. J. Connors May 15, 1944 Oct. 1, 1944
A. W. Motley Oct. 1, 1944 Apr. 15, 1945
Robert L. Glenn Apr. 15, 1945 Dec. 31, 1945*
Rates4: John C. Howard - Apr. 4, 1944 Nov. 2, 1944
Harry Wilson Nov. 2, 1944 Oct. 16, 1945
Victor I. Gruber (acting).. Oct. 16, 1945 Dec. 29, 1945
Review and Special Studies5: Charles L. Dearing Apr. 4, 1944 Sept. 21, 1944
Storage’: Leo N. Nicolson Apr. 4, 1944 Jan. 11, 1945
Samuel G. Spear Jan. 11, 1945 Dec. 27, 1945
TRANSPORT DEPARTMENTS Railway Transport7: Henry F. McCarthy Apr. 8, 1944 Sept. 30,1944
E. J. Connors Oct. 1, 1944 Jan. 31, 1945
J. H. Aydelott - Jan. 31, 1945 July 1, 1945
E. E. McCarty July 1, 1945 Dec. 31, 1945*
Highway Transport8: Guy A. Richardson Apr. 8, 1944 Dec. 14, 1045
Waterway Transport9: Ernst R. Holzborn” Apr. 4, 1944 Oct. 11, 1944
Laurence C. Turner Oct. 11, 1944 Dec. 31, 1945*
Liquid Transport11: Fayette B. Dow Apr. 4, 1944 Mar. 15, 1945
Porter L. Howard Mar. 15, 1945 Sept. 5, 1945
*Continued with post-war organization.
’From May 16, 1944, to December 31, 1945, the Information Office was classified as a staff division with a Division Director. Previously the Information Officer was in the Office of the Director, ODT.
’Abolished Feb. 17, 1946. Reestablished May 6, 1946, and merged with Division of Transport Personnel to form Division of Manpower and Materials.
’Name changed to Manpower and Materials, May 6, 1946, with functions of former Divisions of Materials and Equipment added.
‘Abolished Dec. 29, 1945.
’Abolished Sept. 21, 1946.
’Abolished Dec. 27, 1945.
’Including Division of Traffic Movement and Division of Railway Transport.
’Including Divisions of Local Transport and Motor Transport.. Abolished Dec. 4, 1945.
’Including Divisions of Coastwise, Intercoastal, Inland Waterways, and Great Lakes Carriers.
’’Died in office.
’’Formerly Division of Petroleum and Other Liquid Transport. Abolished Sept. 5, 1945.
351
Section 2
PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS IN EASTMAN ORGANIZATION ON JANUARY I, 1944
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
CARRIER DIVISIONS
Director ...».............„...........Joseph B. Eastman
Deputy Director.......................Brig. Gen. Charles D. Young Assistant Director, Motor Trucks....................John L. Rogers
Assistant Director, Waterways
Transportation .........„...........„.Ernst R. Holzborn
Executive Officer ........Joseph L. White Administrative Officer ..............Simon C. Skeeis Information Officer..................Samuel Botsford Principal Statistician ...James M, Curtin Assistant to Deputy Director.... Stoney L. Miller Special Advisor on Railroad
Abandonments ............................Ralph H. Jewell
STAFF DIVISIONS
General Counsel............„....Jack Garrett Scott
Assistant General Counsel. Walter L. Baumgartner
Assistant General Counsel. Francis A. Silver
Assistant General Counsel.CLAiR M. Roddewig Division of Review and
Special Studies: Director ................„....Charles L. Dearing
Associate Director ............Harold J. Drescher
Division of Traffic Movement:
Director....Henry F. McCarthy Assistant Director .......Arthur E. Baylis Assistant Director,
Car Utilization ...........Charles F. Caley Assistant Director,
Traffic Channels...............Arthur R. Mahaney
Assistant Director, Passenger Traffic........... M. D. Riggs
Assistant Director, Export
and Import Traffic ...........G. E. Talmage
Division of Transport
Personnel: Director .............„.....Otto S. Beyer
Assistant Director .............. Edwin M. Fitch
Division of Storage:
Director.............„.........Leo M. Nicolson
Associate Director, Refrig-
erated Warehousing Section .............. „...J. R. Shoemaker
Associate Director, Mer-
chandising and Raw
Materials, Storage ..............Samuel G. Spear Assistant Director ......... H. K. Osgood'
Chief of Storage Control Section ..................Robert C. King
Chief of Raw Materials Section ..................James R. Sloane
Acting Chief of Real
Estate Procurement Section ..........„.....L. B. Beardslee, Jr.
Division of Rates:
Director ......................G. Lloyd Wilson
Assistant Director .......„„.John C. Howard
Assistant to Director .........Harry Wilson
Division of Materials and
Equipment: Director ................„ H. H. Kelly
Associate Director .......„ A. L. Sorensen
Assistant Director ............Carroll W. Brown
Head Program Specialist.... H. K. Snell
Principal Materials •
Analyst ....................... A. B. Cole
Principal Materials Analyst ..................J. A. Dillon
Principal Materials Analyst ................ Gilbert K. Smith
Division of Railway Transport:
Director ............................... Victor V. Boatner
Executive Assistant ..............Harry H. Kiernan
Assistant to Director ........ Edward F. Sinclair
Central Organization:
Deputy Director .......... R. O. Fischer
Freight and Passenger
Operations:
Deputy Director ............. J. H. Aydelott
Assistant Directors: Oil Movement ............N. P. Willis
Refrigerator Car
Movement ....................... C. W. Taylor
Freight Car Service, except Coal and Ore.. E. L. Strange
Passenger Car Service.. J. E. Carroll
Mechanical:
Associate Director ............... C. J. Wolfe
Assistant Directors:
Controlled Materials Plan ...»..............E. R. Hauer
Locomotives .....................Shannon Kuhn
Cars ............................H. S. Keppelman
Ways and Structures
Associate Director .......... R. L. Groover
Assistant Director .......... S. E. Shoup
Assistant Director ............M. E. Burk
Statistical and Economic
Section:
Assistant to Director .... H. Ashton
Coal:
Associate Director ......Vacancy (S. S. Bruce)* •Previous incumbent
Assistant Director ............J. E. Snider
Assistant Director ......... T. J. Leonard
Associate Director, Ore and Grain Traffic..........F. S. Keiser (Chicago)
Special Representative—
Federal Manager, T. P.
& W. Railroad „.„.„......„Holly Stover
Special Assistant, FederaJ
Security Program .„„......’.Luther A. Thomas
Regional Organization—
Rail and Port:
Eastern Director............W. G. Curren (New York)
Deputy Eastern Director.... A. R. Pelnar
Associate Eastern
Director.......................C. M. Moore
Southern Director ...............J. M. Hood (Washington)
Assistant Southern Director ..................E. C. Cavey
Assistant Southern
Director ......................J. P. Kiernan
Western Director ............... W. F. Kirk (Chicago)
Deputy Western Director.. J. M. Baths (San Francisco) Associate Western
Director...................... N. S. Laidlaw (San Francisco)
Assistant Western
Director ......................H. R. Fertig (Chicago)
Assistant Western Director .................... R. B. Croll (Chicago)
Assistant Western Director ............. O. C. Castle (Houston)
Assistant Western Director ................... X. R. Campbell (St. Louis)
Rail-Truck Conservation:
Eastern and Southern Director ................„.„C. B. Colpitts (Washington)
Western Director ..............H. A. Hobson (Chicago)
Division of Local Transport: Director .......................Guy A. Richardson
Associate Director ...............Edward A. Roberts
352
Associate Director ........T. H. Nicholl
Associate Director ...........Edgah F. Zelle Associate Director ......W. S. Rainville
Special Assistant ..........JFrank H. Shepard
Section Chiefs:
Contract Clearance............Ernst Jacobsen
Intercity Bus Section ....Vacancy (B. A. Wahle)* •Previous incumbent
School Bus Section.....C. D. Hutchins Taxicab Section........Clewell Sykes
Regional Directors:
New York, N. Y...................P. N. Simmons Philadelphia, Pa.......Homer A. Johnson
Atlanta, Ga...................Guy Kelcey
Cleveland, Ohio ..............Wheelock Whitney
Chicago, Ill..................H. B. Potter
Kansas City, Mo...............C. R. Woods
Dallas, Tex...................E. P. McCallum, Jr.
Denver, Colo..................R. Cloyd Kimball
San Francisco, Calif..........R. O. Crowe
Division of Motor Transport: Director.....................Harold C. Arnot
Executive Assistant........H. Richard Stickel
Liaison Officer .............E. Spencer Rider
Central Organization:
Assistant Directors:
Operations—Property Section ...............Ellis T. Lonoenecker
Vehicle Maintenance
Section .......................W. J. Cumming
City Delivery Section.. E. M. Brady
Farm Vehicle Section ....R. A. Hicks
Inventory Section..........James O. Riley
Allocations Section .......Matthew E. Kane
Regional Organization:
Associate Director ............A. S. McEvoy (Washington) Regional Directors:
New York, N. Y..............William J. Clark
Philadelphia, Pa............Melvin R. Greene
Atlanta, Ga.................John G. Caley
Cleveland, Ohio .....Robert D. Thomas Chicago, Ill.........Harry L. Gormley
Kansas City, Mo.............R. C. Coleman
Dallas, Texas...............John C. Massenberg
Denver, Colo.............Asa J. Merrill San Francisco, Calif..Roy Long
Division of Petroleum and
Other Liquid Transport: Director...................Fayette B. Dow
Deputy Director ...................P. L. Howard
Associate Director—
Pipe Lines....................R. W. Shields
Associate Director— Tank Car Service ..........A. V. Bourque
Associate Director—
Tank Trucks...................S. F. Niness ,
Assistant to Director ........ H. R. Lewis
Assistant to Director ..........R. H. Lamberton
Consultant on State
Barriers .....................Joseph E. Keller (Major,
Transportation Corps, USA)
Regional Directors:
Eastern Region...........,..........Raymond Green (New York) Southern Region..........J. W. Painter (Houston) Western Region ..........E. K. Garrison (San Francisco) Central-Western .........Arthur A. Adams (Chicago)
Waterway Transport
Assistant Director ........Ernst R. Holzborn
Deputy Assistant Director.................John H. Eisenhart, Jr.
Research and Permit
Section, Chief ................ L. C. Turner
Materials Analyst .................T. R. Tarn
Division of Coastwise and In-
tercoastal Transport:
Director (New York
Office) .....................Charles F. Kellers
Division of Inland Waterways: •
Director........................Glenn E. Taylor
Assistant Director (New
Orleans Office) ...............A. W. Kitto
Division of Great Lakes
Carriers:
Director .......................K. T. Wood
Puerto Rican Transport:
Director .......................M. G. de Quevedo (Washington)
Federal Manager, Proper-
ties of the American
R. R. of Porto Rico .......M. G. de Quevedo (Washington) San Juan:
Regional Director .......Charles G. Anthony
Assistant Regional Di-
rector, Railroads .............Paul H. Quinn
Assistant to Regional Director, Truck and Passenger Transport ..........Luis Lavergne Yordan
Federal Operating Manager American Railroad of Porto Rico ......................O. Arthur Kirkman
Hawaiian Transport:
Regional Director...............Ormond R. Bean (Honolulu)
This organization chart shows the organization of the Office of Defense Transportation at the peak of its activities early in 1944, before the death of Director Eastman.
353
354
Section 3
PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS IN JOHNSON ORGANIZATION ON JUNE I, 1945
OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
Director .............«....„.J. M. Johnson
Executive Assistant .......... Homes C. Kino
Deputy Director .............Bbig. Gen. Charles D. Young
Executive Officer .............Joseph L. White
Principal Statistician .James M. Curtin Historian ....................».Joseph R. Rose
Chief Consultant—Rates.......G. Lloyd Wilson
Special Assistant to Director.... Frank Perrin Assistant to Deputy Director.... Sidney L. Miller
STAFF DIVISIONS
General Counsel..............Clair M. Roddewig
Assistant General Counsel.. Francis A. Silver
Assistant General Counsel.. Frank Perrin
Assistant General Counsel.. Harvard R. Osmond Information:
Division Director ............Charles E. V. Prins
Assistant /Division
Director ....................Charles V. Warren
Storage: Division Director............Samuel G. Spear
Consultant on Refrigerator
Storage..................„...J. R. Shoemaker
Storage Control Section, Chief.....„.............Robert C. King
Merchandise Warehouse Section, Chief .........George G. Roddy
Transport Personnel: Division Director ...........Robert L. Glenn
Assistant Division Director, Field...................W. J. Micheels
Materials and Equipment: Division Director ...........H. H. Kelly
Assistant Division Director ...............Carroll W. Brown
Principal Materials Analyst ..............A. B. Cole
Principal Materials Analyst ................Gilbert K. Smith
Materials Requirement Specialist..............J. J. Meany
Rates: Division Director............Harry Wilson
Assistant Division
Director ...................Victor I. Gruber
Assistant to Division Directoi................Charles D. Turner
TRANSPORT DEPARTMENTS
RAILWAY Director ....................J H. Aydelott
Associate Director ............E. E. McCarty Assistant Director ......Linwood L. Adams Traffic:
Manpower ...................G. R. Gallagher
Operations.........*.......J. E. Friend
Equipment and Structures ............S. E. Shoup
Passenger Traffic .....V. T. Corbett Export-Import....................Al S. Johnson Car Utilization .......J. E. Carroll
Section Chiefs:
Commodity-Routing .........H. L. Brooks
Operating Statistics ........P, B. Christian Tax Amortization ......M. E. Burk
Special Representative, Federal Manager TP&W Railroad ...............Holly Stover
Regional Organization:
Eastern Director ........Lee A. Christiansen (New York) Associate Eastern
Director ......................C. M. Moore (New York)
Assistant Eastern
Director ......................J. D. Gallery (Buffalo)
Southern Director.....I. M. Hood (Washington) Assistant Southern
Director .......................J. P. Kiernan (Washington)
Western Director .....JW. F. Kirk (Chicago) Associate Western
Director, Ports .......N. S. Laidlaw (San Francisco) Associate Western
Director ......................F. S. Keiser (Chicago)
Assistant Western
Director ......................R. B. Croll (Chicago)
Assistant Western Director .............J. M. Baths (Los Angeles)
Assistant Western
Director ......................X. R. Campbell (St. Louis)
HIGHWAY Director .....................Guy A. Richardson
Executive Manpower
Officer .a........................B. R. Miller
Property Operations:
Division Director .............H. Richard Stickel
Section Chiefs:
For-Hire Carriers.....Fred W. Eiselstein Private Carriers ..............A. H. Walter Farm Vehicles...........R. A. Hicks
Traffic and Vehicle Registration .........John R. Scott
Passenger Operations: Division Director ........E. A. Roberts
Section Chiefs: Transit ................W. H. Ahearn
Intercity Bus ...............C. F. Warden
School Bus ..................C. D. Hutchins
Taxicab .......................C. B. Caldwell
Federal Operations:
Federal Manager ............E. T. Longenecker
Equipment and Research:
Division Director .............W. S. Rainville, Jr.
Section Chiefs: Allocation..............Matthew E. Kane
Maintenance .................W. J. Cumming
Program .....................Marc Haas
Management:
Division Director .............Ernst Jacobsen.
Section Chiefs:
Contract Clearance ....O. F. Mealy Inventory and Statistics ............J. O. Riley
Administrative ......._A. B. Rosenbaum
Regional Operations: Division Director ........P. N. Simmons Regional Directors:
New York, N. Y.........Alvin S. McEvoy Philadelphia, Penna...Melvin R. Greene Atlanta, Ga.............-John G. Caley
Cleveland, Ohio .......Robert D. Thomas • Chicago, Ill..........Harry L. Gormley
Dallas, Texas ........E. P. McCallum, Jr. Denver, Colo..............Asa J. Merrill San Francisco, Calif..Robert O. Crowe
Puerto Rican Transport:
Director ......................_M. G. de Quevedo (Washington)
San Juan:
Regional Director..............Paul H. Quinn
Assistant Regional Director ..............Luis Lavergne Yordan
Assistant to Regional Director ..............Fernando R. Molina
355
WATERWAY TRANSPORT Director .................._L. C. Turner
Assistant to Director .Ralph E. McPherson Section Chiefs: Controlled Materials Section.........John H. Snyder
Research and Permit Section .......John K. Cogley
Division Directors: Coastwise and Intercoastal ...........£...Charles F. Kellers (New York)
Inland Waterways...........Vacancy
Assistant Division Director .............A. W. Kitto (New Orleans)
Great Lakes Carriers, Consultant ...........A. T. Wood (Cleveland)
LIQUID TRANSPORT Director...................Porter L. Howard
Associate Director ....R. H. Lamberton Consultant..............Fayette B. Dow
Adviser on State Barriers..Major J. E. Keller
Division Directors: Pipe Lines................R. W. Shields
Tank Car Service..............A. V. Bourque
Tank Trucks ..................S. F. Niness
Southern Region:
Regional Manager, Tank Cars ..............J. W. Painter (Houston)
Western Region:
Regional Manager, Tank Cars ..............E. K. Garrison (San Francisco)
Regional Manager,
Tank Trucks .....................W. A. Cheshire (San Francisco)
District Manager, Tank Cars ..............Forrest O. Moore (Los Angeles)
Hawaiian Transport:
Regional Director ............James O’Dowda (Honolulu)
Alaskan Transport:
Alaskaii Representative .. John E. Pegues
This organization chart shows the organization at June 1, 1945, after it had been consolidated and streamlined by Director Johnson, but before the radical reduction in forces following V-J day.
356
357
I
N
DEX
Page A
Administrative division of ODT ....................... 344
Air transportation, domestic ..................... 191-192
Statistics .................................. 295, 298, 299
Alaska, ODT administration in ................. 261-264
Allocation of equipment ......................... 199-204
Allocation of tires ............................ 206-207
Allotment of gasoline ............................. 114
Allotment of materials ......................... 193-198
American Railroad of Porto Rico .............. 248, 274-276
Amortization procedure ............................213-216
Appropriations and expenditures for ODT .............. 344
Authority, sources of ODT:
Powers derived from the President .................... 325
Authority delegated by other agencies................. 325
Relationship with other agencies ..................... 326
Jurisdiction of other agencies affecting ODT .. 326-327
Texts of Executive Orders ...................... 327-334
Summarized statement of General Orders
of ODT ........................................... 334-344
Automobiles, private ............................. 157-159
B
Bad order cars, reducing of.......................... 312
Barge construction ............................... 182-184
Barge movements:
Of petroleum on inland and intracoasal waters 179, 190
Of fuel oil to New England .......................... 179
For flying fields .................................. 179
On the Pacific Coast ............................. 179-180
Barge-pipeline operations ........................ 178-179
Biographies of ODT keymen ........................ 346-350
Box cars: (see also Freight cars)
Grain car shortage ............................... 73-75
Cars for Canadian grain ............................ 75-77
Cars for Mexican grain ................................ 77
Summary of surpluses and shortages ................... 311
Busses (see Motor Carriers of passengers; see Equipment) C
Capital Transit Company, Federal management of .. 287-288
Car-sharing campaign ............................. 158-159
Carload traffic, movement of (tables from waybill studies)........................................... 99-100
Certificates for amortization......................213-214
Certificates of transfer (for commercial motor vehicles) ........................................ 200-202
Certificates of war necessity..................... 111-119
Scope of control.................................. 111-112
Administration of program......................... 112-113
Tailoring of applications ........................ 113-114
Establishment of gasoline allotments................. 114
Field offices ..................................... 114-115
Critical situation in the East (gasoline shortage) 116-117
Records and reports required...................... 117-119
Basic statistics...................................... 119
Circuity:
Rail traffic ....................................... 96-98
Truck traffic.................................... 103-104
Chicago truck strike, Federal management of....... 285-287
Coal:
For export.......................................... 44
Control of rail movement of........................ 55-67
Great Lakes coal movements...............'.......... 60-63
Hampton) Roads ports ............................... 63-64
Northern tidewater ports............................ 64-66
Emergency movement in New England................... 66-67
Emergency coal rates ............................. 242-243
Coal emergency committees..................... 61, 64, 65-66
Controlled Materials Plan (CMP) .................. 196-198
Conventions, restrictions on travel to.............. 84-86
Page
D
Dairy products movement........................... 136
Dairy industry advisory committees.............. 137-138
Demurrage, summary of ICC Service Orders to increase . 314
Diesel and other fuel oil requirements.............. 205
Diversion and rerouting of traffic.................21-25
Diversion of passenger traffic from bus to street railway ...................................... 153-154
E \
Eastman, Joseph B., appointment, citation, death of .. 1, 2, 4 Equipment:
Air lines, ODT made claimant agency for............... 191
Barge construction ............................... 182-184
Commercial Motor Vehicles:
Recommendation to Defense Plant Corporation .... 155
Allocation of new equipment..................... 200-202
Allocation of busses............................ 202-203
Integral bus construction starts................ 203-204
Maintenance of.................................. 209-212
Railway:
Allocation of new............................. 199-200
Postwar production of new freight cars............314-322
Postwar problems of freight car supply............310-311
Executive Orders, texts of........................ 327-334
Export-Import traffic............................... 35-45
Committees..................................... 35-37, 42-43
Control measures ...........................*........37-40
Reporting and policing systems...................... 40-42
Postwar controls .................................. 43-44
Grain .............................................. 43-44
Coal................................................. 44
Storage problems at ports...................... 38-39, 48-49
Storage in transit rates...............................237
Export rates on frustrated traffic................ 238-240
Import rates established.......................... 240-241
F
Farm motor vehicles, pattern and control.......... 131-141
Farm county transportation committees................. 133
Farm industry advisory committees..................... 135
Federal management of transportation properties ... 269-292
American Railroad of Porto Rico................... 274-276
Capital Transit Company........................... 287-288
Chicago truck strike ............................ 285-287
General railroad strike ..............,........... 278-281
Great Lakes Towing Company........................ 289-290
Illinois Central Railroad......................... 276-278
Midwest motor carriers ........................... 283-285
New York tugboat companies ........................ 290-292
Scranton Street Railway Company........................287
Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad Company .. 269-274
Ferry for truck service, Cleveland to Detroit......... 103
Ferries in passenger service...................... 155-156
Field activities, organization and growth of . 3-4, 5, 7, 114-115 Forecasting traffic flow, degree of accuracy........... 91
Forecasting traffic movements .........;............ 87-94
Freight cars (see also Box cars) :
Age of U. S. cars..................................... 318
Postwar problems of supply......................... 310-311
Postwar production of new..........................314-322
Utilization of.................................... 11-15
Fuel requirements for motor vehicles (see also
Gasoline) ...................................... 205-207
Fuel oil to New England by barge...................... 179
Functions and organization of ODT............. 1-6, 345-357
G
Gasoline (see also Liquid transport): Establishment of allotments...................... 114
Critical situation in the East.................... 116-117
359
Requirements for motor vehicles................. 205-207
General Orders of ODT summarized................ 334-344
Government agency equipment and service.......... 161-162 Grain:
For export....................................’... 43-44
Control of rail movements......................... 69-80
Storage...................................... 47-48, 69-71
Car shortage...................................... 73-75
Cars for Canadian grain........................... 75-77
Cars for Mexican grain............................... 77
Permit committees and agents..........................72
ODT-ICC grain committees.......................... 77-80
Great Lakes shipping: Coal movement.................................. 60-63
Control of shipping............................. 180-182
Manpower problems................................... 182
Great Lakes Towing Co., Federal management of ... 289-290 H
Hampton Roads, coal movement..................... 63-64
Hawaii, ODT administration in................... 253-259
Highway transportation (see Motor carriers) I
Illinois Central Railroad, Federal management of .. 276-278
Information, Division of...................... 265-267
J
Johnson, J. Monroe, appointment, biography, citation ... 4, 5
Joint action plans.............................. 121-126
For railroads ..................................... 12
For over-the-road motor carriers .. 105, 121-122, 123-124
For local for-hire motor carriers................... 123
For private carriers of solid fuel.............. 124-125
For taxicabs ....................................... 167
Immunity from anti-trust prosecution............ 122-123
Permissible scope of actions.................. 125-126
Results achieved ................................... 126
Joint information offices....................... 127-130
L
Labor disputes (see also Federal management)..... 223-225
Land grant deductions ......................... 237-238
Liquid transport................................ 185-190
Barge movements.............................. 178-179, 190
Pipeline movements.............................. 189-190
Tank car movements ............................. 185-188
Tank truck operation ........................... 188-189
Rates on petroleum movements by tank car and tank truck.................................. 241-242
Litigation involving ODT ...................... 227-233
Livestock movements by truck.................... 136-137
Livestock industry advisory committees.......... 138-139
Loading regulations:
Railroad l.c.l................................... 11-14
Railroad carloading............................... 14-15
Exemptions from (railroad) ........................ 12,15
Truck loading requirements (see also Registration of traffic) .................................... 103
Exemptions from (motor carrier) ................ 105-106
M
Maintenance of motor equipment .. ;............. 209-212
Manpower problems ...............................217-225
Magnitude of problem.................................218
Women in transportation ........................... 218
Recruiting for railroads.........................219-222
Training programs ........................... 212, 219-220
Co-operation with Selective Service............. 220-221
Co-operation with War Manpower Commission............222
Priority Referral Plan ......................... 222-223
Labor disputes ................................. 223-225
On Great Lakes...................................... 182
In shipyards........................................ 184
In Hawaii ...................................... 258-259
Materials, allotment of......................... 193-198
For railroads................................... 193-194
For motor carriers ................................. 194
Magnitude of requirements ...................... 194-195
Requirements and production ........................ 195
ODT becomes claimant agency......................... 196
Controlled Materials Plan (CMP) .................. 196-198
Materials for construction of barges and vessels .... 183-184 Midwest motor carriers, Federal management of .... 283-285 Military traffic:
Exemption from diversion and rerouting................. 24
Railroad movement of troops ..........................81-84
Statistics ............................................ 301
Motor carriers of freight, control of: ODT responsibility stated........................... 102
Over-the-road common carriers controlled........ 102-106 Local for-hire carriers controlled ............. 106-107
Private and contract carriers controlled........ 107-109 Certificate of war necessity program............ 111-119
Traffic and vehicle registration............... 127-130
Farm vehicles controlled....................... 131-141
Trade barriers ................................ 143-147
Motor carrier rates adjusted................... 243-244
isee also Joint action; Operating and traffic conditions in World War I and II)
Motor carriers of passengers, control of: General policies.................................... 149-152
Local traffic ................................ 152-156
Private automobiles............................ 157-158
Sightseeing and charter busses..................... 161
Government agency equipment and service.........161-162 Intercity busses controlled .................... 162-164
School busses.................................. 164-166
Taxicabs ...................................... 166-168
Rental cars ................................. 168-170
(see also Operating and traffic conditions in World Wars l and II.) N
Necessity certificates, amortization....... 214-216, 330-333 New York tugboat strike, Federal management of .. 290-292
O
Operating and traffic conditions in World Wars I and II ............................................. 293-308
Orders and directives affecting ODT................. 325-344
Organization of ODT............................ 1-7, 345-357
Organization of ODT, postwar........................ 309-310
P
Panama Canal transportation .............................245
Parts, for repair of motor equipment .............. 209-212
Passenger traffic, local:
Local bus and street car services.................. 153-154
Subways.............................................. 155
Ferries .......................................... 155-156
Rapid transit lines ............................... 155-156
Railway suburban traffic............................... 156
(see also Operating and traffic conditions in World Wars I and II)
Passenger traffic, motor carrier (see Motor carriers
of passengers)
Passenger traffic, railroad:
Control over train operations....................... 81-83
“Don’t travel” campaign ...................i.......83-84
Troop movements................................. 81-84
Restrictions on conventions ........................ 84-86
Railway suburban traffic ............................ 156
(see also Operating and traffic conditions in
World Wars I and II)
Personnel, Key positions in ODT .................. 351-357
Personnel, ODT field and headquarters.............. 7, 334
Personnel for the transportation industry (see Manpower)
Petroleum movement (see Liquid transport)
Postwar controls:
Diversion and rerouting..............................24-25
Export traffic.................................... 43-44
Loading............................................312-314
Postwar operations of ODT......................... 309-323
Pipeline movements.........................:...... 189-190
Pipeline-barge operations ........................ 178-179
Pipeline statistics .......................... 297, 298, 299
Public relations................................. 265-267
Puerto Rico, ODT administration in................ 246-251
Puerto Rico, Federal management of American Railroad of Porto Rico.................................... 274-276
360
Page
R
Railroad transportation, Control of: General statement ................................ 9-10
Loading regulations and savings achieved ............ 11-15
Traffic channels plan ............................. 17-19
Diversion and rerouting of traffic .'.................21-25
Refrigerator car movement ........................... 27-34
Export-import traffic ...........'................... 35-45
Coal transport ...................................... 55-67
Grain transport ..................................... 69-80
Passenger traffic............................... 81-86, 156
Railroad waybill studies ........................... 95-100
Rail-truck coordination................................. 13
Rail for truck service................................. 105
Rail service, substitution of bus for.......... 153-154, 161
Rail-truck service, rates on.......................... 244
Rapid transit ..................................... 155-156
Rates.............................................. 235-244
Storage in transit................................. 237, 238
Land grant deductions............................ 237-238
Export rates on frustrated traffic ................ 238-240
Import rates established........................... 240-241
Petroleum and products in tank cars and tank trucks ..................................... 241-242
Emergency coal rates.......................... 242-243
Motor carrier rates adjusted ................. 243-244
Coordinated rail-truck service...................... 244
Refrigerator car movement ........................... 27-34
Refrigerated storage .<.............................. 50-52
Registration of traffic and vehicles (Joint Information
Offices) ........................................ 127-130
Rental cars, control of............................ 168-170
Repair parts, for motor carriers.................. 209-212
Rerouting and diversion of traffic....................21-25
S
School busses: Problem and control of ........................ 164-166
Litigation............................................. 231
Statistics ....................................... 297, 306
Scranton Street Railway Co., federal management of .. 287
Sightseeing and charter busses ....................... 161
Speed limit, enforcement of........................ 171-175
Speed tests by ODT................................ 172-173
Staggered hours ..................................... 153
Staggered hours in Honolulu............................ 256
State Trade barriers (see Trade barriers).......... 143-147
Storage problems..................................... 47-53
At ports ....................................... 38-39, 48-49
Warehousing plan .....................................48-50
Refrigerated storage................................. 50-52
Storage in transit................................... 52-53
Grain storage................................ 69, 70-71
Storage in transit................................... 52-53
Storage in transit, rates.......................... 237-238
Streetcar services, diversion of bus traffic to..... 153-154
Street traffic control............................. 154-155
Strikes in transportation industry (see also
Page
Federal management) ...................,.... 223-225
Subways....................................... 155
Suburban traffic.............................. 156
Tank car movements................................ 185-188
Tank car petroleum rates ......................... 241-242
Tank truck operations........................... 188-189
Tank truck petroleum rates ............................242
Tax amortization.................................. 213-216
Taxicabs, control of............................ 166-168
Taxicab statistics................................ 297, 306
Territorial transportation:
Alaska............................................ 261-264
Hawaii........................................... 253-259
Panama Canal ......................................... 245
Puerto Rico....................................... 246-251
Virgin Islands ....................................... 251
Tire estimates and allocation..................... 206-207
Tire tests by ODT................................. 172-173
Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad, Federal management of................................... 269-274
Trade barriers:
Weight and size limitations ....................... 143-144
Licenses and fees.................................. 144-145
Program to eliminate................................... 146
President’s Committee.................................. 146
Emergency Transportation Act........................... 147
Traffic forecasts ................................... 87-94
Traffic channels plan................................ 17-19
Traffic registration .............................. 127-130
Training automotive maintenance employees ............ 212
Training programs for transportation industry personnel .................................... 219-220
Troop movements by railroad ......................... 81-84
Trucks (see Motor carriers of freight; see Equipment) Turn-around time, reducing ....................... 313-314
V
Virgin Islands, transportation in
251
W
Warehousing (see Storage) Waterway transport........................4...... 177-184
Regulations and restrictions ......................... 178
Inland waterways...................................... 178
Barge services ................................... 179-180
Control of coastwise service.......................... 180
Control of lakes shipping ........................ 180-182
Manpower problems on Great Lakes...................... 182
Manpower problems in shipyards........................ 184
Barge construction................................ 182-184
Canadian vessels, use of.............................. 182
Ferry service for truck, Cleveland to Detroit......... 103
Ferries in passenger service.......................... 155
Postwar problems ....;............................ 322-323
Statistics................................... 297-299, 308
Waybill studies, railroad ........................ 95-100
361