[The Defense Coordinator in Industrial Plants. Pt. III, Sabotage and Preventive Measures]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

OCD Publication 3100
Part III
THE DEFENSE COORDINATOR IN INDUSTRIAL PLANTS
SABOTAGE AND
PREVENTIVE MEASURES
December 1943
U. S. OFFICE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE Washington 25, D. C.
FOREWORD
The techniques of subversive activity employed by the enemy have been stated .by Nazi ideologists, and the effectiveness of these techniques has been repeatedly demonstrated abroad. Prominent among them is industrial sabotage, th? insidious crippling and destruction of the industrial facilities of the Nation. If the concept of America as the “Arsenal of Democracy” is to be fully realized, this threat to industrial production must be defeated. It can be defeated by planned protection and eternal vigilance. Responsibility for taking any necessary measures rests on the management of each plant or facility.
U. S. Grant, 3d,
Major General U. S. Army,
Chief, Protection Branch.
Note.—This planning guide is issued as a unit of the OCD 3100 series. When assembled in a ring binder, the series is designed to serve as a guide for The Defense Coordinator in Industrial Plants. Each unit of the series concludes with one or more selected references pertaining to the subject in question. Many of these titles have been selected from OCD and other governmental publications that may be obtained free or at small cost and inserted at the end of the unit to which they apply. The complete series, together with these references, will supply the Plant Defense Coordinator with assistance in organizing and administering the protection program for his plant.
SABOTAGE AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES
The effectiveness and costliness of sabotage is well illustrated in the 19 countries invaded by Germany in this war. Each was lulled into a false sense of security only to discover a sudden outburst of well organized sabotage that disrupted and then paralyzed domestic, industrial, governmental, and military life. Communications were interrupted, military and governmental leaders were assassinated, important roads and bridges were blown up, false alarms and false orders were issued, fires were started, airplanes and munitions were destroyed, the water supply was disrupted, transportation and light were stopped, sewerage systems were clogged, and the food supply was contaminated.
The persons responsible for the security of technical information, plant facilities, raw materials, and products vital to the war effort should be fully aware of the possibilities of sabotage and devise the preventive and counteractive measures necessary to stop or balk it.
The Nature of Espionage and Sabotage
The three major types of activity engaged in by hostile powers or subversive organizations are espionage, sabotage, and subversion.
The general objective of espionage is to collect, interpret, and transmit information to foreign powers or enemy groups that will be useful in planning and executing military strategy and tactics; committing physical, psychological, and economic sabotage; and causing subversion.
Sabotage is divided into three major types: physical, psychological, and economic. The objective of sabotage in general is to reduce the scope and intensity of military action. Specifically:
The objective of physical sabotage is to destroy resources, facilities, and records essential to the development and maintenance of a war and its complementary civilian economy.
The objective of psychological sabotage is to prevent or retard war activity by the crea
tion of confusion, dissension, fear, panic, or a false sense of security.
The objective of economic sabotage is to prevent the acquisition and exploitation of resources and finished products required to develop and maintain a war.
Motives.—Since mofft sabotage is intentional, there must be a reason behind the act. The reason usually falls into one of the following categories:
1.	By direction of a foreign power. Foreign agents are motivated either by direct orders, pay, sympathy, or patriotism.
2.	Promotion of a subversive cause.—The individual is moved here to take “direct action” in furtherance of some alleged reform or movement for change in the political or economic system, generally as a member of some organization.
3.	Grievance.—These are cases in which the individual is actuated either by an ill or well founded grievance against a method, person," firm, government, or by his outlook on society in general.
4.	Profit.—This is where the saboteur expects to make personal gain by committing the act, and sells out to the individual or organization concerned.
5.	Compulsion.—This is where the act is committed more or less against the individual’s will through blackmail, duress, threat or fear of physical force, such as harm to a relative living in the enemy country concerned.
Who may commit sabotage.—The least suspected persons are usually the most effective. Enemy agents, soldiers who have infiltrated in other raiment, fifth columnists, and enemy sympathizers, would be expected to operate as saboteurs. On the other hand, unscrupulous persons operating for pay, or those with grievances, or unthinking people, or normally good citizens misled by propaganda, blinded by greed, fear, or hope of reward, or occasionally even those whose positions shield them, are frequently the unsuspected perpetrators of sabotage.
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Selection of an objective.—The skilled saboteur’s criterion for selecting a specific objective is usually based upon four major factors, namely: (1) The strategic importance of the resource, product, facility, or service; (2) the potential replacement in terms of the available supply of required materials or equipment, the available supply of skilled technicians or labor, and the length of time required to replace, repair, or resume service; (3) the relative vulnerability or easetof damage; and (4) the degree of damage that may be expected from the sabotage.	•
The objective necessarily differs with the industrial facility and how much damage is desired. The general objectives of espionage, sabotage, and subversion may be accomplished by direct action against: (1) Raw or processed materials, finished products or those in process; (2) facility structures and equipment; (3) services of supply and distribution; and (4) facility personnel and the general public.
Specifically, direct action may consist of: (1) Obtaining vital information by infiltration and observation; (2) destroying or retarding essential war production; (3) destroying or retarding nonmilitary production necessary to the domestic economy; (4) disrupting the transmission of information; (5) destroying or retarding the transportation of military or civilian goods and personnel; and (6) demoralizing military personnel and the civilian population by exploiting or promoting fear, grievances, and the antiwar sentiments of special groups or individuals.
Common zones of subversive action.— These are: (1) The facility structure; (2) vulnerable points and critical areas in the plant; (3) vulnerable points and critical areas outside the facility but within the facility controlled area; and (4) the area surrounding the facility from which observation and surveillance of the structure or activities around it is possible.
Espionage.—In order to commit sabotage, the saboteur first needs to commit an act of espionage. Specifically he will probably collect information concerning the type, volume, and location of military activity arid war as well as important civilian production in order to learn objectives and vulnerable points after which the most effective and practical method of destruction or disruption can be determined.
This requires an opportunity to see and observe critical areas and vital structures, installations, and processes. It also involves an opportunity to read or overhear descriptions, specifications, analyses, or evaluations of production.
Specifically, the kinds of information wanted by saboteurs are: (1) Types of product or services rendered; (2) production methods, rate and capacity of production; (3) confidential reports, specifications, plans, formulae; and (4) test records of newly developed apparatus, equipment, guns, airplanes, or munitions.
The objectives and methods of espionage.—Typical sources involve the surroundings, routes, and schedules used by a facility. They concern:
1.	Information gained from employees or ac* quaintances of employees through conversation or eavesdropping.
. 2. Information that can be purchased.
3.	Information that is obtained under false pretenses.
4.	Confidential reports that can be stolen.
5.	Materials that can be copied.
6.	Working models or finished products that can be photographed.
7.	Working models or finished products that can be stolen and reproduced.
8.	Production operations and test runs that can be observed.
9.	Infiltration or illegal entry into a plant or facility as an employee.
10.	Information gained through blackmail or threat of injury to relatives or friends of employees residing in foreign countries.
Plan.—The saboteur is a person with a purpose and usually a plan. He must have:
1.	Knowledge of destructive methods. , This includes a knowledge of how to handle explosives, how to make and use incendiary devices, and how to creat discontent among workers.
2.	Technical knowledge. For example, consider the case of a petroleum refinery. The saboteur will be sufficiently well acquainted with the processes of refining to know where and how to do the most damage.
Means.—The saboteur usually has the means with which to commit sabotage. There is not much that he can accomplish with his bare hands, therefore, the following must be had:
1.	Funds, money or credit for bribery, pur
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chase of destructive materials, and living as well as traveling expenses.
2.	Materials and implements, such as explosives, incendiaries, contaminators, abrasives, inflammables, chemicals, firearms, printed matter, and the like. These may be found at the point where the sabotage is to be committed but usually they are purchased and transported to the scene.
The master saboteur in many cases has jobs which require assistance or which can be handled through apparently or actually innocent parties. There are very few jobs that can be accomplished alone and it is this need of assistance which frequently leads to the undoing of the saboteur.
Freedom of action.—The normal individual is not in a position to undertake sabotage even if he should have some reason for doing so, just as with other forms of criminal activity. Ties of sentiment or self-interest give him too many reasons to refrain from such activity. Too many people know him and where he goes and what he does. The potential saboteur must be inconspicuous and have freedom from observation.
Prospects of escape.—Any one of several means- of escape are employed by the saboteur such as: (1) Concealing the damage so it will not be discovered until later; (2) committing the sabotage in such away as to conceal intent and method because obvious crimes lead to quick identification; and (3) operating in such a way that the true identity of the saboteur remains undiscovered, as through disguise, impersonation, and the like.
Protective and Preventive Measures Against Sabotage
A survey should be made of conditions that will permit of simple and involved sabotage so these can be corrected or controlled to avoid trouble. This will minimize the vulnerability occasioned by such hazards. The continued protection of each industrial facility in question will depend upon the alertness of the personnel and the enforcement of the protective measures adopted.
The following pages cover such measures as have proven most effective. These are presented in two parts, the first dealing with physical and the second with those precautions generally classified as nonphysical. Admittedly
such measures are not complete insurance against sabotage. The effectiveness of any plan will depend upon the recognition and enforcement it receives.
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES
Fences.—Shortages of metals formerly used for man-proof fences make it necessary to use wood or other substitutes. Where an efficient guard force is operating, this need cause no lessening of all-round protection. Fences should be inspected regularly, and any needed strengthening or repairs made at once. Fenced areas should be patrolled during each shift and fence lighting should be installed in areas where intruders might otherwise be able to enter under cover of darkness.
Gates.—The number of gates opened should be reduced to a minimum. Unused gates should be locked and the locks changed periodically. Gates should be well lighted at night to permit easy identification of all persons and vehicles entering or leaving. Guards should be on duty at all open gates.
Means of entry.—All possible means of entering the facility area, buildings, or installations, should be checked and precautions taken immediately wherever necessary. Ordinarily the following are possible sources of unauthorized entry: Outside fire escapes, skylights, coal chutes, sidewalk elevators, basement and first floor windows, storm sewers, emergency exits, tunnels, and adjoining buildings. Responsibility for the security of these vulnerable points should be assigned, and any needed physical protection such as locks and bars should be installed.
Parking areas.—The space for parking should be separated from the facility so all personnel will enter through pedestrian gates. No cars should be parked within 25 feet of important buildings or installations. If ground lay-out or operations are such that cars must be permitted within the premises of the facility, personal identification should be required of each occupant. Parking areas should be definitely marked out, and no parking permitted outside the area. Guard patrols should cover the parking area at variable intervals.
Delivery docks and platforms.—-Truck passes should be issued to all trucks entering
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the plant property. A register should be maintained at truck gates or docks. Deliveries other than routine shipments should be inspected at the entrances of manufacturing areas. Drivers and helpers should be prohibited from entering manufacturing areas. All drivers and helpers should be required to show personal identification, unless they are known and have been checked previously. If any question of identification arises, a routine telephone check should be made with their employers.
Railroad, entrances and gates.'—All railroad entrances should be provided with gates, to be kept locked when closed and guarded when open. Railroad cars should be inspected inside and out by a plant protection officer when they enter or leave facility premises. Railroad crews should have positive identification and should not be permitted to enter manufacturing areas, or any areas not in line of duty.
Communications systems.'—A telephone PBX board should be attended at all times. Controls or recording devices for fire alarm, watchman and guard patrol, air-raid warning, and burglar alarm should be centralized in a guarded area, and not be accessible to unauthorized persons. The use of telephone facilities for outside calls by personnel should be discouraged. Telephone operators should be provided with list of persons to call in cases of emergency.
Confidential plans and materials.—All confidential items such as descriptions of processes, formulae, blueprints, working models, photographs, charts, reports, when not in use by responsible employees, should be kept in a plans office which should be adequately guarded at all times. Materials kept in this office should be filed in fireproof cabinets or vaults with tamper-proof locks. A rigid charge-out system should account for the location of all items at all times. Confidential documents should never be kept in portable containers; such as small safes, which could be carried away.
Valuable precision instruments and tools.—All technical and precision tools, and scarce or hard-to-replace items like dies and jigs should be in locked rooms or well-protected areas. A detailed charge-out system should be maintained when such tools are in use. Precision tools which might be of interest to the enemy should be guarded closely. The guard
force should consider the tool room as a vulnerable point when an attendant is not on duty.
Restriction of vital areas and installations.—Vital areas and installations vulnerable to sabotage should be considered “Restricted areas,” and only assigned personnel admitted. A distinctive badge or badge insert should clearly identify all personnel permitted in restricted areas. Visitors should be excluded from restricted areas. All personnel regularly employed in restricted areas should be instructed to challenge any strange or unauthorized persons, visitors, or trespassers and report any suspicious behavior or unusual interest shown on the part of any employee.
Lighting.—All areas close to important buildings, equipment, or installations should be well lighted. All outside lighting should be arranged to enable guards to control it from centralized control switches. Flood lights should be directed so as not to blind patrolmen and guards, and if possible, to enable them to remain in the darkness. Inside night lighting should be maintained in buildings housing vital equipment and installations. Facility premises should be checked for dark areas in which intruders could escape detection, and such areas should be suitably lighted.
Storage.—All explosives should be stored and handled in conformity to the Federal Explosives Act. Guards and watchmen should be kept informed of the storage of explosives and other hazardous materials. Valuable or scarce materials should be given protection, and should not be concentrated in one storage area. Dangerous acids, poisonous substances, and substances having low kindling points should be carefully handled and stored at all times under the supervision of men understanding the properties of such substances and the dangers connected with them.
Food and water supply.—Cafeteria kitchens should be under the surveillance of the plant protection force. Anÿ cases of food poisoning or gastric disorders traceable to cafeteria food should be rigidly checked. Food supplies should be obtained from known and reliable suppliers.
The water supply should be checked on the following points: Adequacy for fire-fighting needs, chlorination, and vulnerability to sabo
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tage or contamination by disease-producing bacteria.
Handling of mail.—Mail pouches should be sealed by a mail clerk and delivered to the post office, or guarded until they are picked up by the mail truck. Incoming mail should be checked in at appropriate receiving stations, preferably removed from proximity to vital areas or installations. Packages should be carefully examined, and plant police summoned if suspicion is aroused.
Mail marked “Personal” or “Confidential” should be delivered unopened to the official addressed. Outgoing mail of this type should be sealed by the writer or his secretary.
Wastepaper disposal.—All wastepaper from offices where confidential work is carried on should be disposed of within the plant area by incineration or shredding. Such wastepaper should under no circumstances be sent to junkmen or collectors. Contents of wastepaper receptacles from planning, drafting, or photostat rooms should be disposed of with scrupulous care. Discarded drafts of confidential memos, diagrams, or specifications might be found in them intact or in easily assembled pieces.
Vital services.—All powerhouses, primary switch houses, transformer banks, electrical substations, and other vital utilities should be adequately guarded and checked. Generators and compressors should be guarded and regularly inspected. Electric closets and panel boxes should be kept locked, and switchboard equipment kept inaccessible to unauthorized persons. Plant police should be furnished with diagrams showing the location of all main electric control switches and the service valves that control the transmission of steam and gas. This is necessary for the dual purpose of assuring adequate protection, ànd for eliminating hazards in the event of fire, explosion, or other incidents.
Fixed posts and routine patrols.—All entrances and gates should have guard protection for checking personnel and visitors and for keeping out unauthorized persons. Loading and delivery docks should have guard protection, and employees of outside concerns kept under surveillance while on facility premises. Railroad gates should be under guard ’when open, and locked by guards when closed. Sidings or wharves where material is being
handled should have guard protection, and no unauthorized persons should be permitted to loiter about. Incoming freight cars should be inspected by guards for both intruders and dangerous materials. Guards should inspect outgoing freight cars before sealing them, and guard them until the railroad personnel assumes control. Routine patrols should be on variable schedule and so planned that all parts of the plant and yard will be under observation. Locked gates, entrances, and doors should be checked. Any suspicious or unusual conditions or circumstances noted on patrols should be immediately investigated and reported to the guard force office.
RELATED NONPHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES
The following is an outline of standards by which an industrial facility may assure itself of the minimum desirable protection. One of the prime concerns is the loyalty and integrity of the persons through whom essential functions are performed, because it is at this point that every facility has its greatest vulnerability.
The problem of personnel control involves:
1.	New employees; their recruitment, selection, and investigation.
2.	Present employees; their background, current activities, associates, and sympathies.
3.	Control of duty assignments as regards employee hazards arising from the use of irresponsible, questionable, or inadequately trained personnel at vulnerable points.
4.	Employee turnover; exit interviews to determine reasons, and to learn the plans of employees who have resigned or been dismissed for various reasons.
5.	Control of visitors and outside contractors while within the facility area.
6.	Guard force; their physical vigor, mental alertness, duties, responsibilities, training and familiarity with plant security problems.
7.	Occupants of the area adjacent to the facility; their activities, attitudes, and loyalty.
In successfully carrying out a program to protect the facility and to maintain capacity production, the facility management will find a properly constituted and staffed personnel department indispensable. Where such steps are taken, the basis will have been laid for protecting the facility from malicious mischief,
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major harm, or disruption attributable to its own personnel, to persons entering the area of the facility, or to persons who reside in its vicinity.
THE RECRUITMENT, SELECTION, AND INVESTIGATION OF EMPLOYEES
Sources of personnel.—The recruitment of employees, particularly the sources from which they are drawn, should not be left to chance. If applications are referred to the facility by an employment agency, a union, or other organization, a responsible official of the plant or facility should make a personal investigation of the recruiting source to assure himself of the character, reputation and competence of those in charge. Positive standards for the selection of applicants should be adopted and made clearly known to the agencies referring job applicants to the facility.
Application forms.—An adequate form should be developed or adopted, and its completion required of every applicant before he is considered for employment. The completed form should be in the hands of the official interviewing the applicant, and the interview should be based upon the information contained therein. If possible, the following items should be incorporated:
Applicant’s full name and address. v
Personal history.
Physical description.
Place and date of birth.
Nationality.
Birthplace of the parents of applicant and spouse.
Name of spouse, maiden name, husband’s full name.
Place and birth date of spouse.
Employment of spouse, company and location.
If foreign born:
Name used by applicant on entering United States.
Port of embarkation from which applicant traveled to the United States.
Name of the ship.
Port of entry.
Date of entry.
Alien registration number, if any.
Proof of citizenship:
Record of birth certificate showing date and place of birth and date of registration.
Other acceptable evidence of citizenship presented by applicant.
Naturalization certificate showing certificate number, date and place issued, and issuing court.
Citizenship claimed through naturalization of another person—in which case the facts pertaining to the situation should be recorded. {Note.—Record the pertinent information from the evidence produced by the applicant and indicate whether the documents are original, certified, or other copies.)
The unauthorized duplication or use of duplicated copies of naturalization certificates is a felony under Federal law; hence, if photostatic or similar copies are exhibited these should not be accepted, but a statement setting forth the circumstances should be made a part of the application file.
Relatives.—Names, addresses, and relationship of the immediate family of the applicant and spouse.
Names, addresses, and relationship of all relatives of the applicant and spouse who—
1.	Reside in foreign countries.
2.	Entered the United States since 1932.
3.	Are in the military, naval, or civilian employ of the United States Government.
4.	Are in the military, naval, or civilian employ of any foreign government.
Name, address, and relationship of the person who should be notified in case of an emergency.
Education:
Schools attended.
Locations.
Periods of attendance.
Courses pursued.
Former employment:
Name and address of all employers.
Type of work or title.
Period of employment.
Reason for termination.
Was the position held under civil service?
Has any former employer conducted an investigation as to applicant’s character and fitness?
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Military and naval experience, both do- • mes tic and foreign, showing for each period of service:
Ñame of Government served.
Date and place of enlistment or induction.
Date and place of discharge.
Branch of service and rank.
Serial number of enlistment.
Reason for termination of service.
List of all organizations (other than labor unions) of which the applicant is currently a member or of which he was a member at any time since 1932. A statement describing the applicant’s whereabouts and activities during the period 1914-18 inclusive.
A statement describing any visits to foreign countries since 1932 giving dates, length of visit, countries visited, and reason for visit.
Applicant’s social security number.
Selective Service data:
Serial number.
Order number.
Draft board.
Address of applicant at time of original registration.
Classification.
References:
Name and address of three character references other than relatives.
Arrest:
A statement indicating whether the applicant has ever been arrested, and if so:
Date.	-
Place of arrest.
Offense charged.
Disposition of charge.
Fingerprinting new employees.-—All new employees should be fingerprinted before entrance on duty. A statement concerning fingerprinting procedures as applied to both present and new employees appears later in this section.
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS
Situations requiring their installation.— It is recommended that an identification system be installed in those facilities in which one or more of the following conditions prevail:
1.	Where the number of employees makes personal identification b’y fellow employees or guards difficult pr impossible.
2.	Where it is possible for the day-to-day
status of any employee to be unknown to the other workers, e. g., where they may be unacquainted with whether or not the person in question is employed, resigned, or discharged; or with- the hours or shifts during which the person is employed, or the section or sections of the facility to which he is permitted access.
3.	Where the facility area or entrances are such that little control can be maintained over the movement of strangers and visitors on the facility grounds and installations.
The identification system used should enable the employees to recognize an outsider immediately and to know by sight when an employee or visitor is in the area where he does or does not belong.
Identification badges.—The most satisfactory badge is one combining a color scheme and a numbering system, which together will indicate to an informed observer: (1) The area or section of the facility in which the wearer is employed; (2) his authority to enter other facility areas; (3) his shift, and (4) his payroll number.
The communication of this information may be accomplished by the use of a badge having a background of two or more colors, one color to indicate the area or section to which the wearer has authorized acbess and the second color to indicate the shift or hours of duty. Badges are available on which the shift colors can be exchanged in the event that an employee’s working hours are changed. The number on the badge may be identical with the employee’s pay-roll number. The badge system should be governed by rules which should include the following provisions:
The badge is to be worn in a uniform place on the outside of the employee’s clothing. All persons must wear badges within the confines of the facility, hence, all visitors must wear a special identification badge when entering upon facility property, and all official and administrative personnel must wear badges when they are on the facility property.
All employees, particularly all members of the guard force, must be advised that there are to be no exceptions to these rules, and any person observed in the area without proper identification, irrespective of his official rank, should be reported immediately to a plant protection officer. Employees reporting for
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work without their badges must obtain temporary badges or credentials before going on the job, and such temporary badges or credentials are not to be issued except following proper identification of the employee by his immediate superior or other trusted employees. A suitable penalty should be inflicted upon any employee, losing, altering, or loaning his badge, or using, borrowing, or purloining the badge of another employee.
Each employee should be required to sign a statement that he has read, and is acquainted with, the above rules, and that he accepts responsibility for compliance therewith.
The current trend in identification badges is not to have the name of the facility appear on the badge. This is done for two reasons: (1) To prevent an outsider from readily identifying a man’s place of employment, and (2) to make it difficult for an outsider, finding such a badge, to know where it may be used. In the absence of the name of the facility, these badges are made up in unusual shapes or identifying symbols. Badges should be tamperproof. _
Identification cards.—Identification cards should be issued to each employee. These cards should contain the following information:
The full name of the employee.
The home address of the employee.
A brief personal description of the employee, indicating his age, weight, height, color of hair, and color of eyes.
A photograph of the employee (head and shoulders only). <
The signature of the employee.
The signature of the official issuing the identification card.
Employee’s thumb prints.
The cards may be distinctively colored to indicate the status or privileges accorded the holders. Cards should be protected against duplication, alteration, and counterfeiting by such measures as imposing company seal or stamp on photograph, and signature, both of holder and issuing official, and use of special laminated or coated papers for cards to reveal any attempt at tampering.
KEY CONTROL
Many facilities overlook the control of keys in vital areas. In some cases the same locks
have been in use over a long period of time. Keys have been lost, duplicates made, and no record kept of who has possession of these keys. Wherever such a condition is found, it should be brought immediately under control. Old keys should be called in, locks changed, and new keys be charged out to and receipted for by personnel authorized to use or supervise them. Even then, keys charged to an employee should be permitted to remain in his custody only during such hours as he is actually on duty at the facility. Any facility which permits a workman to retain keys to vital areas after he leaves the plant for the day must recognize the possibility that the keys may be lost or stolen, or that the employee could have duplicates made. The making of exact duplicates of intricately cut keys frequently requires Jess than 2 minutes when the work is done on modern, electrically operated key-cutting machines. Furthermore, duplicates may be obtained at the key counter in the hardware section of practically any “dime store” in a metropolitan community. The crowded conditions of the store make for anonymity and questions are never asked. Some key-cutting machines are small and portable, so that saboteurs could conceivably make their own duplicates on the spot.
It is important that the number of entrances to a facility be reduced to a minimum consistent with traffic needs and safety from fire hazards. Any doors that can be kept locked lessen the manpower required to guard them, but there is no such thing as a pick-proof lock. Even vital areas that are locked may need to be patrolled. Most locks can be picked in a very few minutes by an expert. This fact therefore points to the necessity for all locked doors to be examined frequently by a guard patrol and that any locks chosen for installations at vital points be as nearly pick-proof as possible.
Doors are too frequently thought of as the only means of -entrance. Other means are windows, transoms, skylights, vents, drains, tunnels, and even sewers and manholes. None should be overlooked. Every artery or opening by means of which anyone could conceivably gain entrance to the facility from outside, or leave it once entrance has been secured, should be locked except when actually in use. It is just as important, and sometimes more im
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portant, to the saboteur to have a means or channel of escape once he has committed his act of aggression, as it is to gain entrance. A survey of the facility would probably show that some doors which are necessarily left open during the day could well be locked during the night. Within the facility itself there are probably many doors in vital areas left open that should be locked when not in use. All exit doors on the premises should be equipped where possible with panic locks which cannot be opened from the outside.
Finally, whenever any worker employed in a vital area of the plant is discharged or leaves the employ of the facility under suspicious circumstances, consideration should be given to changing those locks to which that employee was formerly entrusted with keys.
CHECKING THE PRESENT EMPLOYEES OF THE FACILITY
The number of persons concerned in the total industrial protection program runs into the millions, and the investigative agencies of the Federal, State, and local governments are already burdened almost beyond their capacities with essential tasks which cannot be put aside. Yet the facility managements in many cases feel that some positive action should be taken to check on the background, character and loyalty of their operating personnel. It must be recognized that not all employees can be investigated completely, and that it is not necessary that all employees be so investigated. If an employee is not in a position to do more than trifling damage and has no access to information which should be kept in confidence, he does not constitute a primary risk and may be eliminated from investigative consideration. It may be assumed further that any hostile behavior on the part of such an employee within the facility would be disclosed in due time through the normal processes of personnel control.
When investigation is indicated, it is important that all inquiries be made with discretion. Hasty actions founded upon incomplete circumstantial background data should be strictly avoided. It is reported that in some facilities employees have been dismissed because of such slight evidence as the receipt of anonymous allegations concerning them, when
a shift in their assignments or working hours might have been all that was necessary to eliminate any possible hazard to the facility until such a time as more complete data could be gathered.
Any act or report containing the definite implication of imminent or potential sabotage should be disclosed at once to the nearest field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by the facility or by the participating agency inspector, whichever receives the information.
VISITORS
Under wartime conditions, the facilities are strongly urged to keep close check on visitors. A lax system of visitor-control opens many possibilities of espionage and sabotage to agents of the enemy who show amazing ingenuity in taking advantage of them. For maximum efficiency, a visitor-control system should consider as visitors all persons entering the facility who are not actually employed there. This includes visiting salesmen, vendors, and suppliers, - and outside maintenance and service men of all types.
It is recognized that systems for visitorcontrol will necessarily vary with different facilities, depending on such variable factors as size of personnel, area of premises, and kind of manufacture. However, in approaching the problem of visitor-control there are some basic procedures and practices which can be outlined and recommended, since they are based on the experience of management in facilities of all classes. These procedures may be listed as follows:
• Standard practice in visitor-control.-—All visitors should be required to enter at the same entrance and to furnish the following information for the registration book or form in their own handwriting.
Date and time of entrance.
Full name and home address.
Business connection and status.
Citizenship.
Where bom.
Purpose of visit.
Persons to be interviewed.
Extent of facility area to be visited.
Sign agreement to comply with rules and regulations of facility.
The visitor should be required to wear a
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badge or equivalent identification. He should be escorted, or kept under continuous scrutiny while on the premises. He should surrender his badge at the point of original entry, and the time of leaving should be noted.
All facilities are urged to observe the following precautions in handling visitors:
Don’t permit visitors to carry cameras.
Visitors should not be permitted to carry uninspected packages into or out of the facility. Visitors should surrender brief cases or packages for inspection. This also applies to tool kits and equipment.
Don’t accept arrival in a company vehicle as sufficient identification for outside maintenance or servicemen, unless theyx are personally known. Make a telephone check with employers as to identity and assignment.
Commissioned officers, military or naval, should be required toxshow personal identification card before admittance is permitted, and should not be admitted on the basis of uniform only:
Don’t permit visitors to drive cars aroiyid the facility premises.
• All unnecessary visiting should be discontinued for the duration. In addition to the ordinary idle visitor, this applies to solicitors, collectors, and all nonessential visitors.
Personnel should be instructed to report any unusual behavior of visitors, or undue interest in any installation or process that might be of use to the enemy.
Employees of outside concerns.—Visitors entering the facility to work, such as outside maintenance and service men, constitute a special problem in the field of visitor-control. When they are frequent visitors, as many are, scrutiny tends to become lax, and free access to all areas and installations is often permitted. The following suggestions are offered for coping with this problem:
Employees of outside concerns should be furnished with positive identification cards. Much time can be saved by requiring lists of accredited men from outside concerns supplying men for specialized tasks within the facility.
Employees should be required to certify men they send to work in the facility area as to citizenship, loyalty, and trustworthiness. Employees of outside concerns should be required to wear a visitor’s badge or equivalent identifi
cation in a uniform, conspicuous, and readily recognized place.
Employees of outside concerns should be restricted to the area in which they are working, and should be subject to all rules governing the facility’s own personnel.
Contractors and subcontractors.—Contractors, subcontractors, and their employees should be subject to the same rules and regulations which are binding upon regular employees of the facility. A badge should be issued for each of these employees, the colors indicating the exact status, and the privileges allowed.
Police, fire, and Civilian Defense service members.—Arrangements should be made in advance to facilitate identification and admittance of local fire, police, and Civilian Defense services to the plant or facility in the event of emergency.
CONTROLLING PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS AT VITAL POINTS
Mention has previously been made of the necessity for the survey, by the facility management, of key and vital points within the facility physical structure, and in the flow of operations. No employee in whom the management does n'ot have complete trust should be assigned to these points. For the purpose of personnel control such jobs should be identified by some distinct method of recording, such as a colored pay roll or record card, in order to indicate when an employee leaves, that care should be exercised in selecting his successor.
PREVENTING EMPLOYEE IDLENESS AND WANDERING
Almost everyone is imbued with tendencies toward idle curiosity and wandering. In an industrial organization the element of danger even in peacetime is increased by the presence of spectators who are not actively engaged in the operations under way. In time of war the spectator provides an additional cover for the saboteur, whose actions are screened by the presence of other visitors who likewise have no legitimate reason for being within the vicinity. To curb this, “visiting” should be prohibited throughout the plant. Employees should be kept within the specific agreas to which their duties require access, and they should not be admitted to other parts of the
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plant or facility without a pass. As previously mentioned, the employee’s visible badge should show by distinctive coloring the shift and area to which he is assigned.
An employee assignment record, kept on a current basis, will be useful in maintaining control over movements of personnel within the facility. It should show the current location of the employee, his hours of duty and the nature of his work, at least so far as this is indicated by the title of his job.
FORMER EMPLOYEES, TURNOVER, AND THE EXIT INTERVIEW
Facility managements too frequently con-: sider their relation to, and interest in, an employee ends the moment he leaves the pay roll. This is unwise for several reasons. For one thing, former employees have intimate knowledge of the plant layout and operations which would be invaluable to saboteurs who frequently obtain employment just to gain such information. Records of persons leaving the facility employment should therefore not be destroyed but should be preserved for future reference. Inquiries from other organizations concerning former employees should be answered promptly and as completely as possible.
Employee turnover slows down normal operations and means production time lost while replacements are being sought and trained. To find and remedy the causes of excessive turn-, over, many facilities have instituted the exit interview. An official of the facility interviews each employee about to leave, in an attempt to learn the reason and whether it is possible to retain his services. This procedure is also helpful in bringing to light the operations of saboteurs who use certain techniques. For example, experience has shown that individuals desiring to hamper industrial production, particularly those engaging in psychological forms of sabotage, frequently are careful to stop short of committing an act which would warrant criminal prosecution. When their disruptive activities such as rumor-spreading, fomentation of employee dissatisfaction, and inciting of slowdowns come to the notice of the management, the disloyal worker usually quits before any action is taken against him. He then seeks employment elsewhere to begin again the same disruptive tactics. In the exit interview, tactful
inquiry concerning the future plans of the employee should be made. If his answers are vague or evasive, a note of it should be made on his record and the case reported.
SURVEILLANCE OF THE AREA SURROUNDING THE PLANT FACILITY
The security of a facility may be directly affected by the persons who inhabit, occupy, or frequent the area contiguous to it. A check should therefore be made of the occupants and owners of all adjoining structures and of the activities which are carried on therein. Report should he made to the local police of any questionable activities within their jurisdiction. Saloons and other drinking places frequented by workers are a fertile field for persons who, for ulterior purposes, are seeking information pertaining to the activities of the plant or facility.
The Guard Force-—‘Its Duties and Responsibilities
The guard force should be organized by and under the direction of the plant protection officer. The guards should report only to such an officer or his representative.
The guard force should be regarded as something more than “watchmen” with negative functions. They should constitute, the facility’s protective force and, as such, be carefully selected and fully investigated before employment. Physical vigor, intelligence,. and alertness are required.
A sufficient number of guards should be maintained to patrol adequately the facility area and at the entrances to control the admission of employees, visitors, and vehicles. Guards should be assigned to shifts in accordance with local requirements but the change of guard shifts should be so scheduled as to avoid employee shifts.
The guards should be uniformed, deputized and given training for their duties and responsibilities. Such training should include a knowledge of the methods of espionage and sabotage and counter measures, familiarity with the plant, its processes, points of vulnerability, hazard and vital areas; the use and location of all fire-fighting equipment, valves and switches of vital utilities; and first-aid
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methods and location of all first-aid equipment for accident protection. Guards should be given specialized training in the use of firearms before arms are issued to them. Otherwise, their duties are as follows:
1.	Check the credentials of every person entering the plant.
2.	Inspect packages in and out.
3.	Inspect vehicles, trucks, and railroad cars coming into or leaving the plant.
4.	Make irregular patrols about and through the facility, checking fences, doors, and locks.
5.	Be alert for unauthorized personnel in vital areas, and unusual and questionable material and evidence of attempted sabotage.
6.	Anticipate and plan action for any emergency.
Daily written reports of any unusual occurrences, carelessness, or questionable circumstances, should be submitted to the plant protection officer or his representative. The Federal Bureau of Investigation should be notified immediately of any suspected acts of sabotage and the scene of the crime should be
protected until law enforcement officers arrive.
Selected References on This Subject
United States Department of Justice, The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Some Technical Observations in the Detection of Sabotage. (Confidendtial) Washington, D. C., 1942, 44 p.
United States Department of Justice, The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Suggestions for Protection of Industrial Facilities. (Confidential) Washington, D. C., 1941, 54 p. Available only to officials of industrial plants. Secure from the Provost Marshal General’s Office.
United States War Department, Provost Marshal General’s Office. Internal Security Inspection Manual. (Restricted) Washington, D. C., November 1942, 58 p. Available only to officials of industrial plants.
United States War Department, Provost Marshal General’s Office. Plant Protection for Manufacturers. Washington, D. C. May 1943, 24 p.
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1944