[Ships for Freedom]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

ships
for
freedom
OFFICE OF PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT
LABOR DIVISION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
foreword
Without a great many more cargo ships to carry food and ammunition, the Battle of Britain may be lost.
And on our own first line of defense, the United States has decided upon immediate construction of-a new fleet of warships to provide a two-ocean navy.
The magnitude of this double job, and its immediacy, if we are to break up Hitler’s timetable, are a tremendous challenge.
We can meet the challenge, and we are doing the job.
A cooperative effort by labor, industry, and Government is under way to build thousands of ships under a growing program which already carries nearly eleven and a half billion dollars’ worth of appropriations and authorizations.
The preservation of our free system of life is the aim of our defense efforts, which are based on the idea that we can produce more than Hitler can destroy, without losing our economic gains and our freedoms.
In shipbuilding, the workers, management, and Government have developed an industrywide program to meet the imperative needs of defense, avoiding most of the strikes, lockouts, and other interruptions that go with rapidly expanding industries.
This pamphlet tells the story of the development of this program.
The ships are rolling down the ways!
OFFICE OF PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ships for freedom
THE STORY
OF THE STABILIZATION PROGRAM
IN THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
ships and defense
DURING World War I, we built more ships than we had ever built before in so short a period of time. We called them our “Bridge of Ships” and ^though the Armistice came before they could be put into service, the fact that they were under construction was of major importance to the outcome of that struggle.
Today’s program is far greater in magnitude, for we are almost doubling our own Navy’s warships to protect the shores of both oceans, in addition to undertaking an enormous expansion of our merchant fleet and that of Great Britain.
Expanding trade with Latin America creates new demands for ships to carry goods to our southern markets and bring back critical and strategic materials.
United States and British orders to American yards for naval vessels, merchant ships, and transportation equipment, as of the end of August 1941, totaled approximately $11,500,-000,000 (appropriations and authorizations since June 1, 1940).
Under construction at the end of October 1941 were 1,900 ships, one of the greatest armadas ever conceived by man. They include everything from superbattleships, bigger and more powerful than any ever built, to motor torpedo boats, barges, tugs, cargo ships for British and United States carriers, and oil tankers.
Most of them are for direct Government orders.
SHIP ORDERS PILE UP
As German submarines and airplane raiders take their toll, the orders for more ships pile up and up, and the United States Government makes known its firm determination to raise production to a maximum to offset the German blockade and keep open Great Britain’s lifeline.
The size of the task is increased by an unknown amount of ship-repair work to be done in commercial and Navy ship-
1935
ANNUAL AVERAGE
1936
ANNUAL AVERAGE
1937
ANNUAL AVERAGE
1938
ANNUAL AVERAGE
1939
ANNUAL AVERAGE
1940
ANNUAL AVERAGE
1941
JUNE
1942
SEPTEMBER (ESTIMATE)
employment in shipyards
on Construction and Repair of United States Government, British, and Private Vessels.
each figure equals 25,000 workers
Black symbols—in Private Shipyards. Grey symbols—in U. S. Navy Yards.
yards, and conversion of older commercial, pleasure, and naval craft into modern defense ships.
New ways and yards have been started on all four coasts— Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf, and Great Lakes, and facilities unused for years are being brought into the big action program.
The job is made more difficult, as to both speed and acquisition of necessary facilities, by the need for naval vessels as well as merchant ships. Whereas in 1917-18 the problem was largely the construction of merchant tonnage, the 1941 need is for warships too. Battle wagons like the huge new North Carolina are not produced overnight. Though many cargo ships being built for the Maritime Commission can be constructed in a year or less, and emergency cargo vessels can be completed in 4 to 6 months, a battleship requires 4 years, a cruiser 3 years, and a submarine about 30 months.
These warships, moreover, are tailor-made jobs, and do not come off the assembly line. Each must occupy the ways for a period of time, from the laying of keel to the launching. Each piece of steel must be fitted with great precision.
It will take a great deal of money, much time, and the best we have in engineering and mechanical skills, to produce the twin fleet of carriers and fighters needed by the democracies.
MEN WANTED: TO BUILD SHIPS
In December 1939, 132,000 persons were employed in United States shipyards. In June 1941 this figure was more than doubled, nearly 300,000 workers being employed in the construction and repair of United States Government, British, and private vessels. Private shipyards employed 167,000 of these, and U. S. Navy yards 131,900.
Early in 1941 the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that shipyard employment would have to be expanded—to a total of 530,000—by September 1942.
(Figures from Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor)
The situation quickly became more grave as the orders fori ships mounted. In July 1941 the estimate of shipbuilding and repair employment for September 1942 was raised to 725,000 men. There are indications that the lid might be lifted further, as subs and planes take their toll in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.
World War experience showed how serious are the problems created by expanding employment in shipyards. Even after the United States entered that war, the country was confronted in late 1917 by strikes in the New York area, Wilmington, Philadelphia, Seattle, Portland, and San Francisco. The West coast shipbuilding program was tied up. Behind these manifestations of unrest there lay the absence, at least at the beginning, of a Government policy on wages and working conditions.
SHORTAGE OF SKILLED LABOR
As early as the fall of 1940, shortages once again developed in certain shipyard occupations, and it appeared that history was about to repeat, with more emphasis than in 1917-18. Some months later, in early 1941, the United States Bureau of Employment Security, which centralizes the statistics of the public employment offices over the Nation, reported significant shortages of ship carpenters, loftsmen, and shipfitters. The public employment offices at one time could fill less than 2 percent of the job openings for loftsmen, a highly skilled operation. Other occupations for which these offices could not meet the demand were marine architects, shop electricians, marine gas-engine machinists, and template makers.
Because ships are custom-made about one-half of the mechanical staff of a shipyard is classified as skilled labor.
There are four sources from which these skilled workers can be drawn: Other industries, other shipyards, training programs, and the unemployed. The qualified unemployed were drawn on quickly, and quickly exhausted as far as the highly skilled were concerned. Training programs are under way, and have been helpful, but they cannot by themselves meet the immediate need. Thus employers are driven to seek labor
8
from other industries and other shipyards.
One survey, made by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, showed that one-third of the 1,580 skilled workers hired by five Atlantic coast shipyards during the last 6 months of 1940 were secured from outside the State in which each yard was located. One out of every ten hired by these yards was drawn directly from other shipyards, machine tool, or aircraft industries—all essential to national defense.
COMPETITION FOR WORKERS
Such conditions lead directly to competitive bidding for labor, known in the industry as “scamping.” One yard raids another, and the other yard raids back. The worker and his family are pulled back and forth between employers, and we have uneconomic labor migrations, acute local housing difficulties, a high and inefficient labor turn-over, and disruption of the defense program. Wages spiral unevenly, and the cost of ships to the Government is increased beyond the bounds of any reasonable advance calculation.
The dangers of competitive wage-bidding were increased by the wage situation prevailing in United States shipyards in November 1939. Variation rather than uniformity was the rule in average hourly earnings for most occupational groups. For example, average hourly earnings of skilled burners and welders varied along the Atlantic coast from $1.27 in the highest paid yard to 62 cents in the lowest paid yard.
Such a condition, if left to itself, would lead to only one result. The high-average yards would attract labor from low-earning yards. The low-average yards would be forced to raise their rates to hold men. This would force the higher-wage yards to increase their rates. Thus the wage spiral, and with it the chaotic conditions of aimless shifting of labor, would be under way.
The seriousness of the situation was clear to the Advisory Commission to the U. S. Council of National Defense and to many leaders of the shipbuilding industry and of organized labor. It was time to act!
9
stabilization
ON November 27, 1940, Sidney Hillman, then Commissioner in charge of the Labor Division of the National Defense Advisory Commission—subsequently made Associate Director General of the Office of Production Management— announced appointment of a Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee, composed of representatives of labor, the shipbuilding industry, the United States Navy, the United States Maritime Commission, and the National Defense Advisory Commission.
The function of this Committee, as stated by Mr. Hillman, was to develop a labor program which would insure the most efficient and speedy construction of ships for defense. The Committee was asked to make a detailed investigation of wage rates and working conditions, with particular emphasis upon the migration of workers from yard to yard and its effect upon production.
WHAT IS “STABILIZATION”?
Let us define this word “stabilization” in simple terms. The United States Government is buying ships. Two of its agencies particularly, the Navy and the Maritime Commission, have placed huge orders for defense vessels with privately owned shipyards—nearly a hundred shipyards in the many ports of the country. Like all other industries, these shipyards are operated by two main elements, management and labor. Management plans the work and supervises it; labor realizes the plan.
In a time of emergency, it was therefore only natural that Government as the buyer of ships, management as contractor for ships, and labor as the actual builder of ships should get together in advance and discuss possible bottlenecks and sources of trouble. That is exactly what the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee did, and the result was a
10
broadly worded voluntary agreement on a limited number of topics, essentially uniform for the entire industry—designed to provide against trouble for the whole period of the emergency, and to put the shipbuilding industry at one stroke on a sound, equitable, and productive working basis. The agreements were to become effective on acceptance by labor and management, and incorporated in union agreements through the collective bargaining process.
“NO INTERRUPTION OF PRODUCTION”
The Committee was cnosen to represent all groups interested. John P. Frey, President of the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor, and Harvey Brown, President of the International Association of Machinists, represented the American Federation of Labor. The Congress of Industrial Organizations was represented by John Green and Philip H. Van Gelder, President and Secretary respectively of the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America. Management’s representatives on the Committee were H. Gerrish Smith, President of the National Council of American Shipbuilders, representing the Great Lakes shipyards; Gregory Harrison, representing the Pacific shipyards; F. A. Lidell, representing Gulf Shipyards; and Professor H. L. Seward, representing Atlantic shipyards. Joseph W. Powell, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, (Capt. G. W. Fisher, U. S. N., as alternate) represented the Navy. Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission, (Capt. J. O. Gawne, U. S. N., as alternate) represented the Maritime Commission. Morris Llewellyn Cooke, Industrial Engineering Consultant to the Labor Division of the Office of Production Management, was named Chairman, with Thomas L. Norton as Executive Secretary.
On December 5, 1940, the Committee, in the interests of promoting harmonious labor relations, adopted the following resolution:
“The Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee at its first 11
employment in shipyards jweekly average-June 1?41) by zones
DOES NOT INCLUDE WORKERS EMPLOYED ON PRIVATE AND BRITISH GOVERNMENT ORDERS
I SEATTLE
PORTLAND
“ PRIVATE SHIPYARDS
U. S. NAVY I YARDS
SERVICE AND REPAIR
NEW
CONSTRUCTION
• SAN FRANCISCO
PACIFIC ZONE
A LOS ANGELES
SAN DIEGO
HOL GALV

PACIFIC ZONE INCLUDES:
NORTH BEND AND MARSHFIELD, OREG.
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON TACOMA, WASHINGTON PORTLAND, OREGON OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA ALAMEDA, CALIFORNIA BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA
VALLEJO, CALIFORNIA RICHMOND, CALIFORNIA 10$ ANGELES, CALIFORNIA BREMERTON, WASHINGTON SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA ASTORIA. OREGON
NAPA, CALIFORNIA SAN PEDRO, CALIFORNIA WILMINGTON, CALIFORNIA STOCKTON, CALIFORNIA LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA ANTIOCH, CALIFORNIA TERMINAL ISLAND, CALIFORNIA HOUGHTON, WASHINGTON SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA NEWPORT BEACH, CALIFORNIA
ATLANTIC ZONE INCLUDES:
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY BALTIMORE MARYLAND SAVANNAH, GEORGIA CHESTER, PENNSYLVANIA NEW YORK, NEW YORK KEARNY, NEW JERSEY PHILADELPHIA PENNSYLVANIA COCOA, FLORIDA ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND SPARROWS POINT, MARYLAND SOUTH BRISTOL MAINE BROOKLYN, NEW YORK CAMBRIDGE, MARYLAND
CAMDEN, MAINE
CURTIS BAY, MARYLAND LEESBURG, NEW JERSEY NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA GROTON, CONNECTICUT BAYONNE NEW JERSEY BATH, MAINE
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT WILMINGTON, DELAWARE BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS QUINCY, MASSACHUSETTS EAST BOOTH BAY, MAINE NEW BEDFORD, MASS. CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA
CITY ISLAND, NEW YORK OYSTER BAY, LONG ISLAND LANCASTER, PENNSYLVANIA NEPONSET, MASSACHUSETTS STAMFORD, CONNECTICUT MANTEO, NORTH CAR A A DAMARISCOTTA, MAIN!* WEST MYSTIC, CONNECTICUT NQANK, CONNECTICUT DUNDALK, MARYLAND REEDVILLE, VIRGINIA IPSWICH, MASSACHUSETTS ELIZABETH CITY, NORTH CARO-
LINA
DULUTH
GREAT LAKES ZONE.
PRIVATE SHIPYARDS
(SUPERIOR
GREEN I BAY
SOUTH • CHICAGO
BAY CITY
RIVERÌ ROUGE
TOLEDO
LORAIN
CLEVELAND
BATH'
PORTLANDI
PORTSMOUTH(
BOSTON AREA I
GROTON
NEW YORK
DELAWARE RIVER AREA A
SPARROWS POINT
ATLANTIC ZONE
NEWPORT NEWS
PRIVATE
SHXRYARDS
U. S. NAVY I
YARDS j
SERVICE AND REPAIR NEW CONSTRUCTION
WILMINGTON •
CHARLESTON!
PRIVATE (SHIPYARDS
GULF ZONE
SAVANNAH4
PASCAGOULA
I MOBILE
JACKSONVILLE'
ORANGEI
OUSTONI
LVESTONI
NEW
ORLEANS^
I BEAUMONT
TAMPA
GULF ZONE INCLUDES:
FREEPORT, LONG ISLAND GREENPORT, LONG ISLAND BRISTOL, RHODE ISLAND KINGSTON, NEW YORK MILFORD, DELAWARE WÍRHODE ISLAND deWco, new jersey DORCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
ROCKLAND, MAINE SOUTHWEST HARBOR, MAINE SOUTH PORTLAND, MAINE ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY
MOBILE ALABAMA ORANGE TEXAS NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA JACKSONVILLE FLORIDA CHICKASAW, ALABAMA HOUSTON, TEXAS PASCAGOULA, MISSISSIPPI BEAUMONT, TEXAS TAMPA FLORIDA GALVESTON, TEXAS MIAMI, FLORIDA GRETNA, LOUISIANA WESTWEGO, LOUISIANA SLIDELL LOUISIANA
DUNEDIN, FLORIDA CLEARWATER, FLORIDA SEABROOK, TEXAS PENSACOLA FLORIDA ROCKPORT. TEXAS
GREAT LAKES ZONE INCLUDES:
CLEVELAND, OHIO MANITOWOC, WISCONSIN SOUTH CHICAGO, ILLINOIS BAY CITY, MICHIGAN RIVER ROUGE MICHIGAN SUPERIOR, WISCONSIN TOLEDO, OHIO DETROIT, MICHIGAN ALGONAC, MICHIGAN PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA DUBUQUE IOWA ERIE PENNSYLVANIA AKRON, OHIO
ALEXANDRIA BAY, NEW YORK
JEFFERSONVILLE INDIANA STURGEON BAY, WISCONSIN POINT PLEASANT, WEST VIR-
GINIA
DULUTH, MINNESOTA PORT CLINTON, OHIO NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE BUFFALO, NEW YORK ROCHESTER, NEW YORK N. TONAWANDA NEW YORK BENTON HARBOR, MICHIGAN
meeting adopts a policy urging that there should be no interruption of production on the part of shipyard employers and of shipyard employees before all facilities at the disposal of the National Defense Advisory Commission for adjusting differences have been exhausted.”
A subcommittee met the same day and began discussion of approaches to the problems of labor and shipbuilding.
CHARTING THE COURSE
The Committee was faced with two questions, namely, “What specifically were its objectives?” and “How should these objectives, once determined, be realized?”
After several meetings the Committee resolved its problems into eight items, which were subsequently made the subject of zone standards.
1.	Wages. The question of wages was important because of the possibility of competitive bidding for labor. The Committee wished to reduce the prevailing variations in rates and provide a systematic and periodic review of the wage question. Should the Committee try to achieve uniformity of rates for all classes of labor within the industry, or should it be concerned only with the basic rate for standard skilled mechanics, leaving to local collective bargaining negotiations the rates for other types of work? Because the former would be a tremendous undertaking due to local variations in conditions, because there was no desire to upset local community balances, and because of the relative importance of skilled workers, the Committee decided to limit itself to the basic hourly rate for standard skilled mechanics. The Committee, furthermore, decided that the definition of occupations to be included in the standard skilled class should be based on conditions prevailing in each major area.
2.	Overtime. Overtime provisions, which would protect labor standards and yet not preclude such a lengthening of the working week as might be necessary in the emergency, were also determined to be a matter for consideration.
14
3.	Shift Premiums. Because second and third shifts will be necessary to complete the defense program quickly, the premiums to be paid for second and third shifts were included.
4.	No Limits on Production. Full speed in shipbuilding cannot be secured with limits on production, hence it was agreed that this was a proper subject for action.
5.	No Strikes or Lockouts. So that construction might be carried forward without interruption, the Committee agreed that during the emergency there should be no strikes or lockouts.
6.	Arbitration. The Committee decided that grievance machinery—including provisions for the ultimate arbitration, if necessary, of all differences between yards and their employees—should be established.
7.	Training. Though not included as a “must” item, the Committee has sought to make provision for training programs in each zone agreement.
8.	Duration of Standards. Finally, the Committee was of the opinion that any zone standards should last for at least 2 years, with the important proviso, however, that periodic wage adjustments might take place. Thus, there was no desire to freeze wages for the duration of the emergency. On the contrary, the aim was to provide for an orderly revision satisfactory to all parties concerned.
Other topics might have been included—and many more were discussed—but the Committee limited the subjects to be considered, at least in its initial program, to these fundamental questions.
THE DEMOCRATIC WAY
There were two possible roads to stabilization. The Committee could have determined the standards arbitrarily, or asked some government agency to do so. This would have been the quickest method and the easiest. Instead, the Com
15
mittee chose a more time-consuming but more democratic way. The Committee concluded that labor conditions could best be stabilized through voluntary cooperation of all concerned hence, the zone conferences at which employers, union representatives, and Government officials together outlined desirable standards for each of the four zones.
Stabilizing the wage rate and other working conditions during a given period of time—with a year as the maximum— conforms to union practice. In collective bargaining, wages are “frozen” during the whole or a part of the life of an agreement.
Following the establishment of zone standards, employers and employees in each local area were to incorporate the standards into local agreements.
Since the zone conference method was a new device, the Stabilization Committee modified its procedure when unforeseen circumstances in a zone called for special consideration. It seems advisable, therefore, to outline briefly the way the conference idea operated in the four zones.
16
four agreements
IN accordance with the policy agreed upon by the Stabilization Committee, the labor organization which had the majority of workers under agreement in each zone (i. e., AFL or CIO) was to represent labor in the zone conference. The union in the minority was expected to conform with the approved standards. This method of representation was followed in all but the Gulf States conference where the numerical strength of both labor organizations was so nearly equal that both were actively represented in the conference.
The Pacific coast conference, first of the four, drew up standards to cover ship construction only. It soon became evident that a more desirable agreement would cover ship repair as well. In the three subsequent meetings, therefore, working conditions in both ship repair and ship construction were “stabilized.”
In each zone, lessons were learned which could be applied to the next. For example, in the Pacific coast conference, only labor and management were active conferees. Yet Government is vitally concerned in the building of ships—in fact, most of the ships we are building are on government order. In the Atlantic coast, Gulf States, and Great Lakes, therefore, representatives of the Government took active part along with labor and management.
The Gulf standards are more detailed than those of the other zones, because both employers and union representatives preferred to incorporate the standards bodily in local agreements, rather than to translate generally worded standards into specific clauses.
All these are minor variations in a well-integrated, Nationwide stabilization program which constitutes a great forward step in defense production. The tabulation of zone standards which follows this page shows at a glance the results of the zone conferences.
17
summary of zone standards:
PACIFIC COAST	ATLANTIC COAST
BASIC HOURLY WAGE. $1.12. (Standard skilled mechanics.) RATES FOR OTHERS.—No decreases. (Increases provided for in supplementary master agreement.) USE OF PREMIUM MEN. Permitted. ADJUSTMENT OF WAGES TO CHANGES IN COST OF LIVING. On demand of labor at end of first year, or of either party every 6 months thereafter, if cost of living in United States shall have changed by 5 percent or more from that existing at time of agreement.	$1.12. (Standard first-class skilled mechanics.) Corresponding percentage increases. Not mentioned. At end of first year or first month thereafter by which cost of living in United States shall have changed 5 percent or more from that existing 6 months after effective date of agreement. Thereafter, at any 6 months’ interval by which an additional 5 percent change shall have occurred.
2, TIME-AND-A-HALF. Over 8 hours per day. Over 40 hours per week. All Saturday work.	Over 8 hours per day. Over 40 hours per week. All Saturday work. Hours other than employee’s regular shift.
DOUBLE TIME. Sundays and holidays.	Sundays and holidays.
3b PREMIUMS FOR SECOND SHIFT	7 percent.
" WORK. 10 percent. With pay figured for full shift though time cut 30 minutes. PREMIUMS FOR THIRD SHIFT WORK. 15 percent. With pay figured for full shift though time cut 1 hour.	7 percent.
A LIMITATION OF PRODUCTION. ALL FOUR AGREEMENTS PROVIDE: “There shall ' be no limit on, or curtailment of, production.”
§ NO STRIKES OR LOCKOUTS. ALL FOUR PROVIDE that the agreement is a guarantee that there will be neither strikes nor lockouts.
C GRIEVANCE MACHINERY AND ARBITRATION. ALL FOUR PROVIDE for (1) the " prompt settlement of all complaints and grievances between representatives of employers and employees, (2) the making of supplemental agreements as to machinery and procedure, including (except on the Pacific coast) time limits within which each step must be taken, (3) resort to arbitration should other means of settlement fail.
7 TRAINING PROGRAM FOR APPREN-■ TICES AND OTHERS. Apprenticeship training programs may be established by employer.	No provision.
g DURATION. During the emergency or 2 ’ years, whichever is longer; and thereafter, except as either party, desiring a change, gives notice 30 days prior to expiration of any year.	Two years.
G^LF COAST $1.07. (Standard skilled mechanics.) No decreases. Equitable increases through negotiations.	GREAT LAKES $1.12. (Standard first-class skilled mechanics.) 1 No decreases. Corresponding percentage increases.
Restricted.	Restricted.
On demand of either party at end of first year and every 6 months thereafter, provided cost of living in 10 Gulf cities shall have changed by 5 percent or more from the basic period or that of last preceding adjustment.	At end of first year or first month thereafter by which cost of living in United States shall have changed 5 percent or more from that existing 6 months after effective date of agreement. Thereafter, at any 6 months’ interval by which there has been a change of 5 percent or more from level at last preceding adjustment.
Ship construction only {including large Government conversion jobs'): Monday to Friday, all work other than on regular scheduled 8-hour shift. All Saturday work.	All except certain private repair work: Over 8 2„ hours per day. Over 40 hours per week. All Saturday work. Out of regular scheduled shift hours.
Sundays and holidays. Ship repair only: Monday to Friday, all work other than on regular scheduled 8-hour shift. All Saturday work.	Sundays and holidays. All overtime on private repair work on “time and material” basis, when so provided in local agreements.
When two shifts: 40c for full shift. When three shifts: 40c for full shift. With pay figured for full shift though time cut 30 minutes.	40c for full shift. With pay figured for 8 hours, hours of shift to be determined by local agreements.
>c for full shift. With pay figured for full shift though time cut 1 hour.	Same as above.
LIMITATION OF PRODUCTION. ALL FOUR AGREEMENTS PROVIDE: “There shall 4. be no limit on, or curtailment of, production.”
NO STRIKES OR LOCKOUTS. ALL FOUR PROVIDE that the agreement is a guarantee that there will be neither strikes nor lockouts.
GRIEVANCE MACHINERY AND ARBITRATION. ALL FOUR PROVIDE for (1) the prompt settlement of all complaints and grievances between representatives of employers and employees, (2) the making of supplemental agreements as to machinery and procedure, including (except on the Pacific coast) time limits within which each step must be taken, (3) resort to arbitration should other means of settlement fail.
May be established by employer.	Shall be established. Joint committees to be created.
Two years, and thereafter, except as either party, desiring modification or termination, gives notice 30 days before expiration of any year.	Two years.
Copies of the complete agreements for each of the four zones can be obtained from the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee, Labor Division, Office of Production Management, New Social Security Building, Washington, D. C.
defense comes first
ONLY through the slow process of continuous discussion, resulting in gradual modification of the views of all parties, was agreement finally reached on the zone standards. The Pacific conference met from February 3 to February 13 and again from March 10 to April 2. The Atlantic conference ran from April 28 to June 20, the Gulf from May 13 to June 18, and the Great Lakes, with recesses, from April 23 to July 11. Ratification by local and international unions and the companies involved consumed several weeks after the standards were approved by the conferences.
Considering the magnitude of the problems involved, however, the time taken was not unduly long. Furthermore, since the standards were obtained through the free negotiation of all parties, they command more respect than if created by Government fiat.
INSURING TOP PRODUCTION
Zone standards were not designed as a bar to differences of opinion, but rather to provide for the orderly adjustment of those differences. What about the few strikes and stoppages that have occurred since the agreements were ratified? We must remember that the zone standards are not rigid laws, but pacts entered into voluntarily by labor and management.
In every industry there are pent-up theories and prejudices constantly seeking expression on both sides of the employeremployee relationship. Shipbuilding attracts rugged types, both in the yard and in the front office. A shipyard is a scene of heavy hammers and clanging plates, of hot rivets thrown great distances over cavernous depths, of operations where grave risks are taken, of joyous occasions like keel layings and launchings. The building of ships means color, action, a minimum of routine, and a wealth of tradition.
20
In some shipyards there is no semblance of employee organization. Other yards have different varieties of unions, some strong and well disciplined, others young and less experienced. Changes in methods of work under modern mass production afford frequent cause for jurisdictional disputes between the various groups, but there is every evidence that both employers and workers are coming to understand that, under stabilization, grievances can be adjusted without stopping defense work.
With shipyard personnel and shipbuilding activity constantly increasing, a joint pledge against strikes and lockouts for the duration of the emergency, and standards which provide machinery for the settlement of all grievances, are insurance of top production.
MARGIN FOR LOCAL VARIATION
It was not intended that the zone standards should cover all the items usually found in a labor agreement, but the committee felt that, with general standards determined, employers and unions could then modify their local agreements where necessary to conform to the standards. Some labor leaders feared that they might weaken labor’s bargaining power during subsequent negotiations concerning the other items of local agreements. They were, therefore, anxious to discuss with the employers the complete contents of local agreements before finally ratifying the zone standards. In the Gulf and Great Lakes informal discussions were held along such lines. Employers and the AFL unions on the Pacific went even further. A complete master agreement was negotiated before the zone standards were approved. On the Atlantic no such discussions were held.
THE FIRST YEAR
Zone standards for the four major shipbuilding areas of the country have now been established and ratified by everyone concerned. Local agreements are in process of being modified or drafted in accordance with the standards. The initial goal of the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee has been reached.
21
It is the hope of the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee, that a check has been put on competitive differentials and in their place an orderly process of wage revisions secured. The gigantic task of adding more than half a million workers to the shipbuilding industry should now be accomplished with a minimum of migration, either from city to city or from plant to plant, and with a maximum of opportunity for the locally unemployed or ineffectively employed.
Geographic areas separated by the breadth of the continent may in the course of time require some compliance machinery to further standardization.
A MODEL PACT FOR OTHER INDUSTRIES
The conditions established in the shipbuilding and shiprepair industry are a basis for maximum production of ships in a minimum time. Zone standards, evolved through voluntary cooperation, are contributing to national defense and the preservation of democracy.
The Shipbuilding Stabilization program has wide implications for other defense industries. In the building trades, affecting 800,000 workers, the unions and the Government have already worked out a similar set of labor standards on a national scale to cover all defense construction.
All over the country, plants are expanding as a result of defense orders. Thousands of workers are being added to payrolls. Inherent in such situations is the possibility of haphazard spiraling of wages, undue migration of workers, increases in defense costs and in cost of living. In contrast to all this stands the program developed in shipbuilding.
Stabilization is the democratic way, and there is no reason why it cannot be applied to other defense industries.
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16------------------24184
LABOR DIVISION
OFFICE OF PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.