[Conversion: America's Job]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

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-THE ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY SERIES.
CONVERSION: AMERICA’S ■ JOB ’,
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2	Britain Learns the Lesson
3	Britain Gets Under Way
4	Aiiteriean Models
5	Labor's I*art
6	What everybody Can Bo
-OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT.
Washington, B» c.
V\ I?
President Roosevelt has given us the Blueprint for Victory.
In 1942 it calls for:
60,000 planes.
45,000 tanks.
20,000 antiaircraft guns.
8 million tons of shipping.
Government, industry, labor, and every other element in American life must translate that blueprint swiftly into actual arms.
We cannot wait to do it next year or the year after that.
Germany and Japan are shooting the works for victory this year. They realize that, once this country’s manpower and machines are fully mobilized, their defeat is sure.
That is why we must convert thousands of additional peacetime plants to war production. That is why we must all accept the economic dislocations this entails.
Conversion is America’s No. 1 job on the industrial front. Every American has a part to play in that job. To help him understand that part, and to do it well, is the purpose of this booklet.
Division of Information
Office for Emergency Management
Washington, D. C.
CONVERSION:
AMERICA’S JOB
America Must Convert
The lives of millions of Americans and the outcome of the war itself depend today upon the speed with which additional factories are shifted to war work.-
War doesn’t wait for those who aren’t ready. If the United States waits until it can build more special purpose plants and machinery to make weapons, thousands of young men are going to die who should live to take part in the peace.
Every suitable existing factory—from the huge automobile plants to the thousands of machine shops—must find a way to produce war materials or essential civilian goods.
Given an equal start, the United States could out-produce the entire Axis— single handed. But the start was not even. America is behind. None realizes better than the enemy that you can’t shoot with potentialities.
The enemy is ahead because he has mobilized his resources for nearly a decade with the single purpose of building an invincible military machine. The United States was loath to leave the ways of peace. It began to wake up only when masses of German tanks and planes smashed through Poland, Belgium, and France.
Since then America has built or begun vast new munitions plants. Some of these are turning out tanks and planes and others are coming into production. Many existing plants have been shifted from peacetime to war work. But today this country, the greatest industrial nation on earth, is still hitting with far less than its maximum industrial power.
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To get an idea of America’s job, consider what Germany has done. Germany has a national income of around 40 billion dollars a year. The income of the United States is nearly 100 billions. But last year Germany produced 25 to 27 billion dollars’ worth of war goods. The United States produced 15 billions’ worth for itself and the other United Nations.
Japan and Italy brought the total Axis war production to something like 45 billions. That’s approximately equal to what Britain, Russia, and the United States produced together. But authorities generally agree that the United Nations, in order to overtake the Axis and go on to victory, must out-produce it 2% to 1.
Axis Conversion All Out
The early successes of the Axis nations in this war are due largely to the completeness with which they have geared their industrial potentialities to war needs. In Germany, Japan, and Italy, conversion of civilian production to war production was considered a prime requisite. There was no thought of business as usual. Their Governments, bent on conquest, put every person and every machine to that task.
Hitler, without neglecting construction of special-purpose ordnance plants, began in 1936 to convert the large civilian factories of Germany to war production. His original plan was to concentrate war work in mass-production plants, leaving the task of meeting civilian requirements to Germany’s 2,000,000 small handicraft shops. Thus he hoped to utilize the little man as well as the large manufacturer.
But in 1938, when the war was near, Hitler changed his industrial strategy because the little shops proved less able to produce complete civilian items than to make bits and pieces of war machines. A few efficient large firms in each industry were given the job of producing minimum civilian requirements.
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Then through a vast system of subcontracting, Hitler put the skilled handicraft workers—blacksmiths, tinsmiths, coppersmiths, locksmiths, electricians, die workers, watchmakers—to work on war production. In their homes and small shops they began to fashion parts for Hitler’s machine of destruction. Work and materials reached them through prime contractors and through jobbers—men who made it their business to line up production capacity for prime contractors and military authorities. Frequently the small shops formed cooperative pools and got contracts, each doing what it could with its tools, together turning out assemblies or subassemblies.
The entire conversion program was greased financially by the German Industrial Bank which was created to advance long-term, low-cost loans to firms which wanted to expand, build, or convert for war production. Military authorities made sure that money was advanced only to those who demonstrated ability to use it well for the war effort.
Italy Uses Mass Production ——
Italy, although handicapped by its dependence on outside nations for essential raw materials and by corruption and inefficiency among Fascist politicians, also succeeded to an important extent in intensifying war production. Most war production there is carried on in mass production plants, however, because they are able to process most of the raw material Italy can get. Through subcontracting, smaller firms have been brought in as needed.
In an effort to make the most of Italy’s manpower, Germany has begun to import Italian labor for its own industry.
Japan, also limited by its lack of raw materials, for 25 years has been developing its key industries—iron and steel, shipbuilding, oil refining, machinery and tools—
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primarily to increase its military power. This expansion has centered around government owned and operated arsenals.
But Japan has constantly stimulated construction of private plants which produce or can be easily converted to production of war materials. As early as 1937, importation of 270 nonessential items was forbidden so all foreign exchange could be mobilized for the purchase of military essentials. Subcontracting was practiced extensively in Japan before the present war, and experience facilitated conversion of these plants to war work. Rationing of civilian goods— a sure indication of conversion—began in Japan in July 1938.
After the shock of Dunkerque—three years after the Axis began all-out production—England abandoned business as usual and converted. War production in England has been intensified to the extent that 60 percent of the national income, instead of the earlier 20 percent, is now going for war goods of all types.
America 5 Years Behind
From the standpoint of conversion, the United States is 5 years behind the Axis. But, because of our great potentialities, the fastest possible action now will enable us to catch up, long strides at a time. A recent study shows that machines and men which last year produced 20 billion dollars’ worth of goods in the United States are convertible to war production. When geared to our war needs, this industrial power, added to the special-purpose facilities, built and building, will put us within sight of our goal of 40 billion dollars’ worth of war production in 1942. The sooner conversion is completed, the sooner our fighting men can take the offensive.
But anyone who says this conversion can take place overnight doesn’t know what he’s talking about.
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The automobile industry, for example, has begun war production with more of its existing facilities, but few realize what a tremendous retooling job must be done. The automotive industry includes 900 principal supply firms. About 25 percent of all its facilities is already engaged in the manufacture of military trucks, scout cars, jeeps, peeps, and other military vehicles similar to the industry’s normal products. Another 25 percent of the industry’s facilities is highly specialized machinery that cannot be used in war work. The remaining 50 percent has to be retooled extensively and, even when that is done, it won’t be able to go into production until it is supplemented with other machinery—new, or existing outside the industry—that will do what present machinery can’t do.
Other industries face similar problems and, besides, each faces problems peculiar to itself. Certainly one of the most pressing faced by all is the training of workers for highly skilled new jobs. Another is providing unemployment compensation to the millions who will be temporarily out of work while the factories are being retooled for the war effort.
Bring the Little Man In
But the biggest problem of all is finding the best ways to bring the little man into the war program. Extensive subcontracting is undoubtedly one answer. Many small shops have versatile machines that can do work which special-purpose machines of large factories couldn’t do without elaborate retooling.
One motor company, for example, is filling a contract for 20-mm. automatic guns and doing only 7 percent of the work in its plant. The rest is handled by a swarm of smaller plants which could make parts on existing machinery. Another firm—an axle company—increased its production 400 percent with practically no
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plant expansion or retooling, simply by farming out work to shops equipped to handle it.
Finding answers to all these problems is the responsibility of Government, military authorities, management, and labor.
The necessity of realizing that they must be worked out quickly, no matter what sacrifices in comfort and convenience are required, is the responsibility of every American citizen.
Our enemies have converted. America must convert.
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Britain Learnsthe Lesson
England awoke at Dunkerque to find it was fighting with one hand behind its back.
The hand it hadn’t been using represented the hundreds of smaller manufacturing plants and the thousands of skilled and semiskilled workers who for decades had been turning out such handy items as fountain pens, safety pins, shoe horns, sewing machines, pots and pans, light fixtures, and lipstick holders—certainly not instruments of destruction.
And these small manufacturers were not the only ones who had little room initially in Britain’s house of war. Many sanguine Britishers doubted very much at first that even the larger peacetime plants—where trucks and cars, farm machinery and stoves were turned out—would have to be geared to all-out production of planes and tanks, guns and bullets. Many Englishmen, who know better now, were content to fidget nervously, to hope that new and existing special-purpose plants would soon turn out enough to turn back the Nazis.
Then came the moral and physical shock of the months from the invasion of Norway to the withdrawal from Dunkerque, months that made a tough fighter of a sluggish gentleman. What had been vaguely apparent became electrifyingly obvious: If Britain was to depend upon existing special-purpose plants or wait for new ones to be built, she might just as well quit.
Thus, in the late spring of 1940, England was jolted into the realization that all-out war required all-out production, that every available suitable machine and worker must somehow find a place in the production of war materials, regardless of the peacetime use of those machines and those workers.
The situation was exactly this: War materials were needed so desperately that
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there was no time to manufacture plants and tools with which to manufacture the war materials. A system had to be devised under which existing tools, labor, and plants could be used.
Hitler, who had the advantage of knowing what he was going to do next, had come to the same realization 2years before. And, lest we in the United States get too smug about Britain’s sluggishness, it might be well for us to listen to those who accuse us of not yet having come fully to that realization.
In attacking its problem of converting all possible plant equipment and labor into an efficient, coordinated machine, an alarmed Britain adopted the system of subcontracting that became known as “bits and pieces.”
That isn’t bad terminology, because under the system Britain has discovered it can produce bits and pieces of guns, tanks, planes, shells, and ships in ordinary factories and machine shops. Because these bits and pieces are almost always turned out under the direction of a larger firm—the prime contractor who usually makes the heavier parts and does the assembly work—the system is sometimes known as the “hen and brood,” which is an accurate if not a warlike tag.
Products Must Be “Exploded”
Before a “bits and pieces” program can be installed, the various desired products must first—as the English put it—be “exploded.” The term applies to nothing more violent than the process of breaking a given product—a tank, for example— down into its constituent parts to the end that each prospective subcontractor may study the 5,000 different parts and determine which of them he can best make with his particular tools and labor.
Having once got rid of the idea that “exploding” is a form of sabotage, it is necessary—in order to understand how
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the British put the system to work—to get rid also of the idea that a tank is a tank or a plane a plane.
For the purpose of plant conversion, the British considered the tank as some 25,000 separate pieces, 5,000 of them different. The different parts were put on display and all manufacturers were invited to look them over with an eye to deciding which, if any, they could make with their plants and their labor.
As far as war production was concerned, Britain quickly discovered it had three types of available plant facilities.
Three Types of Plants —
First, for example, were the concerns like the one that had been making eyelets for shoes and corsets. This plant continued to make eyelets for army shoes, and also, with practically no change in machinery and labor, began turning out rivets for a plane manufacturer. There were many plants of that sort which were able to swing immediately into war production, once “bits and pieces” was started.
Then there were other plants which were adaptable to war production after slight change in machinery and education of employees. One illustration is the small shop which had been turning out display counters, shop fronts, tailor dummies, and mannequins. Its management discovered that after a little jiggery-pokery, as the British insist upon calling it, the craftsmen and layout men could handle composition airplane parts, gradually working up to all-metal parts, wing flaps, and the like.
Finally, there were the plants which just couldn’t convert to any great degree. Some stove-making plants were in that class. No war use could be discovered for lots of their machinery. But they did have intelligent management, trained workers, and lots of plant space. Only thing to do in that case, the British learned,
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was to put the inconvertible machinery in storage for the duration and replace it with machines that could do war work, thus fully utilizing management, labor, and plant space.
Britain found that it was possible to manufacture 75 percent of aircraft parts and 62 percent of aircraft engine parts in plants which originally were not counted on for wartime production. Of course, many accessories in the aircraft industry had been manufactured separately for some time, but under the impetus of war necessity such manufacture virtually went on a 100-percent basis, the parent firm abandoning all effort to manufacture accessories.
In the meantime, the larger plants discovered that with the assistance of a brood of small shops they could contract to turn out more or less complete units of warfare which they could not otherwise have attempted without large expenditures for new plant equipment.
For these and other production gains since Dunkerque, Britain now salutes its civilian manufacturers, large and small, who found a way to use what they had to make what was needed. And everyone on the island is congratulating everyone else that Britain woke up in time.
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Britain Gets Under Way
Once shocked by Dunkerque into the necessity of converting every available man and machine to the production of war materials, Britain swung into its conversion program with a right good will.
Through a workable system of subcontracting, the British discovered that a small plant which could not make a whole tank could make “bits and pieces” of tanks. Large and small plants found war work they could handle as prime contractors, subcontractors, or sub-subcontractors.
For a time the majority of the converted peacetime factories were inclined to supplement curtailed normal production with war work. But it was soon recognized that this half-and-half system wasn’t for the best.
Take, for example, the case of any eyelet manufacturer who was turning out eyelets for shoes and rivets for tanks on the same machinery. He and government production men saw the plant couldn’t operate at top efficiency in that manner. So the eyelet concern agreed to make only rivets. But the demand for eyelets was at least as strong as in peacetime, because they were needed for military shoetops. What to do? Britain needed both eyelets and rivets, but it wasn’t good business to manufacture both in the same plant. The problem was solved by a system of “concentration” under which, say, two eyelet firms made only rivets while a third made only eyelets.
But it wasn’t as easy as that, because the two firms making rivets couldn’t help feeling concern about their chances of reestablishing themselves, in competition with the third firm, in the eyelet business after the war. In some industries, where drastic changes in machinery had been made, this concern was especially acute.
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Hence, the British Government has taken several steps to insure that plants which have had to forego normal operations because of war production will get their workers, tools, and customers back after the war is over.
British Conversion Easier	_
Many authorities consider some such similar concentration of civilian production, with its accompanying sacrifices and hardships, an inevitability in the United States.
In converting its automobile industry to war production, England found plenty of difficulties, but did not have one which we face in the United States. Because standardization of models is not so complete and because British plants don’t turn out as many cars, it has not been economically wise for the British automobile makers to invest heavily in highly specialized machines. Their plants were, therefore, converted to war production much more easily than ours, in which many machines are highly specialized—made for a single purpose.
Automobile production in England was curtailed drastically at the beginning of the war, although for a time export production was continued to provide foreign exchange for the purchase of munitions. Because of the need for skilled mechanics and die and tool makers in the revamped industry, a survey was made of the industry’s employees. This survey resulted in the finding of several hundred men in less skilled jobs who fitted into tool rooms and experimental departments, where they proved invaluable.
Fortunately, in England as in the United States, some of the best engineering brains were concentrated in the automobile industry and they were, for the most part, able to take baffling problems in stride, once the necessity of solving them became generally apparent.
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The British have won the reputation of being an essentially optimistic people. In this case their optimism was justified by the neat way in which the “bits and pieces” program, forced upon them by necessity, worked out. The system has had a way of coming up with advantages to offset its disadvantages.
For one thing, while manufacturing by bits and pieces permits the basic advantages of mass production, it is sometimes more expensive than conventional massproduction technique.
The expense of transporting the bits and pieces to the parent firm, the necessity of providing additional supervision and inspection, of providing the technical assistance, and of organizing the distribution of materials to the participating firms resulted in an increased cost of the finished product, in some cases amounting to 10 percent.
When two or more subcontractors were engaged in the manufacture of the same part, it became necessary to provide more tools and gages than would have been necessary had the parent firm continued to make those parts itself.
Industry Widely Dispersed ___
Further, there is always the possibility that for some reason—say, a well-dropped German bomb—a subcontractor may not be able to furnish the prime contractor with vital parts. To be on the safe side, the contractor has to order from two or more firms more of all bits than he actually needs.
But at the same time, this dispersal of industry makes it impossible for the Germans to stop any one war product by bombing.
Also, under any other system than “bits and pieces,” Britain would have found a serious problem in getting its skilled workers to move to areas of concentrated production. The workers normally resent
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and resist efforts to pull them up by the roots. Under “bits and pieces,” the work can be brought to the workers.
This factor was also important because it relieved the already acute housing and transportation problems in war production communities, problems which will get bigger in the United States as the war increases in scope and fury.
All Plants Geared	......
In Britain the disadvantages of “bits and pieces” are considered insignificant compared with the fact that under the program the production of virtually every suitable plant is geared to Britain’s fight for life.
Although there should be no minimization of the importance of recognizing the need for all-out production, it must not be supposed that all Britain had to do was go ahead and do it. A way of doing it had to be set up.
The installation of the “bits and pieces” system in England was effected through Government-industry-labor teamwork designed to fill a war order in the least possible time with the best-suited machinery and labor available. The administrative machinery reached its present efficiency only after trial-and-error experimentation accompanied by considerable public complaint.
Twelve regional boards, each composed of three representatives of labor and three of employers in addition to the representatives of such governmental agencies as the Ministries of Labor, Supply, Aircraft, Production, the Admiralty and the Board of Trade were set up. Each board member is responsible to the group he represents while the board in its corporate capacity is directly responsible to the Production Executive.
Broad powers to enforce cooperation have been granted to the Government, including the power of “requiring persons to place themselves, their services, and their property at the disposal of His Majesty.”
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It must be added, however, that Britain succeeded in intensifying its industrial war effort with comparatively little use of compulsory powers.
The purpose of the regional boards is to act as the connecting link between Government and the management and labor that gets the work done.
Typical, although the largest, is the London and South-Eastern regional board. It follows principles laid down by central authorities but is pretty much free to make full use of its knowledge of local conditions in carrying out those principles and in adjusting policy to local circumstances.
The board found that firms already in war production were, because of changes in design, temporary shortages of material, or bottlenecks in the production process, sometimes idle. Further, many firms had not been switched over from peace to war production, and there were thousands of firms in the area whose capacity could in some measure be used for the war effort. The board discovered, essentially local though it was, that it was not local enough; it could not maintain close enough contact with all the firms in its area.
It “broke down” the problem by, in a sense, “breaking down” itself. It set up 10 clearing centers in its area, each of which was instructed to maintain intimate relations with firms in its neighborhood. The centers collected and passed on information about machines and labor available in each district, inspector’s reports, Government contracts, and the like.
Regional Cooperation Urged	.
Firms were urged to contact their own clearing center when they had spare capacity or when they had all the work they could handle, thus making it possible to utilize spare capacity, of which the regional board might never have been aware, and to spread the load.
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For example, the clearing centers learned by experience that even the huge firms, which apparently had as much work as they could handle, often had substantial temporary machine-tool capacity available.
One of the important functions of the clearing centers was to move expediently to the assistance of the many firms whose peacetime production was shut off but which needed guidance and information in converting to wartime production. Also, Government representatives, seeking a plant at which an order could be filled, found they could get last-minute, accurate information about spare capacity, backed by personal knowledge of the firm, from the clearing centers.
Typical of the close cooperation induced in the area as a result of the board’s activities were meetings at which tools used in making planes, tanks, guns, shells, and ships were exchanged. Representatives of scores of firms, armed with lists of tools needed to fulfill urgent orders and with lists of tools for which they had no immediate use, got together. Men sitting side by side found they could often supply each other with tools to keep plane and tank parts coming from their plants. Some of these tools were sold; others were simply loaned.
“One Job----Beat Hitler” ——
“There are no business competitors here today,” one manufacturer said at a recent meeting. “We have only one job—beat that man Hitler. By means of this conference, we want to cut our paper transactions. You can here fix up jobs which would take a month by writing letters. In one part of the country, we have cleared 5,000 bottlenecks in 15 minutes.”
This type of cooperation, common in England now, was not easily attained. It was common experience, in the beginning, for two manufacturers who had been in
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fierce competition to refuse to sit down in the same room to discuss common problems of war production. Gradually, after patient coaxing on the part of Government, these competitive carryovers gave way to a realization that assistance to any manufacturer was assistance to King and Country.
The United States, awakening at last to the realization that it, too, must engage in all-out production to defeat the Axis, appreciates the desperate necessity of intensifying its industrial effort. Much has already been learned from Britain’s experience with conversion, and it is to be hoped that much more will be learned, giving the lie to the statement that democracies cannot learn from one another.
But whatever else we learn from England, nothing will be so important as the realization that every man and tool— beyond those engaged in actual combat and those necessary to keep essential domestic wheels turning—must somehow find a way to fashion a weapon, or a part of a weapon, for use against our enemies.
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American Models
Thousands of American manufacturers who are wondering how to put their plants into the fight against Hitler can take a tip from others who have already done it well.
Spurred by necessity, like the early pioneers, these trail blazers used their acquired know-how and their native learn-how to convert all sorts of peacetime factories to Arsenals of Democracy.
A plant that used to make merry-go-rounds, for instance, is now making vital Army and Navy equipment. When the merry-go-round business broke down because materials that went into it were needed for war, the manufacturer stepped out and talked himself into a subcontract from an airplane company to make hooks for plane packing-cases. The plant didn’t have the type of big press ordinarily used to bend the hooks into shape. But it had a horizontal bulldozer which had shaped the tracks of many a thrill ride.
“You can’t make hooks with that thing,” the manufacturer was told.
Hooks were made with that thing.
Now the plant is bustling. Men who had spent years carving horse heads went to work on lathes. Those who had painted designs on thrill rides took to casting dies. Special training was given the men. The staff of 20 was doubled. Now men and machines who made dizzying Sky-Hi rides are making metal towers used by repair crews to reach the noses of bombers. Other jobs included the making of jigs and fixtures for production of tanks and gun mounts; and tools, punches, dies, and gages for plane production.
Versatile men and machines of a midwestern factory, which used to make thermostats for stoves, are now making the intricate devices that fire artillery shells. The shift-over was a compara
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tively simple one because both men and machines were geared to precise work on delicate parts.
One of the country’s largest producers of washing machines has converted a large part of his facilities to the manufacture of 2 million dollars’ worth of difficult parts for bombers.
Vocational Classes Help______
What helped make this conversion possible were the vocational classes conducted by the city’s school system in which new and old workers were trained in elementary and advanced machine work. Because of this trained manpower, and because the facilities of 16 large and small tool shops in the region were used extensively, the necessary retooling in the plant was completed in one-third the usual time.
Among the first plants to convert to war production was a safe and lock company which has made vaults for some of the largest financial institutions in the world. Since 1938, when it got its first war contract, this firm has contracted for about $90,000,000 of equipment for the Army and Navy.
In getting and turning out this work— including gun mounts, complete gun units, tank parts, armor plate, mines—the company has not only made full use of its machines, which were originally designed to fashion and handle everything from a 300-ton bank-vault door to intricate combination locks, but used virtually every shop and plant in the diversified industrial community. Parts it couldn’t make, or couldn’t take time to make, were farmed out to smaller plants with utility machines.
By the beginning of last year many neighboring firms got war contracts to supplement or replace normal production. The resources of the community were in, effect, pooled. Virtually every plant is
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now working to the hilt, filling prime contracts or subcontracts or sub-subcontracts from one another and from outside firms.
More than $150,000,000 worth of war goods have been contracted for in the shops of the community, which is in the under-100,000 population class.
“Do what you can with what you have,’* has become the prosperous city’s battle cry.
Firms in other regions have also discovered that what you can’t make alone, you may be able to make together.
New Tricks Learned ........-	, ....
Eight metal products companies in an inland city far from the sea got together and swung a contract to make $56,000,000 worth of parts for 24 Navy ships. With men and machines which normally make everything from flumes to bridges, mining machinery to structural steel, the group is sharing the task of welding, cutting, shaping, and tooling the ship parts. Very litde new machinery was needed.
“We just had to learn new tricks,” said one of the manufacturers.
Steel is shipped over the mountains to this pool, and the finished parts are shipped back over the mountains to the main assembly plant on the coast. Certainly it’s more expensive than concentrating the processes, but right now time means more to the United States than economy.
In the last war some hastily constructed shipyards got into production of freighters too late to do the Allied cause much good. Many of the freighters needed in wartime were launched in 1920.
But, through plant conversion, sleek freighters are now coming out of inland and coastal plants in prefabricated subassemblies at the rate of one a day. Before the year is out, two a day will be splashing from the ways.
Not far from the coast is a factory that turned out freight cars before it was
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closed 10 years ago. In March 1941, the plant was leased and converted to ship-building. Production work began in June. With a nearby shipyard assembling parts turned out in the old car plant, a freighter was completed before Christmas. Now this setup is making one a week and expects to lop a day off that time.
A manufacturer of cash registers surveyed his supposedly antiquated, 35-year-old machinery—not sadly but with a shrewd eye to figuring how it could be used in war work. He set his engineers to work on possibilities of the old belt-driven machines. Strengthened and reinforced, those machines now produce chrome nickel forgings and parts for gun magazines. Others of his old machines are making fuses.
Women workers in an eastern factory, who had developed skill through the years in making step-ins and flimsies of silk and satin, giggled one day when they were told to go to work on coarse mosquito netting. But it wasn’t a gag. From looms where dainty underthings had been woven soon flowed a supply of netting to protect fighting men in the swamps and jungles of far-off battle fronts.
Carpets to Gun Barrels -
Then there was the small carpet maker who closed his plant because he couldn’t get materials for normal products or find war work for his looms. And yet that firm today is busy rough-turning gun barrels for a war contractor—not on its looms but on the machines of the adjoining maintenance shop where its looms were built and repaired. Meanwhile the manager expects to put his looms to work as soon as he completes a deal with a furniture maker down the street. Together, they will make Army cots.
For another neat example of conversion, consider the case of the man whose normal business was making orange squeezers
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and metal games for children and who now is engaged in the exacting business of making gages, dies, and bullet punches in his 12-man plant. Or the case of another small eastern firm which converted from the manufacture of egg poachers and aluminum frying pans to percussion caps, struts, flap hinges, and other bits and pieces for planes.
Gas masks are being made in place of footballs; 8-inch compasses, gun sights, and binnacles instead of toy trains; precision instruments instead of watches; ammunition boxes instead of fishing boxes; gages instead of zippers.
A body-repair man is making steel lockers. A manufacturer of aluminum hair curlers is making aluminum clamps used in airplane assembly work. Armor-piercing shot is coming from a plant that once made oil-well rods. A razor-blade firm makes primers.
Conversion Must Be Multiplied ........—
The list goes on and on. Behind each conversion is the story of men who were quick to realize that they must somehow find a way to make something useful to a nation engaged in life-and-death combat with a powerful foe.
Those who have used their brains and hands to get into war production have not only served their country well but saved their plants and their workers from the danger of shutdowns because of lack of raw materials for nonessential products.
And it must never be forgotten that the conversion achieved so far is merely an example of what can be done, what must be done on a far greater scale. Conversion already accomplished must be multiplied again and again if America’s fighting men are to overwhelm the enemy.
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Labor’s Part
To labor, with its vital role in production, nothing is more important now than the further conversion of peacetime plants to war.
Labor realizes with other patriotic Americans that every suitable man and machine must be put to work to defeat the Axis. Working people have gladly pledged themselves to do without the normal products of the converted factories. But labor is particularly concerned with conversion and the problems to be solved, because labor itself is one of the elements which must be converted.
Hands that worked on automobiles, washing machines, phonographs, and vacuum cleaners must be put to guns, ships, tanks, and planes. This conversion involves grave readjustments.
When a machine has to be retooled, it is often necessary to retrain its operator. In some cases this training is merely a matter of explaining the new process. But often it involves weeks of intensive study and practice on the part of the worker. Further, many new workers must be trained—men and women not familiar with factory work.
Under the supervision of the Labor Division of the War Production Board, already almost 3 million workers voluntarily have enrolled in training courses. One thousand public vocational and trade schools, 155 colleges, and 10,000 publicschool shops are extending their facilities to this program.
Every day more work.ers are registering for this training at the 1,500 offices of the United States Employment Service.
One of the most important aspects of the training program is carried on by the Training Within Industry Branch of the Labor Division of the WPB. Working with specialists borrowed from industry,
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aided by labor and management advisors, the branch has facilitated training of more than 2 million workers in factories themselves.
Speedy completion of the tremendous retooling job requires more highly skilled workers than ever before.
Some of the men who normally work on assembly lines must be “upgraded”—put to work at more skilled jobs in tool shops. Generally these men are trained sufficiently to replace men who did rough tool work. The latter, in turn, replace machinists who normally did finer work, leaving the most skilled free to concentrate on precise work that only they have the “know-how” to do.
The National Youth Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps are helping thousands of young workers, meanwhile, to acquire skills needed by a nation at war. More than 75,000 are currently enrolled in the NYA’s Youth Work Defense Program. Another 50,000 are participating in NYA work projects related to war production. Altogether 334,000 young people have completed courses since July 1940.
Time Lag a Problem
One of the toughest problems arises from the time lag. No matter how much ingenuity and determination is thrown into the job, it takes anywhere from a few weeks to a good many months to convert most factories to war production. Thousands must wait while retooling takes place.
It is neither just nor wise to ask the temporarily unemployed to seek other jobs. They will be needed—and needed badly—when the plant is again ready for production. President Roosevelt has already asked Congress to provide “layoff” wages for these workers to help them maintain their homes through this difficult period.
Then there’s another group—illustrated
24
by automobile salesmen—whose peacetime occupations are practically abolished by the war program and who, many of them, will find it extremely difficult to get wartime work. Many of these workers normally are not covered by unemployment compensation laws. The plan is to provide benefits for them for a period up to 26 weeks—half a year.
Compensation by Legislation
Congress is considering ways and means to cushion these and similar dislocations, and it is quite possible more money will be needed. Recipients will be required to accept war industry jobs or training for such work.
About 10 million additional men and women are going to be needed this year to produce the flood of weapons for millions of fighting men. From 3 to 4 million men and women, it is estimated, will be drawn from the old workers, women, young workers, and the unemployed. But the remainder must come from civilian industries, all of which are simultaneously giving sturdy young men to the armed forces.
Although plant conversions will enable thousands of workers to get into war work without leaving their homes, other thousands will have to move to new jobs. Some will have to move from one part of town to another; others will have to move to other communities. Tremendous problems of housing, education, seniority, transportation, sanitation, and recreation must be solved quickly.
None realizes more than labor the gravity of these problems, but labor faces them courageously, realizing the necessity of stepping up war production to the maximum degree. Labor has seen its responsibility in doing all in its power to effect conversion speedily and has made many suggestions.
A year and a half ago, for example,
25
the United Automobile Workers Union brought forth a proposal, developed by Walter Reuther, to use the vast productive capacities of the automobile industry for making airplanes.
The Reuther Plan
The Reuther plan provided for conversion of approximately half the automobile industry to airplane production. Reuther and his associates said a survey showed that during the year only half the productive capacities of the industry were needed for making automobiles, provided no time, manpower, or facilities were lost in retooling for new models and provided, further, that there would be a complete pooling of resources and equipment. While half of the industry worked on planes, according to Reuther, the other half could remain available to turn out the same yearly quota of cars of that year’s model.
In meetings of the labor advisory committees established by Sidney Hillman, Director of the Labor Division of the War Production Board, committee members have said frequently:
“Tell us how much materials our industry can have, and we’ll divide our workers accordingly and make the surplus available for war industries’ production.”
And every day other suggestions of new ways to speed up production are being made by workers to their employers and to the Government. Employees in non-essential civilian plants are helping to devise ways of converting machines to war production.
Spokesmen for both management and labor now meet and consult with industry branches of the War Production Board on questions relating to the most effective contribution of that particular industry to the war effort.
In this whole activity, the final authority remains with the Government. No single
26
individual or group has a monopoly on industrial “know-how”; no one has a patent on constructive ideas. The experience, the technical knowledge, the ingenuity of Government experts, workers, and management are all utilized under a centralized direction.
None dares take his time in this vital job of conversion. A worker not yet transferred to a war job, a suitable plant not yet converted to war output must be reckoned in terms of planes and guns not produced, of keels not laid, of vital weapons of war neither fabricated nor delivered.
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What Everybody Can Do
President Roosevelt’s Blueprint for Victory requires that every American find a way to throw his weight behind the war effort.
It is not only a job for fighting men, for manufacturers and workers who make weapons, for farmers who feed us all. Housewives can help by doing without that new car, that new washing machine or ice box—products which take an astonishing amount of steel and other materials now needed for war.
“Our task is hard—our task is unprecedented—and the time is short,” the President said. “We must strain every existing armament-producing facility to the utmost. We must convert every available plant and tool to war production. That goes all the way from the greatest plants to the smallest—from the huge automobile industry to the smallest machine shop.”
It has been said that this is a war of machines and, therefore, right down our alley. It is. None will deny the industrial potentialities of which we boast. But our immense resources are not yet being fully used. And our enemies are striking fast, hoping to knock us out before we get around to the realization that potential planes can’t carry bombs.
We must not only convert more men and machines to war work—we must convert every remnant of our national complacency to grim realization of the job to be done.
Of course, many long strides have already been taken toward the conversion and development of our maximum industrial capacity. Additional facilities of our giant automobile industry are being swung into all-out production for war. Many other industries—the washing-machine industry, for example—are filling Army
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and Navy orders. In every industry individual firms, large and small, have shown remarkable ingenuity in demonstrating how peacetime machines can be used to make weapons.
Generally speaking, the bulk of initial arms orders went to larger firms with well-known records of performance. Now the smaller firms are needed as well, and Congress is appropriating additional billions that will make it possible to spread the work more widely than ever before.
Contract Distribution Branch -
These smaller firms, eager for war work, are not equipped to turn out entire tanks and planes. But many of the “little men” can make parts under subcontracts for larger firms that assemble the finished product. Many prime contractors—large firms which take the responsibility of delivering complete assemblies—are making extensive use of smaller shops to speed up and increase their output. Others have not yet adopted the policy on an adequate scale.
In order to bring the little men and prime contractors together, the War Production Board operates Contract Distribution offices in 113 widely placed cities. These offices do not sign contracts, but they steer factory owners to Army and Navy procurement offices and to prime contractors who can.
In cooperation with the armed services and other Government agencies, the Contract Distribution Branch sent three defense trains through the country, carrying to manufacturers everywhere a catalogue of needed war equipment. It is the job of these manufacturers to follow up vigorously the tips they got on their visits to these trains.
Through Contract Distribution field offices, manufacturers can find out when and where they can see subcontracting exhibits in St. Louis, Philadelphia, New
29
York, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit, Kansas City, New Orleans, San Francisco, Memphis, Buffalo, Portland, Oreg., Dallas, Boston, and Newark, N. J. Some of these exhibits of needed bits and pieces have already been opened; others will be.
Some problems of conversion are peculiar to a particular industry, and extend throughout that industry. Manufacturers within each such industry may discuss these problems together through their industry branches in the Division of Industry Operations of the War Production Board at Washington. One of the functions of this division is to determine which firms shall continue with necessary civilian production and which shall convert to war work. As Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the Board, said at a recent press conference:
“We have come ... to a situation where there won’t be enough of any one item to keep all of the factories in an industry busy. In that case, working with the Division of Industry Operations, the industry and the [branch] chief will select the companies that will make essential civilian products, and the others will go ahead operating on war materials.”
Speed May Limit Spread .........
The only factor that would limit the spreading of war work, Mr. Nelson indicated, was the all-important factor of speed. In other words, if it is proved that a given plant can turn out a given product in less time by doing all the work itself than it can by farming out some of it, it may go ahead on that basis.
One of the best things about subcontracting is that it brings the work to the worker, eliminating or alleviating many problems of housing and transportation in congested communities around the large mass production plants. Similarly, many potential ghost townsand the construction
30
of much machinery with little peacetime utility will be avoided by this policy of using existing equipment where it stands.
Thus millions of workers will be enabled to continue living in their established homes. The hardships and social dangers of wholesale migrations of entire families to overcrowded communities will be immeasurably lessened.
Great Sacrifices Necessary _______
But the Nation cannot throw its full weight behind our fighting men without sharing hardship and privation, without making great personal sacrifices.
Not all factories can convert to war or essential civilian work. Some will have to shut down for lack of raw materials. Their owners will suffer and their managers and workers will have to go into other essential plants.
Since conversion is the shifting of productive capacity from peacetime to wartime use, it follows inevitably that we must do without the normal products of the converted facilities. Since the United States is the Breadbasket as well as the Arsenal of Democracy, we must make drastic changes in our eating and drinking habits, as well as in our dressing, transportation, recreation, and working habits.
There are and will be enough of the essentials needed to keep us in fighting and working trim. Patriots will resist the temptation to hoard these essentials. They must be shared.
The President’s Blueprint for Victory calls for production of 60,000 planes, 45,000 tanks, 20,000 antiaircraft guns and 8 million tons of shipping this year.
The translation of that blueprint into actual weapons to overwhelm the enemy depends upon the manufacturers, the workers, the citizens of America.
In brief, it depends upon you. You, too, must convert, for conversion is America’s job.
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FIELD OFFICE DIRECTORY
Contract Distribution Branch War Production Board
ALABAMA:
♦Birmingham: 301 Phoenix Bldg., 1706 Second Ave., N. Telephone: 4-7761.
ARIZONA:
♦Phoenix: 406 Security Bldg.
ARKANSAS:
♦Little Rock: 304 Rector Bldg., 3d and Spring Sts.
Fort Smith: 13 North 7th St.
CALIFORNIA:
♦San Francisco: Furniture Mart, 1355 Market St. Telephone: Underhill 3301.
Fresno: 314-318 Mattei Bldg. Telephone: Fresno 4—5119.
Los Angeles: 1031 South Broadway. Telephone: Richmond 1261.
Oakland: 209 Financial Center Bldg. Telephone: Higate 6816.
San Diego: 510 Union Bldg., 235 Broadway. Telephone: Franklin 8907.
Sacramento: Suite 407, Farmer’s and Mechanics Bldg., 1014 Eighth St. Telephone: 2—5808.
COLORADO:
♦Denver: U. S. National Bank Bldg., 817 Seventeenth St. Telephone: Main 4231.
CONNECTICUT:
♦Hartford: Phoenix Bank Bldg., 805 Main St.
Bridgeport: 144 Golden Hill St. Telephone: 4-9441.
New Haven: 514 Liberty Bldg., 152 Temple St.
DELAWARE:
♦Wilmington: 314 Penn Bldg., French and Water Sts.
FLORIDA:
♦Jacksonville: 730 Lynch Bldg.
Miami: 701 Congress Bldg. Telephone: 3-0756.
Tampa: 901 Wallace S. Bldg.
GEORGIA:
♦Atlanta: Suite 150, Hurt Bldg. Telephone: Jackson 5880.
IDAHO:
♦Boise: 409 Capital Securities Bldg. Telephone: 409.
Note:
♦Indicates Main Office in State.
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ILLINOIS:
♦Chicago: 20 North Wacker Drive. Telephone: Andover 3600.
Decatur: 308 Standard Office Bldg.
Peoria: 2d Floor, Alliance Bldg.
Springfield: 407 Leland Office Bldg. Telephone: 3-6211.
INDIANA:
♦Indianapolis: Circle Tower Bldg.
South Bend: 206 City National Bank Bldg. Telephone: 2—1411.
Evansville: 8 Koenig Bldg., 112 North West 4th St.
Fort Wayne: 410 Utility Bldg., 114—118 East Wayne St. Telephone: Anthony 8415.
IOWA:
♦Des Moines: 708 Crocker Bldg.
KANSAS:
♦Wichita: 1314 Union National Bank Bldg.
KENTUCKY:
♦Louisville: 200 Todd Bldg. Telephone: Wabash 6553.
LOUISIANA:
♦New Orleans: 423 Canal Bldg.
Shreveport: 916 Giddens Lane Bldg., Milan and Marshall Sts.
MAINE:
♦Portland: Rooms 501—502, 443 Congress St. Telephone: 2-0914.
Bangor: 44 Central St. Telephone: Bangor 6300.
MARYLAND:
♦Baltimore : 1254 Baltimore Trust Bldg. Telephone: Plaza 7460.
MASSACHUSETTS:
♦Boston: 17 Court St.
Fall River: 27 South Main St. Telephone: 7-9306.
Lowell: Sun Bldg., 8 Merrimac St. Telephone: Lowell 6388.
Springfield: 95 State St. Telephone: 2-7493, 2-7494.
Worcester: State Mutual Bldg., 340 Main St. Telephone: 6—4671.
MICHIGAN:
♦Detroit: Boulevard Bldg., 7310 Woodward Ave.
Grand Rapids: 1014 Michigan National Bank Bldg., 77 Monroe Ave. NW.
Iron Mountain: 400 Commercial National Bank Bldg.
MINNESOTA:
♦Minneapolis: 326 Midland Bldg.
Duluth: 416 Federal Bldg.
MISSISSIPPI:
♦Jackson: 610 Tower Bldg.
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MISSOURI:
*St. Louis: Boatmen’s Bank Bldg., Locust St. Telephone: Central 3200.
Kansas City: 508 Mutual Bldg., 13th and Oak Sts.
MONTANA:
*Helena: 222 Power Block Annex.
NEBRASKA:
♦Omaha: 501 Grain Exchange Bldg., 19th and Harney Sts.
NEVADA:
♦Reno: Saviers Bldg.
NEW HAMPSHIRE:
♦Manchester: Amoskeag Industries Bldg., Stark St. Telephone: 2031.
NEW JERSEY:
♦Newark: Globe Bldg., 20 Washington Place. Telephone: Market 2—0700.
Camden: Broadway Stevens Bldg., 300 Broadway. Telephone: Camden 9075.
Trenton: City Center Bldg., 32 East Hanover St. Telephone: Trenton 2-4455.
NEW MEXICO:
♦Albuquerque: 103J^ West Central Ave. Telephone: 6641.
NEW YORK:
♦New York City: Chanin Bldg., 122 East 42d St. Telephone: Murray Hill 3-6810.
Albany: State Bank Bldg., 75 State St. Telephone: 5-1749.
Brooklyn: 16 Court St.
Buffalo: 212 Manufacturers’ and Traders’ Bank Bldg., Main and Swan Sts.
Rochester: Commerce Bldg., 119 East Main St. Telephone: Main 546.
Syracuse: 302 Starrett-Syracuse Bldg., 224 Harrison St. Telephone: 2—1343.
Utica: First National Bank Bldg., Genesee St.
NORTH CAROLINA:
♦Charlotte: New Liberty Life Bldg. Telephone: Charlotte 7811.
Raleigh: c/o State Dept, of Conservation and Development, New State Office Bldg.
NORTH DAKOTA:
♦Bismarck: 14 First National Bank Bldg. Telephone: 174.
OHIO:
♦Cleveland: Union Commerce Bldg., East 9th and Chester Ave. Telephone: Cherry 5975.
Canton: 601 Commercial Bldg., 205 Market Ave., South.
Cincinnati: 804 Union Trust Bldg.
Columbus: 513 Town St.
Dayton: 1021 Third National Bank Bldg., 32 North Main St.
Toledo: 519 Spitzer Bldg.
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OHIO (Continued):
Youngstown: 1002 Union National Bank Bldg. Telephone: 3-0415.
OKLAHOMA:
*Oklahoma City: 540 Key Bldg. Telephone: 7-2456.
Tulsa: 430 Kennedy Bldg. Telephone: 2-3274.
OREGON:
♦Portland: 815 Bedell Bldg. Telephone: Atwater 7241.
PENNSYLVANIA:
♦Philadelphia: Broad St. Station Bldg., 1617 Pennsylvania Blvd. Telephone: Walnut 5900.
Allentown: 506 Hamilton St.
Chester: 12—14 East 5th St. Telephone: 2-4331.
Erie: Erie Trust Company Bldg.
Harrisburg: Doehne Bldg., 24 South 4th St
Johnstown: U. S. National Bank Bldg., 216 Franklin St. Telephone: 6—1251.
Lancaster: 655 Woolworth Bldg. Telephone: 2-0011.
Norristown: 306—308 Norristown-Penn Trust Bldg. Telephone: 6760.
Pittsburgh: 406 Fulton Bldg. Telephone: GR. 3790.
Reading: 615 Penn St.
Scranton: 717 First National Bank Bldg.
Wilkes-Barre: 53 West Market St. Telephone: 9086.
Williamsport: Susquehanna Trust Co. Bldg., 120 West 4th St.
York: Manufacturers Assn. Bldg., 25 North Duke St.
RHODE ISLAND:
♦Providence: 530 Industrial Trust Bldg. Telephone: Dexter 4684.
SOUTH CAROLINA:
♦Columbia: 204-206 Manson Bldg., 1207 Taylor St. Telephone: 2—8646.
SOUTH DAKOTA:
♦Sioux Falls: 309-310 Boyce Greely Bldg. Telephone: 1146.
TENNESSEE:
♦Memphis: 2112 Sterick Bldg.
Chattanooga: 909-910 James Bldg.
Knoxville: 202-204 Goode Bldg.
Nashville:1014 Stahlman Bldg.
TEXAS:
♦Dallas: Fidelity Bldg. Telephone: Riverside 4651.
El Paso: 222 El Paso National Bldg. Telephone: Maine 2881.
Houston: 9th Floor, Electric Bldg., 1016 Walker Ave.
San Antonio: 816 Majestic Bldg.
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UTAH:
♦Salt Lake City: 306 David Keith Bldg. Telephone: 3-7676.
VERMONT:
♦Montpelier: 12 State St. Telephone: 1410.
VIRGINIA:
♦Richmond: Johnson Publishing Bldg., Fifth and Cary Sts. Telephone: 7-2331.
WASHINGTON:
♦Seattle: 239 Henry Bldg., 4th and Union Sts. Telephone: Maine 2155-2156.
Spokane: 629-630 Old National Bank Bldg. Telephone: Main 3521.
WEST VIRGINIA:
♦Charlestown: Southeast corner Capital and Quarrier Sts.
Huntington: 309-311 West Virginia Bldg.
Clarksburg: Empire National Bank Bldg.
Wheeling: Hawley Bldg., 1025 Main St.
WISCONSIN:
♦Milwaukee: 161 West Wisconsin Ave. Telephone: Broadway 4440.
Appleton: 341 W. College Ave. Telephone: 4476.
Eau Claire: 128J4 Graham Ave. Telephone: 2-1395.
Madison: 405 Washington Bldg.
Wausau: 404 Third St.
WYOMING:
♦Casper: P. and R. Bldg., Box 1211. Telephone 3196.
10-07117-1
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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SUBCONTRACTING EXHIBITS
Subcontracting exhibits of the Contract Distribution Branch, War Production Board, are now open or are scheduled to open soon at the following addresses:
City
St. Louis, Mo..
New York City Philadelphia .
Detroit, Mich..
Chicago, Ill. .
Cleveland, Ohio
Kansas City, Mo Memphis, Tenn.
New Orleans . Los Angeles. .
San Francisco. Atlanta, Ga. . Boston, Mass. .
Buffalo, N. Y..
Newark, N. J..
Location
. Boatmen’s Bank Bldg., Locust St. and Broadway.
. Chanin Bldg., 122 E. 42d St.
. Broad Street Station Bldg., 1617 Pennsylvania Blvd.
. Boulevard Bldg., 7310 Woodward.
. Civic Opera Bldg., 20 North Wacker Drive.
. Union Commerce Bldg., E. 9th and Chester Ave.
. Mutual State Bldg.
. 18 th Floor, Sterick Bldg.
. Canal Bldg.
. Western Pacific Bldg., 1031 S. Broadway.
. Whitcomb Hotel.
. Suite 150, Hurt Bldg.
. Court Street Branch, First National Bank.
. White Bldg.
. 4th Floor, Indemnity Bldg., 20 Washington Place.
“This country today faces the most gigantic Job any country has faced in ali history. We must build a great armament program; we must make up, in less than 2 years, what the aggressor nations have done in 10 years; we must make today the things we would be making next year if we had the time to spare.”
Chairman, War Production Board.