[Report of the Rubber Survey Committee]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
Report oj the , RUBBER SURVEY COMMITTEE
SEPTEMBER 10, 1942
James B. Conant Karl T. Compton Bernard M, Baruchy chairman
To the Congress of the United States:
I herewith send to you, for your information, the digest and report of the Special Inquiry Committee which I appointed on August 6 to study our rubber situation and to recommend action.
The Committee consists of B. M. Baruch, Chairman, Dr. J. B. Conant, President of Harvard University, Dr. Karl T. Compton, President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a staff of experts.
The introduction to the report tells the story in outline; the report proper gives the details in full.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House, September 10, 1942
☆ ☆ ☆
For the Press
I have received the report of Messrs. Baruch, Conant and Compton and have forwarded copies to the Congress for its information.
Recommendations made by the special committee will be put into effect as rapidly as arrangements can be made.
It is an excellent report. The Government owes a debt of gratitude to the committee members for the time, labor and efficient handling of this most important work.
Statement by the President
September 10, 1942
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CONTENTS
PART I
Page
Letter of Transmittal and Introduction............ 5
PART II
Digest of Committee’s Report..................... 10
PART III
Full Report of the Committee..................... 23
1. Statement of the Problem................................................... 23
2. Procedure of the Committee................................................. 25
3. Analysis of the Supply and Demand for Rubber............................... 27
Without synthetic rubber, our stocks of new rubber would be exhausted during 1943. If synthetic rubber production now planned comes through on schedule, we can get through, but without adequate reserves against contingencies. The allotment of a small amount of reclaim, crude, and synthetic material will provide a tire replacement and recapping program, but only with drastic restrictions on civilian driving.
4. Rubber Requirements of the Armed Services................................. 32
The armed forces have already severely reduced their rubber requirements and instituted conservation measures. They state that further substantial reduction would seriously impair fighting efficiency.
5. Tires for Passenger Automobiles............................................ 34
To maintain civilian driving to a degree necessary for public morale, avoidance of unnecessary hardship, and efficient functioning of our economy, the Committee recommends a program of civilian automobile tire conservation based on supervised recapping and replacement of tires to maintain cars in operating condition, safeguarded and combined with universal enforcement of a 35-mile-per-hour speed limit, tire inspections, and reduction in mileage to a national average of not over 5,000 miles per car. It further recommends nationwide gasoline rationing as the quickest and most workable method for conserving rubber through control of mileage. It also recommends an expansion of the Thiokol program for recapping by 36,000 tons.
6. The Synthetic Program...................................................... 39
To safeguard the military situation in the critical year 1943 against possible delay in synthetic rubber production, or failure to obtain expected crude rubber imports, or further expansion of requirements dictated by enemy actions or new strategy; also to provide the additional rubber needed to maintain the civilian automobile use outlined: the Committee recommends (1) that there be no further substitutions in the plans now laid down; (2) the immediate authorization of an additional 140,000 long tons of Buna S capacity per year; (3) immediate institution of a refinery
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conversion program to yield 100,000 short tons of butadiene in addition to that now planned; (4) the immediate adjustment in the rates of construction of present styrene and polymerization plants in order to obtain the maximum production of Buna S in 1943; (5) the construction of an additional plant for the production of 20,000 tons of Neoprene per year; (6) the erection of a 27,000-ton butadiene plant from grain and an associated polymerization plant to produce 30,000 tons of Buna S, both to be located near the center of grain production, the construction to be started six months hence unless the Rubber Administrator determines otherwise; the process to be employed to be.determined in the light of the information then available; (7) the immediate erection of alcohol plants to produce 100 million gallons per year, using recently developed apparatus, the plants to be erected on sites near the grain producing states and located on water transportation.
7. Priorities.................................................................. 48
If the synthetic rubber program is to succeed on time, assured arrangements for construction materials are urgent.
8. Administration.............................................................. 50
The Committee finds that consistency, cooperation between governmental agencies, and adequate management have been lacking. It therefore recommends appointment, by the Chairman of WPB, of a Rubber Administrator, to whom he shall delegate full responsibility and authority for all aspects of the rubber program (except for specific limitations where aviation gasoline and toluene for explosives are concerned).
9. Agricultural Program........................................................ 54
Action within a month is necessary to remove legal restrictions on acreage and to provide certain farm equipment in order to avoid a whole year’s delay in expanding the planting of guayule, which can become a major source of new crude rubbei within a few years.
10. Rubber Goods Manufacturing Capacity......................................... 56
The Committee recommends immediate steps to increase by 20 percent the country’s capacity to reclaim rubber from rubber scrap. It also recommends a nationwide survey of rubber milling, mixing and tire building capacity, to be carried out on or about March 1, 1943, in the light of the mixing, milling, compounding, tire building, and vulcanizing arts which then exist for the processing of synthetic rubbers, and that steps then be taken to provide whatever additional manufacturing facilities are found to be necessary to handle the full volume of synthetic rubber production expected in 1944.
11. Scrap Collection............................................................ 59
The Committee finds the present scrap stock piles plus current receipts sufficient to feed the reclaim rubber plants at full capacity for the next 18 months. In the meantime, normal scrap collection should be continued and plans laid for a second intensive drive for scrap, probably about a year hence. It is important that measures be taken for further protection of existing scrap rubber stockpiles.
12. Technical Suggestions J or the Rubber Administrator......................... 60
APPENDIX I. President’s Message on Senate 2600
APPENDIX II. Chemistry of Synthetic Rubber
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PART I
Letter of Transmittal and Introduction to Report
Mr. President:
Herewith is presented a digest and full report of the Committee you appointed on August 6, with instructions that the survey “include not only facts with respect to existing supplies and estimates as to future needs, but also the question of the best method to be followed for obtaining an adequate supply of rubber for our military and essential civilian requirements. * * * to recommend such action as will best produce the synthetic rubber necessary for our total war effort, including essential civilian use, with the minimum interference with the production of other weapons of war.”
We find the existing situation to be so dangerous that unless corrective measures are taken immediately this country will face both a military and a civilian collapse. The naked facts present a warning that dare not be ignored. We present herewith the significant figures:
Crude rubber position of the United States {July 7, 1942 to January 7, 1944} in long tons:
On hand July 1, 1942 (Stockpile). . ......................... 578,000 Tons
Estimated imports July 1, 1942 to January 1, 1944............ 53,000 Tons
Total crude rubber.......................................... 631,000 Tons
Estimated military and other essential demands July 1, 1942 to January 1, 1944 with no allowance for tires for passenger automobiles. ...................................... 842,000 Tons
Deficit that must be met by production of synthetic rubber before January 7, 1944........................................... 211,000 Tons
Unless adequate new supplies (natural or artificial) can.be obtained in time, the total military and export requirements alone will exhaust our crude stocks before the end of next summer.
Tires on civilian cars are wearing down at a rate eight times greater than they are being replaced. If this rate continues, by far the larger number of cars will be off the road next year and in 1944 there will be an all but complete collapse of the 27,000,000 passenger cars in America.
We are faced with certainties as to demands; with grave insecurity as to supply. Therefore this Committee conceives its first duty to be the maintenance of a rubber reserve that will keep our armed forces fighting and
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our essential civilian wheels turning. This can best be done by “bulling through” the present gigantic synthetic program and by safeguarding jealously every ounce of rubber in the country.
At the same time we find that rubber for necessitous civilian use has been insufficiently allocated. More must be allowed for tire replacement and recapping. That is part of the conservation program we submit. More rubber use to those who need it; less to those who don’t!
Let there be no doubt that only actual needs, not fancied wants, can, or should, be satisfied. To dissipate our stocks of rubber is to destroy one of our chief weapons of war. We have the choice!
Discomfort or defeat. There is no middle course.
Therefore, we recommend:
That no speed above 35 miles an hour be permitted for passenger cars and trucks. (In this way the life of tires will be prolonged by nearly 40 percent.)
That the annual average mileage per car now estimated as 6,700 miles be held down to 5,000, a reduction of 25 percent. (This does not mean that each has a right to 5,000 miles a year; it applies to necessary driving.)
That more rubber than now is given to the public be released to fully maintain, by recapping or new tires, necessary civilian driving.
That a new rationing system of gasoline be devised, based on this 5,000 miles a year to save tires.
That the restrictions as to gasoline and mileage be national in their application.
That compulsory periodic tire inspection be instituted.
That a voluntary tire conservation program be put into effect until gasoline rationing can be established.
Gas rationing is the only way of saving rubber. Every way of avoiding this method was explored, but it was found to be inescapable. This must be kept in mind: The limitation on the use of gasoline is not due to shortage of that commodity—it is wholly a measure of rubber saving. That is why the restriction is to be nationwide. Any localized measure would be unfair and futile.
This note of optimism is permissible: If the synthetic program herein outlined will fulfill reasonable expectancy, it will be possible to lessen this curtailment before the end of 1943. But until then, any relaxation is a service to the enemy.
In answering the questions of how much rubber do we have and where are we going to get more, the country is dependent, finally, "upon the pro
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duction of synthetic rubber, which, it is hoped, will reach its full swing in 1944.
Why not earlier? Why so late? The answers to these queries lie in the past. These errors, growing out of procrastinations, indecisions, conflict of authority, clashes of personalities, lack of understanding, delays, and early non-use of known alcohol processes, are not to be recounted by us, nor shall we go into the failure, to build a greater stockpile of crude rubber. We are concerned with the past record only insofar as it has seemed to us to cast light on problems of future administration.
To prevent a recurrence of these mistakes, this Committee asks an immediate reorganization in present method and the creation of a Rubber Administrator. This official will have authority over the policies governing the priceless stock of rubber now on our automobiles, the drivers of which are trustees of our national safety. He will direct the course of the technical and industrial development—wholly new to America—of the synthetic rubber production.
If our hopes are realized, the production of Buna S and Neoprene (the two synthetic materials on which we now rely most to replace crude rubber) will total 425,000 tons by the end of 1943. But, on the other hand, the figure might easily fall to less than half that amount if delays occur—delays of as little as 120 days. “Bugs” may be found in plant construction or in operations at any one of the three stages in the manufacture of Buna S— the making of butadiene, the making of styrene, and the polymerization, or mixing, of the two.
With 425,000 tons we should have a margin of safety, a slight one, to be sure, perhaps 100,000 tons above necessary inventories for ourselves and our allies-—for the Front. With only 200,000 tons of Buna S produced, our supplies would be exhausted. The successful operation of our mechanized army would be jeopardized.
We cannot afford to take a chance. It is better to be safe than to be sorry. We dare not depend upon unbuilt plants; upon increasing the reclamation of scrap; upon bringing the tire manufacturing capacity up to equal a theoretical synthetic production; upon other unproven factors.
The members of this Committee have full faith in the ability of American industry to lick all these problems, but there is grave uncertainty as to time. Whatever our hopes, or even our reasonable estimates, until the synthetic rubber plants are operating at capacity, we cannot take unnecessary risks. We cannot base military offensives on rubber we do not have. All our lives and freedoms are at stake in this war.
Until synthetics come fully to hand, we recommend that sufficient reclaimed rubber, a small amount of crude, and an increased supply of Thiokol, or other substitutes, be made available for the tire replacement and recapping program which we urge shall go into effect at once.
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Perhaps this should be said: Few believed that 90 percent of our normal supply of crude rubber would be cut off when Pearl Harbor was attacked December 7. And only a few evaluated the situation correctly after that date!
There are almost as many estimates of future supplies—the rubber we do not have—as there are persons and agencies concerned in this problem. It is important to bear in mind that these are only estimates—based upon great intangibles.
How much rubber we shall get from South America, for example, depends on the shifting of nearly half a million natives into the Amazon valley—it would be one of the great population movements of history— and on how many of them succumb to sickness and disease. It depends, too, on how successful we are in combating the menace of Hitler’s underseas raiders.
No one can estimate with certainty the amount of scrap rubber in the United States. About 400,000 tons of scrap rubber were collected in the drive inaugurated by the President last June. This gathered scrap will yield about 300,000 tons of reclaimed rubber. It is true that nowhere near all of the scrap in the country has been collected. However, there already is on hand more than enough scrap to keep the entire reclaiming industry operating at capacity for many months. The Committee is recommending measures to step up reclaiming operations to the fullest capacity and also a 20 percent expansion of existing reclaiming facilities. Until that is done, the accumulation of huge scrap piles is an unnecessary fire and sabotage hazard which gives the Committee much concern.
Roughly, a year will be required to increase reclaiming capacity appreciably. Too, reclaimed rubber is inferior to natural rubber, and its use as a substitute for crude is limited. So, again, we find that in the final analysis we are basically dependent upon synthetic rubber.
Failure of the responsible officials to request the aid of Russia in setting up our synthetic system is a neglect for which we have not had a satisfactory explanation. The Soviet Republics have been first or second in the production of synthetic rubber, and we are asking that their “know how” be obtained. The Soviet has expressed a willingness always to be cooperative. Russia has lost, through the German advance, between 50,000 and 60,000 tons of its annual rubber-making capacity.
Among other points to which the Committee directs attention are:
Faulty flow of critical materials may block or delay plant construction.
No new synthetic processes are to be substituted for those approved.
That the present program must be expanded to roughly 1,100,000 tons of all synthetics.
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That the road rubber (rubber actually in tires now used on passenger cars and trucks) totals 1,000,000 tons.
In rubber, the United States must be listed as a “have not” Nation.
Once we are secure in our position, we shall be free’d from a source of worry that affects the high military and other governmental figures. We shall gain that position through sacrifices. There is no royal road to victory.
Herewith follows the digest of our findings and recommendations and, as a separate document, the full report.
Respectfully submitted,
James B. Conant
Karl T. Compton
Bernard M. Baruch, Chairman
September 10, 1942
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PART II
Digest of Committee’s Report
Giving Civilians More Rubber
All of the many witnesses who appeared before the Committee urged the need for conserving the rubber now on automobiles. There was disagreement only on methods. The Committee, however, has been concerned not only with reducing the use of rubber but with seeing that enough rubber is provided to maintain a minimum of necessary civilian driving. The Committee does not believe in the doctrine of sacrifice for sacrifice’s sake nor that workers should be expected to live in tents and farmers trudge miles to market unless our situation is so desperate that there is no alternative.
Our analysis of supplies on hand and expected shows that at best only enough rubber can be made available for civilian use to maintain the average mileage of vehicles at 5,000 miles a year. At present the annual average is estimated at about 6,700 miles, which would mean that a further reduction of roughly 25 percent in mileage is necessary.
The 6,700-mile figure, in itself, is a reduction from the pre-war national average of about 9,000 miles a year. In good measure this voluntary conservation on the part of motorists is a reflection of the fear that when present tires are worn down no new tires will be available. Should this apprehension be relieved by an enlarged tire replacement program, without any other restriction, the Committee fears that voluntary conservation would largely disappear, and the average mileage would shoot up.
It then would take 250,000 tons of crude rubber a year to supply all cars with all the rubber they need. If additional rubber is to be made available to civilians, there must be a sure control over rubber mileage. After analyzing every possible method, the Committee finds the quickest, surest, and most convenient check is through the nationwide rationing of the use of gasoline.
Therefore, the Committee recommends this five-point program of rubber rationing:
1. A reduction of the average mileage to a total not to exceed 5,000 miles per year by nationwide rationing of gasoline.
2. Enlargement of the present tire replacement program to provide sufficient recaps and new tires for the maintenance of this minimum of essential driving, and to prolong to the utmost thé useful life of tires now on the road.
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Prompt and strict enforcement of a nationwide speed limit not exceeding a maximum of 35 miles per hour for all passenger cars and trucks. Voluntary reduction to 30 miles will give substantially further mileage.
4. Compulsory periodic tire inspection.
5. An interim program of voluntary tire conservation until the rationing and inspection programs can be put into operation.
Rationing Must Be Nationwide
It must be kept in mind that we are not restricting the use of gasoline as such; we are rationing gasoline as the only effective measure to hold down tire use. To make the restriction other than nationwide would be unfair and futile.
As part of this program, the Committee recommends that sufficient reclaimed rubber, a small amount of crude, and an increased supply of Thiokol or other substitutes be made available immediately for making new tires and retreads for civilian use.
Thiokol is a rubber-like material which can be used to make retreads with an average life of about 5,000 miles. At present, the production of 24,000 tons a year is planned. The Committee recommends the expansion to 60,000 tons a year.
With prompt action, this capacity can be provided by early 1943, and more than 50,000 tons produced next year. Thiokol retreads are serviceable only when driven at speeds under 40 miles an hour, which makes a rigid speed limit all the more imperative.
Conservation Essential
It must be clear that this program is not intended to give every citizen the right to drive 5,000 miles. This figure is an average which obviously means that the mileage allowed less essential drivers must be cut considerably below that amount to permit greater mileage for more essential drivers. The proper distribution of mileage to various drivers is a matter to be worked out by the responsible governmental agencies.
It also should be stated that, in the Committee’s judgment, even this indicated curtailment of driving will be insufficient to meet the situation unless there is an intensification of such conservation measures as car pooling and sharing of rides, and the purchase by the Government of extra tires
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and spares from persons who do not need them for resale to war workers, farmers, and others who do need them.
Protecting Necessary Driving
The Committee has given careful consideration to the objections against the use of nationwide gasoline rationing to conserve rubber. It realizes that real hardships will be caused many persons, and that some industries, communities, and business pursuits will be particularly hard-hit. However, the disadvantages are outweighed by the necessities for a sure, effective method for seeing that essential driving is maintained.
We Are a “Have Not” Nation
Each time a motorist turns a wheel in unnecessary driving, he must realize that it is a turn of the wheel against our soldiers and in favor of Hitler.
The rubber rationing program proposed here should be considered as providing only a minimum of conservation and not as eliminating the need or value of the voluntary conservation measures now being practiced by many motorists.
The Committee is confident that the American people, once acquainted with the uncertainties of our rubber supply, will gladly accept whatever conservation measures are necessary. If our supply situation is eased— and the expansion of the synthetic program that the Committee is recommending holds out that hope—these conservation measures can later be relaxed somewhat. But until the soundness of the synthetic program has been fully demonstrated, and sufficient capacity is in actual production to meet all our military requirements, it is not safe to borrow from the rubber we have for any but the most essential of civilian needs.
When it comes to rubber, we are a “have not” nation. If we are to err, it must be on the side of sterner curtailment and conservation to anticipate the worst dangers that the war may bring.
Program Unduly Delayed
While the Committee has not sought to recount the mistakes of the past, it is concerned with the question of whether the present administrative organization is such as to insure the effective carrying through of the program. It is not.
The Committee finds a number of different Government agencies with □verlapping and confusing authority over the synthetic rubber program. The conflict between the Rubber Reserve Company, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the Office of Petroleum Coordi-
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nator has delayed and complicated the bringing in of new facilities for the production of butadiene from oil.
To make Buna S rubber, the synthetic around which the Government’s program has been built primarily, three separate kinds of plants must be erected, for producing styrene, for producing butadiene, and for combining the two—polymerization is the. technical term. At present the butadiene part of the program is lagging behind the styrene and polymerization capacity. Thus, any delay in getting the greatest possible butadiene production directly reduces the amount of synthetic rubber that will be produced.
The production of synthetic rubber represents an investment exceeding 5600,000,000 and is one of the most complicated technical projects ever undertaken in this country. Yet, in none of the Government agencies has there been a clearly recognized group of independent experts to make the technical decisions. Reliance has been placed on one part-time technical adviser aided by committees drawn from industry.
This technical adviser has testified that on more than one occasion he requested the appointment of an adequate technical staff in vain. The Committee has found many evidences of procedures bordering on the chaotic in which nontechnical men have made decisions without consulting with subordinates nominally in the positions of responsibility.
There have been many adjustments and readjustments in the synthetic rubber program. Some of these were inevitable. Some appear to be the result of bad administration.
Russian Help Not Asked
One example of inexplicable administration that we can mention is the failure to obtain detailed technical information concerning the experience of Soviet Russia in making synthetic rubber. Russia has been manufacturing synthetic rubber successfully for more than 10 years. Had the offer of the Soviet Government made in February to exchange full information been accepted, it is conceivable that plants for producing synthetic rubber by the Russian processes might well be on the way to completion. To date we have no detailed information as to the Russian experience, nor analyses of Russian tires. We feel this information should still be obtained.
Restrictive Secrecy
One of the more critical technical battles that must be won is in the compounding of synthetic rubber. Synthetic rubber requires more time and effort to fabricate into tires—about a one-third loss in efficiency is reported. While tires for light passenger cars can be made entirely out of
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Buna S rubber, thus far in the manufacture of combat and heavy duty tires, which represent about 70 percent of the Army’s requirements, a good percentage of crude natural rubber must still be used. As long as crude rubber must be mixed with Buna S, we do not dare cut too deeply into our stocks of crude rubber—a minimum carry-over into 1944 of 100,000 tons is vital.
However, the dissemination of technical information on the compounding of Buna S to all rubber companies has become an accomplished fact only in the last few days. On July 3 of this year an agreement was entered into between the Rubber Reserve Company and four large rubber companies, by which Rubber Reserve alone was permitted to give out information on compounding to other companies. It took six weeks of repeated effort for the Rubber Branch of the War Production Board, desiring to launch a program of education throughout the industry, to get this vital information released by the Rubber Reserve.
New Administration
We recommend a complete reorganization and consolidation of the governmental agencies concerned with the rubber program.
These changes should include:
(1) A directive by the President ordering the Rubber Reserve Company and all other Government agencies to act in all matters relative to the rubber program as directed by the Chairman of the War Production Board.
(2) The appointment by the Chairman of the War Production Board of a Rubber Administrator, delegating to him full and complete authority in all matters related to rubber, including research, development, construction, and operation of plants. The Chairman of the WPB should divest himself of all direct concern with these matters.
(3) Establishment of an adequate technical staff, properly staffed under the immediate supervision of the Rubber Administrator; funds to be provided for these purposes.
Centralize Oil Operations
(4) That the Petroleum Coordinator be directed by Presidential Order to act on specific directives from the Rubber Administrator to explore all methods for the production of butadiene from petroleum and natural gas products and to recommend new proposals to the Rubber Administrator for consideration and action. However, to make certain there are no construction delays because of conflicting
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authority, the construction of all plants and equipment concerned with the production and purification of butadiene from oil shall be under the direction of the Rubber Administrator. The Petroleum Coordinator shall supervise the operation of these plants, after construction, but he shall not change the presently authorized program (or plans for operation) except as approved by the Rubber Administrator.
In delegating this added responsibility to the Petroleum Coordinator, the Committee has sought to secure complete coordination of the butadiene-from-oil program with other petroleum and natural gas requirements, especially for aviation gasoline and for toluene for explosives.
As the situation develops it may be desirable that the funds required for the rubber program be put directly at the disposal of the Chairman of the War Production Board for the purposes of the Rubber Administrator instead of, as at present, indirectly through the Federal Loan Agency.
The most important feature of these administrative changes is the type of man who is appointed as administrator. He should be a man of unusual capacity, a thoroughly competent operating and manufacturing executive, preferably with experience in the rubber industry. No plan of organization can bolster up a weak man sufficiently to meet the difficult problems he must face.
No Changes in Processes Nou>
The Committee has investigated, with the aid of its experts, the status of the present Government program for the production of synthetic rubber and believes that every one of the processes is technically sound and ultimately will work. The Committee has also investigated many other processes not now in the Government schedule. In its opinion a number of these processes have promise, but it does not believe that any one of them gives sufficient certainty of producing more rubber quickly enough to warrant substituting it for processes already in the program.
In war one cannot wait upon perfection. Any weapon on the battlefield is better than the best weapon on a blueprint.
The Committee recommends that the present program be pushed forward with the greatest possible speed, without further change, except that if new projects are adopted they be made additions to the present program.
Delays Not Unlikely
The Committee has examined the present status of the Government’s schedules and estimates that if the present construction program can be met
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on the dates specified and technical difficulties in reaching full production are overcome, there will be produced during 1943:
400,000 tons of Buna S;
30,000 tons of Neoprene (in part from private sources);
62,000 tons of Butyl rubber; and
24,000 tons of Thiokol (from private sources).
Only Buna S and Neoprene can be used for combat and heavy duty tires. These two synthetics and a portion of the Butyl rubber could offset the likely deficit of crude rubber which the country faces during the critical year of 1943. Under present priorities and allocations, however, there is grave danger that the construction of the synthetic program may be delayed by as much as four months. If this occurs, the production of Buna S in 1943 will fall below 200,000 tons, and our supplies of rubber will be made«-quate for military needs.
Critical Materials
Much has been said of shortages in critical materials. There are two kinds of shortages: The first, where there is not enough to go around for all essential purposes; the second type of shortage is where enough of the material exists, but is not available when and where it is urgently required. There are a few materials short in the first sense; but many have been short in the second sense of failing to be where needed when needed.
In large part, this has been due to permitting materials to be used for purposes not essential to the conduct of the war; to the lack of vigorous policy in conservation, inventory control, and the finding of substitutes; and, most of all, to the changing, complicated, and ineffective methods that have been used to distribute materials and to control priorities. Shortages have been accentuated by superimposing upon the heavy military demands and the delayed conversion of civilian industry to war purposes a vast war construction program approximating 17 billion dollars. This program will be near completion by the end of this year—about 70 to 80 percent is to be finished in January—and all of it about July 1, 1943. Then, large amounts of construction materials should be released.
After this, the question of critical materials will be eased, provided vigorous measures are taken to increase supplies, to find substitutes, to press research work, to complete conversion, to effect the utmost in conservation, inventory control, standardization, and simplification, and, above all, to perfect a simple workable system of priorities for the distribution of materials.
Too often an attitude of complacency has been assumed, and there has been a failure to take those vigorous measures necessary to increase
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supplies, working closely with the industries concerned. There has been some disposition to accept the “impossible” instead of trying to overcome it.
The military men must decide what things come first in war production; but it is the duty of this Committee to point out that, unless the flow of materials for the construction of these synthetic rubber plants is insured, there will be no rubber in the fourth quarter of 1943 with which to equip a modern mechanized army.
Expand for Safety
The year 1943 is so critical for the rubber situation that the production of 100,000 or 200,000 tons of Buna S may be the determining factor in the success of our military program. To add a greater margin of safety to the program the committee recommends these additions:
(1) An increase in the production of butadiene by 100,000 tons, to be obtained from a refinery conversion program, more commonly known as “quick butadiene.” This process utilizes refinery equipment made idle by the lessened demand for gasoline and which can be brought into production in six months. Since butadiene output is lagging behind styrene and polymerization capacity, if this additional butadiene can be made available quickly enough an additional 40,000 to 50,000 tons of synthetic rubber could be produced in the critical year of 1943. This extra butadiene, too, would furnish insurance against possible difficulties with other plants and be a standby-capacity as a reserve for the future. To be of greatest value this butadiene should be brought into production by next spring. Delay on the part of the Government can turn this “quick butadiene” into slow butadiene.
The Committee is concerned by the efforts on the part of many persons to substitute this so-called “quick butadiene” process for the regular butadiene plants scheduled in the Government’s program. The first thought that occurs to the Committee is “Why now? Why not months ago? Why the sudden activity? And, above all, why substitute at this late date?” The Committee recommends the quick butadiene program as an addition to, not a substitution for, the present program.
A Second Process From Grain
(2) In addition to the increase provided for through the refinery conversion program, the committee recommends another increase of 30,000 tons of Buna S. This should come from a plant to be erected during the latter part of 1943 to come into operation early in 1944.
There are two advantages in delaying construction until this time. There is good reason to believe that with the completion of the present huge
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war construction program the present tightness of critical materials will be less acute and facilities for fabrication and for chemical equipment more readily available. Second, within the next six months it will be possible to judge better as to the relative merits of two processes for making butadiene from grain which are not now in the Government program—the so-called Polish process from alcohol and the butylene glycol process from grain.
Plants in Grain Areas
(3) The plants for the production of this additional 30,000 tons of Buna S by a grain-using process should be located near the grain area. Such units should preferably be operated under the control of a local group.
More Alcohol
The estimates of alcohol supplies and needs given us by different agencies vary considerably. If no additional alcohol is provided for the expanded rubber program we have recommended, there is a possibility that at some time in the future the production of smokeless powder and other munitions may soar and alcohol be diverted from the making of rubber.
(4) We recommend that facilities for the production of 100,000,000 gallons of alcohol be erected on sites near the grain-producing areas and accessible to water transportation. This would make it possible for molasses to be brought to the plants by barges after the war in the event that the manufacture of alcohol from grain proves uneconomical.
In recommending this addition to our alcohol facilities, the Committee wants to make clear that it is providing only enough additional alcohol to meet the increased demands of the expanded synthetic rubber program. The Committee is not saying that that is all the extra alcohol that may be needed for all war purposes. By the use of newly developed apparatus, these alcohol plants can be constructed with but little expenditure of critical materials.
No Pood Shortage
The Secretary of Agriculture has assured the Committee that no concern need be felt that an expansion of the alcohol and butadiene from grain will interfere with our food supply. After all food requirements that, can be anticipated now are met, there still will be upwards of 1,250,000,000 bushels of wheat left on this continent.
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Relaxing Restrictions
If by the end of 1943 the actual production of synthetic rubber measures up to schedule and if synthetic rubber can be used readily, or if military or export needs for rubber prove less than now anticipated, it should be possible to relax the restrictions somewhat on civilian driving. Before that can be done, however, there must be an assurance that between 100,000 and 150,000 tons of Buna S rubber a year will be available, in excess of military needs, for civilian purposes.
Under the rubber rationing program recommended by the Committee, civilians will continue cutting into their capital—the rubber on their tires—although at a much lesser rate than now. By 1944 a further expansion of tire replacement for civilians to repay this “borrowed rubber” will be necessary. One of the impelling reasons for the Committee’s recommendation that the synthetic rubber, program be expanded is because we desire to see the rubber turned out that will keep America on wheels.
More Neoprene
(5) As a margin of safety on the military side, we recommend the construction of 20,000 tons a year of additional Neoprene capacity. Neoprene is the one synthetic rubber which has been shown to be the full equivalent in quality of natural rubber for combat and heavy duty tires. It also holds promise of being used in place of crude rubber in association with Buna S. The relative high cost of Neoprene in terms of critical materials and electric power needs are offset by the fact that it is an insurance against the possibility that our imports of natural rubber, already reduced, may be cut off or that the production of Buna S in 1943 be delayed, forcing us to cut too deeply into our crude stockpile.
The New Program
(6) The War Production Board has fixed the total annual output of Buna S rubber at 705,000 tons for the United States. The Committee recommends that this ceiling be raised by 140,000 tons to 845,000 tons. Additional styrene and polymerization capacity should be built, as necessary, to take care of the increased production of butadiene. This expansion should be directed to produce the maximum possible amount of Buna S before January 1, 1944.
In addition to Buna S, the expanded program recommended by the Committee calls for a total of 69,000 tons of Neoprene, 60,000 tons of Thiokol, 132,000 tons of Butyl, with other synthetics like Flexon being added to the program if they can be brought in during 1943 after being adequately tested.
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Standardizing Polymerization
At present four of the large companies have designed their own polymerization facilities, each differing somewhat from the others. Each type of facility represents the best efforts of a group of keen technical men. Last May, Rubber Reserve decided to standardize all the polymerization plants to be constructed chiefly to save critical materials. In essence, this means standardizing the operation.
The design now ready is a compromise of the ideas of four separate technical groups. It may or may not incorporate the best ideas of each; on this point there are grave reasons for doubt. At all events, no one has ever operated such a standardized plant. The Committee does not wish to criticize the decision, but does recognize the need for the immediate construction of one such standard plant so that experience with its operation can be obtained at the earliest moment. We recommend the swift construction of such a plant.
More Protection
Sampling inspections were made of a number of crude and scrap rubber stockpiles and of the methods being used for their protection. While the situation in general is satisfactory, a number of spots were found where protection from fire is definitely inadequate. The Committee suggests the advisability of more adequate protection. These stockpiles constitute some of the most critical possessions of the Nation.
Plant Capacities
A most important consideration in connection with the synthetic rubber program has to do with the capacity of the country to manufacture rubber goods out of the natural and synthetic rubbers which will be available. It would be obviously foolish to carry through a program of plant construction for the manufacture of synthetic rubbers only to discover too late that the fabricating facilities were insufficient to handle the rubber.
The Committee has made a survey of these facilities and finds that, as matters now stand, there will not be sufficient factory capacity to deal with the quantities of synthetic rubber that will be produced in 1944. One important limiting factor is that, at present, it takes about a third more time to fabricate synthetic than natural rubber. While this would indicate that the capacity of the industry should be increased; the technical developments in the art of processing are proceeding very rapidly and the time required to manufacture synthetic goods certainly will be reduced. It follows that output will be increased. The Committee has been informed that the decision on whether to expand capacity can safely be deferred to
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April 1943 and therefore recommends that the Rubber Administrator review the problem early next year.
The Committee’s finding and recommendations on plant capacity are given in greater detail in the full body of the report, which in addition contains other detailed recommendations and findings.
'Free Competition
In concluding this digest of findings and recommendations, the Committee wishes to point out that never before has this country embarked on an undertaking comparable to the development of the synthetic rubber program. It is not only an ambitious technical project that must be rushed to completion at breakneck speed but in large measure it is a new political and economic undertaking. It seems to us of vital importance that this program be managed in a spirit of the fullest competition and interchange of information among all groups. On the one hand there should be the most complete interchange of information and, on the other, as much competition in research, development, and operation as possible. Such, after all, are the conditions in the field of laboratory science where during the last hundred years such tremendous strides have been made—cooperation and competition going hand in hand.
Nor is the Committee unaware that the production of synthetic rubber is potentially a large new post-war industry and that different groups will be contesting for a share in this post-war industry. This struggle should not be allowed to obscure the basic facts of our situation as regards the war and rubber. No matter what processes were provided in the program there would be the samé uncertainties as to the future, the same huge requirements, the same threat to our essential civilian economy, and the same necessity for conserving the rubber we have until our new rubber comes in.
The Committee recognizes that there still is room for reasonable scientific disagreement over many of the processes for making rubber that are being developed. It is quite possible, even likely, that, before much of the synthetic rubber now planned is produced, better processes will have proven themselves. In any new industry the processes of today are outmoded by the processes of tomorrow and tomorrow’s by those of the next day. However, our need for rubber quickly is too great to wait upon perfection and if this Committee were to advise the newly-appointed rubber administrator it would say, “Bull the present program through.”
For Victory—Unity I
In drawing up these recommendations the Committee has sought to find a basis upon which the entire nation can go forward together, uniting our energies against the enemy instead of dissipating them in domestic
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wrangling. It appreciates that it is asking the public to make sacrifices because of mistakes that have been made and for which the people are not to blame. But wrong things done in the past cannot be cited as a defense for making mistakes in the future. The war demands that we do these things. Victory can be won in no other way.
The Committee:
James B. Conant, Karl T. Compton, Bernard M. Baruch, Chairman September 10, 1942
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PART III
Full Report of the Committee
1. Statement of the Problem
Of all critical and strategic materials, rubber is the one which presents the greatest threat to the safety of our nation and the success of the Allied cause. Production of steel, copper, aluminum, alloys, ©r aviation gasoline may be inadequate to prosecute the war as rapidly and effectively as we could wish, but at the worst we still are assured of sufficient supplies of these items to operate our armed forces on a very powerful scale. But if we fail to secure quickly a large new rubber supply our war effort and our domestic economy both will collapse. Thus the rubber situation gives rise to our most critical problem.
Our position with respect to this vital commodity may be briefly outlined as follows:
The demands now placed upon us are enormous. Without any allowance whatsoever for civilian passenger car tires, the estimated requirements for the year 1943 are 574,000 tons. This contrasts with the total average over-all consumption in the United States before the war of about 600,000 tons.
We must supply not only the needs of our own armed forces but much of those of the military machines of our Allies as well. We must equip our buses and trucks and other commercial vehicles and provide on a large scale specialty items for such purposes as factory belting, surgical, hospital and health supplies. And in addition to all these we must maintain the tires on at least a substantial portion of our 27,000,000 civilian passenger automobiles. Otherwise an economy geared to rubber-borne motor transport to an extent not approached elsewhere in the world will break down.
To meet these demands we may look to four main sources of supply:
First, our present stockpile of natural rubber and such additions as may come to it from natural rubber imports from Latin America, Africa, and other rubber-producing lands. These are comparatively small.
Second, our present stockpile of scrap rubber, estimated as sufficiently large with yearly additions to operate our reclaiming industry at present capacity through the year 1945.
Third, the production of synthetic rubbers.
Fourth, we possess in the tires of our automobiles a priceless reserve, which must be guarded with greatest care. It represents a stockpile of some 1,000,000 tons of rubber applicable to the uses of our civilian transportation and the needs of the day-to-day life of our people.
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Having lost to Japan 90 percent of our pre-war source of natural rubber, chief reliance on new supplies of rubber must be placed on the new synthetic rubber program. But to obtain this in time we must have created, within two years after Pearl Harbor, one of the largest industries in the country. Normally such a development would require a dozen years. To compress it into less than two years is an almost superhuman task.
Our Committee is convinced that the Government’s present program is technically sound. From this time on the important thing is to get on with it without further delay.
In drawing up the recommendations which follow, the Committee has sought to find a basis upon which the entire nation can go forward together, uniting our energies against the enemy instead of dissipating them in domestic wrangling. It appreciates that it is asking the public to make sacrifices because of mistakes that have been made and for which the people are not to blame. But wrong things done in the past cannot be cited as a defense for making mistakes in the future. The war demands that we go forward from this point united and resolved to win at any cost. Victory can be won in no other way.
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2. Procedure of the Committee
The Committee was asked “to get the facts and make recommendations.” To this end, immediately after its appointment it assembled a competent technical staff of approximately twenty-five men of whose competence we had knowledge through first-hand experience. With the aid of this group the Committee has endeavored as far as humanly possible in the time at our disposal to get the facts and draw from these facts the logical conclusions.
With the aid of experts in the art of rubber manufacture and rubber compounding and with the assistance of a group of chemists and chemical engineers, we checked so far as possible the chemical processes involved in the Government program and those suggested by individuals and companies not yet included in this program. For this purpose members of our staff traveled throughout the eastern, southern, and middle-Western sections of the country, examining plants, consulting the technical experts concerned with the progress of the program and in the construction of new facilities. With their aid, we also examined carefully the present status of all tests throwing light on the adequacy of the new synthetic materials for military and civilian purposes, as well as the potentialities of numerous materials which have been suggested for the recapping of tires or special uses in the rubber program. We also examined at first hand into the condition and state of protection of the nation’s stockpile, which must serve as the essential backlog of our efforts until synthetic materials can be brought into substantial production.
Special checks likewise were made by men competent in business and engineering associated with the Committee, as to the rate of construction of scheduled plants and the situation with respect to the allocation of strategic materials to these plants and the granting of the necessary priorities. The capacity of the country to produce the essential raw materials for the development of the synthetic program also was checked. We have endeavored with the aid of competent assistance to evaluate the potential requirements of this country and the United Nations and have made our estimates of the probable supply, present and to come.
In addition to interviewing, through our staff, a number of persons familiar with the various aspects of the rubber situation, we heard formally many officials of the Government as well as representatives of industry. A great number of documents from governmental and other sources were put at our disposal, and we examined these records with care. The printed records of hearings before the committees of Congress which deal with this subject run to thousands of pages. We reviewed the evidence thus presented as of value on many points. All of the Congressional Committees who had interested themselves in the problem were asked for their
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suggestions or recommendations and many stimulating suggestions were made. Particularly helpful were the Committees under the chairman-ships of Senators Truman, Gillette, and Murray. In conclusion, it is a pleasure to acknowledge that from all with whom we have been in touch we have received the maximum of cooperation.
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3. Analysis of the Supply and Demand for Rubber
The natural starting point for a consideration of our rubber problem is an estimate of the essential needs during each of the next few critical years, and a corresponding estimate of the sources of supply from which these needs may be met. Many such balance sheets of the national position have been drawn up by various governmental agencies during the past eight months, and authoritative revisions must be made from time to time to give warning if our program is running behind expectations, or to give opportunity to make additional important military uses of rubber if the program should run ahead of schedule, or to relax restrictions on civilian driving.
In arriving at the data presented in the following tables, which form the principal bases of the Committee’s conclusions, we have tried to be neither unduly optimistic nor unnecessarily pessimistic. The figures in each case represent our best judgment of expected performance. We realize, and this should be continually borne in mind, that unanticipated events may change many of these figures substantially. We also should bear in mind that there are many more circumstances which might arise to changes the figures unfavorably than there are to change them favorably. Such circumstances are likely to arise for human rather than technical reasons, and some of these circumstances constitute the basis of recommendations in Sections 7 and 8 of the full report.
Considering, first, the anticipated supplies of all types from all available sources, our estimates are presented in Table I.
In this table have been included certain additions of Neoprene and Thiokol to the present governmental program, in accordance with recommendations presented in Section 6. However, the recommendations there given for increasing the supply of Buna S rubber as a safeguard for the critical year of 1943 and a backlog to maintain civilian transportation after 1944 are not included in this table.
TABLE I. SUPPLY. Before any consumption, the supply of rubber available to the United States, as estimated by the Committee’s staff, is as follows (in thousands of long tons):
Present stocks, July 1,1942 578. . Expected 1942, 6 months 12. . Additions, 1943 41. . . 1944 . .68
Buna S. . 0 0 386... .705
Neoprene 0 4 30... . .59
Butyl. . . . 0 0 62... .132
Thiokol. . 0 0 . 54. . . . .60
Reclaim. 47. . ,..160.. 360... .400
This table does not include small amounts of Buna rubbers produced from private sources in 1942.
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Against these supplies of natural and synthetic rubbers, the presently estimated total requirements for various categories of essential use are presented in Table II.
In our calculation the use of synthetic rubbers has been stated in terms of equivalent tonnage of natural rubber by the use of factors depending upon the specific gravities and resistances to wear of the various types of rubbers, as appropriate to the specific uses included under each classification.
The item “private transportation” does not include the reclaimed rubber or synthetic materials necessary to maintain private passenger car transportation, these being shown in Table V. The item “private transportation” does, however, give the amount of natural rubber which would have to be used in addition to the reclaim and synthetic rubbers of Table V as a cement in recaps and new tires made of reclaim. The . item “British deficiency” shows the expected requirements of the British Empire, excluding Canada, as its accumulated stockpile of natural rubber is consumed.
T ABLE II—The total requirements of natural and ¡or synthetic rubbers (in terms of natural) are estimated as follows (in thousands of long tons'):
1942, 6 months 1943 1944
Military 138... .. .’325. .. . . . .325
Private transportation 1 3 3
Commercial vehicles 28... .. . .59. . . 85
Other civilian uses 24... ....49.... 50
Foreign countries 74... ...117... .... 103
British deficiency . . o . . . .24. . . ....106
Total 265... ...577... . ...672
The item “commercial vehicles” in Table II refers primarily to passenger buses and trucks whose operations are controlled by the Office of Defense Transportation with cooperation of the Office of Price Administration in matters of rationing. Under the ODT steps have been taken to conserve rubber through consolidation and rerouting of commercial traffic and, as this is written, by an order requiring certificates of war necessity which limit the mileage and purposes for which commercial vehicles may be driven by limitations on loads and restrictions on the purchase of tires, parts, and motor fuel. Our Committee believes that further savings can be made through elimination of cross hauls and more stringent substitution of alternative types of transportation not requiring rubber. Our estimates in Table II for commercial vehicles depend upon limitation of speed, conservation of tire wear, and maximum proper loading.
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The item “other civilian uses” includes several hundred products such as rubber hose, belting, electrical insulation, storage battery separators, industrial footwear, medical equipment, etc. The Committee has carefully examined the program of the Rubber Branch of WPB with reference to the elimination of unnecessary use of rubber in such items or the substitution of lower grades of rubber and is convinced that a thoroughly competent job has been done in reducing the use of rubber in such items to a point at which very little further reduction can be expected in this list.
A few remaining possibilities are being actively studied by the Rubber Branch, but the sum total of all such possibilities is estimated to be so small that the time when the Nation might run out of crude rubber could not be postponed more than ten days if all such reductions, some involving considerable hardship, were enforced.
An essential part of our rubber supply is in the form of reclaimed rubber secured from the stockpile of scrap rubber. To the estimated 47,000-ton stock of reclaimed rubber on July 1, 1942, is added year by year the additional amounts of such rubber which it is estimated can be produced by present rubber reclaiming plants operating at capacity. These plants are not now running to capacity because of the governmentally enforced limitations in allocation of reclaimed rubber to manufacturers.
The demands listed in Table III are based on the assumption that all possible excess of reclaimed rubber will be allocated for the maintenance of civilian passenger car tires. To secure these amounts for private transportation, and to insure adequate provision for military and other needs, the Committee recommends (in Section 10) that plant capacity for producing reclaimed rubber be expanded as rapidly as possible above its present limit of 350,000 tons per year. The effect of such expansion is reflected in the estimates of “supply.”
TABLE III—Supply and requirements of reclaim are estimated as follows (in thousands of long tons):
1942, 6 months 1943 1944
Supply _ ..207.. ...360.. ...400
Requirements :
Military 37. . 84 ....84
Commercial vehicles 18. . ....33. . ....43
Other civilian uses 72. . ...146.. ...146
Foreign countries 18. . ....21.. . ...21
Balance available for passenger cars. ... 62.. ....76.. ...106
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If in the requirements in Table II we*substitute the various types of synthetic rubber to the extent that they are expected to be available and for the purposes for which they are suitable, we can, from Tables I and II, deduce the amounts of crude natural rubber which we will have on hand at various times, as indicated in Table IV. In deriving this table we have reserved for civilian passenger car tire use all of the Thiokol given in Table I (since this material is not suitable for many other uses). We also have reserved a small amount of Butyl rubber and a considerable amount of Buna S rubber in 1944 for similar purposes, as shown in Table V. With these reservations the amounts of natural rubber available in the United States are as shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV—Estimated crude natural rubber in the United States, after application of synthetic rubber substitutes (in thousands of long tons):
1942, 6 months 1943 1944
Balance on hand 578. . ... 328 224
Requirements 262.... .145.. ....51
Added during period.. . . 12.... ..41.. .... 68
Amount added to (+) or drawn from
(—) stocks —250. . . - -104. . . . +17
Balance carried over 328. . ... 224 241
The estimated amount remaining for application to civilian passenger transportation is shown in Table V.
TABLE V-—Rubber applicable to civilian transportation is estimated as follow (in thousands of long tons'):
1942, 6 months 1943 1944
Crude natural 1 3 . . . . 3
Buna S 0 . n . .185
Butyl 0 0 . . .15
Thiokol 0 ..54... . . .60
Reclaim 62 . .76... . .106
Two comments on the above tables are important. The first is that the amount of rubber available for civilian passenger car tires is a relatively small residual left-over from a very large program, and must absorb the shock of any miscarriage of our plans. The Committee has assured itself that a strong effort has been made to hold the military, allied, and other
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civilian requirements to a minimum. Since the amount left over for civilian passenger tires is a small residue, any unfavorable change in the above figures would tend to squeeze out the amounts left for civilian driving. This is the strongest argument for a drastic program for conservation of the tires on civilian passenger cars. Any failure to conserve these tires, combined with either an increase in military requirements or a delay in obtaining the expected production of synthetic materials, would result in a complete breakdown of civilian passenger car transportation in 1944 or 1945.
The other important comment is that the balances shown for crude rubber in Table IV are very little above the requirements of prudence. This can be illustrated by examining the balance of 224,000 tons expected to be left at the end of 1943. This balance includes the inventories that manufacturers of rubber goods must have on hand to continue manufacturing operations without delays because of temporary transportation or procurement difficulties.
Of this 224,000 tons, about 50,000 tons would represent a 30-day inventory for American manufacturers, which is none too large. Another 4,000 tons can be considered as a reasonable inventory for Canadian manufacturers. The Committee believes that at least 66,000 tons should be considered as the necessary inventory on hand in Great Britain in case there should be several months’ interruption of transportation on account of a possible change in the naval situation in the Atlantic Ocean.
Thus about 120,000 tons out of the 224,000-ton balance is to be considered a necessary “working inventory.” The balance of 100,000 tons is certainly none too large for safety when one considers that a delay of two months in the presently expected production schedule for Buna S rubber would completely wipe out this balance. In this connection it must be remembered that a substantial amount of crude rubber must always be in hand to blend with synthetic materials for various important uses.
For these reasons the Committee feels that an analysis of the balance sheet indicates: (1) that we can survive the rubber crisis without serious impairment of our military program or domestic economy if the plans go through on schedule, but (2) that the margin of safety is uncomfortably small in view of reasonably possible unfortunate contingencies. The Committee therefore recommends (in Section 6) certain expansions of the present program to aid the civilian driving program and as an insurance against such contingencies.
The Committee also recommends that WPB through the Rubber Administrator scrutinize all requirements, foreign and domestic, submitted for rubber to the end that only actual needs be allowed for.
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4. Rubber Requirements of the Armed Services
The rubber requirements of the armed services have been stated in terms of over-all tonnage in Table II of Section 3. It would not be appropriate in this report to discuss the individual items which make up these requirements. Suffice it to say that our Committee has examined these requirements in some detail and submits the following comments:
It is reassuring to note that the Army has cut its crude rubber requirements by about 45 percent; the Navy, by about 35 percent with expectation of raising this to 45 percent. These differences are largely on account of the differing types of requirements in these services. The Committee believes that both services have handled their rubber conservation program sincerely and effectively. The Committee accepts at full value the statement that substantial further reductions cannot be made without a serious reduction in military efficiency. It also recognizes, on the other hand, that large combat losses might increase substantially the rubber requirements of the armed services above their present estimates.
The following comments amplify the general statement just made and are based upon the Committee’s examination of the estimates and performances of these services. In general, the estimates are based upon:
(1) a recognition of the dangers inherent in the short supply of rubber;
(2) a sound method of calculation of needs on the present facts as to the size of the armed services (the Committee does not attempt to measure the need for the items using rubber, but only the need for rubber as estimated if the items are purchased);
(3) the establishment of an organization to develop and push the conservation program, with competent personnel, keeping in toucn with all developments in the conservation of rubber;
(4) a quite complete policy as to the elimination of rubber articles formerly in use in the service and providing for substitutes generally where possible;
(5) a careful examination of all specifications covering rubber goods so as to reduce the crude rubber content, and increase the use of reclaimed rubber or substitutes;
(6) tests for utilization of rayon, nylon, and steel (in place of cotton) which, being stronger, will demand less rubber;
(7) a comprehensive plan for conserving rubber in use and suitable orders and instructions covering its operation.
While there is no adequate measure as to actual accomplishments in
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the field, inspection reports are encouraging in some spots and discouraging in others. The organization set-up appears sound.
In one area of extensive army training maneuvers previous inspections disclosed extremely wasteful practices in the use and abuse of tires. A recent inspection by the same experienced civilian group led to their report that the tires in this area were now being conserved with at least as good care as would be found in an operating fleet of commercial vehicles. This part—making the plan effective in the field—will require a vigorous follow-up, training of operating and inspecting personnel, aided by rigid inspections, and adequate disciplinary measures.
All these things can be done readily without interfering’with military effectiveness. Three other aspects of conservation of rubber are under study by the services and some progress has already been made, but there is need for careful work and prompt decision as to whether:
(a) the conditions under which equipment will be used permit redesign of the equipment so as to save rubber; for example, the use of steel wheels or rims instead of rubber tires to a greater extent;
(b) the experience in combat does not- warrant the use of equipment using either lower grade or less rubber, so that the rubber will not be planned to outlast the remainder of the equipment;
(c) requirements for spares cannot be materially reduced;
(d) inner tube requirements cannot be cut as tubes outlast tires;
(e) depreciation is not less than estimated, due to the conservation plans.
The full utilization of existing inventories through complete inventory control, the avoidance of purchases whenever possible, the scrutiny of all unusable items—both new and scrap—in inventory and providing for their prompt utilization in the armed services or elsewhere in the war effort are matters now in hand but still demanding rigorous prosecution.
The armed services assure us that this entire program will be carried out to the limit.
The savings expected are not large. If attained they are enough only to provide a small factor of safety required for the whole national program.
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5. Tires for Passenger Automobiles
The adoption of a policy for conservation of civilian-owned tires and its enforcement at the earliest possible moment is unquestionably the most urgent item still remaining unsettled in the rubber program. The cost to our war effort of not doing this would far exceed the. cost in materials and rubber of doing it.
It must be remembered that practically nothing has been done during the last nine months to supply tires for the 27,000,000 passenger cars now on the road. In normal years about 250,000 tons of crude rubber have been consumed annually in meeting this demand. Many tires are now reaching the point where they will become unusable, and unless something is done at once to provide recaps and a limited supply of new tires we shall be headed for a drastic breakdown in the not far-distant future. It has been estimated that by April of 1943 one-half of the tires on passenger automobiles will be worn to the point where they should be recapped. If such a condition is reached it would not be many months before our civilian economy collapsed.
In the Committee’s opinion it is unfortunate that the Government was not able to institute a tire replacing and recapping program in the spring of 1942. Many billions of car miles of rubber would have been conserved. It is of the utmost importance that this program be instituted at once together with provisions for adequate tire inspection.
Experience has shown that out of every 100 tires brought in for recapping only about 60 can be thus repaired. The other 40 tires must be replaced by new tires. It is primarily this fact which sets the limits to any program which can be instituted now for conserving our rubber-borne transportation through a recapping program. If we were to decide tomorrow to provide enough new tires and recaps on the pre-war basis of replacement to carry the 27,000,000 passenger cars through 1943, with unrestricted driving as to speed and mileage on the pre-war level, some combination of crude and reclaimed, as for example about 200,000 tons of each, would be required. Clearly the allocation of such an amount of crude rubber or synthetic material for the use of civilian passenger cars is fantastic. The Committee must emphasize once again that the critical time for the country, as far as rubber for its military effort is concerned, is the third quarter of 1943 and the quarters immediately succeeding. This is because many of the plants now under construction for the production of synthetic rubber will not reach full operation until the latter part of the coming year. Our analysis shows that even with optimistic estimates of the total quantities of new crude and synthetic rubber that will be available the amounts that can possibly be spared for civilian passenger cars will be sufficient for a recapping and tire replacement program only provided that strict conservation measures are instituted at once.
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The Committee is well aware of the fact that the American people are quite prepared to make any sacrifice that is needed for the winning of this war. No one will complain of hardships or discomfort when he thinks of the young men who now are preparing to risk their lives freely on distant battlefronts throughout the world. But the Committee does not believe in the doctrine of sacrifice for sacrifice’s sake. Neither do we believe that civilian workers should be expected to live in tents and farmers trudge miles to the market unless it can be demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that the situation is so desperate that there is no alternative except that of inviting military defeat.
Consequently the Committee has explored carefully the amount of rubber which can be spared for keeping the passenger cars of the country in operation. We realize full well that beyond some point we cannot limit the amount of transportation thus carried throughout the country without severe effects on our war program. * Indeed- we have been given estimates that point to the fact that unless approximately 50 percent of our normal annual car mileage can be maintained our normal productive effort would be seriously retarded. Necessary civilian needs are a part of the war effort. Ludendorff complained that the home front crumbled before the war front. We must provide for the bottleneck of lessened automobile transportation befoie it occurs.
If we could be absolutely certain that all the production of synthetic rubber planned for 1943 would come in on time and that no difficulties would be had in the initial stages of using this material, it might be safe to draw on existing stocks of rubber to manufacture tires for passenger cars. It is essential, however, that we have a margin of safety for our military effort. No American would ask the Government to jeopardize our war machine through lack of rubber so that he might drive a few miles farther in his car.
The average annual mileage of passenger automobiles before the war has been estimated as approximately 9,000 miles. Today the figure usually quoted is 6,700 miles. It is clear that in the areas where gasoline is not being rationed the decline in annual mileage is a result of voluntary restriction brought about largely by the fear that no further tires will be forthcoming for the owner of a private car.
There is every reason to believe that if a tire replacement and recapping program were announced without restrictions, drivers would feel that the danger was passed and would increase both their speed and mileage almost to pre-war levels. If this were done the amount of rubber required for any recapping and tire replacement program would soar beyond our expectations of supply in the critical year 1943—250,000-300,000 tons of Buna S, almost the entire production if the less optimistic estimates prove correct.
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Strict enforcement of a speed limit of 35 miles per hour for private automobiles together with adequate tire inspection are extremely important factors in conserving rubber. The Committee recommends that these measures be instituted at once on a nationwide scale.
On this basis it would be possible to provide enough new tires and recap to maintain the program here recommended, if a maximum of 138,000 tons of reclaimed rubber were made available during the next 16 months for keeping the passenger cars of the country in operation. The small amount of crude rubber which is required in connection with the recapping program amounts to only a few thousand tons. This crude and reclaimed rubber, supplemented by synthetic materials as shown in Section 6, we believe will enable the nation to maintain approximately the present number of passenger automobiles at an average annual mileage of 5,000 miles.
To insure that this mileage will prevail in fact, the Committee recommends that nationwide gasoline rationing be instituted at the earliest possible moment under policies to be determined by the Office of Defense Transportation and implemented by the Office of Price Administration.
The Committee has examined various alternatives to gasoline rationing as a means of conserving rubber, but by no other procedure can we be certain that the annual mileage will be held to an annual average of 5,000 miles. We must have some assurance that individuals who are' ready to lead in the conservation of rubber will not be taken advantage of by the small percentage of the population who are not ready to follow.
It must be clear that this program does not give every citizen the right to drive 5,000 miles. This figure is an average which obviously means that the mileage for unnecessary driving must be cut considerably below this figure, in order that essential driving requiring greater mileage may be maintained. The proper distribution of mileage to various drivers is a matter to be worked out by the responsible governmental agencies.
It should also be stated that, in the Committee’s judgment, -even the above drastic curtailment of driving will be insufficient to meet the situation unless there is further increase in the practice of car pooling and sharing of rides. Extra tires of popular sizes now in the possession of persons who will not need them could be made available for essential uses under a suitable program of pooling through voluntary sale to the Government.
Every day of delay in putting the above program into effect will mean irretrievable, unnecessary loss of rubber and will build up, if long delayed, a day of disastrous reckoning. The nation is now driving on rubber borrowed from a happier past. Without recaps and replacements the majority of civilian cars would be forced off the road by irreplaceable tire failures.
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If by the end of 1943 actual production from the synthetic rubber plants under construction measures up to schedule, and if the synthetic rubber can be used as readily as is believed, or if military and export demands for rubber should prove to be substantially less than now anticipated, it would be possible to draw further upon the stocks of rubber before 1944 for civilian passenger car use.
In that case, restrictions on driving could be lessened, provided that the Rubber Administrator feels sure that by 1944 between 100,000 and 150,000 tons of Buna S will be available for tires for civilian driving. To make more certain that this will be the case the Committee is recommending elsewhere an expansion of the present synthetic program to provide for this extra synthetic rubber. This, we believe, can be done without interfering with the war program. The drastic conservation measures recommended for the year 1943 may therefore be somewhat relaxed after another 12 months has passed, if the situation in regard to synthetic rubber proves as rosy as our hopes.
At this point the Committee wishes to correct the erroneous impression which has been spread to the effect that tires on cars standing in garages would deteriorate almost as rapidly as if they were being driven. This idea is completely wrong. When standing under proper conditions in a garage the deterioration of tires amounts to only a very few percent, even in the course of an entire year. The conditions which must be observed are that the tires must not be allowed to stand uninflated; - they should not be allowed to stand on oil or grease; and the car should be jacked up to relieve the pressure on the tires if the car is to stand for several months without use. High temperature and sunlight also have a deleterious effect. With reasonable observance of these precautions, cars may be kept in storage with almost complete saving of the remaining mileage in the tires.
In the interim the Committee is confident that the American people, once acquainted with the true facts in regard to our rubber supply, will gladly accept whatever conservation measures are required.
To sum up, our recommendations, as far as passenger automobiles are concerned, are as follows:
1. Immediate institution of a tire replacement and recapping program with the allocation of reclaimed rubber for that purpose.
2. Nationwide gasoline rationing to hold the average annual mileage to 5,000 miles under the general direction of the Office of Defense Transportation.
3. Prompt and strict enforcement of a nationwide speed limit not exceeding 35 miles an hour for private passenger cars and trucks.
4. Compulsory periodic tire inspection.
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5. A voluntary interim tire conservation program until gasoline rationing can be instituted.
To provide for the recapping program which we have outlined previously it will be necessary to expand immediately the facilities for the production of Thiokol. At present the country has plants for the production of 24,000 tons per year from private sources. This should be enlarged by Government-sponsored plants to produce an additional 36,000 tons by conversion of existing idle plant capacity, giving a final total of 60,000 tons per year. Thiokol is most rapidly produced of all of the synthetic materials suitable for the retreading of civilian tires. The amount indicated will be needed to help carry civilian passenger tires through the years 1943 and 1944. If prompt action is taken the additional Thiokol should be in production by January 1943.
Adequate tire inspection is an important element in the conservation program. In general, where industry can be organized to function, great care should be taken not to build a duplicate governmental organization. This has special reference to periodic examination of civilian tires. It would seem much easier to license recognized tire dealers and repair men with experienced help who are fully equipped for examining tires and advising as to their maintenance. Such an organization could be created almost overnight. Rationing boards would be governed by the reports presented to them by those requiring tire recapping or repairs from the information furnished by these examiners. The Committee suggests that these examinations be governed by a mileage total instead of elapsed time.
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6. The Synthetic Program
The present plans for the production of synthetic rubber as outlined to us by the governmental agencies concerned call for the erection of the following types of plants in the United States:
(1) for the production of Neoprene, eventual capacity 40,000 tons per year (in addition to a 9,000-ton plant now in operation by a private company);
(2) for the production of Butyl rubber to yield 132,000 tons per year;
(3) for an over-all production of 705,000, tons of Buna S. This production of Buna S involves construction of three types of plants, for producing styrene, for producing butadiene, and for the co-polymeri-zation, or mixing, of butadiene and styrene to form Buna S.
For the manufacture of butadiene the following processes are scheduled (all figures expressed in the long-ton equivalent of Buna S):
Tons
(1) from alcohol by the Carbide and Carbon Chemical pro-
cess, rated capacity................................. 242,000
(2) , from butane (in natural gas) by a process developed by the Phillips Petroleum Company............................ 50,000
(3) from butane by the Houdry process.................... 16,500
(4) from butylene (obtained by the cracking of petroleum)
by a process developed by Standard Oil of New Jersey. 283,000
(5) by the cracking at high temperatures of gas and heavy oils (the so-called thermal or refinery conversion processes) ...............;................................... 20,000
(6) by combination of (4) and (5) in one locality......... 93,500
The Committee has examined the present status of the Government’s schedules and estimates that if the construction program can be met on the dates specified there will be produced during 1943: 400,000 tons of Buna S; 30,000 tons of Neoprene (in part from private sources). We believe that these processes will ultimately work on a large scale and yield satisfactory products.
Furthermore, our experts estimate that the time required to get the various plants running smoothly under actual operating conditions will not be so lengthy as to cause serious delay. On the other hand it must be remembered that we are dealing here with a new industry and that in the production of Buna S three separate manufacturing operations are concerned, no one of which has been carried out as yet on anything approaching the present contemplated scale.
Therefore, until more experience has been gained by the operation of one of the large-scale units at each step, we must consider that a con
39.
siderable element of risk is present in the picture. The importance of completing rapidly one full-scale plant using each process and the erection of pilot plants is considered in the technical section of this report.
The Committee wishes to emphasize once again at this point that the whole question of obtaining synthetic rubbers in adequate amounts in 1943 hinges on the rate of construction of the manufacturing plants. Unless the present situation involving the assigning of priorities and allocating of materials is improved, there is grave danger that there will be serious delays in the completion of the plants and consequent reduction in the amount of synthetic materials produced. Furthermore, unless the administrative changes recommended in a later section of this report are put into effect, conflicting governmental plans with respect to the oil industry may seriously jeopardize the production of butadiene.
We also have examined. with the aid of our experts many other processes for the production of butadiene and synthetic rubber. We find that quite apart from their merits or demerits, no one of them could now be substituted in the present program with hope of accelerating the production of Buna S in the critical year 1943.
We would be blind if we did not see the efforts now in progress on the part of many companies to have a part in the development of a large new industry with vast post-war possibilities. This has been accentuated in the minds of the petroleum producers by gasoline rationing with its attendant loss of sales. They are thus forced to turn to other products including butadiene. Furthermore, we are not unaware that it is inevitable that once the war is over there will be a struggle amongst various groups for the control of this new industry.
But all such considerations cannot affect this Committee as to its conclusions. We are concerned only with the production of the largest amount of rubber in the minimum amount of time in order to carry the country successfully through the war. It is our firm conclusion that present processes for manufacturing synthetic rubber and the raw materials required (butadiene and styrene) must not at this late date be changed unless new processes can be shown beyond peradventure to have such advantages over those now employed that more rubber would be obtained in the ensuing tnonths than would otherwise be the case. We have found no such process in the course of our investigations.
The Committee finds that there has been considerable discussion between two groups within the oil industry as to whether or not there was a serious conflict between the butadiene program based on butylene and the high octane aviation gasoline program. With the aid of our experts we have examined carefully into this problem and consulted many technologists in various oil companies as well as discussing the matter with officials of the Office of Petroleum Coordinator. It is our conclusion that, while the
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possibility of a conflict between the two programs does exist, it need not become serious if the possibility is' recognized and if the administration of these two closely related enterprises is properly integrated.
The necessity for the administrative changes along these lines which are recommended elsewhere in this report is further demonstrated by the uncertainty of the stated aviation requirements both in quantity and in quality. The evidence clearly indicates that if present demands for high octane aviation gasoline and butadiene stay where they now are, there need be no conflict.
If and when the armed services should decide that larger quantities of high octane aviation gasoline are needed, there are ways by which this demand can be met by the industry without diminishing the flow of butylene to butadiene plants.
It is fortunate that the program for the needed plants is generally in the hands of as competent engineers as there are in the country. Probably the most interesting and satisfying part of our study is the confidence we have acquired in the men from industry who have the plans in hand and who are satisfied they can lick the problem in the given time. Thein competence and experience, their resourcefulness and ingenuity are the best guarantees we have that they can do so.
We have been much impressed with the fact that this stupendous undertaking is only possible because of the highly developed skill of our technologists. No one could have examined the facts before us without appreciating the magnitude and scope of the task; no one could have made this study without realizing that because of the shortsightedness and failure to act on technically sound advice we must now proceed with insufficient experience. We venture the statement that never on the basis of so little has so much been involved. Under these uncertainties the only recourse is to provide ample margins when in doubt.
The Problem of 1943
The year 1943 is so critical for the rubber situation that the production of 100,000 tons more or less of Buna S might be a determining factor in the success of our military program. In view of the extremely precarious situation in 1943 the Committee recommends the prompt increase of 100,000 short tons a year of butadiene over the present schedule, to be obtained by a refinery conversion program.
This can be accomplished with a very small expenditure of critical materials. This recommendation is 'designed to accomplish three ends: (1) fill the gap between butadiene production and polymerization capacity in the early part of 1943 (the minimum polymerization capacity exceeds that for butadiene production and according to present schedule the two will not come together until the middle of 1943); (2) provide a reserve of
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standby capacity for the later years of the program; (3) furnish valuable insurance against contingencies affecting other plants in the program and provide additional facilities to meet possible increased demands of the armed services.
Due to pressures from various sources there have been, even in very recent days, belated efforts to change from the present butadiene plants scheduled by the Government to the refinery conversion processes, popularly called “quick butadiene.” The first thought that occurs to the Committee is, “Why now? Why not months ago? Why the sudden activity? And, above all, why substitute at this late date?”
We have recommended the refinery conversion program as an increase to, not a substitution for, the present program. We have made this recommendation, to produce more rubber during the critical year 1943. We should like to emphasize again that it would be a major blunder to make a further change in the program at this date by the substitution of one process for another.
To obtain the maximum utilization of the combined refinery conversion program, we recommend a prompt increase in the rate of construction of polymerization facilities and of the styrene plants to balance the program upwards so that the maximum possible amount of Buna S can be produced in 1943.
If this expectation and the optimistic estimates of the present schedule are realized, the Buna S produced in 1943 might be as much as 450,000 tons. Even this amount will not provide too large a margin of safety when it is recalled that our “carryover” to 1944, assuming only a 400,000-ton Buna S production, does not exceed 100,000 tons.
Looking Ahead to 1944
The present plans call for the building of polymerization plants with a rated annual output of 705,000 tons of Buna S. If the 100,000 short tons of butadiene (equivalent to 110,000 tons of Buna S)* provided by the refinery conversion program are to be utilized when the program is complete, additional facilities for polymerization must be provided and likewise for the manufacture of styrene. While there is evidence that the butadiene plants may produce 15 to 20 percent above their rated capacity our experts have found no indication that a similar situation exists with respect to the polymerization plants.
The War Production Board has fixed the total annual output of Buna S at 705,000 tons.
The Committee recommends that this figure be raised now by 140,000 tons, and that this be accomplished by authorizing:
(a) the construction of the additional polymerization facilities and
*Following the practice established by the Government, the Committee figures butadiene in short tons and Buna S and other rubbers in long tons. The ratio used is 100 short tons of butadiene to yield roughly 110 tons of Buna S.
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styrene capacity, to be ready by January 1, 1944, which are required to balance upwards the annual production of the refinery conversion program (110,000 tons of Buna S);
(b) the later construction of a 27,000-ton butadiene plant and a 30,000-ton polymerization plant to be located near the center of grain production.
The Committee recommends that the Rubber Administrator, about six months hence, in the light of the situation which exists regarding the best technical process then proven for the production of butadiene from grain, and in the light of the need for additional Buna S then estimated, proceed with the erection of the 27,000-ton butadiene plant from grain and the associated polymerization plant. He should also make whatever arrangements are necessary to produce and ship the necessary styrene from the centers of styrene production. If the needs for synthetic rubber and the production program are in balance, making due allowances for civilian driving, he may then cancel the erection of this additional 30,000 tons of Buna S capacity.
The Secretary of Agriculture has assured the Committee that no concern need be felt that the expansion of the butadiene from grain program will interfere with our food supplies. After all food requirements that can be anticipated have been met there will be upwards of 1,250,000,000 bushels of wheat left on this continent.
This additional Buna S, which it will thus be possible to produce in 1944, should provide the margin required for relaxing the restrictions on civilian driving. As pointed out earlier in this report, if by the end of 1943 synthetic rubber production is in satisfactory shape and military needs for rubber have not increased, it should be possible to allocate considerable quantities of Buna S for civilian needs. We shall not need the 140,000 extra tons of Buna S until 1944, when it will be required for tires for passenger cars. Without at least half this amount in 1944, a great many passenger cars would be forced off the road. It is at that time that we shall have to begin repaying the rubber which we have been borrowing, so to speak, by running our cars without a tire replacement and recapping program during the past nine months.
By delaying the construction of the extra polymerization facilities for six months, in all probability we shall prevent a serious conflict between this eventual expansion of the Buna S program and other aspects of the war program. There is reason to believe that the shortage of critical materials will be less acute six to eight months from now. This will certainly be true in regard to facilities for fabricating special chemical equipment.
Our recommendation for an additional 27,000 short tons of butadiene
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capacity to be located near the center of grain production is made with this time schedule in mind. This plant (together with the corresponding 30,000-ton Buna S plant) need not be started for another six months. There will be relatively little cost to the war effort involved in its construction for the reasons just given in regard to the easing of the situation in respect to the fabrication of equipment.
Furthermore, another advantage will accrue. At that time—six months hence—it will be possible to judge the relative merits of two processes for the manufacture of butadiene from grain which are not now in the Government program, namely, the Publicker process using alcohol and that employing butylene glycol developed by the Department of Agriculture in Peoria. This latter method involves a special fermentation of grain.
These two processes should be carefully compared with the alcohol process developed by the Carbide and Carbon Company and now a major part of the Government’s plaiis, - At present insufficient data are at hand for an evaluation. A. few months from.now this no longer will be the case.
It is clear to the Committee that new facilities for producing alcohol from grain must be provided. More alcohol may be required for the production of butadiene in plants under construction; if not, the extra capacity will be useful in the explosives program. The estimates we have obtained from the most reliable sources vary, but in all likelihood a considerable quantity of additional alcohol must be on hand in 1943 and 1944 to meet both the synthetic rubber and the explosives program. We recommend that these facilities be erected on sites near the grain-producing States and located on water transportation.
By the use of recently developed apparatus, alcohol plants can be constructed with little expenditure of critical materials.
If the Rubber Administrator should decide that the plants for the production of the additional 30,000 long tons of Buna S which we recommend should be constructed during late 1943, they should be located near the center of grain production and such units should if possible be operated under the control of an independent local group.
Diversification of the synthetic rubber industry both from the point of view of geography and control seems important to the Committee. Another element of competition would be provided if this recommendation is carried out.
We may sum up our recommendations in respect to the Buna S program as follows:
(1) There should be no further changes in the plans now laid for the construction of the scheduled plants—the time to freeze has passed in view of the urgency of 1943.
(2) The authorization of an additional 140,000 long tons of Buna S-capacity per year.
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(3) Proceed immediately with a conversion of refinery plants to produce a total of 100,000 short tons of butadiene by this process, this being in addition to the butadiene now planned from other processes in the present program.
(4) Promptly make an adjustment in the construction rates of the present styrene and polymerization plants, so that the maximum amount of Buna S may be produced in 1943.
(5) Expand the polymerization and styrene facilities to be ready on January 1, 1944, to balance upwards the entire program.
(6) About six months hence, in the light of the situation which* then exists regarding the best technical processes then proven for the production of butadiene from grain, and in the light of the need for additional Buna S rubber which then may be estimated, proceed as indicated with the erection of a plant to produce an additional 27,000 short tons of butadiene from grain through alcohol or butylene glycol and with the erection of an associated additional polymerization plant to produce 30,000 long tons of Buna S, both to be located near the center of grain production. Also make whatever arrangements are necessary to produce and ship the necessary styrene from the centers of styrene production.
(7) Proceed promptly with the erection of additional alcohol capacity to produce 100,000,000 gallons of alcohol per year, by the use of recently developed apparatus. These plants should be erected on sites near the grain-producing states and located on water transportation.
Finally, as a further margin of safety, considered only from the point of view of filling military needs, we recommend the construction of an additional plant for the production of Neoprene to the extent of 20,000 tons a year capacity.
We make this recommendation because Neoprene is the one synthetic material of a quality to be the full equivalent of natural rubber for combat and heavy duty tires. It also holds promise of being used in place of crude rubber in association with Buna S.
The relatively high cost of this substance in terms of critical materials required for the construction of the plant and electric power needs is offset by its special significance in the rubber program. As an insurance against the distant possibility that we may be cut off from all supplies of natural rubber, we feel that the expenditure involved to provide an additional margin of safety is not too great.
Four large rubber companies already have developed their own polymerization facilities, each one differing somewhat from the others. Each plant represents the best efforts of a separate group of keen technical men
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Last May, Rubber Reserve decided to standardize all the new polymerization plants which were to be constructed; this means, in essence, also standardizing the operation.
The design that is now ready is a compromise of the ideas of four separate technical groups. It may or may not incorporate the best ideas of each; on this point grave doubts have been expressed to the Committee. At all events, no one has ever operated such a standardized plant. The need for the immediate construction of one such standard plant so that experience with its operation can be obtained at the earliest moment is evident. It is our recommendation, therefore, that one of the standard plants now on the schedule be rushed to completion as quickly as possible.
The recognition of the importance of technological competition leads us to make two recommendations in regard to the operation of the polymerization plants:
First, one or more corporations controlled by the smaller rubber companies and chemical companies interested in polymerization should operate a certain number of these standard plants.
Second, at the same time, to keep the competitive urge to improve the new art of polymerization, we recommend that as part of the program each of the four large rubber companies be allowed to expand their facilities according to their own design, if they so prefer.
We feel sure that the pride of authorship, as strong among technical men as among artists, under these conditions will yield in a short time a rich harvest to the nation. Adoption of this second recommendation would not retard the program, for the expansion should be 'provided in that portion of the program we have recommended which requires additional polymerization facilities to be ready about January 1, 1944, to balance the refinery conversion program.
The nation as a whole is endeavoring to provide for the development of essentially novel manufacturing operations on a vast scale. How this program is managed and the spirit in which it is carried forward seem to us of great significance. Unlike the production of ammunition, the enterprise has implications for the postwar period. For a double reason, therefore, the nation is concerned lest special groups play too large a part in the construction and operation.
For the rapid development of the new art this Committee is fearful lest the influence of governmental policy serve to discourage the beneficial rivalries of the best brains in industry. We believe, therefore, that on the one hand there should be complete interchange of information and, on the other, as much competition in research, development, and operation as possible. Such, after all, are the conditions applying in the field of labora-
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tory science where during the last hundred years tremendous strides have been made. Competition ànd cooperation in this new national effort, we believe, should go hand in hand.
In concluding this section of the report dealing with the synthetic program, the Committee wishes to make special mention of the fact that there are a number of materials in the offing which give promise of considerable significance in the future development of rubber substitutes.
In particular, Flexon, which is very similar to Butyl rubber, is now undergoing careful tests to determine its utility in the manufacture of tires and .as a recapping material. Flexon has an advantage over Butyl rubber, in that it can be made more quickly and the plant involved does not require any large amount of critical materials.
The production would be limited, however, by the amount of solid carbon dioxide (dry ice) that would be available. The process is a wasteful one from the point of view of isobutylene, a raw material which is also of great value to the aviation gasoline program. As the tests of Flexon stand today, the Committee does not feel that it can recommend the inclusion of any large production in the present program.
However, in relatively short time the art of manufacture may be improved and one of the chief present drawbacks, namely, the lack of uniformity in different samples, may be overcome. If later tests prove the usefulness of this substance, its production then could be undertaken in considerable quantities.
Another rubber substitute which we are not recommending in our program but which is nevertheless in an interesting state of development is the material known as “Noropol,” prepared by a series of chemical reactions from soya bean oil. The process of manufacture seems entirely feasible, but tests have not gone far enough yet to demonstrate the worth of .the material in the manufacture of tires or recaps. It undoubtedly will have value as a substitute for rubber in certain mechanical goods.
Several other developments of a similar nature have been called to the Committee’s attention, but all are as yet in the laboratory stage. The Committee hopes that experimentation will continue and facilities be provided so that these new substances which show real promise may be tested thoroughly and eventually find their proper place in thé national economy. Necessity requires the country to stop tampering with the present synthetic rubber program in order to produce the maximum amount of usable material in the coming year. It would nevertheless be most unfortunate if this situation should prevent the development of other materials or new methods of manufacture.
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7. Priorities
The Committee wishes to emphasize and reemphasize the absolute necessity of having the maximum amount of synthetic rubber produced in the year 1943. As we have Said before, this turns largely on thé rate of completion of the plants now scheduled. No one of these plants of any considerable capacity has been completed as yet. Many of them are not yet even started. We have found that although there is every reason to believe the construction schedule can be met so far as the time of fabrication and construction is concerned, there is grave doubt whether the plants actually will be erected as planned unless something is done at once to change the situation in regard to the flow of materials to the fabricators.
We therefore recommend that urgent attention be paid to this phase of the rubber problem. We already have pointed out the dangerous situation the country would face if even four months of delay in the program should occur. Indeed, it is clear that the whole problem of critical materials is intimately associated with the problem of producing sufficient synthetic rubber in 1943 to tide us through the crucial year; and the President has asked us to make a report on critical materials.
Much has been said of shortages in critical materials. There are two kinds of shortages: the first where there is not enough to go around for essential purposes; the second type of shortage is where, though sufficient exists, it is short in the sense of not being available when and where it is urgently required. There are a few materials short in the first sense, but many have been short in the sense of failing to be where needed when needed.
This has been due to permitting materials to be used for purposes not essential to the conduct of the war; to the lack of a vigorous policy of conservation, inventory control, and the finding of substitutes; and, most of all, to the changing, complicated, and ineffective efforts at material distribution and priority control.
Shortages have been accentuated by superimposing upon the heavy military demands and delayed conversion of civilian industry to war purposes a vast war construction program approximating 17 billion dollars. This program will be nearing completion by the end of this year and will thus release large amounts of construction materials. It is estimated that 70 to 80 percent will be finished about January 1, 1943 and all by about July 1, 1943.
After this, provided vigorous measures are taken to increase supplies, find substitutes, press research work, complete the process of conversion, effect the utmost in conservation, inventory control, standardization, and simplification, and above all to perfect a simple, sound, and workable system of priorities for the distribution of materials, unless demands are
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greatly increased, shortages should be much reduced and the bottlenecks in critical materials become fewer.
There has been often an attitude of complacency arid a failure to take the vigorous measures necessary to increase supplies, working closely with the industries concerned. There has been some disposition to accept the “impossible” instead of trying to overcome it.
The military men must decide what things come first in war production, but it is the duty of this Committee to point out that unless the flow of materials for the construction of these synthetic rubber plants is insured there will be no rubber in the fourth quarter of 1943 with which to equip a modern mechanized army.
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8. Administration
The Committee finds that a number of different Government agencies have had overlapping jurisdiction in regard to the synthetic rubber program. This has caused delay and confusion. In particular the conflict between Rubber Reserve and the Office of Petroleum Coordinator has complicated in recent months the bringing in of.new facilities for the production of butadiene from oil. The. Committee has been unable to determine, in spite of many inquiries, as to where the responsibility has lain for many of the decisions which have been made in the last eight months.
The failure of the Government to provide a clearly recognized group of independent experts who would make technical decisions has added greatly to the public confusion and uncertainty. The reliance on one part-time technical adviser, aided by committees drawn from industry, has, in the opinion of the Committee, been insufficient for the development of an entirely new industry involving an investment exceeding 5600,000,000. The technical adviser has testified that on more than one occasion he requested the appointment of an adequate technical staff.
It would have been wise administration for the officials in charge of policy to have delegated to a competent technical staff the function of collecting information about the various processes. Such a staff should have been relied upon for supplying through regular channels the data on which all important decisions were made. Instead of such orderly methods of procedure we have found many evidences of a chaotic situation in which nontechnical men have made decisions without consultation with subordinates nominally in positions of responsibility.
There have been many adjustments and readjustments—a “stop and go” policy—in the synthetic rubber program. Some of these were inevitable; some appear to be the result of bad administration.
There is clear evidence that the situation with respect to the alcohol supply was altered between the fall of 1941 and the spring of 1942. What had once been a deficiency became an apparent surplus. As a result of this change the proportion of alcohol and petroleum-based processes in the synthetic rubber program was altered. A more adequately staffed organization might have foreseen earlier the changed situation and altered the program a few months earlier.
As another example of faulty administration we may mention the failure to obtain early in this year the detailed information concerning the Russian process for making synthetic rubber'. Russia has been manufacturing synthetic rubber successfully for more than 10 years. It would seem natural to have endeavored to benefit from this experience as soon as rubber became of major concern to the United States. If the Russian offer made in February to exchange men and information had been
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accepted and Russian engineers with blueprints of manufacturing had been rushed to this country last winter, it is conceivable that plants for producing synthetic rubber by the Russian process might now be well on the way to completion. To date we have no detailed information as to the process and no samples of Russian tires have as yet been obtained. Every effort ought to be made to obtain this information.
The dissemination of full information concerning the compounding of Buna S to all companies has become an accomplished fact only in the last few days. An agreement was entered into on July 3 of this year between the Rubber Reserve Company and the four large rubber companies. According to this agreement, Rubber Reserve alone was permitted to give out information to the other rubber companies. But in fact it did not do so for some six weeks in spite of repeated efforts of the Rubber Branch of WPB to have the information released. In view of this situation one hardly needs to point out that there has been very imperfect cooperation between the Rubber Reserve Company and the Rubber Branch of WPB.
Because of the record briefly summarized above, we recommend:
A complete reorganization and consolidation of the governmental agencies concerned with the rubber program.
(a) The War Production Board must assume full responsibility for the rubber program in all of its phases. We therefore recommend a directive from the President ordering the Rubber Reserve Company and all other Government agencies to act in all matters relative to the rubber program as directed by the Chairman of WPB.
(b) To discharge adequately the responsibilities which we recommend that the Chairman of WPB explicitly assume for the entire Rubber Program, full authority must be centered in a single official. We therefore recommend that the Chairman of WPB appoint a Rubber Administrator and delegate to him full and complete authority in regard to the manufacture of synthetic rubber, including research, development, construction, and operation of plants.
This single official, who must be a man of unusual capacity and power, must also have full’charge of all matters connected with rubber within the WPB. It should be his duty to formulate policies and administer the operation of the rubber program subject only to the Chairman of WPB, who should divest himself of all direct concern with these matters. Good administration dictates that the Rubber Administrator use the available facilities of other Government agencies in the execution of the program, but his decisions and not theirs must control.
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(c) We recommend that particular care be directed to the establishment of a Technical Division, under the immediate control of the Rubber Administrator.
(d) We also recommend that the Construction Division of Rubber Reserve be designated by the Rubber Administrator as the agency to supervise the construction of all plants under the rubber program.
It will be a matter of great importance to have the Technical Division adequately staffed and provided with branches in charge of all the various phases of research and development, except for the production of butadiene from petroleum which is referred to in the next recommendation.
The Rubber Administrator, acting on authority delegated by the Chairman of WPB, should have the sole responsibility for supervision of operation of all Government plants engaged in the production of rubber. In the execution of that responsibility he may utilize other agencies of the Government upon their agreement thereto, but shall not be required to do so, and he shall cancel such arrangements when satisfactory results are not obtained.
Funds must be made available at once to WPB to provide for the staff under the Rubber Administrator and to enable him to place such contracts as he may deem necessary in connection with research and development.
(e) We further recommend that the Petroleum Coordinator be directed by Presidential Order to act on specific directives from the Chairman of WPB, acting through the Rubber Administrator, to explore all methods for the production of butadiene from petroleum, and natural gas products and recommend new proposals to the Rubber Administrator for his consideration and action.
(f) The construction of all plants and equipment concerned with the production and purification of butadiene from petroleum should be under the authority of the Rubber Administrator, who we recom. mend shall designate the Construction Division of Rubber Reserve to carry out this function.
This provision is necessary in order to unify control of the construction program and make certain that no delays ensue by reason of conflicting authority and personalities. The Petroleum Coordinator should have supervision of the operation of the plants for the manufacture of butadiene from petroleum and natural gas products after completion of construction, but he should be directed not to modify the presently authorized construction program or the plans for operation except as approved by the Rubber Administrator.
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(g) We further recommend that in the Office of Petroleum Coordinator there be created a new Technical Division responsible for research and development in connection with all problems of the manufacture of butadiene from petroleum; funds for this purpose should be provided to OPC.
This specific delegation of responsibility to the Petroleum Coordinator is made in order to secure complete coordination of the butadiene program with other petroleum and natural gas requirements, especially for aviation gasoline and for toluene for explosives.
As the situation develops it may be desirable for the funds required for the entire rubber program to be put directly at the disposal of the Chairman of WPB for the purposes of the Rubber Administrator instead of, as at present, indirectly through RFC.
The most important part of the plan is obviously the choice of the right man for the position of Rubber Administrator. He should be a thoroughly competent operating and manufacturing executive, preferably with experience in the rubber industry. The demand for speed and the vital need for this man to start with experience and knowledge of the problem make it important that the man chosen be of proven integrity and enjoy the public’s confidence and that of the rubber industry as well. We cannot stress too much the importance of choosing the right man for this work, for no plan of organization can bolster up a weak man sufficiently to meet the difficult problems he must face.
One of the problems presented to this Committee has been the difficulty of determining the future needs of the war program for rubber and the components required for the manufacture of synthetic rubber and substitutes. This difficulty arises from the unpredictable character of the war operations as to location, kind of war, and equipment employed under various conditions. In spite of these and other such difficulties, there is need for determining the requirements on an authoritative basis. Every aspect of the rubber problem must be under continuous review by a man whose sole responsibility it is. The most we can do is to appraise the present situation and indicate a sound course for the future.
A program can be no better than its administration; therefore we place special emphasis upon this series of recommendations and wish to state that unless they are followed there can be no assurance of the successful development of the synthetic rubber program within the time required.
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9. Agricultural Program
Various agricultural plants which can be grown in the United States have been suggested as sources of rubber. Thomas Edison’s experiments with goldenrod are an example. Kok-saghiz, a Russian dandelion, is considered promising in Soviet Russia as an auxiliary source of rubber, and seeds have been sent to the United States for test planting. However, the two agricultural possibilities which show most promise for the United States are guayule and cryptostegia.
Guayule is a shrub which grows freely in Mexico and the American Southwest. It contains a high percentage of rubber which is extracted from the entire plant. Best yields are obtained after four years’ growth, but the shrub can be harvested any time after two years.
The Department of Agriculture has undertaken a large program of guayule cultivation in California, based on an initial independent planting of 500 acres in 1930. With seeds on hand and the expected harvest this month, there will be 66 tons of seed available for further planting. The seeds must be planted in a nursery and after one year transplanted to the field. The plans call for planting an acreage increasing to about 180,000 acres by the end of 1944. If this program is carried through, it is anticipated by the Department that there will be crude rubber available from this domestic guayule rising from 600 short tons in 1942 to about 33,000 in the fall of 1944, about 47,000 tons in the fall of 1945, and increasing thereafter.
The Committee believes that these estimates are over-optimistic but that the project is inherently sound and should be supported. The Committee therefore recommends that this program be given every possible support as the principal source of crude rubber which could not be lost to us short of conquest of American territory. To proceed with this program, however, certain things must be given immediate attention since the program will be delayed one year unless the following actions are taken before about October 1.
(1) Authorization must be secured to plant additional acreage. There is a question as to whether or not existing legislation would prevent the planting of more than 75,000 acres of guayule. This restriction, if it exists, must be removed promptly if the program is to go forward on a really significant scale.
(2) The second item is the granting by the War Production Board of adequate priorities to secure the farm equipment which would be required to prepare the land and plant the seeds. This, again, must be done very promptly to meet the fall planting season.
There are additional requirements for the success of the program,
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which are sought by the Department of Agriculture and to which the Committee gives its support.
Crypostegia is second in importance among rubberrproducing plants capable of substantial-scale production in the United States. This vine will grow wild in Florida and other southern states. It contains only two or three percent of rubber, but this is of high grade and can be secured from the leaves harvested each year from the perennial vines.
A plan to plant these vines extensively this year has met with relatively small success, owing to a delay in securing authorization for the gathering and purchase of cryptostegia seeds from wild-growing vines in Mexico. This authorization was another instance of “too late,” and was secured just after the seeds had scattered. There is little to be lost and much might be gained by pursuing this program vigorously when the opportunity again arises next year.
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10. Rubber Goods Manufacturing Capacity
A most important consideration in connection with the synthetic rubber program has to do with the capacity of the country to manufacture rubber goods out of the natural and synthetic rubbers which will be available. It would be obviously foolish to carry through a program of plant construction for the manufacture of synthetic rubbers only to discover too late that the factories for manufacture of tires, electrical insulation, footwear, and other rubber goods have insufficient manufacturing capacity to handle the material. The Committee has made a survey of these facilities and finds that, as matters now stand, there may indeed be a deficiency of factory capacity to handle the synthetic rubber when it comes into full production.
The Committee’s findings and recommendations in the matter of manufacturing plant capacity are given below under three headings: rubber goods manufacturing capacity, recapping capacity, and reclaim rubber capacity.
(a) Rubber goods manufacturing capacity. The significance of this problem is indicated by the following facts:
(1) The largest previous year’s use off rubber goods in the United States was 775,000 tons of crude rubber in 1941.
(2) The largest monthly production in the history of the rubber manufacturing industry used at the rate of about 1,000,000 tons per year of crude rubber—a rate which could not be continuously maintained. •
(3) The present governmental program calls for the procurement, of about 68,000 tons of crude rubber and approximately» 910,000 tons of synthetic rubber substitutes in 1944. The recommendations of this Committee would raise the total of these synthetic materials to about 1,100,000 tons.
(4) The processing art as developed at present requires more time, on the average, to fabricate than for the same tonnage of natural rubber. The Committee estimates that, on this account, the manufacturing capacity today for synthetic rubber is between two-thirds and three-fourths of what it would be for handling natural rubber.
These facts would indicate that the capacity of the country would have to be increased substantially to handle the quantities of synthetic rubber which will be produced in 1944. However, the following compensating factor must be taken into account:
(5) During recent months technical developments in the processing arts have proceeded very rapidly and the time required for the manufacture of synthetic goods is being reduced. For example, during the short existence of this Committee, means have been found for doubling the speed with which milling and mixing operations can be performed with Butyl rubber.
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Similar advances are being made in handling other synthetic rubber There is reasonable expectation, therefore, that the intensive technical research program now being carried on by the rubber companies will substantially increase the speed with which synthetic rubber goods can be manufactured and therefore increase the manufacturing capacity of the factories.
For this reason the Committee recommends that the Rubber Administrator institute a survey of milling, mixing, and tire-building facilities, on or about March 1, 1943.
This survey should determine the extent to which these facilities must be expanded in view of the processing and tire-building art at that time so as to handle the expected volume of synthetic rubber in 1944, after allowing for export of rubber stocks.
The Committee is informed by the rubber manufacturers that a decision on this matter made by April of 1943 would permit the manufacturing companies to add whatever additional manufacturing facilities might be required in adequate time to meet the manufacturing schedules of 1944— provided the necessary priorities are given for the procurement of the necessary equipment.
(b) Recapping facilities. The total recapping capacity of the United States, exclusive of the tire-building facilities of the tire manufacturers, is approximately 16,000,000 passenger tire recaps per year. This might be increased to 19,000,000 by operating at full capacity with extra shifts. The program recommended by the Committee for tire replacement and conservation may call for as many as 25,000,000 recaps per year. To meet this deficiency the Committee recommends utilization of tire molds of the tire-making plants so as to meet any excess demand for tire recapping.
(c) Reclaim rubber capacity. The program of recapping for the conservation of civilian passenger tires contemplates principally the use of reclaimed rubber. Other essential uses of rubber goods also call for reclaimed rubber. The armed services have gone far in substituting reclaimed rubber for natural rubber wherever circumstances permit, as a measure for the conservation of crude rubber. All these demands for reclaimed rubber will exceed somewhat the capacity of the present rubber reclaiming plants of the country. They indicate the necessity for providing some increase in this capacity.
The Committee is convinced that the quickest and most economical manner of securing increased rubber reclaiming capacity is by working through the existing experienced reclaiming companies rather than by erecting new and independent reclaiming facilities to be operated by relatively inexperienced groups.
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The Committee therefore recommends that the reclaim rubber manufacturers, through their National Rubber Reclaimers Association, be requested to submit to the Rubber Administrator a program for increasing by about 20 percent the present rubber reclaiming facilities of the United States, and that authorization be then given to carry through such measures as may be necessary in the form of priorities, financial aid, or contracts to secure this increase in rubber reclaiming capacity during 1943.
Several methods have been reported recently for increasing the useful qualities of reclaimed rubber. At least one of these is reported to involve only the use of chemicals which are not difficult to obtain in the present war economy. The Committee recommends that every encouragement be given to the further development and application of these new processes. Such encouragement could take the form of priorities for procurement of the necessary experimental materials and also financial aid, if necessary.
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11. Scrap Collection
No one can estimate with certainty the amount of scrap rubber in the United States. A reported 450,000 tons of scrap rubber were collected in the drive inaugurated by the President last June. This gross tonnage should yield about 350,000 tons of reclaimed rubber, but there is reason to believe that the actual amount of scrap collected is considerably below the above figure because of duplicated reporting of collections. Probably only about 300,000 tons of reclaimed will be netted.
There have been sensational claims regarding the amount of scrap rubber still uncollected in the country. The Committee has investigated some of these claims and has found them utterly without foundation in fact.
It is nevertheless true that the rubber now in the scrap piles of the country, together with anticipated current receipts, are sufficient to feed the rubber reclaiming plants at full capacity for about 18 months. During this time further scrap collections will continue through the normal operations of scrap collectors and junk dealers.. In addition to this supply the armed services have instituted, as part of their program of rubber conservation, an inspection system which will insure that damaged tires from military vehicles will be repaired if possible, and if not capable of repair will be assembled through scrap-collecting agencies and thus fed into the nation’s scrap stockpile.
Still another supply of scrap rubber will come automatically if new tires are rationed to civilian drivers in accordance with the recommendations of this report, since a condition for the procurement of a new tire will be the turning in of the worn-out tire for scrap.
With these supplies of scrap rubber in sight there is adequate time for the careful preparation of another national scrap rubber drive well in advance of serious depletion of the existing stocks. The Committee recommends that this drive be carefully prepared in advance tb secure its maximum effectiveness, and to this end suggests that the Rubber * Administrator take the initiative in selecting and directing the proper agencies for the organization and conduct of this drive. The Committee further believes that these steps can most advantageously be undertaken about a year hence.
Elsewhere in this report the Committee makes a number of recommendations in regard to the increased production and more efficient use of the reclaimed rubber produced from this scrap.
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12. Technical Suggestions for the Rubber Administrator
As a result of the study made by our experts the Committee has been in a position to Evaluate a number of technical points in connection with the rubber program. Therefore we have a number of recommendations of a minor nature to make which we should like to pass on to the man who, we hope, will be in charge of the rubber program as Rubber Administrator. We shall assume that he will immediately place a highly competent man on a full-time basis in charge of his Technical Division, and it is to that man in particular that these suggestions are directed.
1. We recommend the immediate installation of one or more small commercial pilot plants using the catalyst system developed by Standard Oil of New Jersey operating on butylene feed stock. These should be completed with fractionating towers and refining systems to the end that they may serve as training plants for the study of any difficulties that may be experienced in bringing the large units into operation at rated capacity, and for trying out suggested means for improving the over-all operations.
2. We recommend that one of the large-scale plants operating on this same process should be given as high priority rating as possible to insure that it is completed by March 1943, so that experience may be gained on the full-scale operation of this plant. Although our experts have no doubt that the engineering data provided by the small-scale experiments are adequate for the design of the large plants, it is clearly a difficult and somewhat uncertain matter to make the transition to the full large-scale plant which must be operated.
3. We believe that the purification of butadiene deserves further investigation both in the laboratory and in the pilot plants.
4. The .Committee has explored new and novel substitutes for conventional rubber tires, largely through access to a very full survey of such devices conducted by a special committee of the Society of Automotive Engineers at the suggestion of the National Inventors’ Council-Among these devices one stood out as possessing promise of giving relief to the less essential drivers in urban areas during the next few critical years. It is the “sandal,” developed by one of the large rubber companies, and consisting of a section of carpet impregnated with asphalt and easily fitted over an ordinary tire which has been too far worn to be used further with safety. On asphalt or concrete streets, and at very moderate speeds, these sandals have a life of between 1,000 and 2,000 miles. Using no critical materials and easily manufactured, they may provide temporary relief to drivers who otherwise may be
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unable to continue driving their cars. The Committee considers this ' to be an interesting possibility in the emergency and recommends that it be further studied.
5. The Committee recommends that the policy of encouraging inventors and research groups working on the development of rubber or rubber substitutes should be adopted. This encouragement might take the form of granting priorities for critical materials, where the amounts required are fiot excessive, for experimental and pilot plant development.
6. Recognizing the necessity for providing a real incentive to conserve crude rubber by finding ways of substituting synthetic, we favor the plan that was suggested by the Synthetic Rubber Section of the Chemical Branch of the War Production Board. This provided for a greater than proportionate increase in a manufacturer’s synthetic rubber allocation if he could increase the percentage of synthetic rubber in his product. Inadequate supplies of synthetics have forced postponement of this plan for the time being, but we suggest that it be reinstated in the program when large-scale production of synthetic rubber is attained. A further incentive for increasing the use of synthetics may be provided, within the limits of product specifications, by raising the price of crude relative to synthetic rubber.
7. Polyvinyl resins now are being used as rubber substitutes at a rate which corresponds to a saving of approximately 22,000 tons of crude rubber per year. Other substitutes are under consideration, but there is no well-defined clearing house in any Government agency at the present time for promising materials. Suggestions come in to the Rubber Reserve Company, War Production Board, the Office of Civilian Supply, and various other Government organizations, but center at no definite point, with the result that there is duplication of effort and delay in evaluating such new materials. This should be centered under an official reporting to the Rubber Administrator.
8. There appears to be considerable confusion in regard to the military involving rubber substitutes. Several branches of the Navy and the Army each have been searching for rubber substitutes and are in competition with each other to obtain scarce materials. The Rubber Administrator should furnish the proper liaison for the armed services and should center research along these lines under his own control.
9. The Committee suggests the institution of a prompt survey to determine the number of chemical engineers and other technically trained men who will be required to operate the synthetic rubber plants now under construction; and, if this survey indicates a serious shortage of
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such technical talent, that the Manpower Commission be called upon for assistance in devising a policy for meeting the situation.
10. Inspections of a large number of crude and scrap rubber stockpiles and examination of the methods being used for their protection have convinced the Committee that this situation is generally satisfactory. A number of spots were found, however, where protection is definitely inadequate. While commending the inspection program now set up by Rubber Reserve Company, the Committee suggests th€ advisability of more adequate protection through additional armed guards where-ever a hazardous situation is found to exist. These stockpiles constitute some of the most critical possessions of the nation.
11. The Committee also suggests the introduction into the manufacture of “camelback” for the retreading of civilian tires, the practice of adding up to 20 percent of finely ground tire treads into all reclaimed rubber tread stocks. This practice will improve the wearing qualities of the reclaimed rubber required for their production. This will be equivalent in its results to a further increase of between 10 percent and 20 percent in the capacity of the reclaim-rubber plants.
♦
The Committee:
James B. Conant,
Karl T. Compton,
Bernard M. Baruch, Chairman
September 10, 1942
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APPENDIX I
President’s Message on Senate 2600
To the Senate:
I return herewith, without my approval, Senate 2600, a bill “To expedite the prosecution of the war by making provision for an increased supply of rubber manufactured from alcohol produced from agricultural or forest products.”
This bill would create a new independent agency to be known as the Rubber Supply Agency to be headed by a Director of Rubber Supplies. The new agency is directed to “make available at the earliest possible time an adequate supply of rubber which, when added to the rubber being supplied by other agencies, will be sufficient to meet the military and civilian needs of the United States.” To perform this duty, the agency is empowered to provide the necessary plants, equipment, machinery, materials, and supplies for the making of synthetic rubber. In order to get such plants and machinery, the Director is given power to obtain any necessary materials, and is given priority for them over all other private plants engaged now or later in making implements of war.
In other words, by legislative fiat, the manufacture of synthetic rubber is ordered in quantities large enough to satisfy any and all civilian needs; and absolute priority is given to obtain scarce materials for this purpose, in preference to any other military needs as scheduled by the War Production Board, or called for by the armed forces.
The approval of this bill would, in my opinion, block the progress of the war production program, and therefore the war itself.
The Congress of the United States has heretofore definitely laid down the policy, approved by the President, that in order to carry on a unified, integrated, and efficient program of war production, it is necessary to centralize the power to determine the priorities of materials not only between military and civilian needs, but also among competing military needs. This power to fix priorities for the use of scarce materials has been vested by the Congress in the President of the United States, and has been delegated by him to the War Production Board. Experience in other wars, as well as in the present conflict, has proven beyond doubt that simplification of power with respect to the use of critical materials is essential to speed and efficiency. In fact, without this, there can result only conflict and delay.
On the War Production Board there are now represented all of the
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Government agencies concerned with the supply and use of materials for civilian needs in the United States and for the military needs of ourselves and our allies in this war. To this board, therefore, can be presented all of the many conflicting military and civilian demands for materials of which there is not enough to go around. One of the responsibilities and functions of the Chairman of the War Production Board is to determine, in the light of the many demands and inadequate supplies, which requirements must be filled first—considering, as we must, that the sole objective is victory in this war.
Obviously, it is only after all of the reasonable military requirements have been met that the civilian needs can even be considered.
This bill would immediately break up that logical coordination of centralized control, and would set up a new agency with power and duty to manufacture alcohol and rubber, and to override all the priorities established by the War Production Board for materials necessary to manufacture all the other hundreds of products essential in war. It goes much further than that. It provides that even civilian needs of rubber—for pleasure driving, joy-riding—must be given consideration, for the bill sets forth the duty of the new agency to furnish rubber in quantities sufficient “to meet the military and civilian needs of the United States” irrespective of the relationship of such civilian needs to winning the war.
The War Production Board has adopted a program for making synthetic rubber, and is now operating under it. In doing so, it has endeavored to operate on the basis of estimated military needs for rubber and those civilian needs which are essential. By the phrase “essential needs” is meant those needs of civilians who require rubber in work directly related to the war effort—for example, driving to war production plants in automobiles where other transportation is not readily available. It includes also certain necessities for the community, like getting milk to the consumer dr children to school.
In order to produce any substantial amount of synthetic rubber, new plants must be constructed or old plants converted. In formulating its program, therefore, the War Production Board has, of course, taken into consideration the amount of critical materials which can be diverted from other vital needs of the war program to build the plants to produce synthetic rubber.
In its program, the Board has allocated a certain amount of rubber to be produced from agricultural products, and a certain amount to be made from petroleum. Both types of plants—those using farm products and those using petroleum—are now being constructed, and others are planned to be constructed month by month, at the greatest possible speed.
Every one of these plants and all the machinery to be installed in them will require large quantities of certain materials of which there is great
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scarcity and which are sorely needed for other war purposes. They will require steel plate, other steel, copper, bronze, and brass. Remember that every time steel plate is used for a synthetic rubber plant, just so much is being taken away from ships, tanks, high octane gasoline plants, and munitions plants. These rubber plants will also require compressors which are so badly needed to manufacture ammonia and other components of explosives. Every pound of copper taken for rubber plants and their equipment will mean fewer shells and less ammunition for our fighting forces.
In spite of the shortage of materials, however, we know that plants must be built to manufacture synthetic rubber, because rubber is necessary for our fighting machine, and for our production machine as well. I am just as determined as anyone to get that rubber—and to get it as quickly as we can. But it is necessary to weigh the need for factories to care for civilian luxuries against the needs of our fighting forces.
Therefore, to take the determination of this question away from a board which is equipped by personnel, and by experience, and by an overall knowledge of all our military and civilian needs, and to place it in an agency which is concerned principally with the manufacture of only one commodity, rubber, is in itself a disruption of a unified and expeditious production program. To go further, and to say that these materials can be taken away from ships and guns and ammunition and .put to work producing rubber, so that some people might use it for automobiles for idle-hour pleasure, is to fly in the face -of the realities of the present grave military situation which threatens all the world and civilization itself.
It is a gross distortion of our war production policy and a repudiation of our all-out effort to win the war to say that any critical material can be taken away from military purposes and devoted to nonessential civilian demand. I am sure that not one loyal American would wish to take an ounce of critical war materials of any kind in order to insure the use of his own automobile for anything but essential war needs.
There is one other commodity—of supreme importance—which is involved in this question of synthetic rubber. That is food.
The proposed bill not only provides for a complete supply of rubber for any and all purposes, but it also directs that the new agency shall have the duty to “make available at the earliest possible time an adequate supply of alcohol produced from agricultural products to meet any military or civilian need of alcohol in the United States.” In addition to the further consumption of critical materials for the construction of any new alcohol plants which the new agency may determine to be necessary, this provision may require the consumption of many millions of bushels of grain. Even the process of making synthetic rubber under the present program, now actually under way, will require almost one hundred million bushels of grain.
It is true that we have great grain reserves at present; but we must
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bear in mind that there is a steadily increasing demand for grain for the making of food for the Army and Navy and Air Force—not only of the United States but of all the United Nations. In the event of a serious drought next year like those of 1934 and 1936—which is always a possibility—our reserves of grain may not be sufficient to cover the requirements both for food and for unlimited alcohol and rubber. Therefore, the need of grain for food instead of unlimited rubber or alcohol is something which must also be taken into consideration by those charged with the over-all responsibility of the entire war production effort.
The processes for making synthetic rubber are now in a state of flux. Some of them are in the purely experimental stage, others have been demonstrated to have varying degrees of efficiency.
It is obviously impossible to determine in advance just which process will eventually prove to be the most desirable, taking into consideration the elements of speed, efficiency of production, and consumption of critical materials. Even the processes for making synthetic rubber out of grain are several in number, and new ones are being presented from time, to time. The whole question of which process to use is tied up with the question of the most strategic use of the materials which are at hand or which can be obtained. Determination in this more or less unchartered area should have the advantages of the flexibility of administrative action rather than be frozen by legislative mandate.
It may well be that serious mistakes have been made in the past, based either on misinformation, misconception, or even partiality to one process or another. It may be that the present program of the War Production Board is not the best solution. If so, the facts should be ascertained and made public. This is particularly so, if it be true, as charged by some persons in the Congress and outside the Congress, that the manufacture of synthetic rubber from grain has been hamstrung by selfish business interests.
The question of rubber for automobiles is an unusually important one because it so intimately affects the daily lives and habits of so many American citizens. The very passage of the present ill-advised bill is an indication of the overwhelming interest which the American people have in this problem.
I am sure, however, that once they are given the full facts as to the supply of rubber and the military and essential civilian needs for rubber, and the amount of materials required for the production of an adequate supply of synthetic rubber, they will be wholly willing to forego their own convenience or pleasure. Americans gladly give up their comforts, their time, their money—everything that seems necessary to the successful prosecution of the war effort. They freely and proudly make the greatest sacrifice of all—their own sons and brothers.
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In recent months there have been so many conflicting statements of fact concerning all the elements of the rubber situation—statements from responsible Government agencies as well as from private sources—that I have set up a committee of three men to investigate the whole situation— to get the facts—and to report them to me as quickly as possible with their recommendations.
This committee will immediately proceed to study the present supply, the estimated military and essential civilian needs, and the various processes now being urged; and they will recommend processes to be used, not only in the light of need for rubber but also in the light of critical materials required by these processes. In a sense this will require a review of the program now being followed by the War Production Board. It will form a basis for future action not only with respect to synthetic rubber, but also such matters as nationwide gas rationing and motor transportation. The responsibility for the distribution of critical materials will continue to remain with the War Production Board; but the board, as well as the American people, will have a complete statement before them of the facts found by the committee.
This unusual investigation is being directed because of the interest of the American people in the subject, because of the great impact of the lack of rubber upon the lives of American citizens, and because of the present confusion of thought and factual statement.
In the meantime, of course, the manufacture of synthetic rubber from oil and grain will continue without interruption.
The functions of this committee require not only experience in business and production and the relations of Government thereto, but also trained, scientific minds. Therefore, I am appointing as members of this committee, Honorable Bernard M. Baruch, Chairman; Dr. James B. Conant, President of Harvard University; and Dr. Karl T. Compton, President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology. They will be equipped with adequate staff and will, I know, submit their report at the earliest possible moment. I am asking them to investigate the whole situation, and to recommend such action as will produce the rubber necessary for our total war effort, including essential civilian use, with a. minimum interference with the production of other weapons of war.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House, August 6, 1942
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APPENDIX II
Chemistry of Synthetic Rubber
Strictly speaking, no material has yet been produced which warrants the name of synthetic rubber—at least in the sense in which we speak of many other synthetic substances. Synthetic indigo, for example, is identical in every way with the dyestuff prepared from the indigo plant. Likewise synthetic camphor may be manufactured which is identical in every way with the substance obtained from the camphor tree. On the other hand no one of the synthetic rubbers so far developed—and at least a thousand more or less rubberlike substances have been produced—is exactly, the same as natural rubber either in its chemical make-up or its physical properties.
The molecules in natural rubber are of very great size and are constructed by the multiplication of a basic unit composed of five carbon atoms. This unit is known as isoprene- Rubber-like materials have been prepared synthetically by starting with artificially manufactured isoprene and causing the units to combine together to form a large molecule.
Although such material is identical with natural rubber in chemical composition it still differs appreciably in physical properties because the artificial conditions under which the isoprene units combine do not produce the same-size molecule with exactly the same architecture as that found in nature. If isoprene could be manufactured readily it might well be the best raw material for the manufacture of a synthetic rubber. Lacking any process for the production of isoprene economically on a large-scale basis, chemists have turned in their studies to closely-related simple chemical compounds.
One of these is butadiene which differs, from isoprene in having four carbon atoms in its structure instead of five. Another is chloroprene which differs by having four carbon atoms and a chlorine atom.
The molecules of butadiene may be caused to combine together by the action of metallic sodium to form a rubber-like material often known as Divinyl rubber. This is the synthetic rubber which has been produced in Russia for a number of years. On the other hand, the molecules of chloroprene will combine to form a giant molecule with rubber-like properties known as Neoprene. This product has been commercially in production in this country for a number of years. All of these processes by which small molecules join up to form a large one are known as polymerization.
It has been found in recent years that highly satisfactory rubber-like materials may be formed by allowing mixtures of butadiene and relatively
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small amounts of other compounds to polymerize. In this chemical reaction, large molecules are formed in which both the butadiene unit and the other molecule are built into a large and complex aggregate. When two or more different kinds of molecules are involved in the polymerization the process is known as co-polymerization. The material which results when styrene and butadiene are co-polymerized carries the name Buna S. This is the synthetic rubber which will be produced in largest quantities under the present Government program.
Another co-polymer which has recently received considerable attention is that known as Butyl rubber. This material results from the copolymerization of isobutylene and small quantities of butadiene or isoprene. Flexon is the name given to a Butyl rubber which is prepared in a special way requiring little apparatus but the maintenance of low temperatures by the use of solid carbon-dioxide (dry ice).
butadiene and Its Cousins
To complete the picture as it applies to the projected program for the supplying of synthetic rubbers in this country, there should be considered briefly the manufacture of butadiene, chloroprene, and isobutylene, which are the basic constituents in the processing of Buna S, Neoprene, and Butyl rubber.
Butadiene is a close relative of a compound known as butane which occurs in large quantities in natural gas. Butadiene differs from butane only by reason of its relatively smaller content of hydrogen. Even closer in its relationship to butadiene than butane, however, is the gas called butylene which is a by-product of the petroleum-cracking process for the manufacture of gasoline.
All these three substances—butane, butylene, and butadiene—have four carbon atoms per molecule; they differ only in their degree of dehydrogenation—that is, in their content of hydrogen atoms. Butane has 10 hydrogen atoms, butylene has 8, and butadiene 6.
It sounds as though it should be an easy matter to ring the changes between these various gases by the removal of hydrogen atoms. In practice it is by no means simple. In general it takes high temperatures and special substances known as catalysts to dehydrogenate molecules, and butane and butylene are no exception. However, it can be done and the process of manufacturing butadiene from the other two petroleum compounds depends on either the removal of four hydrogen atoms from butane or of two hydrogen atoms from butylene.
It is unfortunate from the point of view of endeavoring to give a simple explanation of the chemistry of rubber synthetics that the situation is still further complicated by the intrusion of the material called isobutylene in
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the rubber picture. Isobutylene contains the same numbers of carbon and hydrogen atoms as does butylene, and differs from butylene only in the architecture of the molecule—the arrangement of the atoms. Because of this difference it is only distantly related to butadiene and cannot be converted into butadiene. As has been pointed out, however, it has the ability of being co-polymerized with small quantities of isoprene or butadiene to form Butyl rubber.
Both isobutylene and its cousin, butylene, share one characteristic in common, namely, that both are valuable materials for the manufacture of high quality aviation fuel—in other words, high octane gasoline. The importance of this fact to the war program rests in the interconnection of the preparation of butadiene from petroleum and the manufacture of aviation fuel and other petroleum products.
Finally, the fact must be recorded that relatively small quantities of butadiene and still smaller amounts of isoprene are formed when gasoline or higher boiling mixtures of hydrocarbons are subjected to the cracking process; i. e., heated to a high temperature. This “thermal process” of manufacturing butadiene has. been in operation in this country on a considerable scale for several years.
However, in previous high-thermal cracking, butadiene has appeared as a by-product. Hence this source is not available for the manufacture of the great quantities of butadiene needed for the present synthetic rubber program. The sizes of plants required for manufacture of butadiene by this method would be excessive and the disposal of the main products of the process a major problem; furthermore, because of the high temperatures employed (1300 degrees Fahrenheit), the life of some of the crucial equipment is short.
This is the reason why the chief reliance in the Government rubber program, insofar as petroleum is concerned, has had to be in processes starting from butane or butylene.
Alcohol Processes
In addition to petroleum products, alcohol may also be used for the preparation of butadiene. This can be accomplished in several different ways, which amount to the union of two two-carbon units of alcohol into the four-carbon butadiene unit by the processes of dehydration and dehydrogenation—that is, by the loss of water and the loss of hydrogen.
The Germans employ four steps in this process. The American process, by which one-quarter of the butadiene under the Government rubber program will be manufactured, accomplishes the same transformation in two steps. The Russian and Polish processes accomplish the entire transformation in a single step by the use of a special catalyst.
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It should be remarked here that in the public discussion of the various processes of manufacturing butadiene from either alcohol or petroleum there has been a tendency to lay altogether too much stress on whether a process involved one step or two steps. Actually in all the processes there are many separate phases from the point of view of the chemical engineer and only a detailed analysis of the very complicated blueprints of the plant layout enable one to pass judgment on the comparative simplicity and merits of the operation. In one of the plants for the manufacture of butadiene under the Government program, for instance,’ over 600 separate engineering drawings are required.
Alcohol can be prepared by the fermentation of carbohydrates material, such as grain or molasses, or from the carbohydrates found in sawdust or sulfite liquors from wood pulp manufacture. It also can be manufactured from ethylene which, in turn, is a by-product of petroleum, or from acetylene which is manufactured from limestone and coke.
These many routes, starting from widely unrelated materials and all passing through the alcohol process for the production of butadiene and eventually of Buna S rubber, have led to the appearance in print of many erroneous chemical interpretations and conclusions. For instance, we may speak of Buna S as being manufactured “essentially” from wood-pulp or grain or petroleum or limestone and coke, and yet in each case we might be endeavoring in simplified language to describe the preparation of butadiene through a single route—the alcohol route—and its subsequent conversion to Buna S or Divinyl rubber.
Still another process for making butadiene from grain has recently been developed and is being experimented with by the Department of Agriculture in its laboratories at Peoria. This involves a special fermentation of the grain to produce butylene glycol, which, in turn, through a series of chemical reactions, is turned into butadiene and then into Buna S rubber.
Neoprene
We have mentioned that the Germans, as far as is known, start their process from limestone and coke. At this point we may conclude our account of the chemistry of these substances by a description of the American product Neoprene, which also traces its ultimate origin to the same substances.
In a high-temperature, electric furnace, limestone and coke yield calcium carbide which when treated with water gives acetylene. The Germans transform acetylene to butadiene by a four-step process, which is essentially one of the alcohol routes for the manufacture of this gas. In this country two molecules of acetylene are combined and a molecule of
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hydrochloric acid (which comes from salt) then added. The product is chloroprene-—the four-carbon compound which differs from isoprene, the unit of natural rubber, by reason of the presence of one chlorine atom. Chloroprene is polymerized to Neoprene.
One final basic fact regarding synthetic rubbers must be mentioned. To manufacture tires from either natural or synthetic rubber, the material of the tire must be (a) milled and (b) compounded; then the tire must be (c) built and (d) vulcanized or cured. All four processes depend on the nature of the rubber-like substance or substances used in fabrication. Buna S and Neoprene resemble natural rubber more closely in structure than Butyl rubber. Hence they can be milled and cured more nearly in the same way as natural rubber.
Buna S, Neoprene, and Divinyl may properly be regarded as members of the same family as natural rubber. Other synthetic rubber materials now in the public eye are more distantly related. Chief among these now much discussed is Thiokol. It is manufactured from ethylene chloride (a product of ethylene and chlorine), sulfur, and caustic soda. The architecture of the Thiokol molecule bears little resemblance to that of natural rubber—in its structure a sulfur atom plays a predominant part.
Other rubber-like materials have been manufactured by the preparation of large molecules by various chemical reactions from a wide variety of natural products. The starting point of these processes has varied widely. They may be oil from soya beans or, as in another case, lactic acid (a by-product of the manufacture of casein from milk). To date insufficient data are available both as to the manufacture of these compounds and their possible use as rubber substitutes to warrant our relying upon them for a significant part in our immediate rubber program. The inadequacy of our present stockpile of natural rubber for a long war and the need for an early production of synthetics to supplement that stockpile make it imperative that we turn to those substances from which production in substantial amounts before the end of 1943 seems best assured.
Nevertheless, one of these relatively untried substances may prove to have important uses either for recapping or for the manufacture of tires, or for substitution in other rubber products. Therefore experimentation in and adequate testing of all such substances and of others which should be developed should be encouraged. At the same time it is to be hoped that extravagant claims as to the merits of such pro-substances can be kept out of the public press, until full data for a competent evaluation are available.
It must be remembered by the public that a complicated series of chemical reactions are involved in the manufacture of any rubber-like substance from common raw materials. Each step requires long experimentation, protracted engineering study, and time for construction. Some
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day it may be possible to prepare a rubber substitute with a less elaborate procedure than now used for the manufacture of butadiene or Neoprene, but it is not within the range of prudence to count upon any such process to yield significant quantities of rubber substitutes within the next two years for military purposes, nor can anyone hope for any similar solution of the civilian tire problem in the same period.
Synthetic Rubbers
To round out this discussion of the chemistry of synthetic rubber, the differences in the various rubbers produced by these processes might be explained:
Buna S is the mainstay of the present synthetic program. It is particularly well adapted as a material for tires, showing wearing qualities as a tire tread material approximately 90 percent of those of crude rubber. With suitable compounding, successful tires in sizes up to 7.00 can be made entirely out of Buna S. In the larger truck, heavy duty, and combat sizes a certain amount of natural rubber has thus far been found necessary in the sidewalls and carcasses of the tires.
On the basis of presently developed art it seems safe to state that not over 20 percent of the entire weight of a heavy duty Buna S tire would have to be crude rubber. The tire industry believes that this percentage may be reduced to 10 percent, perhaps lower.
Buna S has about the same density as natural rubber and can be vulcanized with sulphur, zinc oxide, and regular accelerators. It requires a plasticizer to facilitate processing. Buna S is an excellent material for the insulation of wires subjected to very rough usage, provided it is covered with a layer of some better weather-resistant material such as Neoprene.
Neoprene is the synthetic material most nearly similar in its general utility to natural rubber, although its density is about one-third greater. It is more oil-resistant than natural rubber and has good aging properties and can be vulcanized with metallic oxides, with sulphur acting as an accelerator. Neoprene is excellent for heavy duty tires, being the approximate equivalent of natural rubber in ordinary service and definitely superior to natural rubber when run over ground containing flinty or other sharp materials likely to damage the tires.
Butyl has inferior abrasive qualities to Buna S or Neoprene but is characterized by a very high degree of impermeability to air and other gases. It has excellent properties for electrical insulation and heat resistance and requires a relatively high temperature for vulcanization with sulphur, zinc oxide, and accelerators. It is only recently that means have been found to attach Butyl to natural rubber or' to Buna S or Neoprene, because of the very different degrees of saturation of the constituent carbon
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atoms. For this reason its use in tires was until recently considered only possible for whole tires but it now appears that it may prove capable of being used as a recapping material also.
Flexon is chemically similar to Butyl and differs in that it can be produced at dry ice temperatures simply by mixing the constituents in an open vat. In its production, however, about half of the isobutylene is lost. Isobutylene is a valuable constituent for making aviation gasoline. . Also, because of its method of preparation, Flexon is inferior to Butyl, apparently because of lack of homogeneity. It is probable that its quality will be considerably improved with further developments in the art of its production. In general, it can be considered to be an inferior type of Butyl but one which can be produced with a minimum use of critical materials in the production plant.
Thiokol is brought into the program principally for two reasons: first, because it is a quickly producible material for recapping natural rubber tires, and, second, because it is exceedingly resistant to oils and various other chemicals which attack natural rubber. Thiokol has an unpleasant odor and produces somewhat the effect of tear gas, though in recent forms of Thiokol this objectionable feature has been considerably reduced. As a recapping material its wearing qualities are definitely inferior to Butyl and about equal to the present types of reclaimed rubber.
In all of.these synthetic materials an important consideration is the speed with which they can be processed in the various operations of milling, mixing, compounding, tire building, and vulcanizing, since on this speed depends the capacity of the rubber milling equipment to handle these materials. The accompanying chart gives the general status of these synthetic materials as of the time when the Committee’s report was written. It should be emphasized, however, that very rapid developments are being made in the processing arts so that it is reasonable to expect that the situation as regards manufacturing efficiency may be more favorable six months from now.
Here follows a chart comparing various synthetics and reclaimed rubber with crude rubber as a tire and recap material.
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Comparison of Synthetic Rubbers and Reclaimed lubber with Crude Rubber as a Tire and Recap Material*
Manufacturing Efficiency Tread Wear Carcass Failures Suitability as, a Recap For Inner Tubes
BUNA S (new tires and recaps). Good— Mixing . . 40-70% Building .80-100% Curing . . 100% Good—Tests show about 90% mileage of crude rubber. None—If 10% crude rubber is used. Good—Tests show about 90% mileage of crude rubber. Curing time about the same as crude rubber. Apparently satisfactory.
NEOPRENE (new tires and recaps). Good— Mixing . . 40-65% Building. 75-100% Curing . . 50% Good—90% mileage of crude rubber at normal speeds; 125% under severe service. None—No carcass failures reported in tires tested recently. Some failures in earlier tests. Good—Tests show 90— 110 % mileage of crude rubber recaps. Curing time longer. Apparently satisfactory.
BUTTL (new tires). Good— Mixing . . 100% Building. 100% Curing .. 70-75% Fair—40—50% of mileage of crude rubber. Frequent-—65 % of first tires failed, largely due to blisters which developed in the manufacturing process. Promising—A d h e s i o n with crude rubber was poor at first, but a recent development appears to have overcome this difficulty. May be developed, but not yet satisfactory.
FLEXON (new tires). Fair—Similar to experience with Butyl. Manufacture slow; material soft and sticky. Poor—Mileage in tests not more than 40% that of crude rubber. Frequent—Tread and ply separation common in the few tires tested. Later tests show improvement, as with Butyl. Promising-—Same difficulties as with Butyl. Unsatisfactory.
THIOKOL (recaps). Poor—Thin, smooth recap gave only 14% of mileage of crude rubber; 28% for comparable thickness. Regular non-skid tread gave 20%. * Good—Curing and cooling time somewhat longer than for crude or reclaimed rubber recaps. U nsatisfactory.
RECLAIM (new tires and recaps). Good—Equal efficiency in milling, etc.; cures somewhat faster than natural rubber. Poor—About 20—25% mileage of crude rubber. Infrequent ; Good—Curing time same as for crude rubber. Fairly satisfactory.
‘Comparisons are based on average experience in latest tests, operating at speeds around 40 miles per hour. The mileage life of a crude rubber tire at this speed is considered to be about 35,000 miles.
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