[Landing Craft and the War Production Board, April 1942 to May 1944]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

CIVILIAN PRODUCTION ADMINISTRATION BUREAU OF DEMOBILIZATION
LANDING CRAFT AND THE WAR PRODUCTION DOARD
APRIL 1942 TO MAY 1944
^HISTORICAL REPORTS ON WAR ADMINISTRATION: WAR PRODUCTION BOARD Special Study No. 11
99-046 cover
CIVILIAN PRODUCTION ADMINISTRATION John D. Small, Administrator
Bureau of Demobilization, (5. Lyle Belsley, Director
LANDING CRAFT
AND THE WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
April 1942 to May 1944
Prepared under the supervision of JAMES W. FESLER War Production Board Historian
GEORGE E, MOWRY
First issued July 15,1944
Re-issued March 8,1946
HISTORICAL REPORTS ON WAR ADMINISTRATION* WAR PRODUCTION BOARD SPECIAL STUDY No.Jl
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HISTORICAL REPORTS ON WAR ADMINISTRAT IONr WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
. ... v ; SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES
Number	Title	Issued	Re-issued
1,2,3	Not available		
1*	Evolution of Premium Price Policy for Copper, Lead and Zinc: January 191*0 to November 191*3	Dec. 10, 191*3	Feb. 22, 191*6
5	Not available	•••••••	• ••••••
6	Resumption of Production of Domestic Electric Flat Irons» April 19h3 tq, August 191*1*	‘	; / • : ' '	Aug. 31, 191*1*	Mar. 1, 191*6
7	Pulp and Paper Policies of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies: 191*0 - 191*3	Mar. 25, 191*1*	Mar. 1, 191*6
8	Lead and Zinc Policies of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies: May 19h0 to March 191*1*	Mar. 31, 191*1*	Mar. 1, 191*6
9	The Closing of the Gold Mines: August 191*1 to March 191*1*	June 1, 191*1*	Apr. 5, 191*6
10	Mercury Policies of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies: May 191*0 to March 191*1*	June 3, 191*1*	Mar. 8, 191*6
11	Landing Craft and the War Production Board: April 191*2 to May 191*1*	July 15, 191*1*	Mar. 8, *191*6
12	. Policies Governing Private Financing of Emergency Facilities: May 191*0 to June 191*2	Sept.20, 191*1*	Mar. 15, 191*6
13	Farm Machinery and Equipment Policies of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies: May 191*0 to September 191*1* '	Nov. 10, 191*1*	Mar. 15, 191*6
11*	Concentration of Civilian Production by the War Production Board: September 191*1 to April 191*3	Nov. 25, 191*1*	Mar. 22, 191*6
15	Development of the Reconversion Policies of the War Production Board: April 191*3 to January 191*5	Feb. 26, 191*5	Mar. 22, 191*6
16	Alcohol Policies of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies: May 191*0 to January 191*5	Apr. 21, 191*5	Mar. 29, 191*6
17	Truck Production and Distribution Policies of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies: • July 191*0 to December 191*1*	May 23, 191*5	Mar. 29, 19b6
18	Shipbuilding Activities of the National Defense Advisory Commission and the Office of Production Management: July 191*0 to December 191*1	July 25, 191*5	Apr. 5, 191*6
19	The Facilities and Construction Program of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies: May 191*0 to May 191*5	,	. , .	Nov. 2, 191*5	Apr. 5, 191*6
			
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FOREWORD
It was President Roosevelt’s opinion, which President Truman has reaffirmed, that Nwe need both for current use and for future reference a full and objective account of the way the Federal Government is carrying out its wartime duties.” The Special Studies constitute one of several series that attempt to meet that need with respect to the War Production Board. Each study endeavors to treat in some detail an area of the War Production Board’s operations that was particularly significant during the war and that has continuing importance for the understanding of administrative and economic problems and for the planning of industrial mobilization.
Special Study No. 11, Landing Craft and the War Production Board: April 1942 to May 1944, was originally issued on July 15, 1944, under the same number and title, as a secret report for use exclusively within the War Production Board. The original report has been declassified in order that the report may be made generally available.
Although minor errors of fact and typography have been corrected, the study has not been revised to extend its chronological coverage to the termination of the War Production Board on November 3, 1945, or to take account of any additional documentation that may have become available since completion of the original draft.
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WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
July 5, 1944
IN REPLY REFER TO:
MEMORANDUM
TO:	Mr. G. Lyle Belsley
Executive Secretary
FROM:	James W. Feeler, Chief
Policy Analysis and Records Branch Office of the Executive Secretary
Attached is Report No. 11 of the Policy Analysis and Records Branch, Landing Craft and the War Production Board. It records the history of two great production efforts upon whose success has depended in large measure the timing and effectiveness of the invasions of North Africa and the European Continent. In addition to its basic function of recording the War Production Board1 s activities related to the production of landing craft, the study provides data basic to analysis of broad problems of industrial mobilization. Among these problems are the role and organization of the Armed Services in connec-. tion with strategic decisions and the translation of such decisions into production requirements; the War Production Board’s relation to procurement agencies in the execution of production and procurement programs; the influence of theater-of-operations experience on change of designs and programs for military items; the techniques for reconciling competing demands of highly urgent programs for components and materials; the development of methods of expediting the delivery of items needed to complete critical military equipment; and the relation of expediting to the priority system as a whole.
This report is based entirely upon records in the custody of the War Production Board and upon interviews with officials of the Board. The report is intended to be an objective history, but is not designed to be as comprehensive as would be a history that covered all agencies’ activities on landing craft and drew its data from all relevant records and all informed officials of such agencies.
A preliminary draft of this report was prepared on April 27, 1944, and circulated among Board officials who have actively participated in the development and execution of the landing craft programs. The comments and suggestions of these officials have been taken into account in the preparation of the study in its present form.
Attachment
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.	Introduction	1
II* The First Landing Craft Program
I(April 1942 to May 1943)	5
First Quarter, 1942	5
Production Goals	6
Production: April 1 to August 31, 1942	8
WPB Participation	11
WPB Landing Craft Organization	12
Materials and Components	14
Special Assistance Given to Landing Graft
Program	19
Production, September 1, 1942, to	July	31, 1943	21
Conclusion	22
III.	The Second Landing Craft Program
(August 1943 to May 1944)	25
Difficulties Involved in Meeting December 1
Schedule	33
Marine Diesel Engine Facilities	37
Materials	38
Priorities and WPB Landing Craft Organization 39
Critical Landing Craft Components	44
Priority Conflicts	51
WPB Assistance to Landing Craft	Program	56
Production Progress	57
Conclusion	62
Appendixes
A.	Chronology	64
B.	Landing Vessel Contracts Awarded July 1940 to
March 1944, by Months	69
C.	Production of Landing Craft, July 1941	to
September 1943	72
Production of Landing Craft, October 1943 to
May 1944	73
D.	Position of Landing Craft and Destroyer Escorts
in the Navy's Shipbuilding Precedence Groups, January 18, 1942, to December 23, 1943	74
E.	Shipyards Participating in 1ST and Destroyer
Escort Program	75
F.	Landing Craft Program as of January 1,	1944	76
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LIST OF TABLES
Table	Page
1. Landing Craft Production Schedules, July 1, 1942	6
2« Production of Selected Types of Landing Craft
May to August 1942	10
3» Landing Craft Schedules	28
4« 1ST December 1 Schedule, Deliveries and Dates of
Contracts or Directives, by Yards December 1, 1943
to May 1, 1944	36
% Schedules, Deliveries, and Cumulative Deficiencies in LST*8, December 1943 to March 1944«	57
6« Schedules, Deliveries, and Cumulative Deficiencies in LVT’s, December 1943 to March 1944	59
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I,	INTRODUCTION
Modern large-scale amphibious operations require the use of thousands of shallow draft vessels of many types and sizes to transport men, equipment, and supplies from ship to shore and from shore to ship» These vessels are collectively known as landing craft» Today they vary in type from seagoing ships of 4,710 tons light displacement, the so-called Landing Ship, Vessel (ISV), to lightweight rubber boats capable of carrying only a few men» Disregarding the rubber boats, which will not be considered in this study, the main requirements of landing craft are that they be self-propelled, that they have a very shallow draft, and that they be capable of carrying their burden and landing it on a beach in any reasonable seaway» The large craft, in particular the Landing Ship, Vessel (ISV), the Landing Ship, Dock (ISD), the Landing Ship, Tank (1ST), and the Landing Craft, Infantry (LCI), must be capable of negotiating the high seas through any weather in company with a task force» Landing craft of every type must be so designed as to permit their approach to, their unloading on, and their retraction from, a beach in the shortest possible time, often under hostile fire» Their speed and sureness in these operations are at the highest premium»
The decisive importance of this type of vessel to successful amphibious operations and to the eventual outcome of the present war can be seen from the recently printed statement that Germany was nqt able to invade the British Isles in the summer and fall of 1942 because of the lack of landing craft» 1/ The importance of landing craft to our own strategic plans, past and future, is obvious» For the first time in our history we have had to begin every major campaign in this conflict by amphibious operations» As someone has remarked, much of this war has consisted of a "battle for beachheads»*
Prior to the beginning of the present war our familiarity with the construction of landing craft was scant indeed» In 1924 the Navy first constructed what might be termed loosely a self-propelled landing craft» But it was not until 1937 that a close approximation of the present smaller-type landing craft was developed» This was the 35 to 50 foot tank lighter, which was capable of carrying one light tank» Varied experiments were carried on with this type of craft for the next five years»
During 1940 and 1941, as the prospects of war grew daily, the Navy let contracts for other light types of landing craft»
1/ Albert Carr, "The Five Mistakes of The Axis," Harper*s Monthly, February 1944, p. 219.
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When war actually came to this nation, therefore, we either had built or building, in addition to the tank lighter, four other types of light landing craft, namely Landing Craft, Medium, Landing Craft, Personnel (Large), Landing Craft, Personnel (Ramp), and Landing Vehicle, Tracked, the weight of which varied from six to 20 light-weight tons. Moreover, in November 19U1 the British asked the United States Navy to develop a large landing «raft of real ship dimensions. This craft, according to the British had to be capable of undertaking long ocean voyages and of carrying and depositing on enemy held beaches many heavy tanks and other heavy equipment. Thereafter, with the aid of a group of British consultants, the Bureau of Ships developed the preliminary design of the LSI, a large ocean going craft of l,U90 tons. The preliminary design of this ship was practically complete by the end of December, l?hl. £/
Since Pearl Harbor, this nation’s landing craft construction programs have closely reflected strategic commitments. The first large construction program started in April 19U2, seven months prior to the landings in North Africa, and ended in the spring of 191*3« The second program, anticipating the invasion of western Europe, and Pacific operations originated in August and September of 191*3 and reached its peak in deliveries during May of 191*1*.
Throughout these years of mass production of landing craft, designs and types have been constantly changing in answer to both anticipated needs and actual battle experience. Some types that were included in the first program are at present no longer being made; and entirely new types have been added as the Services grew older and wiser in the ways of amphibious warfare. For purposes of clarity, the main types of landing craft that this country has constructed since the outbreak of the war are given below, together with their abbreviated designations and their weights in light displacement tons.
1.	Landing Ship, Vessel, LSV, U,710 and h,^70 tons.
This seagoing vessel is used for the transportation of non-ocean-going landing craft and for other nonspecified purposes.
2.	Landing Ship, Dock, LSD, h,$00 tons. This seagoing vessel is used as a repair dock for the smaller landing vessels, and for the transportation of non-ocean-going landing craft.
3.	Landing Ship, Tank, LST, 1,1*90 tons. This type of ocean-going vessel is used to carry and land tanks, heavy artillery, heavy vehicles, and troops. If any one type of landing craft can be singled out as the most important it would probably be the LST. At
2/ Statement Captain J. 0. Gawne, Director WPB Shipbuilding Division “ to author, June 9, 191*1*.
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present LST’s constitute more than 50 percent of the tonnage of the entire landing craft program«
4« Landing Craft, Infantry (Large), LGI, first models - 175 tons, later models - 207 tons« This seagoing type of craft is almost entirely used to carry troops and their light equipment to a beachhead.
5« Landing Craft, Tank Mark VI, LCT (6), 134 tons« This craft is used to carry heavy tanks, artillery, and vehicles from ships to a beachhead« Previous models of this craft weighing less tha.n the present model were constructed in the first landing craft program«
6« Landing Ship, Medium, LSM, 490 tons« A type of craft similar in description and uses to the LCT but much larger, faster, and ocean-going« For a time this craft was known as LCT (7)• The first contracts for LSM’s were let in 1943 and deliveries were first made in April 1944« *
7« Landing Craft, Control, LCC, 23.5 tons« This craft, on which construction was first started in 1943, is used as a close-in control point for amphibious operations«
8« Landing Craft, Mechanized, LCM (3) and (6), 19.6 tons and 22.1 tons«
9« Landing Craft, Support (Small), LCS (s)(2), 8 tons«
10« Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel, LCVP, 8 tons«
11« Landing Craft, Personnel (Ramp), LCP (R), 6.4 tons«
12« Landing Craft, Personnel (Large), LCP (L), 6 tons«
13« Landing Craft, Vehicle, LCV, 8 tons« This type was discontinued, the last delivery being made in October 1943»
14« Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Unarmored), LVT - (Armored), LVT (A) 6 models! LVT (A)(1), 16.4 tons (production discontinued March 1944); LVT (2), 12«6 tons; LVT (A) (2), 13«8 tons; LVT (3), U.8 tons; LVT (4), 12.7 tons; LVT (A)(4), 18«4 tons« The production of these
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amphibious tracked cargo carriers and amphibious tanks has recently been greatly expanded as a result of the Gilbert Islands campaign. Many of the unarmored types are now being heavily armored.
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II.	THE FIRST LANDING CRAFT PROGRAM (April 1942 to May 1943)
First Quarter, 1942.*-0n December 7, 1941, this country had ready for use only a limited number of miscellaneous types of small landing craft and an additional 1,700 on order. Of those on order, the great majority consisted of Landing Craft, Personnel (Large), Landing Craft, Personnel (Ramp), and some tank lighters fifty feet in length. During the first quarter of 1942, the Navy Department’s Bureau of Ships slowly began letting contracts for more varied types of landing craft, in particular for some of the larger types patterned after British design. For the Airst time, Landing Ship-Docks (LSD) and Landing Ship-Tanks (1ST) appeared on Navy purchase orders. But the Navy still did not consider the landing craft program as relatively a very urgent one. By virtue of being placed in the eighth group in the Navy’s Shipbuilding Precedence List published on January 18, 1942, landing craft had a very low priority. On March 31, it fell even lower, - to the tenth group. 2/ Altogether the Navy’s April 1 schedule exclusive of tank lighters called for the construction of 1,189 landing craft during 1942. This total was composed of 1,017 LCP(L) and (H) and LCV’s, 55 LCM*s, 9 LCT’s, and 108 LVT’s. (J
One of the reasons for the low relative priority assigned by the Navy to landing craft during the first quarter of 1942 was the menace of the German submarines, which required concentration on building vessels for anti-submarine work, principally destroyer escorts. After the destructive German submarine campaign throughout 1940 and 1941, the Navy had let sizeable orders for destroyer escorts in October 1941, and again in January 1942. The attitude held by the Navy about the urgent need for these ships is indicated in its choice of construction yards. These yards were among the more efficient shipyards of the country. In addition to the Boston, Philadelphia, Mare Island, Norfolk, Newport News, and Charleston Navy lards, the Bethlehem Hingham; Dravo Corporation, Wilmington; Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock; Consolidated Steel Corporation; and the Brown Shipbuilding yards were brought into the program. ¿/ Work was scarcely well started on this program, however, when the landing craft program was interposed in the Navy* s total program. As an indication of how
2/ See Appendix D.
"Navy War Program: Semi-Monthly Progress Report," January 15, 1944, p. 18; WPB, "Official Munitions Production, United States," April 1, 1942, p. 86.
2/ "Combatant Vessels Under Construction, United States Navy - Report of Progress," March 1, 1942, pp. 25-31. (For a comparison of yards building 1ST’8 and destroyer escorts 1942-44, see Appendix E)
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it affected the destroyer escort program, the construction of IST’s was subsequently undertaken at six of the 11 yards constructing destroyer escorts in the spring of 1942« These included the Boston, Norfolk, Charleston, Philadelphia, Newport News Navy yards, and the Dravo Corporation, Wilmington« 6/
Production Goals»—Foreshadowing the North African campaign, a conference was called at the White House on April 4» 1942, at which, among other things, the urgent need for landing craft to be used in future operations was stressed. As a result of the White House conference , the Bureau of Ships was ordered to provide 600 fifty-foot tank lighters by September 1, 1942, or in other wc>?d8, within five months» Subsequently, the anticipated campaigns in the Pacific added to the requirements until the first landing craft program bulked as one of the most important in the Navy's shipbuilding list» By July 1, the landing craft program for 1942 called for the construction of over 12,000 vessels with a total value running well over one.billion dollars» 7/ The production goals of the various types of landing craft in the 1942 program as scheduled on July 1, 1942, are given below:
TABLE 1» landing Craft Production Schedules» July 1, 1942 (Number of Craft)
1942	1ST	LCI(L)	LCM(3)	LCT(5)	LVT	LCF(L)	LCP(R)	MV
April					21	33	16	105
May			27		68	49	151	67
June			36	1	108	62	159	125
July			315	44	101	61	169	244
Aug»			543	104	123	13	220	350
Sept»	2	1	487	112	120	0	238	715
Oct»	12	33	335	103	117		357	498
Nov,	37	69	126	65	109		300	
Dec.	77	88	25 ‘	43	16			
Jan»	88	95	25					
Feb.	59	45	14					
March	26	19						
April	28							
May	27							
Source: WPB, “Official Munitions Production, United States,* July 1, 1942.
6/ Ibid.» pp. 28 f.	’
2/ Bureau of Ships, “Landing Craft Progress Report,* November 1, 1942»
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The landing craft program initiated in the spring of 1942 faced almost incalculable difficulties in meeting the schedule month by month as outlined above. In the first place, since the nation’s all-out war effort had just started, the program was in competition for materials and components with scores of other urgent military programs. And, although landing craft were placed alone in the first preference group of the Navy’s Shipbuilding Precedence List on July 1, deliveries of materials and components on time was by that action alone far from assured.
Moreover, the landing craft program was the first multiple, mass-production, ship program undertaken by the Navy. The resulting need for accurate coordination of the flow of the required materials and components was a task of immense proportions about which the Navy had little experience at that time. Experience was also lacking among some of the participating building yards. At the start of the program there were few yards in the program that had built any number of landing craft previous to that date. Because of the size of the landing craft program and the huge existing naval pfogram for other types of ships, contracts for landing craft had to be let to many small boat yards, structural steel plants, and other metal-working firms located thousands of miles away from deep water. By June 30, contracts had been let to five Navy yards, 22 major private yards, 11 minor private yards, 12 small boat yards and 29 manufacturing companies. Of this total, 21 were located in the Mississippi River - Great Lakes water sheds. And they, together withmany firms on the coasts, had to acquire the “know-how“ of constructing landing craft. Tn that acquisition thousands of mistakes were made, thousands of man-hours lost. 8/
Many other difficulties stood in the way of the program’s completion exactly on schedule. Since many of the types were being con- . structed for the first time, and as inadequacies appeared in deep water tests, design changes were numerous. But of all the hurdles standing in the way of the program, the amazingly rapid acceleration of the production rate was perhaps the most difficult to surmount. This was particularly true of the first four or five months of the program when deliveries were needed for the North African campaign and when construction experience was almost completely absent. By the Bureau of Ship’s May 1 schedule, the production of LOM’s was expected to rise from no ships in April to 499 ships in August, LCT’s from no ships in May to 89 in August, LCP (R)’s from 110 ships in April to 896 ships in August. And although this rate of increase was cut sharply by the July 1 schedule, it was the steepest rate of increase in tannage production that the Bureau of Ships had scheduled to that time. There was little doubt but that the latter part of the program would be met, but whether those
8/ “War Progress,“ No. 117, December'll, 1942, pp. 6-8; WIB, “Shipbuilding Program and Activities of the Shipbuilding Branch,” July 28, 1942, p. 7.
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steeply ascending delivery rates of the first few months would be fulfilled was questionable«
Production: April 1 to August 31» 1942*—The landing craft program ordered by the White House conference of April 4, 1942, got off to a slow start. To make certain of obtaining the 600 fiftyfoot tank lighters by September 1, 1942, the Bureau of Ships let contracts for 1,100 such craft on April 16 and 22, 1942. These 1,100 lighters, however, were to be of the Bureau of Ships own designa although (1) by actual tests slightly smaller Bureau of Ships designed lighters had been proved unsatisfactory, (2) similar lighters designed by the Higgins Industries of New Orleans had been proved satisfactory, and (3) the Forces Afloat had stated their preference for the Higgins designed craft. 2/
By May 1942, the first fifty-foot Bureau of Ships designed lighter was available for a test against a comparable craft designed and built by the Higgins Corporation. In the words of the Truman Committee, the report from these tests *concluded that the Bureautype lighter was unseaworthy and that the Higgins lighter performed excellently.1* 10/ As a result, 1,000 tank lighters in this program were changed to the Higgins design on May 29. This change, of course, meant to some extent starting the program again from scratch with only 90 days remaining before the dead line date of September 1.
‘ 3/ U.S .Senate 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, Additional Report, in Report No. 10, Pt. 16, pp. 138-139.
10/ Ibid., p. 163. After the completion of the report on tank lighters by the Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, the Secretary of the Navy asked Professor H. L. Seward of Yale University to investigate the charges made by the so-called Truman Committee and make a report to him on the same. Citing Seward’s report as an "impartial" study, Captain J. 0. Gawne, Director WPB Shipbuilding Division, in a memorandum to J. W. Fesler dated June 9, 1944, objected to the wording of this paragraph and stated that the failure of the Bureau of Ships lighter in the May 25 test was "primarily due to improper loading." Professor Seward does state in the body of his report that after the May 25 test "it was determined that the lighter had been improperly loaded with the medium tank used for the test, thereby creating a list which led to the shipping of water." He does not say, however, who made the determination of the improper loading and how it was made. Moreover, there is no mention of this improper loading elsewhere in the report. Instead in a final discussion of the shipping of water (Continued on next page)
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Meanwhile, the Bureau of Ships had been busy adding to the few orders let in the first quarter of the year for other types of landing craft« During April, May, and June, additional contracts were let for 160 IST’s, for 340 Landing Vehicles, Tracked (unarmored), and for the first 251 LCT’s weighing over 100 lightweight displacement tons« In June, contracts were also let for 350 of a new type of landing craft, the Landing Craft, Infantry (Large), of 175 lightweight displacement tons« And the total program,. insofar as major types were concerned, was rounded out in November when 3,800 Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel were ordered« 11/
According to its May and July schedules, the Bureau of Ships expected many types of landing craft to attain peak production in August, September, and October of 1942, presumably in time for the units to be used in the North African Invasion. This was true in the cases of LCM (3), LCT (5), LVT (1) and(A), and tank lighters. The extreme urgency of that part of the program was evidenced by the change in the status of landing craft on the Navy’s Shipbuilding Precedence List from the 10th group on March 1 to a position alone in the first group on July 1« In fact, completions did rise rapidly from a total value of $2,275,000 in April to $26,000,000 in August. 12/ the corresponding rise in tonnage was from 1,457 to 15,806. That in itself was a considerable accomplishment, considering the difficulties
io/(Continued from previous page)
by the Bureau lighter the following statement is made: "The theoretical analysis of the'hydraulic properties of the Bureau lighter had been thoroughly computed for calm water, but the heavy seas appeared to be too much for it."
Professor Seward in his opening summary does state that he agrees with the recommendation of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee that the building of further Bureau-type lighters should be abandoned. In his findings Professor Seward speaks of the "unsatisfactory performance of the Bureau lighter at the May 25 test" and states categorically that he prefers "the Higgins to the Bureau types, the latter having numerous mechanical difficulties not present in the former, as well as decidely inferior controls." Furthermore, in its concluding discussion the Seward report reads: "It is obvious that the Bureau, after a long period of development, produced a tank-carrying lighter which was eclipsed in its total of acceptable qualities by a lighter produced in a very short time by Mr. Higgins." Herbert L. Seward, Report to the Secretary of the Navy on the Xa-nk Lighter Program of the Navy Department (77th Cong«, 2nd Sess«, Committee on Naval Affairs, Senate Committee Print, 1940), pp. 37, 41, 3, 5*
11/ Bureau of Ships, "Landing Craft Progress Report," November 1, 1942, p. 1 et seq. See Appendix B for tonnage of contracts let by months.
12/ WPB, "War Progress," No. 117, December 11, 1942, p. 6; WPB, "Official Munitions Production, United States," May L, and September 1, 1942.
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involved and the woefully short period of time intervening between the letting of the contracts and the scheduled delivery dates« landing Craft, Tanks, of over a hundred lightweight tons that had been ordered in April were being delivered in August* But by August 1 it was apparent that the program in many respects was falling short of the May and July programs of the Bureau of Ships« For example, 416 LCM(3)’s, a class covering the tank lighters referred to previously, had been scheduled by the Bureau of Ships May 1 Schedule for delivery in July« Anticipating disappointing deliveries, the July 1 Schedule had reduced this number to 315« But actual deliveries in July amounted to only 118« As a matter of record, none of the 1,000 Higgins fifty-foot tank lighters ordered in May by directive of the April 4 White House Conference were delivered in July« Only 118 of them were delivered in August and another 111 in September. The entire 600 required by the White House Conference
TABLE 2. Production of Selected Types of Landing Craft May to August 1942
(By Units)
LCM(3)					LCT				LVT			
	Schedule	»dule	shedule	Actual Deliveries As Recorded September 1	Schedule	»dule	:hedule	»liveries	Schedule	»dule	® xj o	»liveries Led September 1
	May 1942	July Schi	August S<		May 1942	July Sch(	J August S<	Actual De	May 1942	July Sch«	August Sc	Actual De As Record
May	30	27	27	27	0				20	48	48	48
June	208	35	35	35	12	1	1	1	109	58	58	58
July	416	315	116	116	33	44	1	1	63	101	74	74
Aug«	499	543	315	309	89	104	29	44	no	123	126	94
Source: WPB, "Official Munitions Productions, United States," May 1942 to September 1942«
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by September 1 were not delivered under this program until late in November. Even then, 129 of these 600 Higgins-designed fifty-foot tank lighters were not fitted with propulsion engines. 13/ And what was true of LCM’s was to a lesser degree true for other types, as noted in Table 2.
WPB Participation.—Reflecting official concern over the lagging landing craft program, the President gave instructions to Donald M. Nelson in August 1942, that landing craft were of such urgency that the program "should interfere, when necessary, with any other program where such interference could not be avoided." 14/
Prior to the receipt of these instructions from the President, the Navy had already held conferences with top officials of the War Production Board about expediting the landing craft program. During July, at the request of the Navy, an AA-1 priority had been authorized for all material, components, and plant equipment needed for the completion of the landing craft program. A month later, the Navy asked the War Production Board to advise all manufacturers that landing craft would take precedence over all other programs in the AA-1 category. It also requested authority from the Board to divert "all material on hand, on order or otherwise authorized for other uses by the Production Requirements Plan for landing craft without further reference to the War Production Board." Finally, the Navy asked that authority be delegated to the Bureau of Ships to issue AAA priority on equipment, materials, and components for the landing craft program. 15/
The request by the Navy for plenary priority powers was refused. But in a subsequent conference among Vice Admiral S. M. Robinson, Major General Lucius D. Clay, William L. Batt, and J. A. Krug, agreement was reached on a plan, first discussed in late July, whereby the Navy together with the War Production Board would give special treatment to the landing craft program. At this and later conferences it was determined that the landing craft program would remain in the AA-1 priority group, but that higher preferential treatment would be granted by the use of a directive for expediting the delivery of equipment, materials, and components for the landing craft program under certain conditions. 16/
12/ Bureau of Ships, "Landing Craft Progress Report," July 1, August 1, September 1, October 1, November 1, 1942.
14/ Donald M. Nelson to Admiral H. L. Vickery, undated letter not sent.
15/ Letter, Vice Admiral S .¡¿.Robinson to Amory Houghton, August 22, 1942.
16/ Letter, J.S.Knowlson to Donald M. Nelson, August 26, 1942.
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WEB Landing Craft Organization.--To implement the above program, the Navy engaged the Bethlehem Steel Company to organize an office in New York to act as Material Coordinating Agency for the program, and the WPB appointed L. R. Boulware, Assistant to W. L. Batt, to supervise the priorities and expediting aspects of the program. To carry out his responsibilities, Boulware was given a special delegation of priority authority by J. A. Krug, Deputy Director General for Priorities Control. In January 1943» when William Francis Gibbs was named Controller of Shipbuilding, Boulware was appointed Deputy Controller, retaining his special priorities delegation and landing craft expediting functions.
To work under Boulware’s direction a Landing Craft Specialist was appointed for every War. Production Board Regional Office. It was agreed between Krug and Admiral Robinson on August 24 that the Navy Bureau of Ships was to be held responsible for coordinating delivery dates in all purchase orders for all materials and components needed for the program, that the Materials Coordinating Agency would be responsible for preparing a detailed construction schedule, which would serve as a master production program, and that Boulware and his Landing Craft Specialists would be responsible for resolving bottlenecks in the flow of materials and components by the usual WPB field procedures and by the use 'of directives where necessary. 17/ By Field Administrative Order No. 708-4, Regional Directors of the War Production Board were delegated authority to issue Directive Form PD-637, which required ”any supplier to produce and make delivery of specified items on schedule, regardless of the effect of such directives on orders bearing lower or equal ratings • • •” This overriding directive, however, was to be issued only under circumstances, and subject to the conditions, specified in written instructions from the Director General for Operations, the Assistant Director General for Operations, or the Deputy Director General for Priorities Control of the War Production Board. Among these subsequent instructions was one to the effect that no directive interfering with the production or delivéry of any AAA items should be issued without Boulware’s prior permission. Another prohibited the issuance of a directive on materials or components that had been scheduled by a WPB branch without consultation with the scheduling branch. 18/
17/ ” Outline of Proposed Scheduling Procedure for Landing Craft Program,” August 24, 1942 (signed by J. A. Krug for the War Production Board and Admiral S. M. Robinson for the Navy).
18/ WPB Field Administrative Order No. 708-4» August 26, 1942; letter, J. A. Krug to All War Production Board Regional Directors, September 12, 1942; Memorandum, J. A. Krug to L. R. Boulware, September 3» 1942.
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At first, Field Administrative Order No. 708-4 was misinterpreted by Navy officials to mean that landing craft automatically took precedence over all other military programs except where AAA ratings had been granted. A Bureau of Ships official wrote to all Inspectors of Naval Materials that by agreement the landing craft program would take precedence over all Army priorities. Thus the Landing Craft Program is at the top of the AA-1 category ... so this program should receive preferential treatment over all other military priorities except /for/the minimum number of AAAs that have been issued." 19/ This memorandum was in clear violation of Priorities Regulation No. 1 and resulted in the practice of putting Navy landing craft ahead of landing craft made for the Army, which were also rated AA-1. In addition, it would have put landing craft orders ahead of all other AA-1 military orders irrespective of when purchase orders were placed. Objections were soon naturally voiced to this practice. And, as a result, instructions had to be reissued to all Landing Craft Specialists, Branch Chiefs, and WPB Regional Directors, "That the precedence as between landing craft orders and others bearing the AA-1 rating is determined only by the date of their receipt by the vendor." Additional preference for landing craft, it was indicated, could be obtained only by granting of an AAA rating or by a directive. It was not until November 1, however, that the practice of granting Navy landing craft orders priority over Army AA-1 programs was completely stopped. 20/
A subsequent priorities tangle developed between the Navy and the WPB when the Navy issued orders to all vendors holding naval contracts not to accept any other contracts without first notifying the Navy Department. In operation this actually prevented WPB Landing Craft Specialists from placing orders in firms already holding Navy contracts until such placements were approved by the Navy Department. This situation was shortly resolved when the Navy rescinded the order. 21/
On August 27 and 28, 1942, Boulware held a meeting of all the Regional Landing Craft Specialists in New York City to outline the procedure for according special treatment to the landing craft program. Under this procedure, each Landing Craft Specialist was to check all appeals for aid in his district with the proper Inspector
19/ Memorandum, W. Pressinger to Inspectors of Naval Material, August 1942.
20/ Memorandums, J.A.Krug to All Bureau Chiefs and Regional Directors, October 28, 1942; L.R.Boulware to All Landing Craft Specialists, October 28, 1942; M.B.Doty to D.B.Ford, November 9, 1942.
21/ Memorandum, J.A.Krug to L.R.Boulware, September 14, 1942.
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of Naval Material« He was then to obtain a written declaration from the Materials Coordinating Agency that the material represented as a bottleneck in the plea for aid was actually "the determining factor in the schedulethat it could not be installed later without delaying delivery of the completed ship, and that *it was not being requested at a rate greater than either the needs of the schedule or the capacity of the recipient to process it,* Upon receiving these assurances from the Materials Coordinating Agency, the Landing Craft Specialist was then to "exhaust the usual WPB procedure in an effort to give relief without a directive and without disruption of the rest of the war program«* This was to include arranging for substitutions, requisitioning idle and frozen stocks with the aid of the WPB Regional Inventory and Requisitioning Sections, and changing purchase orders so that the work could be done elsewhere« If these possibilities were unpromising, relief by directive could be provided« If the decision on the case was to the effect that relief should not or could not be given, the Landing Craft Specialist was to report the decision back to the Materials Coordinating Agency within 24 hours« PD-637 directives were not to be issued without certification by Boulware's office in Washington« 22/
A screening system was subsequently set up to avoid the issuance of directives when they were unnecessary, thus protecting other programs from too much landing-craft interference« Reports of bottlenecks by Inspectors of Naval Material were to be sent first to the Materials Coordinating Agency which was to screen them before they were sent to Boulware's office in Washington« There they were to be screened again in cooperation with the Industry Division concerned« From Boulware's office the cases requiring further action were to be sent to the WPB Field Specialists« Directives were to be issued then only if no other means were at hand to obtain the required items, and if the Landing Craft Specialists were sure that the directive would be effective« As a check upon the effectiveness of field actions, Landing Craft Specialists were required to send a weekly report to Boulware's office with a notation of the cases received, the actions taken, and the cases remaining open at the end of the week's business« 23/
Materials and Components«—The task of getting materials and components for the Landing Craft Program on schedule in the last four months of 1942 was no mean one« The requirements for materials and components for the overall war program were running far ahead of actual production, and the competition among various agencies of the Armed
22/ Memorandum, Material Coordinating Agent to Bureau of Ships, All Inspectors of Naval Material, et al«, "Summary of a Meeting of WPB Regional Representatives, etc«", August 29, 1942«
23/ Memorandum, L.R.Boulware to All Landing Craft Specialists, August 28, 1942«
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Services for available material was keen. Moreover, the specific materials and components needed for the Landing Craft Program were in most instances the same items required for the other building programs of the Navy and the Maritime Commission. There was some evidence that the Services were hoarding. According to a report by the Steel Division of WPB, a survey had revealed that 18 Maritime Commission Yards and 19 Navy yards had inventories of carbon steel plate in excess of a three months1 supply. 24/
Conscious hoarding, was not the only obstacle to rapid delivery of landing craft. Materials and components were also being tied up because of the unfamiliarity of the Navy and participating companies with correct scheduling procedures for the mass production of ships. At the start of the program the Navy announced that Gibbs and Cox would order all material and components for the LST’s. But at the same time they authorised the individual shipyards to make local purchases whenever shortage of particular components threatened to delay ship construction. In the words of a Navy official, this practice resulted in individual building yards attempting *to place orders not for a few emergency items as intended, but for part or all of the valves and the fittings which they will require to build this program.” When this procedure of duplicate components was discovered, the authority of yards to purchase was immediately limited. 2$/
Proper lead factors were often ignored, with materials and components being dumped into yards months ahead of the dates on which they were to be utilized. In one such instance the American Bridge Company was authorized to receive $500,000 worth of Section F materials in the last quarter of 1942. Purchase orders, however, were placed by Gibbs and Cox for delivery of apprcqcimately five times that amount to the American Bridge Company. Because of a lack of storage space the company protested first to Gibbs and Cox, and when that did not produce the desired results, to the War Production Board. 26/
24/ Letters. Raymond F. Hart to WJ*.Gibbs, April 29 and 30, 1943* 25/ Memorandum, Commander R. M. Watt to Captain N. L. Rawlings, August 22, 1942.
26/ Letter, J.W.Peterson to H.G.Batcheller, December 12, 1942; memorandum, Rear Admiral T.S.Keleher to Rear Admiral Cochrane via Vice Admiral S .M.Robinson, December 18, 1942; memorandum, Vice Admiral S.M.Robinson to W.F.Gibbs, December 29, 1942; memorandum,’W.F.Gibbs to L.R.Boulware, January 4> 1943; memorandum, L.R.Boulware to W.F.Gibbs, January 16, 1943.
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Erring in the other direction, some companies had not even reduced all their needed components to individual delivery dates as against the completion dates of individual ships« Others, having scheduled materials and components, did not check previous to the required delivery dates to see whether the items were going to be delivered as per schedule« 27/
Illustrating the above mentioned points, Boulware reported in April 1943 that a number of destroyer escorts had been tied up for six months after launching pending the receipt of needed components« This situation had never been reported to the WPB and only became known to it when Boulware visited some Philadelphia ship yards« On the other hand, in the same city, materials were on hand in Navy yards for the construction of cruisers which were not to be started until 1944« 28/ To correct such mistakes, Boulware early suggested that materials and equipment be transferred from some of the seacoast yards where they were not being utilized to some of the interior yards where they were sorely needed« 29/ He also suggested later that agencies be set up within the Navy and the Maritime Commission to schedule components, construction, and inventory accumulation in all shipping yards« 30/
Shortly after the War Production Board undertook to aid in expediting the Landing Craft Program, Commander E. W« Sylvester of the Bureau of Ships wrote that the materials for the IST’s were "definitely behind schedule"; what was true of IST’s was true generally of every part of the program« 31/ The most critical materials for the landing craft program were carbon and alloy steel and copper alloy« Approximately 60 to 70 percent of the appeals for directives on materials concerned various shapes of carbon and alloy steel« One initial difficulty in getting steel for landing craft resulted from the conflicting directives that were sent out from the WPB Steel Division and Boulware*s office« It was Boulware’s contention that a PD-637 directive superseded all other instructions« The Steel Division disputed this in its own instructions to the steel industry, with the result that Boulware complained that "for three weeks we have not gotten a wheel turned on alloys and plates at Republic and Carnegie." 32/ The argument was resolved almost immediately after Boulware’s complaint« - Telegrams were sent to all steel firms concerned to the effect that a PD-637 directive was "to take precedence over each and every allocation, directive or instruction heretofore or hereafter received in connection with plates, alloys and all products«" 33/
27/ Letter, W.F.Gibbs to Admiral C.F .Jones, February 9, 1943«
28/ Memorandum, L.R.Boulware to W.F.Gibbs, March 24, 1943, Id. to Id., April 14, 1943.
29/ Letter, L.R.Boulware to Vice Admiral S.M.Robinson, September 11, 1942«
30/ Letter, L.R.Boulware to W.F.Gibbs, March 24, 1943«
31/ Letter, Commander E.W .Sylvester to J.W.Powell, September 25, 1942.
32/ Memorandum, L.R .Boulware to J .A. Krug, September 14, 1942«
33/ Telegram, E.C.Kanzler to All Steel Companies, September 16, 1942«
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The greatest difficulty in obtaining items on time for landing craft, however, was the fact that the Navy often anticipated the need only a few days or weeks before it was wanted« And when such needs first necessitated getting the steel needed for the same into the mill's melting schedules, as was often the case with alloy steel, the possibility of furnishing it in any reasonably short time was slight indeed« In other words, the problem of obtaining materials and components for landing craft was not just one of keeping pace with the increases in the military program, but of always keeping several jumps ahead of the program, since components are needed days and sometimes weeks ahead of completion dates« This lead factor must also allow for fabrication time, which is considerable when vendors' order books are crammed to capacity« Thus, if requirements for materials and components are not anticipated well before they are to be utilized, delays are bound to occur«
As a case study, steering gears were wanted for installation in landing craft during November« The steel billets from which they were to be manufactured were ordered on October 2« On October 17 it was determined by the Navy that production of the billets was lagging« At that date Boulware estimated that with good luck the billets could be gotten out in two or three weeks or that substitutes might be found elsewhere« But the time required for fabrication, according to Boulware, would delay the installation of the furnished steering gears until about Christmas« 34/
The most critical equipment and common components for the landing craft program were machine tools, welding rods, diesel engines, electric motors, generators, reduction gears, and valves and fittings« Of these, the shortage of diesel engines probably affected landing craft more directly and severely than all of the others mentioned, for the cancellation of 100 IST's in late September 1942 was ascribed to the insufficiency of main diesel propulsion units« 33/ Even then it was estimated that the Navy had41,000 small vessels of all types in
34/ Letter, L.R .Boulware to E.B.Harper, October 17, 1942«
35/ Memorandum, A,E.Pierce, Chief Special Studies Section, Shipbuilding Division, WPB to C.E.Wampler, October 7, 1942« Captain J.O.Gawne, Director, WPB Shipbuilding Division states that the lack of diesel engines had nothing to do with the cutting back of 100 LST's, Statement, Captain J.O.Gawne to author, June 9, 1944*
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the water and the Army 100 more without engines» And although Boulware had not been asked to do anything about this, since the expediting of diesel engines and parts was not being effected by the Materials Coordinating Agency, he did suggest that a central authority be designated to schedule production and use of diesel engines» 36/
There was no response to that suggestion beyond the one that had been given previously by the Navy that it thought sufficient engines would be obtained in the future» yi/ That judgment proved to be wrong. On November 3, the WPB Shipbuilding Division reported that insufficiency of diesel engines was affecting landing craft as well as the Army and Navy small boat programs» ' 38/ Later in the same month, the Navy slowed down the production rate of IST’s so that the diesels intended for installation therein could be utilized as spares on ships already put in service. A reasonable balance of spare diesels and IST’s was not obtained until the middle of February 1943» 39/
The production of marine diesel engines had been increased by almost 100 percent in the three months between July 1 and September 30, 1942, and the construction of almost $60,000,000 of new facilities for their production had been started, but still, production was far behind total military requirements. 40/
One item that was holding up the production of diesel engines and that delayed the shipbuilding program as a whole was marine D» C. motors and generators. Like diesel engines, these were not being expedited by the Materials Coordinating Agency and thus were not a direct concern of Boulware’s WPB organization, except where their nondelivery threatened to immobilize other materials and components» However, a report in October indicated that landing craft was the only class of ship not being held up by non-delivery of motors and generators. 41/ But this apparently was so only because the Navy was heavily sacrificing spares to increase original production» Unlike the diesel , engines situation, an unbalance between spare D.C. motors and generators and completed LST’s still existed in February 1943, even though the LST program had been substantially cut back. 42/
The difficulty in most of the critical items for landing craft was not because production had not been expanded, but rather because the demands of the military program had experienced such staggering
36/ Memorandum, L.R.Boulware to W.L.Batt, October 26. 1942»
37/ Letter, Admiral S.M.Robinson to L.R .Boulware, September 30, 1942»
38/ Memorandum, Captain J.O.Gawne to E.C.Kanzler, November 3, 1942*
39/ Letter, Captain E.W.Mills to W.F.Gibbs, February 16, 1943»
40/ ’’Critical Components Data Book,” April 1943, pi SH-24«
41/ Memorandum, A.E.Pierce to C.F.Poirir, October 20, 1942.
42/ Letter, Captain E.W.Mills to W.F .Gibbs, February 16, 1943.
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Increases within so short a time» The production of brass valves, for example, had been increased 40 percent by weight in four months during 1942, but the demand increased even more rapidly* The same story was true of steel valves* In each instance, total requirements in 1942 were greatly in excess of the top capacity of the industry. 43/
How much the landing craft program was delayed for want of materials and components is hard to estimate* The supply of materials and components was considerably behind schedule at the time that Boulware tock over the responsibility of aiding in expediting the program, as has been previously pointed out* There can be little doubt that delays occurred subsequently because of the acute situation in regard to most of the materials and components required by the program. In December it was apparent that the shortage of diesel engines was substantially affecting the program, a situation that could not be immediately remedied, because it was impossible at that time to get a clear picture of the Army’s requirements for diesels. 44/ Other delays occurred when shortages were not anticipated until too late for deliveries to be made on time and when directives were useless in speeding production of the item required*
Special Assistance Given to Landing Craft Program. —No complete quantitative record was kept of the total amount of both formal and informal assistance given to the Landing Craft Program by the Landing Craft Specialists and other WPB agencies in the field. However, from September 1, 1942, to January 15, 1943, over 2,000 requests for special priority treatment were received from Inspectors of Naval Material. In answer to these requests only 270 directives were issued. Immediate solutions for over 1,400 of the requests were found in the field and elsewhere without recourse to the issuance of directives. Solutions for the remainder were either found by the* Materials Coordinating Agency in New York or by Boulware’s organization in Washington also without issuance of directives. On a program of $750,000,000 worth of Landing Craft, directives weré issued covering a total of approximately $5,000,000.worth of materials and components. Thus only 2/3 of 1 percent of the program was obtained by the use of the directives. 43/
43/ Memorandum, Captain J.O.Gawne to E.C.Kanzler, December 12, 1942.
44/ Memorandum, W.F .Gibbs to C.E.Wilson, December 3, 1942.
45/ "Information Regarding Directives Taken on Gibbs and Cox, Navy and New York Shipbuilding Corporation Purchase Orders,” Compiled by the Materials Coordinating Agency, December 10, 1942; letter, W.F.Gibbs to James V. Forrestal, January 21, 1943. The total figure given by the Materials Coordinating Agency was $6,513,755*74 but this, as was pointed out, covered directives granted on 490 IST’s worth of material, whereas by that time the 1ST program had been cut back to 225 ships; letter, E.B.Harper to L Ji .Boulware, February 20, 1943.
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The total number of directives issued for the Landing Craft Program as against the number asked for and the total value in dollars as against the total value of the program indicates the careful screening policy followed and the concern evidenced over interfering with other critical war programs« How much interference with other programs actually did occur was a matter of subsequent debate« Whereas Boulware estimated later that only six cases of "minor interference" were experienced in the first few months of the program, all of which were "easily resolved," the New York Supervisor of Shipbuilding remarked that the use of overriding priorities in the Landing Craft Program had "disrupted other /Navy/programs to such an extent as to cause considerable embarrassment and annoyance«" 46/ Representatives of the Army and the Maritime Commission also stated that landing craft had disrupted their programs severely« Admiral Land estimated that the 175>000 tons of IST’s that the Maritime Commission had constructed for the program had cost them at least 775>000 deadweight tons of Liberty vessels« In addition to that, the rest of the Maritime program, he wrote, had been affected by landing craft orders "in many manufacturing concerns«" 47/
Evidence exists to show that there was considerable substance to these claims of interference« Perhaps the most immediate landing craft interference with other programs was caused by the diversion of steel« By November 1943, the Shipbuilding Division was temporarily unable to complete 310 requests for carbon and alloy steel and copper alloy because its allocations of those metals had been used, a situation which in part was undoubtedly due to landing craft requirements« Ninety percent of the 310 cases were for AA-1 programs« 48/ At one time in the autumn of 1943, the fastest Liberty Ship building yard in the country was operating on less than a two weeks1 inventory of steel« 49/
What was true of steel was also true of other materials and components« But considering the overall requirements of shipbuilding materials and components as against the existing supply, it is doubtful whether any program of the size and urgency of the landing craft program could have possibly been superimposed upon an already full shipbuilding program without creating some disturbances« Undoubtedly true was Boulware1s statement that the remarkable thing about the program was that a much greater amount of conflicts did not develop with the
46/ Letter, L.R.Boulware to Ernest Kanzler, November 21« 1943; Memorandum, Rear Admiral James M. Irish to All Inspectors of Naval Materials, January 11, 1943«
47/ Letter, Colonel H«A«Toulman, Jr«, to W.F.Gibbs, January 20, 1943> E.S.Lahd to W.F.Gibbs, January 21, 1943; H.L.Vickery to L JI .Boulware, November 5> 1942«
48/ Letters, W.F.Gibbs to James V« Forrestal, January 21, 1943> C.E .Wilson to Ferdinand Eberstadt, November 16, 1942«
49/ Letter, H.L.Vickery to D.M.Nelson, January 5> 1943»
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Army, Navy, Aircraft, and Maritime Commission programs« 50/
Production, September 1, 1942 to July 31, 1943«—Boulware1e remarks were especially pointed when the success of the program was considered« For the landing craft program, which had been sadly lagging in September, met the monthly scheduled requirements for the first time in November« During the few months in which the WPB organization had been operating to help expedite the landing craft program, the total tonnage delivered had jumped from 24,443 in September to 57,863 in November, and that figure was increased again in December to 85,200 tons« During the last six months of 1942, 218,000 tons of landing craft were delivered, which was more than 20 times the production for the preceding six months« The increase in tonnage production was the steepest in the history of the nation's naval expansion« 51/ (For statistics on landing craft deliveries, see Appendix C«)
Even before the North African invasion, the landing craft program lost some of its urgency« As early as October 30, landing craft had slid to the second group in the Navy's Shipbuilding Precedence List, being preceded in group one by six aircraft carriers« Following the invasion, landing craft dropped to the 12th group in the Precedence List on November 11, and then was raised to the third group on November 18, at which time it was preceded by carriers, destroyer escorts, and mine sweepers« 52/ Meanwhile, the 1ST program was being cut back severely« Originally set for 490 ships, the 1ST program was reduced to 390 ships in October 1942« An agreement was made at that time to give top priority to all of these 390 ships, but in December this was changed so that special expediting assistance was given to only the first 225 of these ships« 53/
The cut-back of the program and its drop in the Navy's Precedence List reflected the then satisfactory state of landing craft production and at the same time the more urgent character of other projects« This was obvious in a listing of the President's "must programs" for the year 1943« The list, which had previously contained landing craft, now mentioned only rubber^, high octane gasoline, aviation, escort vessels, and merchant shipping« 54/ Landing craft, which had replaced
50/ Letter, L.R .Boulware to Ernest Kanzler, November 21« 1943» 51/ Bureau of Ships, "Landing Craft Progress Report", November 1, 1943> "Navy War Production Program", September 14, 1943, P* 2«
52/ "Navy War Program: SemiMonthly Progress Report", January 15, 1944, p« 18«
53/ Letter, L.R.Boulware to All Landing Craft Specialists, December 5, 1942.
54/ Letter, Admiral E«S«Land to W.F«Gibbs, January 21, 1943«
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the Navy’s program for escort vessels in the spring and summer of 1942 in the Navy’s preference list, were now in turn being replaced in preference by the destroyer escort program. In fact, submarine sinkings during 1942 had become so great, and the need for destroyer escort vessels so urgent, that in December 1942 Boulware and his Landing Craft Specialists were requested to perform the same service for destroyer escorts that they had afforded to landing craft. By December 8, 1942, six of the 17 yards that had been constructing 1ST*s were scheduled for the production of destroyer escorts. These were the Boston, Norfolk, Charleston, and Philadelphia Navy lards, the Bethlehem Fore River and the Dravo, Wilmington and Neville Island lards. The yards remaining in the landing craft program with few exceptions were those with the longest construction times. 55/ Bar» gain day for landing craft was over * temporarily. 55/
Despite the emphasis upon destroyer escorts and overriding priorities given to the high-octane gasoline and synthetic rubber programs, landing craft production continued to rise rapidly in the first few months of 1943« Conflicts did develop, as for example» when rubber and high-octane gasoline directives stopped the production of valves needed for landing Craft, Dock, at Oakland, California. But the momentum that the program had picked up from the work done in 1942 served to increase production figures to a record level in February 1943» In that month, 786 landing craft weighing 106,146 light displacement tons wore delivered, a figure greatly exceeding the month1 e requirements. 57/ Prom that time on, landing craft production declined as the 1942 program neared its end. By the end of March, the July 1942 program as revised was practically completed, except for a email number of IBT’s and approximately 600 of the LVT's, the construction of which had boon delayed by numerous design changes. Additions finally made on May 25 by the Vioo Chief of Naval Operations hold the monthly scheduled rate of production for the root of 1943 at a little more than half of the February rate of 106,000 tons. 51/ In July 1943 the special directive ueod to expedite materials and oom» ponente for landing craft was eliminated, thus clearly Illustrating the lessoning concern with the program In tho cummer of 1943« 52/
Conclusion.—In retrospect, substantial completion of tho first landing oraxi program la the early months of 1943 was no noon aooom* pllahmont. Tho Chief of Staff of the United States Army An his bion» nial report to the Secretary of War stated that in pluming tho North African invasion "it was urgently desired to make initial landings
55/ Por completo lists of shipyards used in the landlZForaK and destroyer escort programs seo Appendix X.
55/ Letter, W.P.Gibbs to 0.2.Wilson, December 17, 194^1 Memorandum, Captain B.W.Sylvoetor to L.R .Boulware, December S, 1942«
52/ For total production of landing oraft by months seo Appendix 0, 55/ WPB Progress Division, "Monthly Report to tho War Production Board", September 1943 (War Production Board Document No. 253), P. 26.
52/ Letter, L.P .Boulware to AU WPB Marino Specialists, July 16, 1943.
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to the east of Algiers at Bone, Philippeville, and possibly Tunis, but the lack of shipping, and of landing boats and aircraft carriers at the time made this procedure impracticable." He further stated that "it vas desired to carry out the operation early in the fall, but it was necessary to delay until November in order to receive a large number of the craft from the shipyards and provide and train crews for the operation of these vessels.” 60/
This insufficiency of landing craft could hardly constitute a reflection on either the industry producing the craft or the Government agencies cooperating in their expedition inasmuch as the contracts for most of the ships in this program were let so late that there could have been little real expectation that many of them would be ready by November 1, to say nothing of a few months earlier. Criticism, however, might be leveled at those top officials responsible for strategic planning for not anticipating the need for landing craft further in advance of an amphibious campaign. From the White House Conference on April 4, where the need for landing craft was first stressed, until September 1, when the craft had to be delivered in order to participate in the North African invasion, was a period of less than five months. Very few of the landing craft to be produced in the first program had been ordered before that time. The schedule of the Bureau of Ships for April 1942 showed only 1,189 craft scheduled for delivery for 1942, of which only nine LOT'S were of a major type weighing over 25 light displacement tons. 61/ Much time was consumed after that date in getting the program underway; for example, the Bureau of Ships did not finally decide upon the exact type of lighter to be constructed under the 600 lighter program ordered by the April 4 White House Conference until May 29.
It was not until July 4, 1942 that landing craft was raised to a high preference position on the Navy's Shipbuilding Precedence List. In the same month, a special priority rating was asked for and granted to landing craft. Moreover, the War Production Board was not approached officially for special assistance on the landing craft program until late in August, at which time Boulware's special organization for expediting landing craft was organized. At that time, the production of landing craft was running 50 to 70 percent behind the speeded-up schedules of July and August. Within two months the program had met schedule and within another three months was exceeding the planned production. That Boulware's organization aided materially in this spectacular
60/ Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, to the Secretary of War, July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1943, pp. 18-19. As against this statement it is interesting to note that of the 137 LCM (3) contracts let by the Army in 1942, none were produced until after January 1, 1943; Bureau of Ships, "Landing Craft Progress Report," January 1, 1943.
61/ WPB, "Official Munitions Production, United States," April 1, 1942, p. 86.
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gain cannot be doubted; that to him and to his organization is due a large part of the credit for the restraint shown in using directives so that interference with other high priority programs was kept at a decent minimum is also apparent«
When the special WPB organization for the expediting of landing craft was scarcely a month old, Commander E. W. Sylvester of the Navy’s Bureau of Ships had already referred to its services as "invaluable«” The head of the Material Coordinating Agency subsequently concurred in this estimate, ”. • • without your help and without the complete cooperation, which you and your men have given us,” he wrote to Boulware, ”the Navy would never have had these ships«” Later, testifying before the Truman Committee, Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal characterized the completion of the program as ”one of the most outstanding high-speed efforts of the whole war effort.” 62/
62/ Memorandum, Commander E.W.Sylvester to All Inspectors of Navy Material (copy) September 25, 1942; Letter, E.B.Harper to L.R« Boulware, December 16, 1942; Verbatim Record of Proceedings of Senate Investigating Committee, Investigating National Defense Program, Wednesday, April 28, 1943, the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington, D« C., p. 484.
23-64» p8» ”U
- 25 -
III.	THE SECOND UNDING GRAFT PROGRAM (August 1943 to May 1944)
During the spring and summer of 1943 there was little pressure for additional landing craft. Deliveries, as noted previously, fell considerably below the average of preceding months. Completed contracts were not replaced by new orders. As a result, facilities in some of the yards that had been used in the construction of landing craft were then idle.
Despite this lull in the construction of landing craft it was evident even then that large quantities of craft would be needed during the following year. C* E. Wilson voiced this thought when he remarked that unless total requirements for 1944 were delineated soon, the accomplishment of certain programs in 1944 would be endangered. Among others, he referred specifically to the Navy program which because of an "incomplete program rather than the production trend" showed a considerable decline for 1944» "There are certain indications", he ended, "that certain large programs are yet to be added - notably the district and landing segments." 63/
With this prompting, the Navy calculated that the materials requirements for landing craft in 1944 would be roughly four times greater than such requirements had been during 1943« 64/ The contracts let in June, July, and August 1943 for deliveries during 1944, however, did not reflect the plans known to be under consideration at this time. Nor did the August 1 Schedule of the Bureau of Ships. For this schedule, which was to be the basis for future increases, merely projected the 1943 monthly rate of deliveries of about 60,000 tons on through the first half of 1944#
Commenting upon the smallness of this program, the WPB Progress Division cited the addition of*500,000 tons of landing craft to the 1945 and 1946 programs as demonstrating "the need for larger numbers of landing craft." These could be produced in 1944, it was pointed out, by utilizing the facilities freed by the current cut-back of both patrol and mine craft. By using these freed facilities to resume the
63/ Minutes, WPB, Meeting LVIII, May 18, 1943.
^4/ WPB, "War Progress", June 11, 1943, p. 7.
65/ Bureau of Ships, "Landing Craft Progress Report", August 1, 1943« ’
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1943 peak level of production, the WPB Progress Division concluded, there could be added "to the fleet in 1943 and 1944 the entire amount now scheduled for delivery in 1945 and 1946." 66/
No sizeable additions were made to the landing craft program, however, until after the Quebec Conference* Meeting in Quebec from August 7 to 24, the President and the Prime Minister of Great Britain laid out time schedules for future amphibious campaigns in both the European and Pacific theaters of operations* The successful implementation of the strategic plans formulated at Quebec would obviously require greatly accelerated deliveries of landing craft* And, if the invasion date deadlines set at Quebec were at all imminent, a quick revision of landing craft schedules would seem to have been imperative* It was two weeks after the Quebec Conference had ended that the War Production Board received its first official word of future plans* At that time, September 9, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to Donald M* Nelson a set of recommendations that they had passed, together with the request that Nelson "take such action as may be necessary to aid in their fulfillment* The recommendations were as follows:
"1* That an overall expansion of 25 percent in the current landing craft program, exact percentage of each type to be determined by the Joint Staff Planners, be undertaken without delay, accepting the reductions in other programs as outlined in the enclosure*
"2* That reductions in the Maritime Commission program be limited to Liberty Ships, and that the manpower thus released be made available to assist in the accomplishment of the increased landing craft program*
"3* That the carbon and alloy steel required * * * during the 4th quarter of 1943 and the 1st quarter of 1944, be made available by the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission, each allotting one-third of the amount required from their allocations for those quarters; thereafter steel to be made available by the Navy in the usual way*
¿6/ WPB Progress Division* "Monthly Report to the War Production Board," July 1943 (WPB Document 242), pp* 42-43*
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"4. That measures be taken without delay to expand the Gray Diesel engine facilities at Detroit Diesel and Pontiac as required to meet the increased expansion in the program,
"5, That further study and investigation be made by the Joint Administrative Committee to de» termine and make recommendations as to the best method of further increasing the current Landing Craft Program to a total of 35 per» cent." 67/
As a basis for WPB action, this Joint Chiefs of Staff directive was practically useless» It did not define the specific types of landing craft the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired increased» Nor did it state definitely which "current program" was to be increased by 25 to 35 percent» As events occurred the final decision on the specific types of landing craft to be accelerated was not made until late November» And the WPB was never informed exactly what "current program" was to be increased 25 to 35 percent» By subsequent calculation it is reasonable to suppose that the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive referred to the Bureau of Ships August 1 schedule» In other words, the result of that directive would have been to raise landing craft deliveries from about 60,000 tons a month to about 75,000 throughout the rest of 1943 and the first half of 1944» However, just before this directive was issued, the Bureau of Ships had published its September 1 schedule» This September 1 schedule, in anticipation of future demands, increased the August 1 schedule by about 12 percent, thus just about meeting one-half of the increase later directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff» The full 25 percent increase over the August 1 schedule was subsequently reflected in the Bureau of Ships October 1 schedule, which was momentarily considered as the firm schedule of deliveries for the next nine months» (For a comparison of August 1, September 1, and October 1 schedules, see Table 3) As stated above, the October 1 schedule provided for monthly deliveries of about 75,000 tons of landing craft»
Meanwhile, the adequacy of even this increased program was debated among high officials» Among the people who questioned its adequacy was Donald M» Nelson» In late September 1942 Nelson was in England» He had gone there primarily to obtain a closer contact with the ultimate users of war production» After talking with high
67/ Letter» Joint Chiefs of Staff to Donald M. Nelson» September 9» 1943.
23*048 *88
- 28 -TABLE J. Landing Craft Schedule8, Avgust 1, September 1, October 1* Bov ember 1, December 1, 1943 (Selected. Types)
X ¿eqaecea X ¿equeACg g<	X Aoqo^co X ¿eqneqdag X qenEny		225 225	300 225	360	360 225	3«0	380	380 225	too	too	4oo	too 225	425	425	425	600 225	3^9	353	377	800 225	381	381	381	900 225	368	369	370	8to 213	112	118	Ito	738	
X «i eqveoeg X .ieqw®AO£ §	X J«ROt°0 X aeqne^deg X ^snEny		795	I 800	815 805	850	855 730	850	855	830 520	850	855	830	830 501	'850	855	830	830 56	850	855	830	8301 12	850	855	880	830 900 905 880 880 900 905 880 880	
1 ICT	i	LCM(3)(6)	X ¿eqaecea X jeqoeAOx X xeqo^OQ X aeqae^deg X ^enEny	260 334	446 1 365	503	520 | 394	516	548	544 too	528	579	575	575 370	528	588	584	58& 274	528	600	600	600 2Uf	528	600	600	600 to	528	600	600	600 U70 600 600 600	
	X Jeqmeoea X ¿eqseAOK X aeqo^co X jeqme^deg X ^enEny	11 18	30 18 to 41	| 33	Ug	44	42 to	35	44	47	47 39	36	44	54	68 3g	34	44	44	68 37	38	44	41	77 37	41	to	35	78 37	to	37	35	78	
LCI(L) r-4	®	*4	14 X> k ®	• 4>	B	® •	®	X>	a	6 d	4»	o	®	® &	p,	4»	»>	O S	•	°	£	Ji <3	m	o	&	R		In	R S 5 K? cm	w &	Tn &»£$&&&& CU	IQ O	CM	CM	O	CK	O> Kl ^rt HeMCMNCQrlr*«	
		m »4	£ X>	»4	®	2	K *	■	®	«2	«2	h	S _ &	p	®	►	*	|	x> ?	u
- 29 -
military officials in England about future plans, he cabled Charles E. Wilson:
"Im convinced, after detailed discussion with American and British military authorities, that landing craft, particularly LCT and 1ST types, is the most important single implement of war from the point of view of the European theater» It is my belief that the requirements have been grossly understated and that we should, without fail, advance the whole landing craft program at least one month» Furthermore, I am convinced that 25,000 or more lives will depend on our doing this»*
Nelson then requested Wilson to do everything he could to *look into the program at once* and suggested that the "best production man available* be obtained to expedite the program "with a view to increasing even more • • the step-up of one month»* This message was sent on September 27 and Nelson indicated that he would communicate with Wilson again on September 30 to find out what he "had been able to do regarding the program»* 68/
Nelson sent this message to the United States Embassy in London on Sunday September 26» It was transmitted to the Department of State in Washington on September 27 and delivered to Wilson’s office on September 28» Unfortunately, the message was not brought to Wilson’s attention until after Nelson had communicated again on September 30» After Wilson understood what was wanted, he immediately sent Boulware to confer with Vice Admirals Robinson and Horne about the possibility of stepping up landing craft production» At that conference the Navy gave no definite answer to the proposition« To Wilson’s later inquiries on the same subject the Navy replied that "the possibilities and subsequent results of attempting a change in the rate of delivery of these vessels had been canvassed in the Navy Department and are now before the Commander-in-Chief for his determination» As this is purely a military question", the reply concluded, "nobody in the lower echelon
¿8/ Cablegram (State Department paraphrase^« Donald M. Nelson to Charles E» Wilson, (Through Ambassador Winant and Secretary of State) September 27, 1943«
ia-640 P87
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is competent to give you the material to answer the /Nelson/ cable** 69/ Subsequently a second inquiry from London was made to Wilson about the possibility of increasing landing craft deliveries* This came from Philip Reed, who was fully informed of Nelson's efforts* But evidently Wilson was still unable to get a decision from the Navy* For on October 27, Wilson replied: "Problems of Landing Craft Being Studied Here But No Decision Has Been Arrived At As To What Our Potentialities Are For Acceleration of These Programs*" 70/ Under these circumstances, the Bureau of Ships November 1 schedule, except for a few LCT'SjWas the October' 1 schedule, plus the deficits incurred in October and September* (See Table 3) Thus an excellent chance to fix realistic requirements and to save critical time in the construction of landing craft was lost*
During November 1943, two large changes were made in the existing landing craft schedule* The first important one was caused directly by the invasion of the Gilbert Islands and particularly, the landing operations on Tarawa* At Tarawa many landing craft had run aground on a series of slightly submerged coral reefs hundreds of yards from the beach* The result was a high Yate of destruction of landing craft and serious personnel losses, highlighting the need for more LVT’s, tracked landing craft, which could surmount such underwater barriers* By the August 1 schedule, 1,338 LVT’s were to be produced in the six months period of December 1, 1943» to May 31, 1944« This figure was raised to 2,055 in the September 1 schedule, and was substantially unchanged in the November 1 schedule* However, the events at Tarawa in November were reflected in the doubling of LVT’s for the same six months on the December 1 schedule* 4,284 were scheduled at that time for delivery between December 1, 1943, and May 31, 1944« 71/
Whether or not additional increases in other types of landing craft should also be scheduled was a question that had been debated since September* That question was finally settled in late November after the President had left the ¿country for his eventful conferences with Prime Minister Churchill at Cairo and with Joseph Stalin at Teheran* On the second day of the Cairo conference, James F* Byrnes, Director of the Office of War Mobilization, received the following cablegram from the President:
69/ Letter, J.W.Powell to Gharles^E* Wilson* October 8, 1943*
70/ Cablegram, C.E.Wilson to Philip Reed, October 27, 1943«
71/ Bureau of Ships, "Landing Craft Progress Report", March 1, 1944, pp* 4-62 et seq*
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"Extremely important and urgent that I know at once whether the present schedule for production and completion of landing craft can be increased during January to June* On assumption that landing craft takes precedence over all other munitions of war will you let me know how many additional landing craft by types can be delivered during months of January, February, March, April, and May. List each month separately. Call conference of all interested departments. Very urgent." 72/
Byrnes called a conference at 9$30 the next morning of representatives of the WPB, the Navy, and the Army. Byrnes then replied to the President giving him the numbers of landing craft that could be added to the December 1 program provided that landing craft took precedence "over all other munitions including the Russian protocol," and that overriding priorities for the program were given immediately« These additions to the December 1 program, Byrnes added, would affect "army trucks, naval construction and to some extent high octane«* As an example of the step-up that the conference considered feasible, Byrnes answered that no additional LST’s could be delivered in January, 2 In February, 5 in March, 15 in April, and 28 in May, the dates representing the delivery dates to tidewater ports, United States. Moreover, no increase in the production of LVTts was considered possible before June, and any increase in the number of LCP(L)*s and LCS(S)*s, it was indicated, would have to be at the expense of LCVP deliveries« 73/
The reply from the President came from Teheran: "The increase in critical types of landing craft proposed in your message of 25 November, coupled with the unstated effect on other critical programs, does not become effective soon enough to justify change in present construction programs«" 74/
Normally the President’s cablegram should have settled the landing craft production schedule« But that was not the case. Among themselves Byrnes, the WPB, the Navy, and the Army agreed to go ahead on the basis of the schedule developed at the November 23 meeting. Thus, without specific higher approval, certain portions of the November 1 schedule were to be accelerated by three months. In other words, 81 IST’s, 129 LCI(L)’s, and 149 LCT’s that had been scheduled for delivery in June,
72/Cablegram, F.D.Roosevelt to Justice James F. Byrnes, November 23» 1943 (copy).
73/ Cablegram, James F. Byrnes to F.D.Roosevelt, November 24, 1943 (copy).
74/ Cablegram, F .D .Roosevelt to James F. Byrnes, November 29 > 1943 (copy).
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July, and August of 1944 were now to be completed by May 31, 1944« Altogether, these increases meant the addition of 165,000 tons to the program during December 1943 and the first five months of 1944. 7$/
In summary, the original basis for later increases in the land* ing craft program was the August 1, 1943^ schedule» This had been revised on September 1 and again on October 1, at which time it repre* sented the 25 percent increase directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff« The November 1 schedule, except for a few additional LCI(L)*s, was simply the October 1 schedule revised for delayed deliveries« However, the December 1 schedule included both the three months acceleration of IST’s, LCl(L)*s, and 101*8, which was the result of long drawn-out discussions of the high policy makers, and the "Tarawa program" of 2,000 additional LVT’s« Altogether, the December 1 schedule increased the November 1 schedule in terms of August 1943 unit costs from $1,728,000,000 to $2,624,000,000, or by more than 50 percent« 76/ For purposes of comparison, the five landing craft schedules are given in Table 3.	-
Although the December 1 schedule remained relatively firm, there was still uncertainty about whether it was to be even further increased, after the Byrnes, WPB, Navy, Army agreement« On December 4, the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet wrote the WPB in part as follows:
"It appears certain that the pressure will be toward increasing the availability of landing craft by forcing an immediate increase in production« Inclination is to force production at the expense of the Maritime Commission, particularly cargo vessels« Be prepared to adjust radically upward the production of landing craft, especially larger sizes." 77/
No subsequent information, however, was received translating this warning into positive increases« And the 1944 landing craft program remained largely what it had been in the Bureau of Ships December 1 schedule«
7^7 Bureau of Ships, "Landing Craft Progress Report", November 1, December 1943.
76/ Figures on cost obtained from WPB, Munitions Branch, Statistics Division, February 26, 1944.
77/ Letters, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet to War Production Board, December 4» 1943? Rear Admiral E.S«Land to C«E «Wilson, December 2, 1943; C«E.Wilson to Rear Admiral E.S.Land, December 7, 1943.
83-64« P40 bu
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One thing should be pointed out about the December schedule« It was an "incentive* or a "target" schedule in that it represented the maximúm that the Bureau of Ships thought possible, considering the availability of ways, manpower, components, and materials« To achieve that maximum figure, materials, manpower, and components would have to mesh almost perfectly in the production cycle« That development is always quite improbable in the first few months of a program, as the history of the first landing craft and destroyer escort programs indicate. Therefore, the Bureau of Ships compiles a more conservative schedule to be used as a basis of fleet operational plans« This alternate schedule is not released to shipyards, but is held very confidentially within the Navy Department« Known as the Bureau of Ships Predictions this schedule is considered as the Bureauts guaranteed schedule on the basis of which naval operations are planned« This minimum schedule for the accelerated types of landing craft was substantially lower than the published "target" schedule« For example, the December 1 schedule called for the construction of 260 IST’s from December 1, 1943, to flay 31, 1944, whereas the Bureau of Ships guaranteed the construction of only 217 in the same period«
Difficulties Involved in Meeting December 1 Schedule.—Major design changes in the 1ST and the LVT contributed to the problems of landing craft construction in the 1944 program« The most serious problems connected with the 1944 landing craft program, however, were not of a technical or production nature, but rather ones of planning and especially of timing« With the total Navy program for 1944 calling for 3,800,000 displacement tons or for 50 percent more tonnage than for the previous year, and with a Maritime Commission Program of approximately the same size as it had been for the year before, the problem of adding this increased landing craft program to the already crowded shipbuilding schedules was difficult«
Some understanding of the size of the landing craft program can be obtained from the fact that4the value of all work to be done on landing craft in 1944 was 57 percent greater than the cumulative value of all work done on such craft in the preceding 3^ years« To complicate that problem, much of the Navy’s shipbuilding program for 1944 was made up of destroyer escorts, patrol craft, and other small vessels, the production of which had been delayed from previous years, and the materials, tools, and ways for which were precisely the materials, tools, and ways needed for construction of the greatly enlarged landing craft program. To cut back other small ship programs so that landing craft might utilize their facilities took time, and time was dreadfully short« As an example, the Navy cancelled the construction of 305 destroyer escorts during September and early October, because of a change in the tactical situation« But, with the exception of a contract placed on September 16, 1943, for 25 LST’s, no other 1ST contracts were let to yards building
23“»48 P41 bu
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destroyer escorts until December 9» 1943« At that time, contracts for 170 1ST1s were let to yards then building destroyer escorts« In other wordsj two to three months had elapsed between the cutting back of the destroyer escorts and the placing of contracts for 1ST1s. 78/
In March 1944 when it appeared that the deliveries of IST’s would not meet the December 1 Schedule, the WPB Progress Division charged that the Navy had been negligent in the autumn of 1943 in not cutting back the Destroyer Escort program enough to clear the way for the construction of 1ST* 8» The Progress Division pointed out that 17 yards had gained experience in constructing IST’e in the 1942 program. Eight of these 17 yards were transferred to the destroyer escort program in 1943« Only four of these last eight were given 1ST contracts again in the 1943-44 program. Moreover, of all the 17 yards that had gained experience in 1ST construction in 1942, only seven were given contracts for 1944 deliveries. Finally, of the second group of 17 yards that had been building destroyer escorts in 1943, 15 were still in production of these craft on March 1, 1944» 79/ However, Boulware and Garwood, who had been closest to the landing craft program, felt that the Progress Division*e statement was "superficial and unrealistic", based "purely on statistics" and not upon sound engineering possibilities. 80/
Of all the difficult military programs in 1944, landing craft was perhaps the most urgent. With the date for the invasion of Europe already set, time was of the utmost importance. And yet the time between the planning of the program and the expected delivery dates was remarkably short. May 31, 1944, had been set as the deadline date for the delivery of landing craft, and although the need was known in August 1943, both the kinds and quantities to be delivered by the end of May were not decided until November 24, 1943« One week after the latter date, possible program changes were still under discussion. That meant, and this was especially true of IST’e and LVT's, that the placement of some of the contracts was inordinately late for May 31 delivery. When these contracts represented merely additions to previous orders, the matter of time was not so serious• For then presumably the yards had ironed out production kinks and had acquired the construction "know how". Some very late contracts, however, were let to companies without back orders. (See Table 4) And even though letters of intent were sent well in advance of the formal contracts,
78/ Bureau of Ships/"Landing Craft Progress Report", January 1. 1944. 79/ Progress Division, "Monthly Report to War Production Board", March 1944 (WPB Document 283).
80/ Statement, L.R.Boulware to J.W.Feeler, May 2, 1944; Memorandum, E.C.Garwood to J.W.Feeler, May 8, 1944«
89-648 *49
- 35 -
the delivery deadlines were still precariously short«
It was hoped that this shortness of time in the 1ST program would be fully compensated for by the fact that three of the crack Navy and commercial coastal yards, Bethlehem Hingham, Bethlehem Fore River, and the Boston Navy lard, which had set records in the construction of destroyer escorts, were brought into the new LST program« But the difficulty here was that deliveries from these three crack yards would not begin to affect production of IST,s materially until April of 1944» or just a few weeks before the deadline date of May 31, 1944« There were eight yards in the 1ST program« Of the 178 181*8 scheduled for delivery between December 1, 1943, and May 1, 1944» just 22, all of which were accelerated vessels, were scheduled to be delivered by the three yards mentioned by name above« Actually only 17 vessels were delivered in these months by these three yards« Earlier deliveries were impossible because these yards were not given 1ST contracts until December 9» 1943« The other 156 IST's, of which 32 were accelerated, were scheduled to be delivered by the five other yards in the program« At least three of these five, the Missouri Valley Bridge and Iron, the Chicago Bridge and Iron, and the Jeffersonville Boat and Machine, had been among the slowest in point of construction time in the 1942 1ST program« For example, the Navy estimated that the average 1ST construction time for the Bethlehem Hingham and the Bethlehem Fore River yards would be around 2«25 months« This figure contrasts with the actual construction time of six months for the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company and 4«5 months for the Missouri Bridge and Iron Company« Thus, the responsibility for meeting the lion*s share of the deliveries in the critical first four months of 1944 had been given to companies whose past operating records were among the poorest of all the yards that had participated in previous 1ST programs« 81/
One other aspect of the 1944 landing craft program that presented special difficulties was the sharp rate of increase in the required rate of deliveries« The required rate of deliveries for LVT’s was to be doubled in the 60-day period from January 1 to March 1, 1944, and for all landing craft the total tonnage of May deliveries was planned to be over twice the total tonnage required in January« 82/ The history of the preceding mass-production, small-ship programs had been pretty much the same« Both the first landing craft program and the destroyer escort program had been finished relatively on schedule, but during the first six months of each program, deliveries had lagged« Beginning in April 1942, the first landing craft program reached a given month*s requirements for the first time in November, and the cumulative loss was not made up until February« Starting in Decerns ber 1942, the destroyer escort program did not overcome previous
81/ WPB Progress Division, "Monthly Report to the War Production
Board", (WPB Document 283) March 1944«
82/ Bureau of Ships, "Progress Report", February 1, 1944«
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monthly deficits until eleven months later» 83/ With these facts for background, the future of the 1943-44 landing craft program, with a deadline date just seven months away, did not appear too bright in December of 1943»
Marine Diesel Engine Facilities.»-Id September 1943 there was little of a general nature that WPB could do for the landing craft program. During the latter part of August, in response to an informal request of the Bureau of Ships, Boulware’s office agreed to give such WPB assistance as was available in expediting landing craft» This assistance, which was given to the LCI(L)’s in particular, took the form mainly of priority assistance for specific cases and technical help» General WPB action had to wait until the Services had worked out more definite plans than were contained in the Joint Chiefs of Staff resolutions»
Specifically, however, the resolutions had called for such expansion of the Gray Diesel engine facilities at the Detroit Diesel Engine Division of the General Motors Corporation "as required to meet the increased expansion of the program." 84/ The reaction to this recommendation was fast and certain» After conferring with company officials, the Bureau of Ships sponsored the application for over $1,000,000 worth of additional tools, which, according to the Bureau of Ships, would be adequate to provide the needed production» On September 14, 1943, the WPB Industrial Facilities Committee approved the total amount, less $387,000 worth of tools that had been found in existing stocks, provided (1) that the Bureau of Ships agree to move out enough contracts from the Detroit area to make room, manpower-wise, for the expansion and (2) that the company agree to subcontract as many future orders as possible» The two conditions were the result of the War Manpower Commission’s objection to the expansion without compensating labor reductions, since Detrdit was one of the most critical labor areas in the country. 8$/
The proposed expansion was finally approved on September 21, when the company agreed to meet the new schedule without adding to its labor force in Detroit» During the next three months the Facilities -Committee approved additional proposals for the same concern, until, by January 6, the total amount approved since September 1, was $2,280,000 worth of new facilities» 86/
83/ WPB Progress Division, "Monthly Report", January 1944 (WPB Document No» 270), p» 32»
84/ Letter, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Donald M. Nelson, September 9,
1943.
8$/ Minutes, Industrial Facilities Committee, Meeting No» 18, September 14, 1943»
86/ Minutes, Facilities Committee, Meeting No» 14-A, January 11, 1944.
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From January 1 to June 30, 1943, Gray had received 7,000 engines, or 1,200 a month, from the Detroit Diesel« 87/ By March 1944 Gray was receiving 1,800 engines a month from Detroit Diesel« Moreover, arrangements had been made so that Detroit Diesel was by that time using the Gray patents to convert their own engines« By April 1, 1944» the production of Gray marine engines was up to 2,200 a month, and new facilities scheduled to come into production in July 1944 will increase that by another 200« By April 1944, production therefore had been raised by over 80 percent« Up to the present, no landing craft have been delayed by the lack of Gray engines« 88/
Materials«—Taking action on the less specific parts of the new landing craft program, Charles E. Wilson asked the Navy to estimate the quantities of steel needed for landing craft increases ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 9« These figures were supplied on September 13« On the next day, the Navy, Army, and Maritime Commission were formally requested to furnish the WPB with information indicating the proposed allocation of the additional manpower that would be necessary in the yards affected, and the proposed cut-backs of other programs together with the estimated savings these cut-backs would make in manpower and materials« This information was necessary, of course, before additional steel and other requirements could be estimated accurately«
The answer to these requests of September 14 came in promptly from the Maritime Commission and the Army, but the Navy had not yet analyzed all of its proposed cut-backs« At that time the Navy still hoped that all the steel needed would be provided by further cut-backs« Evidently this hope did not materialize, since the WPB Steel Division was still working with Navy officials on the placing of orders« At that time the Operations Vice Chairman was told that all orders "for plates, bars and other steel items have been satisfactorily taken care of with the exception of about 300 tons of sheets required for October and larger amounts for subsequent months« There was no reason," the advice ended, "why the necessary steel cannot be obtained in time for the requirements for the program«" 89/
87/ Gray makes no landing craft engines« Instead it receives six-cylinder diesel engines from the Detroit Diesel and converts them to a marine engine of higher horsepower by making certain alterations protected by patents in Gray’s possession« These engines are then used in the smaller types of landing craft«
88/ Statement of E «A «Lucey (Chief, Marine Diesel Engine Section, Shipbuilding Division) to author, April 12, 1944«
89/ Letters, Col« E«F«Jeffe to Vice Admiral S«&«Robinson, September 14» 1943» Rear Admiral E«S«Land to Col« E«F«Jeffe, September 16, 1943; Memorandums, Howard Bruce to Col« E.F«Jeffe, September 22, 1943; Norman W« Foy to H«G«Batcheller, et al«, October 16, 1943«
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On November 1, the requirements for the various types of landing craft were reduced to figures in the Bureau of Ships Progress Report. 90/ Steel plate requirements for the rest of 1943 and the first quarter of 1944 were then made out on the basis of these figures. The figures were scarcely cold, however, when the Byrnes, WPB, Army, Navy agreement of November 24 to accelerate specific types of craft by three months had once again changed all requirements for materials. On November 25, the Navy furnished the War Production Board with the exact figures for the new increase. By November 27, the steel plate and sheet rolling schedule had been rescheduled to include the additional 39,000 tons of steel needed in December for the increased number of landing craft. This was done by moving back the entire existing plate and sheet schedule by the number of days required to wedge in the needed steel. Soon afterward, by the same method, 50,000 tons of steel were added to the January schedule, and this was again revised in late December to take care of another increase in the number of LVT’s. 91/
Priorities and WPB Landing Craft Organization.—The first Naval request for special WPB assistance for the landing craft program came unofficially in August 1943. Following the placing of numerous 1ST contracts, the New York Supervisor of Shipbuilding asked that Boulware give the Navy the same kind of special assistance that had been given on the original 1ST program in the autumn of 1942. Boulware replied that he would be glad to give any assistance possible, but that any special assistance in the way of improved priorities for landing craft would have to depend to a degree upon the position that these ships occupied on the new Navy Shipbuilding Precedence List. And, since the list of September 1 still showed landing craft in Group 4 despite the Quebec conference, little in the way of obtaining higher priorities could be accomplished. 92/
The first official Navy request for WPB special assistance for the program came at a conference held between Army, Navy, and WPB representatives on Thanksgiving Day, November 25, 1943» At this conference the Navy also asked that a completely overriding priority be given to the speeded-up portion of the landing craft program, and that this priority be extendable all the way down to the raw materials needed for the program. This grant of priorities was refused. However, as an
90/ Memorandum, Charles E. Wilson to H.G.Batcheller, et al., October 16, 1943.
91/ Minutes, Production Executive Committee, November 29, 1943? Memorandum, Bertrand Fox to J.A.Krug, January 5, 1944? Statement of Bertrand Fox to author, March 1, 1944«
92/ Letters, Rear Admiral J.M.Irish to W.F.Gibbs, August 3, 1943?
L.R.Boulware to Rear Admiral J.M.Irish, August 7, 1943? "Navy War Program, Semi-Monthly Progress Report”, January 15, 1944, p. 18.
Landing craft was moved up to Group 1 on the Navy Precedence List of October 5, 1943.
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expedient, and with the knowledge but not the formal concurrence of the Navy, the following telegram was authorized by J« A. Krug and issued by the WPB to all prime contractors of the Navy supplying components for the 1ST, LCI(L), LCT(6), LCT(7), (ISM), LCM(3), LCVP, and LVT:
•Delivery of additional number of completed landing craft of types 1ST, LCI(L), LOT(6), LOT(7), LCM(3), LCVP and LVT, is of the utmost urgency in the war program« The Navy Department will communicate the expanded and advanced component schedules to prime vendors of components for these ships« Pending receipt of revised component schedules, all producers of components for these ships are directed immediately to advance their production so as to deliver by 15 March 1944 all quantities which according to the present schedules will be required by 15 June 1944, and to communicate the substance of this wire to all their suppliers of parts and materials« All manufacturers concerned shall immediately request any additional CMP allotments required to meet the accelerated production schedule« They will place mill orders at once, and, if necessary, request assistance to obtain position in mill schedules« If it is impossible for any manufacturer to accelerate his delivery schedule as hereby directed in compliance with applicable War Production Board Regulations and Orders, whether because of lack of materials, labor shortages, conflicts with other orders, or for any other reason, he shall communicate at once with the Naval Inspection Service which will obtain from the War Production Board either an overriding priority or whatever other direction or shifting of orders may be necessary to accomplish the desired delivery«• 93/
The types of landing craft to be accorded the special priority assistance meruioned in the WPB telegram, were subsequently twice revised by the Navy« On December 10, 1943, the Bureau of Ships informed
93/ Telegram« Recording Secretary« WPB, to Selected Manufacturers« November 26, 1943; Statement of Lt« E.C.Garwood to author, February 28, 1944; Statement of James W. McNally to author, February 26, 1944«
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all Inspectors of Naval Material to disregard the WPB wire of November 26 as it affected LCM(3),6 and LCVP’s, because a decision had been reached that there was to be no increase in the production rate of these types. However, two weeks later the Navy reconsidered the matter and asked that LCM(3)’s and LCVP’s be placed back on the list of craft for which special assistance was to be given. So, as matters stood on January 1, 1944, special priority assistance was to be given to all LST’s, LCI(L)’s, LCT(6)’s, LCT(7)’s, LSM’s, LCM(3)’s including those designated as LCM(6)‘s, LCVP’s, and LVT’s that were to reach the end of their construction period prior to June 1, 1944. 9b/
On the same day that the telegram was sent to component manufacturers, the Navy wired all Officers of Inspector of Naval Material instructing them to send representatives to meetings in New York and Chicago on November 29 and December 1, 1943, where Boulware, who had again been selected to head the program for the War Production Board, was to explain the priorities involved and the organization set up for giving special assistance to the program. Before Boulware left for these meetings, he prepared a special procedure and arranged for the WPB Special Rating Branch to handle telephone requests for assistance from Naval Inspectors in the field.
At New York and Chicago it was explained to all Naval and War Production Board field personnel concerned that no blanket overriding priority would be given to the landing craft program. That decision was undoubtedly prompted by the fear that such a directive would create disastrous interference with other high priority programs. Instead of a‘blanket overriding priority, the conference was told, all landing craft would be placed in the AA-1 category. But whenever special assistance was needed on the types of craft mentioned in the WPB telegram of November 26 to component suppliers, either a AAA or a scheduling directive could be obtained upon request of the Inspectors of Naval Material to the War Production Board. However, this special assistance would be granted only to those craft that were to be delivered prior to June 1, 1944, and only when the usual expediting measures would not effect required deliveries.
The organization created during the New York and Chicago meetings to obtain special aid for landing craft was much more simple and direct in its operations than the landing craft organization of 1942-43 had been. To coordinate the flow of materials and components a separate Materials Coordinating Agency was set up for several of the various types of landing craft to be expedited. Once the schedules for the delivery of materials and components were delivered to them, these agencies were responsible for "initiating the necessary progressing and
9b/ Telegram, Chief, Bureau of Ships'to All Inspectors of Naval Materi-al, December 10, 1943; Memorandums, Lt. E. C. Garwood to Harcourt Amory, December 31, 1943; Bureau of Ships to All Commandments of Naval Construction Districts, January 3, 1944.
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expediting action” according to a fixed reporting and expediting procedure, for maintaining the flow of materials and components at the required rate, and for maintaining records of the status of materials on each order over which they had cognizance* Bottlenecks were to be referred by Inspectors of Naval Material to the WPB Regional Offices, where Marine Specialists were to take all possible actions to arrive at a solution* Problems found incapable of solution in the field were to be reported directly by the Inspectors of Naval Material to a Special Landing Craft Section of the Special Rating Branch, WPB, in Washington* This section was to log each request as it came in* It received general supervision from Lt. E. C. Garwood, who was to direct the program after Boulware’s appointment as WPB Operations Vice Chairman. Every possible effort was to be made to find a solution to the request within 24 hours. From this log a weekly report was to be prepared on disposition of all cases, together with a record of the time required to settle eadh case*
After requests were received by the Special Rating Branch they were to be referred to the proper Industry Division where special men had been appointed to handle the landing craft business* In each case the Industry Division concerned was to find the best solution to the problem and to report it back to the Special Rating Branch if possible within 24 hours. If the issuance of a scheduling directive was the only solution found practicable, the division concerned was to make that recommendation to the Special Rating Branch where the directive would be issued after its probable effects upon other top ranking programs had been considered by representatives of the Navy, the Maritime Commission, the Petroleum Administration for War, and the Army.
Requests for special priority treatment were to be screened prior to this survey by the representatives of the interested agencies, by the Inspectors of Naval Material in the field, and again as they first came into the Special Rating Branch of the WPB. In the New York meeting with the Inspectors of Naval Material, Boulware went to great lengths to stress the fact that requests for special assistance were to be severely limited so that the conflicts with other programs might be held to the barest minimum. They were instructed to ask for WPB aid only if:
1.	The materials or components were for the specific ships advanced by the WPB telegram of November 26, 194?.
2.	The materials or components requested were actually the determining factor in helping the manufacturer meet the required schedule.
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3.	The material or component requested was not to be delivered at a rate greater than either the needs of the schedule or the capacity of the recipient to use it. 9$/
It should be remembered that the War Production Board had asked the Services in September to estimate not only the amount of materials, but also the manpower to be saved in their proposed cut-backs for facilitating landing craft. By this time in the war effort, manpower was, if anything, as short as materials. In August 19U3, a study of labor supply in shipyards had indicated that of 89 yards in the country, 38 had been behind schedule during the previous three months. In part those delays had resulted from insufficient labor. Even before the September additions to the landing craft schedules, this study indicated, the snipbuilding program required an additional labor force of 3hh,000 exclusive of replacements. With the step-up in landing craft, and with continued drafting of men, the manpower factor was fast becoming critical. 96/ But since both the Navy and the Maritime Commission estimated That their cut-backs would release sufficient manpower for the September additions, little was done. The manpower problem resulting from the rapid acceleration to the program in November was a horse of a different color. On November 26, Selective Service was requested to defer all the trained workers in factories and yards included on a list submitted by the Navy. Fearing that such action would not be sufficient to solve the manpower troubles ahead of the program, L. R. Boulware thought it necessary to set up a field organization which, in the resolving of labor problems, would function much like the organization for the expediting of materials. According to this procedure, which was approved by the Navy, Selective Service, the WPB, and the' War Manpower Commission, if the manpower problems of the landing craft program could not be solved locally by the District Civilian Personnel Officer of the Navy, they were to be reported to the WPB Regional Director, who was to investigate the possibility of
9$/ This last rule was made to avoid the piling up of materials by the insistence of the Navy upon delivery according to the Bureau of Ships production schedules even when actual production had fallen weeks behind those schedules. Telegram, Chief of the Bureau of Ships to All Inspectors of Naval Material* November 26, 19U3; Minutes, New York meeting with Inspectors of Naval Material, November 29, 19U3; Navy, Bureau of Ships, Memorandum, Progressing and Expediting Responsibilities of Inspectors of Naval Material, December 18, 19h3; Letter, Supervisor of Shipbuilding, to All Inspectors of Naval Material, January 11, 19Uh.
96/ Memorandum, Fred Searls, Jr., to J. F. Byrnes, August 15, 19h3*
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contract transfers, terminations, or rescheduling. In addition, the Regional Director of the War Production Board was expected to certify that part of the landing craft schedule that had to be met, to the Regional Director of the War Manpower Commission, to the State Director of Selective Service, and to the District Civilian Personnel Officer of the Navy. Such certification was to be accepted by all agencies as authority to grant the plant *11 assistance in the recruiting and deferment of necessary personnel. If satisfactory answers could not be secured for problems in 48 hours after they had been received, the WPB Regional Director was to report them to Boulware's office in Washington*-There, such special action was then to be taken as thought necessary by Boulware's office. 97/
With organisation of the special assistance program for materials, components, and labor completed, action on the total program waited until all the purchase orders had been let. At the time of the New York meeting, only about 66 percent of the total orders for the program had been placed. However, when a list of the hull numbers and the building yards for IST's, IBM's, LCl(L)'s, and LCr(6)'s was received ten days later from the Bureau of Ships, a reasonable basis for the granting of directives had been established and the organisation was ready to function. $8/
Critical Landing Craft Components.—Because of the urgent need for landing craft, the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission had agreed that scheduling directives should be granted, when necessary, to obtain deliveries for materials and components. This policy was consistently followed, and as a consequence relatively few delays were actually caused to the program because of lack of materials or components. On the other hand, there is no question but that the use of directives has to a degree adversely affected many other important war programs. On November 24, 1943, the Bureau of Ships estimated that the most critical components for the landing craft program were fractional horsepower motors, stern winches for IST's, steering gears> worm reduction gears, anti-friction bearings, pumps, and diesel engines. Of all the above mentioned items, anti-friction bearings were perhaps the tightest by January and February. Certainly, bearing cases outnumbered any other single component among the requests for special priority assistance. 99/
97/ Office of the Operations Vice Chairman, Staff Memorandum No. 25, December 28, 1943«
98/ Minutes, New York meeting of Inspectors of Naval Material, November 29, 1943, pp. 14*15; Memorandum, Bureau of Ships to Lt. E.C. Garwood, December 10, 1943.
99/ Special Rating Branch, Daily Landing Craft Report, December 1943 to February 29, 1944.
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The tightness in supply of this component may partially account for the fact that thé Bearing Section of the Tools Division took longer than any other Industry Division in closing the landing craft cases referred to it by the Special Rating Branch« Tor example, on January 21, 1944, 22 of the 59 cases that had been held open for more than 24 hours were bearing cases« Of these delayed bearing cases, 6 had been pending for 10 days or more« 100/
There is some indication, however, that poor organizational effort may have been responsible for this delay« In addition, it was felt that the solutions for cases recommended back to the Special Rating Branch by the Bearing Section were not always the most effective under the circumstances« At least Lt« E« C. Garwood thought that the bearings people were not extending themselves enough in searching for solutions for the cases presented to them« On January 11 Garwood pointed out what he thought was an undue delay in the solving of the bearing cases, and as a result a special report indicating the time at which bearing cases were received and at which they were solved was regularly made« 101/ A short time later, an "understanding* was obtained from Trans Stone, Deputy Director of the Tools Division, on the procedure to be used in handling bearing cases« According to this understanding, when a case was presented to the Bearing Section it was to be responsible for "contacting bearing manufacturers, ascertaining the best possible solution toward meeting requirements, this including canvassing other bearing manufacturers when the one in question cannot fill requirements on time « « ,* Moreover, the cases were to be closed only •when a good solution /was7 obtained* and they were "not to be referred back to the Inspector ¿of Raval Material/ suggesting that he seek other sources of supply«* 102/ That there may have been substance to the earlier complaints about the Bearing Section was suggested by the Section’s success in considerably cutting down the tins on cases after this understanding was concluded« 103/
4*"^
Two of the main troubles with bearing production in the fall of 1943 and thereafter were an insufficient labor supply, and a lack of facilities for the production of specific types« Secondary troubles
IQO/ Special Rating Brandi, "Daily Landing Craft Report*, January 21, 1944.
101/ Memorandum, Lt, E«C«Garwood to Frank V« Connolly, January 11, 1944« 102/ Memorandum, Lt« E«C.Garwood to Frank V« Connolly, January 25» 1944« 103/ Special Rating Branch, Daily Landing Craft Reports, January - February 1944«
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were caused by lack of forging facilities« The bearing industry is highly concentrated, with eight or nine old-line companies doing 80 percent of the business« At the start of the war the average starting wage rates in the industry were not high and the companies were reluctant to raise wages« Moreover, the large companies were concentrated geographically in the Connecticut Valley; Trenton, New Jersey; and Philadelphia areas, all extremely critical labor markets« In December, a survey of the bearing plants showed that the companies were operating 90 percent of their machines on the first shift, 55 percent on the second, and only 25 percent on the third« 104/ Since mid-1939 to the present, the monthly production of bearings has been quadrupled« Production in the last year, however, has increased c;ily from about 26,700,000 units per month in April 1943 to 32,000,000 in February 1944« Throughout this period supply was never equal to oilers placed, although the size of the backlog has been constantly decreased since November 1943« In November 1943 there was a backlog of 275,000,000 units; by April 1944 that had been reduced to 211,000,000 units« 105/
Great inherent difficulties obstructed attempts to remedy the bearing situation« For one thing, there are about 30,000 different types and sizes of bearings,of which 5,000 are in common use, and complete control of their flow to all industrial users is practically impossible« Many types of bearings - and this is particularly true of certain types used in marine construction - are not stock items« Thus, when certain orders were placed for landing craft in the autumn of 1943, they had to be completely filled by new production and not from existing stocks« 106/ Finally, old-line bearing companies, unlike some of the more plastic "war babies", were not too receptive to remedial proposals«
The labor situation in the bearing industry was foreseen by WPB officials as early as 1942« Several unsuccessful attempts were made then and afterward to encourage the companies to ask the War Labor Board for adjustments in the wage scale« Likewise, numerous suggestions were made to the companies for setting up new facilities outside labor areas that were fast becoming critical« But here again the resistance to change was considerable« 107/ In September 1943, the War Manpower
104/ Minutes « Requirements Committee {Verbatim Transcript) « Meeting 104« December 10, 1943, pp« 50-55«
105/ Minutes, War Production Board, Meeting 81, April 4, 1944, p« 5; Other figures supplied by the Bearing Section, Tools Division, May 30, 1944.
106/ Statement of Franz Stone to author, March 8, 1944
107/ Minutes, Requirements Committee (Verbatim Transcript), Meeting 104, December 10 r 1943, pp« 50-55«
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Commission set a goal of 10,500 new employees for bearing plants by February 1944* But even with a Ho, 1 labor priority, actual results were to fall far below the goals, In the Connecticut Valley, men seeking work were forced to go to plants selected by the representatives of the War Manpower Commission or to emigrate from the area. Even this did not suffice to procure the necessary manpower. Finally, in an effort to get as much production as possible from available labor supply, local task forces composed of representatives from the Army, Navy, War Manpower Commission, and War Production Board were set up at selected plants. Each committee was to sit with the company’s management and outline a complete production program after making a thorough investigation of wages, health facilities, absenteeism, employee relations, etc, 108/
Attacking the problem from another direction, the War Production Board asked the Services in August 1943 to review critically their demand for bearings, particularly with reference to their spare requirements, later, the Services were asked to make a complete inventory of the bearings they had on hand. The inventory taking was complicated, because the Services did not use the commercial names for bearings. It was found that in some cases, after transliteration had been made, they held the same item under two or three different names. This stock taking revealed a considerable amount of excessive inventories, 109/
In the fall of 1943 the Services were prevailed upon to accept a 50 percent reduction in deliveries of spares for the three months of December, January, and February, Meanwhile, in October, a screening procedure was set up for the purchase of bearings. Regular reports were requested from 200 large users of bearings as to future requirements, stock on hand, orders placed, and uses to which the bearings were to be put. By this procedure it was hoped to find surplus stocks, to screen out unnecessary orders, and to reduce short runs by which bearing manufacturers were losing an estimated 15 percent of their production. That at least one of the ends was obtained was evident from a news release of March 9, 1944, that bearings mere being secured for landing craft from •distressed stocks* of these products, 110/ On March 11, 1944, the War Production Board announced that for *the purpose of achieving greater efficiency,* the production of all large-sized, anti-friction bearings
108/ Minute«, Requirements Committee (Verbatim Transcript), Meeting 104, December 10, 1943, pp. 47-50; Minutes, Production Requirements Committee, Meeting 54, December 15, 1943,
109/ Statement of Franz Stone to author, March 9, 1944; Minutes, Production Executive Committee, Meeting No, 4^, September 1, 1943»
110/ WPB Press Release 5151, March 9, 1944.
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used in heavy military and industrial equipment had been concentrated in ten producing plants* 111/
In addition to all the other actions taken on bearings, a constant search has been made since September 1943 to obtain new bearing facilities that could be put into operation quickly* In October 1943» a group of the leading bearing firns proposed to the WPB Production Executive Committee a plan to construct new plants away from the critical labor areas* But this proposal was turned down when it was estimated that it would take nine months to get such plants into production* What was wanted was almost immediate production* As an answer in part. Jack and Heintz of Cleveland, Ohio, was constrained to make 750,000 of their own bearings a month, and new facilities wexe installed in the plants of the Brown Lipe Chapen Company of Syracuse, New fork, the Tyson Roller Bearing Company of MassiIon, Ohio, the Split Ball Bearing Company of New Hampshire, the Bower Roller Bearing works at Detroit, and the International Harvester Company, among others* Most of these new facilities were installed for the production of medium-size bearings, the size required mostly by the landing craft, motor track, and farm equipment programs* Capacity for medium-sized ball bearings increased during the first quarter of 1944 by 20 percent* An increase of 32 percent is expected for the second quarter and 42 percent for the third* The production of medium-sized tapered roller bearings reached the required peak by April 1, 1944» By the end of March it was authoritatively stated that bearings were not at that time "the limiting or determining factor in any procurement or production program • • *• 112/
One of the contributory reasons for the tightness in bearings, and another acute item for the landing craft program as a whole, was the critical situation of the forging industry* Here again the problem of labor was paramount, although had all the labor been available to operate all existing facilities the requirements of bearings and forgings would still have been considerably above the maximum production potential* In December 1943 the requirements for malleable castings, for example, were 240,000 tons a year, the top potential capacity was 200,000 tons, the actual production with what labor was available was around 40,000 tons*
111/ WPB Press Release 5167* March 11* 1944?
112/ Statements of Franz Stone to author, March 9, 1944; Minutes, Requirements Committee, verbatim transcript, Meeting 104, December 10, 1943, pp« 50-55; Minutes, Production Executive Committee, Meetings 47 and 51, October 13 and November 17, 1943; Minutes, War Production Board, Meeting LXXX, April 4, 1944, P» 5; Memorandum, L.R «Boulware to Donald M* Nelson, March 29, 1944 (WPB Document 286) •
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Most of the conditions responsible for the critical labor shortage in the bearing industry were present in a more exaggerated form in the forging plants» The individual shops were smaller, the wages considerably lower, and the work a good deal more unpleasant in that it was dirty, non-mechanized, and heavy» Moreover, because the workers were young and invariably strong, the Selective Service System almost decimated the existing labor supply» And since it takes two years to train a hammer operator, the harm done could scarcely be repaired quickly» In September 1943, with military programs desperately needing forgings, some shops had half their hammers idle»
The problems of the industry were investigated in the summer of 1943» and a series of concrete remedial moves were made in September by the War Production Board» Local task committees, like those formed for some of the bearing plants, were organized for 200 selected foundries and 25 forge shops» As a result of their actions in increasing wages and prices, recruiting skilled labor, installing eating and comfort facilities, and taking the water out of schedules, considerable advances were made» At one shop where a committee was organized in September, production was up 35 percent by November, rejections were down 75 percent, and the foundry scrap was cut by an equal amount» Another project started in September, and which is still under way, was the installation of *25,000,000 of mechanized facilities in these shops to permit the employment of women» A campaign of persuasion to change certain industries now using malleable steel castings over to the use of press forgings and stampings has also had considerable success» New foundry and forge shop facilities now in operation or to be completed by June 1944 will be adequate to supply all known requirements, it is stated, *if sufficient labor becomes available.* 113/
Other components causing some trouble in the landing craft program were steel plates and diesel engines» The wedging of over 80,000 tons of plate Into the schedules and the steel strike in December of 1943 brought about a temporary ^shortage of plate» Then too, a failure to observe directives and an over-optimistic production estimate for a new steel mill, slightly held Up the landing craft program in two yards» In January and succeeding months, however, the Navy got its full requirement of steel plates. 114/ Marine diesel engine production had been raised from 812 units in July 1942 to 3,027 units in December 1943, and the production of all diesel engines had been upped 100 percent in the 12 months following June 1942; but this still was not enough to take care of the landing craft program and all the other
113/ Minutes, Requirements Committee, verbatim transcript, Meeting 104, December 10, 1943. Memorandum, W.B.Murphy to Donald M. Nelson, March 21, 1944 (WPB Document 287)»
114/ statement, Bertrand Fox to author, March 1, 1944.
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urgent marine programs* The special assistance given to the landing craft program obtained most of its diesel requirements without significant delay* The difficulty with diesel engines was primarily a matter of components, with cylinders, lever castings, pistons, bearings, crankshafts, and fuel injection systems the most critical* Soto of the trouble was due to the high requirements of the Navy for spares; for example, the requirements for fuel injection pumps, were one spare for every engine bought* The difficulty with crankshafts was in forgings, a situation that was partially alleviated when Ford and General Motors were induced to open up their own forge shops*
One future tight spot in the supply of diesel engines for power-" ing LST’s appeared to be at the Electro-Motive Division of the General Motors Corporation* At a meeting on January 15, 1944» to reschedule production, claims by the Navy for landing craft and by the Office of Defense Transportation for the locomotive program were considerably over the company’s capacity to produce* Specifically, the Navy wanted a minimum delivery of 90 engines a month from January through August, and the Office of Defense Transportation wanted 40 engines a month for the first two months of the year, 44 for the next three, and 48 for July and August* In the settlement the company agreed to a delivery of 90 engines a month for the Navy and 32 a month for ODT, but only if a great deal of assistance was promised in securing materials and components* Lt* E* C* Garwood estimated that the Navy, even though granted 90 engines a month, would be short 66 engines (33 1ST ship’s worth) at the end of April. The Bureau of Ships still hoped, however, that they could meet the delivery requirements* "By shortening the lead factor appreciably, and by developing other sources of supply, such as the Cleveland Diesel," Garwood wrote, "Captain Lee still has hopes of meeting the 1ST requirements*" 115/
On the face of varying reports, components, other than the ones discussed above, might appear to have been short of the needs of the landing craft program* Thus, in one report the Navy estimated that the delivery of valves was 53 percent behind schedule* That figure, however, was not nearly so serious in substance as it appeared* By the Navy’s way of reporting, if one valve out of a huge order of 20 or 30 types were not delivered exactly on schedule, the entire order was listed as behind* In January 1944, the total production capacity of the valve industry was ample to take care of all marine requirements if the time between the placement of orders and deliveries was in any way consistent with the shortest possible minimum time required for production* Often in the landing craft program this minimum time was not observed, and temporary shortages did appear, notwithstanding the fact that the total production of both brass and 115/ Memorandum, Lt*E*C«Garwood to L*R*Boulware, January 15, 1944*
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steel valves had been doubled in the past 18 months« To ease these temporary shortages, the WPB Shipbuilding Division located from excess inventories and other sources over 500,000 bronze valves and 115,000 steel valves for the landing craft program« 116/
priority Conflicts«--There is little doubt that the quality and quantity of special assistance given to the accelerated landing craft program has hurt other high-priority war projects« This was anticipated by the Army-Navy agreement at the time the program was set up« Since the WPB Production Executive Committee was to list 13 “must programs" as highly urgent in the first quarter of 1944, and since at least five of them (the Manhattan District project, synthetic rubber, 100-octane facilities, heavy trucks, and group 1-4 airplanes) were likely to compete with landing craft for materials and components, this agreement to overriding preference treatment for landing craft by the Services was an extensive concession* 117/ Summarising his understanding of the Army-Navy agreement, L. R. Boulware wrote to Donald M« Nelson:
"It is my understanding that in those cases where satisfactory alternates to bottlenecks in this program cannot be found I am to issue a directive which will give precedence over all other programs to that part of the advanced landing craft program needing assistance to meet the new schedule«" 118/
Apparently, however, objections had been raised to such an overriding priority by some of the other claimants, for Nelson on the following day informed Boulware that no directives for landing craft were to be issued without concurrence of all key claimants« Accordingly, Boulware wrote to Frank Connolly: "In accordance with instructions received from Mr. Nelson via his Assistant Mr« Locke, we are to issue no further directives without concurrence of the key claimants«" Thereafter, before every directive was issued, it was shown to the representatives of all key claimants, including the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission, and the Petroleum Administration for War, to obtain their concurrence« If objections were made to a directive because of its likely interference with another program, either the nature of the _ directive was changed with the approval of Boulware’s office, or, if
Uh/ Statement of William T, Snyder to author, March 7, 1944* 117/ Wnut*«, Production Executive Committee, March 1, 1944. Tig/ Letter, L Ji .Boulware to Donald M. Nelson, December 2, 1943*
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this could not be obtained, the case vas referred to Boulware for his decision« In any instance of serious conflict with other important programs the Navy was required to prove its case and limit its requests to absolute minimum delivery requirements« Up to the present date of writing, no directive has been issued without the concurrence of the representatives for the key claimants« 119/ To the extent then that the concurrence of the key claimants was asked and obtained before a directive was issued, the newspaper story that landing craft had been given a completely overriding priority "giving them the right of way over planes, high-octane gasoline and all other ’urgency* production programs” was misleading«
Of all the programs adversely affected by the landing craft program, undoubtedly the Anny’s heavy truck program, which was also a "must" program, and the Navy's other ship programs were the hardest hit« But these two Services, keeping their original agreement, accepted their losses without objection« The need for stern-anchor handling gear for LST's also conflicted with the need of equipment for maintenance of extractive industries« This conflict was settled when a decision was reached allowing manufacturers of mining equipment to ship chains when they were immediately needed to repair a breakdown, but not to ship for stock in the anticipation of breakdowns, and to ship the 1ST handling gear one month later than scheduled«
One of the most strenouous objections to the priorities given landing craft came from the Petroleum Administration for War« This was not primarily because of any undue interference with high-octane gasoline, but because of a confusion that existed as to the nature of the landing craft priorities, and because of PAW’s unwillingness to have landing craft interfere in the slightest way with the high-octane program« Undoubtedly inspired by the reports that "completely overriding priorities" had been granted to landing craft, the Deputy Petro* leum Administrator for War on December 17, 1943, wrote a letter to Donald M« Nelson, protesting against the great damage done to the high-octane program by the overriding directives issued for landing craft« He also asked that the high-octane gasoline project be given exact equal status with landing craft in the matter of special assistance« 120/ Nelson replied to that communication on December 30« "The War Production Board," he wrote, "has not issued any overriding directives to the Landing Craft Program« In a telegram addressed to the
119/ Statement of Frank V« Connolly to author, March 22, 1944»
120/ Letter, R«K «Davies to Donald M« Nelson, December 17, 1943«
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suppliers of components and materials to this program, we have established a procedure whereby the Inspectors of Naval Material can request from the War Production Board an AAi or directive on those purchase orders which after thorough investigation appear to be /the/ delaying factor on the Accelerated Landing Craft Schedule* However, as explained to you by Mr. Deutch, such directives are issued only after the possible conflicts with other programs have been carefully considered.* Nelson then went on to add that the WPB and the Navy had agreed, if Davies so desired, to "confirm the same procedure for the 100-octane gasoline program." 121/
The misunderstanding between WPB and PAW continued to exist because of the definition of "overriding directive." By that term Nelson in his letter of December 30 meant that no blanket directive was issued for landing craft without regard to its need or possible interference with other programs. It is noteworthy that Boulware instructed the Special Rating Branch in December not to issue landing craft directives without first referring them to the PAW, Army, and Maritime representatives, and to refer to his office any directives that could not be reconciled. 122/ On the other hand, PAW’s representatives chose to define an overriding directive as any directive scheduling the production for landing craft of any materials or components before any of those of the 100-octane program, irrespective if whether the extent of the conflict had been thoroughly investigated prior to issuance and a solution arrived at that had the concurrence of PAW’s representative. Even the granting of similar aid to the 100-octane program, which was actually done on January 11, 1944, was not acceptable to PAW. 123/ The reason for PAW’s stand was obvious. Since PAW’s 100-octane program was much older than the landing craft program and most of PAW’s orders had been placed prior to the orders for landing craft, it stood to gain by objecting to the issuance of any overriding directives.
Determined to win his point, R. K. Davies of PAW again protested to Nelson on January 15 that materials and equipment for the 100-octane gasoline program were being seriously delayed by landing craft interference, and again insisted that the practice of issuing landing craft overriding directives be stopped. Davies then declared that the industry divisions of WPB were issuing unscreened directives for landing craft, apparently without regard to their effects on the 100-octane program. Finally, he asked that all existing landing craft directives be changed or that new directives be issued with the qualification that they were not to override any conflicting orders for the 100-octane program. 124/ Shortly thereafter, without consulting WPB, Max B. Miller,
121/ ¿etter» Donald M. Nelson to R.K.Davies, December 30» 1943« 1^/ statement of Frank Connolly to author» March 23, 1944« 123/ Memorandum, C.E.Wilson to J.T.Whiting, January 11, 1944* py Letter, R.K .Davies to Donald M. Nelson» January 15, 1944.
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the Director of Construction for PAW, sent the following telegram to all bearing, valve, and fitting manufacturers:
*In view of extreme urgency of 100-octane gasoline, we wish to remind you that 100-octane program is on a par with landing craft, and 100-octane orders take precedence over subsequent landing craft orders of equal or lower priority ratings* You will recall landing craft telegram of November 26 merely instructed you to accelerate your deliveries by three months and was not a directive covering any specific orders • • ♦ * 12$/
Ab PAW's telegram might be interpreted to mean that no landing craft directives were to supersede 100-octane orders, Garwood suggested a telegram be sent countermanding the PAW telegram and stating that any instructions as to the urgency of relative programs would come from WPB and no one else* The matter was settled, however, by Nelson in a letter to Davies in which the WPB Chairman stated that after a thorough investigation of the points discussed he was sure that not only were the two agencies in agreement as to the solution of conflicts, but that the method of resolving *any such conflicts has already been adequately determined* * Nelson then referred to the instructions issued to all industry divisions on November 29, 1943, expressly requiring them to accept landing craft expediting cases only from the Special Rating Branch, where PAW had a representative* Moreover, by those instructions the industry divisions were not to issue directives, but simply to refer their proposed solutions back to the Special Rating Branch, which would issue all directives* *1 have every reason to believe,* Nelson continued, "that the Divisions have complied with these instructions* While there may well have been some unauthorized, dislocation of orders for other programs as a result of the publicity in connection with the landing Craft Program, the field organization of the Navy and the more critical component manufacturers are now fully aware that a landing craft order may not be put ahead of older orders bearing equal rating or of higher rated orders without specific authorization from the War Production Board* Such authorizations, when granted, have been previously reviewed by your representative**
Nelson then referred to a January 1 memorandum from WPB to all manufacturers of critical components for the 100-octane program
125/ Telegram, Max B* Miller to Bearings, Valves, and Fittings
Manufacturers, January 28, 1944«
126/ Memorandum, Lt* E.C*Garwood to L*R.Boulware, February 21, 1944«
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requesting them to inform PAW of any conflicts that might arise from the acceleration of landing craft; he also referred to instructions issued on January 10 to all divisions of the WPB. The instructions were as follows:
"It has been decided that wherever conflicts arise between Group 1 Programs, preference should be given to the 100-octane gasoline and related construction projects over Group 1 items except landing craft« The landing craft and high-octane construction programs thus have an equal position, both standing above other Group 1 items « • •*
The letter ended with
the following paragraph«
"In view of the foregoing, I am sure you will agree with me that it would not be appropriate for the War Production Board to modify existing directives or issue new ones on the Landing Craft Program with the qualification that such directives were not to override any conflicting orders for the 100 Octane Gasoline Program« This practice might be justified in the event, for example, that the 100 Octane Gasoline Program had been determined to be of greater urgency than Landing Craft« However, with respect to programs of equal urgency this might easily result in putting in the hands of a manufacturer, or his order clerks the right to determine whether or not a specific War Production Board directive should be executed « « « I believe the organization we have established « « • is prepared to resolve substantially any serious conflicts between them before a directive is issued« This is particularly true because, as you know, a representative of your organization has the opportunity to review all directives covering landing craft items before they are issued« Moreover, the recent trip made by members of the Special High Octane Committee has revealed that the aviation gasoline projects are not at present being delayed by the shortages of materials or equipment«" 127/
In the course of the interchange, PAW had obtained the right to ask for the same special assistance that was being given to landing craft« PAW did not, however, win its point of attempting to stop the issuance
127/ Letter« Donald M« Nelson to R.KJ)avies, February 1, 1944*
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of directives for landing craft. One other point is pertinent. Shortly after 100-octane gasoline had been accorded equal priority status with landing craft, J. A. Krug received a letter from the Steel Division protesting against the unscreened character of the requests for special assistance for 100-octane materials. The letter then asked that the same screening process being applied to landing craft, which was "working out very smoothly“, be applied to 100-octane requests. 128/
WPB Assistance to Landing Craft Program.—No figures are available of the total amount of aid that has been given the landing craft program by local and regional WPB agencies since a good part of this aid escapes tabulation. But that it was tremendous is undeniable. For example, during one week the WPB regional offices found in excess inventories and elsewhere 17,400 tons of steel shapes, all of which were used in the landing craft program; in the same week these offices found another 9,100 tons of steel shapes, most of which were used in landing craft. _ 129/
As of May 1, 1944, 2,735 appeals for special priority assistance had been received by the WPB in Washington, of which 2,282 were answered by the granting of a directive. The remaining 453 cases were settled by the finding of other solutions. The total value of the 2-,282 directives issued amounted to $41,452,451-42. The directives issued for LST’s amounted to approximately 40 percent of the total dollar value; the directives for LVT’s amounted to another 40 percent. Approximately one-half of the directives issued were for the three critical items, steel, bearings, and diesel engines. 629 directives were issued for steel, 339 for bearings and 139 for diesel engines. The dispatch with which the cases were handled is evident in the records of time lapse, kept by the Special Ratings Branch of WPB. By rough count, about half the cases were settled in the allotted 24 hours. A good portion of the rest were settled within two to five days, with only a few requiring a period from ten to fifteen days. 130/ On the whole, the Special Ratings Branch had done an excellent job of handling the day to day affairs of the landing craft program.
128/ Letter, J. T. Whiting to J'. A. Krug, January 17, 1944.
129/ Letter, Lt. E. 0. Garwood to Harcourt Amory, January 15, 1944.
130/ Special Rating Branch Daily Landing Craft Reports, WPB, December 1, 1943 - February 29, 1944; Memorandum, Lt. E. C. Garwood to L. R. Boulware, January 8, 1944; Special Rating Branch, WPB, "History of the Accelerated Landing Craft Program", no date.
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Production Progress.»«Like the first landing craft program and the destroyer escort program, the second landing craft program was substantially behind schedule in its early months* On September 1, 1943, the Bureau of Ships had scheduled 214,000 tons of landing craft deliveries for the fourth quarter of the year. By the Bureau of Ships October 1 schedule this figure had been raised to 237,000 tons, Actual deliveries during the fourth quarter of 1943 were a disappointing 211,000 tons, 23,000 tons under the revised schedule. During the first three months of 1944 the landing craft program continued to lag. On a total delivered tonnage basis the program fell 14 percent behind schedule in January, 28 percent behind in February and about 24 percent behind in March, From December 1, 1943, to March 31, 1944, the cumulative defi-ciency from the December 1 schedule was 97,500 tons, 131/
By far the greatest laggards in deliveries during the first four months of the December 1 program were the IST’s and the LVT’s, both of which had been accelerated enormously from the November 1 schedule. The IST’s alone made up 40 percent of the total tonnage of the December 1 schedule, so that any lag in this part of the program was bound to affect the entire schedule severely. As of March 31, the cumulative deficiency of 1ST1 s from the December 1 schedule was 29 ships. (See Table No. 5)
TABLE 5. Schedules, Deliveries, and Cumulative Deficiencies in IST’s, December 1943 to March 1944»
	November 1 Schedule	December 1 Schedule	Actual Deliveries	Cumulative Deficiencies Schedule From December 1
November 1943	20	20	20	
December 1943	28	30	25	5
January 1944	24	28	28	15
February 1944	25	32	18	19
March 1944	27	38	28	29
Source: Bureau of Ships, "Landing Craft Progress Report," April 1, 1944, pp. 4-2.
131/ wpb Progress Division, "Monthly Report to the War Production Board", January 1944 (WPB Document 270), February 1944 (WPB Document 275), March 1944 (WPB Document 283).
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At that date seven of the eight yards scheduled for deliveries of IST’s during the month were behind, with the major delays being concentrated in four yards, the Jeffersonville Boat and Machine, the Missouri Valley Bridge, the Chicago Bridge and Iron, and the Dravo Corporation, Neville Island» Design changes on the new 542 Class 1ST, including a vehicle ramp instead of an elevator, a distilling plant, an emergency diesel fire pump, and heavier armament probably accounted for a part of the delay» The new designs were not completed until December 1943, the purchase orders were late in being placed, and the flow of components and materials was thus retarded. More of the delay in LST’s was due to the shipment of spare parts» During the first three months of 1944, the Navy intentionally sacrificed the delivery of LST’s to ship 45 ships1 worth of component spares to service 1ST* 8 already in operation» To make way for these spares, the deadline date for the delivery of LST’s was set back from May 31 to June 20, 1944» 132/
The other type of craft badly behind the accelerated December 1 schedule was the LVT. This program, which had been accelerated from about 2,500 vessels to about 4,500 for the seven months beginning November 1, 1943, had the steepest rate of increase scheduled for any type of craft» As seen by Table 6, deliveries were scheduled to jump from 400 in December to 800 in February, an increase of 100 percent in 60 days» Actual deliveries as of March 31 were behind the December 1 schedule by 643 craft» Beyond the steeply ascending schedule, the major causes for the delay of LVT’s were undoubtedly the belated letting of contracts, and consequent delays in receipt of materials and components by assembly plants, and the changes in design»
132/ Statement, Bertrand Fox to author, May 24, 1944;"Statement of the Navy Department Before the Wa? Production Board on Landing Craft Production,"April 4, 1944 (NPB Document 291)»
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TABLE 6« Schedules, Deliveries, and Cumxilative Deficiencies in LVT’s, December 1943 to March 1944< (Number of Vessels)
November 1, 1943 Schedule		December 1, 1943	Deliveries	Cumulative Deficiencies from December 1 Schedule
November 1943	329	329	329	
December 1943	400	400	319	81
January 1944	425	600	442	239
February 1944	377	800	5H	528
March 1944	381	900	785	643
Source: Bureau of Ships, "Landing Craft Progress Report," April 1, 1944, pp. 4-5.
Up to March 31, the other types of craft in the accelerated schedules were either ahead of schedule or very little behind« LCl(L)’s, and LCT’s, for example, were five and thirty ships respectively ahead of schedule on April 30, 1944. The non-accelerated types were setting even a better record. Thus, the only difficulties as of April 1, 1944, were in the types first mentioned, the Landing Ship, Tank, and the Landing Vehicle, Tracked« It is noteworthy that in both instances design changes had been made late in the program« 133/
Reviewing the landing craft program in March, the WPB Progress Division criticized general phases of the Navy’s handling of the program« Specifically, it criticized the Navy’s production planning, especially for the 1ST and ISM programs« According to the Progress Division, the Navy in the new 1ST program had utilized only a mlnlmum number of the shipyards that had gained experience in building IST’s in the previous program« Furthermore, the Progress Division charged that the Navy had neither reduced the destroyer escort program quickly enough, nor had it cut back sufficient tonnage to make the realization of the May 31, 1944, 1ST and ISM goals feasible.
Secondly, the WPB Progress Division criticized the Navy’s practice of increasing schedules from month to month by the addition of accumulated past deficits« These so-called "incentive" schedules were
133/ Bureau of Ships, "landing Craft Progress Report," March 1, 1944, pp« 4-2 to 4-6«
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described as thoroughly "unrealistic", and, in the case of IST’s, IS M’s, and LVT’s, as impossible of attainment month by month as scheduled, The Progress Division further charged that the Navy’s scheduling of materials and components to conform with these "unrealistic* schedules resulted in immobilization of these critical resources for extended periods, during which they could have been used for other highly urgent war programs.
Finally, the Progress Division predicted that the actual deliveries of landing craft "will be much less than the forecast by the Bureau of Ships," In particular, pointing to current deficiencies of 137*8 from the December 1 schedule, it predicted that deliveries of IST’s would be much less than the goal of 240 by May 31, 1944, that no IBM’s would be delivered in April and only half of those forecast would be delivered in May, Except for the LOT, LCI, and other smaller classes, the Progress Division implied that the success of the program ending on May 31, 1944, was in danger, 134/
In rejoinder, M, D, Safanie, speaking for the Navy, denied these conclusions. He dismissed the charge of poor production planning as one founded on a lack of knowledge of the obstacles in the way of a quick change from one type of ship to another. Moreover, he asserted that the Navy felt that a stoppage in the production of other important types of ships for the purpose of speeding up deliveries of IST’s was "not desirable," "The manpower problem, the present work load at the various yards, and the general all-around ability to shift quickly to the production of another type of shin," he explained, *govemed the Navy in its choice of additional /LST/ yards,"
Safanie admitted that the Navy’s incentive scheduling might result in deficiencies at any given interval in a program. But, pointing to the history of past mass-production programs, he insisted that this was the only method of scheduling that would assure that the end goals of the program would be met, "If easily attainable goals had been set up* he explained, "the programs would not have received the needed impetus,"
Safanie also denied that the Navy had immobilized materials and components for any length of time by scheduling them far in advance of their actual need at shipyards, Schedules for materials and components, he said, had been revised both in February and March, Moreover, the Navy regularly rescheduled them every 90 days. The WPB Progress Division in its criticism, Safanie explained, had not allowed for the decreased building time for landing craft, and also had based its
134/ WPB Progress Division, "Monthly Report to the War Production Board," March 1944 (WPB Document 283).
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claims upon its own pessimistic outlook on future deliveries, an outlook with which the Navy did not agree«
In conclusion, Safanie asserted that, although the December schedules had not been met in the past for.all types of ships and although they might not be mot at any specific time in the next two months, the cumulative December 1 schedule, which he insisted was the Navy's "maximum expectations", would be met by May 31, 1944> "for all the major types of landing craft except for 19 IST's and 229 LVT’s." 13$/
During the course of this argument there was considerable confusion as to terms« The Progress Division considered the December 1 goals as extremely rigid ones which should be met; the Navy referred to them as "maximum expectations«" Moreover, throughout its argument the Progress Division was implying that deliveries month-to-month were extremely important« The Navy, as in the past, was asserting that monthly schedules did not mean much and that what counted was meeting the program by its end date« Thus, it was able to refer to the success of the first landing craft and the destroyer escort programs even though these programs did not meet their schedules for many months after their origin« The correctness of this viewpoint for the overall war effort depends upon whether strategic plans are formulated upon the basis of end dates, and upon the published schedules of the Bureau of Ships, or upon specific deliveries of craft month-by-month before the end dates, and upon the confidential guaranteed schedules« A case in point from the past is the relation of the North African invasion and the deficient deliveries of landing craft during the months prior to that invasion« If the coming invasion of Europe was planned in part on the basis of total guaranteed landing craft deliveries to May 31, 1944, then the Navy's argument, as far as deliveries were concerned, was rational« If, on the other hand, Invasion plans were formulated on the expectations of the specific amounts of landing craft as published in the Bureau of Ships Progress Reports being delivered month-by-month, the WPB’s concern with the deficient deliveries during the first three months of 1944 was justified«
The most important point in this argument, however, was settled conclusively on May 31, 1944» That was the amounts of landing craft that could be delivered by that time« Safanie had predicted that the Navy would fully meet the December 1 schedule by that date except for 19 IST's and 299 LVT's« The WPB Progress Division had doubted the possibility of this accomplishment« Fortunately, the Navy was right and the Progress Division was wrong« During April for the first time
135/ Memorandum, "Statement of the Navy Department Before the War production Board on Landing Craft Production", April 4, 1944 (WPB Document 291).
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the December 1 schedule, which the Navy insisted reflected its "maximum expectations”, was met. And May deliveries, exceeding the schedule by a sizeable amount, totaled a record 197,900 tons. Particularly impressive was the delivery in May of 82 IST’s, 966 LVT’s, and 39 LSM*s. Deliveries of ISM’S, a new landing ship of 490 tons, had exceeded the May schedule by 13 ships. All in all, by May 31, 1944, deliveries of landing craft had more than justified the Navy’s predictions. In fact, except for 9 IST’s, 553 LVT’s and negligible amounts of LCC’s, LCM’s and LCVP*s,the December 1 schedule had been met. What the WPB Progress Division had regarded as impossible stood as an accomplished fact. 136/ (For complete delivery statistics see Appendix C)
Conclusion.—In retrospect the second landing craft program presented a picture of some minor disappointment in its early stages, but of brilliant achievement overall. Each month, deliveries had exceeded the guaranteed schedule for every class of craft. And by May 31, 1944, the goal set by the Navy in December 1943 as the absolute maxi mum then thought possible had been virtually achieved. The obstacles that the 1943-44 landing craft program had to surmount were immeasurably greater than those that the first program had surmounted. The total tonnage of the second program was over twice as great as that of the first program; the time designated for its completion was approximately half that designated for the first program. It also suffered keener competition from other urgent war programs for manpower, and in some instances for materials and components• For, while production capacity for landing craft components had increased in the interval between the two programs, military demand for these specific items had increased even faster. In labor supply at least the ratio was inverse. While the demand continued to rise, the supply, because of military inductions, actually decreased.
The War Production Board contributed much to the success of the second landing craft program. Noteworthy is the fact that Nelson had seen the need for, and had urged the production of, increased amounts of landing craft months before actual increases were ordered. Significant also was the swift WPB action in agreeing with the Navy on an accelerated program on November 24, 1943, without specific approval of higher authorities. Subsequently, scarcely an hour had been lost in informing manufacturers of components of the acceleration and in organising a landing craft expediting organization. During the course of the program the WPB Special Rating Branch had issued 2,282 directives compared with less than 300 issued during the first program. That
136/ WPB Progress Division, ”Monthly Report to the War Production Board,” June 1944 (WPB Document 302).
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meant that the WPB had not only found a workable solution for over 2,000 requests for aid, but had also found acceptable solutions for every case of landing craft interference with other programs. That was no small task. That it had been handled effectively was implicit in the statement made in the Navy's April 4 Memorandum that "sufficient quantities of materials and components" were being supplied to assure landing craft production on schedule. 137/
Of special interest was WPB’s connection with the invasion planning by the Headquarters of the United States Army in London. While on his fall trip to London, Nelson had made arrangements with the military authorities in London to supply them with accurate statistics of landing craft deliveries. Nelson sent these reports monthly to Brigadier General Lord, the last report being made on June 3, 1944, just three days before the invasion of Western Europe. Since Brigadier General Lord wrote that the reports were "widely circulated" and kept "everyone well informed on what to expect from the production angle" it can be assumed that these statistics were of vital use in the calculations centering around one of the greatest military ventures of all times. 133/
137/ Memorandum, "Statement of the Navy Department Before the War Production Board on Landing Craft Production," April 4, 1944 (WPB Document 291)«
I38/ Letters, Donald M. Nelson to Brigadier General R.B.Lord, December 18, 1943, February 11, March 6, April 14, June 3, 1944; Brigadier General R.B.Lord to Donald M. Nelson, April 26, 1944*
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APPENDIX A
Chronology
1941
August 4	• Navy lets first contracts for LVT's.
January 10	- Navy lets contracts for 100 destroyer escorts«
January 18	• Landing craft placed in Group 8 in the Navy’s
Shipbuilding Precedence Groups«
January 21	- Navy lets contracts for 250, 36-foot Eureka
landing boats (wood).
February	9	•	Navy lets contracts for	first	LCM(3)’s.
February	10	-	Navy lets contracts for	first	1ST’8«
. March 31	-	Landing craft placed in	Group	10 in the	Navy* s
Shipbuilding Precedence Groups«
April 4	• White House conference at which Bureau of Ships
was directed to provide 600, 50-foot tank lighters (later called LCM(3)ts) by September 1, 1942.
April 22	- Navy lets contracts for 1,100 tank lighters
(LCM(3),s) of Bureau of Ships design«
May 29	- Contracts for 1,000 Bureau of Ships designed
LCM(3)’s changed to Higgins design after tests had proved the craft designed by the Bureau of Ships to be unseaworthy«
July 1	- Landing craft placed in Group 1 in the Navy's
Shipbuilding Precedence Groups«
August 1	- Priority rating for all landing craft changed from
A-l-a to AA-1.
August 7	- Amphibious invasion of the Solomon Islands«
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2242
August 24	• Plan for granting special assistance to landing
craft by WPB agreed upon by the Navy and WPB« Field Administrative Order No« 708-4 authorizes the issuance of scheduling directive PD-637 on landing craft materials and components« L. R. Boulware appointed as Special Assistant to Deputy Director General for Priorities Control to head WPB landing craft organization« Landing Craft Specialists appointed for each WPB regional office«
August 27, 28	- Meeting of all Regional Landing Craft Special-
ists in New York City«
September 1	- Deadline date set at April 4 White House confer-
ence for delivery of landing craft« Landing craft deliveries 50 percent behind schedule«
November 7	- Invasion of North Africa«
November 30	- Monthly landing craft deliveries meet schedule
for first time«
December 17	- L. R. Boulware designated to head up WPB organ-
ization for granting special assistance to the destroyer escort program«
December 18	- Appointment of W« F. Gibbs as WPB Controller of
Shipbuilding announced«
1943
February 28	- Landing craft deliveries for February set record
of 106,146 tons«
May 11	- Amphibious landing on Attu Island in the
Aleutians«
July 9	• Invasion of Sicily«
July 16	- Scheduling Directive PD-637 eliminated« Navy
authorized to issue GA-209»
August 3	• New York Supervisor of Shipbuilding unofficially
asks for WPB assistance for the increased 1ST program«
23-846 P?3 bu
- 66 -
1943
August 7	- Quebec Conference begins at which strategic
plans for the future are formulated.
September 1	- Bureau of Ships schedules 10 percent increase
in landing craft program. landing craft placed in Group 4 in the Navy*s Shipbuilding Precedence Groups.
September 4	• Invasion of the Italian mainland.
September 9	- Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that August 1 land-
ing craft program be increased by 25 percent.
September 27	• Donald M. Nelson cables from London, England,
urging further increases in the landing craft program.
October 1	- Bureau of Ships schedules 25 percent increase in
landing craft over August 1 schedule.
October 19 to 30	- Moscow Conference,
e
November 19	- Navy furnishes WPB with steel requirements for
accelerated landing craft program.
November 20	- Invasion of Makin and Tarawa in the Gilbert
Island Group.
November 22	- Cairo Conference begins.
November 23	• The President cables to James F. Byrnes in-
quiring about the possibility of further increases in the landing craft program. Conference of Army, Navy, Maritime Commission and WPB officials called by Byrnes. Navy first asks officially for WPB aid in the landing craft program.
November 24	• Conference between Army, Navy and WPB.
November 26	- Teheran Conference begins. WPB sends a tele-
gram to all important component suppliers for specific types of landing craft asking that they accelerate deliveries.
3»-64» P74
-67 -
November 29	• The President replies to James F. Byrnes* pro-
posals for Increased landing craft deliveries* Meeting of WPB Landing Craft Specialists at New fork City«
December 1	- Bureau of Ships schedule accelerate specific
types of landing craft by three months and greatly increases scheduled deliveries of LVT*s«
December 2	- Teheran Conference ends«
December 9	• Last 1ST contracts let by Navy for delivery
before May 31, 1944.
December 17	- Deputy Petroleum Administrator for War pro-
tests against the issuance of overriding directives for landing craft materials and components«
January 1	- Landing craft deliveries for December 1943
total 75,000 lightweight displacement tons or 15,000 tons less than scheduled«
Fehruary 1	- Landing craft deliveries for January total
90,000 tons or 12,500 tons less than scheduled«
March 1	- Landing craft deliveries for February total
78,000 tons or 40,000 tons less than scheduled« WPB Progress Division criticizes Navy’s handling of landing craft program and predicts that total program will not be met by May 31, 1944.
March 30	- Issuance of WPB General Operations Circular 207
extending WPB assistance to landing craft program to July 31, 1944.
March 31	- Donald M« Nelson announces a ten percent in-
crease in the landing craft program«
23-84«
- 68 -
April 1	- landing craft deliveries for March total 98,000
lightweight displacement tons or 30,000 less than scheduled.
April 4	- Bureau of Ships replies to WPB Progress Divi-
sion’s criticism.
April 30	- Landing craft deliveries for April totalling
131>000 tons, meets the December 1 schedule for the first time*
May 1	- Navy starts great drive for increased production
of IST’s during May*
May 31	- Landing craft deliveries for May total 198,000
tons* December 1 schedule met except for 9 LST’s and 553 LVT’s*
June 6	- Invasion of France*
*»•«46 *7« bu
o Ul o
i 5
CD < fe 5 < p ai i-“Ho , z $ £ O 0> • £ O — < J Ì uj 2 en CD /a Ul X > F o o z s o > Z ÄI <
Source: Bureau of Ships, Progress Report.
3
£
©
- 70 -
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50 Ton Group	tu £ X fl 5	Vehicle	«J XJ s- O E- CD i— fl fl <3 E^ §	C	O	o	O	o	o	Q	o	• 7 o	0 - o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	<*\ O		O
Under	Grand	d o Eh	fl £ O 0 <4-1 fl o	o	C	'h	o	'o4	fl	O	04	o	fl	O 04		o'fl		o	o	o	o	to		UA
	Landing	* Ch aJ Ô	fl fl §•8 CO fl	o	Q	O	o	o	o	O	o	o	o	O	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o
	b£ fl •H fl 5	Ph «fl co	Medium ISM	o	O	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	O	o	o	o	o	o	/O	o	o	o	o
	bO fl •H O fl 5	•s Ph fl CO	Dock LSD	O	O	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o		o	o	o	o
	bD fl •fl fl 3	«h fl fl O	Tank lot	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	04
	bO fl Ö fl 3	ä fl fl O	Infantry LOI (L)	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	O
•	bO fl 5 fl 3	•fl fl CO	Tank 1ST	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	co 04 to		04 UA
		bp	01																					
rH oi		•fl c Si	O fl CO -P to o o Eh	o	o	H	O 04		fl	o	04	o	fl	o'	04	o'	fl	o	(0) 36		c*\		04 Ch	O'
			fl -p p Q	o at	-p co s » fl § s 3	February	fl o fl £	Ph fl •fl S		1	July August		fl ¥ fl e © Ph © CO	fl © fl o o o	fl © fl g CD > O	fl » fl s p aS 3 O'	& d 3 fl fl © Pm	fl Ü fl â
28-846 P7S bu-
- 71 -
© a o
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a © a © Ü aS
ft
M
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O O o
Ton Group	Landing Vehicle Tracked rr & LVT(Ä	O O ma	H	o	c*	H			O	- 71 o o		«» o	O	o	o H	O	MA	omo		to MA	O	O	xQ xO H
o	►4																						
Under	Grand Total for Broun	Ox MAH 02 H H	H	02	o	to	ma	cm	£>	coto en en		Ox O H		Ox	to	MA CO	02 ma	O xO	02	Q xO	O	O	MA
	Landing Craft, Support LCS (L)	O O <39	O	o	o	o	o	o	O	O	o	O	O	O	O	O	O	o o	O	O	O	02	02 H
	Landing Ship, Medium LSM	oo o	O	o	o	o	o	o	O	o	o	O	O	o	O	O	œ Ox	MA O 02 MA	o	O	o	H MA	4 02
	Landing Ship, Dock ISD	OOH co	O	o	o	o	o	o	o	O	o	O	Q	o	MA	o	O	O O	o	xO en	o	4	CM CM
	Landing Craft, Tank LOT	H O O MA	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	O	kO H	O	O	ua 02	xO 02	o	o	o to	o	o	o		02 H
	Landing Craft Infantry LOI (L)	OOH MA	o	“o 02		o	o	o	o	o	O	O	O	4	to 02	o	H	UA WA MA	o	o	O XO		02
	Landing Ship, Tank LST	o co o H xO CM	o	o	o	co	o	o	o	ó	O co	O	0x0		02	xO	xO CO	O Ox H	ox to ío	o	02	MA	
																							
	40 CD rH „ J - t																						
1	M ri rn —| «H © aJ —I 'O W -P ctí fl w o 4 5 e-	xO to co Ox O- Ox 02	H 02		02	ma to	MA	02		co co	if	H °		Ox	O 02	H	02 O 02	o to co H 02	Ox en	xO H Ox 02		CO	MA CO CM
	4m fl o	•H	m fl «C ä H 02 H	July August		fe © a © a © CO	fe © 43 o b o	fe o 43 a o > o »,	fe © 43 a o o o Q	! 2 fl 43 <0 © fM CO co ’ H		44 O i	H •H fe <	1	1	£ ’a»	August	fe © a © +3 © en	fe fe © © 43 43 a O © •p > 5? o o a	fe $ a © o © Q	& 1 4 H	& s fe 43 ©	’S fe s	H <4 S E-t
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23*046 P79 bu
- 72 -
APPENDIX C
TABLE 1» Production of Landing Craft, July 1941 to September 1943
man jo	•on (s)son							
	jo *on 001							
	jo -on AOI					«a o »a if CM	O CAxO rd *4	Qx MX -4 CM CM<*^ CM
•on (H)	man JO pa* (l)J01	8	xO step »a O' -4O'Hx0x0	xOO> Pl Pl	4	to «4 o o (M rx	4 0OO'O UXCACM	C*XxO MX CM CO OtO^>ÍO	CM CM -4*4 > CAxO O rd CM CM CA
6%™	jo *on MOI	x0	CO o xD 0 »A Q CA UA MXX0
si™ JC	•on moj	CM	O *O »A UXrd co cm *4^ o	-4 MX UX O' 	a	©	4 m	®	jq	a	a p	-P	o	®	© bo ft-P	>	O p	®	o	o	® 4 ® ® •p a © 3 4 « © a s s >> 3. t? ° ® ® jippp®oo® a»*9>-»«4cooao	s e-sa Si h h h oj ® Di ft al »-j ft a <4 a	■p a © ® g if & p. § *3 p ® »-» ►» ^CQ
		1941		a H			H	
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-74 -
APPENDIX D
Position of Landing Craft and Destroyer Escorts in the Navy*8 Shipbuilding Precedence Groups, January 18, 1942 to December 23, 1943#
	Landing Craft	Destroyer Escorts
1942 January 18	18	
March 21	10	8
July 4	1	10
September 3	1	3
October 30	2	3
November 5		
November 11	12	2d
November 18	3	2d
November 24	/	1
1943 March 26	4b	2
September 1	4®	2e
October 5	1	6f
December 23	1	5f
a« Included only selected IST’s,		LCI(L)'s and LOT'S
b.	Except LST’s after first 200
c.	Except LCC
d.	First 83 only
e.	First 245 only
f,	First 400 only
Sources Navy War Program, "Semi-Monthly Progress Report," January 15, 1944#
83“64fl P02 bu
- 75 -
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s$ sa ¿E x â o o O X to ß Ch © X >» O Id h © en g © © Qg PQ	E © N £ g g X © o PQ	E © H £ â * ß 0 © © Pt © Xi U	• «E	E	& ß ©	©	O ©H H >H	tord >>X Ë Ö © r*» R	ß	R	© *H	© > R ■©	©	©	X à	x © sz	H	tox	ta ss	.	g x TO	>4	©	*H ß	q5 X £	>	-H	X X	© ß © © X PU-P © S SS PU fi X cd A	X © x Td to x x © x en «h H p H qd G)	rd O O © rd ß O © &Ch A X P TO Pt £ Ih X X O G © © O X © Pt 0 s ßß K min 0						, E © to 5 gS to ß 3« S -H rd X X co 1 o-e > © EE PQ		Dry Dock	►					
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- 76 -
APPENDIX F
LANDING VESSEL PROGRAM
AS OF JANUARY Î, 1944
VALUE PUT IN PLACE
JULY I, I94O"DECEMBER 31,1943
1944
VALUE OF DELIVERIES
JULY 1,1940-DECEMBER 31,1943
tondino Ship«,Dock
1944
Source: Munitions Branch, Statistics Division, WPB
re«