

Elevating the Role of Socioeconomic Strategy in Afghanistan Transition

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October 2011

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Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology And National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available at <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html>.

FOREWORD

The System Analysis and Studies (SAS) Panel of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Research and Technology Organization (RTO) created a Specialist Team (ST) in June 2010 in response to an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) request to help develop, refine, and implement a strategy for data collection and management. The overarching goal of the initiative was to provide direct assistance to NATO, ISAF, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) as they collectively move forward to implement the Inteqal (transition) plan. More specifically, the goals of the NATO RTO SAS-091 ST were to:

- support the development of a plan that promotes the systematic collection, management, and analysis of data among ISAF nations;
- identify technological mechanisms and policy agreements for data-sharing among Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) stakeholders (ISAF, GIROA, and the NATO Senior Civilian Representative [SCR]) in easy-to-use formats, and;
- develop metrics, a data collection plan, and a data-sharing framework for the initial phase of Inteqal¹ that are useful to senior decisionmakers.

To accomplish these tasks, the team held two international workshops organized around six syndicates. Four of these six syndicates focused on the Inteqal initiatives: security, governance, rule of law, and development. The other two syndicates examined ubiquitous problems associated with data collection and data-sharing. All syndicates drew on polling results, demographic information, development projects, and other activities and measures in their deliberations.

The Inteqal initiatives mirror the four lines of operation (LOOs) commonly of concern to decisionmakers and commanders in developing a nation's or region's capacity. These LOOs were the primary focus of the NATO effort and will be referenced often in this paper. A brief description of each follows:

- *Security* is the protection from threats/activities of insurgent, terrorist, criminal, nationalist, ethnic, and extremist groups.
- *Governance* is the collective process of decisionmaking and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). It may be analyzed by three components: process, participation, and accountability.
- *Rule of Law* (RoL) is dispute resolution as it applies to person-to-person, person-to-group, and group-to-group disputes. RoL may include traditional systems such as a constitution, national laws, local district/village laws, courts, judges and police forces, as well as nontraditional systems such as religious laws (e.g., Sharia laws).
- *Socioeconomic Development* includes actions that build the capacity of social and economic institutions so they may withstand and diminish the threats identified above in the Security LOO. This may include establishing governing institutions,

improving the existing transportation infrastructure, providing basic needs (water, electricity, sewage, etc.), expanding the existing education infrastructure, improving access to medical facilities, and providing high-impact economic (agriculture and industry) assistance. Related objectives include reducing illicit economic activities such as corruption, poppy cultivation, and processing/distribution of narcotics.

Some 175 participants from 17 NATO countries, ISAF, GIRoA, and a variety of other organizations who attended Workshop One (Summer 2010) hosted by NATO Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum, Netherlands, generated numerous methodologies and projects that helped identify and evaluate metrics and improve data collection and data-sharing. About 115 participants who attended Workshop Two (Winter 2010) hosted by the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A), in The Hague, Netherlands, refined the metrics and information architecture to support the Inteqal framework and enhance processes associated with data collection and data-sharing.

In writing this paper, the authors drew heavily upon the knowledge gained from this NATO effort as well as previous National Defense University (NDU) Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP)–sponsored workshops addressing human, social, cognitive behavior (HSCB), corruption, data needs for U.S. combatant commands (COCOMS), and modeling and simulation needs for irregular warfare. Additionally, the authors reviewed a variety of open-source information, including GIRoA documents (e.g., Afghanistan National Development Strategy [ANDS], National Priority Program [NPP], Provincial Development Plans [PDPs], District Development Plans [DDPs]).

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Introduction

Afghanistan is attempting to move beyond the status of a failed state. It meets many of the criteria established by experts and used by donors to begin intervention.² Afghanistan has weak state institutions, is poorly governed, has been at war for nearly 30 years, and continues to have low-intensity conflict; its people are impoverished and its economy is immature. Afghanistan is also responsible for flooding the international market with opium and drug cartel “spill-over” effects that threaten global security.

The goals of the international community (IC) have been to create a stable Afghanistan, eliminate terrorist safe havens, reconstruct the state, and reestablish the economy, but things have not proceeded as envisioned.³ The stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in November 2001 has proven more difficult than initially anticipated. After the initial ousting of the Taliban, the question arose as to whether the country needed only state-building or whether nation-building is required as well.⁴ Indeed, decades of foreign domination, invasion, and civil war have left Afghanistan in need of both state- and nation-building efforts.

Creating socioeconomic development, stability, and security in Afghanistan that will enable transforming the war economy to a peace economy will require good governance and time. This is critical since more than 40 percent of post-conflict, low-income countries that maintain peace fall back into conflict within a decade.⁵ Paul Collier, professor of economics at Oxford University and leading expert on African economies, argues that coupling external peacekeepers with a robust economic development effort has proven more critical than political reform in preventing a return to conflict.⁶ According to Dietrich Rueschemeyer, rebuilding a state after a conflict requires:⁷

- the development of both institutions and norms
- alignment of interests and coordination of many different actors
- embodiment of conflict, antagonism, winners, and losers, and long-term stalemates.

Development, security, and stability are multidimensional processes that contain not only economic but also social and political (governance and rule of law) aspects. Therefore, policymakers must take into consideration their interdependence and interrelatedness when developing policies to stimulate development.

Reflecting these complexities, the U.S. Regional Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan discusses the role and strategy of economic development in these extracts from the Overview:⁸

“In Afghanistan, our focus is building the capacity of Afghan institutions to withstand and diminish the threat posed by extremism, and to deliver high-impact economic assistance—especially in the agricultural sector—to create jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents off of the battlefield.”

“The provinces and districts are where our most consequential programs will be delivered, where we must help the Afghan government provide economic opportunities that increase stability and reduce the strength of the insurgency—and where we are most visibly expanding our civilian commitment.”

“Our top reconstruction priority is implementing a civilian-military (civ-mil) agriculture redevelopment strategy to restore Afghanistan’s once vibrant agriculture sector. This will help sap the insurgency of fighters and of income from poppy cultivation.”

These strategic priorities highlight the high impact expected from economic program efforts, but recent evidence indicates that Afghanistan, the United States, and coalition partners have met challenges in execution.⁹ Part of the problem appears to be the disparity between military and civilian resources. ISAF is heavily focused on its security mission, and individuals have admitted that socioeconomic planning and assessment have been “tertiary.”¹⁰ On the other hand, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) touts the broad range of programs that it has pursued across Afghanistan on its Web site.¹¹ Many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also cite other broad “bottom-up” efforts.

Providing aid in Afghanistan has been an extremely complex undertaking, however, involving a wide range of actors with different agendas making cooperation and coordination difficult and, at times, competitive. Many factors contribute to this problem: the lack of field presence, poor coordination and information sharing, a dearth of reliable data, rapid turnover of on-site staff, and lack of capacity. There are also clear indications of inadequate civilian resources for local areas, to both implement high-impact development programs and to grow the local capacity to sustain socioeconomic growth into the future. These are just a small number of the more obvious factors that contribute to the poor availability and utilization of resources.

Countries that lack human capacity, have ongoing violence (ethnic, religions, social, etc.), and lack of functioning institutions frequently experience restricted development. Afghanistan fits this mold because it lacks all of the required criteria necessary to begin rebuilding. It has limited capacity for embarking on any long-term strategy for development. It lacks the political consensus for implementing an effective development strategy. Its leaders also fail to think strategically and identify critical paths. These leaders also fail to identify constraints and assess their impact of successful implementation.

To be successful, the government of Afghanistan must select a few priority areas based on a rigorous examination of resources and capabilities. Selecting a few provinces to implement such a program will limit the potential for overwhelming existing capacities, which would in turn increase wasted resources and contribute to all-too-frequent policy failure.

As a product of the series of conferences with the IC (further described in the next section), a set of documents has been developed that provides potential strategic objectives and implementation plans (the ANDS and the ANDS Prioritization and Implementation Plan [PIP]).¹² However, finding ways to ensure that Afghanistan has the capacity, information, and motivation required to pursue these strategies has been problematic and is exacerbated by the need to enact programs and achieve their objectives at the provincial level. To achieve this goal requires a clear policy statement that articulates specific and measurable objectives.

However, for lack of capacity, GIRoA has failed to prioritize spending among programs and budget execution (payments, procurement, accounting, etc.), which has resulted in a waste of resources and poor execution. The lack of accountability and transparency has resulted in corruption and loss of public support. Public finance has played and continues to play a vital role in economic stability and security for Afghanistan. To support these objectives, public finances must be: affordable; well-prioritized in accordance with Afghan national strategies; efficient in terms of value for money and service delivery; and fair, accountable, and transparently reported to the Afghan public, private business, and other stakeholders.

An optimal model for Afghanistan's development needs would be one that blends top-down and bottom-up strategies. The *loya jirga* bottom-up strategy for development has to focus on rebuilding the state and societal relations. Donors and GIRoA, from the top-down, need to be conscious of how they can support such a process. To accomplish this, policy makers will need to focus on building upon the fragile foundation already in place in districts and villages.

The time clock for return to Afghan sovereignty (the process referred to as "Inteqal") has already been set in motion. The first "tranche" of municipalities and locales to enter transition has already been announced.¹³ These initial selections were based on a balance of security status, governance capacity, and development state. This suggests that socioeconomic progress has a role among transition priorities, yet no clear process for an ordered transition across Afghanistan's provinces has been revealed. In fact, some of the selections reflect convenience more than strategic value.

There is little question that security and self-sufficiency are key building blocks for sustained success; but for true enduring success, the transition that must occur in Afghanistan is the change from *security-enabled economic opportunity* to a state of *socioeconomically-derived security*.

To accomplish such a transition, GIRoA, ISAF, and the IC must do several things. First, they must organize the transition process around a clear, focused set of development drivers. The immediate result will be a clear ordering of provinces based on their contributions toward the development objectives. Next, they must overlay considerations of local security and governance to arrive at an adjusted ordering of provinces, or possibly districts or municipalities. This ordering may then be broken into *transition cohorts* for entry into the Inteqal process. At this point, the ordering for transition would reflect contribution to development objectives, rather than convenience.

Cohorts must receive the necessary resource allocation and planning focus to achieve transition success. This is both internal, focused on capacity development in government and local institutions, and external in the broader development community, focused on alignment with local needs and on sustainability. Planning and execution must address both economic objectives and local social needs. Two important tools to assist with this planning are the Provincial and District Development Plans that were commissioned by the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD). This top-down strategic approach coupled with bottom-up planning to meet local needs and supported by focused resources provides an opportunity for timely success in transition. Finally, all of this effort must be supported by an enhanced data-collection process to track not only economic and social success and growth, but also to ensure that Afghan governance and institutional capacity is progressing in order to ensure successful Stage 4 transition under Inteqal.

Background

In October 2001, the United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban regime, which had been in power since 1996 and had been providing a safe-haven to Al Qaeda—the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks. In November 2001, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1378, which enabled the IC to intervene in Afghanistan and called for a central UN role in establishing a transitional government.¹⁴ On December 5, 2001, the major Afghan factions met in Bonn, Germany, under UN auspices and signed the so-called Bonn Agreement to form an interim government for Afghanistan. The interim government set the stabilization of the regime and the delivery of humanitarian assistance as its highest priorities.¹⁵

Stabilization efforts focused on strengthening the central government, which was weak and unable to control regional and factional leaders; rebuilding the Afghan National Army; deploying a multinational ISAF under NATO coordination to patrol Kabul and other cities; demobilizing, disarming, and resettling militias; and setting up regional enclaves to create secure conditions for reconstruction and state-building, utilizing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

In January–February 2006, a conference for donors and the Afghan government was held in London, where the Afghan Compact was signed.¹⁶ This innovative agreement was based on donors pledging to implement a program of work and funding, following agreed principles (alignment and harmonization) and a national work plan, known as the ANDS.¹⁷ Targets and monitoring systems were also established. The Afghan Compact emphasized reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as a national priority and eliminating the production and trafficking of narcotics as a shared goal. It established three critical and interdependent areas of activity for 2006–2011: governance; rule of law and human rights; and economic and social development.

During 2006–2007, the Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development (MRRD) in GIRoA undertook a series of workshop-based planning activities using Community Development Councils (CDCs) in Afghanistan provinces and districts. Applying a common template approach to maximize consistency, these workshops created a locale-driven set of development snapshots and priority needs. These documents, known as PDPs and DDPs, provide a fairly comprehensive view of local development status, priority needs, and basic strategies across Afghanistan.

The July 2010 Kabul Conference produced the *Integral Framework*, which contained a plan for the transition of Afghan provinces from ISAF to GIRoA control in the areas of security, governance, and development.¹⁸ The JANIB, chaired by a senior individual from GIRoA with the NATO SCR and ISAF commander as co-chairs, was created to assess and endorse the readiness of Afghanistan provinces for transition in the areas of security, governance, and development for both Phase I and II. Phase I involves an assessment of the readiness of individual provinces to begin transition, while Phase II guides a province through the transition process.

At the November 2010 Lisbon Conference, NATO reaffirmed its intent to maintain a long-term relationship with GIRoA—beyond the 2014 deadline, when GIRoA accepts responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan. In March 2011, the JANIB announced its first selections for transition—most of Kabul province, Panjshir, and Bamiyan provinces, the cities of Herat and Mazar-e-Sherif, and the districts of Metharlam and Lashkar Gah. For socioeconomic development, the main metrics for progress through the stages of transition address capacity of Afghan institutions, sustainment commitments of the IC, and the transition of the role of PRTs from execution-oriented to advisor to provincial government institutions.

The challenges facing Afghanistan remain immense and are further complicated by insecurity within Afghanistan and the continued prevalence of a large illicit economy. The problems derived from the abundance of funds from multiple sources further complicate the difficulty of creating a viable and stable Afghanistan. Approximately 90 percent of all reconstruction funds are provided by the IC, of which an estimated 75 percent are outside of the Afghanistan Government budget cycle.¹⁹

The future of Afghanistan is unpredictable. It is still unknown what the security, stability, and development situation will be after 2014. The drawdown of ISAF will be accompanied by reduced resources. As a result, it will be impossible to meet all GIRoA needs. What resources will be forthcoming will require developing strategies and setting priorities to identify those provinces, districts, and villages that have the best potential for sustainment.

Transition from ISAF to GIRoA control will take place over the next several years. The *Integral Framework* has outlined a plan for Phase I and II in the areas of security, governance, and development. In the current approach, security criteria are critical for furthering transition. Development, however, should also be given full consideration for selection, planning, and execution in order to provide an orderly and stable transfer of authority from ISAF to GIRoA. This is extremely important since, as stated earlier, a significant number of post-conflict low-income countries that maintain peace still fall back into conflict within a decade. By taking a strategic approach to development, ISAF and GIRoA can achieve transition objectives, while implementing a plan for maximizing Afghanistan's socioeconomic potential based on local conditions.

A Procedural Approach to Elevating the Role of Development

The recent history of events in Afghanistan suggests that efforts are being expended in multiple domains to move Afghanistan toward sovereignty and self-sufficiency. However, synchronizing efforts remains a challenge. International conferences have pushed ahead, setting governance and development objectives at a state level. But the ISAF efforts remain heavily focused on confronting the insurgency and terrorists, while also training Afghan security forces to develop capacity for self-sufficiency. Development efforts, funded mainly outside the Afghan budget, have been approached broadly by USAID, other countries, and NGOs. Recent news articles cite questions of the effectiveness of key USAID programs, and related delays in funding.²⁰ In the development arena, efforts are underway ranging from development of strategic resources and infrastructure (i.e., mining and primary roads) to basic food and health programs.

While any and all of these efforts may be appropriate, what seems to be lacking is an organizing approach that strategically meshes socioeconomic development goals with security and the growth of governance and rule of law across the entire process of transition. If the overall transition effort is seen as a resource allocation process constrained in time (complete by 2014), personnel (Afghan expertise and IC subject matter experts), and funding (actual Afghan revenues and IC sustaining donations), a key objective must be transitioning the provinces of Afghanistan with the lowest possible risk of recidivism. Socioeconomic development conditions must be in place and improving, while civilian programs and capacity must be in place to enable and sustain successes, including the stated goal of encouraging private investment. In addition, the security situation must be stable to allow economic opportunity to flourish.

Two other elements, one a constraint and the other a key objective, must be considered to complete this mental model of transition management. First, basic social needs must be met in selected provinces to minimize disaffection of the population with the provincial and national leadership during the transition and post-transition periods. This constraint must be addressed at the local needs level. Second, the transition selection process must address socioeconomic drivers for Afghanistan. It is easy to accept the notion that transition priority should be given to provinces that enable the greatest economic opportunity for the most Afghans, while long development timelines and enduring security may cloud specific selections. Nevertheless, those provinces that generate the most revenue and provide the most opportunity for commerce and jobs would appear to be high priority candidates. Applying the approach consistently results in a consistent approach to resource allocation throughout transition.

Organizing this thought process into a resource-allocation model results in a straightforward top-down selection process based on socioeconomic drivers, coupled with a bottom-up planning process for transition. The first step is to identify the prime strategic approach to transition. This is important both to clarify drivers for transition selection and to balance development considerations with security considerations. The ANDS and related documents define key objectives: to enable sustainable economic

growth, to positively affect the lives of Afghans, and to generate jobs.²¹ A strategic approach to accomplishing these objectives is to build on current economic centers, open key trade routes internally and regionally, and address the centers of greatest population early.

Once the strategic approach is agreed upon, strategic drivers are identified. These straightforwardly include the economic potential of the provinces, greatest population centers, key regional border crossings, and internal transport corridors, including the Ring Road. Security risk is the main consideration that is applied after the development-related ordering is completed.

At this point, each province is rated for its potential according to each driver, then given a composite rating and assigned to cohorts for transition. The rating method, reasonably objective in its approach, is described in more detail in the next section. Following this initial rating, security risk is overlaid since security may affect the ability to implement transition or require special programs. Decision makers should have adequate information at this point to make adjustments to sequencing.

So far, the process addresses entry into the transition process. At this point, detail is necessary to plan and monitor progress through the transition stages of Inteqal. For each province, PDPs and DDPs must be analyzed and compared to ground truth to determine specific development objectives for transition, and to determine where and how capacity and sustainability will be developed and demonstrated for local government and related entities. To be faithful to the principles of Inteqal, detailed planning must be a true cooperative effort among GIRoA, ISAF, and appropriate stakeholders (NATO, USAID, NGOs, etc.).

Selecting Strategic Socioeconomic Drivers. While many different criteria may be applied to prioritize selection for transition, from a socioeconomic development perspective, a relatively small set of drivers can be identified as objectives to use. Applying this approach, a set of recommended cohorts can be developed based on this handful of criteria that support key Afghan development strategies and objectives.

One key criterion used here is economic development. From open source literature such as UN reports (e.g., the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan [UNAMA] and UN Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], or the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] World Factbook), it is fairly easy to ascertain the general economic potential of the provinces of Afghanistan. Based on these descriptions, it is possible to group Afghan provinces into three categories of potential: commercial and industrial, agribusiness, and subsistence. Through private conversations with GIRoA Ministry representatives, the authors obtained unofficial Afghan categorizations (rated 1, 2, or 3) of provinces that reflect this thinking. This assignment reflects the economic potential of the province, where a rating of 3 indicates high (commercial/industrial) potential.

A second criterion, aimed at placing as much of Afghanistan back in Afghan sovereign control as quickly as possible, identifies the largest urban centers and most populace

provinces (both total population and population density). Two other criteria relate to economic enablers: key border-crossing provinces that enable regional trade and revenues and internal transportation corridors (e.g., the Ring Road and others). A final criterion applied here is proximity to high-priority economic centers. The basic notion is that economic growth can more easily move outward from centers to nearby areas. An added effect is to expand secure areas and to allow conservation of resources applied to socioeconomic growth efforts.

Table 1 lists these drivers, the rationale for each, and an example set of leaders for each driver. The more often a province appears, the greater its overall importance; but individual provinces must be considered in light of all criteria.

An integrated priority list is the desired result. The economic criteria are evaluated individually, and then integrated to develop a priority order of provinces. At this point, security risk is applied, resulting in a risk-informed set of cohorts. This socioeconomic information can then be combined with other considerations to select transition candidates. For example, in the development line of operations, other considerations might include a high degree of social need or the degree of ISAF presence.

Strategic Driver	Rationale	Examples
Economic Potential	Higher priority to provinces with rapid growth potential to support economic growth.	Balkh, Kabul, Nangarhar, Hirat, Kandahar
Trade Corridors / Borders	Opening, securing, and managing borders enabling regional trade growth and enhances revenue generation	Balkh, Hirat, Kandahar, Nangarhar
Internal Transport Corridors	Opening and enhancing internal transport facilitates trade and economic growth, as well as population mobility (key focus is securing Ring Road plus)	Badghis, Baghlan, Balkh, Bamyan, Farah Faryab, Ghazni, Ghor, Hilmand, Hirat, Jawzjan, Kabul, Kandahar, Parwan, Samangan, Wardak, Zabul
Serve broad Population	To serve greatest population soonest gives priority to urban centers, provincial total population, and greatest densities.	Kabul, Kapisa, Nangarhar, Khost, Laghman, Kunduz, Parwan, Kunar, Logar, Paktya <i>Cities: Kabul, Kandahar, Hirat, Mazari-sharif, Ghazni</i>
Geographic Clusters	Cultivate near neighbors as growth opportunity from economic centers, also enhancing security buffers	Kapisa, Laghman, Logar, Parwan, Paktya, Nangarhar, Wardak

Table 1. Strategic Drivers

Prioritizing Provinces. In this initial effort, ratings were made based on a small composite data set assembled from the references cited in the literature review. For these criteria, ratings are viewed as additive and scaled appropriately, so that relative priorities of provinces are determined by the sum of their ratings. To manage flow into transition, provinces are grouped into cohorts with similar scores, with roughly seven in a cohort.

Prioritization of provinces is based on a straightforward weighted sum of ratings for the individual priority categories. Here, the ratings are scaled to be similar in range and magnitude, and are therefore simply additive. Alternatively, ratings can be applied to the order statistics or to quantiles, and then normalized before being summed.

Notation:

- p = index of provinces, numbered 1–34
- i = index number corresponding to rated category -- econ potential, border, population, transport, near neighbor, etc.
- $V(p, i)$ = rating value assigned for to category i for province p
- $w(i)$ = weighting applied to each rated category (all $w[i] = 1$ when criteria are equal priority)
- $P(p) = \sum w(i) V(p, i)$ for all i .

In the initial application, equal weighting of priorities was adequate to arrive at rationale cohorts. However, weighting may also be applied and varied to explore alternative transition strategies to reflect the relative importance among the chosen drivers.

Table 2 displays the cohorts generated by the strategic drivers discussed above. While the actual numbers of provinces entering transition would include other management factors, in this demonstration, provinces are broken into cohorts based on similar overall scoring. The first cohort contains the eight highest-rated provinces. Of these, the three lowest (Baghlan, Ghazni, and Kunduz) still score well overall with large, high-density populations to complement their Ring-Road positions and moderate, agriculture-focused economic potential.

Cohort 1	Cohort 2	Cohort 3	Cohort 4	Cohort 5
Baghlan	Farah	Badakhshan	Badghis	Daykundi
Balkh	Faryab	Ghor	Bamyan	Nooristan
Ghazni	Hilmand	Kapisa	Kunar	Paktika
Hirat	Juzjan	Laghman	Nimroz	Panjshir
Kabul	Khost	Logar	Paktiya	Urozgan
Kandahar	Perwan	Takhar	Saripul	
Kunduz	Samangan	Wardag	Zabul	
Nangarhar				

Table 2. Recommended Transition Cohorts based on Development Drivers

Organizing ensuing cohorts by similar scores, five cohorts averaging seven provinces each were identified. The number of provinces entering transition may be varied according to the ability to manage transition activities, which includes specific stage transition criteria defined for the Inteqal process.

Introducing Security Risk Consideration. At this point, the Afghan provinces may easily be parsed into transition cohorts based on socioeconomic drivers, but prospects of successful and enduring economic progress appear best when the risk of security-based issues is low. While an environment of low security risk is more benign for progress in the social and economic environment, an environment with higher security risk does not preclude development progress. However, the approach must be properly sized and structured, and must be well integrated with security planning. Indeed, any development progress may help mitigate and reduce security risks when progress is made. For example, where unrest is tied to deprivation, addressing basic needs may be critical for reducing security risk issues. However, when risk is severe and the drivers are more political than social or economic, it may be necessary to defer transition until basic security needs are met and risk is reduced to tolerable levels. Nevertheless, once the strategy-driven cohorts are overlaid with security risk considerations, decision makers are in a position to modify cohorts as necessary to move them from *desirable* to *feasible* or *executable*.

Adding security risk consideration requires some care and consultation. Reviewing security-related risk assessments from various sources, one can see that there are multiple definitions and schemes being applied by various raters. Even without formal common definitions, it is possible to categorize these risk assessments according to their “bias” as moderate, more optimistic, or more pessimistic and cautious in their nature. Looking at four such security risk assessments, each bias appears to be present. An informal assessment received through personal communications with GIROA officials appears to be moderate, perhaps reflecting a higher tolerance for some insecurity issues after decades of war. On the other hand, a recent ISAF assessment could be considered optimistic overall, reflecting a belief that the surge strategy is working. Comparatively, an assessment made in early 2011 by Afghan transition lead Dr. Ashraf Ghani reflects a more pessimistic bias based on his belief that some provinces *inherit* security risk from less-stable neighbors if they do not receive appropriate attention soon.

For the purpose of this paper, a relatively cautious assessment made by the UN in October 2010 and reported in the *Wall Street Journal* in December 2010 is used as a base. The UN assessment may be the best choice at this point because it was designed to identify risks and thus inform UN operations planning. It also reflects emerging changes to risks in the northern provinces that do not appear in the more optimistic ISAF ratings and are overwhelmed by the overall pessimistic ratings of Dr. Ghani. Since the UN ratings are more detailed (down to district level), they have been aggregated for use here into the approximate province-level ratings that are used in the following demonstration.

Security Risk*	Cohort 1	Cohort 2	Cohort 3	Cohort 4	Cohort 5
Low	Balkh Kabul	Juzjan Samangan	Badakhshan Takhar	Bamyan Saripul	Panjshir
Medium	Baghlan Kunduz Nangarhar	Faryab Perwan	Ghor Kapisa Logar Wardag		Daykundi
High	Ghazni Hirat Kandahar	Farah Hilmand Khost	Laghman	Badghis Kunar Nimroz Paktiya Zabul	Nooristan Paktika Urozgan
*Security risk adapted from UN assessment reports and Wall Street Journal					

Table 3. Risk by Cohort

Organizing Transition Cohorts. Applying risk categorization highlights a key challenge for decision makers in selecting provinces for transition. In Cohort 1 alone, five priority provinces have a high-risk rating that must be addressed. Decisions must be made to modify transition planning to accommodate development in a risky environment, or to transition only key districts with manageable risk, or to defer transition until the security risks are cleared. If deferrals are made, then cohorts can be adjusted accordingly.

Note that transition focuses on returning provinces to sovereign Afghan leadership. However, ISAF does not have a significant presence in all provinces, such as in certain provinces in Cohort 5. Particularly for such provinces where risk is not high, it is possible that they could enter the transition process at will since they tend to be more *subsistence* economies and would tend to have needs more in the social and agricultural end of the development spectrum.

An additional value of visualizing risk-informed cohorts is to allow discussion of alternative transition strategies. For example, high-priority but high-risk provinces might enter transition immediately with greater resources necessary to address security needs in one approach, or they could be deferred in favor of transitioning more stable near-neighbors to establish *economic opportunity buffers* that can positively affect neighbors. Such trade-offs can affect the overall pace of transition and the amount and use of resources supporting transition.



Figure 1. Cohort Map Overlay

Examining First Cohort Attributes. As might be expected, the first cohort has several positive attributes with respect to the strategic development drivers. The first cohort is represented by circles on the map of Afghanistan in Figure 1. Balkh, Hirat, Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Kunduz contain key border crossings that allow regional commerce and should generate substantial revenues for re-emerging Afghanistan. All Cohort 1 provinces have key urban centers or large, high-density populations, such as Nangarhar. Many have category 1 economic ratings, but Nangarhar (category 2 potential) is an example of a province that joins the cohort based on good scores in multiple other categories. All of these provinces incorporate segments of the Afghan Ring Road. Further examining recommended cohorts reveals that the second cohort would largely complete the Ring Road and that selected provinces would provide some buffering to the primary centers of Cohort 1.

Once again, it is evident that some of these provinces have high security risk ratings, such as Kandahar. In these cases, decisions must be made on how to implement security transition. For example, this transition for Kandahar City, Kandahar's Ring Road, and Kandahar's border crossing may be accelerated while the southern barren areas are secured later.

One of the drivers selected for development was to impact the Afghan population at the quickest pace possible, thereby focusing on population centers and population density. Figure 2 depicts the rate at which population transitions by cohort. The first cohort addresses approximately 50 percent of the population, and more than 80 percent is addressed by the first three. In short, focusing on strategic-development drivers described

here will direct resources to where they can benefit a large portion of the Afghan population as quickly as possible.




Figure 2. Population/Cohort

Planning and Monitoring Transition Progress in Inteqal. Once provinces are selected for the transition process, Inteqal describes a progression of four Phase 2 Stages through which a province must progress to complete transition. At the end of 2010, as the transition process was being debated among GIRoA, ISAF, and the IC, metrics and indicators were under debate to support the process. Considering the declared end point for transition of 2014, it is clear that the actual development state in any given province cannot be advanced too far. However, it is equally clear that the process of transition to Afghan leadership must enable and measure the progress toward Afghan ownership of development processes, must develop and measure the capacity to do the governmental and institutional business of socioeconomic development, and must measure the ability to sustain progress during and after transition. This final element is ultimately a measure of IC commitment to adequately fund Afghan governmental and institutional activities and programs at provincial levels while Afghanistan grows toward self-sufficiency.

Since these dimensions both contribute to assessing and understanding transition progress, a decision support framework incorporating both is helpful. In Table 4, Development State is rated against the vertical axis, while Capacity and Sustainability are rated against the horizontal. The Development State axis is vertical using the five colors and language of current Afghan assessments. The horizontal axis uses four colors to relate to the four stages described in Inteqal Phase 2. Two benefits quickly emerge in application: development state can be tracked as a progression; and capacity and sustainment can be directly recorded, allowing a history of (x, y) pairs to track results.

Development State				
Sustainable Development	Plan for Capacity Development	Stage 4 End State Will Vary by Locality		
Dependent Growth				
Minimal Growth				
Stalled Growth	Plan for both	Plan for Development Improvements		
Population at Risk				
	Unproven	Demonstrated Delivery	Full Program Capability	Full Authority
	Capacity & Sustainment			

Table 4. Development State and Capacity/Sustainment

Some key notions are enabled with the matrix approach. First, at the Phase 1 selection, the development baseline can be mapped onto the Development State dimension as appropriate. However, since economic potential under ANDS can be imputed down to the local level, rational local objectives need to be applied. In short, districts can have different end states and need not all strive for *green* ratings. And, of course, gathering the indicators initiates or extends the management information that Afghanistan will need to track progress well after Inteqal is complete.

Second, capacity and sustainment assessments can also be conducted at the time of Phase 1 selection. Therefore, stage assignments can be tailored to the actual condition of the location under consideration. In this scheme, locations with more mature capacity can progress quickly through Phase 2. Third, this matrix approach can be applied in a uniform and consistent way to all locations and can be aggregated to develop other pictures of maturity and progress. Fourth, positioning on the matrix can easily be used to support Action Planning for progress through transition. A consistent approach can be used to identify whether key needs to be developed are state-oriented or capacity-oriented, or both. An added benefit of tracking capacity directly is the emergence of learning processes and “best practices” to employ throughout Inteqal.

Case Studies: Use of PDP and DDP Information in Planning

Once provinces have been designated for transition, detailed planning should proceed to address specific projects, organizations, and capabilities for transition. The overall objective of transition is, in essence, to ensure that the most important local socioeconomic needs are being addressed while institutional capacity and sustainability are being built to enable a permanent return to sovereign Afghan leadership, and to set the stage for mid- and long-term socioeconomic improvement. A challenge in Afghanistan is to gain an authoritative appreciation for the most pressing local needs that can be integrated into prioritized needs on a provincial basis, allowing focused application of resources and capacity development. Recent experience indicate that relevant information is vested in many individual NGO databases, or is partially available through organizations like the UN and USAID, but is seldom available in military databases in helpful form and extent. Since the task of canvassing Afghan districts and villages to generate up-to-date needs data would be daunting, the most appropriate “bottom-up” documents that exist are the PDPs and DDPs. Out of 34 provinces, 30 PDPs are known to be available.

The PDPs are most valuable for development indicator data that is roughly comparable across provinces. While the data are vintage 2005–2007, they can be used to provide an initial historical baseline. Since the documents were developed through local workshops using a standard approach and drawing together the best available information across development sectors of interest, they present a relatively consistent picture of development sectors for each province and district of Afghanistan. Since they are historical, they allow a straightforward opportunity to compare past conditions to current conditions to assess the quality and impact of interim development efforts. Additionally, the documents are supported by detailed data on local needs and project priorities that provide a locally-based view that can be composed into province-level views to aid in focusing developmental programs and capacity-building efforts.

Sector	Develop Priorities
Economic	Establish companies, build factories, establish Markets, provide loans, banking system, tax manual
Infrastructure	Dams, roads, bridges , communications , retaining walls
Agriculture	Irrigation projects, cooperatives , machinery, seeds, veterinary clinics , animal husbandry farms
Education	Construction/renovation of school facilities, teacher training programs, equipment
Health	Construction/ renovation of medical facilities, drinking water, sanitation facilities
Social	Shelter, pensions, vocational training, emergency food, retaining walls
Governance	Priorities include salary, staff, training, facilities, equipping
Security	Priorities include salary, staff, training, facilities, equipping

Table 5. Development Sectors and Priorities

Table 5 shows the development sectors addressed in the DDPs, which present district-level strategies and are accompanied by lists of priority projects developed through CDCs. This data can easily be used (once placed into a common spreadsheet) to develop a province-level view of local priority development. It can also be used to validate that local priorities are in line with national priority programs.

For transition planning, the strategies and the priorities help focus development objectives. This allows plans to be developed for government capacity and sustainment development among province-level government entities. Case studies of these documents have demonstrated their utility in several ways, as suggested by the examples that follow. For this demonstration, two provinces—Kandahar and Laghman—were studied in detail to show how local development documents can be used to identify and prioritize development interests, both within development sectors and across them at the provincial level. Then, development plans were studied in aggregate to demonstrate how the information can be used to support broader planning for Afghan national interests.

Kandahar and Laghman share a few similarities but many differences on the socioeconomic development spectrum. Kandahar is a Cohort 1 province, strong on many of the strategic development drivers, while Laghman is in Cohort 3, rated lower overall against the key drivers. Kandahar is a large province of 17 districts, diverse in terrain, and currently rated as a high security risk with ongoing violence at the time of this writing. Laghman is a smaller province of five districts, overall mountainous and pastoral, and rated low in security risk. Examining the development strategies and the proposed development projects highlights the similarities and differences of locally-derived priorities.

One clear application of the DDPs is to paint a province-level view of the priority strategies for each development sector. Taking the individual strategies of the 17 districts and compiling them into a single database across the development sectors, a table of development sector priorities emerges for Kandahar. Table 6 shows the strategies ordered by number of occurrences in DDPs (The table is truncated at the point where all ensuing strategies are mentioned only once.)

Infrastructure		Education		Health		Agriculture		Social Services		Economic	
18	Roads, Bridges, Culverts	18	Schools	15	Health Clinics	10	Agricultural Equipment	12	Financial Support	18	Trade Center & Markets
12	Hydroelectric	12	Religious Schools	12	Public Health Awareness	10	Veterinary Services	12	Shelter	9	Factories
12	Irrigation	10	Teachers	7	Medical Equipment	8	Drinking Water	12	Vocational Training	7	Small Industry
9	Telecomm	6	Educational System	5	Doctors and Physicians	7	Irrigation	8	Flood Protection Walls	7	Micro Finance
5	Natural Resources	5	Educational Awareness	4	Disease Prevention	7	Irrigation Dams	6	Disaster Preparedness and Relief	5	Private Sector Development
4	Public Transportation	4	Vocational Education	3	Drinking Water	6	Ag. Research Farms	2	Jobs Programs	4	Natural Resource Exploitation
3	Flood Protection	2	Educational Equipment	3	Health Training	6	Flood Protection Walls	1	Drug Programs	2	Economic Dev Programs
1	Drinking Water	2	Educational Facilities, other	3	Medical Wards for Women and Children	5	Fertilizer & Seeds	1	Drinking Water (wells)	2	Vocational Training
1	Shelter	2	Literacy Courses	2	Health Inspectors	5	Trade Centers and Market	1	Red Crescent	2	Capacity Building for Farmers
1	Grazing Lands	1	Kuchi Clinics (health)	2	Vaccination Programs	3	Micro Finance	1	Social Services Department	2	Electricity

Table 6. Strategy Occurrences

In most sectors, the highest priority goes to three or fewer strategies. Some interpretation of the strategies is necessary, since there are both some repetitions and some differences in how strategies are expressed (leading, for example, to more occurrences of a strategy than the 17 district plans they are drawn from). However, the difference between the broadest needs and lesser needs is compelling in most sectors. It is also noteworthy that most strategies address the more basic ends of the development spectrum, with near- to mid-term impact on local populations.

However, any plan of action must narrow its focus to key activities that can be resourced and, in the case of Afghan transition, will lead to an improved development state. Since institutional capacity-building must occur, it must also be focused during transition; attempting to develop all institutional capacity equally can be both wasteful of resources and have limited impact or impact in the wrong areas. In order to demonstrate this cross-sector prioritization, the Kandahar strategies were rank-ordered across development sectors. Adjusting for duplications of strategies in different sectors allows added emphasis to emerge.

In Table 7, the need for irrigation to make agriculture broader and more productive receives extra emphasis when development of irrigation is cited as an agricultural strategy and as an infrastructure strategy. Following this thinking, the table imputes

highest priority to very logical strategies for irrigation, trade centers and markets, schools, and roads. However, the fifth priority—flood protection—becomes evident when strategies in agriculture, infrastructure, and social welfare are examined as a composite. The logic of this priority will become clearer later when provinces are examined for economic-shock impacts. However, regional descriptions of Kandahar suggest that it is broadly agricultural in nature, with large regions subject to droughts and mountainous sections subject to annual floods that both devastate crop production regularly. A final note on this list of priority strategies is that many, collectively, address either basic human needs, including shelter, drinking water, health, or vocational training to provide basic employability. Therefore, while Kandahar represents a strategic economic development priority for Afghanistan, many of its priority needs are at the social welfare level.

Count	Activity	Sector
27	Irrigation	Agric
23	Trade Center and Markets	Econ
21	Schools and Facilities	Educ
19	Roads	Infra
17	Flood Protection	Infra
16	Vocational Training	Soc
15	Health Clinics	Health
14	Hydroelectric	Infra
13	Drinking Water	Health
13	Shelter	Soc

Table 7. Sector Priorities Kandahar

While the priorities for Kandahar were derived by examining the strategies stated for each development sector, the composite picture of Laghman, at right, was derived by placing the actual lists of project proposals accompanying the DDPs into a single database and coding each entry by its specific type of project. This method has the advantage of providing a demographic distribution of projects over the method of counting strategy references from the Kandahar example, but it does bring out both similarities and differences that appear to be real between Laghman and Kandahar.

For Laghman, in Table 8, six types of projects highlight the greatest needs, and highest among these is the need for clinics and schools in this more isolated and pastoral province. Irrigation and roads are logical, given the agriculture focus, as is the need to reach markets and medical attention. Shelter for a displaced and deprived population is clearly necessary. Only the priority for factories requires some explanation. The idea is to enable some value-added handling of agricultural products, opening potential for revenues from more distant markets, as well as related job opportunities. The overall priority in this province is to meet more basic social needs while improving agriculture from mere subsistence level to the first opportunities of “agribusiness.” On the other hand, one thing the detailed project data highlighted by its absence is a priority focus on higher-end agribusiness or commercial-industrial programs, which is largely consistent with Laghman’s potential.

Count	Description	Sector
21	Clinics and Hospitals	Health
17	Schools	Education
16	Factories	Economics
12	Irrigation	Agriculture
12	Roads & bridges	Infrastructure
10	Shelter	Social
7	Farms	Agriculture & Social
6	Ag Productivity Tools	Agriculture
6	Veterinary	Agriculture
6	Electricity dam	Infrastructure

Table 8. Sector Priorities Laghman

The final example of PDP and DDP use is the comparison of provincial level information among groups of provinces or to Afghanistan as a whole. The most obvious applications are in comparing provincial standards against Afghan or other international norms. Literacy, health, and even poppy cultivation statistics are examples frequently seen. The development plans provide comparable data points for many of the sectors that can be used directly, or used with other demographic data, to compute comparative measures and indicators. While these are not presented here, they do provide value, and may even be used to derive thresholds and objectives for development in their sectors.

Perhaps a more interesting and informative application for the information in the development plans is the use of some of the less standard, more descriptive, data to understand and to validate the priorities among cohorts of provinces. Each of the PDPs contains a table and discussion of whether the provincial population has encountered “shocks” to their lives and whether the shocks have endured through the year. Each PDP contains a table comparing the impacts for agricultural shock, natural disaster, water and sanitation, finances, health and epidemics, and lack of security. Besides the more obvious use for understanding key impacts in each province, these tables provide a helpful tool for understanding development sensitivities across provinces. In addition, since they were acquired around 2006, they may be used to determine where progress has been made, or lost, in addressing these issues.

The bar chart in Figure 3 compares the Cohort 1 provinces for shock impacts on the Afghan population. The x-axis reflects the sum of portions of the population affected, indicating that people may be affected by multiple shocks in the same year and at the same time. Several important insights can be drawn. Agricultural shocks and natural disasters (mainly floods and droughts) have the greatest impacts across these key provinces, so these should be high among development priorities. Water and sanitation have generally lesser, but important impacts. For Kandahar, the combined impact of agriculture shocks and natural disaster rate highest in the lives of the population. Other social needs, or even financial and security shocks, are not rated as having as great an impact. In the ordering, Balkh appears least susceptible, while Ghazni is most affected with multiple shocks. Once again, these insights can certainly help focus detailed planning for transition and for the development of capacity in the areas where it will have the most potential to positively affect the socioeconomic lot of each provincial population.

These short case studies show some of the potential contained in the PDPs and DDPs, especially since they provide insight that does not appear to be easily accessed in the military or civilian data systems that the NATO coalition utilizes. Of course, this data is not currently in a single database form that supports detailed analysis and exploitation. Broad access to fully integrated data would logically enhance the power of this information.




Figure 3. Shock Impacts Affecting Afghan Provincial Populations

Summary and Conclusions

Even as the surge continues to clear more provinces of the insurgency, the process of transition has begun. The first tranche of provinces entering transition has been named, while development programs continue to broadly address needs across Afghanistan without a clear strategic focus and with criticism of alleged ineffective or misdirected programs. The ANDS and the NPPs describe a full scope of programs, ranging from social needs to high-end economic development of natural resources, but phasing of these priorities and management of limited execution resources is not clear. The security-first approach has had beneficial effect to date. Now is the time to take action to put development effort on an equal plane with security, raising the potential for success in transition. Coalition partners and GIRoA should take several steps to make their intent clear.

First, clearly articulate the strategy driving the transition process. As we have demonstrated in this paper, by identifying a few strategic drivers, a logical prioritization for provincial transition based on development objectives is immediately evident. While the ANDS and the NPPs address strategic elements, they are too broad to provide time-sensitive focus to drive transition success.

Next, adjust the development-based ordering for the local realities of security conditions, governance state, and other considerations. For the first cohort in particular, this means that some provinces may need to be deferred until security is stabilized or corruption is dealt with, while others may be prepared at the district or city level. The result is a comprehensive prioritization of provinces for transition. There are multiple benefits to establishing this ordering. Prioritizing transition targets has the immediate benefit of allowing resources to be allocated to enable priority transitions. An associated benefit is that other international actors, such as investment banks, would also be able to marshal resources to reinforce success in the priority areas. A third benefit is the strategic

communications value of both announcing where Afghan economic strengths are and informing local leaders of what their key shortcomings are to reinforce success and to work to change lagging behaviors.

Third, focus planning and operational resources on activities to move the priority cohorts through transition efficiently. Since these locales present higher-order economic opportunity, this implies the need for a multi-dimensional effort. Internally, an early focus must be on capacity-building in key governance areas and institutions. More broadly, planning must identify and establish key programs and priority projects to focus the efforts of all actors, including development banks and NGOs. However, reflecting the need for both state-building and nation-building, the more direct social needs of the people must be addressed at the same time as higher-level economic strategy.

Fourth, plans should address the key social drivers of dissatisfaction and need on a localized basis. PDPs and DPPs should be used as the starting point to drive transition plans. These documents were generated in a template-enabled process, thus they contain local priorities that align with the intent of NPPs and can be compiled to provide province-level insight as well as used to assess comparative need and opportunity across provinces. While it is generally known that social and agricultural issues take priority, the PDPs and DPPs bring needs into a localized focus that can positively affect the lives of the Afghan people.

Fifth, and finally, these steps should be used to develop a consistent and robust data support plan to track progress both of the state of development and of the growth of capacity and ownership. This notion is clearly consistent with the intent of Inteqal, but in the past has not been consistently used and resourced at local levels.

The operations in Afghanistan are frequently described as complex operations, even placed into the category of *wicked* problems. Yet the NATO-based coalition and the international community in general have directed a multiplicity of resources broadly across the country to address issues of security, governance and rule of law, and development. The strategy of the surge has been “clear, hold, and build.” Now is the time to implement a development-driven strategy for transition with a focused approach to build, grow, and succeed.

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Appendix B: Glossary and Abbreviations

Inteqal—Is the Dari and Pashtu term for the process of transition. The Inteqal framework has mutually agreed upon criteria; and it will be implemented gradually on the basis of an assessment of the security, political, rule of law, and socioeconomic development situation.

Loya Jirga—A jirga (a tribal assembly of elders that takes decisions by consensus) regarded as “grand assembly,” a phrase in Pashto meaning “grand council.” A mass meeting prepared for major events: choosing a new king; adopting a constitution; discussing important national political or emergency matters; discussing disputes in Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CDC	Community Development Council
COCOM	United States Combatant Command
CTNSP	Center for Technology and National Security Policy
DDP	District Development Plan
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HSCB	Human, Social, Cultural Behavior
IC	International Community
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JANIB	Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board
JFC	Joint Force Command
LOO	Line of Operation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MRRD	Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC3A	NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency
NDU	National Defense University
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPP	Afghanistan National Priority Program
PDP	Provincial Development Plan
PIP	Prioritization and Implementation Plan
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RoL	Rule of Law
RTO	Research and Technology Organization
SAS	System Analysis and Studies
SCR	Senior Civilian Representative
ST	Specialist Team
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Appendix C: Endnotes

¹ According to NATO, *Inteqal* means transition in both Dari and Pashtu.

² Jens Meierhenrich and David Carment, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

³ Astri Suhrke, “Reconstruction as Modernisation: the ‘post-conflict’ project in Afghanistan,” *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (2007): 1291–1308.

⁴ State-building refers to activities that create or enhance human and institutional capacity to increase the functional capability of a state (e.g. administrative control, rule of law, financial management, security services, etc.). Nation-building refers to activities that seek to stimulate or increase a singular collective cultural identity and loyalty to that identity (i.e. the Nation).

⁵ U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Economic Growth, Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade, *A Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries* (Washington, DC, 2009).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Dietrich Rueschemeyer, “Building States—Inherently a long-Term Process? An Argument from Theory,” *States and Development: Historical Antecedents of Stagnation and Advance (Political Evolution and Institutional Change)*, ed. Matthew Lange and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 143–164.

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¹⁰ Interview with an ISAF staff officer, August 30, 2010.

¹¹ U.S. Agency for International Development, Afghanistan, “Sectors: Agriculture, Economic Growth, Education, and Health,” available at <<http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/programs>>.

¹² Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance, Department of Policy, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy Prioritization and Implementation Plan 1 and 2*, (Kabul, 2010); Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Office of the President, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy I* (Kabul, 2007).

¹³ President Karzai announced the first “tranche” for transition on March 22, 2011: provinces of Bamyan, Kabul, and Panjshir, and the municipalities of Heart, Lashkar Gah, Mehtarlam, and Mazar-e-Sharif.

¹⁴ United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1378 unanimously on November 14, 2001. After reaffirming Afghanistan resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), and 1363 (2001), the Security Council affirmed that the UN would play an important role in the country and called for the establishment of a transitional administration leading to the formation of a new government.

¹⁵ The “Bonn Agreement” is officially called the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions.” It was the initial series of agreements intended to re-create the State of Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks. Agreements were made at a meeting held in Bonn in December 2001.

¹⁶ The Afghanistan Compact was the output of the “London Conference on Afghanistan” in 2006. The conference included representatives of the government of Afghanistan, the United Nations, and the international community. It established the framework for international cooperation with Afghanistan for the following five years.

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¹⁹ World Bank and United Kingdom Department of International Development, Poverty Reduction, Economic Management, Finance and Private Sector Development Unit, South Asia Region, *Afghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Second Generation of Public Expenditure Reform*, 53892-AF, (London, 2010).

²⁰ Maiwand Safi, “Afghanistan: Local Reconstruction Effort Goes Awry,” *Institute for War & Peace Reporting*, ARR 398 (May 17, 2011), available at <<http://iwpr.net/report-news/arr-issue-398>>.

²¹ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance, Department of Policy, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy Prioritization and Implementation Plan 1 and 2*, (Kabul, 2010); Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Office of the President, *Afghanistan National Development Strategy I* (Kabul, 2007).