

Caribbean
Security on the
Eve of the
21st Century

Ivelaw L. Griffith



***A popular Government,
without popular information or the means of
acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or
perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
And a people who mean to be their own
Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.***

**JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY
August 4, 1822**

**CARIBBEAN SECURITY ON
THE EVE
OF THE 21ST CENTURY**

IVELAW L. GRIFFITH

McNair Paper 54
October 1996

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Washington, DC

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

- *President:* Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, USAF
- *Vice President:* Ambassador William G. Walker

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

- *Director & Publisher:* Dr. Hans A. Binnendijk

PUBLICATIONS DIRECTORATE & NDU PRESS

Fort Lesley J. McNair , Washington, DC 20319-6000

- Phone: (202) 685-4210 □ Facsimile: (202) 685-4378
 - *Director & Managing Editor:* Dr. Frederick T. Kiley
 - *Vice Director & General Editor:* Major Thomas W. Krise, USAF
 - *Chief, Editorial & Publications Branch:* Mr. George C. Maerz
 - *Senior Editor:* Ms. Mary A. Sommerville
 - *Editor:* Mr. Jonathan W. Pierce
 - *Editor for this issue:* Major Thomas W. Krise, USAF
 - *Distribution Manager:* Mrs. Myrna Myers
 - *Secretary:* Mrs. Laura Hall
-

From time to time, INSS publishes McNair Papers to provoke thought and inform discussion on issues of U.S. national security in the post-Cold War era. These monographs present current topics related to national security strategy and policy, defense resource management, international affairs, civil-military relations, military technology, and joint, combined, and coalition operations.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implied, are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted without further permission, with credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC. A courtesy copy of reviews and tearsheets would be appreciated.

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328
ISSN 1071-7552

CONTENTS

PREFACE	v
1. COMPLEXITY, CHANGE, AND CHALLENGE .	1
2. THE 1980s IN RETROSPECT	3
Geopolitics	5
Militarization	9
Intervention	10
Instability	12
3. THE CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT	19
Meaning of Security	19
Global Military and Political Power	20
Economic Relationships	22
Rethinking Policy Priorities	24
4. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES	29
5. CARIBBEAN GEONARCOTICS	33
Trafficking Patterns	37
<i>Modus Operandi</i>	43
National Countermeasures	45
Regional and International Countermeasures	50
6. SECURITY COLLABORATION	61
Why Collaborate?	61
Regional Security System	63
7. STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY	69
8. CONCLUSION	73
APPENDIX: Caribbean Security Who's Who	75
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	79
ABOUT THE AUTHOR	81

PREFACE

General John J. Sheehan, USMC

As the 21st century approaches, the international community continues to grapple with the consequences of major shifts in the security environment. The world we now live in is a paradox: political integration and community fragmentation; expanding transnationalism and rising nationalism; unimaginable wealth and unspeakable poverty; high-tech militaries and low-tech conflicts; decreasing military spending and expanding use of defense resources. In this complex environment, the United States is debating its global role and security priorities for the 21st century.

The United States' evolving security priorities must include a workable relationship with our neighbors in the hemisphere, particularly the sovereign nations and European territories in the Caribbean.

Before we embark on a new Caribbean policy, it would be constructive to reflect on past U.S. "policies" toward the Caribbean. Such reflection is necessary to understand the context—and biases—of past policies, and the legacy we live with as a result of those policies.

The United States has had a long, yet inconsistent, security interest in the Caribbean. In fact, America's security relationship with the Caribbean predates the early days of the War of Independence. The American colonists relied heavily on weapons and gunpowder purchased from sympathetic Dutch merchants on the Caribbean island of St. Eustatius to keep their fledgling rebellion alive. On November 16, 1776, St. Eustatius became the first foreign territory to recognize the rebellious 13 colonies as a legitimate independent nation when the U.S. Brig-of-War, the

General Sheehan is Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

Andrew Doria—carrying a copy of the Declaration of Independence to deliver to the island’s Governor and flying the red-and-white striped flag of the Continental Congress—fired the traditional salute while entering the port of St. Eustatius. Under the Governor’s orders, the guns of the island’s fort returned the salute in ritual response.

Since that day, American and Caribbean security interests have been linked. For most of that time, the United States has viewed the Caribbean as a possible arena for subversion or larger conflicts involving nonregional powers—British, French, Spanish, German or Soviet. That paradigm remained from our War for Independence, through the days of the Monroe Doctrine, to the Spanish-American War, the U-boat campaigns in both World Wars, and finally the Cold War and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Despite concern about subversion by extra-regional actors, there had been a realization among U.S. policy makers that our greatest interests lay in the economic and political development of this hemisphere. However, from 1917 on, the fear that European powers—either German or Soviet, or their proxies—might establish a military foothold in the region, dominated our concerns and thus our hemispheric security policy. Some of the most significant events of this century that occurred in this hemisphere were the result of these global power struggles:

- The Zimmermann telegram that convinced the U.S. public that Germany was seeking Mexico’s aid against the U.S. in return for assistance in helping Mexico regain its lost U.S. territory.
- Deadly Nazi U-boat attacks in the Caribbean, which in 1942 alone sent 336 allied merchant ships to the bottom.
- And, of course, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the closest the superpowers ever came to nuclear conflagration.

Until quite recently, most of Washington’s Caribbean policies fell under the spell of our Cold War containment strategy, contributing to a legacy of U.S. military interventions in the Caribbean island nations. Today, with the exception of Cuba, we all enjoy democratic governments. This fact, together with the end of the Cold War, provides us an opportunity to develop a common vision of security that supports our mutual interests.

Fortunately, the United States now recognizes that the greatest threat from the Caribbean is instability. Obviously, the United

States cannot ignore an unstable region on its periphery. While instability takes many forms, it usually has a political, economic, environmental, and criminal dimension. And, the most prominent symptom of instability is large-scale legal and illegal migration. In addition to the massive 1994 migrations from Cuba and Haiti, there are signs that migration is a regional problem. Using 1992 data, Elliott Abrams estimated the number of Caribbean Basin foreign nationals living in the U.S., as a percentage of total population from selected countries, varied from a low 1.5 percent for Costa Rica, to a high of 18 percent for Grenada. Five other Caribbean Basin countries—Belize, Guyana, Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, and Jamaica—had figures of or near 15 percent. Obviously, this trend cannot continue indefinitely, and it is clearly in U.S. interest for all Caribbean nations to succeed economically and politically.

In February of 1995, President Clinton unveiled the new *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. In this important document, President Clinton highlighted the December 1994 “Summit of the Americas” in Miami as the stimulus for a new Caribbean Strategy. I attended the Summit of the Americas as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command. It was impressive to see representatives from this hemisphere’s 34 democratic nations agree to a detailed plan of cooperative action in such diverse fields as health, education, counter-narcotics, environmental protection, information infrastructure, and the strengthening and safeguarding of democratic institutions, in addition to mutual prosperity and sustainable development.

Only a few years earlier, it would have been unthinkable that 34 sovereign nations in our hemisphere could agree on a common vision and a set of common principles to pursue that vision. It was clear to me that these representatives were talking about the security concerns of the twenty-first century—economic growth, free trade, environmental protection, law enforcement cooperation against drug trafficking cartels, and political stability. Gone were the major twentieth century concerns about Marxist-Leninist regimes, foreign subversion, or leftist guerrilla insurgencies. Security today means an economic and political response, with the military playing only a supporting role.

Nor was the Summit of the Americas an isolated event. Since that meeting, the themes of the Summit of the Americas have been reaffirmed in other regional forums, such as the annual Caribbean

Island Nations Security Conference CINSEC in Santo Domingo in 1995 and in Barbados in 1996, and the Defense Ministerial of the Americas, held in Williamsburg, Virginia, in July 1995.

The language of the new U.S. strategy, and the tone from the conferences indicate that the United States and our Caribbean neighbors now view security in an integrated regional context, and more important, as a cooperative venture among our nations.

Although the Caribbean is a relatively peaceful region compared to the Middle East, Africa, or the Balkans, its diversity in language, history, and sociocultural characteristics make it particularly challenging for American policy makers.

While Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico share a common language and history, most of the Caribbean island nations have few linguistic, cultural, or security ties with "Latin America." Rather, these nations trace their culture and history to Africa and to non-Spanish-speaking Europe, and their strongest hemispheric affiliations today are with Canada and the United States. We must recognize and appreciate these differences if we are to build the level of cooperation required to tackle the hard security issues facing the islands—illegal migration, drug trafficking, disaster relief, environmental protection, economic self-sustainment—and build regional solutions like the Regional Security System and the CARICOM Battalion. If we are to prevent regional instability and build common security goals among this diverse group of nations, we must set the tone in the region by recognizing each island nation's unique history, characteristics, and, most important, sovereignty.

The following McNair Paper by Dr. Ivelaw Griffith, one of the foremost scholars on Caribbean affairs, provides a balanced account of the events in the 1970s and 1980s that defined the U.S.-Caribbean security relationship during the later years of the Cold War. He discusses the impact of the Cold War on the U.S.-Caribbean security relationship, and Caribbean responses designed to balance cooperation with the U.S. and other regional powers in areas of mutual interest, while at the same time protecting their sovereignty.

He also shows how the end of the Cold War has fundamentally changed the way we view not only security, but also each other as partners in an emerging interdependent security relationship. Rather than a "rogues gallery" of communist dictators,

revolutionaries, and terrorists, the key Caribbean actors today, with the possible exception of ruthless and well-heeled drug traffickers, are transitional and amorphous political and economic forces that lead to instability, illegal migration, and environmental destruction.

Dr. Griffith's McNair Paper, the first ever on the Caribbean, will help interested readers re-examine their views of the new U.S.-Caribbean security relationship. It suggests how the U.S., Canada, and others should work with our Caribbean neighbors to promote stability, development, and democracy, and take advantage of the historic opportunity before us to build a lasting regional security system that benefits all nations in the hemisphere.

The stakes are high for all in the region. Future generations will profit or suffer depending on how well we understand the legacy of our shared past, seize the tremendous opportunities of the present, and plan accordingly for their future. However, in these resource-constrained times, we must continue to integrate these programs to provide the most benefit for every dollar invested in the region. Fortunately, the U.S. has a number of bilateral agreements with our European and Caribbean allies on which to build. These are increasing the effectiveness of the Caribbean counternarcotics effort. Our shift in emphasis from anti-insurgency training to preparing Caribbean militaries, coast guards, and police to work together is appropriate and has already paid dividends. Soldiers from the CARICOM Battalion patrolled the streets of Haiti along with Bangladeshi, Canadian, U.S. and other U.N. forces. They provided essential support in Haiti's struggle for democracy. Caribbean peacekeepers have demonstrated their ability to play an important role as part of "a coalition of the willing" thus opening other doors to regional cooperation.

Whether or not you agree with Dr. Griffith's observations and conclusions, his analysis provides an excellent basis for further study and discussion.

CARIBBEAN SECURITY ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY

1.

COMPLEXITY, CHANGE, AND CHALLENGE

This study assesses the Caribbean security landscape on the eve of the fast-approaching new century with a view to considering what the future portends in the security arena. Engaging in even guarded prospection during this period of history is particularly difficult, but also exciting, partly because of dramatic changes that the world began undergoing during the 1980s. These changes make scholars and statesmen approach the new century with a combined sense of expectancy and apprehension. The expectancy stems from the anticipated benefits of the end of the Cold War, among other things; the apprehension is driven by the many unknowns that the dynamics of changing international relations hold for the future. This is true for the Caribbean as it is for other regions of the world, and it holds true for security as it does for other issue areas.

The contemporary security scene in the Caribbean is characterized by complexity, change, and challenge. Complexity, in part, arises from the fact that the region comprises small, subordinate states that are vulnerable to a wide range of military, political, and economic actions by states near and far. But part of the complexity also is derived from the fact that Caribbean

2 CARIBBEAN SECURITY

countries are also subject to the dictates of nonstate actors, some of which wield more economic and political power than some states. The complexity factor also inheres in the reality that because of the dramatic changes referred to above, hemispheric and global turbulence sometimes makes a mockery of attempts at rational policy calculations.

The global turbulence and the transformations being experienced make change inevitable, if not always desired. Understandably, some of the dynamics of change in the Caribbean and elsewhere capture some of the elements of the “old” situation; some “old era” issues retain their salience. In many cases, *plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose*. Scholars and statesmen are progressively coming to terms with the complexity factor and are constantly coping with the turbulence and change. But no longer is there the luxury of first trying to interpret the world before attempting to change it. Now part of the challenge involves having to manage change while interpreting events and outcomes.

2. THE 1980s IN RETROSPECT

Understanding the Caribbean's present complexity, changes, and challenges requires an appreciation of the recent past. A look back at the decade of the 1980s finds that geopolitics, militarization, intervention, and instability were the major security concerns. Given the interface between domestic and international politics, it is understandable that there were links among some of these themes and among their domestic, regional, and international aspects. Grenada's militarization in the 1980s, for example, was predicated on the need to defend the Grenada revolution against foreign intervention and local counterrevolution. Ironically, this very militarization created the climate that led to the self-destruction of the revolution, presenting the United States with the opportunity to intervene. In so doing, the United States was able to fulfill a preexisting geopolitical aim. Militarization and concerns about stability in Dominica, Barbados, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines also raised security concerns within the Eastern Caribbean, such that Eastern Caribbean states not only created the Regional Security System (RSS) in 1982 to bolster subregional security, but were willing accomplices of U.S. intervention in Grenada a year later.

The four themes—geopolitics, militarization, intervention, and instability—were often subsumed under a megatheme: vulnerability. This topic became an important reference point for analysis of small state security concerns everywhere during the 1980s.¹ States were—and still are—considered vulnerable because of geographic, political, economic or other factors that cause their security to be compromised. Vulnerability is thus a multidimensional phenomenon. One study identified six factors that can lead to it:

- Great power rivalries
- Territorial claims
- Possession of valuable resources
- Provision of refuge to refugees or freedom fighters

4 CARIBBEAN SECURITY

- Corruption
- Suppression of democracy.²

Experts from the Commonwealth of Nations who studied the vulnerability question noted the range of threats to which small states can be vulnerable:

The special position of small states is borne out in all three major categories of threats to security: threats to territorial security resulting from incursions to both military and non-military sources; threats to political security, which can involve a broad range of actions that are deliberately intended to influence and, in some cases, bring about a specific change in the threatened state's national policies; and threats to economic security, involving action that can have the effect of undermining a state's economic welfare and which, additionally, can also be used as an instrument for political interference.³

All the above factors have affected Caribbean countries in recent years, and some continue to do so as we approach the 21st century. The size and political, military, and economic limitations of Caribbean countries make them all subject to the dictates of the United States, the hemisphere's hegemon, and, to a lesser extent, to pressures by middle-sized powers such as Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. In explaining the range of threats to which Caribbean states are vulnerable, former Barbadian Prime Minister Lloyd Erskine Sandiford, observed:

Our vulnerability is manifold. Physically, we are subject to hurricanes and earthquakes; economically, to market decisions taken elsewhere; socially, to cultural penetration; and [now] politically, to the machinations of terrorists, mercenaries and criminals.⁴

Sandiford neglected to mention the vulnerability related to U.S. foreign policy and security pursuits.

Caribbean states not only suffer from power deficiencies, but many of them also have weak state systems, a combination that exacerbates their vulnerability. As Barry Buzan noted, "where a state has the misfortune to be both a small power and a weak state . . . its vulnerability is almost unlimited."⁵ On the same issue, Robert Pastor once stated that vulnerability in the region has had a

practical effect: it has made sustained development illusory, a situation that partly explains “the prevalence of utopian revolutionaries and millenary rhetoric.”⁶

GEOPOLITICS

There was considerable attention paid to the expanded U.S. military presence in the Caribbean, as well as the geopolitics of the region that gave rise to this situation, and U.S. national security policy towards the area. The 1980s witnessed dramatic increases in U.S. military instruments in the Caribbean, including direct military presence, increased military sales, aid, and training, expanded intelligence operation, and regular high-profile military maneuvers. Some of this activity derived from concerns about Marxist or other leftist governments in Jamaica, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Suriname, among other countries. Fears were also expressed that these leftist governments would facilitate Soviet geopolitical designs. Specific concerns existed regarding Cuba, based on claims made in 1979 about an expanded Soviet military presence on the island.⁷

Partly because of these concerns and fears, by 1984 the Caribbean Basin had become home of 21 U.S. military installations, including five naval, two air force, and seven army bases. The largest forces were in Puerto Rico, Panama, and Guantánamo, Cuba; together they formed a strategic triangle spanning the entire Caribbean Basin. One very visible trend of U.S. military activity in the 1980s was the holding of high-profile military maneuvers. *Solid Shield '80* and *Readex '80* signaled a shift toward this strategy, continuing in 1981 with *Ocean Venture '81*, then the largest peacetime naval maneuver since World War II. It involved some 120,000 troops, 250 ships, and 1,000 aircraft.

Structural and operational rearrangements were undertaken to facilitate this enhanced presence. In one major instance, the Department of Defense upgraded its regional defense network to command status by consolidating the 2-year-old Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force at Key West, FL, with the Antilles Defense Command in Puerto Rico. The result was the creation, in December 1981, of the Caribbean Command, responsible for “waters and islands” of the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and parts of the Pacific bordering Central and South America. This command was disbanded in 1989 because of reorganization within the defense establishment, partly due to budget cuts and partly

6 CARIBBEAN SECURITY

because of new regional and international developments. The duties of that command were assumed by the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) Headquarters in Norfolk, VA.⁸

The heightened military presence was due partly to larger geopolitical concerns. These included the resource capacity of the Caribbean (oil, bauxite, gold, nickel, among other natural resources) and U.S. resource needs and business interests. In the late 1980s, for instance, 79 percent of the U.S. bauxite imports came from the Caribbean. Moreover, the Caribbean was supplying the United States with a significant proportion of its oil refining and about 56 percent of all oil imports. Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) in the Caribbean area also have featured in the strategic matrix (figure 1). Foremost is the Panama Canal connecting the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, used for both military and civilian purposes. Once ships exit the Canal on the Atlantic side, they must use one or more of some 16 passages in the Caribbean Sea to reach destinations in the United States, Europe, Africa, and elsewhere. Thus, the Caribbean has had multidimensional strategic value, and in the context of the East-West rivalry conducted during the 1980s, the United States did everything possible to thwart actual and potential threats in the area.⁹

In terms of the East-West conflict, the USSR was viewed as having several aims in the region, including creating dissension between the United States and other countries, promoting conflicts, and fostering political-military changes that could eventually facilitate Soviet-Cuban expansion.¹⁰ Many analysts considered the Soviet-Cuban nexus as the centerpiece of Soviet strategic pursuits, partly because the only significant Soviet military presence in the Caribbean was in Cuba. This presence included modern naval facilities and troops. In September 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev disclosed that Soviet troop strength stood at 11,000—much larger than the United States had estimated. The Soviets also boasted reconnaissance operations in Cuba, including the 28-square-mile facility at Loudres, reputed to have been the largest of its kind maintained outside the USSR. Yet strong Soviet-Cuban connections did not prevent differences over geopolitical issues,¹¹ nor did they prevent the Soviets from maintaining other Caribbean contacts—with Grenada until 1983, and with Guyana throughout the 1980s.

8 CARIBBEAN SECURITY

Although the links with Grenada lasted a mere 4 years, they were more dramatic than those with Guyana, as is evident from the military agreements between Grenada and the USSR. Agreements were concluded in 1980, 1981, and 1983. Another drafted before the October 1983 intervention was never signed. The 1980 agreement provided for \$58 million worth of military supplies, including mortars, machine guns, and anti-aircraft guns. That of 1981 provided for armored personnel carriers, submachine guns, grenades, radios, generators, and other equipment. The 1982 treaty provided for additional arms and equipment, including 50 armored personnel carriers, 30 76-mm. guns, 30 antitank guns, 50 portable missile launchers, 2,000 AK-47s, and mortars. What also worried U.S. policy makers caught in the East-West geopolitical prism was that Grenada also had extensive military and political contacts with Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, and other Communist countries.¹²

Of course, the genesis of all of these geopolitical considerations predated the 1980s. Yet, that decade was marked by a U.S. Caribbean policy as dramatic as it was different from earlier ones. One significant reason for this was the election in 1980 of Ronald Reagan, which heralded a different foreign and security policy: harsh anticommunism, a willingness to use force without much compunction, and an unapologetic pursuit of American preeminence in global political, economic, and military affairs. The policy that the Reagan administration fashioned toward the Caribbean was designed to fit what former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David Jones called "a comprehensive strategic vision that integrates regional issues within a larger global framework."¹³

Thus, unlike President Jimmy Carter who at first had been more accommodating to leftist regimes in the Caribbean, Reagan made it obvious from the outset that he favored regimes that supported U.S. foreign policy, opposed Cuba and the Soviet Union, and endorsed free enterprise. He therefore made no apologies for rewarding those who supported U.S. interests or complied with its dictates, or for punishing those who did otherwise. In addition, while the Carter administration had given initial priority to multilateral relations, apart from the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), Reagan displayed from the beginning a preference for bilateral dealings that enabled the United States to exercise more leverage. Although Carter had

been increasingly concerned about developments in Nicaragua, Grenada, and elsewhere in the region and had committed additional resources to deal with them, his administration generally respected the sovereignty of Caribbean states. In contrast, the Reagan administration was fully prepared to violate any country's sovereignty if such a course was considered politically expedient or militarily necessary.¹⁴

MILITARIZATION

The militarization concern pertained to the dramatic growth of military budgets and the expansion of military and police forces in some parts of the Caribbean. Moreover, military officials in some cases were also increasingly visible and influential in making and executing policy. This kind of militarization was particularly true of Suriname, Guyana, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Haiti. In Suriname and Haiti the militarization fit the Finer model: "The armed forces substitution of their own policies and/or their persons for those of recognized civilian authorities."¹⁵

In other cases, the situation involved civilian rulers garnering loyalty and obedience from the armed forces by penetrating them with political ideas and political personnel, an approach described by Eric Nordlinger.¹⁶ Armies became practically arms of ruling parties and were compensated with accretions of money, equipment, and personnel—precisely the case in Guyana and the Dominican Republic.¹⁷ In Guyana especially, the security establishment performed not only military functions, but also duties in the realms of political, economic, and, (later) diplomatic security.¹⁸

Security consciousness became heightened in the Eastern Caribbean in the aftermath of several internal and external developments: invasion scares in 1976, 1978, and 1979 in Barbados; a rebellion in St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 1979; the ouster of Eric Gairy in Grenada that same year; and two coup attempts in Dominica in 1981. These events led to several security initiatives. One was enunciation of the "Adams Doctrine," a proposition made by Tom Adams, Prime Minister of Barbados at the time, for establishing a rapid deployment force in the Caribbean to respond to intraregional threats. Adams and Brigadier Rudyard Lewis of the Barbados Defense Force (and later also of the RSS) also proposed creating a standing army in the Eastern Caribbean.¹⁹

Cost considerations, U.S. policy, and skepticism by some Caribbean leaders combined to kill those proposals. What emerged, instead, was the RSS, which is examined later.

Some scholars identified links between geopolitics and militarization. Some argued that a certain symbiosis existed between these two areas in that Caribbean militarization was partly a function of the geopolitical environment, especially U.S. security policy. Indeed, there was a ground-breaking volume on militarization that substantiated connections between the two themes.²⁰ Other scholars, however, disputed the militarization argument. Anthony Maingot, for example, called the claims of militarization a myth.²¹ He argued that “the most important security-related activities in the Caribbean do not directly involve the governments of the area. . . . There has not been, in fact, a major military build-up in the English-speaking Caribbean.”²²

This dispute was essentially definitional. Maingot did not accept the expanded U.S. military presence as a manifestation of militarization. For him, militarization is a state-level phenomenon that “denotes and connotes the perversion of civilian structures by a comprehensive emphasis on power by the military.”²³ Other scholars have shown, though, that there is just as much credibility and intellectual value in examining militarization as an international-level phenomenon as there is in examining it as a state-level one.²⁴

INTERVENTION

Intervention became a major security theme of the 1980s not because of a large number of interventions in the Caribbean Basin, but because of the power asymmetries of the states involved, ideological overtones, and the justification proffered by the intervener in one case. Most of the interventions were undertaken by the United States, although other countries took action on several occasions, as in the Honduran incursions into Nicaragua. Those incursions led Nicaragua to take legal action against Honduras in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). But after discontinuation of the action by Nicaragua, the case (*Nicaragua v. Honduras on Border and Transborder Armed Actions*) was removed from the ICJ docket on 27 May 1992. The two countries agreed to improve bilateral relations.²⁵

The most dramatic interventions were the U.S. invasions in Grenada in October 1983 and Panama in December 1989. Both events dramatized the power asymmetries of the states involved, but the Grenada action was a clear demonstration that the United States was prepared to act with impunity when it perceived the threat as a communist-centered one in its cherished strategic space. The Grenada intervention also involved controversy about the role of Barbados, Jamaica, and other Caribbean countries in the action. Mark Adkin, a retired British army officer involved in the intervention on the RSS side, is among those who have provided incontrovertible evidence that the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) invitation to the United States was a Washington construct designed to justify its action.²⁶ Some Caribbean argued nonetheless that their support for U.S. action and participation in the affair was based on their own conscious decisions, not on compulsion by the United States.²⁷

The Panama intervention was the first post-World War II U.S. intervention in Latin American that was not rationalized in terms of communism. President Bush justified Operation *Just Cause* on four points: needing to protect the lives of Americans; helping restore democracy in Panama; preserving the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty; and bringing Manuel Noriega to justice for drug trafficking and racketeering.²⁸ The drugs rationale in particular demonstrates the changing nature of the U.S. national security agenda. Bush claimed vindication after Noriega was convicted on eight counts of drug trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering, and was sentenced on July 10, 1992, to 40 years in prison.²⁹

Part of the intervention theme of the 1980s revolved around U.S. action in Nicaragua, which was different from that in Grenada and Panama because it was characterized by covert action, a form of clandestine intervention. That covert action is traceable to November 1981, when President Ronald Reagan signed National Security Directive No. 17 authorizing \$19.5 million in funding for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to create a paramilitary commando squad to conduct raids in Nicaragua. Covert warfare was unofficially declared in March 1982, when CIA-trained and CIA-equipped operatives destroyed two major bridges in Chinadega and Nueva Segovia provinces. The CIA later provided the Contras with *Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare*, a manual on low-intensity warfare strategy. The CIA itself undertook missions

12 CARIBBEAN SECURITY

considered too sophisticated for the Contras. Between September 1983 and April 1984, these included some 22 air, land, and sea raids. Mining of Nicaraguan harbors was also a central part of the anti-Sandinista operation. By the first week of April 1984, 10 commercial vessels had collided with mines.³⁰

The United States was castigated by many countries for these actions and was also repudiated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the now famous case, *Nicaragua v United States*, the court ruled:

The United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the *contra* forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another state.³¹

But, as is well known, the United States denied the jurisdiction of the ICJ shortly before the Court announced its decision, ignoring the ICJ ruling that required the United States to pay reparations and refrain from any other interventionist activity. Later, following the political changes after the defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 elections, the consequent ideological adaptations, and rapprochement between the U.S. and Nicaragua, the matter was dropped. In a letter to the ICJ dated September 12, 1991, Nicaragua asked for the matter to be discontinued. The Court then issued an order of discontinuance on September 21, 1991.³²

INSTABILITY

The Caribbean scene in the 1980s also featured a significant amount of internal instability precipitated by various factors, including coups and coup attempts, insurgencies, ideological disputes, political factionalism, and disputed political legitimacy. Several countries were affected, some more than others, some with multiple factors, others with one. The noteworthy cases were Haiti, Suriname, Jamaica, Guyana, Grenada, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.³³

But by the end of the decade, the manifestations, if not the root causes, of political instability had been addressed in several places, among them Grenada and Nicaragua. These changes contributed to

an appreciable improvement of the region's political landscape such that Aaron Segal could assert that in the Caribbean opposition political parties win elections and take office, the courts retain their independence, the press is privately owned and relatively free, civil liberties are recognized and respected, and dissent is tolerated. Segal continued: "Although there are exceptions, there is an active civil society that protests, dissents, takes its cases to the courts, contests free elections, and provides an effective opposition."³⁴

As might be expected, the themes and issues mentioned above were not the only ones presented in the 1980s; there were other concerns. For example, there was increased drug production and trafficking and the attendant corruption and other problems. Cuba, the Bahamas, Belize, Jamaica, Antigua-Barbuda, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago were the countries that faced the greatest drug-related challenges. Territorial disputes between Guyana and Venezuela, Belize and Guatemala, and Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago also generated several crises. In the Belize-Guatemala case, the crisis was such that Britain established a military garrison to guarantee Belizean territorial and political sovereignty. Yet, by the end of the decade, all contending parties had taken steps either to lessen tensions through confidence-building measures, or to resolve their disputes altogether. In the dispute between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, for instance, a maritime treaty signed in April 1990 effectively settled the matter. In the Belize-Guatemala case, although Guatemala did not relinquish its claim, it recognized the sovereignty of Belize in August 1991, and the two countries established diplomatic relations the following month.³⁵

NOTES

1. Commonwealth Study Group, *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985); Sheila Harden, ed., *Small is Dangerous: Micro-states in a Macro World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); Colin Clarke and Tony Payne, eds., *Politics, Security, and Development in Small States* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); and William T. Tow, *Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990).

2. Harden, *Small is Dangerous*, 13.

3. Commonwealth Study Group, *Vulnerability*, 23.

4. "Communique and Addresses—Eleventh Meeting of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community," *Caricom Perspective* 49, Special Supplement (July-December 1990): 6.

14 CARIBBEAN SECURITY

5. Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 113.

6. Robert L. Pastor, *Whirlpool: United States Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 23.

7. Josefina C. Tiryakian, "The Military and Security Dimensions of U.S. Caribbean Policy," in H. Michael Erisman, ed., *The Caribbean Challenge: United States Policy in a Volatile Region* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 48-71; George Black, "MARE NOSTRUM: U.S. Security Policy in the English-Speaking Caribbean," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 19 (July/August 1985): 13-48; Dion E. Phillips, "Caribbean Militarization: A Response to the Crisis," *Contemporary Marxism*: 10 (1985): 92-109; Humberto García Muñiz, *Boots, Boots, Boots: Intervention, Regional Security and Militarization in the Eastern Caribbean* (Río Piedras: Caribbean Project on Justice and Peace, 1986); Jorge Rodríguez Beruff, "U.S. Caribbean Policy and Regional Militarization," in Augusto Varas, ed., *Hemispheric Security and U.S. Policy in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 89-120; and Jorge Rodríguez Beruff, "Puerto Rico and the Militarization of the Caribbean, 1979-1984," *Contemporary Marxism* 10 (1985): 68-91.

8. Black, "MARE NOSTRUM;" García Muniz, *Boots, Boots, Boots*; R.A. Hudson, "Strategic and Regional Security Perspectives," in Sandra W. Meditz and Dennis M. Hanratty, eds., *Islands of the Commonwealth Caribbean*, (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1989), 585-634; and Ivelaw L. Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States*, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).

9. Richard Sim and James Anderson, "The Caribbean Strategic Vacuum," *Conflict Studies* No. 121 (August 1980), 1-21; David Ronfeldt, *Geopolitics, Security, and U.S. Strategy in the Caribbean Basin*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1983; Thomas D. Anderson, *Geopolitics of the Caribbean*, (New York: Praeger, 1984); and Lloyd Searwar, "The Caribbean Conundrum," in Thomas G. Weiss and James Blight, eds., *The Suffering Grass* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 15-38.

10. Edward Gonzalez, *A Strategy for Dealing With Cuba*, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1982), 288.

11. See Cole Blasier, *The Giants Rival: The USSR and Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 103-28; W. Raymond Duncan, *The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influences* (New York: Praeger, 1985), 169-77; and Pastor, *Whirlpool*. On page 223 of *Whirlpool*, Pastor refers to a meeting he had with Fidel Castro in January 1992 where Castro indicated that "the Soviets opposed all our support for revolution in Latin America."

12. U.S. Departments of State and Defense, *Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection* (esp. Docs. 13-20) (Washington DC, 1984); Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); and Anthony Payne, "The Foreign Policy of the PRG," in Jorge Heine, ed., *A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 123-51.

13. Tiryakian, "The Military," 50.

14. See Tiryakian, "The Military;" Black, "MARE NOSTRUM," 3; Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The United States and the Caribbean Basin: The Politics of National Insecurity," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 8, nos. 2-3 (1986): 83-89; Hudson, "Strategic and Regional Security Perspectives"; Andrés Serbín, *Caribbean Geopolitics: Toward Security Through Peace?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990); and Lloyd Searwar, "The Caribbean Conundrum."

15. Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 20.

16. See his *Soldiers in Politics* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977).

17. See George Danns, *Domination and Power in Guyana* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1982); George Danns, "The Role of the Military in the National Security of Guyana," in Alma H. Young and Dion E. Phillips, eds., *Militarization in the Non-Hispanic Caribbean* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986), 112-38; and Pablo Mariñez, "The Armed Forces in the Dominican Republic: Professionalization and Politicization," in Jorge Rodríguez Beruff et al., eds., *Conflict, Peace, and Development in the Caribbean* (London: Macmillan, 1991), 81-109.

18. See Ivelaw L. Griffith, "The Military and the Politics of Change in Guyana," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 33 (Summer 1991): 141-73.

19. Black, "MARE NOSTRUM"; García Muñiz, *Boots, Boots, Boots*; Dion E. Phillips, "The Increasing Emphasis on Security and Defense in the Eastern Caribbean," in Young and Phillips, *Militarization in the Non-Hispanic Caribbean*, 42-64; Leslie Manigat, "The Setting: Crisis, Ideology, and Geopolitics," in Jorge Heine and Leslie Manigat, eds., *The Caribbean and World Politics* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), 25-74; and Griffith, *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean*.

20. Young and Phillips, *Militarization in the Non-Hispanic Caribbean*.

21. Anthony P. Maingot, "The United States in the Caribbean: Geopolitical Realities and the Bargaining Capacity of Small States," in Anthony T. Bryan et al., eds., *Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 246-49; Anthony P. Maingot, "The English-Speaking Caribbean and Hemispheric Security: The

Lessons of Grenada," in Georges Fauriol, ed., *Security in the Americas* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), 73-79.

22. Maingot, "The English-Speaking Caribbean and Hemispheric Security," 246, 249.

23. Maingot, "The United States in the Caribbean," 74; Maingot, "The English-Speaking Caribbean and Hemispheric Security," 246.

24. See, for example, Miles Wolpin, *Militarization and Counterrevolution in the Third World* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1972); Jagat S. Mehta, ed., *Third World Militarization* (Austin: LBJ School of Public Affairs, 1985); and Augusto Varas, *Militarization and the International Arms Race in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview, 1985).

25. "Nicaragua Discontinues Case Against Honduras," *UN Chronicle* 29 (September 1992), 78.

26. See Adkin, *Urgent Fury*.

27. Vaughan A. Lewis, "Small States, Eastern Caribbean Security, and the Grenada Intervention," in Heine, *A Revolution Aborted: The Lessons of Grenada*, 25-63.

28. See "A Transcript of Bush's Address on the Decision to Use Force in Panama," *New York Times*, December 21, 1989, A19.

29. Larry Rohter, "Noriega Sentenced to 40 Years in Jail on Drug Charges," *New York Times*, July 11, 1992, 1, 8.

30. Peter Kornbluh, "Nicaragua: U.S. Proinsurgency Warfare Against the Sandinistas," in Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, eds., *Low-Intensity Warfare* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 136-57.

31. Herbert W. Briggs, "The International Court of Justice Lives up to Its Name," *American Journal of International Law* 81 (January 1987): 79.

32. See *American Journal of International Law* 68 (January 1992): 173-74.

33. For more on these cases, see Anthony P. Maingot, "Haiti: Problems of a Transition to Democracy in an Authoritarian Soft State," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 28 (Winter 1986-87): 75-102; Betty Sedoc-Dahlberg, "Interest Groups and the Military Regime in Suriname," in Young and Phillips, *Militarization in the Non-Hispanic Caribbean*, 90-111; Scott B. MacDonald, "Insurrection and Redemocratization in Suriname?: The Ascendancy of the 'Third Path'," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 30 (Spring 1988): 105-32; Griffith, "The Military and the Politics of Change in Guyana"; Heine, *A Revolution Aborted*; and Perry Mars, *Foreign Influence and Political Conflict in the Post-Colonial Caribbean*, Working Paper No. 133, Center for Studies of Social Change, New School for Social Research, 1992.

34. Aaron Segal, "The Caribbean: Small is Scary," *Current History* 90 (March 1991): 107.

35. Government of Belize, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, press release, September 11, 1991.

3.

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The world witnessed dramatic change and turbulence as the 1980s gave way to the 1990s. The changes critical to the Caribbean are examined in this section. But before doing this it is important to offer a commentary on the subject of security.

MEANING OF SECURITY

Security has long been a highly contested concept with a variety of definitions and usages, founded mainly on traditional realist theory. Hence, the traditional approach to security emphasizes the military variable, focuses on the state as the unit of analysis, and sees states as rational actors pursuing their national interests. Threat orientation is mainly external, and the utility of security countermeasures is measured largely in military terms. Security is considered part of a country's "high politics." Traditional realism has long been challenged, but the end-of-Cold War turbulence has led scholars to question increasingly the validity of the realist conceptualization of international politics generally, and of security in particular.¹ Consequently, advocacy for a postrealist definition of security has developed.

Postrealists believe that nonmilitary developments can pose genuine threats to long-term security and quality of life; that traditional concepts of sovereignty cannot cope with torrential transborder flows of narcotics, money, AIDS, arms, and immigrants; that no single country can combat these threats alone; and that new regional and international rules and institutions will be needed to cope with the nonmilitary threats facing most countries.² They do not exclude the military variable from the security matrix, but the economic, political, and, for many, the environmental variables are considered as equally important. Postrealists posit that

internal security issues are important in their own right, complicating and sometimes aggravating external ones. Indeed, circumstances often are such that the distinction between “internal” and “external” threats and apprehensions is blurred. Moreover, not only are states no longer the only critical actors in the international arena, nonstate actors abound, and some of them wield considerable power, oftentimes more than states.

This new approach to security is progressively being embraced by professional military officers,³ and not just by security scholars. Yet understandably, not all security analysts support it. Moreover, this “new thinking” does not represent a total debunking of traditional realism, for as Richard Falk has noted correctly,

To challenge to centrality of realism does not imply its total repudiation. States do remain important actors, war does remain profoundly relevant to international relations, and many international settings can better be understood as collisions of interests and antagonistic political forces.⁴

If one adopts the postrealist approach to security, there are three structural and operational features of the still-transforming global environment with direct implications for the region:

- The changed structure of global military and political power
- Alterations in economic relationships
- Policy reprioritization by states which traditionally have had an interest in the Caribbean.

GLOBAL MILITARY AND POLITICAL POWER

The collapse of world communism and the concomitant end of the Cold War are at the center of the transformation in the first area. The bipolar character of global military-political power has been replaced by the reemergence of a multipolar global system. Not only is there evidence of multipolarity, but some scholars point to the development of the multidimensional basis of global power. One reputable scholar, for example, discerns the development of different currencies of power affixed to different poles of international power: military, economic and financial, demographic, and military and economic. He sees the poles varying in their productivities, with demographic power as more of a liability than

an asset, and the utility of military power being reduced.⁵ Another respected scholar views the structural and operational aspects of world power differently. He sees the distribution of power being "like a layer cake," with the top (military) layer being largely unipolar, the economic (middle) layer as tripolar, and the bottom layer (transnational interdependence) showing a diffusion of power.⁶

This post-Cold War structural-operational transformation has at least two major implications for the Caribbean, both of which pertain to the realities of U.S. geographic proximity, power, and interests. The first is that U.S. policy and action toward the Caribbean will be shorn of the previous East-West ideological cloud, thereby altering the character, if not the scope, of United States-Caribbean relations. Although it is true that, so long as Fidel Castro is able to remain adamant in the pursuit of communism in Cuba, there will be some U.S. concern about an ideological threat, "the Communist threat" is virtually nonexistent, partly because of regional changes in Nicaragua, Grenada, Guyana, and elsewhere.

The previous East-West military-political fixation of the United States not only colored its relations with Caribbean countries on a bilateral basis, it influenced multilateral relations as well. During the Cold War, the interests and conduct of some Caribbean countries caused them to suffer the consequences of U.S. displeasure, while others received the benefits of its approbation in the context of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). However, there is already evidence that the end of the Cold War has led to appreciable change in U.S. attitudes and behavior toward Caribbean countries in these multilateral arenas.

The second implication is related to the U.S. military presence in the region. The character and scope of U.S. military deployment and posture in the Caribbean, part of its geopolitical game-plan for countering the former USSR, have already begun to change. This is contributing to a lesser U.S. military presence, reduced IMET (International Military Education and Training Program) assistance, and reduced arms supplies and sales to countries that were either U.S. allies in the East-West conflict, or considered otherwise important to U.S. national interests.⁷

The transfer of responsibility for the Caribbean from USACOM to the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is further evidence of

change. In keeping with changes to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) announced by Defense Secretary William Perry in February 1996, SOUTHCOM's geographic area of responsibility has been expanded with the addition of waters adjoining Central and South America, and the Gulf of Mexico. According to the Pentagon, "This change satisfies two objectives:

- To enhance Southern Command's interactions with the navies of Central and South American nations.
- To have one commander control all U.S. military activities in the Caribbean Basin and Central and South America."⁸

The change takes place in two phases. Phase One, effective January 1, 1996, gives SOUTHCOM authority over the area adjoining Central and South America. The second phase, to take effect after June 1, 1997, will give SOUTHCOM control over the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. This move is a reflection of U.S. budgetary pressures and policy rethinking, central to which are cost-efficiency calculations for counternarcotics operations. Yet, one potential risk of this change from the Caribbean vantage point is the possibility that the Caribbean will get short shrift in the balancing of security relations between the U.S. and countries in Central and South America, and those in the Caribbean, which are smaller and relatively less important.

As Jorge Domínguez rightly observed, the Caribbean now has lesser military importance in world affairs, although there remains some significant military issues in the region.⁹ Yet, the end of the Cold War does not obliterate the strategic value of the Caribbean. As was shown, the region's strategic significance is reflected in economic, geographic, and communications attributes that have transcended East-West geopolitics, even though they were affected significantly by it during the Cold War. And as will be seen, the Caribbean is not only of strategic importance to states, but also to non-state actors, notably the drug barons.

ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS

Allied to the military-political changes attendant upon the end of the Cold War are alterations in the structure and operation of economic power relationships. The profundity of actual and anticipated economic power changes has been such that one scholar was able to popularize a concept he coined to capture the scope and

depth of economic power relations in the new global environment—geo-economics, the mixture of the logic of conflict with the methods of commerce. Edward Luttwak is convinced that the new strategic environment will be such that “as the relevance of military threats and military alliances wanes, geo-economic priorities and modalities are becoming dominant in state actions.”¹⁰ He expects that both the causes and instruments of conflict will be economic.

The movement toward the formation of economic blocs around the world is one important manifestation of global economic power alteration. The European Union now boasts a unified market of 320 million consumers, and ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), with some 420 million people, agreed in January 1992 to create a free-trade area as a precursor to establishment of a common market. Original plans called for an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by January 1, 2003, but ASEAN members are now aiming for January 2000, following the counsel of Brunei’s Sultan at the September 1995 meeting of ASEAN Council of Economic Ministers. Closer to home there is NAFTA, with annual production of over \$6 trillion and some 387 million consumers in Canada, Mexico, and the United States.

One appreciable consequence of this megabloc phenomenon for the Caribbean is the potential reduction or even loss of economic assistance, foreign investment, and preferential trading arrangements. Concerning NAFTA, for example, there is justified fear that the anticipated increase in trade resulting from the removal of trade barriers in Mexico will help displace U.S. trade with Caribbean countries and reduce the benefits of tariff preferences under schemes like the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the General Scheme of Preferences, and Section 936 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, the last of which is dying a slow death. And this is only one of several policy and institutional concerns with economic and political security implications.

The megabloc phenomenon with its varied implications comes at a particularly unpropitious time for the region, given the cumulative impact of the global and regional turbulence, which includes depressed banana, bauxite, and sugar production, high public debt, and high unemployment. A former Deputy Secretary-General of the Latin American Economic System observed:

The dawn of a new era of heightened economic competition in which industrial countries are adopting a less concessional approach to developing countries on trade and economic matters generally coincides with an almost loss of geopolitical appeal for Caribbean countries. . . . It is important for Caribbean Community societies to recognize that the nature of the challenge goes even beyond NAFTA. . . . It relates much more to the requirements of the current global economic environment of increased competition, to which NAFTA is itself a response.¹¹

RETHINKING POLICY PRIORITIES

The military-political changes caused by the end of the Cold War and the megabloc phenomenon have had both causal and consequential links to the third general feature of the new strategic environment that is critical to the Caribbean: policy reprioritization by big and middle powers that once considered the Caribbean to be important to them, and or by countries on which Caribbean states placed importance. Noteworthy in this respect are the United States, Britain, and Venezuela, which is also Caribbean in the Caribbean Basin definition of the region.

Reprioritizing by these countries is the result of several factors, sometimes acting in combination. These include budgetary constraints, economic recession, shifting foreign policy focus, the demand by domestic constituencies for more attention to domestic concerns, and leadership changes which may cause policy reevaluation. In the United States, for example, the 1994 congressional onslaught by the Republicans has led to the articulation of and efforts to implement the *Contract with America*, a document with considerable quasi-isolationist overtones.

In tangible terms, the things just cited have meant reduced aid, aid reallocation, preferential trade readjustment, reduced foreign investment guarantees, and diplomatic downgrading of some Caribbean countries. For example, the withdrawal by the British of their military garrison in Belize was prompted by both budgetary difficulties and a review of British foreign and security policy toward Central America and the Caribbean. This action has had a dual effect: increased vulnerability of Belize to territorial and political sovereignty violation by Guatemala, and reduced Belizean capacity for credible responses to narcotics production and trafficking.

When the United States slashed its 1990 aid package to Jamaica to augment its aid to Poland, more important than the sum of money involved—\$20 million—was the symbolism of the action. Moreover, in May 1994 the U.S. State Department explained that it planned to close embassies in Antigua-Barbuda and Grenada because of the *strategic insignificance* of those countries, and partly “to shift resources to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.” It took congressional pressure, especially from the Black Caucus, to reverse the decision on Grenada. The embassy there will remain open, for the time being.¹² Lobbying, however, is not expected to succeed with the United States Information Agency (USIA), which announced in fall 1995 the closure in 1996 of its offices in Suriname, Belize, and Guyana.¹³ The Guyana office was closed in March 1996. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has also closed its Eastern Caribbean office, which was located in Barbados.

Not all countries of importance to the region have been reducing their tangible interaction with the region, though. France and Spain are notable in this regard, although Spain’s involvement has been narrowly focused, mainly on Cuba and the Dominican Republic. There are also a few countries that are taking new or renewed interest in the region, Japan and South Korea among them. Nevertheless, the value of the lost interest seems to far outweigh that of the new/renewed relationships. More than this, the Caribbean’s diminished importance based on reprioritization is not limited to actions by states. Some nonstate actors, such as foundations and multinational corporations, are also acting accordingly.

A special note is needed about Canada. Although Canada has been forced to reduce aid because of budgetary problems, its trade relations with Cuba have grown over recent years. Quite understandable, then, is Canada’s strident criticism of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, popularly known as the Helms-Burton Act, which was signed by President Bill Clinton on March 12, 1996. Canada’s Caribbean interests extend beyond Cuba, although Canada has long had a “soft spot” for the Commonwealth Caribbean, which forces it to strive to maintain credible levels of aid, trade preferences, and technical assistance.

The most recent reflection of this is the Communique of the Canada-CARICOM Summit, held March 3-5, 1996 in Grenada.

Among other things, the Communique indicated that "Prime Minister Chrétien confirmed that Canada was seeking from the World Trade Organization (WTO) an extension of the waiver granted from its current preferential trade agreement, CARIBCAN. He also expressed his intention to explore the incorporation into CARIBCAN of those products which are currently excluded from the arrangement."¹⁴ The Communique also identified Canada's continuing assistance in such varied areas as debt management, small business development, the environment, drugs, and regional security.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*; Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities," *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (June 1993): 131-46; Joseph J. Romm, *Defining National Security* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); and Robert Latham, "Thinking About Security After the Cold War," *International Studies Notes* 20 (Fall 1995): 9-16.

2. This formulation is from Theodore Sorensen, "America's First Post-Cold War President," *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Fall 1992): 29.

3. For example, Gen. James R. Harding, "Security Challenges and opportunities in the Americas," *North-South* 3 (February- March 1994): 48-51; Vice Adm. Jorge Patricio Arancibia Reyes, "View from Chile," in L. Erik Kjonnerod, ed., *Hemispheric Security in Transition: Adjusting to the Post-1995 Environment* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995); Gen. John J. Sheehan, "Lessons of 1994; Outlook for the Future," Presentation at the USACOM-NDU-North-South Center Caribbean Security Symposium, Miami, April 18, 1995; and Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, "Lessons 1994; Prognosis for 1995 and Beyond," Presentation at the SOUTHCOM-NDU Annual Strategy Symposium, Miami, April 25, 1995.

4. See his "Theory, Realism, and World Security," in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds., *World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 10.

5. Stanley Hoffman, "A New World Order and its Troubles," *Foreign Affairs* 69 (Fall 1990): 115-22.

6. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What New World Order?" *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Spring 1992): 88.

7. For a discussion of military changes pertaining to the Caribbean, see Humberto García Muñiz and Jorge Rodríguez Beruff, "U.S. Military Policy Toward the Caribbean in the 1990s," *Annals of the American*

Academy of Political and Social Science 533 (May 1994): 112-24; and Gen. Sheehan, "Lessons of 1994; Outlook for the Future." For a global assessment, see Hans Binnendijk and Patrick Clawson, eds., *Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1994).

8. "Unified Command Plan Changes Announced," Pentagon Press Release No. 066-96, February 7, 1996. The changes to the UCP go beyond USACOM and SOUTHCOM shifts. Adjustments also affect the Pacific Command, the Central Command, and the Strategic Command. The UCP itself is the overall schema that guides all unified commands, by (a) establishing missions, responsibilities, and force structures, (b) delineating geographic areas of responsibilities (for geographic combat commanders), and (c) specifying functional responsibilities (for functional commanders).

9. Jorge I. Domínguez, "The Caribbean in a New International Context," in Anthony T. Bryan, ed., *The Caribbean: New Dynamics in Trade and Political Economy* (Miami: North-South Center, University of Miami, 1995), 2.

10. Edward N. Luttwak, "From Geopolitics to Geo-economics," *National Interest* 20 (Summer 1990): 20.

11. Henry S. Gill, "NAFTA: Challenges for the Caribbean Community," in *The Caribbean: New Dynamics in Trade and Political Economy*, 49.

12. See Steven A. Holmes, "Less Strategic Now, Grenada is to Lose American Embassy," *New York Times* May 2, 1994, A1, A6; and Holmes, "U.S. Embassy for Grenada," *New York Times* May 15, 1994, A9.

13. Bert Wilkinson, "US Pulls Away from Region," *New York Carib News* October 17, 1995, 6. Incidentally, the Peace Corps presence is increasing slightly. In 1995 an office was reopened in Guyana after closure during the 1970s as relations between Guyana and the U.S. soured.

14. *Communiqué, Canada-CARICOM Heads of Government Summit*, St. George's, Grenada, March 5, 1996, 4.

4. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

Although turbulence and transformations are precipitating changes in many areas, some security issues from the previous era have retained their salience. One issue with continued salience is territorial disputes, one where the dynamics have been changed pertains to drugs. Territorial disputes and drugs are, however, not the only items on the region's security agenda; they are among the most critical ones.¹

The outbreak of hostilities between Peru and Ecuador on February 26, 1995, not only threatened to shatter "the Spirit of Miami" 6 weeks after its creation, but it provided sobering testimony of the continued salience of territorial and border disputes in the Americas. Moreover, while there had been an accentuation of peace initiatives in the hemisphere even before the Summit of the Americas, among the collateral consequences of the Peru-Ecuador conflict has been a jolting of memories about the number of similar disputes in existence and a rekindling of nationalist sentiments about the prosecution of claims.

In the Guyana-Venezuela case, for instance, the aftermath of the Peru-Ecuador war led to apprehension in Guyana over troubling signals coming from Venezuela. In relation to its Guyana claim, which is for two-thirds of the country, Venezuela's Foreign Minister, Miguel Burelli Rivas, visited Guyana March 2-3, 1995, to ask for priority attention to be given to the issue. More troubling, though, he called on President Cheddie Jagan of Guyana to have "a proposal to be pursued in practical terms" ready for when Jagan meets Rafael Caldera during fall 1995. Guyana flatly refused the diplomatic arm twisting.² As a result, Venezuela suspended plans for a Jagan-Caldera summit, although the two leaders met briefly later, on October 8, 1995, while Jagan was in transit in Venezuela, on his way to the Non-Aligned Summit in Colombia.




FIGURE 2. Territorial claims against Guyana

Not only have the global transformations not reduced the salience of the Guyana-Venezuela dispute, but they have also left other significant disputes in tact. As figure 2 shows, Suriname also has a territorial claim against Guyana for 15, 000 square kilometers of territory. As noted above, the Guatemala-Belize dispute, involving the claim by the former to the entire territory of the latter, is not settled, although Guatemala recognized Belizean sovereignty in 1991 and its posture has changed significantly since then.

However, these territorial disputes are not the only ones in the Caribbean Basin. Others involve Venezuela and Colombia, Colombia and Nicaragua, Suriname and France (over French Guiana), El Salvador and Nicaragua, and Honduras and Nicaragua. It is useful to note, however, that while structural and operational post-Cold War changes might not have affected the salience of territorial disputes, they have helped to create an environment where peace and reconciliation are emphasized, and this environment itself can make a difference in approaches to resolving territorial and other disputes.

NOTES

1. For an assessment of the region's security agenda, see Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Caribbean Security: Retrospect and Prospect," *Latin American Research Review* 30 (Summer 1995): 3-32.

2. See "Indecent Proposal," and "Venezuela's Ultimatum," *Guyana Review* no. 27 (April 1995): 2-6; and "[Foreign Minister Clement] Rohee Says No," *Guyana Review* no. 29 (June 1995): 7.

5.

CARIBBEAN GEONARCOTICS

The Caribbean lies at what José Martí once called “the Vortex of the Americas,” making it a bridge or front between North and South America. European leaders recognized the strategic importance of this vortex soon after the 1492 encounter between Europe and the Americas. This strategic importance has persisted over the centuries, and it was dramatized in geopolitical terms during the Cold War. However, the strategic value of the Caribbean lies not only in its geopolitical value as viewed by state actors engaged in systemic conflict and cooperation. Over recent years the region has also been viewed as strategic by nonstate drug actors, also with conflict and cooperation in mind, but in terms of geonarcotics, not geopolitics.

Geonarcotics is a concept developed to explain the multiple dynamics of the narcotics phenomenon. It posits that:

- The phenomenon is multidimensional with four main problem areas: drug production, consumption-abuse, trafficking, and money-laundering
- These give rise to actual and potential threats to the security of states around the world
- The drug operations and the activities to which they give rise precipitate conflict and cooperation among various state and nonstate actors in the international system.

Over and above this, the term captures the dynamics of four factors: drugs, geography, power, and politics.

Geography is a factor because of the global spacial dispersion of drug operations, and because certain geographic features facilitate some drug operations. Power involves the ability of individuals and groups to secure compliant action. This power is both state and nonstate in source, and in some cases nonstate sources exercise relatively more power than state entities. And politics, the fourth factor, revolves around resource allocation in the

gets what, how, and when. Since power in this milieu is not only state power, resource allocation is correspondingly not exclusively a function of state power holders. Moreover, politics becomes perverted, and all the more so where it already was perverted.¹

Although the Caribbean drug phenomenon involves drug production, consumption and abuse, trafficking, and money laundering,² it is trafficking that best highlights the region's strategic value. Aspects of both the Caribbean's physical and social geography make it conducive to drug trafficking. Except for mainland Belize, French Guiana, Guyana, and Suriname, Caribbean countries are all island territories. Some are plural island territories, such as St. Vincent and the Grenadines, which comprise close to 600 islands, and the Virgin Islands, composed of about 100 islands and cays. Indeed, one, the Bahamas, is an archipelago of 700 islands and 2,000 cays. This island character permits entry into and use of Caribbean territories from scores, sometimes hundreds, of different places from the surrounding sea. For the mainland states, access is from various places from the Atlantic Ocean in the case of Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana, and from the Caribbean coast in the case of Belize. And when one adds to the matrix the inability of Caribbean countries to provide adequate territorial policing, their vulnerability to trafficking is more readily appreciated.

The most important location feature of the region's physical geography is proximity. This proximity is dual: to South America, a major drug-supply source, and to North America, a major drug-demand area. On the supply side, the world's cocaine is produced in South America, coming notably from Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Colombia alone produces about 80 percent of all the cocaine in the world, although only about 20 percent of worldwide coca leaf cultivation is done there. (Colombia's coca cultivation is reported to have grown 13 percent in 1995, making that country the world's second largest coca producer, after Peru. Bolivia's place is now reduced from second to third.) A significant proportion of global heroin and marijuana production also comes from South and Central America, especially from Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, Brazil, and Guatemala.³

On the demand side, the United States has the dubious distinction of being the world's single largest drug-consuming nation. An analyst at the Congressional Research Service reported in 1988:

America is consuming drugs at an annual rate of more than six metric tons (mt) of heroin, 70-90 mt of cocaine, and 6,000-9,000 mt of marijuana—80 percent of which are imported. American demand therefore is the linchpin of one of the fastest-growing and most profitable industries in the world.⁴

By 1993, however, State Department estimates placed consumption of cocaine alone at 150-175 metric tons, valued at \$15-17.5 billion.⁵ In April 1995, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, then head of SOUTHCOM and now the U.S. drug “czar,” estimated that about 300 mt of the approximately 575 mt of cocaine available worldwide in 1994 were consumed in the United States.⁶

As is evident from figure 3, there is not much distance between either the Caribbean and South America, or the Caribbean and the United States, especially the southern and northeastern parts of the United States. For example, except for French Guiana and Suriname, the distance of all Caribbean countries is less than 2,000 miles from Miami, and only seven of them are more than 2,000 miles from Atlanta and Washington, DC. As for distances between the Caribbean and some main South American drug centers, over 80 percent of Caribbean countries are no more than 1,000 miles from Caracas, and all except Belize (in relation to Caracas), French Guiana (in relation to Cali and Medellín), and Suriname (in relation to Medellín) are less than 1,500 miles away from Bogotá, Cali, Caracas, and Medellín. The distances involved are often quite short. For example, the island of Bimini in the Bahamas is just 40 miles from the Florida Keys; a mere 90 miles separate Cuba from the United States; only 7 miles separate La Brea in southwestern Trinidad and Pedernales in northeastern Venezuela; the town of Lethem in southwest Guyana is a mere 75 miles away from the city of Boa Vista in northeast Brazil; and Eteringbang, Guyana, is only 28 miles from El Dorado, Venezuela.⁷

Europe is also a huge drug consuming area. Despite the relatively great distance between that continent and the Caribbean region, the Caribbean is a major transit area for cocaine, heroin, and marijuana bound for Europe.⁸ Several reasons explain this. One is proximity between the Caribbean and South America. A second relates to commercial, communications, and other linkages between Europe and the Caribbean, which provide the institutional and other infrastructure for trafficking.




FIGURE 3. Maritime Trafficking Routes in the Caribbean

Third, because French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique are Départements d'Outre Mer (DOMs) of France, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and Caicos are British dependencies, and Bonaire, Curaçao, Saba, and St. Maarten are integral parts of the Netherlands, there are certain customs, immigration, and transportation connections between these territories and their respective European "owners," and these are exploited by traffickers. Some of the arrangements are similar to those involving the United States and Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which also facilitate traffickers aiming for destinations in continental United States.

The Caribbean's vulnerability to trafficking and the prospects for continued trafficking make drugs a clear and present danger to the region. One way to understand the geography dynamics involved is to examine trafficking patterns and the modus operandi of traffickers.

TRAFFICKING PATTERNS

Apart from shipping their own marijuana to the United States, some Caribbean countries are important transshipment centers for South American cocaine, heroin, and marijuana bound for Europe and North America.

Bahamas

For more than two decades, the Bahamas, Belize, and Jamaica dominated this business. The Bahamas is an excellent candidate, given its 700 islands and 2,000 cays and strategic location in the airline flight path between Colombia and South Florida. For a typical cocaine trafficking mission, aircraft depart from the north coast of Colombia, arriving in the Bahamas 4 to 5 hours later. The cargo is dropped either to waiting vessels, or for later collection and placement on vessels, and then the final run is made to a U.S. point of entry. However, this is not the only trafficking method. Recently traffickers have been using other tactics, including use of Cuban waters to evade OPBAT (Operation Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos) measures. Cocaine seizures dropped from 490 kilos in 1994 to 390 kilos in 1995, while marijuana seizures increased dramatically from a 1994 figure of 1,420 kilos to 3,530 kilos in

1995. The number of people arrested for trafficking rose from 1,025 in 1994 to 1,565 in 1995.⁹

Belize

The geography and topography of Belize also make that country ideal for drug smuggling. Apart from a long coast line and contiguous borders with Guatemala and Mexico, two major heroin and marijuana producers, there are dense unpopulated jungle areas and numerous inland waterways. Moreover, there are about 140 isolated airstrips and virtually no radar coverage beyond a 30-mile radius of the international airport at Belize City. While there still is air trafficking, recently there has been an increasing use of maritime routes. Crack has also been featuring more prominently. While 141 kilos of cocaine were seized in all of 1994, two seizures in January 1995 alone netted 636 kilos of cocaine. The overall 1995 cocaine seizures amounted to 840 kilos.¹⁰

Jamaica

Jamaica has long been key to the drug trade, given its long coastline, proximity to the United States, its many ports, harbors, and beaches, and its closeness to the Yucatan and Windward Passages, as figure 2 shows. Trafficking takes place by both air and sea, using both legal and illegal airstrips for air operations, and cargo, pleasure, and fishing vessels for maritime ones. Many of the illegal airstrips are only 1,200 to 1,500 feet long, just enough length for use by Pipers, Cessnas, BE-100, and KingAir aircraft. Jamaica's west and south coast are the most popular areas for air trafficking. Apart from landings on strips designed or adapted for drug operations, landings have been made on roads, in cane fields, and on legal strips owned by bauxite and sugar companies. The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) has destroyed close to 100 illegal airstrips, but as the JDF Chief of Staff explained, given the heavy limestone in many of the popular landing areas, operators are often able to make fields serviceable within 10 days of destruction.

Most of the cocaine air operations using Jamaica over the last few years have involved San Andres and Bogotá in Colombia, the Bahamas, Panama, and Curaçao. Traffickers do not rely only on illegal flights; legal commercial flights are also used. Particularly popular, and problematic for Jamaican officials, was the commercial link between San Andres and Montego Bay. That connection was

severed in September 1994, but there are still commercial flights linking Jamaica and Bogotá. Now, according to military intelligence sources, the drugs go from San Andres to Bogotá, and then to Montego Bay or Kingston.¹¹

Although the Bahamas, Belize, and Jamaica are still important drug trafficking centers, countermeasures there and in South and Central America have prompted traffickers to seek and develop alternative routes, bringing eastern and southern Caribbean countries into greater prominence since the early 1990s. The shifts are of such a magnitude that, in November 1994, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands were designated by the United States drug "czar" as High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), a designation surely appropriate to other areas in the region. Moreover, because of the increased drug activity, in July 1995 the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) upgraded its presence in Puerto Rico from "Office" to Field Division, increasing its staffing and assigning a special agent to oversee the Caribbean, formerly done from Miami. The Division became operational on October 1, 1995.

Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles

These are said to serve as vital links in the transshipment of cocaine and heroin from Colombia, Venezuela, and Suriname to the United States and Europe. Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao are very close to Venezuela, from which much of the drugs confiscated in these islands come. Trafficking in the Dutch Caribbean generally involves the use of commercial and private airlines, air cargo flights, and cruise ships, although ship containers have also been used. In Suriname, for example, in 1994 one seizure alone netted 207 kilos of cocaine concealed in cargo waiting to be shipped to Europe.

Seizures in Aruba for 1995 totalled 153 kilos of cocaine, 366 kilos of marijuana, and 4 kilos of heroin. In the Netherlands Antilles the figures were 111 kilos of cocaine, 810 kilos of marijuana, and 8 kilos of heroin.¹² In January 1996, while operating near Grand Cayman, the British frigate HMS *Brave* recovered \$200 million worth of cocaine that had been dumped at sea earlier. All together, there were 3,000 pounds of cocaine in 40 bales.¹³ Overall for the Cayman Islands in 1995, 548 people were arrested for

trafficking, and confiscated drugs totalled 314 kilos of cocaine and 2.6 mt of marijuana.¹⁴

Cuba

Cuba's strategic location has caused it to be used for trafficking, apparently both with and without official sanction. One 1983 DEA report dates official Cuban involvement to 1991, suggesting that there were economic and political motives involved. Cuban officials have also been indicted in the United States for trafficking. One of the earliest cases of importance was in November 1982 when four senior officials were convicted *in absentia*.

Andres Oppenheimer asserts that Fidel Castro and Colombian drug operators once had a long association, based mainly on political convenience. Castro is said to have first ordered his intelligence agencies to penetrate the Colombian drug networks in the 1970s to gain access to what then appeared as potentially one of Latin America's most powerful economic and political forces. Indeed, he says, "When the Carter administration launched exploratory dialogue with the Castro regime in the late 1970s, one of the things the Cubans offered was to help stop drug smuggling through the Caribbean. The proposal died when normalization talks collapsed."¹⁵

Cuban involvement in trafficking commanded the greatest attention in 1989 when several top military officials were convicted and given harsh sentences for trafficking, corruption, and other infractions. Several analysts indicate that the participation of military officials in the smuggling of drugs and other commodities was not done mainly to profit individual officers, but to satisfy economic needs of the military in particular, and economic and political interests of Cuba generally. Evidence suggests that Cuba's military and political high command knew about the trafficking in drugs and other contraband, and that they colluded in it. But they turned on the architects of the operations when it became politically inconvenient to have their operations continue.

Although there is no credible evidence of present Cuban Government involvement in trafficking, there is evidence of the practice in Cuba. For example, in April 1992, 29 Cubans in the city of Camaguey were found guilty of possessing and trafficking in cocaine. Some were also convicted of currency and weapons possession charges.¹⁶ Cuban officials reported that 3.3 mt of cocaine

were seized in 79 different cases during 1993. Reported seizures for 1994 were 238 kilos of cocaine and 1.1 mt of marijuana.¹⁷

Haiti

Several factors explain Haiti's trafficking vulnerability and involvement: geographic location, poorly monitored coasts, mountainous interior, about 20 unpatrolled airstrips, inadequate law enforcement resources, and corruption. In Haiti, the complicity of military and other officials has been well established.¹⁸ The DEA estimated in 1993, for instance, that 2 to 4 tons of cocaine passed through Haiti, mostly with the blessings of military officials. In April 1994, Gabriel Tobaoda of the Medellín cartel told a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that Lt. Col. Joseph Michel François, then commander of Haiti's police, collaborated in the shipment of tons of cocaine during the 1980s. According to the testimony, the deal had been sealed in 1984 following François's visit to Medellín. Haiti was reportedly used as a bridge to the United States, with both the flights and the cargo protected by the military.¹⁹ Officially reported cocaine seizures have been increasing recently, but the figure plunged in 1995: in 1992, the figure reported was 56 kilos; 1993, 157 kilos; 1994, 716 kilos; and 1995, 550 kilos.²⁰

Guyana

This country has recently become an important center of operations. Like other Caribbean countries, Guyana's trafficking use saw its graduation from marijuana to cocaine and heroin. The earliest known trafficking case was in June 1979, when a trader from the bauxite mining city of Linden arrived from Jamaica with 60 pounds of compressed marijuana.²¹ Cocaine and some heroin now enter Guyana from all three neighboring countries: Brazil, Suriname, and Venezuela. Cocaine seizures in 1993 were 463 kilos—1,000 percent higher than in 1992. The exceptional 1993 figure was due to one dramatic seizure in June 1993, when 800 pounds of cocaine were dropped from air into the Demerara river, along with \$24,000 and huge quantities of Colombian and Guyanese currency. Several Guyanese, Colombians, and Venezuelans were implicated in the affair.²²

During 1994 alone, 56,707 kilos of marijuana were confiscated, up from 15,654 kilos seized in 1993. And in January 1995, 5,000

pounds of marijuana valued at \$2 million were discovered behind a false fiberglass wall of a container about to be shipped from Georgetown to Miami.²³ Only 51 kilos of cocaine were reported seized for the entire 1995, but it is credible to suggest that the decline from the 1994 figure of 76 kilos "does not necessarily indicate a decrease in the amount of drugs transiting the country. It may be the result of more sophisticated techniques and coordination on the part of drug smugglers or an insufficient drug enforcement unit, or both."²⁴

The air, sea, and land routes developed for smuggling contraband into Guyana from Brazil, Venezuela, and Suriname during the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s have now been adapted to narcotics trafficking. A further complication is the fact that the borders with these neighboring countries are very long: 1,120 kilometers with Brazil, 745 kilometers with Venezuela, and 600 kilometers with Suriname. Moreover, traffickers are able to take advantage of the country's large size (214,970 square kilometers), the coastal habitation, and absence of adequate manpower and equipment to police the territory. In relation to air trafficking, for example, there are 92 legal airports (private and public), most of them in remote parts of the country where the physical and social geography provides clear advantages for traffickers. Like elsewhere in the Caribbean, trafficking in Guyana is not done only by air runs dedicated to drug delivery or collection; commercial flights are also used.

Guyana's physical geography makes it also vulnerable to maritime trafficking. Guyana, whose name is derived from an Amerindian word that means "Land of Many Waters," has hundreds of inland rivers and creeks. Moreover, there are 13 huge rivers that flow into the Atlantic Ocean, and each of those rivers has a network of tributaries. The maritime traffic is also facilitated by the fact that the network of rivers also runs into Brazil, Suriname, and Venezuela. For example, the Takatu river in southwest Guyana flows into the Parima, a tributary of the Rio Negro, which flows into the Amazon in Brazil.

The Guyana situation is clear evidence of the vulnerability of Caribbean countries to drug trafficking and other operations. Geography apart, a contributor to this situation is the absence of adequate military and police resources for credible responses. In effect, the state lacks the power to exercise proper political and

territorial jurisdiction over the nation. Top army, coast guard, and police officials in many parts of the region have expressed frustration at not only the inability to adequately protect their countries' borders against trafficking, but also at being the pawns of traffickers who often create successful small interdiction diversions in order to execute large operations.²⁵

MODUS OPERANDI

Drug trafficking brings out the creativity and ingenuity of drug operators and the people who collude with them. People have used every possible orifice of the human anatomy, every possible piece of clothing, all manner of fruits and vegetables, and a variety of craft, furniture, and other things for the conveyance of drugs. In so far as the human anatomy is concerned, use has been made of the vagina, anus, arm pits (to strap packages of drugs), the abdomen and the back (to strap packages), the tongue (by placing drugs under it), both natural and false hair, thighs (where drugs are strapped on inner thighs), and the stomach and intestines. Indeed, there are people—called swallows or mules—who specialize in the use of the stomach and intestines. One Eastern Caribbean official related a case where a leg wound was used. Condoms with cocaine were found in the wound and within the bandaging of the wound.

Drugs have also been found in fish, rice, cake, pepper sauce, coconuts, yams, bananas, "coffee beans" (where the beans are cocaine pellets stamped to the shape of coffee beans and dipped in coffee syrup), cheese, butter, cans of fruit, beer, and juice, cigarette packaging, vegetables, detergent, furniture and furniture fixtures, lumber, piñatas, mannequins, bales of cloth, mail, ceramic tiles, ice cream, bottles of shampoo and mouthwash, video tapes, frozen vegetables, concrete posts, wooden coat hangers, rum (where liquid cocaine is purported to be coconut rum), and countless other objects. All sorts of clothing are used, including shoes and sneakers with false soles and heels. Both dead and live birds and animals are also used to convey drugs. And in one attempted candy disguise, 1,000 pounds of cocaine packed inside candy containers were seized upon arrival in New York in March 1996, having come aboard an American Airlines flight from Puerto Rico.²⁶

People of all ages and of both sexes are involved in trafficking, and old women are sometimes used, because they do not fit the

trafficker profile used by law enforcement agencies. But some are caught. In one case, a 63-year-old Honduran-born American citizen was arrested in Guyana with 6 pounds of cocaine in her underwear. She was about to board a British West Indian Airways (BWIA) flight to New York when one of the packages fell from under her. The woman, Gwendolyn Martinez, a grandmother, later admitted that she had been recruited in Brooklyn for the job. Upon conviction she was sentenced to 10 years in jail.²⁷ Martinez was one of several “granny mules” arrested during 1993 and 1994 in Guyana and Trinidad.

Some operations are very sophisticated, using digital encryption devices, high-frequency transmitters, cellular telephones, beepers, radar tracking devices, flares and sensors for air drops, and other equipment. Some trafficking is done individually, but most of it is conducted through networks. Most of the networks could not exist or succeed without the collusion of people in government and private agencies in various positions and at all hierarchical levels: people in shipping companies, customs and immigration agencies, warehouses, police forces, the military, airlines, export and import companies, stores, cruise ships, trucking companies, and factories, for example. Some officials collude by acts of omission: they just fail to perform certain acts, go to certain places, or return to their posts at a certain time.

Thus, while the recent global turbulence and transformations have altered the strategic environment in many ways, because of the continued salience of some issues and the heightened dynamics of others, the Caribbean strategic environment still holds some clear and present dangers. Drug trafficking presents some of these dangers. The implications of trafficking go beyond merely the consequences of being transit centers, partly because not everything intended to go through the region actually does so. Some of the cocaine and heroin remain, both by default and by design, as payment for services, for example, in the latter case. Partly because of all this, throughout the Caribbean there are problems of drugs-related crime, arms trafficking, and corruption. What, then, is being done about the narcotics phenomenon?

NATIONAL COUNTERMEASURES

A range of coping strategies to counter drug trafficking is being adopted. Countermeasures are multidimensional, multilevel, and multiactor, a reflection of the nature and scope of the drug phenomenon. They need to be multidimensional because drug operations and their impact are multidimensional; they need to be multilevel—national, regional, and international—because drug operations and many of the problems they precipitate are both national and transnational; and they have to be multiactor for the two above reasons, plus the fact that countries lack the necessary individual capabilities to meet the threats and challenges. Hence, responses come not only from governments, but also from national Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs).

National countermeasures are wideranging in scope, if not sufficiently substantive in character. They include law enforcement, education, interdiction, demand reduction, rehabilitation, intelligence, crop substitution, airport and seaport management, financial services regulation, and legislation. There is no regionwide standard for most of the countermeasures, although countries emulate successful models elsewhere and common practices do exist. The kind and impact of countermeasures introduced depend essentially on three things: perceptions of the predicament, national capability, and foreign support.

Public sector resources are insufficient to design and implement narcotics countermeasures. This is more so because countermeasures need to be both multidimensional and simultaneous. In other words, circumstances are such that one cannot apply education, and then rehabilitation, and then interdiction. As a matter of fact, no set of measures can really be undertaken only sequentially. Education, rehabilitation, interdiction, and other measures have to be applied at the same time. Indeed, in many places it was a failure to adopt simultaneous measures, based on misperception of the situation, that has contributed to its deterioration.

Most countries have therefore adopted an inclusive approach, actively reaching out locally to NGOs and corporate agencies for partnership in countermeasures. Generally, though, even the

combined available resources of governments and NGOs are insufficient, making foreign state and non-state assistance necessary. In some cases the foreign support becomes so central to programs that its withdrawal results in the program's collapse. A case in point is Operation *Buccaneer* in Jamaica. That program began in 1974 with some ambitious aims: eradication of all marijuana cultivation; arrest of all persons, equipment, aircraft, and marine vessels engaged in trafficking; and destruction of all illegal airstrips. It involved joint army-police operations heavily supported by the United States. The U.S. obligations were usually for salaries for 25-30 people to cut and burn marijuana fields, fuel for the helicopters, boats, and vessels used in operations, funds to purchase chemicals, equipment, and supplies to cut and spray fields; and the lease of Bell 205 helicopters for use by the JDF air wing. The United States also provided vessels for the JDF Coast Guard, and helped with intelligence gathering.

Operation *Buccaneer* was interrupted for 11 years, largely because of U.S. antipathy toward the socialist posture of the Michael Manley government. Operation *Buccaneer* recommenced in 1985 and continued as an annual exercise, interrupted only in 1988 when Hurricane Gilbert hit Jamaica and destroyed most of the island's marijuana fields. Because of budget constraints, the United States stopped funding Operation *Buccaneer* in 1993. However, residual funds from previous years enabled a drastically reduced operation to be conducted in 1994. Operation *Buccaneer* finally ceased in December 1994.²⁸

Foreign assistance is not only bilateral, but multilateral, as will be seen later. Aid sometimes comes from places with generally little interest in the Caribbean, which suggests that the rationale behind the assistance is often not the specific country getting it, but the issue concerned; the fact that drugs constitute an interdependence issue is what really matters. In one case, Germany gave DM 4,500 (J\$75,000) toward drug rehabilitation in Jamaica. The money was given in December 1993 for Patricia House, a rehabilitation facility for recovering addicts that had been established in 1991 with support from the European Community, the Jamaican government, and Richmond Fellowship, a Jamaican NGO.²⁹

Virtually all Caribbean countries have national drug councils that are supposed to set policy on countermeasures. They usually are composed of officials from various government bodies as well

as NGOs and the private sector. The National Council on Drug Abuse (NCDA) of Jamaica, the Programa para la prevención del uso indebido de drogas (PROPUID) of the Dominican Republic, the National Advisory Council on Drugs (NACD) of Guyana, the National Council for Drug Abuse Prevention (NaCoDAP) of the Netherlands Antilles, and the National Drug Council (NDC) of the Bahamas are a few examples of these bodies. Understandably, structures vary from country to country.

National Master Plans are considered the ideal tools for establishing national strategies and mechanisms for combating drugs. There are Master Plans in over 18 places, including, in order of adoption, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Grenada, the Netherlands Antilles, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Antigua-Barbuda, the British Virgin Islands, Haiti, Belize, Anguilla, Barbados, Turks and Caicos, Aruba, Bermuda, Dominica, and Cuba.³⁰ Some of the Plans are preliminary; others are complete. However, there two problems with Master Plans, one of which the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) notes: "A severe lack of consistent, pertinent, reliable, and comprehensive data on drug abuse and trafficking seriously inhibits proper assessment of the actual situation, and precludes planning of appropriate counter-measures."³¹ A second problem pertains to implementation: for a variety of resource and other problems the implementation record in many places is very poor.

Several Caribbean countries have mounted demand reduction programs, and at least one has pursued crop substitution. Trinidad's demand reduction program is actually one strand of a two-pronged national drug control strategy. The second aspect is supply control. The overall plan attempts to develop a comprehensive and integrated response to ensure that the problems are addressed from all fronts simultaneously. The hope is to modify behavior through public education and positive influences on attitudes and values. Prevention through education is seen as a continuous process involving the psychological development of children, the training of teachers, professional and community leaders to deliver programs, and the treatment, rehabilitation, and social reintegration of the addicted population. Recognizing the need for multidimensional, multiactor efforts, the Trinidad plan also caters

for interagency and international cooperation, both state and non-state.

The demand reduction project began in October 1994 and runs through October 1997. It has four main components: research and information; community prevention; school prevention; and treatment and rehabilitation. Several target beneficiaries have been identified, among them: 150,000 people in five communities; students, teachers, and administrators in select schools; addicts and their families; and governmental and non-governmental agency workers involved in counternarcotics work. The project is proceeding on two main tracks. The first addresses improving the ability to design and implement demand reduction programs. The focus here includes enhancing national research capabilities, public drug education, school prevention, treatment and rehabilitation, and training government and NGO officials.

The second track emphasizes the development and implementation of intensive demand reduction activities in five communities: The communities are: San Fernando, in southwest Trinidad; Arima, in northern Trinidad; Chaguanas, the northwest section of the island; Scarborough, in southern Tobago; and Laventille, in northwest Trinidad. These five communities were selected based on several considerations. First, they are representative of different types of drug problems affecting Trinidad and Tobago. Second, they offer a fairly wide geographic spread, allowing models to be tested in a diverse selection of the country's population. Moreover, they are places where the social infrastructure and community and political organizations are sufficiently developed to give the project a reasonable chance of success.

The project is estimated to cost \$1.9 million; \$462, 469 from local sources, and the remainder from the UNDCP. This project is actually Phase II of a longer term initiative, the first part of which ran from October 1992 to October 1994. Several things were accomplished during the first phase, including the training of 161 community leaders in basic drug abuse prevention, preparation of educational materials, and establishment of the NADAPP Secretariat. Given what officials in Trinidad and Tobago consider as current and projected drug consumption practices, the expectation is that several other phases will be necessary after the current one is completed.³²

The crop substitution program in Jamaica has three aims: assisting growers who are experiencing economic hardships because of marijuana eradication countermeasures; encouraging potential marijuana growers to grow alternative crops and raise livestock; and assisting growers and their dependents to adapt to the pursuit of income substitution activities. In specific terms, the plan is to establish 1,520 acres of permanent and semipermanent crops and 700 acres of cash crops, and provide 1,890 farmers with chicken broilers for poultry rearing.

The project area covers farms in the parishes of St. Ann, St. Catherine, St. Elizabeth, and Westmoreland—the parishes with the highest marijuana production. With information from soil, land use, climate, and market considerations, three models were developed. The first consists of 1-acre units divided into sections for cash crops, permanent or semi permanent crops, and poultry farms, each with 100 birds initially. Model II involves 2-acre units to be used similarly, but with a different size allocation for the three sets of things. Model III consists of 3-acre units divided as follows: one acre for permanent or semipermanent crops; half-acre for cash crops; and the rest for a 200-bird poultry house.

Approximately 2,000 farmers are expected to benefit from the program in the first year, increasing by 1,000 in the second and third years. Substitute crops include yams, carrots, coffee, citrus, papaya, and sugar cane. Training will be offered to farmers, as will be basic farm tools such as forks, machetes, and files. The nonagricultural aspect of the program includes creation of cottage industries for processing agricultural produce, the production of crafts using goat skin and straw, dressmaking, embroidery, and other needlecraft. Women are the principal target for these activities, but men are not excluded.

The program began in late 1994 and is expected to cost J\$234 million over its 3-year duration. Funding comes from the Jamaican government, and grants from local NGOs, IGOs, and foreign governments. This program builds on a 1988 pilot project in southwest St. Ann, where farmers were given J\$1,700 worth of seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides each in an effort to encourage the shift away from marijuana cultivation. The St. Ann experiment had considerable problems, but was judged as fairly successful. Notable in this regard has been the commitment of many farmers to reinvest

part of their profit to extend the substitute acreage initially cultivated.³³

Like crop substitution initiatives in Latin America, the efforts in Jamaica raise the issue of the comparative economic advantage, from the standpoint of the farmers, of cultivating marijuana as opposed to the alternative crops. The planners in Jamaica are realistic but hopeful in this regard, noting that "While it is not realistic to expect this plan to generate income capacities as marijuana production, a sufficient level of income will be generated devoid of the risk and negative social impact [that comes] with production of the illegal crop."³⁴

One troubling area in several countries is rehabilitation. Some countries have several clinics and hospitals with rehabilitation programs. In the Bahamas, for example, rehabilitation is offered at the Sandilands Rehabilitation Center, at Doctors Hospital, and elsewhere. In Trinidad and Tobago, it is undertaken at New Life Ministries, Mount St. Benedict, Caura, Rebirth House, and elsewhere. But some countries, notably in the Eastern Caribbean, have absolutely no rehabilitation capability. What is worse, there are places without facilities where addiction is worsening, because of the fallout from increased trafficking. In Guyana, one of these places,³⁵ and in other places that lack rehabilitation facilities, addicts are usually treated at public mental institutions and private medical clinics.

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COUNTERMEASURES

Caribbean counties participate in a variety of regional and international networks. Some of them, like the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the OAS Money Laundering Expert Group (OAS-MLEG), and the UNDCP, are devoted solely to combatting drugs. For some of them, such as the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP) and the RSS, drugs are part of a wider mandate. Like national efforts, regional and international initiatives are multidimensional, covering the very areas dealt with nationally. But unlike the national level, regional and international operations see less NGO and INGO involvement, and more from states and IGOs.

One regional plan calls for the establishment of a Regional Training Center for Drug Law Enforcement. The proposal, by Jamaica, is for that agency to serve as a resource base for technical advice to Caribbean governments, and to systematize the region's anti-drugs law enforcement training. The Center, to be funded by the United States, the UNDCP, and CICAD, will become part of an existing criminal justice complex that includes the Police Staff College and the Jamaica Police Academy. Initially to be ready by the end of 1993, its opening has been delayed by incomplete needs assessment and delayed funding. However, it is expected to become operational in September 1996.³⁶ Recognizing the key role of intelligence in all counternarcotics efforts, the ACCP agreed in May 1994 to pursue an allied initiative: the creation of a Regional Drug Intelligence System.³⁷

Many Caribbean countries, including Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Guyana, already have United States-sponsored Joint Information Coordinating Centers (JICCs) that are linked electronically with the DEA operational and analysis center in Texas called the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). However, several Caribbean officials have stressed the importance of having a system within the region to serve the region since most of the JICC intelligence data flows are unidirectional: from Caribbean JICCs to EPIC.

Caribbean countries are also part of several international counternarcotics regimes. Among these are the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances; the 1972 Protocol amending the 1961 Convention; and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Indeed, one Caribbean country, the Bahamas, has the distinction of being the first country to ratify the 1988 Convention, on January 30, 1989. The Convention includes provisions on drug trafficking, money laundering, organized crime, and related issues, such as arms trafficking. It requires states that are party to it (120 up to May 1996) to strengthen laws concerning financial reporting, extradition, asset forfeiture, and other subjects. It also urges adherents to improve cooperation in intelligence, interdiction, eradication, and other areas.

As of May 1996, all Caribbean countries except Belize and Cuba had ratified the 1988 Convention, ratification of which is now

viewed by the international community as a litmus test of commitment to battling drugs. Thus Caribbean countries are good international citizens. Yet this is only part of the reality. There is a point beyond ratification where Caribbean countries are delinquent. More critical than ratification of treaties is execution of their provisions, and all Caribbean countries are remiss, for various reasons, including administrative lethargy, and technical, financial, and other resource limitations. Of course, there is variation among countries of the extent of delinquency.

About 90 percent of the regional and international countermeasures involve foreign support—by states, IGOs, and INGOs, in various combinations. Because the regional and international agencies involved recognize the importance of coordinating their assistance, several of them formed a coordinating mechanism in 1990. Called the Bridgetown Group because it is centered in the Barbados capital, it includes representatives from the American, British, Canadian, Dutch, and French diplomatic missions in Barbados (and in Trinidad and Tobago in the case of the Dutch and French missions), the OAS, and the UNDCP. The Group meets every 6 to 8 weeks to coordinate programs. The success of the Bridgetown Group has led to the creation of four other groups: the Georgetown Group (in Guyana); the Port of Spain Group (in Trinidad and Tobago); the Santo Domingo Group (in the Dominican Republic); and the Kingston Group (in Jamaica).³⁸

Most Caribbean countries have signed Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) with the United States, among them Antigua-Barbuda, Jamaica, the Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Suriname, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Trinidad and Tobago. MLATS provide for training, joint interdiction, asset sharing, extradition, intelligence, and material and technical support. Some countries, like the Bahamas and Jamaica, have long had several complementary agreements with the United States.

Some agreements provide for ship-rider arrangements, which allow Caribbean military and police personnel to sail aboard U.S. Coast Guard ships to authorize the boarding of suspect vessels in Caribbean waters and arrest suspects and confiscate their drugs. Among the most recent complementary arrangements were those put in place between the U.S. and Trinidad and Tobago. Signed by Prime Minister Basdeo Panday and Secretary of State Warren

Christopher on March 4, 1996, the agreements provide for maritime and air counternarcotics operations as well as for extradition.³⁹

It is useful to note that although no formal agreement exists between Cuba and the United States, occasionally there has been meaningful antidrug cooperation. One example of this occurred in September 1993 when Cuba granted permission for U.S. aircraft to enter Cuban airspace in hot pursuit of suspected traffickers aboard a speedboat. Following the chase, Cuban maritime authorities detained the vessel and two suspects. They delivered the narcotics (720 pounds of cocaine) and the suspects to U.S. officials.⁴⁰

Other bilateral narcotics treaties exist. Belize, for example, has agreements with Mexico for intelligence exchange and Mexican assistance with demand reduction and rehabilitation, among other things. Bilateral agreements also exist between Suriname and Colombia, Cuba and Guyana, Suriname and Guyana, Venezuela and Guyana, Suriname and the Netherlands, Cuba and Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, Jamaica and Mexico, Cuba and Panama, and other sets of countries. These cover a range of joint and individual initiatives. In one unique case, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela signed a pact that provided for joint air patrols.⁴¹ Unfortunately, it was never fully implemented.

Intelligence and interdiction measures are among the most costly of countermeasures, and they involve considerable technology, which Caribbean countries lack. This partly explains the sustained and significant U.S. role. Once during the 1980s there were ground-based air radar systems in Providenciales, Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI); Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; and Borinquen, Puerto Rico; and five sea-based aerostat radars in the Bahamas, some with both sea and air detection features. An aerostat radar itself is an airborne surveillance system that consists of unmanned, tethered, helium-filled balloons that carry radar. Each aerostat cost about \$10 million to install and near \$4 million to operate annually during the 1980s.⁴² Radars were also used at Lovers Leap in Jamaica from August 1991 to December 1994 as part of the Caribbean Basin Radar Network (CBRN).⁴³

One intelligence and interdiction countermeasure of some distinction, which uses some of this technology, is OPBAT. It started in 1982 as a U.S.-Bahamas operation dedicated to apprehending airborne smugglers in the Bahamas. U.S. equipment, primarily helicopters, and personnel are used to transport and assist

Bahamian, and later TCI, law enforcement officials in apprehending suspected smugglers. OPBAT uses DEA, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Army personnel and equipment at the OPBAT sites in the Bahamas. In addition, DEA and U.S. Coast Guard personnel direct OPBAT helicopter maneuvers and coordinate all interdiction operations from the OPBAT headquarters in the U.S. embassy in Nassau.

Over the years supplementary operations were mounted. For instance, in September 1986 Operation *Bandit* was initiated by U.S. Customs to improve apprehension response time. Use was made of helicopters based in Florida, with Bahamian police and military aboard to authorize arrests and seizures in the Bahamas. In October 1986, SEABAT (Sea Based Apprehension Tactics) was launched to provide ship-based launch platforms for helicopters with Bahamian law enforcement personnel aboard. OPBAT has been credited with securing hundreds of arrests and the seizure of thousands of tons of cocaine and marijuana, as well as hashish and other drugs. Indeed, it was considered so vital that a multilateral treaty, involving the Bahamas, Britain (for TCI), and the United States was signed on July 12, 1990, extending the OPBAT basing network from three bases to four, the fourth being at Great Inagua, the southernmost island of the Bahamas.⁴⁴

Also of importance is CBNR, mentioned earlier. At its operational peak, it drew signals from 17 radar sites in 10 countries. However, CBRN has been plagued with problems. Each site covers only 180 miles, and sites are often non-functional because of bad weather or poor maintenance. CBRN is being replaced with a system that is more sophisticated. In June 1995 the Cayman Islands site was closed following earlier site closures in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama.

The system that will replace CBRN is ROTH—Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar—originally designed to track Soviet bombers, and can scan many times further than conventional radar. A prototype ROTH was established in Virginia in April 1993, and a second system in Texas underwent final testing during September 1995. Puerto Rico is to be the site of the third ROTH. The Pentagon explained that the first two sites can scan 2,000 miles on a clear day, and 1,600 miles on a day with atmospheric disturbances. Thus, they can sweep most of the Caribbean, Central America, and northern Colombia and Venezuela.⁴⁵

ROTHR uses a technology different than conventional line-of-site microwave radar. It works by bouncing signals off the ionosphere, the outer region of the atmosphere that begins about 30 miles from the earth. The fully functional system in Virginia consists of two installations, about 70 miles apart. One, in New Kent, consists of 32 antennas; the other is in Chesapeake. The latter is the receiver site, with 372 pairs of 19-foot tall aluminum poles arranged in two parallel rows stretching 1.5 miles. As might be expected, ROTHR is even more expensive than CBRN: \$12 million each, with annual operating costs of between \$12 million and \$14 million per facility.⁴⁶

The way the United States pursues some of its unilateral and joint countermeasures has often been a problem for some Caribbean countries. United States law enforcement officials are known to have pursued suspects into the territorial waters of Caribbean countries, making arrests in those countries' jurisdictions, sometimes without even courtesy notification of the arrests. There has often been virtual coercion by U.S. agencies in the selection of personnel for local drug enforcement operations, and in the design and implementation of countermeasures.

Caribbean leaders have often protested such affronts to their sovereign authority. The most public occasion was in July 1988. Writing on behalf of CARICOM, the then Chairman of CARICOM, Antigua-Barbuda Prime Minister Vere Bird, Sr., wrote to President Ronald Reagan protesting "attempts to extend domestic United States authority into neighboring countries of the region without regard to the sovereignty and independent legal systems of those countries."⁴⁷ In essence, this is part of the dilemma of Caribbean countries where drugs are concerned. Michael Morris puts it aptly: "The policy dilemma posed by the drug trade for small Caribbean states is that individually [and even collectively] they cannot control the drug trade, but that a US-controlled, anti-drug strategy for the region may impinge on national sovereignty."⁴⁸

There is considerable "muddling through" in the design and implementation of narcotics countermeasures in the region. Various factors account for this: capability limitations, administrative lethargy, a "rock-and-hard-place" dilemma in which policy makers find themselves partly because drug operations have both negative and positive aspects, and the fact that decisions about many national programs, not to mention the regional and international ones, are

not made solely by local elites. What is worse, there is a troubling sense of fatalism in some places, which is dangerous for several reasons: it affects adversely the psychological buoyancy of people involved in combatting drugs; it contributes to greater cynicism in the general population of countries; and it emboldens drug operators with the possibility that they might increase the scope of their operations in the region.⁴⁹

NOTES

1. For a full explanation of this issue, see Ivelaw L. Griffith, "From Cold War Geopolitics to Post-Cold War Geonarcotics," *International Journal* 49 (Winter 1993-94): 1-36.

2. For more on these issues, see Duke Pollard, *The Problems of Drug Abuse in the Commonwealth Caribbean* (Georgetown: Caricom Secretariat, 1987); Anthony P. Maingot, "Laundering the Gains of the Drug Trade: Miami and Caribbean Tax Havens," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 30 ((Summer-Fall 1988): 167-87; Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Drugs and Security in the Commonwealth Caribbean," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 31 (July 1993): 70-102; Michael A. Morris, *Caribbean Maritime Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 132-65; Ivelaw L. Griffith, *The Money Laundering Dilemma in the Caribbean*, Working Paper No. 4, Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico, September 1995; and Ivelaw L. Griffith and Trevor Munroe, "Drugs and Democracy in the Caribbean," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 33 (November 1995): 357-76.

3. For a discussion of Latin American drug production in global context, see Bruce M. Bagley and William O. Walker, III, eds., *Drug Trafficking in the Americas* (Miami: North-South Center, University of Miami, 1994); United Nations, *Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1995*, E/INCB/1995/1, January 1996, 37-45; and U. S. Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* [hereafter INCSR], 1996, 61-158.

4. William Roy Surret, *The International Narcotics Trade: An Overview of its Dimensions, Production Sources, and Organizations*, CRS Report for Congress 88-643, October 3, 1988, 1.

5. INCSR, 1993, 16.

6. Gen. McCaffrey, "Lessons of 1994: Prognosis for 1995 and Beyond," Presentation at the SOUTHCOM-NDU Annual Strategy Symposium, Miami, April 25, 1995.

7. I am grateful to Brig. (Ret.) David Granger of the Guyana Defense Force for the Guyana-Brazil and the Guyana-Venezuela information and to Ricardo Mario Rodríguez, Minister Counselor at the

Venezuelan Mission to the OAS for the Trinidad-Venezuela information, all provided during May 1995.

8. For a recent assessment of European drug operations and their Latin American, Caribbean, and other connections, see Scott B. MacDonald and Bruce Zagaris, eds., *International Handbook on Drug Control* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992), Ch. 14-18; Rensselaer W. Lee, III and Scott B. MacDonald, "Drugs in the East," *Foreign Policy* no. 90 (Spring 1993): 89-107; and INCSR, 1996, 315-432.

9. INCSR, 1996, 166.

10. The January 1995 seizure is reported in INCSR, 1995, p. 122; the total 1995 figure comes from INCSR, 1996, 122.

11. Interviews with Rear Adm. Peter Brady, Chief of Staff, and Captain Desmond Edwards, Military Intelligence Officer, JDF Head Quarters, Up Park Camp, Jamaica, December 19, 1994.

12. INCSR, 1996, 187.

13. "British Ship Makes Cocaine Haul," *New York Carib News* February 3, 1996, 4.

14. INCSR, 1996, 209.

15. Andres Oppenheimer, *Castro's Final Hour* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 41.

16. "Cocaine Found on Coast Brings 29 to Court," *Miami Herald*, April 14, 1992, 13K.

17. INCSR, 1995, 166.

18. See Congress, Senate, *Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: The Cartel, Haiti, and Central America*. Committee on Foreign Relations Hearings, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., July 11, 12, and 14, 1988; and Alexandra Marks, "Haiti's Military May Dig in Heels to Keep Lucrative Drug Trade," *Christian Science Monitor* November 1, 1993, 1, 14.

19. Tim Weiner, "Colombian Drug Trafficker Implicates Haiti Police Chief," *New York Times* April 22, 1994, A7.

20. INCSR, 1995, 176, and INCSR, 1996, 177.

21. Interview with Winston Felix, Assistant Commissioner of Police (Crime), Eve Leary Police Head Quarters, Georgetown, Guyana, June 30, 1994.

22. See Mohamed Khan, "Drugs Dropped by Mysterious Aircraft," *Stabroek News* (Guyana) June 8, 1993, 1, 11; and "23 Held in Air-dropped Cocaine Probe," *Stabroek News* June 9, 1993, 1, 11.

23. See INCSR, 1994, 189; Alim Hassim, "Marijuana Container valued at US\$2M," *Stabroek News* January 6, 1995, 1; and "Three Charged for Trafficking," *Stabroek News* January 16, 1995, 1, 24.

24. INCSR, 1996, 175.

25. Interviews with, among other officials, Brig. Joe Singh, Chief of Staff, Guyana Defense Force, Camp Ayanganna, Georgetown, June 30, 1994; Lt. Cmdr. Gary Best, Acting Commander, Guyana Coast Guard, Coast Guard Headquarters, Georgetown, July 1, 1994; Jules Bernard, Commissioner of Police, Trinidad, Police Headquarters, Port of Spain, July 8, 1994; Orville Durant, Commissioner of Police, Barbados, Police Headquarters, Bridgetown, July 19, 1994; Rear Adm. Peter Brady of the JDF; Supt. Reginald Ferguson, Head of Drug Enforcement Unit, Bahamas Police Force, Nassau, December 22, 1994; and Alvin Goodwin, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Antigua-Barbuda, in Port of Spain, Trinidad, January 21, 1995.

26. *New York Times*, "Cocaine Concealed in Candy Boxes," April 2, 1996, A11.

27. "10 Years in Jail for Honduran," *Stabroek News* November 1, 1993, 1.

28. Interviews with Rear Adm. Brady and Captain Edwards, December 1994.

29. See "Drug Rehab Program Gets German Aid," *Jamaica Herald*, December 15, 1993.

30. UNDCP, *Subregional Program Framework for the Caribbean 1994-95*. Bridgetown, Barbados, October 1994, 19.

31. *Ibid.*, 12.

32. UNDCP, *Assistance to the [Trinidad and Tobago] National Drug Abuse Demand Reduction Program*, AD/TRI/94/910, 1994, 5-22.

33. Government of Jamaica, Ministry of Agriculture, *Alternative Systems for an Illegal Crop*, September, 1994, 1-11.

34. *Ibid.*, 2.

35. See Ryan Naraine, "A Drug Rehab Clinic—When?" *Stabroek News* September 6, 1993, 5; and Mohamed Khan, "Prison Boss Calls for Drug Rehab Clinic," *Stabroek News* September 4, 1993, 1, 13.

36. Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Drugs and World Politics: The Caribbean Dimension," *The Round Table*, no. 332 (1994): 428; and telephone conversation with Michel Amiot, UNDCP Caribbean Director, September 22, 1995.

37. Interview with Commissioner Durant, July 1994; and Alim Hassim, "Regional Crime Data Exchange System Agreed," *Stabroek News* May 25, 1994, 12.

38. Interview with Michel Amiot, Bridgetown, Barbados, July 15, 1994.

39. See *Internet Express*, "T&T Signs Anti-crime Treaty with US," March 9, 1996.

40. Howard French, "Cuba Gives Over two Drug Suspects," *New York Times*, September 20, 1993, A5; and James Gerstenzang, "Cuba, U.S. Join Forces to Catch Drug Suspects," *Los Angeles Times* September 19, 1993, A1, A17.
41. "T&T, Venezuela Consider Joint Air Patrols," *Trinidad Express* July 24, 1991, 2.
42. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Drug Control: Anti-Drug Efforts in the Bahamas*, GAO/GGD-90-42, March 1990, 17, 22.
43. Interview with Rear Adm. Brady, December 1994.
44. U.S. GAO, *Drug Control: Anti-Drug Efforts in the Bahamas*, 14-16; INCSR, 1991, 180-81; and INCSR, 1995, 160. The 1995 INCSR reported erroneously that OPBAT has been terminated.
45. *New York Carib News*, "Radar Station to Close," April 4, 1995, p. 10; and Tim Johnson, "Cold War Tools Turned on Narcos," *Jamaican Weekly Gleaner* September 14, 1995, 18A.
46. Bradley Graham, "Drug Flights Cross Pentagon's Super Radar Screen," *Washington Post* August 23, 1995, A1.
47. Ron Sanders, "The Drug Problem: Policy Options for Caribbean Countries," in Jorge I. Domínguez et al., eds., *Democracy in the Caribbean* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 22; and West Indian Commission, *Time For Action* (Black Rock, Barbados, 1992), 348-49.
48. Morris, *Caribbean Maritime Security*, 141.
49. Omitted from this discussion on countermeasures is the matter of money laundering countermeasures. For this, see Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, *Annual Report 1994-95* (Port of Spain, Trinidad, August 1995); and Griffith, *The Money Laundering Dilemma in the Caribbean*, 15-22.

6. **SECURITY COLLABORATION**

Despite the considerable regional and international action to combat drugs, collaboration in the Caribbean is not limited to drugs, as a brief examination of the Regional Security System (RSS) here shows. However, before turning to the RSS, it is important to probe the logic behind security collaboration in the region.¹

WHY COLLABORATE?

An underlying assumption of any meaningful regional security cooperation is that there are common regional threats, or at least the perception of such threats by the relevant political and military elites of the countries concerned. In addition, as suggested in the discussion on countermeasures, countries also cooperate because of capability limitations. Such limitations are pronounced in the region, and they involve money, natural resource base, manpower, weapons, technology, and training. However, capability limitations are not uniform, and there are countries within the Caribbean with sufficient individual capabilities to execute some security missions efficiently by themselves.

The assessment of common threats and the existence of capability limitations should not mask the reality that there are challenges to cooperation. Sometimes it does, however, providing the basis for frustration when expectations and objectives are not fulfilled. One such challenge is the capability challenge. This challenge does not merely arise because of the actual constraints and limitations with regard to money, equipment, training, etc. It does so because inherent in the capability disparities of cooperating states is to need for those with fewer deficiencies to give relatively more to the collective effort.

Achieving what amounts to capability progressiveness, akin to taxation progressiveness in a domestic context, is not always easy, because sometimes

- The political elites of some countries are unwilling to commit resources to the collective effort when it is not clear that there will be commensurate returns
- Some political elites are unable to see the national interest value in participating in a cooperative venture, but, paradoxically, the venture itself may be jeopardized because of capability dilemmas that are resolvable by the reluctant or recalcitrant partners
- Domestic political considerations, such as changes in the configuration of governmental power, public opinion, and timing may make it difficult for the country with the least deficiency to deliver on pledges made earlier.

Beyond the capability challenge there is a sovereignty challenge. The capability disparities themselves are a reflection of power asymmetries within the area. But while, because of power deficiencies and the nature and scope of some of the threats involved, paying continued credence to the traditional notion of sovereignty is challengeable, sovereignty is both a prized integer of nationhood and part of schema for dealing with some of the threats, especially by the very small states. The larger states in the partnership therefore need to be mindful of sovereignty sensibilities in dealing with the group, and in relation to both the decision-making and execution sides of collaboration.

Over and above this, there is need for acceptance of both substance and symbolism; that while some states may not be able to “pull their weight,” inclusiveness in planning and executing missions is still important. The symbolism of inclusiveness is not only invaluable for sustaining the partnership of state actors, it is also important for the psychological aspect of efforts to deal with non-state “enemy” actors. Such actors, the drug operators in particular, must sense or perceive inclusiveness and partnership by the states confronting them.

One further challenge that is a perennial bugbear in some places pertains to bureaucratic politics. Whether we like it or not, there will be jurisdictional turf battles and coordination difficulties involving army and coast guard/navy, army and police, army intelligence units and police intelligence outfits, etc. Some of these battles and difficulties can undermine security initiatives within a single country. Thus, the potential dangers involved when several countries and agencies are involved are even greater. All the


countries and agencies involved need to be constantly mindful of these dangers, and accept that there is often value in subordinating the ego, pride, or interest of an individual bureaucracy or service to some greater purpose or larger interest.

REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

As was noted earlier, it was the perception of common threats and recognition of capability limitations that gave rise to the RSS. The RSS was established in October 1982 through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by five Eastern Caribbean countries: Antigua-Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. St. Kitts-Nevis joined the following February, and Grenada in January 1985.

Concerns about militarization by Barbados and St. Vincent and the Grenadines stymied efforts in 1986 to upgrade the MOU to a security treaty and thereby give the RSS international legal personality, but those efforts were not altogether abandoned. The MOU was revised in 1993, and a treaty was finally signed between the end of February and the beginning of March 1996, with March 5, 1996 being the treaty date. According to the operational head of the RSS, all member-countries were expected to ratify the treaty by June 1996.² Under the treaty the RSS is required to prepare contingency plans for and assist member-countries in national emergencies. In operational terms, this mandate includes drug interdiction, search and rescue, customs and immigration control, protection of off-shore installations, and natural and other disasters and threats to national security.

As figure 4 shows, the structure of the RSS involves a Council of Ministers, which comprises national security ministers, as the central policy-making body. Operational command falls under a Regional Security Coordinator (RSC) who heads a Central Liaison Office (CLO), which is located in Barbados. Barbados also provides the RSC, currently Brigadier Rudyard Lewis, who is substantively Chief of Staff of the Barbados Defense Force. (Lewis is the founding RSC.) The CLO plans and coordinates in conjunction with a Joint Coordinating Committee comprising army commanders and police commissioners. (See the appendix for a list of military and police heads for the entire Caribbean.) Figure 4 identifies the



OECS Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
 MLOEC Military Liaison Office, Eastern Caribbean
 HCEC High Commission, Eastern Caribbean
 --- Indirect Relations

FIGURE 4. The Regional Security System

participating forces. As is also evident from it, not all RSS member-countries have armies. A key component of the police forces of the countries without armies is the Special Service Unit (SSU), elite paramilitary police with the equivalent of S.W.A.T. training and weapons. They deal with crises above the capacity of the regular police.

The RSS gained notoriety in 1983 for its role in the U.S. intervention in Grenada, namely mopping up and postinvasion policing, roles that were more politically expedient, given the controversy over the intervention, than militarily necessary.³ However, the RSS had become involved in the Grenada crisis even before the intervention, by conducting intelligence missions and designing plans to rescue Maurice Bishop, all of which became subordinated to U.S. plans once the decision to intervene was made in Washington. Apart from its roles in Grenada and continuous interdiction and other measures, the RSS deployed forces in Trinidad and Tobago following the coup attempt there in July-August 1990, to support the local military and police forces. Troops and police were also deployed in St. Kitts-Nevis during November 1994 following a mass prison riot that was part of a larger drug-driven crisis.

RSS forces have been deployed annually since 1985 in military training exercises, in conjunction with forces from other Caribbean countries, the United States, and, at varying times, from Britain, France, and the Netherlands. The first exercise, *Operation Exotic Palm*, was held in September 1985 and focused on counterinsurgency. The 1995 maneuvers, *Tradewinds '95*, were held between March and May, and dealt with amphibious missions, mainly coast guard search and rescue, oil pollution management, and port management. The 1995 exercises involved all Anglophone Caribbean countries, reflecting the growing participation that began significantly in 1989. In addition to Caribbean and U.S. forces, French troops also participated, mainly in the St. Kitts-Nevis leg, and on a bilateral basis with St. Kitts-Nevis.

To accommodate the May 7-8 Barbados meeting of Caribbean military officials, along with U.S. military officials responsible for the region, *Tradewinds '96* was held between March 4 and April 28, 1996. As with previous maneuvers, *Tradewinds '96* involved not only RSS military and police forces, but also troops from the United States, the Bahamas, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and

Jamaica. Following successful operational models based on previous maneuvers, the 1996 exercises were conducted in four phases, centered on different islands and focusing on different issues. The 1996 focus included disaster preparedness, marine pollution, and search and rescue operations.⁴

Because of capability limitations of member-states, the RSS has had to rely on foreign material and political support. The original foreign benefactors were the United States, Britain, and Canada, operating on a bilateral basis with member-countries. But given the geopolitical changes, budget pressures, and other factors identified earlier, the level of support has diminished over the years. At the same time, RSS-member states themselves have been experiencing economic difficulties, preventing them from fulfilling their financial obligations to the System, thereby aggravating the dependency problem. The combined effect of this reduced foreign support and the delinquency of member-states can only serve to compromise the operational readiness of the System, and consequently, its ability to rise to the challenge of helping to cope with threats and apprehensions in the region.⁵

NOTES

1. The cooperation challenges raised here are drawn from Ivelaw L. Griffith, "Regional Security in the Caribbean: The Cooperation Logic and Some Challenges." Paper delivered on the Symposium on Cooperative Security in the Caribbean, co-sponsored by USACOM, the National Defense University, and the North-South Center, University of Miami, and held in Miami, April 18-19, 1995.

2. Telephone conversation with Brig. Rudyard Lewis on March 8, 1996.

3. This is clear from what is so far the best account of the affair, in terms of the domestic political and geopolitical circumstances that precipitated the intervention, the intervention as planned and executed, and its aftermath: Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989).

4. These and other details of the 1995 and 1996 exercises were provided in telephone conversations with Brig. Lewis and Lt. Col. Trevor Thomas of the Antigua-Barbuda Defense Force, both on June 24, 1995, with Brig. Lewis on March 8, 1996, and with Lt. Col. Thomas on March 9, 1996.

5. For more on the RSS, see RSS Staff, "The Roles of the Regional Security System in the East Caribbean," *Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs* 11 (January-February 1986): 5-7; and Ivelaw L. Griffith, "The RSS:

A Decade of Collective Security in the Caribbean," *The Round Table*, no. 324 (October 1992): 465-75.

7. **STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY**

The collaboration challenges, some which are manifested in the Regional Security System (RSS), are, however, only part of the landscape of complexity and challenge. A critical part of it relates to the need to strengthen democracy.

The most popular approach to democracy used by Caribbean social scientists is the Schumpeterian approach, which sees contention and participation as the central features of democracy. As far as Carl Stone was concerned, for example, "democracy can be defined as a process which seeks to distribute power from centers of power concentration to the majority of citizens in a political system."¹ For Evelynne Huber, "Democracy is defined by free and fair elections, at regular intervals, in the context of guaranteed civil and political rights, responsible government (i.e., accountability of the executive to elected representatives) and political inclusion (i.e., universal suffrage and nonproscription of parties)."² Other specialists view democracy as "A system of government in which there is meaningful and extensive political competition for positions of government power, at regular intervals, among individuals and organized groups, especially political parties."³

Elections are a critical legitimizing mechanism for democracies, and thus there is need for them, and for them to be free and fair. Nevertheless, as Douglas Payne of Freedom House correctly observed, "To assume that elections alone are an accurate gauge of the health of democracies is naive at best."⁴ Thus, for me, notwithstanding the importance of free and fair elections, the critical democracy challenges in the Caribbean involve full and meaningful participation by citizens in policy making, access to decisionmakers and institutions of government, and responsiveness by political rulers.

Central to the maintenance of democracy and the respect for human rights is the climate and character of the political environment. An environment where political elites act as though

they are indispensable to the survival of the state is not conducive to a healthy climate for democracy or human rights. This attitude has not only led to electoral malpractice to retain power where there is a pretense to having electoral democracy, but it also has resulted in the cooptation of the military or their direct intervention into politics. Moreover, such a situation leads to gross violations of the civil and political rights of opponents of the regime specifically and of members of the body politic generally. Hence, transparency and accountability in political rule are critical, not only for elections, but for decisionmaking generally.

Political stability is not a guarantee of democracy and the protection of human rights. But there are strong links between stability and democracy, and between stability and human rights. Stability itself is a function of at least four factors: political legitimacy, political authority, political equality, and political participation. Legitimacy requires that the governing elites be representative and be based on a popular mandate. Authority relates to a reciprocal relationship between government and people where the political elites exercise power and the citizens consent to its use. Equality implies the possession of rights by citizens to participate actively in the political process without regard to distinctions such as race, ideology, gender, social geography, and social class. Participation, the fourth factor, involves the ability of citizens to influence the nature and operation of political rule through institutions such as political parties, unions, the courts, and the media. It is the absence of some or all of these that creates political instability.⁵

The experiences of Suriname and Haiti show that while electoral democracy and stability are necessary, they are not sufficient. One writer makes the important point that "ending civil conflict, holding relatively free elections, and installing elected civilian regimes [are] not, in and of themselves, sufficient to create democratic systems."⁶ This brings us to the issue of institutions, one of which is the judiciary. The critical role of this institution to democracy generally and to human rights specifically needs no belaboring.

The term "justice delayed is justice denied" comes to life in the Caribbean due to case backlogs, absence of sufficient judicial personnel, and inadequate facilities, among other things. One observation about Jamaica has regionwide relevance: "Excessive or

inordinate delays between the time of arrest and the final disposition of the case has frequently . . . extended into several years, and it is not unusual for cases to be finally determined after four or five years.”⁷ Yet, the judiciary is not the only institution in need or repair and sustenance. While courts need to be independent to be effective judicial arbiters, they cannot operate in isolation; the nature and operation of police forces and prisons and other criminal justice agencies affect not only the work of the courts, but the quality of justice generally. Beyond the judiciary and these criminal justice institutions, the media, educational institutions, political parties, and labor unions are important pillars of functional democracy, and they all need to be strengthened in the Caribbean.

Given the resource and institutional limitations of the region, external support is also necessary to strengthen Caribbean democracy, to help repair and sustain the institutions mentioned above, among other things. However, as noted earlier, several donors are reevaluating their foreign aid policies, with the result that aid is being reduced. Donor fatigue is also a contributor. This situation certainly does not help the sustenance of democracy. However, although international-level action is crucial, it is not a substitute for domestic-level action. For as Richard Millett noted correctly: “Prime responsibility for the success of any democratic system rests with national elected authorities. . . . International assistance for strengthening democratic institutions needs to be enhanced, but political will can never be imported.”⁸

NOTES

1. Carl Stone, “Democracy and Socialism in Jamaica: 1972-1979,” in Paget Henry and Carl Stone, eds., *The Newer Caribbean* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1983), 235.

2. See her “The Future of Democracy in the Caribbean,” in Jorge I. Domínguez et al., eds., *Democracy in the Caribbean* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 74.

3. Carlene J. Edie, “Introduction,” in Carlene J. Edie, ed., *Democracy in the Caribbean* (Westport: Praeger, 1994), 2.

4. Douglas W. Payne, “Ballots, Neo-strongmen, Narcos, and Impunity,” *Freedom Review* 26 (January-February 1995): 27.

5. For more on these connections, see Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Charles Andrain, *Political Change in the Third World* (Boston: Unwin and Hyman, 1988).

6. Richard L. Millett, "Beyond Sovereignty: International Efforts to Support Latin American Democracy," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 36 (Fall 1994): 9.

7. Delroy Chuck, "The Right to a Fair Trial Under Caribbean Constitutional Law," in Angela D. Byre and Beverly Y. Byfield, eds., *International Human Rights Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 68.

8. Millett, "Beyond Sovereignty," 20.

8. CONCLUSION

In comparison with regions such as the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Africa, the Caribbean is a peaceful region, but an analysis of the dynamics of the region's complexity, changes, and challenges suggests that the security landscape is fraught with a variety of dangers. Some are not so much specific threats as they are apprehensions, and some of these are clear and present, while others are not. Moreover, these threats and apprehensions do not have a uniform impact on the countries in the region, but their character and scope, the size and capability limitations of the countries, and the vulnerability of Caribbean countries to state and nonstate action make the entire region subject to the impact of these threats and apprehensions.

The supreme challenge facing Caribbean states as they grapple with the problems that characterize the region's security landscape on the eve of the 21st century is, of course, survival. The vulnerabilities to which these small states are subject, and the threats and apprehensions facing them make real the question of whether some of them can survive in the 21st century as political and economic entities with more than just a mere modicum of sovereignty, which itself is undergoing change because of turbulence and change within and outside the security arena.¹ In thinking of this matter I am reminded of a statement made in July 1984 by Shridat Ramphal, then the Secretary General of the Commonwealth of Nations, which still so aptly captures the dilemma of Caribbean and other small states: "Sometimes it seems as if small states were like small boats pushed out into a turbulent sea, free in one sense to traverse it; but, without oars or provisions, without compass or sails, free also to perish. Or perhaps, to be rescued and taken aboard a larger vessel."²

Some people look to various integration mechanisms as potential "larger vessels." The Association of Caribbean States (ACS), which was formed in July 1994, is the latest such

mechanism.³ However, other people entertain the thought, if not hope, that the U.S. would become that "larger vessel," despite the fact that the U.S. itself has often undermined the sovereignty of some Caribbean states. Thus, the United States is featured both in the vulnerability and the survival options of the Caribbean. As Robert Pastor notes in an article on United States-Caribbean relations in the May 1994 issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, "The United States is both a solution and a problem."

How scholars and statesmen assess the Caribbean's supreme challenge and its threats and apprehensions near the end of this century will influence what actions they propose and implement to address them in the new century. For as the late Kenneth Boulding presciently observed more than a quarter-century ago, "People whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the 'objective' facts of the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their 'image' of the situation. It is what we think the world is like, and not what it is really like, that determines our behavior."⁴ One can only hope that the "image" of the Caribbean presented here is useful to those who have to design and implement policies relating to its security.

NOTES

1. James Rosenau provides an assessment of global turbulence in his *Turbulence in World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), and of Caribbean turbulence in "Hurricanes are not the Only Intruders: The Caribbean in an Era of Global Turbulence," Paper presented at the Conference on International Security in the Greater Caribbean, held at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, October 20, 1995.

2. Ramphal was then delivering the opening address at the first meeting of the Commonwealth experts on small state security. See Commonwealth Study Group, *Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society* (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985), 119.

3. For a cogent assessment of the ACS and some of its challenges, see Henry S. Gill, *The Association of Caribbean States: Prospects for a "Quantum Leap,"* North South Agenda Papers No. 11, January 1995.

4. Kenneth Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 423.

APPENDIX:
Caribbean Security Who's Who

<u>Country</u>	<u>Political Leader</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Head of Military</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Head of Police</u>
Anguilla	Hubert B. Hughes (CM)	NONE ¹	NA	Royal Anguilla Police Force	Commissioner Elliot Richardson
Antigua-Barbuda	Lester B. Bird (PM)	Antigua-Barbuda Defense Force	Lt. Col. Trevor A. Thomas Commandant	Royal Antigua-Barbuda Police Force	Commissioner Alvin Goodwin
Aruba	Jan Hendrick Eman (PM)	NONE ²	NA	Aruba Police Corps	Commissioner Lucas E. Rasmijn
Bahamas	Hubert A. Ingraham (PM)	Royal Bahamas Defense Force	Commodore Leon Smith (CoS)	Royal Bahamas Police Force	Commissioner Bernard K. Bonamy
Barbados	Owen S. Arthur (PM)	Barbados Defense Force	Brig. Rudyard Lewis (CoS)	Royal Barbados Police Force	Commissioner Grantley Watson
Belize	Manuel Esquivel (PM)	Belize Defense Force	Brig. Earl E. Arthurs (CoS)	Belize Police Force	Commissioner Sherman Zuniga
British Virgin Islands	Ralph T. O'Neal (CM)	NONE ¹	NA	Royal Virgin Islands Police Force	Commissioner Vernon E. Malone
Cayman Islands	John W. Owen (G)	NONE ¹	NA	Royal Cayman Islands Police	Commissioner Anthony Grey

Cuba	Fidel Castro Ruz (P)	Revolutionary Armed forces	Gen. Ulises Rosales del Toro (CoGS)	Revolutionary National Police	Brig Gen. Jesus Becerra Morciego
Dominica	Edison James (PM)	NONE ³	NA	Commonwealth of Dominica Police Force	Commissioner Desmond Blanchard
Dominican Republic	Joaquín Balaguer Ricardo (P)	Dominican Armed Forces	Lt. Gen. Iván Vagas Céspedes (GcoS)	Dominican National Police	Maj-Gen. Segundo Imbert Tesson
French Guiana	Jean-François Cordet (PFT)	NONE ⁴	NA		
Grenada	Keith C. Mitchel (PM)	NONE ⁵	NA	Royal Grenada Police Force	Commissioner Col. Nestor Ogilvie
Guadeloupe	Michel Diefenbacher (PFT)	NONE ⁴	NA		
Guyana	Cheddie B. Jagan (P)	Guyana Defense Force	Brig. Joseph Singh (CoS)	Guyana Police Force	Commissioner Laurie Lewis
Haiti	René Préval (P)	NONE ⁶	NA	Haitian National Police Force	Chief Pierre G. Denize
Jamaica	Percival J. Patterson (PM)	Jamaica Defense Force	Rear Adm. Peter Brady* (CoS)	Jamaica Constabulary Force	Commissioner Col. Trevor MacMillan
Martinique	Michel Morin (PFT)	NONE ⁴	NA		

Montserrat	Reuben T. Meade (CM)	NONE ¹	NA	Royal Montserrat Police	Commissioner Frank G. Hooper
Netherlands Antilles	Miguel A. Pourier (PM)	NONE ²	NA	Netherlands Antilles Police Corps	Head Commissioner W.A. Tweeboom
Puerto Rico	Pedro Rosselló (G)	NONE ⁷	NA	Puerto Rico Dept. of Police	Supt. Pedro Toldeo
St. Kitts-Nevis	Denzil Douglas (PM)	NONE ⁸	NA	Royal St. Kitts and Nevis Police Force	Acting Commissioner Brian J. Reynolds
St. Lucia	Vaughan A. Lewis (PM)	NONE	NA	Royal St. Lucia Police Force	Commissioner Vernon Augustin
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	James F. Mitchell (PM)	NONE	NA	Royal St. Vincent and the Grenadines Police Force	Commissioner Randolph Toussaint
Suriname	Jules Wijdenbosch (P)	Suriname National Army	Lt. Col. Arthy Gorré (CoS)	Suriname Police Corps	Commissioner Carlo F. Hunsel
Trinidad and Tobago	Basdeo Panday (PM)	Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force	Col. Carl Alfonso (CoDS)	Trinidad and Tobago Police Service	Commissioner Jules Bernard

Turks and Caicos	Hugh Derek Taylor (CM)	NONE ¹	NA	Royal Turks and Caicos Police	Commissioner Paul Harvey
U.S. Virgin Islands	Roy L. Schneider (G)	NONE ⁷	NA	Virgin Islands Dept. of Public Safety	Commissioner Ramon Davila

Notes:

- CM Chief Minister
- CoDS Chief of Defense Staff
- CoGS Chief of General Staff
- CoS Chief of Staff
- G Governor
- GCoS General Chief of Staff
- NA Not Applicable
- P President
- PFT Prefect
- PM Prime Minister
- 1 Defense is the responsibility of the United Kingdom
- 2 Defense is the responsibility of the Netherlands
- 3 Dominica had an army from November 1975 to April 1981, when it was disestablished
- 4 Defense is the responsibility of France
- 5 Grenada's People Revolutionary Army was created in March 1979 and disbanded in October 1983, following the U.S. intervention
- 6 The Haitian military was demobilized between November 1994 and April 1995
- 7 Defense is the responsibility of the United States
- 8 St. Kitts Nevis Defense Force, which had been created in January 1968, was disbanded in September 1981.
- * Col. John Simmonds will act as Chief of Staff between September 1996 and August 1997, while Rear Adm. Brady pursues professional development.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACCP	Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police
ACS	Association of Caribbean States
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Association
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BWIA	British West Indian Airways
CARIBCAN	CaribbeanCanada Trade Agreement
CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
CBI	Caribbean Basin Initiative
CBRN	Caribbean Basin Radar Network
CFATF	Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICAD	Comisión Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas (InterAmerican Drug Abuse Control Commission)
CLO	Central Liaison Office
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DOM	Département d'Outre Mer
EPIC	El Paso Intelligence Center
GAC	Guyana Airways Corporation
GDF	Guyana Defense Force
HIDTA	High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
IADB	Inter American Development Bank
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IMET	International Military Education and Training Program
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International NonGovernmental Organization
JDF	Jamaica Defense Force
JICC	Joint Information Coordinating Center
MLAT	Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NACD	National Advisory Council on Drugs (Guyana)
NaCoDAP	National Council for Drug Abuse Prevention

	(Netherlands Antilles)
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NDC	National Drug Council (Bahamas)
NDCA	National Council on Drug Abuse (Jamaica)
NGO	NonGovernmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OASMLEG	OAS Money Laundering Experts Group
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
OPBAT	Operation Bahamas and Turks and Caicos
PROPUID	Programa Para la Prevención de Uso Indébito de Drogas (Program for the Prevention of the Illegal use of Drugs)
ROTHR	Relocatable OvertheHorizon Radar
RSC	Regional Security Coordinator
RSS	Regional Security System
SEABAT	Sea Based Apprehension Tactics
SLOC	Sea Lane of Communication
SOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
SSU	Special Service Unit
TCI	Turks and Caicos Islands
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UNDCP	United Nations International Drug Control Program
USACOM	U.S. Atlantic Command
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USIA	U.S. Information Agency
WTO	World Trade Organization

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ivelaw L. Griffith is Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida International University. A specialist on Caribbean and Inter-American security, he is editor of *Strategy and Security in the Caribbean* (Praeger, 1991), author of *The Quest for Security in the Caribbean* (M. E. Sharpe, 1993, 1994), and coeditor of *Democracy and Human Rights in the Caribbean* (forthcoming from Westview Press).

His work has also been published in several scholarly journals, including *Caribbean Affairs*, *Conflict Quarterly*, *International Journal*, *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, *Latin American Research Review*, and *The Round Table*. Professor Griffith is Book Review Editor of *Hemisphere* and is currently writing *Sovereignty Under Siege*, a book about the security implications of drugs, funded by the MacArthur Foundation and the North-South Center, University of Miami.

McNair Papers

The McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair, home of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University. An Army post since 1794, the fort was given its present name in 1948 in honor of Lieutenant General Lesley James McNair. General McNair, known as "Educator of the Army" and trainer of some three million troops, was about to take command of Allied ground forces in Europe under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy, 25 July 1944.

The following is a complete listing of published McNair Papers. For information on availability of specific titles, contact the Distribution Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, Fort McNair, Washington, DC 20319-5066 (telephone: commercial 202/685-4379; DSN 325-4379).

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, *Egypt and the New Arab Coalition*, February 1989.
2. John E. Endicott, *Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region*, May 1989.
3. Eugene V. Rostow, *President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional Monarch?* October 1989.
4. Howard G. DeWolf, *SDI and Arms Control*, November 1989.
5. Martin C. Libicki, *What Makes Industries Strategic*, November 1989.
6. Melvin A. Goodman, *Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third World*, February 1990.
7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplomacy," in *Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy*, April 1990.
8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, *A Strategic View of Insurgencies: Insights from El Salvador*, May 1990.
9. Steven R. Linke, *Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The PEPCON and Avtex Cases*, June 1990.
10. Christine M. Helms, *Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and Nationless States*. September 1990.
11. Ralph A. Cossa, *Iran: Soviet Interest, US Concerns*, July 1990.
12. Ewan Jamieson, *Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand*, May 1991.
13. Richard J. Dunn III, *From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond: Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Warfare*, March 1992.
14. Ted Greenwood, *U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Military Operations in the Mediterranean*, June 1993.
15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., *Bulgaria's Quest for Security After the Cold War*, February 1993.

16. William C. Bodie, *Moscow's "Near Abroad": Security Policy in Post-Soviet Europe*, June 1993.
17. William H. Lewis (ed.), *Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, June 1993.
18. Sterling D. Sessions and Carl R. Jones, *Interoperability: A Desert Storm Case Study*, July 1993.
19. Eugene V. Rostow, *Should Article 43 of the United Nations Charter Be Raised From the Dead?* July 1993
20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durell-Young; Jeffrey Simon; Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarthy, *European Security Toward the Year 2000*, August 1993.
21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., *Developing Battlefield Technologies in the 1990s*, August 1993.
22. Patrick Clawson, *How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic Sanctions, 1990-93*, August 1993.
23. Jeffrey Simon, *Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Visegrad Cohesion, and European Fault Lines*, October 1993.
24. Eugene V. Rostow, *The Future of Palestine*, November 1993.
25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir Brian Urquhart, *Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead?* November 1993.
26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, *Triage for Failing States*, January 1994.
27. Gregory D. Foster, *In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Structure*, February 1994.
28. Martin C. Libicki, *The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon*, March 1994.
29. Patrick Clawson, ed., *Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities*, April 1994.
30. James W. Morrison, *Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist*, April 1994.
31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program*, November 1994.
32. Scott W. Conrad, *Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond*, December 1994.
33. John N. Petrie, *American Neutrality in the 20th Century: The Impossible Dream*, January 1995.
34. James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, *The Russian Military's Role in Politics*, January 1995.
35. S. Nelson Drew, *NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlantic Security in Transition*, January 1995.
36. Karl W. Eikenberry, *Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers*, February 1995.
37. William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, *Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations*, March 1995.

38. Robbin Laird, *French Security Policy in Transition: Dynamics of Continuity and Change*, March 1995.
39. Jeffrey Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion*, April 1995.
40. James W. Morrison, *NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments in Europe*, April 1995.
41. Barry R. Schneider, *Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation*, May 1995.
42. John Jaworsky, *Ukraine: Stability and Instability*, July 1995.
43. Ronald Tiersky, *The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future of French Security Policy*, August 1995.
44. John A. Cope, *International Military Education and Training: An Assessment*, October 1995.
45. Elli Lieberman, *Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab-Israeli Wars?* October 1995.
46. Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense*, December 1995.
47. M. E. Ahrari, *The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia*, January 1996.
48. Mark J. Roberts, *Khomeini's Incorporation of the Iranian Military*, January 1996.
49. Steven Philip Kramer and Irene Kyriakopoulos, *Trouble in Paradise? Europe in the 21st Century*, March 1996.
50. Alan L. Gropman, *Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War II: Myth and Reality*, August 1996.
51. Ralph A. Cossa, *The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Security*, September 1996.
52. Barry D. Watts, *Clausewitzian Friction and Future War*, October 1996.
53. Donna Lee Van Cott, *Defiant Again: Indigenous Peoples and Latin American Security*, October 1996.


**The Institute for
National Strategic Studies**
is pleased to announce
a new program of
electronic publication!

Publications available now include
Strategic Forums
McNair Papers
Strategic Assessment
Selected Books
NDU Press Book Catalogue

New titles are being added every month

Electronic publications can
be found on the World Wide Web
at the award-winning NDU Home Page:
<http://www.ndu.edu>

For direct access to
publications only, use
<http://www.ndu.edu/cgi-bin/wais>



INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY