



**INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL
STRATEGIC STUDIES**

VLADIMIR ZHIRINOVSKIY

**An Assessment of
a Russian Ultra-Nationalist**

JAMES W. MORRISON

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

McNair Paper 30



***A popular Government,
without popular information or the means of
acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or
perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
And a people who mean to be their own
Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.***

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY

August 4, 1822

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**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
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Contents

SUMMARY v

1. WHO IS VLADIMIR ZHIRINOVSKIY? 1

Zhirinovskiy—the Man
Zhirinovskiy in 1993 and 1994
Trips to Central and Eastern Europe
Support and Funding
Alleged Affiliations with the KGB
Views of a Former KGB General
Zhirinovskiy and the Military
Guards, Paramilitary, and Youth Groups
Views on and Ties with Iraq
Jewish Issues
One Russian Media Assessment

2. WHAT DOES ZHIRINOVSKIY STAND FOR? 31

Domestic Politics
Russia and the Near Abroad
Policy Toward Other Nations

3. ZHIRINOVSKIY AND INCREASING RUSSIAN NATIONALISM 37

Defining Russian Nationalism
Recent Rise of Russian Nationalism
Statements of Leaders and Others

**4. IMPLICATIONS OF ZHIRINOVSKIY'S
INCREASING POLITICAL STRENGTH 57**

Arguments Against Overestimating
Arguments Against Underestimating
Scenarios for Zhirinovskiy's Future
If Zhirinovskiy Accedes to Power

**5. WHAT SHOULD WESTERN POLICY BE FOR
DEALING WITH ZHIRINOVSKIY? 73**

**APPENDIX: SELECTED QUOTATIONS FROM
VLADIMIR ZHIRINOVSKIY 79**

Russian Domestic Politics
Russian Power and the Near Abroad
Threats to and Relations with Other Countries

NOTES 127

SUMMARY

Zhirinovskiy—The Man and His Supporters

Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party in Russia and newly elected delegate to the lower house of the Russian parliament, has been called frivolous, a buffoon, a clown, a kook, but also a demagogue, ultra-nationalist, jingoist, fascist, and a comparative Hitler or Mussolini. His style of action and many of his statements tend to support some, if not all, of these charges. He has been described as arrogant, provocative, unpredictable, and emotional, but also sharp-witted, resourceful, hard-working, and an excellent orator. His statements are often contradictory in substance and alternatively aggressive and conciliatory, and it is difficult to say with certainty what he really believes and supports. He clearly desires power and wants to be president of Russia. He seems to believe that to achieve power he needs publicity and that to get publicity he must make statements and act in ways that grab the attention of the media and the public, even if some or many regard what he says and does as outrageous.

Zhirinovskiy was born and raised as a Russian in Kazakhstan. This may have influenced his interest in areas south of Russia and his later promotion of Russian

nationalism. He appears to have had an unhappy childhood, and accounts of childhood and adolescent incidents suggest feelings of discrimination and an early history of others perceiving him as a trouble-maker.

He attended Moscow State University, where he studied foreign languages and later law, and worked in a number of government or quasi-government organizations. He became visibly active in politics only in 1990 when he emerged as leader of the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party. In 1991, he ran for president of the USSR's Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, coming in third with over 7% of the votes. In 1993, he participated in meetings to help draft the new Russian constitution and campaigned in the parliamentary elections, where he led his party to an unexpected degree of success. In recent months he has gained publicity or notoriety for his trips to Central and Eastern Europe and his activities in the parliament.

It has been alleged that he and his party have ties to or have been supported by the KGB and its successors, Russian defense industrialists, the Russian military, Russian and indigenous businessmen in Western and Eastern Europe, right-wing elements in Europe, Armenian businessmen, and Saddam Hussein. The truth about these allegations would be difficult to establish.

Zhirinovskiy's Policies and Positions

There are many inconsistencies in Zhirinovskiy's stated policies and positions across the board.

Domestic Politics: Zhirinovskiy calls himself a liberal democrat but has authoritarian leanings. While emphasizing the electoral process and willingness to work with those in parliament and the government, he has

indicated that if he becomes president he would establish a dictatorship in Russia at least for a few years or until the internal situation improves in Russia or all the former USSR. While saying he advocates equal treatment for all peoples, he has made anti-minority statements, espouses as a slogan "For Russia, for all Russians," and suggests a Russian cultural and political superiority. He has made anti-Semitic statements, while denying he is anti-Semitic and discounting reports of Jewish affiliations.

Russia and the Near-Abroad: Zhirinovskiy, on the one hand, calls for ending Russian assistance to other former republics of the Soviet Union and says he does not want them as part of Russia at least for the near-term. On the other hand, he envisions over time a Russia that includes all the territory of the former Soviet Union, suggesting that the former republics will seek to subordinate themselves to Russia for economic and security reasons. In this new Russia, there would be no separate republics based on nationality, and Russians would be essentially first among equals, with other nationalities allowed to maintain their cultural but not political identities.

Policy toward Other Nations: Zhirinovskiy says no one needs to fear Russia, but, on one occasion or another, he has threatened to pursue nuclear blackmail against the U.S., U.K., and France, attack Germany, Japan, and Pakistan with nuclear or other forces, and blow nuclear radiation into Lithuania. He advocated replacing the president of Bulgaria with one of his advisors, while denying interfering in Bulgaria's internal affairs.

He opposes receiving foreign aid in Russia, and opposes Russian aid to countries other than Iraq and Serbia. He has written of a renaissance for the Russian military, opposes defense conversion in Russia, and strongly supports sales of Russian arms abroad. He advocates close relations

with Germany and has spoken of an axis involving Germany, Russia, and India. He appears to be a friend and supporter of Saddam Hussein and Iraq. He has written a book entitled *Last Dash to the South*, which critics say propagandizes war against Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan and advocates extending Russian influence militarily southward to the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. An official investigation related to his book and other of his activities has been initiated.

Zhirinovskiy and Increasing Russian Nationalism

Zhirinovskiy appears to have both drawn upon and helped stimulate an increasing Russian nationalistic sentiment. He has appealed to this sentiment in his campaigns and in his post-election statements and activities. In turn, his campaigning and the relative success of his Liberal Democratic Party in the parliamentary elections appear to have helped stimulate other political leaders and the Russian government to pay increased attention to this issue and in some cases adopt positions that are more nationalistic than in recent years.

Implications of Zhirinovskiy's Rise

There are many views about whether Zhirinovskiy's success to date poses a significant danger to democracy in Russia and world peace. Among possible scenarios for the future are that he:

- discredits himself and fades from the scene;
- is prosecuted and imprisoned for warmongering;

- antagonizes people so much that he is physically harmed;

- continues to be a major player in parliament and gains even greater influence and power; and

- eventually becomes president of Russia or heavily influences Russian policy.

Were Zhirinovskiy to become president, we could face a Russian government that was:

- internally anti-reform, even dictatorial, and anti-minority, including anti-Semitic;

- outwardly acquisitive toward other former USSR republics;

- supportive of increased funding and support for the military-industrial complex in Russia;

- anti-Western and anti-U.S.;

- supportive of Iraq, Libya, and other irresponsible states;

- capable of declaring, if not executing, the most irresponsible of threats to world peace.

This could have significant implications for U.S. national security policy, defense budgets and programs, and a broad range of foreign policy issues, including refugee policy.

What Should the West Do?

There are several alternative approaches the West might pursue in dealing with Zhirinovskiy. These include:

- neglect;
- aloofness;
- purposeful ignoring;
- constructive engagement; and
- active criticism and containment.

The author believes that Zhirinovskiy is fundamentally dangerous for democracy in Russia and international peace. While it should not be overdrawn, much about his rise, his ethnic and nationalistic prejudices, and his grand design for military conquest to help save and revive the fatherland conjure up the image of a Russian Hitler. Western and other states should share a strategic interest in diminishing the chances that Zhirinovskiy could rise to a leadership position in Russia. While reasonable people can debate the best tactical approach to take toward this strategic interest, the author believes Western and other countries should pursue, and encourage Russians to pursue, an approach of "active criticism and containment" of Zhirinovskiy.

1. Who is Vladimir Zhirinovskiy?

Zhirinovskiy—The Man

The Formative Years and Beyond. According to recent profiles, including one published in the Russian newspaper *Rossiyskiye Vesti* (Russian News),¹ Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy was born on April 25, 1946, in Alma-Ata (now Almaty), the capital of Kazakhstan. His father, described in this profile as an office worker but said by Zhirinovskiy to be a lawyer or legal adviser, died within a year in an accident.

In his formative years in Kazakhstan, Zhirinovskiy attended a Russian school and appears to have felt that there was discrimination against Russians. The authors of the *Rossiyskiye Vesti* profile suggest he has a complex about the "nationalities question," rooted in his early childhood; they quote him as saying that Kazakh students received marks twice as high as Russian students for giving the same answers to questions.

Zhirinovskiy, who displayed a special aptitude for foreign languages, reportedly went on to Moscow State University, where he graduated from the Institute of Oriental Languages or the Institute of Asian and African Studies and later the Law Faculty (evening studies

2 ZHIRINOVSKIY: RUSSIAN ULTRA-NATIONALIST

department).² He is said to speak four foreign languages—Turkish, English, German, and French.³

As a university student in his fifth year, Zhirinovskiy says he worked as an interpreter for eight months and apparently had other work experience for a few months, gaining experience on a radio and television committee and elsewhere. Then he "went to Turkey as an interpreter, with a Russian engineer's delegation."⁴ After graduation he served in the Soviet Army in the Transcaucasus Military District.⁵ He has said that he was a soldier in Tbilisi for two years, serving in the staff headquarters where he "pushed papers," and that he was never rebuked nor did he abuse anyone or participate in anything.⁶ He then returned to Moscow and worked at the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, later at the higher school of the trade union movement, where he was associated with work for foreign students, at the Foreign Law Collegium, and at the "Mir" Publishing House, where he was a legal consultant.⁷

Zhirinovskiy is now reported to be married, with a grown son, living in a cooperative apartment in Moscow.⁸

The Recent Political Awakening. Again according to the *Rossiyskiye Vesti* profile, beginning with perestroika in the latter half of the 1980's, Zhirinovskiy developed sympathies for Mikhail Gorbachev and, later, Boris Yeltsin, and then became dissatisfied with the reformers' activities. This profile suggests that Zhirinovskiy's desire for active political work and power dates to 1990. Another account indicates he belonged to other political groups as early as 1987.⁹ He organized or helped organize the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and became its chairman. Accounts differ as to whether the founding date was March 1990 or March 1991; according to one report, an early Liberal Democratic Party was founded in March

1990 with Zhirinovskiy as chairman, but he was expelled and in February 1991 launched his own Liberal Democratic Party which in April 1991 was officially registered as the first party since 1917 to which the Communists granted official status.¹⁰ The profile suggests that "In view of V.V. Zhirinovskiy's lack of any previous political experience, it appears highly dubious that the idea of forming this party arose spontaneously."¹¹ (See the below section entitled "Alleged Affiliations with the KGB" for allegations and denials of involvement of the Communist Party and KGB in the establishment of the party.)

In 1991, Zhirinovskiy's party nominated him as a candidate for president of the USSR's Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). To be officially registered, he had the choice of collecting 100,000 signatures or at least 213 votes of deputies of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. He chose the latter and, reportedly to everyone's surprise, received 477 votes, more than 50% of those present. He was said to have impressed the deputies with "the absolutely fascinating unconventionality of his expressions and opinions and his 'almost magical effect,' a 'fusion' of shocking peremptoriness, extreme radicalism, and unabashed self-publicity." In the actual election won by Yeltsin, Zhirinovskiy won 6.2 million votes, about 7% of the total, placing third behind former Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov. He announced that he would immediately start his next election campaign and began addressing various groups.¹²

Zhirinovskiy in 1993 and 1994

In June 1993, Zhirinovskiy participated in the Constitutional Conference, helping to draft Russia's new constitution. According to some observers, he demonstrated "a

4 ZHIRINOVSKIY: RUSSIAN ULTRA-NATIONALIST

constructive and sensible approach that came as a surprise to many other participants in this work."¹³ In the fall, he led his party in its campaign for the December parliamentary elections, where he and his party surprised many with their relative success.

Toward the end of the election campaign, some reformers apparently saw Zhirinovskiy as a threat and began criticizing him. Yeltsin avoided—and has continued to avoid—criticizing Zhirinovskiy personally. State-run television on 11 December ran a documentary critical of Zhirinovskiy in an apparent attempt to discredit him.¹⁴

In the 12 December parliamentary election, Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party won 22.8% of the nation-wide party-list vote for 225 of 450 seats in the lower-house State Duma—more than any other party, with the pro-reform Russia's Choice coalition coming in second with 15.4%. After counting in victors in the other half of the Duma seats chosen by individual district, Zhirinovskiy's party came in second for total representatives in the Duma with about 14% of the seats, following Russia's Choice which gained about 17%.¹⁵ Zhirinovskiy himself won an election contest for one of the district seats in the Moscow area.

After the 12 December parliamentary elections, Zhirinovskiy actively sought or welcomed selection to various positions in the government or State Duma. He suggested publicly that he would be open to Yeltsin naming him prime minister or simply a minister.¹⁶ He was one of ten delegates nominated to be chairman of the State Duma, but he withdrew his candidacy, referring to his unwillingness to "act in the role of an overseer."¹⁷ Zhirinovskiy sought the chairmanship of the State Duma's foreign affairs commission but was blocked from this position by parliamentary leaders; and, in an apparent

compromise, his party was given the chairmanship of a newly-created "geopolitical" committee, the mandate of which is unclear.¹⁸

Earlier in the fall of 1993, Zhirinovskiy had published, in 75,000 copies, a book entitled *Posledniy Brosok na Yug*, translated variously as *Last Dash to the South*, *Last Push South*, *Last Thrust Southwards*, and *Last Assault on the South*. In his book, Zhirinovskiy provides a strange mix of chronicles of his deprived and unhappy childhood, stories of unhappy relationships or non-relationships with women, and political strategies for acquiring power and launching an assault by the Russian military south of Russia. (Invited on one occasion to comment on a remark attributed to *Izvestiya* that it is easier for Zhirinovskiy to seduce a nation than a woman, Zhirinovskiy replied: "I never had the problem of being obliged to seduce a woman. As far as the nation is concerned—I am working on it."¹⁹

Critics have charged that this book "propagandizes the unleashing of aggressive war against Russia's neighbors Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan" and have asked that a criminal case be opened against Zhirinovskiy.²⁰ On 26 January 1994, it was announced that the Russian procurator general's office had instituted criminal proceedings against Zhirinovskiy under the Russian criminal code's article 71 on war propaganda. In a press conference that day, Zhirinovskiy began defending himself by claiming that this "dash" to the south would be accomplished by Russian troops without firing a single shot.²¹ A prosecutor has stated that in bringing the lawsuit against Zhirinovskiy his office has focused not only on the book but also on a court ruling in December, an article in the *Kuranty* newspaper, and an incident at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on 12-13 December. The prosecutor indicated that the issue was

a complex one with a large number of circumstances and that he did not know how long it would take to complete the investigation, which is reportedly a step that would precede filing of any charges.²²

Zhirinovskiy's Trips to Central and Eastern Europe

Zhirinovskiy travelled to Central or Eastern Europe several times in late 1993 and early 1994. He travelled in October to Germany, in December to Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria, in January and February to countries in the former Yugoslavia and Hungary, and in March to Poland. He also tried to revisit Slovenia in March but was turned back at the airport.

He travelled to Germany in October 1993, meeting with right-wing extremist Gerhard Frey and his German People's Union.

With much publicity, he also travelled to Central and Eastern Europe in late December after the Russian election. For this trip, he said, "The basic goal of my visit to several European countries is to renew my business contacts and present our party's positions."²³ On the December trip, he travelled to Munich, where he met again with Gerhard Frey.²⁴ He has said that "Dr. Frey is my friend and the DVU (German Peoples Union) is our partner."²⁵ Accompanied by Frey, he then travelled to Austria where he was hosted by a timber merchant, Edwin Neuwirth.²⁶ Neuwirth has been described as an ethnic German from Transylvania, who volunteered for the Waffen—SS when he was sixteen.²⁷ Zhirinovskiy indicated he had come to Austria to meet with numerous Russian industrialists throughout Europe to examine economic problems.²⁸ Representatives of Eastern trading companies

with seats in Vienna were reported to have attended a meeting with Zhirinovskiy.²⁹ Neuwirth boasted that "We received businessmen from Austria, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia here."³⁰ Zhirinovskiy was also said to have gone to a hospital in Graz, Austria, for unspecified treatment.³¹

Zhirinovskiy next travelled to Bulgaria, where he publicly suggested that Turkey was preparing to conquer both the Balkans and the Caucasus, Romania was an artificial state inhabited by Italian Gypsies, and President Zhelev should step down and be replaced by Svetoslav Stoilov, a Bulgarian living in Austria who has been described as Zhirinovskiy's personal economic advisor.³² The Russian Embassy in Sofia issued a statement distancing itself from Zhirinovskiy, saying that his remarks "have nothing to do with Russia's policy based on noninterference"³³ The Russian ambassador also offered apologies.³⁴ Zhirinovskiy charged that the press had distorted his statements, denied having spoken against the Bulgarian president, and declared his respect for Bulgaria and its people.³⁵ Bulgarian authorities, nevertheless, order Zhirinovskiy to leave Bulgaria within 24 hours on grounds that he had insulted Bulgaria, meddled in its internal affairs, and jeopardized its relations with neighboring states.³⁶

Stoilov, when asked in an interview if he intended to become president of Bulgaria, responded, "Me, Bulgarian president?! This would be an insult for me. I shall become president of the Balkans (or Balkan peninsula). This will be followed by a great upheaval in Bulgaria. We shall throw all the parties that exist in the country today into the Black Sea. The plan is ready" When asked if this would likely provoke a military conflict in the Balkans, Stoilov responded: "We are so strong that no one would dare to do anything. In saying "we," I mean our

party—Mr. Zhirinovskiy's party."³⁷ Stoilov also was reported to have said that in four or five months Zhirinovskiy "will have ousted Yeltsin and will be president. And I will advocate an independent state for all Macedonians from Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. A roundtable should decide as soon as possible on the return to Germany of the territories occupied by Poland. . . . South Tirol must be returned to Austria as soon as possible."³⁸

According to German government sources, Zhirinovskiy then sought a visa to travel at the invitation of a private company to Berlin where he wanted to hold a news conference and participate in a conference on Europe.³⁹ The German Foreign Minister, however, denied him a visa.⁴⁰

When a German Embassy official at the Sofia airport on 30 December told him of the visa denial, Zhirinovskiy reportedly threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Germany and furiously pointed out that there were still Russian troops stationed on German territory, saying these troops would not be withdrawn and, if he came to power, 300,000 Russian troops would be stationed in Germany. He also said Germany would have to pay compensation for World War II damages. He threatened that the German Embassy official could be sure to be "liquidated" soon and that he, Zhirinovskiy, had such good contacts with Russian intelligence that he could make the official simply "disappear."⁴¹

Zhirinovskiy was reported by one Western source (the author could not find other sources to confirm this) to have travelled apparently in late 1993 or January 1994 to the Crimea to lend support to the Russian nationalist politician Yuri Meshkov, who won the 30 January runoff election for the presidency of Crimea. After the election, Meshkov declared that the outcome of the election was a

"vote to restore broken links to Russia . . . and conclude a military-political alliance with Russia."⁴²

In late January and early February 1994, Zhirinovskiy made a trip to countries in the former Yugoslavia, where he and his party again gained publicity. Travelling to Slovenia, Zhirinovskiy and his entourage acted in such a way that Slovenia's Foreign Ministry asked that he leave the country as quickly as possible, saying that he had "offended public order" and "caused consternation among part of the Slovenian public."⁴³ He was reported to have stated at a press conference that Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs should reunite in a single state.⁴⁴ Other reports indicated that his bodyguards or supporters had grossly violated public order in the resort town of Bled.⁴⁵

Leaving Slovenia enroute to Belgrade, Zhirinovskiy stopped in Budapest where he reportedly told the Hungarians that they had no prospects, that no one wanted the buses they make or their apples, and that the solution to their economic situation was to create a zone of East European cooperation using ideas from the former CEMA and Warsaw Pact organizations.⁴⁶ Another report indicated Zhirinovskiy bullied and threatened Hungarian airline personnel at the Budapest airport as he arrived late for a plane about to depart.⁴⁷ The Hungarian Foreign Ministry sent the Russian Embassy in Budapest a memorandum stating that Zhirinovskiy's insulting remarks about Hungary and the airport staff were unacceptable behavior.⁴⁸

In Serbia, a meeting was planned with the minister of minorities and human rights but was not held, apparently as the government did not want to elevate the status of the trip. Zhirinovskiy then went to Bosnia for a visit organized by a Vienna-based businessman, Petar Ivanovic, a native of Montenegro. He met with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and an individual who had been instrumental in

forcing Muslims from their homes. When he was introduced to a Russian fighter who had joined Serb paramilitary forces, Zhirinovskiy was said to have commented: "The Russians have already arrived. They are coming on their own, it is a sign of Russia's goodwill."⁴⁹

Addressing a crowd in Bosnia, Zhirinovskiy praised the Serbs for waging war to "save Orthodoxy" and promised: "Don't worry, brothers. We will protect you . . . If a single bomb falls on Serbia, we will consider that an attack on Russia." He also said that: "Once we punished France; 50 years ago we did the same to Germany. Now the same treatment awaits anyone who mistreats the Serbs."⁵⁰ Another report indicated he stated that: "I want to warn the Western countries' governments that to bomb any cities in Bosnia will be to declare war on Russia. . . . Let them not forget that there are still Russian forces in Europe and they could remain there for a long time."⁵¹ In a news conference in Belgrade, he reportedly told a news conference that if NATO attacked Serbs, a group of Russian officers in Europe would use a secret weapon against Western forces. He also said he opposed creation of small states and called for there to be two or three Orthodox states in the Balkans, which he called "the land of Orthodoxy, where Serbian and Russian will be spoken," and suggested formation of an "Eastern European Community from Knin to Crimea."⁵²

There were reports that after visiting the former Yugoslavia Zhirinovskiy planned to continue on to Poland, where he had been invited by Janusz Bryczkowski, a Polish industrialist who heads the National Self-Defense front, a small extremist party. There are no indications that the visit actually took place as planned at that time. Zhirinovskiy eventually visited Poland in mid-March.⁵³

According to *Izvestiya*, before the trip to the former Yugoslavia, Zhirinovskiy on 21 January reportedly threatened Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev with dismissal unless he changed his policy on the Balkans within a week and put himself unconditionally on the Serb's side. Kozyrev rejected this ultimatum, indicating he did not intend to take a pro-Serb stance. Kozyrev stated that: "Certain political forces are trying to drag Russia into a global catastrophe, and use this to their own advantage, to seize power. . . . If Zhirinovskiy or anyone else demands my resignation, I will perceive this as the best admission that my policy is correct." This same *Izvestiya* article suggested that Zhirinovskiy after his trip to the former Yugoslavia might demand a no confidence vote on Kozyrev in the State Duma where there is said to be an influential "anti-Kozyrev lobby."⁵⁴

After the trip, on 5 February Zhirinovskiy addressed a meeting of about 1,000 people in Moscow in support of Serbia.⁵⁵ In his remarks, he reportedly accused the Russian government of conniving on policy toward Serbia with the West. He said that in Serbia the West was "testing mechanisms for destroying Russia" and that already in progress in Yugoslavia is "the third world war waged against the Slavs and the Orthodox Church by the USA, West Germany and the Vatican." He went on to accuse the West of wanting to surround Russia with "a green Muslim corridor" employing a program to destroy Serbs and populate their lands with Muslims, and apparently employing this policy "from Moscow to Vologda and Arkhangelsk." He condemned the Russian government for keeping in office Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Deputy Prime Minister Chubays, and Economics Minister Shokhin and declared that they had "betrayed not only the Russian people, but also all the Slavs."

On 9 February, he addressed the Russian State Duma on the Bosnian issue. He declared that bombing of Serbian positions in Bosnia would be "the beginning of World War III," said the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina are "a single Orthodox people, some of whom at some time were forcibly converted into Islam and Catholicism," called for withdrawal of all foreign forces, and proposed that the Duma adopt a position that "the countries whose pilots will dare to bomb Serbian positions will be completely eliminated." When there were numerous calls to turn off his microphone, Zhirinovskiy promised his critics "a trip to the north in the very near future."⁵⁶

In mid-February, the Spanish Government was reported to have refused to give Zhirinovskiy an entry visit to participate in a television show in Spain.⁵⁷

Support and Funding for Zhirinovskiy and the Liberal Democratic Party

There have been reports that Zhirinovskiy and his party have received support and funding from a variety of sources—including citizens in Russia; the Russian military-industrial complex; Russian security, intelligence, and information services; Russian and other business firms in Western Europe; ultra-rightists in Germany and elsewhere in Europe; Armenian businessmen in Armenia and Russia; and Saddam Hussein. The authors of the *Rossiyskiye Vesti* profile suggest that Zhirinovskiy's social base includes "the military-industrial complex, the Army, the impoverished section of the former Soviet middle class, pensioners, a section of the working class, Russians in the nearby foreign countries, young people." The authors indicated they have been unable to ascertain the sources of finance for Zhirinovskiy's lengthy campaign.⁵⁸

Zhirinovskiy has claimed that ordinary citizens in Russia have funded his efforts and no funding has come from other sources. He has mentioned that six million people voted for him in the 1991 election and implied that many of them have mailed money to him, suggesting what may be a hypothetical figure of 6 billion rubles or \$3.5 million; but he has also indicated that there are main sponsors, saying, ". . . I will not disclose the name of the main sponsors: Secrecy is the essence of business."⁵⁹ He has said that the December election campaign was conducted at the expense of "money orders from Russian citizens" and that "Not a single mafia grouping, economic structure, bank, or political organization gave us a kopeck." He did not deny, however, receiving money for interviews by foreign journalists, saying, "There is a long line and those who want to jump it have to pay."⁶⁰ He also said that "ordinary people" paid nearly a billion rubles to his party's election fund and the party will easily pay its 200 million ruble debt to television companies.⁶¹

Zhirinovskiy's party and the other 12 parties or blocs qualifying for the 12 December parliamentary election were each given 100 million rubles to conduct the campaign, according to a staffer of the Central Electoral Commission's press service.⁶²

The Liberal Democratic Party's Deputy Chairman, Aleksandr Vengerovskiy, when asked about supporters, replied: "Industrialists who do not yet want to name themselves. In addition to having a state job, I also have some restaurants in Moscow. Rather than buying Mercedes cars, I finance party issues from the profits."⁶³

Andrey Zavidiya, who was Zhirinovskiy's running mate in the 1991 presidential election and is chairman of the Galant (other reports say "Galand") Company (which a co-panelist on a TV show said has 1,500 enterprises),

claims to have been an early supporter of the Liberal Democratic Party and the "main organizer" of the party's parliamentary election victories. Zavidiya said he first met Zhirinovskiy in 1990 at a Kremlin ceremony, they later began cooperating, and Zhirinovskiy asked how publication of the party program might get funded. Zavidiya said he or his firm paid 26,000 rubles to have the program printed in 1991 and paid another 10,000 rubles for Zhirinovskiy posters. Zavidiya reportedly went on to say, this time apparently speaking of the December 1993 parliamentary election, that the Galant company had set up 3,500 organizing committees throughout the country and that they voted for Zavidiya rather than Zhirinovskiy (here there is a garble but it appears to suggest that Zhirinovskiy relegated his place on the nation-wide party list to Zavidiya or someone else, while Zhirinovskiy competed for one of the district seats from the Moscow area). Zavidiya disagreed with a suggestion that the Communist Party or KGB were behind the establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party. He said he did not know of other sources of funding for the party but suggested that Zhirinovskiy would not have approached him for this relatively small funding had there been other sources.⁶⁴

According to another report, Zavidiya provided funds for both the 1991 and 1993 election campaigns of Zhirinovskiy, with Zavidiya allegedly saying that for the 1993 election he provided money "via third, even tenth firms, rather than directly." Zavidiya reportedly has broken with Zhirinovskiy and has said that: "I sealed his victory, then he went on to strike me from the deputy list; that offended me and I parted with him." Saying that "I have cut off his oxygen," Zavidiya reportedly has begun "withdrawing his men from the party" where they represented 60-70 percent of the support, and has ordered

his enterprises to stop paying Zhirinovskiy and demand repayment of debts. Zavidiya says that Zhirinovskiy is "drowning in debt," and Zhirinovskiy is reported to owe one billion rubles for television time. Zavidiya is reported to have said that he himself is a communist and that nearly ten percent of the Liberal Democratic Party members hold communist convictions. He has also reportedly said that the party has no base and that one-half the party's candidate list comprised people associated with Galand enterprises.⁶⁵

Russian and Dutch press reports have indicated that an Amsterdam-based company, Global Money Management (GMM), owned by a 27 year old Muscovite by the name of A.V. Nenachov (the only shareholder in the company that was registered with the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce in January 1993) has at least "paid a considerable part of the campaign costs"; a Russian press story described GMM as "sub-criminal" and said it illegally launders money for Russians in the West. Other reports indicate that GMM contributed between \$50,000 and \$800,000 to Zhirinovskiy's party, and that Netherlands officials and the Russia Central Bank are investigating this.⁶⁶ GMM was said to have bought a place on the electoral list for Aleksey Soejev, described as a 23-year-old adviser to Nenachov.⁶⁷

There are reports of a network of support being established by businesses in Europe. A Viennese newspaper reports that Aleksey Vedenkin, who describes himself as the financial adviser and spokesmen in Europe of the Liberal Democratic Party and who operates from a hotel in Vienna, claims to have succeeded in establishing a network of companies all over Europe and subsidiaries of the Liberal Democratic Party in Austria, Germany, Italy, France, Holland, and Switzerland. Vedenkin claims to have contacts not only with right wingers Frey and Neuwirth in Germany and Austria but also with the former financial

director of the East German Socialist Unity Party, Werner Girke; he says that Girke has visited with Zhirinovskiy but has not moved "any millions around for us." Vedenkin apparently suggested that Zhirinovskiy's true financial backer is a French woman named Miriam Selen, said to be close to Jean Marie LePen and one of the richest women in Europe. The Viennese newspaper reports that neither *Le Figaro* nor *Der Spiegel's* Paris bureau had heard of this woman.⁶⁸

T. Gdlyan, chairman of the Russian People's Party, has been reported to believe that there are Western and Mafia elements behind Zhirinovskiy. Gdlyan also claims to have information that Zhirinovskiy receives financial support from Armenian businessmen in Armenia and Russia.⁶⁹

In a discussion at the Hudson Institute on 14 December 1993, former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin, responding to reports of rumors that Zhirinovskiy had received funds for the election campaign from extreme right circles in Germany and from the Russian armed forces, claimed that several millions of American dollars had come from Saddam Hussein. Kalugin recalled that Zhirinovskiy had supported the Iraqi position during the Gulf War, had visited Saddam, and has vowed to resume arms sales to Iraq and to use Russia's vote in the UN Security Council to lift sanctions on Iraq.⁷⁰

A Russian reporter from *Moscow Evening*, who claims to have infiltrated the Liberal Democratic Party in the final stages of the campaign for the December parliamentary elections, alleges that the party leader of the district of southern Moscow told him that he had travelled to Iraq on behalf of the party in mid-1993, met with people from the surroundings of Saddam Hussein, and was promised financial support. This party leader also allegedly

said that Zhirinovskiy receives money from directors of the weapons industry.⁷¹

Alleged Affiliations with the KGB

Some have alleged that Zhirinovskiy has been affiliated with the former KGB (the Committee of State Security of the former Soviet Union) and that he and his Liberal Democratic Party have received funding and other support from the KGB and its successors.

The truth about whether Zhirinovskiy has had or continues to have connections to the KGB and its successors is something that would be extremely difficult to establish.

The KGB is reported to have issued a special statement on 28 August 1991 refuting the claim that Zhirinovskiy was a KGB agent.⁷²

Zhirinovskiy has denied being affiliated with or funded by the KGB and its successors. In response to a question about him being a former KGB agent and reports that the KGB helped establish his party, Zhirinovskiy has stated: "Never. All that is propaganda. Just like they say that I am a Zionist, anti-Jewish, a member of the radical right or left, or Jewish. Nothing of the sort. I am Russian, Russian, Russian."⁷³ In response to questions about KGB funding, he has said: "With regard to KGB-like bodies, no one is helping me. I would be pleased if I was given money."⁷⁴ Asked about KGB support, he has said: "If the State Security Committee had helped me, I would not be sitting here now but in the Kremlin. This was their downfall precisely—they did not admit people like myself while they themselves withered away, went into decay, and the country and the economy collapsed together with them."⁷⁵ He has been shown on Russian television walking

along the Arbat (a street in Moscow with vendors) and criticizing the sale of KGB iconography, saying the KGB is the only organ capable of saving the country.⁷⁶

Former KGB General Kalugin has indicated that, while he has no proof, he believes Zhirinovskiy was recruited by the KGB while overseas, saying: "All I can do is judge by what my former colleagues have said. As far as I know from them, Zhirinovskiy was recruited by the military counterintelligence bodies of the KGB when young, when he was a translator in a Middle East country. There is nothing special about that."⁷⁷ It has been reported that Zhirinovskiy had ties to the KGB dating to his student days at Moscow State University and that, according to Oleg Gordievsky, said to be a former Soviet intelligence officer who was a double agent for the British, Zhirinovskiy was recruited by the KGB as an informer when he was in Turkey in 1969.⁷⁸

St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak has alleged that Zhirinovskiy was a captain in the KGB active reserve and that the Liberal Democratic Party was created by the former KGB on orders of Mikhail Gorbachev and the Politburo of the old Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Sobchak claims that, after the abolition of Article 6 of the USSR constitution stipulating a monopoly of power for the Communist Party (this occurred in February 1990), Gorbachev told the Politburo that a multiparty system was in the offing and that the Politburo should set up the first alternative party, one that would be malleable. He further claims that the selection of a prospective party leader was left to the KGB, that it chose Zhirinovskiy, that the name Liberal Democratic was invented there and then, and that the party was officially registered two weeks later—the first party to be officially registered in the USSR.⁷⁹

The Washington Post, in reporting the claims by Sobchak, noted that, while Sobchak was well-connected, he had not been a member of the Politburo and offered no documents or evidence, although Sobchak said he would provide evidence in a coming book. The newspaper reported that Gorbachev had said that Sobchak's claims were untrue—"pure falsification"—and suggested that "democrats" like Sobchak were seeking scapegoats now that their policies had paved the way for Zhirinovskiy's success. It also reported that in a telephone interview, Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of the KGB in 1990, denied any role in creating the Liberal Democratic Party.⁸⁰

A Vienna newspaper, reporting on Zhirinovskiy's trip in late December to Austria where he allegedly met with businessmen from various countries, claimed that "Zhirinovskiy, who made a career in the environs of the KGB, is in effect considered the 'manager' of the new cover companies of the KGB empire. The giant military-industrial complex of the former Soviet Union uses them for its activities. . . ."⁸¹

Former KGB General's Views on Zhirinovskiy

In the December 1993 discussions at the Hudson Institute,⁸² former KGB General Kalugin expressed the view that Zhirinovskiy considers the parliamentary election and the new State Duma as just steps toward assumption of the presidency—to be followed by his seizure of dictatorial powers. Kalugin opined that Zhirinovskiy has been seriously underestimated and that he is extremely intelligent, well-informed, and well-connected. Kalugin said that in private Zhirinovskiy is hardly the clown or psychopath that he appears to be in public, bearing in this regard a disturbing similarity to Mussolini and Hitler.

Zhirinovskiy, according to Kalugin, has a far better understanding of the Russian mentality than any other politician in Moscow, knowing the Russian sense of humiliation, fear, rage, and disgust. Zhirinovskiy blames the reformers and their "crazy professors" for the economic misery in Russia. Kalugin forecast that Zhirinovskiy would not concentrate his attack on Yeltsin, at least not at first, aiming instead at the democratic reformers. He also forecast that Zhirinovskiy would do all he could to divide the reformers and Yeltsin, first destroying the reformers and finally Yeltsin.

According to Kalugin, Zhirinovskiy has very close ties to the Russian Federation's Foreign Intelligence Service and Ministry of Security. Kalugin estimates that 85-90% of the members of both services voted for Zhirinovskiy. He claims that the Security Ministry has supplied Zhirinovskiy with the results of their polls for years and that it was on the basis of this information that Zhirinovskiy fashioned his electoral campaign.

Kalugin also claimed that Zhirinovskiy's closest foreign and national security adviser is an emigre writer named Eduard Limonov (phonetic), who made considerable money in Western Europe and the U.S. in the 1980s as a businessman—a writer of soft-pornography. Kalugin said Limonov does not believe the nonsense that Zhirinovskiy spouts but knows that these fables and myths appeal to the average Russian. He further said that Zhirinovskiy and Limonov are fascists—real fascists—and believe that such an ideology is perfect for Russia in its present state.

Zhirinovskiy and the Military

Zhirinovskiy appears to have considerable sympathy or support within the Russian military—perhaps winning for

his party as much as one-third or more of the military vote in the December parliamentary elections.

The sympathy and support appear mutual. Zhirinovskiy's statements—especially his book—advocate a renaissance for the military, which has come upon hard times, and he strongly supports the military-industrial complex in advocating an end to defense conversion and promotion of arms sales abroad. He appears interested in weaponry and has spoken of an alleged new, secret Russian weapon which he called the "Elipton" and which he has compared to neutron and sonic weapons.⁸³

There are contradictory reports about the results of military voting in the 12 December parliamentary elections. Early press reports indicated that 72% of the Strategic Rocket Forces and 46% of the military in the Moscow military district voted for Zhirinovskiy's party. Defense Minister Grachev, however, on 29 December disclaimed these types of reports, saying that the Central Electoral Commission had not released any figures on military voting and that most military personnel voted together with civilians.⁸⁴

On the other hand, President Yeltsin, responding at a 22 December press conference to a questioner who suggested that most of the Army had voted for Zhirinovskiy's party and who asked what measures Yeltsin would take, said: "Well, it was not most of the Army that voted for the Liberal Democratic Party, but a third. Nonetheless, it is a lot and it worries us. Relevant measures are already being taken now." (The measures were not further specified).⁸⁵

A Russian press report in late January is consistent with the Yeltsin statement in saying: ". . . On average, in closed precincts in Defense Ministry subdivisions the LDPR got 34 percent of the votes, the Communists 9 percent, and

'Russia's Choice' 11 percent respectively. It is characteristic that the opposition got the largest number of votes among servicemen serving in 'hot spots' (the Dniester region, Tajikistan). The LDPR got the smallest number of votes (19 percent) among Black Sea Fleet personnel, and the largest number (49 percent) among personnel of the Northwest Group of Forces. At the same time the LDPR garnered 31 percent of the votes among Military Space Forces personnel and 32 percent among servicemen in Strategic Missile Forces units."⁸⁶

The Deputy Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, Aleksandr Vengerovskiy, when asked in an interview if party membership included army officers and policemen, responded: "Yes, a quarter of the membership. There are large-scale dismissals from the army. It is mainly the dismissed officers who come to us, because this is where they find the suitable political orientation. According to the current Russian law, they cannot form a separate party."⁸⁷

Vengerovskiy immediately after the election indicated that the LDPR shadow cabinet would "focus on beefing up the armed forces more than the present government." The LDPR candidate for the security ministry, a former KBG officer, advocated recalling "former KGB officers who left the agency for political reasons" with an aim of putting an end to the country's rising crime."⁸⁸

Guards, Paramilitary, and Youth Organizations in the LDPR

There have been several reports of guards or paramilitary personnel, often in one type of uniform or another, deployed at the LDPR headquarters, and there have been references to activities of LDPR youth groups.

According to former KGB general Kalugin, Zhirinovskiy has not only a bodyguard but also a kind of party militia whose members wear ordinary Russian military uniforms; some may be soldiers or security police on leave or detached service. Kalugin has suggested that they seem to be preparing to act like Blackshirts or Storm Troopers.⁸⁹

LDPR Deputy Chairman Vengerovskiy, answering a question about the party's youth organization, has stated: "We indeed have a youth organization. We do use means like combat sports to attract young people. When our organization was founded, the young people did ask to wear blue uniforms like in the air force, but they have not been wearing these for five months now."⁹⁰

Zhirinovskiy has been shown on Russian television explaining the military-style uniforms of his followers by saying that they prefer this.⁹¹

Vengerovskiy has spoken of teaching people the fighting spirit he learned in the army, saying: "People are itching to take up arms. We want to teach them the fighting spirit that I, for example, was given in the army: This is where we learned what the real tasks of a man are."⁹²

According to an article about a reporter from the newspaper *Moscow Evening* who is said to have infiltrated Zhirinovskiy's party in the final phase of the December election campaign, there allegedly exist within the party secret combat groups—so-called boyeviki—who have access to weapons. They are part of a secret structure, work within the police and the army, and would be ready to use the weapons for the goals of the party.⁹³

Views on and Ties with Iraq

Zhirinovskiy reportedly has close ties to Iraq. According to one analysis, pictures of Saddam Hussein are displayed in the offices of Zhirinovskiy's party, members of Saddam's Ba'ath Party have participated in Zhirinovskiy's party's congresses; and Zhirinovskiy has likely been on Saddam's payroll.⁹⁴ This same analysis reports that Zhirinovskiy has demanded that Russia violate UN sanctions against Iraq, claiming that Saddam had promised him that in exchange Iraq would immediately pay \$10 billion of its outstanding debt to Russia. This analysis quoted Zhirinovskiy as calling Iraq "our most reliable allied country" and suggests that Zhirinovskiy wants to re-establish Russia's leadership of a radical, secular anti-Western bloc in the Arab world, with Iraq as the centerpiece and Libya, Syria, and rejectionist Palestinian groups as likely participants.⁹⁵

Zhirinovskiy at a 14 December 1993 news conference dismissed allegations that Saddam had made funds available to him and said the LDPR: ". . . never sent volunteers to Iraq. What we had was an exchange of youth tourist groups." Zhirinovskiy also claimed that: "We have no contacts with the Iraqi embassy or state."⁹⁶ But, according to an Iraqi radio report, Zhirinovskiy met on 21 December with the Iraqi ambassador to Russia and asked the ambassador to convey his wishes to Saddam Hussein for good health and success in achieving all goals for which the Iraqi people are struggling. Zhirinovskiy reportedly told the Iraqi radio correspondent that his party supports Arab causes which Iraq is upholding and that one of his party's priorities is to enhance Russian relations with Iraq and contribute to lifting the embargo on Iraq.⁹⁷

Jewish Issues

In light of statements by Zhirinovskiy that have been characterized as anti-Semitic or anti-Israel, there have been considerable interest in and speculation about reports alleging that Zhirinovskiy's father was Jewish, that Zhirinovskiy was affiliated with a Jewish cultural organization, and that he had been issued an entry permit by Israel. There has also been interest in what his positions are on Jewish-related questions.

A Moscow television feature broadcast before the December 1993 election showed a youth representative of Zhirinovskiy's party talking about the strong Jewish influence in the U.S. and in Russia and why it must be combatted. It then showed footage of Zhirinovskiy telling a rally that Jews are to blame for both World Wars but have so far failed in their original intentions of world domination.⁹⁸

Zhirinovskiy was reported to have said at a news conference on 14 December that "From time to time, Russia is overwhelmed with anti-Semitism. This phenomenon is provoked only by Jews themselves."⁹⁹ He has also made statements with racist overtones, such as "Our electors always tell us that many television announcers are not Russian and that they would like to see good Russian faces on the screen speaking to them in good Russian."¹⁰⁰ One report quoted him as referring to the "Jewish infection on TV."¹⁰¹

A remark by Zhirinovskiy that his mother was Russian and his father was a lawyer has led some to raise questions about the nationality or ethnic background of his father. The preface to an interview with Zhirinovskiy published by a Hungarian newspaper said Zhirinovskiy was born to a Jewish lawyer's family.¹⁰² Asked during an

interview if his father was a Jew, Zhirinovskiy responded that this was propaganda and that allegations that his father was Jewish, that he is an anti-Semite, a Zionist, an extremist, a fascist, a communist, and that Saddam Hussein had given him money are outright lies.¹⁰³ He has said that "Both my mother and father are Russian, and father's kin were all lawyers."¹⁰⁴ Zhirinovskiy told one journalist that his father was a Russian whose second language was Polish because he was born in Poland, then incorporated into the Russian empire.¹⁰⁵

A reporter for the U.S. media reportedly has found documents in the archives in Almaty, Kazakhstan, where Zhirinovskiy was born in 1946, that list Zhirinovskiy's surname on his birth registration as "Eidelshtein" and other documents that show that Zhirinovskiy applied for and received permission to change his name from "Eidelshtein" to "Zhirinovskiy" in June 1964. Documents reportedly show that Zhirinovskiy's mother was married to Andrei V. Zhirinovskiy who died in August 1944, 18 months before Vladimir Zhirinovskiy was born, and that five months before Vladimir was born she married Volf Isakovich Eidelshtein, who was officially listed as Jewish. She took the name "Eidelshtein." Zhirinovskiy's birth certificate identifies his father only as "Volf," and a note on the back says "no documents for father." The registration shows in handwriting the baby's last name as "Eidelshtein." This was crossed out and "Zhirinovskiy" was handwritten in with a note indicating the change was made in 1964. Officials at the archives have said the records are authentic, but a spokesman for the Liberal Democratic Party said they are "forged" and that since Zhirinovskiy's birth ". . . his only last name has been Zhirinovskiy."¹⁰⁶

When one correspondent indicated that the Israeli government had said that they had given Zhirinovskiy an

immigrant entry permit, Zhirinovskiy responded: "It is a complete lie . . . show me the supposed relative of mine! If I had a relative there, I would be pleased. But I have no relative there. . . . I am Russian—I myself, my mother, my father, and the whole family. Half of them have already died."¹⁰⁷

When the same correspondent raised reports of his participating in the establishment of the Shalom association in Moscow, reportedly a Jewish cultural organization, Zhirinovskiy responded: "That is also a lie. The establishment of nationality associations was begun in Moscow five years ago by Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, and so forth . . . Almost 1 million people of foreign descent live in Moscow. Among them, the Jews also decided to set up a cultural association called Shalom. I then visited these associations one after the other; I was invited and visited them. I am a legal expert, and that was the time that the association's statutes were adopted. I made some comments that they liked."¹⁰⁸

It has been reported in *Parade Magazine* that: "In the 1980s, according to CIA sources, Zhirinovskiy was a member of a group called Shalom. Although outwardly pro-Jewish, Shalom was set up by the Anti-Zionist League—a KGB front designed to create divisions among Soviet Jews."¹⁰⁹

When asked during an interview if there were Jews in the Liberal Democratic Party, Zhirinovskiy was reported to have appeared incredulous, repeated the question, and after regaining his composure replied: "There may be one, two, or three of them. I do not know their exact number, because when people join our party we do not ask them to disclose their nationality."¹¹⁰

Asked in the same interview for his views on Israel, Zhirinovskiy is reported to have said that the state of Israel

must exist and that Russia and the U.S. should work together to finalize Israel's borders so that war and extremism would be over. Asked about emigration, he said Russian Jews should be allowed to go to Israel but if they want to stay they are most welcome.¹¹¹

One Russian Media Assessment of Zhirinovskiy

The authors of the profile of Zhirinovskiy published in *Rossiyskiye Vesti* attempted to assess Zhirinovskiy's characteristics and motivations.¹¹² Below are extracts:

"He is not acquainted with the burden of power and responsibility, his actual administrative potential is not known, so the motive behind his desire for power may be assumed to be the desire for self-fulfillment, which, combined with a marked inclination to express opinions in a peremptory manner, could, if that desire was fulfilled, create a situation of dangerous unpredictability in his decisions of authority."

"He is inclined toward a certain arrogance, unconventional behavior, and political risk-taking. . . ."

"He is a master of the art of persuasion and polemics. . . ."

"By political conviction he is a 'liberal democrat' and an advocate of authoritarianism ('tough' power), including in foreign policy. . . ."

"In international relations he is inclined toward unpredictable political extremism."

"He has undoubted linguistic ability; he is resourceful, sharp-witted, and extremely emotional; he easily makes contact with any audience; he is an excellent orator and improviser; his public utterances are generally provocative; he tends toward metaphorical thinking and terse, short sentences; he has a unique personal image and

a high capacity mentally to 'infect' his audience; he is extremely self-confident, with a pronounced desire for recognition, insatiable self-esteem, and high opinion of himself; he is uncritical, often to the point of irresponsibility; he virtually always speaks in the first person and never cites other authorities; his preferred conversational style is imperious. He has the capacity to transform himself with artistic virtuosity. His capacity for work is high."

"He has repeatedly demonstrated a unique political intuition and a capacity to make unerring predictions whose sources can only be guessed at." (The authors cite how Zhirinovskiy correctly predicted three weeks in advance that he would come in third in the 1991 RSFSR presidential election, and how two weeks before the 1993 parliamentary elections he said his party would get 24%—they got about 22.8%—of the votes for the 225 seats in the lower-house State Duma chosen by nation-wide total votes for parties.)

"V.V. Zhirinovskiy is undoubtedly a talented and gifted man, but it is absolutely clear to any professional that for all his 'multifunctionality' and huge capacity for work, it would have been beyond his powers single-handedly to tackle simultaneously and with such a high degree of skill the program tasks, analytical and forecasting tasks, and practical tasks."

"V.V. Zhirinovskiy, however attractive this simple view may seem, is certainly not the puppet of the forces behind him, he is an independent and active participant in the process that is being pursued, and is clearly and soberly aware of what is going on. His role in this process is far from unequivocal, and simplistic assessments of that role, including hysterics and the pinning of labels, are not permissible."

The authors of this profile suggest that "the statements of certain politicians regarding his [Zhirinovskiy's] fascism are premature at the moment," but they offer a concept of how populism may slide into extremism and then fascism.

2. WHAT DOES ZHIRINOVSKIY STAND FOR?

What Zhirinovskiy really believes is hard to say. Many of his statements appear designed to grab attention and make the headlines of the media, but also to appeal to sentiments held by at least some Russians. Michael Dobbs, former *Washington Post* Moscow bureau chief, has described an argument that took place around the end of 1992 between Zhirinovskiy and a supporter of Boris Yeltsin. When Zhirinovskiy argued for recreating the Soviet empire plus Alaska and Finland, the Yeltsin supporter protested, "But that's plain demagoguery." Zhirinovskiy is said to have smilingly replied, "Sure. That's what politics is all about—demagoguery."¹

His statements are contradictory, and he sometimes follows an aggressive statement with a conciliatory one, or vice versa. While one might be inclined to discount some of his statements, such as blowing nuclear radiation into Lithuania, it would be difficult to try to distinguish between what he says to shock or grab attention and what he really believes.

This said, authoritarianism, racism, and Russian nationalism are threads that can be discerned in Zhirinovskiy's statements and writing.

Domestic Politics

Zhirinovskiy calls himself a liberal democrat, and he has in recent months emphasized the electoral process and his willingness to work with those in parliament, with President Yeltsin, and many in the Yeltsin Government, with the notable exceptions of officials he has wanted ousted, such as former First Deputy Prime Minister Gaidar and current Foreign Minister Kozyrev.

Behind this, however, are apparent authoritarian leanings. Zhirinovskiy has advocated strong presidential powers and stated that if he were to become president of Russia in current circumstances he would establish a dictatorship for at least a few years.

He espouses as a slogan "For Russia, for all Russians," and suggests a Russian cultural and political superiority over non-Russian ethnic groups. He has made anti-Semitic statements, while denying he is anti-Semitic. At the same time, he says he advocates equal treatment for all peoples in Russia. The authors of the *Rossiyskiye Vesti* profile summarized his views on national or ethnic government as follows: "abolition of national-territorial formations and the principles of promotion on ethnic grounds; restoration of the administrative division of Russia into governorates, which was introduced by Peter I and existed until 1924; and deletion of the 'nationality' section from all documents, with everyone retaining equal rights to freedom of movement and the right to elect and be elected, to preserve and develop the national culture, and to decide for oneself on one's allegiance to a given culture (nation)."²

On economic issues, the authors of the profile in *Rossiyskiye Vesti* state that: ". . . He declares his commitment to the ideas of the convergence of various socioeconomic systems; he does not share the values of

either socialism or capitalism. . . ." They also indicate that he supports "Equality of all forms of ownership; an adaptable tax policy; assistance for production; state incentives for the creation of new jobs and restrictions on middlemen . . . " and ". . . maintaining a certain minimum level of unemployment as an incentive to ensure the maximum work capacity, reduce personnel turnover, and counteract strike activities by working people. He is a supporter of lockouts . . . and strikebreaking. . . ."3

Russia and the Near Abroad

Zhirinovskiy, on the one hand, calls for ending Russian assistance to other former republics of the Soviet Union and says he does not want them as part of Russia at least for the near-term. On the other hand, he envisions over time a Russia that includes all the territory of the former Soviet Union, suggesting that the former republics will fall into further trouble and seek to subordinate themselves to Russia for economic and security reasons. Similar to what he envisions for the current Russia, he suggests a new, expanded Russia would have no separate republics based on nationality, and Russians would be essentially *primes inter pares*, with other nationalities allowed to maintain their cultural but not political identities.

Policy toward Other Nations

Zhirinovskiy has made demagogic statements that appear designed to appeal to some of the baser anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and anti-Western instincts that may reside in portions of the Russian population.

While Zhirinovskiy made a number of saber-rattling, anti-Western, and anti-U.S. statements before the 12

December election, after the election he backed away or softened these in an apparent effort to present himself as someone with whom the West might deal.

Zhirinovskiy says no one needs to fear Russia, but, on one occasion or another, he has threatened to pursue nuclear blackmail against the U.S., U.K., and France, to attack Germany, Japan, and Pakistan with nuclear or other forces, and to blow nuclear radiation into Lithuania. He advocated replacing the president of Bulgaria with one of his advisors.

He opposes receiving foreign aid in Russia and opposes Russia giving aid to other countries, with the exception of Iraq and Serbia. He opposes defense conversion in Russia and strongly advocates sales of Russian arms abroad. He advocates close relations with Germany and has suggested an axis involving Germany, Russia, and India. He is a friend and supporter of Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

In his book *Last Dash to the South*, Zhirinovskiy proclaims as a geopolitical concept the necessity for Russia to gain access by military conquest to the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.⁴ Viewing this "last dash" as the "task of saving the Russian nation," he argues that Russia needs to secure access to these warm water routes to thrive and that it needs to subjugate its southern neighbors in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan to eliminate threats posed by pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. He claims that Ankara is planning "to establish a greater Turkey reaching from the Adriatic to Tajikistan," which would allow Turkey to dominate Slavic populations in the former Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, while placing extreme pressure on Russia via the Caucasus and Central Asia. He argues that Moscow must fight back by leading a pan-Slavic, anti-Turkish alliance, perhaps in partnership with a

resurgent Germany. He suggests that a military conquest to the south would be the basis for a renaissance of the Russian military which has fallen on hard times.⁵

Zhirinovskiy provided his vision of a future world security system in one or more interviews conducted by Rolf Gauffin, a retired French diplomat, published in January 1994 in two similar but not identical newspaper articles.⁶ Zhirinovskiy projected a trilateral German-Russian-Indian axis, linking an expanded Germany, a new Russia that would include most of the former Soviet Union and some additional territory, and India. With some two billion people linked by this axis, Zhirinovskiy opined that the world would take whatever form this axis wanted it to. India and Russia together would neutralize China, and Germany and Russia would neutralize or control Europe.

In Zhirinovskiy's vision, Russians living outside Russia would be given dual citizenship and Russia would defend them, primarily with economic instruments of power.

Zhirinovskiy was reported in one interview by Gauffin to have said that Russia didn't want the Transcaucasus as there were only criminals there, no real economy, and no opportunities for Russia to profit; he said Iran could take over Azerbaijan and Armenia and Georgia could go to Turkey; but, he also said one day these countries would ask to belong to Moscow again. In another report of a Gauffin interview, Zhirinovskiy said that Russia would step in to save the states in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, if these states paid Russia to do it.

The Baltic states, according to Zhirinovskiy, would be part of Russia, except for Tallinn which would be a separate city republic and three cities in Lithuania which would form a small Lithuanian state. Koeningsberg might be returned to Germany some day. Zhirinovskiy said "no

problem" with respect to Finland, but if Finland wanted Karelia back, then all of Finland would have to go to Russia.

One report had Zhirinovskiy saying that Eastern Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova would be part of Russia; another report had him saying that Ukraine and Belarus are Russian and the people want to belong to Russia.

In Eastern Europe, according to Zhirinovskiy's vision, three cities in northwestern Poland would become part of Germany, and Lvov in Ukraine might be given to Poland as compensation. Slovakia might want to become part of Russia. The Czech Republic would go to Germany. Austria and Slovenia should unite, perhaps along with Germany. Bulgaria would get the Dobrudja portion of Romania. Greece should return Thrace to Bulgaria. In the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians would keep the borders that now exist. He proposed that all foreign or UN forces withdraw from the former Yugoslavia so the warring parties could settle the conflict themselves, but he also said that Russia and the Balkan states would solve all problems in the Balkans.

3. ZHIRINOVSKIY AND INCREASING RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

Zhirinovskiy appears to have both drawn upon and helped stimulate an increasing nationalistic sentiment in Russia. He has appealed to this sentiment in his campaigns and in his post-election statements and activities (see Chapter 4 and the Appendix of this paper). In turn, his campaigning and the relative success of his Liberal Democratic Party in the parliamentary elections appear to have helped stimulate other political leaders and the Russian government to pay increased attention to this issue and in some cases adopt positions that are more nationalistic than in recent years.

Defining Russian Nationalism

There is an apparent rise and broadening of Russian nationalism. While the scope of this paper can only touch on the definition of Russian nationalism, the concept merits considered and detailed definition and analysis, and degrees of Russian nationalism should be differentiated.

Using a broad definition, one could say that expressions of Russian nationalism range from the patriotism one might expect of a citizen of the newly independent and sovereign Russian Federation to the views of Zhirinovskiy and other ultra-nationalists. A narrower

definition of Russian nationalism and Russian nationalists might focus on people sometimes described as traditionalists, who advocate hardline, anti-reform policies and positions, perhaps excluding Communists who at least philosophically would not espouse nationalism. An even narrower definition would focus on Zhirinovskiy, members of his Liberal Democratic Party, and other such groups, but the term "ultra-nationalist" seems appropriate for these people.

Without addressing the more historic Russian nationalism and its many facets, one can point to a few salient features that characterize the new, revived Russian nationalism.

Beyond affinity and support for Russia *per se*, the most important factors and common threads that run throughout the range of expressions of Russian nationalism are:

- a sense of Russian "greatness" and the right and responsibility to exercise Russian leadership within the total area made up of states now comprising the Commonwealth of Independent States and perhaps beyond; and

- an expressed desire to protect and promote the interests of citizens not only within the Russian Federation but Russian Federation citizens living outside Russia (perhaps with dual citizenship) and other ethnic Russians or even Russian-speaking populations outside Russia.

Less important and less universal elements in Russian nationalism appear to be a sense of pan-Slavism and, perhaps even to a lesser extent, affinity for the Orthodox Church. These are manifest most notably in Russian sentiment toward Serbs in the former Yugoslavia.

Another element—reflected in varying degrees in expressions of Russian nationalism—is a love-hate or partnership-adversary view of the West. Some speak

admiringly of the West, or at least parts of it. There is often an expressed desire for Western assistance and technology and even government and business partnerships. On the other hand, there is often suspicion of Western motives. Some appear to believe that the West wants to keep Russia weak; that it is able but unwilling to provide the assistance that Russia needs; and that it wants to restrict Russian influence and involvement in world affairs, in the "near abroad" of the former Soviet Union, and in arms sales abroad. Some also express concern about the impact of Western influence within Russia and complain that the West wants to impose Western solutions and practices in Russia.

To illustrate the range of nationalistic sentiment, at the far extreme are ultra-nationalists such as Zhirinovskiy who envision a Russia led by Russians that includes all the territory and people encompassed in the former Soviet Union, without ethnic or nationally-based republics. These ultra-nationalists deprecate smaller nationalities and minority groups, especially Jews. Zhirinovskiy has referred to Serbs and other Slavic elements outside Russia as "our brothers," has said that "great Russia will be the protector of all Serbs," threatened that air attacks on Serbs would result in war with Russia, and has called for "creation of a joint Slav state from Vladivostok to Knin."¹ He appears extremely suspicious of the U.S. He calls for rejecting U.S. and perhaps other Western offers of assistance and advice to Russia. At the same time, he advocates close relations with Germany and has developed contacts with right-wing politicians and with businessmen in Western Europe. Opposing defense conversion, he has expressed the view that the U.S. has tried to cut Russia out of arms sales abroad.

At the other end of the spectrum, one can increasingly find statements of reformers that speak about protecting and promoting the interests not only of Russia *per se* but also ethnic Russians abroad and about retaining some Russian forces outside Russia. They appear to want to maintain close relations with the West and to receive extensive assistance, but at the same time they imply criticism of the West for not providing enough assistance, for not sufficiently relaxing restrictions on assistance and technology, and for attempting to impose severe economic measures in the name of economic reform. They also caution against attacks on Serbs.

The Recent Rise of Russian Nationalism

Russian nationalism has a relatively strong historical basis, both in terms of centuries of Russian history and the power and international prestige of imperial Russia. During the 75 years of Soviet rule in the USSR Russian nationalism was generally suppressed, although Stalin temporarily sought to exploit it in defending the motherland against Nazi Germany. Even during the years of Soviet rule, Russians played a dominant role. (According to figures for 1990, in a USSR population of 288 million, 146 million, or 50.7%, were Russians.) The capital of the country was in the Russian Republic and Russians held most of the positions of power at the national level and important if not the top positions in many of the other republics.

The rise of Russian nationalism *per se* is a relatively recent phenomenon. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, many in the USSR—including in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic—identified with being part of a "Soviet" nation. Developments in 1991 changed this. In June 1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected president of the

Russian Republic, becoming the first popularly elected leader in some 1000 years of Russian history. Russian nationalism received another boost when Yeltsin stood up against the coup plotters outside the Russian parliament's White House in August 1991 and when, in the aftermath of the coup attempt, he presented himself as a more authoritative leader than the weakened USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev. When the USSR was officially dissolved in December 1991 and new independent states of the former Soviet Union were established and recognized internationally, there was no longer any basis for a "Soviet" nationalism. The establishment of fifteen new independent states provided a basis for fifteen new, highest order nationalisms backed by sovereign state governments.

Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States does not appear to have been accompanied by the rise of any popular "Commonwealth" nationalism.

There is in Russia a relatively solid basis for strong nationalism of the leading ethnic group. Ethnic Russians constitute 82% of the population in Russia, with the next most populous ethnic group being Tatars, who comprise 4% of the population, followed by Ukrainians at 3% and other nationality groups each at 1% or less.

The policy of Soviet leaders was to ensure that there were sizeable ethnic Russian elements in the populations of all the non-Russian republics. In large part because of this policy and the way borders were established between the various republics of the former Soviet Union, there are today an estimated 25 million ethnic Russians living outside Russia in former republics of the USSR, not counting the many ethnic Russians who have migrated back to Russia. In these former republics, according to figures for 1990, Russians as a percentage of the population accounted for 38% in Kazakhstan, 34% in Latvia, 30% in Estonia, 22%

in Ukraine, 21% in Kyrgyzstan, 14% in Moldova, 13% in Belarus, 9% in Lithuania, and at least 6% in all other republics, except Armenia where Russians accounted for only 2%. (In referring to former republics, it should be noted that the U.S. Government did not recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR.)

Many in Russia have expressed dismay at the loss of prestige stemming from the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Many have also vocally called for support of ethnic Russians living outside Russia, particularly those in the Baltic states, Moldova, and Ukraine—especially in the Crimea.

Protection of the rights of these Russians in other former republics of the Soviet Union, particularly in the Baltic states, has become an increasingly important issue in Russia and a major element in the Russian government's foreign policy.

Zhirinovskiy has appealed to both these sentiments of national prestige and protection of Russians. This may well have been a major factor in the relatively strong showing of his party in the December parliamentary elections, although there were other important factors, such as protesting against poor economic conditions and against crime, and Zhirinovskiy's skills in addressing the public. In the 1991 election for president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic—before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Zhirinovskiy received just over 6 million votes. In the December 1993 parliamentary elections, in the voting for 225 of 450 State Duma seats chosen by nation-wide total voting by party list, Zhirinovskiy's party received more than 12 million votes, or nearly 23% of the votes, compared to the second place "Russia's Choice" coalition which received about 8 million votes or 15% of the votes.

The 30 January 1994 election for president in the Crimea, won by a Russian nationalist, Yuri Meshkov, has several important aspects. Some view this, similar to the relative success of Zhirinovskiy's party in the December Russian parliamentary election, as an indication of rising Russian nationalism—but in a region of Ukraine. Others, such as Vyacheslav Chornovil, leader of Ukraine's nationalist movement "Rukh," regard Meshkov's election as a protest vote, saying: "It doesn't mean the majority of the population is striving for independence or reunification with Russia. . . . They wanted change."²

Regarding the possibility that Meshkov could move ahead with holding a referendum on Crimean independence, Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk is reported to have opined that he thinks "political wisdom will prevail in Crimea," but Ukrainian officials are said to admit that such a referendum would lead to a confrontation. While Ukrainian officials are also reported to believe that the Russian government has shown moderation on this issue to date, there are reports of a growing concern that Moscow might, perhaps responding to pressure from Russian nationalists in Russia such as Zhirinovskiy, intervene. Any such intervention could lead Ukraine to reconsider recent nuclear agreements with the U.S. and Russia.³

Officials in Ukraine and other of the new independent states of the former Soviet Union could be concerned that the vote in Crimea could be a bellwether stimulating Russian nationalism among other Russian speaking populations on their territory.

Zhirinovskiy reportedly has called for the Crimea to be reintegrated into the Russian Federation, saying that people in the Crimea no longer want to be part of Ukraine.⁴

Following his visit to the former Yugoslavia, Zhirinovskiy in early February 1994 began emphasizing

pan-Slavism and Orthodox Christianity. He has spoken of 300 million people living together in an "Eastern European Slavic community" that does not serve the West, and he announced that he and others (unidentified) were organizing for 2 and 3 April in Moscow a world congress of Slavic and Orthodox peoples.⁵ In announcing this in an interview for a Czech newspaper, Zhirinovskiy said that politicians and deputies from the Czech lands would be invited to this "World Slavic Congress," since "After all, we are one people, one culture. . . ." In another interview probably in February, he stated that: "I am for solidarity between Slav countries: We are neighbors and we have the same economic and cultural background. But I want a union without military interference and without one country dominating the others. The government should not be exercised from Moscow. The center can be located in Prague, Sofia, or Warsaw."⁶

Recent Statements of Russian Government Leaders and Others

Key Russian government leaders have recently made or released statements on issues related to Russian nationalism. There are references to reviving Russia's "greatness," to a priority ("first among equals") for Russia in relations within the CIS, and to protection of Russians outside Russia. Some of these references appear to be responding to statements by Zhirinovskiy and the relative success of Zhirinovskiy's party in the December 1993 parliamentary elections.

President Yeltsin. President Yeltsin in early 1994 spoke of reviving Russia's greatness, but he also downplayed the threat of "neo-imperialism." He has been a leading proponent of the Commonwealth of Independent

States, where Russia is only one of many states, but he has spoken of Russia as "first among equals" in the Commonwealth. In his 24 February speech to parliament, he emphasized that Russia should play a strong role in relations with other republics of the former Soviet Union.

In his opening address to the new upper-house Federation Council on 11 January 1994, Yeltsin spoke of Russia's greatness and returning to its roots. He stated that: ". . . Russia is returning to its roots, is restoring lost traditions. It cannot acquire its true character . . . go forward . . . take a worthy place in the contemporary world without that."⁷

Speaking of Russia's culture and greatness, Yeltsin said that: ". . . material prosperity alone will not make the country happy nor revive in citizens of Russia a sense of their own dignity. . . ." He went on to say that: in ". . . transformations in the Russian Federation, only a very little of the mighty potential of the multinational culture of the fatherland has so far been activated. This culture has been left on the sidelines of the reforms, and it is perhaps this that is the reason for many difficulties and failures. It is our common task to align the market and culture to the greatest possible degree. Unless we do so, the market will not become civilized; unless we do so, the market will not emerge from crisis, there will be no revival of spirituality, there will be no revival of Russia's greatness."⁸

Later in his remarks, Yeltsin addressed Russia's role in the world, saying that: ". . . Russia is a great power and it will never agree to be on the sidelines of world civilization. The time has ended when our country felt itself to be a besieged fortress and was in confrontation with the rest of the world. Our task today is to activate truly wide and equal cooperation with the world community. It is not by military might alone that a worthy

place in the world is defined. Our country and people have a great resource of vital energy, and it is up to us to help our fatherland to gather its forces, to revive those powerful stimuli which would resurrect its greatness. International law is our fundamental guideline in the world. Russia will strictly abide by its norms and principles, convinced that this is the most efficient way of protecting national interests. However, . . . all states must also strictly abide by norms of the international law in their relations with Russia. No double standards will be tolerated here. . . ."⁹

In his address, Yeltsin also spoke of Russia's relations with other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States, suggesting that this is "a most crucial moment of the existence of the Commonwealth of Independent States," and stating that: "Each of the states is increasingly coming to understand that alone they cannot cope with most difficult problems, and that they cannot survive alone. Our countries are already being linked together, and in this process it is Russia's vocation to be the first among equals."¹⁰

He went on to discuss correct relations among CIS states, saying: "Our compatriots, those in the former Soviet republics, first and foremost, rely on the fact that voluntary, free, and peaceful integration will grow from strength to strength. They hope that their lawful interests will be protected. And our duty is to live up to these expectations." He went on to say that "The election of the Russian president to the post of CIS chairman provides an exclusively favorable opportunity to implement these aims. . . . The richer, the more comprehensive, and the closer the relations between our states are, the better. . . ."¹¹

In a statement made at a joint press conference with President Clinton in Moscow on 14 January 1994, Yeltsin indicated that he had briefed President Clinton on "the

integratory processes that have got under way on the territory of the former Soviet Union" and on CIS meetings. He stated that: "There need be no fear of any neo-imperialist lust here—Russia's only interest is in stability. It is undertaking honest mediatory efforts to extinguish the hotbeds of conflicts on the perimeters of its new borders. We are ready to cooperate widely and even to coordinate our actions here with the United Nations, the CSCE, and with the entire international community. Unfortunately, the international community itself has not as yet shown a great deal of enthusiasm. There has been a wary reaction to our specific proposals, whether in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, or in Tajikistan."¹²

Yeltsin also indicated that he raised with President Clinton the "question of human rights violations among national minorities, especially in the Baltic area," and stated that "There should be no double standards here, whether it is taking place in Haiti or in the Baltic area." Yeltsin indicated that he and President Clinton had adopted a statement on this and that President Clinton would adopt corresponding measures on contacts with the Baltic countries "so that discrimination against the Russian-speaking population there will ultimately be abandoned."¹³

In a major address to the Russian parliament on 24 February, entitled "On Strengthening the State of Russia," Yeltsin spoke of a strong role for Russia in the area of the former Soviet Union: "A strong Russia is the most reliable and real guarantor of stability on the entire territory of the former Soviet Union." He said Russia would pay "close attention" to the problems of ethnic Russians in this area who are "victims of discrimination," and that: "When it comes to violations of the lawful rights of Russian people, this is not an exclusive internal affair for some country, but also our national affair, an affair of our state." He also

called for ending "the misguided practice of making unilateral concessions" and promised to protect Russia's defense budget and arms sales abroad. He said that "Russia is not a guest in Europe, it is a full-fledged participant," and opined that any expansion of NATO not including Russia would be a "path to new threats to Europe and the world."¹⁴

Vladimir Shumeyko, Former Deputy Prime Minister and Newly-elected Chairman of Russia's Parliamentary Upper-house Federation Council.

Vladimir Shumeyko has recently addressed Russian nationalism and protection of Russian-speaking populations.

Responding in an interview sometime after the December parliamentary election to a question about preventing a nationalist from becoming president in two years, Shumeyko observed that: "A president's party must emerge. I see the people advocating the notion of a strong and powerful state. The Russian nation, in a historic-philosophical sense, has always been expansive. Yet Russia has never conquered other states, only absorbed them. The Bolsheviks took over this empire. The people here and in the West always saw Russia in the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost some of its territory for the first time in history. Russians became a minority in other states. This is a psychological shock for the whole nation. Zhirinovskiy's campaign was focused on this fact, and a presidential party must also focus on it."¹⁵

On 13 January, after his election as Chairman of the Federation Council, Shumeyko told a news conference that he agreed with ". . . Foreign Minister Kozyrev, who said quite clearly that the West should stop moralizing and preaching at Russia. Russia is not a state that needs to be told what to do and so on. . . . Another thing is that one of Russia's main priorities should be concern for the interests

of what is referred to today as the Russian-speaking population."¹⁶

The Russian Military and Military Doctrine. Various Russian military leaders and the new Russian military doctrine have addressed issues related to Russian nationalism.

On 2 November 1993, prior to the December parliamentary election, the Russian Federation Security Council approved a new Russian military doctrine, the basic provisions of which were reported in a "detailed account" in the Russian media on 18 November.¹⁷ According to this account, the doctrine contains a provision that suggests that Russian military forces could be used to help ensure the political rights and other interests of Russians living in the "near-abroad" and possibly even beyond. The doctrine lists as one of the "basic existing and potential sources of external danger for the Russian Federation" the "suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states. . . ."

A description of what the new military doctrine cites as the basic sources of military danger to Russia suggests that "the threat of direct aggression" has declined in contemporary conditions and that "Social, political, territorial, religious, national-ethnic, and other conflicts and the desire of a number of states and political forces to resolve them by means of armed struggle constitute the main reasons for it (the danger of war) and for the emergence of armed conflict and wars. Armed conflicts which arise on the basis of aggressive nationalism and religious intolerance pose a special danger."

The doctrine addresses threats that could come from the "near-abroad" or other foreign states which may directly threaten Russia. This is a theme addressed also by Foreign Minister Kozyrev, as indicated below. In a section of the

doctrine that discusses factors that transform a military danger into an immediate threat to the Russian Federation, references are made to troop buildups on the Russian border; attacks on border installations and borders of allies, and the launching of border conflicts and armed provocations; training of armed elements on the territory of other states intended to be transferred to territory of Russia and its allies; and actions by other states hindering support of Russian nuclear forces and command and control including their space component. The doctrine indicates that cooperation with the members of the CIS in resolving problems of collective defense and security and agreeing on military policy and defense organizational development is "the priority" for Russia, above cooperation at the regional level and on a global scale.

The doctrine makes two statements about tasks related to Russian troops outside Russia. On the one hand, it indicates that a task "through 1996" is "the completion of the withdrawal to Russian territory of formations and units stationed outside Russia. On the other hand, it notes under tasks "in the period 1996-2000" for force structure reorganization, that there may be requirements for troops and resources outside Russian territory and mixed troop formations manned by CIS servicemen, generally on a contract basis. It states that Russian troops may be outside Russia within joint or Russian groupings and individual bases. It appears, as indicated below, that Foreign Minister Kozyrev in an article on 14 January emphasized the withdrawal task, without mentioning possible requirements for deploying Russian forces outside Russia; four days later, for unexplained reasons, he emphasized the latter.

The military doctrine also cites internal sources of military threats against which Russian Federation armed forces and other troops may be used. One of these is

"illegal activity by nationalist, separatist, or other organizations which is aimed at destabilizing the situation in the Russian Federation or violating its territorial integrity and which is carried out using armed violence."

The military doctrine appears to address protection outside of Russia of only citizens of the Russian Federation. It may be that Russian policy envisions the possible use of armed forces to protect Russian citizens abroad, while employing diplomatic and economic instruments of policy to help protect the interests of people outside Russia who are not citizens of Russia but who are ethnic Russians or Russian speakers. Statements by Foreign Minister Kozyrev, as discussed below, seem to support this conclusion. On the other hand, recent reports on agreements on locating Russian bases and forces in Georgia mention protecting Russian-speaking populations.

On 3 February 1994, President Yeltsin reportedly visited Georgia and signed agreements on military cooperation between Russia and Georgia. Russian Defense Minister Grachev is said to have indicated that one of the main results of the visit was the signing of a protocol of intent to set up three Russian military bases in Georgia by 1 July 1994. Aleksandr Galkin, the head of the Russian delegation to talks with Georgia, reportedly indicated that Georgia wants Russian troops to stay after 1995 when an agreement on their presence expires. Galkin was reported to have said that Russian military presence in Georgia is indispensable for ensuring stabilization of the situation, protecting the rights of the Russian-speaking population, and providing assistance to Georgia to establish its own armed forces. It was reported that the agreement on bases is to last for ten years, and that Grachev believes Russia should keep up to 23,000 troops in Transcaucasia, with two-thirds of these in Georgia.¹⁸

The Foreign Ministry. Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has, particularly since the autumn Russian parliamentary campaign, spoken out in more nationalistic terms. In a statement on 14 January, he referred to withdrawing all Russian military units stationed outside Russia back to Russia before 1996, but four days later he appeared to back away from this and emphasize the need to maintain Russian military presence. When some expressed concern that this could be regarded as applying to the Baltic states, the Foreign Ministry indicated it applied only to the CIS area and not the Baltic States.

On 14 January 1994, Kozyrev published an article under the title of "Russia's Interest: Country's Military Doctrine and International Security."¹⁹ He began the article referring to a debate abroad in which some observers, citing "irresponsible, profascist statements made during the election campaign," predicted a strengthening of Moscow's "imperial aspirations." Kozyrev argued that such a course was guarded against by the role of the president of Russia, enshrined in the new constitution, and the new Russian military doctrine. Some of the more interesting points in his article follow:

- Kozyrev, indicating that the new military doctrine envisages that all Russian military units stationed outside Russia would be withdrawn back to Russia before 1996, stated: "We will seek to ensure that the agreements being elaborated with a number of countries regarding this properly take into account Russia's security interests and also the interests of the Russian-speaking population in these countries." While the context is different, it is interesting to note his reference to the "Russian-speaking population" in other countries, compared to the reference in the military doctrine document to "citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states."

■ Kozyrev spoke of peacekeeping operations, implemented under the auspices of the UN and other collective security organs or in accordance with international agreements, primarily within the CIS context, and stated: "The Russian troops taking part in such operations strictly respect the sovereignty of the sides involved in the conflict and act with their consent and in accordance with a clearly defined mandate." He also indicated that "the security of the Russian Federation and other CIS members may necessitate the stationing of Russian Federation forces outside its territory," but ". . . this will be done only on the basis of appropriate international legal documents and with the consent of the states on whose territory our Armed Forces will be stationed."

Four days later on 18 January, in what appears to have been a Foreign Ministry conference that included Russian ambassadors to the CIS and Baltic states to discuss foreign policy regarding these countries, Kozyrev was reported by the Russian news media to have said that:

■ Defending the rights and interests of Russian Federation citizens in the near abroad is one of Russia's main foreign policy tasks.²⁰ Another source indicated that he said that the protection of the rights of Russians in former Soviet republics is a major strategic foreign policy task and that he indicated that the issue of dual citizenship is the key one in this policy, stating that "A better mutual understanding has been reached in this aspect of late."²¹ A third source reported that he said that protection of the Russian-speaking population, our fellow countrymen, is a vital priority, using the phrase "To help create conditions in which Russians feel that they are equal citizens."²²

■ Appearing to back away from his reference of 14 January to withdrawal of all Russian troops to Russia by

1996, Kozyrev said it is necessary for Russia to keep its "military presence" in former Soviet republics in order to prevent forces hostile to Russia from filling in the "security vacuum," and that raising the issue of a complete end to Russian military presence is an "extreme approach." He reportedly indicated that the solution lies in the middle between a complete withdrawal and full military presence. He was quoted as saying: "We should not withdraw from those regions which have been the sphere of Russian interests for centuries and we should not fear these words about the military presence."²³ Another report quoted him as saying: "Russia must preserve its military presence in regions which have been spheres of its military interest for centuries," and then adding: "The withdrawal of all military presence from those regions is the same extreme approach as imperial suppression using tanks."²⁴

- A "security vacuum" will emerge as soon as the Russian troops leave the region which will be "inevitable [sic] filled in by forces which are often not friendly, and in many cases even directly hostile to Russian interests," adding that the CIS and Baltics comprise a region of "priority vital interests for Russia which also poses the major threats to the interests."²⁵

- Conflicts and problems in the former USSR directly affect Russian internal developments and everyday life but the region opens vast possibilities for better relations and friendly contacts, as well as enhanced Russian influence.²⁶

- Among other priority tasks are creation and improvement of mechanisms of cooperation and the drafting of a short-, medium-, and long-term strategy of creating an economic union. Kozyrev reportedly called for an "individual approach" in this respect, especially regarding monetary unification. He stated that "An all-around

assessment of the issues is necessary and such mechanisms should be created which would allow Russia to avoid unjustified expenses while the republics would not feel themselves pushed aside and would not look for new partners."²⁷

■ The CIS has reached such a degree of maturity as to feel it desirable to "become a member of world processes," adding that "It is developing from a regional into a global factor."²⁸

The Russian Foreign Ministry later clarified Kozyrev's statement about retaining Russian troops abroad by stating that ". . . his words about retaining a Russian military presence in the zone of vitally important interests in no way apply to the Baltics. . . ."²⁹

Russian Army Paper on Kozyrev Statements.

The Russian Army's newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda* (*Red Star*), on 20 January published an article by Vladimir Gavrilenko entitled "Neighboring Foreign Countries Were, Are, and Remain a Zone of Russia's Vital Interests."³⁰ The article apparently referred to Foreign Minister Kozyrev's participation in the 18 January Foreign Ministry conference mentioned above and reported many of the statements cited above which Kozyrev is said to have made at the conference.

This article reported that Kozyrev—while being late in doing so—had stated that "The CIS and Baltic countries are the region where Russia's paramount vital interests are concentrated. It is from there that the main threats to those interests stem."

The article suggested that while this idea was timidly expressed back in 1992 it was drowned out by "the thunder of the collapse of the Soviet empire, the euphoria caused by the acquisition of sovereignty, and the unfeigned and sincere joy of the fledgling Russian democracy at the

appearance of a number of sovereign states nearby. Yes, yes, joy, because it had helped in the struggle of those selfsame Baltic republics again the Union center. . . ." It went on to say that 1992 was a crucial year and that: "The many armed conflicts along Russia's borders, the infringement of Russia's state interests in strategically important neighboring regions, and finally the shameless and at times humiliating pressure on our fellow countrymen in neighboring foreign countries has led to the realization that we cannot close our eyes and ears and withdraw into our own Russian backyard."

The article commented that ". . . it seems that Russia's difficult, months-long progress toward an understanding of its own role in neighboring foreign countries is nearing the desired end."

The article concluded that "The feeling that Russia has no specific interests in neighboring foreign countries is being agonizingly replaced by the realization that it has a special role to play in the post-Soviet era."

It also warned that ". . . attempts by anyone anywhere to assume the role of interpreter and organizer of Russian affairs in neighboring foreign countries will now be viewed as unfriendly acts. Russia is ceasing to do that which historically was inappropriate to it—backpedalling. Russia is making it plain that everyone who wants to live with it in love and fond accord should take account of its geopolitical interests. Just as it is prepared to do unto others. With determination, dignity, and honor."

4. IMPLICATIONS OF ZHIRINOVSKIY'S INCREASING POLITICAL STRENGTH

Figuratively speaking, Zhirinovskiy's political rise has had the relative speed and light of a meteor. No one can say at this time whether he and his followers will be burned up in the atmosphere of Russian politics, be reduced in mass or attitude so as not to pose a threat, or continue on a course that could pose an increasing threat to reform in Russia, to neighboring states, and to the West.

Some may regard Zhirinovskiy as frivolous and only a fringe element. Others appear to suggest that he may have been making outrageous statements only to grab headlines and that he may become more responsible in the future. Finally, some believe that he should be regarded as having the potential to pose a serious threat within Russia and without.

Arguments Against Overestimating Zhirinovskiy, His Statements, and the Threat of Fascism in Russia

Some have cautioned against overestimating Zhirinovskiy's political support and the threat of fascism in Russia, suggesting that Zhirinovskiy's relatively strong showing in the election was due to a protest vote. President Yeltsin

has said: "There are many poor people. It were they who voted for the Liberal Democratic Party. They voted not for its leader, (or) the programme, but in protest against poverty."¹ Izvestiya commentator Otto Latsis, has suggested that people are on the wrong track in comparing the Zhirinovskiy phenomenon to Germany in the 1930s and Hitler, and has observed that "According to my estimates, a maximum of 8 percent of the electorate could be considered hard core militant Zhirinovskiy supporters. The rest voted for the LDPR as a protest."² In a recent poll of 1,223 people in Russia, 72% said they would not like to see Zhirinovskiy as prime minister, while 8% said they would. Some 67% said they did not think he would carry out his campaign pledges, and 10% thought he would.³

In statements after the elections, both President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev appeared to differentiate between statements Zhirinovskiy made during the election campaign and those he might make in the post-election period, both taking a wait-and-see attitude with respect to the latter and indicating a readiness to cooperate with Zhirinovskiy.

Yeltsin, asked at a 22 December press conference if he were prepared to cooperate with Zhirinovskiy after his statements, replied: "You see, we have heard Zhirinovskiy's words so far, what he has said during the election campaign. Let us wait for him and his party's deeds, their deeds in parliament, and only after that will we draw conclusions on how to cooperate with him. If he starts a constructive dialogue and works for the benefit of the country and the people who have elected him, then naturally we will cooperate and interact."⁴

Kozyrev, commenting shortly after the election on statements by Zhirinovskiy, whom he said he has known for a very long time, said that it was his personal, moral, and

political assessment, and not a legal assessment, that Zhirinovskiy's statements "verge on utter irresponsibility and, in general reek strongly, to put it bluntly, of fascist-style demagoguery." He went on to comment that "I must say that Hitler, in the past—I am not whipping up tension in this case and we really have nothing to fear, but we must remember some similarities—did more or less the same in Germany in 1933."⁵

Kozyrev, however, went on to say: "Therefore, when I meet . . . Zhirinovskiy in the Duma or somewhere else I shall not offer to shake his hand, at least not until he says, not just smoothly but as a good solid man, simply as an honorable man . . . until he says to me and to those around: Yes, I made a few statements during the election campaign—well I wanted to be a deputy, I wanted to be a leader—I made several irresponsible statements but I have renounced them and I have reviewed my position. If he does this, I shall be glad and evidently it will be possible to shake hands with him. . . ." Later he said: "A threat of fascism? Yes . . . the threat does exist . . . but this is a complete nonsense that this pest will now spread all over the country, that we must panic and therefore keep silent, that we must get frightened, let others intimidate us and terrorize us. . . . I think we will get away with an inoculation. . . ."⁶

Yeltsin, in his 22 December press conference, downplayed the threat of fascism in Russia, saying: ". . . some people are currently comparing the Germany of the 1930's with today's Russia. I believe that there are no grounds for this. True, there are some grounds such as hurt national feelings, unsteadiness, poor living conditions, the unsatisfactory living conditions of many people—these, of course, show some similarity. But the main thing that was absent in Germany, which we have, are a president and a

constitution, which is on guard against fascism, and we will not permit anyone to get through with such ideas." Later in the press conference, he said he was prepared to cooperate ". . . with factions in parliament. That means not only with the neo-fascists, to use your (a journalist's) word. It means members of parliament. And I am obliged to cooperate with them because they were elected by the people." He went on to say: "I do not consider the threat as great as it is being blown up to be by certain mass media, as dangerous as that, because the people of Russia lived through so much . . . (pauses) millions of lives, millions, were lost, tens of millions in Russia alone. So such a people and such a country, even more so with such a constitution, will not permit these forces to be unleashed." When asked if he would in the future speak out against "anti-Semitism and other forms of jingoism," Yeltsin replied, "I can guarantee you this."⁷

Others have discounted suggestions of fascism in Russia. For example, Russian political observer Lev Korneshov has written that many people are writing articles and organizing anti-fascist committees based on the outward resemblance of Weimar Germany and today's Russia, both with their impoverishment, prices, inflation, economic recession, and the like. He dismissed this similarity and the idea that those who voted for Zhirinovskiy and his party are infected with fascism. He also concluded that "The democratic stratum in our society has proved all too thin and barren. . . ."⁸

Russian Academician Georgiy Arbatov in a recent article raised the question of whether Russia is doomed to fascism. He first observed that, with the events of December 1993, he had seen "the successful movement of fascism to power for a second time" (the first being when he lived in Germany from 1930 to 1935 with his parents

who were there on official business). Arbatov went on to say that he is "profoundly convinced that we are not doomed to fascism" and that the solution lies in unity and coalition among democratic forces built around a new radically revised economic and political platform, but with none of what he called the "ruinous monetarist experiments of Gaydar, Boris Fedorov, and Jeffrey Sachs."⁹

An article in the Russian newspaper *Trud*, entitled "Reading *Trud* mailbag. Not So Much 'For' as 'Against,'" assessed views on Zhirinovskiy expressed in letters sent to the newspaper.¹⁰ The article warned readers not to trust political magicians who promise easy routes to prosperity which may result in bloodshed; it reported that many people believe that "voters voted not for Zhirinovskiy but against the ruling team's ability to cope with reforms," or, to put it another way, they voted for him "because he highlighted society's sore points to which our leaders are deaf."

According to *Trud*, others commented positively about Zhirinovskiy, saying they were impressed with his promises to restore lost savings. *Trud* reported that from the letters ". . . you can see something else. There are plenty of people who think Zhirinovskiy is the person who will (maybe) save the country. . . ." One person wrote that: "On television he spoke not to everyone at once, like certain turncoat Communists, but as it were to everyone individually." Another wrote that, "If Zhirinovskiy does not betray his election promises and implements a policy in the interests of Russian citizens and Russia, he will move mountains." Another stated that: "The Zhirinovskiy option, the 'stick and carrot' option suits us more in these conditions. And when he runs for president, you see, he will poll 90 percent of the vote." One writer defended Zhirinovskiy, saying he envisioned only the minimum use of force in the drive to the Indian Ocean.

Arguments for Not Underestimating Zhirinovskiy and the Threat of Fascism

On the other hand, former Soviet President Gorbachev has cautioned against underestimating Zhirinovskiy and observed that: "At first Hitler was also treated with irony. However, an enormous price for that had to be paid a couple of years later."¹¹

Columnist Charles Krauthammer has written that the West has been staggered not because Zhirinovskiy will influence Russia's government (which Krauthammer suggests he will not because the new constitution provides for a strong presidency that can practically ignore parliament) but because of what Zhirinovskiy's victory tells us about the Russian people. Krauthammer goes on to say that, if what it tells us is true, the entire post-Cold War strategy of the West—gradually bringing Russia into the Western security system—is built on sand. Krauthammer acknowledges that it is possible that the December election revealed not an ugly Russia mind but just an ugly Russian mood.¹²

In looking at this issue, one must take into account Zhirinovskiy's relatively rapid rise from obscurity and his increasing political support. He founded his party only in 1990. In 1991, he won the vote of some 55% of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in order to be registered for the RSFSR presidential election and then won more than 6 million votes, or 7.8%, in the popular voting for the president. In 1993, he participated in the constitutional conference to help draft the new Russian constitution. In the 12 December parliamentary election, he won a seat in the new State Duma by capturing an individual district election in the Moscow area. Even more significantly, he led his party to win the support of more than twice the

number of voters compared to 1991—more than 12 million in 1993 compared to some 6 million in 1991. Perhaps even more significantly, he led his party to capture more votes than any other party and nearly 23% of the total votes cast in the nation-wide party-list voting for 225 of the 450 seats in the State Duma. Zhirinovskiy's party, with more than 12 million votes and about 23% of the total, far outdistanced the coalition party that came in second—"Russia's Choice," which won just over 8 million votes or about 15% of the vote.

In the final analysis of party strength in the 450-seat State Duma (when the election of representatives from individual districts to fill the other 250 seats is factored in), it appears that Zhirinovskiy's party will have a total of 63 seats. This is fewer only than the 76 registered for "Russia's Choice" and the 65 registered in parliament after the election as a newly created faction of independents under the title of "New Regional Policy." It is more than the 57 for the Agrarian Party, the 45 for the Communist Party, the 30 for the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, the 27 for the Yabloko Bloc, the 23 for the "Women of Russia," and the 15 for the Democratic Party.¹³

According to an assessment based on research by the All-Russian Central Public Opinion Research Institute, Zhirinovskiy's party has won over part of the supporters of the Yabloko Bloc led by reformer Yavlinskiy, and could even draw some support from supporters of "Russia's Choice," where 40% see a need for state financial support to enterprises and 10% cite Zhirinovskiy as among the politicians they can trust. The author of the article reporting on this assessment concludes that, "A fear arises that it will be very difficult to stop Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's growing influence by political maneuvers. . . ." ¹⁴

This assessment suggested that Zhirinovskiy supporters are "'men . . . employed mainly in the state industrial sector' . . . working at less than thriving enterprises in small towns . . . belong[ing] to the average income brackets. . . ." Liberal Democratic Party electors are said to "stand apart from others in their irritation and anxiety. Their misgivings primarily relate to Russia's losing its great power status . . . and the weakness of state authority in the country . . . identification with the 'Soviet people' is very essential. . . ."¹⁵

Based on results of a survey conducted in Russia just before the December parliamentary election, Professor Jerry Hough has written that: ". . . it was not impending unemployment in the cities that produced Zhirinovskiy's triumph. His largest support was in the countryside, the small towns and the medium-sized cities, and it came at the expense of the centrist parties, especially the Agrarian (Peasant) Party. Mikhail Gorbachev's agricultural Stavropol region, for example, gave 38 percent of its vote to Zhirinovskiy and only 10 percent to the Agrarian Party." He reported that Professor Susan Lehmann's analysis of the data "found the following rates of approval for Zhirinovskiy's party among skilled workers who lived in villages and towns of different population: Under 50,000, 33.5 percent; 50,000-200,000, 29 percent; 200,000-500,000, 27 percent; 500,000 to million, 21 percent; over 1 million, 15 percent." Hough indicates that there was a major decline in voter turnout in the large industrial centers.¹⁶

In another personal assessment, Mikhail Poltoranin, head of the Federal Information Center, expressed the view that it was not the poorest segment of society that voted for Zhirinovskiy's party but that there were rich business people and even farmers who voted for Zhirinovskiy because they were being threatened by gangsters and

Zhirinovskiy had promised order. He expressed the view that "... if policies go on drifting for just six months more, the people will demand the iron fist. I do not think that forces behind the scenes are preparing the LDPR leader for this role: He is too talkative, and deliberately draws fire onto himself. Zhirinovskiy is just the probe they used to measure the depth of dissatisfaction in Russia. Another man is ready to spring out from behind his back—I cannot see his face yet, but I can just make out his general's shoulder boards through the smoke."¹⁷

Zhirinovskiy continues to receive much attention in connection with the new parliament. He was one of ten nominated to be speaker of the Duma but withdrew his name. His party was given chairmanship of a Duma committee on geopolitics that apparently was created in a compromise to keep him from the chairmanship of the international relations committee. The Liberal Democratic Party's number two person, Viktor Kobeliyev, was nominated to be one of four deputy speakers of the Duma.¹⁸

Zhirinovskiy's party captured more committee chairmanships than any other party—committees on work and social support, environment, industry, natural resources, agriculture, and geopolitics.¹⁹

The shouting, intimidation, and other activities on the floor of the Duma by Zhirinovskiy and his party colleagues have drawn much attention. One observer has characterized the Liberal Democratic party as "a party of the street," explaining that: "The LDPR plays without rules—that's why it is a party of the street."²⁰ According to one summary of Zhirinovskiy's remarks to fellow delegates on 13 January, he said: "You are not yet mature enough for a normal parliament. . . . I agree to undergo psychiatric examination. . . . My two-day visit to Europe made everyone sit up. . . . I am not suitable for the role of

parliament's traffic controller [in other words chairman of the State Duma]. My health will be spoilt by Chubays, Kozyrev, Fedorov. . . . But my health is necessary for the entire Russian people. Mr. Chubays (addressing Chubays), don't look at the clock, you will have time to look at it in your cell in Lefortovo. . . . Quiet! (taps with his heel on the rostrum). Get out of the hall, out, all of you! I am waiting for the presidential elections. Then I will show you!"²¹

We should expect to hear much more from Zhirinovskiy in his role of parliamentarian, much of it designed to grab attention and to shock. A quotation from his 13 January address in the Duma is illustrative: "I would gladly have agreed to carry out the functions of leader of the Russian parliament as it would have been an example, not just for this country, not just for Europe, but for the whole world. After all, just two days that I spent in Europe sent the entire planet reeling, all the diplomats, all the ministers."²²

An article has been published indicating that Zhirinovskiy has plans to create a radio program or station to be called "Radio Zhirinovskiy."²³

In early 1994, Zhirinovskiy apparently was a major advocate, along with communist politicians, of an amnesty for people imprisoned in connection with anti-government activity in recent years. He reportedly proposed in the State Duma an amnesty for those arrested in connection with the August 1991 abortive coup, the demonstration by hardliners on May Day 1993, and the October 1993 armed revolt, but this proposal was voted down by the Duma on or about 17 February.²⁴ An amnesty was subsequently approved by the Duma on 25 February. Zhirinovskiy's role in the amnesty is not entirely clear. Some have reported that Zhirinovskiy wanted to free the men, including former Vice President Rutskoy, from jail but not necessarily allow them to

participate in politics.²⁵ If Rutskoy becomes active in national politics, he could draw support away from Zhirinovskiy, an issue to which Zhirinovskiy has responded: "There will always be contenders—so be it," and that in the next presidential election "the choice will be between me and Rutskoi."²⁶ Rutskoy's political future and his willingness to work with or compete against Zhirinovskiy remain to be seen.

In addition to support from a significant proportion of the population, Zhirinovskiy may have strong support from the security forces in Russia and possibly from foreign sources such as Iraq.

Zhirinovskiy's party appears to have considerable support of the military. In the December nation-wide party-list voting for 225 of 450 State Duma seats, his party may have received as much as one-third or more of the votes of the military, with indications that the reformist coalition Russia's Choice came in second with some 11 percent. Zhirinovskiy writes in his book of using the "dash" to the south to help provide a renaissance for the Russian military. He appears interested in weapons and weapons research, and has spoken of a new, secret sonic weapon called Elipton. He has already announced his intention to run for president of Russia in the next such election.

Many have viewed Zhirinovskiy's success as raising the specter of fascism in Russia. Some have compared him to Hitler, and others to Mussolini. Some have dismissed these suggestions or said that at least they are premature.

A Russian television film on Zhirinovskiy showed an interview with a youth movement representative of Zhirinovskiy's party who drew parallels between the Liberal Democratic Party and Hitler's Nazi Party as follows: "Our party arose in troubled times, and won its supporters by sure steps, just as Hitler's party arose in its time. Just in

the same way, it won its supporters before it came to power. We also have a second thing in common. Hitler came to power by constitutional means, by elections, and our party also intends to come to power legally and by constitutional means. Third, Hitler pursued a firm ethnic policy. He favored the German race within Germany. We pursue the same policy, but in Russia. We want Russians to feel good in Russia."²⁷

On 2-3 April 1994, the Liberal Democratic Party reportedly held a party congress in Moscow which elected Zhirinovskiy as the leader of the party until the year 2004, endorsed him as a candidate for the Russian presidential election, and voted to grant him dictatorial powers in forming the party's leadership. Zhirinovskiy told the congress he would restore all democratic institutions in the party after he wins the presidency, but also said that the idea of democracy "does not correspondent [sic] to the national psyche . . . in Russia."²⁸ He also reportedly called for a new Eastern European Slavonic Union, and the LDPR Congress reportedly transformed itself into a "Congress of Slavonic People," which set up an "All-Slavonic Parliament" and an "All-Slavonic Government." Zhirinovskiy was elected head of the "parliament" and former KGB general Aleksandr Sterligov became head of the "government."²⁹

Alternative Scenarios for the Future of Zhirinovskiy

Several scenarios are possible with Zhirinovskiy and his party:

Discredited or Fade Away. Zhirinovskiy could discredit himself and his party, become isolated, and even fade from the political scene.

In mid-February, two Liberal Democratic members of the State Duma were reported to have declared that they were leaving Zhirinovskiy's faction, criticizing him for extremism and interfering in the affairs of other countries.³⁰ Other reports indicated Zhirinovskiy had expelled them and would institute criminal charges against them.³¹ These reports were subsequently denied. Zhirinovskiy indicated that the reported split was a ruse to ferret out dissenters in the party and expose machinations of the security services who might try to split the party.³² One report suggested there had been a reconciliation after Zhirinovskiy met with the dissenter or dissenters.³³ Finally, a later report indicated that Zhirinovskiy had called all of the parliamentary deputies of the LDPR together and pressed them to adhere to party unity; this report indicated there were three disgruntled LDPR deputies and that only one of the three attended this meeting. Zhirinovskiy allegedly took a hard line at this meeting, calling for strengthening his chairman's position and saying: "We have unity, a policy and leader and the party's rating is going up at breakneck speed," "What our opponents want is party infighting and we must not give them a chance," and "If you dislike it, put your party card and deputy mandate on the table and start from scratch in some other party."³⁴

Another new nationalist party, the movement for Russia's National Revival, has emerged, and one of its leaders, Dmitry Vasilyev, has denounced Zhirinovskiy, saying his rise was "not incidental" and that there is someone behind him. Vasilyev has described Zhirinovskiy's statements as a "dangerous political provocation" and said that Zhirinovskiy "provokes revenge-seeking sentiments and discredits the idea of the Russian issue."³⁵

Prosecuted. He could be prosecuted and imprisoned for war-mongering. The Russian prosecutor general's office has opened a formal criminal investigation into statements he has made in his book and perhaps elsewhere that may violate Article 71 of the Russian Criminal Code, which provides for 3-8 years imprisonment for propagandizing war. The investigation was launched after complaints by a Russian newspaper man and human rights campaigner. Not until the investigation is completed would any charges be filed, under Russian law.³⁶ (See in the Appendix under Part C, 3, selected quotations from his book cited as possible violations of Article 71.)

Physically Harmed. He could even so antagonize people that someone might attempt to physically harm him. On 14 January 1994, a fellow Duma delegate punched Zhirinovskiy in the face in a dining room, reportedly after one of them attempted to jump ahead in the cafeteria line, and, some time before the December elections, body guards of a popular singer are reported to have beaten him up at a concert.³⁷ Asked during an interview about whether he worried about being physically removed, he responded "No, because there is no getting away from fate. Lincoln had to be killed, so they killed him. Kennedy—they killed him. Palme—they killed him. . . ." ³⁸

Major Political Player. On the other hand, with the force of his personality and the strength of his support, he could continue to be a major player in the parliament and even become more powerful as coalitions are formed generally or on specific issues. In the government at large, he might be able to have even wider influence. The government already appears to be taking into account the recent elections with respect to some new bureaucratic and policy issues, and Yeltsin has avoided criticizing

Zhirinovskiy and has even accorded him a degree of respect over the past year.

Government Leader. At the further extreme, between now and the 1996 presidential election, if something were to happen to Yeltsin, if Zhirinovskiy succeeded in promoting his candidacy for the presidency sufficiently to become a leading contender, or if something even more untoward occurred (there have been two attempted coups in Moscow in the past three years), it is not inconceivable that a Russian government heavily influenced or even led by Zhirinovskiy could emerge.

Implications If Zhirinovskiy Were to Accede to Power

If Zhirinovskiy were to lead the Russian government, it is always possible that assumption of power would sober him. But if he were to follow some of the policies he has advocated, we could face a Russian government that was:

- internally anti-reform, even dictatorial, and anti-minority, including anti-Semitic;
- outwardly acquisitive toward the other former republics of the USSR, including the Baltic states;
- supportive of a renaissance of the Russian military, increased funding and support for Russian defense industry, an end to defense conversion, and increased arms sales abroad;
- anti-Western and anti-U.S.;
- supportive of Iraq, Libya, and other irresponsible states;

- capable of declaring, if not executing, the most irresponsible of threats to world peace.

Zhirinovskiy's accession to power could have significant implications for U.S. national security policy, defense budgets and programs, and a broad range of foreign policy issues, including refugee policy.

5. WHAT SHOULD WESTERN POLICY BE FOR DEALING WITH ZHIRINOVSKIY?

There are several alternative approaches the West could take vis-a-vis Zhirinovskiy, including:

- neglect,
- aloofness,
- purposeful ignoring,
- constructive engagement, and
- active criticism and containment.

Neglect

If Zhirinovskiy were perceived as harmless, in terms both of intent and power, then the West could basically shrug its shoulders and neglect Zhirinovskiy and his followers. This approach could be based on a presumption that Zhirinovskiy does not really believe or support some of the more outrageous statements or positions he has espoused and that he has made these only to gain attention. It could

also reflect a presumption that the relative success of Zhirinovskiy's party in the December elections represented only a protest vote and one that is not likely to be repeated. Another presumption might be that Zhirinovskiy, who despite his efforts, has not been appointed a government minister or selected as chairman of a major parliamentary committee, is not very powerful now and is not likely to become much more influential in the future. A further assumption might be that even should Zhirinovskiy rise to positions of authority, he would become more responsible in his statements, policy, and actions.

Aloofness

If one believes that in dealing with other countries, particularly democracies or countries attempting to establish democratic institutions and procedures, it is fundamental that the West remain neutral and not oppose—or support—any specific politician or party, then an approach based on aloofness and remaining above or outside the fray might be pursued. If Russia's executive branch remains basically neutral toward Zhirinovskiy and his party, then this might be a further reason to pursue this approach.

This course might also be prescribed if one is concerned that active Western opposition to Zhirinovskiy might be exploited by him or others to gain popular support in Russia from those who dislike or are suspicious of the West. This approach might also be pursued if one believed that Zhirinovskiy might rise to power and Western relations with him after his rise to power would be better if the West had not opposed him on his way up.

Purposeful Ignoring

The West might purposefully ignore Zhirinovskiy, believing that he and his movement thrive on publicity and that the best way to oppose him is to ignore him. Under this approach, Western governments would not have their senior leaders, statesmen, or even their ambassadors meet with him. They would also not issue statements or warnings about Zhirinovskiy, even when he says or does something outrageous or irresponsible, nor would they include references to him in major speeches. They might conduct classified research on him and address his activities in restricted diplomatic channels, but they would not promote any public responses. They might, however, quietly open or pursue contacts at a low level with those in his movement in an effort to assess the movements' activities and policies.

Constructive Engagement

If Western leaders judge that Zhirinovskiy is misinformed or misguided and can be influenced to change his rhetoric and positions, then the West could attempt to engage him constructively in an effort to cease his offensive, irresponsible statements and positions and to develop closer relations. Western ambassadors might meet with him to discuss issues, and meetings with Zhirinovskiy might be sought for important Western government officials and citizens travelling to Russia. In this regard, he might be treated at least equally to leaders of other political parties in Russia, or even given greater attention. The West might indicate that if he becomes more responsible, the West would not oppose and might even welcome visits by Zhirinovskiy to the West.

Active Criticism and Containment

If leaders in the West believe that Zhirinovskiy is fundamentally a dangerous individual who presents an increasing threat to democracy in Russia and peace and stability in the world, then an approach involving active criticism and efforts to contain his influence might be pursued.

This approach might be based on assumptions that Zhirinovskiy has deep prejudices within him, and that he seeks power and is prepared to say and perhaps do most anything to obtain it. It could also include the presumption that if he were to gain power in Russia, he would reverse the process of democracy, moving it back toward dictatorship, stimulate an aggressive Russian nationalism as outlined in his book *Last Dash to the South*, and threaten the interests of neighboring states and much of the world at large.

Under this approach, the West would carefully study, monitor, record, and, as appropriate, publicize the statements and activities of Zhirinovskiy, using the assets of government agencies and supporting efforts by the private sector. Public diplomacy campaigns might be developed to publicize irresponsible and threatening positions espoused by Zhirinovskiy. When he says or does something irresponsible, Western leaders would publicly take him to task.

Countries could be encouraged to deny him visas to visit their territory, as Germany, Spain, and apparently Slovenia have. When Western leaders visit Russia, they would avoid contact with him and could criticize his activities before other Russian leaders and the public, taking into account internal political sensitivities.

Western governments could also begin contingency planning for political, economic, and national security steps they might want or need to consider should Zhirinovskiy gain increasing political strength in Russia.

The Author's Views and Recommendation

The author believes that Zhirinovskiy is fundamentally dangerous for democracy in Russia and international peace. Zhirinovskiy's statements and activities show him to be a reckless demagogue, willing to say almost anything to attract attention and gain political power. He has indicated that, if he comes to power in the near future, he would rule dictatorially at least in the first few years. He appears fundamentally prejudiced against many non-Russian or non-Slavic ethnic groups inside Russia and on Russia's periphery, especially the southern periphery. Despite his protestations, he appears to have anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim prejudices. He has shown a special affinity for Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq and for right-wing elements in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. He is antagonistic toward the United States and other Western states. He advocates an aggressive Russian nationalism, extending Russia throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union, and deploying Russian forces southward to the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean as part of a mission to save and revive Russia and its armed forces. He advocates redrawing state borders in Europe and has threatened to attack or annihilate many other states. While some may disregard this as bluster, should he accede to power, he could significantly threaten international peace.

While it should not be overdrawn, the rapid rise from obscurity, the oratorical skills, the quest for power and dictatorial proclivities, the apparent ethnic and nationalistic

prejudices, the interest in redrawing borders, and the grand design of military conquest of other states to save and revive the fatherland, all conjure up an image of Zhirinovskiy as a Russian Hitler.

Responsible political leaders in Russia, in neighboring states, and in the West in general should share an interest in helping to diminish the chances that Zhirinovskiy could gain greater power and even accede to a leadership position in Russia. While this might be a shared strategic objective, reasonable people can debate the best tactical approaches to take vis-a-vis Zhirinovskiy.

The author believes that Western and other countries should pursue, and encourage Russians to pursue, an approach of "active criticism and containment" of Zhirinovskiy. Zhirinovskiy is too dangerous to neglect, and remaining aloof or only ignoring him cedes him the field. Western leaders, statesmen, and senior officials should not meet with him, and efforts toward constructive engagement risk our giving him credibility and, in effect, helping him win power, only then to see his dangerous, aggressive nature reemerge. While an "active criticism and containment" approach might give Zhirinovskiy additional media attention, educated publics and leaders are the best protectors of democracy and peace.

APPENDIX: SELECTED QUOTATIONS FROM ZHIRINOVSKIY

A. Russian Domestic Politics

1. Liberal Democratic Party

Main goal: (Asked about his main goal) "We want to participate in the government as a strong parliamentary group to gain the opportunity to implement our program—this means to implement another form of reforms of the economy and of the state. We want neither the form of the CIS nor that of the former Soviet Union, but the rebirth of a strong, rich, cultural, and democratic Russian state within the borders of the former Soviet Union." (Vienna *Die Presse*, 15 Dec 93, p. 3, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia Daily Report (FBIS-SOV)*-93-239), 15 Dec 93, pp. 19-20)

Claim to be centrists: ". . . we too are neither rightists nor leftists, but only centrists. We are to the right of center. It could be said that we are slightly to the right of center by some 20 percent. . . ." (London *Kanal-6 Television*, 10 Jan 94, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, West Europe Daily Report (FBIS-WEU)*-94-007, 11 Jan 94, p. 59)

Claim not to be fascists/Communists: "... our party has no relation to fascism or communism. We are a moderate centrist party with a liberal-democratic program. . . ." (Sofia *Otechestven Vestnik*, 27 Dec 93, pp. 1,2, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, East Europe Daily Report (FBIS-EEU)-94-001*, 3 Jan 94, pp. 6-7)

Party size and funding: "We are not a small party. We are even the largest party in the country, with hundreds of basic level organizations, hundreds of thousands of members, and millions of supporters. Our party's funds amount to over a billion rubles, and they come from contributions made by ordinary people, people who are anything but rich. Every day we receive small contributions of 5,000, 10,000, and 50,000 rubles. You can check that at the main post office. . . . Not one ruble has come from hands that are dirty. In the 1991 presidential elections, 6,211,000 people cast votes for me. If each one of them only contributed 200 rubles, the cost of half a packet of cigarettes, we would immediately have 1.2 billion rubles in our party's coffers. Who does not gladly make that kind of sacrifice for a party leader that he loves? . . . We received neither money or any other kind of assistance from abroad. Saddam Husayn did once invite me to visit him. If the Israelis had done that, I would have gone there too. I have feelings neither of antipathy nor fondness toward any foreign statesman." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93, pp. 116-117 and pp. 119-120, in *FBIS-WEU-93-242*, 20 Dec 93, pp. 21-24)

No paramilitary or violence: (asked if there are armed men in his party) "No, not one—nothing near it. There is not one. I do not even have a penknife. . . ." (and asked if the party will use only constitutional means) "That only. Heaven forbid. We have never organized violent action.

In Moscow and in all of Russia, our party held the most peaceful rallies. . . . There has never been violence—not a bit . . . never a single scuffle . . . the most peaceful party members; the most peaceful groups of deputies in the regional bodies and at the national level. . . ." (Budapest *MTV Television Network*, 7 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-006*, 10 Jan 94, pp. 11-15.) One reporter who visited the party headquarters observed short-haired young men in camouflage uniforms, one of whom said they carried only batons and not firearms. (Reported in Budapest *Beszelo*, 16 Dec 93, pp. 19-21, in *FBIS-SOV-93-243*, 21 Dec 93, pp. 6-8)

Guards who handle weapons: (Asked about his guards—one report mentioned two guards dressed in Army pea coats at his headquarters) "O-o-oh! Twenty counterintelligence officers who have been through Afghanistan, Abkhazia, and the Dneister region. Excellent guys; they handle all types of weapons. Half the people in my office are guards. Even at night I have a guard by me. If necessary, they will blow up this entire building." (The interviewer added that, according to Aleksandr Vengerovskiy, who is described as in charge of the LDPR's secret service and in the process of drawing up a project for a 'Russian Intelligence Service,' these men serving as Zhirinovskiy's personal bodyguards once guarded Brezhnev.) (Moscow *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 22 Jan 94, p. 2, in *FBIS-SOV-94-015*, 24 Jan 94, pp. 33-35)

2. Recent Election and New Constitution

Claim 70%: ". . . we achieved a national average of 70 percent of all votes. An attempt is now being made to manipulate the figures so that they appear to be lower." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

Claim elections rigged: Zhirinovskiy claimed that the outcome of the general elections in Russia was "rigged" and the Liberal Democratic Party garnered "more than 50 percent of the votes" but official results gave his party only about one-half this. (Paris *AFP*, 21 December 93, in *FBIS-WEU-93-244*, 22 Dec 93, p. 5)

Working with other parties: "The other side constantly sought to provoke tension and threatened to exclude us from the elections, to reduce our television air time. It was in the government's hands. That is why there was a tougher approach. Following our victory, we can adopt a somewhat more relaxed approach. . . . (election campaign tirades against internal and external enemies) They were meant seriously, very seriously. The joy of victory has only mellowed me somewhat. . . ." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

Constitution: (Zhirinovskiy, who helped in drafting the new constitution, appears not to have joined others in suggesting that it be revised, but the Liberal Democratic Party's Deputy Chairman, Aleksandr Vengerovskiy, has suggested redrawing the constitution. Vengerovskiy, speaking of the power of the Russian president under the new constitution, has said: ". . . a little more than half the electorate voted, and only half of them accepted it; therefore, only a quarter of the Russian people agree with it. However, we will not

put up with this. We will start to implement our basic three program points immediately. Urgently launching the reform course is one of these, and redrawing the Constitution is another. . . . Foreign policy is the third area. . . ." (Budapest *Beszelo*, 16 Dec 93)

3. Relations with Yeltsin and His Government

Yeltsin patriotic: "Yeltsin is making mistakes, but he is not destroying the country. He is wrong on some issues, but deep in his heart he stands on a patriotic platform." (Munich *Deutsche National-Zeitung*, 17 Dec 93, pp. 3-5, in *FBIS-SOV-93-241*, 17 Dec 93, pp. 13-14)

Yeltsin approval: "I can sense that the president (Yeltsin) likes me as an individual and our party as a whole." (Moscow *Russian Television Network*, 14 Dec 93, in *FBIS-SOV-93-239*, 15 Dec 93, p. 18)

Sympathy from and toward Yeltsin: "I feel the president's sympathetic attitude toward us. We have taken a centrist line. We are ready both to form our own new government and to join a coalition, but if the president does not invite us, we will not be upset. Likewise, we are ready to contest the June presidential elections, but if they are not called, we will not open confrontation." (Moscow *Segodnya*, 15 Dec 93, p. 1, in *FBIS-SOV-93-239*, 15 Dec 93, p. 19)

Sympathy toward Yeltsin: ". . . If there are presidential elections, I will definitely take part in them. However, I am not desperate to inflict a crushing defeat on Boris Yeltsin. He did what he was able to do. All the mistakes are the fault of his team." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

Relations with Yeltsin: (Asked about status of relations with Yeltsin) "Good. We meet from time to time. He likes volleyball, and so do I. He is a good man, and he gives me no trouble." (Interview by Fulvio Scaglione in Moscow, date not given, "Hands Off Russia," Milan *Famiglia Cristiana*, 9 Feb 94, pp. 44-45, in *FBIS-SOV-94-023*, 3 Feb 94, pp. 16-17)

Positions in government: "The president should give us a few ministerial posts. . . . The most important ones of course: defense, state security, the police, and foreign affairs. . . . Of course, the Yeltsin team will defend their sinecures with every last drop of strength they have. If he hands over those ministries, then his team will immediately disappear from the political stage. An attempt might be made to fob us off with unimportant ministries: social policy, labor, agriculture, and the arts. . . . We would find them acceptable, and we will participate in the government in what form we are offered. If Yeltsin's people try using delaying tactics, they will achieve a breathing space of a few months at the very most. We will occupy all the key positions in the Russian Government by spring at the very latest. . . . (if no places in the cabinet) Then we will assume the role of constructive opposition that will expose the mistakes made by the government, but will not provide a pretext for dissolving parliament. We do not want any more crises." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

4. Relations with Others in Russian Parliament

Coalition with whom: (Asked about coalitions) "With the women's movement. It is the most neutral political force and would not be an obstacle for us. The others will see

how they will get on with us. . . . (Asked about working with the Communists) "Boris Yeltsin would not like that. Why should we pick a fight with the President, when we ourselves have nothing in common with the Communists. We are opposed to the Communists, just as we are opposed to the government's 'Russia's Choice' block. However, we would have nothing against their participation in a coalition government. They could receive two or three minor ministries at the very most." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

Reconciliation/work with all: "The party's position is reconciliation. The LDPR is ready to cooperate with all but will not join blocs or agreements with anybody. . . . (he indicated the LDPR supports the new constitution in every way, regarding it "good for 90 per cent" and saying the party plans to strive for creating "a strong parliament along with the strong president"). (Moscow *ITAR-TASS*, 10 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-006*, 10 Jan 94, pp. 26)

5. Need for Strong President and Dictatorship

Strong president: "If I want to be objective, I must say that parliamentary democracy is superior to the presidential power. . . . This would be the ideal situation, but concretely in Russia, we need a strong presidential power and a strong president." (Budapest *Pesti Hirlap*, 14 Dec 93, pp. 1-2, in *FBIS-SOV-93-239*, 15 Dec 93, pp. 22-23)

Dictatorship and shootings: "I say it quite plainly: When I come to power, there will be a dictatorship. I will beat the Americans in space. I will surround the planet with our space stations so that they'll be scared of our space

weapons. I don't care if they call me a fascist or a Nazi. There's nothing like fear to make people work better. The stick, not the carrot. Those who have to be arrested will be arrested quietly at night. I may have to shoot 100,000 people, but the other 300 million will live peacefully." (Remarks reportedly made in late 1991 at the Kremlin, reported by the Associated Press in *The Washington Times*, 15 Dec 93, p. A12)

Democracy not now: "As a lawyer and expert on human rights, I am an advocate of democracy, but I do not think democracy is the right medicine for the state's diseased organism. The only panacea is strong authority. Only after the organism of the state has recovered from the crisis and the economy has healed will it be possible to switch over to a democratic system. . . . The disease of destruction is very far advanced in Russia, and the economic crisis has assumed a particularly acute form. That is why it is essential to apply drastic measures. Only through fear can one enforce an end to the civil war, stop the disintegration of the army, and stem the tide of emigres. . . . (Russians) have never lived under democracy! By voting for me, they have opted for democracy and entrusted me with it. Democracy is in the right hands now. . . . The shift to democracy must be suitably prepared. Democracy needs an economic base, political parties need varied social strata, and the Army needs an objective and specific conditions. What is needed today, however, is a freeze, a political diet. . . . We need a strong authority." (Poznan *WPROST*, 2 Jan 94, pp. 47-48, in *FBIS-SOV-94-007*, 11 Jan 94, pp. 19-20)

Ban parties, strikes, unions for 2-3 years: "I would only ban all the parties in the country, all strikes, and all trade unions for two to three years until peace and order prevail

everywhere and national conflicts are resolved." (Berlin *ADN*, 13 Dec 93, in *FBIS-SOV-93-238*, 14 Dec 93, p. 34)

6. Desire to Be President

(If presidential elections were held in June 1994) "I will certainly take part in them . . . If, however, presidential elections are not held until 1996, then my election to that position would be a nice present for my 50th birthday." (Moscow *Interfax*, 14 Dec 93, in *FBIS-SOV-93-239*, 15 Dec 93, p. 18)

". . . I have no doubt that I will win the next presidential election. Neither the so-called democratic camp nor the communists will stand a chance. That is a pity, because I am accustomed to a sharp struggle. I am sad that the victory will be so easy." (Poznan *WPROST*, 2 Jan 94)

7. Domestic Policy In Russia

Three tasks: "As prime minister I would make three basic decisions—an end to all financial help for foreign countries, an end to the conversion of the weapons industry to civilian production, and a sharp struggle against crime." (Ibid.)

Minimum program: ". . . Russia's economy can be restored in a very short time. Russia possesses rich resources. . . . We have arrived at economic disaster and the impoverishment of the people because of the squandering of Russia's wealth, because of our wide open borders. . . . We need to begin with state borders, by establishing a strict customs regime, by stopping the export from the country of

resources we need ourselves. A minimum program is needed. 1. All aid to foreign countries, nearby or further afield, should be stopped. . . . 2. The conversion of military industry should be suspended. We must continue to produce military products and sell them on the world market, from which the United States ousted us by deceit. . . . 3 . . . put an end to organized crime. . . . The right to trade must be granted only to people having Russian citizenship. . . . " (Moscow *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 10 Dec 93, p. 2, in *FBIS-SOV-93-237*, 13 Dec 93, pp. 13-14)

Saving money by stopping aid to neighbors: ". . . I will demand that aid to neighboring countries be immediately stopped. That will raise our standard of living by 30 percent straightaway. Then a severe blow will be delivered against crime, a blow organized by officers from the ministries of defense, security, and internal affairs. That will also bring a significant increase in the standard of living." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

Economic program: "The people are tired . . . we promise an improvement in the standard of living by about mid-1994—that is, in about half a year—if we can work because we get the necessary number of deputies. This is to be achieved, first, by reducing subsidies. This yields an additional 30 percent of revenues for the state. Second, the destruction of the military-industrial complex is to be stopped. Destroying it is more expensive than continuing production. This yields another 30 percent in additional revenues. Third, the struggle against organized crime must be intensified. If we are able to serve a decisive blow to the 5,000 organized gangs in Russia, we get another 30 percent of revenues from their assets. In this way we can improve our financial situation by 100 percent within a

short time. . . . We must shape foreign policy . . . so that we get the corresponding economic benefit from it. We must reestablish relations with the Balkan states and improve relations with the states in Eastern Europe, with Iraq, and with India. We must make sure that we get our debts repaid: We have debts of \$70 billion, and others owe us \$100 billion. This is \$30 billion in our favor. If we get those and improve the relations with our immediate neighbors, this has a further effect on our economic situation." (Vienna *Die Presse*, 15 Dec 93)

Mixed economy and anti-crime program: "We will pursue a mixture of . . . planned economy and moderate market economy . . . we will stop inflation. . . . Within three months I will destroy the several hundred mafia gangs . . . and every kind of serious criminals . . . with the entire rigor of the law and a police force that is free of any corruption. Law and order must be restored. I guarantee it. And the Russians know that." (Munich *Deutsche National-Zeitung*, 11 Feb 94, pp. 3-5, in *FBIS-SOV-94-031*, 15 Feb 94, pp. 12-14)

Crime and Mafia: ". . . The entire Mafia from the southern regions must be wiped out: A terrible blow has to be delivered against crime. . . ." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

Security: ". . . After six months, not only would people's standards of living increase, but also their security. I would also bring more militiamen and soldiers out onto the streets." (Poznan *WPROST*, 2 Jan 94)

Defense industry: "Conversion to civilian purposes must be

stopped immediately. We should finally start building submarines again. Export earnings for each submarine amount to \$200 million. . . ." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

Provinces and tasks for the center: ". . . In the future, Russia should just have provinces, 40 or 50 self-governing units. We have to get rid of terms such as republics and autonomous regions. The central government, on the other hand, should concentrate on just seven [sic] tasks: foreign policy, defense, finances, transportation, energy, and the environment." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

Mixed economy: ". . . we support a mixed economy without destroying the state sector in the towns and in the countryside, and we are opposed to dismantling the collective farms. . . ." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

Promising vacations: ". . . The citizens of Russia will be able to breathe a sigh of relief. They will be able to afford a vacation once again—in the Crimea, on the Baltic, on Cuba, and in Bulgaria. Then after their vacation, they will say in the fall: We made the right choice in December 1993—the Liberal Democratic Party." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

B. Russian Nationalism and Power and the Near-Abroad

Military and colonies: ". . . The most important thing today is our weapons—the army and the navy. This is mighty power! The best borders are maritime. Britain is a maritime power and the best borders are sea borders!

Mongolia—no sea borders—a miserable third-rate state! Today we have no colonies; meanwhile colonies provided the lion's share of revenues for Britain, for instance. At present we are not only getting anything (nothing?) from the colonies but ourselves are feeding these impoverished appendices. And we would be well advised to think about colonies." (Moscow *Kuranty*, 16 Dec 93, p. 4, in *FBIS-SOV-93-240*, 16 Dec 93, pp. 16-17)

"For Russia, for all Russians": ". . . a new state system, a new economic policy, a new foreign policy—all this is to bring about better life. All this we want to implement under the slogan 'For Russia, for all Russians.' No Russian blood is to be spilt in nationality conflicts anymore. . . ." (Vienna *Die Presse*, 15 Dec 93)

Russian greatness: ". . . Russians and Germans are the greatest European peoples, and Russia is the world's greatest state." (Munich *Deutsche National-Zeitung*, 14 Jan 94, pp. 3-4, in *FBIS-SOV-94-011*, 18 Jan 94, pp. 37-39)

Russia not a satellite of the West: ". . . we and our real friends want Russia to remain Russia and be a strong Russian Russia, not a satellite of the West." (Munich *Deutsche National-Zeitung*, 17 Dec 93)

Models to emulate: "Personalities from Russia's great past—Piotr Stolypin, Alexander II, the military commanders Suvorov, Kornilov, Zhukov. There are their portraits; they were real Russian patriots. That was how big Russia was 120 years ago (he points to the emblem of his party, which shows the Czarist empire including Alaska.)" (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93, op. cit.) And ". . . My model is Bismarck. His great social laws on the one hand, and his

ingenious foreign policy on the other, have made the creator of the small German empire immortal. . . ." (Munich *Deutsche National-Zeitung*, 14 Jan 94)

Russia in USSR borders: "The LDPR advocates the recreation of the Russian state within the borders of the former USSR. We are against the CIS as it now exists—it is an artificial formation that breaks ties between people and production lines and destroys the single economic area of the great power which formed in the course of centuries—Russia . . . it is necessary to reject national divisions and restore the old, prerevolutionary territorial administrative divisions. . . . Russia is a fatherland for all. . . . All peoples—great and small—are equal before the law, each possesses the right to maintain their traditions and customs and develop their national culture and the right to freedom of conscience. Naturally, the Russian people, the most numerous in our country, who possess a high culture and who made great sacrifices in the process of forming and maintaining the Russian empire, play the role of guarantor of the country's prosperity and integrity. There will be no need . . . to resort to violence in order to reunite Russia's lands. . . . Inhabitants of the 'nearby foreign parts' have been deprived of their accustomed selfless aid from the Russian Federation . . . they will ask of their own accord to be restored to the body of the Russian state." (Moscow *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 10 Dec 93)

Republics made to come back: "Our republics must be made to come back. How? By not being kind toward them. . . . We are buying third-rate cotton from Uzbekistan at world prices! And the way to act here is this: Two Zhiguli cars for your garbage cotton and that is it! They will starve? Let them. Tribal societies should starve. And

why ever should they be living at the expense of the civilized Russian nation?! Estonians . . . a nation of 900,000—and all are stealing! A nation of thieves! Politics is the art of deception, and one should not be embarrassed by this. As long as we are kindly and decent looking in the eyes of the "world community," our people will go about hungry and wretched. . . ." (Moscow *Kuranty*, 16 Dec 93)

Former republics return to Russia: The former Soviet republics "will crawl on their knees begging to be admitted to Russia. We will not take them all back at once but will listen to what the world community says." This will happen "when the republics see for themselves that they are incapable of self-rule and cannot offer people anything but chaos and war." (Moscow *Interfax*, 14 Dec 93)

Reestablishing borders of Russia: "The reestablishment of the borders is to take place peacefully. Already today, Tajikistan, the Caucasus, and others are willing to return to us. And I think the events in Moldova, in the Baltic states, in Ukraine, and in Belarus contribute to making the majority of their people willing to return to Russia—not as republics in a federation, but in the form of governments (as during the time of the tsar—the editor). The CIS is nothing else but a weak variety of the Soviet Union, in which the center must keep the periphery. If Georgia is in danger, Moscow must one again rescue it, and, in return, Russian soldiers are killed from Georgia to Tajikistan and the members of the Russian minorities are humiliated. Therefore, they all want to get away from there—not only Russians, but also Ukrainians and others, who live as minorities there. Therefore, we—in contrast to other

parties—see the solution only in a strong Russian state." (Vienna *Die Presse*, 15 Dec 93)

USSR borders for Russia: ". . . We think that, in the long run, Russia's borders could be the borders of the former USSR, but this could happen only if the relevant territories, which today are viewed as independent, want this." (Sofia *Otechestven Vestnik*, 27 Dec 93, pp. 1,2, in *FBIS-EEU-94-001*, 3 Jan 94, pp. 6-7.) [Similar words plus the following sentences were reported by Sofia *BTA*]. "If they do, they may approach Russia's new political leadership to get incorporated into Russia's borders. It won't happen unless they want it." (Sofia *BTA*, 26 Dec 93, in *FBIS-EEU-93-246*, 27 Dec 93, pp. 7-8.) And again: "We will not object if the currently independent areas—the former Soviet republics—ask to be allowed back to the fold. We will examine the question of readmitting them, and then the borders of the former Soviet Union will gradually become the borders of Russia." (Budapest *MTV Television Network*, 7 Jan 94)

USSR/Russia/Borders/Military Forces/Nuclear Weapons:

"The state should not have been allowed to disintegrate! The Soviet Union might still exist today; one should have provided greater independence and divided the country into provinces. Such a variant should also have been suggested to the Asian and Caucasian regions, plus Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltic countries. Then they would have realized the advantages to be gained from living within one large state in which all the principles of freedom—cultural and economic freedom—are respected. Look what is happening right now. Entire settlements are burning, towns are being bombed, people are perishing. . . . (asked if the return of the USSR is still possible) Yes, in a territorial sense. But

the law, ideology, and government will be different. The territory of the former USSR could become the territory of a reborn Russia. That will only be possible when a new democratically oriented authority appears in the Kremlin, one that will work out a model of a strong state. A reborn and strengthened army is required for this purpose, together with a nuclear potential that must be improved so that our possible adversaries know that we are prepared to use it. Therefore we will develop our nuclear weapons, create a base in space, and from there we will defend Russia if the need arises. The ideal scenario calls for the existence of a Russo-Swedish and Russo-German border, and a border with China and India in the south." (Poznan *WPROST*, 2 Jan 94)

Expansion: "No expansion. On the contrary, we now have a situation where, for instance, Tajikistan and some Transcaucasian republics want to be with Russia once again. But I for one, together with my party, do not want this. We want the opposite . . . these countries should develop on their own as independent states, but I also say they will never be like independent states, because they joined Russia 200 years ago. This was always the tragedy of these peoples. . . . I favor the pullout of all Russian troops back to Russia, to Moscow. You will see . . . that a terrible war will start there between Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. . . . This is not a state, this is not civilization. This is already a part of the third world war . . . a situation of civil war within their country, or in a state of war with other states: Armenia and Azerbaijan, Abkhazia and Georgia, Tajikistan and Afghanistan. This is already part of the world war because it is a vast territory from India to Athens, to Serbia. It is larger than Europe during World War II. . . . I want to see

our state within its historical borders, but not through violent means, only through economic means, through civilization, culture, law. For instance, if one day they want to return, if they call on us, and if you in the West . . . say we too will help these people to live . . . then perhaps can we take positive steps. However, now, we do not want them to come back within Russia, all the peoples from the south, from Tajikistan to Chisinau. . . . (asked if this includes the Baltic states) Yes, the Baltic states too, but I say we must have economic relations. This does not mean constant aid for the Baltic states. If we stop selling our energy and mineral resources cheaply to the Baltic states, contrary to what we are doing now, their existence as independent states is over. . . . If I lead the Russian Government, we will immediately stop all economic aid to the Baltic states and to any other country. Trade yes, but pay, pay: Pay with hard currencies and no more economic aid. After that, the existence of the Baltic states as independent states is over." (Paris *TF-1 Television Network*, 3 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-002*, 4 Jan 94, pp. 4-5)

Oppose USSR/CIS: "We are against preserving the CIS, just as we are against recreating the USSR. If anybody wants to join Russia, they are welcome, only with the rights of a territorial unit: a province or oblast. No national-state formations." (Moscow *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 22 Jan 94)

No national republics: ". . . we are against having national republics on Russian territory. There are to be no Tatarstan, Yakutsia, Bashkiria, or no North Caucasian Republics. Instead, 40 to 50 governments are to be established. As long as we do not have governments, there will always be conflicts and clashes, which for their part lead to resistance civil-war-like situations, and mass flight."

(Vienna *Die Presse*, 15 Dec 93)

Defense of Russia and Russians: (Speaking of the 1991 presidential elections) "I was the first politician who said he would defend Russians. I got six million votes just for saying that." (Michael Dobbs, *The Washington Post*, 15 Dec 93, p. A23)

Protect Russians: ". . . We want to protect all Russians and have secure borders." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

Crimean Russians: "Remember that the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia will stand up for your rights together with the Russian Party of the Crimea. We will protect Russian people wherever they are." (Moscow *Interfax*, 10 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-007*, 11 Jan 94, p. 15)

Russian nationalism/motherland: ". . . Now, in the former USSR and the former republics, nationalism is the main ideological weapon, and in certain regions anti-Russian emotions intensified. We say that various nations should not be opposed to each other, because we are against every discrimination. Nevertheless, they try to slander us and say that we support Russian nationalism. We say that Russia is the motherland for all and that we oppose the idea of restoring the USSR and CIS. We support the existence of a Russian state, a great Russia, but as a motherland for all nations that live on its territory. It is their common motherland as a geographical entity. And what are they trying to do? They try to prove with their tales that we are Russian nationalists, that we want a pure Russian state, and so on. We do not want this. . . ." (Sofia *Otechestven Vestnik*, 27 Dec 93, pp. 1,2, in *FBIS-EEU-94-001*, 3 Jan 94, pp. 6-7)

Don't want former republics in Russia: "Ex-Soviet Union republics, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, or Middle East, Central Asian republics—they want to be included to (sic) Russia. We don't want, because no profit to be together." (Vienna *Oesterreich Eins Radio Network*, 22 Dec 93, in *FBIS-WEU-93-244*, 22 Dec 93, p.6) According to another report, Zhirinovskiy, noting that many former republics, especially Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, are interested in joining Russia, stated that "we do not want that as there are big differences between us and those republics in the way of politics, economics, and culture. The program of our party does not envisage the former Soviet republics joining Russia." (Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*, 22 Dec 93, in *FBIS-SOV-93-245*, 23 Dec 93, pp. 7-8)

Georgia: "Two hundred years ago Georgia became part of Russia forever as Tiflis Province and had no right to secede. For us Georgia is a state that does not exist. . . ." (Georgia should be allowed to exist on its own) ". . . without Russian subsidies, without our assistance. Let Turkish troops come and show them what Turkish democracy means if they don't want Russian democracy." (Moscow *Interfax*, 4 Feb 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-025*, 7 Feb 94, pp. 15-16)

Common Russian-Turkish border: "It is better for Russia that there should be a common border between Russia and Turkey, without the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Only Turkey and Russia. That will be sufficient." (London *Kanal-6 Television*, 10 Jan 94)

Opening for Turkey in Central Asia: "The Turkish culture could grow like a flower in the Tashkent region, because that is exactly the place for you. Below that are the

Persian-speaking Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and to the north is Russia. But the Tashkent-Ashgabat region is your motherland. You have the Motherland Party, and your motherland lies between Tashkent and Ashgabat. One day in the past, your Ottoman Turkish armies marched into the Byzantine lands from this very region between Tashkent and Ashgabat." (London *Kanal-6 Television*, 10 Jan 94)

Ukraine and Kazakhstan as Provinces of Russia: "Ukraine has not been, and will not be independent. It will be one of our provinces. The same applies to Kazakhstan, which will become a province within southern Siberia." (Bucharest *Romania Libera*, 14 Dec 93, p. 1, in *FBIS-SOV-93-240*, 16 Dec 93, p. 17)

Getting Ukraine to kneel: "It's all very easy. We cease supplying timber to Ukraine, and all the mines of its major coal region of Donbass will collapse. . . . And in three months, Ukraine will kneel." (Interview with *Izvestiya*, early Dec 93, in *The Wall Street Journal*, 15 Dec 93, p. A10)

Moldova as a Province of Russia: "Moldova will become a province of the Russian Federation, with the capital city at Tiraspol . . . " (Bucharest *Romania Libera*, 14 Dec 93)

C. Threats to and Relations with Other Countries

1. Threats to Other Countries

Strong Russia, but no conflicts: ". . . When I advocate a large and strong Russia, I do not want to build up any conflict with Washington. But having several great powers,

to which Russia and others belong, in addition to Germany and the United States, is better for the world than a single globocop, to whose tune the world dances. Equal rights in the family of peoples and states is the key to real partnership. I abhor war and any kind of military conflict, but I am for the peoples' right to self-determination. . . ." (Munich *Deutsche National-Zeitung*, 11 Feb 94)

No threat from Russia: "The world does not need to fear us anymore. No one will be exposed to any kind of danger from Russian soil ever again: There will be no claims on territory, no military missions, and complete adherence to international treaties. Russia will be a civilized European country, open to the rest of the world, without prison camps, without repression, without Stalinism, and—God save us—without fascism. There will only be democracy." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

North-South Division of the World: "Why should the United States meddle with European affairs? Let it take care of Latin America; let Europe take care of Africa; let China and Japan to take care of Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand; and let Russia take care of Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. This vertical domination will produce a good, warm climate all over the world. We will spend less in transportation, communications. Fewer planes will fly, thus making air and water cleaner, and the environment will be preserved. . . ." (Sao Paulo *Veja*, 9 Feb 94, pp. 7-9, in *FBIS-SOV-94-031*, 15 Feb 94, pp. 14-16)

Nuclear blackmail: (Zhirinovskiy is reported to have said the following during the 1991 RSFSR presidential campaign) ". . . I'll move the troops; about 1.5 million strong, into the former (East Germany), rattling my nuclear

sabers, and they'll give me everything. . . . What price Paris? How about London? Washington? Los Angeles? How much are you willing to pay so I don't wipe them from the face of the Earth with my SS-18s (missiles). You doubt me? Want to take a chance? Let's get started." (*The Washington Times*, 14 Dec 93, p. A14)

U.S.: "You Americans must leave the Balkans and the Middle East. . . . If you do not, you will find yourself on a court bench facing another Nuremberg." (quote not further identified, reported in *USA Today*, 15 Dec 93, p. 8A)

U.S./Alaska: (In a meeting with German right-wing party leader Frey, Zhirinovskiy was shown on television as toasting "To a German Prussia and a Russian Alaska." (Moscow *Ostankino Television First Channel Network*, 11 Dec 93, in *FBIS-SOV-93-237*, 13 Dec 93, pp. 15-16)

(Commenting on how the U.S. will soon face the same hardships as the former Soviet Union) "There will be no joy when California joins Mexico, when a negro republic is founded in Miami, when the Russians take back Alaska." (Quoted from Zhirinovskiy's book, *Last Dash to the South*, in *USA Today*, 15 Dec 93, p. 8A)

(When an interviewer asked about a map of Alaska mounted on the wall at Zhirinovskiy's party headquarters) "No that is a historical map. That is what Russia was like 120 years ago. We do not want to restore these borders. That was when the Russian empire was flourishing. . . . It is only history. . . ." (Budapest *MTV Television Network*, 7 Jan 94)

Any Western attackers of Bosnia (presumably Serb elements): "As leader of the main opposition party in Russia, the party that won the elections, I want to warn all governments of Western countries that bombing any towns in Bosnia means declaring war on Russia." The report implied Zhirinovskiy was speaking of Bosnian Serbs, that he called for all foreign forces to withdraw from the former Yugoslavia, and that after such a pullout the Serbs should be left to solve their own problems, but that, if necessary, Russia would be ready to send its army. (Reuters report in *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 31 Jan 94, p. 8)

Ukraine: ". . . Nothing has to be conquered again. We stop delivering timber to Ukraine and the mines will collapse; if we also stop delivering other goods, within three months Kravchuk will come begging on his knees to be allowed to return. . . ." (Budapest *Pesti Hirlap*, 14 Dec 93)

The Baltic states: "I love the Balts . . . a nice cultured nation. . . . The Baltics is a region of the highest culture and the broadest cooperation—no soldiers, no shooting, mere economy, culture and festivals. . . . But if they jeer at Russians depriving them of voting rights and steal of Russia what belongs to Russia, then we will be forced to use the means of defense. . . . If you try to deprive Russians of their rights we will answer with such steps that you will have no electors left to stage elections. . . . If you use force to deprive them of voting rights, evict them from apartments, dismiss them from jobs, we will use economic methods only to square all accounts with the Baltics and your countries will collapse in two weeks after I have become the president of Russia. There will be not a single Baltic country if you continue your thievish policies."

(Tallinn *BNS*, 14 Dec 93, in *FBIS-SOV-93-239*, 15 Dec 93, p. 21)

Estonia: "A nation of 900,000 people, and all of them thieves." He spoke of a need to strengthen the defense of Russian borders "so that nobody can steal anything any more, especially a country like Estonia." (Tallinn *BNS*, 17 Dec 93, in *FBIS-SOV-93-241*, 17 Dec 93, pp. 12-13)

Estonia: ". . . If I become president, the Estonians will be satisfied. Those who are not satisfied will leave—for Sweden, Finland . . ." (Moscow *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, 30 Dec 93, pp. 4-5, in *FBIS-SOV-94-001*, 3 Jan 94, pp. 32-35)

Baltics and small states: "I'll start by squeezing the Baltics and other small nations. I don't care if they are recognized by the U.N. I'm not going to invade them or anything. I'll bury radioactive waste along the Lithuanian border and put up powerful fans and blow the stuff across the border at night. . . . They'll all get radiation sickness. They'll die of it. When they either die out or get down on their knees, I'll stop it. I'm a dictator. What I'm going to do is bad, but it'll be good for Russia." (remarks reportedly made at a parliamentary session shortly after the August 1991 coup, reported by the Associated Press in *The Washington Times*, 15 Dec 93, p. A12)

Germany: "If I was sitting in the Kremlin, the Germans would pay for all this meddling. I wouldn't hesitate to use nuclear weapons. We would make new Hiroshimas and Nagasakis." (quote from 1991 reported by *Die Welt*, as reported by the Associated Press in *The Washington Times*, 15 Dec 93, p. A12.) This was also reported as: "If a German looks at Russia the wrong way when I'm in the

Kremlin . . . we will create new Hiroshimas and Nagasakis. I will not hesitate to deploy atomic weapons." (quote not further identified, reported by Charles Krauthammer in *The Washington Post*, 17 Dec 93, p. A25)

Threat to destroy Germany for denying visa: Zhirinovskiy reportedly told a German diplomat who informed him of the denial of a visa application that this denial could lead to a "third World War" by which Germany would be "completely destroyed." Claiming to have such good contacts with Russian intelligence that he could make the official simply "disappear," Zhirinovskiy threatened that the diplomat would soon be "liquidated." (Paris *AFP*, 1 Jan 94, referencing *Welt Am Sonntag* of 2 Jan 94, in *FBIS-WEU*-94-001, 3 Jan 94, p. 11)

Germany/France: "History has shown that in Europe, our faithful ally should have been Germany. We could have avoided the two world wars with them. We needed a war against France." (quote not further identified, reported by Associated Press in *USA Today*, 15 Dec 93)

Central Europe: "The so-called Oder-Neisse line isn't the last word in history." (interview with *National Zeitung*, reported by Associated Press in *The Washington Times*, 15 Dec 93, p. A12.) This article also reported that at a 2 Oct 93 meeting of the far-right German People's Union in Bavaria, Zhirinovskiy had said Germany and Russia should divide up territories in Poland, the Baltics, and Ukraine.

Turkey/NATO: ". . . We are only interested in Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan . . . (asked if he was afraid NATO will stand behind Turkey) ". . . You are mistaken if you believe the Turks are invulnerable because they are

members of NATO. NATO is a weak bloc. . . . Who will fight. . . . We, on the other hand, have fought the Turks 30 times and beaten them every time. We have no worthy opponent anywhere in the world. NATO is an insignificant bloc, and it should be eliminated. The same goes for the United Nations. However, Russia is a peaceful country. We will not attack. . . . We prefer to win by economic means instead of military ones. . . . (Sofia *I68 CHASA*, 28 Feb 94, pp. 1, 21, in *FBIS-SOV-94-045*, 8 Mar 94, pp. 6-9)

Kuril Islands: "These islands belong to Russia. And the Sea of Okhotsk will be Russia's internal sea. We'll set up a 200-mile zone and not a single foreign fishing boat will ever enter the Sea of Okhotsk and all marine products will reach the Russians' dining tables." (Moscow *Interfax*, 13 Dec 93, in *FBIS-SOV-93-238*, 14 Dec 93, p. 33)

Japan/Pacific: (To Japanese journalists) "You'd better not raise the Kuril Islands issue, otherwise we'll bring up the issue of compensation for the 40 years of the illegal use of Sakhalin by Japan. . . . We'll drive everyone out of the Sea of Okhotsk—the Japanese, the Koreans, the Filipinos. . . . The Sea of Okhotsk will be a closed Russian sea. We'll establish a 200-mile zone, and you'll be fishing in Australia." (Moscow *Interfax*, 6 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-005*, 7 Jan 94, p. 10)

The "Novosti" newscast stated that Zhirinovskiy had said he planned to occupy the post of Foreign Minister and as his first step he intended to invite Tokyo to sign a peace treaty, and if it refused he would use the Russian navy to blockade all Japanese islands. (Moscow *Ostankino Television First Channel Network*, 6 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-005*, 7 Jan 94, pp. 10-11)

Pakistan: (Asked how he would deal with the problem of prisoners in Pakistan) "I will call the Pakistan envoy and give him 72 hours. If our Russian boys do not arrive at Sheremetyevo airport within the 72 hours, I will send the Pacific fleet to the shores of Pakistan, and it will start by wiping Karachi off the face of the earth." (undated quote contained in article in *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, 30 Dec 93)

Secret Weapon—Elipton: ". . . This weapon is stronger than nuclear weapons because its consequences are different, and there is no antidote. This is where its strength lies. There is no way of defending against it. It is the same with the sonic weapon. We also have this. What happens is that the cartridge detonates, and the sound is such that it brings down an entire military division. That is it; they are dead. . . . The elipton has the same effect. There is no radiation, no fire. There are no wounds. An entire military division simply dies. It is similar to the neutron weapon, but the latter has radiation. It has a damaging effect. The neutrons enter the human body; those cause the destruction. With the former, there is no damage, but all of life is immediately destroyed . . . (asked if the Americans or others had the weapon) No . . . No one. Russian scientists developed it exclusively. . . . (asked why no one had heard about it) Because it is secret." (Budapest *MTV Television Network*, 7 Jan 94)

"It is my personal weapon. It completely destroys buildings and people, not by fire, but with a laser beam that destroys all targets. (asked if he could destroy the world with the "Elipton" weapon) "Of course I can, but I do not want to. It is important that we possess such a weapon. If any danger threatens us, in the case of extreme necessity there

is nothing strange about us using it in certain regions—for defense." (Sofia 168 CHASA, 28 Feb 94)

2. Zhirinovskiy's Future View of Russia and the World

(Note: Source of quotes below is an interview with Zhirinovskiy by Rolf Gauffin, date and place not given, published under the title "Prague? Let Us Give It to Germany," in Rome *L'Espresso*, 21 Jan 94, pp. 76-79, in FBIS-SOV-94-018, 27 Jan 94, pp. 20-21. Quotations in parentheses are from a similar but not identical report of an interview by Gauffin for the Italian *Limes* magazine published in Berlin *Die Welt*, 31 Jan 94, p. 3, in FBIS-SOV-94-021, 1 Feb 94, pp. 19-21)

Transcaucasus and Central Asia

"Events in the Transcaucasus show that, without Russia, those peoples will always fight each other. . . . This will happen everywhere along Russia's southern borders . . . there will not be a Russian military presence in these areas. All we can do is sell weapons. If they want to buy them, they can do so only in Russia."

". . . Afghanistan . . . is a country without a government, where one gang fights another, where one city fights another. This is the future of Central Asia. After 30-40 years the . . . entire region will plunge into the abyss. Then Iran and Turkey will intervene. It will be hell. Then, after a further 20-30 years, they will plead with Russia to return to guarantee stability. . . ."

"From Moscow we can force those small nations to stop fighting. Since they are aware of the strength of Russia's industry and Armed Forces, they must stop the destruction. Together with the international community, they will ask us for help. We will examine the possibility of halting the disaster, but only if they pay us. Otherwise, we will leave those regions to slide downhill, as is now happening in the Transcaucasus and Tajikistan. . . . "

("Trans-Caucasus. There we have Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. One day, they will ask to be permitted to belong to Moscow again. Yet, we do not want these territories. There are only criminals there, no reasonable economy, and no opportunities for profit for Russia. Iran can take over Azerbaijan, while Armenia and Georgia will go to Turkey. These countries have never been independent.")

("These regions and the international community will ask us, and we will—with certainty—stop the disaster, but only on condition that they pay for it.")

". . . Throughout its history Kazakhstan has never had a role as an independent state. The whole of Kazakhstan is nothing but southern Siberia. . . . Kyrgyzstan, which used to belong to China, must go to Russia. There has never existed a state called 'Kyrgyzstan.' As for the rest, there are no problems of any kind with Mongolia, China, Japan, and India."

Russians Outside Russia

". . . all Russians living outside their homeland must be granted dual nationality. Then we will defend them,

mainly by means of economic instruments. . . . take Estonia. . . . If the Russians do not obtain the right to vote in that country, we will implement an economic blockade. And without Russia's sources of energy and infrastructures, Estonia will be completely annihilated as a state. This is why we will never use military force but will use the force of law and the economy, instead, to protect Russians' interests."

Baltic States, Koeningsberg, and Finland

". . . Estonia. There are Russians living there. This territory must therefore be included within Russia's borders. . . . But Tallinn . . . should remain a kind of city republic, like Luxembourg, Monaco, or Liechtenstein. The rest of Estonian territory belongs to Russia. . . . In Latvia over half the population is Russian. In Riga only 35 percent of the population are Latvians. So the whole of Latvia must go to Russia. . . . Lithuania, with its capital Kaunas (sic), and with the cities of Panevezys and Siauliai, will form a small Lithuanian State. All the rest is Russia's. . . . Koeningsberg is part of Russia. Some day we may return it to Germany. We would like to give back to the West whatever the West wants."

(" . . . Lithuania will become a small, independent state, an enclave. . . .")

([Finland] "No problem. Yet, Finland would like to have Karelia back. All I can say on this issue is that if Finland wants to have Karelia, all of Finland must go to Russia. We will not cede one inch in the West. One day, everybody will return to Russia. . . .")

Eastern Europe

"Gdansk, Wroclaw, and Szczecin, which used to be part of Prussia, belong to Germany. And if Poland wants Lvov, we may even accept its request. This is to compensate the Poles for its losses. It will be Russia's gift to the West. But eastern Ukraine is entirely Russia's. The same applies to Moldova and Belarus. . . . Some day, perhaps, Slovakia will want to become part of Russia. The Czech Republic, however, will go to Germany. Austria and little Slovenia should unite. The future Germany-Austria-Slovenia will have to have access to the Adriatic. This is the German people's will. Thus the Germans will have well-founded historical borders to the east and south."

(" . . . All of eastern Ukraine belongs to Russia . . . [note: much later in the interview] Belarus is Russian, Ukraine is Russian, and the people want to belong to Russia.")

(" . . . Dobrudja also belongs to Bulgaria. And the Greeks should return Thrace to Bulgaria. . . .")

([Yugoslavia] "All foreign troops must leave the country. The Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians should keep the borders that exist now. The UN Forces should withdraw so that the warring parties can settle the conflict among themselves.")

German-Russian-Indian Axis

". . . Some day there will be a greater Germany and a new Russia, which will reach an agreement with India. India has 1 billion inhabitants. We have 300 million. So,

together with Germany and India, we would total more or less 2 billion people. Then the world will take whatever form we want. India and Russia together will neutralize China in Asia. With Germany, Russia can neutralize Europe."

("One day, greater Germany, a new Russia, and India will form a new entente. Then there will be no problems for the world any more. India and Russia will neutralize China in Asia; Russia and Germany can control Europe; and Russia and the Balkan states will solve all problems in the Balkans.")

3. Selected Quotations from Zhirinovskiy's Book, *Last Dash to the South*

(Note: Source of quotes below from Zhirinovskiy's book is Moscow *Izvestiya*, 21 Jan 94, First Edition, pp. 1-2, in *FBIS-SOV-94-015*, 24 Jan 94, pp. 31-33.)

Dash to south to save Russia: "I have already begun to develop my own geographical concept. I don't want to give it my name, the Zhirinovskiy formula, say, but the last 'dash' to the south and an outlet for Russia to the shores of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea are really the task of saving the Russian nation."

Shock 'Dash': "The idea emerged of the last 'dash'—last because it will probably be the last repartition of the world and it must be carried out in a state of shock therapy, suddenly, swiftly, and effectively."

Wash boots in Indian Ocean: "The last 'dash' to the south. I dream of Russian soldiers washing their boots in the

warm waters of the Indian Ocean and switching to summer uniform forever. Lightweight boots, lightweight trousers. . . . And a small modern Russian assault rifle produced by the Izhevsk plant. These assault rifles are much better than UZI's. So any platoon of Russian soldiers can impose order anywhere."

'Dash' needed by Russia but states to south won't like it:
". . . we will make this last 'dash' to the south. We badly need it, it is medicine that we must take. Medicine is not always sweet. Some people in Kabul, Tehran, and Ankara may not like this. But millions of people will feel better as a result."

'Dash' as renaissance for the Army: "Our Army will perform this task. This will be a method of ensuring the survival of the nation as a whole, it will be the basis for the renaissance of the Russian Army. New armed forces can be reborn only as a result of a combat operation. The Army cannot grow stronger in military commissariats and barracks. It needs a goal, a task."

Pros outweigh cons and Army needs it: "The pros of carrying out this operation considerably outweigh the cons which may naturally be perceived. And the Russian Army also needs this so that our guys can flex their muscle, tired as they are of 'hazing,' instead of sitting around in barracks, in the depths of Russia, waiting for the end of their term of service, not knowing where the enemy is, who the adversary is, or what they need to prepare themselves morally and physically for. This would be a cleansing for us all."

Southern campaign: *"May Russia successfully accomplish its last 'dash' to the south. I see Russian soldiers preparing for this last southern campaign. I see Russian commanders at the headquarters of Russian divisions and armies tracing the itineraries for the movement of troop formations and the destinations of the itineraries. I see aircraft at airbases in southern districts of Russia. I see submarines surfacing off the shores of the Indian Ocean and landing ships approaching shores along which Russian Army soldiers are already marching, infantry fighting vehicles are driving, and huge masses of tanks are moving. [The italics are V. Zhirinovskiy's.] At long last Russia completes its last military campaign."*

4. Relations with Other States

(a) America, the West, and Aid to Russia

America: ". . . Everywhere there are hotbeds of war, you find Americans. Everywhere you find diseases, they are diseases from America. AIDS is from America. Drunkenness and depravity is from America." (Moscow *Ostankino Television First Channel Network*, 11 Dec 93)

President Clinton: (Asked if he expected to meet with President Clinton during the January Summit) "I can, but he refused. He's afraid. He's a weak President. But what I can do? I'm strong. I'm brave. I can but he couldn't. In sexual life, that means impotensa. Impotensial!" (CBS *Evening News*, 12 Jan 94, reported in Dept. of Defense Radio/TV Dialogue media summary.)

"I am ready, but he is scared—and so much the worse for

him. Shame on such a president, let him go on playing his saxophone at home and not come here at all. . . . You in the west are all scared of the new, honest, and brave politician emerging in Russia." (Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*, 6 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-004*, 6 Jan 94, p. 3.)

President Clinton and Support for Disintegration of Russia: (President Clinton) ". . . has shown himself to be a weakling" (by not having a meeting with Zhirinovskiy in Moscow). "This is a gift, because anti-American feeling is growing in Russia, because the people know that Clinton supports the disintegration of Russia." (Belgrade *Tanjug Domestic Service*, 30 Jan 94, in *FBIS-EEU-94-020*, 31 Jan 94, p. 25.

Meeting with President Clinton: "He asked for a meeting, but I refused, because the invitation was addressed to the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. It should have been addressed to me personally. . . . However, the chance of Clinton and me meeting has not been lost. My adviser will soon fly to the United States and arrange this in March or April. We will play golf and go to a ranch. We will have a rest and get to know each other better. . . ." (Sofia *168 CHASA*, 28 Feb 94)

Aid to Russia: "We need no help from the United States or the West! . . . We are a very rich country. Very strong. Very rich." To an American, he bellowed, "No necessary help from you. Help Africa." (Statements to reporters at the Duma, reported by the Associated Press in *The Washington Times*, 14 Jan 94, p. A12.)

". . . Until now, the so-called help from the West has caused us more harm than good. Russia has been exploited

materially and intellectually. Let them leave us alone, and we will reestablish Russian power. . . ." (Poznan *WPROST*, 2 Jan 94)

"This business of Western aid is just a provocation. Nobody gives us a cent: In fact they only come here to take. This IMF is just an illusion; it does us harm, and that is all. The tide of profiteers will gradually be eliminated: By 1995 we will have thrown them all out, we will have a new government and a new policy." (Milan *Famiglia Cristiana*)

(b) Europe

Europeans: (Asked if he really wanted Italy to cede South Tyrol to Austria) "Definitely. You wanted to break us up into pieces. Well, now you can taste some of your own medicine. . . . You Italians, you Europeans, you Westerners. You caused the Soviet Union to collapse, and it would serve you right to suffer the same fate and see what it feels like. Thus, perhaps you will understand what Russia is experiencing now, without the 14 republics that have historically belonged to it. . . . You are small, but you must become even smaller. . . . (Rome *La Repubblica*, 12 Jan 94, p. 13, in *FBIS-SOV-94-008*, 12 Jan 94, pp. 22-23)

U.S. Troops in Europe: (Asked about a NATO proposal to move U.S. troops to the very border of Russia for defense) Zhirinovskiy said: "All American troops must come back to home. And Russian, all troops come back in Russia. It's good. If you would like to approach your troops to border of Russia, so you would like war. What kind of reasons to approach my troops to near the border of this

country? That means I would like to have the war with this country." (*CBS Evening News*, 12 Jan 94)

Union with Germany: Zhirinovskiy is reported to have said that the "strategic point" for Russian foreign policy was a "union with Germany," which would "benefit the whole world." (Berlin *DDP*, 21 Dec 93, in *FBIS-SOV-93-244*, 22 Dec 93, p. 11)

Friendly relations with all, especially Germany: "We want to have proper friendly relations with other countries. That particularly applies to Germany. Russians and Germans should never fight each other again. The best possible partner-like relations are what we want and no less than that." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

Cooperation, especially with Germany: "I will develop the most extensive cooperation that Russia has ever had with the rest of the world. That is the only way in which we can put an end to military confrontation. It is my greatest wish that the last Russian soldiers should leave German soil soon, but all American troops should leave too. There should be no foreign military bases left on German soil. Germany should be completely free. No Russian ethnic German should leave. On the contrary, German farmers might have success here. . . . I would gladly welcome hundreds of thousands to the Moscow region, for example. We would give everyone 30 hectares of land for nothing and we would see to it that they have the best conditions so that they can work for the good of Germany and Russia. Houses are ready and the infrastructure is there, including telephone lines." (Hamburg *Der Spiegel*, 20 Dec 93)

Major Projects with Germany: ". . . I have proposed a joint

German-Russian project for the construction of a highway linking Berlin and Moscow via Koenigsberg, that German should become the principal foreign language taught throughout Russia, that our students should participate in large-scale exchange programs, and that there should be a free cultural exchange between our countries. I have proposed that Germany play the leading role in the extraction of our mineral wealth, in our industry, and in joint defense projects." (Munich *Deutsche National-Zeitung*, 4 Feb 94, pp. 3-5, in *FBIS-SOV-94-026*, 8 Feb 94, pp. 18-19)

Oder-Neisse Line: ". . . when I talk of reaching agreement on a settlement of the East Prussia issue in a way that will be to the advantage of Germany and when I also say that history has not said its last word about the terrible injustice of the Oder-Neisse line, which I believe can be revised through peaceful negotiations, then I am portrayed as some evil demon from hell and a fanatical enemy of Germany." (Munich *Deutsche National-Zeitung*, 4 Feb 94)

Europe/Germany/Poland: ". . . In Europe we have an alliance with Germany, because it is a major country. But Poland lies between us, and there are problems there. I know the mood in Germany—to get back eastern Prussia, but that is part of Poland. . . . These, however, are Polish-German problems. . . ." (Moscow *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 22 Jan 94, p. 2, in *FBIS-SOV-94-015*, 24 Jan 94, pp. 33-35)

Europe/Germany/Poland: "In Europe, we are mostly interested in good relations with Germany, and it is in this context that one should address the Polish question. However, we do not want to interfere in Poland's internal affairs. Even if Poland wants to join NATO, that is an

internal matter for Poland and NATO. . . . Poland has never had a permanent border. It has possessed various shapes at various times of history, and there was a period when it was divided and formed part of Russia, among other countries. Until recently, the Russian forces guaranteed the Polish border. Today, in this matter, one should turn to NATO and Germany, which play the greatest part in this section of the continent. For the time being, the Poles can carry on singing 'Poland has not perished yet.'" (Poznan *WPROST*, 2 Jan 94)

Germany/Poland: (Asked by the Berlin media about "Eastern Prussia") "Solve that with Poland. We don't give a damn about it." (Berlin *DDPADN*, 7 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-005*, 7 Jan 94, p. 10)

Eastern Europe: (asked about Russia regaining Eastern Europe) "Not at all. I say this to the countries of Eastern Europe: Stay neutral, free, and independent. You do not need NATO at all. Why do you want to lick American and British general's boots? You will never have anything to fear from Russia. Russia will never reach as far as Prague or Budapest." (Rome *La Repubblica*, 12 Jan 94)

Finland and Poland: "All the stories that . . . I threaten the sovereignty of Poland and Finland are lies. . . . We do not question at all the fact that Finland is now a sovereign state. . . . We do not talk about returning Finland to Russia. We do not need this. Let Finland be. The same applies to Poland." (Sofia *Otechestven Vestnik*, 27 Dec 93)

Czech Republic: ". . . if Vaclav Havel is unhappy, then I am also unhappy that a playwright can become the president of a country. . . . Why is a playwright a president? . . . Your

country is on the decline . . . in 10 years from now, there will be no Moravia and no Sudetenland. In 10 years time, the entire Czech nation will curse Havel the way the Russian people are cursing Gorbachev . . . young Czechs . . . will be forced to speak German, to forget their mother tongue, to go to German churches, and to clean the boots of German officers. . . . Therefore, we want to talk to everyone at the congress of Slavic peoples. After all, there are 300 million of us and we will live together in an Eastern European Slavic community. We will not serve the West." (Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 9 Feb 94, pp. 1, 8, in *FBIS-SOV-94-031*, 15 Feb 94, pp. 9-10)

Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slavic Cooperation:

"Because of the Sudetenland and Moravia, the Czechs are closer to the Germans. Practically speaking, Czechia has no future. Germany will gradually take it over. Bratislava, however, could turn into a center for East European Slavic cooperation. This would be a counterbalance to the West European alliance . . ." (Ljubljana *Mladina*, 2 Feb 94)

Peace in the East: ". . . the period of transition in Russia and all East European countries has come to an end and these countries will soon see new political leaders come to power. Conditions will soon be ripe for sustainable peace and democracy for everybody, not for a single nation or group of individuals only. Man will be of paramount importance, he will be even more important than the state." (Sofia *BTA*, 26 Dec 93, in *FBIS-EEU-93-246*, 27 Dec 93, pp. 7-8)

Bulgarians decide their fate: ". . . nobody has the right to tell Bulgarian people how to live, who to govern them,

what parties to have. Bulgarians alone can decide their fate." (Sofia *BTA*, 26 Dec 93)

Change Bulgarian leadership: "We think that Bulgaria must be a key country in the Balkans and that Macedonia and Thrace could be ceded to its territory. They are ancient Bulgarian lands. However, the main thing for us is the fact that the country's political leadership must be changed. Your current president, Zhelyu Zhelev, is a figure of the transitional period, which is about to end. The state leaderships of many East European countries are being replaced, and I would like to see Mr. Svetoslav Stoilov as your president. I think that this will also be beneficial for Russia. Mr. Stoilov is a well-known economist and our European consultant on all economic issues. Bulgaria needs such a president in the new year. The process of stabilizing relations throughout the entire Balkan peninsula with the participation of Russia will begin only after he comes to power. Then the violent actions and armed conflicts will end. Naturally, the help of the UN Security Council member-countries is necessary for this. . . . I think that this confederation among the Balkan states could be expanded by the inclusion of Romania and Hungary, but no state will have priority. Every nation has the right to live in the Balkans and discrimination based on nationality or religion is necessary. There have never been Muslims in the Balkans. Whoever claims the opposite lies. Slavonic and Christian peoples, predominantly belonging to the Eastern Orthodox Church, but also Catholics, lived here. The lie about the Muslim nation is a pure game on the part of certain centers. This all could be regulated and I think that the new Russian parliament, the Duma, will support the Liberal Democratic Party plan on peacefully and finally stopping the conflicts in the Balkan peninsula. However,

for the time being, the main thing is to change Bulgaria's political leadership, and I think that this will happen soon." (Sofia *Otechestven Vestnik*, 27 Dec 93)

Serbia: "We side with the Serbs. Our position is clear. The Serbs must be saved. They are our Orthodox brethren." (quote not further identified, reported by Associated Press in *USA Today*, 15 Dec 93)

Support for Serbs: "We are supporting the Serbs and our standpoint is that the Serb lands—the republic of Srpska and the republic of Krajina should be within the Republic of Serbia. (he would be happy if) ". . . Russia and Serbia had a common border." (He has never) ". . . liked the policy pursued by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, particularly in the Balkans," (and will demand his resignation) ". . . if he does not support Serb policy." (Russia has never threatened anybody with anything and has not done anything by force) ". . . but it will come, if someone calls for it." (When he is elected president, he will) ". . . propose an alliance of Slav states, whose center will not be Moscow, because everyone has grown tired of this." (Belgrade *Tanjug Domestic Service*, 30 Jan 94, in *FBIS-EEU-94-020*, 31 Jan 94, p. 25)

Former Yugoslavia: ". . . There should be only three parts: Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, full stop. And Bulgaria. All foreign armies should leave Yugoslavia. . . . There is no Muslim question. Historically speaking, the Muslims are ethnic Croats and Serbs. . . . Instead of Bulgaria, it should be named Macedonia. . . . Serbia should get the Serbian part of the present Macedonia. . . ." (Ljubljana *Mladina*, 2 Feb 94, p. 22, in *FBIS-EEU-94-023*, 3 Feb 94, p. 33)

Threats to those who bomb Serbs: "I am opposed to any kind of force against the Serbs. I warn you, I view the bombing of Serb cities as if it were the bombing of Russian cities. This would absolutely alter Russia's foreign policy. If the bombing takes place, we will—of course—send protests to the countries whose pilots take part in it. We will warn them that what they are doing to Serb cities will be done to their countries. Bombs will be dropped on the cities of those countries that bomb Serb cities." (Prague *Lidove Noviny*, 9 Feb 94)

Dissolve NATO, withdraw troops: "We have dissolved the Warsaw Pact, but NATO continues to exist. NATO must also be dissolved. All foreign troops must be withdrawn. . . . " (Vienna *ORF Television Network*, 21 Dec 93, in *FBIS-WEU-93-244*, 22 Dec 93, p. 5)

Disband NATO while East forms economic and cultural union: "We oppose [military blocs]. If the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, we think that NATO should also be dissolved as a military bloc. However, it is very possible that the East European peoples form an economic and cultural alliance with Russia, similar to the European Community, without attributing any military aspects to this alliance." (Sofia *Otechestven Vestnik*, 27 Dec 93)

NATO expansion okay: "Member of NATO or create a new block is their problem [preceding three words in German], for Russia no problem. We are for peace, but if Poland, Hungary would like to be included in NATO, okay." (Vienna *Oesterrich Eins Radio Network*, 22 Dec 93, in *FBIS-WEU-93-244*, 22 Dec 93, p. 6)

Oppose Poland joining NATO: ". . . Let us all be neutral and neither we nor you join. Do not think that they are waiting for you there. Even if that is so, it is waiting for servants who would polish the boots of German or British generals. They would force you to feed foreign divisions, they would behave like peasants. . . . Blacks from America will come over and kick you in the face. You are going to be a testing ground and a dump. You must understand that a neutral Poland and security guarantees for the whole of East Europe are what we need. . . . We Russians have never had an urge to push west. We have problems in the south. So, if you want, we will give you Lvov back. Do not join NATO in any case." (Warsaw *Radio Warszawa Network*, 10 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-007*, 11 Jan 94, pp. 18-19)

Opposition to NATO Expanded Membership: "It would be best if all former East Bloc states remained neutral. NATO is a military bloc. If a country accedes to this bloc, this will not contribute to the establishment of peace. NATO will use these countries as small partners that are to serve the big members." (Vienna *Kurier*, 1 Feb 94, p. 5, in *FBIS-SOV-94-021*, 1 Feb 94, pp. 21-22)

(c) Middle East

Iraq: "Interference in Iraqi affairs is inadmissible . . . We are very favorably disposed to everything that is going on in Iraq." (quote not further identified, reported by Associated Press in *USA Today*, 15 Dec 93)

Iraq and embargoes on Iraq, Libya, and Serbia: "We have never had any special relationship with him (Saddam Hussein). What happened historically was simply that the

Soviet Union invested enormous sums in Iraq. Therefore, Iraq now owes us more than \$10 billion, and it is ready to pay this. That is why it is not in our interest to take part in the embargo against Iraq—just like in the case of the embargo against Serbia and the embargo against Libya." (Budapest *MTV Television Network*, 7 Jan 94)

Mid-East arms embargo: ". . . The adherence to the arms embargo on the Middle East, for example, is costing us many billions of dollars. Russia could earn about \$50 billion a year from weapons exports. . . ." (Poznan *WPROST*, 2 Jan 94)

World War III and the South: ". . . World War III is a possibility. I do not wish it but if the wars in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia continue; if something happens between Iran and Iraq; or if the Kurdish problem in Turkey expands, then World War III might occur. I do not want it but we are slowly approaching that eventuality. . . . If the war continues in the Caucasus, Turkey will definitely be involved in it." (Ankara *Show Television*, 10 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-008*, 12 Jan 94, pp. 21-22)

Turkey: ". . . I love Turkey and the Turks. . . . Everything is all right in the current Turkey. The Turks, however, arrived five centuries ago on Byzantine territory as enemies. They were the real enemy. They were not invited by anyone. . . . They decided that they had the power to occupy the rich people living in peace in the west. What kind of behavior was that? . . . I say that this is not the fault of the current Turkish people. . . . Why did Demirel visit our Central Asian republics? There are Russians living there. There is a Turkish speaking population but there is also a Russian speaking population. . . . This is not

what the Russian people want. Let them interfere with another people. It can backfire. . . . That is why I wrote this book (*Last Dash to the South*) . . . it is written on what will happen if this interference continues. If this policy is pursued then it will backfire. The Russians will advance up to the shores of the Indian Ocean. The Turkish Army advanced up to the shores of Constantinople once. The Russians will now advance up to the shores of the Indian Ocean. (*Ankara Show Television*, 10 Jan 94)

Arms sales/proliferation: "We will continue to sell weapons everywhere. Whoever wants to buy will always be welcome. But we will ensure that our weapons do not end up in the hands of those who have aggressive intentions with respect to Russia. So to our neighboring countries we will sell only defensive weapons, while to distant countries we will sell offensive weapons." (Milan *Famiglia Cristiana*)

War against the Muslim world: ". . . This will be a religious war against the Muslim world. Well, it is already happening. For this reason, I have also written the book—the *Last Push (Dash) to the South*. . . . At the end of the 20th century, there will be no more international wars, however, religious wars will begin. . . . Now Turkey and Iran can push toward Caucasus, the Turks are penetrating into the Balkans, Iraq in Central Asia, Afghanistan in Tajikistan. You will have pan Islamism, Balkans, Arabs. France and Germany will be destabilized. Finally, Europe will be in a state of war. . . . (Who can stop all this?) "Only Russia. Russia could be a factor of stability. It could stop the process of disintegration of Europe, the Balkans, and central Asia. . . ." (*Ljubljana Mladina*, 2 Feb 94)

NOTES

Chapter 1: Who Is Vladimir Zhirinovskiy? (pages 1-30)

1. M. Reshetnikov and V. Vasilyev, "Analytical Research: Democracy. National Populism. Extremism, Fascism? Problems of Spiritual Leadership," Moscow *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, 30 Dec 93, p. 4-5, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia Daily Report (FBIS-SOV)-94-001*, 3 Jan 94, pp. 32-35. For a report on Zhirinovskiy's political rise in the 1990's, see article by Lee Hockstader, "How Russia's Zhirinovskiy Rose," *The Washington Post*, 6 Mar 94, pp. A1, A26, and A27.
2. Ibid.
3. Moscow *Interfax*, 15 Dec 93, in *FBIS-SOV-93-240*, 16 Dec 93, p. 16.
4. Budapest *MTV Television Network*, 7 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-006*, 10 Jan 94, pp. 11-15.
5. Moscow *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, 30 Dec 93.
6. Budapest *MTV Television Network*, 7 Jan 94.
7. Moscow *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, 30 Dec 93.

8. Ibid.

9. Walter Laqueur, *Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia* (New York: Harper/Collins Publishers, Inc., 1993), pp. 254-257.

10. The *Rossiyskiye Vesti* article suggests that Zhirinovskiy established and became chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party in March 1991, while the Laqueur book indicates March 1990.

The Hockstader *Washington Post* article suggests there were both an early and a later Liberal Democratic Party.

11. Moscow *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, 30 Dec 93.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Moscow *Ostankino Television First Channel Network*, 11 Dec 93, in *FBIS-SOV-93-237*, 13 Dec 93, pp. 15-16.

15. Moscow *Interfax*, 25 Dec 93, in *FBIS-SOV-93-246*, 27 Dec 93, p. 1, and Moscow *ITAR-TASS*, 19 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-015*, 24 Jan 94, p. 57.

16. Paris *France-Inter Radio Network*, 14 Dec 93, in *FBIS-SOV-93-239*, 15 Dec 93, pp. 20-21.

17. Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*, 13 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-009*, 13 Jan 94, p. 43.

18. Paris *APF*, 17 Jan 94, and Moscow *Russian Television*

Network, 17 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-012*, 19 Jan 94, pp. 31-32.

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20. Moscow *Izvestiya*, 21 Jan 94, First Edition, pp. 1-2, in *FBIS-SOV-94-015*, 24 Jan 94, pp. 31-33.

21. Press conference by Zhirinovskiy and Gerhard Frey in Moscow, 26 Jan 94, reported by Moscow *Russian Television Network*, 26 Jan 94, and Moscow *Ostankino Television First Channel Network*, 26 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-018*, 27 Jan 94, pp. 19-20.

22. Interview or interviews, place and date not given, with prosecutor Viktor Kruglov by Sergey Kaverin, "Only for Kuranty: Zhirinovskiy Under Probe," Moscow *Kuranty*, 1 Feb 94, p. 5, in *FBIS-SOV-94-021*, 1 Feb 94, pp. 25-26; and "Mr. Zhirinovskiy Might Be Arrested," Moscow *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 8 Feb 94, First Edition, pp. 1-2, in *FBIS-SOV-94-026*, 8 Feb 94, pp. 23-24.

23. Sofia *Otechestven Vestnik*, 27 Dec 93, pp. 1-2, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, East Europe Daily Report (FBIS-EEU)-94-001*, 3 Jan 94, pp. 6-7.

24. Paris *AFP*, 21 Dec 93, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, West Europe Daily Report (FBIS-WEU)-93-244*, 22 Dec 93, p. 5; and Vienna *Wirtschaftswoche*, 7 Jan 94, pp. 38-39, in *FBIS-WEU-94-006*, 10 Jan 94, pp. 10-12.

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26. Paris *AFP*, 21 Dec 93, and Vienna *Oesterreich Eins Radio Network*, 22 Dec 93, in *FBIS-WEU-93-245*, 23 Dec 93, p. 4.
27. Vienna *Wirtschaftswoche*, 7 Jan 94.
28. Vienna *ORF Television Network*, 21 Dec 93, in *FBIS-WEU-93-244*, 22 Dec 93, p. 5.
29. Vienna *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*, 24 Dec 93, p. 2, in *FBIS-WEU 93-246*, 27 Dec 93, p. 2
30. Vienna *Wirtschaftswoche*, 7 Jan 94.
31. Vienna *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*, 24 Dec 93.
32. *Radio Free EuropeRadio Liberty Daily Report*, 29 Dec 93, p. 3.
33. Sofia *BTA*, 27 Dec 93, reported in *FBIS-EEU-93-246*, 27 Dec 93, p. 8.
34. Sofia *Khorizont Radio Network*, 29 Dec 93, in *FBIS-EEU-93-249*, 30 Dec 93, p.1.
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36. Sofia *BTA*, 28 Dec 93.

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51. Moscow *Izvestiya*, 1 Feb 94.
52. D. Becirovic, "Zhirinovskiy: There Will Be No Bombing of Serbian Towns," Belgrade *Politika*, 2 Feb 94, p. 3, in *FBIS-EEU-94-032*, 16 Feb 94, p. 56.
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62. Moscow *Kuranty*, 15 Dec 93, p.1, in *FBIS-SOV-93-239*, 15 Dec 93, p. 23.

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Chapter 3: Zhirinovskiy and Increasing Russian Nationalism (pages 37-56)

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12. Statement by President Boris Yeltsin at news conference in Moscow, 14 Jan 94, Moscow *Russian Television Network*, 14 Jan 94, in *FBIS-SOV-94-011*, 18 Jan 94, pp. 6-7.