

The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Security

Ralph A. Cossa



*A popular Government,
without popular information or the means of
acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or
perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
And a people who mean to be their own
Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.*

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY
August 4, 1822

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RALPH A. COSSA

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- Phone: (202) 685-4210 □ Facsimile: (202) 685-4806
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THE MAJOR POWERS IN NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

The political, economic, and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century will be shaped in very large part by the interrelationships among the United States, Japan, China, and Russia. To the extent these four nations can cooperate, a generally benign environment can develop in which the challenges sure to develop in the region can be managed. Conversely, tensions and conflict among the four will have a profoundly destabilizing impact regionally, if not globally.


This monograph addresses the future roles and interests of the four major Asia-Pacific powers and how their policies will affect security in Northeast Asia and, more specifically, on the Korean Peninsula as we enter the 21st century.

Each of these powers is undergoing a transition of sorts. In the case of the United States and possibly Japan, the changes may be more of style than substance, but will impact their respective foreign policy outlooks nonetheless. In the case of China and especially Russia, the potential for significant change is much greater. There is a high degree of unpredictability regarding the future paths of these two nations as we approach the 21st century.

The future course and behavior of the two Koreas, individually and (at some unpredictable point in the future) together, add to the uncertainty. While the four major powers have the ability to influence events on the Korean Peninsula,

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Figure 1. *Northeast Asia Interrelationships*



they cannot direct or fully orchestrate them. On the other hand, actions by the Koreans can force policy choices by the big four that they might otherwise not pursue; the Korean "tail" has on occasion proven itself capable of wagging some very large dogs.

Further complicating the analysis are the complex interrelationships that are created with each set of two major powers. Among the four nations, six sets of bilateral relationships occur: U.S.-Japan, U.S.-China, U.S.-Russia, Japan-China, Japan-Russia, Russia-China. Worse yet, fifteen sets of bilateral relationships occur when each of the four deals not only with each other, but with the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) and the two Koreas deal with one another (figure 1). Changes in any one set of relationships will undoubtedly affect several, if not all, the other sets.

1.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Before discussing the various sets of bilateral relationships and their impact on one another and on regional security, several general observations about the Northeast Asian security environment appear in order.

BENIGN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

For one of the few times in history, relations among the four major Asian powers are generally cordial. Tensions exist and the trends are not always favorable, but all four nations are currently at peace with one another; the Asia-Pacific security environment is generally benign. In strategic terms, none sees any of the others as posing an imminent threat to its own survival or basic security interests. This situation must be maintained and improved upon.

The return of a regional bipolar struggle pitting any one or combination of the four against any of the others would serve no nation's fundamental interests and would disrupt regional stability and economic progress. Particularly destructive would be any effort to brand any one of these nations as the future "enemy" or long-term "threat" to regional stability.

COMMON OBJECTIVES

Maintaining a generally harmonious relationship is possible only if the states involved focus on shared national security interests and objectives. Fortunately, while differences among

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the major powers are already plentiful (and more are sure to be generated), there are some common objectives all share and are likely to continue sharing into the 21st century or until Korean reunification, whichever comes first.

One goal that the four powers will continue to have in common is a desire for stability on the Korean Peninsula. This can be translated into a desire not only to avoid another war between the North and South, but also to avoid a sudden, perhaps violent collapse of the North. All hope for a "soft landing" for the troubled DPRK economy, although how this can be brought about is anyone's guess—as a general rule, soft landings require experienced pilots and these seem in short supply in the North at present.

Table 1. *Major Power Common Objectives*

- Korean Peninsula stability
 - A "soft landing" in the North
 - Benign security environment
 - Continued economic prosperity
 - Nuclear-free Peninsula
 - Eventual peaceful reunification
-

All four major Asian powers would prefer to concentrate on building their own economies and see the maintenance of the currently benign security environment as an essential precondition to sustained economic growth. Conflict on the Peninsula would directly or indirectly affect all four powers. Clearly, South Korea also attaches a high priority to continued economic growth; even the North, I suspect, understands that conflict on the Peninsula would be disastrous for its own economic (and political) survival.

In addition, the four major powers all prefer a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula today and after reunification—a goal subscribed to, at least publicly, by both Koreas. Finally, while some (perhaps all) of the major powers appear in no rush to alter the status quo, all would rather see a peacefully reunified Korea than have to deal with either a divided Korea on the brink of turmoil or a seriously destabilized Peninsula.

KOREAN REUNIFICATION

This leads to the larger question of the attitude of the major powers toward Korean reunification. It is difficult to discuss this topic without hearing the charge, usually but not always from a North or South Korean, that one or more of the major powers is responsible for keeping the Koreas apart. There is little doubt that the major powers were primarily responsible (in varying degrees) for the Peninsula's division. However, I would argue that the principal factor keeping the two Koreas apart today is not the actions or desires of the four powers, but the actions and attitudes of the Koreans themselves.

This does not imply that any of the four is eager to bring about reunification in the near term. They probably are not, for the same reasons that many in South Korea seem to be having second thoughts about immediate reunification: uncertainty about how one gets from here to there peacefully and how much the entire process will cost. However, I seriously doubt that leaders in any of the four capitals spend much time worrying about, much less fearing, reunification or are actively working to prevent it. When it comes to keeping one another at arm's length, the two Koreas need little outside help.

Among the major powers, it is not fear of the consequences as much as uncertainty about the process of reunification that generates the greatest amount of concern. Realistic scenarios for a genuine, near-term, peaceful reunification are difficult to envision. And, while all no doubt

understand the inevitability of the South's system prevailing in the end, China (and probably Russia as well) would have a difficult time publicly acknowledging this viewpoint.

One day, the Peninsula will no doubt be reunited. It is also a safe bet that a free market system and democratic pluralism will prevail. It is doubtful, however, that reunification could occur before the end of this century—at least not peacefully. Even if the North implodes rather than explodes, there remains a high probability of violence, at a minimum directed internally against competing factions, but also against those who might try to "help" or intercede. Should the current regime in the North suddenly collapse, there is also no guarantee that its successor will be any more accommodating or trustful toward (or trusted by) the South.

The best hope for true reunification lies in a gradual process, through some type of loose confederation that will permit the South to lay the groundwork and develop the inroads and infrastructure (and some level of personal trust and confidence) necessary to make a peaceful transition possible some time down the road. Whenever it comes, reunification will be burdensome and expensive.

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE

The key to eventual reunification and the best hope for long-term stability on the Korean Peninsula rest in the hands of the Korean people on both sides of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). This is why direct dialogue between the South and North is so essential. While barriers to meaningful direct dialogue exist on both sides, it is important to note that a basic foundation for cooperation has already been laid. Direct dialogue is not unprecedented; in fact, the two sides engaged in a series of meetings up to and including the ministerial level in the 1988-1992 time period.

Of particular significance, the two sides laid the groundwork for closer cooperation in December 1991 with

two historic joint South-North agreements: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchange and Cooperation; and the Joint Declaration on a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula.¹ As summarized in table 2, these groundbreaking bilateral agreements lay out a series of confidence-building measures upon which to build future cooperation. They also provide proof that the two sides are capable of communicating and cooperating with each other when both sides determine that such cooperation is mutually beneficial.

Table 2. Confidence-Building Measures on the Korean Peninsula

The **Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchange and Cooperation** commits North and South Korea to build confidence and improve relations in political, security, trade, and other areas. Among its provisions:

Reconciliation Measures

- Respect for each other's political and social systems; noninterference in each other's internal affairs; renunciation of propaganda, sabotage, and subversion; and a commitment to cooperate in the international arena;
- Resolution to transfer the Military Armistice Agreement of July 1953 into a "solid state of peace";
- Establishment of a joint reconciliation commission and a working-level group to ensure implementation and observance of the agreement.

Nonaggression Measures

- Nonuse of force, peaceful resolution of disputes, and prevention of accidental armed clashes;
- Establishment of a joint military commission to negotiate confidence- and security-building measures and arms reduction accords on notification and limitation of military exercises; peaceful use of the demilitarized zone; exchanges of military

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personnel and information; phased reduction of armaments; elimination of weapons of mass destruction and surprise attack capabilities; verification provisions; and installation of a hotline between "military authorities."

Trade, Exchange, Cultural, and Humanitarian Measures

- Increase trade, economic development, and cooperation;
- Increase travel, communication, and educational contact;
- Family reunions and visits.

The **Joint Declaration on a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula** includes a range of confidence- building measures specifically designed to address the nuclear issue:

- Not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons;
- Not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment;
- To use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes;
- To verify compliance upon the request of one party but agreed to by both;
- To ensure implementation through the establishment and regular meeting of a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

Source: The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, *IFANS Review*, December 1995.

ROLE OF THE MAJOR POWERS

The prime objective of the major powers should be to create an atmosphere conducive to the meaningful conduct of direct talks between Seoul and Pyongyang. The major powers should encourage—perhaps even pressure—both sides to remove the many barriers (psychological, as well as physical and political) to direct interaction between South and North. However, the formula for reunification must come from the Korean people themselves; it cannot be imposed from outside.

This having been said, it is also true that any solution that runs directly contrary to the vital security interests of any of the four major powers will have a significantly reduced likelihood of success over the long term. The blessings of most, and preferably all, are essential to sustaining the agreement once reached.

INCREASED MULTILATERALISM

Emerging multilateral security mechanisms provide additional opportunities for cooperation and constructive dialogue aimed at building confidence and promoting stability in Northeast Asia. Well-established multilateral mechanisms aimed at enhancing Asia-Pacific security now exist both at the official and at the nongovernmental or so-called track two levels.

Foremost among the new official mechanisms is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF).² This annual ministerial gathering, first held in 1994, provides a clear signal of the growing regional commitment to multilateral security dialogue throughout the Asia-Pacific. At the track two level, organizations like the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)³ and the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD),⁴ supplement the official talks.

These multilateral security forums hold great promise for enhancing regional security, provided their limitations as well as their benefits are fully recognized. All four major Asia-Pacific powers have expressed support for such efforts and, as will be discussed later, the current trend toward multilateralism is generally consistent with the national strategies of the major regional players.⁵

2.

THE MAJOR POWERS IN NORTHEAST ASIA

The future policies of the major powers and their ability (or inability) to interact constructively with one another and respond collectively to future challenges and tensions will have a profound effect on regional security. In this section, I will briefly look at each of the major powers' current policies, its relations with the other three, its views regarding the two Koreas and reunification, and the future direction in which each appears to be heading. I will end with an assessment of the future role each seems most likely to play in Northeast Asia as we enter the 21st century.

THE UNITED STATES

The United States remains the principal guarantor of peace on the Korean Peninsula, by virtue of its long-standing security alliance with the Republic of Korea. This alliance is part of a broader web of Asian security arrangements with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand as well, with each alliance doing its part toward ensuring broader regional security.

Each security relationship underwrites the other. The U.S.-ROK treaty is particularly relevant in this regard, since it is the only one today that faces a serious external challenge. A U.S. failure to sustain the alliance or otherwise honor its security commitment to the ROK would seriously call into question the validity and credibility of the other alliances and, more broadly, of the U.S. commitment to remain an Asia-Pacific power.

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Northeast Asia



Current Policies

The United States remains committed to maintaining its defense relationships in Northeast Asia. Concurrent with the leadership change in Washington in January 1993, there was a great deal of concern in Asia—and among American Asian specialists—that there would be a precipitous American withdrawal from Asia.⁶ While this concern has not fully dissipated, the Clinton administration has taken some important steps to assure its friends and allies of the U.S. commitment to remain engaged.

President Clinton, in defining his vision of a "New Pacific Community," identified a continued forward military presence in East Asia as the "bedrock of America's security role in the Asia-Pacific region."⁷ The administration's recognition of Asia's importance was further demonstrated during the U.S. Defense Department's 1994 "Bottom-Up Review" which revealed that the number of forward-deployed forces in Asia would remain at approximately 100,000 through the end of the decade.⁸

The continued U.S. military commitment was reinforced in early 1995 when the Pentagon issued an Asia strategy document entitled *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (normally referred to as the East Asia Strategy Report or EASR).⁹ It stresses the permanent nature of America's vital security interests in Asia and pledges to keep U.S. military forces forward deployed in Korea and Japan for as long as they are welcome there. As was the case with its predecessors, the EASR strategy is consistent with, and underwrites, the U.S. Pacific Command's "Cooperative Engagement" strategy, which guides the day-to-day activities of U.S. military forces throughout the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁰ The EASR also signals America's embrace of multilateral security dialogue mechanisms as a useful complement to—but not as a replacement for—its bilateral relationships. It also further defines the broader U.S. strategy

of "Enlargement," through which the United States plans to reach out beyond its traditional allies and friends.

Relations with the Other Powers

The EASR discusses the centrality of the U.S. security alliances with the ROK and Japan while establishing a blueprint for increased cooperation with China and Russia. It recognizes the importance of building new friendships while maintaining and strengthening existing alliances. Most importantly, it makes no attempt to brand any nation as the new "enemy" to replace the Soviet Union, focusing instead on the need to maintain peace and prosperity and to deal with challenges to regional stability wherever they occur.

As noted earlier, maintaining a generally harmonious multilateral interrelationship requires, first and foremost, that all bilateral legs of the interrelationship remain harmonious. While there is great coincidence of views between the United States and the other three powers regarding the need for peace, stability, and economic progress within the region (and globally), all legs of the relationship have experienced challenges and strains in recent years.

U.S.-Japan Relations. The U.S.-Japan relationship continues to be the "world's most important bilateral relationship—bar none!"¹¹ The end of the Cold War has not reduced its importance. The U.S.-Japan security relationship, embodied in a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, remains an essential element in the interaction between the world's two foremost economic powers; it also provides the foundation for stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the most economically vibrant region in the world.¹²

The Treaty commits both sides not only to the defense of Japan but also to the promotion of regional stability. With the significant reduction (but not elimination) of external threats to Japan's security, the alliance's focus today must shift from defense of Japan to the broader regional goal. As Ambassador

Richard Armitage, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, asserted at the 1996 San Francisco Security Seminar:

The most important issue in the current relationship is not "how many forces?" or "what weapons systems?" but rather "What are the U.S. and Japan going to do as security partners should the need arise?"¹³

This is a highly sensitive issue, given Japan's hesitancy to discuss "collective security." But refusing to discuss worst case scenarios can only make crises more likely, and surely will add strains to the alliance relationship.

The challenge in the post-Cold War era is for both governments to articulate more clearly the continuing rationale behind the alliance and the vital importance of U.S. forward-deployed forces (in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan and in Korea) in this equation. The U.S. security umbrella over Japan and the rest of Northeast Asia must be seen as secure and unwavering. This will require a renewed, reinvigorated alliance and a continued credible U.S. military presence. It also requires a greater willingness on the part of Japan to share increasingly in the risks and responsibilities, in order to keep the alliance robust and relevant. Also needed is greater trust and understanding on the part of Japan's neighbors, and an increased acceptance in Japan and in the region of a more active, responsible Japanese security role.

The Joint Declaration issued by President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto during their Tokyo summit meeting in April 1996 was a significant step forward both in informing the general publics about the importance of the security relationship and in paving the way for greater defense cooperation. It recognized close bilateral defense cooperation as a "central element" in the security relationship and went on to say that:

The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing

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with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan.¹⁴

While seen in a generally positive light by most U.S. and Japanese security specialists and generally endorsed throughout most of the Asia-Pacific region, the Joint Declaration has been greeted by a certain degree of skepticism and concern among PRC security analysts and officials who are constantly seeking evidence of an evolving U.S. "contain China" policy.

U.S.-PRC Relations. In assessing the major power relationships today, the U.S.-China link is clearly the most troubled. U.S.-China relations appear to be at an historic crossroads. Debates are underway in both capitals as to how much one side can or should trust and cooperate with the other. Should either side conclude the other is its next enemy, this forecast could easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

There appears to be a growing misperception in Beijing that the United States has already embarked on a containment policy vis-a-vis China. As one Chinese Communist Party pronouncement warns:

Engagement and containment are outwardly antithetical but identical in reality. America's concept of the term engagement means to participate in some activity so as to develop it according to one's own will. It is very important to understand this point so that we do not feel completely relaxed when we hear "engagement" or fly into a rage when we hear "containment." Some Americans call their China strategy "soft containment" which may be more appropriate.¹⁵

The above quotation, while perhaps not representative of the official PRC Foreign Ministry position, clearly represents one line of official thinking in Beijing and demonstrates how far apart the United States and China are on basic matters of policy interpretation. The Chinese complain that U.S. actions do not match our words, such as the professed U.S. allegiance

to a "one China" policy. For proof, they point to the approval of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's June 1995 visit to the United States (after perceived assurances that such a visit would not be allowed) and, most recently, to U.S. "interference" in cross-straits tensions, i.e., the deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups in response to Chinese saber-rattling during Taiwan's March 1996 presidential elections.¹⁶

While the U.S. government continually stresses the need for a policy of constructive engagement with China,¹⁷ many points of contention remain. The United States remains concerned about China's human rights practices, its failure to enforce intellectual property rights agreements, and its apparent support to Pakistan's nuclear weapons development program. China, in turn, accuses the United States of meddling in China's internal affairs and of attempting to inhibit China's economic growth while impeding its emergence as a major regional or global power. Disagreements over Taiwan further exacerbate and politicize tensions on both sides.

From a U.S. perspective, the real challenge is to meld America's traditional commitment to democracy and human rights and its concerns over issues such as nonproliferation into a broader overall long-term policy that promotes regional stability and cooperation; one that stresses patience and long-term results over instant "compliance" with American demands or desires. China's sovereignty concerns, especially as regards Taiwan, must also be recognized and dealt with in a more constructive manner.

There is also a great deal that China can and must do. For example, China could increase the transparency of its military budgets, strategy, and weapons systems acquisition or development plans. It could promote greater military-to-military dialogue and other confidence-building measures. It also needs to seek out opportunities for greater bilateral and multilateral dialogue, to include discussions on security as well as economic issues not only with the United States but with others throughout the region.¹⁸

One potential area of cooperation is on Korean Peninsula issues. Such cooperation, usually low-keyed and often behind the scenes, has taken place in the past, despite PRC protests that it has very little leverage over the DPRK. During the April 1996 summit meeting between President Clinton and ROK President Kim Young-sam, the two leaders asked China and North Korea to join them in a four-party meeting to promote peace on the Peninsula.¹⁹ While the Chinese response has been less than enthusiastic, Chinese leaders have expressed general support for the proposal while stressing the need for both Koreas to take the lead in peace discussions between one another.²⁰

U.S.-Russia Relations. U.S. relations with Russia are primarily focused on promoting internal stability in that vast nation and on both reducing and safeguarding Russia's massive nuclear arsenal. These objectives were clearly at the top of President Clinton's priority list during his April 1996 Moscow summit meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Next highest priority appears to center on achieving a greater coincidence of views on such European-centered events as the possible expansion of NATO and cooperation to prevent renewed conflict in Bosnia.²¹

Asian issues were scarcely mentioned during the April 1996 Clinton-Yeltsin summit, even though Clinton arrived in Moscow via South Korea and Japan. The Russians did express mild annoyance at not being included in the Clinton-Kim Young Sam proposal to convene a four-party meeting with the DPRK and PRC to discuss peace on the Korean Peninsula, and Clinton asked Yeltsin to press Beijing on joining the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty later this year, but these were clearly side issues.

Another Asia-oriented point of contention in U.S.-Russian relations (apparently not discussed during the Clinton-Yeltsin summit) involves the United States "taking sides" in the lingering Russo-Japanese dispute over Moscow's refusal to return Japan's Northern Territories, a small group of islands

seized in the closing days of WWII.²² The emotionalism engendered by this issue was underscored by the uproar—to include (unheeded) demands for his removal—that accompanied U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Tom Pickering's rather routine December 1995 repetition of the U.S. stand favoring the return of the Northern Territories to Japan.²³

On the positive side, contacts and cooperation between the Russian and U.S. militaries are on the rise. This includes military-to-military exchanges between officers (at the colonel level) from the U.S. Pacific Command and the Russian Far East Military District as well as more traditional Moscow-Washington exchanges. Such interaction promotes mutual understanding and builds confidence between two historic adversaries.

Relations with the Koreans. The Korean Peninsula in many respects remains a Cold War hold-out, even if there is currently some cause for cautious optimism. I remain a strong supporter of the 21 October 1994 Agreed Framework signed between the United States and DPRK. If seen through to fruition, it could represent a significant step forward on the road to peace . . . but only if North Korea lives up to its end of the bargain.²⁴

Until true peace is achieved, the U.S.-ROK security alliance remains essential, both to prevent North Korean miscalculation and to keep pressure on Pyongyang to act in good faith. The alliance continues to serve as the primary source of deterrence against potential North Korean aggression, a role that has been critical for the past forty years and remains just as critical today. The security commitment of the United States has been the principal obstacle to Pyongyang's oft-expressed desire to reunite the Peninsula, by force if necessary, under the North's political system.

In addition, I would argue that it is only under the umbrella of this alliance that Seoul can feel confident enough to pursue meaningful talks with Pyongyang. The U.S.-ROK

alliance provides a low-cost security blanket which makes dialogue between the two Koreas possible.

In the event of conflict on the Peninsula, the United States will defend the ROK and will, together with its South Korean allies, soundly defeat North Korea. A DPRK-initiated conflict would not only result in the aggression being reversed but, in all likelihood, would bring about the complete removal of the current regime in the North and the reunification of the Peninsula under Southern-style democracy. The price, however, would be horrendous, both in terms of dollars and, more importantly, in terms of human suffering.

This adds to the critical importance of the U.S. military's primary role in Korea and the rest of Asia: namely, to deter conflict. If, as many (myself included) believe, the prospects for hostility on the Korean Peninsula have diminished significantly in recent years, it must in large part be due to the realization of the ultimate futility of the North's pursuit of the military option.

The United States has taken on a new role in the past two years, since it started into direct dialogue with North Korea—an event that, despite close coordination between Washington and Seoul, continues to make many in the Republic of Korea nervous. It has long been suspected that North Korea would like to split the United States from the ROK and, through direct negotiations with Washington, somehow cast doubts about the legitimacy of the government in Seoul. As a result, great care has been taken to prevent North Korea from using either the direct talks or the promised road toward future diplomatic recognition against South Korea's interests.

The DPRK continues to seek direct military-to-military talks with the United States outside the Armistice framework and has called for a separate peace treaty with the United States to replace the Armistice. The joint announcement issued at the April 1996 Clinton-Kim summit, however, unambiguously asserted that peace negotiations that

specifically exclude the ROK are unacceptable. As Article 4 clearly states:

The two Presidents confirmed the fundamental principle that establishment of a stable, permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula is the task of the Korean people. Both Presidents agreed that South and North Korea should take the lead in a renewed search for a permanent peace arrangement, and that *separate negotiations between the United States and North Korea on peace-related issues cannot be considered*. [emphasis added]

Any DPRK attempts to exclude or marginalize the Seoul government should and will be rejected by Washington. Article 4 makes it clear that the road to a lasting peace on the Peninsula runs through Seoul; the ROK must be an equal partner in any peace agreement. South-North direct dialogue once again provides the key; this must remain an unyielding benchmark to be achieved before promised (much less additional) rewards are offered to the North.

Eventually, U.S. recognition of the DPRK will and must occur. After both Koreas joined the United Nations and Beijing and Moscow established diplomatic relations with Seoul, the DPRK expected that Washington and Tokyo would soon follow suit by recognizing the Pyongyang government.²⁵ North Korean actions have justifiably delayed this from already occurring but, ultimately, recognition of both Koreas by each of the four powers seems necessary and appropriate.

Of the four major powers, the United States is probably the most supportive of, and least concerned about, near-term reunification, provided it occurs peacefully. To reemphasize an earlier point, the United States can best show its support for this goal by promoting increased North-South dialogue and the lowering of barriers to meaningful direct contact between the two sides, and by ensuring that its own dialogue with North Korea does not get out in front of the North-South process. Nonetheless, U.S. diplomatic recognition of the DPRK seems a precondition for reunification.

As regards the continued need for a U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula after reunification, it is too soon to rule out this possibility. But, it is also unwise to assume that a post-reunification U.S. military presence will be supportable either in Washington or in Seoul. The advisability and feasibility of U.S. bases in a reunified Korea is highly scenario-dependent.

If the two present Korean governments reach an accord on some type of confederation that is otherwise acceptable or even favorable to the ROK, but includes a proviso that U.S. forces depart the Peninsula, how will Seoul react? On the other hand, if the South absorbs a collapsing North, what will be the rationale for retaining U.S. forces? Will the South be able to afford continued host nation support, given the financial burden (estimated in the billions of dollars) it will inherit if the North dies a sudden, even if peaceful, death?

Despite these unknowns, under most plausible scenarios (and especially under a confederation scenario), my own view is that U.S. forces will have a future role on the Korean Peninsula after reunification, at least in the near term, in order to help ensure a secure environment conducive to much-needed demilitarization, if for no other reason. Not all security specialists agree with this view, however. Even among military professionals fully committed to sustaining Korean Peninsula security, there are serious questions of the advisability and sustainability of a U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula post-reunification.

For example, a cross-section of retired and some active duty U.S. military officers were recently polled on their views regarding a continued U.S. presence today, under a North-South confederation, and under full reunification. Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority agreed that a continued U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula was essential today, even if the DPRK continues to honor the 1994 Agreed Framework.²⁶ Moreover, most agreed that a

continued military presence was desirable and appeared supportable even under most confederation scenarios.

However, slightly more than half believed that U.S. forces had no role to play on the Peninsula post-reunification. Many of these still supported a modest U.S. military presence in Japan and elsewhere in Asia post-Korean reunification as a hedge against future uncertainty. But survey respondents raised serious questions both about the strategic necessity and about the probability of political support (in either Washington or Seoul) for a continued U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula once genuine reunification is achieved.

Future Directions/Roles

The current, largely benign Asian security environment, while a product of many factors, has as its single largest determinant, the American forward military presence and the sense of security commitment that this entails. This American security blanket not only protects the security interests of friends and allies, it also protects and promotes U.S. political, economic, and security interests as well.

It is also cost-effective. History has repeatedly demonstrated that an extra ounce of protection, even in the absence of an imminent or predictable threat, is considerably cheaper than the pound of cure that would be required to undo a wrong or respond to a crisis we failed to anticipate or deter. A continued American forward military presence and the credible combined defensive capability this ensures provide that additional ounce.

For reasons of national self-interest, the continued presence of forward-deployed U.S. forces seems assured through the end of this decade, although it appears unrealistic to expect that the 100,000-troop level forecast in the EASR will be sustainable (or necessary) over the long term, especially if there is a significant cooling of tensions between North and South Korea.

The East Asia Strategy Report could have been more forward thinking and prescriptive in this regard, rather than tying American commitment in Asia to a specific number of forces forward-deployed. Presence and commitment can be demonstrated in a variety of ways and numbers of forces can and should be adjusted as threat perceptions change and regional military capabilities (or friends and potential foes) evolve.

The April 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration appears to recognize this and lays the groundwork for possible future adjustments in the number of forward-based U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific. Instead of repeating the oft-heard pledge to retain 100,000 troops "for the foreseeable future," the Joint Declaration notes that:

On the basis of a thorough assessment, the United States reaffirmed that meeting its commitments *in the prevailing security environment* requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan.²⁷ [emphasis added]

This declaration clears the way for reassessments based on changes in the security environment (for better or for worse). Even under the most benign security environment, however, one can argue that some level of forward-deployed forces will remain desirable to promote and protect future U.S. and broader regional interests.

JAPAN

Japan also has an important role to play in terms both of Peninsula and of broader Asian security, although it is much more a support role than a leading role. Neither Japan nor its neighbors would be comfortable with increased Japanese assertiveness. Nonetheless, greater Japanese involvement in regional security affairs, in a manner that is nonthreatening and

not unilateral, is appropriate as Japan seeks to become a more "ordinary" nation.

Current Policies

Japan, given its domestic political turmoil and lingering economic difficulties, has been even more inward-looking than usual in recent years. Nonetheless, Japan has taken some cautious steps to become more involved in regional security affairs, supporting Cambodian peacekeeping operations and encouraging the formation of security-focused dialogue mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. Most recently, in conjunction with the April 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Tokyo Summit, the two sides completed the long-awaited (by the U.S.) acquisition and cross-servicing agreement that permits greater cooperation and logistical support between the two militaries during peacetime. In all such instances, Japan is careful to work within the context of the U.S.-Japan Treaty or the United Nations and other recognized multilateral forums.

The U.S.-Japan Treaty, in particular, provides what one Japanese defense official described as Japan's "passport to international society":

This passport is useful and necessary for Japan to alleviate the unnecessary fear of Asian countries that Japan might become a military power again, and play an active part in international society. Countries in the Asia-Pacific Region can feel sure that so long as US-Japan alliance exists, Japan will continue to be a lightly-armed country that carries on democratic policies and embraces the spirit of the peace Constitution.²⁸

Japan remains constitutionally (not to mention politically and psychologically) prohibited from developing an offensive or power projection military capability or from participating in potentially-threatening alliances and other types of collective security arrangements or schemes. Nonetheless, as Japan strives to become a more "normal" nation, voices inside Japan

and beyond are insisting that Japan become more active internationally. One of the most prominent of these internal voices is Japan's new Prime Minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto. Another is Ichiro Ozawa, leader of the opposition Shinshinto Party. As a result, it seems clear that Japan will continue to move, however slowly and cautiously, in the direction of greater involvement in regional and global security affairs.

Relations with the Other Powers

Japan's first priority is the maintenance of strong bilateral security ties with the United States. Reality dictates that this must be the strongest, thickest link in its interrelationships with the major Asian powers. But, the U.S.-Japan security relationship must focus on the promotion of regional security, stability, and prosperity. While clearly providing for the defense of Japan, it must not be viewed as aimed at countering or containing either China or Russia.

The U.S.-Japan alliance is also important to Korean Peninsula security, in addition to being essential in its own right. The American presence in Japan, and the use of Japanese ports and airfields in support of Korean contingencies, adds to the credibility of the U.S. commitment to the ROK and thus directly supports deterrence. The U.S. presence in Japan, and especially in Okinawa, can also be seen as a subtle means of underwriting the U.S. de facto security commitment to Taiwan, although Japan has traditionally been hesitant to talk openly about such a contingency use of Japanese facilities.

Japan-China Relations. The Japan-China relationship appears to be on relatively steady ground today, despite centuries of antagonism and suspicion (that still lurk only slightly beneath the surface). Pragmatic leaders in Tokyo and Beijing are aware of the economic and security benefits to be gained by continued cooperation. However, much of the positive momentum generated in recent years by increased economic cooperation has been undercut by antagonism over

what the Chinese view as a half-hearted Japanese government apology last year during WWII 50th anniversary commemorations.

China's vitriolic reaction to the curtailment of Japanese aid to the PRC in response to China's continued nuclear testing has further exacerbated tensions.²⁹ This, combined with the strong anti-Japanese tone surrounding Chinese President Jiang Zemin's November 1995 visit to Seoul³⁰, has caused some in Tokyo to reassess the wisdom of their conciliatory approach to Beijing.

Japan-Russia Relations. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia remains high on the list when security concerns are chronicled in Japan. Japanese security specialists generally agree that the threat of overt military conflict between Japan and Russia is negligible today. Russian intentions are generally viewed as benign, although in discussions with the United States, the Japanese are quick to point out that there is a significant difference between "lack of hostile intent" and "evidence of friendly intent," suggesting that Americans tend to focus on the former while the Japanese are still awaiting proof of the latter from Moscow.³¹

True rapprochement between Japan and Russia remains unlikely in the near term, due to continuing disagreement over Russian occupation of Japan's Northern Territories, other lingering historic suspicions, and the relatively low priority attached to improving Russo-Japanese relations, especially in the Kremlin. Although the end of the Cold War had reduced security concerns on both sides, political sensitivities remain high and have actually increased in Russia, making any near-term settlement of the Northern Territories issue highly unlikely. Nonetheless, the value of increased Russo-Japanese direct dialogue is evident and should be encouraged, even if progress is slow.

One positive, if tentative, step in this direction occurred when Prime Minister Hashimoto met with President Yeltsin in Moscow at the Group of Seven (G7) Nuclear Safety Summit.

Both seemed to agree that "the time is ripe to redirect the bilateral relationship down a more productive, mutually beneficial path."³² Yeltsin reaffirmed his intention to seek a solution to the Northern Territories dispute based on "the principle of law and justice" and both agreed to revive cabinet-level negotiations aimed at finally concluding a WWII peace treaty.³³

Relations with the Koreans. Japan is attempting to improve relations with both Koreas. Tokyo generally recognizes that its primary contribution to stability on the Peninsula is its continuing effort to present a united front, along with the United States and ROK, when it comes to dealing with the North. In this regard, it is extremely important that Japan not be seen as getting out in front of, or undercutting, ROK or U.S. efforts, particularly during periods of sensitive negotiations.

Japanese security specialists express concern about nuclear developments and attitudes in both South and North Korea. It is true that there is little talk emanating from official channels about the ROK reinstituting an indigenous nuclear weapons program in the face of the potential North Korean challenge. However, talk in Seoul about the prospects of the South one day "inheriting" a nuclear weapons capability when it eventually absorbs the North³⁴ is particularly unsettling to the Japanese, as it is to anyone favoring nuclear nonproliferation and a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

Japan and the ROK have made steady progress in improving relations, despite occasional flare-ups normally associated with inopportune and inappropriate remarks made by Japanese politicians regarding the Japanese occupation of Korea or Japan's role in WWII. Of particular note was the decision, announced in mid-September 1995, that the two nations would begin holding regular high-level defense consultations. This announcement came during a meeting between Japanese Defense Agency chief Seishiro Eto and

ROK Defense Minister Lee Yang Ho in Seoul.³⁵ Bilateral cooperation on defense matters reportedly will include the strengthening of intelligence ties and the institutionalization of the sharing of military information, in addition to more frequent working level meetings and exchange visits, including regular meetings between the defense chiefs. Such cooperation is essential to peace and stability in North Asia.

On the negative side, lingering territorial disputes, most recently over Tok-do/Takeshima Island (a ROK-occupied island claimed by both sides while defining their respective exclusive economic zones), remain a source of irritation. Also, ROK President Kim's harsh criticism of Japan during the historic state visit to Seoul of Chinese President Jiang Zemin—remarks no doubt encouraged and reinforced by Jiang—reveal deep animosities which South Korean political leaders seldom resist exploiting.

Some Korean security specialists have also expressed concern over the April 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration, even though the Seoul government has officially endorsed the accord, with the caveat that it should be implemented with an eye toward "contributing to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula."³⁶ Nonetheless, others in the ROK are concerned over what "appropriate roles" the United States will ask Japan to play.

One extreme, but not atypical concern, expressed by a leading ROK Japan specialist, is that the United States may have "deputized part of its role as policeman in the region to Japan."³⁷ Dr. Song Yong-son went on to say,

Basically, I don't object to the new U.S.-Japan security pact due to the lack of alternatives, but the problem lies in the momentum generated by developments that started with Japan's participation in the UN peacekeeping operations and will continue with the unshackling of devices put in place to prevent it from becoming a military power.³⁸

Clearly, Japan has a long way to go before overcoming deep-seated historical ROK suspicions about its future intentions. It is equally clear that the ROK sees the U.S.-Japan alliance as a necessary (if only marginally successful) safeguard against Japanese remilitarization.

Relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang remain strained although there was some improvement following Japanese aid shipments of rice to North Korea after the September 1995 intense flooding in the DPRK. The North Koreans have also asked Japan to hold high-level dialogue on the resumption of normalization talks. These talks, initiated in early 1991, collapsed in November of 1992 and officially remain on hold as of this writing.³⁹ There have, however, been reports of lower level "secret talks" in Beijing, aimed at reinvigorating the dialogue.⁴⁰

Ultimately, Pyongyang hopes for recognition from Japan (as it does from the U.S.) as the *quid pro quo* for China's and Russia's earlier recognition of the Seoul government. While Tokyo coordinates closely with Seoul and Washington in its dealings with the DPRK, many in the ROK remain extremely wary of any Japanese overtures toward Pyongyang.

Meanwhile, DPRK paranoia over Japanese intentions still runs high. The North Korean press frequently includes invectives against "Japanese militarism" and Japan's "continuing aggressive ways." For example, the DPRK assessment of the fall 1995 Japan Defense Program Outline (which forecast a 25 percent cut in the authorized strength of Japan's Self-Defense Forces) identified this document as "an aggressive military strategy to realize Japanese militarists' ambition for overseas aggression and expansion."⁴¹ Over time, Japan can be expected to play a major role in assisting in the economic development of the North in order to help pave the way for the "soft landing" that everyone seeks, although Tokyo's effort must be closely coordinated with that of the other major powers and, most importantly, with the ROK's efforts. Japan's leading role in the Korean Peninsula Energy

Development Organization (KEDO), including critical Japanese financial support for the light water reactor project and other aspects of the October 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, is also of major significance.

There are some, perhaps even many, in Korea (South and North) who believe that Japan actively opposes Korean reunification and is working to prevent it from happening. I disagree. True, Japanese leaders are not likely to expend much effort trying to speed the process along—nor would such measures be expected, welcomed, or trusted by most Koreans. But Tokyo understands that there is little it can do either to prevent or to promote reunification, or even to adequately prepare Japan for it, other than to attempt to mend fences with both Seoul and Pyongyang.

This is not to say that Japanese security specialists have no apprehensions about a reunified Korea. Simple arithmetic tells us that a reunified Korea, absent any significant prior force reductions, would have 1.85 million men under arms. This would make it the second or third largest army in the world, larger than the U.S. military and more than nine times the size of Japan's Self-Defense Force. When one adds up the number of tanks, artillery, aircraft, and other items of military hardware on both sides of the DMZ, the figures are staggering. South-North dialogue must focus, early in the process, on reducing the number of military forces and hardware on both sides, in order to make eventual reunification less alarming to Korea's neighbors.

Future Directions/Roles

As is the case with the United States, Japan should and will in due course establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK, with all the above caveats still applying. The ROK should not feel threatened by such a move, if properly coordinated, since it is clear that progress in Japan-DPRK relations will be a lower priority than, and will not occur at the expense of, either Japan-ROK or Japan-U.S. relations.

Japan's role in the event of conflict on the Peninsula remains an area of contention both in Tokyo and in Washington. What is Japan's role if war breaks out on the Korean peninsula? Will Japan have to wait until it is physically attacked to participate in defense of the sea lanes, especially between Japan and Korea? Will Japan help rescue its own citizens who may be trapped on the Korean peninsula amidst the hostilities . . . and would the Koreans permit them to do so? Will Japan help protect or rescue Americans or other third party nationals? These and other broader geopolitical and strategic questions relating to constitutional and treaty interpretations must be addressed now, in order to test—and ultimately to expand or redefine—the limits of Japan's willingness and ability to contribute to regional defense.

In reality, one would anticipate very little in the way of direct combat support from Japan in the event of a Korean contingency, beyond surveillance and sea lane security and defense of U.S. bases and facilities in Japan. But it is important, in peacetime, to begin to define these roles and develop procedures for overcoming the obstacles to performing them; a mature relationship requires nothing less. The April 1996 Clinton-Hasimoto Joint Declaration at least opens the door for such discussions.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

When one ponders the future of Northeast Asia, one question looms larger than the others: "Whither China?" As the world's most populous nation, with the world's largest military and fastest growing economy, China will play a major role in defining the Northeast Asian security environment for the indefinite future.

China has traditionally been a highly xenophobic, nationalistic society and it is becoming more so as today's political leaders jockey for future position. It is unclear who

will emerge to take the helm once senior leader Deng Xiaoping departs the leadership scene. Even if Deng's successors are committed to economic reform (a strong probability), it remains to be seen how well they can manage the internal challenges and the international tensions inherent in China's becoming a major power in Asia and the world at large.

Current Policies

China today is clearly a nation in transition. Many trends are positive. China's commitment toward economic reform appears irreversible and China's leaders recognize that this process requires extensive and positive interaction with developed market economies. Therefore, foreign investment is encouraged and technology transfer from the West is avidly pursued. Membership in multilateral economic organizations such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum (which China has joined) and the World Trade Organization (which it wants to join) is deemed highly desirable. As will be discussed later, China has been less eager to participate in multilateral security discussions, although it is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum and participates in the Indonesian-hosted nongovernmental dialogue involving the various Spratly Island claimants.

Relations with the Other Powers

Driven by its desire for economic cooperation—and the recognition that economic development requires a stable security environment—China has made a concerted effort to improve relations with its Northeast Asian neighbors and understands the benefits of improved relations with the United States as well. Nonetheless, competition between China and the other powers appears inevitable, fueled not only by emerging economic and political realities, but also by historic tensions and suspicions that remain just below the surface.

The question is not "will there be competition?" but "how responsibly can this competition be managed?"⁴²

Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese relations have already been discussed. As noted, it is vital to regional security that both Japan and the United States maintain good relations with China; a "zero sum" approach must be avoided by all three states. Constructive dialogue on security issues among the three nations (in a trilateral or broader multilateral setting) is essential, as is close coordination between the United States and Japan regarding China policy in general.

The generally suspicious (when not openly critical) Chinese reaction to the April 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto summit and Joint Declaration reflects growing Chinese concern over the potential for the U.S.-Japan alliance to take on an anti-Chinese tone, now that the Kremlin no longer provides the threat upon which to justify the alliance.⁴³ The Chinese penchant for viewing the world in balance of power terms magnifies this worry.

China-Russia Relations. Sino-Russian relations were temporarily set back due to Beijing's barely-disguised approval of the 1991 Kremlin coup attempt that was foiled by soon-to-be President Boris Yeltsin. Relations have improved markedly since then but are still described in terms of "good neighborly coolness" rather than comradeship.⁴⁴ Chinese security specialists express concern over Russian instability (although their concern does not match that expressed by the West) and believe that Russia will eventually regain its "big power mentality" and become a force to be reckoned with once again. This will hold true even if the current wave of ultra-nationalism is held in check.

The Russians seem less concerned about the potential Chinese threat and, while somewhat cautious about Chinese migration into their Far Eastern provinces, welcome the immediate benefits the Chinese bring. Moscow tends to see China primarily as a source of much needed investment and

hard currency, the latter to be provided in significant measure through the sale of advanced Russian weapons systems.⁴⁵

Beijing benefits from the high priority Moscow attaches to improved Sino-Russian relations. Russian President Boris Yeltsin has been to Beijing twice, most recently in April 1996, just days after President Clinton called on him in Moscow. During the 1996 Beijing summit, the Russian leader traded Russian acknowledgment that Tibet and Taiwan were "inseparable" and "inalienable" parts of China for Chinese endorsement of Russia's efforts to suppress the Chechen rebels ("safeguarding [Russian] national unity").⁴⁶

There are some who see the potential for some type of Sino-Russian strategic condominium emerging from this growing rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow.⁴⁷ While it is true that at the most recent summit both leaders "railed jointly against 'hegemonism, power politics and repeated imposition of pressures on other countries'—against U.S. pushiness, in other words," it is equally true that "the warmer atmospherics will not do away with deep-rooted differences and suspicions."⁴⁸ While balance of power practitioners in Beijing and Moscow may attempt to play a Russia or China card, the best they can realistically hope for is a somewhat tentative marriage of convenience. A long-lasting true strategic partnership does not appear likely.

Relations with the Koreas. China is another critically important player in terms of Korean Peninsula security, in part because it is the only one of the four major players that currently maintains essentially cordial relations with both South and North Korea. China has traditionally been considered the DPRK's closest ally. However, China's decision to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea, and its backing of the entry of both Koreas into the United Nations, have undoubtedly raised some concern in Pyongyang over the long-term reliability of the Sino-North Korean special "close as lips to teeth" relationship.

Beijing has also taken a very strong stand against the use of force on the Korean Peninsula, stating that the "starting point" of China's Korea policy is the belief that "any problem in this region should be settled in a peaceful way."⁴⁹ Beijing also continues to support direct dialogue between the two Koreas as the best means of achieving a peaceful settlement.

Chinese relations with the Republic of Korea have shown dramatic improvement over the past decade. Both sides benefit politically as well as economically from this relationship, and it is likely to continue to improve. This was clearly underscored by the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Seoul prior to the 1995 APEC Leader's Meeting in Osaka. In his address before the ROK National Assembly—the first ever address by Jiang to a foreign parliament—Jiang stressed the growing political, economic, scientific, and cultural ties between the two nations, while praising (and promoting) increased ROK financial investment in China.⁵⁰

While China clearly attaches great importance to improved relations with the ROK, Beijing will avoid moving too fast, and will be disinclined to make public many of the private assurances it no doubt utters behind closed doors to the South, in order not to further alienate the North.

Meanwhile, relations with the DPRK have become strained for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is China's improved relations with the ROK.⁵¹ Nonetheless, relative to the dismal state of North Korea's relations with virtually everyone else, China remains one of North Korea's closest and most important friends. The question of just how much leverage China has over North Korea, or how much Beijing is willing to use whatever leverage it has, is subject to debate. Still, it is clear that no other nation in Northeast Asia (and perhaps in the world) has more influence over North Korea than China.

China maintains a bilateral security treaty with North Korea, although the Chinese have made it clear that the

agreement is defensive in nature and would not necessarily apply in situations where Pyongyang was the aggressor. This Chinese caveat has some deterrent value. While North Korea has long subscribed to its "Juche" system of self-sufficiency, few believe it would be capable of sustaining military operations against a combined U.S./ROK force without considerable outside logistical support. North Korea can no longer rely on China providing that support.

China is probably the least eager of the four major powers to see reunification occur, for a variety of reasons. First is its desire to maintain a buffer zone. This is especially important given the presence of U.S. military forces in the ROK and the fear that an ROK-dominated, unified Korea would maintain this presence and perhaps even let it spread northward. China's growing suspicion that the United States is embarked on a Chinese containment policy, while incorrect, nonetheless feeds the desire to maintain a buffer.

China also places high value on regional stability which it oftentimes equates (again incorrectly) with maintaining the status quo. Since many reunification scenarios include the collapse of the North's government and some level of instability or chaos, the Chinese see the risks of reunification far outweighing the gains (especially the gains for them). Finally, there is the matter of ideology. While "socialism with Chinese characteristics" is a far cry from the "Juche socialism" practiced in the North, political leaders in both nations still rely on communist ideology for their legitimacy. Thus, for a number of reasons, China is not eager to see the North Korean domino fall.

Over the long run, China no doubt understands that Korean reunification is inevitable. As a result, Beijing is carefully enhancing its ties with both Seoul and Pyongyang while positioning itself as a potential replacement to the United States as security guarantor for a united Korea. While some Koreans may be enticed by this possibility, it would

likely cause concern in Washington and Tokyo and, upon serious reflection, in Seoul as well.

Future Directions/Roles

What will China be like at the turn of the next century? Will it be a prosperous, stable, responsible member of the community of nations, fully committed to political, economic, and security cooperation with its neighbors? Or, will it be a sprawling, amorphous, undisciplined, perhaps even somewhat fragmented giant, troubling to its neighbors and a real challenge to the rest of the world? Or, as is more likely, if it falls somewhere in between, toward which of these two directions will it be heading?

It is, of course, too soon to make specific predictions. Those who will be most responsible for charting China's future course have yet to be fully ordained into power. Even a leadership committed to reform will face immense challenges in achieving both economic prosperity and political stability. Should economic reform succeed, there is still no guarantee that a prosperous, stable China will necessarily be a cooperative or benign one, especially if political liberalization does not follow (or if more intense nationalism does).

An optimistic (and in my view highly plausible) future scenario painted by one Chinese scholar seems worth repeating here:

China is in transition today but is following a course of "economic reform with political stability" that is supported by the leadership, the party, and the people. After Deng, there may be some continued shifting of players, but basic policy will not change. The debate is over the pace, speed, and tactics, not the basic direction. Differences of opinion and occasional leadership changes will not affect this.⁵²

The most important certainty, from the Chinese perspective, is that China will continue to move forward and become stronger economically every day. Political

liberalization should inevitably follow but it will be a gradual, not an overnight process. China cannot afford to copy the Russian model (nor should anyone want it to); nor will it copy Western-style democracy. My best assessment is that, over time, China will develop its own form of "democracy with Chinese characteristics."

RUSSIA

Russia wants to remain involved in Asian security affairs, even if, realistically speaking, it brings very little to the table today other than the ability to create serious problems if it is excluded. Russia's economic and political problems and the rise of a hostile brand of nationalism, as manifested in the political rise of zealots such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, raise concern not only over the prospects for long-term stability but over the future of the democratic process in the Kremlin. The resurgence of the Russian Communist Party adds to these concerns, even though it is doubtful that even a communist victory in the June 1996 presidential elections would have caused a return of Soviet-style rule in the Kremlin. Meanwhile, the appointment of the highly nationalistic (and very ambitious) former General Alexander Lebed as Russian Security Council chief raises new questions about Russia's future direction, given Mr. Yeltsin's reported ill health.

The security of nuclear arsenals and plutonium stockpiles throughout the former Soviet Union, and the perceived willingness of some individuals to sell nuclear materials (or their own expertise) to the highest bidder, continue to raise global proliferation-related concerns as well. Ironically, Russia's nuclear arsenal may pose a more imminent threat today (in terms of probability of use or proliferation) than it did during the Cold War, given environmental and security problems being experienced as Russia attempts to keep its stockpiles secure.

Given these concerns and Russia's continued geostrategic importance, every effort must be made to support Russian efforts at economic and political reform—even if future prospects do not seem particularly bright at present.

Current Policies

President Yeltsin, like Mr. Gorbachev before him, likes to stress that Russia is a Pacific as well as European power; that the two-headed eagle on the Russian coat of arms looks both east and west. Nonetheless, for the most part, Moscow's attention lies elsewhere.

To the extent Moscow has an Asia policy it is focused on keeping relations with China secure. Beyond that, Asia is a lesser priority, given Moscow's preoccupation with internal developments and consolidating relations with the former Soviet Union Republics (the "near abroad"). Even Yeltsin's April 1996 trip to China was done at least in part for domestic political reasons: to demonstrate his foreign policy prowess while also showing that he was not favoring the West.

The selection of a well-known hardliner, Yevgeny Primakov, as foreign minister was also aimed in part at silencing domestic critics of Yeltsin's foreign policy. Primakov is an old Asia hand and his appointment is unlikely to result in any significant shift in focus, although he is expected to be somewhat less U.S.- or Euro-centric than his predecessors.⁵³

Relations with the Koreans

Russia's relations with the other major powers have already been covered in previous sections of this paper. There is also little of additional significance to report regarding Russian-ROK relations beyond saying that they exist and continue to be strengthened. The Russians look at Seoul primarily in economic terms. Moscow seeks Korean trade and investment and is hopeful of one day cracking the tight U.S. hold on ROK arms purchases.⁵⁴ The ROK, in turn, sees improved Russian relations as part of its "zero sum" contest with the DPRK,

while eagerly seeking Russian endorsement of the Kim-Clinton peace proposal and other North-South dialogue initiatives.⁵⁵

As briefly noted earlier, Mr. Yeltsin has tried to insert his nation more directly into the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula on several occasions, most recently by expressing displeasure over not being included in the Clinton-Kim Young Sam four-party meeting proposal.⁵⁶ Earlier, during the 1994 United Nations debate on possible sanctions against the DPRK after its refusal to permit inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Yeltsin insisted that a four-power conference be held to discuss the crisis before any Security Council vote was taken. Jimmy Carter's intervention with Kim Il Sung avoided a showdown on this issue (as it did in several other areas). Nonetheless, Mr. Yeltsin was serving notice that he wanted a role in Asian affairs. The fact that Russia has a veto on the Security Council makes it highly likely he will normally get a seat at the table.

The Kremlin has had a long-standing security agreement with North Korea, dating back to 1961 and renewable every 5 years. Mr. Yeltsin has stated that this treaty, along with all other official agreements signed by the former Soviet Union, is still valid. Moscow, like Beijing, has repeatedly stated, however, that it will not come to Pyongyang's aid in the event of North Korea-initiated hostilities.

The current treaty's Article One still requires Moscow to come to Pyongyang's aid if attacked. However, reports in the fall of 1995 (both acknowledged and denied by Russian officials) suggest that Russia plans to replace the treaty with a new one that contains no provision for Russian military assistance to the DPRK when the old treaty comes up for renewal in September 1996. A DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman, when asked about this development, reportedly said "we consider [the old treaty] to be insignificant and as good as nullified after the collapse of the Soviet Union."⁵⁷ This comment speaks volumes about the DPRK's views

regarding the value of a continued security relationship with Russia.

Most Russians, given a choice, would probably prefer a divided Korea to a unified one, but have few strong feelings either way. Even if they strongly objected, there is little the Russians could do to prevent an agreement reached between North and South from being consummated.⁵⁸

Future Directions/Roles

Russia's greatest future contribution to Northeast Asian stability would be to quietly support U.S. and ROK diplomatic efforts with North Korea. The best venue for Russian involvement in Asia in general and Korea in particular seems to be in the context of multilateral security mechanisms. Such multilateral forums provide a useful vehicle for Russia to become involved in security-related matters in Asia in a manner that appears nonthreatening to Japan and others who may still harbor suspicions about Russian intentions.

Greater Russian integration into the region is in everyone's best interest because it promotes a degree of familiarity and respectability that also bolsters those in the Kremlin most committed to reform and international cooperation. This has value, in and of itself, even if there is not much of substance that Russia can offer today.

3.

MULTILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE

The successful establishment and productive results to date of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the willingness of government officials to participate actively (in their private capacities) in such track two organizations as CSCAP and the NEACD, provide ample evidence of regional acceptance of, and at least limited official governmental support for, multilateral security dialogue. Such dialogue appears generally consistent with the national security desires and strategies of the United States and the other major regional actors, with several important caveats.

It is important to note that in virtually every case, multilateral proponents, at least at the governmental level, do not see such activity as a substitute for bilateral arrangements—especially not in the near term. The United States and Japan have been most direct in making this point, but it is consistent with the views of other major powers as well.

Simply put, bilateralism and multilateralism are not mutually exclusive, but mutually supportive. This is not, and should not, be seen as an "either-or" proposition. Without solid bilateral relationships, few states would have the confidence to deal with one another in the broader context. Conversely, some problems can best, perhaps only, be solved bilaterally.

THE UNITED STATES

The United States has modified its view about multilateral security dialogue in recent years, recognizing the value of such dialogue mechanisms in the post-Cold War era, provided they served to complement and did not seek to replace America's vital bilateral alliances in Asia.

President Clinton underscored this theme in his July 1993 "new Pacific community" speech before the Korean National Assembly. Clinton identified four priorities for the security of this new community: a continued American military presence/commitment, stronger efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, support for democracy and more open societies, and *the promotion of new multilateral regional dialogues on the full range of common security challenges*.

This U.S. policy conversion has raised concerns among those in Asia who are skeptical regarding America's long-term commitment to the region. Even many long-time proponents of multilateralism in Asia, while clearly supportive of the concept and pleased with the change in U.S. attitude, have expressed concern that U.S. participation in multilateral security mechanisms might serve as a cover or excuse for a reduced American military presence or commitment.

American policy-makers seem attuned to these concerns, and continually stress that U.S. support for increased regionalism is built upon the premise that such multilateral efforts complement or build upon, and should not be seen as a substitute for, enduring bilateral relationships. Given lingering regional apprehensions, however, it remains incumbent on the United States to stress, *and demonstrate*, that its involvement in multilateral activities is aimed at providing additional means of engagement and not as an excuse for a significant reduction in America's security commitment in Asia.

JAPAN

Multilateral security forums offer a particularly effective means for Japan to become more actively involved in regional security matters in a manner that is nonthreatening to neighboring countries. It is an unfortunate, but no less relevant, fact that many of Japan's neighbors remain uncomfortable about Japan playing a larger security role in Asia. This puts serious limits on Japan's ability to exert a regional political or security role more commensurate with its economic clout. Nonetheless, active participation in the ARF, CSCAP, NEACD, and similar multilateral forums provides a means for Japan to cautiously exert a greater leadership role in this area. Japan's willingness to do so is evidenced by its co-chairing the ARF Inter-sessional Support Group on confidence building and the CSCAP North Pacific Working Group, among other actions. In the economics sphere, Japan did a better than expected job in hosting the 1995 APEC annual ministerial and leaders' meetings in Osaka, President Clinton's absence notwithstanding.

This is not to suggest that Japan should or must chart a course independent from its closest security ally, the United States. Japanese regional security efforts, to remain nonthreatening to Japan's neighbors, can most effectively be accomplished within the framework of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. United Nations multinational peacekeeping operations also provide a useful forum for greater Japanese participation in international security-related affairs.

The U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is not only a prerequisite to both nations' participation in regional multilateral activities but, arguably, is a prerequisite for the success of such efforts in general. The following statement, delivered at a meeting of Japanese and U.S. security specialists reviewing bilateral/multilateral options and implications, captured one consensus conclusion:

The combination of the strategic interests of the U.S. and the constraints imposed on Japanese international behavior make the U.S.-Japan security alliance as close to a permanent fixture of East Asia as one can identify. Therefore it is important to realize that all multilateral frameworks in the region are intended to complement rather than to replace this vital bilateral relationship.

The interconnection is important to understand: the bilateral relationship is a precondition for multilateral initiatives; simultaneously, no multilateral initiative can or should be undertaken that would weaken the bilateral connection.⁵⁹

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The PRC was initially reluctant to participate in regional multilateral security forums. Beijing strongly prefers to deal on a bilateral basis with its neighbors, assuming (rightfully) that its smaller neighbors in particular would be much more inclined to yield to PRC persuasion when dealing with sensitive or contentious issues on a one-on-one basis.

However, with the emergence of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the growing solidarity of the ASEAN states themselves, China has been confronted with a multilateral environment that it can no longer ignore. As a result, Beijing has decided to participate and is now generally (although perhaps grudgingly) supportive of such efforts.

Chinese attitudes regarding the South China Sea provide an illustrative case. Beijing was initially reluctant to engage in multilateral dialogue, even when restricted to the other claimants, insisting that each should deal with Beijing separately. Today, Beijing participates in the Indonesian-hosted track two workshops on the Spratlys (although some have accused Beijing of participating only to delay or impede progress) and has agreed to abide by multilateral principles, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas, in addressing these claims.⁶⁰

Of note, Beijing still refuses to participate in multilateral dialogue involving non-claimants, even in track two forums, stating that outside forces (especially the U.S.) have no right to discuss (interfere in) this "internal" matter. China also generally refuses to participate in multilateral discussions dealing with other "sovereignty issues" such as Taiwan or Tibet and avoids even nongovernmental, largely academic dialogues if scholars or officials from Taiwan are invited.

Despite these Chinese caveats, from the perspective of the United States and China's more immediate neighbors, even limited PRC participation in multilateral mechanisms provides a useful vehicle for greater interaction aimed at drawing an emerging China into the international community in a constructive manner. Active Chinese participation in a broad range of security-oriented forums could also promote greater transparency regarding Chinese military capabilities and intentions and this would clearly contribute to regional stability.

RUSSIA

Multilateral forums provide Russia the same opportunities for greater regional integration. For its part, the Kremlin has signalled its desire to become more directly involved in multilateral security dialogue in Asia. For example, during the 1994 UN Security Council debate over sanctions against North Korea, it was Russia that proposed an international conference of key Asian players, in order to seek ways of defusing the crisis (while assuring Russia a seat at the table). The earlier referenced complaint about not being included in the Clinton-Kim Young Sam Four-Party Meeting proposal underscores Russia's desire to be involved in all Asian multilateral arrangements, as does Moscow's strong bid for entry into APEC.

One could argue that, in Northeast Asia, Russia brings very little to the multilateral table today beyond the ability to

be antagonistic and obstructionist if left out. Russia possesses very little leverage over its former Cold War ally, North Korea, and remains generally distrusted by Japan. Nonetheless, bringing Russia into the Asian dialogue community costs little and also bolsters those in the Kremlin most committed to reform and international cooperation. Russia is currently a member of the ARF, CSCAP, and the NEACD. Russia has also volunteered to take the lead within the ARF in developing "norms and principles of security and stability" for the Asia-Pacific region.

SOUTH KOREA

The Republic of Korea also supports multilateralism as long as it complements existing bilateral relationships. As one ROK official recently noted:

Currently, Asia-Pacific security is sustained primarily by a network of bilateral security arrangements, with the United States playing a key role. The United States has been the region's *de facto* stabilizer and moderator through these bilateral security arrangements. A strong U.S. presence will continue to serve as the backbone of security in the region and help to inhibit the reemergence of tensions. However, there is also emerging a genuine need for a framework for security dialogue and cooperation among the countries of the region.⁶¹

South Korean security specialists promote a three-pronged approach to security on the Peninsula.⁶² The first is direct dialogue with the DPRK, based on the 1991 "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchange and Cooperation" and "Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula" accords worked out between South and North Korea. Another is the application of global agreements on disarmament and arms limitations, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

The ROK endorses a third approach—multilateralism—as a means to promote cooperative security, prevent disputes from arising, and prevent existing disputes from escalating. It was in this spirit that the ROK Foreign Minister introduced his earlier-referenced proposal for a Northeast Asia Security Dialogue at the May 1994 ARF Senior Officials' Meeting in Bangkok. This ROK commitment to multilateralism is also witnessed by its active participation in the ARF, APEC, CSCAP, and the NEACD, among other multilateral mechanisms.

The ROK's approach to multilateralism appears based on four working principles:

- Any multilateral security forum in Northeast Asia should not undermine or erode the existing bilateral arrangements in the region.
- Emphasis must be placed on a gradual or step-by-step approach that nurtures habits of consultation and cooperation.
- In addition to official or governmental talks, there is a need for unofficial channels of dialogue on security.
- Forums should involve all the members of the region as much as possible. However, this principle must be flexible in practice. In the first stage, forums can be established without the participation of certain countries that show negative responses.⁶³

The ROK is prepared to participate in multilateral dialogue with the DPRK, but is also clearly prepared to engage in such forums without the North, even when the Korean Peninsula is the focus of attention. While the ROK has been very supportive of DPRK participation in track two efforts—leading the effort to bring the DPRK into CSCAP and encouraging their participation in the NEACD—it seems less certain about the desirability of having the DPRK enter the ARF at this time.

In my own discussions with ROK Foreign Ministry officials, I note (and fully understand and appreciate) mixed feelings on this subject. On the one hand is the need for more dialogue and greater DPRK awareness of geopolitical realities which immediate participation offers. On the other is the continued frustration over North Korea's refusal to recognize the ROK's legitimacy and resume direct dialogue. At present both the ROK and United States appear to agree that a resumption of South-North talks should precede U.S. recognition of the DPRK and its subsequent participation in official forums such as the ARF.

NORTH KOREA

DPRK spokesmen acknowledge Pyongyang's commitment, at least in principle, to multilateral security dialogue, with one important caveat mentioned earlier, namely, that the dialogue not be directed specifically toward (i.e., against) them. North Korea's resistance to four-plus-two settings also stems from its resentment, if not feeling of betrayal, over the lack of progress in establishing diplomatic relations with both Japan and the United States.

DPRK spokesmen have made it clear that North Korea has no intention of participating in four-plus-two or other Korean Peninsula-oriented dialogues at either the track one or track two levels until all bilateral relationships are in balance, i.e., until the United States and Japan recognize the DPRK.⁶⁴ The DPRK specifically rejects the ROK-proposed Northeast Asia Security Dialogue. Instead, DPRK officials maintain that, "in order to ensure security in the region through multilateral negotiations, it is important to create an atmosphere of confidence building above all by resolving the complicated issues bilaterally."⁶⁵

Despite these problems (or perhaps, because of them), multilateral security-oriented mechanisms that are broader-based and nongovernmental, such as CSCAP, can prove

invaluable. They provide a useful venue for bringing North Korean security specialists and government officials into direct contact with their southern counterparts in a less confrontational atmosphere, while also helping to expose the North Koreans to other opinions and a more realistic world view in an informal setting where propaganda can be minimized. It is more difficult to imagine an official multilateral forum serving this purpose, at least not until some progress is made in South-North talks.

BENEFITS OF MULTILATERALISM

Emerging multilateral security mechanisms in Asia can be important vehicles for promoting long-term peace and stability. Institutionalized multilateral forums can be most valuable if they serve as confidence-building measures aimed at avoiding, rather than reacting to, crises or aggression. In time, they should also be capable of dealing with nontraditional security concerns such as refugee problems or pollution and other environmental issues.

Multilateral settings can also facilitate bilateral (or subregional) dialogue among nations and their official or unofficial representatives who, for a variety of reasons, may be unable or ill-prepared to make arrangements directly with one another. The APEC Leaders' Meetings, for example, have made it possible for President Clinton twice to engage in direct discussions with Chinese President Jiang Zemin when bilateral summit meetings would have been politically impossible to otherwise arrange. The 1994 APEC Leaders Meeting in Indonesia also produced a three-way "mini-summit" involving the leaders of the ROK, the United States, and Japan. Likewise, the G7 Nuclear Safety Summit provided the first opportunity in 11 years for a Japanese Prime Minister to visit Moscow.

Multilateral security mechanisms such as the ARF and CSCAP are, by their mere existence, confidence-building

measures, in that they promote greater trust and understanding in the region. They also provide a forum for the further investigation and development of confidence-building measures that may be applied either region-wide or on a more selective, subregional basis. In this, as in many other instances of multilateral dialogue, the process itself is an extremely important product, since increased dialogue promotes increased understanding which, in turn, hopefully leads to a reduced risk of conflict.

Multilateral forums also provide a venue for other regional actors to be heard on security issues that affect them all. Track two organizations such as CSCAP can provide "benign cover" for governments to vet new policies and strategies in a more academic setting before adopting formal proposals at the official level. In addition, nations or entities that might find it uncomfortable or politically unacceptable to engage in bilateral dialogue can still effectively interact at the multinational level, particularly in nongovernmental forums.

Finally, briefly recapping points made during earlier commentary, multilateral security forums provide a framework for enhanced U.S. involvement in Asian security that complements, but does not seek to replace, current bilateral security commitments. They permit Japan to become more actively involved in regional security matters in a manner that is nonthreatening to neighboring countries. They also provide a useful vehicle for greater interaction between China and its neighbors while promoting greater transparency regarding Chinese capabilities and intentions.

Multilateralism also provides Russia with opportunities for greater regional integration while bolstering those in the Kremlin most committed to international cooperation. Finally, nongovernmental forums provide a venue for bringing North Korean officials into direct contact with their southern counterparts in a less confrontational atmosphere, while also helping expose them to broader regional realities.

LIMITATIONS OF MULTILATERALISM

Multilateral security dialogue mechanisms hold many promises for Asia, but have their limits as well. A clear understanding of the weaknesses and boundaries—of what multilateralism is neither suited for nor intended to accomplish—can prevent false or overly optimistic expectations and allow the nations of the region to maximize the benefits to be derived from multilateral approaches to regional security.

Broad-based institutionalized multilateral forums like the ARF are useful vehicles for discussing potential problems, but seem ill-equipped (and not very eager) when it comes to resolving crises once they have occurred. Ad hoc coalitions and more focused problem-oriented groupings appear more useful in solving problems or dealing with actual crises in Asia or elsewhere (witness the Desert Storm coalition assembled to deal with Iraqi aggression during 1990/91). A standing NATO-type alliance aimed at defeating or containing a specified threat simply does not apply to a post-Cold War Asia—nor, for that matter, was it possible to sustain even at the height of the Cold War.

Multilateral organizations (governmental and nongovernmental) generally act through consensus in setting their agendas and making recommendations. This acts as a brake of sorts on how fast these organizations can move forward. For this reason, those promoting multilateral dialogue and various forms of regional confidence building realize the continued value and relevance of unilateral and bilateral measures that not only build trust and confidence in their own right, but also help lay the foundation for broader-based cooperation. Such efforts set useful precedents and place pressures on multilateral organizations to move forward.

Finally, as regards Northeast Asia, problems on the Korean Peninsula can most effectively be resolved in a bilateral setting. This was the case with the U.S.-DPRK dialogue to defuse the nuclear crisis. While this dialogue required close and constant coordination between the United States and ROK, it seemed most effectively handled initially in a bilateral forum. Most importantly, the U.S.-DPRK talks were aimed at setting the stage for the resumption of direct South-North dialogue, which (as repeatedly stressed) still appears essential to reduce tensions, to build confidence, and eventually to help bring about the peaceful reunification of the Peninsula.

4.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The prospects for future stability on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in Northeast Asia depend in large measure on both the willingness and ability of the four Asian powers to cooperate among themselves and with the two Koreas. A few observations and recommendations aimed at increasing the prospects for regional stability are offered for future consideration.

IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL ALLIANCES

First, despite the positive trends toward enhanced regionalism and multilateral security dialogue, future stability will most likely continue to be built upon the foundation provided by several key bilateral alliances.

U.S.-Japan Alliance

First priority should be accorded to the continuation of the formal U.S.-Japan security alliance. This alliance not only serves the interests of the world's two foremost economic powers, it serves the security interests of the entire region—and is generally recognized as doing so. It seems clear that, absent firm U.S. security guarantees, Japan would have no option but to develop a stand-alone military capability. And, given the dangerous neighborhood in which Japan resides—with two declared nuclear powers (China and Russia) and one nuclear aspirant (DPRK) virtually next door—this would in all likelihood mean developing its own

nuclear capability to compensate for the closing of the U.S. security umbrella. Japanese remilitarization (conventional or nuclear), in turn, would set in motion a series of counter-reactions that could undermine the current sense of equilibrium in Northeast Asia.

This is not to predict that a more militarily powerful Japan would be a threat to Japan's neighbors—Japan lacks the manpower, resources and, in the wake of World War II's devastation, the political will to once again become an aggressor nation. But, regional apprehensions would rise nonetheless and potential arms races could follow. Clearly, a Japanese "stand alone" military capability serves no one's interests—not America's, not China's, not the Koreans, not the region's at large, not even Japan's.

U.S.-ROK Alliance

The importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance has been fully documented earlier in this paper. Until such time as there is true reunification on the Peninsula, there is no substitute for the security guarantees this vital alliance provides. To answer a question posed earlier, if the DPRK were to insist on the withdrawal of U.S. forces as a prerequisite for agreeing to any kind of loose confederation, this would be a good indication of DPRK ulterior motives. The ROK is more interested in assuring its security than in taking a risky first step toward reunification and would reject any such DPRK demand.

The future U.S. military role on the Korean Peninsula, particularly after reunification, is an issue that must be seriously thought through. Nonetheless, it would not be out of character for Pyongyang to make such a demand, assurances from interlocutors such as Dr. Selig Harrison notwithstanding.⁶⁶ And, there will be some in the ROK (and in the U.S.) who would be inclined to go along with such an offer. As a result, it will require a good measure of wisdom and political courage to make the right decision on this issue.

PRC-DPRK Alliance

The Sino-DPRK Security Treaty could serve a positive role in providing the North with the same kind of security blanket that the U.S. alliance provides the South. As argued earlier, it is only under the mantle of the U.S.-ROK alliance that Seoul feels confident enough to pursue meaningful talks with Pyongyang. North Korea may need similar reassurance before it feels safe enough to proceed in a truly meaningful manner. Only the Chinese are trusted enough to be able to provide such reassurance to Pyongyang.

In this context, China's nuclear capability could become a source of regional stability if Beijing is willing to offer, and Pyongyang is willing to accept, a Chinese security guarantee in return both for strict North Korean adherence to the Agreed Framework and for a resumption of the North-South dialogue (including a mutual commitment to the no-reprocessing agreement).⁶⁷ The U.S. and ROK governments should also encourage Beijing to take more initiative in proposing long-term solutions to the challenges emanating from the Korean Peninsula. This is particularly important in this time of political uncertainty in the North. A more direct role by Beijing, as envisioned in the Clinton-Kim April 1996 Four-Party Meeting proposal, appears crucial to ensure that the window of opportunity for dialogue remains open. The time is ripe for Beijing to be more proactive in its approach to security on the Korean Peninsula, while continuing to play its thus far seemingly effective "honest broker" role. China is seriously committed to economic growth and development and views conflict on the Korean Peninsula as disruptive to its long-term goals. It is, therefore, in China's vested interest to continue to apply pressure on Pyongyang to cooperate with the United States and ROK.

NEED FOR KOREAN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

No spot on the globe is more in need of confidence-building measures (CBMs) than the Korean Peninsula. The North and South, first and foremost, must resume their direct dialogue. But they must do more. They must start taking concrete steps to overcome decades of hatred and mistrust. The North needs to open up, albeit slowly, and the South needs to start building the infrastructure that will help the North eventually integrate itself into the ROK (and global) economy.

There is also a pressing need for CBMs aimed at partially demilitarizing the Korean Peninsula. Both sides, but particularly the North (given Seoul's close proximity to the DMZ), need to pull forces back from the DMZ, and to enter into talks aimed at mutual force reductions. Shortly before his death, North Korean President Kim Il Sung agreed in principle to discuss reductions during his meeting with former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Here once again, the PRC could provide the necessary security assurances to the DPRK to make demilitarization possible. While Beijing may itself feel uncomfortable with such a move, a stationing of PRC "tripwire" military forces between the DMZ and Pyongyang might provide one means of security assurance for the North.

HARMONIOUS U.S.-PRC RELATIONS ESSENTIAL

While all four Asian powers have a role to play, the above analysis leads to the conclusion that the PRC and U.S. remain the central players in the Northeast Asia security drama. How they interact with the rest of the region in no small part depends on how well they can interact with one another. In the final analysis, and assuming the continued viability of the U.S. alliances with Japan and the ROK, the principal determinant of regional stability will be the degree of harmony

that can be maintained between Washington and Beijing as both nations adjust to China's emergence upon the regional and global leadership scene.

Let me be perfectly clear about this point. I am not talking about a U.S.-PRC alliance or strategic condominium. Nor am I demeaning the centrality of the U.S.-Japan relationship or suggesting that a U.S.-PRC relationship can substitute or replace that alliance. What I am talking about is genuine cooperation and managed competition that does not lose sight of the fact that China and the United States are each too large and too important for the other to ignore or alienate. This will require Beijing to lower its voice and stop treating every U.S. action as if it were part of some grand conspiracy or containment scheme. It will also require the current (or any successor) American administration to take firmer control over its foreign policy toward the PRC—and require the U.S. Congress to act a bit more responsibly as well.

The day may come when the United States, in conjunction with Japan, Korea, and other regional friends and allies, is forced to conclude that China is determined to pursue a collision course with the rest of Asia and must be contained. But that day has not arrived. The goal today should be to prevent this from occurring. The return of a bipolar confrontation pitting China (and those in Asia that would choose to align themselves with the PRC) against the United States, Japan, and others, would serve no one's national security interests.

MULTILATERAL DIALOGUE HELPFUL

Multilateral security dialogue also holds many promises for Asia, although it is important to understand the limits as well as the opportunities it presents. Broad-based multilateral forums are useful vehicles for discussing potential problems. They are ill-equipped (and not very eager) when it comes to resolving crises or righting wrongs once they have occurred.

Bilateral alliances and ad hoc coalitions still appear better suited to deal with traditional security threats. Institutionalized multilateral forums can be most valuable if they serve as confidence-building measures aimed at avoiding, rather than reacting to, crises or aggression.

Despite their limits, emerging multilateral security mechanisms in Asia can be important vehicles for promoting long-term peace and stability. They offer a means for Japan, China, and Russia to become more actively involved in regional security matters in a manner that does not threaten their neighbors. They also provide both a means for, and guarantee of, continued direct U.S. involvement in Asian security matters. And finally, they provide a mechanism for other regional actors to be heard, while contributing to a sense of regional identity and a spirit of cooperation.

Multilateral dialogue is not likely to produce a long-term solution to South-North tensions; this can only come from direct dialogue between the two Koreas. It can, however, help promote and facilitate that direct dialogue and can ultimately endorse or underwrite its results. Nongovernmental forums also provide a useful means for Koreans on both sides of the DMZ to engage one another in broader security discussions that otherwise may be difficult to arrange. It is more difficult to imagine an official multilateral forum serving this purpose, at least not until some progress is made in South-North talks and the cross-recognition process is completed.

CONCLUSIONS

Future stability in Asia largely rests in the hands of the four major Asian powers, the United States, Japan, China, and Russia. To the extent they can cooperate with one another, a generally benign environment can develop in which future challenges can most effectively be managed. Conversely, should any one or combination of the four end up pitted

against any of the others, this will have a profoundly destabilizing effect region-wide, if not globally.

While any one of the four powers can adversely impact regional security, and major tensions within any one of the fifteen bilateral relationships can have a rippling effect on the others, it seems clear that the United States and China remain the central players. Assuming the U.S.-Japan security alliance remains solid, the U.S.-China bilateral relationship represents the key variable affecting future regional stability. Should either the United States or China somehow come to decide the other was the "enemy," this would quickly prove to be a self-fulfilling prophesy. It would force the return of a bipolar struggle that would serve neither country's national security interests while disrupting regional stability and economic progress. As regards the Korean Peninsula, the United States and China, working together, could provide the necessary security umbrella for both South and North Korea to move toward genuine rapprochement, partial disarmament, and eventual reunification. Without U.S. and Chinese acquiescence, any type of meaningful reunification becomes problematic. Even with it, however, success is by no means assured. Ultimately, it is up to the South and North to determine their collective fate. Hopefully, together they will be able to design a mutually agreed upon framework for closer cooperation now, leading to reunification in the not-too-distant future.

The key to reunification remains direct dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang. The two sides laid the groundwork for closer cooperation in December 1991 with two historic joint South-North agreements: the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula. The time has arrived for both Koreas to resume their direct dialogue and begin implementing these, and new, agreements.

NOTES

1. For more on these agreements and how they fit into the broader South Korean dialogue strategy, see Byong-Hyo Choi and Seo-Hang Lee, "Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia: A Korean Perspective," in *IFANS Review*, Vol. 3, No. 6, December 1995, pp. 1-12. This article includes an excellent summary of "Confidence Building Measures on the Korean Peninsula" which appears in slightly edited form as table 2 in this volume. *IFANS Review* is published by The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security in Seoul.

2. The ARF brings together the foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), their dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the United States, and the European Community), and other key regional players (China, Russia, and Vietnam, plus Papua New Guinea, Cambodia and Laos) — 19 nations in all — to discuss regional security issues.

3. CSCAP links regional security-oriented institutes and, through them, broad-based member committees comprised of academicians, security specialists, and former and current foreign ministry and defense officials. Government (including uniformed military) participants take part in their private capacities. CSCAP member committees have been established in Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, South and North Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. A European Community consortium and an Indian institute have joined as associate members. Vietnam is forming a member committee and is expected to become a full member in the near future, as is Mongolia.

4. NEACD is a "four plus two" dialogue (U.S., Japan, China, Russia, plus both Koreas) that brings together government officials (normally one each from the foreign and defense ministries) and private individuals (normally noted academicians or security policy specialists) from each country for dialogue on political, security, and economic issues of concern to all parties. The NEACD has met four times since October 1993, most recently in January 1996 in Beijing. While the DPRK attended a preparatory meeting in July 1993, it has not participated in any of the four meetings held to date.

5. Some Asia dialogue mechanisms, particularly in the political and economic arenas, date back to the 1960s and 1970s, as do several military-to-military efforts. However, the most ambitious and potentially significant (like the ARF, CSCAP, and NEACD) are of more recent vintage and focus on political or security-related issues. Even the most prominent of the economic gatherings, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, has taken on an important political dimension with the introduction, since 1993, of an annual "Leaders' Meeting" which brings together the heads-of-state of

member nations. Of note, APEC is a gathering of "economies" not nations; a distinction that makes it possible for the PRC, Taiwan, and Honk Kong all to participate. Only China's President is represented at the annual leaders' meeting, however, a source of constant irritation to Taiwan.

6. For a review of some of these concerns, please see Ralph A. Cossa, "U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia: Is President Clinton on the Right Track?" *Vital Speeches of the Day* LX, no. 24, October 1, 1994, 765-768.

7. See President Clinton's speech to the Korean National Assembly in July 1993. The President's comments built upon, and added an extra degree of credibility to, Ambassador Winston Lord's April 1993 testimony during his confirmation hearings to become Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. Lord signalled that the new Administration understood the economic and strategic importance of the region, when he noted, "Today, no region in the world is more important for the United States than Asia and the Pacific. Tomorrow, in the 21st century, no region will be as important."

8. For a more detailed analysis of this author's views on the Clinton Administration's then-emerging security policy in this region, please see Ralph A. Cossa, "United States Security Posture in the Asia-Pacific: A Changing Strategy for a Changing World," *Asia-Pacific Military Balance* (Malaysia), Jan 1995, and Ralph A. Cossa, "Good News for Asia: The Bottom-Up Review," *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 11-17.

9. Published by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (East Asia and Pacific Region) in February 1995 as a follow-on to the Bush Administration's 1990 and 1992 *East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI)* series of reports. *EASR* has also been referred to as the "Nye Report" since it was prepared under the direction of then Assistant Secretary Joseph Nye.

10. The Cooperative Engagement strategy is spelled out in the Summer 1993 edition of *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum* published by the U.S. Pacific Command, and in Admiral Charles R. Larson's April 21, 1993 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Both of Larson's successors as Pacific Command chief, Admirals Richard Mackey and Joseph Preuher, have endorsed this basic strategy, which focuses on maintaining alliances, building friendships, and deterring aggression, while maintaining the ability to react to and defeat aggression, should deterrence fail.

11. A phrase first coined by then-U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield and since echoed by every U.S. Ambassador to Japan and, most recently, by President Clinton during his state visit to Japan in April 1996.

12. Please see Ralph A. Cossa, *The Japan-U.S. Security Alliance and Security Regimes in East Asia* (Washington DC: Center for Naval Analyses, January 1995) for additional details on the alliance and its regional impact.

13. Richard L. Armitage, "Issuing A Challenge for the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance," paper presented at the 1996 San Francisco Security Conference, January 16-18, 1996. The San Francisco Security Conference is an annual off-the-record nongovernmental security forum involving U.S. and Japanese current and former government officials, businessmen, and security specialists.

14. "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century," April 17, 1996. For a copy of the complete text, see *Pacific Forum CSIS PacNet Newsletter* (hereafter cited as *PacNet*), No. 17, April 26, 1996.

15. Wei Yang, "How China Should Understand and Face the World," originally published in the Chinese Communist Party journal *Liaowang* and subsequently distributed by the British Broadcasting Corporation in the December 20, 1995 "BBC Summary of World Broadcasts."

16. For commentary on China's over-reaction to Taiwan's elections, and the U.S.'s over-reaction to China's over-reaction, please see Ralph A. Cossa, "China's Missile Exercises are Likely to Backfire," *International Herald Tribune*, March 9-10, 1996, and Christopher Neal, "U.S. politics, nationalism fuel crisis, analysts say," *Honolulu Advertiser*, March 12, 1996, p. A3.

17. One of the most carefully thought-out and well-crafted explanations of the need to engage China can be found in U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry's October 30, 1995 speech, "U.S. China Policy: Neither Containment Nor Appeasement" presented in Seattle, Washington. See *PacNet*, No. 4, Jan 26, 1996, for an abridged version.

18. See Ralph A. Cossa, "China and Northeast Asia: What Lies Ahead?", *Pacific Forum CSIS Policy Report*, February 1994, for additional prescriptions for constructive PRC integration into the Asia-Pacific community of nations.

19. Kim Young Sam and William J. Clinton, "ROK-U.S. Joint Announcement Proposal to Hold a Four Party Meeting to Promote Peace on the Korean Peninsula," April 16, 1996.

20. See, for example, "Jiang Sends Letter to Kim to Support 4-Way Peace Talks," *Korea Times*, April 22, 1996, 1. The headline is more optimistic than the article gives cause to suggest.

21. The Bosnia effort has achieved some success. However, Yeltsin remains strongly opposed to any further expansion of NATO among the Kremlin's former Warsaw Pact allies.

22. The official U.S. position regarding most international territorial disputes is to remain neutral while urging all sides to settle their differences peacefully. However, in the case of the Northern Territories, the U.S. has strongly and consistently supported Japan's quest for the unconditional return of all the islands.

23. Alessandra Stanley, "US Envoy's Comments on Dispute Outrage Moscow," *New York Times*, A10, December 10, 1996.

24. At this writing, the DPRK was apparently still honoring its commitment. For background on the agreement and its implementation, please see Edward T. Fei, "Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Issues in East Asia," a presentation at the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue meeting in Beijing, PRC, January 1996.

25. DPRK expectations were alluded to in So Chank-Sik, "Features of Security Situation in the Asia-Pacific Region, Northeast Region, and the Korean Peninsula," distributed at the annual United Nations Disarmament Conference sponsored by the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific in Kathmandu, Nepal, Feb 21-24, 1996, 3. Mr. So is Chief of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Disarmament Division. Information in this monograph regarding DPRK attitudes and expectations is based in large part upon discussions with Mr. So, with Mr. Kim Ryul from the Institute of Disarmament and Peace in Pyongyang, and with Mr. Kim Myong Chol, a Korean free-lance writer residing in Japan who maintains close ties with the DPRK's Foreign Ministry. I am indebted to them for the insights provided but bear sole responsibility for any misinterpretations of their explanations of DPRK positions.

26. Ralph A. Cossa, *Korean Peninsula Security in the Wake of the October 1994 Agreed Framework Between the U.S. and DPRK*, a Pacific Forum CSIS Special Report, December, 1995. Also summarized in "Korean Peninsula Security: A Survey of U.S. Military Attitudes (Retired and Active Duty) Toward Korean Peninsula Issues," *PacNet*, no. 1, January 5, 1996.

27. "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration," section 4(b).

28. Norburo Yamaguchi, "Roles of US-Japan Alliance within the Regional Security Framework," in a collection of papers prepared for a conference on U.S.-Japan Security Relations, Washington, DC, April 29-30, 1996, 89. Yamaguchi attributes the "passport to international society" phrase to former-Administrative Vice-Director General Nishihiro of the Japan Defense Agency.

29. For more on Japanese attitudes toward China, see Ralph A. Cossa, "The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty," 7-10. For details on China's reaction to modest reductions in Japanese aid, also see Hisane Masaki, "China revives war reparations to oppose Japanese aid freeze," *Japan Times Weekly International*, September 11-17, 1995, 3.

30. For details, see "China, South Korea Blast Japan for View of War Issue," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, November 15, 1996, 12, and "Kim, Jiang Criticize Japanese Attitude on Past Wrongdoings," *Korea Newsreview* 24, no. 46, 6-8.

31. *The Japan-U.S. Security Alliance*.

32. Barbara Wanner, "Hashimoto, Yeltsin Strive To Revitalize Japanese-Russian Relations," *Japan Economic Institute Report*, No. 17B, May 3, 1996, 6.

33. *Ibid.* Given the politically-sensitive nature of the Northern Territories issue, Hashimoto and Yeltsin agreed to wait until after the June 1996 Russian presidential elections before resuming the talks.

34. Based on my private conversations with Korean college students and junior military officers and particularly during a series of seminar discussions in 1994 and 1995 at Yonsei University in Seoul with Korean graduate students.

35. "ROK, Japan Agree to Expand Military Ties," *Korea Times* (English version), September 23, 1995, 1, and Naoaki Usui, "Japanese, S. Koreans Cement Alliance," *Defense News*, September 25 - October 1, 1995, 20.

36. Son Key-young, "Seoul Shows Mixed Reactions to US-Japan Security Declaration," *Korea Times*, April 18, 1996, 2.

37. Oh Young-Jin, "South Korea Keeps Head Cool As Japan Looms as Regional Military Power," *Korea Times*, April 23, 1996, 3, citing Dr. Song Yong-son of the Korean Institute of Defense Analyses in Seoul.

38. *Ibid.*

39. See "Informal talks eyed with North Korea," *Japan Times*, September 24, 1995, for background information on Japan-DPRK talks.

40. Steve Glain, "Japan, North Korea Secretly Resume Talks in Effort to Normalize Relations," *Wall Street Journal*, April 5, 1996, A4.

41. "What Japan's 'outline of new defence programme' is after," *The Pyongyang Times*, November 4, 1995, 8.

42. Again, for more details on China's relations with its neighbors from both U.S. and Asian perspectives, see Ralph A. Cossa, "China and Northeast Asia: What Lies Ahead?"

43. In the wake of the Clinton-Hashimoto summit, Japan felt it necessary to send a special envoy to Beijing (and to Seoul) to allay these fears. For details, see "Stung by China, Korea Critiques, Tokyo Sending Envoys to Explain Policy," *Japan Digest*, April 22, 1996, 1.

44. *Ibid.*, 9.

45. When Lenin proclaimed that "the capitalists will sell us (the communists) the rope we need to hang them with," he could not have foreseen that the capitalists would be in the Kremlin, while the "us" would be the Chinese, who are eagerly buying up as much rope as the Russians are willing to sell, and at bargain prices to boot. For details on Russian arms sales to China, see Theresa Hitchens, "Industry, Defense Needs Forge Russia-China Arms Link," *Defense News*, February 5-11, 1996, 24.

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46. Steve Mufson, "China, Russia Swap Support, Sign Array of Agreements," *Washington Post*, April 26, 1996, A27, citing a Yeltsin-Jiang Zemin joint statement.

47. "China Card, Russia Card," *Washington Post* editorial, April 29, 1996, A16.

48. Ibid. Also see Steven Mufsen, "Yeltsin, Chinese Have Some Needs in Common," *Washington Post*, April 24, 1996, A25.

49. Son Key-young, "China Opposes Use of Any Force by Either North or South to Settle Korean Problems," *The Korea Times*, December 13, 1995, 2, citing Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yingfan.

50. "Jiang Lauds China-ROK Ties," *China Daily*, November 16, 1996, 4, which reproduces the full text of Jiang's November 14, 1996 speech.

51. Jiang has yet to make a state visit to Pyongyang.

52. Ralph A. Cossa, "China and Northeast Asia: What Lies Ahead?", 9.

53. For an assessment of Primakov, see Carol Williams, "Moscow Policy Veers to the East," *Los Angeles Times World Report*, March 31, 1996, 1. Also see Marian Leighton, "From KGB to MFA: Primakov Becomes Russian Foreign Minister," *PacNet*, no. 11, March 15, 1996.

54. Alexander Sychev, "When Russian Gunsmiths Remain Without Job, They Find It At 'Samsung,'" *Izvestiya*, Oct 10, 1995, 3, as summarized in *Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Daily Report* (hereafter cited as *NAPS Daily Report*), November 2, 1995.

55. See "Korea Peace Proposal" section in *NAPS Report*, May 6, 1996, which summarizes, among other reporting, "South Korea Courts Russia in Talks," *Washington Times*, May 6, 1996, A13.

56. The proposal deals specifically with replacing the 1953 Armistice with a peace treaty. Since Russia was not a signatory to the Armistice, it's exclusion from this particular initiative should not be seen as surprising (or as an attempt to exclude Moscow from Asian security affairs).

57. See 1995 Kyodo News Service stories entitled "Russia offers new friendship treaty with North Korea," Moscow, September 7; "Russia denies cancellation of pact with North Korea, Moscow," September 7; and "North Korea mulls new treaty offer from Russia," September 8; plus "'You are on your own,' Russia tells North Korea," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 24, no. 4, 4.

58. Unlike the Korea case, public opinion in the then-Soviet Union was very much opposed to German reunification but, even in this case, there was little Moscow could do politically to halt this movement once the Kremlin's control over East German was loosened.

59. Ralph A. Cossa, *The Japan-U.S. Alliance and Security Regimes in East Asia*, 33.

60. For more information on the Spratly dispute and Chinese attitudes, see Ralph A. Cossa and Carolina Hernandez, "Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea," *PacNet*, no. 3, January 19, 1996.

61. Eui-Yong Chung, "Challenges and Prospects for Northeast Asian Cooperation," in *Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies Volume 6, 1996: Economic and Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia* (Washington DC: Korea Economic Institute of America, 1996), 232. Mr. Chung is Minister for Economic Affairs at the Republic of Korea Embassy in Washington, DC.

62. Choi and Lee, 6-11.

63. Seo-Hang Lee, "Korea's Approach to Multilateral Security Regimes: Four Working Principles," *PacNet*, no. 34, November 12, 1993.

64. So Chank-Sik, "Features of Security Situation in the Asia-Pacific Region, Northeast Region, and the Korean Peninsula," and follow-on discussions in Kathmandu, Nepal.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

66. Harrison reports that senior DPRK military officials are willing to "set up the new peace mechanism on the basis of mutual understanding that the stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea will continue indefinitely" and that Pyongyang has abandoned its quest for a separate peace treaty with the U.S. and now envisions "implementing separate military agreements with Washington and Seoul" after dissolving the Armistice. ("North Korea Said to Ease Stance on U.S. Troops," *Washington Post*, September 28, 1995, A22). To date, the DPRK has not made these proposals formally to the United States and ROK through established diplomatic channels, however.

67. While Russia has a nuclear arsenal that clearly overshadows China's, it appears less likely that Pyongyang would turn to Russia for security guarantees or trustingly accept them if offered, given Russia's total abandonment of Marxism.

ABBREVIATIONS

APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (forum)
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CBM	confidence-building measure
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
EASR	East Asia Strategy Report
G7	Group of Seven
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Develop- ment Organization
NEACD	Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ralph A. Cossa is Executive Director of Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based, policy-oriented Asia-Pacific research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. He is also Executive Director of the U.S. Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. A political-military affairs specialist and former U.S. Air Force colonel, he has previously been a National Security Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Deputy Director for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies in Washington.

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
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