


EFFECTIVE LEGITIMATE SECURE



INSIGHTS FOR
DEFENSE INSTITUTION BUILDING

ALEXANDRA KERR & MICHAEL MIKLAUCIC, EDITORS

EFFECTIVE, LEGITIMATE, SECURE

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Center for Complex Operations
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Washington, DC

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Defense institution building (DIB) must be studied, understood, and refined as a discipline in order to generate the knowledge and skills necessary to effectively support partner nations in building professional defense institutions. Yet, while DIB has grown in importance in the past two decades, the development of DIB programs at the Department of Defense (DOD) has primarily been a bottom-up effort, leaving a vacuum in top-level thinking on the issue. Despite growing knowledge and experience gained regarding DIB in recent years, there remains a gap in dedicated literature on this relatively new discipline. Aware of this gap, Thomas (“Tommy”) Ross approached the National Defense University during the summer of 2015 with the idea of developing a book devoted entirely to DIB. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation, Tommy recognized both the importance and the underutilization of DIB as a key instrument in the security assistance and cooperation toolkit, as well as the extent of untapped knowledge and expertise in the nascent DIB community.

This book draws from that DIB community, as well as the relevant experience of other countries and fields, to frame the challenge of defense institution building and set out the right questions for future development of the discipline. The chapters provide context for future policy and decision making in the Pentagon, Congress, and the armed services; they draw from and add to the security sector reform community, and their insights provide a base upon which those undertaking security cooperation and security assistance activities can further develop this crucial element of U.S. national security. The insights will also serve DIB partner and allied countries, as they too navigate the process of building effective defense institutions.

Many individuals contributed to this volume. The authors not only wrote the chapters, but participated in workshops and conversations, sharing insights and experience from the ground that were instrumental in shaping the volume’s content. Our sincerest thanks to Alex Alemán, Paul Bisca, Dennis Blair, Frank Boland, Mike Boomer, Dave Cate, Julie Chalfin, Paul Clarke, Tom Davies, Dickie Davis, Nadia Gerspacher, Jeanne Giraldo, Querine Hanlon, Tim Hoffman, Jack Kem, Erik Leklem, Chip Leonard, Gary Milante, Renanah Miles, Robert Perito, Juan Carlos Pinzón, Tommy Ross, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, and George Topic. We owe a special debt of gratitude to Dave Cate, Jeanne Giraldo, and George Topic for their expert insights throughout the process.

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Finally, Tommy Ross has proven himself a thought leader in this field, and we are grateful for his collaboration throughout. His recognition of the importance of DIB has helped to distinguish it as a discipline and elevated it to a major element of DOD's approach to security cooperation.

—*Alexandra Kerr & Michael Miklaucic*

INTRODUCTION

Defense Institution Building: A New Paradigm for the 21st Century

Alexandra Kerr

Today, the United States faces a security paradox. On the one hand, the U.S. military is unrivaled in size, strength, capacity, and budget; on the other hand, the global operating environment of the 21st century is diffuse and complex. Beyond the rise of geopolitical challenges from China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, threats to the United States are increasingly unpredictable and often asymmetrical. From terrorist groups that thrive in the absence of strong governance to transnational criminal networks unhindered by state borders, such challenges stipulate that no single nation, regardless of its traditional military might, can completely address its security objectives alone. The United States is no exception. Developing a network of competent partners that can share the burdens and responsibilities of global security, embracing a strategy of coalition and cooperation, is therefore vital to U.S. interests.

In the contemporary context, however, many partner countries lack the capacity to defend their own populations and borders, never mind the capabilities necessary to contribute meaningfully to international coalitions, peacekeeping operations, or shared security goals with other countries. At a time when tangential conflicts and threats originating far from the U.S. homeland frequently have direct consequences for the United States, its security, and its allies, the ability of partner countries to maintain their own security and stability is critical. The challenge, then, for the United States is how to best invest its resources to help establish strong and capable defense partners. To this end, security cooperation and assistance programs are the main line of effort, but traditional approaches employed by these programs have proven insufficient to instate sustained improvements to partners' defense sectors.

Defense institution building (DIB) seeks to fill the gap in these traditional approaches by supporting partners in developing the strong institutional foundations needed for legitimate, effective, professional, and sustainable defense sectors that contribute to the overall security and prosperity of the state—and in turn, to regional stability and U.S. national security. This chapter provides a wave-top introduction to the concept of DIB, the context from which it emerged and developed, what the DIB process entails, and its importance to the national security goals of the United States. It then lays out the structure of the book and reviews the content of the four main sections, concluding with a discussion of some of the major crosscutting themes that run throughout the chapters.

Background

Defense institution building is a relatively recent concept that has grown in response to three distinct but related developments since the end of the Cold War. First, DIB's operating theory is a legacy of the concept of security sector reform (SSR) that emerged during the 1990s; second, the practice of DIB has its roots in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which began as a way to reform the defense sectors of former-Warsaw Pact states after the fall of the Soviet Union; and third, it has evolved in response to the increased spending on, and use of, U.S. security assistance and cooperation efforts in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), particularly as these efforts shifted toward effectiveness and building capacity.¹

Roots in Security Sector Reform and PfP

The link between functioning institutional governance and effective security emerged during the tumultuous decade following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For the previous 40 years, the divide between Communism and the West had ordered the international system into two opposing camps. Almost every aspect of U.S. strategy—including the approach to both development aid, and security assistance and cooperation—was seen through the lens of containing the spread of communism, while extending the reach of liberal democracy. In the case of security assistance, the United States delivered weapons, equipment, and training to key partners and allies in order to forge or maintain relationships, and to strengthen their defensive postures (among other national priorities, like access for the U.S. military and bolstering the domestic defense industrial base).² While U.S. security assistance aimed to strengthen its partners against Soviet-sponsored insurgencies, it did so from a strictly military standpoint, with little if any involvement in the governance aspects of the partners' security and defense sectors.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 prompted drastic changes in the global political and security landscape, and in turn, altered how security was conceptualized. While many had expected the end of the bipolar order to usher in an era of peace, instead there was an emergence of fragile, often predatory states and a shift from interstate conflict to intrastate violence, marked by deep divisions along ethnic or religious lines.

For the security community, the resulting operating environment was characterized by humanitarian interventions to end conflict, often coupled with peacekeeping operations to prevent violence from reigniting in post-conflict environments. While the U.S. security assistance and cooperation system remained largely unchanged in terms of equipment grants and sales—with an emphasis on sales to help offset the sluggish U.S. economic recovery after the 1990 recession³ and a redistribution of funds, giving larger sums to fewer countries (e.g., Egypt, Israel, and Colombia)—the goal of this assistance shifted from simply thwarting communism, to emphasizing the promotion of democracy and civilian control of the military.⁴ Thus, in addition to traditional Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF), programs such as International Military Education and

Training, the Center for Civil-Military Relations, the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, and the Regional Centers were instituted in the nineties to further these objectives.⁵

For the development community, the concept of “human security” dominated assistance efforts in the post-Cold War context. Human security shifted the focus of security from the state to the individual, and moved beyond traditional security apparatuses to include the social, economic, and political conditions necessary for ensuring the protection of the individual. Where securing the sovereignty and territory of the state had, in many cases, superseded the protection of the basic needs of citizens, the human security paradigm maintained that the protection from harm and the provision of the basic needs of individuals were critical to both individual and national security.⁶ In the global South, the lack of social and economic development was perceived as a major threat to human security. The development sector thus concentrated resources on strengthening weak and post-conflict states through economic aid, focusing on liberalizing the economies of fragile states on the premise that this would reduce poverty and improve social progress toward liberal democracy. They did so while largely shying away from engagement with these countries’ security and defense sectors (many of which had supported or led authoritarian regimes throughout the Cold War, and remained tainted by corruption, human-rights violations, and ineffectiveness).⁷

However, prosperity and stability can seldom take hold when development is pursued without security.⁸ The problem with decoupling development from security was two-fold: First, at the same time that efforts were being made to improve the economies of fragile states, militaries that had been propped up by outside regimes during the Cold War remained bloated and rife with resource-siphoning corruption. The opportunity for development efforts to help downsize or rightsize militaries, promote civilian control, and reallocate the excess resources to civilian activities, was initially overlooked. Second, the state’s capacity to protect the population from threats within its borders and to defend those borders from external threats is a necessary condition in order for socio-political and economic development to take hold; human security requires functioning and effective security services. Insufficient attention had been paid to the correlation between fragility and the role of functioning security sector institutions in a state’s ability to deliver security to its citizens. As Kofi Annan would later put it, “We will not enjoy security without development, we will not enjoy development without security.”⁹

This gave rise to a reevaluation of the delivery of international assistance, both in terms of security and development. Clare Short, then UK Secretary of State for Development, recounted that at this stage,

we needed to re-examine all the instruments of policy. Aid could no longer be an instrument of Cold War policy propping up kleptocratic dictators such as Mobutu simply because they were firmly pro-Western. Arms sales, and export credits and military assistance programs needed re-examination. And the propaganda, which stressed the provision of aid as an act of charity for the poor and hopeless, also

needed reconsideration. If we meant to seize this historical opportunity, we needed to re-examine all the old assumptions and develop policy focused on helping end conflict and building competent state institutions that would encourage economic growth and human development in the poorest countries.¹⁰

The resulting concept of SSR (which Short went on to champion) focused on governance and highlighted the nexus between development and security.¹¹ Where the traditional security assistance paradigm focused on improving security force effectiveness and the traditional development assistance approach did not address the security aspects of the state, SSR instead argued for a holistic approach to enhancing partner capacity in all aspects of the security sector. The SSR approach would achieve this by improving the governance, oversight, accountability, transparency, and professionalism of security sector forces and institutions, in line with democratic principles and the rule of law.¹² Importantly, SSR argued for the importance of functioning professional ministerial institutions to sustained security capacity. While SSR tended to focus on the domestic side of the security sector (e.g., law enforcement or justice), its emphasis on the governance of security institutions laid the theoretical groundwork from which DIB has developed.

Toward the end of the decade, the SSR construct enjoyed widespread support in Europe, particularly the UK, and from Canada, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations.¹³ While SSR did not receive the same institutional acceptance in the United States, the idea gained traction among both the security and development sectors. One example of this was Plan Colombia—the security and assistance package developed by the United States and Colombia in 2000, when the country was overwhelmed by violence that emanated from drug trafficking and organized crime, as well as an armed insurgency, and in danger of becoming a failed democracy. Plan Colombia is discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, but it is worth mentioning in the context of SSR as it sought to reform governance of the entire security sector of Colombia, not just bolster its military capabilities.¹⁴

The United States was also deeply involved in the post-Cold War efforts of NATO in Europe—which strongly reflected SSR principles.¹⁵ The alliance had found new purpose in helping support the sudden influx of fledgling democracies that emerged from the former Warsaw Pact alliance. While these states sought to throw off their authoritarian past, many teetered on the brink of falling back into old, familiar habits, and, recognizing that imminent support was necessary to stop this regression, NATO pledged to provide assistance to help navigate the difficult transition to democracy. This included targeted security assistance and cooperation to help reshape Soviet-era defense sectors, primarily through the PfP program, which was established in 1994 and supported by the United States through the launch of the Warsaw Initiative Fund—later renamed the Wales Initiative Fund (WIF)—the same year. PfP attached the carrot of potential NATO membership to countries' security sector reform efforts.¹⁶ States that desired deeper ties with NATO, and those hoping for eventual membership in the alliance, received security assistance to help bring their outdated defense sectors in line with those of NATO members. PfP aimed

to ensure that new democracies had defense sectors built on Euro-Atlantic principles of civilian control and democratic governance in order to safeguard regional stability. Importantly, PfP did not just seek to provide the new states with training and equipment, but rather emphasized the implementation of governance mechanisms throughout the entire security sector, including the establishment or overhaul of democratic, accountable, and professional defense institutions.

The Short-Term Capability, Long-Term Capacity Disconnect

The 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted another fundamental shift in U.S. national security strategy. With the focus on combating irregular warfare and rising global terrorism, security swung back toward the type of war-fighting response seen during the Cold War, including arming and training partners to assist in the Global War on Terrorism alongside U.S. forces. Effective counterterrorism relied on the ability of states to defend their own territory and secure their own populations—sealing porous borders and shrinking ungoverned spaces. Security assistance and cooperation efforts were thus oriented toward providing tools—primarily in the form of training and equipment—to supplement the weak militaries and internal security forces of strategic partners (particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq) to improve their operational and tactical proficiency.

The magnitude of U.S. security cooperation investments after 9/11 accounted for billions of defense dollars annually, particularly in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁷ Yet, these huge investments resulted in only (some) short-term progress: ultimately, the provision of more assistance did not mean the provision of better assistance. In the context of these conflict zones, Title 10 security cooperation was mainly used for putting out fires in the immediate term, primarily through a familiar train and equip paradigm, the provision of which was considered critical to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts; partners were given the “stuff” they needed, such as trucks or weapons, to help fulfill a directive to contain the “bad guys” by countering an imminent threat. In this sense, short-term wins gave the impression that gap filling, e.g., the provision of trucks and weapons, was successfully building capacity. While these programs were also intended to build each country’s ability to deliver effective security and defense after the United States disengaged, within a short time it became clear that major investments in time, money, and personnel had not resulted in corresponding increases in institutionalized and sustainable partner capacity—and in some cases, overall security had even diminished.

Discussing post-9/11 security assistance and cooperation, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in 2010, “[t]he security assistance system, which was designed for the more predictable requirements of the Cold War, proved unequal to the test.”¹⁸ To understand why, look to the example of security cooperation in the form of large-scale military equipment. Through FMF or FMS, the United States may, for instance, provide a partner with helicopters in order to assist U.S. forces in a specific mission to fend off an insurgent group. And indeed these helicopters may serve that short-term purpose. But if the country’s military does not have functioning institutional logistics, resource management, and human resources systems, then that partner will not have access to the fuel to power

the helicopters or the funds to buy fuel to power them, personnel with the knowledge to fix and maintain the helicopters, access to the unique parts necessary to fix them, or the funds to buy the necessary parts. And so those helicopters will most likely be rusting on the tarmac within a year.

This all too frequent scenario—perhaps substituting helicopters for F16s or empty U.S.-built training facilities—highlights that while such programs can sometimes serve U.S. interests in the short term, the partner's long-term capacity to counter threats and secure its population is not correlatively strengthened; equipment and training that fill short-term gaps do not result in the capacity to deliver and maintain security in the longer term. Put simply, a piece of equipment is not a capability and its possession alone does not increase capacity. Therefore the delivery of training and equipment alone, regardless of the amount, did not lead to functioning defense sectors in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Problematically, the rapid responses necessary for countering groups like al-Qaeda and the Taliban left little time for considering post-conflict governance, and the illusion of success, as seen through short-term gains, further distorted the need for long-term governance planning.¹⁹ The critical flaw in the gap-filling approach is that it misses the inextricable correlation between institutions and absorptive capacity—i.e. that foundational institutions must be in place for a partner to be able to assimilate and apply the training, knowledge, skills, and equipment that the United States provides through other forms of security assistance and cooperation.²⁰ In the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, the security sectors were at best dysfunctional and functioning defense institutions were often nonexistent. These partners thus lacked the capacity to absorb training and equipment, and to sustain it once the United States left; so even though there was a graduation goal, graduation was not possible.

In light of this, the past ten years have seen sustained partner capacity—that is, the capability to maintain effective security and defense once the United States is no longer involved—become a critical goal of security cooperation efforts. These conflicts revealed that while there is often tension between the provision of security in the immediate context and building institutions for the long run, the latter cannot be subverted if the ultimate goal is sustained partner capacity. “Building Partner Capacity” activities have expanded to reflect a more holistic approach to strengthening partner states by focusing on the effective, legitimate, transparent, and accountable governance of various elements that make up the security and defense sectors.²¹ These activities stress the importance of addressing the core, underlying problems in the institutional foundations of these sectors in order for a country to develop long-term capabilities to secure its population and defend its sovereign borders, and to ultimately contribute to shared security goals with the United States.

Within this context, defense institution building is one of the integral components of any effort to establish long-term defense capacity. DIB takes on the considerable challenge of helping partner nations establish or reorient their human resources, organizations, rules, norms, values, processes, and behaviors to develop a functioning and professional defense sector, in order to develop and manage security forces, subject to civilian control, that can defend and secure the state. In so doing, DIB helps lay the foundations of defense.

Defense Institution Building

Defense institutions are the foundation of professional defense establishments. At a fundamental level, defense institutions play an essential role in fulfilling the social contract: defending sovereign borders and territories of the state, ensuring the security and prosperity of the citizens therein, protecting the interests and values of the state abroad, and maintaining national and regional stability. They serve to deliver and maintain the present and future strategies and capabilities that the armed forces need in order to conduct their operations. Democratic defense institutions also safeguard civilian control of the military and are themselves accountable to the government, to legislation, and ultimately to the electorate.

In the United States, the Department of Defense (DOD) employs over 700,000 civilian personnel, in addition to the nearly 1.5 million active-duty members of the military and hundreds of thousands of reservists.²² While physically headquartered at the Pentagon, DOD utilizes sites covering over 30 million acres of land,²³ and operates on the world's largest defense budget: \$590.5 billion for Financial Year 2017.²⁴ While these figures are impressive, tangible assets do not in and of themselves constitute an institution. Rather, defense institutions are comprised of people, organizations, rules, norms, values, processes, and behaviors that enable oversight, governance, management, and functionality of the defense enterprise.²⁵

For the United States, DIB is based on the recognition that in order to be effective defense partners, countries need professional defense sectors, which in turn require functioning defense institutions. If a country's defense sector is unaccountable, poorly managed, and not subject to civilian control, it will be difficult for the rest of the government to govern effectively or to promote social wellbeing and economic prosperity—never mind for democracy to take hold. Unfortunately, countries that fall into this category outweigh those with accountable and democratic defense institutions: Transparency International's most recent Government Defense Anti-corruption Index, which "assesses the existence, effectiveness and enforcement of institutional and informal controls to manage the risk of corruption in defence and security institutions," places 80 countries (i.e. 70 percent of the 114 countries analyzed in 2015) in the "high" to "critical" risk range.²⁶ Countries with such high levels of political, financial, operational, personnel, and procurement risk in their defense institutions pose a direct threat to the stability of the state and their respective regions. This shines a light on the extent of the challenge, and why practitioners must study and plan for DIB separately from (though in coordination with) other types of institution building and security assistance and cooperation.

An Emerging Discipline

Only in the past decade has DIB been approached as a separate discipline and employed as a distinct tool of national security. As mentioned above, recent U.S. activities that target partner institutional capacity at the ministerial level primarily date back to the

establishment of PfP in the 1990s. The successes of PfP contributed significantly to the recognition of DIB's importance as a fundamental element of security cooperation, and laid the groundwork for the development of targeted DIB activities at DOD. The term "defense institution building" also has its origins in NATO. It was first used officially in the Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building, launched at the NATO Istanbul Summit in 2004, which laid out the following 10 objectives for NATO to assist its partners in developing democratic defense institutions:²⁷

- *Effective and transparent arrangements for the democratic control of defense activities;*
- *Civilian participation in developing defense and security policy;*
- *Effective and transparent legislative and judicial oversight of the defense sector;*
- *Enhanced assessment of security risks and national defense requirements, matched with developing and maintaining affordable and interoperable capabilities;*
- *Optimizing the management of defense ministries and other agencies which have associated force structures;*
- *Compliance with international norms and practices in the defense sector, including export controls;*
- *Effective and transparent financial, planning, and resource allocation procedures in the defense area;*
- *Effective management of defense spending as well as of the socio-economic consequences of defense restructuring;*
- *Effective and transparent personnel structures and practices in the defense forces;*
- *and Effective international cooperation and good neighborly relations in defense and security matters.*

Use of the word "building" in DIB has proven somewhat controversial (particularly with partners), given that the large majority of efforts do not actually build institutions from scratch, but rather help partners to strengthen and reform the governance and management of particular elements of their existing institutional systems. The nuances of the concept are clarified in the 2016 *DOD Directive 5205.82 Defense Institution Building*, which defines DIB efforts as "activities that empower partner-nation defense institutions to establish or re-orient their policies and structures to make their defense sector more transparent, accountable, effective, affordable, and responsive to civilian control."²⁸ In the more recent National Defense Authorization Act for 2017, the term "defense institution building" was expanded upon to the more appropriate "defense institution capacity building," though this terminology has yet to replace DIB in most instances.²⁹

DIB includes missions that "improve the civilian control of armed forces; transmit values of respect for the rule of law and human rights; improve the management methods of

defense institutions, as well as their support elements (most prominently: logistics, human resources, and financial management); [and] professionalize defense personnel.”³⁰ DIB is therefore not one single program, but rather a process undertaken by a mosaic of programs and actors, primarily in the Department of Defense. Within DOD, the Defense Governance Management Team (DGMT) is the lead implementer of DIB efforts. The main programs and centers that deal specifically with DIB are the Center for Civil-Military Relations, the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program, the Defense Institution Reform Initiative, WIF-DIB, the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, and the DOD Regional Centers.³¹ Other U.S. agencies (such as the U.S. State Department [DOS]), countries (including the UK and France), and organizations (most prominently, NATO) also engage in DIB-related activities. As a 2016 RAND report highlighted, coordination between and among these DIB (and DIB-related) activities, programs, and actors will need to be enhanced to avoid unnecessary overlap, miscommunication, and subversion.³²

It is worth noting that DIB is an emerging and evolving practice, taking place in diverse contexts worldwide, and cannot be “owned” by any single proponent. While this book offers numerous descriptions and insights on DIB, any attempt to define the practice by administrative fiat, or rigidly codify its techniques and methods will restrict the intellectual space needed for DIB to remain adaptable in the face of diverse and ever-changing environments. While DIB has been codified in a DOD Directive and other publications, this does not mean that the definitions, characterizations, practices, and principles are universally accepted. As with any emerging discipline, there are predictable definitional disputes, bureaucratic competitions, and parochial rivalries. DIB is no different in this regard with various offices, commands, agencies, and even countries and individuals seeking to set the terms and parameters as the practice evolves. Thus, even in this book, the reader will perceive some nuanced differences in definitions, usages, and prescriptions.

DIB Engagements

DIB activities target defense institutions responsible for oversight, management, and governance of a partner’s defense sector at the national level. While the preferred entry-point is the Ministry of Defense, DIB requires working across multiple levels of the defense sector (e.g., general staff and service headquarters) and with multiple stakeholders; defense institutions are a system of systems and all must be involved in the process for the changes to truly take hold. The length of DIB engagements varies between programs and activities; DGMT projects, for example, tend to last multiple years, and engagements between the U.S. practitioners and the partner-nation counterparts are carried out on the ground, lasting generally one to two weeks at a time. The main phases of a DGMT DIB effort—which are not necessarily linear in practice, but rather necessarily blend and overlap—include scoping and assessment; capability-based planning and program design; implementation; continuous monitoring and evaluations; and ultimately, graduation (U.S. exit).

The scoping and assessment phase looks at the historical and current political, socio-economic, and cultural context to determine a useful baseline for the DIB engagement.

This phase seeks to accrue an accurate picture of the existing defense institutions and culture (e.g., defense processes and structures, and how the defense establishment relates to other parts of government), the partner nation's existing capabilities and resources, what U.S. assistance the partner nation desires and why, and who stands to lose or gain from the changes. The planning and program design phase uses the partner context that was determined by the assessment to link the project strategy to realistic resource availability and project feasibility based on pragmatic expectations about constraints. The planning phase is also when U.S. and partner-nations negotiate and determine goals and priorities. Determining the overarching security goals of the partner nation is as critical to this stage as identifying their DIB goals. Understanding broader security objectives can help practitioners guide the planning process toward the most useful place to start, which is not always the starting point the partner initially has in mind.

During implementation, the U.S. practitioners help the partner to reform specific areas of their defense institutions, including but not limited to strategy, policy and planning, human resources management, resources management, and strategic logistics. Steady assessments take place throughout implementation to determine if the original plan is working and to make course adjustments where necessary. U.S. and partner practitioners' are also monitored to determine if they are fulfilling their agreed-upon role in the effort, and if sufficient progress is being made toward "North Star" goals—the overarching outcomes being sought by both sides. All DIB efforts aim to end with graduation, the partner having the developed institutional capacity to a point where the United States can disengage—though this is not an end-state, as all institutions continue to evolve over time. This layout of phases is, of course, a significantly simplified vision; in practice, DIB is far more complicated and convoluted by external events, human agents, and the specificities of context.

DIB in the Broader Security Cooperation and Assistance Context

While it is a distinct discipline, DIB does not exist in a vacuum; it is one important tool to advance U.S. interests. As Congress seeks to develop a broader comprehensive strategy for security cooperation in the 21st century operating environment, the indispensability of DIB is reinforced.³³ DIB is not synonymous with building partner capacity or SSR, but complements efforts related to both. That said, DIB should not be seen as an "add-on" after the fact to make other investments sustainable; rather, it should be integrated into the front end of any security cooperation conversation and planning to ensure that the assistance provided, such as training and equipment, can be sustained.

Security assistance and cooperation efforts are the chief line of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives. In the context of this book, the authors often use these terms for their intrinsic meanings, as DIB efforts entail both "assisting" and "cooperating" with the partner to improve the partner's institutional defense capacity. But it is important to note here that the official distinction between "security cooperation" and "security assistance" activities within the U.S. government has to do with the agency administering the program: in

simplest terms, it is either an activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance).

DOD and DOS have shared responsibility for engaging with foreign partner militaries since the mid-twentieth century, with the bulk of congressional security assistance funding allocated to the Department of State through Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) of the U.S. Code.³⁴ Programs overseen and given direction by DOS but administered by DOD, however, are considered security cooperation activities. In the modern context, and particularly after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the legal framework for the funding and administration of such activities has evolved in response to emerging threats. Congress has increasingly granted funding and authorities directly to DOD under Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code for security cooperation, particularly for improving the capacity of partners “to enable foreign forces to take greater responsibility for their own defense and for achieving mutual security goals in order to reduce U.S. costs.”³⁵ Therefore, while DOS security assistance programs can include DIB components, the majority of DIB-specific programming is funded under Title 10 and is thus security cooperation. This tangle of authorities is difficult to unwind, even for those intimately involved in the security cooperation and security assistance enterprises, and in the case of DIB, it can be a point of friction within and between agencies.

The Strategic Role of DIB in U.S. Security Interests

With the number of programs that already exist to strengthen the security and defensive capabilities of U.S. partners and allies, questions arise about “if” and “why” DIB should be set apart as a separate discipline with specific programming. The answer to this lies in the distinct strategic role that DIB plays for the United States. While the partner’s objectives and perspectives have to be the starting point for all engagements, DIB efforts are not undertaken simply for the benefit of partner nations. DIB plays three major strategic roles for U.S. national security: sustaining security investments, increasing regional and global stability, and creating partners capable of sharing security burdens.

First, by increasing the partner’s absorptive capacity, DIB increases the sustainability of U.S. security investments.³⁶ In order to ensure the effective oversight, management, and functionality of all other forms of security cooperation and assistance, partners must first have functioning institutional systems; without them, partners lack the ability to permanently assimilate and apply the training, knowledge, skills, and equipment provided by the United States. This is the necessity of functioning institutions for absorptive capacity. DIB enhances and complements the gains made by other capacity-building programs, ensuring that the United States gets the “most bang for its buck.” In addition to increasing the viability of investments, DIB complements the goals of other security assistance and cooperation efforts by maintaining and improving relationships with partners and allies, and by addressing some of the major problems other capacity-building programs have faced after the United States leaves, including the misuse of U.S. provided training and equipment.

Second, DIB reduces state instability and fragility, which can lead to regional instability, internal conflicts (which can spread beyond state borders), terrorist safe havens, and ungoverned spaces that transnational criminal organizations can utilize—all of which threaten U.S. national interests and security. The establishment of functioning defense institutions increases stability by enhancing the partner nation’s capacity to address its own security needs, protect its population, maintain governance, and ensure border security. DIB facilitates the preconditions for defense sectors to function as they should, and the resulting security allows governments and populations to focus resources on strengthening governance, civil society, rule of law, and economic prosperity—all of which are vital to long-term stability. In a 2014 RAND report assessing the utility of U.S. security cooperation as a preventive tool to reduce instability, researchers analyzed security cooperation efforts in 107 countries between 1991 and 2008 to test the hypothesis that “[security cooperation] to bolster a partner state’s security institutions can be used as a preventive measure to reduce fragility and decrease the need for larger and more- extensive U.S. military interventions.”³⁷ The study revealed that the correlation is more nuanced: the effectiveness of U.S. security cooperation in preventing conflicts and reducing stability is more pronounced in countries that have strong institutions (including defense institutions) and “the capacity to project [their] governance functions throughout [their] territory.”³⁸ DIB is thus a necessary first step for providing the institutional foundations necessary for stability.

Third, by building long-term partner defensive capabilities, DIB helps to create partners with the ability to contribute meaningfully to shared security goals with the United States and its allies, such as counterterrorism or peacekeeping efforts. At a time when emerging threats are difficult to predict and therefore difficult to plan for, DIB can serve to enhance the ability of the United States to be proactive rather than reactive in shaping the future security environment.

Overview of the Book

This volume was born of the recognition that there is a dearth of thinking, writing, and analysis dedicated to the emerging practice of defense institution building in the United States, despite the fact that it has become and will remain a powerful tool of national security. While insights that are derived from existing SSR literature are often directly applicable to DIB, much of what is written about SSR focuses on the internal security apparatuses of the state—such as the police, border guards, or the justice system.³⁹ Similarly, while institutional capacity-building literature exists and can be useful to DIB, building defense institutions stands apart from other institution building because defense institutions are unique in their global scope, inherently more sensitive nature, and existential role for the state.⁴⁰ As a product of bottom-up evolution, there has only recently been high-level thinking on DIB in the Department of Defense. While DIB practitioners agree that DIB is not yet as good as it could be, insights and lessons from their experiences around the world

have not been systematically recorded. Without looking to past and existing efforts, little can be done to improve DIB undertakings in the future. This book is therefore motivated by a desire to take a first step toward formalizing the study of DIB, laying the groundwork for refining the discipline.

This is not, however, a handbook for “how to do DIB.” Instead, it is a collection of reflections, opinions, analyses, insights, and suggestions. The authors range from DIB practitioners to high-ranking policymakers and former members of the military, to diplomats, academics, and experts from other fields and countries. They have obtained their data through experience on the ground, historical accounts, intimate knowledge of the decision-making processes, and interviews. Their thoughts on DIB do not reflect a single or unified position, and indeed in some cases authors sharply diverge in their analysis, interpretations, or opinions. This diversity of thought gives the reader the opportunity to form a rounded perspective on where the DIB discipline has come from, where it stands now, and how it may evolve in the future. The chapters seek to answer, or at least begin to address, the following questions:

- What is DIB and what is its purpose?
- How is DIB undertaken within the current security cooperation architecture?
- How does DIB support U.S. security assistance and cooperation goals?
- Why is DIB important to achieving high-level U.S. policies?
- What are the U.S. and partner-nation goals, how are they determined, and how can they be reconciled?
- What role does the partner play at each phase from planning to implementation to evaluation?
- How can we gain and maintain genuine partner buy-in and ownership?
- What does the United States want its partners to be able to do, and are the right tools in place to help them achieve this?
- Why has the United States either failed or succeeded in past DIB efforts?
- What will ideal DIB scenarios look like?
- What will the major impediments be, and how can the road blocks be mitigated?
- Who makes up the DIB workforce?
- How can practitioners be better equipped for the task?
- How can we improve the current approach to assessing, monitoring, and evaluating DIB efforts?

The book is divided into four sections that explore the origins and meaning of the DIB discipline, detail the technical elements of a DIB effort, draw on the relevant insights of related experiences, and extract lessons learned from DIB case studies. The conclusion looks to the future of the DIB enterprise in the United States and offers insights for policy makers and practitioners on the major outstanding challenges.

Section One

Section one traces the evolution of DIB from its conceptual origins in the historical events and policy discussions of the post-Cold War period, through the terrorist attacks on 9/11 that brought the abrupt return of operational effectiveness as the primary goal of national security policy, to the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan that demonstrate the limits of relying solely upon training and equipping operational forces to build partner capacity. This historical context sets up the backdrop upon which DIB has emerged as a critical component in assisting partner-nation security forces and institutions to be more effective and accountable.

The theoretical and practical applications of DIB, and how DIB fits into a broader strategy for building partner-nation defense sector capabilities in support of U.S. strategic objectives, are then examined. This includes a description of “what good looks like” in a professional defense partner, and also looks at what DIB efforts have the potential to achieve. While many DIB missions take place in non-democratic countries, DIB activities have the potential to guide our partners in a democratic direction by encouraging transparency, professionalism, and accountability, and by demonstrating how these practices benefit the partner nation more than systems that are rife with nepotism and marred by endemic corruption.

Finally, this section turns a critical eye to the very crux of DIB: partnership. It details the concept of partnership and the crucial role that it plays in DIB endeavors, while examining the challenges and inherent tensions partnership entails. It considers whether the development of a partnership is a means or an end for the United States; whether partnerships are grounded in national security imperatives or the more altruistic, long-term notion of capacity building; the problem of viewing partnerships primarily as a source of interoperability aimed at helping the foreign assistance community; and the paradox inherent in the differing conceptions of partnership.

Section Two

Section two delves into the integral technical elements of DIB from the experiences and perspectives of seasoned DIB practitioners. It begins by detailing the nested levels of the initial assessment and planning phases, which are critical for guiding the long-term effort, and then turns to how to plan a strategic DIB engagement. The planning and assessment phases lay the groundwork for establishing effective defense governance, including the cultivation of several integral systems that make up defense institutions. The second section includes chapters on three of these fundamental “pillars” of a defense institution—strategy and policy development, strategic human resources management, and logistics. A fourth pillar, resource management, is discussed in the specific context of Guatemala as an exemplar in the fourth section.

The second section concludes with one of the most important, but least developed elements of the DIB enterprise: monitoring and evaluation. Evaluation is critical for understanding what is going right and what needs to be altered in a DIB engagement; for

communicating to policymakers what is needed for the DIB effort and why; for showing how a program is achieving its intended goals; and for determining if a particular system is working for the partner, as well as whether the partner is playing its mutually agreed part in the endeavor. Yet, practitioners face a challenge in monitoring and evaluating both U.S. DIB efforts and the partner-nation institutions that are the focus of the work, as the North Star goals—a professional defense partner and enhanced U.S. security—are difficult to quantify or connect to specific inputs, and may take decades to come to fruition, while engagements are rarely more than episodic. This chapter examines the potential of a layered, outcome-driven evaluation system for measuring progress and successes in DIB efforts.

Section Three

Section three looks further afield to gain insights from other sectors, agencies, countries, and organizations that have undertaken institution building efforts or have applicability to the DIB enterprise. Defense institution building, while idiosyncratic, is not unique; development agencies have for decades understood that social change depends on the consolidation of robust and inclusive institutions. Any attempt to develop this practice independent of the broader developmental context of institution formation and reform would deprive practitioners of the insights derived from many decades of experience in other sectors. Thus, this section looks first to the development sector, where authors draw insight from New Institutional Economics—a concept that has shown that “how” people manage their relations through institutions (primarily government, but also through informal norms and customs) affects the efficiency and distribution of service delivery and the provision of public goods (in this case, security and defense).

It then examines the State Department’s Security Governance Initiative (SGI), which recognizes that weak or mismanaged security sectors represent significant obstacles to sustainable development, democracy, and peace. President Obama launched SGI in Africa to help develop effective and democratic partner-nation institutions and professional forces rooted in the rule of law and accountable to civilian oversight. Section three then looks at applicable lessons from the United Kingdom’s 20th century experiences in Oman, South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe. Finally, NATO’s DIB efforts, primarily through the PFP program, are examined, and the strengths and weaknesses in NATO’s approaches over the years are analyzed.

Section Four

Section four details and analyzes contemporary DIB case studies. Though still an evolving and dynamic activity, the United States has tested and developed approaches through the trial and error of mid-conflict experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the implementation and adaptation of highly successful programs in South America. The DIB effort in Colombia is a salient demonstration of what strong partnerships can accomplish. U.S. DIB efforts in Colombia are reviewed within the context of a long historical relationship, which,

over time, established mutual respect and understanding. This section then looks at the recent and highly successful case of DIB in Guatemala. It details how a U.S. team helped the Guatemala Ministry of Defense transform itself from an organization shaped by the demands of past civil wars into a professional defense institution structured to handle new national security paradigms. The case of Guatemala highlights the importance of taking a holistic approach to defense reform and adds to the debate on measuring success in DIB.

Finally, section four looks at the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. In both countries, U.S. and allied forces focused primarily on raising, training, equipping, and advising army and police forces, but belated attempts were also made to help establish effective ministries in both countries. In Afghanistan, the United States' main focus after the attacks on 9/11 was to defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda, with little regard or planning for post-conflict governance, and in the case of Iraq, the United States did not anticipate widespread post-conflict instability or plan for the need to rebuild or reform basic defense institutions in the face of this instability. The challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan were (and are) formidable—from financial, materiel, and time constraints, to lack of direction from Washington and training for those carrying out the job, to cultural and linguistic differences, political upheaval, widespread corruption, and sectarian turmoil on the ground. In both cases, U.S. and coalition personnel on the ground found themselves adapting to the evolving post-conflict environments and, when it came to DIB, building the plane while they were flying it.

Crosscutting Themes

Throughout the chapters, the reader will find several important crosscutting themes. These may seem familiar and somewhat self-evident to those in the field, but their importance to the DIB enterprise is paramount.

The first is the time factor in DIB efforts. Defense institution building is not a quick fix. It seeks to catalyze institutional change, to address the core of a systemic problem, so that the outcomes of the activities conducted in the near to medium term will be sustained in the long term. While DIB engagements are relatively limited, the time necessary for an institution to undergo the changes set in motion by DIB can take decades or even a generation. Even then, there is no definitive end-point at which an institution becomes perfectly complete: indeed, even institutions in the world's most advanced democracies continuously change, adapt, and improve. For DIB activities, this gradual pace of change presents a unique set of challenges, from long-term planning, staffing, and funding, to the need for constant adaptation to shifting political environments, to congressional reporting, assessments, and evaluations. This requires both the United States and the partner to develop and agree upon a long-term strategy from the outset that guides the DIB process consistently in the long run.

The second is that one size fits one: that is, the importance of approaching each DIB case without a preset template. A common pitfall is to think of DIB as the transfer

of institutional culture. Indeed, there are plenty of cases in which this “mirror-imaging” approach was applied and summarily failed, or resulted in isomorphic mimicry (when a partner’s defense institutions take the form of the donor country’s defense institutions, but have none of the substance or capabilities in practice). Moreover, lessons learned from one DIB endeavor will be largely informed by the cultural and contextual particularities—historical and contemporary—of that country at that time: lessons learned in extreme cases like Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, are undoubtedly important to identify, but do not always translate seamlessly into best practices for, say, Colombia or Indonesia.⁴¹ This reinforces the importance of focusing on customized plans for each country, informed by applicable lessons drawn from related experiences from a variety of sectors, and based on what is realistically possible in that context. Engagement with each country will be different and in order to be sustainable, the institutions that DIB efforts help to form must be appropriate for the unique defense culture of each partner.

Third, partnership and ownership are the crux of defense institution building. The U.S. role in DIB is building defense institutions with, not for, the partner; external influence, after all, can only guide, not drive, real change. DIB starts with the default position that the partner must be all “in” at all stages and at the highest-levels; experience demonstrates that otherwise the institutional changes will fail to take hold. At the outset, this means identifying and clearly defining the partner’s security challenges and priorities, while clearly laying out the overarching objectives of the United States.⁴² In planning and implementation, partners must be fully engaged in a genuine discussion of competing interests and adjustments of proposals to mutual satisfaction; the role of the United States is to offer actionable solutions, not ultimatums. A take it or leave it approach centered around U.S. demands can lead to the wrong plan being forced on the partner and in turn a misconception about lack of partner will to implement change. Inclusion, flexibility, diplomacy, relationship building (both between the United States and the partner, but also between the partner’s defense ministry and other government ministries in that country), and negotiation with the partner must be employed at every stage of a DIB engagement if the institutional enhancements are to last.

This book is not a blueprint for building defense institutions; rather, it frames the challenge and asks the right questions for further development of the DIB discipline. The chapters herein reinforce the fact that DIB efforts will not be easy, and that while bolstering institutional and governance capacities within a defense sector fills a glaring gap in the traditional approach, DIB is not panacea. But the United States cannot and should not be everywhere at once, and as instability increases and defense budgets shrink, the United States must rely on its partners to share some of the security burden. By using our own strengths to strengthen our partners, DIB can help create security that is lasting.

Notes

1 Jeanne Giraldo, “DIB 101,” March 1, 2017, PowerPoint Presentation, slide 3.

2 For a more detailed account of the U.S. security assistance policy during the Cold War broken down by administration, see “Appendix 2: History of Security Assistance and Security Cooperation,” in *Green Book: The*

- Management of Security Assistance*, Edition 1.0, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (Fairborn, OH: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, March 2016) available at <http://www.discs.dsca.mil/documents/greenbook/v1_0/21_Appendix_2.pdf>, 4-13.
- 3 While there was an acknowledgement of the unintended negative consequences of the prolific and under-scrutinized arms transfers that took place during the Cold War, the policies put in place during the 1990s to make arms transfers more judicious were not intended to slow down foreign military sales or grants for the United States.
- 4 “Appendix 2: History of Security Assistance and Security Cooperation,” *op. cit.*, 15.
- 5 The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies was established in 1993; the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies was established in 1995; the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies was established in 1997; and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies was established in 1999. The Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, however, was not established until the year 2000.
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- 15 David G. Haglund, “From USSR to SSR: The Rise and (Partial) Demise of NATO in Security Sector Reform,” in *Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform*, ed. David M. Law (Zurich: LIT Verlag Münster, 2007), 103-122.
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- 17 Hanlon and Shultz Jr., *op. cit.*, 227.
- 18 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates at the Nixon Center’s Distinguished Service Award,” Remarks at the Nixon Center, Washington, DC, February 24, 2010, available at <<http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1425>>.
- 19 T.X. Hammes, “Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War*, ed. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. and Joseph J. Collins (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, September 2015).
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- 22 Katherine Blakeley, *Analysis of the FY 2017 Defense Budget and Trends in Defense Spending* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2016) available at <http://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA6196-2017-Budget-Analysis_PRINT.pdf>, 1.
- 23 “About the Department of Defense (DOD),” available at <<http://www.defense.gov/About-DOD>>.
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- 39 For additional reading on SSR, see: *The Future of Security Sector Reform*, ed. Mark Sedra (Ontario: The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010); Hanlon and Shultz, Jr., *op. cit.*
- 40 For information on the delineation between the terms “security sector reform,” “security sector governance,” “defense sector reform,” and “defense institution building,” see McNerney, et al., *op. cit.*, 10-12.
- 41 Sedra makes a similar point about the translation of SSR lessons learned from “basket cases” versus “normal cases” in *The Future of Security Sector Reform*, *op. cit.*, 17.
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I. SCOPING THE ISSUE

DIB in the Broader Security Architecture

Querine Hanlon and Robert M. Perito

Give us the tools,” Prime Minister Winston Churchill said in his famous Lend Lease radio address, to “finish the job.”¹ The United States has been “giving tools” to strategic allies for the better part of a century. Historically, this assistance was used to buttress the defense sectors of key allies like Greece, Turkey, Israel, and Egypt against state threats.² Although the programs varied across countries, U.S. security assistance throughout the Cold War involved long-term efforts to build infrastructure, such as runways, and the provision of major weapons systems, such as tanks or fighter jets, to countries seen as essential in the fight against communism. With few exceptions, little attention was paid to how these countries’ security sectors functioned internally or how their security institutions were managed and led.

As the security environment evolved in the aftermath of the Cold War and again after September 11, 2001 (9/11), the U.S. approach to providing assistance to partner nations underwent a series of fundamental shifts to align U.S. security assistance tools with the requirements of a transformed security environment. These shifts were in part “pushed” by a reevaluation of the concept of security, first during the surge of intrastate conflict in the post-Cold War period, and again after 9/11 by the direct attack on the U.S. homeland by a nonstate armed group. Armed groups and the failed states that harbored them were elevated to tier-one security threats, and a broader concept of security replaced the narrower Cold War focus on defense against state threats.³ But these shifts were also “shaped” by events on the ground—the U.S. experience reforming security institutions in Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan, where belated institution building efforts were conducted in the midst of war.⁴ The United States came to recognize that effective external defense and internal security sectors in fragile states mattered a great deal, and a host of new policies and programs were developed to build the capacity of key partners and allies to fight new threats, alongside and in support of U.S. interests.

Within the U.S. defense establishment, the growing recognition that institution building is the “missing piece” in the U.S. government’s security assistance toolkit has prompted a renewed focus on defense institution building (DIB). The experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan—and in many other fragile places where the United States has sought to strengthen partner defense capacity—have shown that U.S. policymakers cannot bank on DIB being an organic outgrowth of security assistance and security cooperation efforts.

Instead, Washington has to invest some time and effort in thinking about what institution building really means and how best to meet its requirements. This timely volume captures some of the key lessons from the U.S. experience building defense institutions, and in so doing, provides a meaningful contribution to the ongoing debate about how to enhance the impact and sustainability of U.S. assistance for partner states. This chapter provides the conceptual context for this endeavor, focusing on the changing security environment that pushed the new focus on institution building, and the post-Cold War and post-9/11 events that shaped the requirements for and development of a DIB focus for the U.S. government.

DIB and the Transformation of the Security Environment: The Push Factors

The decades immediately preceding and following the turn of the 21st century have been witness to a remarkable transformation of the international security environment. Throughout most of the Cold War, the concept of security was military and state-centered, and the United States developed a robust security architecture for supporting key allies across the globe to counter Soviet-led communist expansion. Not surprisingly, the programs and funding authorities for assisting countries like Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, and Korea were designed to buttress allied military defense establishments against external, state-led threats. Important training and advisory missions were also created to support countries throughout Latin America and elsewhere to engage in low intensity conflict against Soviet-sponsored subversion. With few exceptions, little attention was paid to how these defense sectors were managed or led.

The Korean case stands as one of the few successful examples of defense institution building during the Cold War.⁵ A small program providing military equipment and training for Korean soldiers in their use—a train and equip program—that began in 1946 was expanded rapidly with the outbreak of the war in 1950, turning into a large scale program that “transformed the military of the Republic of Korea (ROK) from a small, disorganized constabulary into the most dominant institution in South Korean society.”⁶ The effort involved not only providing vast military resources, but also “instructing officers in how to carry out complex technical and logistical operations” and “indoctrinat[ing] military officers with a sense of duty and patriotism.”⁷

Many of the challenges U.S. trainers and advisors faced in Korea echo those of the countries where DIB will likely be implemented in the future: an illiterate or poorly educated recruiting base, high desertion rates, and an officer corps more interested in material enrichment and self-promotion than success on the battlefield. Addressing these challenges required more than the mere transfer of equipment and accompanying training. Korea’s defense establishment needed institutions and processes to manage and sustain an effective defense sector. Nearly two decades after it began, U.S. assistance resulted in the doubling of the Korean armed forces and the professionalization of its military and defense establishment. It also created an ongoing partnership that reflects the objectives of the building partner capacity (BPC) approach launched by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

During the Cold War, the concepts of security and development came to be seen as separate spheres of activities for third parties, whether individual donor states or international actors like the United Nations (UN). To an important degree, this was due to the numerous interventions by the armed forces into politics in many developing countries, the inordinate amount of resources they subsequently accumulated, and the impact that this had on poverty alleviation efforts. Development came to be seen by those involved in the enterprise as largely concerned with “reducing poverty in the [Global] South through the promotion of economic growth based on investment and the application of science and technology. The implicit assumption was that economic development automatically enhanced peace and stability.”⁸ The opposite proposition—that without security, the conditions for development become problematic—appears not to have been given serious consideration.⁹

U.S. Security Assistance in the Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War appeared to provide a golden opportunity to shift resources and attention to the development needs of the Global South. Many believed the end of the Cold War would open the door to a new international security environment—one dominated not by opposing military alliances or narrow state interests but guided by the genuine security needs of the people. Conflict between states would become a vestige of the old order. Funds previously spent on defense could instead be repurposed toward development and the eradication of poverty.

Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War ushered in a new security environment marked by a growing number of intrastate conflicts fostered by ethnic and religious divisions.¹⁰ Largely unexpected, this escalation in instability was also characterized by a proliferation in the types of nonstate actors—ethnically-based militias, guerrilla or terrorist organizations, clans, tribes, warlords, organized communal groups, and criminal gangs—challenging weak states.¹¹

In the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, and Middle East, and across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, ethnic and religious identity emerged as the principal source of organized violence.¹² Wars in these regions were no longer limited to internal conflicts between substate actors. They challenged state sovereignty, prompted the disintegration and collapse of multiethnic states like Yugoslavia, and taxed the international community’s ability to respond. They also introduced new terms into the international relations lexicon. In places like Bosnia and Rwanda, “ethnic cleansing” became the new term of art for the atavistic practice of ethnic homogenization.¹³ These strategies were employed not against a nameless foe but against “enemies intimately known.”¹⁴ Rather than being a relic of the past, the power of local identity in places like Bosnia and Chechnya was changing the character of war.

Prescient theorists such as Mary Kaldor and Kalevi Holsti, and European military commanders like Sir General Rupert Smith, saw in Bosnia the harbinger of the future: with the demise of the Westphalian state, interstate conflict would be replaced by local

conflagrations between adjacent ethnicities.¹⁵ They posited that these violent conflicts were not merely an anomaly of the post-Cold War era but a new form of warfare. “New wars involve a blurring of the distinctions between war . . . organized crime . . . and large-scale violations of human rights,” Mary Kaldor noted on the eve of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999.¹⁶ At the other extreme, the global phenomenon of societal violence became the basis for a new paradigm of civilizational conflict proposed by Samuel Huntington, in which fundamentally dissimilar groups would clash along civilizational fault lines.¹⁷

The new form of warfare in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Kosovo, General Smith concluded, was “war amongst the people.”¹⁸ This new war diverged considerably from that 20th century standard of conventional war between states along recognized battlefronts conducted by uniformed soldiers. These experiences led him to conclude that “it is now time to recognize that a paradigm shift in war has undoubtedly occurred: from armies with comparable forces doing battle on a field to strategic confrontation between a range of combatants . . . using different types of weapons, often improvised.” And those conflicts, Smith noted, “can take place anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defense of civilians.”¹⁹ Critical to making sense of this new state of affairs, Smith argued, was the realization that it was wars between nation-states that were becoming the anomaly.²⁰

In the context of the upsurge of intrastate conflict, the United States discovered that its traditional military and security assistance tools, which had been developed to deal with interstate wars and to support formal military forces, were ill-equipped to manage the challenges that emerged out of the conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere. However, unlike the response to the events of 9/11, this realization did not fundamentally shift the U.S. security assistance architecture.

In 1996, the UN deployed a peace enforcement mission to Bosnia, followed by the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia and a second peace enforcement operation in Kosovo. By 2000, some 70,000 NATO forces had been deployed to the region to support these operations. In the Balkans, the United States expended \$21 billion on military operations as well as a significant civilian presence to build democratic, multiethnic institutions.²¹ Yet this large commitment of resources failed to overcome ethnic hostilities and create national unity. American military capacity alone could not solve the breakup of Yugoslavia, what former Secretary of State Warren Christopher called the “problem from hell.”²² The struggle to resolve the violence in the Balkans and elsewhere presaged the difficulty the United States would face bringing the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to a close in the decades following 9/11. Military force alone could not resolve the underlying institutional dysfunctions of weak and fragile states. Nor could it build effective institutions in states rent by violent conflict.

The limited utility of military force for creating stability and lasting peace in weak and fragile states was readily apparent on the ground following the signing of the Dayton Accords and the deployment of a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII, the peace enforcement provisions of the

UN Charter. The NATO force, led by the U.S. First Armored Division from Germany, accomplished its mission of stabilizing the ceasefire and the cantonment of troops and heavy weapons in the first ninety days after its deployment. The political provisions of the agreement, however, proved more problematic. International efforts to create meaningful national defense institutions largely failed. One critical hurdle was the country's division into two ethnically defined entities, the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska, each of which was granted considerable autonomy, including the authority to maintain its own armed forces deployed along an internal boundary that divided the country. Accordingly, the ethnic Bosniak-Croatian and Serbian armies maintained their separate identities and chains of command. Each force was administered, financed, trained, and equipped by its respective leadership.

A major threat to the peace settlement was the military imbalance between the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb forces at the end of the conflict. "To achieve a lasting peace in the Balkans," U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry argued, "it will be essential to achieve stable and balanced force levels within Bosnia-Herzegovina and among the states of the former Yugoslavia."²³ But existing Cold War U.S. security assistance programs were not designed to supply the nonstate combatants for "war amongst the people." In what was to become a much larger and more ambitious effort to reshape the U.S. security assistance architecture after 9/11, the United States was forced to create a new program to meet the training and equipment needs of ethnically allegiant military forces that emerged out of Yugoslavia's collapse. This was not a task for which the existing security assistance architecture was designed. The result was "an unusually successful" interagency initiative using private contractors called the "Bosnian Train and Equip Program."²⁴

Implemented by a small interagency task force, this now forgotten program achieved all of its operational goals—creating a rough military parity among opposing forces, removing foreign fighters that had fought on the Bosniak side, and instilling "Western civil-military norms and NATO military standards."²⁵ Specific DIB components included training of the armed forces leadership and battle staffs, the ministry of defense, and the joint command.²⁶ Many of the challenges of building the ethnic Bosniak-Croatian army's capacity resonate with those faced by DIB efforts today: ethnic tensions among senior ministry staff and operational commanders, bureaucratic battles over both large and small issues (including the distribution of office furniture), perceptions among recipients that training and institution building were unnecessary, and challenges introducing NATO standards to forces indoctrinated in Soviet military tactics and operational principles.²⁷

The goals of the peace agreement negotiated at Dayton were to end the fighting, establish a viable Bosnian state, and restore the pre-war, multiethnic character of Bosnian society. The international intervention largely succeeded in accomplishing the first two goals, but failed to politically unify the country. Subsequent NATO efforts to create an integrated national army and to reform war-time defense institutions were rebuffed by political elites who preyed upon popular fears and animosities to maintain their positions, a situation that largely continues to the present.

Despite its experiences on the ground in the former Yugoslavia (and with peace enforcement operations more generally), the United States did not seriously consider the changing security dynamics of the new post-Cold War order—and the implications for U.S. national security and its international posture—until after 9/11.²⁸ Of course there were strategists and military commanders who recognized the need for change and warned that “this conventional mindset could lead to military misfortune.”²⁹ However, asymmetrical, intrastate conflicts against irregular actors in fragile states were at best considered tertiary security matters while the United States remained focused on the ramifications of the Soviet collapse, German unification, the First Gulf War, and the European security community’s eastward expansion. The U.S. security assistance architecture developed during the Cold War to manage these tier-one security challenges remained largely intact—with one noteworthy innovation to meet the challenges of NATO’s eastward expansion. Created in 1994, the Department of Defense (DOD) Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) supported the participation of 34 former Warsaw pact countries and former Soviet republics in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.³⁰ Renamed the Wales Initiative Fund, WIF is a central program in the DIB toolkit.

Although WIF was a new program created specifically to address the changing dynamics of the post-Cold War security environment, its approach did not differ greatly from existing security assistance programs. It funded military engagement seminars and exercises, and supported institution building efforts for the region’s military academies. It was only after the events of 9/11 that the United States undertook a concerted effort to reshape the country’s security assistance architecture and revisited the need for institution building.

U.S. Security Assistance after 9/11

The events of 9/11 prompted a dramatic shift as the threat of armed groups and the failed states that harbored them were elevated to tier-one security threats.³¹ New terms entered the national security lexicon with the focus on weak, failing, and failed states, and the threat of ungoverned spaces from which a host of new armed actors could directly threaten the U.S. homeland.

Within the U.S. defense establishment, the paradigm shift augured by 9/11 prompted a new focus on irregular warfare, which was elevated to a vital mission area in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Post-9/11 combat was depicted as “irregular in its nature.” Enemies in those fights were “not conventional military forces” belonging to nation-states. Rather, they included various armed nonstate actors who employed indirect and asymmetric means. A new directive on irregular warfare followed. It stated that irregular warfare “is as strategically important as traditional warfare” and recognized that the capabilities required for each would be different.³²

In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States became enmeshed in large-footprint engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as many small-footprint engagements along arcs of instability stretching from the African continent through the Middle East, Central

and South Asia, and the U.S.-Mexico border through South America. It adopted—and adapted—its approach to security assistance in order to provide better tools and training to fragile states that lacked effective capabilities to manage these 21st century security threats on their own. The vast majority of this assistance was train and equip programs to build the capabilities of weak military and internal security forces to counter nonstate threats and operate alongside and in support of U.S. interests. With some exceptions, there was little effort to build security sector institutions—such as ministries of interior and defense—even though many of these institutions were perceived to be weak, corrupt, or illegitimate.

There are numerous reasons why institution building was not a priority in the early years after 9/11. Among Washington policymakers, there was an aversion to nation-building activities that would likely stretch over many years, require significant human and materiel resources, and that could not address the near-term requirements of beleaguered forces on the ground. There was also no capacity to do so in any systematic way. Although the United States had robust capabilities for providing equipment and training, there was no program explicitly designed to build security sector institutions in fragile states. Also missing was guidance for planners to incorporate the institution building requirements into their pre-war planning, with tragic consequences in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, the urgent requirements of partner countries did not offer Washington policymakers—or the commanders on the ground—the luxury of time to delve into earlier institution building lessons. It is only now, with not quite a decade of experience implementing DIB programs, that concerted efforts are being made to learn from U.S. experiences in the 20th and early 21st centuries. This book is part of that important effort.

In the years following the 9/11 attacks, the United States began to explore how to reshape the purpose of U.S. security assistance. If fragile states were to be the recipients of the new programs being conceptualized in Washington, what should that assistance aim to do? Was the goal to be interoperability with U.S. forces? Engagement to secure U.S. access to critical regions, ports, or airspace? Or, drawing on the lessons of the former Yugoslavia, should that assistance aim to create internal stability? And if stability and broader regional security were to be the goals, how could security assistance be properly leveraged to achieve them?³³

One answer emerged out of the development community in Europe. Clare Short, the first UK Secretary of State for International Development, had argued to her Ministry of Defense colleagues at the end of the 1990s that both the security and development communities had to “re-examine all the old assumptions and develop policy focused on helping end conflict and building competent state institutions that would encourage economic growth and human development in the poorest countries.”³⁴ One of the principal obstacles to development, Short and other development specialists recognized in the aftermath of the Cold War, was “the existence of bloated, repressive, undemocratic, and poorly structured security services.” These bloated security sectors not only “soaked up resources,” but were often the major “source of insecurity and human rights abuses.”³⁵ Short and others recognized that development was not possible without security and

stability, and that security and stability were not possible without the development of competent and responsive security sector institutions and forces. Thus the answer to the twin challenges of security and development lay at the nexus of security assistance and foreign aid, captured in a new concept called security sector reform (SSR).

SSR is an approach to security assistance that prioritizes institution building to ensure that security sector forces—both internal law enforcement and military and defense forces—are appropriately managed and led in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law. DIB is a key component of this approach, with its focus on the institutions that oversee, provision, manage, train, and lead the armed forces and hold them accountable. Thus, defense institution building owes its conceptual origins to the SSR concept.

It was through the shift to a counterterrorism strategy—and the concordant focus on failed and weak states—that SSR first attracted the interest of the Washington policy community as a potential tool for protecting U.S. allies and interests around the globe.³⁶ Unlike their British, Canadian, and other Western counterparts, SSR was not a part of the post-Cold War security assistance discourse in the U.S. military or in the broader U.S. government. What took place was security assistance programming within the context of “military operations other than war,” complex contingencies, and peace operations. These missions covered a range of activities, from traditional humanitarian assistance to more complex peace enforcement operations.³⁷ Although these missions included activities that addressed aspects of a country’s security sector, they were not explicitly designed to rebuild and reform those institutions within an SSR framework.³⁸ While enforcing the peace exposed serious security, poverty, governance, and infrastructure problems, solutions exceeded the scope of most of these missions, with Bosnia and Kosovo being the exceptions.

However, in the final 18 months of the George W. Bush Administration, an interagency working group led by mid-level officials from DOD, Department of State (DOS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) developed a common statement on SSR that attempted to translate the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) *Guidelines and Handbook on SSR* into a U.S. context. The statement provided the three lead agencies with a common vocabulary for understanding SSR. It also informed DOD’s *Guidance for Employment of the Force*, the U.S. military’s primary planning document; the SSR chapter in the Army’s Field Manual 3-07; and the 2010 QDR. Although the statement was published, it was not endorsed by five of the eight agencies in the working group and did not rise to the level of government policy. Leading members of the working group hoped the incoming Barack Obama Administration would build on their work, but this did not happen.³⁹

Instead, the Obama Administration developed a Presidential Policy Directive on Security Sector Assistance (SSA). Its focus on SSA rather than SSR is clearly reflected in its statement of purpose: “this directive is aimed at strengthening the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity.”⁴⁰ Rather than emphasizing support for comprehensive security sector reform, the emphasis is on building capabilities of allies and partners to meet a range of challenges, including fighting alongside

U.S. forces, countering terrorist and international criminal networks, participating in international peacekeeping operations, and building security and justice institutions.⁴¹ The selection of SSA as the U.S. government's preferred policy was significant.⁴² Whereas SSA focuses on the supply side of U.S. assistance and on improving the way in which assistance is delivered, SSR is a much broader concept that involves capacity building to enhance the effectiveness of security sector forces and institutions, and efforts to strengthen the accountability, oversight, and governance of those institutions in accordance with democratic principles and the rule of law.

As defined in the directive, SSA is closely aligned with the concept of BPC outlined by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. According to Gates:

*Strategic reality demands that the U.S. government get better at what is called "building partner capacity": helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance. . . . Helping other countries better provide for their own security will be a key and enduring test of U.S. global leadership and a critical part of protecting U.S. security, as well.*⁴³

BPC helped reframe the purpose of defense sector train and equip programs to meet the requirements of the changed strategic security environment. To assist fragile states and achieve the objectives of BPC, and SSA more broadly, the United States needed a new security assistance toolkit. New authorities and programs were added under the DOD, and funded through the DOD budget. Many of these new security assistance programs were focused on BPC in host nations where the United States was operating, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, or in partner nations, such as Poland, that were supporting the U.S.-led coalition. In an important shift, the post-9/11 security assistance programs altered their focus from assisting allied national defense sectors to addressing broader security sector challenges, including counterterrorism, counternarcotics, democracy promotion, nuclear nonproliferation, and strengthening the broader security sector.⁴⁴

The result was to create an even more complex security assistance architecture. There are essentially four models for how U.S. security assistance is resourced and executed, most of which pre-date 9/11. The first model includes activities conducted by other U.S. government agencies using DOS resources. This category includes the Cold War-era Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs appropriated to DOS for DOD implementation. In this model, DOS retains oversight of the funds.⁴⁵ The DOD-implemented programs in this category are considered part of DOD security cooperation.

A second model includes activities conducted by the State Department using State Department resources. Because DOS capacity for direct implementation is limited, in this model DOS contracts the activities or transfers the funds to another government agency or entity for execution. DOS retains oversight of the funds in this second model.⁴⁶

The third model involves activities conducted and resourced by other agencies. In the case of DOD, these programs are also classified as security cooperation and are implemented by a variety of DOD actors, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense, combatant commands and their military components, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Included in this category are multinational military exercises and assistance provided to partner-nation security forces during U.S. combat operations. Because these activities are designed and executed with the host nation, DOS oversight takes place later in the process through the U.S. Embassy's country team.⁴⁷

Most of the post-9/11 programs belong to the final category: hybrid models to address a range of new security assistance and capacity-building needs arising from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global counterterrorism campaign. Although specific mechanisms vary, the hybrid models require the "joint concurrence" of DOS and DOD.⁴⁸ Examples of this hybrid model include Section 1206 Global Train and Equip, Section 1207 Reconstruction and Stabilization, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), Pakistan Counterterrorism Capabilities Fund, and the Global Security Contingency Fund. Many of these hybrid models were created to address post-9/11 needs and to fast track assistance to partner countries. Whereas the pre-9/11 funds for military assistance were generally focused on long-term defense sector assistance and sustainment, the new programs sought to meet short-term security sector capacity gaps. The recipient countries are also markedly different. For example, in the first seven years of the 1206 program, \$1.8 billion of training and equipment was provided to 41 countries.⁴⁹ The largest recipients during the first seven years included Yemen, Pakistan, Lebanon, and the Philippines. In later years, Mauritania, Uganda, Burundi, Romania, Tunisia, Georgia, and Yemen received over \$25 million each.⁵⁰ Before 2010, almost all Section 1206 funding was used to purchase counterterrorism training and equipment, including radios and communications systems, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, trucks, ambulances, boats and other vehicles, small arms and rifles, night vision goggles and sights, and clothing. After 2010, funding was also used to train and equip foreign military forces for stability operations, particularly in Afghanistan.⁵¹

The U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan also shaped the new post-9/11 security assistance architecture. One important and costly lesson was the belated attention to institution building during the Iraq war. For example, Lieutenant General James Dubik, the commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, has argued that U.S. train and equip efforts were not even able to meet the tactical requirements, much less "enterprise-wide imperatives" such as know-how regarding sustainability, force management, or logistics and acquisition.⁵² Some of these shortcomings informed the creation of two new programs explicitly designed to build the institutional capacity of ministries of defense and interior.⁵³ These two initiatives—the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) program and the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI)—became the flagship programs of DIB. Together these efforts propelled a new approach to

security assistance that expanded the purpose of these programs, from merely providing tools, to a much broader and more ambitious agenda: building the institutional capacity of key partners and allies to fight new threats alongside and in support of U.S. interests.

What became quickly apparent during the early efforts to implement DIB is that the defense building needs of fragile states differ markedly from the places where such efforts had been initiated during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. For example, in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics there was a baseline institutional capacity upon which to build defense sector reform efforts. In many of the fragile states where DIB is likely to be a priority today, that baseline capacity is missing; defense sector institutions may be weak or nonexistent. There are also significant human capacity challenges, including low levels of literacy and even numeracy.

Defense institution building is a tall order. It is much more difficult to build institutions than to provide training and equipment, because the results are less immediate and the risks involved for the recipient country are higher. DIB may require reforming existing institutions by putting new systems and processes in place for procurement, or human resources that directly threaten the power base of key actors who may emerge as critical spoilers. It may also require building institutions from scratch, often in environments that are not permissive for the long-term embedding of advisors to guide and support the effort. There may be little host-nation capacity—in terms of human capital or financial resources—to build or reform these institutions and sustain them in the long term. DIB also competes with immediate and more urgent priorities, such as direct or even existential threats to recipient forces or regimes.

There is also the enduring challenge of political buy-in for highly intrusive reforms that require these countries to reveal information about budgets, force numbers, operations, intelligence, or procurement processes that are classified and could be damaging to senior political or military leaders if they were publically released. The entire effort is further compounded by the sheer time required to affect institution building. It is difficult to secure the buy-in and commitment of key leaders and stakeholders if the purported benefits of DIB are realized a decade hence, well beyond the next election or promotion cycle.

Nonetheless, DIB is an essential addition to the post-9/11 U.S. security assistance toolkit. Resolving the enduring challenge of how to build effective and sustainable defense institutions in fragile states has become a new priority for the United States. Fragile state governments are losing the battle to counter security threats because they lack institutional capacity. Train and equip programs can address operational force capacity gaps, but these programs are not designed to strengthen, reform, or build institutional capacity. And without that institutional capacity, there is nowhere to embed that assistance and to ensure that U.S. efforts can be sustained by the recipient country after U.S. assistance ends. By “building” these countries’ defense institutions, DIB promises to make U.S. assistance for foreign defense sectors more effective and sustainable.

DIB on the Ground: The Shaping Factors

The recognition that defense institution building was the missing piece in the U.S. security architecture was largely pushed by the transformation of the international security environment and the effort to reshape that architecture to meet the capacity needs of fragile states. The actual development of the DIB concept, however, was shaped by experiences on the ground—most notably in Afghanistan where DIB was first implemented in 2010—and also by the successful post-Cold War military downsizing in Europe, and NATO expansion efforts through the PfP program.

Although these lessons are explored in more detail in subsequent chapters of this volume, one key lesson from experiences in Eastern Europe, Iraq, and Afghanistan was the recognition that defense institution building is not just about force generation or interoperability with U.S. and allied forces. It requires building the ministerial capacity to manage, sustain, and lead these operational forces, and to operate alongside and in support of U.S. interests. But how should this ministerial capacity be built, and by whom? And for what purpose?

The U.S. involvement in the eastward expansion of the European security community helped influence the overall purpose of the DIB program. The 10 PfP objectives for defense sector reform identify the broader purpose of defense institution building, including “effective and transparent arrangements for democratic control of defence activities,” “civilian participation,” “legislative and judicial oversight of the defense sector,” and “effective and transparent” defense sector procedures.⁵⁴ The 2016 *DOD Directive 5205.82 Defense Institution Building* echoes many of these principles. It calls for creating defense institutions that are “transparent, accountable, effective, affordable and responsive to civilian control.”⁵⁵

The 10 PfP principles also provide some guidance on how to implement DIB to achieve these objectives.⁵⁶ For example, “effective and transparent personnel structures and practices” (PfP Objective 7) requires the creation of “sound personnel policies” that are essential for an “efficient fighting force,” and “effective and transparent financial, planning, and resource allocation procedures” (PfP Objective 8) requires modern and efficient planning, programming, and budgeting procedures, as well as procedures for auditing, oversight of budgeted funds, and awarding contracts for equipment or services. Many of these principles are reflected in the types of expertise MODA advisors need to support their ministerial counterparts and in the assessment tools employed by the DIRI program to assist partner-country defense institutions improve their functions.

However, the lessons from the PfP program were not fully applicable to the DIB needs of fragile states because the environments for each differed significantly. Whereas the defense institution building challenges in Eastern Europe were mostly about reforming existing institutions and processes, in Afghanistan they were much more basic. Often, institutional mechanisms were simply missing and had to be built from the ground up. This

required a highly specialized form of expertise, as well as the skills to share this expertise in productive ways, a lesson that quickly became apparent when MODA was first launched in Afghanistan.

In 2009, deteriorating security conditions in Afghanistan, coupled with the growing awareness that U.S. security assistance had failed to produce a viable Afghan army or police force, prompted a renewed focus on defense institution building. This was reflected in the 2010 QDR, which specifically called for the strengthening of the U.S. military's capability for ministerial-level training of partner nations, and in the creation of two new programs within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy discussed above—MODA and DIRI—to meet the new requirement.

The MODA program, which deploys senior civilian management and administration personnel from their positions in the DOD to serve for up to two years as advisors in Afghanistan, was designed to improve upon the earlier reliance on U.S. military officers who had been assigned from front line positions to serve as ministerial advisors. Other positions had been filled by contractors who were often retired military officers. Many lacked the expertise or experience for the specific and often highly technical ministerial functions, such as recruiting, procurement, human resources, logistics, and information management, that are the purview of DOD civilians in the United States.⁵⁷ To be able to deploy these civilians overseas, the MODA program recruited senior DOD civilians through a new program, the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW). This important innovation enabled MODA to recruit the right types of expertise required for DIB in Afghanistan.

A second important lesson from the experience in Afghanistan that shaped the requirements for DIB was the need to define institution building more broadly. DOD had the mission to build the whole of Afghanistan's national security forces—not just the army, but also the Afghan National Police and the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The Afghan MOI suffered from even more serious institutional capacity gaps than the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and therefore MODA advisors were assigned to both organizations.⁵⁸ Thus in its implementation, the MODA program reflected the SSR focus on the broader security sector institution building needs of Afghanistan. A similar SSR focus is evident in the newest DIB-related program created by DOS, the Security Governance Initiative (SGI), which focuses not only on building ministerial capacity throughout the security sector, but goes even further by promoting effective and transparent security sector governance.

Yet another lesson that shaped the development of DIB was the recognition that advising requires a specific skill set. In addition to recruiting advisors with the right technical expertise to support their counterparts, these advisors also need the skills to “transfer knowledge” in a way that local officials find helpful.⁵⁹ This requires more than knowing how these systems work in their own countries. It requires understanding how that expertise could be useful in a different context and culture, and how to transfer this knowledge given that different context and culture. Doing so requires a host of soft skills alongside the technical expertise required to support capacity building of specific ministry functions. To meet these requirements, MODA implemented a pre-deployment training

program that attempted to replicate the context and difficult conditions MODA advisors would face to better prepare them to meet the new institution building requirements in Afghanistan.⁶⁰

In 2014, Congress expanded the program beyond Afghanistan, authorizing the assignment of ministerial advisors to partner countries worldwide. The new “Global MODA” and a similar expansion of DIRI indicated that DIB would remain an important part of the U.S. security assistance toolkit moving forward. As DIB expands in scope and reach, there are important lessons that can be drawn from past U.S. experience building defense institutions. This book provides one opportunity to delve into the institution building requirements drawn from lessons on the ground that can in turn shape the future evolution and implementation of DIB.

What Lies Ahead

Most of our early learning about defense institution building comes from a very different security environment. Both during the Cold War and in its aftermath, the focus was on building defense sectors in relatively stable states where there was a significant degree of institutional capacity already in place. After the Cold War, the emphasis was mostly on reforming these institutions to establish or strengthen civilian control of the armed forces and enhancing transparency, accountability, leadership, and management of the defense sector. These conditions are unlikely to be replicated in the future.

The places where DIB will likely be a priority in the future will be remarkably difficult environments for affecting institutional change. For example, Mali is one of the priority countries of the 2015 Security Governance Initiative. When a U.S. government assessment team visited Mali to document how assistance was being utilized, they found that much of the equipment that had been supplied to Mali’s security forces was still sitting in boxes, unopened, in scattered locations around Bamako. None had been deployed to frontlines in the north. Still worse, none of the training offered to Mali’s forces was being utilized in various pre-deployment programs.⁶¹ Although corruption and bureaucratic rivalries certainly played a role, the broader problem was simply one of institutional capacity. Mali’s security institutions lack the capacity to manage and deploy equipment, track its use, and standardize training across its forces.⁶²

Given the instability of the post-Iraq and Afghanistan security environment, the exponential growth of irregular security threats, and the enormous gaps that exist in the operational capacity of fragile states where U.S. interests are at stake, the environments where DIB will be a priority are more likely to resemble Mali than Montenegro. And although some of the institution building challenges of these places will mirror those of Afghanistan, the DIB effort will likely be further complicated by the fact that there will not be a large U.S. presence on the ground to support DIB implementation.

One solution may be to focus future DIB implementation on states where there is a modicum of institutional—and absorptive—capacity. For the more fragile states like Mali,

building ministerial-level capacity may seem like a luxury when local commanders do not know how many forces they have or where they are. There will always be a tension between immediate gaps in equipment or training and the longer term institutional capacity gaps, and beleaguered governments will likely opt for U.S. assistance for the former over the latter.

The political will to undertake institutional reform will also likely remain a challenge, regardless of the level of existing capacity. By its very nature, DIB is an intrusive process—advisors and expert teams need access to information about the inner workings of defense bureaucracies and their budgets, information that may not even be available to these countries' own populations. Finally, there is the enduring challenge of time. DIB is by definition a slow process, and measurable results may take a decade or more to appear. Short-term U.S. government funding cycles will make it difficult to show the near-term results often necessary to sustain long-term funding.

Finally, one important lesson from Afghanistan is that the institution building challenges of fragile states are unlikely to reside only in the defense sector. The internal security sector—the police and ministries of interior that oversee them—are likely suffering from equally challenging institutional capacity gaps. It will be hard to ignore these capacity gaps if the goal of DIB is to promote security and stability in these fragile states.

Nonetheless, DIB remains a key program in the U.S. security assistance toolkit. Without it, U.S. security assistance will remain largely focused on building the capacity of operational forces. These operational gaps are real, and they require urgent attention. But to make that assistance more impactful and sustainable, the United States will need to incorporate institution building into how it helps partner states build security sector capacity. By building both operational and institutional capacity, the United States can better meet the security needs of key partner states where U.S. interests are at stake and increase the likelihood of return on investment for U.S. security assistance.

Notes

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Defining the Discipline in Theory and Practice

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January 2012 brought one of the more unexpected and profound international crises in recent years: the establishment of an al-Qaeda-controlled terrorist safe haven spanning a region the size of Texas, within a five-hour flight of western Europe. Groups of Tuareg rebels returning home after the collapse of Qaddafi's Libya started an armed uprising in northern Mali that would soon be co-opted by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), sparking the utter collapse of state security in the region. The Malian Army should have been prepared for this challenge. For the previous 10 years, the United States had spent tens of millions of dollars training and equipping Malian forces to confront terrorist groups and to maintain control of their sovereign territory. In the three years leading up to the crisis, U.S. special operations forces had particularly focused efforts on training an elite counterterrorism unit, the *Compagnie de Forces Speciales* (CFS).

And yet, when the fighting began, ragtag groups of poorly trained rebels and AQIM fighters turned back the CFS and the rest of the Malian military quickly collapsed. According to one press account, "as insurgents swept through the desert last year, commanders of this nation's elite army units, the fruit of years of careful American training, defected when they were needed most—taking troops, guns, trucks, and their newfound skills to the enemy in the heat of battle."¹ The common narrative held that Malian forces—despite years of U.S. training and support—simply withered in the face of a modestly capable enemy.

A deeper examination of this episode calls into question the common narrative. According to many on-the-ground accounts, the CFS acquitted itself reasonably well in fighting against AQIM and other combatant groups. The failure of the Malian Army's operations lay not primarily with the will or courage of its soldiers, but in deep systemic flaws in the institutions of the military as a whole. Soldiers fighting in the North quickly ran out of bullets and food because of the lack of a logistics system capable of resupplying them.² Other units outside the CFS had been poorly organized and unevenly trained due to a flawed human resource management system. Many were poorly equipped despite the large influx of weaponry through U.S. and international assistance because of an inadequate maintenance system. Certainly, a deeply divided political system and a chronically starved budget also contributed to the hollowing of the Malian forces.

Human resource management systems, logistics enterprises, and budgeting: these are hardly the capabilities that come to most minds when considering how to win wars. And yet, the failure of Mali's defense system and U.S. military training efforts in Mali to attend

to these capabilities, led to one of the most significant setbacks in the global fight against terrorism in years. It is a chronic failure across militaries in underdeveloped nations, and in the attendant U.S. and international military assistance missions seeking to build capacity within those militaries—from Iraq and Afghanistan to Ukraine and the Philippines.

Defense institution building (DIB) is the U.S. Defense Department’s answer to these failures. DIB is a discipline that supports partner-nation stakeholders as they seek to build and sustain systemic capabilities within the core institutions of their defense sector. This chapter will explore the contours of DIB as it has evolved over the last decade, in an effort to define its purpose, scope, and key focuses. It will seek to illuminate, as the Mali experience suggests, the vital role of DIB in the effective, sustainable development of partner-nation military forces and their larger national security sectors.

U.S. Assistance to Defense Institutions: A Brief History

While the United States has a long history of working with partner-nation militaries at the institutional level, concerted efforts to build institutional capacities in support of effective defense sector governance are relatively new. In the wake of World War II, U.S. military advisors worked at the highest levels in Japan, as well as in some European governments, helping not only to rebuild defense agencies, but also to help entire new governments form and gain their footing, with great success. Thousands of military advisors also famously supported the Vietnamese Army in advance of the initiation of U.S. combat operations in Vietnam; while they were largely working at the tactical level, some advisory roles extended into the defense ministry as well. Advisors have worked within defense institutions in a number of other contexts as well, from the Philippines to Saudi Arabia. Raymond Millen, a professor at the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, traces the U.S. role in advising defense ministries back to at least the 1848 occupation of Mexico.³

In all of these cases, however, the mission was primarily advisory in nature—that is, oriented toward providing advice and encouragement to foreign counterparts to take policy or strategic decisions in accordance with U.S. interests, rather than focused on building indigenous institutional capacities. Advising partner defense establishments to take decisions that advance U.S. interests is a far different proposition than building institutional capacity to support the ability of partner nations to advance their own, and shared, interests.

The fall of the Soviet Union initiated a fundamental reorientation toward institutional capacity building, beginning with the establishment of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). At a summit of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense ministers in Travemünde, Germany, in October 1993, the United States first proposed the establishment of the PfP; the Partnership was launched at the NATO Summit in Brussels three months later. The *Declaration of Heads of State and Government*, issued at the Summit, proclaimed that the PfP would expand military cooperation throughout Europe by focusing on practical cooperation and, in particular, “at a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire

of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.”⁴

The PfP provided a platform for U.S. and NATO cooperation with states of the former Soviet Union to enhance institutional capacity and align policies, processes, and standards with NATO and its members. It laid the groundwork for “defense institution building,” and, in fact, the term itself officially emerged at the 2004 NATO Summit in Istanbul, when NATO released the “Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building” (PAP-DIB). PAP-DIB represented a critical evolution in two ways: first, it provided a concrete conceptual framework for approaching capacity building within the defense institutions of NATO’s partners; second, it prompted the establishment of new initiatives specifically oriented toward DIB within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).

In the United States, DOD launched a robust line of DIB programming through its Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF, recently renamed the Wales Initiative Fund), launched by President Bill Clinton in a 1994 visit to Poland. WIF has grown to provide DIB support to over 15 PfP members in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. As the Department saw the gains by PfP partner defense sectors enabled by WIF’s DIB support and began to recognize the need for greater institutional capacity among partners beyond the PfP, it started to explore ways to take DIB global.

As the Department was seeing its DIB efforts pay off in Eastern Europe, it was also coming face to face with the challenges of large-scale, intensive capacity building in defense institutions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following combat operations that toppled sitting regimes in each country, U.S. reconstruction efforts initially focused on training units within the military and civilian security forces to confront remaining threats associated with the ousted regimes. However, in each country, it quickly became clear that functional defense ministries were required to direct, support, and sustain military forces, including these newly trained units, if there were to be any hope of enduring stability. In Iraq, ministerial development was initially so ignored that the Coalition Provisional Authority established a new Ministry of Defense (its establishment rushed to meet the scheduled 2004 transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi government) with only three weeks of training for incoming officials at the National Defense University and the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, DC.⁵ Beginning in 2005, DOD initiated an evolving mission to provide training and advisory assistance to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, which brought together a mix of U.S. military personnel, civilians, and contractors.⁶

In Afghanistan, the period from the launch of combat operations in 2001 through 2009 was, as one researcher described it, one of “fragmented inattention.” U.S. military training organizations “focused the bulk of their initial technical assistance resources and energies on the rapid generation of armed forces over the long-term management capacity inside the defense ministry.”⁷ The United States did provide limited support to the development

of the new Ministry of Defense (MOD) through commercial firms that provided contracted advisory support, primarily Military Professional Resources International (MPRI, now Engility) and DynCorp, and through retired military officers and former government civilians with vast but varied experience. Dedicated advisors, primarily military personnel, began to be assigned to the Afghan MOD in 2007; however, it was not until 2009—with a rejuvenated Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan and a newly created NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan—that the United States began to elevate ministerial development as a priority.

In 2009, these two threads—the mounting evidence of institutional gains in Eastern Europe and the growing concerns about institutional failings in Iraq and Afghanistan—came together to prompt the Defense Department to significantly expand its commitment to DIB. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates established two new programs exclusively devoted to DIB: the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), designed to undertake programming similar to WIF's efforts but for partners around the world outside of the PfP, and the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) program for Afghanistan, specifically designed to meet mounting ministerial development needs in that country. One year later, the MODA program was given a global reach, authorized to assign civilian experts as technical advisors to partner defense institutions around the world.

As these three programs—WIF, DIRI, and MODA—have matured and have been complemented by other Defense Department programs offering relevant institutional assistance or engagement, the Department has begun to embrace DIB as a critical element of its broader security cooperation with partner nations across the globe. By 2015, robust DIB programming had taken root around the world, spanning more than three dozen partner nations.

Defining DIB

As the discipline of DIB has emerged, one essential challenge has been defining what it means to build defense institutional capacity, and what DIB ultimately seeks to achieve. As a discipline, it is a unique blend of security assistance and institutional capacity building. It is distinct from most assistance programs targeting partner defense sectors in that it focuses on institutional capacity rather than tactical or operational mission readiness. As a recent RAND study put it, “DIB aims to promote effective, transparent, and responsive institutions in a variety of ways. Its goals include improving civilian control of the military, building respect for the rule of law, and improving military professionalism. What it does *not* do is focus on the operational readiness or tactical capabilities of the host nation's military.”⁸ That is not to say DIB does not contribute—significantly—to operational readiness or tactical capabilities; however, such contributions are outcomes of the DIB discipline's focus on broader processes at the institutional level, as opposed to outcomes of interventions specifically targeted at individual, tactical-level units or capabilities. While DIB can draw lessons from institutional capacity-building efforts often seen in the development community, it remains distinct in that it targets defense capacities that are

often without counterpart in civilian ministries, and are ultimately intended to support and sustain specific military roles and missions.

Department of Defense Directive 5205.82, the Department's top-level policy guidance for DIB, defines the discipline as follows:

Security cooperation activities that empower partner nation defense institutions to establish or re-orient their policies and structures to make their defense sector more transparent, accountable, effective, affordable, and responsive to civilian control. DIB improves defense governance, increases the sustainability of other DOD security cooperation programs, and is carried out in cooperation with partner nations pursuant to appropriate and available legal authority. It is typically conducted at the ministerial, general, joint staff, military service headquarters, and related defense agency level, and when appropriate, with other supporting defense entities.⁹

Defense institution building, therefore, is generally organized around two primary objectives. The first is to enable a partner nation to improve its ability to provide for its own defense, including by undertaking roles and missions that benefit shared security interests. That is, DIB seeks to help partner militaries become more effective so that they can provide more valuable contributions to regional and international security operations, as well as to more effectively protect the security of the citizenries they are established to defend. There is thus an immediacy assigned to DIB objectives: desired improvements in defense governance are embedded within strategy-based plans to address emerging or existing real-world security challenges.

The second objective is to empower a partner nation to undertake reforms within its defense sector that achieve greater transparency, accountability, efficiency, legitimacy, and responsiveness to civilian oversight. In other words, DIB seeks to help partners improve defense governance, resulting in defense sectors that are both more effective on the battlefield and more responsive to their citizenries. While these two goals are fairly straightforward, taken together, they distinguish DIB from institutional capacity building in other settings, where capacity-building efforts are often focused exclusively on enabling more effective partner-nation governance, with a less explicit expectation that improvements in such governance will lead to direct benefits for the donor nation or broader international community. Other such institutional capacity-building efforts may not be strictly altruistic, but may be developed in service to strengthening international systems or regional stability over the long term. DIB, on the other hand, is often expected to generate more effective militaries that will be employed to meet shared, often specific, national security objectives.

As discussed in greater detail below, DIB draws from traditional defense security cooperation, foreign development assistance, and the broader discipline of security sector reform (SSR), but it is distinct from all three. By definition, DIB falls within the broader set of activities within DOD termed "security cooperation": that is, it is one tool with which

the Department seeks to engage and assist key foreign partners and allies to build military capabilities, promote interoperability, and enable the United States and partners to jointly pursue shared national security interests. It also falls within the broader area of “security sector reform,” a discipline which emerged in the late 1990s along a trajectory similar to DIB’s evolution, which has come to mean “the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that are undertaken by a series of stakeholders to improve the way a state or governing body provides safety, security, and justice to its civilian population within the context of rule of law.”¹⁰ DIB is not generally considered to fall within the boundaries of development assistance; nevertheless, the two disciplines share key similarities. Notwithstanding the overlap across these terms, DIB has emerged as a distinct practice, blending key elements of all three broader disciplines. It is more focused on institutions and long-term outcomes than most traditional defense security cooperation, while it is more focused on specific security outcomes of direct relevance to U.S. national security interests than is development assistance. Security sector reform efforts and related literature, meanwhile, have largely focused on justice and policing sectors in their brief history; however, without question, defense sector reform is a critical—if unique—sub-area within SSR.

DIB efforts may vary widely in scope and, because of the different models involved, the intended scope becomes another important question in defining DIB. Two settings that were in many ways the birthplace of U.S. DIB (Iraq and Afghanistan) are also outliers in the discipline’s practice. Massive DIB interventions in which a large number of embedded trainers and advisors seek to help build or fundamentally rebuild a defense ministry, such as those the United States undertook in Iraq and Afghanistan, look far different in practice than the more common DIB programs in which a relatively small team works in partnership with ministries to seek agreed-upon reforms of various levels of ambition and complexity, depending on the partner. Because of the differences in models and underlying conditions that these two approaches entail, it is important to distinguish the large-scale, from-the-ground-up type of effort on display in Iraq and Afghanistan, from the more targeted activities that represent the norm.

Finally, any definition of DIB should be accompanied by a caveat: activities do not constitute DIB simply because they take place within the defense sector, or even within defense institutions. DIB is a specific subset of such activities that focuses on enhancing the systemic capabilities involved in governing the defense sector. Nicole Ball, an expert on SSR, has issued a similar warning in that context: “All too often, the term SSR is applied to a wide range of security-related activities. In fact, in many cases ‘SSR’ entails re-hatting existing programs or initiating activities that are largely devoid of governance content.”¹¹ Governance, as Ball rightly notes, is the key defining factor; if an effort is not primarily focused on improving a partner’s capacity to govern its defense sector, then it is not DIB.

The Role of Defense Institutions within the Defense Sector

As suggested above, DIB is distinguished from other defense security cooperation activities

not only by its objectives and scope, but also by where its activities are situated within a defense sector. Because building military capabilities necessarily involves the development and improvement of specific tactical units tasked with employing those capabilities, most defense security cooperation activities are appropriately located at the unit and individual level—that is, focusing on specific operational units or individual personnel. DIB, on the other hand, must target institutional systems to achieve its objectives. These systems are found at a number of different levels within a defense sector, but always above the unit level.

A nation’s defense sector consists of a number of different elements, ranging from the national leader—who often serves dually as the Commander-in-Chief of the national armed forces—to individual military units at the bottom of the chain of command. As *Figure 1* demonstrates, these elements might be divided into five levels distinct in function but often, in practice, overlapping in structure: national governance, ministerial, military headquarters, operational, and tactical (or unit).

Figure 1: Functional Levels within the Defense Sector



At the national governance level, defense institutions are guided by decisions, laws, and processes managed by interagency government leaders and organizations, including national leaders and other national government departments, and usually by laws passed by legislative bodies. It is at this level that governance of the defense sector is integrated with broader government objectives, strategies, and equities. While functions at the national governance level bear upon the defense sector, this level is most often characterized by actors outside of defense institutions—ranging from presidential offices to parliaments—and thus is best addressed through whole-of-government interventions broader than DIB.

A second distinct level is the ministerial level, comprised primarily of the Ministry of Defense, but also potentially including specific defense-related organizations housed within other ministries (for example, some offices or organizations within certain Interior Ministries perform defense-related ministerial functions, such as oversight of National Guards) or other civilian defense institutions organized outside of the Ministry of Defense.

The military headquarters level captures those functions associated with general and joint staffs, military service headquarter operations, and certain national commands: namely, those functions associated with the translation of ministerial-level policy and guidance into military policies and orders, and with the organization, maintenance, training, and equipping of armed forces. The military headquarters level could be divided into two levels based on two separate functions: one, generally associated with joint and general staffs, translating ministerial-level policy into broad, cross-service military policies and orders; and the second, generally residing in individual military service headquarters organizations, involving the organization, training, and equipping of forces. In practice, however, many militaries do not include general or joint staffs, and the two functions are commonly combined into a single organization.

A fourth level, the operational level, captures those functions associated with the employment of those armed forces in military operations, and generally includes operational commands (such as the U.S. Military's Geographical Combatant Commands).

The latter three levels—the ministerial, military headquarters, and operational levels—encompass the institutional systems upon which individual military personnel, units, and capabilities depend. For that reason, DIB activities are targeted at these levels, almost exclusively. The final level is the unit (or tactical function) level, which is comprised of the individual military units of a partner nation's armed forces and is generally associated with tactical operations and activities. While units at this level are dependent upon institutional systems, they generally are not in a position to manage or shape such systems and, for that reason, are rarely objects of DIB engagement. It is worth noting that military training and assistance often target individual military personnel, which may represent the lowest level of a military organization; however, for the purposes of simplicity individual personnel are treated as part of the unit level within this chapter.

Defense Sector Level	Core Capacity Focus Areas
Ministerial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Resource Management ▪ Human Resource Management ▪ Strategy, Policy, and Planning ▪ Acquisition and Logistics ▪ Rule of Law
Military Headquarters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Total Force Management ▪ Force Development ▪ Logistics ▪ Command Responsibility and Accountability
Operational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Readiness ▪ Command-and-Control ▪ Logistics ▪ Operational Planning

DIB plays out differently at each of the three targeted levels. Each level is characterized by institutional capacities, processes, and systems that enable organizations to carry out the functional responsibilities associated with that level. These capacities, processes, and systems are connected and integrated across levels in many cases; for example, an effective national logistics system depends on policies and governance at the ministerial level and a functional distribution network that ensures acquisition and dispersal of equipment from national organizations to dispersed local units—involving military headquarters and operational level functions. However, while they are connected, different capacities are required at each level.

The list of capacity areas required for a defense sector to function efficiently, effectively, and in alignment with broader national policies, laws, and strategies could fill volumes. However, at each of the three targeted levels of a defense sector, there are a handful of core capacities that are vital for any defense sector, no matter its organization, scope, or level of maturity. While U.S. DIB activities have not been restricted to these core capacities, they are the starting point for effective defense institution capacity building—each a *sine qua non* for effective defense institutions. The annex at the end of this chapter offers a taxonomy, summarized in *Figure 2*, of the core capacities at each level.

DIB, Development Assistance, and Defense Security Cooperation

Defense institution building remains a new and evolving discipline for DOD. The taxonomy outlined in the annex remains somewhat theoretical; the Department has a relatively limited set of experiences from which to draw lessons, and several potentially promising models have yet to be fully explored. Nevertheless, even the relatively short history of DIB has offered a number of practical lessons, many of which highlight additional elements helpful

in defining and distinguishing DIB. Many such elements highlight just how different DIB is compared to other defense security cooperation activities, at least as they are currently undertaken by most of the world's security exporters, and just how challenging it can be to integrate DIB and other defense security cooperation activities into holistic approaches.

Among the distinctions that separate DIB from mainstream defense security cooperation are considerations relating to engagement rhythms and time horizons, target audiences, practitioners or implementers, and considerations with regard to foreign partners. Most defense security cooperation engagements with foreign partners are sporadic and short-lived. While the acquisition and transfer of equipment to a partner may take months or years as defense articles are put on contract and delivered, their delivery to partners is experienced as a single event. Because of the authorities and resources available to most security exporters and their military's training rhythm, foreign partner training is rarely sustained over long periods. Additionally, the bulk of defense security cooperation activities are conducted as discrete events—military staff talks, port calls, exercises, or subject matter expert exchanges.

Part and parcel with the engagement rhythm is the target audience. Because most defense security cooperation activities are focused at the unit level—primarily seeking to build capacity, interoperability, shared understanding of tactics or operating concepts, or rapport with individual units—such activities tend to be conducted with a rotating cast of partner leaders and units. Each U.S. military service will tend to work with its foreign counterparts, and will generally work with a range of units within each partner-military service. This approach creates a cumulative effect that can powerfully build military capabilities or develop interoperability but, individually, most security cooperation activities are characterized by their short time horizons, sporadic engagement rhythms, and diverse set of unit-level partner participants.

DIB, meanwhile, lends itself to sustained, consistent engagement with a core group of stakeholders that, working persistently over many months or years, are committed to reforming institutional systems and capacities. Institutional change, as a rule, cannot be achieved through one-time events; it requires a persistent, cooperative effort to identify institutional shortcomings, develop potential solutions, and adjust the solutions under implementation as circumstances dictate. Such a sustained effort, in the DOD experience, must be led by committed partners who take the lead in developing homegrown solutions and building consensus within partner governments for implementing them. Moreover, such committed partners, by virtue of DIB's institutional focus, will largely be found at the Ministerial, Military Headquarters, and Operational levels; rarely are individuals at the unit level empowered to lead institutional reforms.

DIB is thus distinguished from other aspects of defense security cooperation in that it involves regular, sustained engagements with a core of committed participants at institutional levels, rather than largely sporadic, short-term engagements with a diverse set of actors primarily at the unit level. This distinction is not inherent or inevitable: in fact, experience has demonstrated that mainstream defense security cooperation efforts, like DIB,

will achieve more successful outcomes when planned in coherent, sustained approaches that target actors across different levels of a defense sector. However, mainstream security cooperation efforts are often constrained by a host of factors that impose less pressure on DIB programs. For example, equipment programs are tied to acquisition and delivery cycles, while unit-to-unit exchanges or trainings are dependent on the separate training and deployment cycles of each unit, which makes sustained engagement or routine follow-up challenging. Given their focus at institutional levels, DIB programs are often less affected by deployments, training requirements, and rapid personnel turnover and are more likely to involve committed partner counterparts empowered to lead reforms to achieve desired outcomes.

This practical distinction between mainstream security cooperation activities and DIB can create challenges in integrating the two. DIB interventions may take years to bear tangible fruit. In an ideal world, DOD could work with partners to enhance institutional capacities during simultaneous efforts to build tactical capabilities and link them into a broader defense enterprise; in practice, however, it is difficult to predict DIB outcomes and timetables and thus to develop coherent implementation plans for tactical and operational capacity building that build upon and integrate institutional efforts. Similarly, in an ideal world, tactical capacity-building activities would be preceded by engagements at the institutional level that serve to develop or enhance partner defense strategies in order to ensure the right tactical capabilities are targeted for further improvement, or to develop financial and human resource or logistics capabilities to ensure that they can be sustained and manned. In practice, however, tactical capacity-building activities may be seen as options to address near-term requirements, meaning that waiting for institutional capacity-building efforts to take hold may not be seen as an acceptable luxury. These challenges point to the need for more strategic, long-term approaches to security cooperation planning that seek to align the nature and timing of long-term and short-term activities around a viable theory of change.

DIB is also often distinguished from mainstream defense security cooperation by its practitioners or implementers. Mainstream defense security cooperation activities are primarily implemented by personnel of individual U.S. military units who are available to deploy for such activities or who are present in a partner nation because of their assigned duty stations, training rotations, planned exercises, or other responsibilities. In some cases, contract personnel implement such activities, though they are often civilians with prior service in related military units. Meanwhile, DIB activities are implemented by a mix of civilian DOD personnel, military personnel with relevant experience, and contracted subject matter experts.

It is a fundamental prerequisite of successful DIB programming that implementers have direct experience and/or subject matter expertise in the chosen focus area at the appropriate level in the institution. Even more importantly, implementers need to have an understanding of how systems or processes work across levels and then be able to determine which aspects of this knowledge are relevant to the often very different circumstances of

the partner nation. While this principle sounds simple and obvious, in practice it creates challenges. For example, one of the most common needs—at all three levels of DIB—is logistics capacity, a fundamental military capability. Yet, while the U.S. Armed Forces maintain substantial logistics capacity across the military, most logisticians work at the tactical level and have scant experience with the institutional processes associated with a highly functional national or operational logistics enterprise. While the military offers tremendous logistics expertise, most logisticians are not ideal DIB implementers. On the other hand, civilian and contractor subject matter experts who may have had little experience working within military units, or working through U.S. military institutional structures, may find it difficult to navigate partner military organizations. This disconnect, without careful management, can lead to missed opportunities and well-intentioned planners and implementers talking past each other due to their mismatched experiences.

Finally, DIB is often distinguished from mainstream defense security cooperation by the requirements it creates on the relationship between the United States and its partners. While defense planners generally make every effort to involve partners in the planning and implementation of security cooperation activities, especially those designed to advance specific partner military capabilities, the truth is that these activities often risk becoming transactional and unidirectional in nature. They involve the donor (the United States) handing over to the recipient an article (a weapons system, a piece of equipment) or a service (training, education, information). DIB, on the other hand, must be bidirectional, mutual, and non-transactional in order to achieve enduring results. It asks partners to commit to a process that will result—if successful—in the partners making targeted, systemic changes to their own processes, policies, and practices.

In that regard, DIB is situated more closely within the practice of foreign aid and development assistance, which, in recent years, has increasingly embraced a principle of “country ownership,” established in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, as a critical best practice. Country ownership fundamentally entails a relationship built upon mutual collaboration between donors and recipients of development assistance, ensuring that the recipient nation both prioritizes areas of focus and takes steps internally to develop solutions. As the Accra Agenda for Action elaborates, “Developing countries will systematically identify areas where there is a need to strengthen the capacity to perform and deliver services at all levels – national, sub-national, sectoral, and thematic – and design strategies to address them. Donors will strengthen their own capacity and skills to be more responsive to developing countries’ needs.”¹²

Country ownership is one of several principles DIB shares with development assistance. Underlying the similarity between DIB and development assistance is a value-neutral approach to empowering partner nations to self-sufficiently govern and meet critical citizen needs. In practice, the similarities in approach have yielded similar principles for success that tailor the way each discipline is applied.

For example, in addition to country ownership, both DIB and development assistance have developed approaches built upon the understanding that improving a partner

nation's capacity for governance fundamentally involves political action in addition to technical assistance. Reform efforts must overcome not just technical shortfalls, but deeply entrenched interests that benefit from the status quo despite its inadequacy for serving citizens generally. As Thomas Carothers, an expert on developing democratic governance capabilities, has written:

Governance shortcomings often directly serve the interests of power holders. The lack of meritocracy allows leaders to reward political followers and cement their bases of support. The weakness of the bureaucracy diminishes the risk that an independent source of authority might limit or even threaten the prerogatives of the ruling elite. Inefficient and opaque policy processes provide opportunities to insert special favors for powerful interests . . . In these situations the primary governance challenge is unavoidably political: forging a basic societal consensus on the form and legitimacy of the state.¹³

This understanding generates two important lessons for undertaking assistance to improve governance capacity. First, such assistance should be prefaced by an informed political economy analysis. It should evaluate the political dynamics relating to a capacity targeted for reform, identify actors who will lead reform efforts and those who are likely to undermine them based on their entrenched interests, and develop strategies for navigating the political dynamics in order to advance reforms. Second, such assistance requires sustained political engagement with senior partner-nation leaders in order to develop and maintain the top-level support for reforms that is necessary to overcome entrenched interests.

Another key principle is that governance assistance should look for solutions that represent the best fit with a partner nation's own capacities, culture, personnel, and resources, rather than seeking to impose a donor nation's own way of doing things or one-size-fits-all best practices. As Carothers has also noted, "attempting to install best practice institutions that lack any real relationship to their local context is likely to spark unintended consequences and could even hinder institutional development. In response to these challenges, governance experts have increasingly embraced the idea of 'best fit' rather than best practice."¹⁴ Some of the more prominent failings in previous DIB experiments have fallen short precisely because they neglected this principle. For example, anecdotes have long circulated about military officers in Afghanistan seeking to develop a budgeting system in the Afghan Ministry of Defense based on the Pentagon's own Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation (PPBE) system—that is, seeking to adapt an incredibly complex system designed to balance requirements of numerous components and agencies across a budget of over half-a-trillion dollars to meet the needs of a ministry that has a budget the size of an average big-city school district in the United States.

A number of other key principles—such as donor transparency, the importance of monitoring and evaluation, and the integration of governance assistance with assistance

in other areas—have also informed both DIB and development assistance practices. These shared principles suggest a deep affinity between DIB and development assistance. Moreover, many touchstones of development assistance—such as country ownership and the preference for “best fit” over “best practice”—are not only currently shared with DIB, but are also applicable to traditional security cooperation, even if they are less uniformly adopted. The point is not to establish hard walls between the disciplines, but to suggest that DIB is unique as a discipline in practice because it brings prominent characteristics of traditional security cooperation and development assistance together—both in harmony and creative tension.

One way to describe this unique aspect of DIB is to understand DIB as the ongoing attempt to reconcile the tension between U.S. and partner security goals and U.S. and partner governance goals. As Nicole Ball notes, partner nations engaged in security sector reform often experience it as a tension between two competing goals: improving security sector governance—implies greater effectiveness, accountability, transparency, and respect for the rule of law—and pursuing security against domestic and foreign threats, which too often convince governments of the necessity of excess, secrecy, and shortcuts. Security sector reform, according to Ball, works best when it enables partners to have both; that is, when security sector reform efforts can “identify the areas where a development approach to security and justice reform overlaps with security work and how the two can become mutually reinforcing, rather than pulling in opposite directions. It is with this effort that what is truly unique in the SSR concept—the emphasis on democratic governance of the security sector—can be realized.”¹⁵ The additional element brought by DIB is the goal of identifying areas where these two goals can be mutually reinforcing in concert with another goal: empowering the contribution of a partner nation’s defense sector to address national security interests shared by both the partner and the United States. A recent RAND study brings these three mutually reinforcing poles into focus:

Effective security institutions, as well as professional and accountable military forces, provide the conditions that make it possible to deter extremism and combat transnational threats. DIB also creates a virtuous circle by reinforcing the country’s ability to provide security to its citizens and the region as a whole. For instance, having legitimate and accountable security institutions reduces the risk of abuses against the civilian population and repression of ethnic and religious minorities, which can provide fertile ground for radicalization and extremism, whether homegrown or transnational. DIB also increases a partner nation’s security—by reducing internal tensions—and legitimacy by providing security to its neighbors. In this way, DIB objectives can form useful “stepping stones” for other U.S. strategic objectives.¹⁶

In addition, DIB is distinguished from development assistance—and even other security sector reform efforts outside the defense sector—in the unique challenges it routinely

confronts. Improving governance within the defense sector involves building capacity in key areas that generally are not found outside the defense context; it involves challenges unique to the defense sector that involve distinctive power relationships, relations with the citizen population, and responsibilities under domestic and international law. For example, in general, in no other sector of government might an organization maintain a workforce that is, in part or in full, conscripted into service. The dynamics involved in enabling a partner military to better manage a conscripted force, or to transition from a conscripted force to a volunteer force, are unique. Addressing policies and accountability under international humanitarian law in a context often involving warfare with irregular or unlawful insurgent forces and the blurred lines between such forces and civilian populations is similarly unique to the defense sector. Moreover, many of the core focus areas, particularly within military services and operational commands, are rarely replicated outside of defense sectors: take, for example, force readiness or military operational planning.

Ultimately, therefore, DIB is truly a unique discipline that brings together critical elements of traditional defense security cooperation, broader security sector reform, and development assistance. It is a narrow discipline that focuses on a discrete set of objectives, actors, and capabilities. By holding in balance the objectives and best practices of all three disciplines, DIB generates opportunities to achieve and sustain fundamentally transformative defense objectives in cooperation with partners around the world.

The Way Ahead

Defense institution building, like security sector reform, is a young discipline that continues to experiment, fail at times, and learn. There is much work to be done to identify what works in most cases and what does not, where different models are needed, and how to overcome challenges and mitigate risks. This need is particularly glaring given the relative paucity of international experience with DIB. Only a few actors, such as the governments of the United Kingdom and France, have undertaken ministerial advisory efforts that are rooted in SSR and address many of the functional areas of DIB; the list is not long. NATO's Partnership Action Plan for DIB has not yet taken root as a major influence on the efforts of NATO members and partners to lead defense institution reform. As the discipline matures, it will need to make room for other actors, to embrace and harness their efforts, and to maintain a robust capacity for self-examination to identify better ways of approaching shared challenges.

Another critical gap is the misunderstanding, relatively low prioritization, and lack of integration of DIB in relation to traditional security cooperation and security assistance efforts. The dominant model of security cooperation, both within the United States and among other security exporters, is focused on providing military equipment and operational training to tactical military units in partner nations, and is rarely informed by or subordinated to efforts to build institutional capacity. As a recent report commissioned by the UK's Department for International Development found, often "many of the most critical reform issues, notably the impact of the programme and the sustainability of any

effect, are treated by the military as strategic-operational level issues to be addressed at a political level. They are often not considered from the outset by programme level planning processes.¹⁷ Such efforts risk setting partners up to fail. As military force planners in the United States and other high-end militaries know well, developing a military capability requires that the full military system—from the ministerial down to the tactical level—adapt to embrace the new capability; simply inserting a new piece of equipment without the concomitant systemic adaptation often means the equipment is unlikely to be maintained, supported by the right personnel, or employed effectively. To address this shortcoming, a critical task is educating policy makers and security assistance planners within the security sectors of the United States and other security providers on the role, purpose, and implementation of DIB. A second key task is developing more precise, repeatable models for merging “train and equip” programs with DIB; that is, models for holistic approaches to military assistance that account for the full range of requirements associated with building legitimate, affordable, effective, and sustainable military capabilities.

Ultimately, a model that effectively integrates unit-level capacity building with institution building may require a fundamental shift in the way the United States and many other security exporters approach security sector assistance. Rather than seeking to address defense institution and broader whole-of-government issues after plans to provide tactical military capabilities have already been developed or initiated, it may require turning this model on its head: starting with whole-of-government approaches to developing effective governance institutions, including in the defense sector; identifying and analyzing shared security objectives that may guide further capacity building; and then planning the development of tactical capabilities as direct outgrowths of this strategic alignment. There are numerous disincentives standing in the way of such a transformation, however, and even minor shifts in that direction require the reorientation of a wide array of actors. That is not to say that such an approach, which holds the potential for far more successful outcomes, should not be pursued.

These challenges notwithstanding, DIB is a nascent discipline with great promise, both for improving the ability of the United States and other security providers to achieve strategic national security objectives, and to empower partners to more effectively, accountably, and transparently govern their defense sectors so as to enhance the security of their own citizens. In the increasingly complex security environment that has thus far characterized the 21st century, DIB’s potential is rivaled only by its necessity.

Taxonomy of DIB Focus Areas

This annex presents a taxonomy of core focus areas across the three levels of engagement for defense institution building (DIB): the ministerial, military headquarters, and operational levels. The taxonomy is intended to identify critical functions at each level that may be important areas of focus for institutional capacity-building efforts; it is not a task list. It is also important to note that many identified functions are not rigidly confined to one level, while many functions identified at different levels may be present in a single organization.

Organizational structure notwithstanding, the functions identified in the taxonomy are critical to effective defense sector governance.

Ministerial Level

The critical goals of DIB at the ministerial level are to ensure that a partner nation's defense ministry is able to effectively perform oversight and ensure the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of its military activities; align policies, strategies, and investments of the defense enterprise with those of the national government; set the direction of the development and employment of the military through clear, executable policy and budgetary guidance; and ensure unity of effort across disparate elements of a defense enterprise. To achieve these goals, DIB at the ministerial level focuses on five major competencies: resource management; human resource management; strategy, policy, and planning; acquisition and logistics; and rule of law. Each of the five major competencies is defined below.

Resource Management

The ability of the host-nation (HN) defense sector to plan, allocate, execute, and account for resources in support of national defense through the nation's armed forces. Resource management includes capacities to budget, conduct analysis of short- and long-term budgetary requirements, effectively allocate resources in alignment with strategic priorities, execute budgets through effective program management, contracting, and acquisition, conduct analysis of expenditures, and audit expenditures.

Human Resource Management

The ability of the HN's defense sector to identify, assign, develop, and maintain the required civilian and military workforce to achieve national defense objectives. For a host nation, according to a manual produced by NATO's Building Integrity program, "The goal of the defence personnel management system is to ensure that the right numbers of people with the right mix of skills and experience are in the right positions to provide for defence outputs—current operations, future capabilities, command and control, etc."¹⁸ The same manual notes that, for a personnel management system to perform effectively:

it must perform two complementary functions . . . :

- 1. Determine human resource requirements, based on future defence requirements and force plans. These include short-term requirements to meet the needs of the current force, mid-term (5-6 year) requirements for the evolving force, and long-term (15+ year) requirements for meeting long-term development goals.*
- 2. Manage and develop people—as individuals and in aggregate—to maximize the human resources available to meet requirements. This requires systematic efforts*

*to attract, train, motivate, assign, promote and retain personnel to ensure an available pool of personnel with needed professional competencies (knowledge, skills and experience).*¹⁹

Critical capabilities in this area thus include the ability to establish human resource requirements, establish and maintain viable civilian and military career paths, ensure successful policies and processes for recruiting and retention of civilian and military personnel, provide sufficient professional education and development, maintain objective and transparent promotion processes, determine and plan for appropriate compensation and benefits, maintain objective and transparent performance management or evaluation systems, and ensure fair and transparent recourses for redressing personnel grievances.

Strategy, Policy, and Planning

The ability of a host-nation defense sector to develop and oversee defense and military strategies, plans, and policies that identify and prioritize defense objectives, direct when and how to commit military forces, provide for the management and oversight of both military and civilian elements of the defense sector, and develop plans that align available ways and means to desired ends.

The policy function entails the ability of a ministry to engage in national level, interagency policymaking, as well as to clearly articulate policies governing the specific functions of the defense sector. Such policies will define missions and objectives, identify and direct the means through which the defense sector pursues such objectives, and assess and seek to mitigate risks associated with those objectives. The policy function also includes engagement with foreign partners to seek agreements, develop common practices, share information and planning assumptions, and otherwise collaborate to achieve mutual objectives.

Strategy and planning entail “the intelligent identification, utilization, and coordination of resources (ways and means) for the successful attainment of a specific objective (end).”²⁰ Strategy, too, has both interagency and defense-specific dimensions; the effective ministry of defense should be able to work through interagency processes toward the development of national security strategies while translating national guidance into specific defense strategies (that is, the application of defense sector ways and means against identified objectives) that account for both broad national defense interests and specific regional or functional challenges. Planning is the translation of these strategies into specific plans that sequence, coordinate, and integrate activities and resources to achieve desired end states, as well as the assessment and mitigation of risks associated with alternative courses of action; at the ministerial level, planning requires direction to and oversight of military planners to ensure that military plans are developed, maintained, and assessed in support of identified, prioritized defense objectives.

Acquisition and Logistics

The ability of a host-nation defense sector to acquire new defense capabilities, to maintain existing capabilities, to move forces, equipment, and supplies within and between areas of operation, to maintain necessary infrastructure, to manage supply chains and risks thereto, and to provide medical support to defense personnel.

More specifically, acquisition at the ministerial level requires appropriate policies and management frameworks to support effective identification and articulation of specific requirements and performance specifications associated with desired military capabilities, cost analysis and life-cycle support planning, and mechanisms (such as contracting) to acquire weapons systems, equipment, support systems, and services in support of the missions of a country's armed forces and defense institutions. Logistics is "a nation's capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to required points of application." The two go hand-in-hand, and are often lumped together under the category of logistics. NATO's *Logistics Handbook*, for example, provides an expansive definition addressing both capabilities:

The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, the aspects of military operations which deal with:

- *design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposal of materiel;*
- *transport of personnel;*
- *acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities;*
- *acquisition or furnishing of services; and*
- *medical and health service support.*²¹

While logistics is a critical capability at all three levels of DIB activity, at the ministerial level its focus is on ensuring the policies and processes necessary to maintain effective acquisition and logistics systems, allocating resources to achieve acquisition and logistics requirements, ensuring management frameworks to maintain program accountability within the acquisition and logistics systems, and address the integration of defense logistics systems (including supply chains) with national logistics systems. Moreover, at the ministerial level, logistics often demands an ability to make arrangements for multinational cooperation, such as ensuring viable lines of communication to support foreign deployments, including through seeking necessary agreements with allied or partner nations. Finally, in certain circumstances, it entails the ability to receive, host, and support foreign forces deployed to ensure the partner nation's security.

Rule of Law

The ability of a HN defense sector to ensure the accountability of armed forces to national authorities; ensure the adherence of armed forces to domestic and international law and treaty obligations; administer an effective, fair, transparent, and timely system of military justice or to ensure military personnel are accountable to a national justice system; provide military leaders with the tools to ensure accountability of military personnel to a clearly defined chain of command; and provide direction and oversight to the conduct of military justice activities, such as investigation and detention. The United Nations defines rule of law as:

*A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.*²²

This core focus area is essentially the application of the United Nations definition to the institutions of the defense sector; however, in the defense sector, the principle of accountability through a clearly defined chain of command becomes a primary means through which armed forces are directed and held accountable in adherence to the law. Capabilities in this area serve to enhance public trust in the defense sector, maintain good order and discipline among military units, establish clear policies governing the circumstances under which military units apply instruments of force, enforce justice, and ensure that armed forces are employed strictly in support of national policies and laws.

Military Headquarters Level

The critical goals of DIB at the military headquarters level are to translate ministerial-level policy and guidance into military policies and orders; to ensure that a partner nation's military services are able to form, train, equip, sustain, develop, and direct operating units within military forces; to organize those operating units most effectively and efficiently to perform assigned missions; to integrate units across services through joint staffs or other mechanisms; and to provide appropriate guidance to military personnel regarding the execution of assigned responsibilities. To achieve these goals, DIB at the military headquarters level focuses on four major competencies: personnel management; force development; logistics; and command accountability. Each of the four major competencies is defined below.

Many militaries, including the United States military, choose to divide the functions identified within this level into two distinct organizational levels. Joint or general staff models often assume the function of translating ministerial-level policy and guidance into military policies and orders, while headquarters organizations of individual military services are charged with organizing, training, and equipping forces. However, many other militaries lack general or joint staffs, and combine the functions into single organizations.

Total Force Management

The ability of the HN military's organizational structures and processes to support recruitment, mobilization/demobilization, the distribution of resources, and other efforts that support the forming and reforming of units. Total force management involves many of the same functions as human resource management at the ministerial level; however, specific tasks, activities, and challenges may take a much different shape in a military context. Total force management may involve determining the balance of volunteer forces versus conscripts, managing and developing conscripted forces, blending military and civilian workforces within a service, planning for the mobilization and deployment of forces for combat, integrating reserve forces into active duty status, and other challenges unique to the military context.

Force Development

The ability of the HN military's systems to develop its forces through development, testing, and fielding of materiel and non-materiel capabilities required in support of strategy; to develop doctrine, provide professional military education, ensure funding and personnel to support such capabilities; developing budgetary analysis and input to ministerial functions in support of such capabilities; and to maintain necessary physical infrastructure and installations. Force development determines what functional capabilities are required to meet assigned missions and objectives, and undertakes the development, maintenance, assessment, and integration of those capabilities. Such capabilities include materiel, systemic, and personnel elements.


Logistics

The ability of the HN military's systems to provide logistical support across the military institution through the maintenance and assurance of the supply chain and a national distribution system, the establishment of policies and systems to support strategic planning for sustainment and distribution, and the establishment and maintenance of sufficient personnel, units, and organizations to meet national logistics requirements.

Differentiating logistics at the military headquarters level from logistics at the ministerial or operational level is critical. *Figure 3*, adapted from Henry Eccles's classic *Logistics in the National Defense*, provides a visual differentiation of logistics roles at various levels.²³ At the military headquarters level, the fundamental task of logistics is the application of national- and ministerial-level guidance, resources, policies, and direction

to develop and sustain logistics systems designed to support service-specific military units and capabilities, and to integrate those systems into a joint logistics system that supports the application of joint military power.

Figure 3: The Levels of Planning in Logistics²⁴



Command Responsibility and Accountability

The ability of the HN military to maintain a clearly established chain of command within and among its units, to select and replace command staff, to establish mechanisms for effective communication and coordination across units, to ensure personnel accountability, and to set policies and guidance that ensure the adherence of military personnel and units to the rule of law. Maintaining order and discipline is an inherent responsibility of any military officer serving in a command capacity; however, the ability of a military commander to do so depends on an institutional architecture of standards, regulations, procedures, tools for accountability, and the like. As a former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff summarized, “standards must be uniformly known, consistently applied and non-selectively enforced. Accountability is critically important to good order and discipline of the force. And, failure to ensure accountability will destroy the trust of the . . . public.”²⁵ The command responsibility and accountability function includes, where applicable, the maintenance and application of a military justice system and other disciplinary frameworks.

Operational Level

DIB’s focus is most robust at the ministerial and military headquarters levels; it is at those levels where most systemic mechanisms supporting the effective management and

accountability of the defense sector are located. However, there is a focused set of capabilities at the operational level that are also critical to well-functioning military institutions, and these capabilities may benefit from defense institution building efforts as well. It is worth noting that in some, especially smaller, militaries, functions at the military headquarters and operational levels are often found in the same organization. The critical goals of DIB at the operational level are to ensure that a partner nation's military units are able to plan for, mobilize, deploy for, sustain, and assess military campaigns and major operations, and to demobilize and recover from such operations. To achieve these goals, DIB at the operational level focuses on four major competencies: readiness; command and control; logistics; and operational planning. Each of the four major competencies is defined below.

Readiness

The ability of the HN military's systems to provide the key elements needed to identify, achieve, and sustain a level of training readiness to meet operational requirements for its units, to establish and maintain physical infrastructure necessary to support training requirements (e.g. training ranges), and to ensure that each unit maintains the requisite personnel and equipment necessary to meet operational requirements. In essence, readiness is determined at the level of individual operational units, and depends on the extent to which each unit has the personnel, equipment, and training to enable it to carry out operational responsibilities when required. As retired Army Colonel Richard Dunn has written:

To fight effectively, the armed forces must be manned, equipped, and trained to operate under dangerous, complex, uncertain, and austere conditions—often with little warning. They require the right personnel operating the right equipment with the right training to win Readiness is like a three-legged stool. The personnel, equipment, and training legs need to be balanced and in sync to support the load.²⁶

Readiness, as a core institutional function, refers to the systemic capability to address each of these three legs across a military's units. A well-functioning readiness capability does not necessarily ensure that all units are ready at all times; rather it manages requirements and risks associated with training, personnel, and equipment according to projections of likely operational requirements.

Command and Control

The ability of the HN military's commands to exercise effective command and control during operations; to direct force maneuver, intelligence, fires, and force protection; and to hold personnel accountable to a clearly established chain of command. The concept of command generally implies the effective expression of will by a military officer assigned authority over other military personnel. The function of command, in the institutional

context, however, extends beyond the expression of will: it requires established chains of command, regulations that shape the expression of authority, clear delineation of responsibility, and tools and procedures to enforce authority, order, and discipline. Control is, by nature, systemic: it “implies the personnel, facilities and procedures for planning, directing and co-ordinating [sic] resources in the accomplishment of the mission. It implies standard operating procedures (SOPs), rules of engagement (ROEs), regulations, military law, organizational structures, policies, equipment—in short, all those structures and processes (including cybernetic processes) put in place by the military to facilitate the accomplishment of its mission in a safe and efficient manner.”²⁷

Logistics

The ability of the HN military’s systems to provide logistical support to operationally deployed military units and personnel, including fielding, distribution, and maintenance relating to critical equipment, personal gear, and provisions such as food and fuel; and to establish and maintain lines of communication. Operational logistics encompasses the activities and resources necessary to undertake military campaigns and major operations. According to U.S. Marine Corps doctrine, “Operational-level logistics links strategic resources with tactical units and enables force closure [that is, ensuring sufficient personnel are in place to carry out assigned tasks], sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of forces...Operational logistics supports expeditionary operations.”²⁸

Operational Planning

The ability of the HN military’s operational commands to establish, maintain, execute, and assess coherent, resource-informed plans for responding to contingencies and for conducting steady-state activities. Operational planning is well defined in the U.S. Army’s treatment of the concept of “operational art” in its Field Manual on Operations (FM 3-0). It is, according to the Field Manual, “the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war.” In this conception, operational art “requires three continuous, cyclic activities”: identifying and framing the mission, formulating an operational design to achieve the mission, and refining the design based on assessment and additional information. As the U.S. Army defines it, “Operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution...Through operational art, commanders and staffs develop a broad concept for applying the military instrument, including landpower, and translate it into a coherent, feasible design for employing joint forces. This operational design provides a framework that relates tactical tasks to the strategic end state. It provides a unifying purpose and focus to all operations.”²⁹

Notes

- 1 Adam Nossiter, Eric Schmitt, and Mark Mazzetti, “French Strikes in Mali Supplant Caution of US,” *New York Times*, January 13, 2013, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/world/africa/french-jets-strike-deep-inside-islamist-held-mali.html?pagewanted=2&_r=0&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130114&pagewanted=all>.
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3

Attributes of a Democratic and Competent Defense Partner

Dennis Blair

The ultimate goal of defense institution building (DIB) is to assist in the development of partner armed forces that are competently organized, trained, and equipped in accordance with democratic civil-military principles, and that plan and conduct military operations skillfully while under the full political direction of a democratic government. Historically, such partner nations have consistently served in coalitions with the United States against authoritarian regimes from the Soviet Union in the Cold War, through Serbia in the Balkans, to Saddam Hussein in the First Gulf War, and the Taliban in the Afghan War. It is these nations that share the United States' vision of a prosperous, peaceful, secure, and free world and are willing to use their armed forces to achieve that vision.

Only a few armed forces around the world—primarily longstanding treaty allies in NATO and Australia in the Pacific—meet these criteria in full. While there are many other countries with which the United States cooperates and interacts, it has found that its most reliable partners are those that are democratic in their governance and competent in their military capabilities. Simply put, the objective of DIB is to work with the defense organizations—military and civilian—of other countries to build the strength of democratic, civil-military relations and the competence of their armed forces in a balanced manner.

In order to plan and carry out an overall DIB campaign with a specific country, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) must first, formulate a logical approach to selecting from the many diverse DIB programs available. This begins with an understanding of the characteristics of democratic civil-military relations, and the skillsets or competencies of effective defense ministries and uniformed military forces. The next step is an assessment of a prospective state recipient of DIB programs, a potential partner for defense and military cooperation. The assessments must cover both the state of civil-military relations and the competence of the defense and military organizations. It is not in the U.S. interest to help develop the military competence of a defense organization that can be directed by an authoritarian government to suppress its own people, or to give it greater capability to take actions hostile to the United States. In some circumstances, the United States may offer military assistance to authoritarian governments for immediate strategic imperatives, but an overall DIB campaign should take the long-term view of balanced development of a

potential partner's capabilities. The final steps in a DIB campaign are executing, monitoring, and adjusting—then continuing, evolving, or terminating—the programs over time.

This chapter begins with a description of “what good looks like” in a competent democratic defense partner. It details an idealized model meant to portray what the United States is working toward with a partner. The chapter then describes seven characteristics observed in the armed forces of mature democracies, and summarizes the most important areas of functional defense and military competence. Next, an outline of a process for planning, executing, and adjusting a military-military program using the DIB toolkit is described. Finally, the chapter discusses some of the lessons that have been learned in using military interactions to transform armed forces in transitioning countries into competent organizations, responsive to democratic government. The reader should understand that though building defense institutions is not an exclusive prerogative of the United States, the author is writing from the perspective and experience of a U.S. military officer. Therefore, the characteristics and competencies described, not surprisingly closely resemble those of the United States armed forces, and will be those most readily recognized by an American military officer. While differences exist among the armed forces of democracies across the world, these seven characteristics, or similar variations, can be found in most mature democratic forces. It should further be noted that while the professionalization that results as DIB progresses does instill transparency and civilian-control of the armed forces, DIB is undertaken in both democratic and nondemocratic settings.

The Seven Characteristics of Democratic Armed Forces

The best, short description of democratic armed forces is as follows, “Armed forces in a democracy are competent, honest and respected defenders of the nation’s interest, loyal and responsive to the elected national government.”¹ Building on this, this section discusses seven particular characteristics observed in the armed forces of most mature democracies, which DIB efforts can help nations to establish. These characteristics are derived from the author’s own experience and research, and include: a constitutional and legal basis; clearly delineated internal and external missions; an inclusive force representative of the demographic makeup of the country; political neutrality and loyalty to the elected government; an established ministry of defense; developed budgetary, pay, and procurement systems; and finally a reputation that earns the respect and backing of their populations at large.

Constitutional and Legal Basis

In a mature democracy, the roles and functions of the armed forces are established in the constitutional and legal framework. The roles, functions, and loyalty of the armed forces are in service to the nation (that is, the people of their country and their elected representatives), rather than to a ruling person, family, tribe, religion, or political party. In the transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic governments, while the process of

creating and promulgating a new legal framework for the armed forces can take years, it is of vital importance to ensuring the accountability and civilian oversight of a professional defense sector.

Legal frameworks specify the authority of the head of state to give orders to the armed forces, and the authority and responsibilities of other officials in the government—including ministers of defense and their staffs, chiefs of defense and their staffs, and the role and authorities of legislative bodies. They set out the procedures for sending units of the armed forces into combat, appointing and approving senior officers, providing military budgets, and purchasing military equipment and supplies. Importantly, they provide the basis for legal orders to the armed forces.

The responsibilities of the legislature for the armed forces are especially important in a democracy. Although the government directs the armed forces on a day-to-day basis, and the head of government generally serves as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the legislature in a democracy has vital responsibilities. It is the legislature that approves the budget and the appointments of the most senior officers. The legislature also approves a government's decision to go to war and has oversight responsibility for the armed forces to investigate mistakes and failures and hold the government accountable for them. Legislatures in mature democracies develop experience and expertise in military matters to provide effective oversight, exerting an important constraint on executive power.

Mission

In most mature democracies, armed forces have the primary mission of defense against external threats. External threats include both immediate military threats within the region and more distant threats to the international order that have provoked a collective response from the United Nations or other international authority. For countries that do not have an immediate external threat, the primary mission for armed forces is to maintain sovereignty over land, air, and maritime territory—a minimum capability that can be expanded should future threats arise—and to support international peacekeeping operations against common threats to the international community.

Armed forces in democracies also have internal missions. Military units often conduct national development projects, such as building roads and bridges, or providing medical care in remote areas. When disasters occur, armed forces are expected to be among the first to respond to save lives, provide emergency supplies, and restore transportation and communications systems. Armed forces can also perform internal counterinsurgency or counternarcotic operations, or support law enforcement or border patrol authorities. Internal operations like these in democracies are always under strict legal controls, especially regarding the use of force and handling of detained citizens. They are conducted to the extent possible in support of domestic government agencies (most often domestic law enforcement agencies) and are conducted for limited periods, subject to renewal by established government procedures. Military intelligence agencies in democracies are

permitted to gather information about a country's citizens only under strict controls that are approved outside the intelligence services themselves through an established legal process.

Demographic Representation and Contribution to Society

Armed forces in democracies reflect the ethnic, regional, religious, and tribal makeup of the country. Recruitment programs and promotion procedures are established to ensure representation of the groups making up the country's population. This mixing of groups in the armed forces is intended not only to provide service opportunities for different segments of the society, but also to ensure that the armed forces retain a national perspective: not favoring one group within the country because of its dominance in the armed forces, either in numbers or in leadership positions. Mixing of minority groups within the armed forces has been most successful when it has been carried down to the unit level—for example, to the brigade or regiment level in an army. In democracies, when veterans of military service return to civilian life, they are expected to contribute to a country's overall objectives through the skills and knowledge they gained during their service.

Political Neutrality

In democracies, the armed forces are expected to be just as loyal and responsive to the orders of a new government on its first day in office as they were to the previous government on its last day. Active duty military personnel play no role in elections beyond casting their individual votes, and they do not make any political preference known publicly. During political crises, armed forces remain neutral.

In countries without long-established democratic traditions, there will often be strong pressures on military leaders during times of political and economic stress and crisis: popular opinion may call for them to take power in times of social disorder and economic hardship; civilian political leaders vying for power may seek their support; and once elected, heads of government may abuse their authorities to consolidate or extend their power, moving toward authoritarianism. There are rarely simple and correct guidelines to follow in situations like these; rather, military leaders must carefully think through the issues at stake and make decisions based on supporting the long-term democratic development of their countries.

Ministries of Defense

In democracies, military leaders provide advice on military policies, but the ultimate decisions on the structure and funding of the armed forces and on their employment are made by the elected government. Ministries of defense perform the function of receiving professional military advice from the uniformed services and then implementing the national decisions that affect the armed forces. Usually, there is an appointed and confirmed Minister of Defense with a staff that has the authority and skills for these responsibilities. The Minister of Defense is responsible both to the head of government and to the legislature

for defense policy, budgets and major equipment purchases, the appointment of senior military officers, and the overall direction of military operations. Although military officers can serve in assignments within the Ministry of Defense, the top positions in democracies should be all civilian politicians or senior career government employees, and a majority of the staff should not be not serving military officers. A strong and competent Ministry of Defense ensures that the military leaders of the armed forces are not making policy decisions that have consequences beyond the military sphere, and in addition it insulates them from policy responsibility. For example, if a war is unpopular, the armed forces are not held responsible for it, and can still be respected and supported by the population for doing their duty. In a transition from an authoritarian government to a democracy, the development of a competent Ministry of Defense staff is one of the most difficult and lengthy challenges.

Budgets, Pay, and Procurement

Military budgets are big, and with big budgets come powerful incentives for both control and corruption. Established democracies have developed systems to ensure that their armed forces are adequately funded for their missions, and that the funds are spent on the intended purposes and not siphoned off into the pockets of the powerful. In mature democracies, military budgets are funded entirely by the national government as approved by the legislature; the armed forces do not own and operate businesses. Military budgets are published. Systems to purchase supplies and equipment are transparent. The competitive procedures, costs, and responsibilities of all officials involved are established by law, audited, and published. Legislatures have the staff, authority, and responsibility to closely track the expenditure of defense funds, and to initiate independent audits to ensure that they are being used for their intended purposes. Military personnel of all ranks are compensated adequately in the armed forces of mature democracies through salary, housing allowance, medical care, and pension. Adequate pay both ensures that capable people serve in the armed forces and reduces the incentives for corruption.

Prestige, Reputation, Rights, and Opportunity

In established democracies, the armed forces routinely rank in opinion polls as one of the most respected institutions in the country. They are considered defenders of their country who are willing to serve—despite personal hardship and the obligation to risk their lives—out of patriotism and a higher sense of service. When they are committed to action, popular support grows, and even if popular opinion turns against a war effort, the citizens of democracies are expected to understand that the armed forces who fight those wars are performing honorable duties, and continue to support them and honor the sacrifices they make in their countries' service.

Members of the armed forces in democracies do not enjoy all of the personal freedoms of the other citizens in their countries; while on active service, they give up some of their rights to free speech and political activity, and much of their right to privacy. In return,

they are owed fair treatment within the military system through promotion based on merit, adequate compensation, and a military justice system that protects the rights of the accused as it pursues just verdicts and supports military discipline.

Competencies of Armed Forces

In addition to the seven characteristics described above, there are important areas of functional competence of armed forces in mature democracies, which are drawn from the standard organizations of ministries of defense and uniformed staffs of advanced democratic countries. The six competencies described below are areas in which the DOD, and in particular DIB programs, can help build the capability of its partners. These areas of competency are closely related to many of the democratic characteristics listed above, and in some cases they overlap.

Strategy and Budgets

It is a combined responsibility of ministries of defense and military staffs to write national defense strategies and draw up budgets for the armed forces for approval by governments and legislatures, and to then execute those budgets. A national defense strategy generally includes a description of the security environment of a country, its overall nature, as well as specific vulnerabilities and threats. It describes and prioritizes the nation's security objectives, and provides at least the outline of a plan to meet the objectives. The national defense strategy provides the foundation for directing, prioritizing, and assessing the full range of military activities.

Based on its national defense strategy, the Ministry of Defense and military staffs draw up budgets for submission to the government and the legislature. The most important budget categories are personnel, operations, and procurement. In most countries, budgets are approved by legislatures one year at a time, but budget planning must extend into the future: at least five years in detail, and then another five or more years in more general terms.

Once a budget is approved, it must be executed competently. Accounting systems are required to transfer and account for funds, procedures to handle changing requirements within a budget cycle, and auditing functions to verify proper expenditures and to prevent the diversion of funds.

Personnel Management

Some democracies fill their ranks through conscription, and others recruit volunteers. In either case, it is important to draw from all of the ethnic, religious, regional, or tribal sectors of a country, and to assign them so that all units—even down to the tactical level (i.e. brigades or regiments)—have diversity. There must be a regular system for promotion based on merit, although provisions can be made to ensure that the senior ranks also are diverse. Military training and education systems are extremely important, and democracies

have extensive professional military education systems for both the enlisted ranks and officers; the quality of training and education must be continually assessed and improved. Finally, compensation at all levels must be adequate so that service is attractive and there is no excuse for accepting bribes and practicing extortion.

Intelligence

The armed forces in democracies need intelligence systems to plan and conduct their missions. The components of an intelligence system include technical collection systems (such as photo-reconnaissance aircraft and satellites), personnel to collect intelligence and to analyze it, and secure communications systems. The scale and sophistication of intelligence systems will depend on available resources. However, this basic intelligence cycle is common to all military intelligence operations: the establishment of intelligence requirements by planning staffs and by operational commanders, the collection of intelligence, analysis of the intelligence, and then distribution of intelligence reports to all levels of the armed forces, from tactical units through top-level command.

Doctrine, Operational Planning, and Execution

Armed forces in democracies have established procedures to develop and approve doctrine (that is, the standard approach of that country's armed forces to the major military functions). In addition, military forces develop sets of tactics, techniques, and procedures that provide more detailed direction for the military functions. Doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures provide the basis for military education and training, and for the full range of activities performed by the armed forces.

Initial planning of a military operation or campaign is a process of translating political objectives received from the government into military objectives and a specific plan to reach those objectives. Once the plan is approved and the order to execute is given, the operational cycle commences. The operational cycle is an interactive, continuous system of assessing the situation, directing actions, carrying out those actions, and repeating the cycle. Intelligence and reports from operational units flow up to commanders with recommendations, assessments are then made by the commander and his staff, and fresh direction in the form of orders is sent to the operating units. There are variations in this cycle depending on the level of skill of commanders and units, the quality of communications systems, and the style and experience of commanders, but the fundamental cycle takes place in all military operations.

Logistics and Medical Services

Military logistics systems provide food and water, fuel, ammunition, spare parts, and other replacement materiel to tactical units. Logistics systems are both "push" and "pull" systems. The "push" component is the pre-stocking or automatic supply of items based on estimates of what will be needed; the "pull" component is filling requirements that are sent in by operational units as they maneuver, engage, and use up their supplies. Like military

operations themselves, military logistics require initial planning and flexible decisions once operations begin. Transportation is an integral part of logistics, as the supplies must be moved from storage areas, depots, and stock points to meet the operational units.

Adequate medical care is an essential part of logistics in democratic armed forces. One of the characteristics of a democracy is the emphasis on the importance of individuals. Mature democracies take care of their soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines by providing medical care for service members, including during peacetime. When operations begin, the wounded receive immediate care, and if necessary, they are evacuated and treated in hospitals. Individuals are provided with continued care if they have to leave the service because of injuries and when they retire at the end of a career in the armed forces.

Communications

Virtually all the competencies describe above depend on extensive communications within the armed forces. Communications systems are used to send plans and orders, to submit reports, to gather and disseminate intelligence, to order and distribute logistics support, and to schedule transportation and medical support, among other purposes. Military communications systems all require security, depending on the nature of the information.

Increasingly, communications systems consist of computer networks with linked databases, enabling the sharing and exchange of large amounts of data, written messages, voice, and video. Often, military networks are embedded within the global communications network, using the Internet for communication, and commercial hardware and software for both data storage and communication. The increased use of military communications networks linked to the Internet has led to more informed and effective military capabilities, but has also opened up major vulnerabilities for adversaries to infiltrate networks for both espionage purposes and to interfere with communications. Therefore, the security of military networks has become another important function.

Planning, Prioritization, and Execution of Defense Institution Building

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5205.82 lists ten objectives for DIB programs, along with another seven types of activities, one of which includes nine major “principle functions of effective defense institutions.” With such numerous and complex objectives and activities, selecting the right DIB programs for a particular country depends on careful assessment and prioritization. The DIB programs do not exactly correlate with the objectives, activities, and principle functions listed in DODD 5205.82; some contribute to multiple objectives, and other DOD programs and activities that are relevant are not classified as DIB programs. A planning process is needed that can prioritize and synchronize the various programs that the United States can bring to bear to improve the democratic development and functional competence of partner armed forces.

Any Department of Defense planning process follows the same basic approach: specifying strategic objectives, assessing the situation, defining the mission, executing the plan, and monitoring and adjusting execution of the plan. This same process can be applied

to bring order and coherence to the large number of DIB programs in a geographic region and in a specific recipient country.

The characteristics and competencies described earlier in this chapter provide the ultimate long-term objectives for DIB programs for the many countries the United States Department of Defense deals with. However, an assessment process is necessary to set realistic short- and medium-term objectives for a recipient country.

Assessment

Every country is unique. Each has its own history, culture, and is at a different stage of military and political development. The influence of the United States, and of the Department of Defense, is often an important factor in that development, but in most countries internal factors are most important. Understanding these internal factors is crucial if DIB programs are to be applied effectively.

The first, and probably most important, step to take in planning a DIB program is to analyze the potential recipient country's internal situation. Overall, is it moving toward a stronger democracy and greater military capacity, or is it becoming more authoritarian or even deteriorating militarily? What is the power and what is the relationship of the armed forces to other branches of government and organizations—the ministry of defense, the head of government, the legislature, the police, the coast guard, etc.? What is its relationship to other powerful individuals, political parties, or ethnic, regional, religious, or tribal groups and their leaders? Which leaders in the government, the ministry of defense and the armed forces are the most influential, and are they reformers or are they resisting reform? What do the armed forces consider their primary missions? What is the overall level of corruption in the country, and which officials and officers are the most and the least corrupt? The current intelligence estimates of most countries that the United States works with do not ask these kinds of questions, but the information can be gathered from intelligence staffs, attachés, and military assistance officers, and from other knowledgeable observers, like journalists, academics, think tank officials, and on-the-ground observers from NGOs, among other organizations. An overall understanding of the state of development of a country provides the foundation for the selection of DIB programs.

A Model for Combatant Command Planning

Combatant Commanders are required to submit Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs) for approval by the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.² The TSCP planning process provides an orderly way to assess the armed forces of the countries with which the United States has military relations—allies, partners, neutrals, and adversaries—and to prioritize the full range of military-to-military programs the United States conducts with a particular country, including specific DIB programs.

The assessments of individual countries need to strike a balance between completeness and usefulness. For overall planning purposes, a “stop-light” matrix provides about the right level of detail without becoming incomprehensible. For each country in the area

of responsibility (AOR), the Combatant Commander can draw up a matrix of the seven democratic characteristics and the six functional competences described above and assign one of three assessments: red for inadequate, green for adequate, and yellow for partially adequate. In addition, an arrow can be added to each assessment, with its direction indicating a favorable, unfavorable, or steady trend in that assessment in recent years. The author has observed the value of this matrix in various regional combatant commands (CCMDs), but cannot confirm whether this type of a matrix is required under current procedures. The assessment should be a qualitative judgment, based on the observations of the country officers on the CCMD staff, with input from the CCMD intelligence (J-2) staff, the attaché and military assistance staff at the embassy in that country, and—where it would add value—the service component staffs.

This overall assessment will provide a solid foundation for the selection process for DIB programs. However, before making that selection, an additional planning step is needed: defining realistic near- and medium-term objectives for each country in the AOR based on the state of democratic development and functional defense and military competence that country can be reasonably expected to achieve in the near future (about five years). This judgment is important for several reasons: it recognizes that in most cases development is primarily caused by the efforts of the country itself, rather than by DIB programs; it identifies countries that are unlikely to make much progress, even with heavy application of DIB programs; it identifies countries that are motivated and likely to make progress on their own without extensive outside assistance; and finally, it identifies countries that are likely to improve their functional competence without making progress on democratic development, or vice versa.

This step of assessing the potential future development of different countries will narrow the scope of candidates for most DIB programs to ensure that the limited resources of the United States are used in countries in which the investment will yield the most effective and sustainable results. Such an assessment will help eliminate those countries—Russia, for example—that have little chance of progress. This assessment will distinguish those countries that have their own plans for democratic and functional competence development and need little assistance from the United States (such as Japan), from countries with little official intention of democratic development, but strong incentives for development of military competencies. The countries for which DIB programs are likely to be the most effective, like Myanmar for example, are those that are motivated to make progress in both democratic development and functional competence, and have clear needs in both areas (as identified by red and yellow assessments in individual areas in the matrix described above). Because DIB programs are limited, they should be used sparingly focusing on countries with potential but little chance of making significant progress on their own, or those already making progress which could be enhanced by U.S. partnership.

Matching DIB Programs to Assessed Partner Needs

Once a country has been given an overall, detailed assessment, then the final planning

step can be taken: matching DIB programs to the assessed needs of the country in both democratic reform and military capability improvement. These decisions should involve the regional and country knowledge of the Combatant Commanders' staffs as well as the functional experience of the DIB program managers and the relevant offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Some DIB programs have been running for several years, so there is experience to draw from as to what works and what does not.

Careful judgments are required for countries that both want and could benefit from military improvements, but are resistant to democratic development. In the long run, it is not in the U.S. interest to support only the military capability of an autocratic government, however friendly to immediate U.S. interests. In some cases, however, U.S. strategic imperatives will be decisive in a decision to offer military assistance to an authoritarian country. Examples include counter-terrorism training and assistance, or the sale of arms to strengthen a country's defenses against a powerful neighbor threatening both that country's and U.S. interests. However, in these cases, DIB programs and similar programs that can encourage democratic development, such as International Military Education and Training, should be included to encourage greater democratic characteristics in that country.

Ongoing Monitoring and Adjustment

The final step in the cycle of DIB programs consists of monitoring and plan adjustment. The Theater Security Cooperation Plans are submitted annually, and as part of each year's submission (an evaluation of the trends in the overall assessment), any changes to the seven democratic characteristics and the six functional competencies should be highlighted. In addition, there should be a careful assessment of the effectiveness of specific DIB programs that have been going on in the recipient countries. Although the results of these programs will often take several years to be clear, the process of continual evaluation is important to ensure that the resources are being used for their maximum value.

Conclusion

Two important lessons have been learned over time in DIB programs and their predecessors. The first is that democratic development and military capability improvement are long-term processes. A one-year program assisting, for example, financial planning and comptrollership capacities in a country will not usually produce a much higher level of self-sustaining skills. Often, the first year is spent in identifying the true obstacles to progress and necessary internal reforms that were not known in detail before the program started. Programs should be planned on a multi-year basis, with flexibility to adapt once there is a full understanding of the most effective approach.

The second lesson learned is the importance of skilled instructors and facilitators working for extended periods—generally several years—with officers and officials from the recipient country. Progress in the important and sensitive areas that DIB programs target

proceeds “at the speed of trust.” There is very little chance that successive waves of new U.S. faces coming to a country for short periods will earn the trust to make real progress. It takes multiple interactions over several years for instructors and facilitators to be trusted sources of advice, and for them to figure out how to work productively with the different officers and officials in the recipient country.

With these lessons in mind, the seven characteristics and six competencies of a democratic and competent armed forces provide a basis for assessing the countries considered for DIB programs by the Department of Defense. The Theater Security Cooperation Plans of the combatant commanders provide an existing cycle in the Department of Defense that can be readily applied to plan and execute the DIB programs. Due to the large number of countries and programs involved, procedures need to be kept straightforward to avoid staff overload; however, this process can ensure that the Department of Defense achieves the maximum benefit from the substantial human and financial investments made in these programs.

Notes

1 The seven characteristics in this chapter are drawn from: Dennis Blair, *Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions*, Volume I (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 15.

2 DOD Directive 5132.03 directs the combatant commanders to “Develop campaign plans, as appropriate, to conduct security cooperation programs and activities.” Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, *DOD Directive 5132.03: DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, December 19, 2016).

Paradoxes of Partnership

Nadia Gerspacher

Defense institution building (DIB) requires a well-calibrated approach to establishing working partnerships with host-country counterparts. The past 15 years of assistance leave no doubt that host-country officials are the change agents responsible and vital for ushering in new institutional processes, and ensuring they are underpinned by the necessary competencies of individuals and systems. This insight highlights two critical elements necessary for DIB success: local buy-in and local ownership. While this lesson is reflected in the discourse and increasing attention on DIB, planning and implementation are plagued by significant confusion about how partners and partnerships fit into the endeavor. Indeed, approaches to host-country partners and partnerships differ greatly. An ad hoc approach to partnership, and confusion on how to build effective relationships with host governments and individual officials, can pose significant impediments to sustainable and successful DIB activities—particularly when there is a tendency in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. foreign policy community to influence the behavior of host-country counterparts and institutions to primarily achieve U.S. interests.

Herein lies the paradox of partnership: a relationship founded on a donor nation influencing the host nation to act in the donor’s interest—rather than one in which the donor and host nation find common ground on a mutually beneficial plan that addresses both nations’ interests—is unlikely to lead to sustainable solutions.

Understanding Narratives on Partnership

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) briefings for various audiences at the Pentagon on the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense (MOD) advising missions underway in Afghanistan consistently fail to adequately address where Afghan ministry officials fit into the change management process, at what stage they were involved, and what their roles were in the process. Similarly, during a January 2014 briefing in Washington, an astute Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) returnee asked, “Where are the Afghan counterparts in all of this?” The briefer responded, “We know we are supposed to engage them but there is no time.” In conflict or post-conflict environments, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, the characteristic urgency of operations may lead practitioners to bypass labor and time-intensive processes. Well-meaning practitioners may feel the need to “do the

job for them (host-nation counterparts),” as it is not uncommon for practitioners to be skeptical of host-nation capacity, and impatient for results. Cultivating local buy-in and local ownership, however, are critical for success.

These reflections demonstrate how partnerships are viewed by many who work on strengthening host-country government institutions, privileging a utilitarian approach rather than a mutually beneficial enterprise. Indeed, a recent RAND Corporation study of DIB in Africa focused on the interests of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), seldom mentioning the recipients of the assistance.¹ Similarly, Theater Campaign Plans emphasize the goals of the Combatant Commander (CCDR), with little or no mention of partner goals. And during the working group discussions that led to the development of the Directorate of Building Partnership Capacity (BPC), the most frequently discussed issue—and subject of heated disagreements—was whether the P in BPC stands for “partner” or for “partnership,” the latter being the goal of the doctrine.

These narratives and approaches to partnership have led to significant confusion about what works in capacity-building efforts, and in turn, have had negative impacts on the countries receiving the assistance. For instance, some host-country counterparts have learned to leverage the inequality inherent in this approach to partnership by effecting little or no real change in their systems, while acquiring large quantities of equipment donations. The result is a partnership in which the donor country promotes changes to little or no avail, because the recipient country does not agree to the plan—often because the changes do not make sense to them or because the plan threatens an order that suits various actors benefitting from the status quo.

A key question that DIB strategists, planners, and implementers must contemplate is: What is the role of partnership in DIB? It is important for the DOD and the entire U.S. government to understand the merits and pitfalls of the various conceptualizations and strategic uses of partnerships. This chapter explores the concept of partnership in the context of DIB activities. The notion of partnership is central to the development of the necessary and complex capacities of defense institutions, as well as other government entities. Indeed, the right kind of partnership facilitates the transfer of knowledge, skills, and expertise, and a mutually beneficial exchange of information. It is the key ingredient for the establishment of a new normal of enhanced ability of a country to provide security for its population and territory.

The concept of partnership is the cornerstone of doctrines such as BPC and security cooperation, and of planning and project design throughout the security assistance community. Less evident and clear is the role that partnership plays in these endeavors. Is the development of a partnership with a recipient or host country a means or an end? Are partnerships grounded in national security imperatives or the more altruistic, long-term notion of capacity building? What is the nature and scope of the type of partnership that is conducive to long-term institution building? Which partnerships will not lead to a sustainable new normal? The answers to these questions are by no means intuitive; in fact, they can be quite counterintuitive for practitioners who are often from tactically-

driven agencies. Indeed, they present the four layers of the paradox that the chapter will subsequently examine in greater detail:

- First, the term “partnership” is politically courteous, but imprecise and ambiguous, as “partners” in the DIB field can refer to either allies within a capacity-building coalition or recipient countries. The intention is to express mutual respect. Paradoxically, by conflating two essentially separate roles this prioritization of political courtesy leads to misunderstandings and confusion in program discussions and planning, as well as inefficiencies in implementation.
- Second, a partnership established for the purpose of developing effective institutions must be understood as instrumental—a means to an end. The paradox is that while good partnership is essential for effective capacity building, the opposite is not true. Good partnership can also be cultivated by sharing information and intelligence, joint training and education, and shared coalition experience. Such partnerships will not necessarily lead to effective capacity building.
- Third, partnership implies joint ownership and shared interest; what happens when interests diverge? Does the United States partner with another nation in order to have a collaborator or proxy in remote regions that can effectively burden-share or provide support when needed in their region? Or is a partnership a means to strengthen the partner’s ability to pursue its own, self-defined national interests? Is the partnership about the U.S. interests or the interests of the host country? Or both? Most will answer both, but then institutional reform in the host country may adversely affect the interests of stakeholders in the status quo, paradoxically threatening the very partners upon whom we depend for effective capacity building.
- Fourth, security assistance providers tend to see partnerships as a useful mechanism to establish interoperability as they aim to help host countries develop systems and processes that mirror existing DOD systems and processes. This is an approach and a mindset which by imposing systems and processes inorganic to the partner country has paradoxically led to more problems than solutions in the recent history of security assistance, and even various DIB efforts, as we will see.

This chapter aims to describe and explain the problems inherent in differing views of partnerships. It offers suggestions for more effective leveraging of partnerships to meet the goals of capacity building and national security through the design and planning of DIB initiatives. In general, an effective partnership prioritizes mutual goals over the partnership itself. This is a mindset which has yet to permeate capacity-building practices, leading to less than stellar strategies, missions, operations, and activities in the past 15 years or more of security sector reform. This chapter offers insights and reflections on the concept of partnership as it can best be leveraged for conducting defense institution building.

There are Partners, and There are Partners

Partnership has various connotations, and it is useful to inventory the various notions of who and what partners are. In the context of assistance, partners may include allies or a coalition of countries operating together in a specific country or mission. Alternatively, they may call on each other to work together to deliver assistance to conflict-affected countries or fragile countries in the case of violent extremism, terrorism, or other non-traditional conflict scenarios. According to this understanding, U.S. partners include the UK, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, and others like Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Alternatively, partners may be understood to mean recipient countries, i.e. those countries receiving the assistance from the U.S. and its donor community partners. This second category of partners comes out of lessons learned concerning local ownership, which highlights the importance of local solutions for local problems.² Indeed, assistance is cognizant of the need to involve host-country officials in reform processes. However, such involvement is often superficial. Even the confusing use of the term “partners” for both allies and for host countries who receive assistance demonstrates that the language is evolving, but real partnerships have not caught up with the narrative. It is safe to state that recipient partners do not see themselves as the same types of partners as those who provide assistance alongside the United States.

The impacts of using the same term for very different actors in the assistance arena cannot be overlooked. Understanding partners interchangeably as members of a coalition and as host-country recipients of assistance confuses assessments, planning, and actual activities on the ground. An assessment of the capabilities of the French to operate alongside the U.S. Special Forces in Mali and even the strengthening of those capabilities if necessary for mission success is not the same activity as the assistance to a host-country recipient’s Ministry of Defense to address its ghost payroll problem. The first engagement is one in which partner countries develop their joint capabilities to achieve readiness for a set of capacity-building activities. The second is about reforming an institutional system and/or processes to strengthen the ability of the Ministry of Defense to administer and manage defense activities in their country. The approaches to these two distinct engagements as well as the interests that underpin them are quite different and should be approached differently. It is important to distinguish between the development of joint capabilities to carry out a set of activities, and the target of the capacity-building or DIB activities. These partnerships are not the same, in nature or scope.

Henceforth, “partner” will be used to describe the recipient country whose ownership and buy-in of the reform and change processes is crucial to building institutional capacity. In the case of Liberia, the national defense strategy designed by the U.S. DOD was not implemented because there was no real buy-in—meaning that Liberian defense sector actors had not been part of the process early or often enough.³ In many cases, “engagement” means merely “assessing” to DIB implementers, but engagement goes far

beyond assessment; indeed, host-country counterparts must be involved in the process of identifying solutions, not just sharing vulnerabilities in their systems (in some cases, the vulnerabilities in their systems are observed by outsiders but not accepted by host-country counterparts). While these vulnerabilities may well be the legitimate source of fragility of the system, the only viable and sustainable practice is for the host-country partner to be involved in the identification of both problems and solutions, which will in turn improve assessments, analysis, ideas, and solutions to address gaps in capacity.

Operationalizing Partnerships: Ends or Means?

It is important to distinguish whether partnerships are a means to an end, or an end in themselves. In other words, what are the varying strategic uses of partnerships? There are partnerships that are established and maintained in order to ensure a specific behavior from a partner either on an ongoing basis or in times of crisis. This approach privileges the influence of the United States on host-country partners to ensure that their decision-making processes align with and reinforce the interests of the United States in a given scenario. This approach is one in which a partnership is based on expectations of behavior and is primarily operationalized through financially-based assistance. The approximately \$1.4 billion assistance package that Egypt receives annually from the United States is intended to maintain the geopolitical status quo in the Middle East region. In this instance, given the primacy of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) portion of the assistance package, the partnership is an end to itself—a partnership designed to sustain a specific international relations architecture, and predicated on strengthening operational capabilities rather than building institutional capacity. This approach to partnership should not be seen as strengthening defense institutions, as it carries expectations of specific behavior but does not address gaps in defense institutions' capacity to support, administer, and manage defense activities. Confounding this type of assistance with programs designed to strengthen procurement capacity, logistics management, and human resource management systems is problematic and counter-productive to the efforts to build up security institutions effectively.

Under Title 10 of the U.S. Code of Laws, training and equipping activities underpinned by FMS programs operationalize the concept of partnership through the exchange of interest-based concessions.⁴ Essentially, equipping and training host-country militaries has been the conduit to developing relationships which are seen as strategic partnerships. These partnerships have many inherent expectations that are often miscommunicated and difficult to manage. Essentially, the expectation of this approach is that the partner who enters in a partnership through the reception of equipment will behave according to (or at least not against) U.S. interests (and may be reminded of the nature of the partnership so they may behave according to its unspoken terms).

These geopolitical and mission-specific partnerships are an end in themselves. When

DIB activities were incorporated in these scenarios, it was mainly to introduce conditions for receiving materiel assistance; for instance, transfers of trucks to send security forces to border areas incorporate DIB by requiring that inventory or maintenance programs be in place prior to delivery.⁵ Similarly, defense technology transfers require specific security mechanisms to be in place to ensure proper use of the newly implemented systems.⁶ Neither of these scenarios represent a capacity-building ethos; rather, they bring back a logic akin to that of structural adjustment programs.⁷ This precondition-based approach has been discredited for failing to build sustainable capacity in host-country contexts.⁸

Defense institution building seeks to operationalize partnerships differently by establishing a partnership with a host country, its institutions, and its key actors as a foundation for identifying capacity gaps. This approach facilitates the development of joint capacity-building projects which address the institutional weaknesses identified by the partner. This approach leverages a partnership as a means to an end, which offers more hope for sustainability. The end becomes enhanced capacity rather than the partnership itself. Indeed, capacity-building activities require access to and candid interaction with host-country counterparts, and successful planning depends on understanding failures, vulnerabilities, and obstacles. These are very difficult to identify without a solid partnership among peers. This type of partnership takes time to develop, but developing the partnership is only the very beginning of the capacity-building activity.

The role of DIB activities is to promote and support host-country officials and their institutions in identifying and developing a change management process that will result in enhanced institutional capacity. By developing partnership as the means, the partnership becomes the foundation for catalyzing change, which must be led and genuinely accepted by local stakeholders and officials. For example, in order to uncover a ghost payroll problem plaguing an army's operational capacity, a solid relationship, based on information-sharing and some level of trust regarding what the partners might do with such information, is necessary. While this type of partnership is not easy to achieve, it should be prioritized for the purposes of DIB.

While partnerships as an end can be an effective tool of diplomacy or international relations, they are not generally effective for building institutional capacity to provide security. The onus is not only on implementers and planners to leverage partnerships effectively as a means to a capacity building end. Success also depends on specialized training, policies, and decisions. When assistance is for the purpose of capacity building, additional training is required to improve the practitioner's familiarization with the country, its culture, and its language. The message that many receive from this heavy investment in understanding the context is that the partnership itself is the end goal, as such efforts help to ensure that culture is respected and partners view the United States favorably, and will cooperate when needed. However, this is an incomplete picture of how to build capacity overall.

Balancing National Goals and Interests with Capacity-Building Principles

A major obstacle to successful defense institution building is ambiguity regarding our motivation, and its purpose. “Why do we do it?” The question is vital for DIB planning and implementation. In fact, it is important to ask the question even prior to making the decision to implement DIB as part of a security cooperation strategy. This is not merely a philosophical question, as it affects the strategy, design, and implementation of any DIB effort. Indeed, it is important to define the motivations of both providers and consumers, as well as an understanding of the foreign policy that underpins the overall assistance program. Governments articulate their reasons for engaging in assistance in various ways, and have several audiences, including the domestic public, donor partners, and the recipient partners (whose institutions are fragile and require strengthening). The narrative can be one of assistance in order to better sell international assistance with domestic audiences, as is the case with Canada and its police missions. Alternatively, it can be to ensure that the language and culture of a host country remains intact through the provision of assistance and beyond, as is the case with France. It can also be about securing the homeland and addressing threats to security before they have a chance to reach home, as is often the case for the United States.

A country’s motivations in offering assistance programs tell a very complex tale of goals and interests, which may fit awkwardly with the interests of the host or recipient country. Each country has a specific narrative justifying assistance programs. Those motivations and the many factors that shape them can lead to a strategic view of partnerships that does not fit well with the key requirements of capacity building. As in most security assistance and cooperation efforts, the leading reason for engagement in DIB is national interest. Indeed, the U.S. government’s goals are to increase a partner country’s capacity to address common security challenges, and become partners in supporting U.S. interests including promoting good governance and universal norms, and strengthening international security agreements and collective arrangements. While these goals translate into first rate military operations, the narrative they convey is less conducive to effective institution building activities.

As DIB is expected to complement the Title 10 mission and render it more sustainable, it is important for strategy and planning efforts to take stock of the tension that arises when simultaneous goals exist to build sustainable capacity and secure U.S. national security interests. Effective capacity-building partnerships are often the main casualty in the use of partnership to directly pursue U.S. national security interests; such use can violate key capacity-building principles, including respect for local ownership, “do no harm,” and especially sustainability. The emphasis on transparency and/or accountability, for example, demonstrates that U.S. stakeholders often impose specific changes that are not envisioned or even deemed necessary by host-country counterparts. DIB cannot be achieved without integrating systems and processes that make the defense ministry accountable for its actions, decisions, policies, and procedures. As imposing accountability requires systemic

institutional reform as well as the development of the competency of key individuals, DIB efforts require built-in partnership development, which takes time, strategy, and the right skills.

It is possible to reconcile effective capacity building and goals defined around the national interest. The bad news is that such an approach takes much more time, skill engaging host-country actors, and agility in transferring capacity. But the good news is that if host-country actors are truly seen as equal partners with whom capacity-building projects are designed, the footprint of international assistance that is necessary for impact is much smaller. Indeed, effective institution building only requires a few, but the right, experts. Therefore, capacity building in DIB should be perceived as a strategy to render a fragile defense sector more capable of providing security, which will, in turn, contribute to the U.S. goal of national security; a much better investment-to-impact ratio than having to provide assistance every time the need arises without building sustainable capacity. This narrative can be particularly insightful for strategy, planning, and implementation. It is rooted in a logic of focusing on capacity building in order to reach the goals of national security, which is less direct and more challenging, but more rewarding in terms of sustainability and successful exit strategies (i.e. those more than simply the abandonment of a precarious environment likely to ignite upon the departure of international agents).

Too often, assistance amounts to putting in a familiar system with the goal of achieving interoperability, but ends up depending heavily on a permanent funding support. This is often referred to as the “cookie cutter solution”: bringing in the U.S. procurement system to fix the host-country system. While experience clearly shows that this approach fails time and again, identifying an alternative has proven difficult. And even when an alternative is identified, it is difficult to convince policy, planning, and implementation communities to do things differently. This undermines any capacity-building effort (especially DIB) and underestimates the potential that constructive partnerships with host-country stakeholders offer. Partnerships are the cornerstone of DIB as well as other capacity-building efforts. Without a strong partnership with defense ministry officials and other relevant government actors, no DIB efforts—let alone other Title 10 assistance activities—will be sustainable, and repeat engagements will undoubtedly be necessary. However, the right kind of partnership may lead to the development of sustainable local solutions (although these have proven easier to invoke than to achieve).

According to this logic, the partnership with a host-country’s defense institution is a means to an end. It is the means to finding local solutions, by learning about the sources of problems and how the problems matter to those with the authority to usher in change in their own institutions. Such partnerships look quite different than the older generation of partnerships. They are based on mutual learning about the realities on the ground, what has been tried, why it worked, or why it did not, and the exchange of ideas about how to address the gaps in capacity.

Sustainable defense institution building depends heavily on establishing a partnership based on the honest sharing of vulnerabilities, problems, gaps, and sources of resistance

that change agents are likely to encounter. A partnership based on this access to host-country counterparts will allow for a more targeted, even surgical, approach to capacity building, and one which ensures that the only actors with the authority to affect this change in their country—the host-country officials—will do so in a manner that can be accepted by the contributing stakeholders. This kind of partnership allows for the exchange of ideas for addressing problems, and is rooted in a true understanding and respect for existing dynamics and other realities such as culture, socio-economics, and political contexts.

The Illusion of Interoperability

The question “Why do we do it?” often brings the response that the goal is “interoperability.” It is important to understand both the opportunities and the risks of that presumption. Closely tied to the idea of providing assistance as a means of achieving national security (by addressing a threat before it comes to the shores of the United States) is the desire for compatibility of materiel and non-materiel systems between the United States and the recipient country. This motivation begs a much subtler articulation of how defense institutions are strengthened. Helping a fragile defense sector strengthen its institutional practices in the mirror image of the donor’s defense institutions colors all aspects of interaction with host-country counterparts. However as one astute advisor recounted, host defense officials approach this type of assistance with the attitude of, “don’t worry; when they leave, we will do it our way again.”⁹

Such misalignments are not only about the size of an army or of budgets, nor are they the inevitable results of differing cultural and historical contexts. They result from pursuing the wrong approach to establishing capacity-building partnerships. Interoperability may be a worthy goal among allies or coalition partners conducting counterterrorism missions side-by-side or addressing belligerent states; and in the context of DIB, it requires a different kind of partnership, characterized by mutuality, interdependence, and equality. When describing host-country counterparts, advisors sometimes refer metaphorically to parenting; counterparts are like children, or teenagers. The relationship then should be carefully crafted to ensure that the teenagers adopt the image of their role models. This is possibly the most alienating mindset to a host-country counterpart. It conditions the words chosen as well as the tone, the body language, and the content of all aspects of the partnership.

Further, emphasizing interoperability can reinforce the perception that the United States and some of its allies are strictly self-serving and not genuinely interested in the strategic concerns and interests of the counterpart country. Other concepts that illustrate this challenge are anti-corruption and merit-based staff recruitment. Prioritizing interoperability results in a view of partnership based on the assumption that there is only one correct way to manage a process. This assumption is detectable in all interactions with counterparts, as well as in the advice shared by advisors deployed to strengthen institutions. Besides losing credibility as a legitimate resource for strengthening fragile

defense institutions, DIB efforts driven by the quest for interoperability are likely to be crafted in a manner that privileges the “cookie cutter solution.”

In the case of DIB, this implies establishing acquisition, technology, and logistics systems that can operate in sync with those of the U.S. Army. An ISAF briefing in 2015 described the U.S. approach to building the capacity of the Afghan procurement system as “making their system communicate with ours and ensuring the Afghan Ministry of Defense procurement department only has to push a button to order equipment.” This is not developing a partnership, nor will it lead to interoperability, because it is not driven or supported by ministry officials. This method also fails to strengthen the capacity of the various operators in the ministry who contribute to a procurement system. Such approaches based on interoperability and mirroring donor systems have been adopted because there is “no time to engage counterparts.” DIB activities need to pay closer attention to the problems of championing interoperability and recognize that institutions will become sustainable if partnerships are approached as a means to building sustainable capacity, and if the assistance provided is not something akin to “assistance for dummies”; an abridged version of how to create and maintain strong, effective, and interoperable institutional systems.

A More Systematic Approach to Partnerships

As mentioned above, a common approach to security assistance assumes that once partnership has been established, based on sharing of information or transfer of equipment, knowledge, or skills, it is the duty of the host country to undertake the changes advised by the donor country. This reflects an “I owe you” logic that will not likely lead to the desired results, because it is based on the notion of the donor giving something in exchange for influence over recipient actions. This often leads to host-country institutions and officials receiving equipment they may or may not deem desirable for their own needs. A more sustainable approach would empower host-country counterparts as the change agents who can contribute to more effective functioning of their institutions.

The emerging DIB paradigm developed from the recognition that security sector reform is ineffective when founded on training and equipping programs. It also rests on empirical experience and lessons showing that sustainable solutions are vital to success. Sustainable solutions are both locally identified and driven in order to be accepted by both operators (those who contribute to the enhanced functioning of an institution) and the end users, such as the population. Establishing partnerships to enhance fragile defense institutions is about more than strengthening capabilities to counter specific threats at a given single point in time. Rather, it is about increasing capacity to manage, administer, strategize, and plan for the use of the equipment and skills for enhanced operations and improved security.

Successfully building human capacity depends on establishing partnership built on commitment to learning the realities and competencies of host-country counterparts, in

addition to the more general demographic, cultural, and socio-political dynamics that constitute the counterpart operating context. Many security sector assistance providers attempt to build capacity without understanding those realities. However, bypassing that step signals dismissiveness to host-country counterparts, sending a message that the relationship is one between parent and teen, or doctor and patient.¹⁰ This asymmetrical approach comes significantly short on delivering a level of trust and credibility vital for sustainably building capacity. In fact, many who have used this approach have found themselves reverting back to train and equip programs in hope of influencing the counterpart. This short-term approach may seem effective, as assistance recipients are well disposed to accepting material and equipment as the solution to their capacity gaps, especially—as they often state—since it is so willingly offered. From an impact perspective, though, this is not a desirable path, as it delivers very little in terms of long-term solutions to capacity gaps.

Essentially, DIB is a reform and change management process. Partnership has long been based on the assumption that change must be managed by outsiders—those providing assistance to a fragile government. This has proven to be wrong for a number of reasons, particularly as it misinterprets the nature of the relationship between the capacity builder and the host-country government official. Formulating a strategy to strengthen a defense institution based on the notion that the change belongs to the United States or any other provider of assistance sets the mission up for failure.

Defense institution building demands significant changes of host-country stakeholders. An effective change process can only be managed effectively by those who work and operate within the target system on an ongoing basis. The assisting partner must have a keen understanding of its role as a supporter, a peer, a promoter of change, and a facilitator of reflection about gaps in capacity and capabilities.¹¹ Essentially, the partnership that will lead to long-term solutions is predicated on partners being positioned as equals, each having much to bring to the relationship—a crucial concept that underpins any successful DIB effort.

Partnership in this context must emphasize the two parties' respective interests, identify how they can reinforce each other, and develop capacity-building activities that implement a long-term change management process. As the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development recently stated, better political engagement and more change management are needed to improve security and justice programs.¹² This requires partnerships that leverage existing host-country capacities, and recognition that stronger processes are necessary from the host-country partners.

Existing Opportunities

Current Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) of geographic combatant commands state goals that lend themselves to DIB activities, in addition to goals of other security cooperation programs. AFRICOM's TCP, for example, seeks to neutralize al-Shabaab, contain the

instability in Libya, contain Boko Haram in Western Africa, disrupt illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea and in Central Africa, and build African partners' peacekeeping and disaster assistance capabilities.¹³ All of these goals provide opportunities for implementing DIB activities, which aim to strengthen the institutional processes of these countries' militaries. Disrupting illicit activity requires a myriad of capacities for strategies and the management of systems necessary to put these strategies in place. This includes investigative capacity, intelligence capacity, analysis capacity, and strategy development capacity, as well as procurement and logistics systems which provide the security actors with a steady stream of the tools they need.

Additional Capacity for Effective DIB

Establishing and maintaining a partnership that lays the foundation for sustainable capacity-building activities is the missing link that is required for effective DIB activities. There is a gap at DOD and throughout the U.S. government that inhibits institution building efforts in many instances: the lack of a standardized, evidence-based, and consistent approach to the development of partnerships with host-country counterparts and between the DOD and MODs. Engagement strategies are chosen with the best intentions, with the existing tools that each individual brings to the endeavor, but they are also very ad hoc. There is a critical and urgent need to develop a set of protocols for U.S. DIB capacity builders—those assisting MODs and other host-country institutions to become more effective.

DOD planners and implementers need a roadmap for building partnerships that are going to develop sustainable and viable institutions, capable of unilaterally and independently assuming the responsibility of defense. The problem with partnerships cannot be defined by the capacity or will of the host-country stakeholder; that part is difficult to control and will fluctuate over time and across borders. What can be controlled is the professionalization and the practices of the practitioners of defense institution building.

There are two skill sets that are crucial to render U.S. DIB planners and operators good partners: an in-depth knowledge of the area requiring strengthening (i.e. procurement, contracting, oversight, recruitment, logistics); and the skill set and mindset for establishing partnerships that will lead to joint capacity-building activities that enable defense institutions to better provide security as part of a country's governance structure. The DIB community needs to invest more systematically in the recruitment of individuals who have the depth and breadth of experience necessary to know how to address capacity gaps in defense institutions. There is a need to invest in transforming these experts into astute advisors with the skills to establish constructive partnerships. Being a good partner is not about pointing out weaknesses, but rather promoting the reflection and analysis by the host-country counterpart to identify sources of ineffectiveness and viable solutions. This is a skill set that will change mindsets and approaches, a skill set that DOD has begun to invest in through the MODA and DIRI programs, which represents great hope for the professionalization of the DIB workforce.

Conclusion

When asked about how and when to engage host-country partners, DOD consistently responds “early and often.” This demonstrates awareness that partnerships must be based on consultation, information sharing, and a willingness to acknowledge what works and what does not. Engaging early and often is difficult. It requires skills and attitudes suitable to balancing the “can-do” attitude, useful in some situations, but less helpful when providing in-depth advice to host-country counterparts in the identification of capacity-gap solutions.

An effective DIB partnership will entail confronting the challenges associated with influencing a partner’s behavior. It will require a shift in how partnerships are developed, maintained, and leveraged. Establishing this type of partnership is challenging. Indeed, the mutual nature of DIB programs conflicts with the more transactional nature of more traditional security cooperation and security assistance programs. The former takes time and, in theory, should come before the latter. While the security situation often requires security assistance programs, separating these from DIB is worth considering. They are separate activities, and if approached that way they can be managed as separate efforts: one short-term, the other long-term.

Notes

1 Michael J. McNerney, et al., *Defense Institution Building in Africa: An Assessment* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), available at <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1232/RAND_RR1232.pdf>.

2 Timothy Donais, ed., *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008); Timothy Donais, *Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Post-conflict Consensus-building* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

3 McNerney, et al. *op. cit.*

4 U.S. Code, Title 10, “Armed Forces”.

5 Statement by an AFRICOM director, June 12, 2015.

6 Defense Technology Security Administration Advisor, interviewed by Nadia Gerspacher, January 9, 2016.

7 Structural Adjustment Programs are economic policies for developing countries, promoted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund since the early 1980s, regarding the provision of loans conditional on the adoption of certain policies. Structural adjustment loans are loans made by the World Bank. They are designed to encourage the structural adjustment of an economy: for example, removing “excess” government controls and promoting market competition as part of the neo-liberal agenda followed by the World Bank.

8 F. E. Ogbimi, “Structural adjustment is the wrong policy,” *African Technology Forum* 8, No. 1 (2001).

9 International Security Sector Advisory Team/DCAF advisor, interviewed by Nadia Gerspacher, April 18, 2016.

10 This metaphor is often mentioned when discussing the right type of partnership as a way to understand the nature of the relationship with counterparts.

11 Nadia Gerspacher, *Strategic Advising for Foreign Assistance: A Practical Guide* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016).

12 E. van Veen, “Improving Security and Justice Programming in Fragile Situations: Better Political Engagement, More Change Management,” *OECD Development Policy Papers* No. 3 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, March 2016).

13 Statement of United States Africa Command Commander General David M. Rodriguez, “United States Africa Command 2016 Posture Statement,” before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 8, 2016.

II. DEFENSE INSTITUTION BUILDING IN PRACTICE

Assessment and Program Design

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With the increased Department of Defense (DOD) focus on building partner capacity (BPC) activities since 2001—ranging from routine, steady-state efforts to encourage democratic and competent partners, to the more extreme cases of Afghanistan and Iraq—most stakeholders involved in security cooperation are conversant with the basic lessons captured in the chapters in this volume. Each country is unique; solutions must be appropriate for partner-nation realities and should not simply mirror U.S. organizations and processes. The influence of external actors, including the United States, is limited; change will be driven from within. There will be actors who actively oppose change. Even when change is desired, it may require cultural adjustments that take time. External actors should have patience; trust and relationship building are essential first steps in supporting change processes. And while the military is important, it is just one tool that a state has at its disposal to achieve national security objectives and serve its citizenry; effective engagement on security issues requires a comprehensive whole-of-government approach.

These lessons seem to overlap with many of those drawn from the international development community’s experience with institutional capacity building over the past decades. Tommy Ross highlights some of these principles in chapter two: “Best practice” approaches should be eschewed in favor of finding the “best fit.” Change is fundamentally political; powerful stakeholders may see their interests undermined by change and oppose it, thus external support for a reform effort should be informed by a political economy analysis. Partner ownership is essential for successful reform. And finally, defense sector reform should be firmly nested within security sector reform.

This apparent convergence on lessons, however, hides some very real differences. By most accounts, the defense community in the United States (and internationally) lags the international development community on the capacity-building learning curve.¹ This is not surprising; the sustained capacity-building efforts of the international development community predate those of the defense sector by decades. Notwithstanding isolated U.S. advisory efforts during the Cold War in places like El Salvador and Vietnam, widespread military-military engagement with the objective of building partner capacity is largely a post-Cold War phenomenon. The development community’s critique of its own traditional, technocratic approaches—where outside experts come in with the “right” institutional

blueprints and insist on partners having the “political will” to implement them—began in the 1950s and picked up steam in the 1990s, but consensus on an alternative approach only really began to emerge in the late 2000s.² In contrast, the majority of the security assistance and security cooperation communities, both in the Department of State and Department of Defense, are still only in the initial stages of developing a critique.

The alternative approach that has emerged in the international development community focuses largely on process issues related to assessment, program design, and implementation, rather than the content of reform. It has been developed by practitioners in a wide range of institutional reform areas, including public sector management reform, security and justice sector reform, and rule of law reform. The DOD’s Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) has also piloted and validated similar practices for defense institution building (DIB) since 2010. Arguably, the somewhat independent convergence of so many different communities on the same good practices reinforces their validity.³

This chapter summarizes these “state of the art” assessment and program design practices for institutional capacity building, contrasts them to traditional approaches, and describes their applicability to defense institution building. The following section describes how the apparent convergence on the lessons identified above can mask important differences in how these lessons are conceptualized and put into practice, particularly at the assessment and program design stages. As a result, policymakers, planners, and practitioners may think they are in agreement on the basic principles of DIB (and security cooperation), but find they have radically different ideas about how to plan for and implement these activities.

The next section describes the innovations made in DIB programming since 2010, based on an understanding of the failures of traditional, technocratic approaches to institutional reform and lessons learned from previous efforts to execute DIB within the traditional security cooperation paradigm. The challenge was not only to devise a new results-oriented approach appropriate to the DIB problem set but also to carve out space for the exercise of the new approach. This section highlights some of the obstacles to effectiveness posed by traditional security cooperation practices and the minor accommodations to these practices that have been made to enable effective DIB programming.

The chapter concludes by discussing the challenges that lay ahead as DIB moves from being a specialized program offered to a subset of interested and priority countries to a more mainstream part of security cooperation. Care will need to be taken to ensure that the gains made in understanding and operationalizing the requirements for effective DIB—the assessments, program design, and implementation “good practices” identified in this chapter—are not lost. At the same time, there are opportunities for security cooperation writ large to become more effective and sustainable with the mainstreaming of DIB, but only if this is understood to include more than just the expansion of DIB programming. It will require a nurturing of the initial tentative steps being taken to make DIB considerations a more integral part of the policymaking, strategic planning, and security cooperation planning processes.

International Experience with Institutional Reform: New Approaches to Assessment and Program Design

The International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) aptly notes that security sector reform has three key dimensions—technical, political, and holistic—and should be driven by a general guiding principle of “local ownership.”⁴ This section describes how apparent agreement on basic principles in these areas (e.g., “best fit, not best practices” to describe how technical knowledge should be applied) can hide very real differences in how each of those insights is conceptualized and put into practice. In general, the difference is between a more narrow interpretation of the lesson that leads to minor adjustments in how institutional reform is undertaken, on the one hand, and on the other, a more fundamental critique of traditional approaches, with significant implications for how assessment and program design are conducted. The international community’s long path to developing alternative approaches arguably stems in part from an evolutionary process where, initially, only tweaks were made to the traditional approach; when these proved ineffective, more radical changes were attempted with better results—hence the current consensus on the approaches described below.

The Technical Dimension of Reform: Best Fit, Not Best Practices

In the United States, discussion of the role of technical expertise in the DIB workforce has been deeply colored by the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where military commands were in charge of institutional capacity-building efforts. In many cases, non-experts in defense management (active duty military or retired military hired as contractors) resorted to “mirror imaging” of U.S. models, which proved inappropriate in the partner-nation context. Some reacted by drawing the assumption that “real” experts—individuals who had performed defense management functions within the U.S. system—would be better-placed, after some advisory training, to avoid these pitfalls.⁵ Others noted that, given the size, scale, and level of sophistication of the U.S. defense bureaucracy, U.S. experts would likely have an in-depth knowledge of individual parts of their own system, but not the overall view of systems and processes needed to provide advice to partners pursuing reform. Instead, experts from countries with smaller defense sectors and U.S. experts who have studied the diversity of international experiences with defense management, would be better placed to act as DIB experts.

U.S. policymakers expressed their faith in technical expertise by calling for the use of baselines of defense management best practices as a guide for action. In particular, detailed lines of activities—i.e. frameworks defining the technical details of functions within each defense pillar, such as resource management or human resource management—were called for as “menus” from which security cooperation planners could choose. This inclination toward DIB templates came at a time when the international community had largely rejected templates, after decades of relying on international best practice frameworks that

proved largely ineffective. Just as the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan had resulted in the mirror imaging of U.S. processes, the development community's experience had resulted in the mirror imaging of international best practices (institutional isomorphism). Formal laws, documents, and organizations were created that looked good on paper, but had little impact on how things functioned or, if they had an impact, did not produce the desired outcomes.

In some cases, this disconnect between form and function could be attributed to partners adopting best practices under pressure from the international community, without the partner intending to implement said practices. In many cases, however, partners willingly adopted best practices in the hope of achieving improved governance and were disappointed with the results. This can be attributed in part to a major flaw in the best practices approach: templates typically depict an ideal system of all the best practices thought to possibly make a difference, but which no country (not even the most advanced) displays. This has led experts to acknowledge that the goal should be "good enough governance"—identifying the minimum subset of practices necessary to produce the desired outcomes in any particular context.⁶

In addition, experts acknowledged that changes in formal processes might not lead to the desired results because informal factors (e.g., status, personal relationships, beliefs, individual incentives) mattered as much or more for achieving the desired outcome. The importance of informal practices and other country-specific factors in shaping the impact of institutional changes meant that experts had to show a greater humility in their approach and work much more closely with partner-nation personnel to identify whether and how different good practices might be tailored to partner-nation realities to produce the desired outcomes.

Among other things, this meant eschewing the traditional best practices gap analysis approach to assessment and program design. This approach compares existing partner-nation practices to best practices, identifies an (often long) list of gaps between the two, and recommends working through the checklist of identified gaps until a modernized system is in place. However, while checklists and templates can prescribe specific and sequenced steps for addressing complicated technical problems (e.g., rebuilding a carburetor or preparing an airfield), they are less appropriate for complex problems like institutional reforms (sometimes called "wicked problems"), in which human beings are involved and the context significantly affects results.

When context matters, and the goal is to find the best fit rather than import best practices, assessments need to center on defining the relevant aspects of the context rather than gaps in best practices.⁷ Two complementary approaches have emerged in this regard: a problem driven approach which focuses attention on the specific desired outcomes of reform in a particular context (the "problem" to be solved) and a baseline description of current practices (the "as is") that should fundamentally shape thinking about the kinds of reforms that might be feasible and necessary.

The problem driven approach provides the “North Star” to orient reform efforts. Instead of identifying the lack of best practices as the problem to be addressed (as in traditional approaches), the focus is on identifying the key problem that the partner cares about (and thus will be motivated to address). It is a facilitated conversation with the partner about shared strategic objectives and priorities, and the extent to which the performance of their defense management system is affecting the realization of these objectives. In some cases, the “pain points” may be very clear from the start, even if it will take stakeholders time to collectively identify their root causes and possible solutions. In other cases, the framing of the problem and possible solutions may require some refining over time in an iterative process that is the hallmark of approaches for working in volatile, uncertain, complex, and adaptive environments. A key focus is identifying the necessary and sufficient ingredients required to solve the problem, which often means addressing not just institutional processes but the broader system within which actors operate.

In addition to identifying the problem to be solved, DIB practitioners work with the partner to develop a baseline (“as is”) assessment of the existing formal and informal “rules of the game”—who does what to whom and why and with what effect—to identify where change might be necessary and feasible. In contrast to a best practices approach, change is not about experts designing new processes and insisting the partner leadership have the political will to implement them, but rather about determining how it might be feasible to get large numbers of individuals to behave differently. Understanding existing approaches—their strengths, the opportunities for change, and the perceptions and interests of the actors involved (e.g., decision makers, analysts, implementers, users)—is key to the problem solving effort.

The Political Dimension of Reform: Thinking About How Change Happens

A conclusion reached by most capacity builders is that change affects the balance of power, and will frequently be resisted by those who benefit from the status quo. While perhaps obvious, this insight represents a departure from a more technical theory of change embodied in early public sector management reform (and implicit in many security cooperation training and education approaches to capacity building): provide partners with an understanding of “what right looks like” and they will make changes in their organizations or their behavior to produce better outcomes. Unfortunately, while education often serves to help an individual understand the dysfunctions of the system, it usually does not empower or incentivize them to make change.

When change did not come automatically with the imparting of knowledge, or was resisted, external actors began to revise their theory of change, concluding that political will, and not just knowledge, is essential for change. In response, external actors operating at the policy level have tried to influence a partner’s political will through conditionality, diplomacy, or a combination of “sticks and carrots.”

At the program level, the reaction to the need for political will has varied. Technical experts sometimes insist that the political aspects of reform are outside their duties or “above their pay grade”—their job is to share knowledge, but it is the partner’s (or

donor's) responsibility to do something with that information. At other times, technical experts take a more proactive approach but one that is based on a fairly technical, linear, and hierarchical understanding of the policy formulation and implementation process: leadership endorsement is secured before beginning a project; the relevant staffers are engaged over a period of time (often years) to teach them best practices and have them apply this knowledge to the creation of a document or new process; leadership then publishes the resulting product, creates a strategic communications plan to ensure it is understood by implementers, and monitors implementation. The timelines for this approach are often divorced from political reality, and are driven by the technical complexity of the processes being taught and the amount of time required for this process.

Unfortunately, these approaches to tackling the political dimension of reform often yield changes in the form of partner institutions, but not their function. Outsiders can force the formal adoption of new laws or procedures through conditionality or through a sense of obligation (for instance, as part of a package of technical support), but neither result in real change. Despite the importance of “champions of change,” especially in hierarchical partner-nation militaries and bureaucracies, leadership endorsement—or the political will of a single individual—is also usually insufficient to affect change. The scope and process of change tends to be much broader and messier than envisioned by the linear, hierarchical approach: if true changes in the ways of doing business are desired, the broader set of stakeholders expected to adopt, implement, and institutionalize new practices needs to be consistently considered throughout the process. Coalitions for reform need to be built, and may come together in different ways and at unexpected speeds in different settings.

To address these shortcomings, the international community has stressed the need for a political economy analysis (PEA) to understand the incentives and power of a wider array of stakeholders who might support or oppose change. In some cases, dysfunctional processes may exist not because they serve elite interests, but because factors that affect human behavior and decision-making—inertia, fear of the unknown, discounting of the future, limited time and attention span—are often at work, and must be overcome through a reform process that deliberately targets these issues. In other cases, change might serve the collective good and make everyone better off but it is not in the interest of individuals to unilaterally take action to solve the problem. Understanding the factors that contribute to the preservation of the status quo and how these might be changed is essential for successful reform.

Though it represents a broader effort to tackle the politics of reform, more than a focus on leaders and political will, PEA by itself has not been a sufficient tool for adequately incorporating the politics of change into program design and implementation. There are at least two plausible reasons for this: first, stovepiped functions in many donor agencies mean that assessments are conducted by one set of actors, and programming is shaped by another set of actors who tend to choose a stock program with little regard for initial assessments. Second, PEA conducted during the assessment stage frequently only offers limited insight into stakeholder interests. Instead, PEA must be thought of as an ongoing process that continues during the design and implementation phases of a project.⁸

In addition to incorporating PEA as a central feature of their new approach at the assessment, design, and implementation phases, external reformers have responded to the politics of change by emphasizing the central importance of engaging local stakeholders in the process from the start. From this perspective, “problem definition is an inherently political process of negotiation and priority setting.” Problems and their potential solutions are not determined externally by expert assessors, but should be the subject of debate among local stakeholders, supported by experts. In addition, engaging stakeholders from the start “helps uncover the real incentives and interests of the actors involved in conducting . . . reform change and finds a compromise between them.”⁹ Moreover, the process of change itself may alter an actors’ interests and stance toward reform, requiring that experts have the flexibility to adapt or iteratively build their programs accordingly.

In this approach, PEA can help the reformer understand the initial space for reform and propose a plausible theory of change. But since change is multifaceted and there are likely multiple paths to the desired outcome, the steps of the process cannot be laid out in great detail in advance. The terrain can be mapped; the reformer knows to avoid the cliff to the left and the waterfalls to the right, but other paths might be pursued sequentially or concurrently, with the reformer having the flexibility to change course when dead-ends are hit or to accelerate change when a clearing is found. This understanding of change (and corresponding program design) is often contrasted with the sequenced roadmap of reforms produced by a best practices gap analysis. If the latter is similar to a train moving down a track hitting milestones at determined intervals, more complex institutional change is akin to a sailboat, tacking according to the prevailing winds but guided by a North Star and problem-driven sequencing of reforms.¹⁰ In many cases, the lines between the assessment, program design, and implementation phases become less distinct with the iterative development of knowledge of the technical and political feasibility of different possible solutions over time.

The Holistic Dimension of Reform: Setting a Realistic Level of Ambition

The security sector reform literature rightly stresses the need to understand how parts of the security sector interconnect within broader government, legal, and societal contexts. This need for a holistic perspective, however, is often mistakenly interpreted as the need for holistic action—undertaking an overly comprehensive assessment or proposing an overly ambitious reform agenda at the program design phase. In both cases, the results ironically tend to be far less than what would have been produced through more targeted assessments and projects. As ISSAT notes:

Experience has also shown that comprehensive assessments that aim to cover all actors in depth are ambitious, complex, resource intensive and time consuming. Comprehensive assessment efforts often falter with poor results that assess a limited number of actors unevenly. As a result, comprehensive assessments should generally be avoided, and focus given to areas where there is likely to be a greater positive impact.¹¹

Of course, the challenge is to determine what criteria should be used to identify focus areas of greater positive impact. Traditionally, the best practice framework has provided little analytical purchase in this regard, as even less-than-comprehensive assessments usually produce long laundry lists of gaps. This often results in programming that is overly ambitious—comprehensive reforms to address as many of the gaps as possible. Or, if the limits of the partner nation’s time, energy, and resources for reform are acknowledged, a curiously unambitious approach is taken: Since everything cannot be addressed, an “anything helps” mentality prevails, with external agencies almost inevitably able to find a need for their stock programs among the list of gaps. Programming ends up being the same as it would have been in the absence of an assessment. In both the overambitious and under-ambitious cases, programming is supply-driven—external experts offering up best practice templates for reform or favored individual programs.

In reaction, the international community developed the more diagnostic approach to programming described in previous sections, which is focused on the need to identify achievable and relevant reforms based on partner-nation realities and desired outcomes. This problem-driven approach seeks to understand how a desired functional outcome might be reached, presuming that the introduction of some subset of good practices will be necessary but insufficient to reach the desired outcome. The approach emphasizes flexible problem-solving, acknowledging the constraints of the environment while focusing on the actors who will be responsible for defining the problem and designing, implementing, and sustaining new ways of doing business. Based on what is known about actors’ perceptions and incentives, and a problem’s technical challenges, can a clear theory of change be proposed for how the proposed changes will expand the reform space and fix the functional problem? This diagnostic approach, as the World Bank notes, “implies an emphasis on flexible problem-solving,” conducted iteratively, rather than a formal project design and approval approach with solutions defined in detail in advance; “the traditional distinction between ‘design’ and ‘implementation’ . . . gets blurred – and more flexible instruments are needed.”¹²

Local Ownership

The preceding pages have described the upending of the traditional, technical approach to institutional reform, shifting from a long-standing model—where experts and their best practices were the driving force behind change—to one where partner-nation stakeholders are rightly understood to be the engines of reform (with external experts acting in a support role). Within this context, the concept of local ownership of reform is easily grasped, but nonetheless is subject to varying interpretations that determine whether the intended result is achieved.

In some cases, the principle of local ownership may be acknowledged, but the political priorities of the donor or the lack of flexibility within donor planning processes may lead to decisions being made and then imposed on the partner. This is particularly the case when external actors are required to produce and adhere to detailed plans early in a relationship, when the problems and solutions have not yet been discussed with the partner.

In many cases, ownership is often equated with the existence of formal agreements between countries and formal governance structures overseeing the work being supported by external experts. However, there is nothing automatic about this equation: it is not uncommon for formal agreements to mask a lack of real partner ownership. In part, this is because formal agreements are often sought at the very beginning of a process of reform and this timing can pose serious challenges for meaningful local ownership. Early on, it is often not clear to policymakers what they are really signing up for, creating the illusion of ownership where there may be very little. This is particularly the case when leaders endorse an initiative, with the assessment and program design phases to follow.

In addition, when a more detailed plan is formalized early (after a truncated joint assessment process), the danger lies in narrowing the potential scope of reform, since dialogue about required changes often leads to more expansive support for reform months into the project rather than at its onset. This can be accommodated if early agreements do not attempt to lock in overly specific milestones, but instead agree to the steps that help actors to deepen their understanding of required changes (for example, conducting “process tracing” as part of the implementation plan). As one author notes:

An iterative process would . . . view an assessment not as a prerequisite to beginning an SSR process but as an integral part of that process. An iterative process would not aim to tick the box of local ownership, but rather see it as a continuum of open discussion between the national government and international partners, regarding expectations, needs, and what is feasible given certain constraints.¹³

The conceptualization of local ownership as a “continuum of open discussion” also provides a corrective to some notions of local ownership that put the partner completely in the driver’s seat. This may be the case when a stakeholder interprets ownership as asking the partner what they want, as opposed to engaging in an informed dialogue about issues of mutual importance and debating the best strategies to advance these shared objectives. This also takes place when teams of contractors are assigned as advisors and see their job primarily as providing technical advice and keeping the partner happy. In contrast, the expert should add value by providing a transformative perspective, helping partners discover new ways of doing business and supporting reformers in the face of resistance to change. This ranges from introducing challenging new good practices, like infusing transparency into a system as part of an effort to improve effectiveness, to opening the possibility for new approaches by bringing disparate stakeholders together that would never have spoken to one another if left to their own devices.

Defense Institution Building Innovations

As DOD looked to take DIB global under the DIRI program in 2010, it modified the traditional DIB paradigm to reflect the critiques and alternative approaches outlined in the

first part of this chapter. Notably, these changes were not motivated by a desire to apply lessons learned from the international experience to DIB; in fact these international lessons learned were being articulated over the same time period as the DIB innovations (2009 and following), and the similarities between the two processes only became evident much later. Instead, the DIB innovations were driven by an analysis of the practices required for strategically relevant outcomes and built on lessons that had emerged from the experience of the Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF)-DIB program which was already in place (but limited to supporting members of NATO's Partnership for Peace program).¹⁴

The WIF-DIB "playbook" in place in 2009 was characterized by a fairly traditional, technocratic approach to capacity building. A DIB team would conduct a technical "requirements determination," assessing (usually over a week) the partner's defense organizational structure and its processes in strategy, policy, and planning, resource management, human resource management, and logistics, as compared to international best practices. This typically generated a long list of gaps that formed the basis for a sequenced roadmap of activities—a menu that security cooperation planners used to match providers to activities, working their way through the list based on U.S. objectives, partner interest, and availability of funding.

The DOD's creation of the DIRI Program in 2009 significantly advanced both understanding and the practice of defense institution building. This section describes three of the fundamental changes that were made as DIRI hit its stride. First, DIRI expanded the scope of DIB to capture all areas of the defense institution that needed to be targeted to see real improvements in governance and management. Second, DIRI began every DIB project with a scoping phase, where all relevant stakeholders would determine what was achievable and relevant in a given partner-nation context—moving from a technical, best practices approach to a politically-informed approach. Third, DIRI established an approach to program management, project design, and implementation that allowed the long-term perspective and short- to medium-term flexibility required for effective DIB.

Each of these innovations had implications for how DIB programs related to other security cooperation activities and to the traditional security cooperation planning process. Understanding this logic will be essential as DOD seeks to institutionalize DIB as a standard part of security cooperation programming. Ideally, the process will meet the requirements of all stakeholders, while retaining the planning and programming required to make DIB effective.

Defining DIB

DIB was initially characterized as a ministerial capacity-building program contributing to broader objectives of defense sector effectiveness, affordability, transparency, accountability, and responsible civilian control.¹⁵ Building on WIF-DIB practice, four main pillars were identified as key to effective governance: the management of ideas (strategy, policy, and planning), money (resource management), people (human resource management, including defense and military education), and things (logistics). Civil-military relations

and interagency coordination, which were treated as separate focus areas under WIF-DIB, were incorporated as cross-cutting principles potentially applying to all DIB activities.

In some quarters, “ministerial capacity building” was viewed from a traditional, technocratic perspective, focusing on sharing knowledge with Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials to improve their ability to manage the defense sector (e.g., providing policy guidance or managing money). However, viewed from a broader political and holistic perspective, it was clear that this narrow approach would not increase the MOD’s capacity to effectively oversee ideas, money, people, and things, and thus could not contribute meaningfully to solving the problems partner nations faced. To do that would require understanding—and potentially influencing—the broader governance and management system and set of power relations within which the ministry operated.

In any defense sector, the MOD is only one part of the overall defense management system—a key fact that was acknowledged by broadening the scope of DIB to include “the ministerial, general, joint staff, military service headquarters, and related defense agency level, and when appropriate, . . . other supporting defense entities.”¹⁶ Focusing only on the MOD’s ability to do their job would make sense if defense management processes were structured effectively and only lacked competent ministry officials. However, in most cases, effective DIB requires a review of all the steps in the “results chain” (looking across the “levels” of the defense sector) to determine where breakdowns are preventing effective processes and to identify required action. The organizational capacity of the ministry is important, but should not be confused with the overall institutional capacity of the defense sector, which refers to “the people, organizations, rules, norms, values, and behaviors that enable oversight, governance, management, and functioning of the defense enterprise.”¹⁷

This caveat about the role of the MOD is true everywhere, but is particularly important in partner nations where considerable power resides in the military services, rather than in the MOD or even the general command or joint staff. Introducing new ways of operating in these settings often requires changing power relationships and empowering a ministry that may be reluctant to assert its authority to lead the defense sector toward more effective and accountable practices. Understanding these power relationships, possible sources of leverage, and urgent problems that might serve as the opening for working collectively toward new ways of doing business is a necessary first step.

In this system of systems approach to defense management, the ministry is the preferred entry point for engagement, even if those interactions eventually lead to primarily working with other interlocutors as the main change agents. (In some cases, depending on the problem to be solved and the power of the ministry, engagement with the MOD may not be necessary.) However, engaging at least initially through the ministry represents not only a normative stand on the importance of civilian control, but also the acknowledgment that the ministry is frequently potentially responsible for the changes needed to create new ways of doing business. The MOD is, after all, at least formally responsible for representing the defense sector to the rest of the executive branch, the legislature, and the international community, and interacts with those actors on fundamental legal, policy, and resourcing

issues. This includes working with the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of National Planning, and legislative bodies on resource management issues, and with other ministries in the security sector to coordinate and deconflict roles, missions, and service delivery.

In addition to this outward-looking role, the MOD is responsible for ensuring that guidance from executive and legislative actors shapes the actions of the defense sector on key issues related to the design of defense sector processes. From its key position above the military services, and as representative of the national interest, it can advocate for solutions to collective action problems that military services—motivated by their individual interests and perspectives—may not be able to reach. Designing effective solutions for the defense sector requires the MOD to work with key stakeholders in the general staff, service headquarters, and elsewhere to ensure the right design and implementation.

This broad understanding of institutional capacity development, requiring a partner to look across the levels of the defense sector to understand what might need to be changed to improve performance and solve specific challenges, demands a similarly integrated approach from DIB providers. However, this runs contrary to the counterpart approach to engagement that often characterizes security cooperation (e.g., the Defense Logistics Agency in the United States engages with the corresponding agency in a partner nation). This approach not only runs the risk of mirror imaging, but also is likely to contribute to the development of only one part of the system—often with little effect if reforms in other parts of the system are required.

Assessment: “Scoping” is the Key

While the traditional paradigm identified a best practices gap analysis as the first step in a DIB project, this was replaced with a scoping phase that engaged key U.S. government and partner-nation stakeholders to identify shared objectives and priorities, areas where institutional performance hindered the realization of these objectives, and feasible and realistic entry points for DIB projects that could advance those objectives. The term “scoping” was selected to emphasize that the necessary start point was not a comprehensive assessment of the partner’s defense institutions—an undertaking most partners were not willing to engage in—but rather a process that narrowed or scoped the project to target the most strategically relevant and achievable reforms.¹⁸

Reforms were considered to be “achievable” only if they advanced partner-nation objectives and priorities. Understanding this is the point of departure for the scoping process. This emphasis was subsequently validated by a large-scale RAND study, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances*, that identified support for partner priorities as the single most important factor affecting the success of BPC efforts.¹⁹ This is a central focus of desk study activities where U.S. government stakeholders are asked to share not only U.S. strategic objectives and priorities, and U.S. perceptions of institutional shortcomings that were affecting the realization of these objectives (performance gaps), but also their understanding of how different partner stakeholders viewed their strategic priorities and institutional issues. Understanding the

fundamentals of how relationships were structured—among MOD, General Staff, Service HQ, and commanders; between the defense sector and the security sector; and between the defense sector and the rest of the government, legislature, and society—is also a big-picture issue addressed during the scoping phase.

A successful DIB project usually requires engaging with the partner at the highest level possible in order to understand its objectives and priorities, to link any institutional reform efforts to those objectives, and to lay the groundwork for the high-level support that would be needed to affect institutional change. Since defining a program should be a political and strategic process, similarly high-level stakeholders need to be consulted on the U.S. government side. This includes the regional office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-P), which sees DIB as a key engagement tool to build relationships with counterpart MODs, as well as State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development officials on the ground (e.g., ambassador, deputy chief of mission, and pol-econ and pol-mil officers). Stakeholders at Combatant Command (CCMD) headquarters, the Office of Security Cooperation Chief, and the Senior Defense Official-Defense Attaché are also consulted, and may have different, although usually complementary, perspectives on U.S. and partner objectives.

Typically, a conference call between DIB scoping experts and all key stakeholders—OSD-P, CCMD, and embassy personnel—is held as soon as a DIB request is received. This allows any differences of opinion to be resolved to avoid competing mandates from different stakeholders. It also maximizes the information available for understanding the partner, as different stakeholders are likely to have insights on different aspects of the partner-nation reality. In addition, international actors working in the country are consulted, not just to deconflict activities, but also to benefit from their insights on working with the partner.

As in other policy areas, U.S. objectives for defense sector reform in a given country are usually stated in a generic way and are often the same for all countries (e.g., the desire for an effective, affordable, accountable, and professional defense force). Since this is the case, the challenge is to derive more specific objectives by understanding overall strategic aims and priorities and, through a facilitated dialogue on the topics described above, work with stakeholders to identify the kind of DIB project that would best advance shared partner-nation and U.S. objectives. Often this is an iterative process, with rough general answers identified early on but greater fidelity added as the DIB program begins work with partner-nation stakeholders (and continues discussion with U.S. stakeholders) on topics of interest.

Comparison to Traditional Security Cooperation Planning Approaches

The traditional approach to security cooperation is often a highly stove-piped, menu-based one: the policymaker or planner assesses the requirement, reviews the tools in the security cooperation toolkit, and decides which are needed. Given the standardized nature of most security cooperation programs, the policymaker or planner can look at the available menu of courses or training opportunities, and select the most relevant one based on his or her understanding of what is required. Not infrequently, the menu is offered directly

to the partner, who identifies items of interest. The provider then offers the standard course, unable to tailor it in advance to partner-nation requirements because the specific requirement is unknown or uncommunicated to the provider. Good providers will make adjustments on the ground to try to improve the value of their offering, but these are often highly constrained by the circumstances.

DIB programs, in contrast, are highly tailored to partner-nation realities and strategic objectives. Conducting this (initial and ongoing) tailoring requires a facilitated dialogue between policymakers, planners, and DIB experts, as well as partner-nation stakeholders. While general topics and focus areas can be provided to policymakers to give a sense of the scope of DIB work, a menu-driven approach typically fails when applied to DIB.

Program Management, Project Design, and Implementation: Developing a Flexible, Iterative Approach

When the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) decided to expand DIB in 2009, it made a deliberate decision not to delegate the programming of DIB activities to CCMD planners, opting instead for a more centralized program management structure that would work closely with OSD. This was motivated by several lessons learned from the WIF-DIB experience: that the strategic-level entry point of DIB programs would require strategic decisions by OSD regional offices and high-level interaction with the partner, thus making it advisable that the DIB program have privileged access to those offices; that the tactical and operational focus of most CCMD planners would not lead to effective DIB planning; and that existing security cooperation providers and tools available to the CCMDs for planning DIB were largely oriented toward an educational mindset, rather than persistent engagement over time, to achieve collectively defined improvements in defense management. Finally, even if individual providers could make the shift to a more project-oriented approach, the WIF-DIB experience demonstrated that progress in DIB required an integrated approach at the country level, designed and overseen by DIB experts.

The DIRI program was tasked with devising an effective approach to institutional reform. The program would provide persistent engagement with a partner, engaging as frequently as the partner desired for up to two weeks per engagement. The program did not provide education or training, but took a problem-driven approach, working with the partner to determine the scope of the effort and project objectives (which part of the defense management system would be targeted for improvement, how, and why). This would require developing a methodology for the most effective engagement in institutional reform—the approaches to assessment and program design described in the first half of this chapter—and a management structure to operationalize the approach, learn lessons, and adapt. This included an emphasis on creating a strong linkage between the otherwise stove-piped steps in a planning process—with DIB management: contributing to strategic discussions about realistic and relevant DIB objectives at the policymaker and planning levels; designing and overseeing projects accordingly; and then ensuring feedback loops that allowed for adjustments along the way. Both the international institutional capacity-building literature and the experience of other security cooperation providers

stress the importance of clear linkages between the assessment, design, implementation, and monitoring and feedback phases, and lament their loss when multiple agencies and bureaucratic processes intervene.²⁰

Responding to palpable “assessment fatigue” at the partner-nation and U.S. Embassy level—long, intrusive assessments that answered the bureaucratic imperatives of donor agencies but did not produce any actionable support for the partner—the program developed an approach that allowed action to begin almost immediately on priority issues. The dates, topics, and stakeholders for a follow-on engagement would usually be settled with the embassy and partner before departing at the end of an initial scoping visit. To allow for U.S. policy feedback, partner-nation ownership, and the broadening of the reform space that would take place over time, a project might begin with two complementary tracks: action on quick-win or priority items identified by the partner (and of interest to the United States), and activities designed to contribute to the collective definition of problems and possible solutions. A deeper dive into technical details of systems and understanding of stakeholder interests (e.g., process tracing) that was previously part of an external assessment, are instead conducted by DIRI as part of the project, allowing relevant partner-nation stakeholders to jointly define problems and their solutions. Multi-stakeholder workshops are particularly effective at launching this process, bringing together multiple actors who normally communicate infrequently, and whose perspectives often depend on where they sit in the defense bureaucracy, to discuss key challenges and next steps. Ideas of spiral development, quick wins, and pilot projects are incorporated to generate momentum for reform or, alternately, to fail quickly and move on to more promising approaches, while having learned more about the system by taking the initial action.

Understanding that institutional change is most likely to succeed when it responds to politically urgent priorities, DIRI was structured to be able to respond to emergent requirements from partners, rather than requiring they wait until the next planning cycle. For instance, a new head of state who is elected on a security platform would want to initiate change in the first 100 days in office, and the United States would want to be able to rapidly provide support in order to take advantage of the initial window of opportunity for reform (as well as to have the entire length of the administration to consolidate gains).

Program funds are also managed to address some of the dilemmas posed by traditional security cooperation approaches. In many cases, roadmaps for reform are laid out without resources to match. DIRI projects, in contrast, are scoped to ensure that results can be achieved within the level of resources that the United States and partner nation are willing to devote to the project. Flexibility in funding, a key good practice for effective institutional reform, is also a central tenet, in contrast to many security cooperation projects with funding levels locked in for a country—leading to funds being spent, regardless of progress being made. Flexible funding allows funds to be shifted between lines of effort within a country project and between country projects depending on progress being made. In addition, even though funds are “one-year money,” program management practices allow for longer-term commitments to partners, as long as progress is being made. While challenging from a

management perspective, this approach allows for an effective, long-term perspective to be taken at the individual country level.

The Way Ahead: Mainstreaming DIB

As of this writing, a number of processes are underway that represent the mainstreaming of DIB. A planned DOD Instruction defines the roles and responsibilities of all security cooperation stakeholders in guiding, planning for, and implementing DIB activities. Congress has been paying increasing attention to DIB since the summer of 2015 when it suspended the delivery of large equipment packages for a number of African countries under the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund on the grounds that the partners would not be able to absorb and sustain the equipment. DIB activities were required to be added to the equipping packages, forcing at least the beginning of an internal DOD debate on sustainment. In addition, proposed changes to the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act in 2016 require DIB activities to accompany every train and equip package—though the intent in this case is not the sustainment of U.S. security cooperation investments but rather the strengthening of responsible civilian control.

While potentially valuable because of the increased attention these efforts direct to DIB, they run the risk of making DIB merely a routine part of a security cooperation process that most stakeholders acknowledge requires some adjustments. Conducting seminars on DIB to “check the box” for a DIB requirement is unlikely to contribute to policy objectives. And even persistent engagement on topics selected from a DIB menu (the old WIF-DIB approach) are unlikely to have an effect unless planned and executed as part of a more deliberate and integrated DIB strategy. Without a coherent, results-oriented approach to DIB activities, these will yield few benefits.

Even with such an approach, many of the objectives associated with DIB—such as the sustainment of other U.S. security cooperation investments—cannot be accomplished through action at the program level alone. Instead, a more profound integration of DIB principles into security cooperation plans is required.

In this regard, the combined actions of Congress and DOD policymakers have helped to create an awareness among security cooperation planners of the need for training and equipping plans to incorporate DIB considerations if equipment provided is to become an operational capability that can be effectively and legitimately employed and sustained. In particular, the idea of a “capability planning package” has resonated with military planners, as it highlights the concept that buying a piece of equipment does not automatically create a military capability; rather, operational enablers and institutional capacity are required for equipment to become an employable and sustainable capability.²¹

Despite the progress this represents, more work will need to be done to convert this concept into an effective approach. The initial impulse from security cooperation planners has been to attempt to implement the concept in a way that only tweaks the existing equipment-centric security assistance system. Just as past innovations designed to increase

the sustainability of U.S.-provided equipment began with a specific piece of equipment and added on a two-year package of spare parts, maintenance, and training to form a “total package” approach, the “full-spectrum capability planning package” is often interpreted as “wrapping DIB elements around a piece of equipment.” Such an approach, however, will only add to security cooperation spending, likely with little effect.

Training and equipping plans made in the traditional way—with little regard for the partner’s institutional capacity to employ and sustain the assistance—cannot suddenly be made sustainable with the addition of DIB programming. In contrast, an integrated approach to DIB and security cooperation would require adhering to guidance provided in *Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance*: “Formal assessments of current partners’ institutional capacity, political will, operational capabilities, and anticipated security sector needs will be conducted as needed as the first phase of strategic planning at both the country and regional levels.”²² This assessment of institutional capacity should not be seen primarily as providing a roadmap for the programming of DIB activities, but as a fundamental input to a strategic approach that includes asking what kind of training and equipping can be effectively employed and sustained given the partner’s institutional capacity (or potential institutional capacity with expected DIB accomplishments during the planning timeline).

Policymakers may decide to provide equipment that is not sustainable for a number of reasons—in order to maintain the relationship or stay competitive in a context where other countries are willing to provide “shiny objects”; to support the U.S. defense industry; or to create a long-term relationship that comes with the sale of major pieces of equipment, whereby the partner becomes reliant on the provider for parts, training, and maintenance. But these competing policy objectives should be acknowledged, and explicit policy decisions should weigh those objectives against the sustainability objective. If still deemed beneficial, more realistic objectives can be set for DIB programs in those countries. While some of these conversations have taken place in the halls of the Pentagon in response to new Congressional requirements, they are by no means guaranteed within the current approach to security cooperation, which sets high-level policy objectives that are not fleshed out in any kind of detail required for effective DIB action. Instead, if DIB programming is to live up to its potential, stakeholders must seek out the opportunities that can be created within current security cooperation planning processes for policymakers, planners, embassy personnel, and DIB experts to engage in this kind of strategic, results-oriented conversation about DIB objectives, program design, risks, and potential payoffs.

Notes

1 A recent study notes that “the main programming and knowledge gap at this time is the lack of information on military sector reform effectiveness.” The International Security Sector Advisory Team, “What Works in International Security and Justice Programming? Preliminary Findings,” June 2, 2015, available at <<http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/92383/1618536/file/International%20Good%20Practice%20Approaches%20Report%20Release%202015.pdf>>.

2 Representative critiques include: World Bank, Public Sector and Governance Board, “The World Bank’s Approach to Public Sector Management 2011-2020: Better Results from Public Sector Institutions,” February 3,

2012; Vivienne O'Connor, "A Guide to Change and Change Management for Rule of Law Practitioners," January 2015; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Improving Security and Justice Programming in Fragile Situations: Better Political Engagement, More Change Management," April 12, 2016; Lisa Denney and Pilar Domingo, "Context-relevant, flexible and transnational programming. The future of security and justice?" December 2015.

3 Similar good practices have been advanced over the last half decade by others within the U.S. defense community, suggesting an even broader applicability in areas such as counterinsurgency campaign planning. For example, see Jack D. Kem, *Design: Tools of the Trade* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined General Staff College, 2009).

4 International Security Service Advisory Team, "SSR Overview," available at <<http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/SSR-Overview>>.

5 This is the assumption behind the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program.

6 See Merilee Grindle, "Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries," *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions* 17, No. 4 (2004), 525-548.

7 Although practitioners in other contexts are often careful to refer to "good practices" to signal their adherence to the principle of "best fit, not best practices," DIB practitioners sometimes continue to refer to "tailored international best practices (IBP)" for a number of reasons. First, given DOD past practices, the reference to IBP often serves as a shorthand way to communicate to both U.S. and partner-nation stakeholders that the advisor is not promoting U.S. mirror-image solutions. Second, the term still holds a powerful aspirational appeal in many settings. Reformers may be dissatisfied with the status quo and want change, but are not entirely sure what that entails; therefore, the initial request is often to understand IBP. Finally, being able to say that proposed new practices are international standards can also be an effective weapon for reformers. The danger of IBP comes not in the use of the term, but when IBP are converted into models and used by practitioners—or policy makers—as a blueprint for action.

8 Lisa Denney, "Using political economy analysis in conflict, security and justice programmes," March 2016, available at <<https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10362.pdf>>.

9 World Bank, *World Bank's Approach to Public Sector Management 2011-2020: Better Results from Public Sector Institutions* (Washington, DC: World Bank, February 2012) available at <<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVANTICORR/Resources/3035863-1285601351606/PSM-Approach.pdf>>, 10.

10 For the sailboat analogy, see Rachel Kleinfeld, "Improving Development Aid Design and Evaluation: Plan for Sailboats, Not Trains," March 2015, available at <<http://carnegiendowment.org/2015/03/02/improving-development-aid-design-and-evaluation-plan-for-sailboats-not-trains/i4u1>>. This less linear view of change does not preclude systematic thinking about problem-driven sequencing of reform efforts to expand the space for reform. See Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock, "Doing Problem Driven Work," *Center for International Development at Harvard Working Paper* No. 307, December 2015, available at <http://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/files/bsc/files/doing_problem_driven_work_wp_307.pdf>.

11 International Security Sector Advisory Team, "Operational Guidance Note: Overview for Security and Justice Assessment," April 2010, available at <<http://issat.dcaf.ch/content/download/1176/8908/file/ISSAT%20Assessment%20OGN%200%20Overview.pdf>>, 6. The Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group came to a similar conclusion in their efforts to assess partner-nation Marine Corps as a first step in proposing a plan of engagement: a comprehensive DOTMLPF assessment was usually not feasible, nor advisable.

12 "The World Bank's Approach to Public Sector Management," *op. cit.*, 12. For problem-driven iterative adaptation, see Matt Andrews, *The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

13 International Peace Institute, "Security-Sector Reform Applied: Nine Ways to Move from Policy to Implementation," February 2012, available at <<https://www.ipinst.org/2012/02/security-sector-reform-applied-nine-ways-to-move-from-policy-to-implementation>>.

14 The use of the term "defense institution building" within the U.S. Department of Defense comes from the WIF-NATO experience and has stuck, despite the challenges it poses when interacting with partners, who rightly note that they already have institutions and do not need them to be "built."

15 Some policymakers use the term "responsible civilian control" instead of "democratic civilian control" to capture the idea that the military needs to be transparent and accountable even in less-than-democratic settings, as well as to indicate that civilian control must follow some standard principles (like transparency) in a democracy.

16 See Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, *DOD Directive 5205.82 Defense Institution Building* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 27, 2016), 13. DIB programs also routinely support ministries of defense as they interact with actors external to the defense sector, like the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of National Planning.

17 *DoD-Directive 5205.82 Defense Institution Building, op. cit.*

18 Similarly, the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group replaced their initial model of comprehensive DOTMLPF-P assessments with a "scoping" approach based on U.S. and partner-nation objectives that ensured the

requirements for information and action were realistic and achievable.

19 Christopher Paul et al., *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), available at <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/MG1200/MG1253z1/RAND_MG1253z1.pdf>.

20 One example of breaking down stovepipes between stages of the security cooperation planning process is provided by the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, which has adopted the good practice of including an individual from the assessment team that conducts security cooperation planning on the teams that subsequently deploy to execute the planned activities. In this way, knowledge gained of country context and the intent of the activities is more effectively conveyed to implementers than is normally the case in security cooperation. In another example, Special Operations Command Africa has also effectively employed the good practice of combining the planning and evaluation personnel to ensure that plans and objectives are designed with clearly defined outcomes in mind.

21 Thomas W. Ross, “Enhancing Security Cooperation Effectiveness: A Model for Capability Package Planning,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 80 (January 2016).

22 The White House, *Presidential Policy Directive 23: Security Sector Assistance* (Washington, DC: The White House, April 5, 2013), 12.

Strategy, Policy, and Defense Management Architecture

Erik J. Leklem

Defense institution building (DIB) activities help partner nations address gaps in how they manage their defense sectors. Ensuring that a nation's defense management architecture includes a solid defense strategy and policy (DSP) framework is key to successful DIB initiatives. Effective strategy and policy are only achieved if a nation designates roles and missions for the defense sector and defense leaders, which can then be translated into defense guidance for planning and budgeting. Budgets not driven by strategy and defense guidance are at best, prone to status quo outcomes, and at worst, promote ineffective, inefficient, and corrupt flows of state resources. Good strategy and policy will also identify human resource and logistics needs. Strategy can then lead to analytically sound (ideally, "joint") requirements for the defense sector to generate military units and operations—the ultimate test of DIB impact and partner-nation institutional capacity.

Successful DIB projects connect strategy and policy processes with highly contextualized options for a partner nation to adopt. Sustainable DIB DSP work should be truly strategic in that DSP projects are anchored to five- or ten-year milestones, accounting for a country's long-term fiscal and development timelines, incentive structures, and needs. Determining how to better conduct such capacity building is an ongoing effort of practitioners and policymakers alike. There remains a need to better connect DSP capacity building and traditional educational security assistance, to refine DSP and defense resource management (DRM) doctrine; to improve the linkages between DSP work, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and related grant aid; and to explore how joint concepts and DSP may be further harmonized for better institutional capacity building.

While this chapter references theory, cases, and best practices, the author includes observations from personal experience, as well as the experiences of colleagues, to provide examples of DSP work from a U.S. perspective. But history has also shown that there are limits to focusing exclusively on U.S. examples in capacity building. For this reason, practitioners should consider and incorporate principles and best practices from a variety of donor countries, such as those found in the chapters on the British and NATO experiences within this volume.

Strategy and Policy: Framing Defense Management

A nation's defense institutions operate most effectively and efficiently when guided by a strategy. Ideally, a nation will implement plans and policies that translate the strategy into more tangible outcomes, such as force structures, policies for military engagement with other countries, and prioritized military capability requirements. Defense budgets should flow from strategic needs; human resource plans and policy should align to defense priorities; and defense posture planning should inform the creation of military sustainment and supply networks. If this entire management system is well designed and aligned, nations should be better able to generate military operations within available resources and at acceptable levels of risk. DSP capacity building influences how a nation resources its military, determines the size of its human resource needs (to include military end strength), structures its logistics system, develops the ways its military will operate jointly, and identifies the ways in which the military supports national objectives.

This section describes what DSP comprises and its terminology as it applies to the emerging DIB discipline. Defense strategy and policy describe a pillar of the defense management system that guides, frames, and restrains how a nation structures and resources its military. While strategy and policy are sometimes used interchangeably, they are not identical. Some practitioners include planning as an element of DSP. In this chapter, and in alignment with emerging DIB doctrine, defense guidance will be used to describe the strategic or policy direction that is provided to guide more detailed planning, as conducted by capability and budget planners.

Defense Strategy

Defense strategy is the government's articulation of the major goals or ends that the defense and military must achieve for the nation, and how those ends will be achieved.¹ Defense strategy is distilled from a higher-level national security strategy or national policy. As such, significant attention should be devoted to clearly prioritizing what those ends are, as well as important but less critical defense goals that help support other aspects of national policy (e.g., the military's role in responding to national disasters).

Defense strategy should capture, clarify, and translate relevant national guidance for purposes of managing the defense sector. Some common, basic elements of defense strategy are: a description of the strategic environment (with a focus on military trends and threats); a delineation of the priority threats in that environment; a prioritized list of the ends or goals of the defense sector in responding to that environment and protecting the nation from those threats; a list of missions and postures (or ways) to achieve those objectives; and a description of the capabilities, force structure, and activities (or the means) that defense and military organizations will need to achieve those ends.²

Nations may also use defense strategy documents (especially when shared publicly) to describe defense policies, initiatives, or related issues. For example, these strategy documents will usually have a review of major bilateral and regional defense relationships

and what they mean for the country (e.g., a defense diplomacy section or a defense analysis review of major regional and global powers).

Defense Policy

Defense policy clarifies how a country will approach specific defense or military topics, as guided by strategy.³ Ideally, policy will be published for dissemination and implementation. Policies can drive relations with other countries (sometimes referred to as a bilateral policy), with groups of countries or regions (e.g., multilateral or regional policy), or focus on functional or subject-driven topics (e.g., cyber policy, counter-narcotics policy, arms control policy). In all cases, good defense policy should determine what a defense establishment must do, could do, may do, or will not do in relation to the topic. For example, a regional defense policy might describe how a nation will use its military to promote peacekeeping or support a regional alliance.

Policy should also promote strategic objectives. It may be a ministry of defense developing policy to pursue closer relations with a neighboring country, a policy to reduce tension through binational patrols of a border, or a policy to cooperate with other countries in countering a specific threat. Corresponding ways and means for achieving the objectives should be identified. For DIB practitioners, supporting defense policy development can be some of the most sensitive work done, as a partner may ask those practitioners to also get involved in the substance of those policies. The basic elements of policy development (how to conduct it and what needs to be in a policy), however, can be divorced from such issues. For example, DIB practitioners can use fictional countries or contexts as one method of “showing what right looks like” for explaining the processes for policy development, while steering clear of what needs to comprise the actual contents of such a policy.

Defense Guidance

Defense guidance flows from strategic processes. When issued by defense organizations, it is generally used to shape two major defense management efforts: planning for military force employment and planning for military force development. The former provides national guidance to the military for how forces might be used to defend a nation under certain circumstances (e.g., homeland defense), in particular areas, or in external environments (e.g., for border security, or a contingency plan against a specific threat or country). In defense management parlance, force employment planning connects defense strategy to how and where a nation may conduct military operations. Force development planning connects strategy to capability planning and resource management; and ideally, it identifies capabilities and forces required to conduct the major military missions identified in a strategy. In both cases, there is a role for joint concepts to play—as determined by the direction and objectives articulated by the strategy.⁴

Countries wanting to improve the effectiveness of their national defense or military forces should start by developing better defense strategy and policy. In many cases, national defense institutions and their leaders may also be required by law or regulation to issue

strategies or specific policies. For practitioners of DIB, understanding whether and to what extent a country has a well-managed and structured defense strategy and policy system is essential. If the country does not have a strong DSP system, other forms of assistance may fail to take hold, be sustainable, or generate impact. For example, providing maritime capacity assistance to a country that advocates for maritime capabilities in its defense strategy, but that lacks a management process that translates that strategy into increased budgets for sustainment of those capabilities, may lead to frustration and wasted effort. When a country has good DSP systems, capacity building in any part of a defense system should be oriented toward a nation's strategic objectives. For example, when the United States trains and equips foreign militaries, it is best to do so in high priority mission areas that the partner nation is committed to developing on its own, even without U.S. assistance.

Conditions for Successful DSP Development

Practitioners and security cooperation officers should look for indications of defense strategy and policy formulation by a partner country, as should leaders and analysts in those countries. Defense leaders seeking to improve the management of the military should be aware of these preconditions, and establish or continue to foster them. For DIB practitioners charged with strategy or policy it is essential to determine whether these preconditions exist and to what extent they do or do not shape existing defense guidance.

First, it is helpful for a country to have a national policy that articulates the roles of the defense sector and the nation's military forces. Such policy should also clarify how the military relates to the rest of the government and its citizens. This guidance can specify what the nation expects of its military and it can delineate how military forces and law enforcement (including police forces) divide the responsibilities of ensuring a nation's security. In many cases, such a policy will extend from existing law or a nation's constitution.

Second, it is useful for the executive or legislative branches to require the defense ministry or its equivalent to develop a defense strategy. Such a requirement usually describes what must be included in a defense strategy and when these strategies should be published. A common time is at the start of an executive leadership cycle such as the beginning of a presidential term of office. Legal requirements for the U.S. defense strategy, for example, provide a long list of what the U.S. Congress wants to see in such strategy, to include identification of major threats, required military capabilities to face such threats, and how the U.S. military will manage risk.⁵

The Benefits of DSP Cooperation

Capacity building for DSP enables other pillars of defense management. It also has ramifications for policymakers and officials involved in defense matters. The author, in his work as both a practitioner and policymaker, observed that cooperation between countries on DSP capacity building provides common benefits in the following six ways:

Improving Mutual Understanding

DIB activities, by their very nature, emphasize broad and deep initial discussions, or scoping, of both U.S. and partner interests, objectives, and gaps. Scoping discussions will often reveal a good deal about each country's systems and policies, more so than many bilateral dialogues.

For example, during initial DIB work with U.S. treaty ally Thailand, the U.S. DIB team asked Thai counterparts about their defense strategy in order to understand how the work (a human resource project) could be aligned to Thai objectives. Thai counterparts were open to sharing their defense strategy, which enabled the DIB team to learn about Thai strategic objectives and how the strategy addressed human resource topics. This helped improve both mutual understanding and U.S. appreciation for how changes to human resource systems might better support Thai objectives in the long run.

In many countries, initial DIB discussions on DSP provide U.S. stakeholders a unique opportunity to explain U.S. strategies and implications of major policy initiatives (e.g., “the Asia Pacific Rebalance”). Importantly, they foster exchanges on how U.S. defense and military organizations are structured, why, and with what authorities. DIB work is usually done in a host country, and often with counterparts that may not have benefited from traditional U.S. assistance such as International Military Education and Training (IMET). As such, DSP scoping can reach more stakeholders within the partner nation.

Confidence Building Measures

DIB activities can be useful confidence building measures between defense organizations—especially when geographic distance, a lack of combined military operations, or foreign policy differences complicate such confidence building. A common theme of DIB cooperation with Indonesia, for example, is how DIB exchanges help demystify the bilateral defense relationship and provide opportunities for extended dialogue on defense issues. Given Indonesia's non-aligned foreign policy tradition, advanced forms of confidence building (such as combined military operations or habitual exchanges due to basing access) are not feasible. Along with military staff talks and exercises, DIB activities and exchanges have become important ways for both nations' defense establishments to build confidence in one another, as recognized recently in the U.S.-Indonesia Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation of 2015.⁶

Common Goal Identification

DIB engagements on DSP are particularly useful for exploring and identifying where countries share common interests, threat perceptions, or defense objectives. When performing workshops for DSP, sessions might include horizon scanning, regional security challenges, or discussing processes for threat analysis. These illustrative processes of DSP capacity building allow partners to discuss common views, objectives, and goals—all of which can help identify richer ground for future cooperative activity.

This outcome can also manifest itself during discussions on functional capacity building with strategy or policy aspects. A U.S. capacity-building team that was supporting

Saudi Arabia's early steps to bolster its cyber defense capacity observed this effect. Workshop sessions included cyber strategy development, which allowed both nations to better understand common goals in the cyber domain and where shared mutual vulnerabilities require cooperative approaches.

Diplomatic Agenda Identification

The flipside of common goal identification is that DSP capacity building is also a way for countries to clarify where there are divergences of goals, ways of operating, and how nations will defend themselves. Just as a workshop on defining strategic interests can illuminate where two countries share a common interest, such a dialogue can also bring differences of view into sharper relief. One nation's military focus on illicit trafficking or poaching, for example, can be at odds with U.S. views of appropriate use of military forces. This allows both countries the opportunity—through diplomatic channels—to discuss how cooperation might proceed using either different capacity-building approaches (e.g., law enforcement capacity building), or where concerted diplomatic activity may be required to find compromises in dealing with a particular security or foreign policy issue.

Enabling Other DIB Activity or Changes to DIB Methods In-country

DSP capacity building will often identify institutional capacity gaps and shortfalls. For example, an exchange of best practices for linking strategy and budget planning might reveal faulty aspects of a budgetary system. If budget categories, codes, or records are not well designed, these budget management approaches may actively prevent defense leaders from aligning budgets to national objectives. Likewise, an advisor supporting a partner with defense policy for counternarcotics may also help that nation identify insufficient force structure, inadequate personnel training, or outdated interministerial coordination policies.

Some DSP work can reveal flaws in U.S. assistance methods and alternatives. During advisory DSP efforts in Afghanistan, it became apparent that the U.S. team of advisors had been using traditional U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) planning, programming, budgeting and execution modules to train the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Afghan military. Unfortunately, this was at odds with the modalities of the Afghan government's Ministry of Finance, which operated on World Bank financial timelines and processes. The United States spent years, millions of dollars, and untold man-hours training Afghan officials on defense budget systems and terminology that were not appropriate for their national budgeting system.

Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight (TAO) and Democratic Civilian Control

DIB activities can help nations improve civilian oversight of the military, increase transparency and accountability regarding defense and military spending, or help parliaments and civil society conduct oversight of military forces and defense institutions. Nations can achieve these objectives by improving how they formulate and publish

strategies and policies related to defense and military affairs. As such, DIB DSP projects can take on formal or informal—direct or indirect—roles in improving democratic civilian control and TAO. What is sometimes lost in such work is that defense strategies (and to a certain extent, policies) of a country are usually made public in some form. They become one of the mechanisms for the public, parliaments, and civilian elected leaders to understand what the military is for, what it is trying to achieve, and what it may be seeking in terms of budget, weapons systems, or end-strength.

Additionally, the civil-military discussion regarding which defense strategy and policy ends need to be achieved (usually led by civilians) and in what “joint” ways (usually led, or proposed, by the military) is a critical process that can reinforce and foster civilian control. Ultimately, civilian control should be about leading and driving that discussion on how defense strategy and policy is achieved, to include implementation.⁷

Unlike other technical aspects of DIB—such as human resource management, resource management, and logistics—DSP is the major DIB context within which debates and discussion between the public, civil society, civilian leaders, and the military happen. Public explanations of the defense sector which stem from DSP efforts can be important to stabilization efforts in fragile or transitioning states, or for countries seeking to advance economically and politically. DSP in these contexts can become essential to fostering civilian-military dialogue, improved understanding, and more resilient governance—key elements of security sector reform.⁸ For U.S. foreign policy goals, which often include the promotion of democratic processes or objective civilian control of the military, the importance of DSP as a DIB tool in the U.S. security cooperation and assistance kit bag cannot be overstated.

Issues and Methods for Conducting DSP DIB

The doctrine for practitioners attempting DSP capacity building must be context specific and account for partners with specific requests and a desire to cooperate (i.e. demonstrating “will”), as well as reticent partners. It should also describe how to help fragile or conflicted countries, where host-nation leaders may be suffering from institutional and personal shock affiliated with weak governance or violent conflict. DSP doctrine and methods must anticipate these environments. Like other forms of doctrine, it must be adaptable to circumstance, political tides, and the emergence or departure of key personalities, leaders, and spoilers. Such work is inherently context driven, yet it must also be outcomes focused, or in defense terms, “strategic.”

For those involved in designing, conducting, or evaluating DSP capacity building, there are few, if any, axiomatic ways of conducting these interventions.⁹ This is even truer for DSP work than for other DIB pillars, as DSP capacity building tends to be broader, more variable, and much more dependent on host country context. The U.S. experience conducting DIB in dozens of countries illustrates some of the key factors that drive how practitioners can or should approach DSP activities, using common DIB processes

described in detail in this volume. Much of this experience has attempted to borrow from prevailing thinking (or doctrine) in international development, such as Theory of Change¹⁰ and principles of strategic advising.¹¹ Methods from management consulting and human-centered design disciplines have also served to inform DSP capacity building.¹² These approaches are particularly useful for exploring existing strategies and their shortfalls, the power of institutional norms and tradition, and areas where governance systems are disconnected from strategic objectives.

The following sections offer suggestions on what could be included in future DSP DIB doctrine. These suggestions are based on examples, failures, and lessons observed on the ground during DSP-related efforts in a number of countries. They are also distilled from observations of fellow practitioners and foreign partners. In keeping with other chapters in this book, these suggestions are shared using some of the key phases of DIB efforts and projects. The bias is toward providing observations drawn from countries where the United States lacked a fully willing partner that acknowledged gaps in institutional capacity for DSP. An associated assumption is that doctrine for DSP work with willing partners is simpler; when a partner acknowledges gaps and wants to fix them, DIB project design and implementation are less complex, and the pace of work may be faster. That said, the suggestions that follow apply to all DSP DIB activities, even those with more favorable circumstances.

The Five Phases of DSP DIB Efforts

Phase 1: Assessment and Scoping

DSP capacity-building efforts must begin with comprehensive assessment, or scoping, as with other DIB engagements. Below, the four common sub-phases of assessment are described with illustrative DSP aspects.

Paper or “desk” review and, ideally, pre-deployment training: The first sub-phase is research and learning done by DIB practitioners, often with the help of knowledge management staff as part of a pre-deployment training cycle. Most practitioners will do this as part of their own professional approach to the work: reading country profiles, conducting library and Internet research on a country’s DSP documents, issues, and challenges, researching governance and military history, and analyzing the defense legal context for DSP work. Research on the laws and regulations that govern the defense sector is particularly relevant; as with U.S. public law regarding the DOD and the Armed Forces (e.g., Title 10), understanding host nation laws is vital.

In the author’s experience, articles on security sector reform in a given country are often instructive for DSP capacity building. Many U.S. and international think tanks also have information on national defense structures, policies, and strategic topics. Additionally, practitioners should make an effort to access the academic work of

partner-nation officials, particularly those that have written thesis papers during their time in U.S. military education institutions. In preparation for DIB assignments in both Afghanistan and Indonesia, the author also benefited from participating in a two-month pre-deployment training program. This training included briefings and discussions with country and topical experts to help orient and prepare the author for DSP work in those countries.

Policymaker and embassy consultations: Practitioners should have extensive conversations with U.S. policy makers and security cooperation officials (especially in the country team) who are interested in supporting a partner with strategy efforts. These stakeholders will have a good understanding of partner needs and ambitions, and will be able to articulate why it is in the U.S. interest to support that partner on DSP topics. Practitioners should identify which U.S. objectives are most important: what types of changes in the partner's security environment suggest the need for a new strategy? Are there new missions that the partner wants to take on that will help the United States with burden sharing in a particular region or capability area (e.g., maritime domain awareness)? To what extent has civil society or civilian leadership been involved in DSP formulation and is the time ripe for a recalibration? For example, when the Government of Kosovo requested U.S. support in conducting a security sector review coinciding with the end of supervised independence, DSP practitioners worked closely with officials in Washington and Pristina to develop an understanding of U.S. policy objectives and concerns. A key U.S. objective for this politically sensitive review was to produce recommendations for a reasonably sized and equipped defense force, which would contribute to regional stability. DSP practitioners judged that a technically sound approach to force planning and cost estimation would likely produce this result, while still respecting partner ownership of the process (which was especially salient in this case, as Kosovo officials felt they had been forced to accept the international community's views during a previous review). By identifying the issues that are foremost on the agenda of U.S. officials, practitioners will also be better placed to continue their efforts and link them to other U.S. security assistance and cooperation efforts in-country.

A great method for DSP practitioners to gain insights is to identify existing country team efforts related to assessment or strategic planning. DSP practitioners can join these efforts in real-time, or plan a scoping visit to the country during one of these reviews. Wherever possible, they should try to participate in annual evaluations of the security cooperation office and country security cooperation planning.

In Indonesia, including visiting security assistance teams or DIB practitioners into these internal processes was advantageous. As part of the assessment of maritime strategy and policy capacity building needs in-country, these visitors brought new perspectives and technical expertise to add to the assessment process. The practitioners also benefitted by learning from the discussions in ways that they may not have otherwise seen or heard during a typical scoping visit.

Consultations with host-country officials: Practitioners and security cooperation officials can best achieve the third sub-phase of assessment through a teamed approach in consultations with defense counterparts. This may occur simultaneously or sequentially with the second sub-phase above. Security cooperation officers can transfer their knowledge of a counterpart's security and defense agenda, current issues, and challenges. They have existing knowledge of and relationships with the country's defense leaders and staff. As such, security cooperation officers will often hear the demand signals from a partner for DIB support on DSP topics. There may even be a DIB practitioner assigned to the country team as an advisor or technical expert, who will be more aware and focused on identifying DIB gaps and opportunities.

DSP practitioners will benefit from this kind of teamwork. On arrival in Afghanistan, for example, existing advisors provided the author with orientation, familiarization, and updated training on Afghan culture within the military. They introduced Afghan counterparts, ministerial organizational structures, strategic and planning documents, and associated capacity gaps. This was uncommon; there is not usually a formal handover from one advisor to another.

Consultations with a wide range of host-nation experts are recommended. DIB experts will need one or more scoping visits to do this well. These visits should include office calls, briefings, and informal discussion sessions with stakeholders, such as:

- Officials directly involved with the strategy, planning, or policy issues that will form the basis for a capacity building project.
- Offices that handle international cooperation, or the defense diplomacy aspects of bilateral defense cooperation for most ministries or military headquarters. These offices should also be consulted. They will be involved with coordinating future meetings, arranging for access, and may also regulate security access/approvals.
- Officials providing guidance to the defense sector. This includes coordinating ministries, presidential/prime minister staff, parliamentary staff, or planning/finance ministries. They can help diagnose what is working well and what could be improved in a nation's defense strategy, planning, or policies.
- External experts, including researchers, think tank staff, retired military or defense officials, and academics can also be useful sounding boards.

DIB practitioners should consider using human-centered design methods during this work. This ranges from ethnographic research (e.g., looking at which offices and in what conditions strategy and policy making are done, and how), to assessing how people and systems interact in DSP (e.g., understanding stakeholders through mapping key relationships). The objective for all of these interactions is to identify where useful DSP capacity building work can be done.

Information synthesis: The final sub-phase of initial assessment involves the synthesis of this information by the DIB practitioner or team. The objective is to identify initial hypotheses: Where are the main institutional capacity gaps? What are the immediate needs?

How might these be explored through initial DIB engagements, demonstrations, or pilot projects? Practitioners will need a disciplined process for sifting through their observations, evidence, documentation, and research material. Key questions to explore are: does the partner have existing strategy, planning, or policy processes and documentation? What are the initial impressions of the human capital working on these topics? To what extent is top-down guidance shaping or directing DSP? How are these DSP processes driving priorities, military activity, and budgets? What gaps in understanding still exist about the partner's defense context, military history, or bureaucratic culture?

During the author's initial assessment phase in Afghanistan, these types of questions led to nagging concerns. U.S. capacity-building efforts had imposed formulaic U.S.-centric processes and timelines on DIB partners. This was done without sufficient accounting for host-nation ownership. There was also a lack of empathy on the part of U.S. assistance providers. Through similar scoping synthesis, DIB practitioners will be able to: identify what additional scoping work or research needs to be done; note where a partner may most welcome or need initial DSP capacity building; clarify if existing assistance needs to be adjusted; and determine how such work will benefit the partner and the United States.

Assessment will continue over the lifespan of any DIB program or activity. For DSP projects, this is especially true. As the DIB pillar that is the most sensitive and reactive to external and internal events in a host nation, regular assessment checks are needed. Changes in government policy, the arrival of new civilian or military leaders into key positions, or tensions with neighboring countries can all trigger institutional shifts in strategy and policy.

Phase 2: Demonstration

Practitioners must prove they can be relevant. In work with the host nation and counterparts, practitioners must demonstrate appreciation and respect for the partner's DSP system and needs. By bringing initial knowledge, examples, and illustrative approaches to the partner for consideration, they can gain trust and demonstrate expertise. There may be engagements where the practitioner has to demonstrate subject matter expertise on strategy, planning, or policy development. Practitioners must be able to draw upon their own experiences, knowledge of core DSP principles, and associated international and U.S. practices and examples.

This phase requires some degree of humility, as well. Practitioners will know that best practices from other countries have their limitations, and are not always perfectly replicable. Being able to discuss these experiences with a counterpart in a calibrated and contextualized way is vital. For example, the author's experience with several Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) in the United States initially seemed like a good source of anecdotes or methods of planning to share with host nation counterparts. After all, QDRs include work on multiple DSP processes. However, for countries like Indonesia, with an executive cycle different from that of the United States and which uses a World Bank-based central planning system, QDR timelines and components may not work as well.

Likewise, DIB practitioners should demonstrate their knowledge to U.S. officials, at multiple levels. All relevant U.S. staff will be assessing the practitioners' utility, be it the country team, a regional combatant command security cooperation office, or policy and program managers at the headquarters level. This is the test of credibility and adaptability that can sometimes doom a practitioner or team. If a DSP practitioner fails to understand how a country's own governance systems are different than those of the United States, but keeps pushing for solutions that copy U.S. procedures, this should be a reason for the country team to prevent that individual or team from coming back and continuing their work.

A tagline for this phase is "get invited back," which means two invitations. The most important invitation to return is from the partner. The most difficult return invitation to earn can sometimes be from your own government.

Phase 3: Project Design

Practitioners conduct their capacity-building project design based on their assessments. Their project design should lead to one or more capacity-building approaches and associated plans that identify what elements of DSP capacity building will be conducted, what commitments the partner has agreed to, and a schedule for these activities. Project plans should identify long-term capacity goals (e.g., an improved strategy development system that restrains and guides defense budgets), and include shorter-term pilot projects or "quick wins" (e.g., sharing best practices in analyzing security and military trends). The latter is important to bolster confidence with a partner, and to demonstrate capacity-building benefits immediately relevant to better strategy or policy processes. Long-term goals, or what are sometimes referred to as "the North Star" that guides strategy efforts, are the five- to ten-year milestones that a DSP project is seeking to influence, support, or catalyze. This may be to drive a multi-year budget plan or to shape a long-term set of weapons systems and capability investments that will change the partner's defense posture. The design of these projects necessitates multiple interactions with the partner and includes the designation of a project sponsor and set of working-level counterparts.

In U.S.-NATO advisory work with the Afghan Ministry of Defense, the U.S. DSP team worked on project design efforts on several levels simultaneously.¹³ By 2011, the long-term NATO objective was to support Afghan establishment of ministerial functions and required offices capable of conducting strategy, defense diplomacy, policy, and budget planning/programming. Many projects were being implemented already. Other DSP projects needed to be established or re-scoped based on the team's assessment of gaps in the approach and feedback from Afghan partners.

A practitioner on the DSP team identified Afghan interest in military center of gravity analysis as a good defense analysis approach helpful to DSP work. This analytic approach was understood by some experienced Afghan leaders, but not widely understood across the MOD. The DSP practitioner leveraged several months of assessment work and relationship building with his ministerial counterparts to discuss and then co-design a capacity building workshop on center of gravity analysis and related Clausewitzian theory. The workshops

included Afghan speakers who could present operational and historical experiences that described the value of center of gravity analysis in the Afghan context and Afghan way of war. The workshops incorporated educational materials from U.S. military education institutions to bolster their credibility and the materials were prepared in both English and Dari. Many more hours went into project planning and design than the implementation itself, and it paid off. In departure calls with Afghan ministerial officials, it was repeatedly referenced as one of the most impactful workshops the team conducted during that tour.

This anecdote is an example of how DSP practitioners can design capacity building to account for host-nation buy-in, needs, and absorptive capacity. In some cases, project design for defense strategy may need to look different than capacity building for defense policy and vice-versa.

Defense strategy project design: A common project effort is to support a nation conducting a strategic review, or assessment, of its security and defense needs. Another may be a full, multi-year defense strategy process improvement effort. A third common strategy project is to explore how strategy is managed with resourcing and budgeting.

Many countries struggle with using strategy to constrain and restrain budget priorities and capability investments. For example, the Indonesian MOD senior leadership asked the U.S. for DSP process support to examine the extent to which strategy was shaping budget planning. The DIB team conducted a series of process mapping workshops to allow Indonesian strategists and budget planners to see how their processes were, or were not, connected.

Some DSP projects may also favor inclusion of stakeholders outside defense and military strategy offices. This will involve drawing upon information from people in other ministries, academia, or think tanks. Projects like this may be more sustainable if external stakeholders also serve as formal project team members (such as the U.S. National Defense University or strategic policy offices of related ministries).

Defense policy project design: An initial choice to present to a partner is whether a project will be about the process of developing policy, or about a specific policy itself. Policy projects will usually have shorter time frames than strategy projects. They allow DSP practitioners the chance to demonstrate some quick wins as well: supporting development of a policy document will usually be less complex than developing a nation's defense strategy.

Defense guidance project design: DSP practitioners and their partners need to identify whether the project will emphasize force employment issues or force development. The former often relies on designing simulations and table-top exercises to test force employment options, or they can provide opportunities to link DIB with existing bilateral military exercises. Force employment efforts may also require greater interaction with joint, regional, or service military headquarters, where much of the force employment

planning expertise of a nation either resides or will be impacted. For force development projects, a DSP practitioner team should plan to include capability planners or resource/budget management experts. Likewise, such projects may need to include diverse parts of defense institutions (e.g., planning staffs and program managers or long-term budget analysts) that may not be accustomed to working together.

Phase 4: Project Implementation

A milestone for the end of a DSP project design is the formulation of the project plan, terms of reference, or other agreements that set the parameters for implementation. While there are exceptions (especially in cases where a country is willing to move directly to fixing DSP gaps or challenges), most DSP projects will have two major phases. The first phase involves practitioners transferring core knowledge on DSP, good/best practices, and lessons from U.S. and international cases where DSP efforts have gone well or poorly. The second phase involves the partner choosing to explore how that knowledge can be applied to improve systems, processes, or policies. For defense institutions struggling with change management or reform, the second phase may be delayed, or it may never occur.

DSP capacity building can take on many forms, as described in previous sections; a comprehensive list or description of these types of projects is beyond the scope of this chapter. There are, however, some unique lessons and challenges in implementing DSP projects that can inform doctrine.

“Regular” timelines are often trumped by reality: In many countries, including the United States, the work of strategists, planners, and policymakers is often associated with presumed regular schedules. Some capacity builders therefore try to use these schedules as incentives during project implementation. But in many countries, those schedules are frequently ignored or delayed (especially in countries where strategy is already disconnected from budget planning). Simple reasons can drive this (i.e., a strategy staff did not get its annual budget for conducting the work) or it can be more complex. A common challenge is senior leader turnover, which often restarts the process of a strategy or planning effort. Experienced practitioners understand that these timelines are fluid. In contrast, human resource management is a DIB pillar that is less forgiving; when soldiers are not paid, they tend to only tolerate such failures in management for so long before revolting. The cold reality for many defense institutions is that DSP activities are often considered nonessential for a ministry of defense or a military headquarters if they want to simply appear to be functioning. In situations where this is the case, DSP practitioners will find more success by helping the defense institution understand the costs associated with not having strategy drive resource priorities. They may also be able to help a policy staff articulate to leadership the negative consequences of not having a particular policy.

Some inexperienced security cooperation officers or DIB practitioners will confuse the regular production of strategy or policies for “a functioning defense institution.” However, just because a National Military Strategy is produced every year on time does not

make it a good strategy. On arrival in Afghanistan, the author learned (to his dismay) that the U.S. had forced an annual strategic document production process on the Afghan MOD and military headquarters. We had confused form with function. Some advisors explained, “This will give them good practice in strategy and planning.” Even in the United States, we do not develop national military strategies every year. As a result, the DIB team began working with Afghan counterparts to move away from the annual production cycle for strategy documents. At the same time, we shifted our capacity building attention to more important challenges associated with force employment planning: how to plan the transfer of territorial control from NATO forces to the Afghan MOD, the Afghan National Army, and other security forces.

Strategists need to be aware of bureaucratic limitations: Most DSP DIB practitioners have lived the experience of seeing a strategy, plan, or policy fail at the execution or implementation stage in their own nations. In countries needing DSP DIB support, this challenge is even more common. Be it lack of implementation oversight, insufficient budgetary guidance, weak internal controls, or organizational resistance to strategic direction, defense institutions around the world often lack the systems required to assure DSP implementation.

A common capacity shortfall among strategists, planners, and policymakers in a defense institution is the absence of bureaucratic “savvy,” or understanding of what other parts of the defense institution need from their strategy and policy work. For DSP project implementation, it then becomes paramount that DSP practitioners use the capacity building opportunity to build awareness in their counterparts about how their work relates to the rest of the defense institution. Good methods for doing this include process mapping workshops, focus groups with stakeholders from other parts of the defense institution, stakeholder mapping (and assessment of the health of these processes and stakeholder relationships), and structured interviews/discussions with offices that use (or ignore) strategy, planning, and policy documentation.

External and internal events can disrupt or accelerate implementation: While events can alter the course of any DIB project, DSP activities are particularly sensitive to political, military, or societal changes in or near a country. For example, a new president will often mean implied and/or explicit changes to a country’s defense strategy and policies. The arrival in 2012 of the new President in Guatemala, for example, actually led to the initiation of a new DSP DIB project by the United States after that leader asked for help with reducing corruption and improving security in his country. A significant DSP and resource management set of DIB projects came to follow in the span of a few years. Regional security dynamics—such as the purchase of a major new weapons system by a neighboring country—may quickly alter the threat perceptions of a partner nation. This may change its assessment of both planning requirements and bilateral defense relations toward that neighbor. Societal views toward the military may shift, changing the way that a defense institution explains its strategies or policies to the public.

DSP DIB practitioners should monitor events within and external to the partner and adjust the approach as warranted. Within U.S. channels, regular interactions with the country team will help with this. Building in project-oriented and informal time to discuss ongoing events with DSP DIB counterparts in the MOD and military services is also a necessity. Another useful mechanism is structuring DIB workshops with time to discuss recent events, or facilitate analysis of major news items or think tank reports relevant to a country's defense sector.

Implementation may be thrust upon you without needed time to design: DSP practitioners are familiar with responding quickly to new tasks related to a strategic topic, a new planning requirement, or the need to quickly conduct policy analysis of an emerging development in defense affairs. These are typical dynamics in a modern defense organization. The same holds true for our partners and their defense institutions. The DSP DIB practitioner can be a key sounding board or otherwise support a counterpart during these times. This is especially relevant in situations where the DSP practitioner is an in-country advisor with a good counterpart relationship. Unplanned DSP DIB events may be opportunities for practitioners to either demonstrate the relevance of a project already in implementation, or quickly shift to a new implementation event that supports their counterpart. There may not be sufficient time to design a new capacity building effort, but these events can provide real world situations to road test ongoing DIB themes or objectives.

A similar opportunity emerged while in Afghanistan as NATO and coalition forces prepared to transfer security responsibility to Afghan security forces. This phased transition of geographic control became known in Dari as *Inteqal*. Coalition leadership disseminated the order to prepare for this transition and within days the DSP team was to begin the planning process with our Afghan counterparts for how this would unfold in reality. Prior discussions with ministerial counterparts on national military strategies and subordinate planning documents quickly shifted to the need to support the team's Afghan counterpart (a Deputy Assistant Minister for Strategy and Policy) with his duties for *Inteqal*. That said, this new implementation event also became a venue for practical discussions of how existing strategic objectives in the Afghan National Military Strategy translated to the operational level of security transition, and how they did not. This process also galvanized Afghan MOD understanding of the need for improved campaign planning, which energized its involvement in Army headquarters-driven planning processes. Through what quickly became an interministerial and coalition combined planning effort, numerous opportunities also arose to advise counterparts on the need for the MOD to take a leading role in coordinating political and defense leadership guidance into the planning process. These discussions provided opportunities to share lessons on civilian oversight and control of the military; discuss roles and missions of a MOD in interministerial affairs; and identify future areas for DSP capacity building.

Whether it is a regional security crisis that sparks new work within a defense institution, or the arrival of a new leader within the defense chain of command, DSP DIB

practitioners can leverage these events toward the ultimate objectives of their work with a partner. The path toward that objective may take a turn, or it may need to be blazed in a new direction, but usually such events provide new opportunities and tangible contexts for DSP to be made even more relevant with partners.

Phase 5: Monitoring and Evaluation

Ongoing monitoring of DSP capacity-building progress is required to ensure efforts are on track. Regular reviews should be scheduled. Evaluation efforts are best done at the end of major projects, or to support annual security cooperation timelines (such as the annual review of country security cooperation plans). This volume provides a good example of how to conduct monitoring and evaluation of DIB, to include associated metrics.

A few DSP unique monitoring and evaluation best practices merit attention. Country teams and policymakers alike can leverage standing bilateral defense dialogues, military-military dialogues, and staff talks to check DSP project value. Usually, such projects will be related to, or be impacted by, decisions stemming from such bilateral events.

For monitoring, DSP projects should be responsive to any changes in higher-level national strategic planning efforts. They should also anticipate any adjustments to national budget cycles. DSP projects that do not build capacity or improve processes in ways that are responsive to, and influential to, these national processes run the risk of becoming irrelevant.

During evaluation phases, external evaluators and practitioners should assess DSP projects against conditions across the security sector, and not simply in relationship to producing better defense or military outcomes. Determining progress toward U.S. interagency goals in the country's Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) is also warranted. Many U.S. ICS objectives tend to be directly tied to the DSP pillar of the defense management framework.

Future Issues and Conclusion

For those interested in the future of defense strategy and policy capacity building in the DIB context, there are four issues for consideration, further debate, and incorporation into future security cooperation approaches. Some are born of lessons gained while working at the country team level, others are cumulative in the author's experience at the policy level and in working with DIB program managers and practitioners.

- *Help security cooperation officers and in-country practitioners by better linking DSP DIB activities with individual training and education programs provided through IMET, FMF, or other security assistance:* Many host-nation strategy and policy leaders (or future leaders) benefit from education at premier U.S. war colleges and defense education institutes. But their involvement and participation in DSP

capacity building in their own country is often spotty, or not well coordinated. Host nation officials leading or participating in DSP projects often miss the chance to be involved in such individualized education. A good first innovation would be to identify existing strategy and policy courses, professors, and degree programs that could be linked with DSP activities in-country. Ideally, this would be in a digital format that could more easily be used by security cooperation officers and partner-nation officials alike to improve capacity building integration and effectiveness.

- *Develop simpler and more useful doctrine for synchronizing DSP and DRM:* While practitioners and DIB program managers have done good work on these related, but different pillars of defense management, more forums for discussion and deliberation between practitioners would be beneficial. With multiple U.S. DIB programs now having accumulated experience in many country projects, it could be beneficial to convene practitioners associated with these projects. They could report on crosscutting lessons, develop areas of doctrinal innovation, and develop training materials for future teams and advisors pursuing this work in the field.
- *Consider reforms to U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) processes and equipment assistance programs to better integrate DSP capacity building as part of the sales and equipping processes:* Country teams can do more to consider the strategy and policy aspects of a host nation's interest in FMS or a particular grant aid weapons system. There appears to be room for improvement in how the strategic orientation of a country's defense needs is assessed and considered as part of such weapons sales or assistance. Additionally, the United States could do more to require or link DSP capacity building to traditional FMS or equipment assistance programs. Such changes may help reduce the common risk that such sales and assistance end up being improperly sustained or mismanaged by partner nations.
- *Research and test ways to better combine capacity building for DSP and joint concepts:* While mentioned briefly in this chapter, better capacity building on joint concepts as part of comprehensive defense management and DSP efforts appears to have great promise. For example, improving how joint concepts in military exercises and operational security cooperation are linked with long-term institution building merits greater attention. Country teams, regional combatant command staffs, and policymakers seeking to achieve U.S. security cooperation goals could leverage such improved DIB doctrine for joint concepts for higher-level defense objectives. The United States has tremendous experience of joint concepts. In many ways, the United States has comparative advantages in jointness, which is acknowledged by many security cooperation partners and foreign militaries. These strengths should be leveraged to improve the relevance and impact of U.S. DIB programs and activities.

With the insights gained from many years of DSP capacity building conducted by the United States and other countries, there is emerging doctrine for how such work ought to be conducted. As argued above, DSP capacity building will be more efficacious in countries where conditions are conducive for the successful articulation of national goals, roles, and missions for its security sector. That said, the processes of DSP capacity building, even in less favorable conditions, can be useful in pursuing other U.S. goals—especially in fragile states or in other countries for purposes of supporting TAO and improved democratic civilian control.

Practitioners have been producing significant lessons learned for DSP work in the field and why it should matter to policymakers, to which the DIB and DOD communities should pay greater attention. The doctrine derived from some of those lessons, as described above, is closely linked to which phases of DSP DIB activity are happening in a given country. This doctrine will continue to evolve. Within the pillars of defense management there is more work to be done on harmonizing doctrine. This is especially true in relation to how DSP is synchronized with resource management and joint concepts.

U.S. national defense strategies of the future will likely continue to call on our allies and partners to do more to support global security. Defense strategy and policy capacity building can be central to making that aspiration a reality. The security cooperation system and its leaders are prone to promoting training and equipping to achieve those ends. The United States should ask that same system and its leaders to better promote institutional capacity building for DSP, lest burden sharing efforts fail due to the fragility of a partner's defense strategy and policy framework.

Notes

1 There is a difference between strategy and policy made at the defense level, and policy made at the military service or joint headquarters levels. Defense strategies encompass subordinate military strategies; for example, they also provide guidance to non-military organizations and personnel in a defense sector (for example, defense agencies, ministerial offices, etc.). For ease of reading, “defense” is used as the umbrella term. Doctrine for defense strategy and policy capacity building is generally the same for associated military-oriented DSP work, although military organizations have important cultural, organizational, and mission differences that will impact strategy and policy formulation at the military headquarters level and below.

2 Zoltan Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 355-356. Barany provides a useful discussion of why it is important for countries in democratic transition to identify the right military missions, so that these militaries will be sized and shaped to be relevant to the direction of that democratic change. For DSP practitioners that may be working in a state experiencing such a transition, defense strategy processes can be very useful to supporting a review of new or needed missions for a military undergoing reform or change.

3 Policies exist throughout a defense enterprise to direct the work of organizations and people. Policies are used to keep organizations and staff aligned as they do that work. Personnel policies, logistics policies, and budget policies all play important roles in helping defense institutions manage day-to-day activities. Defense policy in this definition operates at a political-military level as described.

4 Joint concepts are important for defense institution building as they help defense and military institutions to identify more effective and efficient ways to manage their organizations, budgets, and military units. A simple example relates to airpower across multiple services. Without joint concepts being used to shape defense choices, defense institutions may naturally evolve to have airpower and aviation capabilities in every single service in ways that are not needed. In systems where oversight or management is not good, this may result in each military service investing in or trying to maintain similar types of aviation aircraft (such as helicopters). This may also result in these aircraft being very expensive to maintain, or operate, which can often lead to management choices

to not fund readiness or sustainment. Over time, a nation may have a large helicopter fleet, but it will not be able to operate those aircraft when it needs to (due to resultant operational readiness shortfalls). Using joint concepts to inform “force development” choices can help identify how a smaller number of aircraft, associated with joint missions and tasks, can be maintained and operated at lower cost (e.g., efficiency) but still get the required military activities accomplished (e.g., effectiveness). While beyond the scope of this paper, and still evolving as an area of DIB discipline, joint concepts and their utilization in DIB capacity building are topics worth additional academic study and practitioner discussion.

5 U.S. Code, Title 10, “Armed Forces,” § 118.

6 Republic of Indonesia Ministry of Defense and U.S. DOD, Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation, October 26, 2015.

7 Elliot Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 2002), 205-207. Cohen’s arguments on civilian control and civil-military dialogue are instructive to this point. He argues against those that believe civilian leaders should simply identify the goals of a strategy or a war and then let the military determine the ways and means to conduct them; he believes this is deeply misguided. Rather, he sees that the right lessons from history should be, “above all, that political leaders must immerse themselves in the conduct of their wars no less than in their great projects of domestic legislation; that they must master their military briefs as thoroughly as they do their civilian ones; that they must demand and expect from their military subordinates a candor as bruising as it is necessary; that both groups must expect a running conversation in which, although civilian opinion will not usually dictate, it must dominate; and that conversation will cover not only ends and policies, but ways and means” (emphasis added).

8 United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 6-51 to 6-53.

9 Intervention is used here as borrowed from international development terminology.

10 Isabel Vogel, “Review of the use of “Theory of Change” in international development,” UK Department for International Development Review Report, April 2012, available at <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a5ded915d3cfd00071a/DFID_ToC_Review_VogelV7.pdf>, 8-12. For an overview of theory of change history and usage within international development efforts, see Vogel: “Theory of change comes from both evaluation and social change traditions, so it is being used both by smaller civil society organizations and by donors. Development agencies and organizations are mainly using theory of change for evaluation, but it is increasingly being used for program design and to guide implementation. Perceived benefits include an integrated approach to design, implementation and evaluation and better analysis of the program context than other approaches.”

11 Nadia Gerspacher, *Strategic Advising in Foreign Assistance, A Practical Guide* (Boulder, CO: Kumarian Press, 2016), 27-38.

12 Luma Institute, *Innovating for People Handbook of Human-Centered Design Methods* (Pittsburgh, PA: LUMA Institute, 2012).

13 Technically, in 2011 and 2012, ministerial advising with the Afghan Ministry of Defense was not a declared NATO mission. It was a U.S. mission, under the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Commander (the commander was dual hatted as the NATO Training Assistance-Afghanistan Commander). Other countries joined this effort in their respective bilateral mechanisms. This included the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Germany, Estonia, and others. In practice, however, our Afghan partners saw us as representing the NATO coalition, and we operated as a multilateral staff. For simplicity sake, the author uses NATO advisors or capacity builders to describe our efforts.

Human Resources Management

Henry A. Leonard

Strategic human resource management (HRM) is a fundamentally important institutional capability for all defense organizations, and thus a key element of defense institution building (DIB). Although each nation manages its defense institutions differently, every nation needs its own overarching concept, along with policies, plans, and programs, to manage its security forces and the people in them. HRM combines with other technical elements, such as resource management and logistics, to form the pillars that support the overall administration of a nation's defense sector. Successful strategic human resources (HR) systems provide not only for the armed forces themselves, but also for the organizations and institutions that support those forces. Absence or failure of this pillar would be a serious if not fatal flaw in a nation's overall defense posture. Accordingly, partner nations have a significant interest in adapting and transforming their strategic HR systems to align with modern best practices.

Despite this basic motivation, support for efforts to transform strategic HRM institutions can be particularly challenging. HRM is inherently complicated in the best of circumstances: its different elements are closely interwoven and frequently in tension with one another, sometimes in ways that cannot be foreseen. One classic example is the tension between current readiness, which argues for retaining people in positions longer to capitalize on their experience, and readiness in the longer term, which argues (up to a point) for rotating more people through key developmental positions. This is just one of the myriad balances that strategic HRM systems, and the people who implement them, must achieve. In addition, defense sector HRM institution building in many of our partner nations faces challenges presented by socio-political, cultural, and economic circumstances, alongside challenges posed by vested interests within existing political and military structures. Collectively, these challenges can produce considerable inertia, which makes strategic HRM transformation programs simultaneously more challenging and more important than they would otherwise be.

This chapter begins by discussing the overall goals and vision for a typical DIB effort to support transformation of strategic HRM institutions, and presents a general framework for designing such support for ministries of defense, general staffs, and armed forces staffs in their efforts to modernize their institutions and practices. The concepts, principles, and a greater share of the methods themselves apply more or less equally to the management of the military and civilian defense workforce, and should be viewed in that light. The

discussion then turns to a more detailed presentation of a strategic HRM concept and a model to accompany it, including insights drawn from work with partner nations over the past several years. The next section draws directly and heavily from experiences with partner nations and discusses two cases that bring out many of the points discussed earlier, as well as insights into some of the challenges faced by those attempting to build more modern defense institutions. The chapter ends with some general considerations and conclusions that highlight the more important aspects of the model.

DIB and Strategic HRM

The general purpose of DIB is to advance strategic U.S. objectives by working with partner-nation defense officials to define requirements for the transformation of their defense institutions and to establish a shared approach to address those requirements. More specifically, this involves helping partner nations build effective, transparent, and accountable defense institutions, thus advancing the ideals of democracy and the rule of law, as well as key strategic interests.¹ DIB programs aim to empower partner-nation defense institutions to establish or re-orient their policies and structures to accomplish those ends, including making their institutions more affordable and responsive to civilian oversight.²

Human resource management transformation efforts include modernizing strategic HRM institutions and practices, enhancing the professionalism of defense workforces, and improving the ability of the people in partner-nation defense organizations to coordinate operations with other modern defense forces engaged in cooperative international efforts. Considering this framework, the foundations of a strategic HRM system include transparency, meritocracy, efficiency, effectiveness, and a carefully maintained balance between short- and long-term goals. Similar to the other pillars of strategic defense institution management, it is also important for the system to include suitable requirements and measures for evaluating the impacts of the various policies and procedures being put into effect.

Accomplishing the three HRM goals outlined above requires the active participation of both the senior leadership and key leaders and staffs in the defense sector, and on occasion those in other institutions. Although DIB HRM teams typically do most of their work with staffs directly concerned with HRM—e.g., the HRM departments in the ministry of defense (MOD), the J-1 or G-1 divisions of the joint or general staffs, and the G-1 divisions of service staffs—it is important that they connect periodically with more senior officials in the ministerial or senior military leadership. It is also important that they connect with the most senior officials—i.e., department or division chiefs—in the HRM arena, as well as with their staffs. For instance, DIB teams have interacted with the deputy ministers responsible for HRM, principal deputy ministers, and occasionally the defense ministers themselves. On the military side, the teams have regularly met with J-1s or their

deputies, and periodically with chiefs of defense staff or their deputies. Where appropriate, they have also had sessions that combined defense HRM staffs and key officials in civil service or veterans outreach agencies.

Aligning HRM Objectives with Strategic Defense Goals

This chapter highlights the importance of ensuring that a partner's overall strategic goals are appropriately reflected in its strategic HRM goals; the emphasis given to this connection is a distinguishing feature of the model discussed below. While this may seem more or less intuitive to most HR experts, partner nations do not always have the capability to make these important connections or to describe the processes by which national strategic goals drive—as they should—the goals of the HRM system. Thus, this principle can be overlooked or given too little attention in practice. From a DIB HRM standpoint, this means that work with any partner nation must be based on a mutual understanding of the nation's overall strategic goals, how these goals lead to appropriate force designs and goals for HRM, how the various processes for achieving HR objectives are put into practice, and how the processes currently work.

A national strategic goal could be, for instance, “defend the nation's territorial integrity.” This clearly necessitates land warfare and in many instances maritime capabilities, thus giving rise to requirements for land, naval, and air forces. These requirements also include a command and control structure to plan, coordinate, and execute operations; an institutional structure to raise, train, equip, maintain, and sustain the forces; and a resource management system to provide funding to support all those activities. All the organizations responsible for these functions must also be provided with the human resources to accomplish them. Actual force requirements depend on a host of other factors, including the country's overall geopolitical environment and the degree of cooperation and support agreed upon with allies, if any, or other friendly nations. While these connections are not solely the responsibility of HR managers, the act of making the connections and turning them into force designs is, among other things, an act of strategic HRM and should be considered as such. It follows that learning about how the partner nation conducts these processes, and how its HR community translates force designs into manning and workforce development requirements, should be part of a preliminary examination of that nation's strategic HR posture.

HRM Assessments

Conducting a preliminary examination to determine the status of strategic HR practices and institutions, and of current efforts to transform them, is fundamental to the design of any DIB effort. This assessment—based on the HRM implications of the national defense strategy—starts with an exploratory visit to the partner nation to discuss goals and objectives with defense officials, members of the U.S. country team, and, where present and as appropriate, other members of the international community engaged in similar support efforts. These introductory discussions also give the partner nation's defense

leadership an opportunity to learn about the DIB team's plans and the views, experience, and perspectives of the team's members, and to shape those plans to complement their own transformation efforts. This scoping process endeavors, as much as possible, to examine the current state of the defense workforce and to learn how the partner-nation leadership would like to see it develop. Planners of the DIB effort need to gain familiarity with current institutions, policies, and practices designed to develop a professional defense workforce, acquire any current assessments as to their effectiveness, and gauge the senior leadership's understanding of their strategic HR challenges as well as their commitment to dealing with them. The teams should also obtain the partner nation's current working definition of strategic HRM and learn how it is reflected in associated strategy and policy documents. In addition, it is important to determine the partner leadership's priorities for transforming or enhancing their HRM institutions. Balance is important here as well: while it is important to understand and empathize with the partner-nation officials, it is also important for DIB teams to offer their own assessments of HRM institutions as well as the priorities for working to change them.

Those engaged in DIB efforts have to bear in mind that any nation's HRM institutions and practices are, to a significant extent, reflections of the nation's socio-political, economic, and cultural circumstances, and constrained by them. The legal framework in some partner nations can also be a more significant constraint than is commonly found in the United States and other Western countries. For example, pension system laws and regulations may apply to the entire civil sector of the nation, making it difficult to change aspects of military pensions. In short, defense establishments around the world differ considerably in their approach to the management of both uniformed and civilian personnel; and understanding these differences and the challenges they pose is fundamental to the success of any supporting effort.

Enhancing strategic HRM institutions and practices is not just about introducing new ways of doing business, but also about addressing long-standing cultural, social, political, and power relationships. These factors often make proposed changes in HRM practices contentious and difficult to achieve. American—or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or “Western”—solutions cannot be directly incorporated: opportunities for progress depend upon the unique institutional arrangements and the underlying socio-political and cultural contexts in each country.

One DIB HRM team, for instance, worked with HR staff in a partner nation to develop a means to eliminate a long-standing practice of assigning people—particularly officers—based more on the preferences of senior leaders than on the rank and qualifications of the person being assigned. Accomplishing this objective was a significant challenge: it had been a NATO Partnership Goal for almost a decade, with no visible progress. More than two years after the DIB team began working with the partner's staff, the staff was ready to take a decision briefing to the Defense Minister to accomplish this overall purpose. The Minister approved this plan and implementation has proceeded systematically over the following years, albeit amid some vestigial resistance. Understanding the existing circumstances and

their influence on HRM institutions and practices is thus an important element of the initial scoping process. This understanding also helps in maintaining perspective—i.e., managing expectations—regarding the ability of partner-nation leaders to engender change.

An Overarching Construct for Strategic HRM

Experience shows that transformation efforts are most productive when carried out in a collaborative manner. Thus, the major elements of the model presented in this chapter lend themselves to cooperative engagement. This section starts with an organizing construct for strategic HRM, drawing on the “Talent Management” concept, and continues with details regarding the key components of the framework.³

There are two important things to note about the model and the presentation in this chapter: First, no two nations are alike in their defense institutions and goals. Therefore, no two collaborative support efforts can be entirely alike, and planners have to adapt their approaches in the context of partner-nation circumstances, goals, practices, and other considerations. The model presented here enables adaptive (and selective) application, based on a planner-based assessment of goals and priorities. This model can be a decision support tool, both for conducting assessments and for designing and focusing support efforts, and has been used successfully with that idea in mind. The importance of adaptive and selective application—i.e., using the construct here as a template and not as a rigid framework—cannot be overstated in the context of DIB. While the examples and case studies in this chapter concentrate on areas where DIB efforts were needed on a larger scale, the processes, policies, programs, and institutions in a given partner nation may need only minor adjustments to accomplish their HRM goals.

Second, valid and current assessment of the partner nation’s HR situation is crucial, and it is a necessary first step toward the development of more detailed support plans. Thereafter, it is important to conduct informal assessments continuously throughout the engagement, though it may also be useful to conduct more formal reviews periodically. The construct presented here is both a basis for design and conduct of assessments, and a foundation for the design of support plans.

The strategic HRM model below is an adaptation of the Talent Management concept, and draws heavily from it. The Association for Talent Development has defined Talent Management as, “A holistic approach to optimizing human capital, which enables an organization to drive short- and long-term results by building culture, engagement, capability, and capacity through integrated talent acquisition, development, and deployment processes that are aligned to business goals.”⁴ This is a good working definition of the strategic HRM concept outlined here. It is important to stress the provision at the end of the definition, that the “processes” are “aligned to business goals.” In the context of the strategic HRM model in this chapter, that means re-wording the above passage slightly to, “aligned to the goals of the nation’s national security and military strategies.” In other words, the foundation underlying a nation’s HR strategy includes the nation’s

national security and military goals. From these goals come more specific requirements for capabilities, requirements for forces and organizations oriented on providing those capabilities, and competency requirements for the different positions in the units and organizations. This is the essence of the planning function in the construct below. The rest of the processes are then designed to support the achievement of the overall HR goals and to contribute to the ability of other processes to achieve them.

Figure 1: Strategic HRM Model




Figure 1 illustrates the strategic HRM construct used in this chapter. This chapter favors the model illustrated in Figure 1 because it explicitly establishes the need for alignment of organizational goals with HRM system goals. This model is itself a composite that draws not only from other models but also from the experience of several DIB HRM teams.


The diagram demonstrates the primacy the model gives to the overall strategy and goals, and their influence on the personnel planning process (represented by the block at the top), which derives its goals and direction from the national strategy and goals (the blue arrow at the top left connotes this connection). The essence of this model, and one of its distinguishing features, is that all three of the other major functions (acquisition, engagement, and development, and the sub-functions associated with each) derive their goals directly or indirectly from the personnel planning goals. All functions contribute individually, and often collectively, to the accomplishment of the overall goals.

Another important feature is that the functions operate simultaneously: although the planning activities drive the others, this is a dynamic model that represents the real

world in which all the functions are continually adapting to changing circumstances. The thin two-way arrows symbolize the integrated nature of the model: all the major elements influence the other elements in some way. The same can generally be said of the more specific processes that comprise each element. In fact, some of the more specific HRM processes are arguably an integral part of more than one major element; performance management (supporting both engagement and development) is but one example. The arrow connecting the results box with the strategy and goals box signifies the requirement to evaluate the overall results of the strategic HRM system in light of its contribution to accomplishing the nation's strategic goals.

There are other models (and accompanying diagrams) that illustrate the various elements of HRM and their connections with one another. Many in the strategic HRM community are familiar with a model usually called the life-cycle model, illustrated in *Figure 2*.⁵

Figure 2: Life-Cycle Model



By way of brief comparison with the model represented by *Figure 1*, note that the functions illustrated in *Figure 2* are essentially confined to the management of individuals, and as such, are very closely matched to many of the functions in the strategic HRM model. But this figure does not explicitly include requirements for units, organizations, people, capabilities, and skills, so it is treating these requirements as more or less exogenous.

Figure 1 is more comprehensive; it not only includes the determination of requirements, it starts with it. This significant difference is what makes a strategic HRM model truly strategic, capturing the principle that the HRM-specific processes need to be “aligned to business goals,” and, in the case of defense-related HRM institutions, that they need to be derived from—and aligned with—national strategic goals. It would be possible to adapt other versions of the life-cycle model, especially those that can be applied at both the organizational process and individual level, to accomplish the purposes we are discussing. But the key purposes of the model in the DIB context—establishing a framework for the assessment of partner-nation defense HRM practices and for designing and guiding support for their transformation efforts—remain constant regardless of the model chosen.

The Strategic HRM Model in More Detail

The following subsections provide more detail on the contributing elements in the strategic HRM functions (planning, acquisition, engagement, and development). They draw, as appropriate, from the Talent Management strategic HRM model outlined in *Figure 1*. The primary purpose of these subsections is to provide additional detail regarding the numerous elements and sub-elements of a strategic HRM system. Taken as a whole, this section is a template—a “teachable model”—that can aid in the design of an assessment of a partner nation’s HRM institutions, policies, and practices, and in the design of the DIB efforts specified in that assessment. It starts with drawing HRM goals from the national strategic goals, and proceeds to show key elements of workforce planning, systems for acquiring and retaining talent, means for developing the workforce, and programs that engage with and sustain the workforce. This section also includes considerations for a records management system, which, in one form or another, is a crucial supporting system in strategic HRM.

Connecting Strategic Goals with Strategic HRM

This connects with the “plans” block in *Figure 1*. If strategic HRM processes are to derive from and support the overall national security strategy, they should be founded on a method for drawing from national strategic goals, capability, and force requirements to articulate the workforce requirements that form the foundation for the human resource strategy; the means for developing the overall HR strategy; and the institutions to implement it. Each of these can be addressed separately, as in the discussion that follows, which also addresses some key sub-elements that enable the overall process.

The national security strategy’s implications for capabilities turn into more specific requirements for forces, manpower, and skills through functional links between the development of national defense requirements and the delineation of strategic HRM requirements and goals. Those responsible for strategic HRM (not just the HRM staff) must first translate strategic defense goals into required capabilities for military forces. Many readers will see here a notable similarity with capability-based planning. The processes are nearly identical until one considers the more detailed HRM functions. The next steps include

deriving operational and institutional requirements from national security and military plans, identifying roles and missions for military forces and supporting institutions, and translating roles and missions into organizational designs both for the military forces and for their supporting institutions. The organizational designs and requirements then utilize a job and position classification system to establish specific manning needs: numbers, skills, and grade levels for military and civilians in operating forces and their supporting institutions. There must also be a process in place for ensuring accessions, retention, career management, and professional development processes are and remain consistent with manning requirements.

These processes and those listed below are iterative and may in some cases be simultaneous or nearly so, as suggested by the feedback loops and the “Measure and Evaluate” section of the strategic HRM diagram presented above. It is also important to note that the required force has to be determined not only in the context of strategic requirements but also in the context of the capabilities to produce, develop, equip, and sustain it, both in the near term and in the longer term. The HRM system needs to have a rationally developed set of requirements to man either the operating forces or the supporting institutions with any reasonable chance of success. Partner countries have been known to develop force designs that are not compatible with the manning system, and may in fact not be feasible at all considering resource and political constraints. In other cases, HRM staffs are trying to manage workforces without a sufficiently developed force design. In one case, a partner nation continues to try to develop certain types of forces that are not best suited to the operational context in which those forces will operate. In another case, a partner nation is still struggling to develop and articulate a concept for the employment of reserve forces, from which would flow the specification of capabilities, and then numbers, types, and designs for units in the force. This challenge spills over into specification of manpower requirements for active forces as well. Until the armed forces staff and leadership can define the concept and its derivative requirements, the HRM workforce planning process will continue to lack a well-developed set of requirements, and thus will have significant difficulty in meeting either active or reserve force manning goals.

Manning requirements—specified in terms of positions, ranks, grades, qualifications, skills, experience levels, and the like—become the fundamental goal for the HRM strategy and the means for implementing and assessing its success. Like strategy development processes, this generally involves establishing and articulating strategic HRM goals, identifying ways and means to accomplish those goals, and articulating the goals, objectives, ways, and means in an overall statement of the HRM strategy. In this process, it is important that the HRM system take into account both current requirements and the need to sustain the force over time. The latter starts with specifying, establishing, and maintaining a sustainable grade and experience profile for the force, consistent with manning requirements drawn from the force design. Put simply, sustainable profiles are those that allow for natural aging and attrition of the force: ideally the profile has more people with six years of service than with seven, and so forth. This rather simple theory is

difficult to put into practice; U.S. and other Western military services frequently struggle with it, especially when downsizing. The challenge becomes more acute when—as is the case in some partner nations—the actual profile is skewed toward the longer years of service, with a significant trough in the middle years. Regardless of the current size and shape of the personnel profile, the establishment of a sustainable one is a key strategic HRM goal. Once the strategic goals have been articulated, the next steps require translating the strategy into specific policies, procedures, and implementing guidance; this is an area where DIB teams are likely to find themselves engaged repeatedly.

A parallel process involves identifying the financial resources required to support all the HRM functions, and ensuring programming and budgeting processes suitably account for those requirements. The main cost of this resource requirement comes from compensation, benefit, and pension systems; legacy compensation systems in partner nations frequently consume disproportionate shares of small defense budgets. Additional costs include recruiting operations and the operations of HRM institutions and their infrastructure.

The nation must also have in place the strategic HRM institutions needed to accomplish the purposes described above. If those purposes are clearly delineated, this process will be much easier; in many cases, it will involve relatively minor refinements or adaptations to existing institutions. Depending on the presence and suitability of strategic HRM institutions, some combination of the following steps will aid in their creation, refinement, or adaptation. Identifying responsibilities and aligning the strategic HRM system and its institutions with the designed strategy is the first step. Which agencies will be responsible for which elements of HRM? Where does ultimate responsibility for policy formulation and oversight lie? How will the different elements coordinate their efforts and account for their impacts on one another? These are fundamental questions DIB HRM teams have confronted in many partner nations. Depending on the answers to questions like these, DIB teams also assist in assessing the ability of HRM institutions and policies to carry out their responsibilities and in identifying areas for refinement or improvement. In turn, this process can lead to the development of alternatives for reorganizing and augmenting HRM institutions and agencies at the MOD, joint staff, and service HQ level as needed, and to the development of ideas for training and educating staffs and other key implementing personnel.

Last, but not least important, is the theme of designing and implementing systems, with associated metrics to evaluate the success of the HRM strategy and its policies, and compliance with HRM guidance.

Workforce and Succession Planning

In the context of our HRM model, the term “succession planning” refers to the ability to project anticipated vacancies and turn those projections into requirements for replacements—either from the existing manpower pool or from new hires.⁶ An additional challenge in succession planning is that it is an iterative process: replacements coming

from within the pool must themselves be replaced. This process could perhaps as easily be added to the workforce design parts of the strategic HRM planning considerations described above; in the model diagram it belongs in the planning box. Succession planning is discussed separately in this section because it is distinct as a specific responsibility of the human resource community and because it forms a good connecting bridge with the acquisition, development, and engagement functions that follow. In particular, this bridging step forms the basis for accession and retention planning, and for many of the elements of career management as well.

A capable workforce planning process tracks and projects anticipated losses and pending vacancies using some kind of measurable model. The technical complexity of this process depends on its magnitude and on the cultural characteristics and technological capabilities of the partner nation. Small forces do not need elaborate systems to project vacancies; larger ones will be better served if they have a comprehensive analytical system that supports accurate projections. Given reliable projections, the organization can determine how vacancies will be filled, including where candidates will be drawn from (new hires, transfers, promotions). The process must also account for the requirements for each position, in order to accurately allot candidates to open positions. These derive from the force design process, and could include rank, technical skills, or years of experience. By aligning the projected losses and vacancies with specific requirements, organizations are able to evaluate whether their existing applicant pool contains enough qualified candidates, or if more need to be sought, for example, through outside or civilian hire, recruitment, conscription, or some combination.

The assignment system must also be tied to the career management system to ensure positions are filled not just on the basis of immediate needs and qualifications for the position in question, but also with a view toward the experience and exposure (either managerial or technical) the position will provide in developing the incumbent for other positions in the future. This implies the need to connect the succession management and assignment systems with training, education, selection, and professional development systems in a comprehensive career management system. This is one of many examples of the ways in which different elements of the HRM system influence and depend on one another in important ways. In many partner nations, these connections are better understood in theory than in practice. In designing these planning systems, the partner nation must ensure that they employ fair and transparent assignment and selection protocols that permit transparency and accountability.

Lastly, partner nations must design a succession plan for senior leadership and other key positions. This may or may not be included in the processes described above; many military services (including those of the United States) have separate—generally board-supported—selection processes for filling many key positions at more senior levels.

Systems for Acquiring and Retaining Talent

This is the “acquisition” element of the model. Arguably, the retention components could

be considered part of development or engagement—another example of how the different elements are intertwined. Noting these close connections, retention is included here because it is a means of acquiring (or re-acquiring) people to fill the vacancies determined in the workforce planning process. Recruiting and conscription (which can be and frequently are used simultaneously) are also separated from the initial “onboarding” of newly acquired personnel.

There are thus three overall functions connected with acquiring and retaining talent: acquisition itself, frequently called the “accession” process, transition (“onboarding”) of the new accessions, and retention. These all interrelate closely with requirements determination, and with the development processes.

Accessions: The HRM system identifies, screens, and acquires its new entrants (“accessions”) through a fair and transparent recruiting or conscription process, or both. To do this efficiently, the succession planning process must specify accession requirements in terms of numbers, skills, aptitudes, and qualifications. The accession system itself must set and enforce qualification standards, and must have the means for testing and screening applicants or conscripts using those standards. Accomplishing this requires due attention paid to the allocation of sufficient manpower resources to institutions responsible for the accession processes, training those personnel, and focusing and supporting their efforts with marketing and propensity analyses, advertising, and appropriately targeted incentives.

Entry and “onboarding”: Establishing and carrying out successful entry training and “onboarding” processes starts with maintaining a functional and visible link between accession plans and requirements, and the capacity of systems conducting accession training and education. For officer accessions, this will often include military academies (current or planned), and in other cases it will involve countries having their personnel trained in other nations’ military academies. The successful transition of new entrants also requires adequate resources—sufficient numbers of properly trained and qualified personnel operating in organized entry training institutions (academies, training base, etc.) with sufficient equipment and facilities to meet requirements. Finally, successful transition culminates in effective “onboarding” processes in receiving organizations; this should be a matter of interest in assessments of HRM activities.

Retention: Effective retention processes start with the establishment of retention goals based on manning requirements and predicted losses: skills, aptitudes, qualifications, and numbers, which, taken together, comprise specific retention requirements. This is yet another example of the connection with workforce planning processes. Retention planning should include the means to compare retention goals with anticipated behavior and adjusting policies or incentives accordingly, and to apply those incentives to encourage the required number of people to continue their careers. This is partly an ongoing and relatively short-term dynamic process centered on bonuses or other immediate incentives,

but over the longer term it should include periodic examination of the retention effects of the entire compensation system, including all pays and benefits. Retention processes should also identify training and education requirements and select individuals to align with them, with sufficient lead-time to allow efficient allocation of training and education resources. This aligns closely with the development function, below. Finally, the HRM system must ensure that the assignment and distribution systems place retained individuals in accordance with requirements; this is another case where periodic assessments are needed to ensure all systems are aligned.

Developing the Workforce

This function covers a very wide range of activities, all of which should trace back to overall requirements; the connections with workforce and succession planning are particularly important. The elements and sub-elements listed here also connect very closely with one another and in many ways with the engagement and acquisition functions. Of all the parts of the strategic HRM model, this major function depends the most on active participation from the leadership in operational units and supporting institutions, not just members of HR staffs. For many partner nations, professional development, education, and training are key reform activities. In some cases, education and training have been singled out as a specific NATO Partnership Goal.

Professional development system: First and foremost, there must be a comprehensive and well-maintained professional development system. This is the prerequisite for operating effective training and education systems. An effective professional development system must first project and identify vacancies, along with the education, training, and experience requirements associated with the coming vacancies. Career and assignment managers must then match the pre-requisites with available candidates in the pool, which helps to determine any needs for additional training or education for these candidates, and also enables better alignment of individual development needs with the manning requirements of the force. Note that a system for monitoring accumulated experience, training, and education is a key enabler for identifying candidates and any development needs. The result of these coordinated processes is the efficient matching of best-qualified candidates against projected vacancies.

Education and training systems: These support the professional development system outlined above, and could thus be combined. Typically, however, the institutions that perform these functions are separate from the staff and leadership organizations that accomplish the functions listed above. Whether the institutions are combined or not, the functions must be well coordinated with one another and with the assignment and career management functions. The professional development system provides the requirements for the training and education system, thus enabling the managers of that system to project and specify training and education needs for all components of the force. The

HRM system must also develop and maintain the capacity to provide required training and education. Ideally, this is a flexible capacity that can adjust, within reasonable limits, to changes in requirements. Part of this flexibility can come from judicious planning and projecting. Integrating available foreign or civil sector training and education courses with requirements determination is another potentially significant source of flexibility in matching requirements with the capacity of national institutions; this plays a particularly significant role in the training, education, and professional development systems in smaller partner nations. Evaluation and validation of the effectiveness of all of these systems, and the degree to which they are suitably coordinated, is also a key responsibility.

Selections: Requirements-based, objective, and transparent promotion and selection processes are the third major element of the development function. The basis for all of these processes is identification of vacancies by grade and specialty, in accordance with needs projected in the succession planning and professional development processes—another of the many connections among the elements of the HRM system. It is important to emphasize that selections are not just for promotions, a concept not universally well understood. An assignment manager makes selections all the time; a commander is selecting when he or she chooses someone from within the organization to move from one position to another. The selection system must be founded on objective selection criteria that are disseminated to and understood by those affected. Another significant challenge is the establishment of selection procedures (as distinct from criteria), including boards as required or appropriate, and ensuring their workings are also fully understood in the workforce. Another crucial enabler for effective selection procedures is a system for collecting and keeping records that objectively, systematically, and consistently reflect performance and other key factors connected with the selection criteria. These processes, and the evaluation and performance management systems that support them, depend heavily on the active and informed support of leaders and other supervisors in the workforce. It is therefore crucial that these individuals be well educated on the workings of the systems and their roles in them. It is also important that those directly responsible for the selection processes (e.g., senior leaders, assignment managers, board members as appropriate) be well educated regarding their responsibilities. Finally, there must be an oversight process through which the senior leadership monitors selection processes and evaluates their success and objectivity.

Engaging with the Workforce

This major function involves efforts to engage with and sustain the workforce, including provision of support for families as appropriate. Like the others, it includes a wide range of sub-elements, and many of these overlap with the other overarching functions, particularly the development function. One overlap in particular stands out: performance management, which is a key element of both engagement and development. This is included with engagement because the developmental aspects of performance management comprise one of the ways in which the leadership engages with and motivates the workforce. However,

one could just as easily argue that the most important effects of performance management are those that support workforce development. The success of all these efforts should be evaluated in light of the degree to which they accomplish the overall goals set forth in the planning process, or contribute to the effectiveness of other activities in achieving those goals.

Performance Management

Setting up and employing an objective and transparent performance management system consists of a wide range of policy development and implementation practices. This has been a matter of considerable interest for the HR communities in many of our partner nations. Performance management is a holistic process that comprises much more than just evaluations: one of the reasons it is included in this model under engagement, while also an important contributor to development. This point, and the need to keep all the elements listed in this section coordinated with and supportive of one another, is not altogether well understood by some partner nations.

Performance management starts with establishing and publishing overall goals for the system. This includes developing criteria for evaluation—professional values and standards, and key common competencies, knowledge, and skills—and developing skill and knowledge requirements by specialty and grade. This connects closely with job and position classifications (in workforce planning) and, again, with professional development. The HRM system must also organize evaluation means and methods into a comprehensive process for individual evaluations, and establish methods to be used in the evaluations: the means by which leaders and managers communicate evaluations of key traits, knowledge, skills, competence, overall performance, and potential. Typically, this is done using evaluation forms; getting these forms structured in ways that truly accomplish the purposes of the evaluation system is a frequent challenge. Another challenge is encouraging partner nations to include and stress policies for goal-setting and periodic counseling. These provisions tend to be honored more in theory than in practice.

The maintenance of links between performance evaluation and systems for selection, retention, and separation also needs attention; discussions of performance evaluation invariably lead to these links. It is important to stress that while evaluations can and should have a prominent role in selection processes, performance management should also contribute in more general ways to furthering the development and improving the abilities of the workforce to accomplish its goals. In this regard, appropriate policies and practices for other means of recognizing achievement (e.g., awards, other commendatory actions, and bonuses) can be useful contributors to the overall performance management system.

The points above make the importance of training and educating all personnel regarding the performance management system and their role in it more or less self-evident. Another potentially large stumbling block is getting “buy-in” from the leaders who have to implement the performance management system, which is critical since efforts to refine the system will fail otherwise. It also follows that overseeing the system to ensure quality

control and enable adaptation is another significant role for the HRM staff, supported by the senior leadership.

Compensation and Benefits

A total compensation/benefits system integrates the effects of numerous forms of monetary and non-monetary compensation. Such a system is generally founded on a pay program based on appropriate characteristics and qualifications of individuals (e.g., rank and experience) and reflected in basic pay tables. The system should also have supplementary compensation and bonus policies as appropriate to reward certain duties, incentivize skills, and shape the force longitudinally. It should also take account of the role that non-monetary benefits (discussed below) play in the total compensation system and, thus, of their contribution to shaping the force. Many host counterparts have trouble conceptualizing this: benefits tend to be considered as social programs and not as part of the means for motivating or shaping the force. Partner-nation HRM staff and the leadership in the force must also ensure that the total compensation and benefits system is communicated to and understood by all concerned.

Retirement and Pensions

Effective strategic HRM includes establishing a retirement and pension system that fairly and effectively rewards dedicated service, adequately provides for retirees, and complements the rest of the compensation system in accomplishing motivational and force-shaping goals. Many see this element of compensation as separate from the others, so those involved in DIB programs should emphasize the value of taking a holistic view. In particular, programs should help partners to see pensions and other retirement benefits as part of total compensation. Some partners do not have a military pension system *per se*, so pensions for military retirees come under a national pension system. In these cases, it is far more difficult for those in the HRM system to see and use pensions as part of total compensation. This does not mean giving up on advancing the holistic view, but it is an additional challenge in the design and accomplishment of DIB goals. Establishing overall goals for the retirement system helps to encourage a broader vision. Such a vision, based on national and strategic HRM goals such as sizing and shaping of the force, should lead to a system designed as an integral part of the total compensation system, including provisions for non-financial benefits that may continue after retirement. Disseminating policies and educating the force on retirement benefits is important, especially in cases where the system is being altered along the lines suggested above.

Separation and Transition Processes

These processes, in their raw forms, are simply inventory management. In a well-designed HR system, they are an integral part of total compensation; they become an effective part of both engagement and inventory management when designed fairly and efficiently, and when aligned with force shaping goals. In some cases, it will be necessary to develop

standards for separation and selective retention to accomplish these purposes. Involuntary separations are also a necessary component; fairness in their design and implementation includes provisions for independent appeal processes. Appropriate types and amounts of transition assistance enhance the fairness of the separation system, as do transition benefits. The latter should be designed with entitlement provisions tied to eligibility criteria such as length of service, disabilities, or other appropriate considerations. Veterans' outreach programs and other means of recognizing service of those being separated are also worthwhile enhancements; some of our partner nations have shown considerable interest in these kinds of programs.

Quality of Life

Many of our partner nations refer to quality-of-life institutions and practices as "social support" or a similar term. This aligns with the previous remark that many see these benefits as entitlements and social programs rather than part of the means for attracting candidates and motivating the force. The latter view deserves more emphasis: quality-of-life programs connect with many other aspects of engagement, so they are included here as one of the elements of that overall process. Ultimately, U.S. partners in other nations will try to design programs consistent with national standards, but it is appropriate to encourage them to do so with motivational (and, thus, force shaping) effects in mind as well. Examples of quality-of-life programs include, but are not limited to: medical, psychiatric, and dental care; housing, or a housing allowance that enables members of the workforce to obtain housing competitive with national standards; education benefits; and assistance in employment searches and job counseling. Many nations include recreational facilities and programs, especially where such opportunities are absent or inadequate in the civilian community. Programs for helping people obtain information about recreation opportunities and facilitating their access fall into this category as well. Note also that the other elements of engagement may affect the families of workforce members, but a common thread that runs through all of these programs is that they can be designed to have direct impacts both on members of the workforce and their families.

Appeals and Redress of Grievances

Affording access to fair and transparent systems for seeking redress is frequently called providing for "ombudsman" support. These systems are an important way of ensuring people are treated fairly, both in fact and in their own perceptions. This requires, first and foremost, that leaders and staffs be trained and supervised to execute their responsibilities for listening to and dealing fairly with valid requests for redress. There must also be policies and adequately staffed agencies within the HRM system for reviewing grievances and appeals connected with personnel management decisions; appeals of evaluations and promotion selections are prominent examples. Finally, transparency also requires that there be "ombudsman" support outside both the chain of command and the personnel management chain, available to all and understood by all to be independent. This is at least as important as providing for redress within the chain of command and the HR system.

A System for Managing Information and Records

All human resource management systems need a system for collecting, using, analyzing, and archiving information on the members of the workforce. Such a system is valuable not just for managing and tracking individual careers (reason enough to have the system), but also for evaluating the effects of policies and programs and for planning future adjustments to them. Most modern systems are automated, but that is not a hard-and-fast requirement, and many partner nations will, at least initially, be more comfortable with manual records or a system that combines digital and manual records. However, it is essential that some system be in place that stores and makes available information for decision support (e.g., assignments and selections), research, actuarial analysis, reporting, and evaluation of programs and policies. For example, such a system can be especially valuable in managing retention incentives by using longitudinal analyses (enabled by archived records) to gauge responses to these incentives. In any records system, it is also important that the information be periodically and systematically updated; contained in archived records to enable compiling of histories (like assignment records) and longitudinal analyses; and accessible, with appropriate safeguards, to personnel staffs and key decision makers. The choice of which types of information to include in the records system will naturally reflect the priorities and requirements of the partner nation; following the guidelines above will better enable designers of the system to select the right elements.

This section examines two case studies from DIB team experiences in partner nations. These cases provide some perspective on supporting the efforts of partner nations to transform their strategic human resources management, illustrate some of the points made earlier in this chapter, and demonstrate the importance of understanding and working within the extant circumstances of the partner nation. The first centers on the importance of securing and maintaining support from the partner nation's senior leaders. In the second, the partner nation's leadership was already engaged and supportive, so the DIB team's efforts focused on supporting HR staff as they put together a sound and comprehensive program for acquiring new talent for the MOD.

Case Study 1: Objective Selection and Assignment Processes

This case study examines the experiences of a DIB HRM team in supporting the efforts of a defense ministry and military HR staff to eliminate a legacy selection and assignment system that essentially amounted to patronage, and replacing it with a more objective and transparent system. The discussion brings out the challenges that socio-political and cultural circumstances can pose—in this case, the inertia endemic to a legacy military assignment practice combined with cultural influences. It also highlights one of the advantages inherent in civilian control and oversight of military practices.

The legacy system derived from the nation's connections with the Soviet Union's military establishment. It was further affected by socio-political and cultural influences that grew out of the strife inherent in the transition toward democracy, which gave rise

to loyalties and debts that influenced assignment and selection practices. As the country worked on modernizing its military, the only example they were familiar with was their legacy system—a system that was over-centralized, with unclear lines of command, and led by senior officials who frequently were selected based on personal relationships, rather than professional qualifications.

This latter practice was reflected throughout the military establishment, with officers selected for command and other key assignments based on the preferences of senior commanders, with little or no regard for the rank, experience, or qualifications of the candidates. Officers so selected were paid according to the position they held, and not by their grade, unless coincidentally. Thus, a captain filling a colonel's position was being paid as a colonel. In the early years of the transition process, this practice was justified as a means of giving responsibility to forward-thinking, Western-oriented junior officers by passing over the old line officers from the legacy force—who were being retained for political reasons. Over time, however, even as the relevance of this rationale faded and many recognized it was inconsistent with the principles of a well-ordered military personnel system, the practice became more entrenched, developing into a cultural norm of sorts.

For those in the nation's defense community interested in fostering closer partnership with NATO, this practice had to change. NATO had in fact presented a Partnership Goal calling for a change in the personnel assignment system for many years, yet nothing had been done, as the partner nation's defense and military leadership cited complications with retirement pay and other transition difficulties that would result from such a change. Changing the legacy system was also identified in a Bilateral Defense Consultation with the United States as one of the tasks to be accomplished for transformation of the personnel management system. HR staff planning to accomplish this change was under way as early as July 2009, with a projected implementation date of 2011. Nevertheless, many senior officers were more comfortable with the "flexibility" in assignments that was central to the old system, and thus rejected the reform. A directive signed by a Deputy Defense Minister directing this reform had essentially no effect. When the DIB HRM team came on the scene in 2011, it was apparent that accomplishing this transition would require not only good staff work, but also the active support of senior leadership in the MOD.

That active support materialized in the form of a new reform-minded Deputy Minister, but the process still moved slowly with resistance from those that saw this reform as too disruptive. In a private meeting with the Deputy Minister, the DIB HRM team made the case for the transition on the basis of achieving a merit-based, objective, and transparent selection and assignment system. They explained that moving the system in this direction was not really about making sure that all persons of a given rank were paid the same, but rather about making assignments by matching the rank and other qualifications required for a position with the rank and suitability of candidates to fill it. They used the analogy of conducting a procurement process but then setting aside the result of the competitive process to award the contract to a friend, which is essentially what happens when a favored officer is assigned without regard to an objective system. That example resonated well, and the Deputy Minister decided to push forward with the reform.

Case Study 2: Screening and Hiring Civilian Professionals for the MOD

In this case study, the most significant challenge facing the partner nation was the absence of a working system that used best practices to find, recruit, screen, interview, hire, and onboard new staff for the MOD. Unlike in the example above, the DIB HRM team detected little to no bureaucratic or political resistance, even at the beginning of the process. In fact, the MOD's HR staff and the Deputy Minister holding the HR portfolio were eager to move forward, while simultaneously willing to be deliberate and careful in designing their system. Other departments in the Ministry shared their enthusiasm, judiciously combined with patience in the design process, and the end result was a highly successful opening round, followed by continued success in subsequent rounds of a process that became well understood and well established.

The fundamental challenge in this project was that there were no foundations on which to base a recruiting and hiring effort. There was essentially no functioning national civil service, and patronage was a significant part of the basis for hiring and placing people. Until these efforts to build a modern recruiting and hiring system began, there had been no serious effort to attract suitable candidates to the Ministry from the partner nation's public. There had been no established screening process, interviews, or any systematic (or widely understood) assessment of the capabilities a candidate could bring to the staff, nor any means for communicating job descriptions and requirements to prospective candidates. In fact, there was little to no internal documentation of position requirements—a different but related problem whose solution is still a work in progress. All of these missing attributes are elements of a sound system for acquiring talent—i.e., the acquisition function in the strategic HRM model above—so the DIB team concentrated its efforts on supporting the design and development of such systems.

Through workshops, email discussions, the exchange of illustrative documents and templates, and the offering of ideas gleaned from other modern systems, particularly those of the United States, the DIB HRM team mentored the partner nation's staff and provided advice to guide their thinking and approach to this challenge. The terms "advise" and "guide" are especially important here: the MOD staff did all the actual work in designing and implementing the process, and the ultimate success was (and is) theirs. It is also important to note that while the MOD HR staff had the lead role in concept development, design, and implementation, they meticulously saw to it that they included representatives from the rest of the Ministry at every step. They developed and vetted an overall scheme for the process, and then partnered with a governmental testing agency to develop a test specifically designed to screen applicants for the MOD. They then determined how best to derive a short list of the best-qualified candidates, set up interview panels for each department, and complete the selection of new staff. The DIB team provided general advice and support throughout the process. Two key elements were advice on the design and content of essays to be used to evaluate candidates who passed the initial screening, and advice on onboarding processes.

Regarding the essays, the DIB HRM team first worked with the HR department's designs, which later could be adapted to apply to other departments' screening efforts. The team's advice on the essay design included: ensuring in advance that the purpose of the

essays was clearly understood by all involved in the selection process; deciding whether or not any essay questions would be connected with one or more specifics of HRM; and establishing the criteria and methods for evaluating the quality of the essays and what the content indicated about the suitability of the candidate. With those considerations in mind, the team advised dividing the prospective questions into two groups, one dealing with the applicant's experience (not just HR experience), and the second dealing with general HR and policy development issues. This second category brought out the degree to which the candidate understood contemporary HRM. For example, "Describe how HR contributes to the effectiveness of an organization in accomplishing its mission." The DIB team stressed that considerations for the essays were also largely applicable to structuring interview protocols and criteria for evaluating candidates in those circumstances.

The second specific element of DIB team support came in the area of welcoming, orienting, and onboarding new staff. The team advised the partner nation on how to bring new staff into the world of defense and defense-related institutional policies and practices; how to help them to understand the work being done at higher levels; and how to give them a sense of how and where their contributions fit in. The team reviewed and commented on several concepts, and pointed the HR staff toward several references to deepen their understanding of contemporary practices.

Within the first few months after the new program began in earnest, the Deputy Minister noted its success and praised both the work of the HR staff and the quality of the new hires. Throughout the next year, the program continued successfully; by the end of 2014, it had dealt with over 1,000 applicants, and successfully brought on upwards of 60 new hires. In 2015, the partner nation ran seven more competitions, with a view toward filling upwards of 80 positions. The cumulative extent of this effort has been considerable: more than 3,000 applicants considered, with over 600 screened successfully and qualified for interviews.

The MOD has also begun to re-compete many positions in which the incumbents were not originally selected through the open competition system. Many, but not all, of the incumbents compete successfully. Overall, this process has been a significant contribution to transparent and merit-based hiring; a NATO Peer Review Team noted this and commented favorably on the use of independent testing with a balanced interview process using selection panels in the hiring of new civilian staff.

This success resulted from the care, diligence, and hard work of the HR staff, supported by senior leadership. The DIB team's role—as it should have been—was to provide advice and support. The MOD HR staff took very seriously their role in supporting this entire process for all agencies in the MOD, frequently subordinating their own needs to those of other departments.

Other General Considerations

This section addresses some more general considerations that can help assure success both in the scoping and assessment process, and in the design and implementation of DIB HRM

plans. In the process, it also reinforces the idea that the elements of the strategic HRM model are closely intertwined. Some of these observations are drawn from “Nine Best Practices for Effective Talent Management.”⁷⁷

Nations must align their HRM strategy with their overall national security and military strategies, and the force and capability requirements that derive from them. The scoping process should determine whether or not this is already the case. Accordingly, strategic HR managers must be fully cognizant of strategic goals and adapt HR goals and practices as national goals and circumstances evolve. Note that in many instances this calls for engagement of senior defense leadership above the senior HR management levels; strategic HR managers must also see to this and be provided access accordingly.

Development of the workforce should be founded on established, basic competency (skill) requirements for each type of position at each level; ideally, these are specified in the workforce planning processes. In addition, requirements should include personal attributes connected with motivation, success, ability to work with others, leadership, and basic good character; general technical or professional knowledge beyond the essential competencies; and experience, which develops the attributes outlined above in ways that training and education cannot.

Human resource management is the responsibility of all leaders, not just senior HR officials or staff members. This cannot be emphasized enough: the system is as strong as its weakest link. For example, an ideal performance management system on paper will fail if the (largely non-HR professional) leaders who implement it do not understand it or do not believe in it, and therefore fail to make it work. Good professional development systems stress the role of leaders, and thus provide accordingly for their acculturation.

The HR system must select and reward best performers. It must identify, select, and develop based on demonstrated potential for operating at higher levels of responsibility or for the exercise of higher levels of technical skill. This is a fair process if it is transparent, objective, and understood by all concerned. But another critical element of this process is ensuring that the criteria for the best performers are truly tied to the requirements of a specific career field and, for key positions, the requirements of that position. Technical fields may require a heavy concentration of people with deep expertise, so it may be counterproductive to turn over employees in those fields at high rates simply because they are less qualified on some less relevant criteria. This is a constant source of tension in development and selection systems, and those systems should be designed to adapt to that tension. The emphasis on selecting and developing employees based on potential also means the system must reflect as much strategic patience as possible.

The system should emphasize development, but ultimately must rely on selection processes to get the right people into the right positions. This further underscores the importance of transparency and objectivity in selections, and in the evaluations that support them.

The HR system must continually and accurately communicate with the larger organization and hold itself accountable for aligning its practices with the goals and

objectives of that organization. It must also ensure the HR responsibilities of those outside the HR community are fully articulated and understood. Thus, the system should include a comprehensive set of processes and tools for monitoring its effectiveness and the compliance of the rest of the organization with HR responsibilities and standards.

Concluding Observations

As long as organizational success depends on qualified people performing the tasks they are assigned, good strategic human resource management will be at the core of that success. Strategic HRM is a complex iterative process that involves the entire organization, and the single most important prerequisite for success of the HRM enterprise is that it be fully integrated into the workings of the organization. From a DIB standpoint, this means ensuring that the partner's senior leadership provides the guidance, direction, and visible support needed to get the entire defense establishment working together to accomplish the needed HRM changes. It also means developing and continuing constructive relationships with the HRM staff to support their efforts to design policies and programs suitable to their context. Accomplishing these aims requires both empathy and strategic patience.

The model offered here, with its basis in the modern Talent Management construct, is a comprehensive approach to framing efforts first to understand, and then to adapt or refine the HRM policies and practices of partner-nations' defense communities. It is not, however, a rigid one-size-fits-all framework either for scoping efforts or for the design of follow-on DIB efforts. Those using these ideas must have sufficient expertise in strategic HRM to be able to judge which elements of the framework are applicable in the particular circumstances of the partner nation, and customize their use of the model accordingly.

Notes

1 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "Defense Institution Building," available at <<http://www.dsca.mil/programs/institutional-programs>>.

2 Naval Postgraduate School: Center for Civil-Military Relations, "Defense Governance Management Team," available at <<https://my.nps.edu/web/ccmr/-/defense-governance-management-team-dgmt->>; See also Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, *DOD Directive 5205.82 Defense Institution Building* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 27, 2016). This Directive identifies HRM as one of the core functions of DIB programs.

3 American Society for Training and Development (ADT), "How Do You Define Talent Management?," *ATD Blog*, May 08, 2009, available at <<https://www.td.org/Publications/Blogs/ATD-Blog/2009/05/How-Do-You-Define-Talent-Management>>.

4 Ibid.

5 For a sampling of the many others, see the following webpage <https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=images+for+life+cycle+model+of+hrm>.

6 In the context of this model, succession planning is broader than the more narrowly defined processes of vetting, grooming, and selecting people for key positions. The model presented here includes those processes, but is not limited to them.

7 Richard S. Wellins et al., "Nine Best Practices for Effective Talent Management," 2009, available at <<http://www.ddiworld.com/resources/library/white-papers-monographs/nine-best-practices-of-effective-talent-management>>.

Logistics

Michael Boomer and George Topic

Logistics is an elemental component of all military operations; it is not only a major function unto itself, but also a vital consideration in every other aspect. Logistics essentially undergirds operational capability in support of national security. Rear Admiral Henry Eccles, the seminal logistics theorist of the twentieth century, is credited with the idea that logistics sets the reach of the operational commander. While every commander and senior leader understands the importance of logistics, it is too often seen that a failure to consider, plan for, and resource logistics has resulted in diminished operational capability or even mission failure.

Although the definition of logistics varies from country to country and over time, several key themes and concepts are remarkably consistent. At the very least, logistics is “the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied.”¹ Different countries add more complexity to that definition so that the term can include the support required to raise, equip, train, employ, and even retire military capabilities and personnel. No matter how simple or complicated the definition, logistics activities are key to the effective deployment and sustainment of military forces. As such, the people, procedures, and technology that make up the national military logistics systems are essential to create and maintain military power. Without these elements, all of the operational capabilities that a nation might develop become unusable. Logistics, then, is one of the critical building blocks for any defense institution.

Security cooperation and engagement activities, including defense institution building (DIB), have been an important component of U.S. national security strategy, as well as military and diplomatic efforts, for many years. These activities have taken various forms, ranging from small efforts to massive programs that have transformed regional security at a strategic level. Virtually all of these efforts included a logistics component or, at a minimum, considerations of supportability. Failing to ensure that the recipient nation has the capability to effectively manage logistics can undermine the overall effectiveness and credibility of the nation or defense force the United States is attempting to assist. In this way, failure to ensure viable logistics support ultimately undermines U.S. credibility and interests.

One of the major avenues for support of friendly, allied, and partner nations is through the provision of equipment and other materiel, and logistics is a major component of ensuring the effectiveness of such equipment and materiel. Planning, management, and

accountability are all required to ensure that the generally expensive and often sensitive or dangerous capabilities offered to developing nations are appropriately used and effectively protected. During the Cold War era, for instance, robust support programs that included all aspects of logistics for major equipment programs were provided around the world by the United States and other allies. The post-Camp David Accords program in Egypt, for example, was truly transformational and resulted in very effective capabilities that have endured for over three decades. In addition to the significant purchases of advanced combat equipment (including tanks, fighter aircraft, and naval vessels), the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation worked closely with the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to build an extensive logistics system. Over the course of several decades, they modified a deeply ingrained Soviet-style sustainment program to effectively support many billions of dollars' worth of advanced U.S. systems. This included developing several generations of logistics leaders that continue to provide effective support and operational readiness today.

Yet, while it is essential to ensure that support for all equipment and materiel provided has an appropriate degree of structure and consistency, this has not always been the case. There have been instances where the need for a quick response instigated hasty assessments of requirements and political realities, producing poor outcomes; to say that some areas of the world are littered with the results of such efforts is a distressing but accurate double entendre. In addition, competition with the Soviets for influence in developing nations and regions caused the United States to make detrimental decisions concerning long-term relationships with other nations. Throughout the Cold War, assistance programs around the world essentially became an East-West battleground, where poor decisions were made not only in what equipment was provided, but also in some cases where no support was offered to extremely poor countries. Moreover, shifting allegiances, civil and factional conflicts, and the natural tendency for "partners" to play the United States against the Soviets, all exacerbated this problem. In almost every case, logistics was left as an afterthought with often regrettable results.

Success in implementing the logistical aspects of DIB programs has varied. In the post-Soviet era, many opportunities for engagement emerged across Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as countries worked to build democratic institutions and modernize their aging and poorly supported equipment. Efforts to develop institutional structures to support transformational change have taken many forms in the decades since. Some programs, such as the education of individuals through the International Military Education and Training program, are relatively easy to administer. These programs have produced senior leaders that were instrumental in transforming logistics within their nations, helping to create the capacity to further both host and donor nation interests. Yet other initiatives have proven more challenging. Some lost support over time, or were so disconnected from other efforts that they were of little consequence. In all cases, the partner nation must fully support and value any engagement effort for it to be worthwhile. The various components of the DIB programs described in this volume work toward these larger objectives through logistics modernization efforts.

This chapter is one of a series of chapters describing the functional components

and attributes of logistics programs, activities, initiatives, and plans as an integral and essential part of DIB. One of the key points in this discussion is to recognize that, like any other aspect of military operations, logistics depends on its integration with many other functional areas, and that its overall effectiveness depends in large measure on how well a plan is synchronized to optimize the use of resources. The intent in this chapter is to describe what logistics is, how it fits, and why it is important for DIB. The discussion includes a summary of the types of activities that have constituted recent engagements, major issues, and implications and the challenges of designing, planning, and executing the logistics portion of an integrated DIB program. The chapter then turns to the case of Colombia as a model for DIB logistics efforts.

Defining Logistics

One of the challenges in planning for and managing logistics is simply ensuring that there is a common understanding of what the term means; this is true within the U.S. military across services and between different organizations. For example, the question of whether medical support should be included within the logistics portfolio is a major issue in U.S. military doctrine, and management of the health services function has moved in and out of the logistics community several times in recent years. This has implications for DIB insofar as each nation approaches this issue differently. It is, however, obvious that the provision of medical support is closely aligned with logistics, provision of supplies, and patient or casualty evacuation, and that positioning and movement of medical support are both essentially logistics functions. Similarly, engineer support is aligned with the logistics community in U.S. joint doctrine, although engineer planning and management falls generally under the director for operations on military staffs.

Another difficult aspect of defining logistics in a military context—particularly in the realm of multinational initiatives and building partner capacity—is the relationship between acquisition and support throughout the life cycle of equipment. Because a great deal of the total cost of ownership—often between 60 and 80 percent—is attributed to the use, repair, support, and modernization of equipment, the line between acquisition and logistics is often blurred. Moreover, decisions made in the acquisition and design process can have a dramatic effect on the cost of operating and ability to maintain equipment systems. How individual nations manage these processes has a major impact on their logistics systems. Additionally, the fact that most nations must purchase or acquire their equipment from many different foreign countries and firms adds to the complexity of supporting a diverse array of equipment. The example of Afghanistan, where logistics challenges are almost inconceivably difficult, is emblematic of this problem. Their inventory includes vehicles from over a dozen different nations, often donated in less than ideal condition, or consisting of outdated models that require multiple supply chains and sources, and mechanics trained to service many different types and models. When you add the very low Afghan literacy

rate and the miniscule number of documents written in local languages, the problems become even more intractable.

The Complexity of Stakeholders

One factor that adds to the complexity of logistics efforts in DIB is the tremendous number of stakeholders and entities involved in planning and managing support operations, especially at higher levels. This is true not only within the U.S. government, but also in working with allies and other provider nations, international organizations, and, of course, the partner nations themselves. As with any engagement activities and capability development, other nations in the region will be affected by any significant change, even if it is simply regional “competition.” The complexity of the bureaucratic processes is an obvious and constant challenge for even the most skilled and experienced managers; resourcing, diplomatic protocols, regional security considerations, and adjusting to constant changes in all of these factors requires constant vigilance, exhaustive coordination, and, in many cases, great patience.

Within the Department of Defense, there are dozens of entities that all have an interest in or impact on security cooperation programs. Many are identified and discussed in various parts of this volume, but several bear highlighting in this chapter to demonstrate the breadth and complexity that specifically attend logistics. At the higher levels, various components of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the services, the Combatant Commands and their components, the mostly service-based acquisition communities, Defense Logistics Agency, U.S. Transportation Command, and many others are all involved in the design, approval, implementation, and execution of logistics activities with our partners. Almost all have different organizational objectives and priorities, and satisfying every entity is challenging. Multinational exercises that seem to be designed to support building partner capacity might actually be motivated by the desire to build U.S. capabilities; for instance, advocating for other nations to purchase equipment that helps lower costs for domestic acquisition, or supporting activities for diplomatic or political aims that are not necessarily useful for the receiving foreign units that participate. This does not even touch on other parts of the government, where in some cases there are programs that might compete with each other. At a minimum, partner nations (which often have small staffs who do not speak or understand English) will struggle to grasp the complexity and multitude of interactions.

There are also a number of issues among the stakeholders that exacerbate the difficulty of developing well-integrated, long-term strategies, plans, and programs. In recipient nations, while they try hard to assign their best people to senior positions dealing with international cooperation, in many cases they are not logisticians by training or trade, and do not always understand some of the nuances of the “business.” Often, the chief of logistics for a partner nation’s military will be someone in his first job in this demanding field. Rotations on staffs at all levels within the U.S. military are also relatively short

compared to the long timeframes involved in security cooperation. The officers that plan and coordinate activities often never see their execution. Newly assigned officers rarely have an appreciation for the exhaustive coordination that takes place to support major activities, or some of the sensitivities that may well be present.

Perhaps the most challenging part of this enterprise is in the U.S. Office of Security Cooperation itself in each partner country. This office is invariably lightly staffed, and the senior officer is likely to have only had a few weeks of specific training on security cooperation and cursory introductions to the dozens of people he will be required to coordinate with in the months after he or she is assigned. It is unrealistic to expect these officers to have a solid background in the affairs of the regions, a working knowledge of the challenging equipment purchase, transfer, and acquisition processes, U.S. policies for dozens of issues that affect their efforts, etc. In some cases they have little or no background in the security cooperation field, and may have never served on a staff that managed international affairs. If we expect these people to effectively advocate for and coordinate the resourcing and provisioning of logistics to our partners without any assistance, we should anticipate less than optimal results.

Designing a DIB Logistics Engagement with a Partner Nation

This section offers a general description of and key considerations for designing, planning, and executing a program for building partner capacity in logistics. While the focus of DIB is generally at the national or institutional level, a holistic approach is critical to overall effectiveness. Even if efforts are specifically and narrowly focused, broad and informed consideration of all effects at every level and across complementary functions is essential. Similarly, logistics initiatives can be of a grand scale or quite modest, and in either case have a significant impact. Above all, recognizing that every situation is unique and making sure that the partner nation is committed to shared objectives is of paramount importance.

When designing a logistics engagement project with a partner nation, the DIB Logistics Engagement Team (DIB LET) should establish a few simple parameters. First, it is important that the team determine the U.S. intent for both results and timeframe. These two factors are closely inter-related because strategic change takes time, while tactical change can be accomplished relatively quickly. For example, if the intent is to support some simple changes in the partner's ability to support its military vehicle fleet, then a few tactical adjustments focused on the maintenance and supply aspects of that fleet might be all that is required. On the other hand, if the requirement is to support the way in which logistics requirements are determined, funded, and managed, such a strategic change might necessitate years of effort to understand what is required and create new processes and procedures (as well as laws and regulations) to achieve the desired outcome. It is important that the time and resources to be invested in the necessary changes are calibrated to the availability of U.S. support. Starting an ambitious improvement project to improve a partner logistics system that will require more time and investment than the

United States is willing to invest does a disservice to all of the participants.

One of the earliest deliverables from an engagement should be an agreement between the partner and the DIB program team on what is to be achieved and in what timeframe. This should be viewed as an ongoing process, as it is unlikely during the early days of the engagement that either the partner or the DIB LET can identify and articulate the aims of the engagement. Indeed, it is quite likely that it will take a series of visits to identify what can be done, what the partner wants to accomplish, and the level of effort required.

In these initial visits, the DIB LET may need to establish some common lexicon with the partner, so that the partner-nation senior authorities, the DIB LET, and the U.S. senior authorities understand what is being discussed, considered, and eventually proposed. The issue may be one of language, where the partner nation's language(s) is not English, and misinterpretation of terms can be a significant issue. To reduce the potential for confusion, it might be necessary to build a simple compendium of terms, defined in both English and the partner's language(s). This can start with the definition of the term "logistics," which can mean different things to different organizations. The United States has its definition of logistics,² the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has its definition,³ and various civilian organizations have theirs. The UN might have it right when it advises that "there is, realistically, no precise name or definition that can be universally applied because products, organizations, and systems differ."⁴

The DIB LET should therefore try to establish whether there is a partner definition of logistics in order to establish the initial boundaries of the engagement, unless the aims of the engagement have already been determined. This will help set the parameters for subsequent work if the theme of the engagement is, as is often the case, to "improve partner logistics." Depending on the partner, the definition of logistics might include some or all of the following elements:

- Materiel management, including planning for the introduction of new materiel into the defense forces, management of in-service materiel, control of materiel usage, and eventual disposal of surplus and obsolete items.
- Facilities management, including creating and supervising a national military infrastructure plan, controlling the use of existing defense infrastructure, planning national infrastructure maintenance, and the acquisition and disposal of infrastructure.
- Movement and transportation management, including designing and running a national defense distribution system, coordinating national and international movements, and liaising with domestic transportation companies.
- Services management, including making national contracting arrangements for the procurement of services; liaising with various national and international companies providing services to the partner defense forces; setting postal, audit, and food services standards; making veterinary arrangements; and other non-

materiel support required by the military.

- Health services support, including the preparation and implementation of military health care policies and standards, management of hospitals, training of personnel, and coordination with the national civilian and international military health care providers.

Once some broad parameters are established regarding what is part of the partner logistics system to be reviewed, the DIB LET can begin the work of identifying, with the partner, what should be improved.

The Logistics Needs Assessment

Often, the DIB LET must conduct a logistics needs assessment to determine with the partner which aspects of the current logistics system need to be improved. This can be an important step if the goals of the engagement have not already been decided, and is something that must be carried out with the active support of the partner nation's senior authorities, preferably both the military and civilian ministry officials. The initial step of the needs assessment is to identify how the partner nation currently conducts its logistics activities. This "as is" logistics system may be formally documented or informally conducted on a daily basis. The DIB practitioners should be aware that the formal documentation could bear little resemblance to the actual logistics system. This often occurs in those countries that have had previous logistics engagements by the United States or other allies who simply copied and pasted another country's system into a document purporting to be the partner's logistics system without ever implementing it. As a result, great care must be taken from the outset to ensure that the engagement team understands how the logistics system really works in the country, before considering ways to work with the partner to improve it.

There is often a great temptation to declare that the partner's logistics system is so poorly organized that the only solution is to completely replace it with a new one, and one with which the engagement team is conveniently familiar. Engagement teams should be very careful to avoid this initial assessment, for it is rarely correct. Foreign logistics usually require foreign methodologies, doctrine, and financial and legal regimes that may not exist in the partner country. Trying to implement a foreign logistics system in a partner nation that does not have the capacity to implement it, often results in making an already poor logistics system worse—the exact opposite result from the headline goal.

To avoid this pitfall, it is important that the DIB LET carefully examine the history, culture, and financial, legal, and organizational structure of the partner before offering advice on what to change. This first step can be far more challenging than might be expected, since it is possible that no one in the partner nation actually understands how the system works, or why. Some partner logistics systems have developed as a result of multiple engagements by various "mentoring nations" spread over decades. When the "mentoring nations" have completely different logistics methodologies, the end result can be that some aspects of the partner's "as is" logistics system will resemble Soviet-style logistics while

others are more Western-oriented, and yet others reflect the influence of UN operations logistics frameworks. These varied (and sometimes incompatible) procedures may be lashed together with some Byzantine system of training, education, leadership, and doctrinal and financial procedures. Understanding the basics of how the current system functions, why it does so, and how the various parts of it are interlinked is the most important first step.

In parallel with this, the engagement team must also understand the partner nation's military threats and operational requirements. In an ideal world, these have already been identified in a formal, government-approved document that provides the military strategy of the country to meet its internal and external security challenges. More often, however, these must be implied from the assessments provided in government speeches, think tank papers, and interviews with senior governmental personnel in both the military and the president's or prime minister's office.

In addition, when starting a DIB logistics engagement, it is important to gather as much information regarding the various stakeholders as possible, including those from the United States, the partner nation, non-governmental organizations, and other nations. This is because, for each engagement to be successful, it should take into account the motivations of the various players who are part of, or have an ability to influence, the outcomes of the engagement. These stakeholders will affect how much change is possible and how it can be achieved or stymied. For some stakeholders, maintaining their power and authority will be one of the most important factors in any change. Other stakeholders may be motivated by the needs of their country to better meet the security challenges, without regard to how change might affect them personally. Still others are motivated by greed and avarice. In addition, there will be a sprinkling of those who are concerned that their past sins may become revealed through improvements to the logistics system. Some allies might be concerned that the U.S. activities will undercut their traditional relationships with the partner, while others might be happy to have the United States assume some of the real or imagined burden of assisting the partner nation. Understanding the role and motivations of each stakeholder in any logistics engagement will be important before proposing changes.

Other factors that should be considered include the literacy level of the general population and of the logistics personnel in the host-country military. The ability of the nation and its military logistics practitioners to make change will be constrained by these factors. In addition, the size of the military and the complexity of the equipment that it operates will also affect the extent and nature of the changes that are achievable. Small militaries operate in a very different manner from large ones. One of the most important factors is the ability of the national government to provide the financial means to the military to conduct and support operations and training. Where funds are limited or provided on an irregular basis, the logistics system must still function. Finally, the way in which information and data is generated, stored, and used to make decisions will be an influencing factor. Partner nations that are paper-based (analogue) will require a very different logistics system than those that are highly automated and digital by design.

While much of this information can be gleaned from official government papers,

academic studies, and other published documents, the DIB LET should also consult with various civilian and military personnel. The purpose of the consultation is to discuss the logistics requirements of the partner nation and to confirm that any assumptions or conclusions reached during the literature survey are correct. In addition, if possible, the DIB LET should also visit representational units of the military forces to get a firsthand look at the equipment, personnel, infrastructure, and operating conditions. This will serve two purposes: to frame the DIB LET's perception of the current conditions on the ground, and to confirm, or perhaps challenge, the information gathered earlier.

Resource Availability Assessment

Change requires resources and resource reallocation decisions. Before launching into aggressive recommendations for logistics change in a partner nation, it is important that the DIB LET understands what resources may be available to institute change or be reallocated to support changes. This can usually be obtained from the ministry's budgeting directorate, or the military forces chiefs when they are allowed to apportion their respective shares of the national military budget. The amount of resources, both financial and human, that can be made available to implement improvements will often become the limiting factor in any proposals for logistics improvements. It will be important that the DIB LET and the partner-nation team understand those constraints before designing any new logistics proposals.

Legal, Political, Cultural, and Other Constraints

The design of the future "as is" partner logistics will be affected by the partner's laws, policies, and disposition to implement change, as well as the level of commercial capability available within the nation and the level of education of the logistics personnel. These factors must be understood if the DIB LET is to leverage the strengths of the partner while understanding and compensating for the weaknesses. One of the major factors, often worth special consideration, is the level of corruption that exists or is believed to exist in the military logistics system.

Corruption is one of the most corrosive factors in logistics management. Because money tends to flow through the logistics system, and the bulk of the valuable materiel is controlled through the logistics system, corruption must be considered when addressing possible changes to a partner nation's logistics operation. Corruption robs troops of their means to train and fight, reduces the credibility of the national government and military forces, and generally degrades the partner's security. It can be confused sometimes with incompetence, when poorly trained logistics personnel make serious errors that result in significant funds being expended for little operational support capability. It is important to identify whether what is labeled as corruption is really illegal activity designed to enrich specific individuals, or just incompetence, where individuals have been assigned logistics responsibilities that exceed their training and experience. While the latter can be addressed through training and education, the former is more difficult to tackle because it tends to be

systemic, with commanders often either complicit or unwilling to admit the problem for fear of being tainted. Nevertheless, it must be addressed if the partner is to have any chance of making real and lasting logistics reforms. Ignoring corruption, or tacitly supporting it to try and make reforms, is unfair to the partner's government, people, and troops. It also does little to enhance the U.S. image abroad.

Dealing with real corruption requires patience and the commitment of the senior leadership in the partner nation. Without both of these, corrupt practices and people will simply disappear below the surface for a while, waiting for the opportunity to reemerge. The best remedy against corrupt practices is transparency, where the processes used to award contracts, distribute materiel, and dispose of surplus or obsolete items is based on clear rules and practices that are routinely audited by third parties and publicly reported. Illegal practices must be investigated by appropriate authorities, and those guilty of participating in or condoning those practices must be publicly punished. This requires considerable fortitude on the partner's military and civilian leadership, but without this, it is unlikely that systemic corruption can be rooted out. The DIB LET must carefully consider what it can and should do when confronted with this issue as it designs a partner engagement plan.

During this phase of an engagement, the DIB LET should also ensure that it has a basic understanding of the legal system as it applies to partner military logistics. Contracting law in particular will be an important factor in making logistics improvements, as it is usually very difficult to change national contracting laws. As a result, the DIB LET should encourage improvements that are based on working with, and not fighting, the legal processes in place. While in the long term, improvements to the contracting law might be in order, in the short term these are usually too difficult to achieve. Indeed, in many cases, the partner's military must first demonstrate that it can be trusted with more contracting authority, so making early improvements to the management of military logistics might become the price to pay for being allowed more authority later. This will depend on the nation, of course, but should be considered during the engagement design phase.

The Gap Analysis

The next step for the DIB LET should be to conduct a gap analysis between what the partner's logistics system is currently capable of providing, and what it should be capable of to meet the nation's security requirements. Most of the first order gaps should be fairly obvious from the logistics needs assessment work already performed, such as mismatches between the troops' needs and the materiel or services being provided. These often occur when the Ministry uses a central logistics planning system that is highly bureaucratic and relies on templates created years earlier. Some DIB logistics engagements have noted that this centralized logistics planning simply lacks an effective feedback loop, where there is a significant disconnect between line units' actual requirements and the central bureaucracy that establishes the procurement contracts.

Another common gap is the inability to move troops, equipment, and other materiel from the warehouses or supplier points-of-sale to the locations where they are

actually required. This often occurs when there is a disconnect between the bureaucracy that supervises the procurement process and the military organizations that possess the transportation resources.

Other gaps may relate to the capability to maintain equipment once it is procured. There are many reasons for this. In some cases, the equipment has been donated by an ally but without repair parts, technician training, or the appropriate tools and repair facilities. In other cases, the equipment has been procured by the partner without consideration for the ongoing maintenance requirements, simply because the procurement process did not include experts who could properly identify those needs. Whatever the cause, the result is the same: equipment that cannot be employed because it is broken and there is not a functioning maintenance system in place to source the necessary repair parts, contract out the necessary repairs, or acquire the tools and technician training necessary to complete the repairs.

If health service support is part of the logistics engagement, a key gap is often the lack of an organized way to treat and evacuate casualties. Where there is not an effective integrated treatment and evacuation system in place, troops may not be as willing to expose themselves to combat for fear of being left to die on the battlefield. Recent experience with some partner nations has suggested that this may be why some partner units have been reluctant to close with and engage their enemy.⁵ The adoption of improved medical care protocols, particularly Tactical Combat Casualty Care, has significantly reduced the preventable loss of life in a number of militaries, and the exportation of these procedures to partner nations may be an important force enabler to consider.⁶

During this phase of the engagement, all of the logistics gaps should be identified and, where possible, assembled into packages of gaps that appear to have similar characteristics or causes. Great care should be taken to avoid “cherry picking” some gaps and ignoring others, as doing so can result in proposals for improvements that are insufficiently holistic to have a lasting impact. Improvements that are only temporary or fail to address the real causes of the problems can result in wasting the financial and human resources that are devoted to the subsequent phases of the engagement, both of the United States and the partner.

Analyzing the Options

The options analysis phase is both difficult, and the most important. This can be a daunting exercise if the DIB LET attempts to resolve logistics capability gaps by trying to replicate the “best in class” support available in militaries such as that of the United States and senior NATO allies. This is because, while it may be possible to measure the capability gap between the partner and “best in class” military logistics systems, finding a way to bridge that gap is often too great a challenge for the partner, requiring financial and human resources that are not available. While it might be possible to implement one small improvement that is “best in class” (for example, an automated inventory tracking software package), unless the improvement is integrated into the total logistics system context, it may simply

become an orphaned capability that has expenses that outweigh its overall utility. When the partner has very limited resources, these must be devoted to getting the most capability improvement for the resources being expended, and not all expended on a single logistics capability.

Instead of looking at “best in class” solutions to the logistics gaps, a better approach is to look for partner appropriate solutions that will address the capability gap. This implies considering options that have demonstrated their utility in the past and might be appropriate for the next phase of the partner’s logistics improvements. While it is tempting to try to skip generations by using contemporary technology, there may be pitfalls that can have serious, even disastrous, consequences. Obviously, logistics improvement programs need to take advantage of such capabilities as modern communications if available, but as always, implications must be very carefully considered.

One of the key factors to consider during this phase is the partner’s level of information management (IM) and information technology (IT). U.S. logistics processes and procedures benefit substantially from outstanding IM and IT. Inventory management, repair procedures, technician training, and other key elements of the U.S. logistics systems exploit the U.S. IM and IT systems to their fullest. On the other hand, many partner nations do not have IM and IT systems that can replicate the U.S. approach. In fact, many partners do not have the capacity to generate the electricity required to even run a system as reliant on IM and IT as is used by U.S. and allied militaries. An inventory management system based on index cards (similar to those used in the 1950s and earlier in the United States) might be a completely acceptable solution in a partner nation with a small military and low levels of military IM and IT integration. Consequently, the DIB LET must understand the extent to which the partner can copy methodologies that are reliant on sophisticated IM and IT systems, or must employ some “old school” analogue techniques to manage its logistics requirements initially, as it builds more robust (and potentially more expensive) techniques in the future. This may be the most important factor when considering what options for logistics improvements are suitable for the partner. It may also be one of the greatest challenges for the DIB LET if the team members do not possess the necessary experience with analogue logistics systems to assist the partner in developing affordable, effective, low-tech solutions to their logistics gaps.

In addition to the level of partner information management capability, other factors must be considered. Key among these are the partner nation’s history, political situation, the size of the military organization, its equipment, doctrine, and capabilities (both current and planned). The level of training and education of the forces’ personnel, and the relationship between the decision makers in the Ministry and the Forces, will also be important factors, since these may identify where the key operational and support decisions will be made. It is important that the logistics system be designed to support the desired division of authorities and responsibilities for logistics decisions/activities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Alliances, both political and economic, are yet another important consideration. For

nations that are part of the NATO alliance, the need to conform to NATO practices is mandated. For other nations, however, this is not necessarily the case. Regional alliances may be a driving consideration for some nations while others might consider the United Nations to be the most important alliance for their military planning. Others may be ambivalent, wanting to maintain a strong independence from allies, while being able to still work cohesively in a coalition when the conditions call for it.

The most appropriate options analysis will usually be the one based on including all of the most important factors and as many of the less important factors as possible. While it will be impossible to identify all of the latter, the DIB LET must make every effort to include all of the former. The partner-nation personnel may or may not be able to identify the important factors. This can make the options analysis phase both challenging and dynamic.

Selecting the Appropriate Options

This phase of the engagement can be one of the most challenging, as it requires the full involvement of the partner nation, particularly the senior ministerial and military officials who may have little experience in logistics. The option(s) selected to initiate or continue to improve the partner logistics system often have economic, political, and other ramifications that exceed the approval authority of the Service- and lower-level ministerial logistics specialists. For instance, in a number of partner countries, the lack of a single inventory management system has been identified as a major stumbling block to logistics improvements. One of the key ingredients of a good inventory management system is an integrated, automation-friendly method of uniquely identifying the materiel procured and used by the military. One of the often preferred solutions for this is the NATO Codification System, with its NATO Stock Numbering capabilities. While all NATO nations use this system to manage their inventories, as do many non-NATO nations, the decision to adopt this system has significant political and financial implications. The partner nation will also require a NATO sponsor before becoming a participant. Consequently, even though the NATO system might be the best technical solution to an inventory management capability gap, it might not be an acceptable political one. The DIB LET must ensure that the partner has all of the information and understands the implication of selecting this option when it is one of the contenders to bridge a logistics capability gap.

Reviewing how other countries have contended with similar capability gaps is one of the better approaches to options analysis. While not every country publishes its logistics improvement experiences, a number of them have, and their reports can be used for comparison. By reviewing how other nations dealt with similar capability gaps, and then with the second and third order consequences, the partner can gain a better understanding of what will be required should it decide on a certain course of action, and can anticipate the less obvious issues that will have to be addressed to implement that course of action.

The way these decisions should be made will vary in each partner nation and should have been identified in the stakeholder assessment conducted at the outset, since the decision

makers will clearly be some of the most important stakeholders. One of the roles that the DIB LET can perform is to help the partner-nation participants write down the issue to be resolved, the options that are being considered, the implications of each option, and, in the end, record the decision taken. One of the common weaknesses of partner logistics change management is that decisions are made using unclear language and not recorded. This can become a serious problem during the implementation phase of the engagement, when senior leaders inevitably are replaced by others who did not participate in the decision-making process and who may not understand the issues. A good set of records that show how the work progressed from problem identification and option analysis, to an informed decision, will often become an invaluable aid before the engagement ends. It will also serve as an example that future DIB teams can show other partners.

The Future Logistics Support Structure

The end result of the gap analysis and the option selection should be a decision on the future partner logistics structure or system. The changes might include organizational changes, reapportioning responsibilities and authorities around the forces and the ministry in a more effective manner, or introducing new processes, procedures, IM/IT systems, or other improvements. The changes might also include new education and training requirements for key individuals, new audit regimes, or improved selection criteria for assignments to key logistics jobs. There may also be a requirement to phase the improvements over time so that the future logistics structure becomes an evolving target. This often occurs when the partner decides to move from a paper-based logistics management system to a more highly interconnected one that relies on new IM/IT packages. In these cases, the pace of change may be limited by the rate at which the new IM/IT packages can be procured and installed, procedures amended to fit the IM/IT package requirements, and personnel trained to work within the new system. The evolution may take many years and as much as a decade before the conversion is fully implemented.

In other cases, the initial changes might be quite small but meaningful. This is often the better course of action for partners that have many logistical challenges to overcome, but little recent experience with making change. In these circumstances, it is quite common for the senior decision makers to have a poor understanding of the second and third order consequences of changes made to various parts of the logistics system. By establishing a series of small, easy but meaningful projects to improve the partner's logistics system, the DIB LET can assist the partner to better understand how to make change and how to forecast the second and third order consequences of the various change proposals under consideration.

Whether the proposal is for sweeping changes to the partner logistics system or for a few small, incremental changes, the output of this phase of the engagement should be a written plan, approved by the partner senior authorities, which clearly identifies the problem to be resolved, the resources assigned, the outcomes to be achieved, and the

authorities and responsibilities of the individuals or offices charged with executing the plan. Where the changes are extensive, there may be a series of plans linked through some overarching master plan. Where the changes are smaller and focused, there may be only a single plan.

Typical logistics development plans designed to produce a new partner logistics structure may include:

- Materiel Development Plans that highlight how to improve the process of identifying the materiel required by the forces, then procuring, receiving, warehousing, distributing, and disposing of the surplus or obsolete items.
- Movement and Transportation (M&T) Development Plans that identify improvements in how materiel and personnel will be moved in support of military requirements. The M&T plan might include how both military and commercial assets and contracts will be combined, or how the resources of different services will be managed to reduce inefficiencies and costs. When the Materiel Development Plan proposes improvements to the distribution of goods, there may be a specific need for either a companion M&T plan or an M&T annex to the Materiel Development Plan.
- Facilities Development Plans that ensure that the infrastructure requirements of the partner military are sufficient and adequate to support the training and operational needs of the forces. These plans may include specific sub-plans or annexes devoted to such things as creating a catalogue of the existing infrastructure, with its value and condition, as well as which organization is responsible for maintaining it. Facilities may include buildings, runways, piers, ranges, and training areas.
- Logistics Services Improvement Plans that identify how to improve the non-materiel support to the partner forces. Common areas of logistics services development include food services, postal, veterinary services, laundry and bath, pay, and flight publication management. Identifying how to leverage the national commercial capacity to provide some services is often included in these plans.
- Health Services Support Improvement Plans that may include such simple items as combat first aid courses or better individual and collective medical kits, or more sophisticated casualty/medical evacuation systems. Depending on the requirement, a Health Services Support Improvement Plan might include a medical facilities development sub-plan, an M&T sub-plan or annex, or a medical supplies distribution sub-plan or annex.
- A Logistics Information Development Plan when there is a desire to increase the level of IM/IT used to support the national logistics system improvements. This can be a key plan that may manage many aspects of the partner's logistics structure when converting from a paper-based logistics system to a modern, digital, information-based system. This plan would have to connect to many collateral improvements, including process and procedural changes in materiel distribu-

tion, M&T management, Logistics Services management, and often both facilities and Health Services management.

Execution

The execution phase of the engagement is where all of the prior work finally pays off. When the previous phases have been carefully completed and the partner nation has been not just a participant but the owner of the work and the decisions, the execution phase has a higher probability of success than when the DIB LET has been doing the bulk of the work, the partner has only marginally participated, and the senior partner authorities have endorsed but not made the key decisions.

Even with full partner participation to this point, the execution phase is frequently the point where the logistics engagement fails to deliver on expectations. While the previous phases have required the intellectual involvement of the partner's personnel, this phase requires actually making change through expenditures for training, facilities and equipment, realigning authorities and responsibilities, and other activities that upset the status quo. When the previous phases of the engagement have clearly demonstrated the need for change and evaluated the options, and the senior authorities in the ministry and services have selected a course of action with the knowledge of what will be required, the probability of successful execution is much higher than when those authorities only become aware of the difficulties during the execution phase.

As part of the execution phase of the engagement, the DIB LET may have to support the partner in many different areas. The changes may touch on many areas not commonly associated with or controlled by the logistics leadership. These include such things as national military doctrine, which might have to change to accommodate or fully leverage the improvements. There may be requirements to create new logistics units or redesign unit missions and re-equip existing ones with significant implications for the Human Resources management aspects of the partner's military. Similarly, there may be requirements for new logistics training, for logistics and non-logistics personnel, so that they understand how to integrate their training and battle plans into the new logistics system. There may also be requirements for some legislative changes to provide the necessary legal authorities for new concepts such as public/private agreements or international agreements with allied militaries or organizations such as NATO.

Reality will Disrupt the Best Laid Plans

While the foregoing suggests that it is possible to move seamlessly through a series of simple steps from identifying the need for logistics changes in a partner nation to implementing a brilliant plan, the reality is almost always far more complex. Nations have many competing interests and individuals with their own agendas. The national political process routinely interrupts the cycle with new governments and new government policies. Military and, to a lesser extent, civilian decision makers move from post to post, to be replaced by those

who have no background in the work done or knowledge of decisions already made. War and natural or manmade disasters occur even as the DIB LET is trying to support the preparations for new ways to deal with these same events. As a result, it is important that those working with the partner nation understand that these events are inevitable and a natural part of the partner's reality; as such they are also a part of the DIB LET's. How the DIB LET deals with these circumstances may well determine the long-term success of the project.

A Model for Building Logistics Capability: The Case of Colombia

Colombia has been a country of special interest to the United States for many years. It is remarkable for the investments made by the United States under Plan Colombia and related efforts to stem the flow of drugs. Between 2000 and 2012, the United States provided over \$8 billion in assistance to Colombia to combat the drug trade, reestablish Colombian control over its territory, combat terrorist activities, and reduce poverty.⁷ As a result of these investments, Colombia has developed a close partnership with the United States and adopted many of its military conventions. In 2010, the Colombian Ministry of National Defense (MoND) embarked on a series of studies aimed at improving its military capabilities through new investments in training, equipment, organizational structure, and policies to meet the aims of the government's *Política Integral De Seguridad y Defensa Para La Prosperidad* (Comprehensive Defense and Security Policy for Prosperity).⁸ One of the study areas was logistics. The studies concluded that Colombian military logistics were not supporting the military and ministry effectively; change was needed, but it was unclear what those changes should entail.⁹ The MoND asked the U.S. Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) program for support.

The DIRI approach was to review the information gathered by the various studies conducted by the Colombians, and then to hold a series of workshops with the MoND and the four Public Forces (Navy, Army, Air Force, and National Police). From the work done by the Colombians themselves and the workshops, the DIRI team concluded that the major opportunity for change came from something that the Colombians themselves identified: to move from four separate service-oriented logistics systems to a more joint and "coordinated" (the word the Colombians use to describe instances where the National Police are involved) system. This would allow them to gain economies of scale across a wide range of logistics services, including training, procurement, inventory management, and maintenance. Unlike the United States, there was no equivalent to Title 10 (which provides the legal basis for the organization of each of the U.S. armed services and Department of Defense) restrictions on the amount that the four Public Forces could integrate their spending processes, and all four Forces were using a single Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software for their inventory management. In addition, the Forces were agreed that integration of their logistics systems was absolutely essential if they were going to make significant advances in improving the delivery of goods and services while reducing costs.

These were three key building blocks that the DIRI team used when considering what to recommend.

On the downside, the Colombians had no central manager of logistics policies and procedures. While there was a will to work together, there was no one to lead the effort. The first recommendation from the DIRI team was to find a way to amalgamate the four logistics systems, where sensible, and to select a logistics leader at the ministry level with the authority to make the kinds of changes that would be needed. This was generally accepted, although the new Director of Logistics was strictly authorized only to propose, not make, changes. The management of the ERP was assigned to him, along with a number of other “orphan” logistics projects that were scattered across the MoND. In December 2011, the new Logistics Directorate was created, with a mandate to prepare a Logistics Master Plan for ministerial approval.¹⁰

Having a leader was only the first step in making change. From 2012 through 2014, the DIRI team worked with the new Logistics Directorate to identify what changes were required and what it would take to implement them. Much of the early work concentrated on the social aspects of change management. The Logistics Directorate was a new invention and it was not clear how the Forces and the various directorates and agencies would react to the interloper. To address this, the combined Colombian/DIRI team carefully listened to the various entities to understand their logistics requirements and concerns, and then identified high-value, low-risk, simple solutions to some key logistics shortcomings. The improvements were launched through a series of pilot projects, each one aimed at a specific logistics requirement and designed to experiment with different approaches to identify ways and means of making change that were culturally acceptable, low cost, and effective.

For example, the Public Forces and MoND recognized that their current procurement and supply management system could become more effective and cost less if they could somehow merge the four separate systems of the respective Public Forces into a single, integrated system. One of the first projects that the new Logistics Directorate took on was how to achieve this integration. Deconstructing the problem into its constituent parts, the lack of a single inventory codification system was identified as the key change that needed to be implemented. Without a way to compare usage data and inventory holdings among the four Public Forces, it would be difficult to make significant improvements in this area. The combined Colombian and DIRI team reviewed the various options, including building a custom system, adopting another Latin American system, implementing the United Nations (UN) system, or joining the NATO Codification System. The Colombian analysis concluded that the NATO Codification System was the best option and it was adopted, although the political aspects of this move were debated at very senior levels in the government. Next came the process of understanding how to implement the NATO system and to establish the appropriate policies and procedures in Colombia for its use, as well as mapping the inventory reference numbers being used by the individual Public Forces to the NATO equivalent. Spain proved to be a very helpful partner in this area, having done similar work after it became a NATO nation in 1982. Spain provided considerable

training, technical assistance, and Spanish language software, as well as advice on common inventory management policies and procedures. NATO provided mentorship to the Colombians through its meetings and panels, while the United States—in addition to providing expertise through the DIRI program—provided support through the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency’s National Codification Bureau.

Although this project is still ongoing, it represents the kind of logistics change management that will act as a major stepping stone to future improvements in Colombian defense logistics. The new inventory management system is scheduled to replace the existing four systems in late 2016 or early 2017, setting the stage for the next series of improvements, including common inventory management of the procurement and repair of high-cost, low-volume items used by more than just one service. In Colombia, three of the four Public Forces fly the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter, and the ability to manage the key (and expensive) components of this aircraft in common is being actively pursued as a priority effort. Similarly, other pilot projects have covered such things as common life cycle materiel management, with emphasis on creating common readiness standards, common maintenance procedures and standards, and maintenance data gathering and analysis. Another pilot project will allow the four Public Forces to start using each other’s movement assets to eventually create a common distribution system, speeding up the delivery of items to units while at the same time reducing the unused cargo space on the Forces’ trucks, aircraft, and marine craft. Yet another pilot project will ensure that fuel and lubricants are managed at the national level, gaining economies of scale in procurement, storage, and distribution.

The common thread running through these initiatives is that each started from an initial Colombian analysis of what needed to be done. The Colombians identified some of their critical logistics issues, but required support to articulate both the requirement and decide on the next steps including determining how to accomplish their aims, introducing methodologies used in other countries to address similar issues, and finding partners and experience outside of Colombia that could be used to advance each improvement. A major component of the work has always been to understand that the cultural aspects of change are equally important as the technical aspects. Solutions that are simple in one country can be difficult in others for purely cultural reasons. At the same time, solutions that are difficult in one country can be relatively simple in others. The lesson from Colombia is that DIB efforts need to start with the host country’s own assessment of its objectives and priorities, and their perceptions of how performance gaps in logistics are affecting the realization of those objectives. From this, the DIB effort can then support stakeholders as they collectively define the nature of the problem(s) and the range of acceptable solutions. Following this, the DIB LET can work with the country’s logistics leaders to identify what should be implemented first, identify the legal and cultural support and impediments to change, then help find appropriate partners with the necessary experience to allow the country to initiate the change on its own schedule, as it builds its own expertise.

Conclusion

Each partner-nation logistics engagement will be different, because each partner has its unique combination of history, culture, military organization, and goals. There is no template that can be applied that will ensure a successful engagement. To begin an engagement, it is therefore important that the DIB LET understand the partner's situation by conducting with the partner some kind of needs assessment, resource availability assessment, and catalogue of the legal, political, cultural, and other factors that might either support or constrain the implementation of logistics improvements. Following these activities, a useful strategy is to build the logistics improvement roadmap that will determine what to change, as well as how to change the current "as is" partner logistics system into a new "to be" construct. Depending on many factors, this may be a radical and significant change, or it might be some minor changes designed to accustom the partner to implementing logistics improvements. The roadmap can be constructed by conducting a gap analysis of logistics shortcomings, considering options for overcoming those gaps, and then supporting the partner to select an appropriate, affordable yet effective, new logistics structure. Once this is completed, the final activity is to support the partner in the creation of the new logistics construct. In those situations where the initial engagement is limited in scope and intent, the lessons learned can then be used to assist the partner nation begin the process again to initiate another series of improvements.

Despite the many challenges described above, the United States has achieved excellent results and produced a number of remarkable accomplishments in logistics within the field of security cooperation in recent years. In addition to the achievements of the logistics development efforts in Colombia, efforts to build partner capacity in Eastern Europe—both in the newer NATO nations and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) members—has been significant. Assistance with building partner logistics capability has enabled many nations to make important contributions to coalition efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and to global counterterrorism efforts. Similarly, assisting in the improvement of partners' logistics systems has facilitated participation in UN and other peacekeeping efforts, as well as many humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in recent years. Recent initiatives and high-level support from the U.S. Department of Defense and close allies point to even greater results in the years ahead.

Such examples of progress demonstrate the importance of planning for and investing in logistics in virtually every undertaking to assist partner nations in their capacity-building efforts. The nature of the geopolitical environment in the years ahead—combined with fiscal realities and the uncertain nature of conflict—make DIB efforts as important as in any time in history. Increasingly, however, we are developing the tools, expertise, and commitment that can lead to the development of strong partnerships, which, ultimately, will enhance security, stability, and progress.

Logistics is, and will always be, a critical component of virtually every security cooperation effort. The entire concept of building partner capacity rests upon the durability, and hence sustainability, of cooperative efforts. It is also clear that logistics developed

in partnership with other nations should be designed for adoption across the affected components of the force, integrated vertically from the tactical to institutional level, and capable of enduring for as long as necessary. Short-term and/or “point” solutions may sometimes be required to meet immediate operational requirements, but they cannot be expected to provide enduring support. At the same time, logistics must be considered as a component of a broader development effort, especially at the institutional level. As a recent RAND study noted, “just supporting partner nations at the operational and tactical level—without supporting the basic infrastructure to handle personnel management, logistics, finance, and many other functions necessary to a well-functioning military—would create a partner-nation force unable to sustain itself.”¹¹ The development of logistics improvements that are appropriate to each partner is a complex, interactive, and nation-specific activity that requires a broad understanding of the technical and human aspects of both logistics and building partner capacity. While still evolving as a tool to support partner nations as they build effective, transparent, and accountable defense institutions, the development of DIB logistics methodologies and practitioners will be key to obtaining the best return on DIB investments in the future.

Notes

1 Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 1.

2 Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: the Joint Staff, November 8, 2010 [as amended through February 15, 2016]), 142.

3 NATO AAP-6, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French) Edition 2015*, (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Office, 2015), 2-L-5.

4 United Nations, “UN Logistics Operational Guide (LOG),” available at <<http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/LOG/Logistics>>.

5 Steven Donald Smith, “Iraq’s Military Medical Capability Improving, Iraqi General Says,” American Forces Press Service, August 24, 2006, available at <<http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=562>>. Iraqi Army Brig. Gen. Samir A. Hassan notes “It is very important to take care of your soldiers. This affects the morale of the soldiers during the fighting.” In the same article he noted that because of the Iraqi military medicine system, about 40 percent of their wounded troops die while for the U.S. forces this number was as low as 5 percent.

6 See Erin Savage et al., “Tactical Combat Casualty Care in the Canadian Forces: lessons learned from the Afghan war,” *Canadian Journal of Surgery/Journal canadien de chirurgie* 54, supplement (December 2011) available at <<http://canjsurg.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/54-6-S118.pdf>>. Also, see Russ S. Kotwal et al., “Eliminating Preventable Death on the Battlefield,” *Archives of Surgery* 146, No. 12 (December 2011), available at <<http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamasurgery/fullarticle/1107258>>.

7 See June S. Beittel, *Colombia: Background, U.S. Relations, and Congressional Interest*, RL32250 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 28, 2012), summary available at <<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32250.pdf>>.

8 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional República de Colombia, *Política Integral de Seguridad y Defensa para la Prosperidad*, May 2011, available at <http://www.ceedcds.org.ar/Srd-LibBL/COL/POL_INT_SEG_DEF.pdf>.

9 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional República de Colombia, Viceministerio para la Estrategia y la Planeación, *Logística para la Defensa y la Seguridad*, December 16, 2011 (author’s collection).

10 República de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional Decreto Numero 4890 of 2011, December 23, 2011. This decree lays out the new organizational structure and initial mandates of selected Defense Ministry organizations.

11 Walter L. Perry et al., *Defense Institution Building: An Assessment* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), available at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1176.html>, 181.

Measuring and Evaluation

Paul Clarke and Thomas Davies

Defense institution building (DIB) seeks to produce relevant institutional change with partners by addressing complex problems in dynamic environments. In order to determine their impacts, these changes must be continuously monitored and their effects, positive and negative, evaluated. However, the methods and techniques commonly used for the monitoring and evaluation of security cooperation activities often prove inadequate to produce the information required for thoughtful DIB decisions. Further, information requirements differ between those necessary for the development and justification of DIB authorities, policies, resources, guidance, and programs (the “DIB Enterprise”), and the management toward DIB outcomes by programs and other implementers (“DIB Activities”). Evidence from measures at the activity level will heavily influence decisions at the DIB Enterprise level. In addition, measures to support monitoring and evaluation must enhance the effectiveness of DIB without over-burdening the limited capacity of the small footprint, high impact teams that carry out the work. This chapter will first address the role that measures play in DIB decision-making and the unique complexities of measuring in the DIB context. The importance of integrating measures into every aspect and phase of DIB will then be discussed, as well as what appropriate measures should be for DIB activities.

Terminology

The term “measure” in this chapter refers to the quantitative or qualitative description of an input, output, or outcome of DIB policy, programs, or activities. Measures are often further defined as measures of performance, which seek to describe progress toward an objective, or measures of effectiveness, which seek to describe the degree to which an objective was met. The term “metric,” which is not used in this chapter, is often used interchangeably with “measures,” but metrics can be understood to refer to the combining of multiple measures to provide information (examples include rates such as “cost per hour” and changes from a baseline such as “increases in staff capacity”). For simplicity, the use of the term “measure” in this chapter is intended to capture the wide array of techniques available to process, analyze, and present measures, inclusive of the use of metrics. “Accountability” and “learning” are the primary purposes of DIB measures. “Accountability” refers to measures that seek to compare DIB inputs, outputs, or outcomes with expectations for these. “Learning” refers to measures that seek to improve the effectiveness or efficiency

of DIB policies and practices. “Monitoring” and “evaluation” are processes that use measures to inform the decisions required to manage DIB policy, programs, and activities. “Monitoring” occurs on an ongoing basis for DIB programs and activities, and is generally accomplished through internal resources (or in conjunction with those of partners). “Evaluations” seek to answer specific questions related to DIB policy and programs, occur in conjunction with specific events (such as the end of an activity), and often include some degree of independence from the programs and activities they target.

What Should Measures do for DIB?

DIB measures should enable evidence-based decisions. Evidence-based decisions about policy, programs, and practices are those that are grounded in research and informed by experiential evidence from the field.¹ These decisions can support DIB policy, programming, priorities, and resources, as well as the management of DIB activities, and improve their outcomes. The production of experiential evidence requires deliberate and considered monitoring and evaluation of the progress and effects of DIB activities. As such, the most critical aspects of integrating effective measures for DIB is to anticipate the decisions that need to be made, who will make the decisions, when the decisions will be made, the information required to make the decisions, the level of fidelity required from the information, and how the information needs to be presented. Further, the information gathered needs to be linked to decision makers at the right time and in the right way to have the intended influence on outcomes. While these decisions may not be apparent or even known at the onset of DIB activities, the more insight gained and guidance provided as early as possible regarding requirements for experiential evidence, the better information can be provided for DIB decision makers.

The inclusion and implementation of measures supports both accountability and learning. *Figure 1* shows examples of information requirements for accountability and learning that can inform decision-making for the conduct of DIB activities and management of the DIB Enterprise. Accountability in the DIB context should explain what has happened, particularly to confirm or challenge assumptions and to determine to what extent objectives have been met. This has been critical in the problem-driven, iterative, and adaptive approaches that have proven successful in DIB in practice—where “failing fast” can be a virtuous component of the process.² The ability to rapidly determine what works and what does not, allows teams and partners (as well as DIB policy makers and planners) to focus on efforts that contribute to positive outcomes while divesting themselves from, or avoiding, efforts of limited relevance or effect. Learning in the DIB context describes a process of gaining knowledge or skill by practicing or experiencing something; measures facilitate learning by demonstrating patterns and trends both within and across DIB activities, programs, and contexts. In the dynamic environments where DIB takes place, learning occurs across many different cycles, from insight into how the “political will” or “absorptive capacity” of a partner will affect the design of an activity, to the long-term effects of institutional capacity on Foreign Military Sales decisions. Varying cycles

of learning require measures with feedback loops that are appropriate for the decisions and outcomes they are meant to support. Learning at the project level may require the immediate judgment of a team on the ground. While learning at the program level, such as for the refinement of practices, may need to be widely and deliberately vetted to ensure consideration across various contexts and appropriate application. Learning at the policy level may require information across multiple years to inform and justify change(s), such as the need for new DIB authorities or programs.

Figure 1: Typical DIB Information Requirements

DIB	Accountability	Learning
Enterprise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DIB's Relevance/Impact ▪ Prioritization of DIB Activities ▪ DIB Resource Planning and Management ▪ DIB Program Effectiveness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ What Works in What Contexts ▪ New DIB Programs/Authorities ▪ Integration of DIB and Security Cooperation/ Building Partner Capacity ▪ Engaging with the DIB Community of Practice/Interest
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SMART DIB Objectives ▪ Leading Institutional Change: Performance - are we doing things right? Effects - are we doing the right things? ▪ Efficiency, "Bang for the Buck" 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Scoping New or Existing DIB Lines of Effort ▪ Testing Theories of Change ▪ Adapting to Dynamic Environments ▪ Disseminating Lessons ▪ Refining Practices

At its best, DIB is a facilitated process of partner-led institutional change toward mutually beneficial outcomes, and the role of the partner is therefore an indispensable aspect of DIB measures and evaluations. That said, the practice of partner ownership presents challenges to measures. There are some elements of performance and effectiveness that a DIB team can be directly responsible for, but much of it they cannot. To the extent we hold DIB teams accountable, perverse incentives can emerge for implementers to do the work for the partner—undermining the enduring and institutionalized change that comes from partner ownership. The challenge is therefore to have multiple tiers of measures and show their overlap: so an outcome for the DIB team is really only an output from the partner's perspective. Further, the partner's active involvement in monitoring and evaluation may relieve some of the burden of information gathering for DIB practitioners, though it should be recognized that the partner's capability and capacity for monitoring and evaluation might need to be developed over time.

Integrating partners into the process of monitoring and evaluation can be a means of institutionalizing good governance and management. A partner's self examination of the decisions necessary to implement and institutionalize change, analysis of the information requirements to support these decisions, development of appropriate measures to provide the information, and management of the information as it is collected, will facilitate

implementation of the DIB activity. At the same time, this process enhances the partner’s ability to ensure changes endure and adapt with the partner’s defense establishment. Further, a practical implementation of measures can demonstrate the means of establishing transparency, accountability, and evidence-based decision-making more broadly for partners. As these practices are adopted, they become tools of good governance that address potentially sensitive issues, such as corruption, without directly taking them on.

Box 1: Hierarchy of Evaluation³

In a piece published in the Small Wars Journal, RAND Senior Scientist Christopher Paul describes the importance of explicit theories of change and a hierarchy for the evaluation of planning and assessments. He explains that “having an explicit theory of change helps the assessor identify what to measure and supports an assessment structure that tests assumptions as hypotheses, which leads to improved operations, outcomes, and assessments.” He also describes a hierarchy of evaluation with five nested levels that “helps the assessor match assessments to stakeholder needs and identify where improvements are needed when operations do not produce desired outcomes”:

Level 1 - Assessment of Need for Effort
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focuses on the problem to be solved or goal to be met, the population to be served, and the kinds of services that might contribute to a solution. ▪ Establishes the problem to pursue, as well as the intended objectives.
Level 2 - Assessment of Design and Theory
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focuses on the design of a policy or program, and is where an explicit theory of change should be articulated and assessed. ▪ If program design is based on poor theory or mistaken assumptions, then perfect execution may still not bring desired results. ▪ If the theory does not actually connect the activities with the objectives, efforts may generate effects other than those intended.
Level 3 - Assessment of Process and Implementation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focuses on program operations and the execution of the elements prescribed by the theory and design. ▪ Poor execution can foil the most brilliant design. ▪ Traditional measurements at Level 3 are measures of performance (MOP).
Level 4 - Assessment of Outcomes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Focus is on how outputs are translated into outcomes or achievements. ▪ Outputs are the products of activities, and outcomes are the changes resulting from these efforts. ▪ Measures at this level are often referred to as measures of effect (MOE).
Level 5 - Assessment of Cost-Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Only when desired outcomes are at least partially observed can efforts be made to assess their cost-effectiveness - before you can measure “bang for buck,” you have to be able to measure “bang.”

What is Unique about Measuring in DIB?

The unique nature of the cooperation between the United States Government (USG) and partner nations poses challenges for measurement across the DIB effort such that several factors must be considered in the tailored development of DIB measures, including: institutional perspective, various actors, motivations, political will, cultural context, the low-capability of some partner countries, and the fact that teams will be dealing with a mix of defense governance systems. At the DIB Enterprise level, the stakeholders are many, including senior policy makers, legislators, and multiple Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, each of which has a different perspective on success, requiring measures that accommodate these perspectives. In the case of the Security Governance Initiative—a DIB-related program in Africa—the work is inherently interagency, and the lead is with the State Department rather than the DOD. At the program level, measures have to be agreed upon by numerous USG actors overseeing the projects, while the U.S. expert teams that actually execute the projects may draw expertise from multiple think tanks, private contractors, and other providers. The result is often a tenuous relationship between the measures envisioned in the project's design, execution, and assessment.

The perspectives and motivations of the multiple players in a DIB project complicate the conceptualization of measures, although all seek to achieve success via institutionalized improvement. The United States has its own internal measures related to budgets, programs, competing security interests, and methodologies, while the partner has its own internal measures, which may stem from its motivation to secure the ongoing engagement of the United States and maintain the flow of U.S. training and equipment. Another challenge is determining whose work is to be measured. DIB work is produced by three broad categories of workers: the U.S. experts and the partner nation each working separately, and the U.S.-partner teams working together. As mentioned before, measures for each of these need to overlap to create the appropriate incentives for partner ownership and enduring change.

Typifying a DIB Engagement is also difficult, since the roster of partner nations has grown rapidly. The result is a diverse body of engagements in different security environments and socio-economic realities that runs from Bangladesh to Kosovo, and from Colombia to Guinea. For the DIB Enterprise, this manifests itself in finding measures that have legitimacy in many different contexts and an understanding that rolling up or aggregating measures without these contexts may result in a loss of significance. This diversity is less of a challenge at the program level, since it is to be expected that each partner will have its own context. Still, DIB partners are chosen for a reason—to cure a particular challenge, to take advantage of an opportunity, or to shore up a partner in a tough security environment.

Every partner has its own context, including some level of internecine conflict from the banal (interagency) to the truly divisive (insurgency or sectarian conflict). And, of course, the motivations of the partner, including the perspectives of different elements of a partner's government, remain an important factor. In the world of political insight, U.S. DIB practitioners may be able to discern basic truths and speak the unspoken, but they remain novices in the partner's political setting. It can be tough to discern: what is the

unstated priority of the leadership? Which accommodations should not be tampered with? Which graft grinds the system down and which is lubricating the gears? In an environment where appropriate institutional fixes must be married with political reality, powerful measurements of progress can be difficult to create.

U.S. experts face several imperatives when designing projects and the measures to evaluate their effectiveness. The “do no harm” imperative is always in play, but for countries that face an active threat there is a corollary of “fix the system without breaking it.” The work in such cases should consider how to determine when the work impedes the running of operations. The U.S. experts may not perceive when they cross such a threshold, but the partner may also not be fully aware of the trade-offs that are being made. For instance, how much the partner staff’s work on DIB soaks up energy from other efforts, how support systems might be stressed by changes, or how adjusting budgets may affect operations.

Measuring progress and evaluating success can also be challenging in countries where a multitude of outside actors are advocating for some form of political or security sector reform. External initiatives might come from interested states, regional bodies, or the United Nations. In Western Africa for example, we see French, European Union, and United Nations’ efforts, together with regional (African Union) and subregional (Economic Community of West African States) efforts to produce defense reform. DIB efforts can aid in these reforms, and the synergy between those initiatives and U.S. efforts can be powerful. Yet, when it comes to measurements, the cause of progress might be hard to discern since many countries may have set the stage for reform through long years of engagement, and the payoff may be manifested in part through the U.S. DIB effort.

Designing measurements in the early phases of a DIB project is similarly problematic, since discovering and incorporating into a baseline the existence of related efforts by other actors can be very time intensive. The partner might also struggle to meet tasks and deadlines because they are engaged in similar but different international efforts. One nation may have started with the French system of defense forces, then embraced the Soviet system for decades, turned back to the French and the United States and now find itself with Chinese equipment and training. Mixing these many defense systems poses a challenge to measurement design and collection, since different systems track and evaluate equipment using dissimilar tools, or have different approaches to human resource management. In the example of logistics, the partner may have received instruction in tracking equipment readiness from various donors, and these different systems may exist side-by-side in the same institution, hindering understanding of their own state of readiness. For outside experts, the design of measures can be complicated by these multiple standards, the complexity of which can only be revealed by in-depth study.

Inevitably, DIB efforts are increasingly taking place with low-capability countries in grave crisis, which have often become the recipients of large amounts of material assistance. In the past, countries where the U.S. was engaged in DIB-related efforts had more capacity to absorb the concepts and the workload involved in implementing DIB; take for instance Colombia, Chile, and former Warsaw Pact countries in Eastern Europe. While there are

advantages to working with low-capability countries—for example, there is low-hanging fruit to pick, and simple solutions can have big impact—the very concepts of DIB can be difficult to translate into such institutions, and devising useful measures for partners' success can therefore be challenging. For such low-capability countries, the U.S. DIB tools and methodologies are underdeveloped and untested. In time, the methodology will advance, and further studies may find that DIB work in this category of countries has both great risk and great payoff. If absorptive capability is a challenge for developed ministries of defense, it is doubly so with low-capability partners, who are already receiving so much material assistance that it poses a risk of choking the support system. Measures should seek to reveal the absorptive capacity of a partner to inform the levels of engagement that are effective for DIB, the capacity constraints most burdened by material assistance to focus effort, and the limits the partner faces in integrating and sustaining material assistance to inform future material assistance.

Low-capacity countries are often dealing with significant societal challenges. Tolstoy begins *Anna Karenina* by noting, “All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”⁴ DIB practitioners need to find the unique qualities that make a security establishment “unhappy,” and this involves understanding the nature of the defense institutions, of course, but also more broadly the society and political values and processes in the partner. On the societal side, when formulating measures, DIB planners need to consider how sectarian, social, and regional issues influence decision-making and resource allocation. The ongoing effects of these on DIB activities should be monitored to allow activities to adapt in order to remain relevant in dynamic environments. The work itself and the measures developed must take into account the subtle nuances that keep an institution together. Many motivations may come into play, and corruption (hidden rice bowls, ghost soldiers, etc.) is a reality one must consider when asking for institutions to measure their work or conduct other self-assessments. A bit of investigation will often find a lack of materiel, missing parts, inadequate training, faulty communications, insufficient logistics support, the wrong mix of capital assets and so on, but rarely are the cultural foibles in the institution evident upfront. In designing measures, DIB experts should consider where the power and authority reside, who has oversight, and how those qualities interact. Measures should be designed with foreknowledge of how they might produce winners and losers.

Measures are most useful when there is support for the DIB effort by the political leadership, rather than just the career defense officials. Political leaders can provide the authority and resources to ensure DIB success, since they represent the will of the people. Without such buy-in, measures may not become institutionalized or the information provided may lack key insights. Political buy-in aids the overall effort, ensuring that timelines are met, that replacements are found for DIB counterparts, and that the program's efforts remain consistent with the evolving priorities of the partner. Political clout can also overcome divergence between the political level and the operational level, and between different agencies and services, helping to ensure that reliable measures are developed.

Without that support, different processes between different ministries (Interior and Defense) may impede collection of information used for measurements or create confused data. Finally, lower level officials lack the authority to collect useful and sensitive data, so the political class can give these officials more power to perform that function. Political leaders should be brought into the process early on by commissioning the work, setting the terms of reference, reviewing progress, and approving and directing the implementation of any recommendations.

Integrating Measures into DIB

The effectiveness of DIB will be greatly increased if measures are integrated from the start into every aspect of DIB policy, program, and project methodologies—monitoring and evaluation should not be an afterthought. In fact, some information may be lost if baselines are not established and deliberate measures put into effect. Additionally, DIB measures should themselves be actively managed throughout all phases of projects to account for the complex problems and dynamic environments they address.

DIB outcomes center on change and measuring change requires the establishment of baselines as a point of reference for comparison. A baseline is a description of a condition at a point in time, ideally before the effects of DIB take place. Baselines often focus on those things that pose the greatest challenges to achieving desired outcomes. An example of this for DIB could be the “as is” process map for a partner’s annual budget, which includes information on how its inputs, outputs, actors, and decisions affect current outcomes. However, DIB baselines should also include the conditions that may indicate opportunities for action such as engaged and empowered senior sponsors, relevant dynamics, such as absorptive capacity, that may be favorable or unfavorable for change, and the people and politics that influence the DIB environment. Baselines are necessary for effective action, so they should be defined upfront, and fleshed out or clarified as the activity proceeds, as they can be difficult and costly to create after the fact.

All measures have a cost, and the cost of producing measures can have a tremendous impact on DIB operations. In the context of DIB, cost refers less to the financial impacts of monitoring and evaluation (though these should be considered) and more to the opportunity cost of producing the information. If the burden of collection and analysis of information for measures falls on the typically small DIB teams carrying out the work, then there must be consideration of the effect on the project before levying information requirements. The importance of the decisions, the level of detail needed to make the decision, the need for establishment of a baseline, and the frequency of updates should all be factored in and adjudicated before stakeholders request information about DIB activities. What DIB information is then produced should be widely available to satisfy the situational awareness and decision-making requirements of as many stakeholders as possible. Another potential cost is that measures can create perverse incentives for DIB practitioners, such as interfering with partner ownership, stifling learning and adaptation,

setting safe goals when meaningful change requires more, and standardizing practices when tailored approaches are appropriate. The potential perverse incentives formed by any measure should be considered and controlled for as the measure is developed and implemented. Finally, the type of information and the timing of the requirements can have an effect on the relationship between the DIB implementers and the partner's interlocutors. Building trust takes time, and it can be lost quickly or never achieved at all if the partner perceives the DIB team as "collectors." Information is not useful if it negatively affects the overall ability of the DIB activity to progress toward its ultimate outcomes.

Integrating Measures for the DIB Enterprise

Measures should support decisions regarding DIB authorities, policies, priorities, resources, and programs. Foundational to this is the establishment of enterprise-level DIB objectives that are nested in broader security cooperation objectives. The Specific, Measurable, Achievable/Agreed, Relevant and Time Bound (SMART) approach advocated for security cooperation planning, which links broad end states to concrete tasks, should carry through for DIB and its measures.⁵ DIB Enterprise-level objectives should provide sufficient direction for programs and activities to develop measures that provide the relevant information necessary for greater understanding and more effective management of DIB's array of complex challenges and dynamic environments. In addition to these objectives, policy makers and planners should articulate information requirements related to the performance of DIB programs, priorities, and resource allocations. The DIB Enterprise may also pool monetary and manpower resources to ask and answer specific evaluation questions through means more external than a program's own monitoring. Though the evaluation may be external to the DIB program, the collection of information should be integrated within DIB activities as much, and as early, as possible to increase the value of the information collected. The information gathered to support enterprise-level DIB objectives should drive ongoing and thoughtful dialogues among the decision makers who must link strategies to DIB programming and resources, and who must justify the results.


Measures can also be used to educate and inform the DIB community of interest.⁶ The DIB community of interest can include legislators, policy makers, planners, and implementers involved in related security sector development and security cooperation activities. This community can also include independent contributors such as academics, think tanks, and the media. Across this broad spectrum of stakeholders, it is important to establish what DIB can and cannot do, DIB's impact and contributions, and how DIB affects other activities. To this community, measures can be a powerful means of communicating the appropriate application and potential impact of DIB activities, as well as the effectiveness of practices for partners, environments, and outcomes sought.

Integrating Measures for DIB Activities

Measures to support DIB activities need to be integrated throughout the cycle of building partner capacity (see *Figure 2*). Though monitoring and evaluation are explicit components

of this cycle, their effectiveness will depend on deliberate actions taken to plan for and integrate measures throughout the earlier scoping, design, and implementation phases. Further, the DIB environment is dynamic and facilitating partner-led change is a process that highlights different aspects as it proceeds, so measures should be adapted with the environment and through implementation to support problem-driven outcomes.⁷ Security cooperation and development programs frequently have separate evaluation teams that come in one to two years after the end of the project to evaluate effectiveness. However, given the newness of the field and its characteristics (volatile, uncertain, complex, and adaptive), DIB activities have focused heavily on effectiveness in earlier phases—especially monitoring with immediate feedback loops into country projects and for program-level practices (such as for DIB’s overall methodology).

Figure 2: DIB Model for Building Partner Capacity⁸




Scoping: Scoping is the process of transforming broad guidance to engage with a partner into a logical set of targeted and feasible recommendations that communicate the intent, and shape the design and implementation of DIB activities. As such, scoping establishes the foundation upon which the measures of DIB activities are built. Specifically, scoping begins to define the outcomes upon which to devise measures of progress and effect, and establishes the baselines that set the starting points for measuring change and defining what is feasible.

Scoping should, at a high level, define the intended and mutually agreed outcomes of a project. These should seek the “sweet spot” (see *Figure 3*) among U.S. government priorities, the objectives and priorities of our partners, and how institutional improvements

of defense governance and management can contribute to both. If realistic, these become the ultimate outcomes or “North Stars” that allow DIB projects over time to develop SMART objectives as part of the project design, implementation, and monitoring phases.⁹ From these project level outcomes, teams can begin to anticipate the information required to manage progress and determine the effectiveness of projects and their activities.

Figure 3: The “Sweet Spot” for DIB Objectives¹⁰



Scoping should also begin to establish the relevant baselines for a project. Baselines are a description of the relevant “as is” state of the partner’s institutions, opportunities for and challenges to mutual interests, and current level of performance relative to outcomes sought. Baselines should not only describe the current state of the partner’s institutional capabilities but also describe other factors related to the partner’s motivations for and limitations to change such as leadership, priorities, will, capacity, absorption, and spoilers. Baselines are the foundation from which any measures of change are built and are therefore paramount to managing progress and measuring the success of DIB activities.

Design: DIB projects are designed to address the unique institutional environment and outcomes sought with partners. In other words, when it comes to DIB projects, one size fits one. As such, measures must also be custom tailored to suit the needs of the project (See Box 2). Specifically, measures should be integrated into and support the logic (referred to as theories of change) for how teams intend to work with partners to achieve objectives.

Theories of change strive to incorporate and relate all of the necessary and sufficient elements required to achieve a desired outcome into a logical framework. They are generally expressed as a series of cause and effect or “if, then” statements that start from a baseline

condition and proceed to the outcome sought with no unrealistic assumptions or leaps of logic. Since these logic frameworks incorporate all of the elements to produce outcomes, they will not only include the technical elements of institutional development but also the human and political aspects of the institutional environment that accept, support, produce, and sustain the changes. An essential element of theories of change is that they are testable. If a portion of the logic proves wrong (either through a false assumption or a changed condition), then the theory must be adjusted to accommodate the new information. As such, measures must be developed to test the theories that underlie the design of DIB projects.


Box 2: Evaluating Complexity¹¹

In their work, Preskill and Gopal respond to a growing realization that, “systemic change is not linear, predictable, or controllable...problems are more resilient than previously thought and that traditional means of tackling them often fall short.” In response, they described characteristics of the complex systems that contribute to this realization (an accurate portrayal of the dynamic environments and complex problems DIB typically faces) and offered propositions for evaluation (measures) under such circumstances.

Characteristics of Complex Systems	Propositions for Evaluation
A complex system is always changing, often in unpredictable ways; it is never static	1. Design and implement evaluations to be adaptive, flexible, and iterative
Everything is connected; events in one part of the system affect all other parts	2. Seek to understand and describe the whole system, including components and connections
Information is the fuel that drives learning and helps the system thrive	3. Support the learning capacity of the system by strengthening feedback loops and improving access to information
Context matters; it can often make or break an initiative	4. Pay particular attention to context and be responsive to changes as they occur
Each situation is unique; best principles are more likely to be seen than best practices	5. Look for effective principles of practice in action, rather than assessing adherence to a predetermined set of activities
Different sources of energy and convergence can be observed at different times	6. Identify points of energy and influence, as well as ways in which momentum and power flow within the system
Relationships between entities are equally if not more important than the entities themselves	7. Focus on the nature of relationships and interdependencies within the system
Cause and effect is not a linear, predictable, or one-directional process; it is much more iterative	8. Explain the non-linear and multi-directional relationships between the initiative and its intended and unintended outcomes
Patterns emerge from several semi-independent and diverse agents who are free to act in autonomous ways	9. Watch for patterns, both one-offs and repeating, at different levels of the system

From theories of change, objectives can be developed that provide the “connective tissue” from baselines to outcomes, which guide activities to get from “here” to “there.” Measures must be developed to determine if and to what extent these objectives are met. This includes both intermediate outcomes that act as milestones toward the ultimate outcome, as well as measures of the ultimate outcome(s). All objectives, including intermediate ones, should strive to be SMART. Beyond the obvious “measurable” component, “achievability” and “relevancy” are critical to a project’s theory of change and may be subject to assumptions made or to the DIB environment. Time is also a measurable component (by either chronology or events) that can have significant impacts in terms of relevancy and relativity to other activities that may define a critical path for a project. For example, the sophistication of technical requirements may have to be balanced against the need to meet certain political deadlines.

Figure 4: Graphic Example of Objectives and Measures in a Logic Framework¹²



Implementation: The essence of DIB implementation is the facilitation of a partner-led change management process (see Box 3). As such, if implementation is when change happens, then implementation is when measures need to take place. Further, because change is a dynamic process, collection of information through implementation should not be static or risk not being relevant through the entire course of a project. For example, critical measures at the beginning of a DIB project may include partner leadership: assigning the correct stakeholders to the working group, committing to ensure continuity of personnel, taking briefings from the working group, and contributing to and making project design decisions. Do working group members show up, engage meaningfully, and undertake the agreed-upon work on the project between engagement visits? Measures midway through the

implementation of a project may focus on understanding and applying new concepts and approaches. The institutionalization of the changes to a partner’s supply chain management processes may be a more critical measure at the end of a DIB project. Measures through implementation should, to the greatest possible extent, be integrated into the conduct of a project so as to complement and enhance the work of DIB implementers, while providing the information needed for DIB decision makers. Therefore, frameworks and tools for the collection and management of a project’s measures should complement and be adaptive to the project’s needs (and other higher level DIB decision requirements) and highlight the information that is most relevant given where a project is along the change process.

Box 3: Leading Change¹³

Kotter’s well-known process of “Leading Change,”—recently updated to accommodate the context and objectives of a faster moving world (and more accurately reflect the complex problems and environments of DIB)—is useful for demonstrating the dynamic informational requirements to support the implementation of DIB activities. It is important to note that change for DIB is rarely linear as Kotter’s “steps” may suggest, and Kotter’s update describes running the steps “concurrently and continuously” in such cases:

Step 1: Create a Sense of Urgency	Craft and use a significant opportunity as a means for exciting people to sign up to change their organization.
Step 2: Build a Guiding Coalition	Assemble a group with the power and energy to lead and support a collaborative change effort.
Step 3: Form a Strategic Vision and Initiatives	Shape a vision to help steer the change effort and develop strategic initiatives to achieve that vision.
Step 4: Enlist a Volunteer “Army”	Raise a large force of people who are ready, willing, and urgent to drive change.
Step 5: Enable Action by Removing Barriers	Remove obstacles to change, change systems or structures that pose threats to the achievement of the vision.
Step 6: Generate Short-Term Wins	Produce, track, evaluate, and celebrate volumes of small and large accomplishments and correlate them to results.
Step 7: Sustain Acceleration	Use increasing credibility to change systems, structures, and policies that do not align with the vision; reinvigorate the process with new projects, themes, and volunteers.
Step 8: Institute Change	Articulate the connections between the new behaviors and organizational success, and develop the means to ensure leadership development and succession.

In order to manage the information from a DIB project, it is useful to have a systematic way of collecting and interpreting the data. It is also useful to have a means to assess the totality of what is being measured to determine if it meets the informational requirements of the DIB activity without exceeding the reasonable capacity of the implementers. There are various methods for this kind of data management and the methods and tools used should fit the needs and requirements of a particular project. For programs that use

theories of change in the development community, for example, this is often done through a “results framework” that provides a tabular format for succinct statements of data such as baselines, objectives, intended results, observations, and analyses.

Monitoring and Evaluation: Monitoring and evaluation of DIB activities involves gathering, processing, analyzing, presenting, and managing information to support evidence-based decisions. Though the groundwork for effective monitoring and evaluation is established in the scoping and design of DIB activities, the groundwork means nothing if it does not get the right information, in the right form, to the right people, and at the right time to make evidence-based decisions. Therefore, deliberate planning and management should be applied to the effective utilization of the information gained through the monitoring and evaluation of DIB activities (see *Box 4*).

Box 4: Evaluation in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Environments¹⁴

The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) has “established a partnership with a consortium of leading organizations in the fields of conflict, security and justice to develop more effective approaches to the use of data in the design, implementation and evaluation of programs that contribute to reducing conflict, crime and violence.” This has yielded a significant body of knowledge of its own regarding fragile and conflict-affected environments in general and for the integration of measures in these environments specifically.

The DFID consortium advocates that integrating theories of change and measures provides planners with a basis to determine whether a project, program, or strategy is on track to accomplish the desired change, and if the environment is evolving as anticipated in the project or program design. DFID establishes that theories of change enable evaluators to ask hard questions about why certain changes are expected, the assumptions of how the change process unfolds, and which outcomes are being selected to focus on and why.

The work of the DFID consortium also proposes that the process of monitoring assumptions and theories of change involves an iterative cycle of regular data collection, analysis, reflection, feedback, and action. They hold that theory-based evaluation helps assess whether underlying theories of change or assumptions of a program are correct by identifying the causal linkages between different variables and is particularly useful for learning and accountability—whether the success, failure, or mixed results of the intervention were due to program theories and assumptions, or implementation. Finally, the DFID consortium asserts theories of change need to be as reflective of the actual environment as possible without overly complicating the situation—clearly defining the boundaries of the theory and its assumptions is critical.

The challenges that arise during DIB projects are often multi-causal and highly political, and may involve many people and organizations. Therefore it is important to

identify measures that indicate progress and adequate resolution. Testing theories of change and making adjustments to DIB activities, including the measures used to support them should be highlighted as features of the monitoring process (and captured for learning within the DIB activity and across DIB programs). Making adjustments to the plan should not be taken as indications of failure—failure would be to rigidly follow a plan and miss opportunities to achieve outcomes in the face of new information or changing circumstances. Therefore, evaluation must also take into account that DIB activities intentionally evolve beyond scoping and design, and throughout implementation, in order to achieve intended outcomes. Measures should be able to “tell the story” that justifies the evolution of a DIB activity by providing the evidence that led to the decisions to adjust course. Without this evidence, a DIB activity may be evaluated on objectives that were only relevant at the time they were established, decisions that may be scrutinized as arbitrary, and activities that are criticized for not having discipline or direction (when the discipline was in the deliberate exercise of agility in the face of changing circumstances or new information).

Appropriate Measures for DIB

Public policy deals with tough questions, such as: is NATO a success? One would answer this question differently at different times in history. Early on, NATO demonstrated the resolve of the United States in Europe, but during the Cold War it sometimes demonstrated the lack of Western unity and at times it was outflanked by Soviet initiatives. At the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it appeared a great success. But soon after, its utility was in dispute again, while its value rose after the Russian Federation became more provocative. One could ask the same thing about DIB. Is DIB as an enterprise a success or is a specific DIB activity a success? What are the measures as a whole and by case?

One measure of the success of a DIB effort is to query the ultimate stakeholder of DIB work, the citizen of the partner nation. This construct of a measure of success could be evaluated through surveys, and that science has come a long way with accurate public opinion surveys being conducted in war-torn areas, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁵ One can even find data on how the defense institutions we work with are viewed by their consumers, their citizens.¹⁶ On the other hand, such surveys are certainly far removed by time and effort from any direct DIB projects, and the ability to disaggregate causes from effect can also be challenging.

Program evaluation is essential in public policy. DIB is a relatively new concept with much still to be learned or developed, but there is a growing basis of understanding about the challenges and some useful tools to deal with them. Among them are tools that rely upon timely and accurate qualitative and quantitative information, and a process that aims to monitor and evaluate intermediate objectives as the primary means to assess program success. It should be noted that, while there is great power in the analytics associated with quantitative measures, there is no inherent superiority of quantitative over qualitative

measures—each has its time and place. This is important since the nature of DIB issues and environments will often necessitate the use of qualitative information to support evidence-based decisions.

Quantitative Data Collection and Assessment

Though DIB environments often necessitate their use, DIB should not develop its own bias for qualitative measures when quantitative measures may be available and appropriate to the situation. At the enterprise level, programs can be evaluated long after the activities are over, changes in methodologies can be weighed, and categorization of various programs in different contexts can be developed. And while the data itself may be labor intensive to produce, the data analysis tools at the activity level tend to be rather simple, requiring basic trend tracking and past and future consumption and spend rates. This also applies to measures that DIB teams may help partners integrate into their management systems where a simple tool can require a good deal of labor to develop and support it. For example, creating a unit readiness system (a factor of personnel and equipment, and the training and maintenance of the same) requires a great deal of work by the partner, evaluations of the processes of the system by experts, and a judgment of success by the DIB team and partner-nation leadership.

Quantifiable data can be categorized by the amount of information (too little or too much), the reliability of the information, and timeliness. Having too much information is not often a problem, but discerning what is important and what is not is an issue. Quantitative information should be informed by contextual insight. Experts are best served when they have the key bit of data or insight that informs the data overall: what is missing? How much information is enough? Answers to these questions can be hard to divine. The more common situation is a paucity of information—an undefined force structure, a partial insight into the status of vehicle and equipment maintenance, a lack of records on how the force performs under stress situations (exercises and operations), etc. When developing measures for DIB projects, practitioners will have to take into account the amount of information available and determine if it is adequate to effectively manage, and, if not, what could be done to gain the necessary data to produce relevant outcomes.

One of the greatest obstacles to overcome in the quantitative realm is that usable data often arrives late in a program. Partners may not have the tools to understand their own capabilities, and in fact, often those skills, programs, and processes are an intermediate outcome of the program. If the partner is in crisis, then collection of quantifiable data may be more difficult, yet becomes even more crucial. The solution is clear. If there is no baseline early in the design of the program, other than the realization that there is an unknown, then a line of effort of the program should be to create that baseline.

In order to be confident in the use of data to drive decisions and make evaluations, we must ascribe to that data a level of reliability. As we noted earlier, measures can be thwarted by any manner of political, cultural, and administrative challenges. For instance, in the process of the program, the DIB team may have urged the partner to duplicate measuring

systems that do not capture a useful baseline. If the authority is not there to collect the data, or if there is graft or a need to save face, then the DIB expert faces a dilemma. Fortunately, DIB experts can rely upon others for evidence. The U.S. Embassy country team may have data related to the partner's practices, as well other donor countries. In the realm of resource management, there is usually a wealth of World Bank and other reports to provide a basis of insight. Some data will be more accurate than others, and the DIB professional has to discern how that might reflect upon the institution as a whole: Is the information accurate across the institution or do we know the status of the Special Operations Forces unit because the United States spent years working with them? Is the data simply a snapshot reflecting a moment in time, a recent bit of support to a partner? Will reliable data continue to inform the institution once we have gone?

The challenge of collecting hard, reliable data leads to satisficing, eschewing optimal results for practical outcomes. As Herbert A. Simon posited, "decision makers can satisfice either by finding optimum solutions for a simplified world, or by finding satisfactory solutions for a more realistic world. Neither approach, in general, dominates the other, and both have continued to co-exist in the world of management science."¹⁷ DIB practitioners strive to make a defense institution better not perfect, and the goals they devise with partners reflect an appraisal of what the defense institution can produce throughout the program. In some cases, rough order magnitudes of hard data are what will satisfice to move the institution forward.

Qualitative Data Collection and Assessment

Qualitative approaches can be used throughout the program to test questions that hard data cannot address. Qualitative assessment answers the core questions about the work of the program: "are we doing all the right things to achieve objectives?" which is essentially about progress, and "are we doing things the right way?," which is about the effectiveness of the program. Qualitative practices can be particularly useful for tying hard data to the relevance question: is the program contributing to improving the security capabilities of the partner? Are all the consequences (good, bad, and indifferent) of the program being evaluated? Does the partner have the capacity and political will to follow through on DIB efforts, to make adjustments during the program? Judgments on institutional learning also rely mostly on qualitative evaluations.

One of the most common qualitative approaches is a form of process mapping, which seeks to understand the *how* and *why* of institutional decision-making, often with a goal of increasing organizational efficiency and effectiveness. As applied to DIB, the *who* and *what* are also appropriate questions, providing an appraisal of what an institution is doing well and when it is not. Of course, such assessments are best made with an appreciation of data, but a simple comparison of processes against adapted international practices is itself useful for DIB purposes to measure progress for both U.S. experts and partners' institutions.

Even when quantifiable data is used throughout a program, it is often aided by qualitative measures. For example, a logistics review (a key DIB assessment) starts with a

baseline of data of the current status of the partner's system, followed by an analysis of this data (often tied to operational support).

Setting Intermediary Objectives

During program execution, those who provide oversight will ask if the program is going according to plan. This can be addressed by those measures of performance (MOPs) that have been built into the program. A MOP weighs whether or not the inputs are producing outputs and outcomes in the project. Are the experts and partner-nation representatives meeting, is work being produced, is the timeline being met, etc.? MOPs are sometimes criticized, because they do not answer the existential question of whether the work will lead to the designed end-state in the institution. But inputs and activities are essential for creating impacts, and knowing their success or failure can help keep a program on track or suggest that a new tack is required. A program will also include measures of effectiveness (MOEs) that address the larger question of how "well" the program is, and if it is leading to desired outcomes and eventually program impacts.

Using both qualitative and quantitative tools, the practitioners weave together measures all along the course of the program. Some of these will serve the purpose of external evaluation for overseers and other stakeholders, while others are internal tools to ensure a program adjusts to the changing arrangements. In this process, intermediate objectives serve as the link between the performance measures and the North Star of a program.

Conclusion

Sigmund Freud posited that psychoanalysis had a limited mandate and, "much will be gained if we succeed in transforming your hysterical misery into common unhappiness."¹⁸ As he saw it, psychoanalysis brought merely "common unhappiness," and DIB practitioners share the same sort of bounded goal, bringing defense institutions into the unsatisfying realm of imperfect public policy and out of the world of unacceptable risk. Within that world are the many challenges unique to working on complex problems with such partners—the political realities, the cultural and social characteristics, and a multitude of actors with a variety of perspectives and motivations. These are intensified as DIB activities increasingly reach a diversity of partners across a spectrum of capability. Despite these dynamic environments, DIB efforts strive to integrate both quantitative and qualitative tools, as appropriate, to measure the progress and effectiveness of programs and activities. In that context, these measures serve to track progress toward intermediate outcomes that compose the causal logic and framework of action toward ultimate outcomes for a partner. When these measures are effectively integrated into DIB practices, a base of experiential evidence sufficient to support accountability and learning is created. This base should be thoughtfully managed to support the decisions, and enable the disciplined agility, to adapt for better outcomes within DIB activities and across the DIB Enterprise. The way ahead is to build on practices for measures and collate knowledge of what is effective and what is not for wider dissemination. As DIB becomes institutionalized within security cooperation, it

should move toward more formal evaluation, since the focus of measures so far for DIB has been on the earlier phases of building partner capacity through monitoring.

Notes

- 1 Sophie Sutcliffe and Julius Court, "Evidence-Based Policymaking: What is it? How does it work? What relevance for developing countries?," Overseas Development Institute, November 2005, available at <<https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3683.pdf>>.
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- 4 Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina* (Moscow: The Russian Messenger, 1878), 1.
- 5 Michael McNerney, Jefferson Marquis, Rebecca Zimmerman, and Ariel Klein, *SMART Security Cooperation Objectives: Improving DOD Planning and Guidance* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016) available at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1430.html>.
- 6 The DIB community of interest includes, but is not limited to: the international community (bi-lateral and multi-lateral, governmental and non-governmental actors engaged in the same "space" as DIB); the interagency; U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, Services, and agencies; U.S. regional Combatant Commands and their components; country teams and security cooperation practitioners.
- 7 John Kotter, "8 Steps to Accelerate Change in 2015," Kotter International, 2015, available at <<http://www.kotterinternational.com/ebook/eBook-Final-Copyright-2015.pdf>>.
- 8 Graphic used in Defense Governance and Management Team (DGMT) briefings to illustrate the process and considerations used for DIB engagement with partners.
- 9 McNerney et al., *op. cit.*
- 10 Graphic used widely in Defense Governance and Management Team briefings to illustrate the confluence of factors that define where DIB can be most effective.
- 11 Hallie Preskill et al., "Evaluating Complexity: Propositions for Improving Practice," November 2014, available at <<http://www.fsg.org/publications/evaluating-complexity>>, 3.
- 12 Graphic used in Defense Governance and Management Team briefings to illustrate how theories of change and SMART objectives contribute to intermediate and ultimate outcomes.
- 13 Kotter, *op. cit.*
- 14 Vanessa Corlazzoli and Jonathan White, "Back to Basics: A Compilation of Best Practices in Design, Monitoring & Evaluation in Fragile and Conflict-affected Environments," Department for International Development, March 2013, available at <<http://cdacollaborative.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Back-to-Basics-a-Compilation-of-Best-Practices.pdf>>.
- 15 Arturo Muñoz, *U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations, 2001–2010* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), available at <www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1060.html>.
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III. DRAWING INSIGHTS

The Security Governance Initiative

Julie E. Chalfin and Linda Thomas-Greenfield

The White House estimates that between 2009 and 2014, U.S. assistance to sub-Saharan African militaries and police combined to total more than \$3 billion.¹ Of this total, the United States spent approximately \$900 million on support to peacekeeping efforts alone. The U.S. government also provided approximately \$90 million in foreign military financing and sold more than \$135 million worth of arms.² Despite these substantial expenditures and investments, the ability of African states to address their security challenges remains insufficient. Some African peacekeepers are falling short in peacekeeping performance; terrorism and other transnational threats impede human development in several parts of the continent; and African citizens often mistrust their police and military forces. When the fundamental responsibility of the state for the security and justice needs of its citizens is inadequately executed, the result is often increased insecurity and de-legitimization of the government.

Based on years of security assistance delivery, the U.S. government concluded that if the aim was to develop sustained and effective African capacity to tackle security and justice challenges, then the traditional approach for providing security assistance was incomplete. The Security Governance Initiative (SGI) was introduced in 2014 as a new approach to respond to this quandary. The SGI approach seeks to align partner priorities with U.S. national interests, resources, and expertise to enhance the management, oversight, and accountability of the security and justice sectors. SGI also offers a more comprehensive, effective, and efficient approach for partners addressing security challenges, and for the U.S. government in providing security assistance.

Security sector governance is defined as the transparent, accountable, and legitimate management and oversight of security policy and practice. This chapter presents an overview of security and justice sector governance challenges in Africa, a review of U.S. security sector assistance on the continent, and a description of SGI, its key principles, and the progress made on implementation. This chapter also discusses defense institution building (DIB) through the SGI lens, and the role of other stakeholders in the governance of the security sector. While SGI is focused broadly on security governance, because of the centrality of defense institutions to the security sector, DIB is a key component of the SGI framework. In some cases, such as in Mali, Niger, and Nigeria, partners specifically identified the enhancement of defense institutions as one of their priorities for SGI. Although SGI activities for these focus areas will primarily benefit the defense sector, the

holistic approach that SGI promotes will ensure that these governments consider defense institutional capacity building in relation to overall security priorities and resources.

African Security and Justice Sector Challenges

Security and justice sectors that are weak, poorly managed and coordinated, and affected by corruption, present significant obstacles to sustainable development, democracy, stability, and peace across Africa. Democratically governed security sector institutions and professional forces rooted in the rule of law and held accountable to civilian oversight are critical. Governments are more effective in the delivery of services to their population—and are better partners for addressing shared security interests—when they can communicate priorities, capabilities, and requirements, and can efficiently and transparently manage human, material, and financial resources. It is no coincidence that the first pillar of President Obama’s 2012 Presidential Policy Directive for Africa is to strengthen democratic institutions.³

Decades of imbalances in power between military and civilian security institutions, including allocations of resources that heavily favor the military and, more specifically, military operations, have left many African countries with civilian security institutions that do not have the capacity or confidence to carry out their core functions. This imbalance has further perpetuated the reliance on and favor for the military. The dynamic created has led to security institutions that do not trust one another and a stove-piped approach for planning and budgeting for security requirements. This paradigm inhibits governments from meeting the demands of complex security challenges that require a whole-of-government effort. The stove-piped approach also leads to redundancies, confusion of roles and responsibilities, and wasteful practices.

While the mismanagement of personnel and resources might preclude efficiencies in the security sector structure, the lack of oversight and accountability of the entire security system has allowed corruption and abuse to thrive. Tolerance for corruption and abuse not only erodes security capabilities, but also the trust of the population in the government and its security services. The U.S. government recognizes that professionalism and sustainment challenges are faced by security institutions around the globe, not just in Africa. However, given that African states are earlier in their state formation process and continue to be dominated by problematic relations between the population and government security forces, the African continent was selected first for this initiative. It is likely that SGI will expand to other parts of the globe as demand for this partnership increases.

Similar problems plague African judicial sectors, which have frequently been marginalized or otherwise neglected by the continent’s strong, executive-centric governments. Conceived of as the formal institutional mechanism that ultimately holds individuals—including government representatives—accountable for civil and criminal infractions, judiciaries are an integral part of the security sector apparatus. Without effective, independent courts that are able to hold security actors accountable, there is

nothing to assure citizens that predatory acts will be punished. While traditional justice systems will continue to play an important role in mitigating conflict and assuring justice for Africa's citizens, SGI focuses on strengthening modern systems wherever able, and establishing citizen confidence in the justice process.

SGI is distinctive in the broad scope of its institutional mandate including armed forces, civilian oversight agencies, police and other internal security organizations, legislatures, and civil society, reflecting a holistic understanding of security. The program emphasizes collaborative processes and U.S.-host country partnership in pursuing shared national and international security goals.

U.S. Government and Security Sector Assistance

For more than a decade, the U.S. government has supported security sector reform and defense institution building efforts in Africa, primarily in countries transitioning from conflict, such as Liberia and South Sudan. The Department of State (DOS) Bureau of African Affairs not only led policy formulation of these efforts, but also played the lead role in implementing DIB of the fledgling Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) of southern Sudan and eventually South Sudan. In Liberia, DOS similarly led the early planning and execution of the reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) starting in 2004. These major attempts at reform produced results that were both positive (Liberia) and mixed (South Sudan), which are worthy of close study for DIB practitioners operating in post-conflict contexts.

In South Sudan, U.S. assistance began following the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with a focus on transforming the SPLA from a largely guerrilla force to a professional military, respectful of the rule of law and civilian control. These efforts occurred along with similar work to improve South Sudan's police and justice systems. In addition to building headquarters and unit infrastructure, and supporting the development of tactical and operational capabilities, U.S. assistance focused on enhancing the command, control, and administration of the force, as well as the establishment of policies, strategies, and procedures to guide the transformation process. Partly owing to the lack of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel resources and a permissive security and political environment, DOS led the DIB mission using training and advisory teams composed of mostly retired U.S. military personnel embedded in the offices of the Sudan People's Liberation Army leadership and later, a second U.S. team, embedded within the offices of the South Sudanese Ministry of Defense directorates.

Despite some tangible progress, a number of challenges stymied the overall military professionalization and DIB efforts for South Sudan. These included: 1) a lack of sufficient South Sudanese buy-in as indicated by a lack of resources invested in the sustainment of the force; 2) a lack of coherence with the wider budget and immature public financial management; 3) the inability of leaders to delegate responsibilities; 4) the lack of a human resource management system to strategically vet, develop, and employ personnel;

5) an entrenched antagonism to civilian control, even from the Ministry of Defense; and 6) the preoccupation of South Sudanese leadership with ongoing conflicts and other political priorities.

On the other hand, the commitment by the Liberian political and security leadership to the defense reform process, assisted by significant U.S. assistance, resulted in the formation of a professional, competent, and civilian-led Liberian defense force. The DOD joined with DOS in reform efforts early on, playing a significant training and mentoring role for the AFL, alongside work by the Economic Community of West African States and other international partners.

U.S. assistance and Liberian political will were instrumental in disbanding the entire existing defense force and re-constituting it from scratch. This fresh start allowed the government to establish institutional norms, infuse national purpose in the AFL, and undertake necessary reforms that would have been resisted by personnel from the AFL serving under the former head of state Charles Taylor. Liberia's Ministry of Defense drew from shared U.S. best practices, such as the recruitment of personnel from across Liberia's regions and thorough military induction standards.

Alongside this AFL rebuilding effort, the Liberia National Police (LNP) was maintained and was able to provide public order management in coordination with the United Nations (UN) Mission in Liberia so that the AFL development could advance without distractions. The increasing competence of the AFL, and Liberia's demonstrated ability to protect its people and borders, has permitted the UN to draw down its peacekeeping mission and plan for its complete withdrawal within the next few years—the mark of a successful exit strategy for U.S. security sector reform efforts. This relatively successful endeavor took place in conjunction with LNP reform, economic progress, and other post-conflict reconstruction work that has buoyed the Liberian body politic and placed the country on a solid reconciliation path.

As the different outcomes of these two U.S. government experiences illustrate, certain conditions are necessary for successful institutional reforms to endure. Without political will, absorptive capacity, credible and effective institutions, willingness to independently manage U.S. and other international donor investments, an equal stake in the success of security sector initiatives, and policy commitment to security sector reform, governments will not sustain reforms undertaken with U.S. assistance over the long term. In addition, it is imperative that civil society engagement and parliamentary oversight be strengthened to ensure that the security system has checks and balances, and over time can produce increased government legitimacy.

In 2013, Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance (PPD-23) endorsed a comprehensive U.S. strategy for building sustainable partner security sector capacity.⁴ PPD-23 provides a framework for the U.S. government to coordinate efforts and ensure transparency and consistency in security sector assistance delivery. The policies and guidelines offered in PPD-23 also provided the foundation for developing a whole-of-government approach to address the governance obstacles that prevent the sustainability

of security sector assistance. PPD-23 reaffirms the State Department's lead in policy, supervision, and general management of security sector assistance. DIB is crucial to these general security assistance management efforts since defense institutions play a pivotal role in the governance of a major component of the security sector. For greatest impact, these efforts must be jointly planned and monitored by the Departments of State and Defense, and other relevant agencies.

New Approach: The Security Governance Initiative

President Obama launched the SGI at the August 2014 United States-Africa Leaders Summit, offering a new approach to improve security sector governance and capacity in Africa. SGI is a coordinated interagency process that promotes inclusivity and partnerships. The Initiative is informed by consultations with a broad audience, including U.S. government experts, civil society, international donor partners, and other international nongovernmental organizations. This approach is to ensure a thorough understanding of issues and efforts to address security sector governance challenges.

SGI is not intended to replace training and equipping assistance programs. Rather, SGI's central objective is to complement these other efforts, and enable countries to develop policies, institutional structures, and systems that allow them to more efficiently, effectively, and responsibly deliver security and justice to their citizens.

Through SGI, the United States partners with countries to undertake strategic and institutional reforms required for governments to tackle key security challenges, both in regard to the mission of protecting state institutions and assuring citizen security. As a Presidential initiative, SGI calls for high-level, bilateral commitments. A foundation based on shared goals and commitments ensures appropriate management, coordination, and prioritization of efforts undertaken under SGI. The SGI focus is intended to foster resiliency within partner governments to not only address short-term disruptions in the security environment, but also to be better able to make strategic choices about their future security posture. SGI also emphasizes productive dialogue with civil society stakeholders.

SGI Process and Principles

To coordinate this new initiative that will initially focus primarily on sub-Saharan Africa, DOS established an SGI Coordination Office in the Bureau of African Affairs. This inaugural SGI Office includes liaison officers from other U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development. Applying PPD-23's central tenets of transparency and coordination across the U.S. government, DOS convenes an SGI Working Group to coordinate with the broader SGI interagency community. The SGI Working Group includes all relevant U.S. government agencies to synchronize efforts, reduce redundancies, minimize assistance-delivery timelines, ensure consideration of the full range of policy and operational equities, improve data collection, and measure effectiveness. The SGI Working

Group also provides an opportunity to share best practices that DOD and other agencies can apply to DIB.

The SGI Coordination Office works closely with U.S. Embassy country teams in partner countries, which play a critical role in SGI program development and implementation. Specifically, U.S. Embassies maintain regular contact with key partner-country SGI interlocutors, provide real-time information about the dynamics in a country, and assist with Leahy vetting and other foreign assistance reporting requirements. The interagency quality of embassy country teams also offers a natural forum for SGI coordination to take place between the various U.S. interagency implementers.

Before engaging in an official visit, U.S. government officials gather information and organize briefings with U.S. government and nongovernmental country and subject matter experts. This includes arranging sessions with U.S. Embassy teams to develop a shared understanding of the U.S. interests at stake, inventory current and planned U.S. assistance and programs, discuss the security situation, and identify potential areas for engagement. The intensive study and preparation informs the SGI team prior to engaging the partner country by providing awareness both of the relationships between the defense sector and other security sector stakeholders, and of the partner-country security sector institution capabilities, including defense institutions. The study also considers the relationship of the state security and justice institutions to the wider public they are in principle expected to serve.

The SGI approach applies key principles to ensure the commitment of governments and the sustainability of good security sector governance. These key principles include: promoting partnership and collaboration; coordinating interagency and interministerial efforts; and adopting a flexible and adaptable approach based on the needs of the SGI partner and the evolving environment.

Partnership and Collaboration

The SGI process was developed based on the premise that sustainable solutions to security sector challenges must come from within the partner country. Through SGI, the U.S. government launches a dialogue with the partner to identify opportunities to tackle urgent and emerging threats. After securing head of state commitment to the principles endorsed by SGI, U.S. delegations are dispatched to actively listen to the concerns articulated by high-level government officials. U.S. Embassies also facilitate conversations between the U.S. SGI interagency teams and other stakeholders, such as representatives from parliaments, local nongovernmental organizations, academics, and other international donors.

This open dialogue creates a space to explore options for addressing systemic security sector governance problems, reinforcing the necessity for burden-sharing, managing expectations of U.S. resource commitment, and confirming partner priorities. Frank communication establishes a feedback loop where ideas, best practices, and lessons learned can be readily shared. It also builds relationships that can lead to productive dialogue on other shared bilateral interests not necessarily in the SGI realm.

This diplomatic engagement is a key component of SGI and cannot be overemphasized. Engagement at all levels, including dialogue between senior leadership and between working-level counterparts, allows the U.S. government to gauge government interest and commitment to undertake the difficult and often sensitive reforms required. Over time, it also builds trusting relationships, and allows U.S. government officials to better understand evolving security challenges from the partner's perspective, and appropriately link good governance principles to a country's ability to address current security threats.

Consistent diplomatic engagement provides the opportunity for the United States and partners to manage expectations and proceed at the pace in which reforms can occur. Despite good will and intentions, partner institutions might lack skilled human capital to receive assistance, and governments might not have the resources readily available for reforms to which they have committed. The United States and its partners must consider the absorptive capacity to take on the reforms and present a realistic timeline to set up the government for success. SGI program design is, therefore, founded on a developmental approach to help manage expectations and undertake the appropriate efforts at a tempo that does not place undue burden on the partner government.

Based on priorities and requirements articulated by the partner country through the consultations and dialogue, the U.S. government proposes specific focus areas for SGI engagement. Focus areas not only reflect partner-country interests, but are selected to draw on a range of available expertise and experience from the U.S. interagency, present options for improving systems to sustain and complement other U.S. security assistance, and provide opportunities for addressing underlying governance challenges that prevent partners from meeting their security objectives. Focus areas proposed also align with U.S. national interests.

Several partners identified DIB as a priority area of focus, including Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. Partner countries expressed a desire to improve resources management in particular. In Niger, for instance, a main component of SGI programming is focused on improving the defense sector's human, material, and financial resource management. Enhancement in these areas not only helps countries to overcome their own security challenges more effectively, but also makes them more capable and sustainable long-term partners for the United States, with the ability to contain local conflicts and prevent them from rising to a threat level that could more directly threaten U.S. interests.

Once partner governments agree on the proposed SGI focus areas, a Joint Country Action Plan (JCAP) is co-drafted to define the parameters of the SGI partnership. The JCAP development process illustrates the importance SGI places on collaboration. U.S. and partner-country experts jointly conduct an analysis of the challenges and opportunities available in each focus area, which includes reviewing any related and parallel activities. These expert teams then articulate the desired end state for each focus area, and recommend activities, required steps, and milestones for achieving these ends.

Best practices and lessons learned can be shared through sustained, high-level engagement and through the process of conducting a joint analysis in which government

officials are more likely to openly discuss any capacity gaps and root causes of security sector challenges. Consultation teams have been able to build a rapport with officials in partner countries, which has facilitated honest and open exchange. This process also establishes a common understanding of the current environment and allows the U.S. government to offer better informed and targeted assistance to address the systemic issues unique to the partner's context. Hence, the final JCAP presented to U.S. and partner leadership for signature is the product of in-depth conversations between partner and U.S. government subject matter experts.

SGI activities are developed and implemented using the JCAP as the roadmap. A senior-level SGI Steering Committee, co-chaired by the U.S. ambassador and a senior partner representative, is established to regularly discuss SGI activities and progress. The Steering Committee, comprised of U.S. representatives and senior officials from the partner country, including ministers, deputy ministers, and representatives from the Office of the Presidency, meets approximately every six months to review progress made on the focus areas and intermediate objectives outlined in the JCAP. SGI relies on the embassy team and the partner to ensure that SGI points of contact have the backing of the head of state. This coordination mechanism ensures that JCAP implementation reflects joint expectations, is pragmatic and resource-informed, and gains and maintains senior leader support.

Periodic review by the senior SGI Steering Committee is required to determine the relevance and effectiveness of SGI activities, whether objectives should be added or omitted, and the level of continued partner commitment. The Steering Committee assesses whether the completed activities have contributed to moving closer to the desired end state for each of the focus areas, and discusses planned SGI activities intended to meet the objectives articulated in the JCAP that have not yet been reached, or new objectives identified.

Interagency and Interministerial Coordination

SGI leverages expertise and experience from throughout the U.S. government. Interagency coordination and collaboration both within the U.S. government and with the partner is a hallmark of SGI. SGI applies a comprehensive, whole-of government approach for addressing complex and emerging security challenges. Liaisons from the relevant U.S. government agencies and departments are detailed to the SGI Coordination Office in order to maintain a constant flow of information between home agencies and SGI planning. The SGI Office also facilitates weekly meetings to provide frequent updates and solicit feedback from the broader SGI interagency community. Regularly scheduled meetings allow for the interagency to discuss and coordinate the most appropriate U.S. implementer and resources for SGI programming, and to adjust the programs as the environment changes.

The SGI approach adopts the premise that governments that have a comprehensive understanding of their security sector capabilities, gaps, and deficiencies can more efficiently align resources to address security priorities, and that well-developed policies, systems, and processes allow governments to more effectively manage their security and justice sectors. To be truly impactful, laws, policies, and procedures must be clearly stated

and widely understood. More transparent and effectively managed security and justice sectors, in turn, lead to better coordinated and formulated plans, and more targeted and organized operations.

Harnessing the expertise and resources of the entire government can lead to new collaboration and creative solutions; however, the practice of collaboration and cooperation is difficult and time consuming for any country. For some countries, interministerial coordination can be especially challenging. Often, partner governments need to overcome years of mistrust and rivalry between ministries, and systems that perpetuate stovepiped decision-making processes. The lack of reliable and practical information-sharing between security sector organizations can undermine the effectiveness of each organization. One of SGI's key strengths is its convening power. The majority of SGI engagements identify, organize, and call together interministerial representatives to discuss shared interests and challenges. Repeated interactions over the course of the life of SGI, which is expected to be several years, can create and cultivate important governmental relationships.

Despite existing hurdles, SGI countries have voiced a desire to attain the benefits of this approach, recognizing that interministerial coordination and a whole-of-government approach to security builds resiliency and efficiencies into the security sector. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities of each organization, as well as systems for sharing information help to reduce redundancies, ensure a common mission, and institute a process for ministries to hold one another accountable. For example, in Kenya SGI has encouraged improved border management by breaking down stovepipes and providing opportunities to communicate between agencies.

A Flexible and Adaptable Approach

As threats evolve, priorities shift, and a better understanding of the environment emerges, SGI endeavors to be flexible to adapt to changing requirements. The SGI Steering Committee provides a forum for the U.S. and partner leadership to assess progress and determine whether the objectives presented in the JCAP reflect the evolving environment. For SGI to remain relevant to the partner and, at the same time, satisfy U.S. interests, modifications to the JCAP are open for discussion and must be mutually agreed upon by both the U.S. and partner senior leadership.

Defense Institution Building Through the SGI Lens

While SGI is not solely focused on DIB, there are direct and indirect contributions that SGI makes to enhance the governance of defense institutions. There are also many lessons learned from U.S. government experience in undertaking DIB efforts in Africa that have informed the SGI process, most importantly, that success depends on the partner's political commitment and embrace of institutional reform.

Through SGI, mechanisms for information sharing and coordination between ministries are being established, new relationships between the defense sector and other

security agencies are being formed, and the distinct roles and functions of the various security agencies are becoming more clearly defined and understood. These outcomes have the potential to result in the military relinquishing some of the *de facto* responsibilities it acquired from its colonial legacy or might have acquired over time, and allow ministries of defense to more effectively and efficiently target their efforts and resources to fulfill their primary defense functions.

In some cases, such as in Mali and Nigeria, partners specifically identified the enhancement of defense institution systems as a priority for SGI. For example, defense human resource development and management was selected for Mali, and the enhancement of defense procurement and acquisition processes were selected for Nigeria. Although activities to support these areas primarily focus on and benefit the defense sector, the holistic SGI approach encourages the partner to consider institutional capacity building in one sector in relation to broader security priorities and public budget resources.

SGI Progress

The U.S. government selected SGI partner countries based on existing relationships, a commitment by the governments to the guiding principles of the initiative, and an expressed desire to undertake necessary security sector reforms. Kenya, Niger, Mali, Ghana, Tunisia, and Nigeria are the six initial SGI partners. Since the August 2014 launch, SGI has enjoyed modest successes, and the approach to SGI implementation has been well received.

Kenya

Kenya is the most advanced in SGI implementation. The Government of Kenya was the first of the SGI countries to: receive an interagency consultation team; finalize a JCAP, which was signed on the margins of President Obama's visit to Nairobi in July 2015; appoint a senior representative as the primary SGI point of contact; and host SGI Senior Steering Committees. The SGI engagement with Kenya has informed the SGI process, including validating the importance of sustained high-level communication and feedback. Progress made to date is mainly due to excellent bilateral collaboration at the senior and working levels, and proactive steps taken by Kenya to meet desired SGI objectives. An example is the development of a plan and process to establish a new Kenyan Customs and Border Protection Agency to integrate border management capabilities and capacities. Without the support of senior Kenyan leadership, working-level officials would not have been empowered to propose the new structure and offer innovative ideas for advancing an integrated border management framework.

The three mutually agreed areas for SGI-Kenya do not directly address DIB, but rather focus on enhancing and coordinating internal security processes and responses. In addition to establishing a holistic approach to border management, which involves elements of the defense sector, SGI is working to enhance police human resources management and the administration of justice. An overarching goal of SGI, and a national security priority for the Government of Kenya, is to foster greater public confidence in security and justice

institutions, and prevent the marginalization and radicalization of segments of Kenya's population. Building institutional capabilities—beyond the defense sector—to detect, deter, prosecute, and eliminate terrorists and violent extremists, will ensure a comprehensive approach for addressing threats that require more than a military response.

Niger

Niger is a country with significant security challenges, including fighting a three-front battle against extremists along the Malian, Libyan, and Nigerian borders, and facing major budgetary challenges as one of the least developed countries in the world. The country has a relatively small military (estimated 12,000) to handle the difficult tasks with which it must contend. As such, SGI programming in Niger seeks to assist the Nigerien Armed Forces and has a large DIB component. Two of the SGI focus areas, while not dedicated solely to supporting the defense sector, require inputs from the Ministry of Defense and seek to enhance defense institution capacity. Specifically, focus areas are aimed at improving decision-making processes that determine the allocation of human, materiel, and financial resources for security sector requirements. SGI work to date with Nigerien defense institutions includes reviewing processes for managing military personnel, logistics, and budgets, and establishing systems for multi-year planning to more effectively anticipate and respond to current and emerging threats. For example, SGI is supporting the Ministry of Defense to enhance human resourcing procedures, including ensuring consistency in job qualifications and developing a merit-based promotion system. As a result of active participation by senior level defense officials in SGI activities, the government has begun to institute several of these reforms.

Mali

Mali has been in a crisis since the coup and collapse of the government in 2013, and the subsequent routing of the military by terrorists. This catastrophe weighs heavily on the country today as it simultaneously works on the peace process, institutes systematic security sector reform, and conducts limited counterterrorist operations. Mali's security institutions, including its defense sector, are addressing several challenges as they work to consolidate and build on the 2013 restoration of democracy and implementation of the 2015 Algiers Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. SGI has provided a forum for the Government of Mali to engage in interministerial discussions on security sector governance priorities, and the opportunity to explore innovative reform options outside of the current system of governance. Through SGI, the U.S. government has facilitated discussions with Ministry of Defense officials to strengthen internal decision-making processes and improve systems that manage the budget, human and materiel resources, strategy, and policy.

Enhancing its defense institutions' human capacity and budget management will allow the Government of Mali to be more efficient in directing defense resources and governing the defense sector. Establishing processes for managing defense logistics and matching resources to identified needs will enhance the effectiveness of defense efforts and assist the Government of Mali in rebuilding defense institutions that address its national

security, and enhance citizen security throughout the country. This foundation will allow the Malian military to better address the requirements of the peace process, as well as the fight against terrorism, in a more sustainable way, which is certainly part of the exit strategy for the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

Ghana

As a partner with arguably stronger democratic institutions and a closer connection between the security institutions and the state, Ghana does not have the severity of security challenges faced by some of the other partners. Still, Ghana contends with increased threats along its maritime and land borders, and must continue to be an able contributor to UN and regional peacekeeping operations. The SGI focus in Ghana is to develop and implement comprehensive strategies that address key security sector challenges, which include maritime security, border management, and cyber-crime and cyber security. At the same time, SGI seeks to improve the administration of justice within these domains.

Enhancing defense systems to more effectively coordinate and communicate with other maritime and border-related agencies is a component of SGI in Ghana. Through SGI support, the roles, responsibilities, and legal authorities of the various agencies involved in maritime and border security will be clearly defined. For example, to protect the future of oil production and the fisheries, both of which are important for state revenue generation, the Ghanaian Navy must engage with civilian security entities. SGI is working to improve the ability of Ghanaian defense institutions to coordinate policies and procedures with other agencies responsible for providing maritime security, and to respond more effectively and efficiently to maritime threats. A clear definition of roles will ensure that suspects and evidence are properly gathered and handled following a maritime event, such as piracy, armed robbery at sea, human trafficking, or illegal fishing. Demonstrating its commitment to SGI, the government of Ghana has established interministerial working groups to support the implementation of SGI activities.

Tunisia

In the wake of the Arab Spring, Tunisia has had to contend with a major political transition, following free and fair elections and the establishment of a new government with high public expectations. SGI in Tunisia focuses primarily on enhancing the legitimacy, capacity, and transparency of the civilian security and justice sectors. Specifically, through SGI, the U.S. government will work with the government of Tunisia to improve police policies and procedures, particularly with respect to community engagement, and strengthen the judiciary and law enforcement agencies to address key drivers of radicalization. DIB will be addressed in Tunisia through the SGI focus on integrating Tunisian border management functions. SGI aims at defining the roles and responsibilities, and coordination and decision-making mechanisms for all border-related agencies, including the military. The coordination and communication between defense institutions and other border-related agencies is critical to stem the flow of extremists, weapons, and illicit goods in and out of

Tunisia and, at the same time, facilitate trade and the safe movement of people across the borders.

Nigeria

Following the corrupt and poorly run administration of President Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria under President Muhammadu Buhari faces major challenges and opportunities. Popular expectations are high and the country must contend with significant security challenges, from militias and oil bunkering in the Delta region to the terrorist group Boko Haram in the northeast of the country. The Nigerian military has significant operational missions with which to contend and still requires significant reform to maximize its capacity to support the Nigerian public.

Corruption has long diverted resources away from development and governance in Nigeria, fueled instability and violent extremism, and hindered military readiness and effectiveness on the battlefield. The enhancement of defense procurement and acquisition procedures and processes is one of the SGI focus areas for Nigeria. SGI aims to improve the Ministry of Defense resource management systems through targeted reforms to procurement and acquisition processes. Established and transparent procedures for needs identification, management, and accountability of defense materiel acquisitions could improve the performance and morale of Nigeria's defense services by ensuring that service members have the equipment they need and that equipment is maintained and replaced on an appropriate schedule. Systems that ensure that budgetary resources for military acquisitions are used effectively also establish safeguards that can deter corruption.

SGI activities will also contribute to the development of Nigeria's nationwide emergency response planning and coordination, and the reestablishment of civilian security and justice in Northeast Nigeria. While these two areas primarily focus on determining the roles and capacity of civilian agencies to address these goals, current and future defense sector roles and responsibilities must be reviewed and considered in these plans. Establishing a plan for transitioning civilian responsibilities from the military to civilian agencies, and mechanisms for defense institutions to effectively communicate and coordinate with civilian agencies, especially in the event of an emergency, will be essential for either of these two focus areas to achieve their objectives.

Lessons for DIB from SGI Implementation

A number of insights can be drawn from SGI's initial years of implementation and applied to DIB efforts. Partner governments, for instance, have expressed an appreciation for the consultative nature of SGI, and have been pleased that focus areas were determined and shaped based on their priorities. Investing the time to understand a partner's defense sector priorities from their perspective could reveal opportunities where a commitment to DIB exists on the part of the partner. In addition, understanding the role that the leadership expects defense institutions to play in meeting national security priorities, as well as the

military's relationship to other security sector agencies, can contribute to more effective and efficient security assistance programming. As described below, it is important to ensure that civil society better understands and appreciates the role of the military in serving national security interests, and therefore provides greater support for defense resources, both in terms of human capital and operational requirements.

An SGI partnership requires demonstrated political will in support of improved security sector governance and support for SGI at the highest levels of government. This commitment can be gauged through regular diplomatic engagement and an active plan for monitoring and evaluation. Similarly, through regular dialogue with senior defense officials and military to military engagements, a commitment to DIB can be determined. To ensure sustained senior-level commitment, the United States and the partner nation should share key security interests as well as a common understanding of security threats and the evolving political environment. The types of long-term reforms recommended through the SGI process, and for DIB, are often sensitive, difficult to implement, and even disruptive to existing government processes and structures. A government's unwavering commitment to expend the necessary influence and often limited resources to support the SGI process and principles, and for DIB alike, is imperative. This is the only way that the United States will be able to positively impact the force generation, executive management, and operating functions of the DIB enterprise in a sustainable way.

Like SGI, DIB must be a partnership. A government needs the capacity and political stability to contribute to the dialogue and share the burden in meeting DIB objectives. Defense officials must be able to articulate priorities, make strategic decisions, and implement DIB activities. The success of DIB relies on strong leadership and commitment by a partner. This commitment is weakened by political instability. Low-capacity countries with weak political frameworks may increase the risk of stalling or even completely ending SGI and DIB implementation.

Finally, the active involvement of other stakeholders that support the DIB process is critical for its success. Such stakeholders include the legislature, particularly the defense and finance committees, civil society organizations, and other international actors involved in the partner country's defense sector. Their roles and importance are discussed in more detail in the following section.

Role of Other Nongovernment Security Sector Stakeholders

Civil Society Organizations

Civil society plays a critical role in the governance of the security sector. Civil society organizations serve several different functions, including monitoring the performance of security sector actors and articulating the public demand for safety and security. Their vigor and courage in demanding transparency and accountability can be a force that pushes government agencies to be more open in their interactions with the population.

Civil society organizations, both those located in the United States and in the partner

countries, perform various roles. Organizations that focus on human rights conduct thorough investigations and publicize their findings, thereby increasing the pressure for governments to conduct their own investigations and take remedial actions. Other types of civil society groups devote their talents to assist in elections and the functioning of institutions such as legislative bodies to make these institutions more democratic and responsive to the political priorities of the public. These non-partisan institutes take the lead in making the political process more closely represent the electorate and its priorities. Think tanks and academics present a long-term view of trends and events from the scholar's point of view. They provide the historical perspective as one measure of how the current government is likely to handle long-term issues and deficiencies in governance.

Countries with a vibrant, professional, and corruption-exposing press provide an important source of information for reform elements. By their nature they emphasize transparency and accountability, and cover every element of reform: gross misconduct by military and police, the fairness of elections, the ability of the criminal justice system to investigate and prosecute corruption in the governmental sector, and the ability of the government to engage in budgetary planning and then carry out priorities transparently. The press also monitors the ability of the legislature to pass legislation that meets the needs of the nation and to serve in an oversight capacity to governmental institutions.

In some cases, however, a government may feel threatened by public criticism and pressure from civil society actors to change its policies and approach for providing security. Despite these tensions, through SGI, partner governments are encouraged to value the voice of civil society and the population more generally, and explore means for engaging in constructive dialogue with these groups. Demonstrating the value the U.S. government places on civil society, U.S. government SGI interagency leadership, the SGI Office, and U.S. SGI implementers meet regularly with civil society representatives in Washington, DC, and while visiting an SGI partner country, to learn from their perspectives and solicit ideas on the challenges and solutions to security sector governance. In Niger, where formal venues for civil society and Government of Niger interaction were lacking, SGI activities will include support for media and civil society actors aimed at strengthening their professionalism and capacity to report on and discuss security issues.

SGI also helps security sector institutions to develop channels for communicating security policy, plans, and activities with its population, and establish systems for receiving feedback from communities on their security needs, interests, and priorities. For example, SGI in Kenya includes programs to enable border management agencies to effectively communicate with the media and share information directly with border communities; SGI in Tunisia includes programs to enhance police policies and procedures for engaging and sharing information with communities; and SGI in Niger includes programs to develop the capacity of the ministries of defense, interior, and justice to communicate security sector related information to the population. By establishing more transparent and accountable security sector institutions, citizens will trust and be more confident in the government's ability to effectively, efficiently, and responsibly deliver security and justice.

Legislatures

African legislatures should be one of the most important stakeholders in ensuring the success of any reform effort. Unfortunately, owing to colonial heritage and a preponderance of executive-heavy systems, many African parliaments are not able to perform a robust oversight role. They often lack the legal authority to perform essential functions such as budgetary review, or the technical capacity to scrutinize the government's security institutions. At this early phase of implementation, SGI is primarily focused on enhancing national-level security strategies and policies, and building the capacity for institutions to better manage and oversee the delivery of security and justice. However, in order for SGI objectives to be achieved, partner government security sector institutions must engage with competent legislatures. As an SGI program evolves, strengthening parliaments to effectively conduct their oversight role will be required either through SGI programming or other activities.

International Partners

In many African countries there is sizeable investment by other international partners in the security and justice sectors. These partners include the European Union, UN, United Kingdom, France, and many others. The United States must ensure that other donor activities are considered along with SGI and DIB programming. International partners provide a vital perspective. Establishing an SGI and DIB community is critical to share best practices and ideas, provide for a more rigorous analysis of security sector governance, and prevent the duplication of efforts.

Conclusion

The comprehensive approach that the United States is pursuing with SGI is the culmination of years of lessons learned through providing security sector assistance to African countries in a range of developmental and fragility settings—from extremely poor to institutionally solid, and from post-conflict to steady state. The Department of State prioritizes good governance and has learned that the solutions to Africa's security challenges rely on both the political will of the partner and its adherence to good governance policies and practices. SGI is helping the U.S. government to avoid past disappointing results from earlier “train and equip” efforts that were not founded on a solid political and governance dynamic.

SGI provides a blueprint for linking democracy and governance programs and objectives with security assistance to improve the management, accountability, and oversight of the security and justice sectors. Involving a multi-year approach and an active system for monitoring impact, SGI is poised to assist partners to develop security sectors systems that more effectively and efficiently respond to security challenges, while also supporting African countries' need for greater transparency and accountability of their institutions. This new approach SGI offers also increases the likelihood that U.S. assistance will be responsibly used and sustained.

The whole-of-government approach to providing security sector assistance allows the U.S. government to better coordinate interests and assistance, apply our collective understanding to designing programs, and present to partners the wide range of expertise and experience our government has to offer. Engagement with multiple stakeholders, including incorporating the voice of civil society into the process, allows SGI to support a path for greater accountability of security institutions, and enhanced legitimacy of African governments.

Notes

1 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa,” June 2012, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/africa_strategy_2.pdf>.

2 U.S. Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, “Foreign Military Financing Account Summary,” January 2016, available at <<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm>>.

3 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa,” August 2014, available at <<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/06/fact-sheet-us-support-peacekeeping-africa>>.

4 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy,” April 2013, available at <<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/05/fact-sheet-us-security-sector-assistance-policy>>.

NATO and the Partnership for Peace

*Frank Boland*¹

During 1989 and 1990, as the hold of the Soviet Union and the authority of communist regimes evaporated across the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies attempted to make sense of this new situation. There was unease that the old certainties of the Cold War era were being swept away without any guarantees that their replacements would be more comfortable to live with. There was disquiet that the security linkage with the United States, through NATO, might no longer be sustainable or, at least, might be substantially more difficult to sustain than it had been. The complete dissolution of the Soviet Union was barely conceivable at that time. Allies were also wrestling with the complexities of extremely challenging arms control agreements, while also trying to define the wider role of the Atlantic Alliance in a Europe where the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe and, subsequently, the European Union would also be significant political players.² As they contemplated these uncertainties, the idea began to take hold that the Alliance had to provide practical assistance and institutional structures to support emerging democratic institutions and states in resisting the almost inevitable pressures that could emerge and drag them back toward the authoritarian practices to which they had been accustomed for a generation, or more.

In July 1990, in their London Summit Declaration, NATO Heads of State and Government extended the “hand of friendship” to the countries of the East that had been their adversaries in the Cold War.³ They also noted that NATO would adapt and could “help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.”⁴ They also proposed that the countries of the former Warsaw Pact establish regular diplomatic liaison with the Atlantic Alliance.

At the November 1991 Rome Summit, NATO leaders “applauded” the “rejection of totalitarian communist rule” by the peoples of Central and Eastern European states.⁵ They pledged support in their steps toward reform and promised “practical assistance to help them succeed in this difficult transition.”⁶ They also invited the foreign ministers of these countries, including the newly independent Baltic States, to meet with Alliance foreign ministers the following month to inaugurate a new North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) that would “focus on security and related issues where Allies can offer their experience and expertise, such as defence planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations.”⁷ During the course of that inaugural meeting on December 20,

Ambassador Afanassievsky, representing the Soviet Union, requested that all references to the Soviet Union (which would formally dissolve itself six days later) be deleted from the official statement of the meeting and that he now only represented the Russian Federation.⁸

While the NACC helped build confidence by providing opportunities for multilateral political consultation and cooperation in the early 1990s, it became clear that many of the newly democratic countries of Europe wished to fully integrate into European institutions, such as NATO, that had been closed to them during the Cold War. This was a response to clear and understandable security concerns, but was also seen as a badge of “respectability” demonstrating that they had left behind their communist past. These pressures could not be ignored, even though the most pressing issue for NATO at this time was its growing involvement in support of a struggling United Nations, in trying to ameliorate the effects of the bloody conflicts that had broken out in the Western Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in particular.

The January 1994 Brussels NATO Summit—while also focusing on measures to contain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and adjusting NATO military structures to be better able to support the planned emerging European Security and Defence Identity—made one crucial policy statement and inaugurated a new process that would fundamentally affect the development and dynamic of the Alliance for the next two decades. There was an unambiguous commitment to accept new members into NATO: “We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East.”⁹ This was linked to the new Partnership for Peace (PfP) process, a concept that had been developed by Ambassador Charles W. Freeman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Security Affairs (subsequently International Security Affairs), and Joseph Kruzal, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe.¹⁰ The Summit Declaration stated:

*We have decided to launch an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace. We invite the other states participating in the NACC, and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join with us in this Partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.*¹¹

PfP was to be an essential component of association with NATO for any country that wanted to become a member, but it also provided a framework in which other countries could develop a relationship with NATO to the extent and at the speed they wished.

One major component of PfP focused on developing military interoperability between individual partner countries and those of NATO, but it also emphasized the importance of measures that form the bedrock of what is now called defense institution building (DIB).¹² In an article published the month after the Summit, the late Les Aspin (U.S. Secretary of Defense when PfP was launched and who had presented the idea to NATO Defense

Minister colleagues at their meeting in October 1993) noted that “importantly, the partner will also demonstrate that it intends to achieve civilian control of its military and make its defence budgets and policies transparent - that is, making them visible to its citizenry.”¹³ This tied in closely to the aims of the George C. Marshall Center, opened by Aspin and the then German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe in June 1993. The center’s first Director, Dr. Alvin Bernstein, described it as focusing on “apolitical military under civilian oversight and the defence priorities necessary for the maintenance of a stable government.”¹⁴

PfP had several basic requirements: signature by a partner of the common Framework Document (the first two objectives of which were transparency in defense planning and budgeting and democratic control of the armed forces); submission of a Presentation Document (setting out the main areas of cooperation with NATO in which the partner country was interested); and the development of an Individual Partnership Programme between NATO and the partner country detailing the specific activities in which the partner wished to participate.¹⁵ However the PfP concept needed considerably more detail. Much of this was drawn from feedback from briefing teams that visited potential partner countries in the months after the Brussels Summit. This information was then considered by the new Political-Military Steering Committee established in NATO to develop PfP.

Also missing from the original PfP prospectus was the promised planning and review process that “the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will develop with the other subscribing states...to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces.”¹⁶ The importance of such a planning and review process derived from the experience of NATO force planning, which was initiated in 1952 and was regarded, despite regular complaints about its complexity and workload, as an essential pillar of NATO’s collective defense. Work to establish the PfP Planning and Review Process (or PARP as it became known) began in earnest in the summer of 1995 when representatives of four countries met to hammer out the details before passing their ideas to the NATO International Staff for discussion among all the Allies.¹⁷

A major reason for adopting this unusual approach was a desire on the part of the four countries to avoid introducing into PARP a number of Cold War-legacy features that continued to exist in Alliance force planning. This would have been more likely if the proposal had been drawn up by the International Staff who would, necessarily, have had to take Alliance force planning as a model. These legacy issues included a rather rigid demarcation of responsibilities between the NATO military and civilian staffs, and the sequential involvement of military-led and civilian-led committees, which lengthened the allied force planning process (with doubtful added value), decreased flexibility and responsiveness, and created a tendency toward bureaucratic “turf wars.” The four countries wished the PARP to be capable of being carefully tailored to the needs of each individual partner. Therefore, it had to be flexible, keep bureaucracy to a minimum, and involve NATO civilian and military staff working as one team (under civilian lead), with only one

NATO subordinate committee—the new Political-Military Steering Committee—dealing with the process in a holistic way.¹⁸

During its early years, PARP did, indeed, focus on identifying and evaluating partner forces for multinational training, exercises, and operations, and developing planning targets for such forces, jointly agreed between NATO and the partner country concerned. But the lessons identified from the accession to NATO of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999 demonstrated clearly that PARP needed to go beyond this and put a much greater focus on reform. This development led to PARP, and especially the planning targets drawn up within it (now called Partnership Goals), becoming a central mechanism in NATO's approach to DIB.

Reviewing their own experiences of preparing for NATO accession, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland saw that they had been significantly over-optimistic about what they could achieve in preparing their forces for future NATO membership, over-optimistic in assessing what forces they could provide to the NATO force structure, and substantially unprepared for assessing associated costs. These shortcomings had largely been the result of the prevailing mindset within their military structures, derived from their communist, Warsaw Pact legacy, which led the military simply to state what they believed they needed in the expectation that “the politicians” would then provide the cash. When coupled with the absence of effective evaluation and accounting structures in the military and ministries of defense, which were hardly needed in such a demand-led environment, the result was considerable embarrassment that the promises made by the three countries during the accession process could not be delivered. The three new NATO members concluded that they should each have conducted a thorough defense review and made any necessary adjustments before joining the Alliance. Allies agreed with this conclusion and, at the Washington Summit in 1999, inaugurated the Membership Action Plan (MAP).

The MAP was intended to be a much more comprehensive and intrusive progress review of countries wishing to join the Alliance.¹⁹ It consisted of five chapters: political and economic, defense and military, resources issues, security issues, and legal issues (corresponding to the five areas covered in the formal NATO accession discussions before a Protocol of Accession is signed). In the defense and military chapter, PARP was to be the mechanism to assess progress, but with an expanded mandate. This was despite a proposal by the United States to introduce a completely new planning process only for aspirant countries, which, it was eventually recognized, would have been unmanageable. The MAP document said:

Within the general framework of the expanded and adapted PARP and in accordance with PARP procedures, planning targets specifically covering areas most directly relevant for nations preparing their force structures and capabilities for possible future Alliance membership will be elaborated with aspirants. Aspirants will undergo a review process on their progress in meeting these planning targets. These planning targets will be established on the basis of consultations

between each aspiring country and NATO and may be applied to any component of their force structures, rather than solely to their Pfp-declared forces.²⁰

While targets to develop relevant standards and interoperability of future NATO forces remained important, the first planning target in the Partnership Goal packages for all countries in the MAP (and which was non-negotiable) required them to carry out a strategic defense review and to do so, importantly, in consultation with NATO. This Partnership Goal required a great deal from MAP countries. For instance, individual Partnership Goals from a variety of countries included, as a minimum, that the review should include the missions of armed forces and capabilities necessary to implement them, and the affordability of current and/or planned force structure against the level of national resources for defense. Other aspects to be included in the review should address the equipment-term modernization plans, manning levels of military units, other personnel aspects (including the proportions between officers, NCOs and professional soldiers in active service, and a reserve concept), education and training policies and practices, logistic support capabilities, base closures or realignment, and the disposal of surplus equipment and ammunition. The wide-ranging Partnership Goal formed the basis for the greater part of the discussions that took place between the country concerned and the NATO staff team; the discussions could be very frank and robust.

The PARP procedures required only a limited number of formal interactions between a partner country and NATO staffs or NATO countries. In even-numbered years there would be a detailed staff level discussion, typically over a day and a half, of the proposed package of Partnership Goals in the partner country's capital. This was followed by a Political-Military Steering Committee meeting in Brussels between the partner country and all the Allies to discuss and recommend agreement of the Partnership Goals. In the following year, the staff level and Political-Military Steering Committee meetings would focus on the draft PARP Assessment that reviewed progress in implementing Partnership Goals, developing the armed forces and their interoperability more generally, and determining progress in the strategic defense review. The Partnership Goals and PARP Assessment were formally approved through "silence procedure" by NATO ambassadors and that of the partner country.²¹

In practice, many of the countries in the MAP actively sought additional consultations with NATO staffs, and sometimes with the Political-Military Steering Committee, to elicit feedback on how the direction or elements of their strategic defense reviews were being perceived. For the countries concerned, there was a clear value in checking that what they intended to do in their strategic defense reviews would be regarded favorably by the NATO staffs as they prepared the biennial PARP Assessments that formed part of the annual MAP assessments by Allies.

Therefore, the role of the NATO staffs expanded to provide a consultancy service to MAP countries: this became one of the core tasks of the NATO civilian force planners in the Defence Policy and Planning Division of the International Staff. In this work a key

element was an insistence that there was no “NATO model” that could, or should, be applied by a partner country as it developed its defense forces and defense institutions (and, later, security institutions more widely). The approach was to probe whether the country had a coherent and effective set of policies, objectives, and management practices that could stand up to scrutiny from within government, parliament, civil society, and outside organizations like NATO. If a country could not withstand such scrutiny, this was pointed out, and suggestions were made on how to adjust matters, drawing on the wide experience the NATO staffs had of military structures and Ministries of Defense. However, it was a cardinal objective that this work had to be carried out by staff officers (civilian and military) of the country concerned. They had to fully understand how the results had been reached, be able to defend the methodology and conclusions internally and externally, and thereby ensure that the outcomes were “owned” by the country concerned.

The general range of issues covered in this consultancy work usually followed a particular format. The first area was a solid definition of the country’s security and defense objectives: Had they been defined comprehensively and clearly? Were they understood in the same way by all of those involved in the defense and security field? Was that understanding shared by the political establishment and the general public? What were the risks to security that a country believed it faced? Did this constitute a common understanding across government about the security priorities for the country? What sort of assumptions were being made as these policies were being developed? How far ahead had the government looked to try and predict the issues it would need to resolve? How much money would be available for defense and security, taking into account other important priorities associated with economic and social issues? Were these questions being properly addressed in fundamental documents such as a National Threat Assessment, National Security Strategy, Defense Strategy, Military Doctrine, and Defense Law?

From these issues, the NATO team would then suggest re-examining the proposed roles of the armed forces and whether there was complete clarity about the objectives they should pursue. This re-examination had to take into consideration the detailed tasks of the armed forces and how many of each type of unit or capability would be needed for each task. These detailed tasks could then be subjected to analysis to determine what might be the optimum way of fulfilling them. For example, how many light infantry battalions would be needed, compared to the number of mechanized or armored battalions? How big should the reserve forces be compared to the active forces, and was there sufficient money to provide them with worthwhile training and equipment? What were the infrastructure and logistics requirements needed to allow the front line units to carry out their tasks most effectively? Would it be possible to perform tasks more effectively by providing more resources for logistics support, rather than investing in front line capabilities?

Linked questions addressed whether the units in the armed forces would have the optimum capabilities in terms of equipment, training, and procedures to be able to carry out their tasks most effectively. This might also lead to a discussion about whether there was scope to increase effectiveness by greater cooperation between individual services within

a country, such as shared logistics or education facilities, or by greater cooperation with other countries, including Allies. It was often necessary to focus on personnel management, training and education, logistics, and command and control systems to assess whether they could be improved as well as suggesting ways to assess what might be the best mix of equipment for the armed forces.

It was always necessary to discuss the financial provision for defense, both in absolute terms and whether a country was getting the best value for money from the defense budget it had or would likely have in the future. This usually required considerable discussion of a country's ability to identify what it spent on particular activities or capabilities: the experience of the team was that there was a great temptation for the military to base its plans on the financial resources that they wished to be available, rather than what the Ministry of Finance was prepared to allocate.

Finally, there was the question of how to deal with political approval (within government and outside) and public information about defense and security plans. This area included how to ensure proper and informed parliamentary scrutiny and public debate on defense plans, and whether there should be a White Book to ensure a reliable source of information on policy.

The NATO force planning staffs dealing with these issues and providing consultancy advice were very small, never exceeding 11 staff officers, and also had to deal with the cyclical force planning work for all of the Allies. Therefore, it was vital that an effective working relationship was developed with the staff of the country requesting the consultancy advice. Consequently, the same staff officer would work with one or more countries over an extended period (sometimes eight or more years) with continuity and the possibility of building enduring working relationships given priority. This is significant because the military members of the NATO team were generally on short-term postings of three years or less. It was noticeable that in this relatively short period, with only limited opportunities to interact with the staff of partner countries, few of the military members of the team were able to make much of a real contribution to the long-term work of guiding a strategic defense review or building defense institutions.

However, NATO was not the only player in the field offering advice to countries on defense transformation and institution building. A few countries provided defense advisors who lived in the partner country and worked within the Ministry of Defense (MOD) (and sometimes in the General Staff). Defense attachés in allied embassies (and those of wealthier partners) also played a role in advising or facilitating the provision of advice. The United States, in particular, provided funds for partner countries that were often used to pay for contractors to work in the MOD to provide advice. The fact that these individuals were "on the ground" on a daily basis meant that it was extremely important that the NATO team liaised with them to ensure that they understood what advice NATO was giving countries, (and vice-versa) and to ensure that, as far as possible, partner countries were not receiving contradictory messages. Similarly, other actors, such as U.S. European Command and the International Security Advisory Board were also providing advice in the area of DIB and it was important to keep alongside them, as far as possible.

In addition to work with MAP countries, there was also a special program with Ukraine which, following independence in 1991, had requested that NATO help in transforming its large Soviet-style military establishment into smaller, modern, and more efficient forces. Ukraine was an early member of PfP and the PARP. In 1997, the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine was signed. A year later, the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform was established, co-chaired by NATO and Ukraine, to facilitate consultation and practical cooperation on defense and security sector reform issues. The priority for NATO in setting up this body was—in addition to improving the interoperability of Ukrainian forces with those of Allies—to strengthen the democratic and civilian control of Ukraine’s armed forces and to enhance governance more widely.²² In April 1999, a NATO Liaison Office was established in Kyiv to support these efforts.

Ukraine did not then aspire to NATO membership, but there was a clear need for a structure, going beyond consultation, to try and add impetus to reform efforts for the Ukrainian armed forces. In 2001, drawing on the PARP framework of Partnership Goals, a special set of planning targets was developed for each of the individual Ukrainian services (army, navy, air and air defense) and the General Staff to focus efforts on reform in each of these institutions. Progress in taking these forward would then be assessed during regular meetings with the NATO team. These special targets were called National Defence Reform Objectives and covered preparations for a defense review, developing coherent strategic documents, establishing transparent and accurate financial management, improving personnel management, equipment procurement, training and education, logistics systems, and other management areas.

In addition, the Ukraine country officer from the Force Planning Directorate of the NATO International Staff was deployed to Kyiv for several periods of roughly three weeks to assist Ukrainian staff officers in planning to meet these targets and to help implement mechanisms that would allow a more objective approach to analyzing defense management issues, and devise solutions to put in place a self-sustaining system. A program was also created to identify promising young Ukrainian officers who, with financial assistance from some Allies, were brought to NATO Headquarters in Brussels to work as interns in the Force Planning Directorate for a year in order to give them practical NATO experience; they would then return to Kyiv to take up key staff positions.

The National Defence Reform Objectives for Ukraine were subsequently incorporated into the regular PARP Partnership Goals. However, following Ukrainian requests, and agreement in the Joint Working Group for Defence Reform, the PARP for Ukraine was extended. The armed forces and militarized units of the Ministry of Emergencies had participated in PARP since 1995 but, following the development of the National Defence Reform Objectives, the Interior Troops (which have now been superseded by the National Guard), the State Border Guard Service and the Security Service of Ukraine also began taking part in PARP.

Further Steps to Enhance the Partnership for Peace

As conceived in 1994, PfP was an open-ended mechanism in which each partner would set its own objectives, wide or narrow, and pursue them at the speed and to the extent they wished. This was successful in providing opportunities while not being prescriptive. However, over time, Allies wished to provide more encouragement for reform in the defense sector and in other areas. Consequently, following a Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace at the 2002 Prague Summit, Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) were introduced to “ensure a comprehensive, tailored and differentiated approach to the Partnership, and which allow for support to the reform efforts of Partners.”²³ These plans would enable NATO to “provide its focused, country specific assistance and advice on reform objectives that interested Partners might wish to pursue in consultation with the Alliance. Intensified political dialogue on relevant issues may constitute an integral part of an IPAP process.”²⁴

Over time, eight countries decided to develop IPAPs.²⁵ IPAPs were far-reaching documents covering areas where the individual country committed itself to reform, not only in the defense area but also more widely, such as in rule of law, human rights, combatting corruption, promoting stable and sound economic development, relations with neighbors, and improved public information systems to support democratic oversight.²⁶ Essentially, IPAPs, which were jointly agreed by the Alliance and the partner country, could be seen as a bargain between the two parties that, if the partner country was serious about reform, Allies would adjust their cooperation and assistance programs to support these efforts more actively.

The Prague Summit also saw the launch of the Partnership Action Plan mechanism that was intended to be “an issue-specific, result-oriented mechanism for practical cooperation involving Allies and interested Partners,” focused on functional areas.²⁷ It was envisaged that such areas might include border security, capabilities for joint action, civil emergency, management of resources, or environmental issues. The first of these was, unsurprisingly in the wake of September 11, 2001, the Partnership Action Plan–Terrorism (PAP-T). Although PAP-T did not evolve into a vibrant cooperation mechanism, the concept of an issue-specific mechanism did lead to the launch of Partnership Action Plan–Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) at the 2004 Istanbul Summit.

The PAP-DIB aimed “to reinforce efforts by EAPC [Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council] partners to initiate and carry forward reform and restructuring of defence institutions to meet their needs and the commitments undertaken in the context of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document and EAPC Basic Document, as well as the relevant OSCE documents including the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.”²⁸ Although the official text noted that it might have particular relevance to the partner countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as Moldova, it was open to all partners. Its aims were to enhance democratic control of defense activities; improve legislative and judicial oversight of defense; improve assessments of security risks

and national defense requirements; develop and maintain affordable and interoperable capabilities; optimize the management of defense ministries and other agencies with force structures; encourage compliance with international norms and practices in the defense sector; foster effective and transparent financial planning and resource allocation; help improve effective management of defense and the socio-economic consequences of defense restructuring; ensure effective and transparent personnel structures and practices in the defense forces; and encourage international cooperation and good neighborly relations in defense and security matters.

For both IPAPs and the PAP-DIB, it was explicitly recognized that, in the defense and military sphere, the PARP would play a major role in collecting and analyzing information about practices and progress in reform, and by using the structured mechanism of Partnership Goals, negotiated directly with partner countries, as a means to try to hold countries to account for any perceived backsliding on their declared reform objectives. It was also clear to the NATO staffs that, although the focus of these programs was on the defense sector, they could not be viewed in isolation. If reform was to be effective, it needed to permeate all areas of government. Therefore, Partnership Goals in the PARP had a deliberately wider emphasis than just the defense sector, and sometimes were addressed specifically to ministries other than the Defense Ministry.

Special Cases: The Western Balkans

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

The Dayton Peace Agreements of 1995 ended the fighting, but left BiH with two entity governments (plus the Brcko District) and a very weak and greatly circumscribed state-level governmental structure. Both Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had their own defense ministries, and separate armies and command chains (as well as separate, informal Bosniak and Croat command chains within the Federation army). The international community was heavily engaged with this complex set of governments to try and encourage the development of a coherent political entity, rather than one where different groups had stopped killing each other (perhaps only temporarily). International engagement was also complex: the Office of the High Representative had one mandate, the OSCE another; NATO had the job of policing the “peace,” and a number of individual countries also acted independently in trying to influence political outcomes. Dayton had also mandated a Standing Committee on Military Matters to provide coordination between the two entity armies, though it was generally ineffective.

Nonetheless, with much prodding from the international community, work began to promote communication and coordination between the two armies. As the sense developed, both among Bosnian politicians and the international community, that the country’s development would best be anchored in Euro-Atlantic institutions, there was an aspiration that BiH should apply to join PfP. It was clear that further progress in defense reform would be necessary. In November 2002, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson

set out in a letter to the Presidency of BiH “important areas in which progress in reform would be needed before membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be considered.”²⁹ Among these was the important political consideration of unambiguous full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

In May 2003, High Representative Lord Ashdown used his Bonn powers to establish the Defence Reform Commission (DRC) to “examine the legal measures necessary to reform defence structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, identify constitutional and legislative provisions at variance with such requirements and propose legislation and other legal instruments.”³⁰ Lord Ashdown appointed James R. Locher III, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, as Chairman. The DRC was supported by elements of the international community, including NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) in BiH and the NATO international Staff in Brussels who organized workshops as part of a Tailored Cooperation Programme (often in the NATO School at Oberammergau, Germany) to bring together representatives of the different entity Ministries and armies on “neutral” ground to facilitate understanding and a willingness to compromise.³¹

The DRC’s first report recommended that BiH look beyond PfP and make an explicit commitment to achieving NATO membership in the future.³² By the end of 2003, a Law on Defence had entered into force that created a minimal state-level command structure, but left in place the separate entity armies and MODs. This structure—although not demonstrating that “the centre of gravity in defence has shifted decisively from the Entities to the state,” as Lord Robertson described it, nonetheless was regarded as a first step toward full integration in this sensitive area. In December 2003, NATO Foreign Ministers urged BiH to envisage the NATO June 2004 Istanbul Summit as a realistic target by which it could meet the outstanding conditions to join PfP.³³ In order to maintain progress, Lord Ashdown extended the DRC’s mandate so it could oversee the implementation of the report’s recommendations.³⁴ To advance this work, an ad-hoc group of international community experts led by the OSCE worked with the Secretariat of the Standing Committee on Military Matters to define the structures of the MOD, Joint Staff, and the Operational Command.

During 2004, the first state-level Minister of Defense, Nikola Radovanovic, was appointed and the process of filling military and civilian positions in the MOD proceeded—though very slowly. Work to implement the 2003 Law on Defence was also slow as a result of fundamental disagreements about the extent to which effective state-level institutions should be developed. Nonetheless, there was progress in developing concepts and producing a Defense White Paper, but this was not sufficient for the Alliance to invite BiH to join PfP at Istanbul. Politically, the continued inability of BiH—primarily Republika Srpska—to cooperate effectively and sincerely with the ICTY, more than offset the progress made on defense reform, as was noted explicitly by NATO.³⁵ Meanwhile, the security situation within BiH having greatly improved, NATO was preparing to end the SFOR mission and hand over principal responsibility for security to the European Union at the end of 2004. However, NATO maintained a presence in the country, creating NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, whose primary responsibility was to support defense reform in BiH.

Lord Ashdown, who was dissatisfied with the lack of progress in putting the entity armies fully under state-level control, extended the DRC mandate for another year, until the end of 2005.³⁶ This was intended to “inter alia, include assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina with regard to further implementation of its recommendations and to oversee the fulfillment of the benchmarks of [NATO] for Partnership for Peace and progress toward a single military force for Bosnia and Herzegovina.”³⁷ During this period, the DRC would have two co-chairmen: state-level Defense Minister Radovanovic and a NATO co-chair. Interestingly, the NATO co-chair was not the Commander of the new NATO Headquarters Sarajevo; rather it was one of his subordinates, Raffi Gregorian, a U.S. diplomat experienced in the region who was appointed as Political Advisor to the Commander of NATO Headquarters Sarajevo. Gregorian’s terms of reference were, uniquely, agreed by the North Atlantic Council itself, and included an explicit requirement for him to communicate directly with the International Staff in Brussels to ensure that the military chain of command did not try to constrain his actions in this inherently political area. Likewise, to ensure that there was sufficient in-depth expertise to support him, NATO recruited the principal members of the OSCE-led ad-hoc group of experts established at the beginning of 2004 to work as part of the NATO Headquarters (though fortunately with offices in the state-level MOD building in central Sarajevo rather than in Camp Butmir, some eight miles away, where NATO Headquarters Sarajevo is based). These experts were necessary since the military personnel appointed to this and other such headquarters would generally stay for six months to a year.³⁸

By the end of 2005, after substantial work in a variety of sub-groups, a new Law on Defence and a Law on Service had been drafted and enacted. A new Armed Forces of BiH had been created with a Joint Staff having full authority over military elements. The previous conscript force structures were replaced by a professional army based on multi-ethnic brigades under an Operational Command. The two entity armies and MODs had ceased to exist, and the entity Parliaments had amended their constitutions to remove any defense role. However, this significant set of achievements still required full implementation and the structure that was agreed also included many compromises required to satisfy entity concerns and assuage associated fears. Nonetheless, as an exercise in persuading former enemies to work together toward a common purpose, it was a major success. In inviting BiH to join PfP in December 2006, Allies acknowledged that the work on defense reform and the creation of a “single military force” within the country had been the brightest spot in terms of attempting to normalize political life in BiH. As a PfP member, BiH continued to work on developing its defense institutions, including inserting more realism into the structure set out in the 2005 Defence Law, through their IPAP, PARP Partnership Goals, and consultative advice from the NATO International Staff and NATO Headquarters Sarajevo on a further defense review launched in April 2009.

Serbia

Two months after the murder of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on March 12, 2003, Boris

Tadic, the newly appointed Defense Minister of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, visited NATO Headquarters and addressed the North Atlantic Council. During this address he expressed the desire of Serbia and Montenegro to join PfP. For similar reasons that BiH could not be invited to join PfP at that time—doubts about the level of cooperation with the ICTY and the failure to hand over indicted war criminals to the Tribunal—Serbian membership was, politically, not then possible. However, Allies were keen to help the Belgrade government with reforms, especially in the defense and security sectors. NATO staff therefore began cooperation with the Belgrade authorities on defense reform issues from late 2003, with a number of discussions in Belgrade on defense reform and defense restructuring, including as part of an established Tailored Cooperation Programme. Within the MOD, a reform team had been established in December 2003 working with the UN Development Programme and a number of seconded foreign advisors.

However, the process of reforming the military, which had for so long been a semi-independent institution, was not going to be straightforward. First steps had been to order the transfer of the intelligence and security services from the General Staff to the MOD, and to place the General Staff under the control of the Defense Ministry. These structural changes needed to be accompanied by changes in mindset and working practices if they were to be successful; all of this occurred against the background of severely constrained financial resources for defense and uncertainties about the future of the State Union.³⁹

In mid-2005, the Norwegian Delegation in NATO made a proposal for a special Defence Reform Group (DRG) to be created between Serbia and NATO. Allies discussed how such a group might function, and drew up terms of reference, which were then transmitted to Belgrade for consideration. The DRG would have senior-level co-chairs from Serbia and the NATO International Staff, and was to involve, to the extent possible, defense attachés and other representatives of allied countries accredited in Belgrade. The procedural details were worked out between the two co-chairs. The purpose of the DRG was to provide advice and assistance to Belgrade in restructuring their military and implementing transparent and coherent management of the military. Therefore, the most important objective was to ensure working practices that best suited Belgrade's assessment of the most effective methods to achieve the desired results in the circumstances that they faced; NATO was not intending to tell Belgrade what to do or how to do it.

It was agreed that the DRG would conduct business mainly through "Working Tables" considering a range of different topics such as policy and planning, finance and budget, human resources, logistics, civil/military cooperation, professionalization of the military, base conversion, military health, public relations strategy, reform of the intelligence and security system, and military housing. These Working Tables would meet on a regular basis and report back to a coordinator on progress. These progress reports would be the basis for plenary meetings which, initially, were held about every six to seven weeks and included presentations by the leaders of each of the Working Tables. The first plenary meeting of the DRG took place in February 2006. Therefore, well in advance of the November 2006 NATO Riga Summit at which BiH, Montenegro and Serbia were invited to PfP, NATO

already had an extensive and intensive institutional relationship with Serbia, which was enhanced with the opening, in December 2006, of a NATO Military Liaison Office in the Serbian MOD building.

It had always been intended, certainly on the NATO side, that meetings of the Working Tables would include allied defense attachés that were interested in the subject covered by the Working Table, and whose countries were providing or contemplating concrete assistance in these areas, such as financial management. This arrangement proved very difficult to put into practice and was a source of much frustration among the defense attaché community, with whom the NATO co-chair had a preliminary meeting (including later the Military Liaison Office staff) before each of the DRG plenary meetings. Various reasons were given for the failure to inform defense attachés about—much less invite them to—forthcoming Working Table meetings; these included the short-notice nature of the meetings and the demands that interpretation would have put on resources. It was also made explicitly clear as time went on that there were procedural and quasi-legal obstacles to (and indeed suspicions about) unsupervised direct contacts between members of the Serbian armed forces and members of foreign military forces and foreign governments.

Nonetheless, progress was made in a number of areas, the extent of which was largely dependent on the personality and energy of the Serbian co-chair.⁴⁰ The DRG functioned as a mechanism by which the senior leadership of the Ministry could force the sometimes reluctant lower levels to undertake work and be held accountable for it, in public, on a regular basis. It was the NATO role to essentially provide support for the reform efforts of the Serbian leadership, to provide the public audience, and, in the case of the foreign representatives, to facilitate the provision of whatever assistance their capitals were prepared to offer. However, the extent to which the Serbian co-chair used the DRG in this way varied as individuals who held the post changed.

In June 2007, Serbia joined the PARP by submitting its first PARP Survey on the basis of which a draft PARP Assessment and an initial package of Partnership Goals were prepared. During the autumn of 2007, however, it became clear that Kosovo was preparing to declare independence, most Allies would recognize its independence, and NATO would undertake a number of functions beyond the scope of the existing UN mandate that would have the effect of supporting that independence.⁴¹ This was unacceptable to Serbia and the result was a “de facto” suspension of many activities with NATO. These included meetings of the DRG, from October 2007, and discussion and finalization of the PARP Assessment and Partnership Goals. It did not mean, however, that contacts between NATO and Serbia ceased. By November 2008 there was agreement on the Serbian side that work on the PARP documents could continue, and that the DRG would also begin to work again in the future although with a slightly changed emphasis. The number of Working Tables, which was as high as 16, would be significantly reduced, and their work would focus on the areas of development covered in the Partnership Goals; in practice this meant that most areas addressed by the previous Working Table structure

would continue to be improved. DRG plenary meetings would be held less frequently, twice yearly. The DRG commenced work again in June 2010.

Kosovo

Following the Kosovo air campaign in 1999, NATO deployed the Kosovo Force (KFOR) under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 to ensure a “safe and secure environment.” UNSCR 1244 also authorized a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status. However, Serbia and Kosovo Albanians, and their respective foreign supporters, had very different views on what type of future status would be acceptable; consequently, attempts to secure agreements made little progress. In 1996, discussions began on a political process to determine the future status of Kosovo, led by the United Nations Special Envoy Maarti Ahtisaari. The Ahtisaari proposals were never formally approved and, when it became clear that Kosovo would not wait for a negotiated political settlement, many of the countries most involved in the process talks began making preparations for how they would support a “post-independence Kosovo.” In addition to continuing to ensure a safe and secure environment, NATO agreed to take on three new tasks: stand down the Kosovo Protection Corps, stand up a new Kosovo Security Force (KSF), and establish a new civilian-led organization to oversee the KSF.⁴² The first two of these tasks were given to KFOR, but the third—building a new security-related Ministry from scratch—was to be the task of NATO HQ in Brussels.

From the outset, some basic principles for this task were determined. Civilian, democratic control of an armed force would be paramount and the uniformed military (in the KSF) had to accept this. Therefore, even well before the declaration of independence, a NATO staff officer from Brussels was deployed to Pristina to work closely with the institutions of the international community on the ground in drafting the new constitution, its associated laws, and the framework for the new Ministry. The Ministry’s structure would include the senior command of the KSF; there would be no separate General Staff.

It was also deemed necessary to have a team on the ground in Pristina to undertake the work of developing the Ministry. Since NATO International Staff resources were meager, Allies and some partners were asked to provide and pay for staff to work in the Ministry Advisory Team—later renamed the NATO Advisory Team (NAT) to accommodate concerns of the four Allies that did not recognize an independent Kosovo.⁴³ The key team members were in place in January 2008, and others joined over the succeeding months until it built up to a total of 14 members plus several locally recruited support staff. The team leader reported directly to NATO HQ in Brussels and—since this was the key post and the incumbent became *de facto* a key advisor to the Minister—continuity was regarded as essential. In the seven years between early 2008 and spring 2015, there were only three team leaders, an average time in post of almost two and a half years for each individual.

It was also regarded as very important that the team members were integrated into the Ministry and also into the society. Therefore, a generous offer by the KFOR Commander to provide the team with working and living accommodation in Film City, the secure

NATO command compound, was politely refused. The team was initially provided office accommodation in the Kosovo government building, later in the Ministry for the KSF, and generally rented apartments in Pristina.

The team needed to prepare for and design the Ministry (during the first months there were no Kosovar staff in the Ministry), including drafting almost all of the necessary legislation and regulations covering the personnel management of civilians in the Ministry and uniformed members of the KSF. They then needed to organize the recruiting of staff; establish the staff branches and support elements; devise policies, plans, guidelines, and supporting regulations; provide training; and handle legacy issues such as financial matters that required resolution. Thereafter, once the Ministry had an initial operation capability, they advised and mentored Ministry staff and assisted in refining and implementing plans, policies, and guidelines. This effort led to the development of a Ministry—where there was nothing before and which still needs to mature—over a relatively short period.

In the meantime, the Kosovo Protection Corps had been stood down in 2009 with the assistance and involvement of the United Nations Development Programme. The KSF was established in January 2009 and began to operate in September 2009. It was mentored by KFOR and assessed by the KFOR Commander in November 2011 as having reached full operational capability. The North Atlantic Council formally announced in July 2013 that full operational capability had been reached. The long period between the KFOR recommendation to declare full operational capability and the formal NATO announcement was taken up with very difficult and politically-charged discussions within the Alliance (including non-NATO KFOR troop-contributing countries) on how NATO would provide support to the KSF in the future.

The task of mentoring and advising the KSF was taken away from KFOR—which had long wished to distance itself from its KSF responsibility, as it believed that such responsibilities undermined its perceived impartiality between the two communities in Kosovo—and was given to a newly-formed NATO Liaison and Advisory Team (NLAT). The poorly drafted NLAT terms of reference included the provision of advice to the KSF at brigade-level and above, ignoring the fact that the already-established NAT had the role of providing advice to the Ministry for the KSF, which already contained within it the senior command chain of the KSF above brigade level. The NLAT—whose members generally worked and lived in Film City, rather than being collocated with Kosovar colleagues—was also to be headed by a military officer. As was usually the case, military personnel undertake relatively short tours of duty: between July 2013 and September 2016, there were six commanders of the NLAT, an average time in post of slightly over six months for each incumbent.

As the NATO committee discussions on support for the KSF dragged on, the proposition was advanced that having two advisory teams entailed duplication; indeed, when the NLAT structure was recommended by the same committee in 2013, it did duplicate a number of functions that had already been successfully carried out by the NAT since 2008. Finally, in early 2016, NATO took the decision to merge the two teams—in future

to be known as the NATO Advisory, Liaison and Training Team (NALT)—with a military officer in charge, thereby undermining the decisions-in-principle taken in 2008 that civilians should be unambiguously in charge of the KSF, and that continuity of engagement with Kosovars would be a vital factor in maintaining influence.

Programs that Never Were: Russia, Afghanistan, and Libya

Russia

The Russian Federation joined PfP in June 1994. It developed a package of activities as part of its Individual Partnership Program, a number of which were pursued very enthusiastically, such as cooperation in the field of civil emergency planning. It did not, however, join the PARP, despite a number of approaches from the NATO staffs to explain the potential benefits of this planning process for Russia. It seemed that Russia felt that it would be inappropriate, as a major power, to participate in PARP on the same basis as other, much smaller, countries. In response, NATO staffs offered to create a new process dealing with planning specifically for Russia that would be separate from PARP, but this was rejected. In 1997, the Permanent Joint Council was created with Allies and Russia, giving Russia a special forum that distinguished it from other partners; in 2002, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was created, which gave Russia the same status in that forum as each of the NATO Allies.

Under the framework of the NRC, a number of attempts were made to engage Russia in work that could be linked to DIB. These included a series of roundtable discussions with presentations by individual nations on their experiences in defense management areas, such as the conduct of strategic defense reviews, reserve systems, recruitment systems, the role of non-commissioned officers, and the management of post-traumatic stress disorder. The Russian approach to these discussions was always less than enthusiastic and it rejected, as it saw it, being “forced” to “adopt” Western standards. There was also an attempt to engage Russia in an exercise in transparency, which NATO countries had undertaken for decades by publishing each year’s defense expenditure and military manpower data. Russia did provide some expenditure data (but not military personnel numbers) in 2005 but not thereafter.⁴⁴ The effort involved in trying to organize DIB-related exchanges increased greatly. Practical cooperation was pursued in a range of other areas, such as search and rescue at sea, logistics, and theater ballistic missile defense, with the NATO hope of moving toward broader DIB.

In the face of such reluctance to engage with NATO on defense reform or even to acknowledge that any reform of the Russian military establishment was necessary, it proved impossible to undertake any meaningful DIB-related work.

Afghanistan

A separate chapter in this book addresses Afghanistan and provides considerable detail on DIB efforts there. However, it is worth noting a slightly different perspective: as seen from staff in NATO Headquarters.

Afghanistan was primarily a military operation, militarily-led and organized, with

large numbers of personnel rotating through the theater at relatively short intervals. In 2006, the Defence Policy and Planning Division of the NATO International Staff was tasked—as part of the Afghan Cooperation Programme being led from NATO Headquarters—with providing advice and assistance to the Afghan MOD to develop a long-term planning system. This led to a number of discussions with Afghan interlocutors on the form this system might take, and four staff visits to Kabul from 2007 to early 2009.

The relative paucity of visits to Kabul resulted from the difficulty in obtaining permission for entry to theater from the NATO military commanders who had been granted virtually complete authority in these matters. This was due to limited accommodation at ISAF Headquarters, the need to provide force protection to incoming visitors, and competing priorities. While Afghan Defense Minister Wardak and his staff were supportive of such a program, the NATO military authorities and Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) were suspicious, to the point of hostility. Their concern was that the NATO staff focus on a long-term planning system might undermine their objective of the development of an Afghan National Army in the medium term, or that the Afghans might try to play one group off the other in order to secure more practical assistance. Although it was possible to persuade the NATO and CSTC-A military personnel in Kabul that the proposed NATO effort was neither intended to, nor would it, undermine the medium-term objective, by the time each successive NATO staff visit took place, almost all of the previous military interlocutors (on six-month tours) had gone and the whole process needed to be repeated with the newcomers. Given the very small number of NATO staff available to address this task (many of whom were already heavily engaged in other projects), this program was abandoned.

Libya

Following the fall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Libya suffered enormous disruption and turmoil as competing militias vied for power, influence, and wealth. The United Nations established the United Nations Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL). With the assistance of foreign embassies and assistance teams in Libya, UNSMIL launched a process called “Towards a Defence White Paper” that aimed to build a consensus on the need for coherent, well-organized armed forces under the control of the central government.⁴⁵ The official Libyan armed forces had become moribund under Gaddafi, and the different militias, affiliated to different regions, cities, tribes, and philosophies, were now the de facto powers in the country. NATO staff were invited to take part in two of the 2012 sessions attempting to develop this document, but the Alliance itself had no formal role in this work.

In February 2013, representatives of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, sought NATO support for the creation of a new National Guard in Libya. Following an official request by the Prime Minister, Allies agreed (with some misgivings concerning the security situation) to authorize a fact-finding team to visit Tripoli in June 2013.

The team had high-level meetings with the Prime Minister, Defense and Interior Ministers, Chief of Defense, and others. The team also insisted on a meeting with representatives of the revolutionary brigades. Although the Libyan government (to the extent that it had a common view) seemed to see a National Guard as a way to “lawfully integrate armed revolutionary brigades” into a new security structure, it was clear that external assistance would need to address concepts, doctrine, command and control arrangements, equipment, finance, infrastructure/basing, legislation, personnel structures, and recruitment/integration, and would have to be coherent with arrangements for the army and police. It was envisaged that when work progressed to the stage of real implementation, it would then be appropriate to consider establishing a small team on the ground for a short period. That team would need to be mostly voluntary national contributions, with a NATO International Staff member in situ as team leader.

The team concluded that it ought to be practicable to provide assistance, but a number of additional questions needed to be answered, including the issue of appropriate security provision for team members in the lawless environment of Libya. However, on July 18, Prime Minister Zeidan sent another letter to NATO saying that the proposal for a National Guard was now off the table, but asking for NATO support in some unspecified DIB context. Consequently, a further visit took place in September 2013 to explore exactly what was meant, and to scope what might be possible. The team had meetings with a number of the same interlocutors as on the previous visit and also with representatives from the General National Congress (GNC). The report produced did not attempt any sugar-coating. It was blunt about the security situation, the lack of progress by the Libyans, the absence of an over-arching security sector vision, and the lack of a common view among Ministers, the GNC, and the revolutionary brigades about how to resolve the parlous security situation. However, it concluded that there was a potential role for NATO in trying to help develop work on a security sector architecture in conjunction with UNSMIL, the European Union Border Assistance Mission, and the Allies active on the ground, including in working to establish a properly trained army.

Allies agreed to establish a NATO Advisory Team and the Secretary General wrote to Prime Minister Zeidan on November 26 stating that NATO’s effort would be to advise Libya on development of a national security strategy. The NATO team would also provide advice on issues arising from this, as well as adapting the current security architecture to the new policy. This would build on and complement the work of other international actors. The offer of assistance also required the establishment of a proper framework for cooperation between NATO and Libya based on an Exchange of Letters. Unfortunately, a combination of the failure of the Libyan authorities to sign the Exchange of Letters (despite numerous attempts by NATO to get them to do so), the ousting of Prime Minister Zeidan on March 11, 2014, and the sharply deteriorating security situation inside Libya during 2014 meant that the NATO Advisory Team never began its work. NATO continues to be prepared to support Libya in such a venture as soon as conditions allow.

Further Initiatives

Building Integrity and Trust Funds

In 2007, NATO and Transparency International staffs generated the idea that NATO might develop a program to address corruption in the defense and security sector. The EAPC endorsed this idea in November 2007 as part of the PAP-DIB; it has grown considerably to include some 20 participating countries.⁴⁶ The Building Integrity program requires a country to complete a self-assessment questionnaire on existing policies and practices. This is then analyzed as part of a NATO peer review process, with a draft report produced and discussed with country authorities. The aim of this process is to recommend, in conjunction with the country concerned, practical steps to strengthen transparency, accountability, and integrity in the defense and security sector. Participating countries are encouraged to involve parliamentarians and civil society groups in the completion of their self-assessment questionnaires and the peer review process, and are free to apply the model more widely across government.

The Building Integrity program has been financed largely through NATO's Trust Fund mechanism, which allows interested countries—Allies or otherwise—to commit funds for a specific purpose—in this case, for combatting corruption. By providing close oversight and strict standards on project proposal development and implementation for projects, Trust Funds also contribute to building capacities and enhancing working practices in the defense and security field.

Professional Development Programs

Under the auspices of the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR) for Ukraine, a professional development program was launched in 2005 for civilians working in Ukraine's defense and security institutions. The aim of the program was to strengthen capacity for democratic oversight and management, help anchor best practices, and help improve interagency cooperation through training. This program was expanded significantly in 2014 to help Ukraine meet the challenges arising from Russian aggression. A professional development program for Georgia was launched in 2009 at the request of the Georgian MOD. In 2011, it was expanded to encompass other security-related institutions. Both programs are managed from the NATO Liaison Offices in Kyiv and Tbilisi respectively, and are also supported by NATO Trust Funds.

Education

In addition to the education and training establishments run by or for NATO, there are about 30 national Partnership Training and Education centers in both Allied and partner countries that offer education and training to enhance individuals' capacities to develop policy or manage projects and programs in ways that are more effective, transparent, accountable, and responsive to democratic control. The Alliance also has an Education for Reform Initiative that focuses specifically on this objective. This initiative is supported

by Defence Education Enhancement Programmes, which bring together teams of defense academics from Allied and partner countries and are tailored to individual countries. These provide advice on how to develop defense educational establishments with an emphasis on developing faculty members and comprehensive curricula, including the DIB Reference Curriculum.

Defense and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative

At the 2014 NATO Wales Summit, the Alliance launched the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative (DCBI)—initially focused on Georgia, Jordan, and Moldova (and subsequently Iraq)—to enhance NATO’s role in capacity building, noting that NATO had been engaged in such work for many years.⁴⁷ This was intended to reinforce NATO’s commitment to its partners and to assist in projecting stability, and was a further explicit recognition of the importance of such activities. DCBI is not limited to NATO partners; it is also intended to be available, on a case by case basis, to countries that have not entered into a formal partnership arrangement with the Alliance.⁴⁸

While the DCBI includes technical military training and assistance, it is focused on strategic-level advice, including national security architectures, policy, and defense planning. The initiative envisages the Alliance acting in close cooperation with other international actors, especially the United Nations, European Union, and OSCE. Under DCBI, a pool of pre-identified International Staff and International Military Staff experts has been established to provide a task force or “surge capacity” for fact-finding missions or strategic-level advisory and assistance missions. A Special Coordinator for DCBI has been established (currently the NATO Deputy Secretary General) who is responsible for ensuring coherence among existing programs and bringing together the civilian and military staffs. A “Military Hub” has also been designated to act as a coordination point for the staff of the NATO Strategic Commands and to assist in assessing requests from countries for aid.

The 2016 Warsaw Summit also emphasized the importance of this initiative, which is now included under the rubric of “projecting stability,” but it remains to be seen what the balance in these efforts will be between DIB and technical military training.

Conclusion

In a number of countries—especially those that have joined or aspire to join NATO—there is a demonstrable improvement in the environment in which policy and management decisions are made, with a clear movement toward a more objective, analytical, and transparent approach. Significant numbers of civilian and military personnel in Ministries of Defense and General Staffs have understood the need for effective, objective-based decision-making.

Unfortunately, it is not yet possible in all cases to say that this constitutes a culture of honest, objective decision-making throughout these organizations. There are still

examples of decision-making in the equipment, logistics, personnel, policy, and other spheres, including in NATO countries, that do not stand up to close scrutiny, fly in the face of established priorities, or which have obviously been influenced by political factors. There is always a risk that DIB efforts will falter when dealing with a small, largely self-selected group of interlocutors who may not be representative of the greater numbers in the organizational structure, and who remain largely untouched by the attempts of outsiders to change established cultural practices and expectations. The performance of the Ukrainian MOD and General Staff in 2014 and 2015, as the Russian aggression unfolded, was a salutary lesson in how far intensive NATO engagement for 20 years had failed to modernize mindsets throughout the structure.

Reflecting on these successes and failures, what lessons can be derived from NATO's experience in DIB (recognizing the difficulties of generalizing about NATO's experiences with over 25 countries on four continents, some at peace and others engaged in conflict)?

Credibility

Defense institution building—or DIB—is not a military process; it is a political and cultural process. It depends upon many factors. Among the most important is credibility—those offering advice must be able to demonstrate their own personal experience in the subjects on which they are advising, and must be able to produce relevant examples from their previous positions that illustrate the relevance of that advice. Building a rapport with host country interlocutors involves conversations that allow both sides to demonstrate their professional competence. Almost everyone likes to talk about their job, or previous jobs, and discussions of this nature help form a common bond.

Continuity

DIB demands continuity. There must be continuity among those offering advice so that trust and personal relationships can be developed with interlocutors; this militates against a rapid turnaround of personnel in this area (military personnel on tours of short duration are especially vulnerable from this point of view). Continuity is most effective when the advice is provided from advisors based in the host country who work alongside host country colleagues day to day, socialize with them off-duty, and live in (and hopefully come to understand better) the community in which they are based, rather than in an isolated “bubble” (such as a military compound).

Continuity is also important among the interlocutors. If the host nation personnel with whom advisors are interacting change on a frequent basis, it will be difficult to make headway. Host country interlocutors need time to understand concepts, develop skills, and put those skills into effect. They must also be seen to be valued and rewarded for having acquired those skills, and given appropriate and consistent support from high-level managers and from peers by ensuring that sufficient numbers of those who have acquired new skills can work together to provide a critical mass for new ideas to take hold.

High-level Buy-in

There needs to be high-level engagement and support in the host country for the process of building effective institutions and working practices. Again, such engagement needs to be consistent, which may prove difficult as political leaders (and their priorities and positions) could change following elections. The relationship with NATO, or any other body of advisors, may lose momentum as a result. It is important for DIB teams to maintain engagement during such low periods in order to demonstrate long-term commitment to assisting the host country. Interludes like this can be frustrating, but without such strategic patience, progress may be lost and emerging windows of opportunity may be missed. In addition, maintaining consistent high-level engagement is necessary for NATO to properly support its staff officers in the field.

Consistency From and Within NATO

Although there has been a long-standing understanding that supporting reform and effective democratic institutions is an important contribution that the Alliance can make to stability, it has not been communicated with sufficient consistency and enthusiasm over the years. The evident decline in importance attached to the EAPC and the growth of ministerial and summit meeting formats linked to military operational contributions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and elsewhere (reflecting a “what can you do for NATO?” approach), has caused some dismay. A proliferation of new partnership programs (often as a result of messy compromises arrived at to resolve disputes in NATO committees) over the years, some with questionable or minimal substance, does not necessarily help create an impression of an organization that has carefully considered its intentions. The failure of Allies to come to timely agreements on the dates and formats for Ministerial and Summit meetings has created frustration among partners, as has the decision to deny them offices in the new NATO Headquarters building. There is also an occasional tendency for those who work in NATO Headquarters in Brussels to assume that their preoccupations are the most urgent items on the agendas of countries with whom they seek to engage, when the reality is that NATO and its programs may be quite a long way down their priority lists. This rather careless and casual approach does not help those on the ground seeking to demonstrate to a host country that NATO values them and is prepared to invest in helping them.

Understanding the Political, Societal, Historical, and Existing Institutional Context

Successful engagement with a host country requires understanding of its history, political and social culture, and governmental and military practices. Any advice given must take account of these and be individually tailored to best fit what may be possible in that country. There is no NATO or Western model that must be followed, and any attempt to impose one (even assuming there would be agreement among NATO countries or staffs about what such a model would look like) would cause antagonism. However, in some cases, especially where a country is very keen to join the Alliance, a clear statement of

the standards expected by NATO may be necessary to progress the debate and to resolve disagreements.

Language skills are also important in being able to engage with and influence host country interlocutors. The official languages of the Alliance are English and French, but in practice, English is the principal working language and among the NATO military staffs it is the working language. If there is a sufficient pool of host country interlocutors with good language skills, business can be conducted expeditiously and effectively. Where this is not the case, it is essential that professional interpreters with a good knowledge of the relevant technical vocabulary are provided; without this support, much time will be wasted, opportunities missed, and frustration caused.

Commitment of Resources

Support for the development of effective, accountable, and transparent defense institutions has become an essential part of NATO's work to encourage development of a security environment where there is less likelihood of instability, conflict, corruption, and miscalculation, and greater likelihood of improving governance in the defense and security sector. The demand for DIB activities, both from Allies and from potential recipients, has grown substantially, although the financial and staff resources that NATO is prepared to devote have not.

This contradiction between growing ambition and practical reluctance was summed up eloquently by Lord Robertson in his farewell speech to the North Atlantic Council on December 17, 2003, where, referring to the NATO Civil Budget, he said: "Never has so much attention, with so much detail and to so little effect, been devoted to such a small thing. With a budget of 171 million Euros a year, each nation around this table gets an excellent bargain. It is sad, even scandalous, that your nations ask and receive so much from NATO and its staff, and at the same time show yourselves so mean in refusing additional resources for this small and effective organisation. My successor deserves better treatment."⁴⁹

Notes

1 The author worked in the Defence Policy and Planning Division of the Brussels-based International Staff for almost 20 years until mid-2015, retiring as Director of Planning. This article is, therefore, written from the perspective of NATO Headquarters and its own activities. There were many activities and programs supporting defense institution building carried out by individual Alliance countries (and some partner countries), other organizations, and in the framework of military operations that were not always completely visible to staff in Brussels. This needs to be taken into account in reading this chapter.

2 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in January 1995.

3 NATO, *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance* (October 27, 2000), available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm>>.

4 Ibid.

5 NATO, *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation* (October 27, 2000), available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a.htm>>.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 NATO, "North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation," Press Release M-NACC-1(91) 111, December 20, 1991, available at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_

texts_23841.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

9 NATO, "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council ("The Brussels Summit Declaration")," Press Release M-1(94) 003, January 11, 1994, available at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24470.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

10 Charles S. Kennedy interview by Charles W. Freeman, Jr., April 14, 1995, available at <<https://www.loc.gov/resource/mfdip.2004fre01/?st=gallery>>.

11 "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council ("The Brussels Summit Declaration")," *op. cit.*

12 Countries participating in PfP were originally referred to as "Partners." However, the development of new relationships (Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994, Contact Countries/Partners across the Globe in 1998, and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative in 2004) led to a decision to largely combine these programs in 2011. All non-NATO countries in these programs were then known as "partners." This convention is used throughout this chapter. On a separate note, in June 1992, NATO Foreign Ministers had declared the Alliance's willingness (on a case by case basis) to support CSCE peacekeeping activities: in December 1992 Foreign Ministers extended this to include United Nations peacekeeping activities and Defense Ministers concluded that support for peacekeeping activities should be included among the missions of NATO forces and headquarters. There was already a recognition that non-NATO nations would likely wish to take part with NATO in such missions; the requirement for interoperability was therefore necessary and obvious.

13 Les Aspin, "New Europe, New NATO," *NATO Review* 42, No. 1 (February 1994), available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1994/9401-3.htm>>, 12-14.

14 Richard Cohen, "The Marshall Center: An Experiment in East-West Cooperation," *NATO Review* 43, No. 4 (July 1995), available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1995/9504-6.htm>>, 27-61.

15 NATO, "PfP Framework Document," Issued at Ministerial Meeting of North Atlantic Council, January 10-11, 1994, available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm>>.

16 *Ibid.*

17 The Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom, and United States: France was invited but declined to join this group, since it did not, at that time, participate in NATO's collective defense planning.

18 The new committee had two seats at the table for each country so that national civilian and military delegations could be represented. Unfortunately, in practice, there was little involvement from the staffs of Allied Military Representatives who established their own military-only committee.

19 NATO, "Membership Action Plan (MAP)," Press Release NAC-S(99) 066, April 24, 1999, available at <http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/official_texts_27444.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

20 *Ibid.*

21 A NATO procedure to streamline decision-making, whereby a document prepared by the staff or a NATO committee is circulated to ambassadors (or ministers) but is not expected to require a meeting to discuss it, since agreement by national staffs has already been reached. If "silence" is "broken," a discussion at ambassadorial (or ministerial) level would be required.

22 NATO, "NATO-Ukraine Action Plan," November 22, 2002, available at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19547.htm?>.

23 The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was the successor to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). It was established in 1997 and, like the NACC, brought together representatives of the Allies and all partners. It was intended to reflect NATO's desire for a security forum that would better reflect the more operational role of partnership. In fact, in recent years it has fallen into disuse, with preference being given to meetings in formats of Allies and those partners contributing troops to different NATO operations. The last EAPC Ministerial meeting took place in June 2009; NATO, "Prague Summit Declaration," Press Release (2002)127, November 21, 2002, available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pt/2002/p02-127e.htm>>.

24 NATO, *The Prague Summit and NATO's Transformation: A Reader's Guide* (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2003), available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-prg/rdr-gde-prg-eng.pdf>>.

25 Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Montenegro, BiH, and Serbia. Uzbekistan began developing an IPAP, but work on this ended after the deaths in Andijan in 2005.

26 As an example, see Serbia's objectives, available at <<http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/images/ipap/ipapeng.pdf>>.

27 *The Prague Summit and NATO's Transformation: A Reader's Guide, op. cit.*

28 NATO, "Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB)," June 7, 2004, available at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_21014.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

29 SG (2002) 1215, included in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Defence Reform Commission, "The Path to Partnership for Peace," September 15, 2003, available at <https://www.jfncaples.nato.int/systems/file_download.ashx?pg=1441&ver=1>.

30 The Peace Implementation Council, meeting in Bonn in December 1997, granted substantial powers to the High Representative to adopt binding decisions relating to implementation of the Dayton Peace agreements when local parties seemed unwilling or unable to act; Office of the High Representative, "Decision Establishing the Defence Reform Commission," May 09, 2003, available at <<http://www.ohr.int/?p=65835>>.

31 For a full and largely first-hand account of this effort, see: Rohan Maxwell and John Andreas Olsen, *Destination NATO: Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2003-13*, Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall Paper 80 (London: Routledge, March 24, 2014).

32 “The Path to Partnership for Peace,” *op. cit.*; In April 2010, the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Tallinn invited BiH to join the Membership Action Plan, pending resolution of the issue of the ownership (by the state or Entity governments) of 63 sites identified as needed for the use of the Armed Forces of BiH. To date, despite some progress, it has not been possible to fully resolve this issue.

33 NATO, “Final Communiqué,” Press Release (2003)152, December 4, 2003, available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-152e.htm>>.

34 Office of the High Representative, “Decision Extending the Mandate of the Defence Reform Commission,” February 04, 2004, available at <<http://www.ohr.int/?p=65627>>.

35 NATO, “Istanbul Summit Communiqué,” Press Release (2004)096, June 28, 2004, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>>.

36 Office of the High Representative, “Decision Extending the Mandate of the Defence Reform Commission,” December 31, 2004, available at <<http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/pol/drc/pdf/drc-report-2005-eng.pdf>>, 181.

37 *Ibid.*

38 This Political-Military Cell in NATO Headquarters Sarajevo still exists and has been recognised in successive annual NATO Periodic Mission Reviews as being a crucial asset in promoting defense reform and building defense institutions. Consequently, any proposal for change to this Cell has to be referred to NATO Headquarters in Brussels for approval. This stipulation proved necessary because it became clear that the military command chain was uncomfortable with having a group of civilians as part of a subordinate headquarters whose expertise in the principal goal of the organization was so far ahead of the military members of the chain of command. This had resulted in attempts by the military chain of command to constrain their size, resources, and activities, which the Headquarters in Brussels was not prepared to permit. Having said this, it is not inevitable that a military headquarters staffed largely by military personnel will be inadequate to the task of supporting defense reform and defense institution building, particularly if given the right leadership and the imposition of strict requirements concerning the expertise and length of deployment of the personnel posted there, as evidenced by the work of NATO Headquarters Skopje over several years.

39 The State Union was created in February 2003, but was a very loose political union between Serbia and Montenegro. There were pressures in Montenegro for full independence that were realised in June 2006, after a referendum in Montenegro resulted in 55.5 percent of those voting casting their ballots for independence. Serbia declared its own independence a few days later.

40 For example, Working Table 1, dealing with financial planning, produced a report in October 2007 acknowledging that the financial planning model then used in the Ministry of Defense was based on a methodology that was 20 years old, obsolete, unusable, and needed to be thoroughly overhauled.

41 Kosovo declared independence unilaterally in February 2008.

42 NATO agreed to take on these tasks in a so-called “Bridging Directive,” NAC Execution Directive for the KFOR Bridging Directive, dated March 10, 2008.

43 Greece, Romania, Spain, and the Slovak Republic.

44 NATO, “NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence,” June 9-10, 2005, available at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_57094.htm?mode=pressrelease>.

45 UN Security Council, “Report of UN Secretary General on United Nations Support Mission in Libya,” S/2012/675, August 30, 2012, available at <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/675>.

46 These include seven NATO countries as well as partners in Europe, Asia, and South America.

47 NATO, “The Wales Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond,” Press Release (2014) 120, September 5, 2014, available at <http://nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_112985.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

48 This was a specific response to the possibility of providing advice and assistance to Libya, but it also keeps open the door for such requests from other countries in the future.

49 NATO, “Farewell Speech to the Council by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson,” December 17, 2003, available at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_20352.htm?selectedLocale=en>.

The British Experience in Africa and Oman

Dickie Davis

This chapter explores the British experience in defense institution building (DIB) through the examination of four case studies: Oman, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Sierra Leone. They are all set in the 60-year period between 1955 and 2015, the first 25 years of which was dominated by the British withdrawal from Empire. Throughout, there were severe budgetary pressures on defense expenditure as a result of periodic recessions, demands of the Cold War, operations in Northern Ireland, and more recently those in the Gulf, Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Thus, the overall approach taken to DIB was one of small-scale assistance to develop self-sustaining local capacity.

With the benefit of hindsight, the speed of British withdrawal from Empire looks hasty. In most of the newly independent countries, there was only a short period of preparation and the military, therefore, in many cases, left behind small training teams and commanders to ease the transition. It would be hard to classify such support as genuine attempts to build sustainable defense institutions. But the four examples chosen are different: Oman because it highlights what can be achieved with sustained commitment and adequate resources; Zimbabwe and South Africa because these countries initially chose different paths upon leaving the Empire, ones which resulted in protracted conflicts, at the conclusion of which they both requested British assistance to rebuild their armed forces from elements of the conflicting forces; and Sierra Leone because, following a long period of conflict, it represents a relatively recent attempt to rebuild all the defense institutions in a country.

These examples highlight the time, commitment, and resources needed to deliver lasting, meaningful results, and the criticality of generating trained, educated, and experienced leaders. They also highlight that, while much attention is typically given by outsiders to the “means to fight,” comparatively little attention is given to the “will to fight.” Yet history is full of examples where the will to fight has been the dominant factor in performance in combat.

Having briefly outlined the historical background and details of British military assistance in these four particular engagements, the chapter concludes with a section that highlights a number of observations of use to future DIB efforts.

A Brief History: British Military Assistance

The British relationship with Oman stretches back to the 17th century and the British East India Company's attempt to trade in the Gulf, with the first defense treaty being signed in 1798. Robert Landen identified five phases in British engagement in Oman: the first until the late 18th century was commercial; the second until the mid-19th century was political; and the third in the second half of the 19th century led to indirect rule (this was linked to the strategic importance of the Gulf to British engagement in India). The last two stages, dominance and accommodation, occurred in the first half of the 20th century, and were linked to the height and the end of the British Empire in India.¹ Oman continued as a partner of strategic importance for Britain throughout the second half of the 20th century, particularly during the period up until the early 1970s, when East of Suez withdrawal was complete. The relationship remains to this day, albeit for slightly different strategic reasons. Thus when the discovery of oil in Oman led to unrest in the 1950s, quickly followed by an insurgency in Dhofar, it was to be expected that the United Kingdom (UK) would come to the Sultan's aid.

Meanwhile, Britain, aware of its declining status as a world power and keen to respond to growing anti-colonial sentiment, granted independence to Ghana in 1957, and thus set in motion an African decolonization process that was to last more than two decades. Initially, Africa was a foreign policy priority, as the UK government sought to protect investments, trade links, and citizens with the right to return to the UK. Yet, by the time of Britain's entry into the Common Market in 1973, Africa was being eclipsed by relations with America and Europe. By 1987, Africa was receiving only \$325 million in aid from the UK, only 16 percent of the over \$2 billion supplied by France. The continent was, moreover, receiving no more than 3.2 percent of the UK's exports and providing only 1.9 percent of the UK's imports.² Throughout this period, the UK sought to avoid becoming militarily committed on the ground, withdrawing forces East of Suez by 1971 and vacating the last operational military base in Africa, in Simon's Town (South Africa), in 1975. The British Army, however, continued to train in sub-Saharan Africa through the development of permanent training facilities in Kenya and through a varied exercise program across the continent.

After the withdrawal from sub-Saharan Africa, the British Army retained links with the newly established African armies and provided a range of training and assistance. This support lessened over time, as UK defense spending was reduced in successive budgetary rounds. Furthermore, as conflicts in former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa ended, surge assistance was offered in the form of British Military Advisory and Training Teams to help establish the new post-conflict armies as stabilizing forces for good.

The end of the Cold War in 1991 and the resultant calls for a peace dividend, combined with the early 1990s recession, put considerable strain on the UK defense budget. The mid-1990s saw many military savings measures imposed on a wide range of areas, with overall

defense spending dropping from £26.33 billion in 1993 to £24.38 billion in 1998.³

The 1997 election of a Labour Government and the creation of the Department for International Development (DfID), which focused on the global alleviation of poverty, marked a renewed focus on sub-Saharan Africa by the UK government. This was further reinforced by the UK's commitment at the Gleneagles Summit in 2005 to double bilateral spending in Africa—a target which has been achieved, resulting in a bilateral aid budget in Africa of over £2.5 billion in 2013/2014, 54 percent of the bilateral program.⁴ In parallel with this change, the focus of military training and assistance shifted to one of supporting African armies taking part in peacekeeping operations. Since 1997, the two largest training teams have changed their titles to “British Peace Support Teams” and adopted a more regional approach, both in terms of their areas of operations, but also in their support to regional security organizations.

The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent growth of Islamic extremist groups on the continent has resulted in support to counterterrorist training and assistance first in East and now in West Africa. Combined with fiscal constraints, this new emphasis has resulted in a reduction of support to peacekeeping training, as the UK withdrawal from the Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre highlight.

Oman

Historical Background

Modern-day Oman has a long history of tension between the eastern coastal region that contains the capital Muscat, and the interior, which is separated from the capital region by the Hajar Mountains. Under the Treaty of Seeb (1920), it was agreed that the Sultan of Muscat would rule the coastal region and be responsible for the external affairs of Oman, while the autonomy of the interior of the country would be recognized and ruled by Imams.

The discovery of oil in the 1950s put pressure on this finely balanced arrangement. Sultan Said bin Taimur claimed the right to all dealings with external companies, while the Imam ruling the interior claimed that, as the oil was in his territory, it was an internal matter. In December 1955, the Sultan sent a small force, supported by British advisors, to occupy the main centers in the interior of Oman. Imam Ghalib bin Ali al Hinai, the ruling Imam, led a rebellion against the Sultan that was quickly suppressed. The Imam's brother fled to Saudi Arabia and returned in 1957 with a group of several hundred well-armed fighters. After some initial skirmishes, one of the major interior tribes joined forces with the Imam's fighters; together, they inflicted considerable losses on the Sultan's forces. The rebellion was suppressed with British help, including the deployment of two companies from the Cameronians (a Scottish infantry regiment), and the rebels fled to the mountains of the Jebel Akhdar, where they held out until their defeat by a British Special Air Service (SAS)-led assault in 1959. Imam Ghalib al Hinai escaped to Saudi Arabia, remaining in exile until he died in November 2009.

Peace was not to last for long. In 1962, Mussalin bin Nafi formed the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF), which aimed to establish a separate state in Dhofar. This started a conflict that would be fueled by the Cold War, result in the overthrow of the Sultan by his son, and last until 1976. To prevail, the state of Oman and its armed forces had to be rapidly modernized, and the benefits of the new-found oil wealth (exports began in 1967) had to be felt by all. To bridge the gap while the transformation took place, both Iran (whose forces suffered the highest casualties) and Britain provided extensive support, with Jordan also providing an engineer squadron.

The Province of Dhofar is in the far west of Oman. It consists of a thin coastal strip containing the regional capital, Salalah, and gives way inland to the Jebel Dhofar hills. Further north, the hills run into the deserts of the Empty Quarter. Initially, the conflict was low-intensity, with the DLF conducting hit-and-run attacks and the Sultan using a locally recruited irregular force—the “Dhofar Force”—to contain the problem. In 1966, this irregular unit attempted to assassinate the Sultan; the Sultan’s response was heavy handed, and the conflict grew in intensity.

In 1967, the British withdrew from Aden and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen was established, providing a route through which both the Chinese and the Russians could provide support to the rebels.⁵ In 1968, the DLF renamed itself the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf, adopted a communist ideology, and began to receive external support from Yemen in the form of both weapons and training. By the 1970s, the rebels were making considerable progress, controlling the entire Jebel, and their increasingly forceful attacks convinced many, including the British, that a new approach and leadership was needed.

The Sultan’s heir, Qaboos bin Said, was educated in Salalah and India, and was sent to secondary school in England at age 16. Following school, he attended the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and then served in the British Army with the Cameronians. He then took a course in local government and completed his education with a world tour chaperoned by Leslie Chauncey, who had been the British Consul General in Oman from 1949-1958 and personal advisor to the Sultan from 1961-1970.⁶ On July 23, 1970, Qaboos initiated a bloodless coup at the Sultan’s Palace in Salalah, with the help of his uncle, and exiled his father to Britain, where he was to die two years later.

British Security Assistance in Oman

Back in 1932, Sultan Said bin Taimur inherited a country that was indebted to both the UK and India. Through very tight management of the budget he broke this hold, but the result was a very poor and underdeveloped country, the state of which shocked external observers.⁷ Thus, Sultan Qaboos inherited a country that had seen little benefit from the oil boom and suffered from an insurgency that was now a real threat to the state. James Worrall summed up the situation:

The Sultan had a great deal of internal legitimacy, partly because of his extensive tours, made since his assumption of power and the contact with his people this

*engendered and most importantly because of the hope for future development and prosperity he had promised. The difficulty that faced both the Sultan and the British was the need for the new regime to be seen to be run by Omanis for Omanis when so few Omanis had the educations and skills to create an effective indigenous administration which could provide the development craved by the people... The new regime needed to reduce British influence to appear legitimate but also needed British expertise to be able to create an effective and developing state. . . . It was this dilemma that underpinned the British approach to the development of the Armed Services. In 1971 the five key British interests in Oman were summarized as: "a) to prevent the Sultanate from disintegrating or falling to a regime hostile to the stability of the Gulf and Britain's oil interests during withdrawal from the Gulf, b) in the long term to ensure the Sultanate was a stable, internationally recognized and pro-British State, c) to maintain the flow of high quality oil, d) to maintain the RAF facilities and BBC relay station on Masirah at least for as long as commitments to Malaysia and Singapore continued, and e) to keep to the minimum, British military activities in the Sultanate without damaging the other objectives."*⁸

By the early 1950s, the British knew Oman and its Baluchi and ad hoc forces well.⁹ After the reverses of 1957, the Sultan's Army was reorganized by a British Officer, Colonel David Smiley, who had considerable experience in the Middle East and working with irregular forces.¹⁰ Within each unit and sub-unit, the British provided a number of officers, and the Baluchi and Arab soldiers were mixed in order to reduce their opportunities for sympathizing with the rebels (though this led to language problems and other tensions). By 1964, the Sultan's forces were still in a weak state: undermanned, undertrained, and poorly equipped. Although some reorganization took place with the creation of the all-Baluchi Southern Regiment, it was slow and not enough to deal with the growing insurgency in the West.

When Sultan Qaboos took charge, he initiated rapid reform of the Armed Services. His vision was for a modern force that could not only defeat the insurgency, but would act as a deterrent to future aggression. The existing forces suffered from critical weaknesses, lacking equipment and Omani human capital.

Initially, many more Omanis were recruited into the Armed Forces and the Baluchis were concentrated in separate units, setting up a gradual shift from the use of irregular forces to the creation of a modern professional force. To bridge the gap, a number of local irregular units known as *firqats* were established, each with about 100 men under command of a British officer. During this process, large numbers of British officers and non-commissioned officer (NCO) instructors were attached to Omani units and to the Ministry of Defense (MOD); this was not without its difficulties, as operations in Northern Ireland were putting the British Army under considerable strain in the early 1970s. Over time, the number of British officers and NCOs seconded to the Sultan's Armed Forces was

gradually reduced, but importantly, the senior advisors were among the last to be released.

In parallel, a concerted attempt was made to develop indigenous Omani capability through both internal and external training and education. Considerable funds were applied to the creation of training establishments, such as the Sultan Qaboos Military College, initially established in 1971, and the Command and Staff College, established in 1987. These and other training organizations have been continuously developed, and are regarded by some as among the best in the region.

Initially, the British even provided an officer—Major General John Graham (1970-1972), followed by Major General (later General) Timothy Creasey—to act as the Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces (1972-1975).¹¹ These experienced commanders drove the rapid modernization that the Sultan desired. When Major General Graham took command, the Sultan's forces numbered 4,000; when he left, they stood at 11,000, with 49 aircraft and a growing navy. In 1977, the Sultan's Armed Forces were reorganized into land, air, and naval forces, with the office of Chief of Staff of Defense being established in 1981. British leadership of all three services by officers on loan continued until the late 1980s, but by the early 1990s, all senior positions were held by Omanis, with the British providing a two-star general as the Sultan's military advisor (a post that remains to this day).

Alongside a real and sustained effort to develop people, the Sultan's Armed Forces received considerable funds to modernize and expand their equipment fleets, and to sustain the progress that it had made in building its defense institutions. In 1970, the defense budget stood at \$123 million (15.2 percent of GNP). It rose quickly: by 1973, it stood at \$366 million (37.5 percent of GNP).¹² Income from oil allowed this growth to be sustained such that by 1988 spending on defense had reached \$1.5 billion, peaked in 2012 at \$12.3 billion, and stood at \$9.8 billion by 2015.¹³

Today, Oman possesses some of the most modern and capable forces in the region, has steadily decreased its dependence on foreign assistance, and has increased its use of modern technology. It is, in many ways, an excellent example of what can be achieved given a clear vision, a long-term approach, and adequate funding.

Zimbabwe

Historical Context

Prime Minister Ian Smith's declaration of independence for Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) from the UK on November 11, 1965, preempted the intended decolonization of the country and set the stage for a bitter internal war that lasted for 14 years, ending with a ceasefire on December 28, 1979.¹⁴

The ceasefire was overseen by a Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF), which facilitated the movement of Patriotic Front guerrillas to 16 assembly areas across the country.¹⁵ The leaders of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) had some difficulty making contact with their guerrillas, yet by the end of February 1980, some 18,000 ZANLA and

6,000 ZIPRA fighters were in the assembly areas, with an additional 6,000 arriving after the March elections.¹⁶ At the time of the ceasefire, the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) numbered 15,000 regulars, 20,000 territorials, and 25,000 auxiliaries, with another 6,000 special troops; all were withdrawn to their barracks.

In February 1980, two months before he was elected prime minister of the newly independent Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe met with the British Governor of Rhodesia, Lord Soames, and the Commander of the CMF, Major General Acland. Mugabe agreed that the CMF would depart on schedule in April, but that a 50-strong British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT), under Major General Palmer, would be deployed to Zimbabwe to help integrate the new National Army. The BMATT's deployment was complete by May 8, 1980. The challenge facing the team was huge, as there had been three distinct fighting forces, none of whom thought that they had lost the war, and all of whom had fought each other at various points during the war. With the disparity in living conditions between the RSF in their barracks and the ZANLA and ZIPRA in the assembly areas, there was a real and growing pressure to get on with both demobilization and integration.

British Security Assistance in Zimbabwe

The BMATT plan was to select potential leaders from ZANLA and ZIPRA fighters in the assembly areas, and for BMATT, assisted by former Rhodesian Army instructors, to train them in leadership, administration, and basic skills. The training was also to act as an assessment of leadership ability, on completion of which they were appointed to positions in a battalion. Then, 450 ZANLA and ZIPRA fighters were chosen as the battalion's soldiers and put through a month of basic training. Once the individual training was complete, each new battalion was joined by a BMATT major and warrant officer for six months to help get the organization working effectively. Specialist elements of the battalion were trained separately, and it was in these areas that the former RSF members were concentrated. By July 1980, the first infantry battalion was trained, with new battalions finishing training at the rate of two per month. A Joint High Command (JHC) was established to oversee the process of integration and demobilization. It required much support from senior elements of the BMATT, particularly when the commander of the Zimbabwe Armed Forces (and former Head of the Armed Forces of Rhodesia) Lieutenant General Peter Walls resigned in July 1980 after having given a controversial interview to the British Broadcasting Corporation. The new minister of defense then stepped in and assumed the position of chairman of the JHC. In August 1981, the JHC handed over to a new Defense Headquarters, which was co-located with the MOD.

In December 1980, it was finally agreed that a demobilization scheme was needed, although it took until October 1981 to agree to the details and then it was slow to deliver; the disarmament process was much quicker. The issue of creating a chain of command was particularly problematic while substantial numbers of each faction remained outside the National Army. In February 1981, a Senior Officer's Selection Board selected 27 brigadiers

and colonels from 50 ZIPRA and ZANLA potentials. Those selected then attended staff college training enabled by the BMATT. The whole process was not without controversy; some new appointees managed to bypass the process completely, and there were allegations of bias and political selection.

Throughout this early period in the formation of the new Zimbabwe Defense Force (ZDF), there was considerable friction between former ZANLA and ZIPRA fighters. The height of this friction came during the mutiny and mini-civil war in early February 1981 near Bulawayo, the final death toll of which was some 300 former guerrillas and 200 members of the police, national army, and civil society. However, the JHC and the government held together and were united in ending the crisis. In the summer of 1981, the Government of Zimbabwe decided to accept an offer from North Korea to train a special brigade. The 5th Brigade was composed almost exclusively of former ZANLA fighters. Former ZIPRA fighters viewed it with suspicion, as a potential instrument of coercion, and as the leading edge of the politicization of the Armed Forces.

The last amalgamated battalion, the 42nd, finished training in October 1981, by which point the Armed Forces were approximately 65,000-strong. The BMATT then began to concentrate on improving individual training and helping to start the full suite of professional courses needed to sustain and develop defense institutions. In his final report, Major General Palmer observed that the BMATT had created a large, relatively stable force that would need a lot more work to turn it into a modern professional fighting force. He felt that considerable internal and regional challenges remained and that the eventual outcome was still uncertain. Yet, by 1985, the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) was undergoing formation training, and by 1987, the Zimbabwe Staff College was offering some of the most advanced command and staff training in Africa.

Over time, the BMATT was gradually reduced in size to a point where, in 1995, plans were made to disengage from bilateral support except for a three-man team at the Zimbabwe Staff College. However, after a review, it was decided to keep the team in Zimbabwe, but for it to be given a regional role. It became BMATT (Southern Africa), providing training to the armed forces in Mozambique, Mauritius, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland, and Zambia, as well as Zimbabwe. The team was mandated to focus on regional peacekeeping training.

In 2001, as a result of the deteriorating relationship between the governments of the UK and Zimbabwe, it was decided to close the BMATT and relocate the regional element of its training to the newly established team in South Africa. The withdrawal of the team was announced by the Foreign Secretary on March 1, 2001, and the withdrawal was complete by March 31, 2001.

Of note is the fact that at some point a civilian advisor was added to the team to help with MOD reform. His work in helping with the development of a Zimbabwean MOD program's branch and defense management plan received much positive comment. He was aided by the ability to send officers to the UK for management planning courses, and by a UK MOD Defense Management Training Team, which deployed to the region and ran a series of in-country courses.

South Africa

Historical Context

Of the 11 statues in London's Parliament Square, seven are of British leaders and two are South African—Jan Smuts and Nelson Mandela— demonstrating the long and deep links between the two countries. Between May 31, 1910 (with the formation of the Union of South Africa) and May 31, 1961 (when South Africa declared itself a republic and left the Commonwealth), South Africa was an independent dominion of the British Empire, fighting as such in both world wars. In the period 1960-61 relations between the two countries deteriorated. On February 3, 1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan gave his “winds of change” speech to the South African Parliament, in which he signaled his country's intention to grant independence to its colonies, including South Africa. This was an unexpectedly sudden change in the British Government's attitude toward African self-government.

On October 5, 1960, the ruling National Party (which had been in power since 1948, was predominantly comprised of white Afrikaners, and was staunchly anti-British, a sentiment stemming from the Anglo-Boer Wars) held a referendum on changing the South African Union to a sovereign republic. Despite significant opposition, voting was restricted to whites, and the referendum was passed with a majority of 52.2 percent.

Then followed a long period of difficult relations. The UK, which opposed the National Party's apartheid regime, attempted to pursue a policy of engagement. This policy led to the isolation of the UK within various international fora that were calling for stronger action, particularly the Commonwealth, and difficult relations with the African National Congress (ANC), which only started to improve in the late 1980s. At its core, the British policy appeared to be based on a belief that it was the Government of South Africa that would deliver the required changes and, therefore, not only pressure but also engagement was needed; critics argued for more pressure, and the UK reluctantly imposed sanctions in 1985. In 1990, the National Party finally lifted the ban on the ANC and other political parties, and released Nelson Mandela from prison. A negotiation process followed, culminating in a multi-party election on April 27, 1994. The ANC gained 62 percent of the vote, winning 252 seats in the National Assembly. The Assembly's first act was to elect Nelson Mandela President.

British Security Assistance in the Republic of South Africa

On April 8, 1994, the South African Transitional Executive Council issued a formal invitation to the UK government to assist in the process of the formation of the new South African National Defense Force (SANDF). The 1993 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa stated that “The National Defense Force shall be established in such a manner that it will provide a balanced, modern and technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its functions in terms of this Constitution” and that “All members of the National Defense Force shall be properly trained in order to comply with international standards of

competency.”¹⁷ The overall challenge was considerable, as it involved the integration of seven separate forces into one body, and a large downsizing operation.

The British Military Advisory and Training Team (South Africa) was quickly established and deployed in June 1994. The first team was 33-strong, of which nine personnel were on two-year-long tours, and the remainder held short-term posts of up to six months in duration. The BMATT was given three principal tasks: validating entrance criteria and standards for the SANDF; monitoring assessment, selection, and training across all four arms of the SANDF to ensure compliance with an even-handed application of the agreed standards; and adjudicating disputes arising between the parties involved in the integration process. It was also asked to assist with training and instruction, but only if such activity did not conflict with its three principal tasks.

The BMATT (South Africa) mission was extended in 1999 and again in 2001. In recognition of the success of the integration program, its work shifted toward the rationalization and development of the SANDF and it was given the additional task of assisting the SANDF in developing its Peace Support Operations capability. In 2002, its name was changed to British Peace Support Team (South Africa) (BPST [SA]). The SANDF integration training was concluded by the end of 2003 and, thus, the original BMATT mission was complete.

However, in anticipation of the end of the original mission, BPST (SA) was reconfigured in March 2003 to focus on peacekeeping training in support of the SANDF as it became more engaged in such operations across Africa. With the change of mission, combined with the closure of BMATT (Harare), it also began to adopt a regional role.

By 2015, the BPST (SA) had been reduced to nine military personnel and three locally employed staff, was based in Pretoria, and was jointly funded by the UK and South Africa under a memorandum of understanding lasting until 2018. It is engaged in supporting both national and multinational peacekeeping training.

Alongside the BMATT, a British Defense Advisory Team (BDAT)—consisting of a civil and military official, each of at least one-star rank—was created to help with the establishment of a Department of Defense. Prior to the 1993 constitution, defense forces were managed and controlled by the military—there was no civilian management structure in place. The BDAT’s mandate was to develop processes related to governance, risk, and control over defense resources, including the framework against which policies, strategies, and plans were to be developed. Initially headed by Dr. Ian Hamill, it provided advice directly to the Secretary of Defense (initially Lieutenant General [retired] Pierre D. Steyn) and the Chief of the National Defense Force. The team was supported by visiting advisors from the UK Ministry of Defense.

Following a lengthy dialogue on training needs in 1998, the UK Government agreed to fund up to eight members of the South African Department of Defense to attend a Higher Management Training Program at Ashridge Business School in the UK. This was considered such a success that Ashridge was invited to deliver an eight-day program,

known as Project Clipper, to Department of Defense civil servants in South Africa. From 1998-2006, some 230 staff took part in the program.¹⁸ Initially, the program was used to train managers of color in order to redress the effects of the apartheid regime; later on it was used to improve gender balance. Such was the profile of the course that individual attendance was countersigned by the Secretary of State for Defense.

Following a 1994 Defense White Paper that set out the primary role of the SANDF as one of territorial integrity, the Defense Review four years later provided the justification for a significant rearmament order from British, German, Italian, and Swedish suppliers. However, new equipment was not enough. What was needed was fresh blood, downsizing of personnel numbers, and a greater slice of operational spending. These were factors recognized in the 2014 South African Defense Review, which described the SANDF as being in:

*a critical state of decline characterized by: force imbalance between capabilities; block obsolescence and unaffordability of many of its main operating systems; a disproportionate tooth-to-tail ratio; the inability to meet current standing defence commitments; and the lack of critical mobility. The current balance of expenditure between personnel, operating and capital is both severely disjointed and institutionally crippling.*¹⁹

It was a force that, despite the international care and advice lavished, had moved from a “warfare” to a “welfare” institution, as a source, primarily, of employment in a job-scarce environment.²⁰

In some respects, the honesty of the report is the mark of a strong institution, but in others, its harsh criticism points to a Department of Defense that has been unable to marshal the arguments for adequate resources and has not managed its business effectively. What is clear is that from a reasonably well-founded starting point (in terms of available equipment and human capability), a new defense force under effective civilian control was established in short order, and a process of rebalancing was initiated to make it more representative of the nation. Twenty years later, in the absence of a direct threat to South Africa, and subject to severe resource constraints, it has fallen on hard times. The acid test for the Department is: can it reform once again to deliver the strategic approach outlined in the 2014 Defense Review? Thus the jury must still be regarded as “out” on the effectiveness, over the long term, of the assistance delivered by the British.

Sierra Leone

The UK-led International Military Advisory and Training Team (Sierra Leone) (IMATT [SL]) was established in 2002, after a peace process that ended years of conflict.²¹ The team’s mission was to “support the Government of Sierra Leone in the development of effective, democratically accountable and affordable Armed Forces.”²² At its high point, the IMATT

(SL) was over one hundred strong, with contributions from Canada, the United States, Nigeria, Jamaica, France, Senegal, Bermuda, and Ghana. It was funded entirely by the UK Africa Conflict Prevention Pool.

The IMATT (SL) was focused on Pillar One of the Government of Sierra Leone's poverty reduction strategy, that, "good governance, consolidated peace and security and a strengthened security sector are key elements of the enabling environment for the delivery of services, for attainment of food security, creation of employment opportunities, human development and economic growth."²³

While in the post-colonial period, prior to the outbreak of war in 1991, the army, police, and intelligence services had become politicized and lost considerable capability, the war broke the institutions completely. The task of the IMATT (SL) was to build the new Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) following a military reintegration program that brought together fighters from all factions, reducing numbers in the process through early retirement. The approach chosen was a bottom-up transformation through the provision of individual and "train-the-trainer" instruction. This allowed the RSLAF to quickly take the training lead, freeing up IMATT (SL) resources to assist the MOD and RSLAF leadership plan for the future, thus producing top-down direction and long-term momentum. The emphasis in the training was on the moral and conceptual components: "thinking, not things."

The Commander of the IMATT (a brigadier general) was appointed as advisor to the Government of Sierra Leone on security issues and given right of direct access to the President. IMATT civilian staff and military officers were embedded in the Ministry of Defense, in both executive and advisory roles, to help establish momentum for change and to ensure that the principle of civilian control was properly understood and accepted. Importantly, from the outset, the British considered the mission a joint endeavor between the British Ministry of Defense, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Department for International Development, with funding provided jointly through the Conflict Prevention Pool, thus enhancing civilian engagement in security sector reform and reinforcing the notion of civilian control.

A British Stability Unit Report on Security Sector Reform in West Africa noted, "It is important, however, to recognize that IMATT (SL) represented a significant long-term investment by the UK over its lifespan and that it is seen as a success, not just by the UK but by the Government of Sierra Leone, the RSLAF, and the international community, and it has paved the way for the International Security Assistance Team." Brigadier General Barry Le Grys, a former team commander, writing in 2007, drew three deductions from the IMATT (SL) experience. First, that security sector reform was broader than just the Armed Forces, for unless the rest of government improves, it is hard to ensure effective civilian oversight. Second, that security sector reform takes time, is expensive, and will often require donor support until the economy picks up. Third, that local ownership is critical, both in design and implementation.²⁴

The IMATT (SL) was replaced by an International Security Assistance Team (ISAT) in April 2013. While IMATT (SL)'s focus was on the development of the RSLAF and the MOD, the ISAT's remit is much broader, as it aims to look more strategically across the security sector. This is a huge area, and the final Commander IMATT (SL)'s report highlights the challenge:

There is huge appetite for ISAT support amongst the civilian security sector agencies and ISAT will need to prioritize very carefully where and how it uses its limited resources whilst at the same time being seen to deliver substantive effect early . . . Its main effort must be directed at the Sierra Leone Police.²⁵

The performance of the RSLAF during the Ebola crisis of 2014 and 2015 highlights the progress made. During the crisis, the RSLAF deployed (unarmed) in support of the police across the country, and were widely praised for both their actions and their discipline. The RSLAF engineers worked with British Military Engineers to build treatment centers and the RSLAF played a key role in the management of dead bodies.²⁶ But the scale and length of the international military assistance offered to the RSLAF has been relatively modest, and it will not be until at least the late 2020s that an officer who joined the new RSLAF at the start of their career will emerge with the capability and experience to lead it effectively.

Observations: Tension, Relationships, and Fighting Power

Tensions

In this cursory examination of British attempts at defense institution building, a number of critical tensions are apparent that strike at the very core of such endeavors.

The military in politics: The accepted Western starting point for defense institution building is civilian control of the military—that the military's role is to ensure the security of the nation and that in doing so it should not be a political player. The reality in many countries where assistance is offered is somewhat different. If the military is seen as part of the power structure of a country then, it will inevitably be supplied or denied resources accordingly. External military assistance given without a full understanding of the context can fall foul of this tension. Yet despite this issue, comparatively little effort is put into developing effective civilian control of the military. The case study of Zimbabwe demonstrates this clearly. From very early on, the BMATT was concerned about the politicization of the military and the creation of the North Korean trained 5th Brigade; its subsequent actions confirmed their unease. Indeed, as the leader of both ZANU and ZANLA during the war, Mugabe may never have seen such a separation. The team continued to operate in Zimbabwe until 2001 in the belief that continued engagement over the long term would help position the military as a stabilizing force in society. However, in 2001 after just over 20 years of engagement the political differences between the governments of the UK and

Zimbabwe became too great for such support to continue. Despite recognition of this issue, it appears there was only one civilian post dedicated to assisting the Zimbabwean MOD establish and consolidate its position over the course of the partnership.

Time and timing: While military capability is highly perishable (given the generally young age of soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and the relatively short duration of their service), the development of experienced leaders and commanders takes a considerable amount of time (20-30 years). Yet assisting forces are too often under significant pressure to get up and running fast, to produce early effect, and to move on after a period of a few years. Thus there is often a concentration on developing highly perishable skills, to the detriment of those needed for the operation and leadership of the institutions that make such forces self-sustaining. The approach taken in Oman and resultant success is very thought-provoking in this respect.

Sultan Qaboos had a clear vision, has remained as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief throughout, providing long-term continuity, and was prepared to wait until the early 1990s (20 years) before he appointed trained and experienced Omani Service Chiefs. In the light of the approach taken in Oman, the deployment of a two-man BDAT for three years and the provision of eight days of intensive courses to the South African MOD civil servants in the late 1990s looks thin given the scale of the task. Clearly, following the end of the apartheid regime the challenge faced by South Africa was different. The newly created MOD had a number of highly experienced senior officers and civil servants, but it also had an urgent need to rebalance the leadership structure so that it was more reflective of the nation. The problem is that such experienced leaders, military or civilian, cannot be created quickly. Therefore, logically, to help fill the gap the BDAT should have been larger, stayed for much longer, and offered more access to longer-term education and training.

Resources: The history of British military support to African forces since the early 1960s has been dominated by the reduction of resources allocated to the task. This has manifested in reductions in both the numbers and ranks of the personnel deployed and in the premature curtailment of long-term activities. While this has been the consequence of understandable budgetary pressures and changing priorities, its effect on already small teams has been considerable. For effective senior-level engagement and influence, rank matters, and in this respect is not linked to the size of the team deployed. The approach taken in Oman again offers a sharp contrast, for at the height of the crisis and British engagement, the senior British officer was a Major General; some 40 years later, albeit with a different role, it is still a Major General. This difference is probably underpinned by the fact that Oman has the ability to pay for the support it needs, whereas others do not. At the core of this tension has been a UK defense planning cycle of 5 years, linked to the tenure of governments, and an institution developmental timeframe that is better thought of as generational. Given this resource challenge is shared by many of the nations involved in external defense institution building, there is considerable scope for international cooperation in this area. This is

recognized by many of the key contributors, but actual cooperation on the ground remains relatively limited.

Nature of engagement (internal or external): Throughout Britain's long colonial past there was a practice of embedding officers and NCOs as part of a local force, providing a core human capability from which a unit or institution could be developed. The roles of Colonel David Smiley and Major General John Graham in Oman illustrate this perfectly, and the effects they achieved point to the critical importance of quality, trained, and experienced people. The UK has now moved away from providing embedded personnel to an approach that supplies teams that offer advice from a more external position. There are sound historical and legal reasons for such a change, but it does appear to be less effective. Interestingly, the French have retained an embedded system, and in Afghanistan, under the pressure of combat, the UK returned as close to the embedded approach as possible. For embedding to work, as highlighted by the experience in Oman, there must be local ownership of both the need and the solution, which must include a long-term plan to replace "loaned people capability" with properly trained and experienced locals.

Relationships

Defense engagement and by extension DIB is, at its core, a relational activity. For success in this area, militaries need to build strong, lasting relationships with both institutions and people.

For the UK, there appear to be two issues that militate against the development of such relationships with the senior officers of supported countries. First, British defense forces and institutions operate on an appointment- and time-based personnel management system; once an individual moves on from a post, relationships are only maintained on a personal friendship basis, and much is lost as a result. The vast majority of interviewees in a recent study conducted by the author highlighted the need for continuity through longer and repeated tours, thus allowing the build-up of both understanding and relationships.²⁷

Second, as UK Defense Attaché posts have been "de-enriched," they have dropped to a rank level where it is hard for the incumbents to develop personal relationships with senior officers of the supported nation. Because their visits are too infrequent and brief, visiting senior officers from the UK have not filled the resulting gap. Again, Oman is different in this respect from the other three case studies, given its retention of a two star military advisor. This officer has played a key part in the UK-Oman defense relationship, despite considerable shrinkage in the physical support delivered.

Fighting Power

Ultimately, the aim of defense institution building is to create effective, civilian-controlled, self-sustaining armed forces that operate in accordance with international law. Thus, it is instructive to examine what has been provided through the lens of the concept of "fighting power" and its three components: physical, conceptual, and moral.²⁸

Physical (manpower, equipment, training, sustainability): The vast majority of support is provided in the area of the physical component: equipment, training, and sustainability. This is something the militaries are generally comfortable providing and receiving. But training for frontline forces, given its highly perishable nature, is a short-term activity, and the ability to sustain equipment supplied is often lacking. In terms of long-term defense institution building, this is arguably the least effective component on which to expend effort.

Conceptual (doctrine, education, context): Through a focus on staff college development and training (in the case of Sierra Leone, students attended programs at the Ghanaian Armed Forces Staff College), a reasonable amount has been delivered by the UK in the development of the conceptual component in each of the four cases examined. Indeed, the approach taken in Sierra Leone of “thinking, not things” is a thought-provoking strap line. However, the choice of which concepts to impart bears some consideration. Each of the four countries examined had a long association with the British military and, therefore, the continued use of British doctrine was logical. But effective doctrine contains a strong national element, one that recognizes national culture and how a society operates; it is an expression of guidelines and principles that underpin how a nation fights. Future attempts at defense institution building need to start by recognizing this issue. During the Zimbabwe War of Liberation, ZANLA received considerable assistance from China. Since the British team was withdrawn from Harare in 2001, it is unsurprising that the ZDF has turned to China for assistance. In terms of arms supplies, between 2000 and 2009, China accounted for 39 percent of Zimbabwean imports of major conventional weapons. China has also assisted in the provision of training for the Zimbabwean military, especially at the Zimbabwe Staff College.²⁹ This change in support has come with a change in doctrine: at best, it will offer a thought provoking contrast; at worst, it will create inconsistency and the potential for confusion.

Moral (ethical foundations, moral cohesion, motivation): Comparatively little assistance has been delivered in support of the development of the moral component, yet as Napoleon highlighted, “moral is to the physical [material] as three is to one.”³⁰ In this respect, the case study of Oman is interesting, because, for example, such considerations were at the forefront when Colonel Smiley chose to mix Omani and Baluchi soldiers as part of his 1957 reorganization. They are also seen in Sultan Qaboos’s decision to increase the number of Omanis in the armed forces and in his long-term plan to grow capable, experienced Omani leaders, thus reducing his reliance on outsiders. These actions were all aimed at bonding the armed forces to the state. As we have observed with the initial collapse of the Iraqi Army in the face of attacks by militants from the Islamic State, lack of strong moral cohesion can undo considerable support offered to enhance the physical and conceptual components. What makes support to this component challenging is that it is potentially the most political of the three components. At the very least, this component needs to be thoroughly assessed before support to any of the components is offered.

Conclusion

This short examination of four examples of British attempts at defense institution building offers five pointers for success:

- For defense institutions to flourish they need to be led by high-quality, well educated, and experienced people. Thus, defense institution building must take account of the means of development of such individuals.
- Generating such leaders takes time; therefore, defense institution building needs to be thought of as a long-term, generational activity and resourced accordingly.
- Defense institution building contains a very strong relational element between both individuals and institutions. In this context, rank gives both access and influence. Thus, the rank structure of the support team supplied is key and, therefore, should not be overly dictated to by budgetary concerns.
- In the context of the concept of fighting power, the national nature of “how to fight” (the conceptual component) needs recognition. An approach that teaches unmodified Western military doctrine to a non-Western country is unlikely to yield the best results.
- The issues of power, politics, and the will of a force to fight cannot be ignored; they need to be considered as a fundamental part of defense institution building from the outset.

It may be fairly argued that the circumstances that have given rise to the transformation of the Omani armed forces are unique, given the long continuity of vision and leadership provided by the Sultan and the relative lack of resource constraints. But the results achieved by the transformation, when compared to other attempts at defense institution building, are certainly thought provoking.

Notes

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3 “Time Series Chart of Public Spending,” Public Spending Chart for United Kingdom 1990-2020, available at <http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/spending_chart_1990_2000UKb_15cli11mcm_30#>.

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at the *End of Empire* (London: I.B Tauris, 2014), 112-113, and 116.

9The Sultan of Oman owned the port of Gwadar, in modern day Pakistan, until 1955 and the palace guard was recruited from Baluchistan. Under the hand-back settlement, Baluchistan remains a recruiting area for the Sultan's Armed Forces.

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15 The Patriotic Front was a coalition of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union and the Zimbabwe African National Union.

16 ZANLA was the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union, led from 1979 by Robert Mugabe. It drew its recruits mainly from Shona speaking groups and used Chinese Maoist doctrine. Until the early 1970s it operated from Zambia following which it shifted to operating mainly from Mozambique. ZIPRA was the military wing of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union. It was led by Joshua Nkomo's deputy Jason Moyo. It operated mainly from Zambia and followed Soviet Marxist Leninist doctrine.

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22 *Ibid.*, 57.

23 *Ibid.*

24 *Ibid.*, 59.

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Insights from the Development Sector

Paul M. Bisca and Gary J. Milante

Development is big. It encompasses economic growth, but also social development through civil society, state-building (improving the capacity of the state to deliver services), and political institutions, including rule of law.¹ New Institutional Economics (NIE) has changed how development practitioners think about growth and development over the past 15 years.² NIE has shown that “how” people manage their relations through formal and informal institutions affects the efficiency and distribution of service delivery and the provision of public goods.

This chapter is written by development practitioners who work at the intersection of development and defense, and it is written from the perspective that institutions, including defense institutions, are vital means through which societies coordinate their social, political, and economic activity. The authors have seen places where this institutional reform has created real transformation that led to previously inconceivable peace, prosperity, and growth. More often, unfortunately, tragedies occurred where policymakers ignored institution building, or undertook it as purely a technocratic exercise with no appreciation of the underlying politics. The result was dismal failure. Consequently, the development community has much to learn about how to adapt local solutions, informed by these successes and the failures, as do those working on defense institution building (DIB).

The first section of this chapter introduces key concepts in NIE to the non-economist, including a definition of institutions and the relationship between institutions, public goods, and political economy. Next, it identifies four common mistakes or pitfalls seen in development practice: missing ownership, isomorphic mimicry, perplexing complexity, and unrealistic timeframes. It concludes with a review of recent uses of the Security Sector Public Expenditure Review (SSPER) in developing countries, which is one useful tool for engaging with the complex challenges of DIB to avoid the pitfalls above.

Institutions from the Development Economist Perspective

From an economist’s perspective, institutions are important because they are used to coordinate all social, economic, and political behavior. Institutions regulate scarce resource allocation through the ordering of private and public incentives, by following the “rules of the game” set by law through political systems.³ These laws can be enacted, but can also take

the form of norms and customs—the products of cultures and traditions. Institutions are not meaningful in a one-person economy, but if two or more people engage in production, exchange, and consumption, institutions are necessary to regulate how labor and the fruits of that labor are divided. Thus institutions are a purely social construct—they are only meaningful so long as those that would be regulated by them collectively understand and believe in them.

Institutions are vital to economic theory—for example, take property rights, a core assumption in any elementary economics textbook. Without property rights, the basic building blocks of savings and investment necessary for economic growth and capital accumulation are not possible. Likewise, human rights guarantee civil liberties that are necessary for social discourse (and the social process necessary to construct institutions). Other rights and norms guarantee access to education and health services, essential for human capital formation. Everything else held constant, it has been shown that improvements in institutions lead to improved economic growth.⁴

While such institutions often take the form of line ministries (ministry of health, education, etc.), it is important to remember that the institutions are bigger than just the buildings and their staff (typically referred to as the organization, a subcomponent of the institution). Alternatively, institutions have been characterized as the “software” of a system, whereas the people, buildings and material are “hardware.”⁵ Software is a useful analogy, as institutions also include the operating system of societies: the expectations that people have about how the institution works (capacity) and the respect they have for the ability of the institution to regulate behavior (authority), which is often related to how the institution was formed (legitimacy).⁶ Effective institutions are not always legitimate, and where more than one institutional structure is in place (e.g., in dual-justice systems where tribal/customary justice and state justice institutions are both functioning) they can compete for legitimacy and authority. Not all authoritative and effective institutions are legitimate—the institutions of slavery and dictatorship are examples. Legitimacy does not always derive from democratic processes—it has been shown that one-party systems can have legitimacy if society believes that anyone can compete for leadership positions through a transparent, meritocratic process.⁷ In many developing countries, legitimate institutions are not effective in terms of capacity (weak civil service) or have limited reach and authority. The governments of Afghanistan and Somalia, for example, while constituted through a relatively democratic process, have limited reach beyond Kabul and Mogadishu, respectively.

Institutions matter not just because they regulate and enforce, but because of the coordination that they encourage. While we often use metrics like court cases or crime rates to measure enforcement and regulation, the real impact of institutions on law enforcement is the “dogs that don’t bark”—i.e. the crimes that do not happen because would-be criminals respect the authority of the state or the norms and customs of lawfulness enough so that they “do the right thing,” resulting in societies that work better together. In many developed

countries, this coordination effect is taken for granted, while in many developing countries, the peaceful outcome is a result of traditional or customary laws and norms that prevail. Furthermore, the coordinating effect of institutions is compounded through a positive feedback loop whenever individuals “pay it forward,” refraining from self-serving behavior that would be at the expense of others or the public good because of laws, norms, or morals, thus reinforcing the norms and standards for others.

To recap, to an economist, institutions are the organizations (the hardware: people, buildings, and material) that enforce and regulate, as well as the individuals that interact with those organizations who have expectations about how they should perform (the software). The overall effectiveness of institutions can be measured on the three dimensions of capacity, legitimacy, and authority.

Institution building is therefore the process of improving capacity, legitimacy, and authority not just of the organization, but vis-à-vis the society in the state-society relationship. Recent comparative studies by development economists on the divergent paths of institution building⁸ have explored its failures in developing countries, four of which are frequent enough to be classified as common pitfalls:

- *Missing ownership:* Because they are social constructs, institutions can only be properly built by those that will use them: governments, policymakers, and the society. Where actors do not “own” the institution building process—because of lack of will, mandate, or capacity—it is not absorbed into practice and does not benefit from the positive feedback loop described above.
- *Isomorphic mimicry:* Often, to appease international donors and other external actors, governments will adopt the forms or structures of successful institutions in other countries, even where that form is not fit for function in the current environment. Isomorphic mimicry is the importation and application of “best practice” forms without adaptation to local context.
- *Perplexing complexity:* Any organization chart shows that government organizations are comprised of smaller systems of departments and units, embedded in larger systems of the nation-state and society that interact with the organization through social, economic, and political events. When the complex relationships between these systems are not integrated into the process of DIB, it is doomed to fail before it begins.
- *Unrealistic timeframes:* Institutions take decades to evolve and improve, even in the most developed countries, which have had the benefit of decades of peace. When policymakers have unrealistic expectations about the time necessary to build or reform institutions, they often set the institution up to fail, creating a negative feedback loop of unmet expectations that ultimately yields lower authority, capacity, and legitimacy.

Before examining the pitfalls of institution building, it is important to note that defense is a strange thing to the development economist. There is not really a production function for defense—it is difficult to say how much defense an individual tank or an assault rifle produces, because the answer often depends on the context. What are the threats and what are the capabilities of the adversary? What is the effectiveness of the person using the tank or the assault rifle? What other multipliers are in play? These unmeasurables are most evident in the modern world—even clear military victories are difficult to measure in terms of gains when occupying armies engage in protracted conflicts with remnants of an old adversary regime.

Nor is defense readily consumed. As a good it is difficult to measure—citizens simply do not say “I enjoyed two units of defense today.” For these reasons, defense is often considered a non-productive activity—to an economist, it is instrumental in enforcement and regulation of how and by whom production is consumed, but it does not produce anything directly consumable.

However, this is a blind side for the economist—for anyone who has lived or worked in an insecure environment, security and peace are clearly public goods; they are vital to the functioning of the economy. When absent, there are serious impediments to growth and well-being. Furthermore, the fundamental Weberian notion of statehood—that its core defining attribute is its monopoly on the use of coercive force, implies a preeminence to defense institutions because these institutions directly affect the authority of the state’s ability to regulate and enforce all other state functions—in other words, defense institutions have a primacy among institutions.⁹ This chapter regards institutions as the public goods that must be built to coordinate social, political, and economic activity. Defense institutions are a special case of those public goods, unique in their primacy in the projection of government authority, which has implications for all other functions of the state. For reasons discussed further below, the chapter references security and defense interchangeably, though it acknowledges that actors in both fields will be offended by the conflation of the two.

The next four sections of this chapter discuss further each of the pitfalls above (missing ownership, isomorphic mimicry, perplexing complexity, and unrealistic timeframes) in detail, explaining what the pitfall is and the warning signs of such a pitfall, including special considerations for DIB. The last part of the chapter looks at tools for avoiding the pitfalls, with a special focus on the SSPER tool that might be useful to the DIB practitioner. This taxonomy of pitfalls and the tools proposed is by no means exhaustive, as DIB is far too complex for a 20-page “how-to manual.” Rather, the SSPER is provided as an example of one way to avoid these pitfalls, with practical cases of how it has been adapted to different contexts. The SSPER is not, however, a “silver bullet” or “one size fits all” instrument, and should not be interpreted as the recommendation of a “hammer” with all DIB activities being “nails.”

Missing Ownership

Often, well-intentioned international actors, bilateral donors, and the international community will project themselves into a state's institutional reform or development process and say they are engaged in institution building. This is a mistake. Institutions are comprised of those that enforce the rules and those that are regulated by them. Thus, they can, by definition, only be built by those actors.¹⁰ Outside actors, no matter how integrated they are into the system, are “supporting” institution building. When the actors inside the system—those that will have to deliver and live with the results when the international actors have gone home—do not understand or own the process of institution building or reform, they will not integrate these reforms into behavior of the institution, and will not create the positive feedback loop of good performance and increased expectations from society. Often, external actors working in such an environment will observe that there just “is not traction” or “uptake” to reforms. Meetings will happen, agreements will be made, and then at the next meeting there will be no progress, because higher-level political leadership has not endorsed the decision. These are warning signs of missing ownership.

Missing ownership can come about through a number of channels. Senior policymakers and leaders may sacrifice institutional progress for personal gains. These practices are conveyed down through the ranks, who then sense that real reform is not possible. Political cycles (upcoming elections or current crises) or limited mandates may disempower policymakers who feel that progress cannot and should not be made until leadership questions are resolved. Policymakers may simply not understand what needs to be done or the value of reforms—the importance of experience cannot be stressed enough. If someone has never lived in a society with a professional, reformed, well-functioning defense institution, why would they expend the energy necessary to build one?

In economics, the provision of public goods through institution building is plagued by two pernicious problems: the credible commitment problem and the principal-agent problem. Both are related to ownership issues and have unique relevance for defense institutions.

The Credible Commitment Problem

A credible commitment problem exists when neither actor can make a promise that they do not have an incentive to break later—most famously captured by the “prisoner's dilemma.” In defense policy, all of the elites or identity groups in a state might agree that they need a defense force that can protect the state from external threats. However, if any of the actors in power have access to such a defense force, they can use it to oppress others and secure their own power. All of these actors can say publicly that they support a strong defense force against external threats and intend to cooperate, but each has a private incentive to use the force for the benefit of their own network interests, and will defect from cooperation if given the chance. Since none can make sincere promises that they will use the force “fairly,” they cannot credibly commit to building such a public good.

This credible commitment problem is particularly prevalent in developing countries where there is a legacy of distrust between ethnic groups or among elites. Commitment problems are compounded in the building of defense institutions because of the aforementioned primacy of defense in the projection of state authority. This primacy escalates the costs of losing the prisoner’s dilemma game beyond just the defense institutions—the prize for power becomes all of the functions of the state, and none dare risk giving that to another. Furthermore, commitments are less credible in contexts where defense forces have historically been used to punish political opponents, or were previously used to gain power through coup or civil war.

For these reasons, it has been argued that the security dilemma in developing countries is fundamentally different from that of developed countries, because developing countries face more internal threats than developed countries.¹¹ This is strongly supported by data on all wars since World War II, reported by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (*Figure 1*). Ninety-two percent of all wars since 1945 have been internal (521 out of 567 wars). Today’s income level classifications show that high-income Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries have fought 52 percent of their wars against internal threats, while low-income countries have fought 91 percent of their conflicts against internal threats. Trends in the last 20 years reinforce this—since 1995, only 4 percent (6 of 167) of those wars that have involved developing (low- or middle-income) countries have been interstate conflicts.¹² Of course, threat assessments vary by country, but on average, the threats to security of the developing state (and the leadership of that state) are significantly higher from within than from outside the state.

Figure 1: All Wars (Minor and Major) Since 1945, Income Level of Actor and Adversary¹³

In the last 70 years, this income level of country has faced these types of adversaries						
	Internal	HIC OECD	HIC non-OECD	UMIC	LMIC	LIC	% Internal
High Income OECD (HIC OECD)	22	0	2	10	7	1	52%
Non-OECD High Income (HIC non-OECD)	27	2	0	4	0	1	79%
Upper Middle Income (UMIC)	97	12	4	4	5	3	78%
Lower Middle Income (LMIC)	205	5	0	5	14	4	88%
Lower Income (LIC)	170	1	1	3	4	8	91%
TOTALS	521	100 states have been involved in 46 interstate conflicts (off-diagonal differences are due to coalitions, including Iraq in 2003, the Arab-Israeli War, and the Suez Crisis)					

The Principal-Agent Problem

The principal-agent problem is similar to the credible commitment problem, but relies on information asymmetry (i.e. hidden information that one actor, the agent, has about its own performance). In principal-agent problems, the principal hires the agent to perform a task, but finds monitoring either too expensive or impossible due to the nature of the task. In such a situation, the agent can deliver on the task, but often finds incentives to shirk—delivering less than what was promised or nothing at all. The issue with principal-agent problems is that the agent will always send positive signals to the principal, but the principal has no way to know whether these signals are true.

The relevance of the principal-agent problem to defense institution building is clear to anyone who has ever struggled to unpack the “black box” of security expenditures and performance. The people (principal) delegate the task of security to the ministries of defense, justice, and interior (agent) through government. For often legitimate and practical reasons, there is information asymmetry; the state cannot share everything it knows about threats, deployments, capabilities, expenditures, and incidents. However, the information asymmetry can be exploited, ranging from the relatively benign form of mediocrity and complacency (where policymakers lack the will or incentives for proper reform) to corruption and, in the extreme, abuse of power.

Ways to Avoid the Missing Ownership Pitfall, the Credible Commitment Problem, and the Principal-Agent Problem

Development practitioners have learned to assess the political economy of the context as a first step when supporting institution building to avoid the missing ownership pitfall. A careful assessment of the key actors and their relationships, power dynamics, mandates, incentives, and competing interests is vital, especially in DIB. This has been called a variety of things: political economy analysis, fragility assessment, risk and resilience assessment, institutional mapping (in the SSPER work below), and, informally, “thinking and working politically.”¹⁴

Because of the credible commitment problem, international actors that want to support DIB in a developing country must carefully consider their own bias that comes from their development context. Is the intervention by the practitioner intended to stand up a force that, like the forces in high-income OECD countries, is prepared to wage an interstate war, or is it intended to build security of the state vis-à-vis internal threats? And, if the latter, what design issues should be considered with respect to organizational structure? Lastly, an ethical question arises once the credible commitment problem is invoked: if actors in the system cannot trust each other and the institutions of the state to contain the abuses of power by the defense sector, should the capacity and power of that sector be further improved through external support? One of the OECD’s *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations* is “Do no harm”—this should also apply in DIB efforts.¹⁵

Typically, the principal-agent problem is “solved” by reducing the information asymmetry between actors. In defense terms, this can involve improving transparency on expenditures and performance, including through civilian and parliamentary oversight. Restructuring and reorganization through DIB can help to solve mandate and hierarchy issues by reordering relationships and moving agents closer to principals for monitoring. For instance, in the Liberia example discussed below, the World Bank and United Nations recommended that the Ministry of Finance play a more active role in National Security Council deliberations so as to become party to decision-making and express opinions on matters of sustainability.

Isomorphic Mimicry

Development experts have been fooled many times over the past 60 years of development practice by organizations that look and feel like institutions, but do not act and deliver like other institutions of the same name. Ministries may have revered ministers and polished wooden desks, courts may have marble entries and proper statues of Lady Justice, militaries may parade and salute in crisp uniforms, yet the expected underlying functions of these institutions are not delivered. Isomorphic mimicry is the ability of an organization to sustain legitimacy through imitation of forms of other institutions, while lacking functionality.¹⁶

Very often, the reason that policymakers in developing countries employ isomorphic mimicry is because of the development actors themselves. The expectation biases from donors of their counterparts are tied to financing and other support, which encourages developing country counterparts to perpetuate the models. As a result, those receiving the money build form over function, propping up artificial constructs of ministries, organizations, and militaries that, like a Western stage set, look like the real thing, but are shallow replicas. Isomorphic mimicry has deleterious effects on development; not only does it disincentivize real reform and institution building, but it actually diverts energy into replicating the artificial forms—ministries expend scarce resources on building form, rather than on the organically grown institutions that might otherwise evolve.

For DIB in a developing country context, isomorphic mimicry could take multiple forms. Often, elites and stakeholders in developing countries are given titles and positions commensurate with their power or contacts as a form of patronage or power-sharing, but not with their experience or expertise. In such cases, they must be given respect due their title and influence, but may not be willing or capable of undertaking the reform that someone in their position should. Organization and force structures may be replicated following a regional, former colonial, or global power, a design of form without regard to the required function of the force. Liaisons and focal points are not assigned because they are the best suited or located to act as a counterpart, but because they are someone’s nephew. Weapon systems may be purchased and deployed because they mimic developed country capabilities (and are tied to a developed country’s support) without regard for the

functionality necessary in-country. The list goes on.

The problem of isomorphic mimicry has been a persistent one in the development industry. Because of observer bias, isomorphic mimicry can be very difficult to identify—many practitioners see what they want to see in their counterparts. Warning signs often come from independent observers or unbiased outcome variables: where there is a disconnect between the signals being sent by a ministry and its objectively verifiable indicators and metrics, there may be isomorphic mimicry. The case of Afghanistan discussed below is a good example: at the time of the SSPER undertaken by the World Bank in 2005, the Afghan government had established planning and coordinating security sector institutions, but they were not yet capable of providing leadership to a force of the size envisioned, for which projections had been done outside the limits of a realistic resource envelope.

Perplexing Complexity

The butterfly effect posits that a small change in an initial state (a butterfly flapping its wings) could have effects on much larger systems (a hurricane a world away). This is troubling to development actors, who think that the world functions as a linear, deterministic series of interactions between cause and effect, but liberating to those who accept that the world is a complex, interrelated, and often chaotic system of systems. To the former, all of the hard work of planning and design—the engineering of a solution—can be undone by the smallest unobservable variable. To the latter, getting development right is not about mechanical solutions, but rather about navigating and adapting to the ebbs and flows of progress evident in complex systems, best characterized by the sub-title of a recent report on the topic: *Plan for Sailboats, Not Trains*.¹⁷ Those who embrace this complexity have found “systems thinking” to be a useful frame for engaging with this chaos. There are a number of features of systems that are relevant to understanding complexity:¹⁸

- *Systems are parts (actors and machines) that work together through processes and turn inputs (energy, material, and information) into outputs:* All systems produce some outputs, but they may not be the outputs one expects—a ministry of mines can excel at producing outputs in the form of off-shore bank accounts, but never produce any mining safety. Understanding the outputs of the system is a first step toward understanding the behavior of the system.
- *Systems are bounded, but boundaries are defined by observers:* For proper analysis, a system cannot be “everything”—we simply cannot comprehend such a system, so it must be bounded in some way. Acknowledging that the boundaries of a system can be user-defined gives the policymaker the freedom to adjust the conceptualization of the system to the level of analysis that is useful. If a reform cannot be undertaken at the ministry level, then the frame could be changed to the department or unit within the ministry where progress can be made.

- *Solutions are endogenous to the system:* Linked to the ownership issue, this is a pivotal lesson for international actors. Any solution that will improve performance of a system to produce the outputs desired will have to be internally consistent with the system. If a solution using the inputs and processes in the system would not be adopted by the actors, then another solution must be found within the system or the system must be redesigned or redefined.
- *Systems are dynamic and complex:* While actors within a system may seek equilibrium, it is important to remember that systems hardly ever reach equilibrium. This is an important lesson to economists who use “equilibrium models” in complex settings—while there may be a pull toward an equilibrium solution, it is unlikely that a society in the process of transformation will actually find equilibrium. Indeed, it is hard to give an example in the modern world of a society or system in equilibrium.
- *Systems can seem unpredictable, but often follow an internal logic:* Growth in a system may be cyclical, chaotic, or exponential—it is difficult to tell in the middle of a pattern whether it is a pattern. Consider the sequence of numbers 1, 2, 4, 7...; what is the next number? There are reasonable mathematical rules that suggest it is 12, 13, or 14, but it could just as easily be 3, 5, 6, 8 or 9 if the sequence is the order of billiard balls sunk in a game of 9 ball. It is often our incomplete knowledge of the system and our cultural bias that makes a system seem unpredictable or chaotic and our knowledge of context that makes a pattern recognizable.

Linked to the concept of systems thinking is the concept of “wicked problems.” A wicked problem is so complex that the problem itself is not well understood. Solutions may not be known until a solution is tried, and they are often “one-shot” solutions. There is no stopping-rule—one can cycle through alternative solutions for a variety of preference reasons, and none of them may be absolutely preferable.¹⁹

To some, the complexity of systems and the challenge of wicked problems is daunting. Such concepts are too amorphous and complicated to ever solve through linear programming and planning. However, as Dwight D. Eisenhower sagely advised, “Plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”²⁰ The purpose of planning is not to come up with a single, executable plan that works; it is to create the institution of common purpose that comes from consensus building, mapping of a complex problem, and jointly building the skills necessary for problem-solving, including trust between actors.

Examples of dialogue mapping and joint problem-solving are evident in many disciplines; perhaps one of the most established comes from the defense sector: wargaming. Wargaming involves playing out a scenario to test strengths, weaknesses, and resilience of a system in response to various outcomes, and identifying likely scenarios and possible responses. Likewise, in development, recent innovations include problem-driven, iterative adaptation, which encourages multiple feedback loops so that actors engaged in problem-

solving will adapt their projects to local conditions, building on successes and learning from failures in real-time, rather than designing “fire and forget” projects that cannot change course mid-delivery.²¹ Acknowledging this complexity through mapping exercises and workshopping of problems is a way to build joint understanding of the path dependency of problems, the context, and the available solutions internal to the system.²²

Unrealistic Timeframes

Institution building takes time. Recent analysis comparing country experiences for institutional reform suggests that it takes 15 to 25 years to improve institutions a single standard deviation—that is, not moving Haiti or Somalia to the level of Denmark or Canada in terms of institutional quality, but rather moving them to something that is “good enough” to deliver basic government services—for example, a level of services like in Ghana or Thailand.²³ These results hold across the board, on multiple measures and indexes of institutional quality, including “moving the military out of politics” and “reducing corruption” for the ten fastest countries on each indicator, suggesting that a generation for reform is a good, but perhaps still unrealistic, target.

A generation for reform is a difficult truth to reconcile to international assistance initiatives in any sphere. Most development actors have rotations of three to five years in a country, before they are promoted and move on to the next country and challenge. Humanitarian and security actors often have shorter deployments. Among practitioners and policymakers, it is rare to find someone with more than five years of field experience in a country. Of course, nationals in developing countries can have years of experience, but they can also be diaspora or have studied abroad, and may be equally disconnected from the political context of the country. Overlaying the timeframe for deployments and for true reform means that the support initiatives a practitioner invests in today may not come to fruition until four or five of his or her replacements have cycled through their office. Each of those counterparts will have to learn the local and political context, avoid supporting isomorphic mimicry, and learn to appreciate and adapt to the complexity of the challenge.

One tool for developing consensus on institution building is a joint initiative (a review, a workshop, contingency planning, etc.). A special case is the Security Sector Public Expenditure Review discussed at length in the remainder of this chapter. The SSPER is not included here as a “silver bullet” to solve all DIB problems; rather, it is an example of how complex systems can be bounded and defined through a joint consultative exercise so that common understandings of the problem set can be developed and joint ways forward for iterative, adaptive solutions can be identified.

Security Sector Public Expenditure Reviews as a Tool for Defense Institution Building

A Public Expenditure Review (PER) is an analytical instrument that examines government

resource allocation within and among sectors, assessing the equity, efficiency, and effectiveness of those allocations in the context of a country's macroeconomic framework and sectoral priorities.²⁴ In addition, a PER identifies the reforms needed in budget processes and administration to improve the efficiency of public spending. Public financial management (PFM) studies can be executed independently or together with a PER, and assess the quality of budget execution (e.g., apportionment of resources within institutions or risks to financial management systems).²⁵

Over the past decade, SSPERs have become the de facto accepted terminology for PER studies, which encompass the constituent elements of the defense, justice, and security sectors. They explore the political economy of security institutions and its impact on the allocation of resources, the link between the budget cycle and security policy, and some of the more detailed aspects of public financial management. It is important to remember that statistics and metrics, including budgets and other measures of state performance are, themselves, institutions—they are public goods that provide the basis for informed debate and the formation of sound policy. As activities that create a common understanding of the rules of the game, they are instruments that can help integrate defense institution building within the broader framework of good governance and financial sustainability. Since SSPERs mix qualitative with quantitative analysis, their approach is driven by evidence and context rather than norms and best practices.


Acknowledging that there is no one model for security institutions, the first report of the United Nations Secretary-General on security sector reform defines the “security sector” as a broad term used to describe the structures, institutions, and personnel responsible for the management, provision, and oversight of security in a country. The security sector thus includes defense, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services, and institutions responsible for border management, customs, and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are in many instances also included. Furthermore, the sector encompasses actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies, and civil society. Other nonstate actors that could be considered as part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services.²⁶

In and of itself, the SSPER is not a panacea to avoid missing ownership, isomorphic mimicry, complexity, and unrealistic timeframes. Yet by assessing spending patterns and the political economy of institutions, it can help policymakers understand how these “systems of systems” function, who makes the decisions, and what kind of security sector a country envisions; and get a sense of how much money and time is required to build sustainable defense institutions.

According to the World Bank's *Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector*, an SSPER typically contains the following elements:

- *Institutional mapping*: What is the relationship between expenditure policy analysis of the security sector and the broader development strategy, governance, and public financial management reforms? What is the sector management structure, and who are the key players? How are they linked to the budget cycle? What are the security sector functions, and how are these organized? Are there alternative operational arrangements, and what are their implications for the structure of security expenditure?
- *Financial management systems*: How can national authorities integrate security sector functions into expenditure planning, budget formulation, budget execution, accounting, and reporting? How can the security sector set up effective systems for personnel expenditures, procurement, and asset management?
- *Financial oversight*: Principles of accountability and transparency are as important in the security sector as they are in other sectors. The SSPER reviews how national authorities address these principles and identifies alternative institutional arrangements, focusing on the roles of the legislature, audit authority, and civil society. Transparency opens the “black box” of security expenditures, reducing information asymmetry and helping to solve the principle-agent problem.
- *Performance, effectiveness, and cost drivers*: What are some key performance measures? Good metrics can be the basis for mutual accountability frameworks, which create the foundation for credible commitments. What are the cost drivers in developing-country contexts, taking into account differing policy objectives and organizational arrangements?
- *Post-conflict issues*: What are the expenditure implications of security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs?²⁷ How can these actions improve confidence and trust between former adversaries?

While crunching numbers is a big part of this exercise, the SSPER’s inherent value is to shed light on the political economy of the sector and its consequences for development. By increasing transparency and creating a common forum for review of expenditures, it is an instrument by which both the government and civilians can gain knowledge of how defense, policing, and criminal justice institutions function, which then makes it possible to subject these institutions to the same standards of effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability as other elements of the public sector. This is the fundamental process of iterative trust-building necessary for commitments to become credible. This simultaneous process is depicted in *Figure 2*, which shows a stylized version of a regular budget process and the corresponding steps in the security sector. Ideally, the PER helps fortify the link between these two cycles.

Figure 2: The Security Sector in the Budget Cycle²⁸

Notwithstanding special considerations, like secret budgets for special operations or classified information, treating the defense sector as a subset of the public sector is important because the national budget provides the financial basis for the delivery of government functions and the implementation of public policies. By balancing competing objectives, it allows the government to strategically allocate scarce public resources to achieve the greatest public good.²⁹ Given the size of its spending, integrating the defense sector into the national budget is essential for meeting the four overriding goals of macro-fiscal policy:

- *Macroeconomic and fiscal stability*, which involves maintaining control of a country's overall fiscal position. Excessive spending on the military relative to productive sectors can threaten a country's macro-fiscal equilibrium, a situation which can also take place when the bulk of spending is off-budget. Analyzing the macro-fiscal implications of security spending helps avoid the problem of unrealistic timeframes by showing how economic growth affects the resource envelope for defense institutions over a certain time-period.
- *Allocative efficiency*, which involves balancing competing demands and allocating scarce public resources where they will have the greatest benefit (as well as assessing whether allocations match government sectoral policy priorities). Spending on defense, policing, and courts must conform to a well-defined strategy that links resources to ends and ways aimed to mitigate threats to national peace and security, and lay the foundations for economic

stability. Part of this process involves developing a joint understanding among all stakeholders about how complexity affects resource allocation.

- *Operational efficiency*, which involves achieving outputs and outcomes that are economical, efficient, and effective to get the most out of all funds expended.
- *Fiscal transparency and accountability*, which involves providing open and transparent access to financial decisions and data so that government officials can be held accountable for their actions. In this way, transparency reduces information asymmetry and reduces the impact of the principal-agent problem. This applies to most defense spending, even though governments usually retain some parts of their spending composition as secret.³⁰

Four Case Studies: El Salvador, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Niger


El Salvador: Navigating Complex Institutions

The study of security and justice spending carried out by the World Bank in El Salvador in 2012 reflects these points.³¹ It also shows that once complete, PERs can serve as instruments for building consensus on security sector objectives between different stakeholders in society. In 2008, costs of violence associated with gangs were equivalent to approximately 11 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), almost triple the resources needed to ensure universal coverage of basic social services (education, health, nutrition, housing, water and sanitation, and electricity) for the entire population.³² Using metrics from the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank estimated in 2010 that the value of a measure known as “disability-adjusted life years lost” reached nearly 2 percent of GDP (approximately \$271 million), higher than any other country in the region.³³ By 2011, homicide rates had reached 70 per 100,000 people, more than seven times the 9.8 threshold used by WHO to signal a “violence epidemic.”³⁴

In this context, the PER was the first comprehensive assessment of the security sector’s resource allocation, efficiency, and effectiveness. The analysis divided the security and justice institutions according to the main tasks they fulfill, and sought to evaluate the allocation of inputs (resources), outputs (specific services), and outcomes (citizen security). In El Salvador, several state institutions that are located under different branches of government execute five main security tasks: crime and violence prevention; police patrolling; crime investigation and formal indictment; presentation to court and judicial resolution; and sentencing, supervision, imprisonment, and rehabilitation (see *Figure 3*).

The study found there was little to no coordination and complementarity among the several institutions that make up the citizen security sector. They were all vulnerable to corruption. In many instances, abuses had been connected with corruption or extortion cases, particularly with individual police force members. Vulnerability to corruption, under-paid and under-qualified personnel, and lack of monitoring techniques to measure performance meant that institutions in prevention, police, courts, and prisons were unable to fulfill their service-provision function.


Figure 3: Institutional Mapping of Security and Justice in El Salvador³⁵



These conclusions were developed through a data collection effort across government institutions, academia, and civil society in order to elicit reliable statistics that were previously missing. This process identified performance metrics that allow an institutional efficiency assessment in addition to the sector-wide results indicators.³⁶ The PER was prepared in consultation with the key stakeholders and institutions that comprise its core audience, thus expediting data collection. Working groups were established with support from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice and Security, which appointed focal points.³⁷ The specific steps undertaken to perform the PER are summarized below and illustrated in *Figure 4*.

In terms of structure, the PER discussed the national context, including a brief historical, political, and economic review of the country in order to better understand the security and justice sector. The report analyzed the composition, typology, and geographical distribution of crime (primarily homicides and extortions), pointing out the main drivers of crime and violence. After the selection of performance indicators, El Salvador’s University Public Opinion Institute reviewed the formal sector institutional arrangements, relevant legal architecture, and statistical information from police reports, crime statistics, court records, public surveys, expert surveys, legislative reviews, and narrative reports in order to harmonize the different data sets and obtain the baseline information to sustain the indicators developed by the PER.³⁸

Figure 4: Steps to Conduct the Security and Justice PER in El Salvador (2012)



The process-oriented approach informed the dissemination of findings. One key finding was that government spending was unevenly distributed across the five segments in the security and justice services chain. Police patrolling was the primary destination of security spending. In 2011, almost 45 percent of security spending was dedicated to this purpose. While police patrolling activities received most of the resources, the training and formation of professionals and contributions from the armed forces to vigilance activities also affected spending in this segment. Judicial process and resolutions were the second largest destination of resources. The segment composed of the judicial body and the national council of justice received approximately one-third of the spending in the sector. The investigation segment, composed of the investigation segment of the police, the attorney general, and the medical forensic institute, was third, receiving approximately 15 percent. Finally, imprisonment, rehabilitation, and prevention combined received less than 10 percent of total spending in the sector.

On the basis of the PER findings and working group recommendations, each group elicited a matrix of specific steps and results to improve interagency coordination in the security and justice sector. The results matrices enabled both the government and the World Bank to subscribe to a plan of action whereby objectives were clearly articulated, short- and long-term actions were agreed upon, and roles and responsibilities of each institution formulated. Step 5 in *Figure 4* illustrates this approach by showing how government reforms were linked to the original PER conclusions. The results matrices were aggregated into a consensus-based National Citizen Security Action Plan, which was submitted to the government for consideration.

This study is an example of how future defense institution building efforts can translate computing power into convening power to elicit a consensus on citizen security goals. Yet it also shows that national authorities decide on whether these goals are pursued, and that this is tremendously difficult in countries where there is only partial control over

the means of violence. Hence while the findings of security sector PERs can be used to generate national ownership, political realities ultimately dictate if the SSPER's analytical effort and recommendations translate into tangible outcomes. For instance, El Salvador currently displays a staggering 103 intentional homicides per 100,000 people, making it the most violent country in the world.³⁹ This is a product of complex factors, including the disintegration of the 2012 truce between drug cartels and the government's decision to resort to repressive tactics. The El Salvador case is thus a reminder of both the promise of a new approach aimed at deciphering the complexity of institutions, fostering national ownership, and attempting to elicit realistic timelines, while acknowledging the limitations of DIB.

Afghanistan: Missing Ownership in Security Sector Planning

The security sector PER undertaken by the World Bank in Afghanistan in late 2005 aimed to achieve five goals: first, to gain as complete an understanding as possible of the current level and structure of security expenditures, recent trends, and likely future expenditure requirements based on current plans; second, to describe the institutional framework for the security sector and ascertain the extent to which it embeds or is conducive to sound public financial management; third, to assess the strategic coherence and the fiscal sustainability of security sector expenditures; fourth, to assess the extent to which coherent strategies for the security sector guide public expenditure allocations; and finally, to review processes for determining funding levels, expenditure allocations, budget execution, and post-execution functions, and assess the extent to which they follow sound PFM principles.⁴⁰

The findings were astonishing. Afghan security spending (not including counternarcotics) exceeded domestic revenues by over 500 percent, running at some \$1.3 billion per year, or just 23 percent of GDP, and just over three-quarters financed by donors. The main driver of security sector expenditures was the Afghan National Army, which absorbed funds on the order of \$800 million per year during 2003/04 and 2005/06, after a start-up phase in 2002/03. The growth of police expenditures was equally striking, as they were projected to quintuple to nearly \$600 million (budgeted) in 2005/06.⁴¹

The PER revealed the unsustainability of the security sector and the need to bring military and police costs under control. Moreover, it showed that the ownership of national authorities at that time was limited, as there was no agreement among key Afghan stakeholders on the country's broad national security goals. Instead, international security partners dominated planning in the sector, making it susceptible to isomorphic mimicry. Although the Afghan government had established planning and coordinating institutions, they were not yet capable of providing leadership. The government at that time could not reach an agreement on setting fiscal objectives. For example, it had a three-year rolling budget that included large parts of the security sector, but budgeting was largely mechanical and not linked to resource availability or long-term planning.

To a very large extent, security sector policies and spending patterns in Afghanistan had not been determined by the capacity of national resources to finance them. Targets for

military, police, and judiciary reform were set outside of a medium-term fiscal framework, and targets for counter-narcotics efforts were not linked to the budgeting process.⁴² According to the SSPER, “the lack of long-term planning and related costing thus runs the risk of undermining the fiscal sustainability of the current security structure and effective allocation of budgetary resources, on the one hand, and the ability of the security services to maximize the security they will be able to provide, on the other hand.”⁴³

These findings were relevant even a decade later. According to a World Bank country report from 2014, wages and salaries accounted for some three-quarters of the operating budget. In 2010/11, the security wage bill alone represented about two-thirds of operations and 7 percent of GDP. In 2010, the government’s contribution to security salaries stood at 3 percent of GDP. Indeed, security spending (mostly salaries) dominated the Afghan core budget. In 2010/11, nearly 40 percent of core on-budget spending (operating and development) was allocated to security. This share was projected to grow as the Afghan National Security Forces would reach their target level of 352,000 troops by November 2012. With such high security spending and a likely decline in external financing, a real risk existed that priority development, operations, and maintenance, as well as service delivery expenditure would be increasingly crowded out. About one-third of the 2010/11 budget was allocated to education (15 percent), infrastructure (14 percent), and health (4 percent).⁴⁴

The Afghan case suggests several lessons. First, the degree of ownership can be identified early on through policy dialogue, based on political economy analysis and institutional mapping. Second, targets for the size of the security sector apparatus should be set within the reality of the capacity of national resources to finance them. To this end, assisting host-country readiness to build the capacity to absorb external resources would be essential for future defense institution building efforts. Third, trade-offs matter: with limited sources, national governments will have to make difficult choices between security and development spending. Yet the two are inter-linked.

Afghanistan’s formal economy depends on U.S. bases and contracts, and after the 2014 withdrawal of U.S. troops, unemployment reached 40 percent—a figure donors drastically underestimated, with little funding set aside for an emergency jobs program. U.S. spending in Afghanistan went from about \$100 billion in 2012 to half of that in 2015.⁴⁵

Liberia: Costing and Timing a Security Transition

The World Bank and the United Nations undertook a similar joint effort in Liberia in 2012, in order to assess the cost of gradually transitioning from a peacekeeping force—the United Nations Mission to Liberia (UNMIL)—to an indigenous force. According to Liberia’s 2008 *National Security Strategy*, the main threats to peace and security were internal: poor rule of law and poverty; large numbers of deactivated ex-servicemen (17,000) and ex-combatants (103,019 demobilized and an estimated 9,000 who did not benefit from reintegration programs); illegally-held arms; land and property disputes; and ethnic tensions.⁴⁶ The threat assessment that accompanied the SSPER further emphasized

the tendency of minor incidents to escalate into large-scale violent confrontations beyond the response capability of the national police. Moreover, high crime, an inadequate justice system, youth alienation, and land disputes remained serious conflict triggers.⁴⁷ The main challenge was thus one of public order, hence given the prevalence of internal security threats and the military's external-security remit, reforming the Liberian National Police and the border police was more critical than reforming the Armed Forces of Liberia in the short run.

The PER found that despite a good National Security Strategy and sector-specific reform strategies, reform of Liberia's security sector was undermined by weak institutional coordination, oversight, and financial sustainability. While the national security strategy underscored the need for an accountable and democratic security architecture, reform of the sector had focused on developing operational effectiveness. Mechanisms for accountability and coordination were weak, and civilian oversight was largely ineffective.⁴⁸

The study—undertaken prior to the 2014 Ebola outbreak—estimated the total cost of providing security services during 2012-19 at \$712 million. This figure comprised the following spending categories:

- The cost of maintaining the ongoing security services already provided by the Liberian security agencies. Assessed at \$546 million, it was projected to increase at the same rate as the average inflation rate of 4 percent per year. This price included personnel costs (salaries, allowances, pensions) and non-wage recurrent costs, which support the operation and maintenance of equipment and infrastructure (fuel, repair maintenance, office supplies, etc.).
- The transition cost related to the handover of security functions from UNMIL was estimated at \$157 million, including personnel and fixed costs, and assuming a gradual UNMIL drawdown over seven years.
- The recurrent outlays for the proposed regional justice and security hubs planned under the Justice and Security Joint Program (financed by bilateral partners and the UN Peacebuilding Fund).⁴⁹

To set the priorities for the security sector and avoid unrealistic timeframes, the SSPER proposed the use of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) that the government introduced in 2012. The MTEF is a mechanism for allocating limited resources, requiring a top-down resource ceiling for a sector set (typically by the Ministry of Finance) and a bottom-up medium-term cost estimate from the sector ministry or agency in question. The rationale for adopting an MTEF was that while a budget is adopted annually, policy objectives and delivering national projects cannot be achieved in a single year.⁵⁰ On this basis, the study estimated that a financing gap of \$86 million would emerge between 2012 and 2019, given the total estimated resource ceiling of \$626 million and the estimated cost of \$712 million.⁵¹

To address this financing gap, the study recommended that the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning become a more active partner in the National Security Council, as UNMIL transition was just as much a financial issue as a security one. A proactive role in priority setting and involvement in the MTEF process could ensure that the security budget discussed at the National Budget Committee was informed by the National Security Council's decisions. Moreover, the apparent high cost of the security transition forced the government to identify a package of core security functions and services that could be obtained in line with a limited budget. Reform efforts encompassed both institutional and human resource management, reflecting challenges in recruiting and retaining security personnel.⁵²

The Liberian case shows the benefits of an integrative approach to defense institution building which determines needs on the basis of evidence rather than abstract best practices. Liberia needed an effective police first and foremost, rather than a large military, hence the efforts to estimate the financing gap for the Liberian National Police took precedence over other security institutions. Secondly, the PER gives an example of how coordination between finance and security agencies can be institutionalized. An instrument, the MTEF, was specially designed for the financing and planning needs of the country during a transition period.

Niger: Sustainable Spending and Regional Security

Whereas the PERs in Afghanistan and Liberia were conducted within the remit of sustained international security efforts, a similar study was performed in Niger in 2012 against the backdrop of a regional security crisis. At that time, Niger faced multiple external security threats, including the war in Libya, ongoing political tensions in Nigeria, and a deteriorating crisis in Mali. Moreover, the country's large territory, uneven distribution of population, poverty, and high degree of political instability added domestic risk factors manifested in increased terrorist threats, kidnappings, and the trafficking of drugs and other contraband.⁵³

In light of these challenges, the PER had a dual goal: to inform the government and other stakeholders of the nature of public spending on and public sector management of the security sector; and to help enhance governance of the security sector to ensure greater macroeconomic stability and safeguard economic and social resources for Niger's development.⁵⁴

The study found that the turbulent security environment had led to an increase in the number of supplementary budgets. Thus, the allocations to the security sector increased significantly between the initial budget law and the final supplementary budget, by as much as 70 percent in 2010 and 2012. In 2013, the final supplementary budget allocated to the security sector was 40 percent above the initial amount.⁵⁵ In addition to high personnel expenditures representing on average one-third of the voted security budget, the economic composition of the security budget changed significantly on the capital expenditure side, which accounted for 55 percent in 2012, the largest item of expenditure. The PER then combined macroeconomic forecasting with security analysis to elicit four scenarios

comparing variables such as government revenues and projected spending on security; in two scenarios, the spending was deemed unsustainable.

The report, while aimed at Niger's security sector writ large, had a number of findings that are applicable to DIB efforts, particularly for DIB planners and practitioners on the ground. For instance, it noted that increasing resources without strengthening planning and prioritization could strain the management capacities and in turn the efficiency of defense forces, as well as the overall sustainability of public expenditures. The efficiency of the security sector could be strengthened by enhanced budget transparency, internal control, and greater capacity in administration, financial management, and procurement. Recommendations included:⁵⁶

- The preparation of a security sector strategy covering all security forces
- The translation of this strategy into a multiyear budgetary framework, including procurement planning
- The establishment of a results monitoring mechanism
- An analysis of the impact of this strategy on fiscal and debt sustainability
- A more specific budget classification that would allow improved transparency and a more comprehensive monitoring of sector expenditures
- A more systematic classification of expenditures according to their economic nature that would also facilitate the monitoring of their execution
- A more comprehensive integration of systems and an increase in the payment of salaries via banks that would strengthen the control of personnel expenditures

Mali: Sustainable Spending and Domestic Security

The turning point in the Sahelian security crisis that prompted Niger to boost defense spending occurred in Mali in 2012, when armed and trained ethnic Tuaregs returned to the country after taking part in the Libyan civil war. Claiming long-standing economic and social grievances, they formed the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad and won victories over government forces in Northern Mali in January 2012. This sparked a coup d'état in Bamako, conflict between rebel factions, and interventions by the Economic Community of West African States and the French government.

The crisis also entailed major economic repercussions in the country, introducing new risks to medium-term macroeconomic stability. Mali's economy had grown steadily in the preceding decade, with roughly 5 percent growth between 2005 and 2010. In 2011, however, growth fell to 2.7 percent because of a decline in agricultural output linked to unfavorable rainfall conditions. Then in 2012, real GDP contracted by 1.5 percent relative to a growth projection of 5.6 percent when the budget law was prepared, leading to an estimated decrease in government revenues by as much as 30 percent.⁵⁷

According to the PER undertaken by the World Bank at the request of the government in 2013, Mali increased its security sector budget allocations between 2011 and 2012 by 37 percent in absolute value, while their proportional weight in the general budget virtually

doubled.⁵⁸ These allocations show an execution rate of close to 100 percent, well above the rate for the general government budget (83 percent in 2010). Economic forecasts showed that this effort could be sustained, but, depending on the scenarios, external budget support would likely be necessary to limit the budget deficit and avoid a crowding-out effect on other expenditures.⁵⁹

Moreover, the study found that both budget preparation and the reporting on budget execution lacked transparency. For example, soldiers were fully paid in cash and the military units distributed their salaries. Standard operational expenditures passed through a special “imprest” account, the initial purpose of which was to provide urgent support to military operations and not be used for other categories of expenditures until its spending ceiling was reached. Government contracts were usually entered into by direct agreement, even eschewing the use of the special dispensations set forth in the code for defense contracts. This choice introduced risks in terms of the transparency and performance of government control in the sector.⁶⁰

As with Niger, the Mali case highlights two important lessons. First, challenges to DIB originate in complex regional dynamics, which must be understood in order to assess the criteria for increasing military spending. Second, the public finance dimension may not be the most exciting part for a security and defense practitioner, but issues of budget execution, payroll and transparency lie at the heart of DIB sustainability. As such, an interdisciplinary approach that relies on the dialogue between finance and security professionals might chart a more realistic course for future defense institution building efforts.

Conclusion

The development community has (slowly) learned about institution building over the past 50 years. It has come to realize that for human development, the rules of the game—how people divide the pie—are as important as the size of the pie reflected by economic growth. International actors should take the time to understand the local political context, and work closely with counterparts that own, desire, and have the capacity to elicit real change. They should also stay the course over long periods of reform. Yet this is very much an ideal scenario. More often than not, external actors have promoted “quick fix” technocratic solutions that are neither fit for purpose, nor for the complex political realities on the ground. They have tried to push them through quickly, regardless of local ownership, and have seen failures in the form of setbacks, corruption, and abuses.

Four well-known pitfalls and their warning signs were discussed in this chapter: missing ownership, isomorphic mimicry, perplexing complexity, and unrealistic timeframes. These pitfalls are not mutually exclusive. Lack of ownership can be a result of perplexing complexity, and isomorphic mimicry can lead to unrealistic timeframes and “premature load bearing” where systems are tested before they are ready (for example, rushed elections or security forces stood up before training is completed).⁶¹ When isomorphic mimicry leads to a vicious circle of poor performance and lowered expectations

from the institution, a capability or fragility trap can develop.⁶² In development, successful practitioners appreciate this complexity; they do not believe that their plan is foolproof or that it is the only one, and they are prepared to adapt to new information and changing circumstances. These practitioners conduct many consultations for two reasons: to learn as much as they can about a system, and to build consensus with actors in the system about solutions that will work.

Developed by the World Bank, public expenditure reviews of security institutions are a relatively new tool in a sector that was previously “off-limits” to most economists, auditors, and planners. SSPERs integrate security and public finance expertise, and can be a useful exercise for creating a common understanding of the stakeholders, budgetary constraints, and priorities. They can help anchor politically sensitive discussions relating to defense and policing in a numerate context where sustainability issues are addressed early on. Institutional mapping makes it possible to identify complex stakeholder dynamics and the degree of national ownership. Macro-economic and public finance analysis help address questions of resource allocation and identify a realistic timeline for reform. Like any tool, SSPERs are not foolproof. Even if well done, their recommendations can effect change only if national policymakers are willing and able to implement them.

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IV. LESSONS FROM THE FIELD

Partnership: The Colombia-U.S. Experience

Michael Miklaucic and Juan Carlos Pinzón¹

Strong security partnerships are not born overnight. They must be built on a foundation of shared goals, mutual respect, and understanding. The Colombia-U.S. security partnership is built upon just such a relationship, one that evolved over generations and spans multiple sectors. Although, in common with all Latin American countries, Colombia's historical and cultural roots can be traced to the Iberian colonization of the Western Hemisphere, trade, diplomatic, and military relations with the United States date back to the early 19th century. The United States was among the first countries to recognize Colombia when it declared independence from Spain, receiving a diplomatic representative in Washington in 1822 and establishing its first diplomatic mission in Cartagena and Santa Marta in 1823. The first commercial treaty between the two young countries was signed in 1824, followed by a treaty of friendship and commerce in 1848.² The Colombia-U.S. relationship has not been without its ups and downs historically, but it has led to familiarity, and in recent years a common understanding of shared security challenges in the Western Hemisphere.

This chapter describes the context, as well as the richness, of a partnership based on shared goals, demonstrable commitment to those goals, mutual respect, trust, and consultation. While Plan Colombia, a Colombia-U.S. initiative targeting security issues and drug-trafficking, was a historic and epic phase of the Colombia-U.S. partnership, much has been written on it, and therefore it is not the focus of this chapter. The chapter instead offers context and insight into the effort to reform and strengthen Colombia's defense institutions that succeeded Plan Colombia and the working Colombia-U.S. partnership between 2013 and 2015.

In Bolivar's Shadow

Political conflict has been persistent throughout Colombia's history. The country was forged in resistance to Spanish colonialism, resistance that came in the form of protests against *mal gobierno*, the formation of juntas for representation, and with inspiration from the U.S. and French revolutions. The juntas formed in this early period of Colombia's history struggled with concepts of leadership, representation, and forms of government, federalism or centralism—struggles that have haunted the country until the present day. Simon Bolivar led the independence movement and the early process of state consolidation.

In 1821, the Constitution of Colombia, the Cucuta Constitution, was signed, establishing a centralist government with popular representation, Bolivar as president, and his top military general, Francisco de Paula Santander, as vice president. Tensions emerged early between the civilian and military spheres, personalized in the competition between Bolivar and Santander.

Political divisions persisted in Colombia through the 19th century. Personalism and regionalism remained key factors in national politics, but by 1849 ideological fissures led to the emergence of two competing political parties: Partido Liberal and Partido Conservador, both of which would dominate Colombian politics until the 1980s. Liberals sought a weakened executive branch, liberalization of state monopolies, free trade, and freedom of press, education, religion, and business; more than anything, they were anticolonial. The conservatives preferred neocolonial structures, a strong church-state alliance, the preservation of slavery, and a more authoritarian form of government.

Surviving a coup d'état in 1854, military dictatorship, civil war, and dozens of local conflicts, the liberal and conservative parties competed and alternated power throughout the 19th century. The intensity of their competition created fertile ground for the sporadic violence that has scarred Colombia's history. In July 1899, for instance, this fierce competition led to the outbreak of the War of a Thousand Days resulting in thousands of casualties.

The turn of the century was also a rocky period in Colombia-U.S. relations, as tension over Panama and the soon-to-be-built canal pitted their respective national interests in conflict, with Colombia too weak at the time to prevent Panama's secession in 1903. The more cordial tone was restored when Woodrow Wilson was elected U.S. President in 1913. Wilson signed the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty (though it was not ratified by the U.S. Senate until 1921) while his government expressed regret for U.S. actions in 1903, and paid a \$25 million indemnity.³

The period 1948 through 1958 (or as late as 1965 by some accounts), known historically as *La Violencia*, which began with the assassination of liberal politician Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, was particularly wrenching, characterized by political assassinations, riots, uprisings, and extreme cruelty. As many as 200,000 Colombians perished during this violent decade.⁴

Popular Uprisings

La Violencia ended with an entente between the perpetually feuding and sometimes warring liberal and conservative parties, known as the National Front. The National Front was a short-lived experiment in coalition government and conflict mitigation, representing residual competing interests within the elite classes of the two major parties. It was, however, not an inclusive accord and failed to address the interests and concerns of the rural poor. The Colombian Communist Party, taking inspiration from the Soviet Union and Cuban revolution, did not join the National Front, which it dismissed as an exclusivist deal among

elites. The emergence of rural-based and Marxist-influenced guerrilla movements, notably the National Liberation Army (ELN) in 1964 and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 1966, signaled a proclamation of those class interests and marked the inauguration of another protracted period of political violence in Colombia, but with new players. The ELN and FARC insurgencies were primarily fought in Colombia's rural areas. Their shared goal was to create a society in which the needs and concerns of neglected rural populations would be addressed. To pay for its movement, the FARC initially depended on kidnapping for ransom until the late 1970s when it began trafficking cocaine to fund its activities. Despite numerous attempts at peace accords, both ELN and FARC's violent tactics and kidnappings continued due to a lack of trust in government reforms.

During the late 1970s and the 1980s, the insurgency came to the cities. A new guerrilla organization, M-19, or the 19th of April Movement, rose from the electoral controversy of 1970 with a mixed ideology of revolutionary socialism and populism and committed spectacular acts of terrorism, including the 1985 siege of the Ministry of Justice. Among the 100 casualties were 11 of the 21 justices of Colombia's Supreme Court. In response to the threat from these left-wing groups, a right-wing umbrella group—the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)—was formed in 1997 by landowners and drug-trafficking cartels, such as the powerful Medellin- and Cali-based organizations. Powerful drug lords helped build the paramilitary armies that made up the AUC. The group carried out multiple massacres and assassinations, targeting left-wing guerrilla groups and activists, as well as those who spoke out against the drug trade.⁵

Narco Wars and the Descent into Chaos

Colombia's narco wars, inflamed by poverty, rampant inequality, and the structural weaknesses of the state, compounded the violence resulting from the rural and urban insurgencies. In the 1970s, poor farmers began planting marijuana, a far more lucrative alternative to the traditional, legal crops on which they had struggled to survive on in the past. Rapidly growing demand for drugs in the United States fueled dramatic increases in production in Colombia. In the 1980s, the major cocaine cartels emerged, most notably Pablo Escobar's Medellin cartel and the Cali cartel in the southwest. The burgeoning cocaine trade generated unprecedented volumes of cash and added a further dimension of lawlessness in Colombia. In time, the cartels' cocaine empires ran from Bolivia, through Colombia and up to Miami, Los Angeles, and New York. The cartels fought each other, and both fought against, and corrupted from within, the Colombian state, armed forces, and police. By 1993, with the ongoing insurgencies, Colombia had become the "murder capital of the world, with a homicide rate of 381 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants."⁶

Eventually aggressive action by the armed forces, with substantial help from a number of U.S. agencies, brought down the Medellin and Cali cartels, but the drug trade continued. Opportunist criminal groups that allied to defeat the larger syndicates took over supply and distribution routes. The new groups learned their tradecraft from the successes and failures

of the Medellín and Cali cartels. They included paramilitary groups composed of ex- and active police who found that the fall of the large drug empires offered opportunities and benefits. The fall of the Medellín and Cali cartels led to the end of direct purchase of coca paste from Peru and Bolivia and a boom in coca production in Colombia, which fell into the hands of these small criminal groups as well as the insurgents—most notably, the AUC, FARC, and Norte Del Valle (a drug cartel operating in the Valle del Cauca department).

The breakup of Norte del Valle and the demobilization of the AUC led to the creation of criminal-paramilitary hybrids called *bandas criminales*, criminal bands, or BACRIM—which marked a new era for Colombian crime, beginning around 2006.⁷ The largest active standing BACRIM today is the Urabenos, who are both excluded and out of the purview of current peace talks. The BACRIM continue to constitute a criminal challenge to Colombian law enforcement.

The Long History Behind the Partnership

The yearning for democracy ran deep in Colombia, and early consultation with U.S. leaders, including Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, led to sustained amity between the two countries. Tensions between Spain and the United States led Jefferson to declare that the Spanish colonies had “a right to be free, and we a right to aid them” and that if a war were to occur between Spain and the United States, then he favored “joining the South Americans, and entering into treaties of alliance with them.”⁸ Shortly thereafter, Henry Clay pushed Congress to support independence in South America.

In the following years, the United States would often see its forces fighting alongside South Americans, and vice versa. By 1820, the Colombian navy contained a considerable number of U.S. volunteers. Colombian military officials and youth came to the United States at this time to attend the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and other U.S. educational institutions. The turbulence of Colombian governance—the shifting presidencies, regimes, and dictatorships, and outright warfare during La Violencia—caused periodic tensions in bilateral relations. These tensions were exacerbated by periodic trade disagreements, and naturally concerns over the Hay-Herran Treaty, rejection of which by the Colombian legislature ultimately led to U.S. support for a political uprising on the isthmus and Panama’s independence. Still, U.S. troops worked alongside Colombian troops to monitor the canal. This relationship was remedied by the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty in 1914, which promised Colombia remittances for Panama. World War I delayed these remittances until 1921, but an economic partnership was initiated and sustained.

Colombia remained neutral during World War I, but by World War II found itself on the side of the Allies, fighting German U-boats after a series of attacks on Colombian ships. World War II facilitated closer military cooperation between Colombia and the United States. Previously, Switzerland and the United Kingdom had provided Colombia with military aviation and naval support; however, due to proximity and strength of its big

northern neighbor, Colombia shifted the focus of its military partnership to the United States. Both countries agreed to prevent attacks on the Panama Canal, and the United States agreed to assist Colombia if it came under attack. Colombia even allowed the United States to use its military facilities as part of an inter-American agreement and contingent upon the need of another South American republic during time of war. Both countries exchanged technical advisers, patrol officers, and strategy.

As a result of this alliance, Colombia was able to modernize its military, and participate in the Lend-Lease Act beginning in 1942, which paved the way for other loans and grants to build public infrastructure. Private U.S. investment in Colombia soared as a result, and even the Colombian air force was further developed with the assistance of aircraft shipments from the United States. In 1951, Colombia, as a U.S. ally seeking to strengthen the Colombia-U.S. relationship, entered the Korean War. It was the only country in Latin America to do so.⁹ According to Bradley Lynn Coleman, the “Cold War transformed the Colombian-American conventional defense partnership into an internal security alliance. . . . By December 1960 the two countries had formed the basis of the modern Colombian-American internal security alliance.”¹⁰

In 1955, facing growing domestic disorder resulting from La Violencia, Colombia established the Escuela de Lancers. At this time, Colombian military personnel began attending U.S. training schools to learn the art of counterinsurgency. Their counterinsurgency training in the United States, particularly at Fort Benning, led to the creation of companies of Lancers to combat guerrilla groups. The United States also provided materiel assistance to pursue guerrilla groups, primarily through Plan Lazo in 1962. Under Plan Lazo, the Colombian military developed a pacification plan in which an attempt would be made to separate vulnerable populations from guerrillas through land reform, political inclusion, patrols, airmobile operations, and civil defense. Colombia and the United States worked together on military training and the administration of nonmilitary aid.¹¹

During the Cold War, Colombia was the largest supplier of students to the U.S. Army School of the Americas, where soldiers received counterinsurgency training. As the Cold War, and its defining fight against global communism, drew to a close, the focus of the School of the Americas shifted to the so-called war on drugs.

Plan Colombia

By the late 1990s, as the FARC, ELN, and AUC insurgencies persisted, and drug-related violence peaked, many considered Colombia to be on the brink of state failure.¹² Colombians participated in “*No Mas*” protests in cities throughout the country. According to Colombia’s National Administrative Statistics Department, between 1995 and 2000 over 700,000 migrants left the country, many of them frightened members of the middle class.¹³ However, the country:

*has been converging fast toward higher living standards since the early 2000s. Sound macroeconomic policy reforms—the adoption of an inflation targeting regime, a flexible exchange rate, a structural fiscal rule and solid financial regulation—have underpinned growth and reduced macroeconomic volatility. From nationwide lawlessness in the late 1990s, when insurgent groups controlled as much as 40 to 50 percent of Colombian territory, the state has recaptured control, with only six percent of municipalities . . . affected by terrorism by the end of 2014.*¹⁴

How did this dramatic reversal of national fortunes take place, and how was Colombia rescued from failure?

Plan Colombia was, as its name implies, a Colombian plan to restore order to the beleaguered country. The initiative of the administration of Colombian President Andres Pastrana in 1998, it was embraced by U.S. President Bill Clinton and U.S. financial support began to flow. While the human cost of the insurgencies in Colombia was certainly devastating, and the insurgencies were the primary concern of Colombia's leadership, it was the scourge of cocaine, particularly the crack cocaine epidemic in the United States and the associated crime, that caught the attention of U.S. leaders in the 1980s. The so-called war on drugs was launched by U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1971, but it became a national cause celebre when championed by First Lady Nancy Reagan, whose "just say no" campaign kicked off in 1986. At that point Colombian and U.S. interests began to converge around the drug issue and an enhanced partnership began—the shared burden being the growing devastation caused by drug-trafficking.

The Pastrana administration envisioned Plan Colombia as a new Marshall Plan, where foreign aid could be leveraged to carry out social development programs in support of possible peace processes with the insurgencies. Pastrana firmly believed that negotiation processes with the FARC should have been premised on identifying and eliminating the elements of poverty, inequality, and the absence of democratic opportunities countrywide, all of which he believed are drivers of violence. The U.S. Congress, however, had other priorities—namely halting the flow of cocaine into the United States. Shaped in part by congressional priorities, Plan Colombia evolved with a heavy emphasis on counternarcotic operations. Colombia established an army counternarcotics brigade and by 1999, 43,246 hectares of coca had been eradicated. By 2002, more than 122,695 hectares had been eliminated.¹⁵ Though the emphasis was on counternarcotics, much of the effort fell onto the armed forces, and the Colombian professional army grew by 150 percent between 1998 and 2002, to around 200,000 in 2003, equipped with robust offensive capability, strategy, and vastly improved morale.¹⁶ But with the United States not wanting to get bogged down in a counterinsurgency operation, and in order to insulate itself, a "battalion of 3,000 men trained by U.S. special forces could not be used to combat the guerrillas or paramilitaries unless their targets were clearly protecting drug labs or coca fields."¹⁷

In the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11,

2001(9/11), the original congressional resistance to supporting the military campaign against the Colombian insurgency dissipated. Post-9/11, both the United States and Colombia shifted focus from the narco-cartels to countering terrorism and combatting the FARC. This began with the Infrastructure Security Strategy, which was designed to protect the Cano Limon oil pipeline from guerrilla attacks. U.S. Special Forces worked with counterinsurrection battalions of Colombia's 18th Brigade to protect the pipeline until 2005.¹⁸

Elected in 2002 on a security-first platform, President Alvaro Uribe shifted the national security focus definitively to the fight against the insurgents, firmly believing that development depends on security. His premise was that security would generate confidence and investment, as well as an "environment for security." Uribe's policy came to be known as democratic security and brought "a level of focus to the conflict that had never been previously seen, using his personality and energy to infuse a more intense and committed effort into the security forces as well."¹⁹ He was able to strengthen Colombian security forces without sacrificing social development programs. Increased security under his presidency led to more than 31,000 paramilitary combatants laying down their arms and to over 22,000 guerrillas deserting and entering into government-led rehabilitation programs.²⁰ Plan Colombia gave Uribe's government the means—both in terms of funding and U.S. partnership—to strengthen and modernize the country's armed forces while dismantling militia groups, their logistics networks, and their leadership. In executing Plan Colombia, Colombia and the United States grew closer, and the partnership became one of mutual trust, as it shifted from advice and training to alliance and consultation.

Throughout the life of Plan Colombia, the United States contributed over \$10 billion, but Colombia invested a great deal more.²¹ This is an important point; upon taking office in 2002 President Uribe proposed a 1.2 percent "war tax" on approximately 400,000 wealthy individuals and businesses.²² While U.S. investment has been substantial and perhaps even catalytic, the vast majority of the cost of the past nearly 20 years of recovery from the brink of state failure has been paid by the Colombian people.

Although Plan Colombia still has skeptics and critics, many in Colombia and the United States firmly believe it was a strategic success for both countries. Coca cultivation declined from 160,000 hectares to 48,000 hectares from 2000 to 2013.²³ Far more important though, from a strategic vantage point, Plan Colombia enabled the country to recover from the brink of failure by dismantling the AUC and imposing unsustainable military costs on the FARC. While drugs have been, from the Colombian perspective, a scourge, fighting the war on drugs was the means to a much larger end: to recover territorial control, establish rule of law, pacify the country, and bring prosperity to the Colombian people. Between 2003 and 2008, as many as 31,000 paramilitary fighters were disarmed and demobilized.²⁴ Many paramilitary leaders were tried and convicted or extradited for trial to the United States. Between 2001 and 2012, the number of FARC combatants was reduced from as many as 16,000 to fewer than 7,000.²⁵ While the war on drugs in Colombia may not have been won by Plan Colombia, the war to restore state sovereignty was. In late 2016, the government of Colombia reached a historic agreement with the FARC, bringing an end to five decades

of civil war. It is likely that the government will soon reach a similar agreement with the ELN. Although there certainly remain many causes for concern in what is inevitably an imperfect deal, this should at least bring about an end to major armed violence. Today, Colombia is thriving both economically and socially.

Modernizing the Force: Plan Colombia to Peace Colombia

Over the course of Plan Colombia, the Colombia-U.S. partnership broadened and matured. Any vestiges of “mentorship” or “tutorial” dynamics eventually vanished, and the partnership became a collaborative one of sovereign equals in pursuit of common interests. In 2009, the Colombian Ministry of National Defense (MND) requested assistance from the U.S. government to develop certain strategic and institutional tools to ensure the sustainability of the progress that had been made in defeating the FARC militarily, and restoring the security and stability of the nation. Specifically, the MND sought support in assessing the long-term ramifications of current budgetary decisions as well as in aligning budgetary allocations with national strategic objectives.

One illustrative example of the critical initiatives of this collaborative relationship was the introduction of the Defense Resource Management Reform (DRMR) effort in January 2010. The purpose of the project, implemented by the MND with the U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Institution Reform Initiative, was to undertake major upgrades to planning and budgeting processes, thus enabling the MND to make informed decisions concerning force structure, readiness, and sustainment, and avoid long-term atrophy and hollowing of the armed forces. The project also examined the requirements to institutionalize adaptability in the Colombian armed forces in order to respond effectively to inevitable future security challenges.

The DRMR effort would support the MND’s enhancement of defense resource management by implementing and institutionalizing three processes: estimating future defense costs, linking strategic planning to budget, and improving investment planning.

The MND had been challenged previously to estimate the long-term costs of many of its decisions and budget requests, and faced increasing pressure and scrutiny from the Ministry of Finance, which was demanding analytic justifications with projections of future impact. The requests related primarily to personnel, health care, pensions, and sustainability for the growing force structure. The DRMR project provided the analytic tools and skills to collect and organize pertinent data, identify the cost-drivers, validate costs, and consolidate them into a single database called the Force-Oriented Cost Information System (FOCIS). From this, the MND is able to project future costs, and identify and analyze alternative options and paths.

Linking strategic planning to the budget was a critical challenge; unlinked, the MND was unable to accurately assess whether budgets were sufficient to support national priorities. Military objectives were not clearly articulated, nor was planning aligned in terms of capabilities or mission areas derived from national strategy. Developing a

planning process that systematically considers long-term force structure development aids in the design and analysis of options that achieve strategic objectives, optimize resources, and minimize risk. The process developed through DRMR, referred to as Capability-Based Planning (CBP), ensures a budget process based on capabilities tied to Colombia's national strategic objectives.

Life-cycle planning for defense-sector investments is complex and should anticipate the costs of training, necessary infrastructure maintenance and upgrades, spare parts, long-term equipment maintenance, and fuel, among many other factors. At the outset of the DRMR project, senior defense leaders were unable to project future spending requirements related to specific equipment or projects with sufficient accuracy, nor was there an integrated investment planning coordination capability. DRMR helped the MND develop a life-cycle cost estimation capability and an investment planning process linked to the new CPB process. This provided the ability to determine which acquisitions best fill capability gaps discovered during the CBP process, while estimating the life-cycle costs, life expectancy, and key performance parameters to be included in instructions for manufacturers.

In the past, the individual military services as well as the National Police, which in Colombia are situated within the MND, developed their strategic plans and justified their respective budget requests according to their own unique criteria, without consideration of the views and plans of the other services. CBP provides the analytic tools and an integrated approach to assessing and addressing capability gaps as well as sustainability concerns. As such, the MND is today much better prepared to effectively assess the fiscal impact of budgetary and investment decisions. Consistent Colombian senior leadership resulted in the publication of directives concerning roles and responsibilities with respect to the new processes, as well as the development and execution of an initial CBP process to link strategy to budget. Furthermore, using the new CBP process, the MND improved investment planning driven by capability gaps discovered during the planning process.

The MND reform had significant institutional implications. Transformation based on application of capability-based force structure planning was institutionally represented by the January 2012 establishment of a Capability Planning Directorate, responsible for developing and managing the CBP process. The following April, the Vice Minister for Strategy and Planning directed the use of FOCIS in developing the 2013–2016 budget and investment process, and validating the funding requirements of anti-FARC operations. The adoption of an advanced concept of human capacity development, based on the capabilities identified in force structure planning, was the responsibility of the Human Capital Directorate. The adoption of improved budgeting processes and systems that standardized previously separate systems and processes of each of the three armed services, and the separation of planning from the budget offices, was accomplished in the Planning and Budgeting Directorate (DPP). In January 2013, the Budget Enhancement and Sustainability Group (GMSP) was established inside the Planning and Budgeting Directorate. GMSP was charged with proposing, designing, and implementing methodologies and models, including FOCIS, that optimize planning practices and decision-making. GMSP serves as

DPP's "think tank" for daily activities and devising new approaches to persistent resource problems.

In January 2013, the MND utilized the CBP to develop the first defense-sector integrated long-term plan, an effort that involved the full support and participation of the army, navy, air force, and national police. This plan projected forward through 2030 and led to a common vision of the threats and challenges facing the defense sector as a whole. This holistic vision allowed for the development of operational concepts for each mission area, replacing concepts for each military service and the National Police. This, in turn, allowed the emergence of the joint and coordinated orientation of the security forces from early planning stages and the improvement of institutional structures, not just operations.

In July 2013, the first long-term estimate of future defense costs through 2040 identified the impact of sustaining current spending associated with Plan Colombia. The results were the basis of the recognition that the existing force could not be sustained at then-current spending levels, leading to the appropriate adjustments in the February 2014 submission of the 2015–2018 Budget and Investment Plan.

In addition to institutional adaptation, the Colombia-U.S. partnership has been a catalyst for cultural change within the Colombian defense sector. Examples of such cultural transformation include significantly improved transparency. Through FOCIS, all information related to the costs of a unit, operation, or project is collected in a single database. This provides detailed insight into the calculation of common cost factors, clarifying the basis for costs such as flight hours, ship operating hours, and vehicle operating costs. With analytic advancements, the Colombian government can now forecast the long-term costs of investment and planning decisions it makes.

Another important cultural transformation is the adoption of a strategic language that describes the challenges facing and capabilities possessed by the respective military services and the National Police in common terms. This common language has enabled the various actors within the system to communicate easily and with a common understanding. Moreover, political, military, and National Police leaders can now engage in and sustain professional discussions of emerging threats, operational concepts, and required capabilities, based on a common language.

Elements of a Successful Partnership

The few institutional innovations described in this chapter, and many others within the Colombian defense sector, are accomplishments for which Colombia should be proud. They were creative, sustainable, and most importantly effective. As this chapter describes, they were not accomplished in a vacuum, but rather in partnership with the United States—primarily the DOD and U.S. armed forces. By definition, partnership implies that each partner is a part of a greater whole, dividing the weight of shared burdens. The success of the Colombia-U.S. partnership is due to a common perception of the shared burdens, mutual respect, trust in each other, reciprocal commitment, and frequent, if not constant, consultation.

Common Perceptions

Prior to 9/11, the United States and Colombia were focused on separate goals with divergent objectives. For the United States, the metric of success in Colombia was a year-by-year decrease in coca cultivation and production; for Colombia, it was critical that the state recover municipalities and territories ceded to the insurgency during past administrations, stabilize the country, reduce crime, and defeat criminal organizations.

Plan Colombia helped to align the political and military objectives of both the United States and Colombia in the context of the post-9/11 world. The vision of Plan Colombia recognized the dual nature of the threat to Colombia's sovereignty—challenged both by leftist insurgents and by drug cartels—and the necessity for a multidimensional response. Plan Colombia acknowledged the root causes of conflict in the country, but under President Uribe's doctrine of democratic security, it prioritized national stabilization via a relentless pursuit of both the insurgents and the cartels. Once stabilized, the country could embark on a deeper examination of root causes and a program to promote economic development, democratic consolidation, and improved social integration. Both the United States and Colombia recognized the serious nature of the threat to both countries of a failing Colombia, and the national and international security implications of such a failure.

Ultimately leaders in both countries understood the need for a strategic approach beyond the brute application of military force. Plan Colombia addressed not only security—intelligence, special operations, human rights, and legitimacy training—but also justice. A significant effort to reform the Colombian justice system was supported by the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Agency for International Development.

Mutual Respect

Colombia's historical military contributions fighting side-by-side with U.S. soldiers in Korea, Panama, and elsewhere, showcased the country's resolve and value as a U.S. partner. To further build upon this partnership, U.S. officers helped to establish the Lancero School in 1956, the Colombian equivalent of the U.S. Ranger School. From 1956 onward, U.S. advisors have visited Colombia on a regular basis, sharing their experience and expertise in military skills as well as institutional innovation. Colombian officers have attended the U.S. war colleges almost every year since.

Though the United States has worked with other regional partners, Colombia's military, police, and history of democratic governance made it an easy collaborator. When dealing with the Colombian military, the United States is dealing with equals. The Colombian armed forces lacked the necessary modern equipment, but overall were already well prepared for the requirements of modern defense institutions. The Colombian military is a mature force, with historic institutions and traditions, and a deeply held sense of military professionalism. This was not lost on U.S. military leaders, who have been constantly impressed with and respectful of the quality of their Colombian counterparts. Though they have benefited substantially from their partnership with the U.S. armed forces, the martial skills and capabilities of the Colombian military were never in question.

Likewise, the leadership of Colombia's armed forces has historically had profound respect for its U.S. counterparts, recognizing particularly that U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq provided invaluable experience in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

Trust

As Admiral William McCraven has often stated, "You can't surge trust." Trust between Colombia and the United States evolved along with the bilateral relationship itself, and over time became the predominant characteristic. For the United States, trusting Colombia means trusting Colombian leadership to embrace and defend the best interests of the Colombian people, and hemispheric security. It means further trusting Colombian insight into the nature of the country's challenges, rather than assuming U.S. experts have superior understanding. Far too frequently U.S. or other external experts presume they have a deeper understanding of the challenges faced by their partners than the partners themselves. Far too frequently external consultants respond to partner country challenges with strategic prescriptions and technical or financial fixes without understanding the underlying political dynamics. Trust overcomes this presumptive tendency.

The sustained U.S. commitment to Colombia, even after the United States was attacked by al Qaeda on 9/11, helped gain the trust of its Colombian counterparts. Successive senior ambassadors, combatant commanders, and officials in Washington have cultivated this trust-based relationship over multiple decades, constantly and consistently reinforcing it.

Shared Commitment

Every country must own both the challenges to and the adaptations of its defense institutions. This has certainly been the case with Colombia. Plan Colombia was supported by the United States. From the beginning, the United States was a critical contributor, providing materiel assets such as helicopters, boats, and Coast Guard capabilities, as well as substantial financial support. These most certainly aided Colombian efforts to enhance military capabilities. Both countries in a defense institution building (DIB) partnership must have and demonstrate buy-in. From Colombia's viewpoint, ownership is a better description than buy-in.

In the United States, two factors secured its buy-in to DIB efforts in Colombia. First, stability in the Western Hemisphere was paramount; without a strengthened Colombia, the likelihood of a sizable country becoming a failed state was too costly to countenance. Second, a practical, but compelling, consideration was the troubling persistence and growth of the drug trade in the United States. The Clinton administration felt intense political pressure in the 1990s due to the emerging crack cocaine epidemic. Moreover, Colombia's cocaine industry had exported its violent consequences to U.S. cities.

A large part of this buy-in consisted of strong support in the U.S. Congress. Congressional support has been sustained, broad, and bipartisan. Many congressional visits by Colombian statesmen have reminded policymakers of the value of the partnership and the continuing U.S. commitment to Colombia. Meanwhile, Colombia has hosted many

visits by congressional members seeking first-hand observation and understanding of this critical strategic relationship. In 2016, the Obama administration proposed a \$450 million aid package called Peace Colombia, focusing on new multiyear initiatives to help Colombia win the peace. This high degree of buy-in by both countries reinforces trust and mutual respect while demonstrating sustained commitment to meeting the challenge.

Consultation

Over the past several years, the Colombia-U.S. partnership has become close and taken on the character of an ongoing discussion. When any particular situation escalated, the Colombian MND could call the U.S. Ambassador, senior leaders within U.S. Southern Command, or the DOD. The two parties have had frank discussions as partners, not in an effort to produce the best optics for their respective offices but to determine what was needed and how to accomplish it. The tenor of dialogue has consistently been characterized by mutual respect and trust. There are always questions, discussions, concerns—a process of ongoing commitment to jointly meeting the challenges and resolving any emergent problems. Each has felt privileged and welcomed by the other to call any time an issue emerged, a privilege that has been taken advantage of on numerous occasions to the benefit of both the Colombia-U.S. partnership, as well as the security of Colombia, the United States, and the Western Hemisphere.

This chapter demonstrates the potential shared security benefits of a strong and carefully cultivated partnership. Colombia's history is as idiosyncratic as is that of the United States. There is no universal template for a DIB relationship. However, what can be derived from Colombia's experience is that a partnership based on a common perception of the threat environment, mutual respect, trust, shared commitment, and constant consultation provides the most conducive environment for successful DIB and that enduring institutional and cultural transformation of a country's defense sector may be among the benefits of such a partnership. In Colombia's case, this transformation permitted it to recover from near state collapse in 2000 to become the effective exporter of security that it has become. In the absence of any of these elements of a successful partnership, DIB is likely to be a frustrating experience for both parties.

Notes

1 The authors wish to acknowledge the outstanding reporting on DIB related projects in Colombia by Harold Laughlin of the Institute for Defense Analyses, and research assistance of NDU editorial assistants Clark Frye and Zaira Pirzada.

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Transforming Defense in Guatemala

By Alejandro J. Alemán

In April of 2012, in response to an earlier request by Guatemala’s Minister of Defense, then U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs Frank Mora offered the Guatemalan Ministry of Defense (MOD) support in developing a national defense policy and broadly improving the Ministry’s budgeting processes. Within four years the MOD had published a National Defense Policy (NDP), produced program budgets, altered the military force structure, and introduced greater transparency and accountability in its financial management systems. These results were made possible by the establishment of a governance system that afforded the Minister a management platform, which allowed him to make strategic decisions about defense contributions, including weapons programs, required military capabilities, future force design, and budgets. The transformation of the MOD from an organization still shaped by the legacy of past civil wars into an institution operating on the principles of good governance—efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, accountability, and based on the rule of law and respect for human rights—is an exemplar of successful defense institution building (DIB).

The Minister’s request was rooted in a broader government-wide effort to address significant challenges in the national security sector. The government of Guatemala, led by newly-elected President Pérez-Molina, sought to revitalize the government’s national security architecture and attend to the country’s new realities and challenges. The peace accords ending the country’s civil war had been signed 20 years earlier and although the security environment had dramatically changed, the government’s thinking and approach to security and defense had not advanced to keep pace with these changes. The state was no longer battling insurgents intent on a government overthrow. Instead, new, complex, and adaptive threats—e.g., gangs and trans-national criminal networks—had long replaced the earlier challenges and were producing fundamental challenges to basic citizen security, which the government was not prepared to address. Encumbered with the tools of the past, the responses were wholly inadequate. The government’s understanding of national security also required updating prior to beginning an effective, whole-of-government transformation to address Guatemala’s new realities, and in order to provide a foundation for reforms in the security and defense sectors.

The changed context was not the only driver of reform. The MOD was not producing sustainable and effective defense contributions. The state of affairs in the Ministry and the armed forces was dire: years of mismanagement and corruption had contributed to

a hollowed-out force, with the spoils going to a few well-connected and well-positioned individuals. The military was conducting missions for which it was not equipped, fully trained, or adequately resourced; furthermore, full legal authorities were not always provided, putting the troops at risk even when carrying out their orders. The structure of the armed forces was inefficient and didn't support the operations being conducted. There also were no standardized planning processes to speak of to produce military capabilities, leading to unsustainable acquisitions that were disconnected from the country's true defense needs. Budgeting processes were not responsive to strategic planning requirements, and it was nearly impossible to trace and therefore audit the money trail. Finally, the Minister simply did not have adequate tools, processes, or structures in place to effectively govern the Ministry.

Turning this situation around would be a heavy lift; however, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) support to Guatemala was able to generate the results it did because it took a holistic, top-down approach that considered the institution and its key elements and allowed the MOD to perform at higher levels. Stated differently, the reform effort was focused on improving governance at the institutional—not process—level, which addressed the root causes of inefficiency. Throughout the effort the MOD's reform team worked within existing structures and conducted a critical redesign of key institutional elements, aimed to improve overall governance through the establishment of a high-level integrated governance system.

The effort provided the Minister with modern management tools to produce an effectively governed defense institution. Throughout the implementation of the reforms it was critical to evaluate the outcomes not just on their face value, but also in terms of how the reforms were contributing to improved governance. The outcomes could be analyzed in two ways: first, in how they allowed the MOD, through improved ministerial capacity, to produce better outputs. Determining this can be somewhat straightforward, as these results are largely visible and measurable, with evidence (or lack thereof) being produced as outputs of various processes (e.g., new program architectures or budgets), or through the visible implementation of new systems and processes. Second, the outcomes could be analyzed in terms of how they worked to improve governance. This is more difficult to measure but is required, as improved governance was the ultimate objective. Many of the outcomes observed from the Ministry's reform effort provided indicators that good governance was in fact being exhibited in the functioning of the defense institutions in Guatemala, and that those indicators were a direct result of new mechanisms and paradigms resulting from the Ministry's reforms.

The purpose of this chapter is to tell the story of the defense reform effort in Guatemala. It explores the drivers and approaches to the recent defense reform effort and focuses primarily on the outcomes and significance of the reforms, viewed through the lens of how they contributed to or were themselves the result of improved governance and management practices. This case study and documentation of some of the observed outcomes, contributes to the growing body of knowledge on "how to do DIB."

Admittedly, one significant limitation of this analysis is that it is not informed by an independent evaluation of the program implemented in Guatemala. Rather, the analysis relies largely on personal observation, conversations with key leaders in the Guatemalan defense and security establishment, and a large body of reporting produced by the country project leads (of which the author is one). The lack of a framework for evaluating defense reform projects is discussed elsewhere in this book and represents one major shortcoming of the DOD DIB efforts.

Drivers of Defense Reform

2008 provides a natural point to begin discussing reform efforts in Guatemala. In that year the Guatemalan Congress passed a National Security System Framework Law that established a National Security Council and a Technical Secretariat (*Secretaría Técnica del Consejo Nacional de Seguridad* [STCNS]) to direct it. In 2012, newly-elected President Pérez-Molina sought to ensure the full implementation of the law's requirements. In particular, he charged the STCNS with developing three of the legally-mandated documents: the National Security Policy, the National Security Strategic Agenda, and the Strategic Plan for National Security. Several attempts produce these by the previous President had all ended in failure. As the Minister would do later, President Pérez-Molina approached the United States seeking assistance on this initiative, and this was eventually provided by DOD under the aegis of a more comprehensive NSC-directed response to rising violence in Central America. This support to the government's effort led to Guatemala's first-ever National Security Policy, published in July 2012; the Agenda followed in October of that year, and the Plan one month later. Together these three documents included a candid account of the state's many security challenges and the resultant social ills that accompanied them, and provided not only policy guidance and objectives to the government but also established roles, responsibilities, timelines, and even checklists for completion of key actions.

Beyond producing documents, the STCNS, guided by DOD's governance subject matter experts, sought several outcomes: among these, establishing a new concept and understanding of national security; identifying the broad functions and objectives for the state, through its National Security System (NSS) and National Security Council, to implement these new concepts; and creating mechanisms to ensure the government actually performed these functions. The STCNS was cognizant of the need to not only draft policy guidance, but to ensure policy implementation, compliance, and enforcement as well—the STCNS was thinking about governance in the national security sector. The DOD support to this effort deliberately considered and worked toward an outcome where the policies and strategies produced did not become coffee-table books but were in fact documents that could be implemented and guide the government's agendas.

The documents were premised on several core principles such as transparency in government, the need for policy-budget alignment, transparent resource management systems, efficient and effective governance systems, and the need for institutional maturity. Some key observations about these documents illustrate this:

- The documents acknowledged endemic corruption and the need to address this scourge head-on. The Strategic Agenda in particular faulted “generalized corruption, impunity, [and] a lack of strategic leadership” as factors exacerbating the country’s current state of insecurity.¹
- They focused on identifying objectives in order to drive the government to program for deliberate activities, and highlighted the importance of producing measurable results.
- There was an emphasis on the need for results-based management, improving the institutions of the government, and achieving higher institutional performance overall.
- The documents sought to align processes (e.g., planning and programming) and actions across the different ministries in order to produce better outcomes.
- The National Security Policy stressed the need to plan using only current resources, and noted the principles of efficiency, transparency, and accountability required in the management and execution of those resources.

The three documents and their key points fostered meaningful outcomes in national security, by providing guidance to the entire government and giving each ministry a foundation upon which to build. This applied as well to the defense institutions. In fact, these documents can be considered “ground zero” for the reform effort. By defining and establishing roles and responsibilities in the national security architecture, they provided the purpose for the defense institutions—and thereby also scoping their activities—while also giving them meaning and relevance. Absent these characteristics, the defense establishment would be in a position to self-define its attributes and thus its role in the state, undermining attempts at accountability.

The STCNS’s efforts to establish the foundations for a functioning security sector thus sowed the seeds for a reform effort in defense by providing the driver and the justification for that initiative. They also served as an anchor for defense reform while providing the Minister significant political top-cover. With this backdrop, the Minister was on very solid ground when he approached DOD for support.

In addition to drivers at the institutional level and the changed security environment, there were several internal challenges in the MOD generating the need for reform. Defense budgets had shrunk and the Ministry had no processes for prioritizing scarce resources; demands on the military continued to increase but did so in response to ill-defined security and defense requirements; the military’s structure matched neither the missions being conducted nor the resources being requested; defense budgeting processes were opaque, did not respond to policy guidance but rather emergent/tactical requirements, and had few accountability mechanisms; and the military training and education system was mired teaching doctrine of the past—which was wholly irrelevant to contemporary security challenges—with no ability to respond to the demands of the managers of the institution. Compounding these challenges was a lack of a culture of policy or strategy production, let alone one based on a national security framework.

As such, although the Minister's initial request was centered on achieving discrete objectives—i.e., production of a defense policy and improvements in resource management practices—recognition of those fundamental challenges caused the effort to quickly grow into a broader, holistic undertaking focused on improving overall governance of the defense institution, and it did so with the full buy-in of both the sponsor and recipient nation. Other stakeholders also agreed that only a reform effort for improving the overall management of the institution could produce the results necessary to move the Guatemalan Defense Ministry to a higher level of performance. Working to improve one area would not suffice.

Scope and Methodology

The Defense Institutions Reform Initiative (DIRI) project, a multi-country U.S. program, was initiated in Guatemala in 2012. It is distinguished from others wherein the focus is on one or more specific functions resident in the core defense management processes. DIRI's point of departure was an understanding that for any sub-system (logistics, resource management, etc.) to perform optimally over the long term, the institutional environment in which that system resides must be attended to. A singular focus on a specific defense function will admittedly improve, sometimes dramatically, the ability of an organization to execute that one function, but that improvement will not produce subsequent gains in the overall management of the larger institution. Furthermore, even dramatic gains in specific processes will not survive in the long term if other processes with which they are integrated are not improved as well, and if deficiencies in the larger system are not fixed. For example, establishing a state-of-the-art logistics management system requires appropriately trained and educated personnel for current and future operation of that system, generating a requirement for improvements in education, training, and professional development as well as the ability to formulate appropriate personnel policies to manage career progression, among many other requirements. This understanding, coupled with the challenges articulated above, quickly shifted the focus of the DIRI project from one of producing specific outputs (e.g., a new policy) or addressing a specific process or groups of processes (e.g., resource management) to one geared to generating outcomes (e.g., improved governance), which would themselves produce those and other outputs.

Put differently, it was that larger system and environment that the DIRI project sought to address. It thus considered the institution and its key elements among those: the normative architecture serving as the "birth certificate" for defense and defining its roles, missions, and functions; the nature and structure of the organizations and the flows of processes through them; and the rules, norms, values, and protocols guiding behaviors and establishing relationships among the different processes and actors throughout the defense institution.

The DIRI project was to work within existing structures and conduct a critical redesign of those elements with the aim of improving overall governance: by working at this institutional level, the project sought to support the MOD in establishing a high-level integrated governance system. The philosophy behind this approach was that there is a

methodology that can be applied to produce governance, itself the critical component of generating “institutionality” and thereby actually doing institution building.

One convenient way of understanding the methodology as it was applied is by viewing it as a series of phases: assessment, modeling, prototyping, piloting, and implementation. The DIRI subject matter experts, through workshops and seminars, guided the work of a dedicated defense reform team through these overlapping phases of the project.

The assessment phase, although a necessary starting point, continued throughout the whole effort and initially sought to critically analyze key elements of the defense institutions in order to identify gaps. The focus was not only on providing a baseline, but also generating consensus and a shared understanding of the nature of the problem and key concepts involved. For example, one aspect entailed a review of the normative architecture (i.e., laws, rules, policies, treaties, directives, etc.), which defined security and defense and established the boundaries of their activities, in order to identify what the roles, missions, and functions of the military were supposed to be, and what authorities existed for executing those, and then compare them to actual practices, in the process identifying multiple disconnects and gaps. Another activity entailed identifying how key processes and decisions flowed throughout the organization and why, in order to address challenges in authorities, protocols, and overall functional-organizational alignment.² In fact, it was during the assessment phase that the project became manifest. In evaluating the nature of their institution, the Ministry teams quickly realized that in order to achieve an objective that could be simply stated as “improving budgetary practices,” there were broad considerations (other processes and systems) that first needed to be addressed. Not doing so would mean gains achieved in year one would be lost in year two, as those improved elements wouldn’t find themselves supported by, anchored in, or integrated with the many other processes with which they interacted.

The modeling phase provided theoretical models demonstrating the flow of key defense management processes in an organization-neutral environment, and exhibiting best practices. For example, for resource management processes, some of these practices could include embedded oversight mechanisms, integrated metrics, connectivity and responsiveness to policy priorities, and integration with other processes. During this phase, the partner would conduct a comparative analysis between the theoretical model and its own process and functional modeling, identifying not only gaps and inconsistencies, but simultaneously producing “best fit” solutions based on existing structures. A fuller understanding of the concept of transparency and the need to achieve it is gained by the partner during this effort, as inefficiencies in current practices are brought into full view, along with what are, at times, obvious solutions.

In the prototyping phase, the partner identified concrete reform recommendations to implement “best fit” solutions, and work as much as possible within the existing structures. These recommendations could be changes in process flows, authorities, organization, and so forth. Change management was key in this phase and continued in the piloting phase, to minimize disruptions as the prototype was tested alongside existing structures to validate

the new models. Together, these two phases culminated in the gradual implementation of changes throughout the institution.

The application of this methodology was accompanied by some ground rules. These included ensuring reforms were produced with minimal (and preferably zero) cost, and keeping organizational changes to a minimum, in order to prevent disruptions to existing systems. In fact, as part of the DIRI support, only two organizational changes were recommended and later produced: the creation of a new Vice Ministry for Plans and Policy (in part to perform that change management function), and the elevation of the Inspector General to the level of a Vice Ministry (removing it from under the General Staff and placing it under the Minister, thus opening all MOD activities to auditing and inspection). Other profound organizational and force structure changes came later and are discussed below, but those were produced as a direct result of strategic decisions made by the Minister and other defense leaders, and in response to the implementation of the new governance structures.

Achieving Integrated Defense Governance: Defense Policy

Within a year of beginning the DIRI project, the MOD had published a National Defense Policy, achieving one of the Minister's specified objectives from the DOD support and serving as a significant, and very public, milestone in the Ministry's now-broader reform effort. The changes that were being contemplated in the Ministry, as well as those reform elements that had already been implemented (e.g., new planning processes and the way they were to flow through the organization), actually created the requirement for an overarching defense policy that would further direct and guide the reform effort and those new processes, while validating what had been achieved thus far, i.e., it institutionalized them. As such, the institution itself created the condition to ensure that its management (and consequently its outputs) was policy-driven: the NDP was born with built-in legitimacy.

The NDP was a significant outcome in several other, institutionally important ways. Its development flowed from the National Security Policy that preceded it, and it deliberately sought to implement the requirements articulated in that larger policy, thus ensuring that future defense contributions were responsive to and aligned with broader national security objectives. The NDP addressed key concepts required for achieving defense governance and framed those as requirements and mechanisms, allowing the Ministry to better participate in the state's NSS. For example, in recognizing the need to meet the requirements identified in the NSS, the NDP states, "The best way to articulate capabilities and ever-scarce resources with other government actors calls for interoperability and coordinating mechanisms."³ It later continues, "the alignment of decision cycles, based on results-based budgeting, is indispensable, and will in turn permit the Ministry to balance available resources with demands for National Defense, reconfiguring military capabilities."⁴

Also, similar to the National Security Policy, the NDP included an honest assessment of the state of play in defense. It tellingly noted that continuing on the current path would exhaust resources and capabilities, and that pursuing an incorrect path would lead to catastrophic failure; thus the need to act quickly and in a correct manner (i.e., based on some methodological reference).⁵ The NDP also noted the gap between capabilities versus assigned missions, the disconnect between executed missions and the current force structure, and the growing demand for military support to internal security roles while still needing to meet traditional defense roles and mission requirements.

By including this assessment and recognizing these challenges, the NDP was also serving notice to the defense establishment that new paradigms were required. It provided extensive guidance to direct the Ministry's strategic force planning, listing several principles. These included the need to produce multi-purpose, agile, and interoperable military units capable of responding to a range of scenarios; a clarification of the military's role in internal security support missions; and the need to ensure alignment of military objectives with the budget requests.

The NDP thus provided clear guidance, tied defense contributions into the larger NSS, and began messaging on the new management concepts being developed. It also served to initiate change in the institutional culture of Guatemala's defense sector: the very publication of a "national defense policy," which was to be used as a guidebook, and which was deliberately subordinated to "national security," was a new concept, and one that helped to begin defining and scoping what defense should be.

Achieving Integrated Defense Governance: SIPLAGDE

The Ministry's response to the challenge of achieving effective governance in defense was establishing an integrated defense governance system, *Sistema Integrado de Planeamiento y Gestión de Defensa*, known by its acronym, SIPLAGDE. In fact, the first public mention of this was provided in the NDP. The NDP stated that defense planning was going to change and was going to do so based on the establishment of a capabilities-based planning model driven by policy priorities. It specifically named that model SIPLAGDE, "the principal tool for the adequate functioning and development of the National Defense System."⁶

The SIPLAGDE is an integrated system of systems designed, developed, and implemented by the Guatemalans as an organic solution to their challenges, in line with their current structures, and responsive to their requirements. Although guided and supported by foreign subject matter experts, its development and subsequent implementation by Ministry-led teams, ensured that the system responded to the country's and the Ministry's unique cultural realities and was not an externally-imposed "best practices" solutions. It was developed and implemented incrementally, first as a model on paper for how new processes should flow, and then in reality as those new processes were implemented and executed in accordance with the model.

In the NDP the initial, broad structure of this governance platform was laid out, and as the system matured, it was further refined and developed in other planning and policy

documents. For example, the National Defense White Book, published in 2015, goes on to cite the SIPLAGDE as the “Guatemalan version of the so-called high-level integrated governance systems” and lists its overarching objective as allowing the defense establishment “to link the operational activities of its components with the administration of financial resources,”⁷ noting how the system’s articulating logic is based on value chains—i.e., the production of value added in the conversion of inputs into outputs.⁸

The system, as briefed publicly by Ministry representatives, consists of four main processes: capability-based planning; performance-based programming; results-based budgeting; and metrics-based evaluations. Each component of the system is itself comprised of several actors, multiple processes, and various subsystems. The system’s outputs include:

- Annual defense planning guidance signed by the Minister
- A proposed force design based on current realities, considering future alternative scenarios, and in line with the NDP’s guidance
- Capability programs required by the force design, and an associated program architecture to produce them
- A defense budget request, aligned with policy, and responsive to capability requirements

While not an exact comparison, it is useful to understand the SIPLAGDE as analogous to DOD governance systems. In particular, the Defense Acquisition System, described by the Department as “the backbone for developing DOD military capability,” exhibits similar characteristics, and while it carries the word “acquisition” in its title, it is in fact a broader governance mechanism, an integrated system of systems that produces, in the end, operational military forces.⁹ Furthermore, it is one of several governance tools the Secretary of Defense has to manage the Defense Department.

With the SIPLAGDE the Ministry established a governance system and thus achieved another key reform objective; but the SIPLAGDE also represented a broad range of other, institutionally significant outcomes. First, it provided the Minister with a platform with which to make strategic and structural decisions on defense.¹⁰ This platform was responsive to his requirements and priorities, precisely because the system was driven by policy directives. Secondly, the SIPLAGDE aligned and integrated various subsystems and processes, removing system inefficiencies and allowing all processes to work together in producing value-added outcomes. Third, the SIPLAGDE brought stability—a hallmark of good governance—and predictability to the MOD by virtue of being based on fully integrated processes that were transparent, analytical, and repeatable. It fostered “institutionality” by grounding the Ministry and its performance in processes as opposed to personalities, making the functioning of the Ministry personality-independent. That strong integration of the various processes—e.g., ensuring the outputs of one process were required inputs of the next—also strengthened the stability and durability of the system; trying to undo it would be both difficult and disastrous. Fourth, the SIPLAGDE provided

the MOD a platform for dialogue with the other ministries (notably those with the financial and planning portfolios) as well as the congress, in particular during discussions on budget requests. With the SIPLAGDE the Ministry was able to clearly articulate the capabilities the requested budgets would provide, the risks associated with reduced allocations, and the direct linkage between the military's budget request and the government's articulated policy priorities.¹¹ Finally, the SIPLAGDE served to combat corruption in the Ministry's financial systems. By establishing new processes to formulate budgets, which included multiple stakeholders and embedded oversight mechanisms, and by adhering to the principle that everything in the budget needed to be clearly linked to articulated military requirements flowing from identified, prioritized mission sets, the system automatically and naturally reduced spaces where corruption could occur. One retired Guatemalan general went so far as to describe the SIPLAGDE as "a straightjacket that would even constrain the Minister" when it came to developing and executing budgets.

It is important to note that the establishment of any system that will produce good governance necessarily includes, as part of its narrative, the idea of combatting corruption. However, the SIPLAGDE was not designed nor ever envisioned as a mechanism to audit past practices; rather, it was a forward-looking project the intent of which was precisely to address the challenges articulated in the NDP (e.g., the misalignment of force structure with missions and budgets) and allow the Ministry to produce better defense contributions. In the process of improving management and planning practices, the SIPLAGDE necessarily increased transparency and accountability, two other hallmarks of good governance.

Considering Resource Management

Reform of the Ministry's financial management and budgeting systems was always on the table, given an original program objective was improving budgeting practices. As the project progressed, it became apparent that a major overhaul of these systems was required. The Ministry itself clearly recognized it was in a death spiral, even articulating in the NDP what the "end of the road" would look like if things were not improved.

Signs of the many challenges the Ministry faced and that made it perform inefficiently were readily apparent; some were highlighted earlier, including the significant mismatch between assigned missions and allocated budgets, a lack of transparency in how budgets were formulated and later executed, and budgets that responded to emergent tactical requirements rather than long-term policy priorities.

The root causes of these problems lay in the inability to properly manage those resource management processes as one integrated and integral element of the larger institution. The Ministry simply did not have adequate systems to execute these, including those that would implement coherent frameworks for force planning in order to then identify budgetary requirements; link those resource requests with intended outputs and outcomes; execute assigned allocations; and use measures of effectiveness to evaluate the results and inform future years' budgets. Stated differently, the Ministry couldn't determine what it needed, for what, how it would use that, and how it would evaluate its decisions.

These management gaps eventually led to the over-concentration of the financial management processes, contributing to these becoming opaque and opening ample space for corruption. The lack of transparency in financial decisions made it nearly impossible, for example, to determine where the money was going—i.e., how the amounts being received were being allocated throughout the force, both in terms of amounts and their responsiveness to force requirements. Furthermore, what items the military did acquire did not fully account for the funds that had been provided to the Ministry. Contracts were being awarded that were grossly overpriced and did not match the military's mission requirements. Also, there was no subsequent auditing to provide feedback that would highlight this or indicate the effectiveness of what was in fact received. Unsurprisingly, years of operating under these conditions had produced a hollowed-out military that was incapable of sustaining what little capabilities it possessed—an observation the NDP also made—let alone acquire new ones.

This situation also prevented the military from making the most of foreign assistance, including U.S. Security Cooperation. There were no processes to incorporate into the budget foreign funding (which increased the overall budget, displaced Ministry funds and released them for other uses) or to account for the operating costs of equipment received (e.g., for fuel, spares, and maintenance). There were also no processes to consider out-year sustainment costs, or costs associated by additional requirements generated by materiel assistance (e.g., new facilities, or training for personnel to operate and maintain the donated equipment). As in many other countries with similar challenges, the Ministry's natural tendency was to accept all assistance offered, and when funding dried up for those missions that were being funded, donated equipment would continue to be operated until all cannibalization opportunities were exhausted.

There were thus two main challenges in seeking to fix this situation, one procedural, the other socio-cultural. The procedural one entailed continuing on the reform path, i.e., establishing the processes and systems to produce program budgets responsive to force needs, and everything that entailed. The socio-cultural one entailed managing those actors who were benefiting from the current state of affairs.

The analytical and methodological approach employed in the reform effort provided two critical characteristics that were useful for addressing these challenges. First, it generated the requirement to look at those financial management and budgeting systems. Second, it provided an unassailable approach to addressing inefficiencies and ineffective resource management procedures. These characteristics were important because as the project began to get closer to the locus of major financial decisions, it would begin directly affecting individuals' wallets and their ability to influence the system for personal gain. The design of the project itself and the NDP's very public validation of the need to reform created the necessary conditions to continue. Also, by remaining both forward-looking and analytically-based, DIRI's approach had proposed solutions that could be demonstrated to have improved the Ministry's performance and were consequently difficult to argue against. The project was allowing the Ministry to identify the cost of "producing defense,"

to request the necessary resources, and subsequently to execute programs and measure their effectiveness; basic prerequisites to improving performance. Moreover, by this stage the reform effort had generated significant support throughout the Ministry and General Staff, as officers saw how the implementation of new management models would allow them to produce more effective military contributions and provide demonstrable results.

Since no management process in modern, complex systems exists in isolation—particularly those that produce resource requests—the reform of the Ministry’s resource management processes really began at the start of the reform effort as new methods were being implemented in force planning and new processes established for developing capabilities. What was required was integrating these efforts fully to produce value-added outcomes, as well as incorporating and redesigning the full complement of current budgeting and financial management processes.

With the SIPLAGDE in place, even in its initial, embryonic stages, the Ministry began using modern management tools and best practices to conduct long-term planning, and subsequently prepare budget requests (activities that were now grounded in policy priorities, nested under and responding to national security concerns on the use of the defense forces). In moving to the stage of actually formulating the budget, several agreed-upon core principles were applied:

- Only one, all-inclusive budget, i.e., all programs needed to be reflected and there could be no parallel or shadow budgets
- All programs validated and developed using capability-based planning models
- All funding streams included, e.g., including expected foreign assistance
- Adherence to international accounting standards and good practices
- Resource allocation tied to performance

Discussing the full complexity and processes involved in the Ministry’s budget development and its evolution is not possible here. However, it was during this stage that the other reform elements that had been developed and implemented came together to both “cost” defense and produce the budget to pay for it. The specific examples that follow highlight three of those key reform elements—capability-based planning, life cycle cost analysis, and logistics—and their role at this stage, while also highlighting other outcomes being produced as a consequence of their implementation. Continued process and functional modeling served to guide the effort to integrate these elements.

Modeling

The modeling of systems, functions, and processes to ensure alignment and correct development was a constant. During this stage it was important that all actors understood how the full system should function in order to produce a results-based program budget as an output, which would be based on inputs from the various sub-systems and ongoing

processes throughout the Ministry. The inputs for the budget had to be produced at the appropriate times, requiring the appropriate chronological alignment of different processes; each of these in turn had its own input requirements (e.g., policy directives or defense planning guidance), which also had to be properly sequenced. The integrated nature of the burgeoning governance system became ever-more apparent, and the modeling served to clarify and continue identifying gaps and offering solutions. Modeling also considered the post-budget request processes: assuming an approved budget, how would those resources be received, allocated, executed, controlled, and measured? As discussed previously, by comparing the model with the current structures and processes, the Ministry identified multiple areas that needed to be fixed in order to ensure that allocated resources were in fact applied to the programs, executed according to the established planning (which had generated the requirement for these resources), and measured in order to inform the next year's cycle. In order to achieve this outcome, new processes, authorities, and organizations would be required.

Planning

Capability-based planning drove the formulation of the 2014 military budget, along the way demonstrating the value of analytically-based, objective criteria assessments. The path from strategy and policy to budgets was being clearly established. The new planning paradigms were based on validated mission areas and responsive to articulated policies. Statements were produced to identify the capabilities necessary to produce effects in those mission areas; these generated program options for producing those capabilities. They were built out to identify requirements and costs associated with each, and the selected options were then translated into a budget request, considering fiscal realities.

As part of the budget formulation exercise, in the early months of 2013 all major programs being submitted for calendar-year 2014 funding had to be evaluated against validated capability requirements, their ability to be integrated into the larger force, and their total, life-cycle costs. This evaluation resulted in recommendations to cancel major programs, including one to fund new ships for the navy and another to acquire a major C4I program, which included radars and light attack Tucano aircraft from Brazil. The inability of the responsible agencies to clearly justify these programs in light of the new requirements being sought or the programs' total costs resulted in recommendations to cancel them. The subsequent and very public termination of Tucano contract (announced by the President himself) made headlines in both the Guatemalan and Brazilian press, with the unexplained, dramatic cost increase of that contract listed as a main reason for the decision.¹²

Life-cycle Cost Analysis

Life-cycle cost analysis (LCCA) of desired capabilities was a best practice the Ministry began implementing in its budgeting exercise. As with other militaries in the region, the Guatemalans had experience acquiring new materiel (including foreign donations,

as indicated above) only to see it cannibalized for spares in the out years for not having considered subsequent operation, maintenance, and sustainment costs. By employing LCCA as another tool, the Ministry was able to make better-informed decisions, resulting in part, as in the example above, in decisions to cancel programs.

LCCA also affected, from the early stages of the reform effort, Guatemala's outlook not just on programs being requested by different defense components, but also on U.S.-provided security assistance. The Guatemalans now had processes in place that would allow them to determine, first, whether foreign assistance met their capability requirements and could be incorporated without major distortions into their planned force, and second, whether they would be able to sustain and fund that materiel assistance in the out-years. In fact, this recognition of the need to ensure that U.S.-provided assistance would meet the needs of the military and be sustainable once U.S. assistance terminated was a major discussion topic during the first U.S.-Guatemala Bilateral Working Group. It resulted in the establishment of a sub-working group precisely to address the issue and seek mechanisms to align U.S. Security Cooperation offerings with the new planning-programming-budgeting cycles of the Ministry.¹³ In a self-assessment produced by the Ministry on the reform effort, this issue was also recognized: "We understood that many external assistance programs had been received without considering the ability of sustainment, maintenance, and technical specifications, and that in time the Ministry would not be able to sustain the projects. From then on the SIPLAGDE served to inform the Minister's decision regarding what to receive and what to request in terms of foreign assistance, in particular from the United States."¹⁴

Logistics

The role of the logistics system in determining force needs highlighted its inputs and contributions to the budget formulation and execution process, and thus its importance as a defense governance sub-system. It was this governance role—and not the execution of operational logistics functions—that generated the requirement for improvement in this system. This required both internal process improvements and appropriate integration of the logistics function with those resource management processes.

Certain logistics functions, for example identifying and costing the actual resources required to provide certain capabilities, are themselves processes that translate policy into budgets and thus are crucial to defense governance. Understanding this context was important in order to keep the improvements being sought in logistics management aligned with the overall effort to improve the Ministry's functioning.

The Logistics Support Command (*Comando de Apoyo Logístico*, CAL) had been created to perform consolidated logistics planning and acquisition, but had not fully executed those missions in part because lacking budgetary control authority, several functions, including contracting and acquisitions, had largely remained concentrated with other financial management functions in the MOD's Finance Directorate. Furthermore,

there were no processes in the military to accurately account, down to the unit level, for allocated funding and equipment (e.g., inventories and utilization rates); as such, there was also no data available to inform future planning and budgeting decisions.

Those gaps, however, would need to be addressed to allow the CAL to perform its functions. For example, in establishing the SIPLAGDE, the CAL played the major role in the performance-based programming component of the system, through its development of the full portfolio of programs and their associated projects designed to ensure the required, identified capabilities could be acquired and sustained. One output was a comprehensive program architecture that could be costed, in the process performing the policy-to-budget translation function. Creating this new process in the CAL also anchored and integrated the logistics system into the larger governance system. To inform this and other processes, information was needed as to the disposition and performance of previous years' acquisitions. CAL eventually produced tables identifying utilization rates (e.g., including fuel and spares) and estimated requirements based on each unit's table of organization and equipment (TOE), operating conditions, and assigned missions. While supporting the upcoming year's planning process, this new visibility throughout the force also provided the CAL information, which allowed the Ministry to make informed decisions on operational-level issues such as fuel distribution. For example, where previously fuel quotas were determined using the same formula, the introduction of additional variables such as the different fuel consumption of different vehicles, different operating terrain (mountainous jungle vs. city street), and different missions (constant border patrol vs. commander's vehicle) allowed the CAL to develop a stop-light matrix correlating current fuel supplies with expected requirements based on those variables, and providing a visibility that then permitted informed fuel distribution decisions to be made. The information served not just the CAL but could also be compiled into reports for the General Staff and even the Minister. This and other examples in developing the force's logistical requirements began yielding cost savings through the identification and elimination of excesses that were previously unaccounted for, and through improvement of inefficient distributions of resources, while helping to constantly evaluate requirements for future years' budgets.

In focusing on improving the Ministry's budgeting processes then, these elements—continued modeling, implementation of a capabilities-based planning process to identify requirements, LCCA, and the logistics system's role in governance—were only a few of several that were required in order to achieve that outcome. The mechanical exercise of creating a budget thus relied on system-wide inputs from processes that resided throughout the organization. The interrelated nature of these provided built-in oversight mechanisms while simultaneously producing transparency and accountability. More importantly, they were also generating increasing requirements for transparency and accountability in other processes in order for the full system to function appropriately, a conclusion further supported by the analytical modeling.

Resource Management Reforms

Those requirements, along with the need to continue seeking efficiencies, induced the Ministry to produce directives establishing new procedures in two areas; contracting and acquisitions, and budget control and execution. These policy directives were significant in that they formally began to break apart the largely singular and somewhat insular process for financial decisions resident in the Financial Directorate. By deliberately introducing inefficiencies at the lower, process level, the larger system would gain in efficiency; this was captured pithily as, “he who requests doesn’t pay; he who pays, doesn’t receive; he who receives, doesn’t use.” By making different actors responsible for different processes in the financial management system, the Ministry was also establishing additional, embedded oversight and accountability mechanisms.

These directives brought the contracting and acquisition functions to the CAL (generating the establishment of a new office to perform them); it also designated 12 defense organizations as budget execution units with associated cost centers, providing them authorities and responsibilities for the execution of their respective allocated budgets. The Finance Directorate would have a continuing role, but one significantly reduced in terms of authorities and responsibilities, as the budget execution, for example, would be largely removed and distributed among the 12 organizations.¹⁵ These policy-driven reforms in defense were bringing the Ministry’s financial practices in line with the government’s public financial accounting systems, many of which were web-based and publicly accessible, thereby creating additional transparency, accountability, and oversight mechanisms. These were mechanisms that resided outside of the defense institution, allowing not just the government but the people to see where their tax dollars were being spent. These changes also brought the Ministry into greater compliance with current legislation. They were later further back-stopped by congressionally-led changes in the country’s contracting laws, which mandated what the Ministry was essentially on the path to already establishing.¹⁶

Several observations can be made about impacts at the institutional/governance level. First is that the system itself was not just identifying problems but also producing its own solutions to them. Notably, the initial specified objectives of the Minister—a defense policy and budget process improvements—were produced not by focusing on those as the outcomes, but by addressing defense governance mechanisms that later produced those as outputs because the system required it. Secondly, key acquisition decisions were being made based on recommendations from the system’s processes—reducing the role of personalities and their influence. Third, the system and its processes were changing the Ministry’s relationship with a key foreign donor, the United States, and elevating the nature of the conversations in that relationship. In this regard we can understand the Ministry’s implementation of governance and management platforms as affecting the foreign policy realm (i.e., relations with the United States) and also implying a changing domestic role for Defense in the government’s internal conversations on foreign policy. Fourth, the role for logistics was re-conceptualized; beyond playing a functional/operational role (getting the forces what they needed), it became a governance sub-system in its own right, and one

with critically important responsibilities. Finally, Ministry policy was leading legislative changes. The Ministry was well on its way to implementing new structures to produce financial transparency prior to the law catching up and legally mandating the path the Ministry had already embarked on. These legislative changes further validated, protected, and served to consolidate the reforms implemented to that point.

Restructured Force: Case Study in Governance Outcomes

The initial, reformed processes the Ministry began implementing were the building blocks that generated new forms of governance. As they were being established, they began producing outcomes, several of which have already been identified. As seen above, even as they were being employed for one purpose these emerging governance systems and processes began identifying other gaps, which in turn generated discussions on solutions. The new planning and budgeting processes, for example, highlighted the need for a dedicated office to oversee and shepherd them along, but none existed; after identifying this requirement, the General Staff established the D7 Office of Strategic Plans and Policy to perform those functions, in the process also creating a natural coordination point with the Vice Ministry of Plans and Policy, which had been established earlier in the reform effort.

The most dramatic organizational change that occurred was the reorganization of the military structure into regional commands (RC). There were two main drivers for this change, each illustrating how the SIPLAGDE itself was driving reforms. The first was that these new governance platforms increasingly required more attention from the General Staff, and required that this organization function more like a general staff than an operational Army headquarters.¹⁷ Functions like long-term planning, budgeting, and logistics management to support the entire force were consuming more of the staff's resources and time, necessitating a new structure and allowing the institution to better focus on operations while still managing those staff functions.


The second driver was generated by the actual results being produced by employing new planning frameworks. The establishment of new mission areas and the implementation of capability-generating processes were producing solutions that spoke to a new military structure being required. For example, one mission area addressed what is commonly called "defense support to civil authorities" during events such as natural disasters. Another mission area addressed the need to improve the country's sovereignty. Further breakdown of this area yielded the need for a greater focus on securing the borders, with the goal of preventing or diminishing the illicit trafficking (in arms, drugs, and people) that was generating multiple internal security problems. Identifying and analyzing the requirements for a command and control structure for these mission areas supported an option in which the forces would be structured differently, in order to achieve efficiencies in this capability. This analysis played into the option being generated that recommended the force restructure.¹⁸

The establishment of RCs would relieve the General Staff of daily operational responsibilities, as these would reside with each RC Commander. The existing structure


had all of the Army’s eleven brigades responding directly to the General Staff, making the Chief of Defense (CHOD) essentially three-hatted: Chief of General Staff, Army Commander, and Operational Commander. Under the new construct, the brigades would be incorporated into the RCs, removing the operational responsibilities from the General Staff and allowing it to focus on the longer-term development and ongoing sustainment of the force. The RCs would have assigned forces (i.e., multiple brigades) and would operate in a defined area of responsibility, providing the focus and necessary capabilities to meet the operational demands of each mission area.

This course of action was recommended and subsequently approved by the defense leaders. Graphics produced by the Ministry to communicate the changes show this before-and-after transformation:

Before



After



The “Before” slide, shows the original force structure with 20 distinct units encompassing 15 Army Brigades and disparate Air Force and Navy units, as well as functional command

headquarters all reporting directly to the General Staff (JEMDN). The “After” slide shows the new structure of four regional commands each with its assigned brigades, and other units reporting through their functional parent command (Logistics, Education, Strategic, Air Force, and Navy).

The first RC was stood up and a commander named following the publication of a governmental accord in July 2015 indicating its establishment, “With the aim of strengthening peace and internal security in the national territory, and to continue with the process of force design contained in the Integrated Defense Planning and Management System, an organizational restructuring of military units is necessary, to that effect creating the Central Regional Command.”¹⁹ Ministry-internal policy directives would later prioritize the stand-up of the other regional commands, along with the resources necessary to ensure their full functioning.

The area of responsibility of the Central RC consisted of four administrative departments, which covered the capital city and three adjacent areas, including part of the country’s Pacific Coast; this RC—and by inference the entire RC construct—would show its value-added months later when in October heavy rains caused major landslides a few miles east of capital city. The military support to the government’s relief operations was provided, coordinated, and directed by the Central RC—not by the General Staff. The new organizational construct facilitated the military’s ability to respond—the forces were already designated, command structures established, and capabilities resident in the RC. The General Staff was in the background ensuring the Central RC’s efforts would be sustained and supported, while being able to better focus on liaison activities with the national government in responding to this crisis.

In addition to the observed and expected operational benefits, the Army’s organizational transformation was very significant in what it represented: this new structure operationalized a strategic vision for defense’s contributions to the government’s national security agenda, as articulated in those normative documents produced by the STCNS. It was a visible manifestation of how the military was transforming in response to national security requirements, and thus to the citizens’ needs—the essence of social accountability.

This structural change was also noteworthy in the several ways in which it supported institution building. For starters, by producing this outcome, the governance platform validated itself: it demonstrated the ability to produce options of both a strategic and structural nature, and to do so guided by governmental policies and strategies. The Army was producing new and innovative solutions (new force structures) employing a flexible and responsive “solutions-producing” system (SIPLAGDE).

The fact that the published government accord specifically identified the SIPLAGDE was also important institutionally. The governance platform, which by now had been repeatedly identified in several official Ministry publications, was being cited by the government as the responsible entity for generating this change: the accord implied the Army was not requesting authority to reorganize, but rather a process within a governance system had produced that recommendation as its output.

The transformation itself produced a new governance sub-system, necessarily integrated into the larger system, and thus strengthening the entire construct. The creation of this sub-system is actually captured above in the “after” slide, which the Ministry titled “Guatemalan Army’s Theater Management System” (SGT-EG). This title carries the recognition that the establishment of this new organizational structure itself created a new management system in the defense institutions. As with the other systems and processes being established, the SGT-EG would be fully integrated and would be cross-cutting across several of those processes—logistics, resource management, long-term planning, etc.—required for defense governance. As stated earlier, the ability to separate any one process or sub-system would become nearly impossible, ensuring the survival of the whole and contributing to overall system stability.

Additionally, in order for each RC to be fully functional it would require financial resources be assigned in order to be executed at that level, further decentralizing budgetary execution. In fact, the Central RC was one of those organizations designated a budget execution unit. The establishment of the RCs would also have an impact on local economies. A factor considered in their establishment was their ability to acquire supplies (e.g., fuel and food) closer to their point of use, something that was not possible with the earlier construct. Each RC would count with the financial resources required, as well as a regionally-based logistics support command responsive to its requirements, allowing them to enter into arrangements with local suppliers, in the process likely reducing overall transit and warehousing costs for the military. These factors could be leveraged to generate greater civil-military relations and cooperation, as military units and the communities in which they resided grew more interdependent.

Finally, in line with the new policies (cost centers) and paradigms (results-based budgeting), the RCs would need to provide data in order to secure resources for future years. This would need to include not just financial accounting for expenses, but operational data to determine how each was performing its mission, in turn contributing to other factors that were generating system-wide requirements for metrics and evaluations.²⁰

Conclusion

These are only a few of the outcomes the Guatemala MOD produced through the DIRI support. There were others, for example the complete revamping of professional military education and officer development to produce future managers and “thinker-leaders,” in turn supporting the sustainment of the reforms. There were also domestic and regional spillover effects as the MOD shared its lessons learned and included “defense governance and institution building” as topics in its engagements.

The top-down approach of the DIRI project—i.e., focused on producing good governance—is what allowed those and other outcomes to be produced. The Minister had requested support to address very specific challenges and produce very specific outputs. The DIRI project delivered those outputs not by focusing on them as key objectives, but

by understanding them as expected products from an efficiently functioning Ministry. The issue then was one of improving ministerial capacity writ large, and not one of addressing singular processes. Even at its inception the DIRI project was designed to improve defense governance, and to do so by establishing a high-level, integrated governance system. Furthermore, the project design and its sequencing very deliberately and carefully considered how and when those initial specific outputs would be produced, ensuring the Minister's objectives would be met, and that they would be achieved within acceptable timeframes. This focus on governance also naturally addressed the Ministry's critical defense management functions; more importantly, it addressed their relationships and interactions with each other, while improving them in a parallel, integrated fashion, ensuring the management system being created was stable and integrated from the start. With the system in place, the Ministry now had a platform that allowed its leaders to continually produce new solutions to the challenges in defense—and also produce relevant and sustainable defense contributions. The Ministry would be able to determine what kind of military it needed, for what missions, and how much it would cost to produce it.

Also key to success in Guatemala were a variety of favorable factors recognized as necessary for any reform effort, including the presence of key drivers for reform; buy-in from the highest political level, in the Guatemalan case going all the way up to the presidency; a clear champion for change; and several quick wins early on that demonstrated the value of reform and generated additional momentum and commitment to change. Support and buy-in from U.S. stakeholders was also critical to the reform effort, as it communicated continued U.S. support and commitment, while serving as an important acknowledgement of Guatemalans' accomplishments.

The broader U.S.-Guatemala security cooperation relationship will be key in supporting the continued consolidation and sustainment of the reforms, recognizing that the DIRI effort in Guatemala will have to formally conclude at some point. Rethinking the execution of this relationship, including those considerations that the Guatemalans' identified in their self-assessment, will be critical so that assistance does not unintentionally undo or distort what they have produced. Forcing U.S. equipment solutions without consideration to their governance cycles and the requirements they generate, is the wrong approach. There are too many examples of donated U.S. equipment being the wrong kind for the partner nation's mission requirements or being too costly to maintain and operate. How we plan for and provide security cooperation assistance, how we deliver it, and how we work within the Guatemalan Ministry's constructs and timelines will all need to be reconsidered. Fully understanding Guatemala's reform accomplishments and thus its new military requirements is a necessary first step. In the end, this will not only provide better support to our partner, but will ensure that our assistance will be maintained and sustained in the out years, and continue to produce value-added military contributions based on their requirements.

Notes

1 *Agenda Estratégica de Seguridad de la Nación* (Guatemala City: National Security Council Secretariat of Guatemala, October 2012), 1.

2 This is akin to the concept of business process modeling, a practice from the private sector that seeks to graphically represent a business's processes in order to analyze them and implement process improvements.

3 *Política de Defensa de la Nación* (Guatemala City: Guatemala Ministry of Defense, November 2013), 10.

4 *Ibid.*, 11.

5 *Ibid.*, 9.

6 *Ibid.*, 15.

7 *Libro de la Defensa Nacional de la República de Guatemala – EVOLUCION* (Guatemala City: Guatemala Ministry of Defense, 2015), 47.

8 Like BPM, this term and concept, like several others utilized during the execution of the project, is borrowed from private business practices. The MOD's Defense White Book specifically cites Michael E. Porter, *Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance*, 1985.

9 Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, *DOD Directive 5000.01 Defense Acquisition System* (Washington, DC: Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, November 20, 2007), page 3, paragraph 4.1 states: "The Defense Acquisition System exists to manage the nation's investments in technologies, programs, and product support necessary to achieve the National Security Strategy and support the United States Armed Forces. The investment strategy of the Department of Defense shall be postured to support not only today's force, but also the next force, and future forces beyond that."

10 Samuel Huntington, "The Two Worlds of Military Policy," in Frank B. Horton III, Anthony C. Rogerson, and Edward L. Warner III, *Comparative Defense Policy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 109. Huntington describes strategic decisions as those "made in the category or currency of international politics" (e.g., decisions on the war plans and the size of military forces) and structural decisions as those "made in the currency of domestic politics" (e.g., budget and personnel decisions).

11 The Vice Ministry for Plans and Policy, a new office created as part of the reform effort, provided the natural connection point between the Ministry and the Congress. Incumbents in that position made full use of this opportunity, establishing robust communications with the Congress to inform them of ongoing progress in defense reform efforts. Utilizing this communications mechanism, and armed with the analysis and planning that had supported the budget development, the VMOD was able, in 2014, to convince the Defense Commission to restore funds that had been reduced as part of cuts to the defense budget.

12 Luciana Collet, "Guatemala cancela compra de Super Tucanos, diz jornal," November 18, 2013, available at <<http://atarde.uol.com.br/economia/materias/1549331-guatemala-cancela-compra-de-super-tucanos-diz-jornal>>.

13 U.S.-Guatemala Defense Bilateral Working Group, Joint Declaration, Guatemala City, May 11-12, 2015.

14 Guatemalan Ministry of Defense Self-assessment, 2015 (author's translation), 9.

15 As of the writing of this chapter (November 2016), the full implementation of those new processes and authorities was still ongoing and changes were still occurring. For example, after the establishment in the CAL of a *Guatecompras* office, which would perform the contracting functions via the government's eponymous public website, the Ministry was considering moving that new office out of CAL and bringing it under the Minister as an independent agency. This move was being considered to prevent creating another "super directorate" with too many authorities in financial decisions.

16 Jessica Gramajo and Andrea Orozco, "Congreso aprueba cambios a Ley de Contrataciones," *Prensa Libre*, November 17, 2015, available at <<http://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/politica/ley-de-contrataciones-podria-cambiar-este-martes>>.

17 The Chief of the Defense Staff (CHOD) was also the Army Commander (to which the Air Force and the Navy were subordinated); as such, operational command flowed from the CHOD directly to the multiple brigades conducting military operations.

18 The process by which the Ministry produced this recommendation was very involved and also considered many other factors, for example, the military's relationships with local communities and economies, and the need for streamlined management structures.

19 *Acuerdo Gubernativo Número 189-2015*, July 21, 2015 (author's translation).

20 The General Staff's D7 conducted an operational evaluation of the Central RC a year after its stand-up, a process strongly supported by the Commander, who recognized that the path to securing greater resources for mission accomplishment lay precisely in identifying where performance could be improved when the all authorized resources were assigned.

Lessons from Afghanistan

Jack D. Kem

Shortly after the fall of the Taliban in December 2001, the United Nations hosted Afghan and world leaders in Bonn, Germany, to discuss and develop an agreement that would form the basis for international support to establish a representative form of government in Afghanistan. On December 5, 2001, the conferees adopted the *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions*, or “The Bonn Agreement.” This agreement included the framework for drafting a new constitution for Afghanistan, established the interim authority for governance, and created the Afghan Supreme Court.

Also established was the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to monitor and assist in the implementation of the Agreement. The signatories proposed the development of a United Nations-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help Afghan authorities establish and train new Afghan security and armed forces. ISAF would give the interim government the security that was necessary to develop governmental institutions and legislation while establishing the new Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). The UN endorsed the Bonn Agreement in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1383 on December 6, 2001, and authorized the establishment of ISAF under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in UNSCR 1386.

Shortly after the Bonn Conference, in April 2002, the United States and other nations met in Geneva, Switzerland to discuss the requirements and funding needed to train the new ANSF. Using a “lead nation” approach, five nations volunteered to lead efforts in Afghanistan: the United States in establishing the Afghan National Army (ANA); Italy in establishing the judiciary system; Germany in establishing law enforcement agencies; Japan in disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating the Afghan Military Forces into society; and the United Kingdom in engaging in counter-narcotics. This “lead nation” approach changed over time as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command and control structures, international coordination agencies, and host nation governmental institutions developed in Afghanistan, with NATO and, ultimately, the United States assuming a broader role.

The Afghan Interim Government and the international community refined the objectives of the Bonn Agreement at a number of subsequent conferences. The London Conference of 2006 marked a turning point in Afghan sovereignty. At the conference, world leaders signed the Afghanistan Compact and marked the end of the initial Bonn process.

With the adoption of a new constitution and completion of a presidential election in 2004, and the completion of the parliamentary and provincial elections in 2005, Afghanistan was now ready to transition from the Interim Government through the Transitional Government to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA).

One of the key outcomes of the 2006 London Conference was the development of the Afghanistan Compact—an agreement that provided a shared vision of the future of Afghanistan, as well as a commitment by the international community to provide resources and support to realize that vision. The Afghanistan Compact also included a list of detailed outcomes, benchmarks, and timelines for both Afghanistan and the international community. The Afghanistan Compact established goals for the end of 2010 and a mechanism for coordinating Afghan and international efforts to achieve these goals. Security was a central theme in the Afghanistan Compact, which listed it as the first of three pillars of activity for the next five years (along with “Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights” and “Economic and Social Development”). The delegation recognized that “security cannot be provided by military means alone. It requires good governance, justice and the rule of law, reinforced by reconstruction and development.”¹ It addressed the development of the ANA and the Afghan National Police (ANP) under the single concept of developing security forces, setting the benchmark ceilings of 70,000 for the ANA and 62,000 for the ANP.

In April 2009, the North Atlantic Council met at the NATO Summit in Strasbourg-Kehl, Germany. During this Summit, the Council decided to create NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) as a parallel effort to NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). One of the key issues of the NTM-A charter was that ministerial development of the Afghan Ministries of Interior and Defense were not authorized.

In January 2010, key stakeholders met again in London. One week prior to the conference, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) endorsed the *Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme of the Government of Afghanistan*. The peace program had the intent to promote peace through a political approach and to encourage Taliban fighters and leaders, previously siding with armed opposition and extremist groups, to renounce violence and join a constructive process of reintegration. The program was in line with President Karzai’s vision for his second term as outlined in his inauguration speech. The JCMB also approved an increase in the number of soldiers in the ANA up to 171,600 and the number of police officers in the ANP up to 134,000 by October 2011.

The conference later that month, co-hosted by UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, built on the work from the 2006 London Conference to continue to strengthen Afghan leadership, improve security, and build a better future for the Afghan people. According to Prime Minister Brown, the purpose of the conference was to “drive forward our campaign in Afghanistan, to match the increase in military forces with an increased political momentum, to focus the international community on a clear set of priorities across the 43-nation coalition and marshal the maximum international effort to help the Afghan government deliver.”² Discussions focused on several key areas, including security, development, and

governance, and the regional framework and international architecture. The London Conference, as well as the follow-on conference in Kabul held in July 2010, constituted “defining moments in the reconfiguration of the relationship between Afghanistan and the international community.”³

Later that year, a number of follow-on conferences and summits were held concerning the future of Afghanistan, including the Kabul Conference in July and the NATO Lisbon Summit in November. The Kabul Conference was a continuation of a number of international conferences (including the 2010 London Conference and Consultative Peace Jirga) that comprised the “Kabul Process.” The topic of security received thorough coverage and the conference welcomed the Afghan government’s intent to gain full authority over its own security, with an objective of having the ANSF in the lead of military operations throughout the country by the end of 2014. The international community also endorsed the continuation of the growth of the ANSF to 171,600 personnel in the ANA and 134,000 in the ANP by October 31, 2011.

The Lisbon Summit that November, was described by former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen as “the most important summit in NATO’s history.”⁴ A wide-range of topics was discussed, including NATO’s New Strategic Concept, reforms to NATO’s Military Command Structure, the establishment of an Enduring Partnership between NATO and Afghanistan, affirmation of NATO’s “open door” admittance policy, and a commitment to a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia.⁵ Of the three major declarations that were issued at the Lisbon Summit, two directly related to the enduring commitment by NATO and ISAF to Afghanistan, emphasizing international support for the GIRoA in achieving the transition to an Afghan lead for security in all of the provinces in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, consistent with the *Inteqal* (transition) process that was agreed to at the July Kabul Conference.

Insights and Lessons

There are four key insights and lessons that can be derived from the background of security sector reform and defense institution building (DIB) efforts in Afghanistan described above. First, in the context of an active conflict, the participation of the international community is essential for success of DIB. Having the support of the international community provides legitimacy to efforts and fosters burden sharing to some extent. Second, the active participation of the international community comes at a price; it slows down efforts, can be frustrating at times, and not all members of the international community have the capacity or the will to share the burden equitably. In addition, differences in approach can cause friction; for police efforts, for instance, the concept of policing varies by country. Third, having host nation participation in international conferences and meetings is absolutely essential for success in an institutional transition. Finally, the language of international declarations, compacts, and agreements has great importance. Language that may seem benign at the time may have an enormous impact in the future for determining mandates and authorities.

Development of NTM-A/CSTC-A to Lead DIB Efforts in Afghanistan

The establishment of a separate three-star headquarters in Afghanistan as the “training command” was a vital step in creating the organizational structure to enable the eventual transition of full control to the Afghan government.

In November 2009, NATO approved the creation of the Training Mission-Afghanistan, or NTM-A.⁶ NTM-A was joined with the American Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, or CSTC-A, which had been responsible for training and advising the Afghan Army. The new, combined NTM-A/CSTC-A was a dual-hatted training command under a single commander—Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV—that would be both a U.S. and NATO headquarters.

According to the April 2010 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) “Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces,” otherwise known as the “Section 1230/1231 Report,” the creation of NTM-A was a significant achievement in the ANSF development strategy:

NTM-A was established to provide a coordinated training mission for the ANSF, under a single NATO framework, to focus international contributions and standardize overall ANSF development efforts. The dual-hatted U.S. NTM-A/CSTC-A commander is synchronizing ANA and ANP training under a single umbrella, allowing him to draw on, and more effectively employ, in-theater resources. In addition to manning, training, equipping, and sustaining the ANSF, NTM-A is responsible for development of higher-level training, including defense colleges and academies, and is responsible for ANSF doctrine development. The U.S.-commanded CSTC-A retained the bilateral responsibility of the ministerial development missions within [Ministry of Defense] MOD and [Ministry of Interior] MOI, along with control over U.S. Title 10 (DOD) funding responsibilities through ASFF [Afghan Security Forces Fund].⁷

The NATO Summit in Strasbourg-Kehl in April 2009, established the charter for NTM-A—a charter that did not include ministerial development of the Afghan Ministries of Interior and Defense. As a result, although NTM-A and CSTC-A were for the most part an integrated headquarters, ministerial development for the Ministries of Interior and Defense were solely U.S. missions under CSTC-A.

In order to accomplish ministerial development, as well as force generation and the other missions of NTM-A/CSTC-A, Lieutenant General Caldwell structured his organization with two Deputy Commanders (DCOMs): one for the ANP and one for the ANA. Within these two DCOMs (both of which fell under the CSTC-A mandate), he created separate organizations for ministerial development: ANP Development under DCOM-Police, and ANA Development under DCOM-Army. All of the advisors for the respective ministries fell under one of these two DCOMs.

For both the MOD and MOI, NTM-A developed Ministerial Development Plans (MDPs). These plans provided an assessment of the respective ministries, with measures of effectiveness and measures of performance for all of the sub-elements of the ministries. Between the two ministries, there were over 500 advisors that maintained a daily presence in the ministries.

These 500 advisors were generally evenly spread out between the MOD and MOI. The rank structure of the advisors varied greatly; for the most senior officials in the ministries, the advisors were senior Colonels who advised their principal on a full-time basis. The majority of the advisors were dual-hatted with other responsibilities throughout CSTC-A. For these advisors, this provided a challenge in providing the continuity of assistance in developing the necessary institutions for the two ministries.

One of the major challenges for many of the advisors was the issue of translation; many of the senior Colonel-level advisors were provided translators to assist in advising. For those advisors who did not have full-time translators, the issue of language was a constant barrier to providing quality advising.

Funding Mechanisms

In order to sustain the development of the ANSF and supporting defense institutions, several funding mechanisms were developed by the United States and the international community, including the Afghan Security Forces Fund, the Law and Order Trust Fund, and the ANA Trust Fund. Afghanistan is highly dependent on donor countries to provide funding for DIB efforts. The impact of decades of war has decimated the economy, hence international support for a sustained period of time is necessary to ensure DIB efforts are completed and sustained.

The Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) is a two-year appropriation within the U.S. Department of Defense Appropriations Act. Congress created the ASFF to provide the Afghan National Security Forces with equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction. Since 2002, ASFF appropriations have totaled almost \$64 billion⁸. The wording of the legislation for the ASFF has been relatively consistent; the following is from the 2011 Defense Appropriation:

For the 'Afghanistan Security Forces Fund' . . . Provided, That such funds shall be available to the Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the purpose of allowing the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, or the Secretary's designee, to provide assistance, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to the security forces of Afghanistan, including the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction, and funding: Provided further, That the authority to provide assistance under this heading is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign nations: . . . Provided further, That contributions of funds for the purposes provided herein from any

*person, foreign government, or international organization may be credited to this Fund and used for such purposes: Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees in writing upon the receipt and upon the obligation of any contribution, delineating the sources and amounts of the funds received and the specific use of such contribution.*⁹

Since the ASFF has traditionally been a two-year appropriation, this has provided flexibility in the commitment and obligation of funds. The “high-water” mark for the ASFF was in 2011 at \$11 billion, and has decreased to under \$4 billion since Fiscal Year (FY) 2014.¹⁰ The flexibility provided by having two-year appropriations enabled CSTC-A to develop multi-year programs without the normal constraints of single-year reconciliation of obligations and commitments. This was particularly helpful when dealing with construction delays due to the working environment in Afghanistan.

The Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA) is a fund administered by the UNDP to pay the salaries of the ANP and to assist in building the capacity of the Afghan MOI. Since 2002, almost \$4.66 billion has been paid into LOTFA; the United States has paid almost \$1.56 billion into the fund.¹¹ The payment of funds for LOTFA contributions comes from CSTC-A’s ASFF funds; as such, the United States provides indirect payments for the salaries of the ANP. The LOTFA mechanism was critical to ensure that ANP salaries were paid in a timely manner—a crucial element for the ANPs success.

To enable NATO and ISAF members to provide support to the ANSF, NATO developed the ANA Trust Fund in 2007. This trust fund is administered through NATO Headquarters, but expenditures are through a separate budget activity in the ASFF. In FY 2012, the total amount budgeted from the NATO ANA Trust Fund was just under \$116 million. Generally, these funds are earmarked for specific projects by the donor country.¹² In 2010, NATO also created the NATO Literacy Trust Fund for Afghanistan, enabling countries to provide funds to support Literacy Programs for the ANA and ANP.

Ministerial Development in the Ministry of Defense

Within the Afghan MOD, CSTC-A was the largest provider of advisors, but not the only provider. There was a broader multinational effort to develop civil authority throughout the MOD. As a result, many offices there housed a U.S. advisor as well as an advisor from another country or international organization. This reality exposed the risk of initiating projects that were redundant, or in competition, with the efforts of other governmental and nongovernmental organizations operating within Afghanistan. That said, shortly after the 2002 Bonn Conference, the United States had been designated as the “lead nation” for establishing the ANA. Because of this long relationship with the ANA, and because the vast majority of the funding for the MOD came from the United States, the U.S. advisors were considered the senior advisors. This greatly contributed to unity of effort within the ministries and a common aim of meeting the goals and objectives of the MDPs.

The reach of the CSTC-A advisors was also extensive; CSTC-A provided advisors

throughout the MOD and to Army headquarters and functions above the Corps level, which also included the Army schools, logistical facilities, and the Afghan Air Force. This provided a level of oversight and advising for many of the functional areas of the MOD. For example, within the logistics function, CSTC-A had advisors with the Deputy Minister of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, with the ANA General Staff G4/Chief of Logistics, with the Afghan depots throughout the country, and with the Logistics School. This enabled CSTC-A to develop MDPs for not only specific units and headquarters, but also for functions such as logistics and intelligence.

Ministerial Development in the Ministry of Interior

Within the Ministry of Interior, CSTC-A was again the largest provider of advisors, but not the only provider. The international effort to assist in developing the police and the law enforcement system was much more extensive than that of the Army. There were a number of reasons for this: first, the United States was not the original “lead nation” for establishing the ANP—Germany had been assigned that role after the Bonn Conference in 2002, but the United States became increasingly involved in 2005 when it became clear that Germany’s Kabul-centric approach was not working. Second, although the United States provided the majority of the funding for the MOI, this funding was indirect and provided through the Law and Order Trust Fund-Afghanistan (LOTFA), which was managed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Third, the European Union provided police development support through the European Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan). Finally, the international community had established the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB), which provided oversight of police development.

As the original “lead nation” for establishing law enforcement agencies in Afghanistan, Germany still played a major role as late as 2011 in the development of the ANP. The German Police Project Team (GPPT) continued to support the efforts of NTM-A/CSTC-A by training and mentoring Afghan police recruits and trainers. The GPPT consisted of approximately 200 German police officers that volunteered to come to Afghanistan to train and mentor Afghan police forces. The GPPT also supported literacy training for Afghan police recruits. Congruently, the German government was involved in the construction of police stations in northern Afghanistan and police checkpoints throughout the country.

In 2007, in addition to the GPPT, the European Union established EUPOL Afghanistan in order to unite international contributions to police reform in Afghanistan under one organization. The EUPOL mission statement describes best their charter:

EUPOL Afghanistan shall significantly contribute to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements, which will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system, in keeping with the policy advice and institution building work of the Community, Member States and other international actors. Further, the Mission will support the reform process towards a trusted and efficient police service, which works in

*accordance with international standards, within the framework of the rule of law and respects human rights.*¹³

EUPOL Afghanistan had six strategic objectives: police command, control, and communications; intelligence-led policing; criminal investigation department capacity building; implementation of the anti-corruption strategy; police-justice cooperation; and strengthening gender and human rights aspects within the ANP.¹⁴ As of June 20, 2011, EUPOL's mission strength consisted of 295 international personnel and 172 Afghan nationals. The international personnel consisted of 166 police officers, 44 rule of law experts, and 85 civilian experts, with 208 of the personnel deployed in Kabul, 84 in the regions, and 3 in the Mission Support Element in Brussels.

Insights and Lessons

There are a number of insights and lessons that can be derived from the development of NTM-A/CSTC-A to lead DIB efforts in Afghanistan. First, the active participation of the international community is, again, essential for success of ministerial development, particularly within the MOI and MOD as they require linkage to the corrections and court systems. Second, as noted above, the language of international declarations, compacts, and agreements may have an enormous impact in the future for determining mandates and authorities; for ministerial development, the language of the NTM-A charter had a dramatic impact on the mandate for CSTC-A and an impact on the legitimacy of U.S. actions. Third, funding reliability and spending flexibility is key in a contingency operation, but this requires sufficient mechanisms to ensure that funds are committed and obligated within the letter and the spirit of the law. In addition, working through external funding mechanisms, such as LOTFA, provides legitimacy, but also provides less accountability and control. Finally, the terms used to describe "mentors" or "advisors" can have an emotional connotation; "mentors" indicates a level of superiority, which is not always well-received by the "mentee" (especially if the "mentor" is a U.S. Colonel and the "mentee" is an Afghan General Officer). Even the less offensive term of "advisor" can cause problems; in Afghanistan, "advisor" was the same term the Soviets used for their "mentors" providing the same function.

Initiatives to Strengthen Defense Institutions in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, there were four areas that were particularly troublesome in developing the necessary institutions: literacy, gender equality and integration, the rule of law, and corruption. All four of these areas constituted barriers that needed to be addressed in order to develop quality institutions that could be sustained. Therefore, after the establishment of NTM-A, a number of initiatives were undertaken to ensure that the focus for the ANSF was not only on quantity, but also on quality. These initiatives were designed to ensure that the ANSF is well-led, well-trained, well-equipped, well-paid, and increasingly literate.

ANSF Literacy Program

Literacy was the first issue identified as a major barrier to DIB efforts in Afghanistan. Having a basic level of literacy across the security forces is a requirement for developing the systems and organizations to develop sustainable institutions.

Prior to 2009, the CSTC-A literacy program for the ANSF was nascent and disjointed, with the existing ANA and ANP programs running independently of a common curriculum and framework. In November 2009, there were fewer than 13,000 students in literacy training across the ANSF. None of the training was mandatory, and the ANSF lacked any form of testing system. At that time, only 14 percent of the ANP and the ANA recruits demonstrated any level of literacy proficiency. NTM-A/CSTC-A immediately established a strategy focused on growing educational capacity to ensure all recruits received literacy training, and simultaneously established initial entry placement procedures. Standardized evaluations were developed in coordination with the Afghan Ministry of Education, creating one standard between the military and the police.

On March 13, 2010, Lieutenant General Caldwell initiated mandatory literacy training in the ANSF, starting with the goal of achieving first grade literacy based on a 64-hour block of instruction for soldiers and police attending basic training. By late summer 2010, the ANSF had approximately 25,000 students in training. NTM-A/CSTC-A aimed to have 50,000 students in training by December 2010, and 100,000 students in training by July 2011.

By August 2011, NTM-A/CSTC-A had over 3,000 literacy instructors providing classes to roughly 80,000 students. Additionally, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ) was providing literacy training to 4,500 of the ANP in the Regional Command-North (RC-North) area of operations. From November 2009 to August 2011, over 120,000 soldiers and police had completed some level of literacy training.

The key goal of the literacy program was to develop a stable, secure Afghanistan, built in one part by a literate, educated society, which would be less prone to harboring terrorists and would bring much needed stability to the region. The literacy program also enabled the defense institutions in Afghanistan to develop systems and organizations that could be sustained for the long term. Without these systems and organizations, the Afghan defense institutions would remain dependent on ISAF and donor countries to provide needed functions.

ANSF Gender Integration Efforts

Gender equality and integration also posed a significant impediment to building strong defense institutions. Gender equality and integration were considered “human rights” issues, and allowing all Afghan citizens the opportunity to serve was a goal that was shared by the Afghan government and ISAF nations. The Afghan government has participated actively in multinational agreements supporting gender integration and has incorporated gender integration into its foundational legislation. The international community is invested in Afghanistan, and is scrutinizing how Afghanistan meets its obligations under the United Nations agreements. The Constitution of Afghanistan declares that men and

women have equal rights and duties before the law, and the GIROA has integrated or mainstreamed gender into its stated national goals and into government at all levels. The MOI and MOD have an obligation to contribute to the attainment of national goals on gender equality.

From November 2009 to November 2011, NTM-A/CSTC-A established initiatives to reinforce MOI and MOD gender integration programs. Many of these activities were intended to bolster gender integration through transition. These initiatives established liaison, guidance, training, and fostering better partnership with the MOI and MOD. NTM-A established an Integration and Human Rights office focused on gender initiatives and assigned an advisor to the MOI Chief for Gender, Integration and Human Rights from the Office of the Assistant Commanding General for Police Development (ACG-PD). Additionally, Counterinsurgency Training Center-Afghanistan instructors trained leaders and advisors on techniques to incorporate gender perspectives as part of their counterinsurgency curriculum.

In spite of these efforts, gender integration in the ANA and ANP has been disappointing. The 2014 goal was to have 9,500 women in the ANA, and at least 5,000 women in the ANP. These efforts fell far short of their ambitious goals.

Continued gender integration and the inclusion of women in Afghan defense institutions can have a dramatic impact on the future competency of its defense sector. Continuing these efforts will not only improve the representation of women within the defense sector; as a greater number of trained and competent women are integrated throughout the security forces, it will increase the human resources available for the Afghan government to secure and defend its population.

Rule of Law Efforts

Solid social institutions and a clearly established rule of law are critical enablers to the development of an orderly and just society. Establishing the rule of law in support of DIB, therefore, is a critical focus to set the stage for enduring institutions that respect the rights of their citizens.

The Afghan government and the international community have recognized the need for a unified approach to rule of law. In 2009, President Karzai requested from President Obama that the United States lead the international community on helping to build capable Afghan government institutions, rather than continue to rely, beyond the near term, on parallel systems and processes of governance. Subsequently, the U.S. State Department established a U.S. Mission Rule of Law Coordinator in Kabul in 2010. The success of the Rule of Law Coordinator, however, was highly dependent on the spirit of cooperation between the various U.S. entities operating in Afghanistan, as he had no direct supervisory authority over many of them.

NATO implemented a new initiative in July 2011 to facilitate the extension of GIROA governance into the rural districts with the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission. This organization was charged with furnishing essential field capabilities, liaison, and security to Afghan and international civilian providers of technical assistance. These experts,

deployed in Afghanistan's provinces and districts, sought to build Afghan criminal justice capacity, increase access to dispute resolution services, and improve Afghan governance.¹⁵ All of these efforts by the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission contributed to the GIRoA's limited ability to enforce the law at the local level. Resource shortfalls hindered the institution's performance of providing rule according to law, though in areas where the GIRoA can operate securely, it has demonstrated the ability to exercise transparent and accountable rule of law actions.

This is most evident within the ANSF, where NTM-A/CSTC-A facilitated the establishment of a system of checks and balances within the military justice system. These systems were somewhat effective at the time, but the results were not consistent due to the lack of coordination between the various actors in the military justice system. Both the ANA and ANP legal officers were active in establishing and promoting the rule of law within their organizations.

For DIB, a rule of law strategy must look beyond the establishment of institutions and the codification of legislation, to focus on the results, or the ends. Without the establishment of the rule of law, the tenuous security provided by the Afghan military and police will only provide temporary stability and a fading illusion of governmental legitimacy.

Anti-Corruption Programs

Corruption was widely considered to be prevalent throughout the Afghan defense and security ministries, and was particularly troublesome for many of the donor countries as they provided funding for defense institutions. In 2010, ISAF, in coordination with the international community and the Afghan government, established the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF)-Shafafiyat "to develop a common understanding of corruption, to support Afghan-led anti-corruption efforts, and to integrate ISAF anti-corruption activities with those of key partners."¹⁶ The U.S. DOD stated that CJIATF-Shafafiyat is "intended to neutralize criminal patronage networks (CPNs) in Afghanistan."¹⁷ The task force aimed to accomplish this by fostering a common understanding of the corruption problem, planning and coordinating ISAF anti-corruption efforts, and integrating ISAF anticorruption activities with the efforts of key partners.

CJIATF-Shafafiyat had three subordinate task forces: Task Force Spotlight investigated the issue of pilferage along U.S. ground supply lines; Task Force 2010 developed visibility of the flow of contracting funds within Afghanistan at and below the prime contractor level to improve contracting in support of counterinsurgency operations; and CJIATF-Nexus identified and analyzed the confluence of narcotics, corruption, the insurgency, threat finance, and power brokers in Regional Commands South and Southwest to enable synchronized military, law enforcement, and engagement effects.

NTM-A/CSTC-A's efforts included support to Inspector General Systems and the Staff Judge Advocate, including the development of transparency and accountability programs. In line with accountability, NTM-A/CSTC-A reinforced stewardship, focusing initially on accountability of vehicles, followed by weapons, communications equipment,

and night vision goggles. NTM-A/CSTC-A also supported MOI and MOD development of financial systems, to include the NATO Building Integrity program in conjunction with Transparency International, and developed the Afghan First program to provide direct support to vendors to ensure accountability and adherence to standards. Finally, NTM-A established a corruption hotline to enable employees to anonymously report corrupt behavior.

Addressing the issue of corruption is enormously important in DIB. Corruption can easily thwart the efficiency of defense institutions and erode the trust that is necessary for those institutions—trust that must be developed within the country as well as with allies and partners.

Insights and Lessons

There are a number of insights and lessons that can be derived from these various initiatives for DIB efforts in Afghanistan:

- *Literacy is a game changer:* Without basic literacy skills, most DIB efforts will never get off the ground. Defense institutions require a literate, educated workforce to meet the challenges of today. In Afghanistan, this required an all-out effort to immediately incorporate literacy education at all levels, which was resource intensive. For future DIB efforts, literacy has to be an important component of ensuring that both quality and quantity are addressed at the onset.
- *Gender rights are about human rights:* Gender integration is difficult to address in many parts of the world. Defense institutions should be representative of the societies they serve. In Afghanistan, gender integration was particularly difficult due to societal and cultural norms, which differed significantly from Western norms. However, gender integration is not only the right thing to do in terms of human rights, but also is effective in serving the greater needs of a society and providing enhanced security.
- *The rule of law is critical for DIB; the bottom line has to be that what is written is understood and enforced:* One particular problem in Afghanistan was the linkage of the formal rule of law system and the traditional rule of law systems. Issues of jurisdiction, vetting of officials, and appellate processes must be identified at the onset of future DIB efforts.
- *Corruption is also a game changer:* Fighting corruption requires presence, persistence, and setting an example. Corruption, unfortunately, is prevalent in many defense institutions throughout the world. In the context of DIB, corruption can create an enormous resistance to change and to the development of a system of checks and balances. Many of the efforts in Afghanistan addressed these challenges, but required persistence as “work-arounds” were often developed by corrupt officials.

U.S. Ministry of Defense Advisors Program

In July 2010, DOD developed a new civilian program that demonstrated potential to help meet a significant capability gap for DIB efforts in Afghanistan called the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program. This program, authorized under the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW), was designed to provide DOD civilian advisors to Afghan and Iraqi ministerial counterparts to help them develop specific ministerial competencies (including personnel and readiness, logistics, strategy and policy, and financial management).

DOD designed the MODA program as a mechanism that would link specific advisory requirements from defense ministries in the combat theater with U.S. DOD civilians with matching, relevant experience. The MODA program began with a focus on the Afghan MOD, but operational requirements to support police force generation as part of the national security forces, resulted in the expansion of the program to include the MOI. The original 17 MoDA volunteers arrived at NTM-A /CSTC-A in July 2010: 7 served with MOI, 8 advised MOD, and two advisors had split responsibilities at both ministries. In addition, the pilot program deployed an additional 16 MODAs in March 2011. By August, the number of advisors totaled 47.

On average, the MODA advisors had 20 or more years of experience, and came from diverse specialty areas across DOD. The 47 MODAs were generally partnered with traditional defense offices supporting policy and procedure development for personnel management and logistics. Many of the MODA program advisors, however, provided unique capabilities. One would not expect to find employees from organizations such as the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) and the Department of Defense Education Activity serving as advisors in Afghanistan, but the requirements needed to support the development of MOD and MOI in Afghanistan called for a far broader array of expertise than that which would seem immediately obvious.

An example of such special expertise was the MODA advisor for the MOD slaughterhouse. This organization provides the entire Afghan National Army with food. Before the implementation of the MODA program, this advisor position was filled with a uniformed military advisor, but through MODa, this position was filled with a senior civilian from DeCA with over 20 years of meat processing experience. He successfully advised both the MOD slaughterhouse and a government sewing factory that provided uniforms to the Afghan Security Forces.

Insights and Lessons

There are a number of insights and lessons that can be drawn from the discussion of funding and resourcing mechanisms for DIB efforts in Afghanistan:

- The MODA program was a great success, but it is a limited program, and there must be greater support for the U.S. personnel involved.
- The MODA program, drawing on the civilian expertise in the DOD, has capacity

and capability that cannot be met by uniformed personnel.

- The MODA program also addresses the issue of “uniforms advising civilians.” When developing defense institutions, the principle of civilian control over the military is important and should be reinforced; the MODA program provides an excellent vehicle to support this critical principle.

Oversight and Coordination Mechanisms for DIB Efforts in Afghanistan

International Police Coordination Board

The international community established the Afghan-chaired International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) to ensure a coherent and coordinated approach among the international community, and to provide support to the Afghan MOI in the development of policies, strategy, and plans in the area of police reform. The IPCB also ensures political coherence within the international community by comparing and coordinating police reform initiatives implemented within Afghanistan. The IPCB was a critical body that helped to incorporate the diverse interests of the Afghan MOI, the international community, and ISAF. For example, all efforts to increase the size or structure of the ANP required coordination with the IPCB; this enhanced the overall coordination of efforts in Afghanistan for police reform and rule of law efforts.

Joint Coordination Monitoring Board

The most enduring and influential institution from the “Kabul Process” is the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, or JCMB. The Afghanistan Compact, from the 2006 London Conference, outlined the role of the JCMB:

The Afghan Government and the international community recognize that the success of the Afghanistan Compact requires strong political, security and financial commitment to achieve the benchmarks within the agreed timelines. Equally, the success of the Compact relies on an effective coordination and monitoring mechanism To this end, and in addition to existing sectoral coordination mechanisms, the Afghan Government and the international community are establishing a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board with the participation of senior Afghan Government officials appointed by the President and representatives of the international community. The Board will be co-chaired by a senior Afghan Government official appointed by the President and by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan. Its purpose would be to ensure overall strategic coordination of the implementation of the Compact.

The JCMB was established as a high level decision making body focusing on resolving strategic problems arising from the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact with three specific objectives:

*Provide high-level oversight of progress in the implementation of the political commitments of the Afghanistan Compact; Provide direction to address significant issues of coordination, implementation, financing for the benchmarks and timelines in the Compact, and any other obstacles and bottlenecks identified either by the government or international community; and Report on the implementation of the Compact to the President, National Assembly, the UN Secretary General, the donors, and the public.*¹⁸

The JCMB is co-chaired by the SRSB for Afghanistan and the Senior Economic Advisor to the President of Afghanistan. Each of the three “pillars” (Security; Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and Economic and Social Development) has a standing committee for consideration of proposals to the JCMB. The formal JCMB meetings include a wide variety of Afghan and international representatives—including representatives from all of the donor countries, United Nations agencies, international financial institutions, international security forces, and relevant nongovernmental organizations and civil society representatives. The JCMB meetings provide a formal mechanism for each of the participants to “weigh in” on decisions made in Afghanistan.

ISAF Internal Mechanisms

ISAF had a variety of internal mechanisms that were helpful in ensuring coordination in Afghanistan that went beyond military considerations, but also coordinated actions between the ambassadors in Kabul, the United Nations, the European Union, and leaders of the various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan. These included frequent meetings on a variety of topics, including transition, campaign planning, and anti-corruption efforts. Within ISAF, there was broad civil-military cooperation. The NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) played a major role in coordinating actions alongside the ISAF Commander.

U.S. Internal Mechanisms

A somewhat non-intuitive area that provided a means to inform and educate the international community came from the various U.S. agency audits and inspections conducted at NTM-A. These U.S. agencies included the Government Accountability Office, Department of Defense Inspector General, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, and the Army Audit Agency. These four different agencies were continually conducting audits and inspections of NTM-A; during the last half of 2011, over 25 audits and inspections were on-going.

Each of these audits and inspections resulted in a written report; these reports were also posted on the Internet and received wide readership. As a result, these reports were a means to inform and educate the readers on the status of NTM-A and the training mission. Because the reports were conducted by agencies external to NTM-A, they provided independent and objective analysis of the situation in Afghanistan.

In addition to U.S audits and inspections, there were also a number of independent agencies that provided written reports related directly to NTM-A. These included the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Oxfam, the Asia Foundation, and the International Crisis Group. Although the reports from these agencies were normally written without close collaboration with NTM-A, they also served to inform and educate the international community.

Insights and Lessons

There are a number of insights and lessons to distill from the discussion on oversight mechanisms for DIB efforts in Afghanistan: first, international oversight mechanisms, such as the IPCB and JCMB, provide legitimacy to actions and provide a good sounding board for proposals. Second, host nations should have a real voice in oversight mechanisms. Third, military headquarters, such as ISAF, have a key role in supporting and coordinating civil-military operations. The presence of senior civilians within these organizations, as well as formal mechanisms to ensure coordination, helps to foster the working relationships that are necessary to accomplish true integration of civil-military operations. Finally, audits and inspections are necessary to ensure accountability.

Conclusion

Although the focus of this chapter is on DIB, and by necessity, discussing the efforts of NTM-A/CSTC-A, this is insufficient for success in a conflict zone. Success in DIB requires success on the battlefield; it requires success politically; it requires success economically; and it requires success in getting the story out. DIB requires balancing efforts between capability and capacity, as well as quality and quantity. In addition, efforts such as gender integration or rule of law, must necessarily take cultural considerations into account. Ultimately, DIB efforts require agility—for instance the flexibility to shift resources or adapt to changing circumstances on the ground—as necessary for ultimate success.

In addition to these insights from the major sections of this chapter, three overarching lessons can be observed through the U.S. experience in Afghanistan regarding gaining legitimacy, unity of effort, and resources.

Gaining Legitimacy from International Cooperation

In U.S. DOD Joint Doctrine, there are twelve “Principles of Joint Operations.” These include the traditional nine principles of war (objective, offensive, mass, maneuver, economy of force, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity), but also include three additional principles: restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. The purpose of the principle of legitimacy is “to maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations.”¹⁹ Joint doctrine continues by stating that “all actions must be considered in the light of potentially competing strategic and tactical

requirements, and must exhibit fairness in dealing with competing factions where appropriate. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions.”²⁰

Engaging all factions of the international community is absolutely necessary, and well worth the effort expended. Without this engagement of the international community, failure is all but assured. This is particularly true in DIB, especially when engaging with the international community in conflict zones. In some environments, host countries may request assistance from coalition partners, whereas in other environments, assistance may take place between the receiving country and the United States in a bilateral arrangement. Understanding these parameters is critical in ensuring unity of effort.

Establishing Unity of Effort

In the same light, engaging all partners helps to establish a unity of effort. Unified action—where all are generally going in the same direction with the same intent—is hard work. Having a clearly defined end state and purpose applies at the tactical as well as the strategic level. This unity of effort is critical within U.S. agencies, as well as with international partners.

In NTM-A, there were three imperatives from 2009-2011: teaming, transparency, and transition. Teaming with all of the stakeholders was an imperative; transparency was to keep all of the stakeholders informed of efforts, both positive and negative; and transition was the imperative to set the conditions for transition from international partners to Afghan leadership for training programs and security responsibility throughout the country.

These three concepts are enduring and should be applied in all future DIB efforts. Unity of effort can be achieved through constant attention to teaming, ensuring that transparency is exercised in all actions, and focusing on the overall transition to civil authorities and sustainable defense institutions.

Time

One of the most important lessons from Afghanistan is that all resources are precious, and while funding and personnel resourcing are important, the greatest resource challenge is time. Fifteen years of fighting a “long war” is exhausting to the men in women in uniform as well as the public. As an ISAF staff officer said in November 2009, “We’ve got to show progress by the end of next year . . . by fall, the end of the calendar year with proof that is unequivocal that it’s working . . . we don’t get to define that.”²¹ DIB efforts are resource intensive; developing sustainable and professional defense institutions can easily take a generation and enormous assets—and this level of effort is difficult to sustain. This issue of time is often compounded within the context of a conflict. As a result, future DIB efforts must remain focused at all times on the critical tasks rather than the urgent tasks at hand.

A Final Note

On April 27, 2011, nine U.S. citizens were killed at Kabul International Airport; eight were active duty Air Force advisors to the Afghan Air Force and the ninth was a retired Army officer serving as a contractor in support of the advising mission. The events of that day were incredibly devastating to the author's command. These nine U.S. citizens were serving their country in Afghanistan and were killed by an Afghan Air Force Colonel during a meeting. These nine men were away from their families, doing what they could to assist the development of a professional Afghan Air Force, and they were all murdered for their efforts.

There was a ramp-side ceremony later to send the remains back to the United States, followed by somber memorial ceremonies at both the headquarters and at the airport. That evening, one of the British officers quietly went to the flagpoles with his bagpipe and played "Amazing Grace." At the conclusion of his playing the hymn, he quietly saluted the flags and marched off to his office. It was his way of giving tribute to the fallen, which was met with silence throughout the headquarters. These nine brave men made a difference and were truly focused on the important things in life.

This tragic event was a time of reflection, a time to consider just exactly what we were doing in Afghanistan. Our mission was to enable the Afghans to secure their own country and to establish the conditions so we could leave.

Ultimately, DIB is a people business. Individuals make a difference. In the context of conflict, each person contributes to the mission with the full knowledge that they could pay the ultimate sacrifice. We do it for love of country and for our brothers in arms.

The events at Kabul International Airport happened just two days after ANZAC Day, which is observed on April 25th of each year to commemorate the anniversary of the first major military action by the Australian and New Zealand forces during the First World War. During ANZAC Day, there is always a reading of a poem by Laurence Binyon entitled "Ode to the Fallen":

*They went with songs to the battle, they were young,
Straight of limb, true of eye, steady and aglow.
They were staunch to the end against odds uncounted,
They fell with their faces to the foe.*

*They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old;
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.
Lest we forget.*

Notes

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Lessons from Iraq

Hugh F.T. Hoffman

The initial performance of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) against the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was not encouraging, neither from an operational nor an institutional perspective. With few exceptions, the ISF was unable to beat back the advances of ISIS without considerable U.S. assistance.¹ In some cases, units of the ISF completely collapsed and disintegrated in the face of the enemy.² These failures caused the Obama Administration to revisit the commitment of U.S. forces to assist the ISF in defeating ISIS and making itself more effective and self-sufficient.

The ISF's initial shortcomings and failures have brought U.S. efforts to build capable military forces and effective institutions overseeing those forces into sharp relief. Unfortunately, the United States has less to show for the considerable investment in lives, time, materiel, and capital than one would hope. This is reason enough for the Department of Defense (DOD)—and the U.S. government as a whole—to step back and take a critical look at the effectiveness of its efforts over the past fourteen years. What went right? What went wrong? What could have been done better? What were the main obstacles faced, and could they have been addressed in a more effective way? This chapter attempts to answer those questions.

Any critical analysis of U.S. and coalition efforts in Iraq would be remiss if it did not put these efforts in context as events unfolded. Context is critical to understanding how U.S. efforts at defense institution building (DIB) unfolded over time and why they succeeded or failed. For this reason, the analysis that follows takes the reader sequentially through events—from pre-war planning through Operation Iraqi Freedom to the drawdown of U.S. forces and the establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq—to illustrate particular lessons learned as events unfolded.

The story of U.S. involvement in Iraq highlights the difficulty of building effective security forces—difficult under the best of circumstances—while fighting a full-blown insurgency. Fighting an insurgency greatly complicates defense institution building, drawing away critical attention, effort, and resources. Operational conditions and political decisions often force the defense institution builder to take a sub-optimal approach at the outset, thereby inhibiting or delaying some of the longer-range DIB goals, or at least making them a secondary priority. The insurgency, after all, is the more

urgent priority. That said, the two efforts are inextricably intertwined, and separating the analyses of them is not only nearly impossible but also counterproductive. In this chapter, counterinsurgency operational concerns are addressed to the degree they affected DIB.

For the purposes of this chapter, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) are both incorporated under the rubric of “defense” institutions. Ordinarily, the MOI would not be part of such an analysis, as the Department of State has statutory responsibility for such efforts under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. In Iraq, however, President Bush chose to assign this responsibility to the DOD to ensure unity of effort and because of the scope of the effort required to build an effective MOI. Both ministries were considered part of the Iraqi security forces, and the same coalition military organization oversaw their development.

In most cases, defense institution building is really about improving existing defense institutions. In Iraq, however, the coalition was faced with building the ISF from the ground up. To a large degree, this was a self-inflicted wound and should have been anticipated and planned for. Nevertheless, the coalition was able to adapt over time and make progress, despite setbacks along the way. At the end of the drawdown, success would be a question of whether the Iraqi government would accept and sustain the system the coalition had worked with Iraqis to put in place. However things turn out, the story of U.S. defense institution building efforts in Iraq is instructive on many levels. It begins with pre-war planning.

Pre-War Planning for Phase IV

Planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began in 2002. While U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) ultimately had responsibility for the complete operation plan, a number of other planning and analysis efforts were initially commissioned at the behest of the National Security Council (NSC) and other agencies.³ Because these efforts were conducted in secrecy and compartmentalized, the individuals in most of these efforts were unaware of parallel efforts. This precluded early and effective synthesis of a U.S. government position on what would likely happen after the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Though several groups across the government recognized serious problems could arise after the invasion, the most serious concerns either were not addressed by the planning or not addressed effectively, resulting in a plan based on flawed assumptions about what would happen in its aftermath.

General Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM Commander, and the CENTCOM staff found themselves focused primarily on forming the invasion plan to Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s satisfaction, which gave them little time or resources to address the aftermath of the invasion—“Phase IV” of the plan. Throughout the effort, Rumsfeld

pushed to minimize the forces employed in the invasion and maximize the speed at which they took Baghdad. Phase IV planning focused primarily on humanitarian assistance, securing weapons of mass destruction, and restoring critical infrastructure (reconstruction), not the complete rebuilding of governmental institutions destroyed by the war, and certainly not the possibility of an insurgency.⁴

Nine flawed planning assumptions about post-invasion conditions, combined with CENTCOM's operational approach, would put coalition forces in the worst possible position to address the conditions they faced after the defeat of Saddam:

- The Iraqi people would welcome the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and concomitantly welcome coalition forces as liberators.⁵
- As a result, civil unrest would be the exception, not the rule.
- The Government of Iraq's administrative bureaucracies, including its ministries, would remain largely intact and could be quickly restored to an acceptable level of functionality after the war.
- Because the Iraqi governmental bureaucracy would remain largely intact, an interim Iraqi government would assume power quickly, and the coalition would transfer control rapidly to it. Thus, a significant U.S. presence in the Iraq would be short-lived.
- Iraqi oil revenues would fund reconstruction efforts.
- A "demobilized" but standing military would be available for civil reconstruction.
- Iraqi police forces would remain intact and be capable of maintaining law and order after Saddam Hussein's regime fell.
- The international community would contribute substantially to coalition efforts in Phase VI.
- "De-Baathification" would be minimal to preserve Iraq's administrative capacity.

For all practical purposes, these assumptions removed the need for a plan to ensure stability and security and to rebuild the country. Underpinning them was a distressing lack of appreciation of the potent influence of Iraqi culture, religion, sectarianism, and history of strong-man rule. U.S. civilian and military leaders underestimated the power of these factors in a post-Saddam Iraq.

Bad assumptions can render a plan ineffective, or even irrelevant. Thus, good planning recognizes those key assumptions that are most tenuous and accounts for their potential inaccuracy through "branch" plans ("the Plan B") for operations that do not go as expected. In the case of the plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, this did not occur. Consequently, as Phase IV unfolded, those on the ground found

themselves unprepared to deal with the reality they faced. This turn of events put the coalition immediately in a reactive posture and forced it to deal with the post-invasion occupation in an ad hoc manner. Early improvisations in the aftermath of the invasion would have unfortunate—if not disastrous—results.

Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

To oversee reconstruction and address a potential humanitarian crisis after the war, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld appointed retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner to be the head of the newly created Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) on January 9, 2003, over a year after planning began. Given his success in leading U.S. efforts in Operation Provide Comfort after the first Gulf War, Garner seemed to be a good fit for the job. Little did he know that he would be beset by huge political, operational, logistical, financial, and staff challenges throughout his short tenure, not the least of which would be the effects of inadequate Phase IV planning. Garner was largely left to fend for himself in defense and interagency bureaucracies that saw him as an unnecessary outsider. He had been given mission impossible, but that was yet to become clear.

Garner arrived in the Pentagon to find virtually no staff and no one prepared to bring him up to speed on the plan. Largely on his own initiative, he cobbled together an ad hoc team with little institutional assistance from the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Commander of CENTCOM. Although ORHA expanded significantly once Garner deployed, most of his people were military officers with little expertise or experience in the tasks they were expected to perform. Having already missed over 15 months of planning, Garner found himself struggling to get his arms around a maturing plan and organizing for his mission. Complicating matters, he was never well-integrated into the broader planning effort—either inside DOD or the interagency—or the command and control structure for Operation Iraqi Freedom.⁶ Further, his late arrival meant he had almost no opportunity to influence the post-war plan in any significant way.

Garner envisioned his Phase IV responsibilities as falling under three “pillars”: humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and civil administration. He believed his first order of business once Baghdad fell would be humanitarian assistance. Reconstruction of key national infrastructure (electricity, oil, water, etc.) would be next. Based on pre-war estimates, civil administration (e.g., the restoration and development of Iraq’s governmental institutions) would likely be the least of his concerns. Thus, he devoted the least amount of organizational and planning effort on this pillar. Unfortunately, restoring civil administration would be central to Phase IV.

Once Garner arrived in Baghdad, he was faced with a reality that essentially invalidated his priorities and pre-war planning. The confluence of a number of actions created a perfect storm that forced ORHA and the coalition to begin improvising from

the very start of Phase IV. Unknown to the coalition, Hussein had freed thousands of criminals, instructed state agencies to sabotage infrastructure, ordered the shooting of dissident Shia clerics, and directed the destruction of the regime's records if coalition forces entered Baghdad. These actions contributed to the general state of lawlessness and confusion as the occupation began. Compounding their effect was the military's and police's abandonment of their posts during the invasion. As they dissolved into the countryside, the country was left with no apparatus for maintaining stability and order.

CENTCOM's goal was to take down Saddam Hussein's regime as rapidly as possible, before it could employ weapons of mass destruction or generate other mayhem. The speed of the war, coupled with a relatively small invasion force, resulted in ground forces bypassing or ignoring key areas like Anbar, and facilities such as banks (which provided large stores of cash that were later used to fund the insurgency and other organized criminal activity), military bases, and ammunition dumps (which supplied criminals and insurgents with thousands of tons of ammunition).

Already overstretched U.S. forces had no orders to address the widespread looting and inter-sectarian fighting between Iraqi militias that began almost immediately after the fall of Baghdad.⁷ The coalition's military leadership chose not to—and probably could not—impose martial law.⁸ Inaction fostered a descent into lawlessness and criminal violence that was soon beyond the capability of U.S. forces to handle. Further, random lawlessness soon evolved into organized theft by Iraqi criminals and insurgents, and the first indications of a nascent insurgency appeared.

Lack of action by the coalition contributed to a lost opportunity to restore government services quickly. The looting and civil unrest resulted in considerable damage to an already dilapidated and crumbling infrastructure. Government buildings were rendered unusable, as anything useful inside them was stripped out. As a result, Iraqi ministry officials abandoned their offices and would have nowhere to return to in the coming months. Beyond ready cash on hand (a few billion dollars), the Iraqi state was essentially out of money—with no means of producing new revenue. If there was a window of opportunity to restore responsible governance and effect a rapid transition to Iraqi self-governance after the invasion, it was closing rapidly.

Once he arrived in Baghdad in April 2003, Garner did his best to set up operations as quickly as he could. He did so over General Frank's objections and the uncertain state of stability. Once in Baghdad, coordination with military units proved to be next to impossible, because ORHA was not granted access to DOD's classified computer networks and the civilian phone exchange in Baghdad was inoperable. Further, ORHA had no communications plan to calm the Iraqi people and give instructions that might tamp down unrest. Nonetheless, Garner set to work on his organization's eleven goals (see *Figure 1*), which were enormous undertakings and likely unachievable in the time he thought he would have before turning over the Phase IV effort to a successor.

Figure 1: ORHA's Goals

Orha's Goals
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Security ▪ Salaries paid nationwide ▪ Return police to work and train them ▪ Return the ministries to functionality ▪ Restore basic services to Baghdad ▪ Prevent a fuel crisis ▪ Purchase crops ▪ Solve food distribution challenges ▪ Install town councils nationwide ▪ Deploy and integrate Government Support Teams with local government ▪ Prevent cholera and dysentery

Back in Washington, the White House was increasingly uneasy about the coalition's inability to get a grip on the situation in the face of growing lawlessness in Iraq. There was great concern also that the coalition was rapidly losing the support of the Iraqi people. Further, it appears that the administration had shifted its position on the speed of turning over governance to the Iraqis, deciding to delay this transition a year. As no one in Washington informed Garner of this policy shift, he continued full steam ahead with transitioning power to the Iraqis as quickly as possible. As Garner was desperately trying to cope with the situation, Rumsfeld called him shortly after his arrival in Baghdad to inform him of the administration's intent to replace him with retired Ambassador L. Paul Bremer.

Coalition Provisional Authority

With Bremer came the standup of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the stand-down of ORHA. This transition was bumpy at best. Ambassador Bremer arrived in-country without Garner having been informed of significant policy changes made in Washington regarding post-war Iraq. Some of these changes pulled the rug out from what Garner thought had been his mandate (i.e., the rapid creation of an interim Iraqi government and an abbreviated occupation), and were not what he would have advised Rumsfeld and other senior leaders in the U.S. government to do.

Bremer, for his part, had been given the responsibility of "temporary governance of Iraq" without all the authorities and resources necessary to carry out his immense responsibilities.⁹ He found himself with little policy guidance from Washington, no detailed plan to work from, no formal authority over the vast majority of U.S. personnel in-country (at that point they were under the command of Joint Task Force-7 [JTF-7] commanded by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez), and having to build his staff from the ground up. Bremer also found himself forced to improvise from the outset of his tenure and react to

unanticipated and constantly changing conditions on the ground.

Although Bremer was able to bring on experienced and talented senior people, he was rarely able to fill over half of the CPA's civilian positions. Generally, the junior and mid-level people he brought on were inexperienced, young, and with little knowledge of the country, its culture, and the Arabic language.¹⁰ Tours of duty were typically three to six months in length, which drove high personnel turbulence, a lack of continuity, and a continual cycle of bringing inexperienced people up to speed. Further, it did not help that the CPA's staff was largely tethered to the Green Zone in Baghdad. The CPA was simply not adequately staffed with qualified people who could properly advise the key ministries of the Iraqi government on rebuilding and administering their institutions.

Bremer hit the ground intent on quickly taking charge. Almost immediately, he made three momentous decisions in succession—against Garner's advice—that would serve as accelerants for the insurgency and drastically undermine the building of support for his program by the Iraqi people.¹¹ First, he fired the vast majority of senior Baath Party members (known as De-Baathification). Second, he officially dissolved the Iraqi military. Third, he postponed the transition of governing authority to the Iraqis until 2004.

The firing of Baath Party members at the military or civilian-equivalent rank of colonel and above effectively stripped the country's ministries of mid- and senior-level managers experienced in running the bureaucratic machinery of the country.¹² This order put as many as 85,000 Sunni bureaucrats, policemen, and senior military officers out of work and served to alienate the Sunni community, which feared ceding power to the Shia majority. This order, coupled with the wide-scale physical damage to the ministries in the aftermath of the invasion, effectively destroyed the ministries' capacity to run their respective institutions. Importantly, it effectively stripped all the key leaders out of the MOI, which was central to keeping law and order and keeping a lid on the nascent insurgency. In a country deeply divided along sectarian lines, the order disempowered one of the key institutions most likely to play a unifying role in Iraq. Further, it required that this critical institution would have to be completely rebuilt.¹³

Bremer's second directive disbanded the Iraqi military.¹⁴ This decision put about 350,000 armed men out of work in an economy where there was no other work to be had. This humiliating action turned them into a disaffected and antagonistic pool of potential recruits for the insurgents and criminal gangs that would later undercut stability. This directive left the country with only the MOI to address lawlessness and a budding insurgency. It was not up to the task.

U.S. leaders in Iraq knew the police force was corrupt, but initially thought they were generally capable. That assumption proved false. The police were not even competent under Saddam, so there was no cadre of proficient junior and mid-level leaders to draw from after senior leaders were removed. Hence, police forces at all levels were incapable of restoring public order.¹⁵ Bremer was adamant that the police needed to be reformed quickly to restore order and engender public confidence. The requirements for training, however, quickly overwhelmed the CPA and police forces—both because of the large requirements for new

people, and the rising amount of crime and insurgent activity. Further, reform efforts were severely constrained by funding and staffing shortfalls. This initiative depended almost entirely on Iraqi funding (about \$2.4 million) because no one in the U.S. government had anticipated this sort of need on the scale required. Consequently, no U.S. money had been appropriated for this task.

To supplant the now defunct Iraqi Army, Bremer proposed building a “New Iraqi Army” to replace the forces he had disestablished. He wanted to inculcate Western concepts of accountability and the rule of law into this force. In his vision, these forces would have to be accountable to Iraq’s civilian authorities and capable of maintaining national security. Bremer’s subordinate responsible for security sector reform was former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe. Bremer charged Slocombe with creating the new Ministry of Defense and its subordinate defense forces, as well as reforming the Iraqi police and establishing intelligence capabilities for the ISF. Bremer fully recognized the importance of creating a strong, functional MOD and the need to build institutional capability:

In addition to creating the new Iraqi army, we will also be working with the governing council . . . on creating a law-based system for civilian oversight and control, creating the institutions and mechanisms to run the national security policies of what will be a major state in the Middle East. And that is in itself an important part of the creation of a democratic, law-based, constitutional system, which is of course our overall strategy.¹⁶

Given the number of institution-level functions that had to be performed by the coalition, however, it is likely that Slocombe made little headway in filling the two ministries with capable, experienced people or training them to perform the functions necessary to make them viable entities. It is also unlikely, given the manning of the CPA, that he had enough capable senior people to properly advise the ministries down to the bureaucratic levels where the work actually gets done.

Responsibility for building the new Iraqi military fell to Major General Paul Eaton, who arrived in Iraq in June 2003 to take charge of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), which was charged with training and fielding a 40,000-man army.¹⁷ CMATT would work for Bremer and the CPA, not Lieutenant General Sanchez, Commander of JTF-7. Eaton’s counterpart for police training was Bernard Kerik, a former New York City police commissioner, who led the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT). Plagued by a lack of strategic guidance, effectively no plan, shoestring budgets, small staffs, and insufficient time to execute their respective missions adequately, both organizations struggled.¹⁸

Recognizing CMATT’s struggles to generate forces, General John Abizaid, then Commander of CENTCOM, pressed for the military to take over the training of Iraq’s

security forces.¹⁹ Also uneasy with what he was observing, Rumsfeld sent Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry to Iraq in February 2004 to determine how best to ensure there was a sufficient number of trained Iraqi forces in the field to take over security responsibilities. Rumsfeld accepted Eikenberry's conclusion that coalition military forces should oversee the training of Iraq's army and police, and directed the formation of an Office of Security Cooperation led by Eaton and under the command of Sanchez.²⁰ Eaton thus consolidated army and police training under his oversight.²¹

Bremer's third fateful decision was to postpone the transition of governing authority to a sovereign Iraqi Interim Government to 2004—despite earlier plans to do so in the summer of 2003.²² In the intervening year, the CPA established a representative “Iraqi Governing Council,” which provided governing counsel to Bremer and drafted an Iraqi constitution, a necessary precursor for establishing a democratic government.²³ While Bremer and other U.S. leaders may have believed that this was the prudent action to take given the level of unrest and the apparent lack of residual Iraqi governmental structures, this decision surprised the Iraqis and angered key sectarian groups, most notably the Shia.²⁴ This decision served to enhance the perception among Iraqis that the CPA and coalition forces were “occupiers” rather than “liberators.”²⁵

The combination of Bremer's three decisions, however well-intentioned, proved to be a recipe for political, social, and economic upheaval. Collectively, they engendered enmity from disenfranchised Sunnis and opposition to a lengthy foreign occupation from others. They were, in short, a “recipe for instability.”²⁶ For all the many good and important things the CPA accomplished, it failed to accomplish its top goal: stability and security. In fact, the CPA actively contributed to a worsening of security. Resistance to the coalition would increase, and lawlessness would mutate into alarming inter-sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia extremists.

By early 2004, it was becoming clear that the insurgency was increasingly virulent. Despite CPATT's best efforts, rushing training and transition proved to be a mistake. Iraqi forces were undertrained and underequipped to fight unexpectedly competent and well-armed insurgent forces. It should not have been surprising, then, that the ISF performed disastrously during the April 2004 uprisings—refusing to fight other Iraqis. This mutiny made clear that the United States was pushing security responsibilities to the Iraqis prematurely.²⁷

In this context, CPA's official handover of control to the Iraqi Interim Government came quickly, occurring on June 28, 2004, in a small, quiet ceremony removed from the public eye, conducted two days in advance of schedule for security reasons, and protected by multiple levels of “T-walls” and security forces.²⁸ Bremer informed the president that the transfer of control was complete and, without ceremony, quietly left the country. An important shift had been made. The Iraqi Interim Government was in charge, and this changed the dynamic of the coalition's relationship with the ISF. U.S. advisors now supported Iraq's military leadership.

Multi-National Forces Command–Iraq Takes Over

As the insurgency increased in power and security conditions deteriorated, the U.S. Embassy and Multi-National Forces Command–Iraq (MNF-I) replaced the CPA and JTF-7. The creation of MNF-I marked the beginning of detailed campaign planning designed to create stability in Iraq and set the right conditions for the coalition’s eventual withdrawal. This transition, while suffering major setbacks along the way, nevertheless resulted in dramatic changes to the nature and scope of the coalition’s support to the ISF. It marked a robust commitment to building the ISF for the long term, and was a vital component of the U.S. exit strategy. MNF-I recognized that the ISF was not ready to take on the insurgency and that far more—and higher-quality—police and military forces were needed than were on hand.

MNF-I was responsible for conducting coalition operations in Iraq and for overseeing the development and fielding of Iraqi Security forces. It split responsibilities for the ISF between two subordinate commands: Multi-National Command–Iraq (MNC-I) and Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I). MNSTC-I had responsibility for overseeing the initial training, equipping, and fielding of the ISF. Once MNSTC-I trained and equipped them, Iraqi military units transferred to the operational control of MNC-I, where they were assigned embedded advisors who took them through more advanced training before deployment. MNSTC-I would bear the responsibility for building the ISF for most of the remainder of the U.S. military’s presence in Iraq.

Given the worsening security situation and the ISF’s poor performance, Lieutenant General David Petraeus, the new MNSTC-I commander, focused most of his initial efforts on generating competent army and police forces.²⁹ From the outset, Petraeus recognized the huge challenges before him. Procurement could not keep up with the training plan, and the ISF was unable to sustain itself logistically in the field.³⁰ Security forces were heavily dependent upon the coalition for transportation, logistics, fire support, and funding. Almost immediately, he consolidated the following three organizations under MNSTC-I:³¹

- *Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT)*: responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the Iraqi Army
- *Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT)*: responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the Iraqi Police
- *Joint Headquarters Advisory Support Team (JHQ-ST)*: responsible for assisting the joint headquarters of the Iraqi Army in developing a command and control system and assisting in operational planning.

Notably, MNSTC-I did not immediately assume responsibility for advising and training the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior.³² When the CPA shut down, it transferred this responsibility to the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) under the Embassy’s management.³³ This forced Petraeus’ staff to coordinate MNSTC-I’s programs on a daily

basis with the advisors at IRMO, who assisted the ministries. This was a cumbersome bureaucratic arrangement that could slow progress and, if not managed well, result in institutional policy, strategic planning, requirements determination, force design, force sustainment, and personnel systems being disconnected from the actual organizing, equipping, manning, training, fielding, and basing of Iraqi forces. Petraeus made this split arrangement work because he recognized that creating self-sustaining forces was absolutely critical.³⁴ Eventually MNSTC-I would inherit responsibility for the ministerial advisory mission, but that would not happen until October 2005—after Petraeus had handed over command to Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey.

To help the ISF expand rapidly and increase its operational competence, Petraeus pursued a number of initiatives. The first put in place flexible contracting mechanisms for procurement and construction. His success in this arena soon paid off in widespread military and police construction projects for military bases, police academies, and police stations. In terms of training and advising, he greatly increased the numbers of advisors and introduced the concept of “embedded advisors,” wherein advisors from MNSTC-I joined Iraqi units in basic training and remained with them as they graduated and deployed into operational sectors.

To solve chronic resource shortfalls that were not covered by other sources of funding, MNSTC-I developed its own request for supplemental funding to specifically address funding shortfalls for training and equipping security forces. Congress approved this request in May 2005, and allocated nearly \$5.4 billion dollars to the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF). The ISFF was noteworthy because it gave MNSTC-I great flexibility in how to use the funds. With ISFF, the commander had the latitude to reallocate funding for different purposes than originally planned without having to go back to Congress for approval. The ISFF would prove to be a lifeline for the ISF over the next five or so years. It also would serve a useful role in providing the MNSTC-I Commander leverage to get recalcitrant ministries to invest their own funds in the capabilities needed to make their ministries and forces independent and self-sustaining.

While there was still far to go, the ISF was showing signs of improvement on the battlefield. Petraeus and MNSTC-I made great strides during his tour, but major problems and shortfalls still plagued both the MOD and MOI. Most of the command’s attention and effort was focused on getting as many trained and equipped tactical units into the fight as possible. This emphasis reflected the operational need at the time. As a result, other important tasks were deferred, given lesser emphasis, or provided fewer resources.

At the tactical and operational levels, the ISF was still suffering from key capability shortfalls. Iraqi military and police units could not sustain themselves for any length of time and were dependent on U.S. forces for logistical and transportation support. Most, if not all, units struggled with the maintenance of their vehicles and equipment. The Iraqi systems for distributing and tracking equipment were completely inadequate. Iraqi forces were largely dependent upon coalition forces for medevac and medical support. Further, the ISF had no artillery or close air support to back up its units.

At the institutional level, MNSTC-I had yet to assume the ministerial advisory mission from the IRMO and the Embassy in Baghdad. Ministerial capacity-building was still in its infancy, and the two ministries had very limited capacity to perform essential functions. These shortfalls were most evident in the logistical realm, but they were manifest in other areas such as strategy, planning, programming, budgeting, budget execution, requirements determination, force design and management, acquisition, intelligence, medical, and personnel. The MOD and MOI were still essentially ineffective and would not achieve a level of basic effectiveness in these areas for several more years. This inadequacy is particularly troubling because building effective institutions can take years—even decades—of concerted effort. To this point in the Phase IV effort, unfortunately, building capable ministries had been given insufficient attention. MNF-I and MNSTC-I would have only a handful of years to get the two ministries running properly. This task would require a consistent and adequate stream of ministerial advisors with the background and training to properly fill their assigned roles, including a basic proficiency in Arabic and a good understanding of Iraqi culture. Unfortunately, this did not happen.

Over the next four years, succeeding MNSTC-I commanders built on what Petraeus had begun. Over this span, the MNSTC-I mission expanded to encompass four elements: provide basic individual and unit training to the ISF; organize, equip, and generate Iraqi units for the ISF; develop Iraqi security institutions capable of sustaining themselves and providing security to the Iraqi people; and promote a professional ethic in the ISF. Moreover, MNSTC-I as an organization would grow and adapt to take on new missions and adjust to the changing U.S. role in Iraq. By 2008, MNSTC-I would expand to 10 subordinate training and advisory teams. *Figure 2* shows that MNSTC-I assumed responsibility for advising the two ministries as well as overseeing the training of Iraqi intelligence organizations under the MOD and MOI. Further, it established a Security Assistance Office to assist the Iraqis with purchasing U.S. equipment through the Foreign Military Sales system.

Figure 2: MNSTC-I Training and Advisory Teams

MNSTC-I Training and Advisory Teams
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ministry of Defense Transition Team ▪ Joint Headquarters Assistance Team ▪ Coalition Army Advisory Training Team ▪ Coalition Air Force Transition Team ▪ Maritime Strategic Transition Team ▪ Ministry of Interior Transition Team ▪ Civilian Police Assistance Training Team ▪ Iraqi National Counterterrorism Task Force ▪ Security Assistance Office ▪ Intelligence Transition Team

Also under MNSTC-I's purview were the Iraqi-run Ministerial Training and Development Center (MTDC) and a MNSTC-I school that provided preliminary training to MNSTC-I advisors. The MTDC, run by Iraqis and advised by professional U.S. academics, provided standardized educational courses to Iraqi civilians and military personnel based on Iraqi business models, government regulations, laws, and MOD policies. The courses addressed, among other things, budgeting, contracting, program management, and basic computer skills.

Instruction was frequently presented by Arab-Americans who were fluent in Arabic and well-attuned to Iraqi culture and approaches to learning. Often, Iraqis assisted U.S. instructors, with the intention of eventually taking over the responsibility of teaching the courses. By 2009, the MTDC's reputation as a center of learning was such that it was able to expand its mission beyond servicing the MOD and MOI, to helping other ministries in the Iraqi government.

Institutionally, however, the MTDC struggled to obtain sufficient resources from MOD to sustain itself, let alone expand. Part of the problem was MOD resource constraints, and part was the Minister of Defense's apparent apathy toward the center. He did not appear to value MTDC and the instruction it provided, despite the fact that it was well-received by the students. As a result, only junior and mid-level bureaucrats generally attended these courses. While they were receptive to the courses and their technical competency increased, they were not in a position to drive institutional change in the two ministries. Too often, senior bureaucrats in the ministries were unwilling or unable to make the most of these individual's new skills and knowledge. Senior officials were more comfortable with "traditional" Iraqi business practices. Consequently, this education was not used or not exploited to its full potential.

MNSTC-I created its own school for ministerial advisors, because personnel assigned to this task received no such training before arriving in country. In a one-week course, advisors were presented basic insights on Iraqi culture and language, as well as the proper way to work with Iraqis in a culturally adept way.³⁵ Because many of the advisors were assigned to MNSTC-I for only six to nine months, the command assessed that one week was all it could afford to address this training shortfall. The course included roundtables with MNSTC-I's finest and most seasoned advisors, who provided insights on how best to work with Iraqi leaders and emphasized key "do's" and "don'ts." While ministerial advisors were smart, hard-working, and motivated, it was often pure luck if they had the actual institutional-level experience and skills to perform the mission they were assigned. MNSTC-I attempted to mitigate this problem by identifying people who had the right knowledge and skills, and moving them into advisor positions that best used their talents. While this ad hoc approach often helped place talent in the right place, it played havoc with military and civilian personnel assignment systems and took considerable time and effort to sort out—both in Iraq and back in the United States.³⁶

The most successful ministerial advisors were those who possessed excellent interpersonal skills and who established their credibility as experts in fruitful ways early in

the advisory relationship. Because the MOD did not have a history of civilian control of the military, military officers often had a distinct advantage over their civilian counterparts in establishing credibility with Iraqi senior officials. That said, age and seniority matters greatly in Iraqi bureaucratic culture. Assigning comparatively junior officers or civilians to senior officials was not particularly effective and often resulted in the officer or civilian having marginal, if any, positive impact. This disadvantage could be overcome, but it required considerable effort on the part of the advisor to establish his *bona fides*. Likewise, Western women were at a considerable disadvantage in establishing their credibility among Iraqi men, who dominated MOD and MOI. This fact of life in Arab culture often deprived the Iraqis of considerable talent and expertise. Women advisors almost invariably ended up advising the very few women officials in MOD and MOI or pursuing other responsibilities inside the command.

The most effective advisors were those who helped the Iraqis understand their own bureaucratic systems—both their strengths and their weaknesses—and aided them in applying effective remediation where it would improve these systems. The simpler the approach, the better. This methodology helped to engender Iraqi buy-in to the advice provided and take ownership of any changes made. Inherent in this approach was the need to convince the Iraqis that it was in their best interest to invest in an approach or system—or even that it was their idea. Where that happened, MNSTC-I advisors were quite successful. Effective advisors also took a heuristic approach to working with their counterparts. They did not do the work at hand for the Iraqis.³⁷ To the degree that Iraqi personnel were immersed in hands-on learning with coalition partners subtly guiding them, the advice was more likely to stick. Open or direct criticism of leaders is counterproductive in many cultures, so advisors need to be particularly careful about how they frame a problem—especially if that problem could highlight a leader's weaknesses or lack of competence. For Americans used to giving and taking direct criticism, this was often counterintuitive and difficult.

Good advisors also tried to steer their counterparts away from complicated and expensive systems that were beyond their standing capacity to exploit. This was not always possible, as evidenced by the Iraqi's insistence on building up their overall capability by purchasing M-1 tanks and the F-16 fighter. Encouraging the Iraqis to invest in complex Western systems was problematic on several levels. First, they were difficult for the Iraqis to understand and master. Second, they were typically expensive to purchase and sustain—often beyond the Iraqi's budgetary capacity and willingness to maintain. Finally, they involved a type of "systems thinking" that was foreign to Iraqi bureaucratic culture. The resulting decisions too often resulted in incoherent systems.³⁸

From a systemic point of view on the advisory effort, it is worth noting that while MNSTC-I did attempt to measure its progress in training and advising the Iraqi Security Forces and the two ministries, this analysis tended to focus more on what could be readily quantified—the outputs—rather than on the more elusive qualitative results of their efforts—the outcomes. In simple terms, the outputs were the products of MNSTC-I's

efforts, such as numbers of units fielded according to schedule, the fielding of a personnel system, the production of an Iraqi strategic document, or the creation and execution of a budget. The outcomes were the difference these products made or their effectiveness. Output-oriented measurement was reassuring and gave the sense that the coalition's efforts were on track. Unfortunately, these results may have been illusory in terms of the actual capability of the ISF and the ministries to do their respective jobs reliably and effectively. Further, such measurements did not account for the inevitable degradation of capability over time, if capabilities were not refreshed.

The MNSTC-I Commander was also dual-hatted as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission–Iraq (NTM-I) Commander. NTM-I partnered with MNSTC-I in providing key training to Iraqi officers and non-commissioned officers, and supported out-of-country specialized training for Iraqi officers in NATO schools. In addition, it assisted the Iraqi military with developing doctrine and provided help to the Iraq military in developing its command and control structure. The development of this doctrine reflected a close partnership between NTM-I and its Iraqi counterparts. While the starting point was proven Western military doctrine (largely shared by NATO partners), the officers at NTM-I worked in tandem with their Iraqi counterparts to tailor that doctrine to meet the Iraqi military's needs. The result was a doctrine that the Iraqis felt like they owned and were responsible for. As for the command and control system, NTM-I again worked closely with the Iraqis to build a system that was appropriate for the Iraqi military's (particularly the army's) organization and ways of operating. The hardware purchased was suitable to the Iraqis' needs without being too expensive and beyond their capability to maintain. At the same time, NTM-I and the Iraqis jointly developed standard operating procedures for the nodes to this C² system—the national and regional command centers—that proved workable and acceptable to the Iraqis. The result was a functioning command and control system.

One of NTM-I's most important and successful contributions to the professionalization of the Iraqi police was through Carabinieri-led training. The Carabinieri are Italy's National Military Police force, an elite force that is recognized globally for its high standards and superior performance. This contingent of 60 to 90 officers focused their efforts on training the basics and professionalizing the force. Because many Iraqi police officers were semi-literate at best, the Carabinieri used practical, hands-on training to inculcate modern police investigative techniques, crowd control, and counterterrorism tactics. Part of the program was to train the Iraqi trainers. In this regard, the goal was to make the Iraqis self-sufficient after the Carabinieri departed Iraq. Importantly, the Carabinieri worked hand-in-hand with the MOI to identify capability shortfalls and rectify them.

By May 2008, due to the Surge and the Awakening, stability in Iraq had improved. Security incidents declined to levels not seen in four-and-a-half years and remained at lower levels until U.S. forces departed Iraq. This achievement gave MNSTC-I room to address force structure shortfalls and institutional capabilities that heretofore had been deferred or underdeveloped. During 2008 and 2009 the security situation improved

enough for Iraqi forces to become the lead for security across the country, with MNF-I pulling its combat forces out of Iraq's major cities and increasingly playing a back-up role to the ISF. On January 1, 2009, the Iraqi government became fully responsible, through its security ministries, for providing security and ensuring the rule of law for its populace. The question at this point was how and when to begin transitioning the Iraqi military from a force dedicated to internal security to a traditional force with the mission of defending the country against external threats.

MNSTC-I had been increasingly successful at assisting the MOD and MOI in generating competent army and police forces. The MOD was also becoming increasingly competent at unit set fielding, which resulted in units with higher cohesion and levels of readiness than in the past. Most units were manned at greater than 100 percent strength to account for attrition (casualties, leave, AWOL, desertion, etc.). That said, army units still had considerably fewer officers and non-commissioned officers assigned than required. The MOD and MNSTC-I at this point were in the early stages of generating combat support (engineers) and combat service support (predominantly logistics support and motor transport) units. At this point, fielding efforts were primarily directed at creating divisional logistical support, transportation, and maintenance units to offset glaring weaknesses in the ability of Army units to support themselves.

The Iraqi Air and Maritime Forces were another matter. Still in their infancy and comparatively small compared to the army, they struggled to receive attention and resources from MOD. The air force and navy's development lagged far behind that of the army primarily because of the urgent need to field ground units to fight insurgents and the "ground-centric" culture of the ministry and joint headquarters. From late 2008 through 2009, MNSTC-I leaders urged ministry leaders to recognize the need to build a navy sufficient to protect Iraq's two oil platforms in the Gulf—the principal source of Iraq's revenue. As with the navy, MNSTC-I pressed the ministry to accelerate and expand its investment in the air force. This would entail building nascent capabilities for monitoring and controlling Iraq's air space, which was vulnerable to foreign incursion without the presence of the United States.³⁹ Fortunately, MNSTC-I was ultimately able to carry the day.⁴⁰

Progress—or a Lack Thereof—at the Ministerial Level

By 2009, the MOD was still a work in progress. Though MNSTC-I had established a training center for Iraqi civil servants, the ministry still struggled to institutionalize and strengthen basic business processes that would underpin the full range of institutional capabilities required for a fully-functioning organization. Part of the problem was over-centralization at the top, with the Minister and top officials refusing to delegate even mundane decisions to subordinates.⁴¹ This sort of behavior had been culturally ingrained in Iraqis and was a prominent feature of officers and high-level civilians who had grown up under Saddam Hussein's regime. While MOD and the Joint Headquarters were making strides in force

management, operational planning, personnel management, and training, logistics capabilities (acquisition, distribution, maintenance and sustainment) were a serious concern and needed significant attention.⁴² To help with these shortfalls, MNSTC-I pushed the Iraqis to rely increasingly on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) while MOD developed effective acquisition and logistic support capabilities.

Despite consistent MNSTC-I efforts to the contrary, the ministry resisted or ignored efforts to develop a strategy-to-plans-to-requirements system that would inform force design, acquisition, manning, and budget expenditures. While the ministry claimed it did so, its process and resultant “strategy” resulted in nothing more than a long, non-rationalized⁴³ shopping list of equipment untethered to either a real threat, doctrine, force design, or budgetary realities. Capabilities analysis and planning remained foreign concepts.

Budget planning and execution were equally problematic. MOD appeared incapable of setting priorities, again against repeated urging to do so. Further, leaders did not balance budgetary requirements well across the budget portfolio. This tendency was compounded by the Iraqis’ desire to acquire as many advanced weapons systems as they could, as fast as they could; every investment in weaponry was a high priority. Further, ministry budgets looked only one year out and were perpetually late.⁴⁴ As a result, budget execution typically lagged months behind schedule, causing under-execution and a last-minute flurry of spending. The worldwide recession of 2008 and 2009 did not help matters. As the global recession set in, the bottom fell out of the oil market with oil prices dropping close to 70 percent. Because the Iraqi economy is almost entirely dependent on oil revenues, this drop had an immediate, adverse effect on the MOD’s budget, as it was almost totally based on expectations of higher oil revenues than occurred.

The Ministry of Interior, on the other hand, was better at many institutional functions than the MOD at this point. The difference was that the MOI had embraced modern methods of strategic planning and programming, and thus did much better at establishing a rational and effective program for effectively using its resources to do what its strategy required. Equally helpful was the minister’s initiative to conduct management reviews, which assessed how well the ministry was executing its strategic plan. As a result, the MOI was better than MOD at articulating its requirements and managing its resources.

The MOI largely used a civilian model for its logistics and thus was in a slightly better position than MOD, with the exception of maintenance shortfalls. As of late summer 2009, the MOI was in the process of assuming its life support contracts from the coalition. While it continued to build training bases around the country, it still faced a significant training backlog. To alleviate officer shortfalls, the MOI continued to recall former army and police officers and put them through a three-week transition and integration program.

MNSTC-I still had to keep a close eye on the MOI and police forces for corruption and rule of law violations. That said, the MOI was becoming increasingly aggressive against corruption. It had made continuing progress in establishing credible internal affairs and inspector general offices to address corruption and prevent the abuse of prisoners and

detainees. As a result, it had some success in taking adverse action against employees who broke Iraqi laws or otherwise abused their positions. While the number of cases—over 4,300—indicated that significant problems remained, the MOI had shown a willingness to go after “bad cops” and other employees who violated the law.

While the combat capabilities of the two ministries and their subordinate forces had improved significantly, they were not yet capable of operating without U.S. assistance. In mid-2008, before the U.S. elections, it appeared that MNF-I and MNSTC-I would have ample time to help the Iraqis reach a point where the ISF was self-reliant and required minimal U.S. training and advisory assistance. The election of President Obama in November 2008 would change this mindset dramatically. Upon taking office, Obama made a series of decisions that shortened the amount of time U.S. forces had to provide robust and comprehensive assistance to the ISF.

Impact of President Obama’s Drawdown Decision and Timeline

In a February 27, 2009 speech at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, President Obama announced his timeline for the drawdown of U.S. forces. He declared that the U.S. combat mission in Iraq would end on August 31, 2010, and Operation Iraqi Freedom would officially conclude. U.S. forces would draw down from about 147,000 troops to between 35,000 and 50,000 troops and become a transitional force responsible for training, equipping, and advising Iraqi security forces; conducting targeted counterterrorism missions; and protecting ongoing U.S. civilian and military assistance efforts within Iraq.⁴⁵ This announcement immediately concentrated MNF-I’s attention on preparing for the drawdown, how it would reorganize itself to execute the revised mission starting September 1, 2010, and what it must help the ISF accomplish before all U.S. forces departed Iraq at the end of 2011. These were all major tasks. It was immediately clear to all involved that there was much to do and comparatively little time to do it.

While MNF-I and MNC-I put the bulk of their planning effort into reorganizing the command and addressing the massive personnel and logistical effort before them, MNSTC-I focused on its own internal reorganization and what absolutely had to—and could—be accomplished in terms of Iraqi capabilities before the drawdown was complete at the end of 2011. Two factors outside the coalition’s control had a major impact on planning and executing those plans with the two ministries. The first was the global recession that began in 2008 and continued through 2009. During that period, crude oil prices collapsed from a high of \$147 per barrel to a low of \$32 per barrel. Even though the market began a recovery in 2009, oil was still selling for less than half its price at the high-water mark.

As might be expected, this collapse had an immediate, adverse impact on Iraq’s budget, requiring severe cutbacks across all the ministries, including the MOD and MOI. The immediate result was putting a hold on any plans for expansion and greatly slowing budgetary expenditures. This was precisely at the time that ISFF assistance was supposed to begin declining, from \$3 billion to about \$1 billion.⁴⁶ MNSTC-I planners were deeply

concerned that MOD and MOI would be unable to make investments necessary for ensuring that the ISF would be prepared to assume full responsibility for the security mission once the United States departed. One immediate effect was a hiring freeze.⁴⁷ A second effect was the extension of timelines for procuring weapons systems and other equipment. The third effect was MNSTC-I's request for an increase in ISFF.

The second factor was the impending Iraqi parliamentary elections to be conducted in March 2010. While this election was a critical milestone in solidifying democratic processes in Iraq, it resulted in significantly slowing governmental processes, as key officials played a delaying game to see who would assume power and assess how that would affect them and their roles in the government. As the election approached, MNSTC-I entered a prolonged period of relative inaction that would not end until well after the elections had concluded. During this period in late 2009 and early 2010, it was difficult to get Iraqi ministerial leaders to make major plans or decisions about the future of the ISF. It was in this context that MNSTC-I planners began to think about what was achievable to make the ISF self-sufficient and capable of defending the country from threats—both internal and external—before the United States departed.

MNSTC-I planners came up with the concept of “Minimum Essential Capabilities” (MEC) to determine what was in the art of the possible in the two remaining years it had given the resources projected to be available. After a great deal of internal debate, MNSTC-I's leaders determined that the broad end-state for the ISF should be institutions and forces capable of providing internal security and the minimum foundational capabilities to defend against external threats.

In this regard, the MOI was in comparatively better shape than it had been a few years earlier. It had most of the vehicles and equipment it needed, and its force size was reaching maturity. The operational goal for MOI was to achieve “police primacy,” which meant police forces taking the lead for internal security in cities so the Iraqi Army could focus on external defense. For them to achieve this goal, the MOI needed to develop a self-reliant ministry with sustainable and enduring systems, professional staff, and capable leadership that enabled the manning, training, and equipping of police forces.⁴⁸ This task was well within the realm of possibility, and no major shifts in size or mission were required.

The situation with the MOD was more difficult. The key was in determining what exactly constituted “minimum foundational capabilities to defend against external threats.” The Minister of Defense wanted a large, conventional force capable of executing the full range of missions against a conventional external threat—in addition to fighting the insurgency. In part, this aspiration stemmed from the MOD's inability and unwillingness to do the necessary strategic planning and attendant requirements analysis to determine what realistically could be done in the remaining two years. The Minister's goal was simply not feasible. The MOD did not remotely have the funds to achieve it, and even if it did, the laws of management and physics militated against it. There simply was not enough time or institutional capability to acquire the equipment, get it delivered, train the force with it, and field it. As important, he had not even considered building the doctrine, training, or sustainment capability for such a force.

Across the two ministries, MEC initiatives fell into two groups. The first was to establish sustained capabilities for ensuring internal security, and the second was to expand the MOI's and MOD's capabilities to protect Iraq from external threats. At the institutional level, MNSTC-I determined it would have to make a full-court press to develop modern logistical systems in both ministries—but particularly in the MOD—that could sustain them over the long term. The ministries had considerable deficiencies in this arena, not the least of which were an inability to assess, record, and address logistics requirements in a systematic way; develop effective contracts that used ISF resources well; and conduct maintenance and supply operations effectively.

At the same time as MNSTC-I was going through its MEC analysis for the ISF, it also recognized that no U.S. organization in Iraq (either the U.S. Embassy or MNF-I Headquarters) or in Washington had yet begun to think through the creation of an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I), which would fall under the control of the Embassy and functionally replace MNSTC-I once U.S. forces departed Iraq. Given the president's announcement, this was understandable. Every organization in Iraq was scrambling to react to his direction because time was short. By April 2009 the MNF-I staff was inundated with drawdown planning.

It was in this context that MNSTC-I volunteered to do the staff work needed for establishing the OSC-I. Even though it was only three months into the new administration, MNSTC-I's staff knew that they were already late to this task, particularly with regard to providing input into the U.S. FY12 budget cycle.⁴⁹ They immediately began to research the requirements for standing up an OSC-I and, just as importantly, the legal and policy limitations that would constrain any planning for the OSC-I. One major consideration was that the police training mission would be handed back over to the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, which would execute this mission as a separate entity under the Embassy's oversight. Given the uncertainty of the post-2011 environment, MNSTC-I began developing a variety of options for the organization, manning, and missions of this new organization. Options ranged from a small, traditional organization to a robust and large organization with a broader mission set. Clear from the start of this planning, though, was that the OSC-I would have greatly diminished capability to assist Iraq with building its defense institutions.

Transition: U.S. Forces-Iraq to Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq

In January 2010, MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I folded together into the newly created U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I). The creation of USF-I, an interim step in the drawdown and transition to the OSC-I, streamlined staff overhead for the theater. USF-I's principal focus would be managing the monumental effort of the drawdown, overseeing the transfer of its responsibilities to the Iraqis, and ensuring that conditions were such that U.S. forces could cease combat operations and transition to a pure advise, train, and assist role on September 1, 2010.⁵⁰ Under this reorganization, the Commander of MNSTC-I became the Deputy Commanding General, Advise and Train (DCG-A&T) for USF-I. Three organizations fell

under him: the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM), the Iraq Security Assistance Mission (ISAM), and the Iraq National Counterterrorism Task Force (INCTF). ITAM would focus on institutional training while ITAM would be responsible for foreign military sales and associated Security Assistance missions. *Figure 3* shows the composition of ITAM and ISAM under this reorganization. ITAM and ISAM would serve as the basis for the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq (OSC-I) in late 2011.

Figure 3: ITAM and ISAM Teams

ITAM Advise and Train Teams	
▪ ITAM-Army	▪ ITAM-Intel TT
▪ ITAM-Air Force	▪ ITAM-MOD
▪ ITAM-Navy	▪ ITAM-MOI
▪ ITAM-Police	▪ Partnership Strategy Group-Iraq
ISAM Teams	
▪ ISAM Army	▪ ISAM Logistics / End Use Monitoring
▪ ISAM Navy	▪ ISAM International Military Education and Training / Out-of-Country
▪ ISAM Air Force	Training

The DCG-A&T’s mission set was virtually the same as MNSTC-I’s. All of MNSTC-I’s initiatives begun in 2009 continued under this new organization. The only difference was that the DCG, A&T performed these tasks with fewer people. Although the mission and associated tasks remained the same, it was clear to the Iraqis that the United States was on the way out. Receptivity to U.S. counsel noticeably declined in some quarters, and several key ministerial advisors found themselves increasingly doing less advising and more liaison work. The opportunity for instituting modern business practices to address Iraqi deficiencies was declining rapidly.

One exception to this trend was the work of USF-I’s Strategic Logistics Directorate, which was established in 2010 for improving the ISF’s logistics and industrial capability to sustain the minimum materiel readiness of the two forces.⁵¹ This initiative almost immediately resulted in notable improvements in a number of areas. It was more successful than other ministerial advisory efforts because, first and foremost, a few key leaders in MOD, MOI, and the Joint Headquarters saw the need for this effort and embraced it. It was also more successful because USF-I put the necessary resources into the effort. The directorate was headed by a senior executive with deep experience in Service- and DOD-level logistics. He was also provided a staff whose size and talent was commensurate with the mission. Other ministerial-level bureaucratic functions received neither this kind of emphasis nor commensurate resources.

As planning in 2010 for the new OSC-I progressed, the U.S. Government sought to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Government of Iraq.⁵² A SOFA would be necessary if Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki were to ask the U.S. president to leave residual military forces behind to continue the train and advise mission.⁵³ When the United States and Iraq were unable to reach such an agreement, it became clear that any military personnel who remained in Iraq would have to be assigned to the U.S. Mission, where they would enjoy a form of diplomatic status. The issue then became how big an office would be needed to perform the full range of normal security cooperation activities plus additional responsibilities requested or agreed to by the Embassy, and approved by Congress.⁵⁴

The final design of the OSC-I included just 157 military personnel and civil servants. Many of the training and advising functions performed at the Embassy and six field sites would be performed by a large contractor contingent. This new organization would be much smaller than MNSTC-I yet be responsible for many of the same tasks.⁵⁵ Importantly, this OSC would have a very small staff to address key institution-building initiatives and advise the Ministry of Defense staff. While this organization would be larger than most other OSCs around the world, it also had to attend to many tasks for which other OSCs were not responsible.

On October 1, 2011, three months before U.S. forces completed their withdrawal from Iraq, the OSC-I officially stood up and took over the DCG-A&T's responsibilities. The OSC-I faced challenges from the beginning. The first had to do with dated CENTCOM guidance.⁵⁶ The second had to do with whether the Departments of State and Defense saw eye to eye on the nature and scope of the OSC-I's mission. Operating under less than clear guidance, the OSC-I forged ahead with establishing its plan, believing it was consistent with the latest guidance from CENTCOM and that CENTCOM was in sync with the Embassy and the State Department.

Over the next two years, the OSC-I would learn that its goals and supporting activities were out of sync with the Embassy. This disconnect would put many of the OSC-I's activities, and related facilities and personnel, in jeopardy. Even so, the OSC-I fought to maintain a "Senior Advisor's Group" for the purpose of developing Iraq's institutional capabilities. This very small contingent, however, did little to offset the OSC-I's devolution principally to security assistance tasks.⁵⁷ Complicating matters, inadequate training and other pre-deployment preparation would continue to plague the OSC-I.⁵⁸

The departure of U.S. forces came before USF-I could bring the ISF to full capability, competence, and self-sufficiency. While the Iraqis possessed increasingly complete capabilities for internal security, they were still in the early stages of transitioning to a more traditional division of responsibility between the Ministry of Defense and a Ministry of Interior. The MOD was only on the front edge of developing the ability to defend against external threats, while the Ministry of Interior was hampered by a lack of effective courts, a criminal justice system that was not fully functioning, and substandard detention facilities.⁵⁹ The two ministries, not fully effective before the United States departed, increasingly

reverted to traditional bureaucratic practices, which undermined much of what the United States had tried to accomplish. Further, they were still beset by corruption and sectarian animosity.

Institutional Reversion after U.S. Withdrawal

The remaining work was left to a small cadre of military advisors and trainers who, in some respects, were undertrained for the challenge that lay before them. Their task would have been difficult even if the prevailing sentiment in Iraq had been pro-United States. Unfortunately, Iraqi sentiment was just the opposite. Many in the Iraqi government still saw the United States as occupiers, and not particularly effective ones at that. In particular, many of those who surrounded Prime Minister al-Maliki neither liked nor trusted the United States. Although it is not clear what Maliki's personal feelings were, he seemed to be swayed by those who surrounded him. It was in his interest that he not be perceived as under the sway of Washington and a puppet of the United States. At any rate, Maliki did much to polarize his country and undermine the effectiveness of his own forces.

From 2009 on, Maliki accelerated his reversion to the strong-man tactics so prevalent in Iraq's past history.⁶⁰ These tactics revolved around the centralization of political and military power and played on religious and tribal allegiances through patronage and nepotism. He began by creating the extralegal Office of the Commander-in-Chief (OCINC), staffed by loyalists, which he used as an informal command and control apparatus to exert direct operational control over forces in the field. This organization clearly acted outside of Iraq's official chain of command. Further, he diverted U.S. arms and vehicles to equip his praetorian guard, the Presidential Brigades.⁶¹

Using the OCINC, he also brought the elite Baghdad Brigade under his control and then employed them to conduct special missions and target political rivals. He created the Counterterrorism Command to bring Iraq's highly trained and effective special operation forces under his control via the OCINC. These forces were used to target political rivals, both Sunni and Shia. To extend his control over the military, he replaced competent military commanders with loyalists of his own choosing—who may or may not have been militarily competent and effective leaders.⁶² Lastly, he brought the intelligence services under his personal control. Maliki also used temporary appointments to control the two security ministries. When the Iraqi Council of Representatives was unable to agree upon replacements for the Ministers of Defense and Interior after the 2010 elections, Maliki had himself selected as the acting minister for both ministries.⁶³ All of these actions systematically undermined the legitimate chain of command and the legal levers of power.

The ISF also suffered from rot at lower echelons. As soon as they were no longer under the careful watch of U.S. advisors, many Iraqi units began to regress in training, sustainment, military professionalism, and ethics. Tribal and sectarian patronage re-emerged and often trumped loyalty to the state. Some leaders of lower-level units put commissions and positions up for sale. Others failed to remove killed, wounded, or AWOL

(absent without official leave) soldiers from unit rolls so they could pocket their salaries. Gains in getting leaders at lower levels to show initiative and competence were gradually lost, as many commanders gave their subordinates little latitude to act independently. Units came increasingly under the senior command of Shias, which heightened sectarian tensions. Finally, with U.S. impetus to maintain their capabilities and sustain their equipment gone, Iraqi units slid back into bad practices, and their combat readiness declined significantly.

It is little wonder that when faced with a capable and determined opponent like ISIS, large elements of the ISF collapsed and ran. The Maliki government, in creating security institutions that served its particular political and sectarian interests, sowed the seeds of the force's failures. It did much to undo years of U.S. investment in building a capable force that would serve a democratic state. Maliki's actions also illustrate the danger of creating forces that are as much a threat to stability as they are a force for achieving it.⁶⁴

Conclusion: Lessons Learned

The foregoing highlights the difficulties of overcoming ingrained practices and instituting new methods for building sustainable defense institutions. The United States not only underestimated the power of Iraqi culture and history, it also overestimated its ability to overcome this culture in a few short years and make lasting change. For the Iraqis' part, the ISF lacked the political and cultural incentives that would motivate the lasting transformation that U.S. forces desired. Institutional change of this sort takes a long time, possibly decades, to inculcate. It requires a substantial, long-term investment in creating a strategic partnership. The United States, however, was unwilling to make such an investment for the long term. That said, the onus was ultimately on Iraq to embrace and internalize change.⁶⁵

Notwithstanding these major considerations, there is much to be learned about the U.S. and coalition's DIB experience in Iraq. The following discussion highlights five major areas where the United States fell short in the early days of Phase IV and the lessons learned from these shortfalls. To their credit, the coalition and the United States generally learned from their early mistakes—though not in every case—and took corrective action over time.

Planning

By all accounts, Phase IV planning generally got short shrift and did not benefit from the expertise and involvement of agencies outside the DOD. Moreover, Phase IV planning suffered from a late start and fatally flawed assumptions. Better Phase IV planning could have precluded many of the coalition's early problems after seizing Baghdad.

Two major lessons can be derived for future DIB planners. First, a detailed, thoroughly wargamed Phase IV plan, based on carefully vetted assumptions, is essential to success. As much—or more—planning effort should go into Phase IV as the other phases of the operation. This should be a unified civilian and military effort overseen by the highest levels of the government to ensure that the proper perspectives and expertise are brought to bear.

Such planning should be overseen by the NSC, and conflicts should be adjudicated by them. At a minimum, planning should address the initiation of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and civil administration as quickly as possible once major combat operations begin to wind down. Planners should identify which of the Phase IV plan's critical assumptions are most fragile (have the greatest possibility of being wrong and the greatest potential for negatively affecting the plan if wrong) and develop contingency plans for the possibility that these assumptions prove wrong.

Second, planners should anticipate an initial period of public disorder and collapse of governance during Phases III and IV (this has been the historical norm). Planners should be prepared to establish martial law swiftly, and have a plan to quickly recall or reconstitute the police—and the military if necessary. This will include ensuring enough forces are on the ground to keep the peace until the police can be reconstituted and formal governance reinstated. Civil order is a vital precondition for institution building. Relatedly, planners should prepare for the need to establish interim government institutions, and put them in place as quickly as possible after major combat operations have terminated. Given that the police and military may have been part of the problem in the past, deep concern about past practices should be balanced with a measure of practicality and common sense in restoring order.

Unity in Decision-making and Policy for Phase IV

The United States and its coalition partners greatly complicated their job of maintaining security and rebuilding the Iraqi military after the invasion by disbanding the army and firing senior ministerial officials who were Baathists. The military leaders of the coalition were not fully in agreement with the *what* and *how* of these two early initiatives. These decisions resulted in leaving the two ministries bereft of critical experience and expertise—and resulted in the coalition having to rebuild the Iraqi military's operational and institutional capabilities from scratch. These well-meaning but misguided initiatives took years to overcome. Ultimately common sense prevailed, and they were—at least in part—walked back over time. It was not clear, either, how much these decisions enjoyed the support of the White House and NSC, which should have been closely involved in their promulgation.

In addition, the efforts of military leaders in the coalition forces and civilian leaders in the ORHA and CPA were not well-synchronized. In fact, they too often worked at cross purposes or needlessly duplicated initiatives pursued by the other. To say the least, communication and unity of effort were not optimal.

These experiences highlight two lessons for future DIB efforts. First, national-level policies and decisions regarding an occupation and subsequent institution building efforts should be coordinated with, and understood by, all involved in Phase IV on the ground well before their implementation. Such decisions should be vetted in interagency forums, and conflicts and concerns should be adjudicated before they are instituted. Second, during the transition from Phase III (led by the military commander) to Phase IV (where a civilian

leader takes over), it is vital that the major decisions and policies are promulgated in a unified and integrated manner. Close consultation and unity of effort will serve to prevent civilian and military leaders working at cross purposes and undermining each other's efforts. Such decisions and policies should be jointly wargamed to ensure as best as possible that they do not unintentionally damage U.S. goals of reconstituting effective and efficient administration of military institutions and effective governance as a whole.

Balance between Building the Operational Force and Defense Institutions

Building lasting defense institutions requires commensurate efforts between building the operational force and putting in place higher-order systems to design, build, arm, man, and sustain those forces. The creation of competent tactical-level forces can be done faster than building capable, self-sustaining institutions. For far too long in Iraq, the coalition put the majority of its emphasis and resources on getting forces into the counterinsurgency fight. It waited too long to address major institutional deficiencies. When it did do so, it put too few resources toward this important task. By late 2009, the Iraqis knew the United States would be pulling out in force and they would soon be back in charge. At that point, the U.S. window of opportunity began closing—and to a large extent the Iraqis waited the coalition out. Unfortunately, too few senior Iraqis appreciated the need for defense institution building or pressed their government to invest in it. There is an important lesson to be learned here: to the degree possible, do not delay engaging in DIB, even if tactical conditions make such engagement difficult. Those engaged in institution building will likely have a limited window of opportunity for making a major positive impact. Engagement is most effective when the partner perceives the need is greatest and least effective when the partner believes that U.S. involvement has begun to subside.

Establishing and Maintaining an Effective Defense Ministerial Advisory Effort

Building effective institutions is a difficult, complicated, and long-term task. It requires advisors and trainers with the right preparation, aptitudes, and skills who can provide expertise and continuity. Too often the advisors for this mission lacked the requisite experience and preparation. The U.S. military and civilian personnel and training systems did too little to prepare these advisors for the task before them. Too often they were learning on the job, which caused them to be less credible and competent than they needed to be at the start of their tours. Finally, short tours caused high personnel turbulence, which in turn caused problems with continuity, experience, expertise, and credibility.

This highlights the importance of pre-building—well in advance of need—DIB teams adequate to the scale of the task and staffed with individuals who have the requisite expertise, experience, and gravitas to have credibility with ministers and their principal assistants. They should train and work together as a team before deployment. These teams should be robust and well-versed in the language and culture of the country to which they will be deployed. The U.S. government should be prepared to deploy these teams as soon as it is prudent to do so. To the degree possible, these advisors—particularly the most senior

advisors—should be left in place as long as possible to build strong relationships with their counterparts and ensure continuity of effort and policy. Very little can be more disruptive and frustrating to the partner than dealing with an ever-changing parade of inexperienced advisors—with little to no seniority and attendant credibility—who constantly change the direction and content of the overall advisory effort.

Co-opting the Partner in Building the Defense Institution

Too often during Phase IV, coalition and U.S. ministerial advisors attempted to put in place Western systems and practices that were either alien to Iraqi culture or to which the Iraqis did not subscribe wholeheartedly. As a result, the Iraqis often reverted to their own traditional systems and practices once U.S. advisors left because they felt no ownership in what the United States had put in place.

Two important lessons can be taken from this experience. First, the partner must have the major say in all new or modern systems to be instituted. To the extent that they own it and it becomes their system, it will be more likely to survive the advisor's departure. Such an effort should, wherever possible, seek to exploit and optimize well-accepted bureaucratic practices and policies in the partner country. The artificial imposition of practices alien to the country's bureaucratic policy are likely to fail or have limited effect. To the degree possible, the partner should believe bureaucratic improvements are his idea and see that these improvements are in his best interest to implement.

Second, as with developing the operational force, a “train the trainer” technique can be effective at instituting new systems and bureaucratic practices at the ministerial level. The partner, however, must own the facility, provide the instructors, and have a strong hand in the development of the curriculum for such an effort. It is best that such courses be taught by respected teachers from the partner country.

Given past errors, current turmoil, and the limitations of the OSC-I, it is very much an open question whether the Iraqis will develop truly effective, accountable, transparent, and responsive defense institutions in the foreseeable future. It can only be hoped that the U.S. and Iraqi governments recognize the precariousness of the current situation and reinvest in a partnership designed to help the Iraqis with this important task. Their failure to do so invites outcomes that neither country wants.

Notes

1 Ben Kesling and Matt Brady, “Victory Marks Turnaround for Iraqi Army,” *Washington Post*, December 29, 2015.

2 Jonathan Marcus, “Factors Behind the Precipitate Collapse of Iraq’s Army,” *BBC News*, June 13, 2014. See also Eric Schmitt and Michael R. Gordon, “The Iraqi Army was Crumbling Long Before its Collapse,” *The New York Times*, June 12, 2014.

3 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), *Hard Lessons* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 8-22. See also Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2006), 102-103.

4 The CENTCOM planning effort begs a detailed discussion of “end state” analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Rumsfeld, rather than focusing on what a post-war Iraq should look like, concentrated on “options”

for defeating Iraqi forces. That is, he focused on the “means” and “ways” first before doing a thorough analysis of the “ends.” From a planning perspective, this puts the cart before the horse. At best, the defeat of the Iraqi armed forces was an intermediate objective to a broader goal, which should have included a well-defined, desired state of affairs for post-invasion peace and the conditions under which that peace should be secured. Rumsfeld, instead, chose to assume that military defeat of Iraq would automatically translate into an acceptable post-war state of affairs. Rumsfeld’s approach to planning is not uncommon among inexperienced decision makers, who pay far too little attention to what it is they want to achieve before looking at how to conduct the operation. The end state should have driven the planning, not the reverse.

5 Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2006), 98. Deputy Secretary of Wolfowitz stated this belief succinctly in 2002 stating, “I am reasonably certain that they will welcome us as liberators, and that will keep requirements down.”

6 Illustrative of this failure was the fact that he was located less than 50 yards from the Office of Special Plans, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s organization dedicated to planning for Iraq. He never saw its products or even knew of the existence of this office until just days before the invasion, finding out about it only by accident. Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, *Hard Lessons* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009), 36.

7 Bing West, *The Strongest Tribe* (New York, NY: Random House, 2008), 5. See also Ricks, *op. cit.*, 135-138; and Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, *op. cit.*, 59-60.

8 *Hard Lessons, op. cit.*, 54. See also, Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 57.

9 Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum to L. Paul Bremer, Presidential Envoy to Iraq, “Designation as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority,” May 13, 2003.

10 James Dobbins et al., *Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2009), xvi. See also Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, *op. cit.*, 82-83.

11 Ricks, *op. cit.*, 158-162.

12 Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1, “De-Baathification of Iraqi Society,” May 16, 2003.

13 Ultimately, low- and mid-level former Baathists would be readmitted after vetting.

14 Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” May 23, 2003. This decision, in the opinion of Bremer and his key advisors, merely reflected the status quo, for the Army had effectively disintegrated anyway. CPA Directive 2, however, left police forces intact.

15 Donald P. Wright et al., *On Point II* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Press, 2008), 429.

16 Wright et al., *op. cit.*, 430-432. See also Dobbins et al., *op. cit.*, 62-63.

17 Later in the year, CMATT would be given the responsibility for creating the Iraqi Air Force and Coastal Defense Force (later to become the Iraqi Navy). Wright et al., *op. cit.*, 432.

18 For example, Eaton was given only \$173 million for his budget. Compounding Eaton’s problems was Rumsfeld’s decision to greatly accelerate training. Rumsfeld wanted to ensure that a military force was in place by the disestablishment of the CPA and turnover of control to the Iraqis in September 2004. This meant cutting CPATT’s two-year training plan in half. Kerik estimated it would take him six years to create a competent force; Bremer gave him two years to do it. At the same time, Sanchez pursued a parallel initiative to address unrest. He directed the creation of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) to assist with constabulary duties, give jobs to former soldiers, and provide Iraqis a sense of ownership for security in their communities. The ICDC’s creation, unfortunately, put forces on the ground that competed with the local police and undercut the Army’s regional authority. Ineffective coordination between the ICDC, the Iraqi Army, and the police aggravated these problems.

19 Abizaid realized he was facing a growing insurgency. Deeply concerned that the Iraqi Army would not be large enough—fast enough—to address the threat posed by the insurgency, he lobbied to “really put the muscle of DOD behind the training effort.” Ambassador Bremer and General Eaton opposed this initiative for a variety of reasons but were ultimately overruled by Rumsfeld. Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, *op. cit.*, 132.

20 This Office of Security Cooperation should not be confused with the OSC-I created after the U.S. drawdown in Iraq. MG Eaton’s OSC ceased to exist once MNF-I came into being. His responsibilities were subsumed by MNSTC-I.

21 Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, *op. cit.*, 133.

22 Wright et al, *op. cit.*, 404. See also Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, *op. cit.*, 72. See also Ricks, *op. cit.*, 165.

23 Bremer claims to have received such direction directly from President Bush.

24 “Sistani to Declare Handover is Illegal,” *Dawn*, March 28, 2004 available at <<http://www.dawn.com/news/392867/sistani-to-declare-handover-illegal>>. See also Dobbins et al., *op. cit.*, 269. The Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the most prominent Shia cleric, issued a fatwah claiming that the IGC was illegitimate. This was representative of deep Iraqi concerns about not regaining sovereignty over their own affairs quickly enough.

25 Ricks, *op. cit.*, 166.

26 *Ibid.*, 165.

27 Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, *op. cit.*, 133. See also Thomas E. Ricks, “Iraqi Battalion

- Refuses to ‘Fight Iraqis’,” *Washington Post*, April 11, 2004, available at <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/21/AR2006062101420.html>>. See also Ricks, *op. cit.*, 338-341. See also Wright et al., *op. cit.*, 449.
- 28 Ricks, *op. cit.*, 391. See also Dobbins et al., *op. cit.*, 325-326.
- 29 The coalition did not transfer full responsibility for force design and force generation to the MOD and MOI until near the end of the drawdown. Part of the reluctance to do so had to do with capability and part had to do with lack of trust that the MOD and MOI would actually follow through and create the planned forces as designed. The actions of the Maliki Government and elements in both the MOD and MOI gave good reason for this distrust.
- 30 Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, *op. cit.*, 194.
- 31 Subsequent commanders in chronological order were Lieutenant General Martin E. Dempsey (September 2005–June 2007), Lieutenant General James M. Dubik (June 2007–July 2008), Lieutenant General Frank Helmick (July 2008–October 2009), and Lieutenant General Michael D. Barbero (October 2009–2010).
- 32 It is important to note that intensive work with the Ministries of Defense and Interior would begin in earnest only after LTG Martin Dempsey succeeded Petraeus in 2005.
- 33 Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction, *op. cit.*, 157. IRMO was in charge of reconstruction policy and continued using the senior advisors from the CPA. Under IRMO senior advisors functioned principally as consultants to Iraqi ministers, helping them coordinate ministry operations and reconstruction projects. They were apparently not resourced to build ministerial capability at all bureaucratic levels. This would not happen until later.
- 34 Wright et al., *op. cit.*, 453. Petraeus emphasized, stating “we can develop all the battalions, brigades, divisions and ground forces, and police, and so forth, in the world, but they’ve got to be supportable and supported by the Ministries of Defense and Interior to ensure eventual self-reliance and transition to complete Iraqi control.”
- 35 Later, the course was split into two parts: the first was conducted online, and the second was addressed in a one-day classroom session.
- 36 A series of MNSTC-I reorganizations and recurring downsizing from 2008 until the creation of the OSC-I only amplified this problem.
- 37 This was a significant problem in some quarters. Such action did not help the Iraqis. Rather, it made them dependent on the United States rather than autonomous. Additionally, the Iraqis were more than happy to let the advisors do their work for them.
- 38 While the terminology “incoherent system” is an oxymoron, by “incoherent” the author means the system as an entirety is internally inconsistent—the components do not fit together in a logical way.
- 39 Fortunately, the Iraqis were much better at supporting their counterterrorism forces, the two Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF) Brigades. Although undermanned, these units were highly-trained and effective, perhaps the best trained units under MNSTC-I’s oversight.
- 40 Convincing the Minister of Defense required an intense personal effort by the MNSTC-I commander and other senior leaders in MNSTC-I. The commander at the time, LTG Frank Helmick, was personally instrumental in cajoling the Minister to make these important investments.
- 41 Defense Minister Abd al-Qadr was renowned for working late into the night reviewing and signing hundreds of documents—important and trivial. He delegated very little.
- 42 This problem is intimately connected to an Iraqi cultural disposition to address supply or maintenance only when equipment breaks down or supplies run out. For example, the concept of “preventative” maintenance was foreign to ISF forces and the Ministries. Typically, units focused only on maintenance after a vehicle or weapon broke down. Only then would they put a demand on the maintenance and supply system, if at all, especially when cannibalization of another vehicle was quicker and cheaper. This resulted in abysmal operational readiness rates and large numbers of inoperable vehicles.
- 43 A non-rationalized set of equipment is one that is non-standard and built from a variety of sources. This sort of scattershot acquisition practice, plays havoc with establishing parts replacement systems and maintenance. It also greatly increases the costs of life cycle maintenance because it makes it difficult, if not impossible, to establish any economy of scale in the logistical system.
- 44 This was a function of one-year national budget cycles and an almost total reliance on oil revenues.
- 45 President Barack Obama, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq,” Remarks at Camp Lejeune, NC, February 27, 2009 available at <<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/02/27/responsibly-ending-war-iraq>>.
- 46 ISFF was flexible in that it was allocated in two-year tranches, which gave MNSTC-I significantly more latitude in expending it than a traditional one-year allocation.
- 47 Both ministries would not be able to pay their employees’ salaries for the year if the ministries continued to expand. Salaries and basic life support consumed roughly two-thirds of each ministries’ budget, which left comparatively little money for infrastructure, procurement, maintenance, logistics, and other expenditures. For both ministries combined, this amounted to about \$1.5 billion dollars for addressing these other categories of expenditures.
- 48 DOD Report to Congress, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2010, available at <<https://www>.

defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/June_9204_Sec_Def_signed_20_Aug_2010.pdf>, 48.

49 Department of Defense Inspector General Report, "Assessment of Planning for Transitioning the Security Assistance Mission in Iraq from Department of Defense to Department of State Authority," Report No. SPO-2011-008, 2-5.

50 At that point Operation Iraqi Freedom would officially conclude. Operation New Dawn would begin on the assumption of this new mission.

51 DOD Inspector General Report, "Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Iraq Security Forces," Report No. SPO-2011-001, November 17, 2010, ii.

52 Such a follow-on agreement would give U.S. military personnel stationed in Iraq after December 31, 2011, but not assigned to the U.S. Embassy, certain privileges and immunities.

53 Anthony Cordesman and Sam Khazi, "Shaping Iraq's Security Forces," *Center for Strategic Studies Report*, June 12, 2014, 4-5. DOD initially considered leaving 10,000 to 15,000 personnel in country, but later estimates decreased to 3,000 to 4,000 personnel under Secretary of Defense Panetta.

54 DoD Inspector General, "Assessment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq Mission Capabilities," DODIG-2013-136, September 18, 2013, 136.

55 The OSC-I's responsibilities included overseeing Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs, managing Foreign Military Sales (FMS), training the Iraqi military on newly fielded weapons systems, conducting joint military exercises, overseeing International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, as well as what remained of the advise and train mission.

56 "Assessment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq Mission Capabilities," *op. cit.*, 15-16.

57 Because they were too small to accomplish much of anything in the way of actual institution building, they focused their efforts on maintaining situational awareness of the MOD, facilitating a long-term security relationship, fostering a partnership with MOD and Joint Headquarters counterparts, and facilitating key leader engagements.

58 "Assessment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq Mission Capabilities," *op. cit.*, 35-36.

59 Cordesman and Khazi, *op. cit.*, 6.

60 "Foreign Intervention: From Beirut to Baghdad," Special Report: The Arab World, *The Economist*, May 14, 2016, available at <<http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21698441-america-tired-policing-arab-world-and-vice-versa-pulling-out-could-be-just>>. Ryan Crocker, Ambassador to Iraq from 2007 to 2009 referred to Iraqi politicians' instinct to revert to narrow sectarianism in the following way, "compromise is a concession, a concession is a defeat and defeat is death."

61 Cordesman and Khazi, *op. cit.*, 18.

62 Marisa Sullivan, "Maliki's Authoritarian Regime," *Institute for the Study of War Middle East Security Report* 10, April 2013, available at <<http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Maliki-Authoritarian-Regime-Web.pdf>>, 18. To illustrate this point, 13 of 14 Army division commanders were Shia at the time of her report.

63 Sullivan, *op. cit.*, 17.

64 Cordesman and Khazi, *op. cit.*, 3.

65 This leads to the uncomfortable conclusion that perhaps the coalition should have taken the training wheels off the ISF earlier and pushed the ISF to take full responsibility for operations sooner.

CONCLUSION

A Vision for the Future of Defense Institution Building

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As the United States faces the increasingly complex security challenges of the 21st century, it must be able to rely on its partners and allies to share the burden of preventing conflict, ensuring lasting peace, and maintaining long-term stability. Assisting partners in their efforts to develop sustainable defense capacity is therefore vital to U.S. national security interests. In the case of security cooperation, however, traditional approaches have proven insufficient to achieve sustainable reforms. Defense institution building (DIB) is an innovative approach to security cooperation, emphasizing the importance of governance and management to the sustainability of partner capacity.

DIB efforts are defined in the introduction of this book as activities that empower partner-nation defense institutions to establish or re-orient their policies and structures to make their defense sectors more transparent, accountable, effective, affordable, and responsive to civilian control.¹ As each chapter demonstrates, DIB ensures that efforts to build capacity are undergirded by solid institutional foundations, which increase the effectiveness and sustainability of U.S. assistance and investments. At the same time, DIB is a process of facilitation, not imposition; through its partner-centric approach, DIB ensures that the process of building institutional capacity stems from and remains rooted in the partner. In doing so, DIB increases the partner's ability to achieve its security priorities, maintain national and regional stability, and address shared security challenges with the United States and its allies.

This chapter considers the challenges that lie ahead for DIB and draws on insights from the book to discuss possible ways forward. It looks first at the chronological development of U.S. DIB in the 21st century, tracing its evolution from the early 2000s through to its current state in 2017. Returning to the themes laid out in the introduction, it considers some of the major findings from the volume's chapters and then looks in depth at some of the outstanding challenges that DIB practitioners are currently grappling with, including defining U.S. interests and goals for DIB, understanding partner incentives, improving DIB assessments, measuring progress and evaluating DIB outcomes, organizing for DIB in the U.S. system, and shaping the DIB workforce. These sections provide recommendations for U.S. policymakers and practitioners who will be involved in future DIB endeavors.

An Evolving Concept

In the past 15 years, the role of DIB has expanded in the United States. While U.S. assistance at the ministerial level and the recognition of a need to foster strong institutions is not entirely new, it is only in the past decade or so that programs dedicated specifically to building institutional capacities in support of effective defense sector governance have been developed and established in the United States. This section traces DIB's evolution from its roots in security cooperation in the post-Cold War era through to recent developments in 2017.

As Kerr and Hanlon and Perito detail at the beginning of this volume, U.S. DIB emerged out of three related but distinct developments. First, the shifting security environment after the end of the Cold War set the backdrop for a need to revise the security assistance system. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar order ushered in a decade of instability, dominated by weak states and intrastate violence. Hanlon and Perito note that while there was recognition that U.S. security assistance tools were not equipped to handle the challenges of the post-Cold War global order, the conventional mindset remained dominant. As a result, the existing security assistance architecture was not fundamentally realigned to match the requirements of a transformed security environment.

Second, the emergence of the concept of security sector reform (SSR) during the 1990s, which championed the nexus between security and development, established the theoretical underpinnings of the DIB concept. SSR challenged traditional notions of the link between economic development and peace, arguing instead for the importance of effective oversight, accountability, and governance of defense establishments to the economic, social, and political development of weak states. While the U.S. defense establishment did not initially embrace SSR as thoroughly as did Europe, the United States was involved in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations to reform the security and defense sectors of NATO aspirants in Eastern and Central Europe. Through the Wales Initiative Fund, established in 1994 to support the new Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, the United States first experienced the advantages—and the challenges—of DIB in practice, laying the foundations for DIB as a fundamental tool in the U.S. security toolkit.

Third, the changes that took place after September 11, 2001 (9/11) led to increased spending and authorities for security cooperation and a shift toward building partner capacity. As the United States contended with the Global War on Terrorism after 2001, it became rapidly apparent that it could not achieve its strategic objectives without cooperation and collaboration with its allies and partners. With the goal of raising and mentoring partner security forces, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) began to focus its counterterrorism strategy on military training, education, exercises, and acquisition projects. Yet, as Kerr discusses, the security assistance system designed for the requirements of the Cold War proved insufficient in the post-9/11 context, and the

multitude of programs and authorities launched to make up for the shortfalls—including many focused on training and equipping partners to improve their ability to fight terrorists and insurgents—were not effective or sustainable on their own. In the wake of disintegrating security in high profile cases like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, it became increasingly evident that institutional development was not an automatic outgrowth of training and equipping, and a concerted effort to establish governance would be necessary.

Thus, post-Cold War and 9/11 shifts in the external security environment, coupled with lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, led to the creation of new programs and capabilities designed to rebalance the security assistance framework. DIB was increasingly acknowledged as a, if not the, missing component of security cooperation efforts, coming into its own as a distinct tool of national security over the past decade.

The first institutionalization of the DIB concept came from the 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit, during which the Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB) was launched. Boland notes that NATO's Partnership Action Plans were issue-specific, result-oriented, and functionally focused mechanisms to improve cooperation among NATO allies and PfP partners on specific reform areas. Through PAP-DIB, DOD incorporated DIB into its bilateral NATO partnership programming, particularly through the Wales Initiative Fund. PAP-DIB gave the United States an initial introduction to the idea of targeted defense institution reform activities and laid the groundwork for similar efforts outside of the NATO context.

In the years following the initial ground operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it became increasingly evident that traditional security cooperation approaches were falling short. There was a shift toward emphasizing effectiveness and building sustainable capacity through security cooperation efforts, as reflected in defense guidance documents beginning around 2006. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, for instance, stated that “[w]henver advisable, the United States works with or through others: enabling allied and partner capabilities, building their capacity, and developing collaborative mechanisms to share the decisions, risks and responsibilities of today’s complex challenges.”² The 2008 Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)—a document that provides comprehensive strategic guidance to the combatant commanders and their staffs—also indicated a shift in how security cooperation was conceived at the strategic level by the DOD. The GEF gave prominence to the role that security cooperation plays in achieving national security goals, making security cooperation operations a primary focus of theater planning; where contingency planning had previously been central, the 2008 GEF emphasized “continuous engagement, rather than contingency operations, as the principal military means to attain national objectives[,] acknowledge[ing] the relative economy of conflict prevention and the importance of partner relationships and capacity in an increasingly interconnected world.”³ For DIB, the GEF was particularly important as it listed institutional capacity—i.e. activities that “Strengthen [a] Partner nation’s security sector [by building] long-term institutional capacity and capability”—as one of the main focus areas for security cooperation operations.⁴

By 2009, the DIB concept began to take hold in DOD. As Ross notes, the evidence of institutional gains in Eastern Europe, coupled with concerns about institutional failings in Iraq and Afghanistan, spurred an increased commitment to DIB from the Department of Defense. As Giraldo describes, U.S. DIB moved away from a gap-filling, donor-driven approach based on international best practices, toward a more holistic, partner-driven approach, based on iterative and flexible scoping and implementation in the short to medium term. In February of 2009, DOD, the State Department (DOS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development released a report arguing for a more holistic, interagency, “3D” (defense, diplomacy, and development) approach to security sector reform.⁵ The report argued that “[t]he increasingly complex threats facing our partners and our own nation urgently require that we address the linkages among security, governance, development, and conflict in more comprehensive and sustainable ways.”⁶ The report aimed to improve the U.S. approach to foreign assistance to ensure that “it promotes effective, legitimate, transparent, and accountable security sector development in partner states.”⁷ One of the document’s guiding principles calls for U.S. practitioners and policymakers to balance operational support with institutional reform.⁸

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review further stressed the need for security cooperation to go beyond training and equipping partner forces, focusing instead on the institutional and human dimensions required to develop partner defense capacity and to sustain U.S. security investments: “the Department recognizes that in order to ensure that enhancements developed among security forces are sustained, the supporting institutions in partner nations must also function effectively.”⁹ Moreover, in 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates gave a speech in which he said,

*We have made great strides in building up the operational capacity of our partners – training and equipping troops and mentoring them in the field. But there has not been enough commensurate attention paid to building the institutional capacity – such as defense ministries – and the human capital – leadership skills and attitudes – needed to sustain security over the long term. We have come to recognize that the security sector of at-risk countries is in reality, a system of systems tying together military, police, justice, and other governance and oversight mechanisms. As such, building a partner’s overall governance and security capacity is a shared responsibility across multiple agencies and departments of the U.S. national security apparatus – one that requires flexible, responsive tools that incentivize cooperation.*¹⁰

During this time, the security cooperation system began to undergo a series of changes, largely in response to the acknowledgement that, despite the magnitude of resources being dedicated to training and equipping, security cooperation activities had resulted in short-term and often failed outcomes. Iraq and Afghanistan were high profile examples, but Chalfin and Thomas-Greenfield note that where the United States also

invested significant amounts of money in sub-Saharan African militaries and police, the ability of these countries to address their security challenges remained insufficient. Based on years of security assistance delivery, the United States government concluded that if the aim was to develop sustained and effective capacity to tackle security and justice challenges, then the traditional approach for providing security cooperation was incomplete. This lack of success, paired with mounting Congressional frustration over the unclear objectives and opaque budgets surrounding many capacity building efforts, raised questions about the efficacy of existing security cooperation approaches.

Congress established a security cooperation reforms task force in 2010 to identify pain points across the security cooperation system. There was a growing recognition that the organizational structure of the security assistance and cooperation system, which operated along the 1960s model created to support security assistance in the Cold War security environment, had not been able to keep up with the evolving threats of the modern era. The findings of the task force would later lay the basis of new security cooperation planning guidance released by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 2012. The Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) and the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program were also both established during this time to help partner nations build defense capacity at the institutional and ministerial level.¹¹ The establishment of such programs indicated that, through a bottom-up effort, DIB was increasingly accepted as an important national security tool. In 2013, Presidential Policy Directive 23 on security sector assistance was released, which (at least on paper) called for security cooperation efforts to focus on helping partners develop security sector capacity, while also promoting democratic principles of good governance and rule of law, echoing many of the same principles as SSR.¹² At this stage, DIB efforts were piecemeal at best; with no overarching strategy to guide a long-term systematic approach, and no coherent goals or outcomes, DIB was frequently approached as an add-on to existing train and equip programs, or as a gap-filling mechanism to plug holes in capacity.¹³

In 2014, amidst the reforms taking place around the security cooperation system, OSD created the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation, bringing a new level of leadership and centralized strategy to the security cooperation system. The same year, DOS established the Security Governance Initiative to improve the U.S. approach to building security capacity in Africa. Through the initiative, the United States partnered with six African countries to address the strategic and institutional reforms required for governments to tackle key security challenges, with an emphasis on enhancing the accountability, oversight, and transparency of their security and defense sectors, including through targeted DIB activities.

Since 2015, policy and process for DIB has been more formally institutionalized in the U.S. defense toolkit and seen for its standalone value. In October 2015, the Defense Governance Management Team (DGMT) was established as “an elite, leading defense governance and management organization providing the ideas, approaches, resources and capabilities necessary for DOD/USG [U.S. Government] to plan, implement, and

manage DIB projects, develop methodology and doctrine, and train and educate DIB and security cooperation personnel.”¹⁴ DGMT manages and implements key programs, such as the DIRI, and supports the institutional and governance reform aspects of other DOD and interagency initiatives, such as the Security Governance Initiative (SGI), the NATO Defense Capacity Building Initiative, the Maritime Security Initiative, the Counter Terrorism Partnership Fund, and the Vertically Integrated Logistics Approach. It also serves as a knowledge management hub. Since its establishment, DGMT has more than doubled its in-country activities, from 137 activities in 27 countries in fiscal year (FY) 2015 to 284 in 52 countries in FY 2017.¹⁵

In 2016, the DOD released a directive on DIB, which formally defined the discipline and delineated the roles, aims, and responsibilities within the DOD.¹⁶ This directive establishes DIB’s integral role in security cooperation efforts. More recently, DIB was codified in sections 332 and 333 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2017, which specifies that defense institution capacity building, as well as human rights training, should be an element of all foreign capacity building, including train and equip efforts.¹⁷ The 2017 NDAA consolidated some of the old security cooperation authorities (of which there were over 120 by 2015) into new, simplified authorities and expanded the ability of the security cooperation workforce to engage with partners on capacity-building issues over extended periods of time, helping to move security cooperation efforts toward a clearer, more effective and integrated framework. It also helped reduce the risk of providing equipment and training to countries that cannot assimilate or sustain it, or indeed those that would misuse it, or let it fall into the hands of nefarious actors due to lack of governance capacity.

Crosscutting Themes

As it becomes increasingly mainstreamed in U.S. defense strategy, those planning and implementing DIB can use the wealth of insights that the authors have provided throughout this volume to avoid pitfalls and improve future efforts. While this chapter cannot possibly summarize all of the book’s lessons, findings, and recommendations, the sections below draw out some of the main insights, starting with three crosscutting themes that are laid out in the Introduction and echoed throughout the chapters: first, the challenges posed by the extended timeframe of the DIB process; second, the importance of approaching each DIB case without a preset template; and third, the centrality of ownership in institution building, without which no DIB effort can succeed.

Time

DIB is a long-term process aimed at long-term gains. It seeks to alter institutional behavior and norms in a partner’s existing defense culture, changes that can take decades or even generations to cultivate. As Milante and Bisca note, recent analysis suggests that it takes 15 to 25 years to improve institutions a single standard deviation, which is, in their words,

“not moving Haiti[’s institutions] to the level of Denmark—but rather moving them to something that is “good enough” to deliver basic government services.” This is echoed in Davis’s analysis of Oman, which shows that institution-building successes were due in large part to a sustained, long-term engagement, during which leadership positions were cultivated over 20 to 30 years. Thus, every element of a DIB process—from the commitment of staff and funding, to long-term planning and adaptation amidst changing political contexts, to determining effective parameters for assessments and evaluations—is set within a much longer time frame than other security cooperation activities, and the length of engagement and pace of change present an array of challenges.

First, for both the donor and the partner nation, DIB requires sustained staffing. As Kem describes, the high rate of turnover in U.S. military leadership in Afghanistan, coupled with a lack of clear long-term goals and post-conflict planning, led to multiple reinventions of the proverbial wheel. Boland notes that a similar lack of staff continuity plagued PfP DIB efforts in Kosovo. The turnover of staff is problematic for DIB efforts both in terms of disrupting the continuity of the process being implemented, as well as building and maintaining relationships, which are extremely important in gaining trust between the partner nation and the DIB team. Thus, the long-term nature of DIB requires that the United States and the partner develop a long-term strategy from the outset to provide consistency of goals and approaches for the DIB process in the long run, as well as to account for changes in staff in both the host and donor countries, to ensure that new teams are able to continue ongoing work, rather than starting from scratch.

Second, DIB’s extended time horizons can make political buy-in on both sides difficult to sustain. Giraldo suggests that DIB works best when practitioners are able to respond to politically urgent priorities to gain high-level support for the broader project. Aleman also notes that quick wins in the DIB process in Guatemala contributed significantly to its success by demonstrating the value of reform and generating additional momentum and commitment to change. Thus, longer time horizons for “North Star” goals should be married with a sense of urgency; shorter time horizons should be established for specific quick wins or losses.¹⁸ That said, quick wins should not set up unrealistic notions about the timelines necessary to institute sustainable reforms. As Milante and Bisca explain, annotated timeframes put in place by the donor country, including for reporting reasons, can make the DIB process ineffective; the shortcuts taken to satisfy the timeline in the short term will set the institution up to fail in the medium to long term.

Finally, the pace of change presents challenges for the monitoring and evaluation of DIB efforts. While the section on assessment, monitoring, and evaluation below discusses these challenges in more detail, it is worth noting here that both recipient and donor policymakers will require evidence in the short to medium term that a program is working in order to justify committing additional resources. Yet evaluating DIB is inherently difficult because its ultimate aim—to instate professional defense institutions—often takes an extended period of time to materialize. Furthermore, even when a strong institution emerges to claim as a success, it is difficult to tie this overarching success to

one specific DIB activity or engagement. Compounding this issue is the fact that the United States is usually one donor among many that are working to improve elements of a country's defense establishment across the years and decades, so it is again challenging to prove that a specific activity or set of activities resulted in the improved governance of the overarching defense sector.

One Size Fits One

No two DIB activities will ever be exactly alike. Success therefore hinges on DIB plans and activities being molded to the unique cultural, historical, and sociopolitical context of the partner at hand; finding the best fit for the partner nation's context, rather than finding the gaps in a preconceived template of best practice. Bisca and Milante note that, as solutions are endogenous to the system, the solution must be tailored to the system at hand. As Kem and Hoffman describe in their accounts of institution-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, where there is a failure to build institutions that are appropriate for the cultural context of the country, the results are dire. Conversely, in the case of Guatemala, the integrated defense governance system was produced in line with the partner's defense culture, capabilities, and resources and the results were significantly more successful.

To that end, Giraldo explains that a solution-driven approach, which entails conforming the partner's institution to a preset notion of what "good" should look like, is ineffective. Rather, DIB should take a problem-driven approach, whereby DIB teams identify a problem, conceptualize what an improved version of that function would look like for that country, and then bridge the current and future context by developing a theory of change, which sets in motion a plan that is flexible and adaptable. This approach helps to avoid the trap of isomorphic mimicry in which a nation adopts organizational structures that look like good institutions on paper, but lack all functionality and effectiveness in practice.

DIB plans must also be grounded in realistic expectations that account for each partner's unique limitations. DIB practitioners should not seek to build perfect institutions—they do not exist—but rather ones that will function effectively in the context of a given partner-nation. Overambitious visions can set a plan up for failure. For example, plans must be limited to what is feasible within the partner's available budget and based on what the partner's budget will be able to sustain in the long term. In the case of Guatemala, for instance, Aleman notes that the National Security Policy, which was produced with the support of the U.S. team, stressed the need to tie plans to existing resources in order to ensure changes to the defense sector would be realistically achievable and sustainable. Institutional reforms must also take the partner's existing capacity into account. Topic and Boomer point to the fact that many partners do not require or cannot assimilate the level of technological sophistication that the equivalent U.S. system uses; for example, some do not even have the capacity to generate electricity. Thus, practitioners must avoid seeing technology as a silver bullet to update partners'

systems, and should work instead to make incremental changes based on each partner's baseline capacity.

Ownership

Virtually every author in this book emphasizes that institutions can only be built by those who use them; without this ownership, reforms will not be absorbed or sustained. Ownership is thus the most important element for the success of DIB—ownership not only of the implementation process, but also of assessments, planning, measures of effectiveness, and ultimate evaluations. Yet, one of the most common pitfalls that institution-building efforts face is missing ownership. While discussed in greater detail in the section below, two insights for ensuring ownership are worth mentioning here.

First, the donor country should not view DIB as a transfer of institutional culture, but rather the partner's existing culture should be the starting point from which the entire DIB process is derived. For example, in Chalfin and Thomas-Greenfield's analysis of the countries involved in the SGI in Africa, they note that taking the time to first understand the partner's defense priorities from their perspective allows DIB practitioners to understand the role that the leadership expects the defense institutions to play in meeting national priorities. Similarly, Leklem explains that understanding the partner's existing defense strategy and policies is important because they represent the translation of national interest into tangible elements of a nation's defense institutions and military. This is a good starting point for understanding the partner's defense priorities.

Second, many of the authors who have been involved in DIB on the ground pointed to the importance of high-level buy-in as critical to partner ownership. In the case of Guatemala, one of the key factors for success was the high-level buy-in going all the way up to the President. High-level buy-in is essential to determine priorities and objectives, link institutional reforms to those objectives, and create the support needed to drive change. Leonard's case studies demonstrate that gaining and keeping senior leader and political support is a non-negotiable element necessary to ensure that reforms are taken up throughout the entire defense system.

Such buy-in can be difficult to secure, particularly if the proposed institutional reforms will have a negative effect on power-holders benefiting from the existing system. Boland also notes that high-level buy-in requires particular effort during periods of political change, which can lead to less engagement, making it challenging to sustain the relationship and to demonstrate long-term commitment. Understanding the partner's defense priorities and existing policies is thus important for helping the DIB team to "sell" the reforms to high-level leadership by demonstrating how the DIB process will help the ministry to function more effectively and better align its resources to achieve defense priorities. Reforms that help the partner to achieve its priorities will be easier for the DIB team's counterparts to sell up the chain of command and more difficult to argue against for those who resist change for personal gain.

Interests and Priorities

Strong defense institutions have always been necessary for the effective and legitimate use of force, yet the last 15 years have seen changes in both supply and demand for DIB. As detailed above, in the years after the 9/11 attacks, the United States found itself in major engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as many smaller engagements spanning the world. Yet the majority of U.S. security assistance took the form of traditional train and equip missions, leaving the underlying security sector institutions largely unchanged. Even though the United States has long worked with partner militaries at the institutional level, Ross explains that it was not until the shortcomings of traditional security cooperation measures appeared in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, that the United States began “concerted efforts” to help partners build and transform their defense institutions.

These conflicts also drive demand-side incentives for DIB. Intra-state war is far more common than inter-state war today—in the 21st century, civil wars have claimed nearly one million lives. Many of these wars are repeat conflicts that occur as countries become caught in cycles of violence. Rebuilding (and reforming) the armed forces is often a central component of stabilizing countries and preventing civil war relapse. Fragile institutions may not be able to sustain or deploy forces, and public trust in defense institutions is often low, prompting states to appeal to outside assistance.¹⁹

Defense institution building thus addresses both supply and demand-side interests. Its two primary objectives, according to Ross, are to help partners provide for their own security, including missions that meet shared U.S. and partner interests, and to undertake reforms that result in more effective, accountable, and legitimate armed forces. These broad objectives have been codified in U.S. policy and doctrine, as well as new legislative goals for building partner capacity.²⁰

Benefits for the United States

This volume explores the ways that DIB contributes to U.S. national security. First, strengthening partner defense institutions leads to more sustainable U.S. security investments. When partners have effective management and governance structures in place, capabilities are less likely to be misused, underused, or fail for lack of sustainment. Second, countries with effective governance and military forces are less likely to experience political instability. Moreover, DIB targets development of long-term defense capabilities, creating partners who can provide for their own security and work with the United States toward shared interests.

While these goals capture the overarching U.S. interest in DIB, specific goals vary by country. This volume describes DIB in settings ranging from wholesale rebuilding of governance institutions in places like Afghanistan, to reform in countries with higher levels of baseline capacity, such as Guatemala. In addition to questions of scale, the scope will vary by partner need. For example, logistics may be most pressing for countries combatting active insurgencies, such as Mali, while strategy and force planning may be

most important for a country reorienting its primary defense mission, such as Indonesia. Moreover, because DIB focuses on areas of *mutual* interest, U.S. security priorities will vary by country and region as well. The observation that priorities in one place may not be priorities in another place seems banal, but unclear or competing goals are a frequently cited source of confusion.

Even when there is a consensus on goals for DIB, the U.S. government is not a unitary actor, nor is it typically the only actor present in a given partner country. Actors from different agencies and levels of government often have divergent perspectives and priorities. This volume's chapters reflect a range of the potentially important players in any given context—from DOS, to the Combatant Commands, DOD policy community, DIB specialists, international development agencies, and NATO, to name a few. Clear goals can thus serve as coordination mechanisms within the U.S. government as well as with its allies and partners. Conversely, unclear or competing goals can limit the likelihood of success.

Set clear, appropriate, and overlapping goals: This volume points to an imperative that the United States begin each DIB partnership with the same thing it asks of its partners: clearly identified, leader-supported goals that are understood by practitioners across the U.S. security cooperation community. To do so, two separate but related processes must occur. First, U.S. security cooperation writ large needs improved coordination, better identification of available “tools,” and streamlined processes for joint decision-making. Establishing guidelines for prioritizing countries for engagement and integrating existing engagements will help to avoid competing efforts. Otherwise, the whole may be less than the sum of its parts when it comes to U.S. security cooperation investments.

However, these steps in and of themselves are insufficient for the type of well-identified goals that are prerequisites for success. The second process, then, is one whereby DOS, DOD, and DIB experts discuss high-level objectives and jointly assess the partner's context to arrive at shared, relevant, and realistic objectives. The diversity of DIB stakeholders and the demands for action militate against this kind of leader-driven, practitioner-centric, iterative coordination. Yet the stakes require the effort.

Once the United States has clear goals, the next step is to understand the partner's goals and identify which of these are mutual and feasible. Authors writing from both the DOS and DOD perspective stress the importance of taking time to understand the partner's defense priorities and to scope projects. Giraldo points out that the term “scoping” is intentional; trust often follows engagement rather than preceding it, and partners may be reluctant to open their institutions up for comprehensive assessment in the beginning of a partnership. Nonetheless, scoping exercises can identify what she calls “achievable” reforms: strategically relevant goals that the partner is interested in and are realistically attainable in the specific context.

Goals must overlap because DIB is designed to advance U.S. and partner national security objectives as well as governance goals. In theory, this is a powerful way to achieve

mutually beneficial ends at relatively low cost. In practice, this can be challenging, particularly in the countries where some argue that DIB will be the most needed. Countries with effective governance that distribute resources fairly are usually not the countries that end up facing internal conflict and political instability.²¹ What then should the United States do when goals diverge? There is no easy answer to this question. In some cases, the answer might be to disengage and pursue a more beneficial partnership elsewhere; in other cases, continued engagement may be the best option. Moreover, the partner's claim that goals align does not necessarily mean that they do. Divergence of interests may not be apparent upfront, either because the partner hopes to obtain resources without undertaking real change in return, or because the partner's stakeholders fail to accurately anticipate how their interests will be affected. We explore the implications of partner incentives below.

Understanding Partner Incentives

A common theme throughout this volume is that understanding partner incentives is a necessary condition for success. Indeed, this is one of the major points of consensus in the broader academic literature on external interventions to improve governance: "Even if external actors are focused on institutional change, they will not accomplish their objectives unless their goals are compatible with those of a set of political leaders in target states."²² When local elite motives do not align with the outside actor's goals, institutional change will prove elusive at best and at worst, they will exploit attempts at assistance to acquire goods without complying with the conditions of reform.

DIB projects seek to enhance mutual security for all participants, but the possibility of conflicting interests remains. States have existential goals such as survival that always come first; similarly, fragile regimes will often prioritize their survival above all else. The U.S. stakes in DIB typically are not existential—it wants more stability in troubled regions, better governance, more capable partners to share security burdens, and so forth. Things can look very different from the partner's perspective. Gerspacher points out that institutional reforms can alter the status quo power structure in partner countries, "paradoxically threatening the very partners upon whom we depend for effective capacity building." Illustrating this point is Aleman's discussion of DIB efforts in Guatemala, where the United States helped the Ministry of Defense reform its budgetary process and tackle corruption. The partnership began at the invitation of the Minister of Defense and the newly elected President of Guatemala, Otto Perez-Molina. In 2015, Perez-Molina was arrested over allegations of embezzlement by an international anti-corruption body. Perez-Molina has blamed the United States for his fate from the jail cell where he remains held on graft charges.²³

Many scholars and practitioners view the problem of divergent interests as *the* limiting factor in international influences on other states' compliance, particularly when it comes to how they govern.²⁴ Others are more optimistic, noting that sustained engagement coupled with the right inducements, can lead to "socialization" and changed preferences within the state.²⁵ The authors in this volume present a range of perspectives on how to

identify partner incentives, exploring the sources of institutional fragility and strength, and the social means of change. The importance of partner interests is self-evident; it is also incomplete. Interests alone are not a sufficient condition for success. Moreover, the process of institution building may shape interests themselves. The following insights highlight how practitioners can set up efforts for success by grounding them in local context and by prioritizing relationships with key stakeholders.

Build institutions from the inside out: The term “defense institution building” implies that the United States can create partners’ defense governance from the outside in. But institutions are social constructs that can only be built from the inside out. Bisca and Milante explore this point, drawing on the canonical definition of institutions as the “rules of the game,” or the “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction.”²⁶ In other words, institutions are only meaningful insofar as the actors who are supposed to follow the rules understand what they are and agree to live by them. This presents a dilemma: the outside institution builder has the material and conceptual ways to shape institutions but only the partner country itself has the social means to change them. Because only the people who will use institutions can build them, as Bisca and Milante show, the role of outside actors is only ever to “support” institution building. Gerspacher also picks up on this theme, arguing that the idea that the United States—or any external provider—owns the change process can doom missions to failure.

Mistaking who owns the change process is one pitfall; another is failing to recognize how the current rules allocate resources and power among the partner stakeholders. Rules are more than just coordination mechanisms; they have distributive implications and determine, as Giraldo notes in her chapter, “who does what to whom and why and with what effect.” Giraldo explains that this is why DIB practitioners ought to begin with a political economic analysis of the existing formal and informal rules of the game in order to understand where change is both acceptable and possible. Changing the rules thus requires creating new ideas about winners and losers. In other words, building institutions involves politics.

Avoid borrowed or co-opted institutions: Building capacity requires understanding the existing level of capacity as well as the underlying institutional balance of power—who holds power and who benefits from the status quo. U.S. models of capacity building, particularly in conflict and post-conflict environments, have often privileged apolitical capacity building, yet this is the wrong approach.²⁷ Failure to take local capacity and interests into account can result in the twin perils of institutions that do not stick or are subject to hijack.

Many of the authors describe the trap of “isomorphic mimicry” or institutional borrowing, where donors attempt to replicate their own institutions in the partner country without considering whether their “best practices” are the “best fit” for the current environment. This is a particularly pernicious problem in post-conflict environments where

the partner may have little say over the type of institution it gets. These situations are prone to local illegitimacy and colliding donor models, as Lecklem, Kem, and Giraldo describe in their accounts of the U.S. and allied experience in Afghanistan. Even if the imported models are appropriate for the scale and scope of the partner's needs—which they often are not—the bigger problem is failure to consider how they align with local power structures. The result may be to create “incongruence between rule writers and power holders”²⁸—a recipe for institutional fragility.

Capacity-building efforts are often explicitly focused on increasing the size of the pie—more public goods in the form of better defense for the country, and so forth. Defense is in many ways a non-excludable public good, but it has private components. As Blair notes, big military budgets come with big incentives to control or co-opt resources. Acquisition and materiel flows as well as new organizational structures, promotions and demotions, control of people and budgets, all benefit some entities more than others. And even where private goods are not a temptation to hijack, collective action problems can undermine DIB solutions that would otherwise increase the size of the pie at stake.

As Clarke and Davies explain, understanding power structures and anticipating how interests will be affected by institutional changes is a tall order for DIB practitioners who are often “novices” in the partner's political context. The partner may not know either; in periods of flux or rapid institutional change, rule writers often struggle to correctly anticipate how they will be affected.²⁹ Yet as Giraldo and Clarke and Davies emphasize, early assessment of the key players and their motives followed by iterative reassessments will help DIB practitioners to better support partners in framing the problem, finding practicable solutions, and making timely adjustments when necessary.

Understanding Partner Interests

Given the self-evident importance of partner interests, how do DIB providers gain this understanding and put it into action? The insights in this volume's chapters converge on several imperatives: DIB providers need to learn the local context, prioritize the right relationships, and find ways to make long-term changes palatable in the short term—for example, through incremental measures.

Establish local context: Virtually every author points to a fundamental requirement to understand each partner's sociopolitical and economic context, as well as the history of the partner's military and defense institutions. As Boomer and Topic underscore, evaluating the partner military's structure and systems may be more challenging than expected. Smaller states that have depended on great power donors, often since their independence, may have developed patchwork systems that they themselves do not fully understand. In cases of previous institutional borrowing, the formally documented process may be divorced from actual practice. Moreover, this scenario presumes a baseline level of institutional capacity—jury-rigged or not—whereas DIB may increasingly be called for in fragile countries with low- or non-existent capacity.

This type of context setting clarifies what the partner needs to achieve its goals and what it can absorb in pursuit of those ends. It also helps the DIB provider to differentiate between issues of technical capacity and issues of preference alignment. This does not diminish the problem of partner incentives, but serves to clarify it by distinguishing between political will and capacity. To identify the former, the country's sociopolitical context is critical. While DIB providers are subject matter experts in their respective fields, they typically are not experts on the broader context. Fortunately, these experts exist. For example, the U.S. Embassy teams can and should be a source of local knowledge as well as information on other security sector stakeholders, other U.S. assistance and programs, and broader U.S. interests. Yet this is only the initial solution; the enduring solution is developing the relationship with the partner and supporting their ownership.

Prioritize relationships: Relationships are a *sine qua non* for DIB. Ross notes that “regular, sustained engagements with a core of committed participants” sets DIB apart from other forms of security cooperation; similarly, Gerspacher calls partnership the “means” of DIB. Blair says that progress in DIB proceeds “at the speed of trust,” while Clarke and Davies caution that building trust takes time and is reversible—it must be fostered and maintained continuously.

Relationships can open or close doors—they are the catalysts of effective partnerships and when relationships fail, so may reform efforts. Aleman shows how successful reform efforts in Guatemala occurred at the request of Guatemala's Minister of Defense who personally opened the door for U.S. DIB practitioners to engage with the ministry. Conversely, Davis cites political fallout between the British and Zimbabwean governments as the reason for broken engagement at the defense sector level. These examples illustrate the importance of political leadership engagement and endorsement, yet individual relationships matter as well. Lower-level officials may lack the authority to initiate change projects, but they are often the implementers and the ones who engage over time with the DIB team. Even when political relationships are strained, this can leave the door open to continued interaction, as Boland illustrates with NATO's experience in Serbia.

Make change attractive: The third key insight from the experience of DIB practitioners across diverse environments is the need to make long-term beneficial changes more palatable in the short term. As scholars have argued, “[I]n weak institutional environments there may be an inherent trade-off between institutional scope and stability.”³⁰ The more sweeping the change sought, the more likely it is to engender resistance. Conversely, modest changes are less likely to provoke opposition but also less likely to address fundamental problems. There is no easy solution, however there are ways to make change more attractive such as incremental measures. Immediate benefits—“quick wins”—can provide tangible incentives to pursue longer-term, potentially difficult changes. Similarly, privileging the partner's political time horizons over formulaic timelines may create

buy-in for projects that would otherwise be lacking. As several authors suggest, partner preferences are not necessarily fixed; they may change as a result of the engagement itself.

Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation

Assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) are essential for the success of any DIB mission, ensuring learning and accountability both for the partner nation and for the donor country. The results of AM&E reporting are used to produce an appropriate implementation plan in a given country, to decide the corresponding goals of the donor and the partner nation, and to determine whether a given activity is achieving progress as planned toward the stated objectives. AM&E also play a significant role in the institution-building process: the integration of AM&E into DIB activities with the partner can help to build governance capacity, while institutionalizing norms of accountability and transparency. Despite its essential role, there is, as many of the authors note, room to significantly improve the existing AM&E elements of DIB.

Assessments play one of the most important roles in a DIB engagement. The 2017 DOD Instruction on AM&E defines assessments as “[s]ystematic analysis to provide an understanding of the context, conditions, partner capabilities, and requirements to inform . . . planning and implementation.”³¹ Assessment is the first step in a DIB process and continues throughout the lifecycle of the engagement. The assessment (or “scoping”) phase allows practitioners to determine strategic alignment, levels of partner support and will, the partner’s absorptive capacity, and potential risks to the DIB process.³² The information gathered through this assessment can help the team understand the partner nation’s goals and priorities, determine the partner’s capacity and resource availability, and to find common ground with those of the donor nation. On the donor side, assessments address what it wants the partner to be able to do and whether the donor has the right things in place to achieve that goal. Determining what the partner wants, why they want it, who within the government is asking for it, and where they fit within their system, can minimize the problem of plans skewed by individual or organizational biases. Assessments also help to determine if buy-in exists at higher levels and, if not, how to obtain it. They are central to understanding the partner nation’s perception of its existing capacity shortfalls, which can help the DIB practitioners to determine if a perceived gap is a symptom of a larger structural issue, and, in turn, to demonstrate to the partner where the real changes need to take place in the broader system in order for the reforms it seeks to be sustained in the long run.

The monitoring process is also continuous and helps to determine if the initial theory of change was accurate or if course corrections need to be taken. For example, as relationships are strengthened, practitioners may receive more insight into the partner’s capabilities or desires, which could in turn help to identify mid-course corrections based on updated analysis.³³ Monitoring efforts measure the near-term results of specific DIB activities in order to provide “regular feedback on the extent to which expected outputs and

outcomes are being achieved to inform decisions or corrective actions.”³⁴ Evaluation differs from monitoring in that it seeks to assess the long-term impact and outcomes of the DIB engagement as a whole, whereas monitoring tends to focus on the short-term results of specific activities and achievements of milestones along the way. Evaluations are undertaken to determine relevance, value, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact of a DIB process. Evaluations comprise “a systematic collection and analysis of information and evidence about the characteristics and outcomes of an ongoing or completed initiative, and its design, implementation, and results.”³⁵ DIB practitioners, planners, and policy makers use evaluations to identify ways to improve cost-effectiveness, to provide evidence-based support for future DIB policy, legislation, and resource needs, and to identify lessons to improve future DIB engagements.

Progress in Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation

Historically, the monitoring of outputs (e.g., the quantity of resources provided, the number of hours spent teaching, etc.) in security cooperation activities has been decent, but the monitoring of outcomes (in the case of DIB, outcomes refer to institutional and behavioral changes in the partner nation’s defense establishment) has been lacking.

Each program and agency undertaking DIB activities has developed its own approach to AM&E.³⁶ The primary implementer, DIRI, initially developed a framework for AM&E based on the methodology of the NATO Wales Initiative Fund-Defense Institution Building (WIF-DIB) program. DIRI adapted its methodology to account for the fact that countries in which DIRI programs are implemented do not have the same motivation as PfP countries that are the recipients of WIF-DIB (i.e., that PfP countries have the added element of potential NATO membership, which influences their willingness to change and update any element of their defense institutions that NATO deems necessary). In 2012, a report from the DOD Inspector General called for DIRI to define more specific performance measures for its programs.³⁷ DIRI has since continued to develop a system of reporting that is flexible enough not to constrain teams from tailoring their engagements but specific enough to give Congress and policymakers the AM&E data required to track progress and see the impact of the DIB enterprise writ large. This includes (though is not limited to) daily reports from practitioners on the ground while they are in country; After Action Reports (AARs) that are disseminated to the DGMT, the regional Combatant Command, OSD regional desks, and so on; AAR conference calls to discuss what is in the report and ways forward; ad hoc briefings, papers, and updates as requested during the engagement; and an annual report to Congress on the entire DIB enterprise.

In January 2017, since Clarke and Davies completed chapter 9 on measuring and evaluation for this book, the DOD released an instruction on AM&E for the security cooperation enterprise writ large, which aims to establish policy and assign responsibilities for conducting AM&E for security cooperation activities, including DIB. The instruction reaffirms the importance of assessments, monitoring, and evaluation, to tracking, understanding, and improving returns on all security cooperation investments.³⁸ It notes

that U.S. AM&E efforts should be aligned with the AM&E efforts of the host country in order to reduce the burden on U.S. practitioners and to increase overall effectiveness of the security cooperation activity. The instruction acknowledges that the partner's ability and willingness to improve institutional capacity is a critical element to look for in the initial assessment of a partner country. This points to the fact that building the capacity of the partner's defense institutions is integral to the security cooperation enterprise.³⁹ It also calls for the DOD to ensure sufficient funding to carry out AM&E policy implementation, disseminate lessons learned from AM&E analysis, and train the appropriate workforce to conduct and support the technical AM&E functions.⁴⁰

The instruction and the broader demand for better results from security cooperation activities, hold both promise and peril for DIB. Peril, if an approach that pushes for a formulaic standardization of best practices is taken, which could restrict the flexibility necessary for DIB activities to succeed in widely varying contexts. DIB requires a problem-driven and iterative approach that affords for the flexibility to adjust planning as assessments evolve with engagement and trial. It could also prove problematic if it restricts the ability of DIB implementers to "fail fast"; as Giraldo, and Clarke and Davies discuss, DIB implementers use trial approaches to rapidly determine if a given approach works or not, or to demonstrate to a partner why their proposed solution or approach is not viable. This is an important element of the process for implementers to determine a correct path for a particular country, to quickly divest from an approach that does not work in practice, and to make adjustments where necessary. The complexity inherent in building institutional systems requires an equal measure of agility. The instruction is promising, nevertheless, if security cooperation policymakers and planners are forced to grapple with identifying desired outcomes and the elements that are required to achieve those outcomes, which would inherently lead to wider understanding and acceptance of the necessity of DIB to the sustainability of all other forms of security cooperation and assistance.

AM&E Challenges and Recommendations

Building defense institutions presents several challenges specific to implementing effective AM&E. For instance, Milante and Bisca note that often the metric of success is the "dog that didn't bark," meaning the absence of a negative behavior. This is a virtuous cycle for society, but poses a challenge for impact evaluation. As planners and policymakers continue to develop DIB in practice, the following recommendations could help to address some of the challenges and improve DIB AM&E.

Tailor AM&E requirements for each country: Because DIB activities are tailored for each host country in accordance with that country's particular capacity, institutional culture, and socioeconomic and political context, there are challenges inherent in establishing an AM&E framework that fits all DIB activities: the unique contexts and characteristics will determine much about the opportunities and risks to a specific DIB effort.⁴¹ While the North Star goals of all DIB activities—e.g., establishing a functioning, professional, accountable,

and transparent defense institution—will be similar for every DIB engagement, the interim objectives will vary widely.

Thus, AM&E requirements should be flexible enough that teams can tailor them to the context of the country at hand. U.S. practitioners should receive training and guidance on how to conduct effective assessments and evaluations for DIB projects. While the type of reporting will change based on the project and country, developing a standard for training will help to develop AM&E solutions that work for DIB projects across the board, as well as identifying which elements of AM&E are not working in the field and why.

Base AM&E frameworks on realistic expectations about existing capacity: The collection of data proves challenging in the DIB context for several reasons. On the U.S. side, because DIB engagements are undertaken by U.S.-based practitioners, rather than regionally based personnel, the consistent collection of data is extremely difficult.⁴² On the partner side, while partner ownership of the process is essential, many of the countries simply do not have the capabilities or resources to carry out effective AM&E. This lack of capacity can lead partners to provide inaccurate data in order to save face or to appear to have fulfilled a requirement in order to get “stuff” that they want from the donor. In either case, the provision of false or insufficient data can lead to isomorphic mimicry, where a partner’s institution looks viable on paper, but does not function in practice.

As Clarke and Davies note in chapter 9, DIB teams on the ground are “small footprint, high impact.” Those designing AM&E reporting requirements for DIB should take the limited capacity of DIB teams during engagements into account to ensure that AM&E reporting does not overburden the practitioners and detract from the effectiveness of the DIB activity. Equally, the AM&E requirements should account for the capacity of the partner and, where it is lacking, provide assistance in building AM&E skills. NATO, for example, provides partners with a “Building Integrity Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process” as part of its PAP-DIB, which simplifies the DIB assessment process for partners by providing clear guidance on data requirements, followed by a process to peer-review the assessment and to provide recommendations on ways forward.⁴³

Disaggregate short-, medium-, and long-term outputs and outcomes: To address the challenge of measuring short-term successes and while achieving long-term goals, DIB practitioners should disaggregate short-, medium-, and long-term outputs and outcomes. This includes finding ways to measure short-term performance that are distinct from long-term outcomes, but can be aggregated or tracked over time in order to inform long-term evaluations of DIB’s effectiveness toward overarching goals. The ultimate outcomes of a DIB engagement will be improved by determining the baselines and milestones of the monitoring process during the assessment phase, as doing so will force DIB teams and partner-nation teams to think through theories of change and plan with specific, measurable goals in mind.

Connect long-term goals with short-term funding cycles: Resources for DIB are tied to Congressional budget cycles; with one to two years for obligations and five years for disbursements. Thus, DIB activities are generally episodic, with a few engagements a year that last for a few weeks at a time, while the overarching goals that measuring and evaluation aim to monitor are long-term.⁴⁴ Yet, the results of DIB engagement, particularly the overarching outcomes such as a functioning human resources system, often take much longer than one or even five years.

DIB practitioners and policymakers should use strategic planning to connect long-term goals with short-term funding cycles in order to address the issue of short-term funding for programs or activities that tend to be multi-year in scope and goals that tend to take multiple decades to come to fruition. This means identifying a theory of change that includes milestones predicated on the shorter budget cycles in order to show progress at intervals of one to five years.

AM&E requirements should reflect that outcomes are primarily the responsibility of the partner: DIB is a collaborative process and the United States is not the only, nor the main, actor with an influence over outputs and outcomes. The partner nation will also have structural, capacity-related restrictions on their ability to carry out or contribute to AM&E, for example their own funding cycles or policymakers that want to see quick returns on their DIB investments despite the long-term nature of the overarching objectives. Due to the partner-led process that DIB embraces, the outcomes of many DIB engagements will rely on the partner's work, not the U.S. practitioners' inputs. This is compounded by the fact that the United States is not always the only donor nation working with the partner, and often the partners struggle to meet milestones because they are engaged in similar but different capacity-building activities with other donors.

Holding U.S. DIB practitioners responsible for outcomes can prove problematic, if it results in perverse incentives for U.S. practitioners to do the work of the partner, for the partner. This goes directly against the operating principle of partner ownership in DIB, which is the key to institutionalized and sustainable change. Thus, AM&E requirements should be predicated on the understanding that outcomes (institutionalized changes) are primarily the responsibility of the partner. As Milante and Bisca note, the institution-builder has the material and conceptual ways to shape institutions, but only the country itself has the social means to actually change them. Analysis should focus on why a partner has not achieved a given output, whether it is because of a flaw in the initial theory of change, a lack of will to implement change, or a misperception of the capacity of the partner to achieve a given milestone.

Organizing for Defense Institution Building

Key leaders and officials in the DOD and in the U.S. Congress are increasingly concerned with the ability of partner nations to maintain and sustain equipment provided by the

United States, and for the civilian structures in those nations to maintain adequate oversight of armed forces in their nations. The Congress and the DOD now clearly recognize the need to build institutional capacity in partner nations alongside, or even in lieu of, train and equip programs, to achieve a more balanced approach to DOD security cooperation. To do this well, the Department must organize to conduct DIB activities, and train key personnel in the DOD workforce for a variety of DIB tasks with which they are currently unfamiliar.

The advent of DIB has revealed numerous disconnects throughout the broader security cooperation community and highlighted the extent to which the Department is not yet adequately organized to design and implement DIB programs. Most of the current DOD security cooperation architecture was created and grown years ago to support security assistance tasks: selling equipment or providing partner nations access to U.S. military education and training. In an era when DOD held “nation building” at arm’s length, providing access to defense articles and services the Department already had on the shelf, as it were, seemed a perfectly acceptable means of capacity building.

Differences in supply and demand drive variation in organizational functions for security assistance and DIB. While there is significant international competition for sales, especially for major military hardware, security assistance starts with a partner’s desire for U.S. military equipment and training. Coordination and competition may be involved, but the “sale” is made as a first step; potential purchasers generally want U.S. equipment. On the supply side, the “product” typically already exists and is readily available.

For DIB, as a key element of “non-material” security cooperation, both the up-front demand, and the design and availability of the product, are much less clear. The key organizational challenge is to adapt organizational constructs and personnel skills designed for security assistance (generally “material” cooperation) to the requirements of institution building, and non-material security cooperation more broadly.

While many observers note that the DOD has historical experience building institutional capacity, the current approach to DIB only began in the early 2000s, when OSD began to tailor military engagements to support NATO PfP countries as they worked to reform their defense institutions and become more interoperable with NATO. There was no clear, top-down direction; no comprehensive study of demand with recommendations for organization, process, and personnel changes. As such, from its NATO-oriented start, DIB has grown in a decentralized manner, rather than as the fully staffed and funded undertaking that might have resulted from clear, top-down guidance. The bottom-up approach has been effective, but current demands for DIB make clear the urgent need to remedy organizational and personnel shortfalls.

Doctrine and guidance for DIB are beginning to appear. As noted above, in the last two years the Department has updated much of its guidance for security cooperation and published three new documents that provide direction needed to guide the evolution of DIB and security cooperation writ large: a “directive” on DIB, Department-wide guidance on security cooperation, and an “instruction” on AM&E for DOD security cooperation. These

enhancements are both influenced and supported by the FY2017 NDAA, which introduces sweeping reforms to DOD security cooperation, and clearly provides the opportunity to properly organize and train DOD personnel for current security cooperation challenges, including DIB.

Roles and Responsibilities

Setting Afghanistan aside, most DIB planning for partner nations relies on collaboration between OSD, the Joint Staff, DOD's DIB programs, geographic Combatant Command (GCC) staff and Security Cooperation Officers (SCOs). As DIB is relatively new, assignment of roles and responsibilities, matched with requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities, have not yet been determined. One fundamental challenge for DOD will be determining the roles of the respective GCCs and the broader "fourth estate," including the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).

Recent history has made clear that GCCs, as operational war-fighting organizations, lack the requisite preparation and staff to properly plan and guide DIB over the full range of country challenges. Operational-level entities are inherently oriented toward different missions. Assignment of roles and responsibilities for DIB must account for this and establish processes to provide additional support to GCCs to reduce risk.

Roles and responsibilities for planning and conducting DIB by the DOD must reflect a balance between responsibility and capability. GCCs serve at the center of DOD security cooperation, but lack experience and assigned staff for DIB. OSD Policy has grown DIB as a functional capability over the last decade, providing oversight of DIB and broader security cooperation from a regional perspective. DSCA has recognized the need to increase management capacity for DIB, but this will take time as DSCA addresses a range of requirements contained in the FY2017 NDAA. The Joint Staff has little experience addressing DIB issues in partner countries, though more robust engagement by the Joint Staff with GCCs would be welcome.

As the DOD seeks to better organize for DIB, one key question to resolve is how to strengthen and grow the core of the DIB enterprise: is it at the "center," aligned to DSCA? Is it distributed to the GCCs? Or is it something in between? Key security cooperation organizations will have to be involved, but determining the mix of responsibilities will have resource implications among those organizations.

Staffing GCCs to plan DIB would ensure DIB expertise is present where the detailed planning happens. But covering the range of institutional requirements experienced by developing (and more advanced) countries will always require a large number of functional experts and planners. To ensure that successful approaches to DIB in one region inform efforts in other regions, DOD would need to maintain a core capability at some level; a distributed system does not negate the need for a "center." Future proposals for organizational changes to improve the conduct of DIB must address the planning functions and capabilities necessary to ensure that both horizontal and vertical connections are made and reflected in DIB planning.

Organizing to ensure these connections are made must lead to questions about which command or agency should perform these functions, both in the near and longer terms. Are the vertical and horizontal connections made at the SCO or GCC level, or is this a function performed more centrally for the entire department? With the proper education, training, and guidance, these functions could be performed in a number of ways. Both GCCs and DSCA, or perhaps another agency selected by DSCA, could do this. While SCO training is enhanced over the next few years, it may make more sense to grow the expert cadre more closely aligned to DSCA. This would avoid the significant staffing increases that the GCCs would require to cover the broad range of functions partner ministries should perform, and would increase the likelihood that lessons in any region can be applied in others. As more SCOs with better preparation and training arrive in the field, the balance among all entities could be reviewed.

One way to empower a central agency to guide DIB department-wide would be for DSCA to establish a Defense Field Activity to serve as a Center for Defense Governance. This center would provide the core capability to support SCOs and GCCs with DIB planning expertise, scope challenges in any partner country with full knowledge of similar challenges globally, and to implement DIB with great consistency across the Department. The center could also serve as the nucleus of a security sector assistance (SSA) “hub,” an idea gaining traction among observers of and participants in U.S. SSA strategy development. This center or hub could be a field activity, or perhaps a global Joint Interagency Task Force for DIB, and could work to better connect the efforts of U.S. institution builders with those of international partners engaged in similar and related activities.

The DIB Workforce

Adapting organizational structures, including strengthening and growing DIB providers and coordination capabilities, is only part of the answer for improving the DOD’s ability to conduct DIB. Improving DIB training and education for SCOs, made all the more urgent by Congressional direction in the FY2017 NDAA, is equally important.

There are a number of skills and abilities required to conduct DIB activities with partners. The two key requirements are broad technical expertise and the ability to employ functional knowledge in the context of the partner’s institutional development. Additionally, DIB practitioners should understand the relationship of their technical field to other institutional functions across a partner’s security sector, understand the human and organizational factors associated with implementing reforms, and be sensitive to challenges of managing change in any organization.

Training Security Cooperation Officers

To date, SCOs have been trained for security assistance tasks—the material side of security cooperation—with little attention to the non-material challenges faced by partner nations. DSCA’s schoolhouse for security cooperation has updated curricula in recent years to

reflect changes in authorities, but has received little guidance to look more broadly at non-material security cooperation, including DIB. To comply with the NDAA and to deliver high-quality security cooperation and DIB programming the DOD must improve the training provided to the security cooperation workforce. An important first step is to ensure that SCO training and education are aligned to the challenges SCOs actually face in the field rather than to the funding mechanisms the DOD executes.

While the DOD clearly has experts in institutional functions throughout the Department, they will typically lack the requisite breadth of experience for DIB unless they have served at a fairly high level *and* have experience working across interrelated functions. The additional challenge is to be able to see through to the fundamentals of their own discipline to mesh the key tenets of their field with the partner's environment and processes, all without imposing upon the partner a U.S. system or approach. It is a false premise to believe that personnel in the DOD with functional job descriptions are inherently capable of conducting DIB in developing countries. DIB requires specially educated and trained personnel.

The DOD has had the good fortune to be able to rely on the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community to fill most SCO positions globally, though there is a little understood challenge that accompanies this practice. FAOs are superbly prepared to accomplish their primary tasks, which are principally to understand a region's culture, language, economics, etc., and to support U.S politico-military planning and interactions. Their education and training prepares them well for these tasks. Fifteen years ago (and earlier) the security assistance training provided to FAOs before embarking on SCO tours was probably adequate. With the numerous changes in DOD authorities since 9/11, and the added complexity of knitting together multiple authorities to achieve objectives, including the conduct of DIB, today's SCO training is no longer adequate.

Once again, organizing for DIB and SCO training and education must be considered together. As the DOD begins to improve SCO training it must grapple with the organizational issue of whether and where to create the nerve center for DIB. Is it possible to prepare every SCO and every GCC desk officer to be able to address every possible challenge? How much advanced training on DIB is required for an in-country SCO, a GCC desk officer, or for a strategist at DSCA? Tomorrow's security cooperation workforce should have enhanced skills to engage partners on a broader range of training and equipping issues, and have significantly greater capability to diagnose institutional and other non-material gaps to support nuanced and thoughtful design of security cooperation programs. Partner requests for equipment should be met with a rigorous but delicate assessment of the requirements driving the request, analysis of alternatives, a life-cycle costing exercise, and a focus on capabilities over individual platforms. Partners may request, but more likely SCOs will have to initiate, a discussion on the partner nation's ability to afford, sustain, and employ equipment that may be desired. To that end the following recommendations could serve to improve the role of SCOs in DIB.

Broaden the SCO selection pool: Tomorrow's DIB workforce should be shaped according to the challenges actually found in the field. No doubt some of these revolve around equipment sales and scheduling of training slots in U.S. defense schoolhouses. In the future, though, more SCOs could (and should) be selected based on their qualifications in functions and capabilities the United States seeks to strengthen in a partner nation. Logisticians could be selected for nations with maintenance and sustainment challenges; strategists for nations conducting strategic defense reviews; finance and budget specialists and human resource managers could be selected for nations grappling with those issues. The DOD should also broaden the pool from which it selects SCOs to include civilians. Civilians on five-year overseas tours would significantly enhance continuity of DIB programs and could be better prepared than their military counterparts for service in countries where institutional challenges abound.

Train SCOs to identify institutional gaps: The main objectives of DIB training for SCOs are to better prepare them to identify the gaps and shortfalls in the partner's institutions, increase their awareness that the DOD can craft programs to address those gaps, and ensure that others receive their insights for possible action. Far too many significant opportunities have been missed because the SCO was not equipped to do one of these three things.

Four Tiers of Training

Improvements to education and training for DIB should be tailored to the various levels of the DOD security cooperation enterprise, with the greatest emphasis on those positions that call for the most interaction with the partner nation, and those where key U.S. planning decisions for security cooperation are made. Training should first be enhanced for those who directly interact with partner nation officials, or who plan security cooperation at GCCs, in DSCA, and in OSD Policy, and perhaps in Service headquarters. The DOD should consider tiered training to enhance competencies broadly throughout front-line positions and provide more advanced DIB preparation for positions in all relevant DOD entities.

- *“Level 1” Add a two week DIB training program to the security assistance-focused training SCOs receive now:* This introduction to DIB would expose SCOs to the fundamentals of defense and security governance and management. It would cover all of the DOD programs that conduct DIB and provide examples of successful DIB projects globally. Its principal goal would be to increase SCO awareness of institutional gaps in the defense and security establishments of the nations in which they serve to support development of stronger and more targeted DIB proposals.
- *“Level 2” Provide an additional three weeks of education and training on DIB, principally to GCC staff:* This training would provide them greater depth and breadth in DIB to allow them better to support SCOs in the GCC's area of responsibility.

This level would examine global DIB and SSR approaches and provide trainees with a more substantial knowledge base from which to craft programs. Level 2-trained staff would serve as guides and mentors to SCOs in the field and validate initial SCO proposals before submission to DSCA and OSD Policy for approval.

- “Level 3” Provide training for approvers of DIB plans from GCCs: These staff would be selected based on a superior understanding of DIB and SSR principles and practices, and their connections to DOD and international security cooperation.
- “Level 4” Provide DIB training and education to senior officers, political appointees, and OSD and Service regional and functional desk officers: General and Flag officers reporting to GCC leadership positions receive very little, if any, exposure to security cooperation and DIB. A two-day executive program would significantly enhance their ability to provide oversight of the GCC’s DIB responsibilities, and serve to ensure that DIB is integrated into GCC plans. The DOD’s “Capstone” program could be adapted to this purpose.

In Conclusion

Defense institution building is difficult and complex, and much work remains to be done to improve the process. DIB can be crippled by overambitious goals, inadequate budgets, unrealistic timeframes, lack of coordination or clear goals, the wrong workforce, or a lack of cultural appropriateness. Yet, DIB offers a strategic solution to some of the major shortcomings of one of the most important tools in the U.S. defense tool kit: security cooperation. This book is being published at a time when insecurity is widespread. The World Economic Forum Global Risk Report for 2017 ranked “failure of National Governance,” “State Collapse or Crisis,” and “interstate conflict” as leading global risks.⁴⁵ The number of refugees has not been as high since the Second World War. Geopolitical tensions are once again rearing their heads. Proxy conflict is flourishing. Democracy is threatened. While DIB is not a silver bullet for this evolving security landscape, it can help to establish partners with the capacity to maintain their own security, improve regional stability, and take on a share of the burdens of global security that the United States cannot address alone.

Notes

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Juan Carlos Pinzón presented his Letters of Credence to the President of the United States on August 3, 2015. Most recently, Pinzón served as Minister of Defense of Colombia for nearly four years. Under his leadership, the Armed Forces dealt the most severe blows to terrorist organizations—FARC and ELN—and Criminal Bands, highly degrading their capabilities, structure and leadership, which was critical to President Santos' Peace Strategy. This resulted in improved security conditions throughout the country and the lowest homicide rate in 35 years. During his tenure, the Armed Forces' equipment and training was modernized, the welfare of the men and women in uniform and their families was improved, and a transformation plan for the next 20 years was designed. Colombia also became an exporter of security expertise, aiding over 60 nations. Prior to serving as Defense Minister, Pinzón was Chief of Staff to President Juan Manuel Santos from 2010 to 2011, and Vice Minister of Defense from 2006 to 2009. In 2011 the World Economic

Forum selected him as a Young Global Leader. He has also held positions as Senior Advisor to the Executive Director of the World Bank, Vice President of the Colombian Banking Association, Assistant Vice President of Investment Banking at Citibank, Private Secretary and Chief of Staff for the Ministry of Finance, and Economist for Colombia at Citigroup. Pinzón taught economics at the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana and the Universidad de Los Andes. He earned a BS in economics and holds an MS in economics from the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá, and a master's degree in public policy from Princeton University. Pinzón also completed advanced courses in international relations and strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University, and in science and technology at Harvard University.

Thomas W. Ross, Jr. is the Senior Director for Policy at the Business Software Alliance (BSA). In his role he works with BSA members to develop and advance global policy positions on a range of issues, with a particular focus on cybersecurity and privacy. Ross was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Security Cooperation from August 2014 to January 2017. As DASD he was responsible for prioritizing U.S. Department of Defense bilateral and multilateral security cooperation activities and aligning security cooperation resources to the defense strategy, as well as managing a suite of Defense Institution Building programs designed to strengthen capacities in partner-nation military and defense institutions. Ross joined the Defense Department after 12 years as a staff member in Congress. From 2009 to 2014, he served as Senior Intelligence and Defense Advisor to Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the Senate Majority Leader. From 2005 to 2009, he served on the staff of Rep. David Price of North Carolina. He served as Legislative Assistant and, subsequently, Legislative Director, advising Rep. Price on foreign affairs, defense, intelligence, and veterans' issues, and managing the Congressman's legislative staff. He staffed Rep. Price's work as Chairman of the House Democracy Partnership, a congressional commission working to strengthen institutional capabilities of legislatures in developing democracies. Previously, he served as a policy analyst for the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, where he supported the Democratic Caucus on national security policy and communications. He began his career as a research assistant for Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle. Ross is a graduate of Davidson College in North Carolina, and holds an MA in theology and ethics from Union Theological Seminary in New York. He has completed the Air Force's Air Command and Staff College as well as a Certificate in Africa Intelligence Studies at the National Intelligence University.

Linda Thomas-Greenfield is the Resident Senior State Department Fellow at Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. Thomas-Greenfield, a member of the Career Foreign Service, served as the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs since 2013. In this capacity, she leads the bureau of State focused on the development and management of U.S. policy toward sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to this appointment, she served as Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources from 2012 to 2013. Thomas-Greenfield's 34-year Foreign Service career includes an ambassadorship to Liberia from 2008 to 2012, and foreign postings in Switzerland (at the U.S. Mission to

the United Nations), Pakistan, Kenya, The Gambia, Nigeria, and Jamaica. In addition to the Bureau of Human Resources, her Washington postings include the Bureau of African Affairs from 2006 to 2008, where she served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, and the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration from 2004 to 2006, where she served as Deputy Assistant Secretary. Thomas-Greenfield was the 2000 recipient of the Warren Christopher Award for Outstanding Achievement in Global Affairs in recognition of her work with refugees. She has received several Superior, Meritorious, and Performance awards, including the Presidential Meritorious Service Award. She was a 2010 inductee into the Louisiana State University Alumni Association Hall of Distinction. Prior to joining the Department of State, Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield taught Political Science at Bucknell University in Pennsylvania. She earned a bachelor's degree from Louisiana State University and a master's degree from the University of Wisconsin, where she also did work toward a doctorate.

George Topic is Vice Director of Joint and Strategic Logistics at Ft. Lesley J. McNair. His career as a military logistician and strategist spans almost 35 years, including service at many different levels within the U.S. Department of Defense. From 2006 to 2009, he served on the Joint Staff as the Deputy Director for Strategic Logistics where he was responsible for the strategic management of multinational, interagency, and NATO logistics, as well as information management, education and concept development programs. Topic received a commission in the Quartermaster Corps of the U.S. Army in 1976 through the ROTC program at Claremont-McKenna College in California. His assignments included tours with 3rd Armored Division and 7th and 25th Infantry Divisions. He also commanded the 194th Maintenance Battalion at Camp Humphries, Korea. Topic has also served in a variety of staff positions including the Department of the Army Inspector General, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics at the Headquarters of the Department of the Army. For his last four years on active duty, Topic served on the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces where he was director of the Strategic Logistics Program; his areas of special interest included Security Cooperation, Asian Regional Security Studies, Contractor Support to Military Operations, and Humanitarian Assistance. After retiring in 2005, he worked as a Director of Business Development for MPRI, a defense contractor. Topic earned master's degrees in logistics management from Florida Institute of Technology and national security studies from the Naval War College. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Today, the United States faces a security paradox. On the one hand, the U.S. military is unrivaled in size, strength, capacity, and budget; on the other hand, the global operating environment of the 21st century is diffuse and complex, and threats are often asymmetric and transnational. Such challenges stipulate that no single nation, regardless of its traditional military might, can completely address its security objectives alone. Developing a network of competent partners that can share the burdens and responsibilities of global security is therefore vital to U.S. interests. The challenge is how to best invest resources to help establish strong and capable defense partners. To this end, traditional security cooperation and assistance approaches have proven insufficient to instate sustained improvements to partners' defense sectors. Defense institution building (DIB) seeks to fill this gap by supporting partner stakeholders as they seek to develop the systemic capabilities and strong institutional foundations needed for legitimate, effective, professional, and sustainable defense sectors that are responsive to civilian control and contribute to the overall security and prosperity of the state—and in turn, to regional stability and U.S. national security.

Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for Defense Institution Building offers an introduction to the concept of DIB and argues that establishing effective and legitimate defense institutions to undergird a partner's defense establishment is the only way to ensure long-term security.